

CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY

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Interplay between Network Configurations and Network Governance
Mechanisms in Supply Networks

A Systematic Literature Review

Cranfield School of Management
Master by Research

MRes
Academic Year: 2011 - 2012

Supervisor: Dr. Marko Bastl
October, 2012

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ABSTRACT

Purpose: This work systematically reviews the extant academic management literature on supply networks. It specifically examines how network configurations and network governance mechanisms influence each other in supply networks.

Design: 125 analytical and empirical studies were identified using an evidence-based approach to review the literature mainly published between 1985 and 2012.

Synthesis: Drawing on a multi-disciplinary theoretical foundation, this work develops an integrative framework to identify three distinct yet interdependent themes that characterize the study of supply networks: a) Network Configurations (structures and relationships); b) Network Governance Mechanisms (formal and informal); and c) The Interplay between Network Configurations and Network Governance Mechanisms.

Findings: Network configurations and network governance mechanisms mutually influence each other and cannot be considered in isolation. Formal and informal governance mechanisms provide better control when used as complements rather than as substitutes. The choice of governance mechanism depends on the nature of exchange; role of management; desired level of control; level of flexibility in formal contracts; and complementary role of formal and informal governance mechanism.

Research implications: This nascent field has thematic and methodological research opportunities for academics. Comparative network analysis using longitudinal case studies offers a rich area for further study.

Practical Implications: The complexity surrounding the conflicting roles of managers at the organisation and network levels poses a significant challenge during the development and implementation stage of strategic network policies.

Originality/value: This review reveals that formal and informal governance mechanisms provide better control when used as complements rather than as substitutes.

Keywords: Systematic literature review; supply chain management, trust, power, structures, relationships

Paper type: Literature review

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

This dissertation presents a systematic review of literature aimed at discovering the ways in which network configurations and network governance mechanisms influence each other in supply networks. The method employed in the dissertation — the systematic review — is a method of gathering, selecting and analyzing evidence that aims to be transparent and reproducible, thus increasing the rigour of the review process.

This dissertation in general and the systematic review in particular are the first step towards a full-scale doctoral research project. Therefore, the aim of the dissertation is not only to review and synthesize the available evidence, but also to sketch the possible directions for subsequent doctoral research.

The systematic review works best when the review question is sharp and focused. The degree to which arriving at such a question is possible is often influenced by the nature of the field. The research issue explored in this review is located at the intersection of five major fields of management knowledge: a) General Management; b) Operations Management; c) Supply Chain Management, d) Strategic Management; and e) Marketing (industrial). It is clear that a complete review of these vast fields is impractical and hardly plausible. Therefore, in this dissertation, the literature in these fields was used as a general context which informed the design of the review.

1.2 Contextualizing the Systematic Review – The Business Problem

Organisations in industrialized nations are shifting away from their traditional approach of seeking competitive advantage through either product or process innovation (Dickson, 1992; Baines et al., 2007). Instead, now the focus is on integrating value-added services (Wise and Baumgartner 1999; Johnson and Mena 2008) with their core product offering (Slack et al., 2004; Davies, 2006). Consequently, organisations are now outsourcing their strategically relevant activities (e.g. customer support service, logistics etc.) as shown in Figure 1. This is because these organisations either lack the

in-house capability (e.g. financial constraint; complex technology); or they do not want to perform these activities themselves (Christopher, 2011).




Figure 1: Using Service to Augment Core Product (Christopher 2011)

However, “*though they are different, services and products are intimately and symbiotically linked*” (Shostack, 1982:49). For instance, many organisations outsource logistics (which is a service) to deliver their products to the customers. In this case the supplier (logistics provider) comes in direct contact with the customer and hence a triad is formed. Thus, supply chains are becoming supply networks (Christopher, 2011). A supply network is defined as:

“A network of interconnected and interdependent organisations mutually and cooperatively working together to control, manage, and improve the flow of materials and information from suppliers to end users” (Aitken , 1998:45).

The success of these supply networks depends on the success of each network member (Villena et al., 2011). However, key decision makers and network managers have little guidance on how to select and employ a suitable network governance mechanism to match a particular network configuration in order to achieve the desired network performance target beyond the traditional dyadic approach (Li and Choi 2009).

This is evident from the: a) frequently observed opportunistic behaviour by organisations in a supply network – e.g. aerospace industry (Rossetti and Choi, 2005; Rossetti and Choi, 2008; Wu et al., 2010); b) inability of organisations to visualize technology developments and manufacturing advances – e.g. Nokia (Choi and Linton,

2011); and b) failures in service outsourcing – e.g. Dell (Aubert and Croteau, 2005). It is this implication of the interplay between network configuration and network governance mechanism that this review will focus upon.

1.3 Motivation for Research

As a business practitioner in a food supply chain (1995-2010), while dealing with outsourcing decisions in supply chain networks, I observed that most organisations took their supply chain decisions without considering their impact on the supply chain as a whole. Most of these decisions were taken at the enterprise level instead of the network level. The primary aim for each organisation was to its own performance target rather than that for the whole network.

Consequently, different types of governance mechanisms were employed by the organisations to achieve their own individual performance objectives. For instance, buyers (manufacturers) regularly monitored the inventory levels of the customers (retailers) as well as the daily dispatches of the suppliers (distributors) to identify any unusual patterns pointing towards opportunistic business practices. Little concern was shown by participating organisations to formulate joint targets at the network level.

Similarly, organisations took various measures to either maintain or strengthen their position in supply networks. For instance, buyers often sacrificed long-term gains by focusing on short-term profits thereby damaging buyer-supplier relationship irretrievably. Conversely, disillusioned suppliers, driven by the two unfulfilled promises of strategic sourcing leading to lack of close working relationship with buyers and diminishing profit margins) refused to tolerate broken long-term contracts and established direct relationship with the customers. From a personal perspective, the main goal of my research is to address these challenges faced by practitioners.

1.4 Aim of the Review and Review Question

The aim of this systematic review was to examine the academic management literature regarding the interplay between network configuration and network governance mechanisms in supply networks. For this purpose, the following review question was employed:

How do network configurations and network governance mechanisms influence each other in supply networks?

This review focused on goal directed supply networks that evolve as a result of service outsourcing or servitization based strategies. Since both outsourcing and servitization involve services, so this review focused on how services are managed in the wider context of supply networks.

1.5 The Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation builds on the scoping study recently conducted by the author. The remaining part of the dissertation is structured as follows.

Chapter 2 presents a shorter version of the scoping study. The aim of the scoping study was to sketch the landscape of the relevant bodies of academic literature and use their respective arguments to: a) position the research issue; b) arrive at the appropriate review question; and c) inform the design of the systematic review. Chapter 3 outlines the method used for conducting the literature review and provides a clear record of the decisions taken during the review process. Chapter 4 presents the descriptive findings of the review based on the range of data gathered from the selected studies. Chapter 5 highlights the thematic findings of the review. The major ideas and arguments encountered in the studies are reported separately. Chapter 6 is regarding the discussion about the key findings. This discussion aims to draw a coherent picture of the reviewed fields and to provide the answer to the review question by synthesizing the evidence encountered during this review. Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation with a review of the major findings and their limitations, and a brief discussion of the learning points regarding the content and the process of the review. A set of possible research questions are presented.

2 POSITIONING THE INQUIRY – The Narrative Review

2.1 Overview

This review aims to identify structural patterns of relationship between network configurations and network governance mechanisms in context of ‘goal directed’ networks. These are formal mechanisms for problem solving based on joint action by the network members (Provan and Milward 1995; Provan, Isett, and Milward 2004).

This review will follow the definition of goal directed networks provided by Kilduff and Tsai (2003). Goal-directed networks are those interorganisational networks that “*are set up with a specific purpose, either by those who participate in the network or through mandate, and evolve largely through conscious efforts to build coordination*” (Provan and Kenis, 2008:231).

An example of a publication that is clearly within the scope of this review is that of Provan and Kenis (2008) in which the authors clarify the concepts of network configuration (Li and Choi, 2009) and network governance mechanism (Rossetti and Choi, 2005) in supply networks (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003).

Thus, by focusing on goal directed supply networks, this review aims to position the research in the literature domain of Supply Chain Management because both outsourcing (e.g. Rossetti and Choi, 2008) and servitization (e.g. Bastl et al., 2012) are topics situated in the Supply Chain Management literature.

2.2 Mapping the Field

The two constructs of research interest are: a) network configurations; and b) network governance mechanisms. The phenomenon of research interest is the interplay between network configurations and network governance mechanisms in ‘goal directed’ supply networks (see Figure 2).




Figure 2: Constructs and Phenomenon of Research Interest

The two constructs of research interest are discussed below.

2.3 Network Configurations

Network configurations consist of nodes and possible (direct and/or indirect) relationships between organisations participating in a network (Wu and Choi, 2009). Network configurations are compared and contrasted across different network structures and various states of relationships between the organisations.

Levels of Analysis: Interorganisational scholars have studied interorganisation networks at multiple levels of analysis, including the dyad (Gulati, 1995), the ego network (Gomes and Casseres, 1996), and the overall network (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). The main emphasis in a dyadic relationship is to determine how two organisations impact each other (e.g. how one supplier affects another supplier) and on the relations (e.g. cooperative vs. competitive) (Choi and Wu, 2009). However, in order to determine the behaviour of an organisation in a network, it is important to look beyond a dyadic relationship and use triads as the fundamental building block of a network (Choi and Wu, 2008).

Contexts for Studies on Triads: Triads have been studied in different contexts (e.g. manufacturing, services etc.). A buyer-supplier relationship, based on a triadic framework, displays different dynamics in manufacturing outsourcing as

compared to services outsourcing (Li and Choi, 2009). These differences are discussed below:

Manufacturing Context: In this context, the bridge position between the customer and the supplier is retained by buyer before, during, and after the outsourcing strategy is operationalized. A bridge is the actor that is positioned on a structural hole (Li and Choi, 2009). A structural hole is defined as the lack of connections between agents or groups that are not directly linked together (Burt 1992, 2000a; Li and Choi, 2009). The buyer controls the flow of information between the supplier and its customer during these three stages of outsourcing.

Services Context: In this context, the relationship is more dynamic and undergoes transformation during the various stages of outsourcing. For instance, the buyer holds the bridge position between the customer and the supplier during the contract finalization stage. During the contract execution stage, the customer comes in direct contact with the supplier. It is now the supplier that assumes the bridge position from the buyer. (van der Walk and van Iwaarden, 2011). This phenomenon where one organisation starts losing its bridge position is called bridge decay (Li and Choi, 2009). After the outsourcing strategy has been implemented, the supplier might assume the position of bridge instead of the buyer. This phenomenon where the bridge position changes from one organisation to another is called bridge transfer (Li and Choi, 2009).

2.4 Governance

Governance is the science, theory, or study of good order and workable arrangements that is primarily concerned with the means aspect of the means – end relationship (Williamson, 1996). Governance is also an exercise in assessing the efficacy of alternate modes (means) of organisations (Provan and Kenis , 2008).

Governance in business organisations has traditionally focused on the role of the board of directors in representing and protecting the interests of their shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983). Governance has also been studied in the non-profit context, although the focus here has generally been on the role of boards of trustees, as

representing and protecting the interests of community members or other politically important constituencies (Provan 1980; Poppo and Schepker, 2010).

In public management, governance refers not to the activities of boards, but mainly, to the funding and oversight roles of government agencies, especially regarding the activities of private organisations that have been contracted to provide public services (Provan and Skinner, 1989; Hill and Lynn 2005; Provan et al., 2007). A critical role for governance in all these sectors, and consistent with principal-agent theory, is to monitor and control the behaviour of management, who are hired to preside over the day-to-day activities of running the organisation (Fama and Jensen 1983; Eisenhardt 1989).

The overarching aim of governance is to bring about adherence to desired outcomes through the exercise of influence, authority, power or legitimacy (Williamson, 1996; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). Thus, in its broadest meaning, governance is the regulation of social activities utilizing a variety of modes and mechanisms of societal regulation (Provan et al, 2007; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). These range from collectively binding decisions to uncoordinated individual action guided by social norms and rationality principles (Kilduff and Brass 2010; Lin et al., 2011).

2.5 Governance Mechanisms

Governance mechanisms are the means by which order is accomplished in an interorganisational relationship (IOR) in which potential conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realize mutual gains (Williamson, 1996). Governance mechanisms are the means through which organisations manage the content flows and coordinate their relationship (Ebers, 1997).

IOR literature has highlighted a wide variety of governance mechanism (Jones et al., 1997). Attributes of governance mechanisms that have been widely studied include: a) trust (Bachman and Inkpen, 2011); b) reciprocity and equity as well as other forms of norm-based social exchange (Ouchi, 1981; Uzzi, 1997); c) incentive structures and administrative controls (Nootboom, 1996); and d) various forms of contracts (Ring, 2008).

Governance mechanisms are described along different dimensions, including: a) control agent; b) the subject of control; c) mechanism of control; d) degree of control; e) the

focus or degrees of control, f) the legitimacy of control; and g) methods or tools of control (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). Governance mechanisms for various types of transactions are presented in Figure 3.

Distinguishing Characteristics	Forms			
	Discrete Market Transactions	Hierarchical Managerial Transactions	Recurring Contract Transactions	Relational Contract Transactions
Nature of exchange	One time transfer of property rights	On-going production and rationing of wealth	Episodic transfer of property rights	Sustained production and transfer of property rights
Terms of Exchange	Clear, complete and monetized agreement by pay and performance	Authority structure; superior hires; subordinate obeys or quits the employment relationship	Certain, complete; contingent on prior performance; plans for experimentation on safeguards	Uncertain; open and incomplete; plans for bilateral learning safeguards and conflict resolution
Transaction specific investment	Non-specific	Idiosyncratic	Mixed	Mixed and idiosyncratic
Temporal Duration of Investment	Simultaneous Exchange	Indefinite	Short or moderate term	Moderate to long term
Status of the parties	Limited, non-unique relation between legally equal and free parties	Structural-functional command-obedience relationship between legally unequal parties	Unlimited; unique relation between legally free and equal parties	Extensive, unique social embedded relation between legally equal, and free parties
Mechanism for dispute resolution	External market norms and societal legal system	Internal conflict resolution by fiat and authority	Norms of equity and reciprocity and societal legal systems	Internally designed by parties and based on trust
Relevant contract law and governance structure	Classical contract market governance	Employment contract; unified governance	Neoclassical contract; market governance	Relational contracts; bilateral governance
Source: Ring and Van de Ven (1992: 486)				

Figure 3: Forms of Governance Mechanisms

From Figure 3 it is evident that the terms of exchange have an influence on the suitability of a governance mechanism. For instance, in case of discrete exchange context, formal contracts are considered more affective. On the other hand, informal (relational contracts) governance mechanisms are more suitable in case of long-term inter-connected exchange relations (Macneil, 1980).

Governance mechanisms affect good order by enabling and constraining actors' behaviour. Different governance mechanisms regulate in different ways (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Pilbeam et al., 2012). For instance, by providing (dis) incentives for action or by directly regulating behaviour through a formal contract (Williamson, 1996; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Research examining individual governance mechanisms has developed along distinct lines of inquiry as discussed below.

Risk and Control: Research in this stream has examined governance mechanisms and their ability to provide the necessary: a) safeguards against the risks inherent in exchange relationships (Williamson, 1985; 1991; Das and Teng, 1998; 2000); and b) efficiency in the co-ordination and administration of IOR to reduce transaction costs, including the costs of search, monitoring and enforcement (Das and Teng, 1996; Williamson, 1996).

Control and Formal Contracts: Formal contracts represent promises or obligations to perform particular actions in the future (Macneil, 1978). Work in this line of inquiry has appraised long-term buyer-supplier contracts and control, alliance contracts and control, and incompleteness of contracts (Arvind 1993; Doz, 1996; Nooteboom et al., 2002; Lin et al., 2011).

Trust and Risk Management: This research stream analyzes the role of trust in governing IOR. This research stream emphasizes, in particular, on the relationship between trust and risk (Das and Teng, 1998; 2000; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Inkpen and Curren, 2004).

Trust and Control: Studies in this line of inquiry highlight the role of trust as: a) a control mechanism; b) an organizing principle; and c) a moderator of the relationship between hazards and control mechanisms (Nooteboom, 1996; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Poppo and Schepker, 2010).

Relational Governance and Formal Contracts: Relational governance refers to a social institution that governs and guides exchange partners on the bases of cooperative norms and collaborative activities (Heide and John, 1992; Macneil, 1980; Zaheer and Venkataraman, 1995). Formal contracts represent promises or obligations to perform particular actions in the future (Macneil, 1978).

Work in this area explicates the relationship between formal and informal governance mechanisms (including debates of compliments and substitutes). This research can be further grouped as follows: a) the effects of contractual governance on the development of trust (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012); b) “*legal remedies*” as substitutes for trust (Ring, 2008); c) the relationship between formal legal contracts (control) and psychological contracts (trust) (Poppo and Schepker, 2010); d) how

transaction hazards (and other determinants) impact the way contracts are drawn (contract complexity) (Williamson, 1996); e) the role that trust plays as a moderator of the relationship between contractual governance and performance (Poppo and Zenger et al., 2008) ; e) the effects of pre-existing trust on the nature of contractual governance that is adopted in an IOR (Bachman and Inkpen, 2011); and f) the interplay between contracts and trust (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Gulati, 1995a).

Characteristics of Transactions and Contextual Factors: This line of inquiry investigates the internal relationships within the formal and informal governance mechanisms and the contextual factors and characteristics of transactions: a) trust and asset specificity (Bourlakis and Bourlakis, 2005); b) contracts and asset specificity (Williamson, 1996); c) contracts and technological uncertainty (Poppo et al., 2008); and d) trust and technological complexity (Poppo and Zenger, 2002).

Post-formation developments in governance mechanisms: Change in governance mechanisms, including initial conditions and post- formation changes have been examined by the work done in this line of inquiry (Reuer and Arino, 2000; Ahuja et al., 2012).

Interactions between governance mechanisms and agent characteristics: The outcomes based on the relationship between governance mechanisms and agent characteristics are examined by this line of inquiry. The arguments in this stream of research are that agent characteristics or personnel turnover in boundary-spanning functions can influence the choice and deployment of governance mechanisms and ultimately IOR outcomes. Boundary spanners in IORs act as decision making agents. They engage in processes such as information sharing, joint problem solving, and conflict resolution that can be categorized as varying degrees of co-operative behaviours (Williamson, 1996). A governance structure is thus usefully thought of as an institutional framework in which the integrity of a transaction, or related set of transactions, is decided.

2.6 Network Governance

Network governance is widely acknowledged and is seen as producing important economic benefits. However, the mechanisms that produce these benefits are vaguely specified and empirically still incipient (Uzzi, 1996). For instance, Powell (1990) defines network governance as a form of coordinating economic activity which contrasts (and competes) with markets and hierarchies. This vague specification lacks clarity on what network governance is, when it is likely to occur, and how it helps organisations (and non-profit agencies) resolve problems of adapting, coordinating, and safeguarding exchanges.

With some exceptions (Park 1996; Jones et al, 1997; Goldsmith and Eggers 2004), most literature on organisational networks does not explicitly address network governance. The most obvious reason is that since networks are not legal entities therefore the legal imperative for governance is simply not present as it is for organisations (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Bastl et al., 2012; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). Researchers have defined in Network Governance in a variety of ways. These are presented in Figure 4.

Reference	Terms	Definition of Network Governance
Alter & Hage (1993)	Interorganizational Networks	Unbounded or bounded cluster of analysis that, by definition, are non-hierarchical collectives of legally separate units.
Dubini & Aldrich,(1991)	Networks	Patterned relationships among individuals, groups, and organizations
Gerlach & Lincoln,(1992)	Alliance capitalism	Strategic, long-term relationships across a broad spectrum of markets
Granovetter (1994; 1995)	Business groups	Collections of firms bound together in some formal and/or informal ways by an intermediate level of binding
Jones, Hesterley, & Borgatti (1997)	Interorganizational Networks	A select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous firms (as well as non-profit agencies) engaged in creating products or services based on implicit and open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard exchanges. These contracts are socially—not legally—binding
Kreiner & Schultz(1993)	Networks	Informal interorganizational collaborations
Larson (1992)	Network organizational forms	Long-term recurrent exchanges that create interdependencies resting on the entangling of obligations, expectations, reputations, and mutual interests
Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker, & Brewer (1996)	Social networks	Collectivity of individuals among whom exchanges take place that are supported only by shared norms of trustworthy behaviour
Miles & Snow (1986; 1992)	Network organizations	Clusters of firms or specialized units coordinated by market mechanisms
Powell (1990)	Network forms of organization	Lateral or horizontal patterns of exchange, independent flows of resources, reciprocal lines of communication

Figure 4: Definitions of Network Governance

For goal-directed organisational networks with a distinct identity, however, some form of governance is necessary to ensure that participants engage in collective and mutually supportive action, that conflict is addressed, and that network resources are acquired and utilized efficiently and effectively (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999; Humpharies and Wilding, 2004; Provan and Kenis, 2008; Pilbeam et al., 2012)). Ring and Van de Ven (1992) provide an overarching look at network governance comprising informal social systems within organisations and formal contractual relationships between them to coordinate complex products or services in uncertain and competitive environments. However, this perspective does not address the interplay between formal and informal network governance mechanisms.

Grandori and Soda (1995) define network governance as a set of instruments that coordinate network participating organisations to deliver network outcomes. However, these authors do not address the circumstances in which a certain set of governance instruments is more effective than the others.

In contrast, Jones et al. (1997) provide a different take on network governance by stating that it involves a select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous organisations (as well as non-profit agencies) engaged in creating products or services based on implicit and open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard exchanges. Thus, for this research, the following definition of network governance will be focused upon:

“Network governance involves a use of institutions and structures of authority and collaboration to allocate resources and to coordinate and control joint action across the network as a whole” (Provan and Kenis, 2008:231)

The rationale behind focusing on this particular definition is because it highlights the importance of the interplay between configurations and governance mechanisms in a network context. The network perspective of this approach attempts to address the limitations of the extant work in this field of inquiry. For instance, governance mechanisms are generally examined in terms of particular activities conducted in a specific network (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Consequently, there is a lack of theory on: a) the various forms of governance that exist; b) the rationale for adopting one form

versus another; and c) the impact of each form on network outcomes (Provan and Kenis, 2008).

2.7 Network Governance Mechanisms

A suitable network governance mechanism is required for amicable resolution of conflicts and effective utilization of network resources (Provan and Kenis, 2008). To achieve this, it is important to understand the strengths and limitations of each type as discussed below

Governance mechanisms are generally examined in terms of particular activities conducted in a specific network. Consequently, there is a lack of theory on: a) the various forms of governance that exist; b) the rationale for adopting one form versus another; and c) the impact of each form on network outcomes (Provan and Kenis, 2008).

There are three main types of governance mechanisms. These are: a) Outcome-based vs. Behaviour-based contracts; b) Third party (or formal contracts) vs. Self-enforcing safeguards (informal contracts); and c) External vs. Internal governance mechanisms. Details are as following:

2.7.1 Outcome Vs Behaviour Based Network Governance Mechanisms

Agency theorists put forward the two types of network governance mechanisms. Outcome-based contracts are designed to promote the business interest of the buyer (Eisenhardt, 1989). They focus on measurable performance variables that encourage suppliers to achieve performance targets set by the buyer (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). Behaviour-based contracts depend upon the activities and processes, required to achieve the performance variables based outcomes (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). They are more effective if a buyer can monitor the performance of a supplier cost effectively (Eisenhardt, 1989).

2.7.2 Third Party vs. Self Enforcing Network Governance Mechanisms

A comparison across the Economics and Sociology literature shows that there are two categories of network governance mechanisms. Third party safeguards rely on formal contracts between exchanging organisations. Dispute resolution is through enforcement of

these formal contracts by a third party (e.g. state) (Williamson, 1991). Self enforcing safeguards rely on self-enforcing informal agreements between the exchanging organisations. Dispute resolution is through mutual negotiation without any third party intervention (Telser, 1980).

Self enforcing safeguards are further subdivided into two types of informal safeguards. Formal self-enforcing safeguards are based on a formal collateral bond that links the cooperation of the exchanging partners with economic incentive. For instance, a buyer and supplier could make symmetric investments in co-specialized assets (Williamson, 1983). Their main purpose is to discourage opportunistic behaviour and encourage the organisations to engage in value creation activities based on mutual trust (Dyer and Ouchi, 1993).

Informal self-enforcing safeguards are based on informal agreements and often rely on mutual trust built on past experience. They are frequently used to supplement formal controls (Granovetter, 1985) and are effective because they: a) facilitate complex exchange of information and capabilities between organisations; and b) lower transaction cost since they do not require investment in elaborate procedures to monitor and control exchanging organisations (Uzzi, 1997).

2.7.3 External vs Internal Network Governance Mechanisms

To encourage network level relationship based on collaboration and coordination at the network level, it is important to have some form of formal governance mechanism (Provan and Kenis, 2008). These formal network governance mechanisms may either be external or internal (Provan, Fish, and Sydow, 2007) (see Figure 5).




Figure 5: Network Governance Dimensions (Provan and Kenis, 2008)

The choice of the network governance mechanism influences the network structure as explicated below.

External Governance Mechanisms: These comprise an external (independent) network administrative organisation created with the sole purpose of governing the network activities. It is created either by the network member organisations or through a government mandate. This organisation does not participate as a member in the operational activities of the network. The key objective of this organisation is to coordinate sustainable network activities to ensure that network level performance objectives are met (Human and Provan, 2000).

Internal Governance Mechanisms: These mechanisms can take three different forms: a) *Highly brokered governance mechanisms* are suitable where network members interact infrequently with each other. Network governance is conducted through a lead organisation/organisation. This organisation is responsible for all the strategic decisions made at the network level; b) *Shared brokering* is suitable where network members interact with a moderate frequency. Decision making is shared between the lead

organisations/organisation and other network members; and c) *Decentralized brokering* is suitable where interactions between network members are highly frequent. Responsibility and decision making authority is divided amongst subgroups of network members (Provan and Kenis, 2008).

In general, informal governance mechanisms are most effective when based on mutual trust; and formal governance mechanisms are required for the sustainable cooperation between network members.

In the following two sections, the role of interorganisational “*trust*” and “*power*” as informal governance mechanism within the contest of supply networks is discussed.

2.7.4 Role of Trust as a Governance Mechanism

Considerable theoretical debates remain about the role and value of trust in relationships between business organisations participating in a network (Sako, 1992). Most of these controversies are due to the sometimes conflicting assumption and premises of different disciplinary approaches within the business and management literature. These theoretical debates evoke strong feelings among scholars with economic backgrounds on the one hand, and sociologists on the other. Comparing and contrasting extant literature on inter-organisational trust indicates that the concept of “*trust*” has been conceptualised in multiple ways.

First, trust may be regarded as a meta preference (which is based on a belief in certain values) rather than mere preference (which is based on a commitment to the content of the normative value). (Etzioni, 1988). Second, trust may be considered as a renewable source or augmentable skill (Gambetta, 1988). The assumption here is that trust multiplies with use i.e. organisations engage in ‘learning by interacting’ to enhance trust (Arrow, 1962). Third, disagreeing with this assumption, Williamson (1985) stated that trust may be treated as a scarce resource, but with a different degree of scarcity or abundance from country to country. In this discourse, the supply of trust is fixed and therefore ultimately depletable. Fourth, trust may be conceptualized as an intangible capital asset jointly owned by organisations involved in a business relationship. Thus trust is considered as bilateral and specific to a particular relationship based on mutual confidence building activities (Asanuma, 1989). Fifth, trust may be treated as a

commodity for which no market exists. According to this aspect, trust cannot be readily bought or sold because the instrument exchange orientation destroys the very basis of trust (Leibenstein, 1966). Based on the predictability in behaviour, trust can be distinguished into the following types:

Contractual Trust: This is embodied in social norms and ethical codes – the pre-contractual base of contracts (Durkheim, 1947). Thus, promises to be kept may not always be with reference to bilaterally agreed rules but with respect to rules more generally based on universalistic ethical standards. For instance, in relationships based on contractual trust, the reliance is more on oral agreements rather than written ones (Sako, 1992).

Competence Trust: This is built upon the mutual performance expectations of organisations. The required competencies may be attained either by acquiring existing competencies in the market place or by investing in creating competencies. For instance, technical and managerial competencies could be enhanced through training programs or by hiring suitable personnel. Similarly, technical competence could be strengthened by investing in new technology (Sako, 1992).

Goodwill Trust: This is based upon the mutual performance expectations that go beyond the formal contractual obligations. This is based on discretionary initiatives taken by organisations to avoid exploitation. (Akerlof, 1982).

The role of trust, as a governance mechanism, also depends on the way power is used (or misused) in an IOR (Zerbini and Castaldo, 2007). The role of power as a governance mechanism is discussed as follows.

2.7.5 Role of Power as a Governance Mechanism

A comparison and integration of extant research on inter-organisational power as an informal network governance mechanism paints the following similarities. First, power is required to influence joint objectives within supply networks (Medcof, 2001). Second, studies that examine the role of power within IORs (Inkpen and Bemaish, 1997) in a network context (Agarnoff and McGuire, 2001) generally considered the relationship as the units of analysis; c) issue related to the use of power are primarily focused at the strategic choice of organisations to influence network performance

outcomes through acquisition of control (Hardy et al., 1998); and d) there is an imbalance of power in all inter-organisation relationships including collaborative relationships within supply networks (Grimshaw et al, 2002).

Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) is commonly thought of as providing the earliest perspective on inter-organisation relationship power (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Drawing on theoretical models of power, including Emerson's (1962) notion of power dependence and exchange, RDT focused on the "interdependence" of an organisation with other organisations in its environment.

Because power enables organisations to realize their goals, the Figure 6 (Knoke and Chen, 2008) conceptualizes the dynamic patterns of power generation and distribution among organisations. The solid arrows indicate the main dynamic mechanisms in the generation and distribution of power among organisations. The dashed arrows indicate the reciprocal influence of power on its main sources. The dotted arrows represent mutual influences among the three power sources (Huxham and Beech, 2008).




Figure 6: Dynamic Patterns of power generation and distribution among organisations

(Knoke and Chen, 2008)

This discussion indicates that the network configurations and network governance mechanism have been extensively discussed by researcher scholars as two separate constructs. However, there seems to be a dearth of studies that talk about the interplay between configurations and governance mechanisms in a supply network context.

The methodology employed to systematically review the extant literature is discussed in the next section.

3 METHOD

3.1 The Systematic Review

A systematic review of literature is a structured and transparent way of analysing the available evidence in order to inform the decision making process. It has been employed in medical research (Mulrow, 1994) and has migrated to the field of management (Tranfield et al., 2003a). It has been argued that the advantage of systematic reviews lies in their transparency and replicability, as they make researchers' decisions and biases explicit (Tranfield et al., 2003a).

Transparency and replicability in turn make literature reviews stronger and more rigorous than traditional narrative reviews, thus providing a solid basis for informing theory and practice.

This chapter is essentially a protocol of the systematic review that adheres to the general principles outlined in the literature and follows the structure advocated by Cranfield School of Management¹:

Phase I: Planning the Review

1. Forming a review panel
2. Mapping the fields
3. Producing a review protocol

Phase II: Identifying and evaluating studies

1. Conducting a systematic search
2. Evaluating studies

Phase III: Extracting and Synthesising Data

1. Conducting data extraction
2. Conducting data synthesis

¹ Source: Cranfield School of Management (www.cranfieldonline.com)

Phase IV: Reporting

1. Reporting the findings

Phase V: Utilising the Findings

The narrative review presented earlier contains the maps of the fields that were used in this systematic review. It is also necessary to say that the process of this review stops at the stage of informing research. This is partly caused by the highly academic nature of the main concept of the review and partly by the time limitations of the project.

3.2 Consultation Panel

A literature review, especially if it is cross-disciplinary in nature, cannot be performed in isolation. A researcher will receive valuable input from outside sources at different stages of the review process. To guide the author in conducting my systematic literature review, a panel of experts in the area of research interest was assembled. The panel members were consulted in the selection of relevant sources and in the development of inclusion and inclusion criteria. Panel members were from both inside and outside Cranfield University School of Management.

3.2.1 Internal Review Panel

The internal review panel provided their expert guidance on: a) developing the research protocol for this systematic literature review; and b) determining the appropriateness of the literature selected. Members of the internal review panel are as follows.

Dr. Collin Pilbeam

Dr. Pilbeam is a Senior Research Fellow within the Centre for Management Knowledge and Strategic Change at Cranfield School of Management. He is a subject expert in the area of governance mechanisms in supply networks. His wider research interest lies in addressing questions surrounding the evolution, management and performance of networks found in the not-for-profit sector, particularly those delivering International Development/Humanitarian Aid and Research. He is an expert on the systematic review methodology. Dr. Pilbeam is the chair of this internal review panel.

Dr. Mark Johnson

Dr. Johnson is a Principal Research Fellow within the Supply Chain Research Centre at the Cranfield School of Management. He is a subject expert in the area of IORs within service networks. He is an expert on the systematic review methodology. Dr. Johnson is also on the Editorial Boards of the Journal of Operations Management and the International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management. Dr. Johnson is a member of this internal review panel.

Dr. Marko Bastl

Dr. Bastl is a Senior Research Fellow within the Supply Chain Research Centre at the Cranfield School of Management. He is a subject expert in the area of management of inter-organisation relationships as networks, designing networks and relational strategies for provision of integrated solutions and managing information exchange in complex inter-organisation relationships. He is an expert on the systematic review methodology. He also acts as a reviewer for Journal of Operations Management. Dr. Bastl is the PhD supervisor of the author.

Ms Heather Woodfield

Ms. Heather Woodfield an information specialist and was approached at the stage of designing search strings that were most appropriate for selected databases.

3.2.2 External Advisory Panel

External advisory panel members represented academic as well as practitioner knowledge. Members were contacted via email to provide input on the articles selected. This was an informal panel and hence provided assistance upon the request of the author.

Professor Thomas Choi

Professor Choi is the Bob Herberger Arizona Heritage Chair and the Director of the Centre for Supply Networks at Arizona State University. He is world class scholar in the area of supply chain design and network structures, supply base management, supplier-supplier relationships, triads in supply networks, total quality management and

continuous improvement involving suppliers. Professor Choi is also the Co-Editor-in-Chief of Journal of Operations Management.

Professor Keith Provan

Professor Provan is the McClelland Professor of Management in the Eller College of Management at the University of Arizona. He is a world class scholar in the area of inter-organisational and network relationships, including network structure, evolution, governance and effectiveness. Professor Provan is also a Senior Research Fellow at Tilburg University, in the Netherlands.

3.3 Search Strategy

The aim of the systematic search strategy was to identify the publications that are relevant for the review question. In this section, the process of the database search is explained. Though the decision process used throughout the review is shown here as linear and smooth flowing, there were many decisions reviewed and revisited at each stage, as more clarity emerged about the topic of interest. The experience was more messy and iterative than linear. The flow chart for the systematic review process is shown in Figure 7.




Figure 7: Flow Chart of the Systematic Literature Review Process

In an effort to identify recent research work done on the interplay between network configurations and network governance mechanisms, an extensive review of the

literature was undertaken. This systematic review considered only secondary data in printed publications and only academic literature. Two main sources of material were used: electronic databases and the recommendations of the consultation panel.

3.3.1 Defining Search Terms

Informed by the review question, three search terms were identified. The rationale behind the selection of these search terms is shown in Figure 8:

Search Term	Rationale
Network	This includes three or more organizations linked together with formal and informal relationships. The smallest unit of a network is a triad.
Configuration	This is to compare and contrast different structures (e.g. dyads, triads) and links (e.g. direct vs. indirect) between organizations participating in a network.
Governance	This will keep the search focused on specific activities that facilitate the coordination between organizations participating in a network. These activities can be formal (e.g. contracts) or informal (e.g. social relationships, trust, power).

Figure 8: Search Terms and the rationale

3.3.2 Broad Search String

Initially a broad search string was constructed with Boolean Connectors (AND, OR, AND NOT) using the three main search terms: network; configuration and governance. As the focus of this research was towards networks therefore at this stage the term dyad was considered irrelevant for the search. This initial or broad search string is shown below.

(network AND configur* AND govern*) AND NOT (dyad*)*

The purpose of employing this search string was to run it through different databases to see how many hits were achieved? Clearly those databases with the most number of hits were considered to be the most important to this study since they provided the maximum coverage. Based on this criterion, a total of six databases were identified as being the most relevant for this systematic literature review. Figure 9 summarizes the total number of records generated from these databases using the broad search string.

<i>Data Base</i>	<i>Google Scholar</i>	<i>Web of Knowledge</i>	<i>Scopus</i>	<i>EBSCO</i>	<i>Pro Quest</i>	<i>Willey Black Well</i>	<i>Total Hits</i>
<i>Hits</i>	9,030	1,212	697	952	1,557	399	13,847

Figure 9: Number of records generated by the broad search string

The initial search showed a high number of hits (13,847). Initial abstracts were reviewed to identify opportunities for refinement and to devise a subsequent string after excluding irrelevant content.

On reviewing the first two hundred abstracts generated by the broad search string, it became apparent that specific words were surfacing unintended and irrelevant articles. For instance, the term “govern*” introduced a significant number of articles on the role of government agencies in handling various types of illegal networks. Similarly a large number of records were generated that included irrelevant terms such as networks infrastructure networks, computer networks, telecommunication networks, intermodal networks and biological networks. Informed by these initial research results, the broad search string was further refined to remove these anomalies. The steps taken to revise the search strategy are discussed as follows.

3.3.3 Tight Search String

The objective of developing the revised or tight search string was to further sharpen the research focus towards the phenomenon of interest. Consistent with the range of definitions of networks provided in the literature, search terms were modified to include the terms: clusters, consortia, alliances and chains. Similarly, structures, formations, and triads were found as alternate terms for configurations. The term "govern*" was replaced by the term governance to target the alternative terms for governance including: coordination, monitor, control and regulate. A list of the terms included for the tight search string is presented in Figure 10.

Search Terms	Key Words		
Network	Network	Cluster	Chain
	Consortium	Alliance	
Configuration	Configuration	Structure	Formation
	Triad		
Governance	Governance	Coordination	Monitor
	Control	Regulate	

Figure 10: List of terms used to construct tight search string

These selected key words were used to construct the tight search string with Boolean Connectors (AND, OR, AND NOT) as shown in Figure 11.

<i>Network</i>		<i>Configuration</i>		<i>Governance</i>		<i>Not Related Terms</i>
<i>network*</i>				<i>governance</i>		<i>dyad*</i>
<i>OR</i>				<i>OR</i>		<i>OR</i>
<i>cluster*</i>		<i>configur*</i>		<i>OR</i>		<i>infrastructur*</i>
<i>OR</i>		<i>OR</i>		<i>coordinat*</i>		<i>OR</i>
<i>consort*</i>	<i>AND</i>	<i>structur*</i>	<i>AND</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>AND</i>	<i>computer*</i>
<i>OR</i>		<i>OR</i>		<i>monitor</i>	<i>NOT</i>	<i>OR</i>
<i>allianc*</i>		<i>formation*</i>		<i>OR</i>		<i>telecommunication</i>
<i>OR</i>		<i>OR</i>		<i>regulate</i>		<i>OR</i>
<i>OR</i>		<i>triad*</i>		<i>OR</i>		<i>intermodal</i>
<i>chain*</i>				<i>Control</i>		<i>OR</i>
						<i>biolog*</i>

Figure 11: Construction of tight search string using Boolean connectors

A list of terms that were captured unintentionally by the initial search but were deemed irrelevant for this research are also shown in Figure 11. These were subsequently excluded from the tight search. Based on the combination of the above mentioned keywords, the following search string was used for this systematic literature review:

<p><i>((network* OR cluster* OR consort* OR allianc* OR chain*) AND (configur* OR structur* OR formation* OR triad*) AND (governance OR coordinat* OR monitor OR regulate OR control)) AND NOT (dyad* OR infrastructur* OR computer* OR telecommunication OR intermodal OR biolog*)</i></p>

Figure 12 summarizes the total number of records generated using the tight search string.

<i>Data Base</i>	<i>Google Scholar</i>	<i>Web of Knowledge</i>	<i>Scopus</i>	<i>EBSCO</i>	<i>Pro Quest</i>	<i>Willey Black Well</i>	<i>Total Hits</i>
<i>Hits</i>	4,180	657	451	212	219	176	5,895

Figure 12: Number of records generated by the initial search string

The number of records identified by the broad search string were 13, 847 while those by the tight search string were 5,895 indicating a significant decline of nearly 57%. This showed that that each of the six databases indexed different number of articles because each data base uses a different combination of sources for obtaining information.”

3.3.4 Sequence of Database Search

“Aiming to examine the overlap of very broad issues, the research question was not constrained (or particularly well informed) by any specific sector. This general nature of the research question was used as a guideline while selecting the databases for the search. The database search was divided into three main categories. First, preference was given to a general-focus database with wide coverage i.e. Google Scholar. Second, Web of Knowledge and Scopus - two bibliographic databases (i.e. Web of Knowledge and Scopus) that do not provide content were used to for inter-disciplinary search. Third, three content databases (i.e. EBSCO; Pro Quest and Willey Black Well) were engaged for a more refined search to gain direct access to papers.

The relative hierarchical location of the databases used to explore the relevant literature is shown in Figure 13. The hierarchical location indicates the sequence in which these databases were used.




Figure 13: Hierarchical Location of Data Bases

3.3.5 Relevance of Data Bases

Based on the most number of records identified by the broad search string, the following 6 databases were shortlisted as being the most relevant for this research.

Google Scholar: This database was employed for first cut research. It was searched as an avenue to gain access to comprehensive selected academic publishers and unpublished documents not available in other databases. The total number of articles identified by engaging this database was 4,180.

Web of Knowledge: This is a bibliographic data base. Web of knowledge was engaged because it covered an extensive range of subjects related to social sciences. The ability to carry out citation searching was a key feature as well. It comprised different databases containing information gathered from scholarly journals, books, book series, reports, conferences etc. This data base was utilized for inter-disciplinary search to select articles from specific subject areas including economics, sociology, and social sciences. Subject areas relating to technology, medicine or natural sciences were excluded. The total number of hits was 657.

Scopus: It is a bibliographic data base and was utilized since it was one of the largest abstract and citation databases of peer-reviewed literature covering all areas of science, technology and medicine. It had several functions that allowed the search to be personalised according to the requirements. This data base was searched for selecting articles beyond the scope of management literature including peer-reviewed studies in Psychology and Sociology. Categories excluded from the search were life sciences, health sciences and physical sciences. The total number of records identified from the search of this database was 451.

ABI (Pro Quest): This database was utilized because it was a comprehensive content database for articles related to business in general. It spanned more than 3,000 periodical with coverage of virtually all the aspects relating to business and economic systems. This database provided access to the full text of over 2,000 academic journals and was utilized as the primary search engine for this literature review. A total of 212 records were identified from the search of this database.

EBSCO: It is a content database, was employed because it had subject coverage spanning a spectrum of management disciplines including full text of journal articles on strategic management; industrial marketing; operations and supply chain management. This database provided access to more than 8,000 electronic journals containing more than 4 million full text articles. This database was drawn upon to refine the search on areas associated with management such as organisational theory and organisational behaviour. This major source for business and management was used as a secondary source alongside ABI (Pro Quest) to gain direct access to specific articles. The search of this database generated a total number of 219 records.

Wiley Black Well: This publisher-owned content data base was used because it provides full text access to more than 350 online peer-reviewed journals for researchers and professionals. This database was found useful in searching for the publications in the subject areas of business and economics. The categories excluded during the search were: chemistry, computer science, earth and environmental science, education, electrical engineering, engineering, life sciences, mathematics and statistics, medicine, polymers and materials science, physics and astronomy, psychology, and

telecommunications. The total number of records generated from the search of this database was 176.

3.4 Screening Process

Considering the high number of records identified from the tight search string, first all 2,004 duplicates were removed from this list. This accounted for 34% of the initial pool of 5,895 articles. The screening process of the remaining pool of 3,891 articles identified by the tight search string was conducted in two stages summarized below in Figure 14.

No	Description of the Screening Process	Initial Articles	Rejected Articles	Remaining Articles
1	Title and abstract based screening	3,891	2,522	1,369
2	Full text based screening	1,369	890	479

Figure 14: Summarizing the Screening Process

Figure 14 illustrates that 65% (2,522) of the initial articles (3,891) were rejected after the title and abstract based screening process while another 23% (890) articles were rejected after the full text based screening process. The remaining 12% (479) articles were subjected to quality appraisal process. The details of the screening process are discussed as follows.

3.4.1 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria for the Screening Process

The screening process was restricted to include only peer reviewed journal articles. This choice was influenced by the expected higher quality from journal articles due to a more rigorous review process. Conference papers were excluded due to limited academic transparency because their publication was not systematic and they lacked rigour in the review process. Working papers were not included because in general they were not the final version and were rarely peer reviewed, hence lacking academic rigour.

The selection of the articles was initially limited to the post 1985 period. This choice was made keeping in mind that most research work on networks has been done after 1985. However, seminal papers (e.g. Granovetter, 1973, 1985) were later added through forward and back ward search and upon recommendations of the panel members. The selection

was confined to publications in English language keeping in view the language proficiency of the author. Articles -that examined inter-organisational networks were selected. This choice was aligned with the review question. Articles that investigated intra-organisational networks, physical infrastructure (e.g. road and rail), computer networks, telecommunication networks (e.g. wires and cables); intermodal and biological networks were considered irrelevant for this field of inquiry.

Aligned with the review question, the screening process focused on those articles that addressed IORs embedded in a network rather than simple dyadic relationships, intra-organisational relationships or interpersonal relationships. This choice was motivated by the network level focus of the research.

Articles belonging to Natural Sciences, Computer Sciences, and Engineering were deemed irrelevant for the present area of enquiry. The phenomenon of interest, that is the interplay between network configurations and network governances, was primarily discussed in articles originating from the literature domains of: a) Operations Research; b) Supply Chain Management; c) Strategic Management; d) Industrial Marketing; and e) General Management. The selection process indicated the wider implications of the phenomenon of interest went beyond just the operational perspective. Articles that focused on corporate governance or financial governance were also rejected because coordination aspect within networks was the main focus.

A summary of the inclusion and exclusion criteria employed to conduct the full paper screening process is presented in Figure 15.

