CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY

PETE K. ITO

BALTIC MILITARY COOPERATIVE PROJECTS:
CASE STUDY ON EFFECTIVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMMES

COLLEGE OF MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY

PhD THESIS
Baltic Military Cooperative Projects:
Case Study on Effective Military Assistance Programmes

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2015
ABSTRACT

From 1994, the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) undertook a number of cooperative regional military projects with the support of numerous Western countries. In particular, the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) was an example of efficient Western defence cooperation to generate outcomes in order to achieve military and political goals. BALTBAT became the template for other Baltic programmes: the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL).

This thesis analysed the Baltic programmes, particularly BALTBAT, as a case study for identifying the elements of a model for effective military assistance projects. The focus was on the broad political decisions agreed upon by the donor and recipient states, such as the selection of development of peacekeeping capabilities, as the basis for military assistance, which provided the foundation for these initiatives.

The value of the Baltic programmes as a case study and basis for identifying the elements of a model was enhanced by the fact that they succeeded at a delicate time in a sensitive region. The Baltic states had virtually no military forces upon regaining independence. Russia objected to Baltic state membership in NATO and was sensitive about a build-up of military capabilities close to Russian borders. In spite of these obstacles, the Baltic projects achieved outcomes which supported the military and political goals of the donor and recipient states.

Analysis of the Baltic projects highlighted the importance of broad political decisions between donor and recipient states for military assistance initiatives. It also indicated the major factors (subsequently called Mechanisms) resulting from those decisions which were important to the outcomes from these programmes. These Mechanisms comprise the elements of a model which could be of value to academics and practitioners working in the area of military assistance.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of the many people to whom I am indebted for this particular piece of research.

First, my thanks to the late Professor Richard Holmes, who served as my initial thesis supervisor. Richard deserves the credit for turning my initial idea for this research into reality. I am grateful for his support in encouraging me to pursue this thesis topic, and, more important, for his wisdom and guidance.

Second, my thanks to Anna Maria Brudenell, who took over from Richard after he retired from Cranfield. I am particularly indebted to Anna Maria for constantly reminding me of all the details which were so critical to providing a polished final product, and for all her work in leading and managing my thesis committee. I also wish to express my appreciation to Bryan Watters, Peter Caddick-Adams, Laura Cleary and Trevor Taylor who served as my thesis committee. All of them provided valuable suggestions which were critical to keeping me on the right track.

Third, my thanks to all of the individuals who agreed to be interviewed for this research and who were so generous with their time. All of their fascinating insights and perspectives made this process a joy rather than a burden.

Finally, and most important of all, my thanks to my wife, Riana, who has shown the patience of Job in putting up with all the time that I spent in conducting this research. I could never have completed it without her assistance and support.
CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. i
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................. iii
CONTENTS ...................................................................................................... v
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................... xi
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................. xii
LIST OF MAPS ................................................................................................... xiii
DRAMATIS PERSONAE ....................................................................................... xiv
LIST OF DOCUMENTS ..................................................................................... xvi
GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................ xix
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY DATES ..................................................................... xxi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 1
  1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 1
    1.1.1 Increased Importance ........................................................................ 1
    1.1.2 Definition and Purpose ..................................................................... 2
    1.1.3 Success and Failure .......................................................................... 2
  1.2 Thesis Aims and Research Aims .............................................................. 2
    1.2.1 Research Question .......................................................................... 3
    1.2.2 Research Objectives ........................................................................ 3
  1.3 Scope of the Research ............................................................................. 4
  1.4 Research Methodology ........................................................................... 4
  1.5 Research Design and Ethical Issues ....................................................... 4
  1.6 Background to the Research Subject ..................................................... 5
  1.7 Contribution to Knowledge: Study Value ............................................. 5
  1.8 The Baltic Military Assistance Programmes: Historical Background .... 6
  1.9 A Particularly Difficult Environment .................................................... 6
  1.10 Thesis Structure ...................................................................................... 7
  1.11 Summary ................................................................................................ 8
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................... 9
  2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 9
  2.2 Narrative Literature Review ................................................................... 9
  2.3 Systematic Literature Review ................................................................ 9
  2.4 Conduct of the Systematic Literature Review ....................................... 10
  2.5 CIMO - Context/Interventions/Mechanisms/Outcomes ......................... 10
    2.5.1 Other Possible Models .................................................................... 11
  2.6 Conduct of the Review .......................................................................... 13
  2.7 Military Assistance - Results of Systematic Literature Review .......... 14
    2.7.1 Other Literature on Military Assistance ........................................ 14
  2.8 CIMO - Context ...................................................................................... 16
    2.8.1 Context - Donor/Recipient State Relationship ................................ 17
    2.8.2 Context - Long-Term Relationship .............................................. 17
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.8.3</td>
<td>Context - Political and Security Concerns</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8.4</td>
<td>Context - Goals of Donor States</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8.5</td>
<td>Context - Review</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>CIMO - Interventions</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9.1</td>
<td>Interventions - Mott</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9.2</td>
<td>Interventions - Training</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9.3</td>
<td>Interventions - Education</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9.4</td>
<td>Interventions - Recipient State Assumption of Control</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9.5</td>
<td>Interventions - Funding</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9.6</td>
<td>Interventions - Review</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>CIMO - Mechanisms</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10.1</td>
<td>Mechanisms - Broad Overview</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10.2</td>
<td>Mechanisms - Commitment by Donor States</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10.3</td>
<td>Mechanisms - Control by Donor States</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10.4</td>
<td>Mechanisms - Political Motivation</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10.5</td>
<td>Mechanisms - Appropriate Model</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10.6</td>
<td>Mechanisms - Training</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10.7</td>
<td>Mechanisms - Negative Factors</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10.8</td>
<td>Mechanisms - Efficient Planning</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10.9</td>
<td>Mechanisms - Role of Individuals</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10.10</td>
<td>Mechanisms: Review</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>CIMO - Outcomes</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.1</td>
<td>Outcomes - No Measurement</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.2</td>
<td>Outcomes - Training</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.3</td>
<td>Outcomes - Education</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.4</td>
<td>Outcomes - Are Measurable</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.5</td>
<td>Outcomes - Measurement by US Africa Command</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.6</td>
<td>Outcomes - Measurement Regarding GPOI</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.7</td>
<td>Outcomes - Absence of Clear Aims</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.8</td>
<td>Outcomes - Professional Military Education (PME)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.9</td>
<td>Outcomes - Causality</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.10</td>
<td>Outcomes - BALTBAT: General Comments</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.11</td>
<td>Outcomes - BALTBAT: National Defence Capabilities</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.12</td>
<td>Outcomes - BALTBAT: Deployments</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.13</td>
<td>Outcomes - BALTRON</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.14</td>
<td>Outcomes - BALTNET</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.15</td>
<td>Outcomes - BALTDEFCOL</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.16</td>
<td>Outcomes - Review</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>Narrative Literature Review on the Political/Historical Context</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.12.1</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.12.2</td>
<td>NATO and the West</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.12.3</td>
<td>The Nordic States</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2 First Mechanism - Assessment of Regional Security Concerns ............. 92
  5.2.1 Differing Assessments Regarding Russia ........................................... 94
  5.2.2 First Mechanism - Documents .......................................................... 94
5.3 Second Mechanism - Focus on Optimal Area of Military Assistance .... 95
  5.3.1 Avoiding Russian Objections ............................................................ 96
  5.3.2 Buttressing the Case for NATO Membership .................................... 97
  5.3.3 Developing National Defence Forces ................................................ 97
  5.3.4 Second Mechanism - Documents ...................................................... 98
5.4 Assessing The First Two Mechanisms - Russian Non-Reaction .......... 99
5.5 Third Mechanism - A Solid Source of Support ................................. 100
  5.5.1 Nordic Disunity ................................................................................. 103
  5.5.2 Third Mechanism - Documents ........................................................ 103
5.6 Fourth Mechanism - Long-Term Commitment .................................. 105
  5.6.1 Questions On A Long-Term Commitment .......................................... 107
  5.6.2 Fourth Mechanism - Documents ....................................................... 107
5.7 Fifth Mechanism - Connection to Larger Goals .............................. 107
  5.7.1 Reprise - The State of Baltic Military Forces ................................. 108
5.8 Fifth Mechanism - First Example: NATO Membership .................... 109
  5.8.1 Excessive Concern regarding NATO Membership? .......................... 111
  5.8.2 NATO Membership - Documents ...................................................... 112
5.9 Fifth Mechanism - Second Example: National Defence .................... 113
  5.9.1 Dissent on Emphasis regarding National Defence ............................ 115
  5.9.2 National Defence - Documents ........................................................ 116
5.10 Sixth Mechanism - Developing New Leaders .................................. 117
  5.10.1 Sixth Mechanism - Documents ........................................................ 119
5.11 Seventh Mechanism - Appropriate Direction and Control by Donor States ......................................................................................... 119
  5.11.1 Baltic Unity ....................................................................................... 120
  5.11.2 Baltic Disunity .................................................................................. 121
  5.11.3 The West - "Twisting Arms" ............................................................. 122
  5.11.4 Seventh Mechanism - Documents ................................................... 124
5.12 Eighth Mechanism - Turning Over Responsibility to Recipient States ................................................................................................. 125
  5.12.1 The Right Pace ................................................................................. 125
  5.12.2 Too Slow A Pace for "Baltification" ................................................. 127
  5.12.3 Eighth Mechanism - Documents ....................................................... 128
5.13 Ninth Mechanism - Flexibility in Planning .................................... 129
  5.13.1 Ninth Factor - Documents ............................................................... 131
5.14 Tenth Mechanism - Good Organizational Structures .................... 132
  5.14.1 Organizational Weaknesses .............................................................. 134
  5.14.2 Tenth Factor - Documents ............................................................... 135
5.15 Eleventh Mechanism - A Strong Lead Nation ............................... 138
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Recommendations for Future Research</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Final Thoughts</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPENDIX C</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPENDIX D</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPENDIX E</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPENDIX F</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 – Military Personnel Levels of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Number of Stationed Russian Personnel in 1991 ........................................ 49

Table 2 – Military Capabilities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1994 .......... 50

Table 3 – Number of Military Personnel and Reservists in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 2004 ................................................................. 51
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Clusters of Mechanisms.......................................................... 184
LIST OF MAPS

Map 1 Baltic Region (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kaliningrad, Russia)

Source: Wikimedia Commons
Downloaded on 11 February 2014
DRAMATIS PERSONAE


4. Carlsen, Per - (Denmark) Former Deputy Permanent Secretary of State for Defence. Interview on 3 October 2010.


6. Donnelly, Chris - (UK) Former Special Advisor for Central and Eastern Europe to the NATO Secretary General. Interviews on 20 June 2011 and 19 March 2012.


14. Kolga, Margus - (Estonia) Former Deputy Secretary General for Policy in the Ministry of Defence, former Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former Estonian representative to the BALTBAT Steering Group. Interview on 9 November 2009.
15. Laneman, Brigadier General Alar - (Estonia) Former and First Commander of BALTBAT. Interview on 9 November 2010.


17. Linkevicius, Linas - (Lithuania) Former Minister for Defence. Interview on 4 November 2010.


19. Molis, Dr. Arunas - (Lithuania) Former Chairman, International Relations Studies, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College. Interview on 9 November 2009.


There were four individuals (one from Latvia, one from Estonia and two from the US) who were willing to provide comments for background, but made clear that they would not be for attribution. When their views are cited, they are identified as:


LIST OF DOCUMENTS

The titles given below utilise, at appropriate times, an informal formulation such as "The Baltic Republics" or "The Ministers for Defence of the Three Baltic Republics" rather than the full official title in order to save space without reducing the ability to identify the document. Where appropriate and necessary to identify the document, the level of the signatories is also included. The documents are:


The 1994 Agreement on Baltic Parliamentary and Governmental Cooperation (governments of the Baltic States).

The 3 June 1994 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Nordic-Baltic Co-operation on the formation of a Baltic Peace-keeping Battalion (Ministers for Defence of the Nordic and Baltic States).


The 11 September 1994 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Cooperation on the formation of a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic and Supporting States).

The 13 September 1994 Agreement Between the Three Baltic Republics concerning the Establishment and Formation of Joint Peacekeeping Unit (governments of the Baltic States).

The 13 September 1994 Regulations for the Committees of Senior Officials (Baltic Council of Ministers, adopted by the heads of government of the Baltic States).


The 27 February 1995 Agreement on Cooperation in the Fields of Defence and Military Relations (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic States).

The 3 April 1997 Joint Communique of the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic States.

The 10 December 1997 Agreement Between the Governments of the Baltic Republics Concerning the Baltic Battalion.

The 10 December 1997 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministers of Defence of the Baltic Republics Concerning the Ministerial Committee and the Baltic Military Committee Established in Connection with the Cooperation on the Baltic Battalion.


The 16 April 1998 Agreement between the Baltic Republics concerning the Establishment of the Baltic Naval Squadron (governments of the Baltic States).


The 1998 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Cooperation in the Establishment, Operation, Administration and Initial Funding and Secondment of Staff to a Baltic Defence College in the Republic of Estonia (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic and Supporting States).

The 12 June 1998 Agreement Between the Governments of the Baltic States Concerning the Baltic Defence College.


The 1 February 1999 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Cooperation on the development of BALTBAT into an Infantry Battalion (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic and Supporting States).


The 22 April 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development of the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic States).
The 7 May 1999 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic Republics Concerning the Operation, Funding and Administration of the Baltic Battalion (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic States).


The 1999 Agreement Between the Governments of the Baltic Republics on the Establishment of the Baltic Air Surveillance Network.


The 1999 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Organisation, Operation, Funding and Administration of the Baltic Naval Squadron.

The 5 October 1999 Terms of Reference for BALTRON Military Coordination Group (Baltic Military Committee).

The 1999 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic Republics concerning the Organisation, Operation, Funding and Administration of the Baltic Naval Squadron.

The Terms of References for Commander BALTRON.


BALTBAT Standing Orders - Chapter 3 on Training.

BALTBAT Standing Orders - Chapter 6 on Logistics.

The Baltic Battalion - Status and future development (from the Baltic BALTBAT Military Co-ordination Group).
# Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Analytic Induction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIA</td>
<td>Army International Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTBAT</td>
<td>Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTCOM</td>
<td>Baltic Contingents (BALTBAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTFECOL</td>
<td>Baltic Defence College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTNET</td>
<td>Baltic Air Surveillance Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTRON</td>
<td>Baltic Naval Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTSEA</td>
<td>Baltic Security Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMG</td>
<td>Baltic Management Group (BALTBAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMO</td>
<td>Context, Interventions, Mechanisms and Outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPOI</td>
<td>Global Peace Operations Initiative (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>International Force (Bosnia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPG</td>
<td>Initial Partnership Goal (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCG</td>
<td>Military Co-ordination Group (BALTBAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCM</td>
<td>Mine Counter-Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWG</td>
<td>Military Working Group (BALTBAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATINADS</td>
<td>NATO Integrated Air Defence System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWG</td>
<td>Naval Working Group (BALTRON)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARP</td>
<td>Planning and Review Process (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAI</td>
<td>Regional Airspace Initiative (BALTNET)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RASCC</td>
<td>Regional Airspace Surveillance Coordination Centre (BALTNET)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force (Bosnia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Steering Group (BALTBAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEEP</td>
<td>Training Principles and Requirements (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>Training Teams (BALTBAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialists Republic
WEU  Western European Union
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY DATES

Drawn heavily from Brett (2001, pp. 69-74)

1991

24 August: Baltic states regained independence.

1992

June: The Baltic states signed a Protocol on Agreement on Co-operation in the Field of Defence.

1993

31 August: Russia completed withdrawal of troops from Lithuania.

13 September: Baltic Defence Ministers issued a declaration which refers to peacekeeping training and cooperation in a "joint peacekeeping unit."

22 November: Baltic Chiefs of Defence agreed to closer military cooperation, including establishing a battalion with a company from each country for input to UN operations.

1994

11 January: Launch of Partnership for Peace (PfP) at Brussels NATO Summit.

25-26 January: Nordic Foreign Ministers agreed to support the Baltic peacekeeping unit.

15 February: Baltic Defence Ministers signed agreement to form a joint peacekeeping battalion.

18 March: Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) Steering Group formally established during a meeting in Copenhagen.

25-29 April: United Kingdom (UK) and Nordic "briefing and fact finding team" visit to Baltic states to investigate nature of support needed to BALTBAT.

2-3 June: Nordic-Baltic Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning cooperation on the formation of BALTBAT signed in Visby.

8 August: Baltic participation in UN courses began.

31 August: Russia completed withdrawal of forces from Latvia and Estonia.
11 September: MOU on Cooperation on formation of BALTBAT signed between Defence Ministers of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden and the UK.

1996

8-18 July: BALTBAT participated in BALTIC CHALLENGE 96 exercise.

7 October: Staggered deployment of Latvian company to International Force (IFOR)/Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia with Swedish forces.

8 October: Lithuanian company deployed with Danish forces to IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia.

12 October: Baltic Defence Ministers issued "Declaration of Intent" to continue BALTBAT project after 1997.

1 December: Estonian company deployed to United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with Norwegian forces.

1997

10 April: Lithuanian company returned from IFOR/SFOR deployment in Bosnia.

18 April: Latvian company returned from IFOR/SFOR deployment in Bosnia.

9 June: Estonian company returned from UNIFIL deployment in Lebanon.

12-17 July: BALTBAT participated in Field Training Exercise BALTIC CHALLENGE 97.

1998

12 June: Memorandum of Support for the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) is signed.

31 July: Military Working Group (MWG) report issued on "what it would take" to deploy BALTBAT to UNIFIL.

12 August: Baltic Defence Ministers formally decided not to proceed with a possible deployment of BALTBAT to UNIFIL.

28 August: Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) was inaugurated.

20 October: Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian companies began staggered deployments to SFOR in Bosnia with Danish Battalion. Each deployment preceded by two months pre-mission training in Denmark.
1999

16 August: First senior staff course at the BALTDEFCOL initiated.

2000

20 March: Estonian Latvian and Lithuanian deployments to SFOR in Bosnia ended.

6 June: Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) began operations.

9-20 October: Field Training Exercise BALTIC EAGLE marked completion of the BALTBAT transition to an infantry battalion.

2003

26 September: BALTBAT deactivated.

2004

29 March: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became NATO members.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

One issue with which states continue to grapple is how to develop capable military forces. This remains a challenge for military assistance programmes, not only for the developing countries trying to establish an effective force, but also for developed nations that attempt various types of assistance initiatives to help developing countries achieve that goal. Mott (1999) asserted that:

Over the course of history, governments have devoted vast sums of money and incalculable other resources to military assistance as an instrument of foreign policy and military strategy. They have not usually had, however, the benefit of anything beyond political insight and the pressures of current events as bases for their actions (p. 4).

1.1.1 Increased Importance

If Mott was correct and there is a paucity of concrete theory regarding military assistance, such a situation is surprising in light of the increased attention on the use of such programmes. Cottey and Forster (2004) noted that:

Over the last decade, there has been a growing trend, especially amongst the Western democracies, towards the use of defence ministries and armed forces as means of building cooperative relations with other states, and supporting other states in reforming their militaries (p. 6).

The authors emphasized that the important change is that such efforts are “now being used not only in its longstanding realpolitik role of supporting the armed forces and security of allies, but also as a means of pursuing wider foreign and security policy goals” (Cottey and Forster, 2004, p. 7).

With a specific focus on the United States (US), Reveron (2010) noted the US “has stepped up its security assistance efforts and finds its military forces in more countries than ever” adding that “the forces seldom engage in direct combat operations, but are training, equipping and mentoring partner countries’ militaries” (p. 23). Reveron (2010) emphasized the policy imperative for such action, noting that “national strategies underscore the interdependence of security and prioritise building the capabilities of partners as the basis for long-term security” (p. 48). As a result, commented Reveron (2010), the US military is facing new challenges and “activities are evolving beyond old models of military assistance that transferred weapons or occasional military interventions” with US military commands incorporating civilians into command structures to better address non-warfighting challenges (p. 49).

Supporting Cottey and Forster in general and Reveron in particular, Glantz (1998b) concurred on the growing significance of military assistance, stressing
“the US military assistance program is an important tool of the nation’s foreign policy” and “military assistance is an essential element in the US strategy of engagement designed to promote regional peace and stability, which the US defines as vital national interests” (p. 1).

1.1.2 Definition and Purpose

It appeared valuable to see what type of contribution could be made to academic theory regarding military assistance programmes. In order to do so, the first question to be addressed was what exactly constitutes military assistance. The definition provided by Mott (1999) is straightforward and was the definition used for this thesis: “Military assistance involves providing equipment, funds, training, or leadership to the military forces of a recipient nation” (p. 17).

The second question which arose concerned the purpose of military assistance. On that count, Mott (1999) asserted that:

The fundamental objective of military assistance is to strengthen, expand, or increase the military capabilities of the recipient country, and thereby to achieve whatever other aims are involved. Well-articulated objectives for military assistance involve the specific force development to be accomplished by the military assistance – specific levels of readiness, combat capabilities, force structures and strengths, weapons inventories, or even levels of training and proficiency to be attained in the recipient force (p. 17).

1.1.3 Success and Failure

It appeared that despite a large quantity of information gathered over numerous military assistance projects, it remains a challenge to efficiently assist nations in developing military forces. With regard to why such results occur, Mott (1999) asserted that the fields of political science, economics, military science or diplomacy have not:

… produced a coherent theory that provides standards, criteria, models or even clear guidance for practitioners or administrators, whether for particular issues or the entire concept of providing or accepting military assistance. The absence of any theoretically sound, historically demonstrable tenets, any conventional wisdom, or even much rigorous analysis forces theoretical critiques to rely on selected examples that ‘prove’ a point (p. 8).

1.2 Thesis Aims and Research Aims

The aim of this thesis is to make a contribution to the body of knowledge regarding military assistance programmes. In particular, this thesis is an attempt to identify elements which could be used as a basis for eventual
development through further research of a model for effective military assistance initiatives that would be of use to both academics and practitioners in the area. The identification of such elements could assist academics in the generation of concrete theory and practitioners in the consideration of practical steps that should be taken regarding military assistance projects.

It should also be noted that, in line with the thesis aims, the research aim was to analyse one particular set of military assistance initiatives used for one set of countries at a particular point in time, and assess the extent to which they have the potential to provide general lessons for military assistance programmes. It is noted that for the purposes of this research, there was no distinction between “project,” “programme,” and “initiative.”

The projects which were analysed are the various initiatives in the 1990s which focused on assisting the three Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) to develop modern military forces. These programmes consisted of the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT), the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL).

Particular attention was paid to BALTBAT as it served as the blueprint for the other Baltic defence initiatives which were subsequently established. A number of different supporting states participated in the various programmes, with the Nordic countries taking a leading role in handling much of the work on these projects.

1.2.1 Research Question

The specific research question to be addressed was: Can the elements to be used as the basis for development through further research of a model for effective military assistance projects be identified from the experience of the Baltic military cooperative programmes, particularly BALTBAT? An analysis of models, modelling and elements for use in generation of a model is provided in Section 3.5.9.

1.2.2 Research Objectives

This research put forward the proposition that a number of aspects of the establishment and development of the Baltic military projects were worth analysing. There were four distinct objectives for this research.

The first objective was to review the literature regarding the specific issue of military assistance programmes.

The second objective was to construct an appropriate research methodology to allow for the gathering of primary data regarding the Baltic initiatives which could contribute to knowledge in the area of military assistance programmes.
The third objective was to analyse that data and identify the elements of a model for effective military assistance projects derived from the Baltic programmes which could be of value to academics and practitioners working in the area.

The fourth objective was to provide recommendations on the potential utility of these elements for a model for effective military assistance initiatives, and note recommended areas for additional research to fully develop such a model.

1.3 Scope of the Research

An assessment of four separate defence cooperation programmes involving a dozen nations would be unwieldy without a decision on the scope of the research. For this thesis, the scope involved analysis of the overarching political decisions which provided the foundation for the detailed work on initiating, establishing and developing BALTBAT and the other projects. These decisions included issues such as the areas in which BALTBAT would focus its attention (peacekeeping capabilities), the pace at which the Baltic countries would assume responsibility for the initiatives and the role the Baltic programmes would play with regard to larger political (NATO membership) and military (development of national defence forces) goals.

It is important to note what was not covered by this study. The research did not address the detailed steps taken to initiate, establish and develop these projects. This topic had been addressed by Brett (2001) and others. While issues such as project management arose as part of the discussion of the Baltic initiatives, they did not constitute the focus of attention for this thesis.

1.4 Research Methodology

The research methodology utilised is described in detail in Chapter Three. Due to the nature of the subject matter, a qualitative approach was selected, as it appeared more suitable than a quantitative approach. One reason for selecting this topic was that it is still possible to obtain information from individuals who worked on the establishment of the Baltic projects. Their recollections and reflections were particularly valuable in analysing the factors which resulted in the strengths and weaknesses of these initiatives. The use of qualitative methods allowed for gathering a wide range and depth of data. A more detailed analysis of these points is provided in Chapter Three.

1.5 Research Design and Ethical Issues

As will also be detailed in Chapter Three, the case study method appeared to be most useful for this particular research and semi-structured interviews the best method to obtain original data. All the interviews were conducted in English. Particularly for those in policy-making positions, English was the language utilised by those participating in the Baltic initiatives. Moreover, the command language for BALTBAT was English.
One ethical issue regarding this research involved anonymity for the interviewees. For this thesis, the interviewees were asked whether their comments were for attribution. If they did not wish to have their comments attributed to them, adequate methods of keeping the individual anonymous were utilised. For example, the quote was attributed to "an Estonian official."

In order to provide a common framework, all interviewees were provided a questionnaire in advance (Appendix A in Appendices). It was emphasized to the interviewees that the document was intended to highlight possible points for discussion, but was not a limitation on subjects for discussion. The interviews were written up and sent back to the interviewees for their edits before they were finalised.

The results of the interviews were coded with the use of NVIVO 8 software. In addition, documents from the Baltic projects were reviewed for content relevant to any factors which emerged from the interview material. The data from interviews and sections of relevant documents were analysed to determine whether a specific factor was present. A detailed analysis of the points regarding research design and method is provided in Chapter Three.

1.6 Background to the Research Subject

The author is a former US Foreign Service officer who served at the US Embassy in Copenhagen, Denmark during the period 1996-2000. The US was one of the countries providing support to BALTBAT and the other programmes, and the author had an opportunity to view the extensive effort which the supporting states, and Denmark in particular, put toward the success of BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives. While this experience might have generated questions with regard to the neutrality of the author, every effort was made to try to remove bias in the conduct of the research.

1.7 Contribution to Knowledge: Study Value

This research sought to provide contributions to the body of knowledge regarding military assistance. Mott (1999) asserted that:

A set of general uniformities about the donor-recipient relationship that holds over time, across politics, in peace and war, and in various geopolitical-economic situations may form a theoretical and logical foundation for useful analyses of military assistance (p. 19).

With regard to benefits from the research, the first benefit was the contribution to the academic work in the area of military assistance. As will be indicated in the Literature Review in Chapter Two, the author was unable to find any research into the specific area of political decisions between the donor and recipient states regarding BALTBAT and the other Baltic projects (a lacuna). The second benefit arose for practitioners in the subject area. Identification of
the elements of a model for effective military assistance initiatives drawn from
factors for success from the Baltic programmes could assist the efforts of
developed and developing countries to achieve the goals they set for these
projects.

Other academic areas, such as project management, were touched on as
appropriate as the material from the research was analysed. However, they did
not receive explicit emphasis and were handled as subsidiary areas of
academic or practical interest.

1.8 The Baltic Military Assistance Programmes: Historical Background

In June 1992, the Baltic states signed a "Protocol on Agreement on Co-
operation in the Field of Defence." The document set out the framework for
Baltic defence cooperation. In 1993, at a meeting of Baltic military
commanders, the Commander of the Estonian Defence Force broached the
idea of a joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion.

The "Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Concerning Co-operation on the
Formation of a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion" was signed by the three Baltic
countries, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK) on
11 September 1994. The MOU set out the project framework for BALTBAT.
France, the US, Germany and the Netherlands later signed as supporting
nations.

With regard to the other Baltic initiatives, BALTRON was inaugurated on 28
August 1998. The first senior staff course at the BALTDEFCOL was held on 16

BALTBAT was de-activated on 26 September 2003. The other BALTIC
initiatives are still in operation with BALTRON and BALTNET integrated into the
NATO operations of the Baltic forces.

1.9 A Particularly Difficult Environment

The Baltic initiatives appeared to be a particularly interesting set of military
assistance projects which warranted extensive review. All of the following
points are assessed in detail in the Literature Review in Chapter Two, and
indicated the challenges faced by the Baltic and donor governments at the time
BALTBAT and the other programmes were initiated.

The first challenge was Russian troops. The Baltic and Western governments
had to decide how to develop the military capabilities of the Baltic countries in a
delicate political environment. Latter (1992) highlighted comments from the
Russian military which indicated they would not withdraw from the Baltic states
under any circumstances (p. 2). Russian forces did not complete their
withdrawal from Lithuania until August 1993 and from Estonia and Latvia until
The second challenge was the sensitivity regarding treatment of Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia. Asmus and Nurick (1996) highlighted the significance of this issue as a cause of regional tension. The third challenge involved Russian sensitivity regarding membership of the Baltic states in NATO. Russia had made it clear, noted Blank (1997), that it would not accept Baltic state membership in NATO and even threatened to terminate cooperative efforts with the West (p. v).

The final challenge was the fact that the Baltic governments had virtually no military forces upon regaining independence. Former Lithuanian Defence Minister Linkevicius (1999) wrote that at independence the military was short of everything and there was no national security concept. Former Latvian National Security Advisor Zalkans (1999) noted that in 1993, the Defence Ministry had no defence concept or defence plan.

All of these topics, and other relevant issues noted in the Chapter Two Literature Review, indicated that the development of BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives under such challenging circumstances highlighted the value of analysing these military assistance programmes.

1.10 Thesis Structure

The structure of the thesis is as follows:

Chapter One: Introduction

The first chapter provides an overview of the plan for the thesis and the rationale for the research.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

The second chapter provides a systematic literature review on the issue of military assistance. There is also a narrative literature review of the points noted above in Section 1.9 which provide the political and historical context in which the Baltic programmes were developed.

Chapter Three: Research Methodology

The third chapter provides details into the research methodology and specific research methods which were utilised.

Chapter Four: Collected Data

The fourth chapter outlines the interviews which were conducted as well as the various documents regarding the Baltic programmes which were assembled and analysed.
Chapter Five: Data Analysis

The fifth chapter presents the critical factors (subsequently called Mechanisms) which emerge from analysis of the data from interviews and documents.

Chapter Six: Discussion of the Elements of a Model

The sixth chapter provides the identified elements of a model for effective military assistance programmes arising from the critical Mechanisms.

Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Recommendations

The seventh chapter summarizes the conclusions of the research and recommends future possible areas of research.

1.11 Summary

The overarching goal of this research was to make a contribution to knowledge in the important area of military assistance. In that regard, it is useful to note the comment from Mott (2002) that:

… military assistance was and remains a valuable policy instrument. Soldiers, politicians, diplomats and bureaucrats can use it effectively to achieve donor aims. Scholars, analysts, and pundits can explain it and predict its effects. In our efforts to create and manage the future, we can only be well served by observing and learning from the efforts of our predecessors to use this unique instrument. We would be best served, however, by refining their refinements to accommodate our own world, rather than rejecting their work as flawed or irrelevant (p. 312).

The specific aim of this research was to analyse the Baltic military initiatives, particularly BALTBAT, as a case study to identify the elements of a model for effective military assistance projects. Brett (2001) noted in his review of BALTBAT that he found a consistency of views that BALTBAT was a success (p. 60), so it would appear that the Baltic programmes were worthwhile subjects for analysis.

The proposition put forth in this thesis is that the elements of a model composed of key factors (subsequently called Mechanisms) for effective military assistance initiatives can be identified from the experience of the Baltic military cooperative programmes, particularly BALTBAT. They were a valuable topic for research, and provided results which are worthwhile for academics and practitioners in the area of military assistance.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Chapter One provided an introduction to the thesis and outlined why military assistance in general and BALTBAT and the Baltic military assistance programmes in particular should be analysed. Chapter Two provides a systematic review of the literature regarding the specific issue of military assistance. There is also a narrative review of the literature to provide background regarding the relevant political and military issues concerning the establishment of the Baltic initiatives.

It is worthwhile to begin with a delineation of what is covered in this chapter with regard to "literature." The proposed answer is that for purposes of this thesis, literature involves the writings of academics and practitioners.

2.2 Narrative Literature Review

As highlighted by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2000), the critical literature review forms the foundation on which research is built (p. 44). The initial question was what type of review should be conducted. The two primary methods are a narrative literature review and a systematic literature review. Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003) noted that a narrative literature review is a descriptive account “of the contributions made by writers in the field” (p. 208). However, narrative literature reviews have been criticised for various weaknesses, with Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003) asserting that they “frequently lack thoroughness” (p. 207) and “have also been condemned for lacking critical assessment” (p. 208).

2.3 Systematic Literature Review

A systematic literature review provides a more structured method by which to determine what literature to review and also to assess the quality of the literature to be assessed. Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003) commented that:

Systematic reviews differ from traditional narrative reviews by adopting a replicable, scientific and transparent process, in other words a detailed technology, that aims to minimize bias through exhaustive literature searches of published and unpublished studies and by providing an audit trail of the reviewers decisions, procedures and conclusions (p. 209).

Buchanan and Bryman (2009) asserted that selection of a systematic literature review method is not “merely a technique for snapping reality into focus; choice of methods frames the data windows through which phenomena are observed, influencing interpretative schemas and theoretical development” (p. 1). Denyer and Tranfield (2009) noted that in a systematic literature review:
...the researcher is required to set prespecified relevance and quality criteria for the selection/inclusion of studies and to make such criteria transparent to readers. Extensive searches are conducted to incorporate both published and unpublished studies (p. 671).

The point was made by Denyer and Tranfield (2009) that a systematic literature review should be regarded “as a self-contained research project in itself that explores a clearly specified question, usually derived from a policy or practice problem, using existing studies” (p. 671), and “if the review identifies knowledge gaps or incongruent findings, then this signifies a research need and raises questions for future research” (p. 672).

There are weaknesses with regard to a systematic literature review. Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003) noted that they have usually been applied in areas utilising positivist and quantitative methodologies (p. 212), and as a result, “researchers from an interpretivist or phenomenological position may suggest that systematic reviews, with their positivist leanings, should not be adopted in the social sciences” (p. 214).

Despite these criticisms of a systematic literature review, it appeared that its use was advantageous in reviewing the literature regarding military assistance. As the focus was on the “need to discuss critically the work that has already been undertaken” in the specific area of research and present it “in a logical way” (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2000, p. 45), a systematic literature review was most appropriate, as it allowed for a structured method of evaluating literature in the area of military assistance.

2.4 Conduct of the Systematic Literature Review

Turning to the conduct of a systematic literature review on the issue of military assistance, the first stage was planning the review (Tranfield, Denyer and Smart, 2003), and the need to “arrive at a definitive review question” (p. 215). Denyer and Tranfield (2009) cited as an example that “in management and organization studies, a practitioner question may be framed as follows: how can project team performance be optimized through leadership behaviours?” (p. 682).

For this thesis, the review question was as follows: “What is the significance of broad political decisions between donor and recipient states on the ability of military assistance programmes to achieve military and political goals?”

2.5 CIMO - Context/Interventions/Mechanisms/Outcomes

Denyer and Tranfield (2009, pp. 682-3) cited the Context, Interventions, Mechanisms and Outcomes (CIMO) model as a logical method of deconstructing the review question into four specific, reviewable questions. The CIMO model appeared to be of utility in conducting the systematic literature
review for this thesis and structuring the analysis of the results of that review.
The specific CIMO components were described by the authors as follows:

**Context** – Who are the individuals of interest? Which interpersonal relationships are of interest? Which aspects of the institutional setting are of interest? Which aspects of the wider infrastructural system are of interest? (Denyer and Tranfield, 2009, p. 683, Figure 39.1). In the particular case of military assistance, the specific Context question was: What is the nature of the relationship between donor states and recipient states?

**Interventions** - What is the Intervention of interest? Denyer and Tranfield (2009) cited as Interventions “leadership style, planning and control systems, training, performance management, etc.” (p. 683, Figure 39.1). In the particular case of military assistance, the specific Intervention question was: What is the impact of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states on the efficacy of the military assistance programme?

**Mechanisms** – What are the Mechanisms of interest? What is it about Interventions acting in a Context that leads to the outcome? Why are Mechanisms activated or not activated? (Denyer and Tranfield, 2009, p. 683, Figure 39.1). In the particular case of military assistance, that meant the following questions: What are the particular Mechanisms that can cause broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states to have an impact on the efficacy of military assistance? Political commitment? behaviours? Organizational structures? Leadership? Support?

**Outcomes**– What are the relevant Outcomes? What Outcomes would be important to the individuals involved? How will the Outcomes be measured? What is the primary Outcome and what are the secondary Outcomes? (Denyer and Tranfield, 2009, p. 683, Figure 39.1). In the particular case of military assistance, that meant the following question: Are the military and political goals associated with the military assistance programme achieved?

### 2.5.1 Other Possible Models

There were other models which could have been utilised for this research instead of CIMO. As it involves development of military forces, the widely used framework for the evaluation of training and education generated by Kirkpatrick (1994) could have been utilised in this research. That model remains standard in business, government, military and industry and uses a framework with four levels: reaction, learning, behaviour and results.

However, there were limitations to the Kirkpatrick model. Bates (2004, p. 342) asserted that the model is incomplete and that it does not consider contextual influences in the evaluation of training. The significance of context as cited by Bates indicated a key weakness in the Kirkpatrick model. It also highlighted the advantage of using the CIMO model to consider context.
Another model which could have been utilised was the organizational elements model from Kaufman (2000) which is used in the areas of strategic planning and needs assessment. This model identifies linkages and alignments of inputs, processes, products, outputs and outcomes. Such a model has strong positive attributes to recommend itself with regard to this research. The evaluation of two factors and what is generated at three different levels would be suitable for a military assistance initiative: results (micro level) outputs (macro level) and outcomes (mega level). However, the model suffered from the same weakness as the Kirkpatrick model: the context is not considered.

One additional type of analysis that could have been utilised for this research was costs-consequences analysis. Kaufman et al (1997, pp. 8-9) described it as “a suggested coarse-grained estimate of what one puts into a system and what one gets out of it.” The analysis “provides decision makers with the array of variables to make an informed decision” and it “defines the minimal data required to provide useful indicators of return-on-investment” (Kaufman, 1997, p. 9). However, the authors stressed that “it is intended to be used by leaders and decision makers when there is not the necessity nor the time and/or resources for complete determination of all of the variables that actually go into a full-scale return-on-investment analysis” (Kaufman, 1997, p. 9). With regard to the Baltic programmes, the participating states had the time and resources to thoroughly consider what military assistance initiative would be of greatest value.

The justification for use of the CIMO model was noted by Hartley and Tranfield (2011), who asserted that:

Realist evaluations are comprehensive in that they take account not only of I-O (Intervention-Outcome) logic, but address in addition, the impact of specific Contexts/Circumstances (C) in which the intervention took place. They also identify the Generative Mechanisms (M) that were triggered by the intervention to produce the specific range of intended and unintended outcomes… Because a realist evaluation operates on C-I-M-O logic it attempts to explain ‘what works for whom in which circumstances and why?’ (p. 5).

As an indication of its utility, the CIMO model has been utilised in various types of research. Madu and Kuei (2012) used CIMO in their construction of a model with regard to sustainability management, writing that “This model adopts a systems approach with a focus on the context-intervention-mechanism-outcome (CIMO) logic” (p. 10). Van Aken and Romme (2012) analysed a design science approach to evidence based management and with regard to design propositions, “one would like to have it tested through actual applications and grounded in a theoretical explanation of why this type of contract is super in this particular context. The logic of the field-tested and grounded solution concept is called the CIMO-logic …” (Van Aken and Romme, 2012, p. 147).
In a paper on e-prescribing, King (2009) used CIMO and noted that “while not a structural analogy like inter-organizational systems or social networks, CIMO does provide a prescriptive framework for analysing organizations” (p. 15). Raisanen et al (2014) gathered and organized data in an examination of the requirements for an intergenerational learning game utilising CIMO. Holmstrom, Tuunanen and Kauremaa (2014) noted in a conference paper on logic for design science research theory accumulation that the proposition rests on the notion that “representing the structure and logic of DSR (design science research) theory components by using CIMO makes it easier to understand how design theory components are related, which in turn, enables DSR theory to be more easily evaluated, transferred, and combined” (p. 3701).

In short, there were numerous examples of academic research in which CIMO had proven to be of utility, particularly because of the inclusion of Context. Such a consideration appeared to justify the use of CIMO as the preferable model for this thesis.

2.6 Conduct of the Review

The second stage of the structured literature review involved conducting the review. Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003) noted this begins with “the identification of keywords and search terms” and then a decision by the reviewer “on the search strings that are most appropriate for the study” (p. 215). For this literature review, the three search terms identified were “military assistance,” “defence assistance” and “developing military forces.” The data bases utilised were ABI, EBSCO, Emerald, Praeger, SAGE, Science Direct, Taylor & Francis and Wiley. The three search terms were run in these eight data bases to search for literature on military assistance. The specific time period for searches was for articles from 1990-2013. The justification for selecting 1990 as the start date was to gather articles written from the time of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. As noted by Mott (2001), the focus of attention for military assistance shifted dramatically with the end of the competition between the US and the Union of Soviet Socialists Republic (USSR).

Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003) noted that “searches should not only be conducted in published journals and listed in bibliographic data bases, but also comprise unpublished studies, conference proceedings, industry trials, the Internet and even personal requests to known investigators” (p. 215). It must be conceded that the literature search which was conducted for this thesis did not meet all of those requirements and was limited to the results found from searches conducted in the eight data bases noted above and literature from other sources identified from the searches.

However, Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003) also noted that “the strict criteria used in systematic review are linked to the desire to base reviews on the best-quality evidence” (p. 215). In that regard, the use of the specific search terms and the data bases noted above indicated the structured literature review
conducted for this thesis did result in “the best quality evidence,” particularly as the referenced literature was also drawn upon to supplement the analysis. Denyer and Tranfield (2009) made the case “for the development of a bespoke and fit for purpose methodology, which can cope with the variety and richness of research designs, purposes, and potential end uses of management and organization studies reviews” (p. 672).

The third stage in the process was reporting and dissemination, which provided “a broad ranging descriptive account of the field with specific exemplars” as well as a “thematic analysis” (Tranfield, Denyer and Smart, 2003, p. 218), with Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2000) noting that the result “may be highly critical of the earlier research and seek to discredit it” (p. 45).

2.7 Military Assistance - Results of Systematic Literature Review

The results of the search for the specific terms in the specific journals for the specific period outlined above resulted in thousands of items. However, filtering the results through use of the specific review question and the CIMO sub-questions noted above, the articles relevant for this systematic literature review became apparent. Those results also led to references and other literature on military assistance relevant to the review question and CIMO sub-questions.

As noted above, Denyer and Tranfield (2009, p. 672) supported development of a bespoke methodology suitable for the purpose of the research, and it appeared to be prudent to include academic literature on military assistance relevant to the review question which served as source material for the literature identified in the search. With regard to a framework for analysing the results of the systematic literature review, the CIMO structure appeared to serve as the optimal tool, as it was the basis for the sub-questions which were analysed.

2.7.1 Other Literature on Military Assistance

The academic literature indicated numerous issues involving military assistance. One theme was its role in pursuing foreign policy goals. Pach (1991, p. 4) commented that the US considers “military aid essential to the attainment of vital objectives.” Hovey (1965, p. 256) noted that “most programs of assistance, economic and military, were closely related to meeting immediate military threats.” Sachar (2003, p. 404) asserted that India’s military experience could be used “to build close military ties and healthy, mutually beneficial bilateral relations.” Neuman (1986, p. 126) wrote that the superpowers use “military assistance both to enhance their position in the world and to limit each other’s expansion.”

However, Pach (1991, p. 4) noted that critics assert that military assistance policies “have exacerbated local and regional hostilities … and burdened the United States with new obligations to defend foreign countries.” Moreover, Tessman and Sullivan (2012, p. 11) concluded that “increasing levels of US military aid significantly reduce cooperative foreign policy behaviour” with the
US. Agyeman-Duah (1986, p. 305) asserted that the decision of the Ethiopian military to terminate the US military assistance programme “serves as a serious indictment against the prevailing premise – that military assistance cultivates political attitudes in a recipient country that should prove favourable to the donor nation.”

A second key theme addressed the decision-making process within donor states with regard to military assistance. Anderson and McCauley (2009) asserted that the US makes decisions on military assistance and foreign aid in a pragmatic manner, rather than due to ideology. Poe and Meernik (1995, p. 399) wrote that strategic, political, economic, human rights and economic development issues are all considered in decisions on military aid. However, Pach (1991, p. 6) noted that the Truman administration rapidly expanded US assistance programmes “often with little thought about their ultimate goals.” Moreover, Kilford (2010, p. 8) asserted that Canada was not immune to the demands of other countries and “its own industries to become engaged, militarily, in developing countries by selling weapons and providing military assistance.”

A third key theme was the impact of military assistance on recipient states, which can cover a variety of areas. Wolf (1961, p. 828) outlined the broad question of how military assistance can generate military effectiveness and “yet generate improved economic and political side-effects.” One aspect was the impact of military assistance on the behaviour of recipient states. Sylvan (1976, p. 609) concluded that “sharp increases in military assistance tend to change decidedly the recipient nation’s international conflict and cooperative behaviour” and “the direction of that behaviour change is toward increased conflict and decreased cooperation.”

Another aspect involved direct economic impacts on recipient states. Hartman and Walters (1985, p. 453) noted that receipt of substantial amounts of military aid “was one route to limited upward mobility ... for a small number of countries.” Stein, Ishimatsu and Stoll (1985, p. 42) concluded that “military assistance by the U.S. can have large, and often unanticipated, fiscal effects on the recipient nations.” Khilji and Zampelli (1994, p. 345) asserted that US aid is “highly fungible with a significant portion channelled to the private sector where it finances current consumption relatively more than investment.” Kilford (2010, p. 1) noted that in the early 1960s, there was a belief “that military assistance would be a catalyst for wider economic and political development in the receiving countries.” However, “military forces in the developing world, it would eventually become clear, were not agents of change and modernization at all” (Kilford, 2010, p. 8).

One other aspect involved military assistance and human rights. Pach (1991, p. 4) noted that critics assert that military assistance policies have “assisted more often in the suppression of legitimate opposition than in the repulsion of external aggression.” However, Lefever (1976, p. 85) asserted that the US Military
Assistance Training Program had “advanced the efficiency, professional performance, and readiness of the recipient military services.”

One final key issue involved the practical question of how military assistance projects can be improved. Hajjar (2014, p. 647-8) noted that “effective advisors deploy a multifaceted cultural toolkit filled with peacekeeper-diplomat, warrior, subject matter expert, innovator, leader and other tools.”

In short, there were numerous important aspects of military assistance addressed by the literature which were worthy of study. However, it was also apparent from the literature that a critical aspect of military assistance projects which also should be addressed is the relationship between donor and recipient states, a Context which is addressed in Sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.2. Moreover, it was also apparent from the literature that a significant component of this relationship involves political decisions regarding the initiative, as this Intervention constitutes the foundation of the programme.

2.8 CIMO - Context

As indicated above, with regard to Context, the specific question was: What is the nature of the relationship between donor states and recipient states? While the specific time period for the systematic literature review began in 1990, it is worthwhile noting that much of the early academic research cited by writers in the 1990-2013 period addressed foreign aid in general with only some attention to the specific issue of military assistance. Brown and Opie (1953) provided one of the first overviews of US foreign aid, touching on military assistance. However, the focus of their work was on foreign aid with attention to economic issues. Liska (1960) provided more of a political perspective with attention to military assistance, commentary on donor control and the need for military assistance and foreign aid policies to be consistent.

On those lines, Wolf (1960) examined the issue of allocating donor resources between various recipients and addressed the issue of allocation of resources between economic aid and military assistance. As with Brown and Opie (1953), the focus of Wolf’s work was on the economic aspects of aid. Jordan (1962) analysed military assistance from the practical view of an administrator, asserting that it is important to generate a basic theory to deal with administration, goals and means as well as what can be accomplished through military and economic aid.

In an assessment of US and USSR foreign aid, Walters (1970) provided a political-economic analysis of the aims of donor states, although much of the attention was devoted to economic assistance. Addressing the Context sub-question about donor and recipient states noted above, Pranger and Tahtinen (1974) asserted that a donor state needs to have some direct way of influencing recipient state actions in order for military assistance to be successful, noting that politics, economics and strategy in both the donor and recipient states have to be considered.
2.8.1 Context - Donor/Recipient State Relationship

Detailed research on military assistance is a more recent occurrence. With regard to the Context issue, Mott (1999) proposed that “For military assistance to be effective, a donor must fathom the recipient’s polity, economy, and culture and cause the recipient to adopt desired policies, military strategies, or other behaviors” (p. 17). Indeed, Mott (1999) asserted that “the donor-recipient relationship of military assistance creates its own worldview, its own structural and behavioural norms, and its own set of rewards, punishments, values and incentives” (p. xii).

2.8.2 Context - Long-Term Relationship

Other writers supported Mott’s emphasis on the centrality of the relationship between donor and recipient states. Cottey and Forster (2004) asserted that the relationship between donor and recipient states “should be viewed as a long-term - decades-long - process, rather than an approach likely to produce quick results” (p. 28). With regard to the Context sub-question, Cottey and Forster (2004) wrote that “common interests should be emphasized” and that “functional cooperation and substantive projects may provide a more durable foundation and have a greater impact than more symbolic measures” (p. 29).

The point made by Cottey and Forster (2004) regarding the Context issue of a long-term relationship between donor and recipient states was highlighted in other literature. Glantz (1998a), in the first of his three articles analysing assistance to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, asserted that with regard to these recipient states, “this struggle to overcome the legacies of the past will be a long-term one,” adding that “rather than years or decades, generations will be involved” (p. 4). Glantz (1998a) stressed that:

… the intellectual legacy of Soviet rule may prove to be the most difficult problem in the military to overcome. In fact, this reality poses the greatest barrier to military reform in the three countries and, at the same time, the greatest challenge to foreign military assistance that seeks to foster military reform (p. 4).

Supporting the view put forth by Glantz (1998a), Sieca-Kozlowski (2006) reviewed two books by Forster, Edmunds and Cottey, The Challenge of Military Reform (2002) and Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe (2003), both of which are cited later in this chapter, and stressed that these books enable the reader:

… to better understand the scope of such a task as army professionalization in these countries: new roles and mission must be identified in a changing geopolitical context, resources must be reorganized, and non-military democratic control accepted. The
progress of reform depends on many factors such as resources and the solidity of political commitment… (pp. 170-171).

In short, particularly for countries in the former Warsaw Pact, it was important for the relationship between donor and recipient states to be of a lengthy duration, as successful change of military forces would involve generational change. Referring specifically to Baltic military forces after they had experienced a long period of military assistance from the West, Trapans (2002) noted that “a generational change is evidence” that “a new and well-trained group of younger officers was emerging” (p. 88).

2.8.3 Context - Political and Security Concerns

On the Context question and the specific impact of political and security concerns of recipient states on the nature of the relationship with donor states, Glantz (1998a) commented on the security policy views of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, noting that there is congruence among the leadership of the three countries about security needs (p. 5), particularly about the centrality of Article V of the NATO Treaty regarding mutual security guarantees (pp. 6-7). There was therefore a strong desire on the part of these recipient states to have a robust military assistance relationship with Western donor states.

Political and security concerns held by donor states also had an impact on the relationship with recipient states. Glantz (1998b) noted that “national-level policy documents provide clear aims, objectives, strategies, and performance indicators for the US military (security) assistance program” and that these documents “which established, implemented, and have guided the operation of various assistance program elements, generally accord with national guidance” (p. 2).

However, highlighting points which have an impact on the Context issue of the relationship between donor and recipient states, Glantz (1998b) commented that four issues “closely associated with the program’s aims, objectives, and methodologies are generating some concern and confusion in the countries receiving military assistance” listing these issues as: 1) overall US aims, 2) the role of commercial motives for military assistance, 3) a perceived shift in US policy after the Madrid Summit in 1997, and 4) the congruence of US and NATO aims and objectives, particularly after Madrid (p. 2). Glantz (1998b) asserted that “the US military assistance program must address and clarify these four issues if it is to remain coherent, credible to both recipient country and NATO ally alike, and effective as a foreign policy tool” (p. 8).

On the specific Context question of the relationship between donor and recipient states in military assistance projects, Reveron (2010) noted that “Different from direct action or counterinsurgency, security assistance programmes attempt to strengthen the partner to provide for its own security, thus enabling political and economic development” (p. xi).
2.8.4 Context - Goals of Donor States

As noted in Section 2.7.1, among the various areas of academic literature on military assistance was the issue of the goals of donor states in providing such aid in pursuit of overarching security policy goals. Specifically with regard to the Context question in this thesis, the significance of military assistance and the donor-recipient relationship was emphasized by Reveron (2010) in his comment that “Security assistance is now a key pillar of U.S. military strategy, which places American officers and non-commissioned officers in more than 150 countries to train, mentor and professionalize other militaries” (p. 2), adding that “security assistance can help democracies consolidate, fragile states avoid failure, and authoritarian states liberalize” (p. 6). Reveron (2010) noted that military assistance involves a wide variety of non-combat activities between donor and recipient states, and that:

By doing so, the United States seeks to improve its international image, strengthen the state sovereignty system by training and equipping security forces, pre-empt localized violence from escalating into regional crises, and protect U.S. national security by addressing underlying conditions that inspire and sustain violent extremism (p. 6).

With regard to the Context issue of the goals of donor states in assisting recipient states, and with a focus on the US as a particular donor nation, then-US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (2010) commented in an on-line article that strategic realities demand that the US improve on “building partner capacity,” and that “building the governance and security capacity of other countries must be a critical element of U.S. national security strategy.” Gates (2010) asserted that within the US military “advising and mentoring indigenous security forces is moving from the periphery of institutional priorities” to a point where it is “a key mission for the armed forces as a whole.” Indeed, Gates (2010) stressed that “there has not been enough attention paid to building the institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or the human capital (including leadership skills and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the long term.”

Referring to principles cited by Cottey and Forster (2004) and also by Glantz (1998a) regarding a long-term approach by donor states, Gates (2010) commented that “security assistance efforts must be conducted steadily and over the long term so as to provide some measure of predictability and planning for the U.S. government and, what is more significant, for its partners abroad,” and concluded by noting that “helping other countries better provide for their own security will be a key and enduring test of U.S. global leadership and a critical part of protecting U.S. security as well.”

