

CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY

IAN WESTERMAN

Breaking the Mould of the Orthodox Approach to Security Sector Reform:
A Case Study of Israel's Civil-Military Relationship

SCHOOL OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY

PhD
Academic Year: 2021

Supervisor: Dr Bryan Watters
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ABSTRACT

Post-conflict Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a complex and difficult task which offers few historical examples of success. The challenges that SSR encounters are compounded by the western liberal democratic origins of the majority of the civil-military relations (CMR) theory from which it draws. By their nature, these theories are ill-suited to most post-conflict scenarios. This thesis offers a new perspective on the problem by suggesting that the use of elements of other less orthodox, but nonetheless still democratic, models of CMR would help SSR programmers to develop more appropriate objectives. It further argues that the Israeli system of CMR is an example of one such model.

Using a critical realist approach, the thesis presents a single case study to investigate the research question: How has Israel's CMR evolved since the state was founded in 1948? It employs thematic analysis to evaluate data obtained from a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with influential Israeli elites. From this, three 'Big Ideas' are identified. If adopted, these could help to break the mould of the previously unfruitful, orthodox approaches to post-conflict SSR. They are: first, that culture and history must impact the design of all SSR programmes from the very start; second, that more flexibility must be shown regarding military involvement in defence policy-making; third, that if the benefits of more unorthodox approaches to SSR are to be realised, clear provision must also be made for the system to adapt over time.

The lens of critical realism brings a fresh perspective to the hitherto well-documented subject of Israel's civil-military relationship, and the development of a novel analytical framework (CIPMIS) contributes to the wider body of knowledge in this field. Most significantly, analysis of this unique interview dataset enables the Israeli experience, for the first time, to directly inform understanding of post-conflict SSR.

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1 INTRODUCTION

The concept of Security Sector Reform is often used to refer to the process through which a country seeks to review and enhance the effectiveness and the accountability of its security and justice providers. (DCAF, 2012, p.5)

Guidelines for implementing Security Sector Reform (SSR) in post-conflict and conflict-affected environments have tended to draw from theoretical work in the field of civil-military relations (CMR), which in turn have resulted in western liberal democratic (WLD) models of governance in this area being projected as normative (Westerman, 2017). In his critical study of SSR in Afghanistan, Sedra (2013, p.372) identifies several flaws with what he describes as “the wider liberal peace project”, and from this two common themes emerge. The first is that programmes are frequently donor-focused, and designed to deliver western-oriented models, and the second is that there is an unwillingness to adapt such models to local situations and contexts. In her examination of modern SSR programmes in Africa, Detzner (2017, pp.116–117) found similar concerns, identifying amongst the most frequently occurring problems, “failures to correctly assess the post-conflict security environment”, and, “failures to ensure local ownership of reform efforts”.

One way to help address the issues with western-led post-conflict SSR programmes is to consider other, less orthodox, but still democratic, examples of CMR. In this way transferrable elements of other non-western focused models of CMR could be identified which would broaden the scope of the solutions available, and which might be able to assist post-conflict SSR programmers to draw up more relevant and appropriate objectives. There are many countries whose CMR models offer varying degrees of potential for such investigations, but the state of Israel ranks high amongst them.

Israel is a democracy, but one quite different from any western state. It was born out of conflict, and has for almost seventy years experienced continuing

existential threats, economic struggles, political uncertainty and demographic challenges. Throughout this time the military has openly played a significant and often pivotal role in society, and yet not once has there ever been any serious suggestion of the military seizing power, or even an attempt by the armed forces to replace one civil government with another. This makes it an excellent subject for a study into alternative CMR models. Much of the original, unconventional nature of the political and military interfaces that were established in 1948 by the first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, is still found in Israel's CMR; nevertheless, inevitably there has also been a great deal that has been transformed over the years, both by design and through circumstance.

This study examines the nature of Israel's unorthodox CMR by considering the way in which it has developed since independence in 1948 and, by scrutinising the defence reforms that it has undergone, and attempts to ascertain the key elements that have driven its transformation. The general area of inquiry is established by setting a primary research question to enable a relevant literature review to be carried out. The literature is reviewed using a bespoke conceptual framework, which highlights the most pertinent aspects of the relationship and generates detailed secondary research questions that are used to help to focus on the key issues. Then, through a series of semi-structured interviews with leading figures in Israel's security and defence environment, data is collected and thematic analysis (TA) is employed to pinpoint the significant areas of CMR development and reform. The results of this analysis are used to identify how Israel's unique CMR has come about and what the Israeli experience of defence reform has been. From this, consideration is then able to be made of how this experience might be employed to help shape and inform current post-conflict SSR practice, and which aspects of this unorthodox CMR model, if any, may be usefully replicated elsewhere.

In the concluding chapter the argument is put that Israel's defence reform process has not primarily been driven by any conscious decision-making, but more by reaction to the pressures of perceived security failures. It also shows that, despite many of the key indicators of excessive military dominance being present in the

Israeli CMR, the essential principles of overall civil authority have always been deeply embedded in the mentality of the nation, and still remain strong today. It further argues that whilst the relationship between the government and the military may not meet all of the accepted academic criteria for absolute civil supremacy, the almost symbiotic relationship between the military and the civil population that was deliberately created by Ben Gurion has served to mitigate against this. It is suggested that, although much of the way in which the system operates is unique to Israel and would be difficult to replicate elsewhere, nevertheless there are elements of the Israeli CMR model that may have relevance in other situations. In particular, the Israeli example shows that some aspects of the post-conflict SSR agenda that are often seen as sacrosanct could in fact safely be disregarded if other systemic features were present, or were to be created. Ultimately, three specific 'Big Ideas' that have the potential to break the mould of recent unsuccessful approaches to post-conflict SSR are identified. These relate to: culture; military influence on policy-making; and the need for adaptability.

At this point it is important to acknowledge that SSR can take place in wide variety of situations. These may include routine restructuring and transformation activity in established democratic states, as well as more radical reforms of states emerging from stable, but perhaps more authoritarian regimes. However, this study explicitly considers SSR which is applied to post-conflict and conflict-affected situations, and therefore it is important to understand what is meant here by those terms. Within the SSR literature there are no universally accepted definitions of what makes a situation post-conflict or conflict-affected, with most references addressing the subject by describing their characteristics rather than defining the parameters. For example, in the International Security Sector Advisory Team's own outline of SSR (DCAF, 2012, p.24) they suggest a list of features that might characterise post-conflict SSR, which includes: "continuing violence; dysfunctional security sector; Structural collapse; Institutional fluidity; Unclear mandates; weak local elites; predominant role of militaries; gender based violence; strong donor role; and external engagement fatigue". Whilst this list would undoubtedly help in considering the influences which may come to bear on

any anticipated SSR programme, it does not clearly delineate the boundaries of the situation. In considering the term post-conflict one definition which aligns well with the understanding which drives this study is that offered by Jackson (2010, p.p119) when he states that, “What post-conflict SSR implies is a context in which a serious conflict has come to an end. The state may have completely collapsed along with security and there is a desire to reconstruct it”. Slightly broader, but also helpful, is Cunningham’s view that, “A post-conflict context can be conceptualized as a transitional period bounded by past war and future peace” (Cunningham, 2017, p.1). Similarly, the definition of the term conflict-affected that is proposed by the charity Educate a Child is the closest to what is implied when it is used in this study. They suggest that, “Conflict-affected situations are characterized as situations that are in or have experienced severely disruptive conflict(s). Conflict-affected is not a distinction between war and peace. While there is no single clear definition of conflict-affected situations or states, they are situations where the existing problems are caused by an ongoing or very recent conflict, and/or there are existing problems that are associated with a previous conflict. The effects of conflicts can be the result of explosive conflicts that suddenly erupted or a protracted series of events” (Educate a Child, 2021). This is the sense in which the terms post-conflict and conflict-affected as used here.

1.1 Further Definitions and Explanation of Terms

1.1.1 English

Basic Laws – Israel has no written constitution, but at various points in the history of the state the Israeli parliament has enacted Basic Laws which could, at some point in the future, “embody the foundations of the country’s legal principles” and which might be the basis for a constitutional text (Cohen and Cohen, 2012, p.11)

Chief of the Israeli General Staff (CGS) – The only officer of Lieutenant General rank in the Israeli Defense Force, the CGS is the military head of the armed forces. The precise relationship that the holder of this position has with regards the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense is blurred and has been the subject of much debate in the past (Ben-Meir, 1995, pp.27–75)

Civil-Military Relations/Relationship (CMR) – In this study the abbreviation CMR is used interchangeably to represent both the terms ‘civil-military relations’ and ‘civil-military relationship’. The understanding of these terms is closest to that put forward by Mackubin Owens as being (2012, p.67) - “the interactions among the people of a state, the institutions of that state, and the military of the state”.

Democracy/Democratic – the meaning of the terms democracy, and democratic, when used throughout this study, align with those proposed by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) which draws on on Huntington’s definition – “Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (DCAF, 2003a, p.1).

Existential Threat – In this study this is understood as more than just a threat posed by an enemy which might result in grave national consequences, but one which threatens the very existence of the state itself.

Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) – “The Supreme Court in Jerusalem is the highest court of Israel and the final court of appeals. The Court consists of 15 Justices and two Registrars. The head of the Supreme Court and of the whole judicial system is the President of the Supreme Court ... The Supreme Court wears two hats: it is the highest Court of Appeal in the State of Israel, and also sits as a High Court of Justice, hearing Petitions against various governmental authorities at first instance as well as against rulings of Appeals Tribunals” (The State of Israel, 2017).

Jewish Diaspora – “The dispersion of Jews among the Gentiles after the Babylonian Exile or the aggregate of Jews or Jewish communities scattered ‘in exile’ outside Palestine or present-day Israel” (Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2020)

Mandatory Palestine – In 1920, at the St San Remo conference (and later confirmed by the newly created League of Nations), Great Britain was given a mandate to administer the territory of the previously Ottoman-ruled region of

Palestine. The mandate was in force until the British withdrew from the territory in May 1948, and had the objective of eventually establishing the region as an independent entity (Sluglett, 2014).

National Security Council (NSC) – In Israel this was founded as, “an authority that prepares consultations, information, and analyses, on issues relating to national security, to present to the prime minister and the government. The Council derives its power from the cabinet, acting under direct instructions from the prime minister, with the chair of the Council being directly dependent on the prime minister, acting as the prime minister’s adviser in national security affairs” (Muhareb, 2011, p.10).

Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) – “Occupied by Israel since June 1967, the West Bank - including East Jerusalem - and the Gaza Strip have come to constitute the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT). These territories, along with Israel, form the area of the former British Mandate over Palestine, intended under the terms of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 of 1947 to be partitioned into two States, one Arab and another Jewish. While the State of Israel was established on 15 May 1948 and admitted to the United Nations, a Palestinian State was not established. The remaining territories of pre-1948 Palestine, the West Bank - including East Jerusalem- and Gaza Strip, were administered from 1948 till 1967 by Jordan and Egypt, respectively” (United Nations, 2021).

Orthodox Judaism – “Orthodox Judaism views itself as the continuation of the beliefs and practices of normative Judaism, as accepted by the Jewish nation at Mt. Sinai and codified in successive generations in an ongoing process that continues to this day” (Jewish Virtual Library, 2021a).

Religious Zionism/National Religious Politics – “Based on a fusion of Jewish religion and nationhood, it aims to restore not only Jewish political freedom but also Jewish religion in the light of the Torah and its commandments. For Religious Zionism, Judaism based on the commandments is a sine qua non for Jewish national life in the homeland” (Jewish Virtual Library, 2021b).

Security Sector Reform (SSR) – there are many complex discussions about what precisely defines SSR, but USAID provides a useful general description – “Security Sector Reform is the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice” (USAID, 2009, p.3). In this study, unless stated otherwise, all references to SSR programmes are taken to signify those that are focused on post-conflict or conflict-affected states.

Zionism – “The term ‘Zionism’ was coined in 1890 by Nathan Birnbaum. Its general definition means the national movement for the return of the Jewish people to their homeland and the resumption of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel. Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Zionism has come to include the movement for the development of the State of Israel and the protection of the Jewish nation in Israel through support for the Israel Defense Forces” (Jewish Virtual Library, 2021c).

1.1.2 Hebrew

Aman – An abbreviation of *Agaf HaModi'in* in Hebrew, which roughly translates as the intelligence section, or department. It is the IDF’s military intelligence branch and it primarily comprises three units: 8200 unit (signals intelligence analysis unit); 9900 unit (visual intelligence); and 504 unit (human intelligence). It also encompasses the IDF special forces unit, the *Seyeret Matkal* and the military censor (IDF, 2020)

Haganah – Translates as ‘Defence’ and was the main Jewish underground military organisation during the Mandate period. Formed in 1920, it was disbanded at independence in 1948 on the formation of the IDF. Proscribed for most of the time by the British Mandatory authorities, it was briefly acknowledged and supported by them during WW2.

Haredi (plural Haredim) - “The ultra-Orthodox are often referred to in Hebrew as Haredim, or ‘those who tremble’ in the presence of God (because they are God-fearing). Unlike the Orthodox, the ultra-Orthodox continue to reject

Zionism—at least in principle—as blasphemous” (Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2019a).

Tzahal - An abbreviation of *Tz'va Ha-haganah Le-yisrael* (literally, the force for the defence of Israel, in Hebrew), this is the most commonly used name amongst Israelis for the IDF.

Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL) – This translates as, National Military Organization and is variously referred to as: The Irgun; by the Hebrew abbreviation Etzel; or by the anglicised abbreviation IZL. It was a, “Jewish right-wing underground movement in Palestine, founded in 1931. At first supported by many nonsocialist Zionist parties, in opposition to the Haganah, it became in 1936 an instrument of the Revisionist Party, an extreme nationalist group that had seceded from the World Zionist Organization and whose policies called for the use of force, if necessary, to establish a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan” (Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2012).

Kippah – The *kippah* is a form of skullcap, which is the traditional head covering for observant male Jews. The style of the *kippah* says something of the individual’s beliefs. Research suggests that a knitted (or crocheted) *kippah* generally indicates that the wearer is on the political right and does not support the creation of a separate Palestinian state (Pew Research Center, 2021).

Knesset – “The Knesset (Israel's unicameral parliament) is the country's legislative body. The Knesset took its name and fixed its membership at 120 from the Knesset Hagedolah (Great Assembly), the representative Jewish council convened in Jerusalem by Ezra and Nehemiah in the 5th century BCE. A new Knesset begins to function after general elections, which determine its composition” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021).

Lehi – An abbreviation of the Hebrew *Loḥamei Herut Yisra'el* (which translates as ‘Fighters for the Freedom of Israel’), and also known by the British as the ‘Stern Gang’. It was founded in 1940 by Avraham Stern after a split in the right-wing underground movement, the IZL (Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2017).

Mossad – “In full *Mossad Merkazi le-Modiin ule-Tafkidim Meyuhadim*, (Hebrew: ‘Central Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations’), one of the three major intelligence organizations of Israel, along with Aman (military intelligence) and Shin Bet (internal security). The Mossad is concerned with foreign intelligence gathering, intelligence analysis, and covert operations” (Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2019b).

Palmach – An abbreviation of the Hebrew *Plugot Mahatz*, meaning ‘strike force’. The *Palmach* was a specialist unit within the *Haganah*, created in 1941 as a reaction to the increased threat of an Axis invasion of Palestine. Although primarily a ground assault organisation, by the end of WW2 it had also established air and seaborne units, *Palavir* and *Palyam* respectively.

Shabak/Shin Bet – Officially, in English, the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), in Hebrew, *Sherut ha-Bitahon haKlali* (which translates as the General Security Service), often abbreviated to *Shin Bet*, or *Shabak*. It is responsible for, “internal security, primarily the countering of terrorism and domestic political subversion” (ISA, 2021).

1.1.3 Spellings

The decision was taken that throughout this study the British English form of spelling would be adopted. The only time when this is not adhered to is when quoting directly from a source, in which case the original spelling is used, or when referring to Israeli organisations or bodies which employ US spellings in their titles.

1.2 The Rationale for the Study

The practice of reforming and restructuring security-related organisations is not a new activity, but in the late 1990s the innovative notion began to emerge that security and development could, and indeed should, be delivered together (Westerman, 2017). This novel proposition, that existing stand-alone attempts to address security issues might be successfully combined with development programmes, found a strong champion in the, then, UK Secretary of State for

Development, Clare Short (Ball, 2010, p.29). The concept became known as SSR, and since then, despite its relatively brief history, it has now become broadly acknowledged as a key aspect of the international development agenda worldwide.

Over the last 25 years SSR programmes have become increasingly far-reaching in the scope of activities that they have sought to encompass. In attempting to bring together reforms of such diverse state structures as the military, the judiciary, the police and the intelligence services, SSR programmes have steadily become more ambitious in their aims. However, despite this (or perhaps because of it) only very mixed results have been achieved (Detzner, 2017; Mannitz, 2014; Zyck, 2011). This lack of success can of course be attributed to many complex factors, but it is not helped by the fact that neither SSR, nor even the concept of the security sector itself, has ever been fully defined. Attempts to codify SSR and to provide an internationally recognised framework have been made but it still remains a very ill-defined field (ISSAT, 2016a; OECD DAC, 2007). Given the history and variety of actors involved in its development, and its continually contested discourse, it is perhaps not surprising that there is no single theory of SSR. Indeed, when reviewing SSR through the lens of the UK's involvement in Sierra Leone, Paul Jackson (2010, pp.130–131) criticises the lack of what he describes as “the upstream view” and suggests that once the evidence is considered, “much of the contemporary orthodoxy of SSR begins to look more like a constructed mythology than a coherent theory”.

In trying to develop more academic and scholarly approaches to SSR, as well as making use of the studies carried out by the development community over the years, attention has also turned to CMR theory. Unfortunately, however, likewise there is a history of dispute and disagreement involved in this particular branch of academia. The topic straddles a wide variety of disciplines (international relations, political science, sociology, law and philosophy amongst them) and each of these views the issues from a different perspective - even the term CMR itself still has no firmly agreed meaning (Westerman, 2017). It is of no surprise therefore that, in a paper entitled ‘Understanding Security Sector Reform’, Chuter

(2006, p.3) explains that the incoherence that he finds in the study of the subject is, in his view, a result of its parentage, and he refers to SSR as, "... the bastard child of Civil-Military Relations and Development Studies".

Of all of the various descriptions of CMR that exist, that provided by Mackubin Owens is probably one of the most straightforward. He suggests that CMR can be understood as, "the interactions among the people of a state, the institutions of that state, and the military of the state" (Owens, 2012, p.67). In a democracy in which such a relationship is operating successfully, the military, despite its clear monopoly on the use of force, acts as the obedient servant of the elected civil government. However, in states where the relationship breaks down, the consequences can range from coups d'état, to civil wars and military dictatorships. Ultimately the critical issue is resolving what Feaver (1996, pp.149–178) describes as the paradox of the "civil-military problematique". This is essentially the challenge of finding a way to ensure that the military retains the power it requires to defeat the state's potential enemies, and yet conducts its own affairs such that it does not imperil the very society that it was established to protect. Therefore the study of CMR theory is, essentially, the consideration of the ways in which this dilemma can be resolved, and SSR is, thus, influenced by the way in which this is enacted.

The ultimate objective of SSR is to produce an effective and accountable security and justice system and, whilst the linkage between CMR and the achievement of this aim may not be immediately obvious, it exists, and is critical to SSR success (ISSAT, 2016b; Westerman, 2017). Each SSR programme faces a unique set of challenges and it would be naive to suggest that simply changing the CMR model employed will solve all programme issues, nevertheless, "... establishing an appropriate and effective working relationship between the legitimate state government and its military forces can be perceived as a necessary baseline from which to begin the process" (Westerman, 2017, p.11). The diagram in Figure 1-1 illustrates how the legitimisation of the military, and its reciprocal acknowledgement of the authority of the civil government, feed through each of the elements of wider SSR identified in the DCAF manual to achieve the ultimate

goal of SSR (DCAF, 2012). Unless this foundation is firmly established from the outset, then difficulties are likely to occur later on.




Figure 1-1 The baseline position of CMR with respect to SSR
(Westerman, 2017, p.12)

Modern academic thinking on the subject of CMR can be argued to have begun with Laswell (1941) and his work in the 1930s on his garrison state theory. Since then various theoretical solutions to the problem have been presented, with the subordination of the military to a legitimate, democratically elected civilian government being the critical element of any theory. In the end, however, nearly all of these ideas can be seen as simply being different variations of what Cohen (2002, pp.4–7) has described as the “normal” theory of CMR. The normal theory is based on totally removing the armed forces from the political sphere, and at the same time maximising their professionalism, leaving them a relatively free hand in the detailed aspects of military affairs. The most well-known text on this subject, and one which is still frequently quoted today, is *‘The Soldier and the State’* by Samuel Huntington (1957). Huntington was concerned about the situation in America in the 1950’s in which the Soviet Union was seen as an ever-growing threat that needed to be countered, and he sought to offer a solution that would avoid the possibility of militarising society. He saw the problem fundamentally as a balance between functional and societal imperatives, and in

his book he argued that the way to solve this is by employing what he describes as 'objective civilian control'. In this concept a system is established through which the military are isolated from government and have minimal input to any political decision-making. As a balance, for their part (reassured by the professional nature of the military officer corps) the civilians leave the military alone to conduct their business without political interference. In this way civil control is maintained, but at the same time military effectiveness is not diminished.

Arguably, since Huntington first published his book nothing else has managed to replace it as the principal text in the field. That is not to say that Huntington has remained unchallenged, but he has not been displaced, and with its notions of separation and objective control, his text still remains the primary normative theory of CMR (Burk, 2002; Feaver, 1996; Schiff, 2009). Within a short time of the publication of 'The Soldier and the State' two serious attempts were made to question Huntington's ideas - the first from Janowitz (1960) in his book 'The Professional Soldier', and then from Finer (1962) in 'The Man on Horseback'. Since then, particularly since the fall of the Soviet Union, there have been a number of further attempts by academics to try to find different approaches to the issue, including that of Peter Feaver (2003) and his game-theoretic agency theory. However, most of these later concepts have also taken a primarily US-centric, or at best a WLD-focused, view of CMR. As a consequence, they have really only tended to make minor adjustments to Huntington, especially concerning the key characteristic of a strict separation of the military and civilian elements from one another. It is this aspect of these theories that has often proved to be problematic when attempting to apply them to the reality of SSR programmes in newly emerging post-conflict states in other parts of the world where the civil and the military are often very closely entwined (Beeson, Bellamy and Hughes, 2006; Schiff, 2011). Despite this, over the years, these theories have become to be seen by many as representing the ideal example of how all civil-military relationships should be organised and they are often referred to collectively as the orthodox, or normal, model of CMR. As a result, they have

continued to have significant influence on the objectives set in defence reform programmes employed in various situations around the world.

Amongst the post-Huntington theorists there are some exceptions to this. In their book 'Governing Insecurity', Cawthra and Luckham (2003, pp.3–15) do accept that a broader, more contextually-based approach could be helpful. They highlight that the style of the political framework in any given scenario is key and suggest that in reality there are different levels or categories of governance. They acknowledge that military involvement in politics can occur in a variety of ways, depending on the circumstances, and they focus on the issue of the importance of a particular nation's "historic trajectory", concluding that one size of CMR does not fit all. Both Schiff's concordance theory and Bland's unified theory also challenge the view that attempting to implement the WLD model is the only acceptable route to restructuring the CMR in developing states (Bland, 1999; Schiff, 1995). They argue that such an approach ignores the cultural and historical conditions of the state, and that by doing so there is a risk of making the desired outcomes unachievable in the short term, and that possibly such a solution may be unsuitable even in the long term. However, in the end, none of these alternative theories has proved able to breakthrough into the mainstream thinking on CMR theory, and Huntington's ideas still prevail.

As a result, in SSR it is the orthodox CMR model that predominates. It is seen as a necessary part of a wider liberal governance approach that is also based on traditional western values and practices (Jarstad and Belloni, 2012). An example of this can be found in the series of background documents on SSR produced by the Geneva-based Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), one of which refers to the military being distinguished from civilians by their, "relative social isolation from civilian culture and community", and suggests that there are typical features of democratic civilian control of the armed forces which include, "institutional separation between the head of state and the operational head of the armed forces through layers of public sector management and administration" (DCAF, 2015, p.6). This archetypical CMR model is one which has taken a long time to evolve, emerging out of a particular set of geopolitical,

historical and cultural contexts. In general it is seen as working well for those states where this gradual evolution has allowed the necessary systems and practices to fully develop - hence Cohen's view that it is now accepted as normative. But it is acknowledged that this idea that such a democratic or liberal peace model is automatically beneficial elsewhere is problematic (Newman, Edward; Paris, 2009). Often it is those two factors, the length of time taken for its evolution, and the specific cultural background from which it is derived, that can prove to be the very issues which make it unworkable in many post-conflict SSR programmes. This potentially presents a difficulty for those who are tasked with drawing up SSR aims and objectives for reform programmes aimed at non-western, post-conflict and conflict-affected states. If the CMR theory from which they are expected to derive elements of the SSR programme is unsuitable for use in those scenarios, then where else are they to look for their inspiration and direction? Often hybrid-solutions are employed whereby elements are borrowed "selectively from external models of security governance, instead of adopting them wholesale" (Schroeder, Chappuis and Kocak, 2014, p.216). However, the problem with hybrid peace governance solutions is that they often draw upon inappropriate or illiberal elements and can result in making poor situations worse (Jarstad and Belloni, 2012). Ideally, rather than reaching out to illiberal models for alternatives, hybrid solutions would draw on elements from various non-orthodox, yet liberal democratic, examples of CMR.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

When seeking to find alternative models the first requirement is to identify states whose CMR is both suitable – that is to say, acceptable to western donors – and at the same time relevant to the post-conflict and conflict-affected situations in which the SSR programmes they might support could be applied. For both these conditions to be fulfilled, it is suggested that a candidate state would need to meet three basic criteria:

- a) for donor acceptability it would need to be a state whose political nature is not entirely dissimilar to the WLD ideal, but which still offers a different, less orthodox perspective;

- b) to be relevant in post-conflict or conflict-affected situations, the armed forces of the state would need to be significant enough to be considered in the social and political life of the state (without presenting themselves as a military government per se);
- c) additionally, to further ensure relevance, some form of conflict should be present, either external or internal, which is perceived by both the government, and by society in general, as being fundamental to the very existence of the state, but not so overwhelming that it obscures all other issues.

Taking the three proposed criteria for a candidate state one by one, it is argued that Israel is in fact an ideal contender to offer a potentially suitable and relevant alternative CMR model. By most metrics Israel is a democracy. It is true that like many democracies it has its faults, and it is a state which generates much discussion as to where precisely it fits on the democratic scale, but it is a democracy nonetheless (Mchenry and Mady, 2006, p.258).¹ Additionally, and of particular interest when considering post-conflict situations, it is a society in which the military plays a central role, and yet the leadership of the government has always remained in the hands of civilian politicians. Finally, the population has perceived there to be a continual threat of existential conflict, in various forms and degrees, from the moment that the state first came into being, right up to the present day. This scenario has been well-described by Kobi Michael of the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS):

Among democratic nations, the State of Israel provides a unique example of the centrality of the military. Throughout Israel's history - in its experience of statehood and in its very ethos as a nation - the security establishment and particularly the military have wielded extensive influence over civil society and politics. This exceptional situation is the result of the persistent threats that Israel has faced,

¹ In the 2020 Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index Israel rates as a 'flawed democracy', below the USA and France, but above Italy and Belgium.

the numerous wars and violent conflicts it has fought, and the deep sense of existential anxiety that dwells in the consciousness of the Jewish people, both in the Diaspora and especially in the homeland. (Michael, 2014, p.140).

For these reasons Israel can be seen to be a particularly valuable candidate for a case study which is looking at alternative, less orthodox, approaches to CMR; it has the potential to offer innovative ways in which to support the design of new frameworks for SSR in conflict-affected or post-conflict states. In comparison with most WLD states Israel has a relatively brief history and, hence, has had only a comparatively short timeframe in which to develop its particular model of CMR. Nevertheless, 70 years is not an insignificant period of time in terms of political and social development, and the Israeli example offers a manageable and clearly defined set of events to consider. It presents an opportunity to examine how a nascent democracy, which was born out of a violent struggle within a region that already had a long history of conflict, has established itself as a viable state, whilst at the same time managing to avoid the pitfalls of military government.

The nature of politics and political relationships in any state is extremely bureaucratic, and as a consequence there is much that is obscured beneath the surface concerning the way in which the Israeli government conducts its day to business with its military forces. It requires a robust and methodical study, drawing on reliable and well-informed sources of information, to disclose this. A critical aspect of this is to identify what is conventional in the way in which the state organises its security sector, and then to highlight what is exceptional. Additionally, it is also important for such a study to ultimately be able isolate those elements of the Israeli CMR model which are uniquely and exclusively applicable to the particular circumstances in which they are found. In this way, those which remain can be assessed for the potential to help to develop alternative, more adaptable models for use by the designers of SSR objectives for post-conflict scenarios. This is the problem that the study seeks to address.

1.4 The Study Aim

The aim of the research is to conduct a single case study to identify and analyse the key elements driving the evolution of Israel's civil-military relationship (CMR) from the founding of the state to the present day.

The study's enabling objectives are given below:

- Identification of a suitable conceptual model for an evaluation of the literature, and to then highlight the aspects of Israel's CMR that are most relevant to the study.
- Development of a suitable network of knowledgeable and experienced elites from within the Israeli CMR community who are qualified in the relevant fields.
- Arrangement and conduct of interviews with members of the network, to draw out informed views on the aspects of the case addressed by the primary and secondary research questions.
- Assessment and analysis of the results of the interviews, using appropriate tools and methods, leading to recommendations and conclusions.

1.5 The Research Questions and The Main Implications of the Findings

The study seeks to answer one primary research question:

How has Israel's civil-military relationship evolved
from the founding of the state until the present day?

To answer this question the study examines the nature of the current relationship between the military, the civil government and wider society in Israel, and the way in which it has altered since the formation of the state in 1948. It further seeks to explore Israel's experience of defence reform during this period. In order to achieve this, the primary research question is further refined and additional secondary and more specific research questions are identified.

In answering these questions the study finds that, whilst the basic approach to CMR taken by Israel does superficially appear to replicate that of many WLD states, there is in fact much about it which differs. A series of findings are presented, and from these specific implications for SSR are proposed. Three 'Big Ideas' are put forward that have the potential to help to break the mould of the previously unsuccessful, orthodox approach to post-conflict SSR. The first is that the cultural and historical background of the situation is so critical that it must be the starting point for all reform programmes, and not simply used to amend existing orthodox solutions. The second articulates the view that in situations of high threat, if the military are permitted to have greater influence than is usual, rather than threatening democratic government this can actually result in it being strengthened, and national security being enhanced. Finally, it is suggested that for an unorthodox CMR solution to succeed it must be able to adapt to circumstances, and for this to happen a mechanism must be put in place that facilitates change.

1.6 The Approach To the Literature

Whilst the main focus of the study is on the development of Israeli CMR since 1948, there is nevertheless a need to reach back and to take an historical view by considering the pre-state period too. In his doctoral thesis one of the foremost academic scholars on the subject, Professor Yoram Peri, examined Israel's CMR during the first thirty years of the state's existence, stating clearly that to see the full picture it was important to look at the period before the formation of the state in 1948, saying, "Although the establishment of the sovereign national state of Israel transformed Israeli society, the contemporary political system cannot be comprehended without an analysis of the patterns which emerged in its formative period" (Peri, 1980, p.113). The pertinent literature that examines this period falls mainly into one of two categories: recollections or histories of the pre-state paramilitary forces; or analyses of local and diaspora politics. Very few texts specifically focus on the relationship between the two. However, by examining the aspects of these two groups of texts which do consider the overlap it is possible to get a reasonable appreciation of the roots of the early development

of Israel's CMR. This function is achieved through the medium of a summary of the pre-1948 period, based on the relevant literature, and which has been placed in a separate annex for clarity - Annex A. The study of this literature confirms that, despite the 1948/49 War of Independence being the culmination of the Zionist project, all that took place in the decades leading up to it had a significant and long-lasting effect on what was to come afterwards. The development during that time of the three-way relationship between the military, the government and the civil population led to a situation in which, from the very beginning of its existence, the IDF was seen as an embedded part of society, and not a separate organisation set apart from the people (Schiff, 1987, p. 70).

The situation regarding the literature that looks at post-1948 Israeli CMR is dealt with differently. Whilst much has been written in the last 70 years about Israeli politics and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in general, authors who have addressed the specific issues of Israeli CMR are much fewer in number. Additionally, of those that do, many only consider certain specific areas of the wider picture of the relationship. In 1983 Yoram Peri published a book based on his PhD thesis entitled, 'Between Battles and Ballots' and in it he stated that, "academic research on civil-military relations in Israel has a surprisingly short history and is remarkably limited in scope" (Peri, 1983, p.1). In the decade that followed there was a gradual increase in contributors to the field, including Horowitz, Lissak, and Perlmutter, all of whom published works that addressed various aspects of the relationship (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Lissak, 1983; Perlmutter, 1969, 1978). But it was only really from the early 1990's, as public scrutiny of the IDF became more acceptable in Israel, that there was a significant increase in scholars writing on the subject (Rosenhek, Maman and Ben-Ari, 2003). With the publication of Ben Meir's book 'Civil-Military Relations in Israel', the topic began to become more of a mainstream issue for academic discourse (Ben-Meir, 1995). Since then, and particularly from the turn of the millennium, there has been a slow but steady stream of books and articles that have attempted to analyse the unorthodox case of Israeli CMR. All of this literature is reviewed in some detail in the main literature review in Chapter 2. The review uses a thematic approach, and the exact nature and derivation of the conceptual

framework which led to the themes that are employed is discussed later in Section 1.7.

However, in addition to, but separate from, the thematic review of the post-1948 literature, it was considered helpful to briefly consider just those texts produced by the principal scholars on the subject, focusing on their positions on such key issues as civil supremacy and civil control of the military. This analysis can be found at Annex B. It places each of the scholars into one of four categories - Reverentialists, Detractors, Revisionists or Conspirators. These categories, whilst overlapping each other in many respects, can be perceived to have come in a series of waves, each reflecting an increasingly greater willingness to engage in criticism of the Israeli system. Although very different in approach and character, when considered as a whole they appear to have more in common than might at first be supposed. These similarities can be understood as the basic building blocks of studies into Israeli CMR, and they are the foundation upon which their otherwise differing opinions all rest. They are listed in the introduction to Chapter 2.

1.7 The Need for a Bespoke Conceptual Framework (CIPMIS)

As previously mentioned, it was considered important to subject the post-1948 literature to a detailed, thematic review, however, it was not clear which conceptual framework² to employ for this task. The relationships that exist between military agencies of the state and the political organisations that are tasked with governing that state are, by nature, complex and multifaceted. To study such a relationship use must be made of a mechanism through which the manifold strands of it can at least be codified; only then can investigation and analysis and take place. This mechanism is essentially the conceptual framework which is used to focus the study into the relevant areas of interest. In selecting such a framework consideration must be made of the degree to which it is

² A conceptual framework is understood here in the sense described by Maxwell (2013), as a 'conception or model of what is out there that you plan to study, and of what is going on with these things and why – a tentative theory of the phenomena that you are investigating.'

possible, or indeed desirable, to constrain the research. Rietjens (2016, pp.133–135) refers to this aspect of research design as “anticipatory data reduction”, describing it as a way to cut down what might otherwise be an impossibly complicated investigation into something that is more manageable in a single study. They point out that in the process there will inevitably be an element of simplification which is likely to have an impact on the study. For this reason, the assumptions behind the simplification need to be laid out clearly as they could affect the way in which the results are interpreted and may impose restrictions that must be placed on their validity. This aspect of the process is described in more detail below.

Studies into civil-military relationships are undertaken by researchers from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds. This can be a major factor that influences the decision of whether to conduct a “more loosely designed” study, or to make use of a tighter and more structured approach (Soeters, J., P. M. Sheilds, and S. Rietjens, 2014, pp.131–132). The former is that which is most often used by more long-term, anthropologically-based studies, in which it is preferred to allow structures to emerge themselves, perhaps using a grounded theory approach. That is not the case with this study, which is relatively tightly bound by both time and scope. Here, a degree of pre-determination of the focus of the study was essential to avoid asking either unanswerable or irrelevant questions, and potentially missing the key issues. To do this it was necessary to operationalize the study, or to, as Petre and Rugg (2010, pp.110–123) describe it, “map from the question to the evidence needed to answer it”.

Originally it was anticipated that an existing framework produced by one of the leading SSR proponent organisations might be able to be employed in some form. Alternatively, if this was not possible, it was hoped that use could be made of work that a previous researcher may have already undertaken involving a similar process. However, although an extensive examination of the literature on SSR and CMR revealed several frameworks that dealt with different aspects of CMR, none was found that was considered to be workable for this study. For this reason, it was decided to develop a new and innovative conceptual framework

designed specifically for this purpose. Returning to the texts that had offered the most relevant considerations of the issue of frameworks or analytical schemes, an evaluation was made which attempted to draw out the best of each of them, and then to construct a bespoke, hybrid model. From this process six high-level factors were identified as being the critical areas for study. These factors were labelled Cultural, Individual, Political, Military, Institutional, and Situational – hence the framework was referred to by the acronym CIPMIS, as shown in Figure 1-1. Beneath each of the six high-level factors sit a series of sub-categories, each of which is able to provide an increasing level of detail. A full and detailed explanation of the process by which CIPMIS was derived, and which resulted in it being a robust and distinctive conceptual framework, is provided in Annex C.




Figure 1-2 CIPMIS Analytical Framework

1.8 The Value of the Research

The need to find alternatives to the traditional liberal peace governance models for use in SSR programmes is well understood, and much has been written about it by scholars already (Andersen, 2012; Newman, 2009; Paris, 2003; Richmond,

2009, 2013, 2014; Selby, 2013). However, as has been discussed, the majority of the work in this area, both in the field and in academia, has involved the use of hybrid governance models which blend conventional liberal values with elements of more radical, illiberal, non-democratic principles. By considering the possibility of employing elements of the unorthodox, yet still democratic, model of CMR found in Israel to other reform situations found elsewhere, the study not only opens up new areas of interest to scholars of SSR, but to also those interested in Israeli CMR, and CMR more widely.

Unlike previous research conducted in this area, the study looks at the phenomenon under scrutiny from a critical realist (CR) position. Employing the CR concept of a layered ontology comprising the empirical, the actual and the real, the analysis of the data allows the identification of the key themes that have driven reform of Israel's CMR since the creation of the state in 1948. By then considering the causal mechanisms that have brought these reforms about, a totally fresh view of the subject is provided.

Finally, the construction of an original and comprehensive conceptual model with which to analyse CMR not only provides a distinctive viewpoint for this particular study of Israel's situation, but it also introduces a framework which may prove valuable in other similar studies in the future. The development of the framework is complimentary to other work that is ongoing in the field of CMR, and it opens up new and previously underexplored avenues for consideration in the analysis of these complex relationships.

1.9 Structure of the Thesis

Chapter 1 – Introduction. The opening chapter has provided the rationale for the research. It considered the reasons for undertaking the study – the belief that there is a requirement to find an alternative to traditional, orthodox, WLD approaches to post-conflict SSR. It justified the decision to choose Israel as possible source of such an alternative, outlined the approach to be taken to the literature, stated the primary research question – *How has Israel's civil-military relationship evolved from the founding of the state until the present day?* - and laid out the main implications for SSR of the study findings. Finally, after

introducing CIPMIS as the conceptual framework to be employed, it highlighted the value of the research to scholarly studies in this field.

Chapter 2 – A Thematic Literature Review of the Post-1948 Literature. This chapter takes a thematic approach to reviewing previous studies of Israeli CMR subsequent to the creation of the state in 1948. It highlights the fact that few studies involving the such a broad range of contemporary Israeli practitioners, experienced in the relevant fields, have previously been undertaken. The chapter also shows how there has not been a previous study into aspects of Israeli CMR that has considered its strengths and weakness in the context of the possible applicability outside of the state. It concludes by further refining the principle research question through the addition of three secondary research questions.

Chapter 3 – Research Philosophy, Methodology and Methods. The third chapter gives a detailed justification of the selection of critical realism as the research philosophy employed, and provides an explanation of the theory behind the choices made with regards case selection, the nature of the data employed, and the techniques of data collection and data analysis. In the course of this Braun and Clarke's 5 Phase Thematic Analysis (TA) framework is introduced (Braun and Clarke, 2013).

Chapter 4 – Results of the Data Acquisition and the Subsequent Analysis. This chapter considers the way in which the initial conceptual coding of the data was conceived and implemented, and uses the code 'The Nation as an Army' to provide a comprehensive textual example of the process. Further information on the other codes is provided in tabular form in an annex. The chapter then looks at how the later steps of the 5 Phase TA framework was used to derive the final thematic map, resulting in three overarching themes and a number of main themes.

Chapter 5 – Discussion. The penultimate chapter provides a critical examination of the findings, with reference to the theoretical concepts presented in the previous chapters of the thesis. It highlights a number of specific discussion points which consider experiences and revealed manifestations that were identified in the analysis of the data. Consideration is made of the causal

mechanisms that brought them about, and any positive and negative impacts that replicating these elements elsewhere might produce are reflected upon. It concludes by summarising the points in a table, and highlighting their potential relevance to Post-Conflict SSR.

Chapter 6 – Conclusions and Recommendations. The final chapter begins with a re-stating of the problem and a summary of the analysis, presenting the findings of the study and considering how they address the primary research question. It then relates the findings to the existing literature, and underlines the unique and original contribution made by the study, whilst also pointing out its limitations. Looking forward, recommendations are made for further research. Finally three ‘Big Ideas’ are presented which it is considered can help to break the mould of the previous, unsuccessful, orthodox approaches to post-conflict SSR.

2 A THEMATIC REVIEW OF THE POST-1948 LITERATURE

2.1 Introduction

The brief literature review that is found in Annex B examines the most significant texts produced by the principal scholars on the topic of post-1948 Israeli CMR, placing each of authors into one of four categories to represent their general approach to the subject. These categories are: Reverentialists; Detractors; Revisionists; and Conspirators. The conclusion of this review is that, despite taking quite differing, and at times conflicting opinions, nevertheless they did all share a number of common views. Referred to as the basic building blocks of studies into Israeli CMR, these were that:

- a) Israel is 'different' – it has so many historically, culturally, politically, and geographically unique elements to it that it cannot be templated;
- b) security is, and always has been, the critical factor in determining policy in all areas of Israeli life;
- c) one consequence of the primacy of security is that the relationship that has developed between the military, the political hierarchy and civil society is powerful and effective, but it does not conform to the conventional measures of civil supremacy or civilian control;
- d) notwithstanding all of the above, there has never been a military coup in Israel, nor is such an event likely in the foreseeable future.

The identification of these building blocks is particularly useful as it indicates that, notwithstanding some major debates and discussions on the subject in the past, there are nevertheless a number of persistent aspects to the literature referring to Israel's CMR that merit further, more detailed study. In this chapter an in-depth thematic review of the post-1948 material is conducted, employing the CIPMIS framework as its basis (this framework was introduced in Chapter 1, and its origins are detailed in Annex C). As well as considering the work of the major scholars, this thematic literature review also examines lesser known, but equally valuable, texts that specifically focus on material relevant to each of the CIPMIS

headings. In this way it seeks to identify all of the core concepts and ideas that have already been explored by past scholars of the subject. From this the chapter then further refines and pares down the primary research question to concentrate on the gaps that exist in the literature, hence focusing on the specific areas in which this study can add value and increase knowledge.

2.1.1 Language Limitations

Whilst the researcher's level of Hebrew did allow for very basic conversations to take place, it was not sufficiently strong to enable reading and analysis of written work. For this reason, with the exception of a very small amount of material which was professionally translated, only texts published in the English language were reviewed. This exclusion of non-English language material, a direct limitation imposed by the difficulties of funding translation services, means that the review excludes any literature that has only been published in the Hebrew language. However, as most of the significant literature on Israeli CMR was either written in English in the original, or was subsequently translated into English and then re-published, this did not prove to be a significant limitation (Rosenhek, Maman and Ben-Ari, 2003, p.470). However, there are a small number of texts - journal articles in the main - that have only been published in Hebrew, and these have had to be assessed through secondary allusions to them in other English language texts.

2.2 Cultural

The 'Cultural' factor in CIPMIS has seven first level sub-headings beneath it, each of which are addressed, to a greater or lesser extent, in the literature on Israeli CMR that has been produced during the last seventy years. The one exception to this has been the society's views of the legitimacy of the government. There has been extensive international debate on Israel's legitimacy, but this is separate issue from a challenge arising from within Israeli society itself. The absence of any significant discussion of this particular aspect of the 'Cultural' factor is understandable given that, once the brief period of the possible IZL challenge to Ben-Gurion's leadership was resolved in 1948, the legal status of the government in Israel has never been challenged internally in any meaningful way.

Each of the remaining six sub-headings of history, society's values, society's view of the IDF, society's oversight of the IDF, and the position of the media are all addressed below.

2.2.1 History

An examination of the major accounts of pre-state CMR were covered in some depth in Annex A but, in addition, a few scholars have made a point of drawing directly on the historical narrative to justify, or to provide evidence for, their contemporary arguments and it is worth just highlighting the most notable of these. As each wave of immigrants came of age and entered the IDF they were seen as having brought their own particular traditions and experiences with them (Eisenstadt, 1967; Naor, 2002). Nevertheless, it is significant that, despite their differences, the one common experience they all shared was that of persecution, and consequently they could all agree on the overriding importance of security in the new state (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Schiff, 1987).

Perlmutter (1969), writing only twenty years after independence, was keen to reference the efforts that Ben-Gurion exerted in ensuring that no pre-state paramilitary force was carried forward as the basis of the official state armed forces, with all them being disbanded on the creation of the new IDF. However, he does accept that it was not possible to leave every characteristic of these organisations behind. In particular he refers to Ben-Gurion's use of the traditions of the *Haganah* and the *Palmach* as a vehicle for national integration and modernisation. However, he also makes the point that there was much that needed to be purged from their conceptual models, in particular the view that the various military bodies were instruments of specific political or ideological groups (Perlmutter, 1969, p.133).

2.2.2 Society's Values and Standards

One of the biggest cultural aspects of CMR that has been addressed by scholars (and perhaps the most fundamental one) concerns the extent and nature of the boundaries between the civil and military sectors. In one of the earliest discussions Perlmutter (1969) argued that whilst he did recognise the existence

of two distinct spheres, in fact he saw a closely reciprocal relationship between them, and suggested that, in reality, they blended into one.

Horowitz and Lissak - both collectively and individually – later came to similar conclusions, talking about the boundaries between civil and military being permeable, and having multiple points of contact, both at individual and institutional levels (Horowitz, 1976, 1982; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Lissak, 1983). They also saw the co-joined systems of conscription and the reserves acting as channels through which civilian attitudes penetrated into the military environment (Horowitz, 1976; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989). Their book 'Trouble in Utopia' concluded, in much the same way as Perlmutter had twenty years earlier, that there was a partial insinuation from one sphere into another, and that the common understanding of the need for security was the glue that bound the two together (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989, pp.195–230).

The conversation around permeable and integral boundaries was also picked up quite early on by Peri, and he continued to address it throughout his many discourses on Israeli CMR, in particular, pursuing the idea of the penetration of the boundaries being reciprocal (Peri, 1983, 2001, 2005, 2006). His interest has always lain primarily in the innately political nature of the IDF, and it was this that led to his widely espoused belief that Israeli CMR is a, “partnership between generals and politicians” (Peri, 1983, p.281). He has acknowledged that it is not an equal partnership and that the military strongly dominate, but nonetheless he believes that the two coexist without a struggle. This concept of a partnership was supported by Rebecca Schiff's concordance theory, in which she too identified the military partner in Israel as the dominant one. In fact she was sceptical of even acknowledging that the other side of the association could be described as civil at all, and has notably referred to Israel as an “uncivil state” (Schiff, 1992, p.636, 1995, p.17).

Others have also picked up on this theme of indistinct boundaries and there being some form of partnership or alliance between the civil and military elites. Owen (2004, p.197) challenged Horowitz's earlier characterisation of the IDF as, “a civilianized military in a partially militarized society” (Horowitz, 1982, pp.77–106).

He argued that it was better viewed as being a nation-in-arms and that, not only the army but the whole of society, was continually involved in preparing for the next conflict – a scenario in which Israeli security could be described as being a “national project”. Sela (2007, p.55) agreed, but took a darker, more ominous perspective, referencing Kimmerling (2001, p.209) and his “cultural code of civilian militarism”, in which a collective belief in institutional violence is seen as being the primary motivation of the society. For others, however, within the reserves the close linkages between the two spheres are socially oriented and derive less from any tendency to militarism, but are, “based more on voluntarism, trust, and influence than on coercion and authority” (Lomsky-Feder, Gazit and Ben-Ari, 2008, p.606).

Indeed, of all of the major contributors on this aspect of Israeli CMR there are none who take a particularly contradictory stance. Even the Revisionist scholars who primarily focus on their particular derivative of militarism, still all refer to blurred or permeable boundaries. In one text Kimmerling expressed the view that the “socio-political boundaries were determined and maintained by a single-minded focus on national security”, although later he also concluded that the military and civilian cultures were so intermingled that it was almost impossible to recognise them as separate entities (Kimmerling, 1993, p.207, 2000, pp.215–253). In a similar way to Schiff ten years earlier, Ben-Eliezer (2001, pp.137–172) has queried whether or not there is even a such a thing as “civility” in Israel. Critiquing what others had said on the matter, and using a similar phrase to Owen, he considered the idea that the army’s principle role of preparing for war might have become, “a more extensive social project” (Ben-Eliezer, 2001, p.140). Despite this, having identified a pattern of militarisation, demilitarisation and finally a further remilitarisation of Israeli society over the years, he was still able to conclude that, after Rabin’s assassination in 1995, additional institutional arrangements were put in place, “that, blurred a possible distinction between the civil and the military” (Ben-Eliezer, 2001, p.160).

Running throughout all of the consideration of Israeli society’s values is the recurring theme of the central position that security occupies. Michael (2009,

p.700) has spoken of national security in any given culture as being a social problem which reflects, “the hegemonic set of beliefs and ideologies in the society”. In Israel, as a consequence of the high threat levels and the elevated status of the military, he concluded that the societal viewpoint had been directly shaped by the IDF. Hermann (2019, p.57) too felt that security was the primary focus of civil society in Israel, and suggested that, to most Israelis, it was of even greater importance than the image the state projected internationally. Kimmerling was prepared to go further still, and described the presence of an existential threat as being, “a routine, immutable, uncontrollable given” and, in a separate text, referred to Israel’s, “civil religion of security” (Kimmerling, 1993, p.208, 2001, p.212).

Almost all writers have clearly identified the salience of security as the primary characteristic of the nature of Israeli society (Horowitz, 1976, 1982; Peri, 1983). However, one consequence of the long drawn-out involvement of the IDF in Lebanon in the 1980s and 1990s, was that a few voices did start to question the continuing validity of the assumption that there was a unanimity within society on the critical significance of security. Surprisingly, as early as 1987, whilst still noting Israel's obsession for security and describing it as being sacred to the Jewish people, the otherwise reverential Ze'ev Schiff was drawn to go on to reflect on the possibility that the conflict in Lebanon might lead to, “the shattering of a long standing consensus on security” (Schiff, 1987, p.261). However, from Kimmerling’s perspective at least, such an outcome did not materialise and writing several years later he observed that even after the debacles of 1973 and 1982, “the institutional and cultural centrality of the security regime, still remained as strong as ever” (Kimmerling, 1993, p.205).

2.2.3 Society’s View of the IDF

Sheffer and Barak (2013, p.49) have pointed out that prior to the 1967 Six Day War it was uncommon for retired members of any of the security services to make the move into government; even in 1969 it was noted that, whilst they often sought positions in management elsewhere, on retirement officers showed little interest in politics (Perlmutter, 1969, p.125). However, not long after the 1967

war this began to change, and a decade later Perlmutter (1978, p.1) referred to ex-officers becoming influential in politics, and reported that they were now occupying some of the highest positions in the government. Over the next few years both Peri and Sela noted this trend continuing, and identified that, what had begun as a trickle, soon became a flood (Peri, 1983, 2006; Sela, 2007). They considered that reasons for this were less to do with individual political ambitions than with the public's desire to see their military heroes in the legislature; additionally the political parties recognised this and attempted to capitalise on the popularity of retired generals in the polls (Peri, 1983, p.119; Sela, 2007, p.57).

Yaakov Amidror (2019) has linked the high level of public regard for the military as a group to the collective success on the battlefield that the IDF has historically achieved in the times of the country's greatest crises. However, others have also focused on the personal level, remarking how, in addition, there is a perception amongst the public that the senior leadership in the IDF are possessed of greater integrity than the political leaders, and are, "more interested in promoting the national interest and not their own personal goals" (Sheffer and Barak, 2013, p.31). One consequence of this is that the IDF have invariably appeared at the top of the opinion polls with regards public confidence (Ben-Meir, 1995; Eran-Jona, 2015a). In general, most scholars have acknowledged this as a positive factor, even if some have considered it to be based more on perception than fact - what Sheffer and Barak (2013, p.34) refer to as, "the myth of the IDF infallibility". However, not all have been entirely convinced that, what has at times almost amounted to hero worship, is the sign of a healthy relationship. Kobi Michael has put forward an idea that this unparalleled status of the IDF in society, coupled with the pre-eminence of the CGS in government circles, and the weakness of the civil government in terms of strategic capability, has led to the IDF being seen as, "an epistemic authority" in the area of security (Michael, 2007a, pp.421-446, 2009, p.690). It is noteworthy that, despite all of the discussion on military mismanagement that had taken place by then since the IDF's heyday in 1967, nearly fifty years later Michael could still espouse this viewpoint. Nevertheless, statistics would certainly bear out the fact that, whilst the status of the IDF may have been in gradual decline for a number of years, nevertheless the public trust

in the army still remains high, and did so even during the difficult times during the 1980s and the 1990s (Eran-Jona, 2015b; Hermann, 2019).

