

CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY

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WHERE THE STATE IS NOT STRONG ENOUGH:
WHAT CAN ARMY RECONSTRUCTION TELL US ABOUT CHANGE
NECESSARY TO THE OECD DAC SSR PRINCIPLES?

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What can Army Reconstruction tell us about change necessary to the OECD DAC
SSR Principles?

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Abstract

Post-conflict army reconstruction is an important element of security sector reform (SSR), tracing its origins to at least 1980, before the SSR concept itself was formulated. Reconstruction of security forces is an important element in wider post-conflict reconstruction, and for political reasons, an army has almost always deemed necessary.

Since 1998, SSR itself has been increasingly conceptualized, with principles for SSR having been laid down by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) since 2004. Yet SSR faces a host of philosophical and practical problems, perhaps the greatest being the gap between theory and practice (Chanaa's 'conceptual-contextual divide'). To make SSR efforts more successful, the underlying principles need to be revised and amended. Post-conflict army reconstruction experience since 1980, and associated academic study, military doctrine, and work by international organizations (particularly the OECD) can provide a basis for such revision. This thesis aims to survey post-conflict army reconstruction activities since 1980, draw overall lessons from that review and field study in Liberia, and propose amendments to the SSR principles on that basis.

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Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan

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Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction	8
Chapter 2: The SSR Literature.....	23
Introduction	23
The Evolution of SSR and its linkages to Post-Conflict Army Reconstruction	25
Definition	26
Origins.....	28
Critiques of Security Sector Reform	38
Absence/Severe Weakness of the State	40
Difficulty of transforming neopatrimonial government institutions	45
Local Ownership.....	49
Sectoral versus strategic transformation priorities.....	51
Short-Term Stabilization versus Longer-Term Governance	55
Security Sector Management	58
Summarizing the SSR Critiques	64
Chapter 3: Army Reconstruction Literature Review	68
Existing Army Reconstruction Guidance	68
Broad Policy Guidance	69
Broad Overall Guidance for Defence Sector Reconstruction	70
The DDR Experience	77
Doctrine for Reconstructing Armies.....	80
Conclusions.....	87
Chapter 4: Methodology	92
The State of the Literature	93
Social Science Research Fundamentals	98
Quantitative and Qualitative Research Strategies.....	103
Choosing the appropriate qualitative theoretical perspective	105
Phenomenological Research Methods	108
Research Design.....	115
Qualitative Indicators: Utility and Limitations	120
Identifying Cross-Case Processes and Issues	126
Applying the Field Experience Test	128
Risk Analysis and Limitations	130
Analysis of Data.....	132
Ethical Issues	135
Summary	139
Chapter 5: Lessons derived from Army Reconstruction Experience.....	141
Armies rebuilt by ‘Military merger’	146
Political-Economic Factors in Military Merger Cases.....	148
Capability Enhancement in ‘Military Merger’ cases.....	153
Applicability of SSR principles to the military merger model	166
Armies rebuilt by the ‘ Institutionalization’ method.....	171
Political-Economic Factors in Institutionalization cases	171
Capability Enhancement in Institutionalization Cases	173
Applicability of SSR Principles to Institutionalization Cases	178
Single state forces	180
Political-Economic Factors influencing Single State Forces.....	181
Capability Enhancement in Single State Forces	184
Applicability of SSR principles to single state forces	199

Conclusions	207
Chapter 6: The Liberian Army Reconstruction Process	215
Political-Economic Factors shaping the Current Force	217
Postwar Army Capability Enhancement in Liberia	226
Assessing Force Capability	238
Adherence to SSR Principles	241
People Centred and Locally Owned	241
Democratic Norms, Human Rights Principles, and the Rule of Law	245
Addressing Diverse Security Challenges through integrated policy	247
Greater Civilian Oversight and Involvement	252
Transparency and Accountability	255
Enhancing Institutional and Human Capacity	257
Conclusions	269
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations	273
Summary of Dissertation Research.....	273
Comparing Adherence to SSR Principles	284
Conclusions: Reconsidering the SSR Principles	290
Recommendations.....	299
Annex A: Model Army Reconstruction Framework	301
Preparatory Considerations.....	308
Assessment and Design Phase	312
Army Reconstruction Process.....	314
Conclusions.....	316
Annex B: Key Interviewees	318
Bibliography	319

Chapter 1: Introduction

When the colonial powers withdrew from their former possessions in the 1950s and 1960s, the developing polities they left were almost invariably much weaker than the imperial homelands. Efforts to achieve development were hampered by lack of security provision, among many other factors. The monopoly of violence, the critical attribute of the modern state, was incomplete at best, and, beyond the capital cities, often left in the hands of chiefs and community leaders.¹ Yet because of agreements to respect what was incomplete sovereignty, notably the Organization of African Unity's 1964 Cairo decision to accept existing African colonial boundaries, and the freezing effect that Cold War alignments imposed upon interstate relations, world powers treated the new developing countries as states formally equal to their own.²

In the early 1990s the increasing prominence of internal conflicts with international implications prompted a rise in efforts to halt such wars. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, and Rwanda became perhaps the most widely known examples. To ensure that the peace created by such interventions can make long-lasting development possible, it was and is vital that security be maintained. Physical security is required to allow development work to take place. Africa and Asia continue to be torn by internal conflicts, many eventually attended by the presence of international intervention forces.³ While they are in place, they often effectively act as the country's defence force as well as dampening internal conflicts.⁴ International interventions only usually last for a few years (eg. the UN Mission in Somalia, with the current UN Congo mission being a rare exception).⁵

¹ Louise Andersen, Bjørn Møller, and Finn Stepputat, *Fragile States and Insecure People? : Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 9.

² J.N.C. Hill, "Challenging the Failed State Thesis: IMF and World Bank Intervention and the Algerian Civil War," *Civil Wars* 11, no. 1 (2009): 40-41.

³ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2009*, (SIPRI, Oxford University Press), 2009, 71-72.

⁴ The clearest examples of intervention forces acting as exterior defence forces are in Kosovo against Serbia and in East Timor, with INTERFET poised against Indonesia.

⁵ Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, *The quest for viable peace : international intervention and strategies for conflict transformation* (Washington, D.C. Arlington, Va.: United States Institute of Peace Press ; Association of the United States Army, 2005), 38.

Domestic political factors on the part of troop contributors, as well as UN reluctance to stay, dictate that intervention forces can only stay for a certain time. In any case, matching developed-state ideas on the appropriate reach of a state's security apparatus with the contested reality of the developing world often means that as the intervention force withdraws, its task is almost always deemed incomplete.

Mainstream developed-state ideas however sometimes need their assumptions challenged. Efforts to improve security provision can form part of the larger liberal peace project. The liberal peace has five main components: democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and neo-liberal development.⁶ Richmond argues that there is a weak consensus between the UN, major states and donors, agencies, and NGOs that all international intervention should incorporate key elements of the liberal peace.⁷ The liberal peace idea contains numerous positive elements, but these elements should not be put into practice without being aware of the direction, scope, and implications of the entire concept. Perhaps even more important than this is the acknowledgement that intervention is an external, rather than homegrown, process. Therefore interveners may be more interested in their own aims rather than always being primarily focused on the well-being of the host state.

Mainstream thinking on intervention in internal conflict deems the reestablishment of public order necessary to establish effective control of the means of violence.⁸ Therefore, a transition of security responsibility to indigenous forces is considered necessary. Almost invariably it is deemed necessary to have both armed forces and policing organisations. While police forces, potentially including a gendarmerie or border guard, fulfill the main internal security requirement, armed forces are necessary to defeat external threats or sustained internal armed insurrection.

However, armies in the developing world appear to face a diminishing level of threat from other states' armed forces. An examination of major armed conflicts shows that

⁶ Oliver P. Richmond, 'The problems of peace: understanding the liberal peace,' *Conflict, Security and Development*, 6:3 (October 2006), 292.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars : Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 10.

few since 1990 are caused by one state confronting another. One of the exceptions, Ethiopia-Eritrea, has its origins in previous internal conflict within Ethiopia's previous boundaries. While they retain their previous orientation towards defence of national borders, armed forces in the developing world today seem much more likely to be used within their nation's boundaries. This is partially because the colonial system in Africa forged a state system with the utmost respect for boundaries. States are often weak, and only able to claim sovereignty over distant hinterlands because no other state can challenge their rule.⁹ State armed forces engage each other less because European colonial customary practice, reinforced by post-independence agreements, has meant that few states attempt to challenge another's territorial integrity by force. In many cases, armed forces are used against internal unrest or insurrection. This has external involvement in many cases. Examples include the Taliban, which span Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), whose leadership opposes the current Rwandan government from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (henceforth 'the Congo'), and invasions of exiles, such as in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Whether threats are internal or external, armed state land forces – armies - are almost always required, as navies and air forces cannot effectively hold ground. Only a single post-conflict country, Haiti, elected to dissolve its armed forces completely, mirroring what might be identified as a Caribbean trend, following Costa Rica¹⁰ and Panama. Even in countries without formal armies, armed state land forces can evolve. The militarization of the Costa Rica Civil Guard is a good example.¹¹

The signing of the peace accord effectively initiates the post-conflict period. Ideally armed disturbances will taper off while political and practical space for development activities will grow. Reconstruction of an army is among these activities. However, it is again necessary here to emphasize the assumptions on which peace accords are

⁹ Jeffrey Herbst (2000) quoted in Jonathan Di John, 'Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States,' Crisis States Research Centre/LSE, January 2008, 30.

¹⁰ Donald E. Schulz, Haiti: Will Things Fall Apart?, *Parameters*, Winter 1997-98, pp. 73-91, accessed online at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97winter/schulz.htm>, November 26, 2008. See also Eirin Mobekk, International Involvement in Restructuring and Creating Security Forces: The Case of Haiti, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 12, No.3, Autumn 2001.

¹¹ Julio Montes, 'The Costa Rican Defence Forces,' *Jane's Intelligence Review*, November 1994, 525.

almost always founded. The liberal peace almost always underpins the motives of the external powers who often steer the substance of the peace accords. The varying motivations of the powers involved thus need to be kept in mind.

Partially because armed forces are seen as a symbol of statehood, an indigenous army is almost always recreated. There can be severe time pressure on the process because troop contributing states wish to bring their forces home.¹² In most cases, the interveners and other partners wish to quickly supplant the multinational force with local assistance. Interim expedient organizations such as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps are sometimes created. To take over from these expedient arrangements, and in order to eventually take on defence responsibilities, efforts are usually begun almost immediately to rebuilding an armed state land force. A land force development programme often appears to be formulated without sufficient input from higher-level strategic guidance. The best elements of both international best practice and partner visions for national defence are sometimes not included. Indigenous national defence planning is not always informed by a sophisticated analysis of alternatives derived from consideration of threats and tasks.¹³ East Timor is a good example of this situation, where even the year's delay in formulating an appropriate future for the East Timorese resistance army, Falintil, created severe resentment and the risk of unrest.¹⁴

The armed forces' reconstruction programme must be tailored to the security requirements of the strategic and regional environment faced by the new government. Len LeRoux, a former South African Air Force officer with experience of the South African transformation process, said that, ideally, these forces should be 'adequate, affordable, appropriate, and accountable.'¹⁵ The author's view is that the planning for armies in these contexts should be carefully considered over a long period, if at all possible. Beyond that, armies should concentrate on relatively simple procedures and

¹² Most evident in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also evident in INTERFET in East Timor. The United Kingdom only committed a single company group of Gurkhas for the initial phase; they were withdrawn shortly afterwards. http://www.gov-news.org/gov/uk/news/british_troops_withdraw_from_east_timor/49512.html, accessed 20 May 2010.

¹³ International Crisis Group, Timor Leste: Security Sector Reform (International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 143), January 17, 2008), 11.

¹⁴ Edward Rees, "Under Pressure: Falintil-Fdtl Three Decades of Defence Force Development in East Timor 1975-2004," (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004), 7.

¹⁵ Len le Roux, Challenges for Defence Planners in Africa: Ensuring Appropriate, Adequate, Accountable, and Affordable Armed Forces, African Security Review Vol. 15, No.4, December 2006.

techniques, as well as light rather than heavy forces. Developed-country standard procedures are often overly complex to be inculcated in these contexts, due to inadequate educational systems. The less complex the equipment selected, the more likely it is to be sustainable over the long term.

Immediately after the peace accords are signed, an interim period begins, where neither the new government nor, often, international stabilization forces, are fully in place.¹⁶ The various groups represented in the peace agreement often try to seize as much advantage as possible for themselves, setting off continual political interplay. This can spill over into armed confrontation. Informal security groupings, already present, continue to foster both security and insecurity in complex patterns. Meanwhile there are often pressing humanitarian concerns which take up the attention of key decision-makers. Amid this near-chaotic environment, alongside all the other governmental programmes which have to be formulated, is the new army and wider defence planning. Ideally this assessment and the resulting programme should take account of wider national security needs and be the result of a consultative process between the various stakeholders.¹⁷ It is best if the resulting programme is locally owned and will remain appropriate well into the future.

However, often, this does not take place, because Western models, inculcated through programmes only a few months or years in duration, are worn away. Western patterns may simply not 'take root' sufficiently in a very different context.

Security sector reform is one of the most important concepts that is often utilized to give coherence to such defence redevelopment programmes. The concept arose from the confluence of defence transformation priorities, particularly in Eastern Europe, with long-established development requirements which were being reassessed after

¹⁶ For further discussion of this gap, see Mark Downes and Robert Muggah, 'Buying Time: How Interim Stabilization can enhance Security Sector Reform in Post-war Settings,' Future of Security Sector Reform Conference paper, May 2009, p.5. The OECD recognises an 'inception phase' involving many of the same issues; see OECD Handbook on SSR 2007, 24.

¹⁷ For a discussion of these issues, see Andrew Rathmell, Kevin O'Brien, Olga Oliker, and Susanna Bearne, 'National Security Decision-Making Structures and Security Sector Reform,' RAND Europe, June 2005, accessed at <http://www.ssronline.org/edocs/tr-289-ssdat%20national%20security%20decision-making%20structures%20for%20security%20sector%20reform.pdf>, 24 January 2009.

the end of the Cold War.¹⁸ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), and the European Union (EU) all became gradually involved, in areas ranging from reorganization of defence establishments to demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. NATO and the EU were faced with the challenge of non-democratic control of the security sector in countries that were aspiring to membership. Meanwhile, the development community was seeking ways to reduce funds allocated to security expenditure. Continuing debates over civil-military relations and the proper place of a military in a democracy also increased interest in the proper place of armed forces in domestic politics.

These three streams of thought were combined into what became known as security sector reform, a term first coined by Claire Short, UK Secretary of State for International Development. She introduced the term in a speech on May 13, 1998, to draw public attention to the need to comprehensively reform the security sector.¹⁹ Efforts soon began to synthesize the concept and make it practically useful, work which has continued to the present day.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has played a significant part in systematizing the SSR concept and establishing guidelines for its use, often through its Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In 2004 the DAC promulgated SSR principles, which were reissued, with some changes, in the OECD DAC Handbook on SSR in 2007. These principles aimed to ensure that SSR was carried out in a consistent fashion that appropriately reflected international norms and was accepted by the OECD DAC members and other interested parties.

They say that ‘...SSR should be:²⁰

- People-centred, locally owned and based on democratic norms and human rights principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear and measurable reductions in armed violence and crime.

¹⁸ Jane Chanaa, Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges, and Prospects, Adelphi Paper 344, International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2002, 7-15.

¹⁹ Peacebuilding Initiative, Security Sector Reform and Governance: Definitions and Conceptual Issues, accessed at http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=1793#_ftn15.

²⁰ OECD Handbook on SSR, 2007, p.21-22

- Seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse security challenges facing states and their populations, through more integrated development and security policies and through greater civilian involvement and oversight
- Founded on activities with multi-sectoral strategies, based on a broad assessment of the range of security and justice needs of the people and the state.
- Developed adhering to basic governance principles such as transparency and accountability
- Implemented through clear processes and policies that aim to enhance the institutional and human capacity needed for security policy to function effectively and for justice to be delivered equitably.’

Each of these principles covers a number of distinct components. This complexity makes it difficult to assess the success of each clearly. Some are also peripheral to army reconstruction, as opposed to wider security sector reform. Therefore, to produce a clear list of assessable principles, they have been reordered as follows.

SSR should be:

- People-centred and locally owned
- Based on democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law
- A framework to address diverse security challenges, through a broad needs assessment and integrated multi-sectoral policies
- A practice promoting greater civilian oversight and involvement
- Transparent and accountable
- A practice that enhances institutional and human capacity.

This more simplified formulation aims to preserve the meaning of the OECD principles while rendering them into assessable form.

Since 1998, SSR, and the implementation of the OECD DAC SSR principles, has been hampered by what Chanaa called the 'conceptual-contextual divide.'²¹ This term represents the enormous gap between the ideals of security sectors in the North, well-

²¹ Chanaa, 2002, 61.

funded by centuries of investment supported by rich economies, and the reality of security sectors in the South. In addition to a difference in resource levels of many orders of magnitude, there are enormous cultural differences, and the aims of senior national leaders may simply be different from those in the North. An effective and accountable security sector may not be such of a high priority.

Reflecting these challenges, attempts to reconstruct post-peace accord armies have been beset by a number of difficulties. These have included repeated missteps in the preparatory stage, a tendency to adopt Western procedures beyond their useful limits, inadequate consideration of overall national security issues, and difficult disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes, which often face severe problems in the reintegration phase. Inadequate coordination with other security redevelopment programmes has also been a problem. These weaknesses both show and reflect the deficiencies of the current security sector reform principles. Post conflict army reconstruction can serve as a useful mirror to examine the level to which the OCED DAC principles cater for the current environment, and what changes might be usefully made to them. Improvements in the principles would then serve to improve the way SSR programmes both for armies and more generally are delivered.

Research Question and Objectives

Western and Soviet bloc armies gained extensive experience of army redevelopment during the Cold War. These activities were aimed at creating partner armies in strategic part of the world. The underlying function was to strengthen each political bloc's strength, with lesser regard for the status of any particular country. This situation made it more acceptable to apply Western (and also Eastern) models, strategies, and doctrines in a literal and derivative fashion.²² In the West, the United States Army Special Forces followed their Foreign Internal Defense doctrine while assisting many states, while the British and French armies tended also to try to replicate themselves but not while following such a formalized doctrine. In the East the Soviet Army replicated itself in nearly identical fashion across Eastern Europe and sometimes beyond.

²² Dr Rocky Williams, 'African Armed Forces and the Challenges of Security Sector Reform,' JoSSM, March 2005, 6.

As this pattern indicates, military advising and assistance has since its modern origins in the early 1800s been overwhelmingly a bilateral process.²³ The advice given to the first of the recent army reconstruction efforts, in Zimbabwe from 1980, followed this pattern, as did the activities in Namibia from 1990, and South Africa from 1994. From 1994 to 2010, however, methods began to diversify. In addition to new operations which retained the traditional bilateral framework, such as British assistance to Sierra Leone since 1999 and the United States' Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorist Initiative (TSCTI) engagements across West and North Africa, multilateral, coalition framework, United Nations, and private contractor approaches have been applied, depending on the particular circumstances of the country concerned. However, despite the overtly different nature of each intervention, Anglo-American countries' armies seem to have dominated the process repeatedly.

The post-Cold War era, where the development and prosperity of individual states, as opposed to worldspanning power blocs, is the objective, means that much more attention has been paid to local views and concerns, spawning the 'local ownership' debate within Security Sector Reform. SSR principles were developed by the OECD DAC to guide the overall process of SSR as the concept gradually coalesced. Yet the experience of post-conflict army reconstruction appears to indicate that these principles might benefit from amendment.

Each country's situation and experience is different, requiring, to achieve the best results, a unique, tailored set of solutions. Ideally, local actors would design, develop, and then implement the entire programme. Yet roughly the same group of international interveners – the United States and British Armies, and former personnel of those armies, sometimes with their close allies the Canadian and Australian Armies, as well as a variety of U.S. private military contractors – travel to different countries repeatedly, carrying out the same type of army reconstruction mission.²⁴

²³ Donald Stoker (ed.), 'Military Advising and Assistance: From mercenaries to privatization, 1815-2007,' Routledge, London and New York, 2008, 1.

²⁴ The U.S. and British Armies have been involved in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, and Southern Sudan. The Canadian Army has been involved in Sierra Leone. The Australian Army has been involved in East Timor. Contractors have been involved in Iraq and Liberia.

This 'one-size-fits-all' approach risks mis-application of ideas appropriate to one theatre to another, dissimilar environment.²⁵

Army reconstruction activities have taken place at least eight times since 1993, in Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, the Congo, and Kosovo. Very similar cases took place during the Cold War, from 1980 in Zimbabwe, and from 2005 in Southern Sudan. Closely related army reconstruction activities have occurred in Namibia from 1989-90, and in South Africa, from 1994.

As discussed above, these programmes have faced multiple challenges adapting to the new post Cold War environment in which much more attention must be paid to local sensitivities. Yet army reconstruction programmes, however well attuned, have been ongoing for over ten years in the post-Cold War environment. Several donor-inspired and more fully locally-owned army reconstruction exercises are underway around the world currently, some named above, but others elsewhere such as in Uganda and Nigeria. Some, such as in the Congo and Afghanistan, are in the process of expansion. This lengthy series of engagements offers a rich experience base which can be drawn upon to provide course corrections for the OECD's current SSR principles.

Thus the research question is:

“Are the OECD DAC SSR principles relevant and practical for post-conflict army reconstruction?”

The core argument of this thesis is that the current OECD DAC's SSR principles lack relevance, and need to be significantly modified in order to make them practical for future post-conflict army reconstruction programmes.

The research objectives are:

²⁵ Ball and Hendrickson note that insufficiently considered assumptions increase the likelihood of such 'one size fits all' models being implemented. Ball and Hendrickson, 2005, 26. In UNMIL, the 'gendarmerie' idea developed originally in UNMIBH was advocated for Liberia. Telephone interview with former senior UNMIL official with responsibility for security, Monday 29 June 2009.

1. To survey existing practice and guidelines which are relevant to understanding the reconstruction of land forces (examined in Chapters 2 and 3). This research identifies three key concepts which play a major role in post-conflict army reconstruction.
2. To examine a wide range of army reconstruction interventions to analyze the effect of three identified key concepts: political-economic factors, capability enhancement, and SSR principles (examined in Chapters 5) The SSR principles alone do not guide post-conflict army reconstruction, and to improve the SSR principles elements of these two other factors should be included.
3. To empirically test these three key concepts in a single case study, Liberia (examined in Chapter 6)
4. To assess the viability of currently available overall strategic guidance against both the wide range of army reconstruction issues covered and the single field case study (examined in Chapter 7)
5. To identify other broad areas of knowledge that might be examined in future research (covered in Chapter 7)

Scope

As indicated in the first pages of this chapter, this thesis focuses on building effective and accountable armies after internal conflict. While all security forces have political importance, the principal challenges to accountable security forces in the developing world lie with armies. The history of civil-military relations and coups since 1960 shows this. Simply put, air forces and navies usually pose much less of a danger to the political status quo of any given state. Much of the research this thesis will generate regarding armies will also be applicable to the reconstruction of naval and air forces. In addition, as indicated by the military focus of the introduction, this thesis examines only part of the international intervention issue, that dealing with military issues. The civilian aspects of intervention are an important issue, but do not form part of the research problem this thesis seeks to address. This thesis also only examines a specific time period. The particular characteristics of post-conflict army reconstruction after an agreed peace accord only appear since 1980, with the reconstruction of the Zimbabwean National Army. Thus this thesis examines post-conflict army reconstruction from 1980 until 2010, with updates in some areas to 2011.

Organization of the Dissertation

Chapter 1, this introduction, outlines the background to the recent phase of army reconstruction since 1989. It reviews the trends that have affected armies in weak states since the end of the colonial period, their need to respond to predominantly internal threats, the fact that armed forces are usually retained in being, and the challenges of defining and implementing security sector reform. Thereafter the research question and objectives are discussed, to discern patterns and derive some generic guidance.

Chapters 2 and 3 review the relevant bodies of knowledge and analyses the SSR literature. This chapter surveys and analyses the existing SSR literature which is relevant to the topic, including the evolution of SSR and its critiques, and the guidance available for post-conflict army reconstruction.

Chapter 4 outlines the method used in the study. It elaborates on the methods used to carry out the research, the fieldwork's execution and challenges, and analysis methods.

A literature review was initiated in August 2008, to survey the existing writing on security sector reform. This review aimed to determine whether guidance on how to reconstruct post-conflict armies already existed. A series of research questions were then formulated, and examined, in a multiple case chapter, across a number of different cases to hone the concepts to be investigated.

The field case study selected was Liberia. Liberia is the only country where, as of 2010, private contractors have been given primary responsibility to execute the entirety of an army reconstruction programme. A range of methods are available to use in case studies, but given the complex nature and large number of variables present in the post-conflict environment that Liberia presents, it was deemed that a qualitative content analysis of data gathered was the most appropriate method.

The primary methods used to gather the data during the fieldwork were interviews and the acquisition of relevant documents. The primary alternate methods considered and rejected were questionnaires and surveys, because the information required was held by key officials only. Analysis took the form of critically examining the content

of the interviews and documents, and then building patterns from the evidence which then were matched against the initial theoretical proposition.

Chapter 5, the case study chapter, explores what is known about the main points of inquiry in regard to other army reconstruction operations. Three main factors which affect all the cases are examined. First, the political and economic drivers that influenced the reconstruction of each army are analyzed. Second is the historical priority in army reconstruction, enhancement of institutional and human capacity. This includes the level to which programmes have been able to create a force suitable for the long-term, which might resonate with the requirements of a fully considered national security strategy, while also addressing immediate post-conflict needs. Third, the applicability of security sector reform principles is examined. The chapter examines fifteen cases. The cases are Zimbabwe from 1980, Namibia from 1990, Mozambique from 1993, South Africa from 1993, Timor from 1999, Kosovo from 1999, Sierra Leone from 2001, Afghanistan from 2002, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Iraq, and Bosnia-Herzegovina from 2003, Liberia from 2004, South Sudan from 2005, and Nepal from 2006. It should be clearly noted that the term 'security sector reform' was not applied to the first four cases in Southern Africa; the concept had yet to be formulated.

While of some interest, two other cases are excluded. Neither the integration of the National Volksearmee in Germany from 1990 onwards is examined, as it is a developed world case, nor the creation of the South Korean Constabulary from 1945-50, as it is not post-Cold War, and over fifty years ago. The Cold War context of army reconstruction in South Korea, directed at external defence rather than post-conflict stability, is too distant from today's realities to draw useful lessons. The work therefore focuses on the creation of armies whose immediate priority is attaining operational capability to relieve an international intervention force. Tasks may include exterior defence, actions against internal rebellion, or humanitarian assistance and development work, but as explained above, tends to concentrate upon internal operations. The emphasis is upon developing lessons from experience since 1990 to apply to efforts underway, under consideration, or foreseeable in 2010.

Chapter 6 is the field case study on the reconstruction of the land component of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The case study focuses on the early decision-making involving the recreation of the AFL, and the contractor-implemented phase from 2004 to December 2009. Its purview stops after the transition in American support from the contractors to U.S. Department of Defense primacy in January 2010. This chapter analyses closely the relevant political-economic drivers, factors influencing capacity achieved, and the validity of the SSR principles, in the Liberia field case environment.

Chapter 7 addresses the research question, summarizing the results of the research, that the SSR principles as currently utilized are not sufficiently relevant and practical for post-conflict army reconstruction. It also identifies and elaborates on areas where rewording of the SSR principles might improve their realistic application to post-conflict situations. This chapter also notes potential areas for further research, including additional areas of knowledge that might shed light on the issue.

Definitions

In order to more precisely examine the topics in question, the key terms involved will be defined so that they are well understood when used throughout this dissertation.

International intervention force refers to an international military force that has been given legal responsibility to establish or maintain security within a country, and has been successful in so doing. Almost invariably this is by a resolution of the United Nations Security Council. Excluded from this thesis are those international intervention forces only given responsibility for a portion of a state's territory, with the rest of the territory excluded. Examples include the Interim Emergency Multinational Force or Operation 'Artemis' in the Congo and the Multi-National Force in Lebanon in the early 1980s. Also excluded are forces that did not achieve domination of the security space within a country. This prerequisite is required to allow security redevelopment efforts to effectively take place. Therefore, the United Nations Mission in Rwanda is excluded, and so thus is the reintegration of former enemy combatants into the Rwanda Patriotic Army.

There are three cases that do not fulfill these requirements exactly, but have been included nonetheless. This is because they share the key characteristics of army reconstruction in a post conflict environment. In Zimbabwe, no international intervention force was deployed. However, an entirely new army had to be created

from three previous forces. In addition, a Commonwealth Monitoring Force had been deployed to support the initial assembly of the guerillas. In South Africa, no international intervention force was deployed. However, again, formerly warring parties had to be combined into a new army. In South Sudan, the international force was only given responsibility for part of the state's territory. However South Sudan was a well-defined area that had been the subject of UN Security Council resolutions aiming to resolve the threat to international peace and security being generated there. *Army redevelopment* refers to the process of conducting extensive restructuring, retraining, and/or reequipping an armed state land force, often to undertake a new set of tasks from its previous mission. An example would be the redevelopment of the South African Army in the mid 1990s.

Army reconstruction is the process of establishing an armed state land force which has previously effectively been dissolved, or so decayed that it has effectively lost the characteristics which make it identifiable as a state institution. An example would be the reformation of the Falintil-FDTL as a state army from 2000-1 from its previous existence as a guerilla resistance movement. It takes place in permissive environments, where often a peacekeeping force has been deployed, such as in Mozambique, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Timor, Kosovo, Southern Sudan, and Zimbabwe, 1980 onward, Namibia, 1989 onward, and in South Africa from 1994. It also takes place in non permissive environments, where the focus is on establishing security (periods in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Congo.)

Post conflict refers to a period after an interstate war or internal armed conflict has been the subject of a peace accord between warring parties. A peace accord is almost always signed, and it is usually hoped that the most major outbreaks of violence will thereafter be restricted to civil unrest. It should be held in mind however that armed conflicts do often continue after accords have been signed, such as in the Congo after 2003, the Sudan after 2005, and Afghanistan and Iraq,

This thesis will explicitly use the term 'army reconstruction' as a term to indicate both army reconstruction and army redevelopment when referring to the general phenomenon. This is for brevity reasons. The single term will be used for both facets unless either specifically needs to be examined. The reason for the use of 'army reconstruction' is that of the fourteen cases identified, all involve the creation of a new institution, except in South Africa. Even in South Africa, while the army was not

renamed, the overall defence force was, from the South African Defence Force to the South African National Defence Force.

Significance of the Study

Possession of the monopoly of violence is a key attribute of a modern state. In order to assure effective reconstruction as well as development of stricken states, an armed state land force must be reconstructed. As detailed above, though many such programmes have been carried out since 1980, they have encountered a variety of significant challenges. Since 1998 the concept of security sector reform, and later defined SSR principles, have been developed, which has subsumed some army reconstruction activity under its auspices. Yet the SSR principles suffer from the same weaknesses as SSR itself, the gap between policy and practice, or the 'conceptual-contextual divide.' The SSR principles in their current form are not sufficiently practical and relevant. If SSR is to become more effective in the future, a more realistic and focused set of principles would be of value. Thus this study's original contribution to the body of knowledge is the scrutiny of the experience of the past twenty years of army reconstruction in post-conflict environments so as to recommend amendments to the current OECD DAD SSR principles.

Three other points should be noted. Firstly, since an investigation of the Egyptian Army of the 1830s, no doctoral work appears to have been undertaken which examines the initial creation of a land force. Secondly, no doctoral work appears to have been carried out on the Liberian armed forces since Harrison Akingbade's 1977 thesis, *The Role of the Military in the History of Liberia 1822-1947*. Thirdly, no academic investigation appears to have been conducted upon the creation of land forces in the post-conflict environments common to multinational interventions since 1990.

Chapter 2: The SSR Literature

Introduction

Examining the experience of reconstructing post-conflict armies necessitates a critical examination of the relevant literature. This chapter will review the relevant security sector reform (SSR) literature, showing that directly applicable guidance is new and limited to military doctrinal manuals produced since 2007. Part of the reason for this lack of widely accepted frameworks is that the current wave of land force recreation dates only from 1990 with the integration of rival factions in Namibia. Much of the directly relevant discussion specifically on armies is confined to the practitioner literature.

However the decision mechanics of creating, designing, and then implementing army reconstruction programmes have significant commonalities with development and more general SSR programmes. Post-conflict army reconstruction has a great deal to learn from the wider SSR literature. The SSR debate itself draws upon politics, development studies, history, management studies, and anthropology. From the 1990s, academics have arguably developed a significant amount of theory and casework relevant to post-conflict armies. Recently prescriptive doctrine has been developed by both the United States and British Armies for the construction of security forces.²⁶ However, it has been shown in Iraq that a purely military ‘force generation’ approach can leave a yawning gap between trained soldiers (or policemen) on the street and the relevant Ministers, without the bureaucratic infrastructure in between to make the whole institution effective.²⁷ The situation in Iraq mirrors experiences elsewhere, such as in Afghanistan. Thus it is evident that non-military perspectives may have a significant contribution to make in terms of producing ‘appropriate, adequate, accountable, and affordable’²⁸ security forces.

²⁶ British Army, ‘Developing Indigenous Armies,’ Doctrine Note 07-16, 2007, and United States Army FM 3.07-1, 2009, ‘Security Force Assistance.’

²⁷ Andrew Rathmell, ‘Fixing Iraq’s Security Services: Why is Reform of the Ministry of Interior so Hard?’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2007, 5, cited in Martin and Wilson, Future of SSR E-Conference Paper, 2009.

²⁸ Len le Roux, Challenges for Defence Planners in Africa: Ensuring Appropriate, Adequate, Accountable, and Affordable Armed Forces, *African Security Review*, Vol. 15, No.4, December 2006.

The literature review focuses solely on the multi-disciplinary contributions to the wider subject of security sector reform. An investigation of post-conflict army reconstruction could be academically situated in several different domains, but there are good reasons for focusing this thesis solely on SSR. Two domains dominate writing on post-conflict army reconstruction: SSR and counter-insurgency. One could investigate the issue by reviewing the counter-insurgency literature, but counter-insurgency at its heart is concerned with ways to win wars. SSR is focused on constructing or reconstructing the state, and incorporates the development literature in a much more intrinsic fashion. SSR has a longer-term time horizon; wars will end, and the military's attention focus elsewhere, but states and their problems will remain. Their challenges will need continuing thought. Other domains, such as civil-military relations, and defence conversion, have been examined but do not dominate the literature. The state-building literature lacks enough emphasis on the role of security forces. Finally, military history will not be discussed as a separate issue because this thesis focuses on contemporary rather than primarily historical challenges.

The literature review is broken into two major sections. This chapter examines security sector reform, starting with its definition. It then discusses the evolution of SSR and its linkages to the post-conflict redevelopment of armies. Here the non-military perspectives that have relevance to army reconstruction are introduced. There are at least six significant issues that face SSR institution building currently. Some of these issues bear upon army reconstruction more closely than others. The six include:

- *the absence of, or severe weaknesses in, the state;
- *the difficulty of operationalizing the local ownership concept;
- *the difficulty of legal-bureaucratic institution building in neo-patrimonial societies;
- *the balance between building effectiveness and governance within security forces,
- *the value of wide consideration of, and formulation, of national security strategies;

and the potential value of the new sub-discipline of security sector management.

The second section of the literature review, presented in Chapter 3, discusses what existing conceptual guidance, both from wider SSR experience and purely military learning, have now been formulated which can guide army reconstruction in a post-conflict context. These fall into three main categories: defence reform guidance, the experience of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-

combatants, and recent national military doctrine as developed from 2007. The gaps thus identified in the literature build to the conclusions, which chart the path this thesis will take.

The Evolution of SSR and its linkages to Post-Conflict Army Reconstruction

To explore issues of army redevelopment and reconstruction, it is important first to look at the overall framework of security sector reform as presently conceived. Army reconstruction will succeed or fail not just because of its own merits, but because of the influences of wider state and security building efforts. Such examination makes a more informed analysis of the army reconstruction process possible. The concept of SSR evolved in the 1990s from the convergence of developmental, defence reform and peacekeeping efforts. Theories of civil-military relations also played a role. Significant influences upon SSR's development as a concept included the role of the United Nations and the 'War on terror' since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. More recently, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has played a significant role in consolidating SSR thinking and practice through the compilation of the OECD Handbook on SSR.

Definition

Defining security sector reform has been a subject of constant debate.²⁹ Various analysts have explored the definition of the term and in the process deconstructed the term 'security,' 'security sector,' and the normative use of the term 'reform,' as well as the alternate term 'security system reform,' promoted by the OECD.³⁰ Alternative terms used have included security and justice sector reform, rule of law, security sector transformation and security sector governance. Here however the term security sector reform will be used as it is most widely utilized. At least four separate

²⁹ Personal conversation with Jane Chanaa at IISS, April 2001.

³⁰ Timothy Edwards, 'Defining Security Sector Reform,' TCMR 1.11, monograph held at the Joint Services Command and Staff College Library, April 2001, Jane Chanaa, Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges, and Prospects, IISS Adelphi Paper 344, June 2002, Wilhelm N. Germann & Timothy Edwards, 'Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe,' Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2003

expanding definitions of what the security sector (or, *pace* the OECD, security system) meant were laid out by Hanggi in 2004.³¹ All included the security forces and their civilian management and oversight bodies. Widening the ambit, however, the broader definitions brought in judicial and law enforcement bodies, and successively non-statutory security forces – a debate with particular resonance in Africa³² – and non-statutory civil society groups.

Some of the most widely accepted early definitions of security sector reform, such as those promulgated by the UK Department for International Development (DfID),³³ included both management and oversight bodies as well as the state military security providers themselves. While there has often been debate over what exactly the definition should include, the basic dual partnership of security forces and their oversight institutions has been relatively generally accepted,³⁴ though some analysts argued otherwise up until about 2008.³⁵ Thus for working purposes the 2007 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Handbook definition will be used:

*‘Security system reform’ is another term used to describe the transformation of the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and this contributes to a well-functioning security framework.’*³⁶

The OECD prefers the term ‘system’ rather than sector so as to refer to the whole system of actors working on security related issues. However, the 2007 Handbook

³¹ Heiner Hänggi, ‘Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction’ in Alan Bryden, Heiner Hanggi, ‘Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector,’ DCAF/Lit Verlag, 2004, 3.

³² Jeffrey Isima, ‘Regulating the Private Security Sector: An Imperative for Security Sector Governance in Africa,’ *Journal of Security Sector Management*, May 2007.

³³ DfID, ‘Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform,’ accessed 26 November 2009 at <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/supportingsecurity.pdf>, 7.

³⁴ Heiner Hänggi, ‘Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction’ in Alan Bryden, Heiner Hanggi, ‘Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector,’ DCAF/Lit Verlag, 2004, 5.

³⁵ David Law, DCAF, interview at the Swedish Defence College, 12 June 2008, cited in Robert Egnell and Peter Haldén (2009) ‘Laudable, ahistorical and overambitious: security sector reform meets state formation theory.’ *Conflict, Security & Development*. Vol. 9, No. 1, 31.

³⁶ *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (2001), Box 5. Security-related definitions, 38, quoted in DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, Security Sector Reform and Governance, OECD-DAC, 2005, 19, 27. While older, this is the definition referred to in the 2007 OECD DAC Handbook.

appears to be the de facto standard for the subject, whether the term system or sector is used.

There are two important elements in the OECD definition. The first is democratic governance, which implies proper management and oversight. The second is a ‘well functioning security framework,’ which implies effectiveness. The OECD definition means that land forces need to have both proper management and oversight, and be effective in carrying out combat and stabilization functions. Superimposed over the land force, carrying out a supervisory role, must be a body or series of bodies which are able to provide ‘effective governance, oversight, and accountability’³⁷ for all security organisations.

A security sector might be capable of iterative, gradual, evolution to improve effectiveness, but still not reflect SSR norms. Democratic oversight is one of the critical differences between such a sector, relatively immune to checks and balances, and the democratically accountable and responsive sector that is the aim of reform. The OECD Handbook states that: ‘*democratic accountability of the security and justice sectors is based on the principle of transparency, responsibility, participation, and responsiveness to citizens.*’³⁸ The handbook recognises six independent ‘pillars’ of oversight and control, being internal, executive, legislative, judicial, independent bodies such as Ombudsmen, and civil society. Each portion plays a unique function and adds a check upon the others. With internal controls often weak in post-conflict situations, international assistance has often achieved some strengthening of parliament and civil society oversight. However they often remain very weak in comparison to the executive, with, as Nathan points out,³⁹ inadequate technical knowledge to hold ministries of defence, for example, to account.

Origins

The SSR field itself originated from the confluence of developmental and intergovernmental (UN, EU, NATO) efforts to better consolidate peace in conflict-

³⁷ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, OECD, 2007, 21.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 112

³⁹ Laurie Nathan, *No Ownership, No Commitment*, University of Birmingham, 2007, 98.

stricken areas since the end of the Cold War.⁴⁰ The great powers' military approach to security in the developing world also changed. There was no longer a requirement to reinforce sometimes weak regional surrogate states against states aligned with the other bloc. Instead there was the opportunity for a much more collaborative approach. The end of the Cold War allowed much more attention to be refocused on security not just in a strictly military sense, but as a part of the development conundrum.⁴¹

The United Nations became slowly enmeshed in security reform issues as a result of the wider state-building mandates given to missions in the early 1990s.⁴² UNTAC in Cambodia, as well as experiences in Eastern Slavonia with UNTAES and in a slightly more limited fashion in Mozambique with ONUMOZ, aimed at implementing a comprehensive peace settlement that would address all the elements necessary to achieve a sustainable peace. Among the challenges these missions faced were disarming and demobilising former soldiers in preparation for their return to civilian life. Demobilisation efforts as part of these comprehensive peace settlements began to raise the need for more comprehensive, holistic, security sector thinking as it was found that there was no necessary correlation between reductions in force and budget levels and the success of economic developing in a post-conflict country.⁴³

Reform of EU and NATO candidate states' defence and security sectors became a key condition of eventual membership and helped to cement the SSR agenda in Europe.⁴⁴ One of the elements of the 'European model' that candidate countries were required to adopt was the democratic control of the security sector. This was made easier to an extent by the fundamental restructuring of most countries' defence establishments set off by the end of the Cold War. NATO emphasised that membership in and cooperation with the organisation would be contingent on the adoption of 'shared values.'⁴⁵ NATO candidates were required to meet certain requirements. NATO had considerable leverage to force at least some level of defence sector reform before candidate accession. Yet the entry of many former Communist countries in two

⁴⁰ Chanaa, op. cit., 7-15.

⁴¹ In thinking out exactly how the end of the Cold War created the space for the concept of SSR to evolve, I have drawn upon thoughts of Nicole Ball, The Evolution of the SSR Agenda, Day 1 Conference Paper at the Future of SSR E-Conference, May 2009.

⁴² Chanaa, op. cit., June 2002, 16-17.

⁴³ Ibid., 16-17.

⁴⁴ Chanaa, ibid., 19-21.

⁴⁵ Chanaa, ibid., 20 drawing upon 'meeting on security issues in southeastern Europe, June 2001.'

enlargement rounds resulted in questions over NATO's ability to induce further SSR after accession.⁴⁶

From the development aid community, it became apparent during the Cold War period that social tensions caused when economic growth was fostered could hinder donors' development efforts. Questions began to be asked about how best to reduce military expenditures.⁴⁷ Thus development institutions such as the World Bank and OECD became increasingly interested during the 1990s in ways in which development could be refocused to address root causes of conflict. Development ministries such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department for International Development began to support reform of the security sector as a key underpinning of socio-economic development. The concept was championed by DfID following the election of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom in 1997.⁴⁸ Claire Short, UK Secretary of State for International Development, first coined the term in a speech on May 13, 1998, to draw public attention to the need to comprehensively reform the security sector.⁴⁹

SSR's origins also drew inspiration from the civil-military relations debates most notably initiated by Samuel Huntington.⁵⁰ Since the early 1960s much of the discussion on civil-military relations focused on how military intervention and the assertion of control over civilian governments could be prevented. This work, which has become known as the 'first generation' problem, led after the end of the Cold War to the 'second generation' discussion, attempts to establish and effectively operate efficient structures for democratic governance of the security sector at a sustainable

⁴⁶ Heiner Hänggi, 'Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction' in Alan Bryden, Heiner Hanggi, *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, DCAF/Lit Verlag, 2004, 7.

⁴⁷ Rocky Williams, African Armed Forces and the Challenges of Security Sector Reform, *Journal of Security Sector Management*, March 2005, 1.

⁴⁸ Nicole Ball, The Evolution of the SSR Agenda, Day 1 Conference Paper at the Future of SSR E-Conference, May 2009, 4.

⁴⁹ Peacebuilding Initiative, Security Sector Reform and Governance: Definitions and Conceptual Issues, accessed at http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=1793#_ftn15. The speech was Short's 'Security, development and conflict prevention', speech to the Royal College of Defence Studies on 13 May 1998. The speech itself does not appear to be accessible on the Internet.

⁵⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1957. Also very influential were Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, New York, Free, 1960, 1971, and Finer's *The Man on Horseback*. Appendix A: Theoretical Perspectives, in Yehuda Ben Meir, *Civil-Military Relations in Israel*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995.

cost to the country concerned.⁵¹ Recent 2009 research shows that it is not easy to find empirical evidence that the central problem of civil-military relations as conceived by Huntington and his contemporaries, a military often institutionally hungry for power, has ever existed.⁵² As Ball and Hendrickson describe however, the role of the military in politics was an important part of the debate that eventually gave rise to SSR.⁵³

Chanaa summarized SSR as consisting of political – setting the context, institutional – describing the ideal security sector, and economic and social dimensions – outlining the necessary support mechanisms for long-lasting reform.⁵⁴ Since Chanaa’s overarching thesis which sought to define the discipline’s extent at relatively early stage, some years have passed, and some notable lessons identified. Rathmell and Sedra drew different conclusions on the state of the field in 2009. Rathmell recently re-made the crucial point that ‘any elite will only envision reform of its core state functions, notably security and justice, in exceptional circumstances,’ so ‘holistic, sustainable and thorough-going reform will be the very rare exception,’ linked to circumstances such as reforms in Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War or situations of state collapse or reformation.⁵⁵ Sedra has argued recently that the problem with SSR as has been conceived in the past ten years or so is its ‘inadaptability and one-size-fits-all approach,’ necessitating differentiated models for improved implementation in the future.⁵⁶ Sedra argues that different models might be applied, say for post-authoritarian states as opposed to states which are being reconstructed after conflict. As described below, SSR has also arguably faced a number of severe difficulties in its application to developing state contexts which give ample basis for the kind of reassessment of the discipline now under way.

⁵¹ Andrew Cottey, Tim Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, ‘The second generation problematique: rethinking democracy and civil-military relations,’ *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 29, No.1, 2002, in Wilhelm Germann and Timothy Edwards (eds), *Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2003, 15-22, as well as Ishima thesis, Chapter 3.

⁵² David Chuter, ‘Civil-Military Relations: Is there really a problem?’ *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2009, 15.

⁵³ Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, *Trends in Security Sector Reform*, IDRC, 2005, 4.

⁵⁴ Jane Chanaa, *Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges, and Prospects*, Adelphi Papers (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), 28-30.

⁵⁵ Andrew Rathmell, ‘Security and Justice Development: What Next?’ *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol. 7, No. 2, November 2009, 2.

⁵⁶ Mark Sedra, *Narrowing the Policy-Practice Divide*, Future of SSR E-conference paper, May 2009, 1.

Chanaa was framing her analysis of SSR during her stay at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2000-2001.⁵⁷ Yet before the Adelphi Paper incorporating her work was published, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States had great effects upon international relations and defence issues worldwide. The resulting US ‘war on terror’ threatened distortion of the SSR agenda. Ball said in 2006 that there was currently ‘huge pressure to make security the key foreign policy objective of donor countries.. subordinating trade and development policy.’⁵⁸ Especially in Africa, ‘war on terror’ concerns have been fostered upon developing countries where in actual fact they are more concerned with their huge poverty reduction challenges. Despite ostensible attention being paid to the governance aspects of SSR, what appears to have eventuated is a continued focus on elevating operational effectiveness. Ball quotes a UK official who strongly supports a governance orientation, but said in mid 2005 of SSR in general that ‘it is virtually all train-and-equip.’⁵⁹ This situation has not appreciably changed since that time.⁶⁰

The concept then began to move through a series of evolutions, including significant input by the OECD DAC. In 2004, the members of the DAC promulgated their policy on security sector reform and its governance. The policy defined SSR as “the transformation of the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance.”⁶¹ The DAC saw the agenda in 2004 as SSR in four-fold terms of developing a clear institutional framework, establishing viable oversight mechanisms, professionalizing security forces and making them capable, and ensuring the sustainability of justice and security sector reform. These four principles played a major role in the way in which SSR was delivered on the ground, though, as described below, sustainability of reform has always been a concern. In many circumstances,

⁵⁷ Chanaa, 2002, frontpiece.

⁵⁸ Ball and Hendrickson, IDRC, 2005, 19.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 22.

⁶⁰ Nicole Ball, The Evolution of the SSR Agenda, Day 1 Conference Paper at the Future of SSR E-Conference, May 2009, 5-6.

⁶¹ OECD Development Assistance Committee, *Security Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and Best Practice*, 20, cited in Nicole Ball, The Evolution of the SSR Agenda, Day 1 Conference Paper at the Future of SSR E-Conference, May 2009, 5.

without ongoing supplementary external manpower, it is difficult to sustain either training standards or accountability improvements.

The DAC later played a significant role again in the evolution of SSR thinking by producing the OECD Handbook on SSR in 2007. The OECD Handbook lays out core SSR principles, first promulgated in an earlier publication in 2004. It then sets out guidance for fostering an appropriate political environment, assessment practices, guidance for strengthening public institutions, and specific guidance on reforms for each part of the security sector. Managing, monitoring, review, and evaluation of SSR programmes is also covered. The Handbook has been widely accepted as providing authoritative guidance for the discipline, drawing on much field experience and academic thinking.

As the DAC's SSR principles have become influential, it is worth elaborating on them. The principles include the need for SSR to be people-centred, locally owned, and based on democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law.⁶² SSR should be seen as a framework to structure thinking on how to address diverse security challenges. These diverse challenges should be addressed through more integrated development and security policy and through greater civilian involvement and oversight. The DAC also states that SSR should be founded on activities with multi-sectoral strategies, based on a broad assessment of the range of applicable security and justice needs. SSR should be developed adhering to transparency and accountability principles. Finally SSR should be implemented through clear processes which aim to enhance the institutional and human capacity needed for security policy to function effectively. The SSR principles have endured since 2004 and have had significant impact. Since 1998 the core challenge for SSR has been implementing Northern derived ideas in non-Northern environments, a difficulty encountered for decades by the development community.

The United Nations has historically had a strong SSR role, whether explicitly recognized or not. The UN has been involved in DDR, justice reform, and attempts to create a more coherent approach to SSR. DDR is one area of SSR where the UN

⁶² Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, OECD, 2007, 21-22.

played an early and central role. DDR gained much prominence, especially in the international development field, through its use in early post Cold War UN peacekeeping missions in such countries as Namibia,⁶³ Cambodia, and Mozambique.⁶⁴ Since this earlier period, DDR programmes in countries such as Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Iraq (less successfully)⁶⁵ have come to form a major element of the present SSR effort. However historically it has been much easier to disarm and demobilize combatants than to effectively reintegrate them into society, and this has led to continuing problems.⁶⁶ The DDR process retains significant importance in paving the way for the formation of new armies, as it has done in Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and elsewhere. At the same time, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) became extensively involved in justice reform.

Arguably the first identifiable SSR recommendations from the United Nations were for Mali in 1994 and 1995. UN officials suggested a ‘security first’ programme of institution building for the police and other agencies, to stop flows of small arms.⁶⁷ UN SSR efforts initially benefited from a measure to increase UN field coordination, the ‘integrated mission’ concept. Thereafter two major policy initiatives were introduced to instill greater coherence into UN SSR efforts. The first was the formation of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, and the second was the later UN policy on SSR.

SSR as a whole has become part of the explicit development of UN ‘integrated missions.’ Since the early 1990s, UN peacekeeping missions have become increasingly multi-dimensional, with tasks including ‘police and defence reform, restructuring, training and operational support; assistance in the restoration and reform of judicial and prison systems; support for the restoration of state authority and administrative capacities at central and local levels; good governance; support for

⁶³ Gwinyayi Dzinesa, *Swords into Ploughshares: DDR in Namibia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe* (Pretoria, SA: Institute for Security Studies, 2006).

⁶⁴ Robert Muggah, No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on DDR and Weapons Reduction in post Conflict Contexts, *The Round Table*, Vol. 94, No. 379, April 2005, 243.

⁶⁵ Thomas Mowle, ‘Paramilitary Demobilization in Iraq: Lessons Not Learned,’ via allacademic.com, accessed 27 November 2009.

⁶⁶ Dzinesa, *Swords into Ploughshares: DDR in Namibia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe*.

⁶⁷ Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, *A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development, and African Peacemaking*, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1998, 193-195.

civil society; and assistance to constitutional processes.⁶⁸ All these functions were carried out under the mission head, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). The UN development agencies dealing with refugees, child rights, food aid, womens' concerns, and the like, had in many countries conducted activities in parallel with UN peacekeeping forces, often not well coordinated. Some stretched into the SSR realm. As an initial step, UN Headquarters brought the varied UN development agencies in each country under the authority of a Resident Coordinator, almost invariably the UNDP head. The next step in countries with both a peacekeeping mission and a development presence was to unify the command structure, which was done by designating the Resident Coordinator as a Deputy to the SRSG with responsibility for the humanitarian and development aspects of the UN's mission.⁶⁹

This greater coordination of functions within the UN laid the basis for more effective field activity, but security sector reform as a concept remained under defined and contested within the UN system. In addition, the UN lacked SSR capacity and any common approach. Rees phrased this concern in 2006 as 'the distinct and independent tools of peacekeepers and development actors have proved generally insufficient to the task of SSR.'⁷⁰ UN Headquarters attempted to provide more guidance by creating the new Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) in 2007. OROLSI started to provide more integrated direction for the large number of policing and justice initiatives the United Nations had underway.

A second initiative was the production of a Secretary-General's Report on SSR, embodying UN SSR policy. In February 2007 a Security Council statement requested a report on UN approaches to SSR, and the report was released in January 2008. Noting the extensive work already under way by Member States on SSR, and the wide variety of SSR activity underway within the UN, the report advocated a series of measures. These included developing UN SSR policy and guidelines, improving SSR capability both in New York and in field missions, building partnerships to provide

⁶⁸ Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer, *Recent Experiences of UN Integrated Missions in Security Sector Reform*, DCAF, 2008, 3.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 8-9.

⁷⁰ Edward Rees, 'Security Sector Reform and Peace Operations: Improvisation and Confusion from the Field,' *Peacekeeping Best Practises*, March 2006, 23.

effective support, expertise and adequate resources to national security sector reform processes, and the establishment of an UN SSR unit to deliver on these priorities.⁷¹ As a result, an SSR unit was created within OROLSI, and has begun a number of coordination initiatives.

However Hanggi and Scherrer make a strong argument for further UN SSR capability improvement so as to approach the subject in a holistic fashion, reflecting SSR tenets, to enable a more cohesive delivery of SSR efforts in the field, and to implement SSR from beginning to end of the conflict cycle.⁷² Hanggi and Scherrer do not end on an optimistic note. Short-term concerns of exit strategy and longer-term reconstruction and development needs, require SSR for different tasks, and these have created a continuing tension between them that may severely hamper the development of a common UN SSR programme. Hanggi and Scherrer say that ‘it may prove difficult to overcome this bias and establish a common vision for post-conflict SSR that fully encompasses the governance dimension.’⁷³ Rees adds that a blend of both peacekeeping and development tools will be necessary to better implement UN SSR, as well as skills such as institution building, participatory decision making, public administration and management and legislative and policy development, not traditionally found in the peace operations community.⁷⁴

Increased acceptance of the SSR approach within developed-world militaries has been signaled by the adoption of the concept by the U.S. Army and in a joint British doctrine note. In autumn 2008, the U.S. Army issued an updated field manual on stability operations, incorporating a full chapter on SSR that reflects the DAC approach to the matter.⁷⁵ The UK had already incorporated DfID formulations of SSR into a Joint Doctrine Note on the Military Contribution to SSR published in 2007. As regards army redevelopment specifically, the UK released a doctrine note in 2007 on

⁷¹ Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting SSR,’ S/2008/39, 23 January 2008, 2.

⁷² Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer, Towards an Integrated Security Sector Reform Approach in UN Peace Operations, International Peacekeeping, Volume 15, Issue 4, August 2008.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Edward Rees, ‘Security Sector Reform and Peace Operations: Improvisation and Confusion from the Field,’ Peacekeeping Best Practises, March 2006, 23-24.

⁷⁵ Nicole Ball, The Evolution of the SSR Agenda, Day 1 Conference Paper at the Future of SSR E-Conference, May 2009, 5.

Developing Indigenous Armies and the US a manual on Security Force Assistance, covering essentially the same subject, in mid 2009.

From its inception SSR thinkers have worried about the gap between SSR policy and practice, referred to by Chanaa as the ‘conceptual-contextual divide.’⁷⁶ Analysts, including Alice Hills, have asked whether SSR is flawed because it is based on a limited understanding of the security sector in many parts of the world.⁷⁷ Good empirical analysis of how security sectors actually function in the developing world has often been superseded by emphasis on democratizing norms,⁷⁸ though some older exceptions for Africa exist by writers such as Luckham, Cox, and Baynham,⁷⁹ and other studies have been done on Asia and Latin America. Concerns have also repeatedly been expressed over whether SSR programme implementation is simply impractical due to the alien nature of northern SSR norms in many parts of the developing world (for example, the idea of dividing the public and private arenas in the context of African neopatrimonial states.)⁸⁰ Whether implemented in government ministries or remote security force bases, SSR’s northern norms appear often unlikely to survive contact with long-held parochial loyalties.

One thread of the SSR debate with particular importance for army redevelopment is the balance, as mentioned above, between improvements in effectiveness as opposed to enhancing the accountability of security forces. While the ‘war on terror’ has heightened the apparent need for effective security forces, emphasis on effectiveness rather than accountability has deep roots in the ethos of Cold War security assistance programmes. Many U.S. security assistance efforts eventually trained, equipped, and then supported on operations, forces that were operating under authoritarian governments. This ‘reform versus SSR’ debate mirrors difficulties during UN peace operations as discussed above, and difficulties in Afghanistan and elsewhere that have attracted the label of the ‘slide toward expediency.’ As discussed further below, it

⁷⁶ Mark Sedra, Future of SSR Conference paper, May 2009, 1, referring to Chanaa, 2002, 61.

⁷⁷ Alice Hills, ‘Defence Diplomacy and Security Sector Reform,’ *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 2000, 46-67, 48, as cited by Chanaa, 2002, 75.

⁷⁸ Ball and Hendrickson, Trends in Security Sector Reform: Policy, Practice, and Research, IDRC, 2005, 25.

⁷⁹ Robin Luckham, ‘The Military, Militarization, and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues,’ *African Studies Review*, Volume 37, No.2, September 1994, 34.

⁸⁰ Alice Hills, Defence Diplomacy and Security Sector Reform, op. cit, 55.

raises the question of whether army redevelopment efforts, which are often almost devoid of significant governance improvement components, can still be regarded as SSR.

The end of the Cold War military confrontation between the Western and Eastern blocs made possible a global reassessment of security provision. In Europe, the EU and NATO began to consider accession of new candidate countries. Worldwide, the United Nations became involved in a myriad of security related activities. The development community, including the international financial institutions, became increasingly interested in refocusing their efforts to address the root causes of conflict. At the same time, a ‘wave of democratization’ appeared to offer new hope to the civil-military relations theorists. Shared interests and opportunities converged to produce security sector reform, a new policy agenda. The new agenda had a broad span, with political, institutional, economic, and social dimensions. The broad span of SSR allowed many different priorities to coexist, and assisted in popularizing the concept. Yet Chanaa’s ‘conceptual-contextual divide,’ formulated within five years of the concept coalescing, identified a significant obstacle to the policy agenda. Since Chanaa identified this issue, introspection over SSR’s possible flaws has gone hand-in-hand, almost paradoxically, with a great increase in the concept’s use. SSR remains an extremely valuable, widely used concept.

Critiques of Security Sector Reform

Though the concept of security sector reform is clearly an advance on its antecedents, various strands of development theory and civil military relations, it has come under sustained criticism almost since its inception due to a number of potential weaknesses, five of which are developed below.

One critique which accepts the current SSR paradigm, is that of the awesome coordination difficulties that large SSR projects, which usually occur simultaneously with transitional governance and reconstruction efforts, can involve.⁸¹ A well-designed strategic plan that includes all the parts of the security sector that need

⁸¹ Major Edward Boanas, ‘Crossing the Fault Line: Coordinating Multilateral SSR Engagement in Post-Conflict Countries,’ *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol. 3 No.3, June 2005.

addressing is also very important. Such a plan is sometimes relatively absent, or as in Haiti, does not cover vital appendages: while army disbandment, the main feature of the plan, did take place, DDR was not effective.⁸² These difficulties are often exploited by vested interests inside the recipient's state apparatus to benefit financially while playing the assisting states off against each other.⁸³ The task is easier when one party is much more engaged than the remainder, such as with the United States in Iraq, Afghanistan and Liberia.

The sheer enormity of the programmes that might support each security sector component is demonstrated by the SSR tasks apportioned by the 2002 Bonn Agreement for Afghanistan. Germany was allocated police reform; Italy, judicial reform, Japan, with the United Nations, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; the UK counternarcotics, and the United States the Ministry of Defence and armed forces.⁸⁴ Each one of these tasks, across a country as large as Afghanistan, could absorb the efforts of thousands of specifically designated personnel. Since 2001, foreign troop levels alone in Afghanistan have routinely exceeded 10,000; other agencies add further personnel. Where donor involvement is most acute, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Congo, and in Kosovo, there can be considerable competition between donors.⁸⁵ For example, the Congo has had multiple military aid providers since the first UN mission left in the 1960s,⁸⁶ which led to competition by the 1970s.⁸⁷ Today in the Congo donors continue to compete, both over police assistance and armed forces' assistance programmes. To address this situation, Boucher argues that when coordination is not possible, or when different actors refuse to recognize a coordinator's role, individual donors should define the areas where cooperation is required, and communicate plans in a timely fashion.⁸⁸ This type of prescription will

⁸² David Law, 2006, 8.

⁸³ Anthony Cordesman, *How America corrupted Afghanistan: Time to Look in the Mirror* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010).

⁸⁴ Jason Howk, "Security Sector Reform/Building in Afghanistan," (Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 7.

⁸⁵ Eric Scheye, *Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development* (United States Institute of Peace, October 2010), 5.

⁸⁶ J. M. Lee, *African armies and civil order*, Studies in international security, 13 (New York, Published for the Institute for Strategic Studies/Praeger, 1969), 85.

⁸⁷ Colonel S.C. Davis, British Military Attache Kinshasa, 'Report on the Zairean Armed Forces for the Period April 1971-April 1972,' 5 May 1972, DA/KIN/76, FCO 31/1170, 7, via National Archives, Kew

⁸⁸ Alix Julia Boucher, "Defence Sector Reform: A Note on Current Practice" (Henry L. Stimson Center, December 12, 2009), 6.

not necessary resolve the coordination issue, but it appears to be the best option available in many countries where different donors are implementing SSR programmes.

Another potential critique of SSR can be developed from thinking about the liberal peace agenda. SSR and especially post-conflict army reconstruction is often a primarily external activity, and internal actors simply may not share the vision of SSR propounded by outside donors. This type of criticism shades into the local ownership debate, and thus is further developed below.

Deeper criticism of the entire SSR edifice has developed with at least five major facets: (i) insufficient resources for the very large task that deep and comprehensive SSR implies, (ii) the inherent difficulty of applying a democratising approach to what are almost invariably neo-patrimonial states, (iii) insufficient local ownership, (iv) that security force assistance may be over-focusing upon equipment and skills transfer ('Train & Equip' programmes) rather than governance improvements, and that (v) that overall national security strategies, a key tool to develop a comprehensive approach, are being neglected in favour of institutional transformation. Finally there is also a concern of lesser magnitude that lessons from the discipline of management are not being applied in SSR contexts where they may have significant value.

Absence/Severe Weakness of the State

Scheye and Andersen note that in fragile states, the state is a minority provider of services, including public safety, security, and justice.⁸⁹ Attempting SSR in these areas is much more difficult than in the former Warsaw Pact and more benign developing countries for which the concept was initially developed. The environment is significantly more adverse. In postcolonial Africa, the monopoly of violence, a key attribute of the Weberian state, was 'incomplete at best and often, for practical purposes, left in the hands of chiefs, community leaders, and others.'⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Louise Andersen, Bjørn Møller, and Finn Stepputat, *Fragile States and Insecure People? : Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 228, and Scheye, 2010, 6.

⁹⁰ Andersen, Moller, and Stepputat, *ibid.*, 9.

In actual fact, armies co-exist alongside other weak state institutions amid a network of security providers dominated by the informal sector. The wide range of non-police security providers can include community anti-crime groups, religious police, ethnic/clan militias, political party militias, civil defence forces such as the Civil Defence Force that played a significant role in Sierra Leone, informal and formal commercial security groups, state-approved civil guards, local government structures, customary police and courts, and restorative justice committees.⁹¹ In Afghanistan, for example, 2006 official estimates indicate that 90% of Afghans rely on customary law due to a lack of trust and confidence in formal justice institutions.⁹² Alongside these other security providers, armies in the developing world play a much lesser role than Northerners might initially imagine.⁹³

Armies are one institutional component of the state's range of tools to provide security for development. But the entire state sector is only a minority provider. Thus it appears that there was and is a disjuncture between the imagined potential power of the state army possessed by most Northern SSR conceptualizers, and the real potential of armies in these states. SSR, to a great extent, is a 'Northern' project formulated in accordance with Northern values, as touched upon by Nathan.⁹⁴ As Ball pointed out in 2005, 'ownership of the SSR concept and policy agenda by developing countries is very low.'⁹⁵ Northern concepts appear to have induced a perception that a relative level of equality of power might be possible between developed-state and developing-state armies. Thus it appears that the security that post-conflict armies might be able to provide for citizens has been frequently overestimated.

