

CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY

ANTON ALIABBAS

HOW POLITICISATION OF THE MILITARY AFFECTED THE
INDONESIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS DURING THE
INDONESIAN-MALAYSIAN KONFRONTASI, 1963-67

CRANFIELD DEFENCE AND SECURITY

PhD Thesis
Academic Year: 2017 - 2018

Supervisor: Anastasia Filippidou, PhD

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Dedicated to my late *Papah*, *Mamah*, my wife Desty & lovely Rubbia

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May Allah always bless you.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation addressed the lack of interdisciplinary research and understanding about the Indonesian military operations during the Indonesia-Malaysia *Konfrontasi*, 1963-67. It examined how use of interdisciplinary research can address way that politicisation of the ABRI might have affected the implementation of the operations. This qualitative study emphasised two aspects, namely, process of politicisation of the military and political behaviour in organisations. Indeed, the existing literature of political behaviour in organisations remained predominantly focused on private organisations. But, this dissertation argued that study of political behaviour in organisations theory is beneficial to assist the scrutiny of political behaviour in military organisation. The research methodology consisted of archival research, interviews and secondary sources. To be more specific, the research adapted explaining outcome process tracing and time series analysis technique to develop valid interpretation.

The study finds that political behaviour in the ABRI contributes to the failure of Dwikora Operation, as hypothesised. The policy of *Konfrontasi* has substantively boosted the politicisation of the ABRI. This can be seen in the diversity of key military actors' motives toward the policy. In particular, the 30 September Movement Affair has significantly changed the behavioural repertoire. Based on these findings, political behaviour in the ABRI toward the *Konfrontasi* generated both dysfunctional and functional individual, organisational and national consequences. Although, the main focus of the research is the Indonesian military operation during the *Konfrontasi*, the implications for certain civil-military relation theory and recommendations for future research were discussed.

Keywords: ABRI, TNI, Dwikora Operation, political behaviour in military organisation

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MAP OF INDONESIA



Source: United Nation, Map, No. 4110 Rev. 4, January 2004

WHO'S WHO

Military



Arto, Sugih (1923-2008): Major General Army; Indonesian Ambassador for Burma



Dani, Omar (1924-2009): Vice Air Marshall; Air Force Commander in Chief; Commander of the KOLAGA



Martadinata, Raden Eddy (1921-1966): Vice Admiral; Navy Commander in Chief



Nasution, Abdul Haris (1918-2000): General Army; Defence and Security Minister; Chairman of MPRS; escaped from an assassination attempt during the G30S Affair.



Suharto (1921-2008): General Army; Commander of the KOSTRAD; Army Commander in Chief; KOTI Chief of Staff, Acting President (1966-67), Indonesian President (1967-1998)



Yani, Ahmad (1922-1965): Lieutenant General Army; Army Commander in Chief; KOTI Chief of Staff

Civilian



Aidit, Dipa Nusantara (1923-1965): Chairman of the PKI



Malik, Adam (1917-1984): Minister of Trade; later become Minister of Foreign Affairs



Saleh, Chaerul (1916-1967): Third Deputy Prime Minister and concurrently Minister of Development



Subandrio (1914-2004): Minister of Foreign Affairs; Chief of the BPI; First Deputy Prime Minister



Sukarno (1901-1970): Indonesian President (1945-1967); Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; Supreme Commander of the KOTI

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|------------|---|
| ABRI | <i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesia</i> (The Indonesian Armed Forces) |
| ANRI | <i>Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia</i> (the Indonesian National Archives) |
| APRI | <i>Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia</i> (the Indonesian Fighting Forces Organisation) |
| BKR | <i>Badan Keamanan Rakyat</i> (People Security Body) |
| BPI | <i>Badan Pusat Intelijen</i> (Central Intelligence Agency) |
| Brig Gen | Brigadier General |
| Brigrat | <i>Brigade Pendarat</i> (Landing Brigade) |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CORO | <i>Corps Opleidingi Reserve Officieren</i> (Reserve Officer Training Corps) |
| DI | <i>Darul Islam</i> (House of Islam) |
| Disjarahad | <i>Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat</i> (Centre for the Army History) |
| DPA | <i>Dewan Pertimbangan Agung</i> (Supreme Advisory Council) |
| DPR | <i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> (House of Representatives) |
| Dwikora | <i>Dwi Komando Rakyat</i> (People's Twofold Command) |
| FRUS | Foreign Relation of the United States |
| G30S/PKI | <i>Gerakan 30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> (30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party) |
| GPPR | <i>Gerakan Perwira Progresif Revolusioner</i> (The Progressive Revolutionary Officers' Movement) |
| IBAL | <i>Ikatan Bintara Angkatan Laut</i> (Navy's Non-commission Association) |
| Inpres | <i>Instruksi Presiden</i> (Presidential Instruction) |
| IPKI | <i>Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia</i> (League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence) |
| Kabir | <i>Kapitalis Birokrat</i> (Capitalist Bureaucrats) |

| | |
|----------------|--|
| Keppres | <i>Keputusan Presiden</i> (Presidential Decree) |
| Kipam | <i>Komando Intai Para Amfibi</i> (Para Amphibious Reconnaissance Commando) |
| KITLV | <i>Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde</i> (Royal Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies) |
| KKO | <i>Korps Komando</i> (The Navy's Marines Command) |
| KNIL | <i>Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger</i> (The Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) |
| Kodam | <i>Komando Daerah Militer</i> (Regional Military Command) |
| KOGA | <i>Komando Siaga</i> (The Alert Command) |
| KOGAM | <i>Komando Ganyang Malaysia</i> (The Crush Malaysia Command) |
| KOHAN | <i>Komando Pertahanan</i> (Defence Command) |
| Kohanmarnas | <i>Komando Pertahanan Maritim Nasional</i> (The National Maritime Defence Command) |
| Kohanudnas | <i>Komando Pertahanan Udara Nasional</i> (The National Air Defence Command) |
| KOLAGA | <i>Komando Mandala Siaga</i> (The Vigilance Command) |
| Koopslihkamtib | <i>Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban</i> (The Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) |
| Kopelapip | <i>Komando Pelaksana Proyek Industri Penerbangan</i> (The Aviation Industries Project Executive Command) |
| Koppanas | <i>Komando Pertahanan Pantai Nasional</i> (The National Coastal Defence Command) |
| Kosatgas | <i>Komando Satuan Tugas</i> (Task Force Command) |
| Kosatgasgab | <i>Komando Satuan Tugas Gabungan</i> (Joint Task Force Command) |
| Kosional | <i>Komando Stasiun Angkatan Laut</i> (The Navy Station Command) |
| KOSTRAD | <i>Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat</i> (Army Strategic Reserve Command) |
| KOTI | <i>Komando Operasi Tertinggi</i> (Supreme Operational Command) |

| | |
|---------------|--|
| KOTI Permibar | <i>Komando Operasi Tertinggi Pembebasan Irian Barat</i> (Supreme Operation Command for the liberation of West Irian) |
| KOTOE | <i>Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi</i> (Supreme Command of Operation Economy) |
| KOTRAR | <i>Komando Tertinggi Alat Revolusi</i> (Supreme Command for Retooling the Tools of the Revolution) |
| KSAB | <i>Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata</i> (Chief of Staff of the ABRI) |
| Lieut Col | Lieutenant Colonel |
| Lieut Gen | Lieutenant General |
| Maj Gen | Major General |
| MPR | <i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i> (People Consultative Assembly) |
| Necolim | Neo-colonialism, colonialism, and imperialism |
| NEFO | New Emerging Forces |
| NICA | Netherlands Indies Civil Administration |
| NII | <i>Negara Islam Indonesia</i> (Islamic State of Indonesia) |
| Opsus | <i>Operasi Khusus</i> (Special Operation) |
| PARAN | <i>Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara</i> (Committee for Retooling the State Apparatus) |
| Penpres | <i>Penetapan Presiden</i> (Presidential Order) |
| Pepelrada | <i>Penguasa Pelaksana Dwikora Daerah</i> (Regional Authorities for the Implementation of the Dwikora) |
| Pesindo | <i>Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Socialist Youth) |
| PETA | <i>Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air</i> (Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Homeland) |
| PGT | <i>Komando Pasukat Gerak Cepat</i> (Air Force's Quick Reaction Force Command) |
| PKI | <i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> (The Indonesian Communist Party) |
| PNI | <i>Partai Nasionalis Indonesia</i> (The Indonesian Nationalist Party) |

| | |
|--------------|---|
| PPKI | <i>Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia</i> (The Preparation of Indonesian Independence) |
| PRRI | <i>Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia</i> (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) |
| PT | Process Tracing |
| Pusjarah TNI | <i>Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI</i> (Centre for the Indonesian Military History) |
| Rera | <i>Restrukturisasi dan Rasionalisasi</i> (Restructuring and Rationalising) |
| RPKAD | <i>Resimen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat</i> (The Army Special Forces) |
| RRI | <i>Radio Republik Indonesia</i> (Republic of Indonesia Radio) |
| SAB | <i>Staf Angkatan Bersenjata</i> (The Armed Forces Staff) |
| Supersemar | <i>Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret</i> (the 11 March Letter of Instruction) |
| TII | <i>Tentara Islam Indonesia</i> (Islamic Military of Indonesia) |
| TKR | <i>Tentara Keamanan Rakyat</i> (People's Security Army) |
| TNA | The National Archives |
| TNI | <i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> (The Indonesian Military) |
| TNI AD | <i>TNI Angkatan Darat</i> (The Indonesian Army) |
| TNI AL | <i>TNI Angkatan Laut</i> (The Indonesian Navy) |
| TNI AU | <i>TNI Angkatan Udara</i> (The Indonesian Air Force) |
| TNKU | <i>Tentara Nasional Kalimantan Utara</i> (The North Kalimantan National Army) |
| TRI | <i>Tentara Republik Indonesia</i> (Military of the Republic of Indonesia) |
| Trikora | <i>Tri Komando Rakyat</i> (The People's Threefold Command) |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| US | United States |
| USD | United States Dollar |
| USMAP | United States Military Assistance Programme |

NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY AND TRANSLATION

In 1947, the official Indonesian spelling conventions were changed. So that 'u' replaced 'oe', and in 1972 further changes were made so that 'c' replaced the former 'tj', 'j' replaced 'dj', 'kh' replaced 'ch' and 'y' replaced 'j'. The new spelling conventions have been used for all geographic names and the names of persons, parties and organisations. As regards proper names, this study refers to the spelling used in the latest Indonesian official publication. In cases where the old and the new spelling have appeared to be equally commonly used, the new spelling has generally been chosen.

All translations from Indonesian are, unless otherwise stated, by the author. Quoted passages from English-language sources, however, follow the translations of the cited source.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Malaysia adalah untuk menyelamatkan timah bagi imperialis. Malaysia adalah untuk menyelamatkan karet bagi imperialis. Malaysia adalah untuk menyelamatkan minyak bagi imperialis... Jikalau pimpinan Negara Malaya terus menerus begini, apa boleh buat kita menjalankan politik konfrontasi terhadap Malaya, kita menjalankan politik konfrontasi terhadap ide Malaysia. Konfrontasi bukan saja politik, tetapi juga konfrontasi ekonomi.

[Malaysia is created to protect tin for the imperialists. Malaysia is created to protect rubber for the imperialists. Malaysia is created to protect oil for the imperialists... If the State of Malaya's leadership continues its policies, Indonesia will have no choice but to implementing confrontation politics against the idea of the creation of Malaysia. It is both a political and economic *Konfrontasi*]

Speech of President Sukarno on 13 February 1963¹

1.1 Making the Case for Study

The politics of the *Konfrontasi* (Confrontation) that was executed by the Indonesian government against Malaysia in 1963-1967 is worth studying. First, this dissertation argued that the *Konfrontasi* was a critical juncture in the Indonesian history. Both internal and external to Indonesia resulted in the creation of a complicated situation. For Indonesia, the conflict with Malaysia was not solely the result of opposition to the creation of the Malaysia Federation but more because of poor economic performance,² domestic political turmoil, military and Cold War rivalry. The *Konfrontasi* was pivotal event because President Sukarno had to step down in 1966, before he succeeded in fulfilling his ambition – crushing the Malaysia Federation. Second, as the relationship of

1 Pengurus Besar Front Nasional [Central Board of National Front], *Jalankan Panca Program Ganyang Semua Tantangan* [Implementing the Five Programs Crush All Challenges], (Pengurus Besar Front Nasional: Jakarta, 1963), 17-19

2 Pauker explained that in early 1960s, Indonesia was suffered by massive deficit financing as a consequence of the *Konfrontasi* against Dutch over the island of Western New Guinea. By launching, "Crush Malaysia" policy, Indonesia would only get more suffers in economic sector. He added, "The inflationary pressure affecting the spirit of the Indonesian people is becoming markedly stronger." Guy J Pauker, *Indonesia in 1963: The Year of Wasted Opportunities*, (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1964).

Indonesia-Malaysia is the love-hate relationship, the memory of *Konfrontasi* embodied strongly among the people of Indonesia. After the fall of Suharto administration in 1998, the slogan of *Ganyang Malaysia*³ (Crush Malaysia) is still frequently used when anti-Malaysia sentiment breaks out.⁴ However, the major reason to study the Indonesian military operations during the *Konfrontasi* is that there is a lack of explanation from the Indonesian side over this episode, as western authors produced most of extant literature.⁵ Owing to the complexity of the *Konfrontasi*, this study made a valuable empirical contribution by comprehensively analysing Indonesian military operations during this event. This research attempts to examine how the politicisation of the Indonesian military affected its military operations during the *Konfrontasi*. It is also hoped that the present research may serve as a basis for future studies on Indonesian military operations.

Sukarno first employed term of *Konfrontasi*⁶ as a policy during the dispute with the Netherlands over the island of Western New Guinea, now divided into two provinces of Papua and West Papua.⁷ Mackie described the *Konfrontasi* as a policy that was made by Sukarno in order to serve his own agenda and

3 In Indonesian publications published before 1972, term of “Ganyang Malaysia” was written as “Ganjang Malaysia”

4 Budiawan, “How do Indonesians remember Konfrontasi? Indonesia–Malaysia relations and the popular memory of “Confrontation” after the fall of Suharto,” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 18:3 (2017): 365.

5 JM Pluvier, *Confrontations: A Study in Indonesian Politics*. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965); H James, and Denis Shell-Small, *The undeclared war: the story of the Indonesian confrontation, 1962-1966*, (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1971); JAC Mackie, *Konfrontasi The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974); Raffi Gregorian, “Claret Operation and Confrontation, 1964-1966,” *Conflict Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. 1 (Winter 1991); Greg Poulgrain, *The genesis of konfrontasi: Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia, 1945-1965*, (Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing, 1998); David Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia 1962-1966*, (London: IB Tauris, 2004); Nick Van der Bijl, *Confrontation: the War with Indonesia, 1962-1966*, (Barnsley, S. Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Military, 2007); Christopher Tuck, *Confrontation, Strategy and War Termination: Britain’s Conflict with Indonesia, 1963-66*, (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013); Mushahid Ali, *Konfrontasi: Why Singapore was in Forefront of Indonesian Attacks*, RSIS Commentary No. 062 – 23 March 2015, (Singapore: RSIS, 2015).

6 Although it was firstly employed to describe the *Irian* campaign, term of *konfrontasi* is often associated with Malaysia or ‘Crush Malaysia’ by Indonesian people or politicians.

7 For detail discussion on the outset of the *Konfrontasi*, see Chapter Three.

influenced by the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*/PKI) and China's government manipulation.⁸ Later, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Subandrio, used this term to challenge the creation of the Federation of Malaysia. Sukarno defined the *Konfrontasi* as:

A contest of power in all fields, Confrontation amounted to a practice of coercive diplomacy, employing military measures stopping short of all-out war, which was designed to create a sense of international crisis in order to provoke diplomatic intervention in Indonesia's interest.⁹

As a term, both in the Oxford Dictionary and the Great Dictionary of the Indonesian Language (*Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia*), *Konfrontasi* is known as a way against enemy or "a hostile situation between parties."¹⁰ Meanwhile, Schwarz defined Confrontation as "a situation when some form of a limited use or threat of force in international relationships is answered by an opponent with a symmetrical threat."¹¹ As a political term, *Konfrontasi* in Indonesian is defined as a difficult situation to directly confront an enemy. Undoubtedly, the *Konfrontasi* between Indonesia and Malaysia is often described as undeclared war. But not all Indonesians accept this definition. The late Indonesian prose writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer¹² argued *Konfrontasi* was closer to the spirit of anti-colonialism, imperialism and capitalism. He rejected common arguments from western scholars who have denoted *Konfrontasi* as an anti-Malaysia

8 JAC Mackie, *Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), 1-2.

9 Michael Leifer, *Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia*. (London-New York: Routledge, 1995), 54

10 Oxford University Press Dictionaries, accessed April 12, 2015, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/confrontation>. For Indonesian, definition of *konfrontasi* refers to *Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia* [Great Dictionary Indonesian]. *Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia*, by Pusat Bahasa Departemen Pendidikan Nasional [Language Centre, Department of National Education], accessed April 12, 2015, <http://badanbahasa.kemdikbud.go.id/kbbi/index.php>

11 Urs Schwartz, *Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World*, (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1970), 15

12 Pramoedya Ananta Toer was a prominent Indonesian writer. He was also knowingly as a President Sukarno's loyalist. He aligned with communist-sponsored cultural groups during 1960s. Following the communist coup in 1965, the Indonesian military put him in prison. During his imprisonment, he produced a series of novel that made him more popular and government, at that time, banned those publications to be produced and circulated in Indonesia.

policy. He defined *Konfrontasi* as “furthering the anti-colonialist ideal.”¹³

Figure 1-1, located on the next page, outlined several key events of the *Konfrontasi*, which will be discussed further in Chapter Three and Four. The tension between Indonesia and Malaysia has started years before the *Konfrontasi* against the Malaysia Federation was launched in 1963. Since 1958, Indonesia-Malaysia relationship was warm following the uprising in the West Sumatra, known as the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (*Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/PRRI*).¹⁴ Sukarno accused the Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman supported the revolt by providing shelter for several people who allegedly involved with the PRRI,¹⁵ As a result, the government established a Consulate in Singapore in November 1958 that was aimed at delivering intelligence operations in Malayan Peninsula. The operations were to monitor foreign intelligence activities that linked to rebellions.¹⁶

However, the Crush Malaysia campaign began when the Indonesian government opposed a plan of the Malayan administration to extend the Federation concept, which embraced Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak.¹⁷ Soekarno dubbed the Federation plan as a neo-colonialist project and considered it a breach of the 1963 Manila Accord.¹⁸ In a move against this project, Soekarno announced “People’s Twofold Command Operation” (*Operasi Dwi Komando Rakyat/Dwikora* Operation), aimed at crushing the Malaysia Federation. This campaign began on 3 May 1964.¹⁹

13 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, *Foreword*, in Poulgrain, vi-xiv

14 The case of PRRI Revolt will be elaborated further in Chapter Three.

15 TNA, DO 187/28, Telegram No 441, CRO to Kuala Lumpur, 13 March 1963

16 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI [Centre for the Indonesian Military History], *Operasi Dwikora 1962-1966 [Dwikora Operation 1962-1966]*. (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, 2005), 31-32

17 Mackie, *Konfrontasi*, 3.

18 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 1-2. Details regarding the Manila Accord see Chapter Three.

19 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 23.




Figure 1-1 Timeline of the Indonesian-Malaysian *Konfrontasi*

Source: Author

Since the beginning of *Konfrontasi*, the Indonesian Army supported Soekarno's *Konfrontasi* policy half-heartedly. On one hand, it recognised that the PKI was the main actor behind anti-Malaysia policy.²⁰ This situation made the army less supportive of the *Konfrontasi* because the PKI would gain more political advantages than the armed forces. On the other hand, the army did not want its enormous budget cut.²¹ As Polomka explained, the "Malaysian Confrontation evoked a turbulent domestic climate that damaged army cohesion and promoted the position of Sukarno and the Communist Party."²²

Although it was not the largest military operation, the *Dwikora* Operation was an incomparable military operation for the Indonesian Armed Forces (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia/ABRI*).²³ There are several reasons why this operation was exceptional. First, it was launched during the Cold War era, which means that the military operation was also influenced by the ideological battle between democracy and communism. Second, the *Dwikora* Operation was launched against Indonesia's neighbouring country, Malaysia, which had never occurred before. Third, Sukarno, the Indonesian military and the PKI utilised the *Konfrontasi* issue to achieve their own different agendas. Within this context, Ricklefs noted that "Sukarno could again drive the revolutionary spirit onward, the army could look forward to increased budgets and PKI could take

20 Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Political Orientations and Political Involvement of the Indonesian Officer Corps 1945-1966: the Siliwangi Division and the Army Headquarters" (PhD Dissertation, Monash University, 1971), 522-590.

21 Prior to the *Operasi Dwikora*, the ABRI launched the *Trikora* Operation in order to fight against the Dutch regarding the issue of Papua. Due to this operation, the Indonesian government established a martial law status and the military was gaining huge budget during that time. Sundhaussen added that some military leadership did not want to lose their credibility and grasp public outcry because of wasting resources. Sundhaussen, "The Political Orientations," 536

22 Peter Polomka, *Indonesia Since Sukarno*, Australia: Penguin Book Australia Ltd, 1971), 69

23 Prior to the year 2000, ABRI consisted of the police force and 3 forces of Indonesian military (TNI): the army, the air force, and the navy. Since 2000, there was a separation between TNI and the Police Force. This study prefers to use term of ABRI to describe the Indonesian military as a whole organisation, since the role of police in the ABRI's decision-making during that time was less significant. The present research recognises term of the army, the navy, and the air force as a different service. To describe all three services, this study uses term of "military", "armed forces" and ABRI interchangeably.

the lead in mass agitation.”²⁴ This event drastically pushed Indonesia into political domestic turmoil. Lastly, during this operation Sukarno had to step down. This political event also created controversy. For many scholars, especially those in the West, this political incident was described as a military coup,²⁵ conducted by a faction within the army.²⁶ Meanwhile, the term “coup” is infrequently used in Indonesian literature until the collapse of authoritarian regime in 1998. For more than three decades, Suharto’s government imposed the term “30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party”, or *Gerakan 30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia* (G30S/PKI) to explain the affair.²⁷

As alluded to previously, the Indonesian army half-heartedly supported Soekarno’s anti-Malaysia policy. The *Konfrontasi* policy, had divided the Generals into two factions. On one side were the Generals who supported the hostility against Malaysia. The Defence Minister/Chief of Staff of Armed Forces (*Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata/KSAB*), General Abdul Haris Nasution led

24 MC Ricklefs, *A history of Modern Indonesia since c.1200*, (Basingstoke: Partridge, 2001), 330-331; variety of military elites’ motivations can be seen in Chapter 4 Section 4.3

25 See, for instance, Benedict Anderson, and Ruth McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia*, (Singapore: Equinox Publishing Ltd, 2009); Harold Crouch, “Another Look at the Indonesian “Coup”,” *Indonesia* 15 (15) (April 1973), 1–20; Daniel S Lev, “Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup,” *Asian Survey*, 6, 2 (February 1966): 103–110.

26 See John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'État in Indonesia*. (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2006)

27 After Sukarno stepped down, new regime led by Suharto tried to control 30 September 1965 incident narrative. His government produced a documentary propaganda movie “*Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*” (G30S/PKI Treachery). Then he obliged all national television to air the movie on the evening of 30 September, every year. Indonesian scholar, Asvi Warman Adam, argued Suharto administration intended obviously control the story of coup in order to “legitimise the New Order regime’s rise to power”. See Asvi Warman Adam, “Studies on ‘65 still trying to reveal truth,” *The Jakarta Post*, January 27, 2015, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/27/studies-65-still-trying-reveal-truth.html>. Also read Katherine E McGregor, *History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past*. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007); Sukarno referred to the September Affairs ‘Gestok’ (*Gerakan Satu Oktober/Movement of 1 October*). Meanwhile, the ABRI employed the term of ‘Gestapu’ (*Gerakan September Tiga Puluh/Movement of September 30*). Van Langenberg explained the term ‘Gestapu’ was presumably aimed at associating the affairs with the Nazi political police (*Gestapo/Geheime Staatspolizei*). In addition, the Movement named itself as *Gerakan 30 September* (G30S/Movement of September 30). For consistency, this study used term of ‘G30S’ throughout. See Michael Van Langenberg, “Gestapu and state power in Indonesia,” in *The Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966: Studies From Java and Bali*, ed. Robert Cribb, (Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria: 1990), 45-46.

this group.²⁸ In February-March 1963, Nasution did a cross command by dispatching troops to the Indonesian-Malaysian border in Kalimantan Island. He was bypassing the chain of command of Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Army, Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani.²⁹ According to Sundhaussen, Nasution's motive at that time was "damming up the decline of the army's political role, and in buying time to reorganise the army's defence."³⁰ Nasution's actions did not purely propose to confront Malaysia, but more on overcoming the PKI's effort.

On the other side were Generals who were resistant to pursue the *Konfrontasi* policy against Malaysia. Yani led this faction.³¹ Both Yani and Nasution shared similar views regarding the creation of the Malaysian Federation. They gave sympathy to the North Kalimantan National Army (*Tentara Nasional Kalimantan Utara/TNKU*) movement and rejected the idea of the Federation.³² However, Yani had less interest in confronting outside power by using a military approach. He much more preferred using political settlement rather than exploiting hard power.

At that time, the ABRI struggled to improve unity, cohesion and military professionalism. Notosusanto argued the ABRI did not "extensively [develop] professionalism and a professional tradition."³³ There was also internal disagreement within the Indonesian military services during that period. Even

28 During the Sukarno administration, it was common that one person held two or more strategic positions at the same time.

29 At that time, Nasution did not have an authority to deploy any troops. Details regarding this incident will be explained later in Chapter Three.

30 Sundhaussen, "The Political Orientations," 546

31 Nasution was definitely Yani's senior in the army. A more comprehensive and detailed rivalry and different perception among generals will be included in Chapter Three and Four.

32 TNKU is known as the rebellion that caused the 'Brunei Revolt'. For detail explanation on Brunei Revolt see, for instance, Nick Van der Bijl, *The Brunei Revolt, 1962-1963*, (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military, 2012); and HA Majid, *Rebellion in Brunei: The 1962 Revolt, Imperialism, Confrontation and Oil (International Library of Twentieth Century History)*, (London: IB Tauris, 2007)

33 Nugroho Notosusanto, "Indonesia: Armed Forces and Society into the 1980s," in *Political-Military Systems: A Comparative Perspective*, ed. C. McA. Kelleher, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974), 47

though the ABRI formally launched the *Dwikora* Operation against Britain and its allies, some individuals launched another operation. Under Yani's approval, the Commander of Army Strategic Reserve Commander (*Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat/KOSTRAD*), Major General Suharto, created a special operation (*Operasi Khusus/Opsus*)³⁴. He also established political contact with Malaysia, Britain, Japan and United States (US).³⁵ Therefore, the Opsus was clearly opposed to the main objective of *Dwikora* Operation, to normalise the tension. In other words, one of factions within the ABRI weakened the military operation.

1.2 Research Problem

As a concept, the politicisation of the military is contested. It has a wider spectrum of discourse.³⁶ Extant literature has captured the politicisation of the military topic within the civil-military relations field. When dealing with the problem of a politicised military, the debates have focused on the problem of military intervention on politics and praetorianism. Although the domain of civil-military relations studies is large, for example, covering from military budget, regulation, the use of the military, to complex relations between civilians and military – the most frequent aspect of its theories is still about the relation

34 This study utilised Tugwell and Charters's definition on special operation as "small-scale, clandestine, covert or overt operations of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant political or military objectives in support of foreign policy. Special operations are characterised by either simplicity or complexity, by subtlety and imagination, by the discriminate use of violence, and by oversight at the highest level. Military and non-military resources, including intelligence assets, may be used in concert. For details see Tugwell and Charters, "Special Operations and the Threats to United States Interests in the 1980s," in *Special Operations in US Strategy*, ed. FR Barnett, BH Tovar and Richard H Schultz, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1984), 27-52.

35 Chalis, 50-70. For a detailed discussion on the Opsus see Chapter Three and Four.

36 Chuter and Cleary explained politicisation of the military as the intervention within military that was conducted by civilian. Meanwhile, in ABRI's case, the politicisation of the military was also conducted by senior officers in order to achieve their personal goals. A more comprehensive and detailed discussion on politicisation of the ABRI will be included in Chapter Three and Four. David Chuter, and Laura R Cleary, "Civilians in defence," in *Managing defence in a democracy*, ed. Laura R. Cleary and Teri McConville, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 89. For a detailed discussion on theory of politicisation of the military, see Chapter Two.

between the government and the military.³⁷ Most studies acknowledge that the military is not immune from the dynamics of domestic politics. As Stepan pointed out:

... because the military is not isolated from politics but in fact performs diverse political functions, simple descriptions of "ideal" military institutions which may emphasise such features as military unity or national orientation often conceal more than they reveal about the interactions between the military and the political system.³⁸

As external environment may affect to the institution, military often keeps its independence in order to maintain unity and solidity. As an institution, the military applied autonomy mechanism in the decision-making authority.³⁹ Pion-Berlin defines military autonomy as "the military's aversion towards or even defiance of civilian control."⁴⁰ The autonomy itself seems ambiguous. As a concept, military autonomy could be seen as an effort to reject external influences. However, the military could not effectively neglect politics. On the contrary, military recommendations could influence policy and civilian opinions. Betts acknowledges two forms of military influence, direct and indirect.⁴¹ As he explained:

Direct influence flows from formal and explicit recommendations, or control of operations. Indirect influence flows from ways in which the soldier may control the premises of civilian decision through monopoly of information or control of options.⁴²

37 James Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 29, No 1 (Fall 2002): 7, accessed December 13, 2015, doi: 10.1177/0095327X0202900102

38 Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics Changing Patterns in Brazil*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), 7.

39 David Pion-Berlin, "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America," *Comparative Politics*, Vol 25, No 1 (October 1992): 84.

40 Pion-Berlin, "Military Autonomy," 85.

41 Richard K Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977), 5-6.

42 Betts says since 1940 many foreign policies had been affected by indirect military influence. Betts, 5

Over the years, most research on the Indonesian military, although increasingly broadened, remained preoccupied with civil-military relations studies. To the extent that the existing literature has addressed the politicisation problem of the Indonesian military, these works have done so by highlighting the political orientation of the ABRI's officers,⁴³ the expansion of the ABRI's non-military roles,⁴⁴ and the political nature of the ABRI's birth⁴⁵. The extant literature failed to explain the wider impact of politicisation of the ABRI into its operations. Another weakness in the literature was the lack of utilising organisational theory that is predominantly associated in the civil-military relation field.⁴⁶ For this reason, this study seeks to address the gap in the debates about political behaviour in the military organisation. In particular, by examining the ABRI's operations during the *Konfrontasi*, this study demonstrated how political behaviour of military affected the execution of its operations.

1.2.1 Working Definitions

Following paragraphs described some key concepts that are used in this study. Providing some definitions will help avoid ambiguity and slippage later in the dissertation. Indeed, as Huntington pointed out politics is:

beyond the scope of the military competence, and the participation of the military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional

43 See, for example, Harold Crouch, *Militer dan Politik di Indonesia* [Military and Politics in Indonesia], (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1999)

44 See, for example, Ulf Sundhaussen, *Politik Militer Indonesia 1945-1967: Menuju Dwi Fungsi ABRI* [The Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967: the Road to ABRI Dual Function], (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988); Salim Said, *Tumbuh dan Tumbangnya Dwifungsi* [The Making and Unmaking of The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces], (Jakarta: Aksara Karunia, 2002); Salim Said, *Legitimizing Military Rule: Indonesia Armed Forces Ideology, 1958-2000*, (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 2006).

45 See, for example, Salim Said, *Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945-49*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991)

46 Evan A Laksmana, *Spoilers, Partners and Pawns: Military Organisational Behaviour and Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia*, IDSS Monograph No 161, (Singapore: S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2008), 6

values.⁴⁷

However, in transitional and established democracy, military institution is part of political institutions. To some extent, it has major influence in political decision-making. Pauker argued

the officer corps, particularly of the army and air force looms as one of the major sources of political power and administrative capacity in the country, along with the Communist Party and with the radical nationalist.⁴⁸

In this study, the term 'military political behaviour' does not necessarily mean domestic military intervention in politics or civilian power.⁴⁹ Pion-Berlin stated there are both institutional and political dimension to the military behaviour."⁵⁰ In particular, according to Stepan, political variables are frequently far more important for determining the role of the military in society than the size of the military.⁵¹ The term military political behaviour in this study is the political behaviour by individual Generals or a faction within military institutions to achieve their own personal objective and it relates both to military institutions or civilian authority. The term political behaviour in this study referred to Buchanan and Bedham's definition: "the practical domain of power in action, worked out through the use of techniques of influence and other (more or less extreme) tactics."⁵² In addition, power is defined as the capacity of individual or groups to exert their will over others.

47 Samuel P Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*. (Cambridge and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 71

48 Guy J Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," in *The Role of the Military in Under-developed Countries*, ed. JJ Johnson, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 185

49 A more comprehensive discussion on military political behaviour will be included in Chapter Two.

50 Pion-Berlin, "Military Autonomy," 84.

51 Stepan, 26

52 Dave Buchanan and Richard Badham, *Power, Politics, and Organizational Change: Winning the Turf Game*, First edition, (Trowbridge, Wiltshire: Sage Publications Ltd, 1999), 11

The phenomenon of politicisation of the military is not exceptional in new nations.⁵³ As Indonesia acquired independence after the end of the Second World War, the ABRI played an important role in shaping Indonesian domestic politics.⁵⁴ Since its birth, the ABRI had a political culture. Furthermore, since 1958, the ABRI had been involved in all civilian matters, which was widely known as “middle way” concept.⁵⁵ By acknowledging this situation, the present research defined the ABRI as a political military institution that “considers involvement in – or control over – domestic politics and the business of government to be a central part of their legitimate function.”⁵⁶ This study recognised that the politicisation of the military was caused by both internal and external factors of the ABRI. According to Webster, to politicise is defined as “to give a political tone or character to.” In the context of this research, adapting from Ransom theory, the term of politicisation referred to:

when preferred self or group interest and political dimension within military dominate decision making, overt or subtle pressures are applied on military institution, resulting in self-fulfilling military strategy.⁵⁷

While political activity is acknowledged as an action “when military affairs have become intertwined with politics, appointments and promotions are made on the

53 Janowitz described new nation as a country that had achieved its independence since the end of World War II. He added new nation is a country “where some form of political revolution has taken place” (p.vii). Further explanation of the involvement military in new nations' domestic politics see Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis*, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964)

54 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 21.

55 Brief explanation regarding “middle way” concept is presented in Chapter Three. See Said, *Legitimizing Military Rule*, 9-63.

56 K. Koonings, and Dirk Kruijt, *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, (London and New York: Zed Books, 2002), 1.

57 Harry Howe Ransom, “The Politicization of Intelligence,” in *Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society*, ed. Stephen Cimbala (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1987), 26, quoted in Stephen Marrin, “Rethinking Analytic Politicization,” *Intelligence and National Security*, 28, 1 (2013): 33, accessed July 30, 2015, doi: 10.1080/02684527.2012.749064

basis of the political affiliations of the officer rather than on his professional qualifications.”⁵⁸

The strong political role of the ABRI during that time was a consequence of the presence of military political behaviour by generals. As Janowitz advocated “military organisations seem particularly vulnerable to rivalries generated by the clash of personalities, which in turn may develop into political rivalries.”⁵⁹ Certainly, military political behaviour was not the sole factor leading to the failure of the *Dwikora* Operation. There are also other factors involved in this problem such as domestic politics, the leadership of Sukarno, and foreign intelligence activities. However, this study argued that friction and rivalry within the ABRI has created major effects in delivering military operation.

1.3 Research Aim

The aim of this research is to examine the effect of politicisation of the military on Indonesian military operations during the Indonesia-Malaysia *Konfrontasi* (1963-1967).

1.3.1 Enabling Objectives

In order to achieve the above research aim, a number of enabling objectives have been set:

- a. Critically review the key literature and seminal works regarding the *Konfrontasi* and Indonesian politicised military theme
- b. Evaluate the concept of politicisation of the military and political behaviour in organisations
- c. Discuss the implementation of the Indonesian military operations during the *Konfrontasi*
- d. Examine the failure of the *Dwikora* Operation

58 Amos Perlmutter, and VP Bennett, *The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), 205

59 Janowitz, *The Military*, 72-73

- e. Contribute to the literature in explaining the effect of politicisation of the ABRI on the *Dwikora* Operation during the *Konfrontasi*
- f. Draw conclusions, lessons learned and propose recommendations for future research

1.4 Research Questions

The following main research question will be investigated: **in what way did the politicisation of the military affect the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation?**

To answer the research question, there are consequently three sub-questions to be answered:

- 1) How was the Indonesian military operations delivered during the *Konfrontasi*?
- 2) Why and how did the Indonesian military become politicised?
- 3) How did military political behaviour affect the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation?

In seeking to address these questions, this research considers two important aspects of the Indonesian military operation, namely, process of politicisation of the military and political behaviour in organisation.

1.5 Hypothesis

The hypothesis pursued in this thesis is that the political behaviour of the ABRI contributed to the failure of *Dwikora* Operation.

1.6 Analytical Framework

While the literature on the politicisation problem of the Indonesian armed forces is replete with the civil-military relations field, systematic studies of military organisation have seldom been made. From the literature, that is presented in Chapter Two, it is possible to identify at least two variables that have been

related to the politicisation of the military and that may offer potential explanation regarding military as organisational politics. These two variables are (a) the process of military institution to become more politicised; and (b) political behaviour of military that affects the outcomes of military operation. The relationships between these two variables are discussed further in the next chapter.

The need to build the framework arises from the research gap that will be illustrated later in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.4. Little has been produced to understand how politicisation of the military affects its operation. The framework constituted a plot to guide the empirical analysis of the Indonesian military operations during the *Konfrontasi*. In developing the analytical framework, this study examined two ways of politicisation of the ABRI, both internally and externally. The in-depth analysis of the Indonesian military operations during the *Konfrontasi* aimed to answer the main research question of in what way did the politicisation of the military affect the implementation of the military operations.

The analytical framework is derived from certain relevant theories that will be elaborated in Chapter 2, Subsection 2.3.⁶⁰ Through this framework, the present study aimed to reveal the process linking the policy of war to the failure of the *Dwikora* Operation. The implementation of military operation was conceptualised as a multi-level, multi actor process where policy of war, main actors within the military and coalitions, politicised military, and military operations are the main factors and building blocks of the Indonesian military operation management during the *Konfrontasi*. Each factor is an essential part of the analytical framework. The existing theoretical explanations to politicisation of the military will be tested during process tracing analysis. To

60 Betts 1977; Perlmutter and Bennett 1980; M Edmonds, *The Armed Services and Society* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988); Samuel E Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*; with a new introduction by Jay Stanley, (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publisher, 2006); R Martinez, "Objectives for Democratic Consolidation in the Armed Forces," in *Debating Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*, ed. DR Mares and R Martinez, (Eastbourne, Chicago and Ontario: Sussex Academic Press, 2014).

verify the empirical findings against the existing theory, it must be clear under what circumstance the analytical framework can be employed. The framework explained the relationship only when all factors are present and the environment is in crisis or wartime.

The analytical framework consisted of four main building blocks, namely: (a) Policy of war, (b) Main actors and coalitions, (c) politicised military, and (d) military operation. To explain the Indonesian military operations during the *Konfrontasi*, it is also necessary to specify and inter-relate the sets of factors, that are perceived as causing politicisation of the ABRI to occur during the military operation-making and implementation process. As noted earlier, non-military actors has certain roles and influence in several factors. Janowitz argued, “political warfare is more likely to be effective if the official declarations of politicians and military leaders about their intentions are realistically based on the military resources at their command.”⁶¹ Consequently, non-military actors can also play important role in influencing the military operations making and implementation during the *Konfrontasi*. The relationship between the blocks is represented in Figure 1-2 (p.20). The analytical framework will focus on two aspects. The first three building blocks dealt with aspect of politicisation of the military. The last block scrutinised aspect of political behaviour in military organisation. The contents of each building block are described in the separate subsections below.

1.6.1 Policy of War

This block aimed to illustrate the early setting of policy of war. Traditionally, after government set out policy of political warfare,⁶² military is required to translate the policy into action. However, capturing various key actors motivation toward the policy is necessary. As motivation reflects action and the internal and

61 Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), 327

62 Janowitz defined political warfare as ‘a modern phrase for the traditional use of persuasion in a political setting where military force is involved.’ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 322

external forces that influence one's choice of action,⁶³ motivation is crucial in explaining such conflicts or discrepancies.⁶⁴ Also, as Manzoor argued, motivation stimulates a performance that is intended as an objective.⁶⁵ In this regard, key actors' motivations and possible consequences over the policy will be illustrated.

1.6.2 Main Actors and Coalitions

Here, it is important to note that coalitions among main individual actors may develop during the military operation making. As Janowitz argued, "an officer's perspectives are influenced by his network of personal alliances and contacts. So, in the case of the military operations making, the existences of main actors and coalitions should be taken into account. When considering this building block, it is important to determine what elements influenced the actors and coalitions. This requires identification of a wider internal environment to determine the context. Reasons why politicised military becomes common feature in the new state will arguably an important element influencing configuration of main actors and coalitions shapes the military operations making. Therefore, as Indonesia was a new state during the *Konfrontasi*, those reasons will also capture the opportunities⁶⁶ (p.55) and motives⁶⁷ of military involvement in politics (p.57-8).

1.6.3 Politicised Military

Further, it can be seen that the politicisation of the ABRI during the *Konfrontasi* can be identified through policy development and organisational resources to ensure that the decisions are implemented. In this block, it is essential to

63 Terence R Mitchell, "Motivation: New Directions for Theory, Research, and Practice," *The Academy of Management Review*, 7, 1 (January, 1982): 81

64 Herbert A Simon, "On the Concept of Organizational Goal," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 9, 1 (June, 1964): 16

65 Quratul-Ain Manzoor, "Impact of employees motivation on organizational effectiveness," *Business Management and Strategy*, 3,1 (2012): 1.

66 Perlmutter and Bennett, 17, 203-205; and Finer, 72-85

67 Koonings and Kruijt, *Political Armies*, 19-21; Edmonds, 100-104

assess the internal variables that are central in shaping the politicisation. The internal variables are political strengths and weaknesses⁶⁸ (p.53-4), level of military influence⁶⁹ (p.58-9) and direction of politicisation of the military⁷⁰ (p.59).

1.6.4 Military Operations

Thus, at the core of the framework is aimed at examining the effect of politicisation of the ABRI on its operations during the *Konfrontasi*. This block will also probe the unity of command during the implementation of military operations. At this stage, the main hypothesis of this study will be tested, whether the politicisation of the ABRI was causing the disunity of command in the military operations during the *Konfrontasi*. In this regard, the research traces consequences of the ABRI as organisational politics at three levels: individual, organisational and national. To support the analysis, the present research adapts the pathway model that was developed by Buchanan and Badham⁷¹ (p.73). The model consists of three variables: antecedents, behaviours and consequences. Antecedents illustrate the factors that trigger political behaviour in the ABRI. Behaviours discuss the tactics that had employed by key actors. And consequences explain the effect of political behaviour in the Indonesian armed forces.

68 Finer, 6-22

69 Betts, 11-12

70 Betts, 53

71 David A Buchanan and Richard J Badham, *Power, Politics and Organisation Change: Winning The Turf Game*, Second edition, (Croydon: Sage, 2008), 30-33




Figure 1-2 Causal Pathway of the Indonesian Military Operation Management during the *Konfrontasi*

Source: Author

1.7 Contribution to Knowledge

This study's originality derives from the research that focuses on analysing politicisation of the ABRI and its effects on its operations during the *Konfrontasi*. As such, the research findings offer an original contribution to knowledge, because they are based on the body of knowledge of politicisation of the military and political behaviour in organisations. Furthermore, the access to the Indonesian military archives provides a unique insight and will add to the original contribution to knowledge.

More research on politicisation of the military and its effects on its operation during a period of the *Konfrontasi* in Indonesia are necessary for two main

reasons. First, there has never been any study about the Indonesian military operations during the *Konfrontasi*. The existing publications from the Centre for Indonesian Military History (*Pusat Sejarah TNI/Pusjarah TNI*) lack the comprehensive scrutiny needed for the field of social science. Therefore, the ABRI employed the terminology of *Konfrontasi* to maintain the strength of both military and political positions.⁷² Second, a critical analysis of Indonesian military operations is useful to fill the *lacuna* of research on the *Konfrontasi*. The *Dwikora* Operation was one of the biggest Indonesian military operations that employed more than 26 battalions excluding air and sea power.⁷³ As Suharto's Opsus might indicate the form of insubordination and disunity of command in military operation, it will serve as key case study to highlight the political behaviour in the ABRI and its effect on military operations during the *Konfrontasi*. Consequently, the results of this research will enrich the historiography of the ABRI, which, until now, has not been done sufficiently. It provides a more explanation to scholarship and practical policymaking in improving the professionalism of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Further, this research seeks to provide a critical analysis of the *Dwikora* Operation by using an Indonesian perspective.

As this research's emphasis is on the politicisation of the military and its effects on the military operation, the views and responses of Indonesian opponents regarding the *Konfrontasi* would not be considered in depth. Previous research has been conducted to cover Indonesia's rivals during the *Konfrontasi*. This study is also limited by a focus on the examination of politicisation of the Indonesian military and its linkage to its operations during the *Konfrontasi*. The view of Indonesian diplomacy conducted by Ministry of Foreign Affairs including the effect of military operation on diplomacy is beyond the scope of this research. However, this research attempts to explain, and verify or challenge, the existing studies.

⁷² Franklin B Weinstein, *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation: an Inquiry into the Function of Indonesian Foreign Policy*, (Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur: Equinox Publishing, 2009)

⁷³ Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 118.

1.8 Research Methodology

The way of responding the research questions will be influenced by research philosophy to research techniques. In this regard, the researcher has selected a research methodology and research methods that are suitable to be employed in examining the effect of politicisation of the TNI on the implementation of *Dwikora* Operation during the *Konfrontasi*. The study will employ the research onion suggested by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill.⁷⁴ The selected research design onion is shown in Figure 1-3, located on the next page.

The present research tended to provide a critical analysis of the *Dwikora* Operation. Therefore, the research philosophy that fitted with this objective is interpretivism, as the study will enrich the narrative of the *Konfrontasi* by using Indonesian perspective. The research design 'onion' (Figure 1-3), located on the next page, showed that the present research adapted abductive or mixed approach. It followed a 'bottom up' approach to data gathering. So, the present research attempted to gain a specific detailed narrative. However, while converting the data into an analytical causal explanation of why the *Dwikora* Operation was a failure, the present research tested several existing theories, which were discussed in Chapter Two, whether they fit with the case study.

Further, the present research employed qualitative as research method. More specifically, this research applied qualitative historical analysis⁷⁵ and using a case study and archival research as research strategies. Borrowing Thomas' explanation,⁷⁶ by using case study, the present study explored and analysed the Indonesian military operation during the *Konfrontasi*. Of course, it would not

74 Mark Saunders, Philip Lewis, and Adrian Thornhill, *Research Methods for Business Students (the 7th Edition)*, (Essex: Pearson Education Ltd., 2016), 124.

75 Term of qualitative historical analysis was introduced by Cameron G Thies (2002). Thies explained this method as a branch of qualitative research with using historical records as primary data to develop and test the theory. For further explanation see Cameron G Thies, "A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of International Relation," *International Studies Perspectives*, 3 (2002): 351-372.

76 Gary Thomas, *How to Do Your Research Project: A Guide for Students in Education and Applied Social Sciences*, (London: SAGE Publications, 2013), 133-155

go to generalise the TNI operations but to gain deeper understanding and knowledge on the politicisation of the military and its effects to the *Dwikora* Operation. By focusing on some key elements such as military political behaviour and politicisation of the military, this case study helped to address a gap in the existing literatures.




Figure 1-3 Research Design 'Onion'

Source: Adapted from The Research Onion in Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, *Research Methods*, 124

This study applied the qualitative research method for two reasons. First, the qualitative research method allowed the researcher to gain a deep and holistic overview of the research case study. Although the researcher might have little or no control to the subject under study, the qualitative research method provided opportunity for the researcher as a key instrument to gather data through examining documents or interviewing participants.⁷⁷ Second, the

⁷⁷ Creswell, *Research design*, 185

qualitative method was the most appropriate technique to be employed when the aim of this study attempted to capture a complex picture of the *Dwikora* Operation. By applying the qualitative research method, therefore, the researcher was able to capture many facets of a central phenomenon. As Cresswell posited “the key idea behind qualitative research is to learn about the problem or issue from participants and to address the research to obtain that information.”⁷⁸

As the research questions have many facets, the study applied an interdisciplinary approach. This study combined three approaches in order to answer the questions: 1) Political Studies, 2) History, and 3) Management Studies. Political Studies, in this study, also covered Strategic Studies and International Relations. International Relations reflected the external factors of military, particularly from outside Indonesia, while Political Studies perspective identified how the military was politicised, both from within organisations and civilians and political parties in Indonesia. In relation to Indonesia, strategic studies particularly examine the execution of the *Dwikora* Operation. Moreover, a management studies perspective assessed the complexity of political behaviour in military organisation. Historiography, as a part of academic discipline of history methodology, enriched the understanding of the case through an interpretation of a case’s chronology.⁷⁹ This research employed historiography and a critical analysis of military records held in the Indonesian Military Headquarter, memoirs, and interviews.

Considering the case study period was during 1960s and not aimed at generating new theoretical position, this research applied two research strategies that were suitable for the present study, namely archival research and case study. The archival research was suitable for data collection of the present research, as the study acknowledged the Indonesian military archives

78 Ibid., 186

79 J O’Brien, Dan Remenyi, and Aideen Keaney, “Historiography as a Research Method in Business and Management Studies,” *Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods*, Vol 2, Issue 2 (2004): 137-138.

as the main source. The researcher gathered archives and related documents from various archival centres for gaining insight on how politicisation of the ABRI affected the *Dwikora* Operation.

Furthermore, the case study was selected for the following reasons. This study attempted to examine the effect of politicisation of the military on the Indonesian military operations during the *Konfrontasi*. In addition, this research acknowledged that the *Konfrontasi* was a complex phenomenon. Thus, the study did not go to generalise the ABRI operations but to gain deeper understanding and knowledge on the politicisation of military and its effects on its operations, particularly the *Dwikora* Operation. Indeed, the phenomenon of military politics in Indonesia is not a new issue. Several studies have provided comprehensive analysis of military politics in Indonesia.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, none examine the relation of the politicised military and the implementation of military operations. A study of examining the impact of politicisation of the military within TNI's operations therefore needs to be conducted in order to provide a wide-ranging explanation of the military politics phenomenon in Indonesia.

There were several reasons why this study is possible to be conducted by an Indonesian civilian. First, the *reformasi* has resulted in a change of the Indonesian military behaviour towards civilian access to military archives. The Pusjarah TNI and The Centre for the Army History (*Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat/Disjarahad*) are more open to provide access for civilians to read military archives.⁸¹ Second, the *Konfrontasi* issue including the *Dwikora*

80 See, for instance, Crouch 1999; Sundhaussen 1988; Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power*, (Washington DC: RAND, 2002); Damien Kingsbury, *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military*, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Jun Honna, *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia*, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*, (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009)

81 Since 2016, the Pusjarah TNI has reduced public access to its archives and imposed tight bureaucratic procedures. Any person who wanted to access the archives should gain bureaucratic approval. Prior to the limitation, public could easily access and read military archives, which are stored in the archival centre (*Pusat Dokumentasi/Pusdok*), the Pusjarah

Operation is not considered as a sensitive issue, compared to other military operations.⁸² Lastly, the status of researcher as a lecturer at the Indonesian Defence University has provided advantages in accessing larger military archives located at the Pusjarah TNI and the Disjarahad.

As this study aimed to examine the effect of politicisation of the military to the Indonesian military operations during the *Konfrontasi*, this research approach was conditioned by the historiography of the *Konfrontasi* era of Indonesian history. There was as yet, no comprehensive study of the *Konfrontasi* era from the Indonesian perspective, and most accounts⁸³ tended to focus on the dynamics of domestic politics and foreign policy. This study did not aim to correct this lack of a comprehensive study of the *Konfrontasi* era. Moreover, this research sought to take a closer look at this event and to demonstrate how the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation was affected by the politicisation of the TNI. To support this, narrative analysis was utilised for illustrating and explaining the connection of politicised military with the *Dwikora* Operation.

Due to time and resource constrains, the present research employed cross-sectional research, analysed the *Dwikora* Operation and related archives from 1963 to 1967, and conducted interviews from August-December 2016. Furthermore, in order to provide a comprehensive analysis, this study combined four data-gathering techniques, namely semi-structured interviews,⁸⁴ snowball sampling,⁸⁵ archival analysis, and secondary data. Face-to-face interviews were undertaken with witnesses and experts on the *Konfrontasi* and Indonesian military history. As explained by Cassel, “the selection of interviewees was

TNI, with a relaxed procedure. The researcher gathered the archives from the Pusjarah TNI in 2012.

82 Not all military archives are available and open access for civilian. Military operation in East Timor, for instance, is still restricted and considered as a sensitive issue.

83 Pluvier 1965; Mukmin 1991; Djiwandono 1996; Weinstein 2009

84 David E Gray, *Doing research in the real world*, 2nd Edition, (London: Sage Publication, 2009), 373.

85 Earl R Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research*, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013), 129.

influence by the research questions and the purpose of the interview in regard to the type of information sought.”⁸⁶ The witness interviews were conducted with retired military soldiers and civilians who were involved in the *Dwikora* Operation, or other events that have linkage with the period of the *Konfrontasi*. Meanwhile, the expert interview referred to an interview, which was conducted with retired military soldiers, and civilians with knowledge and information on the TNI, the *Konfrontasi* or history of the Indonesian socio-politics. The interviews took place in a diverse set of location: home, workplace of the respondents, within or outside Indonesia.

While it was difficult to trace the living witnesses who involved in the *Konfrontasi*, the study applied snowball sampling. The first step was the researcher set up a list of potential informants who were assumed to have sufficient knowledge of the *Konfrontasi*. They are mainly book authors and scholars who have written publications regarding the Indonesian military topics. The researcher developed this list based on relevant secondary data such as books, journals, magazines, and newspapers. Subsequently, the initial respondents were requested to suggest other potential informants who have relevance to the object of research.

This research acknowledged that the ages of the living witnesses are around 70 and 80 years old. Consequently, the responses may be subjective, bias, poorly recalled or inaccurate. However, these interviews still played a role in verifying and providing background information regarding the military archives. In other words, the interviews were part of applying a triangulation method and enriching research materials.

The field research was undertaken in the Netherlands, Indonesia and the UK during October 2015–September 2017. In this stage, researcher was

86 Catherine Cassell, “Interviews in organization,” in *The SAGE handbook of organizational research methods*, edited by David A Buchanan and Alan Bryman, (Cornwall: Sage Publication, 2011), 504

conducting the data collections through in-depth interviews, gathering primary and secondary data from several places. The researcher also accessed the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta Library, the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM) Jakarta Library, SOAS Library in London, Leiden University Library, and the Indonesian Documentation Association (*Perhimpunan Dokumentasi Indonesia*) in Amsterdam to collect a rich array of secondary data. Finally, the researcher also spent four months on a fellowship programme at the KITLV, Leiden (August – September 2016) and the CSIS Jakarta (November-December 2016) for supporting efforts in the data gathering.

The researcher interviewed a total of twenty individuals. In the Netherlands, four individuals were interviewed, comprising one expert and three living witnesses. There were eight living witnesses and eight experts interviewed in Indonesia. The summary of the fieldwork’s respondents can be seen in Table 1.1, below:

Table 1-1 Participants of the Case Study

| | Witness | | Experts | |
|-----------------|----------|------------------|----------|------------------|
| | Civilian | Retired Military | Civilian | Retired Military |
| Indonesia | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 |
| The Netherlands | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 6 | 5 | 6 | 3 |

Source: Author

The present study utilised archival analysis in data gathering because it will provide essential information, which can be explored further through interview and other relevant archival data. Even though, the archives might reflect bias, Yin explained these documents are still useful to verify and enhance data from other sources.⁸⁷ The archival research emphasised on how the ABRI perceived the *Konfrontasi* and the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation and other related-military operations.

⁸⁷ Robert K Yin, *Case study research: design and method*, 5th Edition, (California: Sage Publications, 2014),107

As the main focus of the research was applied the Indonesian perspective, a rigorous scrutiny of the Indonesian military archives regarding the *Konfrontasi* period (1963-1967) was undertaken in two places, the Pusjarah TNI and the Disjarahad.⁸⁸ The study acknowledged records from these two archival centres as primary sources. These included letters, radiograms, reports, presidential decrees, assessments and command instructions of the military operations during the *Konfrontasi*. These important files have never been used in any international publication (English language - *red*). In this context, analyses of TNI's archives are used as the primary data-gathering techniques in this research. To enhance research material, the study also used secondary data such as relevant memoirs and biographies, and also archives from the Indonesian National Archives (*Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia/ANRI*), the Foreign Relation of the United States (FRUS) archives, the UK National Archives and the KITLV collections in the Netherlands.

Further, the archival analysis was conducted before, during, and after the field research. Before the field research, more than 1,400 pages of TNI's archives regarding the *Dwikora* Operation have been gathered. These data provided essential information about the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation. During the field research, archival analysis was necessary in supporting interviews with witnesses and experts. In addition, after the field research, the archival analysis was aiming at verifying, amplifying and providing triangulation for all information that has been gathered.⁸⁹ In addition, the present research adopted secondary data technique to gather data from secondary sources such as newspaper, magazines, and relevant research publications in order to enrich

88 Since 2016, the Pusjarah TNI has reduced public access to its archives and imposed tight bureaucratic procedures. Any person who wants to access the archives should gain bureaucratic approval. Prior to the limitation, public could easily access and read military archives, which are stored in the archival centre (*Pusat Dokumentasi/Pusdok*), the Pusjarah TNI, with a relaxed procedure. The researcher gathered the archives from the Pusjarah TNI in 2012.

89 According to Gray, triangulation is "the use of a variety of methods or data sources to examine a specific phenomenon either simultaneously or sequentially in order to improve the reliability of data." Gray, 582

the data set.

1.8.1 Data Analysis and Research Limitation

This study acknowledged the importance of reliability and validity issues.⁹⁰ Gray pointed out three steps in order to explain the process of case study construction.⁹¹ Firstly, assembling raw case data. In this step, all data regarding the case are gathered. Secondly, constructing a case record. In this part, the collected data will be organised, classified, and edited. Interpreting the data is also a part of this step. Lastly, writing the case study narrative.

Process Tracing

In order to develop valid interpretation, this study adapted process tracing (PT)⁹² and time series analysis technique⁹³. George and Bennett explained PT method tries to identify intervening causal processes between an independent variable and the outcome of dependent variable.⁹⁴ Tannenwald added good process tracing requires deep knowledge of the case.⁹⁵ There are three variants of PT, namely (a) theory testing PT that aims to test a theory; (b) theory-building PT that aims to build a theoretical explanation from empirical evidence of a case; and (c) explaining outcome PT that is a case-centric that attempts to provide an explanation of an outcome.⁹⁶ Strengths of PT method are it offers an

90 According to Yin, reliability refers to “the consistency and repeatability of the research procedures used in the case study.” Meanwhile, Gray explained validity as “the degree to which data in a research study are accurate and credible.” See Yin,240; Gray, 582.

91 Gray, 254-255

92 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, *Case studies and theory development in the Social sciences*, (Massachusetts: BCSIA Studies in International Security, Harvard University, 2005), 205-232

93 Yin describes five analytics techniques, namely (1) pattern matching, (2) explanation building, (3) time-series analysis, (4) logic models, and (5) cross-case synthesis. See Yin,142-168.

94 George and Bennett, 206

95 Nina Tannenwald, “Process Tracing and Security Studies,” *Security Studies*, 24:2 (2015), 221

96 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, “What is Process Tracing Actually Tracing? The Three Variants of Process Tracing Methods and Their Uses and Limitations,”

approach to examine causal change and also may be applicable for assessing causality where attribution is difficult.⁹⁷ Meanwhile, the challenges of this method are time intensive, theory-dependent, the need of empirical sources, and cognitive bias.⁹⁸

To be more specific, this study adapted explaining outcome PT. Due to research limitation, this research did not totally employ the explaining outcome PT. Still, adapting some parts of this method helped the researcher to reveal the specific issues within the case study under scrutiny, and to clarify the relation between those issues. Although this study did not aim at drawing conclusions beyond the case of the Indonesian military operations during the *Konfrontasi*, the results of this research might be useful for cross case studies with a higher ambition for generalisation. As the present research recognised the *Konfrontasi* as a multifaceted episode, explaining outcome PT could contribute in crafting a minimally sufficient explanation regarding the case study.⁹⁹ Although explaining outcome PT is knowingly as inductive approach, the present study combines the analysis with deductive approach by applying theory testing. In this sense, as PT is also knowingly as theory-guided method, several existing theories will be tested through the analytical framework. It is aimed at engaging with the previous research.

In employing the time series analysis technique, this study interpreted and developed arguments, which were based on chronological sequences. Yin explained that the complying of chronological events could cover wider

(Paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Seattle, WA, September 2011).

97 M Punton and K Welle, "Straws-in-the-wind, Hoops and Smoking Guns: What can Process Tracing Offer to Impact Evaluation?," CDI Practice Paper 10, (Brighton: IDS, 2015), 6

98 Punton and K Welle; Pascal Vennesson, "Case Study and Process Tracing: Theories and Practices," in *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective*, ed. Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 238-239.

99 David Waldner, "Process Tracing and Causal Mechanism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science*, ed. Harold Kincaid, (Oxford; Oxford University Press), 67

variables. As Yin pointed out “the chronology can be richer and more insightful than general time-series approaches.”¹⁰⁰

Referring to Figure 1-2 (p.20), the analysis began with discussing the input, which for this research focus on early setting of the *Konfrontasi* policy. The analysis then continued to examine the main actors and coalition during the *Konfrontasi* period. In key actors and coalitions block, the discussion covered the wider aspects that influenced the actors and coalitions, including the opportunities and motives of military involvement in politics.

Next step to analyse the main qualities of politicisation of the ABRI during the *Konfrontasi*. The scrutiny comprised the internal, namely: political strengths and weaknesses. As external environment also might influence military professionalism, the analysis included the role of non-military actors in shaping the military operation making. In this block, the analysis also encompassed the level of military influence and direction of politicisation.

Later, the effect of politicisation of the ABRI on its operations during the *Konfrontasi* was analysed. This part discovered the relationship between political behaviour of the ABRI and the implementation of *Dwikora* Operation. In this block, the discussion included the consequences of the politicisation of the ABRI post the *Dwikora* Operation at three levels: individual, organisational and national.

Validation of the research findings will be undertaken through triangulation method.¹⁰¹ To ensure the validity of the military archives, the research addressed the potential shortcomings by corroborating information across other relevant publications, interviews and primary data from other sources. The proposed triangulation model for this study was illustrated in Figure 1-4.

100 Yin, 154

101 According to Gray, triangulation is “the use of a variety of methods or data sources to examine a specific phenomenon either simultaneously or sequentially in order to improve the reliability of data.” Gray, 582




Figure 1-4 The *Dwikora* Operation: Triangulation to Validate Findings

Source: Author

Research Limitation

Moreover, this research was limited in the following ways: First, this research was limited by the availability of data gathered from the Pusjarah TNI and the Disjarahad. This study relied on TNI's archives during 1963-1967. However, these records might be incomplete¹⁰² and lack a standard format. The archives numbering system was different with other institution. Archives from the Pusjarah TNI did not apply any numbering system to record the archives.

Second, this research source was mainly military archives from the ABRI. It meant all of information on archives solely reflected military's view regarding the *Konfrontasi*. The distortion of evidence, inaccurate or falsified text might be ensued. This research recognised that the information from the archives is possibly subjective and bias.

¹⁰² Johnson and Reynolds explained researcher who relies his data on written records might face incompleteness problem. This is one of disadvantages of using records on research project. It might be caused by losses, internal record maker or keeper problems such as lack of awareness or responsibility of personnel to favour the records. Janet Buttolph Johnson and Henry T Reynolds, *Political Science Research Method*, 7th Edition, (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2012), 301-302.

Third, this research only focused on examining politicisation of the Indonesian military, which comprised three services, namely the Indonesian Army (*TNI Angkatan Darat/TNI AD*), the Indonesian Navy (*TNI Angkatan Laut/TNI AL*) and the Indonesian Air Force (*TNI Angkatan Udara/TNI AU*). Indeed, since 1962, government had restructured the ABRI) and attached the Ministry of Police to the ABRI. However, the position of the Police was not comparable to other services. Nasution admitted the Police as non-military element in the ABRI.¹⁰³ During the 1960s, the Police also was not seen as major player in shaping the political behaviour in the armed forces organisation.

Lastly, this study concerned the time frame of the case studies. This research examined case studies that occurred between 1963 and 1967. However, some related event before 1963 would also be covered just to enhance the description and analysis of military strategy. Meanwhile, this study used 1967 as the end of the time frame because until that time the ABRI was still publishing documents related to the *Konfrontasi*.

Given these limitations, this research acknowledged the restriction of data and scope in this study. However, to overcome problem of record system, this research used the title of records, place, and/or issuing date in referencing for the archives from the Pusjarah TNI. Meanwhile, in relation to avoid bias, falsification or inaccurate and incompleteness, this research also collected other primary sources such as memoirs, biography, archives from British National Archives, Historical Document and National Archives and Records Administrations (NARA) of the US; conducted interviews with witnesses and experts and also used secondary sources such as existing relevant publications, pamphlets and journal articles. Using other sources were also part of triangulation process.