The decline in the status of the IDF that Eran-Jona referred to did not happen overnight, but took place in fits and starts over a number of decades. Ben-Ari and Lomsky-Feder (1999a, p.24) pointed out that beginning in 1967 Israel underwent a series of sociological upheavals and had been, “the site of steady changes in what could be termed the prevailing public attitudes and sentiments”. A particularly significant event in this respect was the 1973 Yom Kippur War, after which the IDF lost much of its previous immunity from criticism, and experienced the first signs of a fall in its prestige (Horowitz, 1982; Lissak, 2001). However, it was really the First Lebanon War, and the subsequent operations in Southern Lebanon, that caused the greatest shift in attitudes (Bregman, 2016, pp.184–186; Schiff, 1987, p.239). A number of the main scholars of CMR see a great significance in the fact that for the first time there were protest movements, not only against the decision to go to war, which was primarily aimed at the politicians, but also later about the conduct of the war itself, which reflected more directly on the generals (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Kimmerling, 2000; Lebel, 2006; Levy, 2013a; Lissak, 2001; Peri, 2000, 2001, 2006).

As well as, and inevitably coupled with, the question of unpopular wars is the issue of conscription and reserve service. In his consideration of the extent to which the IDF had moved from a militia force to a professional army, Cohen (1995, p.245) referred to service in the army as, “an essential rite of passage towards full Israeli citizenship”, and suggested that, those who had not served for whatever reason were often marginalised. Writing some years earlier, Peri identified military service as a reward given to Israeli citizens for their support of the state, and which allowed them to have a hand in determining the fate of the nation, and by doing so to gain, “control over political resources and prestige” (Peri, 1981, pp.313–314). For Kimmerling this was one of the key elements of his concept of cultural militarism – that the military becomes essential to national identity, and service in the armed forces becomes the epitome of what it is to be patriotic (Kimmerling, 1993, p.202). However, some observers have commented

that, whilst this may have been the case in Israel in the past, over recent years it has begun to change. Cohen (1995, p.250), hypothesised that, as the IDF gradually divested itself of its historical nation-building role, it was, “contributing to a shift in the public values attached to military service as a mark of full citizenship”. This change continues, and five years later Ben-Ari and Lomsky-Feder (1999b, p.306) suggested that not only was the concept of the ethos of the warrior declining, but that for many soldiers there was now a question over, “their very commitment to serve in the army and specifically in combat units”. Whilst such a view is perhaps over-stated, and in general most scholars acknowledge that service in the IDF still remains socially significant, many would also concur with Levy, Lomsky-Feder and Harel (2007, p.142) when they expressed their opinion that it no longer exhibits, “its quality of totality, which in the past made it an obligation unconditional on individuals' preferences”.

The concept of the IDF as the melting pot of Israeli society has often been raised in texts discussing Israeli CMR (Bar-Joseph, 2010; Ben-Eliezer, 1995; Cohen, 2007; Krebs, 2005). In many cases the context was regarding the early development of the state, when Ben-Gurion deliberately set out to use the IDF to help forge a single nation out of a disparate group of immigrants; nevertheless, the idea that the army represents the people has lasted long beyond that. Perlmutter (1969, p.132) stated that, “the army of Israel is a true profile of its society”, and half a century later Dan Meridor and Ron Eldadi still identified the need for the IDF help to maintain a national consensus on security by maintaining, “the principle of the people’s army” (Meridor and Eldadi, 2019, p.23). A round-table discussion published in the Jerusalem Post the previous year, involving academics and retired military, also supported this view (O’Sullivan, 2018).

However, the idea that IDF is genuinely a true representation of society has been challenged over the years. Even Horowitz (1982, p.84), whilst extolling the social virtues of an army that saw no class distinctions and drew all its officers from the ranks, did have to admit that despite this, some social groups have been over-represented, whilst others were under-represented, and as a consequence the

IDF could not be considered to truly mirror society. Bar-Joseph highlighted one aspect of a post-Zionist trend of research which asserted that rather than being a “melting pot”, the IDF had actually helped to maintain Ashkenazi supremacy (Bar-Joseph, 2010, p.506). Peri (1983, p.10), concurred, stating that it was not true that, “the IDF is society and society is the IDF”, and quite bluntly expressed the view that “the high command of the IDF is elitist”.

Peri wrote those words nearly forty years ago, and there is many would argue that that the situation has changed since then. Two obvious differences can be seen in the numbers and employment both of women and of orthodox men in the army – although ironically there are now tensions between these two groups. Sasson-Levy and Hartal (2018, pp.1–24) addressed the subject of women in the IDF in some detail. They discussed the lack of opportunities for women if they pursued a military career, despite the expansion of roles that had recently opened up to them, and they referred to the Israeli military as still being, “a male-dominated territory where masculinity - exclusively identified with power and authority - is the norm”. However, whilst they spent much of the article describing the disadvantages that women in the IDF faced compared to their male counterparts, nevertheless, they did concede that women, “can actually reap the benefits of militarization” by using the military to, “accrue sociopolitical power”.

In fact, it is a similar motivation that has been driving the increase in religious recruits to the army, with the religious right recognising that they can make use of military service, “as a vehicle for social mobility and influence” (Levy, 2020, p.106). The most prolific writer on this subject is probably Stuart Cohen who has published on it many times (Cohen, 1995, 1999, 2007, 2013). Cohen has explained that whilst, for a long period the ultra-orthodox Jewish community had rejected military service (from which they can obtain exemption), this began to change when they engaged in representation in politics in the late 1970s. There are now a number of religious pre-military academies that prepare students for service in the IDF, helping to ensure that they maintain their focus on Judaism whilst in the army, and help them to bring together the Torah and service life (Lebel, 2015). In addition, the increase in soldiers wearing the ‘knitted *kippah*’ (a

symbol of the religious right) has begun to create tensions in what has always been a particularly secular organisation; additionally, with this has come the expectation by the Rabbinical authorities that they should have a greater say in every day military matters (Levy, 2020, p.93). There is even a suggestion that secular elements of society are concerned that there is a serious threat to their own historic domination of the IDF (Ben-Ari and Lomsky-Feder, 1999b, p.308). Cohen (2001, p.196) believes that the concerns that have been expressed about religious soldiers refusing to engage in activities that they may consider against their Zionist principles have been exaggerated, but he did warn of potential problems in the future regarding more personal issues – such as service alongside women. Nevertheless, Stadlet and Ben-Ari (2003, p.44) have suggested that, whilst the ultraorthodox view of military service may be changing, and the possibility of their engaging in military service is at least discussed, there is still, “very little practical inclination to take part in soldiering”.

In summary, Cohen (2007, p.121) has suggested that the IDF’s role as the melting pot of society is passing, and that instead, before long it may find itself having to act as, “an arena within which adherents to different Israeli identities seek to give expression to their individuality”. It may even be that this time has already arrived. In a recent article in the Israeli left-leaning national daily paper, *Haaretz*, written after the trial of Elor Azaria (a soldier who shot and killed a wounded and incapacitated Palestinian knife attacker) their senior defence editor posed the question, “Has the Israeli People’s Army Lost The People?” (Harel, 2016). His conclusion was that whilst the IDF - traditionally a left-wing organisation with its roots in the socialist kibbutz movement - had always prided itself on being the People’s Army, the people had now moved to the right, and the army could no longer continue to ignore their influence.

2.2.4 Society’s Oversight of the IDF

As already seen, in the early days of the state, up to and even beyond 1967, open criticism of the government security policy rarely occurred apart from in the occasional personal memoir (Avnery, 2008). It was the near-disaster of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 that saw the first beginnings of a change in this regard, and

then, following the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, momentum soon gathered leading to what Peri has described as the, “secularisation of the security sphere” (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989, p.219; Levy, 2019, p.163; Peri, 1983, p.6). At this point the subject was fully opened to scrutiny, and eventually even the IDF became a legitimate target for criticism by the public – a public which proved to be, “exceptionally opinionated about, and involved in, the national security discourse” (Hermann, 2019, p.62).

The consequences of this have been many and varied. Lebel (2006, p.363) identified two “revolutions” which he considered to have brought the security establishment under more public scrutiny, one in the media and the other in the judiciary. The literature regarding the specific ways in which these manifested themselves are addressed separately elsewhere in this chapter under the sub-headings ‘The Position of the Media’, and ‘The Law’. There is, however, one other quite striking phenomenon and that is the presence of what Levy refers to as, “extra-institutional controls”, which take the form of social movements and interest groups (Levy, 2013a, p.45). Sela (2007, p.58) illustrated how, what began as a series of mild protests to the First Lebanon War, gathered momentum and eventually “reverberated among hitherto passive sectors of civil society”. He described how events such as the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, and then later the steady increase in IDF casualties during operations in Southern Lebanon, caused untold harm to the army’s prestige and image. For Sela (2007, p.73), this signalled a huge shift in Israeli civil society, which in turn led to, “a civil drive to check the military’s powers on security policymaking”. Levy (2007, p.1) has also pointed out how the hugely influential ‘Four Mothers’ protest proved to be one of the main factors that led to the IDF unilaterally withdrawing from Lebanon in 2000. Livny (2018, p.677) too points to the rise in conscientious objection that occurred around this time, and which saw high school seniors expressing their unwillingness to serve through, “collective protest letters directly citing the Israeli Occupation”.

Another concept that Levy has presented is that of, “control from within”, whereby he suggests that a form of civilian control of the military can come about through

whistleblowing and other such activities undertaken by both volunteer and conscript soldiers reluctant to take part in operations with which they disagree (Levy, 2017, pp.192–216). In particular the unique position of reservists has an impact on this, with Vinitzky-Seroussi and Ben-Ari (2000, p.404) suggesting that, often they are seen by society as simply being, “typical civilians who don a uniform for a limited period of time”. Levy has suggested that one aspect of this is that, because of Israel's heavy dependency on its reservists, any decision to go war is, “conditional on the support of the civil population” who would need to be mobilized, and therefore, in this way, “the army is indirectly monitored by social networks of the very youngsters who staff its ranks” (Levy, 2007, p.15).

2.2.5 Position of the Media

Peri has offered a view that the Israeli media's relationship with both the government and the IDF - what he has described as “media-security relations” – has progressed through three distinct phases (Peri, 2000, pp.184–214, 2007, p.80). The first phase, which began with the creation of the state in 1948 and ran until the Yom Kippur War of 1973, he identified as a total war model in which the entire social system was mobilized. Then, he suggested, after 1973 the subordinate relationship which the press had previously adopted moved towards a more competitive approach, also driven by the arrival of a more balanced two-party political system after the 1977 electoral victory of Menachem Begin's Likud party. Finally, from the 1980s, he considered that the relationship became more antagonistic. For Peri, one key feature of this latter phase was that, whilst the criticism that was linked to the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was focused on the politicians, after the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987 it shifted to the IDF themselves. Elsewhere, addressing the same subject, he considered the three phases as describing the way in which the relationship moved from deferential, through adversarial, to confrontational (Peri, 2001, p.116). But Peri has not been alone in identifying these distinct phase shifts, and others too have focused on the same key security events as being the points at which media relations changed (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989, p.219; Lebel, 2006, p.363; Lissak, 2001, p.404).

Two Israeli academics who have written more about this than anyone else are Nossek and Limor, although they are both experts in the field of communications and media rather than in CMR itself. In a 2001 paper looking at the history of military censorship in Israel they described the reciprocal relations between the political establishment and the media as being similar to a marriage, however, “not a marriage of love, but one of convenience” (Nossek and Limor, 2001, p.1). This analogy is interesting because they use it to describe one of the things most non-Israelis find hard to understand – how both the press and the public in a democratic state still appear to find censorship of the media acceptable. Nossek and Limor suggested that such marriages of convenience often last longer than love matches, precisely because they are convenient to both parties. In this case the government retains a hold over what is made public, whilst the press finds that the censorship relieves them of the responsibility of deciding what is and is not safe to print. In a later article Nossek and Limor further explained how the media frequently finds itself in a dilemma where, on the one hand it has the desire to operate as a free press, whilst on the other it has to deal with a public who are quick to criticise it if it publishes anything that might put the security of the state at risk (Nossek and Limor, 2011, p.126). In the past, even when the government itself has given the media more freedom to say what they wish, as happened during the Second Lebanon War of 2006, their more open reporting style has drawn much public criticism as it is seen to be aiding the enemy (Nossek and Limor, 2011, p.123).

In a paper which examined the apparent paradox of Israel being both a garrison state and a democracy, Goldberg (2006) described a situation in which the relationship between the military and society was still changing. As part of this change he considered that, although he had observed an expansion in the militarisation of society, there was also a corresponding growth of transparency in politics. He considered that this latter feature was partly illustrated by the way in which the role of the mass media was increasing. But whether this increase in the power of the media continues or not, Sela (2007) has made a particularly pertinent point regarding Israeli society’s relationship with the media. He has suggested that there is an inherent part of the Israeli character that is naturally

suspicious of a truly free press, and that (notwithstanding a short period during the First Lebanon War when it became more confrontational) during times of conflict the inclination will always be for civil society to 'rally around the flag', and that public opinion will simply refuse to allow the media not to follow suit at such times (Sela, 2007, p.57).

2.3 Individual

Given the informal nature of Israeli society and culture, it is perhaps unsurprising that personality has always featured highly in the way in which the military and the political elites interact (Peri, 2006; Perlmutter, 1978). That interaction is complicated by the fact that at any given time most of the cabinet will have had some degree of military experience, and in some cases may have not been long out of the military before moving into politics (Pascovich, 2014; Perlmutter, 1978). Whilst newly retired officers are eligible to be employed in any field of politics, the tendency has always been for them to focus on the security arena. Lissak saw this as an obvious decision given their extensive familiarity with the subject matter and their decision-making skills and, supporting this view, in the past Peri has suggested that it was the perceived failure of the militarily inexperienced Pinhas Lavon in 1954 that started the move towards putting ex-military men into the defence minister's post (Lissak, 1983; Peri, 1983).

In fact Lavon only filled the position during the brief period between Ben-Gurion's two spells as prime minister since, when Ben-Gurion led the government, he simultaneously held the position of minister of defence as well. Perlmutter approved of this duality and believed that combining the two posts was the way to ensure a smooth relationship between government and the military, and that it would guarantee, "the sustenance of powerful and politically autonomous political structures in Israel" – always providing that the holder was of an equally strong personality as Ben-Gurion himself (Perlmutter, 1969, pp.115–116). One example of the way in which the relationship may be seen to run more smoothly in such circumstances is that the appointment of officers to senior positions in the IDF – often a contentious area in the past - becomes more straightforward as there is no one to argue with the prime minister's choice. As Lissak (1983, pp.7–8)

pointed out, in the early days of the state the individual's political or party considerations were frequently a factor in the selection of the CGS. Perlmutter (1978, p.197) also observed that it was rare for a minister of defence to choose a general who held widely differing political and ideological views from his own to be CGS.

Whilst David Ben-Gurion is by far the most significant character in the history of Israeli CMR, there have also been other individuals whom the literature has acknowledged as having had an impact. Michael (2009, pp.705–706) pulled no punches when he offered the opinion that, with Israel's informal system of civil oversight, and given what he described as the “intellectual vacuum” found amongst Israeli politicians in the past, it is not surprising that trouble has arisen when a charismatic ex-military figure has appeared on the scene and filled this void. There are two instances of this which illustrate such a scenario well - those of Shaul Mofaz in 2000 and Ariel Sharon in 1982. Whilst it should be noted that Sharon was actually a civilian minister not a general at the time, nevertheless, in many respects he acted as if he were still in uniform.

The case of Mofaz as CGS is an interesting one that several scholars have raised, and he has been described by one commentator as the CGS who, “drew more fire during his term ... than any previous chief of staff” (Bar-Or, 2006, p.367). Peri (2006, pp.94–103) looked in some detail at Mofaz's actions during his time as CGS, cataloguing a series of public confrontations that he had with Prime Minister Barak. Retired Major General Danny Yatom, ex-Head of *Mossad*, was Barak's Chief of Staff and security advisor from 1999 to 2001. In his book, ‘Labyrinth of Power’, Yatom condemns the way in which Mofaz, when opposed to Barak's decision to withdraw from Southern Lebanon, unashamedly used his position as CGS to publicly criticize the government and the prime minister (Yatom, 2016, p.589). Bar-Or has also been strongly critical of Mofaz and has suggested that his public confrontations with all three of the prime ministers that he served under (Netanyahu, Barak and Sharon) indicated that he, “had forgotten the difference between a public servant appointed by the government and a person elected by the public to fulfil a political role” (Bar-Or, 2006, p.371).

Sharon has evoked even stronger reactions, and Ze'ev Schiff was barely able to hide his contempt for Sharon, when he described his actions as defence minister at the time of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon as a “putsch”, albeit one which employed more covert methods than usual (Schiff, 1987, pp.237–238). In this diatribe on Sharon, Schiff related how, as a minister, he had used the IDF as a vehicle to manipulate the government, employing his previous high standing with the army to direct the IDF to act, “against the will and intentions of the government without being seen to challenge the country's democratic structures” (Schiff, 1987, p.238). Concurring with view, Lissak (1983, p.6) has expressed the view that Sharon used his powerful personality and influence with the army to monopolise the decision-making in both defence and foreign policy. In some slight mitigation, however, Schiff and Bar-Joseph both agreed that Sharon should not have to take the blame alone, and that other senior officers in the IDF were equally at fault, either directly through their own actions, or through their weakness in not speaking out against what was clearly wrong (Bar-Joseph, 2010, p.519; Schiff, 1987, p.238).

Sheffer and Barak (2013) have also had much to say about the part that personality can play in Israeli CMR, as their whole thesis revolves around the concept of like-minded individuals covertly networking together to run the country. They have suggested that these networks comprise both serving and retired members of the security services, as well as members of large public and private companies, civil society pressure groups, the media and education. Their description of the networks is very reminiscent of freemasonry, in which all members hold common viewpoints and values, and even ensure that their own kind are looked after when scandals and investigations take place (Sheffer and Barak, 2013, pp.70–71). It is interesting to note that, whilst Sheffer and Barak's security network theory has not been widely taken up by other scholars, there are a number who do acknowledge it in their own work (Cohen and Cohen, 2020; Levy and Michael, 2011). In one review of the book 'Israel's Security Networks', whilst not actually endorsing them, Cohen (2014) goes as far as to praise the ideas put forward for their originality and for opening up the way for further research in this area.

2.4 Political

2.4.1 Political Ethos

Security has always been the prime strategic consideration for Israel, with independence of action being a key part of that (Amidor, 2019, p.36). Horowitz (1976, pp.56–65) discussed the reasons for this, suggesting that it was not only a function of the frequency and existential nature of the active conflicts Israel had been involved in, but that the continual presence of a latent threat, even during the periods of relative quiet, had generated the perception in society of it being a nation under siege. But he was equally adamant that, despite this, it had not led to a militarised society. To exemplify this, he pointed to the fact that in the period after the Yom Kippur War a large increase in the allocation of resources to the IDF nevertheless, “coincided with diminution of its political role and social prestige”. In opposition to this view, when looking at the situation some three decades later, Michael (2009, pp.687–713) believed that one result of the focus on national security was that there had been a tendency in Israel to blend together security threats, strategic threats and existential threats. He suggested that this had led to the centrality of “military wisdom”, and consequently had enabled governments to argue for the legitimacy of the use of force in countering them. In discussing Israel's “security model”. Kober (2019, p.227) has taken a similar view, suggesting that, whilst the Low-Intensity Conflicts (LICs) that Israel has been involved with in recent years have not been genuinely existential, the government has nevertheless, at times, been able to use this readiness to accept military solutions, “to manipulate public opinion and to encourage a greater readiness to sacrifice”.

The heavy reliance by the government on the military to produce national security policy is discussed under the ‘Institutional’ heading of this section, primarily in terms of their overwhelming capabilities in comparison to the civil sector. However, there is another aspect to this issue - the extreme confidence that the political echelon puts in the hierarchy of the IDF to deliver solutions (Ben-Meir, 1995, p.176). Whilst in other parts of the world military forces may also hold the respect of their governments, Michael (2007a, p.430) has suggested that in Israel

it reaches different heights, and he encapsulates this in his concept of the IDF acting as “an epistemic authority” for the political echelon. An example of this can be seen in Golda Meir’s momentous decision on the eve of the Yom Kippur War not to mobilise the reserves, which nearly resulted in a catastrophic defeat. In her autobiography she wrote that this decision had been made against her better instincts, and that ever afterwards she had regretted not acting on her own judgement, but that at the time she had thought it unreasonable not to have followed the advice of the senior military officers, whom she felt she could not overrule (Meir, 1975, p.410).

Although there are many interfaces between the civil and political elites in the Israeli system, the critical triangle is, and always has been, that between the prime minister, the defence minister and the CGS (Ben-Meir, 1995, p.29). In Ben-Gurion’s time in office, with him simultaneously holding both the posts of prime minister and defence minister, the relationship was relatively straightforward, and he exercised such absolute authority that no CGS was in a position to question his decisions (Perlmutter, 1978, p.197). However, since that time the nature of the relationship has been heavily dependent on the personalities involved. This has not been further complicated since, despite at least two public inquiries and the enactment of legislation specifically designed to do so, the roles and functions of the three posts have never been satisfactorily defined. This issue was dealt with in some detail by Ben-Meir (1995) in his book, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Israel’, but it has been such a critical issue over the years that most other major scholars of Israeli CMR have also addressed it to some extent (Bar-Or, 2006; Ben-Meir, 1995; Horowitz, 1976; Lissak, 1983; Peri, 1981, 1983, 2006, 2014). Indeed, Peri (2014, p.22) recently suggested that, “Over the past two decades, research regarding the friction between the two echelons has reached saturation point”. The debate mainly revolves around what Ben-Meir has described as “The National Command Authority”, and can be reduced to the simple question, “Who Commands the IDF?” (Ben-Meir, 1995, pp.56–75). In his lengthy and extremely well laid out analysis Ben-Meir delineated the problem by considering the stated purpose of *The Basic Law: The Army* when it was passed by the Knesset in 1976, which he said was, “to give a clear constitutional expression to the principle of

civilian control and to specify the precise relations among the key actors in the defense hierarchy". But, since it doesn't even mention the prime minister at all, and given that the one of the main intentions of the law was that the relationship between the three main actors should be clearly defined, it is perhaps not surprising that Ben-Meir considered that it had failed to achieve its aim.

A few years after the publication of Ben-Meir's book, Peri (2001) wrote an article in which he stated that, even looking back as far as the 1920s and 1930s, he considered that Israeli CMR had now reached the most critical state in its history, and he closed it by suggesting that the crisis was far from over. When he next addressed the subject over a decade later the same issues were still unresolved and had indeed reached the point where, in his opinion, the country was experiencing, "one of the worst crises in the history of the relations between the political and military echelons in Israel" (Peri, 2014, p.17). The particular crisis to which he was referring was the result of a very public falling out between the Defence Minister Ehud Barak, and Lt Gen Gabi Ashkenazi, the CGS. The situation had arisen when Barak and Prime Minister Netanyahu had given Ashkenazi an order that he disagreed with, and, as officially it required to have had cabinet authorization he was not obligated to carry it out. This led to open accusations in public by both sides of there being a 'putsch', and claims of violations of the Basic Law, and in the ensuing tussle Barak and Netanyahu made an attempt to oust Ashkenazi from post. The key conclusion from Peri's analysis of the incident was that ambiguity over who had the authority to give orders to the IDF still remained. This, said Peri, had not occurred by accident and he believed that continued maintenance of the situation was convenient for both sides. It enabled prime ministers to act independently without the rest of the government constraining them, allowing them more flexibility, whilst the CGS benefited as he could expand his influence and raise his status to quasi-ministerial level. For this reason the top echelons in Israel's political and defence echelons had no interest in changing the law, and, according to Peri, they were happy to leave situation as it was and wait for the next crisis to occur. Certainly, the Askenazi incident notwithstanding, the evidence would seem to support this somewhat cynical view

of the reason that the vagueness of the Israeli civil-military interface has continued for so long.

2.4.2 Policy-making

The military's dominance of national security planning originated in the early days of the state under Ben-Gurion, and this situation has now become self-perpetuating (Muhareb, 2011; Peri, 1983). The imbalance between the civil and military spheres in this area has been commented upon many times in the past, not only in the academic literature but also in the reports of various public committees (Levy, 2012a; Michael, 2009; Peri, 1981). Attempts have been made to address the issue, and Cohen and Cohen (2012, p.122) point out that it was as far back as 1986 that Yehuda Ben-Meir first laid out his detailed recommendations for the creation of a national security staff in his book 'National Security Decisionmaking: the Israeli Case' (Ben-Meir, 1986). Five years later his suggestions were used as the basis for a proposed amendment to *The Basic Law: The Government* that was intended to make it mandatory for all Israeli governments to establish a National Security Committee to provide advice to the cabinet. However, it took a long time to finally be passed into law, and even then this organisation has never truly become the institution that it was originally intended to be (Cohen and Cohen, 2012; Levy, 2012a). Even as recently as 2019 recommendations were still being made for a revival and strengthening of what was then referred to as the National Security Council (NSC) (Meridor and Eldadi, 2019, p.46).

Despite these repeated attempts to boost the government's strategic capabilities nothing changed significantly, and in 2006 the Winograd Commission (the body convened to look into the problems arising from the Second Lebanon War) was able to report that, during the conflict, it was only the IDF who actually carried out any professional staff work to fully examine the possible strategies available to the government (Michael, 2009, p.705). Other studies into the capability of both the cabinet and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to conduct their own strategic planning have come to similar conclusions (Bar-Or, 2006; Lissak, 2001; Michael, 2009; Muhareb, 2011; Pascovich, 2014; Peri, 2005). The reasons behind the

failure of the NSC concept have been explored by a number of these scholars, with Bar-Or (2006, p.367) indicating that the IDF were responsible for blocking it as they saw it as threat to their dominance, and Michael (2009, p.706) suggesting that in fact there was actually little appetite for change even amongst the politicians themselves.

The precise reasons why this should be the case are difficult to ascertain, but for many scholars the consequences were clear. Schiff (1987, p.230) was of the opinion that the ubiquity of the army in every walk of life, and the presence of an existential threat throughout the entire existence of the state, had led to what he believed could be described as the development of a garrison mentality – although not in the sense of Lasswell's classic garrison state. For others, the omnipresence of the military in all aspects of society had allowed them to expect, and usually to be granted, authority, not only in areas of security, but even in wider aspects of national policy such as infrastructure, utilities, industry and development (Cohen and Cohen, 2012, p.61; Muhareb, 2011, p.34). Additionally, Bar-Or echoed Michael's idea of the IDF being seen as an epistemic authority when he observed that the way in which the senior IDF leadership was held in, "almost mythic admiration and professional respect" by the politicians made it difficult for them to gainsay the generals when it came to decision-making regarding national security matters (Bar-Or, 2006, p.370). Michael justified the reason why he considers that a sense of military pre-eminence is so deeply embedded in the Israeli character. He explained that in any society conceptions of security, "reflect the hegemonic set of beliefs and ideologies", and that consequently, in Israel, it is the military and military thinking that has had, "a shaping influence on these conceptions" (Michael, 2009, p.700). In supporting this he referred to a statement made to the Winograd Commission by Tzipi Livni, Israel's foreign minister during the 2006 Second Lebanon War, in which she suggested that a pattern of military influence on political decision-making could be traced back to the eve of the Six Day War in 1967, and possibly even earlier (Michael, 2009, p.702).

The military domination of the national security policy-making process has been recognised throughout most of the literature on Israeli CMR, with the main disagreements primarily being over whether they have seen it as a positive or a negative factor or, in the case of Sheffer and Barak, an irrelevance (Ben-Meir, 1986, 1995; Horowitz, 1976; Levy, 2007; Lissak, 1983; Luttwak and Horowitz, 1975; Mann, 1987; Peri, 1983, 2006; Perlmutter, 1978, 1969; Sheffer and Barak, 2013). At one end of the scale Lissak (2001, p.407) saw the IDF as merely playing their natural part in the process, with the former IDF officers in government acting as a, “channel of influence on policy, bringing their professional knowledge with them from the IDF”, and helping the politicians to reduce their dependence on advice from the military. At the other end, in an article comparing the involvement in civil affairs of two different generals nearly fifty years apart – Maj Gen Yariv and Lt Gen Ya’alon – Peri (2014, p.18) came to the conclusion that, “... never in its history was the IDF an instrumental army, divorced from politics and merely carrying out policy dictated to it by the civilian echelon”.

2.5 Military

2.5.1 Military Ethos

In discussions on the structure of a military force the term professional is usually taken to describe those elements engaged in full-time, career service in the military, as opposed to part-time reservists. However, when considered in the context of values and standards, professionalism more usually refers to a force’s approach to such things as discipline, rule of law and ethical principles. In her assessment of the IDF against these criteria Rebecca Schiff (1995, p.17) found the officer corps of the IDF to be, “characterized by an intimate and informal Israeli culture”, and Cohen (1995, p.244), referring to a study carried out by Desivilya and Gal (1996), used the phrase “pragmatic professionalism” to describe the Israeli army approach. The subject of discipline in the IDF was also addressed by Horowitz, who suggested that, in the past, attempts to smarten the army up and to impose a more formal relationship between officers and other ranks had failed, something he put down in part to the close linkages between civilian and military life (Horowitz, 1976, 1982). A deficiency in internal discipline was actually

raised by as a factor in the lack of preparedness for the 1973 Yom Kippur War by the Agranat Commission (the report into the issues that arose from that conflict) (Horowitz, 1982, p.85).

The way in which a government requires its citizens to support the defence of the state is also closely connected with this concept of professionalism, and how a state recruits its soldiers is one of the four critical indicators in Schiff's concordance theory of civil-military relations (Schiff, 1995). Israel's threefold system of career soldiers, a conscript force and a large pool of ready reserves has been described by Cohen (1995, p.237) as being inextricably linked to the Israeli way of life, so much so that it can be regarded as having, "achieved the status of a national hallmark". Similarly, Horowitz and Lissak (1989, p.197) have referred to the reserve and mobilisation system as being, "a social phenomenon that shapes civilian lifestyles and civilian military relations". In a paper that he authored alone in the late eighties, Horowitz expanded on this, saying that the system had remained more or less unchanged since it was devised just after independence and, at the time of writing, he could not see it changing given that any economic benefits achieved could not be justified by the costs to national security (Horowitz, 1987). Others have seen the close integration of the military and civilian elements of society to have both positive and negative implications for the IDF, on the one hand broadening the skills that its members possess, whilst on the other forcing the military, "to accede to external interventions" (Catignani, Gazit and Ben-Ari, 2021, p.6).

Whatever the case, only ten years after Horowitz's comments, Cohen (1995, pp.237–254) made a strong argument for the case that a change in this structure was already under way, listing two primary reasons for this. The first being the rising costs of maintaining such a large conscript army in a difficult economic climate; the second that, as a result of the intifada, the army required a different structure to fight what amounted to a counterinsurgency. In addition he saw there being, "a much less sympathetic domestic environment" towards the notion of conscription, and as a consequence he envisaged these changes continuing for many years. Supporting this view, just after the Second Lebanon War of 2006,

Levy (2007, p.26) maintained that the failure of that conflict had accelerated the process of the transformation of the IDF from a conscript to a professional army. Nevertheless, Meridor and Eldadi, in a section of their review of Israel's National Security doctrine entitled "The People's Army", recommended an expansion rather than a reduction in the size of the draft – albeit that they envisaged this including wider options beyond just military service (Meridor and Eldadi, 2019, p.43).

Another aspect of the professionalism of a military force is the degree to which it remains aloof from party political affairs. Within Israeli society there is a strong commitment to social-democratic values; it is something that is deeply embedded in the civilian leadership and consequently seeps into the IDF hierarchy too. This is so much the case that some early commentators spoke of the military being ideologically committed to democratic government and that, as a consequence, making no attempt to interfere in party political business (Ben-Meir, 1995; Lissak, 1983; Perlmutter, 1969). Writing in the late 1960s, Perlmutter (1969, p.59) was at pains to make it clear that the IDF was wholly apolitical, a situation which he suggested was the result of a deliberate policy by Ben-Gurion to take the partisan pre-state militias out of politics by banning all political groups from operating within the newly formed IDF. This policy of depoliticisation, he believed curbed any possibility of the army and its officer corps from actively intervening in political affairs (Perlmutter, 1969, p.124).

However, Peri (1983, pp.93–100) has suggested that the apolitical status of the IDF changed after the 1967 war when they became an army of occupation. In his view, although agreeing that there had been a deliberate depoliticisation of the military prior to this, the occupation brought the IDF firmly back into politics (Peri, 2006, p.29). A similar transformation was also identified by Schiff (1987, pp.230–238), but for him the process began later, only really being seen as a problem by the public in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the bitter and very public arguments between senior members of the IDF (the most prominent being Ariel Sharon and Chaim Bar-Lev). Peri also identified the second half of the 1970s as a period when military involvement in politics became a very public spectacle.

One of the most significant events that he noted was when, having only recently taken up his post as CGS, Maj Gen Rafael Eitan openly declared his view that Israel should never give up the West Bank (Peri, 1981, p.308). It created a national commotion and, although Eitan did not represent a commonly held view within the IDF as a whole, his status as the head of the army meant that he was identifying the whole organisation with a particular political viewpoint. Peri saw this a critical turning point in the relationship between the political and military elites. Writing nearly forty years after this event, Levy (2019) still saw the occupation as being the biggest threat to the Israeli democratic notion of civil supremacy. Referring to the Azaria incident (discussed previously) he suggested that gradually two separate armies had been created within the IDF – one a traditional state military force, and the other a, “quasi-militia, setting policy that may deviate from official policy” (Levy, 2019, p.170). In the same way, others have also identified the existence of a similar group, members of which are politically and ideologically committed to the settler community, and have suggested that the political influence that they exert on their serving colleagues regarding such issues as the protection of Arabs from settler violence, and even potential settlement evacuation in the future, is one of the biggest problems that the IDF hierarchy faces today (Cohen, 2007; Kimhi and Kasher, 2015; Lebel, 2015; Levy, 2019).

The rule of law within the military more generally is something that was specifically addressed by Menachem Finkelstein in a paper entitled, *Dilemma of the Military Judge-Advocate General*, in which he categorically stated that, based on his 25 years’ experience as a military lawyer, “the IDF is an army that abides by the law” (Finkelstein, 2000, p.181). This was also addressed in an online op-ed written by two renowned Israeli legal academics who looked at the fallout from the Elor Azaria trial (Cohen and Gittleman, 2017). For them, the real issue had not been Azaria’s professional failure to follow the IDF’s ethical code (often referred to as the Spirit of the IDF) since the military had correctly followed procedure and prosecuted the soldier for this failure, but rather that the politicians had caved in to populist opinion and not backed up the senior generals. They concluded that:

The army, for its part, must realize that if it is to act within the legal framework and according to its moral code, it must invest a great deal of effort in education and inculcating the spirit of the Israeli army — even in the face of public opposition.

(Cohen and Gittleman, 2017)

One final aspect of the subject of the military involvement in politics that should be considered relates to the top of the military hierarchy rather than the rank and file, that is to say the place that recently retired senior officers can play. This has been fundamental to the discussions raised by Sheffer and Barak (2013) as retired officers play a large part in the security networks that they have described. To illustrate the strength of the clandestine networks that they believed were dictating government policy, they highlighted the fact that, at the time their book went to press, “six former security officials serve as government ministers: five were high ranking officers in the IDF, including three who had served as chief of staff and, one served as deputy general commissioner of the police” (Sheffer and Barak, 2013, p.50). However, expressing a viewpoint that negates this fear, Goldberg (2006), whilst acknowledging that such individuals could represent a militarisation of politics, saw it in a positive light. For him it was better that political power was held by retired officers, rather than by those who were still in the army as happens elsewhere. He also pointed out that when they did enter politics, ex-generals in Israel could usually be found in parties across the political spectrum and hence did not create any specific military faction, but merely brought much needed security expertise to all sides.

2.5.2 Military Substance

Whilst there has been a great deal written about the structure, expertise, efficiency, and effectiveness of the IDF (four of the subheadings found in CIPMIS under Military Substance) relatively little of it has been directly related to the development of Israeli CMR. However, with regards structure, some comments that have been made about the level of independence that the three individual services possess is interesting to note. Amidror (2019, p.39) makes the point that there are definitely different cultures between the air and the ground arms of the

IDF, the former being more centralised and disciplined; and Ben-Meir (1995, p.83) believes that these differences have benefits for CMR as they allow the minister of defence to receive more diverse views. Under efficiency and effectiveness, and specifically relating to strategy and the ability to adapt to changing threats and opportunities, Gal (2001, p.369) has made some pertinent comments. He suggested that the arrival of the new millennium heralded a great increase in intellectual thinking within the military, which came about from a recognition amongst the IDF that it was, “not as invincible or infallible as it had once thought itself to be”, and that this indicated reduction in its previously conservative outlook and a willingness to make changes. Nevertheless, twenty years on, reviewing the IDF’s strategy document released by the CGS in 2015, Kober (2019, p.234) still considered that, “Israel’s current security model lacks the inner logic, coherence and clarity of its predecessor” – so it would appear that Gal’s earlier optimism might have been ill-founded.

The fifth sub-heading under ‘Military Substance’, ‘The Scope and Remit of the Military’, is a topic that has received some attention in Israeli CMR literature, especially among those who were writing about the early period of the relationship. It has been widely acknowledged that the decision to give the military a broad range of tasks which, in other states, the civil authorities would normally have been expected to undertake, was a deliberate move by Ben-Gurion to involve the IDF in the nation-building project. Further, most scholars agree that any subsequent role expansion has been at the behest of the civil sector and not the military themselves (Ben-Eliezer, 2001; Cohen, 1995; Drory, 2005; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Lebel, 2006; Perlmutter, 1969). Summing this up well, Lissak (1983, pp.1–12) expressed the view that any role expansion of the military that has taken place in Israel has not been driven by ideological pressures from the military themselves, but rather that, in taking on the tasks, the IDF were operating within the remit of, “a decidedly democratic regime and political culture”.

Nevertheless, some scholars have recognised that there are potential consequences for a society that permits its military to operate widely within areas usually reserved for civil actors. Despite their acceptance of the original need for

the IDF's wide-ranging remit, Horowitz and Lissak (1989, pp.213–221) acknowledged that it has allowed governments to use the excuse of national security to involve themselves in more controversial areas such as censorship of the news media. They suggested that this blurring of what is civil and what is military had caused a, "partial militarisation of the civilian sphere" - something that Kimmerling (2001, p.214) also addressed in his arguments regarding Israel's "civilian militarism". He saw this as a form of "total militarism" which was in opposition to "professional militarism". The latter, he considered, was the foundation for CGS Ehud Barak's famous statement that, "what does not shoot must be cut" (Cohen, 1995, p.247). However, despite Barak's attempts to restrict the IDF's role to one purely of warfighting, he did not succeed and there has been some debate as to whether such a move is either possible or even desirable. As an example of this, around the same time that Barak was calling for Army Radio to be disbanded, the new military organisation, Home Front Command, was being created to deal with civil defence. Elran (2016, p.70) was clear that this was a task that in other democratic countries the civil authorities would control, and he highlighted the sensitivity of this and stated that, whilst it may be acceptable for the military to assist in technical and logistic matters, "Taking an active role, or rather a proactive role, in civilian matters, such as the conduct of schools or the behavior of people with special needs, is quite another matter". However, there is not a consensus on the route that this is taking, with some claiming that role expansion of the military in Israel is a thing of the past, even to the extent of suggesting that there was now a situation in which the military roles are actually contracting (Cohen, 1995; Peri, 2001).

2.6 Institutional

2.6.1 Government Structure and Organisation

One of the biggest issues regarding the way in which the Israeli government is organised concerns the integration, or lack of it, between the IDF High Command and the MOD. In 'Civil-Military Relations in Israel' Ben-Meir (1995) spent some time on the subject, highlighting it as a central area for concern, pointing to the absence of any meaningful staff facilities in the ministry, which consequently

meant that they were totally reliant on the military, with no means of checking the validity of that advice they received. He saw the need in Israel for an integrated civil-military system similar that employed by the UK, and called for a central authority for strategic planning and analysis to be created reporting directly to the prime minister. Writing in 2006 Peri echoed this in 'Generals in the Cabinet Room', and he reminded his readers that such recommendations had been made by the Agranat Commission in 1973 and had still not been implemented (Peri, 2006, p.259).

The failure to implement formal recommendations for changes to government structure is a frequent topic in the literature, with reference being made not only to those put forward by Agranat, but also by Pinhas Lavon, the Winograd Commission and in various papers by retired senior IDF officers (Bar-Or, 2006; Ben-Meir, 1995; Harel, 2008; Meridor and Eldadi, 2019; Michael, 2009; Peri, 2006; Perlmutter, 1969). This can be seen to be linked with the arguments that were identified previously under the 'Political Ethos' heading regarding the dominance of the military in national security planning; however, in this domain it is the interference of the IDF in other government departments, most notably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that is particularly significant. Schiff (1987, p.231) has suggested that the MOD frequently became directly involved in relations with foreign governments, "often dictating policy to the foreign ministry". Lissak (1983, p.6) said much the same, throwing the spotlight once again on Ariel Sharon by claiming that his appointment as minister of defence in 1981 brought about a new situation in which this very military-minded ex-general was, "capable of monopolizing the decision-making process with regard to defense and foreign policy, both on the strategic and tactical levels".

2.6.2 State Capacity

The Israeli government's lack of capacity within its civil ministries to generate staff work capable of competing with that of the IDF High Command has been almost universally acknowledged (Bar-Or, 2006; Ben-Meir, 1986, 1995; Michael, 2007b, 2007c, 2009; Pascovich, 2014; Peri, 2005; Perlmutter, 1969, 1978). The origins of this situation, according to Perlmutter (1969, p.7), lie with Ben-Gurion who,

despite being credited with strengthening the civilian element in defence, actually, “institutionalized the primacy of the Tzahal [the IDF] as against the ministry”. As a consequence, even where it may wish to do otherwise, the government is unable to offer up its own alternatives to military proposals and is reduced to either approving the IDF’s plan, or rejecting it and doing nothing (Bar-Or, 2006, p.366; Ben-Meir, 1995, p.85; Michael, 2007c, p.528). This weakness is not restricted to the MOD and Muhareb (2011, p.43) related that an attempt was made to create a strategic planning capability in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but this never achieved the success that it sought.

One small disagreement with this otherwise consensual viewpoint was revealed by Ben-Meir when he related that, in an interview he had held with the former CGS, Mordechai Gur, the general voiced the opinion that ministers were able to make use of the scientific and academic communities to provide them with alternative assessments. Nevertheless, Ben-Meir was quick to dismiss this idea as being, in reality, “both unworkable and impractical” (1995, pp.144–145). Michael has made recommendations for improving this lack of competency in the civilian ministries, believing that it is essential for the political echelon to create an ability to generate its own ideas and plans (Michael, 2007b, p.47). But for this to happen he acknowledged that it would require a cultural revolution in the way that the Israeli government operated.

2.6.3 Economic Management

The extent to which the IDF have control over their own budgetary allocation and distribution has been commented on at some length by Ben-Meir and Peri, with both making the point that although there is some degree of nominal integration with the MOD, it is the military who lead the joint finance organization and dominate it in every way (Ben-Meir, 1995; Peri, 1983, 2006). Lissak (1983, p.8) also discussed this but, whilst for Ben-Meir and Peri this situation was something to be lamented and compared unfavourably with western democratic practice, Lissak on the other hand had no problem with it, stating that the military had never used their leverage to defy government policy. In fact Sela (2007, p.58) too was

quite sanguine, expressing the view that, in part at least, growing activism in civil society has led to increases in transparency in the budget process.

2.6.4 State Oversight and Governance

Notwithstanding Sheffer and Barak's theory of a series of covert networks, there has been a general agreement with Ben-Meir's statement that, ultimately, as befits the armed forces of a democratic state, the IDF are subject to civil authority (1995, p.57). However, it is the extent to which all three arms of government – the executive, the legislative and the judicial – are able to conduct objective oversight and governance that is problematic (Ben-Meir, 1986; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989). The workings of the executive arm was dealt with under the 'Political' heading, and that connected with the judiciary will be considered more explicitly under the sub-factor of 'The Law', however, the legislature does have its own bodies designed for this purpose. The Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (FA&DC) is the parliament's main eyes and ears in the security realm, but it has not always been universally applauded for its effectiveness. On the positive side Ben-Meir (1995, pp.46–51), once again, was keen to commend its independence, and the fact that he saw its influence as gradually increasing. As an example of this he cited an FA&DC report by Dan Meridor written in the 1980's which he believed successfully increased the Knesset's role in controlling the IDF. However, even Ben Meir's acclamation was relatively muted, and Peri (1983, 2006) has been quite sceptical of its true efficacy, and whilst acknowledging that there had been some improvements over the years, he could not avoid noting the many recommendations for strengthening its powers that have failed to be implemented.

The other organisation that oversees defence and security, and which reports directly to the Knesset, is the defence division of the State Comptroller and Ombudsman's office. This body does have substantial powers of investigation and, interestingly, its authority has steadily grown under the leadership of retired generals (Goldberg, 2006, p.393). In the last two decades there has been increasing pressure from the Comptroller for more openness in the security and military spheres, and in particular in the field of the defence budget and

expenditure (Goldberg, 2006; Peri, 2001). However, as Peri (2014) points out, the speed of these moves towards improving the Knesset scrutiny of the IDF has been glacial, and he sees the prospect for any further substantial progress in this area in the future as poor.

2.6.5 The Law

The third, judicial, element of state oversight of the military is enabled through the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) and relies upon its ability, and willingness, to intervene directly in security issues. For many years it was reluctant to do this, but since the 1990s it has shown itself increasingly prepared to legislate in this arena (Ben-Meir, 1995; Cohen, 2019; Goldberg, 2006; Peri, 2006). Amicai Cohen (2019, p.112) laid out a number of reasons that have been advanced for this, including the perhaps cynical observation that the Israeli government has chosen to use it as a “fig leaf” with which to provide a veneer of legitimacy to otherwise illegal actions. However, he also raised the more commonly held view that, as the former president of the ISC, Aharon Barak, clarified in a public speech in 1992, it was simply part of a broader “constitutional revolution” that had claimed the right of the ISC to sit in judgement on any aspect of Israeli legislation and government policy (Barak, 2011, pp.1–4; Lebel, 2006, p.363).

There are many instances of this constitutional function of the ISC in action recorded in the literature, many related to the IDF's operations in the occupied territories (Bar-Or, 2006; Ben-Meir, 1995; Cohen and Cohen, 2012; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989). One particularly striking of the ISC's intervention is the blocking of the promotion by CGS Mofaz of a senior officer who had previously been convicted of sexual harassment - never before had the ISC so blatantly involved itself in the IDF's business (Bar-Or, 2006, p.371). In recent years since Aharon Barak, and then his protégé and successor as president, Dorit Beinisch, left office, there has been a rolling back of the commitment to this doctrine of the ISC acting as the highest constitutional authority, something Cohen (2019, pp.120–121) has noted as a worrying trend.

2.6.6 The Provision of Intelligence

Most Israelis might expect to find the topic of intelligence listed under the Military domain rather than the Institutional domain when examining CMR – however, that is more a measure of Israel's irregular relationship than any error within CIPMIS. This irregularity occurs as a result of the fact that the intelligence branch of the IDF (known by its Hebrew acronym *Aman*), unlike in any western democracy, is the primary source of all intelligence for both the prime minister and the cabinet (Bar-Joseph, 2010; Even and Siman-Tov, 2015; Horowitz, 1976; Muhareb, 2011; Peri, 2006). As a number of scholars have pointed out, this not only strengthens the IDF's influence on the political decision-making apparatus, but it also further complicates the already arcane relationship between the elites as it places enormous power in the hands of the general in charge of the military intelligence branch (Bar-Joseph, 2010; Ben-Meir, 1986; Meir, 2012; Muhareb, 2011; Peri, 2006).

A variety of views have been expressed on the consequences of this situation, although none has been positive. Bar-Joseph (2010, p.517) made the telling observation that an analysis of the situations in which *Aman* failed to provide warning of enemy activity in the past would indicate that they were, “the outcome of the tendency to estimate the opponent's policy almost solely on the basis of military considerations, without taking into account the political logic of its leadership”. Both Michael (2009, p.696) and Pascovich (2014, p.31) have made similar comments on the military's predisposition to miss the social and cultural nuances of the intelligence picture in low intensity operations. However, even in a situation in which the threat was more conventional, the glaring errors made in the build-up to the Yom Kippur War highlight the failure by the military to appreciate the strategic implications of what was being seen (Even and Siman-Tov, 2015; Horowitz, 1976; Pascovich, 2014; Peri, 2006). It was this particular failure that, as far back as 1974, led the Agranat Commission to make recommendations for a loosening of the IDF's monopoly on national intelligence, some of which were eventually implemented (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989, p.217). However, in his recent examination of what he described as, “The Unique Case

of the Israeli Military Intelligence”, Pascovich (2014, pp.7–8) still concluded that, despite this, “AMAN’s dominance has remained untouched”.

2.7 Situational

There is much in the literature that identifies the way in which Israel is a state which was forged in a vicious internecine war, has endured a continual background of violence (which sporadically erupts into open conflict), and whose survival is only maintained by constant vigilance, (Horowitz, 1976; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Michael, 2007a; Schiff, 1995; Sheffer and Barak, 2013). This situation described by Horowitz and Lissak (1989, pp.202–203) as being, “a prolonged state of emergency marked by occasional limited clashes in periods of dormancy and periodic eruption of full scale war under international political constraints”. The effect that this constant exposure to a potentially existential threat has had on Israeli society has been addressed by many writers from a wide variety of academic disciplines. In the field of CMR it has been most frequently raised in the context of militarism or a garrison state mentality, much of which has already been discussed under the ‘Cultural’ and ‘Political’ headings. The key points to note here are that the unique conflict situation which Israel has experienced has had a profound effect on its adoption of an all-encompassing security strategy, and has played a substantial part in the development of its CMR (Schiff, 1994, p.164; Sheffer and Barak, 2013, p.17). Whilst most academics acknowledge this as a negative factor, there is at least one, Professor Dan Schueftan (2015, p.13), who has expounded the opposite; he has offered the provocative opinion that, whilst recognising the immensity of the challenge, nevertheless it was precisely this that, “... has kept Israeli society productive and resilient and has made the alliance with the US both possible and long-lasting”. His upbeat view of the Israeli security situation is not one held by many other observers.

It is important to recognise that this threat has not been static, either in terms of intensity or nature, and the IDF as an organisation, and consequently their relationships with both the civil government and society, have had to adapt to the changes (Cohen, 1995; Eisenkot, 2016; Goldberg, 2006; Horowitz and Lissak,

1989; Kober, 2019; Moskos, 2000; Peri, 2005). In his recent review of the challenges facing the IDF, CGS Gadi Eisenkot (2016, p.13) specifically addressed it as a practitioner, saying that he no longer saw the IDF's primary role being concerned with victory on the regular battlefield, but with defeating an enemy that is hidden amongst the population. The challenge they faced, he argued, was the need to respond to, "... the changing threats and provide a sense of security without excuses". From an academic viewpoint Goldberg (2006, p.391) agreed, recognising this transformation in the nature of the threat, and suggesting that, whilst from a perspective of the military it may have lessened, from that of the civil population it had increased. Peri (2005, p.340) has also highlighted the importance for CMR of this move to a more complex form of warfare, saying that one consequence was that it inevitably draws the military deeper into the formulation of policy rather than just its implementation.

2.7.1 External Threats

The danger to Israel from outside its own borders has widely been acknowledged as coming from the Arab states in the region, either directly or through proxies, although there has been less agreement over the extent as to when, or even if, such a threat ceased to be existential. In the late 1980s Horowitz and Lissak (1989, p.196) wrote of there still being a "broad consensus" that the Arabs posed a threat of genocide - or at least of "politicide", meaning the destruction of the state. Forty years later, however, the situation had changed sufficiently for Meridor and Eldadi (2019, p.50), in reviewing Israel's main security challenges, to unequivocally state that they no longer considered there to be an existential danger from conventional attack, although they did acknowledge that the nuclear threat from Iran, whilst perhaps not imminent, was nonetheless still present.

