Anglo-French Defence Cooperation in the Age of Austerity

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France has no friends, only interests. Charles de Gaulle

We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual . . . Lord Palmerston

Background

On 2 November 2010, UK Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy signed the Anglo-French Defence Co-Operation Treaty. It is comprised of an overarching treaty on defence cooperation as well as a subordinate treaty related to joint nuclear facilities. The Letter of Intent signed by the Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Defence Staff of both countries noted increasing interoperability between the armed forces of the UK and France as a major goal, as well as a number of separate joint initiatives including jointly developing a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force as a non-standing bilateral capability, developing the ability to deploy a UK-French integrated carrier strike group incorporating assets owned by both countries and aligning (wherever possible) logistics arrangements.

Previous attempts at Anglo-French cooperation, most recently the St. Malo declaration of December 1998, have not always achieved the level of bilateral cooperation that was initially anticipated. Nor did St. Malo serve as the foundation for a larger European effort to generate defence capability. It is apparent that the more recent treaty is driven by budgetary pressures pushing a shift in policy toward greater bilateral cooperation, particularly in the area of defence acquisition. The subsequent cooperation between London and Paris in Libya as well as the more recent support afforded by the British to French operations in Mali underscore the benefits of greater bilateral coordination. Such bilateral relationships are however, often subject to events in the wider political arena, as the dispute at the end of 2011 regarding the Euro showed, although in this case, no lasting damage seems to have been done.

This paper seeks to assess, from a predominantly UK perspective, the potential benefits of such enhanced Anglo-French defence cooperation, not only to the two countries concerned but also to Western Europe and the USA. The paper will mainly focus on defence cooperation and not the subordinate agreement regarding limited cooperation on nuclear weapons, which addressed cooperation on the safety and security of nuclear weapons, stockpile certification and countering nuclear and radiological terrorism but seemed to be driven by "acute financial pressures, symptomatic of severe structural deficiencies".

Past and Present

Enhanced defence cooperation between the UK and France would appear to be a natural fit. In 2010, the UK defence budget was around €43.4bn (£36.4 bn) and the French budget around €39.2 bn. Defence spending was between 3.5 – 5% of total government spending in both countries. The two combined defence budgets were just under half of all European defence spending (€82.6bn compared to €193.5bn) and accounted for around seventy-five percent of research and development spending (€6.48bn compared to €8.56bn). RAND has
estimated that by 2015, combined UK and French defence budgets could be around sixty-five percent of EU defence spending.\(^8\)

There has been a long-standing record of Anglo-French defence coordination. They had already established a Franco-British European Air Group (1994), completed a Letter of Intent on naval cooperation (1996), as well as a Letter of Intent on cooperation between the two armies (1997) and established a Joint Commission on Peacekeeping (1996) to harmonise peacekeeping procedures and doctrine. The two established a High-Level Working Group in 2006 to promote closer cooperation in armaments programmes. On the other hand, the history of Anglo-French defence acquisition cooperation has been mixed. There were successful programs in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. Puma, Gazelle and Jaguar) and the establishment of MBDA, Europe's leading manufacturer of guided weapons. However, there have been notable failures. For example, the UK dropped out of the Trigat anti-tank missile, the Trimilsatcom communications satellite programme and the Horizon Common New Generation Frigate project.\(^9\) The new agreement sees a move towards a joint BAE Systems-Dassault developed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)\(^10\), French interest in the British 'Watchkeeper' system\(^11\), "a joint Future Combat Air System Demonstration Programme" and two studies by MBDA, the first into a future cruise missile and the second into a future anti-ship weapon.\(^12\)

At the 17 February 2012 UK-France Summit, the two leaders reemphasized their commitment to do more in the area of defence cooperation. They noted that the 2010 agreement has led to expansion of cooperation "in every major field: capabilities, industry, operations and intelligence".\(^13\) After analyzing the Libya operation, the two countries "have decided to prioritise our joint work in the key areas of: command and control; information systems; intelligence, surveillance, targeting and reconnaissance; and precision munitions".\(^14\) They also noted that the Libya experience reinforced the desire to set up the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force\(^15\) and the two nations will establish a Combined Joint Forces Headquarters by 2016\(^16\), something that has been underlined with the UK support to French operations in Mali.\(^17\)

**Rationale**

**Policy**

To determine what the Anglo-French Treaty may mean for the USA and Western Europe, it is important to assess the driving forces behind this renewed effort at Anglo-French defence cooperation. The question is whether the Anglo-French Treaty is "a new departure or simply the latest twist in the centuries-old Anglo-French tussle for power? It is probably a bit of both" and "if Britain and France are to remain European powers with global reach they will need to share a vision of the big picture and stick to it".\(^18\) Put even more bluntly . . .