103 Abdul Haris Nasution, "*Pidato Yang Mulia Menteri Inti Keamanan/Pertahanan Letnan Jenderal AH Nasution tentang Angkatan Perang pada 13 Januari 1960* [Speech of HE Minister for Security/Defence Lieut Gen AH Nasution about Armed Forces on 13 January 1960]," (Jakarta: Pusat Penerangan Angkatan Darat, 1960)

1.9 Structure of Thesis

This thesis consisted of six chapters. Chapter One set the context and background and also covers summary of case. The analytical framework that is employed in this study also is illustrated in this section. Chapter Two examined the existing key literatures relate to the case study. The discussion of extant literature is divided into two main parts. The first part reviewed key publications and seminal works regarding the *Konfrontasi* and the Indonesian politicised military theme. The second part discussed theories that will be divided into two main strands: politicised military and political behaviour in organisation. Thereafter, Chapter Three and Four addressed the case study. Chapter Three explained the broader setting of the *Konfrontasi* and the outset of the *Dwikora* Operation. This included the contextual background of Indonesian political-security landscape. Then, Chapter Four analysed the *Dwikora* Operation. The major influence of foreign countries, the US and United Kingdom (UK), during the *Konfrontasi* will not discuss in a separate section. As these countries had certain influence to many aspects, the analysis is provided throughout Chapter Three to Four. This thesis highlighted the US as an important feature because this country used to have good relationship with President Sukarno and ABRI. Meanwhile, UK is also essential because this country played a significant role and represented Indonesia's biggest opponent during the *Konfrontasi*. Chapter Five analysed the failure of the *Dwikora* Operation. Finally, Chapter Six covered the overall conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations for future research.

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2 LITERATURE REVIEW: EXAMINING THE POLITICAL ASPECT IN MILITARY ORGANISATION

2.1 Introduction

The existence of national armed forces is primarily to confront external threats. However, for the new nation,¹⁰⁴ military often expands its roles. Stepan explained military in the new state also as an integral part of a political system. In other words, military plays significant roles in some civilian areas. He posited “military institution which may emphasise such features as military unity or national orientation often conceal more than they reveal about the interactions between the military and the political system.”¹⁰⁵

The problem laid regarding politicisation of the military during crisis, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Section 1.2. Ideally, once a government has decided to use force, policy implementation will be left to the military. However, the contextual problem still remains. As Betts argued, “the problem is not only that the boundaries between policy, strategy, and the tactics are rarely clear but civilian leaders may insist on the right to control operations because of their political implication.”¹⁰⁶ At the same time, factions within the military also led the problem to be more complicated. In this regard, the politicisation of the military, both caused by internal and external factor of the military, gave significant impact to the implementation of military operation.

104 Janowitz categorised new nations “include countries of Africa and Asia which have achieved independence or have been swept into the process of modernisation in the end of the World War II.” Janowitz, *The military*, v; Some publications use different terms but have same meaning with new nation such as “third world” (Kelleher, 1974), “developing countries” (Stepan, 1971) and “under-developed countries” (Johnson, 1962). This study acknowledges all terms above have the same meaning. See Kelleher, *Political-Military Systems*; Stepan, *The Military*; Johnson, *The Role of the Military*.

105 Stepan, 7

106 Betts, 13

This chapter examined the key literature and seminal works and discusses the analytical framework employed in the research. In particular, this part assessed the concept of politicisation of the military and political behaviour in an organisation. In addition, the purposes of this chapter are to achieve two enabling objectives (p.14), namely to: (a) critically review the key literature and seminal works regarding the *Konfrontasi* and Indonesian politicised military theme; and (b) evaluate the concept of politicisation of the military and political behaviour in organisations.

In doing so, this chapter is divided into five sections. The first section provided introduction of the chapter. The second section reviewed the existing literature related to the case study. This section is divided into two clusters: the *Konfrontasi* and Indonesian politicised military theme. The third section discussed the evaluation of the relevant theories. This theoretical review is separated into two main strands. The first subsection discussed various theories on politicised military especially in new nations. Then the discussion of theories on political behaviour in organisation is presented in the second subsection. Based on these theoretical reviews, the fourth section explained the research gap. A summary concluded this chapter.

2.2 Reviewing the Context

This section focused on reviewing the extant literature relating to the case study. In this regard, the literature is categorised in two themes: the *Konfrontasi* and Indonesian politicised military theme. By examining the relevant seminal works, this section provided a context for the present research and places it in the existing body of knowledge.

2.2.1 The *Konfrontasi* Theme

Studies on *Konfrontasi* have been viewed from many perspectives. The most comprehensive literature on this event is JAC Mackie's research entitled *Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966*. This book

covered the tensions between both countries during the *Konfrontasi*, explaining how and why the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia emerged. He contends, during the *Konfrontasi*, there was a complex relationship between President Sukarno, PKI, and the army in relation to domestic politics. Meanwhile, the rest of the political parties had less influence due to poor performance during earlier period of parliamentary democracy.¹⁰⁷

Overall, this book provided a broad picture and context of Indonesia and international fora. Mackie argued that since the beginning, Sukarno was not seriously delivering the policy of *Konfrontasi*. Sukarno became more aggressive toward the western bloc after the US cut its aid to Indonesia. However, while mentioning aspects of the Indonesian military, Mackie did not provide detailed explanation of the military operation.

Although the *Konfrontasi* was executed during the same decolonialisation period, it was not clearly defined when it started in 1963.¹⁰⁸ Greg Poulgrain explained that the hostilities between Indonesia and Britain began at the end of World War II when Britain had tried to reclaim some Indonesian territories on behalf of the Netherlands. Then this was followed by a trade war during 1950.¹⁰⁹ Worse, Britain was involved in the 1958 Sumatra Revolt. On 15 February 1958, some military commanders and civilian politicians announced the PRRI based in Padang, West Sumatra. This movement was aimed to overthrow Sukarno administration.¹¹⁰ Regarding this event, this book provided some details of how Britain and the US supported the Sumatra Revolt that created tension in the Indonesia-UK relationship. More specifically, this book portrays the connection between Indonesian officials and the leader of the Brunei revolt, Azahari, and also how Indonesia supported the revolt. Despite demonstrating the rivalry between the army and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the

107 Mackie, *Konfrontasi*, 81

108 Poulgrain, 3-5

109 Poulgrain, 7-12

110 Further explanation see Poulgrain, 169-185

book failed to address military involvement during the Brunei revolt.

In the area of strategic studies, most researchers have applied British perspective. Van der Bijl, for instance, explained *Konfrontasi* as “the diametrically opposed differences between conservative traditionalism and liberal thought and cultural expression.”¹¹¹ However, he posited President Sukarno engaged in *Konfrontasi* as part of an effort to achieve his political goals. He argued, “Sukarno believed that political success could be achieved through diplomatic lobbying accompanied by economic-military threats.”¹¹²

This book described how the British applied a ‘carrot and stick’ policy to respond to the *Konfrontasi* by using Claret operation. The operation was to boost Malaysia’s position during the negotiation process with Indonesia.¹¹³ The absence of any journalists to cover this conflict allowed the British to conduct one of the largest clandestine operations in the history of military operations.¹¹⁴ Generally, the success of this military operation was caused by a joint political and military response. However, this study outlined two success factors of the British operation. As an internal factor, British troops were highly experienced in a jungle setting and had recently defeated communist guerrillas in the Malayan emergency. On the other hand, Indonesia had also failed to predict the capability of British troops.¹¹⁵ However, this book was absence to give details on Indonesian military strategy and operations during the *Konfrontasi*. This book merely focuses on Britain and its allies’ responses. Where, Van der Bijl’s work is relevant for this research is in the provision of essential information. He clearly provided inside comments about Major General Suharto over the *Konfrontasi* policy that Sukarno had run a fatal course.¹¹⁶ This book also indicated the Indonesian army during that time was supported by CIA and

111 Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 16

112 Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 16

113 Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 208

114 Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 244

115 Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 243

116 Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 231

British intelligence.¹¹⁷

Regarding the Claret Operation, Raffi Gregorian explained this operation was a “part of a new British strategy designed to stop Indonesian incursion by forcing them onto defensive.”¹¹⁸ Parallel with Van der Bijl, Gregorian also mentioned that the success of Claret Operation was affected by the British government policy to keep its operation secret. Nevertheless, this study recognised that this operation was not the mere factor that led *Konfrontasi* to end. Political dynamics within Indonesia also influenced de-escalation. Gregorian elaborated that even Claret Operation was a military matter, “the decision to authorise cross border raid was made at the highest level of the British Government.”¹¹⁹

Similarly, James and Shell-Small also examined the *Konfrontasi* from the British side. They argued Britain was successfully gathering local support during the *Konfrontasi*.¹²⁰ They added the British won the war because “security forces had advantage of major military base in the right place (Singapore), had complete command of the sea and air and had superb intelligence service.”¹²¹ Meanwhile, Indonesia lost because the *Konfrontasi* ruined stability and the economy,¹²² and failed to gain full support from local people in Kalimantan.¹²³ However, this book failed to explain the *Konfrontasi* from both sides comprehensively. This research only covered the conflict intensity in Kalimantan Island. None of the chapters explained the infiltrations in Singapore and the western part of Malaysia through the Malacca Strait that were done by the ABRI.

117 Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 18-19; However, Bijl failed to elaborate further how CIA and British intelligence agency encouraged the Indonesian Army.

118 Gregorian, 53

119 Gregorian, 63

120 James and Shell-Small, 71.

121 James and Shell-Small, 193.

122 James and Shell-Small, 193.

123 James and Shell-Small, 71.

In support of James and Shell-Small, Jackson claimed British operations during the *Konfrontasi* were the most spectacular success of the military campaign.¹²⁴ Jackson denoted Indonesia was also supporting the Brunei Revolt, December 1962.¹²⁵ This book also explained the political influence of British campaign in preserving the independence of Malaysia and preventing the spread of communism into Indonesia.¹²⁶ This book covered air and land war during the *Konfrontasi*. Jackson highlights that the political event during the *Konfrontasi* affected the on-going conflict. He noted that during the military stage of the second half of 1965 it was dominated by political events, including Singapore split, and Jakarta coup.¹²⁷ Those events, to some extent, influenced the military campaign from both sides.

Furthermore, British scholar, David Easter examined British policy and strategy in the *Konfrontasi*. This study elucidated the dynamic relationship between Britain and its allies during the *Konfrontasi* including the ambivalence of the US position toward the *Konfrontasi*. The US was worried that Indonesia would become closer to communism.¹²⁸ Easter explained Britain's reason behind the Malaysia federation was to manage global power with cheaper cost.¹²⁹ This book also indicated the involvement of British intelligence in rebel movements in Indonesia.¹³⁰ This action was an effort to dissipate Indonesian forces' focus in the *Konfrontasi* and also in order to weaken the Indonesian government. This support, however, was not aimed at dismembering Indonesia. Easter believed neither Indonesia nor Britain were keen to intensify the *Konfrontasi*. Neither party wanted to escalate the conflict into open war.¹³¹ However, he argued the

124 Jackson, 139

125 Jackson, 121

126 Jackson, 140

127 Jackson, 139

128 Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation*, 67.

129 Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation*, 5.

130 Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation*, 94-97. For detail explanation also read David Easter, "British and Malaysian Covert support for rebel movements in Indonesia during the 'Confrontation' 1963-66," *Intelligence and National Security*, 14, 4 (1999): 195-208.

131 Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation*, 100-135.

successful British operation in the *Konfrontasi* was not solely due to the factor of using a military approach. There were some critical factors such as propaganda through international media,¹³² and also political instability in Indonesia that had affected the success of the British operation.

Meanwhile, Christopher Tuck offered different arguments towards the British approach to the *Konfrontasi* policy. He examined the British counter insurgency campaign from two aspects: 1) tactical level means and method, and also 2) operational level command and control. In this study, he identified three strategic problems over this campaign, as follows: *prolongation*, *negotiation*, and *escalation*.¹³³ He argued that the *Konfrontasi* has created "Indonesia circumstances conducive both the growth of communist influence and Indonesia's progressive alienation from the west."¹³⁴ By using concept of war termination and British point of view as main focus, the main argument of this study is that the "British strategy was neither an exemplary exercise in strategy nor was it fundamentally flawed."¹³⁵ Tuck denoted British misjudgement occurred because, in the beginning, it never predicted that Indonesia would use hard power to stop the creation of the Malaysia federation. Britain assumed that by supporting Indonesia's position towards the *Konfrontasi* against the Dutch would prevent the tension over the plan.¹³⁶ However, the dynamics of Indonesian domestic political events shaped British strategy making. British policymakers influenced the government to terminate the conflict.¹³⁷ Although, the political and budget constraint put the British government in a dilemma, as they should withdraw troops from the Southeast Asia region. On one hand, Britain tried to terminate the conflict without losing face. On the other hand,

132 For detail explanation on propaganda read David Easter, "British Intelligence and Propaganda during the 'Confrontation' 1963-1966," *Intelligence and National Security*, 16, 2 (2001): 83-102.

133 Christopher Tuck, "Borneo 1963-66: Counter-insurgency Operations and War Termination," *Small Wars and Insurgencies Journal*, 15, 3 (2004): 89-111.

134 Tuck, *Confrontation*, 6.

135 Tuck, *Confrontation*, 6.

136 Tuck, *Confrontation*, 22-23.

137 For detail explanation, see Tuck, *Confrontation*, 105-149.

British policymaker avoided any solution that might give advantage to Indonesia especially President Sukarno.¹³⁸

Further, Brian Farrel gave greater attention to how the British military and its allies responded to Indonesian President Soekarno's policy of Crush Malaysia.¹³⁹ According to Farrel, there are some complexities that had fashioned the *Konfrontasi*. As he argued:

The volatile political and economic situation in Indonesia, the articulation of broad geostrategic objectives for Indonesia and the region, the sense of Indonesia as the leader of a bloc of Non-Aligned New Emerging Forces having an example to set, the usefulness of Confrontation to different interests in domestic politics, the tendency to see Confrontation as the most appropriate trajectory for Indonesia's foreign policy in general-these things plus the problem of losing face all made the choice after 16 September appear to Indonesian leader as one between surrender or escalation.¹⁴⁰

This subsection has already highlighted military operation during the *Konfrontasi* from the western perspective. This is another aspect of this low intensity conflict that has not had sufficient analysis. Most of the previous publications fail to elaborate the uprising and infiltration in Singapore during that time. The consequences of the incidents that were organised by Indonesian infiltrators resulted in 130 people killed and wounded.¹⁴¹ In addition, the worst explosion was at MacDonald House that caused two deaths and thirty-three

138 Tuck, *Confrontation*, 230.

139 See Brian P Farrell, "Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation (1962-1966)," in *The Encyclopaedia of War*, ed. Gordon Martel, (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2012); Brian P Farrell, "Escalate to Terminate: Far East Command and the Need to End Confrontation," in *Entangling Alliances: Coalition Warfare in the Twentieth Century*, ed. P Dennis and J Grey, (Canberra: Australian Military History Publishing, 2005); Brian P Farrell, "What Do They Want and How Can We Respond? Commonwealth Intelligence and Confrontation with Indonesia 1963," in *Imponderable But Not Inevitable; Warfare in the 20th Century*, ed. Malcolm H Murfett, (California: ABC-CLIO, 2009)

140 Farrell, *What Do They*, 101

141 Robert Anthony Hall, Andrew Ross and Derrill De Heer, *Comparative Study: Combat operations in North Borneo (Indonesian Confrontation) and 1ATF in Vietnam*, (Canberra: Defence Science and Technology Organisation, 2012).

were injured.¹⁴² This incident also led to two Indonesian Marines being hanged three years later, which heightened the tension between Indonesia and Singapore for several years. As a part of the *Konfrontasi* narrative, the sabotage cases in West Malaysia and Singapore, of course, is too important to be ignored in examining the *Konfrontasi*. These were part of the ABRI operations.

As the *Konfrontasi* is multifaceted, there are several seminal works that have been written in the area of political science and international relation. Those works covered the Indonesian motives,¹⁴³ Indonesian foreign policy,¹⁴⁴ peace process post the G30S affair,¹⁴⁵ Malayan leaders efforts,¹⁴⁶ the role of the PKI toward the *Konfrontasi*,¹⁴⁷ the diplomacy of Britain and its allies,¹⁴⁸ and the dynamics of Indonesia-Malaysia relations.¹⁴⁹ Beyond state level, the *Konfrontasi* may be concluded, according to the literature, the great powers – US, Soviet Union and China – also coloured the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute. As the *Konfrontasi* happened during the Cold War, major powers attempted to maintain their grip and influence in the region. Thus, the *Konfrontasi* was a sort

142 Straits Times Staff, "Terror Bomb Kills 2 Girls at Bank," *The Straits Times*, (March 11, 1965), accessed December 2, 2015, <http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19650311.2.3.aspx>

143 Bernard K Gordon, "The Potential for Indonesian Expansionism," *Pacific Affairs*, 36, 4 (Winter, 1963-1964): 378-393; Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives," *Asian Survey*, 4, 6 (June 1964): 904-913.

144 J Soedjati Djwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited: Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Soekarno*, (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996);

145 Weinstein, *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation*.

146 Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, *Konfrontasi Malaysia Indonesia* [The Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation]. (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2000).

147 Pluvier, *Confrontations*; John O Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi: "Crush Malaysia" and the Gestapu," *Asian Survey*, 6, 10 (October 1966): 523-546.

148 John Subritzky, *Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-5*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Matthew Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South-East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United States and the Creation of Malaysia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002).

149 George McTurnan Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, 37, 3 (Autumn 1964): 253-270; Arnold C Brackman, *Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966); Douglas Hyde, *Confrontation in the East*, (London: Bodley Head, 1965).

of ideological battle between the East and the West. Although, those studies did not discuss the *Dwikora* Operation in detail, they still provided insights of how the Indonesian Army and the PKI exercised their political influence to President Sukarno over the *Konfrontasi* policy.

In particular, Hidayat Mukmin examined the involvement of the ABRI in foreign affairs in order to end the *Konfrontasi*.¹⁵⁰ He argued the ABRI involvement should be interpreted as the form of military participation in the foreign policy matters. The involvement, he added, is a common feature as the ABRI was also involved in domestic politics.¹⁵¹ Even though, Mukmin's work did not examine the *Dwikora* Operation, it still strengthened the assumption that there was a disunity of command during the Operation.¹⁵² This study explained in detail how the peace feelers¹⁵³ from the ABRI conducted their covert operation and denied any civilians acted as peace feelers. Mukmin also agreed that the G30S affair boosted the peace effort.

Written documents about Indonesia's military operations are mostly found in the biographies of former military officers. Only three publications, published by *the* Pusjarah TNI, examined the *Dwikora* Operation.¹⁵⁴ These works described how the *Dwikora* Operation was conducted. These publications divided the military operation based on a time basis: 1963-1964 (preliminary), 1964-1965 (preparation), and 1965-1966 (execution and termination). The establishment

150 Hidayat Mukmin, *TNI dalam Politik Luar Negeri: Studi Kasus Penyelesaian Konfrontasi Indonesia-Malaysia* [The TNI in Foreign Policy: Case Study the Settlement to the Indonesian-Malaysian Konfrontasi], (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1991).

151 Mukmin, 18-19

152 At least there were two civilians elite acted as peace feelers prior to the G30S affair, namely Trade Minister Adam Malik and Deputy Prime Minister Chairul Saleh.

153 Term of 'peace feelers' refers to the term that was employed in the official British archives.

154 See K. Hadiningrat, *Sedjarah Operasi-Operasi Gabungan dalam Rangka Dwikora* [The History of Joint Operations in *Dwikora* Context], (Jakarta: Pusat Sedjarah ABRI, 1971); Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*; G Ambar Wulan (ed), *Operasi Dwikora, 1962-1966* [The *Dwikora* Operation, 1962-1966], (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 2014). Even though, the latest publication does not state as revised edition, but the content is almost completely similar with the 2005 publication. It contained many nearly identical passages.

and the deployment of volunteers also were explained in detail. Both Hadiningrat and Pusjarah TNI argued that the *Konfrontasi* policy was solely influenced by PKI that considered the creation of Malaysia federation as a threat. However, these arguments failed to analyse how military operations were carried out in the context of a successful operation. These studies also did not elaborate on clear military objectives and goals and also ignored any sabotage cases in the western Malaysia.

2.2.2 Indonesian Politicised Military Theme

Several scholars have examined Indonesian politicised military during Sukarno period. The existing literature assessed this topic from various lenses such as military intervention, civil-military relation, and military culture. Even though there were some disagreement and differences, these publications tended to have commonality that politicising the ABRI occurred because of complex circumstances.

Peter Britton, for instance, examined professionalism and its linkage to the root of Indonesian military ideology.¹⁵⁵ There are many factors that shaped the ABRI professionalism. Since the birth of ABRI in 1945, local culture and “foreign values”¹⁵⁶ have affected ABRI’s ideology and professionalism. The main local culture that fashioned ABRI’s ideology and professionalism is the Java culture. Since the birth of ABRI, more than half of the troops came from Java.¹⁵⁷ Military leaders exploited myth, legend stories, and Java’s hero values to increase the spirit and morale of the soldiers.¹⁵⁸

155 Peter Britton, *Profesionalisme dan Ideologi Militer Indonesia: Perspektif Tradisi-Tradisi Jawa dan Barat* [Professionalism and Indonesian Military Ideology: Java and Western Cultural Perspectives], (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1996)

156 Term of foreign values is to explain the value that comes from foreign country and not originally from within Indonesia.

157 Britton, *Profesionalisme*, 38

158 Some of values and stories were taken from Java’s puppet stories. These stories were originated from *Bhawad Gita*, part of Baratayudha epic, war among brothers Pandawa and Kurawa. This story also has similarity with India’s culture. Britton, *Profesionalisme*, 11-51

Britton identified three countries that also influenced professionalism and ABRI's ideology as follows: Japan, Holland, and the US. Both Japan and the Dutch were spreading their "values" through the establishment of troops during their colonialism era in Indonesia. During colonialism in Indonesia, Japan established PETA. Japan recruited and trained local people to be soldier. The main task was to defend "homeland". Japan created PETA as part of territorial defence strategy. Beside physical training, Japan also indoctrinated PETA with *Bushido* value. While during her colonialism, Dutch established *Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger* (KNIL/Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) in Indonesia. During that time, KNIL has applied military professionalism that differentiated civilian and military power.¹⁵⁹ Meanwhile, the US value was dispersed through military aid (1955-1965). The US was helped the ABRI through military assistance program (USMAP). This program included training and education.¹⁶⁰

However, the difference of training background (PETA and KNIL) has created unhealthy rivalry within the ABRI since its birth in 1945. This triggered factions and grouping within the ABRI. Moreover, Indonesian political system also shaped ABRI's professionalism and ideology. Political turbulence during 1945-1965 forced the ABRI to involve actively in politics. During this period, the ABRI initiated "functional group" that gave the opportunity for military to play a more active role in Indonesian politics.

Another scholar, Ulf Sundhaussen, examined Indonesian military politics more comprehensively. This study covered many issues including civil-military relations, military autonomy, military intervention, and politicisation of the military – both from civilian and inside the ranks of the military itself. Sundhaussen argued that factions within ABRI – besides KNIL and PETA

159 Britton, *Profesionalisme*, 37-45.

160 Britton, *Profesionalisme*, 75-120. For detail explanation about this cooperation read Rudolf Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945-1965. A Study of an Intervention*, (Prague: Oriental Institute in Academia, Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1978).

factions – also are caused by ethnicity. As he explained “ethnic composition from officer corps has caused more problems if officers from Java were distributed to hold senior positions across Indonesia and especially in the ABRI headquarter.”¹⁶¹

There were many elements that initiated military intervention in the Indonesian case. Sundhaussen divided these elements into two groups, internal and external. On internal factors, he indicated three interests had boosted military intervention: 1) class interest, 2) individual interest, and 3) corporate interest. Meanwhile, he also added the failure of the political system created the opportunity for the military to intervene politics. To make it worse, civilians were later involved on military matters.¹⁶²

Harold Crouch denoted the ABRI has never limited itself to a specific role as Indonesian defence force.¹⁶³ The ABRI already had a political culture since its birth. He added the boundary between military and political function during colonialism was unclear. Indonesian youths who joined the military were not intended to chase higher career but more on patriotic motive.¹⁶⁴ Parallel to Sundhaussen, Crouch also highlighted the impact of culture to the rivalry within corps, which also occurred during the *Dwikora* Operation.¹⁶⁵ Prior to the G30S affair, the military did not seem to dominate national politics. Consequently, the increasing political role of the military has undermined hierarchy. Faction and rivalry amongst services have made the ABRI structure uncertain.

Indonesian military scholar Salim Said also agreed that military involvement in politics has emerged since revolution period.¹⁶⁶ More specifically, he noted that

161 Sundhaussen, *Politik Militer*, 25.

162 President Sukarno named some generals to fill key posts and then raised controversy within the Indonesian armed forces. A more comprehensive and detailed on politicisation of military will be included in Chapter Three and Four.

163 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 21.

164 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 22.

165 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 75-81

166 Salim Said is an Indonesian scholar who has expertise on military politics. He has published several books and articles regarding this topic.

the ABRI “was not created by the government, or by a political party, neither by the colonial administration.”¹⁶⁷ Since the ABRI was a self-created military,¹⁶⁸ it has grown as a more autonomous and independent institution. As Said argued, “this self-created military drew its members from various organisations, some of them highly politicised, around the days of the proclamation of independence.”¹⁶⁹ He added “the emergence of a politicised military was the result of the reluctance of the government to create a defence force in the early days following the declaration of independence.”¹⁷⁰

One of the main arguments of Salim’s book is civil-military relations in Indonesia can be elucidated by two factors “the involvement in politics of the Indonesian military since its inception and the weakness of civilian institutions.”¹⁷¹ Furthermore, as a result of incapable civilians in handling politics, the military expanded its role – exercising non-military skill. This argument is supported since Nasution introduced the “middle way” concept in November 1958.¹⁷² Even though prior to this year, military officers had occupied some civilian posts. For Said, western theories of civil military relations could not completely explain the Indonesian case. There was a lack of alternative idea or concept from civilians to challenge military rule in Indonesia during that time. He tended to agree with the former Indonesian Minister of Defence Juwono Sudarsono's statement “the only group that can run Indonesia is ABRI.”¹⁷³

167 Said, *Soeharto's Armed Forces*, 36-37

168 Maynard described self-created of the ABRI because “it develop as a spontaneous institution without political guidance”. However, other Indonesian scholar, Nugroho Notosusanto rejects the argument of self-created over the emerging of the ABRI. He argued, “On October 5th, 1945, the government created an official army called the People's Security Army”. Notosusanto was also widely known as an author of some official TNI history books. See Harold Maynard, “Indonesian Military Elite Role Perceptions,” in *The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader*, ed. Amos Perlmutter and VP Bennett, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), 429; Notosusanto, 41

169 Said, *Soeharto's Armed Forces*, 37

170 Said, *Soeharto's Armed Forces*, 61

171 Said, *Soeharto's Armed Forces*, 1-2

172 See also Said, *Soeharto's Armed Forces*, 15-24; Said, *Legitimizing Military Rule*, 9-

173 Said, *Soeharto's Armed Forces*, 25

2.3 Politics and the Military: A Review

This section provided an evaluation of the key literature and debates regarding political aspect in the military that are relevant to the present research. It is started by looking at the essential works on politicised military, starting with the concept of military professionalism, and followed by a discussion of the concept of military involvement in politics. It is then proceed to discuss the scholarly debates on political behaviour in organisations. The discussion started with the concept of power and ends by examining political behaviour in organisation discourse.

2.3.1 Politicised Military

To understand the substantial matters of politicisation of the military, it is important to understand basic features, types, political strength and weakness of the armed forces. Elaborating some essential descriptions of military organisation will provide comprehensive discussion of politicised military literatures. As one of the most organised institution in a country, the military is not alienated from politics. As Stepan argued, “political variables are frequently far more important for determining the role of the military in society than the absolute size of the armed forces.”¹⁷⁴ However, the phenomenon of military involvement in political affairs does not occur only in new emerging states. Professional military¹⁷⁵ in democratic countries also has a certain degree of influence in politics. Önder added, “even in developed countries, although the military is restricted to national defence and obedient to the civil authority, it still has significant influence on the governmental policies.”¹⁷⁶

174 Stepan, 26

175 Term of “professional” refers to a profession that compels certain skill and training. Perlmutter posited professionalism of military could be measured by the conduct method, character, status and standard of its practitioners. Further explanations see Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), 1

176 Murat Önder, “What Accounts For Military Interventions in Politics: A Cross-National Comparison,” E-Akademi, last modified August 20, 2010, accessed August 10, 2015, <http://www.e->

Regarding military professionalism, many scholars engaged in this field.¹⁷⁷ However, the two classic and influential works remain Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* and Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier*. Generally, scholars have acknowledged two types of military organisation, namely professional and praetorian military.¹⁷⁸ Huntington argued that professionalism in military is to highlight the differences between the old and modern soldier. He posited three characteristics of professional military, namely *expertise* that refers to certain skill and knowledge; *responsibility* that denotes to its clients i.e society; and *corporateness* that acknowledges group consciousness and professional competences.¹⁷⁹ Alternatively, Janowitz argued that that a professional organisation had a special skill, a system of internal administration and a sense of group identity.¹⁸⁰ As the military can generate special environment and influence decision making process, Janowitz argued that the military professional should be expert in war-making and in organising the using of violence.¹⁸¹

Moreover, Perlmutter explained, the concept of military professionalism is not a monolithic phenomenon. In many countries, professionalism will be varied and

akademi.org/incele.asp?konu=WHAT%20ACCOUNTS%20FOR%20MILITARY%20INTERVENTIONS%20IN%20POLITICS:%20A%20CROSS-NATIONAL%20COMPARISON&kimlik=1285708304&url=makaleler/monder-1.htm

177 See for instance Huntington, *The Soldier*; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960); Eric A Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, (Englewood. Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Perlmutter, *The Military*; Perlmutter and Bennett, *The Political Influence*; and RC Barnes Jr, *Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium*, (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1996).

178 Most extant publications prefer to use praetorian army rather than praetorian military. See for instance Nordlinger, *Soldiers*; Perlmutter, *The Military*; Perlmutter and Bennett (eds), *The Political Influence*. These literatures employ term of "army" to describe the military or the officer corps as a whole. Meanwhile, Barnes Jr employs term of "diplomat warrior" to describe a political soldier.

179 Detail explanations on three characters of professional military see Huntington, *The Soldier*, 7-18.

180 Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 5-6.

181 Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 15

affected by cultures, values, norms and the 'home' environment. He proposed two key variables of military professionalism: 'control' means military is controlled by internal colleague group and the hierarchy of authority; and 'skill' that is closely linked to bravery, discipline, management and strategy. He added, "the development of the modern military professional is clearly a modern bureaucratic phenomenon."¹⁸² In contrast, praetorian military is described as a situation when the military class exercises autonomous power by virtue of a tangible or threatened use of force.¹⁸³ Perlmutter pointed out that military praetorianism happened in agrarian, transitional or ideologically divided societies that military intended to change the constitution and political order.¹⁸⁴ As Nordlinger argued, intervention occurs when officers "threaten or use force in order to enter or dominate the political arena."¹⁸⁵

In the wider context of military involvement in politics, both professional and praetorian soldier exercised its influence. Pion-Berlin pointed out, not only praetorian military but also professional military has political dimension to the military behaviour.¹⁸⁶ Nordlinger stressed, "the armed forces of all countries exert considerable political influence."¹⁸⁷ So far, focusing on military features, both professional and military praetorianism may have many commonalities. There are five common military descriptions, namely (a) centralised command, (b) hierarchy, (c) discipline, (d) intercommunication, (e) *esprit de corps* and a corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency.¹⁸⁸ Finer recognised these features as one of the political strengths of the military. Besides superiority in organisation, two other assets of military are symbolic status of a

182 Perlmutter, *The Military*, 11.

183 See Perlmutter, *The Military*, 89; Nordlinger, *Soldiers*, 2

184 Nordlinger, 12.

185 Nordlinger, 3

186 Pion-Berlin, "Military Autonomy," 84

187 Nordlinger, 3.

188 Samuel E Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*; with a new introduction by Jay Stanley, (New Brunswick and London:Transactions Publisher, 2006), 7.

country, and monopoly of use weapons.¹⁸⁹ As Harries-Jenkins added, “their (soldiers) claim to a monopoly of arms gives them a special status which enables them to symbolise, as well as make effective, distinctive of the state.”¹⁹⁰ Meanwhile, the political weaknesses of military over civilian institution in a country are shortfall of technical ability regarding wider governmental issues such as economics, public health, and finance; and lack of legitimacy that refers to right to govern.¹⁹¹

Military involvement in politics is occurred in many forms. It is a broad theme with numerous associated theories. Scholars examined this phenomenon with various lenses and definitions. For instance, Finer employed term of military intervention to explain the military involvement in politics as “armed forces constrained substitution of their own policies and/or their persons for those of the recognised civil authorities.”¹⁹² Another example, Lasswell developed term of “garrison state”. He defined garrison state as “the power elites value power enough to resort to large-scale coercion when they regard such coercive strategies as useful to the maintenance of their ascendancy and the elites accept the expectation that the retention of power during at least the immediate and middle-range future depends upon capability and willingness to coerce external or internal challengers.”¹⁹³ Likewise, Stepan used the term of “military prerogative”. From his point of view, military assumed rights and privileges. The privileges included occupy civilian post, control military education and defence sector, and dominate intelligence, judiciaries and police.¹⁹⁴ When analysing military domination in political arena, some scholars applied different lexicon,

189 Further explanations see Finer, 6-13.

190 Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, “Legitimacy and the Problem of Order,” in *The Military and the Problems of Legitimacy*, ed. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Jacques Van Doorn, (London: Sage Studies in International Sociology, 1976), 41.

191 Finer, 14-22.

192 Finer, 23

193 Harold D Lasswell, “The Garrison State Hypothesis Today,” in *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, ed. Samuel P Huntington, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1962), 53

194 Stepan (1988) quoted in David Pion-Berlin, “Latin American Civil-Military Relations: What Progress Has Been Made?,” in *Debating Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*, ed. DR Mares and R Martinez, (Eastbourne, Chicago and Ontario: Sussex Academic Press, 2014), 65.

even though the definition is quite similar. Koonings and Kruijt employed term of “political armies”.¹⁹⁵ Meanwhile Martinez used “military control of political power.”¹⁹⁶ In addition, Betts preferred to use the term of “military influence” to describe military participation in civilian sphere. He advanced influence as “causing decision makers to do something they probably would not have done otherwise.”¹⁹⁷

Generally speaking, there are two factors that provide opportunity for the military to get involved in politics. First is internal factor, which includes military leadership, factions, its political cohesiveness and commitment¹⁹⁸ and the raising of military reputation¹⁹⁹. Second is external factor that includes strength of authority to be replaced, opposition groups, ineffective institution and social control, inadequate social cohesion, ineffective political parties,²⁰⁰ civilian dependency on the military, and domestic circumstances.²⁰¹ This situation denoted that there are some conditions when the military could intervene in politics. Finer pointed out five conditions of military intervention: (a) the rising of nationalism and of the nation-state, (b) substitution of popular sovereignty, (c) the insurrectionary army, (d) professionalisation of officer corps and (e) the emergence of new states.²⁰²

Furthermore, the phenomenon of military involvement in politics often becomes characteristic in a new state. Howard asserted “the scope of the military interest expanded enormously: expanded both in span of time, now that years of

195 Political armies defined as “military institution that considers involvement in - or control over - domestic politics and the business of government to be a central part of their legitimate function.” Koonings and Kruijt, *Political Armies*, 1.

196 Martinez describes military control of political power as “the armed forces simply dominate the whole state apparatus.” R Martinez, “Objectives for Democratic Consolidation in the Armed Forces,” in *Debating Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*, ed. DR Mares and R Martinez, (Eastbourne, Chicago and Ontario: Sussex Academic Press, 2014), 32

197 Betts, 5.

198 Perlmutter and Bennett, *The Political*, 17

199 Finer, 80-83

200 Perlmutter and Bennett, *The Political*, 17, 203-205

201 Finer, 72-80

202 Finer, 207-210.

preparation were necessary if one was to avoid defeat in as many weeks, and also laterally through society, leaving virtually no aspect of national life in which the military leaders might not be legitimately concerned.”²⁰³ When the state does not have a high degree of political system and cultural maturity and technological advancement, military officers could easily seize power from civilians and gain benefits from the power.²⁰⁴ In particular, modernisation and technological innovation have shaped the military in underdeveloped countries to become modern-type organisation. As Pye posited “the more politically conscious officers can hardly avoid being aware of the need for substantial changes in their own societies.”²⁰⁵

Consequently, modern military possibly would occupy any positions in other organisations, which operate within the society.²⁰⁶ Furthermore, the phenomenon of military involvement in politics often becomes common feature in a new state can be illustrated in three reasons, as follows: (1) in search of legitimacy; (2) lack of the material precondition for development of civilian consensus; and (3) some suffer from the handicap of granting independence at the hand of military. Thus, civilian domains in a new state are vulnerable to military immersion.²⁰⁷

203 M Howard, “Introduction: The Armed Forces as a Political Problem,” in *Soldier and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations*, ed. M Howard, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957), 19.

204 Samuel P Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relation,” in *Civil-Military. Relations and Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond, and MF Plattner, (Baltimore and London: The John. Hopkins University Press, 1996), 10.

205 Lucian W Pye, “Armies in the Process of Political Modernization,” in *The Role of the Military Under-developed Countries*, ed. JJ Johnson, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 78

206 Pye, 76-78; the term of modern military in the present research is defined as a professional corps that applies hierarchical relations, has war-oriented in mission and different structure from civilian. The present research recognises there is a discourse over modern and postmodern military and its practical implication. However, the research does not aim to engage further in the dialogue. The debate over modern versus postmodern military can be seen, for instance, Charles C Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R Segal (eds), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Gerhard Kümmel, “The Military and Its Civilian Environment: Reflexions on a Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” *Connections* 1, No 4 (2002): 63-82.

207 Finer, 223-231

In addition, military involvement in politics in new states derived from various motives. Finer distinguished two categories of motive: inhibiting and disposing the military to engage in politics. He stressed that three factors constrain the military to intervene, namely professionalism and its consequences, principle of supremacy and other factors such as military leadership and perception of “threats.”²⁰⁸ Within this context, Finer asserted the concept of military professionalism as described by Huntington and admits military subordination to civilian power. In addition, Finer elaborated four disposing motives for military intervention.²⁰⁹ Firstly, the manifest destiny of the soldier. It referred to soldiers’ belief that they are saviours of the country. Secondly, factor of national interest that military saw the intervention as an action to uphold national interest. For Edmonds, term of “national interest” is ambiguous. National interest may be clearly written in a constitution. But, both civilian group and military possibly have different interpretation or perception of national interest.²¹⁰ Thirdly, the sectional interest included class, regional, corporate and individual self-interest that drives military to interfere into civilian sphere. Fourthly, combination of those motives above that led military to expand its influence. In this sense, Edmonds differentiated self-interest and sectional interest. He argued sectional class may be derived from popular, class, group, institutional and even government demand. In addition, self-interest covered individual ambition to institutional interest.²¹¹ More recently, Koonings and Kruijt introduced the idea that three factors are behind the formation of political armies, namely (1)

208 Finer elaborates military may fear of forfeit if the intervention fails. Consequently, military puts this “threat” into consideration before intervention. For further explanation see Finer, 23-32.

209 Finer, 32-60

210 For detail discussion of the ambiguous concept of national interest see M Edmonds, *The Armed Services and Society* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), 102-106.

211 Edmonds distinguishes 3 motives of military intervention, both civil and military origin, namely sectional interest, national interest and self-interest. Edmonds, 99-106.

“birthright principle” that stresses a myth in state formation,²¹² (2) “competence principle” that refers to the idea “only military are best place to take care of national interest,”²¹³ (3) “principle of civil inadequacy” that indicates civilians are incapable to manage public affairs.²¹⁴

However, a lot of the extant literature does not clearly distinguish between the level and method of military involvement in politics.²¹⁵ These publications seemed combining ways, means and degree of military involvement in politics. For instance, Betts categorised four level of military involvement in politics. First, direct and negative influence, which means military recommends against use of force. Second, indirect and negative influence that means military does not make explicit recommendations against force but presents a set of options against desire of intervention. Third, indirect and positive influence that means military only encourages decision for force. Fourth, direct and positive influence, which means military recommends the use of force.²¹⁶ Meanwhile, Ruffa et al. pointed out four ways that military personnel could influence politics, as follows: (1) military decision is intrinsically political; (2) tactical or operational decisions have political implications in the local area; (3) operation may behave in an “irregular” way such as torture and killing civilians; and (4) action can have political consequences through chain of command.²¹⁷ Furthermore, Edmonds offered wider spectrum of military involvement in civilian affairs from “soft” (influence) to “hard” (intervention). It included a form of involvement (direct and indirect approach) and method (such as supplant, replace government,

212 Koonings and Kruijts elaborates there is a myth in historical situation that believes “without the sacrifices of military the nation would not have been formed.” K Koonings, and D Kruijt, “Military Politics and the Mission of Nation Building,” in *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, ed. K Koonings, and Dirk Kruijt, (London and New York: Zed Books, 2002), 19-20.

213 Koonings and Kruijt, “Military Politics,” 21.

214 Koonings and Kruijt, “Military Politics,” 21.

215 For instance, Betts, 1977; and Edmonds, 1988.

216 Betts, 10-11

217 C Ruffa, C Dandeker and P Vennesson, “Soldiers drawn into politics? The influence of tactics in civil–military relations,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 24, 2 (2013): 326.

obstruction, blackmail and refuse to obey civilian authority).²¹⁸ Only Finer suggested the importance of differentiation of level and method of military involvement in public affairs. He proposed four levels of military intervention²¹⁹ and six methods of military involvement in public affairs.²²⁰ Consequently, indirect military rule, direct military rule and “joint civilian-military” regime are variety of result regarding military involvement in civilian affairs.²²¹

Military involvement in politics discourse also highlighted sources and direction of politicisation as essential topics. Perlmutter and Bennett, for instance, pointed out three sources of politicisation of the military: (1) infiltration of “politicised” professional military officers; (2) a new *weltanschauung* such as fascism and socialism; and (3) political event.²²² Regarding direction of politicised military, Betts suggested two tracks, namely negative (military intervention in public affairs opposed government policy); and positive (military supports and advocacy of administration policy).²²³ Thus, to measure the existence of military interference in politics, Martinez offered four operational indicators.²²⁴ First, the existence of regulations regarding military subordination to civil authorities. Second, the level of military presence as the coercive organ of the state. Third, the level of military presence in decision-making. Last, the degree of civilian supremacy.

This section has already highlighted some essential issues in the politicisation of the military. To summarise the explanation above, Figure 2-1 illustrated a cluster of military involvement in politics discourse. The extant literature about military involvement in politics can be grouped into eight key ideas, namely: motives, condition, opportunity, methods, levels, institution, directions and

218 Edmonds, 103-112

219 Further explanations of four level of intervention see Finer, 86-139.

220 Detail discussions of six method of military intervention see Finer, 140-163.

221 Finer, 164-204.

222 Perlmutter and Bennett, *The Political*, 16

223 Betts, 53.

224 Martinez, 29

sources. The clusters are defined by common basic insight of the relevant theory. These eighth clusters embodied unique aspects of military involvement in politics. Items within the clusters provided further insight into discussion over the military involvement in politics. Thus, the present study provided a unique and comprehensive insight in which political feature in the military may influence attitudes, intentions, or its behaviours.




Figure 2-1 Cluster Diagram of the Discourse of Military Involvement in Politics

Source: Author

2.3.2 Politics in Organisation

Politics is a common activity in every organisation and representing an approach to the understanding of organisational dynamics.²²⁵ As Ferris and King advocated “politics is what takes place in the space between the perfect workings of the rational model (efficiency) and the messiness of human interaction.”²²⁶ In general, politics is often considered as the darker side of

225 Vigoda, “Internal Politics,” 186

226 Gerald R Ferris and Thomas R King, “Politics in Human Resources Decisions: A

organisation by its members.²²⁷ Studies have been conducted regarding politics in the workplace. Those studies examined various elements of organisational politics.²²⁸ However, as Vigoda pointed out, the extant literatures are still insufficient due to fully capture this phenomenon.²²⁹ Politics, power and influence within formal organisation are often perceived as an illegitimate, informal and dysfunctional behaviour against the authority. Atinc et al. argued self-interest has shaped the characteristic of organisational politics.²³⁰

Scholars employed various definitions of organisational politics. Cropanzano et al., for instance, defined organisational politics as "social influence attempts directed at those who can provide rewards that will help promote or protect the self-interest of the actor".²³¹ Meanwhile, Ferris et al described organisational politics as "behaviour not formally sanctioned by the organisation, which produces conflict and disharmony in the work environment by pitting individuals and/or groups against one another, or against the organisation."²³² Similarly, Mayes and Allen suggested organisational politics as "the management of

Walk on the Dark Side," *Organizational Dynamics*, 20, 2 (1991): 60.

227 Ferris and King, 60

228 See, for instance, CP Parker, RL Dipboye, and SL Jackson, "Perceptions Of Organizational Politics: An Investigation Of antecedents and Consequences," *Journal of Management*, 21 (1995): 891–912; R Cropanzano, et al., "The Relationship of Organizational Politics and Support to Work Behaviors, Attitudes, and Stress," *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 18 (1997): 159–180; ML Randall, et al., "Organizational Politics and Organizational Support as Predictors of Work Attitudes, Job Performance, And Organizational Citizenship Behaviour," *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 20, (1999): 159–174; KM Kacmar, et al., "An Examination of the Perceptions of Organizational Politics Model: Replication and Extension," *Human Relations*, 52 (1999): 383–416; M Valle, and PL Perrewe, "Do Politics Perceptions Relate to Political Behaviors? Tests of an Implicit Assumption and Expanded Model," *Human Relations*, 53 (2000): 359–386; Eran Vigoda, (2000), "The Relationship between Organizational Politics, Job Attitudes, and Work Outcomes: Exploration and Implications for the Public sector," *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 57, (2000): 326–347.

229 Eran Vigoda, "Stress-Related Aftermaths to Workplace Politics: The Relationships among Politics, Job Distress, and Aggressive Behavior in Organizations," *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 23 (2002): 571. DOI: 10.1002/job.160

230 Guclu Atinc et al., "Perceptions of Organizational Politics: a Meta-Analysis of Theoretical Antecedents," *Journal of Managerial Issues*, XXII, 4 (2010): 494

231 RS Cropanzano, et al., "Organizational Politics, Justice, and Support: Their Differences and Similarities," in *Organizational Politics, Justice, and Support: Managing the Social Climate of the Workplace*, ed. RS Cropanzano and KM Kacmar, (Westport: Quorum Books, 1995), 7.

232 Ferris, et al., 234.

influence to obtain ends not sanctioned by the organisation or to obtain sanctioned ends through non-sanctioned influence means.”²³³ Dhar also conceptualised organisational politics as “the exercise of power to negotiate different interests among members while maintaining one’s interests in certain organisational issues.”²³⁴ Further, Allen et al portrayed this term as “acts of influence to enhance or protect the self-interest of individuals or groups.”²³⁵ Butcher and Clarke also emphasised the existence of self-interest and personal agenda when capturing politics in organisation. They defined it as “those deliberate efforts made by individuals and groups in organisations to use power in pursuit of their own particular interest.”²³⁶ Meanwhile, Kumar and Thibodeaux proposed concept of organisation politics is in pragmatic view. They argue the existence of organisational politics is considered desirable and associated with the organisational development. Thus, they posited organisational politics as “an organisational reality, and ensuring success of a change programme may occasionally require tactical confrontation with this reality.”²³⁷

However, conceptualising organisational politics is problematic, as organisational politics can be seen as the form of exercising the power among members.²³⁸ Kumar and Ghadially,²³⁹ Dhar,²⁴⁰ and Block,²⁴¹ explained politics in organisation is both helpful and harmful for its members. The positive results

233 Bronston T Mayes and Robert W Allen, "Toward a Definition of Organizational Politics," *Academy of Management Review*, 2 (October 1977): 675

234 Dhar, 37

235 Robert W Allen, et al., "Organizational Politics: Tactics and Characteristics of Its Actors,"

California Management Review, 22, 1 (1979): 77

236 David Butcher and Martin Clarke, *Smart management using politics in organisations*, (Basingstoke and New York, 2001), 18

237 Kamalesh Kumar and Mary S Thibodeaux, "Organizational Politics and Planned Organization Change: A Pragmatic Approach," *Group and Organization Studies*, 15, 4 (Dec 1990): 364

238 Dhar, 37

239 Kumar and Ghadially, 306.

240 Dhar, 38;

241 P Block, *The empowered manager: Positive political skills at work*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988), 5

could be career advancement, recognition and status, enhanced power and position, accomplishment of personal goals, control, etc. Meanwhile, the negative outcomes could be loss of strategic power, position credibility, hamper job performance, etc.²⁴² Further, Ferris et al perceived politics in organisations as “result from the behaviour of supervisors and co-workers, and from organisational policies and practices.”²⁴³

Even though, organisational politics may be perceived as negative activities, politics still has significant role for the institution.²⁴⁴ Politics can minimise the ambiguity in organisation when uncertainty environment occurs. Ammeter et al. explained politics could be seen as “a neutral and inherently necessary, component of organisational functioning.”²⁴⁵ In addition, Butcher and Clarke suggested political mindset will help managers in organisation to develop capabilities, because they will acknowledge the value of personal investment.²⁴⁶ As a consequence, organisational politics entailed some situational and personal attributes.²⁴⁷ Following paragraphs address two issues in organisational politics: power and political behaviour in organisation. As Madison et al argued power and political behaviour are intimately related in the organisational setting.²⁴⁸

Power in Organisation

As argued previously, organisational politics is observed as the exercise of power, it is essential to understand key assumptions and features of power

242 Kumar and Ghadially, 306.

243 Ferris, et al., 234.

244 Butcher and Clarke, 49.

245 Anthony P. Ammeter et al, “Toward a political theory of leadership,” *The Leadership Quarterly*, 13 (2002): 754.

246 Ammeter et al, 76.

247 Joan Marques, “Organizational Politics: Problem or Opportunity? Strategies For Success in The Workplace,” *Human Resource Management International Digest*, 17, 8 (2009): 38, doi: 10.1108/09670730910986177

248 Dan L Madison, et al, “Organizational politics: An exploration of managers' perceptions,” *Human Relations* 33, 2 (1980): 81.

concept. It is because politics and power are often intertwined. Huczynski and Buchanan argue that this tangled has affected members' behaviour in organisations.²⁴⁹ Although, power can be exercised at all level in an organisation (individual, group, department and organisation), it is difficult to define and measure. French and Raven posited, "the processes of power are pervasive, complex and often disguised in our society."²⁵⁰ Many studies proposed their own definition regarding power. Power could be defined as capacity to overcome the resistance,²⁵¹ a force affects behaviour,²⁵² utilised to enhance own survival,²⁵³ context or relationship specific,²⁵⁴ and consisted of supply, information and support.²⁵⁵ Indeed, conceptualising power is problematic. However, the present research defined power as the capacity of individual or groups to exert their will over others.

According to Bacharach and Lawler, there are three-dimensional aspects of power.²⁵⁶ Firstly is relational aspect. In this dimension, power is seen as a notion of interactive setting.²⁵⁷ In order words, examining power should be

249 Andrzej A Huczynski and David A Buchanan, *Organizational Behaviour: an introductory text*, (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), 797

250 John RP French Jr and Bertram Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," in *Classic Reading in Organization Theory*, ed. J Steven Ott, Jay M Shafritz and Yong Suk Jang, (Canada: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2011), 284.

251 Huczynski and Buchanan, 798

252 David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organisation," in *Classic Readings in Organizational Behavior*, ed. J Steven Ott, Sandra J Parkes and Richard B Simpson, (Canada: Wadsworth, Thompson Learning, 2003), 410

253 Gerald R Salancik and J Pfeffer, "Who gets power-and how the hold on to it: a strategic-contingency model of power," in *Classic Readings in Organizational Behavior*, ed. J Steven Ott, Sandra J Parkes and Richard B Simpson, (Canada: Wadsworth, Thompson Learning, 2003), 418

254 Jeffrey Pfeffer, "Understanding the role of power in decision making," in *Classic Reading in Organization Theory*, ed. J Steven Ott, Jay M Shafritz and Yong Suk Jang, (Canada: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2011), 316-317

255 Rosabeth Moss Kanter, "Power failure in management circuits," in *Classic Reading in Organization Theory*, ed. J Steven Ott, Jay M Shafritz and Yong Suk Jang, (Canada: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2011), 307

256 Detail explanation regarding three dimensional aspects of power see Bacharach and Lawrel, 15-26

257 Bacharach and Lawrel, 16-17

underlined “the interactional dynamics of power relationship.”²⁵⁸ It means, different key actors and group and how they exercise their power within the organisation will give different results. Secondly is dependence aspect. Power is seen as “a function of dependence.”²⁵⁹ In this dimension, Bacharach and Lawler posited that this aspect relies on nature and level of dependence between key actors and group in organisation. Therefore, a result-based of this aspect is not constant. Lastly is the sanctioning aspect. This aspect is integral fragment of interactive activities in organisation. Bacharach and Lawler added sanction can be “manipulation of rewards, punishment or both.”²⁶⁰

In view of the fact that the concept of power has wide-ranging perspectives, Buchanan and Badham proposed different lenses for observing power. They elaborate three views of power. First, power as a personal property. In this sense, power defines as a set of resources, which can be accumulated including structural and individual sources of managerial power.²⁶¹ Second, power as a relational property. In this context, power is reflected from interpersonal relationship.²⁶² Third, power as an embedded property. It means power can be seen as taken for granted things. These can be written and unwritten norms.²⁶³

Further, the debate over power theory also happened in identifying bases of power. Some scholars proposed different terms and perspectives while describing power bases. French and Raven mentioned five bases of power: reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, expert power and referent power.²⁶⁴ However, this perspective stimulated conceptual discourse. French

258 Bacharach and Lawrel, 18

259 Bacharach and Lawrel, 20

260 Bacharach and Lawrel, 24

261 David A Buchanan and Richard J Badham, *Power, Politics and Organisation Change: Winning The Turf Game*, Second edition, (Croydon: Sage, 2008), 47-48

262 Buchanan and Badham. *Power, Politics*, Second edition, 48-51

263 Buchanan and Badham. *Power, Politics*, Second edition, 53-54

264 Detail explanation regarding five bases of power see French Jr and Bertram Raven, 405-408

and Raven's concept created overlap over source and bases of power that lead to perplexity. Bacharach and Lawler argued distinctive definition between bases and source of power will avoid ambiguity while examining power. Bacharach and Lawler explained "in dealing with the bases of power we are interested in what parties control that enables them to manipulate the behaviour of others: in referring to the source of power, we are speaking of how parties come to control the bases of power."²⁶⁵ In addition, Bacharach and Lawler offered some different terminology. They explained four bases of power: coercive, remunerative, knowledge and normative power.²⁶⁶ Mintzberg also posited slight different terminology regarding bases of power. He described five bases of power: resource, technical skill, knowledge, legal prerogatives and access. Another example is Benfari et al. who explained bases of power.²⁶⁷ They argued power endure on two levels: as a motive and behaviour. Benfari et al. elaborate eight bases of power, as follows: reward, coercion, authority, referent, expert, information, affiliation, and group power.

Political Behaviour in Organisation

It is noted that there is lack of common definitions for organisational politics and political behaviour in organisation. Following paragraphs explored political behaviour in organisation discourse. As politics is part of every organisation, none are immune from politics. Evidently, political behaviour in organisation is the most interesting subject of analysis in management field. Many studies have been conducted to capture political climate and political activities in organisation.²⁶⁸ Even though, political behaviour in organisation is emerging

²⁶⁵ Bacharach and Lawrel elaborate four sources of power: office or structural position, personal characteristics, expertise and opportunity. Bacharach and Lawrel, 33-34

²⁶⁶ Bacharach and Lawrel develop this concept by adapting Etzioni (1961) that mentions three bases of power: coercive, remunerative and normative power. Further discussion see Bacharach and Lawrel, 33

²⁶⁷ Robert C Benfari, et al., "The Effective Use of Power," *Business Horizons*. May/Jun, 29, 3 (1996): 12-16

²⁶⁸ See for instance, AM Pettigrew, *The Politics of organisational Decision-Making*, (London: Tavistock, 1973); RW Allen, et al., "Organisational Politics: Tactics and Characteristics

subject, Ferris et al. suggested the study should be conducted by careful examination.²⁶⁹ The systematic inquiry of conceptualising political behaviour in organisations is still not fully developed. To understand the substantial matters of political behaviour in organisations, it is essential to comprehend two other related concepts such as power and organisational politics. These explanations provided comprehensive deliberation of political behaviour in organisation literature.

Scholars offered various definitions regarding political behaviour in organisation. Farrell and Petersen, for instance, defined political behaviour in organisation as “those activities that are not required as part of one’s organisational role but that influence, or attempt to influence, the distribution of advantages and disadvantages within the organisation.”²⁷⁰ Meanwhile, Latif et al. suggested political behaviour in organisation as “facilitating non-rational influence on decision making and existing as a “back-stage” doings.”²⁷¹ Further, Buchanan and Badham explained political behaviour as “the practical domain of

of Its Actors,” *California Management Review*, XXII, 1 (1979): 77-83; J Gandz and VV Murray, “The Experience of Workplace Politics,” *Academy of Management Journal*, 23 (1980): 237-251; SB Bacharach and EJ Lawrel, *Power and Politics in Organization*, (San Francisco and London: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1980); H Mintzberg, *Power In and Around Organisations*, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983); Pramod Kumar and Rehana Ghadially, “Organizational politics and its effects on members of organizations,” *Human Relations*, 42 (1989): 305-314; J Pfeffer, *Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations*, (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992); Gerald R. Ferris and K. Michele Kacmar, “Perceptions of Organizational Politics,” *Journal of Management*, 18, 1 (1992): 93-116; Eran Vigoda, “Internal Politics in Public Administration Systems: an Empirical Examination of Its Relationship With Job Congruence, Organizational Citizenship Behavior, and In-Role Performance,” *Public Personnel Management*, 29, 2 (2000): 185-210; Kenneth J Harris, Matrecia James, and Ranida Boonthanom, “Perceptions of Organizational Politics and Cooperation as Moderators of the Relationship Between Job Strains and Intent to Turnover,” *Journal of Managerial Issues* 17, 1 (2005): 26-42; Buchanan and Badham. *Power, Politics*, Second edition; Joan Marques, “Organizational Politics: Problem or Opportunity? Strategies for Success in the Workplace,” *Human Resource Management International Digest*, 17, 8 (2009): 38-41; BG Whitaker and JJ Dahling, “The Influence of Autonomy and Supervisor Political Skill on the Use and Consequences of Peer Intimidation in Organizations,” *Human Performance*, 26, (2013): 353-373.

269 Gerald R Ferris, et al., “Perceptions of Organizational Politics: Prediction, Stress-Related Implications, and Outcomes,” *Human Relations*, 49, 2 (Feb 1996): 233.

270 Dan Farrell and James C Petersen, “Patterns of Political Behaviour in Organisations,” *Academy of Management Review*, 7, 3 (1982): 405.

271 Abdul Latif et al., “Individual Political Behavior in Organizational Relationship,” *Journal of Politics and Law*, 4, 1 (2011): 201

power in action, worked out through the uses of techniques of influence and other (more or less extreme) tactics.”²⁷² They also stated five features of political behaviour in organisation, namely influence, self-interest, damage, backstage and conflict.²⁷³ Jafariani et al. elaborated five differences between organisational politics and political behaviour in organisation: origin, duration, function, form of appearance, and domain.²⁷⁴

Predominantly, the extant literature of political behaviour in organisations focused on private organisations as the subject of research. Meanwhile, studies on political behaviour in military organisations remained part of the civil-military relations field. Yet, the application of management and organisational perspectives is often lacking in examining military politics phenomenon. This study argued political behaviour in organisation theory is potentially useful to the study of military organisation. In this sense, the present research attempted to cover this gap in the literature and approaches, as mentioned in research aim and contribution to knowledge.

There are three similarities between military and business organisation. First, both organisations indicate consistent demand of interconnectivity in coping with the dynamics of a changing environment.²⁷⁵ Second, military and business organisations also set the essential idea of complex dynamic system.²⁷⁶ Last, both military and business organisation deal with political activities in the workplace. Military organisation also has political structure, which provide opportunities for its members to develop career and express individual motives. In this regards, military organisation meets with Dhar proposition that the

272 Buchanan and Badham. *Power, Politics*, First edition, 11.

273 Further discussions regarding the definition of features of political behaviour see Buchanan and Badham. *Power, Politics*, Second edition, 12

274 Hasan Jafariani et al., “Political behaviour in organisational context: nature, research and paradigm,” *Management Science Letters*, 2 (2012): 2989-2990, doi: 10.5267/j.msl.2012.09.008

275 Mie Augier, Thorbjorn Knudsen and Robert M. McNaby, “Advancing the Field Of Organizations Through the Study of Military Organizations,” *Industrial and Corporate Change*, 23, 6 (2014): 1424–1425. doi:10.1093/icc/dtt059

276 Augier, Knudsen and McNaby, 1425

institution will be as a political entity when it is “composed of people who have carried task, career and personal interest.”²⁷⁷ As Janowitz posited “military organisations seem particularly vulnerable to rivalries generated by the clash of personalities, which in turn may develop into political rivalries.”²⁷⁸

Furthermore, political behaviour in organisation may be associated with personality and situational dimension. Regarding personality dimension, there are four personality traits that considered has closed linkage to political behaviour.²⁷⁹ First, *need for power* that can be described as a motive to influence, lead and control others.²⁸⁰ Second, *machiavellinism* that can be explained as “(a) the use of guile and deceit in interpersonal relationship, (b) a cynical view of other people, and (c) a lack of concern with morality.”²⁸¹ In this context, as Wilson et al. advocates, *Machiavellianism* defines as “a strategy of social conduct that involves manipulating others for personal gain, often against the other's self-interest.”²⁸² Third, *locus of control* that indicates the degree of individual confidence can control the result.²⁸³ Fourth, risk-seeking propensity that refers to the individual as a risk-taker.²⁸⁴

Regarding situational dimension, as Ferris and Kacmar stated, political behaviour in organisation tends to emerge when uncertainty occurs in the workplace environment.²⁸⁵ Adapting from Beeman and Sharkey, there are two variables that can be categorised in terms of organisation’s political propensity,

277 Rajib Lochan Dhar, “Living with Organizational Politics: An Exploration of Employee’s Behavior,” *International Journal of Management and Innovation*, 1, 1 (2009): 37

278 Janowitz, *The Military*, 72-73

279 Interpersonal Sources of Power, “9 Power and Political Behavior,” accessed December 17, 2015. http://www.swlearning.com/management/hellriegel/ob10e/isc/web_chapters/00-032C09.pdf

280 Power, “9 Power,”

281 Power, “9 Power,”

282 David Sloan Wilson et al., “Machiavellianism: A Synthesis of the Evolutionary and Psychological Literatures,” *Psychological Bulletin*, 119, 2 (1996): 285

283 Power, “9 Power,”

284 Power, “9 Power,”

285 Ferris and Kacmar, 95

namely uncertainty environment and competitiveness.²⁸⁶ As seen in Figure 2-2, located on the next page, the degree of political behaviour in the organisation is high when member of the organisation is highly competitive. Although, the organisation is not highly political, this kind of behaviour will likely ensue in organisation when the severe rivalry among organisation members in uncertain environment occurs.²⁸⁷ As Buchanan and Badham noted:

... behaviour is defined as political if the motivation is self-serving, with regard to the winning power and acquiring resources, in ways that are against the interest of the organisation. Such behaviour is further characterised by the informal use of power and influence o achieve hidden goals. Political behaviour is further encouraged by uncertainty, conflict, and resistance, and is therefore likely to be intensified by change.²⁸⁸

| | | Uncertainty environment | |
|---------------------------|------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| | | Low | High |
| Competition among members | Low | Low Propensity | Medium Propensity |
| | High | Medium Propensity | High Propensity |

Figure 2-2 An Organisation's Political Propensity

Source: Adapted from Beeman and Sharkey (1987)

Table 2-1, located on the next page, lists a variety of political behaviour in organisation. Farrell and Petersen and Mintzberg are selected because they reflect the range of types of political behaviour in organisation. Indeed, such behaviour may happen in different types. Farrell and Petersen explained eight group-types that are divided into two categories, "legitimate" and

286 Don R Beeman and Thomas W Sharkey, "The Use and Abuse of Corporate Politics," *Business Horizons*, March-April (1987): 26-27

287 Beeman and Sharkey, 26-30

288 Buchanan and Badham. *Power, Politics*, Second edition, 56-57

“illegitimate”.²⁸⁹ In addition, Farrell and Petersen extended the discussion of dimension of political behaviour in organisation. They suggested three dimensions. First, the internal-external dimension that emphasises “the focus of resources sought by those engaging in political behaviour in organisation.”²⁹⁰ Second, the vertical-lateral dimension that recognises the difference of influence processes among organisation members.²⁹¹ And third, the legitimate-illegitimate dimension that concerns the “lawfulness” of political activity.²⁹² These eight-types are the outcome of cross-tabulation of the three dimensions of political behaviour in organisation.²⁹³

However, Mintzberg proposed four types of political behaviour. First, authority game that is defined as resistance attempts between members. This game has two types: insurgency and counter insurgency. Second, power base game that has three variants: sponsorship, alliance and empire building. This game emphasis “the degree and breadth of one’s organisational power.” Third, rivalry game that has two variants: line versus staff and rival camps. The purpose of this game is weakening the opponent. Fourth, change game – whistle blowing and young turks – that has goal to create change or to block it.²⁹⁴

Table 2-1 Typology of Political Behaviour in Organisation

| Game | Characteristic of major player | Status of “lawfulness” | Source |
|--|--|------------------------|----------------------------|
| I <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct voice • Complain to supervisor • Bypassing chain of command • Obstructionism | Superior and subordinates member | Legitimate | Farrel and Petersen (1982) |
| II <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coalition • Exchanging favours | Any members at the same hierarchical level | Legitimate | |

289 “Legitimate” and “illegitimate” categories refer to the legitimate-illegitimate dimension. Detail explanation see Farrell and Petersen, 407-408

290 Farrell and Petersen, 405

291 Farrell and Petersen, 406

292 Farrell and Petersen, 406-407

293 Farrell and Petersen, 407-408

294 Huczynski and Buchanan, 822

| | | | |
|---|---|--------------|--|
| • Reprisal | | | |
| III • Lawsuit | Any member (insider) and external players to organisation (outsider) | Legitimate | |
| IV • Talk with counterpart organisation • Informal contact | Any member (insider) and external players to organisation (outsider) | Legitimate | |
| V • Sabotage • Protest • Mutinies • Riots | Superior and subordinate member | Illegitimate | |
| VI • Threats | Any members at the same hierarchical level | Illegitimate | |
| VII • Whistleblowing | Any member (insider) and external players to organisation (outsider) | Illegitimate | |
| VIII • Defection • Organisational duplicity | Any member (insider) and external players to organisation (outsider) | Illegitimate | |
| Authority games Insurgency Counter-insurgency | Lower level managers Upper-level managers | n/a | |
| Power base games Sponsorship Alliance Empire building | Any subordinate member Line managers Line managers | | |
| Rivalry games Line versus staff Rival camps | Line managers and staff personnel Any group at the same hierarchical level | | |
| Change games Whistle blowing Young turks | Lower level managers Upper-level managers | | |

Source: Author

Table 2-1 illustrated that there are various political games in organisation. It also confirmed the practice of political tactics are rich and widespread. In this regard, Buchanan and Badham offered an 'A-B-C' model to provide understanding regarding the diversity of political tactics.²⁹⁵ The model consisted of three stages: the triggers of political behaviour (antecedents), the nature of political actions (behaviours) and the outcomes (consequences). Stage of antecedents highlighted individual and contextual factors that generate political

295 Buchanan and Badham. *Power, Politics*, Second edition, 20-35.

behaviour in organisation. Stage of behaviours illustrated political tactics, which are used by members of the organisation. And stage of consequences explained the outcomes of political behaviour, positive and negative, and what effect does such political tactics have on organisational change? The 'A-B-C' model is represented in Figure 2-3, below.




