CERES :: Browsing by Author "Holmes, Prof E R"

Browsing by Author "Holmes, Prof E R"

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Open Access
Arming the British Home Guard, 1940-1944
(2011-09-19) Clarke, D M; Holmes, Prof E R
The Second World War saw British society mobilised to an unprecedented extent to meet the threat of Total War. ‘Total Defence’ was manifest in organisations such as the ARP and Home Guard. What sets the Home Guard apart was its combatant role. This thesis examines the arms provided for the Home Guard, and concludes that its combat power has been seriously underestimated. It benefitted from huge quantities of high quality smallarms purchased from the United States, which were not issued to the Regular Army, because they chambered American ammunition. What is extraordinary is that these weapons are always characterised as ancient relics, yet the oldest of them was years younger, in real and design terms, than the British Army equivalent. In 1940 Britain lacked the capacity to manufacture arms in the quantities needed to repair the losses of Dunkirk and meet the needs of the expanding armed forces. The remedy was unorthodox weaponry such as the ‘Sticky Bomb’ and the ‘Blacker Bombard’. These are always associated with the Home Guard, yet saw active service against the Africa Corps. These unconventional weapons were more capable than many modern authors suggest, but they suffer from an impenetrable ‘orthodox view’ that characterises Home Guard weapons as ancient, whimsical and inefficient. This has its origins in the Local Defence Volunteers’ disappointment when the Government failed to meet its promise to arm every volunteer; their dismay at receiving foreign equipment; the way in which the media portrayed the Home Guard; and the fact that the great threats the Home Guard existed to combat – invasion and subversion – appeared to be illusory, making the Home Guard itself seem quixotic. This study strips away that conventional narrative, and exposes a Home Guard that was well equipped for its tasks – frequently better equipped than other components of Home Defence.
Open Access
Artillery and Warfare 1945-2025
(2009-11-24T18:18:23Z) Bailey, J P A; Holmes, Prof E R
For millennia battles were essentially affairs of linear encounter. From the 10th Century to the 20th Century, artillery generally fired directly in the two dimensional plane,limiting potential effects. The development of indirect fire changed this , two-dimensional model. Warfare became not so much a matter of linear encounter as one of engagement as cross and throughout an area; and artillery dominated land operations in both the First and Second World Wars as a result. Firepower was subsequently often applied in even greater weights, but its effects were frequently excessive and high-value targets proved elusive. During the Cold War in Europe,the importance of field artillery wanded relative to other arms. Artillery could only regain its utility by acquiring the highest-value targets and engaging them effectively with the appropriate degree of force in time and space true precision, as opposed to mere accuracy at a point. Improvements in target acquisition and accuracy will enable land systems once more to engage targets effectively throughout the battlespace with implications for warfare analogous to those precipitated by the introduction of indirect fire a century ago. Land operations will become increasingly three-dimensional and Joint. The effects of fire will increasingly be applied in, not merely via, the third dimensions, since targets themselves will increasingly be located, not just on the area of a battlefield, but in the volume of three-dimensional battlespace with values of indetermined by considerations of the fourth dimension, time. Fire, lethal and non-lethal, will also be targeted in other less tangible dimensions such as cyber-space and new types of 'virtual counterfire' will also emerge in the forms of legal and moral restraint. All will be viewed through the lens of perceptions. The burgeoning of firepower from all sources now becomes the spur for changes in the relationship between the land and air components, mindful of those novel factors that will increasingly inhibit the application of that firepower.
Open Access
British Cavalry on the Western Front 1916-1918
(2008-12-02T14:15:26Z) Kenyon, D; Holmes, Prof E R
This thesis examines the activities and effectiveness of the British, Indian and Canadian cavalry which formed part of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Flanders (The ‘Western Front’) during the First World War. The study concentrates on the period from January 1916 to November 1918, focusing on four major Allied offensive battles; The Somme, July-November 1916 Arras, April 1917 Cambrai, November-December 1917 Amiens and the ‘100 Days’, August-November 1918 Other episodes of cavalry fighting associated with these offensives are also considered. It is argued in this study that the contribution of cavalry to the fighting on the Western Front has been consistently underestimated by historians, a trend which began with the Official History of the conflict and continues in even the most modern scholarship. The arm has been characterised as vulnerable to modern weapons, out of date, of little use in combat, and an unnecessary burden on scarce resources. Through analysis of the performance of mounted units in these battles, using data principally obtained from the unit War Diaries, as well as other primary sources, it is argued that cavalry were both much more heavily involved in fighting on the Western Front, and more effective, than has previously been acknowledged. The problems which constrained the performance of the cavalry are also exa mined. These included the limited understanding of their potential among senior officers, as well as command and control problems at lower levels. Issues concerning tactics, equipment, and interaction with other arms, (in particular tanks) are also examined. The evolution of the cavalry arm is also considered in the context of the evolution of the B.E.F. as a whole, and its part in the changing face of the conflict is examined, both as an agent of change, and as a beneficiary of wider developments in how the war was fought.