"Defence cooperation between Britain and France is and must always be about power. The alternative is the decline of both countries, along with the rest of a Europe that seems to accept weakness as strength, equating an inability to act as meaning no need to act in the hope that danger simply bypasses a continent too weak to matter any longer."\(^19\)

There are two main reasons for working with other countries on defence and security procurement. Firstly, the UK may wish to take advantage of the economies of scale that become possible when working with another country. Secondly, there is an opportunity to
harmonise requirements, pool resources, share facilities and overhead costs and benefit from longer production runs. This allows both countries to spread the cost and risk of research and acquisition, as well as to secure better value from our respective investments. Such bilateral cooperation will generally favour technology, equipment and support issues as it is believed to offer the best balance of advantages and disadvantages and working closely will enable both countries to improve access to each others defence markets and explore areas for greater industrial and technological cooperation, especially in those areas that are critical for maintaining key capabilities.

James Arbuthnot, the Chairman of the UK House of Commons Defence Select Committee, provided a similarly frank assessment in providing an overarching view of Anglo-French cooperation.20 Arbuthnot stated that the opportunity to cooperate with France is one which the UK cannot pass up. Certainly, he added, there are suspicions between the UK and France. The UK is always suspicious of what France can or wishes to do but in some ways the two countries are like brothers: while they quarrel, what unites them is more than what divides them. General Sir Kevin O'Donoghue, Chief of Defence Materiel at the UK Ministry of Defence until 2011, concurred that the two countries have roughly the same capabilities and policy views. Bilateral cooperation is clearly logical for both the UK and France.21

Budgets

The impact of the age of austerity for the UK and France in spurring a desire for defence cooperation cannot be overstated. Arbuthnot conceded that scarce resources are a key driving force for increased cooperation but he emphasized that there are also shared threats and responses which makes Anglo-French defence cooperation easier to develop. Indeed, "it is apparent that the strong aspiration will be to achieve a specific quantum of savings".22 In the UK, the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) mandated a cut of around eight percent in UK defence spending in real terms over four years.23 As a result, "there is a chance that the budgetary crisis in the UK will push the government to recognise that potential savings can be made to the defence budget by cooperating more closely with France on armaments."24

With regard to France, "a senior French military officer believes that the defence cuts in France in future are likely to be 'unprecedented' with 'big decisions' on major programmes necessary".25 While Defence Minister Morin announced a reduction of three percent in the defence budget, the future may hold even further reductions.26 Such tight budgets necessitate a focus on how best to generate military capability from scarce resources and "the French Government has also been interested above all in capabilities and force effectiveness."27

However, some analysts warn against placing too much emphasis on funding problems as the motivator behind the Anglo-French Treaty, arguing that there are more fundamental issues involved – "it would be wrong to see Franco-British defence cooperation as driven purely by a short-term need to balance the books" given that several of these initiatives were already underway before the economic crisis.28 If the Anglo-French treaty is indeed driven purely by immediate budgetary considerations, this raises questions regarding the long term prospects:

"The Franco-British treaties, although signed for a 50-year period, focus on the short-term need for capabilities. A number of crucial questions therefore remain. What will happen when the British and French economies recover? Will the two countries' strategic differences re-emerge?"29


Practical Considerations

It can also be argued that the intentions behind this latest Anglo-French effort are quite practical, and are focused on the need to simply maintain credible military capabilities:

"For now, Franco-British defence cooperation is driven primarily by an aspiration in both countries to retain access to a full spectrum of military capabilities . . . to sustain their national defence capabilities for core sovereign obligations . . . to contribute to bilateral and European missions".30

With an eye to maintaining

"military credibility in the eyes of the United States. The many similarities and shared vital interests of France and the UK underpin, but do not drive, the initiative. The end-goal is to retain access to military capability, whether that is through mutual dependence on each other's industrial base and armed forces, or through pooling and sharing capability".31

Thus, while London and Paris wish to retain credibility in Washington's eyes, national sovereignty is also a key consideration. The UK and France are motivated by the desire to retain the ability "to pursue independent foreign policies".32