Figure 2-3 'A-B-C' Model for Assessing Political Behaviour in Organisation
 Source: Adapted from Buchanan and Badham. *Power, Politics*, Second edition, 21

Of course, organisations have to be able to cope with uncertainty. Hickson et al. suggest definition of uncertainty as “a lack of information about future events, so that alternatives and their outcomes are unpredictable.”²⁹⁶ Moreover, Marion and Uhl-Bien argued that uncertainty could affect future condition.²⁹⁷ As a consequence, organisation will deal with uncertainty in all parts: input, process and output. In effect, “all organisations try to survive and to do this they have to make a living.”²⁹⁸ In this sense, Mackenzie suggested definition of power as

296 DJ Hickson, et al., “A Strategic Contingencies' Theory of Intraorganizational Power,” *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 16 (1971): 219.

297 Russ Marion and Mary Uhl-Bien, “Leadership in Complex Organizations,” *The Leadership Quarterly*, 12, 4 (2001): 391, doi 10.1016/S1048-9843(01)00092-3

298 Ralph D Stacey, *Complexity and Creativity in Organizations*, (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1996), 23

“the control of interdependence uncertainty.”²⁹⁹ Furthermore, Hickson et al. proposed strategic contingencies theory that captures power as an ability of organisation to deal with uncertainty. As organisation is seen as a system that consists of interdependency of roles and activities, this theory associates interdependency with three variables: (a) ability of unit to cope uncertainty, (b) the degree of linkage activities between units or known as centrality, (c) extent to which unit's coping activities are substitutable.³⁰⁰

2.4 Research Gap

The literature review revealed two main gaps that should be filled. First, political behaviour in military organisation is still underexplored. The literature review confirmed that politicised military topic remains occupied by civil-military relation studies. The critique has demonstrated that management theory should have been significant in examining the phenomenon of politicisation of the military. In addition, the study of organisational politics and political behaviour in organisation failed to capture the interaction of organisation, political behaviour of internal member and outside actors during political uncertainty.³⁰¹ Also, the existing studies failed to consider the phenomenon of friction and rivalry among members as a result of political behaviour in organisation.

In military organisation, friction does not always lead to establishment of politicised military. This requires a certain condition such as political coalition forming with other members, both internal and external institution, or political mobilisation. Stein and Finto argued friction and rivalry may happen when “a

299 Kenneth D. Mackenzie, “Virtual Positions and Power,” *Management Science*, 32, 5 (1986): 623

300 DJ Hickson, et al., 218

301 Tichy defines political uncertainty as “the degree of stability and predictability with regard to bargaining and exchange relationships among interest groups over the allocation of resources, power, prestige, etc.” Noel M Tichy, *Managing Strategic Change: Technical, Political and Cultural Dynamics*, (Canada: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1983), 230

gang at work” is established.³⁰² In this regard, the existence of friction and rivalry are too important to be neglected while examining political behaviour in military organisation during crisis/wartime.

Theoretically speaking, organisation value, goals, vision and mission should bind all members.³⁰³ Butcher and Clarke argued, “organisation are supposed to be places of corporates unity in which all employees work with consistent strategies cascaded down through the various level an processes of the organisation.”³⁰⁴ In other words, as Gulick posited, as a way of coordination, organisation requires an establish system whereby the implementation Programme is a reflection of core organisation objective.³⁰⁵ Thus, “the primary function of the organisation is to provide purpose to the cohesive unit in the form of goals and objectives.”³⁰⁶ However, Kim advocated cohesion is developed by interaction of elites.³⁰⁷ Cohesion comprised of four interdepending components: horizontal, vertical, organisational and institutional bonding.³⁰⁸ Olmsted and Hare suggested, “cohesive groups are better able in to resist disruptive forces and, thus, avoid disintegration.”³⁰⁹ This study argued the consequences of political behaviour in organisation during political uncertainty are a result of path-dependent process. These mean the outcome of political

302 Stein and Finto define “a gang at work” as “a cohesive group of employees who seek to maintain a dominant position in the organisation by actively engaging in and encouraging “dark side” (i.e., immoral, and/or illegitimate, and/or illegal) behaviours, while simultaneously denigrating ordinary an organisationally healthy behaviours.” Mark Stein and Jonathan Pinto, “The Dark Side of Group: A “Gang At Work” in Enron,” *Group and Organisation Management*, XX, X (2011): 6, doi: 10.1177/10596011111423533

303 Butcher and Clarke, 35

304 Butcher and Clarke, 10

305 Luther Gulick, “Notes on the Theory of Organisation,” in *Classic Reading in Organization Theory*, ed. J Steven Ott, Jay M Shafritz and Yong Suk Jang, (Canada: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2011), 86

306 Wm Darryl Henderson, *Cohesion: the Human Element in Combat*, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 10.

307 Insoo Kim, “Intra-Military Divisions and Democratization in South Korea,” *Armed Forces and Society*, 39, 4 (2012): 707, doi: 10.1177/0095327X12454533

308 Guy L Siebold, “ The Essence of Military Group Cohesion,” *Armed Forces and Society*, 33, 2, (2007): 287

309 Olmsted and Hare (1978) cited in James Griffith and Mark Vaitkus, “Relating cohesion to stress, strain, disintegration, and performance: an organizing framework,” *Military Psychology*, 11, 1 (1999): 41

behaviour in organisation is affected by structure, culture and certain constellation of political entrepreneur (both internal and external organisation).

Military organisation often appears as political institution in many countries particularly in new states. In a post-authoritarian state, military also may attempt to exercise its 'prerogative' include participating in the executive's cabinet.³¹⁰ As Khuri and Obermeyer pointed out, "the military is essentially a political institution – it is the sole instrument of force in the country and a crucible in which community leaders and national heroes are moulded."³¹¹ Thus far, the extant literature advocated that political behaviour in organisation merely bases in individual member behaviour in order to achieve self-interest.

As argued previously, military is not immune from politics. Both in peacetime and wartime, military institution may deal with political activities in various degrees. Scholars tended to agree that the concept of power, organisational politics and political behaviour in organisation are contested. In addition, many of these theories have been: (1) generalised from the private organisation behaviour; (2) implementing an a priori approach to capture the political behaviour phenomenon without adequate attention to more complex dependence; (3) locked in the notion of self-interest but put insufficient attention to possible rivalry or factions within organisation. Newell argued "military power is but one element of national power available to a state or nation to achieve its goals and enforce its policies."³¹² Consequently, military should translate the government decision into priorities.³¹³ As a hierarchical institution, military will sustain the national goals with centralised command. Therefore, the need to retain control to the military is required.

310 Rollin F Tusalem, "Bringing the military back in: the politicisation of the military and its effect on democratic consolidation," *International Political Science Review*, 0, 0 (2013): 4, doi: 10.1177/0192512113496683

311 Fuad I Khuri and Gerald Obermeyer, "The social bases for military intervention in the middle east," in *Political-Military Systems: A Comparative Perspective*, ed. Kelleher, C McA., (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974), 70

312 Clayton R Newell, *The framework of operational warfare*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 37

313 Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 303.

There are many definitions regarding the term of command. Crevelde defined command as “a function that has to be exercised, more or less continuously, if the army is to exist and to operate.”³¹⁴ Meanwhile, Nye proposed a wider scope of command definition. He suggested command should be “more than carry out orders and apply rules and regulations to the ebb and flow of military administration.”³¹⁵ Further, Downey argued the essences of command covers two elements: personal authority over others and dynamic function of the armed forces. Thus, he offered four types of command, namely, full command, operational command, operational control and administrative control.³¹⁶

However, command cannot be understood in isolation.³¹⁷ All command systems have to cope with the uncertainty condition.³¹⁸ During the crisis, military always face uncertainty. Thus, friction within military organisation cannot be avoided. Even, Newell posited, disagreement always presents during war.³¹⁹ Indeed, cohesion is the essence of military organisation, particularly in military operation, as military command requires concentration of power in one person.³²⁰ Cohesion may be obtained through selection of military personnel.³²¹ Siebold explained cohesion also “the basis for various manoeuvre tactics to overcome or mitigate the threat of mobile armour, which varied over time from chariots, to elephants, to knights on horseback, to horse cavalry and so on.”³²²

314 Martin Van Crevelde, *Command in War*, (Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1985), 5

315 Roger H Nye, *The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence*, (New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group Inc., 1986), 28

316 JCT Downey, *Management in the Armed Forces: an Anatomy of the Military Profession*, (Bristo: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977), 122-123.

317 Crevelde, 261

318 Crevelde, 268

319 Newell, 126-127.

320 Nye, 19

321 Crevelde, 271

322 Guy L Siebold, “The evolution of the measurement of cohesion,” *Military Psychology*, 11, 1 (1999): 7

Second, the extant literature failed to explain the whole development process of the politicised military in Indonesia during the *Konfrontasi*. The literature assessed above fails to fully perceive that politicisation of the military during the *Konfrontasi* was complex and legitimised. Considering legitimacy in the process of politicised military in the ABRI during the *Konfrontasi* provided a comprehensive understanding of the complexity of the *Dwikora* Operation. The result is a palpable gap in examining politicisation of the military in Indonesia during the *Konfrontasi*. The complexity of politicised military in Indonesia during the *Konfrontasi* needs to be carefully examined taking into account its factions, personal and group interest within the ABRI.

According to Suchman, legitimacy is “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”³²³ Without legitimacy, influence could not easily be exerted.³²⁴ Weber acknowledged one source of legitimacy is rational rule that applies rules and laws in an objective manner. Specifically, Barnes Jr explained military legitimacy is “a derivative of political legitimacy”³²⁵ and “relates to the balance between might and right.”³²⁶ As legitimacy is constructed with social relations, how the actor exerts his authority is essential.³²⁷ Thus, there are four components of military legitimacy that would provide standard and set a context for decision-making, as follows: values (national and personal), cultural, law and public support.³²⁸

323 MC Suchman, “Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approach,” *Academy of Management Review*, 20 (1995): 574.

324 Kelman and Hamilton (1989) cited in LK Treviño, et al., “Legitimizing the legitimate: A grounded theory study of legitimacy work among Ethics and Compliance Officers,” *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 123, 2 (2014): 187.

325 Barnes Jr, 29.

326 Barnes Jr, 5.

327 Jacques Van Doorn, “The Military and the Crisis of Legitimacy,” in *The Military and the Problems of Legitimacy*, ed. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Jacques Van Doorn, (London: Sage Studies in International Sociology, 1976), 21-22

328 Barnes Jr, 53-60.

As a new state, Indonesia struggled for modernisation of its political system and military capability during the *Konfrontasi*. Notosusanto admitted the ABRI during the *Konfrontasi* was still developing its professionalism and professional tradition but refused to apply “western sense” of professionalism.³²⁹ Pauker also posited that the ABRI involvement in public affairs was a consequence of tumultuous condition in the beginning of Indonesian independence. As a result, the tension of civil-military relation was culminating on 17 October 1952 when military overtly urged the dissolution of the Parliament.³³⁰ Crouch advocated the 17 October affair was an impact of political struggle among civilian groups.³³¹ However, it should be noted that military involvement in public affairs had been increasing since the 17 October affair. Later, the ABRI gained wider political role when President Sukarno through the National Council accepted the military as a member of functional group represented by appointment in the Parliament.³³²

As this research acknowledged the ABRI as political military institution, the wider roles of the ABRI in civilian affair during the *Konfrontasi* boosted the process of politicisation of the military. The ABRI involvement in public spheres created a sense of shared political purpose, which was countering the PKI’s influences. Thus, such elaboration of military involvement in civilian government during the *Konfrontasi* is necessary to be taken into consideration. Consequently, career advancement was vulnerable to politicisation. To exert military influence, high rank generals might tend to politicise their subordinates (lieutenant colonel rank and above). Promotions have not been free of politicisation.³³³ Given this contextual backdrop, this thesis explored in what

329 Notosusanto, 47.

330 The 17 October affair was one of influential events that illustrated how military tried intervening politics directly and overtly. Brief explanation regarding the affair is presented in Chapter Three. See also Pauker, “The Role,” 185-230.

331 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 27-29

332 This situation was a result of military influence that exercised by General Nasution since he introduced “middle way” concept.

333 Betts described politicised professional in military institution is conducted by one star general and above. However, in Indonesia, the politicised military might be conducted by

extent politicisation of the ABRI affected its operations during the *Konfrontasi*. The outcome of the literature review confirmed that no evidence exists to provide answers to this research question.

Lieutenant Colonel rank and above. It referred to the Suharto's Opsus case. The Opsus was organised by Lieut Col Ali Murtopo. Betts, 38-39.

3 THE PRELUDE TO THE *DWIKORA* OPERATION

Apa sebab kita menentangnya? Oleh karena Malaysia adalah penjelmaan daripada neo-kolonialisme. Dan kita tidak mau diadakannya neo-kolonialisme di sekeliling kita. Kita mengerti bahwa Malaysia adalah satu pengepungan bagi Republik Indonesia. Malaysia adalah suatu hasil daripada brain, daripada pikiran, daripada cita-cita, daripada usaha, ikhtiar neo-kolonialisme

[Why do we oppose Malaysia? Because Malaysia is the embodiment of neo-colonialism. And we do not want any neo-colonialism to exist around us. We consider Malaysia besiege the Republic of Indonesia. Malaysia is the product of brain, ideas, ambition and efforts of neo-colonialism]

Speech of President Sukarno on 13 February 1963³³⁴

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examined the wider setting of the *Konfrontasi* policy and the outset of the *Dwikora* Operation. This chapter was essential as it gives a comprehensive view about the wider context of the *Konfrontasi*. This segment as well as Chapter Four aimed to provide comprehensive discussion regarding the effect of politicisation of the ABRI on its military operation. Specifically, this chapter aimed to achieve the third enabling objective of the dissertation (p.14), to discuss the implementation of the Indonesian military operations during the *Konfrontasi*. Although the *Konfrontasi* was a dispute between neighbouring states, it is necessary to elaborate the broader environment beyond state level. As Leifer argued, the competition of external power in Southeast Asia has been the consequence of intra-regional conflict to strategic perspective.³³⁵

334 *Amanat Presiden Sukarno pada 13 Februari 1963* [Speech of President Sukarno on 13 February 1963] in Pengurus Besar Front Nasional [National Front Central Board], *Jalankan Panca Program, Ganyang Semua Tantangan* [Implement Five-Program, Crush All Challenges], (Jakarta: Pengurus Besar Front Nasional, 1963), 17-18.

335 Michael Leifer, *Conflict and Regional Order in South-east Asia*, Adelphi Paper No 62, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), 13

This chapter will start by illustrating the historical overview of Indonesian political and security landscape since 1945. This attempted to elucidate some of internal dynamics that should be taken into consideration. The chapter then explained the setting of the Cold War and its implication for the Southeast Asia and particularly Indonesia. This explanation provided wide-ranging understanding regarding global and regional setting during the *Konfrontasi*. Later, the origins of the Indonesia-Malaysia *Konfrontasi* and covert operation that was conducted prior to the *Dwikora* Operation are illustrated. The chapter concluded with an analysis of key actors' informal network toward the policy. In addition, this chapter employs term of 'Malaya' and 'Malaysia' to distinguish a specific period.³³⁶

There are six sections in this chapter. The first section introduced the chapter. The second section assessed the situational context of the *Konfrontasi* based on the existing literature. Various Indonesian key actors' motivations toward the *Konfrontasi* is illustrated in the third section. Furthermore, the implementation of covert operation called Operation A is discussed in the fourth section. Then the fifth section highlighted informal key actors' network in the context of *Konfrontasi*. Finally, the sixth section provided the summary of this chapter.

3.2 Overview of Indonesian Political and Security Landscape Since 1945

This section attempted to briefly overview the development of Indonesian political and security landscape since 1945. Arguably, the ABRI has become key actor in national politics since Indonesia gained her independence in 1945. Thus, this section would be divided into three periods: the revolutionary period (1945-9), parliamentary democracy period (1949-1959) and guided democracy period (1959-1965). The discussion also elaborated background information of

336 Before her independence from the British in 1957 until 1963, Malaysia was known as Malaya. This dissertation employed the name of 'Malaya' when referring to the country before 9 July 1963 (signing of the Malaysia Agreement). Meanwhile, the name of 'Malaysia' is used when referring to the country after 9 July 1963.

several individual key military actors who played significant roles during the *Konfrontasi*.

3.2.1 Revolutionary Period (1945-9)

On 17 August 1945, following the Japanese surrender, Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta declared Indonesia's independence. They had been leading the prewar Indonesian nationalist movement for years. Shortly after the proclamation, the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia/ PPKI*) had approved and promulgated the constitution of 1945 and elected Sukarno President and Hatta Vice President.³³⁷

Sukarno, a charismatic and flamboyant leader, was born 6 June 1901 in Surabaya, East Java. He, the most important figure of the Indonesia's nationalist movement during the Dutch colonial period, had studied civil engineering. In 1928, he helped the creation of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (*Partai Nasionalis Indonesia/PNI*), which had him jailed by the Dutch.

Meanwhile, Hatta, born on 12 August 1902 in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, studied intensively of economics at Rotterdam School of Commerce. He was the chairman of the Perhimpunan Indonesia, the prominent Indonesian nationalist movement in Holland. Like Sukarno, the Dutch arrested him due to his activities as Indonesian delegate to the League Against Imperialism in 1927.³³⁸ Following the proclamation, joint national leadership of Sukarno and Hatta was knowingly as the *dwitunggal* (dual unity).

The Indonesian military was a self-created military. The government did not create it since the Sukarno-Hatta political leadership did not have any intention to established armed forces immediately. The *Dwitunggal* preferred to defend

337 Leslie Palmier, *Indonesia*, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1965),107

338 George McT Kahin, "In Memoriam: Mohammad Hatta, (1902-1980)," *Indonesia* No 30 (1980): 114

independence peacefully.³³⁹ This stance could be seen when the government created the People Security Body (*Badan Keamanan Rakyat/BKR*) on 20 August. The BKR was only responsible for local security. PETA and Heiho (an auxiliary force within the Japanese Army) troops dominated the BKR.³⁴⁰ Thus, many-armed group challenged this decision and formed independent fighting group and militia (*laskar*) i.e the *Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia* (Indonesia Young Generation), the *Laskar Hizbullah* (armed Moslem young men), the *Barisan Pemberontakan Rakyat Indonesia* (Revolutionary Legion of the Indonesian People), the *Laskar Rakyat* (home guard People's Army) and the *Tentara Pelajar* (student army).³⁴¹

The government then transformed the BKR into the People's Security Military (*Tentara Keamanan Rakyat/TKR*) following the issuance of the *Maklumat Pemerintah* (Government Statement) Number 6 on 5 October.³⁴² This was a result of security situation that country was not able to survive without national military.³⁴³ Besides appointing Supriyadi³⁴⁴ as People's Security Minister, Sukarno also assigned Lieut Gen Urip Sumoharjo, former KNIL, as chief of general staff and who was responsible to unify the various armed groups.³⁴⁵ On 9 October, government also encouraged youth, former KNIL, PETA and any fighting groups to voluntarily join the TKR. Due to overenthusiasm of Indonesians in responding the government call for volunteerism, Urip established 10 divisions of the TKR in Java and 6 divisions in Sumatra.³⁴⁶ Soon after the formation, the TKR clashed with the Allied Forces, British Gurkha and

339 Bilver Singh, *Dwifungsi ABRI: The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces*, (Singapore: SIIA, 1995), 25; Said, Soeharto's, 2

340 Singh, 25

341 Dinas Sejarah Kodam VI/Siliwangi. *Siliwangi, dari Masa ke Masa* [Siliwangi, from Era to Era], (Bandung: Angkasa, 1970), 23; Singh, *Dwifungsi*, 25

342 To this day, 5 October is knowingly as the day of the Indonesian military was born.

343 Dinas Sejarah Kodam VI/Siliwangi. 29

344 Supriyadi was the leader of the PETA battalion whose members revolted against the Japanese in Blitar, East Java, on 29 February 1945.

345 Singh, 26

346 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Sejarah Organisasi TNI*, 25-26.

the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) troops, which landed in Surabaya.³⁴⁷

The TKR officers consisted of three groups. First, group of less well trained former PETA officers. Yani, and Suharto were parts of this group. Second, group of former soldiers of the KNIL. Although, it was small in numbers, around 30 officers, this group was very influential in the TKR due to better educational qualifications than PETA. Nasution and Air Force Chief of Staff Air Commodore Suryadarma were associated with this group. Last, officers, which were from independent fighting groups and the *laskar*.³⁴⁸

It was evident that cohesion was main problem of the TKR. Tensions arose between former PETA-*Laskar* and ex-KNIL officers. Many former PETA officers, particularly in Central and East Java were resistant to Sumoharjo's leadership. Former PETA officers demanded a vote on who should occupy the top post of the TKR. Thus, on 12 November, Sumoharjo held a conference in Yogyakarta in order to resolve the problem. As a result, Colonel Sudirman, former PETA and charismatic battalion commander in Banyumas, Central Java, was elected as Grand Commander (*Panglima Besar*).³⁴⁹ The conference also proposed Sultan Hamengku Bowono IX, the Sultan of Yogyakarta, be appointed Defence Minister.³⁵⁰

Another problem was delicate relationship with civilian leaders. Indeed, Sukarno accepted the election of Sudirman as *Panglima Besar* and promoted to the rank of general.³⁵¹ However, in fact, Sukarno administration did not show the intention to build good cooperation with military. Following the collapse of presidential cabinet, on 10 November, Sukarno asked Sutan Sjahrir, a socialist and educated in Holland, to form a cabinet. The new cabinet hesitancy accepted the proposal for appointing Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX as Defence

347 Singh, *Dwifungsi*, 27-8

348 Sundhaussen, *Politik Militer*, 20-1

349 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Sejarah Organisasi TNI*, 2

350 Sundhaussen, *Politik Militer*, 34

351 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Sejarah Organisasi TNI*, 32

Minister. On 14 November, Sjahrir introduced Amir Syarifuddin, a leftist socialist, as Defence Minister.³⁵² Later, Syarifuddin proposed the creation of people's army including the *laskar* and armed youth groups operated together with regular military. He formed the Indonesian Socialist Youth (*Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia/Pesindo*), the largest youth group associated with the left. Later, in 1948, the Pesindo was involved in triggering an uprising in Madiun, East Jawa, which was known as Madiun Affair.³⁵³

Madiun affair occurred following the issuance of policies of restructuring and rationalising (*Restrukturisasi dan Rasionalisasi/Rera*) the military by the new cabinet, headed by Hatta. Since the Renville Agreement with the Dutch on 17 January 1948, the leftist influence in the Cabinet was reduced. Syarifuddin, who then Prime Minister and Defence Minister, was resigned due to disagreement toward the Renville Agreement. As a consequence, Sukarno asked Hatta to form new Cabinet, which was supported by the Masyumi Party, the largest Islamic party.

It should be noted that Sukarno had approved the Rera policies before the establishment of Hatta's administration. On 2 January 1948, Sukarno signed the *Penetapan Presiden* (Presidential Order) No 1/1948 that restructured the Indonesian military organisation. The order stated Defence Minister was responsible for all defence matters. To assist the Defence Minister tasks, government created Fighting Forces General Staff (*Staf Umum Angkatan Perang*), which led by Air Commodore Suryadharma. Although Sukarno dissolved the leadership of the Indonesian military, he still assigned Sudirman as *Panglima Besar* Mobile Fighting Forces (*Angkatan Perang Mobil*).³⁵⁴ Sudirman became less powerful since the Order put Mobile Fighting Forces structure under Defence Minister. In February 1948, Sukarno also appointed

352 Further explanation regarding conflict between Sjahrir and military see Sundhaussen, *Politik Militer*, 34-9

353 Barry Turner, *AH Nasution and Indonesia's elites: "people's resistance" in the War of Independence and postwar politics*, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018), 60; Sundhaussen, *Politik Militer*, 69-73.

354 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Sejarah Organisasi TNI*, 55

Nasution as deputy of *Panglima Besar*.³⁵⁵ Later, Sukarno withdrew the Order following several protests from the military including Urip dan Sudirman.³⁵⁶

Based on the Rera policies, the size of military would be reduced significantly. Hatta argued the Rera policies help Indonesia on improving economy. The less-equipped and less-trained troops would be dissolved. At least there were 350,000 personnel of regular military in Java, excluding around 470,000 of the *laskar* troops.³⁵⁷ The government targeted the new size of military would be only 57,000 of regular troops. In this regards, Nasution supported the resizing of military.³⁵⁸

Nasution, a devout Muslim from North Sumatra, was born on 3 December 1918. He got military training from the *Corps Opleidingi Reserve Officieren* (Reserve Officer Training Corps/CORO) in Bandung during the Dutch colonialism. Nasution admitted Clausewitz influenced his thought on military strategy.³⁵⁹ Although thought was knowingly as pro-Western and anti-Communist, later Nasution developed the concept of 'dual function (*dwi fungsi*) that asserted the right for military playing active role in political life.

Of course, the Rera policies had significant impact to independent fighting groups and the *laskar*. In February 1948, the Socialist Party, the Pesindo, the PKI, the Labour Party and labour group opposed the Rera policies. They then formed the People Democracy Front (*Front Demokrasi Rakyat/FDR*). Syarifuddin joined the movement. And under Musso leadership, the veteran communist figure, the FDR merged with the PKI. They launched a takeover of Madiun local government on 18 September 1948. The insurgents also killed teachers, religious leaders and officials who were associated with the Masyumi

355 Sundhaussen, *Politik Militer*, 64-5

356 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Sejarah Organisasi TNI*, 56

357 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Sejarah Organisasi TNI*, 55

358 Sundhaussen, *Politik Militer*, 68-9

359 Tim Pusat Data dan Analisa Tempo [Tempo Data and Analysis Center Team], *Jenderal Tanpa Pasukan, Politisi Tanpa Partai: Perjalanan Hidup AH Nasution* [General without Troops, Politician without a Party: the Life of AH Nasution], (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 2002), 177.

Party.³⁶⁰ Due to poor preparation of Madiun revolt, the pro-Republican troops reoccupied the city by the end of September. Madiun was surrender without a fight.³⁶¹

In addition, Sukarno and Sudirman had different strategy toward the political struggle against the Dutch. Revolutionary period was marked as armed conflict and political struggle in upholding Indonesia's independence. After the Madiun Affair, the Dutch had started again to launch military aggression in Indonesia on 19 December.³⁶² The Dutch attacked the capital Yogyakarta and captured the President Sukarno, Vice President Hatta and other senior officials.³⁶³ Regarding the aggression, Sukarno preferred to surrender than launched military action against the Dutch. Meanwhile, Sudirman, who contracted severe tuberculosis, refused to surrender and insisted to apply guerrilla campaign in facing the Dutch. The surrender caused disrespect among military officers about civilian leadership in general.³⁶⁴

It was noted that the general attack (*serangan umum*) of 1 March 1949 against Dutch-occupied Yogyakarta has provided momentum for Suharto to boost his military profile. At that time, Yogyakarta was considered as the military target of guerrilla war. Although the role of Suharto in the attack is subject to controversy,³⁶⁵ Suharto 'successfully' led an attack that involved 2,000-3,000 troops.³⁶⁶ According to Nasution, Sudirman was satisfied with the

360 Katherine E McGregor, "A Reassessment of the Significance of the 1948 Madiun Uprising," *Kajian Malaysia*, 27, 1 & 2 (2009): 87

361 Detail account on Madiun Affair see G Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, (Ithaca and London: University Press Cornell, 1952); DC Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," *Indonesia*, 21, (1975): 1-63; Anthony Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950*, (Melbourne: Longman, 1974).

362 The Netherlands employed the term of 'police action' to refer the aggression.

363 These included Air Commodore Suryadharma

364 Sundhaussen, *Politik Militer*, 75

365 Suharto claimed the idea of general attack was originally his thought. However, some scholars including Salim Said doubted Suharto's claim. Further discussion regarding the issue of general attack of 1 March 1949 see RE Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2001),

366 The attack itself was far from achieving the target, demonstrating the continuing of resistance.

attack result and admitted Suharto as key figure.³⁶⁷ In response to increasing international pressure, Dutch agreed to a cease-fire and continue negotiation with Indonesia. Following the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference, on 27 December 1949 Dutch agreed to transferred of the Sovereignty for Republic of the United States of Indonesia.

Suharto, former KNIL and PETA, was born on 8 June 1921 in Yogyakarta. Although, he was not part of intellectuals of the Dutch educated-elite, Suharto still could gain the position of military commander. During the general attack of 1 March 1949, Suharto was commander of X Brigade. He with his troops we involved in a number of operations to supress rebellions. In 1957, Suharto was promoted to be commander of Central Java. While commanding the post, he was supported by a group loyal subordinates, that later help him in consolidating his power during the *Konfrontasi*.

During the revolutionary period, the Indonesian military has changed its name and structure few times. On 24 January 1946, government issued a Governmental Order (Penetapan Pemerintah) No 4/SD 1946 to change the name of TKR to the *Tentara Republik Indonesia* (Military of the Republic of Indonesia). The changing was aiming at improving the basis and structure of the military in accordance with international standard.³⁶⁸ Later, government changed the TRI to the TNI in order to merge laskar with the regular military on 7 June 1947. Sukarno also established top management team of the TNI that led by Sudirman.³⁶⁹

3.2.2 Parliamentary Democracy Period (1949-1959)

It should be noted that military rivalry, the Rera policies and negotiations with the Dutch had stirred disagreements among military officers. Thus, a number of insurgencies were occurred in many parts of Indonesia during this period. Since

367 Tim Pusat Data dan Analisa Tempo, 66.

368 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Sejarah Organisasi TNI*, 43

369 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Sejarah Organisasi TNI*, 51-53

1948, Sukarno was facing economic problems as consequences of several insurrections. Most of the state budgets were allocated to defence and security. Since Indonesia applied parliamentary democracy, this period also was marked as political instability period due to a frequent cabinet changes.

Darul Islam (House of Islam) movement, for instance, was occurred following the negotiation between Indonesia and Dutch. In March 1948, a group of battallions of the Muslim *laskar*, Hizbullah form the Darul Islam (DI), an autonomous group with its own military, the Islamic Military of Indonesia (*Tentara Islam Indonesia/TII*) following the withdrawal of TNI troops in West Java in compliance with the Renville Agreement with the Dutch.³⁷⁰ On 7 August 1949, DI's leader, Sekarmaji Marijan Kartosuwiryo proclaimed the establishment of Islamic State of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia/NII*). The following years saw a successful extension of the movement throughout Indonesia such as in Aceh, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi.³⁷¹ Thus, the TNI engaged its unit in a number of battles against the rebels in various regions of Indonesia.³⁷²

The 17 October army-organised affair was the one of political events that could potray the complexity of civil-military relation in Indonesia during this period.³⁷³ The affair was a result of deepening political crisis and several background factors including internal factionalisation within the Army and economic situation. In the affair, the army pointed tanks and some of cannons at the Presidential Palace. They demanded Sukarno dissolved the Parliament and parliamentary election be held soon. But the event failed to provide an effective pressure to Sukarno. Later, Sukarno suspended Nasution from active service

370 Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Equinox Pub., 2007), 54

371 Detail explanation regarding the DI movement see Cornelis Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981)

372 Both Yani and Suharto were successfully in defeating the insurrections. Yani had fought in Central Java, while Suharto had fought the DI in South Sulawesi.

373 Detail account of 17 October affair see Bisri Effendy, *17 Oktober 1952: Kronik Hubungan Antara Parlemen, Militer dan Istana*, (Jakarta: Riset Informasi dan Analisis Kecenderungan, 2001)

and appointed Colonel Bambang Sugeng, inactive commander of the East Java as Acting Army Chief of Staff. The Army then deeply divided since the affair. The army leadership was unable to exercise central control. From November 1952, four regional commands were controlled by 'pro-17 October group', and the other three by 'anti-17 October group'.³⁷⁴ McVey explained intra-army coups began take place in several commands.³⁷⁵

Since inactive from service, Nasution still exercised his political interest. On 20 May 1954, he formed the League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence (*Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia/IPKI*). Although, several military regional commands was helping the IPKI by mobilising supports, the party only gained small voters in the 1955 Election, around 1.4 per cent of its total vote. In the election, the PKI obtained 16.4 per cent of its total vote and became the smallest of the four major parties.³⁷⁶ However, Nasution's political activities during the 1955 election has led him to get re-appointment as Army Chief of Staff. The IPKI's manifesto, which was calling the need for a return to the original 1945 Constitution, had influenced Sukarno to consider re-appointment of Nasution. On 27 October 1955, the cabinet decided to assign Nasution to the post.³⁷⁷

It should be noted that the main task of Nasution in his early term of re-appointment as Army Chief of Staff was establishing military discipline and uniting the Army. In February 1958, leading regional commander and politicians proclaimed the establishment of PRRI. The insurgency occurred as result of poor central management and 'java-centric' political orientation conducted by Sukarno. The PRRI revolt aimed to overthrow Sukarno administration.³⁷⁸

374 Feith, *The Decline*, 395

375 Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army: Part II," *Indonesia*, 13 (1972): 148-9. doi:10.2307/3350685.

376 Feith, *The Decline*, 434-6; Sundhaussen, *Politik Militer*, 163

377 Feith, *The Decline*, 443.

378 Further explanation regarding PRRI rebellion see, for example, James Mossman, *Rebels in Paradise, Indonesia's Civil War*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1961); William Stevenson, *Birds Nests in their Beards*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963); Herbert Feith and Daniel S Lev, "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVI (Spring 1963): 32-46; Daniel

However, Sukarno accused the US and also UK covertly involved in this revolt through Singapore, Malaya and Philippines. Feith and Lev explained the US government supplied the rebellion with various American weapons. Although the US did not recognise the PRRI as a state, the official statements still showed their support for the rebel government.³⁷⁹ The capture of twin-engined B-26 bomber pilot, Allen L Pope on 18 May 1958 exposed the covert assistance the Eisenhower Administration was providing to the dissidents.³⁸⁰

On 13 April, Ahmad Yani, who just returned from Fort Leavenworth, US, was assigned to command the *Operasi 17 Agustus* (Operation 17 August) against the centre of PRRI strength in West Sumatra. The operation involved troops from the East and Central Java Divisions, together with paratroop units, and air and navy forces. Less than a day, Yani had succeeded in occupying Padang, capital city of West Sumatra.³⁸¹ Yani, former PETA, was born on 19 June 1922 in Central Java. In 1955, he had received infantry and staff training in the United States. Returning in 1956, Yani was transferred to the Army Headquarter where he became an assistant to Nasution. After led military operation to defeat PRRI revolt in West Sumatra successfully, Yani got promotion to be Second deputy to Nasution on 1 September 1958.

The great victory against the rebel forces in 1958, notably, lifted the military status. The defeat of the rebellions and the disruptive threat from the outside has improved the Indonesian unity and nationalism.³⁸² As the only institution that has monopoly of arms, the victory has made the military stronger and more prestigious than it was. Nasution explained the nature of the ABRI was a

F Doeppers, "An Incident in the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion of 1958." *Indonesia*, 14 (October 1972): 183-195; and Makmun Salim, *Sedjarah Operasi-Operasi Gabungan Terhadap PRRI-Permesta* [History of Joint operations against the PRRI-Permesta], (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah ABRI, Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan, 1971).

379 Feith and Lev, 35-36.

380 Doeppers, 193.

381 Audrey R Kahin and George McT Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret. Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*, (New York: New Press, 1995), 163-165

382 Mrazek, 7

People's army, a freedom army, a national army and an army of partisan.³⁸³ As the unity of the people and the military was vital, he added, the ABRI had two roles: as a tool of the state for defence and as a functional group.³⁸⁴ And recognition of the unity with the people justified the military to create the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management.

It was evident that relationship between Sukarno and Nasution had improved significantly since re-appointment of Nasution. Both of them found similarities in term of political view toward democracy. Nasution, for instance, openly disseminated the idea of return to the 1945 Constitution. Sukarno saw Nasution expressed the same idea. On 21 February 1957, Sukarno proposed an idea to change the form of government. Sukarno argued western concept of parliamentary democracy was unsuitable for Indonesia. The system had caused crises and ineffective government due to the weakness of authority. Thus, he suggested the cabinet 'gotong royong' (literally mutual cooperation) reflected a representation of all political parties in the parliament. Also, he proposed the creation National Advisory Council that represented groups in society such as labour, women, youth, entrepreneur and religious group.³⁸⁵ Many parties opposed the proposal including Hatta.

Nasution was even more aggressive in politics. He urged Parliament and the Cabinet to engage army personnel in political decision-making. On 13 November 1958, Nasution introduced the Middle Way (*Jalan Tengah*) concept. He argued this policy had been implemented by the Supreme Commander, government as well as military leaders. Through this concept, military personnel have opportunity to contribute actively in non-military sphere.³⁸⁶ He also launched the idea of abandoning the European parliamentary system model,

383 AH Nasution, "The Army as Functional Group," in *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965*, ed. Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, (Ithaca and London; Cornell Press University, 1970),428.

384 Nasution, "The Army," 429-30.

385 Justus M Van Der Kroef, "'Guided Democracy' in Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey* 26, No. 8 (1957): 114. doi:10.2307/3024455

386 Said, Legitemizing, 20

which was favoured by Sukarno.³⁸⁷ Nasution and the military could achieve the significant political victory when the Parliament and the Cabinet accepted the ABRI as a functional group.³⁸⁸ Later, the Middle Way served as a basis of dual function doctrine that was explaining two roles of Indonesian Armed Forces: defence role and socio-political role. Thus, Sukarno-Nasution 'cooperation' created a major change in the national constellation of power.

It should be noted that the Navy also faced internal problem due to implementation of the Rera policies. Special treatment and promotion for officers, who were former *Koninklijk Marine* (the Dutch Navy), worsen factional rivalry within the navy. In 1959, several officers demanded Sukarno to remove Vice Admiral R Subiyakto as navy Chief of Staff. They argued that Subiyakto was not well performed. And later Sukarno agreed to replace Subiyakto with Admiral Martadinata.³⁸⁹ Martadinata was chosen because he did not involve in the movement that was widely known as the *Gerakan 1959* (1959 Movement).³⁹⁰ Martadinata, founder of Indonesian Navy School, was born on 20 March 1921 in Bandung, West Java. In 1953, he was attending US Naval Postgraduate School.

3.2.3 Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965)

Indeed, since the declaration of state of emergency status on 14 March 1957, the TNI came controlled the public life. As the martial law put military in a position of considerable power, it could restrict activities of political party, the press and the national economy.³⁹¹ The army leaders perceived parties were

387 Salim Said, "The Political Role of the Indonesian Military: Past, Present and Future," *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, 15, 1 (1987): 23.

388 Cheong, 96.

389 Sukono, et al., 473-484; Interview with M2, 20 December 2016 in Jakarta

390 Petrik Matanasi, *Hartono: Jenderal Marinir di Tengah Prahara*, (Jakarta: Sibuku Media, 2015), 23

391 Yong Mun Cheong, "The Indonesian Army and Functional Groups, 1957-59," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 7, 1 (1976): 95

corrupt and contributing to an inefficient government.³⁹² Taking advantage of this situation, the Indonesian government became dominated by Sukarno and the army. Many officers, especially from the army, occupied civilian posts such as in the Parliament, the People Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR*), and the Supreme Advisory Council (*Dewan Pertimbangan Agung/DPA*). Number of officers who were appointed as governors and district heads also increased significantly.³⁹³

In late December 1958, Sukarno persuaded the military leaders to concentrate their efforts on the restoration of internal security and to leave the civilian affairs.³⁹⁴ To balance the power of the Army and reduce his dependence, Sukarno established alliance with the Army's strongest rival, the PKI. Certainly, the PKI was the most important source of mass support for Sukarno.³⁹⁵ Still, Sukarno engaged the army in the policy of domesticating the parties, especially the PKI.³⁹⁶ Later, the 1959 *Dekrit Presiden* formalised the domination of military in political sphere.³⁹⁷ On 5 July 1959, Sukarno dissolved the Constituent Assembly and reintroduced the 1945 Constitution by issuing Presidential Decree (*Dekrit Presiden*). This decision was adapting Nasution's proposal in overcoming the deadlock over the process of drafting new constitution.³⁹⁸

Clearly, the army expanded its structure and socio-political role significantly in the period of Guided Democracy as Nasution along with Sukarno were the principal power in government.³⁹⁹ Regarding the army structure, Nasution

392 Irene Tinker, and Millidge Walker, "Indonesia's Panacea: 1959 Model," *Far Eastern Survey*, 28, 12 (1959): 178. doi:10.2307/3024292.

393 Daniel S Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, 36, 4, (1963): 360

394 Van Der Kroef, "The Changing Pattern," 232

395 Crouch, "Patrimonialism," 574.

396 Hindley, "President Sukarno," 918.

397 Hindley, "Foreign Aid," 108

398 Ricklefs, *A History of Modern*, 322; Detail account of the process of drafting new constitution see Adnan Buyung Nasution, *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio Legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante, 1956–1959*, (Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992).

399 Pauker, "The Role," 211

reinforced territorial management by establishing military commands paralleling civilian bureaucracy across the country, from province to the civilian government in village level.⁴⁰⁰ Meanwhile, in socio-political role, the army expanded its activities into the economic and political matters.

Although the army provided the main institutional support for his regime, Sukarno was aware of the potential danger of excessive dependence to the army.⁴⁰¹ Thus, he exploited the intra and interservice rivalries as a counterweight to Nasution. When Sukarno introduced the First Working Cabinet (*Kabinet Kerja I*) on 9 July 1959, he attached all chiefs of staff into his Cabinet as *ex officio* members. At least, seven officers were part of the cabinet.⁴⁰² Ambassador Jones noted that even though the army was unified and powerful, there would have been division when it came to taking on Sukarno.⁴⁰³ But Sukarno failed to weaken Nasution's domination over the army. Nasution still served as Minister of Defence and Security as well as Army Chief of Staff until mid-1962.⁴⁰⁴

The friction between Yani and Nasution had started prior to the *Konfrontasi*. Yani had been widely known as Nasution's man. Soon after the appointment as Commander in chief of the Indonesian Army on 25 June 1962, Yani consolidated the institution by removed a number of strategic positions including regional commanders who were known as Nasution's aides.⁴⁰⁵ Yani replaced Nasution's aides who overtly stood up to Sukarno on communist issue. Some of them are the commanders of South Sumatra, South Kalimantan and East Java who had banned communist activities in their region. Subandrio

400 Said, "The Political Role," 26-27.

401 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 44.

402 Donald Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication," *The American Political Science Review*, 56, 4 (1962): 918

403 Howard Palfrey Jones, *Indonesia: the Impossible Dream*, (New York: The Hoover Institution, 1971), 241

404 Ricklefs, 322.

405 Herbert Feith, "President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape," *Asian Survey*, 4, 8, (August 1964), 970-971

discovered that Sukarno had assigned Yani special mission to limit Nasution political manoeuvres.⁴⁰⁶ In this regard, Yani seemed to be neutralising the anti-PKI elements by removing the well-known anti-PKI officers from key positions and replacing with the officers who were less likely to resist the PKI.⁴⁰⁷

The friction between the navy and air force also occurred due to the Battle of Arafura Sea on 15 January 1962. The battle was happened during the *Operasi Trikora*. At that time, the Navy attempted to infiltrate 150 troops in Kaimana, Papua. The troops had to deliver sabotage and to incite local people against the Dutch. But, Dutch destroyers intercepted the mission and sunk the Indonesian Navy ship, *KRI Macan Tutul*, commanded by Commodore Yos Sudarso,⁴⁰⁸ Deputy Chief of Staff of Navy.⁴⁰⁹ The attack resulted in the death of Sudarso. Following the incident, the navy and the army blamed the air force did not provide sufficient air support during the infiltration. But Suryadharma rejected the accusation. He argued the air force was not provided any details regarding the clandestine mission.⁴¹⁰ On 19 January, Sukarno appointed Omar Dani as Commander of the Air Force replaced Suryadharma. Dani was born on 23 January 1924 in Solo, Central Java. In 1950, he was a graduate of TALOA Academy of Aeronautic, US. He was known as Sukarno loyalist. Next section explained broader context of the Indonesia-Malaysia *Konfrontasi*.

3.3 Situational Context of the *Konfrontasi*

The aim of this subsection is to provide a broad overview of external environment of Indonesia prior to the *Konfrontasi*. It is necessary to discuss the situational context of the *Konfrontasi* for two reasons. First, Southeast Asia was main battlespace of the Cold War. Reinhardt explained the political and cultural

406 Soebandrio, 3.

407 TNA, DO 187/27, "The Leftward Development in Indonesian Policy: Internal and External," Brief No 11, Quadripartite Talks on Indonesia, February 1963.

408 Yos Sudarso was involved in the 1959 Movement

409 Djiwandono, 133

410 Surodjo and Soeparo, 27-8

diversity of the region reflected centuries of contact with exogenous influences that entered the area along the trade routes from India to China.⁴¹¹ The situation was further complicated as the region was subject to a deep rivalry between great powers – the US, the Soviet Union and China – involvement from the 1950s onwards. The regional order in Southeast Asia, Acharya explained, was determined by the two Cold Wars: the East-West (Soviet-American) and the East-East (Sino-Soviet) rivalries.⁴¹² Second, there was an obvious link between domestic and foreign policies in Indonesia. Yahuda argued the implementation of ‘independent and active’ foreign policy doctrine was a part of government effort to maintain national mood.⁴¹³ Not only the spirit of struggle for independence shaped the Indonesian foreign policy, but also the doctrine was a way to sustain domestic priorities in overcoming economic and social problems.

In the mid-1950s, Sukarno applied a neutralism in foreign relation.⁴¹⁴ Feith and Castles explained the central posture of Indonesian foreign relations at that time was independent and active foreign policy.⁴¹⁵ The actions of the policy were either isolationist in character, or involved the balancing of contacts with one Cold War bloc by similar contacts with the other.⁴¹⁶ Hatta argued that by applying independent and active principles, Indonesia aimed at seeking

411 Jin McEwen Reinhardt, “Nationalism and Confrontation in the Southeast Asian Islands: The Sources of Indonesian Foreign Policy,” (PhD Dissertation, Tulane University, 1967), 20.

412 Amitav Acharya, *A New Regional Order in Southeast Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era*, Adelphi Paper no. 279, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), 7

413 Michael Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 71.

414 JPD Dunbabin, *The Cold War: the Great Powers and Their Allies, Volume 1 of International Relations since 1945, A History in Two Volumes*, (London and New York : Longman, 2008), 240

415 Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, “Indonesia in the World,” in *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945–1965*, ed. Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 437.

416 Dunning Idle IV, “Indonesia’s Independent and Active Foreign Policy,” (PhD Dissertation, Yale University, 1956), 409

friendship with all nations upon a mutual respect.⁴¹⁷ Rather than involving itself in the big powers' quarrels, Sukarno's government preferred fighting against colonialism and contributing to a lessening world tension. Reinhardt asserted the conception was greatly influenced by its anti colonial confrontation.⁴¹⁸ Thus, during this period, Indonesia was actively hosting international conferences, particularly related to Asian-African, and new state issues.

Although, Indonesia refused to become part of either the US or the Soviet power bloc, she maintained her relationship with the Communist Bloc in cordiality. Soviet-Indonesian relations entered a golden age in the late 1950s and early 1960s. For the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia was important to be influenced as the region might cripple the recovery of Western Europe post World War II.⁴¹⁹ In particular, Indonesia was the primary areas for Soviet expansion.⁴²⁰ As a result, in 1961, Sukarno secured from the Soviet Union arms and used them to put pressure on the US.⁴²¹ The Soviet Union committed to provide military assistance valued at USD1.3 billion.⁴²² Until 1962, Pauker added, credits for economic and military purposes from the Eastern Bloc to Indonesia exceeded USD1.5 billion.⁴²³ From 1959-65, Indonesia was the largest the Soviet aid recipient, receiving around 21 per cent of the total amount provided by the Soviet Union to all non-socialist developing countries.⁴²⁴

417 Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia between the Power Blocs," *Foreign Affairs*, 36, 3 (1958): 480. doi:10.2307/20029302.

418 Reinhardt, 122.

419 Allan J Levine, *The United States and the Struggle for Southeast Asia, 1945-1975*, (Westport and London: Praeger, 1995), 6-7.

420 TNA, DO 187/27, "Assessment of Indonesian Threat,"

421 Dunbabin, 241

422 TNA, DO 187/27, "The Indonesian Armed Forces," Brief No 13, Quadripartite Talks on Indonesia, February 1963.

423 Guy J Pauker, "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia," *Foreign Affairs*, 15 (July 1962), accessed December 26, 2017. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1962-07-01/soviet-challenge-indonesia>

424 Ragna Boden, "Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10, 3 (2008): 116.

Although, Indonesia was greatly in debt to the Soviet Union, Indonesian leaders seemed to resist Moscow's political influence.⁴²⁵ Hirtzel noted the comparative amounts during 1954-1964 excluding military aid were USD538 million from the US and USD369 million from the Soviet Union. The Soviet aid spiked when Indonesia-US relations broke down due to the *Konfrontasi*.⁴²⁶ Clearly, the Soviet Union hoped Indonesia would pursue a policy oriented towards the socialist camp.⁴²⁷ But, Indonesia looked to the West as often as she did to the Communist Bloc for overcoming the economic crisis, while the Soviet Union loaned millions of dollars to Indonesia with little prospect of repayment.⁴²⁸ Still, Indonesia also reaffirmed her neutralism. Van Der Kroef explained that Indonesia opposed nine resolutions of the Soviet Union relating to the Korean conflict and preferred pushing any efforts to create peace in the Far East.⁴²⁹ The Russians only could count on few committed friends within the army and government.

The failure of the Soviet Union in increasing her influence in Indonesia could be explained, at least, in two reasons.⁴³⁰ First, the Soviet Union failed to attract military officers to attend training in her country. The majority of army officers who received overseas training were going to the US. Meanwhile, some air force and navy officers who had training in the Soviet Union found their life there unappealing. Second, the Soviet Union was unsuccessfully expanding her allies in Indonesian domestic politics. The Soviets only appealed to Murba Party leaders, especially Adam Malik who was served as Ambassador to Moscow.

425 TNA, DO 187/27, "Assessment of Indonesian Threat,"

426 Richard Dale Hirtzel, "Economic and Military Aid to Indonesia: A Case Study," (PhD Dissertation, University of Utah, 1967), 60-61.

427 Boden, 124.

428 Hirtzel, 174.

429 Justus M Van Der Kroef, "Indonesia: Independent in the Cold War," *International Journal*, 7, No 4 (1952): 285. doi:10.2307/40197931.

430 Ricklefs, 334

Meanwhile, Murba Party had less extensive influence in the Sukarno administration.⁴³¹

It is notable that Indonesian-US relations were quite close when Indonesia gained her independence. Many Indonesians portrayed the US as a country that had a revolutionary tradition in breaking the colonial rule and liberated Indonesia from Japanese occupation.⁴³² But, US foreign policy placed limited attention on Indonesia.⁴³³ However, in the 1950s, Indonesia and the US had a difficult and bitter relationship. In 1952, for instance, the Sukiman cabinet resigned amid sharp criticism over the signing of an agreement accepting the US Mutual Security Agency's (MSA) aid.⁴³⁴ The cabinet was accused of violating the foreign policy doctrine as the agreement might bring Indonesia into the US sphere of influence.

One of notable examples is the PRRI revolt. The PRRI case has marked a new chapter for Indonesia - US relationship. Following the revolt, on 22 May 1958, the US and Indonesia signed an agreement that the US would provide Indonesia with 35,000 tons of rice, worth approximately USD5.5 million.⁴³⁵ Also, the insurgency imprinted a dramatic turn-around in American policy toward the Indonesian Army. The US viewed the army as the main bulwark against the PKI takeover of the Indonesian government. In a letter to Under Secretary of State Herter, Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke explained a conversation with the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company (STANVAC) representative in Indonesia, Colonel Berlin. Following the meeting with Nasution, Berlin argued the only element in the Sukarno administration, which would prevent the government

431 The *Partai Murba* (Proletarian Party) was founded in 1948. It was knowingly as left-wing nationalist party. Following the domination of the PKI in the government, Sukarno suspended the Murba Party on 6 January 1965.

432 Hirtzel, 164.

433 Brian Evans III, "The Influence of the United States Army on the Development of the Indonesian Army (1954 -- 1964)," (MA Thesis, Cornell University, 1988), 78

434 Hirtzel, 284.

435 *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958-1960, Volume XVII: Indonesia*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), 190-191

from becoming communist, was the army.⁴³⁶ The US Ambassador in Indonesia, Howard P Jones, also shared a similar view regarding the Indonesian Army. He considered the army as a major anti-communist power in Indonesia. Jones suggested the American policy toward the army should be, as follows: (a) the US government honour longstanding request for military equipment; (b) Pentagon extend invites to Nasution and his officers; (c) the US offer the army officers to the Command and Staff School at Leavenworth and additional trainings for officers and noncommissioned officers; (d) revocation of the suspension of export license and providing the Indonesian Army parachutes; and (5) switching of cotton for rice.⁴³⁷ In other words, the American was keen to improve the army's strength.

In general, the total amount of American support to the ABRI was less than the Soviet Union. During 1960-1963, for instance, the US government provided weapons to the ABRI of an annual value of approximately USD20 million.⁴³⁸ The US government, according to Pauker, was not very keen to modernise the ABRI with Western equipment, although Indonesia sought to buy military equipment from the US and other Western countries in 1956-57.⁴³⁹ At end of 1961, the Eisenhower administration rejected Nasution's plea for the army to receive heavy arms.⁴⁴⁰

In 1963, the US government added the civic action programme for the Indonesian Army. Through this programme, the army could involve in any public construction works. As the US concerned with the effectiveness of anti-guerrilla operations and internal security, Mrazek explained this programme helped the army to deal with the PKI.⁴⁴¹ The US aid provided significant impact to change

436 FRUS, 1958-1960, 117-119.

437 FRUS, 1958-1960, 111-113.

438 TNA, DO 187/27, "The Indonesian Armed Forces," Brief No 13, Quadripartite Talks on Indonesia, February 1963.

439 Pauker, "The Soviet,"

440 Frederick P Bunnell, "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965, President Sukarno Moves from Non-Alignment to Confrontation," *Indonesia*, 2 (October 1966): 47.

441 Mrazek, 79

the ABRI. It was because the army primarily enjoyed the US assistance as the civic mission improved the army's image and strengthened its territorial management capability. As the army remained the dominant element in the ABRI, the Soviet influence in the military institution was less substantial. Since then, the army became the only US 'local friends' in Indonesia.⁴⁴² In the American view, the Indonesian military establishment changed into a strong and anti-communist friend of the US.⁴⁴³

The US interest toward Indonesia was clear. They interested in keeping Indonesia out of the control of the Communist Bloc.⁴⁴⁴ In 1964, the US government developed a programme of political action as a response to the increasing of PKI's influence. The purpose of the programme was to curtail the PKI's power and China's influence. Also, the programme, which was coordinated by the Department of State, was aimed at supporting non-communist elements in Indonesia.⁴⁴⁵

On the contrary, Soviet support was more beneficial to the air force and the navy. Even though, Nasution signed the arms purchase agreement totaling USD450 million in January 1961, in fact the navy and the air force that received the highly sophisticated warships and fighters.⁴⁴⁶ Since the times of the Indonesian Revolution until 1962, the air force power had grown seven times and the navy ten times, meanwhile the army had not increased significantly.⁴⁴⁷

Indonesian foreign policy gradually shifted in 1960s. The doctrine of 'independent and active' was abandoned and replaced by the 'New Emerging Forces' foreign policy.⁴⁴⁸ Sukarno divided the world configuration into two blocs, the Old Established Forces of imperialism, exploitation and oppression and the

442 Mrazek, 89.

443 Mrazek, 13

444 FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXVI: Indonesia, 437

445 FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXVI: Indonesia, 234

446 Bunnell, "Guided Democracy," 47-48

447 Mrazek, 135.

448 Feith and Castles, 437.

New Emerging Forces (NEFO) of justice and freedom. Sukarno included the new nations and socialist countries into the NEFO Bloc. He argued the NECOLIM (neo-colonialism, colonialism, and imperialism)⁴⁴⁹ was a greater danger in Southeast Asia than communism.⁴⁵⁰

Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet rivalry created difficulty for Indonesia as she could not rely on both Soviet and Chinese assistance.⁴⁵¹ Since 1956, the Sino-Soviet alliance was weakening as differences of interest emerged. Yahuda explained both countries, Soviet and China had different view in diffusing tensions with US. The Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev tried to reach an understanding with the US in order to reduce risks associated with nuclear weapons and the high costs of maintaining a military confrontation with the West. Meanwhile, China sought to disperse the tension with the Americans so that she could concentrate on her economic development.⁴⁵² The critical moment was the refusal of the Soviet Union to supply China with a sample atomic bomb in 1959. Tension between the Soviet Union and China reached a high pitch in 1963 when the Soviet Union and the US signed the Test Ban Treaty. The signing was evidence that the two super powers tried to restrain China in developing her own nuclear weapons. Later, in 1964-1965, the Sino-Soviet rivalry heated up and several states became their battle space for political influence. Those states were main potential allies of the Soviet Union against China.⁴⁵³

As Indonesia was closer to China, the *Konfrontasi* policy gained little sympathy from the Soviet Union.⁴⁵⁴ Following the end of West Irian campaign, the Soviet

449 Bunnell noted Yani introduced the NECOLIM in early 1964. It quickly became the most popular Indonesian political jargon. Bunnell, "Guided Democracy," 37

450 TNA, FO 371/181491, Letter HAH Cortazzi to RH Hanbury-Tenison, 15 February 1965

451 TNA, DO 187/27, Telegram No 65, Washington to Foreign Office, 8 February 1963

452 Yahuda, 58.

453 Several countries were United Arab Republic, and Algeria. In particular, Indonesia had received nearly USD1 billion of Soviet military aid. Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 131-132

454 Dunbabin, 242

Union thought that Sukarno should be more focused on economic recovery than continuing heavy spending on military.⁴⁵⁵ According to Leifer, Sukarno did not reject the priority of economic stabilisation as he introduced policies to meet preconditions for the receipt of foreign credits in May 1963.⁴⁵⁶ But, the Soviet Union feared that the *Konfrontasi* would lead to military clashes between Indonesia and the UK.⁴⁵⁷ The next section discusses various Indonesian key actors' motivations toward the *Konfrontasi* and, subsequently, the covert Operation A that was launched prior to the *Dwikora* Operation.

3.4 The Indonesian Main Actors Motivations

Britain established the idea of the Malaysian Federation years before Malaysia achieved her independence in 1957. In 1948, Britain proposed the idea of the Malaysia Federation that comprised the nine Malay states and two settlements of Penang and Malacca. At that time, Britain excluded Singapore from the Malaysia Federation proposal.⁴⁵⁸ Singapore had been promised a constitutional review in 1963.⁴⁵⁹ For Britain, the proposal of creating the Malaysia Federation was part of the decolonisation scheme in the Southeast Asia region, which could help in reducing the British budget. Although Britain exercised the decolonisation programme, she still kept her strategic defence interest in the region by retaining Singapore as a key military base.⁴⁶⁰

One year after gaining its independence, the new Malaya Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman showed his interest to implement the Federation proposal. Rahman argued that creating the Federation would prevent the potential loss of

455 Friedman, 141

456 Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, (London: George Allen & Unwin for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983), 81

457 Friedman, 142

458 Robert Allan Andersen, "The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia: A Study in Political Involution", (PhD Dissertation, The American University, 1973), 26.

459 TNA, FO 371/181490, "Relations between Malaysia and Indonesia, An Historical Note," Memorandum, 22 January 1965

460 Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation*, 5.

the North Kalimantan colonies due to possible claim by Indonesia and the Philippines. Malaysia also would gain economic benefit when she would merge with Singapore. As Malays political elite, Rahman was aware of the delicate issue of racial balance. If the Federation only embraced Malaya and Singapore, the Chinese would outnumber the Malays because over a third of Malayan population was Chinese. Thus by enlarging the Federation to comprise the North Kalimantan colonies, Rahman would not upset the delicate racial balance in Malaysia.⁴⁶¹ On 27 May 1961, he overtly affirmed his intention to establish the Federation in front of the Foreign Correspondent's Association of South East Asia in London.⁴⁶²

When the Malaysia Federation plan was announced in 1961, the Indonesian government was not very concerned about it. Subandrio said Indonesia would not object to the idea if the people of the British colonies agreed.⁴⁶³ He assured Malaysia issue was strictly the affair of the peoples of those countries concerned.⁴⁶⁴ Only the PKI strongly criticised the Federation's proposal. The PKI called the Malaysia Federation a form of "neo-colonialism" that might harm democracy.⁴⁶⁵ The Indonesian government changed its position over the Federation idea shortly after the Brunei revolt led by AM Azahari⁴⁶⁶ on 8 December 1962. Both Sukarno and Subandrio showed their support to the Azahari movement. On 10 December, Sukarno declared he was on the side of

461 Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation*, 6

462 Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, *Sejarah TNI Jilid III*, 142

463 Soegih Arto, *Indonesia and I*, (Singapore: Times Books International, 1995), 185.

464 TNA, FO 371/181490, "Relations between Malaysia and Indonesia, an Historical Note," Memorandum, 22 January 1965

465 Sutter, 525-526

466 Azahari, a Brunei Malay, had involved in the struggle for Indonesian independence in 1945. He joined the People's Security Body (later became the Indonesian military). His last position was a captain in the ABRI. He resigned from the ABRI in 1950 as he objected the accused of being involvement in the rebel Islamic group (*Darul Islam*) in West Java. Further explanation regarding Azahari see Poulgrain, 87-105

the 'independence struggle' of the Brunei people.⁴⁶⁷ And by January 1963, he re-employed the word of *Konfrontasi* in his political jargon.⁴⁶⁸

Subandrio, a long-standing rival of Yani, was born on 5 September 1914 in East Java. He was knowingly as a committed and militant nationalist.⁴⁶⁹ In 1950-4, he was appointed as Indonesian ambassador to the UK. Subandrio then was appointed as Indonesian ambassador to the Soviet in 1954-7. Following the proclamation, Subandrio joined the Socialist Party. But, during his post in Moscow, he joined the PNI, Sukarno's old party. This change was perceived as opportunism, as it was believed as stepping-stone to becoming Foreign Minister.⁴⁷⁰

Scholars have tried to analyse the Indonesian motives toward the *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia.⁴⁷¹ The Indonesian motives of the *Konfrontasi* were (a) expansionism, (b) diversion from domestic problems, and (c) anti-colonialism spirit. Malaysian government also acknowledged Sukarno's action as an expansionist effort to "absorb Singapore and Malaysia into Greater Indonesia."⁴⁷² In general, these three motives could explain the background of the *Konfrontasi*. However, those arguments fail to explain fully the diverse point of view of the main actors within Indonesia who were involved in the *Konfrontasi*. Hindley denoted that there was a complex motive behind the policy of *Konfrontasi*.⁴⁷³ The main actors evidently involved in the *Konfrontasi* were Sukarno, Subandrio, the PKI, and the ABRI. Although the ABRI has had its own reason regarding the creation of the Malaysia Federation, different factions

467 Sutter, 526

468 Pluvier, 65

469 Hyde, 22.

470 Langenberg, 70

471 See Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation,"; Pluvier 1965; Sutter 1966; James and Shell-Small 1971; Sundhaussen 1971; Mackie 1974; Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).

472 This statement can be seen on Malaysia white paper. Further explanation on Malaysia charged Indonesia as an expansionist, see H Kosut, *Indonesia: The Sukarno Years* (New York: Facts on File, 1967), 92-93; Jackson, *The Malayan Emergency*, 119

473 Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation," 905

within the institution did not come with a single motivation. The view of the ABRI would be categorised into six parts: (1) the ABRI as institution, (2) the army, (3) Yani faction, (4) Suharto, (5) Nasution faction, and (6) views of the air force and the navy.⁴⁷⁴

Sukarno did not start the policy of *Konfrontasi* when he desired to crush the Malaysia Federation. The policy of *Konfrontasi* started in 1958, when Sukarno preferred to take 'another way' regarding the liberation of the West Irian⁴⁷⁵ as he had tried to annex the West Irian through negotiations with the Dutch for seven years. For Sukarno the Dutch still insisted not to transfer the authority over the West Irian to the Indonesian government.⁴⁷⁶ Thus, *Konfrontasi* against the Dutch was part of a three-main government programme.⁴⁷⁷ Further, on 14 December 1961, Sukarno established a Supreme Operation Command for the liberation of West Irian (*Komando Operasi Tertinggi Pembebasan Irian Barat/KOTI Permibar*).⁴⁷⁸ Later he decreed the establishment of the People's Threefold Command (*Tri Komando Rakyat/Trikora*) in order to annex the West Irian against the Dutch and launched a military campaign, known as the *Trikora* Operation.⁴⁷⁹ The military campaign ended after the signing of the Indonesian-Dutch agreement on 15 August 1962.

