Governance mechanisms, investment opportunity set and SMEs cash holdings

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dc.contributor.author Belghitar, Yacine -
dc.contributor.author Khan, James -
dc.date.accessioned 2014-05-31T04:01:11Z
dc.date.available 2014-05-31T04:01:11Z
dc.date.issued 2013-01-01T00:00:00Z -
dc.identifier.citation Yacine Belghitar, James Khan, Governance mechanisms, investment opportunity set and SMEs cash holdings, Small Business Economics, January 2013, Volume 40, Issue 1, pages 59-72
dc.identifier.issn 0921-898X -
dc.identifier.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11187-011-9366-z -
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/handle/1826/8489
dc.description.abstract This study analyses the effect of firm characteristics and governance mechanisms on cash holdings for a sample of UK SMEs. The results show that UK SMEs with greater cash flow volatility and institutional investors hold more cash; whereas levered and dividend paying SMEs with non-executive ownership hold less cash. We also find that ownership structure is significant only in explaining the cash holdings for firms with high growth investment opportunities, and leverage is only significant in explaining the cash held by firms with low growth investment opportunities. Our findings suggest that internal governance mechanisms are more effective for SMEs with high growth investment opportunities, while external governance mechanisms, such as capital market monitoring, are more effective for firms with low growth investment opportunities. en_UK
dc.language.iso en_UK -
dc.publisher Springer Science Business Media en_UK
dc.rights The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
dc.title Governance mechanisms, investment opportunity set and SMEs cash holdings en_UK
dc.type Article -


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