Open Access
'BROTHERS IN ARMS'?: The American and British Coalition on the Western Front, 1918
(2009-11-17T17:26:29Z) Yockelson, M; Holmes, Prof E R
This dissertation examines in detail, the organisation, training and operations of the 27 th and 30th American Divisions during the period of Summer 1917 to the announcement of an armistice in November 1918. Particular emphasis is placed on the two divisions after they were attached to the 11 American Corps. especiallý their experience with the British Expeditionary Force in 1918, and the training received under the supervision of British officers. The 11 American Corps was unique in that it spent its entire service in France in the British sector. Originally it was composed of 10 divisions, but eight of these were removed by the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, Gen. John. J. Pershing. The divisions were transferred to the First American Army and operated entirely independent of 11 American Corps. The týýo American divisions that h, oth remained with the British, the 27t and -3 , relied heavily upon their coalition partners for advice in training, supplies, equipment, food and more importantly, tactical leadership. Although General Pershing forbade American divisions from being th -, oth amalgamated into Allied armies, in reality, the 27 and -) Divisions became part of the BEF, especially the Fourth Arrný during the final campaigns of the war. Despite its attachment to arguably the best fighting force on the Western Front in 1918, the 11 American Corps suffered heavý casualties during its limited operational experience and. in many ways. failed to take advantage of lessons learned by the British Army during its campaigns of 1916-1917. This dissertation concludes that the relationship between the two American divisions and their British ally was in the end result a success. By allowing the 27 th and 30'hDivisions to remain behind with the BEF, Pershing provided the British with more than 50,000 able American troops to use at the front. Thus the tNNo ,a llies became Brothers-in-Arms.
Open Access
The Development of British civil affairs and its employment in the British sector of allied military operations during the Battle of Normandy, June to August 1944
(2009-11-25T17:53:36Z) Flint, E R; Holmes, Prof E R
Civil Affairs and its more robust sibling, Military Government, were military organisations designed to ensure that basic civil order and welfare were maintained in those allied and enemy states encountered on operations during the Second World War. In so doing, they enabled formation commanders to focus on defeating enemy forces without being distracted by possible civilian problems. Using the battle of Normandy as a case study, this research assesses the utility of Civil Affairs in supporting military needs during operations. This contrasts with previous studies that concentrate on aspects of social and diplomatic history. If the need for Civil Affairs was generally axiomatic, there was much debate as to the extent and method of delivery required. Civil Affairs quickly recognised that in dealing with direct problems such as “disorganisation, disease and unrest” it was necessary for seemingly indirect aspects of civilian life to be maintained. Various forms of bureaucratic friction resulted and several Civil Affairs approaches were used, before the model for the North West Europe campaign was agreed. Nevertheless, the organisation employed in Normandy was arguably the most extensive and best prepared of the war. However, it also had to deal with many different civilian problems and in trying military circumstances. Consequently, the battle is fertile ground for the examination of the extent and nature of the organisation’s operational utility. Using primary and secondary sources, this paper argues that Civil Affairs was militarily both useful and necessary. Furthermore, it was able to provide wider diplomatic and political benefits as well as serving core military needs. The research concludes by acknowledging that whilst mistakes were made, the various improvements made to Civil Affairs in preparation for, together with the lessons learnt during, Normandy stood the organisation in good stead for the significantly larger problems encountered later in the war.