Of all that has been written about the conduct and strategic consequences of Israel's many external conflicts, and the specific ways in which they have affected CMR, it is the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1982 and 2006 incursions into Lebanon that have drawn the most commentary (Ball, 2010; Bar-Joseph, 2010; Kober, 2015; Levy, 2012a; Michael and Even, 2016; Muhareb, 2011; Nossek and Limor, 2011; Peri, 1980, 2002, 2014; Sheffer, 2007; Sheffer and Barak, 2013; et

al). Particular interest has been shown in the reports from the two separate public commissions associated with the first and last of these, the Agranat Commission and the Winograd Commission respectively. Whilst the 1982 war did not lead to a direct report on its conduct - the Kahan Commission specifically focused on the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, not on the war itself – it still generated a great deal of comment in the literature. Although the detail of each of the texts varies, two in particular give a good flavour of the topics and tone of the discussions. Schiff's account focused on the bitter controversy that Israel's first 'war of choice' stirred up amongst the civil population, pointing to the way in which, "dozens of officers and men chose to stand trial and served jail sentences rather than serve in Lebanon" (Schiff, 1987, p.239). Additionally, the conclusion to Levy's chapter on the war in his book 'Israel's Materialist Militarism', examined the consequences of the conflict, suggesting that it further eroded the public's hero worship of the IDF that had begun after 1973, and seriously contributed to its move towards becoming more of a professional army than a militia (Levy, 2007, p.245).

2.7.2 Internal Security

Notwithstanding the ongoing tensions that remained after the initial pre-independence Arab-Jewish clashes, most texts have identified the first move from an external threat to an internal one as having emerged out of the Israeli victory in the 1967 War, and the subsequent occupation that resulted from it (Ben-Meir, 1995; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Levy, 2019; Muhareb, 2011; Pascovich, 2014; Peri, 1983, 2000, 2006; Sheffer and Barak, 2013). Both the unique nature of the occupation itself, and the significance of it to Israeli CMR, has been a common theme. Horowitz and Lissak (1989, p.46) pointed to the gradual change in public perception, even in the mid-1980s, from the early view that it was a temporary aberration, to a later recognition that this was a long-term state of affairs – a situation which they referred as a, "protracted temporariness". The other key issue that they highlighted was that the internal threat had never been seen as truly existential, being referred to as "current security" problems as opposed to "basic security" problems which might genuinely threaten the states very existence (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989, p.199). Kober (2015, p.104) also referred

to this in his study of Israel's "post-heroic" conflicts, and he discussed how this had led to the politicians, aided and abetted by the IDF elites, attempting to, "manipulate Israeli society's willingness to sacrifice by portraying the threat that Israel was facing as an existential threat". Peri (2006, p.127) has remarked that this is just one consequence of the way in which the move from external to internal conflicts brought the military into the arena of policy and politics, and has resulted in an unhealthy situation in which no one quite understands who has the lead.

2.8 The Gaps in the Literature and the Focus of the Research Question

This overall review of the literature looked at the core themes and trends of previous studies of post-1948 Israeli CMR, considering the material covering the situation both prior to, and then since, the creation of the state in 1948. It was driven by the CIPMIS analytical framework, and its purpose was to enable the research question to be further refined and to focus in on the critical areas that would be addressed by the study.

The review highlighted the fact that only a small number of texts had involved a comparison of Israel's CMR with those found elsewhere – a situation which has not changed significantly over the last two decades (Rosenhek, Maman and Ben-Ari, 2003). More pertinently, it also showed that no previous study had specifically considered the strengths and weakness of Israeli CMR in the context of the possible applicability of aspects of the model outside of the state of Israel. Although a number of significant areas were identified in which the development of the Israeli CMR differs from those found in other democracies, three in particular appear to merit further investigation in terms of lessons that may benefit the design of post-conflict SSR programmes. These are: one, the influence that culture and history has had on the way in which civil society and the military now interact; two, the way that, despite the military being closely involved in policy-making, the principle of civil supremacy appears to have been maintained; and three, the extent to which the development of Israeli CMR has been driven by events outside of the government's direct control, and the way in which they have subsequently responded to this. Therefore, to investigate these further, the

primary research question was broken down into three, more focused, secondary questions.

The primary research question:

How has Israel's civil-military relationship evolved from the founding of the state until the present day?

The secondary research questions:

- a) How has the relationship between Israeli society and the IDF changed over the period of the state's existence?
- b) To what extent are the military involved in political affairs in Israel, and what are the oversight and governance mechanisms that have been developed to deal with this?
- c) What have been the significant drivers to defence reform in Israel since 1948, and what impact have they had on the CMR?

The next chapter will provide an examination of the various research philosophies considered for the study, beginning with an outline some of the theoretical aspects of the methodological options available. It will then look at the decisions that were taken in the design of the study, and justify the choices made, before going on to present the approach taken to the analysis of the data.

3 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY, METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

3.1 Introduction

Richards and Morse (2013, p.7) view research as, “a craft, not a mystery”, and consider that the processes of good qualitative analysis are essentially, “the result of the skilled use of simple tools, practised techniques, focus and insight, concentrated work, and a lot of hard thinking”. For this reason it is important that a chapter such as this is not simply a dry description of the various methodologies and methods available, but rather that it is a true justification of the decisions taken about how to proceed with the inquiry (Bazeley, 2013, pp.8–9).

Adopting this outlook, the purpose of Chapter 3 is to clearly layout the route taken in establishing the methodological decisions that that underpin the study. It first offers a critical review of different research methodological options, providing a background to the toolkit available and the craftwork involved in making the selection of which tools to employ. It then goes on to justify the particular overarching philosophy embraced and the research design adopted, which leads to a more detailed discussion of the rationale behind the data collection methods chosen, and why they were preferred over others. After a consideration of the design limitations it finally introduces the approach taken to the analysis of the data.

An examination of a CMR can be considered from many different perspectives, and establishing which viewpoint to adopt in any given study can be important if for no other reason other than it can greatly help in focusing in on the most appropriate methodological texts and guides to refer to. It is possible to view a CMR as one aspect of military history, and of course to some extent this is true. Certainly, even if the aim is purely to understand the mechanisms in place in a contemporary relationship, then it is essential to consider the historical background that has led up to it. This is particularly true in the case of the Israeli CMR where even a cursory examination quickly shows how historical events have directly led to current interactions and affiliations. There is also a good

argument for placing such a study within the international relations arena, which itself in turn links back into many additional fields – anthropology, economics, law, politics and sociology among others (Lamont, 2015, p.14). However, the characteristics of CMR that are of critical importance to SSR (and more specifically to the development of SSR programmes) are really most closely related to the managerial and organisational aspects of the relationship. Establishing this as a primary viewpoint near the beginning of the study does not exclude any particular research methodology or strategy, but it does help to concentrate on those that are most likely to produce the required results.

For this reason, the decision was taken early on to employ a business research approach to the design of the study. It was felt that this was appropriate as much of the nature of CMR as identified in the CIPMIS framework mirrors that seen in a business setting. One view of business study research suggests that there are three features that stand out in this area: the multidisciplinary nature of the research; the high level of education of the participants; and the expectation of some practical application as a consequence of the research (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2015). This closely mirrors the situation here, and by concentrating on this particular approach much greater clarity can be brought to the research design, without restricting it in any detrimental way.

3.2 An Overview of Research Methodologies

3.2.1 Philosophy or Paradigm?

Much is written about both research philosophies and research paradigms, with definitions themselves varying not only from discipline to discipline, but even within texts on the same discipline – what is described as a paradigm in one text is a philosophy in another, and even an epistemological stance in another (O’Gorman and Macintosh, 2014; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016). One relatively straightforward comparison of the relationship between the two is given by Saunders et al (2016, p.124) whereby a paradigm is described as “a set of basic and taken-for-granted assumptions which underwrite the frame of reference, mode of theorising and ways of working in which a group operates”, and a research philosophy is explained as being “a system of beliefs and

assumptions about the development of knowledge”. Although these still appear to be very similar (and indeed are) a little further exploration of the “assumptions about the development of knowledge” as part of a philosophy does help to clarify the position (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016, pp.124–125).

The two critical assumptions that need to be considered as part of a research philosophy are those relating to ontology and epistemology - ontology being the study of the nature of reality and existence, whilst epistemology is concerned with the theory of knowledge, what is legitimate and acceptable, and how knowledge is acquired (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2015, pp.46–47). One further piece in this jigsaw puzzle is the axiology that is brought to the research. Axiology is “the philosophical study of value” and is of particular concern here in terms of the bias that the researcher brings to the study (O’Gorman and Macintosh, 2014, p.66). So, taking these three together, one view of the concept of a research philosophy is shown in Figure 3-1.




Figure 3-1 The Relationship Between Research Philosophies and Paradigms
(AtHope, 2016)

Saunders et al (2016, pp.124–125) advocate an early, clear identification of the researcher’s ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions underpinning the research, which will then, “constitute a credible research philosophy” and help to, “underpin the methodological choice, research strategy and data collection techniques and analysis procedures”. Once this has been done, they suggest following their version of the ‘research onion’ (a diagram indicating the layers of decisions to be made) which, if followed, helps to ensure that a consistent research design is achieved. This research onion is shown in Figure 3-2 and it is worth just briefly considering some of the layers more detail.




Figure 3-2 The Research Onion (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016)

3.2.2 Research Philosophies, Theory Development and Methodologies

As with all of the literature on this subject, there is no definitive agreement on what specific philosophies the different combinations of ontological, epistemological and axiological choices result in, however, there is some degree of commonality. At its most basic the opposing views of ontology are realism and

nominalism. To a realist there is a single truth and all facts exist and can be revealed; for a nominalist, in contrast, there is no absolute truth and all facts are human creations. In general these two perceptions can be seen as extremes on a continuum, with such stances as internal realism (truth exists, but is obscured), and relativism (many truths), positioned along it (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2015, pp.49–50). Potentially, within the social sciences, epistemology presents a similarly dichotomous picture, with the concept of a world in which everything is observable and measurable at one end of the scale, and one where opinions, perceptions and constructs are the knowledge to be sought on the other. However, in practical terms it is often found that elements of both are employed by many researchers (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2015, p.51). With axiology, one key area of interest is the role of the researcher’s own values and ethical approach in the research process. Combining these three sets of assumptions Saunders et al (2016) suggest that in business and management research one of five competing research philosophies are likely to be identified as those most suitable for a given study – see Table 3-1 (immediately below).

Ontology (nature of reality or being)	Epistemology (what constitutes acceptable knowledge)	Axiology (role of values)	Typical methods
Positivism			

Ontology (nature of reality or being)	Epistemology (what constitutes acceptable knowledge)	Axiology (role of values)	Typical methods
Real, external, independent One true reality (universalism) Granular (things) Ordered	Scientific method Observable and measurable facts Law-like generalisations Numbers Causal explanation and prediction as contribution	Value-free research Researcher is detached, neutral and independent of what is researched Researcher maintains objective stance	Typically deductive, highly structured, large samples, measurement, typically quantitative methods of analysis, but a range of data can be analysed
Critical Realism			
Stratified/layered (the empirical, the actual and the real) External, independent Intransient Objective structures Causal mechanism	Epistemological relativism Knowledge historically situated and transient Facts are social constructions Historic causal explanation as contribution	Value-laden research Researcher acknowledges bias by world views, cultural experience and upbringing Researcher tries to minimise bias and errors Researcher is as objective as possible	Retroductive, in-depth historically situated analysis of pre-existing structures and emerging agency. Range of methods and data types to fit subject matter
Interpretivism			

Ontology (nature of reality or being)	Epistemology (what constitutes acceptable knowledge)	Axiology (role of values)	Typical methods
<p>Complex, rich</p> <p>Socially constructed through culture and language</p> <p>Multiple meanings, interpretations, realities</p> <p>Flux of processes, experiences, practices</p>	<p>Theories and concepts too simplistic</p> <p>Focus on narratives, stories, perceptions and interpretations</p> <p>New understandings and world views as contribution</p>	<p>Value-bound research</p> <p>Researchers are part of what is researched, subjective</p> <p>Researcher interpretations key to contribution</p> <p>Researcher reflexive</p>	<p>Typically inductive. Small samples, in-depth investigations, qualitative methods of analysis, but a range of data can be interpreted</p>
Postmodernism			

Ontology (nature of reality or being)	Epistemology (what constitutes acceptable knowledge)	Axiology (role of values)	Typical methods
<p>Nominal</p> <p>Complex, rich</p> <p>Socially constructed through power relations</p> <p>Some meanings, interpretations, realities are dominated and silenced by others</p> <p>Flux of processes, experiences, practices</p>	<p>What counts as 'truth' and 'knowledge' is decided by dominant ideologies</p> <p>Focus on absences, silences and oppressed/repressed meanings, interpretations and voices</p> <p>Exposure of power relations and challenge of dominant views as contribution</p>	<p>Value-constituted research</p> <p>Researcher and research embedded in power relations</p> <p>Some research narratives are repressed and silence at the expense of others</p> <p>Researcher radically reflexive</p>	<p>Typically deconstructive – reading texts and realities against themselves</p> <p>In-depth investigations of anomalies, silences and absences</p> <p>Range of data types, typically qualitative methods of analysis</p>
Pragmatism			
<p>Complex, rich, external</p> <p>'Reality' is the practical consequences of ideas</p> <p>Flux of processes, experiences and practices</p>	<p>Practical meaning of knowledge in specific contexts</p> <p>'True' theories and knowledge are those that enable successful action</p> <p>Focus on problems, practices and relevance</p> <p>Problem solving and informed future practice as contribution</p>	<p>Value-driven research</p> <p>Research initiated and sustained by researcher's beliefs</p> <p>Researcher reflexive</p>	<p>Following research problem and research question</p> <p>Range of methods: mixed, multiple qualitative, quantitative, action research</p> <p>Emphasis on practical solutions and outcomes</p>

Table 3-1 Comparison of five research philosophies in business and management research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016)

To a certain extent, it could be argued that once a view has been taken as to which research philosophy is appropriate for a given study then many of the other options shown in the diagram are inevitably selected as well, and in many respects this is true. However, in the area of theory development there are still choices to be made, and these are even wider than the table would suggest. In Saunders' model mention is made of deduction (in which evidence is sought to test a proposed hypothesis), induction (which derives broad generalizations from empirical investigation), and abduction (a form of deduction in which data which is discovered to fall outside the original hypothesis can still be analysed). However, there is also a fourth process known as retroduction which requires the researcher to look for hidden aspects of the phenomenon, without which a particular concept is unable to exist (Meyer and Lunnay, 2013). Whilst some philosophies are closely tied to one or other of these approaches to theory development, others, depending on the study involved, are able to employ them in various combinations.

The initial decision concerning the selection of a given methodology to follow is essentially whether to use a quantitative or a qualitative approach to the study. Within those two higher level categories there are additionally a number of further refinements, including a combination of the two. Whilst it might seem that the two methodologies have a number of quite distinct properties and strengths, there are in fact many similarities between them (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016, pp.165–174). Quantitative research seeks facts in the form of hard, replicable data, is outcome oriented and assumes a stable reality. Qualitative research on the other hand is more concerned with understanding behaviour using rich, deep data, often involving case studies, and assumes a dynamic reality. Nevertheless, mixed methodology is an established practice and there is plenty of literature with strong support for its use.

3.2.3 Research Strategies, Time Horizons, and Techniques and Procedures

A research strategy can be described as being the methodological link between the chosen philosophy and the methods employed to analyse and collect the data

required (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016). These strategies are also frequently referred to as research methods in many texts, but nevertheless, the view of them being a link from a general approach to a specific plan of action is usually the same (Richards and Morse, 2013; Yin, 2014). There are also many more than the eight shown in the 'strategy ellipse' of the diagram in Figure 3-2, which is intended to be illustrative rather than provide an exhaustive list. Ultimately, in practice it is the research question that will determine the method adopted, and it is likely that any given piece of research will narrow down to no more than two or three strategies that are genuine contenders for conducting the study. However, it is important to make the right choice as this will determine the way in which in which the researcher thinks about the data, which in turn will strongly influence the conceptualisation that proceeds from the subsequent analysis of it (Richards and Morse, 2013, p.49).

The selection of a time horizon should be a more straightforward decision. The research question usually determines whether to conduct a longitudinal or cross-sectional study, also taking into account factors external to the study itself, such as deadlines and funding. In essence, the options are either to conduct a cross-sectional piece of research where the subject is considered at a given point in time, or to follow the subject over a significant period, observing the changes and progressions that occur. Having said that, even a cross-sectional study will often be required to look back at historical events and to consider how they have affected the development of the current situation. What is not possible with a cross-sectional study is to keep returning to discern further changes in the future - that requires a full longitudinal approach.

The core of the 'research onion' comprise the techniques and procedures adopted for data collection and analysis, and is primarily a question of how to interact with the sources of data that are of interest, and then to use them to generate useful conclusions. Once again, the research question will be a primary driver in the choice of methods - for example, if the chosen strategy is archival research then it is unlikely that any form interview is going to prove to be of use. Ideally the higher level methodological choice will have already dictated some

aspects of the requirement to gather numerical/statistical data or narrative-based data from the start of the design of the study. Frequently, a selection of methods can be employed, often with the aim of trying to generate triangulation.

3.3 Research Design

3.3.1 The Approach Taken to the Design of the Study

As already discussed, when deciding on the design for a particular piece of research it is necessary to first identify the overall research philosophy that is most appropriate, both to the study and to the researcher, and then work from there (Collis and Hussey, 2009; Crossan, 2003; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2015; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016). That is the logic behind the approach laid out by Saunders et al in Figure 3-2. However, Hogue (2015, p.21) suggests that there is a perfectly legitimate approach to research design in which the research question itself informs the methods, one consequence of which being that the appropriate methodology becomes self-apparent, and eventually the philosophy itself emerges from this inside-out process. Hogue suggests that for her it isn't that she holds a particular worldview which informs everything that she does, rather that each particular research project that she undertakes requires her to take a specific worldview appropriate to that study. In the end the reality is probably that a mixture of the two approaches is often employed - perhaps working in both directions from the middle – and that the important thing is that the end state should be a set of assumptions that are well thought out and consistent, from the overarching philosophy, through the methodology, down to the methods employed (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016, pp.124–125). Seen another way, this can be described as identifying the unavoidable triangular connection that exists between the research questions, the methods used to operationalise them, and the data generated (Clough and Nutbrown, 2012, p.46). In the same way, in their paper on reliability and validity in qualitative research Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson and Spiers (2002, p.18) make it clear that, “the aim of methodological coherence is to ensure congruence between the research question and the components of the method.” This was the

course taken in the design of this study – to begin with the research question and then to work from the middle in both directions.

3.3.2 Working From the Middle Out – Methodology, Theory Development and the Research Philosophy

Given this approach, the primary research question, ‘How has Israel’s CMR evolved from the founding of the state until the present day?’, automatically implies that one key option has, by definition, already been selected. It is self-evident that this is to be a single case study of Israel, and the reasons for this are easily understood. Case studies have been portrayed by some as not being representative of generality, yet they can be particularly helpful in identifying more widely applicable causal mechanisms (Ackroyd and Karlsson, 2014, pp.23–24). For Yin (2014, pp.52–53) one rationale for electing to carry out a single case study may be that “the researcher has access to a situation previously inaccessible to empirical study” and thus the case study is “worth conducting because the descriptive information alone will be revelatory”. This is an excellent portrayal of the situation presented by this study. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, Israel meets all of the criteria that indicate that a particular CMR is worthy of study: it is a state which is a democracy in one form or another; the military is significant in the political life of the state; and the existence of an existential conflict is almost universally perceived as being present. In addition, the researcher had a unique position, temporarily living in Israel for a number of years, and possessing unparalleled links through the international diplomatic circuit to the Israeli political, military and academic elites. This then immediately establishes the position of the study within the strategy ring of the of the Saunders’ model – it is a case study.

Staying with the model and continuing to work outwards, the researcher’s own situation also strongly influenced the question of whether it was best to make use of a quantitative, qualitative or multi-method methodology. The decision to undertake a revelatory case study, making use of uncommon access to a wide group Israeli elites in the various fields associated with CMR, indicated that the ideal approach would be to employ a mono-method qualitative research methodology, involving interaction with individual experts, drawing on their

personal experiences. Additionally, there would also be a need to make use of, mainly secondary, documentary sources, and therefore there may be some who would prefer it to be categorised as a multi-method approach. Either would be valid, and the choice of one categorisation or the other does not affect the study in any material way.

The question of the approach to theory development, and from there to the specific research philosophy that would embrace the study, needs more careful consideration. The choice of theory development needed for the study was not a straightforward one. Unlike grounded theory, where induction is used to derive a new and innovative theory from the empirical data, in this study some aspects of pre-determined theory already existed. This theory was present in two forms. The first was found in the ideas and concepts of CMR and SSR that were brought to the study from the researcher's own experience in the field, and also those highlighted in the literature associated with those two areas, as presented in Chapter One. The second was that developed for the study itself through the CIPMIS conceptual framework. Both of these elements of theory offered a useful route into a deductive coding process, sometimes referred to as directed content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p.1281). The aim of this process is to use a theoretical framework to help to initiate a basic coding scheme that can later be expanded as new categories or sub-categories emerge. It has the strength that it makes use of existing theoretical work in the field, but it can also suffer from the limitation that it brings researcher bias into the problem. One consequence of this is that researchers may be, "more likely to find evidence that is supportive rather than nonsupportive of a theory" (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p.1283). This is a factor that needs to be borne in mind when addressing the axiological aspects of any research philosophy under consideration. As this is closely linked to the wider analysis strategy employed then the relevance of its issues to this study, and the mitigation employed to deal with this, are discussed fully in Chapter 4, which deals with the analysis in detail.

This deductive approach to theory development is helpful in the initial coding stage of the analysis process, but alone it does not fully or adequately provide for

the wider analytical procedure that is required in a study such as this. The conceptual framework can be effective in drawing out which aspects of the relationship and its development are relevant to the study, and hence the empirical observations that are recorded. However, beyond this some additional process is then needed to account for what it is that has brought these events about. This is where the application of abduction and retroduction can become useful analytical tools. Abduction helps to interpret specific data obtained through interviews or observation in a more abstract and generalised way (Willis, 2019, p.453). Retroduction can then be used to take these reinterpreted ideas and to make sense of them – or as Fletcher (2017, p.189) describes the process, “to identify the necessary contextual conditions for a particular causal mechanism to take effect and to result in the empirical trends observed”. In fact the two approaches are closely linked with one another and were originally used interchangeably (Meyer and Lunnay, 2013). Over time, modern philosophers have come to see them as two distinct entities, however, in this study - which does not necessarily pursue a philosophically pure approach for its own sake, but rather seeks to establish a way of thinking that is both justifiable and reasonable – retroduction can be considered to encompass abduction. In this way it simply expresses an approach to theory development that allows for movement between a priori theory, to observation, and then back again in an iterative process. In this sense it can be argued that retroduction is not truly a logically valid form of inference, but it does, nonetheless, present a, “more comprehensive way of reasoning, arguing, and relating the individual to the universal/general” (Danermark, Ekström and Karlson, 2019, p.109).

In its most rudimentary form the retroduction process as employed here involves taking some basic elements of theory, carrying out an initial analysis on the data using that theory as a scaffolding or framework, and then reassessing the empirical findings to identify previously unseen arguments which might reasonably account for any events or occurrences. The strengths and the weaknesses of such an approach are two sides of the same coin. In line with qualitative research in general, retroduction does not offer definite solutions to problems; rather, it offers plausible and likely suggestions, which may, under

different circumstances, or with further discoveries, later prove to be unsound. On the other hand, when dealing with relationships and socially constructed situations, a researcher should not be expecting to find certainties. Rather, clearly identified tendencies, and highly likely possibilities, are the more usual outcomes, and these can be practical and useful inferences to work with, providing an excellent basis for further studies. In an article from the realm of evolutionary science, in which they discuss what they describe as retroductive analogy, Ward and Gimbel (2010, pp.1–2) sum this up well, stating that, “The possible explanation may be true, but then again it may not be. From there, additional argumentative augmentation based on empirical evidence must be acquired to determine which hypotheses are rational to believe”. In a study that looks specifically at a relationship, knowledge of how that relationship functions (and could possibly be replicated) can only be obtained by asking questions about the situation and the events that are observed (Danermark, Ekström and Karlson, 2019, pp.117–118). This is the essence of retroduction as used in this study, and which was seen as the most helpful approach to theory development for this particular piece of research.

Following this progressive strategy, the final decision to be made is the selection of the research philosophy that most coherently brings all of the other choices together. By taking the early decision to follow a business research approach to the study it was possible to narrow down the choice of potential research philosophies considerably. Applying the options already selected regarding methodology (multi-method and qualitative), theory development (deduction and retroduction), and strategy (case study), to the research philosophy list in Table 3-1 it quickly becomes clear that there are only two options that comfortably fit the study; these are interpretivism and critical realism (CR). The reasons for rejecting the other three can be addressed relatively straightforwardly.

Positivism is a philosophy that lends itself much more to hard scientific research in which things are structured and ordered according to laws and rules. The researcher is detached and objective, and the data is typically in the form of large samples analysed using quantitative methods. This does not sit well with a study

such as this which seeks to examine the complex realities of nuanced relationships. As Crotty (1998, p.28) suggests, “the world addressed by positivist science is not the everyday world we experience”.

On the other hand, at the other end of the scale, pragmatism is very much about research into real world problems. Developed around the beginning of the 20th century pragmatism seeks to make use of, “theories, concepts, ideas, hypotheses and research findings not in an abstract form, but in the roles they play as instruments of thought and action” (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016, p.143). In some respects pragmatism could be made to work with this particular study as it is so flexible that it is able to be adapted to almost any research in the field of social science. However, pragmatism is essentially a form of constructivism and suffers from what Bhaskar (1988, p.27) described as “the epistemic fallacy”, or the reduction of what we understand as being “real” to what can be empirically known about it – in other words making ontology into epistemology. This does not fit well with the researcher’s understanding of the ontological aspects of the situation in which this particular study is rooted, where there can be said to be fixed realities that are present regardless of circumstance, whilst at the same time constructed realities that are experienced as a result of events or activities.

Post-modernism, as described by Saunders et al (2016), is closely linked with the intellectual movement of poststructuralism and focuses on the importance of language. Postmodernists, believe that structure and order in the world are all human constructions, and that there is a primacy of “flux, movement and fluidity of change” (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016, pp.141–142). Whilst accepting the existence of such constructed realities, in the situation under consideration there are also certain aspects of the relationship that exist externally and independently of the individuals who make up that relationship. Postmodernism, has been described as, “form of sensitivity – a way of seeing and understanding that results in a questioning of the taken-for-granted” (Bryman and Bell, 2015, p.527). As such, it encourages an immersion of the researcher into the study, and consequently is often associated with ethnography. Such an approach was not seen as appropriate for this study as the notion of the researcher being

embedded in the relationship under investigation was neither practical nor desirable.

So, having eliminated positivism, pragmatism and postmodernism as realistic contenders from the philosophies suggested for business-related research in Table 3-1, both interpretivism and CR still remained as possible acceptable viewpoints. It is important to note that each of these philosophical approaches appeared to fit comfortably with the researcher's own world views. This matters because, whilst it is the research question itself that must be the primary driver in finding the most appropriate philosophical standpoint, nevertheless the researcher's attitudes are not something that should be ignored entirely. After careful reflection, it was apparent that there was a reasonable correlation of the researcher's views with interpretivism, and an even stronger correlation with CR, indicating that either would be feasible.

In considering the possibility of taking an interpretivist stance one aspect that did offer some concern was the suggestion that the researcher is often required to take an empathetic stance, almost becoming part of the study, to allow them to understand it from the participants point of view (Bryman and Bell, 2015, p.295; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016, p.141). Whilst it was accepted that absolute researcher objectivity was unlikely to be achievable in practice, it was considered important in this study that efforts should be taken to come as close to this as possible, and that such a value-bound approach was not what was sought. Nevertheless, the final decision not to take this approach, but to follow a path focused more closely on CR philosophy, was based less on objections to interpretivism and more on an affinity with the general concept of CR.

The philosophy of CR has its origins in a book, 'A Realist Theory of Science', first published by Professor Roy Bhaskar in 1975 (Bhaskar, 1975). Bhaskar himself later explained his thinking in a series of lectures broadcast in 2004, and these were subsequently encapsulated in book based on transcripts of those talks (Bhaskar, 2017). In the talks he explains that what he calls Original CR (OCR) was based on two main arguments. The first of these dealt with "the epistemic fallacy" mentioned earlier in this section – the fact that Bhaskar considered that

in modern philosophy ontology had been reduced to epistemology (Bhaskar, 1988, p.27). For him it was important that these two are recognised as separate entities, and that for completeness you also need to consider the relative importance of particular arguments. This led to his idea of the 'holy trinity' of CR which is illustrated in Figure 3-3.

In the diagram there are three elements highlighted: Ontological Realism is a recognition that aspects of the real world are independent of our knowledge of it; Epistemological Relativism is the view that beliefs are social constructs and as such our knowledge of reality is relative and possibly, in certain circumstances, fallacious; the term Judgemental Rationality simply expresses the idea that although knowledge is relative, it is not unreasonable, through the expression of strong arguments, to prefer one theory or set of beliefs above another. Working together these produce a powerful way of attempting to make practical sense of complex, real world situations.




Figure 3-3 The 'Holy Trinity' of Critical Realism (Bhaskar, 2017)

Bhaskar's second argument was equally significant and went so far as to lay out a completely new ontology – one which is structured and layered (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016, p.139). As Bhaskar describes it there are three separate domains – the real, the actual and the empirical (Bhaskar, 2017, p.21).

The top level, the Empirical Level, is the domain in which we observe and experience events, and this is the level at which we can make measurements. Often attempts can be made to explain the occurrences observed in this domain using common sense, but they are inevitably perceived through our interpretation of what has taken place (Fletcher, 2017). The middle level, the Actual Level, is where we find events that have not necessarily been observed or experienced, and yet they still occur despite this. Finally, at the bottom, there is the Real Level where the causal mechanisms that generate events are found, and it is these that are, “the true objects of scientific understanding” (Bhaskar, 2017, p.22). This new ontology is described very clearly by Meyer and Lunney (2013). For them the Empirical is “the experience of the participant”, the Actual is “the events as they actually happened (not necessarily as they were experienced)”, and the Real are the generative mechanisms (structural and social contexts) that naturally exist”.

Fletcher (2017, p.183) also offers the metaphor of an iceberg to illustrate this concept of a layered ontology, noting that this is not meant to suggest that any level is more “real” than another, nor that no interaction occurs between levels. A diagram illustrating this iceberg metaphor is shown in Figure 3-4.




Figure 3-4 The Iceberg Metaphor of CR's Layered Ontology (Fletcher, 2017, p.183)

There are two main principles of CR: one, the idea that the 'holy trinity' offers a practical, relativist approach to dealing with real-world issues; and two, the acknowledgement that it offers a stratified ontology which provides for the co-existence of both observable and hidden domains. It is these principles that were seen as making CR the most suitable philosophical choice for this study as they sit well with both the nature of the study (which centred on a complex, politically-focused relationship) and the researcher's own general world view. Easton (2010) describes the CR approach to case study research as one in which the research question is derived through the identification of a particular phenomenon in terms of observable events, and then analysis is applied to find out what caused them to occur. That is precisely the situation with this study. One further consideration is related to the interdisciplinary nature of international relations research generally, and CMR research in particular. As was noted in Chapter 1, CMR is drawn from a wide variety of academic fields and Professor Berth Danermark,

one of the original collaborators with Bhaskar in developing the philosophy, has commented that in their early work on CR they identified that “critical realism was a fruitful way to cope with the philosophical challenges of interdisciplinary research” (Danermark, 2019, p.370).

CR does have its critics. These come from many different academic disciplines, but most focus on the details of CR’s philosophical legitimacy (Kemp, 2005). A good example of this is found in an article by Steele in the journal *Critical Review*. In it the author attacks the self-justification of CR:

Since it is bereft of methodological precepts, CR in practice amounts to little more than the exclusive reliance on a particular ontology that, because of its (asserted) transcendental nature - such that if it were false, experience itself would be impossible - renders CR arguments irrefutable. (Steele, 2005)

CR has also been criticised for its inability to produce definite conclusions. Such criticism may well be valid, however, as has already been suggested, in a world of relationships and socially constructed situations it is unreasonable to seek out certainties; rather it is more realistic to expect to find clearly identified tendencies and likely possibilities. In the world of CMR these are the basic assumptions upon which changes are initiated and policy is created - and this is what CR offers.

Although CR has been in existence for a number of decades, there are surprisingly few examples of it being used in recognised applied research (Willis, 2019, p.450). Joseph (2014) suggests that this may be because it does not set out a particular theoretical approach to the subject, and perhaps that, as even Bhaskar himself originally envisaged, its application can be seen more as holding a supporting role towards, rather than necessarily leading, substantive research (Bhaskar, 1989, p.vii). However, one particularly well-documented example of the use of CR in qualitative research, albeit in another field of social science, can be found in Dr Amber Fletcher’s study of Saskatchewan Farm Women (Fletcher, 2017). Although not from the same scholarly discipline as this study, it does mirror it in many ways as it employed in-depth interviews with 30 individuals and, additionally, it began with a question that was driven by existing research and

guided by theory. She employed a directed coding process using, “a list of codes drawn from the literature review, theoretical framework and key CR concepts” and these were then later “changed, eliminated and supplemented with new codes during the process” (Fletcher, 2017, p.186). Using abduction and retroduction Fletcher attempted to use the demi-regularities (or patterns) that she identified to reveal the social conditions that caused them – what Bhaskar’s transformational model of social activity describes as, “the movement from the manifest phenomena of social life, as conceptualized in the experience of the social agents concerned, to the essential relations that necessitate them” (Bhaskar, 1979, p.32). The result of her research was to highlight two deep casual mechanisms that shaped the lives of the women that she had studied, and from this to make recommendations for changes to Canadian political-economic policy (Fletcher, 2017, pp.191–192). The significance of Fletcher’s research for this study is seen in her concluding paragraph where she states:

Critical realists seek to explain and critique social conditions. This makes it is possible – indeed, desirable – to produce concrete policy recommendations and definitive claims for action on social problems. Although these recommendations will be fallible (or could have unexpected results under various social conditions), critical realists base their recommendations on the identified tendencies and causal mechanisms.

(Fletcher, 2017, p.191)

This is an excellent summary of what this study also aims to achieve. By seeking explanations for ‘tendencies’ in observed phenomena, and then focusing on what Haigh et al (2019, p.4) describe as, “the mechanisms of entities that can generate events – as well as the properties of entities that empower them with such mechanisms”, it is hoped to be able to generate practical recommendations for future SSR programmes.

3.3.3 Working Inwards – The Time Horizon and the Techniques & Procedures Employed

Returning to Saunders' model and working inwards from the decision to conduct a single case study, the question arises of whether this is a cross-sectional or a longitudinal study. Although it is necessary to look back at the historical aspects of the relationship, essentially the study is concerned with the nature the situation at a fixed point in time. The study has a finite, relatively short time frame, and there will not be any attempt made to return to it at a later date to investigate changes or further developments. Hence the study is a cross-sectional piece of work.

A large part of the rationale for conducting what Yin describes as “The Revelatory Case as a Single-Case Study” is that, “the researcher has an opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible to social science inquiry” (Yin, 2014, p.52). In this particular case study the situation that presented itself to the researcher was that, through a unique set of personal circumstances, he was in a position to have access to a number of eminent members of Israel's elite. Whilst these connections were often just cursory in the first instance, the fact that this situation continued over a period of three years meant that it was possible to explicitly develop a network of well-informed and well-connected individuals in the fields of politics, the military, the civil service, the judiciary, the media and academia. Given this situation it was clear early on in the study that relatively in-depth, semi-structured interviews, which allowed the subject to relax and to speak openly, would be the most effective data collection technique to employ.

The literature review, driven by CIPMIS, shaped the research question and hence identified the critical areas that the interviews should focus on. These were: the manner in which defence reform has been enacted in Israel, and the drivers behind it; military involvement in political affairs, and the oversight mechanisms that have evolved to deal with this; and the changing nature of the relationship between civil society and the IDF. These were not difficult topics to raise with the selected participants, but care was needed to ensure that, in being given the

maximum chance to speak freely on the topic that was introduced, they remained focused. Often experts in specialist areas relish the opportunity to talk about their personal experiences to an interested listener; this is one great advantage of conducting in-depth interviews, but there is also the risk that the entire interview may be dominated by their particular preoccupation (Cassell, C. and G. Symon, 2004, p.21). It was specifically to address this problem that the semi-structured approach was adopted.

Turner (2010, pp.754–756) defines three different categories of qualitative research interview: informal conversational; general interview guide; and standardized open-ended. The informal conversational interview has no pre-prepared structure to it, and has the advantage of allowing participants to easily open up and to relax. However, it can be difficult to code and may result in much valuable data being lost or skimmed over. The standardized open-ended interview on the other hand is extremely structured, and it only permits each participant to address the same specific questions as everyone else. This is a popular form of interview for qualitative researchers as it makes comparisons of responses across a variety of participants easier to achieve. However, although in this study it was important to try to get all participants to address the same three critical aspects of Israeli CMR, their very different backgrounds meant that they would have varying levels information of contribute to each. A politician who had spent several years in the cabinet, perhaps serving as defence minister, would be likely to have more to say on military participation in political affairs than a retired president of the Supreme Court. The judge, however, would possibly wish to spend some time focusing on, say, the issue of judicial oversight and the court's constitutional role. For this reason, an approach was required that enabled this degree of flexibility, without allowing unconstrained conversations to develop.

To overcome the difficulties presented by both the informal conversational, and the standardized open-ended categories of interview, it was decided instead to make use of the general interview guide approach which can be seen as a compromise between the two. A set of questions was prepared which was designed to keep the interviews on track and to ensure that the material was

covered, but this was only expected to be used as a framework or guide. As suggested by Silverman (2013) as the interview developed it was then possible to use experience and judgement to permit certain aspects to be omitted, and additional follow-up questions to be posed, depending on the participant and the responses received. In this way, the interviewer is able to keep greater level of control over the direction that the interview takes. This can be an advantage in that it helps to ensure that useful, relevant data is gathered, but it does risk the interviewer's own biases and unfamiliarity with the specialist subject matter skewing the responses. This is something that must be constantly in the interviewer's mind during the session. The value of trials and piloting questions when conducting case study interviews is widely acknowledged (Foddy, 1996; Johnson and Stake, 1996; Yin, 2014). In this regard, Gillham (2005, pp.22–25) suggests that there is a clear distinction between trialling and piloting. For him trialling is a first attempt to try out the questions face-to-face – taking them from the page and presenting them to a live subject. Piloting is the next stage in the process and involves conducting full practice runs under interview conditions. Ideally these should take place with participants of similar stature and experience as those that it is proposed to interview for the study itself. In this study the researcher was fortunate enough to have more potential candidates in certain fields than it was going to be possible, or desirable, to interview and so this was relatively simple to arrange. The aim of these pilot interviews was to identify any flaws or weaknesses with the design of the questions, and to make adjustments accordingly (Turner, 2010, p.757). In fact, although the contents and structure of the interview guide did change slightly as a result of the pilot tests that were carried out, in general few amendments were found to be necessary and the same format was used for each of the 41 interviews that were eventually conducted³. A copy of the final version of the interview guide used is at Annex D.

³ Only 39 were transcribed and analysed as, after the interviews were concluded, two were considered not to have added anything new, and therefore did not merit the additional work required for the their transcription.

The interviews were all conducted face-to-face, with one exception. The very first participant was in his nineties and very frail and, as a consequence, although he was happy to be interviewed, he did not feel up to meeting in person but did agree to be interviewed remotely. This took the form a short exchanges of emails in which the initial interview questions were sent to him, and his responses were then further probed, and supplementary answers provided. All of the other 40 interviews took the form of a one-to-one oral dialogue which was captured on a digital recorder. These recordings were then immediately transcribed, at most within a day or two of the interview, by the researcher himself.

The arrangements and conduct of the interviews all followed a similar pattern. After initial contact was made and a rapport established, a potential participant was asked if they were prepared to be interviewed. Having received a confirmation that this was the case, a few days before the date agreed a briefing pack was sent out under a covering letter giving specific details of the interview times, location etc. Copies of the documents sent as part of the pack can be found at Annex E, and comprised:

- A short explanation of the background to, and purpose of, the interview. Although all participants were English speakers, in addition to an English version, a professionally translated Hebrew version was also sent as it was recognised that often even Israelis who are fluent English speakers can find it hard to read a long and complex English text.
- An ethical statement, following Cranfield University's ethical guidelines (CURES), explaining the issues of the research methods used, consent and discontinuation, confidentiality, dissemination and data storage.
- A consent form asking for formal acknowledgement that they had been properly briefed and that they agreed to take part in the study on the basis described.

Most participants read the material beforehand and completed the consent form straightaway, passing it across on arrival. In the few cases in where they had not had a chance to pre-read the material a short time was spent going through it

with them before the interview proper began. All were happy with the format and conditions and, with one exception, all signed the consent form without any problem. The one participant who did not (a lawyer) stated that whilst he was happy with everything that had been explained to him, he saw no need to put his signature to a piece of paper as any oral agreement made was legally binding. He was asked if he would be prepared to formally give his consent on record at the start of the interview, which he did. This was recorded and typed up in the transcript, which he subsequently approved.

Where possible the participants were interviewed in their own homes or offices to minimise noise and distractions, and where they felt most comfortable. When this was not possible a suitable neutral location was sought – various academic institutions and research organisations were helpful in providing these when required. Only when it was unavoidable, or the participant insisted, were public locations such as cafés and restaurants used. On the few occasions that this did occur there were inevitably some issues with poor sound quality on the recordings, but fortunately this never resulted in any significant loss of data.

It was planned to keep the interviews to approximately one hour in length, and in nearly all cases this was achieved. However, during the course of three interviews it became apparent that the participant had such a deep knowledge of their particular field that a second interview was warranted. In addition, in one case the participant themselves asked for a further interview to allow them to speak for longer. When the data gathering process was completed a total of 41 interviews had been carried out, with 37 different individuals, of which 39 were transcribed and taken forward for analysis. The result was approximately 1000 pages of transcribed text.

3.3.4 Sample Selection, Chosen Participants, Ethical Considerations and Question Development

With quantitative research the focus is on probability sampling in which a suitably representative selection of the target population is chosen for interview or survey. However, with qualitative research non-probability sampling is employed in which the sample is dictated primarily by the research questions and research strategies

that have been employed (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016, p.297). Within non-probability sampling there are a number of different techniques available, and although Yin (2014, p.44) recommends avoiding referring to any particular kind of sampling method in case study research, it was felt that it was worth briefly addressing the two primary techniques employed in this study.

The first can be described as purposeful or purposive sampling where the researcher begins with a reasonably clear idea of what sort of sample is required based on the purpose of the study (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2015, p.82; Moore, 2014, p.121). In this case it was clear from the thematic literature review which aspects of Israeli CMR needed to be focused on in the interviews, with CIPMIS clearly indicating that it was necessary to find participants from the fields of politics, the military, the civil-service, the judiciary, the media, and potentially from academia. They also had to be of sufficient status and experience to be able to provide relevant information regarding defence reform and military input into political policy-making. In survey sampling this would be described as obtaining participants from the right “strata” of the wider group (Gillham, 2005, p.43). This was initiated by drawing on the researcher’s network of socially acquired acquaintances in these fields, either to be participants in the study themselves, or to provide introductions to others they knew and whom they felt would meet the criteria. Care was taken to place the relationship with each individual on a professional footing, and this proved to be significant as it enabled the possibility to work with participants who were both knowledgeable and who were willing and open to share their views, having a full understanding of the nature and purpose of the research (Creswell and Poth, 2018, p.133).

This network provided both a small number of subjects for the pilot study, and then approximately ten of the participants in the main study itself. It also developed throughout the year-long process of interviewing as the researcher continued to meet other knowledgeable and influential individuals. Whilst this process of purposive sampling went on, simultaneously a second technique was also employed to further increase the list of possible participants. This technique, referred to as snowballing, involved asking each participant at the end of the

interview if there was anyone they knew who might conceivably add value to the research, and whom they would be prepared to introduce the researcher to. More often than not, a participant would offer such an introduction themselves during the interview without even having been asked. This serves to illustrate the nature of Israeli society in which there is a great deal of social interaction between elites - even amongst those who may hold differing political or ideological views – and many participants were extraordinarily helpful in making further introductions, often with those at the highest levels. Eventually the point was reached where almost all the suggestions received concerning colleagues or friends who might make suitable participants had already been interviewed, or had been approached and but for various reasons it had not been possible to follow them up. This was a further indicator that data saturation had been achieved and increased confidence that nothing had been missed – Morse et al (2002, p.18) describes this situation well, saying, “by definition, saturating data ensures replication in categories; replication verifies, and ensures comprehension and completeness”.

This approach to participant recruitment did have some limitations. There was a concern that since the researcher spoke relatively little Hebrew, this lack of fluency in the language would restrict, not only the interview participants themselves to being English speakers, but also the broader pool of individuals from which the network was drawn. Despite this, in the end, very few individuals were placed outside of the circle available for selection as English is spoken widely amongst Israelis in key positions (Shohamy, 2014). For this reason it was not felt that the cost and complications involved with using translators was necessary. There was only one occasion when it was known to be a potential issue. One elderly and long-retired Brigadier General had been recommended as a possible participant by a friend of his during an interview. The date was fixed there and then on the telephone, but he later cancelled and it was subsequently intimated that he had been worried that his poor standard of English would embarrass him. This was never verified and, in any case, by that time data saturation had already been achieved and there was no need to pursue contact with this particular individual.

Another possible issue was the rejection by the IDF Spokesperson's Unit of an application for permission to interview serving IDF personnel. This was not unexpected as it is something that is rarely granted, and it did not prove to have any significant impact on the ultimate selection of participants. Permission was not required to interview retired personnel, and reservists could be interviewed in their capacity as civilians. The only case that it did affect concerned one senior serving general who was nearing the end of his regular service when initial contact was made. Although it was not possible to interview him then, he was nevertheless happy to meet, in uniform, in his office in the Kirya (the IDF HQ building) purely to discuss the subject matter of the study, with no attributable notes being taken. He was then subsequently formally interviewed as part of the study a few months later, after he had left the army.

The full anonymised list of participants, showing the code and brief description of their knowledge and experience, is at Annex F. They came from the following backgrounds: ten had been senior politicians (three of whom were still serving MKs), of which eight had held ministerial posts (one as minister of defence), and one had been prime minister; nine retired two-star officers or above, including two Deputy CGS and one CGS; five senior members of the judiciary, including one Military Advocate General, three Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) judges (two of whom were past presidents of the court), and one minister of justice; three ex-National Security Advisors; two ex-prime ministerial chiefs of staff; two past ambassadors to foreign states (including one to the US); one ex-director of *Mossad*; four senior journalists from both print and radio, including the current defence editor of a major daily newspaper at the time of interview; and several professors from key academic institutions in Israel.

In compliance with the Cranfield University code of ethics all participants agreed to be interviewed on the basis that they would remain anonymous, identified only by a brief description of their position or experience. For this reason, throughout the study if they are directly referred to then they are identified only by an alphanumeric code and, where appropriate, their contextual description. These descriptions were approved by the participants themselves, and they were all

given the opportunity to read the transcript of their interview and to make any amendments or deletions as they saw fit. They were also asked if they would agree that, should it be considered desirable to use an attributable quotation, then they would be approached and their prior approval would be sought. All participants gave their agreement to these conditions, and many orally gave permission to quote them on anything they said regardless. Nevertheless, the written agreement was scrupulously adhered to, and any attributable quotes used have received subsequent formal, written approval.

The data provided through the interviews are a fundamental element of the study and the questions employed during the interviews were carefully designed to draw out each expert's exclusive insights into the area of Israeli CMR (where appropriate, specifically focusing on aspects of the relationship that might have potential to be beneficial in other situations). Using the results of the thematic literature review the interviews were constructed around the three secondary research questions:

- How would you describe the current relationship between the IDF and the civil society in Israel?
- To what extent is the military involved in politics in Israel?
- How would you describe the defence reform process that has taken place in in Israel since 1948?

Whilst each respondent was asked these same three questions they were not always posed in the same order, and a series of subsidiary questions was available to be deployed as appropriate, depending on the way that the interview progressed. Full details of the Question Guide are at Annex D. During the course of an interview if any respondent showed exceptional interest in, or exhibited special knowledge of, any particular aspect of Israeli CMR that seemed relevant, and which they were happy to discuss in more detail, then even if no subsidiary question had been prepared, this was explored. As previously mentioned, the result of this extensive data gathering process was approximately 1000 pages (or 350,000 words) of transcribed text.

3.3.5 Bias, Reliability and Validity

One of the reasons that was stated earlier for the rejection of interpretivism, and the selection of CR as an overarching research philosophy, was the difference in the axiological approach to researcher bias. It was felt that, given the researcher's own background and experience, it was virtually impossible to totally avoid such bias in this study, but that it was nevertheless desirable to minimise it as much as possible. This view is summed up well by Galdas (2017, p.2) when he says, "Those carrying out qualitative research are an integral part of the process and final product, and separation from this is neither possible nor desirable. The concern instead should be whether the researcher has been transparent and reflexive". For him it is essential that there is an ongoing and constant critical self-reflection concerning the collection, analysis and presentation of the data.

In their paper on verification strategies in qualitative analysis, Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson and Spiers (2002, pp.13–22) made a plea that qualitative research should reject the moves that they had identified towards replacing in-study processes of verification and validity with the concept of post-study evaluation of "trustworthiness" - at that time something that was innovative and becoming popular. To help encourage this they recommended that five strategies which were designed to ensure both reliability and validity of data should be built into any study from the start. These strategies were, in essence, a series of self-reflective measures, and therefore this was seen as also being a sound approach to dealing with the issue of bias. It was decided that, where possible, they should be incorporated into this study. The strategies, and a brief description of how they were addressed in this study, are listed below:

- **Methodological Coherence.** These are the steps taken to ensure congruence between the research question and the methods and analytical processes and has already been discussed at length in the discussion on the approach taken to the design of the study (Section 3.3.1).

- **Appropriate Sampling of Participants.** It is important that the participants selected are those who best represent or have knowledge of the subject. Again, the way in which this was achieved has previously been explained.
- **Concurrent Collection and Analysing of Data.** This involves an iterative process, whereby the researcher continually analyses data as it is obtained, then reviews aspects of the study design based on thoughts that arise as a result of that ongoing analysis process. This was applied not only through the dynamic recruitment of participants described earlier, but also by taking a reflexive approach to reviewing new literature as it was revealed, and researching emerging aspects of cultural and historical relevance which might not previously have been seen as significant.
- **Theoretical Thinking.** This is best described as simply checking and re-checking the data. Any ideas or re-alignment of theories that emerged from the analysis of data collected later in the process, were referred back and verified in data collected early in the study. It is another iterative process that continues throughout the data gathering and analysis phase of the study.
- **Two-stage Theory Development.** Here Morse et al recommend that theory is developed through two mechanisms: (1) as an outcome of the research process; and (2) as a template for comparison and further development. In fact this strategy was not followed directly as, by following a CR philosophy, retroduction was the main theory development tool and it was not considered helpful to confuse the situation by imposing another process on top of this. The use of retroduction in particular was seen as being sufficient in terms of delivering reliability and validity through theory development, and hence helping to minimise bias.

3.3.6 Design Limitations and Generalisability

One potential limitation of the study design was the selection of a single case study stratagem, particularly one which examined such a unique phenomenon as the Israeli CMR. This potentially raises questions regarding the generalisability

(or perhaps better described as the transferability) of the findings. Yin (2014, pp.40–41) discusses this concern in some detail, acknowledging that case studies in general, and single case studies in particular, are often criticised for having too small a sample size for any findings to be applicable to a larger population elsewhere. However, he makes the point that this is only of concern if you are approaching the case study from a quantitative methodological perspective, where the aim is to achieve statistical generalisation. If, as is more common in case studies, the methodology chosen is a qualitative one then this does not apply. In these circumstances Hartley (2004, p.331) suggests that what is important is the detailed examination of the processes underlying the observed behaviour, and its context, and this should subsequently reveal theories which can then reasonably be proposed as being more widely applicable – achieving what she describes as, “analytical generalization”.

As noted in Chapter 1, part of the rationale for the study was that there was a desire to try to identify elements of the non-orthodox CMR found in Israel that might usefully be replicated in SSR programmes elsewhere. This would suggest that generalisable theories or practices are an essential aspect of what the study seeks to discover. In fact this is not entirely correct. Stake (1996, pp.7–8) makes a valuable point when he says that case study research (especially a study of a unique or revelatory case such as this) is really more concerned with “particularization not generalization” - for him the emphasis is on identifying what it is about such a case that makes it different from the others. This is very much the outlook taken in this study. That having been said, as has been stated, it is hoped that some aspects of what is discovered about the case of Israel’s CMR might be able to be applied elsewhere, so the notion of transferability cannot be entirely dismissed. This was one of the reasons why CR was considered to be an appropriate philosophical approach to embrace as it is extremely sympathetic to the concept of theoretical generalisation in case study research (Tsang, 2014). One aim of CR is to move generalisation from the empirical to the theoretical and hence to seek to, “produce explanations (theories) about the essences (properties) and exercise of transfactual, hidden and often universal mechanisms” (Vincent and O’Mahoney, 2018, pp.201–216). Nevertheless, it is

recognised that even those findings that are identified as potentially being transferrable – as having “analytical generalisability” – would require to be subjected to further research before being confirmed as suitable for implementation in any given SSR programme elsewhere (Hartley, 2004, p.331).