Extensive informalisation of state institutions, and blurring of boundaries, makes improvement of state institutions more difficult. Stepputat, Andersen, and Moller say that the 'distinction between state and non-state... [do] not necessarily correspond to

⁹¹ Bruce Baker, Nonstate providers of everyday security in fragile African states, in Andersen, Moller, and Stepputat, *ibid.*, 2007, 127.

⁹² Amy Senier, 'Rebuilding the Justice Sector in Afghanistan: The Role of Customary Law,' in *Al Nakhalh*, fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhalh/archives/spring2006, cited in Scheye and Andersen, in Andersen, Moller, and Stepputat, *ibid.*, 2007, 231.

⁹³ For a corroborating view see Scheye 2010, 6: 'The West's understanding of the state is not necessarily applicable in postconflict and fragile environments.'

⁹⁴ Laurie Nathan, Obstacles to Security Sector Reform in New Democracies, *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol. 2 No. 3, September 2004

⁹⁵ Ball and Hendrickson, Trends in Security Sector Reform: Policy, Practice, and Research, IDRC, 2005, 28.

the concrete empirical relations that are revealed through closer scrutiny.⁹⁶ Examples are not hard to find; Boas says that in the case of the Eastern Congo, the state and privileged access to resources via the state remain important, but ‘this integration is built on flexible and constantly negotiated relationships of patronage, leading to the establishment of what maybe [sic] best described as competing military-commercial nexuses.’⁹⁷ In Darfur, a large majority of Arab militias’ members are formally members of government security organizations such as the People’s Defence Force and Border Intelligence Guard.⁹⁸ The complications induced by these linkages in post-conflict states place a premium on working from good empirical knowledge of specific personal linkages in specific regions, rather than neat Northern boundaries between organizational constructs.

Even where the state has a significant presence, the SSR project as currently envisioned usually requires far more institutional development resources than can be made available. In 2007, Baker and Scheye said that available resources were incapable of delivering proposed reforms.⁹⁹ They note that both the quality and quantity of human resources are likely to be insufficient in fragile states, that their finances are over-committed and dependent on less than certain revenue streams, and that ‘physical, constitutional, legal, and administrative’ resources are likely to be lacking.¹⁰⁰ They cited the example of the Sierra Leone Police, which despite heavy donor support remains weak.

Affordability of security forces has been a weak point both for African armed forces throughout the post-colonial era, as Le Roux highlights below, but also, as discussants at the *Future of SSR* e-conference in May 2009 noted, for more recent defence reform efforts. The problem has historical roots. Colonial transitions left many developing states with underskilled replicas of Northern defence ministries. These ministries were

⁹⁶ Andersen, Møller, and Stepputat, *Fragile States and Insecure People? : Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century*, 8.

⁹⁷ Morton Boas, "Returning to Realities: A Building-Block Approach to State and Statecraft in Eastern Congo and Somalia," *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (2010): 447, citing Janet Roitman, *Fiscal Disobedience*, Princeton, 2004.

⁹⁸ United Nations, "Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed by Security Council Resolution 1591 Re Sudan," S/2009/65, (New York, 2009), Section 102.

⁹⁹ Bruce Baker and Eric Scheye, ‘Multi-layered justice and security delivery in post-conflict and fragile states,’ *Conflict, Security, and Development* Vol. 7, No.4, December 2007, 507.

¹⁰⁰ Baker & Scheye, 2007, 509.

often seduced by the promise of high-technology equipment that was expensive to buy and difficult to maintain. Acquisition processes were also often vulnerable to corruption. Financial mismanagement saw further sums disappear either through incompetence or malfeasance. Thus into the 1990s the basis of developing-world defence fiscal competence was weak.

Since 1990 security sector revitalization processes have almost invariably been very expensive – mirroring, to some extent, military establishments in colonial countries at the point of independence.¹⁰¹ Afghanistan is one of the worst examples of this process, where additional expansions in the size of the army continue to be implemented when the process is already unsustainable. Spending on the Afghan security sector reached 494% of domestic revenues in the 2004-2005 fiscal year.¹⁰² Unsustainable spending has continued since. Analysts of the Afghan security sector have grave doubts about the future of the army reconstruction effort, due to unsustainable spending and absence of quality Afghan personnel.¹⁰³ Unsustainable military spending has also occurred in Sierra Leone, as noted above, and Liberia.¹⁰⁴

Countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan may be able to preserve unsustainably expensive armies due to the continued support of wealthy Western donors who are strategically engaged, but for other countries such as Sierra Leone or the DR Congo, financial stringencies risk the failure of the entire army reconstruction project. Often foreign donors find the necessary resources initially with the implied expectation of a transition to full local funding, yet this can be very difficult. This creates an inherent sustainability problem. As a DfID programme manager said of the Sierra Leone Police's vehicle fleet, 'the only thing worse than not having any capacity is having temporary capacity and then it being taken away.'¹⁰⁵ Scheye and McLean, in their recommendations on justice and security service delivery in fragile and war-torn

¹⁰¹ Michael Brzoska, Day Five discussions at the Future of SSR E-Conference, Post 11, May 8, 2009. Accessed at <http://www.ssrfuture.org/blogs/day5challe/day5discus>, 2 September 2009.

¹⁰² Andersen, Møller, and Stepputat, *Fragile States and Insecure People? : Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century*, 172.

¹⁰³ Antonio Giustozzi, "The ANA: Unwarranted Hope," *RUSI Journal* 154, no. 6 (2009).

¹⁰⁴ Authors' fieldwork interviews, Monrovia, April-May 2009, supported by Office of Security Cooperation, Liberia, Memorandum for Record: Briefing Notes on U.S. Office of Security Cooperation Liberia, 15 July 2008, 3.

¹⁰⁵ Albrecht and Jackson, 2009, 132.

states, urge a focus on fiscal sustainability.¹⁰⁶ In army reconstruction terms, the smaller the projected army planned, the better the long-term result may be.

Technical approaches exist that can alleviate the problem, such as costing the entire life cycle of a weapons system, and utilizing a 'needs driven but cost constrained approach.' Efficiency drives may also improve matters.¹⁰⁷ Yet these remain inadequate solutions. Put simply, army reconstruction done to a standard developed-world model is beyond the financial reach of most poor developing world countries. Alternatives may be found in a deliberate restriction in the use of modern technology, a reversion to systems such as horses, card files and human runners and secretaries. These practices, it must be admitted, were perfectly adequate to launch and sustain the Napoleonic Wars and the First and Second World Wars. It should be possible to at least trial, on a limited basis, a low-technology army that could be modernized if additional resources became available.

Ambitious projects may be unsustainable, but there may be other options. Reno's analysis of informal networks in Liberia may help in charting an answer, at least for planned countrywide programmes such as police forces. Reno examined the nature of Liberia's informal criminal-political networks which incorporate violent people which have committed war crimes.¹⁰⁸ He argues that such networks should be 'captured,' at least initially, in order to allow the rebuilding government to govern more effectively. Reno's mix of formal and informal solutions paves the way to a potential 'triage' solution for governments faced with limited resources.¹⁰⁹ Applied to army reconstruction, 'triage' might take either a regional or a capacity bounding approach. In countries such as the DR Congo or Afghanistan, remnant unreconstructed armed groupings in some areas might deliberately be left, to focus scarce resources where there are better chances of success. In other countries, where the government can exert control over the whole of its claimed space, a capability bounding rather than a

¹⁰⁶ Eric Scheye and Andrew McLean, "Enhancing the Delivery of Justice and Security," (Paris: OECD, 2007), 38.

¹⁰⁷ Len LeRoux, Day Five discussions at the Future of SSR e-conference, Post 19, May 8, 2009. Accessed at <http://www.ssrfuture.org/blogs/day5challe/day5discus>, 2 September 2009.

¹⁰⁸ William Reno, "Anti-Corruption Efforts in Liberia: Are they Aimed at the Right Targets?," *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 3 (2008). See also Reno in Andersen, Moller, and Stepputat, 2007

¹⁰⁹ For a 'triage' solution in a different situation, see David Kilcullen, 'The Accidental Guerrilla,' Scribe, Melbourne, 2009, 97.

regional bounding might be appropriate. A more cautious force buildup, with significant emphasis on logistics, might well increase the chances of a more sustainable force in the long term.

State security organizations, including armies, are important security actors in post-conflict contexts. Yet Northerners' intrinsic biases may cause them to overestimate the extent of state power that may be achievable. State security organizations coexist within a larger network of non-state security provision, can be extensively informalized, and face severe resource limitations. It is clear that the absolute size of the resources required for thorough SSR is enormous, and the capacity to absorb donors' aid in a post-conflict environment can be limited. The high profile and urgent needs of these states also fragments available donor resources and distracts from the further stabilization of better off, more benign, developing countries. It is also not certain whether, under the twin pressures of fossil fuel depletion and climate change,¹¹⁰ major donor states will continue to find the resources for SSR in anything but the most strategically vital states in the medium to long term.

Difficulty of transforming neopatrimonial government institutions

SSR is a concept founded in democratic norms which attempt to replicate the features of rational–legal modern states. There is no clear template for how this might be replicated in developing neo-patrimonial, states. Hills says that “democratic ideals of accountability and impartiality have little relevance when the impact of the modern state has been felt but social norms make no distinction between the private and public realm.”¹¹¹ These type of neo-patrimonial political networks are a part of ‘*all* late developing states, particularly ones at low levels of development.’¹¹² This includes virtually all the states where SSR is being attempted, and all the case studies examined in this thesis. SSR shares a weakness here with development theory in that it inherently attempts to inculcate these concepts upon culturally dissimilar states

¹¹⁰ See for example Gaia Vince, ‘Surviving in a Warmer World,’ *New Scientist*, 28 February 2009, 29-33.

¹¹¹ Alice Hills, "Defence Diplomacy and Security Sector Reform " *Contemporary Security Policy* 21, No. 1 (2000).

¹¹² Jonathan Di John, ‘Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States,’ *Crisis States Research Centre/LSE*, January 2008, 31.

which do not share rational-legal features. SSR focuses upon changing the security structures of states, but is reliant on a more fundamental transformation having taken place already. Modern neo-patrimonialism must have already been succeeded by the full separation of public and private arenas of the modern rational-legal state for SSR to be fully possible.

Egnell and Haldén added another layer to this critique in 2009.¹¹³ They found that SSR projects faced great difficulty achieving success where states did not have a ‘Westphalian’ structure of state, society, and polity. Pointing out that in Europe these features evolved in sequence, they note the great difficulty of trying to force an ahistorical evolution by trying to create them simultaneously. They cite Amitai Etzioni approvingly, who argues that there is a widespread overestimation of the ‘transformative powers of even the most powerful nations and organisations when it comes to changing and re-engineering the regimes of other nations.’¹¹⁴ Thus they argue that one ‘should carefully determine what level of ambition is realistic for each specific project dependent on local circumstances.’¹¹⁵ Law also cautions against over-expectation: ‘to assume that [interventions] can, in half a generation or so, build structures securing the accountability of the security sector, where little or none existed pre-conflict, is unrealistic.’¹¹⁶

SSR appears to be ill-equipped to change the less central, security, structures of a state where its central structures do not reflect rational-legal values. Those attempting to implement SSR where the rational-legal transition has not fully taken place will therefore always be trying to change the fundamental nature of the state in a contorted and illegitimate fashion. If a state should change, its evolution should focus upon its central nature first, and major attributes, such as its security arrangements, later. The ‘monopoly of violence’ means that security arrangements are intrinsic to the nature of the state. But changing them in order to change the state is less effective than trying to change the state first, after which the security changes might start unfolding with little

¹¹³ Robert Egnell and Peter Haldén, "Laudable, Ahistorical and Overambitious: Security Sector Reform Meets State Formation Theory," *Conflict, Security & Development* 9, no. 1 (2009), 27 — 54

¹¹⁴ Etzioni, Amitai, 2007, *Security First: For a Muscular Moral Foreign Policy*. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 3, cited in Egnell and Haldén, 2009, 48.

¹¹⁵ Egnell and Haldén, "Laudable, Ahistorical and Overambitious: Security Sector Reform Meets State Formation Theory," 27.

¹¹⁶ David M Law, *The Post-Conflict Security Sector*, DCAF Policy Paper No.14, June 2006, 16.

extra effort in any case. Security change should ideally follow nationally led discussions and be based on national norms and values – whether written or unwritten.

If the situation was viewed in purist terms, the ideal approach would be to halt attempts at SSR interventions until a full rational-legal transition had taken place. This of course is not possible for two reasons. Firstly, the transition between neo-patrimonialism and the full apparatus of the rational-legal bureaucratic state is not clear-cut. Portions of the state structure may be operating along rational-legal lines while others remain working to a neo-patrimonial logic. SSR efforts would have to wait forever. There is some logic in pausing, but little in giving up the task entirely, as this would run against the underlying ethos of most developed-world governments' aid efforts. Second, the bureaucratic inertia of the SSR industry, linking government departments, developed-world security forces, universities, policy research institutes, consultants, and private contractors, is already set well in motion, and SSR efforts, however ill-fated, will continue. Yet those considering such efforts should first closely consider how likely it is that they will be able to implement the full force of democratizing SSR, or whether they will be limited to carrying out simple reform within a state structure that does not match SSR's core democratic values.

This limitation to reform instead of full SSR has resulted in a 'slide toward expediency.'¹¹⁷ This formulation describes programmes aimed at increasing the democratic accountability of the security sector which have instead been superseded by a singular emphasis on training and equipping security forces. As this issue is intimately interconnected with raising armies both effective and accountable, it is expanded upon separately below.

The difficulty of the neo-patrimonial to rational-legal transition has arguably not received enough attention in the SSR discourse. Much more attention has simply skipped that issue altogether, and has assumed that practitioners are already working within a rational-legal framework, albeit one which may be operating in an

¹¹⁷ Mark Sedra, 'Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Slide Towards Expediency', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.13, No.1, 2006, 95, as quoted in Hänggi, Heiner and Scherrer, Vincenza (2008) 'Towards an Integrated Security Sector Reform Approach in UN Peace Operations', *International Peacekeeping*, 15:4, 496.

authoritarian or otherwise non-democratic mode. Thus what is frequently referred to as the challenges of corruption, from this perspective, is simply reflective of the normal functioning of a neo-patrimonial society.

Egnell and Halden argue that there may be neither states nor civil societies - in the 'Westphalian' sense of the words - to engage with. Instead governance consists of 'complex webs of informal networks,' that may constantly shift (in the case of Sierra Leone) or be established, formal, and strong (in the case of the clan or tribal-based structures of Central Asia).

Also relevant to the issue of operating in neo-patrimonial societies are conflicts between international human rights standards and local values. Scheye and Andersen have written cogently upon the problem.¹¹⁸ For example, developing-state security forces may inflict violence on detainees in their custody in order to secure information. Adherence to international human rights standards and democratic norms are part of the SSR principles introduced above. But where human rights standards conflict with local practices, donors and other Northerners involved are faced with complicated choices. Part of the answer may involve remembering that human rights may not be as cross-culturally applicable as they might seem.¹¹⁹ The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was an essentially Northern construct, and Northern thinking dominated many of the following legal instruments as well. Scheye and Andersen suggest that a contextualization of human rights standards may provide part of the way forward: '...choosing between different values, or at least in the short to medium term refraining from attempting to promote them all at once.'¹²⁰ To adjust to each specific situation, it might be best if designers of army reconstruction programmes clearly identified which SSR standards were most important for each programme. Trade-offs might then need to follow, probably, to ensure sustainability, for the medium term at least.

All these commentators argue for a more locally variant and locally determined process, a far cry from the originally Northern vision of SSR. At its extreme, the force

¹¹⁸ Andersen, Møller, and Stepputat, *Fragile States and Insecure People? : Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century*, 240-41.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 241.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

of these arguments suggests that army reconstruction processes might not be possible at all. Since SSR assessments and programmes will, whatever their actual assistance value, continue, considerable thought needs to be given to the future nature of such programmes.

Reassessment would almost certainly produce more sustainable SSR programmes. But while such reassessment is underway, programmes animated by the current SSR ethos will continue. All evidence suggests that such programmes take consistent effort over a long period to be effective. It seems that either very large resources must be set aside by donors for a multi-decade effort – an effort constantly vulnerable to being diminished at the expense of other foreign or domestic issues – or expectations must be reduced. Since the end of the Cold War, the only such large efforts have been in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sierra Leone, all states which are perceived as having strategic importance by a major power. Involvement in each of these three cases has either declined or is projected to decline. Given the enormous effort invested and the mixed results achieved, it appears that the launching of such very large efforts in the future will be uncommon. Therefore, in general, expectations need to be reduced. A more realistic direction for SSR efforts would probably include attention to non-state security actors as an equal priority at the very least.

Local Ownership

Local ownership, the idea that SSR will not be sustainable unless it is shaped and driven by local actors, is one of the key tenets in today's view of SSR. Laurie Nathan, wrote the first book-length study of the concept in 2007.¹²¹ He emphasised earlier researchers' conclusions that at that time, 'local ownership is more of a rhetoric device than a guide to donor officials engaged in SSR.'¹²² He recommended that local ownership be given greater force by more emphasis on the process rather than content of SSR. He also recommended that SSR should be designed in a way that promoted national ownership, through a careful process plan that included all the actors

¹²¹ Laurie Nathan, ed. *No Ownership, No Commitment* (GfN-SSR/University of Birmingham, 2007).

¹²² Eric Scheye and Gordon Peake, 'Unknotting Local Ownership,' in Anja Ebnother and Philipp Fluri (eds.), *After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies*, GKS, Vienna, 2005, quoted in Nathan, 2007, 1.

involved, from decision-makers to the disparate outside parties interested in the process. He recommended a number of initiatives by which donors could initiate SSR in a small scale but thus sustainable fashion.¹²³

Since Nathan's work was published, the local ownership concept has come under searching criticism. Critics say that 'serious questions remain over what ownership actually entails, and to whom precisely we are referring when we talk about locals.'¹²⁴ A clear tension now exists between SSR's universalist democratizing norms, and the generally accepted SSR requirement for local ownership. If a project is inculcated thoroughly with democratic norms, it may face difficulties gaining local buy-in from governments threatened by these norms.¹²⁵ On the other hand, if it is too 'locally owned,' it may not be recognizable as security sector reform, merely a different stage in the evolution of an authoritarian security sector.

A question put squarely by Martin and Wilson, and not adequately answered in the current SSR discourse, is that of 'which locals?'¹²⁶ Donais suggests this question is often not addressed adequately. But, to the extent it is, he says, there are at least three levels of local ownership discussed along a minimalist-maximalist continuum, from the national political / security sector elites, to a broad involvement of civil society,¹²⁷ to Martin and Wilson who suggest that the 'locals who matter are in fact the entire citizenry of the country in question.'¹²⁸ Close examination of most army reconstruction programmes indicates that only the elites are engaged, with the broad mass of the population only involved, if at all, as potential soldier recruits. As currently conceived, army reconstruction programmes are among the least locally owned SSR projects underway. This applies especially to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia, where, contrary to previous traditions, a high-quality, voluntary force model has been proposed and then imposed as the solution. The United States

¹²³ Nathan, ed. *No Ownership, No Commitment*, 22, 50.

¹²⁴ Timothy Donais, ed. *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform* (Zurich & Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008), 4.

¹²⁵ Egnell and Halden also make this point; *op. cit.*, 32.

¹²⁶ Donais, ed. *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform*, 9.

¹²⁷ Sandy Africa, "South Africa: SSR after Apartheid," in *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform*, ed. Timothy Donais (Zurich/Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008), 9.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

Army seems either unable or unwilling to mentor and reconstruct armies that do not match its image.¹²⁹

This imposition of current Northern forms, on top of existing rivalries, has led to multiple points of potential or actual disagreement within many armies undergoing extensive redevelopment or reconstruction. As Decalo noted, many African armies ‘seeth ... with a variety of corporate, ethnic, and personal grievances’¹³⁰ that makes armies such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, or Liberia poor starting points for redevelopment. Giustozzi casts this contest in the Afghan case as ‘shadow ownership’ as the Ministry of Defence struggled with the United States to claim a limited measure of control over the process of constructing the new Afghan National Army.¹³¹ The Shia/Sunni/Kurd faultlines in Iraq reflect the same weaknesses.

Martin and Wilson introduce the notion of a more locally owned ‘Security Sector Evolution’ (SSE) process to replace the flaws they perceive in SSR.¹³² SSE, they say, would mean that the aim was to influence the evolution of the security sector, rather than design and build a ‘better’ version. Practitioners and donors would focus upon strengthening the ability of civil society to signal its needs and views, and, on the other hand, strengthen the ability of, and incentives for, the security sector to sense and respond to those needs. This approach would mean giving up any pre-defined strategy in favour of a uniquely evolved unpredictably structured security architecture. Formal army reconstruction programmes might become much rarer under this model.

Reflecting upon the meaning and relevance of the local ownership issue in the current SSR debate, Donnais says that ‘it is not clear that [these issues] can be resolved, at least not on a macro level.’¹³³ The sheer sweep and variance of SSR engagements is

¹²⁹ See Annex A: ‘Doing it Wrong: Host Country Force Development Lessons from Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iraq,’ in Anthony Cordesman and Adam Mausnur, *Shaping Afghan Security Forces: What will it take to implement President Obama’s New Strategy*, 10 December 2009, via www.csis.org.

¹³⁰ Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style*, 1976, p.14-15, quoted in Luckham, 1994, p.15

¹³¹ Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Shadow Ownership of SSR in Afghanistan,’ in Donnais, 2008 (op. cit.), p.221-2

¹³² Martin and Wilson in Donnais, 2008, p.86-87

¹³³ Donnais, 2008, op. cit., p.5

simply too wide for an all-embracing answer to the conundrum. If there is not to be one answer, there will have to be many, and, as Donnais begins to suggest, potentially on differing medium and micro levels. As answers to this critique are developed, they may not leave SSR in a recognizable form, with its current norms intact. Scheye's writing on security sector development, in which he suggests a realistic and disaggregated approach to SSR, embodies some ideas on how to move forward.¹³⁴ Post-conflict army reconstruction in its current form appears very vulnerable to these critiques, and should probably be extensively reassessed. Future army reconstruction programmes needs to be formulated with a through appreciation in mind of who actually provides defence and security services to communities, and what role is appropriate for armies in view of the state's limited resources.

Sectoral versus strategic transformation priorities

The achievability of through, meaningful SSR is threatened by critiques over the vast resources and commitment required, an insufficient understanding of how to transform government institutions, and the contradictions involved in local ownership as opposed to democratizing, universalist norms. Yet there are also other weaknesses in the discipline. A close evaluation of three such issues points to improvements that will add to the effectiveness of both SSR and army reconstruction within it.

First is the great value of a strategic national security assessment. If a comprehensive security assessment is made prior to separate departmental programmes being initiated, such programmes will be much more responsive to other initiatives and the wider governmental environment. Second, SSR suffers significantly from the long heritage of programmes launched which only aim to improve training standards and, sometimes, only train recipient personnel on newly delivered equipment. If SSR is to be successful, management practices must be firmly set in place, and security forces need to be accountable. Third, the application of management principals to SSR, a practice now known as 'security sector management' (SSM), promises potentially

¹³⁴

Scheye, *Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development*, 11-15.

significant improvements in effectiveness, in line with its previous evident promise as regards the management of national armed forces.¹³⁵

Before developing the place of national security reviews versus potentially premature initiatives to transform the defence sector, it is useful to review their place in the accepted SSR framework. In effect, the apex of a country's national security machinery has two principal roles: the more publicized task of developing and maintaining democratic civilian control, and what the OECD calls 'strengthening the process for reviewing security threats and developing the capacity to respond to them',¹³⁶ – implementing a holistic national security policy. Creating and maintaining an effective national security policy which coordinates the efforts of not just military forces but all security agencies is critical.¹³⁷ In covering SSR's multitude of sub-fields, a holistic, comprehensive approach, well planned at the operational level or higher,¹³⁸ is needed in order to integrate efforts coherently together.¹³⁹ In examining land forces, it is critical to acknowledge that armies will not work effectively in isolation, and thus appropriate linkages to police forces, ministries of defence, and other involved civilian agencies need to be considered.

Rocky Williams outlines the main elements of the national policy required to institutionalize an agreed framework within which defence forces and armies within them, should operate.¹⁴⁰ Firstly, key constitutional principles upon which the management of the armed forces need to be laid out; secondly the responsibilities which the government has to the armed forces need to be established, including the provision of adequate resources and clear political leadership; thirdly a clear policy framework for the armed forces needs to be provided, usually in the form of a White

¹³⁵ See for example Ron Matthews & Annie Maddison, *International Defence Management Studies 2002*, Cranfield University Press, 2002, and also Beevor, *Inside the British Army*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1990.

¹³⁶ OECD Handbook 2007, 124.

¹³⁷ For example see Dr. Ann Fitz-Gerald, *Developing a Comprehensive Approach to National Security*, RIIA, February 2007, accessed at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/8268_210207fitzgerald.pdf, 24 January 2009.

¹³⁸ Russell W. Glenn, 'Counterinsurgency and Capacity Building: Lessons from Solomon Islands and the Southern Philippines,' RAND National Defense Research Institute, February 2008, 94-103.

¹³⁹ UK Ministry of Defence, 'The Military Contribution to Security Sector Reform,' Joint Doctrine Note 3/07, dated March 2007, para. 106, page 1-3, and Russell W. Glenn, RAND, *ibid.*, p.86-88.

¹⁴⁰ Rocky Williams, "African Armed Forces and the Challenges of Security Sector Reform," *Journal of Security Sector Management* 3, no. March 2005: 22-4.

Paper or similar document (which ideally cascades from a national security strategy). Beyond the framework set out by Williams, it becomes clear that armies do not have to be restricted to purely military functions. In Africa, the Botswana Army is focused, to a great degree, upon protection of natural resources,¹⁴¹ and the Congolese FARDC maintains development brigades in Katanga.¹⁴² However, such activities need to be defined and agreed, through an institutionalized policy process, to avoid exploitation of the public purse.

However a full understanding of the value of an integrated national security policy planning process in an SSR context has developed relatively late. Perhaps the first major signal that engaging in a thorough national security planning process would aid SSR and probably avoid further duplicative work was the results of the Uganda Defence Review, which was initiated in February 2002. Here planning for military reform was initiated which focused exclusively on defence, but then had to be widened, after it was found that only three of the threat indicators out of the total of 134 could be addressed by the armed forces.¹⁴³ The concept took time to make its way into the wider SSR literature; neither the OECD's 2004 paper on *Security Sector Reform and Governance* nor Hanggi's 2004 survey of security sector reform and reconstruction as part of a wider DCAF work make any mention of the issue.¹⁴⁴

The idea of prioritizing a national security review process, as opposed to addressing specific security sub-sectors, has not gained widespread adherence. For example, the Liberian national security strategy development process commenced in late 2006 and concluded in January 2008, well after the U.S.-inspired reconstruction of the armed forces had been set in motion.¹⁴⁵ However, recently, the value of addressing overall polity security concerns before implementing thoroughgoing institutional change has been more widely realized. The first time the concept was implemented came when the Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review was initiated in 2006. The Review begun

¹⁴¹ Dan Henk, Biodiversity and the Military in Botswana, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 32, No.2, January 2006, 273-291.

¹⁴² Email correspondence with international SSR expert, Kinshasa, December 2008.

¹⁴³ Eboe Hutchful and 'Kayode Fayemi, 'A Survey of Security Sector Reform in Africa,' *Conflict, Security, and Development Group Papers* No.3, May 2005, 12.

¹⁴⁴ Heiner Hänggi, 'Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction' in Alan Bryden, Heiner Hanggi, 'Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector,' DCAF/Lit Verlag, 2004.

¹⁴⁵ Thomas Jaye, 'History of the Development of the National Security Strategy of Liberia,' unpublished document written April 2009.

well before the next evolutionary step for the province's security force, the Kosovo Protection Corps, needed to be implemented. The International Security Sector Advisory Team has started incorporating the concept within their work, including in Guinea-Bissau,¹⁴⁶ and efforts are underway to begin a national security policy formulation process in Nepal, before the institutional process of integrating the Maoist PLAN and government forces begins.¹⁴⁷

While not yet firmly incorporated in commonly understood SSR programming, prioritizing the development of a formalized national security strategy before institutional reconstruction takes place may alleviate the difficulties caused by the three major issues raised above. Firstly, it requires far less resources than major force reconstruction programmes – probably only the services of, at most, three to four outside facilitators. Secondly, if compiled with little outside involvement it will be more reflective of the actual situation inside the country, whether neo-patrimonial or more fully rational-bureaucratic. The extent to which data and analysis will be included, not included, or manipulated to maximise external donor support or to support certain outcomes will be an unavoidable consequence of the general level of transparency prevailing in the country.

While there are a number of potential advantages in formulating national frameworks, there are also a number of implementation difficulties. Scheye notes that they can take three to five years to draft; have exhibited little effect on improving justice and security delivery for, at best, a decade or more; are rarely capable of being implemented; and are sometimes among the first casualties of a democratic transition of power to the opposition, as was the case in Timor-Leste. In reviewing SSR efforts in 2010, Scheye suggested that one of the principal values of national strategies was actually the local actors' skills acquired in the drafting process. Acquisition of these skills helps the development of human capital.

¹⁴⁶ Notably with a 29-30 June 2009 capacity building session at UN Headquarters at the request of the SSR Unit, http://www.dcaf.ch/issat/activities/completed_activities.htm, accessed 28 November 2009.

¹⁴⁷ Seminar on National Interest, Security Policy, and Civil-Military Relation in Nepal, 25 April 2009, accessed at http://www.fesnepal.org/reports/2009/seminar_reports/report_nepo.htm, 30 November 2009, and correspondence with Gordon Hughes in Kathmandu, September-October 2009.

Short-Term Stabilization versus Longer-Term Governance

Programmes which focus on transferring equipment and skills to foreign security forces, without concerns over governance have a long history. Foreign advisors were dispatched to Chile, for example from 1810 and to Egypt from 1815, and many advisors served less formally earlier.¹⁴⁸ During the Cold War, U.S. train and equip programmes involved aid to Cuban exiles which led to the Bay of Pigs operation as well as many armed forces in Latin America and elsewhere. Yet during the Cold War the emphasis was on gaining foreign friends, not building security forces that mirrored the advisor nation's own values.¹⁴⁹ Where this was tried, Cold War experience in the Congo/Zaire and Vietnam (and possibly Nigeria,¹⁵⁰ Liberia and Afghanistan) proved that it was often difficult to build up reliable management mechanisms for indigenous armed forces. After the Cold War ended, U.S. emphasis shifted to the promotion of democratic values, and this well matched the developing theories of what became SSR. Yet the same types of issues continued to be a problem. Hills reports the same failure with regard to British police following the end of the Cold War: "many years' [British] support to forces such as those of Nigeria and Zimbabwe have failed to promote either accountability or the good management practices consistent with Western interpretations of liberalization or professionalism."¹⁵¹

A number of converging factors have however meant that the promotion of good governance and management practices has often been subordinated to concerns of training and equipping security forces. The U.S. 'war on terror' has increased pressure to build numbers of security forces quickly, due to the stabilization imperative to deploy as many personnel as possible. While not directly involving creation of security forces, the desire for actionable intelligence from captured terrorists has led to the circumvention of Western countries' legal safeguards and allegedly to

¹⁴⁸ Donald Stoker, *The History of Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815-2007*, Taylor and Francis, December 2007, Chapter 1.

¹⁴⁹ Conversation with Colonel Thomas Dempsey, U.S. Army (Ret'd), 29 October 2009. A good general example is Cable 72TEHRAN1164, 'Acceleration of F-4Es for Iran,' (Unclassified), 25 February 1972, via cablegate.wikileaks.org, accessed 1 December 2010.

¹⁵⁰ See Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military, A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960-67*.

¹⁵¹ Alice Hills, 'Defence Diplomacy and Security Sector Reform,' *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 2000, pp.46-67, p.59-60

torture.¹⁵² A more intelligent approach might have taken longer but produce more results (as well as avoiding bad publicity). Gaining allies' aid worldwide to help avoid legal constraints has not bolstered the profile of SSR norms.

As well as these 'war on terror' induced factors, the intrinsic difficulty encountered on UN missions of changing the state has also contributed. Mark Sedra coined the above-mentioned term, the 'slide toward expediency,' to describe programmes which aimed at increasing the democratic accountability of the security sector, but instead 'have been superseded by a singular focus on training and equipping the country's fledgling security forces.' Numerous analysts have reported the problem, including Ball¹⁵³, Rees (most successes have occurred in organising security forces, while the greatest failures have occurred in establishing civilian oversight and management),¹⁵⁴ Sedra,¹⁵⁵ Law,¹⁵⁶ Hutchful and Fayemi¹⁵⁷ and Hills among them.

One of the more important factors in creating this 'slide to expediency' has been the short-term stabilization imperative, especially since the 'war on terror' began, to rapidly train and deploy as many security force personnel as possible. This appears to have been a significant factor in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These countries are also the ones where there has been the least attention to an army reconstruction agenda that reflects core SSR norms.¹⁵⁸ Somewhat surprisingly, the need to deploy army forces quickly does not appear to have hastened training elsewhere. Transition of responsibility to a revitalised local force has not been explicitly planned for nor undertaken in Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor in Kosovo. In East Timor, the United Nations took an inordinate amount of time to decide how to

¹⁵² A number of captured terrorist suspects have allegedly been tortured in several Western countries, causing much embarrassment to governments. For example see 'Claws out over Afghan terrorist allegations,' UPI.com, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/International/2009/11/20/Claws-out-over-Afghan-torture-allegations/UPI-22091258728369/, accessed 16 February 2010.

¹⁵³ Nicole Ball, The Evolution of the SSR Agenda, Day 1 Conference Paper at the Future of SSR E-Conference, May 2009, p.6

¹⁵⁴ Edward Rees, 2006, 4.

¹⁵⁵ Mark Sedra, 'Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Slide Towards Expediency,' International Peacekeeping, March 2006, cited in Hanggi & Scherrer 2008.

¹⁵⁶ David Law, 2006, conclusions, op. cit.

¹⁵⁷ Eboe Hutchful and 'Kayode Fayemi, 'A Survey of Security Sector Reform in Africa,' Conflict, Security, and Development Group Papers No.3, May 2005, 15.

¹⁵⁸ Nicole Ball, The Evolution of the SSR Agenda, Future of SSR Conference, 2009, 6.

deal with Falintil, encamped at Aileu, and from September 1999 to February 2001 the bulk of the revered guerillas remained there in deteriorating conditions.¹⁵⁹

This ‘operational capability vs comprehensive SSR’ issue leads one to question whether much of the army reform programmes underway can actually be considered true democratising SSR. Programmes simply aimed at arming and training army and police forces appear to undermine SSR’s core principles.¹⁶⁰ The issue is interwoven with the difficulties of creating full local ownership of army reconstruction programmes. Local ownership is usually interpreted as including the active consent of national political elites. Yet while these elites may operate in a system which has some democratic features, in many cases, allowing full democratic oversight and outside influence from parliament and civil society over such programmes is anathema. Thus programmes which improve or create effective armies are welcomed, but not the governance aspects which would make the programmes more comprehensive and thus sustainable. Including such governance aspects can often trigger local dissatisfaction and opposition, and therefore struggle between donors and local elites.

The successful incorporation of governance components into army redevelopment or reconstruction programmes is the crucial mark of whether a programme can truly be considered SSR. Based on analysis of army reconstruction programmes, it appears that significant governance components were attempted in a total of four – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, South Africa, and Sierra Leone. Due to absence of any perceived need (in the early operations in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique) UN delay and reluctance to take decisions (East Timor), and the aforementioned short-term stabilization imperatives, governance has not been, it seems, a significant component of many army reconstruction programmes. It may be very difficult for both reasons of short-term stabilization trumping governance, and the three major obstacles posited above, to effectively achieve meaningful and sustainable SSR in

¹⁵⁹ Ludovic Hood, Security Sector Reform in East Timor, 1999-2004, *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 13, No.1, 2006, 70.

¹⁶⁰ Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer, Recent Experiences of UN Integrated Missions in Security Sector Reform, Chapter 1, ‘Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions,’ DCAF, 2008, 24.

these programmes. This situation both reflects and raises questions about deeper flaws in the SSR concept as a whole.

Security Sector Management

The five areas surveyed above all include areas of concern that potentially threaten the basis of SSR and army reconstruction within it. The concern with security sector management (SSM) is different. The application of management principles to SSR promises a number of potentially useful techniques and improvements in the way the discipline is implemented, both conceptually and in the field. The question as regards SSM and army reconstruction is what benefit the application of SSM techniques can have and whether they can be applied to alleviate some of the issues canvassed above.

At first glance, recent SSM literature seems to offer attractive, more sophisticated tools which could assist in carrying out army reconstruction programmes. These include work by Fitz-Gerald and Tracy in 2008, and Van Veen also in 2008.

Fitz-Gerald and Tracy analysed alternate decision making models to decide which model best suited security sector reform's requirements.¹⁶¹ They determined that a variant of the Multi-Criteria Decision-making Model (MCDM) was the best choice of the varied models available for further analysis. Fitz-Gerald and Tracy developed a two-dimensional model with a y-axis representing 'Strategy Value' and an x-axis representing 'Ability to Implement.' Potential programmes, which might include, for army reconstruction, 'basic recruit training,' or 'civics training for soldiers' are then scored on a weighted scale to produce a value for that particular policy proposal. An 'ability to implement' is then calculated by group brainstorming. Thereafter both the policy proposal value and 'ability to implement' are determined and plotted on a 3x3 matrix, as depicted in Figure 1. This allows the relative value of each proposal to be considered.

¹⁶¹ Fitzgerald, Dr Ann, and Marianne Tracy, 'Developing a Decisionmaking model for security sector development in uncertain situations,' *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol 6, No.2, July 2008.

		ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT		
		High	Medium	Low
STRATEGY VALUE	High	PRIORITY	SELECTIVE 2ND PRIORITY	OUTSOURCE IMMEDIATELY? DEVELOP ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT MEDIUM TO LONG TERM?
	Medium	SELECTIVE 2ND PRIORITY	SELECTIVE 3RD PRIORITY	MONITOR IN CASE VALUE & ABILITY INCREASES
	Low	MONITOR IN CASE VALUE INCREASES	MONITOR IN CASE VALUE INCREASES	DO NOT CONSIDER

Figure 1: Possible Actions Resulting from the MCDM SSR Decision Matrix (Fitzgerald and Tracy 2008)

If an army is not in being, the model can be applied to the complex process of DDR. If an army is in being - army redevelopment versus army reconstruction - the model provides a sophisticated, rigorous process for choosing the most valuable and easiest to implement programmatic sub-component. The Western model of army reconstruction depends upon all steps of the recruit/train/exercise/operate sequence¹⁶² being implemented. The modified MCDM model would thus be run multiple times in order to guide planners through each step of the rebuilding process.

It could be considered that there might be two weaknesses with this model. A first potential weakness of the model is the necessity for indigenous actors to accept its premise. In at least one context, that of Africa, Prunier suggests that Westerners have repeatedly been manipulated for indigenous actors' ends.¹⁶³ The model has been

¹⁶² See the Formation Readiness Cycle in the Strategic Defence Review, Supporting Essay 31, Post-SDR Structure of Deployable Divisions, 1998 at http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf, accessed 21 October 2009. For the latest terminology for this as regards the British Army, see <http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/10129.html> (accessed 30 September 2009), which notes recuperation as the first stage of the 'Force Operations and Readiness Mechanism.'

¹⁶³ Gerard Prunier, 'From Genocide to Continental War', Hurst & Co., London, 2009, 138-139.

subject to initial field testing.¹⁶⁴ However the data on the field testing is insufficient to determine the absolute level of complexity of the test case. Some neo-patrimonial environments, such as the eastern Congo, have layers upon layers of different issues which all interrelate. In complex neo-patrimonial contexts, interveners attempting to utilize this model may not be able to fully appreciate attempts by group participants to manipulate its workings. Scheye noted in 2010 that ‘donors do not take the multivariate politics of partner countries sufficiently into account.’¹⁶⁵ The model is only two years old; further testing will refine and develop it.

Another potential weakness, the difficulty of attributing the correct discrete values to intangible qualities, should eventually be nullified through repeated use. The same value, such a ‘4’ for police development, may actually describe different levels of perceptions of capabilities in different countries. A ‘4’ in Burundi may describe a different level of capability than a ‘4’ in Thailand. This makes it difficult to achieve comparative assessments. In other words, it may be difficult to avoid ‘comparing apples with oranges.’ Particular intangible-numerical associations may also be challenged, however, if there is political value in doing so, which might be more likely to come from beyond the working group’s immediate participants.

Van Veen’s work on reverse stakeholder mapping is also a potentially very valuable tool for SSR assessment.¹⁶⁶ It is also a two-dimensional, four-box model. However it is focused on ‘the identification of realistic and meaningful strategic SSR objectives.’¹⁶⁷ Examination of army reconstruction programmes reveals that in most cases there is an implicit understanding that army creation will be required, thus setting the strategic objective. Often the intent to create or redevelop an army is specifically written into the peace accord (eg in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mozambique, or Nepal). The Haiti case shows this trend as well. Before the Haiti intervention of 1994, U.S. military planning called for the retention of an army reduced in strength. It was the specific decision of Haitian President Aristide to disband the army, against

¹⁶⁴ Fitz-Gerald and Tracy, 2008, p.32

¹⁶⁵ Eric Scheye, *Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development*, 6.

¹⁶⁶ Erwin Van Veen, ‘Reverse Stakeholder Mapping: On the Need for Actor-based SSR strategizing in post-conflict environments,’ *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol. 6, No.2, July 2008.

¹⁶⁷ Van Veen, *ibid*, 6.

international wishes, that reduced Haiti's security forces to a police force only.¹⁶⁸ In 2011, newly-elected Haitian President Michel Martelly promised during his campaign to recreate the force.¹⁶⁹ This plan only reinforces the trend which shows that retention of an army is almost always *prima facie* expected.

However, if an army is already in existence, and redevelopment is required, Van Veen's model is an excellent tool. It provides a means to navigating the complex array of personal and factional interests that usually exist in such forces in a post conflict situation. However, an essential requirement is a comprehensive understanding of the actors, their interests, and their inter-linkages. Sometimes this prerequisite is not put in place, as Van Veen himself acknowledges.¹⁷⁰ Short tours of duty for international staff are a particular problem. An example directly relevant to army reconstruction is that of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which have up until 2010 focused undue effort on the insurgency and not enough on understanding the environment and the people.¹⁷¹ If this knowledge is available, the Van Veen model becomes useful. Without an adequate depth of data, little success will be achieved.

The Balanced Scorecard is an additional management tool potentially useful for improving the effectiveness of army reconstruction and redevelopment programmes. Fitz-Gerald and Jackson argued for the application of the Balanced Scorecard to SSR strategizing because 'it is a balanced system for indices for effectiveness and has been widely accepted in the management of small, medium and large organizations' worldwide.¹⁷² The scorecard is a performance measurement tool that has been additionally adopted for strategy and communications. It 'translates an organisation's mission and strategy into a comprehensive set of performance measures that provide

¹⁶⁸ Eirin Mobekk, International Involvement in Restructuring and Creating Security Forces: The Case of Haiti, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 12, No.3, Autumn 2001.

¹⁶⁹ Jacqueline Charles, Haitian President Michel Martelly delays controversial army plan, *The Miami Herald*, 18 November 2011, accessed at <http://www.miamiherald.com>, 27 February 2012.

¹⁷⁰ Personal correspondence with Erwin Van Veen, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 September 2010.

¹⁷¹ Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, Paul D. Batchelor, 'Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,' Center for a New American Security, 4 January 2010. Paper accessed at <http://www.cnas.org/node/3924>, 18 February 2010.

¹⁷² Fitz-Gerald and Jackson, op. cit., 2008, 11.

the framework for a strategic measurement and management system.¹⁷³ According to the Balanced Scorecard Institute, introducing the tool into use will:¹⁷⁴

- *Increase focus on strategy and results
- *Improve organizational performance by measuring what matters
- *Align organization strategy with the work people do on a day-to-day basis
- *Focus on the drivers of future performance
- *Improve communication of the organization's Vision and Strategy, and
- *Prioritize Projects / Initiatives (that will achieve that strategy)

The scorecard breaks down organisational performance into four main areas, which for the private sector were financial, customers, internal business process and learning & growth. The financial perspective is traditionally placed at the top as this is the aspect the organisation wishes to perform best in. The inter-relationship of the other three perspectives are ideally combined in such a way as to produce the best possible financial performance. To adopt the tool to SSR use, Fitz-Gerald and Jackson changed the primary focus from that of customer to the whole of a society affected by SSR. The amended model is depicted in Figure 2 below. Prioritizing the Societal perspective at the top, Fitz-Gerald and Jackson changed the other three corners to enabling mechanisms, resources, and future. Enabling mechanisms (the former internal business processes) include, for this version, specific sub-programmes such as a peacekeeping mission, justice reform, micro-credit programmes, disarmament programmes, etc. The futures section, Fitz-Gerald and Jackson said, would cover education and training activities.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Balanced Scorecard Institute, 'What is the Balanced Scorecard,' <http://www.balancedscorecard.org/BSCResources/AbouttheBalancedScorecard/tabid/55/Default.aspx>, accessed 20 August 2009.




Figure 2: A Balanced Scorecard for Security Sector Reform (Source Fitzgerald/Jackson 2008)

The Balanced Scorecard is a helpful assessment tool when faced with integration of a number of programmes, at a general level. Yet army reconstruction, in the form of the organise-train-operate-reconstitute cycle,¹⁷⁵ must go through a series of specific steps. Due to this more rigid nature, the process can be modeled in greater detail than the BSC allows.

Thus the recent Security Sector Management literature is of potential use for ascertaining guidelines for army redevelopment and reconstruction. Fitzgerald & Tracy's MCDM model is potentially very valuable for SSR decision-making. However, it may require further validation and testing. The Van Veen model is also potentially very valuable if a rich understanding of the specific context is available, but will have to be trialed in the field. The BSC, reflecting its origins and application to a wide range of issues, is a generalized tool for a situation, army reconstruction, that can be more specifically analysed. Overall SSM is in its infancy. With longer

¹⁷⁵ See Force Operations & Readiness Mechanism, and the Formation Readiness Cycle in the Strategic Defence Review, Supporting Essay 31, Post-SDR Structure of Deployable Divisions, 1998, op. cit.

practice and field trials, it may potentially be of great value, though it appears at the moment to systematically underestimate the effect of power relations.¹⁷⁶ Other models will no doubt be created in the future to address different issues. But the first step will be popularizing the models so that they can be thoroughly evaluated. This may be slow due to the unfamiliarity of the calculation processes involved to those without a management background. In countries where the education system has been destroyed by war, assimilating the complex concepts involved may also be difficult.

Summarizing the SSR Critiques

Having examined the origins of SSR and its major critiques, the question is to ascertain which of them bear directly upon army reconstruction as a subcomponent of defence sector reform, itself part of wider SSR.

According to the OECD, SSR should be approached in a holistic fashion, with work in ministries on regulations parliamentary scrutiny, and the training and equipping of security forces all complementing each other. Yet since 1998 SSR has arguably privileged this state-centric approach when applying it to regions where the state is not the primary security provider. Given the fragility of the state in these circumstances, it appears extremely unlikely that state security organisations will become such primary providers except possibly in the very long term. Nonstate organisms are established and customarily accepted, while increasing state capacity is vastly expensive. To fully implement its vision, the SSR project needs to more clearly recognise the extent of weakness of the state, and the non-state dominance of security provision, and adjust its approach accordingly. Armies should probably be tasked with more limited missions that they might be able to accomplish more fully, while the vast majority of the non-military missions that adhere to the armed forces in the developing world are placed firmly on other shoulders.

SSR is an inherent rational-bureaucratic process conceived as part of a properly functioning Northern-style state. However the majority of Southern countries operate

¹⁷⁶ This is the same kind of critique that Egnell and Halden make of the UN integrated mission concept and Effects Based Operations. See Egnell and Halden, "Laudable, Ahistorical and Overambitious: Security Sector Reform Meets State Formation Theory," 47.

through versions of a neo-patrimonial system. Yet while SSR programmes are implemented they explicitly and implicitly seek to transform the core attributes of the state. The existing, weak, bureaucratic systems, which are usually subject to stronger kin and patronage imperatives, are strained extensively by reform pressures from abroad. The result for army reconstruction and security force development more generally has often been the ‘slide toward expediency’ – prioritization of capability improvements with emphasis on governance reforms falling away. A reduction in expectations will almost certainly be necessary, as well as a contextualized approach to choosing which values to prioritize, in order to make progress.

Local ownership is a core tenet, if a perennially difficult one, of SSR. A recipient country’s leaders and citizens must adopt transformation as their own if changes are to be sustained. Yet army reconstruction is one of the least locally owned sets of programmes incorporated as part of the SSR paradigm. From Zimbabwe to Bosnia-Herzegovina to East Timor to Kosovo, the model to be aimed for almost every case is a high-quality all-volunteer force. This agenda has had varying levels of adoption and sustainment. Scholars looking at options to address the local ownership conundrum more effectively appear to raise the possibility of a range of ownership options, from micro, to medium and macro levels,¹⁷⁷ adapted to the specific environment. Such changes would mean fundamental change to the present pattern of army reconstruction.

Just as threatening to the ideals of SSR is the lack of effectively functioning governance components in army reconstruction programmes. Upon a close examination of the set of programmes categorized as army reconstruction by this thesis, it appears that very few fully qualify as SSR. The ‘war on terror’ and other pressures that have prioritised the short-term stabilization imperative of getting the maximum number of soldiers operational have meant that ‘train and equip’ type programmes has become much more prevalent. This is also directly applicable to SSR-compatible army reconstruction, threatening its integrity.

¹⁷⁷ Donnais 2008, 5, and Scheye 2010 11-16.

The effect of these sustained criticisms is to leave mainstream, large-scale SSR accused of being essentially impractical and untrue to some of its core tenets. The development of national security strategies or Martin and Wilson's Security Sector Evolution do however provide a path forward, provided a diminution of objectives is accepted. If incorporated into programmatic reality, SSR would in most non-urgent cases be transformed from a large scale invasive effort to a long consultation process before more limited action. At the beginning of an intervention, however, it will often be necessary to accept less locally owned immediate security solutions in order to stabilize the situation. Yet even if introspection produces a change in policy, army reconstruction programmes dominated by 'train and equip' imperatives will continue, and continue to be launched, as well. Evolution of these types of military aid programmes will in most cases lag well behind the evolution of the academic-led discipline.

One of the few remedies to set against this set of dilemmas is the increasingly adopted option of formulating an overall, integrated, national security strategy before embarking upon comprehensive institutional transformation. This approach was first utilised in Kosovo from 2006 (though Kosovo at the time was not technically a sovereign state). Requiring only salaries and support for a few facilitators at the most, it is not resource intensive. It will reflect the nature of the society it operates within, whether neo-patrimonial or nearly fully rational-bureaucratic. However, its analysis and accuracy is likely to be distorted to a greater or lesser extent in order to produce formulations that will appeal to outside donors. The less international involvement there is, the more local ownership there will be. Support can be provided by South-South facilitation, and such facilitation is likely to be more appropriate to the conditions than advisors from the global North. Governance concerns, rather than emphasis on training and equipment, can be incorporated early in the process. Such an approach can set favourable conditions for army reconstruction much earlier in the overall SSR process.

Army reconstruction appears to be heading in two diverging directions. One direction represents the main thrust of present activity, concentrating on the 'train and equip' side of army assistance with few concerns over governance. This trend leads one out of the true SSR paradigm, but seems unlikely to have its level of activity reduced

because of that. The other direction, headed by activities such as national security strategy reviews and civil society-security force consultations, leads away from recognizable defence sector reform in the current mode and into an unforeseeable series of security force evolution activities. Unifying the two streams of activity seems unlikely, given the long history of relative failure in incorporating governance considerations into army redevelopment. Therefore the challenge is to choose the right option of the two for each individual situation. Debating the issues thoroughly, through whatever variant of a national security strategy review or a security sector evolution process, is almost certainly the best alternative to achieve sustainability through maximization of local ownership. Where immediate security solutions are required, however, creating capability quickly through a 'train-and-equip' approach may be the only viable alternative.

To summarize, major issues facing security sector reform include the role of non-state security actors, the challenge of a neo-patrimonial, rather than rational-bureaucratic, state system, inadequate local ownership, and lack of governance components within programmes. As noted above, these factors and other seem to lead army reconstruction in two separate directions, 'train-and-equip' programmes and gradual security force evolution activities. Yet to match the multiples challenges there is also guidance available, from a variety of sources. The next chapter moves the discussion from challenges and opportunities facing SSR, to a detailed analysis of guidance available for army reconstruction.

Chapter 3: Army Reconstruction Literature Review

Existing Army Reconstruction Guidance

This chapter moves from challenges and its opportunities facing SSR, to issues specific to army reconstruction as a part of defence reform. The ‘conceptual-contextual divide’ which hampers SSR is very obvious when army reconstruction is examined in detail. This section examines guidelines, strengths, and critiques applicable to a range of defence sector related programmes. The results of such examination can then be fed back to evaluate the SSR principles. Existing guidance at the strategic and operational level is now well-informed by contextual study. But changing government and international agency operating methods is a long, slow process with frequent reversions. At the tactical level, little progress has been made to change innate Northern conceptualizations of what is and is not achievable for the security agencies of a ‘post-conflict’ state. The liberal peace agenda, and the motivations of external actors as opposed to those indigenous to a country, is also only infrequently questioned.

This section reviews in succession the broad policy guidance and doctrine which is available for post-conflict army reconstruction. The broad policy guidance covers two main issues. First is overall SSR guidance for policy and process from the OECD Handbook. It has served as a milestone in developing the field. The other is defence sector reform, including Boucher’s and Burgess’s work, and Le Roux and Bonnemaïson’s ideas on ‘appropriate’ forces. The communities of practitioners and academics working on development and SSR have iteratively created a range of techniques and processes which can add a great deal of value to land forces reconstruction programmes. Thereafter disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), an often important precursor to land forces reform, will be examined. The recent written doctrine for developing armies, produced by the UK and US since 2007, is then analysed.

Broad Policy Guidance

Effective SSR programming, Fitz-Gerald and Jackson said in 2008, ‘appeared to be driven largely by active SSR donors who work with experienced sets of personal and professional networks on the ground; and the movement of those networks from one theatre of operations to another.’¹⁷⁸ SSR training opportunities were initially limited to a few courses provided by specialist institutions such as the Global Facilitation Network for SSR. Applying only individuals’ previous experience, whether military or developmental, means that approaches and techniques for SSR will be inherently limited to that previous skill-set. This situation had led to much wasted effort in several theatres. For example, retired U.S. soldiers employed to train the Iraqi army in contractor positions face an organizational environment significantly different from peaceful training camps in the continental United States. These failures were slowly recognized, and much has been learned, especially since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks brought an unprecedented increase in army reconstruction activity. Partially in response, SSR practitioners, aided by the international development community, made a concerted effort from 2006 to amass overall guidance to fill this ‘absence of guidance and tools supporting SSR interventions.’¹⁷⁹

Much of this effort became focused on the development of the Implementation Framework – Security Sector Reform (IF-SSR). The creation of the IF-SSR in turn resulted in the OECD DAC Handbook on SSR in 2007. The OECD DAC Handbook made available valuable overall guidance to the whole SSR community.¹⁸⁰ Many SSR donors and enabling partners adopted the Handbook as a baseline framework for their work. Meanwhile, the number of SSR training providers has increased, with the International Security Sector Advisory Team, the United Nations, the Folke Bernadotte Academy, and the Austrian Defence Ministry all administering training courses.

¹⁷⁸ Dr Ann Fitz-Gerald and Dr Sylvie Jackson, ‘Developing a Performance Management System for Security Sector Interventions,’ *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Volume 6, No.1, 2008, 3.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

Broad Overall Guidance for Defence Sector Reconstruction

The compilation of the OECD DAC Handbook drew together in systematic form much knowledge that had only theretofore existed at the level of individual practitioners and groups of practitioners.¹⁸¹ Section Three of the Handbook outlines an assessment tool covering ‘conflict and political analysis; assessing the governance and capacity of the security sector; identifying the needs of the poor, and highlighting other frameworks and programmes with which SSR could be linked.’¹⁸² Chapter 5 of the Handbook lays out overall guidance for strengthening national government institutions, while a section of Chapter 7 addresses defence reform specifically. Then the defence sector itself will be more closely examined, firstly sketching the relatively rigid and inflexible nature of army reconstruction programmes as they currently are being implemented. The defence sector process guidelines in Chapter 7 of the OECD Handbook will be then discussed, and then the work of Burgess, LeRoux and Bonnemaïson.

The OECD Handbook describes ideal steps for a through assessment process. These include extensive consultation, and the conduct of a series of analyses covering the whole conflict situation, including parallel programmes. Joint assessments with other international partners and the local government are desirable if possible. In the case of army reconstruction, one of the most important issues is army-police interaction. Yet here the OECD Handbook does not emphasize sufficiently the insecurity that both armies and police forces tend to create. While the OECD’s work is well-considered, multiple scholars suggest assessment and research should go beyond this level of engagement. They believe a ‘thick description’ - *a la* Geertz - of the environment should be attempted.¹⁸³ Such additional work involves significant effort, but promises significant rewards in terms of understanding the local environment.

¹⁸¹ Dr. Ann Fitz-Gerald, ‘Implications for American, British, and Other Allied Force Planning and for Post-Conflict Iraq,’ *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol. 1, Issue 2, June 2003. See similarity of the table included’s list of desirable bureaucratic requirements, which include legislative framework, civilian oversight, budget planning, capacity, and policy and planning with the contents of the OECD Handbook’s Chapter 5.

¹⁸² OECD DAC Handbook 2007, 26.

¹⁸³ Egnell and Halden, 46, and David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, Scribe, Melbourne, 2006, 304.

Effective capability development has been a challenge since the colonial era began, as Northerners have attempted to socialize peoples of other cultures into their behavioral and professional norms. While developing capability, SSR projects should be incorporated within overall national development programs documents.¹⁸⁴

Military capability development effectively has two parts. At the initial stage, military capability development - initial recruit training - is reasonably simple, about up to platoon or company level. Given a level of experience by the trainers and some facilities and resources, there are no special difficulties. The difficulties arise when heavy equipment and specialized support training is introduced.¹⁸⁵ Effective maintenance, supply, and personnel administration all require well-trained personnel operating within a strong institutional framework. Many are not fulfilling directly military tasks, but instead administrative ones for which opportunities, or pay, may be much greater in civilian life or in the NGO community. This assumes that the skills can be imparted in the first place – something that may be difficult once the foreign trainers leave, in countries where the literacy rate can be very low. Thus backing trained junior soldiers with all the institutions that go to making up an army can be a very difficult task.

There are a number of potential difficulties with this approach. The first is the question of whether army reconstruction, a very foreign-dominated process, can be smoothly incorporated into wider SSR efforts without distorting them. Enormous projected costs for SSR for example are frequently provided by foreign donors without being channeled through the country's Ministry of Finance. The second is the risk of creating an over-powerful civilian entity which can dominate much government business in a country where security is lacking. A good example is the Office of National Security in Sierra Leone, where even non-security functions were being drawn within its ambit.¹⁸⁶ The Sierra Leone example cited relied heavily on a

¹⁸⁴ OECD Handbook, p.88-89, and Scheye and MacLean, 2007, 40-41.

¹⁸⁵ An Australian expert described this phenomenon in an e-mail of April 22, 2010 as follows: 'It is easy to create regiments and battalions but hard to create working military justice systems, workable sustainment processes and impossibly hard to build a beneficial military culture.' Another similar quote is in Daniel Wasserbly, 'Iraqi insecurity heightens concerns over forces' progress,' Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 August 2009.

¹⁸⁶ Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007, GfN-SSR/University of Birmingham, February 2009, 119, 161.

few key figures well capable of running such a potentially politically powerful office in a non-partisan way. The OECD may overestimate the likelihood of having such personnel available who can be trusted to run the process in a non partisan fashion.

Overall the Handbook lays out a well thought out series of considerations vital in the undertaking of SSR efforts. Yet it is arguably an over-projection of Northern conceptualizations onto areas that are by nature very different. Overall, the critical weaknesses are not just the oft-mentioned lack of capability and intent. Capability and intent are important drawbacks. In the countries under study, with education and an ethos of service both often lacking, such limitations do hold progress back. But probably more important is that well-meaning interveners ‘tend to give too little attention to the functions that are served by dysfunctional phenomena such as civil wars.’¹⁸⁷ Thus a complex set of factors may push policy in the direction of failure. Policy may address a certain problem, but not with sufficient resources, or not including key local actors, or only address symptoms, rather than root causes. These problems can result in failure through ‘obstacles to implementation’. Yet the failure of a particular policy does not mean that all those contributing to the intervention have failed in their most important goals.¹⁸⁸ For example, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is giving substantial aid to the Congolese Army (the FARDC). But whether the FARDC becomes efficient and accountable may not matter particularly to the PRC, if their aid to the army assures them continued access to the Congo’s minerals. The OECD Handbook is also biased to an extent by the prevailing approach to SSR which privileges state-based solutions. If state institutions are not strong enough in post-conflict environments to make these policy prescriptions effective, the Handbook’s approach is severely hampered.

Before moving from discussion of OECD guidance on strengthening institutions to the more specific defence reform process, it is useful to review the generally common characteristics of army reconstruction. Army reconstruction programmes are usually supply driven, do not usually reflect the consensus of the wider local population, are restricted in their ability to flexibly adjust to changes in the local situation. They are

¹⁸⁷ Keen 2008, 218-19.

¹⁸⁸ Keen 2008, 155 reflecting Clay and Schaffer. A UN official echoed this kind of assessment in regard to the UNMIS mission in Sudan. Personal contact, 2010.

even more restricted in contractor settings due to the necessity for adherence to a fixed contract. They persist because they are the prevailing vehicle of choice for implementation of formed programmes, long the usual method of engagement of overseas aid for development and defence ministries.¹⁸⁹

As opposed to policy, the OECD Handbook provides helpful guidance on the process of army reconstruction. Linkages to wider SSR efforts as part of defence reform are important. Police functions and responsibilities vis-à-vis the armed forces, especially, need to be carefully delineated and well understood.¹⁹⁰ Oversight is critical, through a variety of institutions. There are a number of important issues to consider in army reconstruction programme design.¹⁹¹ Building reconstruction constituencies both within and beyond the military is especially important. Within the military, the interests of the different functional, hierarchical, and social groupings need to be considered and factored into the process. Once the need for a reconstruction or redevelopment programme has been accepted, creating a consensus on objectives and benchmarks is important.¹⁹² Here, it can be difficult to avoid subvention by particular vested interests. Advisors' reports also make it clear that there can be significant resistance to setting clear objectives. Indigenous senior officers sometimes do not wish to commit targets to paper,¹⁹³ often, probably, to avoid being held accountable.

Encouraging public debate on defence and security issues allows the security concerns of more groups to be heard. It can potentially increase long-term sustainability by fostering greater local ownership, though it will be influenced by vested interests. South Africa is a good example of improved public involvement heightening the effectiveness and credibility of the reform process.¹⁹⁴ To inculcate lasting improvements in armies' effectiveness, it is likely that improvements in management and accountability will be more fruitful – a contention supported by Scheye and McLean's work.¹⁹⁵ Without well-entrenched management procedures,

¹⁸⁹ Ball and Hendrickson, IDRC 2005, 15.

¹⁹⁰ OECD Handbook 2007, Section 7.2, 124, 127.

¹⁹¹ OECD Handbook 2007, Section 7.2, Part 5, 129.

¹⁹² Ibid., 129-130, 133. Subvention took place, for example, in Indonesia.

¹⁹³ Alistair Mack, "Observations on 12 Months Loan Service with the IMATT Sierra Leone: Working in a Different Culture," (British Army, 2006), 18.

¹⁹⁴ Laurie Nathan, 'No Ownership, No Commitment,' University of Birmingham, 2007, 96-99.

¹⁹⁵ Scheye and McLean, "Enhancing the Delivery of Justice and Security," 39.

short-term training improvements are likely to be dissipated. If such procedures are firmly set in place, conscientious internal review may eventually lead to priorities being identified for donor consideration, at the very least.

The OECD outlines a number of lessons which have been learned during previous reform processes in the former Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and elsewhere. These include the need to build reform constituencies, and the need to challenge unbridled military secrecy.¹⁹⁶ Most recent civil wars have involved extensive violence against the civilian population. These and other undesirables need to be prevented from entering the permanent force.¹⁹⁷ The recent process in Liberia provides the best example of filtering potential applicants for a new army. Extensive background checks, including home visits and interviews were conducted.¹⁹⁸ Once the undesirables have been filtered out, the new soldiers must gain public trust if the force is to be effective.¹⁹⁹

The level of attention paid to the OECD DAC guidelines in the army reconstruction arena has been limited. As mentioned above, numerous commentators note that a 'train and equip' approach has prevailed over concerns over higher-level governance of the security sector. More widely, with the exception of South Africa and Sierra Leone, an assessment of SSR in Africa in 2005 found that while various types of security reform programmes were planned or under way, few of them conformed to the OECD-DAC definition.²⁰⁰ The process in Iraq echoes this trend.²⁰¹

Stephen Burgess, Alix Boucher, Len LeRoux and Eric Bonnemaïson offer a number of army reconstruction recommendations. In 2008 Burgess wrote possibly the most important directly relevant work to date on integrating security forces.²⁰² He examined post-conflict African armies which were formed by merging rival warring factions into a new army. He identified four factors that he determined affected the

¹⁹⁶ OECD Handbook 2007, op cit., 132-3.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Sean McFate, 'The Art and Aggravation of Vetting in Post Conflict Environments,' *Military Review*, July-August 2007

¹⁹⁹ OECD Handbook 2007, op. cit., 134.