2.8.5 Context - Review

The specific Context question was: What is the nature of the relationship between donor states and recipient states? A review of the literature
specifically on the Context question indicated recognition of the significance of this relationship for military assistance projects.

A number of important aspects of the donor-recipient relationship have been noted. Mott (1999) asserted that it is central to successful military assistance initiatives. Cottey and Forster (2004), Glantz (1998a and 1998b) and Siecakoziowski (2006) put great emphasis on the importance of a long-term relationship between the donor and recipient states and the complexity of assisting states in developing military forces. Reveron (2010) and Gates (2010) highlighted the significance of the political and security policy focus of donor states in shaping military assistance programmes.

In general, on the specific issue of Context, there appeared to be a view that the nature of the donor-recipient relationship is important to military assistance programmes and various aspects of that relationship have been identified in the literature. The next question which arose was that of specific Interventions and the impact on these initiatives.

2.9 CIMO - Interventions

The next area in CIMO is Interventions. For this research, the specific question regarding Interventions was the following: What is the impact of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states on the efficacy of the military assistance programme?

2.9.1 Interventions - Mott

One of the most detailed analyses of this question was provided by Mott (1999) and is worth examining in detail. In the first of his three books on the subject, Mott (1999) began with the general assertion that:

Success of donor policies would, thus, depend less on donor actions than on the donor-recipient relationship - or perhaps a set of necessary conditions to allow donor success. In such a donor-recipient relationship, success of recipient policies would be either the converse - when goals diverge - or in parallel - when their goals converge - with donor success (p. xii).

Mott (1999, p. 21) analysed eight instances of wartime military assistance through four independent variables (italics in original text):

Convergence, compatibility or congruence of donor and recipient purposes, goals, and objectives in establishing the relationship determines whether recipient mediation is additive or subtractive to donor resources and efforts.
Control by the donor, with corresponding responsivity by the recipient, can ensure additive mediation by the recipient or improve the results of subtractive mediation to neutral indeterminacy.

Commitment of donor combat forces provides the foundation on which military assistance can construct a capable recipient military force.

Coherence or integration of donor military assistance with donor foreign policy and strategy strengthens donor control, strengthens convergence, and rationalizes a commitment of donor forces.

As a result, Mott (1999, p. 25) asserted that:

The set of apparent conditions for a successful donor-recipient relationship involves four basic elements, and perhaps several corollaries, that seem critically related to success in achieving donor purposes:

- Common, converging, or complementary purposes of donor and recipient;
- Donor control of resources transferred;
- Combined donor and recipient military capabilities adequate to achieve donor purposes through military operations;
- Donor use of military assistance as one element of an integrated approach to foreign policy, military strategy, and economic policy.

Continuing with his analysis, the conclusions reached by Mott (1999, p. 267) encompassed a set of uniformities regarding the donor-recipient relationship which appeared to be directly related to the Intervention question on the significance of broad political agreement between the donor and recipient states for military assistance initiatives (italics in original text):

Convergence of National Aims and Interests: The donor and the recipient share common national aims and interests expressed in terms of national purposes, policy goals, and military objectives in peace, and focussed in war goals, military objectives, and complementary strategies in times of war.

Donor Control of the Relationship: The donor retains, and exercises, sufficient control of all resources transferred to promote donor interests and adequate influence over the recipient military forces to ensure that their operations achieve donor purposes.

Committing Donor Military Forces: The donor is politically willing and economically able to commit military forces as necessary in conjunction
with providing military assistance to ensure achieving donor aims when recipient forces are inadequate, unable or unwilling to do so.

*Cohesion of Donor Policies and Strategies*: The donor integrates foreign policy, military strategy, military assistance, and economic aid into a single cohesive, coherent, global approach to achieving donor aims through, with, and in the recipient country.

Concluding his analysis, Mott (1999) asserted that:

... the set of uniformities provides the foundation for a coherent theory of military assistance. The structure and features of the relationship between the donor and the recipient are, clearly, critical elements of any explanation or prediction about military assistance. The donor-recipient relationship determines the likelihood of donor success, its timing, its cost, which features of the relationship most influence donor success, and the relative strength of any exogenous factors in achieving or frustrating donor aims (p. 268).

The initial analysis by Mott (1999) involved instances of wartime military assistance. Subsequently, Mott (2001) examined military assistance in the Cold War era, focusing on Soviet military assistance. Mott (2001) noted that the Cold War context “required several profound refinements” (p. 325), but asserted that “the results of this empirical analysis of Cold-War Soviet military assistance confirm the conclusion of the earlier companion work” (p. 324).

In his first study, Mott (1999) asserted that “US policy was not the determining factor in producing results” in military assistance programmes, and that outcomes were determined by the donor-recipient relationship (p. xiii). In his third study, Mott (2002) concluded that his empirical analysis “supports the earlier conclusions that ‘the structure and features of the relationship between the donor and the recipient are, clearly, critical elements of any explanation or prediction about military assistance’” (p. 311).

### 2.9.2 Interventions - Training

In the third of his articles, Glantz (1999) provided an explanation of why the Intervention of broad political decisions between donor and recipient states has an impact on the Outcomes of military assistance projects, commenting that “for military assistance to achieve its ambitious aims, it must be comprehensive and effective” and that “it must also satisfy the security needs of recipient countries” (p. 3).

The literature indicated that many of the issues (such as training) cited by Denyer and Tranfield (2009, p. 683) appeared to be affected by broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states, which was the Intervention question. One aspect appeared to be the type of training programme agreed between donor and recipient states. Handy (2003) wrote that the US “should
continue to craft customized training packages for individual nations and strengthen the follow-up mechanism to ensure that these programs are appropriate and that the train-the-trainer concept is working” (p. 63). Addressing another aspect of the broad political decisions regarding training, Handy (2003) added that the US must also “intensify its efforts to involve major regional powers (anchor states) in the program” (p. 63).

With regard to training requirements for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, Glantz (1998a) asserted that training remains “a major deficiency in the militaries of all three countries. In light of current and likely future fiscal resource problems in some, if not all, of these countries, all will require greater and more imaginative US training assistance” (p. 27). Glantz (1998b) specifically noted that “training poses one of the most imposing challenges to all three countries,” adding that “training should be one of the highest priority types of assistance during the two-year transition period before the three countries achieve full NATO membership” (p. 8).

With regard to specific types of training as a manifestation of the Intervention of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states, Glantz (1998b) asserted that “the most practical and valuable dimension of US training assistance to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary derives from their participation in the wide variety of exercises” conducted by the US European Command and Allied Command, with comments by officials from those three countries indicating “they consider the program to be a vital one that warrants further expansion” (p. 17).

On the topic of broad political decisions and training, Szayna and Larrabee (1995) assessed Eastern European military reform and agreed that “personnel training is perhaps the most important area in which the United States can make a long-term impact” (p. xi). In particular, Szayna and Larrabee (1995) put forward the proposition that the US should help those states develop a cadre of civilian personnel and also reassess US-based training of military officers from these countries “since the current efforts have had limited impact” (p. xi).

### 2.9.3 Interventions - Education

A separate issue involved education (as opposed to training) as another important aspect of the Intervention of broad political decisions in the donor-recipient relationship. Glantz (1998b) asserted that “the single most important facet of military assistance is the educational effort designed to change minds and attitudes. This effort and its consequences will ultimately determine how lasting the other military reforms will be” (p. 26). After a review of numerous aspects of US military assistance regarding this issue, Glantz (1998b) concluded that “the vital intellectual (educational) dimension of military assistance programmes is no longer sufficient to meet the growing needs of the three NATO-accession countries” adding that “this is the single most serious deficiency in the assistance program” (p. 39). Glantz (1998b) noted that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary “possess a handful (8-15) of
educated civilian and military defense policy specialists and a woefully inadequate number of military theoreticians and analysts” and concluded that “the entire intellectual dimension of US military assistance requires fundamental reassessment and much greater efforts” (p. 40).

### 2.9.4 Interventions - Recipient State Assumption of Control

Assessment of BALTBAT indicated the significance of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states on the efficacy of the assistance programme. The Memorandum of Understanding specifically noted that the intention of the donor and recipient states was that there would be “mechanisms by which the Baltic States can themselves in the future maintain a peacekeeping capability” (BALTBAT Memorandum of Understanding, Article 2, para 1). Fischer (2003) made the general point on the overarching political agreement regarding these initiatives, and stressed the significance of having the Baltic countries develop sufficient capabilities to gradually take over the BALTBAT project (p. 13).

### 2.9.5 Interventions - Funding

Funding of the military assistance initiative was another area which was a result of a broad political decision by the donor state and could generate difficulties with the recipient state. Glantz (1998b) noted that there were problems with regard to US funding, asserting that “funding of virtually all facets of the assistance program is barely adequate for current needs and will be inadequate to future needs,” adding that funding levels do not match the scope and importance of overall program aims, specifically, the reform of recipient states’ defense establishments and the improvement of their defense posture” (p. 54).

### 2.9.6 Interventions - Review

The specific question regarding Interventions was the following: What is the impact of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states on the efficacy of the military assistance programme? Mott (1999) provided the most detailed analysis of the significance of those broad political decisions and the prospects of failure for the initiative if there is a dispute between the donor and recipient states. Glantz (1998a, 1998b), Handy (2003) and Szayna and Larrabee (1995) also appeared to concur that the broad policy decisions between donor and recipient states regarding training in particular are important for the efficacy of the initiative. Moreover, such broad political decisions have an impact on areas such as education and funding (Glantz, 1998b). With regard to BALTBAT in particular, Fischer (2003) noted the significance of political agreement with regard to recipient state assumption of control.

It appeared that there was a reasonable basis to assess broad political decisions between donor and recipient states as a specific Intervention with regard to military assistance programmes. The next question was the extent to
which the literature indicated specific Mechanisms would trigger the particular Outcomes sought in the military assistance programme.

2.10 CIMO - Mechanisms

With regard to Mechanisms, it is worthwhile to reiterate that Mechanisms are what trigger Outcomes. As noted previously, the specific questions for this research regarding Mechanisms were: What are the particular Mechanisms that can cause broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states to have an impact on the efficacy of military assistance? Political commitment? Behaviours? Organizational structures? Leadership? Support?

2.10.1 Mechanisms - Broad Overview

Glantz (1999) cited a number of items which arise from the Intervention of broad political agreement between donor and recipient states and have an impact on the Outcomes of military assistance projects, writing that:

First, to succeed, the military assistance program requires real national commitment to it, particularly in terms of the focus, attention, and human and financial resources commensurate with its ultimate importance. Second, while its aims must be consistent with US values and national interests, they must also recognize and accord with the values and interests of other NATO members, prospective NATO members, and partners alike. Third, the US must divorce the military assistance program from traditional security assistance to rid it of the damaging perception that it is more about arms sales than real assistance. Fourth, the US must structure the program for maximum efficiency to reduce friction, confusion, and redundancy and to improve control, communications, and efficiency. Fifth, and most important, individuals who possess a deep and fundamental appreciation of the conditions the program is designed to address must provide informed guidance at the top and informed administration at all levels below (pp. 3-4).

2.10.2 Mechanisms - Commitment by Donor States

One Mechanism involved the commitment by the donor state to the military assistance project, manifested by a long-term commitment due to the extensive amount of time needed to generate Outcomes. Cottey and Forster (2004) emphasized the significance of time and that such efforts need to be viewed “as a long-term policy instrument that may only reap dividends after many years, even decades” (p. 74), adding that:

Generational change will be particularly important, and the full benefits of defence diplomacy may not be seen until new generations of officers move up through the ranks. Western governments therefore need to have patience when defence diplomacy does not produce dramatic results overnight, and provide sustained long-term support for
engagement with other countries, even when there are setbacks in the reform process (p. 75).

Mott (1999) asserted that “a critical feature of the donor-recipient relationship involves the ‘commitment’ of the donor to the relationship” (p. 19) and goes on to note that there is a need for “focused management, priority for resource allocation, and full donor attention within an integrated holistic policy to achieve some basic primary war purpose” (p. 269).

2.10.3 Mechanisms - Control by Donor States

With regard to the Mechanism of control by the donor state, Mott (1999) provided the view that:

The degree, type, and level of control exerted by the donor over the recipient’s use of military assistance and over those recipient forces supported by military assistance, form a critical component of the relationship, especially when the interests of the donor and recipient do not coincide. Without close donor control, the recipient military forces can be expected to operate in accordance with recipient, rather than donor interest, and by mediating donor resources, the recipient can be expected to divert those resources to its own purposes (p. 22).

With regard to BALTBAT, the organizational structure involved policy (Steering Group) as well as operational (Military Working Group) decisions. Brett (2001) asserted that the two groups did good work in acquiring and distributing equipment, arranging training and support, and implementing a successful “training the trainers” approach in BALTBAT (p. 7). Raunio (2002) concurred on the success of the “training the trainers” approach.

In an on-line article, Bergman (2000) highlighted the fact that the organizational structure for BALTBAT involved clear divisions of responsibility among the Nordic donor states in particular: the Danes handled training of reconnaissance and signal platoons; Norway trained the headquarters platoon and medical platoon; Sweden provided training of maintenance, supply and engineering platoons; and Finland trained the catering and transportation platoons. Bergman (2000) added that the division of labour extended to the type of equipment and material that was provided. Denmark supplied light mortars, sub-machine guns, trucks, generators, depot stores’ shelf systems, military police platoon equipment, and weapon armoury security alarms. Sweden donated rifles and provided training and assistance on deployment. Norway provided training as well as anti-tank rockets, mortars and medical material. Finland provided training and assistance. All of these organizational decisions ensured a division of responsibility which distributed the burden among numerous donor states.

With regard to the selection of the Danish/Nordic model for the development of BALTBAT, Brett (2001, p. 18) wrote that in early 1994, there were basically two
“inter-linked tracks” regarding international support for the Baltic nations. First, with the Nordic countries, there was “an existing close co-operation on UN and peacekeeping matters” and second, with the UK, there was cooperation on basic military and English language training (Brett, 2001, p. 18). Those two streams of assistance to the Baltic governments merged in a variety of different fora. Nordic Foreign Ministers then agreed to offer support to a Baltic Battalion, with subsequent specific proposals for the use of Nordic instructors for training in the Baltic states as well as Nordic agreement on efforts to see if other countries would be interested in participating (Brett, 2001, p. 18).

As a result, the 1994 Memorandum of Understanding establishing BALTBAT noted in Article 3, paragraph 5 that “the Nordic States will provide peacekeeping training and will promote the use of UN peacekeeping procedures throughout the programme.” In addition, Article 3, paragraph 6 added that the UK would provide English language training and basic military infantry training.

Brett (2001) wrote that the meetings which preceded the formal agreement on establishing BALTBAT “produced circumstances that lead to Denmark adopting a role as leading supporting nation in the project” (p. 20). Article 3, paragraph 1 of the 1994 MOU noted that a multinational group of military experts “under Danish chairmanship is responsible for developing the detailed aspects of the cooperative programme of assistance…” Bergman (2000) added that Denmark accepted the role as the leading supporting state for BALTBAT, donated more material to the initiative than the other Nordic states and “accepted a special responsibility of co-ordinating assistance from the supporting nations.”

However, it was not a specific “Danish model” which was adopted. As indicated above, as well as later in this thesis by some interviewees, arrangements for BALTBAT were set up on a somewhat ad hoc basis. As an example, Moeller (2000, p. 39) criticized the decision to utilise UK tactics and doctrine as most of the Training Team officers came from the Nordic countries. This was not a case of utilising the “British model,” and there was no movement from one model (Nordic) to another (UK). From the origins of BALTBAT, there was simply an attempt to utilise the best possible arrangements to optimise the use of contributions from donor states.

Some writers highlighted organizational weaknesses in BALTBAT. Moeller (2000) asserted that equipment donations were disorganized, and that it was a mistake for BALTBAT Training Teams (TTs) to have moved from a training function to an advisory role. However, the general assessment from the literature appeared to support the view of Brett (2001) that there was effective coordination in channelling military assistance under BALTBAT (p. 59) and the BALTBAT experience “provided a useful model for other initiatives” (p. 56) which were subsequently initiated with the Baltic governments.
2.10.4 Mechanisms - Political Motivation

Political motivation also appeared to be a Mechanism which has an impact on the generation of Outcomes. Particularly for donor or recipient countries which are focussed on a political goal, such as membership in NATO, achieving such a goal can provide a political impetus that can be important. Glantz (1998a) asserted that:

NATO’s enunciation of military criteria for entry into its ranks, however vaguely couched in terms of interoperability along with the more public and transparent political, economic and social requirements, lit a fire under the issue of national military reform and made it both a credible and important endeavour (p. 5).

Glantz (1998a) stressed that this motivation was critical as:

…reform of the military, including attention to restored military capability, became a measure of the countries’ ability to qualify for entry into vitally critical Western political and military security organizations, specifically NATO and the European Union … (p. 4).

Supporting Glantz (1998a) with regard to motivation as a Mechanism, Krivas (2003) commented on the significance of public support, noting that NATO enlargement has been “the major external factor influencing military-society relations in Lithuania at both popular and political levels” adding that “NATO membership is a goal that is strongly supported by Lithuanian society” (p. 120).

At the policy level, Urbelis and Urbonas (2002) addressed the significance of motivation, writing that the strategic goal of joining NATO led to “a qualitatively new stage in the development of Lithuanian defence policy” (p. 114). Assessing another Baltic state, Trapans (2006) also commented on the issue of motivation among policy-makers, asserting that a focus on NATO membership “gave the Latvian defence reform process a defined - though not always consistent – set of targets to aim for” adding that “it also allowed Latvia to receive extensive Western assistance quite early on in its defence reforms” (p. 67).

Trapans (2003) addressed the impact of motivation in an earlier assessment, commenting that Latvia’s security policy is based on the principle that joint Baltic defence measures “would not only be more effective, but would also create a better opportunity for the three Baltic States to gain admittance to NATO” (p. 103). Edmunds, Forster and Cottey (2003) concurred with that point, asserting that Western institutions and NATO in particular have acted “as lodestones for military reform efforts in those countries which have identified Western integration as a key foreign policy goal” (p. 253).
2.10.5 Mechanisms - Appropriate Model

Another Mechanism noted in the literature was the importance of adopting the appropriate model to be used in providing military assistance. Supporting the view of the significance of adopting an appropriate model, Foot (2001) noted that when considering the BALTDEFCOL as a 'model' for other regions the key issue is transferability and determining whether “(a) these or similar factors are available elsewhere, or (b) if these factors are not available, whether they can be substituted with others that will make for success and sustainability” (p. 120). Foot (2001) framed the question as whether a BALTDEFCOL-type approach is only possible “because a degree of regional security already exists, or whether – in less benign circumstances – such an institution can help to create the conditions necessary to build regional peace and stability” (p. 120).

Some of the literature on the Baltic initiatives addressed the overarching issue of military assistance and the specific Mechanism of the advice provided by donor states to recipient states and the impact that can have on Outcomes. Clemmesen (2000) provided a good example of this type of commentary with a broad overview of Western aid to the Baltic capitals. While including specific recommendations to improve assistance, such as holding more military exercises, Clemmesen (2000, pp. 11-12) provided five points of general advice to donor states. First, the states must accept the existing situation. If a system is in place, it makes no sense to work to adopt a new system, even if that may arguably be a "better" system. Over time, the recipient nation can select the appropriate system based on experience. Second, recipient states need experience in implementation. Arguments about which equipment or organizational pattern to use are irrelevant. The point is to become familiar with whatever is in place.

Third, one must recognize that long-term plans are irrelevant to meeting immediate challenges. Fourth, supporting states have to coordinate their own efforts and support each other more strenuously. Finally, there should be a concerted effort to not "reinvent the wheel" constantly, and previous decisions should be the basis for future actions. If there are disagreements, it is imperative to have open discussions on the need for a course change.

2.10.6 Mechanisms - Training

There has been research into what Mechanisms could generate greater Outcomes with regard to training, which is one aspect of the Intervention of the broad political agreement between donor and recipient states. Without a specific focus on training under military assistance programmes, Foxworth (2012) utilised “a qualitative grounded theory research process to analyse and code data collected on leaders’ ability to influence training transfer in Army units” and noted that:

...through constant comparison and coding of collected data, five influences - leadership practices, perceived value of training, continuous
and quality learning, operational support and shared leadership knowledge - emerged as key behaviours and practices that supported the Leadership Competence and Support Application model, which depicts how senior NCO (Non-Commissioned Officers) leaders use training-transfer practices and effective leadership to ensure team development (p. 30).

Foxworth (2012) commented that “the findings from the current study succeeded in generating a study that addressed behaviors and practices of U.S. Army senior NCOs,” adding that “the motivation behind the study was to uncover insights into why and how training transfer is manifested back to the workplace” (p. 32). Regarding the need for more research, Foxworth (2012) noted that “additional theoretical research is needed on training transfer, as evidenced by inconsistencies in the use of models and frameworks by the research reviewed” (p. 32).

While Foxworth’s (2012) research was not directed at the question of training as a part of military assistance initiatives, it would appear that the findings are relevant to that specific area. Foxworth (2012) asserted that the five core themes that emerged from the research conducted in the study “resulted in the emergence of the leadership competency and support application theory, which supports leaders’ influence on training transfer among senior Army NCOs,” adding that “the essence of the theory is the core practices and behaviors that senior NCO leaders use to facilitate training-transfer processes in developing individual and collective competence within their units” (p. 48).

On another general aspect of improvement of military training, and specifically technology-based experiential learning approaches concerning training, Vogel-Walcutt, Fiorella and Malone (2013) asserted that there is a need for “creation of improved training systems through the incorporation of a repository of research-based instructional strategies that can be employed across the entire training cycle” (p. 1490). Once again, while the research is not directly focussed on training as part of military assistance programmes, the findings appeared relevant to the discussion of Mechanisms.

Vogel-Walcutt, Fiorella and Malone (2013) asserted that “there is overwhelming evidence that direct instructional support is a necessary component of optimal training environments,” but that “although this approach is well supported in the literature, military training systems are often not designed accordingly” and the military often utilises “minimally guided approaches” (p. 1491). The authors therefore asserted that “the design of training systems will be most optimal when (a) explicit instructional guidance is provided to notice trainees and (b) when guidance is gradually adapted in line with the development of trainee expertise” (Vogel-Walcutt, Fiorella and Malone, 2013, p. 1491).
2.10.7 Mechanisms - Negative Factors

While a discussion of Mechanisms usually addresses those factors which can enhance the generation of Outcomes from a military assistance initiative, some Mechanisms may be factors that need to be avoided to ensure Outcomes arise. Glantz (1998b) put forward the proposition that “it is clear that mixing military assistance and arms sales promotes volatility in a program that requires greater stability” (p. 59) and that the “association of military assistance with arms sales often discredits the assistance effort and, in doing so, lessens the program’s effectiveness” (p. 55). Glantz (1998b) therefore recommended that the connection between military assistance with arms sales “must cease in order to protect the professional ethics of the officer corps and the overall reputation of the military assistance program” (p. 60).

2.10.8 Mechanisms - Efficient Planning

One Mechanism which appeared to have an impact on Outcomes is the efficiency of the planning and implementation process of the donor state. Szayna et al (2004) noted that the demanders of Army International Activities (AIA) “operate on the basis of an in-built bias in favour of demanding more AIA than can be resourced” and they “do not have a full understanding of the resourcing problems and tradeoffs involved in AIA choices” (p. 2). Szayna et al. (2004) asserted that the existing systems run by the US military commands “are plagued by weaknesses in identifying and communicating the costs incurred by conducting AIA and other security cooperation activities” and “there is no systematic communication” between the Army and command planners on the costs of conducting AIA (p. 36). Szayna et al. (2004) stressed that “The Army’s internal resource allocation process is not transparent” and “even experienced resource managers cannot calculate the resources devoted to AIA” (p. 36).

Continuing on that point, Szayna et al (2004) asserted that “rather than national strategic goals driving the process, the primary determinant of AIA has been continuity,” adding that “the main determinant of this year’s budget seems to have been last year’s budget” (pp. 66-67). As a solution, Szayna et al. (2004) noted “the planning system of AIA needs greater flexibility and efficiency” adding that:

- the need for flexibility and adaptability in security cooperation, because of shifting priorities (new partners, different mix of activities) and in order to seize opportunities that may be short-lived, have made essential the reform of the security cooperation planning and implementation process (p. 68).

2.10.9 Mechanisms - Role of Individuals

One additional Mechanism appeared to return to the fact that military assistance projects involve the actions of individuals to implement a policy. Glantz (1998b), who makes a strong case for US policy decisions to be re-assessed,
noted that “it is the personnel who man the assistance system who make it work as well as it does” (p. 51).

Further on that point, Clemmesen (2000, p. 9) noted that while advisors provided by supporting states have the best intentions, they find themselves in a difficult situation. They only have a basic knowledge of the situation, in this case, that of the Baltic nations, and are trying to work in a defence establishment in the early stages of learning new skills. Due to short tours and rapid turnover, there is a lack of continuity, and advisors, at times, even undermine aid programmes of other donor states.

On a specific Baltic initiative, Foot (2001) judged the Baltic Defence College as “a remarkable experiment in combined military education” and asserted that “there is a prima facie case for considering the BALTDEFCOL as a model that could be applied elsewhere within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership community of nations” (p. 119). Indicating the significance of individual initiative and good leadership as a Mechanism, Foot (2001) praised the “committed, energetic and effective leadership of the founding Commandant - Danish Brigadier General Michael Clemmesen- widely accepted by the participant and sponsor states” (p. 120).

**2.10.10 Mechanisms: Review**

The specific questions regarding Mechanisms were: What are the particular Mechanisms that can cause broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states to have an impact on the efficacy of military assistance? Political commitment? Behaviours? Organizational structures? Leadership? Support?

Glantz (1999) highlighted a number of important factors which have an impact on the generation of Outcomes from military assistance projects: national commitment; values and interests; a separation of military assistance from arms sales; structuring the programme for maximum efficiency; and individuals who provide guidance at the top and good administration at lower levels. Cottey and Forster (2004) and Mott (1999) focussed on the significance of donor state commitment, namely the need for a long-term commitment. Mott (1999) also highlighted the significance of control by the donor states, and Brett (2001), Bergman (2000) and Moeller (2000) provided commentary on the issue of donor state control in BALTBAT in particular.

Edmunds, Forster and Cottey (2003), Trapans (2006), Krivas (2003) and Urbelis and Urbonas (2002) supported the view of Glantz (1998a) that political motivation among recipient states is a key mechanism. Foot (2001) and Clemmesen (2000) placed an emphasis on the need to ensure the appropriate model is adopted as a Mechanism which is important in providing military assistance.

In short, there were a number of Mechanisms noted in the literature which have an impact on the generation of Outcomes from military assistance initiatives. The issue which then arose was whether proper assessment of such Outcomes was being conducted.

2.11 CIMO - Outcomes

The final framework for analysis of the literature concerned Outcomes. As noted previously, for this research, the specific question regarding Outcomes was: Are the military and political goals associated with the military assistance programme achieved?

2.11.1 Outcomes - No Measurement

There was a substantial amount of commentary highlighting the fact that the measurement of Outcomes has not been addressed, and this constitutes one of the key problems with military assistance projects. Cottey and Forster (2004, p. 76) stressed that there has been little comparative analysis of these various programmes and few attempts to judge their effectiveness. In an extensive critique, Cottey and Forster (2004) put forward the proposition that:

Despite the expansion of defence diplomacy activities over the last decade, there has been little comparative analysis of such activities and there have been few attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of military cooperation and assistance…. Similarly, although Western states have been seeking to support the democratisation of civil-military relations in Africa, Central and Eastern Europe and South America, these projects have remained largely separate and there has been little comparative analysis of the challenges involved and the effectiveness of different forms of assistance. Western governments can and should do more to establish formal procedures and mechanisms for evaluating the effectiveness of defence diplomacy activities, and should undertake more comparative analysis of the lessons to be learned from experiences in different regions and countries (pp. 76-77).

2.11.2 Outcomes - Training

On the specific issue of measuring the Outcomes from training, Read and Kleiner (1996) stressed that:
The final phase of the training process, and probably the most important in terms of increasing effectiveness, is evaluation. The old adage holds: “that which gets measured gets done”. It is important that someone has the responsibility for developing an efficient training programme and that this efficiency be measured. To be considered effective, the dollar value of the benefits of training, such as increased productivity, must exceed the training costs (pp. 28-29).

Foxworth (2012) noted that “one of the problems identified was that military units and businesses conduct training and in several instances do so without standardized processes to measure training transfer” (pp. 52-53). Foxworth (2012) added that “another significant problem identified was that organizations continually question how dollars invested in training are realized in the workplace in tangible ways” (p. 53).

Other writers asked whether the wrong Outcomes had been set with regard to training. Vogel-Walcutt, Fiorella and Malone (2013) asserted that while “the military has focused much attention on the development of replicable and generalizable training systems,” many are designed “without considering the effectiveness and efficacy of embedded instructional strategies” (p. 1490). Vogel-Walcutt, Fiorella and Malone (2013) asserted that military training is “generally more concerned with the same training outcomes being achieved in a timely and inexpensive manner – that is, effective training in the military may mean the same learning outcomes achieved in less time” and proposed that it is important for military training systems to move “to a learner-centered approach which employs instructional strategies that are consistent with trainees' cognitive architecture and the specific goals of the training environment” (p. 1492).

### 2.11.3 Outcomes - Education

Addressing the Outcome of military education in a more general manner, Foot (2001) concluded by noting “the positive contribution combined defence colleges can make to regional security,” and while conceding that the experience “demonstrates some limitations,” provided commentary that:

any educational and training institution in the military and security field should be about adding value, exploring potential, developing understanding, establishing international linkages and addressing security in its widest meaning (p. 127).

### 2.11.4 Outcomes - Are Measurable

Some of the literature stressed that simply because Outcomes have not been measured, that does not mean that they cannot be measured. Reveron (2010) wrote that Outcomes can and have been measured, asserting that:
Security assistance programs have clearly measurable objectives beyond the good feeling generated by improving people’s lives. These include the strength of regional security arrangements, the types of regional cooperation (air, maritime, land, customs, etc.) and the relative receptivity of U.S. forces within the partner country. Internal to countries, one can measure how well partners combat security challenges, the strength of civil-military relations, and the levels of respect for human rights (pp. 174-175).

2.11.5 Outcomes - Measurement by US Africa Command

Reveron (2010) cited as one example the fact that US military commands recognise the significance of measuring the effectiveness of their assistance programmes. The US Africa Command, noted Reveron (2010), uses three strategic end states that allow for measurement:

1) African countries can provide for their own security and can contribute to security on the continent, measured, for example, by participation in peacekeeping operations and “the relative ability of the government to combat threats.”

2) African governments have the capability to mitigate the threats from “organizations committed to violent extremism,” measured, for example, by levels of internal violence, or levels of cooperation between nations and international organizations regarding security issues, and

3) African countries maintain professional military forces that respect the rule of law and the norms regarding human rights, measured, for example, by human rights abuses committed by the military (p. 175).

2.11.6 Outcomes - Measurement Regarding GPOI

Another study of a US government programme provided additional detail with regard to the effort to determine Outcomes by measuring military and political goals. Assessing the US Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), Serafino (2007) noted that members of Congress had expressed concerns over several shortcomings of the GPOI concept, including “a lack of a strategic plan and evaluation program” (p. CRS-17). Serafino (2007) reported that Congress had four questions of particular concern, which appeared to be metrics for assessing the achievement of specific goals:

(1) Is GPOI meeting its target number of trainees? (2) Are those trained by GPOI to be trainers actually training other troops? (3) Are the soldiers (and police) trained under GPOI actually deployed to international peacekeeping operations? (4) Is the training provided sufficient to enable soldiers … to handle the necessary range of peacekeeping tasks effectively? (p. CRS-19).
Serafino (2007) noted that the US awarded a contract to DFI International to develop a system to evaluate GPOI and to monitor its results against those metrics, and that data had been gathered to answer the first question with some confidence and work was under way to collect data to answer the second and third questions (p. CRS-19). Serafino (2007) concluded that while the numbers “indicate that it is possible that US-funded GPOI training efforts may indeed reach the GPOI goal of 75,000 troops trained” (p. CRS-19) one area in which the numbers may fall short of some expectations, however, “is the proportion of numbers of peacekeeping trainers who are trained” noting that “the available data show that trainers have comprised only 6% of those trained” (p. CRS-20).

2.11.7 Outcomes - Absence of Clear Aims

The difficulty of measuring Outcomes may be due to the fact that Outcomes have not been clearly stated. Glantz (1998b) commented on the “achievements and shortcomings in the US assistance program” (p. 1), and, as noted earlier, asserted that four issues “are generating some concern and confusion in the countries receiving military assistance” with the first question centred on overall US aims (p. 2). One issue of particular relevance to the discussion of Outcomes involved “the continued and persistent absence among the stated aims and objectives of US military assistance of any direct reference to improving the security posture or defensive capabilities of countries receiving the assistance” (Glantz, 1998b, pp. 2-3).

A lack of clarity regarding Outcomes can also arise from organizational and procedural shortcomings. Szayna et al (2004) assessed the US Army’s security cooperative activities and asserted that bureaucratic procedures and structures prevent the clear delineation of Outcomes. Szayna et al (2004) judged that the Army “does not possess a comprehensive understanding and appreciation of the extent of the Army’s activities in security cooperation” (p. xiii) and that under the Department of Defense definitions, “security cooperation” broadly covers a wide range of activities conducted with allies and friends that build relationships, military capabilities and also provide access to US forces (p. 7).

As a result, Szayna et al (2004) asserted that “there is no effective linkage between the execution of security cooperation missions and the provision of accurate planning information,” which leaves the Army without “effective measures to influence resource planning and management for these activities” (p. xiii). The conclusion drawn by Szayna et al (2004) was that the security cooperation planning process “is exceedingly complex, includes a multitude of actors, and suffers from problematic incentive systems, incomplete information exchange, and a difficulty in measuring performance” (p. 2) citing in particular “a lack of good measures of effectiveness” (p. 63).

2.11.8 Outcomes - Professional Military Education (PME)

One controversial example highlighted the significance of determining Outcomes from military assistance programmes and whether they achieve
military and political goals. Ruby and Gibler (2010) noted that US professional military education (PME) had “commonly been blamed for training some of the worst abusers of human rights,” but concluded that the US programme has proven “to be an important stabilizing force during times of democratic transition” (p. 339). Ruby and Gibler (2010) asserted that their case study uncovered very few cases of US PME officers linked to human rights abuses and that the programme actually “provided the initial infrastructure needed to begin domestic military education programs that encouraged civilian control of the military in emerging democracies” (p. 339).

Citing specific participants in US PME training, Ruby and Gibler (2010, p. 340) conceded that the School of the Americas trained Argentina’s dictators Roberto Viola and Leopoldo Galtieri, Panama’s Manuel Noriega and Omar Torrijos, Peru’s Juan Velasco Alvarado and Ecuador’s Guillermo Rodriguez, the leader of the Grupo Colina death squad in Alberto Fujimori’s Peru, four of the five officers who ran Battalion 3-16 in Honduras which controlled death squads, and the commander responsible for the 1994 Ocosingo massacre in Mexico. However, Ruby and Gibler (2010) stressed that “while these examples are horrifying and constitute some of the worst outcomes of American military training, they do not represent the bulk of foreign military education programs in the United States” (p. 340).

Instead, Ruby and Gibler (2010) concluded that, contrary to popular opinion, US PME “provides an important stabilizing force, especially in emerging democracies” and the programme “also provides professional and technical education and extensive exposure to democratic values,” commenting that they:

...examine the effects of US PME on the likelihood of military coups d'état, finding that professional military education of foreign officers does lead to increased stability abroad. We support these large-N findings with case studies on the effectiveness of US PME in maintaining military stability in three countries: Argentina, Greece and Taiwan (p. 340).

In light of their assessment of this particular political goal as an important Outcome, Ruby and Gibler (2010) proposed that:

...educating foreign officers through US PME helps strengthen developing democratic trends. In addition to the obvious benefits of military to military linkages, the US PME system encourages political stability and a democratization for foreign militaries. Our large-N analyses show that foreign officers educated in US PME decrease the likelihood of coups d'état in their home countries, and this finding persists despite the addition of individual country controls for alliance with the United States, presence of the Cold War, regime type, wealth, or changes in wealth. Our case studies extend these findings – in each of our cases, political instability declined with abundant use of US PME, and US PME permanently altered the attitudes of military officers toward accepting civilian authority (p. 359).
2.11.9 Outcomes - Causality

There was also a valuable discussion in the literature regarding the extent to which even if Outcomes are measured, whether causality can indeed be determined. Szayna et al (2004) asserted that:

In general, it is difficult to measure objectively the effectiveness of security cooperation. Usually, the goals are vague and/or aim at contributing to preventing something from happening. Proving causality for something that did not happen is an almost impossible task with regard to security cooperation. The general principle is that the broader the DoD guidelines, the more difficult it is to come up with measures of effectiveness (p. 66).

Mott (2002) asserted the need to assess “the relevant features that affect donor success in providing military assistance” (p. x).

2.11.10 Outcomes - BALTBAT: General Comments

The issue of Outcomes was particularly significant with regard to BALTBAT. Some analysts were critical of the military Outcomes of the initiative. Austin (1999) judged that the Baltic nations in 1999 were still not prepared to meet NATO obligations, and was sharply critical of BALTBAT, calling it politically important, but "militarily useless" (p. 1). Austin (1999) called for the Baltic governments to develop standing armies for national defence, and while conceding that BALTBAT was useful in learning Western military techniques, this could not be the basis for an entire military force (p. 2).

In direct response to Austin (1999), Kazocins (1999) asserted that BALTBAT is "one of the most successful examples of military cooperation in the Baltic region and serves as a good example of what can be done, given the necessary will and determination" (p. 47), adding that the training of hundreds of Baltic military personnel into a single unit familiar with Western doctrine was a remarkable accomplishment. Linkevicius (1999) proposed that BALTBAT led to a systematic working relationship between the Baltic and supporting states, in contrast to a situation that was "spontaneous and chaotic during the preceding years." Dalbins (1996) stressed that coordinated Baltic defence capabilities, supported by integration into Western security structures, were critical to Latvian defence, and the most successful example of that cooperation was BALTBAT.

Echoing these views, Sapronas (1999) wrote that BALTBAT was an effort that produced Outcomes:

In reality, the establishment of a modern Western-type multinational battalion from scratch in the countries that basically had no regular armed forces was a truly Herculean task. Looking back to the early days
of the project, one tends to conclude that even those who understood the complexities and difficulties involved in the project tended to underestimate them. Otherwise they probably would not have started the project at all (p. 57).

Sapronas (1999) did not hesitate to outline criticism of the project. There was resistance from the Baltic military forces not working on BALTBAT due to use of resources on what was viewed as a political project. Many Baltic officers believed BALTBAT training was not relevant to national defence needs, and BALTBAT was viewed as an elite unit where the motivation was financial. Moreover, Sapronas (1999) asserted that between 1995 and 1997, the fixation of the donor states to find a deployment for BALTBAT generated a situation where the Baltic defence structures were working for BALTBAT, rather than the reverse (p. 61).

On balance, however, Sapronas (1999) supported BALTBAT and its delivery of Outcomes, and emphasized that it provided immediate immersion of the military forces of the Baltic countries into the critical requirements for modern defence cooperation, with the most valuable result being the spill-over to the remainder of the national defence forces. Sapronas (1999, pp. 59-60) asserted that BALTBAT was critical to providing Baltic defence forces with a chance to become familiar with Western military forces, and galvanized Baltic defence cooperation. In addition, BALTBAT allowed Western capitals to provide aid to a joint programme, rather than three national projects, while not generating Russian ire. Making the point that the political leadership of BALTBAT recognized the need for a course change, Sapronas (1999) judged that ultimately there was a gradual emphasis on establishing BALTBAT within national defence structures and generating the required Outcomes.

Echoing the point about continued reflection on achieving Outcomes regarding political and military goals, Kazocins (1999, p. 51) stressed that the political leadership was not fixated on original goals, but showed flexibility in addressing new challenges “within the context of developing Baltic national self-defence capabilities and the emphasis placed on wise use of limited resources.” Kazocins (1999, pp. 50-51) cited the “Political Guidance” signed by the Baltic Defence Ministers in 1999 with a clear redefinition of priorities regarding BALTBAT. At the top of the list was enhancing development of national forces and self-defence capabilities. The next item was promoting NATO interoperability. The third item was providing a peace support capability. The fourth item was optimising use of resources. Such decisions, asserted Kazocins (1999, p. 51), indicate “responsible defence management” and political decision-making critical to the project through continued re-assessment of priorities.

### 2.11.11 Outcomes - BALTBAT: National Defence Capabilities

With regard to the military goal of development of national defence forces as an Outcome, Kazocins (1999, p. 52) asserted that BALTBAT contributed to the
development of national forces by transmitting training to other parts of the national military. Brett (2001) concluded that BALTBAT not only met its original objectives, but contributed to the development of Baltic national defence capabilities (p. 7). Brett (2001) noted that BALTBAT instructors provided invaluable support, which the Baltic capitals drew on to put into place national training structures that could handle most military training (p. 6). The project also provided Baltic Defence Ministries with the opportunity to work on a concrete project under the tutelage of more experienced military forces. More generally, Brett (2001) proposed that such experiences encouraged democratic control of military forces (p. 5).

Viksne (2002) asserted that one of the key roles of BALTBAT was to “act as a conduit through which western military norms and culture” were introduced into Latvia’s military forces and that personnel who served in BALTBAT returned to other units of the Latvian armed forces “bringing their experience with them and this has proved a particularly successful means to disseminate experience” (p. 99). Clemmesen (1999, p. 39) noted that Latvia and Lithuania began their efforts to establish military infrastructure and facilities in 1994 in order to have national centres for BALTBAT while the larger work to establish quality national infrastructure only began in 1998, indicating that BALTBAT provided the impetus for work in that area.

Linkevicius (1999) highlighted the fact that BALTBAT played a role in training officers and non-commissioned officers, and that the programme turned general discussions of aid into concrete military assistance, and turned a chaotic process into a systematic project. Skrastins (1995, pp. 46-47) noted that close cooperation among Baltic state military forces was critical not only to address practical issues, but also to make the political point that they could reach joint decisions and address a wide range of problems together.

Returning to the specific issue of achieving military goals as Outcomes, and the challenges faced by the Baltic governments, it appeared that the Baltic military forces did well. Clemmesen (1999) judged the Baltic military forces made impressive progress between 1991 and 1999, having received aid that significantly increased over the years, which was a perspective shared by Bajarunas (2000). Von Riekhoff (2004) concluded that “the efforts to create national defense forces from a zero basis have been impressive, and these have advanced in tandem with the establishment of the requisite mechanisms for proper democratic civilian control of the military” (p. 135). Kramer (2002) asserted that “the Baltic states had to create their armies from scratch after 1991, a task that would have been difficult even for much larger countries” (p. 744). Analysis of specific assistance, such as Mannik (2002) regarding the extent of aid from Finland for Estonia, assessed the impact of particular efforts, while Clemmesen (2000) commented that over time there was increasing willingness to provide assistance to the Baltic governments.

While there were recommendations for improvements on BALTBAT training from Raunio (2002) and Moeller (2000) and suggestions on re-evaluation of the
status and mission of BALTBAT from Zalkans (1999), much of the commentary was positive, with recommendations for improvements. Indeed, Brett (2001, p. 7) agreed that BALTBAT could have done more to assist in the development of national defence capabilities, highlighting the importance of bolstering synergies which would benefit development of national defence. Brett (2001, pp. 59-60) noted that between 1996 and 1998, there were missed opportunities to provide BALTBAT benefits to national forces, and the twin problems were that BALTBAT became separated from national defence development and was not adequately supported by national defence efforts. While some of this was unavoidable, more could have been done to have BALTBAT bolster development of national defence capabilities.

2.11.12 Outcomes - BALTBAT: Deployments

One measure of BALTBAT Outcomes was that approximately 1200 Baltic soldiers served in BALTBAT, with training and exposure to modern military practices. There were also overseas missions which provided practical experience. The Estonians deployed in Lebanon alongside the Norwegians. Sweden guided the Latvian deployment in Bosnia. Denmark handled the deployment of all three Baltic companies to Bosnia. Brett (2001) asserted that such deployments with Nordic forces provided valuable experience for Baltic personnel (p. 5). Sapronas (2002) asserted that the effect participation in international operations had on the “development and professionalization of the Lithuanian armed forces cannot be overestimated” (p. 103), with Urbelis and Urbonas (2002) noting that more than 580 Lithuanian military personnel participated in international missions, which constituted about 10% of Lithuania’s professional soldiers (p. 115).

However, BALTBAT as a whole never deployed for a peacekeeping operation (PKO), although this was one of the initial goals of BALTBAT. This raised the question of whether BALTBAT did indeed achieve the desired Outcomes. Moller (2000, p. 38) and Sapronas (1999, pp. 61-62) listed the numerous reasons why BALTBAT could not deploy as a whole, which involved a variety of issues ranging from logistical support to sustainability to the size of BALTBAT (700 personnel) which made it difficult to find a suitable UN PKO. Ultimately, the BALTBAT Military Working Group decided to rotate the BALTBAT companies within SFOR forces in Bosnia.

However, many commentators asserted that failure to deploy as a whole did not tarnish the accomplishments of BALTBAT. Kazocins (1999) proposed that the goal was a Baltic contribution to a PKO, and that is what the Baltic companies accomplished. The Danish view in 1997 was that BALTBAT could handle PKO duties on its own and eventually would be able to handle the entire range of peace support operations (PSOs), but there simply was not a suitable opportunity for BALTBAT, as a whole, to do so. However, BALTBAT provided the basis for deployments of the individual companies. Kazocins (1999, p. 52) asserted that it was not a mark of failure that BALTBAT changed its goals and
operations as circumstances required. Indeed, the BALTBAT leadership showed that it was flexible.

Moreover, with regard to achieving political goals, the deployments of BALTBAT companies contributed to Outcomes. Archer and Jones (1999, p. 171) stressed that it was apparent the Baltic countries would need to make their case for membership, and the concrete work with NATO forces was beneficial and also allowed the Baltic governments to make the case that they could contribute to providing Western security. Supporting that view, Asmus and Nurick (1996) emphasized the importance for the Baltic states of participating in larger Western security efforts, such as peacekeeping, to establish that they were not just "consumers" of security, and, indeed, recommending expansion of BALTBAT and the other Baltic assistance programmes (p. 131). Clemmesen (2000) noted that it was politically important to have visible participation in international operations, but added the caveat that this should not compromise the goal of developing a self-defence capability (p. 7).

2.11.13 Outcomes - BALTRON

As the issue regarding Outcomes was whether military and political goals associated with the military assistance programme were achieved, the case could be made that Outcomes from BALTBAT could also include the other Baltic military assistance projects which were subsequently initiated. If BALTBAT proved to be an effective method for donor states to assist the Baltic governments, other specialized forms of such cooperation would be possible, and would indicate that BALTBAT achieved its political and military goals.

The idea of a Baltic Naval Squadron was first raised in 1995, and, under German leadership, BALTRON was inaugurated on 28 August 1998. It had an operational task of mine-countermeasures (MCM) with the goal of raising Baltic self-defence capabilities and interoperability with NATO/PfP forces. BALTRON forces participated in various multinational maritime exercises.

Assisting in making the case that the Baltic states were suitable candidates for membership in NATO, Alsauskas (2000) noted that BALTRON trained to NATO procedures and standards. Walter (2001, p. 115) asserted that BALTRON provided a good start for combined naval force development, noting the importance for the Baltic governments of participating in Western training and exercises.

2.11.14 Outcomes - BALTNET

Another Outcome from BALTBAT was the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) which was first discussed in 1994. The Baltic Defence Ministers made the decision in 1997 to locate the Regional Airspace Surveillance Coordination Centre (RASCC) in Kaunas, Lithuania. Norway took the lead in coordinating support, and BALTNET began operations on 6 June 2000.
Vaiksnoras (2002) provided worthwhile background on the initiative, noting that it originated in the 1994 US proposal of a Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI) which funded the establishment of airspace surveillance centres in Central and Eastern Europe. In view of Russian airspace violations, this addressed a key concern of the Baltic capitals, and the system was NATO interoperable. Vaiksnoras (2002) highlighted the fact that the US opted for a single system for the three Baltic countries, rather than creation of national centres, as was done in other states. As a result, the RASCC was located in Kaunas, Lithuania, which forced integration of key parts of the three Baltic defence infrastructures in the area of airspace surveillance and control. Vaiksnoras (2002) asserted that this was a unique example of cooperation, as air defence still remained the responsibility of each Baltic state, but the approach gave the three Baltic forces experience and training which would make it easier to integrate air surveillance and air defence assets into the NATO system.

Winner (2002) highlighted “sensible and politically savvy joint efforts,” citing the “creation of a joint radar station that monitors civilian air traffic but can also be linked to NATO’s air–defence network” as having “augmented each country’s armed forces construction” (p. 209). Szayna and Larrabee (1995) noted that “regional cooperation is no substitute for membership in Western Security organizations but can complement it in important areas,” asserting that cooperation in areas such as “airspace management and air defense would amount to the maximum use of resources” (p. 49).

### 2.11.15 Outcomes - BALTFDCOL

Another Outcome from BALTBAT was the Baltic Defence College (BALTFDCOL), which was first broached in 1996 with a Memorandum of Support signed on 12 June 1998. Sweden took the lead role for this project, and the first senior staff course at the BALTFDCOL was initiated on 16 August 1999.

Former Swedish Defence Minister von Sydow (1999) stressed that the mission of the BALTFDCOL was to establish the basis for producing educated officers, guided by a multinational faculty, who would be the future of the Baltic defence forces, adding the aim of having the Baltic governments assume responsibility for the BALTFDCOL. Clemmesen (1999) noted that all three Baltic states use the BALTFDCOL as the main site for training General Staff officers (p. 37). As cited previously under Mechanisms, Foot (2001) gave high praise to the BALTFDCOL, noting that it “is best viewed as part of the Baltic region’s security arrangements and one of the substantially indigenous means of sustaining regional security” (p. 119).

Fischer (2003) stressed that the BALTFDCOL is an excellent example of the "Baltification" process, as the clear intent from the start was to give ownership to the Baltic governments as soon as they were able to handle the task (p. 13). Indeed, some commentators proposed a larger role for the BALTFDCOL. Moeller (2000) asserted that common Baltic doctrine and tactics must be
developed at the brigade and battalion level, as using UK doctrine and tactics, a topic addressed in Section 2.10.3, would not be the best long-term course for the Baltic governments, and this is the natural task for the BALTDEFCOL, with advice from officers from the supporting nations (pp. 41-42).

2.11.16 Outcomes - Review

The specific question regarding Outcomes was: Are the military and political goals associated with the military assistance programme achieved? There was substantial disagreement on whether or not definition and measurement of Outcomes was being addressed. Cottey and Forster (2004) asserted that mechanisms for evaluating Outcomes are not in place. Read and Kleiner (1996), Foxworth (2012) and Vogel-Walcutt, Fiorella and Malone (2013) all shared the view that the military in particular has not considered how to measure training Outcomes.

However, Reveron (2010) asserted that it is possible to measure Outcomes, and the assessment by Serafino (2007) of the GPOI indicated it is possible. Glantz (1998b) and Szayna (2004) emphasized the significance of having clear aims to generate Outcomes. Finally, commentary regarding the Outcomes from BALTBAT, from developing national defence capabilities to generating subsequent Baltic military assistance initiatives, appeared to indicate that it did succeed in generating the required Outcomes.

2.12 Narrative Literature Review on the Political/Historical Context

The systematic literature review conducted on military assistance was necessary to examine the state of analysis regarding that particular issue. It was also important to analyse the literature to outline the political, military and historical context in which BALTBAT and the Baltic initiatives were generated. As indicated in the CIMO questions noted above, the focus of this research was on the significance of political decisions between the donor and recipient states with regard to the military assistance initiatives. As a result, the political context was relevant. However, as this was to provide a framework and context, a narrative literature review was sufficient.

2.12.1 Russia

The Baltic and Western governments had to decide how to develop the military capabilities of the Baltic countries in a delicate political environment. While the Baltic states regained their independence in 1991, Russian forces did not complete their withdrawal from Lithuania until August 1993 and from Latvia and Estonia until August 1994. Kramer (2002) noted that “the Russian government took numerous steps during the decade after 1991 that caused a good deal of unease and acrimony in relations with the Baltic states” (p. 734). The Baltic governments were concerned about Russian policy, as the Russian army rehearsed and discussed invasion scenarios for the Baltic nations (Blank, 1997, p. 14) and comments from the Russian military indicated they would not
withdraw from the Baltic nations under any circumstances (Latter, 1992, p. 2). Moreover, even after the Russian troop withdrawals, Dalsjo (1998) asserted that “Given the history and geography of the Baltic three, it is understandable that the possibility of a major and deliberate Russian attack on them cannot be discounted” (p. 41).

In addition, Oznobistchev (1994) and Godzimirski (1999) highlighted Russian sensitivity regarding the Baltic nations and objections to their membership in NATO. Velliste (1994) noted that comments from Moscow regarding its responsibilities in the “near abroad” generated unease in the Baltic states, a point supported by Sapronas (2002). More generally, Morozov (2003) asserted that Russian policy towards the Baltic governments is “deeply entrenched in Russian political culture and the domestic political situation” (p. 231). As a result of these points of tension, the Baltic countries sought security guarantees from the West (Lejins, 1994, p. 33).

It had been asserted that there was a gap between what the Russians said they would do, and what they were capable of doing. Blank (1997, p. 19) judged that Moscow recognised it would not be able to enforce its views by military action, and Bodie (1993, pp. 15 and 18) outlined the poor state of the Russian military. Dalsjo (1998) concurred that the Russian Army “is only a shadow of the once mighty Soviet Army, in quality as well as in quantity, and would be hard-pressed to launch a traditional invasion” (p. 41). However, the critical result of Russian statements was the generation of concern in Baltic capitals. Bodie (1993, p. 13) commented that the Baltic nations were confused by the messages coming out of Russia, and Latter (1992, p. 17) noted that those messages generated unease in the Baltic countries.

