Assessing maintenance contracts when preventive maintenance is outsourced
Date published
2012-02-01T00:00:00Z
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Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam.
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0951-8320
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Shaomin Wu, Assessing maintenance contracts when preventive maintenance is outsourced, Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Volume 98, Issue 1, February 2012, Pages 66–72.
Abstract
In some companies, corrective maintenance is conducted in-house but preventive maintenance might be outsourced. This raises a need to optimise some parameters such as the number of contracts from a perspective of the equipment owner. This paper considers a maintenance policy for such a situation, analyses the roles of the parameters in a PM model, proposes approaches to defining bonus functions, and finally discusses special cases of both the PM policy and the bonus function. Numerical examples are also given to explore the impact of parameters on the expected lifecycle cost rate.
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NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Reliability Engineering & System Safety. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Reliability Engineering & System Safety, VOL 98, ISSUE 1, (2012) DOI:10.1016/j.ress.2011.10.004