There is the potential for broader and more mutually beneficial Anglo-French cooperation. This includes combined joint operations and training, aligning joint concepts and doctrine, capabilities and equipment, unmanned air systems, closer alignment of military and industrial capabilities and a range of priority R&T activities across air, maritime and land domains. With regard to practical examples of defence cooperation, the UK and France have agreed to work on the next generation of Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) unmanned air surveillance systems based on a joint industrial partnership, and to develop a common support plan for the A-400M transport fleet. There is also discussion of an arrangement whereby France could use some of the extra capacity in the UK Future Strategic Tanker aircraft.33

Making it Work (or Not) – Key Factors

Political Leadership

There appears to be widespread agreement that political leadership is essential to making bilateral cooperation work. With regard to St. Malo, "the wars in Yugoslavia and rising tensions in Kosovo had pushed Tony Blair towards a Franco-British defence agreement in order to enhance the EU's capabilities for intervention."34 In fact, the Bosnia crisis was a "major challenge to Britain's defence identity" and strengthened "Britain's sense of belonging to a European political community."35 Later, the Kosovo crisis highlighted "Europe's relative military impotence".36 St. Malo highlights two questions. The first is whether Anglo-French defence cooperation can survive if bilateral relations are strained over other issues. The St. Malo spirit was dashed by the sharp policy divisions regarding Iraq and reflected the divergent political views across the Channel.37

The second issue is the extent to which this bilateral push is a creation of the political leadership. If that is the case, then it raises two points. The first was whether it could survive
a change in leadership. From a UK perspective, this revolved around whether French enthusiasm would continue should President Sarkozy fail to win another term in office. In the event, Francois Hollande won the May 2012 election and although it is still relatively early in his administration, seems to be generally supportive of the relationship and France's renewed role in NATO. From the UK perspective, the high-level commitment to bilateral cooperation was manifest in the prompt response from London to assist France in its military operations in Mali.

The second question was to what degree bilateral cooperation has become 'business as usual' within the two bureaucracies. Addressing these issues, Arbuthnot stressed that the high-level political push on Anglo-French cooperation is essential, particularly with regard to bilateral commercial success. He conceded that the on-going difficulties with the Euro could well remain critical but noted that when he and the Deputy Chair of the Defence Select Committee went to Paris soon after the dispute on the Euro, UK and French officials were very clearly determined to ensure that bilateral defence cooperation continued. On the question of the level of support for bilateral cooperation below the political leadership, O'Donoghue commented that there are lots of challenges and mistrust which must be overcome. He asserted that the MoD leadership has bought into Anglo-French cooperation but with regard to farther down in the UK bureaucracy, the level of support is mixed.

Fundamentally, Anglo-French defence cooperation will only work as well as the politicians want it to work. For example, OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en matière d'Armement) was set up to handle the through-life management of collaborative European defence equipment programmes and has six European members, including the UK and France. It had impressive early results but then, the politicians walked away and left it to the bureaucrats to manage and in the absence of political leadership, the result was an ethos of 'not' making decisions – no-one was there "to bang heads together." Indeed, this would apply to any effort, and the key is whether there is real political support in London and Paris to make Anglo-French defence cooperation work. "If bureaucratic and industrial obstacles can be overcome, there is a clear path to substantial cost savings and interoperability gains". However, there is a risk that the Anglo-French effort could founder due to simple bureaucratic inertia:

"Ministries of Defence in both London and Paris have highly effective 'immune systems', notorious for rejecting new ideas. It can be challenging enough to embed change within the confines of a single department, never mind across different departments in two different countries."x

Practical Experience and Libya

It is apparent that the efforts in the Libya campaign have been a boost for Anglo-French bilateral defence cooperation. Nick Harvey, UK Minister for the Armed Forces, told a UK Parliamentary Committee that it was "undoubtedly ... a significant success" and that "we are pleased to have demonstrated the ability of the UK and France to act together in a leading role in the way that we have, which is encouraging for the future."x

Certainly, there were positive aspects of the Libya experience such as the solid UK-French air and maritime cooperation. However, the Libya campaign exposed difficulties in communications, different concepts of operation, gaps in intelligence sharing and a problem with aligning political ambition with military capabilities. Most importantly, there were
problems in sharing classified information. Whether that particular issue can be resolved is down to whether the UK can expand its exchanges with Paris while not risking its arrangements with Washington. While there are agreements in place between the UK and France to share intelligence, they are "lower-key" and "enhanced intelligence-sharing will be critical" to enhanced bilateral cooperation.