3.3.7 The Approach to Analysis

One problem that arises as a consequence of working within a CR philosophy is that there has been very little written about the way in which it should then be practically applied to the conduct of a study, including the analytical techniques that might be employed (Fletcher, 2017). This is ironic given that one of Bhaskar’s primary reasons for developing the philosophy in the first place was that he considered that other philosophies did not provide real world solutions – that they lacked the “seriousness” that he felt CR brought to research (Bhaskar, 2017, pp.8–9). Nevertheless, this is the situation and therefore for this study it was felt necessary to try to make use of an additional rigorous, practical regime of analysis that would still fit comfortably with the CR approach to research.

As an example of this, in his study looking at the design of business-related interviews, Willis (2019) used the CR process to examine how retroduction could be used to enhance the reflexive behaviour a professional body. The diagram that he produced to show the design used for the project’s analytical stages, helpfully provides an illustration of one way that different theory development approaches can come together in a CR study in a well-structured way. This diagram is shown at Figure 3-5.




Figure 3-5 A CR Project Design Employing a Variety of Theory Development Approaches

(Willis, 2019, p.454)

Useful lessons can be drawn from Willis’s design as, although he employed an inductive process in his initial coding rather than a deductive one, the idea of making use of a series of sequential steps, using different theory development approaches as appropriate, closely resembles the design required for this study.

To achieve a similar phased approach the decision was made to use thematic analysis (TA) as a technique, and to follow the 6-Phase framework recommended by Braun and Clarke (2006). The aim of TA is to generate themes or patterns in the data that specifically address the research question, and this seemed to sit well with the basic concepts involved in CR. The framework used is shown in Figure 3-6.

Phase	Description of the process
1. Familiarise yourself with the data	Read and re-read your data
2. Generate initial codes	Code your data in a systematic fashion, collating data relevant to each code
3. Search for themes	Combine codes into potential themes, gathering data relevant to each theme
4. Review themes	Generate a 'thematic map' of your analysis: do the themes need to be altered relative to your codes and data set?
5. Define and name themes	Keep refining the specifics of each theme, what is the theme called, and what its history is.
6. Writing up	For each theme, select extracts that 'capture' the theme, and make sense of them using academic literature.

Figure 3-6 Braun and Clarke's 6-Phase Framework for TA
(Braun and Clarke, 2006)

3.3.8 Summary

The first part of this chapter provided a brief examination of research methodology, describing the interconnection between ontology, epistemology and axiology. It then used the 'research onion' described by Saunders et al (2016) as a useful model to explain the various sub-levels of research design that must be considered. It went on to discuss the need for a coherent approach, under a single overarching research philosophy to ensure every aspect of the study is aligned.

The design of this particular study was developed by starting with the research question and then working out from the middle. In this way the decision to undertake a revelatory single case study led to using a qualitative methodology, with a deductive and reductive approach to theory development, embraced by a CR philosophy. The study took place along a cross-sectional time horizon, making use of semi-structured interviews with participants selected using both purposive and snowballing sampling techniques.

This approach has many strengths, not least that it is firmly focused on answering the research question, and that it sits comfortably with the researcher's own outlook on the subject. However, there is one latent weakness which lies with the apparent lack of practical guidelines for the use of Bhaskar's original CR philosophy in case study analysis. This potential issue was mitigated by the decision to blend the CR process with the practical 6-step TA framework advocated by Braun and Clarke (2006).

The next chapter looks at the implementation of that 6-step analysis process and examines the way in which it is used to derive the thematic map that can be used to provide specific answers to the question, How has Israel's CMR evolved from the founding of the state in 1948 to the present?

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4 RESULTS OF THE DATA ACQUISITION AND THE SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

As has been shown, Israel's CMR cannot be said to be an archetypical one that follows any accepted pattern or orthodoxy that is usually associated with more conventional western liberal democratic (WLD) states. Moshe Lissak, one of the founders of military sociology in Israel, made the point that whilst there are certain common features that mark Israel's relationship out as being cast from the same mould as these more established relationships, it also has many strikingly unique features (Lissak, 2001, p.395). Yet, despite this, Israel has remained a working democracy throughout its entire existence, with its civilian government always exhibiting full control over its military forces - or at least that is how it appears (Peri, 2006, p.18). It is through the analysis of the data collected from the interviews with Israeli elites in the field of CMR, that the study seeks to identify these differences, and to then determine how (if at all) this knowledge may improve the success rate of SSR programmes designed for post-conflict scenarios.

This chapter describes how the first five phases of Braun and Clarke's thematic analysis (TA) framework – familiarisation with the data, the generation of initial codes, the search for themes, reviewing those themes, and defining and naming the final themes that were selected – were implemented. In doing so it shows the practical details of how the TA framework was employed to examine the transcribed data, and to then reduce it down to the key elements which could be used provide answers to the primary and secondary research questions. First the issues involved with coding the data are discussed, and the manner in which the codes themselves were generated is explained. Next consideration is given to the development of the overall thematic map which seeks to graphically illustrate the results of the analysis, and how the higher level themes link directly to the research questions. Finally there is a brief discussion of the conclusions of the analysis process and the next steps that it led to.

4.2 Phase 1 – Familiarisation With the Data

The final data gathered comprised the 39 transcribed interviews that had been conducted with 37 different individuals. Whilst the transcription process itself was time consuming and laborious and generated a great deal of material to assimilate, nevertheless it produced an extraordinarily rich and informative dataset. All of this data related directly to the key areas of the relationship, which was derived from the extensive personal experience of the respondents in their respective fields. Although Braun and Clarke's tabular format (Figure 3-6) might suggest that familiarisation with the data takes place as the first phase of a six-part framework, in reality it was an ongoing activity that occurred continually throughout the analysis procedure. Familiarisation was achieved through personal involvement in the various tasks of conducting the interviews, transcribing the audio recordings, entering the data into spreadsheets, and then reading and re-reading the material as part of the iterative coding process and the TA as a whole.

4.3 Phase 2 – Generating the Initial Codes

Having already gained familiarity with the qualitative analysis software tool NVivo when using it to assist with the management of the Literature Review, it was decided to also use it for at least the initial coding phase because of its ability to cope with large quantities of material, and to enable multiple coding of single texts. Some experts have expressed reservations about the use of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) including Professor Virginia Braun, one of the co-developers of the TA framework employed in this study. Nevertheless, in this case it was considered that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. Supporting this decision, when Braun was questioned about her views during a Q&A session as part of a seminar on TA held at Bath University in February 2020 she did admit that there were circumstances when it could be helpful. In their book on qualitative analysis, Braun and Clarke (2013, p.220) do say that CAQDAS, "... if used in a critical, thoughtful, creative and flexible way that serves the needs of the project, driven by the

researcher, research questions and research design, have the potential to enhance the process and outcome of qualitative analysis.”

The decision on the choice of codes to use was not straightforward as there appeared to be a bewilderingly large number of approaches to take. In their paper on content analysis Hsieh and Shannon (2005) discuss this dilemma and offer some advice to researchers by considering three different approaches to coding – conventional, directed and summative. In conventional coding care is taken to avoid any preconceived categorisations and, after immersion in the data, the researcher just lets the codes reveal themselves. The directed approach uses a more structured process, either making use of existing theory or prior research to point towards a series of initial codes, which can later be added to or amended. Finally summative content analysis is a process that draws on qualitative techniques, searching for words or phrases in an attempt to explore usage rather than meaning. Conventional coding is best suited to situations in which there is little or no existing theory or literature on the phenomenon under investigation. That was not the case for this study and this approach was rejected as it was considered to be liable to result in some critical aspects being missed. Equally, summative content analysis was rejected as, with a broad field of respondents drawn from such a wide range of backgrounds, it was felt that coding based on the repeated use of specific words might not be effective given so many potential idiosyncrasies of speech. However, directed content analysis seemed to sit well with the work already carried out, which had led to the design of the CIPMIS framework and the extensive literature review that was based on it. It was anticipated that the six CIPMIS main factors might be able to act directly as prompts for generating the initial codes.

As a first approach to discover the best fit for these initial codes it was decided to test-code five interviews, one from each in the primary background categories Military, Political, Judiciary, Media and Academia. However, the result was not a great success as, perhaps unsurprisingly in retrospect, what was obtained was a set of high-level codes (referred to as nodes in NVivo) that looked remarkably like the CIPMIS framework originally used to construct the interviews: Cultural issues;

Specific individuals; Political issues; Civ-Mil roles; Structures; Conflict; and Legal issues. Unfortunately, the use of this basic application of directed coding proved to be too literal, and simply resulted in a circular progression that did not bring out anything new from the data. In an attempt to break out of this loop it was decided to start again using a slightly different method of directed content analysis, less specifically focused on the CIPMIS headings.

Saldana (2016) provides an extensive review of 25 different first cycle coding methods, grouping them by their various characteristics and discussing their various attributes, alongside recommendations for use with particular research approaches. He suggests that some of them are especially well-suited to certain research methods – for example open coding is an inherent part of the grounded theory method, and verbal exchange coding links closely with ethnographic studies. After much consideration it was decided that concept coding was most likely to meet the needs of this study as Saldana (2016, p.120) suggests that it works well with many different types of data and is especially suited to critical realism (CR). The actual implementation of concept coding is described by Saldana in the following way:

Concept codes assign meso or macro levels of meaning to data or to data analytic work in progress (eg a series of codes or categories). A concept is a word or short phrase that symbolically represents a suggested meaning broader than a single item or action – a ‘bigger picture’ beyond the tangible and apparent. A concept suggests an idea rather than an object or observable behaviour. (Saldana, 2016, p.119)

It was felt that this approach offered a much better chance of breaking out of the fixed thinking on CMR, and that it would help to move towards finding useful and creative themes later on. The process began well, with new initial codes emerging which were then named using the ‘bigger picture’ approach. However, after coding three transcriptions using this method, it was again clear that there was a danger of easily falling back into micro descriptive codes unless a concerted effort was made to particularly avoid this. In order to focus on the meso, conceptual,

abstract level the new codes that had been developed were re-named once more, this time consciously using more abstract titles. This lifted the thought process out of the elemental level and into consideration of broader constructs; it also worked well in helping the coding process to function more smoothly.

It should be noted that, as was previously mentioned in Chapter 3 under the heading, 'Working From the Middle Out – Methodology, Theory Development and the Research Philosophy', the deductive coding process can result in bringing in unwanted researcher bias. By making use of existing theoretical work Hsieh and Shannon (2005, p.1283) suggest that there is, an increased likelihood of identifying, "evidence that is supportive rather than non-supportive of a theory". They also warn that directed content analysis can lead to an overemphasis on theory that may "blind researchers to contextual aspects of the phenomenon". Whilst these limitations are acknowledged, nevertheless it was considered that the decision to make the early move from directly using CIPMIS as the basis for directed content analysis, to the more abstract analysis method of concept coding, mitigated strongly against them. Concept coding broadens the viewpoint of the analyst, allowing for the visualisation of a bigger picture, which thus helps to ensure that contextualisation is achieved (Saldana, 2016, p.119).

The codes developed over time, and the data, in the form of the transcribed interviews, were employed as the primary driver for the initial creation and subsequent elaboration of each code. An early idea that was found in one or two transcripts was often subsequently further substantiated in other transcripts. At other times an initial indication might later transform itself into a slightly different, although closely related, concept altogether. In one case the early instances of evidence failed to be corroborated elsewhere and, although it survived to the end of the initial coding phase, that particular code was not taken forward beyond this point.

By the end, a set of 14 new, abstractly titled, conceptual codes had emerged. An additional two codes were also employed that served the simple purpose of being holding places for anecdotes and other interesting comments, but they are not detailed here. Use was also made of a number of sub-codes to help better organise the content of what was in the main nodes, but these sub-codes continued to use descriptive titles. The 14

codes were given identifying letters from A to N and are shown in Table 4-1 (shown below) along with their associated sub-codes.

Code ID	Description	Sub-codes
A	The Prerogative of Governance	○ The need for external-independent advice
		○ The National Security Council (NSC)
B	The Nature of Contention	○ Historical development
		○ Military influence over security cabinet
C	The Nation as an Army	○ Is there a civil-military relations-mil divide at all?
D	The Tools for the Job	
E	The Singularity of Situation	
F	The Military Powerhouse	○ The independence of intelligence
G	The Irreproachable Soldierly	
H	The Indivisibility of Security & Politics	○ Ex-military in civil posts
		○ Military – advisors or advocates?
		○ Strategic direction
		○ The role of conflict in determining the relationship
I	The Impact of Personality	
J	The Freedom to Disagree	
K		○ IDF as a pillar of democracy

	The Fabric of Democracy	○ Judicial issues
		○ The role of popular opinion
		○ The role of the media
L	The Enigma of Politics	
M	The Convolution of Occupation	
N	The Apprehension of Ideology	○ Religion and the IDF

Table 4-1 A List of Codes and Sub-Codes

It was found that using the definite article at the beginning of each code provided a focus on the conceptual level and, additionally, the rhythmical nature of each title helped to avoid the dangers of falling back into simple descriptive coding. Each code was the product of an extensive examination of the data found across all of the transcripts. The number of individual references that provided the evidence for each code varied between, three for 'The Tools for the Job' (the code that did not survive the first level of analysis), and 306 for 'The Nature of Contention'; the mean was 97. As an example of how the evidence in the data led to the codes themselves, a small selection of the 65 references linked to the code 'The Nation as an Army' is shown in Table 4-2 (immediately below).

Ser	Respondent	Reference from transcript
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1	<p>P04</p> <p>A senior defence correspondent and analyst for a national daily newspaper.</p>	<p>The role the IDF plays in Israeli society you are aware of. When I mean, the extreme importance of it the way Israeli perception of the IDF is standing between us and, you know, a final, I would say annihilation, but any kind of a doomsday scenario. This is why Israelis emphasise the IDF so much. They emphasise their careers in the IDF, they talk - military affairs are the number one issue in Israeli media.</p>
2	<p>P07</p> <p>Ex-National Security Advisor (NSA) and Head of the National Security Council (NSC).</p>	<p>The fact of the matter is Israel does not have martial principles, martial traditions, we don't have... in Britain you have the exact opposite, among other reasons because of some of your regimental structure is territorially organised, so you have people with kinship and so forth. In Israel nobody remembers the flags, or the units, or the big battles, we have short memory and so Israel is the most non-heroic country.</p>
3	<p>P08</p> <p>Ex-Maj Gen, Ex-NSA and Head of the NSC. Leading commentator and government advisor of defence and security matters.</p>	<p>I do not foresee something like this happens [a <i>military coup</i>], at least in the next decade, and one of the main reasons why I don't believe that it will happen is because in the end of the day the IDF, contrary to other let's say professional Armed Forces, is based number one on mandatory service, so everybody has to serve in the army. So those who in the end of the day move up and become generals are simple ordinary people.</p>
4	<p>P14</p> <p>English news editor for one of Israel's main national daily papers.</p>	<p>... this is may be my biggest take on things here, I think that Israel has – the concept of civilians in the full sense of the term has not really developed here, and the distinction between a civilian and a non-civilian, not so much in the way that people who are critical of Israel think that.</p>

5	<p>P17</p> <p>Ex-Maj Gen in the IDF, later head of <i>Mossad</i>, and for a period of time after this, an MK.</p>	<p><i>[Discussing the blurring between concepts of 'military' and 'civilian' in Israel]</i></p> <p>And this is, this is because they served in the military, this is because until the age of 45 or something like that, being civilians, they continue to serve in the reserve forces – they can be in the reserve forces, Majors, Lt Cols, Cols – meaning they are involved in the material of the military.</p>
6	<p>P18</p> <p>Ex-Deputy president of the Supreme Court.</p>	<p>You know, in a country where everybody serves ... and everybody does reserve service, or many do, the military plays an important role in defending the country, and your children go to the military, mine all went to the army. So... and your father was, your grandfather, sometimes, you know in the younger generations. You feel the army everywhere but still, it's not a military country, so...</p>
7	<p>P19</p> <p>Serving MK who over a long career has held many ministerial positions. A past chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.</p>	<p>... there is something in the Israeli army that is different I think – yes, different from other armies in the following: that it is really what we call the people's army, in the sense that almost everybody has to serve – there are those people who excuse themselves in a shameful way, but it is normal in the country to serve – so in every house you have somebody who knows what happens there, that is built on reserve service for many, many years, 40 years you are reserve service – I just finished some time ago. So everybody knows, you can't hide – I mean you can sometimes, but you can't most things.</p>

8	<p>P21</p> <p>Ex-Maj Gen in the IDF and later NSA and chairman of the NSC.</p>	<p>... look, the military in Israel is different than in Britain and America. It's not a closed sect. It's not generations of officers. It's people who – and remember in every moment 20 percent of the people in the army are reserves, who tomorrow are going to be civilians again. The system cannot work without the civilians. In time of crisis and war the percentage of civilians is even higher. So it is different relations because it is compulsory service, everyone is in the army, everyone's son is in the army, everyone's daughter is in the army. It's not like, you know, America or Britain in which some circles of decision-makers many people didn't meet even one father of a military... I mean it is different.</p>
9	<p>P22</p> <p>Ex-president of the Supreme Court.</p>	<p>Israel is different. Different because the involvement of the people with the military is very strong, practically actually almost everyone has to serve, serve in the military. In every house they have information, stories, and what's very interesting is that even in times when the military actually failed in certain things, still would you see the polls... It's unbelievable. The trust of the people is incredible.</p>
10	<p>P25</p> <p>An Israeli academic specialising in national security studies. Previously he has been an advisor to Israel's NSC, and to two prime ministers.</p>	<p>I remember my daughter coming back from a shift in the army, she was - she served with 8200 in the intelligence - and she came to me once, it was three thirty in the morning, she says to me, "Father you don't understand, I own this country".</p>

11	<p>P28</p> <p>An ex-Maj Gen. former Deputy CGS. Now an MK.</p>	<p><i>[Discussing the conventional approach to CMR of keeping the military separate from civil society]</i></p> <p>Exactly. Not in Israel – for the good and for the bad. For the good – not much tension between military men and civilians, and moving from one career to another it's not so complicated. On the other hand, yes, there are lot of, you know, civilian values that penetrated, you know, the military arena and change a bit the military, not in a good way. Not in a professional way. So I would say that the IDF, basically, and this is the real secret behind it, the IDF is much more a militia rather than a professional military.</p>
12	<p>P29</p> <p>Ex-Head of the security division of the State Comptroller's Office</p>	<p><i>[Discussing the Israeli defence industries]</i></p> <p>They are the main in Israel. It means the connection. Research in the army. Those companies have combined persons. The officers are sitting in the companies, it is [unintelligible], and the reservists. Those who were yesterday in the army are today in the companies. These are connected. They have the same language, that is the understanding. It is much more than it seems to be, much more than it seems to be.</p>
13	<p>P31</p> <p>An ex-civil servant who has held the position of the DG of the prime minister's Office.</p>	<p>You know that the Israeli army is the army of the people - tzva ha'am in Hebrew - it is a very significant wording tzva ha'am. It means that the owner is the people...</p>
14	<p>P33</p> <p>Ex- minister of Justice.</p>	<p>And in a way, after all, they [<i>the IDF</i>]. are not completely detached of the civil society, so they have to take into account, and they have to understand – and they do understand the civil need. After all, they are not really detached. It is not a professional army as at the same time I think you have in Britain or the United States.</p>

15	<p>P34</p> <p>An Israeli civil servant and diplomat. He has held positions as the advisor to the foreign minister and also to the defence minister. Later served as an Israeli ambassador abroad .</p>	<p>... the IDF in Israel has played, and still plays, a very important social role in the state of Israel. It is a matchmaker – I would not meet my wife if we were not going to the same course in intelligence, and many of our friends, families, have been made through service. It is a driver for a melting pot in society. It is a driver for mobilising within a society – you can move up. I am still when I’m interviewing people for work – total civilian now – I will always ask what they did in the army...</p>
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Table 4-2 An Example Showing 15 of the 65 Transcript References Used to Develop the Code ‘The Nation as an Army’

Each code was developed the same way as this one, using a varying number of references drawn from differing respondents. The detailed numbers are shown in Annex G, Appendices 1 to 14. Each appendix also provides a brief description of the topics that the code covered and any previous names that it had been given.

After the initial run there still remained far too much data to handle, as even coding the texts under these headings and sub-headings had generated over 1300 separate coded references. It was decided that, for practical reasons, it was necessary to carry out secondary coding to bring the number of references to a more manageable level. The process consisted of re-visiting everything that had already been coded and identifying the most frequently recurring ideas, and those which came from the most trusted or influential sources, hence reducing the working references to approximately one third of the original number. At this stage it proved to be easier, and more helpful in terms of getting to know the data, to do this using manual methods rather than NVivo. The exercise involved reading through each piece of coded data and then moving the ones that were deemed significant enough to keep into an Excel workbook. The workbook held

separate worksheets for each initial code, and each reference was then recorded against its interviewee identification name, with a brief description of the role and background of the interviewee. This meant that each reference used could be identified by a specific ID comprising the worksheet letter and the serial number of the entry in the worksheet, eg N2, or F33. A sample of the workbook showing entries B50 and B51 from 'The Nature of Contention' worksheet is shown in Figure 4-1 .

Throughout the entire period of coding the data, notes were made on ideas and groups of thoughts that seemed to fit together – some obviously, others more subtly – and these later became the seeds of the themes. These ideas, and other thoughts and reflections, were recorded in a series of NVivo journals which proved invaluable later in recalling the decisions and choices that had been made along the way.

A	B	C
50	<p>P32</p> <p>A senior Israeli defence correspondent, both print and radio media.</p>	<p>Respondent: From my personal knowledge [unintelligible] it is a burden on the shoulders of the military. Having to find themselves entangled or stuck between those political parties and camps, not taking sides but being involved against their will and profession.</p> <p>Interviewer: But the IDF has always had a political view I guess...</p> <p>Respondent: But then, the situation is such, they take their own advantage of it. It is not a situation of 1982 when Arik Sharon was playing Menachem Begin – this cannot repeat itself at any circumstances. And Olmert it is a good example of that. Olmert had no background, less background than Begin in a sense, because Begin at least was a leader or a member of a fighting organisation – Olmert, I don't know what he did for his military service, nothing of substance. But the situation of 1982 cannot return and this is a good, good thing...</p> <p>Interviewer: But Arik Sharon was a unique character as well...</p> <p>Respondent: Yes, but it wasn't only Arik Sharon... It was Arik Sharon with Rafael Eitan, it was you know, the whole constellation came together, very successfully for their own... Not for us. But what I'm saying is that 1982 cannot repeat itself because we have matured, and because of the system that has better protected...</p>
51	<p>P33</p> <p>A senior Israeli academic in the field of Law who had previously held the position of Minister of Justice.</p>	<p>[Discussing how aspects of the civ-mil relationship have changed over the years since 1948]</p> <p>One big change was after the '67 war. This was the greatest change when the army acquired incredible power, at least for a certain period of time, and which I consider some of it was very detrimental, like the increase in military service... which the amazing thing was with such a big victory we are so strong, victorious, so the best thing would be, 'Well, now you can shorten the compulsory...' No, they went the other way, they increased after the Six-Day War they increase the military service from 2 and a half years to 3 years, which was I find absolutely crazy.</p>

Figure 4-1 - Example of Reference Spreadsheet Entries

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4.4 Phases 3, 4 and 5, Generating, Reviewing and Naming the Themes

Phases 3-5 of the TA framework described by Braun and Clarke (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.87) comprise searching for (Phase 3), reviewing (Phase 4) and then defining (Phase 5) the themes themselves. The aim of this process is to generate a small number of key themes which point towards an answer to the research questions. This whole process was very different from the coding stage as it proved to be much more of a cerebral, esoteric procedure than the still creative, but more procedural, technique required for coding. Braun and Clarke describe it well when they explain the difference between a theme and a feature of the data. Although both identify recurrences in the data:

... a theme has a central organising concept, which tells us something about the content of the data that's 'meaningful', something about how, and in what way, that concept appears in the data: it tells us something meaningful in relation to our research question.

(Braun and Clarke, 2013, p.224)

To start the process themes were initially developed by re-reading all of the second stage coding results, and then trying to draw out from them the essence of what was being said. This was done using A3 sheets and a pen as it seemed the most effective way to ensure an open-minded approach. The next step was to go through these paper code sheets identifying particular aspects that stood out as significant, and then to try to see the whole picture. This was achieved by putting them together on a wall, identifying connections that linked them in any way, and then drawing those connections onto the chart. The aim was to use visualisation of the whole picture as an additional tool to generate the themes. This procedure lasted about a week and a snapshot of the developing map is shown at Figure 4-2 below.

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Some of the initial themes were easy to identify as they were drawn almost exclusively from the evidence seen in just one or two codes. 'The Enigma of Politics' and 'The Apprehension of Ideology', for example, shared much common heritage and almost exclusively fed into a single initial theme that was given the provisional name of 'Religion & Politics'. However, the interactions of other codes were much more complex in nature and required more careful consideration. Although, as can be seen from the diagram, there was a great deal of cross-linkage, eventually, after a number of iterations, themes began to emerge. In total six initial themes were identified: 'Dialogue'; 'Democracy'; 'Personality'; 'Religion & Politics'; 'Our Army'; and 'Israeli Reality'. The result is shown in Figure 4-4, with 'The Tools for the Job' having been discarded altogether as there proved to be insufficient occurrences in the data to support it as a separate entity in its own right. The codes that they are primarily (but not exclusively) associated with, and from which the themes draw the majority of their supporting evidence, are shown feeding in to them.

By looking back to the original ideas behind the conceptual codes it was then possible to use that information to begin to construct a further tier of higher-level, or overarching, themes that summarised the ideas addressed by the themes. It was considered that 'Israeli Reality', as it already encompassed three codes, was broad enough that it could stand on its own at the overarching level, focusing on the situation. 'Dialogue' and 'Democracy', had significant cross-links between their primary codes, and these naturally came together as an institutionally focused group. 'Religion & Politics' and 'Our Army' were grouped, less because of any overlap at the level of the primary codes, but more because they sat comfortably together as they both dealt with social issues. The only real difficulty was with 'Personality'. This issue had been mentioned by a large number of respondents as being a key factor in much of the development of Israeli CMR – it was brought up in the transcripts of 32 of the 39 transcribed interviews - so it definitely required to be acknowledged in its own right. However, it was only supported by a single code, and was relatively small in terms of the number of individual references - only 113 compared to 771 for Dialogue and Democracy, 304 for Israeli Reality, and even 179 for Religion & Politics and Our Army. For

these reasons it did not seem appropriate for it to stand at the higher level on its own. There was an argument that, simply to balance out the groups in terms of numbers of references, it should become part of the socially focused group, and this had its merits. Equally, it was possible to argue that, as it was the aspects of personality that interacted with, or even interfered with, the proper operation of the democratic institutions that were of interest in CMR, then it should sit in that group. As it was considered that three was the correct number of overarching themes, it became clear that it would be best to leave 'Personality' unplaced, and to see if the solution became more apparent as the refinement process went on. The results of these amalgamations are shown in Figure 4-5.




Figure 4-4 Code Mapping to Initial Themes




Figure 4-5 The Initial Identification of Potential Overarching Themes

At this stage, it was considered helpful to re-think the original theme names to make them more indicative of the actual data that had generated them. In the case of Israeli Reality it was also decided to re-divide it, but this time into two, separating out the wider aspects of the ongoing conflict from the specific issues arising from the occupation. The re-named themes are shown in Table 4-3.

Original Theme Name	Revised Theme name(s)
Israeli Reality	The Occupation Changes Everything
	The Existential Nature of the Threat
Dialogue	The Dialogical Nature of Politics
Democracy	The Mask of Democracy
Religion & Politics	The Modern Tribes of Israel
Our Army	The Army is Us
Personality	The Impact of Personality

Table 4-3 Revised Theme Names

The three overarching themes also required appropriate and descriptive names and these were found by reaching right back into the original data to find relevant phrases that the respondents themselves had used. The aim was to try to follow Braun and Clarke’s direction and choose names that were meaningful with respect to the research question. Another assertion that Braun and Clarke make about working in this phase of their template was particularly helpful in developing the final map:

... this isn’t about telling the one true story about your data (there’s no such thing in qualitative research), but about telling a story that is faithful to the data (even if it moves well beyond the surface meaning, as critical, theoretically informed analyses often do). (Braun and Clarke, 2013, pp.233–234)

The result was the following three overarching themes:

- **The Concept of a Civilian is Underdeveloped**, comprising 'The Army is Us', and 'The Modern Tribes of Israel';
- **The Military Are the Power Behind the Throne**, comprising 'The Mask of Democracy, and 'The Dialogical Nature of Politics';
- **The Conflict Has Driven Events**, comprising 'The Occupation Changes Everything', and 'The Existential Nature of the Threat'.

A final decision was also taken regarding the location of the theme, 'The Impact of Personality'. It was considered that, notwithstanding the resulting imbalance in terms of the number of references, the logical place for it to sit was between the institutionally focused and the culturally focused overarching themes, not with the status of a full theme, but as a separate sub-theme with links to both groups.

It was at this point that the term 'Israel – the Same but Different' presented itself as a suitable overall description of the analysis of the data, coming out of a repeated experience of the respondents' reactions during the interview phase of the research. They would often begin by stating that Israel was just another democratic state like any other, and that they weren't really sure that there was anything in its CMR that might make it worth considering as an alternative to those of WLD states. However, by the time the interview was concluded (and often long before that point) they would be taking great efforts to justify governmental or military actions taken, decisions made, or policies ordained, which would not be seen as normative in other democratic states with more orthodox CMRs. They defended these actions by explaining that it was important to understand that Israel was different and that, therefore, different criteria applied there. Hence the encapsulation of their perspective of the situation in Israel as being, 'the same, but different'. The final resultant thematic map is shown in Figure 4-6.




Figure 4-6 Final Thematic Map

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4.5 A Summary of the Analysis of the Overarching Themes

The three overarching themes of the final thematic map in Figure 4-6, when taken together, graphically illustrate in big picture terms the response to the primary research question that the analysis of the data generated. However, whilst not specifically designed that way, it is interesting to note that the TA process also resulted in the situation whereby each individual overarching theme could be seen to relate directly to one of the secondary research questions.

4.5.1 The Concept of a Civilian is Underdeveloped

Although the title 'The Concept of a Civilian is Underdeveloped' may seem a little clumsy, it was taken directly from the mouth of one of the respondents [P014] and sums up the situation that the data revealed extremely well. The importance of the integrated nature of the military and the civil population to the success of Israel's CMR should not be underestimated. All of the retired senior military personnel interviewed saw their military service not simply as a profession, but also as their contribution to society; and conversely, even those who had only undertaken the minimum period of conscription still saw themselves as affiliate members of the IDF. In this sense the civil-military dynamic in Israel is completely different from anywhere else. All those interviewed, regardless of professional background or political or ideological outlook, identified as being part of that same corporate body to a greater or lesser extent, with none considering themselves to be entirely detached from the military. This has a considerable bearing on the level of tolerance that Israeli society has for the significant military presence that exists in everyday life, and it also affects their view of the acceptability of the influence the military are able to exert on the civil government.

The emphasis of this particular overarching theme was on the societal aspects of Israel's CMR, with its focus being on providing an understanding why Israeli civil society has maintained such positive attitude to the military. One relevant characteristic of the society that the data identified was the unique nature of the

intimate bond that the civilian population has with the IDF; in particular the idea of their having ownership of the army, rather than simply seeing it as just another state-run institution. This is a connection that is not found anywhere else. However, the situation is not a static and the relationship is not as strong today as it has been in the past. The reasons for this are complex and can be attributed to changes not only in Israeli society itself, but also in civil society more widely across the world. Nevertheless, the data highlighted one particular factor above all others that has contributed to the decline in the IDF's status. As a consequence of the occupation there has been a gradual transformation of the role of the IDF, and they have moved from being hailed as heroic defenders of the nation, to being seen as fulfilling the less reputable function of unsympathetic security guards and uncompromising paramilitary policemen. This has had a negative effect on the views held by the younger members of society to conscription, and it can no longer be taken for granted that individuals will commit to their requirement for subsequent reserve (Ben-Ari and Sion, 2005).

However, despite this, the IDF still remains above all others as the most trusted organisation in Israel, even amongst the young. Whilst it remains to be seen if this will continue to be the case if the army becomes embroiled in the ideological struggles between the secular and the religious elements of Israeli society, for now it would seem that the majority still consider the IDF to be apolitical and above such disputes.

4.5.2 The Military Are the Power Behind the Throne

'The Military Are the Power Behind the Throne' addresses some of the reasons behind Israel's pragmatic philosophy concerning the application of the principle of civil supremacy in a democratic society that is continually subjected to security threats. The phrase itself sums up the apparently paradoxical idea expressed by many of the respondents when they were asked to explain how Israel had avoided overt military intervention in the government throughout the lifetime of the state. There was frequent reference to the concept that Israeli society is democratic by nature, and this supports the view expressed in much

of the historically focused literature that democracy was embedded in the DNA of the Jewish population of Mandate Palestine, both civilian and military, even before the state was established (Cohen and Cohen, 2012; Peri, 1980; Schulman, 2003). For this reason, although the military have always held an unusually powerful position in Israel, they have not been seen to pose a direct threat to the civil government. Instead, the three-way relationship between the government, the military and the civil populace has developed in a way which has permitted democracy to flourish, and yet still allowed the military elites to exercise the authority that they believe is necessary to safeguard the state. At times this has led to claims of militarism, but the data would indicate that the situation in Israel does not align with Vagts' classic definition of militarism in which ones finds, "the vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions, and thought associated with armies yet transcending true military purposes" (Vagts, 1959, p.13). Rather such claims have only been substantiated when the term has been re-defined to fit the evidence, in the way that scholars such as Kimmerling (1993) and Ben-Eliezer (1998) have done.

In the specific area of military involvement in policy and decision-making it must be acknowledged that arrangements have been made that would be seen as unacceptable in the more orthodox relationships of western democracies. However, in Israel they have proved to be both practical and effective, and have resulted in the endurance of democracy and the avoidance of direct military intervention in politics. By allowing the military to engage closely with politicians behind the scenes, influencing government but not running it, the motivation for their seeking greater control of the state itself is diminished. Such an approach has its risks, but in the specific circumstances in which Israel finds they are risks that society seems willing to take.

4.5.3 The Conflict Has Driven Events

The final overarching theme, 'The Conflict Has Driven Events', brings together a consolidated view of the effect on Israeli CMR of a constant background of violence, whether large-scale conventional war with neighbouring states, smaller-scale cross-border incursions, or purely internal, but almost paralyzingly

effective, civil unrest. The continual presence of such conflict has been Israel's hallmark throughout its existence, and the theme embraces not only the existential nature of the external threats that have faced Israel since its earliest days, but also the consequences of the occupation of the West Bank and other territories in 1967. The significance of all of these manifestations of the conflict to the development of Israeli CMR was evident from the data, and a recurring characteristic was that almost all of the respondents used the dates of the major outbreaks of violence to establish the chronology of their narratives. This was the case whether they were being conducted with politicians, generals, judges, journalists or academics. From this, conflict was clearly identified as a major driving force in the development of Israel's CMR and the defence reform process that the state has experienced.

Whilst the direct effects of each of the instances of conflict clearly had an impact on Israeli society, and hence on its CMR, both the literature and the interview data pointed to the consequent formal investigations that took place as the being primary factor in almost every significant defence reform initiative over the last 50 years in Israel. This alone should be a reason for the designers of post-conflict SSR programmes to pay attention to Israel's CMR development, as the need to adapt to deal with an ongoing threats of the resurgence of violence is a issue that that they are also likely to have to address. The institutional aspects of Israeli CMR have been deliberately constructed to cope with the pressure that the constant presence of an existential threat creates. When coupled with the willingness to use the transparency of public commissions of inquiry to confront each crisis as it has emerged, it can be seen that this has been key to the continuing successful development of the Israeli CMR. Even though the recommendations of the inquiries have not always been adopted in a timely manner, they have, nevertheless, usually proved to have been extremely influential in bringing about significant change in the long term.

4.6 Conclusions

Working with the profusion of data gathered through the semi-structured interviews, this chapter showed how application of the first five phases of Braun

and Clarke's TA framework ultimately resulted in the production of the thematic map in Figure 4-6. The map shows, in a graphical form, what the analysis of the data suggests are the higher level, abstracted responses to the primary and secondary research questions. In CR terms the process first moved the study from the empirical level, that is the coding of the data gathered from the individual respondents by the identification of 'tendencies' or 'demi-regularities' that were observed, to the actual level. The next stage involved the use of abduction to interpret the coded data in a more abstracted way, which was then expressed as themes and overarching themes.

The final stage of the CR process is to move into the real level, employing retroduction to try to focus on the causal mechanisms that led to the original empirical observations, and then to try use these to provide more detailed answers to the research questions, which can ultimately generate challenging conclusions and practical recommendations. This activity begins in Phase 6 of the Braun and Clarke framework, which is intended to provide, "a concise, coherent, logical, non-repetitive and interesting account of the story the data tell – within and across themes", (Braun and Clarke, 2019, p.92). This is the subject of the next chapter, which discusses the results of the analysis, using the themes as the basis for a critical examination of the possible foundations of the development of the Israeli CMR. Employing retroductive evaluation, specific observations made by respondents are referenced against the literature and the theoretical ideas reviewed in previous chapters. In this way the chapter provides a detailed discussion of each of the themes, critically considering its relevance and potential for replication in other situations.

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5 DISCUSSION

5.1 Introduction – Israeli CMR: The Same But Different

Employing the critical realism (CR) philosophical approach, the analytical stage of the research took the empirical level of observable experiences, as recorded in the interview transcripts, and then attempted to make sense of them by sorting them and aligning them according to the, often hidden, linkages that were discovered. The result of this analysis was the thematic map in Figure 4.6, which employs the unifying conceptual idea of Israeli CMR being ‘The Same But Different’. The next stage is to more carefully consider the results of that analysis, with the aim of identifying the, “generative mechanisms (structural and social contexts) that naturally exist” (Meyer and Lunnay, 2013). It is that process that is described in this chapter.

The CR concept of using retrodution is to develop arguments which move from a description of a phenomenon to a description of the cause or condition that it instigated it (Collier, 1994, p.22). In this chapter this is achieved by linking the data provided by the respondents back to the literature, to reveal the key elements that have led to Israel's unique CMR. By examining the analysis of the data under the headings of the six themes in turn (plus the one sub-theme), a series of discussions points is considered, each of which highlights a specific underlying cause or condition. In total, 18 such points are raised. Whilst they are all related to the specific case of the Israeli model of CMR, it is at this point in the study that consideration is given to the relevance, or otherwise, that they may have to the difficulties involved with realising successful post-conflict SSR elsewhere.

5.2 The Modern Tribes of Israel

This theme is focused on the way in which Jewish history and tradition has impacted on Israeli CMR. In considering this, however, it is important to recognise that whilst Judaism might present to many on the outside as comprising a single homogenous group, in reality contemporary Israeli society encompasses people with a diverse set of backgrounds, cultures, religious

practices, and ideologies. Waxman (2012, p.3) has described this society as, “a hodgepodge of different groups constantly bickering with each other ... on every conceivable issue”. Reflecting this, the respondents’ views on cultural issues were colourful and wide-ranging. There were only a few who looked directly towards the Jewish aspect of society to provide answers to the questions presented to them, and most shared the opinion of one journalist [P032] who said, “I know we say we are the chosen people, and our circumstances are so different from others, but universally thinking ... every person and every nation each has its own story, and every story is unique”. Nevertheless, despite these apparent declarations of universalism and a common humanity, the data does reveal a deeper, possibly even deliberately concealed, feeling of the atypical nature of Israeli society.

Part of this is driven by the shared history and experiences of the Jewish people, which was clearly identified by many respondents [P035, P037, P020, P007, P009, P028] as being a major contributor to Israeli society’s attitude toward defence and security. They take it more seriously, and naturally tend to see it as a shared concern that overrides any other internal disputes, even above party politics. It was this all-absorbing focus on security that was highlighted by the respondents as the key aspect of Israeli culture that has been most significant in the development of the CMR – a characteristic which was reflected in Ze’ev Schiff’s reference to security as being ‘sacred’ to the Jewish people (Schiff, 1987). This can partly be explained by the ongoing conflict that the country has experienced since independence, which is discussed in more detail under the theme ‘The Existential Nature of the Threat’. However, much of it also derives from a collective identity which is based on a shared historical experience of insecurity, regardless of background or origin; it is this aspect of the ‘Jewishness’ of Israeli society that is important to CMR, and is something that is common to all Jews, whether religious or secular, Ashkenazi or Sephardi, new immigrant or native-born sabra (Halperin et al., 2008; Merom, 1999).

This can be seen in the attitudes to military service that were observed. A very recently retired senior IDF general [P028] argued that the lack of separation

between the military and civil society found in Israel was not, in his opinion, “a matter of Jewish culture ... more a matter of the very basic perception of what it is to be a citizen, and what it is to be a military man”. However, Cohen (2010, pp.59–62) has presented a discussion of the way in which the lack of a military tradition in the Jewish culture influenced modern day Israeli society which would suggest that actually, even if the general did not perceive it that way, the roots of these attitudes do go back into Jewish history. The permeability of the boundaries between civil and military in Israel contrast with the situation seen in many other more established democracies such as France, the UK or the USA, where definite separate military elites have formed. The notion that this difference is a function of Jewish traditions and culture was supported by the defence editor for an Israeli national daily newspaper [P004], who noted that, “Israel does not have martial principles, martial traditions”. Drawing on his experience gained from reporting on military organisations across the world, he compared Israel with other democratic countries such as Britain, saying that, “In Israel nobody remembers the flags, or the units, or the big battles, we have short memory and so Israel is the most non-heroic country”. All of this leads to three discussions points.

5.2.1 The Societal Melting Pot

The decision in 1992 by the Israeli government to give the lead on civil defence to the IDF was recognised by Elran (2016) to be a contentious one, given that this function is something that in most democratic countries would be outside of the military sphere and firmly led by the civil authorities. Whilst he was generally supportive of the decision, he did acknowledge that wider military involvement in aspects of civil life, such as the education of children and people with special needs, was particularly sensitive. Nevertheless, in the early days of the state, Ben-Gurion had insisted on the IDF becoming deeply involved in all aspects of society as a means of welding together the brand-new nation. Perlmutter (1969) has suggested that this aspect of the IDF’s remit was critical to the development of Israeli CMR, and much of his first book on the subject of military and politics in Israel was spent on this subject. Although this function is much less of a

priority now for the IDF than it was previously, it has still not disappeared entirely and the significant presence of the military in everyday civilian life is something that marks Israel out from other, more mature democracies and this was specifically addressed by several respondents [P028, P033, P034, P007].

The requirement for most Israelis, both male and female, to serve in the IDF has had a strong influence in the past on everyday life in Israel, and it continues to leave a deep mark on society today. At least one respondent [P034] referred to the fact that they had found their marriage partner whilst serving together in the IDF, and even now the nature and status of a young person's time in the military can affect their employment potential later on. That same respondent, an ex-Israeli ambassador now working in the not-for-profit sector [P034], further identified with the notion of the IDF as being a social melting pot, saying that when he interviewed people for jobs he would always ask what they did in the army as this was pivotal to his assessment of them.

The role that the army has traditionally played as the crucible for fusion in Israeli society has also had a profound effect on how individuals relate to the IDF after their period of full-time service ends. The bond that is created with those they served with means that Israel's experience of compulsory military service is very different from that seen elsewhere; the requirement for substantial reserve service only increases these connections. The distinctly Israeli style of reserve service was remarked upon by several respondents [P022, P008, P034]. The news editor of a Tel Aviv-based, left-leaning daily newspaper [P014] related that, several years before, whilst living in Austria for a short period, he was shocked to discover that although they also had compulsory military service there was no general feeling amongst the Austrian public of the military being a people's army as there was in Israel. He described military service in the IDF as an homogenizing force in Israeli society.

In the conventional approach to defence reform, in an effort to avoid military intervention in civil government, it is usual to try to work to detach military activity from civil society as much as possible (Huntington, 1957). This will include redefining the force as a distinct professional body, operating in areas away

from civilian affairs, focusing solely on external defence (Mannitz, 2013). Yet Israel's alternative approach has managed to produce a situation in which many respondents wanted to forcefully make the point that a military takeover in Israel in the foreseeable future is unthinkable [P022, P008, P014, P034], and none argued to the contrary. This would suggest that, rather than trying to achieve separation, there may be merit in seeking follow a route more closely aligned to Janowitz's ideas, and to try to integrate the military further into civil society, in this way breaking down the barriers between them (Janowitz, 1960).

Service in the IDF has come to be seen as a badge of national identity and it is something which has bound the nation together in spirit as well as in body (Cohen, 1995, p.244). Elsewhere, however, there will be many post-conflict situations, especially those in which the fighting has been internal or where the military is seen as an aggressor by the civil population, where it may not be easy to make use of comprehensive national military service to assist in generating social unity and creating a common identity. But, even in these circumstances, it may be possible to follow Ben-Gurion's example from 1948 and to disband all previous military organisations and to start afresh. Certainly the early positive experience of using the IDF to generate a feeling of national identity is an aspect of Israel's CMR that should be considered when looking at models for the state forces in any post-conflict SSR programme.

5.2.2 Politics and Religion in Uniform

Whilst Israel's historical absence of a military coup is one clear indication of the success that it has had in keeping the military out of politics, it is by no means the only indicator of a healthy CMR. Nor does it, by itself, preclude excessive military involvement in political affairs. The extent to which this is the case in Israel, and the effects such activity may have on the democratic nature of the state, are considered elsewhere under the theme 'The Mask of Democracy'. This theme deals with another aspect of politics and the military, which is the question of how much party affiliations, and the associated issues of religion and ideology, are manifest in the army. It is interesting to note that amongst the respondents who specifically commented on the presence of politics in the IDF,

those who were retired officers generally agreed with the view expressed by one ex-general [P008] when he stated that the military, “are not ideological and not influenced by political - any kind of political pressure - at least the IDF as I’ve known it since the 70s”. However, a number of politicians, journalists and academics still involved in the current civil-military scene looked at it from a slightly different perspective. They indicated that whilst they agreed that overt party political activity in the IDF had not been seriously seen since Ben Gurion’s time, they felt that more recently ideological (and to a certain extent religious) views were beginning to be expressed in the military once again.

Two individuals, one a serving MK [P037] and the other a news editor on a daily paper [P014], both separately suggested that one reason for this was the perceived support by the IDF hierarchy in the past for a permanent agreement with the Palestinians based on a two-state solution. Such a view is strongly opposed by the National Religious parties and would possibly explain the reason why there has been a definite rise in the number of members of the IDF who wear a knitted kippah being found in increasingly senior positions (Cohen, 2013; Levy, 2020). One ex-minister [P016] even went as far as to claim that this was part of an explicit attempt by the National Religious to infiltrate the higher echelons of the IDF and to directly influence their activities in the future. Whilst this might seem far-fetched, there were significant feelings of unease and apprehension expressed by some respondents (many of whom who had held very senior positions in the Israeli hierarchy) about the influence of the Religious Right in the IDF to suggest that there are genuine problems here [P010, P012, P032, P016]. An opinion piece in the left-wing Israeli daily newspaper Ha’aretz, in February 2015, entitled ‘Keep Religion Out of the Army’, highlighted that concerns about such matters are actually being discussed more widely today than ever before (Misgav, 2015). Taking it further, the data would suggest that problems also exist at the lower echelons of the army. Anecdotal stories were told by some respondents [P016, P023] of the problems that their children had related to them concerning the way in which religious and ideological differences were causing friction in the units themselves amongst the rank and file.

Whilst none of this can be seen as firm evidence of a fundamental problem with religion and politics within the Israeli CMR structure, equally it is a strong indicator that this element of the relationship is not an exemplar model. A useful conclusion to draw from this is that when a military force is as closely integrated into the civilian population as the IDF is in Israel, then it is very likely that any fissures that exist, or which develop, in civil society will also be reflected in the military. This must be a consideration for SSR programme leaders, and active measures must be considered to ensure that the military remains as apolitical as possible. It is not clear that Israel provides any useful examples of how this might be achieved.

5.2.3 A Military-Minded Society

Even in the most politically engaged democracies the average man on the street would struggle to name the minister of defence. However, in Israel this sort of topic is discussed daily in the popular newspapers and on television, so that everyone knows not who only the minister is, but also most of the senior generals, all by their first names. They probably also have an opinion on which two-star officer should succeed the current Chief of the General Staff (CGS) and what his attitude is to particular aspects of security policy (Cohen, 2016; Gross, 2016; O'Sullivan, 2018). It is this deep-seated connection between the military and the civilian population that all respondents were keen to emphasise, and it is touched on again under the theme 'The Army is Us'. The reasons that the public is so knowledgeable and interested in security were addressed under the theme 'The Modern Tribes of Israel', and this increased societal engagement inevitably has had a profound effect on the CMR.

One respondent, a former minister of defence [P002], was keen to emphasise how intimately engaged the Israeli public were with the operational decisions that he had been required to take, pointing out that most families have a member serving in the military - in other words, for Israelis security is personal. A retired Major General and ex-National Security Advisor (NSA) [P021] was very forthright in stating how important that link was, explaining that although in America or Britain most politicians were unlikely to have a close personal

connection to anyone in the military, in Israel, with compulsory service, "...everyone is in the army, everyone's son is in the army, everyone's daughter is in the army". This is a reciprocal link; it not only affects the way that the elites engage in security decision-making, it also helps to explain why the general public show such an extraordinary interest in these matters.

The public's knowledge of security affairs is translated into opinions, and in a democracy where votes count this will inevitably have an impact on the behaviour of politicians, as well as senior military officers who may have an eye to becoming politicians in the future. Whilst this could be considered to be an indicator of a healthy situation, acting as a check on both political and military excesses, one ex-government minister [P033] did express the opinion that the weight that was now given to public opinion had gone too far. He considered that government and the military leaders were often afraid to act firmly for fear of another public inquiry in which they personally may have to take the blame for any failures.

There is a balance to be struck between politicians paying respectful and appropriate attention to public opinion, and simply playing to populist agendas. Beyond the concerns expressed above by the ex-minister, Peri (2006, p.128) has suggested that on occasions ministers have deliberately given less than clear instructions to the military to avoid being subsequently held responsible for any adverse outcomes. Nevertheless, most respondents expressed the view that, over the years, Israeli governments have managed to strike this balance reasonably well, and that a knowledgeable and engaged public has resulted in greater transparency. This agrees with the majority of the literature, in which the suggestion is made that that such transparency has come about for two reasons. Firstly, it is a direct result of the historical and ongoing exposure to the constant background of violence and conflict. Secondly, it has arisen as a side-effect of the ever-present exposure to the military, either in the form of personal experience of service in the IDF or simply via the high level of reporting of security matters in the media (Hermann, 2019; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Sela, 2007). This is significant because a frequently promoted aim of SSR

is the delivery of greater transparency in security and defence matters (Ball, 2014; Chuter, 2011). It is not clear if it is the greater public interest in security in Israel that has caused the higher level of reporting of such matters in the media there, or if it is the other way around. However, either way, it is a positive feedback loop in which each aspect feeds the other, and it seems likely that any post-conflict SSR programme would benefit from the creation of a similar situation and the establishment of a means to sustain it.

5.3 The Army Is Us

The title of this theme was derived from the recurring references that the respondents made to a concept that at times seemed almost illusory - the idea that the people and the army are one. Even those who had spent some time thinking about this professionally struggled to explain it succinctly, but all were adamant that it was significant and that it was a positive notion. An ex-director general of the prime minister's office [P031] pointed to the common use of the Hebrew term *tzva ha'am*. Although this literally translates as 'the army of the people', he wanted to get across the depth of feeling that it evokes in an Israeli, suggesting that it should really be understood as meaning that, "the people actually own the army".

This statement is borne out by the definite sense that was expressed by some of the respondents that the IDF belongs to the citizens themselves more than it does to the state [P025, P031]. This feeling can be traced back to the origins of the IDF in the pre-state paramilitary organisations, and it is this historical narrative that has helped to create the current symbiotic relationship. Whether this almost mythical, communal status of the IDF is still valid today is hard to judge for certain, and there are those who believe that the reality of *tzva ha'am* no longer exists (Haaretz Editorial, 2012). Others, however, would disagree, claiming that the concept of ownership of the IDF by the people is still a reality in contemporary Israeli society (O'Sullivan, 2018). Nevertheless, whichever is the case, *tzva ha'am* remains a frequently heard expression on the streets, and it is one that was used quite often by the respondents. The term 'militia' has been used by scholars when trying to get across the extent to which the civil

and the military aspects of Israeli life are intertwined in the IDF (Ben-Eliezer, 1995; Michael, 2007c). This was reinforced by the, perhaps deliberately provocative, statement made by a political science professor [P025], when he suggested that the IDF should really be seen as a cross between, 'a militia and a youth movement' – an view which is considered in more detail later under the theme 'A People's Army'.

What is clear is that the Israeli public simply see the military, and military service, as part of everyday life. An intriguing insight into this was put forward by one of the journalists interviewed, and it proved to be a thread that ran through many of the other respondents' contributions on this theme. The respondent [P014], who was brought up and educated in the US, was quite clear that the Israeli public's relationship with the military is definitely unusual, and that it doesn't follow the, "same kind of paradigms", found in other western-style democracies. In trying to explain why he thought this was the case he made the philosophical comment that, in his opinion, the concept of civilians had not really developed in Israel, and that for most Israelis there is no real distinction between a civilian and a soldier. This was the source of the title of the overarching theme that embraces both culturally-focused main themes. From it two discussion points arose.