No	Characteristic	Inclusion Criteria	Exclusion Criteria
1	Article type	Article in peer reviewed journals	Conference papers; working papers;
2	Article language	English	All articles other than in English
3	Time frame	After 1985	Before 1985
4	Context	Business to business or business to customer networks	Intra-organization network
5	Research Theme	Interorganizational relationships embedded in networks	Interpersonal networks
6	Type of network	Interorganizational Network	Physical infrastructure, computer networks, telecommunication networks; intermodal; biological
7	Type of node	Organization	Individual
8	Domain of literature	Social Sciences	Natural Sciences, Computer Sciences, Engineering.
9	Governance perspective	Coordination activity	Corporate, financial. or legal governance
10	Configuration perspective	Network level	Firm level

Figure 15: Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria for the Screening Process

Overall a total 3,412 articles were rejected during the screening process of the full articles. This accounted for 58% of the initial pool of 5,895 articles identified by the tight search string. Further details about the rejected articles are provided in Figure 16.

No	Characteristic	Exclusion Criteria	Title/Abstract based rejected articles	Full Text based rejected articles	Total rejected articles
1	Article type	Conference papers; working papers;	252	0	252
2	Article language	All articles other than in English	126	0	126
3	Time frame	Before 1985	177	0	177
4	Context	Intra-organization network	76	0	76
5	Research Theme	Interpersonal networks	303	0	303
6	Type of network	Physical infrastructure, computer networks, telecommunication networks; intermodal; biological	530	179	709
7	Type of node	Individual	202	0	202
8	Domain of literature	Natural Sciences, Computer Sciences, Engineering.	353	0	353
9	Governance perspective	Corporate, financial. or legal governance	352	57	409
10	Configuration perspective	Firm level	227	579	806
	Total Rejected Articles		2,522	890	3,412

Figure 16: Detail of Rejected Articles

Figure 16 indicates that the rejection of the majority (1,924 articles) of the articles during the screening process was due to: a) organisation level perspective instead of network level perspective (809 articles); b) non business networks (709 articles); and c) irrelevant governance perspective (409). This indicated that extant work on interplay between configuration and governance mechanism from a business network perspective is still an under-researched area.

3.4.2 Incorporating Additional Sources

Before undertaking the quality appraisal process, 354 articles were added from four different sources which qualified according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria

described above. The inclusion of 354 articles from the four sources along with the 479 articles from the search string search brought the total number of articles selected for quality appraisal to 833 as shown in Figure 17.

Source of Articles	Number of Articles
Search String	479
Backward Search	161
Forward Search	155
Author Specific Search (Panel Advice)	18
Ad-hoc Selection (Panel Advice)	20
Total articles selected for quality assessment	833

Figure 17: Break up of articles selected for quality appraisal

3.4.3 Sources Considered but Not Selected

There were four other sources of information that were considered but not selected during the review process. These are discussed as follows.

Books: It is worth mentioning here that books were excluded for this review. This was because books were usually less academically rigorous than journal articles. Information provided in the books in terms of methodology was not complete or satisfactory. In some cases the substantial contribution was nonetheless included because the book section was developed starting from an academic study published elsewhere that was located and passed the quality threshold.

Reports: Reports from institutions, public bodies, agencies, etc. were excluded from this review. This was due to the reason that usually these sources were not directly searchable.


Dissertations: These were not included as a possible source of information for this review because of their lack of transparency. This is because the dissertations were not systematically published and usually lacked academic rigour as compared to journal articles.

Documents on the internet: These were not included because this review looked for evidence in printed publications only. Internet sources were considered as questionable or temporary”.

Next, the procedure followed to operationalize forward and backward search is discussed below.

3.4.4 Operationalizing Backward Search

The procedure for operationalizing ‘backward search’ is explicated using an example based on the search conducted using the Web of Knowledge database. The main page for the Web of Knowledge is shown in Figure 18:



The screenshot shows the 'All Databases' search interface. It features three search rows. The first row has a text input field with the example 'oil spill* mediterranean' and a dropdown menu set to 'Topic'. The second row has a dropdown menu set to 'AND', a text input field with 'Provan, Keith, G.' and the example 'O'Brian C* OR OBrian C*', and a dropdown menu set to 'Author'. The third row has a dropdown menu set to 'AND', an empty text input field with the example 'Cancer* OR Journal of Cancer Research and Clinical Oncology', and a dropdown menu set to 'Publication Name'. Below the search fields is a link 'Add Another Field >>'. At the bottom are 'Search' and 'Clear' buttons, and a note 'Searches must be in English'.

Figure 18: Main menu for Web of Knowledge

On the main page, menus were used to select the item being searched (e.g. Author). The search was further refined by restricting it to Social Sciences (selected from the General Categories menu). This search brought up a list of articles from the selected author as shown in Figure 19:



The screenshot shows a search result for an article. The title is 'Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness'. The author(s) are 'Provan Keith G.; Kenis Patrick'. The conference is 'Meeting of the Public-Management-Research-Association' located at 'Univ So Calif, Los Angeles, CA' on 'SEP 29-OCT 01, 2005'. The sponsor is 'Public Management Res Assoc'. The source is 'JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY' Volume: 18 Issue: 2 Pages: 229-252 DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mum015 Published: APR 2008. Times Cited: 99 (from All Databases). There are links for 'Links' and 'View abstract'.

Figure 19: List of articles by selected author

For illustrative purposes, the article shown in Figure 19 was selected. However, this format did not provide links to the references. By clicking on the title of the article, the following format appeared that provided links to ‘Time Cited’ and ‘Cited References’ for this selected article as shown in Figure 20:

Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness

Author(s): Provan, KG (Provan, Keith G.)¹; Kenis, P (Kenis, Patrick)²

Source: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY Volume: 18 Issue: 2 Pages: 229-252 DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mum015 Published: APR 2008

Times Cited: 95 (from Web of Science)

Cited References: 90 [[view related records](#)] [Citation Map](#)

Conference: Meeting of the Public-Management-Research-Association Location: Univ So Calif, Los Angeles, CA Date: SEP 29-OCT 01, 2005
Sponsor(s): Public Management Res Assoc

Abstract: This article examines the governance of organizational networks and the impact of governance on network effectiveness. Three basic models, or forms, of network governance are developed focusing on their distinct structural properties. Propositions are formulated examining conditions for the effectiveness of each form. The tensions inherent in each form are then discussed, followed by the role that management may play in addressing these tensions. Finally, the evolution of governance is explored.

Figure 20: Links to ‘Time Cited’ and ‘Cited References’ for the selected article

This format had links (‘live’ buttons shown in blue colour) for ‘Time Cited’ and ‘Cited References’. By clicking on the link for ‘Cited References’ link, a list of the articles that have been cited in this selected article appears as shown in Figure 21:

Cited References Title: Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness
Author(s): Provan Keith G.; Kenis Patrick
Conference: Meeting of the Public-Management-Research-Association Location: Univ So Calif, Los Angeles, CA Date: SEP 29-OCT 01, 2005
Sponsor(s): Public Management Res Assoc
Source: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY Volume: 18 Issue: 2 Pages: 229-252 DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mum015 Published: APR 2008

References: 90 Page 1 of 3 Go

Save to: [ENDNOTE WEB](#) [ENDNOTE](#) [RefWorks](#) [ResearcherID](#) more options

[Find Related Records](#) [Clear All Pages](#) To find Related Records: Clear the checkbox of an item if you do not want to retrieve articles that cited the item. Then click "Find Related Records."

1. Title: [Governance and the management of networks in the public sector - Drugs policy in the United Kingdom and the case of cannabis reclassification](#)
 Author(s): Acevedo Beatriz; Common Richard
 Conference: Annual Conference of the Finnish Association of Public Administration Location: Rovaneimi, FINLAND Date: DEC, 2005
 Source: PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW Volume: 8 Issue: 3 Pages: 395-414 DOI: 10.1080/14719030600853188 Published: SEP 2006
 Times Cited: 2 (from All Databases)
[→Links](#)
2. Title: [not available]
 Author(s): Agranoff Robert
 Source: Collaborative Public Management: New Strategies for Local Governments Published: 2003
 Publisher: Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC
 Times Cited: 214 (from All Databases)
[→Links](#)
3. Title: [Collaboration networks, structural holes, and innovation: A longitudinal study](#)
 Author(s): Ahuja G
 Source: ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY Volume: 45 Issue: 3 Pages: 425-455 DOI: 10.2307/2667105 Published: SEP 2000
 Times Cited: 641 (from All Databases)

Figure 21: List of articles cited by the selected article

In the case of this example, there are a total of 90 articles that cited this particular article. A list of these articles was provided for further search.

3.4.5 Operationalizing Forward Search

The procedure for ‘Forward Search’ was the same as the ‘Backward Search’ till the format shown in Figure 20 was accessed. At this point, by clicking on the link for ‘Times Cited’ (instead of the link for ‘Cited References’), a list of the articles that cited this selected article appeared as shown in Figure 22:

Citing Articles Title: Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness
Author(s): Provan Keith G.; Kenis Patrick
Conference: Meeting of the Public-Management-Research-Association Location: Univ So Calif, Los Angeles, CA Date: SEP 29-OCT 01, 2004
Sponsor(s): Public Management Res Assoc
Source: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY Volume: 18 Issue: 2 Pages: 229-252 DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mum

This article has been cited by articles indexed in the databases listed below. [more information]

99 in All Databases

- 95 in Web of Science
- 3 in BIOSIS Citation Index
- 3 in Chinese Science Citation Database

Results: 95 Page 1 of 10 Go Sort by

Save to: ENDNOTE® WEB ENDNOTE® RefWorks ResearcherID more options

- Title: **Non-Governmental and Not-for-Profit Organizational Effectiveness: A Modern Synthesis**
Author(s): Lecy Jesse D.; Schmitz Hans Peter; Swedlund Haley
Source: VOLUNTAS Volume: 23 Issue: 2 Pages: 434-457 DOI: 10.1007/s11266-011-9204-6 Published: JUN 2012
Times Cited: 0 (from All Databases)
Links Full Text View abstract
- Title: **Resource Tangibility and the Evolution of a Publicly Funded Health and Human Services Network**
Author(s): Provan Keith G.; Huang Kun
Source: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW Volume: 72 Issue: 3 Pages: 366-375 DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02504.x Published: MAY-JUN 2012
Times Cited: 0 (from All Databases)

Figure 22: List of articles that cited the selected article

For instance, there were a total of 99 articles that cited this particular article out of which 95 articles were indexed in ‘Web of Science’ database. A list of these articles was provided for further search. This search approach allowed for a more efficient and targeted searches than using a macro search tactic using Google Scholar.

A total of 161 articles were selected by using the backward search technique while a total of 155 articles was selected using the forward search technique. All the articles (354) selected from sources other than the search string were subjected to the full text screening process. These articles qualified according to the inclusion/exclusion criteria defined in Section 3.3.1.5.

3.5 Quality Appraisal Process

The total number of articles that qualified for the quality appraisal process was 833. A summary of these articles along with their sources is shown in Figure 17. During this process, each article was rated on the scale of 0-3 based on quality appraisal criteria shown in Figure 23. Based on these criteria, the quality appraisal process relevant to the different types of articles is explicated as follows.

3.5.1 Quality Appraisal Criteria for Conceptual/Theoretical Papers

The quality appraisal process for the conceptual/theoretical papers consisted of the following four steps. First, the comprehensiveness of the relevant review of literature with the indication of key authors, themes and contributions was analyzed. Second, the clarity of the reference to the theoretical base, model or framework that formed the basis of the discussion was examined. For instance, the explicit theoretical links between network configurations and network governance mechanisms were studied. Third, the adequacy of the research to fill an existing gap in theoretical knowledge was studied. Fourth, the clarity of the explanation for further research opportunities presented in the article was analyzed.

3.5.2 Quality Appraisal Criteria for Empirical Papers

The quality appraisal process for the empirical papers comprised the following eight steps. First, the comprehensiveness of the relevant review of literature with the indication of key authors, themes and contributions was analyzed. Second, the clarity of the reference to the theoretical base, model or framework that formed the basis of the discussion was examined. Third, the methodological rigour (e.g. details regarding the target population, sample size, and data collection methods) and the adequacy of the research design in examining the theoretical argument and in using well defined proxies to execute the research idea was investigated. Fourth, the transparency of data analysis, including the clarity of research results and the limitations analysis, was analyzed. Fifth, the integration between the research results and the theoretical underpinning was examined. Sixth, the significance of the contribution of the research to practice was investigated. Seventh, the adequacy of the research to fill an

existing gap in theoretical knowledge was studied. Finally, the clarity of the explanation for further research opportunities presented in the article was analyzed.

3.5.3 Quality Appraisal Criteria for Methodological Papers

The quality appraisal process for the methodological papers consisted of the following three steps. First, the clarity of the reference to the theoretical base, model or framework that formed the basis of the discussion was examined. Second, the comprehensiveness of the discussion on the proposed method or the improvement of the method was analyzed. Third, the adequacy of the research to address the issues characterizing the interplay between network configurations and network governance mechanisms was evaluated.

An article was accepted if it achieved the average score of 2.0 based on the respective quality appraisal criteria. Exceptions were made for five articles that received the score of 1.5 on the basis of high relevance and centrality to the arguments in their respective fields.

No	Elements to consider	Level				
		0-Absence	1-Low	2-Medium	3-High	Not Applicable
1	Literature Review	The article does not provide enough information to assess this criterion	Inadequate review of prior literature	Acceptable review of prior literature	Excellent review of prior literature	This element is not applicable for this publication
2	Theory	The article does not provide enough information to assess this criterion	No underlying theory	Theoretical base is acceptable	Strong theoretical basis	This element is not applicable for this publication
3	Methodology	The article does not provide enough information to assess this criterion	The idea of a study is poorly executed; inappropriate quantitative methods; failure to justify proxies for variable	Justified research design; acceptable proxies for variables; the idea of study is not fully executed	Research design adequately examines the theoretical argument; proxies are adequately defined	This element is not applicable for this publication
4	Data Analysis	The article does not provide enough information to assess this criterion	Data sample insufficient; inconclusive research results	Appropriate data sample; adequate research results but inadequate explanation; limitation analysis partially explained	Adequate data sample; well explained research results support theoretical arguments; well explained limitation analysis included	This element is not applicable for this publication
5	Integration	The article does not provide enough information to assess this criterion	Weak connection between research results and theory	Research results relate to theory to a certain extent	Research results support theoretical arguments	This element is not applicable for this publication
6	Implications for Practice	The article does not provide enough information to assess this criterion	Study fails to motivate practice	Study has limited implications for practitioners	Study has important implications for practitioners	This element is not applicable for this publication
7	Contribution to knowledge	The article does not provide enough information to assess this criterion	Study adds little to the body of knowledge in this area	Study provides adequate contribution to knowledge	Significant addition to current knowledge; fill an important theory gap	This element is not applicable for this publication
8	Opportunities for further research	The article does not provide enough information to assess this criterion	Study provides little explanation for further research opportunities	Study provides adequate explanation for further research opportunities	Study provides excellent explanation for further research opportunities	This element is not applicable for this publication

Area of rejection		Area of acceptance	
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Figure 23: Quality Appraisal Criteria

The details of the articles rejected during the quality appraisal process are presented in the Figure 24.

Source	Articles (Numbers)		
	From Selection Process	Rejected after Quality Appraisal	Final Articles included in SLR
Search String	479	411	68
Backward Search	161	148	13
Forward Search	155	145	10
Author Specific Search (Panel Advice)	18	3	15
Ad-hoc selection (Panel Advice)	20	1	19
Total Articles	833	708	125

Figure 24: Summary of the Quality Appraisal Process

Figure 24 indicates that 55% of the total articles finally selected for this systematic literature review came from the search string search. The forward and backward search made a combined contribution of 19% towards the 125 articles selected. The remaining 26% of the articles originated from the search based on panel advice. This shows that the inclusion of four additional sources of references beyond the records obtained from the search strings proved important for this review because it allowed the inclusion of certain articles that were extremely relevant to this research. For instance, a more precise definition of the two research constructs i.e. network configurations and network governance mechanisms was determined by remaining more flexible in de-limiting the scope of the review beyond the search strings.

3.6 Data Extraction Process

Each article that fulfilled the quality appraisal criteria was then indexed. A summary was produced for each article using a data extraction template shown in Appendix A. This template listed the: 1) author of the article; 2) title of the article; 3) document name; 4) journal title; 5) date of publication; 6) volume; 7) number; 8) page number; 9) paper type: a) empirical (statistical sampling; mixed methods; mathematical); b) analytical (model development; mathematical; conceptual) and c) literature review; 10) geographical location; 11) context/industry; 12) sample size; 13) data collection method; 14) method of analysis; 15) study characteristics; 16) key findings; 17) abstract; 18) key words); 19) organisation field; 20) theoretical lens; 21) mode of governance; 22) configuration elements; 23) relationship directionality; 24) unit of analysis; 25) unit of data collection;

26) research perspective; and 27) quality appraisal score. A separate data extraction form for each of the reviewed article is shown in Appendix C.

3.7 Summary of the Entire Selection Process

Following the process outlined in this chapter, 125 articles were selected for further review. A list of these articles is shown in Appendix B. The summary of the entire selection process is presented in Figure 25 and the summary diagram as Figure 26.

	Articles from Search Strings	Operation	Articles
A	Articles from the search string		5,895
B	Less removal of duplicate articles		(2,004)
C	Less articles rejected through title and abstract screening		(2,522)
D	Less articles rejected through full text screening		(890)
E	Less articles rejected through quality appraisal process		(411)
F	Sub Total	(A-B-C-D-E)	68
	Articles from Other Sources		
G	Articles from backward search		161
H	Less articles rejected through full text screening		(0)
I	Less articles rejected through quality appraisal process		(148)
J	Sub Total	(G-H-I)	13
K	Articles from forward search		155
L	Less articles rejected through full text screening		(0)
M	Less articles rejected through quality appraisal process		(145)
N	Sub Total	(K-L-M)	10
O	Articles from author specific search (Panel advice)		18
P	Less articles rejected through full text screening		(0)
Q	Less articles rejected through quality appraisal process		(3)
R	Sub Total	(O-P-Q)	15
S	Articles from ad-hoc selection (Panel advice)		20
T	Less articles rejected through full text screening		(0)
U	Less articles rejected through quality appraisal process		(1)
V	Sub Total	(S-T-U)	19
W	Total Articles Selected for Systematic Literature Review	(F+J+N+R+V)	125

Figure 25: Summarizing the Entire Selection Process




Figure 26: Summary Diagram of the Selection Process

4 DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS

This section summarizes the descriptive characteristics of the reviewed sources, which help to draw a rich picture of the field of inquiry.

4.1 Academic Sources

The articles shortlisted for this review were sourced from 44 different types of journal. The top five journals from which the highest numbers of articles were selected are shown below. The number of articles selected from each journal is also shown in the bracket:

- a) Strategic Management Journal (16 articles)
- b) Journal of Marketing (13 articles)
- c) Academy of Management Review (8 articles)
- d) Academy of Management Journal (8 articles)
- e) Administrative Science Quarterly (7 articles)

The majority of the articles used in this systematic literature review were published in top quality journals (see Figure 27):

No	Journal Title	Articles	No	Journal Title	Articles
1	Academy of Management Executives	1	23	Journal of Management of Governance	1
2	Academy of Management Journal	8	24	Journal of Management Studies	2
3	Academy of Management Review	8	25	Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management	2
4	Administrative Science Quarterly	7	26	Journal of Marketing	13
5	Agribusiness	1	27	Journal of Marketing Management	1
6	American Journal of Sociology	2	28	Journal of Marketing Research	3
7	American Sociologic Review	1	29	Journal of Operations Management	5
8	Business Process Management Journal	1	30	Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory	1
9	Corporate Governance	1	31	Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management	1
10	Corporate Reputation Review	1	32	Journal of Supply Chain Management	5
11	Decision Sciences	2	33	MIT Sloan	1
12	European Journal of Marketing	1	34	Organization Science	3
13	European Management Journal	1	35	Organization Studies	1
14	Harvard Business Review	5	36	Research in Organizational Behaviour	1
15	Industrial Marketing Management	4	37	Sloan Management Review	1
16	Industry and Innovation	1	38	Strategic Management Journal	16
17	International Journal of Operations and Production Management	2	39	Supply Chain Management: An International Journal	2
18	International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management	2	40	The Academy of Management Annals	1
19	Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing	1	41	The Academy of Management Review	2
20	Journal of Business Logistics	2	42	The International Journal of Logistics and Management	1
21	Journal of business-to-business marketing	2	43	The International Journal of Logistics Management	1
22	Journal of Management	6	44	The Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing	1
Total articles selected for review					125

Figure 27: List of Reviewed Articles

The analysis of academic sources suggested that the primary roots of the review question originated from the literary fields of: a) Strategic Management (49); b) Marketing (Industrial) (23); c) Supply Chain Management (23); d) General Management (19); and e) Operations Management (11). This indicated that the issues regarding network configurations and network governance mechanisms had wider implications that went beyond just the operational perspective. A distribution of the selected articles is presented in Figure 28.




Figure 28: Classification of Articles by Organisational Field

4.2 Distribution of Articles over Time

The distribution of articles over time showed that: a) 31% of the selected articles were published after the year 2005; b) 19% of the articles reviewed were published between the years 2001-2005; c) 24% of the short listed articles were published between the years 1996-2000; d) 15% of the articles were published between the years 1991-1995; and e) only 10% of the articles were published before 1991. The trend line shown in Figure 29 reflected the increase in the research focus on business networks since the year 2000 as earlier observed by Burgess et al., (2006) and Giunipero et al., (2008) and recently reported by Pilbeam et al., (2012).




Figure 29: Chronological Distribution of Articles over time

4.3 Classification by Paper Type

The selected articles were classified according to 3 main types: a) Empirical (60%); b) Analytical (32%); and c) Literature Review (8%). Empirical studies were further divided in five main categories including: i) statistical sampling, ii) case studies, iii) mixed methods; iv) longitudinal studies; and v) mathematical studies. Similarly, analytical studies were further subdivided in three main categories: i) conceptual, ii) model based; and iii) mathematical/statistical. The break up (in percentage terms) for each of the 9 categories is shown in Figure 30:

No.	Classifications by Paper Type	Percentage
1	Literature Review	8.00%
2	Empirical (Statistical Sampling)	26.40%
3	Empirical (Mixed Methods)	4.80%
4	Empirical (Mathematical)	1.60%
5	Empirical (Longitudinal Study)	1.60%
6	Empirical (Case Study)	25.60%
7	Analytical (Model development)	2.40%
8	Analytical (Mathematical)	0.80%
9	Analytical (Conceptual)	28.80%
	Total	100.00%

Figure 30: Classification by Paper Type

Figure 31 indicates that there were significant methodological opportunities for further research in this nascent field of inquiry. For instance, there was a dearth of empirical and analytical studies based on mathematical modelling.




Figure 31: Classification by Paper Type

4.4 Classification by Geographic Location

The distribution of reviewed studies indicated that the majority of the 75 empirical studies were dominated by the USA (41) followed by Europe (20) and Asia (8). There were only 6 studies based on the data from the rest of the world. This highlighted a significant opportunity to conduct further research on networks outside USA and Europe. The distribution (in percentage) of studies on the basis of geographical location is shown in Figure 32.




Figure 32: Classification by Geographical Location

4.5 Classification by Industry Type

The reviewed data when classified according to the various type of industry indicted a fragmented and diverse field of inquiry leaving a clear opportunity for empirical studies to clarify the relationships between the network classification and network governance mechanisms. Studies based on the automotive, aerospace, electrical and electronics industry account for 36% of the total empirical studies. The remaining 64% of the studies are fragmented into 14 different types of industries as shown in Figure 33.




Figure 33: Classification of Articles by Industry Type

4.6 Classification by Sector Type

The classification of the reviewed data indicated that 58 out of the 75 empirical studies were based on the manufacturing sector while the remaining 17 studies utilized data from the service sector. This indicated a shortage of extant research on service networks. The distribution (in percentage terms) of the empirical studies is shown in Figure 34.




Figure 34: Classification by Sector Type

4.7 Classification by the Type of Theoretical Lens

The classification of the literature based on the theoretical underpinnings is shown in Figure 35:

Theory	Number of articles	Percentage
Social Exchange Theory	51	40.80%
Social Network Theory	32	25.60%
Transaction Cost Economics	19	15.20%
Resource Based View	3	2.40%
Balance Theory	3	2.40%
Stakeholder theory	2	1.60%
Stakeholder theory	2	1.60%
Game Theory	2	1.60%
Game Theory	2	1.60%
Agency theory	2	1.60%
Resource Dependency Theory	1	0.80%
Coalition Theory	1	0.80%
Not Provided	5	4.00%
Total	125	100.00%

Figure 35: Range of Theoretical Underpinnings

This classification revealed that extant research on supply networks was dominated (82%) mainly by three main theories: a) Social Exchange Theory (51); b) Social Network Theory; and c) Transaction Cost Economics.

There were some recent attempts to use other theoretical lenses to analyze business networks, for instance Coalition Theory (Bastl, Johnson, and Choi, 2012). However, the number of studies employing alternate theoretical lenses was quite fragmented as shown in Figure 36.




Figure 36: Classification by Theoretical Underpinnings

4.8 Classification by the Type of Mode of Governance

Classification of the reviewed data on the basis of the modes of governance discussed either explicitly or implicitly in the article is indicated in Figure 37:

Mode of Governance	Number of Articles	Percentage
Informal (explicit)	40	32.00%
Formal (explicit) and Informal (explicit)	22	17.60%
Formal (implicit) and Informal (implicit)	14	11.20%
Formal (implicit) and Informal (explicit)	13	10.40%
Formal (explicit)	11	8.80%
Informal (implicit)	10	8.00%
Formal (explicit) and Informal (implicit)	8	6.40%
Not Provided	6	4.80%
Formal (implicit)	1	0.80%
Type	125	100.00%

Figure 37: Type of Modes of Governance

The analysis of data regarding how various modes of governance have been discussed indicated that: a) 47% of the studies selected for the review discussed both the formal and informal governance mechanisms; b) 40% of the studies focused on the informal governance mechanisms; and c) only 9 percent of the studies focused on formal governance mechanism as shown in Figure 38.




Figure 38: Classification by Mode of Governance

4.9 Classification by Unit of Analysis

A comparison of the data across the unit of analysis employed revealed that: a) 60 studies considered the network as the unit of analysis; b) 48 studies considered organisation as the unit of analysis; while c) 10 studies employed the dyadic relationship as their unit of analysis. This result was influenced by the fact that dyadic studies were not the focus of this review. The distribution (in percentage) of the studies based on the unit of analysis is indicated in Figure 39.




Figure 39: Classification by the Unit of Analysis

4.10 Classification by Research Perspective

Analyzing the data from the research perspective illustrated that almost all (98%) of the studies on supply networks to-date used a cross-sectional approach to gather data for their research as shown in Figure 40. Only a handful (2%) of studies was longitudinal. Hence there was a significant opportunity for further research using longitudinal studies.




Figure 40: Classification by Research Perspective

4.11 Key Descriptive Findings

The key descriptive findings of the reviewed data are as follows.

First, the papers selected for this review were mainly from the organisational field of strategic management; published after the year 2005 and were either analytical (conceptual) or empirical (statistical sampling).

Second, the classification of the reviewed data portrayed that a large proportion of the empirical studies were based on the USA and European manufacturing sector (automotive, aerospace, electrical and electronics industry).

Third, the extant research on supply networks was dominated mainly by three main theories: a) Social Exchange Theory; b) Social Network Theory; and c) Transaction Cost Economics.

Finally, majority of the studies: a) discussed informal network governance mechanisms either exclusively or in tandem with formal governance mechanisms; b) used the network as the unit of analysis.; and c) incorporated a cross sectional approach for data collection.

4.12 Reflections on Descriptive Findings

The descriptive findings demonstrate that the field of inquiry is immature with the focus on exploratory and theory building works. Aligned with the work presented by Edmondson and McManus (2007), the large number (36) of conceptual papers (36) and case-based empirical studies (32) indicate that the extant research is in the nascent state of theory development primarily influenced: a) by the unexpected findings in the field; b) by questioning assumptions in the extant literature; and c) from identifying and addressing gaps in existing theory. In studies where theory is nascent or immature, researchers do not know what issues may emerge from the data and so avoid hypothesizing specific relationships between variables (Edmondson and McManus, 2007).

The focus of the extant research on the interplay between network configurations and network governance is still quite narrow since: a) 81% of the reviewed studies are on organisations based in the USA and Europe; and b) 78% of the studies are regarding

manufacturing organisations. This demonstrates that scholars are in the early stages of developing rich and detailed data to add to the little knowledge that exists regarding the phenomenon of interest. This limited geographical and industrial perspective illustrates that the research focus is primarily towards homogenous networks. However, given the varied nature of influencing factors and decision variables, the heterogeneous nature of the networks needs further investigation through comparative studies.

There is a glaring lack of studies that investigate the role of various influencing factors on network evolution (e.g. formation, development, and break down) over time. The existence of only 2 empirical papers based on longitudinal studies indicates that there is still considerable gap research work required before generalizable results can be achieved.

Recent attempts to introduce new constructs and to investigate mutual relationships between them are mainly influenced by the micro level (e.g. individual organisation) approach rather than macro (network level) level focus. The hypothesized links between network configurations and network governance mechanisms are still at a conceptual level. This is evidenced by the existence of only four analytical papers that employ modelling techniques to investigate the complexity of the relationship between network configurations and network governance.

A comparison of the theoretical lenses employed by the researchers depicts a historical divide in the ontological perspectives of network researchers. For instance, 81% of the studies on networks influenced by the concepts developed either from the field of Sociology (e.g. Granovetter, 1973; 1985) or Economics (e.g. Williamson, 1981; 1991). The emergence of recent work by Bastl et al., 2012 represents the broadening of research perspectives to examine the issues related to network configurations and network governance mechanism. For instance, the remaining 19% of the reviewed studies are divided along ten different categories of theoretical lenses/perspectives. This is also reminiscent of the fragmented nature of the field of inquiry.

Finally, the analysis of the descriptive findings shows that although research on the configurations and governance mechanisms from a network perspective is a growing field of interest, yet there is a significant amount of research still required to establish a coherent body of literary work. This argument is supported by the fact that the majority

of the published work in the past three decades came from multi-disciplinary journals instead of those belonging to inter-disciplines.

Till this point in this work, the following aspects have been discussed:

- Chapter 1: Introduction
- Chapter 2: Mapping the Field of Inquiry
- Chapter 4: Methodology
- Chapter 5: Descriptive findings of the review

The remaining part of this dissertation is structured as follows:

- Chapter 6: Thematic findings
- Chapter 7: Discussion
- Chapter 8: Conclusion

5 THEMATIC FINDINGS

This section presents the thematic findings encountered during the review of the selected studies. These thematic findings are divided into three main classifications: a) network configurations; b) network governance mechanisms; and c) the interplay between network configurations and network governance mechanisms.

5.1 Network Configurations

The two foundation blocks of any network configuration are: a) the network participating organisations that are termed as nodes or actors; and b) the possible direct and indirect relationships that exist between these nodes (Ahuja et al., 2012). Traditionally, the focus of the supply chain management literature has been on a dyad (Rowley, 1997; Li et al., 2010). A dyad is made up of two nodes (e.g. a buyer and a supplier) and the link that connects them (e.g. a buyer– supplier relationship) (Choi and Wu, 2009). At the dyadic level the relationship between a buyer and its supplier has been characterized as either cooperative or adversarial (Anderson and Narus, 1984; Dwyer et al, 1987; Ganesan, 1994). However, as compared to dyadic relationships, the relationships in networks are different. For instance, a dyad has only one direct relationship between the two nodes whereas a network can have multiple direct and indirect relationships between nodes.

Thus in order to capture the essence of a network, two things must be examined: how a node affects another node and how a link affects another link. Thus the smallest unit of network arrangement where this occurs is a triad (Choi and Wu, 2009). A triad is: “*a subset of three nodes and the (possible) tie(s) among them*” (Wasserman and Faust 1994 p.19).

Network configurations can therefore be associated with: a) network structures comprising the number, identity, and characteristics of nodes; and b) network relationships consisting of the location, content, strength, and the pattern of interconnections or relationships among these nodes (Ahuja et al., 2012). These two dimensions of network configurations are explicated below.

5.1.1 Network Structures

It is important to note that, within buyer-supplier relationships, triads can have three archetypes. These are: a) two-tier buyer-supplier-supplier triad (2BSS); b) buyer-buyer-supplier triad (BBS); and c) three-tier buyer-supplier-supplier triad (3BSS) (Bastl et al., 2012). These are shown in Figure 41:




Figure 41: Archetypes of Triads (Bastl et al., 2012)

A variation in the existing characteristics of a node or a change in the number of nodes can influence a change in network structures. This includes not only the capabilities of the nodes to achieve the desired results but also when ties between nodes are created, dissolved, or modified in terms of their strength or content (i.e. what flows through them) (Ahuja et al., 2012).

An organisation's frequency of interactions (with other network participants) increases the strength of its relationships with these participants over time. However, developing these strong relationships consumes a lot of time and resources of the organisation involved in the relationship (Rowley et al., 2000).

Findings suggest that structural holes have attracted considerable interest because they are considered a form of valuable social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002, Zaheer and Soda, 2009). Structural hole can be viewed as the gap between two non redundant organisations or networks (Burt, 1992; Li and Choi, 2009). The structural position within a network determines the dynamics among network participants (Burt 1992). The position of an organisation within a network confers certain advantages. First, an organisation assumes a stronger negotiating position by occupying a central position in a network. Second, the central organisation in a network benefits from the additional

information collected from non redundant source (Burt 2000a; Zaheer and Bell 2005). Third, the central or focal organisation can be forewarned about a potential threat or opportunity by gaining access to the information provided by various network participants (Zaheer and Bell 2005). An organisation's bridge position is not a permanent state and is subject to change (Burt 2000b, 2002; Soda, Usai and Zaheer 2004, Choi and Wu, 2009). An organisation faces the danger of losing the advantage of central position including: a) strong negotiating position; and b) access to classified information conveyed through the network (Lipparini and Lomi, 1999).

Centralization facilitates integration and coordination in a network (Provan et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997). However, density and centralization cannot simultaneously be maximized (Rowley, 1997). Some trade-off between the two must occur, and the existence of a large number of ties does not necessarily mean that the network is centralized. High differentiation occurs with low centralization, suggesting that attempting a broad scope of activity is difficult to centrally coordinate (Provan and Kenis, 2008). High differentiation in networks proves to be important for the identification of unique clusters of organisations within networks (Provan et al. 2007). Clusters can be created out of convenience, as in cases of geographic clustering but they also can be created based on the provision of a certain set of services (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Findings suggest that buyers' preference for intensive buyer-vendor ties and intensive vendor-supplier ties in supply networks is depressed when vendors have ties to many suppliers (Wuyts et al., 2004).

Network nodes exploit opportunities arising from past patterns of behaviour, which lead to experiences and knowledge that in turn motivate and enable nodes to recreate and reconfigure past network positions into future beneficial ones. Positions in past networks can provide focal nodes with opportunities that shape future networks independent of nodes' ability or intention to strategically exploit past positions.

5.1.2 Network Relationships

In the supply networks context, there are two broad categories of buyer supplier relationships: a) cooperative relationships; and b) competitive relationships (Cannon and Perrault Jr., 1999; Choi et al., 2002). Conversely, supplier-supplier relationships are

considered as cooperative relationships. These three types of relationships are discussed below:

Cooperative Relationship: The two organisations engaged in this relationship are highly committed towards achieving a common goal (Liker and Choi, 1994) based on a long term relationship. The mutual level of trust is high. This promotes a culture of information sharing (Uzzi, 1997) and conflict resolution through dialogues (Cannon and Perreault, 1999). In this relationship, it is win-win situation for both organisations (Jap, 1999; Jap and Anderson, 2003). This relationship is dyadic in nature.

Competitive Relationships: This relationship is adversarial in nature where the two organisations are engaged in a short-term relationship. The mutual level of trust is low. This promotes a culture where both organisations, fearing potential exploitation, compete for the same resources (Axelrod, 1997). It is a win-loss situation where one organisation gains advantage at the expense of loss for the other organisation. (Jap, 1999). Conflict resolution is through third party mediation based on formal contracts (Cannon and Perreault, 1999). This relationship is dyadic in nature.

Coopetitive Relationship: In this relationship, the two suppliers compete with each other for a certain project while cooperate with each other for another project. The role of the buyer is critical in this triadic relationship. For instance, the buyer, through its sourcing strategy, can encourage the two suppliers to cooperate with each other during the designing stage of a product (Asanuma, 1994). At a later stage the buyer can pressurize the two suppliers to compete with each other for potential production order (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). This relationship is indicative of a situation where an organisation (buyer) can affect an indirect relationship between the two suppliers (Wu and Choi; 2005). Buyers recognize how upstream suppliers' operations affect their downstream customers (Wu et al., 2009). In particular, the way suppliers work with each other (e.g., supplier-supplier relationships) in a supply network has strategic importance for the buying organisations (Choi et al., 2002).

Establishing direct relationships with suppliers is a source of benefit for the focal company in a network. Lower-tier suppliers can provide valuable information about the latest manufacturing advances and technological innovations. Companies that lack such

access have found themselves reacting to competitors' innovations and struggling to match their features and prices (Choi and Wu, 2009).

A growing number of studies and evidence from industries suggest that, besides managing the relationship with its suppliers, a buyer needs to proactively manage the relationships between those suppliers. In a buyer–supplier–supplier relationship triad, the buyer, as the contracting entity, influences the suppliers' behaviours and the relationship between them (Wu et al., 2010).

Recent studies also suggest that buying organisations within supply networks are proactively creating competition among suppliers to elicit both collaborative synergy and market efficiency (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Sako, 2004; Wu and Choi, 2005). In a supply network involving one buyer and two suppliers, the buyer's influence has a direct and positive effect on supplier–supplier competition such that stronger buyer influence is associated with more intense supplier–supplier competition (Wu and Choi, 2005; Wu et al., 2010).

The state of dependency of a company on its immediate as well as distant business partners in supply networks signifies the impact a network has on the company's business decisions, actions, and outcomes for both positive and negative performance. This state of dependency, termed as structural embeddedness offers a number of advantages to the network members.

First, the state of dependency affects how a supplier's performance is influenced by the other companies it is connected to, directly or indirectly, in its supply network (Choi and Kim, 2008). Second, embedded ties entail problem-solving mechanisms that enable actors to coordinate functions and work out problems proactively (Uzzi, 1997). These arrangements typically consist of routines of negotiation and mutual adjustment that flexibly resolve problem. Third, embeddedness promotes economies of time (the ability to capitalize quickly on market opportunities), because the transactional details protect against opportunism (contracts, price negotiations, scheduling) in arm's-length relationships prior to production are negotiated “*on the fly*” or after production is completed (Uzzi, 1997).

Repeated cycles of exchange, risk-taking and successful fulfilment of expectations strengthen willingness of network participants to rely upon each other and expand the relationship, producing a virtuous circle that can be developed and promoted (Wilding and Humphries, 2006).

5.2 Network Governance Mechanisms

Network governance mechanisms are institutional instruments and tools that the network participants put in place as safeguards to enable them to establish, structure, and govern inter-organisation exchanges within the network (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). They provide the means and processes by which a social system can be held within a range of “*desired states*” and by which undesirable situations may be avoided. Governance mechanisms also include monitoring and feedback mechanisms through which the difference between a desired state and the status quo can be detected in order to enable the social system to be kept within the desired range (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011).

Network governance mechanisms can be either be formal (e.g. formalized agreements or contracts); or informal (trust-based norms of reciprocity) (Notebook, 1996; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Poppo et al, 2008; Lin et al., 2011). A discussion on the functions of network governance mechanisms is as follows.

5.2.1 The Functions of Network Governance Mechanisms

The reviewed literature indicates that the co-ordination function and the control function of network governance mechanism have been discussed extensively (Notebook, 1996; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011; Lin et al., 2011). These two functions are discussed below.

5.2.1.1 The Co-ordination Function

Coordination is an enabling process which contributes to the attainment of desired outcomes (Inkpen and Corral, 2004). It is the process of aligning the goals, priorities, and programmes for the future, to manage expectations between or among the transacting parties (Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). Parties engaged in an IOR, at times, encounter difficulties in integrating or aligning each other’s activities.

This may have a negative effect on performance outcomes. To overcome this issue, the parties engaged in the IOR need co-ordination mechanisms to enable them to breakdown the tasks and to communicate plans (Notebook, 1996; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).

In supply networks, co-ordination and alignment of partner activities is a challenge for network managers (Liker and Choi, 2004; Li et al., 2010). One way through which organisations handle heightened co-ordination concerns in an IOR is to include various types of coordination mechanisms in contracts and agreements (Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). Formal contract clauses are employed to precisely: specify and enumerate the tasks to be accomplished; b) define procedures to be used; c) lay out quality standards to be fulfilled; d) specify the decision rights of the parties within the IOR; and e) to structure communication flows.

5.2.1.2 The Control Function

In economic exchanges within networks, parties involved in an IOR generally want to ensure that the other parties engaged in the relationship will perform in accordance with the stated desires or expectations (Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). Formal governance mechanisms are put in place to determine and influence the roles of each network participant. Task reliability is established through the design and specification of actors work and the enforcement of compliance with the prescribed standards (Notebook, 1996; Poppo and Zenger, 2002)

In order to formally specify expectations, it is necessary to be able define tasks and behaviours, and to be able to measure outcomes (Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). This implies that the activities in a transaction or in a relationship need to be predictable and explicitly specifiable in both their process and outcomes (Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). It is also possible to monitor progress and evaluate actual outcomes and behaviour, to determine if parties involved in the IOR perform to the agreed upon rules and standards.

Authors emphasizing the control function of governance mechanisms have tended to use Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory to support their arguments (Parched, 1993).

5.2.2 Formal Network Governance Mechanisms

Formal contract provides a legally binding, institutional framework in which each party's rights, duties, and responsibilities are codified; and goals, policies and strategies underlying the relationship are specified (Macneil, 1980; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). The contract also outlines the promises and obligations to perform particular actions in the future (Macneil, 1980). When exchange hazards increase, so must the specification of contractual safeguards (Williamson, 1985).

Classical contract theory, assumes that complete contracts can be drafted (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). However, most contracts are incomplete since they are designed to handle 'business as usual' (Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). Formal contracts can only define remedies for foreseeable contingencies and/or at best specify processes for resolving unforeseeable outcomes (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The remaining (unforeseeable) issues become taken-for-granted assumptions in the "*psychological contracts*" that parties develop in relation to each other through repeated interactions (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Gassenheimer et al., 2007).

5.2.3 Informal Network Governance Mechanisms

Informal network governance mechanisms comprise rules based on implicit understandings, being in most part socially derived and therefore not accessible through written documents or necessarily sanctioned through formal position. (Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). They are generally trust based, and involve social processes that promote norms, flexibility, solidarity, and information exchange (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011).

5.2.3.1 Role of Commitment as a Governance Mechanism

In supply networks where there are no formal contractual obligations that stop the buyer from switching suppliers, commitment acts as an informal governance mechanism. Game theorists suggest that commitment as a governance mechanism is effective in discouraging opportunistic behaviour whenever expected payoffs from continued exchange surpass short-term gains from defection (Axelrod 1984, 1997).

Empirical studies (e.g. Morgan and Hunt; 1994) show that the opportunity costs the buyer has to bear (if a relationship with a supplier breaks down permanently) are the most important determinant of the level of commitment within a supply network. These costs encourage the buyer to continue its relationship with the existing supplier (Morgan and Hunts, 1994).

5.2.3.2 Role of Mutual Hostages as a Governance Mechanism

Dedicated, mutual investments made by network participants is seen as one way in which organisations can control opportunism and signal their commitment (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Barney et al., 2001; Barratt, 2004; Anderson and Jap, 2005). . There are strong arguments to support this view in the literature. Many scholars suggest that by so doing, the partners create what economists call “*self-enforcing contracts*”. The reviewed literature indicates that researchers view such relationship-specific investments as: a) pledges (Anderson and Jap, 2005); b) commitment input (Gundlach et al, 2005); and c) control mechanism (Jap and Ganesan 2000). Thus the more dedicated the asset is, the higher its loyalty effect on the party making the specific investment (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Barratt, 2004; Anderson and Jap, 2005). Specific investments are also seen as a strong signal of intent and commitment to a relationship (Heide and John, 1988). As such, they contribute to the perception of a party’s trustworthiness because the pay-off time and their irreversibility are indicators for long-term orientation (Ganesan 1994; Barratt, 2004; Anderson and Jap, 2005).

5.2.3.3 Role of Trust as a Governance Mechanism

The reviewed literature indicates that trust is central to the creation of an environment in which cooperation can take place (e.g. Notebook, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). The ability to rely on trust permits the parties to get on with their day-to-day organisational lives without having to inspect and monitor all the uncertainties and vulnerable situations that they cannot control (Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011).

The debate regarding the relationship between trust and control is central to the research on the interplay between formal and informal governance mechanisms (Bachman and Inkpen, 2011; Lin et al., 201). Early works on trust and control assumed an inverse relationship between trust and control. Some authors treat trust and control as functional

substitutes. (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). The partial explanation is that there appears to be a dialectic process between trust and control. When trust between network participants is high, there is usually no need to control their behaviour. Control is brought in only when adequate trust is not present (Bachman and Inkpen, 2011; Lin et al., 2011). Findings from the reviewed literature indicate that: a) trust involves a positive attitude about others' motivations; and b) conceptually trust is not about influencing and affecting others' behaviour.

Interorganizational trust within supply networks is based on believing that other network participants will perform whatever serves the best interests of the network as a whole, even in the absence of control (Das and Teng, 1998; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011; Lin et al., 2011). From this assessment, trust and control seem to be two completely different kinds of approaches to the management of IOR in a supply network. Das and Teng (1998) provide support for this line of argument in their framework which shows that “*control mechanisms*” and “*trust building*” are two distinct pathways that can lead to higher levels of control and trust respectively. Recent network literature portrays that there is an indirect relationship between trust and control (and by extension between trust and governance) within supply networks (Lin et al., 2011). Trust contributes to the increasing predictability and therefore control (Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011).

Interorganizational trust is not a direct governance mechanism. Trust is necessary but not sufficient for the attainment of network performance outcomes (Ghosh and Fedorowicz, 2008; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). The general assumption is that trust is a lower cost governance mechanism than formal contracts. However, reliance on trust involves extensive investment; it is reciprocal in nature; and it is constantly evolving (Ring and Van de Ven, 2004; Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 2008).

5.2.3.4 Role of Power as a Governance Mechanism

In a supply network context, power is a relational concept as it involves two or more network participants. It determines the ability of an organisation to influence, control, or resist the activities of other organisations participating in a network (Hardy and Clegg, 1996).