With regard to the underlying causes of the strained relations between the Baltic capitals and Moscow, Knudsen (1999, p. 5) proposed that two theories drive the relationship, without coming down strongly in favour of either theory. He noted that the first theory is great power rivalry (the Baltic nations as part of the US-Russian rivalry) and the second theory is imperialism (with Russia imposing pressure on smaller states due to various factors, such as politics, culture or the economy). Alternatively, Sergeyev (1999, p. 26) asserted that Moscow does not have a long-term Baltic policy based on Russian national interests, but merely reacts to Russian domestic players which make issues such as Russian minorities an issue critical to the nation, with Moshes (1999) supporting the view that Moscow does not have a genuine Baltic policy. Some writers such as Kvaerno (2000) and Das Kundu (2003, p. 470) emphasized the change in Russian policies toward the Baltic nations over time as the 1990s progressed.

One reason for friction between Russia and the Baltic nations centred on Moscow’s security policy concerns. Oznobistchev (1994) noted that it was hard for Moscow to give up the Baltic ports, which gave the USSR access to the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic (p. 105). Godzimirski (1999) commented that in 1992, the Commander of the General Staff Academy listed the conditions for a powerful Russia, one of which was free Russian access to Baltic state seaports,
and another was exclusion of other military forces from the Baltic countries and non-membership of the Baltic nations in military blocs (p. 37). Blank (1997) stressed that NATO’s sea and air launched cruise missiles would pass through Baltic air space to get to Moscow, so the early warning and other defence systems in the Baltic states were important (pp. 7-8). Latter (1992) highlighted the problem of the isolation of the Kaliningrad region (a map is included at page xiii), which served in the early 1990s as the redeployment centre for Russian troops departing Poland and the former East Germany (pp. 13-14).

Another cause of friction between Russia and the Baltic countries was the Russian minority populations in Estonia and Latvia (there was no sizeable Russian community in Lithuania). Velliste (1994) cited an article written in 1992 which outlined a proposal to use defence of Russians in non-Russian states as a foreign policy tool under the guise of defending human rights (pp. 58-59). Asmus and Nurick (1996) addressed the significance of this matter as a cause of regional tension, a view supported by Latter (1992).

Viewing the Russian-Baltic difficulties as an issue of behaviour, Lejins (1994) asserted that even senior Russian policy-makers had a psychological barrier to accepting Baltic independence (p. 33). Das Kundu (2003) added the assessment that “a majority of Russia’s political elite still considers the Baltic states as part of Russia’s sphere of influence, and there is still an inclination to show big brotherly attitude towards them” (p. 479).

2.12.2 NATO and the West

As a result of concerns regarding Moscow, the Baltic governments sought NATO membership. NATO had expressed in 1991 its support for “the expectations and legitimate aspirations of the Baltic peoples” (North Atlantic Council, 1991, para. 7). However, Russia had made it clear that it would not accept Baltic state membership in NATO, and even threatened to terminate cooperative efforts with the West (Blank, 1997, p. v), which contributed to the doubts in key European capitals about the Baltic nations joining NATO (Asmus and Nurick, 1996, p. 123). Blank (2000) commented that this generated problems for NATO about challenging Russia (p. 7) and Latter (1994) judged that while NATO could not accept a situation where Russia could veto a NATO decision to accept new members, it also wanted to avoid aiding Russian conservatives criticizing the Yeltsin government.

Germany, noted Blank (1997, p. vi), “steadily backtracked since 1993 on Baltic admission into NATO” due to its concern over Russian opposition. Krohn (1999, pp. 114-115) concurred that Germany kept a low profile regarding the Baltic countries. He listed six factors for that policy decision, one of which was a desire to help the Baltic governments, but not strain relations with Russia.

Knudsen (1999) asserted that the US sought a separate security arrangement in which the Baltic states could be provided security without having to become NATO members (p. 6), noting that the Baltic Charter of January 1998 between
the US and the Baltic countries was a political document, but certainly not a
security guarantee (p. 15).

A part of this discussion was the military feasibility of NATO actually coming to
the aid of the Baltic nations. Wallin and Andersson (2001) proposed that “the
proper question is not whether the Baltics can be defended, it is how and
against which contingencies the Baltics can be defended,” adding that this has
to do “with what help the international community is prepared to offer the Baltic
states, both when building up their defence forces and in an actual war” (p. 96).

It was therefore significant that NATO had expressed its emphasis on PKO
activities, including it as an objective within the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
Framework Document (North Atlantic Council, 1994a, para. 3). In the PfP
Invitation document (North Atlantic Council, 1994b), NATO proposed
peacekeeping field exercises within the PfP framework beginning in 1994. The
Invitation document also sent the Baltic governments a clear signal, noting that
"active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in
the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO."

A focus on peacekeeping had many advantages for the Baltic and donor states.
Sapronas (1999) asserted that it was easier for Western countries to support
BALTBAT than provide direct military aid to the Baltic governments, as it could
not be considered provocative (p. 59). Djalso (1999) highlighted the fact that as
late as 1999 Western donors focused their attention on BALTBAT assistance,
training, non-lethal equipment and light arms, while anti-tank and anti-aircraft
weapons, night-vision devices, modern communications and heavier equipment
were not on offer to the Baltic military forces. Cambone (1994) indicated that
the US at that time was supportive of PKO activities (p. 75). Moreover, the PKO
focus cemented Nordic support, with Dahl (1999) having commented that
Sweden, which had been scrupulous about its policy of neutrality, was from the
outset supportive of Baltic efforts to develop PKO capabilities, as well as the
other Baltic programmes (p. 144).

2.12.3 The Nordic States

Russian statements reinforced the determination of the Nordic and other
Western nations to support the Baltic countries. Blank (1997) asserted that
while Western pronouncements and actions were not security guarantees, they
were a useful response to aggressive Russian statements (p. 29). Swedish
Prime Minister Bildt (1994) provided the justification for multinational support for
the Baltic capitals, emphasising that assisting the Baltic states would also assist
the process of reform in Russia, and writing that “the security of the Baltic
nations needs to be assured by integration with the institutions of the West” (p.
85).

Vaerno (1999) commented that the Nordic states largely believed that with the
end of the Cold War, they faced no direct military threat, but were concerned
about developments in Russia and Moscow's intentions regarding the Baltic
nations. Archer and Jones (1999) highlighted the objective Nordic interest: a Russian-Baltic conflict which spun out of control could generate social and economic disruption, and possibly refugees (p. 175). In addition, Vaerno (1999, pp. 194-5) pointed out that the Nordic governments had the responsibility for assisting the Baltic countries thrust upon them. Asmus and Nurick (1996) asserted that the ability of the Baltic countries to achieve political, economic and military reform depended on enhanced cooperation with the Nordic capitals, and a key component of a NATO strategy to assist the Baltic nations was encouraging the Nordic states to enhance ties with the Baltic governments (pp. 132-3).

Lehti (2003) highlighted the responsibilities felt by the Nordic states once the Baltic countries regained their independence, and one aspect was a need to "control, educate and patronize" the Baltic capitals to manage Baltic-Russian tension (p. 25). Dahl (1999) commented that the Baltic region was central to Swedish foreign policy, and Bergman (2006, p. 74) noted that the Nordic states worked "to contribute to the solidification of Baltic independence and re-entry into the international community" (p. 74).

However, Bergman (2000) and Knudsen (1999) asserted that while there was Nordic unity on aid for the Baltic capitals, there was also agreement they would not accept regional responsibility for Baltic security. Vaerno (1999) concurred, asserting the Nordic states wanted to support security for the Baltic countries, but within a larger security structure, as they wanted to avoid anything resembling a regional arrangement that would involve them in Russian-Baltic disputes as well as any arrangement that would have them negotiating alone directly with Moscow (p. 200). Bergman (2000) highlighted the comments from then-Danish Defence Minister Haekkerup in 1997 at the Second Annual Stockholm Conference on Baltic Sea Security and Cooperation, which stressed that while the Nordic countries have a role to play, they cannot do it alone, and security for the Baltic governments must be within a comprehensive security structure.

In addition, there were policy differences among the Nordic states. Vaerno (1999) noted that Finland had a very careful Russia-first policy, while Sweden had a much more supportive policy towards the Baltic countries, emphasizing the need to develop Nordic-Baltic cooperation and Norway had a greater focus on Barents Sea cooperation as a framework for Russian cooperation (pp. 193-194). Archer and Jones (1999, p. 179) commented that Denmark was the most pro-Baltic nation, particularly on Baltic state membership in NATO, and that Norway was more cautious about NATO membership for the Baltic countries. Archer (1999) noted that the Nordic states "have demonstrated some noticeable differences in their involvement in security cooperation with the Baltic states" adding that "these have not detracted from the elements of complementarity and overlap in Nordic policies" (pp. 48-49). In that respect, the focus on PKO was a basis for Nordic unity, as Brundtland (1994) noted that increased Nordic military cooperation was generated by common enthusiasm for PKO activities.
2.12.4 Unity of the Three Baltic States

The extent and nature of unified policy among the Baltic states was an important aspect of the Baltic military initiatives. Archer and Jones (1999) highlighted the common desire of the Baltic nations to be grounded in the overall context of European security, specifically NATO (p. 170). However, Baltic unity was often problematic. Vayrynen (1999) noted the extent to which the three Baltic governments emphasized their differences to serve individual national interests, such as Estonia's effort to pursue EU membership (p. 208), resulting in a split among the Nordic states, with only Finland supporting the Estonian move. Vayrynen (1999) asserted that Lithuania sought to move away from the Baltic countries and closer to Poland and Denmark (pp. 211-212), leaving Latvia to press for Baltic solidarity (p. 215). Indeed, Vayrynen (1999) recounted that one former Lithuanian Foreign Minister noted that the Baltic governments should not be treated as a single entity, and that Lithuania hoped to be viewed as a Central European, rather than a Baltic state (p. 213).

Supporting that assessment, Kolga (2006) commented that Baltic military cooperation faded after the three Baltic nations joined NATO. Malakauskas (2000, p. 136) emphasized that “cases occur when the parties in the Baltic cooperation behave as if it were a zero-sum game where one participant can win only as much as the rest of the players lose” (p. 136). Von Riekhoff (2004) noted that “in historical and cultural terms, diversity rather than unity has been the prevailing Baltic experience” (p. 109) highlighting the fact that Estonia and Latvia are ethnically and linguistically different, but have a common Protestant, Nordic heritage and a long affiliation with Germany and Scandinavia, while Lithuania is a Central European country with a Catholic, Baroque culture and close historical ties with Poland (p. 109). Von Riekhoff (2004) asserted that “while an element of cooperation has continued,” the historical ties of the Baltic states has become more apparent. Estonia has drawn closer to Finland, Lithuania is drawing closer to Poland and “it has not been as easy for Latvia to find an identifiable partner” (p. 109).

2.12.5 Baltic State Military Capabilities

It was important to highlight the very low baseline from which the Baltic nations developed their military forces. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (1992) provided the following numbers for the three Baltic countries in 1991 at the time they regained their independence:

Table 1 – Military Personnel Levels of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Number of Stationed Russian Personnel in 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Armed Forces</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Forces (Russia)</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The IISS (1992) noted that Estonia (p. 75) had Ground Forces consisting of a border guard, rapid reaction force and territorial defence unit. Latvia (p. 78) had Ground Forces composed of one border guard brigade, one rapid reaction battalion and one coastal defence unit. It had a Navy consisting of one Coast Guard division. It had a home guard of 12,000 that could be mobilised. Lithuania (p. 79) had Ground Forces consisting of a border guard, a rapid reaction force and a territorial defence force. It had a National Guard of 12,500.

By the time that BALTBAT was inaugurated in 1994, the Baltic governments had made some progress, although it was apparent that they remained militarily weak and lacking in capabilities. Skrastins (1995, p. 43) cited a 1994 report which indicated the following military capabilities for the Baltic countries:

Table 2 – Military Capabilities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1994

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular Forces</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>11,600</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserves</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>15,100</td>
<td>10,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft (including helicopters)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet (ships and boats)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beyond the quantity of military forces, there was concern about the quality of the forces. Skrastins (1995, pp. 39-40) noted that the Estonian military was equipped with items such as infantry weapons, anti-tank weapons and 38 armoured vehicles. The Latvians had only materiel such as infantry weapons and 14 armoured vehicles (p. 41). Lithuania had an inventory which was largely infantry weapons, anti-tank grenade launchers and 36 armoured vehicles (p. 38). Skrastins (1995) asserted that "the weakest aspect in all three nations is the shortage of weapons and combat equipment, resulting from the little money which the nations can allocate to the re-establishment of their armies during the period of transition" (p. 43).

The poor state of Baltic military forces at that time was also apparent in areas beyond equipment. Former Lithuanian Defence Minister Linkevicius (1999) wrote that at independence the military was short of everything and there was no national security concept. Former Latvian National Security Advisor Zalkans (1999) wrote that at the time of independence, the Latvian military had no threat analysis, defence concept, defence plan, knowledge of budgetary processes or force planning. Clemmesen (2002) highlighted the fact that a majority of the people in the Baltic nations and most politicians considered it "futile to attempt to create independent self-defence forces" (p. 89), a point on which Djalso (1999) concurred.
With regard to the state of Baltic military capabilities at the time they joined NATO, the IISS (2004) provided the overall totals for the Baltic countries as follows:

Table 3 – Number of Military Personnel and Reservists in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Armed Forces</strong></td>
<td>4,980</td>
<td>4,880</td>
<td>13,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reserves</strong></td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>13,050</td>
<td>246,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The specific notations for each Baltic state indicated the progress that was made. In the case of Estonia (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004, p. 47), the Army in 2004 had one infantry brigade (five battalions), 25 armoured personnel carriers, and a good supply of mortars, towed artillery and other modern equipment. The Navy had three patrol and coastal combatants. The Air Force had three fixed-wing aircraft and four helicopters. In the case of Latvia (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004, p. 58), the Army forces included one mobile rifle brigade with one infantry battalion, 13 armoured personnel carriers, 26 towed artillery pieces and a good supply of other modern equipment. The Navy had four patrol and coastal combatant vessels. The Air Force included 14 fixed-wing aircraft and five helicopters. In the case of Lithuania (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004, pp. 59-60), the Army had one reaction brigade with two mechanised infantry and one artillery battalion, with 22 armoured personnel carriers, 72 pieces of 105 mm towed artillery and a substantial supply of other modern equipment. The Navy had five patrol and coastal combatants. The Air Force had 11 transport aircraft, six trainers and ten helicopters.

2.13 The Lacuna

A review of the literature indicated that while there were numerous models, such as organizational elements, which could be utilised, the CIMO model appeared to be most suitable for this research topic. Moreover, there were numerous issues with regard to military assistance which could have been studied. The use of military assistance as a tool of foreign policy, the decision-making process within donor states and the impact of assistance on recipient state support for donor state policies were all critical topics. It could also have been valuable to study the impact of military assistance on recipient states in areas such as economic and political development and human rights.

However, without questioning the significance of all these issues, it was also apparent from the literature that another critical aspect of military assistance projects is the relationship between donor and recipient states. It was also apparent from the literature that a significant component of this relationship involves political decisions regarding an initiative, as they constitute the foundation of the programme.
Utilising the CIMO model, with regard to the Context, as noted by Cottey and Forster (2004) and others, a critical aspect of any military assistance project is the relationship between donor and recipient states. With regard to an Intervention for study, the literature from Mott (1999) and others highlighted the significance of broad political decisions on these initiatives. With regard to Mechanisms, Glantz (1999) and others addressed the various factors which have an impact on these programmes. Finally, on Outcomes, while there was debate about whether Outcomes can be defined and measured, Reveron (2010) made a good case that they can be measured, although other writers made a strong case that while this “can” be done, whether it actually “is” done by participants is questionable.

To summarize, the review of the literature on military assistance programmes indicated a gap with regard to the significance of the Intervention of broad political decisions between donor and recipient states with regard to BALTBAT and the Baltic military assistance programmes. In light of the comments regarding the significance of the Context of the donor-recipient relationship, it appeared that this topic was worthy of analysis. There had been no historical study of the broad political decisions concerning BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives, or research into the extent to which this was a factor in the Outcomes from BALTBAT and the other projects. The conduct of such a study indicated what factors (subsequently called Mechanisms) arose from the specific Intervention and generated Outcomes from the Baltic projects. These Mechanisms are the elements of a model for effective military assistance projects which could be developed through further research. The research conducted in this thesis therefore fills a gap in the body of knowledge regarding military assistance, and provides a contribution to academic work in this area, as well as practical guidance to those working on such initiatives.
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters set forth the rationale concerning the academic value of researching the genesis and establishment of the Baltic military assistance programmes. They outlined the importance of examining the political decisions reached by the donor and recipient states which provided the foundation for these initiatives. They also established that these decisions have only received cursory attention from those working in the area of military assistance and no thorough academic review. The proposition put forth for this thesis was that these decisions were essential for the success of BALTBAT and the other Baltic projects and that they were worthy of extensive research and analysis. Referring back to the CIMO model highlighted in the Literature Review, these political decisions were a critical Intervention which, through various Mechanisms, were important in achieving the Outcomes desired from these military assistance initiatives.

This chapter addresses the issue of how this research was conducted. As BALTBAT was inaugurated in 1994, it was still possible to interview individuals who worked on the establishment of the Baltic programmes and directly obtain their views and recollections. This indicated two reasons why this was a propitious time to conduct research on this topic. The first reason was that the opportunity existed to interview and gather data from those who were "present at the creation." Such an opportunity was of particular value to academics as well as those working on the operational aspects of military assistance, and was utilised while it remained available. The second reason was that enough time had passed since the Baltic projects were initiated so that the participants had sufficient opportunity to reflect on what was decided, what was accomplished, and whether, in retrospect, they would have made a different decision.

There were also numerous public documents regarding the Baltic initiatives which provided political statements on these projects, the processes put into place, and various other aspects of their implementation. These documents provided a good source of primary material which could be compared with the information provided by interviews of those who established and worked on these programmes. As will be outlined below, they provided for a degree of triangulation to compare and possibly validate the points made by the interviewees.

In short, the opportunity existed to directly interview the people who worked to establish BALTBAT and the other initiatives, review many of the public documents regarding these projects, and assess the importance of the political decisions made by the donor and recipient states with regard to these programmes as an Intervention which, due to various Mechanisms, had a critical impact on the Outcomes of these military assistance projects. The specific details regarding the conduct of the research are outlined below,
following a review of the overarching theoretical basis for the research methodology which appeared to be most appropriate for this thesis.

### 3.2 Qualitative vs. Quantitative Analysis

It is worthwhile at the onset of this analysis to highlight the admonition by Plummer (2005) that “research - like life - is a contradictory, messy affair” continuing with the comment that “only on the pages of 'how-to-do-it' research methods texts or in the classrooms of research methods courses can it be sorted out into linear stages, clear protocols, and firm principles” (p. 357). However, while recognizing that an excessively formal methodology generates a false sense of assurance regarding process and results, it remains important to outline the theoretical underpinnings for the methodology selected for this research, and the steps taken to generate validity and reliability, as well as results which could be potentially generalised.

With regard to the selection of a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach for this research, Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2011, p. 17) noted that “The outcomes of quantitative research lead to the identification of statistical trends, patterns, averages, frequencies or correlations” while “the purpose of qualitative research is to understand or explain behaviour and beliefs, identify processes and understand the context of people’s experiences.” Neuman (2011, p. 172) added that “In a qualitative study, we can use the data to help narrow the focus.” Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 141-142) commented that “quantitative research methods are primarily concerned with gathering and working with data that is structured and can be represented numerically,” while “qualitative research methods are primarily concerned with stories and accounts including subjective understandings, feelings, opinions and beliefs.”

On the issue of what should drive the selection of qualitative or quantitative methods, Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 12) asserted that “the research question should dictate the methodological approach that is used to conduct the research.” Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 141) agreed that “the choice of research data collection methods should be determined by the hypotheses or research questions and the aspects of the research topic that are the prime focus and interest of the researcher.”

With regard to the aim of this research (identifying elements for a model on effective military assistance initiatives), a qualitative approach appeared to be preferable. Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 12) noted that qualitative research “allows researchers to get at the inner experience of participants, to determine how meanings are formed through and in culture, and to discover rather than test variables (italics added).” Lindlof and Taylor (2011, p. 4) noted that “qualitative researchers study the performances and practices of human communication (italics in original).”

On the issue of data collection and analysis, Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 147) noted that quantitative approaches gather and work with data that is “structured” (can be counted) and separately “structured by the researcher” (researcher
decides on the questions and the answers that can be given) while qualitative approaches gather and work with data that is “constructed by the research participant in their own way” and “interpreted and structured by the researcher as part of the analytical process.”

Davies (2007, p. 135) highlighted another advantage of the qualitative approach for this thesis, noting that “Qualitative research uses its gathered data to create theoretical ideas, compared with experimental research that starts with a theoretical position and accumulates data in order to test its validity.” Grix (2010, p. 121) took a similar view, writing that qualitative researchers seek to gather information “with a view to discerning patterns, trends and relationships between key variables.” Grix (2010, p. 120) also noted, in contrast, that “a dependence on quantitative methods can lead to a neglect of the social and cultural context in which the ‘variable’ being ‘measured’ operates.”

Bryman (2012) provided a number of contrasts between quantitative and qualitative research, several of which point to the selection of a qualitative approach for this thesis. First, Bryman (2012, p. 408) noted that quantitative data are depicted as “robust and unambiguous, owing to the precision offered by measurement while “qualitative researchers claim, by contrast, that their contextual approach and their often prolonged involvement in a setting engender rich data.”

Second, Bryman (2012, p. 408) wrote that “whereas quantitative researchers conduct research in a contrived context, qualitative researchers investigate people in natural environments.” Finally, Bryman (2012, p. 408) noted that while “quantitative research is typically highly structured, so that the investigator is able to examine the precise concepts and issues that are the focus of the study,” in qualitative research “the approach is invariably unstructured, so that the possibility of getting at actors’ meanings and of concepts emerging out of data collection is enhanced.”

There were certainly disadvantages to adopting a qualitative approach. Davies (2007, p. 151) wrote that “All qualitative research methods begin with the assertion that social researchers are located in a subjective context, and cannot lay claim to neutral or scientific objectivity.” However, there was no intent to claim scientific objectivity in this research. The goal was to generate elements of a model for effective military assistance programmes out of original data from individuals involved in the Baltic initiatives, and as Walliman (2011, p. 130) noted, qualitative research “is based on data expressed mostly in the form of words – descriptions, accounts, opinions, feelings etc. – rather than on numbers.”

In light of the academic literature noted above and the focus of this thesis, it was apparent that a qualitative approach was preferable for this research. As it involved an assessment of a variety of political and other factors within a unique historical context, it did not lend itself to a quantitative methodology. More important, the Intervention and Mechanisms which comprised the lessons to be
learned from the Baltic military assistance programmes were most suitably captured through the use of qualitative methods, which allowed for assimilation and analysis of a wide range of data. In contrast, the use of quantitative methods would have constricted and possibly eliminated data and Mechanisms.

In short, flexibility was critical with regard to the methodology required for this research. As noted by Denzin and Lincoln (2005), a research design "describes a flexible set of guidelines that connect theoretical paradigms first to strategies of inquiry and second to methods for collecting empirical materials" (p. 25). The writers later emphasized that qualitative research is "endlessly creative and interpretive" and that "qualitative interpretations are constructed" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p. 26). These points appeared to apply to the research methodology utilised for this thesis.

3.3 Theoretical Framework - Positivism vs. Emotionalism vs. Constructivism

Allison and Pomeroy (2000) provided a useful optic through which to view the appropriate research methodology for this thesis, analysing epistemology (which they defined as the nature of knowledge) and ontology (which they noted as being concerned with the nature of reality) with regard to the specific area of experiential education (p. 92). The authors made the case that it is important to address "the experiences of individuals and the meanings they make of their experiences" (Allison and Pomeroy, 2000, p. 91). Allison and Pomeroy (2000) added that, with regard to their particular area, "there are more and less appropriate research methods, depending on the question and the context in which the research is taking place" (p. 95) and that research can focus on input, process or outcome, or any combination of these areas (p. 95). Moreover, "in doing so, it will present a specific perspective on a specific situation" (Allison and Pomeroy, 2000, p. 95). Allison and Pomeroy (2000) concluded by making a recommendation in their specific field which appeared to be relevant to research on the Baltic initiatives, asserting that:

[I]t may be more appropriate to employ a constructivist epistemology. This approach embraces a broader range of research questions, moving away from the singular, limited question, 'Does it work?' A constructivist epistemology typically utilises approaches such as ethnography, case studies, biographies, and phenomenology in order to develop understanding, or verstehen, of experiences. These experiences are necessarily subjective and are owned by, or belong to, the individual and the collective group (p. 97).

Denzin and Lincoln (2005) highlighted the range of overarching views of research critical in selecting an appropriate methodology, and there appeared to be a good case for supporting the use of the constructivist paradigm for this thesis (p. 24, Table 1.2). Drawing on the table generated by the authors, the constructivist view of research (and a focus on the substantive-formal) would
focus on the use of interpretive case studies with an emphasis on the criteria of trustworthiness, credibility, transferability and confirmability.

The other paradigms noted by Denzin and Lincoln (2005), such as positivist and post-positivist theory, did not appear to be of great value regarding this research. However, that did not eliminate the criticisms from positivists regarding the constructivist paradigm. For example, it was certainly valid to note that there are problems in relying on interviews to elicit objective facts. Silverman (2006, p. 131) wrote that the problem with the approach is that it focuses on the ability of the interviewee to recall events, rather than whether they have accurately recounted the historical event.

As this is a valid point, it was important to introduce mechanisms to assess whether the narrative was in line with objective facts. Triangulation through comparison with documents was utilised to attempt to address the problem. For this thesis, it was important to be able to rely on the substance of the recollections of the interviewees. However, the examination and analysis of documents regarding the Baltic military assistance programmes allowed for triangulation to check the data provided by interviews.

It is worth noting that there were problems with adopting a pure positivist approach to the conduct of this research. Taken to the extreme, it would have limited the extent to which unanticipated fruitful points of information might have been gathered and assessed, and which might have become the basis for new or modified theories. In the case of this thesis, such limitations would have brought into question the validity and reliability of the research.

The constructivist approach provided for flexibility in the conduct of interviews. This weakened, if not eliminated, the standardization which positivists view as essential to good research methodology. However, it was important to keep in mind that what may be viewed as variations are part of the interaction between interviewer and interviewee, and are part of the effort to make sense of observations and events (Silverman, 2006, p. 130). Thus, the weaknesses cited by positivists of the constructivist approach did not appear to be significant, and, indeed, highlighted the strengths of the constructivist approach for this particular research.

In contrast, it appeared that supporters of the emotionalist view would argue that the focus should be on getting the most accurate reports of what happened. Their position appeared to be that the goal should be an atmosphere in which the interviewee can freely and openly recount what happened (Silverman, 2006, p. 123). Generating such an atmosphere would be hindered by a rigid interview structure, and enhanced by a flexible interview setting.

While the case could be made regarding the advantages of open-ended interviews, its application to this thesis was questionable. This was not a biographic research project. The goal was to acquire the most authentic views of those involved in the Baltic projects regarding the considerations which
generated important political decisions between the donor and recipient states (the Intervention) as well as the Mechanisms which caused those decisions to generate Outcomes from the initiatives. In that regard, a semi-structured interview allowed for the requisite flexibility and avoided foreclosing possible areas or topics of interest, while allowing for sufficient focus of the overarching issues to be investigated.

Such a research approach was important due to the fact that the interviewees were from different nationalities and backgrounds, and also held differing positions regarding policy or operations as the Baltic military assistance projects were initiated and developed. To cite one example: with regard to the potential threat of aggressive action by Russia against the Baltic states, the views of officials from the Baltic governments were expected to differ from those of the donor countries, and it was important to be able to note those differences.

3.3.1 Constructivism in International Relations Theory

The preceding discussion in Section 3.3 involved an analysis of the utility of constructivism for this thesis within the context of qualitative research theory. It is important to note that there was also literature on constructivism in international relations (IR) theory. Within that context, constructivism held the position that critical aspects of IR are historically and socially constructed (Onuf, 1989). While realist and neorealist views in IR asserted that the anarchic nature of the international system and the sovereignty of the nation-state means that power politics and the pursuit of national interests dominate IR (Waltz, 1959), the constructivist school asserted that critical aspects of IR are actually socially constructed and arise from social processes and interaction (Wendt, 1999).

It was significant that the constructivist view in IR asserted that national interests do not exist as some type of fixed, objective reality, but are actually the result of social interaction (Finnemore, 1996). Under the constructivist view of IR, new political entities like the European Union or the increasing role of international organizations have an impact on shaping the calculation of national interests.

However, with regard to the research undertaken in this thesis, two points need to be made. First, constructivism within qualitative research theory was relevant for this thesis and the research methodology utilised. Second, constructivism as applied to IR was not a critical consideration as the focus of this research involved military assistance programmes. The proposition is put forth that whether those arise from objective national interests, as proposed by realists, or from social interaction, as asserted by constructivists, was not an essential question. Whatever the reason for the perceived need to support or seek to benefit from a military assistance initiative, the topic addressed by this thesis is how best to ensure successful Outcomes which support national interests.
3.4 Case Study Method – Strengths and Weaknesses

Within the paradigm of constructivist theory within qualitative research theory, it appeared that the case study method was most appropriate for this research topic. Matthews and Ross (2010, 475) defined a case study as “the study of a single entity, often a person, an organisation, a situation or a country, wherein the subject is explored in detail and great depth.” It is useful to cite two parts of the technical definition of a case study as outlined by Yin (2003), both of which indicated the suitability of the case study method for this research. Regarding the first part of the definition, Yin (2003) noted that “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13). With regard to the second part of the definition, Yin (2003) wrote that:

[T]he case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis (pp. 13-14).

With regard to advantages of the case study method, Davies (2007, p. 34) noted that “the case study approach offers an attractive way of using a variety of research methods to produce a rounded portrayal of an identified subject.” Johnson and Reynolds (2012, p. 200) added that the case study design “permits a deeper understanding of causal processes, the explication of general explanatory theory, and the development of hypotheses regarding difficult-to-observe phenomena.”

Blaxter, Hughes and Tight (2010, p. 74) cited the following advantages and disadvantages to use of the case study method. With regard to the advantages, they: 1) are “seen to be strong in reality,” 2) allow for “generalizations from a specific instance to a more general issue,” 3) allow the researcher to “show the complexity of social life,” 4) can provide “a data source from which further analysis can be made,” 5) can be “linked to action and their insights contribute to changing practice,” and 6) can be “more persuasive and more accessible.” The disadvantages are that: 1) “the very complexity of a case can make analysis difficult,” and 2) while the “contextualization of aspects of the case strengthens this form of research, it is difficult to know where ‘context’ begins and ends.”

Further addressing advantages and disadvantages of the case study method, George and Bennett (2005, p. 19) noted four advantages: “their potential for achieving high conceptual validity; their strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses; their value as a useful means to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; and their capacity for addressing causal complexity.” With regard to disadvantages, they noted:
Recurrent trade-offs include the problem of case selection; the trade-off between parsimony and richness; and the related tension between achieving high internal validity and good historical explanations of particular cases versus making generalizations that apply to broad populations. The inherent limitations include a relative inability to render judgments on the frequency or representativeness of particular cases and a weak capability for estimating the average ‘causal effect’ of variables for a sample. Potential limitations can include indeterminacy and lack of independence of cases. (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 22).

Grix (2010, p. 52) asserted that “One in-depth case-study of a relatively under-researched area can be embedded in, and compared with, the existing body of literature and studies to gain useful insights into a particular region or to establish similar patterns between well-researched regions and the chosen study.” Kumar (2011, p. 126) noted that in a case study the selected case “becomes the basis of a thorough, holistic and in-depth exploration of the aspect(s) that you want to find out about.”

Neuman (2011, p. 42) noted that case study research “allows us to link abstract ideas in specific ways with the concrete specifics of cases we observe in detail.” He went on to note three strengths of the case study method, all of which appeared to be relevant to this thesis. First, “as we become very familiar with the in-depth detail of specific cases, we can create/build new theories as well as reshape current theories to complex cases or new situations.” Second, “the intricate details of social processes and cause-effect relations become more visible.” Finally, case studies “provide evidence that more effectively depicts complex, multiple-factor events/situations and processes that occur over time and space” (Neuman, 2011, p. 42).

Addressing the issue of generalizability of case studies, Bryman (2012, p. 71) noted that “the crucial question is not whether the findings can be generalized to a wider universe but how well the researcher generates theory out of the findings.” May (2011, p. 226) wrote that “The goal for many proponents of case studies … is to overcome dichotomies between generalizing and particularizing, quantitative and qualitative, deductive and inductive techniques.”

In short, while there were advantages and disadvantages to the case study method, it appeared that the advantages were well suited to the goal of this research, which was to generate elements of a model for effective military assistance initiatives.

3.4.1 Additional Points on Utility of The Case Study Method For This Research

It is important to note that the case study method constitutes more than just a historical analysis, but provides the opportunity to include interviews of people involved in the events (Yin, 2003, p. 8). Indeed, that was the particular reason
this method was most appropriate: it provided the opportunity to utilise interviews, supported by documents, to provide an analysis which went beyond a simple historical study (Yin, 2003, p. 8).

Stake (2005) wrote that the case study method has been criticized, particularly for its inability to produce results which have more general applicability (p. 448). While conceding that a case study will not have the same type of general applicability as other types of research, Stake (2005) asserted that case studies make a valid contribution to findings of general applicability, and, more important, that general applicability is not the ultimate goal of research (p. 448). It is worth citing the comment from Stake (2005) that:

> the case to be studied is a complex entity located in a milieu or situation embedded in a number of contexts or backgrounds. Historical context is almost always of interest, but so are cultural and physical contexts. Other contexts often of interest are the social, economic, political, ethical, and aesthetic (p. 449).

In addition, Stake (2005, p. 445) provided his identification of three different types of case studies. The first was an “intrinsic case study” pursued with a primary goal of an extensive examination and understanding of a specific case. The second was an “instrumental case study” where the focus is generating insights into a particular issue or theory. The third was a “multiple case study” in which a study is extended to several cases. With regard to Stake’s taxonomy, the predominant category appeared to be that of an “instrumental case study” with a goal of generating insights into a particular theory. Applying that taxonomy to this research, the Baltic programmes were analysed in great detail, and the contexts, practices and processes were outlined in order to generate elements of a theory which could be of utility to academics and practitioners in the area of military assistance. This was done, as Stake (2005) noted, “all because this helps us pursue the external interest. The case may be seen as typical of other cases or not... Here the choice of case is made to advance understanding of that other interest” (p. 445).

As noted above, case study analysis can be applied for both single and multiple case studies. The distinction was not critical for this research topic, as it constituted both a single and a multiple case study. There were four distinct Baltic military assistance initiatives. However, the case could also be made that the focus of the research was on one topic: the Western effort to assist the Baltic governments in developing modern military forces, which was composed of four separate initiatives. Moreover, as the template established for BALTBAT was then used for the other three projects, the case could be made that they were different examples of utilization of one set of overarching political decisions. As a result, whether this research was viewed as a single or multiple case study was worth noting, but was not critical to the research or analysis of the resulting data. For purposes of clarity, however, it was considered a single case study, with BALTRON, BALTNET and the BALTDEFCOL serving to test the validity of the Mechanisms derived from the analysis of BALTBAT.
Finally, Stake (2005) noted the value of case studies in both academic research as well as public policy, which was of particular relevance for this thesis. On academic research, Stake (2005) wrote that case studies are of value in “refining theory, suggesting complexities for further investigation as well as helping to establish the limits of generalizability” (p. 460). On public policy, Stake (2005) asserted that case studies can also be “a disciplined force in setting public policy and in reflecting on human experience” (p. 460). The comments regarding public policy reinforced the point that analysis of the Baltic initiatives can be of use to academics working in the area of military assistance, but can also hopefully provide assistance to practitioners who are working on the initiation and development of military assistance projects and that the use of a case study approach was of utility in achieving these results.

3.5 Research Protocol

In light of the academic literature which has been cited, the research methodology most appropriate for this thesis came into focus. Yin (2003) emphasized that it is beneficial to have flexible research designs so that new data uncovered during data collection can significantly improve the existing design (p. 55). With that recommendation in mind, the protocol used to conduct this research is outlined below.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted to gather data from a number of different groups of individuals. The rationale for the use of semi-structured interviews is set forth in Section 3.5.3. The first group was composed of the policy-makers who established the foundation and framework for the Baltic military assistance programmes. The second group involved those who were critical to setting up and working on Baltic initiatives. The third group involved a broad category of academics and other specialists in the Baltic area who were in positions which allowed them to provide commentary on the assistance projects. The rationale for the interview sample is set forth in Section 3.5.2.

There was an initial contact in which the purpose of the research was presented to the interviewee. The request was made for an interview. The strong preference was to conduct face-to-face interviews. However, this was not always possible due to limitations on the amount of travel that could be undertaken. As a result, when a face-to-face interview was not possible, the second option was to conduct the interview over the phone. It was also possible to conduct the interview in other ways, such as by e-mail or Skype, if that was the preference of the interviewee. In two specific instances outlined in Chapter Four, the decision of two interviewees was to conduct the interview solely by e-mail. It should be noted that, as was always the case, the interviewees approved the final write-up of the interview.

An extensive questionnaire listing a broad range of issues was provided in advance to the interviewee. A copy is included in Annex A in the Appendices.
In an effort to reduce bias, the point was emphasized to the interviewee that the questionnaire was not intended as an all-encompassing list of topics, each to be addressed in detail, but merely a guide on the types of topics that could be considered. The point was also stressed to the interviewee that he/she was welcome to raise other topics not included on the questionnaire.

The interview was written up and submitted to the interviewee for edits. They were asked to ensure they were fully satisfied with the account of their comments. It was noted that they had complete freedom to add, delete or otherwise modify the draft transcripts of the interview. The point was also made that should the interviewee, upon reflection, recall other relevant points which he/she would have raised, but did not, there was no prohibition to adding those points in the final write-up. While this issue was also raised at the onset of the interview, a clear decision was also requested from the interviewee at the time of final editing on whether he/she could be quoted, or whether any (or all) of the transcript was not for attribution. An example of a final write-up of an interview is provided in Annex B in the Appendices.

With regard to other methods that might have been helpful, but were not utilised, there appeared to be no benefit to be gained from a video record of the interview for this particular research. Such techniques could be worthwhile should the body language or voice of the interviewee be a critical factor, but that was not the case with regard to this data. There was therefore no reason to run the risk that use of such recording equipment might have a chilling effect on the interview setting and inhibit the interviewee.

On the issue of whether an audio record might have been more valuable as a verbatim transcript of all the commentary of the interviewee, it was not apparent that such a verbatim account was critical to the research. As noted above, the interviewees were given complete latitude to edit their comments for the final version. In short, the process utilised to record the information from the interview ensured that the views, recollections and opinions of the interviewees were fully and faithfully noted.

### 3.5.1 Theoretical Sampling

With regard to the general issue of sampling, George and Bennett (2005, p. 31) made the overarching point that statistical researchers focus on trying to make the sample as representative as possible, but that “While useful and necessary in statistical studies, these practices are inappropriate and sometimes counterproductive when extended to case study methods or used to judge these methods.” Davies (2007, p. 152) noted the advantages of a small number of interviewees, writing that “The distinctiveness of working with a small sample is important to grasp from the outset. Your aim is to emerge with feelings, ideas, described experiences, opinions, views attitudes and perspectives that have a breadth and depth to them extending beyond that which a structured questionnaire would deliver.”
As noted by Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 10), qualitative analysis consists of data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing/verification, with the additional comment that the sampling in qualitative studies is not done in a manner in which the samples are pre-specified, "but can evolve once fieldwork begins" (p. 27). Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 30-31) noted that sampling decisions involve settings, actors, events and processes. Those sampling parameters provide guidance with regard to selecting the sample, and, just as important, change as the research process unfolds.

Purposive sampling approaches, primarily theoretical sampling, were utilised for this research. Neuman (2011, p. 267) defined purposive sampling as “A non-random sample in which the researcher uses a wide range of methods to locate all possible cases of a highly specific and difficult-to-reach population.” Davies (2007, p. 57) noted that “Purposive sampling invites the researcher to identify and target individuals who are believed to be ‘typical’ of the population being studied.”

Bryman (2012) defined purposive sampling as “a non-probability form of sampling” (p. 418, Key concept 18.1). He listed a number of purposive sampling approaches, including theoretical sampling, snowball sampling, and opportunistic sampling. For this thesis, theoretical sampling was utilised, although a discussion of opportunistic and snowball sampling is included as they played a practical role in this sampling which was conducted for this thesis.

With regard to theoretical sampling, Walliman (2011, p. 178) defined it as “Selection of a sample of the population that you think knows most about the subject. This approach is common in qualitative research where statistical inference is not required.” Bryman (2012, p. 419, Key concept 18.3) asserted that “Theoretical sampling differs from generic purposive sampling ... in that its practitioners emphasize using it to provide a springboard for the generation of theory and the refinement of theoretical categories. It is iterative in the sense that it is not a one off but an ongoing process that entails several stages.” He added that theoretical sampling is “an ongoing process rather than a distinct and single stage, as it is, for example, in probability sampling” adding that “it is important to realize that it is not just people who are the ‘objects’ of sampling” (2012, p. 419, Key concept 18.3).

Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 145) noted that “Theoretical sampling is concept driven. It enables researchers to discover the concepts that are relevant to this problem and population, and allows researchers to explore the concepts in depth” and that it is “especially important when studying new or unchartered areas because it allows for discovery.” The authors (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) asserted that “With theoretical sampling, interview and observational guides are not as relevant as they are to structured forms of research because they tend to evolve and change over the course of the research” (p. 152) adding the later comment that “in other words, the researcher takes who or what he or she can get in terms of data” (p. 153). Continuing on this theme, Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 146) wrote that “The procedures for theoretical sampling are simple:
the researcher follows the analytic trail." Moreover, the authors (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p. 148) noted that "In theoretical sampling, the researcher is not so much concerned with consistency as following up on important theoretical leads."

Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 167) commented that purposive sampling and theoretical sampling are approaches which are "non-probability based samples and are quite deliberately so," noting that the approach is "generally associated with small, in-depth studies with research designs that are based on the gathering of qualitative data and focused on the exploration and interpretation of experiences and perceptions" including case studies. The authors added that "people or cases are chosen 'with purpose' to enable the researcher to explore the research questions or develop a theory" (Matthews and Ross, 2010, p. 167). As outlined by the various authors noted above, theoretical sampling appeared to be suitable for this thesis.

However, other closely related purposive techniques also played a part in this research due to the practical challenge of trying to contact senior officials who worked on the Baltic military assistance initiatives. With regard to opportunistic sampling, Bryman defined it as "capitalizing on opportunities to collect data from certain individuals, contact with whom is largely unforeseen but who may provide data relevant to the research question" (2012, p. 419, Key concept 18.2).

With regard to snowball sampling, Grix (2010, p. 129) commented on the technique, whereby the interviewer asks "whether the interviewee could name any useful contacts, thus allowing you to get in touch with important people using the interviewee's name and without having to resort to 'cold calling'." Blaxter, Hughes and Tight (2010, p. 170) described snowball sampling as "building up a sample through informants."

Lindlof and Taylor (2011, p. 114) asserted that snowball sampling is well suited to studying "people who have certain attributes in common" going on to note that "It is also sometimes the best way to reach an elusive, hard-to-recruit population." Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 166) commented on snowball sampling and asserted that "given that people who have certain characteristics or behaviour are often part of a network of similar people, this approach to sampling can be quite fruitful."

Johnson and Reynolds (2012, p. 239) noted that with a purposive sample, "the goal is typically to study a diverse and usually limited number of observations rather than to analyse a sample representative of a larger target population." The authors added that in a snowball sample "respondents are used to identify other persons who might qualify for inclusion in the sample. These people are then interviewed and asked to supply appropriate names for further interviewing" (Johnson and Reynolds, 2012, p. 240)
In short, while theoretical sampling was utilised for this thesis, there was also use of “snowballing” and “opportunistic sampling” techniques to seek out offers from interviewees concerning other individuals who could be contacted who worked on the Baltic military assistance programmes. The use of such techniques was not in opposition to theoretical sampling and was utilised to generate a more robust sample which would aid in achieving theoretical saturation, which is discussed below. As Bryman noted “purposive sampling often involves more than one of the approaches outlined above” adding as an example that “it is quite common for snowball sampling to be preceded by another form of purposive sampling” (2012, p. 427).

With regard to the practical steps which were taken to conduct theoretical sampling, policy makers and implementers for the Baltic assistance programmes were contacted and an interview was requested. When an interview was granted and then completed, a request was made to see whether the interviewee might recommend other officials from the donor or recipient states who might be contacted regarding an interview.

### 3.5.2 Sufficiency of Interview Sample

Bryman noted that theoretical sampling “emphasizes theoretical saturation … as a criterion for deciding when to cease collecting new data” (2012, p. 419, Key concept 18.3) and that saturation means “new data no longer suggest new insights into an emergent theory” (p. 421, Key concept 18.4). Bryman (2012) asserted that “the criteria for deciding when theoretical saturation has been achieved are more or less absent” (p. 426, Thinking deeply 18.1) and “Essentially, the criterion for sample size is whatever it takes to achieve saturation” (p. 426).

Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 168) commented that theoretical sampling “continues until there is no new theory emerging and theoretical ‘saturation’ is reached.” Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2011, p. 88) added that saturation “is simply the point at which the information you collect begins to repeat itself” and “further data collection becomes redundant.” Kumar (2011, p. 213) wrote that the data saturation point “determines the sample size,” adding that “the concept of data saturation point is highly subjective. It is you who are collecting the data and decide when you have attained the saturation point in your data collection.”

Corbin and Strauss (2008) stressed that saturation “also denotes a development of categories in terms of their properties and dimensions” (p. 148) adding that “A researcher knows when sufficient sampling has occurred when the major categories show depth and variation in terms of their development” (p. 149).” In short, the theoretical sampling for this research continued until saturation had been achieved.
3.5.3 Structured, Unstructured and Semi-Structured Interviews

With regard to the gathering of information via interviews, Fontana and Frey (2005) were sceptical of the objectivity of the structured interview. They asserted that unstructured interviews “can provide greater breadth than do the other types given its qualitative nature” (p. 705). The authors indicated the distinction between the two is that a structured interview seeks to gather specific data that can be coded to explain behaviour within specific categories that have been prepared. An unstructured interview tries to grasp the behaviour of individuals without imposing a specific categorization that could restrict the research. As a result, Fontana and Frey (2005) noted that unstructured interviews vary widely (p. 712).

Fontana and Frey (2005) appeared to have valid points regarding the problems of the structured as well as the unstructured interview, which indicated why the semi-structured interview was used for this research. Once again, the focus was on the richness of the perspectives which the interviewees could bring to the policy decisions regarding BALTBAT and the other Baltic military assistance projects. That was the value of the data provided by the interviews. As Perakyla (2005) commented:

Most qualitative research probably is based on interviews. There are good reasons for this. By using interviews, the researcher can reach areas of reality that would otherwise remain inaccessible such as people’s subjective experiences and attitudes. The interview is also a very convenient way of overcoming distances both in space and in time; past events or faraway experiences can be studied by interviewing people who took part in them (p. 869).

Miles and Huberman (1994) noted that there are arguments for minimal structure in the interview format, maximum structure in the interview format, or what they pragmatically title “it depends,” which emphasizes that flexibility is important for researchers (p. 35). While the benefits of a tightly-controlled interview process are clear, they have the potential to exclude valuable lines of inquiry or data. While standardisation would be enhanced, that is not the goal of the research. As Miles and Huberman (1994) highlighted, the bulk of research work involves note-taking, recording of conversations and collection of documents, which means that framework questions and categories are all that is required for the interviews (p. 35).

In discussing what he calls semi-standardized interviews, Flick (2002) noted that the various topics are introduced by an open question, include theory-driven, hypothesis-directed questions and end with confrontational questions to challenge the views put forth by the interviewee (p. 81). There is a reason to be concerned about being too rigid in applying a prepared interview guide (Flick, 2002, p. 92). An overly-restrictive view of sticking to the document generates interruptions in the flow of the interviewee’s statements and limits possible information. On the other hand, it should be noted that Flick (2002, p. 93)
commented on the benefits of the consistent use of an interview guide in generating more data on particular points and enhancing the ability to compare data.

While such a result is a worthy goal, it appeared that for this research the more compelling interest was to ensure the broadest possible means of getting information, views and recollections from the interviewees. As a result, semi-structured interviews conducted for this research were done with an interest in not circumscribing the ability of the interviewee to raise any and all points which he/she believed were relevant.

### 3.5.4 Analysis of Documents

As noted previously, there were numerous documents regarding BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives which provided additional data regarding the initiation and establishment of these programmes. Silverman (2006) noted that documents also serve as naturally occurring data, generated independently of the research-provoked data (p. 201). This appeared to apply to the documents regarding the Baltic military assistance programmes, as they provided information generated independently of the interviews.

The data in these documents therefore allowed for a degree of triangulation with regard to the data provided from interviews. Stake (2005) wrote that triangulation is “generally considered a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation,” in order to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of data (p. 454). Stake (2005) noted that triangulation “helps to identify different realities” by highlighting ways in which the case is viewed (p. 454). Thus, it was important to utilise analysis of documents as well as analysis of interview material to triangulate and enhance the reliability of research.

Referring back to the discussion of positivism, emotionalism and constructivism, similar differences of view arise regarding the use and analysis of documents. As Silverman (2006, p. 158) noted, there are four types of analysis of texts: 1) content analysis, 2) analysis of narrative structures, 3) ethnography, and 4) ethnomethodology. The first, content analysis, has a focus on quantitative methodology, and centres on the establishment of categories and an analysis of the number of instances in which words fall into those categories.

The second type of analysis, narrative structure analysis, addresses the way in which the various elements of a narrative fulfil certain functions. The third type of analysis, ethnography, moves farther away from specific words, and has a larger concern with texts as resources from which to understand broader social relationships. The final type of analysis, ethnomethodology, or analysis by consideration of membership categorization, uses membership categorization devices.
With regard to these four types of analysis of texts, neither ethnography nor ethnomethodology appeared to be of utility for this research. Moreover, the focus for this thesis was how documents could assist in triangulation of the data gathered in the interviews. In that respect, the case could be made that the "what" addressed by content analysis was more relevant than the "how" which is the focus of narrative structure analysis.

However, it is important to note that the conduct of the content analysis of the documents regarding the Baltic initiatives was not done in a rigid, formal manner. As Perakyla (2005) noted, “in many cases, qualitative researchers who use written texts as their materials do not try to follow any predefined protocol in executing their analysis” (p. 870). Perakyla (2005) asserted that an informal approach may well be the best method of analysing written texts, particularly in the case of research “where the qualitative text analysis is not at the core of the research but instead is in a subsidiary or complementary role, no more sophisticated text analytical methods may be needed” (p. 870). Such an approach appeared to apply to this thesis. Certainly, in research where the predominant or sole focus is examination of documents, a more rigorous analysis may be required. However, when analysis of text is merely a complement to research which has a heavy focus on interviews and questionnaire data, no more exacting examination of text is needed (Perakyla, 2005, p. 870).

With regard to other options to content analysis of documents, one possibility was critical discourse analysis, cited by Perakyla (2005, p. 871) which analyses how texts indicate the distribution of power and inequalities in society. However, while it was important for this research to note the positions of authority held by interviewees, the focus was on the political decision as an Intervention, rather than the power distribution.

Finally, Perakyla (2005, p. 871) noted the school of thought which stresses the importance of statements as objects and subjects to be analysed within a particular historical context to assess their significance. Such a perspective was of particular relevance to this research, as it addressed the significance of statements within documents generated in a particular historical context which were relevant to an analysis of the Intervention and Mechanisms which generated Outcomes from the Baltic military assistance programmes.

### 3.5.5 General Points on Coding of Interviews

The results of the interviews were coded so that they could then be analysed. However, before going into detail about the coding process, it is worthwhile to note the general assertion by Stake (2005) that “perhaps the simplest rule for method in qualitative casework is this: ‘Place your best intellect into the thick of what is going on’” (p. 449).

Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 475) defined coding as “The process of ‘marking’ or identifying data for later analysis.” Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 65) defined
coding as “Deriving and developing concepts from data” and expanded on that definition by noting that it is “Extracting concepts from raw data and developing them in terms of their properties and dimensions” (p. 159). Walliman (2011, p. 133) noted that “codes are labels or tags used to allocate units of meaning to the data.”

With regard to concrete steps, Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 160) outlined a process of 1) breaking the data into manageable pieces, 2) taking those pieces and exploring for ideas contained within and 3) giving those ideas conceptual names. Bryman (2012, p. 247-8, Key concept 11.1) highlighted two main stages for coding. First, the unstructured material must be categorized. Second, the researcher must assign numbers to the categories that have been created, adding that “the numbers themselves are simply tags that will allow the material to be processed quantitatively.”

As Lindlof and Taylor (2011, p. 248) asserted, codes “are the linkages between data and the categories the researcher creates” adding that “A major purpose of codes is to characterize the individual elements constituting a category.” Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2011, p. 227) noted that coding “enables researchers to focus analysis on specific issues in the data” adding that coding “provides the foundation for data analysis.”

For this research, it was important to continuously reassess the data base as it grew, particularly as it generated new possible issues to be considered. As a practical matter, the material needed to be reviewed and interpreted against new data in an iterative process. In short, the assertion by Stake (2005) that this is a constant process of examination, reflection and revision (p. 450) applied to this research.

Regarding this iterative process, Yin (2003, p. 120) cited explanation building as an analytic technique which was suitable for this research. The effort is to analyse the data by building an explanation about the case being studied. In contrast to other strategies, such as pattern matching, time-series analysis, logic models or cross-case synthesis, explanation building had numerous advantages, including the fact that the process of developing the explanation is iterative.

On the coding process, the raw data from the interviews were analysed so that the data were linked. The relevant data segments were put together so that they could be analysed as clusters, categories or networks of information. As Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 44, Figure 3.2) noted, content analysis is required, counting the frequencies of specific words or phrases, which is important with regard to drawing the appropriate conclusions. There are descriptive codes, interpretive codes and pattern codes, and the method of generating codes proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994) is simply to create an initial list of codes prior to the data gathering process (p. 58).
For this research, pattern codes were generated, which were explanatory and generated themes. Miles and Huberman (1994) noted that they serve key functions which are relevant to this research, such as reducing data into smaller numbers of units, prompting the researcher into analytical thinking, and assisting in generation of a cognitive map (p. 69).

**3.5.6 Details on Coding**

The data were coded from the interview transcripts. As the coding proceeded and possible Mechanisms arose as cited by interviewees, the list of Mechanisms expanded. The final tabulation for the various codes also indicated the frequency with which the particular possible Mechanism was cited by interviewees. NVIVO 8 software was used to code the interviews. One example of coding is included in Appendix D of the Appendices.