5.3.1 A Position of Trust

In independent polls Israelis consistently place the IDF at the top of their list of the most trusted organisations in the country, and although the absolute level of support has declined over the years, the military still remains uppermost in such polls (Tiargan-Orr and Eran-Jona, 2015). This fact was widely recognised by the respondents, with statements such as that made by a retired Major General and ex-*Mossad* chief [P017] being commonplace. He said, "The military is the most trusted body in Israel, by far, of all the other bodies, including the government, including the Knesset, including the Supreme Court". Although none of the respondents managed to give an entirely coherent and logical explanation as to why this was case, the one refrain that they returned to time and time again was that it came from a feeling of ownership of the IDF, - an intimacy with the military

in which the army is seen as 'us' not 'them' [P022, P025, P031, P008, P014, P023, P034]. From this it is possible to see how, even if trust in such groups as politicians, judges and journalists is tainted by the feeling that they are out for themselves, or at the very least working to their own agendas, if the army is seen as being 'us' then, naturally, we find it easier to trust ourselves than others.

There is also a second element to the reverence of the IDF, and that is that Israeli society has an almost desperate need to have faith in the capabilities and effectiveness of the military, as ultimately their safety and well-being depends on it in such a high threat environment. Whether or not the threat to Israel is as genuine as it is so often proclaimed to be by the government is of far less importance than the perception by the civil population that it remains existential (Porter, 2015). What is particularly noteworthy is that the high level of esteem is maintained even though much of the population possesses first-hand knowledge of the system in all its, often inglorious, reality. When asked why this might be, a retired president of the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) [P022] replied, "I think they need it. I think they need it. It's a need to believe, you know, security". This was a view that was echoed by several other respondents, almost all of whom approved of this situation [P034, P021, P002].

There was only one respondent who was critical. A senior print and radio defence correspondent [P032] believed that the presence of such high regard for the military, and the faith that the public placed in their ability to fix all their problems, was not a positive indicator of a nation's democratic progress. Nevertheless, a key aspect of post-conflict SSR is often to reverse a situation in which the military is despised and mistrusted by the population, and establishing a relationship between the civil population and the military similar to that found in Israel would be considered to be a desirable objective (Keane and Bryden, 2010; Schnabel, 2009). If, rather than being held at arm's length, the armed forces of the state could be drawn closer to its civil population (ideally to the point where they are two aspects of the same body of people) then the example of the IDF would suggest that better relations between the two could be the result. For this to occur, however, this there does require to be a baseline to

start from - one in which the military do not already have a reputation as being corrupt, or acting as a tool of government repression. This is not often the case in a post-conflict environment, and in such circumstances a complete reinvention of the military may first be required, in a similar manner to the reform of the police force in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement (Caparini and Hwang, 2019).

5.3.2 A People's Army (*Tzva Ha'am*)

As previously noted, the concept of the IDF as a militia force was raised by many of the respondents, and it is also a term that is used occasionally in the literature (Cohen, 1995; Levy, 2007; Peri, 1983). However, would not seem to be an appropriate expression to use to describe the nature of such a technologically advanced military organisation as the IDF of today, which clearly operates so effectively on the modern battlefield. In attempting to arrive at a better description of the true character of the IDF, respondents were asked to try to express their views in clear, simple terms, but all struggled. The closest any of them came was perhaps an ex-minister of Justice [P033] when he explained his understanding of the way in which the military interact with the civil population by saying that, for him, they existed, "inside society". Others resorted to relating personal experiences in an effort to explain the closeness that the system brings about between the people and the army in Israel. In one of these a respondent [P025] related an event that he considered summed it up well. His daughter had returned home from her army service in the early hours of the morning, after a shift with the highly sensitive intelligence unit that she was part of. When he expressed his surprise at her exceptional dedication to her obligatory military duty she just sighed, saying, "Father you don't understand. I own this country".

In Israel the notion of mandatory military service, and the consequent ongoing reserve liability, is not seen by the majority of Israelis as being an additional burden or a hindrance to one's civilian aspirations, but simply as part of their social responsibility. Cohen (1995, p.244) went so far as to describe it as being seen, as an, "essential rite of passage towards full Israeli citizenship". This situation has come about not by accident, but most definitely by design; it was

part of Ben Gurion's plan from the beginning and it has continued ever since and has strengthened the IDF's commitment to democracy. One retired Major General and ex-NSA [P008] suggested that one reason that a military coup in Israel was such an unlikely event was that the generals were, "simple ordinary people", who were seen as just another part of society. But times change and, certainly in academia, there has been some discussion in recent years as to whether it might be time to move away from mandatory service, and instead create a wholly volunteer force (Levy, 2004). Despite such intellectual debates, however, although small incremental moves towards a more professional force may continue to be made, it is unlikely that any government will make significant changes in this respect for the foreseeable future, and it remains a key element in maintaining the strong bond that exists between the IDF and civil society (Cohen, 1995).

Closely linked to the subject of conscription is that of reserve service. There was very little criticism of this requirement from any of the respondents, and most saw it simply as a necessity of life, whilst recognising that it did have implications for Israeli CMR. One ex-ambassador [P034], in trying to explain why Israeli reserve service was different from that found in other democratic states, said that it was, "in the psyche of the people, in their hearts". Although most of the respondents were old enough to have finished any obligatory service requirements themselves, many had sons or daughters who were still reservists, and although they were positive regarding their own reserve service, they did hold more varied opinions regarding their children's experiences. One former Deputy CGS [P028] summed up the general feeling regarding the Israeli system of conscription and reserve service. He expressed the view that it was, and continued to be, a vitally important aspect of Israel's success as a nation, and that if maintaining it meant that there was a price to pay in terms of a reduction in military effectiveness then, for the sake of national cohesion, it was one worth paying.

The idea of the bonding of the civil population closely to the military, of the army being part of the 'psyche of the people', has been realised in Israel without the

creation a classically militaristic society. The nation's military force has become an organ of the state in which all of society consider themselves to have a stake - or even feel that it belongs to them and not to the state at all. Several respondents suggested that this interdependence greatly diminishes the chances of direct military intervention in civil politics [P008, P017, P021]. Israel's experience would suggest that it is possible to create a situation in which the close interdependence of civil and military, rather than leading to a militarisation of the state, actually produces a military that is held in high regard and respected by the populace. As such, there is no reason why this should not be a practical and achievable primary objective of the reform process in many SSR scenarios.

5.4 The Existential Nature of the Threat

The constant presence of conflict - whether large-scale conventional war with neighbouring states, smaller-scale cross-border incursions, or purely internal, but almost paralyzingly effective, civil unrest - has been Israel's hallmark throughout its existence, and it is at the heart of this theme. When discussing the reason that CMR in Israel is so different from elsewhere one respondent, an academic [P025], made the point that although in world history there have been long periods of war in the past, these were all before the advent of freely elected governments, freedom of speech, and an inquisitive media. For him, Israel's experience is unique in that there has never been a modern society that has been at war for this length of time, and hence the way in which it has developed its CMR is equally exceptional.

The Jewish historical experience of constant persecution, culminating in the Holocaust, means that Israelis have good reason to see themselves as literally fighting for their very existence, not just individually, but collectively. This has generated an emotional link between the civil and military aspects of the state unlike that found anywhere else - as one retired diplomat [P013] explained, people consider the army as, "a substitute to God – the second God to religious people, probably the only God to secular people". At some stage during almost every interview the impression was given that Israel was misunderstood by the rest of the world - that the state had been born out of conflict, that it had

continued to be shaped by conflict ever since, and that this was something that those living elsewhere could not fully comprehend. As one defence correspondent [P004] was keen to emphasise, for all Israelis the very real possibility of conflict – conflict in their own neighbourhoods – is their number one concern.

Within the continuum of this confrontation each distinct violent eruption has acted as a catalyst for a significant change in society in general, but even more specifically in the way in which the three elements of the CMR – the politicians, the military and the people – regard one another (Michael and Even, 2016). A characteristic of almost all of the interviews, whether with politicians, generals or civil society representatives, was the use of the dates of the major outbreaks of violence to establish the chronology of their narratives. Despite this, closer analysis of the data suggests that it was not the conflicts themselves that initiated the reforms that brought about real changes, but the public inquiries that followed them. Excellent examples of this are the changes that resulted in the areas of both strategic intelligence and the creation of a National Security Council (NSC) that eventually came out of the Agranat Commission after the 1973 war. Two further discussions points were drawn from this theme.

5.4.1 A Choice Between the Army and Armageddon

One reason that the close relationship between society and the IDF has been consistently maintained over the years is the enduring likelihood of yet another outbreak of a shooting war on Israel's borders (Eran-Jona, 2015b). This has been compounded by the added pressures of the severity of the possible consequences should Israel lose such a conflict. One journalist [P004] used quite stark terms to highlight the prominence of this, talking of the perception of the Israeli public that the IDF is standing between them and annihilation - what he described as, "a doomsday scenario". This is significant because the presence of a credible existential threat can greatly increase the level of influence a democratic society will permit their state's military forces to exercise before it begins to protest (Cotter, 1953).

A frequent direction that conversations took during the interviews was that it was not helpful to try to look at things in Israel from a western liberal democratic (WLD) standpoint. One retired diplomat [P034] spoke of his frustration over this, comparing the distant expeditionary campaigns waged by the western democracies with Israel's wars which, of necessity, been conducted in their own backyard. For him this was the reason that most Israelis, even those who in principle supported the concept of a separate Palestinian state, feel that they cannot leave the Occupied Territories as they fear they would then be overwhelmed by enemies who seek their total destruction. Voicing similar views to this, the majority of the respondents from across all backgrounds and political persuasions agreed that security was not an area in which anyone in Israel is prepared to take risks. One consequence has been that the public are willing to accept that the military must be permitted certain freedoms to ensure that they are capable of defending the state.

There were a few of the more left-leaning respondents who were of the opinion that the warnings of a continuing existential threat that the government regularly employ to justify security measures did not accurately reflect the true situation [P023, P028, P032, P036]. One retired Major General [P028] was convinced from his own experience of serving in senior positions in the IDF that the threats today are much lower than they have ever been, so much so that the military could actually afford to be "less effective" than in the past. The one ex-prime minister [P036] who was interviewed agreed, suggesting that fear was being stoked up by the current government solely as a means of justifying to the public the continued control of the Occupied Territories. However, whether the threat is real or not, if the public believe it to be so then high levels of military intervention will continue to be acceptable.

Linked with this, one academic interviewed [P025] saw the failure of the peace process of the 1990s as having been an additional factor that underpinned this outlook. He believed that the overwhelming majority of Israelis now considered that the conflict would not be over in their lifetime, and that as a result there was a normalisation of the continual presence of conflict in the minds of the

population in general. When a society begins to accept conflict as a routine part of daily life then the basis on which the nation's CMR is determined is fundamentally altered. It is possible that if the military are able to develop a better relationship with society, from this can emerge a greater willingness by society to accept the military's involvement in affairs of state (Rosen, 1995, p.30). In many instances this leads to militarisation of the state, and even in some cases a military-led government, and yet this is far from the situation in Israel today. The reasons for this are complex and are considered in more detail under the themes 'The Army Is Us' and 'The Mask of Democracy', but it does show that such outcomes are not inevitable.

The data indicates that the gravity of the threats facing Israelis has greatly affected the relationship that they have developed with their armed forces. The persistent presence of an existential threat is one reason why Israel's approach to CMR is perhaps a more relevant model to draw upon when developing a post-conflict SSR programme than those found in most western liberal states today. A question does remain over whether or not a greater acceptance of military intrusion into civil affairs places the long-term democratic nature of the state in peril, but the evidence presented here would seem suggest that such a situation is avoidable if other mitigating factors are also present. These may be such things as a strong perception by the civil population of ownership of the military, or if civil society possesses a deeply ingrained democratic nature – both of which are seen in the case of Israel.

5.4.2 It's Not the Wars It's the Inquiries

The use by the respondents of the major conflicts as reference points throughout their interviews was almost universal – the 1967 Six Day War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1982 First Lebanon War being the most frequently cited. One retired diplomat [P034] identified the 1967 war as a significant point of change - a time after which the generals and the politicians ceased to be close acquaintances, and fellow members of the same political party (*Ma'pai*). It is clear that much did alter for the IDF as a result of the acquisition of territory. Nevertheless, since it had been a great victory there was

no real interest at that time in making changes to a systemic model that had delivered such a successful outcome. Hence, in terms of CMR no significant reforms occurred as a result. However, the 1973 war, it is generally agreed, shook Israel more than any other conflict, both politically and socially, and in contrast to 1967 it materially affected CMR in many ways (Bregman, 2016; Peri, 2000). Several respondents highlighted that it can be considered to have been the origin of many of the most important reforms that have shaped Israeli CMR [P017, P034, P009]. One politician [P015] voiced a commonly expressed view when he said that it was at this time that people began to lose confidence in the invincibility of the military that they had previously venerated. After 1973, for the first time, the IDF were seen to have feet of clay.

The importance of the subsequent Agranat Commission was emphasised time and time again by the respondents. For one veteran general and later politician [P013], it was only as a result of Agranat that the fundamental and relatively elementary concept of the CGS being under the command of the government began to be understood by either the military or the politicians. Similarly, another retired Major General and ex-Head of *Mossad* [P017], noted that the commission was the first time that the issue of the chain of responsibility was openly addressed. Whilst acclaim for the outcome of the Agranat report was not universal amongst the respondents, there were more positive comments about its effectiveness than are generally to be found in the literature (Cohen and Cohen, 2012, p.86; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989, p.209; Peri, 1981). In particular, there was widespread agreement that one of the most significant, and perhaps most plainly visible, results was the passing by the Knesset of *The Basic Law: The Army* in 1976. However, although the Law did attempt to tackle the challenging question of relationships and responsibilities, despite the clarity with which Agranat had laid out the issues, this legislation never really grasped them fully. Cohen and Cohen (2012, p.88) are quite critical of the law, and most respondents, although more encouraged by its achievements, did also admit its inadequacies. Additionally they recognised that the attempts to deliver many other recommendations made by the commission had been less than

completely successful. In considering this they often cited wilful obstruction by the IDF as being one of the prime reasons for the failures.

One significant area in which the military refused to concede ground was with regards to Agranat's criticism of the monopoly on intelligence that the IDF held at that time, and the way in which it looked to improve this by bringing in other ministries and agencies into the field. Although some small success was eventually achieved in terms of improving interactions with *Mossad* (and to some extent *Shabak*) nevertheless, many respondents were clear that even now this has not fully been implemented [P018, P011, P008, P021, P007, P033]. Several of these also identified Agranat as being the first time that a recommendation had been made for an NSC to be created to provide additional advice to the prime minister and the cabinet. Very little came out of this either in the immediate aftermath of the report, nevertheless, the seeds of this institution were sown here. A much deeper consideration of these two important areas is provided in under the theme 'The Dialogical Nature of Politics'.

Another conflict that was frequently raised by the respondents was the First Lebanon War of 1982, which resulted in the IDF being drawn into a long-lasting, and increasingly unpopular, occupation of Southern Lebanon (Hamilton, 2011). Much of what was seen to have arisen concerning CMR was connected with Ariel Sharon's actions as minister of defence during the operation – an issue which is specifically addressed in the theme 'The Impact of Personalities'. Overall, there was a strong consensus that the political and social upheaval in Israel in the 1970s and 1980s, as consequence of the conflicts that took place during this time, led to some of the most significant demands for reform that the state has seen (Bregman, 2016, pp.148–150). This was in part fuelled by the public inquiries into, and critical media reporting of, the Yom Kippur and First Lebanon wars (Haaretz, 1974; Limor and Nossek, 2019; New York Times, 2008). However, there was an equal level of agreement that it was not until after the turn of the millennium that many of the recommendations that were made actually began to be implemented.

There was also some discussion of the events surrounding the Second Lebanon War of 2006, which lasted for just over a month and ended in stalemate, with both sides claiming victory (Bregman, 2016, pp.265–308). Compared with the respondents thoughts on the Agranat report, there was far less unanimity amongst them concerning their views on either the validity or the value of the recommendations made by the Winograd Commission of inquiry that looked into that conflict (Haaretz, 1974; New York Times, 2008). The main accomplishment of the Winograd Commission was that it revitalised many of the recommendations that Agranat had made thirty years before, and which had still failed to be addressed. By 2006 attitudes in Israel had changed, and there was a much greater willingness amongst the public, and the political opposition, to openly criticise the actions of both the government and the IDF during a conflict. As a consequence, although the war itself was perhaps not particularly significant for CMR in its own right, the actions that followed it were, and generally the respondents were in agreement that it can be considered as a substantial driver of events in that respect.

Whilst it was these major conflicts that punctuated the narratives that the respondents articulated, the primary impact of them was simply to have changed the perspectives of those involved - but not the apparatus through which those new perspectives could then be enacted. It was the inquiries that followed them that led to the first signs of concrete modifications to the mechanisms that determine the way in which elite civil-military interactions take place in Israel. However, even these inquiries have not always met their ultimate objectives, and many of the attempts that were made to legislate a more stable foundation for CMR have still not come to fruition. The primary successes that did arise from this process – the Basic Law, the limited widening of the intelligence base, and the establishment of a legal requirement for the NSC – all took a long time to come about, and are still works in progress (Cohen and Cohen, 2012). Nevertheless, the strength of the Israeli system is that there were mechanisms in place, supported by a strong judiciary and a vocal parliamentary opposition, that allowed the formal independent inquiries to take place. It was this that ensured that it has been possible to gradually effect improvements,

even given the often intractable resistance of the IDF to such moves. If a similarly unorthodox CMR were to be effectively implemented elsewhere then investment would also need to be made in ensuring that such public scrutiny of security matters was also possible.

5.5 The Occupation Changes Everything

Whilst belief in some form of existential threat has been constant throughout Israel's entire existence, the way in which it has been manifest has not (Yair, 2014). The theme 'The Occupation Changes Everything' is concerned with the extent to which the effects of Israel's overwhelming victory in the 1967 Six Day War, and the subsequent occupation of the West Bank and other territories, altered the nature of its CMR. A large proportion of the respondents saw the occupation as being a major reason for the absence, or distortion, in Israel of many of the norms that exemplify the more orthodox relationships of WLD states. This view was summed up by one academic [P011] who suggested that it was the presence of the occupation that made Israeli CMR so different because, "...the military is involved in the political – and the most critical political issue". Nevertheless, whilst there was almost universal acknowledgement amongst respondents that the significance of the occupation could not be denied, views on the specific ways in which it impacts CMR differed. A few saw the biggest challenge as an increasingly negative influence on the willingness of the youth to serve in the IDF [P019, P023]; others focused more on the changes that it has wrought within the military itself, and the IDF's subsequent relations with the rest of society [P011, P008, P025, P033]; and some were also concerned with the way in which it has drawn the military into politics [P008, P015, P019]. This theme produced two discussion points.

5.5.1 Heroes or Oppressors

Up until the 1967 war the IDF had predominantly been concerned with protecting Israel's borders from incursion by external enemies. However, from the moment that the ceasefire lines were agreed it also became an army of occupation, with all of the accompanying complications that brings. It could be argued that this was the turning point when, in the international community's

eyes, Israel moved from being the victim to the aggressor. Bregman (2016, p.96) describes the outcome of the Six Day War, and the start of the occupation, as having being the point at which the seeds of conflict and division within Israeli society were sown. Many respondents agreed with this analysis, giving examples of how it had played out within their own experience. Two cited the bad experiences that their children had had during their military service. One related how his son had returned home one weekend and said, “Dad I’ve got to leave this country”, and when he asked him why, he explained how his reserve unit had been involved in arresting a 12 year-old boy for throwing stones, whilst the mother and sisters stood by screaming. He said, “I don’t do that anymore. I never want to do that again” [P023]. The respondent went on to say that, “... there were religious kids who were settlers in my son’s unit, and regular kids. And they don’t like each other. So that unity of purpose {shrugging} [is not there anymore]” [P023]. The other, a politician from a right-wing party [P019], similarly told a story of his son who had been put on a checkpoint in the West Bank and had considered that his orders required him to treat ordinary Palestinians in a degrading way. Again, for him this created a feeling of resentment and conflict with the authorities leading the state that he was supposed to be serving.

One older respondent [P023], a veteran left-wing defence journalist who had grown up in pre-1967 Israel, saw the Six Day War as a major milestone that marked a change in the attitude of society towards the army. He pointed to the way in which, during the early days of the state, on Independence Day there would be pictures of the prime minister and the CGS in the street. He contrasted this with the outlook towards the military that his own children displayed, with both of his sons finding that their reserve service now required them to act as overseers of a beleaguered Arab population in the West Bank. Another, a long-serving political figure from the centre-right [P019], related a similar experience, with both of his sons complaining that they did not feel that they were contributing to the defence of their country, rather that they were being asked to be the public face of Israeli aggression on the checkpoints and barricades of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs).

The same politician had himself served many times in the heart of government, and his perspective on the difficulties that the occupation caused to Israel's foreign relations was particularly noteworthy. He expressed the view that Prime Minister Netanyahu failed to comprehend that it was not Israel in general that the rest of the world had problems with, but their attitude towards the Palestinians. He related how in many conversations he had tried to persuade the prime minister of this, but to no avail and, whilst admitting that he did not have any easy solutions himself, he concluded, "I know one thing, if I were there people would know that I want to fix it. I don't think he wants to fix it". The one ex-prime minister interviewed [P036] also pointed out that it wasn't only that the posture of the IDF changed in 1967 when they became an occupying force, but that since then the world itself had gradually changed. He suggested that what may have been acceptable 60 years ago is now unacceptable in the present international political arena. This was reflected by an ex-minister of defence [P002] who spoke of his concern that in recent years IDF commanders, as well as politicians, were being accused of war crimes by the international community. At present, because of complications regarding the Palestinian statehood, no formal investigations have yet begun by any international courts (Gilboa, 2020). Nevertheless, such pressures have caused the military to be more cautious in their approach to operating in the OPTs and into Gaza, focusing on the image that they project to the outside world (Yarchi and Ayalon, 2020).

As has already been noted, the world is a different place today than it was 60 or 70 years ago, and the change in attitude over that time towards the IDF, both by Israeli society and the international community, cannot solely be ascribed to the occupation. However, it was credited so frequently by the respondents as being the primary cause of friction in Israeli CMR that its significance has to be acknowledged. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how consideration of these circumstances can be reflected in any prospective replication of elements of the Israeli CMR into post-conflict SSR programmes. The precise circumstances are unique to the Israeli-Palestinian situation and a comparable situation is unlikely to be encountered elsewhere. However, it should at least be apprehended as an example of how the image that a force projects can be as important as any

actions that it might take. This is something that the IDF have recognised, but perhaps belatedly (Peri, 2007).

5.5.2 More Than Soldiers

The situation with the OPTs is unusual in many respects, but it is the legal status more than anything else that causes the CMR to become distorted. Under international law, because the IDF are officially an 'occupying force', they are responsible for administering justice. As Cohen and Cohen (2012, pp.97–99) observe, this has resulted in, "an anomaly inherent in the degree of military autonomy enjoyed by military commanders in the region". This was referred to by many of the respondents, but in particular by the legal professionals interviewed. One ex-president of the ISC [P022] was particularly vocal on the subject, remarking that the arrangements that were had originally been put in place in 1967 had only been expected to be temporary, and yet 50 years later they were still in operation. One consequence of the semi-permanent employment of regulations that were designed for short-term oversight is that the IDF have been drawn into acting as civil police. Even worse, as one politician [P019] was keen to make clear, they are, "dragged into, pushed into, pulled into decision-making that is political".

Yoram Peri (2005) has discussed this particular issue at length, pointing out that not only are the military likely to be drawn into determining policy simply by their better access to information and greater capacity for analysis, but also because the politicians are happy to be relieved of the responsibility. For him, this is a burden that the IDF leadership has had to bear as a consequence of, "the traditional functioning style of Israel's political leaders, who issued obscure instructions, failed to give clear directives, and avoided presenting specific political goals" (Peri, 2006, p.128). One respondent, a retired Brigadier General now working as an academic [P020], agreed, saying that, "In a divided society, united only by disagreement, the Israeli governments find it difficult to formulate a clear, coherent policy" and that, as a result, "The army is forced to enter voids created by a political system, which doesn't make decisions".

The occupation has also complicated the nature of the tasks confronted by senior officers in the IDF. Whether they like it or not, the IDF cannot purely focus on what one retired Major General, ex-NSA and active commentator on defence matters [P008] described as the simple things of warfare - "... you have to destroy the enemy, the enemy military capability, you have to conquer certain areas, you have to defend our borders et cetera". Rather, he explained, since the occupation, an IDF general must constantly take into account the politics of the relationship between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This is a relationship in which everything is very delicate and so multifaceted that nothing can be described in straightforward terms, and even any attempt to determine a strategic or political objective is extremely complex.

Thus, the occupation has politicised the IDF, even despite the army's own attempts to stay apart from such matters, and the political elite have conspired in this to avoid making difficult decisions for which they may later be held to account. This situation has greatly endangered the otherwise democratic nature of Israeli CMR, and is not something which one would wish to see replicated elsewhere. Whilst it is true that it would be unusual to find another situation similar to that which has arisen from Israel's occupation of the West Bank, nevertheless, in any SSR process it would be wise to ensure that measures were put in place to prevent the military ever being required to take on such an overtly political role.

5.6 The Impact of Personality (Sub-theme)

Whilst the overarching theme 'The Conflict Has Driven Events' focused on war and violence as the biggest drivers of defence reform and development in Israel, this sub-theme illuminates what has shaped it – the distinctive personality of the characters who have been intimately involved in it. One respondent, a retired Major General [P030], even considered personality to be so important that he structured all of his responses to the questions by basing them around key individuals rather than events. From his perspective, the cases and examples that he felt were most important to the development of the Israeli CMR all revolved around the characters involved - "... not the theories, not the laws,

even not the traditions.” Whilst views on the impact of personality might not have received a sufficiently high level of attention in the data for it to be considered as a main theme, nevertheless, it is an issue that cannot be ignored. As one respondent put it, generals, like all Israelis, “have an opinion, and they present their opinions emphatically”. Informality is the key to the dialogue that characterises Israeli life in general and CMR in particular; it is this informality that has been a major factor in its ability to operate successfully over many decades. However, informality can be a dangerous principle on which to base such a critical relationship, and one problem with systems founded on informal rules is that they only work when everybody understands those rules and abides by them. When a charismatic ‘rogue figure’ appears and beguiles the military hierarchy and intimidates a weak political elite, then without more formal checks in place the system can easily break down. Whilst minor examples of this have occurred in the history of Israeli CMR on several occasions, the case of Ariel Sharon in 1982 was raised by respondents time and again in the interviews, and a brief examination of the data generated by this single event provides some salutary lessons [P002, P008, P011, P015, P017, P016, P022]. This smaller sub-theme only produced the one discussion point.

5.6.1 When Informality Becomes a Liability

Both generals and politicians spoke approvingly of the informal nature of the way in which civil and military elites interact in Israel, and most considered that the flexibility that this engendered helped to avoid stagnation or atrophy in the system. However, all recognised the dangers of what can happen when a powerful personality deliberately decides to ignore the self-imposed norms of behaviour, and several wanted to comment in some detail on the striking example of Ariel Sharon as defence minister during the 1982 First Lebanon War. Many of the respondents had personal experience of working with Sharon, both as a soldier and as a politician and were in a good position to comment on the events that took place.

Technically, Sharon had retired from full-time military service when the invasion of Lebanon took place, and at that time he was serving as a civilian politician.

However, his attitude towards the senior leadership of the IDF whilst he was minister of defence was calculated to give the impression that he was still in uniform, taking on the role of a 'super CGS'. The literature covers the events extensively, with Schiff (1987, p.237) suggesting that when Sharon became defence minister in 1981, "all the rules of the game changed", and Horowitz and Lissak (1989, p.213) refer to him, "deceiving the cabinet". Amongst those respondents who had known Sharon well many had been ardent admirers, but even they considered his behaviour during that period unacceptable. The prime minister at the time, Menachem Begin, had no experience of conventional military service, and was aging and suffering from stress, and Sharon took advantage of this. The only respondent who had himself held the position of minister of defence [P002] considered that Sharon had not only manipulated Begin as prime minister, but also that he manipulated the cabinet, and the hierarchy of the army. In his view, Sharon had used his popularity with the IDF to act as both minister and CGS rolled into one, considering himself to be above everyone else, and that only his opinion was the only one that mattered.

Most recognised that all of the individual factors that allowed Sharon to act as he did in 1982 were still present in the system today, but some argued that the set of circumstances that came together at the time are so unlikely to reoccur that there was no need to fundamentally change anything to accommodate them. This may be the case. Both the literature, and the data from the interviews, show that the adulation of Sharon by the army was a major contribution to the deception, and that his actions would not have been possible without the collusion of senior IDF officers. A few respondents clearly expressed the view, that the CGS, Rafael Eitan, had failed to carry out his responsibilities properly [P032, P023]. Eventually, the Kahan Commission which was set up after the conflict, primarily to look into the massacres that took place in the Beirut refugee camps at Sabra and Shatila, did censure both Eitan and Sharon, declaring the latter to be "unfit to hold the position of minister of defense" (Cohen and Cohen, 2012, p.130). However, in a typically Israeli outcome, whilst he never did hold this post again, he was subsequently elected prime minister in March 2001.

The big question that remains is whether or not such an event could happen again. Although there have been some adjustments to the way in which Israel conducts its CMR since 1982, there have been no fundamental reforms, and certainly nothing which has formally altered its structures. The scholarly views on the question are at best non-committal. Peri (2006, p.263) in the closing pages of 'Generals in the Cabinet Room' speaks of a growing security culture in which, "machismo exceeds civility", but equally suggests that action on the radical changes necessary are perhaps too much to expect whilst the existential threat remains. Levy (2019), in a more recent commentary, has criticised the rise of sectarian militarism in the IDF but, at the same time, did acknowledge that those changes that have been implemented in the institutional mechanisms since 1982 have reduced the risk of military intervention. Most respondents were also uncertain on the subject, with only two offering straightforward opinions - and these were contradictory. The first, a veteran defence correspondent [P032], gave a surprisingly unequivocal response saying, "1982 cannot repeat itself because we have matured, and because of the system that has better protection" – although no suggestion of what this protection might comprise was offered. The other, a retired general and ex-Head of *Mossad* [P017], was equally certain that events similar to those that occurred in 1982 could easily repeat themselves today. Whilst the evidence of both the literature and the data does not present a clear case for one view or another, the significance of the event in the history of Israeli CMR, and the level of debate that the issue has generated, means that it does merit raising it as an area of concern.

Sharon was an exceptional character and it could be argued that the combination of a flawed military leader, with compliant subordinates, and a prime minister and cabinet who were out of their depth in the world of defence and security, is one which might equally have arisen in any other democratic regime. However, Israel's informal system of civil control, which is designed to allow for compromise and negotiation in the relationship, and which exponents of the Israeli CMR espouse as being a positive feature, was perhaps the critical difference. When coupled with the huge imbalance between civil and military

capabilities for assessment and planning, this allowed Sharon to run a major military incursion into a neighbouring state with an almost total absence of oversight from the cabinet. More specifically perhaps, responsibility can be ascribed to the failure of the 1976 Basic Law to tie down the loose ends of the responsibility of each of the key players, and to define their accountability or place limits on their authority. This further highlights some of the weaknesses in the Israeli CMR model which have already been identified elsewhere, and which would need to be addressed if it were desired to attempt to replicate the informal nature of Israel's CMR in a post-conflict SSR programme.

5.7 The Dialogical Nature of Politics

Every Israeli government since 1948 has been a coalition of parties in some form or another. Initially they were dominated by the Labor Party in alliance with other left-wing groups, but since Likud's initial success in the 1977 election there has been a much more diverse mix of ideological and political positions involved. A common view expressed by many of the respondents was the way in which the perpetual requirement for compromise politics that this has engendered has led to a tradition of dialogue and discussion [P029, P019, P028, P011, P012, P021]. The theme 'The Dialogical Nature of Politics' explores how this premise plays out in the interaction between the military and the political leadership in Israel, and to what extent it affects the way that its CMR functions. One recurring topic in the data was the regular clashes between the holders of the three key posts of prime minister, defence minister and the CGS. The causes of this are varied, but the effects on the relationship between the political and military elites has been significant, as many of the respondents were able to demonstrate. One serving MK who had spent many years in the Knesset [P019], often in ministerial positions, tried to explain how, in his view, the relationship between the civil government and the military elites operated uniquely in Israel. Although he was adamant that there was civil supremacy, for him it was not hierarchical, not "as linear simplistic as that", but rather that it is a matter of delicate dialogue. The wealth of data that generated this theme led to the need for four discussion points.

5.7.1 Discourse in the Cabinet Room

Since the early 1980s Peri (1981, 2006) has consistently referred to the nature of the Israeli CMR as being one comprising a partnership between the two elites, and the evidence presented by the respondents would suggest that this concept is a valid one. Peri's view is that the partnership is something which has developed out of necessity and is not necessarily something to be commended or taken as normative, and he has never presented it that way. Despite this, of all of the respondents who had been active participants in this partnership, from both sides, by far the majority saw advantages in the way in which a free and open dialogue takes place between senior military officers and ministers behind closed doors – what might usefully be described as the 'discourse model' of civil-military elite interactions. Whilst this alone is not sufficient to ensure a good relationship, as one serving MK [P037] remarked, "better discourse does not always create better decisions, but bad discourse creates bad decisions". Additionally, the view expressed by another respondent [P003] who had worked in the system for many years, both as a senior military officer and later a high level civil servant, was that whilst the structure might not appear to be very organised or efficient it does, nevertheless, work well. This was an opinion that was echoed by many other respondents. One of the advantages that it can bring, especially in a situation where security is paramount, is that if the military consider that their voice is being heard, then they do not feel the need to push beyond the bounds of the law to influence affairs.

The only ex-prime minister interviewed [P036], along with several other ex-ministers and senior IDF officers [P003, P008, P019, P021, P028], suggested that in Israel this dialogical nature of the interface between the two sides of the civil-military partnership extends far enough to permit, at least the most senior officers, to privately express their views directly to ministers, and even to argue their point with the prime minister directly if necessary. However, once that opportunity has been taken, then they have to step back from the decision-making process and take no part in any subsequent cabinet-level voting that might take place. In this way the principle of civil supremacy that is so essential

to a democratic regime is maintained, and yet the military are still permitted to play a substantial part in influencing the debate.

This informal, dialogical style of relationship can work well provided that the discussions remain in house and are not continued in the wider, public arena. The overwhelming majority of the respondents from all backgrounds who discussed this supported the view that military officers must not publicly express their views on political matters [P002, P008, P003, P010, P012]. Of the very few who felt that there were occasions when this might be permissible, the historical examples that they gave to support their arguments were weak [P017, P006]. Each of the cases they raised presented pictures of personal relationships between particular generals and ministers that had already become dysfunctional, and were potentially unstable even before they became public. This highlights one of the dangers of a system that allows such a high level of discourse between the two elites, particularly when forceful or charismatic personalities are involved.

That a discourse of this nature is able to take place stems in some part from the egalitarian nature of Israeli society, however, this is not necessarily an essential factor for success. It may well be possible to establish a similar relationship in other environments, providing that the boundaries are well understood, and a degree of mutual trust is present. For this reason, whilst this dialogical aspect of the Israeli CMR is one that could be successfully employed in other situations, it is most likely to be effective in societies where the culture is already informal, and no legacy of prior hostility exists between the military and the political elites. It would also be necessary to establish ground rules that would exclude any public political activity by the military. This may not be possible in all post-conflict scenarios.

5.7.2 The CGS as a Political Player

There was unanimous agreement amongst the respondents that the CGS in Israel is more than just another senior officer whose particular job is to lead the armed forces - the position automatically makes him a demi-political figure. His

role extends beyond that of a senior military officer who occasionally interacts with the politicians when his views are sought by them; he is actively involved in setting policy. Several respondents were particularly unequivocal about how influential his position is in the cabinet, with one leading academic in the field of CMR [P011] suggesting that during cabinet meetings the position of the CGS is much more important than the position of most of the cabinet ministers. This view was supported by a senior defence correspondent who said, “In most cases the traditional line of thinking here is that the Chief of Staff is much more important than the defense minister” [P004]. However, surprisingly, none were critical of this situation, with most considering that his influence was actually a positive one, and that it that lessened rather than increased the chances of overt military intervention in state affairs.

This raises the question of the long-standing issue of the critical relationship triangle between the prime minister, the defence minister and the CGS. It has been addressed at some length in the literature and was brought into the limelight by both the Agranat and Winograd Commissions (Bar-Or, 2006; Ben-Meir, 1995; Horowitz, 1976; Lissak, 1983; Peri, 1981, 1983, 2006, 2014). Many of the respondents also had thoughts on this subject, but there was no consensus on this. Some were of the view that whatever is or is not in *The Basic Law: The Army*, and regardless of what the academic opinions might be, the reality is that the prime minister's word is final in all matters of security. Discussing his personal experience of how the decision-making operated in the cabinet one retired Major General who later held a senior position in the MOD for many years [P003], was adamant that at a certain point the prime minister would simply dismiss the generals from the room with no further argument being permitted. A few, however, disagreed, with an ex-deputy CGS [P28] stating that, at least when it comes to operational matters, the CGS will always be able to impose his will on the political echelons. Another well-informed respondent, also a retired Major General who had held the position of NSA [P021], supported this view, making the point that when it was not an ideological issue, but one of security, that it was very hard for the prime minister to act against something which was not approved of by the CGS. As far as the position of the defence

minister is concerned, unless he is also the prime minister as well, then most respondents dismissed his influence almost entirely, with another ex-NSA [P008] saying that, whilst the prime minister could easily ignore the advice of the minister of defence, “to make a decision against the recommendation of the Chief of Staff is almost a political suicide in Israel”.

Although neither Agranat, nor the subsequent passing of the *Basic Law: The Army*, completely resolved the issues associated with Ben-Meir’s National Command Authority conundrum, things have, nevertheless, improved in this area (Bar-Or, 2006; Ben-Meir, 1995; Harel, 2008; Meridor and Eldadi, 2019; Michael, 2009; Peri, 2006). All respondents who directly addressed this issue considered that it was by no means perfect yet, and most agreed that there was still work to do with regards the way in which elite relationships were organised. However, one retired Major General and former intelligence specialist [P030] struck a rare optimistic note, stating that he considered the passing of the basic law to have been a great leap forward that had led to further constructive legislation concerning the way that the government operates. Additionally, the one respondent interviewed who had actually held the position of prime minister [P036] expressed satisfaction with the structural aspects of the relationship, saying, “I think we have the right legislation. We have built the right institutes, we have built it within the limits which are reasonable, acceptable”. However, when asked if he considered if anything was still lacking, he simply replied, ‘Good leadership’. This was perhaps an unsurprising remark given that he was no longer in office.

Assessing the complete picture it seems that, in terms of operational matters, if the CGS wants to do something that the prime minister objects to then it will not happen. On the other hand, if the prime minister wishes the military to take action in the operational arena then it would be extremely difficult for him to achieve this without the approval of the CGS. Such an action would not be impossible, but it would be difficult, and it would almost certainly take a very strong prime minister to succeed (or perhaps one with impressive past military credentials himself). Whilst this may not be strictly in line with the conventional

understanding of civil supremacy, nevertheless, in a scenario in which security is paramount and a truly existential threat exists, then perhaps it a model that is both effective and desirable. Therefore, although the concept of having a military man acting as what is virtually an unelected politician would appear to be very undemocratic, when the holder of such a position has the trust and respect of the public it is possible that it may serve to actually strengthen the democracy. For an arrangement like this to work elsewhere there would need to be checks against the CGS stepping beyond this influential, but strictly bounded, position and attempting to exercise power more directly himself. How this achieved in Israel, and if it is sufficient, is discussed under the theme of 'The Power Behind the Throne' (and to a certain extent as part of the sub-theme 'The Impact of Personality').

5.7.3 A One-sided Dialogue

Throughout all of the interviews a pervasive impression developed that, whilst the nature of the relationship between the civil and military elites might well be one of dialogue and partnership, and that in these deliberations the politicians do wield the ultimate authority, the reality is that this is not a partnership of equals. All of the respondents who had had direct experience of the process, either as participants or as external observers, were open about the fact that the capabilities of the military outstrip those of the civil authorities in almost every aspect. When one ex-NSA [P021] was asked if there were any features of the Israeli CMR that he would identify as being of particular note, his unswerving response was the lack of the prime minister's ability to conduct any significant staff work without recourse to the military.

Despite the strident cries of both the Agranat and the Winograd Commissions that more capability must be given to the prime minister and to the security cabinet to allow them to more effectively challenge the military from a position of knowledge and strength, the respondents indicated that the situation still remains unresolved [P004, P029,P037, P008]. As a consequence, without a well-resourced and fully supported NSC, led by a strong and well-respected NSA, the civil government are unable to enter any dialogue with the IDF on an

even footing (Peri, 2006, pp.256–264). Although this should, on the face of it, be a simple issue to put right by means of legislation and administrative re-organisation, no government has acted to do so. Without the full support of the prime minister, the NSC becomes a meaningless body, and the IDF continue to hold the power in the security domain. The result is the slightly curious situation in which the prime minister, by refusing to empower his own support mechanism, ends up perpetuating the excessive influence of the military. Why this has occurred is hard to determine for certain, but one respondent [P009] suggested that it was the case that where prime ministers have had previous senior military experience they have not seen the need for such external advice, and hence have resisted fully empowering an NSC. Even those without high-level military credentials, such as Netanyahu, may have been nervous about loosening their personal hold on decision-making, perhaps for more political reasons. One political science professor [P025] suggested that an insecure prime minister in a fragile coalition government might not want to create a strong NSA as, in doing so, he could be simultaneously empowering a potential rival in the next election.

As it stands, the MOD has virtually no capacity to address operational issues, and therefore is not able to provide the minister with an adequate means of challenging any aspects of the plans produced by GHQ. Compounding this, one respondent who had previously served as the head of the military bureau of the State Comptroller's office [P029] suggested that over the years the IDF has developed a formidable capability which not only dwarfs that of the MOD, but ostensibly mirrors almost every other aspect of government. This willingness and capability of uniformed officers to influence all matters that they consider to be even remotely connected with security or defence, including budgetary issues, was also highlighted by one currently serving MK who was a very active in defence matters [P037].

In a similar argument to that put forward to support open discourse in the cabinet room, one great benefit of the IDF having control of all of the levers needed to achieve their aims through legitimate means, is that there is then little motivation

for them to openly seize power for themselves. But another consequence of this is that the arrangement does not deliver the second of the two criteria needed for civil supremacy set out by Kohn (1997), that is for a government to be able to set policy free from military interference. Although this may appear to be undesirable, in some situations, if employed alongside other checks and balances, it could be seen as a workable stepping stone towards a more acceptable longer term solution. Additionally, the unacceptably large imbalance between civil and military capabilities present in the Israeli situation would need to be avoided, and a more effective and empowered NSC created. To help in this, any post-conflict reform programme should also include empowerment of the Civil Service element of the MOD, and other ministries should be more closely drawn into the security debate.

5.7.4 The Military Intelligence Monopoly

Whilst the virtual monopoly of the IDF's intelligence directorate, *Aman*, in the field of Israeli strategic intelligence is closely connected to the earlier discussion on military dominance in general, it is significant enough to be addressed in its own right. In all of the public debates and official commissions of inquiry into civil-military matters that have taken place over the years, the subject of intelligence has recurred with relentless regularity. As far back as 1974, one of the strongest recommendations that came out of the Agranat Commission was the urgent need to reform the cabinet's over-reliance on *Aman* to make strategic assessments (Muhareb, 2011). The prominence of this issue was reflected in the frequency with which it was raised by the respondents in their interviews [P008, P005, P021, P011, P030, P033].

Despite the Agranat recommendations, and other inquiries since then, although the respondents acknowledged that some improvements had occurred, most saw the IDF as still having undisputed domination when it came to both the gathering of intelligence and the processing of it. Some did stress that the non-military security services, *Mossad* and *Shabak*, have greatly improved their own capabilities in recent times, and that there are occasions when these organisations will challenge *Aman's* analyses and assumptions in the cabinet

[P005, P003]. Nevertheless, the prevailing view, including that of one retired Major General who had specialised in the field of intelligence, was that it is impossible for the civilian government see the broad intelligence picture without the IDF's input [P008, P011, P030]. This leads to what one academic [P025] referred to as, "an anomaly", whereby the National Intelligence Assessment is made by *Aman* rather than by a civilian organisation as happens in most other democratic states - a legacy from the period where the number one threat to Israel was a conventional military one. The ownership of this function is something that the IDF continue to guard jealously, shrugging off all attempts to wrest it from their possession (Pascovich, 2014). One undesirable outcome is that it results in a situation whereby, instead of the government deciding on the security-related tasks and priorities and then deciding on how to act on them, instead the military essentially become their own taskmasters.

The power that this control of all high level intelligence bestows on *Aman* is reflected in the extraordinary influence that the head of the directorate is able to exert. Although only a Major General, and hence one rank below the CGS, he has unparalleled access to the prime minister, neither requiring the approval of the CGS, nor even the minister of defence, to brief the prime minister directly. Although none of the respondents made any suggestion that the possession by the IDF of such a potent means of influencing government policy was something that other democracies might wish to imitate, equally there were only two who actively criticised it. One of these, an ex-Major General [P021] who had held senior positions in *Aman*, and later, after retirement from the IDF, was the NSA, did go so far as to express his concern that, as a result of this imbalance, the prime minister had insufficient independent intelligence to make objective judgements in the area of security. However, the majority of respondents neither endorsed nor censured the position, simply reporting it as being the way things are in Israel. It was acknowledged that there have been great leaps forward in terms of *Mossad's* (and to a lesser extent *Shabak's*) assessment capabilities, but they still do not compete in the areas that matter; and the attempts to generate an intelligence capability within the ministry of foreign affairs have made no progress at all. That this is still the situation despite repeated calls to

level up the playing field from the Agranat onwards would indicate that it is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

It is hard to see how there can be any benefits to the state from such a one-sided arrangement, which is undoubtedly why every investigation of consequence in Israel has called for reform. This is a worrying aspect of their CMR and, whilst successive governments have recognised that the control of the intelligence function is in the wrong hands, they have been unable to persuade the military to relinquish their hold on it. Whilst the military monopoly of strategic intelligence is a key element of Israel's CMR that marks it out from other democratic states, it is not one that would be a suitable candidate to be an objective of a post-conflict SSR programme elsewhere.

5.8 The Mask of Democracy

The theme 'The Mask of Democracy' considers Israel's apparently paradoxical position whereby the military appear to exhibit a high degree of prominence in both society and politics, and yet the authority of the civil government has consistently remained unchallenged. It assesses the claims made by some that, whilst the on the face of it Israel may operate as a conventional democracy, displaying signs of all of the expected apparatus of civil governance and scrutiny, nevertheless, in the security field behind the scenes the military are able to successfully influence, and occasionally even to directly manipulate, affairs of state. The literature suggests that Israel is a state in which the civil government gives the orders and the military carry them out, and the data from the interviews strongly endorsed that position [P003, P015, P019, P036]. However, the literature also indicated that long before the orders are issued the military will unobtrusively already have ensured that they only contain directives that they approve of - in other words that that they influence the policy (Peri, 2005). This too was supported by the interview data [P004, P008, P009, P019, P021]. It could be argued that where the potential threat to the state is so great such a situation is inevitable, and possibly even desirable; nevertheless it does not meet Kohn's second criteria for the unrestricted exercise of civil supremacy and requires closer examination (Kohn, 1997). Under this theme examination is

also made of the way in which a number of bodies, including the Knesset (the Israeli parliament), the judiciary and, to a certain extent, the media, possess the capability and authority to carry out an oversight function. This final theme also generated four discussion points.

5.8.1 The Power of Parliament

In a unicameral parliamentary system such as Israel's there is no second chamber which might otherwise provide an additional level of scrutiny and oversight when the government holds a strong majority in the primary elected house. When this is coupled with the absence of a written constitution it is all the more critical that the oversight mechanisms that parliament does possess are strong, and provide a capable means of achieving the necessary supervision, not only of the Executive, but also an independent-minded military. The Knesset's much-valued and effective tools for this purpose are the cross-party Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (FA&DC) and the Security Division of the State Comptroller's Office.

Three of the respondents had been members of the FA&DC, and two had chaired it, and they all spoke highly of its ability to question and to require explanation from the Executive and the IDF [P037, P015, P019]. Overall the consensus was that it was exceptionally well-informed on all matters pertaining to security and that, unlike many of the other government bodies, it tended not to leak. The committee has no powers of subpoena and cannot issue orders or instructions to either the cabinet or the IDF. However, one ex-FA&DC Chairman [P019] suggested that although they cannot be summoned formally by law, senior personnel, even including the CGS and the head of the *Mossad*, will invariably come and talk when requested. The committee is particularly well-respected by the IDF hierarchy, and one former long-serving MK and committee member [P015] expressed his opinion that the generals have greater respect for members of the FA&DC than they do for members of the cabinet. The committee's reputation for being able to keep information confidential, coupled with the widely held belief in the willingness of its members to put state security

before personal or political gain are key features that have been essential to the FA&DC's successful operation.

The problem with the FA&DC is that whilst it is effective in its role of inquiry into, and scrutiny of, the government's legislation that deals with foreign and defence matters, in practice it has little ability to actual change anything in these areas (Pedatzur, 2018). One ex-member [P015] did attempt to stress the possibility of the committee occasionally exercising greater influence, saying that, whilst it was not their role to influence policy-making or cabinet decisions, it would at times "nominate itself as an inquiry committee." However, whilst the FA&DC does play a significant role in keeping a watching brief on security matters, the reality of its inability to do anything more than ask questions is a significant weakness.

The second body that reports to the Knesset, the Security Division of the State Comptroller's Office, offers a more effective method of holding the government and the IDF to task. The Comptroller's Office itself goes back almost to the establishment of the state in the late 1940's and its extremely far-reaching powers are safeguarded through the nearest instrument that Israel has to a written constitution - a Basic Law⁴. One consequence of this is that it ultimately allows the Comptroller to take the Executive to the ISC to enforce the findings of its reports if necessary. Only one respondent [P029] had any direct experience of working in this organisation, but as a previous head of the Security Division he was able to give a unique insight into its operation. The reach of the Comptroller's Office is very extensive, with little, if anything being outside of its remit – as the respondent put it, "everything is open, everything, completely everything is opened." This includes access to the external and internal security services, *Mossad* and *Shabak* (and other organisations that, even under the protection of anonymity, none of the respondents would discuss). The amount of independence that the Comptroller's Office has is surprising, with its reports

⁴ The State Comptroller Law first was passed in 1949, and was subsequently updated in 1988 (Cohen and Cohen, 2012, p.233).

going directly to a committee of the Knesset, and those which can be made public later being published. Of significance, the Comptroller's Office is able to investigate not only the material aspects of defence, but also to question policy decisions.

There is, however, one difficulty. As Cohen and Cohen (2012, pp.233–234) noted, it is relatively easy for the IDF to obfuscate and delay action to the point where it amounts to ignoring its directions entirely. This observation was supported by the ex-Divisional head, who gave personal examples of cases where reports had been repeatedly held up, and decisions postponed until eventually they were forgotten about, or simple became irrelevant. Despite this admission, he was also keen to point out that, although the recommendations were sometimes ignored, if they were made public they could be very damaging to a politician seeking re-election, and hence they still had the potential to carry a great deal of weight. Ultimately, however, even the Comptroller's Office lacks the final power that it really needs to make it all that it should be – the ability to compel the IDF to act upon its recommendations. Whilst theoretically, such power does exist via the ISC, this is a clumsy and unsatisfactory procedure and it rarely succeeds, One respondent, an expert in the law and an ex-minister of Justice [P033] expressed his frustration, pointing out that no matter what the court might say or do, “in the end if they won't do it, it cannot make them”.

The lesson to draw from Israel's experience of parliamentary scrutiny bodies is that even when their powers are enshrined in law and they hold the confidence of the organisations that they are overseeing, there is still no absolute guarantee that they can act as an, “effective sentinel of the security framework” (Cohen and Cohen, 2012, p.233). Nevertheless, the ability of the FA&DC to closely scrutinise all aspects of security at least helps to ensure a degree of transparency in the IDF's actions, and the authority of the State Comptroller's Office to issue direct instructions to the IDF with regards its management and procedures (albeit perhaps only nominal) does provide an element of control over their activities. The evidence indicates that the establishment of such

bodies in SSR programmes in post-conflict situations elsewhere would be of great benefit.

5.8.2 Judicial Oversight

The involvement of the judiciary in security affairs has been the subject of much debate in Israel ever since the first years of the state. Several respondents cited examples of cases in which the ISC even took on, and occasionally overruled, Ben Gurion himself on matters of security during his time as prime minister [P018, P019, P005]. One ex-president of the ISC [P024] quoted an expression from that period, still often heard in Israeli legal circles today - "The needs of security is not a slogan that closes all the doors". Given this prominence of the ISC in Israeli political life it is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the respondents not only had differing views on the matter, but that many of those views were quite strongly held.