²⁰⁰ Eboe Hutchful and 'Kayode Fayemi, 'A Survey of Security Sector Reform in Africa,' *Conflict, Security, and Development Group Papers No.3*, May 2005, 15.

²⁰¹ Conversation with Colonel Thomas Dempsey US Army (Ret'd), 29 October 2009.

²⁰² Stephen F. Burgess, "Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict," *African Security* 2, no. 1 (2008).

success or failure of integrating security forces. The four variables were state strength, external involvement and assistance, the professionalism of contending militias, and the management of the integration process. However Burgess's work does not examine some of the factors involved in great detail. The discussion above critiquing SSR examines most of the factors he describes in a more precise fashion.

Boucher authored a note on current practice on defence sector reform in 2009.²⁰³ She echoed the primacy of a needs assessment when designing programmes, and asked whether armed forces were really actually necessary (as opposed to perhaps only border guards or a *gendarmerie*). Roles and responsibilities needed to be defined, and existing armed forces need to be carefully evaluated to determine whether they are either too large or too small to meet the country's requirements. The armed forces' role, purpose, and structure needs to be driven by the country's national security strategy and policy documents. She echoes the need for coordination between different donors' programmes referred to above.

In 2006, LeRoux developed a vision of armed forces which were 'appropriate, adequate, accountable, and affordable.' Creating forces appropriate to their missions means a focus on realistic missions; 'fast reaction to humanitarian disasters,' and 'effective support to civil authorities,' are better priorities than the unreal prospect of defence against external state military aggression.²⁰⁴ Herbst points out that borders can often be guaranteed by international customary practice, with little likelihood of border changes. 'Weak states have been able to claim sovereignty over distant borderlands because no other state could challenge their rule.'²⁰⁵²⁰⁶ Development or maintenance of a *gendarmerie* capability is perfectly legitimate, though not historical practice in Anglophone states.²⁰⁷ Bonnemaïson warns that the basic mission of the military must not become either a quasi-police role or that of replacing private companies undertaking developmental work. Yet other scholars argue however that

²⁰³ Boucher, "Defence Sector Reform: A Note on Current Practice."

²⁰⁴ Len le Roux, Challenges for Defence Planners in Africa: Ensuring Appropriate, Adequate, Accountable, and Affordable Armed Forces, African Security Review Vol. 15, No.4, December 2006.

²⁰⁵ Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*,

²⁰⁶ Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000, quoted in Jonathan Di John, 'Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States,' Crisis States Research Centre/LSE, January 2008, 30.

²⁰⁷ Eric Bonnemaïson, 'Security Sector Planning in Africa: Military force as a public good,' African Security Review, Vol. 11, No.2, 2002.

such a role can free up scarce resources.²⁰⁸ During the first decade of the twenty-first century such a development role for armies in Africa remained a temptation to national governments.²⁰⁹ The present author believes, that a properly relief and development role, might allieviate to an extent that lack of activity that LeRoux's 'unreal prospect' of exterior defence implies.

This is a thesis focused upon weak states which have had to accept international intervention forces. The evidence suggests that it is extremely difficult to reconstruct or otherwise create effective, accountable armies in these type of weak states. Therefore the intellectual question of how to create such armies remains unresolved. State and army are intrinsically linked. The literature suggests that evolution through war is the only known way of building effective states.²¹⁰ European rulers threatened with losing their states' existence were forced to make state structures more effective in order to repel attacks. Many weak states in Europe were destroyed in continual warfare over hundreds of years.²¹¹ State boundaries continually moved, as strong states reshaped and destroyed weaker states. The surviving states eventually created effective state institutions, including armies.

Jeffrey Herbst explored this issue in regard to Africa in his book *States and Power in Africa*, published in 2000. He noted that the OAU's 1964 Cairo resolution on border problems froze state boundaries in Africa through a 'pledge to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence.' This was intended to avoid threats to the political leadership of the newly independent colonial states. With state boundaries frozen, the type of warfare that created effective states in Europe could not take place in post-colonial Africa.²¹² Diplomatic compromises in other regions of the

²⁰⁸ Anja Miller, 'Military Mergers: The Reintegration of Armed Forces After Civil Wars,' Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2001, 130.

²⁰⁹ Some opinion in Sierra Leone favours such a role: 'There was a view among some Sierra Leone interviewees that the RSLAF should be less of a western-style army and more of a community-engaged army that engages in reconstruction alongside civilians.' DfID CPP Evaluation Report 1-2004, 17.

Brownie Samukai, the Liberian Minister of Defence from 2006 has expressed this view; it remains current in Monrovia as of October 2010. In the DR Congo a development role has also been mooted for the army. Caty Clement, 'SSR in the DRC,' DCAF Yearbook 2009, 2009, 97.

²¹⁰ Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, 103-104.13-14, 103-106.

²¹¹ Charles Tilly, 'Reflections upon the History of European State-Making,' in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly, Princeton, 1975, p.38, in Herbst, *ibid.*, 106.

²¹² Herbst, 2000, 103-104.

world have also created the same type of unmoving boundaries. Examples relevant to this thesis include the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It appears that there is a conceptual answer to how to create effective and potentially accountable armies, but it may not be of immediate assistance for the states at the core of this thesis.

The DDR Experience

Army reconstruction is one of a number of SSR programmatic components whose outcome depends heavily on the result of the critical interim period, immediately after a peace accord has been signed. To allow implementation to begin, the intervening force must quickly seize dominance of the security space.²¹³ Once this dominance has been ensured, threats to the peace process can be addressed.

This is the point from which disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes have a crucial role. DDR programmes aim to transition former soldiers of national armed forces and insurgent or warlord fighters from a precarious existence as combatants to productive members of society. DDR programmes under the United Nations banner and beyond have over eighteen years of history, since programmes began in Mozambique in 1992. It is relatively easy to collect weaponry and disburse transition payments. However the most significant DDR obstacle is the repeated difficulty of reintegrating ex-combatants into social and economic life. Often the reintegration component programme is neither sufficiently well planned nor well funded. DDR is important for army reconstruction because it serves as the critical transition link between warring combatant and retrained soldier status. If it is executed badly, there will be much more difficulty recreating an army.

The conventional view of DDR can be summarized through its treatment in the OECD Handbook and the ISS's monograph on Sierra Leone. The process consists of planning, scheduling implementation, collecting weapons, storage and disposal or destruction, monitoring and verification, and reintegration efforts.²¹⁴ The OECD adds the necessity to make decisions on post-conflict security forces prior to

²¹³ Paddy Ashdown, *Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 2007, 69-71.

²¹⁴ Institute for Security Studies, 'Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery,' ISS Monograph Series No.80, March 2003, Mark Malan, Introduction, 19

demobilization, so as to smooth the process out and to avoid a security vacuum, as well as the need for an effective census and identification programme, in order to reestablish democratic control and build public trust.²¹⁵ Members of the military who will be retired or demobilized by reconstruction processes need to have expectations of generous separation support dampened if at all possible. This is not a hard and fast rule, as potential political disruptions by former combatants during DDR may force reassessment in the interests of keeping the peace.²¹⁶ Stockpile security is also an issue.

Beyond demobilization, the process can involve counseling, civic education, and retraining of ex-combatants in useful skills. Yet much of the retraining, for example, in Sierra Leone, in car repair and carpentry,²¹⁷ is not particularly productive due to lack of economic opportunity and start-up capital.²¹⁸ Furthermore, in countries which are fundamentally primary producers, there is often little interest in agriculture, where the bulk of opportunities lie.²¹⁹ If demobilized combatants are not placed into employment or provided with skills training opportunities, they can slip into crime or banditry.²²⁰ Tailored reintegration programmes, such as that of Land Mine Action in Liberia, can provide a solution, where training is supplemented with individual placement of ex-combatants back into preferred places of settlement.²²¹ However such programmes are relatively expensive and very resource intensive, and thus difficult to mount on a large scale. Spear emphasizes that while reintegration is difficult, it remains the most important part of the process, even if delayed by years.

²¹⁵ OECD Handbook, 2007, 106-7.

²¹⁶ OECD Handbook, 2007, 132-3

²¹⁷ Jeremy Ginifer in ISS 2003, 41

²¹⁸ For example, in Liberia (author's personal experience) and Sierra Leone. Jeremy Ginifer, 'Reintegration of Ex-combatants,' in Institute for Security Studies, 'Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery,' ISS Monograph Series No.80, March 2003, 39.

²¹⁹ Jeremy Ginifer in ISS 2003, *ibid.*, and author's conversation with youth in East Timor, mid 2003.

²²⁰ Mark Knight, 'Expanding the DDR Model: Politics and Organisations,' *JoSSM*, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2008 citing P. Collier 'Demobilization and Insecurity: A Study in the Economics of the Transition from War to Peace' *Journal of International Development*, Volume 6, 3:343-351, and Kees Kingma, 1999. 'Post-war Demobilisation and Reintegration and Peace-building', a report submitted for International Conference and Expert-Group Meeting: The Contribution of Disarmament and Conversion to Conflict Prevention and its Relevance for Development Cooperation.' Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion.

²²¹ International Crisis Group, 'Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform,' 13 January 2009, appendices.

Johanna Spear highlighted challenges and opportunities encountered by numerous DDR programmes in a 2005 e-book summary.²²² Challenges included the insufficient attention to reintegration as noted above, and neglect of psychological issues. Neglect of psychological reintegration hampers the ability of ex-combatants to feel fully part of society once again. Issues that hamper DDR and are common with other SSR efforts include the short attention spans of donors. DDR cannot save a flawed or unpopular peace settlement – ‘politics is the independent variable,’ not the technical perfection of the DDR process. This is true of other SSR efforts as well. Porous borders and widespread regional conflict can also hamper DDR efforts limited to one country. Combatants can go through the DDR process in one country, and then become involved in another conflict in close geographical proximity. Attempting to identify potential solutions, Spear calls for deeper local knowledge to be available to interveners, perhaps involving contributions from anthropologists.

Knight describes the tendency of the insurgent groups’ command structures to remain as mutual support networks for the former combatants, contrary to the stated aim of DDR which is often stated to be dissolving such structures.²²³ Such networks sometimes become criminalized, becoming corrupt political networks as referred to by Reno above. Knight emphasizes the necessity in some cases to provide specialized, targeted assistance to the former insurgent organisation so that it could become a pure civilian organisation willing to pursue its (often political) objectives peacefully.

In some cases, DDR is only really half completed, and the new forces must deal with soldiers that really should be in retirement, such as the personnel of the 1st Battalion F-FTDL in East Timor²²⁴ and the thousands of older soldiers in the DR Congo’s integrated brigades.²²⁵ Legal codes applicable to the armed forces in some situations do not have provision for routine retirements.²²⁶ Provision for retirement of soldiers is often overlooked, but can be vital to appropriately cater for potential spoilers.

²²² Johanna Spear ‘Conclusions,’ in Ann Fitz-Gerald and Hilary Mason (eds.), ‘From Conflict to Community: A Combatant’s Return to Citizenship,’ GfN-SSR, Shrivenham, 2005, accessed at http://www.ssronline.org/ebooks_pages2.cfm?b=7&id=170&p=170, 21 February 2010.

²²³ Mark Knight, Expanding the DDR Model, JoSSM, 2008, 10-12.

²²⁴ Edward Rees, Under Pressure: Thirty Years of Defence Force Development in East Timor, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/edr03/>, accessed 3 November 2008

²²⁵ Interview with EU official, Council of the European Union, 27 September 2007

²²⁶ Personal conversation with British advisor, Dili, East Timor, May 2003.

Makinda advances a critique of the mainstream DDR approach by challenging its foundations, which, he argues, rests to a great degree on realist and liberal theories.²²⁷ He says that a viewpoint founded upon constructivist theory would show that peace processes, including DDR, are not just reliant on financial resources and technical arrangements, though they are important. Instead, he argues that the interplay between disarmament, on the one hand, and reconstruction, political, social, and economic, on the other, 'is at the core of any successful peacebuilding ..project.'²²⁸ Makinda's point is correct, and confidence-building mechanisms need to be considered for inclusion in any post-conflict redevelopment process planning.

Mistakes or omissions in the DDR process will damage the following army reconstruction programme. A graphic example can be seen in the Congo, where 'non-integrated' FARDC formations fomented trouble and forced the deployment of unready integrated brigades into combat. The OECD urges that 'planning for DDR ..be a thorough process that takes into account the future size and shape of the armed forces.'²²⁹ This is the ideal. Yet the more comprehensive and complete the DDR process, the easier the following army reconstruction programme will be.

Doctrine for Reconstructing Armies

Until around 2007, it appears that no explicit military doctrine had been produced which mandated how developed-world armies might assist the reconstruction of partner armies in the developing world. In keeping with army reconstruction's Western character, two major Western armies, the United States and the United Kingdom, appear to be the sole source of doctrine on the subject.²³⁰ Specific formal

²²⁷ Samuel M. Makinda, 'Disarmament and reintegration of combatants,' in Maley, Sampford, and Thakur (eds), 'From civil strife to civil society: civil and military responsibilities in disrupted states,' United Nations University Press, 2003, 309-326.

²²⁸ Ibid., 321.

²²⁹ OECD Handbook 2008, 134.

²³⁰ It has not been possible to unequivocally determine that only U.S. and British doctrine covers army reconstruction. Trying to do so is impossible, as it is attempting to prove a negative. Discussion with liaison officers at the French Army's Centre de doctrine d'emploi des forces, their doctrine centre, have revealed neither Canada, Australia, France, Germany, or China maintains any such doctrine. The French Army intends however to begin such development in the new academic year of late 2010. The officers went as far as to say only the UK and U.S. had such doctrine. (Telephone call July 2010).

doctrine on army reconstruction has only appeared since 2007. Earlier U.S. doctrine on Foreign Internal Defence (FID) might be thought to have some relevance, however, in practice, it does not appear to have been utilized.

The first example of army reconstruction in line with this thesis's definition was that of Zimbabwe in 1980. There is no conclusive data on whether the British Military Assistance and Training Team (BMATT) had a manual or procedures for integrating and constructing the Zimbabwe National Army, but it appears unlikely. The BMATT commander in 1989-91, then Brigadier Tim Toyne-Sewell, had no such doctrine available to him.²³¹ This is because the British Army has historically been a pragmatically based organization which has not relied heavily on formal doctrine. It emphasised flexibility and an empirical approach.²³² For much of the post 1945 period, General Kizely says, 'to most officers, there was no such thing as 'doctrine,' only 'pamphlets,' – and they were at best a basis for discussion, and for quoting in promotions exams.'²³³ Thinking began to change in the 1990s after General Sir Nigel Bagnall commissioned *Design for Military Operations*, but this trend does not appear to have produced any doctrinal thinking for reconstructing armies until a British pamphlet of 2007. In addition, Thomas Marks reminds us that just because doctrine directs that an army should operate in a particular way does not mean that these instructions will be heeded.²³⁴ It is likely that the British doctrine described below, though more realistic in its appraisal of political factors, is less heeded than the counterpart doctrine from the U.S. Army.²³⁵

Formal doctrine on army reconstruction had to wait until the British and U.S. Armies found it needed in Iraq and Afghanistan. These recently developed manuals provide the most explicit guidance identified on the actual mechanics of reconstructing or redeveloping a land force. Describing effectively the same process, they exhibit strong similarities. Their most severe weakness is their primarily tactical focus, which

²³¹ Correspondence with Major General Tim Toyne-Sewell DL late KOSB, January 2010.

²³² Gary Sheffield, 'Doctrine and Command in the British Army: A Historical Overview,' Army Doctrine Publication Land Operations, DG D&D, May 2005, 165, 178-9.

²³³ J Kiszely, 'The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945,' in B Holden-Reid (ed.), 'Military Power: Land Warfare in Theory and Practice,' London, Cass, 1997, 185, cited in Sheffield, 2005, 178.

²³⁴ Dale Andrade, "Book Reviews," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 17, no. 1 (2006).

²³⁵ Claudia Harvey and Mark Wilkinson, "The Value of Doctrine," *The RUSI Journal* 154, no. 6 (December 2009): 26-31.

does not pay enough attention to integrating the army reconstruction process into operational and strategic level campaign planning.

First compiled was the British Army's Doctrine Note 07/16, *Developing Indigenous Armies*, completed in 2007. The Note says that 'development of an indigenous army is easier to describe than to define.'²³⁶ It divides the task into preparation, recruitment, training, and operations, while noting that these kinds of distinctions are not so clear in real life. Key suggested fundamentals included the importance of motivating the indigenous soldier, applying local solutions, selecting and maintaining long term goals, flexibility, and the distribution of indigenous success stories to bolster morale and confidence.²³⁷ A good example of the latter is the British arrangement of the entry into Musa Qala in 2007. The Afghans took the lead, and the situation was arranged so that the media saw no ISAF personnel on the streets when the cameras arrived.²³⁸

Preparation steps include identifying individuals who are intuitively suited to working with indigenous soldiers, building acceptance of the innate nature of the indigenous force, and both cultural and specific military-cultural awareness. Developing language skills as well as subject matter experts who can teach the operations and equipment support for each weapon or vehicle is also necessary. Recruitment also includes sustaining the buildup of the indigenous force from the outset. Training an indigenous army should be 'characterised by understanding and assessment of the indigenous soldiers' capabilities.'²³⁹ Ideally, the content of the training would be decided by the indigenous soldiers themselves, though this is usually not possible from the outset.

On operations, options for support of the indigenous army include incorporating individual soldiers as an integral part of the indigenous unit, partnering allied and indigenous units, or embedding assistance teams. The final stage is transition to self reliance, in which one needs to express success or failure of the reconstruction effort in terms of regional normality. Developed-world standards are not necessarily applicable. Timing the transition from directing efforts to mentoring indigenous

²³⁶ Headquarters Land Warfare Centre, *Doctrine Note 07/16, Developing Indigenous Armies*, 2007, 1.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, pages 3-5.

²³⁸ Discussion during a presentation on 'Command in the Contemporary Operating Environment,' Joint Services Command and Staff College, Wednesday, 25 February 2009.

²³⁹ *Doctrine Note 07/16, op. cit.*, 14.

trainers or commanders is ultimately an intuitive judgment based upon the level of indigenous capability and the capability levels normal in the region.

The comparable U.S. Army manual, Field Manual 3-07.1 Security Force Assistance, was published on 1 May 2009. It defines Security Force Assistance as ‘the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.’²⁴⁰ Security Force assistance itself is a new concept, only coined in 2006. When the U.S. Army arrived in Afghanistan and Iraq, it found itself ‘doing something where they had no existing terms describing what they were doing or doctrine on how to do it.’²⁴¹ The nearest available doctrine was ‘Foreign Internal Defense,’ (FID) when the U.S. helps a host nation government prevent or defeat insurgency, lawlessness or subversion. During the Cold War, FID was doctrinally a U.S. Army Special Forces task, to train, advise, and assist host nation forces. Yet until Iraq and Afghanistan had a government, what the U.S. Army and its allies were carrying out was not FID. To make matters worse, if the indigenous army is being trained for both exterior and interior defence, depending on the exact nature of the assistance, it could fall under a whole range of separate, confusing U.S. definitions.²⁴²

Confusion exists even when the U.S. trains a force, such as the Georgians, to defend themselves from both external and internal threats. Such training would doctrinally be Security Cooperation (SC) and Security Assistance (SA) but not FID. However, if those same Georgian forces received Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) with Special Forces or a combined exercise with U.S. GPF [general purpose forces], that training would still be SC but it would no longer be SA. If the training was part of the State Department Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) conducted by a contractor, DOD might not be involved at all and in that case it would not be SC but it would be SA. None of these familiar doctrinal terms cover all developmental situations which can easily lead to gaps in planning and confusion during execution.

²⁴⁰ Field Manual 3-07.1 Security Force Assistance, Department of the Army, May 2009, 1-1.

²⁴¹ Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, ‘JCISFA SFA Planners’ Guide for FSF Force Development,’ (DRAFT), 15 October 2009, Chapter 1, page 9, line 57-58. (Final Draft)

²⁴² Ibid, Chapter 1, page 9, lines 71-78.

The previous terms, FID, SC, and SA were each tied to a particular aspect of the issue, rather than the activity itself.²⁴³ Foreign Internal Defense described, as its name implied, internal defence, usually counter-insurgency. Security Cooperation was associated with a single agency – the Department of Defense – and aimed to build defence relationships that promoted specific U.S. security interests, developed friendly military capabilities, and provided U.S. forces with access to host nations. Security Assistance, on the other hand, was tied to funds provided by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 whereby the U.S. government provided defence articles, training, or services in furtherance of national objectives. To avoid rewriting the existing doctrine completely, it was decided to create a new term which would focus on the activity, rather than the location, funding source, or agency. ‘Security Force Assistance’ was the new term selected.

The best available doctrinal basis for U.S. and U.S. contractor activities in the early 1990s, while acknowledging these complications, remained Foreign Internal Defense. Yet this doctrine was focused on relatively small-scale support to irregular operations, not training either conventional heavy manoeuvre fighting forces or forces for external defence. Its essentials are described in the 1994 manual FM 31-20-3, ‘Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces.’ The manual states that the ‘primary SF mission in FID is to organize, train, advise, and improve the tactical and technical proficiency of these forces, so they can defeat the insurgency without direct U.S. involvement.’²⁴⁴ It has been described as being about ‘professionalising gangs,’ and key personnel involved in the Liberia AFL programme from 2004 have said that it was not appropriate for use when trying to reconstruct an army.²⁴⁵ In addition, as described above, it was a Special Forces doctrine. While some of the soldiers and contractors involved in the first wave of U.S. army reconstruction programmes in the mid 1990s might have had some involvement in Special Forces, key personnel did not.²⁴⁶ It appears that significant numbers of the officers involved in crafting and implementing the U.S. programmes from the mid 1990s would have had limited involvement at best with Foreign Internal Defense doctrine.

²⁴³ Ibid., Chapter 1, page 9, lines 80-84.

²⁴⁴ FM 31-20-3, ‘Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces,’ 1994, 1-17.

²⁴⁵ E-mail with former U.S. advisor, 6-7 September 2010

²⁴⁶ Examples include General Carl Vuono and Major General William Boice. Both had had overwhelmingly conventional force manoeuvre assignments.

The Special Forces manual describes in detail the procedures to be followed in conducting these activities, but focuses upon the mechanics of imparting knowledge, without incorporating ways in which such activities might form part of a democratically controlled army. Not only did such assistance focus on the mechanics of training, but it appears that, in most cases at least, the U.S. ‘did not care’ whether the training successfully enhanced the capability of host nation forces.²⁴⁷ The object of the training, during the Cold War, was met if the U.S. gained political advantage from providing the training. Whether host-nation military capabilities were enhanced might be incidental.

Despite some fifteen years of additional experience, and the changed imperatives of the post-Cold War environment, the 2009 Security Force Assistance manual maintains a largely unchanged focus on the mechanics of training foreign forces. As part of its ‘Framework’ chapter, the U.S. Security Force Assistance manual describes the army reconstruction process in terms of ‘Tasks.’ Tasks in the U.S. model include organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, and advise and assist. Initial organisation of foreign security forces involves decisions on structure and overall procedures of the security force. Recruiting is the next stage, and requires attention to leader selection, personnel accountability, and demobilisation at the other end of the process. The first training task is making sure the foreign trainers are ready for their task and attuned to the host environment. Training standards must be set, and systematic training programmes and leaders properly developed. Appropriate equipment must be bought and facilities made available. Advising and assisting the foreign force is the final stage and continues until conditions no longer require it.

The U.S. manual presents building up foreign security forces as almost a purely technical activity – as the text lacks consideration of political factors, in contrast to its British counterpart. As such it is very much in line with the apolitical approach seen in earlier work such as the 1994 Foreign Internal Defense manual. As a technical set of instructions, it fits in well with other U.S. Army doctrine, and is more likely to be followed by U.S. officers and soldiers. The U.S. and British manuals take a differing

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Conversation with Colonel Thomas Dempsey US Army (Ret’d), 29 October 2009.

approach to the quality and nature of the new force: while the British manual says that ‘every ...plan for engagement with indigenous forces should be steeped in cooperation with local and regional military-cultural normality,’²⁴⁸ the U.S. manual has a stronger emphasis on replicating U.S. practices: ‘...many armies lack a professional NCO corps; establishing one for a foreign security force may prove difficult. In the meantime, adjustments will have to be made.’²⁴⁹

A significant deficiency within the U.S. manual is inherent in its technically heavy approach. Egnell and Halden argue that such concepts share the belief that with enough knowledge of the context, the actors, and their preferences, one can apply the correct actions and therefore produce specific, pre-determined outcomes. The effect of power relations is not sufficiently incorporated and the world is viewed as highly malleable and controllable. ‘By applying variables X and Y with the appropriate mix we can socially engineer our world as we see fit – even within historically minute time frames.’²⁵⁰ They go on to say that this type of orthodox positivism in the social sciences is rare, and reflects the inherent difficulty, if not impossibility, of explaining or predicting the outcomes of complex social processes and individual behaviour.²⁵¹ Egnell and Halden argue in response to this issue that contextual understanding needs to be increased and expectations of success reduced. Even if much greater knowledge of the context than foreign training forces usually have is assumed, the U.S. manual, with its detailed methodology, tends to imply greater expectations of success than can be realistically expected.

The two doctrinal manuals together present a reasonably consistent framework for the actual activities involved in reconstructing armies. Both have preparative, recruitment, and operational phases, before noting important aspects for transition to self reliance. The UK construct is depicted in Figure 3 below. Often at this stage the majority of service support activities is still being carried out either by supervising developed-world armies (such as in Afghanistan or Iraq) or contractors (such as in Liberia).

²⁴⁸ British Army HQ Land Warfare Centre, ‘Developing Indigenous Armies,’ Doctrine Note 07/16, 2007, Page 07/16-3 point 8.

²⁴⁹ United States Army, Field Manual 3-07.1, page 2-4, section 2-25.

²⁵⁰ Egnell and Halden, *op. cit.*, 47.

²⁵¹ Egnell and Halden, *ibid.*




Figure 3: UK representation of the army reconstruction process, showing time progression from left to right. Source: Doctrine Note 07/16, page 6.

Interestingly, neither manual mentions the necessity of the army under training identifying lessons after operations and implementing associated changes. Neither also mentions the recuperation or re-constitution which usually follows operations in developed-world armies.²⁵² This sees personnel promoted, depart on courses, and losses replaced by newly arrived personnel, followed by the unit with its mix of old and new soldiers shaking down and beginning to repeat the training cycle.²⁵³ For example, ‘harmony guidelines’ for the British Army lay down that soldiers should not spend any more than 415 days of separated service in any period of 30 months.²⁵⁴ A recuperation period is required if units are not to be gradually worn down in manning, morale, and effectiveness.²⁵⁵ It is possible that this stage has only been omitted because it was not thought necessary to spell out stages post self reliance.

Overall the two manuals together have something to offer. They do reflect differences in national doctrinal style, with the U.S. emphasis being far more prescriptive while the British not intending be ‘a set of rules’ but instead seeking to ‘guide, explain and educate.’ The broad applicability of the U.S. approach is however hampered by its insistence on U.S. techniques and practices. It might be wise to modify the U.S. prescriptions offered by incorporating greater local ownership. As noted above, their principal weakness is their tactical focus, but this is inherent in military doctrinal manuals intended to be used by soldiers in the field. The political maneuvering and

²⁵² For the latest terminology for this as regards the British Army, see <http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/10129.html> (accessed 30 September 2009), which notes recuperation as the first stage of the ‘Force Operations and Readiness Mechanism.’

²⁵³ For an alternate view of the training cycle from a Soviet perspective, see ‘Viktor Suvorov’ (Vladimir Rezun), ‘Inside the Soviet Army,’ MacMillan, New York, 1982, Part VII, section ‘Day after day.’ Accessed online at <http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov12/index.html>, 12 April 2010.

²⁵⁴ House of Commons Written Answers to Questions, 7 March 2007, accessed at <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070307/text/70307w0001.htm>, 5 January 2010.

²⁵⁵ Major R P McDermott RRF, ‘Fielding an Afghan Brigade,’ MA Thesis, DCMT, July 2006

compromise required to successfully arrange army reconstruction programmes, or other stabilization lines of operation, is not usually covered by military manuals. There is insufficient information to judge whether the use of these manuals has made a significant difference since they were introduced. Given the 'Restricted' classification of Doctrine Note 07/16, any commentary on its value would have to be in classified publications, making it harder to access.

Conclusions

The environment in which army redevelopment and reconstruction programmes have taken place has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. Many such programmes are now viewed through the conceptual lens of SSR. SSR evolved from converging academic domains and intergovernmental policy initiatives in the aftermath of the Cold War. Development theory and practice, as well as civil-military relations, began to include security more and more as part of the development challenge. The expansion of the EU and NATO, and peace consolidation efforts, both UN and non-UN, began to include security reform efforts. The resulting concept came to include DDR, redevelopment or reconstruction of security forces, intelligence, border security, and gendarmerie reform, and a whole spectrum of oversight improvements in order to make democratic control fully possible. As more and more interventions were mounted, it became clear that well-executed DDR was often a prerequisite to building effective and accountable new armies.

Aid organisations (especially the new British government department DfID and USAID), the United Nations, and international financial institutions, became more interested in incorporating security aspects into their wider programmes. The United Nations, slowly became aware that an integrated approach to dealing with these type of issues, from DDR to formulating national security policies, could be of much assistance. Yet of all the intergovernmental agencies which became involved in SSR, perhaps the most engaged was the OECD DAC. It took a definitional lead on the concept, first marked with the issue of their 2004 policy paper, and later with the issue of the OECD Handbook on SSR in 2007.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁶ See Ball and Hendrickson, 'Trends in Security Sector Reform: Policy, Practice, and Research,' IDRC, 2005, 10-11, 14-16, and the subsequent OECD DAC Handbook on SSR, 2007.

Since the codification of the SSR concept as a distinct concept in the late 1990s, much experience has been gained in reconstructing security institutions. Much useful literature on a variety of SSR sub-topics has been produced as a result of this practical experience. Significant lessons have also been identified from activities during the Cold War and the early 1990s. One of the results of those lessons has been the codification of SSR principles by the OECD. The principles reflect normative aspirations for how the process should unfold. Examination of the army reconstruction experience can be utilized to amend the principles in line with what has been learnt since 1980.

A number of themes emerge clearly from the above discussion of army reconstruction. Whether in Namibia, Kosovo, Bosnia, or Afghanistan, there are clear similarities in both success stories and the welter of challenges. Three main points emerge. First, army reconstruction is a significant area of SSR, frequently implemented in adverse environments. Second, three main areas of guidance on army reconstruction can be derived from the existing literature. Yet the focus is predominantly on training and equipping programmes to enhance capability, with much less emphasis on governance. Third, several key SSR norms, such as democratization, can conflict with social and historical norms in many countries where army reconstruction takes place.

First, army reconstruction has become a significant programmatic area of SSR. But in the environments under study the state often does not have the capacity to effectively provide security. This affects the implementation of the wider liberal peace project. The environment is much more adverse than the development and post-authoritarian (often Eastern European) contexts in which much of the conceptual basis of SSR was shaped. The adverse environment affects the conceptual congruence between SSR and army reconstruction. Close examination indicates that relevant *political-economic factors* are significantly different, and that state agencies, including armies, are actually a minority provider of security. A wide range of non-state security providers – including militias, community groupings, and commercial security companies - make up the other, majority, portion of the equation. The space available to implement the SSR principles is often much reduced.

Second, the guidance that has now been formulated for army reconstruction has not been effective in advancing the debate beyond that historical emphasis on *capability enhancement*. Much of this has only been released recently, from 2007-2009.

The guidance covers three broad areas. The OECD provides the best guidance for the first two areas. While the OECD Handbook is unduly constrained by its predilection for state-centered solutions, it does provide the most recent and widely-accepted guidance on higher level state policy concerns, as well as factors which drive the assessment and programme design process. The third area, army reconstruction capability enhancement itself, is well addressed by the British and U.S. military doctrinal documents. However these three sources have not been integrated into a coherent framework. The OECD and British documents, which do acknowledge the significant influence political considerations have on the entire process, contrast to a marked degree with the enhancement of capacity emphasis of the U.S. manual. This emphasis on capacity has marked the U.S. military approach since the Cold War, and has been exacerbated by the imperatives of the 'War on terror'. A lack of emphasis on local ownership means that the U.S. approach can result in an unsustainable army whose capability is lost after foreign support is withdrawn.

Third, the OECD's *SSR principles*, widely accepted by donors, are often at odds with the nature of the recipient state. The democratising aims of SSR stem from the global North. They reflect the nature of their originator societies, which have gone through much political evolution to arrive at today's relatively open democracies. Frequently the states in which army reconstruction and wider SSR is undertaken have inherently different political traditions. Many, especially in Africa, have strong neo-patrimonial structures which resist democratic initiatives. Replacing personalized control by the institutional safeguards inherent in the OECD approach can be unwelcome.

Improving accountability and management arrangements for security forces can threaten elite ownership over them. Local ownership, if seen as efforts to build broad popular legitimacy for security forces, can also be unwelcome to existing elites.

Alleviating these value conflicts presents a thicket of difficulties. But choosing which SSR standards are most important for each individual programme, and accepting resultant trade-offs, may help to pave the path ahead.

These three points suggest that the SSR principles themselves would be likely to gain from reappraisal based upon post-conflict army reconstruction experience. The three key factors identified above - relevant political-economic drivers, efforts to enhance capability, and the applicability of the SSR principles - provide an analytical construct by which post-conflict army reconstruction can be rigorously examined in order to elicit elements for potential improvement. However, before this can be done, a methodological approach must be selected that will elicit the required data so that analysis can take place. The method selected must be appropriate to both the researcher's worldview and the research subject. Therefore, the following chapter on methodology analyses alternatives and outlines the chosen approach.

Chapter 4: Methodology

This thesis aims to suggest revisions to the current OECD DAC SSR principles from the experience of post-conflict army reconstruction since 1980. The only comparable UK doctoral theses uncovered were both historical, a 1993 Oxford examination of the performance of the Egyptian Army in the reign of Mehmed Ali Pasa in the 1830s by K.M.M. Fahmy, and a 1998 SOAS dissertation by R.V.J. Young on the history of the Iraq Levies from 1915 to 1932. Repeated searches for other theses, using four different databases, has yielded no other works.

This chapter establishes the methodological framework used for the study. It begins with the arguments already marshalled in the literature review conclusions, including the conclusion that the SSR principles would benefit from amendment on the basis of experience. The most fundamental tenets of social science and the researcher's viewpoints upon them are then reviewed. The development of the positivist paradigm is briefly described, and then three main currents of the interpretivist paradigm that developed in reaction to it. Quantitative and qualitative research as alternate possible research clusters are then examined. The chapter then briefly describes the various qualitative research paradigms through which social science can be viewed, and how their strengths and limitations affect this research. Qualitative research methods are then discussed, before the research design is outlined.

The research design is focused around a number of research objectives, together forming a narrowing case study approach. The utility and limitations of specifically applicable qualitative indicators are discussed. The extent of the claims this research can make is then explained. Political-economic factors, capability enhancement, and the SSR principles together form a three-part analytical construct that allows rigorous examination of the SSR principles in order to identify areas for potential improvement. Using this construct, the multiple case analysis structure serves to confirm or eliminate broad trends elicited from the single field case study. Thereafter

alternate possible research approaches to ascertain the data required are introduced. A section on the field case study justifies the case choice and explains the methods utilized. Ethical issues and confidentiality concerns are covered. A data analysis then precedes the summary.

The State of the Literature

Post-conflict army reconstruction is a significant part of international interventions in internal conflicts. There have been a number of such interventions since 1980, and significant difficulties have been encountered. Thus the phenomenon is worthy of further study in order to identify lessons and improve processes for the future.

A wide project scope was initially chosen. Therefore, the literature review initially trialled a multi-disciplinary approach. The topic areas initially considered included defence conversion, military history (effectively a survey of relevant post-1945 military historical events), management and organisational theory, and SSR. Yet it became clear a year into the research that the number of potential relevant topical areas was too numerous to be surveyed within the time available. This left a single-domain review, and following consideration, it was decided that SSR be the chosen domain. SSR is the academic domain in which army reconstruction is most easily included. It appears to be the best available academic niche for the subject. This is because it incorporates elements of the development literature and civil-military relations in an integrated fashion.

The other principal alternative, counter-insurgency, is focused upon the best way to win wars. The use of SSR as a framework allows examination of statebuilding practices in both peace and war. Counter-insurgency would also rule out examination of army reconstruction where internal conflicts were not insurgencies. Two examples make this clear. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a war of attrition and manoeuvre, and the conflict in South Africa displayed more of the characteristics of a terrorist campaign inside the country and manoeuvre operations beyond its borders. For these reasons, selecting counter-insurgency as the single academic domain to be studied would have elicited less data.

Surveying the literature detailed in Chapter 2 presents the following picture. Firstly, army reconstruction has since 1990 become a significant programmatic component of what is now termed security sector reform. Army reconstruction is often carried out in less than benign environments. Yet the nature of army reconstruction programmes reflects more Western doctrines and practices than the environments in which it takes place. States in the developing world are often very much weaker than their Northern counterparts. They share the security environment within their accepted territorial boundaries with a wide variety of other non-state actors. This means that Northern conceptualizations of what security sector reform is achievable can vary widely from developing-country realities.²⁵⁷

Secondly, a relatively strong corpus of high-level guidance for army reconstruction can be derived from the distillation of the experience of the last fifteen years and before. The OECD's 2007 *SSR Handbook* gives guidance on both preparatory considerations and assessment and programme design. Guidance on the mechanics of army reconstruction includes a 2007 British Army doctrine note and a series of U.S. Army doctrine works which culminated in the 2009 FM 3.07-1 *Security Force Assistance*. The British and U.S. manuals together provide a fair picture of current best practice for army reconstruction. But current methods, inspired to a great degree by American practice, usually emphasize a 'train-and-equip' approach. This emphasis has its roots in the Cold War army assistance approach, which prioritized military capability development over any improvements in governance, management, or accountability. Therefore there is little tradition of management and accountability improvements for present army assistance programmes to follow. Furthermore, 'war on terror' concerns have induced a strong emphasis on increasing the effectiveness of Western allies' security forces in areas of strategic importance.

Thirdly, the OECD's SSR norms are often at odds with the nature of the recipient state. A further long-running concern has been the difficulty of putting local ownership, a core aspiration, into real practice. SSR incorporates mostly Northern norms, and the majority of SSR programmes are put in place as part of wider

²⁵⁷ See Eric Scheye and Andrew McLean, "Enhancing the Delivery of Justice and Security," (Paris: OECD, 2007).

Northern aid efforts. The democratising aims of SSR stem from the global North. They reflect the nature of their originator societies, which have gone through much political evolution to arrive at today's relatively open democracies. Frequently the states in which army reconstruction and wider SSR is undertaken have fundamentally different political traditions. Many, especially in Africa, have strong neo-patrimonial structures which resist democratic initiatives.

These findings, and especially the third, suggest the possibility of revision of the SSR principles to increase their effectiveness, based upon study of army reconstruction in adverse environments. This will be carried out through a qualitative, inductive process to build recommendations from existing data.

Social Science Research Fundamentals

The researcher's worldview shapes the way that research is conducted. Gray says that a researcher's epistemological stance influences four separate concepts. The theoretical perspectives adopted influences the research methodology. The methodology in turn influences the choice of methods.²⁵⁸ This is the reason why innate assumptions about the nature of reality that a researcher can make should be clearly established in the course of academic investigation. A researcher's perspective on ontology, or the theory of existence, also influences the lens through which one views the world. This section will first examine alternative perspectives on epistemology and ontology. It will then look at alternative perspectives and the methods selected for the first three of Gray's four elements: quantitative and qualitative research strategies, qualitative theoretical perspectives, and methodology. The detailed method selected will be described in the Research Design section.

Epistemology and ontology are perhaps the most important two branches of philosophy upon which a researcher's position must be absolutely clear. According to Gray, epistemology tries to understand 'what it means to know.' This is a philosophical view of the matter. Bryman and Bell, writing from a practical business perspective, characterise an epistemological issue as the 'question of what is (or

²⁵⁸

David E. Gray, *Doing Research in the Real World* (London: SAGE, 2004), 16.

should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline.’²⁵⁹ Perhaps the central issue in epistemology is whether social science questions can be studied according to the same principles as natural science questions.²⁶⁰ A researcher’s ontological perspective needs to be made clear. According to Gray, ontology is the study of being, or the nature of existence. The central question in ontology is whether the universe is unchanging and permanent, or formless and chaotic.²⁶¹

The natural scientific bent of this author’s upbringing dictates his perspective upon epistemology. In regard to epistemology, social science questions should be studied with methods as close as possible to those of natural science. However, it is clear that misperception and imperfect observation can distort an observer’s worldview.

The present author’s views on ontology have evolved as the thesis developed and more was learned about the various ways issues could be interpreted. Initially, he believed that reality was effectively unchanging and permanent (what is known as an objectivist ontological perspective). Constructed or subjective views of reality form the basis of the other two ontological perspectives identified by Bryman and Bell. These two perspectives seemed to represent a distortion of the universe as it actually was. Yet his view changed as more was learned about how various different perspectives could be taken. Army reconstruction in developing states appears vulnerable to different narratives depending upon the viewpoint of the observer. Thus a constructed version of reality appeared more and more appropriate as the complexities of the subject became clearer. This constructivist ontological worldview had an effect on the number of alternatives available when deciding upon the appropriate theoretical perspective.

Exactly what constitutes knowledge is contested between the social and natural sciences. As noted above, this is a central question for epistemology. Bryman and Bell say that there is ‘a long-standing debate about the appropriateness of the natural

²⁵⁹ Alan Bryman and Emma Bell, *Business Research Methods* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 13.

²⁶⁰ Alan Bryman and Emma Bell, *Business research methods* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 13.

²⁶¹ Gray, *Doing Research in the Real World*, 16-17.

science model for the study of society.’²⁶² This debate is interwoven with support for, and criticism of, positivism. Bryman and Bell define positivism as ‘an epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond.’²⁶³ They note however that the constituent elements of positivism vary depending upon the author who discusses it. However, almost invariably, a sharply-drawn distinction between theory and research is one of its key elements. The role of research is to test theory. Theories generate hypotheses, which can be tested, and will therefore allow evaluations of laws. Bryman and Bell note that the debate on the natural sciences’ model and its use in social sciences involves a number of accounts of scientific practice, such as empirical realism and critical realism. However, they say that positivism is the focus of attention, because ‘the account that is offered [of the natural sciences model] tends to have largely positivist overtones.’²⁶⁴

Interpretivism is the term Bryman and Bell use to collectively describe a number of ideas that form a competing epistemology to positivism. Supporters of an interpretivist epistemology, Bryman and Bell say, share a view that ‘the subject matter of the social sciences – people and their institutions – are fundamentally different from those of the natural sciences.’²⁶⁵ Bryman and Bell say that interpretivism forms an alternative to the positivist approach that has dominated scientific discourse for decades. They say also that this approach requires that the social scientist grasps the subjective meaning of social action.

Bryman and Bell note that interpretivism’s intellectual heritage includes Weber’s notion of *Verstehen*, and the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition. They also mention symbolic interactionism, which occupies a similar intellectual space to the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition.²⁶⁶

²⁶² Bryman and Bell, *Business research methods*, 15.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 14.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

Gordon argues that the views of Comte and Saint-Simon were too speculative and metaphysical to be regarded as predecessors of either positivism or sociology.²⁶⁷

Gordon argues that of the large number of writers that have shaped modern sociology (and thus interpretivism), three stand out from all the others: Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber.²⁶⁸ He argues that in their work, these three writers effectively defined the subject matter of modern sociology and developed many useful concepts for the future.

Weber's concept of *Verstehen*, which can be rendered in English as 'understanding,' is one of the more important of these three writers' concepts. *Verstehen* does not appear to be a clear concept. Gordon begins his explanation of Weber's work by noting that Weber wrote his scientific papers in a complex and obscure style that 'makes his ideas difficult to grasp.'²⁶⁹ Translation difficulties compound the matter. This issue noted, Gordon describes the concept as follows. The social scientist can explain events in terms familiar to anyone, if one adheres rigorously to the idea that individual persons cause social events.²⁷⁰ An individual takes purposive actions, and can construe the actions of others in similar terms. 'By tracing the causes of social events to individual actions that reflect the operations of such mental processes' such events can be made understandable.²⁷¹ Gordon says that the social scientist can usefully use a *Verstehen*-inspired heuristic approach to project oneself into the minds of others, and that this can be utilized as a normal mode of work.²⁷²

Weber was developing *Verstehen* and other concepts at roughly the same time as phenomenology was first developed by Edmund Husserl. Husserl's book *Logical Investigations* appeared in two parts in the years 1900 and 1901. Sokolowski argues that this book 'is generally considered to be the first true phenomenological work.'²⁷³

In describing phenomenology, Gordon says that it 'is naïve to treat empirical data as unproblematic equivalents of real things.' Here he draws upon 'the distinction

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 467.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 471.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to phenomenology*, Cambridge, 2000, 211.

between the information about external things that emerges from the interaction between sensations and our cognitive apparatus, and the things ‘in themselves.’²⁷⁴ Empirical facts therefore play a more sophisticated role than just sitting in judgement upon theoretical hypotheses. This distinction is at the heart of phenomenology. While Husserl developed phenomenology as a philosophy, Bryman and Bell argue that the introduction of phenomenological ideas to the social sciences was the work of Alfred Schütz. They argue that Schütz was influenced profoundly by Weber’s concept of *Verstehen* and by Husserl. Schutz’s position, Bryman and Bell say, is well captured in the following much-quoted passage.²⁷⁵

“The world of nature as explored by the natural scientist does not ‘mean’ anything to molecules, atoms, and electrons. But the observational field of the social scientist – social reality – has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the beings living, acting, and thinking within it. By a series of common-sense constructs they have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world which they experience as the reality of their daily lives. It is these thought objects of theirs which determine their behaviour by motivating it. The thought objects constructed by the social scientist, in order to grasp this social reality, have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men, living their daily life within the social world.”

These ‘thought objects’ correspond to Gordon’s conceptualization of the information derived from interaction between sensations and the cognitive apparatus.

The phenomenological approach has similarities to hermeneutics, described by Bryman and Bell as a term concerned with the theory and method of the interpretation of human action.²⁷⁶ Gray describes a hermeneutic perspective as one where social reality is seen as socially constructed, rather than being rooted in objective fact.²⁷⁷

Another influential concept for the social sciences, the paradigm concept, was first introduced by Thomas Kuhn in his book ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ in

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 612-613.

²⁷⁵ Bryman and Bell, 2003, 17.

²⁷⁶ Bryman and Bell, *Business research methods*, 15.

²⁷⁷ Gray, *Doing research in the real world*, 23.

1962.²⁷⁸ Following significant intellectual debate, Kuhn modified his position, and, as Gordon says, the changes he made effectively negated his overall theory of science.²⁷⁹ The term ‘paradigm’ was reduced to merely a theoretical hypothesis, perhaps one more central than others, but not differing from other hypotheses in any fundamental fashion. It is in this sense that the term paradigm is used in this chapter.

Quantitative and Qualitative Research Strategies

The interpretivist ideas discussed above have had significant impact upon social scientific enquiry. They demonstrate some of the reactions to positivism as an epistemology and how contested the idea of using natural scientific methods to describe the social world has been. Gray says that ‘in general ... we now inhabit a post-positivist world in which a number of alternative perspectives (for example, anti-positivist, post-positivist, and naturalistic) have emerged.’²⁸⁰ Bryman and Bell note that the rejection of a positivist epistemology is one of the basic distinguishing features of a qualitative research strategy. The distinctions between qualitative and quantitative research strategies include their view on the role of theory, their epistemological orientation, and their ontological orientation.

Quantitative research, according to Bryman and Bell, can be construed as a cluster of strategies that emphasises quantification. Quantitative methods usually utilize a deductive approach to test a theory already constructed. They incorporate the ‘practices and norms of the natural science model and of positivism in particular.’²⁸¹ It embodies a view of social reality as external and objective. Quantitative methods utilize an objectivist ontological orientation, seeing the world as unchanging and permanent. On the other hand, qualitative research emphasises words and description rather than quantification, with its emphasis on counting discrete variables. It emphasises ‘the ways in which individuals interpret their social world.’ Social reality is seen as a constantly shifting emergent property of individuals’ creation.

²⁷⁸ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd Ed, 1996, p. xi and 6.

²⁷⁹ Gordon, 617.

²⁸⁰ Gray, *Doing research in the real world*, 20.

²⁸¹ Bryman and Bell, 2003, 25.

Bryman and Bell argue that qualitative methods exhibit the interpretivist epistemological orientation discussed above as well as a constructivist ontological orientation.²⁸²

The distinctions between the two paradigms are not as clear as the features just identified might imply. Bryman and Bell say that ‘while it is useful to contrast the two research strategies, it is necessary to be careful about hammering a wedge between them too deeply.’²⁸³ Reality becomes more complex the more investigation is undertaken. Bryman and Bell note that the distinction between quantitative and qualitative methods, while widespread and growing, is not uncontested. Some writers, they say, see the distinction as no longer useful.

Among the issues that often confront quantitative researchers are measurement, causality, generalization, and replication.²⁸⁴ Given quantitative research’s emphasis upon measurement, issues of reliability and validity are significant concerns. Reliability is concerned with whether the results of a study are repeatable, in other words, the consistency of a measure. Validity is described by Bryman and Bell as whether a measure of a concept really measures that concept.²⁸⁵ Researchers utilizing a quantitative paradigm are usually concerned both with describing the world, and attempting to ascertain why events occur as they do. An emphasis upon generalization, shared by both paradigms, aims to guarantee that the research results can be taken as true for situations beyond those of the immediate investigation subject. The ability to replicate a quantitative experiment is also important because it demonstrates that the original findings were not the result of the original researcher’s characteristics or expectations.

There are significant benefits to a quantitative research strategy. But because the vast majority of the data available was not very easily quantifiable, a qualitative strategy was chosen. Varying qualitative theoretical perspectives will first be examined, and then the factors that determined the particular perspective chosen will be explained.

²⁸² Bryman and Bell, *Business research methods*, 25.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, 26.

²⁸⁴ Bryman and Bell, 81.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 74-77.

Choosing the appropriate qualitative theoretical perspective

Within the broad field of qualitative inquiry, a number of theoretical perspectives are available. Alternate theoretical perspectives are open to active debate, with standard texts in the field presenting differing pictures of the field as a whole.²⁸⁶ Indeed qualitative research scholars Denzin and Lincoln said that:

‘..the field.. is defined primarily by a series of essential tensions, contradictions, and hesitations. These tensions .. work back and forth between competing definitions and conceptions of the field.’²⁸⁷

It is not this thesis’s task to resolve or define the various competing ideas on the subdivision of social sciences research. Thus from surveying key texts, a broadly representative listing of the key research methods’ paradigms will be presented, and the thesis’s chosen approach within these paradigms explained and justified.

Qualitative methods can be seen in at least seven separate ways. Flick says that the ‘various research approaches orient towards three basic positions:’

*the tradition of symbolic interactionism, concerned with studying subjective meanings and individual ascriptions of sense

*ethnomethodology, interested in routines of everyday life and their production

And

*structuralist or psychoanalytic positions, starting from processes of psychological or social unconsciousness.²⁸⁸

Guba and Lincoln present a different ordering of the field. They write that there are four major interpretive paradigms for qualitative research, including positivist (a quantitative methodology seemingly included to act as a comparison and starting point for the analysis) and post-positivist, critical, constructivist-interpretive, and feminist-post structural.²⁸⁹ They interpret these paradigms as follows:

²⁸⁶ Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln (eds.), ‘Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research,’ in Lincoln and Denzin, *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, Sage Publications, 1994, p.105-117 and Michael Patton, *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*, Sage Publications, 1990, Chapter 3.

²⁸⁷ Denzin and Lincoln, ‘Preface’ in Denzin and Lincoln, *ibid.*, 3rd Edition, 2005, p.xi

²⁸⁸ Uwe Flick, *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed. ed. (London: SAGE, 2002), 16.

²⁸⁹ Guba and Lincoln, in Denzin and Lincoln, *ibid.*, 3rd Edition, 2005, p.22, 193-194.

- * Within positivism, ‘real’ reality is apprehensible; hypotheses can be established as facts or laws. This is the basis of quantitative research. Post-positivism is critical; ‘real’ reality can be only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehensible; not falsifiable hypotheses can be created which are probable laws or facts;
- * constructivist-interpretive (aiming at understanding and reconstruction; individual or collective reconstruction coalescing around consensus);
- * critical theory (one can aim only to apprehend a virtual reality shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender values crystallised over time).
- *feminist-post structural; This approach emphasises problems with the social text, its logic, and its inability ever to represent the world of lived experience fully.²⁹⁰ It replaces positivist and post-positivist interpretation criteria by terms including reflexive, multi-voiced text grounded in the experience of oppressed people.

From these varying paradigms, the most appropriate research approach needs to be selected for the research question. Some research approaches, therefore, would be better placed to examine post-peace army reconstruction than others. The present author believes that positivism is not an appropriate choice for investigating this topic. A natural science methodology cannot effectively be utilized to gather the data required. With positivism eliminated, there are a wide variety of other theoretical perspectives available for use. The differing typologies of theoretical perspectives propounded by different authors muddle the task of defining one’s methodological approach. Yet the type of research to be conducted in this thesis appears to fit within the interpretivist paradigm, (or, *pace* Lincoln and Guba, ‘constructivist-interpretive’). It also seems to be well described by Gray’s summary of phenomenological research.

Gray describes a phenomenological research perspective as follows:²⁹¹

- *capable of producing ‘thick descriptions’ of people’s experiences or perspectives within their natural settings
- *it emphasises inductive logic
- *seeks the opinions and subjective accounts and interpretations of participants
- *relies on quantitative analysis of data

²⁹⁰ This explanation of feminist post-structuralism is drawn from Norman K. Denzin, Yvonna S. Lincoln, *The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues*, SAGE, 2003, 35.

²⁹¹ Gray 21-22, 28

*is not so much concerned with generalizations to larger populations, but with contextual description and analysis

Many of these features resonate with the type of research that appeared feasible to investigate the central subjects of concern for this thesis. The desk cases and the study of the reconstruction of the AFL in Liberia will both use inductive logic, seek the opinions and subjective accounts/interpretations of participants, and rely on quantitative analysis of data. The weaving of interrelated accounts into the 'tapestry' in Chapter 6 on Liberia will, to some extent, produce perspectives within their natural settings.

Contextual description and analysis will be introduced in Chapters 5 and 6 to help explain the research findings. However, as noted in the Analysis of Data section below, this thesis does aim at a certain amount of generalization to larger populations. It will be argued that the three key concepts provide a useful framework to analyze army reconstruction in developing states.

The order in which these three key concepts are introduced reflects, to an extent, a historical approach. Gordon notes that in the debate over the 'covering law model' of history first propounded by Carl G. Hempel, 'numerous commentators pointed out that a causal explanation of a particular empirical event consists of two elements: a statement of the 'cause' of the event; and a specification of the 'conditions' under which that cause operated.'²⁹² Parallels can be drawn between this description and the three key conditions. Political-economic factors form the 'conditions' under which the 'cause' (the aim of capability enhancement²⁹³) is introduced. Either none, some or all of the SSR principles may be introduced by actors in order to shape the process further. Therefore, a historical approach examining causes and consequences will also inform the analytical process.

²⁹² Gordon, *The History and Philosophy of Social Science*, 396.

²⁹³ The British Army uses a three-part schema to detail what they designate 'Fighting Power: the conceptual component (eg. doctrine, organization, training), moral component (incentivising people to fight), and physical component (materiel, logistics, facilities etc). This schema can be utilised to organize capability enhancement data on army reconstruction programmes. ADP 1 Land Operations, 1995, 2.

The analysis of the Liberia field case will also aim to introduce a significant degree of contextual description and analysis. Issues as widely separated as corruption or West African regional rivalries can be better understood by placing them within the Liberian context informed by anthropology within the state's current boundaries, and Liberian history. For these reasons, designation of this research as following a phenomenological paradigm seems justified.

Phenomenological Research Methods

Within a phenomenological paradigm, a number of alternate methods are available. Bryman and Bell, writing in 2003, listed five main research methods associated with qualitative research: ethnography/participant observation; qualitative interviewing; focus groups; discourse and conversation analysis (language based approaches) and text and document analysis.²⁹⁴ Gray, writing in 2004, lists four main methods: questionnaires, interviewing, observation, and unobtrusive methods. Berg, writing in 2009, listed the following seven qualitative research methods: 'a dramaturgical look at interviewing,' focus grouping interviewing, ethnography (including emic and etic stances), action research, unobtrusive methods, historiography and oral traditions, and case studies.²⁹⁵

In examining these various method typologies, all the methods which correspond to one another will be grouped under Bryman and Bell's typology. Then Berg's two outlying methods will be described. Thereafter, the case study approach, built from a combination of methods, will be described. Then the particular version of the case study method adopted, utilizing interviews and document analysis, will be explained.

<u>Alternate Methods</u>
Ethnography
Qualitative Interviewing
Focus groups
Conversation and Discourse Analysis

²⁹⁴ Bryman and Bell, *Business research methods*, 281-2.

²⁹⁵ Bruce L. Berg, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, 7th ed. ed. (Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon ; London : Pearson Education [distributor], 2009), iv-ix.

Text and Document Analysis
Action Research
Unobtrusive Methods

Ethnography

Ethnography is a long-established qualitative research method. The practice ‘places researchers in the midst of whatever it is they study’ and is used extensively by anthropologists.²⁹⁶ Various scholars have encapsulated this ‘examination of phenomena as perceived by participants’ as ‘cultural description’ or ‘thick description.’²⁹⁷ Ethnography should go beyond describing a population and try to understand it, or further, to explain its actions.²⁹⁸ Ethnography has distinct similarities to participant observation, where the researcher accepts that his or her presence in an environment changes, however slightly, the situation that one wishes to observe.

An ethnographic technique was not appropriate for in this research. This was for two reasons. First, during the fieldwork, it would have revealed only a limited amount of the information required on adherence to SSR principles unless a great deal of time was available. Second, difficulties of obtaining access were anticipated.

Qualitative Interviewing

Qualitative interviewing is the use of interview techniques in qualitative research. It is much less focused than quantitative interviewing, and qualitative interviewing, Bryman and Bell say, has an emphasis on ‘greater generality in the formulation of initial research ideas and on interviewees’ own perspectives.’²⁹⁹

Berg advances a symbolic interactionist view of interviewing when he uses the term ‘a dramaturgical look at interviewing.’ This technique uses symbolic interactionism to add to the understanding about the process of interviewing and how one might go about mastering it.³⁰⁰ Essentially Berg says that ‘interviewing is best accomplished if guided by a dramaturgical model,’ with interviewing perceived as a ‘social

²⁹⁶ Berg, 2009, 191

²⁹⁷ Berg, 2009, 191. ‘Cultural description’ was the term of Wolcott (2008). ‘Thick description’ is a la Geertz (1973).

²⁹⁸ Berg, 2009, 198

²⁹⁹ Bryman and Bell, *Business research methods*, 341.

³⁰⁰ Berg, 2009, 102

performance.³⁰¹ Interviewers should be prepared to play one or more roles, as part of a very flexible and fluid format, in order to gain the most from the interview.

In conducting research for this thesis, variants of the individual interview were some of the most fruitful techniques. In deciding to use an interview technique, three options were available: structured, semi-structured, or unstructured interviews (also described as standardised, semi-standardised, and unstandardised interviews).³⁰² Structured interviews would have stayed rigidly with a pre-determined set of questions, without deviating from them even if useful additional information seemed available. Unstructured interviews would have merely been a conversation roughly on the subject of army reconstruction, without any attempt to pursue specific themes. It was decided to use semi-structured interviews, with a specific set of questions, but allowing the use of extra follow-up questions which could elicit further data on specific points if necessary.

Focus Groups

Focus groups are the third major method noted by Bryman and Bell. Focus group interviewing, Berg says, is an interview style ‘designed for small groups of unrelated individuals, formed by an investigator and led in a group discussion on some particular topic or topics.’³⁰³ Focus group interviews explicitly use group interactions as part of the data-gathering method. They are often used for ‘generating impressions of products, programs, services, or other objects of interest.’³⁰⁴ Focus group interviews were not used during this research, because the author was seeking to limit the time demands on key informants, and thus the interaction requested was limited to individual interviews.

Conversation and Discourse Analysis

Conversation and discourse analysis (CA and DA) is the fourth major method described by Bryman and Bell.³⁰⁵ Academics utilizing these two approaches see language as an object of interest in its own right. “It is not simply a resource through

³⁰¹ Berg, 2009, 103, referring also to E. Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Doubleday, Garden City, NJ, 1959 (no page number given).

³⁰² Bryman and Bell, *Business research methods*, 114, 343.

³⁰³ Berg, 2009, 158

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Bryman and Bell, *Business research methods*, 384.

which research participants communicate with researchers.”³⁰⁶ Language plays a critical role in structuring organizations (and wider social life). Bryman and Bell also say that language is not just reflective of what goes on in an organization, but instead, language and organization literally become one and the same.³⁰⁷ Conversation analysis ‘is the fine-grained analysis of talk as it occurs .. in naturally occurring situations.’ Bryman and Bell describe discourse analysis as the study of ‘how we say things – our phrases, our emphases, the things we leave out.’³⁰⁸ In speaking in a certain way, humans shape others’ perceptions and understandings, and so affect ones’ own reality and the reality of the people one is talking to.³⁰⁹

It can be seen from this summary that a significant amount of access is necessary to a field site in order to properly carry out CA and DA. It would also be of great value to have an understanding of the field’s specific jargon.³¹⁰ Access in the Liberian field case was not extensive enough to use either conversation or discourse analysis to a great degree. However a limited amount of discourse analysis was incorporated within the document content analysis carried out.

Text and Document Analysis

Text and document analysis is the fifth of Bryman and Bell’s described qualitative methods.³¹¹ This type of analysis includes historiography and archive use. Berg uses the term ‘historiography’ in place of historical research.³¹² Historiography is a method for discovering, from records and accounts, what happened in some past period, and seeks to offer theoretical explanations for various historical events.³¹³ Historical data can be classified as primary, secondary, or tertiary sources. Primary sources are original artifacts, documents, or items; secondary source involve the written testimony of people not immediately present at the time of a given event; and tertiary sources involve the distillation and presentation of primary and secondary sources in the form of a collection or anthology. This research relied heavily on historical data organised

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., 393.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Ibid., 384.

³¹¹ Ibid., 282.

³¹² Berg, 2007 edition, 264.

³¹³ Berg, 2009, 296, citing Johnson and Christensen, 2003, 2007.

within the various case studies. The desk case studies relied almost exclusively upon secondary and tertiary sources. In researching the field case, significant efforts were made to acquire primary source documents, with some success; a range of UNMIL, DynCorp, and other documentation was obtained.

The use of archives was not a very practical method for this research, as the Liberian national archives had been destroyed during the first civil war of the 1990s. Using a somewhat different source – U.S. Department of Defense records – led to a Freedom of Information Act request submitted in late 2008 which did not, eventually, lead to any information being made available. Thus efforts have been made to use archival sources, but with little success. It was judged that erosion and accretion would not yield any useful data.

Two of Berg's methods are not included in Bryman and Bell's typology: action research and unobtrusive methods. If dissected, these two methods could be subsumed within Bryman and Bell's typology. However, as they represent a slightly different research approach, it seems wiser to describe them separately. Action research is a 'kind of collective self-participatory enquiry undertaken by participants in social relationship with one another in order to improve some condition or situation with which they are involved.'³¹⁴ It includes techniques such as a cogenerative inquiry jointly between an organisation and researchers.³¹⁵ Given that the organisations involved in the research, principally the AFL, the Liberian Ministry of Defense, and other government ministries, were not collective participants but subjects, this technique was unusable. Unobtrusive methods rely not on intruding into peoples' lives, but on examining and assessing human traces. Berg includes archival strategies and 'physical erosion and accretion' within this category of methods. While the use of archives to investigate previous events is relatively well understood, erosion and accretion is less so.

Case Studies

Multiple methods can be drawn together to create case studies. Bryman and Bell cite Knights and McCabe, who say that case studies provide a vehicle through which

³¹⁴ Berg, 2009, p.247

³¹⁵ Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p.54

several qualitative methods can be combined.³¹⁶ Use of multiple methods avoids too great a reliance on a single approach.

Berg suggests that case study is ‘an approach capable of examining simple or complex phenomenon [sic], with units of analysis varying from single individuals to large corporations and businesses; it entails using a variety of lines of action in its data-gathering segments and can meaningfully make use of and contribute to the application of theory.’³¹⁷ Case studies develop theory through an inductive approach. In essence, a case study is an amalgam of one or a variety of research methods. It can provide a deep understanding – akin to Geertz’s ‘thick description’ – of phenomena, events, people, or organisations.³¹⁸ Given the subject of this thesis, a case study method appeared to present a way of creating such a deep understanding to achieve the research objectives, in a way unachievable by no other single method.

Case studies, Yin reminds us, rely on analytical generalization – generalizing the results obtained to broader theory.³¹⁹ The basis of a theoretical underpinning on army reconstruction processes will be generated by the study, and will result in the building of a theory. The narrowing case study approach will give some ability to test potential guidelines across a range of cases. However, only if the final theoretical conclusions are tested, with positive results, in a second or third environment - where the theoretical conclusions predict matching results will occur - can the second or third testing be accepted as providing strong support for the theory. Thereafter, the results could be accepted for a much larger number of other, similar cases, even though further replications have not yet been performed.³²⁰

Once the various materials on Liberia were collected, a case study method utilising content analysis was applied. The many variables in action in post-conflict cases, including bureaucratic politics, foreign donor interests, technical considerations of weaponry, fiscal issues, and the variety of particular personal motivations common to states evolving from a generally neo-patrimonial mode of government, seemed to be

³¹⁶ Bryman and Bell, *Business research methods*, 54., citing Knights and McCabe, 1997.