Open Access
The development of the British approach to improvised explosive device disposal in Northern Ireland
(2015-10-30) Cochrane, B; Holmes, Prof E R; Watters, B
When the army deployed to Northern Ireland in 1969 it was unprepared for the intensive bombing campaign that was to follow. Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) was conducted in much the same way as it had been since the 19th century – manually, with one or two men pitting themselves against the device, or its creator. The painful experience of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland - and in particular the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) bombing campaign - led to the development of the contemporary British approach to IEDD. The army dealt with over 56000 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) incidents by 2007, rendering safe over 6300 IEDs. These successes came at a heavy price. 17 Ammunition Technical Officers (ATOs) and three other EOD team members were killed in Northern Ireland. Most of these deaths occurred during the early 1970s. It must be asked why the IEDD was more dangerous then and why did it become apparently safer in later years, despite the terrorists’ growing prowess? This thesis argues that EOD changed in the 1970s as a result of the lessons learned when casualties occurred, and that the most important changes were conceptual. Safety and success for the EOD teams came not from out-braving the bombs, but from outthinking the bombers. The lessons learnt were distilled and formalised into a set of principles, philosophies and rules that guided the conduct of IEDD operations. This thesis explains how the EOD experience in Northern Ireland shaped the contemporary British approach to IEDD operations. It begins with an introduction and a historical background. The methodology used is discussed, and the available literature on the subject is reviewed. An overview of the development of IEDs and IED tactics is offered, and the state of IEDD at the start of the Northern Ireland campaign is examined. Each of the incidents resulting in an EOD fatality is discussed and analysed in a case study, and this is followed by a further selection of case studies that scrutinise non fatal incidents that had an influence on the conduct of operations. A chapter is devoted to an analysis of successful attacks on EOD teams and from this a number of theories are offered. The official responses to incidents, in the form of regulatory documents and training publications are then discussed before the roles of equipment and personnel selection are considered.
Open Access
Just War Doctrine: Relevance and Challenges in the 21st Century
(2008-11-25T14:48:54Z) Bowyer, D; Holmes, Prof E R
For nearly two millennia just war doctrine has been central to Western understanding of justified resort to armed force, and on in conduct of war. As the international system developed so the theory was first secularised and then all but rendered obsolete by a legal paradigm that sought first to establish states’ rights and, later, to eliminate armed force as an instrument of international policy all together. In the world order that has emerged after the Cold War, the legal paradigm has been found wanting yet there remains a requirement for resort to force to be justified. Such justification is required at the international level – in order for a state to retain moral standing and be able to exercise ‘soft power’ – at the national level – for the government to retain its legitimacy – and at the individual level – for the moral well-being of those who must fight. Whilst the nature of warfare remains constant – it is about using violence to impose one state’s will upon another, but is an essentially human activity – its chacarter evolves to reflect the age. Contemporary security threats and a changed value-set have made Western governments more interventionist and concern over non-state actors, massdestructive weaponry and the threats emerging from state failure have prompted some to argue a case for preventive war. Western technological dominance and the preference for a different form of asymmetry on the part of the West’s opponents challenge traditional concepts of jus in bello. This is exacerbated by the appearance on the battlefield of a range of new actors and by a tendency – on the part of the West – to attempt to distance soldiers – the ultimate moral agents in conflict – from the battlefield, creating ‘moral distance’ that may undermine our ability to apply proportionality and discrimination.
Open Access
The MARKET GARDEN Campaign: Allied operational command in Northwest Europe, 1944
(2012-10-17) Cirillo, R; Holmes, Prof E R
This dissertation examines in detail, the planning, conduct, and context of Allied Operational Command during the period from the Normandy Invasion to the end of Operation MARKET GARDEN, the airborne invasion of Holland. These campaigns were influenced by several factors: the nature of the Allied Coalition, the differing views and approach to battle of the separate services and the different nationalities within the coalition, and the actual conduct of battle within the context of a larger effort, the military campaign. The 1944c ampaignw as uniquei n that it representedth e two year evolution of a political-military coalition, whose campaign conduct in the field was overseen by a fully integratedh eadquartersa nd whose staff was composedo f memberso f both the individual services and separaten ationalities. While this headquartersp resenteda united front behind its admired commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. its competence to plan and control operations in anything but the broadest sense was challengeda t every turn by the air and ground commandersta skedt o fight the actual campaign. This dissertation concludes that the "oversight" provided by the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, SHAEF, and its Supreme Commander. was not in tune with both operational realities and practices. and was not capable of seizing opportunity and conducting a campaign of maneuver. During the actual execution of MARKET GARDEN, the Allied Command system functioned poorly causing the operation to fail by the narrowest margins. While MARKET GARDEN has often been portrayed as a failure of one man, of intelligence, or of poor planning, the coalition system and the men who ran it were not capable of fighting a complicated battle efficiently because of their inability to function as a team, rather than as a band of brothers, the creation of which was the responsibility of the Supreme Commander.