The data suggested that the degree to which the judiciary is prepared to sit in judgement over security issues is a something that has fluctuated over the years. The principal question that was raised by the respondents in this area concerned the justiciability of security matters in the ISC – that is to say, whether or not the court has the authority to sit in judgement on issues relating to state security. As several respondents pointed out, although the level of engagement by the ISC in scrutinising security issues has varied, this has not been as the result of any specific changes in Israeli law, rather it has been brought about by differing interpretations of what is and is not justiciable [P012, P022, P024]. An ex-Military Advocate General (MAG) [P012] suggested that first major change occurred in 1992 when the then president of the ISC, Aaron Barak, first spoke of what he described as a "constitutional revolution" having taken place in Israel (Barak, 2011, p.83). Barak believed that the passing of two new Basic Laws by the Knesset (both dealing with different aspects of human rights) gave the ISC the power to overturn acts of Parliament (Barak, 2011; Cohen and Cohen, 2012, p.144). From that point on Barak considered every issue, including the political, to be justiciable (Woods, 2009). As a consequence, during the tenure of his presidency of the ISC, and continuing into the period of his successor and

protégé Dorit Beinisch, the ISC steadily became more and more willing to challenge the government in many areas.

In an on-the-record discussion in early 2019 Aharon Barak stated that, since Beinisch had left the ISC in 2012, the tide had begun to turn back again, saying, “Look, it’s under attack, and my guess is that some of it will be rolled back, but the main movement I think is in place”.⁵ Amongst the lawyers interviewed there was also a broad agreement that more recently the ISC had, once again, become less willing to intervene in security affairs, although there was not a consensus over whether this change was for the better or the worse. One ex-minister of justice [P033] who had opposed Barak’s original concept of the constitutional revolution, both on legal grounds and because he felt it had a negative effect on the court, was pleased that the ISC interceded far less in military affairs than it had a decade before. However, he also considered that the situation was now stable, and that there would be no more movement in this area for the foreseeable future. Others were less sure that this was the case. A retired ISC Judge [P018] expressed concern that there would now be further pressure on the judiciary from, “the more conservative, more right-wing, more religious parts of the body politic, or the Knesset, or the government”, to allow more military activity that would support their particular political and ideological agenda. Additionally, a retired IDF Major General and ex-Head of the National Security Council [P021] was of the opinion that, although the pendulum had not yet swung back too far, the government under Netanyahu was trying to push the Court even further out of the realm of security than ever before.

At first glance this view of an all-powerful judiciary, capable of overturning overtly aggressive or putatively illegal activity by the military, might seem to be an obvious contender for implementation in SSR programmes, especially where there may be concern over the strength of other civil control mechanisms. However, the fact that it has not been universally welcomed in Israel – as was made clear from the literature and supported by the data – means that it should

⁵ A. Barak, 2019, personal communication, 30 January.

be approached with some caution (Cohen and Cohen, 2012, p.133; Michelman, 2018). It has been suggested that in recent times frustrated governments have made potentially undemocratic attempts to manipulate the selection of individuals for positions on the ISC bench (Pfeffer, 2017). If this is the likely result of the existence of a judiciary who see themselves as having an active role in adjudicating security policy then it may be counter-productive. Nevertheless, whilst the particular judicial model implemented in Israel may be too specifically tied to their unique political and social structure to be of direct value elsewhere, the principle of a strong judiciary constitutionally empowered, and willing to appropriately challenge military activity, still remains sound. In the absence of a written constitution, and where weak parliamentary scrutiny exists, then some method of allowing the judiciary to act as a check on the military would seem to be both appropriate and valuable, and as such, should be considered as a strong contender to be incorporated into a post-conflict SSR programme.

5.8.3 An Operationally-Sympathetic Press

For one long-serving MK who had held several ministerial posts in the past [P019], the importance of the media in Israel could not be understated. He saw them as a central pillar of Israeli democracy who, unofficially, penetrated every aspect of government. However, the counter-side to this, he admitted, was the ever-present shadow of the Israeli military censor – a sub-unit of *Aman*, the IDF Intelligence Directorate. Censorship in times of conflict and other national emergencies is not uncommon even in many democratic states, but it is usually occasional and temporary (MacArthur, 2004). However, in Israel, the office of the military censor is something that has been present ever since the very first moment that the state came into existence and, although its manifestation and effect has lessened considerably over time, nevertheless it is still very active.

All of the journalists interviewed were conflicted in their view of the censor. This confliction was articulated well by one young news editor [P014] who expressed his dismay at being constantly beholden to the military censor, and yet he also considered that in some ways it was beneficial to the media. He felt that it left

him free to write what he wanted, knowing that someone else would ensure that nothing he said would be endangering soldiers' lives and state security - "... the benefit of the censor system is that we don't need to restrict ourselves because they restrict us." In addition, he considered that the mutual trust ensured that the media were kept better informed on operational matters by the military, suggesting (with only a hint of sarcasm) that, "I know what's happening, if only because they tell me not to publish it." A similar view was expressed by a veteran pressman who had been a correspondent during the 1982 war [P023]. He explained that in his early days as a defence correspondent the censor's reach had been all-encompassing, and yet he didn't feel that anything that he had written had ever been unduly suppressed, only that which was necessary to protect security, and he never considered that his integrity as a reporter had been compromised.

Peri (2001, pp. 116–117) has referred to the development of a, "culture of criticism" in which the Israeli media penetrates the sphere of security. Referencing Peri's work in her study into public perception of the IDF, Eran-Jona (2015, p. 7) was even stronger in her wording, saying, "The media has become an active player in the public discourse on security issues and is often acerbically critical of the army's conduct." Overall, the data indicates that, whilst all of the respondents from the media agreed that the press in more recent times had, to a greater or lesser extent, adopted a much more confrontational stance, none expressed views as strong as those espoused by Eran-Jona [P001, P004, P014, P026, P032].

Any increase in the willingness of the media to criticise the IDF took place gradually over a period of time, and there was no consensus amongst the respondents over which events, if any, could be considered to be the main point at which their disposition changed. An Israeli professor of communications and media [P026] did acknowledge that after 1973 that there had been a noticeable hardening of the attitude of the press to the establishment, but for him this was only the very beginning of a long process which took some considerable time to come to fruition. In his view this did not culminate until as late as the Second

Lebanon War in 2006. If true, this occurred much later than the change in public opinion away from veneration of the IDF and towards a more critical position (Horowitz, 1982; Lissak, 2001). When asked why he believed that the media lagged so far behind the rest of civil society he offered an interesting theory. He suggested that even in 1982, whilst journalists may have at that time have begun to question amongst themselves what they saw happening, they were still reluctant to offer any seriously critical opinions publicly. It was his view that the media remained inherently self-restrained and would not even have dared to criticise the government actions in Lebanon in 2006 were it not for one thing - it was then that the political elite began to break the unwritten rule that said in opposition you did not attack the government concerning operations during a conflict. This change in the political landscape then freed the media up to publish their own criticisms of both the politicians and the generals.

The potentially mutually beneficial relationship between the media and the military that has developed in Israel is one that is based on a shared experience and grudging trust on both sides. It has worked well for many years and as such is worth considering as an aspect of the CMR that might transfer well to in post-conflict SSR scenarios. However, it is not at all clear that it is something that could readily be established from scratch in other circumstances. For this reason, careful scrutiny would be required of the specific situation before deciding to employ this model as an alternative to that of a totally free press. There is also an additional consideration. The theory [P026] that the freedom for the Israeli media to criticise the government's handling of security issues only followed on from a change in the willingness of the opposition politicians to censure it themselves, has not been picked up in any of the mainstream literature, nor was it echoed by any other respondent. Nevertheless, it is a recognised phenomenon and it does align with events in Israel during that period (Hallin, 2006). That being the case then, even if it were decided to try to establish a similar mutually beneficial rapport between state and media in the field of defence and security elsewhere, it would be wise to first ensure that the requisite freedoms to allow for political dissent were already in place.

5.8.4 The Price of a Stable Democracy

The system of CMR that was established in 1948 under Ben Gurion, and which evolved throughout the decades since then, has produced a situation whereby not a single respondent could foresee any realistic conditions in which a coup-d'état might take place. One ex-president of the ISC [P024] considered this to be, “a preposterous suggestion that wouldn't happen”. To have achieved such stability given the violent circumstances from which the state emerged, and through which it has battled to survive ever since, is noteworthy and cannot be dismissed as coincidental. The topic is addressed frequently in the literature, and whilst some scholars do express reservations about the nature of the relationship, even they still concede that, in terms of maintaining a civil government in power, it has been successful (Ben-Eliezer, 1998; Ben-Meir, 1995; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Levy, 2007; Peri, 2006; Perlmutter, 1969, 1978). There is little agreement amongst scholars, however, as why this is the case, with no real consensus on a cogent explanation for it. The respondents themselves also failed to offer a unified view of why they were equally as steadfast in their confidence in the stability of the civil government. This makes the task of trying to identify the underlying causal mechanism, and to determine which aspects of it (if any) might be transferable elsewhere, much harder.

Several respondents pointed explicitly to the inherently democratic nature of Israeli society, and its cultural and historical ties to democratic processes through its roots in socialist Zionism [P017, P019, P024, P025]. A retired Major General [P003] explained that this democratic tradition ran through into the military, saying that the IDF would never attempt a military takeover because they, “understand their role in democracy”. Different aspects of this element of the relationship were explored under the themes ‘The Modern Tribes of Israel’ and ‘The Dialogical Nature of Politics’. There is, however, another consideration which became apparent when listening to the views expressed by respondents – that is the way in which the military prefer to wield their power behind the scenes and to leverage their public popularity to achieve their aims.

Because of the high level of society's confidence in the military it would be almost unthinkable for the cabinet to instruct the General Staff to involve the IDF in any significant operationally-related action of which they did not approve (Peri, 2006, pp.251–264). As one respondent [P008] said, every prime minister is well aware that, "to make a decision against the recommendation of the Chief of Staff is almost a political suicide". Even if the CGS were not to openly speak of his concerns (as some have in the past) the cabinet leaks heavily and the situation would soon become public knowledge. As a consequence, the military have an unprecedented level of influence which allows them to virtually set their own agenda in terms of the operational aspects of national security. Despite this, a number of respondents were anxious to make the point that they believed that the military did not seek to influence the government out of a hunger for power or a desire to take control of the state, but rather out of a sense of obligation [P006, P003, P015, P008]. One serving MK with a long record of government service [P015] suggested that they want to influence the result because, "... they feel this is their responsibility."

This does not necessarily mean, however, that the ingrained belief of much of the Israeli public that their system plainly demonstrates the democratic principle of civil supremacy actually stands up to scrutiny. The military elites may not ultimately be able to vote on the decisions taken in cabinet, but the influence that they exert up to this point is often such that this is almost an irrelevance. Kohn (1997, p.143) makes the point that, "civilian control is not a fact but a process" and in Israel this process is firmly weighted in favour of the military. The descriptions given by several of the respondents of their personal experiences of senior IDF officers holding sway in cabinet discussions, and even arguing down ministers of state, cannot easily be dismissed as simply the informal nature of Israeli society [P004, P019, P015]. One academic [P010], who had also served in the IDF reserves as a Brigadier General, was quite blunt in his assessment, saying that, although the military may not want to be in the frontline of politics, they still sought to manipulate the government in a more clandestine manner.

It other circumstances such a situation would be intolerable in a democracy, however, given the critical importance of security to the very survival of the state, there is an argument that it is a necessary evil. One MK [P021] suggested, that the IDF's veiled control of security matters behind the scenes could be considered as proportional, being more to do with their, "very professional needs" than notions of militarism or power. Whatever the motivation behind their behaviour, it has resulted in over seventy years of stable civil government in Israel, which seems likely to continue, at least in the foreseeable future. However, there is a cost that Israel has had to pay for such stability, which is that the civil government cannot be said to have full control over the military as it is unable to, "frame the alternatives and define the discussion" in the areas of defence and security policy and decision-making (Kohn, 1997, p.141).

It is possible to imagine many immediate post-conflict situations in which toleration of a relatively high level of military influence in policy-making could be considered to be a reasonable price to pay to for a higher level of assurance of the maintenance of civil authority. One difficulty this might present is that such an argument might not be easy to sell to possible international donors, but that is a separate issue. Another consideration is that it is only beneficial where the military elites are genuinely more concerned about the welfare and security of the state than they are about personal gain and prestige. In situations where their greed for power, or other rewards, dominates their actions then the argument quickly falls down. Whilst this element of Israel's CMR that may have worked well for them, great care would be needed to ensure that the circumstances were right should an attempt to be made to replicate it elsewhere.

5.9 Conclusions and Summary of the Discussion Points

In this chapter 18 separate discussion points were examined. Each of these considered specific experiences and revealed manifestations that were highlighted from the analysis of the data, and which related to the question of how Israel's CMR has evolved since 1948. Consideration of the causal mechanisms that brought them about allowed a reflection to be made on any positive and negative impacts that replicating these elements elsewhere might

produce. In some cases there were strong indications that those elements of the Israeli model would provide better foundations for SSR programmes than the more orthodox examples found in western democracies; in others the evidence was less compelling, or even suggested that those areas should definitely not be considered. In a few the original drivers behind them were so specific to the Israeli situation that, even though they might be considered to be beneficial, it was difficult to see how they might be applicable in other scenarios. The details are summarised in Table 5-1 (below).

Srl.	Discussion Point	Summary of the Potential Relevance to Post-Conflict SSR
1.	The Societal Melting Pot	The early experience of Ben Gurion's use of the IDF as a societal melting pot may provide a positive example of a practical method of generating a feeling of national identity amongst a disparate society.
2.	Politics and Religion in Uniform	When a force is as closely integrated into society as the IDF is in Israel, then it is very likely that any fissures that exist, or which develop, in civil society will also be reflected in the military. Active measures must be considered to ensure that the military remains as apolitical as possible. However, is not clear that Israel provides any useful examples of how this might be achieved.
3.	A Military-Minded Society	A high level of public interest in security matters would seem to have contributed to the delivery of greater transparency in Israeli security and defence matters. Whether it has been the greater public interest in security that has caused the higher level of reporting of such matters in the media, or if it is the other way around, it is a nevertheless a positive feedback loop, and the creation, and subsequent maintenance, of a similar situation would be a helpful SSR objective.
4.	A Position of Trust	Israelis consistently place the IDF at the top of their list of the most trusted organisations in the country. The example of the IDF would suggest that, in many circumstances, rather than having the armed forces held at arm's length, if the civil population could be drawn closer to them (ideally to the point where they are simply two different aspects of the same body of people) then better relations between the two could be achieved.

5.	A People's Army (Tzva Ha'am)	The close bonding of the Israeli civil population to the IDF has allowed the nation's military force to be seen as an organ of the state in which all of society has a stake. This is recognised as having greatly diminished the chances of direct military intervention in Israeli civil politics, and could be a worthwhile and achievable primary objective of SSR in many post-conflict scenarios.
6.	A Choice Between the Army and Armageddon	The data indicates that the gravity of the threat facing Israelis has greatly affected the relationship that they have developed with their armed forces, encouraging tolerance and an acceptance of greater military influence in civil affairs. Additionally Israel's example would suggest that such a close dependence on the military need not imperil democratic government if other mitigating factors are present, such as a natural propensity towards democracy in society.
7.	It's Not the Wars It's the Inquiries	One strength of the Israeli system is that there are institutional mechanisms in place, supported by a strong judiciary and a vocal parliamentary opposition, that have allowed formal and transparent inquiries into security matters to take place. If a similarly unorthodox CMR is to be effectively implemented elsewhere then effort would also be needed to ensure that such public reviews of security matters was equally possible.
8.	Heroes or Oppressors	The significance of the occupation as being the primary cause of friction in Israeli CMR cannot be understated, and the precise circumstances behind this are unique. Nevertheless, whilst a directly comparable situation seems unlikely to be found elsewhere, one lesson that can be transferred to other situations is that the image that a force projects can be as important as any actions that it might take when considering the relationship between the military and the society it serves.
9.	More Than Soldiers	The occupation has politicised the IDF, a situation which has greatly endangered the otherwise democratic nature of Israeli CMR, and is not something one would wish to see replicated elsewhere. In any SSR programme the example of Israel would suggest that it would be wise to ensure that measures were put in place to prevent the military being forced to take on a similarly overtly political role.

10.	When Informality Becomes a Liability	The informal system of civil control in Israel allows for compromise and negotiation in the relationship, and this can be considered to be a positive feature of its CMR. However, without a formal mechanism to specify the responsibility of each of the key players, and to define their accountability or place limits on their authority, it can lead to difficulties. If a similar system that leverages the advantages of such informality were to be employed elsewhere then it would be important to ensure that some form of constitutional framework were also put in place to avoid some of the problems that can otherwise arise.
11.	Discourse in the Cabinet Room	In Israel one of the advantages of the free and open dialogue that takes place between senior military officers and ministers behind closed doors is that military consider that their voice is being heard and, as a consequence, are less likely to feel the need to push beyond the bounds of the law to influence affairs. It is most likely that this dialogical aspect of the Israeli CMR could be successfully employed in other situations where the culture is already informal, and no legacy of prior hostility exists between the military and the political elites. It would also be necessary to establish ground rules that would exclude any public political activity by the military - something which may not be possible in all post-conflict scenarios.
12.	The CGS as a Political Player	Although the concept of having a military man acting as what is virtually an unelected politician would appear to be very undemocratic, when the holder of such a position has the trust and respect of the public it is possible that it can serve to strengthen rather than to weaken the democracy. Whilst this may not be strictly in line with the conventional understanding of civil supremacy, nevertheless, in a scenario in which security is paramount and a truly existential threat exists, then perhaps it is one that is both effective and desirable. For an arrangement like this to work elsewhere there would need to be checks against the CGS stepping beyond this influential but strictly limited position and attempting to exercise power more directly himself.

13.	A One-sided Dialogue	<p>The nature of the relationship between the civil and military elites in Israel is one of dialogue and partnership, although the politicians hold the ultimate authority. However, it is not a partnership of equals. In a similar argument to that put forward to support open discourse in the cabinet room, one great benefit of this dialogue is that there is less motivation for the military to openly seize power for themselves. If such an arrangement were to be replicated then it would need to be employed alongside other checks and balances. Also efforts would need to be taken to ensure that the dialogue was equal, perhaps by creating an effective and empowered NSC or similar body, and by strengthening the Civil Service element of the MOD, with other ministries also being more closely drawn into the relationship.</p>
14.	The Military Intelligence Monopoly	<p>The IDF possess a virtual monopoly of strategic intelligence in Israel. This is not a positive aspect of Israel's CMR, and whilst it is undoubtedly a key element of Israel's relationship that marks it out from other democratic states, it is not one that would be a suitable candidate to be an objective of a post-conflict SSR programme elsewhere. Rather it should be considered as an object lesson in how not to organise the structure of the national intelligence network.</p>
15.	The Power of Parliament	<p>A strong lesson that can be drawn from Israel's experience of parliamentary scrutiny bodies is that even when their powers are enshrined in law, and they hold the confidence of the organisations that they are overseeing, there is still no absolute guarantee that they can act effectively. Nevertheless, the ability of the legislature to closely scrutinise all aspects of security (and through the State Comptroller's Office even to issue authoritative instructions to the IDF) at least helps to ensure a degree of transparency and provides an element of control over their activities. The evidence indicates that the establishment of such bodies as clear programme objectives could be of great benefit, preferably though with greater powers of enforcement than they possess in Israel.</p>

16.	Judicial Oversight	<p>Israel's Supreme Court has shown itself capable of overturning even overtly aggressive or putatively illegal activity by the military, and it provides an positive example of how the judiciary can contribute to civil control mechanisms. However, caution must be shown, as such a highly powerful judiciary has the potential to encourage undemocratic attempts by the executive to manipulate the selection of individuals for positions on the Supreme Court bench.</p> <p>Nevertheless, the principle of a strong judiciary, prepared to appropriately challenge military activity still remains sound. In a situation where there is an absence of a written constitution, and where weak parliamentary scrutiny exists, then an SSR programme that provides for some method of empowering the judiciary to act as a check on the military would seem to be both appropriate and valuable.</p>
17.	An Operationally-Sympathetic Press	<p>The media in Israel act as a central pillar of democracy and are effective at, unofficially, penetrating every aspect of government – with the exception perhaps of direct operational matters. However, the presence of an active government censor, run by the military, runs counter to all democratic principles and would require careful consideration before it was attempted to be replicated elsewhere.</p> <p>Although it has worked well in Israel, it was born out of a shared experience, and a hard-won mutual trust between the media and the army that was established during many years of conflict. It is not at all clear that it is something that could readily be established from scratch in other circumstances. For this reason, careful scrutiny would be required of the specific situation before deciding to employ this model as an alternative to that of a totally free press.</p>

18.	The Price of a Stable Democracy	All of the indicators suggest that there is no realistic possibility of a coup-d'état taking place in Israel in the foreseeable future. However, there is a price that has had to be paid for this stability, and whilst the military elites may not openly dictate the decisions taken in cabinet they do exercise significant influence in other, less overt, ways. It is possible that such toleration of a relatively high level of military influence in policy-making could be considered to be a reasonable trade-off for a greater level of assurance of the maintenance of ultimate civil authority. However, this is a perilous path to follow and a detailed risk-analysis would need to be undertaken to ensure that the environment was suitable if an attempt were to be made to replicate it elsewhere.
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Table 5-1 Summary of the Possible Relevance of the Discussion Points to Post-Conflict SSR

Chapter 6, the final chapter, briefly summarises the study itself, revisiting the research questions, the aim and the objectives. It then assesses the results of the analysis and the subsequent discussion points, highlighting the findings that these lead to. Leading from this there is a discussion of the significance of the findings in the context of post-conflict SSR and an examination of the implications for the way in which such programmes should be drawn up in the future. Finally it explains the significance of the work, both highlighting its limitations and suggesting avenues for future research.

6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 A Summary of the Overall Study Process

The aim of the study was to conduct a case study of Israel to identify and analyse the key elements driving the evolution of its CMR, from its origins up until today. This led to the establishment of the primary research question:

How has Israel's CMR evolved from the founding of the state until the present day?

The enabling objectives designed to answer this research question were:

- The identification of a suitable conceptual model for an evaluation of the literature, and to highlight the aspects of Israel's CMR that are most relevant to the study.
- The development of a suitable network of knowledgeable and experienced elites from within the Israeli CMR community who were qualified in the relevant fields.
- The arrangement and conduct of interviews with members of the network, to draw out informed views on the aspects of the case addressed by the primary and secondary research questions.
- The assessment and analysis of the results of the interviews, using appropriate tools and methods, leading to recommendations and conclusions.

It was initially anticipated that the conceptual model, or framework, would be drawn from the existing work in this field. However, as none could be identified as being suitable, a bespoke framework was designed using those texts that had offered the closest approximations to the required solution. The result was the CIPMIS framework, comprising six separate, but related, factors: Cultural, Individual, Political, Military, Institutional, and Situational.

The review of the existing literature was addressed in three separate blocks. First an assessment of the pre-1948 history was conducted to provide the contextual background to the early development of Israeli CMR. Then a brief consideration was made of the main academic approaches previously taken by researchers and authors making inquiries into post-1948 Israeli CMR, with the aim of presenting a broad picture of the subject area. The main literature review comprised an in-depth analysis of the post-1948 material using the CIPMIS framework as its basis.

The conclusions of the literature review were, firstly, that only a very few pieces of research have been conducted which have involved the comparison of Israel's CMR with those found elsewhere. Secondly, and of even greater significance, no previous study was found that had specifically considered the strengths and weakness of Israeli CMR in the context of the possible applicability of elements of the model outside of the state of Israel. Based on this, and from a careful consideration of the material that supported these conclusions, the primary research question was further refined with the aim of addressing the specific additional areas of interest, resulting in three secondary research questions:

- a) What have been the significant drivers to defence reform in Israel since 1948, and what impact have they had on the CMR?
- b) To what extent are the military involved in political affairs in Israel, and what are the oversight and governance mechanisms that have been developed to deal with this?
- c) How has the relationship between Israeli society and the IDF changed over the period of the state's existence?

Consideration was made of the most appropriate methodological approach to take to answer these research questions. The nature of the study made it clear that the strategy that was most appropriate for the circumstances was a revelatory single case study of Israel, and this was chosen as the fixed point from which to explore the other methodological decisions required. Eventually,

a qualitative methodology was decided upon, employing both a deductive and a reductive approach to theory development, all operating within an holistic critical realism (CR) philosophy. Finally, the decision was taken to gather the data required via semi-structured interviews, with the participant subjects being chosen using both purposive and snowballing sampling techniques.

The enabling objective of developing a suitable network of knowledgeable and experienced elites from within the Israeli CMR community was met during the first two years of the researcher's time in Israel; the next objective, that of the arrangement of the interviews and the gathering of the data, was achieved during the final year there. In total, 41 interviews were conducted, resulting in over 1000 pages of transcribed text. This data was then analysed using a thematic approach based on Braun and Clarke's thematic analysis (TA) framework (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Following CR principles, the first step was to employ coding of the data gathered from the individual respondents in order to move from the empirical level (the domain in which we observe and experience events, and the level at which we can make measurements), to the actual level (where we find events that have not necessarily been observed or experienced, and yet have still occurred despite this) (Fletcher, 2017). Abduction techniques were then employed to interpret the coded data in a more abstracted way, which was expressed as main themes and higher-level overarching themes. Moving into the real level, retroduction was then used to refer back to the literature and to identify the causal mechanisms that had led to the empirical observations (Meyer and Lunnay, 2013). These were then employed to generate answers to the research questions themselves.

The output from the last stage of the TA framework was a series of 18 discussion points, each of which addressed a specific aspect of the question of how Israel's CMR has evolved since 1948. They were based on the data drawn from the respondents' experiences, including the subsequent revealed manifestations, and considered the causal mechanisms behind those manifestations. Finally, an assessment was made of the extent to which these aspects of Israel's CMR might prove to be helpful to post-conflict SSR programmers seeking alternative

objectives to the western liberal democratic (WLD) focused solutions that have previously been adopted.

6.2 Reflections on the Use of CR Philosophy

The limitations to the methods employed have already been covered in the Methodology chapter (Chapter 3). However, before the findings of the study are considered, it is helpful to first retrospectively reflect on the wisdom of the decision that was taken regarding one of the most critical aspects of any study – that of which philosophy to embrace. The importance of the decision to take a CR approach cannot be underestimated as it not only affected the whole way in which all thinking about the study was subsequently conducted, but also because much of the originality of the findings rest upon this feature.

For some, the path taken to identify the most appropriate philosophical approach (as described in Section 3.3.2) could be seen as being too restrictive and, as a consequence of focusing on only a few texts to provide guidance, providing insufficient options from which to make a decision. This would perhaps be a legitimate criticism. However, this route was employed because of the researcher's personal lack of an extensive background in the academic discipline of philosophy. For this reason it was considered that firm and constructive scaffolding was required, and the extensive use of Saunders et al (2016) as the primary text provided this. Nevertheless, despite the constraint this placed on the possible choices, looking back it is still considered that the methodology selected fitted both the research and the researcher well, and proved to be the most appropriate one for the study.

The ontological view taken by CR, in which reality is perceived as being stratified through the empirical, the actual and the real layers, suited a study of a complex relationship such as Israeli CMR. CR's ultimate aim of identifying causal mechanisms was precisely what was required for such a case study. This is also true for the axiological aspects of the research since, as a consequence of living in the midst of Israeli society for a number of years, it was impossible for the researcher to stay entirely detached. CR acknowledges that such a situation will

inevitably involve value-laden research, and helps to highlight the need to make definite attempts to minimise bias.

The conclusion of this reflection must be that, whilst it should be acknowledged that the route taken to select a CR philosophical approach was both narrow and, to a certain extent, dictated by a lack of experience in such areas, nevertheless the right philosophy was adopted. It should also be noted that one of the many positives that come out of the study is that the researcher is now better informed in this area and, consequently, in any future studies, wider engagement with the philosophical questions will take place, and it will be undertaken earlier on in the process.

6.3 The Findings of the Study

By considering the 18 discussion points produced at the end of Chapter 5 collectively, it is possible to distil nine separate, but interrelated, findings that directly address the primary and secondary research questions concerning Israel's CMR. These findings are:

6.3.1 The Criticality of History and Culture to the Current Situation.

Although the history of the Israeli state only began in 1948, all that took place in the decades both before and after the First World War (and in some cases much further back in time) has had a significant effect on its structure and character. This applies equally to the nature of the relationship that was established between the civil and military elites as it does to any other aspect of political and social life. During the period prior to the declaration of independence in 1948, the gradual development of the three-way relationship between the military, the government and the civil population led to a situation in which, from the very beginning of its existence, the IDF was seen as an embedded part of society, and not a separate organisation set apart from the civilian population. The analysis of the data showed that almost every aspect of the way in which Israel's CMR has come about can find its roots in the history and culture of the both the Jewish nation generally, and the Zionist project more specifically.

6.3.2 Close Civil-Military Integration.

Whilst the conventional approach to defence reform is to keep the military and civil elements of society separate, Israel has taken a directly contrary approach to this. This has worked well for them, and by integrating the military closely into civil society they have broken down the barriers between them, creating porous boundaries and almost eliminating the concept of 'civilians' and 'military' altogether. It has, however, also had its problems. As the IDF's primary task has gradually moved from defending the borders against brief, high-intensity external conventional threats, to conducting long-term, low-intensity, counter-insurgency operations inside the state itself, this situation has had an adverse effect on the relationship. It undermined the IDF's militia status and weakened the bond that had been developed between them. Despite this, that connection does still remain, and even now one consequence of this is the profoundly positive effect that it has on the way in which individuals continue to relate to the military long after they have left full time service. It also contributes to the exceptionally high level of confidence and trust that the public continue to exhibit in the IDF. This is a significant factor in the willingness of civil society to tolerate a higher than usual level of intrusion of the military both in politics and in everyday life.

6.3.3 Limited Civil Supremacy.

The ultimate authority of civil government in Israel is not in doubt. This positive situation, which shows no sign of changing in the foreseeable future, stems in part from the unorthodox nature of Israel's CMR. As should be the case in any democracy, in Israel the cabinet approval is ultimately required before any overt operational military action is authorised. However, the foil to this is that it would be extremely difficult for politicians to order the army to carry out any operational task of which the generals disapproved. Additionally, the civil government does not have exclusive control over the agenda, discussion and decision-making activity in the area of military policy, with the generals exerting a high level of influence in what would usually be a wholly politically-driven domain. In this sense there is a bargain that has been struck between the two sides, even if it

is not one that is openly acknowledged, that the army will always follow orders, providing that it has a significant say in what those orders are. As a consequence, civil supremacy in Israel can only be described as limited.

6.3.4 Informality and the Use of the Discourse Model.

Informality is the hallmark of the Israeli CMR, and the 'discourse model' that operates creates a uniquely open relationship between the political and military elites. In a situation where security is at the forefront of almost every major political decision, this is both prudent and practical in the high threat environment that exists in Israel. However, whilst informality offers these advantages it also engenders serious vulnerabilities. The problem with systems that are founded on informal procedures is that they only work when everybody understands those procedures and abides by them. When a forceful individual emerges who is intent on manipulating the system to their own advantage, without more formal checks and balances in place, serious damage to national security can occur. Unless strong constraints and boundaries are in place (either through the mechanism of a written constitution or via primary legislation) a catastrophic breakdown is always a risk. This has nearly occurred in Israel on a number of occasions in the past, most seriously with Ariel Sharon in the First Lebanon War of 1982, and it is by no means clear that it could not occur again.

6.3.5 The Lack of a Balanced Dialogue.

For Israel's 'discourse model' of CMR to work democratically and effectively it requires the dialogue between the military and the civil government to be balanced. This necessitates the military elite to have an element of political understanding, which is a matter of education, and for the politicians to have both easy access to strategic intelligence, and the capability to conduct appropriate staff work based on that intelligence. The situation regarding the political education of senior officers in the IDF is occasionally raised as a matter for discussion, but has yet to be fully resolved. However, far more serious is the totally inadequate ability of the civilian leadership to enter into meaningful debate on security matters. As a result, there is a significant imbalance between

the civil and the military decision makers, and this calls into question the true value of the much acclaimed dialogue between them that is so central to the Israeli model. In critical situations regarding national security, given the IDF's virtual monopoly on access to relevant intelligence and their massive superiority in terms of the ability to conduct effective and efficient staff work in this area, such dialogue can become purely notional and is often simply a military monologue.

6.3.6 The CGS in a Political Role.

Although the public face of the position of the Israeli military hierarchy is one of subservience to the civil administration, this actually hides a much more assertive and independently-minded posture. The CGS himself is more than simply the uniformed head of the armed forces; rather he acts as a demi-political figure with certain rights and privileges that set him apart from other senior military officers. Yet, despite the apparently undemocratic nature of this situation, it can be seen to have directly assisted in reducing the risk of a military takeover of power in the country. In matters of security the CGS and the prime minister operate almost as equals. This relationship is extremely complex and difficult to rationalise in a democracy, and yet in a situation in which security is critical to the very survival of the state it has proved to be both effective and reassuring to the civil population. Nevertheless, for it to operate safely much depends on the integrity of the CGS as an individual, and trust being placed in the military elites exhibiting an absolute belief in the democratic system. Over the years, although this situation may have been shaken occasionally, in the main it has stood up well. However, should different circumstances arise in the future it is not clear that there are sufficient safeguards in place to prevent a powerful and charismatic CGS dominating a weak and ineffective prime minister.

6.3.7 The Provision of Oversight and Scrutiny Mechanisms.

Israel has no written constitution and the laws relating to the responsibilities regarding security are vague. In this situation it is imperative that the civil

government's oversight capabilities are effective and have teeth. Both the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (FA&DC), and the State Comptroller's Office do work well in this regard, albeit with some limitations in terms of compelling the military to comply with their directives. From its inception Israel also recognised the importance of an independent judiciary and has striven to maintain its objectivity and wide reach. The Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) has always had an essential role to play in interpreting constitutional issues in the absence of any written document, or even a second chamber. However, in recent years there has been a great deal of debate, both in government and in civil society, about the extent to which the ISC should be allowed to overrule acts of the legislature. For now the situation appears to be stable and the judiciary are still able to deliver an effective check on inappropriate activity, but this remains a live issue.

6.3.8 A Mutually Acceptable Form of Censorship.

The environment in which the Israeli media operates is exceptional and does not fit any conventional democratic model. State censorship over operational matters is still enforced, but the media remain free to openly criticize both the government and the military in other areas of security and defence. Israeli journalists endorse this position, some even welcoming it, resulting in a situation described in the previous chapter as there existing an 'operationally-sympathetic press'. As it currently stands, the balance is one that is accepted by both sides as being mutually beneficial. However, as with the judiciary, there is a question hanging over the future of the public scrutiny role of the media in Israel, and in recent years it has been coming under increasing attack from the government. The example that Israel provides shows that, in an environment in which the threat to the state is high, a close relationship between the media and the military, including perhaps an element of specifically directed censorship, can enhance rather than damage a democracy. Two key things that have contributed to the success of this unusual relationship are the high level of public trust in the military and, latterly, the presence of an environment in which political

dissent by opposition parties to the government's handling of security affairs is both possible and active.

6.3.9 The Means to Adapt.

Nearly all of Israel's defence reforms and attempts to legislate a more formal basis for its CMR have been initiated not as the result of proactive and deliberate planning, but from the frequent need to react to conflict-related events. Whilst this might suggest a weakness in the system, nevertheless, successful reform has come out of this process. One strength of the Israeli system is that it is open to the idea of independent inquiries into government affairs. However, one weakness has been the ease with which both the civil government, and IDF themselves, have been able to resist the implementation of the inquiries' recommendations. In most cases this has only resulted in delaying the inevitable, and the presence of a vocal political opposition has helped to ensure that even the most stubborn resistance has eventually been overcome. Nevertheless, there are still areas, such as the military monopoly of strategic intelligence gathering and assessment, that have proved stubbornly impervious to change.

6.4 How do the Findings Relate to the Literature?

6.4.1 The Correlation of the Study Findings and the Views of the Primary Scholars

The first thing to note is that the review of the literature produced by the primary scholars identified certain views as being commonly held them all - what were described as 'the building blocks of Israeli CMR'. This idea was supported in full by the analysis of the data, and the thematic map shown in Figure 4-6 (reproduced in Figure 4-7 below). This is essentially a summary of the findings at an abstracted level and reflects these building blocks almost perfectly. The unifying concept of Israeli CMR being 'the same but different' supports the first building block that Israel has so many historically, culturally, politically, and geographically unique elements to it that it cannot be templated. The three overarching themes then each address the other three blocks respectively: the

scholarly consensus of security as being the critical factor in all areas of Israeli life; the relationship between the military, the political hierarchy and civil society being effective, but unconventional and not fully delivering civil supremacy; and, notwithstanding the previous point, the extremely remote possibility of there being any direct military intervention in civil government in Israel in the foreseeable future.




Figure 6-7 Review of Final Thematic Map

6.4.2 Specific Areas of Congruence and Disagreement With the Literature

In addition to the broad correlation of the findings with the general views presented in the literature, there are other specific features that they support. The recognition that there are separate civil and military spheres is almost universal amongst scholars, with most acknowledging that the boundaries between the two are blurred or fragmented. Horowitz and Lissak (1989, p.29) described them as “permeable”, whilst Kimmerling (2000) held the view that they were so intermingled that it was almost impossible to recognise them as separate entities at all. The study suggests that Kimmerling’s description is closest to the reality, a conclusion which is summed up in the title of the overarching theme, ‘The Concept of a Civilian is Still Underdeveloped’. This melange of civil and military, and the informal nature of Israeli society as a

whole, were among the factors identified by both Horowitz (1976) and Schiff (1995) as characterising the IDF, and they are in part responsible for the dialogical nature of the relationship identified in the analysis of the data.

The discursive aspect of the CMR was highlighted in the discussion chapter of the study, where it was referred as the 'discourse model' - a concept that accords in many respects with Peri's partnership concept and Schiff's theory of concordance (Peri, 1983; Schiff, 1995). However, Peri's forceful insistence that the instrumental control that can be observed is purely nominal does not fit with the findings. The analysis of the data would suggest that, whilst the overall level of control that the civil government exerts over the IDF in operational matters may not be strong, ultimately the cabinet does still have the power to overrule the CGS if they should choose to do so (Peri, 1983). In this sense the study would have to concur with Ben-Meir (1995) and his rejection of any notion of nominalism. The study's findings with regards the negation of many of the benefits of the 'discourse model' that result from the striking imbalance between the capabilities of the IDF and the civil government was another area that echoed some of the previous scholarly work. The most significant of this being that produced by Ben-Meir (1995) and Michael (2007b). Peri's acknowledgement of the important role that public inquiries have played in seeing some improvement in this area was similarly reinforced, albeit that the study found them to be more significant than perhaps he has suggested (Peri, 2006, 2014).

Another further aspect of the literature was sustained by the study. There were many scholars who praised Israel's well-structured and well-informed formal scrutiny apparatus, both within the legislative and the judicial branches of government, whilst at the same time lamenting the weakness of their ability to enforce their recommendations (Ben-Meir, 1986; Cohen, 2019; Goldberg, 2006; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Peri, 2006). This was strongly endorsed by the study findings, as were Cohen's observation that the willingness of the ISC to intervene in security matters was diminishing. The second point relates to the less formal, but equally important scrutiny provided by the media. Whilst much

of the discussion in the literature involving the media focused on its transformation from a compliant organ of state to one more willing to challenge the establishment, the primary area of discussion that arose from the data concerned the role of the censor. Here there was much support for the concept of the relationship between the media and the IDF being a marriage – but one of mutual convenience, not of ‘love’. The idea being that such an apparently incongruous situation in which a democratic state exercises an element of censorship over its media, and that media showing no real objection to the situation, only continues because neither party actually wishes to dismantle it entirely (Nossek and Limor, 2011, p.126).

6.4.3 The Overall Position of the Study Within the Literature

When positioning the study within the literature it is useful to consider where it might sit with regards the four scholarly categories identified in Chapter 1 - Reverentialists, Detractors, Revisionists and Conspirators. The easiest of these to address is the last. The study simply provided no evidence at all that the Israeli government is controlled by clandestine networks of current and ex-security personnel who have penetrated the government. From the description that Sheffer and Barak (2013) give of those whom they claim were part of these security networks, it is reasonable to suppose that many of them would have been interviewed as part of this study, and yet not a single respondent gave any indication that such a conspiracy existed. Whilst this is not absolute proof that their theory is false, at the very least the conclusion must be that it is neither proven, nor credible.

The position of the findings with regards the Reverentialists is also relatively clear. Their firm belief that, whatever its faults, the IDF has always been, and remains, ideologically committed to democracy was one aspect of their standpoint that the study did endorse. Additionally, their view on the influence of retired generals in Israeli politics also found some traction. This was encapsulated by a slightly sardonic observation made by Goldberg (2006), not a Reverentialist himself, when he said that, whilst having so many ex-military personnel in politics might not be an orthodox democratic model of CMR, it was

at least better than having serving soldiers there. However, the group's defining stance, that the military domination seen in Israel is acceptable given the security situation, and that any apprehensions that might be expressed by those outside of the state are unwarranted, was not supported by the data. The analysis of the data indicates that even the flaws in the system that they do refer to are under-estimated, or not fully acknowledged. In their defence, it must be said that scholars such as Perlmutter and Horowitz, were mostly expressing such views before the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and in times when criticism of the IDF, at least within Israel, was unthinkable. Nevertheless, Perlmutter, Horowitz and Lissak remained steadfastly sanguine into the late 1970s and 1980's (Horowitz, 1976, 1982; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Lissak, 1983; Perlmutter, 1978). During this time they continued to maintain the view that the Israeli CMR was not only nonthreatening to democratic values, but that in many ways it actually enhanced and guaranteed it. Whilst the findings of the study do suggest that there is superficially an argument that can be made for this assessment, it also strongly indicates that their writings naively dismissed the associated risks.

This issue that was of most interest to the Revisionists was the exploration of the intimate relationship that exists in Israel between state and society, and much of what they revealed in this sphere was fully endorsed by the findings. As has already been discussed, this is particularly the case with regards Kimmerling's views on the interchangeability of the concepts of a soldier and a civilian. However, for the Revisionists the key aim was to reintroduce the concept of militarism into the acceptable lexicon of Israeli CMR discourse – a mission that they were completely successful in. However, in order to achieve this Revisionists such as Kimmerling and Levy found it necessary to re-define the term around the facts, thus originating such concepts as “Civilian Militarism” or “Materialist Militarism” (Kimmerling, 1993, pp.206–208; Levy, 2007, pp.11–15). Whilst the study found nothing to dispute the logic of their arguments, the evidence leaned much more heavily towards the view expressed by Horowitz (1976, pp.56–65), that Israel's experience of a heavy military presence in society as being one, “...more analogous to Athens than to Sparta”.

In terms of their understanding of the problem, the Detractors' viewpoint is not so dissimilar to that of the Reverentialists, except that it offers the more pessimistic view that the strong military influence on politics in Israel cannot be recognised as being either wholly positive, or entirely benign. In this respect, it is the closest position to that identified by the study. Much of the work produced by the three main scholars acknowledged as being in this category (Peri, Ben-Meir and Michael) was supported by almost every one of the nine findings. However, not all of their views were endorsed in their entirety. Peri's insistence that the civil government's control over the military is purely nominal is one that has already been mentioned. Another is Michael's advocacy of the concept of the IDF as an epistemic authority (Michael, 2007a, 2009, 2014). The study did find evidence to support the view that the balance of power between the civil and military authorities is seriously biased in the military's favour, and that Michael's description of an epistemic authority is pertinent. Nevertheless, as with Peri's concerns, the evidence of the study could not support the gravity of the consequences that Michael associated with this situation.

6.5 The Specific Design Implications of each of the Findings for Post-Conflict SSR

The implications of the study for post-conflict SSR are presented as a series of reflections on the actions the findings should suggest to programme designers. Each reflection is associated with a particular finding.

6.5.1 Baselining Culture

That local history and culture have an impact on CMR development is widely accepted by mainstream SSR practitioners, but, despite this, this issue has always tended to be addressed through attempts to bring minor local adjustments to an otherwise orthodox, WLD-focused solution (Hendrickson and Ball, 2009). Israel's experience clearly shows that the depth of significance of culture is such that it fundamentally affects the underlying attitudes of a society to security, and hence directly influences the relationship that the state develops with its military. For this reason it is unwise for SSR programmers to treat cultural issues as something that can be confronted by simply fine-tuning external

embellishments, or by applying minor variations to a standard model. Rather they must be acknowledged as the essential baseline from which a programme is constructed from the beginning. Local culture must be considered in the design of a post-conflict reform programme from the very start and it not simply 'bolted-on' afterwards.

6.5.2 Integrating Society

The orthodox approach to CMR with regards the separation of the military from civil society more usually follows Huntington than Janowitz (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Schiff, 1995). For this reason defence reform programmes tend to try to work to detach the military from civil society as much as possible, restructuring them as a distinctly separate professional body, focused solely on external defence. The aim being to avoid the creation of a militaristic society or a classic garrison state. However, the example of the Israeli model suggests that, in some circumstances, integrating the military further into society can actually help to avoid such outcomes. Using the military as a mechanism to draw diverse elements of the population together can assist in generating a higher level of confidence and trust in the military, which then engenders a less antagonistic relationship.

6.5.3 Embracing Unorthodoxy

The orthodox model of civilian control of the military favours a situation in which there is an, "institutional separation between the head of state and the operational head of the armed forces through layers of public sector management and administration" (DCAF, 2015, p.6). The findings show that other less orthodox, yet still democratic, models such as Israel's can be equally effective in preserving the authority of civil government. A limited military influence on government policy-making need not present a mortal danger to the essential democratic processes, and it may even help to avoid more direct military intervention in government. However, it must be acknowledged that there is, potentially, a price to pay for this compromise, which is a loss of outright civil supremacy. Nevertheless, in a state which is constantly facing an existential

threat, it could be argued that such a price may well be one worth paying to ensure the coexistence of military effectiveness and democratic government.

6.5.4 Encouraging Discourse

Informal norms and practices are often downplayed, or even ignored altogether in the SSR agenda (Hendrickson and Ball, 2009, p.43). However, the informality found in the Israeli model has much to recommend it to SSR programmers working in post-conflict scenarios. The 'discourse model' that it promotes allows an effective and helpful interchange between ministers and generals, whilst it also enhances flexibility and responsiveness, features that are much sought after in situations where security is paramount. However, whilst informality does offer these advantages, it also lays the system open to serious vulnerabilities. Without strong constraints and boundaries, either through the mechanism of a written constitution or via primary legislation, a system based on loose understandings and agreements presents a huge risk. If such an approach were to be adopted in any SSR programme then additional action would be required to ensure that that the necessary protection was in place.

6.5.5 Ensuring Civil-Military Parity

As described above, post-conflict situations could benefit from the use of the 'discourse model' of CMR, given its merits as a contender for a working alternative to the more orthodox one of an exclusively dictatorial civil authority in all matters of security. Nevertheless, if such a model is to sustain the necessary minimum level of democratic control, then it is important to guarantee that there is a balanced dialogue between the military and the civil government, with the politicians possessing the necessary resources to debate and question military plans. This is likely to require the establishment of a strong National Security Council (NSC), independent of the military. As an adjunct to this, it must be noted that the advantages such a model can only be leveraged if the reforms also ensure that the civil government in question owns the capability to gather and analyse strategic level intelligence, and to make their own national intelligence assessment based on this.

6.5.6 Appraising Who Makes Policy

Another aspect of the orthodox view of CMR by SSR practitioners is that having serving generals active in politics is unacceptable in all circumstances, as it is incompatible with democratic principles. Paradoxically, if the data suggests that, by permitting their CGS to operate as a demi-political figure, Israel has reduced the chance of direct military intervention in government. Research indicates that experience is not exclusive to Israel and, as Mannitz (2013, p.17) has pointed out, "... recent studies show that interpenetration between political and military levels in the political practice of mature democracies can exist without impairing democratic constitutional order". For this reason, the possibility of permitting senior military officers to take a more active role in policy-making is an attractive option when considering programmes designed for situations in which the peace is similarly fragile. However, there are risks involved and judgement would have to be made on whether or not the generals were sufficiently trustworthy and democratically-focused to ensure that the situation was not abused. These are not traits that are commonly found in the military elites of newly created, post-conflict democracies and caution would need to be exercised if this route were to be followed.

6.5.7 Empowering Oversight

The need for strong accountability and civilian oversight are found as fundamental principles in virtually all SSR guidance (Fitz-Gerald, Macphee and Westerman, 2017). The study's examination of Israel's experience in this area did nothing but confirm that this is sound practice. Two elements are of particular note. The first is that it is possible to have bodies that are extremely effective at overseeing the military and examining their activities, and yet do not have the necessary power of enforcement when it comes to ensuring that their recommendations are followed. This must be avoided. The second is that the ability of the judiciary to freely investigate and adjudicate on matters of national security is an important feature of any democracy. Nevertheless, if the courts become too powerful in such areas, then governments can see them as a non-elected threat to their own democratic role as the defenders of the state. In such

circumstances the usually healthy friction between the judiciary and the executive can develop into a more dangerous hostility. A careful balance needs to be struck here, but this is precisely what SSR was designed to deal with through its consideration of the broader security sector as a whole.

6.5.8 Fostering Media Relations

Most SSR programmers do accept that, even in a democracy, there will always be some tension between the freedom of the press and the need to protect security. The OECD Handbook guide to conducting an SSR assessment of accountability suggests one of the questions to consider is, “Are executive powers of censorship and coercive powers (surveillance and detention for example) defined within a system for oversight and review?” (OECD DAC, 2007, p.114). How this is resolved will vary depending on the particular circumstances, but few states have managed to find a solution regarding operational security that is as mutually acceptable to both sides as that which has developed in Israel (Pantev et al., 2005, p.61). Their example shows that, in an environment in which the threat to the state is high, a close relationship between the media and the military, including perhaps an element of specifically directed censorship, can enhance rather than damage a democracy. But for this to work successfully, at least two other elements also need to be in place. These are, a similarly high level of public trust in the military to that found in Israel, and a comprehensive freedom for the political opposition to openly challenge government activities.

6.5.9 Ensuring Progression and Reform

Much of Israel’s most successful defence reforms have come about through public demand for answers to questions regarding the causes of both political and military failures in conflict, admittedly often driven by an attendant desire to apportion blame. Whilst this in itself could not be advocated as a specific SSR objective, nevertheless, the mechanisms which were put in place to enact the subsequent inquiries and investigations that followed these failures are to be admired and do have much to recommend them. The Israeli example demonstrates that, if an unorthodox CMR is to be employed productively and without threatening democratic rule, then it is essential to have an effective

reform process available, with instruments that are equipped with the powers needed to ensure that any relevant proposals are taken forward and are enacted by the government and the military in a timely fashion.

6.6 The Original Contribution to Knowledge

The development of CIPMIS as a framework with which to analyse CMR not only introduces a unique perspective to this study, but it also provides a tool which may prove valuable to other scholars in the field of CMR in the future. It is complimentary to other work that is ongoing in the field, and it opens up new and previously underexplored approaches to the analysis of these complex relationships.

The comprehensive literature review showed that there has been previous research carried out concerning the possible alternatives to the traditional liberal peace governance models in SSR programmes. However, this work has primarily been concerned with the use of hybrid governance models, and little, if any, consideration has been given to alternative, less orthodox, democratic models. By considering the potential of making use of elements of the Israel's unorthodox model of CMR, this study makes a significant original contribution to the knowledge in this area.

The decision to embrace a CR philosophy to drive the study, employing its relativist epistemological approach, is something new in the field of research into Israeli CMR. One consequence is that the nature of the relationship is viewed as a product of its time, with the occurrences that describe it primarily being drawn from the views and opinions of those people who are directly involved. CR also encourages the boundaries between the civil and military elites and the civil populace to be examined in terms of the interactions between the relevant players and how they relate to events that are observed, and the situations surrounding them. In this way, the study brings a wholly original perspective to the subject.

The analysis of the data gathered from the comprehensive series of semi-structured interviews conducted with well-informed and influential Israeli elites

in the field of CMR, focused on which elements of the relationship might be usefully replicated elsewhere. As such, a unique set of findings were obtained that were then used to focus the findings relating to the Israeli experience on ways in which the success rate of post-conflict SSR programmes might be improved – again something which has not been done before.

6.7 Further Research

The study raised a number of issues that warrant further research. The first of these relates to one of the biggest questions that arose throughout the data acquisition and the subsequent analysis - just how singular is the Israeli situation? It seems clear that the precise Jewish historical and cultural background to the creation of the state of Israel is unique, but similarities to the more general circumstances may be apparent elsewhere. For example, certain aspects can perhaps be compared with Britain's experiences in Northern Ireland and, whilst this is often dismissed as lazy thinking by some scholars, from the researcher's personal familiarity with both situations it has been possible to discern that there are some convincing parallels. Indeed, others too have seen a resemblance between the two situations, with Goodman (2017) remarking that, "While there are some important differences between our conflicts, the multitude of similarities only strengthens the case that solutions developed in Northern Ireland can be used as comparative models and even be tailored to the Israeli reality." So, if the occupation truly changes everything as the study suggests, then it is vital to understand which elements of Israel's relationship with its Arab neighbours are so specific to Israel that they make any aspects of the CMR that are connected with it unusable elsewhere. Equally, however, if features of the situation are more generic, then this would suggest that there are likely to be other situations in which internal civil unrest predominates which could benefit from Israel's experience – both good and bad. Further work is required to fully explore this aspect of the study.