474 The detail discussion about the rivalry between Yani and Nasution will discuss later in this chapter.

475 In Sukarno administration, the official name of Papua was Irian Barat. However, his successor President Suharto, in 1973 changed the official name of Irian Barat province into Irian Jaya. Later, in January 2000, President Abdurrahman Wahid changed the name of Irian Jaya Province into Papua.

476 Sukarno explained 'other way' as an action that involved military and people in the liberation of the West Irian. See President Sukarno's independence-day address to the nation on 17 August 1958 in Jakarta.

477 In 1959, government issued three main programs: (1) an adequate supply of food and clothing; (2) security; and (3) winning of West Irian from the Dutch.

478 Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI [Centre for the Indonesian Military History and Culture], *Sejarah TNI Jilid III: 1960-1965* [History of the TNI Volume III: 1960-1965], (Jakarta: Mabes TNI, 2000), 118.

479 The *Trikora* Operation was the biggest Indonesian military operation. Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, *Sejarah TNI Jilid III*, 118; Al Araf, et al., *Securitization in Papua: the Implication of Security Approach Towards Human Rights Condition In Papua*, (Jakarta: Imparsial, 2011), 28-48.

However, the *Trikora* Operation has brought severe damage to the Indonesian state budget. Sukarno clearly claimed that more than 70 per cent of national activities were intended for security matters and for delivering the *Trikora* Operation. During 1961-1964, the economy suffered from permanent hyperinflation, around 100 per cent per annum.⁴⁸⁰ In that period, the government also faced the deficits around 8-19.5 per cent.⁴⁸¹ Government programmes on providing an adequate supply of food and clothing was far from satisfactory.⁴⁸² As Sukarno did not provide any good solution to cut the deficits, he needed the Crush Malaysia programme to justify the incapacity of government in dealing with domestic problems. In 1960, the deficit reached 8 per cent. And it was double in 1961 that the deficit touched 19 percent. Although, in 1962, the deficit was decreased to 12.8 per cent, the gap was still higher than in 1960. He provided an economic solution, called as *Deklarasi Ekonomi* (Economic Declaration), on 28 March 1963, but it was not effective as deficit hiked to 19.5 per cent.⁴⁸³ So, the Crush Malaysia programme could be interpreted as an effort to distract the people from domestic problems.

Sukarno's consistency was noticeable in denying the accusation of expansionism behind the policy of *Konfrontasi*. Sukarno saw the creation of the Malaysia Federation as a potential threat to Indonesian unity. Following the PRRI revolt, the Malayan government gave its sympathy and aid to the rebellion.⁴⁸⁴ The Malayan government even denied to extradite several people who allegedly involved with the PRRI,⁴⁸⁵ As the Malayan economy was better than the Indonesian and because of the geographical position of Sumatra, the

480 Ricklefs, 328

481 JAC Mackie, "Problems of the Indonesian Inflation", (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1967), 8

482 Departemen Penerangan [Department of Information], "Tahun Kemenangan" [A year of Triumph]: President's independence-day address to the nation on 17 August 1962, in Collection of speeches by President Sukarno and explanations about the struggle for the liberation of West Irian, (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1962), 452

483 Mackie, "Problems," 8

484 Robert Curtis, "Malaysia and Indonesia," *New Left Review*, 28 (November-December 1964), https://newleftreview.org/article/download_pdf?id=324

485 TNA, DO 187/28, Telegram No 441, CRO to Kuala Lumpur, 13 March 1963

Malaysia Federation might attract Sumatrans to consider joining the Federation.⁴⁸⁶ Within this notion, Pluvier elucidated the *Konfrontasi* policy could be seen as an effort to harm Malaysia's economic position.⁴⁸⁷

In addition, Sukarno admitted being fully aware with the allegation of an expansionist ambition. He reiterated the *Konfrontasi* did not indicate a claim upon North Kalimantan colonies.⁴⁸⁸ He expressed the *Konfrontasi* was not a policy aggression and much less a policy of territorial expansion as the aim of the policy was to oppose the neo-colonialist policy of non-Asian country.⁴⁸⁹ However, Bunnell explained there was insufficient evidence to charge Sukarno over his envisioned role for Kalimantan territories. There was no propaganda preparation for the occupation of the area.⁴⁹⁰ The army even perceived the accusation of expansion was part of British propaganda.⁴⁹¹ In his speech delivered during the celebration of the Armed Forces day on 5 October 1963, Sukarno said

Kita tidak mau merampas daerah orang lain, kita bukan ekspansionis, kita tidak mau berperang dengan orang lain, tetapi jikalau kita dihantam, kita akan melawan, Saudara-saudara, Angkatan Perang R.I., Angkatan Bersendjata R.I. akan melawan mati-matian

[We do not want to seize other people's territory, we are not expansionist, we do not want to stage war with other people. But, if we are attacked, we will fight. Brothers and sisters, the Indonesian Fighting Forces, the Indonesian Armed Forces will fight till the end]

486 Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation," 907.

487 Pluvier, 70

488 In 1963, Sukarno quite often stated that the formation of Malaysia Federation was tended to threaten Indonesia in various occasions. TNA, FO 371/169897, W Holliday to JF Sinclair, 26 December 1962

489 Biro Research Umum Departemen Luar Negeri [General Research Bureau of Department of Foreign Affairs], "Confrontation Documents: *Dokumen-Dokumen yang Bertalian dengan Konfrontasi Terhadap Proyek Nekolim Indonesia* [Confrontation Documents: Documents regarding the Konfrontasi against Malaysia Neo-colonialism Project]," *Documenta Diplomatica*, No 5 Th II, (Jakarta: Biro Research Umum Departemen Luar Negeri, no year), 44.

490 Bunnell said that the allegation was brought forward by some Western scholars. But, the Malaysian government found no evidence to support the accusation. Frederick Philip Bunnell, "The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963," (PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, 1969), 11.

491 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP 0027/D/10/4 *Malaysia*

Moreover, another explanation of why Sukarno was eager to confront the Federation was because he felt the British threatened him through the establishment of Malaysia Federation.⁴⁹² It was conceivable as British believed Sukarno aimed at getting British forces out of Kalimantan and Singapore territories.⁴⁹³ At that time, the British portrayed Sukarno as an unpredictable leader with the potential to create serious problem for the West. In 1955, along with leaders from Sri Lanka, India, Burma and Pakistan, Sukarno established the Asian-African Conference that met in Bandung. In the name of Asian-African unity, leaders of communist and anti-communist government sought to create their own separate international agenda. The conference introduced the development of the non-aligned movement. According to Yahuda, the forum also served the occasion for China to establish Third World credentials.⁴⁹⁴ In addition, during the Cold War period, Sukarno faced several assassination attempts.⁴⁹⁵ He alleged the West's involvement in these attempts, as he succeeded in building an alternative view in the midst of East-West rivalry. On 30 November 1957, for instance, there was an attempt to kill Sukarno when hand grenades were thrown at him.⁴⁹⁶ He was convinced the CIA was behind

492 Interview with Jusuf Wanandi, 25 November 2016 in Jakarta; Interview with Harry Tjan Silalahi, 11 November 2016 in Jakarta

493 TNA, DO 169/464, Brief for the Secretary of State, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, 21 January 1964

494 Yahuda, 45-55.

495 Some of assassination attempts that faced by Sukarno were: (a) the Cikini Affair on 30 November 1957; (b) a mortar was fired near his car in Makassar, South Sulawesi, on 1 November 1958; (c) an airforce officer flying a MIG-17 attacked the palace with machine-gun fire; (d) three hand grenades were thrown at his car in Makassar on 7 January 1962. Angus McIntyre, *The Indonesian Presidency: The Shift from Personal Toward Constitutional Rule*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 44-47; "Sukarno Escapes Assassination Attempt; Rips Netherlands in Speech," *Madera Tribune*, Number 166, January 8, 1962. <https://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/cdnc?a=d&d=MT19620108.2.7>; Kosut, 83.

496 This incident was knowingly as the Cikini Affair. At least, nine people have been killed and dozens wounded in this attack. *Tempo*, "Tragedi Cikini: Skenario Gagal Membunuh Soekarno [Cikini Affair: A Failure Scenario to assassinate Sukarno]," *Tempo.co*, October 7, 2015. <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/707195/tragedi-cikini-skenario-gagal-membunuh-soekarno>

the Cikini affair.⁴⁹⁷ Later, testimony of former CIA Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell before the US Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence corroborated Sukarno's allegation. The CIA Report on 30 May 1975 stated:

There was discussion within the Agency of the possibility of an attempt on the life of President Sukarno of Indonesia which "progressed as far as the identification of an asset who it was felt might be recruited for this purpose. The plan was never reached, was never perfected to the point where it seemed feasible."⁴⁹⁸

The last interpretation of Sukarno's reasons in the *Konfrontasi* was personal matter with Rahman. It was apparent reason that Rahman's statement and attitude irritated Sukarno. Besides overtly supporting the PRRI and offering the idea of why Sumatra should join Malaya, Rahman was seen as intentionally disrespectful.⁴⁹⁹ He appeared applying hostile attitude toward Indonesia as one of basic principles of his policy. On 11 December 1962, he accused publicly that Indonesia had trained the TNKU on Indonesian territory. He also claimed that Azahary planned to bring North Kalimantan colonies under Indonesian rule.⁵⁰⁰ Rahman accused the policy of *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia part of Indonesia of territorial expansionism plan.⁵⁰¹ Further, on 9 July 1963, Rahman signed an agreement with UK in London that stated the Federation would be declared on 31 August.⁵⁰²

Sukarno was unhappy with Rahman's decision. He felt insulted and humiliated over the establishment of Malaysia Federation before the UN team had finished the mission.⁵⁰³ Bunnell noted Rahman had violated diplomatic convention by charging Indonesia publicly, while Sukarno and his ministers did not

497 Kahin and Kahin, 114-115; McIntyre, *The Indonesian Presidency*, 45.

498 "Summary of Facts, Invest. CIA Involve. in Plans to Assassinate Leaders," National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), accessed December 26, 2017. <https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32112745.pdf>

499 TNA, DO 187/27, Telegram No 23, Foreign Office to Jakarta, 22 February 1963.

500 Bunnell, "The Kennedy Initiatives," 233.

501 TNA, DO 187/25, Tel. No. 984, BHC Kuala Lumpur to CRO, 24 December 1962

502 Palmer, 200

503 FRUS, 1964-1968, *Volume XXVI: Indonesia*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000), 84

immediately endorse the Brunei revolt.⁵⁰⁴ Sukarno then accused Rahman of cheating and abandoning the Manila Declaration.⁵⁰⁵ Instead of discussing frankly the creation of the Federation, Rahman alleged Indonesian government had interfered in her neighbour's internal problem by supporting the TNKU. Rahman further accused Sukarno of being controlled by the PKI.⁵⁰⁶ He considered Sukarno as an 'untrustworthy' communist.⁵⁰⁷ The accusation forced Sukarno to launch a war of words.

It is inevitable that there might be a personal rivalry between Sukarno and Rahman for prominence in the Malay world.⁵⁰⁸ Both Sukarno and Rahman seemed to be competing against each other in developing their own reputations. Ricklefs explained many Indonesian leaders were jealous of the economic successes of Malaya.⁵⁰⁹ As the creation of Malaysia enhanced Rahman's prestige, Sukarno might have felt unhappy with the situation. Although, according to Lee Kuan Yew, Sukarno would easily defeat Rahman and win the rivalry for the leadership of the Malays.⁵¹⁰

Prior to the *Dwikora* Operation, military leaders did not show any resistance to the policy of *Konfrontasi*.⁵¹¹ All elites shared their support to the policy with different motivations. As an institution, the ABRI considered objecting to the idea of the creation of the Malaysia Federation.⁵¹² There were three arguments why the ABRI rejected this idea. First, the formation of Malaysia Federation was not considering the voice of the people.⁵¹³ Second, the establishment of the

504 Bunnell, "The Kennedy Initiatives," 233.

505 TNA, DO 187/29, Telegram No 769, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 21 July 1963.

506 TNA, DO 187/28, Personal Letter GA Jockel to Sir William Oliver, 6 March 1963

507 Quiko, 150.

508 TNA, DO 187/27, Telegram No 65, Washington to Foreign Office, 7 February 1963.

509 Ricklefs, 329.

510 TNA, FO 371/181491, Letter Fred Mulley to Arthur Bottomley, 9 February 1965

511 Mrazek, 96.

512 Komando Mandala Siaga [Vigilance Command], *Peran Komando Mandala Siaga dalam Konfrontasi terhadap Malaysia* [The role of Vigilance Command in the Konfrontasi against Malaysia], (Komando Mandala Siaga: Jakarta, 1967), 6

513 Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 5-6

British military bases in Malaysia might harm the safety of Indonesia.⁵¹⁴ Third, ABRI envisaged the creation of Federation was to contain Indonesian influence.⁵¹⁵ However, the ABRI did not fully commit their best in the *Konfrontasi*. Only the air force, the navy and the police agreed to support the policy of *Konfrontasi*. British considered the navy as the most committed service in upholding the *Konfrontasi* policy.⁵¹⁶ Meanwhile, the army was split into two groups: support for the *Konfrontasi* and doubt as to the effectiveness of the policy.⁵¹⁷ Consequently, the army did not deploy its best units in considerable numbers in Kalimantan.⁵¹⁸

Sutter explained the Indonesian Army leadership shared common view regarding *Konfrontasi*. The army opposed the idea of Malaysia Federation because of the China issue. Even the army's attitude regarding the overseas Chinese was antagonistic.⁵¹⁹ Since 1959, army intelligence officers had emphasised China as a potential danger to Indonesia because of four considerations: the expansionist policy, military superiority, big producer of goods and aggressively spreading ideology.⁵²⁰ Regarding the *Konfrontasi*, the army still appeared to be obsessed with the Chinese threat.⁵²¹ The leaders were concerned that China would control the Federation later.⁵²²

514 Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 6; Sudono Jusuf, *Sejarah Perkembangan Angkatan Laut* [History of the development of the Navy], (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah ABRI, Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan, 1971), 190

515 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 8

516 TNA, FO 371/181492, Letter GF Hiller to AA Golds, 5 May 1965

517 Mukmin, 143.

518 Arnold C Brackman, *Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 207

519 Eduard Quiko, "The Role of Foreign Minister Subandrio in Indonesian Politics: An Analysis of Selected Indonesian Foreign Policies, 1957-1965," (PhD Dissertation, Southern Illinois University, 1970), 21.

520 Arto, 183.

521 FRUS, 1964-1968, 104

522 Sutter, 527

It is evidence that the army was very cautious with China. Indeed, many Sarawakian Chinese, who were member of the Clandestine Communist Organisation (CCO), involved in several covert mission in Kalimantan. But the army leaders mistrusted the Chinese. So, they never allowed the CCO to conduct independent covert operation. Brackman explained the officers openly resisted the Communist and feared the CCO would take control over the mission.⁵²³

The fear coincided with former Indonesian Vice President, Muhammad Hatta's view regarding the Federation. Hatta perceived the Malaysia Federation would inevitably become a second China, dominated both politically and economically by the Chinese.⁵²⁴ By 1961, the Malaysia Federation would comprise 42 per cent Chinese, 39 per cent Malays, 9 per cent Indians and 10 per cent indigenous Kalimantan peoples.⁵²⁵ He argued the Chinese in Indonesia and Malaya were completely different. Compared to Indonesia, the Chinese in Malay maintained a strong bond of kinship with their mainland. Thus, the Federation would probably become a communist country. And Hatta ensured the Sukarno administration had no intention to claim the North Kalimantan territory.⁵²⁶

On the other hand, the situation in the North Kalimantan colonies was uncertain. The PKI was not considered the area as its operation, even though the CCO in Sarawak was almost exclusively from the Chinese community. The ABRI provided much training for the CCO men for infiltration and sabotage mission.⁵²⁷ The CCO, indeed, cast doubt over their future, whether being a separate state under China mainland influence or annexation with Indonesia.⁵²⁸

523 Brackman, 210

524 Mohammad Hatta, "One Indonesian View of the Malaysia Issue," *Asian Survey*, 5, 3 (1965): 140. doi:10.2307/2642403.

525 Richard Cluttebuck, *Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia 1945-1983*, (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1984), 278.

526 Cluttebuck, 141-143.

527 Reinhardt, 169.

528 Reinhardt, 169-225.

In this regard, the CCO was very cautiously considering the facts that there were mistreatment of Chinese in Indonesia in 1959-1960 and 1963, and the PKI alone had defended the minority.⁵²⁹

Friction within the army over the *Konfrontasi* issue was unavoidable. Sundhaussen elucidated that there were three factions within the army prior to 1965. First was the anti-communist hardliner faction, which blatantly offended the PKI. Nasution led this faction. He irrefutably was a hardcore anti-communist. As Nasution has been leading the army for many years, he already experienced in dealing with the PKI. Second was the anti-communist group but still believed Sukarno could handle the PKI. Majority of the army headquarters officers led by Yani were linked to this faction. Third was the faction that was less resistant to the PKI. This group was also known as the pro-Sukarno group. Maj Gen Pranoto Reksosamudra, who later became interim Army Commander, was part of this group.⁵³⁰ According to Sundhaussen and Subandrio, Suharto was part of Nasution faction.⁵³¹ But, Harry Tjan Silalahi⁵³² and Ricklefs disagreed with this notion. Silalahi argued Suharto was not hard-liner as well as Nasution. Suharto was quite 'populist socialism' (*sosialisme kerakyatan*)⁵³³ in nature.⁵³⁴ Ricklefs added Suharto was among the senior officers who worked to prevent Nasution and Yani faction becoming openly antagonistic.⁵³⁵

529 Reinhardt, 169-225

530 Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Fashioning Unity in the Indonesian Army," *Asia Quarterly*, No. 2 (1971/1972): 201.

531 Sundhaussen, "The Fashioning," 201; Soebandrio, *Kesaksianku tentang G30S* [My Testimony about the September 30th Movement], (Jakarta: Forum Pendukung Reformasi Total, 2001), 2.

532 Harry Tjan Silalahi was a close ally of Suharto. Following the G30S affair, he actively led the Action Command to Crush the 30 September Movement (*Komando Aksi Pengganyangan Gestapu/ KAP-Gestapu*). He is one of the founding members of the Indonesian prominent think tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

533 In Indonesia, populist socialism was introduced by former Prime Minister Sjahrir. He described populist socialism ideology underlined the importance of humanity. So, populist socialism referred to the socialism which respect to the standard of humanity, acknowledge and uphold equality among people. Rosihan Anwar, *Sutan Sjahrir, True Democrat, Fighter for Humanity, 1909-1966*, (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2010), 115

534 Interview with Harry Tjan Silalahi, 11 November 2016 in Jakarta

535 Ricklefs, 334.

Sundhaussen's categorisation of the army, however, was inadequate in discussing the fluidity of elite coalitions during the *Konfrontasi*. He did not elaborate further regarding the pro-Sukarno group. Not all pro-Sukarno officers were less worried to the PKI. Maj Gen Ibrahim Ajie, Regional Military Commander of West Java, for instance, was pro-Sukarno and also known as an anti-PKI hardliner.

In the beginning of the *Konfrontasi*, Yani clearly supported the policy. Hindley depicted Yani as Army Chief who was making the most militant anti-British and anti-Malaysia Federation.⁵³⁶ He considered the dispute with Malaysia was a chance to develop mobile striking segment of the army. Consequently, the development of mobile striking segment might change the military doctrine of territorial warfare. Yani argued Nasution's doctrine of territorial warfare was obsolete and needed to be improved.⁵³⁷ Thus, in 1963, Yani was one of the most outspoken elites supporting the policy.

It was noticeable that Yani and Suharto used the *Konfrontasi* as an entry point to develop the offensive element in the army. Following the settlement of West Irian case, on 15 August 1963, Yani established new mobile striking structure within the army, the KOSTRAD, which composed of three elite brigades. He assigned Suharto to lead the KOSTRAD.⁵³⁸ Indeed, the result of West Irian dispute had boosted Suharto's confidence that the existence of striking unit in the Trikora Operation has contributed significantly.⁵³⁹ Mrazek explained, Suharto was very keen to involve in an airborne-units game.⁵⁴⁰ On 2 October, Suharto argued the presence of military force such the KOSTRAD was needed to bolster Indonesian diplomacy over the *Konfrontasi*. He said diplomatic effort would be effective if it was backed up by the military. Suharto claimed some of

536 Donald Hindley, "Foreign Aid to Indonesia and Its Political Implications" *Pacific Affairs*, 36, 2 (1963): 119. doi:10.2307/2754184.

537 Mrazek, 99-100

538 Mrazek, 97.

539 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP 0034/D/10/4

540 Mrazek, 97

his troops had been deployed in West Kalimantan to support the policy.⁵⁴¹

The domination of the PKI in the Crush Malaysia policy led the fragmentation within the military over the *Konfrontasi*. The army was concerned that the PKI would gain more public sympathies during the *Konfrontasi*. So, the army was half-hearted in supporting the *Konfrontasi* and avoided in-depth involvement in this policy. As Yani knew the opponent was superior in military capability, he was reluctant to face the British in warfare.⁵⁴² For him, a peaceful approach to end the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia was the best solution. On 6 April, he said, “a peaceful solution is always welcome. To us, it is always the best solution. The possibility is still there.”⁵⁴³

The hesitation in backing the *Konfrontasi* did not restrict the ABRI to providing moral support to the TNKU. All key military actors showed similar sympathy over the revolt. Nasution, for instance, expressed his public endorsement and sympathy for the TNKU. In addition, Yani demonstrated his moral support to the Brunei people who were struggling for independence.⁵⁴⁴ In his Daily Orders on 5 October 1963, he clearly articulated the purpose of *Konfrontasi* was to overcome the danger to Indonesia. As he stated

Sekarang kita sedang menghadapi konfrontasi terhadap kolonisme dalam bentuk baru di sekeliling tanah air kita, yang merupakan bahaya dan tantangan bagi kelangsungan hidup Revolusi Indonesia. Tantangan ini wajib kita hadapi, karena ia ditujukan minimal untuk merongrong dan maksimal untuk menggagalkan Revolusi kita.

[Now, we are facing the confrontation against neo-colonialism surrounding our homeland, which is a threat and challenge to the survival of the Indonesian revolution. We must face such a challenge, because it is meant to subvert, at the very least, and to thwart our

541 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP 0034/D/10/4

542 Brackman, 206

543 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP 0034/D/10/4 *Kronology Konfrontasi terhadap Malaysia* [Chronology of the Konfrontasi against Malaysia]

544 Bernard K Gordon, “The Potential for Indonesian Expansionism.” *Pacific Affairs*, 36, 4 (Winter, 1963-1964), 385-386

Revolution, at worst]⁵⁴⁵

Furthermore, Nasution expressed his disappointment over the military budget reduction by supporting the *Konfrontasi* policy. He argued that the policy would help the military avoid budget cuts.⁵⁴⁶ After the settlement of the West Irian dispute, Sukarno proposed a reduction of the military budget plan. In 1962, the military budget reached 53 per cent of the national budget. As the emergency status in Indonesia would be revoked, the government allocated military budget in 1963 and 1964 only 22.1 per cent and 22.8 per cent respectively of the national budget.⁵⁴⁷

Nasution insisted the budget cuts would threaten the army unity. So, according to Nasution, the Malaysia Federation issue could maintain the army's political role in Indonesia.⁵⁴⁸ George Gomory of St Anthony College Oxford explained during the West Irian campaign, the army had enjoyed all the benefits of national budget and became the most powerful political force in Indonesia. As the number of the army personnel was increased, the termination of martial law status might lead to the mass of unemployed veterans.⁵⁴⁹ Thus, the involvement in the *Konfrontasi* permitted the ABRI to maintain its national roles and justified in resisting a 58 per cent military budget reduction.⁵⁵⁰

It was noted that Nasution often echoed Sukarno's message over the policy of *Konfrontasi*. He also portrayed the Malaysia Federation as a neocolonialist

545 Departemen Angkatan Darat [Department of Army], "*Perintah Harian* [Daily Orders] on 5 October 1963," in Panitia Hari AP 1963 [Committee of 1963 Armed Forces Day], *Amanat-amanat Hari Angkatan Perang ke XVIII, 5 Oktober 1963* [Speeches in the XVIII Armed Forces Day, 5 October 1963], (Jakarta: Panitia Hari AP 1963)

546 Sundhaussen, "The Political Orientation," 546

547 See Annex on Civic Mission in Departemen Penerangan [Department of Information], *Genta Suara Revolusi Indonesia* [The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution]: *President's independence-day address to the nation on 17 August 1963*, (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1963), 49-50

548 Sundhaussen, "The Political Orientation," 546

549 TNA, FO 371/181493, George Gomory, "The Situation in Indonesia," Supplement to Bulletin of the Institute of Political and Social Studies, Calcutta: Institute of Political and Social Studies, May 1965, 1-2

550 George McTurnan Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, 37, 3 (Autumn, 1964), 264

project. On 4 April 1963, he said the Malaysia Federation would always maintain western domination in social, political economy and military sector in the region.⁵⁵¹ Nasution rejected the accusation that Indonesia had a claim on the Malayan territory. As he stated

Kita tidak punya klaim teritorial di luar wilayah Republik Indonesia ... proyek ini bukan saja dilanjutkan sebagai benteng kolonialisme dan feodalisme, yang merupakan musuh-musuh revolusi kita, tapi juga pangkalan-pangkalan militer dan ekonomi di daerah tersebut telah tradisional menjadi pangkalan dominasi asing di Asia Tenggara ini

We do not have any territorial claim outside the territory of the Republic of Indonesia ... this project is not only served as the bastion of colonialism and feudalism, which is enemies of our revolution, but also military and economic bases in that area have traditionally turn into bases of foreign domination in Southeast Asia]⁵⁵²

Both Nasution and Yani gave his support to the Brunei rebellions. Nasution overtly asked people who lived near the border with Sarawak, Kalimantan, to support the struggle of Azahari's group. He also offered military training to anti-Malaysia Federation rebels.⁵⁵³ His visit to the West Kalimantan in July 1963 provided a threatening image to the Malaysia supporter by encouraging local people including the Chinese descent to prepare for general mobilisation against Malaysia.⁵⁵⁴

To show his commitment to the *Konfrontasi*, Nasution did a manoeuvre by dispatching troops into East Kalimantan.⁵⁵⁵ Yani was furious following Nasution

551 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP 0034/D/10/4

552 Abdul Haris Nasution, "Amanat yang Mulia Wakil menteri Pertama Bidang Pertahanan dan Keamanan/Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata pada Hari Angkatan Perang ke XVIII pada 5 Oktober 1963 [Speech of HE Deputy First Minister for Defence and Security/Armed Forces Chief of Staff in the XVIII Armed Forces Day on 5 October 1963]," in Panitia Hari AP 1963 [Committee of 1963 Armed Forces Day], *Amanat-amanat Hari Angkatan Perang ke XVIII, 5 Oktober 1963 [Speeches in the XVIII Armed Forces Day, 5 October 1963]*, (Jakarta: Panitia Hari AP 1963)

553 Gordon, 385

554 Bunnell, "The Kennedy Initiatives," 515-517.

555 In February and March 1963, Nasution ordered deputy commander of *Wilayah Komando antar Daerah Kalimantan* (Inter-Kalimantan Regional Command) to dispatch the troops to the Indonesian-Malaysian border. Details regarding this incident will be explained later

bypassed the army's chain of command. Yani argued Nasution had no authority to deploy troops since held new post as KSAB.⁵⁵⁶ But Nasution defended the deployment of troops, especially for intelligence purposes, would counterbalance the PKI and Subandrio's movements toward the Malaysia issue.⁵⁵⁷

Furthermore, as time went on, Yani and Suharto changed their expression concerning the *Konfrontasi* with different reasons.⁵⁵⁸ As mentioned in Chapter 1 Section 1.1, Yani and Suharto were part of the group who supported the *Konfrontasi* half-heartedly. They curtailed their support toward the policy following the appointment of Air Force Commander in Chief, Air Marshall Omar Dani as the Alert Command (*Komando Siaga/KOGA*) commander. Yani perceived Dani's assignment might escalate the Indonesia-Malaysia tension quickly. Meanwhile Yani preferred to keep the conflict within manageable level, as he refused to deploy the Army Special Forces (*Resimen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat/RPKAD*). Other than that, the appointment also increased the interservice rivalry, as the air force leadership was closer to Sukarno than the army.⁵⁵⁹ Moreover, Suharto changed his mind over the *Konfrontasi* due to personal matter. He was disappointed with Sukarno's decision to appoint Dani as the KOGA commander. Suharto felt he deserved the commander job, as he had an experience in leading the Trikora Operation. From then on, he was resistant to Dani's leadership.⁵⁶⁰

in this chapter. Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP 0002/D/10/4 *Sebagian dari Laporan Triwulan ke I dan II tahun 1963, 27 Juli 1963* [Part of 1st and 2nd Quarterly Report Year 1963, 27 July 1963]

556 Based on Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No. 286/Plt/1962 dated 21 June 1962, Sukarno appointed Nasution as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. ANRI, *Daftar Arsip Statis Sekretariat Negara RI: Seri Produk Hukum Tahun 1949-2005 (Keputusan Presiden – Penyelenggara Pemerintahan, Instruksi Presiden) Volume IV* No 7387.

557 Sundhaussen, "The Political Orientations," 546.

558 Changing view of Yani and Suharto toward the *Konfrontasi* will be explained further in Chapter Four.

559 Mrazek, 138.

560 Detail explanation of Dani-Suharto tension will be presented in Chapter Four.

Although intraservice rivalry also happened in the air force and the navy, those internal dynamics did not affect the implementation of the *Konfrontasi* policy significantly. Both the air force and the navy still sent their Special Forces troops to take part in the intelligence operation, called Operation A.⁵⁶¹ Dani who later became the Commander of the *Dwikora* Operation said his troops were ready to uphold the *Konfrontasi* mission.⁵⁶² Navy Commander in Chief, Vice Admiral RE Martadinata also shared similar stance. In his speech in the XVIII Armed Forces Day on 5 October 1963, Martadinata said

Kita tentang proyek ini (Federasi Malaysia) karena ia merupakan bahaya langsung bagi negara kita. Karena ia merupakan ancaman langsung bagi sendi-sendi kehidupan bangsa kita di segala bidang. Kita lakukan konfrontasi total. Konfrontasi terhadap benteng kolonialisme dan imperialisme. Inilah tugas utama kita dewasa ini.

[We reject this project (the Malaysia Federation), because it is an direct threat to our country. It is a direct threat to all sectors of our nations' livelihoods. We advocate a total confrontation. A confrontation against the bastions of colonialism and imperialism. This is our main task at present].⁵⁶³

Subandrio had own reflection regarding the Malaysia Federation issue. He appeared to see the Malaysia Federation issue in a contradictory manner. On one occasion, he considered opposing the Federation plan because the creation of the Malaysia Federation would boost China's influence in the region. As the Chinese minority dominated the Indonesian economy, the Malaysia Federation would create the opportunity for China to expand her influence.⁵⁶⁴

561 The Air Force's Quick Reaction Force Command (*Komando Pasukat Gerak Cepat*/PGT) and The Navy's Marines Command (*Korps Komando*/KKO) were involved in the Operation A. Detail regarding Operation A will be elaborated further in this chapter.

562 Departemen Angkatan Udara [Department of Air Force], "*Perintah Harian* [Daily Orders] on 5 October 1963," in Panitia Hari AP 1963 [Committee of 1963 Armed Forces Day], *Amanat-amanat Hari Angkatan Perang ke XVIII, 5 Oktober 1963* [Speeches in the XVIII Armed Forces Day, 5 October 1963], (Jakarta: Panitia Hari AP, 1963)

563 RE Martadinata, "Amanat Menteri/Panglima Angkatan Laut pada Hari Angkatan Perang ke XVIII pada 5 Oktober 1963 [Speech of Minister/Navy Commander in Chief in the XVIII Armed Forces Day on 5 October 1963]," in Panitia Hari AP 1963 [Committee of 1963 Armed Forces Day], *Amanat-amanat Hari Angkatan Perang ke XVIII, 5 Oktober 1963* [Speeches in the XVIII Armed Forces Day, 5 October 1963], (Jakarta: Panitia Hari AP 1963)

564 Michael van Langenberg, "Dr Subandrio – an Assessment," *The Australian Quarterly*, XXXVIII, No 4 (December 1968), 73

For his stance toward China, in July 1960, the PKI criticised the Cabinet, especially Subandrio.⁵⁶⁵ According to Arto, Subandrio viewed China as a major potential enemy to Indonesia in 1961. China would target Indonesia because of the unexploited natural resources that Indonesia had.⁵⁶⁶ By her superiority, both in number of people and armed forces capability, China would easily dominate the Southeast Asia region.⁵⁶⁷ At that time, Subandrio did not overtly object the Malaysia Federation proposal. He posited that Indonesia had payed little attention to it.⁵⁶⁸ According to Van Der Kroef, the initial response of Subandrio regarding the Federation proposal was to acknowledge it as a “matter entirely for the people concern”.⁵⁶⁹ On 6 April 1964, Subandrio reiterated the reason of Chinese when he told the London Times that Britain and Indonesia shared similar a aim in Southeast Asia, the containment of the Chinese.⁵⁷⁰

However, on a separate occasion, Subandrio came up with a different view regarding the Federation idea. He denoted that the establishment of the Federation was aimed to contain Indonesia. Although Rahman gave the shelter and protection to the West Sumatra rebels, Subandrio argued Indonesia never intend to show hostile attitude toward Malaysia.⁵⁷¹ Like Sukarno, Subandrio also underlined the *Konfrontasi* would not lead into open war against Malaysia. The policy was a form of response to the Malaysian hostile attitude.⁵⁷² He stated

Bukanlah bahwa Indonesia atau Revolusi Indonesia takut pada pembentukan ‘Malaysia’ yang mempunyai penduduk 10 juta, akan tetapi yang harus kita tentang demi keselamatan kita sendiri ialah negara Malaysia sebagai alat imperial untuk membendung dan

565 Ricklefs, 325

566 Arto, 184.

567 Mukmin, 91

568 Langenberg, 74

569 Justus M van der Kroef (1961) as quoted in Langenberg, 74

570 Brackman, 153

571 TNA, DO 187/25, “Indonesian News,” 16 December 1963

572 TNA, DO 187/26, “Subandrio: Indonesia Compelled to Adopt Confrontation Policy Against Malaya’s Hostile Policy,” 21 January 1963

mengepung kita

[It is not that Indonesia or Indonesian Revolution is afraid of the creation of "Malaysia", which has ten million people, but the thing that we should reject was Malaysia state as an imperialist tool to contain and encircle us]⁵⁷³

Undoubtedly, the *Konfrontasi* was the key event for the PKI's rejuvenation. The Party was expecting political benefit from the hostility policy. The PKI exploited the anti-Malaysia campaign for three aims: (a) to inculcate a racial mood in Indonesia, (b) to strengthen its position in domestic politics⁵⁷⁴ and (c) to attach the PKI programme with Sukarno's anti-colonial policy.⁵⁷⁵ Mortimer added the PKI perceived the Federation as the threat of renewed American influence in Indonesia, as the Soviet Union had helped to shift the orientation of Indonesia's foreign policy away from the West.⁵⁷⁶ Although, according to Bunnell, in late 1962, the PKI found itself in jeopardy as it was vulnerable to the army's harassment and denied access to a substantive share of government power.⁵⁷⁷

The PKI had begun its anti-Malaysia campaign in 1961. At that time, Indonesia still had a problem with the Dutch over West Irian and put little concern to the Federation issue. After the Irian dispute was resolved, Aidit tried to influence Sukarno to push another anti-western campaign.⁵⁷⁸ The PKI perceived the Federation as 'a new concentration of colonial forces on the very frontiers of Indonesia.'⁵⁷⁹ By the end of 1961, the PKI condemned the Federation idea as 'a form of colonialism', and attempted to suppress democracy in Malaysia.⁵⁸⁰ They

573 Subandrio, *Keterangan Pemerintah tentang susunan baru dan regrouping Kabinet Kerja dalam rapat pleno terbuka DPR-GR pada 11 Desember 1963* [Government explanation regarding new structure and regrouping of Working Cabinet in the Open Plenary Session of Parliament on 11 December 1963]

574 Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965*, (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006), 204

575 Quiko, 122

576 Mortimer, 203

577 Bunnell, "The Kennedy Initiatives," 240.

578 Sundhaussen, "The Political Orientations," 533.

579 Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 77

580 Justus M Van Der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of Power," *Pacific Affairs*, 37, 4 (1964): 360. doi:10.2307/2755130.

urged the Indonesian people and government to increase vigilance against the creation of Malaysia Federation.⁵⁸¹

Malaysian observed the PKI was behind of the hostilities and aggressive behaviours toward them.⁵⁸² Tunku has been under pressure from the opposition following the announcement of the Federation plan. The Party *Rakyat* (the Marxist Socialist Front) and *Barisan Sosialis* (Socialist Front) Party in Malaya started opposing the Malaysia concept. To put more political pressure, the anti-Malaysia opposition counted on the PKI as a source of support.⁵⁸³ The PKI was the largest or second largest communist party outside the East Bloc with 1.5 to 1.8 million members.⁵⁸⁴ Thus, Rahman considered the core problem for his country was the communist threat to the region.⁵⁸⁵

At that time, Indonesia was more likely inclined to the Communist Bloc due to the massive influence of the PKI.⁵⁸⁶ Rahman's sentiment toward Sukarno as a Communist-inspired Indonesian therefore was unavoidable. Sukarno needed the PKI support to remain in power and to offset the army's pressure. In addition, he also desired to use the communist global network to boost his profile.⁵⁸⁷ So, it is not surprising that Sukarno then overtly admitted the support for the TNKU was Aidit's idea. Sukarno stated

Kita bersimpati pada perjuangan rakyat Kalimantan Utara... Segala perbuatan kita untuk bersimpati, memberi bantuan pada perjuangan daripada rakyat yang ingin merdeka, segala hal ini Bung Aidit punya buatan

[We are sympathetic to the struggle of the people of North Kalimantan... All of our actions to sympathise give support to people

581 Quiko, 120

582 Mahmud, 76.

583 Van Der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism," 360

584 Guy J Pauker, "Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia," *Asian Survey*, 1, 3 (1961): 29 doi:10.2307/3023643.

585 Quiko, 150

586 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 29

587 Quiko, 123

who seek independence, are developed by Aidit]⁵⁸⁸

Promotion of the *Konfrontasi* policy by key actors was understandable in terms of maintaining close relationships with Sukarno. As Sukarno remained the prime source of legitimation of the Guided Democracy, all actors had no choice but to perform an echo function.⁵⁸⁹ Whilst the move from liberal to guided democracy meant a change to a one-man administration, Sukarno was the only one source of Indonesian political norms.⁵⁹⁰ He successfully consolidated his authority and power, which was accompanied by declining of the influence of other governmental agencies.⁵⁹¹ So, all key actors would not go far beyond the President in supporting his programmes. The next section elaborated the covert military operation, called Operation A following the increasing tensions with Malaysia.

3.5 Operation A

This section assesses the process of conflict escalation prior to the *Dwikora* Operation. The illustration adapts three stages process of escalation proposed by Mackie as follows: Stage I (December 1962 – April 1963), Stage II (April – September 1963) and Stage III (September 1963 – Mei 1964).⁵⁹² The discussion covers several overt and covert military operations, peace process attempts and two organisational changes that affected the ABRI. Some key issues that emphasised in this part are: (a) restructuring of ABRI, (b) bypass

588 *Amanat Presiden Sukarno pada 13 Februari 1963* in Pengurus Besar Front Nasional, *Jalankan Panca Program*, 18.

589 Bunnell, "The Kennedy Initiatives," 248

590 Selo Sumarjan, "Guided Democracy and Our Cultural Tradition," in *Indonesian Political Thinking*, ed. Feith and Castles, 129

591 Hirtzel, 132.

592 However, Mackie expanded the period of Stage III from September 1963 to June 1964. He included the failing Tokyo Conference in June 1964. As a matter of consistency, the present research acknowledges Stage III during September 1963-May 1964. This refers to the launching of the Dwikora by Sukarno on 3 May 1964. Mackie, *Konfrontasi*, 200-238

chain of command case, (c) organisational overlaps due to the establishment of the KOTI, and (d) major covert military operation, codename Operation A.

Tensions in the border of Kalimantan Island had increased since January 1963. But, Indonesia's concern over Malaysia had started years before the period of *Konfrontasi*. Prior to 1958, Malaysia noted that the Indonesian intelligence activities in Malaysia and Singapore were poor in coordination and preparation.⁵⁹³ But, those problems were sorted since Maj Gen Gusti Pangeran Haryo Jatikusumo led the Consul-General in Singapore on 13 November 1958.⁵⁹⁴ Indonesia through Consul-General in Singapore intensified her intelligence activities in the Malayan Peninsula. Indonesian government argued that all the intelligence activities were increased in Singapore because this city was believed to be a central-hub for foreign intelligence network in the region and was involved in some insurrections in Indonesia. Later Sukarno officially assigned Jatikusumo to uphold the 'Crush Malaysia' mission. In his speech during the inauguration of Jatikusumo as an Ambassador for Malaya on 11 April 1963, Sukarno stated

Dan saya minta saudara nanti sebagai Dutabesar Luar Biasa dan Berkuasa Penuh di Kuala Lumpur pun menyelenggarakan sama-sama-sama dengan kita berjuang yang hebat ini agar supaya kita nanti benar-benar hidup di dalam satu dunia tanpa penjajahan, tanpa kolonialisme, tanpa neo-kolonialisme, agar supaya kerangka yang nomor tiga daripada Revolusi Indonesia benar-benar terlaksana.

[And I ask you as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Kuala Lumpur to fight together with us, so we could live in a world without occupation, colonialism, neo-colonialism, so that the third framework of the Indonesian Revolution could be implemented.]⁵⁹⁵

593 Ministry of Internal Security Malaysia, *Indonesian intentions towards Malaysia*, (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1964), 12

594 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 31-32

595 ANRI, *Pidato Presiden Republik Indonesia 1958-1967* No 475

Following the increasing dispute, British troops were deployed in Kalimantan in order to defend the Malaysia Federation. British, Malaysians, Australian and New Zealander troops were involved in the battles in Kalimantan.⁵⁹⁶ Since mid-1963, the US position was also clear. The US supported the Malaysia Federation. However, Americans refused to lead the hostility against Indonesia and preferred Britain, Australia and New Zealand to take the lead.⁵⁹⁷

The Indonesian government noted that British airplanes violated airspace two times in January 1963.⁵⁹⁸ Gurkha troops also had crossed the border of Indonesia almost one kilometre for the first time on 28 January. As a reaction to those violations, Subandrio said “*jika Malaya tetap melanjutkan sikap permusuhannya, maka bentrokan-bentrokan tidak dapat dicegah lebih lama lagi* [if Malaya continue its hostilities, then clashes are unavoidable any longer].”⁵⁹⁹

It is also noteworthy that the government had improved the structure of the Indonesian Fighting Forces Organisation (*Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia/APRI*).⁶⁰⁰ The government merged all services and the police under a single institution, the ABRI, since 21 June 1962.⁶⁰¹ The new structure, as depicted in Figure 3-1, located on the next page, was led directly by Sukarno as Supreme Commander of the ABRI. Regarding the administrative affairs of the ABRI, the Supreme commander was assisted by the Armed Forces Staff (*Staf Angkatan Bersenjata/SAB*) Office. This office was led by the KSAB. Sukarno appointed Nasution to lead the SAB as this position should be held by senior officer. In delivering his tasks on daily basis, the KSAB was helped by three

596 Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation*, 2

597 Hall, Ross and De Heer, *Comparative Study*,

598 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 36

599 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 37.

600 Prior 1962, the official name of the Indonesian Armed Forces was *Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia* (the Indonesian Fighting Forces). This was a result of the Dutch–Indonesian Round Table Conference in 1949. During this period (1949–1962), the Police was not part of the Fighting Forces. Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI [Centre for the Indonesian Military History], *Sejarah Organisasi TNI* [History of the Indonesian Military Organisation]. (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, 2014), 97–163

601 The establishment of ABRI was based on Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 225/Pt/1962 dated 21 June 1962

deputies, namely Deputy for Operations, Deputy for Management and Special Deputy. The Deputy for Operations was responsible for intelligence and operations affair. Meanwhile, Deputy for Management was dealing with materials, logistics, manpower, finance and personnel. The Special Deputy dealt with any affairs that were not covered by the other deputies.⁶⁰²

Although all military services and the Police were merged under the new structure, Nasution did not have the authority to make any command. Sukarno curtailed Nasution's influence in the military. Under the new structure, Nasution only had limited authority for military management. He also could not interfere with the operations.⁶⁰³ Meanwhile, Sukarno boosted his position by putting all military commanders directly under his leadership.




Figure 3-1 Structure of the ABRI

Source: *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 225/Plt/1962 dated 21 June 1962.

602 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Sejarah Organisasi TNI*, 164-166

603 According to Article 7 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 225/Plt/1962, Deputy for Operations only had coordinating role for all operations in the fields. However, this Presidential Decree did not provide further explanation regarding the roles and tasks of the Armed Forces Staff Office

The idea of the restructuring of the APRI was discussed years before Sukarno issued the Presidential Decree in 1962. In 1958, First Minister Juanda started to implement this idea through establishing a committee led by the Deputy Minister for National Security, Lieut Gen Hidayat. This committee consisted of all military chief of staffs and Chief of National Police.⁶⁰⁴ As a result, this committee proposed a new structure of the Armed Forces. The new structure would be led by the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. However, Sukarno rejected this idea, as he preferred controlling the Armed Forces directly.⁶⁰⁵ Meanwhile, the KSAB only had authority in administrative affairs.⁶⁰⁶

Feith explained the army's role in political affairs had decreased since the creation of ABRI. The army was being less anti-communist and inclined to pursue policies different from the President.⁶⁰⁷ Many officers involved in administrative, political and managerial tasks. In this regard, Sukarno received two political advantages from the establishment of the ABRI. First, Sukarno could reduce Nasution's monopoly in the army. Since 1959, Sukarno worried about the domination of the Nasution faction in the ABRI.⁶⁰⁸ Nasution was considered as anti-communist prominent leader. Hence, the establishment of the ABRI and appointment of Yani boosted Sukarno's position in military institution. Feith added that although army officers were still having power in many fields, their influence has been fragmented.⁶⁰⁹ Second, the new structure secured Sukarno-dominated polity by enabling him to embrace any military

604 Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi Markas Besar TNI, *Sejarah TNI, JILID III*, 1

605 Nasution explained only the air force and the police opposed the idea of integrating the armed forces. The navy, Nasution claimed, supported the idea. AH Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama* [Fulfilling the Duty Calls, Volume 5: Memories of the Old Order Era], (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1985), 362

606 Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi Markas Besar TNI, *Sejarah TNI, JILID III*, 1-2

607 Feith, "President Soekarno," 977

608 Humaidi, 26

609 Between 1958-1962, the relationship between Sukarno and the army was roughly equal. Nasution, during this period, could maintain a high degree of cohesion in relation to political affairs. Herbert Feith, "President Soekarno," 977

service to support his policy.⁶¹⁰ This was the result of the new position of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, which all services were lined up behind Sukarno. But, intra and interservice rivalry were more intense after the new structure was imposed. The following paragraphs will provide the evidence of military rivalry.

According to Mackie, the pre-*Dwikora* Operation period might be divided into three stages.⁶¹¹ Stage I (December 1962-April 1963), *the Konfrontasi as 'war of words'*. In this stage, there were propaganda wars between Indonesia and Malaysia following the Brunei Revolt. The Indonesian government gave overt support to the revolt as the implementation of anti-colonial sentiment. The Malaysia Federation was seen as neocolonialist and imperialist project.⁶¹² There was no direct military involvement in this stage. During this period, the air force delivered four operations to perform low-level show of force.⁶¹³ First, *Operasi Terang Bulan I* (Operation 1st Moonlight) on 27-28 December 1962. In Singapore, Malaya and Kalimantan border, several strategic bombers TU-16 performed show of force in response to the expanding British military in those areas. Second, *Operasi Terang Bulan II* (Operation 2nd Moonlight) on 11-22 January 1963. For this operation, several TU-16 flew over the West Kalimantan. Third, *Operasi Saputangan* (Operation Handkerchief) on 18 February. This operation employed several TU-16 KS, Hercules and Albatros. Fourth, *Operasi Waspada* (Operation Alert) on 19 February. In this operation, the air force flew several TU-16 to conduct show of force. The ABRI report also identified that the British had violated Indonesian airspace and land border territory eight times during January-March 1963.⁶¹⁴ Meanwhile, Malaysia accused the ABRI was

610 Humaidi, 25

611 JAC Mackie, "Low-Level Military Incursion: Lessons of the Indonesia-Malaysia 'Confrontation' Episode, 1963-66," *SDSC Working Paper* No 105, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1986), 10-16

612 Mackie, "Low-Level Military," 10-11

613 Trihadi, *Sejarah Perkembangan Angkatan Udara* [History of the Development of the Air Force], (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah ABRI, Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan, 1971), 59-60

614 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP 0027/D/10/4 *Malaysia*

helping the revolt by providing TNKU troops training at Malinau, North Kalimantan.⁶¹⁵

As stated previously in this chapter, the *Konfrontasi* had created a high degree of political friction between Nasution and Yani. Although, Yani explicitly supported the TNKU, he remained cautious about the involvement of the troops in helping the struggle for independence in North Kalimantan. He argued the army was waiting for the orders. Even when two divisions of volunteers in West Kalimantan were ready to help the TNKU, he still asserted, “we must be careful and wait for orders.”⁶¹⁶

It is notable that Nasution bypassed the army chain of command during this stage. According to the new ABRI structure, Nasution did not have any authority to command any troops. But, he did a manoeuvre by commanding the Inter-regional commander for Kalimantan, Brig Gen Hassan Basry, to deploy his troops into the Indonesian-Malaysian border in East Kalimantan shortly after the Brunei Revolt. Basry then assigned one company, known as the *Kompi* (Company) T, led by First Lieut Hamdi Silam from the Battalion 600R to help the TNKU gain independence.⁶¹⁷ Battalion 600R was a reserve battalion for the Inter-regional command for Kalimantan. The *Kompi* T consisted of 95 personnel and accompanied by small group from East Kalimantan, led by Major Mulyono, as local guide. On 23 January 1963, this company departed from Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan, to Puruk Cahu by using a motorboat *KM Barito I*. Basry also accompanied the *Kompi* T to Puruk Cahu. On 2 February, the *Kompi* T dispatched from Puruk Cahu to Long Nawang by using a motorboat.

615 Mackie explained the rebellion was receiving support prior to the revolt. The training was held at Malinau, North Kalimantan, under the auspices of East Kalimantan military commander, Colonel Suharyo. Suharyo was known as ‘leftist’ officer. Mackie, “Low-Level Military,” 10; see also Ministry of Internal Security Malaysia, *Indonesian intentions*, 25-51. However, none of military document explained the Malinau’s training. Indeed, during the *Trikora* Operation against the Dutch over the West Irian dispute, Indonesia has recruited many volunteers from Malaya and Singapore. Those volunteers had joined military training. After the Indonesian government launched the policy of *Konfrontasi*, those volunteers were used for uphold ‘The Crush Malaysia’ mission. Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 30

616 TNA, DO 187/27, Letter from JC Petersen to JE Cable, 8 February 1963

617 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP 0002/D/10/4

Yani tried to stop the deployment by sending a radiogram No 0304/S/1963 to Basry on 13 February. Yani stated the deployment was not under his authorisation. However, Basry disobeyed Yani by not passing the instruction to the *Kompi T*. As Basri ignored the command, Yani then tried to intercept the deployment by ordering the Battalion 600R commander, Major Sasmita to approach Silam. The Army Headquarter also attempted to withdraw the *Kompi T* through military communication line and state owned radio station (*Radio Republik Indonesia/RRI*). Still, Silam disobeyed Yani's order and presumed the order was inciting statement.

Indeed, Yani's efforts affected the soldiers' morale and unity. On 5 May, while in transit in Penyungkat, East Kalimantan, cohesion of the *Kompi T* was significantly weakened. At least, 35 soldiers preferred to follow Yani's command, go back to the military base in Banjarmasin. Meanwhile, the rest of the *Kompi T* members still continued the journey to Long Nawang, near the Indonesian-Malaysian border. Again, in the middle of the journey, several members decided to go back to the base. When they arrived at Long Nawang, the total members of the *Kompi T* were 52 personnel. All of them were committed to help the rebellion and never abort the mission. They only would obey a command from Basry or Sukarno.⁶¹⁸ British noted the *Kompi T* had held several guerrilla trainings for locals including six Bruneis. Two of them were Azahari bin Jais and Abdul Samad who in June crossed into Sawarak with instructions to contact local TNKU rebels and gave military training.⁶¹⁹ On 13 May, the *Kompi T* left Long Nawang and went to Sabah territory. Since that day, the army command lost contact with the *Kompi T*.⁶²⁰ The main transits of the *Kompi T* in Kalimantan are represented in Figure 3-2.

618 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP 0002/D/10/4

619 TNA, DEFE 7/2389, "Recent Developments in Anglo-Indonesian Relations including a Record of Indonesian Activities Concerning Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei, September 1963.

620 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP 0002/D/10/4



Figure 3-2 Maps of Kalimantan Island
 Source: Google Maps and www.drodd.com

It is inevitable that the diplomatic tension was heightened during this period. British government indicted Indonesian government encouraging anti-Malaysia activities in North Kalimantan. Also, the Indonesian Consular officials in Jesselton, North Kalimantan, Major Munarjo and Bambang Sumali, were accused that they conducted improper activities such as provided assistance to prepare anti-Malaysia movement and offered military training to the North Kalimantan citizens.⁶²¹ The Indonesian Consulate at Jesselton opened on 29 June 1961 and employed six Indonesian.⁶²² Later, British complained the activities and urged the Indonesian government to withdraw Munarjo and Sumali.⁶²³ But, Subandrio rejected the accusation and insisted the government

621 TNA, FO 371/169898, Telegram No. 268, North Borneo to S. of S., 22 April 1963; TNA, FO 371/169899, Telegram No. 888, Foreign Office to Jakarta, 30 May 1963.

622 TNA, FO 371/169898, Telegram No. 235, Secretary of State for the Colonies to North Borneo, 7 March 1963.

623 TNA, FO 371/169899, Telegram No. 830, Foreign Office to Jakarta, 25 May 1963

was not involved in any secret activities in Kalimantan. As a consequence, Indonesian government refused to withdraw Munarjo and Sumali.⁶²⁴ On 12 July, British government officially declared Munarjo and Sumali *persona non grata*.⁶²⁵ As a preventive action, British police also arrested at least 26 Indonesians who were living in North Kalimantan.⁶²⁶ Following the escalation, British government also rejected the appointment of Muhammad Jen as Vice Consul in North Borneo.⁶²⁷ The Indonesian government then retaliated by also declaring the British Vice-Consuls in Medan and in Surabaya *persona non grata* on 26 July.⁶²⁸

As the problem of West Irian was resolved, Sukarno lifted the emergency 'state of danger' status on 1 May 1963. He then dissolved the KOTI Permibar on 19 July. But, following the rising tension with the Malaya, Sukarno established the 'new' Supreme Operational Command (*Komando Operasi Tertinggi/KOTI*).⁶²⁹ As illustrated in Figure 3-3, the main task of the KOTI was to ensure the implementation of government programme, especially the *Konfrontasi* against any counter revolutionary elements.⁶³⁰ This command was led directly by Sukarno as Supreme Commander of the KOTI. For daily business, Sukarno was assisted by the Joint Staffs. The Joint Staffs consisted of several units and was led by the Chief of Staff. And he assigned Yani to hold the position of the Chief of Staff. Thus, from then on, Yani occupied two strategic posts, the KOTI Chief of Staff and Army Commander in Chief.

624 TNA, FO 371/169899, Telegram No. 700, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 10 July 1963

625 TNA, FO 371/169899, Telegram No. 1079, Foreign Office to Jakarta, 12 July 1963

626 Department of Foreign Affairs, *Indonesia 1963 Looking Back over the Year*, (Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1963), 188

627 TNA, FO 371/169898, Telegram No. 235, Secretary of State for the Colonies to North Borneo, 7 March 1963.

628 Department of Foreign Affairs, *Indonesia 1963*,

629 Bagian Sejarah KKO AL [History Section of the Marine Corps], *Korps Komando AL dari Tahun ke Tahun* [Marine Corps Year by Year], (Jakarta: Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 1971), 322

630 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 142/1963 dated 19 July 1963




Figure 3-3 Structure of the KOTI

Source: *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 142/1963 dated 19 July 1963

The overlapping institution is unavoidable. Sukarno failed to create clear division of the scope of work between the cabinet and the KOTI. As mentioned earlier, the KOTI has main task to ensure government programmes. The complication was inescapable when Sukarno also assigned the main function of the KOTI as to evaluate, plan, control and oversee government programmes by coordinating all national resources.⁶³¹ Several cabinet members held strategic positions of the KOTI.⁶³² Ideally, separation of decision and risk-bearing functions in large corporations like government is an effective approach to controlling the institutional problems.⁶³³ In this regard, member of the KOTI was playing central role in ensuring better exercise of monitoring government program. So, the over centralisation of power in executive position was an evident that the KOTI was not an effective instrument for decision control. The

631 Article 2 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 142/1963 dated 19 July 1963

632 They were Army Commander in Chief, Yani as Chief of Staff of the KOTI; Foreign Affairs Minister, Subandrio as First Joint Chief for Intelligence; and Cooperatives Minister Brig Gen Achmadi as Third Joint Chief for Manpower Deployment.

633 Eugene F Fama and Michael C Jensen, "Separation of Ownership and Control," *The Journal of Law & Economics* 26, No 2 (1983): 301-2.

combining of the KOTI and cabinet roles reduced monitoring abilities of the KOTI. In other words, role duality promoted poor performance and increased organisational problems. The overlapping scope of institutions work is represented in Figure 3-4, located on the next page.




Figure 3-4 Overlaps among Different Institutions
Source: Author

As stated previously, there were several meetings to solve the dispute between Indonesia and Malaya. The Foreign Ministerial Meeting at Manila on 7-11 July agreed to produce the first tripartite⁶³⁴ document, the *Manila Accord*. According to the Accord, both Indonesia and the Philippines agreed to welcome the Malaysia Federation and supported the presence of the Secretary General of the United Nations representatives in the North Kalimantan territory to oversee self-determination.⁶³⁵ The parties also agreed to maintain the stability and security of the area from any form of subversion.⁶³⁶ However, against the spirit of this accord, Britain and Malaysia insisted to establish the Federation on 31

634 Tripartite refer to Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines

635 Brackman, 181-182

636 Brackman, 181

August. They assured that the self-determination would reiterate the establishment of Malaysia Federation. On 9 July, a Malaysia agreement was signed at London between Malaya and the United Kingdom on behalf of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak.⁶³⁷ Sukarno was infuriated with the London Agreement. In view of Indonesia's refusal to the Malaysia Federation, Sukarno insisted that stance was an implementation of "good morality of good neighbourly right."⁶³⁸

The highest achievement of political negotiation was a signing of the Manila Declaration on 3 August. This was a result of the Manila Summit Meeting between the Indonesian, Malayan and Philippines Head of State (30 July-5 August). This summit meeting also produced the Manila Accord and the Joint Statement.⁶³⁹ The three nations agreed "to take initial steps towards the establishment of Mapilindo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as *Mushawarah* Mapilindo."⁶⁴⁰ Within this context, the Joint Statement agreed "the responsibility for the preservation of the national independence of the three countries and of the peace and security in their region lies primarily in the hands of the governments and the peoples of the countries concerned."⁶⁴¹ Not only that, the parties also agreed to not allow the

637 Brackman, 182

638 Departemen Penerangan [Department of Information], *Amanat Presiden Sukarno pada Muktamar Kerja Para Sarjana Pertanian dan Kehutanan Seluruh Indonesia pada 20 Juli 1963 di Istana Negara, Jakarta* [President Sukarno for the Indonesia Agriculture and Forestry Congress on 20 July 1963 at the State Palace, Jakarta], (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1963), 12

639 Details of the results of Manila meeting see United Nations Treaty Series 1965, accessed February 25, 2017.

<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20550/volume-550-i-8029-english.pdf>

640 Mapilindo stands for Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. Meanwhile, *mushawarah* means joint consultation. Manila Declaration by the Philippines, the Federation of Malaya and Indonesia in United Nations Treaty Series 1965, accessed February 25, 2017. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20550/volume-550-i-8029-english.pdf>

641 Joint Statement by the Philippines, the Federation of Malaya and Indonesia in United Nations Treaty Series 1965, accessed February 25, 2017.

<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20550/volume-550-i-8029-english.pdf>

operating of foreign bases, directly and indirectly, to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries.⁶⁴²

Clearly, the Manila Declaration failed to reduce the tension between Indonesia and Malaya. The ABRI noted during August 1963, the British military had increased its strength in North Kalimantan.⁶⁴³ Nasution also interpreted the Manila Declaration by proposing the need of importing military weapons. This was a consequence of 'new responsibility' for maintaining security and stability of the Southeast Asia.⁶⁴⁴ Thus on 17 August Sukarno stated

Pendek kata, seluruh pangkalan asing di sekitar Indonesia dipakai sebagai pangkalan-pangkalan subversi terhadap Indonesia. Apakah, dengan fakta-fakta yang demikian itu, tidak beralasan, jika kita waspada terhadap penggabungan-penggabungan beberapa negeri sekeliling kita, apalagi jika kita tahu bahwa itu adalah proyek asing...

[In brief, all the foreign bases around Indonesia are utilised as bases of subversion against Indonesia. Bearing in mind those facts, could it be baseless, if we are vigilant to mergers of several countries around us, particular if we know that these are are foreign projects...]⁶⁴⁵

Furthermore, Stage III (September 1963-May 1964) consisted of *diplomatic, propaganda, economic and military pressures*. In this stage, Sukarno administration showed more aggressive in attitudes toward the Konfrontasi. Those actions were a response to the Malayan government decision on 26 August, that the Federation would be proclaimed on 16 September. Both Indonesia and the Philippines filed official protests to the Malayan government. The decision was disrespecting the Manila Agreement.⁶⁴⁶ One day before the proclamation, on 15 September, Indonesia overtly stated that it would not recognise the Federation. But, the Malayan government still insisted to

642 Joint Statement by the Philippines, the Federation of Malaya and Indonesia

643 During August 1963, British aircraft carrier, Albion, was arrived in North Kalimantan to boost its presence in the territory. Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 40

644 Brackman, 187

645 Departemen Penerangan, *Genta Suara*, 43

646 Brackman, 200-201

announce the establishment of the Federation. And mobs attacked the Malayan and British embassies in Jakarta following the declaration of Malaysia Federation.⁶⁴⁷ On 17 September, the Indonesian government cut all trade relations with Malaysia and Singapore. Sukarno administration also prohibited all airlines, both cargo and passenger, from Indonesia to offer flights to Malaysia destinations on 27 September.⁶⁴⁸ Later, the Crush Malaysia was officially part of three government programmes.⁶⁴⁹ In addition, on 2 April 1964, Sukarno administration ordered the freeze of accounts tied to Malaysia.⁶⁵⁰

To put more pressure, Sukarno banned Indonesians to listen to Malayan radio and television programme.⁶⁵¹ For those who disobeyed this decision, they might be sent to jail for a maximum of one year. Government also prepared sets of propaganda instructions regarding the *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia.⁶⁵² Deputy First Minister for Information, Ruslan Abdulgani, created tactical operational guidance for propaganda. The guidance also covered military, political and economic issues.⁶⁵³ To spread the messages, government utilised the state owned radio broadcast network (*Radio Republik Indonesia/RRI*).⁶⁵⁴ As this radio propaganda aimed to win the heart of Malayan and North Kalimantan

647 Brackman, 200-201

648 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 41

649 The three government programs were (a) food and clothing, (b) the Crush Malaysia, and (c) continuing development. Subandrio, *Keterangan Pemerintah*

650 Based on Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 74/1964, any account that tied with Malaysia, both owned by Malaysian who lived in Indonesia or Indonesian who lived in Malaysia, would be frozen. Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 74/1964 dated 2 April 1964.

651 Presidential Order (*Penetapan Presiden/Penpres*) No 13/1963 dated 4 November 1963

652 See for instance Deputy First Minister for Information Instruction No 02a/INSTR/1963 dated 1 October 1963; Deputy First Minister for Information Instruction No 03/INSTR/M/1963 dated 28 October 1963; Deputy First Minister for Information Instruction No 262/PMUAV/1963 dated 28 October 1963; Deputy First Minister for Information and Front National Minister Joint Instruction No 02a/INSTR/M/1963 and No. 006/INSTR/PBFN/XI/63 dated 1 December 1963

653 Deputy First Minister for Information Instruction No 02a/INSTR/1963 dated 1 October 1963

654 Deputy First Minister for Information Instruction No 03/INSTR/M/1963 dated 28 October 1963

people, it would be delivered in various languages, namely Indonesian, Tamil, Malay, English, Chinese, Acehnese and Arabic.