Researchers view the significance of power in supply networks in a variety of ways. For instance, power is required: a) to fulfil the need for control in an IOR embedded in a network; b) to achieve network level targets more effectively through joint action; or c) to develop collaborative IORs through which less powerful members can be supported to mitigate the power imbalance (Huxham and Beech, 2008).

The perspectives on the use of power in the interorganisational literature also vary across many other dimensions. These can be divided into three broad categories.

The power over perspective: This perspective is concerned with the control of an IOR embedded within a supply network. The power over perspective is involved with the power of an organisation to achieve its own performance objectives by helping it to function effectively (Huxham and Beech, 2008).

The power to perspective: This perspective considers power in the context of strength of a collaborative network (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). The power to perspective deliberately attempts to take the negative connotations of power (Winter and Ray, 1994).

The power for perspective: This perspective relates to the involvement of organisations that would otherwise not have a voice within a supply network. It is thus concerned with using IOR to transfer power to another organisation or organisations participating in a supply network (Crosby and Bryson, 2010).

These three perspectives on the use of power are influenced by one common factor: how an organisation with the power in a supply network uses it to influence the other network participants (Huxham and Beech, 2008).

Recent studies have highlighted the influence of power in the formation of triadic networks (Bastl, Johnson, and Choi, 2012). According to Coalition Theory, a supplier in a weaker power position in a buyer-supplier-supplier triad would try to create a coalition with another supplier to gain leverage against a common buyer. It does not matter whether this new supplier has more or less power compared to the old supplier as long as the coalition of the two suppliers (old and new) collectively yields more power than the buyer (Bastl, Johnson, and Choi, 2012).

Similarly two buyers would create a coalition to gain leverage against a common supplier if their coalition collectively yields more power than the supplier. Furthermore, the buyer would create a coalition with a second-tier supplier if the buyer is in a weaker power position compared to the first-tier supplier and their coalition would yield more power against the first-tier supplier. (Bastl, Johnson, and Choi, 2012).

The distribution of resources, regulations concerning rights and duties under inter-organisational relations beyond specific individual organisations, and positions occupied within inter-organisational network facilitate and constrain the generation and distribution of power among organisations.

5.2.4 Formal and Informal Governance Mechanism as substitutes

The early 1990s ushered in a new take on the interplay between formal and informal governance mechanisms. According to this perspective, relational norms, such as trust, are viewed as functional substitutes for complex, explicit contracts or vertical integration (Granovetter, 1985; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Ring and Van de Ven (1994); Gulati, 1995b; Uzzi, 1997; Bernheim and Whinston, 1998; Zaheer et al, 1998; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Das and Teng, 2001; Adler, 2001).

Trust counteracts fears of opportunistic behaviour and as a result, is likely to limit the transaction costs associated with an exchange (Poppo and Zenger; 2008; Fulmer and Gelfand; 2012). The economic efficiency argument is supported by Uzzi (1997) who argues that the embeddedness of exchanges within social structures circumvents and thus economizes on time otherwise spent in costly contract renegotiations.

Granovetter (1985) contends that formal mechanisms do not produce trust but instead are a functional substitute for it. In his view, social norms support the emergence of trust because buyers can hope to get some cooperation even when formal instruments are absent. This view finds support in Adler (2001) who talks of replacing formal contracts with “*handshakes*”. The presence of one type of governance mechanism (informal network governance mechanisms, in particular) makes the other redundant (Larson, 1992; Gulati, 1995b). For instance, informal self-enforcing agreements which rely on trust and reputation often replace the controls characteristic of formal network governance mechanisms (Dyer and Singh, 1998).

The embeddedness of exchanges within social structures economizes on time otherwise spent in costly network governance mechanism renegotiations (Uzzi, 1997). A common underlying rationale for substitution emerges: if one party trusts the other, there is little need for network governance mechanisms specifying actions.

An additional reason for substituting formal contracts with informal ones is that formal network governance mechanisms may actually undermine the formation of informal network governance mechanisms. It is argued that the use of rational control signals that they are neither trusted nor trustworthy to behave appropriately without such controls (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). These scholars view informal network governance mechanisms and formal network governance mechanisms as substitutes, which operate through one of two mechanisms. Either informal network governance mechanisms eliminate the need for formal network governance mechanisms and vice versa, or formal network governance mechanisms directly hinder the formation of informal network governance mechanisms.

In light of this predicted substitution, the net effects of formal network governance mechanisms and informal network governance mechanisms on network performance are ambiguous. While informal network governance mechanisms and formal network governance mechanisms may have positive direct effects on network performance, as they function as replacements for one another (or in the case of formal network governance mechanisms causally damage the other), the net effect on network performance is, at a minimum, reduced and potentially negative.

5.2.5 Formal and Informal Governance Mechanism as complements

Recent studies indicate that scholars have observed complimentary characteristics between formal and informal governance arrangements (e.g. Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Ryall and Sampson, 2004; Ferguson et al., 2005; Dekker, 2005). Scholars supporting this view contend that in some situations (e.g. where exchange hazards are severe), combining formal and informal mechanisms may deliver better outcomes than in the use of either one in isolation. The central argument in support of this perspective is as follows.

First, rather than hindering or substituting for relational governance, well-specified formal contracts promote more cooperative, long term, trusting exchange relationships. This is because well-specified contracts, with clearly articulated contractual terms, remedies, and processes for dispute resolution, narrow the domain and severity of risk to which an exchange is exposed and thereby encourage cooperation and trust.

Second, well-crafted formal contracts may have the effect of extending the expected duration of a relationship while at the same time restricting the gains from non cooperative behaviour in a relationship (Klein, 1996; Baker et al, 1997; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). In Transaction Cost Economics, formal contracts are seen as providing standardized approaches and mutually agreed upon policies and procedures for dealing with necessary adaptations in an exchange (Williamson, 1991).

Third, formal contracts can set the stage for the development of trust within a long-term interaction (Poppo and Zenger 2002). Based on this view, relational governance may increase the likelihood that trust and cooperation will safeguard against hazards poorly protected by incomplete contracts.

Fourth, the continuity and cooperation encouraged by relational governance may also help to generate contractual refinements that further support greater cooperation. Relational governance may help overcome the adaptive limits of formal contracts: a bilateral commitment to “*keep-on-with-it*” despite the unexpected complications and conflicts.

The interplay between network configurations and network governance mechanism is influenced by: a) the role formal contracts; b) the nature of transactions; and c) the control and coordination function of the governance mechanisms. A discussion based on these elements is as follows.

5.3 Interplay between Network Configurations and Network Governance Mechanisms

The discussion in this section is divided into the following four segments: a) controlling opportunistic behaviours; b) misapplied contracts; c) impact of new business models; and d) influence of service outsourcing.

5.3.1 Controlling Opportunistic Behaviour

Competition from their own suppliers poses a major threat to engineering, manufacturing, and high-tech companies (Rossetti and Choi, 2005; Rossetti and Choi, 2008). This issue is illustrated as follows. In a conventional supply network arrangement as shown in Figure 42, the buyer sources the components from its supplier, uses its dedicated resources to process and assemble the material, and then sell the finished product to the customer. After the initial purchase of the finished product, the customer requires spare parts for the remaining service life of the product. This requirement is catered for by the buyer. This aftermarket is highly profitable for the buyers operating in certain industries (e.g. aerospace industry).




Figure 42: Conventional Supply Network before SCD

However, this highly profitable aftermarket creates a large incentive for the supplier to bypass (disintermediate) the buyer's supply chain and sell directly to the buyers's aftermarket customers (Kumar, 1995; Herndon, 2002; Rossetti and Choi, 2005). This phenomenon, when a supplier overtly or surreptitiously sells its parts directly to its buyer's customers, is termed as "*Supply Chain Disintermediation*" (or SCD) (Rossetti and Choi, 2005; Rossetti and Choi, 2008) as shown in Figure 43.

Framed as an agency problem, SCD is the result of goal incongruence in the buyer–supplier relationship within a supply network (Rossetti and Choi, 2008). The possible occurrence of SCD is influenced by the degree to which the supplier’s goals are satisfied by the contractual terms (Jap, 1999). This goal congruence within a contractual relationship can be defined as the supplier’s desire to cooperate (Bergen et al., 1992). The greater the goal congruence between the supplier and the contract, the more likely the supplier will meet the terms of the contract. However, when goals are not satisfied by the contract, there is increased risk of opportunistic behaviour (Alfred et al., 2005). By ignoring the risk of SCD, buyers with profitable aftermarkets may find their suppliers competing directly against them in their aftermarkets (Kumar, 1995; Herndon, 2002; Rossetti and Choi, 2005).

Buyers that don’t create efficient contracts increase goal incongruence in their buyer–supplier relationships (Rossetti and Choi, 2008). Goal incongruence leads a supplier to behave opportunistically by engaging in SCD and selling its parts directly to the buyer’s aftermarket customers (Rossetti and Choi, 2005). Goal incongruence can be caused by three factors: a) contract compensation; b) attractiveness of alternatives; and c) contractual flexibility (Harris and Raviv, 1978; Jauch, Osborn, and Terpening, 1980).




Figure 43: Supply Network modified by SCD

Role of Formal Contracts in controlling SCD: Formal governance mechanisms can be employed to prevent the occurrence of SCD through: a) contractual flexibility; b) termination of contract; and b) enforcement of legal contracts (Harris and Raviv, 1978; Jauch, Osborn, and Terpening, 1980). Formal network governance mechanisms involve the strict enforcement of the terms and conditions of the contract. Flexible contracting refers to the degree to which the buyer allows renegotiation over the life of the contract (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Dyer and Chu, 2003). The supplier continuously compares its formal contract to the prospect of entering the aftermarket, and the degree to which the contract does not allow for adjustment will increase its perception that goal incongruence cannot be resolved (Mohr and Spekman, 1994).

Researchers have found that in order to satisfy the supplier's goals, the buyer should design a contract specific to the supplier's risk and reward preferences (Karunaratna and Johnson, 1997). By facilitating adjustment to terms and conditions over the life of the relationship, the buyer can better maintain goal congruence in a changing environment and hence prevent the occurrence of SCD (Kotabe et al., 2003). Thus the level of flexibility of a formal network governance mechanism directly influences the network configuration (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The buyer could also threaten the supplier with a loss of current business. In this sense the revenue provided by the buyer is used as an economic hostage to dissuade the supplier from committing SCD (Williamson, 1983; Provan and Gassenheimer, 1994; Wathne and Heide, 2004). Lawsuits between buyers and suppliers over the issue of SCD are common (Rossetti and Choi, 2008). Even if the buyers do not win the suits, the staggeringly high cost of the defense can act as a preventive measure to dissuade the suppliers from committing SCD (Gully, 1998; Rossetti and Choi, 2005).

Role of Informal Governance Mechanisms in controlling SCD: Informal governance mechanisms can be employed to prevent the occurrence of SCD through: a) monitoring of activities; and b) threat of reputational loss (Rossetti and Choi, 2005). These are explicated below:

When a supplier can hide its activities from the buyer, there is greater probability that the supplier will successfully engage in SCD (Rossetti and Choi, 2008). To prevent this

practice, buyers typically use monitoring and threat of penalties to decrease the probability of opportunistic behaviour (Magrath and Hardy, 1992).

Another effective method of curbing opportunistic behaviour using informal governance mechanisms is to threaten the supplier's reputation if it commits SCD. The buyer can tell the other buyers that this supplier is selling products in the aftermarket, and future or current business with other buyers is also in jeopardy (Dahlstrom and Ingram, 2003).

5.3.2 Misapplied Contracts

Strategic outsourcing decisions are intended to establish long term business relationships by aligning the capabilities of the supply base with the market opportunities of the buyer (Trent et. al, 1998; Carter et al, 2000). However, the promises of long-term relationships are not enough. The majority of the cost savings are gained through increased efficiencies caused by better communication and trust (Dyer, 1996; Rossetti and Choi, 2005). This can only happen in a close working relationship (Heide and Miner, 1992). Simply put, a close working relationship pays rent because the buyer and the supplier reduce the cost of governance mechanism and the cost of transactions (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000).

However, managers often sacrifice long term strategic benefits for short term gains aimed at reducing input costs (Trent et. al, 1998; Carter et al, 2000). As a result the network governance mechanisms are misapplied causing unforeseen changes in network configurations as illustrated in Figure 44.

Sourcing Initiative	Intended Outcomes	Misapplication of Governance Mechanisms	Actual Outcomes	Changes in Network Configurations	Managerial Considerations	Proposed Governance Mechanism
Supply Base Rationalization	Decreased resources needed to manage suppliers	The supply base is reduced to the point where supplier competition disappears	Buyers face new more powerful suppliers	Supplier assume central position to establish direct customer contact	Understand the supply market and suppliers' reactions to strategic sourcing initiatives.	Flexible formal contracts
Commodity Management	More Focused Relationship Building	Simple profit-oriented metrics are adopted as sole measures commodity managers performance	Commodity managers neglect the buyer's long term interests for short term results	Number of Network Participants Increases	Incorporate broader metrics that better reflect corporate goals	Formal contracts promoting long term interest of the suppliers
	Increased understanding of supply markets for given commodity					
	Decreased supplier's internal cost due to improving economies of scale					
	Closer technical relationship between buyer and supplier					
Spend Consolidation	Increased purchasing leverage	Spend consolidation creates highly captive suppliers that are soon driven to zero profits	Suppliers enter the aftermarket to remain profitable or leave the industry	SCD: Supplier establish direct contact with customer	Increase supplier efficiency and guard against supplier bankruptcy	Formal contracts supplemented by informal confidence building steps
	Increased interdependence between buyer and supplier					
	Decreased cost per part					
Global Sourcing	Increased competition in supply market	Intellectual property and suppliers' designs are passed to global sources freely	Intellectual property is lost and suppliers no longer share design capabilities	SCD: Supplier establish direct contact with customer	Make use of global sources for new capabilities and respect supplier's talents	Formal contracts protecting intellectual property and suppliers' designs rights
Sole Sourcing Agreements	Lower prices from suppliers	Sole sourcing partners are chosen solely on price	Suppliers' quality/flexibility capabilities and trustworthiness are discounted	Buyer's short term focus forces supplier to contact customer directly	Ability to form a good relationships	Informal long term relationships building steps
	Increased interdependence between buyer and supplier					
Long Term Agreements (LTA)	Improved quality, delivery and price due to supplier's buyer-specific investments	False promises of long term contracts are made to get the lowest price	Trust is destroyed and suppliers are unwilling to engage in future business	Disillusioned suppliers breaks relationship with buyer	Use LTAs to reduce transaction costs and promote co-prosperity based on trust	Formal long term flexible agreements
	Expectation of trust and co-prosperity between buyer and supplier					
Just In Time Purchasing	Reduced Level of Inventory	Suppliers are forced to absorb risks such as holding inventory and cash flow management	Smaller suppliers leave industry and remaining suppliers mitigate risks by entering the aftermarket or selling intellectual property	Suppliers forced to establish contact with	Balance risks between partners to improve supply network competitiveness	Formal contracts supplemented by informal confidence building steps
	Increased Supplier Responsiveness					

Figure 44: Creating Alignment between Network Configurations and Network Governance Mechanisms

The analysis of Figure 44 highlights that, in an attempt to decrease the resources required to manage the suppliers, buyers misapply the formal contracts too rigidly thereby reducing the supply base to the point where supply chain competition disappears (Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 2008). This results in the buyer facing new and more powerful suppliers that assume the position of centrality in the network (Bastl, Johnson and Menna, 2012). The buyer loses its bridge position as the suppliers create direct relationships with the buyer's customers (Li and Choi, 2009). In order to avoid such a situation, it is important that the supplier should understand the supply market and employ flexible formal contracts that encourage capacity building of a wider base of suppliers (Arino and de la Torre, 1998; Inkpen and Curral, 2004; Wathane and Heide, 2004; Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 2008).

Buyers want to share the cost benefits that suppliers achieve through economies of scale (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). However, the performance of the supplier is only judged across simple profit-oriented matrices that increase the number of participants (Li et al., 2010; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). This increases the coordination and monitoring cost for the buyer (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Trent et. al, 1998; Carter et al, 2000)). To avoid this situation the buyer can design formal long term contracts with the buyers that incorporate metrics reflecting broader corporate goals (Rossetti and Choi, 2005; Wilke and Ritter, 2006; Rossetti and Choi, 2008; Revron and Chappuis, 2005).

To increase their purchasing leverage and to increase their interdependence with their suppliers, buyers create highly captive suppliers (Trent et. al, 1998; Carter et al, 2000). Faced by minimum profits, suppliers either leave the network or form direct relationships with the buyer's customers causing a change in the network configuration. Intellectual property and supplier designs are passed freely taking advantage of contractual loopholes (Humphries and Wilding, 2004; Poppo et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2011). This creates a trust deficit between the supplier and the buyer which hinders future knowledge sharing activities such as sharing of designs for new product development (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011).

To overcome this situation, formal contracts protecting intellectual property and suppliers' designs rights can be designed that respect the supplier's talents (Lambert and Cooper, 2000; Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 2008; Alvarez, et al., 2010). It is important that

the buyers: a) have flexible formal contracts to safeguard the financial condition of the supplier; and b) take informal confidence building measures targeted towards the suppliers to strengthen their long term relationships (Lush and Brown, 1996; Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 2008; Alvarez et al., 2010).

While selecting a sole sourcing partner, network managers employ price driven formal contracts that discount the quality and flexibility capabilities and trustworthiness of the suppliers (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). This short term focus of the buyers encourages suppliers to establish direct contact with the buyer's customers by committing SCD (Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 2008). This problem can be resolved by employing relationship building measures that promote mutual benefits of the buyer and the supplier in the long term (Rowley et al., 2000; Poppo and Schepker, 2010; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011).

False promises of entering long term contracts with the suppliers are made by network managers in an attempt to improve quality, delivery service and lower prices (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 2008). As a consequence, trust is destroyed and suppliers are unwilling to engage in future business (Gundlach et al, 1995; Moorman, et al, 1993; Poppo and Schepker, 2010). This issue can be resolved by: a) using long term contracts to reduce transaction costs (Inkpen and Corral, 2004); and b) by promoting trust based steps that ensure co-prosperity of the buyer and the supplier (Poppo et al., 2008; Lin et al, 2011; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012).

Suppliers are forced to absorb financial risks such as holding inventory and cash flow management as part of the contractual obligations that focus only on inventory reduction at the buyer's end (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). As a consequence, financially weaker suppliers leave industry and remaining suppliers mitigate risks by entering the aftermarket or selling intellectual property (Bourlakis and Bourlakis, 2005; Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 2008; Delbufalo, 2012). This matter can be addressed by creating formal contracts protecting the financially weaker supplier from bankruptcy (Poppo and Schepker, 2010) supplemented by informal confidence building steps (Rowley et al., 2000; Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 2008).

5.3.3 Impact of New Business Models

Value creation process extends beyond the boundaries of an organisation (Stevens, 1989). Supply networks are formed when organisations integrate their business processes in an effort to achieve excellence in their supply chain management (Villena et al., 2011). Thus, the performance of an individual organisation is directly linked with that of other network members (Ellram et al., 2002). To ensure that network performance objectives are achieved, organisations invest in developing mechanism that establish a culture of coordination and collaboration (e.g. Honda and Toyota) across supply network member (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Liker and Choi, 2004).

In traditional supply chains, the relationship between buyer and the supplier is based on a one-time contact when the product is sold by the supplier. However, to maintain their competitive advantage, organisations are now integrating value-added services in their core product offering (Slack, et al., 2004; Defee and Stank, 2005; Choi and Linton, 2011). This new business model - product service system is a special case of servitization (Bastl et al., 2012). Motivated by the intent to achieve network performance objectives, this new strategy changes the existing network configuration as shown in Figure 45:




Figure 45: Servitization Driven Changes

As a result of this market-drive transformation in network configuration, a supplier enters into long term relationship with the buyer and the customer (Li and Choi, 2009).

The structural position of the participants determines the relationships dynamics amongst them. This transition from a manufacturing centred focus to a service oriented

focus has significant implications for network governance mechanisms (Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). A comparison of the two scenarios is as follows.

Pre-servitization scenario: In the pre-servitization scenario, cost-based governance mechanisms (Transaction Cost Economics perspective) are more suitable to manage the one-time transaction between the buyer and the supplier (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003).

Post-servitization scenario: In the post servitization scenario, relational-based governance mechanisms (Social Exchange Theory perspective) are more appropriate. This is because the buyer and the supplier are involved in an ongoing relationship. Now the focus is on the “*sale of use*” rather than the “*sale of product*”. The customer only pays to use the asset rather than its purchase (Shostack, 1982; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992).

A change in network configuration influenced by servitization induces the need for improved coordination and information exchange (Bastl et al., 2012). Driven by this need, network governance mechanisms also evolve from transaction based to relationship based mechanism (Alvarez et al., 2010; Fulmer and Gelfand; 2012; Pilbeam, et al, 2012).

5.3.4 Influence of Service Outsourcing

A change in network outsourcing policy also influences the interplay between network configurations and network governance mechanism (Bachman and Inkpen, 2011; Poppo et al, 2008; Pilbeam et al., 2012). Prior to service out sourcing the buyer enjoys the bridge position between the supplier and the customer. This bridge decay erodes the information and control benefits that the buyer enjoyed prior to service outsourcing (Rowley, 1997; Li and Choi, 2009). However, service outsourcing forces the buyer to accept the condition of bridge decay rather than to the face the scenario of bridge transfer – where the supplier assumes the central position in the network by establishing direct contact with the customer (Li and Choi, 2001; Bastl, Johnson and Choi, 2012). The buyer now has to rely on informal governance mechanism to establish a collaborative relationship with the supplier and the customer (Rowley, 1997; Shurr, 2007; Bachman an Inkpen, 2011; Bastl et al, 2012; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012).

6 DISCUSSION

Based on the thematic findings of the reviewed literature, a discussion is presented in this section to answer the following review question.

How do network configurations and network governance mechanisms influence each other in supply networks?

The thematic findings presented in Chapter 5 portray that network configurations and network governance mechanisms can influence each other as explicated below.

6.1 Inflexible contracts

Network governance mechanisms like formal contracts put in place to monitor the buyer-supplier relationship prove effective to handle “business-as-usual”. Formal contracts represent promises or obligations to perform particular actions in the future (Macneil, 1978). In a conventional supply networks (e.g. buyer-supplier-customer triad), the buyer sources the components from its suppliers; employs its dedicated resources to process the components, and then sells the finished product to its customer.

In the entire process, the supplier is not in direct contact with the buyer’s customer. The buyer acts as a bridge between the supplier and its customer. Because of the structural hole between the supplier and the buyer’s customer, the buyer can strategically control the flow of critical information. The buyer enjoys the information and control benefits associated with the bridge position i.e. what information to share and how to share it with its suppliers and customers.

Therefore, in a conventional supply network the goal congruence between a buyer and supplier is high with low risk of supplier opportunism. The supplier is inclined to meet the terms of the formal contract without having the flexibility to adjust the terms and conditions of the contract over the life of the relationship. Consequently the network configurations remain unchanged as shown in Figure 46.




Figure 46: Change in Network Configuration driven by Inflexible Contracts

On the contrary, in certain types of industries (e.g. aerospace), the highly profitable after market creates a large incentive for the suppliers to bypass the buyer and sell directly to the customer. In such cases, the supplier continuously compares its formal contract to the prospects of entering the aftermarket. The degree to which the formal contract with buyer does not allow for adjustments to accommodate for changes in business circumstances (e.g. introduction of new technology by a competitor; change in raw material price etc.) will strengthen the perception of the supplier that the issues related to goal incongruence between the objectives of the buyer and supplier cannot be solved by the formal contract. The supplier is inclined to take the strategic decision to bypass the buyer and establish direct links with the buyer's customer in order to protect its own profitability. Thus inflexible contracts can motivate the supplier to commit SCD by altering the existing network configuration.

6.2 Misapplied Contracts

The misapplication of network governance mechanism (e.g. contracts) by the buyer to achieve short term gains, while ignoring the strategic benefits associated with the long term relationship with the supplier, leads to unwanted changes in the network configuration. This situation is explicated by the following two examples.

First, while attempting to decrease the resources to govern the relationship with its suppliers, the buyer can misapply the formal contract too rigidly thereby reducing its supplier-base to the point where the competition between the suppliers disappears.

Second, in order to increase their purchasing leverage and to increase their interdependence with their suppliers, the buyer rigidly applies formal contracts to create highly captive suppliers. Faced by minimum profits, suppliers are forced to leave the network to avoid going bankrupt.

The net result in both these situations is that the buyer faces fewer and more powerful suppliers that assume the position of centrality in the network. The buyer loses its bridge position as the suppliers create direct relationship with the buyer's customer. In an attempt to strengthen its newly formed relationship with the buyer's customer, the supplier can further violate its contractual obligation by selling the intellectual property to the buyer's customer. This will result in creating a trust deficit between the buyer and the supplier that will further damage their long term relationship.

This change in the network configurations as a consequence of the rigidly applying the formal contracts is shown in Figure 47.




Figure 47: Changes in Network Configuration due to Misapplication of Formal Contracts

6.3 Power as a Network Governance Mechanism

Various forms of network governance mechanisms influence network configurations differently. In conventional supply networks the buyer monitors the first tier suppliers directly while the second tier suppliers are internally monitored by the first tier

suppliers. In this scenario, the network participants rely mainly on informal and relational governance mechanism with emphasis on “power to” perspective – which considers “power” in the context of strength of a collaborative network (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). For instance, second tier suppliers in the football industry in Pakistan (Pilbeam et al., 2012) mainly comprise sub-contractors often working from home to undertake the more labour intensive processes using child labour.

Multinational companies operating in such globalized supply networks externally impose standards by employing formal network governance mechanisms. These include standards and clear production processes. This choice is driven by the need to ensure legitimacy and compliance to ethical work standards. The focus is towards “power over” perspective which is concerned with the control of the relationship (Huxham and Beech, 2008).

This shift from relational network governance mechanism to a more formal governance mechanism initiates a change in the physical arrangement of the sub-contractors as well. For instance, new stitching centres are established, where these suppliers relocate to continue their operations. External monitoring agency keeps a check on these operations being carried in the stitching centres. The buyer has to deal with one supplier (i.e. the stitching centre) instead of multiple suppliers as shown previously. A comparison of these two network configurations is shown in Figure 48.




Figure 48: Influence of Form of Governance on Network Configurations

6.4 Impact of New Business Models

The transition from a manufacturing centred focus to a service oriented focus has significant implications for the selection of a suitable network governance mechanism to match a particular network configuration.

For instance, in a conventional supply network with a manufacturing centred focus: a) the buyer and the supplier interact with each other only when the product is sold by the supplier; and b) the buyer and the customer interact with each other only when the product is bought by the customer. The focus in this case is on the ‘sale of the product’ where the customer purchases the ‘asset’. In this pre-servitization scenario, formal governance mechanisms (e.g. cost based formal contracts between the buyer and the supplier) are more suitable to manage the one-time transaction between the buyer and the supplier.

On the other hand, in an effort to maintain their competitive advantage, organisations are adopting new business models (e.g. servitization) by integrating value added services to their core product offering. As a result of this market-drive transformation in network configuration, a supplier enters into long term relationship with the buyer and the customer. In the post servitization scenario, relational-based governance mechanisms are more appropriate. This is because the buyer and the supplier are now involved in an ongoing relationship. The focus in this case is on the ‘sale of the use’ where the customer pays to use the ‘asset’. A comparison of the network configurations of the two business models is shown in Figure 49.




Figure 49: Comparison of Network Configurations for Two Business Models

6.5 Influence of Service Outsourcing Policy

Service outsourcing decisions pose a challenge for the network managers in selecting a suitable governance mechanism to coordinate and control the emerging network configuration.

The unique characteristic of services is that the customer interacts with the service provider during the process of delivery. Services outsourcing is typically defined as the conscious choice of replacing internal service functions with the use of external agents to perform one or more service activities.

Prior to services outsourcing, the services buyer acts as a bridge between the services supplier and the buyer’s customer and therefore enjoys information and control benefits associated with the bridge position. In this scenario, formal

contracts are more suitable to maintain the control over other network participants.

Services outsourcing causes the buyer to lose its bridge position, leading to the erosion of the information and control benefits it used to enjoy. In services outsourcing the bridge position is transferred from the buyer to the service supplier. The customer now forms an ongoing relationship with the service supplier for which relational governance mechanism is more appropriate.

6.6 Concluding Remarks

This discussion illustrates that network configurations and network governance mechanism influence each other in a variety of ways. How this happens is explained as follows. The environment in which businesses organisations operate are increasingly unpredictable and risky in nature. Operating in such a complex environment poses its own set of challenges for management both the individual organisational level and at the supply network level. To remain competitive in such an uncertain environment, organisations are constantly revisiting their existing policies and business models.

Organisational change can either be: a) initiated internally by proactively managing the outsourcing policies of the organisation and by adopting new business models; or b) is forced upon the organisations due to transformation in external circumstances. For instance, global supply networks are required to comply with externally imposed international standards related to quality, environment, or business ethics (e.g. prevention of child labour). In other cases, supply networks are left with no option but to introduce new technology to remain competitive at a global level. Misapplication governance mechanisms at the inter-organisational level due to short-sightedness of managers also forces change in relationships at the network level (e.g. SCD). As a consequence of these changes the IORs between the network participants are also affected. In order to coordinate and control these dynamic IORs embedded in a networks, managers are constantly being challenged to find the right mix between network configurations and network governance mechanisms. This research attempts to examine the issues surrounding this particular problem faced by the practioners.

7 CONCLUSION

This systematic review portrays that research on the interplay between network configurations and network governance mechanisms in supply networks is still in the nascent stage of theory development (Edmondson and McManus, 2007). This is evidenced by the exploratory nature of the majority of the reviewed studies. The key findings of this review are as follows.

7.1 Key Findings

First, most of the empirical research on supply networks is based on manufacturing companies located either in the USA or Europe. In addition to the narrow geographical perspective, the studies also explored a limited number of traditional industries that mainly included: a) automotive; b) aerospace; and c) electrical and electronics industry.

Second, the extant research on supply networks is dominated mainly by three main theories: a) Social Exchange Theory; b) Social Network Theory; and c) Transaction Cost Economics. There are a few recent attempts at broadening the theoretical base for analyzing supply networks. However, there is a need for network-level theory building.

Third, majority of the studies: a) discuss informal network governance mechanisms either exclusively or in tandem with formal governance mechanisms; b) use the network as the unit of analysis.; and c) have used a cross sectional approach for data collection

Fourth, there are two broad categories of buyer supplier relationships within supply networks: a) cooperative relationships; and b) competitive relationships. Conversely, supplier-supplier relationships are considered as cooperative relationships.

Fifth, Two principal functions of governance mechanism have received much attention in the literature and in empirical studies. These are: a) the co-ordination function; and b) the control function.

Sixth, network configurations and network governance mechanisms can influence each other either directly or indirectly through a variety of factors. These factors are broadly classified as the: a) nature of exchange; b) role of management; c) level of flexibility in network governance mechanism; d) complementary role of formal and informal governance mechanism; and e) desired level of control and coordination..

Finally, although there are a few recent studies that have used deductive research techniques to test the theoretical lessons learned in the past decade, however, there exist a number of complex issues regarding the phenomenon of research interest. These require a focus on theory building rather than theory testing.

7.2 Limitations

This review is a stepping stone on the way to the doctoral programme, and its ultimate goal is to determine potential areas of further research that can provide the basis for a PhD research project. However, the following limiting factors need to be kept in mind.

First, this inquiry is driven by the author's past experience, spanning over a decade and a half, in managing supply networks and the interest in the interplay between network configurations and network governance mechanisms. The author is still slightly biased, preferring qualitative studies for providing a more rich analysis that is valuable for strategic decision making. Although a conscious effort was made by the author to avoid making imbalanced decisions on this basis yet this practice driven approach influenced by the bias towards qualitative research approach might still have influenced the selection and quality appraisal of the articles short listed for the review. It should be noted that there were no conflicts of interests that influenced the process and the findings of this systematic review.

Second, the intentionally narrow focus of this review might also have limited the richness of the final analysis. The researches constructs lacked clear definitions, were open to interpretations (driven by variety of theoretical underpinnings), and were located at the intersection of diverse organisational fields. Trying to capture all the aspects of the phenomenon of interest in a search string led to an unmanageable number of sources. Bringing it down to a reasonable number inevitably reduced the breadth of the perspective. All possible effort was made to mitigate this dilemma by consulting the panel of experts at the planning and design stages of this review.

Finally, the findings of this literature review are influenced by the definitions and perspectives adopted by the author during the review process.

7.3 Reflections and Key Learning Points

This work was the author's first experience of systematically reviewing the literature. Since the research topic changed completely after joining the MRes programme, so all the concepts regarding the phenomenon of interest were developed from the grass root level. However, this build up of relevant knowledge base proved to be a valuable input for the systematic literature review. The systematic review process was spread over six- month period. This process was quite extensive and was found to be exhausting both mentally and physically. The learning points resulting from this experience are organized into two main segments. These include the key learning points regarding the content and the process of this work.

7.3.1 Content

The systematic review of the literature signified the procedural difficulties in dealing with a complex phenomenon of research interest. First, since this field of inquiry is in the nascent stage of theory development so working with definitions that describe different aspects of the same concept in different language called for substantial "inductive" thinking, and demonstrated the difficulty of maintaining rigour in working with rich and diverse literature. Maintaining a record of the thought process proved to be a very helpful skill.

Second, the complexity embedded in the nature of this research also influenced the data synthesis and analysis part of the review process. Juxtaposing the results of qualitative and quantitative studies was quite challenging that encouraged lateral thinking.

Third, comparing the view points of researchers based on a variety of theoretical underpinnings helped in developing a better understanding of the intricacies involved in the interplay between network configurations and network governance mechanisms. For instance, contrasting the research perspective on network governance mechanisms influenced by Transaction Cost Economics and Social Exchange Theory was an important learning point regarding the content of this work.

Finally, an insight into the process of operationalizing the concepts, of moving from abstract descriptions to concrete and observable proxies was another important learning point.

7.3.2 Process

A number of learning points were related to the process of the systematic review. First and the most important one concerned the selection of appropriate studies. The search and selection processes in this review were perhaps unnecessarily long and complicated. Over 4,000 abstracts across databases were reviewed to come up with only 125 studies included in the final pool of sources. This was probably the result of the strategy which called for very broad search strings. However, this process could have been designed more efficiently. For this work the field is vague and cross-disciplinary. In such a case it may be better to start with very specific search strings and achieve the necessary breadth and interdisciplinary insight later through cross-referencing and panel recommendations. Otherwise, many studies that address the issue vaguely have to be reviewed and later discarded as irrelevant.

Second, the detailed recording of each step of the systematic review process is a key skill that can be used in future research as well. The meticulous recording of the review process, not only enhanced the credibility of this work, but it also ensured the repeatability of the process that may be useful for future research fellows.

Third, the quality appraisal process of the full text required a detailed review of each of the short listed papers before final selection. This part of the process took a lot longer than planned. This unforeseen delay squeezed the time allotted for data synthesis and reporting. The lack of experience of the author may have contributed towards this scheduling issue.

Finally, the output of the data extraction process was a work form developed for each of the 125 articles reviewed. This work form was later used to conduct a descriptive analysis of the reviewed data and to compare and contrast various aspects of the articles.

This output proved to be an invaluable stepping stone to determine the gaps for future research. These work forms can also be used as an input for further publications.

7.4 Further Research Opportunities

This review highlights that the interplay between network configurations and network governance mechanisms offers a rich area for further research. A number of questions remain unanswered and can potentially become the basis for the doctoral research that will follow this study. These questions are as follows.

7.4.1 Inflexible Contracts

The following research question was developed after examining the extant work on the role of network governance mechanisms in managing SCD:

- What are the factors that influence the effectiveness of formal and informal governance mechanisms in preventing SCD in supply networks?

7.4.2 Misapplied Contracts

An investigation of the work on the issues related to the changes in network configurations caused by the misapplication of network governance mechanisms led to the following research question:

- What is the role of the management in the designing and implementation of formal contracts in supply networks?

7.4.3 Power as a Network Governance Mechanism

A review of the existing research work related to the changes in network configurations influenced by various forms of network governance mechanisms formed the basis for the following research question.

- How does power imbalance influence the adoption of “*power over*” and “*power to*” perspective in supply networks?

7.4.4 Impact of New Business Models

The discussion around the impact of new business models on the two constructs of research interest i.e. network configurations and network governance mechanisms led to the following research question:

- When and under what conditions does a particular choice of a network governance mechanism become (in) effective regarding manufacturing/service oriented business models?

7.4.5 Influence of Service Outsourcing Policy

Two research questions was developed from the review of the extant research on the impact of service outsourcing policy on network configurations and network governance mechanisms in supply networks. These are as follows:

- How does the nature of a relationship between the buyer and its customer prior to service outsourcing influence choice of a governance mechanism after the outsourcing decision is taken in supply networks?
- What are the managerial implications in implementing network governance mechanisms before, during, and after taking a service outsourcing decision in a supply network?

From a methodological point of view, there is need to conduct comparative network research based on longitudinal studies. There is a significant shortage of conceptual and empirical studies in the service sector context. Similarly research based on industries other than the USA and Europe could offer a rich opportunity to explore the cultural impact on supply networks strategy.

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9 APPENDIX A – Data Extraction Template

01	Author of the article	
02	Title of the article	
03	Document name	
04	Journal title	
05	Date of publication	
06	Volume	
07	Number	
08	Page numbers	
09	Paper Type	
10	Geographical Location	
11	Context/Industry	
12	Sample size	
13	Data collection method	
14	Method of data analysis	
15	Study Characteristics	
16	Key findings	
17	Abstract	
18	Key words	
19	Organisation Field	
20	Theoretical Lens	
21	Mode of Governance	
22	Configuration Elements	
23	Relationship Directionality	
24	Unit of analysis	
25	Unit of data collection	
26	Research Perspective	
27	Quality Appraisal Score	

10 APPENDIX B –List of Reviewed Articles

(Part 1/9)

No	Title of the Articles Selected for Review	Authors
1	Collaboration networks, structural holes, and innovation: a longitudinal study	Ahuja, 2000
2	Nestle´ Nespresso AAA sustainable quality program: an investigation into the governance dynamics in a multi-stakeholder supply chain network.	Alvarez, Pilbeam and Wilding, 2010
3	The dark side of close relationships.	Anderson and Jap, 2005
4	A model of the distributor’s perspective of distributor-manufacturer working relationships	Anderson and Narus, 1984
5	The use of pledges to build and sustain commitment in distribution channels	Anderson and Weitz, 1992
6	Dyadic business relationships within a business context	Anderson et al., 1994
7	Learning from failure: Towards an evolutionary model of collaborative ventures	Arino and de la Torre, 1998
8	Strategic alliance structuring: A game theoretic and transaction cost examination of inter-organisation cooperation	Arvind, 1993
9	Understanding institutional-based trust building process in IORs	Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011
10	The resource –based view of the organisation: Ten years after 1991	Barney et al., 2001
11	Organisation resources and sustained competitive advantage	Barney, 1991
12	Understanding the meaning of collaboration in supply chain	Barratt, 2004
13	Who’s Seeking Whom? Coalition Behaviour of a Weaker Player in Buyer-Supplier Relationships	Bastl, Johnson and Choi, 2012
14	Buyer-Supplier Relationships in a servitized environment: An examination with Cannon and Perrault’s Framework	Bastl et al., 2012
15	Neither market nor hierarchy nor network: The emergence of bazaar governance	Benoit and Xavier, 2006

List of Reviewed Articles (continued)

(Part 2/9)

No	Title of the Articles Selected for Review	Authors
16	Creating and managing value in collaborative networks	Bititci et al., 2004
17	Business to business exchanges: A rich descriptive apparatus derived from Macneil's and Menger's Analysis	Blois, 2002
18	Outsourcing governance: Fairtrade's message for C21 global governance	Blowfield and Dolan, 2010
19	Networks within Industrial Districts: Organizing Knowledge Creation and Transfer by Means of Moderate Hierarchies	Boari and Lipparini, 1999
20	Information technology safeguards, logistics asset specificity and fourth party logistics network creation in the food retail chain	Bourlakis and Bourlakis, 2005
21	Taking stock of networks and organisations: A multi level perspective	Brass et al., 2004
22	Supply chain management: Structured literature review and implications for future research	Burgess et al., 2006
23	Buyer-seller relationships in business markets	Cannon and Perreault, 1999
24	Unveiling the structure of supply networks: case studies in Honda, Acura, and DaimlerChrysler	Choi and Hong, 2002
25	Structural Embeddedness and supplier management: A network Perspective	Choi and Kim, 2008
26	Don't Let your supply chain control your business	Choi and Linton, 2011
27	Triads in Supply Networks: Theorizing Buyer-Supplier-Supplier Relationships.	Choi and Wu, 2009
28	Social Exchange Theory: An interdisciplinary Review	Corpanzano and Mitchell, 2005
29	Between trust and control: developing confidence in partner cooperation in alliances	Das and Teng, 1998
30	Applying the strategy-structure-performance paradigm to the supply chain environment	Deffe and Stank, 2005

List of Reviewed Articles (continued)

(Part 3/9)

No	Title of the Articles Selected for Review	Authors
31	Outcomes of inter-organisational trust in supply chain relationships: a systematic literature review and a meta-analysis of the empirical evidence	Delbufalo, 2012
32	An examination of the nature of trust in buyer-seller relationships	Doney and Cannon, 1997
33	The evolution of cooperation in strategic Alliances: Initial conditions or learning process	Doz, 1996
34	Developing buyer-seller relationships	Dwyer et al., 1987
35	Japanese-Style Partnerships: Giving Companies a Competitive Edge	Dyer and Ouchi, 1993
36	The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of interorganisational competitive advantage.	Dyer and Singh, 1998
37	Effective interorganisation collaboration: How organisations minimize transaction costs and maximize transaction value	Dyer, 1997
38	Partnering Characteristics: A dyadic perspective	Ellram and Hendrick, 1995
39	What is the right supply chain for your product?	Fisher, 1997
40	At what level (and in whom) we trust: Trust across multiple organisation levels	Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012
41	Determinants of long-term orientation in buyer-seller relationships	Ganesan, 1994
42	The different roles of satisfaction, trust and commitment in customer relationships	Garbarino and Johnson, 1999
43	An evolving theory of hybrid distribution: Taming a hostile supply network	Gassenheimer et al., 2007
44	The role of trust in supply chain governance	Ghosh and Fedorowicz, 2008
45	Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost theory	Ghoshal and Moran, 1996

List of Reviewed Articles (continued)

(Part 4/9)

No	Title of the Articles Selected for Review	Authors
46	A decade of SCM Literature: Past, Present, and Future Implications.	Giunipero et al., 2008
47	A relational approach to organisational design	Grandori and Soda, 2006
48	The strength of weak ties	Granovetter, 1973
49	Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness	Granovetter, 1985
50	Disruptions and supply networks: a multi-level, multi-theoretical relational perspective	Greening and Rutherford, 2011
51	The architecture of cooperation: managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances	Gulati and Singh, 1998
52	Strategic Network	Gulati et al., 2000
53	Social structure and alliance formation patterns: A longitudinal study	Gulati, 1995
54	Alliances and Networks	Gulati, 1998
55	Network location and learning: The influence of network resources and organisations capabilities of alliance formation	Gulati, 1999
56	The structure of commitment in Exchange	Gundlach et al., 1995
57	Do norms matter in marketing relationships?	Heide and John, 1992
58	The shadow of the future: Effects of anticipated interaction and frequency of contact on buyer-seller cooperation	Heide and Miner, 1992
59	Interorganisational governance in marketing channels	Heide, 1994
60	Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: Implications for Transaction Cost Theory	Hill, 1990

List of Reviewed Articles (continued)

(Part 5/9)

No	Title of the Articles Selected for Review	Authors
61	Resource dependency theory: A review	Hillman et al., 2009
62	How to design a service	Shostack, Lynn G., 1982
63	Paradigms of derived exchange value effects in market networks	Hu and Tsai, 2007
64	An emergent theory of structure and outcomes in small-organisation strategic manufacturing networks	Human and Provan, 1997
65	Legitimacy Building in the evolution of small networks – Study of success and demise	Human and Provan, 2000
66	Long term collaborative business relationships: The impact of trust and C3 behaviour	Humphries and Wilding, 2004
67	The co-evolution of trust, control, and learning in joint ventures	Inkpen and Curral, 2004
68	Knowledge, bargaining power, and the instability of international joint ventures	Inkpen et al., 1997
69	A general theory of network governance: Exchange conditions and social mechanism	Jones et al., 1997
70	Organisational Social Network Research: Core Ideas and Key Debates	Kilduff and Brass, 2010
71	Structural investigation of supply networks: A social network analysis approach	Kim et al., 2010
72	The evolution of interorganisation networks: Environmental effects on patterns of network change	Koka, et al., 2006
73	Purchasing must become supply chain management	Kraljic, 1983
74	Social exchange theory and research on business-to-business relational exchange	Lambe et al., 2001
75	Issues in Supply Chain Management	Lambert and Cooper, 2000

List of Reviewed Articles (continued)

(Part 6/9)

No	Title of the Articles Selected for Review	Authors
76	Building successful supply chain partnerships	Lambert et al., 1999
77	The Triple-A Supply Chain	Lee, 2004
78	Triads in service outsourcing: Bridge, Bridge Decay and Bridge Transfer.	Li and Choi, 2009
79	Relational mechanisms, formal contracts, and local knowledge acquisition by international subsidiaries	Li et al., 2010
80	Building Deep supplier relationships	Liker and Choi, 2004
81	How to manage strategic alliances in OEM-based industrial clusters: Network embeddedness and formal governance mechanisms	Lin et al., 2011
82	Product Service Systems and supply network relationships: An exploratory case study	Lockett et al., 2010
83	The leveraging of interorganisation relationships as a distinctive organisational capability	Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999
84	Interdependency, contracting, and relational behaviour in marketing channels	Lusch and Brown, 1996
85	Two's a company, three's a crowd? Triads in cooperative competitive networks.	Madhavan, et al., 2004
86	Power relations in exchange networks	Markovsky et al., 1988
87	Challenges in transforming manufacturing organisations into product-service providers.	Martinez et al., 2009
88	Characteristics of partnership success: Partnership attributes, communication behaviour, and conflict resolution techniques	Mohr and Spekman, 1994
89	Factors affecting trust in market research relationships	Moorman et al., 1993
90	The commitment-trust theory of relationship marketing	Morgan and Hunt, 1994