A modified coding procedure was used with regard to the sample of public documents regarding BALTBAT and the other Baltic military assistance programmes. There was analysis of which possible Mechanisms generated from the interview coding were present in the documents. The modified coding of the documents was done manually, as there was no software suitable for this part of the research process. Thus, the process was a review of the extent to which the possible Mechanisms derived from the interviews appeared in the documents.

As the baseline of coded data grew and possible Mechanisms emerged, it was important to analyse whether initial theories regarding the significance of the Intervention of political decisions and their impact on the Outcomes of the Baltic programmes appeared to be valid. In short, the list of possible Mechanisms grew or shrank as coding proceeded. Such an approach was proposed by Flick (2002), who asserted that it is important “to design methods so open that they do justice to the complexity of the object under study” (p. 5).

The goal of this research was to determine the significance of the Intervention and uncover Mechanisms for success derived from the Baltic initiatives. Relating that to the issue of validity, the test of the coding was not abstract academic criteria, but assessment with reference to the object of analysis: BALTBAT and the Baltic projects. Ultimately, as noted by Flick (2002), the key points concerning qualitative research were “whether findings are grounded in empirical material and whether the methods have been appropriately selected and applied to the object under study” (p. 5). As Flick (2002) noted:

> According to this understanding, coding includes the constant comparison of phenomena, cases, concepts and so on and the formulation of questions which are addressed to the text. Starting from the data, the process of coding leads to the development of theories through a process of abstraction. Concepts or codes are attached to the empirical material. They are formulated first as closely as possible to the text, and later more and more abstractly. Categorizing in this procedure
refers to the summary of such concepts into generic concepts and to the elaboration of the relations between concepts and generic concepts or categories and superior concepts. The development of theory involves the formulation of networks of categories or concepts and the relations between them. Relations may be elaborated between superior and inferior categories (hierarchically) but also between concepts at the same level (p. 177).

As a large number of codes were generated, they were categorized by grouping them, as appropriate, around certain specific topics, issues or phenomena. The ultimate goal was to represent the content of the interviews in as structured and ordered a manner as possible to identify the Mechanisms which allowed for Outcomes and which can be the elements of a model for effective military assistance programmes.

"In vivo" codes drawn from the interviews were utilised rather than constructed codes already developed in the social sciences, as noted by Flick (2002, p. 178). The level of detail needed with regard to open coding was determined as the coding process unfolded. Once the open coding was completed, the next step was axial coding, or the differentiation or refinement of the categories produced by open coding as noted by Flick (2002, p. 181). The most significant categories were identified which appeared to have the most potential for further analysis, and relationships between various categories (or sub-categories) were analysed.

To be clear, there were risks involved with this coding process. In theory, the open coding could have been endless. Moreover, the open-ended nature of the coding did not provide a useful framework with regard to criteria for coding the selected passages. The rebuttal to these criticisms was that it is important to ensure the coding is pursued in a pragmatic manner.

### 3.5.7 Initial Categories

The initial set of categories for coding was derived from the general literature regarding BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives, as outlined in Chapter Two. They naturally appeared to fall into certain categories. The first category was simply Russia. The second category was NATO. The third category was development of national defence. The fourth category was "Baltification," or transfer of responsibility to the Baltic nations. Once again, these were merely the initial categories utilised to begin the coding process and the final result of the process was many more categories.

### 3.5.8 Use Of a Matrix

A matrix is provided in Appendix C in the Appendices. The clustering of the Mechanisms raised by the interviewees can provide a visual guide. Moreover, a matrix can assist in recognizing patterns from the data. A very basic form of matrix is utilised, with the Mechanisms listed along the vertical axis (as
numbered in Chapter Five) and the interviewees listed along the horizontal axis (as numbered in the Dramatis Personae on pp. xiv-xv).

For the purposes of this research, such a basic approach appeared suitable, and there was no reason for the use of other methods noted by Miles and Huberman (1994), such as a conceptually clustered matrix (p. 127), a checklist matrix (p. 105) or a role-ordered matrix (p. 122). A chronological display was another possibility, and a simple listing of events might have assisted in providing an overview of the work of the Baltic programmes. A chronology of BALTBAT and the other Baltic projects is provided on pp. xxi-xxiii to assist in clarifying the developments from 1991 to 2004. While a chronological construct could be accomplished with a critical incident chart, event-state network, activity record or decision modelling (Miles and Huberman, 1994, pp. 115-117), it was not apparent that the sequence of events for the Baltic initiatives was a salient point in uncovering the significance of the Intervention of political decisions between the donor and recipient states and the Mechanisms which generated positive Outcomes.

3.5.9 Models, Modelling and Elements of a Model

The research aim was to identify the elements of a model for effective military assistance programmes. As a general definition, Johnson and Reynolds (2012, p. 208) noted that a model is “a simplified and abstract representation of reality … that purports to show how variables or parts of a system tie together.” Grix (2010, p. 20) defined a model as “a representation of something” and “can be both a descriptive and an exploratory device.” Giddens and Turner (1987, p. 164) provided the admonition that the term ‘model’ is “highly ambiguous in the social sciences.”

Wilson (1990) provided a definition of a model which is relevant to this thesis:

A model is the explicit interpretation of one’s understanding of a situation, or merely of one’s ideas about that situation. It can be expressed in mathematics, symbols or words, but it is essentially a description of entities, processes or attributes and the relationships between them. It may be prescriptive or illustrative, but above all, it must be useful (p. 11).

He stressed that “the model is only part of a process of analysis and not the outcome” (Wilson, 1990, p. 11). Wilson (2001, p. 4) added that “Models (of any kind) are not descriptions of the real world they are descriptions of ways of thinking about the real world (italics in original).” Wilson (2001, p. 4-5) went on to note that an analyst “will make sense of what is being observed by using a set of concepts or intellectual constructs. Dependent upon the nature of the real-world situation a selection of concepts will be made.”

With regard to the purpose of a model, Walliman (2011, p. 107) asserted that a model “aims to isolate and simplify an event in order to inspect it in detail and gain useful data.” He added that “it is essential to understand the system that
lies behind the phenomena to be modelled and what are the important variables and how they interact,” noting that “qualitative models emphasize the relationships between entities without trying to quantify them” (Walliman, 2011, p. 108). Grix (2010) asserted that “a model is a representation of reality imposed on raw data so as to draw out possible relationships among variables” (p. 22). May (2011, p. 125) commented that models “allow assessment of different characteristics where there are multiple independent variables and interactions.”

Addressing the issue of modelling, Giddens and Turner (1987, p. 164) wrote that in social theory, modelling involves “a variety of activities, ranging from the construction of formal equations and computer simulations to graphic representations of relations among phenomena.” Giddens and Turner (1987, p. 164) added that in sociological theory, there are two types of models: empirical-causal models and abstract-analytical models. Empirical-causal models involve “statements of correlation among measured variables, ordered in a linear and temporal sequence” (Giddens and Turner, 1987, p. 165) which was not the focus of this thesis.

On the other hand, abstract analytical models develop “context-free concepts” such as centralization of power or differentiation, and then “represent their relations in a visual picture.” Giddens and Turner (1987, pp. 164-165) noted that “such relations are usually expressed in causal terms, but these causal connections are complex, involving varying weights and patterns (such as feedback loops, cycles, mutual effects and other non-linear connective representations).” The approach taken in abstract analytical models appeared to be of utility for this thesis.

Continuing on the issue of modelling, Wilson (1990, p. xv) wrote that there are various “modelling languages appropriate to various parts of a problem spectrum” noting that this spectrum “extends from the well defined (hard) problems, in which the modelling language may be mathematically oriented, to soft, ill structured problems in which a modelling language is required which is capable of a richer description of the real world than mathematics can provide.” With regard to this thesis, a “richer description” of the real world was more suitable for this particular research.

Finally, with regard to the aim of this research, Kirke (2009, p. 12) noted that “Models of any kind are usually needed because the investigator cannot understand the totality of something. In order to start to make sense of what is apparently overwhelmingly complex information, they need to break it down and give it some sort of shape.” Kirke (2009) went on to note that “A model, therefore, is created for a specific purpose – to find the guiding principles in a particular process, for instance – and it inevitably contains assumptions and artificial boundaries that allow the user to make sense of the relevant part of the picture” (p. 13). In this thesis, the aim was to determine the elements of a model for effective military assistance projects out of large amounts of information regarding the Baltic military assistance initiatives.
The goal for this research was to analyse the significance of a specific Intervention (political decisions), and determine the various Mechanisms (such as political commitment) which allowed that Intervention to generate specific Outcomes from military assistance programmes. Such a process allowed for the generation of elements for a model with regard to the Intervention, Mechanisms and Outcomes. It is necessary at this juncture to be clear about the expectations regarding the utility of the model which can be developed and what benefits it can provide academics and practitioners in the area of military assistance.

The intention was to generate as much meaning as possible from the data and identify Mechanisms apparent in BALTBAT and the other projects. A model with significant predictive ability would be desirable as the final product. However, that is beyond the scope of this research. Similarly, it would have been valuable to draw conclusions regarding the Mechanisms which would have allowed them to be categorized as antecedent (or starting) variables or mediating variables. However, this again was beyond the ambitions of this research, although it would certainly appear to be a worthwhile subject of future research. Finally, those working in the field would welcome a model which could be applied precisely in other states or regions to assure successful Outcomes. However, that was well beyond the goals of this research and raised the question of whether such a model is indeed feasible, a point which is left to future researchers. Instead, the intention of this thesis was to identify the elements which can constitute parts of such a model, highlight the key questions which policy-makers need to ask, and focus attention on the decisions they need to reach to ensure they have a solid foundation for their initiatives and the best possible chance for successful Outcomes.

Re-phrasing the preceding points another way, there was no intention within this thesis of generating a model which can provide mathematical predictability with regard to successful military assistance programmes. Instead, the goals for the research were more modest. Assuming the proposition is accepted that BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives were successful, their genesis, establishment and development indicate there was an Intervention and there were Mechanisms which were the cause of successful Outcomes. Admittedly, the Mechanisms which comprise the elements for a model were generated in a particular geographic area at a specific time in a unique political environment. However, the proposition is put forth that the difficulties involved with that time and that environment indicated that the Mechanisms which generated the desired Outcomes in such challenging circumstances provided a reason to believe that they are of value in future military assistance projects.

In view of the significance of the issue of transferability, a topic addressed in the Literature Review in Chapter Two, the interviewees were asked to provide their views on whether the experience of the Baltic initiatives can (or should) be transferred to other areas. This generated a substantial amount of commentary. The results are analysed in Chapter Five, but at this juncture, the
In short, the goal of the research was to identify the Mechanisms apparent in the Baltic programmes which generated successful Outcomes and are the elements of a model applicable to military assistance projects. Such a model could be of use to academics and practitioners in the area. The goal was modest, but it addressed a topic which has not been analysed, and provided a foundation from which further research can be conducted.

3.6 Evaluating the Quality of the Research

Although the issues of the quality (also addressed with regard to reliability) and validity of research tend to blur, there is an advantage in trying to address the two topics separately. Silverman (2006, p. 276) provided his set of criteria for evaluating qualitative research:

1. Are the methods of research appropriate to the nature of the question being asked?
2. Is the connection to an existing body of knowledge or theory clear?
3. Are there clear accounts of the criteria used for the selection of cases for study, and of the data collection and analysis?
4. Does the sensitivity of the methods match the needs of the research question?
5. Were the data collection and record keeping systematic?
6. Is reference made to accepted procedures for analysis?
7. How systematic is the analysis?
8. Is there adequate discussion of how themes, concepts and categories were derived from the data?
9. Is there adequate discussion of the evidence for and against the researcher’s arguments?
10. Is a clear distinction made between the data and their interpretation?

With regard to reliability, Flick (2002) cited procedural reliability, commenting that reliability is critical against the backdrop of the theory of the research topic and the use of methods (p. 220). The proposition put forward by Flick (2002) is that reliability comes down to two issues: first, the "genesis of the data needs to be explicated in a way that makes it possible to check what is a statement of the subject on the one hand and where the researcher's interpretation begins on the other;" and second, procedures regarding the interview and the text must be made explicit to improve comparability of different conduct by interviewers or observers (p. 221).
For this thesis, the issues noted above regarding the quality and reliability of the research were addressed. The author conducted all the interviews. The interview transcripts are available for examination, and substantial amounts of data from the interviews are provided in Chapter Five. Finally, the rationale behind the specific steps taken to conduct the research (such as use of semi-structured interviews and coding) were presented earlier in this Chapter.

### 3.7 Evaluating the Validity of the Research

Turning to the validity of the research, Yin (2003, p. 97) provided three recommended principles to maximize the benefits from the various data sources: use multiple sources of evidence; create a case study data base; and maintain a chain of evidence. With regard to multiple sources, the use of interviews and documents concerning the Baltic programmes bolstered the validity of the research and served as triangulation. With regard to a case study data base, all the interviews and documents are available for review and assessment. Finally, with regard to chain of evidence, all interviews are in a final form approved by the interviewee and handled only by the author.

It is useful to return to the issue of triangulation, or the use of multiple methods, to determine a more accurate portrayal of the objective truth (Silverman, 2006, p. 291). That could involve use of interviews, observation, surveys or other data. Triangulation does not necessarily result in one method offsetting the weaknesses of other methods (Silverman, 2006, p. 291). However, triangulation has utility, especially if done with a particular theoretical perspective in mind and with methods which can provide critical data within that perspective.

As Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 36) noted, there is great weight on validity based on the factors of “construct (are the concepts well grounded?), descriptive/contextual (is the account complete and thorough?), interpretive (does the account connect with the ‘lived experience’ of people in the case?), and natural (is the setting mostly undisturbed by my presence?).” Miles and Huberman (1994) generated a list of 13 methods by which the findings can be tested or confirmed (p. 263). Specifically with regard to assessing data quality, they cited four methods: checking for representativeness; checking for researcher effects; triangulating; and weighting the evidence. They listed four methods which address looking at what lies outside the expected pattern: checking the meaning of outliers; using extreme cases; following up surprises; and looking for negative evidence. The final group of four methods to test explanations were: making if-then tests; ruling out spurious relations; replicating a finding; and checking out rival explanations. The thirteenth and final method was getting feedback from informants who supplied the original data, which was done for this particular research. While not all 13 methods were utilised in this research, all 13 were considered to see if any particular method should be utilised to enhance the quality of the research.
3.8 Evaluating the General Applicability of the Research

Perhaps the most problematic issue regarding this research was the ability to generalise about the findings of this particular case study. In short, the question was: can the significance of the Intervention (political decisions) and the Mechanisms utilised to generate Outcomes from the Baltic military assistance initiatives serve as the elements of a model for effective military assistance projects which can be applied to programmes in other states? As a starting point for discussion of this question, the literature on the general issue of applicability of case study findings was instructive.

The question posed by positivists and other critics was fundamental: can the results from a case study be generally applied? Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 31) noted that it is easier to generalise when taking results from a small sample to a larger sample, as opposed to moving from a single case to a larger set. However, Stake (2005, p. 450) commented on two different types of general purposes for case study methodology. The first is developing general theories which have substantial applicability. The second is pursuing an intrinsic interest in the case and developing conclusions which are specific lessons from the case. As Stake (2005) noted, even intrinsic case studies cannot avoid the test of general applicability. However, the key point is that this was not the ultimate goal of this research. The assertion by Stake (2005) is that the methodology for an intrinsic case study is “to learn enough about the case to encapsulate complex meanings into a finite report but to describe the case in sufficient descriptive narrative so that readers can experience these happenings vicariously and draw their own conclusions” (p. 450). To a large degree, this describes the process and outcome regarding this particular research into the Baltic programmes.

3.9 Conclusion

The salient points regarding the methodology chosen for this research were addressed by the broad, overarching principles regarding good qualitative research. As Flick (2002) wrote:

It does not make sense to argue that a specific method should be used in qualitative research as the right and only method. This form of commitment is not appropriate to qualitative research. But there are some other forms of commitment necessary in qualitative research. Research should be planned methodologically and based on principles and reflection. Notions like fixed and well-defined paradigms rather obstruct the way to the issue under study than they open new and appropriate ways to do it. Decisions for theory and method in qualitative research should be taken and reflected in a knowledge-based way (p. 274).

The methods and specific procedures utilised in this research emphasized the focus on a flexible, iterative process by which the interviews were coded and,
augmented by analysis of numerous documents, Mechanisms were identified which could be the elements of a model for successful military assistance programmes. In fulfilling those criteria, the methodology met the requirements for valid and reliable research.
CHAPTER FOUR: COLLECTED DATA

4.1 Introduction

The effort was made to interview as broad a range of individuals as possible who could provide insights into the initiation and development of BALTBAT and the other Baltic military assistance initiatives. This included individuals who were in senior positions in the 1990s which allowed them to make the political decisions regarding these projects, those who played a key role in the development of the Baltic programmes, and those who could provide insights into the Baltic nations in general and the Baltic initiatives in particular.

The first and most important group of interviewees consisted of policy-makers who were “present at the creation” of BALTBAT and were intimately familiar with the critical issues which dominated the thinking of those who established these programmes: the concern regarding Russia; the need for the Baltic capitals to act in unison; the focus on establishing the qualifications of the Baltic states to become members of NATO; and many similar concerns. These individuals were particularly well-suited to judge the significance of the Intervention of political decisions, the Mechanisms which were utilised and their impact on the generation of Outcomes from the Baltic military assistance programmes.

The second group of interviewees consisted of individuals who played an important role in turning that overarching political framework into concrete military assistance projects. There was particular value in obtaining the views of civilian and military personnel who worked to develop the project details which allowed the Baltic governments to develop the foundation for modern military forces, and eventually join NATO.

The third and final group of interviewees who provided valuable data for this research were those individuals who worked on general issues related to the Baltic countries, including the Baltic initiatives. One benefit of including such individuals was to obtain a perspective from those who are experts on the Baltic area, but were not directly involved in the military assistance programmes, and may therefore be more objective about their impact and efficiency. These interviewees were familiar with the challenges which faced the Baltic capitals and the political environment of the 1990s, but were able to provide a broader overview of the context in which the Baltic military programmes were undertaken, possibly providing a different assessment of the Outcomes.

With regard to the number of interviews which were conducted, more interviews and more data enhance the quality of any piece of research. However, two responses should be made on that point. The first response is that the key issue was whether a sufficient number of individuals from the three categories noted above were interviewed and provided enough information to conduct sufficiently rigorous analysis. The second response is that while the quantity of interviews was important, it was the quality of the information from the
interviews which was more critical. The proposition put forth is that the data which was received were of sufficient quality to support solid research findings.

Finally, with regard to the geographical distribution of the interviewees, special efforts were made to contact Baltic and Nordic policy-makers as they played a central role in these initiatives. Individuals from the UK, US and other supporting states who worked on these programmes were also interviewed. It should be noted that there was no concerted effort to ensure that at least one individual from each of the supporting states was interviewed. Once again, the critical factor was contacting individuals who could provide high quality information, rather than simply ensuring geographic distribution.

The list of interviewees was provided in the Dramatus Personae on pages xiv-xv which also included the date on which the interview was conducted.

4.2 Policy Makers

On the first category of senior officials who established the political foundation for the Baltic programmes, the twelve individuals who were interviewed and agreed that their comments would be for attribution were:

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen - (Denmark) Former Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson - (Iceland) Former Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Bjorn Tove Godal - (Norway) Former Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence.
Hans Haekkerup - (Denmark) Former Minister for Defence.
Linas Linkevicius - (Lithuania) Former Minister for Defence.
General Sir Jeremy Mackenzie - (UK) Former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
Per Carlsen - (Denmark) Former Deputy Permanent Secretary of State for Defence.
Margus Kolga - (Estonia) Ambassador to the UN, former Deputy Secretary General of Policy in the Ministry of Defence, former Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Kristian Fischer - (Denmark) Deputy Permanent Secretary of State for Defence.
General Sir Garry Johnson - (UK) Former Commander, Allied Forces Northern Europe.
Chris Donnelly - (UK)  Former Special Advisor for Central and Eastern Europe to the NATO Secretary General.

Walter Andrusyszyn -- (US)  Former Director of the Office of Regional Political Military Affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, former Political Counselor in Stockholm and former Charge d'affairs in Tallinn.

4.3 Implementers

On the second category of individuals who were critical to setting up and developing specific Baltic programmes, the six individuals who were interviewed and agreed that their comments would be for attribution were:

Brigadier General Alar Laneman -- (Estonia)  Former and First Commander of BALTBAT.

Brigadier General Michael Clemmesen -- (Denmark)  Former and First Commandant of the Baltic Defence College.

Captain Igor Schvede -- (Estonia)  Commander of the Estonian Navy and former BALTRON commander.

Brigadier General Gunnar Abols -- (Latvia)  Former Commandant of the Baltic Defence College.


Julian Brett -- (UK)  Former UK Exchange Officer at the Danish Ministry of Defence.

4.4 Other Interviewees

On the third and final category of specialists who have worked on general issues related to the Baltic countries, including the Baltic military assistance programmes, the five individuals who provided comments for attribution were:

Dr. Graham Herd -- (UK)  Head of International Security Programme, Geneva Center for Security Policy.

Erkki Tori -- (Estonia)  Head of Outreach and Baltic Cooperation Section, Ministry of Defence.

Dr. Arunas Molis -- (Lithuania)  Former Chairman, International Relations Studies, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College.

Professor Eric Sibul -- (US)  Assistant Professor, Military Theory and Military History, Baltic Defence College.
Anthony Lawrence -- (UK) Directing Staff, Higher Command and Studies Course, Baltic Defence College.

4.5 Not for Attribution

There were four individuals (one from Latvia, one from Estonia and two from the US) who were willing to be interviewed, but made clear that their comments would not be for attribution. When their views are cited, they are simply identified as a Latvian official, an Estonian official, a US official and a retired US military officer.

4.6 Process

As noted in Chapter Three, recognising that the quality of the data is best when the interview is conducted face-to-face, this was the process of choice for this research and done whenever possible. However, there were practical financial limitations which made it impossible to conduct all interviews in-person. As a result, when a face-to-face interview was not possible, it was conducted on the phone. Such a process admittedly did not provide the same quality of data as an in-person interview. However, a telephone interview allowed for an immediate give-and-take between interviewer and interviewee.

In two instances (Hannibalsson and Herd), the interviews were write-ups of exchanges conducted by e-mail. It is emphasized that both began with an offer of a phone interview, which was declined by Hannibalsson and Herd. In both cases, the interviewees felt that the e-mail exchanges were sufficient to capture all of their thoughts and commentary on the issue. This was buttressed, as was the case for all the interviews, by the fact that the interviewees were always reminded that they had complete freedom to edit the write-up of their comments, including the provision of subsequent thoughts which arose after the exchanges. In one other instance (Clemmesen), the interview write-up was augmented with specific commentary addressing the individual points on the questionnaire.

In all instances, the write-up of the face-to-face interview, phone interview or e-mail exchange was sent back to the interviewee for final edits. In all instances, the specific question of attribution was raised and noted in the write-up.

4.7 Original Documents

The research drew on 37 original documents regarding the Baltic military assistance programmes. The intention was to compare the statements provided by the interviewees and the Mechanisms that appeared to arise with official pronouncements regarding BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTNET and the BALTDEFCOL. Once again, the argument could be made that there are any number of other documents critical to an extensive analysis of these programmes. The response to that point is that the documents listed below
provided a sufficient foundation to allow for data triangulation through a comparison of the data collected from interviews with the decisions which were reached and the documents that were issued. All of this strengthened the level of confidence in the findings.

As noted in the List of Documents at pp. xvi-xviii, the titles given below will, at appropriate times, use an informal formulation such as "The Baltic Republics" or "The Ministers for Defence of the Three Baltic Republics" rather than the full official title in order to save space without reducing the ability to identify the document. Where appropriate and necessary to identify the document, the level of the signatories was also included. The documents were:


The 1994 Agreement on Baltic Parliamentary and Governmental Cooperation (governments of the Baltic States).

The 3 June 1994 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Nordic-Baltic Cooperation on the formation of a Baltic Peace-keeping Battalion (Ministers for Defence of the Nordic and Baltic States).


The 11 September 1994 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Cooperation on the formation of a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic and Supporting States).

The 13 September 1994 Agreement Between the Three Baltic Republics concerning the Establishment and Formation of Joint Peacekeeping Unit (governments of the Baltic States).

The 13 September 1994 Regulations for the Committees of Senior Officials (Baltic Council of Ministers, adopted by the heads of government of the Baltic States).


The 27 February 1995 Agreement on Cooperation in the Fields of Defence and Military Relations (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic States).

The 3 April 1997 Joint Communique of the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic States.

The 10 December 1997 Agreement Between the Governments of the Baltic Republics Concerning the Baltic Battalion.

The 10 December 1997 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministers of Defence of the Baltic Republics Concerning the Ministerial Committee and the Baltic Military Committee Established in Connection with the Cooperation on the Baltic Battalion.


The 16 April 1998 Agreement between the Baltic Republics concerning the Establishment of the Baltic Naval Squadron (governments of the Baltic States).


The 1998 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Cooperation in the Establishment, Operation, Administration and Initial Funding and Secondment of Staff to a Baltic Defence College in the Republic of Estonia (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic and Supporting States).

The 12 June 1998 Agreement Between the Governments of the Baltic States Concerning the Baltic Defence College.


The 1 February 1999 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Cooperation on the development of BALTBAT into an Infantry Battalion (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic and Supporting States).


The 22 April 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development of the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic States).
The 7 May 1999 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic Republics Concerning the Operation, Funding and Administration of the Baltic Battalion (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic States).


The 1999 Agreement Between the Governments of the Baltic Republics on the Establishment of the Baltic Air Surveillance Network.


The 1999 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Organisation, Operation, Funding and Administration of the Baltic Naval Squadron.

The 1999 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic Republics concerning the Organisation, Operation, Funding and Administration of the Baltic Naval Squadron.

The Terms of References for Commander BALTRON.


BALTBAT Standing Orders - Chapter 3 on Training.

BALTBAT Standing Orders - Chapter 6 on Logistics.

The Baltic Battalion - Status and future development (from the Baltic BALTBAT Military Co-ordination Group).

4.8 Analysis and Consistency of Views

Analysis of the data from the interviews is provided in Chapter Five. NVIVO 8 software was used to code the information drawn from the write-ups of the interviews. There was a particular focus on those apparent Mechanisms which appeared to have been most important in allowing the Intervention of political decisions to generate successful Outcomes from the Baltic military assistance programmes. There was also attention to the concerns of implementers as they
turned that political framework into reality. The analysis also outlined the errors and weaknesses which the interviewees, upon reflection, would correct in the development of the Baltic initiatives if they had the opportunity. There was also a focus on whether the lessons from the Baltic assistance projects could be utilised in similar efforts in other regions, and, if not, why they believed that would not be possible.

Those findings were compared to various parts of the original documents noted in Section 4.7. As an example, if the data from the interviewees indicated that peacekeeping was selected as the mission of BALTBAT as it was a key area of NATO's PfP, and an area which would not engender Russian objections, it was anticipated that the official statements from some of these documents would highlight the NATO PfP aspect, or use language which would highlight the commitment of the international community to robust PKO capabilities.

The original documents on the Baltic projects were not coded with the use of NVIVO 8. Instead, the documents were analysed to serve to triangulate against the findings which arose from coding of the interviews and the resulting Mechanisms. To take an example, if the political framework for BALTBAT was modified by the late 1990s to generate more "Baltification," or greater control and responsibility for the Baltic nations, it was anticipated that aspects of "Baltification" would also be apparent in documents from that period regarding BALTBAT and the other initiatives.

4.9 Conclusion

The number of interviews conducted and the original documentation regarding the Baltic programmes provided a sufficiently broad data base from which to generate reliable findings. These results involved the significance of the Intervention of political decisions and the various Mechanisms which promoted the generation of Outcomes. These findings were checked against the official pronouncements in the documents regarding the Baltic military assistance projects. As a result of this process, credible data regarding the Baltic initiatives were collected which identified elements to be used as the basis for development through further research of a model for effective military assistance programmes.
CHAPTER FIVE - DATA ANALYSIS

5.1 Overview

The coding of the information from the 27 interviews indicated 12 Mechanisms derived from the experience of BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives which appeared to be important in allowing the Intervention of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states to generate the desired Outcomes from these military assistance projects. These Mechanisms therefore appeared to be the identified elements of a model for effective military assistance programmes. They were:

(1) - Assessment of Regional Security Concerns
(2) - Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance
(3) - A Constant Source of Support
(4) - A Long-Term Political Commitment
(5) - Connection to Larger Goals
(6) - Development of New Leadership
(7) - Direction and Control by Donor States
(8) - Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States
(9) - Flexibility in Planning
(10) - Good Organizational Structures
(11) - A Strong Lead Nation
(12) - Leadership From Key Individuals

5.1.1 Mechanisms - General

Mechanisms involved those specific items from the coding noted by at least seven interviewees. The rationale for this threshold was that for an item to be considered a Mechanism, it should be raised by at least one-quarter of all interviewees.

On setting the threshold at seven interviewees, Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2011, p. 17) noted, in general, that “Qualitative data analysis is interpretive.” Corbin and Strauss (2008) stressed that “Qualitative analysis is many things, but it is not a process that can be rigidly codified” (p. 16) adding that the researcher believes the findings “represent one logical interpretation of data, as seen through the eyes of this particular analyst” (p. 47).

Davies (2007, p. 196) stressed that “the task of data analysis cannot be reduced to a perfect formula.” Blaxter, Hughes and Tight (2010, p. 245) noted that “In more general terms, significance has to do with how important a particular finding is judged to be.” Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 45) highlighted “feeling right,” noting that it is the point at which the researcher “believes that the findings arrived at through reflective analysis express what participants are trying to convey through word and action and emotions, as seen through the ‘eyes’ of the analyst.”
Davies (2007, p. 133) noted that “It is better to have an approximate measure of significance than none at all – so long as due caution is emphasized.” George and Bennett (2005, p. 133) commented on the inductive statistical model which “argued for using high likelihood as the standard for explanation, but did not specify how likely an outcome must be to be considered law-like.”

Bryman (2012, p. 403) commented that “Many qualitative researchers are disdainful of approaches to research that entail the imposition of pre-determined formats on the social world.” Johnson and Reynolds (2012, p. 425) noted that a researcher must “Ask what will be just enough to support or refute a hypothesis.” Lindlof and Taylor (2011) noted that data reduction “means that the use value of evidence is prioritized according to emerging schemes of interpretation” (p. 243) and data analysis “can provide focus and shape to the body of material gathered during a project” (pp. 243-244).

Lindlof and Taylor (2011, p. 274) noted that a possibly indefinite number of interpretations can arise from research, but the ones the researcher elects to develop “are hopefully ones that other people find plausible, insightful and/or useful.” Thus, the literature indicated that there is no “magic number” at which significance is established and the decision to set the threshold at seven interviewees was appropriate to focus on the most important items.

These Mechanisms appeared to be determinative in the success or failure of the Baltic military assistance initiatives. The 12 Mechanisms are presented roughly in order of the frequency with which they are cited by interviewees. The general sequence is from most frequently to least frequently noted. However, to be clear, there is no intention of implying some rough prioritization of the significance of the Mechanisms. Moreover, the sequence of most frequent to least frequent is not strictly followed in certain instances, to allow for the juxtaposition of different Mechanisms which complement or augment one another.

It is worth noting that the analysis in this chapter focusses on outlining the data supporting the 12 Mechanisms, drawing on both interview material and text from relevant documents. While some commentary is provided in this chapter as appropriate, extensive comments on the Mechanisms are provided in Chapter Six, when they are put forth as the identified elements of a model for effective military assistance projects. This structure allows for a clearer delineation between what arises from analysis of the data, and the implications of the 12 resulting Mechanisms.

In Chapter Six, the discussion of the identified elements of a model reiterates that the goal of this research was simply to identify Mechanisms which allowed an important Intervention to generate Outcomes from military assistance programmes. There was no attempt to provide relative weight or significance of individual Mechanisms. There was also no assertion of a particular chronological sequencing in which it would be most effective to have certain Mechanisms addressed before other Mechanisms. Moreover, there was no
attempt to ascertain if the various Mechanisms were moderating or mediating variables. Finally, as the effort was to identify the elements that could serve as the basis for a model, there was no assertion that any type of predictive ability can be generated from the elements. These are all issues for which more research would appear to be needed in order to develop a model for effective military assistance projects from the elements identified in this thesis.

5.1.2 Extent of Data Reporting

The following are the Mechanisms which arose from analysis of the interview material. There was no intention of including all the comments provided on any particular point. While an extensive number of statements were included, this was intended to indicate the breadth of opinion on any particular topic. Positive and negative comments were included to highlight the diversity of views and ensure that there was no false sense of certainty, or an erroneous assumption of unanimity among interviewees. Indeed, the proposition is put forward that the diversity of views on such an important set of issues added to the credibility of the findings.

The issue raised previously of the general applicability of the Mechanisms from the Baltic projects is addressed at the end of this chapter. It was one of the important questions with regard to the utility and validity of the identified elements of a model for effective military assistance initiatives. There was a diversity of opinion among interviewees about the transferability of the Baltic experience to other regions. Some of the interviewees asserted that an attempt to replicate the experience elsewhere through use of the Mechanisms would be a grave error. Others took issue with that position and believed that the Mechanisms for success in the Baltic initiatives could be transferred to other countries. Other interviewees took a position between those two views and asserted that there are worthwhile lessons to be learned from the Baltic experience, but it would not be prudent to believe that can be simply replicated elsewhere.

Particularly because of the lack of unanimity of views on this issue, it is important to note in detail the caveats or concerns that were raised. It is arguably beneficial for practitioners in the area of military assistance in particular to have the Mechanisms and the caveats in mind, and for academics working in this field to consider whether the Mechanisms and accompanying caveats indicated areas that are worthy of additional research.

5.1.3 Text From Documents

Immediately following the analysis of interviewee comments, the relevant points from the documents on the Baltic projects listed in Chapter Four are noted. There was no intention of including all relevant text from all documents, as that would make this chapter unwieldy. The text from the documents was included to indicate the extent to which it supplemented (or contradicted) the data from the interviews, thus providing triangulation of data.
5.1.4 Other Baltic Projects

A separate section is included with regard to BALTRON, BALTNET and the BALTDEFCOL. The intention was to provide a point of comparison for the Mechanisms which arose from the analysis of BALTBAT, as well as a certain amount of triangulation of data and results. To cite an example, to the extent that “Baltification,” or transfer of responsibility to recipient states, was a key Mechanism in BALTBAT, it would be expected to show up in the planning for subsequent projects. Thus, there are separate sub-sections on those projects which bolster or modify the consideration of each Mechanism. The analysis is centered on the interview data, although material from relevant documents is also included.

5.2 First Mechanism - Assessment of Regional Security Concerns

The data from the interviews indicated the first Mechanism which contributed to the success of military assistance programmes was assessment of regional security concerns and recognition of the role of significant regional players. Once again, within the CIIMO framework, the issue was the extent to which, within a particular Context, this Mechanism was important with regard to how the Intervention of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states had an impact on generating relevant Outcomes from the military assistance initiatives. With regard to the BALTBAT experience, the specific political decision was the need to address the concerns of Russia, the dominant regional power, and it would seem logical that as a general point, a focus on regional or broader security concerns by policy-makers was a required Mechanism to generate successful Outcomes.

On this Mechanism, 21 interviewees indicated that Russian views and possible actions were considered in planning Western assistance to the Baltic capitals. These interviewees were: Abols, Andrusyszyn, Carlsen, Clemmesen, Donnelly, Ellemann-Jensen, Fischer, Godal, Haekkerup, Hannibalsson, Johnson, Kolga, Laneman, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Saar, Schvede, an Estonian official, a Latvian official, a US official, and a retired US military officer. While the expressions of concern varied, even the most dismissive comments noted that reactions from Moscow were in the minds of the people working to establish a structure for the Baltic projects. In short, this was a key political decision regarding the foundation for Baltic assistance, and an important Mechanism for consideration in any future initiatives.

Former Danish Defence Minister Hans Haekkerup stressed in a 2008 interview that the primary concern was to get Russian forces out of the Baltic nations as quickly as possible. He added that a focus on the ability to conduct peacekeeping operations was a good way to train Baltic military forces, and was also less threatening to Russia. Former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Sir Jeremy Mackenzie, commented in a 2010 interview that the Baltic countries were tiny, but important, and that Kaliningrad
added to the special sensitivity of the area. He stated that at this point in time, Russia was "imploding." General Garry Johnson, former Commander of NATO Allied Forces Northern Europe, supported those views in a 2011 interview, noting that concern about Russia was an overwhelming and motivating force.

Walter Andrusyszyn, former Charge d'affairs at the US Embassy in Tallinn, and Director of the Office of Regional Political-Military Affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs at the US Department of State, agreed in a 2010 interview that the immediate policy challenge was to ensure Russia completed the troop withdrawal, stressing that there were grounds to believe Moscow at times was ready to find an excuse to halt the withdrawal. He noted that during this critical period, people were still hedging their bets on how Russian relations with the Baltic governments would develop.

A Latvian official emphasized in a 2010 interview that the Baltic nations were still afraid of Russia when BALTBAT began, and an Estonian official concurred in a 2010 interview that Russia was certainly on the minds of people working on these issues. Kristian Fischer, Danish Deputy Permanent Secretary of State for Defence, noted in a 2010 interview that there were concerns about the reaction from Russia to Western military assistance to the Baltic capitals. However, he added that there was also a general consensus among participants that they would deal with Russian reactions if and when they arose.

Brigadier General Michael Clemmesen, the first Commandant of the BALTDEFCOL, commented in a 2010 interview that Russia was, for him, always a concern. When he first arrived in the Baltic countries, it was a tense time in which cars and monuments were being blown up and in which security was a major consideration. Generally, added Clemmesen (interview 2010), Russia could not accept the idea of the independence of the Baltic governments. However, Russia was so disorganized and focused on domestic concerns that it did not have a real policy regarding the Baltic nations. Brigadier General Alar Laneman, the first BALTBAT commander, emphasized in a 2010 interview that Russia was always in the background as people made decisions, if for no other reason than geography.

Chris Donnelly, former Special Advisor for Central and Eastern Europe to the NATO Secretary General, stressed in a 2011 interview that the Baltic capitals were afraid that Russia would send in tanks, adding that in his view, the Baltic governments had good reason to be afraid Moscow would take such action. The Russians had a lot of tanks in the Baltic nations, and there was a real fear of bloodshed. With regard to the Western response, Donnelly (interview 2011) conceded that they were afraid of what to do. There was no idea of how to control Moscow. As a result, he admitted, the Baltic governments got no official support, only a little practical assistance and lots of discouragement from the West.
5.2.1 Differing Assessments Regarding Russia

Some of the interviewees had different perspectives on the issue of Russia and the extent to which a concern about a response from Moscow dominated thinking about military assistance to the Baltic capitals. Former Norwegian Foreign (and later Defence) Minister Bjorn Tove Godal stated in a 2011 interview that Norway counseled the Baltic governments to take a patient attitude. He added that Oslo was not overly concerned about whether Russia would have issues with military assistance to the Baltic nations, which did not make unreasonable requests for aid. Similarly, Brigadier General Gundars Abols, former Commandant of the BALTDEFCOL, commented in a 2009 interview that the West was perhaps too cautious about Russian concerns.

In a 2008 interview, former Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen echoed Godal’s views, stating that in formulating Danish policy in the years up to Baltic independence, “We really did not give it much thought if Russia was offended.” He noted that at that time, even within his own Ministry, there were words of warning that he was perhaps pushing the Russians too hard. Indeed, Ellemann-Jensen (interview 2008) conceded that, perhaps in retrospect, Denmark should have been more concerned about Russian views. He commented that the Baltic capitals were always worried about a Russian invasion. However, Ellemann-Jensen (interview 2008) stated that he never thought Russia would invade the Baltic countries.

Ellemann-Jensen (interview 2008) noted that up to August 1991 and the failed attempted putsch in Moscow, there was resistance to an overly-energetic Baltic policy. Some larger European countries made it clear that they did not want to move too fast to embrace the Baltic nations as this might create problems for then-Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Former Icelandic Foreign Minister Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson concurred in a 2011 interview, noting that despite official rhetoric, Baltic independence leaders were told to not rock the boat, to restrain demands, and to settle for a compromise.

5.2.2 First Mechanism - Documents

In their 2 June 1992 Communique, the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic States expressed the position that:

In examining the issue of security policy of the Baltic countries, the delegates agreed upon the need for close cooperation between the Ministries of Defence. It was noted that the armed forces under the Russian Federation’s jurisdiction are presently stationed illegally in the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These forces blatantly violate laws and government resolutions, illegally supplement their bases with new recruits and disregard general regulations by exploiting air space and sea borders and trespassing upon sovereign nation territories. The operations of the armed forces under the Russian Federation’s jurisdiction continue to threaten the civil population and impede the
operations of the state defence establishments. In this situation, the
delegates regard it necessary for joint policy to secure control and
suppress potential instability.

The statement indicated the extent to which the presence of Russian forces on
the territory of the Baltic states was of primary significance to the Baltic
governments and a sign of the general concern with the actions and intentions
of the Russian government.

5.3 Second Mechanism - Focus on Optimal Area of Military Assistance

The second Mechanism which emerged from the interviews was determining
the optimal area in which to provide military assistance. This was cited by 19
interviewees, who referred to the significance of having BALTBAT focus on
PKO capabilities. These interviewees were: Andrusyszyn, Carlsen,
Clemmesen, Donnelly, Fischer, Godal, Haekkerup, Johnson, Kolga, Laneman,
Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Molis, Saar, Schvede, an Estonian official, a Latvian
official, a US official and a retired US military officer.

The goal of developing PKO capabilities as the basis for military aid to the Baltic
capitals was a major political decision between the donor and recipient states.
It should be noted that this Mechanism could be asserted to proceed naturally
from the first Mechanism of considering regional security concerns. Worries
about Russian reactions would lead policy-makers to find the least controversial
way of providing military assistance. Development of PKO capabilities, certainly
in the early 1990s, would have been a logical choice.

However, the proposition is put forth that the second Mechanism was not
merely a corollary of the first. There are two points to be made regarding this
issue. First, there are a wide variety of options available to provide military
assistance. They can range from exchanges of officers, to training, to the
stationing of troops from one country onto the soil of another. Even if there is
no dominant regional state, it remains important to decide on the best method of
providing military aid. The option which is selected may be influenced by
whether there is a dominant country in the region and possible reactions from
that country. However, the fact that there is influence due to the first
Mechanism does not mean that it determines the outcome of the second
Mechanism.

This leads to the second point regarding this Mechanism. The use of the word
"optimal" in deciding on the form of provision of military assistance implies a
calculation of the various issues that must be considered. These can include
cost, political support, and, most relevant for BALTBAT, political and military
goals. Referring back to the CIMO framework, within the specific Context in
which the participating states agreed to pursue military assistance initiatives,
the Intervention of broad political decisions agreed upon between donor and
recipient states required a specific Mechanism of focussing on an optimal area
of military assistance in order to generate the desired Outcomes, which can be political and/or military goals.

The decision to focus on PKO served the political goal noted later (Mechanism five) of buttressing the case of the Baltic nations for NATO membership. Moreover, development of PKO capabilities was an effective way of meeting the military goal of developing national defence forces. Certainly, the case can be made regarding the latter point that more direct assistance on developing conventional defence forces could have been a more efficient way of achieving that military goal. However, this reinforces the significance of the use of the word "optimal." The second Mechanism indicated the importance of considering numerous issues in deciding on the best way to provide aid and meet multiple goals. In short, the data from the interviews indicated that this is a separate Mechanism which involves an effort to select the best way to provide military assistance.

5.3.1 Avoiding Russian Objections

Drawing on the data from the interviews, it appeared that those who made the political decisions between the donor and recipient countries regarding the Baltic initiatives carefully considered which forms of military assistance would be "optimal." Haekkerup (interview 2008) stressed that development of PKO capabilities was less threatening to Russia, a good way to train Baltic military forces, and an area which allowed Baltic forces to "learn by doing." Godal (interview 2011) agreed that BALTBAT was well-suited to help the Baltic nations develop military capabilities, fit neatly with the focus of the Nordic states on PKO, and would not raise concerns in Russia. Former Lithuanian Defence Minister Linas Linkevicius commented in a 2011 interview that there was not an excessive concern about Russian reactions to these Baltic military initiatives, but it was a good idea to have "some political cover." Thus, the focus on PKO was wise, noted Linkevicius, which was particularly true as PfP included Russia.

Mackenzie (interview 2010) concurred that the political concern about not offending Russia was important in selecting PKO as the focus of initial activity for the Baltic governments. Former Danish Deputy Permanent Secretary of State for Defence Per Carlsen noted in a 2010 interview that PKO was a "safe" area in which to support the development of Baltic military capabilities. An effort to generate additional UN PKO forces was not contentious. Carlsen (interview 2010) added that the PKO focus, particularly for UN missions, made the general push for military assistance to the Baltic governments acceptable.

A US official emphasized in a 2011 interview that it probably would not have been possible in the early years for Russia to have accepted the Baltic capitals moving to develop the type of conventional military forces outlined by a 1998 report prepared for the US Department of Defense. It was important that the Baltic projects focused on areas in which opportunities were available, and PKO was the only good starting point for Baltic governments to develop military forces and receive aid from the West.
Donnelly (interview 2011) stated that NATO did not want to antagonize Russia, and the Baltic countries "did not get an enthusiastic response" from Brussels on establishing a territorial defence force. In view of Russian politics, BALTBAT might have been about all that was possible. A Latvian official (interview 2010) stressed that there was always a concern about Russia, which was why PKO was chosen. However, he added, there was a debate within the Baltic states about whether to focus resources on "hard defence" rather than PKO capabilities. Moreover, commented an Estonian official (interview 2010), while there were reasons for the Nordic countries to assist the Baltic governments, the Nordic states were also wary of giving the impression that aid was directed against any particular nation. Sweden and Finland were worried about the provision of military assistance, so PKO was the best area in which to focus efforts.

**5.3.2 Buttressing the Case for NATO Membership**

The selection of development of PKO capabilities to help make the case for Baltic state membership in NATO was an important political goal regarding this second Mechanism. Fischer (interview 2010) noted that BALTBAT allowed the Baltic capitals to make a real contribution to peace support operations, establishing that they were not just consumers of security, but producers of security. He added that BALTBAT also made a concrete contribution to the development of national defence capabilities for the Baltic countries, and was a clear political manifestation of securing closer connections to Western governments, NATO and the UN. Carlsen (interview 2010) also made the point that it was in NATO's interest that BALTBAT put "meat on the bones" of PfP.

The model used for BALTBAT, stressed Mackenzie (interview 2010), was "excellent." The Baltic capitals could be seen to be a part of the Western effort to generate security. Agreeing with Carlsen, Mackenzie (interview 2010) added that NATO was in need of PKO forces, so any state which could make a contribution was viewed positively. A small but effective force was important, noted Mackenzie (interview 2010), so BALTBAT was useful and carried political weight. In short, the second Mechanism of selecting the optimal form of military assistance can also involve achieving important political goals, as indicated by the impact of BALTBAT on the desire of the Baltic nations to join NATO.

**5.3.3 Developing National Defence Forces**

It would seem apparent that for military assistance programmes, one of the goals should be development of military forces. This can involve the generation of what could be characterised as niche capabilities (such as for PKOs), or more traditional national defence forces. The example of BALTBAT indicated that it might not be prudent to draw too hard a line between the two, and that a political decision to focus on a niche capability could also generate traditional defence forces.
In a 2010 interview, a retired US military officer concurred on the practical importance of the PKO focus, noting that the deployment of the BALTBAT component companies allowed their personnel to see and experience real operations, which furthered their training and development. Johnson (interview 2011) agreed that PKOs are a good way of developing military skills. Moreover, the BALTBAT focus on PKO was in line with territorial defence, noted Donnelly (interview 2011). It is, he added, what Poland does, as territorial defence and PKO are not mutually exclusive. There was a general political consensus, commented Fischer (interview 2010), about PKO as an area which would allow for generation of real military capabilities. This allowed for the development of forces from a low, initial base, as PKO was a solid, practical way to focus military training and provision of support.

To be clear, there was not total agreement on the PKO focus at that time. Margus Kolga, former Deputy Secretary General of Policy in the Estonian Ministry of Defence and Estonian representative in the BALTBAT Steering Group, noted in a 2009 interview that some in the Baltic states thought PKO was a less "useful" area of focus, although the supporters of PKO won the argument. One reason they may have carried the day is that there was a political aspect to the decision on the optimal form of assistance. This led to the general proposition that a key question recipient states need to consider is what type of military assistance donor states are willing to provide. Dr. Arunas Molis, former International Relations Studies Chair of the BALTDEFCOL, stressed in a 2009 interview that the Nordic countries were looking for a niche military capability, and the BALTBAT focus on PKO served that goal as well as providing a prudent way of developing Baltic military forces.

5.3.4 Second Mechanism - Documents

With regard to the political decision to focus on development of PKO capabilities as the optimal means of providing military assistance, the 13 September 1994 document on the agreement of the Baltic states concerning the establishment of BALTBAT noted in the preamble that the Baltic states do so "striving to make their contribution, according to their capacity, to the efforts of the UN and/or CSCE in regulating crises, preventing war and maintaining peace."

In Article 1, paragraph 1 of that document, it was written that they establish BALTBAT "in order to exercise mandates given by the UN and/or CSCE for peacekeeping, also cooperating with NATO and WEU (note: Western European Union) in the field of peacekeeping." Further in that paragraph, it was noted that BALTBAT "shall be organised in accordance with internationally recognized military and peacekeeping principles."

In addition, in the BALTBAT MOU, Article 1, paragraph 1, it was written that the program is "designed to put in place mechanisms by which the Baltic States can themselves in the future maintain a peacekeeping capability."
Finally, the preamble to the Agreement Between the Baltic States on Cooperation in the fields of Defence and Military Relations from 1995 included the text that the states are "seeking to contribute to peacekeeping, security and stability in Europe and in the Baltic region in particular."

In short, there was a repeated emphasis in numerous documents on the political decision reached between the donor and recipient states (the Intervention) to focus on PKO and contributing to international PKO capabilities as the optimal area of military assistance for the Baltic governments (the Mechanism). This Mechanism can be asserted to have had an impact in deflecting Russian objections while allowing for the achievement of political goals for donor and recipient states and generating national defence forces for the Baltic nations.

5.4 Assessing The First Two Mechanisms - Russian Non-Reaction

It is worthwhile to assess at this juncture the extent to which the wisdom of the political decisions on these first two Mechanisms was validated by events. One measure of the significance of the attention to Russian concerns and the decision to have BALTBAT focus on PKO capabilities was the absence of a reaction from Moscow.

Certainly it could be argued that the lack of a reaction could have indicated that there was no reason for concern about Russia in the first place. However, in view of the Russian statements included in earlier chapters, and the assessments noted in the Literature Review in Chapter Two, it appeared that there was ample reason for the Baltic and supporting nations to anticipate negative responses from Moscow. The proposition is therefore put forward that the absence of a reaction was an indication of good analysis and planning by the Baltic and supporting states with regard to the first two Mechanisms, and validated the extent to which these Mechanisms were important elements of a model for effective military assistance projects.

Returning to the data from the interviews, Godal (interview 2011) made the comment that he did not recall that the Russians gave him a difficult time regarding BALTBAT. Haekkerup (interview 2008) stressed that there was no direct opposition from Moscow to BALTBAT at the outset, although Russia increasingly turned negative on the project as criticism of NATO enlargement fed criticism of BALTBAT. He added that Russia later tried to dissuade and even split the Nordic states; an attempt which failed, noted Haekkerup, due to Nordic solidarity.

Carlsen (interview 2010) stated that Russia was informed about BALTBAT developments and that he briefed Russian defence attaches. At the start, Russia was at ease with BALTBAT as there was no discussion about NATO membership for the Baltic countries. In contrast to Haekkerup, Carlsen (interview 2010) asserted that Russian views on BALTBAT never fundamentally changed, in contrast to Moscow's views on the Danish-Polish-German corps,
which generated increasingly negative commentary, as it had a decidedly NATO angle. He noted that the Danes had expected more difficulties and a negative reaction from Moscow, which ultimately were not realized.

In addition, Kolga (interview 2009) commented that Denmark had informed Russia about BALTBAT, and the understanding among the Baltic capitals was that Moscow was not opposed to the initiative. He added that Russia did not say anything to the Baltic countries directly about BALTBAT, and the assumption in the Baltic nations was that if Russia did object, it would voice those objections to the US. Kolga (interview 2009) also noted that the donor states needed to ensure Moscow was aware of the Baltic projects, but there was no "excessive concern" by the donor states regarding Russia.

Even during disputes on issues such as Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia, continued Kolga (interview 2009), Moscow never made a connection to Baltic military assistance efforts. As an example, he cited the 1996 BALTIC CHALLENGE military exercise, which was sensitive, particularly due to its size. Russia simply sent observers at the defence attaché level. In a 2011 interview, a US official agreed that Russia basically left the Baltic nations alone to work on these military projects. Moreover, an Estonian official (interview 2010) added the comment that he was not surprised by the lack of a strident Russian reaction to BALTBAT. One factor was that Russia was more at ease as the assistance came from the Nordic states. Having a US flag on the projects, he commented, would have made things more difficult.

In short, the proposition is put forward that the political success of ensuring no negative Russian reaction to BALTBAT was a result of the two carefully considered Mechanisms. The first Mechanism was assessment of the views and possible responses of the dominant regional power, and what reactions would be anticipated to particular steps. The second Mechanism was consideration of which form of military assistance would be optimal in terms of achieving political as well as military goals. On both counts, the decisions with regard to BALTBAT and the reactions from Russia indicated the significance of the Mechanisms and the success of the political decisions taken by the founders of BALTBAT.

5.5 Third Mechanism - A Solid Source of Support

A Mechanism which interviewees noted frequently was the decision of the Nordic states to make the strong commitment to assist the Baltic nations. While there was broad-based Western support from the UK, US and others, it was critical that the Nordic countries provided the constant and consistent political and military support needed to make BALTBAT and the other projects work. This point was raised by 14 interviewees: Andurszyn, Carlsen, Clemmesen, Ellemann-Jensen, Godal, Haekkerup, Kolga, Laneman, Mackenzie, Saar, Schvede, an Estonian official, a US official and a retired US military officer.
While some of the following Mechanisms were cited more frequently in interviews, the rationale for placing this Mechanism third lies in its juxtaposition with the fourth Mechanism which follows. In its basic form, the third Mechanism addressed the following question: Are there nations which are genuinely committed to ensuring the success of this military assistance programme? The fourth Mechanism addressed the follow-on question: How long will that commitment last? For that reason, the significance of the support provided by Nordic states is listed third.