Until December 1963, government was emphasising more the implementation of Crush Malaysia programme on economic matters such as cutting off trade relations with Malaysia and Singapore.⁶⁵⁵ Therefore the KOTI prepared a plan to deliver the Crush Malaysia programme with military approach. Although, the emergency 'state of danger' status had ended on 1 May, the KOTI considered establishing joint operations in the eastern part of Indonesia.⁶⁵⁶ This action was part of maintaining security and public order. As a consequence, the KOTI would appoint operation commanders that had broad authority to control the public.⁶⁵⁷

By the end of 1963, Britain also acknowledged capability of the ABRI in delivering infiltration up to company size by sea, land and air. As demonstrated in the Trikora Operation in West Irian, the ABRI has shown its ability such operation. However, several limitations such as budget cut, poor maintainance of equipments, and lack of trainings would limit the effectiveness of the infiltration. Shortage of the logistics system, staffs and operational experience were also considered as constraints in delivering proper infiltration.⁶⁵⁸ British noted from 23 April-21 August 1963, at least 16 major incursions were made into Sarawak that involving the ABRI personnel.⁶⁵⁹

At Stage III, regular troops began to be deployed in Sumatra and Kalimantan. Due to increased tension between Indonesia and Malaysia, the KOTI coordinated an intelligence operation, called as Operation A, shortly after it was

655 This policy was based on Letter of Instruction (*Surat Perintah*) No 1/KOTOE/1963 dated 21 September 1963. Hidayat Mukmin, , 97; see also Subandrio, *Keterangan Pemerintah*

656 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 46/KOTI/1963 dated 28 November 1963

657 The Commander had authority to inspect, confiscate and detain person. This action aimed to uphold Indonesian Revolution objectives.

658 TNA, AIR 23/8645, Annex to JIC (FE) 3/63 (Final), 3 January 1963.

659 TNA, DEFE 7/2389, "Recent Developments in Anglo-Indonesian Relations including a Record of Indonesian Activities Concerning Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei, September 1963.

established on 19 July. Brig Gen Magenda⁶⁶⁰ led this operation. The activities of this operation included intelligence, counter-intelligence, psywar, sabotage, demolition, and reception committee in the enemy line.⁶⁶¹ Prior to the creation of KOTI, the covert operation was conducted by the ABRI since June 1963. It was a joint operation between the navy and the army.⁶⁶² This notion has been affirmed by British intelligence that the ABRI had resources and ability to carry out covert activities including propaganda and sabotage within Kalimantan territories.⁶⁶³

For the navy, implementation of Operation A was divided into two bases: Base VI in East Kalimantan to target Sabah and Base II in Riau to target the Malayan Peninsula and Singapore.⁶⁶⁴ As Malayan Peninsula and Singapore were main targets of the operation, the KKO divided Base II/KOTI into five sub-bases with different specific target, namely: (a) Sub Base X and its target was Singapore; (b) Sub Base Y and its target was western part of Johor; (c) Sub Base T and its targets were Negeri Sembilan, Selangor, Malaka and Kuala Lumpur; (d) Sub Base V and its target was Johor; and (e) Sub Base Z and its target was eastern part of Johor. The main tasks of the Base II/KOTI were creating military enclave, training Singaporean and Malayan to be insurgent, infiltration and attempting to separate Singapore and Malaysia. In the Operation A, the KKO employed 162 soldiers for the Base II/KOTI that comprised three teams: First Brahma Team (45), Second Brahma Team (50), Third Brahma Team (45), and Fifth Brahma Team (22). Meanwhile, for the Base VI/KOTI, the KKO deployed 142 soldiers, consisted two teams: Forth Brahma Team (107), and the X

660 Magenda was an army general who worked under First Joint Chief of Intelligence of the KOTI. During the Konfrontasi, he also was Director of Intelligence in the Armed Forces Staffs.

661 Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, *Korps Komando*, 322

662 Later, in 1964, the air force involved in this operation by deploying its Special Forces, Quick Reaction Force Command (*Komando Pasukat Gerak Cepat*/PGT). Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Udara [History Section of the Indonesian Air Force], *Sejarah Komando Pasukan Gerak Cepat (Kopasgat)*, *TNI Angkatan Udara* [History of Quick Reaction Force Command, the Indonesian Air Force], (Jakarta: Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Udara, 1977)

663 TNA, AIR 23/8645, Annex to JIC (FE) (62) 207 (Final), 24 December 1962.

664 Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 324-325

Platoon (35).⁶⁶⁵ The detail target areas of Base II/KOTI are represented in Figure 3-5.




Figure 3-5 Map of Target Areas of Base II/KOTI in Malayan Peninsula
Source: Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 327

Nevertheless, there was no detail explanation regarding how the army implemented the Operation A. The Army Headquarter assigned several regional military commands (*Komando Daerah/Kodam*) to strengthen border control in Kalimantan.⁶⁶⁶ The Army Central Command also deployed troops from Java to Kalimantan, for instance, the RPKAD, the 327 Airborne Battalion from West Java and the 438 Infantry Battalion from Central Java.⁶⁶⁷ But, none of military archives provide an explanation regarding the involvement of the army in the Operation A in 1963.

665 Jusuf, *Sejarah Perkembangan*, 203-204

666 They were Kodam IX/Mulawarman in East Kalimantan, Kodam X/Lambung Mangkurat in South Kalimantan, Kodam XI/Tanjung Bungai in Central Kalimantan, Kodam XII/Tanjung Pura in West Kalimantan. Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 39-40

667 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 39-40; Conboy mentioned the assignment of the 328 Raider Battalion in Kalimantan. This battalion conducted military incursion into Sarawak in November 1963. Ken Conboy, *Kopassus Inside Indonesia's Special Forces*, (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2003), 96-97.

In parallel with the manoeuvre of the KOTI, the Navy's Command Corps (*Korps Komando/KKO*) also assigned an operational task force that consisted of 530 personnel to East Kalimantan on 27 September 1963.⁶⁶⁸ The task force, led by Major Sumari P, has four main tasks, namely (a) to secure border area, (b) to protect insurgent who infiltrated the enemy zone, (c) to protect Indonesian who was expelled from enemy territory, and (d) to conduct civic mission.⁶⁶⁹ The group arrived at the Navy Station Command (*Komando Stasiun Angkatan Laut/Kosional*) in Tarakan, East Kalimantan, on 2 October. Later, it was splintered into several small units and spread into seven locations.⁶⁷⁰ This task force also has an intelligence group, known as the X Platoon. In this area, the task force implemented a military tactic of active defence⁶⁷¹. By employing this tactic, hopefully the task force could minimise military surprise.⁶⁷² In the beginning of deployment, this task force was under the *Kosional* in Tarakan, East Kalimantan. But, since October 1963, the task force officially was attached to the Base VI/KOTI. This action was aimed to avoid the unexpected outcome of infiltration that might harm government strategy over the *Konfrontasi*.⁶⁷³

The task force started its mission with lack of detailed data on enemy strength and the battlefield. As a result, the X Platoon Commander, Lieut Sutanto was killed while he led the team to identify enemy position at Matandak, Sabah. On 17 October, Sutanto with five marines and one volunteer went to Matandak to observe enemy strength. As this was covert operation, they were not wearing military uniform. The group was only equipped with two squad automatic weapons, one pistol and ten hand grenades.⁶⁷⁴ After cross the Indonesia-

668 This was an implementation of Marine Corps Commander Directive (*Direktif Panglima Korps Komando Angkatan Laut*) No 94/G/Rhs/KKO.62 dated 21 September 1963. *Bagian Sejarah KKO AL*, 271-272

669 *Bagian Sejarah KKO AL*, 272

670 *Bagian Sejarah KKO AL*, 272-273

671 In this sense, active defence means the employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks, both in enemy area and within area defence. *Bagian Sejarah KKO AL*, 274

672 *Bagian Sejarah KKO AL*, 274

673 *Bagian Sejarah KKO AL*, 324

674 *Bagian Sejarah KKO AL*, 275

Malaysia border, enemy ambushed the group. Sutanto lost his life in this incident.⁶⁷⁵ Up to January 1964, British highlighted the ABRI had launched at least 350 attacks under covert operation against Sabah and Sarawak. The British assumed the mission involved approximately 2,000 personnel.⁶⁷⁶

As the tension was heightened, the KKO also deployed one-light company troops (130 personnel), led by Lieut Sukarno, to Riau on 3 December 1963.⁶⁷⁷ This troop had different tasks with operation in Kalimantan. The tasks were (a) to protect sea border from trespasser, (b) to conduct counter intelligence, and (c) to eradicate illegal smuggling in the Malacca Strait.⁶⁷⁸ However, the most notable KKO incursion during this stage was Kalabakan raid on 30 December 1963. The KKO attacked the Malaysian military post in Kalabakan, Sabah. The raid involved the X Platoon, the Para Amphibious Reconnaissance Commando (*Komando Intai Para Amfibi/Kipam*) and volunteers.⁶⁷⁹ As a result, eight Malayan soldiers had lost their lives and 38 personnel were injured in this attack. Meanwhile, British claimed only 19 members of security forces were wounded.⁶⁸⁰ The KKO admitted has lost one soldier due to the incident.⁶⁸¹

Following the Kalabakan raid, the Indonesian government intensified the covert operations. On 27 January 1964, Sukarno assigned the KOTI to fully control the implementation of Operation A.⁶⁸² The First Joint Chief for Intelligence of the KOTI, Subandrio, was appointed to lead the operation. As the military incursions in Kalimantan continued, Sukarno assigned Yani as person in charge

675 Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 276

676 TNA, CAB 163/29, Annex to JIC(FE)11/64 (Final), 20 January 1964

677 Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 302

678 Illegal smuggling case was increased since Sukarno cut off the trade relationship with Malaya and Singapore.

679 Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 279-281

680 TNA, FO 371/169912, Telegram No 132, Singapore to Foreign Office, 31 December 1963

681 Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 281; Malaysian Defence Minister Dato Abdul Razak stated that 9 Malaysian troops had been killed. Malaysian also claimed that 2 of the attackers were killed and one captured. Kosut, 89.

682 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 04/KOTI/1964 dated 27 January 1964

of all military operations in North Kalimantan area.⁶⁸³ The KOTI also was authorised to mobilise all resources including the military forces.⁶⁸⁴

Several diplomatic initiatives were undertaken in order to reduce the tension in the region. The US President, Lyndon B Johnson, was quite active to solve the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia.⁶⁸⁵ In this context, President Johnson asked US Attorney General, Robert F Kennedy to go to Asia (17-26 January) to seek a peaceful way to end the conflict. Kennedy met Sukarno in Tokyo (17-18 January) and Jakarta (22-23 January). Soon after the meeting, Sukarno announced his intention to cease-fire.⁶⁸⁶ On 5-10 February 1964, the US government also arranged a foreign ministers meeting in Bangkok.⁶⁸⁷ The Thailand Foreign Minister Thanay Khoman hosted this meeting.⁶⁸⁸ However, the ministers – Subandrio of Indonesia, Tunku Abdul Razak of Malaysia and Salvador Lopez of the Philippines failed to reach an agreement on the status of the Indonesian based guerrillas in Sabah and Sarawak.⁶⁸⁹ Indonesia only would withdraw the volunteers from Sabah and Sarawak territory if Malaysia would return to the Manila Agreement.⁶⁹⁰ Again, the ministers met in Bangkok on 3-5 March. But, it also unsuccessful to reach a settlement, as Subandrio rejected the demand to withdraw the volunteers from Malaysian territory.⁶⁹¹

As the level of British military manoeuvres increased, the KOTI demanded all military services to increase the number of troops for Operation A. The ABRI noted at least 14 incidents of Indonesian airspace violation that were conducted

683 The military operations included the Operation A that conducted in North Kalimantan. Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 07/KOTI/1964 dated 1 February 1964. However, this Decree was signed by Yani himself on behalf of the President of Indonesia.

684 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 13/KOTI/1964 dated 10 March 1964

685 Kosut, 89.

686 Although, after Kennedy left Jakarta, Sukarno insisted to pursue the Crush Malaysia mission. Kosut, 89-90.

687 Kosut, 89-90

688 Brackman, 217

689 Kosut, 90.

690 Mackie, "Low-Level Military," 16

691 Kosut, 91

by the British military during March and April 1964.⁶⁹² In addition, the KOTI also requested the services to employ highly skilled soldiers. Thus the KKO assigned 300 personnel to be involved in the Operation A.⁶⁹³ As this was a covert mission, those troops would be regarded as volunteers, known as *Sukarelawan Kampret* (Kampret⁶⁹⁴ Volunteers). Prior to departure for mission, they attended special training for one month at Training Centre in Cisarua, West Java. The training covered intelligence, counter intelligence, sabotage, demolition, jungle warfare, guerrilla warfare etc.⁶⁹⁵ Soon after the training, the troops were deployed into the Base VI/KOTI in Kalimantan and the Base II/KOTI in Riau.

Sukarno was more aggressive to deliver the *Konfrontasi* policy. In many occasions, he often repeated in various speeches the 'message' of the danger of Malaysia Federation and the reason of why Indonesia had to oppose the Federation. He utilised this message to mobilise public support for the *Konfrontasi*. On 16 March, Sukarno started to campaign the anti-Malaysia volunteers movement. Sukarno claimed 21 million volunteers were ready to mobilise for the *Konfrontasi* mission.⁶⁹⁶ Indeed, number of volunteers has increased rapidly. Besides the PKI mobilised people to become volunteers, another reason of why people joined the voluntary mission was a hope of obtaining free food and clothing.⁶⁹⁷ Regarding the volunteers issue, Sukarno seemed to exploit the mass support and attach them to the Crush Malaysia

692 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP 0029/D/10/4 *Konfrontasi Malaysia* [The Malaysian Konfrontasi]

693 Marine Corps Commander Directive (*Direktif Panglima Korps Komando Angkatan Laut*) No 21/Rhs/KKO/64.

694 Literally *Kampret* is a popular microbat in Indonesia, especially Java.

695 Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 322

696 Departemen Penerangan [Department of Information], *Komando Presiden: Adakan Gerakan Sukarelawan Indonesia untuk Mempertinggi Ketahanan Revolusi Kita. Amanat Presiden Sukarno pada Penutupan Konferensi Presidium Kabinet Kerja dengan Catur Tunggal Seluruh Indonesia pada 16 Maret 1964 di Istana Negara, Jakarta* [Presidential Command: Indonesian Volunteers Movement to increase the resistance of our Revolution. Speech given by the President Sukarno in the closing of Working Cabinet and All-Indonesia Committee of Four Executive Boards Conference on 16 March 1964 in State Palace, Jakarta], (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1963)

697 TNA, FO 371/175274, Letter Jakarta to Foreign Office, 22 April 1964

campaign. In 1964, Sukarno issued several decrees and enacted new Law on the Indonesian Volunteers Movement.⁶⁹⁸ According to Mackie, Sukarno also repeated threaten to escalate the level of violence if Malaysia disobeyed the Manila Declaration.⁶⁹⁹

At this stage, the Indonesian government deployed volunteers to involve in several military incursions. The majority of them were local residents from Sabah and Serawak that felt threatened by the British military.⁷⁰⁰ Even though, British accused some regular army and the KKO appeared as volunteers and used for infiltration across the border.⁷⁰¹ Prior to involvement, the civilian volunteers got short military training from the ABRI.⁷⁰² However, the basic military training was insufficient to create skilful volunteers. Thus volunteer groups were easy to be captured or defeated by Malaysian and British military. To overcome this challenge, the ABRI attached limited personnel to volunteer groups to infiltrate the Malaysian territory.⁷⁰³ This action was also aimed to deter enemy's movement along border area.⁷⁰⁴

698 Several presidential decrees regarding volunteers are: *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 24/KOTI/1964 dated 16 May 1964; *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 29/KOTI/1964 dated 20 May 1964; and *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 147/1964 dated 10 June 1964. Meanwhile, on 14 August 1964, Sukarno enacted Law No 9/1964 on Indonesian Volunteers Movement.

699 Mackie, "Low-Level Military," 16

700 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 41

701 TNA, CAB 163/29, Annex to JIC(FE)11/64 (Final), 20 January 1964

702 Conboy explained Nasution facilitated the basics of guerrilla warfare training by authorised three trainers from the RPKAD. Conboy, 94-95

703 As it was covert operation, military personel also appeared as 'civilian'. Former Marines, who prefers to remain anonymous, explained, at that time, there was an offer for him and his colleagues to join the 'volunteers' group program. Any soldier who joined the program would be trained in a separate camp. Janatin and Tohir, who bombed the MacDonald House in Singapore on 10 March 1965, were part of the program. Interview with retired Marines' private soldier who was involved in the Operation A, 1 October 2015 in Jakarta.

704 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 44-45

3.6 Informal Main Actors Network

As explained previously, several main actors had indicated their position to the policy of *Konfrontasi*. During this period, all main actors in the ABRI showed their commitment over the *Konfrontasi* policy. Although, Omar Dani did not assign his troops yet in 1963 to the *Konfrontasi* mission, he exposed his commitment to advocate the operation.⁷⁰⁵ Meanwhile, both Nasution and Martadinata had overtly supported the *Konfrontasi* by authorising the troops to Kalimantan.⁷⁰⁶ To demonstrate his commitment, Nasution had done a cross command while he did not have any authority to deploy army's troops. Consequently, Yani irritated with Nasution and their relationship was not good due to this incident.⁷⁰⁷

Indeed, Yani, who was known as Sukarno loyalist, supported the TNKU rebellion. However, Yani did not consider utilising full hard power to solve the dispute. He preferred to maximise diplomacy rather than military approach in confronting the Malaysia Federation.⁷⁰⁸ Compare to Martadinata's action toward the *Konfrontasi*, Yani did not show his high enthusiasm to uphold the policy. He prevented the excess of the KKO operations in Kalimantan by attaching them into KOTI's operation.⁷⁰⁹ Certainly, he has been dragging his feet in bringing up the *Konfrontasi* policy. However, his determination to maintain the conflict as low as possible could be interpreted as an effort to ensure that the conflict would not lead to open war. This expression was similar to Sukarno. Although Sukarno overtly showed his intention to support the TNKU, he avoided the

705 Departemen Angkatan Udara, "*Perintah Harian*,"

706 Martadinata had assigned the KKO, while Nasution had ordered the Inter Regional Commander in Kalimantan Hassan Basry to dispatch troops to North Kalimantan.

707 Sundhaussen, "The Political Orientations," 546

708 Brackman, 206-207

709 Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 324

conflict lead to open war.⁷¹⁰ He was careful to avoid all –out military engagement that would pose greater risks to Indonesia.⁷¹¹

There are various degrees of relationship between main military actors and the PKI. Both Yani and Nasution were known as anti-communist. However, Yani adopted softer ‘tactics’ than Nasution toward the PKI. Yani replaced several regional commanders who were widely known as anti-communist hardliners.⁷¹² Meanwhile, both Dani and Martadinata had positive relationship with the PKI. They were less resistant to the PKI. On 5 April 1963, Dani was inviting the PKI’s leader, DN Aidit to give speech in the Air Force Department.⁷¹³ In addition, Martadinata did not liquidate the Navy’s Non-commission association (*Ikatan Bintara Angkatan Laut/IBAL*) that allegedly was linked to the PKI.⁷¹⁴

Furthermore, regarding the main actors from non-military, both Subandrio and the PKI were fully supporting the policy of *Konfrontasi*. Subandrio was directly involved in some political negotiations to solve the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute. He also took several communist political leaders from North Kalimantan to Bogor for political and paramilitary training.⁷¹⁵ Meanwhile, the PKI, as admitted by Sukarno, was having major influence toward the policy of *Konfrontasi*. The PKI’s leader, Aidit, was ‘architect’ of this policy.⁷¹⁶ The informal relationship among main actors is represented in Figure 3-6, located on the next page.

710 FRUS, 1964-1968, 5

711 Hirtzel, 136

712 Sundhaussen, “The Political Orientations,” 537

713 DN Aidit, *PKI dan AURI* [The PKI and the Indonesian Air Force], (Jakarta: Yayasan Pembaruan, 1963)

714 Interview with M2, 20 December 2016 in Jakarta; Former Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Sudomo, stated that the PKI has influenced the IBAL since 1955. Julius Pour, *Laksamana Sudomo, mengatasi gelombang kehidupan*, (Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1997), 170

715 Conboy, 94

716 *Amanat Presiden Sukarno pada 13 Februari 1963* in Pengurus Besar Front Nasional, *Jalankan Panca Program*, 18




Figure 3-6 Informal Main Actors Network Prior to the *Dwikora* Operation, 1963

Source: Author

3.7 Summary

This chapter set out to consider the relationship between the *Konfrontasi* policy and regional order within Southeast Asia during Cold War period. Political polarisation during Cold War has shaped the Indonesian foreign policy and influenced Sukarno. To this end, the chapter discusses the wider setting of the policy and the outset of the *Dwikora* Operation. This serves as the pretext for evaluating the detail account of the *Dwikora* Operation that will be discussed in Chapter Five.

When Sukarno introduced the *Konfrontasi*, Southeast Asia was an important frontier in the political and ideological struggle between the West and the East. Although, Sukarno applied the 'independent and active' foreign policy, in fact, Indonesia was closer to the Communist Bloc than the US. The Indonesian Armed Forces power, in particular the navy and the air force, had increased

significantly over the last decade. And Indonesia was a major recipient of Soviet development assistance in the region. But, the Soviet Union failed to influence Indonesian policy. And following the rising tension of Sino-Soviet rivalry, Indonesia preferred closer relations to China than the Soviet Union. Thus, Moscow did not support the policy of *Konfrontasi*.

In the beginning of the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, Indonesian key actors had a wide-ranging motivation over the policy. This situation clearly indicated that there was ongoing rivalry among main actors. They tried to show their commitment to supporting the government programme. By repeating and articulating Sukarno's idea over the *Konfrontasi* in many occasions, each key actor seemed to compete for securing Sukarno's attention. In particular, new structure of the ABRI had increased the level of intra and interservice rivalry. As Sukarno applied coercive diplomacy in dealing with Malaysia, the ABRI launched covert operation, called as Operation A. So, the tension between Indonesia and Malaysia was significantly heightened.

As will be presented in the following chapter, Sukarno would make a serious attempt to implement the *Konfrontasi* policy by launching military operation, called the *Dwikora* Operation. But this effort was curtailed by the deep-seated rivalries, both intra and interservice. Before turning to trace the failure of military operation, the examination of the *Dwikora* Operation is needed.

4 DWIKORA OPERATION AND ITS AFTERMATH

Hai rakyat Indonesia, hai seluruh sukarelawan, bantulah perjuangan rakyat Malaya, Singapura, Serawak, Brunei, Sabah untuk membubarkan "Malaysia" ini. Hanya satu jangan lupa, "Malaysia" ini membahayakan bukan saja kepada Republik Indonesia khususnya, tetapi membahayakan kepada Revolusi Indonesia, Revolusimu!

[Hey Indonesian people, hey all volunteers, please support the struggle of people of Malaya, Singapore, Serawak, and Sabah in dissolving this so-called "Malaysia". Do not forget one thing, this so-called "Malaysia" is not only dangerous for the Republic of Indonesia, but also endangering Indonesian Revolution, your Revolution!]

Speech of President Sukarno for the launching the *Dwikora* Command⁷¹⁷

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examined the *Dwikora* Operation. This chapter discussed in detail the causes and reasons of changing of the *Dwikora* Operation. It also highlighted and examined why the friction and rivalry of the Generals within the Indonesian military matter regarding the operation. By illustrating a detail account of the *Dwikora* Operation, this chapter aimed at providing the chronicle of how the politicisation of the Indonesian armed forces affected the entire operation. Thus, this part provided a comprehensive narrative of the *Dwikora* Operation. As well as Chapter Four, the purpose of this chapter was to achieve the third enabling objective (p.14), to discuss the implementation of the Indonesian military operations during the *Konfrontasi*.

⁷¹⁷ Departemen Penerangan [Department of Information], *Dwi Komando Rakyat untuk Pengganyangan "Malaysia": Amanat-Komando Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi/Pemimpin Besar Revolusi Indonesia, pada apel besar sukarelawan pengganyangan "Malaysia" pada 3 Mei 1964 di depan Istana Merdeka, Jakarta* [Twofold People Command for the Crushing "Malaysia": Command-speech given by the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia/Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution in a mass meeting of volunteers for the Crushing "Malaysia" on 3 May 1964 in front Merdeka Palace, Jakarta], (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1963), 26

This chapter starts by illustrating the initial stage of the *Dwikora* Operation. This part highlighted the uneasy relationship between Omar Dani and Ahmad Yani. The chapter then explained how the G30S affair affects the operation. It was during the second year of operation that the G30S affair shook Sukarno administration and gave Suharto momentum to capitalise his power. The chapter concluded with an illustration of how Suharto normalised the Indonesia-Malaysia tension.

This chapter is structured into five sections. The first section presented introduction of the chapter. The second section reviewed the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation in its first year of operation. The explanation outlined several key issues including intra-service clash and Suharto's Opsus, which was evidence of disunity of command during the *Konfrontasi*. The effect of the G30S affair on the *Dwikora* Operation is assessed in the third section. This part illustrated how Suharto challenged Omar Dani leadership and took full control of the *Dwikora* Operation. Moreover, the deepening peace process during the third year of the *Dwikora* Operation is discussed in the penultimate section. The fifth section provided the summary of the chapter.

4.2 First Year of the *Dwikora* Operation (1964-1965): Problems of Unified Command

This part examined the first year of implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation. This section highlighted some problems that emerged during the period and their effects on the *Dwikora* Operation. The intense rivalries have caused several problems such as the frequency-change of military operation structure, intra service clash, and Suharto's covert mission. Consequently, the KOGA failed to achieve certain targets and to deliver some military missions. Although, Operation A accomplished some sabotage actions in Singapore. In this regard, a rich array of illustrations from this period reflected the notion of complexity surrounding the *Konfrontasi*.

4.2.1 Frequency-change Organisational Structure

On 3 May, Sukarno officially declared the *Dwikora* comprised: (1) Strengthening the defence of the Revolution; (2) Supporting the revolutionary struggle of the people of Malaya, Singapore and Borneo to dissolve the puppet state of Malaysia.⁷¹⁸ Sukarno argued this decision was chosen because the Malaysian government refused to solve the dispute by referring to the Manila Agreement. He, in agreement with President Macapagal of the Philippines, affirmed that Asian problems should be solved by Asians themselves in Asian way.⁷¹⁹ As a consequence, the interference from non-Asian countries in Asian conflict resolution should be avoided.⁷²⁰

Following the declaration, Sukarno established the KOGA on 16 May.⁷²¹ The KOGA was a unified military command that had two aims, namely (a) to develop and conduct military operation to defend territory and help people of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah in dissolving the Malaysia; (b) to lead and employ all armed forces and volunteers to uphold the mission. Sukarno then appointed Air Force Commander in Chief as Commander of the KOGA.⁷²²

Furthermore, during the first year of the *Dwikora* Operation, the structure of military operation command changed four times. In the beginning of the *Dwikora* Operation, the structure of the KOGA was directed by a commander, assisted by two deputies and the Joint Staff. As represented in Figure 4-1, located on the next page, the Joint Staff was divided into four units: intelligence,

718 Departemen Penerangan, *Dwi Komando*, 27

719 The Asian way was also knowingly as the Sukarno-Macapagal doctrine. This was a result of bilateral meeting between Sukarno and Macapagal in Manila on 11 January 1964. Biro Research Umum Departemen Luar Negeri, "Confrontation Documents," 43-45.

720 Yani illustrated Asian way as the settlement of conflict between two Asian countries without interference from outside, non-Asian countries. TNA, FO 371/180316, Letter Jakarta to Foreign Office, 14 September 1965

721 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 23/KOTI/1964 dated 16 May 1964

722 However, on 16 May 1964, Sukarno did not overtly state Omar Dani as Commander of the Koga. *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 23/KOTI/1964 only mentioned the official position name, Air Force Commander in Chief served as Commander of the KOGA. On 2 June, Sukarno officially appointed Air Marshall Omar Dani as Commander of the KOGA. See *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 34/KOTI/1964 dated 2 June 1964.

operations, administrative and logistics. Below that, there were six main commands under direct control of the KOGA commander. They were: Air Defence Command, Strategic Command, Airborne Command, Amphibious Command, Tactical Command and Logistics Command.⁷²³ Each command consisted of a mixture of all branches. In addition, the KOGA commander was responsible to the President as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. It seemed that Sukarno did not have appropriate assessment in delivering *Dwikora* Operation. There was no further explanation regarding this structure. Sukarno only assigned the detail job description and would be provided later by Yani as Chief of Staff of the KOTI. Consequently, this situation posed complex challenges, which will be discussed further in this chapter, for the ABRI to execute the operation.




Figure 4-1 Structure of the Alert Command

Source: *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 28/KOTI/1964 dated 19 May 1964

It is notable that Sukarno administration did not have full intention to deliver open war with Malaysia and her allies. After less than a month, the main task of the KOGA was amended. On 2 June, Sukarno set the new main task of the

⁷²³ *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 28/KOTI/1964 dated 19 May 1964, signed by Yani as the Chief of Staff of the KOTI on behalf of the President of Indonesia.

KOGA that was only to prepare and deliver retaliation operation in enemy territory.⁷²⁴ The reason behind the change was referring to the current development of the *Konfrontasi* that might lead to open war.⁷²⁵

In conjunction with the new task, Sukarno improved the structure of the KOGA illustrated in Figure 4-2, located on the next page. According to the new decree, the Joint Staff was expanded into six units: intelligence, operations and training, personnel, logistics, territorial and communication.⁷²⁶ However, the new structure reduced Dani's authority as the KOGA commander. He could not command any combat elements directly. Although, the KOGA was still joint command, the new structure changed the approach of jointness.⁷²⁷ Unlike the old structure, Dani would direct several components that based on the capability of the services. Each component, which was led by a commander, had responsibility for operations of all deployed forces. If needed, Dani might establish the task forces.

In this sense, Sukarno might have political consideration while appointed Dani as Commander of the KOGA. By assigning Dani, Sukarno tried to reduce the domination over the operation. He seemed to control the implementation of military operation. It could be seen when Sukarno did not intend to launch air strike or escalate the conflict. Sukarno also prohibited Yani to infiltrate the army troops to Malayan Peninsula, but through Kalimantan.

It seemed that the new structure was a result of rivalry between Dani and Yani. Following the appointment of Dani, the intensity of rivalry between the army and the air force significantly increased. Yani noticed Dani's assignment might challenge its domination over the ABRI and disrupt his plan to expand the army

724 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 32/KOTI/1964 dated 2 June 1964

725 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 48-49

726 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 33/KOTI/1964 dated 2 June 1964, signed by the Chief of Staff of the KOTI, Ahmad Yani, on behalf of President Sukarno.

727 Mukherjee defined jointness as the ability of the army, the air force and the navy, to plan and operate in a mutually reinforcing manner. Anit Mukherjee, "Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military Relations in India," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 40,1-2 (2017): 6, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2016.1196357

strength. As explained in Chapter 3, Section 4.2, even though Yani committed to avoid open war he perceived the *Konfrontasi* as an occasion to build-up the army offensive capabilities. However, Dani brought extremely offensive professional doctrine when he led the KOGA. Mrazek explained, in 1963 Dani was rumoured to favour bombing missions against Malaysian territory, while the army resisted the mission.⁷²⁸




Figure 4-2 Structure of the Alert Command

Source: *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 33/KOTI/1964 dated 2 June 1964

As the ABRI remained under operational command of the Chief of Staff of KOTI and staffed largely with army officers,⁷²⁹ Yani, of course, could easily impede any of Dani's plans. And the new structure of the KOGA was evidence that Yani resisted Dani's leadership. The new decree, which was signed by Yani on behalf of President Sukarno, likely intended to ensure the continued army domination. The new decree possibly adapted the Army's Doctrine of Territorial

728 Mrazek, 137

729 Mrazek, 140.

Warfare.⁷³⁰ By applying component system, the central command should decentralise its authority. It means the implementation of the military operations would be decentralised to the components, while the military strategy was still centralised under the central command.⁷³¹

Indeed, rivalry between the army and the air force was already deep before the *Konfrontasi*. In July 1959, Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Marshall Suryadarma opposed Nasution command to be under control of Department of Security and Defence. Suryadarma argued the air force did not want to be directed by any army officer.⁷³² And following the significant air force and navy power build-up, officers from both services demanded a greater role in all fields and improvement of military policy and doctrine. However, those calls were often neglected by the central military command, which was dominated by the army. Deputy Commander of the Air Force, Air Commodore Sri Mulyono Herlambang argued his service was the best component to uphold any modern and offensive warfare. Meanwhile, the ABRI doctrine remained determined by the territorial spirit with the Land Forces as the primary actor.⁷³³

Furthermore, Dani faced, at least, five major problems to execute the *Konfrontasi* mission during his first quarter at the job. First, the Armed Forces still had to deliver counter insurgency operations in several provinces.⁷³⁴ Thus, the number of troops that were available and ready to deploy for *Dwikora*

730 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 33/KOTI/1964 dated 2 June 1964,

731 Detail explanation regarding the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare see Biro Research Departemen Luar Negeri [Research Bureau of Department of Foreign Affairs], *Perang Wilayah* [Territorial Warfare], (Jakarta: Biro Research Departemen Luar Negeri, 1962); Guy J Pauker, *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM- 3312-PR, November 1963)

732 At that time, Nasution was holding position as Security and Defence Minister/Army Chief of Staff. Humaidi, "Politik Militer AURI Dalam Pemerintahan Sukarno 1962-1966 [Military Politics of the Indonesian Air Force under Sukarno Administration 1962-1966]," (Master Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008), 23.

733 Mrazek, 135-136

734 During 1949-1960s, military conducted some domestic operations to overcome insurgencies such as the *Darul Islam* (House of Islam) rebellions in Aceh, West Java, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan. Details regarding counter insurgency operations see Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, *Sejarah TNI Jilid III*, 155-170

Operation was insufficient. In this regard, the army leaders criticised Dani for being unaware of internal security problem.⁷³⁵ Second, the establishment of KOGA was not well planned. Prior to the formation of KOGA, it did not have any essential documents and guideline to assist the Commander of the KOGA such as Strategic Directives (*Bimbingan Strategis*), Intelligence Assessment, Planning Directives (*Bimbingan Perencanaan*), Situation Awareness, and Battle Staff Guide.⁷³⁶ The KOTI did not provide any document to assist the KOGA. Consequently, the KOGA should prepare the Intelligence Awareness during its early phase.⁷³⁷

Third, supporting staff of the KOGA were inadequate. On 14 August, Sukarno held the KOTI meeting and asked the KOGA to execute military operation. This meeting was a response of the increase of British military presence in the Southeast Asia.⁷³⁸ Then, Sukarno appointed Rear Admiral Mulyadi of the Navy to be the First Deputy Commander for Operations, while the Second Deputy for Supporting was held by Brig Gen Achmad Wiranatakusumah of the KOSTRAD.⁷³⁹ Although, some strategic jobs such as Joint Chief of Staff and several Joint Staff Head positions were filled, the KOGA still did not have any supporting staff. Several the KOGA tasks could not be completed due to lack of staff.⁷⁴⁰ To overcome this problem, Dani utilised the Air Force facility at the Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force base as the KOGA Headquarter. But it was insufficient. Lack of staff resulted in poor the KOGA performance.

735 Mrazek, 137

736 Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 11

737 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP-002/D/2014 *Peranan KOLAGA dan Kodam XII/TJPR dalam Konfrontasi terhadap Malaysia* [Roles of the KOLAGA and the XII/TJPR Regional Command in the Konfrontasi against Malaysia]

738 Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 11-12

739 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 47/KOTI/1964 dated 2 September 1964

740 For instance, the KOGA could not enforce internal disciplinary system. There were insufficient staffs to handle several cases related to military discipline such as friendly fire, military discipline, and traffic offences cases. Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan III Personel [Command Report of the Third Joint Staff for Personnel], dated 15 May 1967.

Fourth, the derivatives of regulation regarding the *Dwikora* Operation were incomplete. The only existing decree was the establishment of the KOGA. To deal with the problems, on 25 August, the KOGA submitted the Tasks Assessment of the KOGA (*Penelaahan Tugas Komando Siaga*) and Logistics System Assessment to the KOTI for gaining approval. Those assessments demanded an integrative approach to deliver the *Konfrontasi*.⁷⁴¹ On 1 September, the KOGA also issued the Planning Directives.⁷⁴² The document identified several weaknesses of the ABRI in delivering the *Konfrontasi*, namely (a) imbalance of military capabilities and (b) inadequate strategic and tactical mobility. Consequently, the KOGA preferred to use the navy and air force in military campaign in Malayan Peninsula and North Kalimantan. This campaign was aimed to gain political impact. Meanwhile, the army campaign only focused occupying several strategic areas in North Kalimantan. But, the document was contradicted with the reports to the President that were prepared by the KOTI. Thus, the KOTI delayed the discussion of the document.⁷⁴³ Later, on 19 September, the KOTI decided all operations regarding the *Konfrontasi* should be attached and under coordination of the KOGA.⁷⁴⁴

The last major problem of the KOGA was dualism in command. After Sukarno established the KOGA, the KOTI still delivered its operations such as the Operation A. Thus, there was a 'dualism in command' in upholding the *Konfrontasi* mission. In other words, both the KOGA and the KOTI were delivering military operation at the same time.⁷⁴⁵ Evidently, the KOTI had been reluctant to hand over the Operation A to the KOGA. The head of Operation A, Subandrio, rejected to disclosure any detail regarding the implementation of operation. He argued the operation was classified as 'Top Secret' material. Meanwhile, the KOGA sometime had to encounter the impact of Operation A

741 Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 13-14

742 *Gagasan Strategi Komandan* [Strategic ideas of Commander], dated 1 September 1964, signed by Commander of the KOGA Air Marshall Omar Dani.

743 Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 13-14

744 Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 15

745 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP-002/D/2014

when delivering operations in the field.⁷⁴⁶ Consequently, Dani could not produce a proper Intelligence Assessment for supporting the *Dwikora* Operation.

Dani challenged Yani's decision regarding the new structure of the KOGA. Dani, unilaterally, imposed the new KOGA structure. On 30 September, he issued a decree to restructure the combat elements within the KOGA and neglect previous presidential decree. Under the new decree, Dani was still the commander of the KOGA. As represented in Figure 4-3, Dani led four joint commands and two battle commands, namely Alert Patrol Joint Command, Alert Strategic Joint Command, First Joint Battle Command, and Second Joint Battle Command. Comparing to the previous decrees, Dani's decree provided clearer explanation regarding the KOGA. It overtly stated that the KOGA was a functional command not theatre command. As a consequence, the KOGA would not conduct any operations that aimed to managing the territory (*pembinaan wilayah*). Dani also strengthened his authorities. Under the new decree, he had authority to fully control all KOGA's operations and coordinate all administrative and logistics supports.⁷⁴⁷ Dani bolstered his authority to change the forces structure in the KOGA. He demanded all military services to provide all supports for the KOGA.

746 One of the impacts was British military deployed its military vessels into Indonesian water territory as a response of some infiltrations in the Malayan Peninsula. Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 13; Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP-002/D/2014

747 This decree seemed contradiction with the army's doctrine of territorial warfare that the authority of implementation of military operation was decentralised. This meant the military operation in the field would depend on the local commander.




Figure 4-3 Structure of the Alert Command

Source: *Surat Keputusan* [Decree] No 01/1964 dated 30 September 1964

There were many evidences that Yani tried to hamper the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation. On 2 October, Sukarno issued a disposition letter to the, Yani, as Chief of Staff of the KOTI, to grant the KOGA Commander a wider authority in delivering military operation. Sukarno also approved the Strategic Directives that prepared by the KOGA.⁷⁴⁸ Sukarno then asked the KOTI to provide military weapons based on the KOGA's requirement list.⁷⁴⁹ However, Yani did not follow up the President's letter. Also, he did not provide military

748 President Sukarno's disposition letter to the Chief of Staff of the KOTI on 2 October 1964, signed by President Sukarno.

749 This list used to be given to Nasution, who during that time was in Moscow, Soviet Union. Sukarno assigned Nasution for overseas trips in order to buy military weapons. *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 252/ 1964 dated 24 September 1964, signed by Subandrio as Acting President on behalf of President Sukarno. ANRI, *Daftar Arsip Statis Sekretariat Negara RI: Seri Produk Hukum Tahun 1949-2005 (Keputusan Presiden – Penyelenggara Pemerintahan, Instruksi Presiden)* Volume IV No 7940

weapons based on the KOGA's needs.⁷⁵⁰ Yani only granted the KOGA's commander proposal to establish the task forces.⁷⁵¹

Indeed, until end of December 1964, process of relocating the troops into the Indonesia-Malaysia border areas did not go as plan.⁷⁵² On 31 December, the KOTI decided to expand the KOGA from the functional command into the theatre command. Of course, this idea would also affect the KOGA structure significantly.⁷⁵³ The KOGA then suggested the new structure should ensure the presence of unified command and eliminate the duality of command.⁷⁵⁴

On 28 February 1965, Sukarno transformed the KOGA into the Vigilance Command (*Komando Mandala Siaga/KOLAGA*).⁷⁵⁵ This policy indicated that Sukarno intended to boost the operation. He then amended the main task of military operation command. Sukarno set the core mission of KOLAGA was to plan, prepare, execute, develop and supervise all military operations relating to the *Konfrontasi*.⁷⁵⁶ To uphold the new mission, Sukarno restructured the military operation command. As depicted in Figure 4-4, located on the next page, the KOLAGA Commander directed nine elements, namely: Vigilance Air Defence Command, Vigilance Strategic Command, Vigilance Armada Command, First Theatre Command, Second Theatre Command, Vigilance Logistics Command, First Battle Command in Sumatra Island, Second Battle Command in

750 *Komando Mandala Siaga, Peran Komando Mandala*, 16

751 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 77/KOTI/1964 dated 31 December 1964, signed by Yani on behalf of President Sukarno

752 Details of implementation of Dwikora Operation will elaborate later in this chapter.

753 *Penelaahan Staf mengenai Struktur Organisasi, serta Komando dan Perhubungan Komando Siaga* [Staff Assessment on Organisational Structure, Command and Control of the Alert Command], dated 4 January 1965, signed by Air Marshall Omar Dani.

754 The KOGA offered three options for the structure of KOLAGA. Details regarding those options see *Penelaahan Staf mengenai Struktur Organisasi, serta Komando dan Perhubungan Komando Siaga* [Staff Assessment on Organisational Structure, Command and Control of the Alert Command], dated 4 January 1965, signed by Air Marshall Omar Dani.

755 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 9/KOTI/1965 dated 28 February 1965

756 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 9/KOTI/1965 dated 28 February 1965

Kalimantan Island and Special Task Command.⁷⁵⁷ The new structure distinguished the function of each element. Vigilance Air Defence Command, First Theatre Command and Second Theatre Command were designed to deliver defensive combat purpose. Meanwhile, Vigilance Strategic Command, Vigilance Armada Command, First Battle Command, Second Battle Command and Special Task Command would uphold the offensive mission. And three elements played supporting roles: First Theatre Command, Second Theatre Command, and Vigilance Logistics Command.




Figure 4-4 Structure of the Vigilance Command

Source: *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 10/KOTI/1965 dated 1 March 1965

Following the new structure, on 13 March, Sukarno still assigned Omar Dani to lead the KOLAGA.⁷⁵⁸ But, the KOTI reshuffled several strategic posts. Major

⁷⁵⁷ *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 10/KOTI/1965 dated 1 March 1965; Details of main tasks of each element see *Bimbingan Perencanaan Komando Mandala Siaga* [Planning Directives of the Vigilance Command], dated 3 March 1965, signed by Omar Dani.

⁷⁵⁸ *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] \ No 13/KOTI/1965 dated 13 March 1965

General Suharto of the KOSTRAD was appointed to be First Deputy Vigilance Commander for Operations. Suharto replaced his colleague from the KOSTRAD, Brig Gen Wiranatakusumah.⁷⁵⁹ Meanwhile Second Deputy Vigilance Commander for Supporting was held by Rear Admiral Mulyadi of the navy. Prior to reshuffle, Mulyadi was First Deputy Vigilance Commander for Operations. Posts of First Theatre Command, Second Theatre Command, Vigilance Logistics Command, First Battle Command in Sumatra Island, Second Battle Command in Kalimantan Island and Special Task Command respectively were held by Brig Gen AJ Mokoginta of the army, Brig Gen M Panggabean of the army, Brig Gen Kemal Idris of the KOSTRAD, Brig Gen Suparjo of the KOSTRAD, and Colonel Kusnaniwoto of the marines.⁷⁶⁰

In addition, Sukarno also ordered the Operation A tactically to be attached to the KOLAGA.⁷⁶¹ Sukarno assigned the First Joint Staff of the KOTI was only responsible for strategic intelligences activities, while all military activities should be under the KOLAGA responsibility.⁷⁶² Again, Subandrio refused to hand over the Operation A to the KOLAGA. Beside this action would disrupt the rest of covert operation, transfer of responsibility of the Operation A could be time consuming.⁷⁶³

Indeed, Subandrio's resistance over intelligence sharing to the KOGA/KOLAGA can be recognised as a residual effect for retaining dual positions. Subandrio's action can be perceived as a violation of his responsibility as leader of the BPI.

759 In KOSTRAD, Wiranatakusumah was the KOSTRAD Chief of Staff, while Suharto was the KOSTRAD Commander in Chief. Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat [History Section of the Indonesian Army], *Kostrad, Sejarah dan Pengabdianya* [Kostrad, History and its Dedication], (Bandung: Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, 2014), 30-31

760 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 52-54; Kemal Idris had been a long-time opponent of Sukarno. According to Crouch, Supardjo was probably a concession to Dani and Sukarno, as he was known as Sukarnoist. Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 78; Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 133

761 Presidential Instruction [*Instruksi Presiden/Inpres*] No 9/KOTI/1965 dated 24 April 1965, signed by Yani on behalf of President Sukarno

762 Presidential Instruction No 9/KOTI/1965 dated 24 April 1965, signed by Yani on behalf of President Sukarno

763 Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 331-332

As head of the BPI, Subandrio was responsible to submit intelligence information on the armed forces to the respective branch of the forces.⁷⁶⁴ On the other hand, there is another possible justification for Subandrio's stance. He might argue that he controlled the Operation as the First Joint Chief for Intelligence of the KOTI. And his responsible was only assisting KOTI Chief of staff. Also, referring to the KOTI structure in Figure 3-3 (p.136), there was no direct link between Subandrio and Dani. Even though, this argument seems to be weak, as Sukarno has instructed the Operation A should be attached to the KOLAGA.⁷⁶⁵

Furthermore, the appointment of Suharto sparked protest from Omar Dani. Indeed, they had experience working together as a team in the past. In 1962, Dani was Suharto's Deputy of the Trikora Vigilance Command, while Suharto held position as the Trikora Vigilance Commander.⁷⁶⁶ However, relating to the *Dwikora* Operation, Dani claimed he was already comfortable working with Wiranatakusumah.⁷⁶⁷ Apparently, Yani still committed to the KOTI decision. Yani admitted that Suharto wanted the role as the First Deputy Commander. As Yani said "*Ya pancen Harto! Iki pancen urusan intern AD. Ini memang problemku* [Yes, indeed this position was Suharto's request! This was the matter of internal army. This was my problem]."⁷⁶⁸

As stated in Chapter 3 Section 3.4, Suharto was upset due to the appointment of Dani as the KOGA Commander, as he was more experienced and senior to Dani.⁷⁶⁹ Then, he sent a resignation letter to Nasution. But, Suharto's

764 Quiko, 30

765 Presidential Instruction [*Instruksi Presiden/Inpres*] No 9/KOTI/1965 dated 24 April 1965, signed by Yani on behalf of President Sukarno

766 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 2/1962 dated 11 January 1962

767 Benedicta A Surodjo and JMV Soeparno, *Tuhan, Pergunakanlah Hati, Pikiran dan Tanganku: Pledoi Omar Dani*, (Jakarta: ISAI, 1999), 46-47.

768 Surodjo and Soeparno, 47.

769 Interview with Jusuf Wanandi, 25 November 2016 in Jakarta

subordinate, Sujono Humardani,⁷⁷⁰ intercepted the letter before reaching Nasution. Regarding Suharto's retirement plan, Wiranatakusumah claimed he knew Suharto was planning to leave the Army. Wiranatakusumah explained Suharto strongly wanted to be part of the KOLAGA. If he could not get the job, Suharto preferred to quit from military service and become a farmer. In a meeting with Dani in November 1964, Wiranatakusumah demanded Dani to accept the proposal of Suharto's appointment.⁷⁷¹ And less than a year, Suharto was assigned as First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA.

The friction between Dani and Suharto continued shortly after they started working together as a team. Suharto advocated an idea to restructure the KOLAGA.⁷⁷² He preferred to decentralise the KOLAGA's authority. Suharto suggested the structure of combat elements consisted of components of all services.⁷⁷³ But, Dani rejected the idea as he favoured the organisation of KOLAGA was small and only served as the functional command.

The rivalry between Dani and Suharto quickly reached its peak. Following the disagreement, Suharto again submitted a letter to the President that he wanted to step down from current position as First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA.⁷⁷⁴ Suharto argued that Dani was unsuitable for the commander job.⁷⁷⁵ Sukarno then responded to Suharto's letter by instructing Nasution to solve the conflict in the KOLAGA. After conducting joint consultations, the Generals agreed to build division of labour in top management, namely: (a) the KOLAGA Commander was responsible for all activities; (b) First Deputy

770 Sujono Humardani was an administrative officer of the Diponegoro (Central Java) military command, while Suharto led the command as regional commander. Later Sujono was personal assistant to Soeharto

771 A Taram, RH Sastranegara and ID Yahya, *Letjen TNI (Purn.) Achmad Wiranatakusumah: Komandan Siluman Merah*, (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2019),11

772 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP-002/D/2014; Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 37-38

773 Suharto preferred the organisation of the KOGA changed back to the previous model, *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 33/KOTI/1964 dated 2 June 1964.

774 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP-002/D/2014

775 Surodjo and Soeparno, 52.

Commander authorised to control the operations and all related activities; (c) Second Deputy Commander authorised to manage all-related administrative activities; (d) Chief of Staff was assigned to control air operations; € Deputy Chief of Staff authorised to intensify operations planning; and (f) top management meeting would held periodically.⁷⁷⁶

This agreement, of course, indicated that Suharto had defeated Dani. Division of labour reduced Dani's authority significantly. Meanwhile Suharto gained power to fully control the *Dwikora* Operation. The agreement was also marking that the army ruled the KOLAGA. As a result, Dani's complaint over the lack of forces in the field was never responded to by his subordinate in the KOLAGA. The Army seemed to be delaying the realisation of the *Dwikora* Operation by abandoning the *Instruksi Operasi* No INSOP-05/1964. Until the end of 1964, the KOGA was still struggling to deploy the troops into border areas. This condition continued in 1965, as Mokoginta and Panggabean were overtly reluctant to supply the KOLAGA with the army troops.⁷⁷⁷ And Dani could do nothing to push the army deployed its troops.

4.2.2 Suharto's Opsus

As explained previously in this chapter, Yani did not support the policy of *Konfrontasi* wholeheartedly. In a meeting with Suharto at the KOSTRAD Headquarter in 1964, Yani raised concerns about insufficient troops to guard Java, as many troops were sent to the Indonesian-Malaysian borders, both in Sumatra and Kalimantan.⁷⁷⁸ He claimed that he was in a dilemma. In one hand, if he sent many troops for the *Konfontasi*, so he would have enough troops to

⁷⁷⁶ Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 38

⁷⁷⁷ Mrazek, 137

⁷⁷⁸ Interview with Jusuf Wanandi, 25 November 2016 in Jakarta. In his memoir, Jusuf stated that the meeting was in mid-1965. However, during interview, Jusuf said that the Yani-Suharto meeting was held in 1964 not as stated in his book, mid-1965. Jusuf Wanandi, *Shades of Grey: A Political Memoir of Modern Indonesia 1965–1998*, (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2012), 67; Jusuf statement during interview coincided with several books that also stated that the Opsus was started in 1964. See, for instance, Arto, 192; Elson, 92; Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 79-81, 228.

guard Java against the PKI if it launched revolt.⁷⁷⁹ On the other hand, if the army were less active, so the PKI might spread the accusation that the army was disloyal to Sukarno.⁷⁸⁰ Ali Murtopo, the KOSTRAD Intelligence Assistant who attended the meeting, proposed an idea to settle the dispute.⁷⁸¹ Then Yani allowed Suharto to establish the Opsus within the KOSTRAD to normalise the tension between Indonesia and Malaysia.⁷⁸² Suharto team consisted of LB Murdani, Aloysius Sugiyanto, Jerry Sumendap, Sugeng Djarot and AR Ramly.⁷⁸³ Later, in February 1965, Suharto recalled Yoga Sugomo, military attaché in Yugoslavia.⁷⁸⁴ Suharto then promoted Yoga as First Assistance of the KOSTRAD and attached him to the team.

However, Wiranatakusumah illustrated different story toward the establishment of Opsus. While being First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA, he claimed always reported all ideas for operations (*Gagasan Operasi*) to Suharto. Suharto then suggested delivering a clandestine operation. Later, Wiranatakusumah established the Opsus, as Suharto's demand.⁷⁸⁵

Essentially, in January 1964 Malaysia started initiating a peace talk. Malaysia Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Tan Sri Muhammad Ghazali bin Shafie persuaded Yani in Hongkong to consider a secret peace talk. He demanded Yani initiating a way to end the dispute, as the army was half-hearted in

779 Wanandi, 67.

780 TNA, FO 371/181490, Letter AA Golds to Trench, 9 March 1965

781 Prior to the meeting, Murtopo and Yani have been known each other. Murtopo was one of the company commanders when Yani established the Diponegoro Division's Special Forces.

782 The Opsus was under Suharto command, but implemented by Murtopo. Wanandi, 68; Mukmin, , 115; Elson, 92

783 Wanandi, 68; Julius Pour, *Benny, Tragedi Seorang Loyalis* [Tragedy of a Loyalist], (Jakarta: Kata Hasta Pustaka, 2007), 140-141.

784 Yoga was Suharto's assistant when Suharto led the Diponegoro Division Command. Bambang Wiwoho dan Bandjar Chaeruddin, *Memori Jendral Yoga* [General Yoga's Memories], (Jakarta: PT Bina Rena Pariwara, 1990), 137-138; Subandrio criticised Suharto action in recalling Yoga.

785 Taram, Sastranegara and Yahya, 6-7; However this claimed seemed weak and lacked of evidences.

supporting the *Konfrontasi*, compared to the navy and the air force.⁷⁸⁶ Yani responded to Ghazali's demand by saying "Yes, but I have to report the demand to *Bung Karno*."⁷⁸⁷ However, Yani never reported his meeting with Ghazali to Sukarno.⁷⁸⁸ Indeed, Yani was willing to stop the hostilities with neighbouring nations.⁷⁸⁹ But, as he did not know Ghazali personally, Yani probably prevented any accusation that he had made contact with Malaysian without Sukarno's permission.

In August-September 1964, Suharto team started establishing contact with Malaysia. During this period, the team started to contact several Indonesian who were associated with the failed revolt of PRRI such as Des Alwi and prominent economist, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. Those persons were believed to have good links with key Malaysian figures such as Tunku Abdul Razak and Tan Sri Muhammad Ghazali.⁷⁹⁰ The purposes of the Opsus in this period were to show good intention to not make a conflict worse and to start peace dialogue.⁷⁹¹ In November, Murtopo also conducted a secret meeting with Malaysian officials to ensure the conflict did not escalate.⁷⁹²

After officially appointed as First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA, Suharto was more confident to pursue negotiation process. He argued that the military approach should be stopped, as several military intrusions overtly failed to uphold the mission.⁷⁹³ In mid-July 1965, Murtopo and Ghazali officially met in Bangkok to discuss the possibility of ending the conflict. Regarding the Opsus, Yani never reported this covert operation to Sukarno. Yani probably was comfortable working with Suharto, as they shared similar view regarding Dani's

786 Mukmin, 114-115

787 President Sukarno was widely referred to as *Bung Karno* or brother Karno. Mukmin, 115

788 Pour, *Benny*, 147

789 Wanandi, 67.

790 Wanandi, 68-69; Elson, 92.

791 Elson, 92-93

792 Elson, 93

793 Two failed missions will discuss later in this chapter

leadership and the need to manage the conflict. Yani also probably might feel Suharto and his team would not betray him and report the covert mission to Sukarno.

Suharto group did not exclusively do the secret peace attempt. Efforts to settle the dispute were done by several persons. Yani and Sukarno also had tried to find a solution to end the *Konfrontasi* without loss of face. Different with Suharto, Yani preferred to approach Britain rather than Malaysia regarding the peace attempt because Britain was in charge in the *Konfrontasi*. Thus he believed the peace process would run smoothly if Britain were involved.⁷⁹⁴ In 1964, Yani assigned Army's Chief of Intelligence, Brig Gen S Parman as peace feeler to establish contact with UK Defence Ministry in London.⁷⁹⁵ On 9 October 1964, Parman met British Military Attaché in Paris, Col Berger. In the meeting, Parman suggested British to withdraw the troops and close her military bases in Singapore. Parman guaranteed if the Britain approved the plan so the army would persuade Sukarno to end the *Konfrontasi*.⁷⁹⁶ As the UK rejected the proposal, Parman's mission was unsuccessful.⁷⁹⁷

In addition, Ibnu Sutowo, Minister of State and President Director of the state oil company *Permina* also established contact with Malaysia in 1964.⁷⁹⁸ It was unclear who assigned Sutowo for peace mission.⁷⁹⁹ He met a Malaysian businessman in Singapore. In the meeting, he explored the possibility of conflict termination. He explained Indonesian would terminate the *Konfrontasi* if Malaysia agreed to organise an election in Sabah and Sarawak within five years. Again, this mission was failed.

794 Pour, *Benny*, 147

795 Parman was former military attaché in London.

796 Mahmud, 159-160.

797 Parman was one of the Generals that had killed on 30 September 1965.

798 Mahmud, 158-159.

799 According to Challis, Sutowo was one of Suharto's oldest, closest friends and financial adviser. Challis, 68.

Sukarno attempted to end the *Konfrontasi* by assigning Ambassador for Burma, Soegih Arto, to contact British Foreign Office in London, in 1965.⁸⁰⁰ Arto used his friend Felice Leon Soh as intermediary.⁸⁰¹ But, Arto's effort in London was ineffective because Britain disagreed with the condition for the peace talk. Sukarno demanded the peace talk initiative should come from the British.⁸⁰² According to Crouch, Sukarno also appointed Brig Gen Sukendro to explore the possibility of peace talk in Malaysia.⁸⁰³ In early May 1965, Sukendro claimed that he had secured the approval of Sukarno to make a contact with Malaysia. However, the idea had been destroyed in a day by Aidit, Subandrio and Chairul Saleh.⁸⁰⁴

There were civilians also acted as peace feelers prior to the G30S affair, namely: Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh and Minister of Trade Adam Malik.⁸⁰⁵ In October 1964, Saleh started making secret approaches to the British. This was recognised as a progress because Saleh was seen as a potential successor to Sukarno and rival to Subandrio.⁸⁰⁶ He persuaded the British willing to have a direct peace talk with Indonesia. This effort should be parallel to secret Indonesia-Malaysia talks. However, this effort was abortive

800 Pour, *Benny*; Arto, 190-195

801 Arto, 193; Prior to London meeting, Arto has met Yeoh in 1964 in Singapore. At that time, Arto asked Yeoh to persuade British representatives to facilitate a peace talk. Yeoh then contacted Neil Pritchard from Commonwealth Relation Office. But, this effort was unsuccessful as Yeoh failed to impress Pritchard. Mahmud, *Konfrontasi Malaysia Indonesia*, 160-163.

802 Arto, 194-195

803 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 80-81; Sukendro was supposed to be closed to Yani, although UK Ambassador for Indonesia Andrew Gilchrist was assumed Sukendro was Subandrio's man. However, Gilchrist assumption was perhaps inaccurate. Following the G30S, Sukarno sent Sukendro abroad on an economic mission as he was knowingly as anti-Subandrio. Sukendro, who also was known as Nasution, was actively requested for British assistance in the character and political assassination of Subandrio. TNA, FO 371/181491, Telegram No 678, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 26 March 1965; TNA, FO 371/181493, Telegram No 1433, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 3 July 1965; TNA, FO 371/181457, Letter British High Commission Kuala Lumpur to CRO, 19 November 1965;

804 TNA, FO 371/181493, Telegram No 1434, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 3 July 1965

805 TNA, DEFE 4/176/66, Annex to COS 64th Meeting/64, Minutes of Meeting Number 66 of 1964; FRUS, *1964-1968*, 185

806 Chalis, 69

following the landing of 55 fully armed Indonesians in Johor in end of October.⁸⁰⁷

Malik, however, used a special envoy Mohammad Mustaza to meet Malaysian counterpart. It was unclear whether Malik had granted Sukarno's permission. Later Mustaza met Malaysian Ambassador in Tokyo Dato Syed Sheh and asked him to arrange meeting with Rahman in Kuala Lumpur. Mustaza claimed he had to deliver Malik's letter to Rahman. However, Rahman refused to meet Mustaza as he was involved in anti-Malaysia movement in Indonesia.⁸⁰⁸ The UK also recognised the 'peace feelers' were purely tactical manoeuvre.⁸⁰⁹ Only Suharto's effort was successful to end the conflict, while Yani and Sukarno's secret missions were abortive.⁸¹⁰ And following the G30S affair, Malik joined Suharto's team to settle the dispute.

It is noted that the PKI had actively opposed the negotiation attempts. The party seemed applying all measures to thwart any peace attempts. Since 1964, the Party had pressured the government for no longer in a position to reverse the hostility policy.⁸¹¹ The refusal of all negotiation had become the PKI's demands. And this aggressive attitude successfully influenced Sukarno and Subandrio over the Malaysia issue. They often engaged in 'offensive revolutionary thinking'.⁸¹²

807 Mahmud, *Konfrontasi Malaysia Indonesia*, 163-166..

808 TNA, FO 371/181490, Telegram No 206, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, 12 February 1965

809 TNA, FO 371/181492, "Indonesia/Malaysia," Brief No 5, NATO Ministerial Discussions 31 March-1 April 1965

810 Parman secret negotiation was unsuccessful because later he was killed on 30 September 1965. Meanwhile Sukarno's mission in London was ineffective because Britain disagreed with the condition. Sukarno demanded the peace talk initiative should come from the British. Arto, 194-195

811 Van Der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism," 371

812 Van Der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism," 373

4.2.3 Internal Navy ‘Clash’

As alluded previously, it is notable that the major problem of the military in upholding the *Konfrontasi* mission was the friction within the armed forces. Frictions occurred in all services with different degrees. The army, for instance, interpersonal friction between Nasution and Yani was deep and often affecting performance of the organisation. Moreover, internal clash also occurred in the Navy during period of the *Konfrontasi*.

In 8 February 1965, three young officers of the Progressive Revolutionary Officers’ Movement (*Gerakan Perwira Progresif Revolusioner/GPPR*) in the Navy met President Sukarno at the Palace.⁸¹³ They reported that the readiness of the navy was poor in delivering the *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia.⁸¹⁴ The navy’s combat readiness was shortfall after the Trikora Operation. The maintenance of warships was very poor.⁸¹⁵ Many navy weapons, including the submarines, were under repair and maintenance at the Surabaya naval dockyard.⁸¹⁶ However, the top management of the navy did not report the real condition. In this regard, the GPPR requested Sukarno to reshuffle the navy’s senior management.⁸¹⁷ Nevertheless, Sukarno refused the idea to reshuffle the navy. Sukarno felt it was not the right time to reshuffle the navy top positions.⁸¹⁸ Thus, he instructed Admiral Martadinata to solve the ‘clash’.⁸¹⁹

The conflict between young officers and admirals was deepening and widening when the IBAL was involved. The IBAL members captured many officers in

813 They were Captain Julius Tiranda, Captain Leo Darsa, and Captain Odo Soehada. Sukono, et al, *Dan Toch Maar!=Apa Boleh Buat, Maju Terus!: Ingatan Dan Pengalaman Adalborts Indonesia, 1949-1957*, (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2009), 464

814 Sukono, et al, 537

815 Interview with M2 20 December 2016 in Jakarta.

816 TNA, AIR 23/8645, Appendix A to Annex to COS 313/63

817 For the GPPR case, those officers did not request the reshuffle but asked Sukarno to warn the admirals. Interview with M2, 20 December 2016 in Jakarta

818 Sukono, et al., 538

819 Presidential Instruction [*Instruksi Presiden/Inpres*] No 08/1965 dated 31 March 1965. ANRI, *Daftar Arsip Statis Sekretariat Negara RI: Seri Produk Hukum Tahun 1949-2005 (Keputusan Presiden – Penyelenggara Pemerintahan, Instruksi Presiden) Volume VI* No 12456

Jakarta and Surabaya. Those officers then were detained in several locations. The admirals were accused behind the incident.⁸²⁰ Again, Sukarno assigned Nasution to facilitate and solve the conflict. As a result, 150 officers were discharge honourably.⁸²¹

There was a speculation that the PKI was behind the GPPR. The Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban/Koopslihkamtib*) overtly stated that the GPPR was sponsored by the PKI. In its official publication, the Koopslihkamtib argued that the navy political stance was similar with the army, against the PKI.⁸²² At that time, the navy command was closer to the Sukarnoist and leftist groups of the Indonesian politics than the army.⁸²³ In June, Martadinata became the first service head to pay a formal visit to Aidit at the PKI headquarters. Martadinata also endorsed the proposal of the establishment of fifth force, peasants and workers, and he described it as “a positive question in revolutionary development.”⁸²⁴

Indeed, the navy treated Officers, NCO and Enlisted differently.⁸²⁵ The Koopslihkamtib accused the PKI exploited the ‘differences’ and promoted disharmony relationship between officers and NCO/Enlisted. In this sense, PKI tried to infiltrate the IBAL. The PKI were working hard at infiltrating of lower ranks of the navy.⁸²⁶ As the PKI and Subandrio did not favour with Martadinata leadership, they sponsored a movement within the navy to shake up the senior

820 Interview with former navy’s officer, 20 December 2016 in Jakarta

821 49 of 150 officers were naval aviators. Sukono, et al., *Dan Toch Maar*, 538

822 Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban [Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order], *Gerakan 30 September Partai Komunis Indonesia (G30S/PKI)* [The 30 September Movement The Indonesian Communist Party], (Jakarta: Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, 1978), 64

823 Mrazek, 139

824 Mortimer, 383

825 This was rooted from culture at Indonesian warship that each rank (officer, NCO and Enlisted) had separate rooms and own tradition. Thus this ‘culture’ affected the whole navy’s tradition.