List of Reviewed Articles (continued)

(Part 7/9)

No	Title of the Articles Selected for Review	Authors
91	The structure and function of collective constructs: Implications for multi-level research and theory development	Morgeson and Hofman, 1999
92	Supply networks as a complex adaptive system: Towards simulation-based theory building on evolutionary decision making	Nair et al., 2009
93	Trust, opportunism, and governance	Nooteboom, 1996
94	Determinants of IORs: Integration and future direction	Oliver, 1990
95	The governance of supply networks: a systematic literature review.	Pilbeam et al., 2012
96	Repairing public trust in organisations	Poppo and Schepker, 2010
97	Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?	Poppo and Zenger, 2002
98	Examining the conditional limits of relational governance: specialized assets, performance ambiguity, and long-standing ties.	Poppo et al., 2008
99	Neither market nor hierarchy: Network forms of organisations	Powell, 1990
100	Interorganisational collaboration and locus of innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology.	Powell, 1996
101	Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness	Provan and Kenis, 2008
102	Interorganisational dependence and control as predictors of opportunism in dealer-supplier relations	Provan and Skinner, 1989
103	Interorganisational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks.	Provan et al., 2007
104	Effects of Swiss Retailers' Strategy on Governance Structure of Fresh Food Products Supply Chain	Revron and Chappuis, 2005
105	Structuring cooperative relationships between organisations	Ring and Van de Ven, 1992

List of Reviewed Articles (continued)

(Part 8/9)

No	Title of the Articles Selected for Review	Authors
106	Developing processes of cooperative IORs	Ring and Van de Ven, 1994
107	A systematic assessment of the empirical support for transaction cost economics	Robert and Han, 2004
108	On the dark side of strategic sourcing: Experience from the aerospace industry.	Rossetti and Choi, 2005
109	Supply chain management under high goal incongruence: An empirical examination of disintermediation in the aerospace supply chain.	Rossetti and Choi, 2008
110	Redundant governance structures: An analysis of structural and relational embeddedness in the steel and semiconductor industries	Rowley et al., 2000
111	Moving beyond dyadic ties: A network theory of stakeholder influences	Rowley, 1997
112	Buyer-seller relationship development episodes: theories and methods	Schurr, 2007
113	Social structure and competition in interorganisation networks: The paradox of embeddedness	Uzzi, 1997
114	Monitoring in Service Triads Consisting of Buyers, Subcontractors, and End Customers.	van der Valk and van Iwaarden, 2011
115	The dark side of buyer-supplier relationships: A social capital perspective.	Vellena et al., 2011
116	Drivers of supply network governance	Verwaal and Hesselmanns, 2004
117	Relational governance in a supply chain network	Wathne and Heide, 2004
118	Understanding collaborative supply chain relationships through the application of the Williamson organisational failure framework	Wilding and Humphries, 2006
119	Levels of analysis in business-to-business marketing	Wilke and Ritter, 2006
120	Comparative Economic Organisation: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives	Williamson, 1991

List of Reviewed Articles (continued)

(Part 9/9)

No	Title of the Articles Selected for Review	Authors
121	Supplier–supplier relationships in buyer–supplier triad: Building theories from 8 case studies.	Wu and Choi, 2005
122	Supplier–supplier relationships in buyer–supplier–supplier triads: Implications for supplier performance.	Wu et al., 2010
123	Vertical Marketing System for Complex Products: A Triadic Perspective.	Wuyts et al., 2004
124	Relational governance as an interorganisational strategy: An empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange	Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995
125	Does trust matter? Exploring effects interorganisational and interpersonal trust on performance	Zaheer et al., 1998

11 APPENDIX C - Data Extraction Forms

Data Extraction Form Number 1

01	Author of the article	Ahuja, Gautam
02	Title of the article	Collaboration networks, structural holes, and innovation: a longitudinal study
03	Document name	Ahuja, 2000
04	Journal title	Administrative Science Quarterly
05	Date of publication	2000
06	Volume	45
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	425-455
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Chemical Industry
12	Sample size	97 organisations
13	Data collection method	Archival research; electromagnetic databases; general business print media; government publications; and consultant reports for chemical industry
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis (regression analysis)
15	Study Characteristics	This study examines the impact of three aspects of an organisation's ego network that include: a) direct ties; b) indirect ties; and c) structural holes, on the innovation output of the organisation. The analytical framework put forward in this paper suggests that three aspects of network structure play different roles in the innovation process.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The degree to which indirect ties benefit the focal organisation, however, is likely to be contingent on the number of the focal organisation's existing direct ties, such that organisations with few direct ties are likely to enjoy greater benefits from their indirect ties than organisations with many direct ties. • Direct ties serve as sources of resources and information, indirect ties serve primarily as sources of information, and structural holes between partners serve two contradictory roles. They expand the diversity of information that organisation has access to but also increase exposure to potential malfeasance. • Direct and indirect ties influence innovation output positively, but the impact of indirect ties is moderated by the organisation's level of direct ties.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The value of a strategy of substituting indirect ties for direct ties will vary significantly across networks. In any network, an analysis of the substantive benefit provided by each kind of tie must be conducted before a network reconfiguration is attempted. • Indirect ties are an efficient and effective way of maximizing network benefits. • In an inter-organisational technology linkage network, an organisation's indirect ties serve as a mechanism for knowledge spill overs and contribute positively and significantly to its innovation output. • Unlike direct ties, indirect ties entail relatively low or no maintenance costs for the organisation, these benefits are extremely welcome.
17	Abstract	To assess the effects of an organisation's network of relations on innovation, this paper elaborates an analytical framework that relates 3 aspects of an organisation's ego network - direct ties, indirect ties, and structural holes - to the organisation's subsequent innovation output. Results from a longitudinal study of organisations in the international chemicals industry indicate support for the predictions on direct and indirect ties, but in the inter-organisational collaboration network, increasing structural holes has a negative effect on innovation.
18	Key words	Structural holes; collaboration networks; direct ties; indirect ties; innovation output; longitudinal study; chemical industry
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social network theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and Informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Network (Ego); Ties (Direct and indirect ties); Structural holes
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Organisation
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research Perspective	Cross-sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 2

01	Author of the article	Alvarez, Gabriela // Pilbeam, Colin // Wilding, Richard
02	Title of the article	Nestle´ Nespresso AAA sustainable quality program: an investigation into the governance dynamics in a multi-stakeholder supply chain network.
03	Document name	Alvarez, Pilbeam and Wilding, 2010
04	Journal title	Supply Chain Management: An International Journal
05	Date of publication	2010
06	Volume	15
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	165-182
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	Switzerland; Costa Rica; Colombia; Guatemala; Mexico; and Brazil
11	Context/Industry	Coffee industry
12	Sample size	48 interviews and 15 documents
13	Data collection method	Semi structured interviews; documents; archival record
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive research
15	Study Characteristics	This longitudinal study highlights the importance of treating governance mechanisms not as a fixed variable to be determined once and for all in the beginning of a relationship, but rather to adapt the coordination mechanisms to the external and internal context of the relationship and the characteristics of the task at hand.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In conditions of uncertainty, flexible conditions and the use of informal governance mechanisms supported by trust facilitated a search and experimentation process. In an environment of high context uncertainty, governance mechanisms were mostly informal during the initial phase. Repeated ties between partners increases the level of trust and lowers the need for formal mechanisms. • Formalization of governance mechanisms is associated with a need to increase the number of parties involved, to enable measurement of identified specific objectives and to bring clarity to current and new players involved in relationship. • As collaboration develops from an experimental and project based initiative to becoming a more comprehensive program, governance mechanisms co-evolve with the specificity of objectives and the complexity of parties involved. • Initial relationship quality among actors can be enhanced and extended to new actors through structured opportunities for informal encounters.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Relationship quality is the result of an initial store of goodwill and actual observations of behaviour over time, which acquires more importance as time progresses.
17	Abstract	<p>Within the context of a sustainable supply chain, the purpose of this paper is to report on empirical longitudinal research on supply chain network evolution and dynamics of governance in a multi-stakeholder supply chain sustainability initiative led by Nespresso, the specialty coffee division of Nestle'. The paper proposes a framework to study the creation and evolution of governance mechanisms over a five-year period. Data from 48 semi-structured interviews and 15 recent and historic documents were also analyzed. The interviews were conducted among current and past representatives of all the organisations concerned including coffee traders, NGOs and farmers. In contrast with literature on the subject, governance mechanisms initially relied mostly on informal mechanisms. Formal governance mechanisms were incorporated into the relationships to enable the supply chain network to grow and to provide clarity to all actors. Relational quality processes that increased trust were critical elements in the early phase, and were explicitly built into a second phase of development. Being a single case study, some caution needs to be applied to generalize findings beyond the specific context studied. An additional methodological limitation is the limited number of actors involved in the overall supply chain network. Paper shows the importance of treating governance mechanisms within the supply chain not as a fixed variable to be determined once and for all in the beginning of a relationship, but rather to adapt the coordination mechanisms of the relationships. Evolution of relationships over time has been "often called for but rarely chosen". The case highlights potential benefits of this type of research to develop an understanding of evolution of relationships in a supply chain network.</p>
18	Key words	Supply chain management, Governance, Economic sustainability, Coffee
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and Informal (explicit); trust; evolution of governance mechanisms
22	Configuration Elements	Network (Supply); evolution of relationships
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individuals (decision makers)
26	Research Type	Longitudinal study
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 3

01	Author of the article	Anderson, Erin// Jap, Sandy D.
02	Title of the article	The dark side of close relationships
03	Document name	Anderson and Jap, 2005
04	Journal title	MIT Sloan
05	Date of publication	2005
06	Volume	46
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	75-82
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	USA, Italy, Canada
11	Context/Industry	Automobile, construction, finance, agriculture
12	Sample size	321 pairs of business-to-business relationship
13	Data collection method	Ethnographic study
14	Method of data analysis	Thematic analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study focused towards the exploring the problems in close buyer-supplier-relationships and prescribes practical steps to overcome these challenges.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unlike personal relationships, business relationships cannot be expected to endure indefinitely. By recognizing quickly that relationship is incompatible/inoperable, companies should cut ties and move on to new relationships. • New personnel can help reduce the vulnerability and reinvigorate the relationship. Relationship managers without battle scars may bring in a fresh perspective that is more optimistic. • When BSR develops problems, partners will review their goals and reevaluate why their relationship was formed in the first place. This reconsideration is often helpful for re-stabilizing the relationship and re-charting its course. • A key relationship should not rest on the interpersonal relationship between two individual managers. Other individuals should be involved on both sides of the partnership on an ongoing basis. While this may appear inefficient and redundant, it can serve as a worthwhile safeguard. • By developing mutual hostages (for instance dedicated investments such as assets, human resources, specialized strategies and capital equipment that are difficult to move and redeploy in other relationships), the partners create what economists call "self-enforcing contracts" because each party loses an incentive to cheat the other and instead gains a powerful motive to stay in the relationship and make the most of it. • One of the best approaches for maintaining the initial benefits of a close business relationship is constantly to evaluate the relationship.
17	Abstract	The vey factors that make partnerships with customers or suppliers beneficial can leave those relationships vulnerable to

		deterioration.
18	Key words	Buyer supplier relationships; coordination; collaboration
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); mutual hostages; evaluation of relationships
22	Configuration Elements	Network (Supply); buyer-supplier relationships
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (buyer-supplier relationships)
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research Perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 4

01	Author of the article	Anderson, James C. // Narus, James A.
02	Title of the article	A model of the distributor's perspective of distributor-manufacturer working relationships
03	Document name	Anderson and Narus, 1984
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing
05	Date of publication	1984
06	Volume	48
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	62-74
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Electronics industry
12	Sample size	153
13	Data collection method	Mail survey – questionnaire the survey questionnaire based on personal interviews
14	Method of data analysis	Structural equation Modelling, a series of multiple group analyses, similarity coefficients, and LISREL analyses
15	Study Characteristics	This study builds upon studies from social exchange theory and channels of distribution to present a model of distributor-manufacturer working relationships from the distributor's viewpoint.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A manufacturer that has more reasonable policies would tend to be more willing when requested to modify policies not in the best interest of the distributor, engaging in coercive practices would be less necessary, and disputes with the distributor would need to be more serious for termination. • A working relationship characteristic strongly desired by distributors is reasonable manufacturer policies. • Sound relationships can be developed and maintained when a manufacturer provides outcomes that meet or exceed distributor expectations, and that are superior to those available from alternative suppliers. • Manufacturers can also improve benefits received by distributors through fostering meaningful communication with distributors (particularly with respect to unanticipated changes in price, product, or delivery). • When the outcomes from a given working relationship meet or surpass expectations, better distributor cooperation and satisfaction (from the distributor's perspective) results. • When outcomes are superior to those of the distributor's best alternative supplier, a manufacturer is less likely to have to use coercive practices and threats of relationship termination to get distributors to perform desired tasks.
17	Abstract	There is a need for more comprehensive models in the field of

		channels of distribution, and more comprehensive means for empirically testing them. Building upon studies from social exchange theory and channels of distribution, a model of distributor-manufacturer working relationships from the distributor's viewpoint is offered. An initial empirical test, employing a structural equation methodology, gives acceptable support of the model, assuming some measurement limitations. Further work on modelling both perspectives of the exchange relationship is explored. The model has implications for managers responsible for working relationships with industrial distributors. Sound relationships can be developed and maintained when a manufacturer provides outcomes that meet or go beyond distributor expectations and that are superior to those available from alternative suppliers.
18	Key words	Social; relations; models; manufacturers; exchange; distributors; distribution channels
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (Implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Business-to-business relationships (distributor-manufacturer)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (distributor-manufacturer relationships)
25	Unit of data collection	Individuals (officials)
26	Research Perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 5

01	Author of the article	Anderson, Erin // Weitz, Barton
02	Title of the article	The use of pledges to build and sustain commitment in distribution channels
03	Document name	Anderson and Weitz, 1992
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing Research
05	Date of publication	1992
06	Volume	29
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	18-34
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Manufacturers and their distributors selected from a list of the Fortune 500 corporations.
12	Sample size	378
13	Data collection method	Mail Survey based on self administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis; simultaneous equation system
15	Study Characteristics	This study provides empirical evidence to demonstrate that idiosyncratic investments have a strong effect on the commitment of both parties to the relationship.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Idiosyncratic (transaction specific) investments strongly affect the perceptions of each party about the level of commitment of the other party. Idiosyncratic investments appear to function in a channel relationship as potent pledges. They are associated with stronger commitment on the part of the pledger and greater confidence on the part of the recipient. • Formal contracts do not play a substantial role in most relationships; rather, the set of understanding that have grown up over time (the 'implicit contract') is more influential. Two-way communication raises the commitment level of both the supplier and the distributor. • Distributors were more closely aligned with manufacturers whom they perceived to be fair in their dealings with other distributors. Committing only to reputedly trustworthy manufacturers presumably serves to reduce the distributor's risk of being mistreated once it is drawn into a partnership arrangement. • Harmonies relationships provide lasting positive dividends as the parties attribute more commitment to each other and subsequently increase their own commitment to their relationship. • Commitment cannot be built on mere assurance and cannot be sustained without undertaking genuine risk by dedicating resources to the relationship.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Both distributors and manufacturers incorporate in their perceptions the history of their arrangement and the behaviours they observe in terms of idiosyncratic investment and exclusivity.
17	Abstract	<p>Commitment in channel relationships is modelled as a function of: 1. each party's perception of the others' commitment, 2. self-reported and perceived pledges (idiosyncratic investments and contractual terms) made by each party, and 3. Such factors as communication level, reputation, and relationship history. A dyadic model represented by a simultaneous equation system is estimated with data from 378 pairs of manufacturers and industrial distributors. The results indicate that one type of pledge - idiosyncratic investments - has a strong effect on the commitment of both parties to the relationship. Additionally, each party's commitment is affected by the perceived commitment of the other party. Idiosyncratic investments signal commitment, affecting each party's perceptions of the other party's commitment.</p>
18	Key words	Models; market research; hypotheses; distribution channels; customer relations; correlation analysis; comparative studies; commitments
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal and Informal; pledges; commitment; Explicit
22	Configuration Elements	Business-to-business relationships (distributor-manufacturer)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (relationship between manufacturers and industrial distributors at the branch level)
25	Unit of data collection	Individuals (managers)
26	Research Perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 6

01	Author of the article	Anderson, James C. // Hakansson, Hakan // Johanson, Jan
02	Title of the article	Dyadic business relationships within a business context
03	Document name	Anderson et al., 1994
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing
05	Date of publication	1994
06	Volume	58
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	1-15
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Mixed method)
10	Geographical Location	Sweden
11	Context/Industry	Participants in a management development program.
12	Sample size	24
13	Data collection method	Face-to-face semi-structured interviews; archival data.
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive research; statistical analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study intends to provide conceptual development of dyadic business relationships that captures the embedded context within which those relationships occur. Business network constructs are formulated from the perspective of a focal organisation and its partner in a focal relation that is connected with other relationships.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A focal business relationship, in addition to desired effects on outcomes within that relationship, inevitably may have some downsides with respect to a focal organisation's network identity. • Anticipated constructive effects on network identity and anticipated deleterious effects on network identity likely each will be present to a varying extent in each business relationship. • The concepts of network horizon, network context, and network identity can be applied at each level with correspondingly different substantive meanings. Whatever network context is selected, definition of the network should focus on the set of significant relationships. • Three broker roles that significantly contribute to the success of business networks are: the architect, who facilitates the building of specific networks yet seldom has a complete grasp or understanding of the network that ultimately emerges; the lead operator, who formally connects specific organisations together into an ongoing network; and the caretaker, who focuses on activities that enhance network performance and needs to have a broader network horizon.
17	Abstract	In business-to-business settings, dyadic relationships between organisations are of paramount interest. Recent developments in business practice strongly suggest that to understand these business relationships, greater attention must be directed to embedded-context within which dyadic business relationships

		take place. Drawing on business network research and social exchange theory, fundamental conceptualization is provided to capture network properties and relationship connectedness within dyadic business relationship models.
18	Key words	Organization theory; networks; models; client relationships; business; research; professional relationships; business community.
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (lead operator) and informal (caretaker); Explicit
22	Configuration Elements	Embedded dyadic relationships within networks
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing Organisation (context influencing inter-organisational relationship)
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (buyer-supplier relationship embedded in a network)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual (managers)
26	Research type	Cross Sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 7

01	Author of the article	Arino, Africa // de la Torre, Josse
02	Title of the article	Learning from failure: Towards an evolutionary model of collaborative ventures
03	Document name	Arino and de la Torre, 1998
04	Journal title	Organisation Science
05	Date of publication	1998
06	Volume	9
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	306-325
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Longitudinal study)
10	Geographical Location	USA; France
11	Context/Industry	Household products industry (cosmetics)
12	Sample size	6
13	Data collection method	Face-to-face interviews; archival data.
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis
15	Study Characteristics	Building on the literature about the development of alliances and an in-depth longitudinal case study, this study proposes a model that explains their emergence, evolution, and dissolution. This model focuses on the on-going assessment by the partners to an alliance of the efficiency and equity conditions prevalent in their venture at any given point in time, as mediated by the quality of their relationship.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A successful renegotiation leads to a new equilibrium, and new iterations of the execution-learning and re-evaluation stages. A unilateral reaction may be undertaken when the result of the reevaluation stage requires some corrective action, but the relationship quality is low and/or there were no established procedures for conflict resolution. • Relational quality incorporates learning from past interactions and affects the level of inter-partner trust. An alliance will be dissolved when either its value to the organisation (or to the partner) falls below that of some alternative arrangement accomplishing the same purpose, or if there is a serious violation of the equity condition. By then, the relationship quality may have deteriorated to the point where there is no possible renegotiation. • External changes, either in the environment or in the strategic context in which the alliance develops, trigger the efficiency and equity assessments. An alliance is not an isolated dyadic relationship. Rather, it is embedded in a space where other organisations will affect its relative value to each partner.
17	Abstract	This paper reports on a longitudinal case study of the interaction between two partners to a failed international joint venture. We develop a model of the collaboration process in partnership and alliances based on earlier work by Ring and Van de Ven (1994)

		and by Doz (1996). We employ a series of events that occurred in the course of the relationship as the unit of analysis in order to trace the interactions between the partners and to explicate the impact that external shocks have on their perceptions of efficiency and equity. The impact of these events, as well as the responses they elicit, on the quality of the relationship (and vice versa) are also considered. We find that the partners' assessments cause them to either engage in renegotiation of the terms of the contract, or to modify their behaviour unilaterally, in an attempt to restore balance to the relationship. The process feeds back until a new mutual understanding of equity is restored, or else the relationship deteriorates gradually until a point when the venture is dissolved. We conclude that positive feedback loops are critical in the evolutionary process, that relationship quality is both an outcome and a mediating variable, and that procedural issues are critical from the start in fostering a climate for positive reinforcement and the building of mutual trust and confidence in the relationship.
18	Key words	Alliances; collaborative behaviour; relational quality; joint ventures; learning and failure in alliances; mutual trust.
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (Explicit); collaboration; trust; feedback loops
22	Configuration Elements	Alliance; Joint Venture
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (relationship between alliance/joint venture partners)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual (board members of the joint venture)
26	Research type	Longitudinal study
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 8

01	Author of the article	Arvind, Parkhe
02	Title of the article	Strategic alliance structuring: A game theoretic and transaction cost examination of inter-organisational cooperation
03	Document name	Arvind, 1993
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Journal
05	Date of publication	1993
06	Volume	36
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	794-829
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Companies involved in inter-organisational alliances were selected from Standard and Poor Register of Corporation
12	Sample size	111
13	Data collection method	Mail Survey based on self administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis; confirmatory factor analysis; regression analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This is a large scale empirical study of the structuring of inter-organisational strategic alliances. It suggests that stable, high-performing alliances can be differentiated from unstable, low performers on the bases of structural properties.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The establishment of structured mechanisms that provide real time information and accurate feedback regarding each other's actions, including effective recognition, verification, and signalling systems between partners, will minimize misperceptions, enhance behavioural transparency, and strengthen cooperation. • Cumulative effects of the past reputation of the organisations influence the building up of a reputation that can attenuate or intensify fear of opportunism, modifying organisation's behaviour. • The potential for opportunism influences both structure and performance and that the partners erect a variety of deterrent measures to stem possible losses from agreement violations. • The specific factors that strengthen reciprocity in an IOR are: a) behavioural transparency; b) frequency of interaction; and c) long term horizons.
17	Abstract	Maintaining robust cooperation in inter-organisational strategic alliances has received growing attention in recent research grounded in game theory, which has suggested that some alliance structures are inherently more likely than others to be associated with high opportunity to cheat; high behavioural uncertainty; and poor stability, longevity, and performance. These analytical

		insights are merged with the logic of transaction cost economics in a general model of alliance structuring and tested with data from 111 inter-organisational alliances. Findings generally support the model and hypotheses, suggesting the need for a greater focus on game theoretic structural dimensions and institutional responses to perceived opportunism in the study of voluntary inter-organisational cooperation.
18	Key words	Cooperation; strategic alliances; game theory; transaction cost economics; opportunism
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (Explicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Alliances
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Alliances
25	Unit of data collection	Individuals (Senior managers)
26	Research type	Cross-sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 9

01	Author of the article	Bachmann, Reinhard // Inkpen, Andrew C.
02	Title of the article	Understanding institutional-based trust building process in IORs
03	Document name	Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011
04	Journal title	Organisation Studies
05	Date of publication	2011
06	Volume	32
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	281-301
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study analyzes relationships between institutions and trust creation by investigating two key issues: a) mechanisms through which institutions produce trust; and b) common managerial situations in which strong and reliable institutions are particularly relevant to trust development.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trusting someone builds on a decision which is based on an assessment of other party's competence, integrity, benevolence, and quick semi-conscious assessment of unrecoverable costs that would occur if other party turned out to be untrustworthy. • Institutional structures that can reduce risk of misplaced trust include: legal regulations, professional codes of conduct that are or are not legally binding, corporate reputation, standards of employment contracts, and other formal and informal norms of behaviour. • Both the power of institutional arrangements and the depth of the embeddedness of inter-organisational exchanges are crucial with regard to the predictability and trustworthiness of individual or collective actors who envisage or build a business relationship. • Law can be an effective risk reducing institution because it aligns actors' expectations and behaviours long before any serious disagreement arises. It provides the possibility that the trustee faces serious sanctions if he or she does not live up to the trustor's expectations. • An organisation's reputation will influence the degree of attraction one has to affiliating with such an organisation. Organisations that value their reputation as social capital are unlikely to engage in practices that can damage that reputation and will thus be more predictable and trustworthy.

17	Abstract	This paper deals with the role of institutions in the development of trust in relationships between organisations. We review various strands of literature on organisational trust and examine the assumptions made about how trust building processes are influenced by institutional arrangements. Following this conceptual analysis, we discuss four mechanisms that are pivotal in the development of institutional-based trust. We also examine four situations where the influence of institutions can be particularly conducive to building trust. Finally, we argue that each of the situations calls for specific mechanisms to be predominantly employed in order to effectively create trust in IORs.
18	Key words	Institutional-based trust; institutions; IORs; trust; trust building.
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	General Sociological Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (Explicit: legal provisions; certificate of exchange partners; community structures and procedures) and Informal (explicit: corporate reputation)
22	Configuration Elements	Organisations as part of community network
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisations
24	Unit of analysis	Organisation
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 10

01	Author of the article	Barney, Jay // Wright, Mike // Ketchen Jr., David J.
02	Title of the article	The resource –based view of the organisation: Ten years after 1991
03	Document name	Barney et al., 2001
04	Journal title	Journal of Management
05	Date of publication	2001
06	Volume	27
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	625-641
09	Paper Type	Literature Review
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This paper: a) summarizes and synthesizes the contributions of the articles offered in this issue; and b) lays out a research agenda for important areas not covered in the articles.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With opportunism, the presence of the organisation facilitates superior knowledge transplantation relative to the market because of superior coding, better control of opportunistic behaviour due to the authority relationship and superior information. • Actions to gain complementary resources allow organisations to learn new and valuable capabilities. Strategic alliances are an attractive alternative for accessing complementary assets because the investment or long term commitment is less than that required in acquisitions. • Entrepreneurial opportunities emerge when certain individuals have insights into the value of resources that others do not. It is through the entrepreneurial process of cognition, discovery, understanding market opportunities, and coordinated knowledge that inputs become heterogeneous outputs. Entrepreneurial opportunities emerge when certain individuals have insights in value of resources that others do not. • To the extent that some organisations in a rapidly changing market are more nimble, more able to change quickly, and more alert to changes in their competitive environment, they will be able to adapt to changing market conditions more rapidly than competitors, and thus can gain competitive advantage. • To the extent that nimbleness, the ability to change quickly, and alertness to changes in the market are costly for others

		<p>to imitate, these abilities can be a source of sustained competitive advantage. Governance choices have a significant impact on how any rents created through the use of valuable, rare, costly to imitate, and non-substitutable resources are appropriated.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attention to how a organisation's ethical stances shape and are shaped by the organisation's culture may be fruitful to analyze corporate social responsibility from a RBV perspective and assert that the social performance of organisations (especially environmental performance) can constitute a source of competitive advantage, particularly in high-growth industries.
17	Abstract	At present, the resource-based view of the organisation is perhaps the most influential framework for understanding strategic management. In this editor's introduction, we briefly describe the contributions to knowledge provided by the commentaries and articles contained in this issue. In addition, we outline some additional areas of research wherein the resource-based view can be gainfully deployed.
18	Key words	Resource based view; strategic management; knowledge management
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Resource Based View
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (explicit);
22	Configuration Elements	Alliances
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influences Network
24	Unit of analysis	Organisation
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	1.50

Data Extraction Form Number 11

01	Author of the article	Barney, Jay, 1991
02	Title of the article	Organisation resources and sustained competitive advantage
03	Document name	Barney, 1991
04	Journal title	Journal of Management
05	Date of publication	1991
06	Volume	17
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	99-120
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study puts forward analytical framework that to evaluate whether the sources of an organisation can provide it with sustained competitive advantage.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formal planning system in an organisation enables it to recognize and exploit other organisations of their resources, and some of these resources might be sources of competitive advantage. • An information processing system that is deeply embedded in an organisation's informal and formal management decision-making process may hold the potential of sustained competitive advantage. • A closely knit, highly experienced management team maybe a substitute for an information-processing system embedded in an organisation's informal and formal decision-making process. • A positive reputation of organisations among customers and suppliers is a source of competitive advantage if it is rare and imperfectly imitable. • Managers are limited in their ability to manipulate all the attributes and characteristics of their organisations. It is this limitation that makes some organisation resources imperfectly imitable and thus potentially sources of sustained competitive advantage. • Organisations cannot expect to purchase sustained competitive advantages on open markets. Such advantages are found in rare, imperfectly imitable and non sustainable resources already controlled by an organisation.
17	Abstract	Building on the assumptions that strategic resources are heterogeneously distributed across organisations and that these differences are stable over time, the link between organisation

		resources and sustained competitive advantage is analyzed. Four empirical indicators of the potential of organisation resources to generate sustained competitive advantage are examined: 1) value, 2) rareness, 3) imitability, and 4) substitutability. A framework for evaluating whether or not particular organisation resources can be sources of sustained competitive advantage is developed. As an example of how this framework might be applied, it is used in the analysis of the competitive implications of several resources that others have suggested might be sources of sustained competitive advantage. The implications of the proposed organisation resource model of sustained competitive advantage for other business disciplines are examined.
18	Key words	Sustainable; strategic planning; resource allocation; organisational behaviour; organisation theory; economic models; business enterprises; experimental designs; competitive advantage; empirical research
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Resource Based View
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit);
22	Configuration Elements	Alliances
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influences Network
24	Unit of analysis	Organisation
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	1.5

Data Extraction Form Number 12

01	Author of the article	Barratt, Mark
02	Title of the article	Understanding the meaning of collaboration in supply chain
03	Document name	Barratt, 2004
04	Journal title	Supply Chain Management: An international Journal
05	Date of publication	2004
06	Volume	9
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	30-42
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study proposes that a segmented supply chain approach limiting collaboration to a small but potentially critical number of customers and suppliers is a more appropriate context for successful supply chain collaboration.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participants in collaboration must be prepared to commit resources as any initiatives in this area are likely to be resource intensive in early stages of their development and over the longer terms as collaboration is rolled out across relevant suppliers and customers. • Bearing in mind the need for a process focus for collaboration, intra-organisational support is required in two distinct forms. First, in the shape of initial and ongoing senior management support, and second, in terms of gaining the support of other parts of the organisation, e.g. purchasing and manufacturing. The degree of intra-organisational support is likely to determine the degree of process alignment and ultimately how successful the supply chain collaboration is likely to be. • For many organisations their focus is not on the supply chain. With distractions such as shareholders, the supply chain and any collaborative initiatives are likely to be seen as unnecessary expenditure. The partial solution arises from the early delivery of promised, but possibly limited benefits, as a way of gaining momentum and fostering greater levels of organisational support. • Supply chain collaboration does not need to be based on technology. In the initial stages of collaboration, use of simplistic technologies (such as email) are likely to be more effective and significantly less expensive than

		the current collaboration tools being offered by software vendors.
17	Abstract	Despite its infancy, some authors are already suggesting that the writing may be on the wall for supply chain collaboration. It has been reported that supply chain collaboration has proved difficult to implement; there has been an over-reliance on technology in trying to implement it; a failure to understand when and with whom to collaborate; and fundamentally a lack of trust between trading partners. This paper proposes that a supply chain segmentation approach, based on customer buying behaviour and service needs, is the most appropriate context for collaboration. The paper also proposes the need for a greater understanding of the elements that make up supply chain collaboration, and in particular how the relevant cultural, strategic and implementation elements inter-relate with each other.
18	Key words	Supply chain management; channel relationships; organisational behaviour.
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); commitment
22	Configuration Elements	Supply chain segmentation
23	Relationship Directionality	Individual influencing Organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Organisation
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 13

01	Author of the article	Bastl, Marko // Johnson, Mark // Choi, Thomas Y.
02	Title of the article	Who's Seeking Whom? Coalition Behaviour of a Weaker Player in Buyer-Supplier Relationships
03	Document name	Bastl, Johnson, and Choi, 2012
04	Journal title	Journal of Supply Chain Management
05	Date of publication	2012 (forthcoming)
06	Volume	NA
07	Number	NA
08	Page numbers	NA
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case Study)
10	Geographical Location	UK
11	Context/Industry	Aerospace, defence and power sector
12	Sample size	Face-to-face interviews; company documentation; archival records.
13	Data collection method	Face-to-face semi-structured interviews; archival data
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study theorizes weaker player in BSR by applying coalition theory to supply chain dynamics.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A supplier in a weaker power position in a buyer-supplier-supplier triad would try to create a coalition with another supplier to gain leverage against a common buyer. • Two buyers can create a coalition to gain leverage against a common supplier if their coalition collectively yields more power than the supplier. The buyer can create a coalition with a second-tier supplier if the buyer is in a weaker power position compared to the first-tier supplier. This coalition will yield more power against the first-tier supplier. • Relational governance (e.g. trust) does not act as a direct substitute to formal contracts in inter-organisational exchange. A more effective way of safeguarding exchange is through trust and the mutual acknowledgment of long-term cooperation in addition to legal contracts.
17	Abstract	Our intent with this research is to articulate propositions for coalition building behaviours involving the weaker player in a buyer-supplier relationship. The context of our study begins in dyads but grows into triads as coalitions are formed. We consider coalition formation arising from power asymmetry in dyadic buyer-supplier relationships. However, when a weaker player pairs up with another player, the context of our study becomes triads (i.e., buyer-supplier-supplier or buyer-buyer-supplier). Based on coalition theory, we identify three archetypes and then formulate four coalition conditions under each archetype. Each coalition condition, framed in a supply network triad, constitutes a finding. For instance, we propose

		that a supplier in a weaker power position in a buyer-supplier-supplier triad would try to create a coalition with another supplier to gain leverage against a common buyer. According to coalition theory, it does not matter whether this new supplier has more or less power compared to the old supplier as long as their coalition collectively yields more power than the buyer. By the same token, two buyers would create a coalition to gain leverage against a common supplier if their coalition collectively yields more power than the supplier. Furthermore, the buyer would create a coalition with a second-tier supplier if the buyer is in a weaker power position compared to the first-tier supplier and their coalition would yield more power against the first-tier supplier. This study marks one of the first attempts at formally theorizing the weaker player in the buyer-supplier relationship. It also marks the first attempt at applying coalition theory to supply chain dynamics and it extends emerging work in supply network triads.
18	Key words	Power; triads; coalition; coalition theory; supply networks
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Coalition Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); legal bonds; cooperative norms; formal contracts; trust; power.
22	Configuration Elements	Network (buyer-supplier dyadic relationship embedded in triad); multi-tier suppliers
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influences (relationships) Networks
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (buyer-supplier dyadic relationship embedded in triad)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross-sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 14

01	Author of the article	Bastl, Marko // Johnson, Mark // Lightfoot, Howard // Evans, Steve
02	Title of the article	Buyer-Supplier Relationships in a servitized environment: An examination with Cannon and Perrault's Framework
03	Document name	Bastl et al., 2012
04	Journal title	International Journal of Operations and Production Management
05	Date of publication	2012
06	Volume	32
07	Number	6
08	Page numbers	650-675
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	UK
11	Context/Industry	Aerospace, defence and power sector.
12	Sample size	16 respondents belonging to 3 organisations
13	Data collection method	Face-to-face interviews; company documentation; archival records.
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis.
15	Study Characteristics	This study extends the existing research on servitization by empirically examining the implications of the adoption of servitization on buyer-supplier relationships. This study also synthesizes extant knowledge to generate and apply a framework for examining buyer-supplier relationships across multiple dimensions.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A positive experience with increased information sharing with customers was translated into the awareness that similar practices should be implemented with upstream suppliers. Although there were variations in the links between the two suppliers and the focal company, closer operational linkages emerged as a consequence of a deliberate inter-organisational effort to effectively support the integrated solutions. • Because of the direct interaction between supplier and the customer, the focal company lost its bridge position between its supplier and its customer. This emerging structural arrangement increased exchange complexity and risk for the focal company. The emergence of cooperative norms as an alternative governance source to legal contracts was logical, given the emergence of trust as a safeguarding mechanism. • Consistency in developing cooperative norms is important. Selective approach adopted by focal company to cooperate with suppliers only on channels related to integrated solutions, whilst maintaining arms-length, non-cooperative behaviour on product channels, hindered adoption of cooperative norms.
17	Abstract	The purpose of this study is to examine a buyer's adoption of servitization and the associated implications for the relationships

		with its suppliers. The authors use the case study approach to examine the tripartite relationship between a manufacturing company and two of its two suppliers. The paper explores the perspectives of employees on multiple organisational levels, and collects evidence on both sides of a relationship. The authors use template analysis utilizing Cannon and Perrault's relationship connectors framework to analyze the data. There are overarching implications of servitization adoption for buyer-supplier relationships. Implications are notable in all five relationship connectors. Parties expected more open exchange of information, operational linkages were strengthened and changes in the structural arrangements of relationships were witnessed. Legal contracts are complemented by relational norms. Authors also observed a departure away from a win-lose mentality and increased levels of supplier adaptation to support the buyer's provision of integrated solutions. Findings are confined to this tripartite relationship and to an extent are context specific. The study unveils buyer-supplier relationships in a servitized context and provides managers with a better understanding of some of the potential implications that the adoption of a servitization strategy may have for managing buyer-supplier relationships. This is the first empirical study that explores the implications of servitization on buyer-supplier relationships. It advances the understanding of the implications that the adoption of servitization has on the manner in which two parties interrelate and conduct commercial exchange.
18	Key words	Buyer-supplier relationships; servitization; integrated solutions; buyer-seller relationships
19	Organisation Field	Operations Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); legal bonds; cooperative norms
22	Configuration Elements	Network (buyer-supplier dyadic relationship embedded in triad); multi-tier suppliers
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influences (relationships) Networks
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (buyer-supplier relationship)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross-sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 15

01	Author of the article	Demil, Benoit // Lecocq, Xavier
02	Title of the article	Neither market nor hierarchy nor network: The emergence of bazaar governance
03	Document name	Benoit and Xavier, 2006
04	Journal title	Organisational Studies
05	Date of publication	2006
06	Volume	27
07	Number	10
08	Page numbers	1447-1466
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study argues that bazaar governance can justifiably claim to be a new kind of governance structure: that it is an original means of organizing exchanges that cannot be subsumed by other structures.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open source communities do not rely on employment contracts and so are unable to be governed by formal authority, as is the case in a hierarchy. • The differences between bazaar and market are: a) as access to the source code is made public and free, price, the major communication mechanism in market is not a coordination mechanism that governs exchanges in bazaar.; b) for volunteers in open source communities potential extrinsic rewards coexist with strong intrinsic motivations that can be more compelling; c) in market, sellers and customers are clearly distinguished; hierarchy involves defined work roles. However, in open source communities, users and producers are potentially the same agents, giving this governance structure a high level of local adaptation. • Identities of the interacting agents in bazaar do not matter, whereas network supposes strong ties where great importance is given to the identity of agents and to their previous interactions. • In bazaar, membership is open because nobody can prohibit access to an open source community and no one can appropriate property rights over open source product, resulting in a principle of non-excludability. • Network calls for long-term engagement to minimize opportunism while bazaar does not presuppose any long-term engagement or strong

		ties among actors.
17	Abstract	A growing body of literature describes the open source phenomenon in the software industry. Drawing on transaction cost economics, we propose that open source projects illustrate a new generic governance structure — which we label bazaar governance — based on a specific legal contract: the open license. We characterize this structure in terms of its strengths and weaknesses and compare it to market, organisation and net Data Extraction Form Numbers. Low levels of control and weak incentives intensity are distinctive features of bazaar, lending a high uncertainty to governed transactions. However, bazaar governance promotes the openness of open source communities, which can generate strong positive network externalities and subsequent efficiency in cumulative transactions. Our theoretical developments offer a potential basis for future research.
18	Key words	Bazaar governance; governance structure; open source; transaction cost economics
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics
21	Mode of Governance	Formal contracts (explicit); legal contracts; open license
22	Configuration Elements	Network
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influences organisations
24	Unit of analysis	Organisations
25	Unit of data collection	Transactions
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 16

01	Author of the article	Bititci, Umit S. // Martinez, Veronica // Albores, Pavel // Parung, Joniarto
02	Title of the article	Creating and managing value in collaborative networks
03	Document name	Bititci et al., 2004
04	Journal title	International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management
05	Date of publication	2004
06	Volume	34
07	Number	¾
08	Page numbers	251-268
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This is an analytical paper that examines the interplay between individual and collective capabilities and competencies and value transactions in collaborative environments.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A single enterprise can have more than one value proposition. i.e. a value proposition for each business unit. • An enterprise can participate within more than one extended/virtual enterprise. • Individual competencies and capabilities (therefore the value proposition), of each enterprise have strong integration with the value proposition of the overall extended enterprise. • Competencies and capabilities (therefore the value propositions) of each enterprise contribute and support the overall value proposition of the extended enterprise. • Overall value proposition of the extended enterprise can be different from the value propositions of its members. • Value proposition of the extended enterprise should be reflected in the kind of value offered to the end customer • Value proposition of the extended enterprise is function of the collective competencies and capabilities. • In an extended enterprise there is a higher degree of strategic and operational integration between the members. In a cluster there is a degree of strategic integration within the core-network in order to leverage the support functions but the focus is still on the creation of competitive advantage for each individual enterprise. Therefore strategic synergy and operational integration are not necessary. • In a cluster each member can leverage the advantages of being a member of the cluster to develop its own competitive advantage

		by enhancing its competencies and capabilities to develop a unique value propositions for its own target customers and markets.
17	Abstract	The theory behind value creation is examined and two types of value are identified, internal value (shareholder value) and external value (value proposition). The literature on collaborative enterprises/network is also examined with particular emphasis on supply chains, extended/virtual enterprises and clusters as representatives of different forms and maturities of collaboration. The interplay of value transactions and competencies and capabilities are examined and discussed in detail. Finally, a model is presented which consists of value transactions and a table that compares the characteristics of different types of collaborative enterprises/networks. It is proposed that this model presents a platform for further research to develop an in-depth understanding into how value may be created and managed in collaborative enterprises/networks.
18	Key words	Value analysis; supply chain management; cluster analysis
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (implicit); strategic and operational integration
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; clusters; collaborative enterprises
23	Relationship Directionality	IOR influences network
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (Collaborative relationship)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 17

01	Author of the article	Blois, Keith
02	Title of the article	Business to business exchanges: A rich descriptive apparatus derived from Macneil's and Menger's Analysis
03	Document name	Blois, 2002
04	Journal title	Journal of Management Studies
05	Date of publication	2002
06	Volume	39
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	523-551
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	Electronics (Semi conductor manufacturers)
12	Sample size	3 case companies
13	Data collection method	Face-to face interviews
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This paper suggests that combining Menger's description of exchange with a more micro interpretation of Macneil's analysis of exchange provides an extended understanding of the nature of exchange that might be described as 'a rich descriptive apparatus'.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within 'a relationship' the behaviour of both the customer and the seller would be expected to be predicated on the assumption that although it is a theoretical possibility, it is not a realistic probability that the other party: 1) will behave opportunistically when unpredicted contingencies arise; 2) will exploit situations where moral hazard exists; or 3) will do other than to seek 'win, win' solutions if unexpected circumstances arise. • Ten specific norms can be found in the many different forms of contracts that exist in a modern society. These ten norms are: 1) Role integrity; 2) Reciprocity; 3) Implementation of planning; 4) Effectuation of consent; 5) Contractual solidarity; 6) The linking norms: restitution; reliance; and expectation; 7) Creation and restraint of power; 8) Flexibility; 9) Proprietary of means; and 10) Harmonization of the social matrix. • Value equation' illustrates, the costs that a customer believes it will incur by making the exchange must be less than the benefits that it anticipates the exchange will bring. • An exchange' is the sum of a number of attributes passing between the two organisations and because of the nature of these attributes and the involvement of many different people the norms that are applicable may vary. There can be elements of an exchange that are discrete — even within an exchange which is overall perceived to be relational.

