Browsing by Author "Bellamy, Prof C D"

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    The conduct of war and the notion of victory: a theory and definition of victory
    (2010-12-01) Zaidi, Mohammad I; Bellamy, Prof C D
    Clausewitz described military victory as a condition where the enemy‘s ability to enter battle, resist or resume hostilities is destroyed. The concept summarises the paradigm of success that preceded Clausewitz and survived through much of the 20th century. Despite increasingly paradoxical outcomes in the last century and the current one, military planners, strategists and statesmen sought answers for failures in different places, only a few questioned the validity of the notion of victory that Clausewitz had so veritably summarised. The fundamental question that begs an answer is ‗what is victory?‘ The rapid transformation in society and international culture has brought with it changes in geo-political and geo-economic relationships as well as warfare. While the traditional linkages between war and politics remain, the mechanisms driving these have altered. In less than absolute wars, it is the wider bargain and the stakes in that bargain that make the ‗enemy do our will‘ and not purely an inability to enter battle, resist or resume hostilities. The new complexities surrounding war and diplomacy necessitate an organising theory to make better sense of policy and action. This research provides one such theory. War is ultimately a violent clash of societies and its character a reflection of opposing cultures, history and experiences. An external dimension to strategy is thus always at work even if not fully recognised; as is often the case. Such un-factored influences create a sort of volatility in victory and defeat adding new challenges while offering opportunities at the same time. Similarly, diplomacy, which invariably precedes and succeeds coercive or compelling use of violence, too is fettered by such external influences. A bivariate approach that triangulates desired ends with the opposing notions of success and perception of defeat is argued. The theory presented encapsulates traditional precepts, adds new ones and simplifies the complexities that have come to surround victory in contemporary times. Offered here are some valuable ingredient to flavour any strategic recipe, not just war and conflict. The eternal challenge of calibrating means and ends needed more systematic awareness of functional and dominant domains of victory which is arguably possible through application of simple principles. The theory potentially allows for a more focused, proportionate, efficient and productive use of power. It is hoped that strategists and analysts alike, would find here new concepts and tools for use in praxis, perspective planning and retrospective analyses.
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    Footsteps across time : the evolution, use and relevance of battlefield visits to the British Armed Forces
    (2010-11-03) Caddick-Adams, P; Bellamy, Prof C D
    This study examines the educational use made by military forces around the world, but primarily those of the United Kingdom, of visits to past battlefields. Investigation suggests this practice commenced formally in Prussia and may be nearing its 200th anniversary; certainly the British Army’s Staff College at Camberley has been visiting battlefields for educational purposes since at least 1885. To date, no extended academic study of this practice has been undertaken, and no specific use of the Staff College Battlefield Tour Archive has been made in this context. An examination is made of educational theory, by which the effectiveness and value of battlefield visiting can be measured. This study creates a typology of battlefield visiting, and thus acknowledges a much older civilian tradition of making pilgrimages to past scenes of conflict (initially to pray for the souls of the dead), which later evolved into civilian battlefield tourism to destinations such as Waterloo and Gettysburg. The work examines the nature of British battlefield visiting, using the Staff College Battlefield Tour Archive, in four phases: before the First World War; during the inter-war period; during the post-Second World War and Cold War periods, and at the time of writing. Throughout the study, parallels are drawn with military battlefield visits undertaken by the American and German armed forces. The conclusion is made that battlefield visiting is a unique and valuable tool in military education that is not well managed, and that no recognition is given to its value in terms of classic education theory.
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    The general as statesman : exploring the professional need for commanders to support viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations as typified by the UK military approach
    (2011-09-08) Lovelock, R; Bellamy, Prof C D
    The problem of theatre level politico-military arrangements during peace and stability operations is important because the intervening actors, working in complex and often ambiguous circumstances, need to calibrate the application of military and political means as a coherent interdependent whole. This is necessary in order to build peace, secure viable political outcomes and hence strategic successes; however it is not easy in practice. This thesis examines the hypothesis that, beyond their security-related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors in order to facilitate and sustain the local political process. This requires military co-operation with other relevant actors, responsiveness to political direction and the specific shaping of military operations to impact decisively on political outcomes. This work establishes that Western and United Nations doctrinal guidance extols political primacy and civil-military cooperation but does not fully explain the central importance of the political process, nor does it capture the potential peace building role of the military component. Analysis of practice in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that military commanders retain a uniquely influential position and have generally used their military means to positively influence political progress and help coordinate multi-dimensional plans. On occasion, to secure momentum and fill a void, commanders have quietly assumed a political function. Doctrine now needs to be refreshed to reflect practice. It should explain the military role in supporting the political process, elaborate the politico-military relationship as the inner core of a comprehensive approach to peace building and provide candid guidance on the difficulties to be expected where politico-military and coordination arrangements are incoherent. Moreover further work is needed on the wider application of this doctrine by the United Nations and the preparation of civilian leaders for politico-military relationships.
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    Leadership and command on the Eastern Front (1941-1945) : the military style of Marchal Konstantin Rokossovskiy
    (2010-03-24T16:27:59Z) Walsh, S M; Bellamy, Prof C D
    Marshal Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy, Hero of the Soviet Union, Order of Victory, Knight of the Bath, OBE, victor of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, the destruction of German Army Group Centre and East Prussia, participated in some of the most significant operations in the history of war, let alone the twentieth century. Yet, in the English speaking world Rokossovskiy is unknown, a name, vaguely associated with famous events. There is no sustained historical analysis of Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership and operational command in the English language. Rokossovskiy rejected the authoritarian leadership culture of Stalin’s Soviet Union and Zhukov’s Red Army. Rokossovskiy was highly demanding and occasionally harsh but his leadership encouraged initiative, consultation, trust, delegation and tolerated mistakes in a way that made him unusual, indeed exceptional, in the Red Army. It was primarily an authoritative style of leadership but Rokossovskiy practised different forms and styles of leadership guided by his own instinctive judgement according to the demands of the situation and the nature of his subordinates. This was a considered philosophy of leadership and command that set him apart from his contemporaries. Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership was intimately connected to his conduct of operations. As one of the Red Army’s finest commanders, respected by the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, Rokossovskiy’s operational art was dominated by the idea of depth. Rokossovskiy, the Pole, was the heir to a long Russian tradition, centuries old, of deep operations, whereas Zhukov, the Russian, was committed to operational encirclement and annihilation, a Germanic concept. Marshal Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy had a distinct military style of his own: his style of leadership challenged the Red Army’s authoritarian culture whilst his style of operations endorsed the historical traditions of the Russian army. It makes him one of the most significant military commanders of the twentieth century.