Open Access
The military effectiveness of the West Country militia at the time of the Monmouth rebellion
(2012-06-28) Scott, C L; Holmes, Prof E R
This thesis considers the military effectiveness of the late seventeenth century militia, focusing upon those county forces which took part in the Monmouth Rebellion campaign of 1685. If the militia were effective then there should be evidence of it fulfilling a set of specified criteria for effectiveness. After examining the militia's historical purpose and context, as well as its relationship with society, these criteria were defined and then used to test evidence assembled from primary sources. Documents containing information and comments upon the nature, operation and performance of the militia were consulted, including records of contemporary official and personal material held both by local and national record offices. The results showed the militia to have been militarily effective, thus lending support to the hypothesis that they were more effective than hitherto supposed. Further research was conducted using information gathered from personal accounts, private papers, letters, financial records, diaries and memoirs held in record offices, libraries and muniment rooms. These also supported the view that the militia was actually an efficient military organisation, according to the period expectations and demands made of it. The sheer number of references discovered, together with the nature and status of their authors, suggests that modern works have presented an inaccurate view of the militia and its qualities. In the light of this new evidence, it was concluded that the late seventeenth century militia were effective in contemporary terms, and recommends that current literature be revised.
Open Access
The nature of the British soldier : warrior or weapons platform a philosophical framework
(2016-11-17) McCormack, P J; Holmes, Prof E R; Jones, N
This thesis is an examination of how the nature of the British soldier is constructed/imagined in contemporary British society if a spectrum of meaning is imagined that posits a warrior existing at one extreme and a weapons platform at the other. Located within a philosophical setting and indebted to Charles Taylor’s modern social imaginaries, a number of sub-questions function as the mechanism used to explore the thesis question in the six research chapters which are: 2, Identity and Narrative; 3, Being and Doing; 4, Clausewitz, Trinitarian War and New Wars; 5, Selected Societal Factors (Death, Risk, and Post-heroicand Feminised Society); 6, The Future Nature of Conflict; and 7, Future Technology. This thesis provides a basis by which to evaluate the cultural, practical, philosophical and intellectual pressures affecting how the British soldier is envisaged in the UK social imaginary. It also offers a functional framework to understand those roles British society is prepared to tolerate and validate when deploying and utilising the generic soldier. The main conclusions of the research chapters are contained in the following six propositions: 1. The identity of the warrior requires a narrative of war(fare) validated by the society with whom he/she is in relationship. The identity of the soldier does not necessarily require a narrative of war. 2. The distinction between the warrior and the soldier is best framed in the language of ‘being’ and ‘doing’. For the warrior their ‘being’ is intuited in combat; whereas the soldier requires a narrative that validates the required/expected output. 3. New wars are non-Clausewitzian. Any Western narrative will suffer narrative deflation in the soldier’s daily experience in non-Western operational settings. 4. Post-modern, risk averse, post-heroic societies will struggle to generate a nonapocalyptic narrative capable of tolerating significant casualty numbers. 5. The question of intervention in a non-Western, non-permissive operational setting will examine the depth of liberal values in Western societies. 6. Though pragmatic, the development of robotic weapons stands in contradiction to the authenticity of the warrior and robs the West of the vitality of its liberal values.