826 TNA, FO 371/180310, Telegram No 447, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 25 February 1965

management.⁸²⁷ Later, following the G30S affair, the IBAL also supported the movement.⁸²⁸

However, this speculation appears to be inaccurate. Indeed, following the affair, hundreds of officers were discharged honourably. However, the government still concerned with the officers fate. On 22 June, Sukarno issued a policy to rehire terminated officers and asked ministries to hire them.⁸²⁹ The assumption that the officers were the PKI supporter is also unjustifiable. If the officers were part of the PKI, they would not have any promotion or better career under Suharto administration, which was known as anti-communist government.⁸³⁰

4.2.4 Complications of Rivalry

The previous section has discussed the rivalry among key actors, which caused complication in implementing the *Dwikora* Operation. Following paragraphs elaborate the substantial effects of the problem on the execution of military operation. The temporary results of the *Dwikora* Operation during first-year implementation included the failure of hitting target and ill-fated military missions.

Missed the Target

As explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.5, several formal peace processes failed to resolve the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia. Tensions were rising in

827 Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, *Gerakan 30 September*, 64; TNA, FO 371/180312, Telegram No 525, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 9 March 1965

828 Interview with M2, 20 December 2016 in Jakarta; Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, *Gerakan 30 September*, 65-66.

829 On 22 June, Sukarno issued Presidential Instruction [*Instruksi Presiden/Inpres*] No 013/1965 dated 31 March 1965. ANRI, *Daftar Arsip Statis Sekretariat Negara RI: Seri Produk Hukum Tahun 1949-2005 (Keputusan Presiden – Penyelenggara Pemerintahan, Instruksi Presiden) Volume VI* No 12461; Several ministries employed the discharged officer such as Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, Ministry for Civil Aviation and Coordinating Ministry for Development.

830 One of the GPPR members, Jusuf Effendi Habibie, was assigned as Ambassador for the United Kingdom by Suharto.

the region quickly. As the dispute intensified, both countries were reinforcing their military. In mid-1964, Sukarno formed the KOGA as a tool to deliver the policy of *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia. The areas of operations for the KOGA covered Sumatra, Java and Kalimantan. In the beginning of his leadership, Dani proposed the structure of the KOGA to be small and only to function as a retaliation force.⁸³¹ However, Sukarno rejected the idea and preferred the structure was as large as the Trikora Vigilance Command.⁸³² Sukarno believed by having naval and air superiority, he could push Malaysia government toward the negotiating table.

As illustrated in the previous section, it is noteworthy that the KOGA faced several challenges since it established. And the KOTI did not fully assist the KOGA to overcome those challenges. The KOTI restricted the KOGA to use navy and air force while making Intelligence Assessment to prevent open clash.⁸³³ But, in September 1964, the KOTI asked the KOGA to handle the British manoeuvres at the Sunda Strait, while at that time the KOGA did not develop the combat elements properly.⁸³⁴ Worse, the KOGA did not have any assigned forces yet.⁸³⁵

On 27 August 1964, the British aircraft carrier HMS Victorious had sailed from Singapore to Australia through the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra. London refused to issue a formal notice or request for Indonesian permission prior to the sailing. British argued the Strait was not Indonesian territorial waters. Of course, the Indonesian military alerted the passage as present danger, as the Strait was around 100 kilometres from Jakarta and it was the first

831 Surodjo and Soeparno, 44.

832 Surodjo and Soeparno, 45.

833 Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 20

834 On 27-28 August, two Royal Navy ships Victorious and Cavendish sailed through the Sunda Strait. Instruksi Operasi [Operation Order] No INSOP-01/1/64

835 Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 23

time British used her aircraft carrier for the *Konfrontasi*.⁸³⁶ Indonesian government assumed the Britain performed show of force.⁸³⁷

Following the incident, Sukarno called the ABRI to increase their alertness.⁸³⁸ Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito then complained to the British and refused passage of *Victorious* through the Sunda Straits on her return to Singapore.⁸³⁹ HMS *Victorious* was scheduled to return to Singapore on 12 September.⁸⁴⁰ As the tension has increased, British delayed the return passage of *Victorious* until 16 September.⁸⁴¹ In dealing with the Sunda Strait Crisis, the KOGA then prepared an operation, known as *Operasi Ini Dadaku* [Operation 'This is my Chest'] on 9 September. This operation was aimed to: (a) detect the British warships routes, (b) perform show of force at the Sunda Strait, (c) to shadow the British warships, and (d) conduct instant retaliation, if needed.⁸⁴² Regarding instant retaliation, the KOGA had identified several strategic targets in the Malayan Peninsula, Singapore and North Kalimantan such as Kuala Lumpur, Singapore Port, Kuching and Tawao Airfield.⁸⁴³ The aim of this attack was to pack the political punch. In this regard, the Indonesian informed the British that the Sunda Strait would be closed from 10 September to 10 October for naval training. The British Chiefs of Staff noted that the ABRI was in a high state of alert. Intelligence report concluded that

In their present truculent state of mind the Indonesians had decided to refuse and resist passafe of the Sunda Strait to HMS *Victorious*, and that they were prepared for any naval clash and retaliatory British/Malaysian air attacks, which, in Indonesian eyes, would have

836 Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation*, 99-100

837 Instruksi Operasi [Operation Order] No INSOP-01/1/64

838 TNA, PREM 11/4869, Telegram No 1414, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 5 September 1964

839 Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation*, 99-100

840 TNA, PREM 11/4869, Letter AP Hockaday to JN Henderson, 4 September 1964

841 TNA, PREM 11/4869, Telegram No 1568, Foreign Office to Jakarta, 8 September 1964

842 Instruksi Operasi No INSOP-01/1/64

843 Petunjuk Operasi [Operation Manual] No POPS-02/64

no conclusive military affect but would considerably improve Indonesia's political standing as a victim of 'Western 180nfiltrati'.⁸⁴⁴

The Sunda Strait Crisis did not spark the open clash. The British decided the HMS Victorious used the Lombok Strait on her return passage to Singapore.⁸⁴⁵ As the Indonesian would not resist if the HMS Victorious would passage through the Lombok Strait between Bali and Lombok.⁸⁴⁶ Indeed, British recognised the return route might be considered as a provocation. But the return of HMS Victorious to Singapore was a requirement in the improving of defensive posture to counter any Indonesian attacks in Malaya or Singapore, as the Indonesian changed the pattern of the operation.⁸⁴⁷

On 31 October, the KOTI issued an operation manual to assist the KOGA in delivering military operation. On this manual, the KOTI created a list of force requirement for the *Dwikora* Operation that covered number of troops, weaponry and military equipment.⁸⁴⁸ The KOTI divided three stages of military operation, namely preparation, implementation and consolidation. This manual also provided detail explanation regarding the roles and responsibility of each combat element in the KOGA structure. The KOTI planned the shifting of troops to the border areas including logistics support could be done in the end of March 1965.⁸⁴⁹ Thus, the stage of implementation of *Dwikora* Operation could be started in April 1965. Later, the KOTI issued *Instruksi Operasi* [Operation Instruction] No INSOP-05/1964 to ensure the process of shifting of troops.⁸⁵⁰

844 TNA, DEFE 24/105, Part I to COS 55th Meeting/64, 10 September 1964

845 TNA, DEFE 24/105, Telegram No 1615, Foreign Office to Jakarta, 11 September 1964

846 FRUS, 1964-1968, 160

847 TNA, DO 169/405, Part I to COS 54th Meeting/64, 7 September 1964

848 *Petunjuk Operasi* 'Jaladara' [Operation Manual of 'Jaladara'] No POPS-02/64 dated 31 October 1964

849 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP-002/D/2014

850 *Instruksi Operasi* [Operation Instruction] No INSOP-05/1964 dated 11 December 1964

Following the preparation stage, the KOLAGA planned to execute the military campaign to crush Malaysia. The operation, under the code name Operation Sajjita Yudha (*Operasi Sajjita Yudha*), was scheduled in April 1965 and controlled by the KOLAGA Commander. The operation upheld five main tasks, namely: (a) to develop deterrence forces, (b) to win the *Konfrontasi* without open war, (c) to deliver reprisal, if needed, (d) to defend the territory from attacks, and (e) to improve resilience of revolution.⁸⁵¹ In addition, the operation would deliver in several forms: subversive operation, territorial operation, instant retaliation and reprisal. In subversive operation, military would assist local resistance movement. Meanwhile, in territorial operation, military would assist local people to establish their own government. Instant retaliation and reprisal would be delivered simultaneously if the KOLAGA Commander has instructed to execute those operations.

Until March 1965, the KOGA failed to hit almost all targets. In intelligence section, the KOGA was unable to gather the intelligence data properly. It only relied on monitoring mass media. Beside lack of intelligence personnel, the KOGA complaint that it did not get any data from the Operation A. Even the KOTI did not share any intelligence information to the KOGA.⁸⁵² In operation section, there was no activity regarding implementation of the operation. There were only military planning and preparation activities. Prepositioning of troops in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Riau, respectively were only 10 per cent, 80 per cent and 15 per cent of the target. Dani argued this failure was a result of vague policies between the KOTI and the SAB.⁸⁵³

Undeniably, the lukewarmness of army command in pursuing the *Konfrontasi* policy contributed to the KOGA's failure. Excessive delay in naming the Combat

⁸⁵¹ *Rencana Kampanye* [Campaign Planning] No REKAM-02/1965 dated 6 March 1965, signed by Omar Dani.

⁸⁵² *Laporan Komando* [Command Report] No LAPKO-02 & 03/65 mengenai *Perkembangan Komando Mandala Siaga Dalam Bulan Februari dan Maret 1965* [Progress of the Vigilance Command during February-March 1965]

⁸⁵³ Katoppo, et al, *Menyingkap*, 27

Commanders and assigning combat troops to the KOGA were evidences to support that observation. In addition, the KOTI, which was dominated by the army, also overtly hampered the process of the deployment of the army forces.⁸⁵⁴ Dani explained, up to August 1964, all services except the army had deployed the troops.⁸⁵⁵ In October, Yani demanded all services should deploy three brigades near the Indonesia-Malaysia border in North Kalimantan by end of December. But, until November 1964, none of the army soldiers had deployed in that area.⁸⁵⁶ When visited Medan in January 1965, Dani was reported by the First Theatre Commander, Mokoginta that the shelter for the troops from Java was never utilised as the troops had not yet came up to Medan.⁸⁵⁷

In personnel issue, the KOGA admitted lack of supporting staffs. Besides many officers had held dual position, some of officers also were not well performing at their posts.⁸⁵⁸ For instance, the First Battle Commander in Sumatra, Kemal Idris, who was knowingly as Suharto's aide. It is evidence that Kemal remained loyal to Suharto. In supporting the Suharto's Opsus plan, Kemal delayed the deployment of troops to Sumatra.⁸⁵⁹ Unlike Kemal, Suparjo, Second Battle Commander in Kalimantan, still showed his commitment to uphold the *Konfrontasi* mission. Suparjo was known as a pro-Sukarno officer, also had good relationship with the PKI. He had maintained the close relationship years

854 The KOLAGA officers had developed informal contact with relevant officers to boost deployment of troops in Sumatra. However, the KOGA could not do similar action to boost deployment of troops in Kalimantan because the KOTI ordered to terminate the action. Laporan Komando [Command Report] No LAPKO-02 & 03/65

855 Surodjo and Soeparno, 45

856 Aristides Katoppo, et al, *Menyingkap Kabut Halim 1965* [Lifting the Halim Fog of 1965], (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 2000), 24

857 Surodjo and Soeparno, 45

858 For instance, Omar Dani held Air Force Commander and the KOLAGA Commander, Suharto held the KOSTRAD Commander and First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA, Rear Admiral Mulyadi was Navy Deputy Commander for Operations and also Second Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA.

859 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 78

before the *Konfrontasi*.⁸⁶⁰ Suparjo took combat strategy and organisational discipline seriously.⁸⁶¹ Although, three day before the G30S launched on 30 September, he left his troops in Kalimantan and joined the movement.⁸⁶²

In logistics matters, the fund to support the operations was insufficient. The budget was limited with complicated procedures.⁸⁶³ West Kalimantan Regional Commander, Brig Gen Ryacudu admitted he paid his troops needs by his own money due to lack of funding from Jakarta.⁸⁶⁴ Indeed, on 20 March, the KOTI had provided a building for the KOLAGA Headquarter at the Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force base. However, the Headquarters were not equipped with proper communication installation. Consequently, flow of information at the KOLAGA was not well developed.⁸⁶⁵

Different with the army, the KKO reinforced its presence in Sumatra and Kalimantan following the tension escalated. The KKO deployed two Landed Brigades [*Brigade Pendarat/Brigrat*] to border areas.⁸⁶⁶ In Kalimantan, the First *Brigrat* KKO had to protect strategic areas from surprise attacks. Meanwhile, in Sumatra, the Second *Brigrat* had to deliver instant retaliation and occupy strategic targets and also defend the area. In this regard, the KKO deployed

860 In addition, Suparjo was likely having close relationship with the PKI. As the commander of the West Java district Garut, he used the PKI cadres in eradicating the Darul Islam movement.

861 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 133

862 Anderson and McVey, 28; Roosa, 85

863 To fund the operation, the KOGA should submit fund request to the KOTI. So, all budgets would be through the KOTI. The KOGA claimed ever borrow money from the navy and the air force. Laporan Komando [Command Report] No LAPKO-02 & 03/65

864 Pramoedya Ananta Toer and Stanley Adi Prasetyo, ed., *Memoar Oei Tjoe Tat Pembantu Presiden Soekarno* [Memoir of Oei Tjoe Tat: An Assistant to President Sukarno] (Jakarta : Hasta Mitra, 1995), 148-149; Surodjo and Soeparno, 55

865 *Laporan Komando* [Command Report] No LAPKO-02 & 03/65

866 This action was implementation of Petunjuk Operasi KKO [KKO Operation Manual] No 012 A – 64. Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 286

one Battalion Landing Team and one Light Battalion to Tarakan, East Kalimantan, and also one Battalion Landing Team to Riau, Sumatra Island.⁸⁶⁷

It was noted that the Sukarno administration tried to utilise all resources in enhancing the implementation of the *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia. On 14 September 1964, Sukarno decided to establish Regional Authorities for the Implementation of the *Dwikora* (*Penguasa Pelaksana Dwikora Daerah/Pepelrada*).⁸⁶⁸ However, this decision did not apply to all provinces throughout Indonesia. Sukarno only appointed the Pepelrada for all provinces in Sumatra, Java and Kalimantan Islands.⁸⁶⁹ The main task of Pepelrada was to lead the implementation of the *Dwikora* in the area based on the President's policy. In upholding the task, Pepelrada was directly responsible to the President.

Although the status of emergency was revoked, Sukarno still granted several extraordinary authorities to the Pepelrada. First, authority reserved the right to demand any items could be utilised for the *Dwikora*. Second, authority reserved the right to search and seize any items that might hamper the implementation of *Dwikora*. Third, authority reserved the right to restrict the freedom of movement of persons. Fourth, authority could perform search of suspicious person. Fifth, authority reserved the right to ban people lived in particular area. Sixth, authority reserved the right to bar people from leaving particular area. Seventh, authority reserved the right to arresting person with warrant for a maximum of 30 days.⁸⁷⁰

867 This decision was based on Operation Directive No 11 Ops/1964 dated 4 November 1964. *Bagian Sejarah KKO AL*, 287

868 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 52/KOTI/1964 dated 14 September 1964

869 Pepelrada might be civilian or military general. Details list of Pepelrada see *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 54/KOTI/1964 dated 16 September 1964

870 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 52/KOTI/1964 dated 14 September 1964. Details of guidance for using Pepelrada's authority see *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 22/KOTI/1964 dated 28 September 1964

As tension has steadily increased, Sukarno expanded the authority of the First and Second Theatre Commander. On 19 May, Sukarno appointed them as Vigilance Authorities for the Implementation of the *Dwikora* (Penguasa Pelaksana *Dwikora* Mandala).⁸⁷¹ By holding this position, they authorised to control any demonstration, publication, communication, lockouts, and meeting hall.⁸⁷² They also allowed controlling air, land and sea traffic and militarising state owned or private companies.

Failures and Successes of Operations

As explained previously in this chapter, the KOTI rebuffed to attach the Operation A into the KOGA. The KOTI insisted to control the implementation of the Operation A. However, due to poor preparation, at least two incidents were notably recognised as mission failures, Pontian and Labis Landing.

Pontian Operation (*Operasi Pontian*) aimed at delivering seaborne infiltration in Johor Bahru, Malaysia. The KKO from the Base II/KOTI in Sumatra scheduled the assault to coincide with Indonesian Independence Day — 17 August 1964. This operation employed 97 personnel including volunteers. The KKO set three target locations for this operation, namely Ayer Baloi, Pontian Besar and Kukup.⁸⁷³ However, the operation did not go as planned. The plot was presumably leaked to the enemy. Before the operation was launched, Malaysia had intensified her sea patrol, surveillance and smuggling prevention. Since 14 August, Malaysia prohibited fishermen to sail in international water surrounding the Malayan Peninsula. Malaysia also strengthened patrol in the villages to prevent unwanted activity.⁸⁷⁴

871 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 37/KOTI/1965 dated 19 May 1965

872 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 37/KOTI/1965 dated 19 May 1965

873 *Bagian Sejarah KKO AL*, 328-329

874 *Bagian Sejarah KKO AL*, 330

Although Malaysia strengthened her security patrol, the KKO was successfully landing its troops in Kukup on 17 August.⁸⁷⁵ This was marked as the first Indonesian military attack in Malaysian mainland.⁸⁷⁶ However, both Nasution and the navy denied the allegation of the KKO's landings at Pontian.⁸⁷⁷

Several clashes between the KKO and its opponents occurred shortly following the landings. Helicopter and dog patrol were involved as part of the search for the KKO. Later, the raid was a failure as Malaysia ambushed the KKO troops in Pulai, a meeting point in Pontian.⁸⁷⁸ In this raid, the KKO stated that had lost of more than seven personnel and several troops were captured by the enemy.⁸⁷⁹ Meanwhile, the Malaysian authorities announced they had killed seven and captured 16 men.⁸⁸⁰ As a result, on 17 August, Malaysia protested to the UN Security Council against this landing.⁸⁸¹

Another failed mission was Labis Landing on 1-2 September. This was an airborne operation that involved one company of the Air Force's Quick Reaction Force Command (*Komando Pasukat Gerak Cepat/PGT*) paratroopers and volunteers. Prior to this operation, Brig Gen Magenda of the KOTI trained the infiltrators.⁸⁸² Unlike previous operation, the PGT was acknowledged as solely performer from the military element for the Labis Landing.⁸⁸³ In this regard, the PGT was requested to send one company to be trained. During the training,

875 Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 330

876 Kosut, 94.

877 TNA, FO 371/175274, Telegram No 1350, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 19 August 1964; Telegram No 1352, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 20 August 1964

878 Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 330-331

879 Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 331

880 Kosut, 94.

881 Kosut, 94

882 Surodjo and Soeparno, 52-53

883 In general, the RPKAD was prioritised for airborne assaults, as it is the Special Forces. Surodjo and Soeparno, 52.

several Malaysian were introduced as trusted contacts in Malaysia after landing.⁸⁸⁴

On 2 September, the operation was launched by using three US made C-130B Hercules transport. At least 96 troops were successfully landed near Labis, about 85 miles south of Kuala Lumpur.⁸⁸⁵ However, one airplane, which was carrying 47 personnel of the PGT, crashed into the Malacca Strait. Wreckage of the plane was found in the sea. No survivors were found at the crash site. An experienced pilot, Major Jalaluddin, operated the plane. Before the crash, the plane had flown low to evade British military radar. Dani accused the incident was suspicious after he met one of the PGT troops that involve in the operation. The soldiers said that Malaysian could capture the infiltrators in less than 48 hours after landing. In addition, the soldiers blamed 'trusted contacts' of betraying the PGT after revealing the Labis Operation to the Malaysian authorities.⁸⁸⁶

The cause of the C-130 crash remained unclear. Dani questioned the airplane crash, whether it was caused by human error or shot down.⁸⁸⁷ Former chief navigator at one of the Air Force Bases during the *Konfrontasi*, who prefers to remain anonymous, said that the incident was caused by pilot error.⁸⁸⁸ He said the case was discussed shortly after the incident. He claimed Jalaluddin was widely known as a pilot who did not trust the flight instruments. Thus, former chief navigator suspected Jalaludin could not maintain a constant distance to the surface of the earth during his low-altitude flight. But, Wasiman Siswanto, former soldier who was involved in the Operation A rejected this explanation. He insisted that the plane was shot down by British military.⁸⁸⁹ There is insufficient evidence to support the accusation that the UK was behind the

884 Surodjo and Soeparno, 53

885 Kosut, 95

886 Surodjo and Soeparno, 54.

887 Surodjo and Soeparno, 54

888 Interview with M1, 8 December 2016 in Jakarta

889 Interview with former KKO, Wasiman Siswanto, 13 December 2016 in Jakarta

crash incident. Reflecting the incident, only Talking Points with the US President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, provided a clue: "after our attack on the Indonesian Air Force, the Indonesians might be expected to seek help from China and the Soviet Union."⁸⁹⁰

Although Pontian and Labis Landings were unsuccessful, British noted those raids as the significant changing pattern of the ABRI Operation against Malaysia.⁸⁹¹ The US observed that the infiltrations were intended to heighten internal security, and increase the pressure on Rahman to negotiate with Sukarno. Other than that, in the long run, those were aimed at dissolving the UK military bases. If the British failed to respond the incidents properly, so it will encourage the Indonesians to expand the infiltration.⁸⁹²

In spite of the fact that several the KOGA's mission were abortive, there was one mission that had been successfully delivered by the Operation A: conducting demolition and sabotage of military and economic targets in the Malayan Peninsula, especially Singapore. Singapore was chosen as the main target because she was seen as a decisive factor in lifeline imperialism structure, especially in political, economy and military sector.⁸⁹³ At that time, Singapore was also playing essential role in controlling all military activities.⁸⁹⁴ And Indonesia tried to divert her trade from Singapore and break the economic dependency.⁸⁹⁵

Malaysians, however, have alleged the presence of infiltrator bases surrounding the country. As Figure 3-5 (p.143) shown, the KKO formed the Base II in Riau which was to target the Malayan Peninsula and Singapore. Since November

890 TNA, FO 371/175275, "Meeting with Mr Bundy, Talking Points,"

891 TNA, DEFE 5/155/305/64, Annex to COS 305/64, 18 November 1964

892 FRUS, 1964-1968, 159

893 *Gagasan Tentang Operasi Khusus* [The idea of Special Operations], dated 6 January 1965, signed by Omar Dani

894 Singapore was a centre for land, air and sea defence and able to deploy military support to any areas. Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 32

895 FRUS, 1964-1968, 23

1963, several Indonesian were captured by the authority. And on 26 March 1964, Malaysia's Minister of Internal Security Dato Ismail alleged the ABRI were directing sabotage and subversive activities in his territory.⁸⁹⁶

The first sabotage was a bomb that went off at the Ambassador Hotel, Singapore, on 24 September 1963. Although, no people were injured or killed, this incident was a major surprise for Singapore.⁸⁹⁷ Hall, Ross and De Heer noted that, at least 88 significant incidents related to bomb explosion and sabotage in Singapore during 1963-1966.⁸⁹⁸ The most notable attack in Singapore was a bomb blast at the MacDonald House on 10 March 1965. The impact killed three and injured 33 people.⁸⁹⁹ This sabotage was conducted by two KKO soldiers, Janatin alias Usman, Tohir alias Harun and one volunteer, Gani.⁹⁰⁰ Prior to this mission, Usman, Harun and Gani were part of Sub Base X that had overtly emphasised Singapore as the main target. They were under leadership of Captain Paulus Subekti of the Sub Base X.⁹⁰¹

The main factor to be noted behind the attack is the 'killing' of Lieut Wasiman Siswanto, Leader of First Brahma Team on 13 December 1964. According to Amir Zainuddin⁹⁰² and Siswanto⁹⁰³, the attack was completely a form of retaliation. Siswanto and his group were assigned to infiltrate Singapore using sea route. However, the attempt was not going as planned. The New Zealand's

896 Van Der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism," 378.

897 N Vijayan, "Konfrontasi," *Joint Manpower Department*, 1, 9 (September 1997), accessed 10 June 2015 https://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/dam/imindef_media_library/imindef2012/about_us/history/birth_of_saf/v01n09_history/Sept1997TMIH.pdf.

898 Hall, Ross and De Heer, *Comparative Study*,

899 The Straits Times, "The MacDonald House Bombing," accessed 21 April 2015 <http://www.straitstimes.com/tags/macdonald-house-bombing>

900 The real names of those two soldiers were Janatin and Tohir. However, to prevent the curiosity, they changed their names with the familiar names in target location. Thus, Janatin was changed into Usman and Tohir was changed into Harun. Following the incident, they were more recognised with the alias names rather than the real name. Murgiyanto, *Usman dan Harun Prajurit Setia* [Usman and Harun the Loyal Soldier], (Jakarta: Subdit Sejarah, Direktorat Perawatan Personel TNI AL, 1989), 10

901 Murgiyanto, 9

902 Interview with former KKO, Amir Zainuddin, 1 October 2015 in Jakarta

903 Interview with former KKO, Wasiman Siswanto, 13 December 2016 in Jakarta

minesweeper fired shots at their boats in the Malacca Strait. Following the incident, the KKO believed Siswanto was 'dead'.⁹⁰⁴ The 'killing' of Siswanto further angered the KKO troops.⁹⁰⁵ Thus, Paulus prepared to attack Singapore as a retaliation mission. The mission target was MacDonald House in Orchard Road.⁹⁰⁶

On 8 March, the team, led by Usman, sailed the Malacca Strait to Singapore by using a rubber boat. After arrived in Singapore on 9 March, they observed and indicated the specific location for planting 12.5kg bomb. Later, on 10 March midnight, they decided to blast a bomb at MacDonald.⁹⁰⁷ At 03:07 AM, a bomb went off on the mezzanine floor and destroyed 20 stores and cars.⁹⁰⁸ Following the incident, Singapore strengthened her security measures. To avoid the suspicion, they decided to disperse. On 11 March, they reconvened and agreed to go back to home base at Sambu Island, Riau. On 13 March, Malaysian patrol captured Usman and Harun in the Malaysian territorial sea and detained in Singapore.⁹⁰⁹ Later, on 17 October 1968, Singapore executed Usman and Harun.⁹¹⁰

904 Due to the incident, one soldier killed and three others including Siswanto wounded and captured. They were detained by Malaysian authority in Johor Baru, Malaysia. Wasiman Siswanto, "Pahlawan yang Dilupakan [The Forgotten Hero]," *Majalah Marinir*, August-October 2000.

905 Zainuddin explained he and his colleagues got the report from the survivors of the battle who fled back to the their base. Interview with former KKO, Amir Zainuddin, 1 October 2015 in Jakarta

906 Siswanto, "Pahlawan yang Dilupakan."

907 Murgiyanto, 11-12

908 Murgiyanto, 13; The Straits Times, "The MacDonald House Bombing," accessed 21 April 2015 <http://www.straitstimes.com/tags/macdonald-house-bombing>

909 Jusuf, 205

910 DWB Chua, *Konfrontasi: Why It Still Matters to Singapore*, RSIS Commentary No. 054 – 16 March 2015, (Singapore: RSIS, 2015).

4.2.5 Key Actors Network Prior to the G30S Affair

During the first year of *Dwikora* Operation, the informal relationship of main actors was developed in different degrees. The relationship among main actors is represented in Figure 4-5, located on the next page. Although, no one overtly opposed the *Konfrontasi*, Yani and Suharto evidently developed the 'resistance' group.⁹¹¹ They were actively obstructing the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation. In particular, Yani and Suharto had betrayed Sukarno by conducting the *Konfrontasi* whole-heartedly. This can be seen from the implementation of the Opsus in 1964-1965. By having Yani's authorisation, Suharto led the Opsus to settle the dispute and hamper the *Dwikora* Operation. Meanwhile, the rest of main actors during this period were still supporting the *Konfrontasi*. Meanwhile, the rest of key actors still committed to uphold the Crush Malaysia mission.

Following the appointment of Suharto as the First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA, the relationship between Suharto and Dani was poor. The friction between them was obvious since they worked as a team. They disagreed sharply over the idea of changing the KOLAGA structure. Suharto maintained the troops along the border with Malaysia understaffed and underequipped.⁹¹² Majority of key actors were reluctant with Dani's appointment as the KOLAGA Commander. Suharto, Yani, Subandrio and Martadinata were half-heartedly supporting Dani leadership by different reason. As Yani did not favour the military approach for the *Konfrontasi*, he tried to obstruct Dani's work in delivering the *Dwikora* Operation. The KOTI did not equip the KOGA with several essential documents and guidelines such as Strategic Directives Intelligence Assessment, and Planning Directives. Meanwhile, Subandrio denied handing over the Operation A to the KOLAGA. He also did not share any intelligence information to the KOLAGA. Indeed, the navy has assured its

⁹¹¹ Resistance group refers to the actors who were half-heartedly supporting the *Konfrontasi* and tried to deescalate the conflict without Sukarno's consent.

⁹¹² Roosa, 114.

even recognised the navy as the only service, which has become more committed to the *Konfrontasi*.⁹¹³ However, Martadinata shared similar view with Subandrio that the handover of the Operation A. He was uninterested if the Operation A should be under the KOLAGA. He argued it would hamper the plan and its execution.




Figure 4-5 Informal Main Actors Network during the *Dwikora* Operation, 1964-1965 (Pre the G30S Affair)

Source: Author

Regarding the relationship with the PKI, almost the army's generals were having poor relationship with the communist. Yani, Nasution and Suharto were known as anti-communist generals. Meanwhile, according to Mrazek, both the navy and the air force were much less suspicious of the PKI. Dani intended to arrange Marxism as basic subject at the Air Force Staff and Command

913 TNA, FO 371/181492, Letter GF Hiller to AA Golds, 5 May 1965

School.⁹¹⁴ Although Martadinata has considered as a supporter of Nasution, Navy Chief made “a pilgrimage to PKI headquarters, the first time a service head did so.”⁹¹⁵ The visit has built up the PKI political confidence significantly. Regarding the GPPR, he let the movement group faced more pressure from the IBAL, which was presumably being sponsored by the PKI. In addition, Martadinata seemed to have a good relationship with almost all main actors except Dani, as he resisted transferring the Operation A. Moreover, relationship between Subandrio and the PKI was closer than before.⁹¹⁶ This was understandable as Subandrio did not have any party and he needed real political support to ensure his position in the Cabinet.

4.3 Second Year of *Dwikora* Operation (1965-1966): The G30S Affair Changed the Direction

This part discusses the second year of the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation. During this time, there was a political event, the G30S affair that significantly changed constellations of Indonesia’s politics and foreign policy. This event led to Sukarno’s political defeat and demise of the PKI and other key actors. To capture the effect of the 30 September Movement affair, the explanation of this section covers the conditions prior and post the G30S affair, the changing of military leadership and the suppression of the PKI. The illustrations include the initial changing direction of the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation.

914 Victor M Fic, *Anatomy of the Jakarta coup: October 1, 1965: the Collusion with China which Destroyed the Army Command, President Sukarno and the Communist Party of Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Or Indonesia, 2005), 92; Mrazek, 138

915 Anderson and McVey, 139-140.

916 TNA, FO 371/181490, Letter AA Golds to Trench, 9 March 1965

4.3.1 Pre the G30S Affair

Since 1965, the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia was worsening. It can be seen through the new policy of Sukarno. On 7 January, Sukarno decided to withdraw from the United Nation. This was a response to the election of Malaysia as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The decision obtained global attention. China supported the withdrawal, meanwhile the Soviet criticised. Although up to 1965, the UN never attempted to resolve the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute.⁹¹⁷

On 12 July, Sukarno established another defence-related institution, Defence Command (*Komando Pertahanan/KOHAN*).⁹¹⁸ However, the new institution did not apply throughout Indonesia. The KOHAN only covered all provinces in Java, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, Eastern Indonesia and West Irian. This command was a unified command that had main task was to defend the territory to ensure the implementation of Indonesian Revolution. As a consequence, this institution might lead and employ the ABRI, Civil Defence, Volunteers and all national defence resources.

Clearly, the Singapore's withdrawal from the Malaysia Federation on 9 August 1965, in some extent, had affected Indonesia. On 11 August, Sukarno issued the detail structure of the KOHAN.⁹¹⁹ The KOHAN Commander led this organisation. In general, the structure was quite similar to the KOLAGA or the KOTI that the KOHAN structure comprises Commander, Deputy Commander and the Joint Staffs.⁹²⁰ Sukarno also improved the structure of National Coastal Defence Command (*Komando Pertahanan Pantai Nasional/Koppanas*). Sukarno then changed the name into the National Maritime Defence Command

917 Alastair M Taylor, "Sukarno—First United Nations Drop-Out," *International Journal* 20, 2 (1965): 211

918 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No. 54/KOTI/1964 dated 12 July 1965

919 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No. 86/KOTI/1964 dated 11 August 1965

920 The Joint Staffs comprised of six units, namely: intelligence, operation and training, personnel, Logistics, Territorial and Communication.

(*Komando Pertahanan Maritim Nasional/Kohanmarnas*). The main tasks of the Kohanmarnas were: (a) to defend maritime territory, and (b) to secure the archipelagic sea-lanes. Alike the Kohan, the Kohanmarnas would be led by a Commander.

In sum, it was clear that an inevitable outgrowth of the *Konfrontasi* required the military-related organisations to match this reality. The new landscape of defence-related organisations is represented in Figure 4-6. However, the changes did not solve the problem of organisational effectiveness, and a particular concern about relationship among military institutions. The establishment of the KOHAN therefore created overlap with other existing institutions,⁹²¹ as Sukarno did not make any clear division of labour and function.




Figure 4-6 Structure of Defence-Related Organisations Landscape

Source: *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 54/KOTI/1965 dated 12 July 1965

The Indonesian government and the KOLAGA, however, claimed that they had involved in the process of the Singapore’s withdrawal. They claimed successfully had accelerated the process of withdrawal through covert

921 Several institutions that had similar tasks were the KOLAGA, the National Air Defence Command (*Komando Pertahanan Udara Nasional/Kohanudnas*), and National Coastal Defence Command (*Komando Pertahanan Pantai Nasional/Koppanas*).

operation.⁹²² Pitut Suharto, former Indonesian Consular official in Singapore, stated that there was a secret agreement between Lee Kuan Yew and the army intelligence to kick out British from Singapore.⁹²³ Following the Singapore independence, Indonesia declared had reached part of victory.⁹²⁴ Subandrio recognised the secession of Singapore from the Malaysia Federation was a complete defeat for British policy.⁹²⁵ Nevertheless, the Singapore's withdrawal did not affect much Indonesian strategy over the *Konfrontasi*.⁹²⁶ Singapore remained as political threat to Indonesia and the main target for the *Konfrontasi*, as the UK military bases was in Singapore. And the KOLAGA still perceived Singapore as the British neocolonialist project.⁹²⁷

In this regard, the KOLAGA prepared a striking plan to destroy Singapore, in particular the British military bases. On 11 August, Nasution warned Singapore that Indonesia would destroy the bases.⁹²⁸ The KOLAGA would attempt to isolate Singapore and occupy Johor. Due to the limitation of operational capability, the KOLAGA categorised two types of operations to uphold the mission, military and non-military. Military type included establishing military enclave, intelligence gathering operation, infiltrations, raids, simultaneous destructive operations and decisive operation. Meanwhile, non-military type covered economic pressures, fomenting civil unrest, and develop national awareness regarding the need of gaining independence. As the KOLAGA

922 *Analisis Sasaran* [Target Analysis], dated 31 August 1965, signed by Omar Dani.

923 "OPERASI A Sandi Ganyang Malaysia Part 2 [Operation A codename for the Crush Malaysia Part 2]," YouTube video, 7:22, posted by "nagnugamjara," August 29, 2009 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=05Drx6etaek>

924 "OPERASI A Sandi Ganyang Malaysia Part 2,"; Indeed, one of main tasks of the Base II/KOTI in Sumatra was to separate Singapore and Malaysia. However, there is no hard evidence to support this claim.

925 TNA, FO 371/181454, Telegram No 1735, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 10 August 1965

926 *Penelaahan Staf tentang Hubungan Bimbingan Strategis KOTI dengan Dokumen-Dokumen Operasi Komando Mandala Siaga* [Staff Assessment on Relationship between Strategic Directives of the KOTI and Documents of Vigilance Command Operations], dated 24 August 1965, signed by the KOLAGA Chief of Staff, Commodore LWJ Wattimena.

927 *Analisis Sasaran* [Target Analysis], dated 31 August 1965, signed by Omar Dani; Kosut, 105.

928 Kosut, 105

recognised Britain has air and sea superiority, the operation would be delivered in subversive activities. Even though, Britain would not start the open war by attacking Indonesian strategic targets,⁹²⁹ the KOLAGA demanded President Sukarno declared state of war status.⁹³⁰

As the agreement of division of labour in top management provided more power to the army, the structure of KOLAGA was changed for the third time. On 2 September, the structure of the KOLAGA reapplied the component system.⁹³¹ So, composition of the components would be decided by each service. As depicted in Figure 4-7, the new structure of the KOLAGA changed the name of the First Theatre Command and Second Theatre Command. First Theatre Command changed into Inter-regional Defence Command for Sumatra, while Second Theatre Command became Inter-regional Defence Command for Kalimantan. To overcome understaffing problem, some posts in the Inter-regional Defence Command for Kalimantan and Sumatra would be occupied by local army commands. Meanwhile, under the new structure, Vigilance Logistics Command was abolished. All related logistics matters would be directly handled by each service command. The new structure also changed the form of Battle Command into Task Force.⁹³² The changing reduced Suparjo's authority significantly. Since the Task Force was a temporary unit, he could not fully control his troops. Suparjo admitted he had instructed to dispatch the troops to West Kalimantan. But the army leaders disobeyed Suparjo's order and the troops had not been deployed.⁹³³

929 *Perkiraan Intelijen* [Intelligence Estimates], dated September 1965.

930 *Gagasan Strategis Komando Mandala Siaga* [Strategic Ideas of the Vigilance Command], dated 31 August 1965, signed by Omar Dani

931 *Surat Keputusan* [Decree] No KEP-39/1965 Organisasi Komando Mandala Siaga [the Vigilance Command Organisation] dated 2 September 1965, signed by Omar Dani.

932 The new structure did not employ name of 'First Battle Command', 'Second Battle Command', and 'Special Task Command'. All names of tactical command changed into 'Task Force Command (Komando Satuan Tugas/Kosatgas) *Rencong*' in Sumatra, 'Kosatgas Cakra' for the KKO, and 'Kosatgas Mandau' in Kalimantan.

933 Chalis, 68.




Figure 4-7 Structure of the Vigilance Command

Source: *Surat Keputusan* [Decree] No KEP-39/1965, dated 2 September 1965

As the *Konfrontasi* progressed, Indonesian domestic political tension also was heightened. Left Sukarnoist and the Communist dominated the mainstream of Indonesian politics in 1965.⁹³⁴ As the tension increased, Sukarno's health began to decline.⁹³⁵ Both the PKI and the army then were counting on Sukarno's poor health. Thus, the clash between the army and the PKI could not be avoided. Regarding the *Konfrontasi*, the army leadership considered the event would enhance the offensive capability and not jeopardise the social status quo. Meanwhile, the PKI assumed the *Konfrontasi* as a means of social revolution.⁹³⁶

One of crucial issues, of that time was the proposal of establishing the Fifth Force. In 1965, the PKI desired to create the Fifth Force of armed peasants and

934 Mrazek, 153

935 There was a stone in President Sukarno's right kidney. Rumours were circulating that Sukarno might soon die following a kidney operation.

936 Mrazek, 154

organised workers in conjunction with the existing four services.⁹³⁷ Sukarno then raised the idea of establishing the Fifth Force comprised of twenty-one millions volunteers of the *Dwikora*.⁹³⁸ In his Independence Day address to the nation on 17 August 1965, Sukarno stated

Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia harus menjadi inti daripada pertahanan yang mulia itu, tetapi dengan pulau sebanyak pulau kita, dengan pantai sepanjang pantai kita, dengan angkasa selebar angkasa kita, kita tak bisa menegakkan kedaulatan Negara kita tanpa Rakyat, kalau perlu juga dipersenjatai – Rakyat, kaum buruh dan kaum tani dan kaum-kaum lainnya...

[The Indonesian Armed Forces should be the core of the noble defence, but with the number of islands as many as that of ours, with coastal line as long as that of ours, with air space as wide as that of ours, we are not able to uphold our state sovereignty without the People, it they should be armed if needed – People, workers and peasants and others...] ⁹³⁹

However, the army leadership decided to stand firm against Sukarno and the PKI proposal.⁹⁴⁰ According to Mrazek, the Fifth Force might break the army's monopoly in defence decision-making.⁹⁴¹ On the contrary, both the navy and the air force were less resistant to the Fifth Force. Omar Dani overtly agreed to Sukarno's effort to establish the Fifth Force. He had shown his loyalty to the President. Later, Martadinata also indicated his acceptance to the President's idea.⁹⁴²

Shortly after midnight of 30 September, Commandant of the First battalion of the Presidential palace guard (*Cakrabirawa*), Lieut Col Untung led a bloodshed movement, so called September 30th Movement (*Gerakan 30 September*).⁹⁴³

937 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 94.

938 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 94.

939 Sukarno, *Capailah Bintang di Langit: Tahun Berdikari* [Reach to the Stars: A Year of Self-Reliance]: President's independence-day address to the nation on 17 August 1965, (Jakarta: PT Rakyat, 1965), 27-28

940 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 97

941 Mrazek, 139

942 Mrazek, 138-139

943 Details regarding the G30S affair see, for instance, Anderson and McVey, A

The Movement attacked houses of seven army's Generals. Only General Nasution was survived from the raid, while the other Generals including the Army Commander, Ahmad Yani, had lost their lives.⁹⁴⁴ On 1 October, Untung set up Indonesian Revolution Council. Untung stated the Movement was solely in order to end Generals who were members of Council of Generals (*Dewan Jenderal*) and other officers, their accomplices and supporters of the Council of Generals.⁹⁴⁵ This announcement was widely circulated through the RRI.

4.3.2 Post the G30S Affair

By late morning, Suharto only knew that six Generals had been kidnapped and did not know of their fate.⁹⁴⁶ He also knew that Sukarno was at the Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force base and Nasution was escaped. At the KOSTRAD Headquarter in Jakarta, Suharto started organising the army and contacted the commanders of other services. All the commanders, except Dani, supported Suharto.⁹⁴⁷ At that time, Suharto assumed he was Acting Commander of the Army.⁹⁴⁸ Sukarno then asked the Jakarta Military Commander, Brig Gen Umar Wirahadikusumah and Maj Gen Pranoto Reksosamudro⁹⁴⁹ to report at the Halim. But, Suharto prohibited them to meet Sukarno at the air force base.

Preliminary Analysis,; Harold Crouch, "Another Look at the Indonesian "Coup"," *Indonesia* 15 (15) (April 1973), 1–20; Daniel S Lev, "Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup," *Asian Survey* 6 (2) (February 1966), 103–110; Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*.

944 They are Lieut Gen Ahmad Yani, Maj Gen Suprpto, Maj Gen MT Haryono, Maj Gen S Parman, Brig Gen Sutoyo Siswomiharjo and Brig Gen DI Panjaitan.

945 Several names of military elites were stated being part of the Indonesian Revolution Council. They were Omar Dani of the air force, RE Martadinata of the Navy, Hartono of the KKO and Subandrio. Suparjo was acting as Deputy Head of the Council. AH Nasution, *Menegakkan Keadilan dan Kebenaran* [Enforcing Justice and Truth], (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1967), 54

946 Elson, 102

947 Elson, 32

948 As a senior military, Suharto was several times appointed by Yani as Acting Deputy Commander of the Army, while Yani travelled outside Indonesia. See, for instance, Surat Perintah [Order] No SP-226/4/1963 dated 13 April 1963, signed by Yani; Surat Perintah [Order] No PRIN-84/3/1965 dated 3 March 1965, signed by Yani

949 At that time, Pranoto was the Third assistant to the Minister/Commander of the Army

Suharto alleged several air force officers were involved in the G30S. He argued that he did not want to risk any possibility of losing another general.⁹⁵⁰

At the Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force base, Suparjo reported the G30S to Sukarno. As Sukarno was aware of Nasution's escape and the killing of Generals, he instructed Suparjo to cease all activities.⁹⁵¹ Indeed, few days prior to the G30S affair,⁹⁵² Suparjo left his command in Kalimantan to Jakarta because his child was sick.⁹⁵³ Sukarno then started thinking of appointing an army's general to replace Yani. There were several candidates for the next Army Commander, namely: Maj Gen Suharto, Maj Gen Pranoto, Maj Gen Basuki Rahmat of the East Java Military Commander, and Maj Gen Mursid of First Deputy Commander of the Army. Later Sukarno issued an Order that stated the army was directly under his leadership and assigned Pranoto as the Army Caretaker for day-to-day matters.⁹⁵⁴

Evidently, Suharto was not happy to hear the Pranoto promotion. Suharto admitted he distrusted Pranoto.⁹⁵⁵ Both Suharto and Nasution disobeyed the Presidential Order by refusing to accept Pranoto as the Caretaker.⁹⁵⁶ They

950 M Panggabean, *Berjuang and Mengabdikan* [Struggle and Serve], (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1993), 323

951 Elson, 102

952 It is unclear when Suparjo has arrived in Jakarta from Kalimantan. Some publications said that Suparjo arrived on 27 September. Meanwhile, others stated he arrived in Jakarta on 28 September. See for instance, Nazif Basir, *Supardjo yang Dirangkul dan Dicidaduk* [Supardjo, who was Embraced and Arrested], (Padang: Penerbit Genta, 1967), 24; Atmadji Sumarkidjo, *Mendung di Atas Istana Merdeka*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2000), 147

953 Supardjo's wife, Triswati claimed she had sent a radiogram asking him to return to Jakarta. Meanwhile another publication stated that Suparjo went to Jakarta after he received a coded message 'his child was sick, please immediately come.' Regarding the coded message, Triswati rejected the allegation. Roosa, , 282; Basir, 24

954 Presidential Order on 1 October 1965. Seksi Penerangan KOTI [Information Section of the KOTI], *Rangkaian Pidato dan Pernyataan Resmi di sekitar Peristiwa Gerakan 30 September* [Collections of Speeches and Official Statements surrounding the 30 September Movement], (Jakarta: Seksi Penerangan KOTI, 1965)

955 Panggabean, 327; the relationship between Suharto and Pranoto was poor for years. In 1959, Suharto, at that time was the Diponegoro Division Commander, was accused of corruption. As a consequence, Suharto had to transfer his position to Pranoto, his Chief of Staff. Suharto accused Pranoto was the mastermind of this affair. Detail story regarding the allegation of corruption in the Diponegoro Division Command see Elson, 71-74

956 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 153

affirmed the appointment of Pranoto could not be implemented due to the fate of Generals were still unaware and the crisis was not resolved yet.⁹⁵⁷ In his speech on 1 October, Suharto declared that the leadership of the army temporarily held by himself.⁹⁵⁸

On 2 October, Sukarno called Suharto to the Bogor Palace for a meeting. Beside Suharto, there were Omar Dani, Pranoto, and Mursid. The meeting was heated because Suharto insisted that the army would rebuff the Pranoto leadership.⁹⁵⁹ Suharto explained he already took over the leadership of the army since 1 October.⁹⁶⁰ In the end, Sukarno decided to assign Suharto to restore security and order,⁹⁶¹ along with the appointment of Pranoto as the Caretaker.⁹⁶²

It seemed clear that considerable tension had arisen between Suharto, Nasution, Dani, Suparjo and the PKI in October 1965. Following the affair, Dani made strong statement that the G30S was aimed to secure Indonesian Revolution against CIA subversion. In this regard, the Movement has been purging those elements in the army, who are controlled by foreign subversives and who jeopardised the Indonesian Revolution.⁹⁶³ This statement sparked polemics. The air force was accused of being involved in the affair.⁹⁶⁴ On the following day, Dani recalled his statement and stated that his institution did not

957 Nasution, *Menegakkan Keadilan*, 66

958 Nasution, *Menegakkan Keadilan*, 68

959 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 153

960 Panggabean, 327

961 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 142/KOTI/1965 dated 1 November 1965, signed by Sukarno. However, this decree was made retroactive to 1 October 1965.

962 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 153; Nasution, *Menegakkan Keadilan*, 73

963 Press Release No 445/Pen/1965 on the Order of the Day of the Minister/Commander of the Indonesian Air Force. Seksi Penerangan KOTI, *Rangkaian Pidato*,

964 Imran Hasibuan, M Abriyanto and Purwadi Pedje Djunaedi, *Elang dan Pejuang Tanah Air: Biografi Marsekal (Purn) Roesmin Nurjadin* [The Eagle and Fighter for Homeland: Biography of Air Marshall (ret'd) Roesmin Nurjadin], (Jakarta: Q Communication and Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2004), 128; Suharto also perceived the statement was indicating the air force support to the Movement. G Dwipayana and Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (eds), *Jejak Langkah Pak Harto 1 Oktober 1965-27 Maret 1968* [The Footstep of Mr Harto 1 October 1965-27 Maret 1968], (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991), 5

interfere in the internal affairs of other services. He also denied the alleged of the involvement of his service in the G30S.⁹⁶⁵ Meanwhile, Suharto and Nasution, on 1 October, had suspected there was a link between the air force officers and the Movement. Also, Suharto alleged the Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force base was the central command of the Movement.⁹⁶⁶ At that time, Suharto has charged the PKI as the mastermind of the affair.⁹⁶⁷ In the meeting at Bogor Palace on 2 October, Suharto repeated his allegation of the air force involvement in the event. On the fourth, Sukarno defended the air force by insisting they were not involved in the September 30th Affair. Sukarno then ordered all services to unite and avoid any clash between services.⁹⁶⁸ However, the conflict between Suharto and Dani was even worse. In his speech on 4 October, Suharto overtly charged the involvement of the air force officers and demanded the air force to purge them.⁹⁶⁹

In addition to the allegation, in fact, Suharto and the army gained positive response in terms of popular support. Ostensibly, the charge against Dani was shocking for general public. Suharto has violated one of basic tenets of the Guided Democracy that responses to Presidential statements be affirmatory or silent.⁹⁷⁰ But, as Paget explained, Suharto's political move brought advantages to the army. The manoeuvre has successfully portrayed the army as a hero and anti-PKI. As the friction within the army could resolve itself and be out of the

965 *Pernyataan Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia* [Statement of the Indonesian Air Force] No 05/207/65. Seksi Penerangan KOTI, *Rangkaian Pidato*,

966 Hasibuan, Abriyanto and Djunaedi, *Elang dan Pejuang*, 141

967 Soeharto, *Pikiran, Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya: Otobiografi seperti yang dipaparkan kepada G Dwipayana dan Ramadhan KH* [My Thoughts, Words, and Deeds: an Autobiography as told to G Dwipayana dan Ramadhan KH], (Jakarta: Cipta Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), 121

968 Nasution, *Menegakkan Keadilan*, 78; Seksi Penerangan KOTI, *Rangkaian Pidato*,

969 This statement was made upon discovery of the bodies of the Generals. Seksi Penerangan KOTI, *Rangkaian Pidato*,

970 Roger Kent Paget, "Youth and the Wane of Soekarno's Government," (PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, 1970), 24

public eye, the army leaders retained a more power nationally. They were easily gathering support to purge the PKI from many elements of society.⁹⁷¹

As pressure to his leadership increased, Dani maneuvered by arresting officers who were involved in the Movement.⁹⁷² But, it was too late. This action did not help Dani's position. Since the funeral of the Generals on 5 October, pressures to the leadership of the Air Force, and the PKI increased significantly. One of consequences was Martadinata refused to sit near to Dani in one occasion.⁹⁷³ On 14 October, Omar Dani wrote a resignation letter due to the raising pressure to the Air Force, but Sukarno refused to approve it.⁹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, on the following day, Sukarno assigned Sri Mulyono Herlambang as interim Commander in Chief of the Air Force to manage political tension.⁹⁷⁵

Likewise, Suharto alleged the PKI should be responsible for the bloodbath. Elson argued there were two motives of Suharto in moving so rapidly against the PKI.⁹⁷⁶ First, he desired to dispose the dangerous enemy for ideology. Second, Suharto seemed to capitalise the momentum to unite anti-communist elements behind him. The army newspaper, *Angkatan Bersenjata*, wrote an editorial on 8 October that clearly mentioned the PKI and Aidit were the

971 Paget, "Youth," 26-27.

972 On 4 October, Dani issued Order No 05/209/65 in order to arrest the officers who involved in the G30S affair. Katoppo, et al., *Menyingkap*, 189

973 Surodjo and Soeparno, 95

974 Surodjo and Soeparno, 101-113

975 Sukarno appointed Dani as Commander of the Aviation Industries Project Executive Command (*Komando Pelaksana Proyek Industri Penerbangan/Kopelapip*). *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 303/1965 dated 15 October 1965. ANRI, *Daftar Arsip Statis Sekretariat Negara RI: Seri Produk Hukum Tahun 1949-2005 (Keputusan Presiden – Penyelenggara Pemerintahan, Instruksi Presiden) Volume IV* No 8036; *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 319/1965 dated 26 October 1965. ANRI, *Daftar Arsip Statis Sekretariat Negara RI: Seri Produk Hukum Tahun 1949-2005 (Keputusan Presiden – Penyelenggara Pemerintahan, Instruksi Presiden) Volume IV* No 8051; *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 369/1965 dated 3 December 1965. ANRI, *Daftar Arsip Statis Sekretariat Negara RI: Seri Produk Hukum Tahun 1949-2005 (Keputusan Presiden – Penyelenggara Pemerintahan, Instruksi Presiden) Volume IV* No 8100

976 Elson, 124

mastermind of the affair.⁹⁷⁷ On 12 October, Nasution even blatantly accused the PKI was behind the affair and urged government to annihilate the PKI.⁹⁷⁸

It seemed noteworthy that the affair did not create tension between Suharto and Martadinata. On the one hand, Suharto and Martadinata made a phone conversation. Suharto claimed that Martadinata cooperated with him to handle the crisis. Suharto claimed there was an agreement between the army, the navy and the police that they would stamp out the G30S.⁹⁷⁹ According to Panggabean, Nasution persuaded Martadinata to support Suharto.⁹⁸⁰ In his official statement on the same day, Martadinata admitted that he would not interfere the army's internal affair. In addition, he also denied involving with the event and disagreed with the Movement.⁹⁸¹ In addition, Martadinata has moved quickly to secure his relationship with the army by discharging Lieut Col Soemardi, who involved with the movement, dishonorably.⁹⁸²

Following the event, Subandrio seemed willing to cooperate with Suharto. On 8 October, he persuaded Sukarno to appoint Suharto as the Army Commander in Chief. Subandrio also encouraged Sukarno to move from the Bogor Palace to the State Palace in Jakarta.⁹⁸³ However, Suharto was still determined to exclude Subandrio from the Cabinet.⁹⁸⁴ To sum up, the changing of informal relationship of main actors following the G30S Affair in October 1965 is represented in Figure 4-8, located on the next page.

977 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 157

978 The Editors, "Selected Documents Relating to the September 30th Movement and Its Epilogue," *Indonesia*, 1 (April 1966), 182

979 TNA, FO 371/180316, Telegram No 2001, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 2 October 1965

980 Panggabean, 325

981 Seksi Penerangan KOTI, *Rangkaian Pidato*,

982 Seksi Penerangan KOTI, *Rangkaian Pidato*,

983 Surodjo and Soeparno, 98-99;

984 TNA, FO 371/180317, Telegram No 2009, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 2 October 1965




Figure 4-8 Informal Main Actors Network during the *Dwikora* Operation, October 1965 (Post the G30S Affair)

Source: Author

4.3.3 Changing the Leadership

It is clear that the G30S affair affected the *Dwikora* Operation. On 1 October, activities paralysed at the KOLAGA Headquarter, as it located at the Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base. All communication lines, both telephone and radio, were shut down. Staffs, especially from the army, became suspicious of each other, as the victims of the Movement were the army's generals.⁹⁸⁵ Thus, the office only focused on current situation at the Halim for few days. On 4 October, Dani requested a meeting with the Joint Staffs at the Bogor Palace. In the meeting, Dani asked the staffs to be aware with the possibility of British attack. The following day, Suharto also demanded all the KOLAGA staffs returned to work.⁹⁸⁶ However, to prevent Suparjo's manouvre,

985 Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 43

986 Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 45

Suharto, as First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA, established Joint Task Force Command (*Komando Satuan Tugas Gabungan/Kosatgasgab*) 'Sumpit' for East Kalimantan.⁹⁸⁷ The command replaced Task Force Command 'Mandau' that was led by Suparjo. The main task of joint task force command was to develop military and non-military operation in assisting people of Sabah and Brunei to gain independence.

On 11 October, Dani had considered resigning as Air Force Commander. The following day, Sukarno rejected Dani's proposal. However, on the same day, several air force officers such as Commander of the National Air Defence Command, Commodore Suyitno Sukirno, and the Air Force Attaché in Moscow, Commodore Rusmin Nuryadin (later became Commander of the Air Force), met Sukarno at the Bogor Palace. They demanded Sukarno to reshuffle the leadership of the Air Force, as Dani was accused of being involved in the affair. This action hopefully would vindicate the Air Force.⁹⁸⁸ Sukarno then said that he would consider the demand.⁹⁸⁹ And three days later, Sukarno assigned Herlambang as interim Commander of the Air Force.

It seemed clear that the generals, following the affair, challenged Sukarno's influence over the Army. According to Crouch, Sukarno was under pressure to appoint Suharto officially as the Army Commander and Chief of Staff of the KOTI.⁹⁹⁰ Nasution admitted that he urged Sukarno to assign Suharto, the solely candidate, as Commander of the Army.⁹⁹¹ Nasution argued Pranoto was unacceptable to lead the Army because he linked to the Movement. The Army, Nasution claimed, had found a letter from one of the Movement leader, Colonel Latief.⁹⁹² Sukarno approved Nasution request. On 14 October, Suharto was

987 Surat Keputusan [Decree] No KEP-45/1965 dated 16 October 1965, signed by Suharto

988 Humaidi, 86

989 Hasibuan, Abriyanto and Djunaedi, 141

990 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 181.

991 Tim Pusat Data dan Analisa Tempo, 177.

992 Tim Pusat Data dan Analisa Tempo, 177; Dwipayana and Sjamsuddin, 10.

appointed as the Army Commander in Chief.⁹⁹³ Later, Sukarno also assigned Suharto as Chief of Staff of the KOTI and rejected the nomination of Nasution.⁹⁹⁴

As Dani was assigned to accelerate the development of aviation industry, Sukarno then appointed Suharto as interim Commander of the KOLAGA.⁹⁹⁵ Sukarno also adapted the KOLAGA Decree No KEP-39/1965 as a basis for restructuring the KOLAGA.⁹⁹⁶ Consequently, most of the articles of the presidential decree were similar to the KOLAGA Decree. Although, the structure of KOLAGA still remained, new decree reinforced the authority of the Commander. The Commander might control his deputies and decide the composition of the Strategic Components.⁹⁹⁷

It is clear that the new Presidential Decree brought several consequences to the KOLAGA.⁹⁹⁸ First, the KOLAGA only divided into two elements: (a) offensive element covered Land, Sea and Air based Strategic Components; and (b) defensive element comprised Inter-regional Defence Command for Sumatra and Inter-regional Defence Command for Kalimantan. Second, Commander of the KOLAGA authorised to fully control the Strategic Component operations. Third, the removal of Logistics Command. Any Logistics Support Operation (*Operasi Bantuan Logistik*) would be handled by the Fourth Joint Staff. Last, the establishment of Seventh Joint Staff for Treasury might improve planning and

993 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 302/1965 dated 14 October 1965. ANRI, *Daftar Arsip Statis Sekretariat Negara RI: Seri Produk Hukum Tahun 1949-2005 (Keputusan Presiden – Penyelenggara Pemerintahan, Instruksi Presiden) Volume IV* No 8035

994 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 115/KOTI/1965 dated 16 October 1965

995 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 129/KOTI/1965 dated 21 October 1965; On 24 November, Omar Dani stepped down from the KOLAGA Commander in Chief. *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 358/1965 dated 24 November 1965. ANRI, *Daftar Arsip Statis Sekretariat Negara RI: Seri Produk Hukum Tahun 1949-2005 (Keputusan Presiden – Penyelenggara Pemerintahan, Instruksi Presiden) Volume IV* No 8089

996 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 124/KOTI/1965 dated 21 October 1965

997 In the KOLAGA decree, the composition of the component would be decided by each service.

998 *Surat Keputusan* [Decree] No KEP-56/1965 *Organisasi dan Prosedur Kerja Staf Gabungan Komando Mandala Siaga* [Organisation and Work Procedures of the Joint Staff of the Vigilance Command] dated 11 November 1965, signed by Suharto.

supervision matters. Regarding the new structure, Suharto sent a radiogram to his commanders to ensure the restructure of the KOLAGA was well implemented.⁹⁹⁹ As part of consolidation, he also demanded the integration of the Operation A.¹⁰⁰⁰ According to Langenberg, following the G30S, Subandrio lost his political power rapidly.¹⁰⁰¹ It was not surprising that, in November, Subandrio agreed to compromise with the army demands. Unlike previous incidents (pp.161-2 & 166-7),¹⁰⁰² handover of the Operation A run smoothly on 16 November.¹⁰⁰³

There has been no change in the *Konfrontasi* policy.¹⁰⁰⁴ Sukarno still continued to reiterate his hostility to the West.¹⁰⁰⁵ The army, including the Generals, also echoed Sukarno's voice, though the *Konfrontasi* have been more defensive than offensive. On 16 October, Suharto issued his first order. One of his orders was to increase readiness in implementing the *Dwikora* Operation.¹⁰⁰⁶ Small-scale incidents in both Kalimantan and the Malayan peninsula, including Singapore, then continued.¹⁰⁰⁷ Although, the British still doubted the *Konfrontasi* would terminate soon, they were not willing to engage the Indonesian military in fighting.¹⁰⁰⁸ Besides they did not want to distract the army in dealing with the

999 Radiogram No T-211/1965 dated 18 November 1965

1000 *Surat Perintah* [Order] No PRIN-254/1965 dated 9 November 1965

1001 Langenberg, 77

1002 Prior to the G30S affair, Subandrio denied to transfer the Operation A to the KOLAGA.

1003 Laporan tentang Serah Terima Operasi A [Report on the Handover of the Operation A] dated 22 November 1965

1004 TNA, FO 371/181456, "Indonesia and Malaysia," Secretary of State's Meeting with Press Correspondents on 19 October 1965, 19 October 1965

1005 TNA, FO 371/180318, "Indonesia," Cabinet, 14 October 1965

1006 TNA, FO 371/180320, Telegram No 2233, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 18 October 1965

1007 TNA, FO 371/181456, "Indonesia and Malaysia," Secretary of State's Meeting with Press Correspondents on 19 October 1965, 19 October 1965

1008 TNA, FO 371/180317, Telegram No 1835, Foreign Office to Singapore, 6 October 1965

PKI, British saw the G30S affair might provide opportunity to lessen the intensification of Indonesian operations against Malaysia.¹⁰⁰⁹

One should note that the abortive coup had changed the direction of the *Konfrontasi*. Secret peace talks started just a few days after the Affair when the army envoy met Ghazalie in Kuala Lumpur. Ghazali believed the army would call off the *Konfrontasi* if Sukarno were disappeared.¹⁰¹⁰ Sukendro was authorised by the Generals, also made a move. He requested to meet Rahman agent in Bangkok. Tunku then asked Ghazali to meet Sukendro in Bangkok.¹⁰¹¹ As the *Konfrontasi* was linked with Sukarno, Subandrio and the PKI, Sukendro explained the army would carry out a scenario that linked the PKI with the policy. He ensured this plan would speed up the dispute settlement.¹⁰¹²

The role of Suharto's Opsus has accelerated the de-escalation of the dispute. A more promising peace talks begun when the Opsus continued approaching Malaysian official on 18 December. At that day, the Opsus team, led by Ali Murtopo, met Razak and Ghazalie in Malaysia.¹⁰¹³ The aggressiveness of the army campaign against PKI has reassured Malaysian negotiators that there is possibility of reaching peace deals with Indonesia. As a follow up to the meeting, both parties agreed to exchange liaison officers as a willingness to end the conflict.¹⁰¹⁴

Indeed, on 9 December 1965, Subandrio tried offering peace negotiation to Malaysia. Subandrio suggested a separate negotiation between Indonesia, Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. The aim of the negotiation, Subandrio argued, was to reach mutual understanding, which would provide a foundation

1009 TNA, FO 371/180320, "Attempted Coup in Indonesia," Andrew Gilchrist to Stewart, 19 October 1965.

1010 TNA, FO 371/181455, Telegram No 1703, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, 12 October 1965

1011 TNA, FO 371/181456, Telegram No 1794, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, 2 November 1965

1012 TNA, FO 371/181457, Letter British High Commission Kuala Lumpur to CRO, 19 November 1965

1013 Pour, *Benny*, 153

1014 Mukmin, 121; Pour, *Benny*, 154

for better relationship.¹⁰¹⁵ However, Razak of Malaysia rejected the proposal, as it seemed to aim to split his country.¹⁰¹⁶

4.3.4 The Suppression of the PKI

Tension continued to increase between the PKI and the army. On 12 November, Nasution issued an Instruction to clean up the military institutions from the G30S affair.¹⁰¹⁷ This instruction provided a classification and sanction for military personnel and civilians in the ABRI who involved the G30S including all related-activities. Suharto then used this situation to widen his role and authority in the KOTI. On the same day, Suharto met Sukarno at the Palace to propose the idea of reorganising the KOTI. Suharto argued this action was needed in order to achieve the national goals. He demanded the tasks of the KOTI should cover social, economy, politics, and military.¹⁰¹⁸ On 13 November, Sukarno agreed to restructure the KOTI.¹⁰¹⁹

As depicted in Figure 4-9, Sukarno formed five positions to take advisory role in the KOTI structure. Those five positions are Deputy Prime Minister; Deputy Supreme Commander for General Affairs; Deputy Supreme Commander for Military Affairs; Deputy Supreme Commander for Economics; and Deputy Supreme Commander for Socio-Politics. Sukarno then empowered the role of Chief of Staff. Under the new structure, the Chief of Staff of the KOTI was the main assistant to the President that authorised to assess, evaluate, plan, prepare, control and oversees all implementation of the President's directives.