Taking a wider perspective on the lessons from Libya, Arbuthnot noted that it was positive that the US gave the Europeans the opportunity to take the lead. Ultimately, the US provided assistance when it became necessary to address European capability shortfalls. But the Libya operation, stressed Arbuthnot, reminded Europeans of their obligations, highlighted the gaps in their military capabilities, and allowed the US to press Europe to fill those gaps.

The problems in intelligence sharing during Libya operations highlights some of the practical difficulties with enhancing defence cooperation. For example, there are questions as to the extent to which the UK and France might be able to work together with regard to their aircraft carriers, with the treaty citing the creation of an integrated carrier strike group. There is still uncertainty as to whether the UK will bring both carriers fully into service and the decision to go back to the F-35B variant (i.e. no 'cats' and 'traps') will severely limit interoperability with the French Navy. In addition, both countries budgetary and financial systems are different from one another.

Multinational Cooperation

In general, multinational defence acquisition has been beneficial to the UK. A report from the National Audit Office (NAO) in 2001, noted that

"Cooperation in defence research offers economic and technology benefits, generating a 5:1 return on the Department's £40 million annual investment on joint research programmes and providing knowledge with an annual value of approximately £280 million at minimal cost through information exchange programmes." In general terms, the NAO assessed that cooperative defence acquisition can bring economic benefits due to cost-sharing and economies of scale. Moreover, it can enhance interoperability with Allies as well as develop technological competence and influence industrial restructuring. With regard to OCCAR, the NAO noted that it offers "the opportunity for significant improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of European cooperative procurement".

However, the overall conclusions by the NAO on multinational defence cooperation are that

"Cooperation adds another layer of complexity to the challenge of procuring equipments within time, cost and performance parameters and subsequently supporting them in-service. The track record of defence equipment cooperation to date has been mixed. Whilst there have been economic, political, military and industrial benefits, on significant numbers of cooperative procurement programmes, not all of the potential benefits have been secured."

Industrial Cooperation

The 2012 Summit declaration placed great emphasis on bilateral defence industrial cooperation which may, over the long-term, be more valuable than practical military
cooperation. For that reason, it is notable that "the treaties have been warmly received by the defence industries of both countries". One of the goals of expanded bilateral cooperation was to provide support for defence industries in both countries which are facing reduced defence spending as "by moving closer to commonly set equipment requirements, the treaty was intended to promote stepped-up cross-channel industrial ties between the two nations".

At the lower level, there have been successful bilateral projects, which do not get much attention, with marine engines being a good example. They are not high-profile items, but they are built on an existing relationship and there is a solid commercial basis for the work. Cooperation works, assuming it's underpinned by commercial logic. Critically, this removes the bureaucracy as a hindrance although the question arises whether Anglo-French industrial cooperation is actually possible across the board or might have to be limited to smaller, non-controversial areas such as marine engines. If it has broader applicability, how would the UK and France protect their national interests i.e. which items are appropriate for cooperation?

There are however, numerous obstacles to cooperation on defence acquisition as "sensible defence procurement between Britain and France means that those two proud and sometimes arrogant nations have to concede political, technical and manufacturing grounds to one another and accept some form of loss of independence, concessions on foreign policy, intrusions in the shaping of industry, and last but not least the inevitable jobs casualties".

There are clear differences on defence procurement. France has "traditionally retained a protectionist attitude towards its defence sector, which is in large part owned by the state". The UK approach has been to subject the defence market to market forces. Moreover, while France's industrial relations "are more oriented towards Europe" UK industries retain strong ties with the US.