Open Access
Operational Art and the German 1918 Offensives
(2009-10-28T17:56:58Z) Zabecki, D T; Holmes, Prof E R
At the tactical level of war the Germans are widely regarded as having had the most innovative and proficient army of World War I. Likewise, many historians would agree that the Germans suffered from serious, if not fatal, shortcomings at the strategic level of war. It is at the middle level of warfare, the operational level, that the Germans seem to be the most difficult to evaluate. Although the operational was only fully accepted in the 1980s by many Western militaries as a distinct level of warfare, German military thinking well before the start of World War I clearly recognized the Operativ, as a realm of warfighting activity between the tactical and the strategic. But the German concept of the operational art was flawed at best, and actually came closer to tactics on a grand scale. The flaws in their approach to operations cost the Germans dearly in both World Wars. Through a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, this study evaluates the German approach to the operational art by analyzing the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918. Taken as a whole, the five actually executed and two planned but never executed major attacks produced stunning tactical results, but ultimately left Germany in a far worse strategic position by August 1918. Among the most serious operational errors made by the German planners were their blindness to the power of sequential operations and cumulative effects, and their insistence in mounting force-on-force attacks. The Allies, and especially the British, were exceptionally vulnerable in certain elements of their warfighting system. By attacking those vulnerabilities the Germans might well have achieved far better results than by attacking directly into the Allied strength. Specifically, the British logistics system was extremely fragile, and their rail system had two key choke points, Amiens and Hazebrouck. During Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, the Germans came close to capturing both rail centers, but never seemed to grasp fully their operational significance. The British and French certainly did. After the Germans attacked south to the Marne during Operation BLUCHER, they fell victims themselves to an inadequate rail network behind their newly acquired lines. At the operational level, then, the respective enemy and friendly rail networks had a decisive influence on the campaign of March-August 1918.
Open Access
Russia's European agenda and the Baltic states
(2009-08-20T09:03:38Z) Šleivytė, J; Holmes, Prof E R
Russia has always been a primary factor in the development of the Baltic States. It is impossible to analyse Baltic security without looking into the processes inside Russia and the prevailing trends vis-a-vis the Baltic States. However, the changes in the Baltic security landscape in the 21st century lack a comprehensive analysis. This thesis seeks to bridge the gap. Two key aims are being pursued in this thesis. The first is to present an analysis of Russia's European agenda under President Vladimir Putin and to examine the place of the Baltic States in this agenda. The second aim is to define Russia-related threats and challengers to the Baltic States, as well as prospects in Russo-Baltic relations. To attain these aims, inter-active approach to international relations, comprising three levels of analysis - the international system, the nation state (domestic level) and the individual (personality) level - has been applied. The neo-realist paradigm of international relations theory, comparative analysis and the Knudsen model, which addresses the peculiarities of relations between great powers and small states, are the methodological framework of the thesis. When analysing the development of Russo-Baltic relations in 1990-2006, this thesis focuses on the evolution of the Baltic States from factors to actors and their chance of shaping Russo-Baltic relations from within the enlarged EU and NATO. It also examines possibilities for more active engagement of Russia in the Baltic region. The thesis concludes with an analysis of perspectives for the Baltic States in countering Russia-related threats and building cooperativer elations with Russia. The author maintains that 'high politics' in Russo-Baltic relations has ended, yet, the tensions do remain in 'low politics'. Russia seeks to retain her political and economic influence in the Baltics by exploiting various tools, primarily economic levers and Baltic dependence upon Russian energy.
Open Access
The Validity of British Army counterinsurgency doctrine after the war in Iraq 2003-2009
(2010-02-22T14:11:16Z) Alderson, A; Holmes, Prof E R
This thesis analyses whether the British Army’s doctrinal approach for countering insurgency is still valid in the light of the war in Iraq. Why is this important? Insurgency remains a prevalent form of instability. In the absence of a major conventional threat to British security, it is one which is likely to confront the Army for the foreseeable future. If British doctrine for counterinsurgency has been invalidated by the campaign in Iraq, this will have profound implications for the way the Army approaches, and is organized, equipped and trained for counterinsurgency in the future. If the doctrine is found to be valid, another explanation has to be found to account for the conduct and outcome of British operations in Southern Iraq between 2003 and 2009. Using historiographical techniques, the thesis examines the principal influences on extant British doctrine, developed in 1995. It analyzes the principal British manuals, the influence on doctrine of the campaigns in Malaya and Northern Ireland and the theories of Sir Robert Thompson and Gen. Sir Frank Kitson in order to distil a ‘British Approach,’ against which both doctrine and the campaign in Iraq are judged. It examines the course of operations in Southern Iraq to determine the validity of Counter Insurgency Operations, and uses the U.S. Army’s experience in developing and applying new doctrine in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 as a comparator. The thesis concludes that there was a dichotomy between theory and practice: British doctrine provided a valid theory for counterinsurgency, yet British commanders followed it only in part to achieve, at best, mixed results. Conversely, U.S. commanders applied their new doctrine, based on British theory, to great effect. While British doctrine may be valid, the issue was the extent to which it had been assimilated.

Browsing by Author "Holmes, Prof E R"

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