There is a second, slightly more esoteric, area of the findings that also merits further study. The informal and discursive nature of the Israeli CMR was noted as being something that marks it out as different from more formal western

relationships, and many of the respondents remarked that was that this was a result of an inherent Israeli national characteristic. However, whilst this may be true, nevertheless there are other examples of the way in which normally formal and strictly hierarchical relationships have been adjusted to become more informal in their approach to meet particular circumstances. A relevant example of this is another area in which the researcher is experienced - that of the regular and the reserve elements of the British army. Whilst the former operates on a classic formal military basis, the latter exhibits a much more relaxed, almost casual set of relationships. In addition, in the reserve element of the army the civil and military also overlap much more – it is not unheard of for the superior/subordinate roles of two individuals in the reserve forces to be reversed in their civilian employment. An investigation of how this has developed, and has then been managed and sustained, might help to inform the possibilities of creating other more informal civil-military environments from scratch elsewhere.

Looking outside of the study itself, if the concept of using elements of unorthodox CMR in SSR programme design is to be of practical use, then ideally there would exist a bank of examples of such models for programme designers to draw on. For this to be the case then similar studies to this one would need to be carried out looking specifically at the replicability of elements of the CMR models found in other states that might be of interest. Whilst there are a great many that could prove interesting, using the criteria outlined in Chapter 1 the following democratic states would appear to present themselves as having definite potential for further examination⁶:

South Korea – A full democracy which faces a clear existential threat, with a military that has been politically significant in the past (Bon, 2019).

India – A flawed democracy which faces a threat which, although perhaps not existential in nature, is perceived to be so by much of the population,

⁶ The categorisation of these democracies as ‘full’ or ‘flawed’ was based on the assessments provided in the 2020 Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index.

and where the military is becoming increasingly active in politics (Ayoob, 2019).

Taiwan – A full democracy, facing a clear existential threat, again with a military with a history of intrusion in government (Fravel, 2002).

Singapore – A flawed democracy, admittedly with a limited national security threat, but one where defence and national security is taken extremely seriously, and which has created strong civil-military links (Chong and Chan, 2017).

One final area for further research, and one which would have made a useful addition to this study had time permitted, would be to consider how application of some of the findings might have been applied to recent post-conflict SSR programmes in the real world. This would be difficult to construct and carry out in a rigorous manner as, by its nature, it would be somewhat speculative, but it could provide a useful validation of the feasibility and usefulness of some of the recommendations. Possible scenarios would include the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Iraq and Afghanistan might also be interesting subjects, although the complex nature of those two situations would likely preclude any useful outcomes.

6.8 Breaking The Mould - The Three Big Ideas

As a final summary of the key lessons of the study, three ‘Big Ideas’ can be identified which, if employed, could help to break the mould of the previously unfruitful, orthodox approach to post-conflict SSR. These are:

One. The cultural and historical background of the state being subject to SSR should impact on the design of a post-conflict programme from the start, and not be considered as a cosmetic addition that can later be applied to an otherwise conventional, normative solution.

Two. More flexibility should be given regarding the extent to which the military can be allowed to be involved in security policy-making and decision-making. Involving them in these areas is not an

automatic retreat from the democratic process, and the Israeli 'discourse model' is one example of how this can be made to work. However, there is a need to be aware that the price to pay for the stability and security that this can bring may be the loss of absolute civil supremacy – but in certain post-conflict situations it may be a price worth paying.

Three. If the benefits of unorthodox solutions to SSR are to be realised then one of the outcomes must be a rigorous and independent mechanism that allows for the system to adapt as circumstances arise. This necessitates a society that is sympathetic to the military, and a state government that is open and transparent to scrutiny and criticism, and achieving these may require additional reforms to be enabled elsewhere.

ANNEX A

A SUMMARY OF THE HISTORY OF PRE-1948 ISRAELI CMR, BASED ON THE RELEVANT LITERATURE

The Need to Review the Pre-State History of Israeli CMR

The critical events in the development of Israeli political and military history are frequently identified as being particular conflicts that took place from 1948 onwards, such as the Kadesh War of 1956 (better known the Suez crisis in the UK), the Six-day War in 1967 or the 1973 Yom Kippur War. However, if the full picture of Israeli CMR is to be understood, then it is necessary to spend some time examining the scholarly analysis that has been directed towards the period before this, potentially going as far back as the start of the Zionist project in the late 19th century. The activities of the *Yishuv* (the Hebrew word for the Jewish community in pre-state Palestine) at that time set the tone and thinking that still runs through many aspects of Israeli CMR even today (Peri, 1980, p.113). Whilst it is not practical to consider all of the texts that have dealt with this period of Israel's history, neither is it necessary as that is not where the focus of this research lies. Nevertheless, as already acknowledged, it is necessary to grasp a clear appreciation of the roots, both in political and security terms, of all the various aspects of the organisation that was first acknowledged as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) (*tstva ha'hagana le'israel*, or *Tzahal*, in Hebrew) in May 1948, and which is still evolving today (Schiff, 1987, p.30). For this reason the historical appraisal is more extensive than might at first be anticipated.

Historical Review

Throughout history, ever since the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans and the dispersal of the population from the area of Palestine in the first and second centuries CE, the Jews in the wider diaspora have been persecuted and subject to harsh restrictions. For the very small remnant who remained in Palestine after the Roman occupation conditions were often equally as exacting - a situation which continued, with varying degrees of severity, right up to, and including, the period under the Ottoman Turks, who ruled over the region from the mid-fifteenth century until the First World War (Ben-Sasson, H. H., 1976). However,

the start of a change in this situation began towards the end of the 19th century when the newly created Zionist movement started to encourage and assist Jews from the diaspora to migrate to Palestine. They arrived in a series of *aliyot*, or waves, and gradually a small, but steadily growing Jewish population was established there.⁷

It was the arrival of these first waves of Zionist immigrants that began to change the approach to defence and security of the Jewish population in the region. The Ottomans provided very little in the way of law and order and all groups living in there, including the newly arrived Jewish Zionist communities, felt the need to organise themselves for self-protection. This was the origin of the first rudimentary Jewish defence organisation whose volunteers were known as the *Shomrim*, meaning watchmen. In 1907, with the arrival of the Second Aliya in the run up to the First World War, the Shomrim were replaced with a more politically oriented group known as *Bar-Giora* (Ettinger, 1976; Schiff, 1987). Two years later the final incarnation of this socialist inspired self-defence organisation was formed; known as the *Hashomer*, it had a more active, dynamic role than its predecessors (Welty, 1991). As well as defending the settlements, the *Hashomer* also undertook retaliatory raids against Arabs who attacked them, and made efforts to obtain, and even manufacture, more sophisticated arms and explosives for this purpose (Schiff, 1987, p.3).

During the First World War two key figures emerged in the drive to create a properly constituted, local recruited Jewish military force that could serve as part of the British-led army that was fighting the Ottomans - Ze'ev Jabotinsky and Josef Trumpledor. At first the British would only agree to the formation of a logistical support unit known as the Zion Mule Corps; however, in August 1917, after the Corps had been seen to have served with distinction in Gallipoli, a new, entirely Jewish battalion was created as the 38th Battalion, The Royal Fusiliers (Fromkin, 2001, pp.277–278). In November of that year the British Government

⁷ There were seven separate *aliyot* (plural of *aliyah*), of Zionist settlement, that occurred from 1882 up until the formation of the state of Israel in 1948, each of which had a distinctive origin and nature. (Neuman, 1999, p.60)

published the Balfour Declaration indicating their support for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, and later the following year the 38th Battalion was further expanded to become the Jewish Legion (Barr, 2011, p.56). At the end of the war they were finally rewarded by being officially recognised as a regiment in their own right - The Judean Regiment. However, this unit did not survive for long, and, after some unauthorised actions by some of its members of the Legion during the anti-Jewish riots of 1920, it was soon disbanded.

As the First World War had progressed, the situation in Palestine had deteriorated into a state of serious neglect, with absentee landlords leasing land to impoverished tenant farmers, and Ottoman taxes crippling the economy. Nevertheless, the Jews had started to become more organised and the publication of the Balfour declaration, made just before Jerusalem fell to Allenby's imperial troops, was a huge boost to the morale of the *Yishuv* (Ettinger, 1976). When the war ended and the Ottoman empire was dismantled, as part of the 1920 San Remo conference the newly formed League of Nations assigned mandates to Britain to govern Iraq, Palestine and Trans-Jordan. The eventual aim of these mandates being to transfer sovereignty to the local populations of those areas (Owen, 2004, pp.6–7). With the arrival of the British Mandate authorities, the leadership of the *Yishuv* considered it best to dissolve *Hashomer* altogether and to create a totally new force in its place - the *Haganah*, meaning defence in Hebrew. This force, although better organized than the *Hashomer*, remained illegal under British Mandate law and care was needed to be taken in how it was run (Goldstein, 1998, p.107). From this point on, with both the semblance of a formalised Jewish civil administration and a semi-official, albeit clandestine, military force, a working CMR within the *Yishuv* was required.

However, it took some time to establish much of the quasi-governmental apparatus that the *Yishuv* was eventually to employ under the Mandate regime, so the supervision of the *Haganah* was at first entrusted to the newly formed socialist party, *Ahdut Ha'avoda* (Goldstein, 1998; Halamish, 2009). As the

organisational structure of the Yishuv developed, and the need was seen for a more central and more widely representative body to control defence, the role passed from the party to the General Workers Union, the *Histadrut* (Peri, 1980, p.118). This governance structure remained in place throughout the relatively quiet period of the 1920s, but the shock of the violent anti-Jewish riots carried out by the Arabs in 1929 changed things dramatically. One consequence of the violence was a determination by the leadership of the Yishuv leadership to reform the *Haganah* and to strengthen it not only in numbers and quality, but more fundamentally in terms of organisation and authority. As part of the reform process it was decided to transfer control of the *Haganah* from the *Histadrut* to the newly created Jewish Agency Executive, a local arm of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) (Peri, 1980, p.120). In 1931 a National Command was established to oversee day to day operation of the *Haganah*, and by 1938 the planned reorganisation of the civilian infrastructure was complete. The final result was that, from its inception in 1920, when it had been little more than a loosely structured militia run directly by a single political party, by the end of the 1930s the *Haganah* had begun to exhibit the appearance of a well-organised national military force under the direct control of a democratically elected governing body.

Within the Jewish Agency there were a number of key personalities who drove the CMR process and individuals such as Eliahu Golomb, Shaul Avigur and Israel Galili had such personal influence and power in the *Histadrut* that they would often implement critical activities without the knowledge or agreement of the *Haganah* National Command (Ben-Eliezer, 1998, p.30). But above all it was the particular and uncommon character of David Ben-Gurion, the somewhat eccentric leader of the socialist *Mapai* party (which would eventually become the Israeli Labor Party), that determined much of the way in which the state developed, and the relationship between the civil government and the military was central to his thinking on this. He saw the unified control of all of the Jewish military forces in Palestine as an essential prerequisite to the establishment of any future state, and he did everything possible to bring this about (Ben-Eliezer, 1998, p.116). The process of establishing a General Headquarters and staff who

were able to take over the day-to-day routine of military operations and administration required a clarification of the specific breakdown of civil and military responsibilities within the organisation. Once in place, the new structure freed up the Jewish Agency to take on more of a supervisory and policy-making role (Luttwak and Horowitz, 1975, p.17). However, in the process of bringing about the much needed streamlining of the governance structures, ironically the reforms also sowed the seeds of future problems. The reform process was a difficult enough task as it stood, but it was made even harder by the strong personalities of the individuals involved (Ben-Eliezer, 1998, pp.29–30). The strength of their influence within the *Histadrut*, and their desire to impose their own solutions, meant that they often bypassed the established chain of command, and the resulting situation was one of disorder and confusion. It can be argued that the lack of clarity this created led directly to the vagaries in the command relationship between the Israeli government and the IDF which would, decades later, become the subject of much public criticism on more than one occasion. The governance system that was eventually put in place could hardly be described as a conventional model that would be recognised as operating in any other democratic state - although, since at this stage Israel was not a state and the *Haganah* was not a legitimate armed force, this is perhaps excusable. And in further mitigation, despite the somewhat idiosyncratic nature of the solution, Ben-Gurion, as the Chairman of the Jewish Agency, did make use of a number of more established ways of controlling the military that would have been of great value had they been carried over into the later Israeli CMR. He sought to closely control the budget and finance, and to direct the gathering and analysis of intelligence, and in addition he exercised personal authority over the appointment of senior military commanders. Hence, despite the inherently disordered nature of the system, by employing a unique combination of centralised socialist methods and more orthodox democratic control measures the civil polity can, nevertheless, be seen to have succeeded in keeping relatively firm authority over the semi-official military forces of the *Haganah*.

Much of the funding for the *Haganah* was initially raised through a voluntary tax called *Kofer Hayishuv*, or the Yishuv ransom (Peri, 1980, pp.124–125).

However, this fund was not in the direct hands of the Jewish Agency and, consequently, through the raising of various additional levies and taxes, Ben-Gurion sought to gradually increase his ability to personally influence the defence budget. He was successful in this aim and by 1943 the Agency directly supplied over 50% of the funding, and in this way it came to dictate much of the financial decision-making (Peri, 1980, pp.138–139). Surprisingly, for a time, even the British had a small part to play in financing what was essentially a prohibited military force, a situation which occurred as a result of their need to take on additional local manpower during the Arab Revolt. Initially they funded for the *Notrim*, a locally recruited branch of the Palestine Police. They then increased their support further during the early part of the Second World War when they agreed to finance and equip specialist elements of the, still theoretically illegal, *Haganah* (Horne, 2003; Schiff, 1987). However, after the British success at El Alamein in November 1942 their need for local forces began to diminish, and the following year the Mandatory government removed this funding altogether (Allon 1970, pp.125–126).

In the intelligence field the concept of coordinated intelligence gathering came late to the *Haganah*, with the official intelligence agency the *Shai* (the Hebrew acronym from the full title of *Sherut Yedi'ot* or information service) only being formed in 1940. At this time it had a broader remit than just espionage, covering in addition counter-espionage and internal security screening (Allon, 1970, pp.165–166). During the Arab Revolt, when the British were working closely with various Jewish organisations, there was a great deal of intelligence exchanged between the two sides (Hughes, 2015, p.593). Additionally, by the end of 1936 over 3000 local Jewish volunteers had been recruited by the British into the *Notrim*, almost all of whom were also members of the underground *Haganah*, and this meant that intelligence information flowed relatively freely in both directions (Horne, 2003). Eventually the *Shai* actually had a separate British Department that was established to specifically infiltrate the Mandate forces to gain information, and in turn to pass false and misleading information to them (Allon, 1970, p.166).

One of the more obvious differences that could be seen when the *Hashomer* was replaced by the *Haganah* after World War One was a move from an elitist to a populist approach to recruitment. The members of *Hashomer* had seen themselves as an avant-garde movement, manifested as an elite self-selecting body, whereas, in contrast, the *Haganah* was deliberately designed to be an organisation which drew from, and involved, the wider community (Goldstein, 1998, pp.109–112). Nevertheless, even in the *Haganah* there were strict criteria that were applied when it came to the selection of personnel to fill senior positions. These were always politically directed and even when the General Staff was established in 1939 it was still made clear that its role with regards the appointment of senior commanders would be purely an advisory one, and that the National Command would always take the final decisions (Peri, 1980, p.138). This meant that it was not always the most militarily suitable individuals who were promoted and, given the difficulty in obtaining experience locally, this did not help to generate good quality leaders in the higher echelons of the *Haganah*. Often individual commanders who had shown promise in the field (either during special operations with the British during the Second World War, or later in the struggle against the Arabs) were passed over for promotion or even removed from the force altogether when the IDF was formed, because their political views did not fit. This was a serious problem in an organisation that already had only a very limited number of experienced staff and commanders (Schiff, 1987, pp.17–19).

The creation and development of a locally recruited Jewish military force such as the *Haganah* was not a straightforward task as traditionally the Jews of the diaspora had never seen themselves cast in the role of warriors, whatever their Biblical history might suggest, and Rabbinical teaching had deliberately sought to cultivate an almost pacifist position (Cohen, 2010, pp.59–62). The older members of the *Yishuv* often looked with scorn on the idea of military service and most had not been interested in joining *Hashomer*. At first the *Haganah* was also seen in a similar light by many, and later their traditional non-confrontational outlook caused a divergence of views over how to respond when the local Arab population began to increase the frequency and intensity of their attacks against

Jewish immigrants. Ben-Gurion and the majority of the *Yishuv* leadership advocated a policy of restraint or *havlagah*, preferring to let the British deal with the problem. However, the younger members of the population disagreed and wished to see the Jews take a more active role themselves. Those who had been born and raised outside of Palestine in the diaspora were often still filled with a survivalist mindset, that had arisen out of years of discrimination and persecution, and which led them to assume a naturally defensive posture (Cohen, 2008, p.22). Their offspring on the other hand, often native-born *sabras*, who were coming of age in the 1920s and 1930s, held a different perspective. They had grown up experiencing no other lifestyle, and as such they possessed a natural sense of ownership of the land and a confidence that came from feeling that they belonged there. This generational division caused serious problems for Ben-Gurion and the political leadership when dealing with the question of how to react to Arab opposition to the Zionist expansion when it manifested itself in violence, and similar issues were to arise again later when determining the *Yishuv's* relationship with the British during WW2.

Disagreements over the stance to adopt with regards Arab violence, and other disputes related to the leadership of the *Haganah*, eventually led to a split within the organisation. The result was the formation in 1931 of the much more confrontational *Irgun Zvai Leumi* (National Military Organisation) - more commonly known simply as the *Irgun*, or by its Hebrew initials, IZL (Bagon, 2003; Peri, 1980). Although the IZL nominally aligned themselves with the Jabotinsky and the Revisionists, even by the late 1930s it could be said that although the organisation was affiliated with the party and generally supported its aims, militarily it did not consider itself to be directly under their authority (Peri, 1980, pp.152–153). Jabotinsky's death in 1940 further weakened the links with the party, and later when the young firebrand Menachem Begin took over as its head in 1943 the IZL developed its own fully integrated, internal concept of operations (Begin, 1977, p.61). Also in 1940 there had been a further split within the IZL itself, with Avraham Stern establishing a particularly violent breakaway group known officially as the *Lohamei Herut Israel* (Hebrew meaning the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) and abbreviated to the *Lehi* - or

unofficially by the British by the pejorative name, the Stern Gang. The *Lehi* had no particular party associations but drew its membership from across the political spectrum, the only common focus binding them together being a commitment to end British mandatory rule by the use of violent means (Peri, 1980, p.154).

The split by the IZL from the *Haganah* could very easily have led to a civil war as the new organisation became not only a rival in terms of authority and political drive, but it openly defied the *Yishuv's* rulings on restraint (Schiff, 1987, p.15). The reprisals against the Arabs carried out by the IZL on the 14th November 1937, known afterwards as Black Sunday, took place with the full approval of Jabotinsky, and ran totally against Ben-Gurion's directives (Begin, 1977, p.137). However, even amongst Ben-Gurion's own followers, his policy of restraint was not universally popular, and many socialists also called for revenge and reprisals. The situation was complicated because, as well as the religious and moral aspects, there was also more hard-nosed political rationale behind Ben-Gurion's attitude. One of the practical factors that had to be taken into account was that, as result of the increased level of violence that occurred during the Arab rebellion, the British had reluctantly increased the opportunities for members of the Jewish population to legally bear arms, and Ben-Gurion saw this as an opportunity for the *Haganah* to gain military experience that should not be squandered (Allon, 1970; Bar-Zohar, 1977). Ben-Gurion maintained his position of restraint throughout the Second World War, and it was only in autumn 1945, when the new Labour government in London made it clear that they did not intend to follow through with the original intent of the Balfour Agreement, that Ben-Gurion finally accepted the inevitable and bowed to growing public opinion in favour of using armed force to achieve independence (Bar-Zohar, 1977; Luttwak and Horowitz, 1975).

When the war against the Nazis had first begun to directly impinge on Mandate Palestine, friction had also been generated over the question of the most useful form of military service for members of the *Yishuv* to undertake. The majority of the leadership, including Ben-Gurion, believed that joining the professional

British Army would be the most effective way to aid the Zionist cause in the long run. However, others were of the opinion that rather than drain an already weakened and depleted *Haganah* of further manpower, instead the answer was to bolster it by creating a better trained and more effective assault force from within its own ranks - one kept directly under local, Jewish control (Allon, 1970, pp.102–116). Eventually, the argument for the need for a more offensive force was won, and the *Palmach* was created as a specialist unit within the *Haganah* (the name *Palmach* derived from the Hebrew abbreviation for *Plugot Mahatz*, meaning strike companies). The concept seemed to work well and produced well-motivated, physically fit and independently minded soldiers (Allon, 1970; Naor, M., 1985). Nevertheless, the choice faced by members of the *Yishuv* who wished to take up arms during the war years was between service in the mainstream *Haganah*, enlistment in the British Army, or joining the *Palmach*. This meant that the manpower was split between the three and, as a consequence, none of the options thrived, with the *Haganah* in particular being much less of an effective force as a result (Ben-Eliezer, 1998, p.30).

For most of the Second World War, in general, Palestinian Jewish recruits to the British Army were restricted to non-combat roles such as drivers and storemen (Allon, 1970, p.114). However, in 1941 and 1942 members of the *Palmach* took part in several British orchestrated combat missions into Syria and Lebanon (van Creveld, 1998, pp.46–47; Schiff, 1987, p.18). Later, in 1943, the British trained 32 special agents, including three women, to be parachuted into occupied Europe to make contact with local partisans and to aid Allied prisoners (Allon, 1970, pp.132–137). Eventually, the Jewish Brigade Group was formed and in March 1945 it joined the British 8th Army in combat in Italy. After the war ended, but before being demobilised and returned to Palestine, the Brigade took on a new mission. Without the knowledge of their British officers they successfully conducted clandestine operations to gather and bring Jewish refugees illegally to Palestine (Naor, M., 1985, pp.119–126). This additional task of assisting illegal immigration into Mandate Palestine – known as *Aliyah Bet* – had actually been a major part of the *Haganah*'s responsibility since the mid-1930s (Bagon, 2003, p.104). Golda Meir, in her autobiography, highlights the

importance of this work, describing the attempt, 'to circumvent the British restrictions and to get as many Jews into Palestine as possible' as one of the three key struggles for the Jewish leadership in Palestine during the war (Meir, 1975, pp.158–160)

As an underground organisation the *Haganah* found it difficult to train and educate its own manpower to sufficiently high standards themselves. There was no possibility of setting up officer training establishments or staff colleges, or even of sending their soldiers to attend those run by other nations. They did, however, successfully run their own low level tactics courses, and much was made of basic skills such as hiking and map reading which could be carried out covertly, but nothing more sophisticated was possible (van Creveld, 1998, pp.24–25). The organisation had two different ways in which they attempted to overcome this disadvantage. The most obvious approach was to recruit those who already had proven military service elsewhere, and the nature of the immigration system, drawing from members of the diaspora around the world, made this quite a practical approach; this was one reason that Ben-Gurion was so strongly in favour of members of the *Yishuv* joining the British forces (Ben-Eliezer, 1998, p.90; Luttwak and Horowitz, 1975, p.19). The second option was to persuade the Mandate authorities to train the *Haganah* themselves, either openly as they did during the brief period between 1942 and 1943 when the *Palmach* were trained and equipped by the British Army, or unknowingly as happened with the *Notrim* during the Arab Revolt. In a similar vein, another opportunity also presented itself when, in 1938, a British Army Captain, Orde Wingate, persuaded the authorities to authorise a scheme by which members of the Jewish population were recruited to directly confront the rebels. Wingate's concept was simple and involved turning the Arab's own tactics on themselves, carrying out night time ambushes on the gangs before they themselves could strike (Graicer, 2015). His Special Night Squads (SNS) operated for about a year and achieved a moderate degree of success. However, their methods were often brutal, and possibly illegal, and Wingate's irascible and exasperating personality did not win him many friends amongst his superiors in the British hierarchy. The SNS were eventually disbanded and in May 1939 Wingate

himself was removed and barred from future service in Palestine (Hughes, 2015, pp.601–603). However, his techniques, and more importantly perhaps his offensive spirit, remained with many of those he left behind.

The decision in 1943 by the British to stop financing the *Palmach* led to a significant moment in the history of Israel's CMR (Allon 1970, pp.125–126). It created a crisis for the *Yishuv* leadership in which, despite the *Palmach's* great prestige amongst most of the population, without the British support they were faced with the possibility of having to dissolve the force for lack of resources (Naor 1985, pp.145–146). The situation forced them to devise a scheme whereby the *Palmachniks* were distributed around the *kibbutzim*⁸ where they were able to be fed and housed, whilst at the same time providing close protection for the *kibbutz*, and as an added bonus were able to assist with the work on the land. In exchange they were released by the *kibbutzim* for military training for 8 days in every month. For most in the *Yishuv* leadership this change, forced on them by a lack of resources, was applied with an element of apprehension; however, some on the far left who wanted to see a more Soviet-style model of a self-sustaining military to be implemented, saw it as a positive move (Ben-Eliezer, 1998, p.60). Whilst the close affiliation of the military with the land that this situation created was ultimately to become one of the key strengths of the IDF, at this time it was seen by those in the *Palmach* as a diminishing of their élite military status and, as a consequence, a lessening of their importance in the military hierarchy (Allon, 1970, pp.126–127).

The internal disputes that arose between the various military factions were not helpful in generating a single, unifying martial spirit, and at no point in its existence could the *Haganah* have claimed to represent all members of the *Yishuv*. The right-wing population considered the IZL to be their representative force, whilst even amongst the left-wing elements there were those who shunned the *Haganah* itself, favouring the more aggressive and free-thinking

⁸ A kibbutz (plural kibbutzim) is a rural collective run on socialist principles. The kibbutz movement in Israel was begun in the years before WW1.

Palmach, and this latter division led to some very acrimonious and public disputes (Ben-Eliezer, 1998, pp.89–91). As these grew the *Palmach*, despite their theoretical position as part of the *Haganah*, began to act virtually as a separate politically motivated army-within-an-army, with most of its membership affiliated not with Ben-Gurion's *Mapai* party, but with the far left *Mapam*. The *Palmachniks'* close affiliation to the rural *kibbutz* movement also helped to create the spirit of an army drawn directly from the people and the land. Being driven by a strong communist tradition in which civil and military affairs were expected to overlap, within the *Palmach* leadership there was an understanding that that the business of politics and of that of war were closely aligned (Allon, 1970; Ben-Eliezer, 1998). Eventually, Ben-Gurion was to form the opinion that unless they were dealt with, the *Palmach* had the potential to become a form of praetorian force for the *Mapam* in the future. For this reason he felt it necessary to eradicate the strong influence that the *Palmach*, and hence the *Mapam* party, had over the army (Bar-Zohar 1977, p.176; Peri 1980, p.198-199). Given their popularity this was never going to be an easy task and it took some time; nevertheless, the final act in the process occurred in June 1948 when, in creating the IDF, he disbanded all pre-state paramilitary forces including the *Palmach* and succeeded in creating a single force that was more representative of all of the various elements of the Jewish population.

If the civil-military linkages between the *Yishuv* leadership and the *Haganah* were difficult, those with the IZL and the *Lehi* were equally problematical. The *Lehi* had no cogent political concept and was never big enough or powerful enough to develop even a coherent military strategy. From the time that Stern brought the *Lehi* into existence as a separate body in August 1940, until his death in February 1942, they were seen as renegades, with Stern himself being extremely unpopular with almost all protagonists in Palestine except his own very small band of followers (Golan, 2011, p.31). Although not renowned as a great administrator, whilst under Stern's direct leadership the *Lehi* did nevertheless exhibit some form of recognisable hierarchical structure. However, when Yitzhak Shamir succeeded him after his death they were reorganised into a looser, cell-like arrangement, which in many ways resembled the system that

would later be employed by terrorist groups around the world - and in the same way that such groups often tend to function, the *Lehi's* political thinking and military operational planning were often indivisible (Shapiro, 2013, p.612). The IZL were more of a concern to Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency who saw their independence as undermining their own status as sole representatives of the *Yishuv* to the British (Bar-Zohar, 1977; Luttwak and Horowitz, 1975). Despite Begin's assurances to the contrary, Ben-Gurion always maintained a suspicion that the IZL might attempt to seize power, and this distrust came to a violent head on at least two occasions. In November 1944 the *Lehi* assassinated the British minister of State for the Middle East, Lord Moyne, at his residence in Cairo. This was so clearly a slap in the face to the Jewish Agency and Ben-Gurion's directives regarding the use of violence against the British that he felt that he must take action against not only the *Lehi*, but also the IZL. In what became known as the *Saison* (a French reference to the hunting season) instructions were issued to the *Haganah* to pass on to the British any information that they had about *Lehi* and IZL members, and to assist in hunting them down (Begin, 1977, pp.145–148). Ironically, given that it was their actions that had initiated the internal dispute, the *Lehi* quickly agreed to cease all operations and thereafter were left virtually untouched; however, the focus then quickly turned to the IZL (Ben-Eliezer, 1998, p.121). Although Begin himself was never captured, a great many rank and file members were, and before long the IZL was on the verge of extinction. Throughout this period the *Palmach* led the purge and attempted to set the conditions for the operations against the IZL. They also tried hard to prevent Ben-Gurion from bringing them to an end before the final blows could be delivered that might have seen the Revisionist opposition totally eliminated. In both endeavours, however, ultimately the *Yishuv's* political leadership resolutely dictated the terms, and eventually, in March 1945, the *Saison*, which was in truth never popular amongst most of the *Yishuv*, was finally abandoned (Ben-Eliezer, 1998, pp.123–155).

The *Saison* was followed by a rare and brief phase of mutual cooperation between all of the armed groups that took place under the banner of the United Resistance Movement (URM). The URM command and control structure was

based on a loose cooperative agreement in which representatives of all three organisations sat as a coordinating body, which approved any plans - although, in theory, the *Haganah* still claimed the right of veto (Grunor, 2005, pp.155–157). However, even during this period, the IZL never truly accepted the authority of Ben-Gurion and the *Haganah* leadership and there were many altercations and misapprehensions between them throughout the truce (Begin, 1977, p.199). When the URM agreement finally collapsed after the King David Hotel bombing in July 1946, the IZL and the *Lehi* returned to running independent operations without any reference to the *Haganah* (Allon, 1970, pp.179–180; Luttwak and Horowitz, 1975, pp.22–23).

By 1945 Britain was exhausted by a global conflict and, led by a Labour government who were opposed to colonialism in principal, the government in London did not take long before they sought to extricate themselves from the violence that had erupted around them in Mandate Palestine (Bregman, 2016, pp.9–11). On the 14th of May 1947, after much wrangling, Britain finally handed the problem to the recently formed United Nations (UN), and announced that they would leave the following year (Bar-Zohar, 1977, pp.140–142). The UN quickly established a special committee to consider the problem, which resulted in a vote to partition the country into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. Ben-Gurion saw more clearly than most that a serious confrontation with both the local Arab inhabitants, and also the regional Arab states, was inevitable and that the Jewish forces needed to be restructured and reinforced (Bar-Zohar, 1977, pp.142–163; Shapira, 2014, pp.155–157). Part of this process entailed a detailed examination of the *Haganah's* resources and planning capability conducted by Ben-Gurion in 1947 and which became known as his 'seminar'. He concluded that within the *Haganah* there was a lack of strategic vision, and he set about rectifying this first by seizing personal control of the defence portfolio, and then by encouraging the military commanders to start to think above sub-unit level for the first time (Cohen, 2002, pp.145–153). Although he achieved nearly all of his ambitious aims, there was one area in which Ben-Gurion failed. He wanted the new IDF to be a regular, fully professional force, fashioned on the British Army model. But, although the organisation itself was

eventually disbanded, the *Palmach* had the last word in this and after the war it was to be the ethos of the *Palmach*, with its classic people's army concept, not the regular, professional army structure of the British, that was to determine the character of the IDF in their role as the official military body of the state of Israel (van Creveld, 1998, pp.89–90; Peri, 1980, pp.196–197, 1983, pp.51–54).

On 14th May 1948, a few weeks after the declaration of the creation state of Israel and during a period of ceasefire, a serious incident occurred that was to have long lasting repercussions for Israeli CMR. Sometime before this Begin had arranged for a ship, the *Altalena*, to bring both supporters and weapons from Europe to Palestine to reinforce the IZL in their struggle against the local Arab forces. Because of delays the ship did not arrive until June, after the official formation of the IDF, and when theoretically the IZL had become part of that new force. Consequently Ben-Gurion, fearing that Begin planned to use the cargo to seize power himself, demanded that the ship and its contents be handed over directly to him for distribution as he saw fit. Begin refused, insisting that he be allowed to determine which elements of the IDF received the weapons and ammunition, and Ben-Gurion's subsequent decision as head of the provisional government to open fire on the *Altalena* resulted in the deaths of sixteen IZL personnel and three members of the IDF. Even the events that occurred during the internecine hostilities of the *Saison* could not be compared with the shock generated within the *Yishuv* by the stark image of Jews opening fire directly on Jews. In taking this momentous decision Ben-Gurion demonstrated his determination to finally eliminate any possibility of the IZL being used to usurp the government's authority. After the ship had been disabled Begin backed down and ordered the IZL to follow IDF orders and the threat, real or imaginary, was eliminated. Whether or not Begin and the IZL were truly planning to militarily confront Ben-Gurion and the *Haganah* is difficult to determine, and even today it is still unclear how much of risk they really posed (Ben-Eliezer, 1998, p.165). However, whatever the truth of the matter, the bitterness that it caused was to continue well into the first few decades of the new state, and it set the tone of many for the civil-military disputes that were to come.

The Altalena incident exemplifies the degree of fear and mistrust that existed between all of the political parties at this time, and it seems clear that Ben-Gurion felt the need to exert his authority over the military to demonstrate strength and solidarity. Two confrontations with the senior military leadership that also took place would suggest that perhaps he was right to feel this way. The first occurred in April 1948 when, on the verge of independence being declared, Ben-Gurion decided to abolish the National Command and place the army directly under the control of a Defence Department within the Jewish Agency, headed by himself (Cohen, 2008, p.24; Peri, 1980, p.191). In response to this what is sometimes known as the first Generals' Revolt occurred, in which five senior military commanders threatened to resign if the proposed changes were carried out. Ben-Gurion tackled this virtual rebellion head on, accusing the generals of mutiny and stating that he would himself resign if his directions were not implemented (Ben-Eliezer, 1998, p.161; Peri, 1980, pp.190–192). In the end a compromise was agreed and the generals backed down. A second internal revolt occurred after independence had been declared and following shortly after the Altalena incident. In late June 1948 Ben-Gurion refused to accept the nominations for the newly formed military commands proposed by Yigal Yadin the military Chief of Staff, and instead nominated his own candidates to the posts – and, as had previously occurred, the heads of the General Staff branches offered their resignations (Bar-Zohar, 1977, p.176; Peri, 1980, p.199). This rebellion too was eventually put down but on this occasion, before he had his way, Ben-Gurion was forced to physically walk out of the government in the midst of the war, and only then did the military hierarchy feel compelled to let him have his way. From this Ben Eliezer (1998, pp.167–168) suggests that it is reasonable to conclude that the reason there was no revolution or military coup in 1948, either from those on the right or on the left, is that the pressures of waging an all-out, existential conflict outweighed all other concerns - or in other words the internal conflict was replaced by a more pressing external one.

The effectiveness of Ben-Gurion's foresight and planning can be seen in the outcome of the war that followed the UN partition vote (Bregman, 2016, pp.33–34). Although it was a close-run affair, the conflict which lasted over 15 months,

including two UN imposed truces, proved to be an astonishing triumph for the IDF. Whilst the general assessment of the victory is that it can be attributed as much to the ineffectiveness of the Arab forces and their inability to act cohesively, as it can to the strength of the IDF, this is not to understate the Israeli achievements (van Creveld, 1998, p.95). The result was that the land was indeed partitioned as had been proposed by the Security Council, but the final boundaries were to be based on the ceasefire lines at the end of the war and these greatly favoured the new Israeli state. The ceasefire line between Israel and the West Bank (occupied at the end of the war by Jordan), was referred to as the Green Line and it became the de facto border between the two countries until the 1967 Six Day War when the Israelis occupied the territory.

Conclusions

The 1948/49 War of Independence was the culmination of the Zionist project, and all that had taken place in the decades leading up to it had a significant and long-lasting effect on what was to come afterwards. This applies equally to CMR as it does to every other aspect of the Israeli political and social life. The development during that time of the three-way relationship between the military, the government and the civil population led to a situation in which, from the very beginning of the existence of the IDF, it was seen as an embedded part of society, and not a separate organisation set apart from the people (Schiff, 1987, p.70). An understanding of the background to this is an essential prerequisite for any analysis of the later evolution and development of Israel's post-independence CMR.

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ANNEX B

A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE PRINCIPAL SCHOLARS OF POST-1948 ISRAELI CMR

Introduction

In their analysis of the scholarly approach to CMR Sheffer and Barak (2010) group the literature into a series of different categories based on each author's attitudes and viewpoints which, whilst primarily designed to ultimately point towards the superiority of their own alternative viewpoint, is nevertheless a logical and rational framework. In their categorisation they suggest that past studies into Israeli CMR can be considered to follow one of three major approaches: the Traditional Approach; the Critical Approach; or the New Critical Approach. This review will make use of a very similar concept, but instead of three, it identifies four categories of researchers, and uses a nomenclature chosen to better point to the nature of the views they exhibit: Reverentialists; Detractors; Revisionists; and Conspirators.

The Reverentialists

The first of these, the Reverentialists, primarily focused their research on the formal, institutional aspects of the relationship, clearly separating the protagonists into the two distinct spheres of the civil and the military. They identified that the boundaries between the two were fragmented, and accepted that in almost all cases the military dominated. Scholars who followed this line of research acknowledged that what they described was undeniably not an idealised, western liberal democratic (WLD) solution, nevertheless, they felt it was well suited to Israel's situation at the time. Perlmutter was the first in this category and, in his contemporary view, Israel possessed, "a strong civilian leadership over the defence establishment", which, being rooted in democratic values, had ensured civil supremacy – a situation which, when writing in 1969, he could not see changing in the foreseeable future (Perlmutter, 1969, p.134). Later, for him even the 1973 war changed very little and in 1978 he was able to state that, "even in the face of *Zahal's* [the IDF's] clear military superiority that

subsequently materialised, the Israeli formula of civil-military relations has remained intact” (Perlmutter, 1978, p.2).

Another Reverentialist scholar was Dan Horowitz. One of his first pieces that related to the subject of Israeli CMR was the book, ‘The Israeli Army’, which he co-authored with Edward Luttwak (Luttwak and Horowitz, 1975). Whilst primarily an historical account of the IDF, it could not avoid touching on the subject of the army’s relationship with government and politics. Just a few years after this Horowitz published an article in *The Jerusalem Quarterly* entitled “Is Israel a Garrison State?” (Horowitz, 1976). This title (which refers to the definition of a garrison state as first discussed by Harold Lasswell (1941)) was carefully chosen to directly address an issue that almost all of the Reverentialist scholars have raised – as indeed have many others. The answer to the question that the article poses, according to Horowitz, is a definitive no. He did admit that Israel displays many of the classic features of a relationship which might be expected to be found in a garrison state, but he then goes on to provide a series of mitigations as to why this designation does not apply to Israel at that time. In doing so he used a classical allusion (which often reappears in later texts on this subject) suggesting that Israel is, “... far more analogous to Athens than to Sparta” (Horowitz, 1976, p.75). He explained his logic for this conclusion as being that the key difference between a garrison state and a democratic one is the extent to which militaristic values are adopted by, and potentially overwhelm, civil society. For Horowitz, this was not at all the case in Israel. So, in many ways, he followed Perlmutter’s views that whilst Israel’s CMR may not be the standard WLD model, it was, nevertheless, perfectly satisfactory for a democracy in the situation in which Israel found itself.

Horowitz also coined another phrase, one which has resonated throughout the years in the discussions on Israeli CMR, that of Israel possessing, “a civilianised military in a partially militarized society” - the title of a chapter that he wrote for the multidisciplinary book ‘Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats’ (Horowitz, 1982). In it he looked at why Israel is a “deviant case”, and more importantly why, despite this, it can prove useful to compare it with other cases elsewhere

(Horowitz, 1982, p.77). He considered that the “schizophrenia of Israeli society”, had actually been partially responsible for its day to day functioning as a stable multiparty democracy, (Horowitz, 1982, p.99). Nevertheless, whilst his arguments for this being the case were, on the face of it, reasonably sound, there is also a distinct impression that he is almost wilfully ignoring contra-indications. In this text he seems to be reluctant to address much of the hard evidence of real disfunction in the relationship that was already apparent at this time from the aftermath of the investigations into the 1973 war, and also in the suggestions of relationship issues that were starting to emerge with the appointment of Ariel Sharon as minister of defence.

Ten years on from this Horowitz and Lissak wrote ‘Trouble in Utopia’, a book which claimed to provide, ‘a comprehensive reorganisation and reinterpretation of much of the available data on Israeli society and politics’ (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989, p.vii). It is beyond the scope of this review to comment critically on the validity or otherwise of that claim in its entirety, but from a purely CMR perspective it isn’t easy to see how it stands up. The main difference from Horowitz’s previous work that can be discerned in this book is that, whilst still recognising the dominance of the military, and still commending the situation as a positive one with regards the health of the democracy, the authors did acknowledge for the first time that the boundaries between the two were changing. They observed that whilst some sectors were becoming more permeable and others were becoming less so. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, they still maintained that the changes that were occurring only further substantiated Horowitz’s previous views of Israeli society comprising a civilianised military, and a partially militarized civilian population (Horowitz, 1982).

As well as co-authoring ‘Trouble in Utopia’, Lissak also contributed pieces of his own on the subject of Israeli CMR (Lissak, 1983, 2001). In these Lissak comes across as a robust apologist for the Israeli CMR model, and he was one of the strongest advocates for the view that, whilst Israel may present as a militaristic society, in fact at its heart it is a state in which the civil government clearly has

the upper hand. The essence of his message was that, whilst he accepts that, to a casual observer, Israel might appear to be a militaristic state, in reality, if you truly understand what is going on, there is no need for concern. Indeed, he went further, expressing the opinion that it was precisely the involvement of the army in civil affairs that had helped to ensure a fully democratic society in Israel. Once again, however, he appears to have only considered the evidence that supported his arguments, but failed to address that which did otherwise.

The Detractors

The first appearance of the Detractors occurred in the early and mid-1980s, with the term here primarily encompassing the work of two separate scholars, Yoram Peri and Yehuda Ben-Meir. Both conducted re-examinations of the history of political involvement in the military (and military involvement in politics) in Israel, and both also concluded, in common with the Reverentialists, that these elements could be discerned as two distinct spheres, albeit with fragmented boundaries between them. However, unlike previous researchers, the Detractors perceived that the inequality in the relationship presented a serious threat to Israel's democratic status. However, despite the overlap in their wider attitudes, they were not writing in harness with one another and held differing views on a number of specific aspects of Israel's CMR.

Peri's PhD thesis was the basis for his first book on the subject, 'Between Battles and Ballots' and which proved to be one of the first serious challenges to the previously widely held view that Israel's CMR was something perhaps to be puzzled over, but ultimately to be admired (Peri, 1980, 1983). 'Between Battles and Ballots' was intended to stir up the thinking on Israeli CMR as Peri considered that too much of what had been written up until that time was complacent, and that the threats that Israeli democracy faced had not been properly highlighted. He made it clear that he believed too much of the research being carried out into Israeli CMR at that time was still deferential and fixed in the past, whilst in fact the future of the democracy was potentially very unstable (Peri, 1983, p.287).

In the book Peri also refuted the view that the IDF reflected all strata of Israeli society, claiming instead that it predominantly represented a white, Ashkenazi elite, and that it was no longer true to claim that in Israel, “the IDF is society, and society is the IDF” (Peri, 1983, p.10). Most damning of all, he expressed the view that, “The instrumentalist-pattern relationship between the military and Cabinet in Israel is nominal. Their mutual involvement, rather than civil supervision, is the governing factor in what actually happens” (Peri, 1983, p.131). The main conceptual idea of Peri’s book is that, for him in 1982, the relationship between the military and the government was not one of subordination of the former to the latter, but rather it was a partnership, and an unequal partnership at that. This concept is one that he has resolutely continued to promote since that time, and he was still reaffirming it over two decades later in an article that he wrote for the *Israel Affairs* journal in which he argued that, whilst the on the surface the instrumental control may be in place, in reality, “...the professional officers’ corps is intimately involved in the policy making process as an equal partner” (Peri, 2005, pp.328–329).

Peri’s other major contribution to the study of Israeli CMR, his 2006 book ‘Generals in the Cabinet Room’, can be seen as an attempt to bring his earlier work up to date some twenty years on, in particular in the light of the security focus having moved from an external to an internal threat (Peri, 2006). However, whilst the second book did add an enormous amount to the knowledge and understanding of the particular events that it reviewed, in terms of reflections on the relationship itself there was little new in it that had not already been raised in the previous text.

Writing during the similar period, Ben-Meir is essentially a Detractor, although some of his earlier writings did reflect Reverentialist views, and he could perhaps be considered to have moved from one camp to another. In his 1986 book on national security decision-making he examined the mechanisms and procedures employed by key western states in general, before then concentrating on those operating in Israel at that time (Ben-Meir, 1986). He made few specifically critical remarks on the issue of Israeli CMR per se, but in

his conclusion he did make a major contribution to the then ongoing debate on the need for, and the composition of, some form of National Security Council (NSC) – a question which had first been raised by the Agranat Commission over a decade earlier. However, in his later book, simply entitled, 'Israeli Civil-Military Relations', he appeared to be much more censorious of the whole CMR system (Ben-Meir, 1995).

Whilst taking a similarly critical stance to Peri, and although describing 'Between Battles and Ballots' as, "a major in-depth study and an important contribution to the field", nevertheless Ben-Meir was not in complete agreement with its analysis and conclusions (Ben-Meir, 1995, p.193). In particular he did not accept Peri's argument that Israeli CMR could be characterised by a civil-military partnership in which the government only exercised nominal control; and yet he equally rejected the contrary view that Israel simply exhibits another version of the CMR seen in major WLD states, a view which he described as being oversimplistic (Ben-Meir, 1995, p.178). Overall, Ben-Meir's own conclusions present a somewhat confused picture. On the one hand he offers an optimistic, Reverentialist view, describing the situation as being, "positive and reflecting an essentially healthy and balanced system" (Ben-Meir, 1995, p.178). And yet, almost in the same breath, he reiterates his criticisms of the lack of an integrated civilian-military staff system for strategic planning – a move that he had recommended nearly a decade earlier – and offered the view that this was, by far, "... the most serious threat to civilian control in Israel" (Ben-Meir, 1995, p.183).

Although writing much later, Kobi Michael can also be considered to sit in the Detractor's camp. In 2007 he wrote a number of articles which supported the Detractors' perspective on the subject of Israeli CMR, (Michael, 2007b, 2007c, 2007a). In these articles Michael began an unrelenting assault on the previously held view of the Israeli CMR as being a benign, even positive, relationship with his article, 'The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil-Military Relations' (Michael, 2007c). In it he appeared to accept the general concept of Peri's partnership model, but attempted to further analyse it and to better

understand the processes that led to it. Ultimately, although following a quite different path to get there, Michael 's conclusion was similar to one aspect of the views that Ben-Meir espoused. In the analysis Michael identified a distinct weakness in the civil political organisation with respect to strategic planning – a weakness which left the government heavily reliant on the IDF to fill this critical role. He considered that in order for this to be corrected then a revolution would be needed in the way in which the government operated in that area. He called for a dramatic re-think that would, “lead to the creation of a culture of strategic thought that will be developed in civilian state institutions, freeing the political level from its almost total dependence on the abilities and qualities of the military establishment” (Michael, 2007c, p.541).

In other articles written in the same year, Michael returned to the subject on several occasions, each time pointing towards the same conclusion, that the civil authorities needed greater and more effective capabilities for dealing with strategic issues which were independent from the military (Michael, 2007b, 2007a, 2007c). In one he highlighted two main ideas: the first, the intellectual concept of an epistemic authority; and the second, his proposition, developed with ex-CGS Moshe Ya'alon, that the IDF had acted as just such an authority in their dealings with the Israeli government, and that this had resulted in an unhealthy relationship between them (Michael, 2007a). The argument Michael made for the concept of an epistemic authority is compelling and can almost be seen as a statement of the obvious. However, the arguments that he presented to support the second idea, that the IDF acted as such an authority to the Israeli government during Ya'alon's time, are less convincing. It is of note that in the final paragraph, discussing the minister of defence's dismissal of Ya'lon as CGS, Michael does not see the irony of using this as an example of the weakness of the civil government.

The Revisionists

The appearance of the Revisionists began in the mid-1990s, with perhaps the first text from this group of academics to make an impact being Baruch Kimmerling's article in the *European Journal of Sociology* entitled 'Patterns of

Militarism in Israel' (Kimmerling, 1993). It is appropriate that it referred to the concept of militarism directly in the title as this is a defining theme of the Revisionist scholars. In the article Kimmerling set out to re-introduce the concept of militarism into the discussions on Israeli CMR, feeling that it had been prematurely, and inappropriately, banished from the lexicon sometime before. In this he was quite open in his aim of radically revising the previous thoughts on CMR. Having thus established the baseline for the Revisionist approach to Israeli CMR, Kimmerling himself only really returned to the subject again occasionally. In a piece that he wrote a few years later he reiterated his view that the interconnection of civilian and military cultures, both in the public arena and in the social environment, had led to, "a military-cultural complex", which he saw as penetrating all aspects of Israel society (Kimmerling, 2000, p.243). He also briefly addressed the subject in his book, 'The Invention and Decline of Israeliness' (Kimmerling, 2001, p.214).

The scholar who has drawn most on Kimmerling's reintroduction of the term militarism into the discussion is the political sociologist Uri Ben-Eliezer (Ben-Ari and Lomsky-Feder, 1999a, p.6). His primary contribution on this subject was his 1998 book, 'The Making of Israel Militarism' (Ben-Eliezer, 1998). However, he had already published some related ideas a few years before this in articles that he had written for a political studies journal (Ben-Eliezer, 1995, 1997). These two texts clearly laid out the foundations on which his subsequent major work in this area was based. 'The Making of Israeli Militarism' was very much an historical treatise but, unsurprisingly given the title, it continued to address the issue of how Ben-Eliezer wished to redefine the meaning of militarism (Ben-Eliezer, 1998). In the end, despite his insistence on bringing militarism firmly into the argument, his analysis seemed to result in similar conclusions to Peri and his concept of a partnership, albeit presented in a different form. He concluded that, in Israel at least, this "... raises the possibility that militarism and praetorianism may be diametrical opposites" (Ben-Eliezer, 1998, p.13). As a balance to this it should be noted that Lissak, an arch Reverentialist, refuted Ben-Eliezer's arguments with regards Israeli militarism, claiming that they were

mistaken and that their conceptual framework was riven with errors (Lissak, 2001, pp.409–410).

Another of the Revisionists is Yagil Levy. He has been a prolific writer on the subject of Israeli CMR for over two decades (Levy, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012a, 2013b, 2015, 2020; Levy, Lomsky-Feder and Harel, 2007; Levy and Michael, 2011) As a political scientist much of his writing has addressed the subject of CMR in general, often using Israel to illustrate his ideas and theories. However, in a few texts he has focused directly on the mechanisms and procedures by which the Israeli civil government attempts to control the IDF. In doing so he too has harnessed the concept of militarism to his own thinking, developing a specific definition for this term when applied to Israel. In his book on this subject, 'Israel's Materialist Militarism', Levy spoke of Israel exhibiting a particular form of materialism in which there is a "reward-for-sacrifice" transaction that is negotiated between the military and the political echelon, and which he related to the "republican equation" (Levy, 2007, p.23). This equation, or contract, Levy (2008, p.26) defies as, "the exchange between the willingness of citizens to sacrifice their lives and wealth by bearing the costs of war and the preparations for it in return for civil, social, and political rights as well as other rewards granted to them by the state". He also looked at Ben-Eliezer's concept of militarism from a slightly different perspective in a co-written article published in *Israel Studies* the same year, this time referring to it as the move from "obligatory militarism" to "contractual militarism" (Levy, Lomsky-Feder and Harel, 2007, pp.127–148). More recently Levy (2013a, p.39) made a further contribution to the discussion in a paper in which he described the existence of a "bargaining space" and "military contrarianism". The bargaining space is how Levy refers to the bartering that he believes takes place between the military and the political echelons when the specific details of the relationship alter and are realigned from time to time, and is similar to a concept of Michael's which he has referred to as the "Discourse Space" (Michael, 2007b, pp.30–31). Contrarianism is simply Levy's term for the military's resistance to following political directions.