UK defence procurement is "a clear means to a clear end - that is to equip the defence forces". On the other hand, the French policy aim is to be "pro-active in contributing to the building of a European defence base with a strong French footprint. This is mainly to be able to compete and/or establish partnerships with U.S. companies, on an equal foothold. The means to achieve this goal remains a direct interventionist policy, enforced by an elite administration." Moreover, there are fundamental conflicts between the behaviour of the two countries regarding defence acquisition. For example, the UK declares its intention for cooperation early while the French declare it late when they have a solution they want others to buy into. There are thus many practical hurdles to be overcome in obtaining greater defence industrial cooperation. The then-UK Defence Secretary Fox highlighted the need for UK firms to have better access to French military procurement projects. For their part, the French "regard the British as unreliable partners, too subject to political whim and the sudden cancellation of or adjustment to programmes". However,

"even a cursory analysis of the defence economics and costs of production in Britain and France suggests that it is only through greater synergy between their defence industries that any MoDicum of affordability and security of supply and re-supply will be assured."
Arbuthnot concurred with many of these points but emphasized that these are not insurmountable obstacles, and the value of the bilateral defence cooperation should be considerable and can overcome these, stressing that there is a fundamental logic for Anglo-French cooperation. O'Donoghue commented that industry has to change, and the MoDs in London and Paris need to work to smooth the path. He noted that government cannot change the goals of industry, but it can influence how industry's goals evolve. For example, the UK does not necessarily want the ability to cut steel for future armoured vehicles, it requires the ability to integrate complex systems and sub-systems. If that is a clear government policy, industry will then change its perspective.

**Cutting Edge Technology**

The 2012 Summit declaration had a particular emphasis on high-tech equipment cooperation, especially on UAVs. A logical step, given that both BAE Systems and Dassault have capabilities in that area but their respective domestic markets are only likely to generate requirements of forty to fifty units each. Should cooperation succeed, it could lead to further work on future unmanned aerial combat systems, which could become Europe-wide. It will however, be interesting to see if such cooperation is possible, given competition in other areas, such as the recent Indian choice of the Rafale (Dassault) over that of the Eurofighter (BAE Systems). Investment in this area needs to be positioned for the long-term, something the French already do with their thirty-year equipment plan (updated annually) and something the UK is keen to do, in its maintenance of a baseline of spending 1.2% of the defence budget (around £400m annually) on science and technology. Indeed, the agreement concerning a ten-year strategic plan for the UK and French complex weapons sector "makes sense if it does lead to the creation of a single European prime contractor (and realizes 30% savings as envisaged)."

Arbuthnot noted that work in this area should be seen in the broader context of the Western alliance. The large US firms clearly have an advantage in this sector and so there is a logic to increased UK-French cooperation. However, concerns remain, especially over each other's intellectual property, an obstacle that has to be overcome with openness and a movement towards greater transparency. O'Donoghue stated that even before the treaty, it was clear there had to be greater cooperation, especially in the area of complex weapons, as R&D in this area is too expensive for each country to properly fund alone. Admittedly, it's taken a long time for the defence industries in both countries to warm to the idea of increased cooperation and requires continued political support to make it happen.

**Reaction from Europe**

While the treaty has not been met with universal approval, with Germany being uneasy over "an exclusive Franco-British agreement" and tensions with the rest of Europe, it could provide the first steps towards "more joint action in European defence procurement." Indeed, "Anglo-French defence cooperation would be a pioneer group par excellence for the rest of Europe" and could benefit the EU more generally by "stemming the deterioration of British and French military capabilities, on which EU deployments rely." Both the UK and France have expressed exasperation with the rest of the EU over the lack of will to maintain defence capabilities but at the same time have to take care to avoid the treaty seeming too exclusive so as not to "cause divisions among European states". Cooperation on projects that are initially bilateral could (in time) be opened up to other European states, although the UK has had its fingers burned with multinational projects such as those mentioned above and
the A400-M\textsuperscript{71}, having "tired of the delays and haggling that often accompany multilateral European procurements, the UK now firmly prefers collaborative procurement on a bilateral basis."\textsuperscript{72} A view reinforced by the SDSR which only mentioned France and the USA as countries which the UK was keen to do business with.\textsuperscript{75}

Arbuthnot commented that is was too early to tell if there would be further European initiatives as a result of the Anglo-French treaty but any action that diluted Anglo-French cooperation should be resisted. Other European states should decide whether or not to join the existing defence arrangement, or if it's defence industrial cooperation, it should be based on an already established Anglo-French arrangement or project. O'Donoghue concurred strongly with Arbuthnot, stating a dislike of multinational projects, but supports bilateral programs. With regard to future European efforts in defence cooperation, the Anglo-French path this is the one and only road that should be followed. This raises the question as to whether the wider effort to maintain a broader European defence capability is doomed to failure, given "the summit took place against the backdrop of a loss of interest in the CSDP within Paris and, to an even greater extent, London".\textsuperscript{74} Indeed, it could be said that