		Alternatively, within an exchange that is seen overall as being discrete, there may be elements that are subject to relational norms.
17	Abstract	The dichotomy "market" or "hierarchy" has exercised a dominant influence on the study of forms of governance and their operation for some time. However, in the past 2 decades there have been large numbers of investigations of intermediate forms of governance. Subsequently it has been recognized that the behaviour that occurs within exchanges is not determined by the forms of governance used and this points to a need to understand behaviour within a variety of exchanges. An apparatus, based on Macneil's analysis, in conjunction with Menger's insights into the nature of exchanges, for describing behaviour within exchanges is proposed.
18	Key words	Organisational studies; corporate governance; organisational behaviour; professional relationships; organisation theory
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and Informal (explicit); contracts; relational norms
22	Configuration Elements	Clusters; IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	IOR influences network
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (Collaborative relationship)
25	Unit of data collection	Individuals (members of the board of directors)
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 18

01	Author of the article	Blowfield, Mick // Dolan, Catherine
02	Title of the article	Outsourcing governance: Fairtrade's message for C21 global governance
03	Document name	Blowfield and Dolan, 2010
04	Journal title	Corporate Governance
05	Date of publication	2010
06	Volume	10
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	484-499
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	Kenya and UK
11	Context/Industry	Tea industry
12	Sample size	437 interviews an 12 focus groups
13	Data collection method	Face to face semis structured interviews, indepth interviews, focus groups
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive research
15	Study Characteristics	This paper aims to examine one of the more mature models of multi-stakeholder co-governance - Fairtrade, and how this is being used by business for delivering ethical governance.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outsourcing of governance puts companies in jeopardy. Despite the promise that Fairtrade harnesses trade for social justice, the failure to achieve the desired outcomes for the poor, indicates that it is not engaging mainstream business in a global justice movement. • Value chain gatekeepers influence governance system even as they outsource governance function. • Outsourcing governance allows companies to make specialists responsible for the difficult aspects of value chain governance when: a) there was an expectancy that the auditing, monitoring, and remediation functions would need to be in-house; and b) it also enables companies to potentially wash their hands of the risk that consumers (or producers) will object to the unfulfilled promises.
17	Abstract	This paper seeks to bring together ethical governance theory and empirical findings to examine the shifting nature of governance in global value chains, and the implications of this shift for mainstream companies. In particular, it aims to examine one of the more mature models of ethical value chain governance, Fairtrade, and how this is being used by business. Information is derived from a longitudinal

		<p>study of multi-stakeholder co-governance in Kenya and the UK, and an analysis of the literature on similar co-governance models. The paper shows that mainstream companies are looking to multi-stakeholder models not only to protect their reputation, but as a way of governing ethical dimensions of their value chains. However, rather than a form of co-governance, it has become a way of outsourcing governance, enabling companies to strengthen their public credibility, while simultaneously transferring an especially difficult element of modern value chain governance to organisations enjoying high consumer trust. Yet, primary data suggest that these governance systems are not delivering the benefits promised, at least at the producer level. By outsourcing governance to initiatives with dubious credibility in this way, companies may seem at risk. However, the mismatch between the promise and delivery of Fairtrade does not seem to be affecting consumer confidence and, until it does, companies may continue to benefit from the halo effect of being a Fairtrade ally. But there are also opportunities for companies to use Fairtrade's weaknesses to make the value chain a better avenue for delivering ethical governance, with implications for similar co-governance models. The study draws on one of the very few pieces of longitudinal field research on the impacts of Fairtrade. It approaches Fairtrade from a governance rather than reputations perspective, and emphasizes the implications for mainstream business rather than the co-governance movement.</p>
18	Key words	Governance, Fair trade, Social responsibility, Value chain
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Stakeholder Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and Informal (implicit); outsourced governance; trust; power; social norms; reputation
22	Configuration Elements	Global supply networks; value chains
23	Relationship Directionality	IOR influences network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individuals (shareholders; employees; consumers)
26	Research perspective	Longitudinal Study
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 19

01	Author of the article	Boari, Cristina // Lipparini, Andrea
02	Title of the article	Networks within industrial districts: organizing knowledge creation and transfer by means of moderate hierarchies
03	Document name	Boari and Lipparini, 1999
04	Journal title	Journal of Management of Governance
05	Date of publication	1999
06	Volume	3
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	339-360
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	Italy
11	Context/Industry	Packaging machinery industry
12	Sample size	6 case companies (1 focal company and 5 suppliers)
13	Data collection method	Face to face interviews
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis
15	Study Characteristics	The introduction by the leading organisation of a moderate hierarchy in its network of suppliers has a significant impact at both organisation and network level and suggests important implications both for knowledge management and inter-organisational relations within geographical clusters (industrial districts).
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With the layering of supplier relationships coordinated by a single contact in the assembly organisation (i.e. vertical keiretsu), the articulation and coding of organisational knowledge increases efficiency and learning, frequently preventing the atrophy of knowledge exchange and development processes. • Learning in networks, by mean of hierarchisation, is “systematized” in order to produce what describes as high-order capabilities, echoing the distinction between individual and organisational competencies. • Codifiability is heavily influenced by the ability of the integrator and/or coordinator organisations to structure the knowledge within a set of rules and relationships which can be readily communicated, and the ability to forge network identity. Early externalization and socialization of tacit knowledge to selected network member/s is enabled by this ability and deliberately sought by the leading organisation. • Within industrial districts, organisational and managerial knowledge may be important attributes in the selection of the individual actors to be involved by leading organisations in new product creation projects.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The competitive advantage of leading organisations lies in their ability to identify suppliers with the appropriate technical competencies, and also in their ability to select suppliers with competencies in the coordination and management of other organisations, as much as in the selection and management of new second-tier suppliers.
17	Abstract	<p>This paper furnishes evidence of innovative modes of organisation of IORs and knowledge management within industrial districts. With the aid of a district organisation, we first highlight the marked tendency among the largest companies to eschew an exclusively endogenous innovative process. Next, we analyze how the leading organisation can play an active role within a network by assigning outside its boundaries tasks that were once undertaken in-house. This happens gradually with the moderate hierarchisation of originally restructured network relationships. In its attempt to organize innovative modes of design and manufacturing, without losing control and strategic legitimization, the leading organisation elects a coordinating agent with direct responsibility over a selected team of specialist suppliers.</p>
18	Key words	Knowledge management; industrial concentration; supply chains; studies; organisational behaviour; districts; business networking.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and Informal (implicit); governance of networks through formal coordinating agents
22	Configuration Elements	Network; restructured network relationships; hub (Focal company) and spoke arrangement
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation (governance of networks)
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individuals (managers)
26	Research perspective	Cross-sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 20

01	Author of the article	Bourlakis, Constantine // Michael, Bourlakis
02	Title of the article	Information technology safeguards, logistics asset specificity and fourth party logistics network creation in the food retail chain
03	Document name	Bourlakis and Bourlakis, 2005
04	Journal title	The Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing
05	Date of publication	2005
06	Volume	20
07	Number	2/3
08	Page numbers	88-98
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	UK
11	Context/Industry	Food retail industry
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study argues that information technology developments can help retailers to exert as much monitoring and control over third-party logistics organisations as over an in-house operation. This study constructs a buyer-supplier information technology safeguards relationship matrix, focusing on the relationship between a food retailer and a third-party logistics organisation.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If asset specific transaction costs are perceived as generally low and not complex for both the buyer and the supplier, there is no need for network formation. There is a simple spot market situation where retailer either externalizes or internalizes retail logistics functions. • If transaction costs are perceived as high for both the buyer and the supplier due to high asset specificity and operational complexity, the retailer will engage into a fourth-party logistics network formation if and only if such transaction costs are reduced via certain information technology mechanisms. • Asset specificity examines whether assets used by the buyer and supplier of the asset can be redeployed in alternative uses and by alternative users. If assets are highly specialized to a transaction, they have limited or no value outside that transaction. If assets are not highly specialized to a transaction, they have considerable value outside transaction. • The fourth-party logistics network has a strong potential to emerge as the most efficient organisational mode as it can decrease transaction costs via complexity reduction and

		absorption embedded in the retail chain. These transaction costs are the result of the new "value-added" logistics services required by the retailer and of the extra fleet needed to deal with home delivery and factory gate pricing demands.
17	Abstract	This paper investigates the evolutionary process of the retail logistics network formation, and proposes a relationship framework between the logistics asset buyer (the retailer) and the logistics asset supplier (the third-party logistics organisation). The evolutionary process is based on the way the asset specificity element of transaction costs theory can be perceived by the logistics asset buyer and the logistics asset supplier. The asset specificity element is linked to both network and buyer-supplier relationship theories with the aim of conceptualising a buyer-supplier relationship framework. A new relationship framework is developed based on the buyers'-suppliers' perceptions in relation to logistics asset specificity, and the conditions required for the formation of the retail logistics network are illustrated. If transaction costs are perceived as high by both the buyer and the supplier of a logistics asset, the retailer will engage into a fourth-party logistics network formation where the use of information technology systems is of critical importance.
18	Key words	Organisational studies; logistics; supply chains; grocery stores; information technology; vendor supplier relations
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit); IT-based coordination device
22	Configuration Elements	Buyer-supplier relationship; network (logistics)
23	Relationship Directionality	IOR influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (buyer-supplier relationships)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 21

01	Author of the article	Brass, Daniel J. // Galaskiewicz, Joseph // Greve, Henrich R. // Tsai, Wenpin
02	Title of the article	Taking stock of networks and organisations: A multi level perspective
03	Document name	Brass et al., 2004
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Journal
05	Date of publication	2004
06	Volume	47
07	Number	6
08	Page numbers	795-817
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	Based on the social network research in management journals in the past 25 years, this paper highlights the importance of investigating networks as a multi-level phenomenon.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The predictable consequences of networks are: 1) they transfer information that gives rise to attitude similarity, imitation, and generation of innovations; 2) they mediate transactions among organisations and cooperation among persons; and 3) they give differential access to resources and power. • Events exogenous to networks can either reinforce or loosen structure in interorganisational and in intra-organisational networks. • Actors' characteristics can also have an impact on changes in interpersonal, inter unit, and interorganisational networks. • The tension between the hope of acquiring new capabilities and the fear of losing control over one's own resources can cause network reproduction and change at both the interpersonal and interorganisational levels of analysis. • Changes in interpersonal networks within a work unit may be contingent upon changes in an organisation. As organisations grow by adding more units, their networks of internal relations increase. On the other hand, as organisations downsize or divest assets, the network ties between personnel and departments are disrupted. • Groups whose members have connections to other groups are likely to be more innovative, but they may have much weaker member identity

		<p>and less member loyalty.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The decisions of organisations may be affected by their peers with respect to both selling and buying networks (White, 2001), just as individuals are affected by their peers. • Niche overlap provides a strong incentive for collusion and the creation of ties among structural equivalents by: a) providing an incentive for competitors to share information on customers; b) engaging in joint ventures and strategic alliances; and c) interlock. • When competitors form alliance ties with each other, they may also try to gain advantage over a competitor outside their alliance. The potential of using alliances with competitors to defeat other competitors raises the possibility of alliance networks competing with other alliance networks.
17	Abstract	The central argument of network research is that actors are embedded in networks of interconnected social relationships that offer opportunities for and constraints on behaviour. We review research on the antecedents and consequences of networks at the interpersonal, inter-unit, and interorganisational levels of analysis, evaluate recent theoretical and empirical trends, and give directions for future research, highlighting the importance of investigating cross-level network phenomena.
18	Key words	Network; embeddedness; social relationships;
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Network; alliance; groups; ties
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing individuals
24	Unit of analysis	Network; organisation
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 22

01	Author of the article	Burgess, Kevin // Singh, Parkash J. // Koroglu, Rana
02	Title of the article	Supply chain management: A structured literature review and implications for future research
03	Document name	Burgess et al., 2006
04	Journal title	International Journal of Operations and Production Management
05	Date of publication	2006
06	Volume	26
07	Number	7
08	Page numbers	703-729
09	Paper Type	Literature Review
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	100
13	Data collection method	Electronic data bases
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This paper, through a systematic and structured review of 100 articles, provides insights into the conceptualization and research methodological bases of the SCM field.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SCM is a relatively “young” field with exponential growth in interest from researchers. • The dominant characteristics of SCM field include: a) a reliance on the manufacturing and consumer goods industries for empirical as well as analytical illustration; b) a conceptual framing of SCM mostly as a process; c) a predomination of transaction cost economics and strategy-based competitive advantage theoretical grounding; c) the presence of mostly descriptive-type theories; d) strong positivist paradigmatic stances in the research methods employed; and, e) the utilization of analytical conceptual, as well as empirical statistical sampling and case study methods. • The dominant characteristics have prevented plurality of ideas in terms of how the area is conceptualized, theoretically described and researched, making the development of the field a narrowly concentrated one. The lack of plurality of ideas has prevented wider dissemination and greater acceptance of ideas outside the functional areas that SCM has traditionally been associated with. The soundness and robustness of the ideas underpinning SCM have not been fully tested.
17	Abstract	Purpose – The field of supply chain management (SCM) has historically been informed by knowledge from narrow functional areas. While some effort towards producing a broader organisational

		<p>perspective has been made, nonetheless, SCM continues to be largely eclectic with little consensus on its conceptualization and research methodological bases. This paper seeks to clarify aspects of this emerging perspective.</p> <p>Design/methodology/approach – A total of 100 randomly selected refereed journal articles were systematically analyzed.</p> <p>Findings – A number of key findings emerged: the field is a relatively “new” one; several disciplines claim ownership of the field; consensus is lacking on the definition of the term; contextual focus is mostly on the manufacturing industry; predominantly “process” conceptual framing prevails; research methods employed are mostly analytical conceptual, empirical surveys or case studies; the positivist research paradigmatic stance is prevalent; and theories related to transaction cost economics and competitive advantage dominate.</p> <p>Originality/value – This review identifies various conceptual and research methodological characteristics of SCM. From a philosophy of knowledge perspective, it is suggested that SCM be framed as a Lakatosian Research Program, for this has the best potential to assist in the development of SCM body of knowledge in a sustainable way into the future.</p>
18	Key words	Supply chain management; literature; research
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Network; alliance; groups; ties
23	Relationship Directionality	NA
24	Unit of analysis	Network; organisation
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 23

01	Author of the article	Cannon, Joseph, P. // and Perreault Jr., William D.
02	Title of the article	Buyer-seller relationships in business markets
03	Document name	Cannon and Perreault, 1999
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing Research
05	Date of publication	1999
06	Volume	36
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	439-460
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sample)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Members of the National Association of Purchasing Management.
12	Sample size	428
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire.
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis including confirmatory factor analysis, cluster analysis and MANOVA; Duncan's multiple-range test;
15	Study Characteristics	This study provides a framework for examining buyer-supplier relationships along five dimensions: information exchange, operational linkages, legal bonds, cooperative norms and buyer-supplier adaptations.
16	Key findings	<p>Drawing on relationship theories and observations of business practice, the following relationship connectors are identified and provide the basis for an empirical taxonomy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information exchange is an expectation of an open sharing of information that might be useful for both parties • Operational linkages capture the degree to which the systems, procedures and routines of both parties (for example customer and supplier) have been linked to facilitate operations • Legal bonds are detailed and binding contractual agreements that specify the obligations and roles of both parties in the relationship • Cooperative norms reflect expectations two exchanging parties have about working together to achieve mutual and individual goals jointly • e) Buyer and supplier Relationship-specific adaptations are investments in adaptations to adaptation process, product, or procedures specific to the needs or capabilities of an exchange partner.
17	Abstract	This study specifies 6 key underlying dimensions (connectors) that characterize the manner in which buyers and sellers relate and conduct relationships. Measures for these relationship connectors (information exchange, operational linkages, legal bonds,

		cooperation and relationship-specific adaptations by buyers and sellers) are developed in a series of pretests. Then, on the basis of relationship profiles for more than 400 buyer-seller relationships sampled from a wide array of industries and market situations, numerical taxonomy is applied to develop an empirically based classification of different types of business relationships. Contrary to approaches used in much of the extant literature, taxonomic methods do not rely on an assumption that the connectors are highly inter-correlated or that they combine in some linear fashion to form a single underlying dimension.
18	Key words	Organisational studies; statistical analysis; market research; industrial markets; vendor supplier relations; manufacturers; suppliers.
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics; Social Exchange Theory; Resource Dependency Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and Informal (explicit); legal bonds; cooperative norms
22	Configuration Elements	Dyad
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (buyer-seller relationship).
25	Unit of data collection	Individuals (managers).
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach.
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 24

01	Author of the article	Choi, Thomas Y. // Hong Yunsook
02	Title of the article	Unveiling the structure of supply networks: case studies in Honda, Acura, and DaimlerChrysler
03	Document name	Choi and Hong, 2002
04	Journal title	Journal of Operations Management
05	Date of publication	2002
06	Volume	20
07	Number	5
08	Page numbers	469-493
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Mixed methods)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Automotive industry
12	Sample size	3 supply networks
13	Data collection method	Semi-structured interviews; archival data; and field observations.
14	Method of data analysis	Analysis was based on the three dimensions of structure: formalization, centralization, and complexity. First, within-case analysis was conducted where three different sets of behavioural principles were developed. Second, once the within-case analyses was done, a cross-case analysis was conducted, where the structures of the three networks were compared and contrasted to develop one overarching set of principles that eventually lead to the propositions regarding the supply-network structure.
15	Study Characteristics	This study investigates structures of supply networks and principles involved in operation of supply networks.
16	Key findings	Formalized rules, norms, and policies lead to the varying degrees of centralization in the supply network, and the varying degrees of centralization affect the level of complexity in the supply network. The cost consideration represents the most salient force that shapes the emergence of the supply-network structure. Long-term plans are controlled through positive feedback, whereas short-term activities are controlled through negative feedback. The program level activities where under-specified requirements need to be converted into concrete requirements are associated with the broadly defined rules and procedures as a control mechanism that is flexible. The implicit yet clearly understood norms lead to

		flexibility and the sense of equity when working without a contract in early program development; however, the explicit and formalized procedures and rules regarding cost lead to rigidity in relationships and the sense of inequity. The centrally selected second- and third-tier suppliers tend to be less cooperative with the first-tier suppliers that manage daily activities.
17	Abstract	Three complete supply networks have been mapped in this study. These supply networks pertain to the center console assembly and come from three different product lines—Honda Accord, Acura CL/TL, and DaimlerChrysler (DCX) Grand Cherokee. Based on these three cases of supply networks, propositions are built concerning how the structure of supply networks operates. Based on the extant literature, we frame structure in three dimensions—formalization, centralization, and complexity. As an underlying methodology, we first conduct the within-case analysis and then expand the analysis to cross-case context. The three structural dimensions affect one
18	Key words	Supplier management; operation strategy; case study research; supply network; supply chain
19	Organisation Field	Operations Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit); rules; policies; contracts; feedback loops
22	Configuration Elements	Supply chain (centralized); hierarchical supplier structures (multi-tier)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individuals (managers)
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 25

01	Author of the article	Choi, Thomas, Y. // Kim, Yuseon
02	Title of the article	Structural Embeddedness and supplier management: A network Perspective
03	Document name	Choi and Kim, 2008
04	Journal title	Journal of Supply Chain Management
05	Date of publication	2008
06	Volume	44
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	5-13
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Aerospace; information technology; automotive
12	Sample size	3 case companies – details not provided
13	Data collection method	Not provided
14	Method of data analysis	Not provided
15	Study Characteristics	This study highlights that buying companies with good understanding of their suppliers' structural embeddedness will perform better in operations, finance, and supplier management as compared with those without such an understanding.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structural embeddedness of suppliers, as a strategic consideration, needs more attention from the buying companies. These companies have traditionally focused more on suppliers' internal capabilities and stability when evaluating and selecting suppliers. • Structural embeddedness refers to the state of dependency of a company on its immediate as well as distant business partners in supply networks. • The concept of structural embeddedness highlights the impact a network has on the company's business decisions, actions, and outcomes for both positive and negative performance - how a supplier's performance is influenced by which other companies it is connected to, directly or indirectly, in its supply network. • A supplier's structural embeddedness in network can serve as an additional lens through which to take another strategic look at supplier - the buyer can garner the knowledge that may be used as leverage. • An adequate understanding of suppliers' structural embeddedness allows a buying company to evaluate its current or potential suppliers more accurately. • Being embedded in the relationship with suppliers that are linked to other technologically or operationally advanced companies could

		<p>be beneficial to the company.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buying companies may want to consider maintaining the relationships with poorly performing suppliers if they have good potential for serving as the conduit to other companies or networks with innovative technologies or new materials. • The knowledge of what networks supplier is part of can assist buying companies in reliable forecasting of future performance of supplier and of buying company's long-term success. • Being aware of suppliers' extended networks might make it easier for a buying company to manage and control the flow of information and materials. • A buying company's ability to take advantage of a supplier's structural embeddedness hinges on having a good relationship with that supplier. • Buying companies need to evaluate and manage suppliers not only for their internal capabilities but also for their structural embeddedness in supply networks.
17	Abstract	<p>The concept of structural embeddedness refers to importance of framing suppliers as being embedded in larger supply networks rather than in isolation. Such framing helps buying companies create more realistic policies and strategies when managing their suppliers. Performance of a supplier is dependent on its own supply networks. By adopting concept of structural embeddedness, we learn that a buying company needs to look at a supplier's extended supply network to arrive at a more complete evaluation of that supplier's performance. By doing so, a buying company may do a better job of selecting suppliers for long-term relationships and may also find value in maintaining relationships with poorly performing suppliers who may potentially act as a conduit to other companies with technological and innovative resources.</p>
18	Key words	Social network analysis; supplier selection; supplier evaluation; supplier performance; supplier relationship; extended supplier network.
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit); standards for supplier selection
22	Configuration Elements	Network; structured embeddedness
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation (IOR embedded in network)
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 26

01	Author of the article	Choi, Thomas Y. // Linton, Tom
02	Title of the article	Don't Let your supply chain control your business
03	Document name	Choi and Linton, 2011
04	Journal title	Harvard Business Review
05	Date of publication	2011
06	Volume	89
07	Number	12
08	Page numbers	112-117
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	Multinational companies
11	Context/Industry	Automotive and Electronics.
12	Sample size	20 leading multinational corporations.
13	Data collection method	Semi-structured face-to-face interviews.
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive research
15	Study Characteristics	This study examines the benefit for the original equipment manufacturers of developing and managing direct business relationships with lower-tier vendors.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In addition to using approved vendor lists, original equipment manufacturers should employ an updated form of value analysis when making sourcing decisions--including which items top-tier suppliers will be allowed to purchase on their own. • An original equipment manufacturer can forge direct ties with lower-tier suppliers by: a) building informal personal relationships with the suppliers' executives even if it doesn't have contracts with those companies; or b) establishing a formal agreement. • Manufacturers that radically shrink their purchasing departments when they delegated sourcing may have to expand them in order to handle more relationships. They may need to supplement or replace people who have only commercial expertise with people who have analytical skills and deep knowledge of commodity markets. • Lower-tier suppliers can provide valuable information about the latest manufacturing advances and technological innovations. Companies that lack such access have found themselves reacting to competitors' innovations and struggling to match their features and prices. • As technology makes the supply chain much more transparent to end customers companies face the fallout from their suppliers'

		<p>responsibility towards environmental stability.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • While selecting vendors, companies should keep in mind the following guidelines: a) retain control over items that have the most significant impact on the total cost of goods sold; b) consider a supplier's innovation potential; c) take into account the environmental and social impact of parts, including the processes used to produce them; d) stay close to vendors that can provide early information on shifts in the economy; and d) revamping purchasing.
17	Abstract	In the past 25 years, major original-equipment manufacturers around the world have shifted to the Japanese tiered approach to supply chains. They've radically reduced the number of suppliers that they directly manage and off-loaded responsibility for supervising the rest, along with the task of building major subsystems, to a handful of first-tier suppliers. But we believe that the delegation has gone too far. The remedy is for OEMs to forge direct relationships with a select number of lower-tier suppliers, and in this article, we'll explain how.
18	Key words	Management science; original equipment manufacturer; vendor supplier relations; supply chain management.
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics; Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); standards; formal agreements; informal personal relationships
22	Configuration Elements	Network; Multi-tier suppliers
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 27

01	Author of the article	Choi, Thomas Y.// Wu, Zhaohui
02	Title of the article	Triads in Supply Networks: Theorizing Buyer-Supplier-Supplier Relationships
03	Document name	Choi and Wu, 2009
04	Journal title	Journal of Supply Chain Management
05	Date of publication	2009
06	Volume	45
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	8-25
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This paper focuses on the internal dynamics of triads in supply networks by applying balance theory and structural-hole concept to nine archetypes of buyer-supplier-supplier relationships.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The buyer's ability to mediate relationships is an antecedent to establishing a balanced state with all positive relationships. The realization by both suppliers of a negative relationship with buyer leads them to develop a positive relationship. If the buyer favours one supplier over the other, a negative relationship occurs between the two suppliers. • As long as the buyer successfully maintains positive relationships with both suppliers, the negative relationship between the two suppliers tends to move towards a positive one. • If the negative relationship between S1 and S2 persists, then one of the existing positive relationships the buyer has with its suppliers may move toward a negative one. • If S2 adheres to its negative relationship with the buyer and S1 sees more value in its positive relationship with the buyer, then the relationship between S1 and S2 tends to move toward a negative one. If S2's desire to grow the business overcomes its negative position toward the buyer, then the relationship between the buyer and S2 tends to move toward a positive one, as long as the other two relationships in the triad remain positive. • Without active intervention by the buyer to improve its negative relationship with both suppliers, S1 and S2 tend to develop a positive relationship to counterbalance their negative relationship

		<p>with the buyer.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When the buyer intervenes to improve the negative relationships with its suppliers, it will most likely improve with only one of the suppliers, as long as the relationship between the suppliers remains negative. When the buyer has a positive relationship with S1 and S2 that are disconnected from each other, the buyer enjoys leverage power. • If the buyer were to bring otherwise disconnected S1 and S2 together in a joint project, the buyer may lose some of the leverage power but S1 and S2 would tend to develop a positive relationship on the strength of the buyer's positive relationship with both S1 and S2. • When the buyer has a positive relationship with S1 and a negative one with S2, the structural hole is less likely to be filled compared to the situation where the buyer has a positive relationship with both S1 and S2. When the buyer has a negative relationship with both suppliers in the structural hole context, the buyer is weakest in its leverage power compared to situations when it has a positive relationship with at least one supplier.
17	Abstract	<p>Past studies in supply chain management have focused on dyadic relationships (e.g. buyer-supplier), as all relationships in a network begin with a dyad. However, dyads do not capture essence of a network. We posit in this paper that triads are the fundamental building blocks of a network. To begin considering triads in supply networks, we build on two extant bodies of literature – the buyer-supplier relationship and the supplier-supplier relationship literature which offers us the context of buyer-supplier-supplier triads. By doing so, we are taking the first step towards cracking the internal dynamics of triads in supply networks. To build analytical propositions, we apply balance theory and the structural-hole concept. We identify nine triadic archetypes of buyer-supplier-supplier relationships and state key propositions that aid in decision making in supply networks.</p>
18	Key words	Balance theory; triads; buyer-supplier-supplier relationships; structural hole; supply chain management.
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Balance Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); positive and negative relationships
22	Configuration Elements	Networks (triads); buyer-supplier-supplier relationships; structural hole; supply chains
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing networks
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 28

01	Author of the article	Corpanzano, Russell // Mitchell, Marie S.
02	Title of the article	Social Exchange Theory: An interdisciplinary Review
03	Document name	Corpanzano and Mitchell, 2005
04	Journal title	Journal of Management
05	Date of publication	2005
06	Volume	31
07	Number	6
08	Page numbers	874-900
09	Paper Type	Literature Review
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	The primary contribution of this review was outlining the nature of reciprocity within exchange and distinguishing three different types of reciprocity: (a) reciprocity as a transactional pattern of interdependent exchanges, (b) reciprocity as a folk belief, and (c) reciprocity as a moral norm.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reciprocal interdependence emphasizes contingent interpersonal transactions, whereby an action by one party leads to a response by another. The process begins when at least one participant makes a move and if the other reciprocates, new rounds of exchange initiate. Once the process is in motion, each consequence can create a self-reinforcing cycle. The sequence is likely to be continuous, making it difficult to organize into discrete steps. • Reciprocity as a folk belief involves the cultural expectation that people get what they deserve. Participants in these transactions accept some combination of (a) a sense that over time all exchanges reach a fair equilibrium, (b) those that are unhelpful will be punished, and (c) those who are helpful will receive help in the future. • Reciprocity as a norm and individual orientation considers a cultural mandate, in which those who do not comply are punished. The key difference between a norm and a folk belief is that norms involve a quality that philosophers sometimes term ought. That is, a norm is a standard that describes how one <i>should</i> behave, and those who follow these norms are obligated to

		<p>behave reciprocally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leaders provide the first signal of a desire for a closer relationship to subordinates, such as a direct communication or implicit offer (e.g., desirable task). The leader waits for the worker's response, if employee responds favorably, and then leader can begin another episode. • A leader's offers and a subordinate's responses can generate high-quality leader-member-exchange relationship (LMX). Once a high-quality LMX is realized, the relationship itself alters the nature of future transactions. • Employees exchange commitment in return for organisational support. Commitment is both particularistic (commitment to the organisation) and symbolic (it is not a tangible commodity). Committed workers are more desirous of maintaining their associations and will become more motivated on behalf of their employers. • The output from a past transaction can be the resource exchanged in a future transaction. This cause and effect are determined by where in the sequence the researcher elects to examine the process. If reciprocated, the quality of the relationship improves, enabling more socio-emotional exchanges.
17	Abstract	<p>Social exchange theory (SET) is one the most influential conceptual paradigms in organisational behaviour. Despite its usefulness, theoretical ambiguities within SET remain. As a consequence, tests of the model, as well as its applications, tend to rely on an incompletely specified set of ideas. The authors address conceptual difficulties and highlight areas in need of additional research. In so doing, they pay special attention to four issues: (a) the roots of the conceptual ambiguities, (b) norms and rules of exchange, (c) nature of the resources being exchanged, and (d) social exchange relationships.</p>
18	Key words	Social exchange theory; reciprocity; workplace relationships
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and Informal (explicit); social norms
22	Configuration Elements	Relationships (inter-organisational reciprocal relationships)
23	Relationship Directionality	Individual influencing Organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Organisation
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 29

01	Author of the article	Das, T.K. // Teng, Bing-Sheng
02	Title of the article	Between trust and control: developing confidence in partner cooperation in alliances
03	Document name	Das and Teng, 1998
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Review
05	Date of publication	1998
06	Volume	23
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	494-512
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This article proposes an integrated framework of trust and control for developing an organisation's confidence in partner cooperation in strategic alliances.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trust and control are two alternative sources in developing confidence in partner cooperation, although the two are not linked by a simple complementary relationship. • Trust cannot be a control mechanism, if both trust and control are defined restrictively for increased clarity. • Trust is defined as a positive expectation about others' motives, and control as the process of regulating others' behaviour to make it more predictable. • The deployment of control mechanisms may either enhance or undermine the trust level, depending on the specific type of control mechanisms partners use. • Trust level plays a moderating role between control mechanisms and control level. Trust level will facilitate the deployment of control mechanisms, even though some of these very mechanisms may be suggestive of a lack of trust. • Structural arrangements, including rules and regulations, are the heart of formal control. In strategic alliances formal control tends to be especially relevant, owing to the relatively high degrees of goal incongruence and performance ambiguity. • Organisations with a high need for control prefer alliance goals of short-term orientation, because performance evaluation and

		feedback can be monitored more frequently against immediate objectives.
17	Abstract	Strategic alliances have been recognized as arenas with potential for opportunistic behaviour by partners. Hence, an organisation needs to have an adequate level of confidence in its partner's cooperative behaviour. The notion of confidence in partner cooperation in alliance is examined and it is suggested that confidence comes from 2 distinct sources: trust and control. The argument is made that trust and control are parallel concepts and that their relationship is of a supplementary character in generating confidence. In addition, it is suggested that control mechanisms have an impact on trust level and that the trust level moderates the effect of control mechanisms in determining the control level. Finally, the various ways to build trust within strategic alliances and important alliance control mechanisms is discussed.
18	Key words	Alliance; control mechanism; trust; organisational behaviour; cooperation; management theory
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Forma (explicit) and informal (explicit); rules; regulations; trust; feedback
22	Configuration Elements	Alliance;
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad embedded in network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 30

01	Author of the article	Deffe, Clifford C. // Stank, Theodore P.
02	Title of the article	Applying the strategy-structure-performance paradigm to the supply chain environment
03	Document name	Deffe and Stank, 2005
04	Journal title	The International Journal of Logistics Management
05	Date of publication	2005
06	Volume	16
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	28-55
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This paper highlight the importance of aligning the key elements of strategy-structure-performance paradigm with key structural elements of supply chain management including: technology integration, communication, standardization, decision-making centralization and decentralization, and reward and compensation integration.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A organisation that adopts a supply chain strategy will demonstrate a high level of: a) computer systems technology coordination and flexibility; b) formal and informal communication; c) data coding and notation communication; d) individual-level and organisational-level rewards across supply chain entities • An organisation that adopts a supply chain structure to support strategy will demonstrate a high level of: a) revenue enhancement; b) operating expense reduction; c) working capital efficiency; and d) fixed capital efficiency. • Appropriate supply chain performance will provide input to adjust supply chain strategy. • Organisational culture provides a sense of control by unifying the way organisational members process information and react to the environment. This facilitates the achievement of a higher level of behavioural predictability. • Clear objectives not only help set the direction for the alliance but also facilitate the establishment of specific rules and regulations.

		<p>Goals are important for formal control mechanisms because they specify what is expected of partners.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Goal setting process is a form of normative control. Because it allows partners to form a consensus gradually, their incentive to deviate from agreed-upon objectives is significantly curbed.
17	Abstract	<p>Purpose – The paper extends a central paradigm of the strategy literature to the supply chain environment to foster a better understanding of the elements characterizing strategic decisions that lead to supply chain structural development and performance.</p> <p>Design/methodology/approach – Strategic literature is reviewed to provide a fuller explanation of the strategy-structure-performance (SSP) research stream. SSP foundational principles are linked to supply chain management concepts, and synthesized into an explanatory framework. Propositions for future research are presented based upon the framework.</p> <p>Findings – An iterative relationship among internal organisation strategy, structure, and performance measurement systems is indicated, implying that organisation supply chain strategy should be complementary with that of supply chain partners.</p> <p>Research limitations/implications – The paper presents a content analysis of existing research and a conceptual framework emerging from it. No data were collected nor were research propositions tested.</p> <p>Practical implications – The primary implication is “know your supply chain partners”. Do their strategies mesh – either as consistent or complementary – to your own organisation’s supply chain strategy? Strategic alignment is a necessary precursor to deployment of an effective supply chain structure.</p> <p>Originality/value – The paper shows that SSP theory can be extended beyond the organisation to the complex supply chain environment.</p>
18	Key words	Supply chain management, Strategic management, Decision making
19	Organisation Field	Operations Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Suitable theory unavailable
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (Explicit); goals
22	Configuration Elements	Network; supply chain
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network (supply chain)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 31

01	Author of the article	Delbufalo, Emanuela
02	Title of the article	Outcomes of inter-organisational trust in supply chain relationships: a systematic literature review and a meta-analysis of the empirical evidence
03	Document name	Delbufalo, 2012
04	Journal title	Supply Chain Management: An International Journal
05	Date of publication	2012
06	Volume	17
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	377-402
09	Paper Type	Literature Review
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	56
13	Data collection method	Data collected from three databases: Business Source Premier; ABI/Informs; Ingenta.
14	Method of data analysis	Meta Analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study provides a critical review on outcomes of inter-organisational trust in supply chain relationships. A systematic literature review methodology in combination with a meta-analytic approach is adopted to review the empirical work published in academic journals from 1990 to 2010.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Studying inter-organisational outcomes in multiple industries inflates the effect size of trust-outcome relationships as compared to studying trust in a single industry. • Cross-industry studies strongly yield the relationship between trust and multiple outcomes, such as for example transaction costs, innovativeness, investment in specific assets, supplier integration and satisfaction. • Indirect and relational outcomes take longer to come than economic outcomes. • Inter-organisational trust has a small effect size on the level of behavioural uncertainty even if the relationship is negative. • There are differences in the effects of inter-organisational trust across national and cultural contexts. • Examining inter-organisational trust at one point in time inflates the true effect size of trust-outcome relationships as compared to longitudinal research design. • Use of triangulation in the study of inter-organisational trust outcomes can improve the completeness of the enquiry more than a single research method.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The combined use of a qualitative and quantitative approach appears the most effective as the two methods complement each other.
17	Abstract	<p>This study's purpose is to improve the understanding of inter-organisational trust outcomes in supply chain relationships. It focuses on synthesizing the empirical research published from 1990 to May 2010 in order to establish both what we know and do not know about this topic, thereby identifying areas for future research. The research methodology used is the systematic literature review. It differs from traditional narrative reviews by being more systematic and explicit in the selection of the studies and employing rigorous and reproducible evaluation methods. In total 56 were selected from three databases: Business Source Premier; ABI/Informs; Ingenta. A meta-analysis was conducted to examine the correlated outcomes of inter-organisational trust in supply chain relationships. A total of 33 outcome variables and 96 independent samples with an overall sample size of 69,452 were included in the meta-analytic process, providing insights for dissemination and discussion. Three major themes emerge from the analysis: direct, indirect and relational outcomes. Inherent limitations could appear with regard to the methodological approaches used. The main research challenges refer to the: conceptualization of inter-organisational trust; definition of supply chain relationship typologies; and availability of primary data for the meta-analytic synthesis. This is the first study employing a combination of systematic literature review and meta-analytic methodologies to explore the supply chain literature on inter-organisational trust outcomes. The findings are of value to academics and practitioners alike.</p>
18	Key words	Inter-organisational trust; supply chain; supply chain management; trust; empirical literature; outcomes; meta-analysis; review; channel relationships.
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); trust
22	Configuration Elements	Supply chain,
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (Trust based inter-organisational relationship)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 32

01	Author of the article	Doney, Patricia M. // Cannon, Joseph P.
02	Title of the article	An examination of the nature of trust in buyer-seller relationships
03	Document name	Doney and Cannon, 1997
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing
05	Date of publication	1997
06	Volume	61
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	35-51
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Industrial manufacturing
12	Sample size	210 purchasing managers
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis including confirmatory factor analysis and regression analysis; and LISREL analysis (LISREL VII)
15	Study Characteristics	This study provides and empirically tests a analytical framework used to identify the antecedent so trust
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information provided by a trusted party is used more and thus provides greater value to the recipient. Organisational buyers who trust salespeople exhibit more integrative bargaining strategies, which lead to benefits for both parties. • Buying organisations develop trust in both the supplier organisation and the supplier's salesperson. Current supplier selection is not influenced by trust of the supplier organisation or its salesperson. • In the industrial buying context of this study, the key criteria for supplier selection are delivery performance and relative price/cost. • Trust of the supplier organisation and trust of the salesperson (operating indirectly through supplier organisation trust) do increase the likelihood that buyers anticipate doing business with the supplier organisation in the future. • Buyers appeared to form trust in selling organisations on the basis of characteristics of the organisation (e.g., size) and actual behaviours (e.g., investing in customer-specific assets). Together, such characteristics and behaviours provide the buyer with an indication that acting in an untrustworthy (or opportunistic) way would be costly for the supplier. • Relationships built on calculative trust are at the lowest and most fragile level. The highest levels of trusting relationships are based on internalizing the other's desires and intentions-where trust emerges through the process of intentionality.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trust built on closely identifying with the partner is more flexible to changing conditions and a more difficult bond to break than is calculative trust. • The interpersonal trust engendered by salespeople and transferred to the supplier organisation plays a key role in developing and maintaining enduring buyer-seller relationships. • Although trust is higher for selected suppliers than for those not selected, aspects of the marketing mix-price and reliable delivery-actually make the sale. • Professional buyers are trained to focus on objective evidence that demonstrates the superiority of the product offering, rather than on subjective assessments of trust.
17	Abstract	<p>A study integrates theory developed in several disciplines to determine 5 cognitive processes through which industrial buyers can develop trust of a supplier organisation and its salesperson. These processes provide an analytical framework used to identify antecedents of trust. The impact of supplier organisation and salesperson trust on a buying organisation's current supplier choice and future purchase intentions is also examined. The analytical model is tested on data collected from more than 200 purchasing managers. Results indicate that several variables influence the development of supplier organisation and salesperson trust. Trust of the supplier organisation and trust of the salesperson (operating indirectly through supplier organisation trust) influence a buyer's anticipated future interaction with the supplier. However, after controlling for previous experience and supplier performance, neither trust of the selling organisation or its salesperson influence the current supplier selection decision.</p>
18	Key words	Professional relationships; suppliers; salespeople; corporate purchasing; purchasing agents; regression analysis; studies; economic theory; cognition and reasoning; buyers
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); trust
22	Configuration Elements	Dyad
23	Relationship Directionality	Individual influencing Organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (buyer-supplier relationship)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 33

01	Author of the article	Doz, Yves L.
02	Title of the article	The evolution of cooperation in strategic Alliances: Initial conditions or learning process
03	Document name	Doz, 1996
04	Journal title	Strategic Management Journal
05	Date of publication	1996
06	Volume	17
07	Number	Special Issue
08	Page numbers	55-83
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	US-Switzerland, US-Italy, US-France
11	Context/Industry	Chemicals, IT, capital equipment
12	Sample size	3 case companies
13	Data collection method	Archival data; semi-structured interviews
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study examines whether the initial conditions (task definition, org. routines, interface structure and partners' expectations) facilitate or hamper learning of alliance partners.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial conditions (e.g. task definitions, organisational routines, interface structure and partners' expectations) facilitate or hamper partner learning along five dimensions (environment, task process skills and goals). • Successful alliances are those where partners engage in series of iterative and interactive learning cycles over time typically characterized by greater trust and adaptive flexibility, as well as the willingness to make larger and larger and increasingly specific and irreversible commitments. • Initial conditions may allow cognitive learning (e.g. understanding how cooperation should take place) but also make alliance participants more aware of the difficulties in behavioural learning. • Initial conditions that allow separate learning by the partners but do not foster joint learning are likely to lead to failure in alliance formation. • Successful learning followed by negative revaluation may lead to the failure of alliance formation.
17	Abstract	An examination is made of how the learning, along several dimensions - environment, task, process, skills, goals - that takes place in strategic alliances between organisations mediates between

		the initial conditions and the outcomes of these alliances. Through a longitudinal case study of 2 projects in one alliance, replicated and extended in another 4 projects in 2 alliances, a framework was developed to analyze the evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances. Successful alliance projects were highly evolutionary and went through a sequence of interactive cycles of learning, re-evaluation, and readjustment. Failing projects, conversely, were highly inertial, with little learning, or divergent learning between cognitive understanding and behavioural adjustment, or frustrated expectations. Although strategic alliances may be a special case of organisational learning, it is believed that analyzing the evolution of strategic alliances helps transcend too simple depictions of inertia and adaptation, in particular by suggesting that initial conditions may lead to a stable imprinting of fixed processes that make alliances highly inertial or to generative and evolutionary processes that make them highly adaptive, depending on how they are set.
18	Key words	Organisational studies; strategic planning; organisational learning; organisation theory; cooperation; alliances.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); irreversible commitment; trust
22	Configuration Elements	Network (alliance)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network (alliance)
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Longitudinal study
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 34

01	Author of the article	Dwyer, Robert F. // Schurr, Paul H. // Oh, Sejo
02	Title of the article	Developing buyer-seller relationships
03	Document name	Dwyer et al., 1987
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing
05	Date of publication	1987
06	Volume	51
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	11-27
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study put forwards a framework for developing a marketing strategy based on long term buyer-seller relationships. This framework covers both inter-organisational and consumer relationships.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To improve customer service and satisfaction, the seller needs to know whether purchases are expanding or contracting. • Conflict is predictable within a relationship just as periods of resource scarcity, misperception, changing values and concepts of fair play. • Functional benefits of conflict include: a) more effective and frequent communication; b) a critical review of past actions; c) a more equitable distribution of system resources; d) a more balanced power distribution in the relationship; and e) standardization of modes of conflict resolution. • Situational proximity between parties facilitates awareness. • Exploratory relationship is very fragile in the sense that minimal investment and interdependence make for simple termination. • In developing relations, there is reluctance to engage in bargaining. Uncertainty and the level of 'stakes' of the exchange affects the extent and nature of bargaining. • When a party fulfils perceived exchange obligations, its attractiveness to the other part increases. • Exchange of 'hostage' (bilateral exchange of transaction-specific human or physical assets) communicates credibility of

		commitment to relationship, and thus supports expanded alliance and exchange.
17	Abstract	A framework is described for developing buyer-seller relationships. Discrete (manifested by money on one side and an easily measured commodity on the other) and relational (transpiring over time with participants deriving complex, personal, noneconomic satisfactions and engaging in social exchange) exchanges are contrasted using modern contract law ideas. A 5-phase model is proposed that includes the general phases through which relationships evolve: 1. awareness or recognition of a feasible exchange partner, 2. exploration, the search and trial phase, 3. expansion, the continual increase in benefits and interdependence, 4. commitment, an implicit or explicit pledge of relational continuity, and 5. dissolution. Hypothesized transitions and key distinctions between phases are emphasized. A marketing research agenda is proposed, and 3 key facets of managing buyer-seller relationships are outlined: 1. performance metering, 2. conflict management, and 3. exit barriers.
18	Key words	Vendors; studies; models; market research; customer relations; consumer relations; buyers; trust; strategic planning
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (explicit); standardized modes of conflict resolution; information exchange; balance of power
22	Configuration Elements	Network evolution (5 phases)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing Network
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (buyer-seller relationship)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 35

01	Author of the article	Dyer, Jeffrey H. // Ouchi, William G.
02	Title of the article	Japanese-Style Partnerships: Giving Companies a Competitive Edge
03	Document name	Dyer and Ouchi, 1993
04	Journal title	Sloan Management Review
05	Date of publication	1993
06	Volume	35
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	51-63
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA and Japan
11	Context/Industry	Automotive industry
12	Sample size	147 including 4 auto makers and 143 suppliers
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Comparative data analysis based on the survey results – details not provided
15	Study Characteristics	This study prescribes a series of lessons that the US managers must learn from the Japanese approach of managing their suppliers in order to successfully compete at the global level.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extensive vertical integration often leads to less innovation and underperformance by world-class standards. • Outsourcing production should be given preference over in-house production, ceteris paribus. • Managers must recognize the dependence on those individuals and companies outside their organisations who have the ability to supply key inputs and perform key tasks more efficiently and effectively than they do. • Reduce the number of direct suppliers to reduce costs and increase quality through greater economies of scales and less variation in inputs. • Make customized investments to optimize the value chain and tailor systems to meet customer and supplier needs. Investment in customized assets can create significant economic value when information is openly share, problems are continuously identified and solved, and a see through value-chain is created. • Force suppliers to compete and reward superior performance. • Support the weaker suppliers improve so that they will continue to provide competition to the stronger suppliers. • Work with partners as a consultant to solve problems jointly and improve productivity.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect investment by building trust through: a) stock swaps; b) inter-organisational employee transfer; and/or c) flexible contracts. • Find ways to promote trust while making customized investments to reduce costs and improve quality.
17	Abstract	Evidence from an increasing number of industries and sources suggests that much of the Japanese success can be attributed to Japanese-style business partnerships (JSP). A JSP is an exclusive supplier-purchaser relationship that focuses on maximizing the efficiency of the entire business system (value chain). JSPs realize economic benefits not available to organisations that either vertically integrate or keep a large supplier base. There are usually 3 types of benefits: 1. fewer direct suppliers, 2. customized investments, and 3. forced competition. The Japanese have recognized the need to be interdependent and have responded by developing bonding mechanisms that build trust and goal congruence between companies. US companies need to develop a capability for partnership or be at a competitive disadvantage. The US can adapt the Japanese partnership approach to the environment in the same way that it is learning Japanese production practices. Data and insights into the topic came from 2 Japanese and 2 US automakers and 143 of their suppliers.
18	Key words	Techniques; suppliers; purchasing; partnering; cooperation; competitive advantage; Japanese style business partnership; value chain; business system; trust; goal congruence.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit);
22	Configuration Elements	Supply Chains; multi-tier suppliers
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing Network
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (supplier-purchase relationship)
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 36

01	Author of the article	Dyer, Jeffrey H. // Singh, Harbir
02	Title of the article	The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of interorganisational competitive advantage.
03	Document name	Dyer and Singh, 1998
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Review
05	Date of publication	1998
06	Volume	23
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	660-679
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	The central thesis is that a pair or network of organisations can develop relationships that result in sustained competitive advantage.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greater the alliance partners' investment is in relation-specific assets, the greater the potential will be for relational rents. • Greater the length of the safeguard is to protect against opportunism, the greater the potential will be to generate relational rents through relation-specific assets. • The greater the alliance partners' investment is in inter-organisational knowledge-sharing routines, the greater the potential will be for relational rents. • Greater the partner-specific absorptive capacity is, the greater the potential will be to generate relational rents through knowledge sharing. • Greater the alignment of incentives by alliance partners is to encourage transparency and reciprocity and to discourage free riding; the greater the potential will be to generate relational rents through knowledge sharing. • Greater the proportion is of synergy-sensitive resources owned by alliance partners that, when combined, increase the degree to which the resources are valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate, the greater the potential will be to generate relational rents. • Ability of alliance partners to generate relational rents from complementary strategic resources increases with the degree of compatibility in their organisational systems, processes, and cultures (organisational complementarity).