There is one further scholar whose work should be mentioned alongside that of the Revisionists and that is Rebecca Schiff. Whether she actually fits comfortably into the category, or if she might rather be considered a Detractor is perhaps debatable, but certainly her ideas are supported in several publications by the leading Revisionist Yagil Levy (Levy, 2012b, 2017; Levy and Michael, 2011). Although not universally well-received, her ideas were first published in 1992, and then later reinforced in a 1995 article for *Armed Forces and Society* (Schiff, 1992, 1995). In these texts she used the example of Israel, which she referred to as “an uncivil state” - a phrase that has since entered into the lexicon of Israeli CMR discussions - as a vehicle to introduce her concordance theory of CMR (Schiff, 1995, p.17). As a general theory it has not been taken up by the wider academic community, although, within Israel it is acknowledged by established observers such as Kobi Michael as an accurate depiction of the relationship found there (Michael, 2007b; Michael and Even, 2016). Additionally, her concept of concordance sits comfortably with Peri’s description of a partnership’ between the civil and military echelons, and he acknowledges her as being a pioneer of thinking in this area (Peri, 2014, p.19). At the same time her views also chime with those expressed by Kimmerling, Levy and Ben-Eliezer when they suggest that internal issues and cultural matters are as much major drivers of the way in which civil-military relationships develop as are the external situation and the imperative need for security.

The Conspirators

The final distinctive category that is identified is that of The Conspirators. There are only two scholars that can really be acknowledged as fitting into this category, and their contributions to the debate appear primarily as co-authored texts. Sheffer and Barak originally introduced what they considered to be a new approach to the analysis of Israeli CMR in a series of articles published in the mid-2000s, one of which was re-published as a book section a few years afterwards (Barak and Sheffer, 2006, 2007, 2010; Sheffer, 2007). The term The Conspirators was chosen to describe Sheffer and Barak’s approach because, as one reviewer of their books has remarked, their theory suggests that the

Israeli government, and other key elements of society more widely, “have been penetrated and are thus controlled by groups of serving and retired personnel from the security services and their civilian collaborators” (Cohen, 2014, p.326). In their texts they introduced the idea that not only is the Israeli relationship between the government and the military unique, but that effectively it involves a clandestine organisation which operates secretly behind the scenes - not one driven by officially elected or appointed personnel, but by shadowy individuals running their own agendas. Some seven years after this unusual theory was first aired, they launched the idea more forcefully in a book entitled ‘Israel's Security Networks’ (Sheffer and Barak, 2013). Sheffer (2018) later returned to re-introduce the subject once again in an article in *Israel Studies*.

The main argument that Sheffer and Barak (2013) made in their book was that, despite the many previous attempts by various scholars to analyse and understand the nature of CMR in Israel, they had all mistakenly focused on formal institutions and relationships, whilst failing to recognise the critical importance of the informal web of acting and former security personnel, which they referred to as a security network. Whilst the evidence produced in the book to support these claims can be argued to have made a sound case for the existence of a security-focused network of some kind in Israel, it is much less compelling when it comes to convincing the reader that such a network either has the desire, or the ability, to influence the making of government security policy and to direct operations behind the scenes. Overall, the impression that their ideas leave is not one of a controlling web which has deliberately, and covertly, manipulated Israeli security matters for the last 60 years, but rather one of a powerful and well-informed ‘old-boys net’, much as is found in many in western democracies, albeit with more influence and authority because of the increased status of security in Israel.

Cohen’s Overall Appraisal

One final commentator who does not fit into any single category, and yet, nonetheless, over the years has had significant things to say about the subject, is Professor Stuart Cohen (Cohen and Cohen, 2020; Cohen, 1995, 2006, 2008,

2010, 2014). Writing in 1995 Cohen was clear that he concurred with all that had been said about the IDF's "hallmark status" as a people's army, which had achieved great successes on the battlefield whilst simultaneously upholding the democratic nature of the state. However, he argued that he observed that something was changing in the IDF, and also as a consequence in the IDF's relationship with both government and civil society (Cohen, 1995, p.237). He considered that, whilst still clinging to a view of itself as a militia force, nevertheless, the IDF was starting to move ever closer towards becoming a modern, professional military. He suggested that such a change would not only alter the army itself, but it would also have an effect on the very nature of Israeli society and that, albeit unwittingly, the IDF was, "... contributing to a shift in the public values attached to military service as a mark of full citizenship" (Cohen, 1995, p.250).

Writing again on the subject of Israeli CMR some ten years later Cohen (2006) published another perceptive article in which he undertook a comprehensive review of many of the different assessments that had been made of Israel's distinctive and complex relationship over the preceding four decades. In this he highlighted the fact that, whilst there was a generally accepted understanding that the IDF hardly fitted the idealised model of a military fully subordinated to the civil government, at the same time observers had also tended to agree that it failed to conform to accepted definitions of a praetorian or garrison state. He referred to the acknowledged concept of Israeli CMR presenting a "unique hybrid" model, and pointed out that both Kimmerling and Levy had taken care to qualify their use of the term militarism in their more critical treatises on the subject (Cohen, 2006, p.769). In this same analysis he also held up both Schiff's concordance model and Peri's partnership concept, suggesting that all of these ideas were in fact, notwithstanding their differing vocabularies, very similar at heart. This led him to conclude that, despite the fragmented nature of the civil-military boundaries in Israel, the army was not actually the driving force in society at all, but that, conversely, "It is now the IDF that is suffering from an erosion of autonomy and that consequently confronts the prospect of a coup in

reverse” (Cohen, 2006, p.785). It should be said that this is an argument which is yet to be validated by any empirical study.

The Four Categories and Their Origins and Links to Social Change in Israel

The four categories of Reverentialists, Detractors, Revisionists and Conspirators cannot be defined chronologically. However, whilst overlapping each other in many respects, they can still be perceived having arrived in a series of waves, each reflecting an increasingly greater willingness in Israeli society to accept wider criticism of the government and the state. The Reverentialists, whilst acknowledging that the relationship was not perfect, nevertheless held it aloft as a shining example of the way in which a small democratic state could focus on security in order to defend the nation, whilst still holding on to basic democratic values. The IDF were lauded, but the civil authorities were acknowledged as clearly holding the reins of power. The Detractors really began to emerge after the disillusionment of the 1982 First Lebanon War. At this time, as the media began to more openly question the suitability and effectiveness of the linkages between the civil and military elites, scholars felt able to publish texts dealing with topics such as military dominance and possible political instability that had previously been unacceptable in Israeli academic circles. But even then they remained constrained by unwritten, yet still potent, societal values that kept them operating within certain boundaries. The Revisionists arrived in the mid-1990s, by which time any past notions of the IDF being an organisation that purely fought existential wars to defend the Jewish homeland from external aggressors had been lost in the reality of the violence of the First Intifada. Over the next decade, as the initial hopes of a lasting peace in the Middle East began to fade, this only fuelled the arguments of the Revisionists that militarism had always been the basis of Israeli CMR, and that the relationship between civil society and the military establishment was more contractual than emotional. The appearance of the underground network theory of Sheffer and Barak is harder to pin to any change in the societal views of the civil and military leadership, but it may be that this in itself is the cause.

With no new debate on the subject of Israeli CMR having been seen for such a long period it is possible that academia was in need of something new to discuss. Certainly this seemed to be, at least in part, Stuart Cohen's view when, in a review, he tentatively welcomed this fresh approach, saying that it was an idea that deserved a wider consideration, and was one which would undoubtedly lead to further discussion in the future (Cohen, 2014).

Conclusion

The overall picture of what has been written by the primary scholars on the subject of Israeli CMR leads to what may be a surprising conclusion – that they have all been saying very much the same thing. Every writer in each of the loosely defined categories employed here, despite their apparent disagreements, has, nevertheless, recognised a number of similar key points that relate to Israeli CMR – what might be described as the basic building blocks of the case. These can be summarised as follows:

- e) Israel is different – it has so many historically, culturally, politically, and geographically unique elements to it that it cannot be templated;
- f) Security is, and always has been, the critical factor in determining policy in all areas of Israeli life;
- g) One consequence of this primacy of security is that the relationship that has developed between the military, the political hierarchy and civil society is strong and effective, but it does not conform to the conventional measures of civil supremacy or civilian control;
- h) Notwithstanding all of the above, the military does not rule in the state of Israel. There has never been a military coup in Israel, nor is such an event likely in the foreseeable future.

The differences in viewpoints between the various scholars have essentially revolved around speculation on how this situation has come about, and what it means both in terms of the future of Israel as a democratic state, and also to a certain extent to the understanding of CMR theory in general. Further still, it is

hard not to conclude that the promotion of some of the theories and explanations, especially the more controversial ones, have been driven more from a desire to be heard above the background noise that the debate on Israeli CMR has generated, than they have from any sincere conviction that they represented a plausible conceptual innovation.

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ANNEX C

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIPMIS CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

CIPMIS was originally conceived from the examination of a number of texts produced from within various academic disciplines, all of which dealt with CMR in some form. From the many works initially considered, eventually only fourteen were used to derive the framework. None of these came from the early era of CMR theoretical study as very little from that period took a practical enough approach for the task of operationalizing the study. Of the texts that were considered suitable, the earliest was written in 1980, and the latest in 2016. For ease of reference these were categorised as: Early Thinking (1980-2000); New Millennial Concepts (2000 to 2010); and Recent Ideas (2010 to 2016)

The first work considered from the Early Thinking texts was that produced by Albright (1980) in his article, 'A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations'. In it Albright looked at what had previously been written and questioned, "the merits of these theoretical notions as a basis for comparative analysis", and he attempted to, "advance an alternative conceptualization of civil-military relations to the generally prevailing one" (Albright, 1980, p.553). He rightly criticized Huntington for being too focused on western liberal democracies, but then he himself narrowed his own study extensively, scrutinizing only the experiences of communist states, thus again restricting the potential universal application of his own ideas. His analysis did, however, provide some useful pointers. He highlighted seven distinct factors which he believed had influenced the modifications in civil-military relations in the states in question. In a close scrutiny of the factors that he identifies, the two key themes that emerge are that of societal involvement in the oversight of the military, and the relevance of the internal, and to a lesser extent external, security situation.

Around the same time Welch (1985, pp.183–195) was looking at the problem from a slightly different perspective. His interest lay in scrutinizing Huntington

by taking “perspectives from the Third World”. He too criticized Huntington’s concentration on “industrialized European and North Atlantic states”, suggesting that by ignoring the “political facts of life” in the Third World his “orthodox” theories were too restrictive to be universally applied. To provide an alternative view, Welch turned the civil-military relations spotlight on Latin America. In his conclusion he suggested that attempting to produce any universal theory of civil-military relations which is derived from a set of data that opens with assumptions of cultural particularity can be seen as paradoxical. Nevertheless, at the end he does offer the view that there are some “common categories” in the field of civil-military relations theory (Welch, 1985, p.194). All of these relate to societal divisions and the relationship between, “the historic role of force in social change” (Welch, 1985, p.183).

The final two texts from this period that were considered were both published in *Armed Forces and Society* in the mid-1990s - Rebecca Schiff’s article based on her doctoral thesis which lays out her Theory of Concordance (Schiff, 1995), and Deborah Avant’s analysis of the confliction between the indicators that analysts were employing to argue that American civil-military relations at that time was in a state of crisis (Avant, 1998). Schiff’s four indicators of concordance are: the composition of the officer corps; the political decision-making process; the method of recruitment; and the military style adopted (Schiff, 1996, pp.12–16). These are very broad brush descriptions of the areas that need to be considered, and Schiff makes little attempt to go into any great detail on them. However, they are further useful pointers towards what may be important in a civil-military relationship.

Avant’s article does not seek to define the key elements of civil-military relations, but by reviewing the way in which a variety of contemporary analysts were critiquing US civil-military relations at the time, in passing she highlights a number of key points of interest in this area. She uses both Finer’s principle of military obedience to civil leadership, and Huntington’s views on military influence on policy-making, as lenses through which to view the contemporary state of affairs. In doing so she points towards some of the areas that analysts

suggest are critical to successful civil-military relations, and which they use as indicators of crisis, or otherwise. Although in her article she attempts to show why, “making clear the implicit theories of civilian control behind each set of indicators will expose some ambiguities and contradictions present in current understandings about what good civil-military relations are”, nevertheless, she does not dismiss these indicators out of hand (Avant, 1998, p.375). Rather she concludes, in a similar way to Schiff perhaps, that achieving good civil-military relations is about getting the balance right between efficiency and accountability. The three high level categories that she discusses are the level of military influence on policy, the degree to which the military is representative of society, and, “the amount of friction in the day to day interactions between civilians and the military”(Avant, 1998, p.375).

These early thoughts on the subject show a considerable degree of commonality in the higher level themes that they identify. The initial appraisal of these suggested that any analytical framework for civil-military relations at least needs to address four key factors, as shown in Figure C-1.




Figure C-1 Early Identification of Four Key Factors in a Conceptual Framework

Within the New Millennial Concepts texts (from 2000 to 2010), as SSR started to become a recognized process, a number of papers and guidelines were produced that were specifically focused on the ideal civil-military relationship that should be established as part of such reforms. Initially few of them related to anything outside of the more orthodox approach and therefore offered nothing new to this particular assessment process. One exception was the DCAF-produced handbook on the principles, mechanism and practices of Parliamentary oversight (DCAF, 2003b). The need to examine both the degree of oversight that civil society has over the military, and also certain aspects of the decision-making and policy-making links between civil government and the military, had already been identified in earlier texts and the DCAF handbook served to underpin this view. In this document the view is expressed that there is a need for the legislature, as well as the executive, to have an oversight role with regards security policy, including such aspects as resource management and budgetary and procurement issues. The difference that an independent media can make to society's ability to remain informed of decision-making is also stressed – one feature of the civil-military relationship that is often overlooked (DCAF, 2003b, pp.19–20, 40–41, 162).

Additionally, one aspect of the relationship that the inclusion of the wider security sector brings to the fore is that of the secret and intelligence services. This raises three further areas of interest: one is how the degree of control and authority over these agencies is balanced between the civil and military spheres; the second being the access that the civil government has to intelligence information that is independent of the military; the third is the oft-debated subject of the scope and remit of the intelligence services (DCAF, 2003b, p.63).

Of great interest in this New Millennial Concepts period are some of the key texts that Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, produced on the subject. In 'The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations', their primary concern is one that is similar to the theme raised by the DCAF parliamentary handbook – that of governance and oversight. Cottey et al suggest that rather than being fixated by the concept of democratic control,

instead there needs to be a reconceptualization, “away from control of the military in domestic politics and towards the wider problem of the democratic management of defense and security policy” (Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, 2002, pp.31–32). Based on their assessment of the situation in central and Eastern Europe a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union, they list five requirements which, if met, they believe would greatly improve the traditional understanding of the relationship between civil and military institutions. These are: (1) a better understanding of the more subtle role that the military often play in politics, aside from the straightforward overthrow of an elected government by a military coup; (2) a move away from only considering military praetorianism, and towards a recognition of the fact that military involvement in the control over foreign and defence policy can also be a challenge to civilian authority; (3) a recognition that civilian control of the military delivered purely by the executive may not provide the level of truly democratic control that is desired and can result in the “tyranny of the majority”; (4) a need to more fully understand of what is defined as “the military” or “the armed forces” in any given situation; and (5), the need to ensure that the state has the capacity and the ability to manage the relevant mechanisms and structures that are put in place (Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, 2002, pp.36–48)

The final text from this period that was utilised was Ngoma’s contribution to the Institute for Security Studies book on civil-military relations in Zambia (Ngoma, 2004). Although there was little that was significantly new in the work, it did point towards two relatively obvious, and yet so far unrecorded, factors – that of the need for the political neutrality of the military and, closely aligned with this, the issue of military professionalism and military standards and values in general (Ngoma, 2004, pp.11–12). These are highlighted by Ngoma as having been particularly problematic in African militaries, and are addressed directly by Huntington, and should be of concern in all civil-military relationships.

These additional texts were drawn into the development of the conceptual framework and, as a consequence, further changes were made to it. As well as incorporating the new lower level concerns, the framework also gained two more

high level factors – institutional and individual. The result of these amendments is shown in the diagram at Figure C-2.




Figure C-2 Further Factors in the Conceptual Framework

The final period of analysis, Recent Ideas (2010 to 2016) proved to be very fruitful, possibly because the high volume of work that was produced during this time as a result of the reflections on the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. One text published in *Armed Forces and Society* (Rahbek-Clemmensen et al., 2012, pp.669–678), aimed as it was at analysing the, “civil-military gap”, added little to the framework that was new, but it did highlight the need to explicitly cover the question of military culture, and also confirmed the requirement to look at some of the individual skills and traits that civil and military elites might possess – or

lack. Of greater interest was Rahbek-Clemmensen's PhD thesis as it directly tackles the specific issue of frameworks, albeit from a slightly different perspective (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2013).

The thesis proposes the idea that there are five key variables that are critical to the operation of the elite civil-military relationship in a state. These are: "the priorities of the civilian government; the civilian trust of the military; the military trust of the civilians; the external institutions that define their mutual interaction; and the actual skills of the military and civilian elites" (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2013, p.9). Mostly his concept strengthened notions that had already been identified elsewhere, but it did add some others that are new, particularly those related to issues of mutual trust. He also makes some further points linked with his five variables and refers to, "a plethora of exogenous factors that determine the strength and health of the system" (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2013, p.9). These include: perceptions of the legitimacy of the government; civilian strategic culture; the general level of threat; and the character of the conflicts in which the state is involved. Later in his paper he highlights the fact there is a tension between civilian control and effectiveness (essentially the same basic tension that Feaver (1996, pp.149–178) described as the "civil-military problematique"), and he raises the issue of the perception of legitimacy, which he considers to be fundamental to successful civil-military relations. In his consideration of control methods he also concentrates some effort on analysing the impact of Peter Feaver's ideas on the use of agency theory (Feaver, 2003), concluding that "theories of civilian control should therefore focus on when and how civilian policymakers combine internal and external mechanisms of control" (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2013, pp.130–131). One final concept which, although hinted at in other texts, is made quite explicit by Rahbek-Clemmensen, is the importance of the way in which the boundaries for the "division of labour" are drawn up in a civil-military relationship (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2013, pp.174–184). By this he means identifying who has the lead in critical matters of planning and policy-making. This division is influenced by many other factors that have already been addressed, such as individual skills and the levels of trust in place, but he makes a strong case for it to be considered as a lower-level factor in its own right.

Luckham and Kirk (2013) also address the topic of analytical frameworks, with their article being specifically directed at situations where the context is that of a conflict-affected, hybrid political order. It is of note that, other than an unsurprising emphasis on the need to identify and understand the more complex societal and political alliances and networks that hybrid situations bring, for the most part this text simply confirmed what had already been noted elsewhere – although this confirmatory role was a meaningful contribution to the process in its own right.

Matei's chapter on a new conceptualization of civil-military relations in 'The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations' (Matei, 2013) provides yet another contemporary re-evaluation of how to look at the subject. She claims to expand her ideas, "into a framework that better captures the priorities and requirements of both democratic consolidation and contemporary security challenges", which indeed she does (Matei, 2013, p.26). This new framework defines three key factors: control, effectiveness, and efficiency – all of which are identified in other texts as being fundamental to any study of civil-military relations. However, the level of detail that she goes into was insufficient to make use of the framework as it stands for the purposes of this study. Nevertheless, her work was useful as it served to underline the criticality of a number of areas that had been noted from elsewhere, including policy-making, budgetary control and threat levels.

The final three texts that were examined, although adding nothing that had not already been seen elsewhere, all served to act as confirmation that at this point an extremely comprehensive and robust set of factors had been identified that, when fused together, would make a worthwhile conceptual framework. These final texts were Angstrom's paper in *Small Wars and Insurgencies* which looked at the way that civil and military were defined in civil-military relationships, and how such categories are no longer "fixed and global" (Angstrom, 2013, p.224), and two articles written by teams headed by Aurel Croissant from Heidelberg University which offered further alternative perspectives on the problem (Croissant et al., 2011; Croissant, Eschenauer and Kamerling, 2016).

In taking all of the contributions from the fourteen separate texts the result was a new and original conceptual framework, based nonetheless on existing, published and peer-reviewed ideas. Some further decisions were necessary with regards where to place certain items as, in a few cases, the overlap of influences meant that they were able to sit comfortably under more than one high level factor. In the end this proved not to be of any great concern as where they lie in the framework is less important than the fact that they are addressed somewhere in the process. At this point the framework was referred to as SIPMIS from the initial letters of Societal, Individual, Political, Military, Institutional and Situational.

The final planned stage in the development of the SIPMIS framework was intended to act as a thorough peer review process. In discussion with other researchers and academics the idea of using a Delphi review procedure was suggested. The concept of the Delphi method is that a group of carefully chosen, but anonymous, experts are employed to comment on particular topic. Their comments are then distilled and re-circulated a number of times, still anonymously, in an iterative process until it is felt that a consensus has been reached. It has its origins in the American business community, and has since been used in many different fields to help solve problems, generate consensus and aid decision-making (Skulmoski and Hartman, 2007).

Requests were sent out to over thirty experts and practitioners in the areas of defence (both civilians and military), politics, academia, and the media to ask if they would be prepared to participate. Attempts were made to get as broad a selection of panellists as possible, not only from a wide range of areas of expertise, but also from various geographic regions. In the end, however, the participants were virtually self-selecting as the task was relatively time consuming and only those who were willing and able to commit the time responded positively. It was considered that a minimum of six participants would be necessary for the process to be valid, and in fact ten ultimately completed the full analysis process – two politicians, one British and one Israeli; four

academics, one European and three Israeli; three senior military officers from various backgrounds; and a US-Israeli journalist.

The panellists were sent a background paper explaining the context of the request, the nature of the research and the need for the framework. They also received a set of explanatory diagrams giving a detailed breakdown of each of the factors and sub-factors, including explanations of what they referred to. For reference, but only if they wished to use it, a paper outlining the rationale behind the development of the framework was made available to them. The intention was to allow the panellists the freedom to comment as they felt appropriate, but also to give sufficient direction to ensure that they covered the essential elements. The final item they received was a short guideline which focused their responses, whilst still keeping the questions as open as possible.

The comments received were all positive with regards the way that the framework reflected their experience of civil-military relationships, and the comprehensive nature of its coverage. One panellist summed up the general view well, saying:

I think that the SIPMIS framework of analysis is fine, if it is considered just that, a FRAMEWORK. This is to say, the six factors do account for the vast majority of things that can and do happen in the relationship involving civilians and military in the quest for reform along the lines depicted in the paper

(Anonymous CIPMIS panellist, Aug 2017)

There were a few who felt that the complexity of some of the issues (particularly how the relationships between some of the factors should operate) was not addressed fully enough. However, these were primarily from those who, despite the explanations given, were looking at the analysis framework as prescriptive 'model' of how an effective CMR should be implemented. The other main criticisms primarily concerned the specific titles or descriptions of the factors. There was a feeling that possibly there should be a separate factor of 'Cultural' in its own right, and several panellists felt that 'History' needed to be accounted

for more explicitly. Overall there was clearly a requirement to review the precise definitions of each category and sub-category to address the following criticism offered by one panellist:

At times, a given item belongs possibly to more than one class of factors, at other times there is a seeming duplication when the same item, in effect, appears in more than one category under different names, and in general the characterization and the delineation of the items in the different categories are not sufficiently clear and sharp.

(Anonymous CIPMIS panellist, Aug 2017)

These views were referred back to the panellists in a second circulation but there was no further comeback from any of them. This probably reflects their heavy workload as much as a definite consensus on the changes. Nevertheless, the Delphi process was extremely helpful, and the outcome was a revised version of the framework which took into account those comments that were received. A few minor amendments were made to accommodate specific ideas, but most the noticeable change was that the 'Societal' factor was renamed 'Cultural', and hence SIPMIS became CIPMIS.

It was anticipated that after making the necessary amendments from the Delphi review that this would result in the final version of the framework that would be employed in the study. However, just as the Delphi process was concluding, a new and particularly relevant book, 'Soldiers, Politicians and Civilians', was published by David Pion-Berlin and Rafael Martínez (2017). Although Pion-Berlin's and Martínez's main thrust in the book was to examine the changes in CMR in Latin America, particularly focused on Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, to do this they also required a framework to work within. For similar reasons to those that have already been outlined here, they too found nothing that would meet their requirements – they were searching for, "a more comprehensive and accurate characterization of the system" – one that identified the, "multiple dimensions", of any given civil-military relationship (Pion-

Berlin and Martinez, 2017, p.28). So, following the same logic that resulted in CIPMIS, they decided to develop their own. Their framework is shown in Figure C-3.




Figure C-3 Pion-Berlin Martinez Framework

Given the apparent similarities between the aims of the two pieces of work, both of which were being derived in parallel (although each unsighted of the other) it

might be reasonable to expect that similar results would be obtained. Indeed, on first inspection there does seem to be some similarity - CIPMIS comprises six 'factors' and Pion-Berlin and Matinez's framework for analysis is divided into six 'dimensions'. However, despite this initial resemblance in fact the two frameworks are quite different in their final forms.

There are two main reasons for this. First, whilst they both cover very much the same areas, they are looking to achieve different outputs. CIPMIS was designed to ensure a comprehensive and in-depth coverage of the subject matter for the purposes of investigation and analysis, whilst Pion-Berlin's framework is specifically focused on producing measurable outputs over time. Second, but perhaps related to this first point, their framework looks at the relationship from a different angle. CIPMIS seeks to identify the key elements that a CMR can be broken down into, getting more detailed as it drills down into each factor; whilst Pion-Berlin's framework concentrates on effects or behaviours that are manifest over time. In a sense it takes a longitudinal approach rather than the horizontal view of CIPMIS. The result is that the two frameworks are more complementary to one another, rather than a duplication.

A comparison between the two suggested that there was perhaps one aspect that needed more explicit coverage in CIPMIS than already existed, even after the comprehensive Delphi process – and that was in the area of the law. Pion-Berlin dedicate an entire high level dimension to the 'Legal Framework', whilst the only specific coverage in CIPMIS was under the heading of 'Military Accountability'. This seemed to be an omission. Therefore, an entirely new sub-factor of 'The Law' was added under 'Institutional Factors', with 'Military Accountability' brought under it, and 'Civil-Military Jurisdiction' added. Other than this no further changes were considered necessary and it was felt that the two frameworks covered the subject matter equally – albeit in different formats. The final version of CIPMIS that was used for the analysis of the development of Israeli CMR is shown in Figure C-4.

The degree of detail that the final CIPMIS framework offers is greater than is required for this particular study. For the most part only the highest level of the

six primary factors is needed to establish the focus of the research. Nevertheless, the lower levels of subordination in the framework are helpful to ensure that the correct emphasis is placed on elements within these areas when necessary. They also provided a useful structure from which to draw on when developing the secondary research questions, and when highlighting specific areas in which to focus questions addressed to particular subject matter experts. Beyond the confines of this study, they can provide the mechanism for generating other more flexible constructions which could prove to be relevant and appropriate for further research in this area. Finally, they offer some evidence of the robustness of the process and give validity to the higher level categorisations.




Figure C-4 The Final (Revised) Version of CIPMIS

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ANNEX D

INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDE

	Primary question	Subsidiary questions (as necessary/appropriate)	
<p>Introductory question</p> <p>(relatively neutral eliciting general and non-intrusive information that is non-threatening)</p>	<p>Tell me a little about your personal experience of the relationship that exists between the civilian and military domains in Israel</p>	<p>Tell me more about ...</p>	<p>Your links with Israel</p>
			<p>Your military service</p>
			<p>Your government service</p>
<p>Transition question (#1)</p> <p>(linking the introductory questions to the key question)</p>	<p>How would you describe the current relationship between the IDF and the civil society in Israel?</p>	<p>And between the IDF and civil government?</p>	<p>What distinguishes these relationships from those found elsewhere?</p>
			<p>How have these relationships changed over the years?</p>
			<p>How do you see them developing in the future?</p>

	Primary question	Subsidiary questions (as necessary/appropriate)	
<p>Transition question (#2)</p> <p>(linking the introductory questions to the key question)</p>	<p>To what extent is the military involved in politics in Israel?</p>	<p>In the security domain?</p>	<p>In other areas of government policy?</p>
		<p>What are the checks and balances on military involvement in political affairs?</p>	<p>How have these changed over the years?</p>
<p>Key question</p> <p>(those most related to the research questions and purpose of the study)</p>	<p>How would you describe the defence reform process that has taken place in in Israel since 1948?</p>	<p>What would you see as the key moments in the reform process?</p>	<p>What brought about these reforms in the first place?</p> <p>What were the main outputs of those reforms?</p> <p>What actually changed as a result?</p>

	Primary question	Subsidiary questions (as necessary/appropriate)
<p>Closing question</p> <p>(easy to answer and provides an opportunity for closure)</p>	<p>Is there any other aspect of Israel's civil military relationship, or the Israeli experience of defence reform, that you feel that we haven't covered?</p>	<p>Is there any one that you know of, and could provide an introduction to, who you think might add to this study?</p>

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ANNEX E

PARTICIPANT BRIEFING PACK

A briefing pack was sent to all participants at least 24 hours (but more usually a week) before the interview took place. A covering letter provided details of the interview (time, location etc) and contained the following attachments:

Appendix 1. A short explanation of the background to, and purpose of, the interview, explaining how it would be conducted.

Appendix 2. A professionally translated Hebrew version of the background explanation.

Appendix 3. An ethical statement explaining the issues of the research methods used, consent and discontinuation, confidentiality (primarily anonymity), dissemination and data storage. This statement followed Cranfield University ethical guidelines (CURES).

Appendix 4. A consent form asking for formal acknowledgement that they had been properly briefed and that they agreed to take part in the study on the basis described.

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ANNEX E, APPENDIX 1

A SHORT EXPLANATION OF THE STUDY (ENGLISH VERSION)

A Study Into Israeli Civil-Military Relations and Defence Reform

This work was born out of the researcher's personal experience of the frustrations that he encountered whilst serving in Afghanistan in 2004. The study began by reviewing the origins of the theories that have been produced on the subject of civil-military relations (CMR) - the way in which the government of a state interacts with its military forces. The literature on this subject indicates that much of the theory that is still considered current was in fact developed by American and British academics in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Over the years, despite their Cold War origins, these theories have become to be seen by many as representing the ideal example of how all civil-military relationships should be organised - they are often referred to collectively as the orthodox, or normal, model of CMR. As a result, they have continued to have significant influence on the objectives set in defence reform programmes employed in various situations around the world.

Further study of academic writing, as well as practical observation, suggests that when such defence reform programmes have been implemented in post-conflict situations, they have rarely proved to be entirely successful – even where they have been implemented as part of wider security sector reform (SSR) programmes. This study suggests that one reason for this is that in drawing their ideas from the traditional, orthodox models of CMR, programmers frequently lose the ability to take into account the culture and diversity of the states they are attempting to reform. Other scholars have also recognized this, with some suggesting that greater flexibility in selecting objectives is required, and that more politically sensitive and realistic approaches to defence reform must be employed if success is to be achieved. For this to happen, however, it is necessary to provide those responsible for designing such programmes with successful examples of alternative civil-military relationships for them to draw upon – ones which have not emerged out of traditional, orthodox environments and yet have proven to be both stable and effective. This research aims to be part of that process.

There are many different states which might offer interesting and potentially helpful illustrations of how alternative CMR can develop, with South Korea, Taiwan, India and Israel all making a strong case for selection. The decision to choose Israel for this particular study was a simple one, given the researcher's

current situation, residing in Israel with connections to the international diplomatic circuit, as well as the opportunity to meet with many influential people in leadership positions in Israel itself. In an attempt to be as comprehensive as possible, the study draws upon the large number of books, academic publications and journal articles available on the subject. However, in order to bring a genuinely practical aspect to the work, additional effort is also being made to access the personal experiences of knowledgeable individuals from across Israeli society, and beyond. Care has been taken to find appropriate individuals within the fields of politics, the military, the judiciary, the media, academia, and civil society more generally, who have the necessary background, and who have expressed a willingness to give their consent to be formally interviewed. This is what will make the study unique.

When the analysis is complete, it is intended that results will be published as part of a publicly available thesis. It is also hoped to provide feedback to the debate on SSR through peer-reviewed articles and, additionally, to highlight areas for possible further research.

ANNEX E, APPENDIX 2

A SHORT EXPLANATION OF THE STUDY (HEBREW VERSION)

מחקר זה הוא תוצאה של ניסיונו האישי של החוקר לנוכח התסכול שחש בעת שירותו באפגניסטן בשנת 2004. המחקר החל בבחינה של המקורות של התיאוריות הקיימות בנושא של יחסי המגזר האזרחי עם המגזר הצבאי (CMR), כלומר הדרך בה ממשל של מדינה מנהל תקשורת עם כוחותיו החמושים באופן רשמי. הספרות על הנושא מציינת שחלק גדול של התיאוריה בנושא שעדיין נחשבת עדכנית פותחה על ידי חוקרים אמריקאים ובריטים בסוף שנות ה-50 ותחילת ה-60. עם השנים, למרות שמקורן של תיאוריות אלה במלחמה הקרה, רבים רואים בהן כדוגמה מייצגת אידיאלית כיצד יש לסדר את היחסים בין האזרחי לצבאי - לעתים קרובות הן זוכות להתייחסות כללית כדגם מסורתי או רגיל של CMR. עקב כך, התיאוריות ממשיכות להשפיע על מטרות שנקבעות במסגרת רפורמות במערכות הביטחוניות במצבים שונים ברחבי העולם.

מחקר מתקדם של מאמרים אקדמיים כמו גם תצפיות פעילות מעלה את האפשרות שכאשר תוכניות רפורמה ביטחוניות כאלה מיושמות לאחר עימותים, לעתים רחוקות הן מגיעות לידי הצלחה - אף כאשר יושמו כחלק מתוכניות רפורמה רחבות יותר בתחום הביטחוני. טענתו של המחקר היא שסיבה אחת היא שבעת שאיבת רעיונותיהם מהמודלים המסורתיים של CMR, המתכננים נוטים לעתים קרובות לאבד את יכולתם לקחת בחשבון את התרבות המסוימת של המדינות שהם מבקשים לתקן ואת השונות בהן. חוקרים אחרים גם הכירו בכך, כשחלקם טוענים שיש צורך בגמישות רבה יותר בבחירת מטרות, שיש ליישם גישות רגישות ומציאותיות יותר לביצוע רפורמה ביטחונית על מנת להצליח ברפורמה. בכל אופן, על מנת שדבר כזה יקרה, יש צורך לספק לאלו שאמונים על עיצוב תוכניות מסוג זה דוגמאות לחלופות מוצלחות ליחסי המגזרים האזרחי והצבאי כדי שיוכלו ללמוד מהם, דוגמאות שלא יהיו פועל יוצא של הסביבות הרגילות והמסורתיות ובכל זאת יהיה מסוגלות להוכיח את עצמן כיציבות ויעילות. מחקר זה מבקש להיות חלק מתהליך זה.

ישנן מדינות רבות שעשויות לספק דוגמאות מעניינות ואף אולי מועילות כיצד ניתן לפתח יחסי מגזר אזרחי וצבאי כאשר ניתן לראות בדרום קוריאה, בטייוואן, בהודו ובישראל בחירה משכנעת למדי. ההחלטה לבחור בישראל למחקר מסוים זה הייתה פשוטה ונסמכה על היותו של החוקר תושב זר בישראל עם קשרים בחוגים דיפלומטיים בינלאומיים, כמו גם ההזדמנות להיפגש עם דמויות מפתח בעמדות הנהגה בישראל עצמה. מתוך כוונה להיות מקיף ככל הניתן, המחקר מסתמך על מספר גדול של ספרים, פרסומים אקדמיים ומאמרים מכתבי עת בנושא. אולם, על

מנת לספק לעבודת המחקר פן מעשי באמת, הושקע מאמץ נוסף על מנת להגיע לניסיון האישי של יחידים בעלי ידע מכל רחבי החברה הישראלית ואף מחוץ לה. נעשה מאמץ לאתר אנשים מתאימים מתחומי הפוליטיקה, המגזר הצבאי, מהמערכת המשפט, מהאקדמיה וממערכות החברה האזרחית, שאף הביעו את הסכמתם הרשמית להיות מרואיינים. דבר זה יהפוך את המחקר לייחודי.

כאשר הניתוח יושלם, הכוונה היא לפרסם את התוצאות כחלק מתיזה שתהיה זמינה לציבור הרחב. כמו כן, התקווה היא לספק היזון חוזר לדין בנושא רפורמות בתחום הביטחוני באמצעות מאמרים שיעמדו בביקורת עמיתים ובנוסף, לשפוך אור על תחומים בהם ניתן יהיה לבצע מחקרי המשך.

ANNEX E, APPENDIX 3

AN ETHICAL STATEMENT

Ethical Statement

1. **Background.** You are being invited to participate in a study which aims to gain a better understanding of the unique civil-military relationship that exists in Israel. The intention is to establish to what extent, and in which ways, this relationship differs from those found in older, more established democracies, and also to consider what have been the critical aspects of Israel's experience of defence reform over the last 70 years. The study is part of a wider doctoral research project, and a one-page study information sheet explaining this overarching project (in English and in Hebrew) is enclosed.

2. **Subject Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria.** Participants in the study will be drawn from all aspects of society, including military personnel, politicians, civil servants and representatives of the media, academia and wider civil society.

3. **Research Method.** Each semi-structured interview will be recorded using a digital voice recorder and subsequently transcribed into a Word document. If you wish, a copy of the transcription of your interview can be sent to you when it is completed.

4. **Consent and Discontinuation.** You should have received this information sheet and its attachments at least 24 hours before the interview is due to take place. You will then receive an oral briefing immediately before the session begins. As part of that briefing you will be asked to sign a consent form before participation (a copy of this form is also enclosed). However, even having signed the consent form, if at any time later you wish to withdraw your consent and to exclude yourself from participation in the study then you will be free to do so.

5. **Confidentiality.** The only place where any participant's name will be recorded directly will be on their consent form. Each participant will be allocated a research number and if it is necessary to refer to an individual this number only will be used. In the write-up the default will be that they will be referred to by position and experience, eg 'an *ex-minister of state*' or 'a *retired senior officer in the IDF*'. However, in some circumstances it may be desirable to attribute a

verbatim quote to a particular individual. In that case your permission would be sought before the text was used in that way. Equally, you may at any time request that some or all of your interview be totally anonymized.

6. **Dissemination** The results of this study will be presented in an Individual Research Project to Cranfield University. Further dissemination into the public domain will be by conference papers and by articles in the academic press, with permission from Cranfield University and any other agent as required. Upon completion of the research, if you wish, a summary of the findings can be emailed to you for your information.

7. **Data Storage:** The researcher will be responsible for storing the project data and consent forms during the study. When the data is finished with, it will be kept in a secure location, along with the consent forms, for 5 years in case unforeseen issues arise. At the end of that period both the data and the consent forms will be destroyed.

ANNEX E, APPENDIX 4 CONSENT FORM

Email: i.d.westerman@cranfield.ac.uk

Centre: Cranfield University, Centre for Defence Management and Leadership.

REC Reference Number: CURES/3271/2017

CONSENT FORM

Title of Project: *A Study into Israeli Civil-Military Relations and Defence Reform*

Name of Researcher: Col (Retd) Ian Westerman

(Please tick box)

- 1. I confirm that I have received and had an opportunity to read the Ethical Statement and Study Information Sheet that has been provided for the study named above. I can also confirm that I have been given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the study, and that they have been answered to my satisfaction.

- 2. I understand that my participation in this study is entirely voluntary, and I am free to withdraw my consent at any time without giving any reason. My legal rights shall not be affected.

- 3. I understand that suitably anonymized data (results) acquired during this study may be looked at by authorized individuals from Cranfield University and may be used in a peer-reviewed publication and/or PhD thesis. I give my consent for these individuals to access my records.

- 4. I agree to take part in the above-mentioned study.

.....
Name of volunteer	Date	Signature
 I D Westerman	
Researcher	Date	Signature

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ANNEX F

A LIST OF RESPONDENTS INTERVIEWED

Identifier	Background and Experience	Date of Interview
P001	Journalist and peace activist. Served in the Irgun and the Haganah in the War of Independence 1947/48 and was involved in the media constantly since that time. He gave permission for all of his interview to be attributable. [Sadly the respondent died not long after being interviewed]	Interviewed by email as he was too frail to meet face to face. Feb-Apr 2018
P002	Ex-Lt Gen in the IDF, who served as CGS and later in government as a minister.	24 Jul 2018
P003	Ex-Maj Gen in the IDF, who later held a very senior position in the MOD as a civil servant for 15 years.	09 Aug 2018
P004	Senior defence correspondent and analyst for a national daily paper.	14 Aug 2018
P005	Ex-Member of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, (MK), lawyer and academic.	20 Aug 2018

P006	Ex-Maj Gen in the IDF, now author and strategic thinker.	21 Aug 2018
P007	Ex-NSA and Head of the NSC.	22 Aug 2018
P008	Ex-Maj Gen, ex-Ex NSA and Head of the NSC. Leading commentator and government advisor of defence and security matters.	29 Aug 2018 and 21 Feb 2019
P009	A senior civil servant in the Israeli government for many years and at one time held the key post of Director General of the prime minister's office.	23 Sep 2018
P010	Ex-Brig Gen in the IDF, now an academic in the field of Israeli CMR.	04 Oct 2018 and 25 Jan 2019 (2 nd interview not transcribed)
P011	Previously the editor-in-chief of an Israeli daily newspaper, now a leading academic in the field of CMR .	07 Oct 2018

P012	Ex-head of the IDF legal department and the Military Advocate General.	11 Oct 2018
P013	A ex-Maj Gen in the IDF and Deputy CGS, later an MK.	25 Oct 2018
P014	English news editor for one of Israel's main national daily papers.	29 Oct 2018
P015	Serving MK with a long record of government service. Previous member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (FA&DC).	30 Oct 2018
P016	Ex-Brig Gen in the IDF. Later became an MK and served as a minister in government.	31 Oct 2018
P017	Ex-Maj Gen in the IDF, later head of <i>Mossad</i> , and for a period of time after this, an MK.	08 Nov 2018
P018	Ex-Deputy president of the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC).	07 Nov 2018
P019	Serving MK who over a long career has held many ministerial positions. A past chairman of the FADC.	13 Nov 2018 and 28 Feb 2019

P020	Ex-Brig Gen in the IDF. Now an academic in the field of Israeli military history.	14 Nov 2018
P021	Ex-Maj Gen in the IDF and later NSA and chairman of the NSC.	16 Dec 2018
P022	Ex-president of the ISC.	26 Nov 2018
P023	Long serving print journalist with leading Israeli daily newspaper. Has also been a contributing editor to US news media.	29 Jan 2019
P024	Ex-president of the ISC.	30 Jan 2019
P025	An Israeli academic specialising in national security studies. Previously he has been an advisor to Israel's NSC, and to two prime ministers.	20 Feb 2019
P026	A senior Professor in the field of communications and media at an Israeli FE college.	07 Mar 2019
P027	A journalist working for an Israeli daily newspaper who previously carried out his compulsory military service with Army Radio.	25 Mar 2019 <i>(not transcribed)</i>

P028	An ex-Maj Gen in the IDF, former Deputy CGS. Now an MK.	14 Mar 2019
P029	Ex-Maj General in the IDF. After leaving the military, for a number of years he held a key civil service post related to defence and security oversight.	13 Mar 2019 and 24 Apr 2019
P030	Ex-Maj Gen in the IDF, specialising in intelligence.	11 Mar 2019
P031	An ex-civil servant who has held the position of the Director General of the prime minister's Office.	03 Jun 2019
P032	A senior Israeli defence correspondent in both print and radio media.	04 Jun 2019
P033	Ex-minister of Justice.	21 Apr 2019
P034	An Israeli civil servant and diplomat. He has held positions as the advisor to the foreign minister and also to the defence minister. Later served as an Israeli ambassador abroad .	27 Mar 2019
P035	Ex-Brig Gen in the IDF, now an academic.	16 May 2019

P036	Ex-prime minister of Israel.	17 Jul 2019
P037	Serving MK, member the FADC as well as the Committee for the Defense Budget.	18 Jul 2019

ANNEX G

CODE DESCRIPTIONS AND RESPONDENTS REFERENCED

Annex G, Appendices 1 to 14 contain the tables showing all of the final 14 codes and a brief description of what they addressed. In addition the tables show the number of times each respondent was referenced in the code.

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ANNEX G, APPENDIX 1 - CODE A THE PREROGATIVE OF GOVERNANCE

The code referenced all issues to do with civil supervision of military decision-making and mechanisms for control. It was originally named: Scrutiny & Oversight.

Srl	Respondent	No. of references
1	P02	5
2	P03	4
3	P04	3
4	P05	11
5	P07	4
6	P08	3
7	P09	2
8	P11	1
9	P12	6
10	P13	2
11	P15	10
12	P16	1

13	P17	5
14	P19	14
15	P20	1
16	P21	5
17	P22	3
18	P24	2
19	P25	5
20	P28	3
21	P29	20
22	P30	2
23	P31	2
24	P33	5
25	P36	6
26	P37	3

ANNEX G, APPENDIX 2 – CODE B THE NATURE OF CONTENTION

The code referenced all mentions of the way in which the elites in Israeli politics and the military interact. It also addressed any discussion of the affects these interactions have on the nature of Israeli CMR. It was originally named: Discursive CMR (the nature of the Israeli manifestation)

Srl	Respondent	No. of references
1	P02	18
2	P03	19
3	P04	8
4	P05	7
5	P06	7
6	P07	7
7	P08	16
8	P09	15
9	P10	3
10	P11	11
11	P12	15
12	P13	9
13	P14	3
14	P15	10
15	P16	10
16	P17	22
17	P18	11

18	P19	8
19	P20	5
20	P21	20
21	P22	1
22	P23	1
23	P24	5
24	P25	7
25	P26	3
26	P28	11
27	P29	11
28	P30	7
29	P31	3
30	P32	8
31	P33	7
32	P34	4
33	P35	1
34	P36	9
35	P37	4

ANNEX G, APPENDIX 3 – CODE C THE NATION AS AN ARMY

The code referenced any discussion of the way in which Israeli society views the military and how the two are integrated. It was originally named: Military caste (lack of in Israel). It was later renamed again: The People's Army.

Srl	Respondent	No. of references
1	P04	1
2	P06	1
3	P07	4
4	P08	4
5	P10	1
6	P11	1
7	P14	7
8	P15	1
9	P17	1
10	P18	1
11	P19	3
12	P20	2
13	P21	2
14	P22	6
15	P23	2

16	P24	2
17	P25	6
18	P26	1
19	P28	7
20	P29	2
21	P31	2
22	P33	4
23	P34	4

ANNEX G, APPENDIX 4 – CODE D THE TOOLS FOR THE JOB

The code referenced discussion of how well senior military officers are prepared for the role of policy advisors (and perhaps drafters). It was originally named: Equipping the military for politics. This code did not survive into the thematic grouping phase as, despite early expectations, in fact it was rarely raised by the respondents again.

Srl	Respondent	No. of references
1	P03	1
2	P08	1
3	P11	1

ANNEX G, APPENDIX 5 – CODE E THE SINGULARITY OF SITUATION

The code referenced all mentions of the way in which respondents considered Israeli and Jewish historical, cultural and hereditary factors make their CMR a unique case. It was originally named: Uniqueness of Israeli situation.

Srl	Respondent	No. of references
1	P02	1
2	P03	3
3	P04	2
4	P07	2
5	P12	1
6	P14	2
7	P15	1
8	P17	1
19	P18	1
10	P20	3
11	P21	5
12	P22	4
13	P24	1
14	P25	5
15	P26	3
16	P28	4

17	P29	1
18	P30	1
19	P31	1
20	P32	4
21	P34	2
22	P37	3

ANNEX G, APPENDIX 6 – CODE H THE MILITARY POWERHOUSE

The code referenced issues regarding the IDF's structures, capacities and capabilities to gather and assess intelligence, and to analyse security situations compared with those of the civil ministries and the PM's office. It was originally named: Planning and assessment - the military superiority over civil service.

Srl	Respondent	No. of references
1	P02	4
2	P03	16
3	P04	3
4	P05	6
5	P07	1
6	P08	13
7	P09	1
8	P10	1
9	P11	3
10	P12	2
11	P13	4

12	P16	2
13	P17	8
14	P18	2
15	P21	3
16	P24	2
17	P25	3
18	P26	1
19	P29	5
20	P30	8
21	P31	1
22	P33	1
23	P37	3

ANNEX G, APPENDIX 7 – CODE G THE IRREPROACHABLE SOLDIERY

The code referenced the way in which society places its trust in the military, both to deliver in its security role, but also in a wider sense of seeing its leaders as honest men, with integrity, in a world of untrustworthy and self-focused politicians. It was originally named: Trust in the military.

Srl	Respondent	No. of references
1	P02	1
2	P03	3
3	P04	1
4	P11	1
5	P13	2
6	P15	1
7	P17	5
8	P18	1
9	P20	1

10	P21	1
11	P22	5
12	P23	1
13	P24	1
14	P25	1
15	P29	1
16	P32	5
17	P34	4
18	P35	1
19	P37	3

ANNEX G, APPENDIX 8 – CODE H THE INDIVISIBILITY OF SECURITY & POLITICS

The code referenced anything that relates to the way in which politics and security/defence are inextricably interrelated in Israel. It was originally named: Integrated nature of political & military affairs in Israel

Srl	Respondent	No. of references
1	P02	7
2	P03	11
3	P04	6
4	P05	2
5	P06	7
7	P08	14
8	P09	8
9	P10	4
10	P11	5
11	P12	6
12	P13	11
13	P14	10
14	P15	4
15	P16	2
16	P17	10

17	P18	1
18	P19	2
19	P20	8
20	P21	12
21	P22	11
22	P23	8
23	P24	2
24	P25	4
25	P26	2
26	P28	9
27	P29	16
28	P30	5
30	P32	5
31	P33	3
32	P34	2
33	P35	5
34	P36	8
35	P37	6

ANNEX G, APPENDIX 9 – CODE I THE IMPACT OF PERSONALITY

The code referenced all mentions of the way in which personality and personal relationships have affected the CMR in Israel. The title remained unchanged in first adjustment of conceptual titles.

Srl	Respondent	No. of references
1	P02	7
2	P03	11
3	P04	6
4	P05	2
5	P06	7
6	P08	14
7	P09	8
8	P10	4
9	P11	5
10	P12	6
11	P13	11
12	P14	10
13	P15	4
14	P16	2
15	P17	10
16	P18	1

17	P19	2
18	P20	8
19	P21	12
20	P22	11
21	P23	8
22	P24	2
23	P25	4
24	P26	2
25	P28	9
26	P29	16
27	P30	5
28	P32	5
29	P33	3
30	P34	2
31	P35	5
32	P36	8
35	P37	6

ANNEX G, APPENDIX 10 – CODE J THE FREEDOM TO DISAGREE

The code referenced all issues concerned with the freedom that senior members of the IDF have to disagree with political decisions - both internally behind closed doors, but also publicly. The title remained unchanged in first adjustment of conceptual titles.

Srl	Respondent	No. of references
1	P02	4
2	P03	4
3	P04	4
4	P06	4
5	P08	4
6	P10	2
7	P12	1
8	P13	1
9	P16	2
10	P17	3
11	P19	1
12	P23	1

13	P25	1
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ANNEX G, APPENDIX 11 – CODE K THE FABRIC OF DEMOCRACY

The code referenced all mentions of the nature of the democratic system in Israel – for example, the lack of a constitution and a second chamber. It also considered discussion of the way in which democracy can be considered to have been sustained by the three pillars of the judiciary, the media and the IDF. It was originally named: The Israeli democratic system

Srl	Respondent	No. of references
1	P01	1
2	P02	4
3	P03	10
4	P04	10
5	P06	6
6	P10	3
7	P11	5
8	P12	12
9	P13	7
10	P14	12
11	P15	4
12	P16	4
13	P17	14
14	P18	11

15	P19	12
16	P20	1
17	P21	19
18	P22	14
19	P23	8
20	P24	8
21	P25	5
22	P26	12
23	P28	1
24	P29	4
25	P32	4
26	P33	16
27	P36	2
28	P37	2

ANNEX G, APPENDIX 12 - CODE L THE ENIGMA OF POLITICS

The code referenced all mentions of the nature of politics in Israel - both past and present. In particular it addressed the issue of the IDF and politics. The title remained unchanged in first adjustment of conceptual title.

Srl	Respondent	No. of references
1	P10	4
2	P11	5
3	P12	1
4	P13	1
5	P14	1
6	P15	1
7	P16	1
8	P17	2
9	P19	1
10	P21	1
11	P23	5
12	P26	1
13	P29	2
14	P30	1

15	P32	3
16	P36	2
17	P37	3

ANNEX G, APPENDIX 13 – CODE M THE CONVOLUTION OF OCCUPATION

The code referenced all items relating to the way in which Israeli CMR changed when facing an insurgency rather than a conventional threat. In particular it highlighted references to the post-1967 Occupied Territories. It was originally named: Political nature of insurgency. Then it was later renamed: The complexity of occupation.

Srl	Respondent	No. of references
1	P02	1
2	P08	3
3	P11	3
4	P12	1
5	P15	2
6	P19	6

7	P21	1
8	P22	3
9	P23	5
10	P25	1
11	P28	2
12	P29	2
13	P33	5
14	P34	1
15	P35	1

ANNEX G, APPENDIX 14 – CODE M THE APPREHENSION OF IDEOLOGY

The code referenced all occasions when ideology or religion was noted as influencing strategy or military common sense - whether driven by the military or the politicians. It was originally named: Ideological bias.

Srl	Respondent	No. of references
1	P08	3
2	P10	3
3	P12	1
4	P14	3
5	P16	3

6	P18	2
7	P19	2
8	P21	4
9	P22	2
10	P23	2
11	P25	2
12	P29	1

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