³¹⁷ Berg 2009, p.318, drawing upon Creswell, 2007, Yin, 2003a

³¹⁸ Berg 2009, p.319

³¹⁹ Yin, *ibid*, p.37

³²⁰ Robert Yin, *Case Study Research*, 1994 edition, p.36-37.

best evaluated via this approach. The data gathered, in accordance with Yin's case study recommendations, will need to be analysed in such a way that it 'converge[s] in a triangulating fashion',³²¹ in order to avoid biases arising from a single source and to attain an acceptable level of rigour. Therefore, where the record appeared incomplete or contradictory, repeated efforts will be made to follow up with knowledgeable individuals in order to check the data.

A combination of interviews and document content analysis was chosen to investigate issues in Liberia. Surveys, questionnaires,³²² experimentation, and the review of previously published data would not have been capable of gathering the detailed data required. Questionnaires to a wide audience would only elicit limited data, as information is often held by specific officials only. Purposive sampling was utilized:³²³ only those with knowledge of the subject matter would be helpful to interview, and thus their bias, conscious or unconscious, became a major potential weakness. This potential problem increased the importance of obtaining numerous interviews to cross check key datapoints. To alleviate this problem, as many officials as possible with knowledge of the core issues under investigation were consulted. Those officials were also asked which other people might be able to provide further insights; a technique known as 'snowball sampling'.³²⁴

Care had to be taken during the research to retain the contextual framework of the information gathered. Much of the information required relied heavily, for its meaning, on its place within the overall context. Thus, while the data retrieval process was underway, the method chosen to obtain it had to retain the contextual framework in which the data had been originally been situated. Maintaining a fieldwork diary helped to achieve this, as the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the data was preserved for later reconsideration if necessary.

³²¹ Robert Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Sage Publications, 2003, p.14

³²² Yin, *op. cit.*, p.xiii and p.1

³²³ Michael Patton, *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*, Sage Publications, 1990, via Dr Del Siegle, 'Purposive Sampling,' accessed at

<http://www.gifted.uconn.edu/siegle/research/Samples/purposivesampling.htm>, 26 January 2010.

³²⁴ Berg, 2009, p.50-51

Research Design

To build recommendations for revision of the SSR principles based upon the experience of army reconstruction since 1980, five objectives have been formulated. This section will describe the research design - how the research objectives build towards constructing the final theoretical framework. In doing so, it will discuss and justify the use of the selected political explanatory framework from the potential alternate models available to examine army reconstruction.

1. To survey existing practice and guidelines which are relevant to understanding the reconstruction of land forces (examined in Chapters 2 and 3). This research identifies three key concepts which play a major role in post-conflict army reconstruction.
2. To examine a wide range of army reconstruction interventions to analyze the effect of three identified key concepts: political-economic factors, capability enhancement, and SSR principles (examined in Chapter 5) The SSR principles alone do not guide post-conflict army reconstruction, and to improve the SSR principles elements of these two other factors should be included.
3. To empirically test these three key concepts in a single case study, Liberia (examined in Chapter 6)
4. To assess the viability of the currently utilized SSR principles against both the wide range of army reconstruction issues covered and the single field case study (examined in Chapter 7)
5. To identify other broad areas of knowledge that might be examined in future research (covered in Chapter 7)

The literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 surveyed the existing research on the subject area, addressing research objective 1. A summary of the literature review's evolution and results was described above. This summary established a clear basis from which to evaluate the methodology for the rest of the thesis. The remaining research programme will focus on objectives 2-6. There are a number of potential ways in which each research objective might be achieved. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are possible, and will be assessed in turn.

The following section describes how the investigation will progress from the identification of the three key concepts (capability enhancement, political-economic factors, and SSR principles) to examination of various cases.

Adopting a unified theoretical lens guarantees the rigour of the analysis. Potential alternate models available to examine developing world army reconstruction include change management, project management, and versions of a weak state political governance model. The first two models are suggested because they would be among the first considered if such processes were taking place in a developed country. The third represents consideration of the primarily political nature of SSR and the factors at work in a developing country.

The term ‘change management’ is drawn from the management literature. From that perspective, it has been defined as “the process, tools and techniques to manage the people-side of business change to achieve the required business outcome, and to realize that business change effectively within the social infrastructure of the workplace.”³²⁵ However, there are a number of misconceptions about the practice, first among them that the organizational change process actually creates value. Instead the Jarrett says that ‘in most cases of cultural and organizational change the expected benefits are not realized.’³²⁶ Change is infrequent but rapid, and cannot be ‘managed.’ However it may be possible to stimulate, steer, or tack with the wind of change.

Project management is also a term developed through management studies. Nokes describes projects as the ‘management mechanism by which all change happens.’³²⁷ Every activity in an organization, he goes on to say, either continues what has gone on before or is a project, which is to say something new. Change that does not occur through projects is unplanned. From this description, it appears that management projects are a tool originally conceptualized as part of a relatively stable environment both within the organization and beyond its boundaries. This corresponds to the generally stable environment in developed countries in which the concept was

³²⁵ <http://www.change-management.com/tutorial-definition-history.htm>, accessed 28 October 2010.

³²⁶ Michael Jarrett, *The Myths of Change Management*, Financial Times Handbook of Management, Third Edition, 2004, 834.

³²⁷ Sebastian Nokes, *Project Management as Value Creation*, Financial Times Handbook of Management, Third Edition, 2004, 281.

initially developed. A large number of projects in both the public and private sector do now take place in developing countries. However, the assumptions that underlie project management appear better fitted for the developed-country environment in which the concept was first developed.

Change management and project management models are both useful concepts for organizational change. Yet both appear to inadequately reflect the absolute degree of uncertainty, instability, and political turbulence prevalent in a post-peace accord developing state. Organizations in these circumstances are not strong, and do not have well established routines. Placement of individuals into leading and secondary roles is frequently not based on merit. This means that the skilled individuals required to implement the principles of change management and project management are often absent. Far more important are the motivations and ties of politics, linking groups of individuals to goals which change over time. For this reason, a power politics model seems more appropriate to reflect the actual characteristics which drive post-peace accord army reconstruction. In addition, among the three key concepts identified in the literature review, political-economic factors and SSR principles have significant political aspects.

Because of the wide variety in the political environments across the 15 case countries, it was felt that selecting or constructing a very specific model would have lead to inaccurate over-generalization. South Africa is an exceptional case with well developed democratic institutions. But for the other 14 cases, the variety in the political landscape between Zimbabwe in the early 1980s and, for example, East Timor in the period from 1999 is great. This means that trying to craft a very detailed analytical model would impose a level of theoretical consistency which would not accurately reflect reality. SSR theorising has repeatedly rejected a 'one-size-fits-all' approach, arguing that each environment merits examination on its own terms. Scheye notes that 'there is unanimous agreement that donors do not take the multivariate politics of partner countries sufficiently into account.'³²⁸ Therefore the chosen model only lists key fundamentals.

³²⁸ Eric Scheye, 'Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development,' U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 257, October 2010, 5

Chabal & Daloz discuss three potential alternate models of weak state political governance in their 1999 book 'Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument.'³²⁹ These are a neo-patrimonial model derived directly from Weberian sociology, the hybrid state perspective, and the 'paradigm of the transplanted state.'

The neo-patrimonial model of governance has already been introduced in the literature review. Briefly, Chabal and Daloz argue that from this perspective the (African) state is both illusory and substantial. 'It is illusory because its *modus operandi* is essentially informal, the rule of law is feebly enforced and the ability to implement public policy remains most limited. It is substantial because its control is the ultimate prize for political elites: indeed, it is the chief instrument of patrimonialism.'³³⁰ Chabal and Daloz say the neo-patrimonial model's two main advantages are that it accounts for the overlapping of the public and private spheres, and that it helps to explain in which ways the operation of the political system is no longer entirely traditional. The outward façade conforms to Western standards while the actual workings 'derive from patrimonial dynamics.'³³¹

The hybrid state perspective 'focuses on the effects for politics of the mixing of the Western norms introduced under colonial rule and the values inherent to African social systems.' Chabal and Daloz say that the hybrid state stresses the re-appropriation and successful adaptation of the Western model of the state to the African context. Within the fixed boundaries referred to by Herbst, mentioned in the Chapter 3, the African state has been reshaped according to local political practices.³³² The state is then used as an instrument of 'primitive accumulation' achieved through the monopoly seizure of the means of production by the political elites.

The 'paradigm of the transplanted state,' Chabal and Daloz note, is more accurately a paradigm conceptualizing the rejection of the transplanted state.³³³ The wholesale transfer of the Western state to Africa, they say, has failed very much because of

³²⁹ Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Oxford: International African Institute in association with J. Currey Indiana University Press, 1999), 9-13.

³³⁰ Ibid., 9.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Ibid., 9-10.

³³³ Ibid., 10.

cultural factors. The development of the modern Western European state, itself the outcome of a particular development path, cannot be simply transported to a wholly different socio-cultural setting. Both the institutions and the trappings of the Western state acquire entirely different meanings and modes of operation outside their original Western European habitat. The transplanted state, therefore is generically distinct, and large parts of the original model are discarded or cease to function.

Chabal and Daloz advance their own model, the political instrumentalization of disorder, as preferable to any of the other three options when analyzing African states.³³⁴ They emphasize the ‘profit to be found in the weak institutionalization of political practices.’ In other words, elites find it advantageous when the state is only allowed a certain degree of effectiveness. Political elites gain from a weak state because it allows them to maximize their political and economic returns. Chabal and Daloz say that the state is both ‘vacuous’ and ‘ineffectual.’ This has profound implications for SSR and other types of governance efforts that are commenced by Western donor states. Chabal and Daloz rhetorically ask why African political elites should dismantle a political system which advantages them so much. ‘The notion that politicians, bureaucrats, or military chiefs should be the servants of the state simply does not make sense.’³³⁵

From these four options, the neo-patrimonial model accurately describes most of the features of the African states discussed in this thesis. It also captures many of the features of the non-African states examined (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nepal, East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq). DiJohn says ‘neo-patrimonial politics, clientism, corruption, and violence are a part of *all* late-developing states.’³³⁶ Therefore in conceptualizing weak states both in and beyond Africa, it seems most appropriate to remain with the well established neo-patrimonial model.

Chabal and Daloz note however that regarding Africa, the neo-patrimonial model is useful only if it is made clear that colonial administrative penetration only went so far. Colonial administrators, they argue, ‘never managed to overcome the strongly

³³⁴ Ibid., 13-15.

³³⁵ Ibid., 15.

³³⁶ Jonathan Di John, *Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States* (London: Crisis States Research Centre/LSE, January 2008), 31.

instrumental and personalized characteristics of ‘traditional’ African administration.’ Chabal and Daloz’s warning about not overcoming strongly instrumental and personalized characteristics of traditional administration, however, may also be applicable to the tribal nature of governance in Afghanistan and Iraq.³³⁷ Thus with this constraint acknowledged, neo-patrimonial politics can be selected as the chosen conceptual lens through which to investigate army reconstruction. One can now examine each of the three key concepts and how they should be analyzed.

Qualitative Indicators: Utility and Limitations

Political-economic factors, capability enhancement, and the SSR principles are the three key concepts that emerge from the literature review conclusions. In order to provide a measure for those concepts it is necessary to create an indicator or indicators for them. Indicators are something that is devised or already exists and that is employed as though it was a measure of the concept.³³⁸ Yet indications have limitations as well as utility. To sketch a framework for analysis of each key concept, the particular opportunities and constraints for indicators for each of the three concepts will be addressed in turn.

There are a number of political-economic factors which affect army reconstruction. Chief among them are the circumstances of the peace accord and the necessity for constructively occupying former combatants. Another relevant question is to what extent the new armies were shaped by immediate post-peace accord circumstances, and whether and how consideration of longer-term challenges, embodied in documents such as national security strategy reviews, began to re-orientate their actions. When one delves more deeply into the post-conflict environment, certain underlying factors appear again and again, principally the neo-patrimonial type of politics already evaluated in the literature review. These dynamics are reflected in the selected political frame of analysis. One has to be clear about the reason for creation of indicators in these circumstances: in order to create a generic overall framework for army reconstruction. Therefore the aim is to identify generally relevant political-

³³⁷ See Small Wars Journal, ‘Tribal Engagement Workshop,’ <http://smallwarsjournal.com/events/tew/>, accessed December 11, 2010.

³³⁸ Alan Bryman and Emma Bell, *Business Research Methods*, 2nd ed. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 159.

economic factors. But one must be cognizant of the need to avoid over-simplifying the analysis. Each country has differing political-economic factors which drive it, though there may be overall similarities.

Another important political-economic question is that of sustainability. It would be extremely valuable to determine whether the collapse of army reconstruction causes a reversion to conflict. What evidence there is however seems insufficient to give a clear answer.

The only real measure of whether a post-conflict reconstruction process is successful and sustainable is whether the state has remained peaceful. Seven of the fifteen cases examined have reverted to war or significant internal unrest: Zimbabwe, the Congo, Sudan, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Burundi. In five of those cases, it appears that the army reconstruction process was not a significant reason for reversion to conflict. For example, in Iraq, the insurgency was bolstered but not created by the CPA order dissolving Saddam Hussein-era institutions.³³⁹ Breakdown of the post-conflict army reconstruction process appears to have been a factor in reversion to armed conflict in two cases: East Timor in 2006³⁴⁰ and in Burundi, where fighting seems to be escalating as of November 2010. It would be extremely valuable to pinpoint the differences between East Timor and Burundi on the one hand, and the remaining other eight cases where peace has been maintained. Yet because such differences would only be based on two cases, any generalizable theory built from such a basis would have very weak foundations.

In addition, even if these type of commonalities could be precisely identified, this would only result in a theoretical formulation based on ten cases. This would also not adequately factor in associated complexities in the five cases where conflict has reoccurred but where army reconstruction problems do not appear to have been among the most significant factors. For example, specific army reconstruction issues in Afghanistan might have played some part in fanning the continuing insurgency in some areas of the country. Furthermore, even surveying the 15 cases covered by this

³³⁹ *Loose Ends: Iraq's Security Forces between U.S. Drawdown and Withdrawal* (Baghdad/Washington/Brussels: International Crisis Group, October 26, 2010).

³⁴⁰ "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis," Asia Report No. 120, 10 October 2006" (International Crisis Group, October 10, 2006), 6.

thesis rules out consideration of closely associated cases like Haiti, where an army was not recreated. For these reasons, a desk-based survey such as this has neither enough detailed information, nor a statistically significant number of cases, to produce robust estimates as to whether post-conflict army reconstruction can produce stability over the long term. More time and more data analysis will be required to produce reliable estimates.

It would be valuable to identify vital and reoccurring political-economic factors, but statistical analysis would not produce accurate identification of such vital factors is difficult because the number of cases is too small. Most cases have occurred since 1990, so analysis is based on 20 years' experience only. More cases will need to occur and be analysed in order to obtain statistically significant data.

Developing effective indicators for analysis of capability enhancement requires determining what tasks armies need to carry out, and then assessing how to measure attainment of those tasks. Broadly there appear to be three main tasks that an army may be called upon to carry out. These include defending the state against external aggression, defence against internal rebellion and assuring internal security functions, and responding to humanitarian emergencies.³⁴¹ Another task related to humanitarian response, with some similarities, is using armies to perform development tasks.

Measuring armies' success in external defence and the suppression of internal rebellion is relatively simple. An army must be successful either in combat, or in operations in support of the civil power, to carry out both of these tasks. Since one cannot predict the future, there are two available measure to assess whether an army will be successful in combat. These are firstly, an analysis of an army's historical combat record, and secondly, assessing an army's present state of combat readiness.

First, historical combat records can give a good indication of potential combat success. The difficulty is that many of the armies in this study have not actually fought since their reconstruction process was completed. Three armies have not seen combat (Mozambique, Bosnia-Hezegovina, Kosovo); one has not even commenced

³⁴¹ OECD Handbook 2007, 124.

its reconstruction process (Nepal), while two others (Sierra Leone and South Africa) have only conducted peacekeeping operations. Two new forces, the JIUs in South Sudan and the Falintil-FDTL in East Timor, have splintered and fought themselves. In other cases, armies have fought but their success is unclear. An example is Zimbabwe and Namibia's operations in the war in the Congo in 1998-2002. The involvement is publicly confirmed, but how successful such operations actually were is not publicly known. In view of these limitations, this indicator will not produce a very precise result.

Second, potential combat success can be assessed through current preparedness. The British Army uses a three-part delineation of capability in the form of the 'components of fighting power:' the conceptual component, moral component (incentivising people to fight), and the physical component. Each could be measured by asking whether an army is conceptually likely to succeed in combat, has the moral preparations to succeed in combat, and is physically capable of success in combat. These questions can only be answered by a survey of the relevant data available about each army under consideration. Yet the detailed data required to make such an accurate, detailed assessment possible is invariably classified. The quality of available public data on such issues varies greatly. Much more is available for developed-state armies than for the armies under consideration in the desk phase of this study. In view of these information limitations, a broad judgement of potential combat success based on the available data will be made. It is important not to attempt fine judgements and extensive analysis on case studies where little data is available. Doing otherwise would risk impairing internal validity. One's own internal preconceptions might induce incorrect patterns into insufficiently detailed data. In time however, further research may fill these gaps in our knowledge.

Crafting indicators for the delivery of humanitarian aid (or development work) is also difficult. They have to be situation-specific to the particular aid emergency or development task. Different political actors will have differing expectations and goals in seeing the armed forces carry out these tasks. The only true test of capability for these tasks is whether the armed forces actually achieved the task set. However, as with combat success, the level of data required to make an accurate assessment often appears unavailable. One factor that might ease assessment is that armed forces' units

sometimes are required to carry out such tasks only with routine levels of human and material resources on hand. This means that if such units are ready for operational service, they would also be ready to assist in humanitarian aid work. However, making such assessments of operational capability, as explained above, is difficult due to lack of data.

It is also important to compare the practice of army reconstruction to the principles of security sector reform. Army reconstruction, and defence reform more widely, is usually viewed as an integral part of security sector reform. But as noted in the literature review conclusions, army reconstruction's adherence to SSR principles appears inconsistent. Some principles are almost always followed, such as increase of capacity. Others, such as the people centred nature of programmes, seem to be incorporated only rarely. Therefore a detailed comparison of programme features with the SSR principles is necessary to create workable indicators. The SSR principles introduced in Chapter 1 were reordered as follows to produce a clear list for working purposes.

SSR should be:

- People-centred and locally owned
- Based on democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law
- A framework to address diverse security challenges, through a broad needs assessment and integrated multi-sectoral policies
- A practice promoting greater civilian oversight and involvement
- Transparent and accountable
- A practice that enhances institutional and human capacity.

This more simplified formulation aims to preserve the meaning of the OECD principles while rendering them into assessable form. It is necessary to illustrate what is meant by 'diverse security challenges' to make the scope of the SSR requirement clear. The most recent National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, issued in 2010, provides some good examples of the kind of security challenges planners face today. Terrorism, hostile acts against UK cyber space, civil emergencies such as floods or pandemics, weapons of mass destruction, trans-national organised crime, military crises, risks from failed and fragile states, climatic change, disruption to

energy supplies, and disruption to information received, transmitted, or collected by satellites were all mentioned.³⁴²

Thus the diverse security challenges of today encompass far more than the threat of armed conflict. Armies on their own are not designed to address all the challenges. Instead, ideally, armies form part of an integrated set of state agencies each with its own task and part to play. What this means, however, is that very few armies will meet the requirement to be an effective part of a framework that addresses diverse security challenges.

Civilian involvement also requires clarification. The OECD Handbook stresses that 'control over the military is central to the exercise of political power.'³⁴³ The woeful coup record which armies have established since wide-scale decolonisation began in the 1950s and 1960s emphasises the need for armies to remain under civilian control. An army or armed forces is not designed to manage and advance a country's interests, and properly is the servant, not the master, of civil authority.

Yet in a democracy the army (and the whole armed forces) have a legitimate right to interact with civilian politicians in order to formulate appropriate defence policies. The level to which military personnel influence defence policy (or wider national policy) while in the process of formulating policy can vary widely. How much influence armed forces' personnel legitimately can have upon national policies is dependent upon each country's historical tradition.³⁴⁴ Chuter makes the point that 'the very concept of civil-military relations is redundant in traditional cultures (such as many in Africa) where every adult male is a warrior.'³⁴⁵ This reinforces the dictum discussed in the literature review that SSR efforts should be context-specific. Thus, no generalization of indicators about the legitimate level of armed forces' influence on

³⁴² Cabinet Office, *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World*, 2008, Part 3, Risks to Our Security, accessed at <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/national-security-strategy.pdf>, 12 January 2011, 27.

³⁴³ OECD Handbook 2007, 124.

³⁴⁴ David Chuter, "Civil-Military Relations: Is There Really a Problem?," *Journal of Security Sector Management* 7, no. 2 (2009): 16.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

policy can be made, unless the military as an institution has actually seized political power.

This respect for individual states' situations is partially why the SSR principles only specified 'greater civilian oversight and involvement.' To achieve transparency, scrutiny must come from beyond the executive branch of government. Thus a key test of greater civilian involvement is the active involvement of the legislature. There will also be a requirement for judicial involvement in certain circumstances.

Of the three key concepts, capability enhancement can be measured relatively well, but only if armies have seen combat. The detailed information necessary to make precise assessments is often not available. This means that care must be taken not to push analysis too far. But because the task of the multiple case analysis is to provide a check on the findings of the Liberia case, the multiple case analysis is sufficient if it confirms or eliminates broad trends. Since the aim for political-economic factors is to assess which factors ought to be represented in the final model, a high level of reoccurrence is sufficient.

Identifying Cross-Case Processes and Issues

Selecting neo-patrimonial politics as an overall theoretical lens and critically examining the utility of indicators to assess the three key concepts allows the analysis to move to the next stage. Once one is clear as to how the key concepts will be analytically manipulated, one can move from Research Objective 1 and the literature review to Research Objective 2, expressed in the multiple case chapter.

Research objective 2 was to examine a wide range of army reconstruction cases to test the relevance of the three key concepts. To gain the best possible picture of the trends shaping the field, it was decided to examine all the identified cases which fitted the circumstances outlined for post-conflict army reconstruction. As defined in Chapter 1, these included the creation of an army after an international intervention which had succeeded in establishing control over the entire territory of the entity it had been assigned to enter. Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Burundi were borderline cases, but were included because they both had the essentials of post-conflict army reconstruction occur.

One method to accomplish this task would have been a series of visits to each case location, and collection of large amounts of both quantitative and qualitative data on each army reconstruction process. Then one could apply the quantitative approach outlined above to analyse the army reconstruction programmes in exacting detail. The qualitative data gathered at the same time would serve to build a fully rounded picture of the programme in question. The advantage of this approach would be the creation of a very detailed picture of the programme. The disadvantage would be the large amount of time and cost this alternative would absorb.

The second alternative, as for research objective 1, would have been a desk review of evidence surveying the large amount of previously published data on army reconstruction, supplanted by consultation with regional experts when available. This necessitates gathering analytic and descriptive writings (books, articles, and 'grey literature') on each case until a reasonably comprehensive overall picture had been made clear. The advantage of this alternative is the shorter time and smaller amount of resources required. Where a particular case of army reconstruction has been previously well studied, a comparatively full picture of the programme might be built from this process. However, where there is little information, only the basic details, or not even that, might be able to be collected.

A third alternative would have been to visit the cases of army reconstruction considered most important, and to rely on a literature review for the others. This attempts to alleviate the disadvantages of the second alternative.

A desk based evidence review, the second alternative, was selected. This was primarily because of resource reasons, as finance and time did not allow an extensive programme of field visits. Also, the kind of extensive research described in the first alternative might often be unwelcome to many military establishments. Very detailed data is often considered sensitive and not for release, especially to foreigners. The result, both for resource reasons and the difficulty of implementing a full quantitative approach, was the reduction in the scope of activity to a desk literature review.

The content analysis aimed to supplement the already identified guidance by identifying the trends and issues that were most important when such activities were actually carried out. Some issues gained in relative importance, such as the importance of careful DDR processes for demobilised fighters' future prospects. Other issues were identified as potentially counterproductive, such as imposing the empowered non-commissioned officer model on armies with no such tradition. If the record appeared incomplete or contradictory, respondent validation was used, where possible, to check the data.

Applying the Field Experience Test

The next research objective, Research Objective 3, applies the results of the multiple cases analysis in Liberia, a single field case study. It aims to empirically test the three key concepts in a single case study, Liberia. It aimed to see whether the desk research still remain valid when subjected to the field experience test. In addition, it aimed to ascertain whether additional amplification or clarification of those issued could be obtained by testing them in on-the-ground reality.

In considering an appropriate site for the detailed case study, the author's approach was guided greatly by his previous experience. Service with New Zealand government institutions, at both governmental level and with the Army, provided the author with experience within a small developed state framework. In addition, some knowledge of small armies after conflict was gained during time spent in East Timor working on policy for the redevelopment of the Falintil-Forca Defesa Timor Leste (F-FTDL). Finally experience in Liberia gave longer-term exposure to a small developing state and the complexities of a post conflict rebuilding process. The thread of small political entities – New Zealand, of four million people, East Timor, of around 800,000, and Liberia, of roughly three million people – runs through these three experiences.

It might have seemed logical to return to East Timor to undertake the detailed study. However, while the *lingua franca* of the army advisors in East Timor was English, the army involved is the F-FDTL, steeped in long use of Portuguese from its Falintil insurgent roots. It would have also involved translation from Indonesian and Tetum, the main languages of the newer, younger recruits. Thus translation would have been

a constant problem. The other consideration was how representative an East Timor case study might be. East Timor is located on a small island in insular South-East Asia, and many of the countries where army reconstruction is a continuing issue are in continental Africa. Much attention in army reconstruction is focused upon areas of strategic concern to Western powers – inland in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile in Africa while security for development, involving the recreation of a viable army, is vital, less attention is being focused upon the issues at hand. Generally speaking, an African case is more applicable to other African cases in the future where attention and resources will be more limited. These considerations, as well as the fact that the operating language in Liberia is English, tipped the scales in favour of Liberia.

The first move in planning interviews was to contact the three key institutional groupings, the U.S. Embassy and its military officials, the Liberian Ministry of Defence and AFL, and the UN. Key individuals within those groupings were then contacted. Snowball identification of further key individuals then followed. Interviews, and associated requests for documents once in Liberia, were divided broadly into two groupings: those individuals who could provide information on the army reconstruction programme, including the assessment and programme design phase, and those who could give information about the development of the higher preparatory stages. A number of individuals, particularly the UNMIL SSR Advisor, were helpful in providing details for both areas. A list of key interviewees is attached in Annex B.

To gather data on the army reconstruction programme itself, as many officials as possible within the Ministry of National Defense,³⁴⁶ including a serving Deputy Minister and former Deputy Minister, were interviewed. A number of military staff, starting with the Command Officer-in-Charge of the AFL, were also interviewed, as well as academics, parliamentarians, and politicians. Several sections within the U.S. Embassy, and the UN Mission in Liberia were consulted as well as the contractors implementing the army reconstruction programme and other nations' military advisors. Finally, staff at Star Radio, recommended as one of the best media present

³⁴⁶ While this thesis is written in British English, I have endeavoured to preserve the original spellings of certain Liberian institutions or practices, which follow U.S. conventions. Thus some words may appear to be misspelled, but follow the Liberian original.

in Monrovia, were also interviewed. Some additional primary data was also gathered. This comprised MOD annual reports, MOD and DynCorp internal magazines and newspapers, Liberian newspaper articles, and biographies.

The key areas that interviews targeted for the higher level process included the national security strategy formulation process, with the National Security Advisor's office, and the staff who had carried out the process. Information regarding legal changes came from Congressmen and Senators. Key observers such as officials from the AU and ECOWAS offices in Monrovia, and two civil society representatives were also consulted.

During the fieldwork it became evident that documents such as ministry annual reports and the text of laws were going to be difficult to obtain, and thus a series of special efforts were made to find other ways in which these documents could be found. Eventually after visiting the Centre for National Documentation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' publications department, most were provided with the help of Senator Blamoh Nelson's office.

Risk Analysis and Limitations

The key risks and limitations encountered during this thesis can be divided into two, in the desk work phase and the fieldwork phase. The primary limitation for the desk work phase was insufficient data. Without a series of visits to each case location, instead of a desk review, much data that would have been required for a full analysis could not be obtained. However it appears that even if repeated visits had been made to each location, not all the data required would have been obtained. This is because of the sensitivity of the type of data required on the military. In order to obtain more information to mitigate this problem, numerous attempts were made to contact people with specific knowledge. These contacts helped widen the knowledge base available for the desk research phase.

There were three main fieldwork limitations. Perhaps the most significant related to the timing of the fieldwork. When initially scheduled in late 2008, an early-to-mid 2009 period for fieldwork appeared to allow sufficient time for determination of appropriate research questions. Yet the literature review took longer than expected.

Thus the time for determining questions was significantly foreshortened. However, on the ground, all available relevant data to the subject in general was sought, rather than just that data specifically associated with the research questions. This allowed a degree of insurance if, as actually happened, the research focus changed after the fieldwork was complete.

There were two major limitations encountered during fieldwork. Due to his senior personal staff being unwilling to schedule an appointment, it was found to be impossible to obtain an interview with the Minister of Defense. Attempts to work around this blockage via intermediaries or attendance at formal events proved unsuccessful. However, as noted above, both the senior Deputy Minister of Defense and the National Security Advisor were interviewed. This lack of access prevented interviews being possible with any of the new army officers at EBK Barracks; interviews were restricted to those staff accessible at the Ministry of Defense. Access was discouraged for U.S. uniformed personnel and contractors beyond the senior official in each case – the Chief, Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), and the contractor programme managers.

The second major difficulty was establishing the exact sequence of events during the force reestablishment in 2004-05, due to the U.S. Embassy's Political Section being unable or unwilling to work from their records of the time, and the lack of exact records within the Office of Security Cooperation. Repeated efforts were made to work around this problem, but were not fully successful by the end of the fieldwork period. This hampered efforts to ascertain events in the assessment and programme design phase of the process.

The two months allocated for the fieldwork, while shortened from the initial plan of over three months, was adequate for the task. This situation occurred despite several meetings being rescheduled or long-delayed due to the absence of the interviewee. It was initially hoped to make a series of visits beyond the capital, but initial investigation found that the vast majority of the people and sites necessary to visit were in the in the Monrovia area.

A final limitation was an incomplete reliability record. Current guidelines on PhD best practice stress the need to document as fully as possible the fieldwork process.³⁴⁷ One is encouraged to describe ones' actions so that a hypothetical second researcher following could replicate the study exactly, and arrive at the same findings and conclusions.³⁴⁸ However, for a variety of reasons at different times it was impossible to document fully some periods of the fieldwork.

Analysis of Data

Research Objectives 2, 3, 4 and 5 require detailed analysis of data. Research Objective 4 will consider the only existing strategic guidance for army reconstruction, the SSR principles, to assess their viability. This will generate recommendations for possible changes to the principles and thus improvement in their effectiveness. A detailed analysis will be carried out, examining the significant issues raised during the research. Such an investigation was necessary to lay the foundations for constructive answers to the first four research objectives and to provide recommendations for interested parties.

At this point it is useful to discuss reliability and validity as it applies to qualitative research. How the factors they seek to assess ought to be reflected has been the subject of some differing views.³⁴⁹ Bryman and Bell identify two major positions. One stance utilizes the same terms, reliability and validity as part of a qualitative strategy. Mason, describing the use of validity, for example, says that validity refers to whether 'you are observing, identifying, or 'measuring' what you say you are.'³⁵⁰ Another approach is use of the terms reliability and validity but with somewhat different meanings. The most important aspects of reliability and validity for this thesis appear to be internal, external, and respondent validity. LeCompte and Goetz describe validity in the following ways:

*Internal validity, meaning that there is a good fit between a researcher's observations and the theoretical ideas they develop.

³⁴⁷ Dr Teri McConville, PhD Research Methods presentation, March 2009.

³⁴⁸ Robert Yin, *Case Study Research*, 1994 edition, p.36-37

³⁴⁹ Bryman and Bell, *Business research methods*, 286.

³⁵⁰ J. Mason, *Qualitative Research*, 1996, 24 cited in Bryman and Bell, 2003, 287.

*External validity, also designated analytical generalization by Robert Yin. This issue involves the extent to which conclusions in one case can be generalized to others, and is discussed below.

*Respondent validity, where researchers provide the people on whom they have conducted research on with an account of their findings. This provides a means of confirming the validity of individual accounts.

This thesis utilizes a reliability and validity approach broadly on the lines of LeCompte and Goetz. While it is important to carefully follow procedures to ensure both reliability and validity, validity concerns are possibly the more important of the two concepts for this thesis. This is primarily because the researcher carried out the work alone rather than in a multi-person team, meaning that internal reliability had little relevance. Extensive efforts were made to assure both internal and external validity.

Given the nature of the data to be analysed, there will be few available alternate analysis methods. Statistical analysis, for example, will be effectively impractical given the qualitative nature of the data. Preparations will be made, however, to carry out a certain amount of basic quantitative analysis if the nature of the data merited it. A more sophisticated qualitative approach involving coding data³⁵¹ was considered but dismissed. This was because from the initial research phase onward, it became clear relatively quickly that data on political-economic factors and capability enhancement was not amenable or sufficiently detailed enough to allow such coding. In addition, it will be clear relatively quickly which principles of SSR will be being either respected or rejected in each case. Therefore a more methodical coded approach was assessed as likely to generate a great deal of extra processing without significant benefit.

The content analysis process will take the form of pattern matching.³⁵² Pattern matching first ascertains patterns in the data provided, considering varying explanations for their formulation, and then deciding upon an explanation which best fits the available data (in order to achieve internal validity without being misled by inaccurate causal explanations), and, critically the context in which the data was

³⁵¹ See for example Berg 2009, 348-365.

³⁵² Yin, *op. cit.*, p.26-7 and Chapter 5.

drawn. These patterns were then matched against the initial theoretical proposition, to determine whether such patterns are broadly representative of army reconstruction programmes.

The manner in which the research is designed, and the data analysis methods, have implications for the extent to which the conclusions can be generalised. It was essential to design the method so that the conclusions drawn would be able to have the greatest applicability possible beyond the single Liberia case study. This is a matter of external validity. External validity, LeCompte and Goetz say, refers to the degree to which findings can be generalized across multiple contexts. As noted above, Robert Yin utilizes the term ‘analytical generalization,’ described above, to refer to the same concept. In qualitative research, this can be a problem because of researchers’ tendencies to employ case studies and small samples. The reason this thesis employs multiple case desk research preceding the Liberia chapter was specifically to ensure that the findings of the Liberia case were authenticated by a wider survey of multiple cases’ data.

However, because of the inherent limitations of desk-based research, and the limited amount of fieldwork possible, the present author does not believe it is wise to claim wide-ranging generalizations from the data gathered. Thus he only will argue that army reconstruction can be well understood by the interleaved usage of political-economic factors, capability enhancement, and the SSR principles. Data organized under these three headings provides a robust basis for reevaluating the SSR principles as a whole.

The fifth research objective was to identify other broad areas of knowledge that might be examined in future research. Examination of other disciplines might shed more light on how to carry out army reconstruction effectively and efficiently. This was achieved by reflection on material considered from the literature review stage of the project onwards.

Ethical Issues

Ethical issues involve the consideration of values in social science research.³⁵³

Bryman and Bell note that such issues revolve around a number of questions, of which they specifically cite two. These two questions are worded to effectively encapsulate the ethics debate. First, they say, there is the question of how researchers should treat the people upon which research is conducted. Second, the other major question is whether there are activities that researchers should or should not engage in, in their relations with those being studied.

Bryman and Bell begin their discussion on ethics by citing four reasons why writings over ethics in the social sciences are frustrating.³⁵⁴ Three are especially important. First, they say that a wide range of ethical stances are taken. These range from universalism, that ethical precepts should never be broken, right across to the other end of the spectrum which argues that a ‘certain amount of flexibility’ should be allowed in ethical decision making.³⁵⁵

Secondly, debates over ethics have often focused on widely-known cases of ethical transgression.³⁵⁶ Yet Bryman and Bell argue that the attention to these type of high profile cases may induce a belief that ethical concerns only relate to such an extreme end of the spectrum. They emphasize again that ‘the potential for ethical transgression is much more general than this.’ Ethical considerations need to be taken account of in all research work. The Economic and Social Research Council argues that even the secondary use of some existing datasets requires ‘light touch ethics review.’³⁵⁷

Bryman and Bell’s third point also refers to the ‘extreme and notorious cases of ethical violation’ by which they describe Millgram’s 1963 experiment and, also, the well-known Stanford prison experiment of 1973.³⁵⁸ Extreme cases are not the only problem; particular methods are, as well. Most prominently, disguised observation

³⁵³ Bryman and Bell, *Business research methods*, 535.

³⁵⁴ Ibid., 536.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., 538.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ ESRC Framework of Research Ethics, page 4 of 50, accessed at http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/esrcinfocentre/opportunities/research_ethics_framework/, November 2010.

³⁵⁸ Bryman and Bell, *Business research methods*, 536.

and the use of deception in experiments may be most closely associated with ethical violations. Bryman and Bell say that an impression can be gained that other methods, such as overt ethnography, can be immune from such problems. Again, this is not the case; all research methods require some form of ethical scrutiny.

The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Framework for Research Ethics is also among the most widely endorsed ethic frameworks utilized in British universities. Because SSR research appears to be significantly influenced by the ESRC, this author believes that the ESRC guidelines are perhaps the most appropriate to utilize in a discussion over ethics.

The ESRC Framework of Research Ethics includes six principles:³⁵⁹

- *research should be designed, reviewed, and undertaken to ensure integrity, quality, and transparency.

- *research staff and participants must normally be informed fully about the purpose, methods, and intended possible uses of the research, what their participation in the research involves, and what risks, if any, are involved. Some variation is allowed in very specific research contexts for which the ESRC provides detailed guidance.

- *the confidentiality of information supplied by research participants and the anonymity of respondents must be respected.

- *research participants must take part voluntarily, free from any coercion.

- *harm to research participants must be avoided in all circumstances.

- *the independence of research must be clear, and any conflicts of interest or partiality must be explicit.

The ESRC also says that research involving primary data collection will always raise issues of ethics that must be addressed. In order to analyze the ethical issues that will be raised in the course of this research, a discussion of ethics related to both the desk and field case studies will be organized under the ESRC's six principles.

³⁵⁹ ESRC, Summary of Framework of Research Ethics: Principles, Procedures, and Minimum Requirements, accessed at http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/esrcinfocentre/opportunities/research_ethics_framework/, November 2010.

The first ESRC principle is that research should be designed, reviewed, and undertaken to ensure integrity, quality, and transparency. This places significant emphasis on research design from the beginning of a research project. During the course of doctoral study, for example, ethical considerations should be considered in a fashion appropriate to the stage the research has reached. During the research for this thesis, ethical considerations began to be introduced through research methods courses, and ethical considerations were a constant issue during fieldwork. During the extended write up period in New Zealand, a considerable amount of contacts with field informants were planned, and therefore the same type of considerations needed to be taken into account.

The second ESRC principle is that research staff and participants must normally be informed fully about the purpose, methods, and intended possible uses of the research, what their participation in the research involves, and what risks, if any, are involved. Some variation is allowed in very specific research contexts for which the ESRC provides detailed guidance. As noted above, much attention focuses upon high profile cases such as the Millgram psychological study. Yet more common examples include the covert nature of a researcher's presence in a study area. Opinions on covert research range from complete opposition to the view that, depending on the circumstances, covert research is both necessary and ethical.³⁶⁰ Misrepresentation of the researcher's status was not a factor during this study. At all times the researcher was clear about his aims and objectives.

The third ESRC principle is that the confidentiality of information supplied by research participants, and the anonymity of respondents must be respected. Bryman and Bell note that 'privacy is very much linked to the notion of informed consent.'³⁶¹ This can be seen in the case of an interview, for example. Once informed consent has been given, a research participant in a sense has acknowledged that the right to privacy has been surrendered for that limited period. But this does not mean that the research participant's right to privacy has been totally abrogated. Certain questions may be refused by research participants.

³⁶⁰ Those who say covert research is completely unethical include Banks, 2004, Engel and Schutt, 2005, Nason-Clark and Neitz, 2001. Berg advances the necessary and ethical view. Berg 2009, 82-84.

³⁶¹ Bryman and Bell, *Business research methods*, 544.

Bryman and Bell note that minor breaches of informed consent may be relatively common.³⁶² Examples they give which this researcher has encountered include not giving ‘absolutely all the details about one’s research for fear of contaminating people’s answers to questions.’³⁶³ For this research, care will be taken to inform interviewees about the nature, demands, and intended use of data during the fieldwork phase. Particular care will be taken when informants were at risk of professional harm from employers or former employers.

The fourth ESRC principle is that research participants must take part voluntarily, free from any coercion. Wolfer describes mandatory steps to ensure potential research participants’ rights are respected.³⁶⁴ They are not required to participate in a study, that they can decline to answer questions, and that they can decide to withdraw from participation at any time. It is anticipated that both during the telephone interviews on the desk cases and during the fieldwork, there will be a number of situations where interviewees may not wish to answer certain question or may withdraw altogether. It is anticipated that this will necessitate two steps being taken. First, these potential refusals to answer certain questions reinforce the necessity to reach out to as great a number of people informed on army reconstruction as possible. Second, there is a requirement to conduct as thorough search as possible for literature, both on the desk cases, and on the contractor phase of the reconstruction of the AFL.

The fifth ESRC principle is that harm to research participants must be avoided in all circumstances. This is perhaps the most fundamental tenet of ethical social science research – avoiding physical and psychological damage. Harm can involve a number of facets: physical harm; harm to participants’ development or self-esteem; stress; and harm to career prospects or future employment.³⁶⁵ During this research, the principal risk of harm identified will be to interviewees’ prospects and safety should interview comments be seen as hostile by others within their professional environment. It will be possible for some comments to be attributed to interviewees by name, because consent has been obtained. However a number of interviews and other data gathering

³⁶² Ibid., 543.

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ Wolfer, *Real Research: Conducting and Evaluating Research in the Social Sciences*, 65.

³⁶⁵ Bryman and Bell, *Business Research Methods*, First Edition, 539.

exercises will have to be conducted under promise of anonymity. The researcher will take a number of measures to make sure that the identity of these interviewees was not disseminated.

The sixth ESRC principle is that independence of research must be clear, and any conflicts of interest or partiality must be explicit. During the desk research phase there will be limited contacts with key informants so this issue was not very significant. Efforts will be taken during the field research to make clear that the researcher was a New Zealander with no particular national bias on Liberian army reconstruction. However, in the atmosphere of suspicion and doubt in Monrovia these may not be effective.

Summary

The security sector reform principles form a key backbone for much post-conflict international intervention around the world. This chapter has established the methodology by which army reconstruction programmes will be analyzed in order to identify potential areas of improvement to those principles. An important starting point is that of positivism, a scientific paradigm which has aimed to investigate the social sciences with methods as close to the natural sciences as possible. However, positivism as a scientific approach has weaknesses. It may require, for example, significant amounts of quantitative data. Because the data available for this thesis was not detailed or comprehensive enough to conduct a quantitative analysis, an interpretivist approach will be adopted.

The interpretivist paradigm, which acknowledges that one constructs one's perception of objects and phenomena, arose partially in reaction to positivism. This epistemological position has its partner in a constructivist ontological paradigm. Within the general field of interpretivist qualitative approaches, a phenomenological technique will be adopted. To make the analysis possible, a comprehensive literature review was undertaken, focusing on the factors which shape post-peace accord army reconstruction.

All studies face risks, limitations, and threats to validity. Where the initial record appears contradictory or incomplete, repeated efforts will be made to unearth additional data. Respondent validation will be utilized as the primary tool to ascertain whether data is accurate. Given the limitation and risks inherent in this thesis methodology, it is important to avoid overambitious claims. The thesis will produce an overall model for how post-peace accord army reconstruction ought to take place, but it is based on one case study. Theory testing in a second or third environment will be important to validate the thesis results.

A narrowing case study approach will be adopted. Three key concepts – capability enhancement, political-economic factors, and SSR principles – need to be assessed. A wide range of army reconstruction cases will be examined through a desk based review in Chapters 5. This review will measure attainment of capability enhancement, to the extent possible with the data available, and identify capability enhancement lessons. It will also identify relevant political-economic factors and assess compliance with the SSR principles. This process will be repeated in the single field case study, Chapter 6. Chapter 6 will examine the reconstruction of the Armed Forces of Liberia in the contractor-implemented phase, which began in 2004 and concluded at the end of 2009.

Chapter 5: Lessons derived from Army Reconstruction Experience

The literature review shows that a significant amount of high-level guidance on army reconstruction has been compiled over the past twenty years. This includes practitioner and academic writing, compilations like the *OECD Handbook on SSR*, and military doctrine. This material is very valid and represents a significant amount of theoretical analysis backed by practical experience. However, its' attention to specific cases of army reconstruction is inconsistent and incomplete. This chapter aims to help fill that gap by focusing on a range of army redevelopment and reconstruction cases.

This chapter examines the army redevelopment and reconstruction experience in an introduction, three main sections, and a conclusion. The introduction reintroduces the definition of army reconstruction used in this thesis, and summarizes previous discussion of the subject. It appears from the literature review that there are three key concepts which significantly affect the army reconstruction debate currently: political-economic influences, capability enhancement, and available strategic guidance. The approach that will be taken to analyzing these three key concepts is briefly discussed, drawing upon the method chapter's framework. The three identified types of army redevelopment and reconstruction will then be introduced: 'military merger,' institutionalization, and single state force. Within the three groupings a general overview will be provided, efforts to enhance capacity analyzed, political-economic influences on the current status of the force sketched, and the effect of SSR principles assessed. The conclusions then sum up what has been learned from these different army reconstruction approaches.

Army reconstruction was defined in the introduction as 'the process of establishing an armed state land force which has previously all but dissolved, or is so decayed that it has effectively lost the character of a state institution.'³⁶⁶ A number of case studies that fit the definition of army redevelopment and reconstruction in a post conflict

366

See Chapter 1, Introduction, 21.

context have been identified. The dividing line between less fundamental redevelopment and transformative reconstruction is inevitably somewhat arbitrary. However for the purpose of this thesis the operative question is whether a new institution has been created. If such a new organization has been formed, then the process has been characterized as army reconstruction; if not, it is described as army redevelopment.

Discussion on post-peace accord army reconstruction is predominantly recent. The subject has only really surfaced since the explosion in international interventions in civil conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Prior to that time, comparable literature often focused on support for armies against insurgencies, rather than wholesale reconstruction aimed at the creation of a democratically controlled institution.³⁶⁷ During the Cold War, Western armies applied their own procedures and doctrines in a literal and derivative fashion in restructuring partner land forces.³⁶⁸ Discussion directly relevant to army reconstruction has mostly been confined to the peacekeeping and security sector reform literature. Much discussion has taken the form of articles examining the status of SSR in one state. To the author's knowledge, the only cross-case analyses of post-peace accord army reconstruction have focused upon mergers of previously warring factions.³⁶⁹

Drawing from the conclusions of the literature review, this author argues that a more accurate analysis would also reflect the multiplicity of political-economic factors that shape outcomes in a post-conflict environment and army reconstruction's historical emphasis on capacity enhancement. As noted in earlier chapters, one of the important political-economic factors frequently involved is internationals' commitment to the liberal peace project. Once these factors are more fully appreciated, it becomes clear that expectations for governance over, and capacity of, defence forces in these contexts may have been frequently overestimated.

³⁶⁷ For example see W.C. Ladwig III, 'Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency: Britain and the Dhofar Rebellion,' *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Winter 1994.

³⁶⁸ Rocky Williams, *African Armed Forces and the Challenges of Security Sector Reform*, *Journal of Security Sector Management*, March 2005, p.6

³⁶⁹ Existing cross-case papers on army reconstruction are mostly recent: Mills (1992), Moller and Cawthra (2007), Burgess (2008) and Licklider (2009 draft).

There are a number of political-economic factors which affect army reconstruction. Chief among them are the circumstances of the peace accord and the necessity for constructively occupying former combatants. Following discussion of varied models, the method chapter justified the selection of a neo-patrimonial governance framework. In this framework the state essentially operates informally, and its resources are the chief prize for political elites.³⁷⁰ Struggle between elites can be very personalized. These features are present in most of the case studies examined in this chapter. However, it would be a mistake to press a single analytical conception too far. Each case is unique, and one, South Africa, has reasonably robust democratic institutions. SSR theorizing has repeatedly been justly accused of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Therefore this framework can only be used as a general guide.

Effective analysis of capability enhancement requires the use of indicators to assess performance. It also requires assessing what missions an army is given, explicitly or implicitly. The utility and limitations of indicators for capacity enhancement were discussed in the methodology chapter. Missions include remaining subject to civilian authority, defend against external aggression and internal rebellion, and responding to humanitarian emergencies. In most cases, the international intervention force was the only available military capability provider in the immediate post-conflict period. However, efforts were usually quickly initiated to develop indigenous capability.

The principles of SSR appear to form the only existing strategic guidance for army reconstruction. The OECD’s SSR principles, reordered as explained in the method chapter, indicate that SSR should be:

People-centred and locally owned

Based on democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law

A framework to address diverse security challenges through a broad needs assessment and integrated multi-sectoral policies

A practice promoting greater civilian oversight and involvement

Transparent and accountable

³⁷⁰ Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Oxford: International African Institute in association with J. Currey Indiana University Press, 1999), 8-13.

A practice that enhances institutional and human capacity.

Using SSR principles to assess army reconstruction programmes allows for judgments on their relative worth and place. It appears from the literature review however that there are significant potential weaknesses in the SSR principles. They appear to reflect Northern aspirations rather than the reality of post-peace accord countries.

Army reconstruction and redevelopment since 1980 can be categorized by subdivision into specific variants. Categorization of the different varieties does not appear to have been attempted beforehand in the literature, but related work has been done. In 2003 Call and Stanley made a distinction between different models that have been used in recent years to reform the security sector.³⁷¹ They identified two models. The first model, 'demilitarization and police reform,' requires reducing the military's power while strengthening the police. The military usually has its budget and power reduced, and is confined to external defence missions. The police take on the bulk of internal security responsibilities. The second, 'military merger,' seeks to combine all armed groups into one single army. At the very least, all parties will have a presence within the armed forces and be aware of any threatening moves. These models are not exactly applicable to army reconstruction, as they deal with other security forces as well. However, they appear to be the only previous thinking on the topic.

The term 'military merger' describes the process which 10 of the 15 armies analyzed have gone through clearly, if the subject is narrowed to armies only, instead of Call and Stanley's usage, involving all security forces. Therefore, that term will be used, with the clarifications described below. Some works (such as Licklider) have used the term 'military integration,' but the present author argues that such usage is terminologically inexact. Several of the armies under consideration have been 'merged' but in no sense can really have been considered to have been 'integrated' – for example, the current army in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or the Joint Integrated Units in southern Sudan. Effectively these armies have been multiple institutions grouped under one title. Therefore the term 'military merger' is preferred.

³⁷¹ William Stanley and Charles Call, "Military and Police Reform after Civil Wars," in *Contemporary Peace Making: Conflict, Violence, and Peace Processes*, ed. John Darby and Roger MacGinty (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press Ltd, 2008), 300-301.

Examination of army reconstruction cases since 1980 indicates that the ‘military merger’ model is predominant as the concept accounts for 10 of the identified 15 cases. Yet other variants exist. One could argue that ‘military merger’ has a hybrid variation – ‘institutionalization,’ where only one rather than several warring factions are institutionalized. The other major variant is the ‘single state force,’ an army rebuilt from new recruits.

The ‘Military merger’ appears to be the most common approach taken in army reconstruction. ‘Military merger’ brings a majority of the demobilizing groups into the new armed forces, and then attempts to professionalize them. It was first used in Zimbabwe from 1980, and then in Namibia, South Africa in the 1990s, Sierra Leone, partially with the Kosovo Protection Corps, in the South Sudan, and in the Congo. The resulting force is less effective for some time, but goes some way to solving the immediate security problem. Fighters are cantoned under military administration in specified areas, and given food, accommodation, and training, which occupies their time. Therefore they will be far less likely to create disturbances and prey on the population. ‘Military merger’ is also politically neat, is a confidence building measure, and effectively extends time available for the DDR process.³⁷² A good example of the last characteristic was in Sierra Leone, where the force size expanded to take in ex-fighters who were regularized. Thus the ex-fighters could be monitored.

Kosovo and East Timor serve as examples of military mergers where only one army is involved. These hybrid cases have been designated ‘institutionalization’. In both cases, an insurgency had been carried out by a nationally acknowledged liberation army, with popular support. When the international intervention force arrived, the liberation army was screened and a great many of its personnel became the core of a new national army for the now independent territory. In East Timor there was a sixteen month delay period. Falintil cantoned itself at Aileu amid the violence of September 1999 to avoid accusations that it was fighting a civil war against the Indonesian-backed militias.³⁷³ Falintil eventually had to wait until 1 February 2001

³⁷² Discussion with Brig. Dennis Blease, 20 February 2009.

³⁷³ Hood, Ludovic. “Security Sector Reform in East Timor, 1999-2004.” *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 1 (2006), 61, 70-71.

for the ceremony by which it became the core of the new East Timorese national army. In Kosovo's case, the delay was ten years, and involved passage through the chrysalis Kosovo Protection Corps stage.

The single state force approach demobilizes all existing armed groupings and starts again from square one with a new state army. All prospective soldiers have to meet high entry standards. The resulting force is well positioned to be of reasonably high quality. This policy has been applied in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia (though through contractors in the last case). However the fighters left out of the process constitute an ongoing security threat.

Armies rebuilt by 'Military merger'

The 'military merger' variant of army reconstruction encompasses the following cases:

- Zimbabwe
- Namibia
- South Africa
- Mozambique
- Sierra Leone
- Democratic Republic of the Congo (referred to as 'the Congo' throughout)
- Bosnia-Herzegovina
- Burundi
- South Sudan
- Nepal

These ten identified armies are very diverse, and can be subdivided in a variety of different ways, chronologically, geographically, or by state strength or success. Here a division by success seems most appropriate. This is due to the assumption that a state must remain intact for its army to remain a legal armed state land force. If the state splinters, an army can lose its legitimate force through no action of its own. This categorization results in three main groupings: the four early cases in southern Africa, which were generally successful, later programmes that appear partially successful, and cases where integration has failed. The first group consists of Zimbabwe, where

the programme began in 1980, Namibia from 1990, Mozambique and South Africa from 1993. The partially successful group includes Sierra Leone, effectively from 2001, Bosnia-Herzegovina, effectively from 2003, and Burundi from 2003. The last, unsuccessful group includes the Congo from 2003, the South Sudan from 2005, and Nepal, where the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in November 2006. Since that point, long-running discussions have been held as to how to incorporate Maoist combatants within the national army. The integration of ex-Rwandan Government combatants into today's Rwandan Patriotic Army, which commenced from January 1995,³⁷⁴ also followed the 'military merger' pattern.

Because eight of these ten cases are African, it is useful here to remind ourselves of some of the general characteristics of African armies since the colonizers departed. Before the outbreak of civil wars, these armies often did not have a great degree of internal solidity and coherence. Many African personal regimes have initiated or greatly expanded military corruption, employed ethnic criteria to recruit soldiers, and created parallel military forces to counterbalance the regular armed forces.³⁷⁵ These measures weakened the cohesion of the armed forces. Leaders initiated rapid promotions in the early years of new states to fill gaps left by departing colonial officers. This too-quick Africanization of the officer corps had severely destabilizing effects.³⁷⁶ Quick mobility between postings disrupted the expected career pattern and weakened the chain of command, while promotion blockages created frustration in more junior officers. Similar problems affected other African armies, though their exact nature depended on the specific country concerned.³⁷⁷ As a result, in Decalo's words:³⁷⁸

'many African armies bear little resemblance to a modern complex organisational model and are instead a coterie of armed camps owing primarily clientelist

³⁷⁴ Richard Orth, "Rwanda's Hutu Genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 12, no. 1 (2001).

³⁷⁵ Herbert M. Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States* (Boulder, CO/London: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 28

³⁷⁶ Robin Luckham, 'The Military, Militarization, and Democratisation in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues,' *African Studies Review*, Vol. 37, No. 2, September 1994, 37.

³⁷⁷ Ibid. See also J.M. Lee, *African Armies and Civil Order*, ISS, 1969.

³⁷⁸ S. Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style*, 14-15, in Luckham 1994

allegiance to a handful of mutually competitive officers of different ranks seething with a variety of corporate, ethnic, and personal grievances.'

The truth of this can easily be seen in the internal feuding that characterized the Sierra Leonean and Liberian armed forces.³⁷⁹ For example, the Armed Forces of Liberia were ethnically factionalised under Samuel Doe in the 1980s. Doe brought in members of his own ethnic group, the Krahn, into the AFL who refused to take orders from others.³⁸⁰ Thus when internal wars began, West African armies were already vulnerable to disintegration.

Political-Economic Factors in Military Merger Cases

There are a number of reoccurring political-economic factors that have influenced the evolution of military merger cases. Several of these factors have been evident in one form or another since the merger of the warring groups in Zimbabwe started in 1980. These factors include the necessity for a viable political settlement; the intervention of foreign parties, playing a political role, to ensure stability (Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, and Bosnia); the already identified necessity for constructive occupation for former fighters; indigenous actors' preference for certain political groups, often on ethnic lines (Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Bosnia etc); and the potential value of reconciliation policies.

Firstly, for military merger integration to be effective, there must be a functioning political settlement. Apart from the 1980 settlement in Zimbabwe, these have invariably incorporated Western liberal-democratic ideas, often due to strong international involvement. The political settlement, and the principals and objectives of the army reintegration process need to be embodied in clear policy documents.³⁸¹ Lack of such a settlement viable for the long term has been a factor in the Congo, Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Nepal. Peace accords can create temporary armed services, such as the Joint Integrated Units in South Sudan. But peace accords do not

³⁷⁹ E D A Turay and A Abraham, *The Sierra Leone Army: A Century of History*, MacMillan, London, 1987, and Malan, *op. cit.*, 8-9

³⁸⁰ Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy*, Hurst & Co., 2001, 56.

³⁸¹ Rocky Williams, *Post Conflict Security Sector Transformation: The South African Experience 1994-2002*, *Providing Security for People: SSR in Africa*, Cranfield University, 2003, via internet.

necessarily make such services viable. While a lack of resources has impeded the effectiveness of the JIUs, South Sudan is one of the clearer examples of political factors making an integrated army unattainable. Prospects for North-South unity are poor, as the two sides retain incompatible interests. The same factors are at work in the Congo. The South African experience shows the value of a political debate on the future size, shape, and tasks of the army.

Most of the obstacles to successful army reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina stem from political weaknesses in the peace settlement. While the international community may have induced the three sides to come to terms, creating effective combined institutions requires willingness to work together over the long term. The Serbs and Croats have resisted the creation of a unified central state, including security institutions, because its creation would, in their eyes, guarantee Bosniak rule as the Bosniaks form the majority.³⁸²

Sierra Leone shows that army reconstruction needs to be addressed not only as part of post-peace accord SSR, but within civil institutional redevelopment of a wider nature still.³⁸³ If this is not done, a reformed army may have its effectiveness made useless because civil institutions misuse it, or fail it. Yet Mozambique's experience with a crippling lack of resources demonstrates that a viable political settlement between combatants does not guarantee the creation of an effective military force. A realistic transition plan, a continuing political consensus, and sufficient resources are also required.

Secondly, foreign commitments to support such a political settlement very often play a significant role,³⁸⁴ but do not appear to be necessary in all cases.³⁸⁵ In Zimbabwe, the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) made repeated early adjustments to the integration process to ensure stability within the nascent new state

³⁸² Slobodan Perdan, "Bosnia: SSR under International Tutelage," in *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform*, ed. Timothy Donais (Zurich/Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008), 267.

³⁸³ In Sierra Leone, the security sector institutions by 2005-07 were competent but many of the other government departments were less so – 'unwilling or unable to take the initiative required to develop a comprehensive [strategy to incorporate the security sector].' Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 159.

³⁸⁴ Stephen F. Burgess, "Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict," *African Security* 2, no.1 (2008), 70-71.

³⁸⁵ I am grateful to Roy Licklider of Rutgers University for drawing this point to my attention.

as best it could.³⁸⁶ Following experience in Zimbabwe and Namibia, another BMATT was sent to South Africa in 1994. Officially they were said to have essentially certified that the process was fair, both for individuals attempting to take their rightful place in the new armed forces, and for the process as a whole.³⁸⁷ However, Kriger's research in Zimbabwe indicates the British preoccupation at that time with the country's future stability, and it is very likely that the same desire for future stability influenced BMATT decisions in South Africa. It seems likely that while making decisions in South Africa on which individuals would be able to enter the new armed forces, and in what positions, the BMATT personnel specifically took account of whether internal organizational tensions would be exacerbated or alleviated as a result. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbian faction had had a significant military advantage during the civil war. After the Dayton Peace Accord was signed, the United States sponsored military training and integration assistance for the Muslim-Croat faction in order to better balance the military playing field in their favour.

A rarer version of this kind of involvement is the commitment of significant amounts of funding. In Sierra Leone, what has been achieved was in large part accomplished because of the UK's persistence and willingness to invest a significant amount of resources. Advisors doubt that the Sierra Leonean government can assume the security sector financial burden after UK assistance ends.³⁸⁸

Thirdly, the size of the post-peace accord army is almost always influenced by the need to constructively occupy former combatants. Sometimes the army provides a framework within which discipline can be maintained temporarily over combatants who will eventually leave government service. Many armies have initially been of an unsustainable size, including those of Zimbabwe, the three armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and the Congo. In Zimbabwe the necessity to occupy former combatants led to many more units formed initially than was affordable or necessary.³⁸⁹ In Namibia again a future needed to be found for both

³⁸⁶ Kriger 2003, 113-114.

³⁸⁷ IISS Strategic Comments, Integration and Demobilisation in South Africa, No.6, 1995.

³⁸⁸ Roderick Evans, David Jones and Graham Thompson, 'Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme II: Output to Purpose Review', unpublished report by Defence Advisory Team 2002 in Adrian Horn/Funmi Olunisakin/Gordon Peake, 'UK-led SSR in Sierra Leone,' *Civil Wars*, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 2006, 120.

³⁸⁹ Kriger 2003, 111, 31.

sides' combatants, but emigration to South Africa and the alternative of police service eventually aided the stability of the new force by providing alternate options for former apartheid government personnel. South African integration was aided by designing the army integration process to be all-inclusive, to avoid factional dissatisfaction and thus the potential creation of spoilers.³⁹⁰ While this increased the size of the SANDF temporarily, quickly a steady stream of personnel began to leave, reducing the burden. The value of temporarily including all ex-combatants, which might potentially reduce the level of resentment caused by exclusion from the post-peace accord army, has been identified in analyses of the East Timorese programme.³⁹¹ In Sierra Leone former rebel combatants were brought into the army, where they could be monitored. This was done by granting them a blanket amnesty, a pre-emptive pardon for any crimes they might have committed.³⁹² However there was a realization that the resulting 15,000 strong force size would be unsustainable. A series of cuts reduced the force to just under 8,500 in 2010.³⁹³

Because the primary *raison d'être* of a post peace accord army has often been the need to employ former combatants, forces have often struggled to find a clear post-peace agreement role.³⁹⁴ Effectively their purpose has been achieved by bringing them into existence. The fact that states' formal frontiers are often assured by customary legal precedent or legal agreement, as in the case of Africa, also reduced the real need for external defence forces. Military merger armies affected by a lack of role include Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone,³⁹⁵ and possibly Namibia, though fragmentary information makes a proper assessment difficult.³⁹⁶ Others include East Timor and Kosovo.

³⁹⁰ Rocky Williams, 'Integration or Absorption?' *African Security Review*, 2002

³⁹¹ Edward Rees, *Under Pressure: Falintil-FDTL Three Decades of Defence Force Development in East Timor 1975-2004* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004), http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/WP139.pdf.

³⁹² Alfred Nelson-Williams, "Restructuring the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces," in *Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007*, ed. Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht (GfN-SSR, 2008), 7-8.

³⁹³ Robertshawe, "Sierra Leone: A Country on the Move?," 124-5.

³⁹⁴ Roy Lickliger, "New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil Wars—A Research Project In Mid-Course," (Prepared for presentation for the Folke Bernadotte Academy's Security Sector Reform Workshop meeting, Geneva, 2010), 13.

³⁹⁵ Zimbabwe – 'an army which country neither needed nor could afford,' (Kriger 2003, 111), East Timor: ICG 2008 17, Sierra Leone: Albrecht & Jackson, 150; Kosovo, Marzouk.

³⁹⁶ There have been SMS messages sent to the main Namibian newspaper, *The Namibian*, that indicate citizens' frustration with what has been reported as a large number of personnel under arms. <http://www.namibian.com.na/smses/full-story/archive/2010/november/article/smses-for-friday-26->

Political concerns, either in the form of large armies to employ ex-combatants, or temporary force structuring requirements such as in South Sudan, make it difficult to incorporate long term concerns into immediate post conflict planning. In any case, the strategic situation often remains fluid during the uncertainty prevailing after a peace accord is signed. The strategic situation may also change dramatically. Defence reviews in major Western countries, which can occur as often as every four to five years, acknowledge this fact. Defence organizational structures formulated in the immediate aftermath of a peace accord, often by foreign advisors, can sometimes be left substantially unchanged for a long period (for example, the army structure in Namibia). This does not remove the value of periodic defence re-appraisals to adjust force structure. An example is the Timorese Force 2020 plan whose strategy differed substantially from earlier planning.