"EU defence efforts are doomed to flounder if there is no enthusiasm from the only two EU countries with extensive experience in expeditionary warfare and global ambitions in security, and which between them account for nearly half of Europe's defence spending."\textsuperscript{75}

**US Interest**

Therein is the reason for the US to support the Anglo-French efforts and hope it succeeds. The implications for the US of Anglo-French cooperation are quite clear: they constitute the best hope of providing a vehicle or framework for European Allies to develop defence capabilities, especially given the US policy focus is shifting towards Asia. With European defence budgets having shrunk over the last decade, economic difficulties making it unlikely that there will be any major increases in the near future and an absence of political will to spend large sums on defence, one hope for the US of getting more defence capabilities out of Europe is that others will join an effort driven by London and Paris.

One key condition of success would be the support of the US, assuming that it did not view the agreement as competition and clashing with its global role as leader of the Western world. In actuality, this is unlikely to be the case, and the US "has a crucial role to play in making the case for the treaties and other examples of bilateral cooperation that would benefit both NATO and the EU"\textsuperscript{76} perceiving the "Anglo-French Defence Treaty as a potential catalyst for creating . . . greater cooperation on conventional capabilities in Europe".\textsuperscript{77} Many commentators remain critical about the state of European defence capability and "the central challenge for both Britain and France is that much of the European continent remains on strategic vacation"\textsuperscript{78} and so "Franco-British defence cooperation is thus not just vital for London and Paris but for a Europe that is dangerously and strategically adrift".\textsuperscript{79}

Both Arbuthnot and O'Donoghue stated that the US should encourage Anglo-French cooperation and that such cooperation could encourage Europe to "get its act together" ultimately benefiting the US if more and more countries are working towards increasing military capability in a broader sense while making the best use of limited resources. O'Donoghue also said that as part of that cooperation, there is a degree of specialisation with regard different areas of capability. For example, both the UK and France have superb engineers while some technology that is produced in the UK is better than that produced in
the US. A Pan-European defence industrial capability, built upon a foundation of Anglo-French defence industrial cooperation could compete with the big US firms, something the US government ought to welcome, even if the US industry doesn't.

Conclusion

From the literature, public statements, interviews, and, above all, actions, it is clear that the Anglo-French defence initiative is driven by practical considerations including the reduction in defence budgets due to the economic recession and reductions in public expenditure but with policy factors which promote enhanced cooperation. The French return to the NATO integrated military command and the policies pursued by the Sarkozy government have made it easier for London to seek greater bilateral efforts. It should be noted that the clearly stated US shift in emphasis towards Asia has also prompted the UK to re-evaluate the extent to which it needs to focus more on European Allies which could assist in generating defence capabilities.

The proposition can be put forth that the primary concern for the UK, France, Western Europe and the US lies in how to ensure that the Anglo-French initiative succeeds. If it does indeed meet the goals that have been set forth, it would assist London and Paris in becoming more capable Allies and could even be the foundation for other European states to participate and develop their military capabilities. US dissatisfaction with the overall European effort in the Libyan campaign was quite apparent. However, there is no indication that European governments are ready to do more on defence, especially with continued economic problems in the Eurozone. Criticism alone from Washington will have a difficult time overcoming the lack of political will and financial resources in European capitals for effective national action. The Anglo-French efforts may at least provide a vehicle for channelling scarce resources into more effective defence spending.

1 This journal article is based on research carried out for a paper and presentation given at the 9th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 15 – 17 May 2012.
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18 p. 6.
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14 Ibid. paragraph 7.
15 Ibid. paragraph 9.
16 Ibid. paragraph 14.
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21 Interview with General Sir Kevin O'Donoghue, former Chief of Defence Materiel on 17 January 2012 in the Centre for Defence Acquisition. All further references to what he said in the text refer to this interview.
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31 Ibid. p. 5.
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36 Ibid. p. 293.
38 Op Cit. Bickerton, p. 117.
40 Ibid. p. 33.
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44 Op Cit. Lindley-French, p. 16.
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50 Op Cit. Gomis, p. 16.
51 Op Cit. IISS, Vol. 17, Comment 47.
54 Ibid.
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57 Op Cit. Lindley-French, p. 17.
58 Ibid.
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60 Op Cit. IISS, Vol. 16, Comment 41.
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70 Op Cit. Jones, p. 5.
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