¹⁰¹⁵ TNA, FO 371/181495, Telegram No 2715, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 11 December 1965

¹⁰¹⁶ Mukmin, 120

¹⁰¹⁷ Instruksi Menteri Koordinator Kompartemen Pertahanan/Keamanan-Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata [Instruction of Coordinating Compartment Minister for Defence/Security – The Armed Forces Chief of Staff] No INS-1015/1965 on *Dasar-dasar Kebijaksanaan Penertiban/Pembersihan Personil Militer dan Sipil dari Departemen Angkatan dan Badan Lainnya dalam Kompartemen Pertahanan/Keamanan* [Basic Order Policy/Cleaning Up Military Personnel and Civilians from Departments and Other Agencies within Defence/Security Compartment] dated 12 November 1965, signed by AH Nasution.

¹⁰¹⁸ Dwipayana and Sjamsuddin, 23-24.

¹⁰¹⁹ *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 161/KOTI/1965 dated 13 November 1965.

By this decree, Sukarno widened the function of KOTI, not only focused on military matters but also covered economic issue. This could be seen in the composition of the KOTI Joint Staff: Intelligence, Operations, Manpower Deployment, Logistics, Socio-Politics, Monetary and Economics. Sukarno also authorised the KOTI to fully control all existing Main Commands.¹⁰²⁰




Figure 4-9 Structure of the KOTI (Post the G30S Affair)

Source: *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 161/KOTI/1965 dated 13 November 1965

It was evident that Suharto was gaining more power following the new structure of the KOTI. On 15 November, Suharto did manoeuvre by issuing two KOTI Instructions, on behalf of President Sukarno. The first instruction ordered the main commands of the KOTI should take actions to clean up the commands by referring the Nasution instruction.¹⁰²¹ For the second instruction, he adapted the

¹⁰²⁰ *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 162/KOTI/1965 dated 12 November 1965 [sic].

¹⁰²¹ *Instruksi* [Instruction] No 21/KOTI/1965 dated 15 November 1965, signed by the Chief of Staff of the KOTI Suharto, on behalf of President Sukarno.

Nasution's Instruction and applied it for all departments.¹⁰²² In addition, Suharto reshuffled the KOTI officials including Subandrio who was removed from his position as the First Joint Staff for Intelligence.¹⁰²³ Suharto suggested Sukarno re-assigned Nasution as Deputy Supreme Commander for Military Affairs.¹⁰²⁴ Suharto's authority was even bigger when Sukarno established the full structure of the Koopslihkamtib.¹⁰²⁵ By this decree, Suharto might control all the Peperlada, task forces, joint task force and special unit. The main task of the Koopslihkamtib was to restore security and public order through physics-military and mental operation.

The expansion of KOTI and establishment of the Koopslihkamtib effected immediate changes. The army had more power to hunt the PKI members and its sympathisers. On 4 December, Suparjo was discharged dishonourably, along with Latief and Untung.¹⁰²⁶ As the domestic political tension heated, on 11 March 1966, Sukarno signed an executive order, which gave Suharto full authority to restore security and order.¹⁰²⁷ On the following day, Suharto manoeuvred by dissolving the PKI.¹⁰²⁸ Suharto then, on 17 March, arrested

1022 *Instruksi* [Instruction] No 22/KOTI/1965 dated 15 November 1965, signed by the Chief of Staff of the KOTI Suharto, on behalf of President Sukarno.

1023 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 163/KOTI/1965 dated 18 November 1965

1024 Nasution admitted that Suharto assisted him as Deputy Supreme Commander for Military Affairs post for the third time. Tim Pusat Data dan Analisa Tempo, 180; Nasution was Deputy Supreme Commander for Military Affairs based on *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 181/KOTI/1965 dated 11 December 1965

1025 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 179/KOTI/1965 dated 6 December 1965

1026 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 171/KOTI/1965 dated 4 December 1965

1027 The document was widely known as *Supersemar* (*Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret* or 11 March Letter of Instruction). However, the Supersemar is still controversial issue because of a suspicion that Sukarno signed the document under pressure. Detail account of the *Supersemar* see, for instance, Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 200-219; Elson, 135-139; Wanandi, 57-83; Damien Kingsbury, *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military*, (London-New York: Routledge-Curzon, 2003), 59-61

1028 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 1/3/1966 dated 12 March 1966, signed by Suharto on behalf of Sukarno

fifteenth minister including Subandrio, who were alleged of the involvement of the affair.¹⁰²⁹ Later, Suharto disbanned all PKI affiliates.

Suharto gained more power following the arrest of Sukarno's cabinet ministers and cabinet reshuffle on 31 March. Together with Adam Malik as Foreign Minister/Deputy Prime Minister for Social and Political Affairs and Sultan of Yogyakarta, Hamengkubowono IX as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic, Financial and Developmental Affairs, Suharto established a triumvirate to control the cabinet.¹⁰³⁰ And the triumvirate started eroding Sukarno's authority gradually, as they were aware the fact that Sukarno still had strong attachments to the Indonesian people.¹⁰³¹ Suharto was responsible for security affairs, Malik for international affairs, and Sultan for economic affairs.

In short, informal key actors network during November 1965-March 1966 had changed significantly. As Suharto was more powerful than Nasution, he seemed to be a central military figure. He controlled all military matters. None of military elites, including the new Air Force Commander Air Marshall Sri Mulyono Herlambang and Navy Commander, Martadinata, tried to challenge Suharto's authority. Moreover, Suharto was determined to abolish the PKI and get rid Subandrio and Dani from the Cabinet. Meanwhile, Sukarno insisted to keep Dani and Subandrio. Sukarno also rejected the idea of abolishing the PKI. As the navy shared similar stance with the army, Martadinata supported Suharto's effort to eliminate the PKI. His relation with Dani was still cold, as Martadinata sought to keep the Leftist-Sukarnoist at a distance. Regarding the *Konfrontasi*, Suharto still kept his lukewarmness. He secretly boosted the peace talk efforts. On contrary, Nasution strongly reiterated Sukarno's view that Britain and the US

1029 Dwipayana and Sjamsuddin, 58

1030 The triumvirate reflected three elements: power, brains and traditionalism. Suharto provided the power of army backing, Malik, a Sumatran with practical diplomatic experience, provided the brains, and Hamengku Buwono IX, represented the traditionalism. Time, "Indonesia: Vengeance with a Smile," *TIME*, July 15, 1966. <http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/printout/0,8816,836000,00.html>

1031 Guy J Pauker, *Toward a New Order in Indonesia*, (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1967).

were threatening Indonesia through encirclement. He believed the separation of Singapore from Malaysia would be followed by other Malaysian states including North Kalimantan.¹⁰³² Informal key actors' network is represented in Figure 4-10.




Figure 4-10 Informal Main Actors Network during the *Dwikora* Operation, November 1965-January 1966
Source: Author

4.4 Third Year of *Dwikora* Operation (1966-1967): End of the *Konfrontasi*

This section emphasised on the de-escalation process of the *Konfrontasi*. Following the G30S affair, Suharto gained more power and control in Indonesia's politics. Meanwhile, Sukarno, who was 'President for life', lost his grip on power after the signing of executive order. As Suharto became leader by March 1966, he intensified the peaceful approach to end the dispute. Thus, this discussion comprises the success story of Suharto's Opsus, ABRI's

1032 TNA, FO 1101/8, Propaganda against General Nasution of Indonesia, 24 December 1965

'ambiguous' tactics, and Sukarno and Nasution resistance toward Suharto's peace mission.

4.4.1 Intensifying the Peaceful Approach

The uprising in the capital city affected Indonesian public and government life significantly. Following the G30S affair, the army started taking initiative in annihilating the PKI and its affiliates by all means. Consequently, military commands under the KOLAGA were merely more focus on the eradication of the PKI rather than delivering operations against Malaysia. Following the G30S affair, a number of military clashes regarding the *Konfrontasi* seemed declining. This can be seen in the Chronology reports from the Task Force Command. The 'Rencong' Task Force, for instance, during October-December 1965, was mainly devoting its duty in searching out and capturing the PKI members and associates in Sumatra.¹⁰³³

It was clear that Suharto intended to end the dispute by peaceful way. In a meeting on 29 January-1 February 1966, Suharto demanded the KOLAGA adjusted its operations.¹⁰³⁴ The changes were needed for several factors, such as (a) insufficient funding; (b) shortfalls in combat readiness; (c) enemy had no intention of undertaking offensive operations; (d) the army still needed to consolidate following the affair.¹⁰³⁵ As a consequence, the KOLAGA applied some adjustments for the operations in 1966. First, military operations would only be implemented in North Kalimantan area, as Singapore has detached from Malaysia. Second, only nine battalions would remain for the *Konfrontasi*: two infantry battalions in *Rencong* Task Force; four infantry battalions and two battalions combat team in Mandau Task Force; one infantry battalion and one

1033 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP-0014/D/10/4 *Laporan Kronologis Kosatgas Rencong/Kopur II* [Chronology Report of the Task Force Command 'Rencong'/Second Battle Command]

1034 Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 56

1035 *Instruksi* [Instruction] No INS-02/1966 *Pedoman Operasi KOLAGA Tahun 1966* [The KOLAGA Operations Guidelines 1966] dated 2 February 1966

the KKO's battalion in *Sumpit* Task Force. Third, intensifying psywar operations in all areas.¹⁰³⁶

However, Sukarno seemed to limit Suharto's influence following Suharto had developed a political base of imposing strength. Suharto was Minister/Commander in Chief of the Army, Commander of the Koopslihkamtib, and Commander in Chief of the KOLAGA as well as Chief of Staff of the KOTI. At that time, the authority of the Chief of Staff of the KOTI was powerful.¹⁰³⁷ Thus, Sukarno attempted to curtail Suharto's alliance. On 21 February, Sukarno removed Martadinata from the office. Rear Admiral Mulyadi replaced his position as Minister/Navy Commander in Chief. Probably, Martadinata lost his job because of his stronger stance over the PKI. At the funeral of Nasution's daughter, Ade Irma Suryani who was one of the victims in the G30S affair, Martadinata encouraged the students to 'sweep' (*sikat*) the PKI. He guaranteed the military would not hinder the purges of the PKI.¹⁰³⁸ Sukarno then assigned Martadinata a new post as Ambassador for Pakistan.

To retain his desire on the *Konfrontasi*, on 22 February, Sukarno established the Crush Malaysia Command (*Komando Ganyang Malaysia/KOGAM*) replacing the KOTI.¹⁰³⁹ The main task of the KOGAM was only to accelerate the Crush Malaysia mission. However, the political move was failed. As his political position was in jeopardy, Sukarno had no choice than assigned Suharto as Chief of Staff of the KOGAM. Thus, Suharto could easily control the KOGAM.¹⁰⁴⁰ Sukarno also assigned Air Marshal Rusmin Nuryadin as Air Force

1036 *Instruksi* [Instruction] No INS-02/1966 *Pedoman Operasi KOLAGA Tahun 1966*

1037 *Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban* [Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order], *Bahan-bahan Pokok G30S/PKI dan Penghancurannya* [The Main Sources of G30S/PKI and its Eradication], (Jakarta: Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, 1968), 50

1038 John Hughes, *The End of Sukarno: A Coup That Misfired: A Purge that Ran Wild*, Fourth Edition, (Singapore: Edison Didier Millet, 2014), 148

1039 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 40/1966 dated 22 February 1966. ANRI, *Daftar Arsip Statis Sekretariat Negara RI: Seri Produk Hukum Tahun 1949-2005 (Keputusan Presiden – Penyelenggara Pemerintahan, Instruksi Presiden) Volume IV* No 8165

1040 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 194-195.

Commander in Chief to replace Herlambang due to Suharto's pressure on 7 April.¹⁰⁴¹

Following the handing over of emergency power by Sukarno to Suharto on 11 March, Suharto was keen to push the peace process. As discussed earlier in this chapter, several people had acted as peace feelers (Table 4-1). However, only the Suharto's Opsus was successful to execute this mission which Malik joined the Opsus team after the G30S affair. After the effective control of the cabinet had passed into the hands of the triumvirate, Suharto and Malik had more room to manoeuvre in accelerating the peace process.

Table 4-1 List of Indonesian Peace Feelers

| Actor | Status | Position | Affiliated | Time frame | | Achievement | Link |
|---------------|----------|---|-------------|------------|-----------|--------------|--|
| | | | | Pre-G30S | Post-G30S | | |
| Adam Malik | Civilian | Minister of Trade | Murba Party | ✓ | ✓ | Successful | Suharto |
| Chaerul Saleh | Civilian | Deputy Prime Minister | Murba Party | ✓ | | Unsuccessful | n/a |
| Ahmad Yani | Military | Army Commander | Army | ✓ | | Unsuccessful | Himself |
| Ibnu Sutowo | Military | Minister of State, President Director of the state oil company <i>Permina</i> | Army | ✓ | | Unsuccessful | Suharto |
| S Parman | Military | Army's Chief of Intelligence | Army | ✓ | | Unsuccessful | Ahmad Yani |
| Sukendro | Military | Minister of State | Army | ✓ | ✓ | Unsuccessful | Sukarno, AH Nasution, Ahmad Yani and Suharto |
| Sugih Arto | Military | Ambassador for Rangoon | Army | ✓ | | Unsuccessful | Sukarno |
| Ali Murtopo | Military | KOSTRAD's Intelligence Assistant | Army | ✓ | ✓ | Successful | Suharto – Ahmad Yani |

Source: Author

1041 Herlambang was seen by Suharto as Dani's man, while Nuryadin was endorsed by Suharto and the army. Humaidi, 108-112

On 16 March, the leadership of the KOLAGA was changed. Maj Gen Umar Wirahadikusumah led the KOLAGA as Commander in Chief replacing Suharto.¹⁰⁴² As the peace talk was on a motion, the KOLAGA still issued a set procedure to prevent any surprise attack.¹⁰⁴³ Regular patrols were conducted along the Indonesia-Malaysia border. On 20 May, Suharto sent a delegation of twenty military officers, led by First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA Rear Admiral OB Sjaaf, to Kuala Lumpur for a goodwill mission.¹⁰⁴⁴ The main task of the team was to meet Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in preparation for the Bangkok peace negotiation between Indonesia and Malaysia on 29 May-1 June.

The Bangkok conference was a foreign ministerial meeting to discuss basic principles in normalising the relation between Indonesia and Malaysia. Malik, who was assigned as the new Indonesian Foreign Minister led the Indonesian delegation, while Razak led the Malaysia delegation. During the conference, there was a dissenting opinion within the Indonesian team. Military representatives demanded Malik to bring sensitive issues such as Sabah and Sarawak status in the meeting.¹⁰⁴⁵ Well-defined statement from Malaysia over Sabah and Sarawak status was needed, as the main task of *Konfrontasi* was to assist people of Sabah and Sarawak to gain independence from the Britain. Malik and Razak then reached the agreement, known as Bangkok Accord, on three principles: (a) people of Sabah and Sarawak would be given opportunity to reaffirm their status; (b) diplomatic relation would be restored immediately; and (c) end the hostilities.¹⁰⁴⁶

1042 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 523/KOGAM/1966 dated 16 March 1966.

1043 *Petunjuk Operasi* [Operational Directives] No POPS – 07/1966 *Keamanan dan Pemberitaan* [Security and Reporting] dated 20 March 1966, signed by First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA Rear Admiral OB Sjaaf.

1044 Mukmin, 132.

1045 Mukmin, 136.

1046 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 228.

The evidence indicates that Suharto applied coercive diplomacy during the peace process. Indeed, following the Bangkok conference, Wirahadikusumah ordered his troops to avoid any clash along the border.¹⁰⁴⁷ He also instructed the main commands to prepare the possibility of delivering joint border patrol with Malaysia. Still, the KOLAGA insisted to deliver 'special operations' that aimed to separate Sabah and Sarawak from Malaysia and to dissolve the Federation in order to establish Maphilindo.¹⁰⁴⁸ And the operations were designed to support the Opsus.¹⁰⁴⁹

From the very beginning of the *Konfrontasi*, Suharto considered military force was a necessary element of diplomacy. In 1963, he argued that the deployment of Kostrad troops to Sarawak border aimed to bolster diplomacy.¹⁰⁵⁰ Thus, it might not come as surprise that the Malaysian and British leaders doubted Suharto's goodwill. Razak admitted that he could not be completely sure of Suharto's sincerity. Although the triumvirate has indicated its stance toward Sukarno, Razak remained uncertain about the continuity of subversive activities, which conducted by the ABRI.¹⁰⁵¹ Up to April 1966, British noted that there was no evidence that Suharto indicated to discontinue military confrontation, as level of disposition of the ABRI in the frontier remained the same.¹⁰⁵²

1047 Radiogram No TR-132/1966 dated 7 June 1966.

1048 The 'special operations' was different with the Suharto's Opsus. The special operations consisted intelligence operation, socio-political operation and territorial operation. Bimbingan Panglima Mandala Siaga [The Directives of the Commander in Chief of Vigilance Command] No 01/1966 dated 16 July 1966, signed by by First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA Rear Admiral OB Sjaaf.

1049 Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan I Intelijen [Command Report of the First Joint Staff for Intelligence], dated 31 May 1967

1050 TNA, FO371/169912, Telegram No 1221, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 3 October 1963

1051 TNA, DO 169/437, Kuala Lumpur to PP Wellington, 7 July 1966

1052 TNA, CAB 148/27/47, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence, 4 April 1966

Available materials indicate that Suharto changed the nature of offensive operation against Malaysia post the G30S Affair.¹⁰⁵³ All military operations in Kalimantan were not mainly targeted at crushing the physical facilities. As the missions was more focus in socio-political aspect, the ABRI only conducted territorial and intelligence operations. The operations included infiltration, counter-intelligence and psychological operation.¹⁰⁵⁴ Both *Mandau* Task Force and *Sumpit* Task Force were responsible to conduct the operations. *Mandau* Task Force formed two teams, *Jalak* and *Manjar* that employed 43 personnel with Kuching-Serian Road in Sarawak as the main target. Meanwhile, *Sumpit* Task Force established 'Ngayau Iting' Operation that comprised of five teams: *Beo*, *Kelabang*, *Hendrik*, *Oga* and *Anji Apoi*. For 'Ngayau Iting' Operation, at least 195 people were deployed for delivering mission in several locations in Sabah: Lawas, Limbang, Jesselton, Selayang and Miri-Marudi. All teams comprised of military personnel, TNKU, and volunteers.¹⁰⁵⁵

But, majority of those operations failed.¹⁰⁵⁶ The major cause of the failure was that the British military successfully detected and intercepted the teams before they could siege.¹⁰⁵⁷ The operations also were unsuccessfully encouraging local people to join the fight against British and Malaysia.¹⁰⁵⁸ As British captured

1053 *Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan I Intelijen* [Command Report of the First Joint Staff for Intelligence] dated 31 May 1967; *Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan II Operasi* [Command Report of the Second Joint Staff for Operation] dated 31 May 1967; Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP 002/D/10/4 *Peranan Kolaga dan Kodam XII/TJPR dalam Konfrontasi terhadap Malaysia* [Roles of Kolaga and the XII/TJPR Regional Military Command during the Konfrontasi against Malaysia]; Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP 0017/D/10/4 *Rencana Operasi Ngayau Iting* [Operation Plan of Ngayau Iting]

1054 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP 0017/D/10/4

1055 *Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan I Intelijen* [Command Report of the First Joint Staff for Intelligence] dated 31 May 1967

1056 *Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan II Operasi* [Command Report of the Second Joint Staff for Operation] dated 31 May 1967

1057 Further explanation regarding British interception see Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 233-240; Christopher Tuck, "Winning While Losing: Borneo Headquarters and the End of Confrontation, June-November 1966," *War in History*, 24, 1 (2017): 102-107.

1058 *Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan I Intelijen* [Command Report of the First Joint Staff for Intelligence] dated 31 May 1967

operation plan documents and interrogated the prisoners, the teams did not have enough room to manoeuvre for implementing the operations.¹⁰⁵⁹

As the KOGAM authorised to make a national policy, it decided to accept the Bangkok agreement on 30 July. Further, to show goodwill, the KOLAGA ordered his troops to stop any operation on 10 August.¹⁰⁶⁰ On the following day, the peace agreement, known as Jakarta Accord, signed by Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, and Malaysia Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak.¹⁰⁶¹ As a response to the Jakarta Accord, the KOGAM issued a Directive for implementation of operational concept.¹⁰⁶² For instance, regarding Sabah and Sarawak isu, the KOGAM suggested the KOLAGA to prevent the merger between Serawak and Singapore. The KOGAM also demanded the KOLAGA to raise the awareness regarding anti-subversion, anti-sabotage, anti-infiltration and anti-illegal smuggling.¹⁰⁶³ Later, KOLAGA terminated all covert operations in Malaysia.¹⁰⁶⁴

In reflecting on this stage of the *Konfrontasi*, it is worth observing that the KOGAM continued the socio-political operations. The US document noted that Indonesia's interest in crushing Malaysia remained active.¹⁰⁶⁵ As small scale border incursions still have continued, the US assumed there were some elements within the army attempted to delay the ratification.¹⁰⁶⁶

The US assumption toward the army's group perception appears accurate. Although the peace talk was led by the Opsus Team, Suharto apparently had 'hidden agenda' toward the peace result. Suharto still admitted Malaysia as a

1059 *Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan I Intelijen* [Command Report of the First Joint Staff for Intelligence] dated 31 May 1967; Tuck, "Winning While Losing," 102-105.

1060 Radiogram No TSR-26/1966 dated 10 August 1966

1061 According to the agreement, both countries agreed to afford people of Sabah and Sarawak opportunity to reaffirm their status, establish close relation and end the hostilities.

1062 The KOGAM Directives No DIR-14/KOGAM/8/1966 dated 13 August 1966

1063 Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 67.

1064 Radiogram No TSR 31/1966 dated 22 August 1966

1065 FRUS, 1964-1968, 463

1066 FRUS, 1964-1968, 457.

British project that should be dissolved.¹⁰⁶⁷ Following the Jakarta Accord, the KOGAM ordered the KOLAGA to give more emphasis to socio-politics operations than 'conventional' military operations. This could be seen on the Main Directive of the KOGAM No 17/KOTI/10/1966.¹⁰⁶⁸ Even though, it did not indicate any intention to employ aggressive military.

As the peace deal indicated good progress in reducing the tension, the KOLAGA started dislocating the troops on 15 December 1966.¹⁰⁶⁹ According to the KOLAGA Joint Staff Report, both Indonesia and Malaysia were consistent to maintain the cease-fire.¹⁰⁷⁰ The KOLAGA then launched Operation *Tertib I* and *II* to liquidate irregular force, which had helped the ABRI during the *Konfrontasi*.¹⁰⁷¹ The operation covered the decommissioning of all arms and ammunition held by the militias.¹⁰⁷² This measure was taken in order to control Kalimantan security post the Jakarta Accord. Later, the KOTI officially dissolved the KOLAGA on 26 May 1967.¹⁰⁷³ On 26 July, Suharto disbanded the KOTI.¹⁰⁷⁴

1067 Suharto suggested Malaysia reform herself. he said the statement during the Commanders Call on 20-22 November. Komando Mandala Siaga, *Peran Komando Mandala*, 74.

1068 *Petunjuk Pokok* [the Main Directives] No 17/KOTI/10/1966 dated 14 October 1966; Sukarno officially changed the name of KOGAM into KOTI on 2 November 1966. *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 236/1966 dated 2 November 1966. ANRI, *Daftar Arsip Statis Sekretariat Negara RI: Seri Produk Hukum Tahun 1949-2005 (Keputusan Presiden – Penyelenggara Pemerintahan, Instruksi Presiden) Volume IV* No 8359

1069 *Petunjuk Operasi* [Operations Guidelines] No POPS-08/1966 dated 15 December 1966, signed by Umar Wirahadikusumah

1070 Laporan Staf Gabungan II Komando Mandala Siaga 1966 [Report of Second Joint Staff of the Vigilance Command 1966] dated 23 February 1967

1071 Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan II Operasi [Command Report of the Second Joint Staff for Operation] dated 31 May 1967

1072 Not all militias were surrendering their arms. Some of them disobeyed the order. They were knowingly as the North Kalimantan People's Guerilla Force (*Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Kalimantan Utara/Paraku*), a splinter in the Sarawak People's Guerilla Force (*Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak/PGRS*). And the ABRI started to hunt them through Operation *Sapu Bersih* (Clean Sweep) since March 1967. Detail account of the annihilation of the Paraku, see Jamie S Davidson, *From Rebellion to Riots: Collective Violence on Indonesian Borneo*, (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 47-84

1073 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 88/KOTI/1967 dated 26 May 1967.

1074 *Keputusan Presiden* [Presidential Decree] No 107 TAHUN 1967 dated 26 July 1967

Despite their limitation, both Sukarno and Nasution still insisted to continue the *Konfrontasi* policy. Even though, in general, the relationship between Sukarno and Nasution was poor. On 8 June at the KOGAM meeting, Sukarno admitted that he was disappointed with the Bangkok result. Sukarno argued Malaysia should provide further explanations before the signing of peace agreement. His stance toward the agreement was clear. Sukarno refused to sign it, even though Malaysia accepted the Bangkok Agreement.¹⁰⁷⁵ As the political tension heated, Sukarno announced transfer of power to Suharto as acting president on 22 February 1967. Nevertheless, the ABRI still recognised Sukarno as the President, but daily tasks were handled by Suharto.¹⁰⁷⁶

Similarly, Nasution who was elected as Chairman of the Temporary People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara/MPRS*), called the continuation of the *Konfrontasi*.¹⁰⁷⁷ Nasution argued the peace process should not discarded Maphilindo and Indonesian principles.¹⁰⁷⁸ So, any peace agreement should be referred to the Manila Agreement. In the matter of the *Konfrontasi*, British noted Nasution as the biggest surprise in being more anti-Malaysia than Sukarno. Also, he was even more rigidly attached to carrying out the *Konfrontasi*.¹⁰⁷⁹ In spite of the fact that Nasution's voice gained considerable support among officers who feared international humiliation, Suharto and all military leaders ignored the demand to revoke the accord. Informal key actors network is represented in Figure 4-11, located on the next page.

1075 FRUS, 1964-1968, 463

1076 Tim Pusat Data dan Analisa Tempo, 221-222

1077 Roger K Paget, "The Military in Indonesian Politics: The Burden of Power," *Pacific Affairs*, 40, 3/4 (Autumn, 1967 - Winter, 1967-1968): 304.

1078 Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 233

1079 TNA, FO 371/1699900, Telegram No. 1078, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 13 July 1963.




Figure 4-11 Informal Main Actors Network during the *Dwikora* Operation, 1966-67

Source: Author

4.5 Summary

When Sukarno launched the *Dwikora* Operation, it was evident that he did not want to lead the dispute into open war. As the army leaders were disappointed with the appointment of Omar Dani as the KOLAGA Commander in Chief, the army was half-heartedly supporting the *Konfrontasi*. This lukewarmness affected the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation. The KOTI, which was dominated by the army, intentionally obstructed the execution of the operation. Thus, in the first year of the *Dwikora* Operation, Dani missed several targets, which led to the failure of infiltration missions.

The intensity of interservice rivalry increased drastically following the assignment of Dani. Both Dani and Yani seemed to exercise their power and influence toward the *Dwikora* Operation. Consequently, the structure of the military operation command has changed for four times. Also, the rivalry between Dani and Suharto exposed complications. Under Yani's approval, Suharto conducted a covert operation (Opsus) to settle the dispute. Indeed, several people had actively involved in peace efforts. But, most of them were failed due to the increasing tension between Indonesia and Malaysia.

It was evident that the G30S affair turned the direction of the *Konfrontasi*. Following the affair, most of key actors lost their power. On the contrary, Suharto, who was a peripheral actor, was successfully turned into central player. He capitalised his power after the G30S. He then became a principal player in the military organisation and political sphere. Thus, as he succeeded concentrating power in his hand, Suharto could end the *Konfrontasi* by signing peace agreement without any major obstacles.

5 UNDERSTANDING THE FAILURE OF *DWIKORA* OPERATION

Victory is an outcome of battle; it is not what a military organisation does in battle. Victory is not a characteristic of an organisation but rather a result of organisational activity

Millett, Murray and Watman¹⁰⁸⁰

5.1 Introduction

As explained in Chapter Three and Four, the *Dwikora* Operation failed to achieve its main goal, crushing the Malaysia Federation. Suharto, who was not the main player in the beginning of the *Konfrontasi*, succeeded in changing the direction of the ABRI's operation. This chapter aims at addressing the research questions as to why and how did the ABRI become politicised, and how did military political behaviour affect the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation. This analysis explores two enabling objectives of the dissertation (pp.14-5), namely, (d) to examine the failure of the *Dwikora* Operation; and (e) to contribute to the literature in explaining the effect of politicisation of the ABRI on the *Dwikora* Operation during the *Konfrontasi*. To achieve the aim and objectives, the research adapts PT technique and test several theories whether the theories can confirm the case study.

This chapter will start by investigating the causal process of how political behaviour in the ABRI contributed to the failure of the military operations. The discussion will follow the building blocks that are illustrated in the analytical framework. The chapter then concludes with the recap of the disunity of command during the *Konfrontasi*.

1080 Allan R Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," *International Security*, 11, 1 (1986): 38. doi:10.2307/2538875.

There are three sections in this chapter. The first section presents the introduction of the chapter. The second section traces the failure of the operation. The division of this section refers to the boxes in the analytical framework (p.20), namely policy of political warfare; main actors and coalitions; politicised military; and military operation. Several relevant existing theories that are discussed in Chapter Two will also be tested. The analysis of how political behaviour of the ABRI affected the implementation of the military operations during the *Konfrontasi* concludes the process tracing. The third section covers the summary of research findings of the study.

5.2 Tracing the Failure

Since the present study examines an historical single case study of the Indonesian military operations during the *Konfrontasi*, process tracing was adapted as an outcome-oriented method. PT provides necessary tools to explain the important characteristics of how politicisation of the ABRI affected its operations during the *Konfrontasi*. The outcome-oriented approach uncovered five causal mechanisms that contributed to political behaviour of the TNI and link directly to its operations, which has led to the failure.

To investigate implementation of the ABRI operations during the *Konfrontasi*, the researcher examined the process change and political behaviour of the ABRI. To understand how the changes occurred, the researcher employed several theories about military involvement in politics to rationalise how the ABRI became more politicised. The four building blocks (Figure 1-2) discussed in this chapter aimed at revealing the relationship between politicisation of the military and the implementation of military operations. As stated in Chapter 1 Section 1.4, in order to answer the research questions, the analysis focuses on two aspects: process of politicisation of the military and political behaviour in organisation. The first three building blocks discuss aspect of process of politicisation of the ABRI from the outset of the *Konfrontasi*. Meanwhile, the last block examines the effect of political behaviour in military organisation on the

Dwikora Operation. The explanations include organisation's political propensity, characteristics, and key actors' political behaviour. As this research recognised the politicisation of the ABRI has been intertwined in the political process of Indonesia, the network with civilian elites, and foreign countries, particularly the US and UK, will be also illustrated. The following analysis (Table 5-1) maps the causal process and existing theories that will be tested.

Table 5-1 Mapping of Process Linking the Politicisation of the ABRI to the Failure of the *Dwikora* Operation

| Mapping Analysis | | | |
|----------------------------|---|---|---|
| Process Linking | | Aspects | Theory-testing |
| Building blocks | Description | | |
| Policy of war | Discussing how various motivations of key actors affected the policy of the <i>Konfrontasi</i> making process. | Process of politicisation of the military | - |
| Main actors and coalitions | Examining two aspects that influenced the key military actors' behaviour toward the <i>Konfrontasi</i> , namely, opportunity and motive. | | Finer (2006), Edmonds (1988), Koonings and Kruijt (2002), Perlmutter and Bennett (1980) |
| Politicised military | Identifying characteristics of the ABRI that were central in shaping the politicisation, level of influence and direction of politicisation | | Finer (2006), Betts (1977) |
| Military operation | Examining the relationship between political behaviour in the ABRI and the <i>Dwikora</i> Operation. This part also probes the consequences of political behaviour in the ABRI at three levels, namely, individual, organisational and national | Political behaviour in organisation | Buchanan and Badham, (2008) |

Source: Author

The researcher considered the Indonesian Armed Forces as the unit of analysis. Since the research and data collection focused on the implementation of the ABRI operations during the *Konfrontasi*, it appeared natural to consider the various levels of analysis: individual, organisational and national/state. Besides collecting archives, the researcher also managed to obtain interviews from a spectrum of witnesses and experts using semi-structured interview. The breakdown of respondents can be seen in Table 1-1 (p.28).

Individuals were selected for a variety of reasons but mostly for their expertise and experience in the *Konfrontasi*. Nine respondents had military background and six of them were witnesses of the *Konfrontasi*. Other interviewees were civilians who witnessed the case study or had expertise on the Indonesian military and the *Konfrontasi*. Five of the nine respondents, who have military background, were content that their personal identification remained in confidential status, because it allowed them to speak more openly regarding particular incidents. All interviews were conducted face-to-face and in Indonesian. The subject of interviews with witnesses covered specific events in the *Konfrontasi*, which they might have thought about the issues. Meanwhile, contents of interview with experts included their judgement on several issues surrounding the *Konfrontasi*.

This case study offers useful insights about internal dynamics of the ABRI during the *Konfrontasi*. The nature of the factions was fluid and much affected by the domestic politics situations. Indeed, military factions within the ABRI have deeply rooted before the *Konfrontasi*. However, the involvement of non-military actors promoted a more intense rivalry within the ABRI during the period. Following sections provides a close analysis of the effect of politicisation of the ABRI into its operations during the *Konfrontasi* and provides links to several relevant theories.

5.2.1 Policy of War

Brooks explained one of critical factors for determining individual, group and organisational success is motivation.¹⁰⁸¹ Generally, motivation can be defined as the direction and persistence of action.¹⁰⁸² Mitchell argued motivation may be defined as individual phenomenon, intentional, multifaceted and to predict behaviour.¹⁰⁸³ Motivation can be divided into two types: intrinsic motivation, which refers to doing something for its inherent satisfactions, and extrinsic motivation, which refers to doing something for attaining some separable outcome.¹⁰⁸⁴ As the motivation to work varies widely, illustration of the diversity of motivation may indicate of how people determined the direction of action.¹⁰⁸⁵

As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4, it was evident that all key actors tended to agree with the *Konfrontasi* policy. Each actor, both from military and civilian, owned several motivations regarding the *Konfrontasi*. In general, as shown in Table 5.2, located on the next page, there are two classifications of motivations over the *Konfrontasi*, namely: self-preservation and striving to grow. Self-preservation included survival, self-defence, self-actualisation, ego needs, and eliminate obstacle.

Heterogeneous nature in the ABRI reflected the way factions perceived the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute.¹⁰⁸⁶ Key military actors in all levels (individual, group and organisational) have a wide range of motivations toward the *Konfrontasi* policy. In organisational level, the ABRI was highly motivated to eradicate the

1081 Ian Brooks, *Organisational Behaviour: Individuals, Group and Organisation*, Fourth Edition, (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2009), 80

1082 Laurie J Mullins, *Management and Organisational Behaviour*, with Gill Christy, Tenth Edition, (Harlow: Prentice Hall, 2013), 245

1083 Mitchell, 81.

1084 Richard M Ryan and Edward L Deci, "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions and New Directions," *Contemporary Educational Psychology*, 25, 1, (2000): 55.

1085 Ronald L Pardee, "Motivation Theories of Maslow, Herzberg, McGregor & McClelland: A Literature Review of Selected Theories Dealing with Job Satisfaction and Motivation," (1990), accessed December 26, 2017. <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED316767>.

1086 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4

perceived threat, the Malaysia Federation. Meanwhile, the army supported the *Konfrontasi* in order to impede China influence in the region and maintain its budget. As Nasution argued, the *Konfrontasi* might help the military to resist budget cut. In addition, the navy and the air force endorsed the policy because for eradicating the perceived threat and maintaining close relationship with Sukarno.

Table 5-2 Diversity of Key Actors Motivations, Implications and Standpoint toward the Konfrontasi

| Key Actors | Motivations | | | | | Implications | | | Standpoint | |
|------------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|------|------------------|-----|
| | Self Preservation | | | | Striving to grow | Moral support to the TNKU | Support the <i>Konfrontasi</i> Policy | | Keen to Open War | |
| | Survival | Self defence | Self actualisation | Eliminate obstacle | | | Less | Full | Yes | No |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Military</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| ABRI | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| Army* | ✓ | | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| Nasution | ✓ | | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Yani | ✓ | | | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| Suharto | | | ✓ | | ✓ | n/a | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| Air Force | ✓ | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Navy | ✓ | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| <i>Civilians</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sukarno | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Subandrio | ✓ | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| PKI | ✓ | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | | n/a |

*As factionalism in the army seemed apparent, the present research illustrates the motivation in two levels: service and faction/group leader.

Source: Author

Given that the key generals were also leaders for their factions, individual-level motivation also reflected group-level motivation (pp.113-22). Nasution and his faction upheld the hostile policy in favour of maintaining the army's unity, while Yani and his group were motivated by maintaining relationship with Sukarno and opportunity for improving army's capability. Apparently, the need of improving the army's striking capability was also encouraging Suharto and his faction to support the policy. Moreover, Suharto had a personal goal to be the KOGA Commander.

Similarly, main civilian actors, both individual and group, had various motivations about the *Konfrontasi* (pp.107-13 & 122-5). Sukarno launched the policy for countering UK intimidation, eradicating the perceived threat, maintaining his political position and self-esteem. Subandrio agreed with the policy in order to maintain his relationship with Sukarno and impede Chinese influence. Besides keeping close ties with Sukarno, the PKI promoted the *Konfrontasi* for gaining political popularity and eradicating the perceived threat.

The important implication follows from the diversity of key actors' motivation. The diversities resulted in the different policy support level. In lower level, majority of key military actors, as well as civilian actors shared similar stance, provided moral support to the TNKU rebellion (pp.118-20). Only Suharto's position was unknown whether he supported the TNKU. However, in upper level, the key military actors were obviously divided into two camps: full and less support the policy of *Konfrontasi*. This condition was reflecting the intensity of inter and intraservice rivalry. Nevertheless, the standpoint of the majority of the actors over the dispute was clear that the *Konfrontasi* policy also should not spill the conflict into an open war.¹⁰⁸⁷ This standpoint was a result of Sukarno's firm decision that he was reluctant to deliver a full military operation as big as the *Trikora* Operation and launch open war.

It was worth noting how the intense rivalry enhanced the development of fluid coalition among key actors during the military operation making. As Kilduff et al. explained, rivalry entailed a focus on a specific, identifiable, opponent.¹⁰⁸⁸ Next section discussed how the key actors form the coalition including what elements shape the process.

¹⁰⁸⁷ There is no evidence regarding the standpoint of the PKI over the dispute, whether it endorsed the limited or open war.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Gavin J Kilduff, et al., "Whatever it takes: Rivalry and unethical behaviour," (Paper presented at the International Association for Conflict Management, IACM 25th Annual Conference, Spier, South-Africa, 2012).

5.2.2 Main Actors and Coalitions

Rivalry is often used interchangeably with competition. However, as Kilduff et al. suggested, those two words are not similar. Competition has neglected to highlight the importance of existing competitors' relationships. Also, a series of interactions has developed the relationships.¹⁰⁸⁹ This section discusses two main aspects that shaped the interactions among actors from the outset of *Konfrontasi*, namely, opportunity (p.55) and motives of military involvement in politics (pp.57-8).

Opportunity

Indonesia was a new state during the period of *Konfrontasi*. According to Betts, traditionally there was a dichotomy between politics and administration.¹⁰⁹⁰ So, civilian authorities established policy and military implemented the politicians' decision. As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.5, there was no clear demarcation between political officials and professionals in Indonesian Cabinet during the *Konfrontasi*. The 1959 *Dekret Presiden* has provided greater roles for military in civilian affairs.

It is noted that Sukarno tried to boost his position and influence over the armed forces. As he intended weakening Nasution's grip in military, Sukarno applied professional-political method in selecting military leadership. Betts explained the problem of choice remained between maximising professionalism and expertise and maximising political control over military.¹⁰⁹¹ The routine-professional mode of service chief selection optimised the value of professional standards but left more autonomy to the military than did the more politicised of selection. Meanwhile, exceptional-political appointments downgraded professional standards. Thus, the professional-political mode was a compromise method.

1089 Kilduff, et al.

1090 Betts, 32

1091 Betts, 73-74.

The integration of military leaders into the political structure, of course, affected the professionalism. There are four explanations of why the ABRI became more politicised from the outset of *Konfrontasi*. First, *military elite manoeuvres*. Undeniably, since its formation in 1945, the military had always been politically oriented.¹⁰⁹² Although the 1957 martial law allowed military officers to involve in political affairs, they did not have any guidance and concept regarding the ABRI's socio-political role. Until Nasution introduced the 'Middle Way' principle in 1958, the political role of the ABRI had a clearer direction.

It was then no wonder that following the integration of military chiefs into Cabinet, the army gained the dominant position in Indonesian politics. Number of officers in the cabinet was significantly increased. In this regard, according to Lev, military did not desire to topple Sukarno.¹⁰⁹³ Soon afterwards Sukarno was the central figure for Guided Democracy, politics became more highly personalised.¹⁰⁹⁴ The chiefs then actively involved in the struggle to influence Sukarno. Consequently, as Nasution said, there was no unified leadership in the matter of preparing for war because the chiefs could act independently.¹⁰⁹⁵ This act can be seen when Yani and Martadinata deployed their troops for covert offensive intelligence operation in 1963 independently.¹⁰⁹⁶

Second, *the declining of military reputation*. Undeniably, the liberation of West Papua boosted Indonesia's military build-up. In January 1961, Indonesia gained a loan of USD450 million for military equipment from the Soviet.¹⁰⁹⁷ Even though, the government budget deficit reached 12.8% in 1962, military still

1092 Harold Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia," *World Politics*, 31, 4 (1979): 574. doi:10.2307/2009910.

1093 Lev, "The Political Role," 360.

1094 Daniel S Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, 8, 1 (1967): 61

1095 AH Nasution, "Unity of Command," in *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945–1965*, edited by Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 418.

1096 Conboy, *Kopassus Inside*, 96-97; Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, *Korps Komando*, 271-272.

1097 Donald Hindley, "The Political Situation in Indonesia, 1962," *The Australian Quarterly*, 35, 1 (1963): 14. doi:10.2307/20633847.

enjoyed 48 per cent of the state budget revenue.¹⁰⁹⁸ Also, around 75 per cent of government expenditure has been allocated for the annexation of West Papua.¹⁰⁹⁹ Thus, this condition endangered the Indonesian economy and threatened the development programme.¹¹⁰⁰ At that time, government was under pressure to curb the inflation. The PKI also attacked the army leaders as the persons who should primarily responsible for economic chaos and corruption.¹¹⁰¹

In addition, the involvement of officers in economic affairs also damaged military reputation, especially the army. As the martial law legalised military to take over the civil administration, the officers could continue already-established corrupt practices and advance their own economic interest. And Nasution was concerned at this situation. When he headed the Committee for Retooling the State Apparatus (*Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara/PARAN*), he conducted inquiries into the corruption cases in state owned enterprises, which were allegedly involving officers and other officials.¹¹⁰² It was suspected that the investigation into the officers on corruption charges might harm Yani's faction.¹¹⁰³ As Crouch explained, the funds from the army's involvement in the economy were transferred directly to the central command, rather than to the government.¹¹⁰⁴ So, the army could reduce its dependence on the state budget.

1098 In 1962, state revenue was IDR 18.9 billion. Mackie, "Problems," 8; Justus M Van Der Kroef, "Indonesia's Economic Difficulties," *International Journal*, 17, 4 (1962): 412. doi:10.2307/40198893.

1099 Hindley, "The Political," 15.

1100 Van Der Kroef, "Indonesia's Economic Difficulties," 412-3

1101 The PKI used the term capitalist bureaucrats (*kapitalis birokrat/kabir*) to attack the army elites. The *kabir* was one of enemy groups placed among both the "three urban devils and "seven rural devils" in the PKI demonology. By 1960, the PKI labelled military officers who occupied civilian posts as 'capitalist bureaucrats.' Sutter, 537.

1102 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 39

1103 Later, in 1964, Sukarno dissolved the PARAN and established the Supreme Command for Retooling the Tools of the Revolution (*Komando Tertinggi Alat Revolusi /KORTAR*), with Yani as its Chief of Staff. Yani showed his approval on Sukarno's decision over the PARAN dissolution. Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 39

1104 Harold Crouch, "Generals and Business in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, 48, 4 (1975): 521. doi:10.2307/2756450.

Third, *civilian dependency on the military*. Understandably, Sukarno and the military elites, especially the army leaders, have been developing unique relationship since the beginning of Guided Democracy. Cooperation and conflict were colouring their partnership. Following the declaration of a state of war, they needed each other in order to rule, as Sukarno had legitimacy and the army had coercive power. At the same time, Sukarno and the army elites were struggling for a dominant role in the military.¹¹⁰⁵ Indeed, Sukarno has strongly dissatisfied with the multi-party parliamentary system of government. Since the martial law provided greater power for the military, it then shared similar view with Sukarno, a limitation of political parties' prerogatives.¹¹⁰⁶ Legge added Sukarno's administration could not survive without support from a united army leadership.¹¹⁰⁷ As a result, Sukarno and the army coalition successfully brought parliamentary government collapse. The military, then, has become a decisive part of Sukarno's polity and supervised all political activities.¹¹⁰⁸

Indeed, Sukarno-military leaders' relationship became strained following the rapid military expansion in civilian affairs. Although, it was not political party, Sukarno perceived the special powers of the Army might pose a threat to his rule. According to McVey, Sukarno was the only civilian element that could influence the top level of military.¹¹⁰⁹ Sukarno's dependency on the military remained high, even though, he had solid mass support, which was provided by the PKI. Sukarno was unable to abandon military support. When he launched the policy of *Konfrontasi*, Sukarno had to employ coercive power to enhance his political pressure on Malaysia. Without military involvement, Sukarno could not execute the policy of *Konfrontasi* to any effect.

1105 Hindley, "President Sukarno," 915.

1106 Tinker and Walker, ,” 178.

1107 JD Legge, *Indonesia*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964), 138

1108 Justus M Van Der Kroef, "The Changing Pattern of Indonesia's Representative Government," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue Canadienne D'Economique Et De Science Politique*, 26, 2 (1960): 232. doi:10.2307/138652.

1109 McVey, "Part II," 147.

Fourth, *domestic circumstances*. As a new state, Indonesia's party system shared some similar experiences with other countries that adopted multi-party system.¹¹¹⁰ Not only there was a tendency of 'mutual destruction' among political parties,¹¹¹¹ but also each party was torn by factionalism.¹¹¹² The failure of parties to form strong parliamentary coalition has led to inefficient government.¹¹¹³ The chaotic in domestic political landscape then contributed to the birth of Guided Democracy. On 5 March 1959, the military high command issued a decree to 'freeze' the parliament. With increasing internal instability, the stagnation of the domestic economy, and the strong assertion of presidential power, the military could assure its greater role in civilian affairs. The army's civic action programme, for instance, was an evidence of how the army maintained its participation in the government.¹¹¹⁴ The programme included building roads, dams and bridges. Besides useful in economic development, this mission also attempted to balance the PKI's influence in the grass-root level.¹¹¹⁵ The US has assisted the mission by providing technician, equipment and technical trainings.

Given the fact that the military reputation was declining at the outset of *Konfrontasi*, Finer's theory on the military opportunities to intervene civilian affairs seems partially fit with the case study. He explained three situations, which provides opportunity for military to involve in political affairs: civilian dependency, domestic circumstances and popularity of military.¹¹¹⁶ However, corruption cases which allegedly involved some military officers had affected

1110 Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia," 58.

1111 Van Der Kroef, "The Changing Pattern," 228.

1112 Hindley, "The Political," 8.

1113 Crouch, "Generals and Business," 520.

1114 Civic mission was the implementation of territorial warfare (*perang teritorial*) doctrine. Programme pilot project was carried out in West Java in areas where the rebellion had occupied. Detail of civic mission see S Sokowati, *TNI dan Civic Mission: Suatu Aspek Pembinaan Wilayah* [TNI and Civic Mission: an Aspect of Territorial Management], (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1963).

1115 Lev, "The Political Role," 363.

1116 Finer, 72-85.

the prestige of the armed forces. Meanwhile, Perlmutter and Bennett theory¹¹¹⁷ fits the case study. Social and political condition during the beginning of the *Konfrontasi* clearly contributed to the opportunity for military to engage in politics.

Motives of Intervention

As presented in Table 5-2 (p.232), key actors have shown a variety of motivation toward the policy of *Konfrontasi*. None of the actors has single motivation. Consequently, as Legge argued, the policy has not been applied with uniform firmness.¹¹¹⁸ Furthermore, the diversity of motives that initiated military to expand its involvement in civilian spheres can be explained in two main clusters: internal and external. Internal cluster covers sectional interest, birthright and competency. Meanwhile, external cluster includes national interest and civilian inadequacy.

Sectional interest. It is noteworthy to emphasize the effect of existence of sectional interest into the disposition of the military involvement in politics. In this regard, sectional interest may include corporate and individual interest. As the ABRI has certain corporate interests including sufficient budget support and maintaining political domination, Crouch argued material interests affected military propensity toward politics.¹¹¹⁹ Indeed, the ABRI recognised Sukarno's political domination during Guided Democracy. All military chiefs had shared many of the president's nationalist foreign policy goals. Yani, for instance, has sought the Indonesian diplomacy applied 'fighting diplomacy' to overcome the imperialist encirclement since the outset of *Konfrontasi*.¹¹²⁰ This indicated the

1117 Perlmutter and Bennett, 203-205

1118 Legge, 156.

1119 Harold Crouch, "The Military and Politics in South-East Asia," in *Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia*, edited by Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985)

1120 He described fighting diplomacy as a diplomacy whose backbone is the armed forces. Bunnell, "Guided Democracy," 514

army's faith in the effectiveness of a confrontation strategy against the Western power.¹¹²¹

As the ABRI did not operate in a vacuum, it was also natural to consider that the military might be strategic in its pursuits of the corporate interest during the *Konfrontasi*. In this regard, the military should deliberate many aspects while dealing with the policy. As noted in Chapter 4, Section 4.2, to overcome economic problem, government demanded military budget cut to meet the IMF requirement of a balanced budget in 1963-1964. If it applied, budget cut would bring significant consequences. The ABRI should reduce its size gradually from 350,000 to 200,000. Apparently, this plan caused the army the most suffering service. Undeniably, the army feared that the policy would lead to a military clash with the UK.¹¹²² Although, both Yani and Nasution favoured with a rationalisation of the military, they concerned possible effect of the reduction plan.

Clearly, the PKI and the army were the backbone of Sukarno's administration during Guided Democracy. They shaped many important policies including elimination of the PRRI, anti-imperialism and neo-colonialism, liberation of West Papua and the Crush Malaysia.¹¹²³ Also, it is noted that the army was the epicentre of the 'communist-phobia' community.¹¹²⁴ As the PKI was mastering mass-mobilisation, the Army leaders feared gradual demobilisation might attract to the PKI-related organisations.¹¹²⁵ As a result, the half-hearted Army in supporting the *Konfrontasi* stemmed primarily from its fear of PKI gains.

Furthermore, military interest also could be viewed from the perspective of individual officers and factions. They often have personal or group material interest in military involvement in politics. Suharto's case, for instance, was

1121 Bunnell, "Guided Democracy," 525

1122 Bunnell, "Guided Democracy," 524

1123 Quiko, 21

1124 Bunnell, "The Kennedy Initiatives," 246

1125 Bunnell, "The Kennedy Initiatives," 420-421.

clear evidence that how the desire of power affected the operation. As explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Suharto was keen to take a leadership role for the *Konfrontasi*, as he had served as Commander of the Trikora Operation. But, soon after Sukarno appointed Dani as Commander of the KOGA, Suharto was frustrated. Comparing to Dani, Suharto had successfully established an image as a key combat commander.¹¹²⁶ He then showed his disappointment through several resistances in order to obstruct the operation such as the Opsus and the delaying of troop deployment.

Birthright. It is clear that military political behaviour may have roots in the early experiences of the institution. The historical experience may reflect in military tradition, values and culture. Crouch explained the orientation of military officers toward political activity is influenced by the military origin.¹¹²⁷ Since the ABRI was formed in order to fight the colonial power, it is noted that the military has basic orientation toward political activity and is not indoctrinated to accept the Western concept of apolitical professionalism. As a consequence, military leaders rejected to accept the principle of civilian control over military.¹¹²⁸

Undeniably, the officers' political orientation does not automatically indicate there is military intervention in civilian spheres. It requires certain condition to dispose officers toward involvement. In Indonesia, the weakness of civilian institutions and instability provide justification for the military interference. Lev argued that until 1956, the military, in particular the army was on political defensive.¹¹²⁹ But the State of Emergency declared in 1957 had provided the army leaders with vital sources of finance and expanding their activities into the political spheres.¹¹³⁰ As the strong civilian institutions including politicians are

1126 Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army: Part II," *Indonesia*, 13 (1972): 176. doi:10.2307/3350685.

1127 Crouch, "The Military," 288.

1128 Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," *Indonesia*, 11 (1971): 131. doi:10.2307/3350748.

1129 Lev, "The Political Role," 349.

1130 McVey, "Part II," 147.

yet to come, unsurprisingly military participation in politics remains the long term feature of Indonesian politics.

Competency. It is commonly argued that the armed forces are one of state institutions that legitimate to use of force. The use of military is clear, a means to political objects.¹¹³¹ As military cannot be separated from politics, it has certain versatility. Clausewitz explained warfare consisted of everything related to the armed forces, including creation, maintenance and the use of military.¹¹³² So, military power can be utilised for physical, threat and a mean to influence political calculations of actors. When the state used military power forcefully, the effects of military are easy to identify, either it achieves the objectives or fails.¹¹³³

Following the instability at the outset of Guided Democracy, the government decided to boost military capability. Even though there were some economic problems, government spent large portion of foreign aid for the military. The Sukarno administration argued that well-equipped and cohesive armed forces were vital to protect the polity.¹¹³⁴ Compared to the army, the air force and the navy increased their capability significantly during Guided Democracy period. Meanwhile, the army enjoyed greater role in civilian affairs than other services. Indeed, the Indonesian military strength was smaller than the UK. Prior to the *Konfrontasi*, British noted that at least the navy had one operational cruiser, eight frigates and 12 submarines. Meanwhile, the air force was capable of operating in the fighter, bomber, transport, and reconnaissance roles, with good effectiveness of forces.¹¹³⁵ The air force owned 495 aircrafts including P-51

1131 Thomas Waldman, "Politics and war: Clausewitz's paradoxical equation," *Parameters*, 40, 3 (2010): 2.

1132 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 95.

1133 Robert J Art, "The Fungibility of Force," in *The Use of Force*, ed. Robert J Art and Kenneth N Waltz, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.), 3

1134 Hindley, "Foreign Aid," 113.

1135 TNA, DO 187/26, Annex to COS 41/63, 30 January 1963

Mustang, LA-11, MIG-15, MIG-17 and B-26 bomber.¹¹³⁶ In general, the ABRI was capable of delivering infiltration by land, sea and air. Also, it was capable to carry out amphibious and airborne operation.¹¹³⁷

National interest. Clearly, the ABRI's involvement in the *Konfrontasi* has constitutional basis. According to the Preamble to 1945 Constitution, there are four national interest of Indonesia: (a) protect the whole people of Indonesia and the entire homeland of Indonesia; (b) advance general prosperity; (c) develop the nation's intellectual life; and (d) contribute to the implementation of a world order based on freedom, lasting peace and social justice. In particular, the Constitution also stated that any form of colonialism should be erased as not in conformity with humanity and justice. Since the establishment of Malaysia Federation might also be perceived as threat and form of neo-colonialism (pp.119-20), the performing of the military in backing the *Konfrontasi* was justified. The ABRI, as a tool of state for defence has to protect the country from any threats, both from internal and external. Also, it had no choice but affirmed the policy when Sukarno as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and primary source of legitimation of Guided Democracy has argued for military backing of the *Konfrontasi*.¹¹³⁸

Civilian inadequacy. Arguably, military involvement in politics often occurs when civilian government could not govern effectively. Normally, military intervention follows the failure of government. In other words, the weak civilian provides opportunity and motive for military interference.¹¹³⁹ As explained in previous subsection in this chapter, the birth of Guided Democracy has marked by the political instability. Multi party system has brought the full range of political conflict into Indonesian democracy. There was no effective control over the state's finance. The parliament also lacked of initiatives to assist the

1136 Pusjarah TNI, Sejarah TNI Jilid III 1960-1965, 24-25.

1137 TNA, AIR 23/8645, Annex to JIC(FE) 3/63 (Final), 3 January 1963

1138 Bunnell, "The Kennedy Initiatives," 248

1139 Crouch, "The Military," 294.

government remedy the economic poor performance.¹¹⁴⁰ Since warfighting is complex and dangerous activities, it requires a professional military who qualified to do the job.¹¹⁴¹

In sum, theory of motive that proposed by Finer,¹¹⁴² Koonings and Kruijt¹¹⁴³ and Edmond¹¹⁴⁴ fit with the case study. As stated earlier in this subsection, each key actor possessed some motivations toward the *Konfrontasi*. It means behind any actions regarding the hostility against Malaysia might own mix motives. And those theories are useful to explain motives of the Indonesian military involvement in civilian spheres.

This part has already highlighted opportunity and motives of military involvement in civilian affairs. Did the diversity of motivation toward the *Konfrontasi* lead to coalition formation within the ABRI? Kelley described a coalition as a group of individuals who agreed to pursue a common goal; willing to pool their sources in achieving the goal; engaged in communication and agreed on the distribution of the benefits received.¹¹⁴⁵ In general, a coalition among key leaders often exists in the formal organisation. In other words, coalition within institution indicates there is consolidation of power, which is essential for institution. Zaleznik explained organisation could not function without a consolidation of power. Overt rivalry amongst the leaders and inability to make strategic decisions are several outcomes that may be occurred due to the failure of coalition formation in the organisation.¹¹⁴⁶

1140 Van der Kroef, "The Changing Pattern," 228.

1141 Lloyd J Mathews, *The Political-Military Rivalry for Operational Control in US Military Actions: A Soldier's Perspective*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1998), 2

1142 Finer, 32-60

1143 Koonings and Kruijt, *Political Armies*, 19-21

1144 Edmonds, 100-104

1145 EW Kelley, "Techniques of Studying Coalition Formation," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 12, 1 (1968): 62. doi:10.2307/2110155.

1146 Abraham Zaleznik, "Power and Politics in Organizational Life," *Harvard Business Review*, (May – June 1970), Accessed January 8, 2018. <https://hbr.org/1970/05/power-and-politics-in-organizational-life>

However, the diversity of motivation of military leaders toward the *Konfrontasi* contributed to the failure of coalition formation in the ABRI. Indeed, all key actors agreed to support the *Konfrontasi*. They also recognised Sukarno as the most important source of power in Guided Democracy. But, these two elements were insufficient to drive the elites to form the solid coalitions. As presented in Figure 3–6 (p.150), relationships amongst actors were dynamics. Yani and Nasution, for instance, although both of them were anti-PKI and supporting the *Konfrontasi*, their relationship was bitter following the incident of bypassing army chain of command. Meanwhile, Martadinata and Dani were less resistance to the PKI than the army.

This situation, at least, can be explained in two reasons. First, politicisation of the ABRI increased after all services were under Sukarno's responsibility. The military leaders tended to maintain good relationship with the president. Consequently, all military chiefs were competing to gain enormous influence with Sukarno.

Second, Sukarno's decision regarding the inserting all chiefs into the cabinet has boosted interservice rivalry. Undeniably, the army and the air force had a history of interservice rivalry. Although Sukarno installed the new air force chief as Commander of the KOGA/KOLAGA, this did not restore the army-air force good relationship. The different motivations and military strategy proposals over the *Konfrontasi* even created deeper friction.¹¹⁴⁷ The fear of rivalry, later, headed to the isolation of one of key actors. Zalesnik explained people become more suspicious one of another due to fear of rivalry and it creates a world of plots and counterplots. This can be seen when Yani and Suharto challenged Dani's leadership with activities such as the Opsus, delaying of budget and troops deployment.

¹¹⁴⁷ The army preferred to apply guerrilla warfare and defensive strategy, meanwhile the air force proposed an idea to attack several military bases in Malaysia and Singapore.

In fact, the various motivations toward the *Konfrontasi* seem successfully to lead the elites form fluid coalition. It means coalition was shifting, unstable, temporary and only working on specific issue. For instance, Martadinata, who was knowingly as Nasution's ally,¹¹⁴⁸ had good relationship with Yani, as they agreed to launch the Operation A. Coalition between Suharto and Yani following the appointment of Dani as Commander of the KOGA also confirmed the existence of fluid coalition. They agreed to obstruct the operation with different causes and reasons. This situation fits with Gamson argument. He defines coalitions as temporary alliances among individuals or groups which differ in goals and means oriented.¹¹⁴⁹ Next part will explain the characteristics of the ABRI that was more politicised during the *Konfrontasi*.

5.2.3 Politicised Military

Given the fact that politicisation of the ABRI increased significantly during Guided Democracy, this block attempted to illustrate the features of the ABRI from the outset of the *Konfrontasi*. The discussion covered political strengths and weaknesses (pp.53-4).¹¹⁵⁰ Later, in this part, level of influence (pp.58-9)¹¹⁵¹ and direction of politicisation (p.59)¹¹⁵² will elaborate further.

Political Strengths and Weaknesses

Finer argued one of political strengths of the military, compare to civilian is superiority in organisation.¹¹⁵³ Military institution is highly structured than any civilian group. Cohesive, hierarchical and *esprit de corps* are some features,

1148 Martadinata was a close friend to Nasution since the Japanese Occupation in Bandung. Said, Legitimizing, 56

1149 William A Gamson, "A theory of coalition formation," *American Sociological Review*, 26, (1961): 374

1150 Finer, 6-22

1151 Betts, 11-12

1152 Betts, 53.

1153 Finer, 6.

which are highly organised than civilian. However, this characteristic could not be found in the ABRI in Guided Democracy. In fact, factionalism in the Indonesian armed forces was deeper from the outset of *Konfrontasi*. This situation could be found in all services: the army, the air force and the navy. For instance, the Army was divided in 1956. Each regional commander possessed a considerable of independence.¹¹⁵⁴ Gregory explained, at that time, there was an obvious factionalism in the army. The split was based on territorial division.¹¹⁵⁵ There were three main territorial divisions, which dominated the army, namely the Diponegoro (Central Java), the Siliwangi (West Java) and the Brawijaya (East Java). Those divisional had played important role on the political scene. Also, each division had significant ideological and religious differences. Islamic parties had influenced the Siliwangi elites. Meanwhile various secular parties had influenced political orientation of the Brawijaya and Diponegoro elites.¹¹⁵⁶ However, as Gregory added, the faction was not tightly integrated and may be cohesive depending on personal and certain issues.¹¹⁵⁷

Following the expansion of military role in the period of Guided Democracy, Nasution claimed the army had become a more congenial, homogeneous and obedient.¹¹⁵⁸ However, such claim seemed to lack bases. In fact, the decision making process in the army remained collegiate.¹¹⁵⁹ The top army leaders' attempt in boosting their control failed to improve military hierarchy.¹¹⁶⁰ Still, the territorial commanders favoured involving in the forum of discussions on the army policies.¹¹⁶¹ Another case that weakened Nasution's statement was the deployment of the Battalion 600R in East Kalimantan in order to support the

1154 At that time, there were seven military regions: two in Sumatra, three in Java, on ein borneo and one was responsible for the eastern islands of Indonesia. Legge, 143.

1155 Ann Gregory, "Factionalism in the Indonesian Army: The New Order," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, 2, 3 (1970): 342.

1156 Gregory, 345-7.

1157 Gregory, 342.

1158 McVey, "Part II," 150

1159 In making decision, the heads of the army involved the regional commanders.

1160 The army leaders established the general staff in order to reduce the involvement of senior generals in decision making process.

1161 McVey, "Part II," 150.

TNKU. This incident was an evidence of factionalism and patronage in the army. It was completely violating the army chain of command. Nasution, who was issued the order, was not the Army Commander, but Minister of Defence and Security/KSAB. Although, Yani, who was the Army Commander, had ordered to abort the mission, the troops disobeyed him.

Did the factionalism completely weaken the political role of the army? The answer was not necessarily. Indeed, the factionalism in the army was deep. As the number of officers in civilian posts increased significantly, the army elites continued to gain power in almost all sectors. Feith added it only resulted in fragmentation of the army's influence in the government.¹¹⁶² The officers were no longer behind one leader, Nasution. But, the army's grip on political sphere remained.

In addition, typical of the factionalism in the air force and the navy is quite similar. At that time, factionalism in these two services was based on rank. In the air force, for instance, some middle officers, led by Nuryadin and Sukirno in 1963, challenged Dani's leadership. They overtly showed their disrespect to Dani due to his sympathy toward the PKI. They also criticised Dani's office performance.¹¹⁶³ As a result, Nuryadin was sent to Bangkok as the air force attaché in 1963. Later, in 1965, he occupied the same post in Moscow. This assignment could easily be perceived as a means of Dani to alienate his rivals. Indeed, Dani was close to the PKI. But, following the G30S affair, rivalry between Dani and Nuryadin was more intense. Nasution asked Nuryadin, who was in Moscow, to return to Jakarta.¹¹⁶⁴ As Nuryadin had good support from the army, especially Nasution and Suharto, he succeeded to eliminate Dani's

1162 Feith, "President Soekarno," 977.

1163 Surodjo and Soeparo, 105

1164 According to M Jasin, who was military attaché in Moscow, Nasution needed to discuss with Rusmin regarding condition within the air force. Nurinwa Ki S Hendrowinoto, et al., ed, *M Jasin: Saya Tidak Pernah Minta Ampun Kepada Soeharto, Sebuah Memoar* [M Jasin: I Never Asked for Forgiveness from Soeharto: A Memoir], (Jakarta, Sinar Harapan, 1998), 58.

faction and became the Air Force Chief.¹¹⁶⁵ In addition, the intraservice rivalry within the Navy happened between the middle officers and the generals (pp.175-7). Different with the air force, the mutiny in the navy was caused by 'dishonesty' issue. And, in the Navy case, the Generals faction still could secure their positions.

