Why Do Companies Use Performance-Related Pay for Their Executive Directors?
| dc.contributor.author | Bender, Ruth | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-05-17T23:14:47Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-05-17T23:14:47Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2004-10-01T00:00:00Z | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper sets out the results of interview-based research to determine why companies use performance-related pay. The findings indicate that many companies adopt this structure despite a belief that the money does not motivate executives. Reasons related in part to best practice in human resource management: pay structures were designed to attract and retain executives with the potential of large earnings; to focus their efforts in the direction agreed by the board; and to demonstrate fairness. Importantly, the variable pay was seen as a symbol of the director's success, both internally and to his or her peers in other companies. Finally, and significantly, an institutional theory explanation was given: companies used performance-related pay because their peers did, and because that legitimised them in the eyes of the establishment. | en_UK |
| dc.identifier.citation | Bender, Ruth (2004) Why Do Companies Use Performance-Related Pay for Their Executive Directors? Corporate Governance 12 (4), 521-533. | en_UK |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00391.x | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0964-8410 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00391.x | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/handle/1826/962 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_UK | en_UK |
| dc.publisher | Blackwell Publishing Ltd | en_UK |
| dc.title | Why Do Companies Use Performance-Related Pay for Their Executive Directors? | en_UK |
| dc.type | Article | en_UK |