The consequences of financial regulation.

Abstract

Given the importance of the financial services for capital accumulation, financial stability, and global financial intermediaries, the last decade has witnessed widespread calls for vigilant regulation of the sector, especially since 2007 to 2009 financial crisis. This has reinvigorated the debates on the economic benefits and costs of regulating the financial services. In this work, I examine the impact of financial regulation on the financial sector to better understand its influence on compliance costs, quality of financial reporting, and risk-taking, as well as the wider impact on the stock market liquidity and price informativeness. I also examine the impact of the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (BREXIT) on the UK stock market and industry. In the first paper, I review the empirical evidence on the literature on financial regulation published over the past thirty-five years with the aim: (1) to extend my understanding of its impact on the financial sector, (2) evaluate whether the regulation achieves the purpose it was designed, and (3) provide insights and suggestions for future research. I find several useful insights have been generated over the past two decades. Despite this progress, I find that most empirical studies were done in the United States, research on other regulatory context is under-researched. Further, most empirical research on costs of regulation exclude the financial sector, and we know that this sector is highly regulated. There is a need for more empirical research to provide insight on the regulatory cost burden to the financial sector. In the second paper, I examine how the Statutory Audit and Corporate Reporting Directives (SACORD) affect the compliance costs, risk-taking and quality of financial reporting of the EU banks. Using a natural experiment, I find that post SACORD, compliance costs of the EU banks increase by 11 to 26 percent. Further, there is a significant increase in risk-taking and a decline in the reporting quality. I conclude that as far as the EU banks are concerned, these regulations do not appear to have the desired effects of improving the reporting quality and constraining risk-taking. In the third paper, I investigate the impact of the MiFID on stock price informativeness and liquidity in the European Union (EU). Using data from 28 EU countries and the Difference in Differences approach, I find that post-MiFID the stock prices reflect greater firm-specific information and the market becomes more liquid. Consistent with the ‘Hysteresis Hypothesis’ the evidence shows that the impact of MiFID regarding price informativeness is greater for countries that have superior quality of regulation. The results are robust with respect to the choice of price informativeness and liquidity proxies as well as the control variables. Finally, in the fourth paper, I analyse the impact of UK referendum outcome (Brexit) on stock prices, along three key arguments made by proponents. I document that restricting EU labour movement is associated with a decline in market value by 9.64% to 10.35% over a 10-day event window. Further, sectors with a majority of their business operations outside the EU fared better than sectors that requires a lot of workforce from the EU. I find evidence that highly regulated sectors benefit more from expected deregulation of EU-derived laws except for the financial institutions. Additionally, internationally focused companies’ performed better than domestically focused firms. In sum, my evidence shows that the market expectations about labour restrictions, streamlining regulation and trade policies significantly affect firm values.