The case can admittedly be made that all military assistance initiatives have a basic level of political backing, or they never would have been started. Even projects which have failed usually can cite initial enthusiastic support from a number of donor countries. However, such examples validate a point which was critically different with the Baltic military assistance projects: there was a solid foundation of support from the Nordic governments which was apparent from the initial decision to proceed. Returning to the CIMO framework, within the Context of the various challenges facing the Baltic nations at that time, the specific Intervention of the broad political decisions agreed upon between donor and supporting states required the specific Mechanism of a solid source of donor support in order to achieve the desired Outcomes.

Moreover, there was a broader base of Western support which was also critical. That involved countries like the UK, which provided substantial amounts of assistance from the start, and countries like Germany, which later became the lead nation for BALTRON. In short, a consistent source of donor support appeared to have been a factor for success for the Baltic programmes, and could be significant for any military assistance project.

Turning to the data from the interviews, Haekkerup (interview 2008) emphasized that there was substantial Nordic solidarity on BALTBAT, noting that there had been extensive Nordic cooperation on efforts to bolster PKO capabilities, as exemplified by the work on the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) that could be called upon by the UN. He also stated that there were domestic political advantages to Denmark which arose from the larger Nordic assistance framework. One Danish political party objected to military sales, recalled Haekkerup, so the label of a "Nordic package" made it easier to get Parliamentary approval.

Supporting Haekkerup on this point, Godal (interview 2011) agreed that there was overall unity among the Nordic states on policy, and they were committed to assisting the Baltic nations. He noted that the Nordic countries worked well together, although there was no organizational framework or existing process that could be used with regard to implementing the military assistance programmes in the Baltic states. Godal (interview 2011) added that there was also unity on the part of the Nordic states. Certainly, Denmark and Sweden were more in the vanguard of the effort to help the Baltic nations, while Finland was more cautious. In the end however, the Nordic states were in agreement on policy regarding the Baltic governments. Godal (interview 2011)
emphasized that the Baltic military assistance projects were part of a grand scheme. As a result, one successful project could lead to the next effort. Moreover, it was notable that the Nordic countries were all committed from the outset to assisting the Baltic nations.

Carlsen (interview 2010) added the point that the Nordic states had worked together to establish training courses in their countries, and the cooperative framework that had been used provided a sort of a template for the Baltic projects. The Military Working Group (MWG) mechanism, for example, was used effectively for the Baltic initiatives. Mackenzie (interview 2010) stated that another factor was the Nordic/Baltic brotherhood which developed, noting that it was different from the ties which are generated between countries which only have land borders. The Nordic and Baltic states share a littoral area, and, Mackenzie (interview 2010) stated, while borders change, coastlines do not.

Buttressing these points, Andrusyszyn (interview 2010) asserted that the Nordic effort to assist the Baltic capitals was important. The US had a positive view of Nordic-Baltic efforts which allowed the Baltic countries to profile themselves. BALTBAT and the other projects, stressed Andrusyszyn (interview 2010), were vehicles to display that the Baltic governments were working to develop military capabilities. An Estonian official (interview 2010) emphasized that the Baltic initiatives also provided a gateway for aid from the Nordic states to be effectively channeled and utilised by the Baltic governments. At this particular time, the Baltic nations had political-military importance for the Nordic countries.

Echoing the other interviewees, the Estonian official (interview 2010) continued by stating that there was extensive Nordic coordination to assist the Baltic nations. They, along with the other donors, were committed to the projects. It is worth noting that other countries are also praised by interviewees for providing solid Western support. A Latvian official (interview 2010) stated that due credit should be given to the UK for the role it played in the early stages of establishing BALTBAT, which also served to encourage and embolden the Nordic states in their support of the Baltic nations.

Kolga (interview 2009) noted that the Nordic governments took the lead, and they had an understanding of the Baltic countries that was beneficial. To be frank, he commented, if the US would have led the effort, it would have just "come in and given us the package and said 'do it.'" Instead, under Nordic guidance, the projects promoted a maturation process for the Baltic governments. Kolga (interview 2009) added that it was valuable to have had a broad-based assistance community for the Baltic initiatives, and the number of donor countries was more than sufficient for the task. Indeed, Kolga (interview 2009) stated that while there could have been more donor states, a significantly larger number could have generated more complications than benefits.

In short, a Mechanism for success for BALTBAT and the later initiatives appeared to be the fact that the Nordic states provided a strong, constant source of support. This generated two significant results. The first was that it
ensured donor and recipient nations that the Nordic capitals would not only take the lead, but would do much of the hard work needed to have BALTBAT and the other projects generate successful Outcomes. That was manifest in the provisions of the BALTBAT MOU addressed below in Section 5.5.2. The second result was that, based on the comments from interviewees, it reassured the Baltic governments that, with a solid foundation of Nordic support, overall Western support would be maintained. The proposition is therefore put forward that these results indicated why this Mechanism would be of value in ensuring the achievement of Outcomes from any future military assistance programme.

5.5.1 Nordic Disunity

To ensure an accurate picture is provided of Nordic unity with regard to aiding the Baltic capitals, it is worth noting the existence of Nordic disunity on many issues. Haekkerup (interview 2008) admitted that there were disagreements among the Nordic states, citing the example of the concern expressed by some Nordic capitals when he pushed to get Baltic forces immediately involved in PKO efforts in Croatia. Taking a different perspective, Carlsen (interview 2010) stressed that within Nordic governments, the Ministries of Defence were supportive of BALTBAT, but that in some capitals, there were policy debates between Defence and Foreign Ministries, particularly due to the concern over Russian reactions. Moreover, Fischer (interview 2010) noted that there were probably different political goals among participating states in 1994 when BALTBAT was initiated.

On this issue, Ellemann-Jensen (interview 2008) stressed that it would be erroneous to provide too sharp an image of early, constant Nordic unity on policy regarding the Baltic nations. Citing an example, at an August 1991 Nordic Foreign Ministers meeting, soon after the attempted putsch in Moscow, one counterpart criticized Ellemann-Jensen for pushing too hard on the Baltic issue. In retrospect, he noted, he was extremely pleased with what the Nordic states did at that time to support the Baltic capitals. After some initial divisions, events generated a situation in which there was a Nordic competition to provide assistance to the Baltic states. Such competition, noted a US official (interview 2011) may have even promoted Nordic disunity. The official (interview 2011) recalled that the Nordic states seemed to find reasons to argue about the Baltic programmes, citing one instance in which the routine handover of chairmanship from a Danish official to a Norwegian official generated heated, behind-the-scenes clashes.

5.5.2 Third Mechanism - Documents

On this Mechanism, the best indication of the strong Nordic commitment to BALTBAT and the other initiatives could be found in the BALTBAT MOU. That was particularly true as the BALTBAT template was largely replicated for the other Baltic projects. Article 1, paragraph 2 of the MOU indicated that "each supporting State will provide assistance according to its national fields of
expertise, within the limits of its national legislation and according to its own resources and budgetary procedures."

However, on specific responsibilities undertaken by the Nordic states, Article 3, paragraph 3 noted that the Nordic states "will assist in administrative and legislative preparatory work for the formation of the Battalion." It also indicated in paragraph 5 that they would "provide peacekeeping training and will promote the use of UN peacekeeping procedures throughout the programme."

The requirements for the Supporting States were listed in Article 3, paragraph 4 as assisting with "organization, recruitment and training of the Battalion as well as with planning of its logistics system and also with training equipment."

Moreover, in Article 3, paragraph 7, the Supporting States would "endeavour to assist the Baltic States in providing training, communication, personal and other equipment with the aim of maximizing when appropriate the opportunities for operational compatibility."

In addition, in Article 4, paragraph 1 of the MOU, the Nordic countries agreed to "assign places on existing Nordic UN peacekeeping courses or will establish special ad-hoc courses for Baltic officers and non-commissioned officers at Nordic UN training centres."

The Nordic capitals also assumed many of the costs involved with BALTBAT. With regard to peacekeeping training, Article 4, paragraph 2 of the MOU indicated that while the Baltic governments would need to meet the costs of travel for their personnel, "other costs and administration associated with the provision of peacekeeping training of key personnel will be met by the Nordic states."

Similarly, with regard to the Basic Military Infantry Training noted in Article 6, paragraph 3 of the MOU, the Baltic nations would provide host nation support, but the UK and Nordic states would cover administration and other costs associated with the training they provided. Furthermore, with regard to UN leadership training covered in Article 7, the arrangement, noted in paragraph 2, was once again that the Baltic capitals would provide host nation support, but the UK and Nordic countries would cover costs for training they provided. Once again, with regard to UN unit training, Article 8, paragraph 3 of the MOU indicated that the Baltic governments would provide host nation support but the Nordic countries would pick up the costs for its instructors.

Finally, with regard to Article 9 of the MOU on Mission Specific Peacekeeping Training and Deployment to UN or CSCE peacekeeping missions, paragraph 1 included the provision that "the Nordic States are willing to provide mission specific peacekeeping training to Baltic officers and non-commissioned officers." With regard to joint deployment for peacekeeping missions, "the participants will enter into a Memorandum of Understanding concerning matters related to deployment of personnel from the Baltic States to the mission area."
To summarize, the Nordic governments clearly indicated their firm support for BALTBAT by making specific commitments to the initiative, embodied in the MOU which was utilised as a template for the subsequent Baltic assistance programmes. Such an indication of a constant source of Nordic support for the Baltic projects appeared to have been an important Mechanism which, critically, instilled confidence in the Baltic states that donor support would remain solid, and ensured the achievement of the desired Outcomes from the initiatives.

5.6 Fourth Mechanism - Long-Term Commitment

One Mechanism apparent from the interviews was the long-term commitment by the supporting states, particularly the Nordic governments, to assist the Baltic capitals. This would appear to be an important element in a model for effective military assistance projects drawn from the experience of the Baltic projects. The long-term commitment was a topic raised by 18 interviewees: Abols, Andrusyszyn, Carlsten, Clemmesen, Donnelly, Fischer, Godal, Haekkerup, Kolga, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Molis, Saar, Schvede, Sibul, an Estonian official, a Latvian official and a US official.

To rephrase the point made previously, the third Mechanism of a strong source of support can be characterized as the question "Who?" with the answer "the Nordic states, and more generally the West." The fourth Mechanism of a long-term commitment can be characterized as "For how long?" with the answer "for the long haul," and it appears this was critical to the success of BALTBAT and the other Baltic military assistance projects. Utilising the CIMO framework, within the Context of the significant challenges facing the Baltic military forces, the Intervention of a broad political agreement between the Western and Baltic governments required the Mechanism of a long-term commitment by the donor states in order to achieve the desired Outcomes.

While there was no binding obligation on the supporting states in the BALTBAT MOU beyond the three years formally noted in the MOU, the data from the interviews indicated that it was clear that BALTBAT was part of a lengthy process to assist the Baltic countries. Haekkerup (interview 2008) emphasized that it was critical that the Nordic states, in signing up to BALTBAT, understood they were making a long-term commitment to support the Baltic capitals, a point on which Linkevicius (interview 2010) concurred. The Baltic assistance projects were part of a larger effort, stressed Godal (interview 2011), and the long-term Western commitment to the Baltic programmes was important to the success of the initiatives.

Mackenzie (interview 2010) asserted that the long-term support of assisting states is significant and is possibly the most difficult item to obtain. The cost of the support is normally underestimated, and nations usually want to get out of commitments early. There is always an initial rush of enthusiasm, stated Mackenzie (interview 2010). Then costs and problems pile up and enthusiasm wanes. It is necessary, he stressed, to set out the time-frame for the assistance effort at the start. However, he added, it is important to have a long-term
commitment from those providing aid, just as it is critical for the political aspects to be synchronized with the military goals.

Fischer (interview 2010) echoed the point that donor states knew they had to make a long-term commitment to BALTBAT in particular, and to military aid to the Baltic governments in general. This was one of the keys to success. Abols (interview 2009) concurred that a key factor was the long-term commitment from the West, which was readily apparent to the Baltic capitals. Andrusyszyn (interview 2010) characterised Western support for the Baltic nations as sound policy decisions provided through “patient, concrete” aid to the Baltic governments.

Taking a different perspective on the significance of time, Molis (interview 2009) added that development of PKO capabilities requires extensive assistance from donor states. Moreover, an Estonian official (interview 2010) asserted that the supporting nations were certainly committed to the projects for the long term. He provided another perspective on the importance of long-term backing, noting that US support was important, even in the absence of a major military contribution. The political support from the US, he asserted, served as an important tool to provide self-confidence to all involved in the Baltic assistance effort.

Kolga (interview 2009) also cited the long-term commitment by the donor countries as an important factor for the success of the initiatives, and highlighted one of the reasons why this was significant: it generated trust among the participating states. The donor states trusted that the Baltic capitals would work hard to make these projects a success, and the Baltic governments trusted that the West would stay committed to the projects for the long haul. A Latvian official (interview 2010) emphasized that this was not a short, quick effort, and the supporting countries had to be determined in order to ensure goals were achieved. The Nordic states had made a long-term commitment to BALTBAT, especially as the UK had indicated its commitment. A US official (interview 2011) added that it was valuable that there was long-term support from the donor nations to the Baltic capitals, although he noted that the level of commitment varied among supporting states.

To summarize, it appears that a Mechanism which had an impact on the Outcomes generated by the Baltic initiatives was the readiness of supporting states to make a long-term commitment to aiding the Baltic governments. There were various reasons why this Mechanism was important in allowing the Intervention of broad political decisions between donor and recipient states to generate the desired Outcomes. The point noted by Kolga (interview 2009) appears critical: the Western commitment enhanced trust between donor and recipient states. In addition, Molis (interview 2009) raised another major aspect of the issue of time: development of military capabilities, such as for PKO operations, does not arise overnight and requires a lengthy commitment if the Outcome is to be achieved. While more research may be warranted to see whether either of these reasons, or some other reason, is the basis for the
impact of a long-term commitment, what appeared from the Baltic experience was the significance of such a commitment as a Mechanism to generate successful Outcomes.

5.6.1 Questions On A Long-Term Commitment

Taking a different view, Carlsen (interview 2010) commented that it was made clear to supporting countries that this would be a commitment of some three years, and all of the states agreed. Moreover, Clemmesen (interview 2010) asserted that in the early stages, the anticipation was of a limited Western commitment to the Baltic nations, so there was no need to twist Western arms. There was recognition that the task would not be easy and that it would take time, but there was no sense that this would become a commitment to a major, long-term set of military assistance programmes. Donnelly (interview 2011) echoed Clemmesen's comments, stating that the initial Western view was not a strong commitment to the Baltic governments, although that later changed due to the people who took charge and pushed hard to get Western aid to the Baltic countries.

With regard to the statistical requirement that at least seven interviewees must raise a particular issue to qualify as a Mechanism, 18 interviewees highlighted the issue of a long-term commitment. Even though Carlsen (interview 2010), Clemmesen (interview 2010) and Donnelly (interview 2011) spoke negatively about that issue and did not believe it contributed to the success of BALTBAT, 15 interviewees cited a long-term commitment as a positive factor in what BALTBAT accomplished. It therefore qualified as a Mechanism.

5.6.2 Fourth Mechanism - Documents

It is important to reiterate that the extent of a long-term commitment by the donor states was not made manifest by legally binding agreements. Instead, it was apparent by the practical military, financial and political support which was maintained throughout the 1990s on BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives.

With regard to the one concrete indication of a Western commitment to a timetable, Article 2, paragraph 1 of the BALTBAT MOU included the provision that "the programme is intended to support the formation of a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion over a period of three years." Additional documents regarding the duration of donor state support are noted in the subsequent sections covering the other Baltic projects.

5.7 Fifth Mechanism - Connection to Larger Goals

Another Mechanism apparent from the interview data was the significance of having a focus on long-term goals, whether political or military. While immediate problems about housing, training and salaries can come to dominate official efforts, such a focus can undermine the long-term prospects of a programme if they become the all-encompassing concerns of policy-makers.
The interviews indicated the extent to which the Baltic programmes were connected to overarching goals and objectives, which appeared to be an important Mechanism and an element of a model for effective military assistance projects. Returning to the CIMO analytical framework, the challenges which constituted the Context in which these assistance programmes were initiated made it important to have an Intervention of broad political agreement between donor and supporting states which required a Mechanism of a continued connection to larger goals in order to achieve the desired Outcomes.

This is not to diminish the importance of addressing problems affecting the lives of soldiers, but to emphasize the significance for policy-makers in particular of staying focused on the ultimate goal or desired Outcome. With regard to the Baltic initiatives, the goals and Outcomes were clear: making the case for Baltic state membership in NATO and developing national defence capabilities for the Baltic countries. Each of these issues is addressed separately below.

5.7.1 Reprise - The State of Baltic Military Forces

Drawing on the comments of interviewees regarding the state of Baltic military forces, it is worthwhile to revisit the situation faced by the Baltic countries at the time they regained their independence. Such a review indicates the importance to the Baltic capitals of making their case for NATO membership and also taking practical steps to develop capable national defence forces. Linkevicius (interview 2010) stressed that Lithuania had nothing in 1994 and there were no resources available. It was clear that the situation was "a mess." Haekkerup (interview 2008) commented that the Baltic states had serious problems regarding their military forces, adding that their professional soldiers were Soviet-trained and needed substantial re-training. Godal (interview 2011) concurred that the Baltic governments had little to start with upon regaining independence.

Speaking candidly, Mackenzie (interview 2010) judged that the Baltic states were almost in as bad a condition as Albania, adding that he could visit the entire Estonian army in one afternoon. In his view, the Baltic capitals had a lower starting-point than the other countries that regained independence with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and USSR. Kolga (interview 2009) also stressed that the Baltic nations did not have indigenous defence structures at the time, and General Valeri Saar, Commander of the Estonian Air Force, and former Chief of Staff of the Estonian Air Force when BALTNET was established, stated in a 2010 interview that Estonia had no military forces, just some home guard units, with no military equipment.

Finally, attempts by interviewees to assess the poor state of the Baltic military at the time of regaining independence indicated general agreement. Johnson (interview 2011) judged that the Baltic states "started from zero," a score also given by Abols (interview 2009). A retired US military officer (interview 2010)
assessed the Baltic forces in 1994 "were at 1 on a 1-10 scale of military capabilities."

5.8 Fifth Mechanism - First Example: NATO Membership

One important aspect of the Baltic military assistance projects was the desire by Baltic capitals to obtain membership in NATO and the role played by the initiatives in making that case to Brussels. This topic was noted by 19 interviewees: Andrusyszyn, Carlsen, Clemmesen, Donnelly, Fischer, Godal, Haekkerup, Herd, Kolga, Laneman, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Molis, Saar, Schvede, Sibul, an Estonian official, a US official and a retired US military officer. While it would seem apparent that it is necessary for a military assistance programme to have a clear objective, some interviewees noted that for many projects, this factor is not adequately considered. Certainly such an objective was set out in the focus on having the Baltic initiatives buttress the effort to achieve the goal of Baltic state membership in NATO.

Turning to the data from interviews, Godal (interview 2011) stressed that the Baltic projects had a natural connection to the desire of the Baltic states for NATO membership. The Baltic programmes, commented Haekkerup (interview 2008), were developed to make the case that the Baltic governments were ready for NATO membership, and the range of initiatives was important in helping Baltic self-assurance and improving capabilities.

Mackenzie (interview 2010) noted that from the NATO perspective, the task was to have the Baltic countries take small steps to improve their military capabilities, stressing that the Baltic capitals were very clear about their desire for NATO membership. Referring to the overarching issue of objectives noted above, he stated that military assistance projects often lack a goal or definition of success, but that this was not the case with BALTBAT and the Baltic projects. Clear political goals, reiterated Mackenzie (interview 2010), are essential, and problems arise if those are not established. The absence of clear goals can, at a minimum, generate delays and efficiencies.

Other interviewees echoed the points about the focus on NATO membership. Linkevicius (interview 2010) noted that the Baltic governments were aware they needed collective security and certainly wanted membership in NATO. Kolga (interview 2009) added that the Baltic projects were important with regard to the overarching Baltic concern with NATO membership. When the Baltic capitals began intensified dialogue with NATO in 1995, BALTBAT and the other military assistance initiatives were concrete examples of defence efforts. He conceded that they may not have generated "meaningful military capabilities," but asserted that they were important to development of the necessary culture, an awareness of procedures, and education and training for military personnel. Kolga (interview 2009) went on to emphasize that the Baltic programmes were key to developing people who could handle the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) process and could later work within the NATO framework and processes.
An Estonian official (interview 2010) emphasized that these initiatives were foreign policy tools and not just military projects, as they raised the profile of the Baltic governments and proved they could be providers of security. He noted that Estonia did not hide, and indeed was quite clear about, the political goal of NATO membership. Taking a broader perspective, the Estonian official (interview 2010) asserted that the essential elements for success of such initiatives are shared values and shared strategic objectives, and for the Baltic projects, the goals and objectives of the Nordic and other donor states were in agreement.

Andrusyszyn (interview 2010) noted that in the early 1990s, there was resistance in the US government to the idea of NATO membership for the Baltic nations, as senior officials focused on completing the Russian troop withdrawal. At that time, the Eastern European states wanted to be in NATO, which led to the generation of PfP, which laid the foundation for BALTBAT and the other Baltic programmes. The general perception, stated Andrusyszyn (interview 2010), was that the Baltic capitals would be consumers of security. A clear US policy came with the 1998 Baltic Charter, which indicated US support for NATO membership of the Baltic countries. He agreed that initiatives like BALTBAT made a contribution to mollifying those in the West who were skeptical about Baltic military contributions, as there were concerns about whether the Baltic capitals were committed to doing what was needed to develop military capabilities.

Fischer (interview 2010) concurred, noting that the projects allowed the Baltic nations to make a real contribution to PKO, establishing that they were not just consumers of security. He stressed that the overarching goal of all three states was NATO membership and the Baltic projects were a clear political manifestation of securing closer connections to the Western nations and NATO. A retired US military officer (interview 2010) noted that the goal for the Baltic governments was to get into NATO, and this was the chance for the Baltic countries to show the West what they could do. NATO had said it needed infantry forces, and the Baltic capitals should focus on generating these capabilities, so BALTBAT sent the right message to Brussels by addressing that goal.

Molis (interview 2009) emphasized that the focus for the Baltic capitals at that time was simply to get military support, but that the Baltic projects were also crucial to making the political case for NATO membership for the Baltic countries. They were concrete examples of training and performance which exemplified cooperation on international missions. He added that the Baltic capitals appreciated the fact that "Western support came at all," and the supply of military assistance to the Baltic nations at that time was a "challenge."

Addressing the importance of practical cooperation with NATO, Saar (interview 2010) noted that there were extensive meetings with the NATO Air Defence Committee and Air Defence Analytical Cell, which made it easier for the Baltic states to make their case for NATO membership and later made integration with NATO structures easier.
In short, it appeared from the data that those working on BALTBAT and the other projects had at least one clear objective in mind: having these initiatives support the case for Baltic state membership in NATO. That provided a focus for the Baltic initiatives and appeared to have been a factor in successfully achieving the political goal of NATO membership. Addressing the point in a CIMO framework, particularly due to the difficult context in which the Baltic nations found themselves, there were political and military outcomes desired from the Baltic programmes, and NATO membership was a clearly sought political outcome. In this instance, the Mechanism of connecting the Baltic initiatives to the larger political goal of NATO membership helped to achieve that outcome.

5.8.1 Excessive Concern regarding NATO Membership?

However, this focus on NATO membership arguably also generated difficulties for the Baltic initiatives and, returning again to the CIMO framework, the case could be made that the intervention of broad political decisions between donor and recipient states could have been missing in this instance. A US official (interview 2011) noted that it is important that there were clear political goals, but added that while the Baltic states and Denmark had a clear goal (NATO membership), the other donor nations did not necessarily have the identical goal. For Denmark, it was critical to use BALTBAT and the other projects to make the case for NATO membership, but Sweden and Finland objected to the NATO emphasis. The US official (interview 2011) noted that Finland said in 1998 that it was curtailing support for all the Baltic efforts except the BALTDEFCOL due to the focus on NATO and the direction of the Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA).

Echoing that point, Carlsen (interview 2010) noted that NATO membership was not an official goal of the Baltic initiatives, due to sensitivities of some Nordic countries. However, the NATO PIP focus on PKO, particularly for UN missions, made the general push for military assistance to the Baltic capitals acceptable to all. He stressed that the goal was to assist the Baltic governments so they were more able to defend their territory and could make a credible claim for NATO membership.

Moreover, there were negative aspects to this constant push to promote the Baltic "label" in order to make the political case, particularly to NATO, regarding what the Baltic governments were trying to accomplish. With the benefit of hindsight, a US official (interview 2011) stated that there was an underlying philosophy among those working in the area that constant growth was needed to generate more Baltic projects. In his view, there should have been a greater focus on improving the performance and efficiency of the existing programmes which were of genuine value. He added that when the idea of a Baltic Air initiative was floated, it was apparent that there was an unhealthy emphasis on continuing to generate items with a BALT-prefix.
With regard to the negative commentary and the statistical requirement that at least seven interviewees must support a particular issue in order to qualify as a Mechanism, 19 interviewees raised the topic of NATO membership. Excluding the US official (interview 2011) and Carlsen (interview 2010) who expressed the view that this did not contribute to the success of BALTBAT, 17 interviewees still voiced support for the focus on NATO membership as a positive factor which contributed to what BALTBAT accomplished. It therefore qualified as a Mechanism.

**5.8.2 NATO Membership - Documents**

The focus in BALTBAT on the connection to the larger goal of NATO membership for the Baltic nations was manifest in a number of documents. The 13 September 1994 agreement of the Baltic states on the establishment of BALTBAT noted in Article 1, paragraph 1 that they establish BALTBAT "also cooperating with NATO and WEU in the field of peacekeeping."

In the Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the development of BALTBAT issued in April 1999, which supplements the 10 December 1997 document, Section 1.2 indicated "The purposes for establishing the Baltic Battalion can be resumed as follows" and cited as the second of four purposes, "To promote the Baltic States integration process into NATO by developing NATO interoperability and compatibility."

The document from the Baltic BALTBAT Military Co-ordination Group, provided in response to the Political Guidance from April 1999, also touched on this factor. Section 3 described the purpose of the BALTBAT project and included the following:

BALTBAT was established with the purpose of increasing the NATO interoperability of the defence forces of the Baltic states, as a catalyst for generally improving military standards and in order to demonstrate the will and ability of the Baltic states to co-operate, both among themselves and in a multinational environment. The first achievements in this respect were exemplified by participation by BALTBAT units in the IFOR/SFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon during 1996/1997. Participation by subsequent units (the BALTCON deployments) in the SFOR operation during 1998-2000 further expresses the emphasis put by the Baltic states on the operational NATO/Partnership co-operation.

Section 3 went on to note that:

By adopting common standards (for example procedures, language and equipment) that - at the same time - are equivalent to the standards used in NATO and in the PfP framework, interoperability is enhanced among the Baltic states and between the Baltic states and NATO/PfP. As such,
BALTBAT is a tool for developing and facilitating closer Baltic co-operation with Alliance structures and procedures.

In addition, it was highlighted in Section 3 that:

On the national level, the project has also become a key part of the Baltic states’ participation in NATO’s expanded Planning and Review Process (PARP) and in the Enhanced and more Operational PfP. BALTBAT is the subject of Initial Partnership Goal (IPG) L0041. The requirements and standards to be met in accordance with the Initial Partnership Goals (and the coming Partnership Goals) are to be taken into account in all relevant areas (e.g. logistic, deployability and readiness), and will form the basis for the planning in the BALTBAT project.

Finally, Section 5 of the document, which covers the Development plan of the Baltic Battalion, indicated that training of BALTBAT “will be based on NATO training principles and requirements (TEEP) and NATO operational procedures in order to ensure interoperability.”

To summarize, the attention to the Mechanism of an overarching political goal of making the case for Baltic state membership in NATO was manifest in numerous documents regarding BALTBAT.

5.9 Fifth Mechanism - Second Example: National Defence

While NATO membership was a clear, desired, long-term political Outcome, there was also a long-term military Outcome: the development of modern defence capabilities for the Baltic countries. There is no reason to attempt to determine which of these Outcomes was of greater significance; indeed, the case can be made that the political and military goals complemented each other. A total of 15 interviewees noted the importance of the Baltic initiatives in building national defence capabilities: Abols, Carlsson, Donnelly, Godal, Haekkerup, Kolga, Laneman, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Saar, Schvede, an Estonian official, a Latvian official, a US official and a retired US military officer.

Godal (interview 2011) asserted that the Baltic military assistance projects were good for development of national defences, and provided a starting point for building capabilities. Haekkerup (interview 2008) concurred, noting that the value of BALTBAT also came as a unit that could serve as an example for the Baltic military establishments. Practices and processes could filter down to other levels, especially as BALTBAT exercised with other Baltic units.

Mackenzie (interview 2010) emphasized that BALTBAT actually was national defence for the Baltic governments. It was the solution on how to take the initial steps to defend the Baltic countries, and was critical to the overall development of national defence forces. Indeed, he argued, it was the only realistic model for the Baltic capitals. Mackenzie (interview 2010) stated that the idea of three independent Baltic military forces was “fanciful.” BALTBAT, he added, could be
viewed as the top of the pyramid of the military forces of the Baltic nations. Below that, it was possible to build the base of the pyramid. For small states, that base was NATO.

BALTBAT, continued Mackenzie (interview 2010), was essential to have a force to provide some type of resistance to invasion. Such a capability would allow Allies and neighbours to be drawn in to help the Baltic governments. Such a process, he asserted, was the only way to really help the Baltic capitals as they faced a very steep learning curve. This process of assisting the Baltic governments, commented Mackenzie (interview 2010), was an effective way of addressing a number of tasks by posing a number of important questions: How would they develop a good corps of non-commissioned officers? What kind of air defence made sense for the Baltic nations? The development of Baltic assistance programmes made it possible to address these questions in a logical manner, and the concrete results showed that the process worked.

Echoing those views, Johnson (interview 2011) stated that a focus on national defence for the Baltic states was not possible. Indeed, Kolga (interview 2009) questioned where the Baltic capitals would have found resources for defence in the absence of BALTBAT. Western transfers of weapons would have been difficult without the initiative, and the Baltic governments had few potential suppliers of weapons. Kolga (interview 2009) added that the Baltic projects provided the political foundation for defence spending by Baltic capitals. He commented that one advantage of BALTBAT was that it was small enough to provide Baltic personnel an overview on all aspects of a military programme. This was enhanced by the fact that the range of Baltic initiatives covered all the military services. The Baltic projects, asserted Kolga (interview 2009), helped resolve differences and generate a common focus.

Continuing on this point, Linkevicius (interview 2010) stated that Baltic governments did not ignore requirements for hard defence. However, as Defence Minister, he had to decide how to allocate scarce resources. The Baltic capitals focused on resources needed for interoperability and selected niche capabilities in NATO which they could realistically address, and which they still provide today. Ultimately, he concluded, he would not do anything differently if he had to do it over again. A Latvian official (interview 2010) emphasized that the idea was to have the skills generated through the BALTBAT experience spread to the rest of the Baltic military forces. However, echoing Linkevicius, there was only so much that could be done on a "trickle-down" basis as there was so little money available for the military. Urgent requirements for weapons, housing, and other needs could not be addressed adequately. Even with the benefit of hindsight, he stressed, what was achieved in the Baltic countries was as much as could have been accomplished in view of the situation and the available resources.
5.9.1 Dissent on Emphasis regarding National Defence

While a preponderance of interviewees asserted that BALTBAT had a positive impact on development of national defence, there were differing views on the extent to which the emphasis on developing PKO capabilities should have been shifted toward generation of traditional national defence forces. For example, Carlsen (interview 2010) acknowledged some validity to the argument that BALTBAT may have received too much priority and allocation of resources. A US official (interview 2011) supported that view, noting that by 1997, there was recognition that a reassessment was needed on whether there should be greater attention to development of traditional national military forces by the Baltic countries.

Abols (interview 2009) asserted that there were no problems with the resources devoted to BALTBAT, as they provided value and generated benefits which are still important. The projects brought the Baltic capitals together and provided a foundation for essential common activities, such as development of doctrine, and the BALTBAT experience had an impact on the overarching work on developing national defence. Moreover, commented Abols (interview 2009), it is important to remember that the Baltic countries did not have substantial resources at that time to develop national defences. However, he concluded, it probably would have been better to have devoted more resources to national defence instead of PKO, as transferring PKO capabilities to national defence is challenging.

With his perspective as the first BALTBAT commander, Laneman (interview 2010) provided an unexpected position on this question, conceding there is some truth to the argument that BALTBAT may have received a disproportionately large amount of resources. He stated that the goal of BALTBAT was indeed to develop national defence capabilities. Due to the shortage of trained personnel, people were training and working at the same time, and personnel were constantly being rotated through BALTBAT. Laneman (interview 2010) noted that there was equipment which went to BALTBAT that national military forces tried to get under their control. However, he asserted that the problem was that the Baltic governments did not take the opportunity to maximize the benefits that could have been derived from BALTBAT. If they had done so, the allocation of resources to BALTBAT would have been appropriate.

An Estonian official (interview 2010) supported Laneman and commented that the projects contributed to development of national defences, which was one of the goals of the participating states. However, more could have been done so that BALTBAT and the other programmes could have made a greater contribution to building national defence capabilities. He noted that there was a split within the Baltic governments over utilizing funds for the development of hard defence versus PKO capabilities. That was the primary reason why BALTBAT expertise was not spread more intensively among the rest of the military forces. As a result, there was inadequate support inside the military
establishments in the Baltic countries to utilize BALTBAT and the other Baltic projects to develop hard national defence capabilities. The balance on PKO versus hard defence, he asserted, ultimately was right, but more spill-over from BALTBAT to the rest of the military could have been achieved. In retrospect, he would have worked to get a consensus within Baltic military forces to use the assistance projects for national defence development, which would have generated more support for the Baltic initiatives.

A Latvian official (interview 2010) supported that point, stating that BALTBAT was seen as “the pandered child” of the military establishment, while others did “real” defense. He noted that if he also had the opportunity to make those decisions again, he might have had more coordination with Latvian officers to address lack of support for BALTBAT within the rest of the defence forces.

This diversity of views with regard to this particular military goal indicated that some practical modification of this Mechanism may be needed to enhance its value. While it is important to have clear, long-term objectives to guide assistance projects, it may be prudent to continuously reassess an objective in light of changing circumstances, such as the extent of progress and the competing demands for resources. In addition, the important lesson to be drawn may involve process, particularly on communicating a message that the specific assistance project (BALTBAT in this case) was indeed intended to contribute to developing a specific Outcome (national defence capabilities in this case). Additional perspectives on this issue are provided in the later discussions on BALTRON and BALTNET.

5.9.2 National Defence - Documents

In line with the first two Mechanisms (assessment of regional security concerns and focus on optimal areas of military assistance), there was no reason to anticipate that any documents would have specific language indicating that BALTBAT was intended to build national defence capabilities of the Baltic states. In view of the need to be aware of the concerns of the dominant regional power (Russia), it would be surprising for any of the public documents, especially in the early part of the 1990s, to stress the development of hard defence capabilities. Indeed, the various issues covered in the documents from 1994 focus on PKO training.

However, the Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development of BALTBAT issued in 1999 provided relevant text. After citing the focus of BALTBAT on peace support operations, Section 1.2 noted that "In parallel, the development of the Baltic Battalion should ensure the development of the self-defence capabilities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania."

Section 1.2 also indicated that BALTBAT "has supported and contributed to the development of the national defence forces and the development of the self-defence capabilities of each of the Baltic States, and its value as an example in
training and development of the national defence forces is recognised as a distinct objective."

In addition, Section 1.2 clearly noted as the first of four purposes of BALTBAT: "The purposes for establishing the Baltic Battalion can be resumed as follows: To enhance the development of the national forces of the Baltic States and raise their operational self-defence capabilities."

In short, the desired Outcome from BALTBAT of developing national defence capabilities, which may well have existed at its initiation, but was unstated, had become an explicitly desired Outcome from BALTBAT by the end of the 1990s.

5.10 Sixth Mechanism - Developing New Leaders

Despite the criticisms regarding the way BALTBAT was utilised to develop national defence capabilities, there appeared to be little disagreement on this as a desired Outcome. An important component of such national capabilities through military assistance programmes would be developing the right kind of personnel. This involved both the right kind of people in the new Baltic military forces, and, of specific importance, a new generation of political-military leadership. This was a topic noted by 10 of the interviewees: Abols, Carlsen, Clemmesen, Kolga, Laneman, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Schvede, Tori and a Latvian official.

Placing this topic within the CIMO framework, in view of the difficult Context in which the Baltic states found themselves, the critical Intervention of broad political decisions agreed upon between donor and recipient states made it important to have a Mechanism of developing new leaders in order to achieve the desired Outcomes. It should be noted that this Mechanism would not be placed here if the methodology was strictly based on the number of times a topic was cited. However, it flowed naturally from the previous point about developing national defence capabilities.

The Baltic and supporting states recognized the significance of developing personnel with the mentality needed for a modern military force. Working on the Baltic projects provided an opportunity for the next generation of Baltic military and civilian policy-makers to develop skills. The need for such initiatives to develop such skills became unnecessary with accession to NATO, and the eventual development of a much larger cadre of Baltic officials and officers. However, up to the point of NATO accession, the Baltic programmes played an important role in developing those new personnel, which would appear to be a Mechanism for any military assistance initiative to generate the desired Outcomes.

The interview data indicated the significance of this Mechanism. Carlsen (interview 2010) stressed that it was important that those who worked in BALTBAT were the young personnel who generated the cooperation that was needed for the Baltic governments to open up to and work with each other, and
with the West. Clemmesen (interview 2010) emphasized that perhaps the key accomplishment of BALTBAT was development of the first of the next generation of Baltic military officers. It was significant that a network of Baltic officers and civil servants was nurtured by work on common programmes and attendance at meetings. In his estimation, there were about 20 important individuals who had the opportunity to work together and learn to trust each other. Clemmesen (interview 2010) provided additional comments which specifically address the BALTDEFCOL and are cited in the later discussion of that initiative.

Echoing those views, Linkevicius (interview 2010) concurred that the results of the efforts in the 1990s still have an impact, as the young people working on these projects are now in positions of leadership in defence and security policy. A Latvian official (interview 2010) added that, in retrospect, he is very proud of the people who came out of the BALTBAT process.

Kolga (interview 2009) noted that BALTBAT served as a “window to the West,” stressing that the Baltic governments in 1991 could not recruit enough good people with the understanding of military matters to establish military forces. BALTBAT and the other programmes allowed Baltic military personnel to get experience in a number of key areas, such as the generation of defence systems, and allowed them to develop understanding of the broader political-military arena. The Baltic initiatives, added Kolga (interview 2009), forced the Baltic capitals to work together, as well as refine their thinking in the defence area. This process may not have led to the immediate development of military capability, but it provided people with exposure to Western military structures and how to work in a multinational environment. This also, commented Kolga (interview 2009), supported the development of basic skills, such as consensus building.

By the late 1990s, continued Kolga (interview 2009), “Baltification,” or the turning over of programme responsibilities to the Baltic governments, had become an issue. However, up to that point, the knowledge base of Baltic officials was very thin. The Baltic projects consumed time and energy, he conceded, but this was unavoidable as a focus was on developing the mentality of young officers of the nascent Baltic forces. Erkki Tori, Head of the Outreach and Baltic cooperation section of the Estonian Ministry of Defence, added in a 2009 interview that what was important was the practical cooperation among the Baltic military personnel which took place in those early years.

At that stage in their development, agreed Mackenzie (interview 2010), it was important to instill in the new generation a mind-set centered on Baltic independence and away from a reliance on others. Such a process, he noted, was the only way to really help the Baltic governments as they faced a steep learning curve. Abols (interview 2009) stressed that the Baltic projects were crucial to developing the right kind of military officers, and over the long-term, leadership and professional development were important. Moreover, in his
view, the process went as fast as possible with regard to development of personnel.

To summarize, one of the Mechanisms for the successful achievement of Outcomes from BALTBAT, and arguably of any military assistance programme, was to have a focus on a process which ensures that personnel develop the right type of mind-set and skills. Such a Mechanism was particularly important with regard to developing competent leadership, and the data indicated that BALTBAT in particular and the Baltic projects in general were successful in achieving that Outcome.

5.10.1 Sixth Mechanism - Documents

In the 27 February 1995 agreement between the Baltic Ministries of Defence on Defence Cooperation, the areas in which the parties would cooperate are listed in Article 1. Item 4 was "recruiting and training of the armed forces," and item 5 was "Professional training of servicemen in educational institutions and units, their training to serve in the forces as well as the improvement of skills of professional servicemen and civilian personnel serving in the Ministries of (National) Defence."

As the BALTDEFCOL in particular had the task of developing the new generation of military leaders, additional text from documents on this Mechanism is listed in the later section covering the BALTDEFCOL.

5.11 Seventh Mechanism - Appropriate Direction and Control by Donor States

Another Mechanism apparent from the interview data was the importance of ensuring that donor states provided the necessary direction and control to ensure recipient nations acted in a way which optimized results. Within the CIMO framework, this appeared to be important in ensuring that within the Context of the difficulties faced by the Baltic governments, the Intervention of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states required a Mechanism of appropriate donor control, agreed to by recipient states, to ensure Outcomes were achieved. The fact that 20 interviewees cited the significance of Western direction and control, particularly to manage rivalries among the Baltic nations, indicated the importance of this Mechanism for the success of the Baltic projects. Those interviewees were: Abols, Andrusyszyn, Carlsen, Clemmesen, Donnelly, Fischer, Godal, Herd, Kolga, Laneman, Lawrence, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Molis, Saar, Schvede, Sibul, Tori, an Estonian official and a retired US military officer.

The concrete manifestation of this factor in the Baltic military assistance projects was appropriate direction by the donor states to ensure the three Baltic governments acted as a single entity, and not at cross-purposes to pursue separate national goals. This was an important political consideration, as noted by some interviewees below, as three Baltic countries acting as one entity could
make a stronger case with NATO than three small, individual states. At the working level, it meant efforts by donor states to ensure there was one Baltic position, rather than three separate national positions.

The case could be made that the Baltic projects presented a unique situation, and donors to military assistance programmes in general would not face this kind of complication. The first and most basic response to that point is that it is likely that all assistance projects have mechanisms in place to ensure that donations are used by recipients as intended by donors, as that is good programme management.

The second response is that while it is true that Western direction for the Baltic initiatives had a more political aspect, once again, it is not unusual for donor states to be in a situation where they must direct political decisions by recipient countries. One example would be on the extent to which programmes to develop military forces need to draw from more than one ethnic group within a country. That may not be an easy decision for the recipient government to make on its own volition. However, it is arguably a critical factor for the success of a military assistance project in an ethnically diverse recipient state. In short, the Mechanism which arose from consideration of the Baltic projects appears to have general relevance to achieve desired Outcomes: donor states on an assistance project need to generate the necessary amount of direction and control to ensure recipient states make best use of the resources.

5.11.1 Baltic Unity

As indicated by the interview data, at a basic level, there was political support in Baltic capitals for BALTBAT and the other projects. Godal (interview 2011) emphasized that Baltic assumption of responsibilities contributed to success, and there was substantial "nation-building energy." The Baltic governments had strong political enthusiasm to work on such initiatives, and their own determination was crucial. A Latvian official (interview 2010) noted a historical factor: the Baltic nations had not cooperated at the onset of World War II and they were determined not to repeat that mistake after regaining independence in 1991. To be candid, added Kolga (interview 2009), the Baltic governments did not understand initially what was involved. However, that understanding grew and the support spread from the top down until it became part of a foundation of political support.

A retired US military officer (interview 2010) commented that the Baltic capitals were tied together in their own self-interest, and the West pressed them to do so. Moreover, Baltic solidarity made it more difficult for Russia to harass three states viewed as a unit, rather than three individual states. It was difficult, noted Linkevicius (interview 2010), to get agreement among the Baltic capitals. There were disputes over which project would be located in which state. However, he stressed, there ultimately was more in common which held the Baltic governments together than differences which separated them.
Taking a different perspective, Dr. Graham Herd, Head of the International Security Programme of the Geneva Center for Security Policy, stressed in a 2011 interview that trilateral military cooperation was driven by the desire for NATO membership rather than internal collaborative impulses. Working together in the military sphere, the Baltic nations could demonstrate a cooperative capacity which also signalled their readiness for NATO membership, and indicated that this would continue when they were in NATO. Herd (interview 2011) made the point that trilateral military cooperation was as much, if not more, a means to an end (NATO membership) than an end in and of itself.

5.11.2 Baltic Disunity

However, as many interviewees made clear, unity among the Baltic governments did not come naturally. Certainly, stressed Mackenzie (interview 2010), the Baltic capitals did not want to be lumped together. Moreover, there are clear differences, such as language, which make cooperation difficult. In a 2011 interview, Professor Eric Sibul, assistant professor in Military Theory and Military History at the BALTDEFCOL, noted the basic fact that Lithuania is Catholic and Estonia is Lutheran.

Tori (interview 2009) commented that there is not a strong instinctive desire among the Baltic states to work together. The three independence movements were a basis for cooperation, but the momentum for Baltic cooperation flagged after they regained independence, and cooperation among the three nations was not at the top of the list of priorities. Tori (interview 2009) stated that the West pushed the Baltic governments to act in a way that was not "natural" to them, but they recognized their common need to turn to the West, which generated a common interest. Ultimately, he asserted, the Baltic nations were "stuck in one boat."

Continuing on that theme, Clemmesen (interview 2010) recounted that one foreign military officer serving in Estonia told him the military leadership of the Baltic capitals supported BALTBAT, but nowhere near enough to remove mutual suspicion. Clemmesen (interview 2010) asserted that key people in the Baltic governments "deeply distrusted each other." He noted that Lithuania pushed hard for creation of a Lithuanian-Polish battalion even after BALTBAT was established. In addition, Lithuania was initially skeptical of the BALTDEFCOL, as it wanted to use educational options in Western countries. Clemmesen (interview 2010) added that Lithuania wanted to be viewed as distinct and separate from Estonia and Latvia, particularly as it did not have a Russian population. It wanted not only to be considered a Baltic state, but also a Central European state, which was more beneficial to its national foreign policy objectives. In that regard, he asserted that Lithuania never really adopted BALTBAT.

Each of the representatives of the Baltic governments, asserted Clemmesen (interview 2010), would go back to capitals and undermine agreed decisions
regarding Baltic projects. This mutual suspicion, he believed, was a remnant of how people had to act under the Soviet regime, and such habits are difficult to break. Interpersonal relationships were, he commented, clearly lacking in trust. With regard to BALTBAT and the other initiatives, Clemmesen (interview 2010) provided the assessment of the Baltic capitals that "their minds were in it, but not their hearts." While they understood the policy rationale, this was not enough to guide their behaviour, and as the political structures were weak, it was hard for them to commit.

Laneman (interview 2010) asserted that the Baltic capitals were not happy with national visibility within BALTBAT. Moreover, a retired US military officer (interview 2010) noted that once the Baltic countries were in NATO, divisions arose among the three countries, even about deploying and operating together. He stated that distinctions showed up in the way they responded to specific military tasks. He characterized the Lithuanians as "gung-ho" about becoming engaged. The Estonians will "engineer" the problem. The Latvians will look for assistance and guidance. He added that there were clear divisions among the Baltic forces operating in Afghanistan. The Estonians and Latvians rebelled against Lithuanian efforts to take the lead of a “Baltic” Provisional Reconstruction Team in central Afghanistan in early 2005, opting instead to integrate their troops in the commands of other forces (for example, Estonia with the UK in Helmand Province).

In a 2011 interview, Anthony Lawrence, Directing Staff of the Higher Command Studies Course at the BALTDEFCOL, noted that intellectually, the Baltic governments understand the benefits of Baltic cooperation, as with obtaining membership in NATO. However, as a practical matter, they find it difficult to do. For example, on defence acquisition, they generally cannot take a Baltic approach. He noted that ministers are apparently ready to cooperate, but working-level personnel find it too easy to find excuses to not do so. The leadership, added Lawrence (interview 2011), does not follow up on these joint efforts, and there is no overarching vision in favour of Baltic cooperation.

Saar (interview 2010) echoed the points made by Lawrence, stating that there was recognition in the 1990s that common Baltic procurement would help address many issues that arise with major acquisition projects. However, each country had its own legislation, and finding a legal basis for common Baltic military procurement was extremely difficult.

5.11.3 The West - "Twisting Arms"

Ultimately, emphasized Clemmesen (interview 2010), the donor states had to "twist arms" to get Baltic coordination and participation, as only outside pressure could get agreement among Baltic capitals. He asserted that, in his view, the most important factor for the success of these initiatives was creating a framework to force the Baltic governments to work in their best interest. To achieve this, added Clemmesen (interview 2010), the US commitment remained the decisive factor.
Godal (interview 2011) stated that the Baltic governments knew the donor states appreciated agreed Baltic action. The message to the Baltic capitals focused on the positive aspects of collaboration, and the Nordic countries could not unduly pressure them. However, stressed Godal (interview 2011), the Baltic nations “got the message.” Certainly, noted Mackenzie (interview 2010), the logic was that the Baltic capitals needed to work together, and cooperating in the military sphere may have been easier than other areas. Johnson (interview 2011) also commented that he impressed on Baltic capitals the need to approach NATO as one entity of three Baltic nations, rather than three small individual states.

Supporting that point, Carlsen (interview 2010) emphasized that getting the Baltic capitals to work together was essential, and a challenge. Sometimes, he conceded, Denmark had to apply pressure to get a common decision. Selecting a training base or a force commander became points of contention, and Denmark had to press for a unified decision. Carlsen (interview 2010) noted that Denmark explained to the Baltic capitals that the Danes could not support a decision and take it to the other supporting states if the Baltic governments themselves were not in agreement. He commented that steady pressure on the Baltic capitals to work together was important for success.

Kolga (interview 2009) noted that there were debates within the Baltic capitals about defence, but BALTBAT and the other projects forced them to work together and refine their thinking. Baltic cooperation was sometimes good, but at times there were difficulties. A lot of work needed to be done on all the projects, he stated, and the Baltic governments understood they “had to deliver.” An Estonian official (interview 2010) concurred, adding there also were differences of opinion between older and younger officers within the Baltic military forces as well as between those with different areas of responsibility.

There were clear divisions among the Baltic capitals, stressed Andrusyszyn (interview 2010), and it was important to find a way to get them to work together and avoid disunity, as differences occasionally came into public view. He noted that one senior Estonian official told him frankly that there was a Baltic view and an Estonian view. This indicated the extent to which maintenance of Baltic unity was an important rationale for the Baltic projects, added Andrusyszyn (interview 2010). In that regard, “Baltification” was irrelevant. More important, he asserted, was ensuring the Baltic countries worked together, and that was a primary benefit of BALTBAT and the other projects. Abols (interview 2009) agreed that in the period 1992-1994, coordination between the Baltic capitals was not well-developed, and they had different visions on how they wanted to develop their policies. However, the West pushed the Baltic governments to act together, which ultimately was a sound policy.

To summarize, the statements from the interviewees indicated one of the Mechanisms which led to the success of BALTBAT and the other initiatives was the determination of the Western supporting countries to ensure that there was
an agreed Baltic position and not a set of three distinct positions by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The comments indicated that there was no natural unity among the Baltic governments, and indeed, that there was a substantial amount of disunity among the three capitals. As a result, it was particularly important that the Western donor countries used a proper amount of pressure to ensure the Baltic governments acted in a way that optimised the prospects of success for the assistance programmes and generated the desired Outcomes. More generally, it appeared that the determination of donor states to ensure that recipient nations acted in such a manner was an important Mechanism necessary for the achievement of successful Outcomes in these military assistance projects.

5.11.4 Seventh Mechanism - Documents

Recognising the political importance of showing a unified front, there were numerous examples of the Baltic governments expressing their determination to pursue a common Baltic position. For example, it was notable that Article 1 of the 1994 Agreement on Baltic Parliamentary and Governmental Cooperation Between the Baltic States indicated that "The Baltic States shall endeavour to develop cooperation in the spheres of foreign and security policy, defence, legislation ... and other fields of mutual interest and for this purpose negotiate bilateral and multilateral agreements which regulate cooperation in the respective spheres."

Moreover, the 13 September 1994 resolution of the heads of Government of the Baltic states noted that:

We deemed it important that common foreign and security policy together with cooperation in the economic sphere between Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia be continued and properly developed in the framework of strengthening regional cooperation as well as with the purpose of joining European structures of political and economic integration and both regional and transatlantic security systems.

The Preamble to the 1995 Agreement Between the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic States on Cooperation in the fields of Defence and Military Relations cited "striving to ensure efficient trilateral co-ordination of actions in the field of defence and security as well as in cases of crises."

Finally, the Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the development of BALTBAT issued in April 1999 included the notation in Section 1.2 that BALTBAT "has been aimed at increasing interoperability and displaying the will and ability of the Baltic States to co-operate both among themselves and in a multinational environment."

With regard to these documents, the case can be made that the importance of the Mechanism of donor states imposing direction and control was most apparent in the fact that inter-Baltic rivalries were contained and public disputes
minimized. Particularly as the extent of the disagreement among the Baltic nations was apparent after they joined NATO, it was noteworthy that the documents provided the appearance of unanimity among the Baltic states, which attested to the significance of this particular Mechanism.

5.12 Eighth Mechanism - Turning Over Responsibility to Recipient States

The preceding Mechanism of donor nations exerting control and providing direction to optimise results is important, particularly if there is disunity among recipient states. However, the case can be made that if that Mechanism is over-emphasized, it can generate a dependency by recipients on donors that could be fatal for the assistance effort. Thus, 18 interviewees addressed the need to consider how to turn over responsibility to recipient states at an appropriate pace. The interviewees were: Abols, Andrusyszyn, Brett, Carlsen, Clemmesen, Fischer, Godal, Haekkerup, Kolga, Laneman, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Schvede, Sibul, an Estonian official, a Latvian official, a US official, and a retired US military officer.

The proposition is put forth that at some point in a military assistance programme, recipient states must be able to assume responsibility for the project and show that they have developed the requisite skills to do so. From a practical perspective, it is hard to imagine donor states being willing to sign on to a programme that would proceed indefinitely. One of the significant aspects of the Baltic initiatives which appeared to have particular value regarding future military assistance projects involved the need to determine how and when to wean recipients off the support provided by donors.

It should be noted that there were a wide range of views among interviewees regarding the experience of the Baltic projects, and whether, in retrospect, the pace of what has been called "Baltification" was too fast, too slow or appropriate for the circumstances. There appeared to be no support for rigid schedules and time-lines for transfer of responsibility. Instead, there seems to have been a general view that decision-makers should keep the goal of transferring responsibility in mind, and act on it when appropriate.