It is noted the foreign aid from super power had substantial effects to the ABRI. First, it boosted the modernisation of the armed forces. As explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.3, the navy and the air force had increased their capability significantly. Second, the aid also fostered cohesion within the army and helped the army to expand its socio-political role. Even though, the army capability did not increase drastically, the central army command might spend military aid for greater rewards such as supporting study trips abroad and better housing for the privates.¹¹⁶⁶ The Army's Civic Action Programme, which was supported by the US, helped the army to counter the PKI's influence on the ground. Meanwhile, for the US, the civic programme facilitated her to maintain pro-American orientation of the Indonesian Army.¹¹⁶⁷ The programme included transmigration, farming, improving communication and roadways through all regions. And the US supplied heavy engineering equipment, farm tools, training to support the operation and maintenance of the heavy equipment.¹¹⁶⁸

The last effect of the foreign aid was made the inter-service rivalry worse. Indeed, Indonesia gained benefit from the Cold War competition. The East and West rivalry has provided Indonesia substantial sources for military requirements.¹¹⁶⁹ As stated earlier, Soviet offered more aid to the ABRI than US government (pp.99-100). The navy and the air force were enjoying the bigger portions of the Soviet aid than the army. Meanwhile, the army enjoyed the

1165 With the army's support, Nuryadin's faction successfully toppled Vice Air Marshal Herlambang from his position as the Air Force Chief on 31 March 1966. Humaidi, 108-109.

1166 Hindley, "Foreign Aid," 113-4.

1167 Evans III, 106.

1168 Evans III, 111-2.

1169 McVey, "Part II," 157.

major US support. Following the declaration of *Dwikora* Operation, the US aid was reduced significantly. The only aid was only for military training, especially for the army. The US perceived it could strengthen the relationship with the Army.¹¹⁷⁰ During Guided Democracy, at least 2,641 officers were trained in the US.¹¹⁷¹

Further, the US also deliberately played in heightening tension between the army and the air force. There are two evidences to support the notion. First, the US encouraged the established the Indonesian Army Flying Cavalry. The aim was clear, to counterbalance the influence of the air force. For the army leaders, the creation of Flying Cavalry corps would decrease their operational dependence on the air force.¹¹⁷² Second, the US turned down Nasution's request on a large weapon purchase in 1960.¹¹⁷³ Thus, this forced Nasution to visit Moscow to conclude an arms deal, worth USD400 million.¹¹⁷⁴

Understandably, the US was resistant to support the modernisation of the air force and the navy. This situation can be explained in three ways. First, as Indonesia was launching the *Konfrontasi* against the Dutch over the West Papua, the modernisation would enable Indonesia to attack a member of NATO.¹¹⁷⁵ Second, the US perceived these two services were 'pro-Soviet' in their professional and political orientation. It was because the services reacted on the neglecting the desire of arms modernisation and turned for help to other countries.¹¹⁷⁶ Third, the US perceived the Navy and the Air Force were too strong to be incorporated in the US 'constabulary' concept. Mrazek described at that time the US applied the policy to keep the military force of underdeveloped countries on a 'constabulary level. It meant the military should only focus on

1170 FRUS, 1964-1968, 215-216

1171 Evans III, 133

1172 Mrazek, 139-140.

1173 Evans III, 88

1174 Guy J Pauker, "General Nasution's Mission to Moscow." *Asian Survey*, 1, 1 (1961): 14. doi:10.2307/3023662.

1175 Hindley, "The Political," 14.

1176 Mrazek, 134.

internal security, while the US forces in the Far East would cover the external threats. As the offensive capability of the Indonesian Air Force and the navy was the biggest in the Southeast Asia region, Washington argued there was no need to help Indonesia in supplying military weapon.¹¹⁷⁷

It was also noteworthy that Guided Democracy provided the ABRI legitimacy to have a permanent role in politics. Since the imposition of martial law over the whole of Indonesia in 1957, the military has been authorised to appoint officers to oversee the civilian administrations. Then recognition of the armed forces as a functional group by the Parliament and the Cabinet in 1958 was major breakthrough in Indonesian politics, which was dominated by civilian parties.¹¹⁷⁸ Following the establishment Guided Democracy, the Middle Way concept has become the military corporate ideology. Rinakit argued it was because the ABRI considered the concept might useful for the sake of military unity and position within the state.¹¹⁷⁹ The return to the 1945 Constitution also provided the military a legal basis for socio-political position. Reinstating the 1945 Constitution meant the military has opportunity to have representatives in the MPR. According to Article 2 of the Constitution:

The MPR membership consisting of members of the House of Representative (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR*) and delegates from the provinces and from functional groups in accordance with rules prescribed by law.¹¹⁸⁰

Not surprisingly, the ABRI has technical inability when dealt with economic sectors. The involvement of the military in economic affairs has brought big impact to its character. Military image has appeared as the manager and the

1177 Mrazek, 134-5.

1178 Cheong, 95.

1179 Sukardi Rinakit, *Indonesian Military after the New Order*, (Singapore/Copenhagen: ISEAS/NIAS, 2005), 20

1180 However, the 1945 Constitution has been amended four times. This article also has been changed since 2002. The MPR agreed to abolish membership from the functional group.

bureaucrat.¹¹⁸¹ McVey noted that many officers who were appointed to manage or supervise the state enterprises were incompetent.¹¹⁸² Inexperience officers have caused the declining of productivity significantly and led to crisis. Indeed, the central command had tried to control all appointments to civilian posts through career promotion system. So, any incapable or unreliable officers might be removed easily by the command. The officers also engaged civilians as partners in business concerns. However, such effort was still insufficient to avoid poor performance of military presence in the economic affairs. Worse, as the state enterprises were sources of funds for the military, some officers allegedly involved in corruption cases.¹¹⁸³

To sum up, Finer's theory regarding political strengths,¹¹⁸⁴ and weaknesses¹¹⁸⁵ partly fit the case study, since the military has legitimation to involve in civilian spheres. Deep factionalism within the armed forces also affected the hierarchy, command and *esprit de corps*. Although, the case study confirmed that the military still monopolised the use of firearms and played as a symbolic status. In the case study, technical inability in the military also was presence as political weaknesses.

Level of Influence

As stated earlier in this chapter, Guided Democracy has strengthened the socio-political role of the military. Even though Sukarno was discomfort with the armed forces, it has become the centre of attention in Indonesian politics.¹¹⁸⁶ Following the increasing number of officers in the Sukarno's administration, the military actively attempted to influence government policy in its favour. As illustrated in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, military involvement in decision making

1181 Crouch, "General," 522

1182 McVey, "Part II," 161-162

1183 Crouch, "General," 522

1184 Finer, 6-13

1185 Finer, 14-22

1186 Lev, "The Political Role," 356.

process regarding military-related policy was higher since Sukarno created the KOTI and attached all military chiefs to his Cabinet.

In general, the military stance regarding the policy at the outset of *Konfrontasi* was clear, avoid escalation of the conflict into open warfare. However, as presented in Table 5.2 (p.232), there was a fragmentation on supporting the policy. Majority of the army was less supporting the policy than the air force and the navy. So, key actors might have different approach in influencing Sukarno. As the army leaders occupied key positions in the government, such condition provided significant effect to the execution of the policy.

Adapting Betts' theory on the level of influence, there are four possible levels of military influence in shaping the government policy.¹¹⁸⁷ First, *direct and positive* that means military supported the policy and explicitly recommended the use of force. Second, *indirect and positive* that means military did not explicitly support the policy but recommended force. Third, *direct and negative*, which means the armed forces supported the policy but did not recommend the use of force. Fourth, *indirect and negative* that means military did not support the policy and the use of force.

As the army leaders were half-hearted supporting the policy, the fragmentation influenced Sukarno and the Cabinet regarding the *Konfrontasi* in two levels. First, *direct and positive*. This level was played by Nasution. Bypassing the army chain of command was clear evidence to support this notion (pp.132-3). Second, *direct and negative*. Majority of the army elites played in this level. They supported the policy but preferred to exploit the diplomacy than military force. In order to manage the conflict as low as possible, as explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.2, Yani resisted with Dani's leadership. Thus, he has several times attempted to hamper Dani in executing the *Dwikora* Operation. One of the best examples is when Suharto could convince Sukarno regarding

1187 Betts divided the level of influence into four: direct and negative (the highest); indirect and negative; indirect and positive; direct and positive (the lowest). He employed the level of influence to examine post-war decisions on intervention and escalation. Betts, 11-12.

the division of labour in top management of the KOLAGA that has curtailed Dani's power (pp.164-9). Meanwhile both the navy and the air force were exercising their influence on the level of *direct and positive*. These two services had indicated their commitment in supporting the policy by employing their offensive units.

Moreover, Betts's theory on level of influence did not fit the case study. In his research, Betts proposed a degree of level of influence from the highest to the lowest in assessing the postwar situation.¹¹⁸⁸ However, the present research made an adjustment in order to create the Betts's theory workable for the case study. The study ignored a degree of level of influence. So, the 'adapting' theory did not estimate degree of influence. The outcome of level of influence will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Direction of Politicisation

Certainly, the attachment of military chiefs into the Cabinet has brought substantial effect to the military. As all services were under direct presidential jurisdiction, military chief positions were more prone to politicisation. Chief can be politicised in two ways: positive which means military will support and advocacy the administration policies; and negative which means military will oppose the policies.¹¹⁸⁹ As stated in previous part, there were two levels of military influence during the *Konfrontasi*: (a) *direct and positive*; and (b) *direct and negative*. These levels were a result of half-hearted military support. Consequently, these also affected the direction of politicisation of the ABRI.

Two opposite directions of politicisation of the ABRI had developed during the *Konfrontasi* simultaneously: positive and negative politicisation. Nasution, Dani and Martadinata were linked to positive politicisation as they supported the policy of *Konfrontasi*. Meanwhile, Yani including Suharto were associated with

1188 Betts, 11-12.

1189 Betts, 53.

negative politicisation. The Opsus case has provided clear explanation on how the army elites curtailed the policy (pp.169-74).

Arguably, Betts's theory regarding direction of politicisation¹¹⁹⁰ in certain part fits the case study. It is practicable to explain the orientation of politicisation. But, the gap exists. The theory does not cover the mixed direction of politicisation that may be occurred at the same time. In this regard, direction of politicisation can be divided into three: positive, negative and mixed politicisation.

5.2.4 Military Operations

The last building block examines political element in the military operation. As stated in Chapter 1, Section 1.2, the present research recognised the ABRI as a political military institution. So, this part discusses the relationship between politicisation of the ABRI and the implementation of *Dwikora* Operation. In particular, this part attempt to verify the hypothesis whether the politicisation of the military was a caused of disunity of command in the *Dwikora* Operation. To discover the relationship, this part adapted the A-B-C of organisation politics model to assess political behaviour in military organisation.¹¹⁹¹ The model consists of three parts: antecedents, behaviours and consequences. Antecedents discuss the triggers of political behaviour. The illustration included a mix of individual and contextual factors. Behaviours identify political tactics of key players. And consequences explain the outcomes of political behaviour in the ABRI during the *Konfrontasi*. The outcomes will be described at three levels: individual, organisational and national. The flow of analysis in this building block is illustrated in Figure 5-1, located on the next page.

1190 Betts, 53

1191 Buchanan and Badham. *Power, Politics*, Second edition, 30-33




Figure 5-1 Assessment of Political Behaviour in the ABRI during the *Konfrontasi*

Source: Adapted from Buchanan and Badham. *Power, Politics*, Second edition, 21

Antecedents

Buchanan and Badham explained political behaviour in organisation might be triggered by two factors: individual and contextual.¹¹⁹² As presented in Table 5-2 (p.232), motivations of key actors toward the *Konfrontasi* are diverse. These motivations encompassed personal and organisational interest. In individual level, the diversity of motivations reflected two important features: personal ambition and self-interest.¹¹⁹³ Suharto's desire to be the KOGA commander has marked the existence of personal ambition. Meanwhile, Yani's interest on developing striking forces (p.117) was one of best examples to illustrate self-interest.

In the context of organisation, the involvement of the ABRI in the *Konfrontasi* generally can be perceived as a means of protecting its existence in domestic

1192 Buchanan and Badham. *Power, Politics*, Second edition, 30

1193 Self interest, in this study, refers to individual interest that can benefit the organisation or service.

politics. As the PKI was aggressively sponsoring the event, the ABRI had no choice but to support the policy. The ABRI's involvement in this policy can be interpreted in four ways. First, there was a widespread emotional popular support for the *Konfrontasi*.¹¹⁹⁴ Sukarno, with the PKI's assistance, successfully encouraged civilians to be volunteers. Up to April 1964, British estimated 2 million civilians might involve in the *Konfrontasi*.¹¹⁹⁵ Thus, the objection of the policy was an unpopular option. Second, adherence to constitutionality, the military should support the policy. Indeed, civilian control of the military was ineffective. However, it did not release the ABRI from its obligation to protect the country from any threat. Article 10 of the 1945 Constitution also stipulated the President as the Supreme Commander of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

Third, the ABRI was aware of the possible risk of Sukarno's mass mobilisation.¹¹⁹⁶ Since Sukarno and the PKI keenly mobilised civilian volunteers to involve in the *Konfrontasi*, the military worried the PKI would gain benefit. Also, as Nasution argued, military leaders found in Sukarno a symbol of unity for a divided nation. Thus, they perceived Sukarno's decision was taboo to be disobeyed.¹¹⁹⁷ Fourth, the ABRI attempted to secure its budget, as the government planned a reduction in military spending. Hopefully, through the *Konfrontasi*, Sukarno would reimpose the State of Emergency, which was revoked since 1 May 1963.¹¹⁹⁸

Behaviours

Following paragraphs will identify basis of power and political tactics of key actors during the implementation of *Dwikora* Operation. As elaborated in Chapter 2, Subsection 2.3.2, bases of power consisted of reward, coercion,

1194 FRUS, 1964-1968, 256

1195 TNA, FO 371/175274, Letter Jakarta to Foreign Office, 22 April 1964

1196 Van Der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism," 364-5.

1197 Tim Pusat Data dan Analisa Tempo, 148

1198 Tim Pusat Data dan Analisa Tempo, 147

authority, referent, expert, information, affiliation and group power.¹¹⁹⁹ In order to avoid confusion, the study will not apply any divisions while explains political tactics. As the G30S affair provided significant impact to the implementation of *Dwikora* Operation, the discussion will be split into two: pre and post the affair.

Pre the G30S Affair

One of the important elements of winning battles is battlefield effectiveness. It defines the ability of the military to carry out the tasks on the battlefield.¹²⁰⁰ Reiter and Stam explained that battlefield military effectiveness is based on two factors: behaviours of the soldier that means the willingness of personnel to lead and execute the orders; and organisational efficacy, which means executing tasks including planning, logistics and intelligence gathering.¹²⁰¹ In addition, Lider posited the effectiveness of the use of force will depend on the aims of the policy.¹²⁰²

To establish an effective leadership, according to Reiter and Stam, an officer should be able to persuade his troops to execute the command.¹²⁰³ And the ability to persuade subordinates will rely on how the leaders acquire and wield power. However, leaders in the organisation may possess different bases of power. In other words, power may distribute among elites unequally. If leaders fail to recognise the unequal distribution of power, it will damage interpersonal relation and productivity.¹²⁰⁴

1199 Benfari, et al., 12-16.

1200 Dan Reiter and Allan C Stam, "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, 3 (1998): 260

1201 Reiter and Stam, 261.

1202 Julian Lider, *Military Theory: Concept, Structure, and Problem*, (Hantts: Gower, 1983), 155.

1203 Reiter and Stam, 265

1204 F Bartolome and A Laurent, "The Manager: Master and Servant of Power." *Harvard Business Review* (November 1986), accessed January 8, 2018. <https://hbr.org/1986/11/the-manager-master-and-servant-of->

It is likely that key actors possessed unequal power (Table 5-3). Nasution, for instance, only owned expert and referent power since Sukarno assigned him as Minister of Defence and Security. He wielded referent power¹²⁰⁵ when he asked Basri to deployed troops to East Kalimantan (pp. 132-3). All military chiefs automatically owned coercion, authority and expert power. But, Yani gained information and affiliation power since he held position as the KOTI Chief of Staff. As he established alliance with Suharto, both of them owned group power. Martadinata expanded more power since his troops involved in the Operation A. However, Dani failed to obtain information power as other key actors frequently attempted to challenge his leadership including withhold useful information for the KOGA/KOLAGA (pp.161-2 & 166-7).

It is noteworthy that Suharto's political skill was high. Although he was not the service chief, Suharto possessed power as many as Yani. As the KOSTRAD Commander and First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA, he owned coercion, authority and expert power. He then expanded his power when he launched the Opsus and established an alliance with Yani. He obtained information power from the Opsus and gathered affiliation and group power from coalition with Yani.

Meanwhile, civilian actors held less power than military actors. Although he was the president and supreme commander of the armed forces, Sukarno only acquired reward, coercion, authority, and referent power. In addition, Subandrio owned authority and information power since he also held position of the Head of BPI and involved in the Operation A. Meanwhile, the PKI only held referent power since it only relied on Sukarno and had no access to the *Dwikora* Operation.

1205 Benfari, Wilkinson and Orth described beside charisma, referent power might be developed through associating with other individual or friendship. Benfari, Wilkinson and Orth, 14.

Table 5-3 Distribution of Power (Pre the G30S Affair)

| Key Actors | Bases of Power | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|----------------|----------|-----------|----------|--------|-------------|-------------|-------|
| | Reward | Coercion | Authority | Referent | Expert | Information | Affiliation | Group |
| Military | | | | | | | | |
| AH Nasution | | | | ✓ | ✓ | | | |
| Ahmad Yani | | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Suharto | | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Omar Dani | | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | | | |
| RE Martadinata | | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| Civilian | | | | | | | | |
| Sukarno | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | | | |
| Subandrio | | | ✓ | | | ✓ | | |
| PKI | | | | ✓ | | | | |

Source: Author

The unequal power distribution clearly affected the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation. As Bartolome and Laurent warned, power differences can disturb interpersonal relations at work and undermine organisational effectiveness.¹²⁰⁶ This condition also fostered the intensity of interservice rivalry. Key actors played certain tactics during the implementation of *Dwikora* Operation. Following the attachment of military chiefs to the Cabinet and establishment of the ABRI, Nasution admitted there was no unified leadership in the matter of preparing for war. All military chiefs could act independently.¹²⁰⁷

The most common political tactics prior the G30S affair were keeping Sukarno's happy and informal influence.¹²⁰⁸ It is noticeable that the ABRI recognised Sukarno as a symbol of unity and essential to the development of the armed forces.¹²⁰⁹ Thus, all key actors echoed the Sukarno's foreign policy.¹²¹⁰ This can

1206 Bartolome and A Laurent, "The Manager,"

1207 AH Nasution, "Unity of Command," in *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945–1965*, edited by Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 418.

1208 Cobb categorised lateral influence among peers and influence exercised by subordinates over their supervisor as informal influence. Anthony T Cobb, "Informal Influence in the Formal Organization: Perceived Sources of Power among Work Unit Peers," *The Academy of Management Journal*, 23, 1 (1980): 155

1209 Howard M Federspiel, "The Military and Islam in Sukarno's Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, 46, 3 (1973): 408. doi:10.2307/2756576.

1210 Bunnell, "The Kennedy Initiatives," 248

be seen in many statements and speeches of military chiefs in various occasions.¹²¹¹ Those actions were very likely aimed at showing their overt support to the *Konfrontasi*. The military leaders attempted to retain their public face of support for the hostility policy.¹²¹²

The appointment of Kemal Idris as the First Battle Command in Sumatra Island (p.165) was the best example to illustrate some political tactics. The relationship of Sukarno and Idris prior to the assignment was bitter. Kemal had been opposing Sukarno for years. Since, during 1956-1963, Sukarno several time rejected the promotion of Idris to be military attache.¹²¹³ Thus, the assignment of Idris in the KOGA could possibly indicate informal influence practices. Moreover, Idris promotion also could explain other tactics: using key player to support initiative, breaking the rule to achieve objective and delaying tactics. As Suharto was in charge for the *Dwikora* Operation, he might need an officer who also resisted the *Konfrontasi*. And Idris's profile fitted Suharto's requirement: a KOSTRAD's officer and resistance to the *Konfrontasi*. Thus, the presence of Idris helped Suharto in controlling the implementation of the operation. In other words, the appointment of Idris was aimed at blocking any offensive plan.¹²¹⁴ And Suharto used Idris to maintain the forces in Sumatra's Battle Command understaffed and underequipped.¹²¹⁵

Another variants of political tactics, which were deployed by key actors, were withholding useful information and building a network of useful contact. Yani and Subandrio employed withholding information tactics while they implemented Operation A during the *Dwikora* Operation. As they refused to hand over the operation (pp.161-2 & 166-7), they also did not willing to share any current developments to the KOLAGA. In addition, building a network tactics can be seen in the Opsus. The covert operation was an example of

1211 See Chapter 4 Section 4.2

1212 Roosa, 187.

1213 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 102

1214 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 78.

1215 Roosa, 187-8.

applying such tactics. Although it was a form of insubordination, the Opsus succeeded to establish network with Malaysians that later were useful to boost the peace process.

In addition, another example for delaying tactics to block others is the changing of the military operation command. During the period of *Konfrontasi*, the military command has changed five times, as represented in Figure 5-2, located on the next page. At least, there are six elements of structure differences: (a) number of joint staff unit, (b) the presence of logistics command, (c) concept of command structure, (d) type of command structure, (e) type of combat unit, and (f) the existence of theatre command.

In particular, the frequently changing structure could be interpreted in four ways. First, the changing indicated the ABRI ill-prepared for the military operation. Clearly, the expansion of joint staffs units, the changing of concept of command structure, and the presence of theatre command showed the complexity of the *Konfrontasi*. Indeed, the ABRI has experienced to establish the military command for the Trikora Operation against the Dutch. As the nature of conflict and opponent were completely different, the ABRI could not easily adapt the previous operation for the *Konfrontasi*.

Second, the changing structure was the result of interservice rivalry. Undeniably, the army elites reluctantly accepted Dani as the KOGA Commander. So, the ill-prepared operation also might be a form of deliberate and wilful attempt to weaken Dani's leadership. Several manoeuvres, such as ignoring Sukarno's letter (pp.163-4), the implementation of Operation A (pp.126-48), and limited support of the KOTI (pp.158-64), have provided strong hint the army resistance. Also, the army was keen to maintain its domination in the ABRI.




Figure 5-2 Comparison of the KOGA/KOLAGA Structures

Note: **A:** Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 28/KOTI/1964 dated 19 May 1964 (p.156);
B: Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 33/KOTI/1964 dated 2 June 1964 (p.158);
C: Surat Keputusan [Decree] No 01/1964 dated 30 September 1964 (p.163);
D: Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 10/KOTI/1965 dated 1 March 1965 (p.165);
E: Surat Keputusan [Decree] No KEP-39/1965 dated 2 September 1965; Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 124/KOTI/1965 dated 21 October 1965 (p.198)

Third, the changing structure also was designated to curtail Dani's power in leading the KOGA/KOLAGA. The dispute over the presence of logistics command, type of command structure and combat unit were completely decreasing the KOGA/KOLAGA's capabilities. As the command structure applied component system, Dani did not have any authority to urge other services to provide sufficient troops. He also could not monitor supply of military logistics, since the distribution was under military chiefs. The KOGA/KOLAGA did not have any details over logistics issue, since the KOTI dispensed logistics budget directly to the service.¹²¹⁶ As component system provided greater authority for the military service in deploying the troops, the services especially the army delayed the deployment of troops. Thus, unsurprisingly, logistics and personnel remained the major problems for Dani to execute the *Dwikora* Operation.¹²¹⁷

Fourth, the changing structure might reflect the exercising of relative authority, which was possessed by each main actor. Osborn emphasised the importance of recognition in implementing the authority. This means followers may ignore leader's authority even though it count as legitimate. But authority could be recognised, although it count as illegitimate.¹²¹⁸ In addition, Grimes explained four characteristics of authority as follows: (a) it is invested in a position; (b) voluntary obedience; (c) the suspension by subordinates of their judgment in advance of a command or decision; and (d) authority can arise only in a collective context.¹²¹⁹

Indeed, as presented in Table 5-3 (p.260), all main actors had authority power. However, not all actors could exercise their legitimate power effectively. Figure

1216 Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan IV Logistik [Command Report of the Third Joint Staff for Logistics], dated 22 May 1967.

1217 Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan IV Logistik [Command Report of the Third Joint Staff for Logistics], dated 22 May 1967.

1218 Thomas Osborne, "Authority, convention and political community," *Journal of Political Power*, 6:1 (2013): 130. DOI: 10.1080/2158379X.2013.774980

1219 AJ Grimes, "Authority, Power, Influence and Social Control: A Theoretical Synthesis," *The Academy of Management Review* 3, No 4 (1978): 725-6.

5-3 indicated that the possession of legitimacy was still insufficient to exercise authority effectively. Possession greater of power would boost leader's ability to restrict outcome.¹²²⁰ This means asymmetric power distribution among main actors contributed to the ineffectiveness of implementation of main actor's authority. Although Dani was the Commander of the KOLAGA, he could not use his authority power effectively. This situation can be explained, at least, in two reasons. First, Dani might be considered to be inexperienced in combat. Zaleznik argued the authority vested in expertise and reputation for competence.¹²²¹ Prior to Dwikora Operation, most of the ABRI operations was conducted by the army. The highest position that Dani ever held in military operation was Deputy Commander of the Trikora Command. Meanwhile, his rival, Suharto had involved in several operations. His highest position was the Commander of Trikora Command, where Dani was his deputy.




Figure 5-3 Relative Authority of Main Military Actors

Source: Author

1220 James T Tedeschi, et al., "Power, Influence, and Behavioral Compliance," *Law & Society Review* 4, No 4 (1970): 525. doi:10.2307/3052819.

1221 Zaleznik, "Power and Politics,"

Second, the asymmetry in power relations contributed to the frequent military operation changing structures. Suharto and Yani could easily hamper any Dani's plan, as they owned greater power than Dani. Also, as the majority of troops for the *Konfrontasi* came from the Army, Suharto and Yani could exercise their dominant control of the KOLAGA. In this regard, the degree of exercising authority corresponded with power possession.

Post the G30S Affair

Notably, the G30S event provided significant impact to political behaviour in the ABRI. The putsch has decreased the number and power of key players. Also, it affected the political tactics deployed by key actors significantly.

It is noted that Suharto has become the most prominent actor in the ABRI since the G30S affair. Even though, Suharto was not the most senior army officer, he successfully developed his image as the new leader of the army. The army's immediate reaction under Suharto's command was providing the heroic image and retaining a clearly anti-PKI figure.¹²²² Thus, he was easily to gather immediate sympathies and support from many elements.

Suharto employed many non-sanctioned political tactics post the abortive coup. He used blame others tactic to attack the PKI. He alleged the PKI was mastermind of the event. To support his goal to annihilate the PKI, he engaged the RPKAD, civilian elements and foreign countries. Following the affair, the Malaysian and Britain secretly provided support to Suharto. They contributed to the counter propaganda campaign mounted by Radio Television Malaysia and the Malaysian Information Department. The counter propaganda was aimed at debunking the PKI.¹²²³

1222 Paget, 27.

1223 On 7 October 1965, for instance, the IRD issued 'Background on Indonesia' which revealed the link between the PKI and the affair. Challis, 99.

Tension between Suharto and Dani increased drastically since the affair. Dani's statement regarding the affair generated polemics (pp.202-3). Soon after Suharto seized control in Jakarta, he attacked Dani by employing some tactics. Suharto highlighted in bold Dani's 'blunder' where the air force supported the affair and recognised it as the army's problem. Suharto then alleged there was a link between the air force officers and the G30S affair as several officers including Dani were listed as member of the Indonesian Revolutionary Council.¹²²⁴ Later, Nasution also engaged in attacking Dani by accusing him has known about the affair beforehand. In addition, both Nasution and Suharto were also determined to eliminate Subandrio. Nasution requested assistance of the US Embassy to attack Subandrio.¹²²⁵ Although Sukarno tried to protect Subandrio, the army was very keen to get rid him. The army also asked the British in the character and political assignation of Subandrio.¹²²⁶

As Vatikiotis argued, the ABRI did not have a clear plan for managing its involvement in political affairs.¹²²⁷ The ABRI was divided regarding Sukarno's attitude toward the PKI. Following the 30 September outbreak, military elites were reluctance to lead any political manoeuvre against Sukarno. Vatikiotis added this situation probably was created by the uncertainty. So, no one was firmly whether any move would gain solid support from the military.

It is noted that the G30S affair affected the distribution of power amongst actors. As shown in Table 5-4, located on the next page, Suharto obtained almost all power. A fortnight after the event, Sukarno assigned Suharto as the Army Commander (p.207). By December 1965, at least Suharto occupied four

1224 Following the bloody incident, the plotters announced the establishment of the Indonesian Revolutionary Council. It consisted of 45 members including 22 officers. Dani and Subandrio were on the list. Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 109

1225 TNA, FO 371/180323, Telegram No 2477, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 8 November 1965.

1226 TNA, FO 371/181457, Letter British High Commission Kuala Lumpur to CRO, 19 November 1965

1227 Michael RJ Vatikiotis, "The military and democracy in Indonesia," in *The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific*, edited by RJ May and Viberto Selochan, (Canberra: ANU Press, 2004), 33-34

strategic posts at the same time: the KOLAGA Commander, the Army Chief, the KOTI Chief of Staff, and the Koopslihkamtib Commander.¹²²⁸ Thus, he has become the most powerful person in Indonesia.

Table 5-4 Distribution of Power (Post the G30S Affair)

| Key Actors | Bases of Power | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|----------------|----------|-----------|----------|--------|-------------|-------------|-------|
| | Reward | Coercion | Authority | Referent | Expert | Information | Affiliation | Group |
| Military | | | | | | | | |
| AH Nasution | | | | ✓ | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| Ahmad Yani | | | | | | | | |
| Suharto | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Omar Dani | | | | | ✓ | | | |
| RE Martadinata | | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| Civilian | | | | | | | | |
| Sukarno | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | | | |
| Subandrio | | | | | | | | |
| PKI | | | | | | | | |

Source: Author

Consequences

The following paragraphs will identify the consequences of political behaviour of the ABRI during the implementation of *Dwikora* Operation. As explained earlier, the *Konfrontasi* was multifaceted. The research analysis above shows that wider issues provide certain effects on the execution of the operation. Such condition also fosters the interservice rivalry. The presentation of consequences will be illustrated at three levels: individual, organisational and national.

Individual Level

Clearly, the only key actor who gained the most functional outcomes was Suharto. Through the *Konfrontasi*, he obtained promotions and greater power. Surprisingly, compare to other key military actors, Suharto was not considered as influential player during the outset of *Konfrontasi*. But, his manoeuvres and

¹²²⁸ He handed over position of the KOSTRAD Commander to Maj Gen Umar Wirahadikusumah on 2 December 1965.

decisiveness succeeded to enhance his image and expand his power. And what he has done after the affair has boosted his career significantly.

On the contrary, other key military actors received dysfunctional consequences. Due to the affair, six high level military officers were assassinated including Ahmad Yani. Even though Nasution was able to escape without serious injury, his daughter and aide were murdered. He also lost his job as Defence and Security Minister. Even though he could occupy the position of Chairman of the MPRS, he still lost his grip in the ABRI. Both Dani and Martadinata also had to hand over their positions as military chief to their juniors. After the downfall of Sukarno government, Dani and Subandrio were arrested and sent to prison. Although it was never carried out, the Extraordinary Military Court sentenced both of them to death. The PKI is banned from national politics.

Organisational Level

For the ABRI, political behaviour provided, at least, two consequences. First, the *Dwikora* Operation failed to achieve its aim, dissolution the Malaysia Federation. It confirmed Nasution's argument that war is not only military matters, but it involves political and economic fields.¹²²⁹ Mortimer argued the failure of the anti-Malaysia campaign was caused by ill-defined objective, as the dispute was not a clear-cut issue of colonialism versus national self-assertion. Thus, the campaign failed to gather international sympathy.¹²³⁰

Second, the G30S affair, evidently, accelerated the integration of the Indonesian Armed Forces significantly. Shortly after Suharto was being Acting President, he imposed dormant plan of the integration of the military.¹²³¹ The ministry also introduced main doctrine for defence and security. To enhance the integration, the new government abolished the ministries of the army, the navy and the air force and stripped cabinet status from the military chiefs. All

1229 Nasution, "Unity of Command," 418.

1230 Mortimer, 214

1231 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No. 132/1967 dated 24 August 1967.

commanders were downgraded to chief of staffs and under responsibility of Defence and Security Minister.¹²³² Lowry explained the ABRI's centralisation and unity of command only depended on one man, Suharto.¹²³³

Furthermore, the army could maintain its domination in the armed forces. Following the New Order government, the ABRI established four defence area command with consisted of several regional military commands. In essence, it was the implementation of territorial defence concept.¹²³⁴ And, the army reoriented its doctrine from the theme of continuing the 'revolution' to the theme of 'development' in order to comply with the ideological hallmark of Suharto government.¹²³⁵ Regarding the socio-political function, the army officers remained occupied many civilian positions. The role performed through *kekaryaan* ('functionals' – personnel serving outside the ABRI). The officers served in many agencies as ministers, governors, and legislators.¹²³⁶ In the Suharto's Cabinet in 1966, the Army officers occupied several strategic posts such as Ministry of Defence and Security and Ministry of Home Affairs.¹²³⁷

Meanwhile, the navy and the air force capability were gradually decreased. Following the hand over operational responsibility to Defence and Security Minister, both services were lack of fund. Consequently, most of eastern bloc supply weaponry system were disrepair.¹²³⁸ The allegation of the air force involvement in the affair, in some extent, affected the air force image.¹²³⁹

1232 Robert Lowry, *Armed Forces of Indonesia*, (St. Leonard's, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 53

1233 Lowry, 83,

1234 Bilveer Singh, *Dwifungsi ABRI. The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces*, (Singapore: Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 93

1235 Peter Britton, "Indonesia's NeoColonial Armed Forces," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 7, 3 (1975): 15

1236 Nugroho, 50. However, since the downfall of Suharto government, socio-political role is officially abolished.

1237 Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 269

1238 Lowry, 98; Crouch, *Militer dan Politik*, 267

1239 The propaganda film *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* (Betrayal of the Communists), which was endorsed by Suharto, explicitly portrayed the allegation.

National Level

The most obvious consequence of political behaviour in the ABRI was the collapse of Sukarno's government. It has marked as the establishment of authoritarian regime. After he completely controlled the government, Suharto curtailed the number of political parties. The annihilation of the PKI also led to massacre that spread across Indonesia. The estimated 500,000-1,000,000 people were killed during the mass violence.¹²⁴⁰ The National Commission for Human Rights concluded the massacre in 1965-66 as the case of gross human right violation.¹²⁴¹

Moreover, there were two functional consequences of political behaviour. First, Government was granted USD500 million of loan in 1967-8. The US also extended long-term credit over USD400 milion. The new government also was granted credit initially fixed at USD200 milion from the Intergovernmental Group for Indonesia (IGGI). However, those loans were not for expanding military capability but economic recovery.¹²⁴² Leifer noted that the dispute settlement facilitated a revision of economic cooperation.¹²⁴³ Suharto set primary initial target for economic recovery was reducing the inflation. Surprisingly, the rate of inflation declined significantly, from over 600 per cent in 1966 to 10 per cent in 1969.¹²⁴⁴

1240 Discussion regarding the massacre see, for instance, Robert Cribb, "Genocide in Indonesia, 1965–1966," *Journal of Genocide Research*, 3(2) (2001): 219–239; International People's Tribunal on Crimes against Humanity Indonesia 1965 (IPT65), *Final report of the IPT 1965: Findings and documents of the International People's Tribunal on Crimes against Humanity Indonesia 1965*, (The Hague and Jakarta: IPT 1965 Foundation, 2016); Jess Melvin, *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: Mechanics of Mass Murder*, (New York: Routledge, 2018); Geoffrey Robinson, *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965-66*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018).

1241 Komnas HAM [National Commission for Human Rights], *Pernyataan Komnas HAM tentang Hasil Penyelidikan Pelanggaran HAM yang Berat Peristiwa 1965-1966: Ringkasan Eksekutif* [Komnas HAM's Statements regarding Investigation of Gross Human Rights Violation 1965-1966: Executive Summary], (Jakarta: Komnas HAM, 23 July 2012]

1242 Justus M Van Der Kroef, "Indonesian Foreign Policy since Sukarno," *Il Politico* 35, 2 (1970): 339-53.

1243 Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 115.

1244 David BH Denoon, "Indonesia: Transition to Stability?," *Current History* (December 1971): 336

Second, reorientation of foreign policy. Suharto government refreshed the foreign policy outlook. The new foreign policy centered around three issues, namely, maintaining adequate defence capability; maintaining a large foreign aid; and upholding free and active policy.¹²⁴⁵ Indonesia then resumed membership of the United Nation on 28 September 1966. To affirm the political transformation, Suharto expressed his interest on promoting a regional association, which the result was establishment of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹²⁴⁶ Following the affair, Indonesian diplomatic relations with the East Bloc was though. Diplomatic relation between Indonesia and Soviet remained, but relation between Indonesia and China was suspended.¹²⁴⁷

5.3 Summary of Findings

Findings from the data analysis aim to answer the research questions as to why and how did the ABRI become politicised, and how did military political behaviour affect the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation. The analysis focused on two important aspects, namely, politicisation of the military and political behaviour in organisation. The case study has revealed that the ABRI has become more politicised during the *Konfrontasi*. Thus, this condition fostered political behaviour in military organisation, which contributed to the failure of *Dwikora* Operation. Summary of findings as follows:

(a) Why and how did the ABRI become politicised?

The politicisation of the ABRI has occurred since its birth in 1945. However, it has become more politicised during Guided Democracy. The Indonesian military especially the army had dominated the government with Sukarno. As wars influenced domestic politics, the *Konfrontasi* also boosted the politicisation of the ABRI. As presented in Table 5-5, located on the next page, there are four

1245 Denoon, 335-336

1246 Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 120-21.

1247 Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 126-27.

reason of why the ABRI became more politicised from the outset of *Konfrontasi* era. The ABRI was more fragmented. So, this condition led to military's ambivalence toward the *Konfrontasi*.

Table 5-5 Summary of Politicisation of the ABRI during the *Konfrontasi*

| Building blocks | Short explanation | Theoretical contribution |
|----------------------------|---|--|
| Policy of war | <p>Key actors have various motivations toward the <i>Konfrontasi</i>. Majority of actors possessed self-preservation motivation. Although there was a division regarding a degree of support for the policy, almost all key actors agreed to avoid open war.</p> | - |
| Main actors and coalitions | <p>The ABRI has become more politicised because of four reasons: elite manoeuvres, failing of military reputation, civilian dependency, and domestic circumstances.</p> <p>Motive of military involvement in politics can be divided into two groups: (a) internal, namely, sectional interest, birthright and competency; and (b) external, namely, national interest and civilian inadequacy.</p> <p>Various key actors motivations resulted in the failure of solid coalition formation in order to uphold the hostility policy.</p> | <p>Finer's theory on the military opportunities to intervene civilian affairs partially fit with the case study since many officers allegedly involve in corruption cases and those brought certain damage to military image.</p> <p>Perlmutter and Bennett theory over the military opportunity to involve in civilian spheres fits the case study.</p> <p>Finer, Edmonds, and Koonings and Kruijt theories regarding motive of military involvement in politics fit the case study</p> |
| Politicised military | <p>Characteristics of the ABRI during the <i>Konfrontasi</i> were:</p> <p>(a) Strengths: legitimacy, monopoly of arms, and symbol of people's army</p> <p>(b) Weaknesses: less cohesive, command control, and <i>esprit de corps</i>; lack of technical ability</p> <p>Cold War contributed to improve military capability and foster interservice rivalry.</p> <p>Fragmentation within the ABRI</p> | <p>The study proposes an improvement for Finer's theory regarding political strengths and weaknesses of the military. Military legitimacy and superiority in organisation aspects are possible to be strength or weakness, depend on how deep military factionalism and civil-military relation.</p> <p>This study proposes an</p> |

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| | <p>toward the <i>Konfrontasi</i> affected the level of military influence. The navy, the air force and minority in the army endorsed the use of force for the <i>Konfrontasi</i>. Meanwhile, majority of the army elites resisted the using of hard power.</p> <p>As a result, there were two opposite directions of politicisation of the ABRI during the <i>Konfrontasi</i> at the same time: positive and negative politicisation. The situation affected the implementation of the <i>Dwikora</i> Operation.</p> | <p>adjustment for Betts theory regarding level of influence to make it workable for examining pre-war situation.</p> <p>The study suggests an improvement for Betts's theory regarding direction of politicisation: positive, negative and mixed politicisation.</p> |
|--|--|--|

Source: Author

Table 5-5 confirms that the ABRI was a political structure, which provided channel for the expression of individual and group motives. So, main actors should perform to gather more power. But, competition for power led to the failure to establish solid coalition amongst main actors. The rivalry resulted in several problems in delivering the policy of *Konfrontasi*, including inability to make decisions regarding the *Dwikora* Operation.

(b) How did military political behaviour affect the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation?

The evidence from the present research also confirms a wider range of political tactics. Clearly, a significant event, the G30S affair, contributes to change the behavioural repertoire significantly. Buchanan and Badham argument regarding the possible consequences of political behaviour in organisation fits the study. Political behaviour in the ABRI toward the *Konfrontasi* also generates both functional and dysfunctional individual, organisational and national outcomes. Political behaviour in the ABRI during the *Dwikora* Operation is represented in Table 5-6, located on the next page.

Table 5-6 Political Behaviour in the ABRI during the Implementation of Dwikora Operation

| Antecedents of political behaviour | |
|---|--|
| Individual Personal ambition Self interest | Contextual To protect service interest Prompting by law Rivalry Top leader domination |
| Behaviours (political tactics) | |
| <i>Pre the G30S Affair</i> | |
| Building a network of useful contacts | Using delaying tactics to block others |
| Using key players to support initiatives | Keeping boss happy |
| Deliberately withholding useful information | Informal influence |
| Breaking the rules to achieve objectives | |
| <i>Post the G30S Affair</i> | |
| Blame others | Avoiding criticism |
| Using key players to support initiatives | Informal influence |
| Using others to deliver bad news | Creating a favourable image |
| Keeping dirt files to blackmail others | Forming powerful coalitions |
| Highlighting other people's errors and flaws | Breaking the rules to achieve objectives |
| Consequences of uses of political behaviour | |
| Functional | Dysfunctional |
| <i>Individual</i> | <i>Individual</i> |
| Power building | Personal injury |
| Career advancement | Loss of strategic position and power |
| Succeed as a change agent | Damaged credibility |
| Enhance personal reputation | Casualties |
| <i>Organisational</i> | <i>Organisational</i> |
| Succeed to maintain service domination | Fail to deliver operation |
| Improving the cohesion | Damaged organisational image |
| Succeed to retain military status quo | Block organisational development |
| <i>National</i> | <i>National</i> |
| Improving economy | Damaged politics |
| Improving foreign relations | National tragedy |

Source: Author

As Table 5-6 shows, political behaviour in organisation can be found in the Indonesian military organisation. A mix of individual and contextual factors is held to be the trigger factor that encourages key military actors to play politics during the implementation of *Dwikora* Operation. Given some variation, the overall judgement is that political tactics, which were employed in military institution, were having commonalities with private organisation.¹²⁴⁸ But, the two-factors of politicisation of the military, both intra-military as well as external to the institution have become the distinctive feature. As the ABRI was the prominent political institution in Indonesia, the outcomes political behaviour of the military also can be found in national level, not only individual and organisational level.

In addition, the A-B-C Model, which introduced by Buchanan and Badham, fitted with the case study. The model is practicable to capture political behaviour in the ABRI during the execution of *Dwikora* Operation. It also supported the notion that military organisation has similarities with private organisation (pp.68-9).

1248 Buchanan and Badham. *Power, Politics*, Second edition, 31-32

6 Conclusions

This dissertation has attempted to analyse the effect of politicisation of the Indonesian military on its operations during the *Konfrontasi*, 1963-67. The preceding chapters included detailed expositions of the nature of political behaviour in the ABRI, interservice rivalry and the reciprocal relationships amongst key actors during the execution of military operations. Even though each chapter contained essential summary regarding its own subject scope, none was capable of offering fundamental and definitive conclusion about the research subject as a whole.

The ultimate chapter aims at exploring the last enabling objective (p.15), namely, (f) to draw conclusions, lessons learned and propose recommendations for future research. This chapter is structured into four sections. The first section contains an overview of the entire thesis. Subsequently, the second section provides conclusions drawn from the research findings on political behaviour in the ABRI during the *Konfrontasi*. The third sections illustrates lessons learned for the Indonesian Armed Forces, which might reasonably valuable to improve the implementation of joint operation, as it has been better equipped and showing improvements in the management of officers. The last section offers potential areas for further research.

6.1 Summary of Chapters

The main question this research seeks to investigate is in what way did the politicisation of the military affect the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation. To help answer the central question, this research established three sub-questions, as follows: (a) how was the Indonesian military operations delivered during the *Konfrontasi*; (b) why and how did the Indonesian military become politicised; and (c) how did military political behaviour affect the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation?

As stated in Chapter One, this study aimed to examine the effect of politicisation of the military on Indonesian military operations during the Indonesia- Malaysia *Konfrontasi* (1963-1967). The enabling objectives guiding the research are six folds, namely to: (a) critically review the key literature and seminal works regarding the *Konfrontasi* and Indonesian politicised military theme; (b) evaluate the concept of politicisation of the military and political behaviour in organisations; (c) discuss the implementation of the Indonesian military operations during the *Konfrontasi*; (d) examine the failure of the *Dwikora* Operation; (e) contribute to the literature in explaining the effect of politicisation of the ABRI on the *Dwikora* Operation during the *Konfrontasi*; and (f) draw conclusions, lessons learned and propose recommendations for future research. Enabling objectives (a) and (b) are concentrated in Chapter Two on the examination of political element in military operation. Subsequently, the enabling objective (c) is addressed in Chapter Three and Four through the illustration of the complexity of the *Dwikora* Operation. Next, the enabling objectives (d) and (e) are emphasised in Chapter Five through process tracing method. Finally, the enabling objective (f) is tackled in this chapter.

Chapter One identified the problem statement and the gap that existed in the politicisation of the Indonesian military literature with regards to its operation. It showed that the effects of political behaviour of military during crisis are underexplored. This was mostly because extant literature predominantly associated with civil-military relation studies. This study argued military political behaviour during crisis has certain effect to its operations. Terms were explained that were applicable and employed throughout the study. This chapter presented the research questions, hypothesis and contribution to knowledge. This chapter also discussed the research methodology for the study. The techniques of data collection and analysis were reviewed.

Chapter Two detailed an in-depth literature review. The chapter began with a reviewing of the context of the case study. In this part, the examination of extant literature was focus on two themes: the *Konfrontasi* and Indonesian politicised military. In existing studies on the *Konfrontasi*, most researches failed to

examine how the Indonesian military operations were conducted and why they were unsuccessful. In particular, the extant literature regarding Indonesia-Malaysia conflict was employing western perspective. In addition, existing studies on Indonesian politicised military theme failed to explore the effect of the ABRI's political behaviour on its operations. This chapter also discussed two key concepts: politicised military and political behaviour in organisation. Eight essential aspects of military involvement in politics were identified. Since politicisation of the ABRI during the *Konfrontasi* was legitimised, the existing studies failed to provide a balance and comprehensive view toward the military political behaviour. In order to address this gap, this study suggested the need to adapt model on political behaviour in organisation. Since political behaviour in organisation model was usually generalised from the private organisation behaviour, the study argued the model is still useful to assist the investigation of military political behaviour. The study further pointed out in Chapter Two that there was a need to examine the effect of politicisation of the ABRI on the operation. Chapter Two presented the analytical framework on which the study is based.

Chapter Three and Four presented more specific information on the case study. Chapter Three explained the period before the implementation of *Dwikora* Operation. Five key issues were identified: national politico-security landscape since independence, situational context of the *Konfrontasi*, the main actors' motivations, Operation A, and informal main actors' network. This chapter introduced the complexity of the *Konfrontasi* prior to the *Dwikora* Operation

Chapter Four discussed the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation. This chapter showed how political behaviour of the ABRI affected the operations. It also emphasised the significant effect of G30S affair on the *Dwikora* Operation. Chapter Three and Four mainly use primary data to show how the Indonesian military operations were implemented. These two chapters essentially served as the foundation for the analysis that follows in Chapter Five.

Chapter Five detailed the data analysis and the analytical framework use for the study. This chapter adapted process tracing to investigate why the Indonesian

military operations were failed. It started with an examination of policy of *Konfrontasi*. This part discussed how key actors' motivations affected the *Konfrontasi* policymaking process. The analysis then continued with the investigation of two aspects that influence key actors political behaviour toward the *Konfrontasi*, namely, opportunity and motive. In this part, several relevant theories were tested. Subsequently, this chapter identified key characteristics of the ABRI, which were significant in shaping the politicisation of the military institution. The occurrence of political behaviour in the ABRI during the *Konfrontasi* was thoroughly examined in penultimate part in this chapter.

6.2 Conclusions

The predominant conclusion drawn from this research is that the hypothesis is proven - the political behaviour in the ABRI contributed to the failure of the *Dwikora* Operation. Based on the findings of the analysis conducted in Chapter Six, the following conclusions are offered:

- 1 **The friction and interservice rivalry in the ABRI were already deep prior to the *Konfrontasi*.** The research findings indicated that key actors have various motivations toward the policy of *Konfrontasi* (pp.105-26). The motivations reflected that each main possessed own agenda or goal toward the *Konfrontasi*. Those differences caused more friction and reflected the intensity of military rivalry, which has existed for years before the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute. As the standpoint of almost main actors was not keen to open war, this might provide a hint that the *Konfrontasi* was more serving a domestic political interest than truly aiming at crushing the Malaysia Federation.
- 2 **Unhealthy military rivalry resulted in poor combat proficiency.** It is noted that one of reasons behind Sukarno's decision to appoint Dani as Commander of the KOGA/KOLAGA was political consideration (p.156). In this regard, aspect of political loyalty was being more obvious than operational competence. As a result, interservice rivalry was worse during

the *Konfrontasi*. The unhealthy military rivalry then eroded enthusiasm in delivering military missions. According to Newel, passion is essential in encouraging the fighting at the tactical perspective of war. Although, too much passion may overwhelm the planning.¹²⁴⁹ Fragmentation in the ABRI during the *Konfrontasi* resulted in half-hearted military operation. Even though the air force and the navy supported the Dwikora Operation, but in general, combat performance was still poor. Because the implementation of Dwikora Operation was highly depending on the army, as it size was the biggest in the ABRI.

- 3 **The imbalance of power possession has contributed to ineffectiveness of Dani's leadership.** The research findings showed that there was unequal power distribution among main actors (pp.259-68).¹²⁵⁰ Sources and influence among leaders lies on their social network. But, this inequality caused organisational dysfunction. Meanwhile, to ensure the effectiveness of military command, Nye argued that it requires a concentration of power in one person.¹²⁵¹ As power distribution is central to the task of organisational planning, Dani failed to fully control over the Dwikora Operation. In addition, the existence of fluid coalitions between certain actors also indicate that almost all actors were aware that they need to form a fluid coalition in order to achieve their own goals.
- 4 **The failure of Dwikora Operation helped the army to maintain its dominance in the armed forces.** The research findings demonstrated that the military rivalry during the *Konfrontasi* was intense. Each service tried to utilitise the *Konfrontasi* for its own purposes. The air force, several time challenged the army's dominance after Sukarno appointed Dani as Commander for the KOGA. But, the army could retain its dominance

1249 Newell, 27

1250 Ronit Kark, Tair Karazi-Presler, and Sarit Tubi. "Paradox and challenges in military leadership." in *Leadership lessons from compelling contexts*, ed. Claudia Peus, Susanne Braun and Birgit Schyns, (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2016), 180

1251 Nye, 19

following the G30S affair occurred. And Dani failed to consolidate the air force post the affair.

- 5 **At the individual level, Suharto was the only main actor who enjoyed the most benefits from the *Konfrontasi*.** In the outset of the *Konfrontasi*, Suharto was not counted as one of main military actors. His position as Commander of the KOSTRAD was not counted as a strategic position in the army. However, he started to be part of key Indonesian military players since he maintained close relationship with General Yani and launched the Opsus. Suharto then succeeded to capitalise his bases of power during the period of *Konfrontasi*. Following the issuance of Supersemar, Suharto was the most powerful person in Indonesia and widely seen as *de facto* leader.

6.3 Lessons Learned

It was observed in the Chapter One that the present research attempted to investigate the relationship between political behaviour of military and its operation. However, the failure of *Dwikora* Operation provides military leaders insights in how they can manage the fragmentation and rivalry during crisis/wartime. In this regard, the findings from the research should be seen within the spirit of enhancing the TNI professionalism. Furthermore, it is also clear that a great deal of further work would be needed to increase the effectiveness of the TNI. These lessons are important considerations for improving the implementation of joint military operation.

The following four lessons that could be utilised for practical purposes, are listed, below:

- a) *Joint military operation requires clear command structure.* During the implementation of *Dwikora* Operation, problem of joint operation remained unsolved. The establishment of an efficient land, naval and air force team is needed in order to prevent unnecessary overlapping amongst the

services.¹²⁵² Military operation structure can be changed but constant revision may increase uncertainty. So, the structure should address the uses of limited resources and problem of power distribution.

- b) *Fundamental issue behind the failure of military operation is the profile of joint force commanders.* The appointment of commander should consider the nature of military operation. Besides based on rank and chain of command, future military operation will guide the leadership style. President should limit political loyalty aspect in selecting the commander,
- c) *Existence of joint force logistics command in the military operation command is vital.* During the first year of *Dwikora* Operation, the KOTI did not equip the KOGA with adequate logistics support (p.183). Even though, the KOGA was set up as unified command, the KOTI and military chiefs disagreed to assign the joint force logistics under the KOGA. Consequently, the KOGA could not hit the target in 1965, as each service remained control the logistics support.¹²⁵³ In this regard, the Joint Military Operation Command Headquarter should be equipped with a full authority of logistics command and control. The TNI Headquarter should establish mutual understanding and promote best practice with all services headquarter in order to meet the future joint logistics requirements. Any problems of supply may affect the course of military campaigns.¹²⁵⁴ As Jomini said, "Logistics is the art of moving armies... Logistics comprises the means and arrangements, which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act;

1252 Thomas A Cardwell III, *Command Structure for Theater Warfare: The Quest for Unity of Command*, (Alabama: Air University Press, 1984), 60

1253 Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan IV Logistik [Command Report of the Third Joint Staff for Logistics], dated 22 May 1967.

1254 John D Millett, "Logistics and Modern War," *Military Affairs*, 9, 3 (1945): 194. doi:10.2307/1983378.

logistics brings the troops to that point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops.”¹²⁵⁵

- d) *The need of more joint training and education to reduce rivalry and improve jointery.* Joint training is essential to successful joint military operation. As each service has own doctrine, joint training helps military to improve joint effectiveness and addresses future interoperability issue. Tellis, et al argue that military forces that are inadequately trained will fail to make effective use of the equipment at their disposal.¹²⁵⁶ Besides training, joint education will also help in decreasing interservice rivalry. Although, this option is not a panacea, frequent joint training and multi service education may improve jointness in military in the long run.

6.4 Recommendations for Future Research

From the conclusions and lessons learned stated above, four areas where further research can be conducted but is beyond the scope of this thesis, are:

- a) This study was constrained with tracing the living witnesses. It would be helpful to conduct further research by also emphasising oral history. The more stories from living witnesses may provide clearer view regarding the implementation of *Dwikora* Operation.
- b) This research was limited to the implementation of the *Dwikora* Operation. Yet, there was specific TNI's operation, which aimed at expanding territory of Indonesia. It was launched when Suharto's government want to annex East Timor in 1975. It would be helpful to conduct further research on other Indonesian military operations to

¹²⁵⁵ Antoine Henri Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. GH Mendell and WP Craighill, (New York: Dover Publication, 2007), 62

¹²⁵⁶ Ashley J Tellis, et al., *Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation: 2000), 150

provide comparative explanation regarding political behaviour in the TNI during that period.

- c) This study suggested an improvement for joint education and training to reduce interservice rivalry. Since Suharto administration era, joint educations were held in two levels: cadet level at the military academy (*Akademi TNI*)¹²⁵⁷; and senior officer level (colonel rank) at the Joint Service Command and Staff College (*Sekolah Staf dan Komando TNI/Sesko TNI*)¹²⁵⁸. Thus, it would be worthwhile to conduct research on examination of military education whether joint education and training could significantly decrease rivalry.

- d) This research recognised there were limited access and data availability regarding intra service rivalry in the Air Force and the Navy. Therefore, when such data are available, empirical research should be conducted to provide a more detailed exposition of the intraservice rivalry, especially with the aim of assessing the effect of intraservice rivalry on the military operation.

1257 On 16 December 1965, Sukarno established the Indonesian Armed Forces Academy (*Akademi Bersenjata Republik Indonesia/AKABRI*) based on Presidential Decree (*Keppres*) No. 185/KOTI/1965. This academy comprised of the Army Academy, the Navy Academy, the Air Force Academy and the Police Academy. Following the collapse of Suharto government, the Police Academy was separated from the AKABRI in 1999. Since then, the AKABRI was transformed into the *Akademi TNI*. During Suharto's era, the cadets spent twenty weeks at the AKABRI before attending their service academy. But, since 2008, the cadets should spend 48 weeks at the *Akademi TNI* before joining their academy service for three years. Lowry, 119; Fanny Pantouw, "Implementasi Kurikulum Integrated System pada *Akademi TNI (Akmil)* Tahun 2011-2012 dalam Rangka Penyiapan SDM Pertahanan Darat [Implementation of Integrated Curriculum System at the Indonesian Armed Forced Academy during 2011-2012 to Provide Indonesian Defence Human Capital]," *Jurnal Prodi Strategi Pertahanan Darat*, 3, 2 (June 2017): 82

1258 This joint service school was established since 1970. "Sesko TNI," Pusat Penerangan TNI [The Indonesian Military Information Centre], accessed March 28, 2018. <http://www.tni.mil.id/pages-24-sesko-tni.html>

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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Participant Information Sheet for Thesis Interview

“How Politicisation of the Military Affected the Indonesian Military Operation during the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, 1963-67”

Dear Participant,

I would like to ask you to participate in the data collection for my PhD research project on “How Politicisation of the Military Affected the Indonesian Military Operation during the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, 1963-1967.” You will find more information about the study on the attached project proposal.

I hope better to understand the following issues:

- How was the Policy of Confrontation developed?
- How was the Dwikora Operation developed?
- How was the Dwikora Operation implemented?
- How did the TNI during the Confrontation become politicised?
- How was military political behaviour affecting the outcome of the *Dwikora Operation*?
- What kind of other factors were influences the TNI during the Confrontation?

Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. It will involve an interview of approximately 60 minutes in length to take place by arrangement. I will initially contact you by email or telephone.

You may decide not to answer any of the interview questions if you wish. You may also decide to withdraw from this study at any time by advising the researcher interviewing you or by emailing a.aliabbas@cranfield.ac.uk or using the contact detail at the end of this document. If you notify me of your withdrawal, all identifiable data will be destroyed. Once data has been anonymised, it will be impossible to identify the origin and cannot be destroyed.

I may ask for clarification of issues raised in the interview some time after it has taken place, but you will not be obliged in any way to clarify or participate further.

There are no known risks to participation beyond those encountered in everyday life. The information you provide is confidential, except that with your permission your name, personal identifying information and quotes may be used. If you request confidentiality, beyond anonymised quotes, information you provide will be treated only as a source of background information, alongside literature-based research and interviews with others.

If you ask me to, your name or any other personal identifying information will not appear in any publications resulting from this study; neither will there be anything to identify your place of work.

The information gained from this interview will only be used for the above objectives, will not be used for any other purpose and will not be recorded in excess of what is required for the research.

Even though the study findings will be published in international conferences, journals or book, only me will have access to the interview data itself. There are no known or anticipated risks to you as a participant in this study.

If you have any questions regarding this study or would like additional information, please ask me.

Yours Sincerely,

Anton Aliabbas
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Consent Form

| Issue | Respondent's initial |
|---|----------------------|
| I have read the information presented in the information letter about the study "How Politicisation of the Military Affected the Indonesian Military Operation during the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, 1963-1967." | |
| | |
| I have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, and received satisfactory answers to my questions, and any additional details I wanted. | |
| | |
| I am also aware that excerpts from the interview may be included in publications to come from this research. Quotations will be kept anonymous, if requested. | |
| | |
| The researcher has informed me that I can withdraw from the project at any time upon request. | |
| | |
| I give permission for the interview to be recorded using audio recording and/or photography equipment. | |
| | |
| I only give permission for the researcher to have access to my responses. | |

With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree to participate in this study.

I agree to being contacted again by the researchers if my responses give rise to interesting findings or cross-references.

no

yes

if yes, my preferred method of being contacted is:

telephone

email

other

| | | | |
|------------------------|--|------------------|--|
| Participant Name: | | Consent taken by | |
| Participant Signature: | | Signature | |
| Date | | Date | |

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

| No | Title/Rank | Name/ Code | Expertise/ Background | Place and Date of Interview |
|------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| WITNESSES | | | | |
| 1 | Col (rtd) | Siswanto | He is former officer in the Indonesian Marines, who was involved in the Operation A | Jakarta, 13 December 2016 |
| 2 | Lieutenant General (rtd) | Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo | He is former officer in the Indonesian Army. During the Dwikora Operation, he was an officer at Army Headquarter. | Jakarta, 30 November 2016 |
| 3 | Colonel (rtd) | Sugiyanto | He is former officer in the Indonesian Army, who was involved in Special Operation | Jakarta, 22 November 2016 |
| 4 | Mr | M1 | He is former officer in the Indonesian Air Force. During the Dwikora Operation, he was a chief navigator | Jakarta, 8 December 2016 |
| 5 | Private (rtd) | Amir Zainuddin | He is former private soldier in the Indonesian Marines, who was involved in the Operation A | Jakarta, 1 October 2015 |
| 6 | Mr | M2 | He is former officer in the Indonesian Navy, who was involved in the 1965 GPPR case | Jakarta, 20 December 2016 |
| 7 | Mr | Harry Tjan Silalahi | He is a civilian who was involved in the Suharto's Opsus | Jakarta, 11 November 2016 |
| 8 | Mr | Jusuf Wanandi | He is a civilian who was involved in the Suharto's Opsus | Jakarta, 25 November 2016 |
| 9 | Mr | Sarmadji | He is an exile who lives in the Netherlands. He was former member of the PKI | Amsterdam, 12 August 2016 |

| | | | | |
|----------------|--------------------------|--------------------|---|------------------------------|
| 10 | Mr | Dharmawan Isaak | He is an exile who lives in the Netherlands. He was former member of the PKI | Amersfoort, 7 September 2016 |
| 11 | Mr | Bambang | He is an exile who lives in the Netherlands. He was a Navy graduate bursar in 1962-1965. However, due to the 1965 event, government terminated his bursary and cancelled the program. | Amsterdam, 8 September 2016 |
| EXPERTS | | | | |
| 12 | Lieutenant General (rtd) | Suryo Prabowo | The Indonesian military operations | Jakarta, 10 November 2016 |
| 13 | Rear Admiral (rtd) | Budiman Djoko Said | Navy history and the Indonesian military operations | Jakarta, 14 November 2016 |
| 14 | Rear Admiral (rtd) | Soleman B Ponto | Navy and intelligence history and the Indonesian military operations | Jakarta, 28 December 2016 |
| 15 | Mr | Bejo Untung | Head of the Foundation for the Research of 1965/1966 Massacre | Jakarta, 14 December 2016 |
| 16 | Dr | Asvi Warman Adam | Indonesian historian, especially September coup. | Jakarta, 18 November 2016 |
| 17 | Mr | Atmadji Sumarkijo | Military historian. Published some biographies of the TNI' generals. He is former journalist | Jakarta, 1 December 2016 |
| 18 | Dr | Greg Poulgrain | Historian who has expertise on the <i>Konfrontasi</i> | Jakarta, 1 December 2016 |
| 19 | Mr | Peter Kasenda | Military historian. Published some biographies of TNI' generals. | Jakarta, 23 December 2016 |
| 20 | Prof Dr | Saskia Wirienga | Historian who has expertise in the G30S affair | The Hague, 2 September 2016 |

APPENDIX 3: THE INDONESIAN MILITARY FORCE LIST

A. Personnel:

- During the KOGA period: 58,233 troops
- During the KOLAGA period (1 March – 1 September 1965): 108,128 troops, including 1,967 troops for Operation A
- During the KOLAGA period (2 September 1965 – 26 May 1967): 108,132 troops, including 1,967 troops for Operation A.

B. Main equipment:

1 squadron of helicopter, 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, 4 light destroyers, 5 submarines, 6 motor torpedo boats, 5 minesweepers, 1 salvage ship, 4 Landing Ship Tanks, 6 submarine chasers, 4 merchantman, 2 attack transport ships, 3 oiler ships, 8 TU-16 bombers, 3 TU-16 KS bombers, 4 P-51 Mustangs fighters, 7 B-25 bombers, 3 C-130 aircrafts, 11 C-47 aircrafts, 4 LL-14 transport aircrafts. 200 *sampan* motorboats

Source: Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan III Personel [Command Report of the Third Joint Staff for Personnel], dated 15 May 1967; Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, *Operasi Dwikora*, 118-120