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greater the alliance partners' ability is to align transactions with governance structures in a discriminating (transaction cost minimizing and value maximizing) way, the greater the potential will be for relational rents. • Greater the alliance partners' ability is to employ self-enforcing safeguards (e.g., trust or hostages) rather than third-party safeguards (e.g., legal contracts), the greater the potential will be for relational rents, owing to (1) lower contracting costs, (2) lower monitoring costs, (3) lower adaptation costs, (4) lower re-contracting costs, and (5) superior incentives for value-creation initiatives. • Greater the alliance partners' ability is to employ informal self-enforcing safeguards (e.g., trust) rather than formal self-enforcing safeguards (e.g., financial hostages), the greater the potential will be for relational rent, owing to (1) lower marginal costs and (2) difficulty of imitation.
17	Abstract	In this article we offer a view that suggests that an organisation's critical resources may span organisation boundaries and may be embedded in inter-organisational resources and routines. We argue that an increasingly important unit of analysis for understanding competitive advantage is the relationship between organisations and identify four potential sources of interorganisational competitive advantage: (1) relation-specific assets, (2) knowledge-sharing routines, (3) complementary resources/capabilities, and (4) effective governance. We examine each of these potential sources of rent in detail, identifying key sub processes, and also discuss the isolating mechanisms that serve to preserve relational rents. Finally, we discuss how the relational view may offer normative prescriptions for organisation-level strategies that contradict the prescriptions offered by those with a resource-based view or industry structure view.
18	Key words	Inter-organisational resources; relation-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, complementary resources/capabilities, effective governance; resource-based view; industry structure view.
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory; Resource Based View
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); relational rents
22	Configuration Elements	Alliance
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (IORs)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 37

01	Author of the article	Dyer, Jeffrey H.
02	Title of the article	Effective inter-organisational collaboration: How organisations minimize transaction costs and maximize transaction value
03	Document name	Dyer, 1997
04	Journal title	Strategic Management Journal
05	Date of publication	1997
06	Volume	18
07	Number	7
08	Page numbers	535-556
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	UDA and Japan
11	Context/Industry	Automotive industry
12	Sample size	344 (including 152 responses from automaker purchasing department and 192 from suppliers)
13	Data collection method	Mail Survey based on self administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis
15	Study Characteristics	Based on the data collected from automotive industry, this study empirically examines the conditions under which transactors can simultaneously achieve the twin benefits of high asset specificity and low transaction costs
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The higher the probability of repeated exchange, the lower the transaction cost. • The greater the total volume of exchange between transactors, the lower the transaction cost per unit of exchange. • The greater the degree of information sharing between the transactors, the lower the information asymmetries and the lower the transaction costs. • Self-enforcing safe-guards (i.e. goodwill trust, financial hostage) result in lower transaction costs than the legal contracts if the expected duration of exchange is long term. • Above some minimum threshold level of trust, additional relation-specific investments serve to increase commitment and the cost of unilateral defection, thereby resulting in lower transaction costs.
17	Abstract	This study of automotive transaction relationships in the U.S.A. and Japan offers data which indicate that transaction costs do not necessarily increase with an increase in relation-specific investments. We empirically examine the conditions under which transactors can simultaneously achieve the twin benefits of high asset specificity and low transaction costs. This is possible because the different safeguards which can be employed to control opportunism have different set-up costs and result in

		different transaction costs over different time horizons. We examine in detail the practices of Japanese organisations which result in effective inter-organisational collaboration.
18	Key words	Collaboration; transaction cost; value; asset specificity; opportunism; organisational studies.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); information sharing; good will trust; financial and asset hostage
22	Configuration Elements	Supply networks (Global)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (buyer-supplier relationship)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual (managers)
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 38

01	Author of the article	Ellram, Lisa M. // Hendrick, Thomas, E.
02	Title of the article	Partnering Characteristics: A dyadic perspective
03	Document name	Ellram and Hendrick, 1995
04	Journal title	Journal of Business Logistics
05	Date of publication	1995
06	Volume	16
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	41-64
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Air transport; banking; chemicals; electronic and electrical equipment; engineering and management services; fabricated metal products; food; furniture and fixtures; industrial equipment, machinery and instruments; paper and packaging; printing and publishing; rubber and plastics; textiles; transportation equipment; trucking; warehousing; apparel; primary metal industries; wholesale trade-non-durable goods.
12	Sample size	80 IORs
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This paper examining partnering characteristics from the perspective of matched pairs including both the buyer and supplier by drawing on a large sample of organisations from a wide variety of industries, including transportation and warehousing.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnering arrangements among buyers and suppliers are generally viewed positively by both parties. • Buyers and suppliers have similar perceptions of the partnering arrangement across a number of factors which have been discussed as key characteristics of partnering in previous studies. These factors include a futuristic orientation, a win/win-risk sharing approach to the relationship, and excellent communications. • Both buyers and suppliers desire to improve the partnering relationship in many ways, even though the current relationship is viewed very favorably. • There is widespread agreement among buyers and suppliers regarding the aspects of the partnering relationship that could be improved upon. • There is widespread agreement between buyers and suppliers regarding the level of improvement desired. • Both buyers and suppliers want more sharing of risks,

		more continuous improvement focus, and a greater willingness to help the other and be flexible in arrangements, rather than take legal recourse.
17	Abstract	An examination is made of the perceptions of buyer-seller partnership characteristics from the perspectives of both the buying and the supplying organisations. The characteristics were derived from previous research and a review of the literature. Based on empirical evidence from a survey of matched pairs of buyers and suppliers who mutually agreed that they are involved in a partnership, an analysis is made of the differences and similarities for: 1. perceptions regarding the current partnering relationship from the perception of buyers and suppliers, 2. the desired characteristics of the partnering relationship between buyers and suppliers, and 3. current and desired partnering relationship characteristics within the group of buyers and within the group of suppliers. In addition to similarities and differences, the absolute level of partnering characteristics perceived today and desired in the future is discussed.
18	Key words	Buyers; suppliers; studies; perceptions; comparative analysis; partnering.
19	Organisation Field	Operations Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; groups; partnerships
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing networks
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (buyer-supplier relationship)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual (managers)
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 39

01	Author of the article	Fisher, Marshal L.
02	Title of the article	What is the right supply chain for your product?
03	Document name	Fisher, 1997
04	Journal title	Harvard Business Review
05	Date of publication	1997 (March/April)
06	Volume	75
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	105-116
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	Worldwide organisations operating in USA, Europe, Asia
11	Context/Industry	Automotive; sportswear; food;
12	Sample size	Not provided
13	Data collection method	Not provided
14	Method of data analysis	Not provided
15	Study Characteristics	This study provides a framework for the practioners to guide them in understanding the nature of the demand for their products and devise the supply chain that can best satisfy that demand.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The first step in devising an effective supply-chain strategy is to consider the nature of the demand for the products one's company supplies. Products classified on the basis of their demand patterns are: either primarily functional or primarily innovative. Each category requires a distinctly different kind of supply chain. The root cause of the problems plaguing many supply chains is a mismatch between the type of product and the type of supply chain. • Supply chain's physical function includes converting raw materials into parts, components, and eventually finished goods, and transporting all of them from one point in the supply chain to the next. Less visible but equally important is market mediation, whose purpose is ensuring that the variety of products reaching the marketplace matches what consumers want to buy. • For products with short life cycle, it is important read early sales numbers or other market signals and to react quickly. The crucial flow of information occurs not only within the chain but also from the marketplace to the chain. The critical decisions to be made about inventory and capacity are not about minimizing costs but about where in the chain to position inventory and available production capacity, in order to hedge against uncertain demand. Suppliers should be chosen for their speed and flexibility, not for their low cost. • Economic gain from reducing stock outs and excess inventory is so great that intelligent investments in supply chain

		<p>responsiveness will always pay for themselves.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When a company has an unresponsive supply chain for innovative products, the right solution is to make some of the products functional and to create a responsive supply chain for the remaining innovative products. • A lean, efficient distribution channel is exactly right for functional cars but totally inappropriate for innovative cars, which require inventory buffers to absorb uncertainty in demand.
17	Abstract	<p>Although there has never been so much technology and brain power applied to improving supply chain performance, the actual performance of many supply chains has never been worse. In some cases, costs have risen to new levels because of adversarial relations between supply chain partners as well as dysfunctional industry practices such as an overreliance on price promotions. The new ideas and technologies have not worked because companies lack a framework for deciding which ones are best for their particular situation. A framework is provided to managers for helping them understand the nature of the demand for their products and devise the supply chain that can best satisfy that demand. Once products have been classified on the basis of their demand patterns, they fall into one of 2 categories: they are either primarily functional or primarily innovative. The root cause of the problems plaguing many supply chains is a mismatch between the type of product and the type of supply chain.</p>
18	Key words	Supply chains; guidelines; product management; product life cycle; supply and demand; strategic planning; technology
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Not mentioned
21	Mode of Governance	Not mentioned
22	Configuration Elements	Supply chains
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	1.5

Data Extraction Form Number 40

01	Author of the article	Fulmer, Ashley C. // Gelfand, Michele J.
02	Title of the article	At what level (and in whom) we trust: Trust across multiple organisation levels
03	Document name	Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012
04	Journal title	Journal of Management
05	Date of publication	2012
06	Volume	38
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	1167-1230
09	Paper Type	Literature Review
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This review highlights the need to differentiate trust <i>in</i> a referent and trust <i>at</i> a level. It identifies common and distinct antecedents and consequences across referents and levels of analysis and highlights their strengths and limitations.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interpersonal trust can be more difficult to develop when two parties have power differences than when they hold similar power. The situation is reversed if the power difference is expected or even deemed appropriate. • During trust repair, high-power trustees are more likely to convince trustors to give them the benefit of the doubt; however, because individuals with high power are perceived to be in control, it may be more difficult for the high-power violator to attribute the violation to situational forces • Gratitude and empathy both increase trust but through different processes, such as reciprocity and social identification, respectively. • Anger and disappointment lead to different forms of trust dissolution. Understanding how emotions are implicated in trust should be especially relevant during trust violations, as violations are emotionally charged events for trustors. • A match between trust and actual trustworthiness is rare because individuals cannot have complete information about the trustee. Mismatches, on the other hand, have costs and benefits. If one trusts more than the actual trustworthiness warrants' there is the potential benefit of self-fulfilling prophecy through which trustworthiness may increase, but the trustor also risks violations. • Trust relationships move from calculus-based trust to identification-based trust. However, the extent to which this is the case depends on the level of interdependence of a culture.

17	Abstract	Despite the importance of trust across multiple levels in organisations, extant reviews have focused predominantly on trust at the individual level. A systematic review of trust research across levels and trust referents is sorely needed to synthesize the growing number of both micro and macro studies on this topic. Moreover, as trust is a linchpin for divergent areas, such as negotiation, leadership, team processes, human resource management, organisational change, entrepreneurship, and strategic alliances, a multilevel review of trust can facilitate integration in the field of organisational sciences. In this review, the authors adopt a levels-of-analysis approach to organize the research on trust between 2000 and 2011 in multiple referents that include interpersonal, team, and organisation at the individual, team, and organisational levels and analyze the similarities and differences in antecedents, consequences, and theoretical perspectives dominant at each level. Building on this foundation, the authors identify current strengths, weaknesses, and research gaps; offer recommendations for integration across levels and referents; and discuss lingering questions that research so far has overlooked. In doing so, the review offers a systematic and comprehensive view of the current state of the trust literature in organisational sciences and provides a blueprint for future research.
18	Key words	Trust processes; levels of analysis; organisations; teams.
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (Explicit); trust
22	Configuration Elements	Alliance; team; organisation; team
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Organisation
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 41

01	Author of the article	Ganesan, Shankar
02	Title of the article	Determinants of long-term orientation in buyer-seller relationships
03	Document name	Ganesan, 1994
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing
05	Date of publication	1994
06	Volume	58
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	1-19
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Six regional department store chains
12	Sample size	176 individuals
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Descriptive statistics; Confirmatory Factor Analysis; LISREL analysis; multiple regression analysis.
15	Study Characteristics	This study aims to determine the factors that affect the long term orientation in buyer-seller relationships. This study compares the perspectives of both the buyer (retailer) as well as the seller (vendor) by conducting a two stage mail survey.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Both retailer and vendor perspectives indicate that long-term orientation is determined by the extent to which a retailer or vendor trusts the channel partner. • Locking in channel partners through transaction specific investments and dependence is not enough to develop a long-term relationship: Actions that foster a climate of trust are needed. • One way to gain control over important and critical vendors is to be long-term oriented and improve the overall profitability of both parties through investments in the relationship. Such an approach eventually would reduce the asymmetry in dependence and increase mutual dependence. In contrast, retailers are likely to have a short-term orientation with vendors who are dependent on them. Retailers view a vendor's dependence on them as a liability for the vendor and use it to their own advantage. • Reputation of the vendor had a significant effect on its credibility but reputation of the retailer did not. This suggests that retailers and vendors could be influenced by a different set of cues regarding the trustworthiness of their partners. Retailers could rely on external cues, such as reputation for fairness in the marketplace, whereas vendors could rely more on internal cues, such as actual interactions with the retailers.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> When retailers and vendors have a diverse market with many products, customers, and competitors, they are more inclined to reduce their dependence on a particular retailer or vendor and deal with multiple entities on a short-term basis.
17	Abstract	<p>Marketing managers must know the time orientation of a customer to select and use marketing tools that correspond to the time horizons of the customer. Insufficient understanding of a customer's time orientation can lead to problems, such as attempting relationship marketing when transaction marketing is more appropriate. It is suggested that long-term orientation in a buyer-seller relationship is a function of 2 main factors: 1. mutual dependence, and 2. the extent to which they trust one another. Dependence and trust are related to environmental uncertainty, transaction-specific investments, reputation, and satisfaction in a buyer-seller relationship. The framework presented is tested with 124 retail buyers and 52 vendors supplying to those retailers. The results indicate that trust and dependence play key roles in determining the long-term orientation of both retail buyers and their vendors. The results also indicate that both similarities and differences exist across retailers and vendors with respect to the effects of several variables on long-term orientation, dependence, and trust.</p>
18	Key words	Vendors; relations; orientations; marketing; buyers; retail stores; market research; customer relations.
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); interdependence; reputation; trust
22	Configuration Elements	IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing Network
24	Unit of analysis	Dyad (buyer-seller relationship)
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 42

01	Author of the article	Garbarino, Ellen // Johnson, Mark S.
02	Title of the article	The different roles of satisfaction, trust and commitment in customer relationships
03	Document name	Garbarino and Johnson, 1999
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing
05	Date of publication	1999
06	Volume	63
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	70-87
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Non-profit repertory theatre company
12	Sample size	401 customers of the theatre
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Structural equation analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study investigates the transactional/relational continuum in a consumer setting and tests this notion using structural equation analysis.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unlike low relational customers, whose future intentions are driven by overall satisfaction, high relational consistent subscribers are driven by trust and commitment. For high relational customers, overall satisfaction has no significant influence on future intentions. • Transactional marketing programs focused on managing satisfaction will be more effective for low relational customers. Relationship marketing programs directed toward high relational customers should focus on maintaining and building trust and commitment, not satisfaction. • Attitudes toward the physical facilities affect satisfaction but not trust and commitment; facility attitudes affect the future intentions of the weak relationship customers but have no influence on the future intentions of the more relational subscribers.
17	Abstract	Several theories of relationship marketing propose that customers vary in their relationships with an organisation or a continuum from transactional to highly relational bonds. Using structural equation analysis, the relationships of satisfaction, trust and commitment to component satisfaction attitudes and future intentions for the customers of an off-Broadway repertory theatre are examined. For low relational customers, overall satisfaction is the primary mediating construct, while high relational customers use trust and commitment as the mediators between component attitudes and future intentions.

18	Key words	Relationship marketing; market research; theatres and cinemas; consumer behaviour; statistical analysis; consumer attitudes; customer satisfaction; variables; customer relations
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); trust; commitment; customer satisfaction
22	Configuration Elements	Relationship (Buyer-seller relationship)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing individuals
24	Unit of analysis	Organisation
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 43

01	Author of the article	Gassenheimer, Jule B. // Hunter, Garry K. // Siguaw, Judy A.
02	Title of the article	An evolving theory of hybrid distribution: Taming a hostile supply network
03	Document name	Gassenheimer et al., 2007
04	Journal title	Industrial Marketing Management
05	Date of publication	2007
06	Volume	36
07	Number	5
08	Page numbers	604-616
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study intends to: a) improve understanding about the complexity of governing a supply network that embraces channel hybridization; b) investigate trust in the context of a network distribution structure, where both cooperation and competition abound; c) identifies two forms of credible commitments that a supplier can use to govern its relationship with hybrid channel members: branded variants and compensation schemes; and d) provides an insight or improving relationships and performance within hybrid distribution.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To properly govern a supply network involving hybrid distribution, suppliers must consider positioning of all distribution partners and relationship with and between each. • Apart from considering the economic and social costs of expansion, it is important to gauge how competition and cooperation within the supply network influence perceptions of supply chain members, particularly issues of fairness. • The ability of the supplier to broker multiple relationships fairly builds trust and has a significant impact in governing supply network relations. • Trust within hybrid distribution networks promotes cooperation and indicates that distributors realize the value the supplier contributes to the distributors' outcomes and remain confident that long-term gains outweigh short-term sacrifices. • The use of credible commitments in the form of branded variants directly increases the distributors' perceptions of the supplier's distributive fairness, increases structural holes between types of distributors, and indirectly increases

		<p>distributor trust in the supplier.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The use of credible commitments in the form of compensation schemes directly increases the distributors' perceptions of the supplier's distributive fairness, decreases structural holes between the supplier and the distributors, and indirectly increases trust in the supplier. • The greater the structural holes between the supplier and distributors, the less the cooperation between the supplier and the distributors. The greater the structural holes between types of distributors, the greater the cooperation between the supplier and the distributors. The greater the distributor's trust in the supplier, the greater the cooperation between the supplier and the distributors. Suppliers that maintain structural holes between types of distributors by brokering the relationship will improve supply network performance. Cooperation between the supplier and the distributors will be positively associated with supply network performance.
17	Abstract	<p>Suppliers attempting to expand markets through hybrid distribution have created a complex, potentially hostile environment that reaches beyond dyads to network relationships. We offer a multi-theoretic paradigm that uses the network, social capital, structural holes and distributive fairness literatures to guide suppliers in the transition of governing hybrid channels so that when markets do overlap, cooperation and competition can effectively co-exist within the supply network. Specifically, we propose that social capital, structural holes, trust, and distributive fairness can be used to govern the effectiveness of cooperation and competition among hybrid channels and yield higher performance within the supply network. A corresponding propositional inventory is offered.</p>
18	Key words	Organisational studies; suppliers; distribution channels; cooperation; competition
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory; Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (Explicit); social capital;
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; hybrid distribution channels
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 44

01	Author of the article	Ghosh, Anupam // Fedorowicz, Jane
02	Title of the article	The role of trust in supply chain governance
03	Document name	Ghosh and Fedorowicz, 2008
04	Journal title	Business Process Management Journal
05	Date of publication	2008
06	Volume	14
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	453-470
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Retail sector
12	Sample size	24 decision makers belonging to two different suppliers
13	Data collection method	Semi-structured interviews
14	Method of data analysis	Content analysis of transcribed and coded data collected through interviews
15	Study Characteristics	This paper identifies key interorganisational governance mechanisms and shows how they can shape information sharing in a supply chain.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • While information technology serves as an enabler for information sharing to take place, successful deployment of interorganisational coordination efforts within a supply chain depends upon the existence of a cohesive set of communication-enhancing governance mechanisms that can be clearly linked to performance and process improvements. Knowledge of the role of these governance mechanisms will help chain partners to realign business relationships and contribute to overall chain performance. • Within the governing structure of a contract, information sharing between retailers and suppliers (or any buyers and sellers) will require both a shift in operational processes and company culture, thereby highlighting the importance of trust. When useful information is shared in a timely manner, supply chain performance will be enhanced and long-term business relationships will be bolstered.
17	Abstract	<p>Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide and illustrate a framework for the role of governance mechanisms in information sharing among supply chain members. The importance of trust in governing IORs is emphasized.</p> <p>Design/methodology/approach – Trust, bargaining power, and contract are three key constructs supporting the governance of information sharing and material flow coordination in supply chains. A conceptual framework showing how these governance mechanisms affect coordination and ultimately, supply chain performance is presented. Four types of trust – calculative,</p>

		<p>competence, integrity, and predictability – are thought to play an important role in determining the efficacy of information sharing. Three research questions are posed on the relationships among trust, bargaining power, contracts, and information sharing in supply chain coordination. These governance issues are shown to be key factors in the supply chain business model, as illustrated in a case study from the retail distribution industry in the USA where collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment is used to exchange supply and demand forecasts.</p> <p>Findings – An example from the retail distribution industry shows that the three constructs of the governance framework are intertwined. Trust as a governance mechanism plays a crucial role in sharing information among business partners.</p> <p>Research limitations/implications – The proposed framework is illustrated with a single case. It will need to be tested empirically for supply chains across different industries.</p> <p>Originality/value – The paper presents a governance mechanism framework for supply chain information sharing. Knowledge of the role of governance mechanisms in information sharing coordination will help chain members to realign business relationships and contribute to improved overall operational performance of the chain.</p>
18	Key words	Information exchange, Governance, Supply chain management, Trust, Channel relations
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); trust, bargaining power, and
22	Configuration Elements	Supply chains
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individuals
26	Research perspective	Cross section approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 45

01	Author of the article	Ghoshal, Sumantra // Moran, Peter
02	Title of the article	Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost theory
03	Document name	Ghoshal and Moran, 1996
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Review
05	Date of publication	1996
06	Volume	21
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	13-47
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	The primary objective in this article is to caution against the growing tendency of applying the TCE logic for such normative purposes.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TCE has been criticized for: a) embodying a hidden ideology that distorts more than it illuminates; b) ad-hoc theorizing divorced from reality; c) lacking generality because of ethnocentric bias; d) ignoring the contextual grounding of human actions; and e) for other such purported acts of omission and commission. • Opportunism is influenced by three factors :) "prior conditioning" that includes all the attitudes and values formed through exposure to conscious as well as subliminal stimuli; b) "feeling for the entity" that represents the individuals' favourable or unfavourable assessment of the specific transaction partner, the group or the organisation; and c) "opportunistic behaviour" – an incongruence between attitude and behaviour that may give rise to dissonance, if behaviour was accompanied by high commitment, freedom of choice and consequence. • The influence of hierarchical governance mechanisms such as fiat, monitoring, and control is positive on the cost of opportunistic behaviour and negative on the feeling for the entity. • Social control can influence behaviour with or without a change in individual attitudes. • As the increased use of rational controls (a) increases the organisation's dependency on those controls, (b) shifts voluntary compliance and extra role behaviour to compulsory compliance and work-to-rule, and (c) encourages more difficult to detect opportunistic behaviour, the cost of

		<p>removing these controls will grow until it is no longer an option for the organisation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equilibrium between dishonesty and control may be reached, temporarily, when the organisation exhausts its opportunities to apply rational controls. By then, the most promising individuals within the organisation (i.e., those who are most equipped to succeed) will more likely be those who are most skilled at furthering their own interests, with the most guide.
17	Abstract	<p>Transaction cost economics (TCE), and more specifically the version of TCE that has been developed by Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985, 1993), has become an increasingly important anchor for the analysis of a wide range of strategic and organisational issues of considerable importance to organisations. As argued by some of its key proponents, the theory aims not only to explain but also to influence practice (Masten 1993). It is argued that prescriptions drawn from this theory are likely to be not only wrong but also dangerous for corporate managers because of the assumptions and logic on which it is grounded. Organisations are not mere substitutes for structuring efficient transactions when markets fail; they possess unique advantages for governing certain kinds of economic activities through a logic that is very different from that of a market. TCE is bad for practice because it fails to recognize this difference. Sources of organisational advantage are identified.</p>
18	Key words	Transactional analysis; studies; economic theory; cost analysis.
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics
21	Mode of Governance	Hierarchical governance mechanism; fiat; monitoring and control
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influence
24	Unit of analysis	Organisation
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 46

01	Author of the article	Giunipero, Larry C.// Hooker, Robert E.// Mathews, Sacha J.//Yoon, Tom E.// Brudvig, Susan
02	Title of the article	A decade of SCM Literature: Past, Present, and Future Implications
03	Document name	Giunipero et al., 2008
04	Journal title	Journal of Supply Chain Management
05	Date of publication	2008
06	Volume	44
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	66-86
09	Paper Type	Literature Review
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	405 studies
13	Data collection method	To develop an extensive database of academic articles within the SCM field, several citation identification methods were employed.
14	Method of data analysis	A content analysis methodology was employed to code and categorize the selected articles into 13 categories. Analysis techniques were divided between basic and advanced data analysis techniques. Basic data analysis consisted of descriptive statistics, means testing, correlation and content analysis. Advanced data analysis techniques consisted of regression, factor analysis, SEM/path analysis, ANOVA and cluster analysis. The least common types of data analysis techniques were content analysis and Discriminant Analysis/Cluster analysis.
15	Study Characteristics	This research is focused towards systematically capturing trends, gaps and the future direction for the SCM field as depicted in the SCM literature and covered by a wide cross-section of nine peer-reviewed journals.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A lagging trend in the SCM literature is environmental, for example, green supply chain and social responsibility. • The practitioner literature is increasing its coverage of green supply chains and their carbon footprint. • Electronic interchanges help organisations achieve cost savings and better integrate their business partnerships. • SCM research in the e-commerce area also addresses streamlining processes associated with inventory management and order fulfillment. • This review indicates a dominance of research at the focal organisation level or one link upstream or downstream.
17	Abstract	This study covers a decade of academic research in the Supply Chain Management (SCM) field, offering an in-depth analytical

		review focused on the existing trends and gaps in the supply chain literature. Nine academic journals were investigated and a subject categorization is developed for SCM research. A content analysis was then conducted on 405 articles, focusing on the categories covered within the SCM literature, various levels of the chain examined and sample populations and industries studied, as well as the research methods employed. Finally, a conceptual framework of the most highly researched categories in SCM indicates that there is a need for more research that seeks to understand the nature of multiple links in SCM chains and networks, as opposed to focusing on dyadic and IORs.
18	Key words	Supply chain management; supply management; literature review; alliances; strategy
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	NA
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Supply Chains
23	Relationship Directionality	NA
24	Unit of analysis	NA
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 47

01	Author of the article	Grandori, Anna // Soda, Giuseppe
02	Title of the article	A relational approach to organisational design
03	Document name	Grandori and Soda, 2006
04	Journal title	Industry and Innovation
05	Date of publication	2006
06	Volume	13
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	151-172
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Mixed methods)
10	Geographical Location	Italy
11	Context/Industry	Chipboard producer and marketer
12	Sample size	Single case company
13	Data collection method	Face-to-face interviews; focus groups; direct observations; documentary analysis. (details not provided).
14	Method of data analysis	Correlation analysis between interdependence matrices and coordination matrices to detect sub-optimal matches.
15	Study Characteristics	The approach to organisation design presented here is based on a procedure, not on a repertory of alternative forms. Hence, it allows solving new design problems, to devise structures in new fields where no repertory exists, to solve complicated organisational problems where the solution is neither obvious nor standardized.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The analysis for slack resources has shown that the organisation has designed its knowledge capacity to effectively face variance in the quantities of resources. These resources can be maintained in excess and are able to absorb the variability of demands. • Physical resources are in general more constrained, in the sense that increasing reserves has a more direct impact on costs. • As the strength of interdependence increases, the greater a deficit of coordination appears. It is the most common encountered problem in organisation design. • Majority activities that are interdependent in a constrained way belong to different organisational units, specializing in different functions and processes. Hence, nothing is more likely than their interdependence being underrated with a deficit of inter-functional coordination. • Maintenance activities (critical to production) are currently externalized. If they are correctly externalized, that is, the cost of producing certain maintenance services internally is higher than the external costs, and coordination costs are approximately equal then the study also supports the proposition that networks of tight, hierarchical and team like

		coordination can and should cut organisation boundaries.
17	Abstract	The paper criticizes the currently dominant view of organisation forms as "discrete alternatives" and "coherent" set attributes, and proposes a more refined and micro-analytic view of organisation forms as particular combinations of coordination mechanisms and rights allocations. This view is relevant for understanding and devising "new" forms and proposing solutions for governing the composite and fast changing systems of today. The view is "relational" as it offers a procedure for devising "superior" configurations as combinations-relations between organisational components-in a quasi-continuous space of possibilities. The approach is sustained by the quantitative methods of network analysis as applied to relations among organisation's resources and activities. Theoretically, the approach revisits organisation design, integrating classic organisation theory tenets with the new inputs provided by organisational economics. Substantively, it is argued that a mix of much differentiated coordination mechanisms is usually superior to the codified, "packaged", allegedly "coherent", forms of organisation. The procedure presented in the paper is applied to a field experiment in a medium size organisation.
18	Key words	Coordination; mechanism; governance; relation; configuration; network; organisation design; quantitative methods; network analysis.
19	Organisation Field	Operations Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) an informal (explicit); coordination; information exchange
22	Configuration Elements	IORs embedded in networks
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 48

01	Author of the article	Granovetter, Mark
02	Title of the article	The strength of weak ties
03	Document name	Granovetter, 1973
04	Journal title	American Journal of Sociology
05	Date of publication	1973
06	Volume	78
07	Number	6
08	Page numbers	1360-1380
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Professional, technical, and managerial job changers living in a Boston suburb
12	Sample size	A random sample of 100 individuals
13	Data collection method	Face to face indepth interviews
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This paper demonstrates that the personal experience of individuals is closely bound up with larger-scale aspects of social structure, well beyond the purview or control of particular individuals.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The removal of the average weak tie would do more "damage" to transmission probabilities than would that of the average strong one. This means that whatever is to be diffused can reach a larger number of people, and traverse greater social distance when passed through weak ties rather than strong. • Since the resistance to a risky or deviant activity is greater than to a safe or normal one, a larger number of people will have to be exposed to it and adopt it, in the early stages, before it will spread in a chain reaction. Individuals with many weak ties are, by my arguments, best placed to diffuse such a difficult innovation, since some of those ties will be local bridges. • The fewer indirect contacts one has the more encapsulated he will be in terms of knowledge of the world beyond his own friendship circle; thus, bridging weak ties (and the consequent indirect contacts) are important in both ways. • From the individual's point of view, then, weak ties are an important resource in making possible mobility opportunity. Seen from a more macroscopic vantage, weak ties play a role in effecting social cohesion. • Trust in leaders is integrally related to the capacity to predict and affect their behaviour. Leaders, for their part, have little motivation to be responsive or even trustworthy toward those to whom they have no direct or indirect connection. Network

		<p>fragmentation, by reducing drastically the number of paths from any leader to his potential followers, would inhibit trust in such leaders.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Linkage of micro and macro levels is of central importance to the development of sociological theory. Such linkage generates paradoxes: weak ties are indispensable to individuals' opportunities and to their integration into communities; strong ties, breeding local cohesion, lead to overall fragmentation.
17	Abstract	<p>Analysis of social networks is suggested as a tool for linking micro and macro levels of sociological theory. The procedure is illustrated by elaboration of the macro implications of one aspect of small-scale interaction: the strength of dyadic ties. It is argued that the degree of overlap of two individuals' friendship networks varies directly with the strength of their tie to one another. The impact of this principle on diffusion of influence and information, mobility opportunity, and community organisation is explored. Stress is laid on the cohesive power of weak ties. Most network models deal, implicitly, with strong ties, thus confining their applicability to small, well-defined groups. Emphasis on weak ties lends itself to discussion of relations between groups and to analysis of segments of social structure not easily defined in terms of primary groups.</p>
18	Key words	Social networks; sociological theory; ties; diffusion studies; cognitive balance
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); social capital
22	Configuration Elements	IORs; ties
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 49

01	Author of the article	Granovetter, Mark
02	Title of the article	Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness
03	Document name	Granovetter, 1985
04	Journal title	American Journal of Sociology
05	Date of publication	1985
06	Volume	91
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	481-510
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This article concerns the embeddedness of economic behaviour. It argues that the level of embeddedness of economic behaviour is: a) lower in non-market societies; and b) it has changed less with modernization than is claimed by development theorists.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the under socialized account, atomization results from narrow utilitarian pursuit of self-interest; in the over socialized one, from the fact that behavioural patterns have been internalized and ongoing social relations thus have only peripheral effects on behaviour. • Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations. • In business relations the degree of confidence must be more variable, but Prisoner's Dilemmas are nevertheless often obviated by the strength of personal relations, and this strength is a property not of the transactors but of their concrete relations. • Social relations, rather than institutional arrangements or generalized morality, are mainly responsible for the production of trust in economic life. • There are two ways to reduce this risk: a) to recognize that distrust, opportunism, and disorder are by no means absent; and b) to insist that while social relations may indeed often be a necessary condition for trust and trustworthy behaviour, they are not sufficient to guarantee these and may even provide occasion and means for malfeasance and conflict on

		<p>a scale larger than in their absence.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The trust engendered by personal relations presents, by its very existence, enhanced opportunity for malfeasance. • Force and fraud are most efficiently pursued by teams, and the structure of these teams requires a level of internal trust that usually follows preexisting lines of relationship. • The extent of disorder resulting from force and fraud depends very much on how the network of social relations is structured. More extended and large-scale disorder results from coalitions of combatants, impossible without prior relations. • It is not only at top levels that organisations are connected by networks of personal relations, but at all levels where transactions must take place.
17	Abstract	<p>How behaviour and institutions are affected by social relations is one of the classic questions of social theory. This paper concerns the extent to which economic action is embedded in structures of social relations, in modern industrial society. Although the usual neoclassical accounts provide an "under socialized" or atomized-actor explanation of such action, reformist economists who attempt to bring social structure back in do so in the "over socialized" way criticized by Dennis Wrong. Under- and over socialized accounts are paradoxically similar in their neglect of ongoing structures of social relations, and a sophisticated account of economic action must consider its embeddedness in such structures. The argument is illustrated by a critique of Oliver Williamson's "markets and hierarchies" research program.</p>
18	Key words	Embeddedness; social structure; economic action.
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); social capital
22	Configuration Elements	IORs; ties; embeddedness
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 50

01	Author of the article	Greening, Phil // Rutherford, Christine
02	Title of the article	Disruptions and supply networks: a multi-level, multi-theoretical relational perspective
03	Document name	Greening and Rutherford, 2011
04	Journal title	The International Journal of Logistics and Management
05	Date of publication	2011
06	Volume	22
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	104-126
09	Paper Type	Literature Review
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	The objective of this paper was to review the extant relational literature relating to networks, with a view to combining these theoretical perspectives with the literature surrounding supply chain disruptions.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dense networks establish strong network behavioural norms anchored in the routine operation of the network. In the case of disruption, these may inhibit the speed of network response to unexpected, sudden and high impact events. • In the event of a disruption, surviving nodes in this type of network will be able to switch suppliers quickly, setting the network on a trajectory of faster recovery when compared to a less dense network. • Opportunistic behaviour will result in further switching of suppliers as the network gravitates closer to equilibrium during the post-disruption recovery phase. • Disruptions located in networks with high dependency ties will have greater impact, and will consequently generate longer periods of recovery. The presence of holes may also be an indication that the network is still evolving and prior to disruption was on a trajectory that would have resulted in the structural holes being bridged. • A disruption has more impact in an evolving network (described by the presence of holes) than it does in a dense network with proportionately less holes. Nodes whose shortest connecting path to a disruptive event is via a weak tie will be impacted less and recover more quickly than nodes whose shortest connecting path is through a greater number of strong ties.
17	Abstract	The purpose of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework for the analysis of supply network disruptions and present a number of propositions to define a future research agenda. In doing so, it draws on a

		<p>review of the literature regarding supply chain disruptions; relationship formation and evolution; and network formation and evolution. The literature review combined traditional contextual analysis with citation analysis and co-citation, assuming a multi-level, multi-theoretical perspective. The findings highlight a paucity of empirical research regarding supply chain disruptions assuming a network perspective, highlighting the dynamic nature of networks and emphasizing the difference between supply chain disturbance and disruption. The paper stops short of testing specific hypotheses, providing a conceptual framework and a series of propositions from which testable hypotheses can be developed. The necessity of assuming a dynamic, multi-level, multi-theoretical perspective highlights the difficulties of empirical research in this area. However, the significance of understanding the network context of disruption and its connection to the securing of appropriate responses and ultimately reasonable mitigation is unavoidable. The ability to understand the implications of network structure and network relational dynamics in the context of disruption will enable managers to respond appropriately to disruptive supply chain events. This capability will assume increasing importance in the vulnerable and sensitive global economy. The paper's specific consideration of disruption (as opposed to disturbance), and the necessitated speed of response leads to the development of several disruption-specific propositions and the development of a new research agenda.</p>
18	Key words	Supply chain management, Social networks
19	Organisation Field	Supply chain management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Supply Network; structure; formation; evolution; dynamics; IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing Network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 51

01	Author of the article	Gulati, Ranjay // Singh, Harbir
02	Title of the article	The architecture of cooperation: managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances
03	Document name	Gulati and Singh, 1998
04	Journal title	Administrative Science Quarterly
05	Date of publication	1998
06	Volume	43
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	781-814
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	Worldwide industries
11	Context/Industry	Biopharmaceuticals, new materials, and automobile sectors.
12	Sample size	The total sample of 1,570 alliances included 769 alliances in the new materials industry, 345 alliances in automotives, and 456 alliances in biopharmaceuticals. Unit of analysis here is the individual alliance and not organisations
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis
15	Study Characteristics	By directly modelling the influence of anticipated coordination costs on the governance structure of alliances after accounting for concerns about appropriation, the study provides a window into the multiple logics used by alliance participants in determining the governance structure used to formalize alliances.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Using a typology of three types of alliance structure and the magnitude and type of hierarchical controls present in each, the extent of coordination costs and appropriation concerns in an alliance can predict the use of particular governance structures. • The greater the anticipated coordination costs arising from interdependence associated with a strategic alliance at the time of its formation, the more hierarchical is the governance structure used to formalize it. • Reciprocally interdependent alliances are likely to have structures with greater hierarchical control than those with sequential interdependence, which in turn are likely to have more hierarchically organized alliances than those with pooled interdependence. • Alliances involving a technology component were likely to use more hierarchical structures than those that did not involve one. • The presence of a technology component in alliances enhances the influence of the appropriability regime of the

		<p>industry on the governance structure used.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The combination of a technology component and an alliance in a sector with a weak appropriability regime increases the likelihood of organisations choosing hierarchical governance structures. • It is important to consider alliances between organisations as occurring within a rich social context in which organisations are embedded. This context channels valuable information between organisations and can thus influence not only the formation of new alliances and the choice of partners but also the specific structures used to formalize alliances.
17	Abstract	<p>This study examines why organisations choose different governance structures across their alliances. The coordination costs in alliances that arise from interdependence of tasks along organisational boundaries and the related complexity of ongoing activities to be completed jointly or individually is focused on. A typology of alliance governance structures that differentiates structures by the magnitude of hierarchical controls is used to test hypotheses predicting alternative contractual choices. Empirical data on alliance announcements in 3 worldwide industries over a 20-year period is used to assess which factors explain the choice of alliance types. The findings suggest that the magnitude of hierarchical controls in contractual relationships such as alliances is influenced by the anticipated coordination costs and by expected appropriation concerns.</p>
18	Key words	Alliances; organisational structure; hypotheses; statistical analysis; corporate governance; organisational studies
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (implicit); hierarchical
22	Configuration Elements	Networks (alliances);
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross section approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 52

01	Author of the article	Gulati, Ranjay // Nohria, Nitin // Zaheer, Akbar
02	Title of the article	Strategic Networks
03	Document name	Gulati et al., 2000
04	Journal title	Strategic Management Journal
05	Date of publication	2000
06	Volume	21
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	203-215
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study examines the five domains of strategy research that are influenced by network approach: a) industry structure; b) positioning within industry; c) coordination, network evolution; d) contracting; and e) inimitable resources.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A network perspective suggests that both contracting and coordinating costs can be influenced by viewing each transaction as simply an event in an evolving network of relationships. • Organisation's networks, and the resources they allow the organisation to tap into, can serve as a source of sustainable competitive advantage. • A resource-rich partner with the right capabilities has the potential to provide a focal organisation with an inimitable source of valuable resources and capabilities. • Managing the network involves using appropriate governance mechanisms, developing inter-organisational knowledge sharing routines, making appropriate relationship-specific investments, and initiating necessary changes to the partnership as it evolves while also managing partner expectations. • Organisations can get better at forging alliances and extracting returns from them as they gain more experience. From a strategic standpoint, this suggests that experience with alliances can be a source of strategic advantage. • Structural network characteristics can affect the profitability of

		<p>the organisations in an industry. For instance: a) network density; b) structural holes; c) structural equivalence; and d) core versus peripheral organisations. Each of these factors can influence the profitability of industries and of the organisations within them.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Network ties to certain favourable supplier industries may preclude access by other organisations or industries, and thus maintain high profits in the focal industry by imposing limits on organisation entry into the industry.
17	Abstract	<p>This paper introduces the important role of networks of inter-organisational ties in examining fundamental issues in strategy research. Prior research has primarily viewed organisations as autonomous entities striving for competitive advantage from either external industry sources or from internal resources and capabilities. However, the networks of relationships in which organisations are embedded profoundly influence their conduct and performance. We identify five key areas of strategy research in which there is potential for incorporating strategic networks: (1) industry structure, (2) positioning within an industry, (3) inimitable organisation resources and capabilities, (4) contracting and coordination costs, and (5) dynamic network constraints and benefits. For each of these issues, the paper outlines some important insights that result from considering the role of strategic networks.</p>
18	Key words	Ties; inimitable resources; capabilities; contracting; coordination costs; dynamic network constraints.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); contracts; coordination
22	Configuration Elements	Network; embedded IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing Network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 53

01	Author of the article	Gulati, Ranjay
02	Title of the article	Social structure and alliance formation patterns: A longitudinal study
03	Document name	Gulati, 1995
04	Journal title	Administrative Science Quarterly
05	Date of publication	1995
06	Volume	40
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	619-652
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA, Europe, Japan
11	Context/Industry	Materials, industrial automation, automotive
12	Sample size	166 organisations
13	Data collection method	Published financial and alliance data for each year between 1980-1989
14	Method of data analysis	Social network analysis using UCINET 4 - a comprehensive software package for conducting the structural analysis of interorganisational networks.
15	Study Characteristics	This study proposes a framework to explain the formation of interorganisational alliances within a social context - accumulation of prior alliances.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dyadic interdependence is relevant in guiding alliance formation. Interdependent organisations are more likely to seek each other out as alliance partners. • Social context resulting from cumulative prior alliances influence alliance formation between organisations. • Previously unconnected organisations are more likely to enter alliance if they have a common partner. Inter-organisational networks are not only valuable conduits for information about specific organisational practices but they also provide an important impetus for guiding the choice of partners in new ties. • Previously allied organisations are likely to engage in further alliances. • Social network of indirect ties is an effective referral mechanism for bringing organisations together and that dense co-location in an alliance network enhances mutual confidence as organisations become aware of the possible negative reputational consequences of their own or other's opportunistic behaviours.
17	Abstract	This study explores how social structure affects inter-organisational alliance formation patterns. It proposes that the social context emerging from prior alliances and considerations of strategic interdependence influence partnership decisions

		between organisations. This social network facilitates new alliances by providing valuable information to organisations about the specific capabilities and reliability of potential partners. The role of both direct ties between organisations and their overall networks were examined with comprehensive longitudinal multi-industry data on the formation of inter-organisational strategic alliances between 1970 and 1989. Results are consistent with both strategic interdependence and social structural explanations of alliance formation. Support for the interaction of the two sets of factors also emerged. The implications of incorporating both sets of explanations for the formation of interorganisational ties are discussed.
18	Key words	Strategic alliances; social networks; embeddedness; cooperative capabilities; organisational learning
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); past experience; interdependence
22	Configuration Elements	Network (alliances); direct and indirect ties.
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Longitudinal study
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 54

01	Author of the article	Gulati, Ranjay
02	Title of the article	Alliances and Networks
03	Document name	Gulati, 1998
04	Journal title	Strategic Management Journal
05	Date of publication	1998
06	Volume	19
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	293-317
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study demonstrates: a) how social networks can be influential in the creation and success of alliances; and b) how a perspective informed by the structural embeddedness of organisations can provide important new insights into the key issues on strategic alliances.
1	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are two broad analytical approaches for examining the influence of social networks. The first emphasizes the differential informational advantages bestowed by social networks, while the second highlights the control benefits actors can generate by being advantageously positioned within a social network. • In network analysis, the position an actor occupies in the structure is a function of the actor's relational pattern in this network. • Relational embeddedness suggests that actors who are strongly tied to each other are likely to develop a shared understanding of the utility of certain behaviour as a result of discussing opinions in strong, socializing relations, which in turn influence their actions. • Actors who share direct connections with each other are likely to possess more common information and knowledge of each other. Information travels not only through proximate ties in networks, but through the structure of the network itself. • For organisations to build ties that effectively address their needs while minimizing the risks posed by such concerns, they must be aware of the existence of their potential partners and have an idea of their needs and requirements.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organisations need information about the reliability of the partners being considered for future alliance, especially when success depends heavily upon the partners' behaviour. • An important implication of the embeddedness of organisations in social networks is the enhanced trust between organisations. • Knowledge-based trust resulting from mutual awareness and equity norms and deterrence-based trust arising from reputational concerns creates 'self-enforcing' safeguards and can substitute for contractual safeguards in a relationship.
17	Abstract	<p>This paper introduces a social network perspective to the study of strategic alliances. It extends prior research, which has primarily considered alliances as dyadic exchanges and paid less attention to the fact that key precursors, processes, and outcomes associated with alliances can be defined and shaped in important ways by the social networks within which most organisations are embedded. It identifies five key issues for the study of alliances: (1) the formation of alliances, (2) the choice of governance structure, (3) the dynamic evolution of alliances, (4) the performance of alliances, and (5) the performance consequences for organisations entering alliances. For each of these issues, this paper outlines some of the current research and debates at the organisation and dyad level and then discusses some of the new and important insights that result from introducing a network perspective. It highlights current network research on alliances and suggests an agenda for future research</p>
18	Key words	Governance structures; alliances; networks; evolution; performance.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); past experience; interdependence
22	Configuration Elements	Network (alliances); direct and indirect ties.
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional study
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 55