Fourthly, politicians' preference for certain parties or factions is an inescapable part of army reconstruction. This factor is part of what makes it such a political, rather than technical, process. Ethnic preferment is widespread in the fragile contexts in which army reconstruction often occurs. Post-peace accord examples abound. In Zimbabwe, the government preferred ZANLA over ZIPRA, which eventually led to former ZIPRA combatants being completely marginalized by 1987.³⁹⁷ This led to a decline in effectiveness, as ZANLA was permitted to operate as they wished regardless of capability decline or rises in corruption.³⁹⁸ In Namibia, black PLAN ex-combatants eventually became the mainstay of the new armed forces. In South Africa, it appears that the necessity for a political reorientation of the new SANDF has had negative effects on operational effectiveness. Since 1994 many competent white personnel have left, due to the affirmative action imperatives now operating within the force.³⁹⁹

Fifthly, reconciliation processes, if promoted actively by the state, can assist establishing and maintaining stability throughout the transitional period. This policy

november-2010/. The IISS Military Balance 2009 army figures (9,000 plus 6,000 paramilitary Special Field Force) may not reflect the full number of security personnel in active service. Contact with regional security expert, late 2010.

³⁹⁷ Kriger 2003, 57, 74-79, 97-98, 104, 12, 14, 38-9.

³⁹⁸ Ibid., 131, 138

³⁹⁹ Helmoed-Romer Heitman, 'SANDF in Crisis,' Jane's Defence Weekly, posted 6 April 2010

was initiated in Namibia, as a specific task for the army, and followed in South Africa. Reconciliation in Namibia was to be promoted by integrating the two former warring factions together. The President of Namibia said at the twelfth anniversary celebrations that reconciliation had been the primary task of the armed forces, and that this had led to the early consolidation of a strong nation.⁴⁰⁰ In South Africa, it was the spirit of reconciliation pioneered by Nelson Mandela that enabled the disparate armed groupings to come together as peacefully as they did. At the military level, the personal qualities of a number of officers who believed in integration helped bring the force together.⁴⁰¹

Capability Enhancement in ‘Military Merger’ cases

Given the wide variety of ‘military merger’ cases, they have been divided here into three groups. The first includes those countries, most in southern Africa, in which the state reconstruction process, including the army reconstruction programme, was relatively successful. The second group’s army reconstruction programmes have seen some success, but a reversion to conflict involving the state, threatening the new army’s integrity, remains a possibility. The third group includes those countries whose army reconstruction processes have essentially failed for one reason or another.

The first four ‘military merger’ cases in southern Africa had strong similarities. Following a peace accord facilitated with the assistance of outside powers, the former enemy armies were melded. In three of the four cases, this meant merging black and white opponents, who had been fighting along racial lines.

The first case began unfolding in 1979 in what was then Rhodesia. The Lancaster House agreement brought the African guerillas’ liberation struggle which had lasted over a decade, to a negotiated end. The two contending guerilla armies, the mainly Shona Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), and their opponents the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), were merged with the

⁴⁰⁰ G Shelton, D Monyue, A Pullinger, M Simmonds & R Williams, *Demobilization and its aftermath II*, ISS, Pretoria, 2001, cited in Dzinesa and Rupiya, op. cit., 210.

⁴⁰¹ Gordon Hughes, personal conversation, 13 November 2008. See also <http://jmagination.com/clients/hoc/original/diagnosticToolStudy2.html>, accessed 26 April 2010.

Rhodesian Army into a new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA).⁴⁰² A joint high command was formed from senior officers of all three parties to integrate, standardize, and develop the army. However there were severe divisions between the Rhodesian forces and the two guerrilla movements and between the two guerrilla movements themselves. This culminated in factional fighting at Entumbane outside Bulawayo from November 1980.⁴⁰³ A complicating factor was the introduction of a separate North Korean training effort to assist in suppressing unrest in Matabeleland. Two divisive factors degrade professionalism, the political division between the three factions and the difference between two foreign separate advisory efforts (the British BMATT and the North Korean effort which followed).⁴⁰⁴

In Zimbabwe, the British trainers of BMATT attempted to raise an effective, operational, army that was also accountable. Yet according to Kriger's research, they had little success; corruption became widespread.⁴⁰⁵ There was an initial lack of interest in military affairs by ZNA senior personnel during the 1980s, also recorded by Kriger. This disinterest in military affairs was tolerated by the ZANU government in exchange for the army remaining subordinate to civilian authority. The army showed that it was capable of external defence operations in the fighting in Mozambique, and later in the Congo war from 1998.⁴⁰⁶ Later it became involved in suppressing internal opposition during the electoral campaigns of Mugabe's ruling party. It is clear that the army enhanced its capacity to a reasonable degree. Capability then probably declined as the economic crisis worsened. Exact capacity assessments are effectively impossible to obtain due to the secrecy of the Mugabe regime.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰² Martin Rupiya, 'Demobilisation and Integration: 'Operation Merger' and the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, 1980-1987, *African Security Review*, Vol. 4, No.3, 1995.

⁴⁰³ Brigadier T P Toyne-Sewell, "Zimbabwe and the British Military Advisory and Training Team," *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal* 121, no. 1 (1991), and Alao 1996, 107, 109.

⁴⁰⁴ Abiodun Alao, "The Metamorphosis of the Unorthodox: The Integration and Early Development of the Zimbabwe National Army " in *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, ed. Nguabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds) (London, : James Currey, 1996), 114.

⁴⁰⁵ Norma J. Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe : Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 132.

⁴⁰⁶ Stephen F. Burgess, "Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict," *African Security* 2, No. 1 (2008): 75.

⁴⁰⁷ While reporting on the capacity of ZNA is scarce, a good 2010 discussion of the general status of the force is Paul Sorensen, "Zimbabwe's Security Services," *The RUSI Journal*, 155: 4, 58 — 68 (September 2010).

In Namibia the new Defence Force was formed by bringing together the two former combatants, the black insurgent People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the South African supported South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) and Koevoet special police. However, many of the Koevoet personnel elected to relocate to South Africa, while many SWATF personnel joined the police force. Eventually former insurgents made up two-thirds of the new Defence Force.⁴⁰⁸ The main planning for integration in Namibia was done by a further British Military Advisory and Training Team, 57 strong, which worked together with the government to formulate a plan for a 10,000 strong force.⁴⁰⁹ The British team had two main functions: to provide advice on the creation of a Ministry of Defence and Army headquarters, and to assist in training and selecting officers and NCOs.⁴¹⁰ The British team ran a series of eight-week leaders' cadre training courses. These courses were designed to 'produce instructors capable of training their own battalions, and leaders capable of commanding soldiers in barracks and in the field.'⁴¹¹ The British advisors then gradually reduced their activities, handing over to newly trained Namibians. The Army has conducted both external defence operations in the Congo and Angola and operations against internal rebellion in the Caprivi Strip, as well as peacekeeping tasks. Specific descriptions of these operations are however difficult to find.⁴¹² It has also carried out humanitarian operations - fighting wildfires. Clearly a significant level of capability has been created, but it is very difficult to assess how combat effective the army is.

South Africa gained a broadly representative democratic government through a peaceful rather than a warlike process. From 1994, the former *apartheid* South African Army, a thoroughly professional land force on the Western model,⁴¹³ began to incorporate former guerrilla fighters of the African National Congress, Pan-Africanist

⁴⁰⁸ Gwinyayi Dzinesa and Martin Rupiya, "Promoting national reconciliation and regional integration: The Namibian Defence Force from 1990-2005," in *Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa*, ed. Martin Rupiya (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 209.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁴¹⁰ Greg Mills, "BMATT and Military Integration in Southern Africa," *South African Defence Review*, No. 2 (1992).

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² See however for a general overview of the Namibian-Zimbabwean-Angolan intervention in the Congo, Eric Berman and Katie Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, UNIDIR/ISS, Geneva, 2000, 175-183.

⁴¹³ Herbert Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*, 2005, 51-52.

Congress (PAC), and the former 'homeland' armed forces.⁴¹⁴ This process melded very disparate elements into what has not been an easy partnership. After a planning phase, most of the rank and file of the MK, PAC, and homeland armed forces were effectively absorbed into the structures of the old SADF.⁴¹⁵ The SADF was renamed the South African National Defence Force. While the name changed, the former SADF leadership continued to dominate the force. Absorption would not effectively begin to be reversed until several years had passed. Two main reasons led to a gradual change in the character and control of the force.⁴¹⁶ First, the Ministry of Defence, utilizing a small group of former MK and liberal SADF officers, succeeded in delivering the Defence White Paper and later the Defence Review, which led to significant change. The other was that many non-SADF officers had been prevented from taking up key positions because they had had to attend Western style training courses. As they returned, the balance within the SANDF began to shift.

South Africa still has 'the best trained and equipped army in Sub-Saharan Africa,'⁴¹⁷ despite losses of skilled personnel. Following the formation of the SANDF, South African forces have been in heavy demand for UN peacekeeping missions. Much more information is available on South Africa than for other African cases. Yet the army has not been tested in combat, and directly relevant information is not available. It has however conducted humanitarian operations, in Mozambique, Lesotho, and during domestic civil service strikes. But growing finance, morale and discipline problems hamper retention of capability. Capability has actually declined since 1994. In 2010 there were been repeated reports of crisis from the South African media.⁴¹⁸

By 1992 the civil war in Mozambique had been underway for fifteen years. The government and rebel combatants had reached exhaustion point, and both armed forces had been debilitated by the struggle.⁴¹⁹ The environment of exhaustion in

⁴¹⁴ IISS Strategic Comments, Integration and Demobilisation in South Africa, No.6, 19 July 1995.

⁴¹⁵ Rocky Williams, "Integration or Absorption? The Creation of the South African National Defence Force 1993 to 1999," *African Security Review* 11, no. 2 (2002).

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ Jane's World Armies: South Africa, accessed online, www.janes.com, 7 April 2010.

⁴¹⁸ Kevin Townsend, 'Defence Force fighting for survival,' Business Day, <http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=125549>, accessed 1 May 2011.

⁴¹⁹ Samuel Decalo, 'Modalities of Civil-Military Stability in Africa,' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1989, 560, quoted in Herbert Howe, *Ambiguous Order*, 2005, 51.

which the peace accord was signed bears some resemblance to 2005 in Sudan, when the accord was signed there. In October 1992, a peace accord was signed.⁴²⁰ As part of the agreement, the government – *Forças Armadas de Moçambique* (FAM) – and opposition *Resistência Nacional de Moçambique* (RENAMO) combatants were to be integrated into a single armed force. The new Armed Forces were Lusophone, and Portugal and France played a significant role in their creation. A 50:50 integration principal between government and rebels was adopted.⁴²¹

After negotiations, a target of 30,000 for the new FADM was eventually adopted. However, poor conditions led to more combatants wishing to be demobilized than wanting to join the new force. Pay, rations and other essentials had long been scarce or late in the FAM. Therefore most soldiers were skeptical of the new force's future, and corruption made matters worse. By February 1995, the new FADM had only 12,000 personnel, and this number was decreasing. This prompted descriptions such as 'the creation of the FADM was not so much a practice of integration, but one of disintegration.'⁴²² Flood relief operations in 2000 exposed multiple FADM capacity problems. The FADM has continued to suffer from severe capacity deficiencies due to continuing rivalries between the two sides, lack of skilled personnel, and lack of funding.⁴²³ The FADM appears to have a very low level of overall capacity for any external, internal, or humanitarian mission. This mirrors the apparent outcomes with the JIUs in Sudan, and with the FARDC in the Congo.

All four of the armies discussed above were initially recreated by assembling and training former enemies together. However the process showed a number of variations. In Zimbabwe and Namibia, the British Army provided training, with the aim of turning the former guerilla movements into professional armed forces. In Zimbabwe from 1980, the BMATT trained both officers and enlisted soldiers. The two black factions together nominated 300 potential leaders for each battalion, and

⁴²⁰ Richard Synge, 'Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action 1992-94,' U.S. Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 1997, 15-16.

⁴²¹ Adriano Malache, Paulino Macaringue, and Joao-Paulo Borgues Coelho, "Profound Transformation and Regional Conflagrations: The History of Mozambique's Armed Forces 1975-2005," in *Evolutions and Revolutions*, ed. Martin Rupiya (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 180.

⁴²² Eric T. Young, "The Development of the FADM in Mozambique: Internal and External Dynamics," *African Security Review* Vol. 5, No. 1 (1996).

⁴²³ Jane's World Armies: Mozambique, 30 April 2009.

then 400 more personnel each who formed the rank and file, and the two groupings were integrated in a training programme supervised by BMATT. From 1990 in Namibia, the BMATT sent there had a reduced role, which was adopted on the basis of experience in Zimbabwe. The British there trained only the identified potential leaders in a series of eight-week leaders' cadre courses. For Mozambique, potential leaders were trained in Zimbabwe by the Zimbabweans, who had had their own army operating for twelve years by that time, and the remaining British advisors.⁴²⁴

It appears that capability was enhanced successfully in these four integration exercises because the task was relatively easy. The ease of training infantry to the company level has been noted above in the literature review. With a relatively successful state reconstruction process unfolding across the rest of a country, the political context appears to have been positive enough for former enemies to work together to create new institutions. The institutional strength of the state also played a role, especially in South Africa, the only developed state. Elsewhere international assistance filled part of the institutional gap. Logistics capability has been harder to create, partially because of lack of resources, and in some cases, disinterest. The level to which institutional and technical capabilities go beyond infantry skills will always be an unavoidable function of the skills base in a country as a whole.

The next process that started, in Sierra Leone, along with following programmes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Burundi, falls into the partially successful category. Such countries may have made substantial progress towards creating a new army post-peace accord, but are vulnerable to a resumption of fighting. Events in East Timor in 2006 and in Burundi from late 2010 demonstrate that a country whose army has been created after a peace accord can revert to conflict. This can in turn split that army in the process. Both Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina are vulnerable to such a reversion. The Mano River region's instability threatens Sierra Leone, and Bosnia-Herzegovina now-unitary state may be split by a Serb withdrawal. Reports of fighting in late 2010 indicate that the Burundian integration process may also be threatened.

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Young, "The Development of the FADM in Mozambique: Internal and External Dynamics."

The civil war in Sierra Leone began in 1991, with severe fighting continuing even after a peace accord was signed at Lome in July 1999. However, by June 2001 it was possible to commence the Military Reintegration Programme (MRP),⁴²⁵ which effectively marked the beginning of the army reconstruction process. The MRP aimed to integrate all ex-combatant groups into a single military force. The MRP began with the countrywide DDR exercise, progressed through individual screening and basic training, and culminated in the new soldiers being posted to army units as individual replacements.⁴²⁶ Around 2,400 former guerrilla combatants eventually joined the Sierra Leone army. After 2003, three rounds of downsizing were completed, reducing the armed forces to a more manageable size.⁴²⁷

The army has not seen combat since the reconstruction process began, but with support and international advisory assistance has developed a great deal. In 2009 a peacekeeping deployment began to the UN/AU Mission in Darfur.⁴²⁸ Therefore capabilities have been raised from near-disintegration in 2001 to some level of effectiveness in 2009. The Sierra Leonean army can now dispatch troops to UN missions. While overall capability has improved, the force continues to be hampered by lack of equipment, low levels of operational activity and welfare, and low morale.⁴²⁹

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) ended the civil war in 1995. The DPA left the country with three armies under two commands: the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) and Bosnian Croat armies within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, facing their recent adversaries the army of the Republika Srpska, the Serb entity. These three armies together had around 419,000 personnel in regulars and reserves.⁴³⁰ Some U.S. aid was given to help integrate the Federation armies, but it

⁴²⁵ Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, *Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone 1997-2007* (University of Birmingham, 2009), 46-65.

⁴²⁶ Ibid., 63-65.

⁴²⁷ Ibid., 103.

⁴²⁸ Lt Col Mike Robertshawe, "Sierra Leone: A Country on the Move?," *The Sustainer* (Journal of the RLC), April 2010, 124-5.

⁴²⁹ Albrecht and Jackson, *Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone 1997-2007*, 150.

⁴³⁰ 'HQ SFOR's Joint Military Affairs and BiH Defence Reform,' accessed at <http://www.nato.int/SFOR/indexinf/171/p03a/t02p03a.htm>, 21 September 2009.

appears little was achieved beyond the transfer of arms.⁴³¹ By 2004, the Federation and Srpska had reduced their forces to 12,000 regulars and 240,000 reserves but had made no effective progress in integrating the two into one new force, though the basis of a state defence ministry had been put in place.⁴³² Conscription for periods of around four months continued, the costs of which were weighing down the two entities.

In 2003 the Office of the High Representative, effectively the international community's proconsul in Bosnia-Herzegovina, initiated defence reforms. After further international pressure, an integration agreement was approved by parliamentarians in July 2006.⁴³³ It ended conscription, increased the powers of the state Ministry of Defence, and decided to form three ethnic administrative regiments, each split among three operational brigades. A single state defence budget and single chain of command were also created. Implementation of this new structure has proceeded slowly. However in 2010 fears have been expressed that if senior Serb officers publicly leave the army, the force might split again along ethnic lines.⁴³⁴ In capacity terms, the force is not designed to defend against external attack, and the police handle internal unrest. Army led humanitarian deployments within Bosnia-Herzegovina have taken place, mirroring deployments by the South African Army, Mozambique Armed Forces, Namibian Defence Force, and many of the other armies examined in this study. The army's long-term operational focus is to deploy on NATO, EU or UN-led operations.⁴³⁵ Small deployments of this type have already taken place.

The army reconstruction programme which began in Burundi in 2003 initially had sufficient similarities to be grouped with the other successful set of countries.⁴³⁶ The civil war in Burundi ended in 2000 after a prolonged struggle made worse by its interplay with the violence in neighbouring Rwanda. However it took until 2003 to

⁴³¹ Rohan Maxwell, "Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.1 MM.doc," (paper presented at the New Armies from Old Conference, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2010).

⁴³² HQ SFOR's Joint Military Affairs and BiH Defence Reform, op cit.

⁴³³ Slobodan Perdan, "Bosnia: SSR under international tutelage," in *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform*, ed. Timothy Donais (Zurich/Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008), 257.

⁴³⁴ Christopher Chivvis, "Back to the Brink in Bosnia?," *Survival* 52, No. 1 (2010), 103.

⁴³⁵ Maxwell 2010.

⁴³⁶ For example see Burgess, "Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict," 71-72.

settle on the force merger details between the Tutsi government and Hutu rebels.⁴³⁷ The new army was to be a 50:50 mix of Tutsi and Hutu, but also open to other former rebel fighters. South Africa provided an initial government protection force which was superseded by an African Union peacekeeping mission, AMIB. As an interim measure, joint military units were created. In 2006, the third rebel faction, the Forces Nationales de Liberation,⁴³⁸ appeared to be integrating successfully within the armed forces. But from August-September 2010, FNL elements appear to have started further attacks, and UN representatives have expressed concern of a return to violence.⁴³⁹ The two original factions appear to have integrated effectively enough, because the unified army is now conducting operations against the FNL. However late 2010 indications suggest that the state may fragment again, destroying what the army integration process has gained.

The problem for these three states lies in a possible return to war. In Sierra Leone, the armed forces may be stronger than at any time since 1990, but the Mano River region remains unstable. Guinea-Conakry's political future is uncertain, and the states in the region retain some of the vulnerabilities that led to conflict in the 1990s. It was reported in 2006 that Sierra Leonean 'transformation is painfully slow and continues to be undermined by systematic corruption and a lack of will to steer change.'⁴⁴⁰ This is despite a number of identified incompetent/corrupt senior officers having been persuaded to leave. These officers were paid the total salary that they would have received if they have stayed until retirement age.⁴⁴¹ The problem is systemic. The continuing presence of the international military training team does however help deter creeping de-professionalization. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the army reconstruction process, despite the progress achieved, is hostage as is all else to entity politics. There is a real possibility of a Serbian attempt to withdraw from the developing unitary state. In Burundi, the FNL appears to have abandoned the integration process.

⁴³⁷ Louise Andersen, Bjørn Møller, and Finn Stepputat, *Fragile States and Insecure People? : Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 191-2.

⁴³⁸ The FNL is a re-naming of the former PALIPEHUTU-FNL, the acronym of the party's French name *Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu*.

⁴³⁹ International Crisis Group, "Crisis Watch 1 November 2010, No.87."

⁴⁴⁰ Contact with British IMATT advisor, 2008-9.

⁴⁴¹ Albrecht and Jackson, *Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone 1997-2007*, 155.

The third military merger sub-group includes those states whose army reconstruction process has been delayed or disrupted enough to be considered failed. For the purposes of this discussion, failure can be understood as the inability to create a unified and reasonably combat capable army. It appears that the major reason for these failures is that enough powerful actors prefer the status quo. For example, in the Congo, effective reform is actually neither desired nor necessary for the governing elite. Certain parties in Sudan and Nepal have too much invested in the status quo to wish to implement their peace accords.

The second of the Congo's two recent wars ended with a peace accord, the Global and All-inclusive Agreement, in December 2002. The negotiations which led to the accords proposed that the new armed forces be built through integration of the six warring factions. In late 2003 as an initial step all the six former warring factions were declared to be part of the new armed forces, but it took until 2005 to formulate a reform plan.⁴⁴² The 2005 reform plan envisaged the formation of eighteen integrated brigades, drawn from all the warring factions, as the first of three stages. Due to a multitude of delays in the DDR and integration process, forming the eighteen brigades was delayed over three years. Deadlines for the second and third stages have also been repeatedly delayed.⁴⁴³ The integrated brigades had to operate alongside a variety of former warring faction groups. Then in 2009 the trained integrated brigades were broken up and melded with former rebel CNDP fighters and Mai-Mai local militias. UN reports in 2009 indicate the resulting force has former rebel parallel command chains operating within it, and its effectiveness and internal cohesion is low.⁴⁴⁴ The army is not effective against external enemies, internal rebellion, or for humanitarian tasks.

⁴⁴² International Crisis Group, "Security Sector Reform in the Congo," 2006, 17-18.

⁴⁴³ Caty Clement, "Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," in *SSR in Difficult Environments (DCAF Yearbook 2009)*, 2009.

⁴⁴⁴ UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Final Report, 9 November 2009, S/2009/603.

An effective army may actually be neither desirable nor necessary for the Congo's ruling oligarchy.⁴⁴⁵ An effective force would threaten the survival of the government and impede individuals' ability to enrich themselves. In any case, the government does not need to control the whole country. A group of presidential advisors deals with the sensitive security issues. This group runs a parallel decision-making system to the formal structure. Lack of donor coordination only worsens the situation, with the UN and the EU vying for SSR leadership,⁴⁴⁶ and the Congolese playing off varied donors against each other.

Two separate army reconstruction processes have taken place in the Sudan. One process spans the North Sudan/South Sudan divide, and the second is attempting to unify and professionalize the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

Attempts to integrate the Northern and Southern armies began following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005 which aimed to end the Sudanese civil war. Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) were created, comprised of both Northern and Southern troops.⁴⁴⁷ The Joint Integrated Units were to have had the functional purpose of filling security vacuums caused by Northern and Southern withdrawal from contested areas, and symbolically, were intended to demonstrate national unity and serve as a confidence-building mechanism. However, due to tensions between North and South, problems over the integration of regional militias, ethnic tensions, and lack of funding, their potential capability was limited. Effectively they remained 'little more than collocated units of SAF and SPLA troops' with separate chains of command.⁴⁴⁸ Capability for any task is low. The JIUs actually fought each other in Abyei in 2008.⁴⁴⁹ The JIUs probably broke up after the 9 January 2011 South Sudanese referendum vote. These problems, along with many other issues, threatened implementation of the peace accord. Yet because prospects for

⁴⁴⁵ Judith Verweijen, "The Beer that would not Brew: Birth and Infancy of the FARDC 2003-2007," (paper presented at the New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars., US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 2010).

⁴⁴⁶ Derived from consultation with international security expert September 2007.

⁴⁴⁷ Jane's World Armies, Sudan, 12 May 2009

⁴⁴⁸ See Small Arms Survey, 'Neither 'Joint' nor 'Integrated:' The Joint Integrated Units and the Future of the CPA, Issue Brief, March 2008, 5.

⁴⁴⁹ International Crisis Group, 'Sudan: Preventing Implosion,' Africa Briefing No. 68, Nairobi/Brussels, 17 December 2009, 3.

future North-South unity are poor, there was little interest in integrating the units further.

The South Sudanese programmes are not the product of an agreed peace accord. The SPLA process is an internal state-building process and is not associated with an international intervention force. Therefore they do not fall under the scope of this thesis. If South Sudan was an international recognized state, however, the South Sudanese programmes would represent a form of the institutionalization method. Because South Sudan is not such a state, some brief details of the programmes are noted here to keep the discussion regarding Sudan in one place. A number of separate programmes to aid the SPLA are being funded by the United States and the United Kingdom. All appear to be being implemented through contractors; Burton Rams International funded by DfID through Adam Smith International,⁴⁵⁰ and U.S. firms⁴⁵¹ are among the commercial companies involved. The U.S. contracts are probably implemented through the AFRICAP (Africa Peacekeeping) contractual arrangement that the Department of State uses to carry out military contractor activities in Africa. The difficulty is that the SPLA appears to be a force fractured between different tribes, of which the Dinka and the Nuer are possibly the most important.⁴⁵² South Sudan appears to be vulnerable to political fragmentation for some time to come.⁴⁵³ This may lead in time to the failure of the SPLA reconstruction process for the same reasons as in the Congo.

The roots of Nepal's present conflict date to 1996, when the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) began a revolt against the Nepalese royal government. Following a military stalemate between the Maoists and the government, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ended the war in 2006.⁴⁵⁴ The transformation of the security sector was envisaged as one of the key parts of the Nepal peace process.⁴⁵⁵ The CPA agreed that the Maoist fighters were to be 'integrated and rehabilitated,'

⁴⁵⁰ Conversations with Sudan security experts 2010.

⁴⁵¹ See for example Department Of State, Capacity Building the Ministry of SPLA Affairs Management Advisory and Training Team, Office of the Special Envoy to Sudan/Bureau of African Affairs, Statement of Work, circa August 2010, via FedBizOpps.com.

⁴⁵² Consultation with African security expert in United States, 27 November 2010.

⁴⁵³ Consultation with British African security expert, 21 October 2010.

⁴⁵⁴ Ian Martin, "The Peace Process in Nepal: Is It Failing? (Speech)," (New School, New York 2009),1.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid., 3.

with some to be incorporated into the state security forces. On the other side, the Royal Nepalese Army was to be ‘democratized’ and its national and inclusive character developed. It was to be trained in democratic norms and values.⁴⁵⁶ Finally the appropriate size of the army as a national force was to be determined. While the process was under way no new recruitment for either army was to take place.

However since 2006 there has been little progress towards these objectives.⁴⁵⁷ Both sides have filled vacancies in defiance of the recruitment ban. The Nepalese Army has resisted the imposition of democratic civilian control. After the dissolution of the royal palace military secretariat, the Armed Forces have been more autonomous than ever. Negotiations on the restructuring process have been continually stalled. As of November 2010, the parties in Nepal are still debating how and whether the two forces are to be integrated.

The major reason for the failures in Sudan and Nepal appears to be that the parties will damage their own power base if they implement the integration agreements. This feared loss of power and influence is also a major factor in hampering reconstruction efforts in the Congo. Improving the effectiveness of the army and other state institutions there would reduce the governing oligarchy’s leverage.

If failure can be defined as the inability to create a unified and reasonably combat capable army, these three cases can be described as failures. These cases show the necessity for a viable peace settlement if reconstruction (including army capability enhancement) is to take place. Three directly applicable capability enhancement lessons can be identified. These are the avoidance of differing foreign armies’ philosophies and practices in the same indigenous force, the necessity and great difficulty of transferring logistics and administrative skills, and the need for realistic rather than unattainable transformation plans. Experience in Zimbabwe and the Congo shows the problems caused when differing military procedures are introduced within the same army. Diversification of military equipment supplies for political reasons has

⁴⁵⁶ Comprehensive Peace Agreement, November 2006, Section 4, Management of Arms and Armies, accessed at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rwarchive/rwb.nsf/db900sid/VBOL-6VSHK8?OpenDocument>, 21 January 2010.

⁴⁵⁷ Martin, “The Peace Process in Nepal: Is It Failing? (Speech),” 6.

also lowered capability in other African states.⁴⁵⁸ Lack of capability within military merger armies is often due to the difficulty of maintaining logistical skills, rather than combat skills. This has been a problem in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, the Congo, and probably elsewhere. The last lesson draws upon South African experience. A realistic assessment needs to be made of the institutional capability for transformation within the armed forces, and objectives set accordingly.⁴⁵⁹ Mozambique and the Congo represent examples of these types of over-ambitious goals. In Mozambique, both a navy and an air force have been retained in the face of crippling resource difficulties, when not enough money is available to fund the army properly. In the Congo, creating eighteen effective integrated brigades has just about proven beyond the state's capability. One lesson identified from Zimbabwe, which has now been integrated into current practice sufficiently to be considered a 'lesson learned', is the need for an overall army strategic and budgeting plan.⁴⁶⁰ Such planning, or, at least, attempts to put such planning in place, is now a feature of virtually all army reconstruction programmes. However, as will be shown in Chapter 7, hurried last-minute changes can still occur.

The fact that only three widely applicable lessons can be drawn from this survey makes more obvious the limitations of programmes focused on capability enhancement alone.⁴⁶¹ This result emphasizes again the truth of Trotsky's dictum that an army is a mirror of its society. The potential power inherent in any army is a function of a society's ability to educate and train the army's personnel. The more sophisticated the concepts an army's personnel can manipulate, the more potent the 'conceptual component of fighting power,' in the British Army's words, will be.⁴⁶² The conceptual component enables the moral and the physical components of fighting power. Because of this many of the most important issues affecting capability enhancement actually reflect the deeper political-economic factors already covered above. Capability enhancement itself, though, is a one of the factors specifically covered by the SSR principles, and it is to these principles that we now turn.

⁴⁵⁸ Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*, 42-43.

⁴⁵⁹ Rocky Williams, "African Armed Forces and the Challenges of Security Sector Reform," *Journal of Security Sector Management* 3, no. March 2005: 23.

⁴⁶⁰ Mills 1992.

⁴⁶¹ See Capt. Gary Felicetti USCG, 'The Limitations of Training in Iraqi Force Development,' *Parameters*, Winter 2006-07.

⁴⁶² British Army, *Army Doctrine Publication Land Operations* (DGD&D, 1995), 2.

Applicability of SSR principles to the military merger model

Six criteria were formulated in the method chapter which expressed the OECD principles of SSR. These criteria will be used to assess whether military merger reconstruction programmes have been a success in SSR terms.

The first criterion is whether the programme was people-centred and locally owned. In general, military merger programmes do not appear to be people-centred. While the reintegration component of DDR programmes may primarily focus on improving former combatants' lives and bettering their welfare, army reconstruction programmes do not. State military security is the dominant concern. Regime security has become a significant factor in Zimbabwe and the Congo.

Local ownership of 'military merger' programmes has been mixed. In Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Sierra Leone, significant British elements have been introduced or re-introduced. In Zimbabwe, the programme was designed to produce a British style army, drawing clear precedents from the British Army. Strenuous efforts were made to transform the guerilla groupings into a bureaucratic institution. Army reconstruction in Namibia appears to have blended elements of local ownership with British practices. However older South African and East Bloc techniques inculcated earlier will have retained some influence.⁴⁶³ Army reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not locally owned. International pressure drove most of the process. Locally owned armies include South Africa, the Joint Integrated Units in South Sudan,⁴⁶⁴ and Nepal. In the Congo foreign prompting was necessary to initiate the process. At the field level however, once the initial involvement by several donors had ceased, the Congolese ran virtually all aspects of the integrated brigade creation programme. The reason army programmes remain locally owned appears to be connected with the level of major power interest. South Africa was a strong industrialized state, organized along Western lines. Little foreign involvement was necessary or desired. In the Congo there is little major power interest in assuring the strength of the state structure. Finally the nature of the new FADM in Mozambique is not clear enough to indicate whether the process was meaningfully locally owned.

⁴⁶³ Mills, 2002, 5 of 8.

⁴⁶⁴ Conversation with former United Nations official, 7 April 2010.

The second OECD criterion was a programmatic basis upon democratic norms, human rights, and the rule of law. Army reconstruction programmes have only met such aspirations where major Western powers have been significantly involved. Such cases include South Africa, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The army reconstruction process in Sierra Leone aspired to all these three goals. However the neo-patrimonial condition of the state continues to obstruct these objectives. The Defence Reform Commission process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while operated according to the three aspirations above, was led by foreign actors. In Zimbabwe, South Sudan, the Congo, and Nepal such principles have not been respected. Most egregiously, soldiers of the new Congolese integrated brigades have carried out multiple human rights violations, mass killings, rapes, extortion, and other crimes. Less serious crimes have been reported in South Sudan. In Namibia the army has been accused of torture and of disappearances.⁴⁶⁵ In Nepal, the democratic norms and principles expressed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have been subverted by the participants. However there have been no widely reported human rights violations.

The third OECD criterion was that SSR should be a framework to address diverse challenges through a broad needs assessment and integrated multi-sectoral policies. As noted in the method chapter, comprehensive SSR requires more than policies for DDR and army reconstruction. Such policies must also be integrated with policies that address policing, justice, intelligence, and national security policy formulation. In Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, and South Africa, this did not occur because the concept had not yet been formulated. The priorities were catering appropriately for the future of the former security personnel, and creating new armed forces. Army reconstruction in Zimbabwe did not effectively meet its ostensible requirement, exterior defence, let alone more diverse challenges. Instead an army ‘which the country neither needed nor could afford’ was created.⁴⁶⁶ South Africa was among the first countries to address such diverse challenges through wide-ranging consultation processes, but these processes began after the decisions on army integration had been

⁴⁶⁵ For example see Christof Marletsky, “Christof Marletsky, United Nations says it can act on mass graves,” *The Namibian*, February 25, 2010, <http://www.namibian.com.na/news/full-story/archive/2010/february/article/united-nations-says-it-can-act-on-mass-graves/>.

⁴⁶⁶ Kriger 2003, 111, drawing upon interview with Major General Rupert Smith, Sept 16, 1994, London

made. In all these four countries, army reconstruction was incorporated into Defence Sector Reform, but not wider SSR.

Since the principles of security sector reform were formulated, significant major Western power involvement has been vital to force the adoption of multi-sectoral policies. Sierra Leone is the only country in this category in which a holistic approach has been attempted with some relative success, compared to other SSR efforts. Significant efforts were made there to implement holistic policies and an integrated approach. Attempts to implement a holistic policy in Sierra Leone were a result of efforts by the British interveners to put their comprehensive concept of SSR into practice. In South Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Congo, and Nepal army reconstruction appears to have become isolated from wider SSR efforts. In Bosnia-Herzegovina this was due to the entities' resistance to change. In the Congo the programme has been ineffectually linked to DDR but has not functioned as part of any wider SSR strategy. In Nepal political agreement has not been reached on army reconstruction, let alone integration with wider security policy.

The fourth OECD criterion is that SSR should be a practice promoting greater civilian oversight and involvement. Four countries have seen promotion of democratic civilian involvement. In Namibia and South Africa,⁴⁶⁷ both greater civilian oversight and significant democratic civilian oversight was introduced. In both countries this process was locally dominated. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, significant foreign pressure was also required. In Mozambique, civilian oversight has been promoted but only to a limited degree. While the armed forces seem to accept their subordination to civilian authority, changing mental attitudes takes time.⁴⁶⁸ The democratic governance of the sector is 'so far, embryonic,' according to a 2007 assessment.⁴⁶⁹ In two countries Zimbabwe and the Congo, civilian oversight has been focused on personalised presidential control. Little growth in civilian oversight is evident for the JIUs in the Sudan. In Nepal, the army is acting with a significant degree of autonomy. In

⁴⁶⁷ See for example Nathan 2007, 94-98.

⁴⁶⁸ Paulino Macaringue, 'Civil-Military Relations in Postwar Mozambique,' in *Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa*, Edited by Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra & Diane Abrahams, Institute for Security Studies, September 2002, 198.

⁴⁶⁹ Anicia Lala, 'Mozambique,' in Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani and Abillah Omari, 'Security and Democracy in Southern Africa,' Wits University Press, 2007, accessed at http://www.idrc.ca/openebooks/426-0/#page_108, 27 January 2010.

summary, most army reconstruction processes do promote civilian involvement. Few programmes have introduced significant levels of democratic civilian control, however, because such control is usually not in the interests of political elites.

The fifth OECD criterion is that SSR should be transparent and accountable. The level of transparency and accountability that army reconstruction has achieved can be divided into three groups. There is a group which has aspired to or achieved transparency, a group which has not achieved transparency, and a group where the situation is unclear. The first group consists of South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The South African integration process appears to have been carried out in a transparent and accountable manner, assisted by the presence of BMATT. Transparency and accountability have been an aspiration in Sierra Leone, but has been severely hampered. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, transparency and accountability have slowly improved, often due to international pressure. The second group consists of Zimbabwe, Namibia, the Congo, Burundi,⁴⁷⁰ and Nepal, which have not achieved transparency. Significant corruption became entrenched in Zimbabwe,⁴⁷¹ and both corruption and massive human rights violations have been endemic in the Congo. The army's autonomy in Nepal means there has been little transparency or accountability. The Namibian Defence Force has also been affected by corruption.⁴⁷² For the JIUs in South Sudan, there is not enough information available to form judgments. The State Department Human Rights Report for Mozambique describes impunity for the police and corruption as endemic.⁴⁷³ Other recent reporting also indicates that transparency and accountability is low there.⁴⁷⁴ As with other SSR principles, significant involvement by Western powers is necessary if SSR standards are to be inculcated.

⁴⁷⁰ International Crisis Group, Burundi: Democracy and Peace at Risk: Africa Report N°120, 30 November 2006, 4.

⁴⁷¹ Kriger, 2003, 132.

⁴⁷² Stephen F. Burgess, "Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict," *African Security* 2, No. 1 (2008), 76-77; Contact with regional security expert, 22 August 2010.

⁴⁷³ U.S. State Department, 2008 Human Rights Report Mozambique, accessed at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119015.htm>, March 2010.

⁴⁷⁴ Astill-Brown, Jeremy, and Markus Weimer, *Mozambique: Balancing Development, Politics, and Security* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, August 2010).

The final, sixth criterion was that SSR should enhance institutional and human capacity. As noted above, this has been the dominant factor throughout the history of bilateral military aid. Much greater effort has been focused on it than any other SSR principle. Capacity has been clearly increased in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sierra Leone, the Congo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Zimbabwe⁴⁷⁵ and Namibia training saw institutional and human capacity raised, and both armies later saw combat in the Congo. In Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina, capacity has been significantly enhanced, and both armies are now capable of deployment abroad. In the Congo, institutional and human capability has been enhanced, but only to a limited degree.

It is difficult to determine whether capacity has been enhanced in Mozambique.⁴⁷⁶ Lack of resources and skilled personnel, accentuated by political disagreement, were the root cause for both the difficulties during the integration process and the problems evident today. The South African process was a success for reconciliation, but it is not clear whether both institutional and human capacity was enhanced. Many less skilled personnel joined the SANDF. An uncomfortable atmosphere was created for white former SADF personnel and well before 2008 it was clear many were leaving.⁴⁷⁷ In South Sudan, given the underfunding and intra-unit hostility, it seems that little human and very little institutional capacity has been added. Capability has not been increased in Nepal; the recruitment of unskilled young people may have degraded it instead.

In summary, few 'military merger' programmes have been conducted in accordance with SSR principles. South Africa is perhaps the only clear example. Yet capability appears to have degraded there. The other seven cases cannot be accurately assessed as fulfilling all the SSR criteria. In many cases, governments have resisted many of the core tenets of SSR. In Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone, the foreign nature of the army programme, and corruption, makes it impossible to deem these programmes

⁴⁷⁵ Michael Evans, 'The Making of an African Army', in Norman Etherington (ed.), *Peace, Politics and Violence in the New South Africa*, London, Hans Zell, 1992, 239, as cited in Kriger, 2003, 240

⁴⁷⁶ The FADM's poor performance during the 2000 flood emphasizes the severe weaknesses of the force. Malache, Macaringue, and Coelho, 2005, 189-191.

⁴⁷⁷ Helmoed-Romer Heitman, Opinion: SANDF faces losing recruiting battle, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 16 June 2008.

meaningful SSR. Army reconstruction in Mozambique does not appear to have been conducted in accordance with SSR principles. With some exceptions, such as local ownership, the South Sudan process has not developed in accordance with SSR principles. The dysfunctional process in the Congo, which has led to multiple severe human rights violations and war crimes, cannot really be considered SSR. In Bosnia the process has been foreign dominated and has lacked transparency. In Nepal, preparations for army reconstruction have suffered from lack of transparency, civilian oversight, and an integrated multi-sectoral policy. Thus the preparations for army reconstruction in Nepal have not met SSR principles either.

Surveying the ten military merger cases, it becomes reasonably clear that the SSR principles alone do not offer comprehensive guidelines for successful army reconstruction. Political-economic factors are of great importance, and capability enhancement has been very important historically.

Armies rebuilt by the ‘Institutionalization’ method

East Timor, together with Kosovo, represents the ‘Military merger’ model in operation with only a single force to be integrated. This single force is then pared down, and is then institutionalized to become the new national army. Therefore this simpler variant of ‘military merger’ has been designated ‘institutionalization.’

Political-Economic Factors in Institutionalization cases

The political-economic factors that have shaped the East Timorese and Kosovo armies share a number of commonalities with those encountered in ‘military merger’ cases. Common important factors include the reality of political preferment, the influence neo-patrimonial linkages can exert, and the difficulty of creating a long-term viable force structure within the first few months of an intervention.

Political preferment in East Timor and Kosovo, as in a number of previous cases influenced who was selected for the new armed forces. The first 650 personnel selected for the new F-FDTL were apparently weighted towards those who were ‘Easterners.’ These selection decisions created resentment among former Falintil

‘Westerners’ who were not selected for the F-FDTL. There was also a generational gap between the survivors of Falintil and new, young, recruits.⁴⁷⁸

Kosovo, like East Timor, demonstrates the significant difficulties faced in trying to transform guerrilla forces, run often on a neo-patrimonial logic, into Western-style professional armies. The KSF, mostly drawn from the former KPC, is part of the wider Kosovo Albanian political network which now runs Kosovo in a less than transparent fashion.⁴⁷⁹ Significant political power continues to be held by KPC personnel. One clear outcome of this power was in 2009, when the Italian KFOR commander decided to allow absorption of non-selected KPC personnel, reversing his previous policy.⁴⁸⁰ Trying to strengthen the transparency and accountability of the KSF will be very difficult without broader measures to do so throughout Kosovo. Yet such measures are unlikely to succeed in face of the deep rooted political-economic-criminal linkages which dominate the territory.

The development of new armies after peace accords can be simplified if their design can be agreed upon early but be appropriate for the long term. Neither in Kosovo nor in East Timor did political-economic factors allow a long-term design to be put in place quickly. Kosovo is the more straightforward example; political considerations forced the creation of a temporary disciplined service, the KPC, with some parallels to the JIUs in South Sudan. Both were government disciplined services explicitly responding to a temporary situation. Both have been or will be superseded by permanent arrangements.

The situation in East Timor, on the other hand, demonstrates the complex situation that can be created by such aspirations. The accepted force structure for East Timor was the result of a King’s College London report. The report proposed three options, ranging from Option I of 3-5,000 personnel, which the Timorese preferred, to Option III, of a 3,000 strong force, half each regular and reserve.⁴⁸¹ Option III was adopted in

⁴⁷⁸ Author’s personal experience, April-May 2003.

⁴⁷⁹ See for example comments about the links between the Prime Minister and the KSF commander in Jim Dorschner, ‘New force may struggle to inspire Kosovan loyalty,’ *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 27 May 2009.

⁴⁸⁰ British army officer’s presentation at DCMT Shrivenham, 4 March 2009.

⁴⁸¹ Centre for Defence Studies, *Independent Study on Security Force Options and Security Sector Reform for East Timor*. King’s College London, London, 2000.

September 2000. Later, the reserve component was dropped for lack of funds. The Force 2020 proposals made public in 2007 advocated a 3,000 strong structure, with a reversion to company level units. Company-sized units had been preferred by the Timorese since their predecessors were serving with the Portuguese colonial militia. In 2010 recruiting of a larger force is ongoing, but a third battalion is being considered, rather than company structures.

It could be argued that the renewed aspiration for a 3,000 strong force represents a return to the posture best suited for the long term. However, given the size of Timor's neighbour Indonesia, whether Timor has a force of 1,500 or 3,000 is irrelevant.⁴⁸² If another invasion took place, any army would quickly become a mountain guerrilla force once more. If a force of 3,000 rather than 1,500 is created, expenses will be increased with little added military value. Thus what this chain of events shows is not really that a long-term Timorese strategic aspiration has been revived. Rather, armed forces have high value as symbols of statehood. Post-conflict states can be willing to maintain armed forces at a larger than justified size for political rather than strictly security requirements.

Capability Enhancement in Institutionalization Cases

The two cases of institutionalization present very different histories of capability enhancement. Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 after the Portuguese colonial governor withdrew. Prior to the invasion the dominant political party, Fretilin, had created an army, Falintil, which drew many of its members from the former Portuguese colonial militia. Falintil then fought the Indonesian military at varying levels of intensity from 1975 to 1999.

As the international intervention force INTERFET arrived in 1999, Falintil cantoned itself at Aileu in the centre of the island. The UN administration could not produce a workable future for the force quickly, and dissatisfaction began to surface.⁴⁸³

Eventually Falintil would wait sixteen months in the cantonment for decisions. It was finally decided to form a small national army (Falintil-FDTL or F-FDTL) of 1,500

⁴⁸² This contention is supported by comments made in an e-mail from a retired Australian officer to the author, 22 April 2010.

⁴⁸³ Ludovic Hood, 'Security Sector Reform in East Timor 1999-2004,' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2006, 70, 72.

personnel, plus reservists, and the core of the new force was raised by selecting 650 of Falintil's 1,736 personnel. The rest of Falintil were demobilized in a process which failed to satisfy 'their expectations or economic needs.'⁴⁸⁴

The dissatisfaction caused by the selection decisions exacerbated already existing regional and factional tensions within the Falintil community. A government commission's recommendations to resolve problems within the defence force, submitted in August 2004, appear to have been ignored.⁴⁸⁵ These problems led to protests by soldiers from the West part of East Timor over soldiers' from the East part's better treatment. 593 'petitioners' eventually appealed directly to the Chief of Defence Force. Attempts to resolve the dispute were made, but broke down. Eventually the 593 protesters were dismissed in March 2006. A crisis developed, which split both the army and the police. Westerners and Easterners in both forces fought each other. Stability was only regained after Australian, New Zealand, and Portuguese troops arrived.

Since 2006 much Timorese military attention has been focused on an ambitious recovery and expansion plan, 'Force 2020.' The army component of the plan foresees a buildup to a force of 3,000 and acquisition of heavy equipment such as armoured personnel carriers. The Australian foreign minister, amongst other commentators, described the plan as too expensive for East Timor to fund.⁴⁸⁶ However, almost 600 new recruits graduated from recruit training in December 2009, and efforts continue to expand the force to the 3,000 mark by 2020.⁴⁸⁷ The Timorese government is determined to implement Force 2020 despite international and UN disapproval.⁴⁸⁸ In the aftermath of the 2006 events and the rebuilding process the F-FDTL is undergoing, it is probable that capability levels are low. In 2007 at least one senior

⁴⁸⁴ International Crisis Group, 'Timor Leste: Security Sector Reform,' Asia Report No. 143, 17 January 2008, 5.

⁴⁸⁵ International Crisis Group, 'Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis,' Asia Report No. 120, 10 October 2006, 6.

⁴⁸⁶ Mark Dodd, 'East Timor Defiant on Boost to Forces,' The Australian, June 14, 2007, accessed at <http://www.timor-leste.gov.tl/mindef/Eng/Defence%20&%20Security/f.htm>, January 29, 2010.

⁴⁸⁷ Centre for International Governance Innovation, Security Sector Reform Monitor, Timor Leste, No.1, December 2009, 11.

⁴⁸⁸ Contact with United Nations official in Timor, May 2010, and NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

officer said that he could not retire because of the incapacity of mid-level officers demonstrated during the 2006 crisis.⁴⁸⁹

The disintegration of the F-FDTL was primarily due to the poor handling of unresolved grievances within the security sector. Internal tensions were not actively addressed and managed until they could be resolved. Several opportunities to address F-FDTL problems seem to have been lost. Not enough attention was focused on the institutional and mental changes required to transition a guerrilla force into a regular army.⁴⁹⁰ However, the pressure on the nascent army was not aided by emphasis on technical 'train and equip' considerations.⁴⁹¹ At the implementation level, relatively sophisticated systems were established, sometimes without proper preparation. For example, a computerized personnel system was created to track pay, promotions, leave, special training arrangements, etc. However it was little used after the foreign advisor that established it left. The East Timorese personnel stopped inputting data for anything but soldiers' pay.⁴⁹²

In East Timor, as with Sierra Leone, the option of creating a reserve force, which might well have diverted some of the resentment of ex-combatants denied entry into the new army, was not taken up. Creating a reserve in this kind of situation remains a potentially useful policy option for the future.

In the Balkans, the origins of today's Kosovo Security Force (KSF) lie in the Kosovo Liberation Army that fought Serbian repression in 1998-9. After the UN became the interim administration of Kosovo, the force was converted into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). The KPC was to carry out emergency civil support duties such as firefighting, search and rescue, de-mining, and reconstruction. Of the KLA's 25,000 personnel registered during demobilization, 5,000 found a home in the KPC.

Despite long discussions with Serbia, no negotiated solution could be reached over independence for the province. As a result Kosovo made a unilateral declaration of

⁴⁸⁹ International Crisis Group, Asia Report 143, 17 January 2008, 17.

⁴⁹⁰ Loro Horta, [Young and Wild. Timor Leste's troubled military](#). Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2006.
<http://www.idss.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/IDSS0162006.pdf>, accessed 12 August 2009.

⁴⁹¹ Authors' personal experience in 2003 and interviews in January 2007.

⁴⁹² Conversations with New Zealand personnel advisor, May 2003.

independence on February 17, 2008. While those discussions had been taking place however, the UN administration had in 2006 initiated what became a national security strategy review, named the Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR).

The ISSR aimed to craft an integrated security policy for Kosovo.

On June 12, 2008, NATO agreed to take responsibility for supervising the dissolution of the KPC and the creation of the new Kosovo Security Force. It was decided that the KSF would be a lightly armed force, with no heavy weapons, of 2,500 with 800 reserves. The UK decided to provide assistance in the creation of the new force. However there were significant problems encountered. Inappropriate personnel were picked due to staff errors (such as those who had committed war crimes).⁴⁹³ Only half of the KPC's well-regarded de-mining team was selected for the KSF. At the same time, those who were not selected pressured politicians. Of the KSF's initial strength, about half were former KPC, but as of June 2009, the proportion of former KPC had increased, to 1,412 out of 1,818.⁴⁹⁴ The KSF attained initial operational capability on 15 September 2009. It is heavily reliant on foreign aid for its training, equipment, and its core budget. When fully operational, it will consist of a Rapid Reaction Brigade, an Operations Support Brigade, a Land Force Command, and a Training and Doctrine Command.⁴⁹⁵

The KSF has not been designed to be capable of external defence tasks. To avoid antagonizing Serbia, the force will not be permitted heavy weapons for at least five years. The presence of KFOR effectively provides a guarantee against external threats for the time being. The KSF has some level of capacity against internal rebellion, but whether it has such a task is unclear. It has been assigned 'security functions not appropriate for the police,' but the emphasis is on humanitarian missions such as de-mining.⁴⁹⁶ The KSF's immediate ambition is to contribute to peacekeeping missions beyond Kosovo's borders.

⁴⁹³ British army officer, presentation at DCMT Shrivenham, 4 March 2009

⁴⁹⁴ Mia Marzouk, 'Changing the Guard,' *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 2009, 58.

⁴⁹⁵ Republic of Kosovo, Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force, <http://mksf-ks.org/?page=2,24,64>, accessed December 2010.

⁴⁹⁶ http://www.nato.int/summit2009/topics_en/04-kosovo.html, accessed December 2010.

Armies recreated by institutionalization have been the subject of some of the most innovative thinking on force structure. In the East Timor case, serving advisers have asked whether the country actually needs infantry battalions, or whether engineers or horse-mounted militia might be a better option.⁴⁹⁷ As noted above, several armies have appeared to lack a clear role. Instead of creating a threat-based army, development tasks – with engineers, for example – might give an army a clearer role. In the Timor case, one advisor argued for engineers on the basis that they would ‘have met some immediate national needs, provided a demobilization path for old guerrillas, and been a longer term tool to build a national skills base (because of the training institutions that support such a force structure).’⁴⁹⁸ However, this goes against advice from Western thinkers such as Bonnemaïson, mentioned earlier in the literature review. Bonnemaïson specifically argues against a development role for an army.

The issue is, however, that in most cases armies will be retained, they often appear to lack a clear role, and as Herbst explains, often national borders are secured by treaty and precedent in any case. Therefore, if an army is to exist, the author considers that a primary development role with a secondary defence role might be worth considering. The development role would keep the army busy from day to day, while the defence role would justify the existence of the army to those actors who see a military force as necessary.

This brings the argument to Kosovo, the only region in the world where a post-peace accord army is being discouraged from appearing too ‘military.’ Instead such formations as a ‘Rapid Reaction Brigade’ are being created. This orientation appears to stem from the KLA/KPC inheritance and regional sensitivities (especially those of Serbia). However there is a chance with the KSF to trial the idea of an army not primarily orientated towards defence functions. This experiment should be monitored with a view, if successful, to trial the idea in other post-peace accord contexts.

⁴⁹⁷ Australian advisor e-mail 22 April 2010; conversation with British advisor May 2003.
⁴⁹⁸ Australian advisor e-mail 22 April 2010.

Applicability of SSR Principles to Institutionalization Cases

This section will briefly compare the SSR principles as used above to the Kosovo and East Timor practice, and then summarize adherence to the SSR principles. The first OECD criterion is that SSR be people centred and locally owned. Neither process was people centred. Both were centred on state security. How locally owned the army reconstruction processes were is difficult to tell conclusively. However it appears there was a significant degree of local ownership in both cases.⁴⁹⁹ The second criterion was a basis on democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law. In Timor the process aspired to democratic and human rights principles; it is unclear to what extent their misuse contributed to the crisis of 2006. Partially due to heavy international involvement, the Kosovo process was extensively founded on these three tenets.

The third criterion was that SSR should be a framework to address diverse security challenges, both through a broad needs assessment and integrated, multi-sectoral policies. The army programme in East Timor did not take place as part of an integrated multi-sectoral policy. Part of the result was uncertainty over the F-FDTL's role.⁵⁰⁰ But between 1999 and 2006, when the future of Kosovo's security forces came under serious consideration, thinking on SSR had moved forward significantly. A review of Kosovo's security arrangements, the Kosovo ISSR, was initiated before decisions had to be made on the future of the KPC. The ISSR noted that 'Kosovo is the first example of a holistic review prior to security sector engagement,' noting that, for example in Sierra Leone, a review was only commenced after the reform process had started.⁵⁰¹ However, the dominant army requirement was to create a future for the KPC, as both an institution and as individuals. Without a well-supported future for their members, the KPC might effectively have become a spoiler for Kosovo's peaceful future development.

⁴⁹⁹ For example, instead of a section size of 9-11 men, typical in Western armies, the F-FDTL adopted a section size of 6, drawn from their insurgency experience. Conversation with foreign advisory chief, April 2003.

⁵⁰⁰ International Crisis Group, Asia Report 143, 17 January 2008, 17.

⁵⁰¹ A Cleland Welch, *Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review* (Pristina: UNDP, 2006), www.ks.undp.org/repository/docs/ISSR_report_eng_ver2.pdf, 2.

The fourth criterion was the promotion of civilian involvement and oversight. There were difficulties inculcating Western ideas about civilian oversight in East Timor as the F-FDTL was created. Disagreements over how, and in what manner, civilian oversight and involvement would be implemented appear to have contributed to the breakdown of 2006. Later, in Kosovo, a strong civilian oversight structure was set in place.⁵⁰² The fifth criterion was transparency and accountability. While there is no evidence of corruption in Timor, the army reconstruction process has shown little transparency or accountability. In Kosovo significant corruption exists within the KSF, despite repeated international action against it.

The sixth principle is the enhancement of institutional and human capacity. In Timor, capacity was enhanced, but degraded again by the 2006 crisis, and it is not clear how much of the new capability built is sustainable. In Kosovo it is clear that institutional and human capacity was developed during the KPC period. Yet the mistakes made during the KSF formation process seem to have degraded capacity.

In East Timor, because of lack of a multi-sectoral strategy, any effective growth in civilian oversight, and lack of transparency, the army reconstruction process did not follow SSR principles. It should be remembered however that these principles had not yet been formulated, and that SSR as a concept was only two years old in 1999. Later in Kosovo there were significant international attempts to follow SSR principles, including the holistic development of a security strategy. The KPC was a venerated force that was expected by Kosovar Albanians to eventually form the basis of a national army. Yet it intimidated its enemies, was corrupt, and was heavily involved in manipulating the government of Kosovo.⁵⁰³ The picture is therefore mixed. Yet local outcomes are the most important final part of SSR. Therefore, since the KPC and KSF did not reflect SSR principles, one cannot say the outcome followed those principles.

⁵⁰² Ibid. pp. XVI-XVIII.

⁵⁰³ Conversation with regional security expert, 30 March 2010.

Single state forces

When the United States has become involved in army reconstruction, it appears that its preference has been to rebuild forces from the ground up, rather than integrate existing bodies into a new army. Many of the processes created have drawn their inspiration from U.S. army procedures.⁵⁰⁴ These processes have included the creation of an all volunteer force, attempts to introduce empowered non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and heavy use of advisers to create a U.S. style army. Analysts have identified these elements in Afghanistan from 2002, Iraq from 2003, and Liberia from 2005.⁵⁰⁵

In both Afghanistan and Iraq the new armies were built on a very weak basis. During the long Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, from 1978 to 1989, the communist regime's army began to disintegrate, and the confusion and lawlessness following the Mujahedin victory of 1992 completed the process. The previous state army was 'de-modernized,' lost most of its professional characteristics, and effectively deteriorated into a militia.⁵⁰⁶ The U.S. attacks which followed the al-Qaeda assault on September 11, 2001, toppled the Taliban government and destroyed the nascent Taliban central army. Following the removal of the Taliban, in early 2002 there had not been a cohesive state army in Afghanistan for over ten years. Along with remnants of al-Qaeda, the Taliban pose the main insurgent threat to Hamid Karzai's new government. In Iraq, Paul Bremer, Administrator of the combined US-British Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), disbanded the whole of the existing Iraqi armed forces in May 2003. The prevailing administrative chaos throughout the country and the growing insurgency made establishing all new state bodies difficult. Efforts to reconstruct both armies were focused on training and equipping; governance concerns were secondary at best.

⁵⁰⁴ Sean McFate, 'Lessons Learned from Liberia: Security Sector Reform in a Failed State,' *RUSI Journal*, February 2008, 66.

⁵⁰⁵ For example see McFate, *ibid.*, Antonio Giustozzi in Donnais, *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform*, DCAF, 2008, 221, and Cordesman and Mousnour, 2009, 103.

⁵⁰⁶ The description in the paragraph is based upon Antonio Giustozzi, 'Auxiliary Force or National Army: Afghanistan's 'ANA' and the COIN Effort 2002-2006,' *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 18, No.1, March 2007, 45-46.

Political-Economic Factors influencing Single State Forces

Political and economic factors influencing single state forces display both similarities and difficulties with those in military merger and institutionalization cases.

Similar factors include the role of the peace accord, provisions for the gainful occupation of ex-combatants, the influence of neo-patrimonialism, and the difficulty of implementing quickly a force structure effective for the long term. Other relevant factors include an emphasis on 'train and equip' over governance, ethnic cleavages, and Arab military-cultural influences on Iraqi military effectiveness.

The circumstances of the peace accord, and decisions that closely follow it still play a dominant role. Perhaps the clearest example was the disbandment of the existing Iraqi Army in 2003. In Liberia, the wording of the peace accord that declared the armed forces would be restructured was superseded.⁵⁰⁷ Instead the programme disbanded the armed forces and recreated them *in toto*. This created resentment as the rump of the government's army did not receive the privileged place in the new force they sought. Instead, they had to go through the selection process along with all the other civilian and former rebel candidates. Few were successful. This has caused continuing resentment, and the old military's sense of entitlement may yet, it appears, prompt it to launch a coup.

Methods used in single state force cases to assuage the threat of idle ex-combatants have varied. Afghanistan had a variety of semi-official military forces controlled by regional warlords existing in parallel with the new ANA, and these forces only slowly declined in size. In Iraq, the dismissed soldiers quickly began to be paid by the United States, but not without the men involving feeling severely humiliated by the disbandment decision.⁵⁰⁸

Neo-patrimonial modes of operation have significantly influenced security sector governance in all three 'single state force' cases. Giustozzi describes the process of SSR in Afghanistan as a 'complex compromise' between Western SSR ideals and Afghan wishes.⁵⁰⁹ Faced with powerful demands that institutions be reformed in accordance with Western standards, reform efforts were carried out on the surface, 'leaving patrimonial and patronage relations to

⁵⁰⁷ This paragraph is based on a variety of interviews in Monrovia in April, May, and June 2009.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibrahim Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History* (London/New York: Routledge, 2008), 209-10.

⁵⁰⁹ Antonio Giustozzi, "Shadow Ownership and SSR in Afghanistan" in *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform*, ed. Timothy Donnais (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2008), 215.

dominate the core of the security establishment.’⁵¹⁰ The Ministry of Defence and the revitalised Army below it attracted more U.S. effort and was more deeply affected by reform than any other security sub-sector. However, even here, subvention of the ministry and army by influential Afghan actors hampered efforts to induce thorough-going reform. This has resulted, at least until mid 2008, in the disproportionate influence of Army Chief of Staff Bismillah Khan’s faction and, more generally, Tajik rather than Pashtun officers.⁵¹¹ In Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has consolidated his personal authority over the armed forces.⁵¹² This move reflects Iraq’s history of authoritarian control.

The reconstruction of ‘single state force’ armies has been focused on immediate post-intervention security challenges, rather than any hypothetical post-insurgency requirements. It does not appear that either the Afghan or Iraqi armies were designed with a long-term orientation perhaps different from immediate needs in mind. Contact with designers of the initial Afghan army reinforces the notion that the immediate insurgency challenge was the dominant factor in the design of the new ANA.⁵¹³ No transition between roles was initially anticipated for the new Iraqi army either. It is clear that initially the army was to be orientated to what the Americans hoped would remain its mission: exterior defence.⁵¹⁴ Only the rapidly developing insurgency forced a change of orientation. In addition, neither the Afghan or Iraqi armies were future-proofed in size. The Afghan force size target was increased from 50,000 in 2001 in stages to 240,000 in 2010, the last figure to be achieved by 2014. In Iraq, the force size jumped from three divisions to 10, and later 14, as the insurgency gained pace. Liberia is a somewhat different case. It was acknowledged that the affordable force size was too small to adequately meet the country’s needs, but it was thought better to have an affordable rather than sufficiently large army. Again, immediate circumstances shaped the force structure, rather than anticipated long-term requirements.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ Ibid., 220-2.

⁵¹² Ned Parker, ‘Machiavelli in Mesopotamia: Nouri al-Maliki Builds The Body Politic,’ World Policy Journal, Spring 2009, p.17, 23, accessed at <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/wopj.2009.26.1.17?cookieSet=1>, 10 February 2010.

⁵¹³ E-mail from retired U.S. Army colonel involved in Afghanistan planning, August 11, 2010.

⁵¹⁴ Spearin, 2008, op. cit.

The development of the revitalized Afghan National Army was dominated by training and equipping priorities rather than concerns over security sector governance.⁵¹⁵ Arguably this is both a result of traditional U.S. practice and the difficulties of inculcating a full SSR agenda in the country. As discussed in the literature review, Cold War U.S. practice emphasized army assistance that would win the United States political favour. Because of this heritage, it is arguable that, whatever the circumstances, training and recruiting would have attracted more U.S. attention than governance concerns. Creating Western-standard management and accountability practices would have been a sensitive matter. Here traditional U.S. priorities in military assistance met Afghan resistance to Western SSR ideals in a mutually reinforcing manner. The result could almost have been predicted in advance, given the history of U.S. military assistance efforts. A year later in Iraq, the same factors began to emerge. Cordesman notes the over emphasis on the quick quantitative ‘train and equip’ expansion of forces at the expense of quality.⁵¹⁶

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, ethnic cleavages within the new army were rife. The Afghan Army, as noted above, saw mutual resentment between Tajiks and Pashtuns. The Iraqi Army was internally politically fractured between Shia, Sunni, and Kurds.⁵¹⁷ Cordesman highlights the need for religious and ethnic diversity, so that no one group feels persecuted by the rest.⁵¹⁸

The difficulties in building a Western-style army in Iraq, an industrialized state unlike so many considered in this study, gives one pause. Even in Iraq, it has proven extremely difficult to build a fully modern army, with all its panoply of bureaucratic support structures. Kenneth Pollack analyzed historical Iraqi military effectiveness as part of a wider investigation of Arab military effectiveness in his book *Arabs at War*. He describes continuing failure at the tactical level and poor maintenance throughout Iraq’s wars. He attributes the failure record that Iraq shares with its Arab counterparts primarily to poor information management, poor weapons handling, and poor

⁵¹⁵ Mark Sedra, ‘Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the Slide toward Expediency,’ *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2006.

⁵¹⁶ Cordesman and Baetjer, 2006, 343.

⁵¹⁷ Cordesman, ‘Iraqi Force Development,’ March 2007, 10-11.