Returning to the CIMO framework, it appeared to be important that within the Context of the challenges facing the Baltic states and the organizational weaknesses they faced at that time, the Intervention of agreement on broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states on gradually turning over responsibility to recipient states was an important part of achieving desired Outcomes, and would therefore be an important element of a model for effective military assistance projects.

5.12.1 The Right Pace

The data from the interviews indicated the diversity of opinions on this question. Haekkerup (interview 2008) stressed that the Baltic states were not ready to assume more responsibility for the projects at the start, but he was surprised at
how quickly they developed their abilities. Godal (interview 2011) commented that it is hard to say if the Baltic capitals could have taken more responsibility for BALTBAT and the other projects at an earlier stage as they needed substantial guidance. It is hard to imagine, he added, that if it could be done again, the donor states would change the way in which they directed and controlled the initiatives. Linkevicius (interview 2010) agreed that he would not alter the pace at which responsibility was shifted to the Baltic countries, stressing that at that time, they needed assistance. The process of moving responsibility to the Baltic capitals was not fixed, he stressed, but happened gradually as they developed their capabilities.

Mackenzie (interview 2010) concurred that the Baltic states could not have done more or done it sooner. They were at a very low stage of development and the leaders were used to taking orders, not giving them. The BALTBAT model, he stressed, was good because it developed at a reasonable pace. Too much change done too quickly would have generated a "disaster." Drawing a comparison, Mackenzie (interview 2010) asserted that other former Warsaw Pact states went too far, for example, in getting new military equipment, but did not think through the changes they were making. He noted that it is important to be clear on a roadmap for devolution of responsibility, and it has to be seen as a journey of assistance for the recipient nations. Johnson (interview 2011) agreed that the pace of “Baltification” was about right.

Addressing another aspect of this issue, it should be noted that elements of the Baltic forces were corrupt and inefficient in their early days. Denmark had to send quartermasters to take care of the equipment, and there was an agreement with donor states that the equipment would not fall into the hands of third parties. Moreover, in the early stages of the projects, the personnel in the Baltic countries had questionable English. The Baltic governments, commented Abols (interview 2009), were not ready at early stages to own the programmes.

An early transfer of more authority to the Baltic capitals simply was not possible, stated Clemmesen (interview 2010), and more "Baltification" was not an option. While some have argued that the Baltic countries could have been given more responsibility, he believed the problem was always to achieve "a full-hearted Baltic will to cooperate and coordinate." An Estonian official (interview 2010) made the case regarding the BALTDEFCOL that “Baltification” was done too rapidly, and the comments of that official will be addressed in greater detail in the later discussion on the BALTDEFCOL.

Fischer (interview 2010) added that, even with the benefit of hindsight, the division of labor between the supporting and Baltic states in the early stages was about right. "Baltification" was pursued with greater intensity beginning in 1997, and could not have been accomplished until then. He noted that the capabilities of the Baltic nations in 1994 simply did not allow them to take more responsibility. That was markedly different by 1997, but this was because they had time to learn at a steady pace with the aid of the supporting states. In his view, the patient process by which the Baltic capitals developed abilities and
could handle more tasks was, even in retrospect, the most effective way to proceed.

A Latvian official (interview 2010) asserted that "Baltification" was always the aim of BALTBAT, and around 1997 there was a desire to have the Baltic governments take more responsibility. However, he agreed this could not have been done any earlier than that. Indeed, the supporting states needed to push Baltic capitals to do more on "Baltification." Kolga (interview 2009) noted that there was some “grumbling” about the donor states telling the Baltic nations what to do, but he added that this was a natural response. In addition, he agreed that it might have been possible for donor countries to have "pushed" the Baltic governments more as they were initially quite passive. However, the method was a patient dialogue to ensure the Baltic capitals understood how things had to be done.

Around 1996, stated a US official (interview 2011), "Baltification" was under way, and this was the right time to have Baltic nations assume more responsibility. The first security assistance conference with Eastern European democracies had been held, and it was apparent these states were not yet ready to handle more tasks. In the early years of BALTBAT, the Baltic countries required a lot of "hand-holding" from the West, but by 1999, they were able to take more responsibility. Certainly, by 1999, the Baltic capitals were prepared to effectively handle more tasks regarding these projects. Even at that time, he added, there were still problems which would arise, such as issues of sanitation and hygiene in barracks facilities, which would indicate the Baltic officials still had much to learn.

A retired US military officer (interview 2010) agreed that he would not have changed anything significant regarding pace, as the Baltic forces were in a situation in which they could only absorb so much information, assistance and equipment. Julian Brett, author of the referenced "Lessons Learned" assessment, and former UK exchange officer at the Danish Defence Ministry, stated in a 2008 interview that there was comparatively little input from the Baltic nations during Steering Group meetings in the early days. However, this gradually improved as the officials concerned gained experience and confidence. By the late 1990s, they were demonstrating more ownership. As a general rule for such programmes, asserted Brett, there should be "Baltification" as early as possible

5.12.2 Too Slow A Pace for "Baltification"

On the other hand, some interviewees made the case that the pace of "Baltification" was too slow and should have been pressed more by the donor states. Carlsen (interview 2010) commented that, in retrospect, perhaps more could have been done earlier to shift responsibilities to the Baltic governments, and they could have received more encouragement from the supporting countries to play a larger role. Certainly, he noted, donor capitals kept watch on
how work was progressing. He believed, however, that Denmark and the other supporting nations may have "guarded" the Baltic governments too much.

Laneman (interview 2010) supported Carlsen's view, stating that “Baltification” could have been done sooner and better. What was actually done was good, but more responsibilities should have been put on the shoulders of the Baltic countries. However, conceded Laneman (interview 2010), a credible argument could be made that the Baltic capitals were not ready to have a substantially larger role. Captain Igor Schvede, Commander of the Estonian Navy and former BALTRON commander, asserted in a 2010 interview that the German leadership of BALTRON did a good job in pushing the Baltic naval forces to assume more responsibilities. In his view, the pace of “Baltification” was good, although echoing Carlsen and Laneman, it perhaps could have been done faster. The comments from Schvede (interview 2010) are addressed in greater detail in the later discussion on BALTRON.

To summarize, there appeared to be little disagreement on the significance of a conscious effort by donor countries to have recipient states assume greater responsibility for the assistance programmes. This would appear to be an important Mechanism for the successful achievement of Outcomes from any military assistance project. In the case of the Baltic projects, the preponderance of views appeared to indicate that the pace of “Baltification” was appropriate, although there were individuals who believed that the pace, in retrospect, may have been too slow. As a principle, it would appear that the Mechanism should be an element of a model for effective military assistance programmes, and the details of the pace of transferring greater responsibility to recipient states should be continuously reassessed to ensure that they are appropriate.

5.12.3 Eighth Mechanism - Documents

It was notable that Article 1, paragraph 1 of the BALTBAT MOU specifically noted that the programme was "designed to put in place mechanisms by which the Baltic States can themselves in the future maintain a peacekeeping capability."

The Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development of BALTBAT issued in April 1998 addressed "Baltification" in the fourth bullet of Section 3: "It is the understanding of the Baltic States, that the Baltic authorities should gradually assume greater responsibility for the development of the project, including the financial share and the logistic support." In addition, paragraph 1 of Section 5 noted that:

Recognising the ongoing gradual "Baltification" process, continuous support by the Supporting States is considered important for the further development of the Baltic Battalion project. Support to the development and anchoring of the training launched in the project (train the trainers) is strongly encouraged.
The Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development of BALTBAT issued in April 1999 also provided relevant text. After citing the focus of BALTBAT on peace support operations, Section 1.2 indicated that BALTBAT "has been aimed at increasing interoperability and displaying the will and ability of the Baltic States to co-operate both among themselves and in a multinational environment."

In short, there was a repeated emphasis in the BALTBAT documentation which indicated that the Mechanism of turning over responsibility to recipient states was always a critical consideration for donor and recipient states and an important part of achieving the desired Outcomes.

5.13 Ninth Mechanism - Flexibility in Planning

In general, the case can be made that a key component of any successful project is good planning. This can encompass a wide variety of issues: setting of goals; organisational structures; reporting requirements; and accountability. Numerous other issues can be added to that list. However, for the purposes of this research, a broad, all-encompassing definition was sufficient, and there was no reason to narrowly define or address the specific components. The rationale for such a decision was that the particular focus on planning drawn from the interviewees was the significance of the flexibility in the general planning process which was evident in the Baltic military assistance initiatives.

Good planning was cited by 14 interviewees as a factor in the success of the Baltic projects, particularly the planning which went into establishing the framework of BALTBAT, as it became the template for the subsequent programmes. Those interviewees were: Abols, Carlsen, Clemmesen, Fischer, Godal, Haekkerup, Kolga, Laneman, Mackenzie, Molis, an Estonian official, a Latvian official, a US official and a retired US military officer.

With regard to a general overview of the importance of this Mechanism, Abols (interview 2009) made the point that the Baltic projects were well and thoroughly planned, which contributed to the chances for success. Carlsen (interview 2010) concurred, noting that from the start, the focus was on addressing practical issues to make these initiatives work. The first topic which had to be addressed, he cited as an example, was what language would be used for BALTBAT, and the Nordic states made the pragmatic decision to use English. As a result, Denmark asked the UK to join in the assistance effort and provide language instructors. When the UK agreed, Denmark took that decision to the Baltic countries. Moreover, Laneman (interview 2010) stated that, as a general principle, there has to be unity between the project details and the policy, and the BALTBAT experience showed that it is essential to have people support the plan and the decisions.

However, what was particularly noteworthy was the commentary on the significance of the flexibility demonstrated by policy-makers. On one count, this appeared to have been important in initiating BALTBAT in particular, as there
was no set framework or structure which the supporting states could utilise. In addition, flexibility was critical in the policy area, where there was avoidance of doctrinaire or dogmatic responses and consideration of utilising opportunities. As a result, the significance of flexibility in planning was frequently and strongly noted by the interviewees as a component of the success of the Baltic initiatives. Returning again to the CIMO framework, within the specific, challenging Context in which the Baltic initiatives were established, the Intervention of broad political decisions among donor and recipient states needed the specific Mechanism of flexibility in planning to generate specific Outcomes.

Godal (interview 2011) provided commentary on the various aspects of flexibility in planning. On policy, he stated that clear political goals were significant, and there was Western donor agreement on policies. However, using opportunities that arose was also important. On the initiation of the projects, he noted that there was flexibility in the way in which the Nordic countries provided assistance. He noted that there was no set Nordic organizational framework to utilize, and processes and procedures for the Baltic initiatives had to be developed by the participants. Haekkerup (interview 2008) concurred, stating that Denmark had the lead on BALTBAT decision-making, but “all the crucial decisions were made in common.” However, there was no blue-print to follow, adding that the will to take action was decisive, and that is how leaders have to respond "when sailing in uncharted waters."

A Latvian official (interview 2010) concurred with Haekkerup’s comment by noting that establishing BALTBAT was “to an extent, made up as the BALTBAT process went along.” Fischer (interview 2010) also echoed Haekkerup’s point that when work on BALTBAT was initiated, the Danish MOD had to develop processes and procedures, even though the MOD did not have a solid blueprint or a significant amount of experience in handling this type of task. He also reiterated Godal’s point that the perspective of those working on the projects was to take advantage of available opportunities to build BALTBAT and Baltic military capabilities.

Mackenzie (interview 2010) concurred that it is important for military assistance programmes to have both a good base framework and the flexibility to head in the strategic direction which has been set out. Too much doctrinaire thinking generates problems and increases the chances of failure. As forces develop, advantages may arise, and it is important to be able to take opportunities. It is also critical, emphasized Mackenzie (interview 2010), to first develop policy and then establish military mechanisms. It is not a case of being doctrinaire and using a specific model. It is important to look at functions, he added, rather than structures, which is why the Danish model worked for BALTBAT. This can include a realization of the existence of regional problems. Moreover, commented Mackenzie (interview 2010), it stresses the importance of not beginning the process by creating the solution. It is important to be able to analyse and take opportunities. They usually arise, he noted, and the key is to have them develop the way you wish.
Echoing Mackenzie’s points, Carlsen (interview 2010) stated that the Danes were focused on how to adapt projects to succeed. It was not the case of beginning with a plan and just sticking with it. In fact, Carlsen (interview 2010) believed that the flexibility of approach was a critical reason that BALTBAT was a success. Clemmesen (interview 2010) reiterated that there was no road-map to follow, and Denmark had to make up the process as it went along. It was a process by which lessons were assessed as work proceeded. Taking a different perspective on flexibility, Kolga (interview 2009) noted the Baltic projects went through an interesting evolution. They began as top-down initiatives, but over time, they generated more bottom-up processes as ideas and suggestions arose.

It is worthwhile reiterating that flexibility in planning was particularly important with regard to BALTBAT, as it was the first attempt at a Baltic military assistance project. As such, it was a valuable indication of the cases in which the approach was productive, or may not have been optimal. Laneman (interview 2010) noted instances in which the flexibility was beneficial. For instance, the initial plans were optimistic, with a proposal for one BALTBAT support organization. When that clearly was not sufficient, two more were developed. Moreover, his first attempt at an organizational table was not a success, but he constantly worked to improve it, which was in line with the ad hoc approach to addressing challenges. In short, the structure was improved as the project went along, which was a mark of the practical way in which BALTBAT addressed problems.

However, there were also difficulties in the area of flexibility and striking the right balance. On the one hand, Laneman (interview 2010) indicated that he would have appreciated some guidance from policy-makers, as he stated that he simply got an order to form a PKO centre. Moreover, he had to generate a statement of intent and a budget “from scratch.” On the other hand, Laneman (interview 2010) commented that his flexibility to act was reduced over time.

To summarize, it appeared to be the case that one of the items which interviewees judged as important to the success of the Baltic projects was the fact that there was a flexible approach to planning. That was manifest in the development of the structures for BALTBAT in particular, and also in the inclination of the decision-makers to be open to using opportunities which became available. Such flexibility in planning would appear to be a Mechanism which would be important for achieving Outcomes and a necessary element for a model for effective military assistance programmes.

**5.13.1 Ninth Factor - Documents**

It was difficult to find examples of documents which included text that specifically cited flexibility in planning. That would be most manifest in the decisions reached by the policy-makers and project managers, for instance, in having Baltic forces participate in particular PKOs. Instead, it was possible to
look at the extent to which there was an avoidance of micro-management and large amounts of detail. On that count, one document excerpt stood out.

It was notable that the Project Plan for BALTBAT was outlined in Annex A to the BALTBAT MOU. It specifically noted that the training of BALTBAT would be conducted in three phases, but in the following very general terms:

- **Phase 1**: Baltic officers and NCOs attend Nordic UN courses.
- **Phase 2**: Training of three Baltic infantry companies by Nordic and UK instructors.
- **Phase 3**: Formation and training of a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion.

### 5.14 Tenth Mechanism - Good Organizational Structures

The organizational structure for BALTBAT and the other projects was noted by 15 of the interviewees, and appeared to be a Mechanism which would be critical in achieving the desired Outcomes from a military assistance programme. Those interviewees were: Brett, Carlsen, Clemmesen, Fischer, Godal, Haekkerup, Kolga, Laneman, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Molis, Saar, Schvede, a Latvian official and a US official.

A short comment is in order with regard to the significance of this factor. It would appear self-evident that a good organizational structure is a prerequisite for any successful project, military or non-military. The reply to such a statement is a comment on the number of assistance efforts which are undertaken with a weak organizational structure. Therefore, returning again to the CIMO framework, within the challenging Context in which participating states were trying to work, the Intervention of a broad political agreement between donor and recipient states required the critical Mechanism of a good organizational arrangement in order to achieve the desired Outcomes from the military assistance initiative.

In the case of the Baltic projects, the policy-makers effectively addressed that Mechanism. At the top of the organizational structure for BALTBAT were the Baltic Ministers for Defence and Chiefs of Defence, who formally were responsible for the project. This indicated the political significance attached to BALTBAT. As a practical matter, the policy-making responsibilities were given to a Steering Group (SG) which was below the Ministerial level and made the overarching decisions with regard to the direction of the project. A Military Working Group (MWG) was set up below the SG, which addressed the details of the assistance programme and managed implementation. Finally, specific training tasks were handled by the Training Teams (TTs) under the authority of the MWG.

One organization also cited by interviewees was the Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA). It was established in 1997 with a focus on coordinating the multitude of bilateral assistance arrangements between the Baltic and donor states. BALTSEA was not an integral part of the organizational structures of
BALTBAT and the other military initiatives. However, the various references to BALTSEA reinforced the point that good organizational arrangements enhanced the prospects of success for the overall effort to assist the Baltic capitals.

The interview data provided positive commentary on the organizational structures that were set up. Haekkerup (interview 2008) asserted that the SG and MWG structure worked well, and Godal (interview 2011) emphasized that political and military frameworks set up for the Baltic initiatives were important to their success. Linkevicius (interview 2010) noted that the SG at the political level and MWG at the practical level were important bodies that worked on concrete issues. He also commented that BALTSEA was a forum where Baltic projects were discussed, adding that it was so useful that it served as a model for implementation of non-military Baltic cooperative efforts. Continuing on that theme, Kolga (interview 2009) believed that establishment of BALTSEA was necessary due to the growth of numerous bilateral agreements. More generally, Kolga (interview 2009) concurred that from the SG down to the TTs, the BALTBAT organizational entities performed well, with the TTs, for example, having the autonomy to do what was needed.

In addition, Mackenzie (interview 2010) stressed that Denmark did an effective job running the coordination on BALTBAT, and also noted that the coordination of military aid to the Baltic capitals under BALTSEA was good. The establishment of BALTSEA, concurred Brett (interview 2008), was important for alignment and harmonisation of efforts. The supporting countries had a list of what they wanted to give, while the Baltic capitals had a separate list of what they needed, and it was sometimes unclear whether the cooperation was demand driven (led by the Baltic governments) or supply driven (led by donors who had surplus equipment).

Fischer (interview 2010) stated that compared to other military assistance programmes, BALTBAT and the other projects were cleanly organized and run. He added that a large part of that was due to the fact that the Baltic capitals knew that reports of corruption would damage political support in donor countries, and the Baltic capitals recognized that it was in their interest to avoid allegations of graft. More generally, Fischer (interview 2010) commented that there were difficult negotiations on funding, especially as the Baltic governments had few resources. However, all of the participating states managed to construct a solid framework to provide aid.

Clemmesen (interview 2010) agreed that the establishment of the BALTBAT SG was important, particularly for the Danish Defence Ministry. The demands on the supporting nations and the work that was required became more intense when BALTBAT became more than a symbol. It was much more challenging to address issues such as vehicles, weapons, military materiel, and the equipment required for a full PKO battalion. Moreover, as BALTBAT organizational structures were replicated in the other projects, it was notable that Schvede (interview 2010) stated that Germany used the MWG structure to provide good
leadership and drive the BALTRON project. With regard to BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010), commented that there were well-connected layers.

Taking a different perspective on the value of the organizational arrangements, Carlsen (interview 2010) noted that the ideas for the various Baltic programmes arose from different sources, and development of these initiatives was facilitated by the opportunity to work in the SG, which he believed was “fairly effective,” a characterization he also applied to the MWG. He noted that building on a Nordic framework sometimes generated problems with the UK, Germany and US. In the early stages, continued Carlsen (interview 2010), use of Nordic processes was fine, but when difficult issues, such as weapons, had to be addressed later, it generated complications.

5.14.1 Organizational Weaknesses

There were, however, caveats and comments about organizational weaknesses in BALTBAT and the other Baltic projects. Some of this data blended into the area of problems with a variety of issues, such as national allegiances, but as they could not neatly be disaggregated from organizational issues, it was best to simply note the points raised by interviewees. For example, a Latvian official (interview 2010) agreed that the SG, MWG and TTs were “good mechanisms to make BALTBAT a reality.” However, he emphasized that they all depended on personalities, with Per Carlsen having taken a critical role in driving decisions, and good TT commanders essential for achieving training results. The Latvian official (interview 2010) noted that there were no problems on general principles, but coordination was difficult.

Laneman (interview 2010), charged with establishing BALTBAT and serving as its first Commander, had a good vantage point from which to comment on this issue. He highlighted good organization as one of the elements for success. He continued by noting that it is important to get the right decisions within a good framework, stressing that he got good support from the SG, MWG and TTs. He added that they were always positive, patient and focused on what had to be done. Laneman (interview 2010) asserted that the SG “provided top cover and support,” and that the SG and MWG were neutral and kept things on track. He stressed that it was never an unpleasant experience working with these bodies, and that they were quite helpful.

However, Laneman (interview 2010) noted that there were weaknesses. For example, national contingents were “misused” and personnel decisions were not optimal. He also emphasized a weakness in the structure -- the authority given to the BALTBAT commander did not match his responsibility. This occasionally generated difficulties in addressing disciplinary issues involving personnel from three different national military forces. He cited an incident where he had to put a Latvian soldier in detention and Latvia initially objected rigorously, although it eventually accepted the decision. Ultimately, stressed Laneman (interview 2010), he and his two deputies agreed on how they would
resolve these matters: as senior national officers, they handled soldiers from their respective Baltic countries.

A US official (interview 2011) noted that the entities which were put into place, such as the SG, did a good job minimizing duplication of effort among the various supporting states. Stressing that the SG performed well, the official noted that a concern was that it only focused on taking action as SG meetings approached. In retrospect, added Molis (interview 2009), there could have been better coordination of materiel, goals and forces in the Baltic projects. There were different doctrines and supplies, which made integration for the Baltic forces more difficult.

To summarize, there appeared to be general agreement on the importance of good organization as an important factor in what was accomplished in BALTBAT and the other programmes. Organizational structure was cited frequently, and the commentary was largely positive, although weaknesses were noted. However, in general, the experience of the Baltic initiatives and the comments provided by interviewees appeared to indicate that a solid organizational structure should be included as a Mechanism and therefore an element in a model for effective military assistance projects.

5.14.2 Tenth Factor - Documents

If solid organizational structures were an important Mechanism in obtaining successful Outcomes from the Baltic initiatives, this should have been apparent in the documents establishing BALTBAT and the other projects. Moreover, as organizational structures were modified or clarified, they would have drawn the attention of policy-making officials.

It was therefore notable that Article 3, paragraph 1 of the BALTBAT MOU noted that the Steering Group, under Danish chairmanship, was established "to facilitate effective coordination and to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and resources." Moreover, the Steering Group goal was to "exercise overall control and direction of the multinational assistance."

In the same paragraph, "a multinational group of military experts (the Ad Hoc Working Group)" was also established under Danish chairmanship and was "responsible for developing the detailed aspects of the cooperative programme of assistance, for reviewing at regular intervals the terms of the Project Plan and for overseeing its implementation."

Subsequently, the 10 December 1997 agreement among the Baltic states concerning BALTBAT, which was done due to "the need to define the conditions on which the Baltic Battalion is established and maintained," noted in Article 3, paragraph 1 that the Baltic states agreed "to establish a combined control mechanism in order to direct, supervise and audit the operations of the Baltic Battalion." They agreed that the mechanism would be:
a) Ministerial Committee, consisting of Ministers of Defence of the Baltic States.
b) Baltic Military Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Defence of the Baltic States.

According to Article 3, paragraph 2:

The MC embodies the highest political authority over the Baltic Battalion and among other things shall:
a) give policy guidance on development of the Baltic Battalion for the BMC;
b) make major decisions on development of the Baltic Battalion;
c) approve the budget of the Baltic Battalion;
d) review annually the progress of the Baltic Battalion;
e) resolve disputes that occur in the BMC;
f) audit accounts and expenditures against the budget by auditors appointed by the MC;
g) approve the Terms of Reference for the Commander, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Baltic Battalion;
h) approve a development plan and annual plan of activities of the Baltic Battalion;
i) make decisions on financing, account and auditing, procurement of equipment and weaponry of the Baltic Battalion;
j) approve the form of the identification card and seal of the Baltic Battalion.

According to Article 4, paragraph 3:

The BMC embodies the highest military command authority over the Baltic Battalion as the Chiefs of Defence will retain Full Command over all their national personnel assigned to the Baltic Battalion. The BMC among the other things shall:
a) make recommendations to the MC on policy, the development of the Baltic Battalion, organization, structure, training and material including operating procedures;
b) approve the form and use of the flag and the emblem of the Baltic Battalion;
c) review structural and organizational matters of the Baltic Battalion;
d) present a development plan and an annual plan of activities to the MC for approval, take responsibility for execution of approved policy;
e) present the annual budget of the Baltic Battalion to the MC for approval;
f) issue operational orders and Standing Operational Procedures to the Baltic Battalion;
g) present the Terms of Reference for the Commander, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Baltic Battalion to the MC for approval;
h) review implementation of the development plan and an annual plan of activities and submit an annual report on the development to the MC;
i) present suggestions on financing, account and auditing, procurement of equipment and weaponry of the Baltic Battalion to the MC for decision;
j) approve the training standards of the Baltic Battalion;
k) present controversial issues to the MC.

With regard to the problems involving discipline noted above by Laneman (interview 2010), Article 5, paragraph 3 of this 1997 document attempted to address that problem. The document noted that "appropriate Command and Control authority shall be granted to Commander of the Baltic Battalion by the BMC as needed to carry out assigned missions or training." However, Article 5, paragraph 4 indicated that:

The senior officer of each national contingent shall be designated as the national contingent Commander and shall be given the power by his national authorities to exercise disciplinary power over all members of national contingent. The Commander of the Baltic Battalion and his subordinate Commanders may require that disciplinary procedures envisaged under the appropriate national legislation are exercised on their subordinates by the Commander of the national contingent where this is needed to uphold good order and military discipline. The national contingent Commanders shall apply their national disciplinary rules, to include the delegation of authority within the national contingent and take appropriate actions to maintain order and discipline within the Baltic Battalion.

That was amplified by Article 5, paragraph 5:

The Commander of the Baltic Battalion may recommend disciplinary punishment for his immediate subordinates of another national contingent to the Baltic Military Committee. The BMC shall direct the recommendation to the appropriate national authority who exercises disciplinary power over the individual.

Finally, with regard to an over-arch view of the organizational structures established for BALTBAT, and the constant effort to improve those structures, the document from the Baltic BALTBAT Military Co-ordination Group, provided in response to the Political Guidance from April 1999, included under Chapter 1.4(a) for "Management and legal framework," the notation that:

Management of the BALTBAT project is provided by Ministers through the Ministerial Committee (MC) and by Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) through the Baltic Military Committee (BMC). In addition the project has utilised the multinational Steering Group and Military Working Group (MWG) established in 1995 by the Baltic states and supporting countries in order to co-ordinate international support to the project.
The two initial international support MOUs from June and September 1994, and the further Support MOU from February 1999 have also provided a degree of overall direction to the project – principally through their outline project plans. The subsequent development of a Baltic Management Group (BMG) and BALTBAT Military Co-ordination Group (BALTBAT MCG) in March through June 1999 is intended to improve overall management and control of the project in the three countries.

In short, there was ample indication in numerous documents on attention to detail in establishing a good organizational structure for BALTBAT.

5.15 Eleventh Mechanism - A Strong Lead Nation

A Mechanism apparent from the data was the extent to which success was due to the determination of the lead nation for the particular Baltic military assistance project. Two points need to be made at the outset regarding this particular Mechanism. First, this was the one Mechanism which addressed a multinational assistance effort. There is a difference between a simple military assistance programme in which Country A is providing aid to Country X and a complex initiative in which Countries A, B and C are providing aid to Countries X, Y and Z. The other Mechanisms outlined in this thesis can be applied with equal ease to both types of projects as they involve issues which need to be raised and considered by one or a number of donor or recipient governments, such as: What is the optimal area of military assistance?

With regard to this particular Mechanism, the focus was on a particular donor nation which coordinated a complex assistance initiative. However, a number of points should be made. First, the proposition is put forward that the issue of a strong lead nation is as relevant in a simple programme as in a complex effort; it is simply the case that the sole donor country does not have to worry about other donor governments. In many ways, this is another manifestation of Mechanisms 3 (A Constant Source of Support) and 4 (A Long-Term Political Commitment), put into the context of a complex effort. Second, inclusion of such a Mechanism allows for the elements of a model discussed in detail in Chapter Six to be applicable to complex as well as simple efforts. Finally, in light of the number of instances in which donor states seek to spread the burden of military assistance programmes, this particular Mechanism appears to have particular practical significance.

The second point which needs to be made is that this Mechanism is closely related to the twelfth Mechanism which follows, which addresses the importance of key individuals in generating Outcomes from the programmes. In some instances, the line admittedly blurs. For example, Saar (interview 2010) noted in his interview the significance of energetic leadership for the success of BALTNET, but rather than giving the credit to Norway as the lead nation, he specifically cited the work of the Norwegian project officer. However, for purposes of the identified elements of a model, the case can be made that it is
important to delineate the operational requirement that a military assistance project has a strong lead nation.

The data indicated the significance or the role played by a lead state which drove the generation of Outcomes desired from a Baltic project. A total of 20 interviewees raised the issue of the key role played by Denmark as the lead nation for BALTBAT: Abols, Andrusysyn, Brett, Carlsen, Clemmesen, Donnelly, Ellemann-Jensen, Fischer, Haekkerup, Johnson, Kolga, Laneman, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Saar, Schvede, an Estonian official, a Latvian official, a US official and a retired US military officer. The commentary on the German role in driving BALTRON and the Norwegian role with regard to BALTNET is addressed later in the sections devoted to those projects.

On the significance of the Danish leadership of BALTBAT, Linkevicius (interview 2010) stressed that the Danes were the key, and it is not possible to overstate the important role that Denmark played. It did an excellent job of coordinating military assistance. The Danes, noted Andrusysyn (interview 2010), put a lot of effort into making BALTBAT a success, and it was important that the Danes did all the detailed work to move BALTBAT forward. Without those efforts, he asserted, there would have been divisions and difficulties among the Baltic governments. Keeping them together was the important outcome, and the Danes were critical to achieving that objective. Without Danish efforts, commented Andrusysyn (interview 2010), corrosive influences would have crept in. A retired US military officer (interview 2010) concurred that the Danes were crucial to BALTBAT success, noting that they were committed to the project and gave substantial amounts of support.

Kolga (interview 2009) emphasized that the Danish leadership on BALTBAT was critical to the success of that project, which was recognized by the Baltic countries. Resources from the lead countries were important, and the Danes provided numerous experienced personnel for BALTBAT. When the Baltic governments did not always understand what was happening and why something needed to be done, noted Kolga (interview 2009), the Danes provided the necessary pressure to move the process along. Making a more general point, Kolga (interview 2009) asserted that it is important for projects to have strong lead donor countries.

Providing additional commentary, Brett (interview 2008) added that in the early days of establishing BALTBAT, Danish support was significant. Dedicated civil and military support enabled the Danes to play a strong leadership role. Donnelly (interview 2011) concurred that the Danes were very proactive. Laneman (interview 2010) asserted that the Danes were "great" and a Latvian official (interview 2010) added that the Danes did a very good job of leading the project.

Mackenzie (interview 2010) concurred that Denmark did a very good job leading BALTBAT. At this point in time, recipient states generally were irritated by too much control by others. Nations had to prove that they knew what they were
doing, and the Danes, asserted Mackenzie (interview 2010), showed they did indeed have that knowledge. Johnson (interview 2011) added that often it is better to let smaller nations take a leadership role, as recipient countries will find that easier to accept. Thus, Denmark was perfect for that role. An Estonian official (interview 2010) agreed that Denmark was the natural lead for BALTBAT, particularly due to its NATO membership.

Abols (interview 2009) made the point that in all of these military assistance projects, there was a central donor nation driving the work and providing support. A US official (interview 2011) agreed that the role of Denmark in providing leadership was important for BALTBAT success, adding however that Norway and Sweden would certainly say that they made as much of a contribution as Denmark.

At this juncture, it is important to note that all the preceding comments regarding this factor were from non-Danish interviewees. With regard to comments from Danish participants, Haekkerup (interview 2008) stressed that it was critical to have a lead nation for such a challenging project, and Denmark was ready to assume that role. He emphasized that Denmark had options and room to act which the US or Germany did not have. Clemmesen (interview 2010) commented that Denmark, led by Haekkerup, volunteered to take the lead, both on policy issues and on driving the concrete actions that needed to be taken on BALTBAT. Danish leadership, he stressed, was essential for turning the policy concept into reality.

To summarize, it was notable that the non-Danish interviewees in particular emphasized the significance of the role played by Denmark as the lead nation for BALTBAT as a Mechanism in ensuring the success of that project. There was also data from BALTRON and BALTNET on the necessity of having a strong lead nation, which is noted in the later discussion of those programmes. It therefore appeared that the Intervention of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states required a Mechanism of a strong lead nation which took an energetic role in guiding, shaping and implementing all aspects of the military assistance project in order to generate the desired Outcomes. Such a Mechanism would appear to be an essential element of a model for effective military assistance projects.

5.16 Twelfth Mechanism - Leadership From Key Individuals

The final Mechanism which arose from the data was the importance of energetic leadership from key individuals to make a military assistance initiative successful. This would appear to naturally flow from the previous Mechanism, since, as a practical matter, “states” do not energetically work to ensure the success of a programme, but individuals representing those states. This Mechanism was noted by nine interviewees: Clemmesen, Donnelly, Haekkerup, Johnson, Laneman, Linkevicius, Saar, Schvede, and a Latvian official.
Linkevicius (interview 2010) emphasized that personalities were important in driving the Baltic initiatives forward. It was strong leadership which kept things moving in the right direction and worked out solutions to problems. If Haekkerup had not been there, he asserted, none of the Baltic assistance programmes would have worked. In 1994, noted Linkevicius (interview 2010), he and Haekkerup were flying to Vilnius in a helicopter when they discussed the prospects of sending a Lithuanian platoon to Croatia to serve under Danish military supervision. Agreement was reached, and upon landing, the two notified a very surprised Per Carlsen that this was going to happen. Linkevicius (interview 2010) highlighted the fact that at point there was no Lithuanian legal basis for the action and certainly no experience in handling such a military task. As a result, the Lithuanians had to develop the legal basis, which included a major effort to get approval from the Lithuanian Parliament. He stressed that there were dangers involved in these decisions. The Lithuanian troops sent to the Balkans could have suffered casualties, and if that happened, it could have had a negative impact on all the Baltic regional activities. However, concluded Linkevicius (interview 2010), this again returns to the importance of personalities and leaders that would drive projects to completion.

Clemmesen (interview 2010) added his view that the most important factor for the success of the Western assistance to the Baltic governments involved the personalities and commitment of key individuals. Ellemann-Jensen was a driving force on Danish support for Baltic independence. Haekkerup and former Danish Chief of Defence Jorgen Lyng were instrumental in formulating Danish policy and pushing for action. Delving into the reasons for the determination apparent in those two leaders, Clemmesen (interview 2010) noted that Haekkerup was "emotionally attached" to Eastern Europe, and particularly to the Baltic governments, due to his time as leader of the NATO Parliamentarians. Lyng was strongly influenced by the fact that the Baltic countries did not enjoy the liberation which Western Europe experienced in 1945, and instead suffered under Russian domination within the USSR.

There was substantial data from interviewees which indicated that Per Carlsen was critical in driving the BALTBAT project forward. Johnson (interview 2011) noted energetic Danish leadership, and cited Carlsen as "the driving force" on BALTBAT. Clemmesen (interview 2010) concurred that the key individual was Carlsen. A Latvian official (interview 2010) added that Carlsen was particularly important in making BALTBAT work, a point on which Laneman (interview 2010) concurred.

Other individuals who played an important role in BALTBAT and the other projects were also noted by interviewees. Clemmesen (interview 2010) stated that the UK Defence Attache in Riga, Janis Kazocins, the son of Latvian refugees, led the effort for the UK to be much more supportive of the Baltic capitals, a position he also pushed with other nations. He also praised US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ron Asmus for playing a central role in pushing the development of US policy towards the Baltic capitals. Supporting Clemmesen’s point, Donnelly (interview 2011) reiterated that the West initially
did not exhibit a strong commitment to the Baltic governments. That changed due to the work of the people who took charge and pushed hard to get Western aid to the Baltic countries.

Clemmesen (interview 2010) and Laneman (interview 2010) praised the Danish head of the BALTBAT Military Working Group who addressed the details and pushed BALTBAT forward. Schvede (interview 2010) emphasized that personalities were key in the BALTRON process. National positions depended on who represented a supporting state at a meeting. Finally, Saar (interview 2010) provided the strongest commentary on this factor, stressing it was the work of the Norwegian project officer for BALTNET who put the initiative on a successful course. A more detailed analysis of his comments is provided in the later discussion of BALTNET.

To summarize, it was apparent from the data that the experience of BALTBAT and the other Baltic programmes indicated that in order for the Intervention of political decisions between the donor and recipient states to generate the desired Outcomes, one of the important Mechanisms was the commitment of individuals to make the military assistance project work. As an operational matter, that would appear to translate into ensuring that military assistance programme team leaders or those providing overall political guidance should be energetic and determined to make decisions and keep initiatives on a forward trajectory. The response could be provided that this is self-apparent and an important ingredient for any project, military or non-military. However, this would generate the reply that although it may be self-apparent, it is noteworthy that many initiatives seem to lack the individual ready to drive the programme to success. Fortunately for the Baltic governments, with regard to their military assistance projects, those individuals were present.

5.17 Significance of Mechanisms – Application in Other Baltic Projects

As indicated in Section 5.1.4, one way of assessing the significance of the Mechanisms was to analyse how they were implemented not only in BALTBAT, but in the subsequent projects (BALTRON, BALTNET and the BALTDEFCOL). If they were indeed Mechanisms important for any military assistance programme which generated the desired Outcomes, they should have shown up in most, if not all, of the Baltic initiatives. Thus, the consistency of the appearance of Mechanisms among later projects provided a degree of additional reliability through triangulation.

The analysis which follows reviews the extent to which the 12 Mechanisms were taken into consideration and utilised in the development of BALTRON, BALTNET and the BALTDEFCOL. Once again, the Mechanisms were:

- Assessment of Regional Security Concerns
- Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance
- A Constant Source of Support
- A Long-Term Political Commitment
It is worthwhile to begin this analysis with general background on the initiation and development of the subsequent Baltic military assistance initiatives before analyzing the extent to which the various Mechanisms were present in these projects. Such information also provides a valuable historical perspective in which to place the individual programmes, and is also of use in assessing the Outcomes that were achieved by these initiatives.

5.17.1 Background on BALTRON

Germany served as the lead nation for BALTRON, which was inaugurated on 28 August 1998. It is valuable to repeat the assessment in Section 2.11.13 of the Literature Review from Walter (2001, p. 115) that BALTRON provided a good start for combined naval force development, noting the importance for the Baltic governments of participating in Western training and exercises.

Schvede (interview 2010) commented that, as a general point, all the Baltic naval forces wanted to cooperate and were inspired by the work on BALTBAT, adding that he actually started working on the initial preparation for BALTRON as early as 1994. With regard to military Outcomes, it appeared that BALTRON achieved the goal of establishing a naval capability for the Baltic states. The fact that BALTRON continues to operate after the Baltic countries joined NATO indicated that it still has military value and reinforced the case that it generated the desired military Outcomes. Schvede (interview 2010) provided an interesting perspective on the continued operational relevance of BALTRON, noting that even though the Baltic nations are now in NATO and receive advice from the NATO Working Group, it has been “comfortable for the Baltic states to continue to use the BALTRON framework.”

On political Outcomes, and specifically NATO membership, Schvede (interview 2010) asserted that BALTRON did make a contribution, due to the close cooperation with NATO member states and the preparation of Baltic naval forces for NATO membership. He noted that BALTRON established the readiness of Baltic naval forces to work within a NATO structure, thereby contributing to achieving the political goal of NATO membership for the Baltic nations.
5.17.2 Background on BALTNET

Norway served as the lead nation for BALTNET, which began operations on 6 June 2000. It is worthwhile to reiterate the point from Section 2.11.14 in the Literature Review made by Winner (2002) which highlighted “sensible and politically savvy joint efforts,” citing the “creation of a joint radar station that … can also be linked to NATO’s air–defence network” as having “augmented each country’s armed forces construction” (p. 209).

Saar (interview 2010) highlighted what he asserts are relevant aspects of the background to the establishment of BALTNET. He noted that after regaining independence, the Estonian Air Force consisted of a dozen Estonian officers who had served in the Soviet air force during the occupation. The first meeting in Riga of the three Baltic Air Force Commanders, commented Saar (interview 2010), was held to discuss and coordinate development of their respective forces, which led to talks about specific cooperative projects among the Air Forces. Coordination was developed, and there were regular Air Force Commanders meetings. The meetings had protocols with a list of action items, commented Saar (interview 2010), but they were still largely theoretical discussions.

This changed, asserted Saar (interview 2010), when the US, accompanied by representatives from Lockheed Martin, broached the idea of the Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI). That was the point at which the three Baltic Air Forces realized they could work together. The RAI was the first opportunity to make genuine progress. When the three Baltic Defence Ministers signed the BALTNET agreement in 1998, stated Saar (interview 2010), the “real work started.”

Once again, it is important to begin by assessing whether BALTNET generated the desired military Outcomes. Saar (interview 2010) provided his view that “BALTNET is a success,” and noted that BALTNET has been maintained even after the Baltic nations joined NATO. As with BALTRON, BALTNET had established its military utility by its continued existence within the NATO framework, providing an air defence system judged to be of sufficient value to be retained by the Alliance. Turning to the issue of whether BALTNET played a role in achieving desired political Outcomes, specifically NATO membership for the Baltic nations, Saar (interview 2010) asserted that BALTNET did make a contribution to that political Outcome due to the conscious effort undertaken to integrate with NATO air defence systems. In that regard, it contributed to the case made by the Baltic governments that they were ready to join the Alliance.

As an overarching commentary relevant to discussion of the 12 Mechanisms and their application in the subsequent Baltic military assistance initiatives, Saar (interview 2010) noted that, with the benefit of hindsight, the key to success was achieving the right political decisions, political support, and a solid framework. That is the situation in which the military works best. Fundamentally, he emphasized, the BALTNET framework was indeed ideal. It was started by the
US and then supported by others. Saar (interview 2010) commented that BALTBAT had good and bad times, and there were questions about the mission. In contrast, BALTNET was “a 24/7 operation and had a focus on a real concern.” The BALTNET system, added Saar (interview 2010), was always improving itself and never went through bad times.

5.17.3 Background on The BALTDEFCOL

Sweden served as the lead nation for the BALTDEFCOL, which held its first senior staff course on 16 August 1999. It is valuable to reiterate the point from Section 2.10.9 of the Literature Review provided by Foot (2001) who judged the Baltic Defence College as “a remarkable experiment in combined military education” and asserted that “there is a prima facie case for considering the BALTDEFCOL as a model that could be applied elsewhere within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership community of nations” (p. 119).

The BALTDEFCOL, like BALTRON and BALTNET, continues to operate after the accession of the Baltic countries into NATO, providing educational opportunities and training for Baltic military personnel and students from other military forces, as well as conducting academic research. With regard to achieving the desired military Outcomes, the BALTDEFCOL contributed to achievement of an important military goal by training a new generation of Baltic military leaders, essential for developing modern military forces.

It also contributed to achieving the political Outcome, specifically NATO membership for the Baltic nations, by training the new military personnel needed to show the West they had the requisite leadership to work within NATO. An Estonian official (interview 2010) asserted that the BALTDEFCOL was one of the most successful Baltic projects, and Molis (interview 2009) commented that the BALTDEFCOL provided quality inputs into Baltic military requirements. In short, it would appear that the BALTDEFCOL successfully achieved the desired military Outcomes and contributed to achieving the desired political Outcomes.

5.17.4 Mechanism 1 in Other Baltic Projects

On “Assessment of Regional Security Concerns” and its application in the development of the subsequent Baltic initiatives, it is worthwhile to reiterate some of the comments from Section 2.12.1 of the Literature Review regarding the relationship between Russia and the Baltic governments. Dalsjo (1998) asserted that “Given the history and geography of the Baltic three, it is understandable that the possibility of a major and deliberate Russian attack on them cannot be discounted” (p. 41). Kramer (2002) noted that “the Russian government took numerous steps during the decade after 1991 that caused a good deal of unease and acrimony in relations with the Baltic states” (p. 734).

With regard to BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) emphasized that Russian reactions were always on the minds of people, but added that they were not a
major concern. Russia was always invited to attend various events, he noted, as the work was done openly and defence attaches were briefed on developments. However, citing a specific example of the impact of the focus on Russian reactions, Schvede (interview 2010) stated that perhaps more could have been done on sea surveillance. He conceded, though, that this might have been too sensitive an area for the Russians.

With regard to BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010) asserted that Russia cast a shadow over all the Baltic military projects. He added that while there was no official Russian complaint about BALTNET, there were lots of Russian articles complaining about the programme. The press items focused on surveillance efforts by the Baltic capitals to gather data and intelligence on Russia, which was particularly unacceptable as the Baltic governments were using US radars. Drawing a comparison, Saar (interview 2010) asserted there was no similar bad press regarding BALTBAT and BALTRON.

With regard to the presence of this Mechanism in the Baltic official documents from Section 4.7, and with particular reference to air defence, the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic States, in their 2 June 1992 Communique, indicated they would prepare a joint conceptual draft “in the field of Military technology” and that “this draft would contain the aspects of technical maintenance, airspace and border protection and air defence.” In addition, Article 1, point 9 of the 27 February 1995 Agreement Between the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic States cited “Creation of air-space control system.” What was notable was the absence of any reference in either document to the need to address a threat from any particular country (such as Russia) and efforts in the 1992 Communique to minimize attention to the work by putting it under the heading of “military technology.”

**5.17.5 Mechanism 2 in Other Baltic Projects**

On a “Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance” and its application in the subsequent Baltic initiatives, it is valuable to reiterate the comment in Section 2.11.12 of the Literature Review from Asmus and Nurick (1996) which emphasized the importance for the Baltic states of participating in larger Western security efforts, such as peacekeeping, to establish that they were not just "consumers" of security, and, indeed, recommending expansion of BALTBAT and the other Baltic assistance programmes (p. 131). Moreover, in Section 2.11.10, Sapronas (1999, pp. 59-60) asserted that BALTBAT was critical to providing Baltic defence forces with a chance to become familiar with Western military forces, and galvanized Baltic defence cooperation, adding that BALTBAT allowed Western capitals to provide aid to a joint programme, rather than three national projects, while not generating Russian ire.

With regard to the development of BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) emphasized that what was important for the Baltic capitals was the goal of getting Western support and practical results. In that regard, the BALTRON focus on anti-mine warfare was cheaper, and resources were a key
consideration. Moreover, as anti-mine warfare is defensive, he stated, it was easier for Sweden and Finland to support politically. Such a consideration therefore also was important in ensuring that BALTRON received financial support.

The documents regarding BALTRON explicitly set forth a mission which arose from the application of this particular Mechanism. It was notable that there was reference to the potential use of BALTRON with regard to peace support operations, a critical focus of the Nordic states and an area in which Russia could not credibly raise objections to Baltic efforts. The 16 April 1998 agreement between the Baltic states on the establishment of BALTRON included the notation in Article 1, paragraph 2 that:

BALTRON shall provide the Baltic states with a permanent short notice capability to undertake naval operations in peacetime and crisis. The functions of the BALTRON shall be mine-countermeasure operations and the enhancement of the security of the Baltic States territorial waters and economic zones. BALTRON may be directed to participate in international peace support operations and operations contributing to regional stability, mandated by international organisations and conducted in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

This focus for BALTRON was reiterated in the April 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development of BALTRON. There were six purposes noted under Section 1.2, three of which addressed Mechanism 2 and three of which drew attention to concerns under Mechanism 5 (“Connection to Larger Goals”). The three purposes relevant to Mechanism 2 were: 1) to counter mine threats, enhance security of peaceful seagoing and contribute to the reduction of environmental damage in the territorial waters and economic zones of the Baltic States; 2) to develop a multinational naval force with the capability to participate in international peace support operations; and 3) to optimise the use of resources.

With regard to BALTNET and the appearance of Mechanism 2, it is worthwhile highlighting the fact that 1) Kaliningrad is part of Russia, 2) the three Baltic nations are located between Kaliningrad and the main part of Russia, and that 3) Russia has an air corridor to Kaliningrad. In short, the location of Kaliningrad, as shown by the map at page xiii, indicated why air defence was an optimal, indeed necessary, area on which to focus military assistance to the Baltic governments. Stressing the importance of this consideration to the Baltic governments, Saar (interview 2010) commented that Russian planes flew close to the Estonian border soon after the Baltic countries joined NATO, and continue to do so.

5.17.6 Mechanism 3 in Other Baltic Projects

On “A Constant Source of Support” and its application in the subsequent Baltic programmes, it is worthwhile to reiterate the point in Section 2.10.1 of the
Literature Review from Glantz (1999, p. 3) which stresses that “to succeed, the military assistance program requires real national commitment to it, particularly in terms of the focus, attention, and human and financial resources commensurate with its ultimate importance.”

With regard to the development of BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) stated that German leadership also led to work by a larger number of assisting countries, such as the US and France. In addition, Baltic naval personnel had the opportunity to use naval facilities in Germany as well as the NATO mine warfare centre. In short, asserted Schvede (interview 2010), Germany did a good job providing solid support in developing BALTRON.

With regard to BALTNET and consideration of this Mechanism, Saar (interview 2010) asserted that Norway, Denmark and the US made a real effort to make the project a success. Whether it was in the US International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme or in other vehicles, assistance from the supporting nations was substantial and the Baltic capitals felt they could rely on those commitments. Saar (interview 2010) noted that this support continues to this day, with extensive training in Norway and cooperation with Denmark.

On the extent to which work on the BALTDEFCOL indicated application of this Mechanism, Sibul (interview 2011) noted that Western support was important for the BALTDEFCOL, as political will was needed to make the projects work, adding that a lack of such will is the reason projects fail. In addition, Lawrence (interview 2011) agreed that there was strong Western guidance on the BALTDEFCOL.

Turning to BALTDEFCOL documents which indicated the presence of this Mechanism, paragraph 2.1 of Annex B of the BALTDEFCOL MOU noted that the Chairman of the BALTDEFCOL Board will be provided by the Ministry of Defence of Sweden.

5.17.7 Mechanism 4 in Other Baltic Projects

On "Long-Term Political Commitments" and its application in the development of the subsequent Baltic programmes, it is worthwhile to reiterate some of the commentary from the Literature Review. In Section 2.8.2, Cottee and Forster (2004) wrote that the relationship between donor and recipient states “should be viewed as a long-term - decades-long - process, rather than an approach likely to produce quick results” (p. 28). In Section 2.8.4, Gates (2010) in his on-line article commented that “security assistance efforts must be conducted steadily and over the long term so as to provide some measure of predictability and planning for the U.S. government and, what is more significant, for its partners abroad,“.

With regard to BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) commented that there was a clear, long-term commitment to the project by many supporting states, and not just Germany. With regard to implementation of this Mechanism in BALTNET,
Saar (interview 2010) asserted that it was important that the donor states made a long-term commitment to the programme.

Turning to BALTNET documents indicating the appearance of this Mechanism, Section 4 of the April 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development of BALTNET specifically noted that:

The BALTNET project provides vast possibilities for international defence cooperation. Continuous support by the Supporting States is an essential factor for the development and build up of the BALTNET system. The Continuation of close contacts between the armed forces of the Participants and their Partners in the fields of air surveillance, control and defence is strongly encouraged.

With regard to the BALTDEFCOL and consideration of this Mechanism, Lawrence (interview 2011) stated that there is a long-term Western commitment to the BALTDEFCOL, with continued support for guest lecturers as merely one example. Turning to BALTDEFCOL documents and the presence of this Mechanism, paragraph 1.2 of the MOU establishing the BALTDEFCOL indicated that support was "intended to assist in the development of the Baltic Defence College towards the said objective over a period of five years."

5.17.8 Mechanism 5a in Other Baltic Projects

On “Connection to Larger Goals” and its application in the subsequent Baltic initiatives, the first specific issue to assess is Mechanism 5a, the goal of “NATO membership.” With regard to valuable points from the Literature Review, it is worthwhile repeating the comment in Section 2.10.4 from Urbelis and Urbonas (2002) that the strategic goal of joining NATO led to “a qualitatively new stage in the development of Lithuanian defence policy” (p. 114). Moreover, in Section 2.10.4, Trapans (2006) noted that a focus on NATO membership “gave the Latvian defence reform process a defined - though not always consistent – set of targets to aim for” (p. 67).

With regard to BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) asserted that work on the initiative was done with an eye to preparing for accession to NATO, and various NATO examples and frameworks were utilised. The Baltic navies, he stated, recognized they had to be familiar with what NATO membership would entail. Thus, Baltic naval forces had no problem moving to NATO communications, for example, due to Danish guidance. As a result, the Baltic navies achieved wider integration among themselves and higher readiness for NATO interoperability.

Turning to BALTRON documents which indicated the presence of this Mechanism, the preamble to the 16 April 1998 agreement noted as one of the reasons for BALTRON that the Baltic states were "striving to enhance interoperability of the naval forces of the Baltic States with NATO." In addition, within the MOU between the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic states regarding the organisation of BALTRON, Section 2.2 on Preconditions for planning and
implementation included the notation "BALTRON will train and act in accordance with NATO/PIP naval and staff procedures both in the fleet and staff work."

Moreover, in the previously cited April 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development of BALTRON and the six noted purposes for BALTRON under Section 1.2, one purpose addressed the goal of NATO membership, specifically citing the need “to promote the Baltic States integration process into NATO by developing NATO interoperability and compatibility.” In addition, Section 2.4 on COMBALTRON and BALTRON Staff indicated that "BALTRON staff will be a multinational naval staff providing the Baltic States with the possibility to have a NATO interoperable staff."

On the larger goal of "NATO Membership" and its consideration in the initiation and formation of BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010) provided extensive commentary. He noted that while the US and Lockheed Martin had the RAI, the Norwegian project leader used NATO guidelines to show the Baltic capitals the optimal way forward. As was proven when the Baltic countries joined NATO, commented Saar (interview 2010), this cooperation was the best way of transitioning from a formerly Soviet-occupied state to a NATO member nation. All of this made it easier for the Baltic capitals to make their case for NATO membership, and also made the subsequent integration with the Alliance’s air defence structures much easier.

The best proof of this success, stressed Saar (interview 2010), was that once the Baltic nations joined NATO, it took only hours to connect BALTNET to the NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS), as the BALTNET system was almost equal to NATO requirements. As the Norwegian project officer reported to NATO, Brussels made extra efforts to assist on BALTNET. This proved to be crucial in making accession to NATO as easy as possible. Additional proof of the success of BALTNET, once again, was the fact that it has been maintained even after the Baltic governments joined NATO.