01	Author of the article	Gulati, Ranjay
02	Title of the article	Network location and learning: The influence of network resources and organisations capabilities of alliance formation
03	Document name	Gulati, 1999
04	Journal title	Strategic Management Journal
05	Date of publication	1999
06	Volume	20
07	Number	5
08	Page numbers	397-420
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA (54 organisations); Japan (66 organisations); Europe (46 organisations)
11	Context/Industry	New materials (66 organisations); automotive (52 organisations); Industrial automation(52 organisations)
12	Sample size	166 organisations
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical sampling (dynamic panel probit model)
15	Study Characteristics	This paper examines the factors that affect the likely hood that organisations will enter into an alliance in each period of observation. The unit of analysis for this study is the organisation-year.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The tendency of organisations to enter new alliances is influenced by the amount of network resources available to them. • The extent of capabilities (that an organisation accumulates with forming alliances) positively affects the frequency with which organisations enter new alliances. • A position of higher centrality within a network leads to the formation of more alliances. • The extent of capabilities organisations accumulated with forming alliances also positively affected the frequency with which they entered new alliances.
17	Abstract	This paper presents a dynamic, organisation-level study of the role of network resources in determining alliance formation. Such resources inhere not so much within the organisation but reside in the inter-organisational networks in which organisations are placed. Data from extensive fieldwork show that by influencing the extent to which organisations have access to information about potential partners, such resources are an important catalyst for new alliances, especially because alliances entail considerable hazards. This study also assesses the importance of organisations' capabilities with

		alliance formation and material resources as determinants of their alliance decisions. I test this dynamic framework and its hypotheses about the role of time-varying network resources and organisation capabilities with comprehensive longitudinal multi-industry data on the formation of strategic alliances by a panel of organisations between 1970 and 1989. The results confirm field observations that accumulated network resources arising from organisation participation in the network of accumulated prior alliances are influential in organisations' decisions to enter into new alliances.
18	Key words	Strategic alliances; social networks; embeddedness; cooperative capabilities; organisational learning
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); past experience; interdependence
22	Configuration Elements	Network (alliances); direct and indirect ties.
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional study
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 56

01	Author of the article	Gundlach, Gregory T. // Achrol, Ravi S. // Mentzer, John T.
02	Title of the article	The structure of commitment in exchange
03	Document name	Gundlach et al., 1995
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing
05	Date of publication	1995
06	Volume	59
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	78-92
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical analysis)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Microcomputer industry
12	Sample size	130 top managers
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis,; multiple regression
15	Study Characteristics	The effect of credibility and proportionality of commitment inputs upon the development of relational social norms, opportunism, and long-term commitment intentions is studied.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reciprocal or joint commitment inputs can lead to stable long-term relationships through aligning participants' incentive structures and enhancing their confidence in each other. • Asymmetries in commitment result in unsatisfactory relationships because the more committed party is vulnerable to opportunism by the less committed party. The less committed party is more willing to abandon the relationship and less willing to reciprocate sacrifices made by the committed party. • Matching commitments align incentives toward parity, whereas disproportionate commitments lead to contrary incentives and motives. A more committed party may become vulnerable to opportunism, whereas a less committed partner may be tempted to exploit its advantage, especially under adverse market conditions. • Higher stakes in a relationship are associated with the development of relational social norms. When parties pledge significant resources, they develop a vested interest in preserving and cultivating a relationship. Relational norms act to provide social safeguards and promote further commitment • Relational norms yield the requisite social safeguards that enable parties to feel confident in their future commitment intentions. The malleable and enduring nature of this form of governance compared to other approaches (i.e., law) is

		<p>especially conducive to exchanges requiring long-term commitments.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opportunistic inclinations arise because of disproportionate commitment structures in exchange relationships. Where opportunism occurs, relational sentiments and climate are undermined. Partners are less likely to exhibit solidarity and mutuality or behave in a flexible and compromising manner. • Distributors often made financial investments in manufacturer RandD projects and next period production runs to secure inventory (partly because distributors held somewhat greater financial resources relative to their operational needs in the early periods of the simulation). By contrast, manufacturer commitment inputs involved brand design intentions, RandD projects, advertising copy/media strategies, and preferential terms of trade. These commitments were relatively more redeployable than distributor commitments.
17	Abstract	<p>Commitment is an essential part of successful long-term relationships. Whereas commitments by both parties in an exchange can provide the foundation for development of relational social norms, disproportionate commitments can lead to opportunism by the less committed partner. Longitudinal effects of the credibility of long-term commitment intentions, relational social norms, and opportunism in one time period on commitment inputs and long-term commitment intentions in later periods are investigated. Data gathered from a behavioural simulation suggest that: 1. credibility of commitment inputs in exchange is positively related to the development of relational social norms, 2. relational social norms may be undermined by opportunistic conduct, and 3. presence of relational social norms in one time period is positively related to commitment inputs and long-term commitment intentions in later periods.</p>
18	Key words	Long term commitment; relational social norms; opportunism;
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); commitment; relational social norms
22	Configuration Elements	Network; IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 57

01	Author of the article	Heide, Jan B. // John, George
02	Title of the article	Do norms matter in marketing relationships?
03	Document name	Heide and John, 1992
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing
05	Date of publication	1992
06	Volume	56
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	32-44
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Standard Industrial Code 35, 36 and 37
12	Sample size	60 industrial buyers and suppliers
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis including confirmatory factor analysis and multiple regression
15	Study Characteristics	This study proposes that the presence of alternative normative structures may actually enhance an organisation's ability to structure a relationship in accordance with transaction cost prescriptions.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific assets do not have a universally positive effect on vertical control. A positive impact of specific assets is contingent on the presence of relational norms. • A limitation of the transaction cost framework is highlighted, namely a preoccupation with the conditions that motivate an organisation to structure relationships in a particular way without specifying the mechanisms that provide the ability to implement the desired structures. Relational norms can provide the ability to implement the desired structures, though accounting for their presence requires an extension of the behavioural assumptions on which the transaction cost framework is built. • Organisations should focus on efficiency rather than control in a relationship. This is contrary to the key normative guidelines that follows from Porter's analysis that organisations should acquire the maximum amount of control in a relationship and conversely, to the extent possible, to avoid relinquishing control. • Power in an exchange relationship can be used by an organisation as a mechanism to structure exchange relationships in the desired way. A dominant partner in terms of bargaining power can extract safeguards for specific investments. • It does not suffice to place markets and hierarchies at the ends

		of a continuum and interpolate between them. Underpinnings of such quasi market modes differ fundamentally from both markets and hierarchies. Normative structure is one aspect that must be attended to more closely in analyzing such cases.
17	Abstract	Transaction cost analysis is rapidly becoming an important analytical paradigm in marketing. However, the accumulation of transaction cost studies has been accompanied by a growing body of criticism, primarily directed toward its underlying behavioural norm of opportunism. That norm is a serious analytical deficiency, not only because it may be descriptively inaccurate, but also because it limits the applicability of the analytical framework. The authors show that norms play a very significant role in structuring economically efficient relationships between independent organisations. In the absence of supportive norms, it is not possible for parties whose specific assets are at risk to acquire vertical control as per the transaction cost prescription. Instead, those parties lose control because of their dependence. An empirical test of the conceptual model in a sample of manufacturer-supplier relationships shows good support for the authors' hypotheses.
18	Key words	Transaction cost; opportunism; relational norms; organisational studies; governance.
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); relational norms; power; exchange relationships
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Relationship (Exchange)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross-sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 58

01	Author of the article	Heide, Jane B. // Miner, Anne S.
02	Title of the article	The shadow of the future: Effects of anticipated interaction and frequency of contact on buyer-seller cooperation
03	Document name	Heide and Miner, 1992
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Journal
05	Date of publication	1992
06	Volume	35
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	265-291
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Standard Industrial Code 35, 36 and 37
12	Sample size	136 industrial buyers and suppliers (including 60 OEMs)
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis including confirmatory factor analysis and multiple regression
15	Study Characteristics	This study is focused on the effects of anticipated future interaction on interorganisational cooperation. The purpose in this inquiry was twofold: a) to add to the understanding of interorganisational cooperation; b) to explore further the potential value of interactive models in the systematic study of IORs.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extendedness in a relationship will have a positive effect on the level of cooperation between two interacting organisations in a Prisoner's Dilemma context. • The greater the number of likely future interactions, the less important is the payoff in a current period relative to the number of potential opportunities for reward or retaliation, and the lower is the relative risk of current cooperation. • In an asymmetrical relationship, the dependency may not be reciprocal, so that one partner has power over the other but not vice versa. In that case, exploitation rather than cooperation might result. • If degree of boundedness is asymmetric, the more dependent party may "cooperate" because the other party demands it. Such a pattern of apparent cooperation by the weaker party can be seen as compliance rather than cooperation. • Organisations learn about each other over time but adopt stable patterns of either cooperation or defection, so that relationship length would have no simple overall main effect on cooperation. • Ambiguity in performance evaluation will have a negative effect on the level of cooperation between two organisations interacting in a Prisoner's Dilemma context.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A organisation's immediate payoff is (1) highest if the organisation defects while the other cooperates, (2) next highest when there is joint cooperation, (3) next highest when there is joint defection, and (4) lowest if the organisation cooperates while the other defects.
17	Abstract	<p>This research examined cooperation between 136 industrial buyers and suppliers. We identified four domains of potential cooperation: flexibility, information exchange, shared problem solving, and restraint in the use of power. Using an iterated games framework, we predicted that (1) anticipated open-ended future interaction, or extendedness, and (2) frequency of contact will increase the chances that a pattern of cooperative behaviour will occur, but (3) performance ambiguity will decrease such chances. Regression analysis results indicated that extendedness and frequency are associated with joint cooperation. Neither simple structural theories of cooperation nor interactive models stressing commitment would fully predict these results, which support the potential value of interactive perspectives on interorganisational cooperation in particular and on IORs in general.</p>
18	Key words	Power; interorganisational cooperation; flexibility; information exchange; shared problem solving; restraint; structural theories
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and Informal (explicit); coordination; cooperation
22	Configuration Elements	IORs;
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing IOR
24	Unit of analysis	Inter-organisational relationship
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 59

01	Author of the article	Heide, Jan B.
02	Title of the article	Interorganisational governance in marketing channels
03	Document name	Heide, 1994
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing
05	Date of publication	1994
06	Volume	58
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	71-85
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Standard Industrial Code 35, 36 and 37
12	Sample size	60 industrial buyers and suppliers
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis including confirmatory factor analysis and multiple regression
15	Study Characteristics	This article draws on a number of analytical perspectives on inter-organisational governance to develop a formal typology of approaches to relationship management. It proposes that nonmarket governance is a heterogeneous phenomenon and different relationship management strategies are appropriate under different conditions.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business relationships can be organized in a unilateral fashion, by means of an authority structure that provides one exchange partner with the ability to develop rules, give instructions, and in effect impose decisions on the other. • The ability to govern by means of authority is not limited to intra-organisation settings, but also can be achieved between organisations by means of contractual provisions, which essentially "produce the effects of hierarchies". • For dependence to give rise to a bilateral pattern of interaction both parties somehow must be locked into the relationship. Bilateral structures can be crafted purposely in relationships between parties who possess inherently individual orientations. This can be accomplished by crafting a self-enforcing agreement or an incentive structure that makes the expected gains from maintaining the relationship exceed the potential short-term gains from opportunism or defection. • Unilateral dependence creates a safeguarding problem, which requires that mechanisms be designed explicitly to reduce the exposure to opportunism. Unilateral governance can be implemented in such a situation by means of explicit contractual provisions that simulate the effects of organisational hierarchies.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nonmarket governance is a heterogeneous phenomenon, which can be accomplished in a unilateral and a bilateral fashion. These exchange problems can be handled through "hard" or "soft" contracting, respectively.
17	Abstract	<p>Relationship management rapidly is becoming a central research paradigm in the marketing channels literature. A growing body of conceptual and empirical literature addresses different aspects of IORs, building in part on recent analytical developments in organisation theory, law, and economics. However, some of these analytical frameworks make radically different assumptions about the nature of IORs, although these differences to date have not been examined systematically in the marketing literature. These analytical perspectives are reviewed, and a formal typology of approaches to relationship management is developed. Specifically, typologies of 3 different forms of governance, which vary systematically in terms of how specific inter-organisational processes are carried out, are developed. The antecedents of different relationship forms are discussed, and the results of a preliminary empirical test are presented.</p>
18	Key words	<p>Studies; relations; organisation theory; models; marketing; interdepartmental; corporate governance; organisational behaviour; market research.</p>
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); contracts (soft and hard)
22	Configuration Elements	IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing relationship
24	Unit of analysis	Relationship (inter-organisational)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 60

01	Author of the article	Hill, Charles, W.L.
02	Title of the article	Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: Implications for Transaction Cost Theory
03	Document name	Hill, 1990
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Review
05	Date of publication	1990
06	Volume	15
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	500-513
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study demonstrates that, over time, the invisible hand of market favours actors whose behavioural repertoires are biased towards cooperation, rather than opportunism. When the state of equilibrium is reached the population of economic actors will contain only those whose behavioural repertoires are biased towards cooperation.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is best to act opportunistically for the last move because there is no future influence. • On the next-to-last move neither player will have an incentive to cooperate and trust because each once can anticipate opportunistic action by the other on the final move. • Reputation has an economic value that plays an important part in determining the willingness of others to enter into an exchange with a given actor who has a questionable reputation. • If avoidance of a party with tarnished image is not viable, other actors will demand that the potentially opportunistic party absorb bonding costs when they enter into an exchange with an actor of questionable reputation. These bonding and monitoring costs absorb much of the composite quasai rent that is inherent in the exchange, reducing the economic value generated from any investment in specialized assets. • The invisible hand of market will delete opportunistic actors when the focal exchange is characterized by substantial asset-specificity investments and high switching costs (i.e. market is not competitive).
17	Abstract	Transaction cost theorists have generally neglected to consider

		the implications that the invisible hand of the market mechanism can have for the risk of opportunism. In the long run, the invisible hand deletes actors whose behaviours are habitually opportunistic. Consequently, as markets move towards the state of competitive equilibrium, the risk of opportunism will be low, even for transactions supported by specific asset investment. Therefore, in many contexts, the transaction cost rationale for internationalization has been overstated.
18	Key words	Transaction cost; opportunism; market mechanism; asset specificity; game theory; prisoner's dilemma; reputation.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and Informal (explicit); reputation
22	Configuration Elements	Networks
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 61

01	Author of the article	Hillman, Amy J. // Withers, Michael C. // Collins, Brian J.
02	Title of the article	Resource dependency theory: A review
03	Document name	Hillman et al., 2009
04	Journal title	Journal of Management
05	Date of publication	2009
06	Volume	35
07	Number	6
08	Page numbers	1404-1427
09	Paper Type	Literature Review
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This literature review is focused towards the resource dependence theory (RDT) logic for engaging in the focal strategies, the current state of empirical testing of RDT, and how research in these areas extends the RDT perspective.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Board of directors can bring four benefits to organisations: advice and counsel, channels of information flow, preferential access to resources, and legitimacy. • The dynamic nature of boards (i.e., changing composition as environmental needs change) appears to be a nearly normative convention, although this has received little empirical testing. • Organisation, through political mechanisms, attempt to create for themselves an environment that is better for their own interest. They may use political means to alter the condition of the external economic environment. In doing so, organisations actively seek to create their environment by trying to shape government regulations that produce a more favorable environment. • Organisations heavily dependent on the government are more likely to engage in political activity. As regulatory agency dependency increases (the agency controls more of the organisation's financial resources), managers are more favorably disposed toward political activity. • Managers perceive government as one of most difficult environmental dependencies to control because of the heterogeneous interests of different agencies and political decision makers. • Organisations who are more dependent on the government will engage in political action; the financial benefits accrue to those

		<p>that create co-optive linkages.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poor organisation performance may be attributed to a misalignment of organisational behaviour with the environment. Replacing the CEO with someone capable of coping with the critical problems facing the organisation may remedy this misalignment. • As environmental uncertainty increases, years of business unit tenure decreases for individuals selected as general managers. In these instances, experience from a single organisation is viewed to be less relevant than diverse, extra organisational experiences in a highly uncertain environment. • Companies in dire financial situation were more likely to hire an outside CEO than their healthier counterparts. • Resource scarcity and intra-organisational political activity shape the post succession environment so the successor's role is well defined. With scarce resources, impact of successors' actions will be much less ambiguous than when resources are abundant.
17	Abstract	<p>Thirty years have passed since Pfeffer and Salancik's seminal work on (RDT). During this time RDT has been applied broadly across the research domain to explain how organisations reduce environmental interdependence and uncertainty. In this review, the authors assess the conceptual development, empirical research, and application of RDT. They structure their review around the five options that Pfeffer and Salancik propose organisations can enact to minimize environmental dependences: (a) mergers/vertical integration, (b) joint ventures and other IORs, (c) boards of directors, (d) political action, and (e) executive succession. Authors summarize past work, synthesize contemporary thought, and propose future research directions.</p>
18	Key words	Resource dependence, boards of directors, organisation linkages.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Resource Dependency Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (implicit); interdependence; IORs
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; joint ventures; vertical integration
23	Relationship Directionality	NA
24	Unit of analysis	NA
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 62

01	Author of the article	Shostack, Lynn G.
02	Title of the article	How to design a service
03	Document name	Shostack, 1982
04	Journal title	European Journal of Marketing
05	Date of publication	1982
06	Volume	16
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	49-63
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This paper highlights that ‘ <i>what</i> ’ is being marketed is often a complex combination of products and services. The first step towards rational service design is to develop a system - known as service blueprint - which will allow the structure of a service to be mapped in an objective and explicit manner to capture all the essential functions to which marketing applies.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The difference between products and services is that products are tangible objects that exist in both time and space; services consist solely of acts or processes, and exist in time only. • The basic distinction between "things" and "processes" is the starting point for a focused investigation of services. Services are rendered; products are possessed. Services cannot be possessed; they can only be experienced, created or participated in. • A marketer must be aware of and have a method for both setting and tracking the deviation tolerance of a service; that is, the degree to which the kinetic execution of the service can or will be allowed to vary from the blueprint. • Since a service is basically a process, service blueprinting rests on systems that have been developed to deal with processes, acts and flows. Three systems are relevant: time/motion or methods engineering; project programming; and computer systems and software design. • A service blue print provides both a visual and a quantitative description of any <i>service</i> element that is more precise than verbal definitions and less subject to interpretation or misinterpretation. • A service blueprint establishes a permanent benchmark against which execution can be measured, modification proposals analyzed, competitors compared, prices

		<p>established and cogent promotional plans developed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A service blueprint allows a service to be created on paper. Rather than resorting to subjective and imprecise concept testing as a means of service development, an actual blueprint can be tested, in which the proposed service has been thoroughly and specifically worked out.
17	Abstract	<p>Effective service marketing requires recognition of the complex combination of products and services which make up a simple service. Molecular modelling approaches product/service combinations comprehensively, offering a visual framework for the relationships of products and services. A change in any aspect of the product/service configuration produces a change in the overall configuration. After determining the position of a service in the molecular model, the marketer develops a service blueprint based on time/motion engineering, project scheduling, identification of service functions, and establishment of tolerance levels. The blueprint serves as a visual representation of the service which can be tested, altered, and retested. It also provides a framework for assessing modification proposals, competition, and consumer needs.</p>
18	Key words	Product development; models; marketing; functions; services; design.
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	NA
22	Configuration Elements	Relationship (inter-organisational)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing relationship
24	Unit of analysis	Organisation
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 63

01	Author of the article	Hu, Jersan // Tsai, Yafang
02	Title of the article	Paradigms of derived exchange value effects in market networks
03	Document name	Hu and Tsai, 2007
04	Journal title	Industrial Marketing Management
05	Date of publication	2007
06	Volume	36
07	Number	5
08	Page numbers	636-650
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	Taiwan
11	Context/Industry	Public health insurance
12	Sample size	5 interviews and secondary archival data.
13	Data collection method	Face-to-face interviews
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This investigation conducts an in-depth inquiry of relational exchange behaviours and their derived exchange effects on B2B exchanges in the Taiwanese National Health Insurance system.
16	Key findings	<p>The interaction between organisations involves exchanging required value as management resources from one another. The exchange value includes economic value, social value, technical value, and knowledge value.</p> <p>The inter-organisational exchange value could be delivered to the other party through the specific exchange. The value of the specific exchange between organisations should be transferred down-stream and may simultaneously transfer the offering value. Meanwhile, the previous exchange value could influence the related succeeding exchange.</p> <p>The derived exchange value between organisations could positively or negatively affect the succeeding exchanges; and it would also be influenced which originate from the previous exchange.</p> <p>Previous exchange behaviours can affect either or both focal exchangers. Therefore, the derived effect can be unilateral or bilateral impact.</p> <p>The transfer relationships of focal exchange value may affect one another. Hence, the relationships of derived effect can be open type or circuit type.</p> <p>The derived effect of exchange value between organisations can be: (1) unilateral open type; (2) unilateral circuit type; (3) bilateral open type; (4) bilateral circuit type of exchange networks.</p>
17	Abstract	Customer consumption value ultimately derives from enterprise production the consumption benefits which originating from inter-organisational cooperation as well as the transferred and

		accumulated exchange value of the enterprise with external organisations. This study plans to clarify the effect of the derived exchange relationship on enterprise exchange value, and also to identify the network models of different derived effect relationships. An analysis of the Taiwanese public health system revealed both positive and negative exchange value effects that impacted relationships among actors in the overall health system. Four generic models were presented by analyzing the qualitative data from phenomenon of different types of inter-organisational exchange behaviours, and other more complex models deduced from four generic models were also proposed
18	Key words	Relationship marketing; Business network; Business to business marketing; Business marketing; Industrial marketing
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); relational exchange behaviour
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individuals
26	Research perspective	Cross-sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 64

01	Author of the article	Human, Sherrie E. // Provan, Keith G.
02	Title of the article	An emergent theory of structure and outcomes in small-organisation strategic manufacturing networks
03	Document name	Human and Provan, 1997
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Journal
05	Date of publication	1997
06	Volume	40
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	368-403
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case Study)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Wood products; metal working; and apparel industry
12	Sample size	2 networks in secondary wood-products industry comprising organisations that manufacture furniture. Total number of organisations is 42 (19 organisations in first network; 23 organisations in second network).
13	Data collection method	Exploratory interviews; telephonic interviews; closed question surveys; articles and network reports. Data collected twice with a gap of two years – longitudinal study.
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive research and network analysis methodologies.
15	Study Characteristics	This study offers evidence that the structure of SME networks is important for network effectiveness primarily as a way of facilitating interactions among organisations that are committed to the network concept. It demonstrates that IORs within purposefully constructed SMEs are unique and that network involvement can yield positive results that are not likely for non-network organisations.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organisations in small-to-medium-sized-enterprise strategic networks are likely to achieve a broad range of favourable transactional and transformational outcomes as a result of their network involvement. Transactional outcomes are most likely to be consistent across SME networks, whereas transformational outcomes are likely to vary across networks. • Organisations in small-to-medium-sized-enterprise strategic networks are more likely than market (non-network member) organisations to obtain outcomes related to increasing interorganisational exchanges of friendship, information, business, and competencies and increasing organisational credibility and access to resources. • Small-to-medium-sized-enterprise network structure can be explained by the domain similarity of the organisations that compose a network. Specifically, a domain- similar network is likely to have a strong central administrative structure and

		<p>an interactive structure of high density within which multiple organisations are central. A network having relatively low domain similarity is likely to have a moderately weak central administrative structure and a low-density interactive structure with few central organisations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For domain-similar organisations, numerous transactional and transformational outcomes will occur when a small-to-medium-sized-enterprise network's administration is central and active in network-wide coordination and when network interactive structure is dense and decentralized. • For organisations having low domain similarity, numerous transactional (but not transformational) outcomes will occur when a small-to-medium-sized-enterprise network's administration is central and active in interactions with individual member organisations and when inter-organisational exchange density is low but centralized.
17	Abstract	<p>A study compares 2 networks of small- to medium-sized manufacturing enterprises in the US wood products industry. Qualitative and survey data were collected from a sample of active participants in each network as well as from a sample of organisations that were not network members (market organisations) in the same industry. Using both qualitative and network analysis methodologies, a model is developed, as well as testable propositions concerning key aspects of network structure and outcomes.</p>
18	Key words	Organisational studies; comparative analysis; alliances; wood products; networks; structures
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (implicit); formal administrative structure;
22	Configuration Elements	Network; structure; IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 65

01	Author of the article	Human, Sherrie E. // Provan, Keith G.
02	Title of the article	Legitimacy Building in the evolution of small networks – Study of success and demise
03	Document name	Human and Provan, 2000
04	Journal title	Administrative Science Quarterly
05	Date of publication	2000
06	Volume	45
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	327-365
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Wood products; metal working; and apparel industry
12	Sample size	2 networks in secondary wood-products industry comprising organisations that manufacture furniture. Total number of organisations is 42 (19 organisations in first network; 23 organisations in second network).
13	Data collection method	Exploratory interviews; telephonic interviews; closed question surveys; articles and network reports. Data collected twice with a gap of two years – longitudinal study.
14	Method of data analysis	Socio-metric analysis using UCINET software
15	Study Characteristics	This study focus on the ways in which multilateral networks of small and medium-sized manufacturing organisations form, grow, and ultimately move toward either sustainment or demise, focusing on how legitimacy is built as networks evolve.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multilateral networks build legitimacy along three key dimensions: network as form, network as entity, and network as interaction. • Legitimacy building during network formation will emphasize legitimizing the network as form and network as entity, regardless of the network's strategic orientation. • The overall strategic orientation of the network for building legitimacy that emerges during network formation will reflect the needs and interests of the dominant stakeholders in the pre-network organisational field. • Networks adopting either an inside-out or an outside-in legitimacy building strategy during network formation will maintain that strategic orientation during early network growth. • During early growth, networks with an inside-out strategic orientation will primarily emphasize legitimizing the network as interaction and the network as entity. Legitimacy of the network as entity will depend on the ability of the NAO to work closely with member organisations to establish a

		<p>recognizable network identity.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • During early growth, networks with an outside-in strategic orientation will emphasize building legitimacy of the network as interaction significantly less than networks with an inside-out orientation. • For networks to be successful in moving from early growth into sustainment, the legitimacy of the network as form, the network as entity, and the network as interaction must all be established. • Networks having an inside-out strategic orientation are more likely to establish the legitimacy of the network as interaction than networks having an outside-in strategy. • Networks seeking long-term sustainment must adopt a dual legitimacy-building strategy, emphasizing both outside-in and inside-out strategies, although not necessarily equally, if legitimacy across all three dimensions is to be maintained.
17	Abstract	<p>This article reports a longitudinal examination and comparison of 2 multilateral networks of small and medium-sized organisations in the US wood-products manufacturing industry. The research focused on how each of these networks built legitimacy over the course of their early evolution, from the pre-network field, to initial formation and growth, and toward sustainment, culminating in the success of one and the demise of the other. The findings demonstrate that despite differences in their early bases of support, which resulted in very different strategic emphases, the 2 networks ultimately had to address 3 conceptually distinct dimensions of legitimacy - the network as form, the network as entity, and the network as interaction. Based on the findings, specific propositions are developed and some tentative conclusions drawn about how legitimacy is established in multilateral networks and how the failure to build legitimacy across the 3 dimensions may lead to network collapse.</p>
18	Key words	Organisational structure; organisational behaviour; alliances; studies; wood products
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (implicit); formal administrative structure;
22	Configuration Elements	Network; structure; IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 66

01	Author of the article	Humphries, Andrew S. // Wilding, Richard D.
02	Title of the article	Long term collaborative business relationships: The impact of trust and C3 behaviour
03	Document name	Humphries and Wilding, 2004
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing Management
05	Date of publication	2004
06	Volume	20
07	Number	9
08	Page numbers	1107-1122
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Mixed methods)
10	Geographical Location	UK
11	Context/Industry	Defence industry (procurement)
12	Sample size	54 monopolistic B2B relationships
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis combined with statistical analysis for data triangulation.
15	Study Characteristics	This study investigates the relationship between trust, C3 behaviour (cooperation, coordination and collaboration), and relationship success.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repeated cycles of exchange, risk-taking and successful fulfillment of expectations strengthen willingness of parties to rely upon each other and expand the relationship, producing a virtuous circle that can be developed and promoted. • Over time, trust supported by credible actions is likely to establish a virtuous circle of ever-improving business-to-business relationship performance. • Lack of co-operative behaviour reduces the growth of trust and therefore the chances of achieving interdependence and equitable outcomes. These include: adversarial commercial attitudes and practices, inadequate investment in specific assets such as work force stability and product/process development, the use of inappropriate performance measures, opportunistically providing poor goods and services and, using proprietary information as a weapon, • Strong counterbalancing, positive business drivers produce examples of relationship-building specific investments, co-operative behaviour, open communications and a desire to reduce the burden of governance through more equitable, long-term arrangements. • There will inevitably be a reduction in freedom of independent action which may affect the perceived quality of the relationship. • It is important to reduce the impact of environmental

		<p>influences that cause frustration and generate negative behaviour. These include: traditional commercial attitudes, lack of long-term funding for projects and lack of investment in process improvements.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Synchronized objectives, pursuing joint approaches to service and product delivery, lowering costs and risks and promoting measures to support the growth of trust appear to be the best ways of mitigating negative influences. • Political acceptance of the lack of choice within long-term collaborations, selecting appropriate governance modes (contractual or relational) and being prepared to change them over time as circumstances evolved, promote building of trust. • Interaction of trust and C3 Behaviour in the Relationship Success Cycle indicates that a structured approach to improving relationships should be planned. • Organisations should attempt small co-operative projects that improve efficiency because these are perceived as being non-threatening; discussions about costs should be left until some maturity has been achieved
17	Abstract	<p>Long-term, collaborative business relationships are like marriages where tolerance, forbearance and some reduction of freedom as well as innovation are necessary to ensure success. Trust and cooperative behaviours are known to be essential ingredients in securing an environment of continuous improvement but, how they are correlated has yet to be tested. The paper describes a research project within a sample of long-term monopoly businesses as a novel approach to bringing trust and cooperation, coordination and collaboration (C3 Behaviour) into sharper focus without competitive distractions. It was found that a correlation between trust and C3 Behaviour and the success of the collaborative relationship exists.</p>
18	Key words	Trust; cooperation; coordination; collaboration; relationships; defence industry; procurement
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); trust; cooperation; coordination; collaboration
22	Configuration Elements	IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing relationships
24	Unit of analysis	Relationships (inter-organisational)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 67

01	Author of the article	Inkpen, Andrew C. // Curral, Steven C.
02	Title of the article	The co-evolution of trust, control, and learning in joint ventures
03	Document name	Inkpen and Curral, 2004
04	Journal title	Organisation Science
05	Date of publication	2004
06	Volume	15
07	Number	5
08	Page numbers	586-599
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	The main theme of this paper is that joint venture trust, control, and learning are key concepts that co-evolve over time. The level of inter-organisational trust is a determinant of the structures and control mechanisms that evolve in a joint venture.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clearly defined joint venture collaborative objectives foster the initial development of trust between the joint venture partners • The greater the initial level of trust between joint venture partners, the lower the initial joint venture monitoring and control costs by the partners and the greater the initial reliance on social controls. • The more extensive the use of formal controls, the slower the development of trust. • In the initial stages of a joint venture, controls that create structural assurance beliefs will foster the development of trust between partner managers. • The greater the initial control one partner has over the joint venture, the greater the likelihood that the other partner will act opportunistically. • Repeated transactions between the joint venture partners that are viewed as successful will lead to increased inter-organisational trust. • Learning about the joint venture partner increases the likelihood that partner organisations will reduce their emphasis on formal joint venture controls. • If learning by one partner leads to a perceived shift in partner bargaining power, then there is increased likelihood that formal controls will be more emphasized.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Learning by one partner that leads to increased dependence on the other partner to perform joint venture tasks increases the likelihood that the learning partner will increase its desire for social controls. • Trust between joint venture partners will moderate the relationship between shifts in bargaining power and joint venture stability: High trust will decrease the likelihood that shifts in bargaining power will result in joint venture instability; low trust will increase the likelihood that shifts in bargaining power will result in joint venture instability.
17	Abstract	<p>This article examines the evolution of trust, control, and learning in a joint venture relationship. Using a co-evolutionary approach, we develop a framework that shows how initial joint venture conditions give way to evolved conditions as joint venture partners develop an understanding of each other and adjust the collaborative process. We explore the relationship between trust and control in joint ventures and identify how these two critical concepts impact joint venture processes. Trust, along with partner collaborative objectives, creates the initial climate that shapes partner interactions. These interactions lead to subsequent decisions about the nature of controls. We then examine linkages between alliance learning and the trust and control concepts, and argue that learning processes are central to evolving joint venture dynamics. Once the joint venture is formed, and if the initial conditions support continued collaboration, then learning processes will be central to evolving alliance dynamics. As initial conditions give way to evolved conditions, learning and trust will co-evolve and impact decisions about control. Propositions linking the concepts are provided as guides for future empirical research.</p>
18	Key words	Co-evolution; trust; control; learning; joint ventures
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (explicit); trust; control; learning
22	Configuration Elements	Joint Ventures; alliances; IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing relationships
24	Unit of analysis	Relationships (inter-organisational)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 68

01	Author of the article	Inkpen, Andrew C. // Beamish, Paul W.
02	Title of the article	Knowledge, bargaining power, and the instability of international joint ventures
03	Document name	Inkpen et al., 1997
04	Journal title	The Academy of Management Review
05	Date of publication	1997
06	Volume	22
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	177-202
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	The focus of this paper is towards the instability that results from factors endogenous to the international joint ventures (IJV) relationship. This study demonstrates that the instability of IJV is associated with shifts in partner bargaining power.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To achieve stability, a local partner should take the following steps: 1) discourage the foreign partner from sending large numbers of managers to the venture. 2) continue to actively invest in local knowledge; 3) should not treat its knowledge contributions passively, but it should continue to upgrade the value of the knowledge to the foreign partner; and 4) consider the track records of potential partners, particularly how long other IJVs that they were a part of have survived. • When knowledge acquisition shifts the balance of bargaining power between partners, the cooperative basis for the JV may erode, and venture instability may result. • When a JV is international and the foreign partner seeks to expand its geographic scope of operations, the local partner's knowledge of local economic, political, and cultural environments will be a key contribution to the JV. • Once the venture is formed, if the foreign partner attaches a high value to the acquisition of local knowledge and has the ability to acquire the knowledge, the probability of JV instability increases. • Once the foreign partner has acquired local knowledge, unless the local partner is contributing other valuable and non-imitable skills to the JV, the rationale for cooperation will be eliminated.

17	Abstract	Although the high rate of instability of international joint ventures (IJV) has been well documented, the underlying reasons for the instability need clarification. A paper develops an analytical framework for instability of IJVs grounded in a bargaining power and dependence perspective. Instability is defined as a major change in partner relationship status that is unplanned and premature from one or both partners' perspectives. Shifts in the balance of bargaining power occur when partners of an IJV acquire sufficient knowledge and skills to eliminate a partner dependency and make the IJV bargain obsolete. The primary focus is on the acquisition of local knowledge by the foreign partner and the impact that this acquisition of knowledge has on the stability of the IJV.
18	Key words	International joint ventures; rate of instability; bargaining power; organisational behaviour.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (explicit); power
22	Configuration Elements	International joint ventures; alliances; IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing relationships
24	Unit of analysis	Relationships (inter-organisational)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 69

01	Author of the article	Jones, Candace // Hesterley, Ailliam S. // Borgatti, Stephan P.
02	Title of the article	A general theory of network governance: Exchange conditions and social mechanism
03	Document name	Jones et al., 1997
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Review
05	Date of publication	1997
06	Volume	22
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	911-945
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	By integrating TCE and SNT, this study provides a framework to identify conditions under which network governance will emerge and social mechanisms that allow network governance to coordinate and safeguard customized exchanges in rapidly changing markets.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interaction of exchange conditions—demand uncertainty with stable inputs, customized goods/services requiring high levels of human asset specificity, complex tasks requiring diverse specialists, and frequent exchanges—promotes structural embeddedness among exchange parties. • Structural embeddedness provides basis for social mechanisms to coordinate, and safeguard exchanges; its presence enhances likelihood of network governance emerging and thriving in rapidly changing markets for complex, customized tasks. • Restricted access: a) reduces coordination costs of customized, complex exchanges; b) enhances the likelihood of network governance emerging and thriving in rapidly changing markets for complex, customized tasks; c) enhances safeguarding of customized exchanges in rapidly changing markets; and d) enhances likelihood of network governance emerging in rapidly changing markets for complex, customized tasks. • The presence of macro culture reduces coordination costs for customized, complex exchanges. Macro culture enhances likelihood of network governance emerging and thriving in rapidly changing markets for complex, customized tasks. • Reputations enhance safeguarding of customized exchanges.

		<p>The more important reputations are, the greater the likelihood of network governance emerging and thriving in rapidly changing markets for complex, customized tasks.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple social mechanisms of restricted access, macro-culture, collective sanctions, and reputation interact to decrease coordination costs of and to enhance safeguarding of customized exchanges. As more of these social mechanisms are used, likelihood of network governance emerging and thriving is enhanced for overseeing complex, customized tasks in rapidly changing markets. • The congruent content of social mechanisms influences the coordination costs and the safeguarding of complex, customized exchanges. The more congruent the content of multiple social mechanisms for collaboration and sharing of information, greater the likelihood of network governance emerging and thriving in rapidly changing markets for complex, customized tasks.
17	Abstract	<p>A phenomenon of last 20 years has been rapid rise of the research on governance. This governance form has received significant scholarly attention, but, to date, no comprehensive theory for it has been advanced, and no sufficiently detailed and analytically consistent definition has appeared. Our objective is to provide a theory that explains under what conditions network governance has comparative advantage and is therefore likely to emerge and thrive. Our theory integrates TCE and SNT and asserts that net Data Extraction Form Number of governance is a response to exchange conditions of asset specificity, demand uncertainty, task complexity, and frequency. Exchange conditions drive organisations toward structurally embedding their transactions, which enables organisations to use social mechanisms for coordinating and safeguarding exchanges. Network governance form has advantages over both hierarchy and market solutions in simultaneously adapting, coordinating, and safeguarding exchanges.</p>
18	Key words	Network; governance; transaction cost economics, social network theory; asset specificity
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics; Social Network Theory;
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); social mechanism; coordination; safeguard of exchanges
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; inter-organisational exchange relationships
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 70

01	Author of the article	Kilduff, Martin // Brass, Daniel J.
02	Title of the article	Organisational Social Network Research: Core Ideas and Key Debates
03	Document name	Kilduff and Brass, 2010
04	Journal title	The Academy of Management Annals
05	Date of publication	2010
06	Volume	4
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	317-357
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	<p>This study argues that there are four interrelated leading ideas that have generated influential debates and empirical work: an emphasis on relations between actors, a recognition of the embeddedness of exchange in social relations, a belief in the structural patterning of social life, and an emphasis on the social utility of network connections. These four leading ideas are at the core of the social network research program and have evolved over time from intellectual traditions in psychology, anthropology, and sociology.</p>
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actors are embedded within a network to the extent that they show a preference for repeat transactions with network members and to the extent that social ties are forged, renewed, and even extended through community rather than through actors outside community. • The denser the network, the more redundancy there is in terms of paths along which information and influence can flow between any two actors. • Networks with high density tend to be ones in which norms concerning the proper way to behave are “clearer, more firmly held and easier to enforce”. • In the competitive evolution of the structural perspective different kinds of relationships can have different effects, especially if one considers negative ties. Similar structural patterns may result in different outcomes when the content of the relationships is considered. • Tie strength is a function of time, intimacy, emotional intensity, and reciprocity. Strong-tie networks (at the

		<p>interpersonal level) are likely to be dense networks because people who have friends in common tend to become friends themselves.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social structure can dominate motivation in the sense that although close friends may be more interested than acquaintances in helping and strong ties may be necessary for the effective transfer of knowledge, it is likely to be acquaintances who have more useful information concerning new jobs or scarce services • Fault lines between different clusters tend to emerge over time, either through default processes such as a preference for interaction with similar others, through processes of active recruitment of friends and kin that can occur beneath the radar of management attention, or with the active encouragement of management.
17	Abstract	<p>Given the growing popularity of the social network perspective across diverse organisational subject areas, this review examines the coherence of the research tradition (in terms of leading ideas from which the diversity of new research derives) and appraises current directions and controversies. The leading ideas at the heart of the organisational social network research program include: an emphasis on relations between actors; the embeddedness of exchange in social relations; the assumption that dyadic relationships do not occur in isolation, but rather form a complex structural pattern of connectivity and cleavage beyond the dyad; and the belief that social network connections matter in terms of outcomes to both actors and groups of actors across a range of indicators. These leading ideas are articulated in current debates that center on issues of actor characteristics, agency, cognition, cooperation versus competition, and boundary specification. To complement the review, we provide a glossary of social network terms.</p>
18	Key words	Studies; social networks; organisation theory; social interaction.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; IORs; embeddedness; tie strength; density; clusters
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 71

01	Author of the article	Kim, Yusoon // Choi, Thomas Y. // Yan, Tingting // Dooley, Kevin
02	Title of the article	Structural investigation of supply networks: A social network analysis approach
03	Document name	Kim et al., 2010
04	Journal title	Journal of Operations Management
05	Date of publication	2010
06	Volume	29
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	194-211
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Mixed methods)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Automotive industry
12	Sample size	Six supply networks - three based on directional materials flow and three based on non-directional contractual relationships.
13	Data collection method	Inductive case study approach based on data collected by Choi and Hong (2002)
14	Method of data analysis	Social network analysis using UCINET 6 - a comprehensive software package for conducting the structural analysis of interorganisational networks.
15	Study Characteristics	This study demonstrates that SNA concepts are particularly suitable for studying how patterns of IORs in a supply network translate to competitive advantages through management of materials movement and diffusion of information.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organisations with high in-degree centrality should focus on developing a capability in system integration or product architectural innovation. Organisations with high betweenness centrality may be in a better position to engage in supply risk management. • Key organisations in a materials flow network can have a considerable effect on the operational quality of overall supply network, affecting lead time, product quality, OEM's inventory level, or stockout costs. • Key suppliers in a contractual relation network could facilitate the timely identification or resolution of those system-level operational problems and other supply disruption risks.
17	Abstract	A system of interconnected buyers and suppliers is better modeled as a network than as a linear chain. In this paper we demonstrate how to use social network analysis to investigate the structural characteristics of supply networks. Our analytical framework relates key social network analysis metrics to supply network constructs. We apply this framework to the three automotive supply networks reported in Choi and Hong (2002).