⁵¹⁸ Anthony Cordesman and Patrick Baetjer, *Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success* (Westport, CT: CSIS/Praeger Security International, 2006), 343.

maintenance and junior tactical leadership.⁵¹⁹ Levels of effectiveness even in a long-established Iraqi Army may therefore tend to be low.

Capability Enhancement in Single State Forces

Since 2002 the aim of capacity enhancement in these three cases has been predominantly been to build counter-insurgency capability, rather than on exterior defence of borders. By 2004 the undisputed focus of both the new Afghan and Iraqi armies was fighting the internal insurgency. Exterior defence had however been, briefly, the initial focus for the creation of the new Iraqi Army, and was the principal projected task for the new Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The overriding importance of counter-insurgency in Iraq was relatively quickly realized. But it may have taken until 2009 to change the focus of the AFL away from hypothetical external invasions.

In 2002, efforts to recruit an Afghan army to support the new government and to aid the counter-insurgency campaign began.⁵²⁰ After some consideration, the initial force target became 9,000 men, to be trained by November 2003. U.S. planning at the time aimed to begin reform of the central apparatus and establish a Central Corps in Kabul.⁵²¹ From the Central Corps, the programme was expanded to the other regions of Afghanistan. Four other corps headquarters were established in 2004. A programme of building up combat forces in the regions followed. By February 2010, the force aim, after repeated increases, was 240,000 by 2014.⁵²² Reviewing the literature, the ANA appears to have little external defence capability and severe weaknesses in facing the Taliban rebellion. These weaknesses include poor human resources, widespread corruption, and bureaucracy fostered by political rivalries.

The rebuilding of the Iraqi Army eventuated uniquely as first a contractor-implemented and then a U.S.-government implemented single state force. First plans for the new army in June 2003 envisaged an army focused on exterior defence, to

⁵¹⁹ Kenneth Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948-1991* (Lincoln, Neb., and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 574.

⁵²⁰ Giustozzi, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, March 2007, 48.

⁵²¹ Jason C. Howk, 'A Case Study in Security Sector Reform: Learning from Security Sector Reform/Building in Afghanistan (October 2002-September 2003),' U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, November 2009, 16.

⁵²² Antonio Giustozzi, "The ANA: Unwarranted Hope," *RUSI Journal* 154, no. 6 (2009).

make a clean break from the past. The CPA's initial concept for the new army called for 'three divisions of light or motorized infantry to be built by September 2006' - a little over 3 years.⁵²³ Vinnell Corporation was given the initial contract to start the rebuilding of the army. Vinnell was directed to train nine 900-soldier battalions from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004, and the contract contained an option to expand the training to the projected full size of three divisions.⁵²⁴ The programme suffered from severe internal and external obstacles. The training was over-theoretical and too short.⁵²⁵ Constricted government resources, especially pay, and slow equipment procurement were the principal external limitations.⁵²⁶ While trained for external defence, the battalions were immediately committed to counter-insurgency operations on being deemed operational. The result was that units disintegrated as they entered combat⁵²⁷ and desertion rates were very high.

Unfortunately the initial contractor programme only created a small force slowly. Reassessment of the threat posed by the growing insurgency led to a massive expansion of the planned new Iraqi army. Called 'Phase II,' the revised plan moved the effective date for the three new divisions forward to September 2004, and explicitly made the new army part of the internal security effort. The reconstruction programme was effectively delegated to the U.S. and Coalition military formations within their specific areas of operations, with attention to the central military bureaucratic framework only being given priority later on.⁵²⁸ The newly established units were in dire need of further mentoring and support to improve on their poor initial performance. The force was expanded from three to ten divisions by 2006, but few units were

⁵²³ Wright & Reese, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003-January 2005*, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008, 433.

⁵²⁴ Technically, 27 battalions. Christopher Spearin, 'A Justified Heaping of the Blaim?,' chapter in Donald Stoker, *Military Advising and Assistance*, Routledge, 2008, and Dean Calbreath, 'Iraqi army, police fall short on training,' *San Diego Union-Tribune*, July 4, 2004.

⁵²⁵ Spearin, 2008, 230.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, 229.

⁵²⁷ Anthony Cordesman with Patrick Baetjer, *Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success*, CSIS/Praeger Security International, Westport, CT, 2006, 72.

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Discussion with Brigadier Bryan Watters OBE, 2 July 2009. Brigadier Watters was Deputy Commanding General, Civilian Police Training Advisory Team, Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-I), November 2004-September 2005.

effective.⁵²⁹ All suffered from lack of equipment, delays in training, and absenteeism.⁵³⁰ Force quality slowly improved, aided by extensive U.S. mentoring. However with the reduction in U.S. adviser numbers, a sophisticated counter-insurgency approach may have ended. In 2010 there appears instead to be disinterest, incompetence, and a wish to revert to an external defence mission.⁵³¹

In Liberia, after thirteen years of intermittent civil war, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in August 2003. As part of the agreement, the United States was given responsibility for restructuring the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), in conjunction with the UN, ECOWAS, and the Liberian Government.⁵³² The contractors DynCorp and Pacific Architects and Engineers began to create a 2,100 strong AFL, with recruiting starting in late 2005. The recreation of the AFL went ahead despite criticism that the armed forces should have been abolished.⁵³³ The success or failure of the programme will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. The most significant issue however is the sustainability of a model fundamentally based on non-locally owned, expensive American practices. This situation risks dissatisfaction and possibly even revolt.

Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq include, in contrast to the southern African experience, the ability of the coalition to create the new army while fighting was underway. The identifiable difference in these cases is between the military merger model and the single state force. All currently identified cases where a reasonably effective army has been able to be created while fighting is underway are single state forces. This means, theoretically, that if a single state force were to be created in a country where fighting is ongoing such as Sudan or the Congo, it might be more successful and sustainable than present military merger efforts. However, this correlation cannot be definitively determined as causation. Put differently, it is

⁵²⁹ Robin Wright and Thomas E. Ricks, "Civil War in Iraq Near, Annan Says," *Washington Post*, November 28, 2006, pp. A1 and A15, cited in Anthony Cordesman, 'Iraqi Force Development,' March 28, 2007, 24.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*, 94-95.

⁵³¹ Michael Knights, "Free rein: domestic security forces take over in Iraq," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (November 4, 2010).

⁵³² Adedeji Ebo, 'Local Ownership and Outsourcing in Liberia,' in Donnais, 'Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform,' DCAF/Lit Verlag, 2008, 155

⁵³³ International Crisis Group, Africa Report No.75, 'Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils,' 30 January 2004, 17-19.

possible that military merger or institutionalization armies might be able to be made effective in the midst of large-scale fighting. As yet, however, no cases support this contention. The very large amount of resources which the United States is prepared to commit also probably make a significant difference here. A single state force reconstruction programme where fighting is ongoing would probably fail for lack of long-term donor funding.

The experience of 'single state forces' in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia is greatly influenced by the unique, enormous effort the United States has made in building them up. Dependency on US support developed in Afghanistan,⁵³⁴ Iraq, and Liberia. Yet it is difficult to imagine how both the Afghan and Iraq wars could have been continued with the indigenous involvement without creating such a dependency. In combat, units of the Afghan and Iraqi armies have had great difficulty without foreign advisors. Unit training, rather than simply individual training, and post-training partnering in the field have not been sufficient emphasized. Introducing non-commissioned officers who have significant levels of responsibility appears to be very difficult in some cases. 'It is far easier to try to introduce [empowered NCOs] in different cultures and developing states than to make it actually work.'⁵³⁵ A deficiency shared with the African rebuilding armies is that logistics capability is weak; transition to full Afghan logistical responsibility, especially with a much expanded strength target, will be a long process.⁵³⁶ Analysts worry that the Afghan security forces will collapse again due to fiscal pressures⁵³⁷ or weak human resources⁵³⁸ as they have in the past. This would result again in de-modernization and an intensification of civil conflict. This reinforces the already discussed importance of restricting goals to make programmes achievable.

Applicability of SSR principles to single state forces

⁵³⁴ September 2006 briefing and for Iraq, Cordesman and Baetjer, 2006, 343.

⁵³⁵ Anthony Cordesman, and Mausnur, Adam, "Shaping Afghan Security Forces: What Will It Take to Implement President Obama's New Strategy?," (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 103.

⁵³⁶ Serving British brigadier, Brig. Tim Allen, interview, 30 October 2008.

⁵³⁷ Andersen, Møller, and Stepputat, *Fragile States and Insecure People? : Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century*, 172.

⁵³⁸ Giustozzi, "The ANA: Unwarranted Hope," *RUSI Journal* 154, no. 6 (2009).

Generally speaking, army reconstruction on the 'single state force' model has not followed SSR principles. The process has not been people centred in any of the three cases. The United States has accorded very little importance to local ownership in any of its army reconstruction efforts. Instead many United States practices have been introduced. The United States allowed less local control over the Afghan Army than over any other part of the rebuilding Afghan security apparatus. 'Models alien to the Afghan tradition, like a highlighted role for non-commissioned officers or Western disciplinary practices, and practices resisted by most of the MoD, like voluntary recruitment and the stress on light infantry as the core of the ANA, were forced upon the Afghans.'⁵³⁹ Against loud opposition from the Afghan Ministry of Defence, the decision was taken to develop a small volunteer rather than a large conscript army.⁵⁴⁰ The gradual increase in the target number, from 70,000 eventually to 240,000 by 2014, may have placated those who wanted a large army to some extent. However, the character of the force remains alien to Afghan traditions.

In Liberia, as will be further discussed in Chapter 5, the U.S. model adopted is fundamentally too expensive for Liberia's resources. Perceptions of local ownership were also significantly influenced by the Department of State decision to utilize two contractors, DynCorp and PAE. Contractors were chosen over U.S. Army trainers because the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq required the active duty personnel. The contractor decision was extremely controversial, which led to unceasing questioning and criticism within the Liberian Congress and civil society.⁵⁴¹ The contractors were not accountable to the Liberian Congress, though compromises were made so contractor personnel accompanied U.S. officials giving evidence before it.⁵⁴²

Democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law have not usually followed. In Afghanistan, patronage and power relationships have dominated the process. In Iraq, sectarian fighting has taken place within the army, and army units have committed human rights abuses. However in Liberia, following years of security forces' misbehaviour, a number of measures were put in place to improve standards.

⁵³⁹ Giustozzi, "Shadow Ownership and SSR in Afghanistan ", 221.

⁵⁴⁰ Giustozzi in Donnais, Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, DCAF, 2008,

222

⁵⁴¹ Ebo in Donnais, 2008, p.163-64.

⁵⁴² Contact with former U.S. military advisor to Liberia, 2010.

The most important safeguard was the extensive vetting programme, coupled with much increased international oversight. Army reconstruction has not been designed to address broad security challenges, and has been more focused, in Afghanistan at least, on combating the insurgency.⁵⁴³

Army programmes have not stemmed from a broad needs assessment, and have not resulted in integrated multi-sectoral policies. Civilian oversight and involvement has been effectively restricted to the executive and defence ministries in all three countries. Iraq has seen a continuation of the historical trend of centralised, authoritarian power. In Liberia, contractor personnel sometimes refused to provide information to the host legislature. Transparency and accountability have been limited. In both Afghanistan⁵⁴⁴ and Iraq, corruption and factionalism have marked the process. In Liberia the contractors were very transparent and accountable to the U.S. government but much less so to the host states.

The final OECD criterion is the enhancement of institutional and human capacity. This criterion has been the primary U.S. objective, and much has been sacrificed so that capacity enhancement is prioritized. As a result, institutional and human capacity have clearly been enhanced. In Afghanistan, the army is combat capable, though not usually without heavy coalition support. Virtually all ANA formations operate as adjuncts to coalition forces.⁵⁴⁵ In Iraq, Vinnell Corporation arguably mishandled what was admittedly a very difficult task in 2003-04. However, by 2010 a new army had been created and had responsibility for most security operations. In summary, both in Afghanistan and Iraq SSR principles have not been the guiding factor. The aim has been the creation of a new bureaucratic institution with significant combat capability. The institutions have been successfully recreated. The Iraqi Army is combat capable, and the ANA has some capacity. DynCorp has trained a small new force for Liberia well, but its long-term sustainability is in question.

⁵⁴³ For Afghanistan see Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, Paul D. Batchelor, 'Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,' Center for a New American Security, 4 January 2010. Paper accessed at <http://www.cnas.org/node/3924>, 18 February 2010.

⁵⁴⁴ Giustozzi, The ANA: Unwarranted Hope, RUSI Journal, Vol. 154, Issue 6, December 2009.

⁵⁴⁵ Jeff Haynes, 'Reforming the Afghan National Army,' E-Notes, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 13 November 2009, accessed at <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200911.haynes.reformingafghannationalarmy.html>, 5 February 2010.

Conclusions

These conclusions will address the degree to which army reconstruction has enhanced capability, been affected by significant political-economic factors, and been implemented in accordance with SSR principles. All three sets of interactions need to be considered when identifying areas of potential improvement for the SSR principles.

As noted above, a number of general lessons influencing capacity enhancement are more deeply rooted in the political-economic factors that shape a state's potential, and thus are addressed below. However, some key trends directly applicable to capacity enhancement can be identified. Generally, sustainable capability enhancement is very difficult to achieve. The impediment to capability enhancement inter-mixage of different foreign philosophies and practices can bring is visible in Zimbabwe and the Congo. The difficulty of transferring logistical and bureaucratic skills in a neo-patrimonial environment is also reinforced by experience in southern Africa and elsewhere. Yet these skills and the associated attitudes are fundamental to building the types of armies most donors desire. There are no easy answers for this particular conundrum, except perhaps to reduce expectations. Reducing expectations, or, put another way, formulating realistic rather than unattainable transition plans, is another lesson identified from African experience. Finally two heretofore unexplored policy options can be identified. Reserve forces may provide a useful method for constructively occupying former combatants, as has been studied in Sierra Leone and Timor. It may also be possible to create effective armies while fighting is ongoing, if a single state force model is adopted.

Political and economic factors influencing army reconstruction, and the trends that emerge from them, have had significant effects. Aspects can be identified that are common to most cases. The peace accord and its provisions create the political framework within which post-peace accord reconstruction will take place. Sometimes the peace accord is never fully implemented and the process stalls, as is happening in Nepal and, to some extent, in Bosnia and South Sudan. Related decisions on army reconstruction have had significant effects in Iraq and Liberia.

Foreign parties play a significant role in assuring the success of integration processes.

Political preferment between or within factions has had a significant impact on army reconstruction. This can see leaders accepting loyalty from their chosen personnel at the expense of effectiveness, as in Zimbabwe, and probably in other cases. On the other hand, if a strong move is made toward reconciliation, the army can benefit significantly, as appears to have been the case in South Africa.

Almost invariably, the necessity to maintain discipline over and constructively employ former combatants affects the composition of the new army. The only possible exceptions appear to be in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the post-2003 period, and in Liberia. Often the army is enlarged with fighters who would otherwise not be chosen. Even when the army was disbanded in Iraq, soldiers and officers were quickly back on government payrolls and soon afterwards were being recruited to join the new force.

There is very little evidence to suggest that an evolution from immediate concerns to potentially different long-term requirements has been part of army reconstruction planning. The lack of a clear role for the post-peace accord armed forces exacerbates the difficulty in formulating the most appropriate post-peace accord structure. There are strong indications that a clear role has been lacking in several cases (Zimbabwe, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Timor, Liberia, Kosovo). Implementing such an appropriate structure is then a separate task. The fifteen cases surveyed tend to fall into two main groupings. First are armies that are the wrong size for their circumstances. This means either unsustainably large (Zimbabwe, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Congo, and, ambiguously, Timor) or deliberately too small (Liberia). The Namibian Army has grown slightly since its formation. The other major grouping is where a temporary structure of one kind or another is explicitly adopted in order to fulfill an immediate requirement. This can involve a temporary disciplined service (South Sudan, Kosovo), armies whose capabilities are deliberately restricted (South Africa) or armies with immediate challenges where consideration of long-term requirements must be postponed (Afghanistan, Iraq). These ambiguities reinforce the need for a robust framework to better inform discussion of the SSR principles.

Attempting to assess whether army reconstruction has followed SSR principles can be difficult. The SSR principles are ambiguous. One example is the democratic norm criteria. In Sierra Leone, to pick one case, many British advisers tried to implement these principles, but the essentially neo-patrimonial condition of Sierra Leonean society made this difficult. Some successes were achieved, and some were not. A definitive 'success' or 'failure' judgment thus has the ability to obscure as much as it illuminates. Choosing the assessment time frame also creates ambiguity: East Timor could have been judged a partial success, as, up to 2006, a new army had been created and trained. Army reconstruction in Nepal may still be a success if the parties involved change their behaviour and negotiate constructively. Finally, there are inherent limitations in a study limited to desk research.

Ambiguities aside, a number of general conclusions can be drawn regarding the influence of SSR principles. Because of the small number of cases and the measurement ambiguities involved, a statistical evaluation would not aid analysis. Thus the conclusions have been limited to qualitative factors. The chart below presents the level of adherence to SSR principles by category of army reconstruction. The chart indicates green for adherence to SSR principles, red for non-adherence to SSR principles, and blue for partial adherence. The levels of adherence vary within each category. In deciding which colour to assign, a 'pessimistic' approach has been taken. Thus if any country does not clearly adhere to SSR principles, the blue or red colours have been selected. This ensures that for any box coloured green, a reader is assured that all countries within that category do adhere scrupulously to that principle.

As shown below in Figure 1, none of the categories of army reconstruction examined have been people-centred. None have placed the welfare of the soldiers, families, former insurgent fighters, and others involved in the process above concerns over the security of the state. Local ownership of the army reconstruction process has been rare. Only in two cases within the 'military merger' category, South Africa and Nepal, have indigenous hierarchies maintained clear control and implemented the process along their own chosen lines. In East Timor there appears to have been a significant amount of local ownership. In each of the other eight cases the army reconstruction process does not appear to have been locally owned.

	Military Merger	Institutionalisation	Single state Force
People Centred	Red	Red	Red
Locally Owned	Cyan	Cyan	Red
Based on Democratic Norms, Human Rights Principles and the Rule of Law	Cyan	Cyan	Cyan
Framework for addressing diverse Security Challenges	Cyan	Cyan	Red
A Practice promoting greater civilian Oversight and Involvement	Cyan	Cyan	Cyan
Transparent and Accountable	Cyan	Red	Red
Enhances Institutional and Human Capacity	Cyan	Cyan	Green

Figure 1: Adherence of Army Reconstruction to SSR Principles

As regards democratic norms, human rights, and the rule of law, the picture is not fully clear. Some states in the ‘military merger’ category have not attempted to implement such policies, such as Zimbabwe and the Congo. Others have, and thus the ‘mixed’ indicator has been chosen. East Timor and Kosovo, the two cases of ‘institutionalization,’ have tried but have not succeeded to a great degree. As regards single state forces, in both Iraq and Afghanistan U.S. forces have faced significant obstacles to implementing the SSR principles. However in Liberia, DynCorp focused significant effort on respecting human rights principles during the vetting process and thus achieved significant success.

Assessing whether army reconstruction has been a framework to address diverse security challenges through more integrated policy is a multi-faceted question. Diverse security challenges were defined in the method chapter as broad, non-military security, national security challenges which SSR seeks to address in its widest sense. None of the armies in this survey were designed to address such challenges, with the possible exception of anti-terrorist response units in the Afghan or Iraqi armies. Such broader security challenges are more the responsibility of other agencies.

The more important issue, therefore, is the other half of the requirement – the integration of policy. It is difficult to make a clear decision on at what point military, police, and other programmes are meaningfully integrated together. It is the author's view that policies are not fully integrated unless there is very clear evidence to the contrary. This has resulted in only Sierra Leone being judged a clear case of army reconstruction being part of an integrated policy. In other cases such as South Sudan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, such integrated policy has been attempted, but for various reasons, has fallen short. At times international actors have urged policy integration upon local leaders in cases where it does not suit the locals' particular interests. Effective integration into multi-sectoral strategies has only rarely been achieved. Therefore for the first two categories the judgment is mixed. As regards single state forces, the judgment has been negative. Army reconstruction programmes in this category have been isolated from wider SSR.

Most cases of army reconstruction have resulted in greater civilian oversight and involvement, but rarely has this extended to the ideal of democratic civilian control. Of the fifteen cases, only four have clearly enhanced democratic civilian control: Namibia, South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These are only four of the nine cases in the 'military merger' category, and thus the overall category indicator is mixed. In the other ten cases, executive dominance rather than democratic civilian control has usually prevailed.

Army reconstruction has usually been neither particularly transparent nor accountable. Only South Africa, Bosnia, and Kosovo are clear exceptions. In Sierra Leone, transparency and accountability have been the aim. Yet while advisors have tried to implant such practices, it has been difficult to sustain them in the country's neo-patrimonial environment. Therefore the 'military merger' indicator is mixed. For the institutionalization and single state forces, the indicator is negative.

The final criterion is the oldest and most fundamental to army reconstruction: whether capability has actually been improved. Because this task had most priority before the concept of SSR was formulated, it has usually seen the most progress. Most of the 'military merger' armies achieved an increase in human and institutional capability.

However the addition of ANC-MK and 'homeland' army personnel to the South African Defence Force may have induced a decline in military capability. As regards institutionalization, capacity was enhanced but then degraded in East Timor by the 2006 crisis. In Kosovo, several administrative errors were made in selecting personnel for the Kosovo Security Forces in late 2008. Therefore the institutionalization indicator is mixed. Capability has been both enhanced and degraded at various times, so no single judgment can be made for the entire category over the entire period. Only the most powerful state in the world, the United States, has demonstrated the ability to create combat-capable armies while significant civil conflict is under way. Capacity was enhanced in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia. Therefore the single state force indicator is positive.

Surveying the SSR principles reveals that a 'people-centred' approach is unrealistic, at least for such a state-focused programmatic area like army reconstruction. Democratic norms and human rights were not emphasized in many early programmes, but can pay off in force quality terms. Integration of army reconstruction programmes into wider security policy has clear benefits. Yet the U.S. style of army reconstruction places less emphasis upon such policy integration. The disconnection of the Liberian programme in comparison to the integrated efforts in Sierra Leone and Kosovo shows this clearly. It will require much repeated persuasion to inculcate such approaches more widely in future programmes. Surveying actual experience tends to support the view that civilian involvement is usually more limited than SSR principles would warrant. Two factors mean however that this situation is likely to only change slowly at best. Programmes to put in place wider civilian involvement and oversight will often threaten host leaders' power. Also, the U.S. tendency is to conduct 'train and equip' programmes focused upon transference of equipment and skills, with little attention to governance.

The discussion above shows that army reconstruction programmes do not reflect a number of key SSR principles. The historical nature of army reconstruction is not likely to change quickly. Virtually all cases where SSR principles have been heavily incorporated have been dominated by Western influences. In South Africa, the institutions of a Western state were already in place. In Bosnia, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone, heavy international involvement assured ample Western influence.

Changes in political-economic factors, and the relative level of respect shown for SSR principles, have mutually reinforcing effects. If political/economic conditions improve, with greater resources and tolerance possible, there will be more political space available for more respect for SSR principles. From the other end of the spectrum, if greater respect is shown for SSR principles, such as human rights, democratic norms and the rule of law, and increasing civilian involvement, there will be greater political space created for parties to better represent themselves. Adverse political and economic conditions usually, in turn, lower respect shown for SSR principles.

It appears that army reconstruction will only significantly reflect SSR principles where Western approaches are dominant. Elsewhere, in states such as the Congo, army reconstruction is likely to retain a focus on improving capability and effectiveness. This orientation reflects dominant political-economic factors in post-peace accord states, and suits elites who do not wish to have their power threatened. It also reflects the historical U.S. orientation in this type of military aid.

These conclusions resonate with messages arising from the literature review and other recent research. Army reconstruction SSR appears very much unrealistic in its immense scope and self-deceptive in its claims to be driven by local priorities. The principles of SSR may be the only existing strategic guidance for army reconstruction. However the field experiences analyzed in this chapter underline that the principles reflect a supply-side approach unwelcome in many contexts and thus unsustainable. Northern wishes to aid the security sector in developing countries may be better served by less ambitious guidelines, more open about being reflective of donors' national interests.

It may, however, be possible to ameliorate the ambiguities that a strict interpretation of SSR principles introduces. The advantages of utilizing political-economic influences to render the debate more realistic are supported by the discussion in this chapter. In the process of drafting the principles, it appears that some of the very relevant political factors influencing army reconstruction may have had their effects rendered less vital than they actually are. It is not very clear how flexible and

applicable the SSR principles are in developing state contexts. The SSR principles, as they have been rendered for generalized use, are sufficiently generic that it is hard to measure the level to which they have been implemented. Quantitative analysis is impeded because the principles lack precision. This is cause for concern, because precise policy discussion and implementation is impeded if the SSR principles are strictly interpreted.

Introducing the additional concepts of political-economic influences and capability enhancement allows for a more realistic analysis of army reconstruction. Introducing these two other factors helps to address gaps induced by a SSR principles-only analysis. Incorporating the other two factors together also helps explain why army reconstruction almost always falls short of its goals.

Chapter 6: The Liberian Army Reconstruction Process

This thesis aims to suggest modifications to the OECD DAC SSR principles based on a rigorous examination of post-conflict army reconstruction. This has been done in a series of sequential steps. Initially the literature review identified existing practice and guidelines which are relevant to understanding the reconstruction of land forces. The multiple case chapter then surveyed a wide range of army reconstruction programmes to identify the mix of factors that contributed to each outcome. However the data on the interplay of capability enhancement, political-economic factors, and adherence to SSR principles is the result of desk research only. It would constitute much stronger evidence for theory formation if this theorization were empirically validated in the field. This chapter will carry out such testing, based upon fieldwork in Liberia carried out in mid 2009.

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part assesses the political and economic drivers that shaped the force creation process in Liberia. The second part describes and then analyses the process of capability enhancement in the chosen army case study, the reconstruction of the Liberian army, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), from 2003 to December 2009. The third part examines each SSR principle to ascertain whether it was adhered to during the Liberia army reconstruction programme. Each has been discussed in some detail to analyze whether they have been respected. The fourth part summarises and draws conclusions.

The analysis unfolds within a neo-patrimonial governance framework. In 2003, Liberian formal administration had been destroyed by fourteen years of civil war. Furthermore, in the wider West African region, informal processes and networks had always been more important than formal structures.⁵⁴⁶ As will be explained further below, the AFL has always been a political arena since it was created in 1908. The relative impotence of the AFL during the 1989-2003 civil war did not change this situation, though the new warring factions were more powerful. In October 2003 a

⁵⁴⁶ See for example Marcus Jorgel and Mats Utas, *The Mano River Basin Area: Formal and Informal Security Providers in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone*, December 2007.

transitional government, the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was installed in Monrovia. The reconstruction plan for the AFL was negotiated amidst jostling for power within the transitional government in Monrovia and the hinterland. As details were settled, a very strong U.S. political agenda, the creation of an effective and well-governed army, began to move forward. This agenda was very well funded, in comparison with indigenous Liberian actors. Nonetheless, indigenous Liberian political actors continued to have a significant effect on the programme.

The AFL reconstruction process thus occurred within a very weak state, where control of the means of violence was split between UNMIL, non-state security groupings, and nascent rebuilding state security institutions. The new state institution appear to have had the least power. Politics was also highly personalized, and NTGL members and other elites extracted rents from public resources.

Political-Economic Factors shaping the Current Force

Reconstruction of the AFL formed part of a wide-ranging effort to promote the liberal peace in Liberia. Beyond the security sector, democratisation efforts, free market reforms, and efforts to improve human rights were all attempted. This effort potentially therefore neglected the needs of civil society and individuals' social and economic needs.⁵⁴⁷ The inherent shortcomings within the liberal peace effort become more apparent when neo-patrimonial and local ownership factors are considered.

There were at least seven major political-economic factors which shaped the evolution of the current force from 2004 to December 2009. In addition the general devastation of the country and the armed forces' facilities and infrastructure meant that there was virtually nothing to build upon when the first U.S. assessment team visited in May 2004. A lack of human and physical infrastructure, administrative chaos, and political infighting formed a backdrop to the entire process.

The significant political-economic factors shaping the force can be divided into factors that stemmed from both U.S. and Liberian decisions, U.S. decisions and

⁵⁴⁷ Oliver Richmond, 'The Problem of Peace: Understanding the Liberal peace,' *Conflict, Security, and Development*, 6:3, October 2006, 291.

constraints, and internal Liberian factors. These three major strands will be examined in turn. The first combined U.S.-Liberian driver was the decision as part of the CPA to give a leading role to the United States in the reconstruction of the AFL, was a confluence of both U.S. and Liberian wishes. As described in the literature review, the United States often gives significant parts of its foreign assistance in the form of military aid. From 1912 to 1990, the United States had given aid to the AFL. Liberians revered the United States and wished to emulate its practices. As former U.S. ambassador John Blaney describes, no other willing donors came forward to fund reconstruction of the armed forces during the Accra peace conference.⁵⁴⁸ These factors all contributed to the decision in the CPA to request a U.S. lead role in restructuring the AFL.

The other political-economic driver that stemmed from both U.S. and Liberian decisions was the isolation of AFL reconstruction from other SSR efforts. This was the result of several converging factors. First, the U.S. assessments of AFL rebuilding needs were solely focused upon the Armed Forces, as police development was left to the United Nations. Existing AFL personnel exerted significant pressure to resuscitate the prewar force without significant changes.⁵⁴⁹ Partially as a result of these factors, no thoroughgoing defence review process took place before the shape of the force was agreed upon. A national security strategy development process did begin, but not until a year after DynCorp began operations.⁵⁵⁰ As the national security strategy process evolved, there was no ability for the Liberian-led process to alter the AFL reconstruction programme, which was dictated by the terms of the contract.

There were at least four political-economic factors influencing the rebuilding of the AFL that stemmed primarily from the United States. These included, first, the rejection of a military merger option in favour of a single state force created from the ground up; second, United States determination to keep the force size to an affordable level; third, slow and inconsistent funding; fourth, the decision to utilise contractors instead of active duty military personnel. The rejection by the United States of a

⁵⁴⁸ Telephone interview with John Blaney, U.S. Ambassador, Liberia, 2002-2005, Arlington, VA, 1 September 2010.

⁵⁴⁹ Email correspondence with U.S. expert, 12 June 2008.

⁵⁵⁰ Thomas Jaye, "History of the Development of the National Security Strategy of Liberia," 2009.

merger of former ex-combatants into a new army, the debate over the army's size, and the slow financial flows, will be discussed here. The debate over contractors will be addressed in the SSR civilian involvement and transparency sections below. What is important to note here is that the contractor decision made the process significantly more controversial than it might otherwise have been. The contractors' commercial status led to their motives and activities being widely questioned, sometimes frivolously.

While the initial discussions over army reconstruction were underway in Monrovia in 2003-04, the United Nations and other interested observers suggested that a new army be formed by incorporating former rebel fighters, on the military merger model. A similar process had taken place in Sierra Leone. This kind of proposal was antithetical to the U.S. tradition and to the way in which the Afghan and Iraqi armies were being reconstructed at the same time. When offered the example of the South African military that had absorbed ex-combatants in the same way, U.S. officials 'pointed out that the 'South African model' destroyed the South African military and was too expensive for a country like Liberia.'⁵⁵¹ With the United States providing the army funding unilaterally, it was decided to remain with the single state force model. As a result, there were a higher number of ex-combatants which had to seek a new livelihood without significant outside support. Yet the number that might have been absorbed may turn out to be less important than the chance of effectively employing numbers of pre 2003 AFL personnel.

The officers of the pre 2003 AFL believe that they have not been granted proper retirement benefits. They remain dissatisfied and may pose a continuing threat. The dissolution of the former AFL was conducted into two parts; about 9600-9800 war service soldiers, enlisted during the 1990-1997 period, and around 4500 regular AFL personnel who had been part of the army since before the civil war started.⁵⁵² The regular AFL personnel were repeatedly promised significant pensions by political leaders, including Taylor and Chairman Bryant. As they were organised on the U.S.

⁵⁵¹ Email correspondence with U.S. expert, 12 June 2008.

⁵⁵² Interview with Joe Wylie, former Deputy Minister of Defense-Administration, 5 April 2009.

model, they came to expect U.S. style retirement benefits.⁵⁵³ Instead they viewed the separation payments they did receive, a one time payment of up to \$4,000.00, as insufficient. It appears that if not carefully handled, they may revolt.⁵⁵⁴

The United States government was determined to keep the new army's size affordable. This kind of economic factor affects whether an army can meet not just immediate post-peace accord needs, but also respond to long-term challenges. As noted in the multiple case chapter, this can often be a difficult task. Armies are often forced by the immediate needs of the peace settlement to be the wrong size for anticipated long-term tasks. In many cases, armies have been perceived as too large to be sustainable over the long term. Liberia is an exception. In 2004-05 U.S. funders acknowledged that Liberians wished to build an army approximately the size of the pre-war force of 6,000. However, the decision was made to restrict the force size to a level that could be sufficiently funded. The desire to expand the army's size was not reached later, on the basis of a re-evaluation of long-term requirements. On the contrary, the wish to build a larger size army had always been present.

Liberian wishes for a large force were backed by very little explanation as to what missions this larger force would exist to carry out.⁵⁵⁵ However, the rough size requirement was validated by draft national defence planning carried out by a Western military advisor.⁵⁵⁶ This planning postulated a requirement for a total of five battalions to assure Liberia's long-term security, four deployed around the country and one as force reserve. Acknowledging Liberia's fiscal weakness, this scheme called for three of these battalions to be provided by other West African states, as semi-permanent, stationed troops.

⁵⁵³ Interview, Col. Thomas Dempsey, former director of the MOD Restructuring Program, 17 April 2010

⁵⁵⁴ Interview, Col. Thomas Dempsey, 17 April 2010.

⁵⁵⁵ For example, see the AFL Restructuring Plan – Revised, produced by the March 2004 Consultative Workshop in Monrovia. No justification is given as for the size of the proposed 6,500 strong force, beyond 'the manpower strength of 6,500 should be adequate for the LNDF to live up to its Mission.' (22)

⁵⁵⁶ Interview with Western military advisor, April-June 2009. See also U.S. Embassy Monrovia cable 09MONROVIA318, 'Scenesetter on UN issues for Liberia visit of UN Security Council, May 19-20, 2009,' 8 May 2009, via Wikileaks.org. This cable's wording supports a force size requirement of up to 5,000.

The wider issue for army reconstruction remains whether there is an opportunity for armies to be designed from the inception to have the right orientation, structure, and size to respond to long-term challenges without significant changes. Liberia here provides another example of the need to think in terms of strategic and defence planning cycles. Both in developed and developing countries, for all kinds of reasons, whether fiscal or due to a changing threat environment, defence planning needs to be periodically reassessed. In Liberia's case, forces may be expanded over the long term or foreign troops made available. In Sierra Leone, the force size was gradually reduced. In Iraq, forces are being re-orientated towards defence from exterior threats. Armies cannot remain static in orientation for decades without finding that their original posture is unsuited for changing challenges.

Inconsistent U.S. government funding slowed the contractor programme. Funding was allotted in small portions spread out over a long period. Training stopped entirely between December 2007 and July 2008 due to funding delays, as will be elaborated on further below. This was partially due to the Bush administration's seeking much of its funding for Liberia through supplemental emergency requests that would not count against the regular budget ceiling, as part of severe disagreements with the Democratic Party-controlled Congress over fiscal policy.⁵⁵⁷ As the supplemental appropriations were separate from the regular budget request and were primarily for Iraq and Afghanistan costs, the time the funds actually arrived for use in Liberia did not necessarily suit the programme's timetable. Several interviews confirmed the problems that had resulted from delaying the programme.

The economic constraints affecting both parties caused some significant problems, perhaps the most important being problems keeping AFL soldiers adequately fed. For example, it appears that there was controversy generated at the point when DynCorp transferred responsibility for the first group of soldier trainees to PA&E.⁵⁵⁸ This transfer also involved a physical site move, from Camp Ware, the former VOA transmitter site, to EBK Barracks, the former Camp Schiefflin. When Camp Schiefflin was rebuilt, it did not include a mess hall (dining facility) for soldiers, a basic fixture

⁵⁵⁷ International Crisis Group, "Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform," (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2009), 13.

⁵⁵⁸ Interview, Col. Thomas Dempsey, 27 November 2010.

in military camps worldwide. It also appears that uncertainties over exact contractual responsibilities between the two companies and the U.S. government meant that soldiers had to rely solely on their pay to feed themselves.⁵⁵⁹ Yet AFL pay levels appear to be insufficient to feed soldiers on a regular basis.

AFL soldiers' dissatisfaction at this point culminated with staged performances for the benefit of Liberian media. A journalist asked soldiers whether they were being driven to knock plums off trees to feed themselves.⁵⁶⁰ Frank discussions between the Liberian and U.S. parties involved appear to have occurred at this point.

Whatever the exact scale of the feeding controversy generated by the DynCorp/PA&E transfer of responsibility, continual action took place since at least June 2008 to address the feeding issue. Then-U.S. Ambassador Donald Booth wrote a letter on June 9, 2008, setting out the following details. The U.S. government would pay:⁵⁶¹

“*June 1, 2008 – April 30, 2009 – two meals per day (breakfast and lunch) at a cost of USD 3.00-3.50 per soldier per day.

*May 1, 2009 – November 30, 2009 – one meal per day (breakfast ??) at a cost of USD 1.50-1.75 per soldier per day.

*December 1, 2009 – The Minister of Defense assumes responsibility for providing a subsidy of at least \$20 [handwritten change] per month per soldier for one bag of rice each month.”

The letter also includes a number of housing improvements to be completed at EBK Barracks by the U.S. side, and possibly most importantly, plans for the construction of outdoor cook stands, to be funded by the Liberian MOD. Construction of cook stands was an important step to allow soldiers to feed themselves, with the supplement to their pay noted above. In addition, as of at least September 2010, a Logistics Command is being established within the AFL.⁵⁶²

⁵⁵⁹ Interview, Col. Thomas Dempsey, 27 November 2010.

⁵⁶⁰ Interview with Lt. Col. Chris Wyatt USA, 20 October 2011, corroborating data given during interview with Jeff Rodriguez, Program Manager DynCorp Liberia, 17 April 2009.

⁵⁶¹ Letter signed by U.S. Ambassador Donald E. Booth to Liberian authorities, June 9, 2008, provided by Office of Security Cooperation, April 2009.

⁵⁶² Interview with Western official, 16 December 2010.

The way the AFL feeding issue was handled demonstrates the difficulty of administering very complex contracts over a long period. It also demonstrates the importance of close attention to logistics and administration issues. The disturbances which took place at EBK Barracks in late 2008 probably had their root cause in soldier service conditions such as feeding and housing. These same issues contributed to the problems of the East Timorese F-FDTL which led partially to the crisis of 2006. This experience underlines assessments in the multiple case chapter. In many cases, logistical and administration support of soldiers appears to suffer from lack of enough attention.

The neo-patrimonial nature of Liberian politics, appears to have been the dominant indigenous political-economic factor. Liberia was founded by black American former slaves in 1847, who became known as ‘Americo-Liberians.’ From 1878 to 1980, Liberia was governed by the single True Whig Party. Personalized clientelism was implanted during the True Whig Party era, especially by President Tubman (1944-71). It appears these methods did not substantially change under the rule of President Tolbert (1971-1980). During the Tolbert era, Ellis describes the Liberian political style as follows:⁵⁶³

“Becoming part of a clique, faction, or network, or even of as many such groups as possible, was the best way for those with ambition to secure preferment... ..One young opposition politician [of the Tolbert era] later recalled how ‘status was bestowed by coterminous leadership or membership in associations together with senior positions in government. The value of membership in an association derived from how many members of such associations were in senior government positions. Social, political and religious and professional groups became indistinct; no arm’s length transactions were possible among them, for memberships were interlocking’ “

Ellis notes further that this interconnected set of linkages was, ‘and still largely remains’ [as of 2001] the context of Liberia’s politics.⁵⁶⁴ Furthermore, ‘..to this day, Liberians are expected to visit regularly whichever rural area their family originally

⁵⁶³ Stephen Ellis, *The mask of anarchy : the destruction of Liberia and the religious dimension of an African civil war* (London: Hurst, 1999), 51.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid.

came from, and to provide benefits and to disperse largesse to the kinfolk who still live in their rural area.' Leaders of rural communities exert pressure on sons and daughters of the village to assist financially, even when these offspring are in Monrovia or the United States. '...The moral system of the village continues to exert an influence over Monrovia, and even in national politics, in spite of the high degree of centralization which was the legacy of Tubman's party-state.'⁵⁶⁵

This neo-patrimonial network of governance subverts ostensible legal-bureaucratic facades such as ministries and department very effectively. Informal connections are far more important than formal arrangements.

The same clientelist methods were used by Charles Taylor to run his enclave during the civil war. Taylor ran the 'Greater Liberia' enclave from Gbarnga, where he used external commercial networks to help control internal patronage networks, and to discipline and play external supporters off one another.⁵⁶⁶ This system was extended by Taylor to Monrovia when he won the presidency.⁵⁶⁷ Taylor accumulated all resources and then redistributed them. Formal government was re-imposed from 2003 and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has made determined attempts to make the formal system work. But these efforts appear to have had very little impression on the political-economic patterns described above. The International Crisis Group decried the 'intensely personalized and mercenary nature of politics' in 2002;⁵⁶⁸ it seems likely that little has fundamentally changed below the surface.⁵⁶⁹ In this environment, even a well-funded attempt to create a formally functioning army appears destined to slowly decay. The gradual re-emergence of impunity for security personnel, and the weakness of the formal pay process for the AFL appear to be symptoms of this phenomenon. As these symptoms are both directly relevant to several SSR principles, they will be discussed in later sections.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid. Also see Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, 'This Child Will Be Great,' Harper, 2009, 261, for a description of a return to help one's ancestral village.

⁵⁶⁶ William Reno, "Reinvention of an African Patrimonial State: Charles Taylor's Liberia," *Third World Quarterly* 16, No. 1 (March 1995): 111.

⁵⁶⁷ *Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability* (International Crisis Group, April 24, 2002), 17.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid., 18.

⁵⁶⁹ See Jorgel and Utas, *The Mano River Basin Area: Formal and Informal Security Providers in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone*, 13-15.

The neo-patrimonial network of governance active in Liberia has inevitably had an effect on the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense. In Liberia, there are differing points of view as to whether the army's primary role is serving and protecting the people or acting as an agent of bureaucratic influence.⁵⁷⁰ The wording of the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and Liberia, which laid out the AFL's mission, did not explicitly delineate the AFL's role, merely saying the new AFL would be 'sufficient for the defense of the Republic of Liberia, and, as appropriate to respond to natural disasters.'⁵⁷¹ Up to the end of the contractor training period (December 2009), the President had not clearly stated what she sees as the AFL's principal role.⁵⁷²

There is evidence to suggest that illegitimate means are being used to increase the defence sector's bureaucratic power. Defense Minister Brownie Samukai has been reported to have had soldiers manhandle a Finance Ministry official in August 2008,⁵⁷³ though this allegation was made by former warlord Prince Johnson. In April 2010, it was confirmed that Samukai was collecting monies from two cellphone companies, reportedly a total of up to \$25,000 a month.⁵⁷⁴ Internet forum chat however suggests that Samukai may own a firm of private security guards. These payments from cellphone companies could be legitimate payments to his commercial enterprise.

It should be noted in considering evidence of potential corruption by Defense Ministry senior officials that President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has dismissed multiple officials for corrupt practices since her government took office in January 2006. Within the Ministry of National Defense, this has allegedly included the ministry comptroller, who was dismissed in August 2009. There are strong suspicions that he

⁵⁷⁰ Interview between European Union Institute (EUI) doctoral student and U.S. officials, 12 January 2010.

⁵⁷¹ Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and Liberia, 9 September 2008, and conversation with Col. Thomas Dempsey, 17 April 2010.

⁵⁷² Interview between EUI doctoral student and U.S. officials, 12 January 2010.

⁵⁷³ Prince Johnson, the former leader of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) faction in the first Liberian civil war of 1990-97, made this allegation. Johnson is now a senator. The Inquirer, Monrovia, 'Prince Johnson wants investigation,' 22 August 2008.

⁵⁷⁴ Stephen Binda, 'Defense Minister Appears Before House Today,' Daily Observer, March 23, 2010, accessed at <http://www.liberianobserver.com/node/5305>, and later Star Radio report.

was dismissed for diverting \$50,000 intended for soldiers' pay.⁵⁷⁵ Utilizing public offices for private gain is the historical norm in Liberia. The picture is clearly incomplete, and there is insufficient data available to put matters in their proper context. However, the available information suggests the Defense Ministry has considerable bureaucratic influence. It seems readily possible that this influence is at least partially obtained through illegal practices. The unusual element here is neither bureaucratic influence nor illegality, but the potential extent of the Defense Ministry's power in comparison to other bureaucratic actors.

Before rendering a judgement on the effects of neo-patrimonial networks of governance on the AFL reconstruction programme, one qualification needs to be made. Ellis was writing his book in 2001 and before. The nature of Liberia's political culture may have changed in the decade since 2001, but it appears unlikely. If the political culture described by Ellis remains substantially unchanged, then the measures being employed within the Ministry of National Defense appear to represent 'business as usual.' If persons within the Ministry are raising additional funds through extra-budgetary measures, then this may represent historical continuity with previous Liberian culture. This explanation appears to fit the known cultural trends and the observed media reports.

What this study does not show, as it focuses on the armed forces, is the probable mirroring of this behaviour throughout the Liberian governmental sector. It seems highly likely that these kind of neo-patrimonial networks are replicated throughout the other ministries, para-statal departments, and county governments. Reports actually suggest that the Ministry of National Defense may only be implicated in corruption on a minor scale in comparison to other government departments.⁵⁷⁶ Credible reports of such continued neo-patrimonial activity only reemphasise that SSR expectations are unrealistic. Whether the U.S. aid effort lasts five or fifteen years, it seems unlikely to change Liberian political culture.

⁵⁷⁵ C.Y. Kwanue, 'Corruption at Ministry of Defense? (Comptroller Sacked for 'Eating' US\$50,000 Soldiers' Pay),' <http://www.liberianobserver.com/node/453>, August 9, 2009, accessed 2 December 2010.

⁵⁷⁶ Interview with Western official, 16 December 2010.

Political-economic factors, in conjunction with the U.S. priority on capacity enhancement, appear to have played the major role in shaping the current AFL. The references to sections of this chapter below make it clear how many of the SSR principles are interwoven with and dominated by these factors. Perhaps the most significant political-economic factor present in other cases of army reconstruction, the need to find worthwhile activity for former combatants, was also present in Liberia. As in other 'single state force' cases, the potential for disruption by dissatisfied ex-combatants is significant. The pre-2003 AFL officers and soldiers may yet revolt. The economic factors affecting the programme also make clear the need to emphasise the development of logistics and administrative skills.

Postwar Army Capability Enhancement in Liberia

This section will describe the background to the army reconstruction programme in Liberia, describe the programme itself as it took place between 2004 and December 2009, and then evaluate how much capability enhancement has been achieved.

Any assessment of Liberia's armed forces needs to take into consideration their long involvement with the United States. After independence in 1847, Liberia's only initial military force was a provisional militia drawn from the settlers. Formal armed forces were only created in February 1908. A joint resolution of the Liberian Congress and Senate authorized the President to 'establish a military police force to be called the Liberian Frontier Force' (LFF).⁵⁷⁷ It was a 500-man force, whose mission was originally "to patrol the border in the Hinterland."⁵⁷⁸ The LFF would also prevent the sorts of indigenous disorders that had invited earlier British and French intervention.⁵⁷⁹

Initially three British officers were recruited to command the force. However in February 1909 the British officers were dismissed as they had attempted to coerce the

⁵⁷⁷ Harrison Akingbade, *The Pacification of the Liberian Hinterland*, *Journal of Negro History*, Vol. 79, No.3, Summer 1994, 281.

⁵⁷⁸ Festus B Aboagye and Martin R Rupiya, PhD, *Enhancing post-conflict Democratic Governance through effective Security Sector Reform in Liberia*, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, RSA, 2005, 258.

⁵⁷⁹ Harold D. Nelson (ed.), *Liberia: A Country Study*, American University, Washington DC, 1984, 33-34, 37.

government. Americo-Liberians were substituted. American negro officers arrived to take command of the Frontier Force in 1912 and did so until 1922.⁵⁸⁰ Once command was handed over to the Americo-Liberians, a U.S. military advisory mission was created to assist in training and operations. U.S. military advisors appear to have been consistently present in the country ever since.⁵⁸¹

The LFF was reorganized as the Liberian National Guard Brigade in 1956 and later became known as the Armed Forces of Liberia. Also in 1962, the somewhat inactive Militia was revitalised. A major reason for the revitalization of the Militia was as a check on the National Guard. Mathews says that with the Guard's increasing professionalism, political ambitions had begun to appear among certain officers.⁵⁸² Yet the skill level of the armed forces, even with U.S. military advice, never rose very high. Officers, all Americo-Liberians for most of the first part of the twentieth century, were often 'inexperienced and unprofessional.'⁵⁸³ There was little training, up until at least 1964, apart from that provided by the U.S. advisory mission.⁵⁸⁴ The political potency of the army was made clear by a number of incidents in the 1960s and 1970s. They included reports of a planned coup in 1963; arrests of senior officers in 1969 and 1970; the discovery of a further conspiracy in 1973; and early dismissals of senior leadership in 1977.⁵⁸⁵ Some of these incidents may however have been pre-emptive purges by the True Whig Party leadership. The Liberian armed forces began to become a potential political threat to the government if not handled carefully, in common with other Sub-Saharan armies.

Together with the limited professionalism of the existing force, the effects of the Liberian civil war caused the Armed Forces of Liberia to lose the characteristics of an organised armed state land force. The civil war had its origins in the turbulence of Samuel Doe's regime, which began in 1980. Master Sergeant Doe had been the senior ranking NCO of the seventeen soldiers which killed President Tolbert during the

⁵⁸⁰ T.D. Roberts, *U.S. Army Area Handbook for Liberia* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1964), 387.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 384.

⁵⁸² Mathews in Keegan, *World Armies*, Second Edition, 1982, 364.

⁵⁸³ T.D. Roberts, 1964, 389.

⁵⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 392.

⁵⁸⁵ Mathews in Keegan, 1964, 364.

soldiers' coup of April 1980.⁵⁸⁶ Doe's rule created significant resistance due to his harsh actions, which included pogroms after a revolt of AFL origin in 1984. As a result, resistance coalesced. Armed resistance began when Charles Taylor led about 100 fighters across the Cote d' Ivoire border into Nimba County on 24 December 1989.⁵⁸⁷ At the time the AFL was about 6,000 strong. During the first civil war, which lasted until 1997, the AFL lost most of its military characteristics and degraded into more of a warring faction than a professional army.⁵⁸⁸ The first civil war ended in an agreement to hold national elections, which Taylor won in August 1997. In 1998, a force restructuring proposal was submitted to Taylor, recommending a force of 6,000.⁵⁸⁹ The proposal was not implemented, and the remnants of the AFL were run down in favour of NPFL militias. Fighting broke out again within two years, and continued until 2003. With rebel forces nearing Monrovia, in June 2003 a peace conference was convened at Accra in Ghana.

In August 2003 the Accra conference culminated with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA included provisions for the establishment of a transitional government drawn from all the warring factions. It outlined provisions regarding the armed forces in Articles VII and VIII of Part 4. Article VII, section 1(b) directs that 'the Armed Forces of Liberia shall be restructured and will have a new command structure. The forces may be drawn from the ranks of the present Government of Liberia (GOL) forces, the LURD, and the MODEL, as well as from civilians with appropriate background and experience. ... The parties also request that the United States play a lead role in organizing this restructuring program.'⁵⁹⁰ A United Nations peacekeeping mission, which was to become the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was to secure and support the rebuilding process. A force of 15,000 troops provided the military component of the force, effectively acting as the country's interim defence force as well as peacekeeping.

⁵⁸⁶ Ellis, *The mask of anarchy : the destruction of Liberia and the religious dimension of an African civil war*, 54

⁵⁸⁷ Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy*, Hurst & Co., London, 2001, 72-76, and Adekeye Adebajo, *Liberia's Civil War*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2002, 58.

⁵⁸⁸ See for example Ellis, *Mask of Anarchy*, 2001, xiii. 'Best described [after 1990] as an anti-Taylor faction with a collective leadership.'

⁵⁸⁹ "AFL Restructuring Commission Report submitted to H.E. Charles Taylor, President of Liberia." (Government of Liberia, Monrovia, Liberia., December 17, 1998).

⁵⁹⁰ Article VII, Section 1(b) of the CPA, July 2003, 15

The National Transitional Government of Liberia, as outlined in the CPA, was inaugurated on October 14, 2003. It was made up primarily of members of the three previous warring factions. The immediate international imperative was to establish security, and thus the expansion of UNMIL's forces was given priority. Among the measures put in place to maintain the cease-fire was the creation of the Defence Advisory Committee (DAC), made up of the chiefs of staff of the AFL, LURD and MODEL.⁵⁹¹ The DAC was located within the Ministry of National Defense. In late 2003 and early 2004, there was some support for the idea of abolishing the armed forces entirely.⁵⁹² The UN Mission head, Jacques-Paul Klein, publicly wondered whether a border guard might be sufficient, though such an idea was never formally considered.⁵⁹³ The border guard-only concept was not discussed widely because it was 'impractical,' said Joe Wylie, Liberian Deputy Defence Minister at the time. Then U.S. Ambassador John Blaney said that it would have been impossible to obtain funding for a militarized border guard because there was no exact U.S. agency equivalent.⁵⁹⁴

On February 5-6, 2004, the Reconstruction Conference on Liberia was held in New York. At this donor's conference the Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) reconstruction plan was created. The first of nine RFTF priority clusters identified was assigned to security and the restructuring of the AFL.⁵⁹⁵ The donor's conference was an important precursor to efforts to rebuild the AFL.⁵⁹⁶

Liberian initial recreation proposals embodied in a March 2004 DAC paper, aimed at a recreation of a force much the same as the pre-1990 AFL.⁵⁹⁷ The DAC 2004 paper was a slightly revised version of the 1998 plan submitted to Charles Taylor, and

⁵⁹¹ Adedeji Ebo, *Challenges and Opportunities for Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), 17.

⁵⁹² International Crisis Group, 'Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils,' 30 January 2004, 18.

⁵⁹³ Interview with Joe Wylie, former Deputy Minister of Defence – Administration, 2003-2005, 5 April 2009.

⁵⁹⁴ Telephone interview with John Blaney, U.S. Ambassador, Liberia, 2002-2005, Arlington, VA, 1 September 2010.

⁵⁹⁵ Republic of Liberia – NTGL, 'Summary Report of the Status of the Restructuring of the AFL,' revised July 12, 2005, 2.

⁵⁹⁶ Interview with former U.S. DynCorp Liberia task order programme director, Monrovia, May 2009.

⁵⁹⁷ Defense Advisory Committee of the MOND, AFL Restructuring Plan Revised, Monrovia, March 22-24, 2004.

appears to be an endorsement of former AFL officers' vision for a recreation of the pre-1990 force. It was produced well in advance of the dialogue on SSR that began later in 2005.⁵⁹⁸ The March 2004 paper outlines a proposed strength of 6,500. Initial April 2004 requests from transitional Defense Minister Daniel Chea to UNMIL senior political officers were for a force of 8-10,000.⁵⁹⁹ One of the first identified UN documents on the issue, in May 2004, recorded initial discussions between UNMIL and Chea in which a desire for a force not exceeding 4,000 was indicated.⁶⁰⁰

Also in May 2004, U.S. personnel from the Department of Defense, the State Department, and U.S. European Command (responsible for West Africa) made a ten day assessment tour.⁶⁰¹ They found that there was no professional military to build up, neither infrastructure nor equipment.⁶⁰² This absence of resources, as well as the limited reach of the state, created an environment significantly more adverse than in many contexts in which SSR programmes had been attempted. As a result, it was determined that the new military should be built from the ground up, and former warring factions' personnel, including the AFL, should not be absorbed without a qualification process. The force design process was heavily influenced by U.S. Army organizational concepts, which most of the U.S. advisors and contractors had experience of, but not, it appears, any specific doctrinal manuals.⁶⁰³

Initial efforts to formulate a defence policy also began within UNMIL at this time. Senior political officials within UNMIL drafted the 'Blue Paper,' a defence policy proposal.⁶⁰⁴ However, the draft defence policy developed had little lasting impact.

⁵⁹⁸ Here it should be noted that Boas and Stig appear to have mistakenly identified a connection between the 2004 DAC plan and the beginnings of the national dialogue in 2005. This author's research has identified no endorsement by the national dialogue of the 2004 DAC plan. Bøås, Morten and Stig, Karianne, "Security Sector Reform in Liberia: An Uneven Partnership without Local Ownership," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 4, no. 3 (September 2010): 291. See Jaye, "History of the Development of the National Security Strategy of Liberia."

⁵⁹⁹ Telephone interview with former senior UN official, 29 May 2009.

⁶⁰⁰ UNMIL Interoffice Memorandum to Jacques-Paul Klein (SRSG), Subj: Restructuring, handwritten date May 2004.

⁶⁰¹ See www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/v.26_4/Auffrey.pdf, accessed April 25, 2009. See also Sean McFate, "Outsourcing the Making of Militaries: DynCorp International as Sovereign Agent," *Review of African Political Economy* 35, no. 118 (2008): 648.

⁶⁰² E-mail correspondence with U.S. expert, 12 June 2008.

⁶⁰³ E-mail from former U.S. advisor, 1 September 2010, and Sean McFate, 1 September 2010.

⁶⁰⁴ Republic of Liberia – NTGL, 'Summary Report of the Status of the Restructuring of the AFL,' revised July 12, 2005, 2.

While the Liberian parties wanted a 4,000 or stronger force, the ultimate decision on force size was made by the United States. There was significant concern that a large force would be beyond the Liberian Government's ability to sustain. The thinking ran that if the force was unsustainable, left unpaid, it might revolt.⁶⁰⁵ Thus the decision upon contract signing in July 2004 was that 2,000 men only, not any larger number, were to be trained.⁶⁰⁶ This decision was not announced at the time; it was October 2004 before *Africa Confidential* reported that DynCorp had secured a 'contract to restructure the Liberian national army' with very few further details.⁶⁰⁷ It was acknowledged that this size of force was insufficient to defend the entire country or relieve the entire UN peacekeeping mission initially.⁶⁰⁸ However, the U.S. said that if the Liberians wished, they could expand the force after the U.S. funded programme ended.

The discussion over the alternative numbers is important because it appears to have substituted for any debate on the army's mission or tasks. It appears an exterior defence, conventional orientation was adopted almost by default, rather than counter-insurgency. There was no established mission statement in existence when a U.S. ODC chief changeover took place in mid 2007.⁶⁰⁹ However, in 2007-2008 Samukai was constantly vocal in private about the need to defeat internal insurgency threats. The factors that finally militated toward an exterior defence orientation included the conventional heritage of most of the U.S. military and contractor personnel involved. From mid 2007 the new U.S. ODC chief began to indicate publicly that the mission would focus on external defence. The other significant factor appears to have been the Liberian heritage of the civil war. Liberians appear to have shied away from an overt role for the armed forces in internal stability, partially because of the human rights abuses that all factions had committed.

⁶⁰⁵ McFate, "Outsourcing the Making of Militaries: DynCorp International as Sovereign Agent," 647; U.S. expert e-mail 12 June 2008.

⁶⁰⁶ Interview with Susan McCarty, U.S. Department of State, Monrovia, 21 May 2009. It should be clearly understood that the apocryphal story regarding the 2,000 strong number being set over a lunch between the U.S. Ambassador and Chairman Bryant, as reported in the International Crisis Group's 2009 report, has no basis in fact. Interview with former transitional chairman Gyude Bryant, 2 June 2009.

⁶⁰⁷ *Africa Confidential*, 'New model army,' Friday 22nd October 2004, Vol. 45, No. 21.

⁶⁰⁸ McFate, *op. cit.*

⁶⁰⁹ Personal correspondence with involved U.S. official, 2010.

In designing the AFL reconstruction programme it was decided that private contractors would deliver the training. Due to the pressures of overstretch on the U.S. armed forces (principally due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) not enough U.S. military personnel were available. The task was finally split between contractors DynCorp and PAE in two task orders signed in July 2004.⁶¹⁰ The Liberia task orders formed a component of the larger multi-year State Department Africa Peacekeeping contract. DynCorp was to carry out recruiting, vetting, and individual training while PAE was to run unit training after the individual training concluded. “The straightforward initial DynCorp proposal consisted.. of putting 2,000 men through boot camp and supplementing their training with a significant rule-of-law and human rights component.. .”⁶¹¹ DynCorp specifically intended at the time to go beyond a straightforward ‘train and equip’ approach. Indeed, the International Crisis Group reported that the reason DynCorp won the individual training contract over PA&E was because it placed legal and human rights training at the centre of its’ proposal.

The decision to allocate the programme to contractors echoed U.S. practice elsewhere. Vinnell Corporation had been granted the initial contract to rebuild the Iraqi Army in 2003, as seen in the previous chapter. In Africa itself, multiple U.S. security assistance efforts had been delegated to contractors through the Africa Peacekeeping contract. Support to African armies originally under the African Crisis Response Force initiative, now the African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA) programme, often is carried out through contractors. The problems faced by Vinnell in Iraq might have been expected to give some pause in this second effort to reconstruct an entire army using contractors. But Vinnell, DynCorp, and PA&E were competing companies, and lessons identified from the Iraq experience might have had commercial value. Thus it appears that lessons potentially identified in Iraq may have had to be learned and possibly relearned in Liberia.

⁶¹⁰ McFate, “Outsourcing the Making of Militaries: DynCorp International as Sovereign Agent,” 648

⁶¹¹ International Crisis Group. Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, Africa Report No.148, Brussels, 13 January 2009, 10.

The restructuring concept was briefed by the American side to interim Chairman C. Gyude Bryant on 22 September 2004.⁶¹² The briefing document still states a 4,000 number as a strategic goal, with ground, air and maritime components, but states that for initial stages, recruiting of around 2,000 to 3,000 personnel would be possible. In November 2004, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) completed a study of Liberia's budget and laid out three broad options for the future force's size. U.S. military public briefings in 2008 presented this study's results as 'determin[ing] that over the [2004-09 period] Liberia could only afford to sustain a military force of approximately 2,000 personnel.'⁶¹³ Despite Samukai having said that the force size was set as a result of the MPRI budgeting exercise,⁶¹⁴ it is clear that the force size decision had been made by the time the contract was signed, five to six months before. Later then-U.S. Ambassador John Blaney said the 2,000 strong figure was the result of his own personal 'back-of-the-envelope' calculations of what Liberia could afford, and not the result of the MPRI studies.⁶¹⁵

In January 2005, Blaney gave the instruction to his staff to initiate the programme.⁶¹⁶ However, before the recreation of the army could start, other concerns intervened. The Liberian government had agreed that demobilisation of the former AFL was to be a Liberian government responsibility. However, DynCorp and US Embassy staff had to initiate the process, at least partially because of lack of capacity within the Liberian Ministry of Defense.⁶¹⁷ In conjunction with the U.S. Embassy staff, DynCorp personnel advised the interim Ministry staff on how to proceed with demobilization. Thereafter in March-May 2005, they wrote the two orders required, the executive order on demobilization, which became Executive Order No.5, and the AFL Operations Order for Demobilization. Executive Order No.5 was signed by Chairman Bryant on 15 May 2005, and stated that the demobilization exercise would begin on

⁶¹² 'Liberia Security Sector Reform: Briefing and Discussion for Chairman Bryant,' 24 September 2004.

⁶¹³ Major General Buz Altshuler, AFRICOM, PowerPoint brief, AFCEA TechNet Europe, Prague, 16 October 2008. Marine Corps Forces, Europe, briefing alternatives from January 2005 outline three potential programme options, according to the amount of funding available: \$200 million for a force of around 4,000, \$112.5 million for a force of around 3,000, and \$82.5 million for a force of around 2,000. (Marine Corps Forces, Europe, Liberia Security Sector Reform Achievable Goals Against Available Funds, PowerPoint brief, 13 January 2005)

⁶¹⁴ Brownie Samukai discussion with Louis-Alexandre Berg, Monrovia, January 2010. Discussion with Louis-Alexandre Berg, 13 April 2010.

⁶¹⁵ Conversation with former U.S. Ambassador John Blaney, Arlington, VA., 19 June 2011.

⁶¹⁶ Personal correspondence with involved U.S. official, February 3, 2010.

⁶¹⁷ Personal correspondence with involved U.S. official, February 9, 2010.

31 May. The demobilization process actually commenced in July 2005 and was completed in January 2006.

While the demobilization preparation process was under way, a round of consultations took place with major stakeholders as to the mission and composition of the new AFL, sensitization campaigns for civil society, and potential locations for training bases. A recruiting and vetting plan was also prepared. By May 2005 the State Department could initiate the programme, and did so by releasing money to DynCorp to start recruiting and facility construction.⁶¹⁸ DynCorp working under direction from Daniel Chea drafted and redrafted different options for the land forces' organization, for example, including an agricultural battalion.⁶¹⁹ However, U.S. disapproval meant that no agricultural unit was included in the structure approved in 2005. On July 15, 2005, the U.S. government received the initial organizational table for the AFL's future force structure from the DynCorp contractors who had written it. It was approved soon afterwards.⁶²⁰ The original organizational table, which had been the subject of repeated consultation with transitional Defense Minister Chea, laid out a seven component structure. There were to be a brigade headquarters, two infantry battalions, an engineer company, a military police company, a brigade training company, and a band.⁶²¹ No service support units were to be created, as the contractors were to provide basic support services at the bases, at least during the training programme. With minor adjustments, this force structure was carried through into reality.

