UK Competition Policy and Shareholder Value: The Impact of Merger Inquiries

dc.contributor.authorArnold, Malcolm F.
dc.contributor.authorParker, David
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-30T16:02:17Z
dc.date.available2009-01-30T16:02:17Z
dc.date.issued2007-03
dc.description.abstractSome previous studies have suggested that competition re´gimes can destroy shareholder value. This study examines data on 50 mergers in the UK between 1989 and 2002. The study confirms the finding from earlier studies of greater gains to shareholders in target than bidding companies, but does not find evidence supporting overall loss of shareholder value to target company shareholders when a merger is prohibited. It finds evidence that when the regulatory re´gime is stable and well understood the capital market behaves efficiently in response to new information. However, for a subgroup of the mergers involving companies with a new regulatory re´gime, where the industry and the stock market had little or no experience with respect to mergers, the capital market operated less efficiently.en_UK
dc.identifier.citationMalcolm Arnold and David Parker. UK Competition Policy and Shareholder Value: The Impact of Merger Inquiries. British Journal of Management, 2007, Vol. 18, pp. 27–43en_UK
dc.identifier.issn1045-3172
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2006.00504.x
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1826/3121
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishingen_UK
dc.rightsThe definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
dc.titleUK Competition Policy and Shareholder Value: The Impact of Merger Inquiriesen_UK
dc.typePostprinten_UK

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