International arrangements were made to allow NATO air policing aircraft to be seamlessly transferred from one country’s airspace to another, stated Saar (interview 2010). He noted that the critical decision was cooperation among the Baltic capitals in airspace related matters. This helped in organizing ideas, concepts, requirements and training, and generated easier integration into NATO. For the Air Force, this specifically involved integrating BALTNET into NATINADS.

With regard to BALTNET documents and the presence of Mechanism 5 and specifically 5a, "NATO Membership," the Agreement between the Baltic states on the Establishment of BALTNET included in its preamble a notation "committing to establish their national airspace surveillance systems compatible with the NATO system ..."
In addition, Section 1.2 of the April 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development of BALTNET noted the purposes of establishing BALTNET, which included "to promote the Baltic States integration into NATO by developing NATO interoperability and compatibility." Moreover, Section 2 of the 1999 Political Guidance specifically indicated that "NATO standards and procedures will be applied in the BALTNET system to the extent possible with the aim of achieving interoperability and compatibility with, and integration into, NATO air surveillance and defence systems."

Finally, with regard to official documents on the BALTDEFCOL and consideration of Mechanism 5 and specifically 5a "NATO Membership," Article 1, paragraph 5d of the BALTDEFCOL MOU noted that activities would "to the extent possible integrate NATO principles and procedures in order to prepare the Parties for NATO membership."

5.17.9 Mechanism 5b in Other Baltic Projects

With regard to the second specific issue under this Mechanism, the goal of "Development of National Defence Capabilities" and its application in the development of the subsequent Baltic programmes, it is worthwhile to reiterate the point made by Reveron (2010) in Section 2.8.3 of the Literature Review that "security assistance programmes attempt to strengthen the partner to provide for its own security" (p. xi).

With regard to the development of BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) provided a useful insight into the question of BALTBAT resourcing and development of national defence with a BALTRON perspective that was different from that put forward by other interviewees. He commented that the stated goal was that people should transfer in and out of BALTBAT, but that did not prove to be as widespread in practice as hoped. As a result, only a small group from the Estonian Army benefitted from BALTBAT. Addressing the issue from another perspective, he noted that BALTBAT was viewed as a high level, stand-alone initiative with limited direct links to the rest of the Baltic armies, rather than as a project for the Baltic armies. In comparison, stressed Schvede (interview 2010), BALTRON was viewed as a Navy programme, as a large majority of the Navy's activities were related to BALTRON.

On the appearance of this particular Mechanism in the BALTRON documents, the MOU between the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic states regarding the organisation of BALTRON, Section 4, paragraph 1 addressed the issue of rotation of forces, noting that "national units will normally be assigned to BALTRON for a period of at least six months."

Moreover, in the previously cited April 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development of BALTRON and the six noted purposes for BALTRON under Section 1.2, two of the purposes addressed the development of national defence. They were: 1) to enhance the development of the national naval forces of the Baltic States and raise their operational self-defence
capabilities and 2) to enhance the presence of the naval forces of the Baltic States into the Baltic sea.

With regard to "Development of National Defence Capabilities" and its implementation in the development of BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010) highlighted the fact that the Baltic capitals had scarce resources to acquire air defence capabilities. However, in organizing their systems, the Baltic countries spent their money optimally. The policy decision to cooperate also helped to organize and optimise procurement, as indicated by the fact that Estonia and Latvia acquired similar radars. It was still national defence acquisition, but BALTNET provided the coordination mechanism.

As a result, commented Saar (interview 2010), BALTNET avoided the internal debates that occurred with BALTBAT. In his view, the two programmes were different. The goal for BALTBAT was keeping units combat ready. BALTNET, stressed Saar (interview 2010), was focused on constantly handling a national military task. There was integration of national data into BALTNET, so it was the sum of three national air defence networks, which is the way NATO addresses air defence. Saar (interview 2010) added that the area of the three Baltic countries is too small for separate national approaches in airspace matters. As a result, the centres in Estonia and Latvia are now arranged so they can take over for each other if the need arises, so redundancy is built into the system.

With regard to BALTNET documents which indicated the presence of this Mechanism, Section 1.2 of the April 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development of BALTNET noted the purposes for establishing BALTNET, which included the following three points: 1) to enhance the development of the national air surveillance capabilities of the Baltic States in their respective airspace, 2) to create a regional airspace surveillance network based on the principles of international cooperation and 3) to optimise the use of resources.

5.17.10 Mechanism 6 in Other Baltic Projects

On "Developing New Leaders" and the extent to which this was a consideration in the subsequent Baltic projects, it is worthwhile to reiterate the comment in Section 2.8.4 of the Literature Review from Gates (2010), who stressed that "there has not been enough attention paid to building the institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or the human capital (including leadership skills and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the long term." Moreover, in Section 2.9.2, Szayna and Larrabee (1995) agreed that "personnel training is perhaps the most important area in which the United States can make a long-term impact" (p. xi).

With regard to BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) reiterated that BALTRON personnel and units were continuously rotated, and as a result, a wide majority of naval personnel received training and experience. With regard to the
presence of this Mechanism in BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010) commented that work in BALTNET also involved training and education of personnel as well as infrastructure projects.

As would be anticipated, there was extensive commentary on the application of this Mechanism with regard to the BALTDEFCOL, where development of new leaders was the foundation of the work, along with academic and educational outputs. Having served as the first Commandant and “effectively built the college,” Clemmesen (interview 2010) emphasized that the goal at the inauguration of the BALTDEFCOL was development of a new generation of Baltic officers and leaders. He noted that the focus at the BALTDEFCOL was not doctrine, as "doctrine becomes dogma." In providing his assessment of the success of his efforts and the Outcomes that were achieved, Clemmesen (interview 2010) candidly stated that he spent millions of Danish kroner that could "just as well have been burned." The funds were not being used efficiently, he asserted, since the mind-set of the Baltic officials involved was simply inappropriate.

The essential task, Clemmesen (interview 2010) stressed, was to encourage the development of common leadership ideas in the minds of the Baltic officers and have them think independently and take risks. He stated that he hoped to be successful in generating that mentality in a minimum of one-third of the students that went through the BALTDEFCOL. Clemmesen (interview 2010) cited the challenges he faced, noting that the Estonian army leadership initially resisted sending its best officers to the BALTDEFCOL, making it hard to achieve the desired goals. It was also hampered by the Soviet legacy, with students stating that independent and thus potentially "revolutionary" thinking was basically unwelcome.

Turning to BALTDEFCOL documents which indicated the appearance of this Mechanism, the 12 June 1998 agreement between the Baltic states concerning the BALTDEFCOL noted in the preamble that "a joint educational institution for senior staff officers training will increase and strengthen the co-operation and understanding between the armed forces of the Parties." Moreover, paragraph 1.1(c) of the MOU establishing the BALTDEFCOL cited the need to "support the high priority that must be given to the development of active and independently thinking staff officers."

**5.17.11 Mechanism 7 in Other Baltic Projects**

On "Direction and Control by Donor States" and its presence in the subsequent Baltic initiatives, it is valuable to reiterate the comment in Section 2.10.2 of the Literature Review from Mott (1999) that “a critical feature of the donor-recipient relationship involves the ‘commitment’ of the donor to the relationship” (p. 19) and that there is a need for “focused management, priority for resource allocation, and full donor attention within an integrated holistic policy …” (p. 269).
With regard to the development of BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) praised Germany as the lead nation for pushing the pace of work on BALTRON at the right tempo. He noted that there were initial tensions among the Baltic capitals, as Lithuania wanted to have the lead on BALTRON. However, the preference was to have Germany lead on a naval project, as the Baltic navies received a substantial amount of equipment from Germany, including old naval equipment belonging to the former East Germany. Moreover, there were German advisors in Estonia, Lithuania and later in Latvia.

Continuing on the topic, with a focus on the specific question of the difficulties of generating a common Baltic position, Schvede (interview 2010) stressed that a critical issue was getting all Baltic capitals to agree on important decisions. The first three Baltic Navy chiefs understood the need to coordinate despite differing national interests. Comparing that to the current situation, he noted that all the Baltic navies now have bought different vessels, so there is no commonality, as there was under BALTRON. Schvede (interview 2010) stated that a challenge for BALTRON in the 1990s was getting all three Baltic countries to agree, and that is still the case. With regard to acquisition of naval materiel, such as diving equipment and communications, the three Baltic governments currently are drifting apart and there is a loss of commonality.

With regard to this Mechanism and its application in the development of BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010) cited examples of the disunity among the Baltic governments, noting the decisions on where certain facilities would be located. Each of the Baltic countries had national facilities at that time. Since each of the three wanted to host cooperative military projects, political decisions had to be made. Estonia became the host nation for the BALTDEFCOL, Latvia got BALTBAT and Lithuania got BALTNET.

The comments from Saar (interview 2010) on the topic of equipment acquisition regarding air defence provided another perspective on the lack of Baltic cooperation and the challenges facing the donor states. His general point was that from initial discussions in 1992, there was recognition that common Baltic procurement would address many issues that arise with major projects. On air defence, Estonia began the procurement of radars and invited Latvia and Lithuania to attend as observers. When Estonia selected a system from Lockheed Martin, it informed the other Baltic capitals, and provided details on price and number of radars purchased.

Estonia also ensured, added Saar (interview 2010), that there was language in the contract that the “procurement could involve other Baltic states,” with more purchases by other governments translating into lower overall costs. Six months later, Latvia joined the Lockheed Martin purchase. Estonia and Latvia then initiated work on logistical support and training, with all training taking place in Estonia. In short, Latvia and Estonia found a way to cooperate, but Lithuania had no interest. Perhaps more important, commented Saar (interview 2010), the procurement of common systems and materiel, such as radars, is
still done nationally. The systems can be integrated later, but it would be easier to operate and maintain common items.

Turning to the presence of this Mechanism in development of the BALTDEFCOL, Clemmesen (interview 2010) noted the disunity among the Baltic governments. He stated that he wanted the BALTDEFCOL established in Estonia, but had to go through a complex procedure to get it there, due to rivalries among the Baltic capitals. He achieved what he wanted by stressing that the college needed to be placed in a university city that was not a capital. The only options were Tartu, Estonia and Kaunas, Lithuania. Clemmesen (interview 2010) stated that as Lithuania was the host for BALTNET, he suggested to Lithuania's Defence Ministry that they "owed the Estonians one." As a result, beginning in 1997, Clemmesen (interview 2010) began preparations with the Estonians to set up the BALTDEFCOL in Tartu. All of which indicated the extent to which the donor states needed to provide sufficient direction and control to overcome a natural disunity among the Baltic governments.

5.17.12 Mechanism 8 in Other Baltic Projects

On "Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States" in the subsequent Baltic initiatives, it is worthwhile to reiterate the point noted in Section 2.9.4 of the Literature Review from Fischer (2003) concerning the significance of having the Baltic countries develop sufficient capabilities to gradually take over the BALTBAT project (p. 13).

With regard to BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) believed Germany as lead nation pushed the Baltic navies to take over responsibilities as soon as possible. He added that, on reflection, the Baltic capitals might possibly have done more and done it sooner. However, language was a problem for the Baltic navies at the beginning of the project. It was important, he emphasized, that Germany never pushed for a key command role, and that the Baltic navies were left in charge. In short, Schvede (interview 2010) asserted that the pace of "Baltification" was good, and in retrospect, perhaps could have even been accelerated.

With regard to appearance of the Mechanism in developing the BALTDEFCOL, there was substantial, albeit mixed, commentary from interviewees. An Estonian official (interview 2010) asserted that the present trend is to bring in indigenous instructors under the heading of "Baltification." However, he believed the pace of BALTDEFCOL "Baltification" had been too fast. The goal, he asserted, is to get Western ideas to new Baltic military personnel. In his view, that had not been enhanced by moving too quickly to get Baltic personnel into teaching positions at the college.

Sibul (interview 2011) began by asserting that "Baltification" on BALTNET and BALTRON is working fine. At the BALTDEFCOL, he continued, the idea is to ultimately turn it over to the Baltic countries, which should have been done by 2008, but turned out to not be possible. The problem, stated Sibul (interview
2011), lies with the perceptions of the defence forces. Moreover, the start of the BALTDEFCOL was "rough." Senior officers went through the courses and had gotten a bad impression. The BALTDEFCOL now has people that have been through the personnel systems of the Baltic military forces. Some are less qualified and they are admittedly "a mixed bag." However, asserted Sibul (interview 2011), the quality is better than before.

Lawrence (interview 2011) concurred that "Baltification" was done prematurely in the BALTDEFCOL. The three Baltic Chiefs of Defence still do not send their best people. Moreover, the "Baltification" process was not done in a transparent and coordinated way. Indeed, "Baltification," asserted Lawrence (interview 2011), has to be "made up as you go along." There was no need for a timetable, but there is a need for good governance and an ability to track progress. In general, in his view, it would be a shame to lose the Western staff at the BALTDEFCOL. The other Baltic programmes, he commented, can be handed over to the Baltic governments, but not the BALTDEFCOL.

With regard to the presence of this Mechanism in the documents concerning the BALTDEFCOL, paragraph 1.2 of the BALTDEFCOL MOU noted that:

...steps will be taken towards achieving a phased taking over of responsibility for the management, funding and staffing of the college by the Baltic Participants. Both Supporting and Baltic Participants recognise that progress towards this taking over of responsibility will depend upon a number of factors, including the availability of suitable Baltic staff, and that this is unlikely to be completed within the lifetime of this MOU.

5.17.13 Mechanism 9 in Other Baltic Projects

On "Flexibility in Planning" and its application in other Baltic initiatives, it is worthwhile to reiterate the point in Section 2.11.10 of the Literature Review from Kazocins (1999, p. 51) that the political leadership of BALTBAT was not fixated on original goals, but showed flexibility in addressing new challenges.

With regard to the development of the BALTDEFCOL, it was notable that the BALTDEFCOL MOU contained the following Annexes which have a length which indicated a clear definition of the goal, but did not provide a substantial amount of detail. In short, flexibility was provided so that those details were left to be addressed by those implementing the project:

Annex A: Project Plan (two pages)
Annex B: Terms of Reference of the Baltic Defence College Board (three pages)
Annex C: Financial, Accounting and Auditing Procedures (four pages)
Annex D: Responsibilities of the Baltic Participants, including Host Nation Support (12 pages)
5.17.14 Mechanism 10 in Other Baltic Projects

On “Good Organizational Structures” and its application in the subsequent Baltic programmes, it is valuable to reiterate the comment in Section 2.10.3 of the Literature Review from Brett (2001) that there was effective coordination in channelling military assistance under BALTBAT (p. 59) and the BALTBAT experience “provided a useful model for other initiatives” (p. 56).

With regard to the development of BALTRON, it was beneficial, noted Schvede (interview 2010), to be able to discuss assistance issues at a high level. Such meetings provided the opportunity for informal discussions to reach agreement among Baltic capitals. The result of these coordination mechanisms benefitted BALTRON participants as, for example, when Norway tailored its aid to meet NATO requirements.

Schvede (interview 2010) noted that a Naval Working Group (NWG) was established, and there were meetings of the NWG, Chiefs of Navy, Chiefs of Defence and even at the Defence Minister level. In short, there was good coordination at various levels which was critical. Schvede (interview 2010) commented that Germany used the NWG to provide leadership and naval expertise for the Baltic navies. It also served to obtain needed expertise in other important areas, such as logistics, while good support from Denmark was obtained on legal issues. Moreover, advisors from the Netherlands and other naval forces also provided valuable advice to the Baltic navies. Baltic personnel had the opportunity to use naval facilities in Germany as well as the NATO mine warfare centre.

There was agreement on roles and responsibilities, noted Schvede (interview 2010), which avoided duplication of effort and confusion. There was a focus on developing specific areas of expertise which was divided among the Baltic nations. The supporting projects included a diving school and mine countermeasures (MCM) simulator in Latvia, a communications school in Estonia and gunnery training in Lithuania. All of this was connected to overall development of BALTRON. Schvede (interview 2010) stressed that scarce resources had to be used efficiently, and aid from 8-10 nations was coordinated to avoid duplication. Provision of ships and materiel, as well as training, were well managed, and advisors assisted on organizational and operational issues.

Schvede (interview 2010) asserted that the progress made by the Baltic navies was so good that the point was reached that the NWG could be dissolved. It is possible, he added, that the command arrangements could have been set up differently and more could have been done to support interoperability. He also stated that the BALTSEA mechanism worked well in supplementing established diplomatic arrangements with regard to provision of assistance. Although parallel bodies, they worked effectively, especially if the Baltic governments could not reach agreement.
Turning to the presence of this Mechanism in the documents regarding BALTRON, it is worth noting that with regard to organisations to "direct, supervise and audit the activities of BALTRON," Section 5 of the BALTRON MOU indicated that there would be a:

- Ministerial Committee consisting of Ministers of Defence or representatives, and a
- Military Committee consisting of Chiefs of Defence or their representatives.

In addition, the 12 June 1998 MOU between the supporting states and the Baltic states concerning cooperation on development of BALTRON included the following points under Section 4 (Organisation):

- There would be, under (1) of Section 4 "a multinational Steering Group under German chairmanship. The Steering Group is responsible for overall control and direction of the BALTRON Assistance Programme."

- There is also, under (2) of Section 4, "a multinational Naval Working Group under German chairmanship for developing the detailed aspects of the BALTRON Assistance Programme, for reviewing the Terms of the Project Plan at regular intervals and for overseeing its implementation."

- It is also notable that under (5.1), the Supporting states pledge to "endeavour to provide assistance to the Baltic States in such a way as to maximise, where appropriate, the opportunities for interoperability." They would also "assist with the organisation and training of BALTRON as well as with the planning of arrangements for its logistic support."

With regard to the consideration of this Mechanism in development of BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010) provided an overarching perspective and stressed his view that the success of BALTNET came down to practical military considerations. There was a common approach, common concept of operation, similar equipment and coordinated training and education. He added the comment that, in retrospect, it might have been possible to have organized it more effectively, although he did not provide specific suggestions.

5.17.15 Mechanism 11 in Other Baltic Projects

On “A Strong Lead Nation” and its significance in the subsequent Baltic initiatives, it is worthwhile to reiterate the assertion in Section 2.8.1 of the Literature Review from Mott (1999) that “For military assistance to be effective, a donor must fathom the recipient’s polity, economy, and culture and cause the recipient to adopt desired policies, military strategies, or other behaviors” (p. 17).

With regard to BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) asserted that German leadership on BALTRON was critical to the success of the project, particularly in
establishing a framework for cooperation. In particular, Germany used the Military Working Group to provide good direction and a substantial amount of naval expertise for Baltic naval forces.

With regard to application of this Mechanism in BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010) stressed the fact that each Baltic assistance project had a partner as a mentoring nation. He commented that it initially proved to be more difficult to find a mentor for BALTNET, but Norway eventually became the lead nation for the programme and got the credit for making BALTNET a success through its solid support.

5.17.16 Mechanism 12 in Other Baltic Projects

Finally, on “Leadership From Key Individuals” and its application in other Baltic initiatives, it is valuable to reiterate the comment in Section 2.10.9 of the Literature Review from Glantz (1998b) that “it is the personnel who man the assistance system who make it work as well as it does” (p. 51).

With regard to the development of BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) stressed that personalities were important to what was achieved in BALTRON. In general, the UK and Norway were always solidly supportive and on specific areas such as communications (with a Danish lead) and diving (with a Norwegian lead), work progressed well and results were achieved. However, Schvede (interview 2010) emphasized that in the case of some countries, national positions depended on who represented a supporting state at a meeting.

Turning to the application of this Mechanism to BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010) stressed the point that an energetic Norwegian Brigadier General was designated the project leader for BALTNET, and “he made things happen.” From concept to details, the Norwegian drove the process and generated good coordination and results on BALTNET. Having made the point noted above under Mechanism 11 that Norway as lead nation made BALTNET a success, Saar (interview 2010) stressed that this was the result of the determination of a single individual.

Finally, with regard to the appearance of this Mechanism in the development of the BALTDEFCOL, Lawrence (interview 2011) stated that Clemmesen, as the first Commandant, had provided “a strong hand.” Such commentary supported the comment in Section 2.10.9 of the Literature Review from Foot (2001), who praised the “committed, energetic and effective leadership of the founding Commandant - Danish Brigadier General Michael Clemmesen” (p. 120).

5.18 Invalidation? - BALTBAT did not deploy as a whole

One question was whether the validity of the Mechanisms was in doubt due to the fact that BALTBAT as a whole did not deploy on a peacekeeping operation. If this was indeed a mark of failure, it weakens the case that Outcomes were
achieved as well as the case for the Mechanisms as elements of a model for effective military assistance initiatives. Thus, it was important to assess the views of the interviewees on whether this absence of a deployment as a whole invalidated the claim of success for BALTBAT. As noted in Section 2.11.12 of the Literature Review, there had been a robust rebuttal to the allegation that the absence of such a deployment indicated BALTBAT was not a success. This was buttressed by the data from the 15 interviewees who addressed that issue: Abols, Andrusyszyn, Brett, Carlsen, Fischer, Godal, Haekkerup, Kolga, Laneman, Linkevicius, Molis, an Estonian official, a Latvian official, a US official, and a retired US military officer.

Providing some background, Haekkerup (interview 2008) noted that he thought BALTBAT as a whole could deploy, but his Nordic colleagues disagreed. The result was a decision to proceed with what was politically feasible, with BALTBAT component companies participating in missions alongside forces of donor states. Godal (interview 2011) asserted that the fact that BALTBAT did not deploy as a whole for an operation was not an indication of a failure, as the Nordic states were pragmatic on this issue. The Baltic companies were able to deploy, and that was acceptable.

Linkevicius (interview 2010) concurred that this was not a blot on the record, as the objective of BALTBAT was training and development of personnel, which was achieved. The Baltic governments needed more logistical support and other capabilities in order to have BALTBAT as a whole deploy. Moreover, there was no good opportunity for BALTBAT as a whole to handle a PKO, especially for just a six-month deployment. However, emphasized Linkevicius (interview 2010), this was not a failure, as it was not the task to deploy BALTBAT as a whole.

All three Baltic companies, noted a Latvian official (interview 2010), deployed to handle PKOs. It was not a “real goal” for BALTBAT to deploy as a whole, so the fact that it did not do so was not a major blow to the record of the project. He added that it would have been financially difficult to deploy all of BALTBAT at one time, and that would have been challenging for the supporting states. Kolga (interview 2009) conceded that there was some disappointment in Baltic and donor countries that BALTBAT as a whole could not deploy. However, the donor nations did not believe BALTBAT was ready to undertake such a mission, and while the Baltic capitals did want deployment as a whole, they agreed that BALTBAT was not ready to do so. Kolga (interview 2009) added the point that, in view of the fact that Baltic platoons had been sent out previously, deployment of companies was a step up for the Baltic forces. Abols (interview 2009) agreed that the absence of deployment of BALTBAT as a whole did not diminish the success of the project. There were logistical challenges that simply could not be overcome.

Providing additional commentary, an Estonian official (interview 2010) stressed that this “should not be considered a major black mark” against BALTBAT. He noted that BALTBAT was concerned with training, developing military
capabilities, and assisting the Baltic military forces to become familiar with Western military processes and procedures. It is important to remember, he commented, that the companies from the Baltic capitals did deploy for PKOs under the wing of larger nations. There were good reasons why BALTBAT as a whole could not deploy, and too much should not be made of that fact.

Andrusyszyn (interview 2010) stated that the fact that BALTBAT did not deploy as a whole was not a key issue for the US. A retired US military officer (interview 2010) concurred that this was not a failure. He asserted that the fact that Baltic forces have participated in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan showed what they have learned, adding that they were “making real contributions” which exceeded those of more developed military forces.

Brett (interview 2008) added that certain partners, notably the UK, were sceptical about BALTBAT deployment because the unit was so small and low level multi-nationality at the company level was unusual. They asked the question whether such a force would actually be helpful in PKOs. Ultimately, individual Baltic companies deployed to the Balkans with "host" units provided by the Nordic countries. This set a pattern for future deployments, particularly by Denmark in IFOR and SFOR. Molis (interview 2009) noted that deploying BALTBAT as a whole was never a formal task or requirement. The overall goal was to receive military experience and material, avoid Russian threats, and make a contribution to Western PKO efforts. There was nothing which specified the need to deploy BALTBAT as a whole. Molis (interview 2009) therefore argued that the BALTBAT goals were achieved.

5.18.1 Acknowledging A Valid Criticism

However, some of the interviewees acknowledged that the criticism of BALTBAT since it failed to deploy as a whole had a measure of validity. Carlsen (interview 2010) believed that the deployment decisions indicated the extent to which the supporting states were flexible about what could be accomplished and focused on getting the Baltic forces missions they could handle, and from which they could learn. However, he conceded that there was some validity to the criticism that BALTBAT as a whole did not deploy for a PKO. He added that it was also true that as the Baltic component companies served in missions alongside Western forces, they achieved genuine military capabilities.

Laneman (interview 2010) concurred that not deploying as a whole was indeed a failure of BALTBAT, emphasizing it is important to be critical, but not negative, about that failure. Cost was a major factor in that decision. Moreover, the initial plan was to have many force elements ready for BALTBAT and draw from them to build BALTBAT when it was ready to deploy. However, noted Laneman (interview 2010), substantial amounts of time were lost because personnel were constantly being rotated in and out of BALTBAT units for other activities. The constant need to train new people was part of the reason why BALTBAT never deployed as a whole.
Fischer (interview 2010) also agreed that critics of BALTBAT were justified in noting that BALTBAT as a whole did not deploy for PKOs. However, he also stressed that the component companies served in UN missions in the Balkans alongside Western forces, which indicated that they did achieve genuine military capabilities, and also learned lessons with regard to peace support operations and international operations with NATO forces. A US official (interview 2011) noted that the inability to deploy BALTBAT as a whole did not appear in retrospect to have been a significant issue. However at the time, it was a serious political question and there was indeed a perception, especially among the Nordic countries, that this was a sign of failure.

To summarize, the general commentary from interviewees and the assessments noted in Section 2.11.12 of the Literature Review indicated that the fact that BALTBAT as a whole did not deploy for a PKO did not invalidate the proposition that BALTBAT was a success and generated the desired Outcomes. BALTBAT achieved its essential military Outcome of improved Baltic military capabilities. It provided training opportunities for Baltic personnel and served as a vehicle for Western military assistance to the Baltic capitals. Moreover, BALTBAT component companies were able to participate in PKOs. In short, BALTBAT generated the planned military Outcomes, irrespective of whether it deployed as a whole.

BALTBAT also contributed to the achievement of the political Outcome of NATO membership for the Baltic nations by serving as tangible proof that the Baltic governments were worthy candidates for membership, once again, irrespective of whether it deployed as a whole. Moreover, the point should be reiterated that BALTBAT served as the template for the other Baltic projects (BALTRON, BALTNET and the BALTDEFCOL) which continued to function and also provided the planned military and political Outcomes. In short, it would appear that the fact that BALTBAT did not deploy as a whole did not invalidate the assessment that it was a success and produced the desired Outcomes.

**5.18.2 Invalidation? - Documents**

It was notable that Article 2, paragraph 3 of the BALTBAT MOU, under the heading "Purpose," indicated that "It is the intention to focus the assistance primarily on providing basic military infantry training and peacekeeping training to one national infantry company from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as to the Battalion's joint Logistics and Headquarters Company."

Subsequently, the Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the development of BALTBAT issued in April 1999 addressed deployment of BALTBAT. Section 2.1 noted the actual capabilities of BALTBAT as follows:

During the exercises in late 1997, the capabilities of the Baltic Battalion were assessed. The Baltic Battalion proved to be able to adequately perform peacekeeping tasks in a non-confrontational environment. The
ability to sustain the battalion in terms of manpower and logistics have
given rise to special attention, and the current status in this area is the
main reason why the Baltic Battalion recently has been seen capable of
only a one-time deployment of 6-12 months after which it would return to
the Baltic States for reconstitution.

A series of critical issues that could jeopardise a successful long-term
deployment have been identified: recruitment (in particular of officers,
staff officers and experts), logistic sustainability (especially due to old
and worn out equipment), legal and budgetary agreements (to regulate
command and control as well as administrative affairs related to a
deployment) and resources required to fulfill the mission.

In Section 3, the further development of BALTBAT was outlined, including as
the second bullet, "A deployment to an international peace support operation
will remain one of the objectives of the Battalion. Priority will be given to NATO
led operations. This objective should not be pursued at the detriment of other
expectations attached to the project."

In the BALTBAT Annual Report 2000, provided by the Commanding Officer,
with regard to the participation of the Baltic contingents (BALTCON) in Balkan
peacekeeping, Section 1a under Execution of Tasks concerning BALTCON
mission noted the following:

BALTCON performed well in the NATO lead mission in Bosnia. The
contingent has solved all given tasks (patrolling, site inspection and
monitoring) in a very good manner and personnel were highly motivated.
All Baltic staff officers and sub-units were fully integrated in the Danish
battalion and participated in the mission duty within their respective
areas. Three national contingents have acted as good representatives
for BALTBAT, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Despite the cultural and
linguistic differences, it has worked well due to the good military skills
and the mutual respect, commitment and consideration shown by those
involved. The main problem was lack of adequate English language
skills, especially below company level, when it comes to co-operation
with other units.

The document from the Baltic BALTBAT Military Co-ordination Group indicated
in Section 5, the development plan of the Baltic Battalion:

Deployments remain a priority but without compromising other project
goals. In the mid-term perspective, BALTBAT will be able to deploy and
sustain a company group size to a mission area. At the same period
there will be also possibility to deploy the whole battalion for one-time
mission for a maximum period of one year. Such deployments would
continue to require outside support. In the long-term perspective
BALTBAT will be deployable and sustainable at a variety of levels in
international operations exceeding one year. The military readiness for BALTBAT units is 30 days.

In Chapter 1, Section 1.4(f) addressing "Operational capability and deployments," the authors provided an extensive analysis, noting (italics in the original text):

**Capacity:** The initial phase of establishing BALTBAT as a peacekeeping battalion was concluded in December 1997 with the FTX "BALTIC TRIAL II" where the capabilities for BALTBAT were evaluated. It was concluded that BALTBAT was capable of undertaking deployment to conventional peacekeeping missions in a non-confrontational environment - after further pre-mission training designed for an actual mission.

The development of operational capabilities since 1994 is shown in Annex B. It has proved difficult to establish the infantry companies before the Headquarters, specialist platoons and the required logistic capacity is in place.

The development of BALTBAT from a peacekeeping structure to that of an infantry battalion capable of Peace Support Operations is being conducted successively as the various sub-units and elements return from deployment to SFOR. The transition should be completed by the end of 2000.

**Deployability:** BALTBAT sub-units have proved capable of deployment to Peace Support Operations with assistance from host units in the mission area and after appropriate pre-mission training. Between 1996-1997, all three national infantry companies underwent a 6-month long international mission practice. The Estonian Company was deployed to the UNIFIL in South-Lebanon as part of the Norwegian Battalion. Latvian and Lithuanian companies participated in IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia, with the support from Sweden and Denmark, respectively. All companies performed well.

During 1998, while investigating deployment alternatives for the battalion, the Steering Group and the Military Working Group recommended rotational deployment of BALTBAT company-plus size contingents as a part of the Danish battalion to SFOR. The contingents deployed to Bosnia (BALTCON) have been rotated every six months in order to ensure that all BALTBAT personnel receive practical experience in the mission area. BALTCON 1, which was deployed to Bosnia in October 1998, consisted of the Estonian Company, a multinational staff and support elements. In April 1999, it was replaced by BALTCON 2, based on the Lithuanian Company, the latter being replaced in October 1999 by BALTCON 3 based on the Latvian Company. BALTBAT contingents in Bosnia are integral parts of the Danish Battalion, operating with a separate area of responsibility in the Doboj area.
A lessons learned report on the deployment of BALTCON 1 and 2 was issued in August 1999. This showed that BALTCON 1 and 2 performed well and that the contingents gave a valuable contribution to the mission. It was noted that operational effectiveness generally increases in accordance with national homogeneity. Within the permissive environment of SFOR, it was seen that organic units of company size or above with their own national commander were the most effective. The report also highlighted the importance of effective pre-mission planning and co-ordination amongst all involved, good starting standards, self-reliability and adequate English language skills at all levels.

The documents noted above indicated that supporting and Baltic states regularly assessed the capabilities of BALTBAT to deploy as a whole for a PKO as well as the option of having operational deployments of component companies. While the former could not be achieved, the participating states judged that the latter was not only possible, but would provide critical operational experience that would be of value to development of Baltic military capabilities.

5.19 Area for Possible Future Research - Recipient State Readiness to Challenge Donor States

In addition to the 12 Mechanisms noted above, there was an intriguing topic cited by multiple interviewees that appeared to warrant consideration for further research with regard to military assistance projects. The topic involved the readiness of recipient states to challenge the decisions of donor states, which was cited by six interviewees: Abols, Brett, Kolga, Mackenzie, Molis and a retired US military officer. Once again, an issue had to be cited by at least seven individuals (at least one-quarter of all interviewees) to be considered a possible Mechanism, so this topic did not qualify. However, particularly as it came close to qualifying as a Mechanism, it is worth highlighting.

Data from the interviews indicated that while the Western military assistance effort was good, problems were generated due to the lack of clarity regarding advice to the Baltic capitals. Providing general commentary, Mackenzie (interview 2010) asserted that each NATO member came in with advice for former Warsaw Pact states, and usually tied these recommendations to military sales. Such an effort almost upset the Western assistance effort, he noted. The Eastern European countries suffered from corruption and rapid changes of Ministers, particularly soon after regaining their freedom. The Baltic governments did not have the finances for such purchases, Mackenzie (interview 2010) commented, and were fortunate to be too small and too poor to draw such attention, so there was no attempt to sell it military equipment.

Kolga (interview 2009) added that Western donations for BALTBAT did at times appear to be channeling a lot of varied material to the Baltic capitals. Indeed, they occasionally refused offers of equipment. However, he emphasized, the
process continued to improve over time and there was increasingly critical assessment among donor nations of what materiel would be useful for the Baltic governments. In retrospect, noted Molis (interview 2009), there could have been better coordination of materiel, goals and forces in the Baltic projects. Echoing Kolga’s comments, he noted that there were various types of supplies which were provided which made integration more difficult for Baltic forces. The Baltic capitals should have been more determined about what they needed and more forceful in raising objections to some of the directions from donor states. However, commented Molis (interview 2009), there were times when it was easier for Baltic military forces to work with donor countries than each other.

A retired US military officer (interview 2010) stated that he had warned the Baltic governments about taking some old equipment no longer used by Western forces, as this could become a “money pit” into which resources would be thrown. However, he added, the West did a good job overall providing equipment and targeted support as well as advice. Abols (interview 2009) asserted that the donor states could have done a better job coordinating assistance for the Baltic initiatives with other bilateral aid. Continuing on the theme of coordination, and citing a related defence example, he noted that it was difficult for the Baltic military forces to develop an integrated military doctrine as there were many different possibilities put forward by varied donor countries.

In short, the data regarding this issue warranted mention as a finding which could be an area worthy of additional research. The question of the attitude of recipient states in challenging the decisions of donor states would appear to be a logical consequence of the CIMO analysis used in this research. Once again, the Context question was: What is the nature of the relationship between donor states and recipient states? The Intervention question was: What is the impact of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient state on the efficacy of the military assistance programme? It would appear that the case could be made that an important Mechanism could involve the willingness of recipient states to challenge donor states.

However, the response could be provided that, rather than serving as a separate Mechanism, such an attitude held by the recipient states would be an aspect of the overall Context and the specific Intervention. While not qualifying as a Mechanism based on the parameters set up for this research, the experience of the Baltic projects indicated that, in line with the CIMO framework, it may be worthwhile to consider how exactly to address the significance of the willingness of recipient states to take a more energetic position in defending its interests when dealing with donor states. Such an assessment could also lead to a consideration of the value of ensuring that specific processes are in place, or opportunities made available, to prompt recipient states to provide input into the type of military assistance which is being provided.
5.20 Transferability of the Baltic Experience

A fundamental question regarding this research which has been raised previously is as follows: Can the experience of the Baltic projects serve to identify the elements of a model for effective military assistance programmes that can be applied to initiatives in other countries and regions? Phrasing the question another way: Is the Baltic experience transferable? It was a topic addressed by 17 of the interviewees: Andursyszyn, Brett, Carlsen, Donnelly, Fischer, Godal, Haekkerup, Hannibalson, Johnson, Laneman, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Saar, an Estonian official, a Latvian official, a US official and a retired US military officer. On this issue, the views ranged from strongly supportive of transferability to quite negative, with the preponderance of the commentary having leaned toward the former. However, it is important to note that even when comments supported the view of transferability to other countries, it was often laden with caveats.

5.20.1 Transferrable - Yes

Mackenzie (interview 2010) asserted that the Baltic model was well-received in NATO, and copied to an extent in Bulgaria. It addressed a number of challenges, and for the Baltic capitals it was "perfect." The BALTBAT template could be transferred to other states, he believed, and was a good first step. However, he stressed that it was important for the political aspects to be synchronized with military goals, and that this included links to other nations. It also involved acquisition of the right military equipment and consideration of logistical support. It was also important, stressed Mackenzie (interview 2010), to use opportunities, which highlighted the importance of “not beginning the process by creating the solution.”

Hannibalsson (interview 2011) agreed that the model that evolved for the Baltic initiatives could set a good example for countries in other regions. Haekkerup (interview 2008) believed that "BALTBAT is a good model," and tried to get the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to copy it. However, the effort failed due to the war in the Congo and developments in Zimbabwe. He also pushed to see if the Central Asian countries could copy BALTBAT, but was unsuccessful. Godal (interview 2011) noted that there were unique conditions for the Baltic governments, but there were aspects of the Baltic projects that could be applicable elsewhere. He added that when he was Foreign Minister, he held the view that South Africa should take the lead role on regional African peacekeeping, and tried to inspire other key states to pursue PKO capabilities.

Linkevicius (interview 2010) commented that the BALTBAT model could not be used in areas like the Caucasus, but might be possible in other places. The BALTBAT Steering Group at the political level and the Military Working Group at the practical level were important bodies that worked on concrete issues. That could be applied, he stated, to other countries, and might be useful to donor and recipient countries. Brett (interview 2008) asserted that, in theory, BALTBAT could serve as a useful model for future projects. Fischer (interview 2010)
added that states in Africa and Central Asia had cited BALTBAT as a possible template they could utilize to develop national or regional military capabilities. He believed the Baltic programmes provided good inspiration for how to utilize assistance.

The BALTBAT model, stated Donnelly (interview 2011), could be applied elsewhere, and it was noteworthy that BALTBAT sought to draw on NATO practice. Using a comparison with Africa, he commented that intense Baltic rivalries were a problem, a point that would apply in Africa. There was also a need to move to a humane model of defence forces in the Baltic nations, which also is relevant to Africa. Moreover, it was important to get Baltic military forces properly trained on the basics of a modern military force, which also applies to Africa. Thus, asserted Donnelly (interview 2011), the BALTBAT model could be applicable in Africa, possibly even more than it was applicable in the Baltic nations.

Laneman (interview 2010) believed that the BALTBAT model could be transferred to other countries. He made the point that BALTBAT was the basis for larger Baltic military cooperation. It served as the centre of a network where MOD and other personnel could work together, coordinate their efforts, and get needed experience. All of this was particularly valuable, noted Laneman. Moreover, Baltic cooperation saved money and generated efficiencies in areas such as joint logistics, joint acquisition programmes, and joint deployments.

### 5.20.2 Transferable - With Key Caveats

Some of the commentary from interviewees indicated support for the proposition that the experience of the Baltic projects was transferable, but added conditions or caveats regarding the preconditions for successful transferability of the model. An Estonian official (interview 2010) asserted that the model used for the Baltic projects could be used elsewhere, but stressed that there must be political unity among recipient and donor states. Success depends on political will. Moreover, the Baltic governments shared the same values. While African states have expressed interest in the Baltic experience, he noted, the question must be asked if African nations are ready to cooperate at the level that was apparent in the Baltic projects.

A retired US military officer (interview 2010) added that in Africa, there is no outside threat that drives cohesion. The Baltic capitals perceived a common threat from Russia, and none of the Baltic nations was a threat to the others. All of these factors provided a strong impetus for successful, cooperative military programmes. A US official (interview 2011) echoed these points, noting that the situation with the Baltic countries in the 1990s involved three small nations with a common threat, a shared goal of NATO membership, and a clear group of friends and supporters.

A Latvian official (interview 2010) also emphasized the importance of the fact that the Baltic capitals were still afraid of Russia when BALTBAT began. The
desire for NATO membership and fear of Moscow drove the Baltic governments together, so political interests were critical to the success of BALTBAT. Self-defence, stated the Latvian official (interview 2010), was a major motivating factor for the Baltic nations to make BALTBAT work. He believed that the BALTBAT model could be used elsewhere, but would require a strong policy motivation to succeed.

The Latvian official (interview 2010) continued by noting that there had been discussion, pushed by the US, of establishing a similar PKO capabilities programme in Central Asia, but that never became a reality. Certainly, he commented, African states may need assistance in developing PKO capabilities so that they can help themselves in crisis situations. However, he added that even though the situation in regions of instability like the Sahel or the Horn of Africa could be motivating factors for African cooperation, it is an open question if the focus on development of PKO forces would be a good route to follow. BALTBAT, echoed Andrusyszyn (interview 2010), was indeed a good model and framework, but while African states have expressed an interest in the template, the situation in Africa is different.

The need for caveats with regard to the issue of transferability was also indicated in the later Baltic initiatives. Schvede (interview 2010) believed BALTRON could be used as a model in other regions, but stressed that there are preconditions for success. Navies must have a willingness to cooperate, and the donor nations must have the same goals. Schvede (interview 2010) also emphasized that if a nation already has a Navy, it is difficult to change it and start something new. In that regard, it is important to remember that all the Baltic countries started from zero and the Baltic navies were simply looking to acquire some kind of capability. However, he stated, even for countries with existing naval forces, the BALTRON experience could be beneficial, but it is important to consider the state of the systems already in place.

### 5.20.3 Transferrable - No

Two of the interviewees expressed the view that the Baltic programmes would not be a model that could be transferable to other regions. Without further elaboration, Carlsen (interview 2010) stated that it is hard to see if it is realistic to have BALTBAT and the other Baltic projects serve as a model for other developing military forces. Johnson (interview 2011) concurred, stating equally briefly that one should not expect too much from use of that model elsewhere. Particularly in view of the roles played by these two interviewees with regard to the Baltic initiatives, their abrupt dismissal of the idea that the model could be transferable was significant.

However, as they did not provide any detail with regard to why they held that particular view, it would be speculative to try to determine why they have come to that conclusion. In addition, as they did not address the specific issue, it would be speculative to try to judge whether they rejected the idea of the transferability of any and all aspects of the model used in the Baltic projects, or
whether they believed that elements of the Baltic programmes could be transferrable to other countries.

5.20.4 Transferability and Utility

As noted above, while much of the data indicated a belief among interviewees that the lessons from the Baltic initiatives could be of use in other countries, there was skepticism among some individuals that the model used in the Baltic projects could be directly transferred elsewhere. There were also caveats that local or regional conditions will have an impact on the chances for success of utilizing a model drawn from the Baltic experience on any future military assistance programmes.

It is therefore important to reiterate the points made previously and ensure clarity about the intended utility of the identified elements of a model for effective military assistance projects, its transferability and the significance of the 12 Mechanisms. The intention was not to distill from the Baltic projects a blueprint that will guarantee success wherever it is utilised. The intention was to identify the elements of a model by highlighting the Mechanisms which were apparent in the Baltic military assistance initiatives. These Mechanisms appeared to be of utility in the future development of a model for effective military assistance programmes.

Taking one of the Mechanisms as an example, the specific process by which transfer of responsibility to recipient states (Mechanism 8) is accomplished will be different in recipient countries in various stages of military, political and economic development. However, the specific decisions on timing, expenditures and overall effort to achieve transfer of responsibility are not critical. What is important is the fact that consideration of transfer of responsibility is undertaken by policy-makers planning the assistance programme. Viewed from this perspective, skepticism regarding the ability to replicate the Baltic experience in other countries or regions was justified, but not the issue. What was significant was that the lessons from the Baltic projects highlighted Mechanisms which should be considered and evaluated, irrespective of the recipient country involved.

5.21 Conclusions

Returning to the CIMO framework, the specific question for this thesis regarding Context was: What is the nature of the relationship between donor states and recipient states? The specific Intervention question was: What is the impact of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient state on the efficacy of the military assistance programme? The specific question regarding Mechanisms therefore was: What are the particular Mechanisms that can cause broad political decisions between the donor and recipient state to have an impact on the efficacy of military assistance? Finally, the question regarding Outcomes was: Are the military and political goals associated with the military assistance programme achieved?
The analysis in this chapter outlined the Mechanisms which were apparent from the data from the interviews, augmented by extracts from relevant documents from the Baltic programmes. These were items noted by at least seven of the 27 interviewees. Those twelve Mechanisms were:

(1) - Assessment of Regional Security Concerns
(2) - Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance
(3) - A Constant Source of Support
(4) - A Long-Term Political Commitment
(5) - Connection to Larger Goals
   (5A) - NATO membership
   (5B) - Development of National Defence Capabilities
(6) - Development of New Leadership
(7) - Direction and Control by Donor States
(8) - Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States
(9) - Flexibility in Planning
(10) - Good Organizational Structures
(11) - A Strong Lead Nation
(12) - Leadership From Key Individuals

Chapter Six provides an analysis of these 12 Mechanisms as the elements of a model for effective military assistance initiatives identified from the experience of the Baltic military assistance projects. There has been no such analysis of BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives, and the proposition is put forward that the data provided by the interviewees, the Mechanisms which were generated, and the identification of elements to be used as the basis for development through further research of a model for effective military assistance programmes are of value for academics and practitioners working in the area.
CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION OF THE ELEMENTS OF A MODEL

6.1 Overview

The analysis of the data conducted in Chapter Five indicated that the following 12 Mechanisms emerged as the main reasons for the success of BALTBAT and the other Baltic assistance projects. The data from the 27 interviews were coded, and any issue had to be noted by at least seven interviewees (at least one-quarter of the group) to be included as a Mechanism, indicating that there was an apparent consensus regarding its significance. The resulting 12 Mechanisms were:

(1) - Assessment of Regional Security Concerns
(2) - Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance
(3) - A Constant Source of Support
(4) - A Long-Term Political Commitment
(5) - Connection to Larger Goals
   (5A) - NATO membership
   (5B) - Development of National Defence Capabilities
(6) - Development of New Leadership
(7) - Direction and Control by Donor States
(8) - Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States
(9) - Flexibility in Planning
(10) - Good Organizational Structures
(11) - A Strong Lead Nation
(12) - Leadership From Key Individuals

Once again, the goal of this research was to identify the elements to be used as the basis for development through further research of a model for effective military assistance programmes. While the goal of this thesis was not to develop such a model, work regarding these elements (the Mechanisms) could be of value for future work in developing such a model.

In particular, clustering of these elements (the Mechanisms) would appear to be of value for future work of academics and practitioners. A basic clustering of those Mechanisms which appeared to be closely related would also provide clarity with regard to how they could interact in any model. To cite an example, the presence of a constant source of support from donor states (Mechanism 3) might often be associated with a strong lead nation (Mechanism 11) driving support from a number of countries, which would also entail a long-term political commitment (Mechanism 4). All of these Mechanisms are indications of commitment by supporting states, which would logically appear to be critical for a model for effective military assistance programmes which generates desired Outcomes.

With regard to the conduct of the research, as there was no attempt in conducting the interviews to try to generate linkages between various Mechanisms, there was no attempt to assume such linkages exist. It may be
possible that chronological linkages (which Mechanisms should be considered in a particular sequence) are essential in the construct of a model. Other possible linkages with regard to the impact of one Mechanism on another may also be apparent and have to be considered in the establishment of a model. However, such linkages were beyond the scope of this thesis, although they will probably be essential areas of consideration for future research into developing a model.

A second point should be noted regarding the conduct of the research, and the benefit of the clustering of Mechanisms. There was no hierarchical listing of the Mechanisms based on the number of times it was cited. At a fundamental level, such an attempt would provide a false sense of certainty using a purely quantitative measure. It also highlighted one of the admitted weaknesses in the conduct of the research. While the transcripts were accurate reflections of the views of the interviewees, there was no attempt to measure the intensity of the views held by the interviewee regarding any particular Mechanism. To take an example, an individual who fervently believed that a strong lead nation (Mechanism 11) was essential to the success of BALTBAT was coded as equal to an individual who noted in passing that a strong lead nation was valuable. This was admittedly a weakness which should be addressed in future research in this area.

Finally, with regard to the goals of the research and the advantage of a clustering approach, it should be emphasized again that the focus was on causality and not on predictability. From an academic perspective, the goal was to conduct an analysis of the significance of the political decisions which provided the foundation for the Baltic military initiatives, and which had not been the subject of academic research. From the perspective of practitioners in the area of military assistance, the goal was to generate the elements of a model which could have utility with regard to enhancing the prospects of success for an assistance project. The research did so by noting that there were various Mechanisms which appeared to have generated the Outcomes from the Baltic programmes, and therefore are worth considering in a future project. Thus, clustering of the mechanisms into logical groups assists in identifying the areas in which attention needs to be directed.

The elements identified for future use in development of a model were not intended to predict the precise probability of a particular Outcome. For example, the research indicated that a good organizational structure (Mechanism 10) was shown to have been important for the success of the Baltic programmes. It did not predict that successful implementation of good organizational structures would generate a 21.7% increase in efficiency, or that the probability of success for the programme achieving the desired Outcome would be enhanced from 16.4% to 27.2% because of a solid organizational structure. Once again, further research into this area which attempts to generate predictability with regard to these Mechanisms would be of value to both academics and practitioners. However, it was beyond the scope of this thesis.
Clustering of the Mechanisms into logical groups, however, could assist in identifying the extent to which Mechanisms may reinforce one another. Moreover, as Mechanisms appeared to fall within a variety of clusters, generation of logical groups could be of value in determining which Mechanisms may have greater significance within a model, particularly if there is interaction with other Mechanisms. Such analysis could assist future research which attempts to generate a model which can have predictive capabilities.

Once again, from an academic perspective, the goal was to conduct an analysis of the significance of the political decisions which provided the foundation for the Baltic military initiatives, and which had not been the subject of academic research. Such analysis has identified the elements (the Mechanisms) that can be used as a basis for development of a model for effective military assistance programmes. From the perspective of practitioners working in this area, the identification of such elements could provide a contribution toward the generation of a model which could enhance the prospects of success for future assistance projects.

6.2 Cluster 1: Political-Military Planning

The first cluster of Mechanisms addressed issues which could be categorized as political-military planning. That is the focus on assessing regional security concerns (Mechanism 1) and deciding on the optimal areas of military assistance (Mechanism 2). It also involves consideration of the connection between the programme and larger goals (Mechanism 5). These are overarching political considerations which civilian and military leaders will need to assess before deciding whether, and how, they wish to proceed. In order to highlight the value of these elements for a model, a number of questions are listed under each Mechanism to illustrate the type of issues that should be addressed by policy-makers.

While these Mechanisms were quite apparent with regard to the Baltic capitals and their concern regarding Russia, the case can be made that they are equally relevant for contemporary or future assistance programmes. One current example is consideration of military assistance for the new state of South Sudan. In the recent past, it could have applied to the countries in the Balkans that emerged from the former Yugoslavia. Such projects are not solely reserved for new states, as there are continuing assistance efforts by developed states to aid lesser developed states in generating military capabilities. One example would be US military and other assistance to Colombia. However, for purposes of examining the Mechanisms, a purely hypothetical country is used.

With regard to Mechanism 1 and regional security concerns, it would be prudent for political and military leaders in donor states to ask a number of critical questions: Is there a dominant regional power? If so, which country is it? If not, are there multiple regional powers? Does a major country from outside the region have a particular interest? How tense are relations with the dominant
regional power? What is the state of relations with neighbouring states? Is there a clear and present threat from any particular state? Is there a coalition of regional states which constitutes the primary threat to the recipient state?

This leads to a set of questions derived from Mechanism 2 and optimal areas of military assistance: What would be the appropriate type of military assistance that should be provided? Would it be prudent to assist the recipient state in generating largely defensive military capabilities? Should the focus be on traditional “hard” defence? Would it be preferable to assist them in developing PKO capabilities? Would a combination of aid including traditional “hard” defence and PKO be optimal? Should the process focus on direct military assistance with personnel from donor states on the ground of the recipient state? Would such an arrangement generate strong opposition from other countries in the region? Would it be preferable to have a small number of trainers in place for a number of years to develop recipient state capabilities? Should the training be conducted through programmes in which personnel from the recipient state receive training in the donor states? How much military equipment will be provided by the donor states? Will such equipment be qualitatively superior to that owned by countries in the region?

All of this would have to be considered within the context of Mechanism 5 questions regarding what larger goals are involved for the donor and recipient states: Is the intention to simply defend the sovereignty of the recipient state against clear aggression? Is the goal to provide adequate defensive capabilities without posing a threat to other nations in the region? Is the goal to develop capabilities to participate in a regional or some other type of military alliance? Has the policy decision been taken to rely on the protection of the donor state? If so, is the goal of the recipient government to be in a position to provide a holding action against any type of attack until the supporting state is able to provide assistance? Is the intention to defend a claim on territory or territorial waters which is being contested? Taking a broader perspective, if the larger goal involves economic development, and specifically to ensure that natural resources of the recipient state can be efficiently extracted, is the goal to ensure the ability to protect those resources while not generating tensions with neighbours that would impede development of those resources?

The hypothetical example indicates that there is a relationship between these three Mechanisms and the ultimate success of a military assistance project. Consideration of the questions listed above enhances the prospects of a solid assessment of the security situation, a decision on the optimal type of military aid and a focus on ensuring that the project contributes to the effort to achieve the overarching goals agreed upon by the donor and recipient state. Analysing the experience of the Baltic initiatives, these would appear to be elements for a model for effective military assistance initiatives which should be considered not in isolation, but in conjunction with one another in order to set a good foundation for any military assistance programme.
6.3 Cluster 2: Steadfast Donor Support

The second cluster of Mechanisms involved the need to have supporting nations which are committed to the military assistance programme. Drawing on the experience of the Baltic states, and the strong support of Denmark in particular and the other Nordic countries in general, it would appear to be important to ensure that the project has donor nations that provide a constant source of support (Mechanism 3) and are also committed to providing assistance over the long-term (Mechanism 4). That may well mean that the donor states will have to provide a significant amount of direction and control (Mechanism 7), particularly from the strong lead nation directing the initiative (Mechanism 11) which may have that energetic position due to leadership from key individuals (Mechanism 12).