Recruiting and vetting for the new force began in October 2005, which attracted thousands of applicants.⁶²² In January 2006, the newly elected Liberian government was installed, and former UN police official Brownie Samukai became Minister of National Defense. The first basic training class was induced in July 2006, much delayed by disagreements over the Liberian contribution to the budget and training

⁶¹⁸ McFate, "Outsourcing the Making of Militaries: DynCorp International as Sovereign Agent,"

649.

⁶¹⁹ Former DynCorp staff member, interview, March 2009, London.

⁶²⁰ Personal correspondence with former DynCorp staff member, February 4, 2010. The document was a Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E).

⁶²¹ McFate, "Outsourcing the Making of Militaries: DynCorp International as Sovereign Agent,"

647.

⁶²² *Ibid.*, 649-650.

and barracks sites. This first class, selected for their leadership potential, was about 110 strong, and graduated in November 2006. From June 2007 formulation of plans to end the training with a final assessment exercise began to get underway. The just-arrived U.S. ODC chief was tasked to “give the MOD a plan on the building of the force and timeline on turnover.”⁶²³ Classes halted entirely from December 2007 to July 2008 due to funding constraints on the U.S. side.⁶²⁴ The first class was trained at the Barclay Training Center in central Monrovia because the planned training site was not ready. The following classes went through the process at the long-planned location, the revitalised Camp Ware near Careysburg, a former Voice of America transmitting station. Camp Ware later became the home of the brigade training company, which was re-designated the Armed Forces Training Command (AFTC) in late February 2009.⁶²⁵ Meanwhile Schiefflin Camp, one of the most important Liberian barracks, located on the airport road between Roberts International Airport and Monrovia, was earmarked for renovation as the main base for the new force. On completion it was renamed Edward Binyah Kesselly Barracks, known to all concerned as ‘EBK.’ However, concentrating all the units except the training unit there has led to overcrowding, which played a part in fomenting later troop protest, as will be elaborated on below.

Once sufficient personnel had undergone initial training, unit training became the priority, but this was hampered by a lack of middle-ranking and senior officers. For internal Liberian political reasons, it was decided that choosing an army commander should be delayed. It appears all factions were worried about having a Liberian of whatever political affiliation in the position.⁶²⁶ Thus a Nigerian officer was requested to serve as interim chief of staff, and Major General Luka Yusuf arrived in 2006. Sierra Leone had earlier had a Nigerian officer, Brigadier General Maxwell Khobe, serve as chief of staff in 1998-99. A number of ECOWAS officers were posted into

⁶²³ E-mail comments by Lt Col Chris Wyatt on draft chapter, October 2010.

⁶²⁴ Thomas Dempsey, ‘Security Sector Reform in Liberia Part I: An Assessment of Defense Reform,’ Issue Paper No. 2000-XX, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, July 2008, 2. On the delays see also McFate, *Outsourcing the Making of Militaries*, 648, and ICG, January 2009, 12.

⁶²⁵ Interview with Jeff Rodriguez, Program Manager, DynCorp Liberia, 17 April 2009. The brigade training company of the initial plan was actually known by the time units were formed as the Brigade Training Unit.

⁶²⁶ Thomas Jaye ‘An Assessment Report on SSR in Liberia,’ Governance Commission, Monrovia, 2006, and Malan, *op. cit.*, p.37-39

the AFL to fill some of the gaps in late 2007- early 2008. Thus initial unit formation for the infantry could begin, and the first three companies were formed in December 2007.⁶²⁷ The company commanders were provided by Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Ghana. Several former 1990-era Liberian officers, at least two of which who had previously served under Brownie Samukai in the 'Black Berets' provisional police force of 1994-95, were also re-commissioned in early 2008 to fill MOD staff posts, and later command appointments.

Also in early 2008, earlier Liberian wishes for a larger force were reasserted. After discussions with the Ministry of National Defense, the Marine Colonel who was acting as Senior Defense Advisor at the Ministry formulated a plan for a 4,500 strong force,⁶²⁸ which was later to grow still further. Without coordination with the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Office of Defence Cooperation, the plan was briefed to the President. The Marine colonel in question, who had been operating far beyond his job description, was later reprimanded by the U.S. Ambassador.⁶²⁹ With the fiscal limitations the two sides were under, such a large amount was unaffordable. Instead defence planning began to consider the long-term presence of other West African troops in Liberia after the United Nations had left.

The two infantry battalions were activated in August and December 2008. There had been long-term U.S. planning that active duty U.S. personnel would be despatched to bolster the contractors.⁶³⁰ However, in December 2008, poor PA&E performance during a platoon-level defence exercise emphasised the immediate need to improve the quality of training, and encouraged the despatch of active duty personnel as soon as possible.⁶³¹ All operational units of the army were concentrated at EBK Barracks in 2008-09, overloading the facilities there. A number of factors had prevented further planned housing from coming to fruition, including the United Nations taking over land which was planned to house about 20% of the planned housing units, and a late MOD decision that resulted in officers being allocated buildings previously

⁶²⁷ 'Ministry of Defence activates first three companies,' Armed Forces Today magazine, Ministry of National Defense, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 2008, p.54

⁶²⁸ Contacts with international advisors, 2009, 2010.

⁶²⁹ Interview with Lt Col Chris Wyatt, former ODC chief, Stuttgart, 20 October 2011.

⁶³⁰ E-mail comments by Lt Col Chris Wyatt, former U.S. ODC chief, on draft chapter, October 2010.

⁶³¹ E-mail from Western advisor, 3 March 2009.

designated as NCO housing. Previous wishes to develop other barracks, such as Camp Tubman at Gbarnga, founded due to lack of funding. But the need to disperse the army across more bases took on more urgency after soldier-initiated disturbances in late 2008.⁶³²

Throughout the first half of 2009 PAE conducted collective training, and in the second half of 2009 the two battalions underwent their final assessment exercise. This was an adapted U.S. Army Readiness Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The ARTEP assessment exercise was completed in December 2009. Passing the ARTEP satisfactorily was one of the core benchmarks to allow UNMIL to proceed through its Consolidation, Drawdown, and Withdrawal process, so that other military forces would be available to supplement UNMIL's troops.⁶³³

In January 2010 the contractors handed over responsibility to the Liberian Ministry of National Defense. At the same time, 60 U.S. Marine mentors began arriving to assist further training for the army. As of March 2010, '50-odd' of the 60 had arrived.⁶³⁴ According to the chief of the Office of Security Cooperation in the U.S. Embassy, the mentors are assisting officers one to two ranks higher than them, but often know more than the Liberian officers. With the departure of the contractors, the overall advisory programme for U.S. support to the AFL is now under Defence Department leadership. From January 1, 2010, the new programme, 'Onward Liberty,' will last for five years.⁶³⁵

The decision to transfer mentoring responsibility fully to active duty personnel was the result of the new unified command, U.S. Africa Command, having the ability to assess the mission fully.⁶³⁶ As noted above, U.S. military operations in West Africa had previously been the operational responsibility of European Command. European

⁶³² Rebecca Murray, 'Liberia: New Army Faces Greatest Challenge,' InterPress, 28 December 2009.

⁶³³ National Security Strategy of Liberia Implementation Matrix – Appendix E, Sections 8.2.4-8.2.13.

⁶³⁴ Phone conversation and subsequent e-mail with Col Al Rumphrey, Chief, Office of Security Cooperation, U.S. Embassy, 30-31 March 2010.

⁶³⁵ Nicole Dalrymple, 'Ward Challenges U.S. Military Mentors to be Model Professionals for Liberian Soldiers,' U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs, Monrovia, Liberia, 25 March 2010, accessed at <http://www.africom.mil/getArticleFresh.asp?art=4198&lang=0>, 15 April 2010.

⁶³⁶ E-mail comments by Lt Col Chris Wyatt, former U.S. ODC chief, on draft chapter, October 2010.

Command had been responsible for Europe and most of Africa. Two other commands, Central Command (covering the Horn of Africa) and Pacific Command (covering a number of islands in the Indian Ocean) had previously partitioned responsibility for U.S. operations on the continent. Africa Command was announced in 2007 to rationalize and consolidate these three commands' activities into one. Africa Command assumed responsibility for the AFL programme on 1 May 2008. Initially, the command had almost no one on staff to respond to queries from U.S. officials in Monrovia, let alone formulate future plans. Over time, it became clear that active duty personnel were required to provide a consistent standard of mentoring. This eventually resulted in the contractor-active duty transition that took place at the end of December 2009.

Assessing Force Capability

The method chapter established a three-part assessment for assessing capability in the absence of a historical combat record. Fighting power can be assessed in terms of a the conceptual component, moral component, and physical component. To assess the success of the process, each will be discussed in turn.

The conceptual component of fighting power includes an army's doctrine, organization, and its training, among other factors. Creating capability in this area was a matter of reemphasising the strict observance of U.S. procedures in Liberia. While the prewar AFL had been generally organized on U.S. lines, there had been minimal adherence to U.S. standards. After 2003, doctrine and organization was introduced by the use of retired U.S. military personnel to carry out the training. As all soldiers entered the army at roughly the same time, doctrine could not be passed on from senior to junior. Instead it was introduced as part of the initial training process, at a relatively simple level. NCO and officers' courses, as well as adoption of U.S. manuals, then began to introduce more complex elements. As noted above, unit training has been restricted to the squad/platoon level. Because of the limited amount of unit training possible, as well as the inexperience of all ranks, conceptually, it appears capability is low.

The moral component of fighting power refers to an army's personnel. Issues include education, integrity, morale, and incentivising soldiers to fight. With few documents available to substantiate recruits' academic standards or criminal records, the Joint Personnel Board interviewed candidates at length.⁶³⁷ The quality of soldiers at entry was high, due to the intrusive vetting process. However, low pay and poor management has since sapped morale. As noted above, 17 soldiers were dismissed after protests in 2008. A former U.S. official attributes the morale problem to the absence of empowered and sufficient unit leadership⁶³⁸ - which, if true, would reflect historical AFL norms since the 1950s. Drug use appears to be common, and two soldiers have been dismissed in 2010 for marijuana possession.⁶³⁹ Due to these factors, moral/personnel capability appears to be low.

The physical component of capability includes equipment, logistics, and facilities. Equipment was provided by the United States with the exception of weaponry, donated by Romania. Logistics and facilities support have been provided continuously by the U.S. contractors. In January 2010 a further contract was awarded to continue facilities support by DynCorp, potentially until 2012. The contract included power generation, water supply, waste disposal, and vehicle maintenance.⁶⁴⁰ Physical capability therefore is supplied to a great degree by the United States. Without U.S. support it appears there would be a very low level of physical capability.

Most of these deficiencies would be expected of any new small army, only four years old in 2010. Capability is low, but this is to be expected. But Liberia has little ability to raise the standard from the level it has now. Due to the U.S. model adopted, the capability is not sustainable without continuing outside assistance. Sixty mentors are providing key support to the army. It is likely that the level of capability the army retains may be directly proportionate to the level of U.S. support that endures.

⁶³⁷ Mark Malan, *Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings* (Carlisle, PA, United States: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2008), 31.

⁶³⁸ E-mail from former U.S. ODC chief, October 2010.

⁶³⁹ The Inquirer (Monrovia) via allAfrica.com, Liberia: Two AFL Soldiers Kicked Out, 16 August 2010. Liberia and Sierra Leone are being increasingly affected by the flow of drugs from South America through West Africa to Europe. Dempsey interview 27 November 2010.

⁶⁴⁰ DynCorp, 'DynCorp International Wins \$20 Million AFRICAP Task Order in Liberia,' 28 January 2010, via benzinga.com.

This situation reflects a widespread phenomenon: developing-country officials desiring, for whatever reason, the adoption of standards that simply do not reflect reality. Whether such officials desire a Northern standard or not, unless Northerners are prepared to remain for very extended periods, the standards so expensively reached will deteriorate, because the developing society cannot sustain them. For example, it seems unlikely that new recruits joining to replace losses will be given the same kind of rigorous basic training given to those trained by the contractors. As of mid 2009, there also does not seem to be the interest in maintaining the vetting capability to carefully check records of new applicants in the future.⁶⁴¹ Over time, it seems likely that the educational standards of the new AFL will gradually decline unless a rigorous entry standard is maintained. Once part of the force, the finance and equipment will not be available to train new soldiers to the same standard set during the contractor programme, nor allow them to conduct operations to the same standard. Therefore, to this author, it seems wasteful to try to build a island of developed-world military competence within a society that does not have the educational, fiscal, and institutional resources to sustain it.

The Liberian capability enhancement experience validates a number of the lessons identified in the previous chapter. The importance of the terms of the peace settlement, the benefits of minimising the number of different foreign military philosophies which influence the new force, and the need to restrict reconstruction programmes to realistic, rather than unreachable, goals, are all evident from the history of the 2004-2009 programme.

Adherence to SSR Principles

From the above description, it is clear that traditional regional security concerns, as well as considerations as to how SSR should best be carried out, had great influence over the Liberian army reconstruction programme. The traditional U.S. approach to security assistance focused on training and equipping security forces, as discussed in the literature review. This situation was exacerbated by ‘war on terror’ imperatives in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. This meant that it was

⁶⁴¹ Interview with Jeff Rodriguez, Program Manager, DynCorp Liberia, 17 April 2009.

unlikely that the OECD's SSR principles would command great attention as the U.S. programme was designed. As the principles were only promulgated in 2004, knowledge of their existence may also have been limited.

If U.S. attention to the OECD's principles of SSR was limited, Liberian recognition was, it appears, even smaller. The neo-patrimonialist framework of Liberian politics limited severely the likelihood that a number of the principles would be respected. Yet the AFL programme was specifically designated the 'Joint U.S.-Liberia SSR Program,' and, as noted above, human rights concerns were specifically incorporated within the programme. Thus it is not unreasonable to assess this programme according to the standards set by the OECD. The method chapter established six criteria for determining whether a programme reflected SSR principals. SSR should be people-centred and locally owned; based on democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law; a framework to address diverse security challenges through a broad needs assessment and integrated multi-sectoral policies; a practice promoting greater civilian oversight and involvement; transparent and accountable; and a practice that enhances institutional and human capacity. Each principle will be examined in turn.

People Centred and Locally Owned

This section will examine whether the AFL reconstruction programme was people centred and locally owned. The evidence indicates that the AFL reconstruction programme was not people-centered, rather, that it was focused on concerns of state security.

If the programme was centered upon assuring the welfare of the people involved with the former and reformed armed forces, one would expect to find extensive support and welfare programmes for the former army personnel running throughout and after the DDR process. One would also expect the new armed forces personnel and their families to be well looked after. Yet families were essentially ignored. The former AFL personnel have not received benefits that they have been repeatedly promised. The reconstruction of the new AFL has not been people-centred either. Neither the salary scales nor other conditions of service were adequate to support soldiers and

their families.⁶⁴² Salaries began at \$90/month for a private, rising to sergeants, on around \$100-150 a month, and reach around \$250/month for colonels. This is not an adequate wage in Liberia, especially for soldiers with large families. The feeding issue discussed above was one of the consequences of this pay scale. Apparently this initial pay scale was always intended to be temporary. Yet budget pressures have prevented any increases. Nor are living conditions adequate. For a number of reasons, insufficient family accommodation has been made available, and as a result, barracks rooms intended for two single soldiers are being shared by both soldiers' families.⁶⁴³ Samukai has also been unable to initiate promised university education for soldiers.⁶⁴⁴

The feeding issue described above may be the most important issue affecting this SSR principle, but there are others. Soldiers' housing standards further demonstrates that the process has not been people-centred. One of the new AFL's other problems has been overcrowding at EBK Barracks, where all the operational units of the army have been stationed. Six months elapsed after the riots of September 2008 before moves got under way to relocate some personnel to the new Chinese built camp at Gbarnga. Yet according to discussions with involved contractor staff, options were internally presented (at least in an informal fashion) to alleviate the problem much earlier. Adjacent to Camp Ware, now-disused former UNMIL troops housing remains empty.⁶⁴⁵ This adjacent housing area has frequently been considered an option to alleviate overcrowding. In 2007-08, however, the fact that the UN took control of the housing without coordination made it impossible for the buildings to be renovated for AFL use.⁶⁴⁶ As of mid 2009, however, with the UN having left, it is not fully clear why the refurbishment had not taken place in order to at least partially resolve the problem.

The rioting and resultant dismissal of soldiers in September 2008 was caused for a variety of reasons, all indicating the lack of a people centred approach.

⁶⁴² Interview, Colonel Thomas Dempsey, 17 April 2010.

⁶⁴³ Interview, Col. Thomas Dempsey, 17 April 2010.

⁶⁴⁴ Interview with Western military advisor, 12 May 2009.

⁶⁴⁵ Interview with Western military advisor, 12 May 2009.

⁶⁴⁶ E-mail comments by Lt Col Chris Wyatt, former U.S. ODC chief, on draft chapter, October 2010.

Overcrowding played a role,⁶⁴⁷ but low pay, family separation, absence of social activities and MOD inability to provide free transport to Monrovia for soldiers also removed potential off-duty distractions for soldiers and increased resentment.⁶⁴⁸ The EBK unit leadership, insufficient in number, inexperienced, and without enough decision-making power was unable to address enough of the soldiers' concerns to avoid resentments which finally sparked confrontation.

These deficiencies show that the process in Liberia has not been people centred. If it had been, far more resources would have been allocated to soldiers' and dependents' welfare. Yet given SSR's aim of building effective state institutions, it seems unlikely that any such programme can be anything but centered on state requirements.

Assessing whether the programme was locally owned is not simple. There was extensive consultation with the United States on specifics and OSC staff have demonstrated a great will to provide what the Liberians want.⁶⁴⁹ Yet each phase has been dominated by foreign expertise and manpower, and funded by the United States. The initial assessment visit, mostly made up of officers who had not set foot in Africa before, proposed force designs taken from U.S. models that addressed conventional military concerns, rather than Liberia specific concerns.⁶⁵⁰ As a result, inappropriate technical rather than political considerations appear to have played a significant part in the initial assessment. Following that assessment, a force structure plan was designed by a former U.S. army officer supervised by the Liberian Minister of Defense. U.S. advisors have described how the engineer component of the force was hurriedly formulated by modification of standard U.S. Army tables of organisation.⁶⁵¹ Thereafter the key demobilisation plans for the army were written by DynCorp contractor personnel. The demobilisation plan was carried out by U.S. contractors. The new army was then trained by U.S. contractors, mostly former U.S. military personnel, in a U.S. built camp to U.S. standards. This was not all-embracing;

⁶⁴⁷ Rebecca Murray, 'Liberia: New Army Faces Greatest Challenge,' InterPress, December 26, 2009.

⁶⁴⁸ E-mail comments by Lt Col Chris Wyatt, former U.S. ODC chief, on draft chapter, October 2010.

⁶⁴⁹ Interview with Western military advisor, 12 May 2009.

⁶⁵⁰ Sean McFate, 'Outsourcing the Making of Militaries,' Review of African Political Economy, 652. A combat engineering, rather than a construction engineering, unit was proposed. Yet Liberia has very little need for combat engineers, and a large requirement for construction engineers.

⁶⁵¹ Interview with Col. Thomas Dempsey, 17 April 2010.

DynCorp successfully carried Liberian wishes for female participation in the AFL to the U.S. Government and as a result females gained greater opportunities in the AFL than in comparable U.S. units.⁶⁵² Yet the overall imprint was of the United States.

The programme has thus effectively sought to create a U.S. Army in Liberia, with African personnel. The unique Liberian local ownership angle here is that Liberians have a great regard for the United States and many would probably prefer this creation of a non-locally owned army. There is a long-standing Liberian preference for adopting U.S. procedures and practices with as little change as possible.⁶⁵³ This was mirrored in the army reconstruction programme, with Samukai and other officials, when asked, always insisting on U.S. Army standards.⁶⁵⁴ Thus an analyst has to decide whether the Liberian preference for U.S. practices outweighs their foreign nature. The issue is whether the Liberians preference for developed-world standards make those standards 'locally owned' in a developing country. This author's tendency is to say that whether Liberians may ostensibly prefer developed-world standards or not, they remain 'not locally owned' for Liberia because they are intrinsically developed-world. On balance however, whether preferred or not, imported U.S. practices dominated. The programme sought to qualitatively change the character of the army, into a Western-style, effective bureaucracy. This aimed to replace the neo-patrimonial networks of governance that had made the AFL work in the past. Put another way, the programme sort to avoid an institution driven by personalities and riven with potential fracture points. This aspiration simply does not reflect the historical character of Liberian state institutions. Considering all these factors, the AFL programme cannot be considered locally owned. This is because it appears that these neo-patrimonial governance arrangement are effectively the existential fabric of the Liberian state and society.

⁶⁵² Sean McFate, 'Outsourcing the Making of Militaries,' op. cit., p.651-2

⁶⁵³ Interview with USAID officer, Washington, November 2007. Department of the Army Area Handbook for Liberia, DA Pam 550-38, July 1964, 235 also illustrates this, though referring to national political practices: 'United States politics are considered almost as Liberian politics at one remove, as if United States politicians and policies almost belonged to Liberia.'

⁶⁵⁴ E-mail comments by Lt Col Chris Wyatt, former U.S. ODC chief, on draft chapter, October 2010.

Democratic Norms, Human Rights Principles, and the Rule of Law

The AFL programme from 2004 to December 2009 under contractor supervision was based on democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law. Each of these three components will be examined in turn. The Government of Liberia requested military assistance from the United States and then negotiated the details of that assistance. Such executive power is an accepted norm for all democratic governments. It was also in accordance with the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Accord. Protest from the legislature and civil society did not render such actions inconsistent with democratic norms.⁶⁵⁵ Indeed, scrutiny and debate within the legislature, and oversight from the judiciary, is another well established democratic norm.

Yet Liberia in the early twenty-first century had very little real experience of democracy. From 1870 onwards, political power was increasingly concentrated in the True Whig Party. From 1878 to 1980, the True Whig Party alone ruled the country, developing the patronage networks described above. After Samuel Doe seized power in 1980, he replaced a well-organized patrimonial system with a less organized, more violent variant. The 1990s brought no fundamental change, merely increasing violence. Thus while the Comprehensive Peace Agreement preamble said that the reconstruction process was to be guided by ‘principles of democratic practice, good governance and respect for the rule of law,’ there was little pre-existing knowledge or respect for these principles already in place. As noted above in the section on political-economic factors, this led to inappropriate use of the Defense Ministry’s bureaucratic influence.

The extensive vetting is the best example of the programme’s commitment to human rights principles. Potential recruits that seemed likely to have committed human rights violations were rejected. The Liberian political leadership accepted every recommended disqualification of potential candidates ‘regardless of how ‘well connected’ that candidate might have been, politically or economically.’⁶⁵⁶ Further

⁶⁵⁵ Adedeji Ebo, ‘Local Ownership and Outsourcing in Liberia,’ in Donnais, ‘Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform,’ DCAF/Lit Verlag, 2008, 161-164, Malan, 2008, 44-45.

⁶⁵⁶ Thomas Dempsey, ‘Security Sector Reform in Liberia Part I,’ US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, July 2008, 3.

evidence of the Ministry of Defense's commitment however came by December 2008. That month it was confirmed that one of the reinstated former 1990s officers, who had been ranked as a Lieutenant Colonel, had failed vetting, and had been discharged from active duty.⁶⁵⁷

Another example of the programme's adherence to human rights principles was the insistence upon country-wide, multi-ethnic recruiting. This issue was particularly important for Liberia, as the army had become enmeshed in interethnic strife during the 1980s. Samuel Doe recruited a large number of Krahn into the force, and the ethnic preference given to the Krahn helped to destroy the functioning of the armed forces' command structure.⁶⁵⁸ Charles Taylor, on the other hand, recruited large numbers of Gio from Nimba County into his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL),⁶⁵⁹ and this process helped ethnicize the civil war. Therefore there was a careful commitment, when recruiting for the new AFL, to make the army as representative of the country's 15 counties and 19 ethnic groups as possible. It appears that every ethnic group is now represented in the new force.⁶⁶⁰ However, this is not because recruits came from across the country. Instead it is because large numbers of people from all the counties and ethnic groups gravitated towards Monrovia, fleeing the conflict, during the civil war. Most recruits ended up coming from Monrovia. Ethnic tensions have been reported within the force. 'There have been several incidents where [Mandingo] recruits have been harassed and beaten up by recruits from other ethnic groups.'⁶⁶¹ However there is little amplifying information available on these incidents. President Johnson-Sirleaf's aim to have 20% women in the force also aided inclusivity, though as of January 2009 the proportion was only 3.5%.⁶⁶²

⁶⁵⁷ Annual Report of the Ministry of National Defense to the Legislature of Liberia for the Period January – December 2008, December 31, 2008, Section 5.0.3, p.12

⁶⁵⁸ Interview with Liberian serving in the AFL at the time, 20 May 2009.

⁶⁵⁹ Stephen Ellis, 'The Mask of Anarchy,' Hurst & Co., London, 2001, p.78

⁶⁶⁰ DynCorp, Security Sector Reform Recruiting & Vetting Report and Analysis, January 18-June 1 2006, Section 3.3, and ICG, January 2009, p.11. Note also DynCorp report Section 2.2: Americo-Liberians and Congo people appear to invariably report themselves as members of other ethnic groups.

⁶⁶¹ Karianne Quist Stig, "Promoting self-governance without local ownership - A case study of the Security Sector Reform in Liberia" (Master thesis, Institute for Political Science, University of Oslo, 2009), 86.

⁶⁶² International Crisis Group, January 2009, 11.

Adherence to the rule of law was demonstrated when Liberian officials accepted removal of candidates who failed vetting, both for the AFL and for the Ministry of Defense training programme. This broke with the previous Liberian practice of security forces routinely breaking the law with no significant consequences. Yet after close contractor control was removed, there are indications that the army's discipline decreased. Both reinstated civil war era soldiers and new recruits have been reported to have committed serious crimes, resulting in deaths, in 2010.⁶⁶³ The two reported crimes alone do not represent enough evidence to draw strong conclusions. However, it appears that adherence to the rule of law is coming under threat. This is an indication that Liberia's neo-patrimonialist environment is beginning to have an effect. Underpaid as the soldiers are, and with pay often disrupted and delayed, frustration and levels of crime are likely to increase.⁶⁶⁴

In summary, the programme adhered to human rights and the rule of law. The policy decisions over the programme were taken in adherence with the norms of a democratic government. Adherence to these principles may have been partially induced by the heavy international involvement throughout the whole process. There are indications that the bureaucratic influence of the Ministry of Defense may be being used in ways inconsistent with democratic norms. This mirrors the way SSR has unfolded in other neo-patrimonial societies. However this does not affect the democratic norms evaluation for the U.S.-supervised army programme, and would have occurred in any case.

Addressing Diverse Security Challenges through integrated policy

The third major SSR principle is that SSR should be a framework to address diverse security challenges through a broad needs assessment and integrated multi-sectoral policies. There is little definitive information on this principle for the Liberian army

⁶⁶³ First incident was reported via UNMIL Radio Summary 11 January 2010, Radio Veritas, 'AFL Soldiers Storm New Kru Town Police Depot,' <http://unmil.org/1article.asp?id=3651&zdoc=1>, accessed on 23 January 2010, which may implicate one of the recalled civil war era officers. The other was a report that three enlisted private soldiers killed two people and wounded three others in a ghetto raid on 5 April 2010. Report at <http://www.starradio.org.lr/content/view/15340/61/>, accessed 15 April 2010.

⁶⁶⁴ Interview with Col. Thomas Dempsey, 17 April 2010.

reconstruction programme. What evidence there is available makes it appear unlikely that the programme was part of an integrated multi-sectoral security policy. At the time the programme was being designed, there appears to have been little focus on the development of an integrated SSR policy.⁶⁶⁵ As discussed in the method chapter, SSR now has to address a wide variety of non-military security challenges. These challenges include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and less immediate changes such as climatic change.

The rebuilt army is not structured to address any of these non-military challenges. For example, national arrangements for counter-terrorism often rely on some level of capability within a nation's armed forces. Yet in the Liberian case, no special anti-terrorism unit now exists within the AFL. Instead the nearest such capability is within the Police, the Emergency Response Unit. The decision to place the capability within the Police, rather than the Armed Forces eventuated for two main reasons.⁶⁶⁶ Firstly, Liberians have a distaste for military special forces units, due to the atrocious history of Charles Taylor's Anti-Terrorist Unit and others.⁶⁶⁷ Secondly, the other reason seems to have been due to the existence of similar 'Special Weapons and Tactics' (SWAT) units within comparable American police forces. Yet the placement of this capability within the Police rather than the AFL underscores the new AFL's focus on military threats to national security.

The Liberian programme was not part of a multi-sectoral programme based upon a broad needs assessment. The U.S. needs assessments in 2004 focused on the armed forces, rather than integrating defence issues into a wider security assessment. The creation of a new army and later the rebuilding of the Ministry of Defense was carried out in isolation from reform of the police, other security institutions, and wider government reform.⁶⁶⁸ The fact that army reform was carried out by the United States

⁶⁶⁵ Ebo, 'Challenges and Opportunities of SSR in Post-Conflict Liberia,' *op. cit.*, 2005, p.19 See also Malan, 7.

⁶⁶⁶ E-mail comments by Lt Col Chris Wyatt, former U.S. ODC chief on draft chapter, October 2010, corroborating author estimate of likelihoods.

⁶⁶⁷ Adedeji Ebo, in conducting research on Liberian SSR in 2004, held an interview with a DAC member in which discomfort was expressed for an earlier U.S. proposal for an AFL 'rapid reaction company,' as part of a mid 2004 U.S. Marine Forces Europe structure plan. The DAC member said this evoked the image of the various previous government strike forces which had oppressed and brutalized the Liberian people. Adedeji Ebo, 2005, 18.

⁶⁶⁸ See for example Sawyer comments in Malan, 2008, 23.

while police reform was handled by the United Nations did not help matters. Two examples make this clear. First, the extensive reforms carried out at the Ministry of Defense while other ministries stagnated; and second, the isolation of the army reconstruction programme from the development of the National Security Strategy which established the development programme for the rest of the security sector.⁶⁶⁹

In Liberia a number of separate SSR programmes were under way. Yet because of the focus on the reconstruction of the army, the AFL and Ministry of Defense became a priority for U.S. aid efforts. Their effectiveness improved while other agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, either stagnated or made little progress. The Ministry of National Defense (MOD) was one of the most competent government ministries, at least partially because of the advisors attached to it.⁶⁷⁰ The other reason the MOD was stronger than other ministries was because the same kind of demobilization and rebuilding programme created for the AFL was carried out.⁶⁷¹ From April 2006 to April 2007, Ministry staff were demobilised, and then retrained. Ninety-one new graduates of the Ministry programme took up their duties in April 2007. This training effort also played a significant role. Under it the army reconstruction programme was being carried out by two competent companies under U.S. military supervision. Yet by mid 2009 there were some signs that the Ministry of Defense, as a competent body, was becoming involved in areas beyond defence, such as crime reduction.⁶⁷²

The difference between the quality of the Defense Ministry and other ministries can be seen from the difficulties the defence sector had with the Finance Ministry. The Finance Ministry repeatedly delayed paying soldiers; interviews indicated that as of mid 2009, there had been significant delays in pay once every three to four months.⁶⁷³

⁶⁶⁹ Various interviews, Monrovia, April-May 2009. For example, the programme manager of PA&E, who was in mid 2009 supervising unit training for the AFL, was not aware that the National Security Strategy had been approved in January 2008.

⁶⁷⁰ Western military advisor and Swedish Senior Advisor to MOD, interviews.

⁶⁷¹ Thomas Dempsey, *Security Sector Reform in Liberia Part I: An Assessment of Defense Reform* (U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2008), 2.

⁶⁷² Western military advisor interview. See also, for example, 'Minister Samukai Talks Tough,' Africa.co.ee, 18 July 2008. Accessed at <http://www.africa.co.ee/2008/07/minister-samukai-talks-tough.html>, 15 March 2010.

⁶⁷³ Western military advisor interview. Steven Koutsis also said that since payment responsibilities had been transferred in the summer of 2008, not a single pay process had gone correctly since – repeated small mistakes. (Interview 16 April 2009).

In December 2009, a further delay in paying the AFL was reported in the *Monrovia Inquirer*, with Defense Minister Samukai complaining of finance ministry delays.⁶⁷⁴ This declining efficiency can be seen as a second symptom of the neo-patrimonialist environment reasserting itself. Both British and American officials who have watched the programme evolve see a threat from the army – possibly a coup – if such a situation is not addressed.⁶⁷⁵ In addition, Amos Sawyer, head of a governance improvement agency, the Governance Commission, as well as civil society organisations, shared earlier fears in 2008.⁶⁷⁶ They were concerned about a possible *coup d'etat* by the AFL once the U.S. phased out its support and funding.

Both the relative priority given to the Defense Ministry, and the weakness of other ministries, demonstrate that Liberian army reconstruction was not carried out as part of an integrated multi-sectoral policy.

The other series of events that shows the isolation of the Liberian army reconstruction programme was the lack of interaction with Liberian national security and defence planning. As indicated above, the army programme was effectively designed between July 2004, when the Liberia task order was signed between the State Department, DynCorp, and PA&E, and mid 2005, when funds were released to DynCorp to begin recruiting and facility construction. The development of the Liberian National Security Strategy, however, did not really begin until mid 2006, after the RAND Corporation had produced their report on 'Making Liberia Safe: Transformation of the Security Sector.' This was then submitted to the Governance Commission for review, starting the process that would eventually lead to the National Security Strategy being approved in January 2008.⁶⁷⁷ The consensus of executive and legislative branch officials, as well as international advisors, in Monrovia in April-May 2009 was that the National Security Strategy had had little to no impact on the army reconstruction programme.⁶⁷⁸ U.S. officials said that there had been very little

⁶⁷⁴ Melissa Chea-Annan, 'Samukai Worried Over Delays of Soldiers Money, Others,' accessed at <http://theinquirer.com.lr>, 17 December 2009.

⁶⁷⁵ McFate 'I Built An African Army,' *Foreign Policy*, 7 January 2010, accessed at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/07/i_built_an_african_army, 15 March 2010.

⁶⁷⁶ Malan, 2008, p.46

⁶⁷⁷ Dr Thomas Jaye, 'History of the Development of the National Security Strategy of Liberia,' unpublished manuscript written April 2009.

⁶⁷⁸ Senators, congressmen, and national security advisor, for example. Monrovia, April-May 2009.

discussion over interaction with AFL programme, which had mostly been ‘set in stone’ by that point.⁶⁷⁹

Not only has the army reconstruction programme not been guided by a national security strategy, it has not been guided by an overall national defence strategy or defence review either. Liberian Ministers of Defense have worked with international advisors at least three times to produce a defence strategy, but none has eventuated. The first was with Daniel Chea and DynCorp advisors in May–June 2005. It appears that this first attempt in 2005 was delayed due to attention being given to the National Security Strategy.⁶⁸⁰ In early-mid 2009, President Johnson-Sirleaf deemed that a more recent draft strategy would not produce a force ready in time to assure the security of the country.⁶⁸¹ A third draft was under development in June-July 2009. Discussions with a Swedish senior advisor suggest that by March 2010 a defence strategy was nearing finalisation and presidential approval.⁶⁸²

There was also a reluctance to broaden the military’s approach to security challenges beyond the exterior defence mission. Liberia’s military history has been dominated by internal security concerns, and the most likely military mission is counter-insurgency. Yet since 2004 there appears to have been a strong focus on an unlikely mission, exterior defence. The Defense Advisory Committee in 2004 aimed to effectively recreate the former AFL, including artillery and an air wing.⁶⁸³ Despite counter-insurgency operations having dominated Liberian military activity for the last fifteen years, significant planning was devoted to conventional exterior defence operations, especially against Sierra Leone.⁶⁸⁴ Asked to indicate the nature of the nascent army, the Nigerian lieutenant colonel serving as Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations (J-3) in May 2009 said the army was focused on conventional, rather than counter-insurgency

⁶⁷⁹ Interview with Steven Koutsis, Political Counsellor, and Col. Al Rumphrey, Chief, OSC, 16 April 2009.

⁶⁸⁰ Sean McFate, “Outsourcing the Making of Militaries: DynCorp International as Sovereign Agent,” *Review of African Political Economy* 35, No. 118 (2008), 648.

⁶⁸¹ Western military advisor interview, April-May 2009.

⁶⁸² Discussion with Swedish Senior Advisor, Ministry of Defense, 29 March 2010.

⁶⁸³ Defense Advisory Committee, AFL Restructuring Plan Revised, Monrovia City, Monday-Wednesday, March 22-24, 2004, page 20 of 28.

⁶⁸⁴ Western military advisor interview, 12 May 2009, Sean McFate, ‘Outsourcing the making of militaries,’ *Review of African Political Economy*, 2008, 652.

operations.⁶⁸⁵ What this shows is that the programme was focused on meeting traditional military, rather than more diverse, security challenges.

Therefore the army reconstruction programme was separated from the police programme, which was carried out by the United Nations, took place before the development of the overarching national security strategy, and focused not on diverse challenges, but traditional military missions. It was also not steered by an articulated defence strategy until perhaps mid 2010. Therefore the programme cannot be considered to have adhered to the integrated policy principle.

Greater Civilian Oversight and Involvement

The fourth SSR principle is the promotion of greater civilian oversight and involvement. The AFL reconstruction programme did not promote wide civilian oversight and involvement. The hierarchy at the Ministry of Defense and other government agencies were involved, but wider involvement by the legislature and civil society was limited. The AFL reconstruction programme was carried out by contractors working in close cooperation with the Liberian Ministry of Defense. The contractors' performance was overseen by the Office of Security Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy. What might be described as a 'normal' level of civilian oversight and involvement was assured by that close cooperation with the Liberian defence authorities. Contractor personnel have described their actions on, for example, the design of the force structure. While preparing the draft, they received guidance and required alterations from Liberian ministry officials.⁶⁸⁶

While normal or routine levels of civilian oversight took place during the Liberian army reconstruction process, this principle of SSR stipulates 'greater' civilian oversight and involvement. It is acknowledged today that legislatures and civil society have an important part to play in scrutinising government security reforms.⁶⁸⁷ Yet 'greater' level of oversight, arguably, did not really take place. Unravelling the reasons for the limited wider involvement requires reconciling a number of

⁶⁸⁵ Interview with Nigerian Army officer serving as Asst Chief of Staff J-3, AFL, 8 May 2009.

⁶⁸⁶ Former DynCorp staff member, interview, March 2009, London.

⁶⁸⁷ Laurie Nathan, ed. *No Ownership, No Commitment* (University of Birmingham, 2007), 40.

contradictory statements by U.S. and Liberian actors. However it appears that there were several factors involved. Among these was the contractor structure of the programme, which created some structural impediments to a free flow of information, as well as distrust; resistance to public debate on security issues by Liberian government agencies; and the role of the U.S. defence cooperation staff.

Given the command chain in Liberia, PA&E and DynCorp were not very open to scrutiny, and were denied the ability to provide outsiders information in some cases. Due to U.S. legal restrictions, the contracts between DynCorp and PA&E and the U.S. State Department that governed the contractors' activities in Liberia have never been open for inspection. While the programme was being designed, the then parliament, the National Transitional Legislative Assembly, was not consulted. Liberian legislators from 2006 could not compel the contractor representatives to appear before them. A number of requests were referred to the U.S. or Liberian authorities. U.S. officials however say that addressing requests for information to the contractors was incorrect, and such data should have been sought from the Liberian MOD and U.S. Embassy. There is also evidence that early efforts by DynCorp to engage civil society tailed off after civil society organisations raised concerns about DynCorp's behaviour elsewhere (for example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina).⁶⁸⁸ There were concerns that DynCorp, due to its previous history elsewhere, was an inappropriate choice to run the army training programme. This led to distance and discouraged open discussion between DynCorp and civil society.

Stig suggests that one potential reason why more local ownership was not taken was that the international actors were not expected to be receptive to local input.⁶⁸⁹ Since the terms of the contract constrained what changes could be made, civil society groups may have felt that repeated attempts to influence DynCorp were not worthwhile. The civics component was possibly the only area where changes were made in the training programme – other areas do not appear to have been negotiable.

⁶⁸⁸ Adedeji Ebo, "Local Ownership and Emerging Trends in SSR: A Case Study of Outsourcing in Liberia," in *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform*, ed. Timothy Donnais (Zurich and Munster: Lit Verlag, 2008), 163.

⁶⁸⁹ Karianne Stig, "Promoting self-governance without local ownership - A case study of the Security Sector Reform in Liberia," 57.

DynCorp received much more attention than PA&E possibly because the recruitment phase was the target of most public attention.

A second factor that discourages wide debate over the programme is resistance by Liberian government agencies to public discussion of security issues. Amos Sawyer, Chairman of the Governance Commission, told a South African researcher in August 2007 that the MOD, the Ministry of Justice, and the Presidency particularly resisted public discussion of such issues.⁶⁹⁰ This author encountered some resistance himself when he was conducting research in Monrovia in mid 2009. It seems likely that official disapproval partially discouraged civil society organisations from tenaciously following inquiries to a satisfactory conclusion. This may accord with U.S. ODC officials' perception that wider participation was limited primarily owing to legislature and civil society's reluctance to participate.⁶⁹¹

The third factor, and one that still remains unclear, is the exact actions of the U.S. ODC staff. When Amos Sawyer made the comments above, he included the SSR programme team in them, as resisting public debate. Yet ODC officials involved have said they worked overtime to engage civic groups. 'Undoubtedly some civil and perhaps even government actors were excluded, but most excluded themselves and then complained from the side lines.'⁶⁹² Visiting Monrovia in 2009, this author encountered both significant openness – despatching official documents – and, in some cases, obstruction. This obstruction may however have related more to events that the officials had not been directly involved in.

It is clear that greater civilian involvement did not really take place, though the exact reasons remain unclear and are the subject of mutual counter-accusations. It appears that the contractor structure the United States used to carry out the programme could have been worked around. However, in the circumstances prevailing in Liberia from 2004-09, the use of contractors heightened mistrust and hampered efforts to increase wider involvement.

⁶⁹⁰ Malan, 2008, 45.

⁶⁹¹ E-mail comments by Lt Col Chris Wyatt, former U.S. ODC chief, on draft chapter, October 2010.

⁶⁹² E-mail comments by Lt Col Chris Wyatt, former U.S. ODC chief, on draft chapter, October 2010.

Transparency and Accountability

The fifth SSR principle derived for this study is that SSR should be transparent and accountable. These two goals will be examined in turn. It appears that the army reconstruction programme was transparent to the State Department, and details were provided to the Liberian Congress. However, complaints from Congress on the programme were frequent. Accountability again was only to the State Department. The very limited applicability of both key principles did not extend to the host and beneficiary country. Therefore on balance it appears that neither facet satisfied what might be described as the true spirit of SSR.

Little transparency and accountability was offered by the American architects of the programme. Yet evidence suggests that the Liberian government would not have been significantly interested in making the programme open to public scrutiny. As noted in the section above, there has been significant resistance from Liberian government agencies to public discussion of security issues. More importantly, the traditional neo-patrimonialist system of governance thrived on opacity, rather than transparency. Presidents Tolbert and Doe closed media outlets that criticised the government.⁶⁹³ Through the U.S. funded training programmes, earnest efforts were made to change the way the new soldiers and the MOD staff thought. Yet even if a small group of key personnel were trained, this seems unlikely to have had a significant effect on the attitudes of the majority of people involved in government circles.

The contractors' activities were initially not very transparent for Liberians. When the AFL programme began, Liberian interlocutors that the International Crisis Group spoke to 'did not appear overly concerned about [the lack of transparency].'⁶⁹⁴ There may have been well-founded fears that opening up the contract to scrutiny would expose it to profit-seeking, given the transitional government's reputation for corruption.⁶⁹⁵ Up to mid 2006, Liberian parliamentarians appear to have tried and failed to obtain key details of the programme. In 2006 Adedeji Ebo commented that

⁶⁹³ Adekeye Adebajo, *Liberia's Civil War* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 27, 29.

⁶⁹⁴ International Crisis Group, January 2009, 31.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid.

the only identifiable involvement of the parliamentary committee on national security was a visit to military sites, organised by the Ministry of Defense.⁶⁹⁶ In 2007-08 however, U.S. officials testified before the Liberian Congress, and provided financial details of the AFL programme when asked.⁶⁹⁷ It appears that transparency was limited at first, but increased as time passed. U.S. ODC officials testified before Congress, and contractor representatives appeared at Congress consultative meetings. Yet criticism from Congress was constant. This may have been partially due to Liberian domestic political factors, as well as pervasive mistrust.

It should be noted that the U.S. supervising officials had extensive visibility of the project. When the first basic induction course at VOA began in mid 2007, the ODC chief at the time drove to the training site 37 times in 60 days to oversee the contractors' actions. In mid 2009, with most of the programme's functions having moved to EBK, contractor programme managers spoke of their continual and close contact with the military officers at the Embassy, citing daily exchanges of e-mails that, for example, began at 5am and continued until 11pm.⁶⁹⁸ They aimed to keep the Embassy as fully informed as possible. Yet this level of oversight did not reassure the Liberian government. Defence Minister Samukai continually complained of the remoteness of the contractors. For example, in August 2007 he complained to a *Wall Street Journal* reporter that he could not see copies of the contracts,⁶⁹⁹ and in April 2008 said the contractors were not consulting with Liberian authorities.⁷⁰⁰ These are probably among the reasons why Samukai has said that he would have preferred to have the programme carried out by serving armed forces personnel.⁷⁰¹

It is clear that transparency and accountability for the contractors was primarily exercised by their U.S. government overseers, with some data being provided to the

⁶⁹⁶ Ebo in Nathan 2006, 'No Ownership, No Commitment,' 81, drawing upon interview with a member of the Standing Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, 31 August 2006.

⁶⁹⁷ Email comments by Lt Col Chris Wyatt, former U.S. ODC chief, on draft chapter, October 2010.

⁶⁹⁸ Interview with Tony Blackmon, Programme Manager, PA&E, April 2009.

⁶⁹⁹ Michael M. Phillips, "In Liberia, an Army Unsuited by Past," *Wall Street Journal*, August 14, 2007.

⁷⁰⁰ Ebo in Donais 2008, 160, citing UNMIL Media Monitoring, 'U.S. Ambassador Debunks Report of Flaw in Liberia's Security Sector Reform Programme,' *Daily Media Report*, 10 April 2008.

⁷⁰¹ Ebo in Donais 2008, p.160, citing 'Minister Brownie Samukai Discusses Liberia SSR in US,' *The Perspective*, 22 May 2007, and Samukai interview with Georgetown PhD student, early 2010, Monrovia.

Liberian Congress. But for the soldiers of the new army, the situation is mixed. Offenses against the Liberian authorities, such as the disturbances that took place in EBK Barracks in late 2008, have been quickly punished. Sixteen soldiers were discharged as a result.⁷⁰² Offenses against the general public by AFL soldiers are less consistently punished. As described above, there have been at least two serious crimes committed by soldiers in 2010 where no military justice proceedings have been reported. Historical patterns of impunity for soldiers may be reasserting themselves.

In summary, transparency for and accountability to Liberians during the army reconstruction process of 2004-2009 has been limited. In some cases, this may have been for good reasons, as is demonstrated by concerns over profit-seeking from members of the transitional government. However, this does not change the main conclusion – that this aspect of the process has not followed SSR principles.

Enhancing Institutional and Human Capacity

The final SSR principle is the enhancement of institutional and human capacity. This was the main focus of security assistance during the Cold War, and even with the advent of SSR principles, probably remains the main thrust of army assistance today. In Liberia, clear success was achieved. Over 2,000 army personnel have been trained both at the individual and at a higher collective level. In addition, the Ministry of Defence staff were trained.

There are two points to note in regard to enhancement of capacity in Liberia. Firstly, the decision to retrain all personnel from the start has led to a significant leadership gap. Secondly, due to inconsistent contractor quality and other associated mistakes, plus subsequent budget cuts from 2010, the force has not been trained in groups larger than platoons (of about 30 soldiers).

The new AFL initially trained only lieutenants, the lowest ranking military officers. This approach created a lack of middle-ranking officers, and the experience level of junior officers and NCOs. Once battalions are activated, they need captains, majors, and a lieutenant colonel as a commanding officer. None of these officers were

⁷⁰² Rebecca Murray, 'Liberia: New Army Faces Greatest Challenge,' InterPress, 28 December 2009.

available. Instead, ECOWAS officers were requested, and a number arrived. The ECOWAS officers' performance has been reported as patchy.⁷⁰³ To supplant and eventually replace the ECOWAS officers, 12 retired pre-2003 AFL officers were vetted for reinstatement into active service. In 2007, nine were readmitted in the ranks of major and lieutenant colonel. In May 2009 these officers were holding principal staff officer positions in Headquarters AFL (two), and serving as brigade executive officer (one), commander of the training command (one) and battalion commander (one). Two others were on training courses in the United States. The other battalion commander is a Ghanaian officer. One of the recalled lieutenant colonels was later promoted to colonel and appointed as deputy chief of staff.⁷⁰⁴ The seventh officer was discharged in 2008 as he failed vetting. Balancing these former officers who have served many years in a thoroughly unprofessional environment with the newly trained second lieutenants is creating stresses within the army. Additionally it is not clear whether the reinstatement of these officers brings needed experience back into the army or risks diluting the ethos instilled by the U.S. trainers.⁷⁰⁵ There is also irritation and opposition within the ranks to accepting officers who did not go through the same training programme as the majority of the new AFL.

Experience levels for the new AFL second lieutenants and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) will have to develop slowly. The new AFL still has inexperienced new second lieutenants in staff positions designated for experienced captains. More importantly, the new NCOs have little experience. Ideally NCOs serve as the backbone of an army's institutional knowledge: 'They form the middle management, the backbone of the army. They maintain the traditions and standards. They maintain

⁷⁰³ Interview with Steven Koutsis and Colonel Al Rumphrey, 16 April 2009. They cited such examples as a Ghanaian lieutenant colonel, acting as brigade executive officer, who had been drunk on duty. These incidents resulted in a new article being written into the Memorandum of Agreement, saying that only ECOWAS officers vetted by the United States would be allowed to serve with the AFL. However U.S. influence over ECOWAS officers is apparently limited. Rumphrey conversation March 2010.

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Lt Col Aaron T. Johnson was promoted to colonel and appointed as DCOS in 2008. He entered service in the 1950s and served under Tubman, Tolbert, Doe, Taylor, and Johnson-Sirleaf.

⁷⁰⁵ One involved U.S. officer warned against the reinstatement of former officers: 'I would not want to see any of the old officers get back in without they go through the same process as everyone else – that's all we need is a group of knuckleheads at the top that are corrupt and do not know their trade.' E-mail 4 July 2008.

the discipline and the administration.’⁷⁰⁶ One especially important NCO post is that of platoon sergeant. The platoon sergeant, ideally a long-serving soldier of great knowledge and experience, is intended to support and educate a newly arrived, freshly-graduated officer platoon commander. The difficulty with the new AFL is that all new officers and NCOs are similarly inexperienced. This has led to incidents of misbehaviour which would be unacceptable in a Western army.⁷⁰⁷ The U.S. mentors arriving in 2010 are designated to support the development of the new Liberian personnel. It is unclear yet what effect they are having.

Thus due to the decision to use a ‘single state force’ model and recreate the army from nothing, a significant experience gap has been created. This has risked the imposition of excessive pressure upon new soldiers who may have been forced to perform beyond their experience. What is quite clear is that to alleviate the weaknesses the army will need extensive mentoring for a long time to come. ‘If we [the United States] keep working with them they’ll be fine. If we abandon them, they will flounder back to old practices,’ as one involved U.S. expert commented.⁷⁰⁸

The other significant point regarding capacity development is that the new army has not been trained to take advantage of its full capabilities. Furthermore, there is little money available in the foreseeable future for this to occur. The new AFL will have five levels of sub-unit and unit command – squad, platoon, company, battalion, and brigade. However, only the first two levels of command were fully trained by the contractors. As noted above, PA&E faced significant problems when trying to run a platoon-level exercise in December 2008. The deficiencies this revealed in platoon level skills delayed the process of training the soldiers in larger units. As of December

⁷⁰⁶ Quote from ‘The Role of the Non-Commissioned Officer,’ <http://www.ukdf.org.uk/assets/downloads/CP46TheRoleoftheNonCommissionedOfficer.pdf>. See also Robert H. Scales, ‘Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War,’ Brassey’s 1997, 23-4, and Hackworth, ‘About Face,’ 398-99.

⁷⁰⁷ One witnessed bad example was the actions of a senior NCO at the AFTC Camp Ware, during a visit in May 2009. Had been drinking beer in the PX since 10am, throughout the day. Koutsis and Rumphrey: ‘Inexperienced privates with 160 days in the army under officers with 100 days in the army are being given what would be considered illegal orders in the US.’ Interview April 16, 2009.

⁷⁰⁸ Personal correspondence with U.S. expert, 4 July 2008.

2009, company, battalion and brigade level training had not been completed.⁷⁰⁹ This is not surprising, given that the initial recruit training classes only graduated in 2006. but it emphasises the need for a continual development of officers' skill in directing larger and larger units. The problem is that the money required to do so is scarce, following government funding cutbacks which began to take effect from early 2010. Training at the battalion and brigade level has been planned, but only started to take place from mid 2011. The domination of training by the American contractors and the supervisory Office of Security Cooperation means that the level above brigade – Headquarters Armed Forces of Liberia itself – gained little or no practice in running the army.⁷¹⁰ It should be said however that the period in which HQ AFL could have gained such practice was limited, given that the first battalion did not form until September 2008. This means that such practice is being gained with little preparation, since January 2010 and the transfer from contractor control.

Other lesser points regarding capacity enhancement in Liberia reflect previous army reconstruction experience elsewhere. Evidence from Liberia supports the contention that logistics, administration and maintenance need particular attention. Salaries have been a particular worry. Also troubling to Western advisors' eyes was Liberian Ministry of National Defense unwillingness to budget properly. Instead of formulating a budget that covered each anticipated requirement, the annual budget has been made as ambiguous as possible to so that 'they can fudge it as they go along.'⁷¹¹ This may be because there is then greater flexibility later to address unexpected shortfalls. Yet if comprehensive planning had been undertaken, most or all contingencies might have been anticipated. Advisors' perception is that Liberian defence officials either cannot or will not plan ahead in great detail.⁷¹²

In summary, the AFL reconstruction programme clearly enhanced institutional and human capacity, but to realise the force's potential through the training of its

⁷⁰⁹ Inferred from National Security Strategy of Liberia Implementation Matrix – Appendix E, Sections 8.2.11, 8.2.12, unit training schedules, and contact with Col. Al Rumphrey, Chief, OSC, 2010.

⁷¹⁰ Western military advisor interview 12 May 2009, corroborated by interviews with AFL officers.

⁷¹¹ Western military advisor interview, 12 May 2009

⁷¹² Western military advisor interview 12 May 2009. They said that the contractors might say 'would not' plan ahead, in view of the training they had given the MOD staff. Personal view of this advisor was either 'could not' or 'would not.'

personnel, much remains to be done. The AFL rebuilding exercise validates the need for close attention to logistics and administration during army reconstruction programmes.

Conclusions

This chapter aimed to explore influence exerted by the historical priority of capability enhancement, political-economic factors, and the SSR principles on the Liberian army reconstruction programme. The Liberia fieldwork reinforces evidence from other cases that the SSR principles have had little influence. The most important influencing factor appears to have been the U.S. desire to enhance capability, in common with numerous other army reconstruction programmes. The programme was designed to produce an effective army. Other priorities that might have risked this goal, such as a greater role for Liberians in the running of the programme and the desire for a large force, were de-emphasised. The prevailing political-economic environment slowly began to serve as a brake on the U.S. capacity enhancement agenda.

Examining each SSR principle in turn, the programme was not people-centred, nor locally owned. It did follow democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law. It did not however take place as part of an integrated multi-sectoral strategy. Instead, reforms to the various parts of the security sector took place independently. Greater civilian oversight and involvement was not fostered. This was mostly because of the use of contractors paid with U.S. money who had little local civilian oversight. Again because of the involvement of the contractors, there was little local transparency and accountability.

Army Reconstruction in Liberia: Adherence to SSR Principles	
People Centred	Red
Locally Owned	Red
Based on Democratic Norms, Human Rights Principles and the Rule of Law	Green
A Framework for addressing diverse Security Challenges through multi-sectoral strategies	Red
A Practice promoting Greater civilian Oversight and Involvement	Red
Transparent and Accountable	Red
Enhances Institutional and Human Capacity	Green

Figure 1: Adherence of Army Reconstruction in Liberia to the SSR Principles

Thus the AFL reconstruction programme conformed to some SSR principles but not others. In making an overall assessment, one must judge whether the lack of local ownership, wider civilian oversight, an integrated multi-sectoral strategy, and transparency, invalidate the successes in incorporating human rights norms, the rule of law, and capacity improvement. As none of the army reconstruction programmes examined in this dissertation appears people centred, it is unreasonable to deem a programme as not reflective of SSR principles for that failure alone.

Because the programme was in its essence about training new soldiers and equipping them, because it was relatively isolated from other security development programmes,

because it was not locally owned and had significant accountability and transparency drawbacks, it seems most accurate to judge that it did not reflect SSR principles.

If one discounts SSR principles as the most significant influence, capability enhancement and prevailing political-economic factors become most important. Put simply, the aim effectively seems to have been the creation of an American (quality) army in Liberia. Thus the historical U.S. priority of capability enhancement, the driving force behind the programme, was introduced into an arena dominated by neo-patrimonial, personalized politics. From the date the CPA was agreed in August 2003, political-economic drivers reflecting Liberian realities began to impose themselves on the capability enhancement agenda. However, the neo-patrimonial influences and networks which dominated the Liberian environment did not immediately begin to penetrate the U.S. programme's 'bubble.' Instead a number of issues began to have an indirect effect. These included a lack of resources leading to dissention within the force, infrequent efforts to expand the force size, and the re-emergence of historical patterns of impunity for AFL personnel. At the same time, constraints of U.S. origin had an effect: the decision to utilise contractors, and the decision to adopt a single state force model, among other factors. In the initial basic training period, when the recruits were sequestered from the outside world, a U.S. environment could be introduced and fostered. But once the initial training period was over the prevailing political-economic climate could have more and more effect.

There were however components of the programme that embodied SSR principles fully. The intensive vetting stands out in this way, a procedure which should be adopted more widely. However, Liberia is creating one of the smallest armies that this study has examined. Opportunities to invest this much resources into this few soldiers will be uncommon. This will inevitably reduce the quality of future vetting programmes.

In summary it appears that prevailing political-economic factors and capability enhancement dominated the AFL reconstruction programme more than the SSR principles. The limited effect exerted by the SSR principles mirrors the experience of the desk case studies discussed in Chapter 4. Evidence in this chapter supports the view that the SSR principles are overly generic and difficult to apply in field contexts.

Since greater consideration of political-economic factors and capability enhancement factors sharpen the analysis, this result also underlines the precision problems implicit in current wording of the SSR principles.

This chapter also provides additional evidence which supports the necessity and value of reducing the scope of SSR programmes, trends discussed in the literature review. If a multi-sector, comprehensive, approach to SSR is abandoned, several of the SSR principles may become easier to implement. The lesser degree of political compromise required to align less ambitious programmes will mean that each individual programme may have a greater chance to incorporate the SSR principles. Smaller, less ambitious programmes appear better placed to make SSR more internally consistent. At present, it appears over-ambitious.

Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter concludes the dissertation by assessing the validity and usefulness of the current SSR principles. The SSR principles were first formulated by the OECD in 2004, and embodied within the OECD Handbook on SSR of 2007. This concluding chapter is in two parts; a summary, followed by conclusions and recommendations. First, the dissertation research is summarized, covering the research question, the findings of the literature review, the method, the multiple case chapter, and the chapter which applies the three key concepts for army reconstruction to the Liberian case. It then revisits the principles to suggest areas where the principles remain valid, and where modifications to the principles might be considered.

It appears from the findings of the literature review, incorporating late 2010 analysis, that the SSR principles may require significant changes to deliver realistic and effective programmes in the future. The results of the multiple case and field case studies have uncovered a number of pieces of evidence which resonate with these views.

Summary of Dissertation Research

Development in many parts of the world is often hampered by security concerns. In the aftermath of internal conflict, the security situation circumscribes and reduces the potential for development. One of the frequent responses by nation-states to attempt to resolve internal conflicts is the deployment of an international intervention force. The despatch of such forces often takes place after a peace accord has been brokered between the parties to the conflict.

Following the peace accord, the international intervention force is usually charged with maintaining the ceasefire and assuring adequate conditions for post-conflict reconstruction to commence. Among the reconstruction tasks is the development of a sustainable army to replace the intervention force upon withdrawal. As indicated in Chapter 4, this pattern has been repeated at least twelve times since 1990. There are

also three closely associated cases, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Burundi, which display enough similar features to be considered alongside the other twelve cases.

However, attempts to construct armies after internal conflict have been beset by repeated mishaps in the preparatory stage, the over-application of Western procedures, failed disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes, and inadequate coordination with other security redevelopment programmes. These difficulties reflect in many cases the weaknesses of the SSR principles as currently formulated. International interventions continue to be launched, some in extremely unpromising circumstances. Therefore studying previous army reconstruction programmes in order to develop potential changes to the SSR principles is worthwhile. Such changes would be useful both to better create conditions for development in post-conflict environments, and to inform the transformation of armies in other contexts.

To address the research question “Are the OECD DAC SSR principles relevant and practical for post-conflict army reconstruction?”, Chapter 2 reviewed the literature to chart the available theoretical knowledge relevant to the topic. The multi-disciplinary area of security sector reform was used as the key body of knowledge informing this debate to date. The chapter surveyed its origins, emanating from the confluence of varied developmental and intergovernmental efforts after the Cold war, to the late 1990s definitions of SSR that are now in common use. In doing so it highlighted the continuing challenge of harmonising the concept and its practice, what has been described by Chanaa as the ‘conceptual-contextual divide.’⁷¹³

The literature review then examined six significant critiques of SSR and related literature. The first was the vast resources needed for comprehensive security transformation in most developing countries. The quality and quantity of human resources in post-conflict states are likely to be insufficient. Finances are almost invariably insufficient for the multitude of tasks involved, and frequently heavily dependent on outside donors. Also, pre-existing physical, constitutional, and

⁷¹³ Jane Chanaa, *Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges, and Prospects*, Adelphi Papers (London: Oxford University Press, 2002).

administrative resources are likely to be weak or lacking.⁷¹⁴ When the transformation of the army is examined more closely, often foreign donors have had to provide the overwhelming majority of the funding for up to a decade (or longer). From the cases examined, it appears that donors are usually only willing to fund programmes sufficiently in countries that are deemed important to their national interest. Thus, for example, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq have had significant resources invested in army reconstruction.⁷¹⁵ In these three states the financial resources invested in army reconstruction may be approaching a level adequate to fund the intended programmes. However, this leaves aside the lack of human and administrative resources.

The analysis in the literature review also highlighted the great difficulties inherent in the task of transforming neo-patrimonial societies. The SSR concept is founded on democratic norms and the replication of the rational-legal features of states along Weberian lines. SSR focuses upon changing the security structures of states, but is heavily reliant upon a more fundamental transformation of the nature of the recipient state itself. In some cases, as Egnell and Halden note, there may be only 'complex webs of informal networks,' for which they cite Sierra Leone as an example.⁷¹⁶ Security change should ideally be based upon written or unwritten national norms and values. However, if those norms and values conflict with the basic principles of SSR, achieving transformation will be extremely difficult. Thus transformation has faced great resistance in Sierra Leone, as Egnell and Halden attest, the Congo, Zimbabwe, East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia.

If SSR is to be sustainable, its programmes need to be assimilated within national modes of operating in the host state. SSR programmes need to be locally owned, and ideally not just owned by the elites of the recipient state, but by broader civil society or the majority of the citizenry of the country. Army reconstruction viewed through this prism often appears inappropriate, as in many instances it can be implemented with either foreign advisors or by carrying out a foreign plan (as in the Defence

⁷¹⁴ Bruce Baker and Eric Scheye, "Multi-Layered Justice and Security Delivery in Post-Conflict and Fragile States," *Conflict, Security & Development* 7, no. 4 (2007): 507.

⁷¹⁵ In conversation on 8 July 2010, Dylan Hendrickson also supported this view.

⁷¹⁶ Robert Egnell and Peter Halden, "Laudable, Ahistorical and Overambitious: Security Sector Reform Meets State Formation Theory," *Conflict, Security & Development* 9, no. 1 (2009).

Reform Commission approach in Bosnia-Herzegovina). But frequently former colonial patterns in the armed forces do not ease the inculcation of a fully local ethos.

A further frequent weakness in SSR programmes is the lack of an integrated approach at the state level. The scope of comprehensive SSR is very wide, and covers everything from ministerial reform in the Interior Ministry, to prison conditions, to armed forces' financial accountability, to training naval captains how to fight multiple ships in coordination. Given the multitude of local and foreign actors, there are often simultaneous, unconnected transformation programmes under way across the security sector, or even just within the armed forces, as international aid efforts to the former Zaire and to the Congo today show. SSR is intended to be an overall, holistic effort, but sometimes there is little coordinated planning at the state level. Creating and maintaining a coordinated national security policy to focus on identified priorities and to avoid duplication and waste is vital. Only recently, with the Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review in 2006, has the opportunity been taken to thoroughly review challenges and opportunities at the state level before the formulation of individual sectoral transformation programmes.

At the level of the army and police, another widely present weakness is the tendency to prioritise equipping and training programmes over governance. This has historical roots with Cold War military assistance programmes. Often such assistance is aimed more to gain political favour with the recipient state leadership than to inculcate effective management and accountability practices. The 'war on terror' has increased pressure since 2001 to build numbers of security forces quickly, notably in Afghanistan and Iraq. In those and other countries, there may be some democratic elements of the political system. Yet the controlling national elites often want reliable security forces that will do their bidding, and full democratic oversight and outside influence from parliament and civil society may be unwelcome. Yet the successful incorporation of governance components into army reconstruction is one of the crucial marks of whether a programme can be considered meaningful SSR.

