dc.description.abstract |
The primary goal of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is to control accident risk. ATM
safety has improved over the decades for many reasons, from better equipment to additional
safety defences. But ATM safety targets, improving on current performance, are now extremely
demanding. Safety analysts and aviation decision-makers have to make safety assessments
based on statistically incomplete evidence. If future risks cannot be estimated with precision,
then how is safety to be assured with traffic growth and operational/technical changes? What
are the design implications for the USA’s ‘Next Generation Air Transportation System’
(NextGen) and Europe’s Single European Sky ATM Research Programme (SESAR)? ATM
accident precursors arise from (eg) pilot/controller workload, miscommunication, and lack of upto-
date information. Can these accident precursors confidently be ‘designed out’ by (eg) better
system knowledge across ATM participants, automatic safety checks, and machine rather than
voice communication? Future potentially hazardous situations could be as ‘messy’ in system
terms as the Überlingen mid-air collision. Are ATM safety regulation policies fit for purpose: is it
more and more difficult to innovate, to introduce new technologies and novel operational
concepts? Must regulators be more active, eg more inspections and monitoring of real
operational and organisational practices? |
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