As noted previously, there was no intention of proposing any strict sequencing with regard to these Mechanisms as elements for the development of a model. However, it would appear logical that once the overarching political-military analysis outlined in Cluster One has been conducted, those countries that are interested in contributing to the military assistance initiative must ask the practical question of whether there is sufficient support for the programme to have a realistic prospect of success. This would mean that any donor states would need to ask questions which would involve the Mechanisms noted above.

With regard to Mechanism 11 and a strong lead nation, it would appear logical to ask one key question early in the deliberations: Which country is willing to take the lead on the project? The issue of causality between the Mechanism and achieving the Outcomes seems to be quite apparent, as the absence of an enthusiastic response from at least one supporting nation would generate doubts about the prospects of successfully achieving Outcomes. To be clear, this does not mean that there must be a strong, positive response in the first discussion about the initiative. It does, however, mean that at some point, one government has to make a clear commitment to doing the work so that the project can achieve the desired Outcomes.

This may well then turn to the question of Mechanism 12 and leadership from key individuals, where it may be the case that one person in a decision-making position in one state is determined to make the programme work, and that individual will drive the national position. That may be sufficient to ensure that there is a strong lead nation directing the effort and working to see if other countries are ready to contribute to the initiative. To return to the example cited by Saar (interview 2010), it was the Norwegian project officer who drove the process and made BALTNET a success.

That could lead to consideration of Mechanism 3 and the issue of a constant source of support for the project. Once again, it is worthwhile to utilize specific questions to provide examples of what is involved with the Mechanisms in this cluster. As a practical matter, the questions which recipient states should place to donor governments (and which donor governments should ask themselves)
should address concrete political and military issues which are logically essential to the achievement of the desired Outcomes: Are you committed to this military assistance project? What resources are you prepared to commit? Can you provide trainers? Can you contribute military equipment? Are spaces available at your staff colleges? Is your focus on only providing political support? Can you provide financial assistance? Are you willing to provide this assistance even in the face of objections from other countries in the region? Are you willing to provide such aid if other donor countries drop out of the initiative? If other donor states reduce or eliminate their contribution, are you willing to carry that extra effort?

With regard to Mechanism 4 and a long-term political commitment, the discussion would seek to ensure that there is no misunderstanding about the time-frame for the programme and the commitment to persevere until the desired Outcomes are achieved. As noted by some of the interviewees, the generation of military capabilities is a lengthy process and the supporting states need to make a commitment for an extended period of time, and not just provide an isolated gesture of support. The questions that should be asked focus on ascertaining whether potential donor states are ready to participate for the long-term: Are you prepared to make a multi-year commitment to this project? If so, how many years? Will that require annual renewal of legislative approval for your participation and contributions? Should unexpected demands arise on your military forces or defence budget, will you still be able to make your promised contribution? If those demands generate a reduction in your contribution for one or two years, will you make larger contributions in subsequent years to make up the shortfall? At what stage should we collectively reassess the duration and depth of our obligations to the project?

Finally, with regard to Mechanism 7 and the need for donor states to provide a significant amount of direction and control, it may be best to view this from two different perspectives. From the optic of the recipient state, the questions are straightforward: Is the recipient state willing to accept a substantial amount of direction and control from supporting states at the start of the initiative? Are there certain areas in which the recipient state cannot or will not relinquish its sovereignty or authority?

From the optic of the donor state, a different set of questions should be asked: In view of the need to direct and control this assistance effort, can we devote the resources to do so effectively? Are we ready to insist on decisions to which the recipient state objects? Are we willing to do so even if it puts the continuation of the project at risk? These questions are somewhat modified, but become particularly important in a multinational effort, particularly after a lead nation is identified: Does any state object to a mandate for the lead nation that it must constantly monitor and supervise implementation? Do we agree that we will not attempt to individually address requests by the recipient state for a relaxation of those controls? Do we agree that we will cooperate to reinforce the authority of the lead nation? What are the mechanisms or processes by
which we will obtain the views of the recipient state regarding the programme and collectively make decisions?

Returning to the issue of the causality between the Mechanisms and the generation of Outcomes, and remaining with the example of a multinational effort, if the lead nation or key individual is not able to generate enthusiasm among a larger group of donor states, the prospects of success should be carefully reconsidered. Should the lead country be able to handle all the responsibilities on its own, that would remove the apparent obstacle. However, it should then initiate careful analysis by the lead government about whether it can handle that burden for an extended period of time. It could also generate a decision by the lead nation that it will support the initiative on the hope that others would later join, which might not be an illogical policy decision for the lead country, depending on the circumstances. All of the questions noted above indicate the significance of considering the Mechanisms in this cluster as elements in the development of a model which have an impact on one another and may well be best addressed as interconnected, rather than isolated, elements.

6.4 Cluster 3: Establishing Permanent Strengths

There was another set of Mechanisms which appeared relevant to the ability of the military assistance project to achieve the desired Outcomes. It is important to consider at the appropriate time how the recipient state will eventually become self-sufficient and no longer dependent on the supporting nations. For that reason, it is valuable to assess how to develop new leadership (Mechanism 6) and how a transfer of responsibility to the recipient state will be accomplished (Mechanism 8).

The intention is not to compel donor countries to develop an artificial timetable by which recipient states will assume more responsibility, or agree on metrics (how many senior officers from the recipient nation need to graduate from training academies in the donor nations) which may have little to do with whether the recipient states have generated the capability to assume more responsibility. The critical aspect of this cluster is to emphasize that the political and military leadership in the supporting countries should discuss with the recipient nations how they can realistically plan to address the development of permanent strengths and capabilities in the recipient states.

With regard to Mechanism 8 and transfer of responsibility to recipient states, it would be beneficial to raise numerous practical questions: At what point in the future do all the participating nations wish to be able to declare that the Outcomes of the assistance project have been achieved? Does the recipient state believe it will be able to gradually assume greater responsibilities in the near future? Is it more realistic to expect that it can only begin to assume more duties after an intense initial training period lasting a number of years? Should the pace of transfer of responsibility be reassessed annually? Should it be reviewed more frequently? Will the supporting countries continue to have
advisors on the ground even after responsibility has been transferred to the recipient state?

Some of the discussion and the resulting questions will relate to consideration of Mechanism 6 and development of new leadership. In this instance, the following questions indicate the type of issues which need to be addressed:

Does the recipient state have the requisite minimum number of senior and/or mid-level officers to be able to implement the assistance programme? If not, would that critical mass be achieved only after a number of years? Should the pace be accelerated by having significantly more of the younger officers attend courses in the donor states? What constitutes the short-term and long-term plan for developing the new generation of leaders? Should officers from the recipient state attend courses in different staff colleges and defence academies in a number of countries to get a broad perspective? Should there be a focus on continuity and sending these officers to only one institution? Should a staff college or defence academy be established in the recipient state? How long will it take until it is running smoothly? What assistance is required from donor countries? Will donor countries continue to provide staff even after the college or academy is managed by the recipient state?

Consideration of these two Mechanisms at an appropriate time will enhance the likelihood of permanent results for the recipient state, which, in all probability, will be an important part of achieving the desired Outcomes. In addition, it will allow for better planning regarding the overall length of the project and realistic expectations for both donor and recipient nations. For the supporting governments, it will help avoid a situation in which it feels that it is carrying a greater burden for a longer period of time than anticipated. For the recipient nation, it will minimize the extent to which it feels it is in an enforced state of dependency, or that it is being held back from doing more to develop its own military capabilities. Achieving any of these results would be beneficial for the assistance programme, and indicate the significance of considering the two Mechanisms in this cluster as elements in the development of a model which have an impact on one another and may well be best assessed as interconnected, rather than isolated, elements.

6.5 Cluster 4: Clear Structures and Lines of Authority

As indicated in Section 1.3, the focus of this research was on military assistance and not project management. The experience of the Baltic initiatives, however, indicated the importance of ensuring that the fundamentals of any well-run project would also be necessary in a military assistance initiative. This should not be interpreted to mean that good application of generic project management principles to military assistance projects will ensure success. It seems unlikely that an initiative with a flawed analysis of the regional security situation and selection of an inappropriate type of military assistance without a strong lead nation and with weak commitment by supporting states would be salvaged by good project management.
However, the experience of the Baltic initiatives indicated the extent to which there are specific aspects of clear structures and lines of authority which are particularly important for military assistance programmes. There are a cluster of Mechanisms which emphasize the need to have good organizational structures (Mechanism 10) as well as strong leadership by a lead nation (Mechanism 11) which includes overall direction and control by donor states (Mechanism 7). Consideration of this particular cluster requires political and military leaders to address fundamental issues which may need to be considered early in the initiation of any military assistance project.

A discussion of Mechanism 10 and good organizational structures leads to a number of practical questions that should be addressed by donor and recipient states, although primarily by the former: Is there an existing organizational framework which the donors wish to copy for this assistance programme? If not, is there an existing model which would appear most suitable with appropriate modifications? If so, which modifications? Does a new structure need to be developed? Does the final organizational structure ensure clear lines of authority? Does it ensure decision-making at appropriate levels? Is it too centralized? Is it necessary to establish a new administrative body devoted solely to administering this programme? Does the structure provide for good flows of information to the leadership and from the leadership back down to the operators? How will it be determined if there are excessive layers that should be eliminated?

In addition, the importance of Mechanism 11 and a strong lead nation requires asking questions about organizational issues relating to the work of the lead country: Will officials of the lead nation control all aspects of decision-making within the organizational structure? If not, which specific areas will be reserved for the lead country? Will the lead nation staff senior positions at all levels? What will be the coordination mechanism for those parts of the organization not staffed by personnel from the lead nation? What is the arrangement regarding transmission of information between the lead country and the other supporting states? What is the mechanism by which all the participating states will assess whether the lead country should devote less time to briefing other supporting governments, and direct that time to aiding the recipient state?

The answers to these questions have an impact with regard to Mechanism 7 and direction and control by donor states. In the case of a simple assistance project noted earlier (Country A provides aid to Country X), direction and control by the supporting state continues to be an essential requirement for achieving Outcomes. It is just that only Country A is concerned. In a complex assistance project (Countries A, B and C provide aid to Countries X, Y and Z), direction and control becomes more complicated, and indicates why in these initiatives Mechanism 7 is connected to Mechanism 11.

While this particular Mechanism is not exclusively the province of the lead nation, and involves the coordinated, united position of all the supporting countries vis-à-vis the recipient state, as a practical matter, it is the role of the
lead nation to manage the daily requirements of implementing the project and addressing any problems which may arise. Thus, there are some basic questions which should be asked so that there is clarity of responsibility among the supporting states and acceptance and understanding by recipient states: What type of supervision and monitoring is expected of the lead nation by the supporting states? In what instances will it be necessary for the lead nation to call on all the donor countries to take a decision? When is it acceptable for individual donor states to work directly with recipient states? When is it imperative for the lead nation to send a united message to the recipient state?

Returning again to the issue of causality and the impact of this set of Mechanisms, it is apparent that a military assistance project, like any other project, has certain prerequisites for successfully achieving Outcomes. A good organizational structure and clear lines of authority, including monitoring and supervision, are apparent in the private and public sectors. What is different regarding a military assistance initiative was apparent in the experience of the Baltic programmes. Particularly if there is a group of donor states, and especially if there are multiple recipient states, the lessons from the Baltic initiatives indicated that this cluster of three Mechanisms generates specific types of questions which should be considered to assist in enhancing the prospects of the project achieving the desired Outcomes. The answers to these questions, although arising from different Mechanisms, appear to have an impact on one another. Thus, it appears to be worthwhile to consider the Mechanisms in this cluster as elements in development of a model which may well be addressed as interconnected, rather than isolated, elements.

6.6 Cluster 5: Sufficient Flexibility

While a clear organizational structure is necessary for an effective military assistance programme, an excessive attention to organization and process could be counterproductive. One example is a structure which is so rigid that it does not respond to unanticipated developments and results in continuation of the original plan even though it is not suited to the new developments. Another example is a structure which does not allow the participants to utilize opportunities which may arise.

As noted by interviewees reflecting on the Baltic initiatives, it is important that there be flexibility in planning (Mechanism 9) which can allow decision-makers to change course and take opportunities. There are other Mechanisms which would also appear to fall within this cluster. For example, careful consideration of the optimal areas of military assistance (Mechanism 2) involves an initial evaluation of what focus the project should have. However, it does not preclude subsequent reassessments to consider changes which have occurred. Indeed, the case can be made that such a re-evaluation would be of substantial value and an indication of good management. It would also be valuable to reassess whether initial plans for the transfer of responsibility to the recipient state (Mechanism 8) should be modified as the recipient nations indicate they are
progressing at a faster (or slower) rate than anticipated. This may well mandate a change in the planning for handover from the supporting countries.

With regard to Mechanism 9 and flexibility in planning, there is no defined set of areas in which there should be a focus on flexibility. It is not apparent that flexibility should be grounded in processes, and may more appropriately be emphasized as part of the behaviour and mentality of the military and political leadership. The processes certainly should include an opportunity for senior level reassessment of where the project stands and whether a change of course is needed. However, quarterly meetings of a group of leaders who do not have the mind-set to institute change or take opportunities would appear to be of little value.

As a result, one potential way forward would be to ensure that periodic meetings of senior officials include a list of questions to be discussed: Do the original Outcomes of the project need to be adjusted? If so, what should be the new Outcomes? If not, is the initiative moving in the proper direction? Are short-term changes needed to exploit a particular opportunity? Is the best option to simply stay the course?

As part of this process, one of the steps that could be taken would involve Mechanism 2 and a re-evaluation of the optimal areas of military assistance. A periodic re-evaluation would appear to be important not only with regard to strengths and weaknesses which subsequently arise regarding the original Outcomes sought from the programme, but also with regard to how success could be further promoted. The experience of the Baltic initiatives involved replication of the initial success of BALTBAT in naval, air defence and military education assistance initiatives.

Returning to the periodic meetings of senior political and military leaders of the assistance programme, there would appear to be numerous questions worth asking: Are our Outcomes being achieved? If not, should the focus be turned to other types of assistance? If Outcomes are being achieved, should progress be accelerated by moving into closely related areas? Should expansion be pursued immediately? Are there sufficient resources? Is there another lead nation able to drive efforts in this new area?

The final Mechanism in this cluster, for which flexibility would appear to be a key consideration, is Mechanism 8 on transfer of responsibility to recipient states. Once again, the periodic meetings should ask basic questions about whether changes are needed: Is the recipient state progressing as fast as anticipated? If not, does the plan for devolving responsibilities need to be amended? Does training need to be intensified? If so, are there sufficient places available? Are there other areas in which we have not focused our attention and require resources? Was our assessment of the ability of the recipient state to develop capabilities simply wrong? If progress is better than anticipated, should the transfer plan be moved forward?
The three Mechanisms in this cluster address the fundamental issue of how to ensure the political and military leadership considers possible amendment of plans due to changing conditions. To be clear, the focus is not simply on pursuing change. It may be that changes generate disruptions which reduce project efficiency. The point, as indicated from the Baltic initiatives, is that it is important for the leadership to have the chance to decide on whether to alter course as events require, or display innovative thinking with regard to challenges and possible opportunities. Moreover, the decisions they take with regard to possible changes, although possibly arising from different Mechanisms, may well have an impact on one another. Thus, it appears to be worthwhile to consider the Mechanisms in this cluster as elements in development of a model which may well be best assessed as interconnected, rather than isolated, elements.

6.7 Pentagon of Clusters of Mechanisms

The five clusters of the 12 Mechanisms outlined above were:

1) Political-Military Planning
2) Steadfast Donor Support
3) Establishing Permanent Strengths
4) Clear Structures and Lines of Authority
5) Sufficient Flexibility

These clusters were an attempt to group the identified elements to be used as a basis for a model for effective military assistance projects in a manner which could be of use to future work on development of such a model. In particular, the clusters noted the significance of the elements as interconnected, rather than isolated. Those five clusters can be diagramed as the points of a pentagon with the relevant Mechanisms noted, as indicated on the next page (also included as Appendix E in the Appendices). Such a graphic reinforces the point that these five clusters are considered to be at the same level of importance in grouping the elements for development of the model. There is no intention of asserting primacy of one particular cluster, or that there is a particular sequence in which these clusters of elements need to be considered in the development of a model.
It is worthwhile at this juncture to reiterate the specific function and value of Mechanisms within the CIMO framework utilised in this research and outlined in Section 2.5. With regard to the particular issue of military assistance programmes, the specific Context question was: What is the nature of the relationship between donor states and recipient states? This led to the question of the specific Intervention of interest, and the question was: What is the impact of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states on the efficacy of the military assistance programme?

This led to the question of what particular Mechanisms are of interest for this research. Once again, the role of a Mechanism (Denyer and Tranfield, 2009, p. 683) was to address the general question: What is about Interventions acting in a Context that leads to the Outcomes? For this research, the question regarding Mechanisms was: What are the particular Mechanisms that can cause broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states to have an impact on the efficacy of military assistance? This led to the final issue of
achieving Outcomes, and the specific question was: Are the military and political goals associated with the military assistance programme achieved?

In short, within the CIMO framework, it was the Mechanisms which were critical in generating Outcomes. It was the Mechanisms which were the elements that have been identified that can be used as the basis for development of a model for effective military assistance programmes. The diagram presented above groups the Mechanisms derived from BALTBAT and the Baltic initiatives into what appear to be logical clusters. Such clusters could be of assistance to those academics doing future work on the development of a model.

The case also can be made that such clusters could be of use to practitioners working in the area as they can assist in understanding the overarching Outcomes sought from the military assistance programmes. The questions noted previously under each Mechanism within the clusters provided an indication of the type of specific issues which should, at a minimum, be considered by policy-makers. While such detail is arguably crucial for such initiatives, the use of clusters provides an overarching way of viewing the Mechanisms and reinforcing the Outcomes that are desired.

For example, it is important to consider in detail how to address transfer of responsibility to recipient states (Mechanism 8), but it is critical to recognize that this is significant because it falls within the larger context of establishing permanent strengths in the recipient state (Cluster 3). The value of the various identified elements for a model is in ensuring that these points are at least addressed as the project is planned and established and that attention is maintained on the ultimate Outcomes sought by the participating states. The value of the clusters is to assist in highlighting the interconnected nature of the various elements. The clusters would therefore be of particular utility to practitioners, and also of value to academics.

It is important to reiterate that the amount of attention devoted to any particular cluster of Mechanisms does not guarantee achievement of the desired Outcomes. Instead, the purpose of the clusters is to note that there is a relationship between these Mechanisms and successfully achieving Outcomes, and consideration of an individual Mechanism can have an impact on the ability to achieve desired Outcomes.

6.8 Conclusion

The proposition is therefore put forth that the specific Mechanisms and the resulting clusters have value for academics and practitioners working in the area of military assistance. The thesis analysed a set of Baltic initiatives which were set in a particularly challenging Context, utilised a particular Intervention and achieved the desired Outcomes. The views and opinions of a wide variety of individuals from the policy-making, operational and academic arenas provided a broad spectrum of commentary from which Mechanisms were derived and the elements of a model for effective military assistance
programmes were identified. While the policies, structures and processes used for the Baltic initiatives may not be directly transferable to other countries, the lessons derived from the Baltic projects do appear to provide elements for a model which could be generalizable and could be of value to academics and practitioners in the area of military assistance.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Studying Success

The specific research question put forth at the start of this thesis was as follows: Can the elements to be used as the basis for development through further research of a model for effective military assistance projects be identified from the experience of the Baltic military cooperative programmes, particularly BALTBAT? The proposed answer to that question, addressed in detail below, is in the affirmative. However, before turning to those conclusions, it is worthwhile to review the larger issue of why the Baltic initiatives were worth extensive study.

In view of the challenges faced by the Baltic and supporting states, the achievement of political and military goals (the Outcomes) provided reasons for these nations to view their accomplishments with a substantial amount of pride. That was apparent in the comments of the interviewees. Mackenzie (interview 2010) stated that, “the result was a good one.” Hannibalsson (interview 2011) asserted that the Baltic initiatives culminated “with considerable success.” Andrusyszyn (interview 2010) noted that the political and security environments were quite challenging, and Western policy regarding the Baltic countries was a success, both with regard to overarching policy goals and performing the detailed work that was needed. A potentially unstable, tense relationship between Russia and the Baltic nations, he added, was avoided due to sound policy decisions and patient, concrete Western aid to the Baltic countries.

Johnson (interview 2011) concurred that the West handled the challenge of assisting the Baltic capitals very well, both with regard to policy in general and the Baltic military projects in particular. Clemmesen (interview 2010) asserted that the Baltic governments were better prepared for NATO upon accession and understood NATO better than the other new members, and that was because of the Baltic programmes. Developing trust and real interoperability with the West were critical. In his view, the Baltic capitals understood the importance of those factors from the start, and the Baltic initiatives gave them the opportunity to develop their abilities in these areas.

An Estonian official (interview 2010) asserted that the Baltic military assistance projects were indeed a success. He noted that they could be judged in two ways: 1) by classical standards of a successful military project, or 2) according to the political aims to be achieved by the particular project. Viewed as a totality, he judged, the experience of the Baltic programmes indicated a good way to proceed with these challenging initiatives.

It is important to highlight the fact that in addition to the unique challenges noted previously, the Baltic projects also had to address the normal difficulties inherent in any such complex enterprise. For that reason, the success of the Baltic initiatives was particularly noteworthy and warranted the extensive research conducted in this thesis. Carlsen (interview 2010) admitted that he
was surprised that things actually kept on schedule. Progress was made, problems were resolved and the process worked. Most notably, when questioned on whether he would do anything differently if he could do it again, Carlsen (interview 2010) flatly stated "no." When asked the same question, Linnkevicius (interview 2010) and Clemmesen (interview 2010) strongly echoed Carlsen’s position. A Latvian official (interview 2010) seconded Carlsen’s point that in view of the risks and challenges when the work began, he was proud that BALTBAT even worked at all. In his opinion, even with the benefit of hindsight, what was achieved in the Baltic states was as much as could have been accomplished in view of the situation they faced and the available resources.

7.2 Conclusions

The specific research question was whether the elements of a model (now called Mechanisms) for effective military assistance projects can be drawn from the Baltic military cooperative programmes, particularly BALTBAT. Drawing on data from 27 interviews, supplemented by 37 documents regarding the Baltic projects, 12 Mechanisms were apparent. They were:

(1) - Assessment of Regional Security Concerns
(2) - Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance
(3) - A Constant Source of Support
(4) - A Long-Term Political Commitment
(5) - Connection to Larger Goals
   (5A) - NATO membership
   (5B) - Development of National Defence Capabilities
(6) - Development of New Leadership
(7) - Direction and Control by Donor States
(8) - Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States
(9) - Flexibility in Planning
(10) - Good Organizational Structures
(11) - A Strong Lead Nation
(12) - Leadership From Key Individuals

These Mechanisms fell logically within the following five clusters:

Political-Military Planning
   (1) Assessment of Regional Security Concerns
   (2) Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance
   (5) Connection to Larger Goals

Steadfast Donor Support
   (3) A Constant Source of Support
   (4) A Long-Term Political Commitment
   (7) Direction and Control by Donor States
   (11) A Strong Lead Nation
   (12) Leadership From Key Individuals

Establishing Permanent Strengths
   (6) Development of New Leadership
(8) Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States

Clear Structures and Lines of Authority

(10) Good Organizational Structures
(11) A Strong Lead Nation
(7) Direction and Control by Donor States

Sufficient Flexibility

(9) Flexibility in Planning
(2) Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance
(8) Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States

The five clusters were intended to assist future research in development of a model for effective military assistance initiatives. There was no intention of providing any relative weighting among the individual clusters or an attempt to indicate a specific sequence with regard to how the clusters should be addressed. They were simply noted as important areas which might be of assistance to academics working on the development of a model, and may need to be considered by political and military policy-makers in preparing the foundation for a military assistance initiative.

The fundamental proposition of this research was that BALTBAT and the other Baltic projects provided lessons for effective implementation of military assistance programmes. There was no claim that the BALTBAT procedures and processes should simply be transferred to other states with the expectation that they would prove to be as successful as they were in the Baltic region. However, an extensive analysis of the Baltic projects appeared to indicate that the broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states (the Intervention) were important in achieving desired Outcomes. Moreover, detailed analysis of the Baltic projects also provided useful guidance on the important Mechanisms that should be considered in planning, initiating and implementing military assistance projects. They also constituted elements in development of a model for effective military assistance initiatives.

7.3 Contributions to the Field of Study

A question which may be raised regarding the Mechanisms and clusters is whether these are not self-apparent. What is the academic contribution which has been provided by this research? With regard to operators and practitioners in the area, are these not the logical issues which would be considered for any military assistance programme? There are numerous points to be made in response to these questions.

First, it is worth reiterating that the number of instances in which military assistance projects appear to fall short of expectations indicates that there is nothing obvious or self-apparent about how such complex enterprises should be planned, structured and developed. If they were that simple and the processes that self-apparent, there would be many more examples of successful initiatives and fewer failures.
Second, this research constituted an attempt to utilize the CIMO model in the area of military assistance. It therefore made two specific contributions. First, with regard to work on CIMO, it was a new utilization of the model, specifically within the field of military assistance, which added to the body of knowledge to judge the utility or limitations of CIMO. Second, with regard to the study of military assistance, the use of CIMO to assess such projects was a novel approach which could assist academics in determining whether it is indeed a suitable model to use in this field. As such, the use of the CIMO model for this particular research into military assistance was of value for academics working in both areas.

Third, the Mechanisms which were outlined are the result of a detailed examination of a set of military assistance projects which had not been previously scrutinized in this particular manner. While there had been commentary about the success of the Baltic programmes, there was never an in-depth analysis of the fundamental reasons which explained why the initiatives were successful. This research provided empirical data regarding the reasons for success, drawn from individuals who either worked on the programmes or were experts in the area.

Fourth, the research addressed the specific Intervention of the impact of political decisions between the Western supporting governments and the Baltic governments on the Outcomes which were achieved in these programmes. This issue had not been addressed by academics or practitioners in the area with regard to the Baltic initiatives, and would appear to be an important topic for consideration. The lessons from the Baltic projects indicated the significance of Mechanisms which could allow the Intervention of broad political decisions between donor and recipient states to generate the desired Outcomes.

Fifth, the findings were drawn from a large number of individuals who were personally involved in BALTBAT or the subsequent Baltic programmes. From a purely academic perspective, this represented a source of information which had not previously been examined. Moreover, from an academic as well as an operational perspective, the views, recollections and opinions of the people who were present at the creation of the Baltic programmes, or worked to make them a reality, were of value and worth recording and analyzing.

Sixth, the Mechanisms and clusters which have been identified were elements that can be used to develop a model for effective military assistance projects. This was the research objective set out in Section 1.2.2. These elements constituted a contribution to the body of knowledge in the area of military assistance and can be drawn upon by researchers for generation of a model. Academics in this field can assess the validity and utility of each of these Mechanisms, possibly by conducting studies on current or past military assistance projects to judge their applicability or impact. In addition, these elements could also serve as starting points for consideration of other potential elements which could be derived from analysis of other programmes.
Continuing with the sixth point, practitioners in the area of military assistance could consider implementation of actions within existing or future projects with an eye toward these elements to see whether there is indeed generation of desired Outcomes. Such practical use of these elements would provide a solid foundation for future research into the strengths and weaknesses of the Mechanisms and clusters, or the need to modify (or discard) some of these elements.

Seventh, the generation of these elements could also contribute to work in other areas of military assistance outlined in Section 2.7.1. With regard to donor states, one of the topics noted was the contribution of military assistance to achieving the foreign policy goals of donor states. Mechanisms such as assessment of regional security concerns (Mechanism 1) and connection to larger goals (Mechanism 5) could be of value to those addressing the issue of how military assistance initiatives can contribute to achieving those goals. Academics could use the appropriate Mechanism to analyse past projects which did not achieve the desired policy goal and ask the following question: Was a failure to consider such a Mechanism a contributing factor to the difficulties in the project which led to a failure to achieve the desired policy goal?

Continuing with the seventh point, with regard to research into the decision-making process within donor states, the identification of Mechanisms such as a long-term political commitment (Mechanism 4) would appear to have relevance. Once again, academics could use the perspective of an appropriate Mechanism to ask concrete questions with regard to a current or past military assistance project: Did the political leadership in the donor state consider this particular Mechanism in making important decisions at the onset of the initiative? If not, was a failure to consider this Mechanism a contributing factor in the overall failure of the programme to achieve the desired Outcomes?

To be clear on this point, the goal of this research was to make a contribution to the body of knowledge by identifying the elements that could be used for the generation of a model for effective military assistance initiatives. Assessing each of these elements in isolation may not be sufficient to generate a model. However, the proposition is put forth that such assessments would make a contribution toward analyzing how the various elements in the model would work as a whole. In short, such analysis is not sufficient, but it is necessary.

Eighth, the proposed elements of a model could also make a contribution toward research into the political or economic impact of military assistance on the recipient states. For example, consideration of development of new leadership (Mechanism 6) would appear to play an important role with regard to the political impact of assistance on the recipient states. Academics could review past initiatives with consideration of the suitable Mechanism to see whether such elements were not considered, were not addressed adequately, or were not considered in conjunction with other elements. They could then ask questions such as: Was there insufficient consideration of generating new
military leadership that would accept and abide by the political concept of civilian control of the military?

Continuing with the eighth point, but turning to economic impacts, the Mechanism of a constant source of support (Mechanism 3) would have an impact on defence spending in recipient states and thereby affect the national budget and spending. However, while the advantage for the recipient state of not having to utilize scarce resources on the defence budget is apparent, the disadvantage of being at the mercy of budget problems in the donor state, with a potentially sharp, unexpected cut-off of assistance funding, is equally clear. The elements generated by this research could assist academics in putting this issue of financial dependency in a larger context. For example, the consideration of a long-term political commitment (Mechanism 4) in conjunction with Mechanism 3 could assist in reducing the potential economic impact. Once again, such analysis would contribute to the arrangement of elements into an effective model.

Ninth, with regard to the topic of the impact of military assistance on the behaviour of the recipient states, the Mechanisms of direction and control by donor states (Mechanism 7) as well as transfer of responsibility to recipient states (Mechanism 8) would appear to be relevant from a purely academic perspective. Researchers could analyse past military assistance projects to assess whether the donor and recipient states had developed an optimal arrangement for the transfer of control and responsibility, and ask questions such as the following: Did the transfer of control of a programme have an impact on the development of recipient state behaviour? If so, was that impact positive or negative?

Tenth, the research findings made a contribution to the larger body of knowledge beyond military assistance. The proposition is put forth that the Mechanisms of leadership from key individuals (Mechanism 12) as well as a strong lead nation (Mechanism 11) would be of relevance to leadership theory in general. Moreover, as this is in connection with a military assistance initiative, this necessarily involves change in the recipient state. This would indicate that some of the elements noted in this research would be relevant with regard to change management theory in general.

Eleventh, while the point was made early in this thesis that the focus is not on project or programme management with regard to military assistance, it would appear that any number of Mechanisms would be relevant for academics working in that subject area. Whether it is flexibility in planning (Mechanism 9) or good organizational structures (Mechanism 10), the findings from this research would appear to augment the body of knowledge for generic project and programme management.

Twelfth, one of the other areas noted in Section 2.7.1 is the specific, narrow task of improving the provision of military assistance. While the goal of this thesis was identification of the elements for a model for effective military
assistance programmes, and a focus on the specific intervention of broad political decisions between donor and recipient states, the research addressed a number of concrete measures which could improve the provision of such aid. The research identified commentary with regard to improved training, better administrative processes, the need for accountability, and numerous other details on the conduct of military assistance. All of these points are of relevance to academics and practitioners in the area in addressing the specific question of how better to address specific aspects of such initiatives.

To summarize, the 12 Mechanisms and five clusters were in no way self-apparent or obvious. They were the result of a research effort which generated new data that are relevant and significant for both academics and practitioners working in the area of military assistance and contributed to the body of knowledge in this field as well as related academic areas.

7.4 Recommendations for Future Research

There are numerous recommendations for future research which are best addressed by moving from the specific to the general. First, there was one specific item raised by six interviewees, which meant that it was not a Mechanism, and possible element for a model, but could well warrant additional research. That involved the issue of recipient state readiness to challenge donor states. Such an issue appeared to have relevance to the topic of broad political decisions between donor and recipient states and the efficacy of military assistance projects and is therefore a possible area for further study.

Second, there were weaknesses in the research methods utilised which suggested the need for further research to correct these shortfalls. The method used in this thesis judged all items that were raised to be the same, preventing an indication of the difference in impact which was placed by individuals on a particular item. Future research should gauge the intensity of the responses of those providing data to judge the weight given to any particular issue and potential Mechanism.

Third, this research did not seek to provide the relationship between the different Mechanisms or clusters, which would be important for future research into development of a model from the identified elements. The first of such relationships which could be addressed is whether a chronological relationship may be present, raising the question of whether clusters or Mechanisms should be considered in a particular sequence. Such research also would be of particular value to practitioners in the field, as it would provide more concrete guidelines with regard to how to address the numerous tasks which are involved. Further on this point, it might be desirable to have individual Mechanisms within each cluster assessed with regard to possible sequencing. As an example, within the cluster of Steadfast Donor Support, it might be prudent to first address a constant source of support (Mechanism 3) before turning to other Mechanisms.
Fourth, a determination of the relative weight of each Mechanism or cluster and its impact on generating Outcomes would appear to be critical for the development of a model. For example, the proposition can be put forth that the cluster of Steadfast Donor Support and the five Mechanisms contained within it are of greater significance than the cluster of Sufficient Flexibility and its three Mechanisms. While the latter is still important, the case can be made that the former cluster is far more critical with regard to generating Outcomes. Once again, such a determination would be of particular value to practitioners in the field, who will benefit from guidance on where best to focus their time and attention.

Fifth, it would be beneficial to ascertain the extent to which decisions on specific Mechanisms will have an impact on other clusters or Mechanisms in a model. Academic research into such a relationship moves closer to the goal of taking disparate elements and generating a model for effective military assistance projects. Practitioners in this area would benefit from having some type of framework for the manner in which the various elements interact, and the guiding principles which could enhance the prospects of achieving the desired Outcomes.

Sixth, should the preceding steps be successfully undertaken, it would then be possible to consider whether a model could be generated which has predictive ability. As noted in Section 3.5.9, there is no requirement that the model actually has to be predictive. If a model can outline guiding principles for a complicated process or provide some order to the complexity of military assistance, that would be of utility for both academics and practitioners in the area. However, should the research on the previous points generate good results, it would be worthwhile to see whether a model with predictive ability could be constructed.

All of these points lead to the seventh and overarching recommendation that more research should be conducted on specific military assistance projects to see which were successful and the reasons for those Outcomes, and which were “failures” and what caused that result. On that count, it was rewarding to have received a request from those familiar with this thesis to use the material to produce a chapter for a book. The result was a chapter with the title “Baltic Military Cooperative Projects: a Record of Success” in a book published by the International Centre for Defence Studies in Estonia (Ito, 2013). The abstract from that article is provided in Appendix F of the Appendices. More such research and writing on specific initiatives would be of value to academics and practitioners working in the area to build the base of knowledge regarding the elements for success in military assistance programmes.

7.5 Final Thoughts

As the author conceded in Section 1.6, the reason for conducting this research arose from personal observation of the effort that went into BALTBAT and the other Baltic programmes, and a judgment that these initiatives were indeed
successful. The complementary observation was that there has been far too little analysis of why some military assistance projects succeed and why so many fail, with the result that initiatives are not built on an expanding base of knowledge about what works or what constitutes a prerequisite for success. The hope was that this research could provide a contribution to that base of knowledge, that it has identified elements which can be used as the basis for development of a model for effective military assistance initiatives, and that it has been of value to academics and practitioners working in this complex and challenging area.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

BALTIC MILITARY COOPERATIVE PROJECTS: CASE STUDY ON EFFECTIVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES

QUESTIONNAIRE

(items which may be of particular interest are highlighted in bold)

Privacy

May I quote you? ____________

If so, what name and title would you wish me to use?

___________________________________________________ ___________

Origin

1. It has been reported in the literature that Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces first raised the idea of a joint Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion at a meeting of Baltic military commanders in 1993. It was also reported that this idea came up from the ranks.

   • 1a. Is that consistent with your recollection?
   • 1b. If so, was it received enthusiastically by the political leadership in the Baltic states?

2. The MOU on Cooperation on formation of BALTBAT was signed by the Baltic states, the Nordic states and the UK in June 1994. The U.S., Germany, France and the Netherlands subsequently signed on as supporting states.

   • 2a. How was the BALTBAT concept first broached with the Nordic states and the UK?
   • 2b. Was there initial, strong enthusiasm among the Nordic states and UK for the project?
   • 2c. Which country (countries) voiced concerns?
   • 2d. Were they based on military, political, diplomatic or other concerns?
   • 2e. Was there a general recognition among the Nordic states and the UK that this was a long-term commitment to supporting the Baltic states?
2e. When was the decision taken to seek the support of the U.S., Germany, France and the Netherlands?

2f. How much of the BALTBAT development programme and timeline already was clear in June 1994?

2g. Was serious consideration ever given to providing traditional military assistance programs to the Baltic states for development of national defence capabilities?

2h. How large a role did NATO membership play in the thinking of planners of BALTBAT and the other Baltic projects?

3. One of the overriding concerns during this period was the reaction from Russia to any project which could involve provision of military assistance to the Baltic states.

3a. What was the level of concern regarding Russian reactions?

3b. Was peacekeeping selected as the area of assistance on the assumption it would be more acceptable to Moscow?

3c. Was the BALTBAT concept broached informally in any way with Russian authorities before the announcement of the project?

3d. From your perspective, what were the key Russian reactions when BALTBAT was announced in 1994?

3e. What were the key Russian reactions in subsequent years, as BALTBAT and the other Baltic programs developed?

4. There has been considerable discussion since BALTBAT was announced on the contribution it would make toward development of Baltic national defence capabilities. Some commentators have argued that BALTBAT was a “show piece” which diverted attention and resources from developing national defence.

4a. How prominent a factor in 1994 was the consideration that BALTBAT would need to make a contribution to development of Baltic national defence capabilities?

4b. How important was it for the Baltic states in particular at that time to have BALTBAT contribute to national capabilities?
• 4c. Ultimately, how extensive were the “spill-over” benefits from BALTBAT and the other Baltic cooperative projects to national defence forces?

• 4d. In retrospect, should there have been more focus on the extent to which BALTBAT and the other projects contributed to development of individual national defence forces?

Baltic State Participation

5. One of the key points emphasized in the MOU was that the Baltic states would assume responsibility for the project. In 1997, it appeared there was an intensified effort to achieve "Baltification."

• 5a. In retrospect, should the Baltic states have played a larger role from the onset of BALTBAT?

• 5b. Did the role and input of the Baltic states increase as the BALTBAT project progressed?

• 5c. Were there particular areas in which the Baltic states should have been pressed to assume a greater role?

• 5d. Was there more intensified Baltic state participation from the onset of BALTRON, BALTNET and BALTDEFCOL?

Coordination

6. The process for coordinating all aspects of BALTBAT has gotten high marks from commentators. The Steering Group and the Military Working Group did a good job handling their specific areas of responsibility and coordinating their work. The BALTBAT Training Teams seem to have been particularly valuable. With the addition of other Baltic programs, the initiation of the Baltic Security Assistance Group appears to have performed an important function.

• 6a. How would you characterize the oversight provided by the Steering Group?

• 6b. Were there policy disagreements within the Steering Group? If so, on what issues?

• 6c. How much latitude was left to the Military Working Group to set schedules and manage equipment delivery and training?

• 6d. How would you characterize the coordination between the Steering Group and the Military Working Group?

• 6e. How much latitude was left to the Training Teams?
• 6f. How would you describe the working relationship between the Training Teams and the Baltic military personnel?

• 6g. In retrospect, would you have any recommended changes to the operations of the Training Teams?

• 6h. How were decisions made on which offers of military equipment, training and other assistance would be accepted? How were decisions made on what additional assistance to request?

• 6i. In retrospect, should a mechanism like BALTSEA have been established with the initiation of BALTBAT?

• 6j. Was there concern about whether the three Baltic companies were ready for their separate deployments for peacekeeping duties?

• 6k. The literature indicates there was disagreement on the key question of whether BALTBAT, as a whole, was ready to be deployed. What are your recollections of the nature of that discussion and the positions taken by the various participants?

• 6l. Were there conscious efforts to find other areas in which Baltic military assistance cooperation could be established? Did BALTRON, BALTNET and BALTDEFCOL arise to utilize opportunities? Did they arise out of necessity?

General Comments

7. The Southern African Development Community is looking to generate a multinational peacekeeping force. The purpose of this study is to assess whether BALTBAT and the Baltic programs in general can provide a model which can be of use in providing effective military assistance programs, particularly multinational forces, and those particularly for peacekeeping missions. The model would focus on essential political decisions which are crucial to establishing a successful program.

• 7a. Do you believe that BALTBAT can serve to provide such a model?

• 7b. What are your views on some of the factors noted below as possible components of that model?
  o Assessment and utilization of available opportunities.
  o Establishing mechanisms that can maximize political and military assistance.
  o Establishing clear political goals.
  o Obtaining a long-term commitment from supporting states.
- Establishing a solid programme framework.
- Clarifying the linkage with other goals (such as development of national military forces).
- Establishing the process by which recipient countries handle more responsibilities.

- 7c. What additional factors would you recommend?

- 7d. Do you have recommendations on how to handle development of this model differently?
Haekkerup emphasized that the primary initial concern was to get Russian forces out of the Baltic states as quickly as possible. Indeed, he pressed for efforts, which ultimately failed, for Denmark to address the cost involved with officers returning to Russia. He candidly noted that the Baltic states had serious problems regarding their military forces. Their professional soldiers were Soviet-trained and needed substantial re-training.

On BALTBAT, Haekkerup said he made his initial pitch for the program to the other Nordic states, which were supportive. He emphasized that Denmark had options and room to act which the U.S. or Germany simply did not have. He stressed that peacekeeping was a good way to educate and train the Baltic forces, and was also less threatening to the Russians. Moreover, it was an area which allowed the Baltic forces to “learn by doing.”

Administratively, the Working Group and the Military Steering Group framework worked well for BALTBAT, noted Haekkerup. He stressed that it was critical to have a lead nation for such a challenging program, and Denmark was ready to assume that role. He added that he did not like the idea of pairing Nordic and Baltic states, although Finnish support for Estonia in a number of areas was an example of the kind of practical pairing that was taking place.

Haekkerup stressed that there was substantial Nordic solidarity on BALTBAT and strong support from the UK. The program then gradually was expanded to include the Netherlands, Germany and the U.S. He noted that there already had been extensive Nordic cooperation on efforts to bolster peacekeeping capabilities, as exemplified by the work on the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). However, he noted the concern that was generated when he pushed to get the Baltic forces immediately involved in peacekeeping efforts in Croatia. He recounted the “helicopter agreement” in which it was agreed that a Lithuanian platoon would be transported by Denmark to assist in Croatia, with Estonian and Latvia platoons subsequently participating. Norway thought that this Danish initiative competed with BALTBAT, but Haekkerup convinced Oslo that it supplemented that effort.

Danish-German-Polish cooperation, asserted Haekkerup, was also critical to the effort involving the Baltic states. The Baltics were concerned about the
attention in this other area, but Haekkerup stressed to the Baltic states that the region "needed two wings in order to fly."

There was no direct opposition from Moscow to BALTBAT from the outset, stressed Haekkerup, but everyone in the Nordic region was concerned about the Russian reaction. Certainly the Baltic states were nervous. Haekkerup commented that Russia later tried to dissuade and even split the Nordic states, particularly by trying to put Sweden in a position where they would not be comfortable supporting the NATO members, Denmark and Norway. He noted that at a stage the Russian Defence Minister even refused to talk to him.

Haekkerup plainly stated that Denmark had strongly pressed the case for supporting the Baltic states, adding that the record clearly showed that he had been particularly outspoken on their behalf. He added that German Defence Minister Ruehe was also critical on pushing the German-Danish-Polish effort. Haekkerup also noted that he did not always get what he wanted in the internal deliberations of Danish policy. For example, Haekkerup said he wanted the Baltics to work and be considered as three separate states. However the Danish policy was to focus on the united group of "Baltic states."

BALTBAT, continued Haekkerup, proved a good model to use in other areas of Baltic military cooperation: BALTRON, BALTNET and the BALTDEFCOL. As for BALTSEA, he noted that it was not really needed early on in the process, but became useful as the Baltic programs evolved and grew.

Haekkerup noted that he tried to get the Southern African Development Community to copy the BALTBAT model. However the effort fell apart due to the war in the Congo and developments in Zimbabwe. He also pushed to see if the Central Asian countries could also copy BALTBAT. In short, emphasized Haekkerup, "BALTBAT is a good model."

There was Nordic disagreement on the deployment of BALTBAT as a whole for peacekeeping operations. Haekkerup said that he thought BALTBAT as a whole could deploy, but the others disagreed and felt BALTBAT was not ready. The result, commented Haekkerup, was simply to proceed with what was politically feasible with BALTBAT component companies from the three Baltic states separately participating in peacekeeping missions.

With regard to the levels of enthusiasm of other Nordic states, Haekkerup noted that Norway was especially conservative on BALTBAT. He added that while Sweden had pursued a policy of neutrality for 200 years, the Swedes certainly did "deliver the goods" with regard to Baltic assistance. Haekkerup also noted that there were domestic political advantages to Denmark from Nordic assistance. One Danish political party objected to military sales, so the label of a "Nordic package" made it easier to get Parliamentary approval for military assistance.
Returning to the issue of practical training, Haekkerup noted that training on old Danish material was good for the Baltic states. More generally, the value of BALTBAT also came as a unit that could serve as an example for the Baltic military establishments. The examples, practices and processes could filter down to other levels, especially as BALTBAT exercised with other Baltic units.

As for BALTIFICATION, Haekkerup emphasized that the Baltic states were not ready to assume more responsibility for the projects at the onset. He was surprised at how quickly the Baltic states developed their capabilities. On the issue of BALTBAT decision-making, Denmark had the lead, but all the key decisions were made in common. Similarly, on BALTRON, the Germans had the lead, but concurrence from the others was needed.

Russia increasingly soured as the BALTBAT project proceeded, noted Haekkerup. Moscow's criticism of NATO enlargement fed the criticism of BALTBAT. The Nordic states increased their efforts to engage with Russia, even offering military cooperation, but the Russians declined. Instead, Moscow tried increasingly to divide the Nordic states, but failed, which Haekkerup attributed to Nordic solidarity on military and non-military projects.

All the Baltic programs, commented Haekkerup, were made to make the case that the Baltic states were ready for NATO membership. The range of initiatives was key to helping the Baltic self-assurance and improving capabilities.

Speaking candidly, Haekkerup noted that the Baltics could have ended up like the Balkans. However, the Nordic states "took the Baltics by the hands and guided them." Citing a particularly sensitive example, Haekkerup said the Nordic states took great pains to make the point to the Baltic states that they needed to handle the Russian minority populations with sensitivity.

Haekkerup emphasized that there was no blue-print or policy for Denmark to follow in this critical period. But, he stressed, that is how leaders have to respond when sailing in uncharged waters. There was an opportunity that Haekkerup and Denmark seized. The will to take that action was decisive. And critically, added Haekkerup, the Nordic countries, in signing up to BALTBAT, understood that they were making a long-term commitment to provide support to the Baltic states in a crucial area.
APPENDIX C

Matrix of Mechanisms Noted by Interviewees

Mechanisms as listed in Section 5.2.1. Mechanisms 5a on NATO membership and 5b on development of national defence capabilities have been combined as Mechanism 5.

1) - Assessment of Regional Security Concerns
2) - Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance
3) - A Constant Source of Support
4) - A Long-Term Political Commitment
5) - Connection to Larger Goals
6) - Development of New Leadership
7) - Direction and Control by Donor States
8) - Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States
9) - Flexibility in Planning
10) - Good Organizational Structures
11) - A Strong Lead Nation
12) - Leadership From Key Individuals
Interviewees

Interviewees are listed in the same order as in the Dramatis Personae on pages xiii and xiv.

1. Abols, Gunnar
2. Andrusyszyn, Walter
3. Brett, Julian
4. Carlsen, Per
5. Clemmesen, Michael
6. Donnelly, Chris
7. Ellemann-Jensen, Uffe
8. Fischer, Kristian
9. Godal, Bjorn Tove
10. Haekkerup, Hans
11. Hannibalsson, Jon Baldvin
12. Herd, Graham
13. Johnson, Garry
14. Kolga, Margus
15. Laneman, Alar
16. Lawrence, Anthony
17. Linkevicius, Linas
18. Mackenzie, Jeremy
19. Molis, Arunas
20. Saar, Valeri
21. Schvede, Igor
22. Sibul, Eric
23. Tori, Erkki
25. A Latvian official.
27. A retired US military officer.
APPENDIX D

Coding Sample

Mechanism 12 - Leadership From Key Individuals

_Clemmesen:_ Clemmesen began by noting his view that the most important factor for the success of the Western assistance to the Baltic states involved the personalities and commitment of key individuals. Former Danish Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen was a driving force on Danish support for Baltic independence. Former Danish Defence Minister Haekkerup and former Chief of Defence Lyng were instrumental in formulating Danish policy and generating action. Clemmesen stated that Haekkerup was "emotionally attached" to Eastern Europe, and particularly to the Baltic states, due to his time as leader of the NATO Parliamentarians. Lyng was strongly influenced by the fact that the Baltic states did not enjoy the liberation which Western Europe experienced in 1945, and instead suffered under Russian domination in the USSR. Clemmesen commented that it was Lyng who actually began the effort to provide aid to the Baltic states, working with former Defence Minister Enggaard, Haekkerup's predecessor, and then with Haekkerup.

However, stressed Clemmesen, UK policy towards the Baltic States reinforces the point of the importance of individuals in driving national policy. Clemmesen said that UK Defence Attache in Riga John (Janis) Kazocins, the son of Latvian refugees, led the UK effort to be much more supportive of the Baltic states, a position he also pushed with other states. Similarly, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ron Asmus pushed the development of US policy toward the Baltic states. Asmus and a small, important group of officials at the Department of Defence who strongly supported the Baltic projects, made the difference in formulating US policy.

Clemmesen stressed that Danish leadership was essential to turning the policy concept into a reality. The key individual was Danish Under Secretary for Defence Per Carlsen.

Clemmesen noted that Carlsen was the official who addressed practical concerns. Subsequently, the later head of the Military Working Group, Colonel Jacobsen, was the individual who addressed details and made BALTBAT work.

_Donnelly:_ Donnelly reiterated that the initial Western view was not a strong commitment to the Baltic states. That then changed due to the people who took charge and pushed hard to get Western aid to the Baltic states.

_Haekkerup:_ Haekkerup emphasized that there was no blue-print or policy for Denmark to follow in this critical period. But, he stressed, that is how leaders have to respond when sailing in uncharged waters. There was an opportunity that Haekkerup and Denmark seized. The will to take that action was decisive.
Johnson: Denmark was certainly the most active from the start, and Danish MOD Under Secretary Per Carlsen was the driving force.

Laneman: The selection of key personnel was very good. "People come first, not the papers." Capable leaders like Danish MOD Under Secretary Carlsen made the project work. The Danish head of the Working Group was tough, but drove the process.

Linkevicius: Danish Defence Minister Haekkerup's efforts were essential to success. In 1994, continued Linkevicius, he and Haekkerup were flying to Vilnius in a helicopter when they discussed the prospects of sending a Lithuanian platoon to Croatia to serve under Danish military supervision. Agreement was reached, and upon landing, the two notified a very surprised Danish MOD Under Secretary Carlsen. Linkevicius stated that at point there was no Lithuanian legal basis for the action and certainly no experience in handling such a military task. As a result, the Lithuanians had to develop the legal basis, which included a major effort to get approval from the Lithuanian Parliament.

Returning to personalities, Linkevicius re-emphasized that if Haekkerup had not been there, none of the Baltic assistance programmes would have worked. There were dangers involved in the key decisions. The Lithuanian troops sent to the Balkans could have suffered casualties, and if that happened, that could have had a negative impact on all the Baltic regional activities.

With regard to the key issues for success, Linkevicius emphasized that personalities were important in driving the Baltic initiatives forward. It was strong leadership which kept things moving in the right direction and worked out solutions to problems.

Saar: Ultimately, noted Saar, an energetic Norwegian Brigadier General was designated the project leader for BALTNET, and he made things happen. From the concept to the details, he drove the process and generated good coordination and results on BALTNET.

Schvede: Schvede stressed that personalities were key in the BALTRN process. National positions depended on who represented a supporting state at a meeting. The UK and Norway were always solidly supportive. So on communications (Danish lead) and diving (Norwegian lead), results were achieved and the work progressed well. In the case of some countries, it depended on the representative.

A Latvian official: The Danes were very good at leading the project, and MOD Under Secretary Carlsen was particularly important in making BALTBAT work. The Steering Group, Working Group and Training Teams were good mechanisms to make BALTBAT a reality. But they all depended on personalities, referring again to the importance of the role played by Carlsen. A good Training Team commander was essential for good results and avoiding or resolving problems.
APPENDIX E

Cluster of Mechanisms

Political Military Planning
- Assessment of Regional Security Concerns
- Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance
- Connection to Larger Goals

Steadfast Donor Support
- A Constant Source of Support
- A Long-Term Political Commitment
- Direction and Control by Donor States
- A Strong Lead Nation
- Leadership from Key Individuals

Establishing Permanent Strengths
- Development of New Leadership
- Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States

Sufficient Flexibility
- Flexibility in Planning
- Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance
- Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States

Clear Structures and Lines of Authority
- Good Organizational Structures
- A Strong Lead Nation
- Direction and Control by Donor States
APPENDIX F

Abstract submitted for ‘Baltic Military Cooperative Projects: a Record of Success’

After regaining independence, the Baltic states undertook a number of cooperative regional military projects in the 1990s with the support of numerous Western countries. In particular, the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) was a good example of a capable multinational military unit, as well as a basis for efficient Western support for the Baltic states to modernize their military forces. BALTBAT became the model for other Baltic programs: the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL).

This chapter analyses the Baltic projects, particularly BALTBAT, and makes the case that they serve as a good model for effective military assistance programs, especially in the areas of multinational forces and development of peacekeeping capabilities. While there is attention to the specific military steps taken to develop these projects, the focus is on critical political decisions, such as the selection of a focus on peacekeeping, the assumption of responsibilities by the Baltic states at the appropriate time, and the significance of the long-term political commitment of the Western supporting states to the Baltic states.