Finally, the application of management theories to SSR is an area where much potential advantage may be gained. There are a number of specific techniques, including Fitz-Gerald and Tracy's ideas on alternate decision making models, Van

Veen's reverse stakeholder mapping, and an SSR application of the Balanced Scorecard, which have been developed in the past five years. These and other innovative new ideas may promise significant advantages in SSR research and programme execution. Yet they need to be much more widely disseminated, evaluated, and fine-tuned through testing to be made more effective.

The second section of the literature review covered army reconstruction concepts and guidance available. These concepts and guidance fall into four main areas: overall guidance for SSR policy and processes, guidance supporting defence sector reform, guidance on DDR programming, and military doctrine. Concepts and guidance informed by the SSR literature is dominated by the OECD Handbook, which covers assessment, capability development, and programme design, as well as a number of less vital areas.

Boucher, Burgess, LeRoux and Bonnemaïson have written guidance for defence sector reform.⁷¹⁷ Boucher, for example, asked whether armed forces were really necessary in all situations, and noted that forces can tend to be either too large or too small.⁷¹⁸ This size challenge echoed a result discussed in more detail in the multiple case chapter. DDR plays a crucial bridging role, allowing ex-combatants to be either reintegrated into wider society, or be moved into the new security forces. The focus has unfortunately historically been placed on the initial disarmament and demobilisation phases, rather than the most important reintegration phase, which can stretch for years. Tailored reintegration programmes seem to be much more effective than simply disbursing money, tools, or training, but are expensive to implement on a large scale.

Doctrine for reconstructing armies is the fourth area, and is relatively new. Only since 2001 has the importance of reconstructing partner armies warranted the attention of doctrine developers. Previously it appears that U.S. and British practices were applied by default, especially in Zimbabwe and the Balkans.

⁷¹⁷ Stephen F. Burgess, "Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict," *African Security* 1, no. 2 (2008): 69-91, Len le Roux, "Challenges for Defence Planners in Africa: Ensuring Appropriate, Adequate, Accountable, and Affordable Armed Forces," *African Security Review* 15, no. 4 (2006), and Eric Bonnemaïson, "Security Sector Planning in Africa: Military force as a public good," *African Security Review* 11, no. 2 (2002).

⁷¹⁸ Boucher, "Defence Sector Reform: A Note on Current Practice."

Military doctrine which provides guidance for defence reform appears to be rare. Yet doctrine which covers the army aspect of defence reform (as opposed to overall armed forces, naval, and air doctrine) seems to be rarer still. There appear to be only two doctrinal documents which address the reconstruction of armies, as opposed to doctrine for armies that already exist.⁷¹⁹ First released was the British Army's doctrine note on *Developing Indigenous Armies*, completed in 2007. It said that every 'plan for engagement with indigenous forces should be steeped in cooperation with local and regional military-cultural normality.' The U.S. field manual on Security Force Assistance, released in May 2009, has a much more technical and prescriptive approach. The text lacks consideration of the political factors inherent in the process. Neither manual elaborates on the linkages between army reconstruction and the higher-level discussion upon broader security issues on which such programmes should be based.

The wider analytical conclusions of the literature review were three-fold. First, that army reconstruction has become a significant part of SSR, with roots stretching back to 1980. It often takes place in adverse environments. But the political-economic drivers of SSR are significantly different in conflict-affected states than they are in the developmental and post-authoritarian contexts for which the concept was originally evolved. The political space available for the implementation of SSR principles can be much reduced. With such limited scope to forward SSR governance aims, this situation has tended to reinforce the historical Western tendency to focus on equipping and training partner armies. Army reconstruction has been hastened appreciably in the face of short-term stabilization imperatives in Afghanistan, the Congo, and Iraq. The pressure of the 'war on terror' has also emphasised the rapid expansion of security forces. Second, between the various writings on defence reform, the OECD Handbook, and the doctrinal manuals, a significant amount of guidance on army reconstruction has now been formulated. However most of it dates only from 2007 onwards and has been insufficiently used to allow for proper evaluation of its

⁷¹⁹ It has not been possible to unequivocally determine that only U.S. and British doctrine covers army reconstruction. Trying to do so is impossible, as it is attempting to prove a negative. However, as discussed in the literature review, it seems extremely likely that the U.S. and UK doctrines are the only ones in existence. Discussion with Lt Col Chris Hogan, British liaison officer at the French Army's Centre de doctrine d'emploi des forces, telephone call 6 July 2010.

worth. Third, the OECD's SSR norms, widely accepted in the West, are often at odds with the nature of the recipient state. Thus most high-level guidance available for army reconstruction is not necessarily compatible with the environmental realities of the theatres in which defence reform takes place. Measures suggested by foreign advisors can be difficult or simply unwelcome in the first place. The literature review conclusions also indicated that, in order to provide greater guidance for post-conflict army reconstruction, a survey of a number of different case studies was required to provide more data to test the general conclusions of the literature.

The first part of this survey of case studies was Chapter 4, a desk based review of some 15 different cases of army reconstruction. A desk review was selected primarily due to resource constraints, as finance and time did not allow an extensive programme of field visits. It was also the view of the author that the combination of a multiple case study analysis, combined with a single case study empirical analysis and fieldwork, would make the study more methodologically sound and empirically robust, and reflect both an effective and efficient use of resources available to a PhD student.

The 15 cases examined include Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, the Congo, Burundi, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nepal, East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia. As noted above, Zimbabwe, Burundi, and South Africa, in which no full international intervention forces were deployed, display sufficient similarities to warrant their examination alongside the other twelve cases.

Based on the questions raised regarding the only available strategic level guidance informing army reform, the desk-based research evaluated the extent to which army reconstruction experiences of the past had actually adhered to SSR principles and, therefore, the utility of such principles in these processes. The OECD-DAC principles provided a detailed set of norms which a effective and accountable security sector should follow.

The analysis of the 15 cases identified common aspects across three distinct categories. The case of the 'military merger' brings all pre-existing armed groups into a single army. This appeared to be the predominant model, covering nine of the 15

cases. The approach has been used in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, the Congo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Nepal. All cases included the phenomenon of two to three previously warring factions amalgamated into one single force, though in the Congo six warring factions were involved. When a single force had been created, a professionalization effort was initiated.⁷²⁰ The resulting force was arguably less effective for a period of time, but by absorbing large numbers of ex-combatants, this model reduces the security problems perennial in such environments. It also effectively extends the length of the DDR process.

The Kosovo and East Timor cases have been designated ‘institutionalization,’ a simpler process of only one former armed grouping being transformed into a state army. The whole process is much simpler, though to a degree inter-faction rivalries are replaced by intra-faction rivalries, such as the discord between ‘westerners’ and ‘easterners’ that contributed to the splintering of the East Timorese Defence Force in 2006. It seems likely that given the more unified nature of the new army, its bargaining power with foreign interests will be higher and thus the prospects for effective local ownership will be higher. Both East Timor and Kosovo forces have evinced a high degree of clandestine influence over the political development of the successor state. Correlation does not equal causation. Yet, given the case of the ANC-MK in South Africa, it is entirely possible that this variant of army reconstruction may lead to a restriction in the political space available for meaningful democracy to develop.

The other major alternative to the military merger model is the ‘single state force.’ In this case pre-existing armed groupings and personnel were either demobilized or prohibited from entering the new army. A new army is created from the bottom up, by giving initial training to men (and in the Liberian case, women) who may or may not have had previous military experience. Contractors may also be utilised to assist to supervise the creation of a ‘single state force,’ as with Vinnell Corporation in Iraq in

⁷²⁰ Examples of contractors assisting ‘military merger’ integration include Protective Security International, being employed to train a Congolese army battalion in 2010, and Burton Rand Associates Ltd, through Adam Smith International (ASI), advising the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in its transformation efforts.

2003-04 and by DynCorp and PA&E in Liberia from 2005. Such a force can dictate high entry standards, and thus is well positioned to become competent relatively quickly. However, as learned in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sierra Leone, the Congo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and South Sudan, excluded ex-combatants may constitute an ongoing security threat.

The three categories vary widely in their adherence to SSR principles. None, however, places people at the centre of security sector transformation activities. Beyond that commonality, it appears that the 'military merger' model adheres most closely to SSR principles, with significant effort being bent to the task of ensuring democratic norms, addressing diverse security challenges, enhancing civilian oversight, and promoting transparency. Two perhaps unusual examples *prevent an* unequivocally positive response on the enhancement of capability. These are the integration of armed groupings in South Africa, where the integration of black ANC and PAC combatants as well as the homeland armies degraded capability. The decay of the army in Mozambique is a symptom of the greater malaise of the state there.

Institutionalization fares almost as well, apart from a relative lack of transparency. Neither the Kosovo Liberation Army nor the Falintil gave birth to successor forces that were particularly open about their political linkages and influence in the reshaped polity. The creation of single state forces, as befitting their American origins, have been unequivocally focused upon military capacity, with less attention to the political consequences surrounding their actions. In all cases, civilian oversight appears to have been limited to the executive branch. All three armies in this category (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia) have however increased their capabilities. All the contractors identified in army reconstruction efforts have been American, and their strengths and weaknesses broadly reflect the 'single state force' model. Only DynCorp's extraordinarily attentive approach to personnel vetting in Liberia reflects a focus on anything but capacity enhancement. Only the very small size of the force involved, two thousand personnel, made such a degree of detailed vetting possible. All the other SSR principles have been of secondary or minor importance.

The multiple case analysis suggested that many of the current SSR principles are flawed, because they represent Northern aspirations which may be completely

unrealistic when attempted in developing states. Army reconstruction may only reflect SSR principles where Northern donors have significant influence. In other contexts, such as in the Sudan, army reconstruction is likely to retain a focus on improving capability and effectiveness. This orientation reflects dominant elite needs in this type of fragile states, and reflects the historical U.S. orientation in this type of military aid.

The utility of the SSR principles to support army reconstruction then needed to be tested in a field case study. Field research was carried out over a two-month period in Monrovia, Liberia, with two visits made beyond the city to the main military training bases. The research also included time spent in the key West African regional centre of Accra, Ghana, in order to consult with other key players in the Liberian security reconstruction process. Multiple semi-structured interviews were conducted with a wide range of experts involving both civilian and military officials, and every effort was made to gain primary source documents. The data was then collated together to assess the extent to which SSR principles were adhered to.

Chapter 6, the field case chapter, served as an in-depth single case study examining the extent to which the reconstruction of the Liberian army adhered to SSR principles. It first introduced the rebuilding of the Armed Forces of Liberia, effectively the Liberian army, from 2004 to December 2009.

The analysis concluded that the reconstruction of the AFL adhered to two of the six SSR principles. In contrast, most of the other cases only achieved a 'mixed' level of adherence to a larger number of principles. The Liberian process was neither people-centred, instead centred on the security of the state with no significant concern for soldiers' or families' welfare, nor locally owned. This finding supports the conclusions of the multiple case analysis. Instead a broadly U.S. model was imported. It should be noted however that throughout Liberian history large-scale adoption of U.S. models has been preferred to the formulation of indigenous Liberian doctrines. While a definite determination of local ownership is difficult to make, this author's decision was to deem the programme not locally owned because the aim was a transformed, Western style institution qualitatively different from previous Liberian ministries.

The process followed democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law. In the background, however, it seems likely that the Ministry of Defense is improperly using its latent bureaucratic influence. This appears to be very much in line with the historical reality of neo-patrimonial governance networks in Liberia. Yet this did not directly affect the contractor-run programme. The programme made a significant break with previous efforts with an intensive vetting campaign organised to investigate the background of potential recruits. Every single candidate recommended for de-selection by foreign advisors was disqualified, at least one which was very close to the Defense Minister. Given the level of detail uncovered by the field case research, it is unclear whether such an approach mirrors other country programmes, but from the reports received from Afghanistan and Iraq at least, it seems unlikely.

The programme was not part of an integrated multi-sectoral effort to address broad security challenges. Instead, needs assessments solely focused upon the army were used to formulate a reconstruction programme isolated from other national security efforts. While the U.S. ran the army reconstruction programme, the United Nations was placed in charge of the police, and neither were integrated to any great degree with the reconstruction of other security agencies. Greater civilian oversight and involvement was not fostered. Instead scrutiny and control was restricted to the executive branch. In this regard the Liberian experience mirrors other single state force and contractor cases, in which much less emphasis has been placed upon wider civilian oversight and involvement than in the military merger category. Transparency and accountability for Liberians was limited, in common with nine of the other 15 cases. None of the single state force or contractor-implemented army reconstruction programmes placed any significant emphasis on transparency. Despite this series of relative failures, the institutional and human capacity of the army was clearly enhanced. This was the primary objective of the programme from the beginning, with other considerations being of less importance.

Despite some adherence to SSR norms and principles, significant divergences remain. There is not a single SSR principle that has been solidly adhered to across all of the four categories. Even the longest-standing, the aim of capacity enhancement, has fallen short in numerous cases. This supports one of the key contentions in the

literature review. Immediate post-conflict reconstruction environments appear to have a much greater degree of difficulty than the more benign developing environments upon which the original conceptualisation of SSR was based. Therefore the SSR principles developed with that more benign context in mind seems much less compatible with the environments considered in this dissertation. Egnell and Halden, after consideration of several cases including Sierra Leone, concluded that a realistic level of ambition for any specific project should be carefully assessed based on local circumstances.⁷²¹ Disaggregated, smaller, projects focusing on goals where aims can be aligned between donors and partner states appear to be a more appropriate aim for the future.

Comparing Adherence to SSR Principles

This section compares the adherence to SSR principles displayed in Liberia against the wider trends examined in Chapter 5. It seeks to add insights from the field case work to deepen our understanding of whether and in what circumstances army reconstruction programmes reflect SSR principles. The six SSR principles, grouping people-centred and locally owned, democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law, integrated policy, civilian involvement, transparency and accountability, and capacity enhancement, will be addressed in turn.

The army reconstruction programme in Liberia, as with all the other army programmes examined in this thesis, was not people-centred. The programmes centre on maintaining and enhancing the security of the state. The experience of other African army redevelopment programmes corroborates this; in Uganda, despite the implementation of the defence transformation programme, significant welfare improvements did not eventuate.⁷²² Other examples include Liberia with inadequate provision for feeding soldiers, referred to in Chapter 5; and in Sierra Leone⁷²³ and the

⁷²¹ Egnell and Halden, "Laudable, Ahistorical and Overambitious: Security Sector Reform Meets State Formation Theory." *Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2009, 50.

⁷²² Brigadier Robert Rusoke, *Strengths and Challenges of Defence Transformation in Uganda: the Case of Harmonising the Functions of the MoD and UPDF*, MSc SSM thesis, April 2010, 68-69.

⁷²³ Lt Col Mike Robertshawe, "Sierra Leone: A Country on the Move?," *The Sustainer (Journal of the RLC)*, April 2010, 124-5.

Congo⁷²⁴ with lack of proper accommodation. Soldiers', dependents, and local inhabitants' welfare should be a consideration in any SSR programme, and performance will improve if participants are well looked after. Yet considering peoples' welfare does not make welfare, or people-centredness, the central imperative of many SSR programmes. Intrinsicly they focus on state security concerns. Therefore the fact that none of the programmes examined is people-centred says more about deficiencies in the way the OECD DAC has worded the SSR principles than it says about each programme. Put differently, some state-focused SSR programmes might incorporate sufficient focused elements to be regarded as adequately catering to peoples' needs. Should the wording of this principle be adjusted slightly, these putative programmes might reach the performance level required to genuinely discharge their duty of care for all citizens affected by the programme.

The difficulty is that SSR's Northern origins mean that the state is almost invariably assumed to be the primary provider of security. 'People-centred' moves the focus from the institutions and politics of the state toward the well-being of individual people. Yet state institutions must in many circumstances prioritize the welfare of the majority of people over a small number of individuals. If state institutions do prioritize the majority, they are not quite acting in a way that is 'people centred,' because some individuals will not be cared for to the best extent possible. Therefore the wording of this particular principle needs to be adjusted slightly. A more carefully worded and still legitimate principle might have been phrased to ensure SSR fosters a people-centred security ethos. A people-centered security ethos allows institutions implementing SSR to place consideration of people at the heart of their activity without having to be diverted by making such each individual receives the best treatment possible. Such treatment might impair the execution of programmes aiming to cater to the majority. Thus a people-centred security ethos is an improvement on asking a process almost invariably focused on serving the many through state institutions to shift its aim to placing individuals at its centre.

⁷²⁴ In one case, a community in North Kivu actually decided to construct more than 200 'maisonnettes' for FARDC troops in their area, in order to alleviate the shortage of housing. Radiookapi.net, 'Kirumba: la population construit 200 maisonnettes pour cantonner la 123e brigade des FARDC,' June 3, 2009.

Two of the three army reconstruction categories show some level of local ownership – military merger and institutionalization. Liberia falls within the single state force category, which does not show enough attention to such concerns to be deemed locally owned. The common thread among single state force cases is the dominant influence of the United States, mostly the U.S. Army, either directly or through retirees who join private military contracting companies. As Giustozzi has shown mostly clearly in the case of Afghanistan, the United States tries perhaps the hardest to replicate the characteristics of its own military in the army under reconstruction. Yet the United Kingdom has done much the same thing, if not to the same extent, in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Sierra Leone. Britain also had significant influence in South Africa. It is really thus only the clear indigenous ownership of the process in South Africa, South Sudan, and Nepal that moves the ‘military merger’ category towards some degree of local ownership. Indigenous actors have been unified in the ‘institutionalization’ category, and perhaps for that reason there has been a greater degree of local ownership evident there.

On reflection it might appear obvious that a process which adopts existing guerrilla armies, rather than dispersing their personnel altogether, will display the highest degree of local ownership. Yet the international situation after the attacks of September 11 may have obscured the innate potential value of the single state force model. After the September 11 attacks, the United States’ government was quite content to follow its own model and build up armies from nothing or very little, rather than attempt to modify what was already in place. The imperatives of trying to avoid further terrorist attacks appear to have circumscribed the options that were considered by U.S. planners. Instead of careful consideration of a model that reflected local circumstances, the U.S. all-volunteer force model, constructed from the ground up, was the option preferred. Without the imperatives the ‘war on terror’ imposes, an indigenous adoption of the single state force model, without significant outside interference, might be crafted to include a significant degree of local ownership.

In comparing adherence to democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law, the Liberian programme comes off significantly better than many other cases. Democratic norms were respected during the implementation of the programme. Only a few other programmes have attempted to adhere to such standards – notably South

Africa, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor. Even where such standards have been the aim, in the fragile security environment of many countries which have reached peace accords it has been difficult to attain such goals. Success in the Liberian case seems to have resulted from a clear mandate to incorporate such goals, a well managed programme (unlike some aspects of the KPC – KSF transition in Kosovo) and the firm presence of a major Western power. All the cases where such principles have been clearly implemented share either a Western standard environment when the process began (South Africa), or strong international influence. It is quite possible that absent such international influence in Liberia, the result would have been the return to service of the former AFL, a warring faction which may have had war criminals within its ranks. Thus it is difficult to escape the conclusion that such principles will only be significantly adhered to where Western donors play a major role. This instantly recreates the inherent local ownership problem already present in army reconstruction.

The third principle is that of addressing diverse security challenges through a broad needs assessment and integrated policy. Again, assessment of SSR programmes for a single component can fall victim to the way the principles are worded. Each component can only address issues within its competence – one cannot expect the police to also address air defence, for example. Integrating SSR efforts nationally and holistically would address diverse security challenges, but asking that of each component is inappropriate. A better wording might have included proper integration with closely related security sectors and programmes, rather than an expectation of performing tasks beyond an individual agency's remit. The two categories which show some adherence to this principle indicate this mostly because of one case in each. In Sierra Leone (for military merger) and Kosovo (for institutionalization) international actors have moved firmly to construct an integrated SSR policy and resulting implementation network. This has more to do with holistic actions from the centre, involving several or many security agencies, than it does with those particular cases of army reconstruction. In the single state force category, U.S. efforts to rebuild armies have placed little importance on integration into wider security policy.

The fourth principle is the promotion of greater civilian oversight and involvement. The field study of the Liberia case brings out no special insights here. The single state

force category, where Liberia is placed, is perhaps the worst category of army reconstruction for the promotion of civilian involvement. This is because not only are reconstruction efforts responding to foreign concerns, as they often are, but because contractors have added a further layer in some cases. In the Liberian case, with contractors, the foreign power separated the locus of effort one remove further still from indigenous civilian control by adding commercial concerns to the mix. Indigenous actors not only had to deal with powerful foreign interests, but then had to induce those powerful foreign interests to make the contractors act the way they wish. In the other two single state force cases, Afghanistan and Iraq, neo-patrimonial governance imperatives have overridden any impulses to allow wider civilian involvement beyond the executive branch. There was also a significant involvement of contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq, initially including army reconstruction through the Vinnell Corporation. Contractors have been present in the other two categories as well, but not anything to the same extent. In the other two categories it is easier to promote civilian involvement, with institutionalization possibly the category where such action is easiest, as there is only one armed grouping rather than many. Yet whether multiple armed factions or a single one makes civilian involvement easier will always be case-specific. Another complicating factor is that 'civilians' may have close linkages to the former warring factions, and thus have other hidden priorities additional to the promotion of disinterested civilian control.

The fifth principle is transparency and accountability. Liberia and the rest of the single state force army reconstruction operations have shown little of either attribute. This is mostly because the most powerful actor, the U.S. government, was far more concerned with immediate enhancement of security provision than any other factor. Looking beyond the single state force category, trying to analyze transparency and accountability via the other two categories is of limited help. As discussed in the Chapter 4 conclusions, only South Africa, Bosnia, and Kosovo are clear examples of transparency and accountability, and both attributes were certainly aims in Sierra Leone. However the fact that three of these cases fall into the military merger category does not help analysis, because other military merger cases, most disturbingly, the Congo, have achieved very little transparency or accountability. The two cases of institutionalization appear to be especially vulnerable to breaches of transparency and accountability. The level of international involvement, often through

organisations such as NATO, the OSCE, or the UN has more to do with the level of transparency and accountability achieved than any specific type of army reconstruction.

The final principle is the enhancement of institutional and human capacity. This is the core focus of what army reconstruction has sought to do throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and not an additional requirement, as some of the SSR principles have often been. Therefore much more success has been achieved in enhancing capacity than on any other principle. The most capability has been built with heavy foreign advisor and equipment support, as with single state forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, but this type of development is not necessarily sustainable. The oldest cases only date from 1980, so the evidence available is not necessarily conclusive as to which typology develops and sustains capacity best over the long term.

It is vital to build up and sustain the training, personnel administration, pensions, maintenance and other programmes which together sustain the institution. The 'military merger' and institutionalization categories appear to address this more sustainably than the other two categories, without the heavy importation of U.S. equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures, and institutional support that the single state force and contractor categories routinely rely upon.

Comparing experience from Liberia to the desk survey results of other army reconstruction campaigns allows one to observe the degree to which each army reconstruction typology adheres most comprehensively to the existing SSR principles. Yet the categories are blunt divisions, and more research is really required, particularly on cases such as Namibia, Mozambique, and Sudan. Further research might make possible more well justified decisions as to which SSR principles were adhered to in each case. The single state force category can be ruled out first. It has not attempted, except in isolated cases, to follow SSR principles beyond capacity enhancement. This leaves the other two categories. Institutionalization, so far, has faced repeated transparency and accountability issues in the two cases where the approach has been tried. Marginally therefore, military merger appears to be the category in which SSR principles have been most respected.

Conclusions: Reconsidering the SSR Principles

Yet application of SSR principles to army reconstruction also reveals the challenges the principles face when being used as guidance. SSR principles are laudable normative guidance for the standards to which implementers should seek to adhere. Yet they do not really engage with the politics of partner countries nor the real motivations of Northern SSR donors. They also reflect a very high level view that simply does not address the complexities of events several layers down from national strategic considerations. Army reconstruction unfolds not at the national strategic level, not at the level of the Ministry of Defence or armed forces headquarters – the Defence Sector Reform level - but a level lower, at the army headquarters and throughout the army. SSR principles are a useful backdrop, and provide some starting points, but do not address the issues at this level. When Afghan brigade commanders are trying to decide their counter-insurgency priorities, merely reading that SSR should be 'people centred' does not provide them the detailed guidance to tailor their community engagement operations. Planners making resource allocation decisions between different capability elements within an army need more guidance than simply the statement that SSR should address diverse security challenges. More detailed elaborations of national priorities are required. Frequently, for example, a decision needs to be made on prioritizing conventional manoeuvre forces vis-a-vis a more counter-insurgency orientation. The two capabilities are orientated towards separate tasks.

Based on these findings, it appears that the debate and the reality on the ground has moved on since the SSR principles were originally formulated in 2004. However no detailed assessments have been found which test whether the principles have been adhered to in the field. Thus on the basis of the trends evidenced in the literature review, Chapter 5, and the fieldwork assessment, proposals will then be put forward for how the principles should be modified to better reflect today's realities.

As the evidence examined in Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrates, the SSR principles play a minor role in steering post-conflict army reconstruction. One of the most significant reasons for this minor role is that the principles, and more importantly, their

underlying assumptions, more reflect Western normative aspirations for how development should take place than the realities of a post-conflict environment. The publication of Eric Scheye's *Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development* in October 2010 authoritatively supports a number of the trends evident from the literature review, and reinforced in Chapters 4 and 5. It also builds upon earlier work, notably Timothy Donais' edited volume which addressed local ownership and SSR in 2008. Donais said that 'most profoundly, perhaps, implementing local ownership in a meaningful way requires a shift in donor thinking.'⁷²⁵ It is important that SSR principles are reconsidered in the light of this mounting evidence. If this is done, expectations can be reduced and less ambitious programmes may be able to be delivered with greater chances of success.

The first problem with the principles lies with their underlying assumptions. In fragile states, non-state security actors appear to be the primary security providers for ordinary individuals. Yet because of the Northern origins of SSR, and the formal frameworks that obscure the real informal power centres in much of the developing world, the vast majority of SSR efforts are directed toward the improvement of formal security actors. As a number of authors have demonstrated, formal arrangements have very little likelihood of becoming potent enough to deliver real security for the majority.⁷²⁶ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to try and formulate exactly how this reality ought to be incorporated into SSR principles, and thus programming. However, the essential question ought to be whether funding and other resources directed towards state security institutions actually induce security benefits for ordinary people. If donors decide they are really most interested in providing security for ordinary citizens, as opposed to supporting partner state elites, they may need to consider re-orientating much of the SSR effort toward non-state security providers.

⁷²⁵ Timothy Donais, 'Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform,' GC DCAF / Lit Verlag, 2008, 279

⁷²⁶ Louise Andersen, Bjørn Møller, and Finn Stepputat, *Fragile states and insecure people? : violence, security, and statehood in the twenty-first century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Eric Scheye and Andrew McLean, *Enhancing the Delivery of Justice and Security* (Paris: OECD, 2007). and Scheye, *Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development* (U.S. Institute of Peace, October 2010).

Moving through the already defined SSR principles, the first is that SSR should be people-centred and locally owned. If attention is redirected toward non-state security actors as perhaps an equal priority to state agencies, 'people-centred' SSR makes some sense. Yet none of the fifteen cases of army reconstruction examined in Chapters 4 and 5 could be deemed 'people-centred.' The priority was placed on state security concerns. Furthermore, the priority is likely to remain on state agencies for some considerable time, at the very least. As discussed in Chapter 5, the use of the term 'people-centred' is not fully appropriate for a process still centred upon the state and its security. This issue requires some deconstruction of the terms 'people-centred security' and 'people-centred security sector reform.' People-centred security is a laudable and entirely appropriate aim. A people centred security sector might be considered appropriate. Yet the formulation 'people centred security sector reform' is imprecise. SSR efforts will probably focus on state institutions for some time to come. In view of this situation, 'people-centred SSR' is terminologically inexact because of this focus upon the transformation of the state and its institutions. Inherently such a process cannot have people at its centre – their security is its object, but it is through a governmental construct. A focus on individuals' freedom from fear, whether actually as individuals or as small groupings, some with vested interests, would divert attention from the improvement of structures to serve all. Such a focus on individuals might be a special danger when considering SSR in neo-patrimonial societies, a frequent occurrence. 'People-centred' could be used to justify the diversion of resources into special programmes for the benefit of any politically well-connected group.

In thinking about an alternative it is important to remain as closely as possible to the original aim of people-centred security. The amendment suggested is thus that SSR should 'foster a people-centred security ethos.' Thus any pressure placed upon state decision-makers to alter programmes to support any special interest groups might be alleviated. At the other end of the spectrum, when trying to address non-state actors, changing the terminology from 'people-centred' to 'people-centred security ethos' would not dilute efforts for such communities. This terminology change might allow state-focused SSR efforts to be more precisely targeted with less risk for diversion of effort and funds in a neo-patrimonial governance environment.

A much more difficult challenge is posed by the issue of local ownership, described by even the eminent SSR expert Eric Scheye as ‘maddeningly complex.’⁷²⁷ The difficulties of local ownership have been a continuing theme through this thesis. This author believes that only two cases of army reconstruction can really be considered ‘locally owned’ – South Africa, and Nepal, where the indigenous authorities maintained clear control. In East Timor also, there was a significant amount of local ownership. Meaningful local ownership does not appear to have occurred in any of the other cases. Scheye suggests trying to improve this situation by addressing informal governance networks, mentioned above in the literature review but almost invariably discounted in favour of the ineffective formal structures. Mapping the networks of favours, power, patronage, and clientalism is critical to understanding and therefore potentially being able to change governance arrangements in developing countries. The necessity for such understanding is emphasized in Chapter 5 by the incomplete nature of the information on the Liberian Defense Ministry’s bureaucratic power. Hidden networks and interactions may be having a significant effect on the Liberian politics shaping the environment for the army reconstruction programme, however, it is not possible to say this with any certainty.

Scheye laments the absence of pragmatic SSR guidance for the question of local ownership. The key factor here however is remembering what the goal of any particular programme is. The role of local ownership will depend on where the impetus for the programme originates. A donor may wish to strengthen some aspect of a partner state’s security structures so that, for example, its population in the metropole is not overwhelmed by large refugee flows. In this case, less local ownership and programmatic arrangements utilizing formal government structures may be appropriate in order to achieve the donor’s aims. The ‘local owner’ remains the formal, indigenous partner government. At the other end of the spectrum, DfID’s wish to support justice development in the Eastern Congo may be of interest.⁷²⁸ In this type of programme, there might be little direct donor interest. Thus the priority might be able to be formulated according to the wishes of the local community. The design of the programme might be formulated via not much more than a couple of anthropologist-specialists making local communities aware that funding is available.

⁷²⁷ Ibid.

⁷²⁸ Scheye and McLean, *Enhancing the Delivery of Justice and Security*, 37.

If it were possible for the local communities to make as many of the programmatic decisions as the bureaucratic constraints in London (or Washington or Paris or wherever else) could possibly see devolved to the lowest level, a great degree of local ownership might be achieved. These two hypothetical examples rest at each end of the donor interest spectrum.

Army reconstruction, however, is in many cases funded from Western donors and influenced by Western strategic desires. Therefore army reconstruction falls closer to the first scenario than to the second. The critical factor is how much control a donor is willing to surrender over its own funds in order to support a programme which might address real needs. This surrender of control necessitates that real needs can be identified and, more importantly, agreed upon, by local actors. Since most of the funding, however, usually is supplied by outside donors, donors do have the option to withhold funding if, in their opinion, a programme does not meet those real identified needs. The question of supplying funding for programmes that may not actually meet the exact needs of ordinary people is a matter for donor ministry decision makers with a single-minded focus on their own country's strategic priorities. Arguably a clear example is Afghanistan, in Chapter 5: army reconstruction for Western security reasons (anti-terrorism), rather than ordinary people's security. As Scheye rightly says, donor taxpayers are the ultimate local owners of donor supported programmes.⁷²⁹ One really should ask in making funding decisions whether Northern taxpayers' interests are served.

The next group of SSR principles is that of democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law. Donais contrasted two separate views in his 2008 edited volume on local ownership. On the one hand, Scheye said in 2008 that 'the values embedded in many [SSR] programmes do not coincide with the predominant cultural norms of many post-conflict and fragile states.'⁷³⁰ Chapter 5 describes perhaps one of the clearest dilemmas, the army reconstruction programme in the Congo. The Congo's ruling oligarchy may not wish to strengthen respect for human rights or support the

⁷²⁹ Scheye, *Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development*, 8.

⁷³⁰ Timothy Donais, *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform* (Zurich & Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008), 280-281.

rule of law.⁷³¹ However, Donais also notes that Hansen ‘is equally clear that in post-conflict contexts at least, normative transformation is part and parcel of the SSR agenda.’⁷³² Resistance to such normative transformation is part of the reason why army reconstruction in the Congo has made so little progress. In other army reconstruction cases, either there has been little motivation to implement such policies (such as in Zimbabwe) or little success has been achieved. Therefore Scheye argues that donors must look for opportunities to support constituencies in the partner state that would (a) benefit from donor supported SSR, (b) accord with donor values, and (c) accord with donor political aims.⁷³³ These are recommendations for situations in which donor wishes form the impetus. However there are SSR opportunities which originate in partner states from civil society or other actors. Where such programmes are possible in the face of state hostility or disinterest, the originators need to choose very carefully where to deploy their resources in a fashion that meets their aims. This may mean doing nothing more than is possible with their own resources, or choosing potential confrontation with the state by drawing upon friendly foreign resources. However, whatever the course of action, such actors can choose carefully to undertake activities that meet their definition of what type of democratic norms or human rights are appropriate for their people in their specific context.

The ‘disaggregation’ approach propounded by Scheye involves selection of specific, achievable programmes. The disaggregation approach also makes clear the great difficulty of meaningfully addressing diverse security challenges through integrated policies. Surveying all the cases of army reconstruction, it appears that only Sierra Leone can be considered a clear case of a programme integrated into wider efforts. As noted above in the literature review, Scheye is frank on the limitations of partner country national frameworks and strategies. Despite the value of national security strategy reviews, Scheye notes such reviews and other similar frameworks require three to five years to draft, have exhibited little effect on improving justice and security delivery, and are rarely implemented or capable of being implemented.⁷³⁴

⁷³¹ See for example, Human Rights Watch, ‘We will crush you: The Restriction of Personal Space in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,’ November 25, 2008, accessed at <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/76188/section/3>, January 2011.

⁷³² Donais, 2008, 280-281.

⁷³³ Scheye, *Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development*, 7.

⁷³⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

Scheye notes that comprehensive programmes are far too expensive (as the literature review reflects), operationally impractical, and prone to fomenting political conflicts between different partner national agency stakeholders. Sierra Leone is the best example of such a comprehensive approach being attempted which incorporates army reconstruction. It suffers from these difficulties to a significant degree. A better alternative may be to look for opportunities to intervene with a decisive amount of resources in sectors where donor and partner interests coincide. This may lead to a decrease in army reconstruction activities. However, the programmes that were implemented would receive much more local support and have greater chances of addressing more closely defined problems.

Greater civilian involvement and oversight is the next SSR principle. Of the fifteen army reconstruction cases, only four appear to have clearly enhanced democratic civilian control: Namibia, South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These are only four of the nine cases in the 'military merger' category. Therefore the overall indicator is mixed. In order to improve this situation, again, the overall aim must be the guiding factor. If greater civilian oversight serves donors' interests, this civilian involvement could be made a priority, at the expense of other principles. However, to take a real example, if it were decided that drug smuggling through Guinea-Bissau to Europe could be best countered by leaving the existing military domination of governance in place, civilian involvement would have a lower priority. It is hard to imagine such a situation, but placing the dilemma in such stark terms helps make it clear that here as in every programmatic case, the original aim should dictate adherence to any particular principle. In most cases, even if civilian involvement and oversight were not possible to prioritize at the outset, the potential would remain to expand such activities slowly as the programme unfolded. Transparency and accountability might also be a greater priority for some programmes than in others, depending on donor and partner priorities. Army reconstruction has usually been neither particularly transparent nor accountable. Only South Africa, Bosnia, and Kosovo are relatively clear exceptions. Finally, the level of attention to capacity enhancement, as opposed to other priorities, also needs to be balanced according to the aims of each individual programme. Capability enhancement has been successfully achieved in most cases, as it has been the historical priority. Yet capacity enhancement might be less important than making

sure a programme is appropriately locally owned – in whatever sense that might be – or meets democratic norms or human rights principles. Small increases in capability, carefully coordinated, assuring respect of other SSR principles, appear among the best placed initiatives to be sustainable in the long run.

Perhaps the clearest common threads in this proposed list of changes – and thus the best way of encapsulating some sort of new path – is by emphasizing realism and honesty. SSR as the OECD envisions it is enormously overambitious, and represents a Northern donor-based agenda. It is not practical to aim at the comprehensive refashioning of Southern states' security arrangements in order that they mirror something akin to those of their Northern counterparts. Therefore prioritization is required. Specific projects will see better results than widespread, ineffective dispersion of funds. It is also important to remember that Northern funding aims, fundamentally, to forward the national interests of Northern states. Therefore it is only reasonable to expect some sort of return on the investment Northern countries make. Smaller – disaggregated – programmes that harness Northern funding in areas where there are common donor and partner actor interests appear more likely to be successful and sustainable.

The difficulty with emphasizing realism and honesty is that any formal redrafting of the SSR principles may be exceedingly difficult. It appears very likely that the SSR principles assumed their current form in 2004 as a result of political compromise. As Chapters 5 and 6 have highlighted, the imprecise nature of the principles makes their application in the field difficult. It would be extremely helpful if a set of principles that embodied the new approach could be drafted and disseminated. Yet international organizations may find this very difficult, due again to the need to achieve consensus.

Moving from the SSR principles to army reconstruction, one is forced to consider the possibility that post-conflict army reconstruction may not always be the best course of action. In many cases, the reconstruction of an army is not the most effective way of inducing security for development. Often it seems that armies are reconstructed for foreigners' aims, and those of partner state elites, more than those of locals. Accepting the key assumption of this thesis that the aim is providing security for development, support for non-state security forces ought to be given much higher priority. Yet

armies will continue to exist, and play a major role, because they are not often dissolved completely, and they are a symbol of statehood.

Therefore the proper balance of support for state and non-state security forces appears to be a key part of the future research agenda. As the history of SSR efforts teaches us, there will be no 'one-size-fits-all' rule. However, if major donors are really interested in assuring security for people, as opposed to security for partner state elites, the present predominance of support to state agencies ought to change. Further research also ought to be initiated so as to explore some general parameters for how much donors should support non-state forces. This agenda would confront directly the support for the state, the custom of the last 65 years of development (and the last 15 years of SSR). However it appears to be the only method by which security for development can be assured in anything but the very long term.

A larger issue is whether principles are useful in themselves. One might question whether formulating principles to guide SSR is actually a useful exercise, based on the results of this research so far. It could be argued that trying to formulate universal guiding frameworks distracts effort from smaller-scale efforts to achieve concrete, measurable tasks. Yet it is this author's considered view that principles, in this case, can be effectively considered analogous to theory. Both research and practical endeavour requires a theoretical framework, even if only a very simple one. The human mind uses a set of preconceptions – theory - in order to better understand and interact with the world. The more sophisticated a deliberately created theoretical framework, the better it approximates reality, and thus the better it may predict events. Therefore it is useful to formulate theoretical precepts in order to guide academic and more practical efforts. Initial theoretical formulations may not be very accurate. Criticism hones and refines such formulations, hopefully building toward more precise models.

To move from generalization to this specific case, one would argue that the SSR principles as defined by the OECD in 2004 represent a useful initial formulation. Yet this and other research demonstrates that they have weaknesses, and thus they need to be revised and updated. With such revision, they will be made more useful and more representative. Such revisions in turn may be superseded by still further re-

formulization. Yet the creation of principles in themselves is a useful, and indeed necessary endeavour should one wish to better understand the world.

Recommendations

In many cases, recommendations would begin with verifying the results of the doctoral thesis research. Yet the material surveyed in the literature review, backed with the desk and field case research, indicates that the problems uncovered with the SSR principles are well-founded. In effect, this thesis has only been an exercise in confirming what is already well known, by study of a new field case. Therefore, recommendations commence with policy reformulation efforts.

In the short to medium term, major Western donor nations should reassess whether their SSR efforts are actually better described as part of foreign aid efforts intended to support developing state governments – which are a worthy goal. This is because many such programmes do not actually display some of the major principles of SSR. Such programmes may be very worthy of continuance, but should not be designated SSR as they divert resources from programmes that are actually SSR, and cloud perceptions of the practice. Others will be vulnerable to a range of the problems mentioned above, and should be reviewed with a view to termination. This applies especially to 'holistic' all-embracing programmes that are simply impractical due to ever-present interagency tensions, and others that do not exhibit enough local ownership to be successful.

Some programme will actually fall into the category of ventures can that truly be considered SSR. Given the problems in the practice surveyed above and in the literature review, most should be rigourously reviewed to ensure that they are actually advancing the security situation in the host countries. Most should be refashioned to make sure they are operating in discrete enough sectors to make success achievable, instead of aiming at holism.

Finally as always in the social sciences, there is a 'opt-out' from such a searching reexamination. It may forward governments' agendas to propose and even implement programmes that are designated SSR without actually displaying its characteristics. This appears especially true of many post-conflict army reconstruction programmes. In considering these challenges, one must always first and foremost be cognizant of

the original aim. In some cases such action is justified, but should be carefully weighed against the potential damage to the overall, very useful, concept.

In the medium to long term, once national governments and other significant actors have reconsidered their positions, the international consensus on what SSR is and does could be reassessed. Changes made at the national level could be placed upon the OECD's agenda, especially those focusing on disaggregated programmes rather than holistic all-embracing efforts. Reformulating high-level guidance and, hopefully, the SSR principles themselves will present difficulties, but the OECD is probably the best organization to steer the process. This would build upon its previous efforts in the area.

Annex A: Model Army Reconstruction Framework

The challenge that initially stimulated this dissertation was the inadequacy of existing macro-strategic guidance for army reconstruction programmes in the face of immediate post-conflict environments. This inadequacy suggested the need for amended guidance, which was the main aim of the research during the second and third years. Following the viva, the direction of the thesis was altered. This author feels however that since a post-conflict army reconstruction framework has been constructed, it should be included as part of the final version so that it might be available for future scholarly use.

At the grand strategic level, the SSR principles lay out an effective set of criteria by which the army reconstruction process should be evaluated. However, they do not constitute an army reconstruction framework in of themselves. Post-conflict army reconstruction is a unique area, both in terms of the short-term stabilization imperatives present and of the potential scale of programmes. It can have very significant impact on other areas of national security and development programming. Thus such a framework could also include broader implications for specific institutional engagement.

A well considered framework which could inform a wider set of post-conflict SSR programmes, linked to generic guidance for post conflict armies, would advance intellectual thinking in this area. This section lays out such a framework on the basis of the research throughout this dissertation, and especially from the practical lessons of the desk and field case studies. Each country or region in which army reconstruction or wider defence sector reform is carried out is unique, and needs to have a reconstruction plan specifically formulated for its own conditions. Therefore the ideas below cannot be rigid rules. They are, as the British Army says of doctrine, ‘the basis for study, training, and informed discussion.’⁷³⁵

⁷³⁵

Army Doctrine Publication 1 Land Operations, AC 71819, May 2005, 1.

Previously there was no specific literature giving guidance for the army reconstruction aspect of defence sector reform. The OECD Handbook on SSR guidance on defence reform is very general and does not provide specific prescriptions for post-conflict army reconstruction. The British and U.S. manuals, on the other hand, arguably do not integrate their tactical prescriptions adequately into an operational or strategic level framework. In addition, the thoroughly political nature of the army reconstruction process is not adequately emphasized, nor the continuing political engagement necessary at a national level reflected. Other writers, such as Boucher, and Burgess, do not provide an overall framework within which post-conflict army reconstruction might take place. To alleviate these literature gaps, the research contained in this dissertation forms the basis for specific guidance on armies, in the highly complex task of their own post-conflict reconstruction. The model below bridges the higher-level considerations, which always need to be informed by the unique characteristics of the country or region, with conclusions informed by the country case studies.

Three key concepts - political-economic factors, capacity enhancement, and the SSR principles – were formulated in the literature review conclusions. These three key concepts aim to represent the most important influences upon post-conflict army reconstruction. This author believes that these three key concepts are extremely important in formulating a revised normative framework for the practice.

The first key concept is political-economic factors. Armies are political instruments of state policy, and are affected by political factors in both the domestic and international arenas. All armies, and national defence forces, are influenced by what economic resources can be provided. Together the term ‘political-economic factors’ incorporates these influences. Chapters 4 and 5 presented a number of important examples which show how these influences work in practice. The end of the Cold War radically changed the world’s political landscape, and effectively made possible reconstruction of armies on a much greater scale than before. The first three army reconstruction programmes in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique can be used to sketch how the interplay of the three key concepts worked in practice. These initial

first three army reconstruction efforts in were affected much more by political-economic factors within the countries and the wider region than any other factors.

The Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique cases demonstrate the key political requirement to create state armies, and wider armed forces, responsive to a new government. Such new state armies were seen as important in making sure the countries were stable, and thus enabling wider regional stability. These developing countries were, however, poorly situated economically, and the state's resources were frequently diverted through neo-patrimonial clientist networks. Diversion of state resources reduced monies available for public spending, including for security agencies, and corroded expectations about integrity in public life.

Capability enhancement is the second of the three key concepts. International and local actors alike, it appears, were keen to create army capability in order to ensure domestic and regional stability. The deputy commander of the BMATT in Zimbabwe in 1980 said he received information on which ZANLA guerrillas should be made senior officers from the Chinese ambassador, because 'it was in their [the Chinese] policy interests to keep a stable southern Africa.'⁷³⁶ In Zimbabwe the British trainers sought to create an accountable army. Yet it appears that creating capable armies that would respond to their political leaders' directions was seen as most important. In order for that to happen other considerations appear to have been given a lower priority. Emphasis seems to have been placed on a functioning, loyal, army, rather than governance concerns.

The major change from the Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique cases and the other cases which followed them from 1994 onwards was the steadily increasing salience of governance concerns. In the post Cold War environment, major powers were much more able to emphasize considerations of human rights, democratic norms, the rule of law, greater civilian involvement, and accountability. Instead of hampering their ability to bolster friendly regimes, such governance considerations, and others, could be emphasized, so that ordinary citizens might be better treated.

⁷³⁶ Norma J. Kriger, *Guerrilla veterans in post-war Zimbabwe : symbolic and violent politics, 1980-1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 111.

From 1998, after Claire Short's speech which began to popularize the term security sector reform, such considerations gradually coalesced into the OECD SSR principles.

These three key concepts are general formulizations of the influences affecting army reconstruction. Yet together they also have a direct relationship with the three major stages which appear to encapsulate the army reconstruction process. Host country political-economic factors directly inform assessment of a country's defence challenges and the design of an army reconstruction programme. Political-economic factors dictate what resources are available to be utilized. In Zimbabwe and elsewhere, the economic necessity to provide gainful employment for former combatants affected the size of the army. In Namibia, as well as in South Africa, the political imperative of reconciliation dictated that personnel for the new force be found from both preceding armed forces. A country's politics influences the choice of potential international partners and the overall configuration of the rebuilt armed forces. For example, existing Commonwealth ties influenced the selection of the British Army as the chosen interlocutor in Zimbabwe and South Africa. A country's economic resources affect what can be spent on the armed forces. In Zimbabwe, due to the need to constructively occupy former combatants, an army the country could not afford was created.⁷³⁷

The historical priority of capability enhancement directly affects the mechanics of the army reconstruction programme. Influential agencies or personalities have often been focused on the need to create capable forces, and less upon how they will be held accountable.⁷³⁸ Examples abound, but perhaps the clearest cases have been in Zimbabwe, the Congo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In each the overriding concern was creating security forces to enforce a nascent government's writ, and abuses of power and of governance have been the result. Elsewhere, though the security situation has induced less pressure to create capability quickly at the expense of other concerns, capability enhancement has remained of vital concern.

⁷³⁷ Kriger, 2003, 111, quoting first BMATT deputy commander, 1980.

⁷³⁸ For a Congo example, see Sebastien Melmot, 'Candide in Congo: The Expected Failure of Security Sector Reform,' *Focus Stratégique* No. 9 *bis*, April 2009, 22.

However, the most important component of the model is the preparatory considerations affecting the entire effort. These preparatory considerations are affected by the SSR principles. This is because the key tenets of the peace accord almost invariably incorporate many of the same normative aspirations included within the SSR principles. For example, Liberia's 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement preamble said that the reconstruction process was to be guided by 'principles of democratic practice, good governance and respect for the rule of law.'⁷³⁹ Both democratic norms and the rule of law are written into the SSR principles. Both SSR principles and the normative aspirations relating to democratic development embodied in many peace accords stem from the same background of Western liberal aspirations formalized in the international arena through such documents as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Chapter 4 cites two factors which affect preparatory considerations: political agreement, invariably along democratic lines, and the value of reconciliation policies. Before the formulation of the term 'security sector reform,' these two factors were best grouped with political-economic factors, and they are grouped thus in Chapter 4. Yet they can also form part of sound preparations for an army reconstruction programme to take place.

Other normative aspirations, such as holistic integration of development and security programming, also feed into preparatory considerations for army reconstruction. For example, the Liberian Poverty Reduction Strategy has four pillars – peace and security, economic revitalization, governance and the rule of law, and infrastructure and social services.⁷⁴⁰ In addition, the democratic right of citizens to discuss important national issues supports the requirement for as wide a debate as possible on security and defence issues.

⁷³⁹ See '[Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy \(LURD\) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia \(MODEL\) and Political Parties](#),' 18 August 2003, especially Preamble and Article 12 on a new Independent National Human Rights Commission.

⁷⁴⁰ See the Liberia Development Information Gateway at <http://www.liftliberia.gov.lr/>, accessed 24 January 2011.




Figure 1 Time Progression Diagram for Army Reconstruction

Figure 1 above depicts this interrelationship in graphical form. In order to gain the proper perspective, attention should first be directed at the ‘Year = 1980s-1990s’ end of the three circular ‘tubes’. These three ‘tubes’ represent the key concepts influencing army reconstruction: political-economic factors, the historical imperative of capability enhancement, and the SSR principles. As the progression of time advances ‘forward’ towards the viewer, years ‘pass.’ Each of the three continuing influences affects a separate component of the overall army reconstruction model. When the progression of time reaches 2011, it is clear that each key concept has a significant effect on a particular counterpart portion of the model.

The model shown in Figure 2 begins with the above-mentioned preparatory considerations at the nation-state level. The OECD Handbook provides good guidance on higher level policy concerns and prerequisites to begin an army reconstruction programme. After such higher level considerations are addressed, assessment of the situation must be partnered by the design of an appropriate reconstruction programme.

The OECD Handbook also provides good guidance in this area. Thereafter the stage is set for the commencement of the reconstruction programme itself, for which the recently released British and U.S. manuals provide guidance. These three areas form the foundations on which the model is based.

The model is in the form of an equilateral triangle, with preparatory considerations, including the vital national security and defence debate, at the apex. From the preparatory considerations, two streams of activity proceed: immediate actions on constructing interim security forces, represented by the line directly to the army reconstruction process, and formulation of a more considered longer-term plan, represented by the line to the assessment and design process. Each part of the process involves a number of issues which will be commented upon in turn.

There is one key factor that does not form part of the army reconstruction process but is nevertheless embedded in the model. This is the pervasive presence of non-state security actors, represented across the whole of the conflict-afflicted state's political space. This presence is represented in the model by the large grey circle upon which the stages of the army reconstruction process are superimposed. The non-state security actors are the primary providers of security to ordinary citizens so that those citizens are able to carry out development activities. Their status as primary providers of security tends to be constant during periods of relative calm, armed conflict, during periods of negotiation, during the arrival of an international intervention force, during the period of that force's stay, and after it leaves. Non-state security providers, as shown in the literature review, also penetrate state security agencies, informalizing them in a number of ways. Without a radical transformation of developing states, non-state security providers also appear set to retain their primary position for the foreseeable future. This is why, as explained below, part of the future research agenda should be the proper balance of support between state agencies, who tend to receive most SSR support, and the non-state actors that actually provide most of the security.

The model is actually more dynamic than a first glance might indicate. Depending on the nature of the transitional state, entry points to begin army reconstruction may present themselves in any one of the three corners of the triangle. This is often the case when 'trial and error' and 'project-based' approaches are taken, particularly in

such unstable environments. Yet the beauty of the model is that it integrates such disparate starting points into a broader narrative which clearly shows the intended strategic direction.




Figure 2: Army Reconstruction Framework

Preparatory Considerations

With these essential precepts clarified, the active aspects of the post-conflict army reconstruction model can be explained. At the stage of preparatory considerations, there are four issues upon which consideration is vital before the process gets underway. These are the peace accord, which forms the starting point for the entire state reconstruction process, the necessity to create a viable future for existing armed factions, a national security and defence debate, and integration of SSR programmes into wider reconstruction.

The first issue is the necessity for an agreed peace settlement. If at all possible, the settlement needs to be widely respected by all the major political factions. The peace settlement forms the starting point for the entire post-conflict reconstruction process, including defence and security issues.



Figure 3: Preparatory Considerations

The second issue is the necessity to create a viable future for existing armed factions. There is never a blank slate for institutional reconstruction in a post-conflict environment. There are always pre-existing forces that need to have their future determined in some fashion. In the Congo there were at least nine separate major groups. There are several options available to provide such a viable future for former warring factions. These options include eliminating them through the DDR process, bringing groupings within the political process, or possibly suppressing them by force. Once some sort of overall framework for their future is established, individual fighters or groupings may be able to be included within either a 'military merger' or new single state force creation.

The third issue is the need for some type of public debate on the future size, shape, and missions of the defence force. Since the pioneering South African debate over defence in the mid 1990s, opening a space for debate has been a feature of reviews in Uganda in 2002-2004, and in Kosovo in 2006.⁷⁴¹ This type of approach was then endorsed by the OECD-DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform in 2007. The

⁷⁴¹ Conflict, Security and Development Group, The Uganda Defence Review: Learning from Experience, September 2007. The Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review has already been highlighted.

South African example shows how such a debate can promote extremely helpful stakeholder consensus.⁷⁴² It should take place even if dominated by political power-brokers and other vested interests. It is important that a wide consultation process is undertaken, even if its bounds are artificially constrained by the country's political terrain, the population's higher priorities (bread on the table as opposed to abstract debate on security) and literacy limitations.⁷⁴³

The debate may conclude that armed forces are not necessary,⁷⁴⁴ and police or border guards can fulfill all required missions. If armed forces are required, the balance between regular and reserve forces, or even the use of a reserve force only,⁷⁴⁵ should be carefully considered. Armies in post-conflict environments tend to suffer from lack of a clear role.⁷⁴⁶ In many parts of Africa, for example, there is little need to defend against aggrandizement aimed at annexing portions of a state's territory.⁷⁴⁷ This is because OAU conventions agreed to respect colonial era boundaries. If armed forces are the appropriate response, the debate needs to produce a clear, widely agreed, and correct mission and sets of tasks for them.

Considerable discussion has taken place on the merits of a reconstruction or development role for armies in developing countries and conflict-afflicted situations. As noted in the literature review, several African countries have considered development focused armies. Western thinking does not support armies tasked to undertake development instead of a primarily combat role. The particular political set of circumstances that gave birth to the Kosovo Security Force may allow a trial of an army not fully focused on military duties. This situation should be monitored so as to elicit lessons that can be identified for other contexts. There may also be another middle way. Pioneers, in the British Commonwealth military tradition, are infantry

⁷⁴² Laurie Nathan, ed. *No Ownership, No Commitment* (GfN-SSR/University of Birmingham, 2007), 97-99.

⁷⁴³ In countries with limited literacy, engagement by radio may have a greater part to play.

⁷⁴⁴ Alix Julia Boucher, "Defence Sector Reform: A Note on Current Practice" (Henry L. Stimson Center, December 12, 2009), 3, echoes this viewpoint.

⁷⁴⁵ Small Wars Council member Schmedlap, 'Tentative Guidelines for building partner armies post conflict' thread, <http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10049>, 29 March 2010.

⁷⁴⁶ Roy Licklider, "New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil Wars—A Research Project In Mid-Course," (presented at the Folke Bernadotte Academy's Security Sector Reform Workshop meeting, Geneva, 2010), 13.

⁷⁴⁷ Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 103-106.

troops skilled in engineer tasks. They are not heavily equipped and their initially manoeuvre warfare role was to provide engineer support on the battlefield when specialist engineers were not available.. Such troops might be an option to accommodate developing nations' wish for a development-focused force with a Western emphasis on combat capability.

The fourth issue is the integration of army reconstruction not just into a broader SSR programme, but within civil institutional redevelopment of a wider nature still. If post-conflict reconstruction is properly managed and resourced, each governmental agency, by properly serving citizens within their ambit, will assist other agencies to more smoothly carry out their mission. Competition between agencies should be avoided if possible.

From the preparatory considerations, two streams of work may unfold. Their existence and priority depends upon the security situation in the area of operations. If the international intervention force needs local supplementation to guarantee dominance of the security space (as in Iraq), interim auxiliary security forces may have to be created relatively quickly. This is the direction represented by the right-side arrow in the model, directly to the army reconstruction process itself. If the intervention force is sufficiently capable to assure security while an army is reconstructed more slowly (as in Liberia), a more considered assessment and design phase may be possible. This is the direction shown in the left-side arrow, leading to assessment and design first, before the reconstruction of an army designed for permanence. Each alternative will be considered in turn.

The first possible alternative is a need for additional security forces to support the intervention force. If the central government is still being rebuilt, then the army (or other warring factions) may be unusable and little further input from the centre may be available. Therefore, to provide interim security for development, supplementary security forces may have to be created at the regional or local levels. In past operations, these have taken the form of the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps, and tribal

forces along the lines of 'One Tribe at a Time.'⁷⁴⁸ As Bruce Baker describes in the context of Sierra Leone, these forces, which might include contractors, must enforce state law, not just local codes of behaviour.⁷⁴⁹ Activities to strength such forces may involve a significant amount of 'train-and-equip' type support. Emphasis on training and equipping at the expense of governance in these situations is almost inevitable. This is regrettable but is likely to be forced by the imperatives of short-term stabilization.

Steps must be taken to make sure these local forces will be able to be disbanded when they are of no further use, or incorporated into the state administrative apparatus. In the case of Afghanistan, David Kilcullen describes the process of raising local police as part of a road-building project in Kunar Province in *The Accidental Guerrilla*. After a year of service, the local police could join the Afghan National Police.⁷⁵⁰ However, disbandment of forces must be carefully handled in order to ensure demobilized youths are found some type of constructive occupation. Otherwise they may drift back into destabilizing activities.

Assessment and Design Phase

Once interim security arrangements are firmly in place, possibly including the support of local auxiliaries to the international force, assessment and design for a permanent army can begin. There are three important characteristics for the assessment and programme design phase. The external advisors and designers involved in the army reconstruction design need to have a clear understanding of the local environment. They need to be aware of the political limitations that each of the local actors operate under (and their own). If it is possible to reach the level of anthropological 'thick description,' in accordance with Geertz's guidelines, this is even better still.⁷⁵¹

⁷⁴⁸ An additional example is the Home Guard type forces described by Matthew Whitchurch, "Orders, Organisation, and Officers," *British Army Review* 147, Summer 2009: 104-05.

⁷⁴⁹ Bruce Baker, "The African Post-Conflict Peacekeeping Agenda in Sierra Leone," *Conflict, Security & Development* 6, No. 1 (2006).

⁷⁵⁰ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla : Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Carlton North, Vic.: Scribe Publications, 2009), 98.

⁷⁵¹ Kilcullen 2009, 304, Egnell & Halden 2009, 46.




Figure 4: Assessment and Design Phase

Second, on the basis of the nationwide debate on defence and security, there needs to be a free and open discussion between the local army process designers and the external designers involved. The discussions between the two successive Liberian Defence Ministers and the DynCorp contractors who formulated the force design for Liberia in 2004-5 represent such a process in its basic form. A discussion which was less constrained – possibly with greater vision and imagination from the hosts - would have produced a more sustainable consensus. Options and constraints need to be fully discussed, so that a shared understanding of potential paths ahead is created.

Third, on the basis of the national debate and collaboration between local and external designers, a comprehensive army reconstruction programme needs to be formulated in as much detail as is possible at the outset. The programme must be created within the framework of a comprehensive defence policy and reconstruction programme. This programme should be realistic and agreed to by all involved donors/outside designers and stakeholders. Army reconstruction activities that will absorb significant government resources need to be sequenced carefully with other government and international actions.

Army Reconstruction Process

There are a number of recurring trends applicable to the army reconstruction process itself. The key requirement is an integrated approach to each formation and unit level of the army being rebuilt. The task can be split into individual and corporate capacity building, and what advisory activities need to supplement capacity building.⁷⁵² There will be different training and advisory needs at each level of the hierarchy. However, if the present heavy use of advisors is to reach its full potential, Western army advisor service will need equal worth with combat service when officers are considered for promotion. For decades a critical step for officers has been battalion command. It is in combat command of one's own country's troops that reputations have been forged. Yet if command of a brigade advisory team in Iraq or Afghanistan does not afford the same chance of promotion, officers with substantial knowledge and experience in mentoring foreign security forces may not be promoted.

The critical requirement is to adjust the British and United States' armies corporate outlook so as to position those armies to effectively advise the development of indigenous security forces. This adjustment in corporate outlook appears to require officers in senior positions with previous advisory experience, so as to influence the evolution of internal military culture. Yet if officers who have had combat command continue to enjoy precedence for promotion over those who have had advisory service, the required military cultural change may not eventuate.

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Interview with Gordon Hughes, 8 April 2010.




Figure 5: Army Reconstruction Phase

At the apex of the institutional structure, there will be a need for training and advice for the national security integrating apparatus. Below, the same will apply at Ministry of Defence level, Army headquarters, army formations, and units and subunits. The concentration of effort, experience seems to indicate, should be at the upper levels.⁷⁵³ Training competencies will need to be nurtured at all levels of the hierarchy. A group of reform-minded senior officers is extremely valuable in implementing change and then ensuring it is not rolled back.

The Ministry of Defence will have to consider and integrate the requirements of the separate armed services, including the *gendarmerie* in some cases. The Army headquarters will have to assure the logistical support for the force, and assure that the army is properly trained to carry out logistics support. This is a critical area of operational capability, more important, in some cases, than combat support forces such as artillery or engineers. This applies doubly when a force is being transformed from a guerrilla into an institutionalized army.

⁷⁵³

Ibid.

Also important to inculcate are routine management skills which may not have been emphasized beforehand: meeting management, running of schedules, and other such duties. Army headquarters will also have to manage development of locally appropriate doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. In adopting foreign doctrine, care should be taken if at all possible to avoid the use of conflicting foreign models. Zimbabwe shows the difficulty of applying differing systems (British and North Korean) in the same army. These models should be not be overcomplicated; British Army experience in Iraq demonstrates that it is unreasonable to expect wholesale adoption of doctrine.⁷⁵⁴

At the formation and training units' level, Southern African experience shows the need to set realistic, rather than unobtainable, transition goals. The army itself when being reconstructed should be designed to be all-inclusive, to avoid factional dissatisfaction. The U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has demonstrated the need for a carefully thought balance between quality and quantity of new soldiers. In general, as recommended in British Army doctrine, quality should be sought at the expense of quantity.⁷⁵⁵ This is because retraining and other remedial actions will be necessary after the end of the planned preparation programme, if units are not of sufficient standard. Yet in certain circumstances the need may be to thicken security force coverage in any particular area, for which lesser trained personnel may be adequate. In Iraq in 2007-08, the U.S. commander responsible for training was aiming for a 'sufficient quantity of sufficiently capable' troops.⁷⁵⁶

Conclusions

The suggested course of action embodied in the model and the above points for consideration are based upon lessons identified from the case studies. Together they represent an ideal process which has internalized the lessons drawn from the case study research. However, due to national political priorities and inertia, such changes are unlikely to happen in full. Local ownership is perhaps the most significant

⁷⁵⁴ Colonel Duncan Barley, 'Training and Mentoring the Iraqi Army: the first Military Transition Teams,' *British Army Review* No.139, Spring 2006, 85-91.

⁷⁵⁵ Joint Doctrine Note 3/07, *The Military Contribution to Security Sector Reform*, 209(d), p.2-11.

⁷⁵⁶ Lt. Gen. James Dubik, Commanding General MNSTC-I, quoted in Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble*, 2009, 199.

problem not just for army reconstruction but for the whole of defence sector reform.
Yet increasing local ownership faces significant obstacles to effective
implementation.

Annex B: Key Interviewees

Higher Defence Processes
Former Head of State (Gyude Bryant, Transitional Chairman)
National Security Advisor, Liberia
UNMIL SSR Advisors (former and serving)
Heads of Civil Society organisations
Staff at Governance Commission who drafted the National Security Strategy
Senators and Congressmen
U.S. State Department staff
U.S. Agency for International Development staff
Political Counsellor, Embassy of the United States
British Political Counsellor attached to Embassy of the United States
University of Liberia academic staff
Pillar Technical Advisory staff, Ministry of Planning
ECOWAS and African Union office political affairs officers
Acting Minister, Ministry for National Security
Reconstruction of the Army
Deputy Ministers, Ministry of National Defence, Liberia (former and serving)
Command Officer in Charge, Armed Forces of Liberia
Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff, Armed Forces of Liberia
Senior Military Advisor, Ministry of National Defence
Chief, Office of Security Cooperation, U.S. Embassy (former and serving)
Chiefs, PAE and DynCorp Armed Forces of Liberia task order (former and serving)
British and Swedish advisors to the Ministry of National Defense
Former chief, U.S. Military Mission, Liberia
Other DynCorp and PAE personnel
Defense Attache, Embassy of the United States
Assistant Defense Attache, Embassy of the United States
U.S. Department of Defence and Department of State personnel
United Nations staff (UNMIL and UNDP Liberia)

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