Board structure and executive pay: evidence from the UK
| dc.contributor.author | Guest, Paul M. | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-11-15T23:01:13Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2012-11-15T23:01:13Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-11-15T00:00:00Z | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We examine the impact of board structure on executive pay for 1,880 UK public firms over the period 19832002, using panel data analysis. First, the proportion of non-executive directors tends to decrease the rate of increase in executive pay whereas board size tends to increase it. Second, the proportion of non-executives strengthens the relation between the rate of increase in executive pay and changes in performance. In particular, although for firms in general the payperformance link is much weaker when performance is poor, a higher proportion of non-executives strengthens this link considerably. Finally, firms that increase the number of non-executives in order to comply with the Cadbury Code of 1992, experience both a decline in the rate of increase in executive pay and an increase in payperformance sensitivity. | en_UK |
| dc.identifier.citation | Paul Guest, Board structure and executive pay: evidence from the UK, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2010, Volume 34, Issue 6, Pages 1075-1096. | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0309-166X | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/bep031 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/handle/1826/4999 | |
| dc.publisher | Oxford University Press | en_UK |
| dc.title | Board structure and executive pay: evidence from the UK | en_UK |
| dc.type | Article | - |