		Each of the supply networks is analyzed in terms of both materials flow and contractual relationships. We compare the social network analysis results with the case-based interpretations in Choi and Hong (2002) and conclude that our framework can both supplement and complement case-based analysis of supply networks.
18	Key words	Supply networks; supply chain management; second-tier suppliers; social network analysis; network structure; structural analysis network indices.
19	Organisation Field	Operations Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); social norms
22	Configuration Elements	Network; structure; multi-tier suppliers
23	Relationship Directionality	Origination influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross-sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 72

01	Author of the article	Koka, Balaji, R. // Madhavan, Ravindranath // Prescott, John E.
02	Title of the article	The evolution of inter-organisational networks: Environmental effects on patterns of network change
03	Document name	Koka, et al., 2006
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Review
05	Date of publication	2006
06	Volume	31
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	721-737
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	Motivated by the need to understand how networks evolve as a prerequisite to the building of effective networks, this study proposes a framework explaining patterns of network change as driven by environmental changes moderated by organisation strategic orientation.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Under the environmental conditions of a decrease in uncertainty and a decrease in munificence, networks will demonstrate a decrease in the number of new tie creations and an increase in the number of tie deletions. • Under the environmental conditions of an increase in uncertainty and a decrease in munificence, networks will demonstrate an increase in the number of tie creations and an increase in the number of tie deletions. • Under the environmental conditions of a decrease in uncertainty and an increase in munificence networks will demonstrate an increase in the number of tie creations and a decrease in the number of tie deletions. • Under the environmental conditions of an increase in uncertainty and an increase in munificence, networks will demonstrate a decrease in the number of tie deletions and an increase in the number of tie creations. • Within each of the predicted scenarios, the absolute level of the environmental factors moderates the effect of the different environmental conditions on tie activity and, consequently, network change. Organisation responses to increases in the level of the environmental dimensions are likely to be lower when the absolute level of the environmental dimensions is high than organisation

		<p>responses to a similar increase in the level of the environmental dimensions when the absolute level is low. Similarly, organisation responses to decreases in the level of the environmental dimensions when the absolute level of environmental dimensions is low are likely to be lower than organisation responses to a similar decrease in the level of the environmental dimensions when the absolute level is high.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within each of the network change scenarios described above, organisation strategic orientation will moderate the specific effects on organisation ego networks, including the rate and direction of network change. In particular, entrepreneurial organisations (prospectors or explorers) are more likely to take advantage of opportunities in the environment by forming new ties and deleting inappropriate ties. Defenders (exploiters) are more likely to continue with existing partners geared toward reinforcing their network position.
17	Abstract	<p>We develop a framework examining the relationship between environmental change and patterns of network change. We propose four patterns of network change (network expansion, network churning, network strengthening, and network shrinking) across four environmental change scenarios. Since network evolution is the result of both environmental context and strategic action, we incorporate strategic orientation as a moderator. Focusing on network change at both the organisation and network levels of analysis will guide us toward a better understanding of the principles behind the building of effective networks.</p>
18	Key words	Correlation analysis; work environment; organisational change; professional relationships.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Network; structures; ties
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross-sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 73

01	Author of the article	Kraljic, Peter
02	Title of the article	Purchasing must become supply chain management
03	Document name	Kraljic, 1983
04	Journal title	Harvard Business Review
05	Date of publication	1983
06	Volume	September-October
07	Number	-
08	Page numbers	109-117
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	Worldwide organisations operating in USA, Europe, Asia
11	Context/Industry	Automotive; Petrochemical; Metallurgy; Electrical
12	Sample size	Not provided
13	Data collection method	Not provided
14	Method of data analysis	Not provided
15	Study Characteristics	In this article, the author offers pragmatic advice on how top management can recognize the extent of its own supply weakness and treat it with a comprehensive strategy to manage supply. He leads the reader step by step from the roots of the problem to the implementation of a solution.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combining supply requirements of different divisions can increase the corporation's total buying clout. • If the company covers a large percentage of its supplies from sources it owns, it will be in a much better negotiating position to cover the remainder of its outside requirements than its less-integrated competitors. • To minimize their supply vulnerabilities and make the most of their potential buying power, use a four-stage approach to devise strategies comprising: a) classifies all its purchased materials or components in terms of profit impact and supply risk; b) analyzes the supply market for these materials; c) determine its overall strategic supply position; and d) develop materials strategies and action plans. • The company needs to support supply decisions of strategic items with a large battery of analytic techniques, including market analysis, risk analysis, computer simulation and optimization models, price forecasting, and various other kinds of microeconomic analysis. • Decisions about bottleneck items may require specific market analysis and decision models for resolution. • Vendor and value analysis, price forecasting models, and decision models come into play on issues affecting leverage materials.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where noncritical items are concerned, simple market analyses, decision policies, and inventory optimization models will normally suffice. • The higher such costs and the greater the risk of incurring them, the less latitude the company has for rapidly shifting supply sources or delaying negotiations or contracts. • Complex companies with numerous products, multiple plants, and substantial production for stock (as in the consumer goods or chemical industries) are more vulnerable than are companies with a single product line and/or considerable job-order production, such as industrial equipment manufacturers. In either case, tailor-made systems support will be called for.
17	Abstract	In many companies, purchasing, perhaps more than any other business function, is wedded to routine. Ignoring or accepting countless economic and political disruptions to their supply of materials, companies continue to negotiate annually with their established networks of suppliers or sources. But many purchasing managers' skills and outlooks were formed 20 years ago in an era of relative stability, and they haven't changed. Now, however, no company can allow purchasing to lag behind other departments in acknowledging and adjusting to worldwide environmental and economic changes. Such an attitude is not only obsolete but also costly.
18	Key words	Supply chain management; purchase;
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Not provided
21	Mode of Governance	Not provided
22	Configuration Elements	Supply chains
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing networks
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Not provided
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional
27	Quality Appraisal Score	1.5

Data Extraction Form Number 74

01	Author of the article	Lambe, Jay // Whittmann, Michael // Spekman, Robert
02	Title of the article	Social exchange theory and research on business-to-business relational exchange
03	Document name	Lambe et al., 2001
04	Journal title	Journal of business-to-business marketing
05	Date of publication	2001
06	Volume	8
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	2-36
09	Paper Type	Literature Review
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This article provides a full and clear explanation of SET, a summary of what has been learned using SET, and the extent of its limitations as a theory.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In terms of governance, situations of unilateral dependence have been found to decrease relational governance, while symmetric and high dependence increases relational governance in exchange relationships • Interdependence significantly increases the use of relational norms as a governance mechanism that in turn increases use of normative contracts. Relational norms help parties acquire vertical control when specific assets are at risk. Credible commitments positively influence the formation of relational norms. These norms support a long-term orientation towards the relationship. • Even when a high state of relational exchange has been achieved between exchange partners, implying high levels of trust and relational norms, the two conditions that can breach the relational governance suggested by SET are: 1) occasional differences between the exchange partners; and 2) the negative effects of long-term relationships on the trustworthiness of exchange partners. • SET is limited in its ability to explain the development of relational BTB exchange governance in short-term relational exchange, or in exchange relationships that must produce results quickly. • Relational exchange competence contributes to the development of relational exchange governance norms in four ways. Organisations that possess it would be: 1)

		better able to work with their exchange partner, which would result in enhanced economic and social outcomes; 2) more likely to transform, or compromise, on economic outcomes, (3) more likely to choose partners that will abide by relational norms, and (4) able to better understand the value of relational norms in exchange.
17	Abstract	Social exchange theory (SET) has been used extensively by marketing scholars to explain business-to-business relational exchange. Despite its popularity as a theoretical explanatory mechanism, there is no recent literature review that delineates SET's foundational premises, how it has been used in the marketing literature, and its theoretical limitations. This article provides such a review and is intended to assist researchers who wish to use SET to examine business-to-business relational exchange
18	Key words	Organisational studies; business to business commerce; theory; relationship marketing.
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); relational exchange competence
22	Configuration Elements	IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing relationship
24	Unit of analysis	Relationship (inter-organisational)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 75

01	Author of the article	Lambert, Douglas M. // Cooper, Martha, C.
02	Title of the article	Issues in Supply Chain Management
03	Document name	Lambert and Cooper, 2000
04	Journal title	Industrial Marketing Management
05	Date of publication	2000
06	Volume	29
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	65-83
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	Multinational companies based in USA
11	Context/Industry	Global Supply Chain Forum (GSCF) – a group of 15 non-competing organisations
12	Sample size	90 managers
13	Data collection method	Indepth face-to-face interviews
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis (Case study)
15	Study Characteristics	Based on case study methodology, the exploratory empirical findings are intended to develop a normative model to guide future research. Executives can use the model to capture the potential of successful supply chain management.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Managing the supply chain involves three closely interrelated elements: 1) the supply chain network structure; 2) the supply chain business processes; and 3) the management components. • The structure of activities/ processes within and between companies is vital for creating superior competitiveness and profitability • A prerequisite for successful SCM is to coordinate activities within the organisation. One way to do this is to identify the key business processes and manage those using cross-functional teams. • It is important to distinguish between primary and supporting supply chain members, and to identify the horizontal structure, vertical structure, and horizontal position of the focal company in the supply chain network. • Integrating and managing all business process links throughout the entire supply chain is likely not appropriate. Since the drivers for integration are situational and different from process link to process link, the levels of integration should vary from link to link, and over time. • There are four fundamentally different types of business process links: 1) managed business process links; 2) monitored business process links; 3) not-managed business

		<p>process links; and 4) non-member business process links.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The demand management process must balance the customer's requirements with the organisation's supply capabilities. A good demand management system uses point-of-sale and "key" customer data to reduce uncertainty and provide efficient flows throughout the supply chain. • Customers and suppliers must be integrated into the product development process in order to reduce time to market. As product life cycles shorten, the right products must be developed and successfully launched in ever shorter timeframes in order to remain competitive. • Managers of the product development and commercialization process must: a) coordinate with customer relationship management to identify customer's articulated and unarticulated needs; b) select materials and suppliers in conjunction with procurement; and c) develop production technology in manufacturing flow to manufacture and integrate into the best supply chain flow for the product/market combination.
17	Abstract	<p>Successful supply chain management requires cross-functional integration and marketing must play a critical role. The challenge is to determine how to successfully accomplish this integration. We present a framework for supply chain management as well as questions for how it might be implemented and questions for future research. Case studies conducted at several companies and involving multiple members of supply chains are used to illustrate the concepts described.</p>
18	Key words	<p>Organisational studies; supply chains; marketing management; integrated approach; models; logistics; inventory management; management science.</p>
19	Organisation Field	<p>Supply Chain Management</p>
20	Theoretical Lens	<p>Social Network Theory</p>
21	Mode of Governance	<p>Informal (explicit)</p>
22	Configuration Elements	<p>Supply chain; embedded IORs</p>
23	Relationship Directionality	<p>Organisation influencing network</p>
24	Unit of analysis	<p>Network</p>
25	Unit of data collection	<p>Individual</p>
26	Research perspective	<p>Cross section approach</p>
27	Quality Appraisal Score	<p>2.5</p>

Data Extraction Form Number 76

01	Author of the article	Lambert, Douglas, M. // Emmelhainz, Margret A. // Gardner, John T.
02	Title of the article	Building successful supply chain partnerships
03	Document name	Lambert et al., 1999
04	Journal title	Journal of Business Logistics
05	Date of publication	1999
06	Volume	20
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	165-181
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual Model)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study puts forward a conceptual framework to accurately calibrate inter-organisational partnerships in order to: a) avoid failures; b) minimize costs; and c) improve the service level.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Between the extremes of an arm's-length relationship and a joint venture, there are three levels of partnering or integration: • <i>Type I:</i> The organisations involved recognize each other as partners and, on a limited basis, coordinate activities and planning. The partnership usually has a short-term focus and involves only one division or functional area within each organisation. • <i>Type II:</i> The organisations involved progress beyond coordination of activities to integration of activities. Although not expected to last "forever," the partnership has a long term horizon. Multiple divisions and functions within the organisation are involved in the partnership. • <i>Type III:</i> The organisations share a significant level of integration. Each party views the other as an extension of their own organisation. Typically no "end date" for the partnership exists. • The probability of poor execution is greatly diminished because the partners jointly agree upon how each component is to be implemented, the priority of the components, and the resources needed to put the components into place at the agreed level. • The strongest partnerships appear to be those in which the contract either is not a written contract at all or exists for

		<p>strictly "legal" purposes and is not used as a guideline for day-today operations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A re-evaluation of the relationship also should occur when major environmental changes take place or when either organisation experiences a change in its drivers.
17	Abstract	A model is presented of a systematic process for building and maintaining successful logistics partnerships to improve service and reduce costs through outsourcing. The model specifically addresses potential causes of failure and helps minimize the probability of a partnership not meeting the objectives of the parties.
18	Key words	Models; logistics; vendor supplier relations; partnering; organisational studies.
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); unwritten contracts
22	Configuration Elements	Partnerships (inter-organisational)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Relationships (vendor-supplier)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 77

01	Author of the article	Lee, Hau L.
02	Title of the article	The Triple-A Supply Chain
03	Document name	Lee, 2004
04	Journal title	Harvard Business Review
05	Date of publication	2004
06	Volume	82 (October)
07	Number	10
08	Page numbers	102-112
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	Worldwide organisations operating in USA, Europe, Asia
11	Context/Industry	Electronics; Food and Drink; Retail
12	Sample size	Not provided
13	Data collection method	Not provided
14	Method of data analysis	Not Provided
15	Study Characteristics	This study demonstrates that the best supply chains are not just fast and cost-effective. They are also agile and adaptable, and they ensure that all their companies' interests stay aligned.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Top-performing supply chains possess three very different qualities. First, great supply chains are agile. They react speedily to sudden changes in demand or supply. Second, they adapt over time as market structures and strategies evolve. Third, they align the interests of all the organisations in the supply network so that companies optimize the chain's performance when they maximize their interests. • In order to respond to short-term changes in demand or supply quickly and to handle external disruptions smoothly, the following steps are required: a) promote flow of information with suppliers and customers; b) develop collaborative relationships with suppliers; c) design for postponement; c) build inventory buffers by maintaining a stockpile of inexpensive but key components; d) have a dependable logistics system or partner; and e) draw up contingency plans and develop crisis management teams. • In order to adjust supply chain's design to meet structural shifts in markets and to modify supply network to strategies, products, and technologies, the following steps are required: a) monitor economies all over the world to spot new supply bases and markets; b) use intermediaries to develop fresh suppliers and logistics infrastructure; c) evaluate needs of ultimate consumers—not just immediate customers; d) create flexible product designs; and e) determine where companies' products stand in terms of technology cycles and product life cycles. • In order to create incentives for better performance, the following steps are required: a) exchange information and knowledge freely with vendors and customers; b) lay down roles, tasks,

		and responsibilities clearly for suppliers and customers; and c) equitably share risks, costs, and gains of improvement initiatives.
17	Abstract	Building a strong supply chain is essential for business success. But when it comes to improving their supply chains, few companies take the right approach. Many businesses work to make their chains faster or more cost-effective, assuming that those steps are the keys to competitive advantage. To the contrary: Supply chains that focus on speed and costs tend to deteriorate over time. Only companies that build supply chains that are agile, adaptable, and aligned get ahead of their rivals. All 3 components are essential; without any one of them, supply chains break down. Great companies create supply chains that respond to abrupt changes in markets. Great companies also adapt their supply networks when markets or strategies change. Finally, great companies align the interests of the partners in their supply chains with their own.
18	Key words	Supply chains; strategic planning; innovations; inventory management.
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit); goal alignment
22	Configuration Elements	Supply chains
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing networks
24	Unit of analysis	Networks
25	Unit of data collection	Not provided
26	Research perspective	Not provided
27	Quality Appraisal Score	1.5

Data Extraction Form Number 78

01	Author of the article	Li, Mi// Choi, Thomas Y.
02	Title of the article	Triads in service outsourcing: Bridge, Bridge Decay and Bridge Transfer
03	Document name	Li and Choi, 2009
04	Journal title	Journal of Supply Chain Management
05	Date of publication	2009
06	Volume	45
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	66-86
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	By extending the social network theory into the services outsourcing context, this paper reveals the shifting relationship structures within the triad of services supply network at different stages of the services outsourcing.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relationship between buyer, supplier and customer in triad differs between manufacturing and services. Supplier and customer establish relationships in services and buyer loses control of relationship in an outsourcing arrangement. • The structural position within a network is what determines the dynamics among actors because social actors in some positions in the networks are better off than those in other positions. • Prior to services outsourcing, the services buyer acts as a bridge between the services supplier and the buyer's customer and therefore enjoys information and control benefits associated with the bridge position. • Services outsourcing causes the buyer to lose its bridge position, leading to the erosion of the information and control benefits it used to enjoy. • How the new relationship is formed between the services supplier and the buyer's customer depends largely on the type of relationship the buyer has established with the supplier prior to bridge decay. • A collaborative relationship between the services buyer and services supplier tends to foster a collaborative relationship between the services supplier and the buyer's customer. • An adversarial relationship between the services buyer and

		<p>services supplier tends to foster an adversarial relationship between the services supplier and the buyer's customer.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In services outsourcing, the triad structure of bridge decay would evolve into the triad structure of bridge transfer, where the leverage position would be assumed by the supplier. • Once the bridge transfer is complete, a collaborative relationship between the buyer and its supplier would mitigate the potential opportunistic behaviour by the supplier, while an adversarial relationship would increase it. In a steady state, bridge decay is a much more strategically desirable outcome for the buyer compared to the bridge transfer.
17	Abstract	<p>Typically, a triad of actors is involved in any outsourcing situation: the buyer, the supplier and the buyer's customer. In manufacturing, the buyer acts as a bridge between its supplier and its customer and maintains this bridge position before, during and after the outsourcing. However, in services, the relationship structures among the three actors change before, during and after the outsourcing. Before outsourcing (i.e., during the contract negotiation stage), the buyer is the "bridge" between its supplier and its customer. During implementation, this bridge position begins to "decay" as its supplier comes in direct contact with the buyer's customer. Post-implementation, the bridge position is intended to be "transferred" to the supplier. However, if left unmanaged, this state of transferred bridge position has serious performance implications for the buyer. The supplier is now the bridge and thus enjoys the leverage inherent in being a bridge. This point has been missed in many services outsourcing ventures by major multinational corporations. To mitigate this effect, we propose that the buyer should continue to actively interact with its customer and closely monitor the supplier in order to prevent the supplier from solidifying its bridge position.</p>
18	Key words	Outsourcing; procurement/purchasing processes; risk/risk assessment; supplier management; supply chain management; conceptual
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Supply networks; triads; bridge; bridge decay; structural hole
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network (triad)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 79

01	Author of the article	Li, Julie J. // Poppo, Laura // Zhou, Kevin Z.
02	Title of the article	Relational mechanisms, formal contracts, and local knowledge acquisition by international subsidiaries
03	Document name	Li et al., 2010
04	Journal title	Strategic Management Journal
05	Date of publication	2010
06	Volume	31
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	349-370
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	China
11	Context/Industry	A sampling frame of foreign manufacturing subsidiaries identified from the <i>22,000 Businesses in P.R.C.</i> , maintained by the China International Business Investigation Co.
12	Sample size	168 foreign subsidiaries
13	Data collection method	Survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis including confirmatory factor analysis and regression analysis
15	Study Characteristics	Informed by survey data from 168 foreign subsidiaries operating in China, this study examines research focuses on relational and contractual mechanisms and examines their impact on foreign subsidiaries' acquisition of tacit and explicit knowledge from local suppliers
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Link duration has a positive effect on explicit knowledge acquisition. The longer the exchange history, the greater the level of explicit knowledge a subsidiary acquires from its major local supplier. Asset specificity also has a positive effect on the acquisition of explicit knowledge. When the supplier invests in specialized assets, it becomes more willing to share easy-to-transfer knowledge. • Cultural distance impedes tacit knowledge acquisition, presumably because distance increases the difficulty of effectively communicating and understanding subtleties in language and customs. • Role of formal contracts in knowledge acquisition and sharing is minimal because the most valuable information that an organisation can obtain is likely to be tacit. • Transferring tacit knowledge across organisational boundaries is generally difficult because of its sticky and hard-to-codify nature, close and intense interactions between exchange partners constitute an effective mechanism to transfer such knowledge. • For exchanges characterized by inter-organisational trust, the

		<p>adjoining behavioural processes are more similar to those that support the transfer of tacit knowledge than those that enable explicit knowledge transfer.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • By clarifying task and performance expectations, incorporating information provisions and requirements, and instituting penalties for noncompliance, contracts mitigate uncertainty and risks associated with opportunistic behaviour. Thus, contracts enhance control and reduce the agency problem inherent in market exchanges. • Formal contracts contain routines that support complex forms of interaction and communication by triggering a set of sequenced actions and activities.
17	Abstract	<p>This research focuses on relational and contractual mechanisms and examines their impact on foreign subsidiaries' acquisition of tacit and explicit knowledge from local suppliers. Using survey data from 168 foreign subsidiaries operating in China, this study finds broad support for the proposed analytical framework. When the foreign subsidiary and supplier share common goals, the foreign subsidiary acquires greater levels of both explicit and tacit knowledge; trust between the two parties promotes the acquisition of greater levels of tacit than explicit knowledge. However, access to the local supplier network through the focal supplier enables the foreign subsidiary to acquire greater levels of explicit but not tacit knowledge. Formal contracts play a complementary role in knowledge acquisition: contracts enhance the acquisition of explicit knowledge and further strengthen the effects of relational mechanisms on tacit and explicit knowledge acquisition. Overall, these findings provide important implications for foreign subsidiaries regarding how to acquire local knowledge in host countries through both formal and informal mechanisms.</p>
18	Key words	Trust; ties; shared goals; knowledge; contracts; international subsidiaries; China
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (implicit); formal contracts; trust
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; supply chains; ties; multi-tier suppliers
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Networks
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 80

01	Author of the article	Liker, Jeffrey K. // Choi, Thomas Y.
02	Title of the article	Building Deep supplier relationships
03	Document name	Liker and Choi, 2004
04	Journal title	Harvard Business Review
05	Date of publication	2004
06	Volume	82
07	Number	12
08	Page numbers	104-113
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	USA and Japan
11	Context/Industry	Automotive industry
12	Sample size	2
13	Data collection method	Semi structured interviews
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study demonstrates the effectiveness of building long term business relationships with vendors by comparing 2 Japanese automakers with their 3 USA based competitors.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct joint improvement activities including: a) Exchange best practices with suppliers; b) Initiate kaizen projects at suppliers' facilities; and c) Set up supplier study groups. • Share information intensively but selectively comprising: a) Set specific times, places, and agendas for meetings; b) Use rigid formats for sharing information; c) Insist on accurate data collection; and d) Share information in a structured fashion. • Develop suppliers' technical capabilities by taking the following steps: a) build suppliers' problem-solving skills; b) develop a common lexicon; and c) hone core suppliers' innovation capabilities. • Supervise your suppliers by undertaking the following steps: a) Send monthly report cards to core suppliers; b) Provide immediate and constant feedback; and c) Get senior managers involved in solving problems. • Turn supplier rivalry into opportunity by: a) Sourcing each component from two or three vendors; b) Creating compatible production philosophies and systems; and c) Setting up joint ventures with existing suppliers to transfer knowledge and maintain control. • Understand how your suppliers work by: a) Learning about suppliers' businesses; b) Go see how suppliers work; c) Respect suppliers' capabilities; and d) Commit to co-prosperity.

17	Abstract	More and more businesses are counting on their suppliers to lower costs, improve quality, and develop innovations faster than their competitors' suppliers can. To this end, many experts agree that American organisations, like their Japanese rivals, should build supplier keiretsu: networks of vendors that learn, improve, and prosper in sync with their parent companies. As history has shown, however, that's easier said than done. Some US corporations created supply chains that superficially resembled those of their Japanese competitors, but they did not alter the nature of their relationships with suppliers. As a result, relations between US manufacturers and their suppliers have sunk to the lowest levels in decades. But reports of keiretsu's demise are overblown. The Japanese supplier-partnering model, which is used by Toyota and Honda, is alive and well - in North America as well as Japan.
18	Key words	Vendor supplier relations; Supply chains; Strategic management; Automobile industry
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (explicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; joint ventures
23	Relationship Directionality	Origination influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Longitudinal study
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 81

01	Author of the article	Lin, Hsin-Mei // Huang, Heng-Chiang // Lin, Chich-Pin // Hsu, Wen-Chung
02	Title of the article	How to manage strategic alliances in OEM-based industrial clusters: Network embeddedness and formal governance mechanisms
03	Document name	Lin et al., 2011
04	Journal title	Industrial Marketing Management
05	Date of publication	2011
06	Volume	41
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	2011
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	Asia (Taiwan and China)
11	Context/Industry	Semi conductor industries
12	Sample size	141
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis
15	Study Characteristics	Responding to the call of multi-actor and multiplicity network settings for a better understanding of the environmental determinants of inter-organisational activities, this study synthesizes and empirically test the mixed roles of network embeddedness—including substitutive, complementary, and moderating roles—toward formal governance mechanisms.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The complementary role of network embeddedness in influencing inter-organisational governance is a significant finding. • Embeddedness values differ significantly depending on organisations' positions in the industrial value chain as well as the Guanxi (social capital in Chinese). • Strategic concerns of every organisation involving transaction costs are different when the transaction values and Guanxi of a cluster are taken into consideration. Thus, beyond the transaction cost, the transaction value and cultural context need to be fully considered when defining transaction characteristics. • An inter-organisational alliance needs to be less involved in a formalized inter-organisational structure and more involved in selecting partners through close personal relationships (a kind of Guanxi) among CEOs or a shared technology status among organisations. • The rigid social hierarchy grounded by the “rules” of Guanxi necessitates a form of trust based on position and prior personal relationships. Thus, partner selection is improved as a result of closer personal and technological connections,

		<p>even when the instrument function in a formal governance mechanism is weak.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Network embeddedness is complementary to formal governance mechanisms. The relationship between transaction hazards and inter-organisational formal governance mechanisms can be stronger or weaker depending upon the network conditions in which organisations are embedded. • IORs allow partners flexibility in alleviating the costly formal governance mechanisms caused by the characteristics of asset specificity.
17	Abstract	<p>The rapidly growing original equipment manufacturer (OEM)-based industrial clusters have been a prominent form of economic organisation in several emerging Asian markets. Characterized by close interdependence and intertwined personal linkages, organisations of Asian OEM-based industrial clusters participate in the phenomenon of strategic alliances. However, how these alliances can be effectively managed through formal governance mechanisms within embedded networks requires further investigation. This study uses social network analysis to identify personal, ownership, and technology networks in 141 semiconductor organisations in an OEM-based industrial cluster in Taiwan that feature different types of OEM-led alliances and the prevalence of Guanxi. We find that relational embeddedness based on personal ties and structural embeddedness based on ownership ties support the employment of formal governance mechanisms. We also pay particular attention to the moderating role of network embeddedness in diminishing the relationship between transaction hazards and formal governance mechanisms. By identifying the embeddedness context in the governance of alliances, our research contributes to a better understanding of the ways in which formal governance mechanisms are contingent on the network embeddedness of OEM-based industrial clusters in Taiwan and other similar Asian economies.</p>
18	Key words	Network embeddedness; strategic alliances; transaction hazards; governance; clusters.
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); social capital; Guanxi
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; clusters; relational embeddedness; structural embeddedness; ties
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 82

01	Author of the article	Lockett, Helen // Johnson, Mark // Evans Steven // Bastl, Marko
02	Title of the article	Product Service Systems and supply network relationships: An exploratory case study
03	Document name	Lockett et al., 2010
04	Journal title	Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management
05	Date of publication	2010
06	Volume	22
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	293-313
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	UK
11	Context/Industry	Complex-engineered products
12	Sample size	22 interviews conducted with 16 informants.
13	Data collection method	Semi-structured interviews
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study adopts a case-based research approach to present a detailed investigation into the delivery of a PSS by a large manufacturer and two of its suppliers. It focuses on the determining how and why the case companies had begun to deliver servitized offerings and the challenges that they were facing within their supply chain relationships.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed benefits of PSS are not necessarily achieved by the extended supply network. A PSS business model can have a negative effect on companies in the supply chain if the suppliers are not well integrated into the PSS delivery. • Customer/supplier relationships in supply chains delivering PSS may become extremely complicated, with companies playing multiple roles in the supply network. • The alignment of incentives between a PSS provider and its suppliers is important for a successful PSS but can be difficult to achieve due to the differing objectives of each company. • The transfer of risk in PSS delivery makes incentive alignment more difficult to achieve than in a traditional supply chain. • It is not sufficient for the PSS provider to develop a formal relationship with a supplier for the delivery of PSS; they also needed to align the profit incentive between them to achieve a successful partnership. • Effective information sharing across the PSS supply network is essential for a profitable and sustainable PSS, but this can be very difficult to achieve in practice, particularly if the PSS provider is concerned about knowledge leakage into the supply chain.
17	Abstract	Purpose – In recent years there has been increasing interest in

		<p>Product Service Systems (PSSs) as a business model for selling integrated product and service offerings. To date, there has been extensive research into the benefits of PSS to manufacturers and their customers, but there has been limited research into the effect of PSS on the upstream supply chain. This paper seeks to address this gap in the research.</p> <p>Design/methodology/approach – The research uses case-based research which is appropriate for exploratory research of this type. In-depth interviews were conducted with key personnel in a focal organisation and two members of its supply chain, and the results were analyzed to identify emergent themes.</p> <p>Findings – The research has identified differences in supplier behaviour dependent on their role in PSS delivery and their relationship with the PSS provider. For a successful partnership it is important to align the objectives between PSS provider and suppliers.</p> <p>Originality/value – This research provides a detailed investigation into a PSS supply chain and highlights the complexity of roles and relationships among the organisations within it. It is of value to other PSS researchers and organisations transitioning to delivery of PSS.</p>
18	Key words	Product management; supply; supplier relations; product life cycle.
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (implicit); information exchange; incentives
22	Configuration Elements	Supply network
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Networks
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 83

01	Author of the article	Lorenzoni, Gianni // Lipparini, Andrea
02	Title of the article	The leveraging of IORs as a distinctive organisational capability
03	Document name	Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999
04	Journal title	Strategic Management Journal
05	Date of publication	1999
06	Volume	20
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	317-338
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	Italy
11	Context/Industry	Packaging machinery industry (SIC 3565).
12	Sample size	3 manufacturers producing machines for pharmaceutical, food and paper industry
13	Data collection method	Secondary data using data basis, personal contacts and institutional sources – longitudinal study.
14	Method of data analysis	Product analysis; structural change analysis
15	Study Characteristics	Based on three lead organisation-networks, this paper takes into account the evolution of the network structures as well as the evolution of the capabilities required to manage a progressive intensification of inter-organisational ties.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large-scale reliance on collaborative activity has the potential to reshape the nature of competition, and an organisation's network portfolio becomes a key organisational attribute. • Organisations have learned how to gain access to, and transfer knowledge across, alliances and locate themselves in network positions which enable them to keep pace with technological developments within the industry. • Within a learning network, the internal knowledge should help the lead organisation to appreciate, select, and mobilize external capabilities. • Lead organisations should develop the ability to interact with others to better manage their internal competencies refinements. • Lead organisations are making serious efforts to create an interacting platform with selected partners in which knowledge and information are generated and transferred. This may foster the learning process in the network, while making it difficult for unconnected competitors to pursue imitative practices, especially when IORs become idiosyncratic. • The quality of the partners and their distinctive competencies provide greater flexibility in the innovative

		<p>process when compared with vertically integrated organisations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lead organisations potentially can lower the overall coordination and production costs of a network through multiple, repeated, trust-based relationships with key suppliers. • Multiple, repeated trust-based relationships with key suppliers favour lead organisation's access to complementary capabilities and specialized knowledge with positive effects on networks as a whole.
17	Abstract	<p>In this paper we present a study of the structure of three lead organisation-network relationships at two points in time. Using data on companies in the packaging machine industry, we study the process of vertical disintegration and focus on the ability to coordinate competencies and combine knowledge across corporate boundaries. We argue that the capability to interact with other companies-which we call relational capability-accelerates the lead organisation's knowledge access and transfer with relevant effects on company growth and innovativeness. This study provides evidence that inter-organisational networks can be shaped and deliberately designed: over time managers develop a specialized supplier network and build a narrower and more competitive set of core competencies. The ability to integrate knowledge residing both inside and outside the organisation's boundaries emerges as a distinctive organisational capability. Our main goal is to contribute to the current discussion of cooperative ties and dynamic aspects of inter-organisational networks, adding new dimensions to resource-based and knowledge-based interpretations of company performance.</p>
18	Key words	Trust; vertical disintegration; competency; knowledge; resources; network; organisational studies; cooperative ties.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); trust; knowledge sharing; interdependence
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; vertical disintegration
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Longitudinal Study
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 84

01	Author of the article	Lusch, Robert F. // Brown, James R.
02	Title of the article	Interdependency, contracting, and relational behaviour in marketing channels
03	Document name	Lusch and Brown, 1996
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing
05	Date of publication	1996
06	Volume	60
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	19-38
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Small size wholesale organisations with 10-20 employees
12	Sample size	454 organisations
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis; structure equation model; factor analysis; multiple regression
15	Study Characteristics	The central theme of this article is that the performance of marketing activities by marketing channel members can be coordinated by two key types of contracts-normative and explicit contracts. This study highlights the importance of bi-directional dependence
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An increased level of interdependence between a supplier and its wholesale-distributor reflects an increased level of commitment to the relationship by both parties. • To make the relationship work and endure and to avoid opportunistic behaviour, organisations develop understandings, both explicit and implicit, regarding obligations, rules, outcomes, contributions, and sanctions germane to their relationship. • Bilateral dependence, therefore, lessens opportunistic behaviour, thus minimizing the need for a highly explicit contract to safeguard transaction-specific assets against opportunism. • High bilateral dependency between a wholesale-distributor and its major supplier leads to more reliance on normative contracts. Significantly, these normative contracts lead to improved wholesaler performance. This suggests that wholesale-distributors and suppliers form relationships in which they both have a high need for each other. • When a wholesaler is dependent on its major supplier, the wholesaler develops a long-term orientation. This long term orientation leads to more contracting, both explicit and normative, and more normative contracting leads to higher

		<p>wholesaler performance.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wholesalers can work effectively with more powerful suppliers if they develop normative contracts, as well as explicit contracts. • When a supplier is dependent on a wholesaler, more explicit contracts are present and the wholesaler has a higher performance level. • Long-term orientation leads to more explicit and normative contracting, as well as to more relational behaviour. • As relationships endure, there is no automatic rise in long-term orientation, explicit and/or normative contracting, and relational behaviour. This suggests that attitude and perspective toward the long term is much more important than merely long-standing relationships
17	Abstract	<p>The dependency structure between wholesale-distributors and their major suppliers is posited to influence the type of contract - explicit and normative - used. In turn, dependency structure and type of contract is hypothesized to influence wholesale-distributor performance. This process occurs both directly and indirectly through some intermediate constructs, such as long-term orientation, relationship length, and relational behaviour. A study investigates 3 dependency structures: wholesaler dependent on supplier, supplier dependent on wholesaler, and high bilateral dependency. Empirical support for many of the hypothesized linkages is obtained.</p>
18	Key words	Relational behaviour; vendor supplier relations; contracts; market research
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (explicit); contracts; interdependence (bi-lateral)
22	Configuration Elements	Relationship (inter-organisational)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing relationship
24	Unit of analysis	Relationship (vendor-supplier)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 85

01	Author of the article	Madhavan, Ravindranath//Gnyawali, Devi R.//He Jinyu
02	Title of the article	Two's a company, three's a crowd? Triads in cooperative competitive networks
03	Document name	Madhavan, et al., 2004
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Journal
05	Date of publication	2004
06	Volume	47
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	918-927
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Mathematical)
10	Geographical Location	Global study
11	Context/Industry	Steel industry
12	Sample size	Data on a competitor network consisting of 45 global steel producers that had entered into 72 strategic alliances during the period 1979–94. The sample organisations had a total of 48 transitive triads. In the regional partitioning, 24 transitive triads were within-block and 24 were across-block. In the technology partitioning, 38 transitive triads were within-block, whereas 10 were across-block.
13	Data collection method	Data were collected using Dow Jones Interactive. A dichotomous 45 X 45 matrix was created capturing strategic alliance ties among the 45 organisations reflecting the presence or absence of an alliance in each potential dyad.
14	Method of data analysis	Triadic analysis was conducted using network model p^* to understand patterns of tie formation and what factors explain their occurrence.
15	Study Characteristics	This study attempts to develop an understanding why certain patterns of tie formation occur and, in particular, to understand what the likelihood of observing transitive triads is and what factors explain their occurrence.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In case of geographical proximity, organisations enter triads because no subset of two partners possesses all the necessary resources to achieve an advantage. This is indicative of the cooperative aspect of the alliance behaviour where a transitive triadic structure is formed with an aim to create value for all three partners. • In case of technological proximity, organisations enter into specific ties to block value appropriation by a partner which is indicative of a value-limiting move aimed at nullifying extra value appropriated by a partner. • Although transitivity in geographic blocks maybe driven primarily by clustering, and transitivity in technology blocks maybe driven primarily by countering, both workers maybe at work simultaneously. • In a competitor network, rivals strive to maximize their own

		value creation and appropriation while minimizing their own value accruing to others, accentuating countering move thereby making their triad transitive.
17	Abstract	Triadic structure is an important, but neglected, aspect of inter-organisational networks. We developed the constructs clustering and countering as potential drivers of triadic structure and combined them with the recently developed p^* network model to demonstrate the value and feasibility of triadic analysis. Exploratory analysis of data from the global steel industry revealed organisations' tendency to form transitive triads, in which three organisations all have direct ties with each other, especially within blocks defined by geography or technology.
18	Key words	Transitive triads; inter-organisational networks; cooperation; competition.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Balance Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Network (triad); ties
23	Relationship Directionality	Origination influencing networks
24	Unit of analysis	Network (triad)
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 86

01	Author of the article	Markovsky, Barry // Willer, David // Patton, Travis
02	Title of the article	Power relations in exchange networks
03	Document name	Markovsky et al., 1988
04	Journal title	American Sociologic Review
05	Date of publication	1988
06	Volume	53
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	220-236
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Mathematical)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	<p>This study proposes and test network exchange theory using Graph-theoretic Power Index that predicts relative power for network positions.</p> <p>This study also addresses the structural phenomena of: a) the breakdown of larger networks into smaller parts; and b) the emergence of positions that simultaneously have one level of power in one part of the network and a different level in another.</p>
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Power and resource distributions are affected not only by network shapes but also by the conditions under which the exchanges transpire. • Four conditions de-limit actor's behaviour: 1) all actors use identical strategies in negotiating exchanges; 2) actors consistently excluded from exchanges raise their offers; 3) actors consistently excluded from exchanges lower their offers; 4) actors accept the best offer they receive; and 5) actors choose randomly in deciding among the tied best offers. • Power is an unobservable, structurally determined potential for obtaining relatively favourable resource levels. Power use serves as an indicator of power.
17	Abstract	<p>Many theories address the problem of how social structure affects the experiences and behaviours of its members. This paper offers a network-exchange theory to solve this problem. Previous research has shown that the nature and outcomes of negotiations among individuals or corporate actors can be inferred from their network positions. The impact of this research has been limited because its theory does not enable researchers to locate power positions in the networks. We offer a theory that is both</p>

		consistent with all the previously reported experimental research and is generalized to conditions not considered by other formulations. In addition to supporting derived hypotheses
18	Key words	Power; network; exchange theory, mathematical model, Graph theoretic power index.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); power; resource distribution
22	Configuration Elements	Networks;
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 87

01	Author of the article	Martinez, Veronica // Bastl, Marko // Kingston, Jennifer // Evan, Stephan
02	Title of the article	Challenges in transforming manufacturing organisations into product-service providers.
03	Document name	Martinez et al., 2009
04	Journal title	Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management
05	Date of publication	2010
06	Volume	21
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	449 – 469
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	UK
11	Context/Industry	An original equipment manufacturer (OEM) that designs and manufactures high-value capital equipment for the power, aerospace and defence sector.
12	Sample size	22 senior managers
13	Data collection method	Semi-structured interviews
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study highlights that an organisation's journey towards higher levels of servitization (e.g. relationship-based transactions, asset utilization, total service integration offering and high levels of production customization), is inhibited by a variety of internal and external challenges. These internal and external challenges are embedded into the five categories, i.e. embedded product-service culture, delivery of integrated offering, internal processes and capabilities, strategic alignment and supplier relationships.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrated activity occurs during design, negotiation, planning, manufacture, service delivery, process design and other processes. Servitizing organisations are increasing their involvement in such activities and improving their integration as a result. Further integration requires improvement to the five pillars of embedded product-service culture, delivery of integrated offering, internal processes and capabilities, strategic alignment, and supplier relationships. • Low levels of servitization are by minimal adoption of the criteria within the five pillars; deeper levels of servitization require a much broader interaction between supplier and customer, hence the challenges faced are more severe and must be more strongly supported. • Embedded manufacturing culture, which has strong technological, product, and engineering orientation, inhibits the transformation towards becoming a servitized organisation. • When an organisation transforms a product-focused background to an integrated offering, there is a tendency to

		<p>focus more on the product part of the offering than the service aspects.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrated offering requires not only an effective delivery but also a timely one, and this has to be enabled by a cohesive delivery system within the organisation. • Measures for measuring inputs and outputs of integrated offerings will likely require more subjective approaches in order to capture heterogeneity of customer expectations.
17	Abstract	<p>The purpose of this paper is to present challenges experienced by UK manufacturing companies undergoing a servitization journey to becoming product-service providers. The paper uses an exploratory single-case study approach based on semi-structured interviews, and archival data. A total of 22 senior managers were interviewed from the product-service provider and its two suppliers, resulting in more than 400 pages of interview data. Data were analyzed through an inductive research analysis by an emergent identification of patterns. This research identifies critical and frequent challenges experienced by UK manufacturing companies undergoing a servitization journey to becoming product-service system (PSS) providers. They are condensed into five pillars, which constitute the architecture of challenges in servitization. The architecture of challenges in servitization provides a full description of the strategy and operations of PSSs. This is qualitative research based on a single case study. Given the nature of research design, the identified patterns cannot be used as a predictive tool. This research provides a framework to understand, analyze and plan the strategic transformations to more highly servitized organisational forms. This paper contributes to knowledge with a new model called “the architecture of challenges in servitization”. This is the only model that explains the importance of the strategic, operational and social tests that organisations confront when adopting servitization strategies. If companies understand these challenges, they have the potential to create unique sets of values for a variety of stakeholders.</p>
18	Key words	Change management; product management; strategic change; manufacturing industries; united kingdom; organisational change.
19	Organisation Field	Operations Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); integration;
22	Configuration Elements	Network; triad
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 88

01	Author of the article	Mohr, Jakki // Spekman, Robert
02	Title of the article	Characteristics of partnership success: Partnership attributes, communication behaviour, and conflict resolution techniques
03	Document name	Mohr and Spekman, 1994
04	Journal title	Strategic Management Journal
05	Date of publication	1994
06	Volume	15
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	135-152
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Personal computer industry.
12	Sample size	140 owner/managers/decision makers
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis; multiple regression analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study focuses on the vertical relationships between manufacturers and dealers. The unit of analysis in this study was the relationship between a computer dealer and one of its suppliers (i.e. manufacturers).
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The following variables were found to be significant in predicting the success of the partnership (either satisfaction or sales): coordination, commitment, trust, communication quality, information sharing, participation, joint problem solving, and avoiding the use of smoothing over problems or severe resolution tactics(both negatively related to satisfaction with profit). As these variables are present in greater amounts, the success of the partnership is likely to be greater. • Joint problem solving, whereby grievances are aired and the underlying issues are brought to the surface, fosters a win-win solution between partners. • Profits derived from a particular vendor might contribute to a dealer's feeling of vulnerability. Powerful, and popular, manufacturers tend not to give the best margins. • Believing that the vendor will act fairly and in the best interest of the relationship might serve to calm the dealer's fear of opportunistic behaviour and might lead to greater perceived satisfaction with this aspect of the partnership.
17	Abstract	The formation of partnerships between organisations is becoming an increasingly common way for organisations to find and

		maintain competitive advantage. While the antecedents of partnership formation and the characteristics of the resulting cooperative working relationship have been explored in the literature, an understanding of characteristics associated with partnership success is lacking. Such an understanding is important in reconciling the prescriptions to form partnerships with the reality that a majority of such partnerships do not succeed. We hypothesize that partnership attributes, communication behaviour, and conflict resolution techniques are related to indicators of partnership success (satisfaction and sales volume in the relationship). The hypotheses are tested with vertical partnerships between manufacturers and dealers. Results indicate that the primary characteristics of partnership success are: partnership attributes of commitment, coordination, and trust; communication quality and participation; and the conflict resolution technique of joint problem solving. The findings offer insight into how to better manage these relationships to ensure success.
18	Key words	Strategic planning; organisational behaviour; alliances; partnership attributes; communication behaviour; conflict resolution techniques; vertical partnerships.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); commitment; coordination; trust; communication quality; participation
22	Configuration Elements	Alliances; vertical partnerships
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Alliance
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 89

01	Author of the article	Moorman, Christine // Deshpande, Rohit // Zaltman, Gerald
02	Title of the article	Factors affecting trust in market research relationships
03	Document name	Moorman et al., 1993
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing
05	Date of publication	1993
06	Volume	57
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	81-101
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Market Research
12	Sample size	779 decision makers for their respective organisation
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis; Single regression model
15	Study Characteristics	This study aims to combine both the sociological approach as well as sociological theories to examine the role of trust in marketing.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A researcher's perceived integrity is the most important predictor of trust, indicating that users expect researchers to adhere to high standards and to maintain objectivity throughout the research process. • Understanding the types of beliefs held by high integrity researchers about themselves, their roles, and their relationships with others may provide insight into whether low integrity is a product of opportunistic, instrumental thought processes or some other set of beliefs. • Following integrity, the researcher's perceived willingness to reduce research uncertainty is the next most important predictor of trust. • Trust can be negatively influenced by bureaucratic controls within one's own organisation and by such controls in an exchange partner's organisation. As a result, large organisations may be especially vulnerable to low levels of trust, because such organisations are typically highly layered.
17	Abstract	A comprehensive theory of trust in market research relationships is described. The theory builds on previous work suggesting that trust is critical in facilitating exchange relationships and focuses on the factors that determine users' trust in their researchers, including individual, interpersonal, organisational, interorganisational-interdepartmental, and project factors. The theory is tested in a sample of 779 users. Results indicate that the interpersonal factors are the most predictive of trust. Among these factors, perceived researcher integrity, willingness to

		reduce research uncertainty, confidentiality, expertise, tactfulness, sincerity, congeniality, and timeliness are most strongly associated with trust. Among the remaining factors, the formalization of the user's organisation, the culture of the researcher's department or organisation, the research organisation or department's power, and the extent to which the research is customized also affect trust.
18	Key words	Trust; market research
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); trust; interdependence
22	Configuration Elements	Relationships (inter-organisational)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing relationship
24	Unit of analysis	Relationships (inter-organisational)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach

Data Extraction Form Number 90

01	Author of the article	Morgan, Robert M. // Hunt, Shelby D.
02	Title of the article	The commitment-trust theory of relationship marketing
03	Document name	Morgan and Hunt, 1994
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing
05	Date of publication	1994
06	Volume	58
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	20-38
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Automotive industry
12	Sample size	204 automobile tire retailers
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis; multiple regression analysis; LISREL analysis (LISREL VII)
15	Study Characteristics	Theorizing that commitment and trust are key variables that mediate successful relationship marketing, a causal model containing 13 hypotheses was tested in the context of automobile tire relationships.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The presence of relationship commitment and trust is central to successful relationship marketing, not power and its ability to "condition others." Commitment and trust are "key" because they encourage marketers to (1) work at preserving relationship investments by cooperating with exchange partners, (2) resist attractive short-term alternatives in favour of the expected long-term benefits of staying with existing partners, and (3) view potentially high-risk actions as being prudent because of the belief that their partners will not act opportunistically. • The hostility and bitterness resulting from disagreements not being resolved amicably can lead to such pathological consequences as relationship dissolution. However, when disputes are resolved amicably, such disagreements can be referred to as functional conflict, because they prevent stagnation, stimulate interest and curiosity, and provide a medium through which problems can be aired and solutions arrived at. • Cooperation is the only outcome posited to be influenced directly by both relationship commitment and trust. A partner committed to the relationship will cooperate with another member because of a desire to make the relationship work. • Effective cooperation within a network promotes effective competition among networks. Therefore, cooperation promotes relationship marketing success.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong negative relationship between organisational commitment and propensity to leave the organisation also hold at the interorganisational level. Just as excessive employee turnover is costly for employers, partnership instability is costly. Therefore, stability is a desirable performance outcome that can be achieved through fostering commitment. • Partners can have ongoing disputes about goals but continue to cooperate because both parties' relationship termination costs are high. Nor is cooperation the same thing as acquiescence. Cooperation is proactive; acquiescence is reactive. Passively agreeing to advertise a partner's product is acquiescence; proactively suggesting better advertisements is cooperation.
17	Abstract	The nature of relationship marketing - its conceptualization, forms and requisites for success - is explored. Relationship marketing refers to all marketing activities directed toward establishing, developing and maintaining successful relational exchanges. There are 10 forms of relationship marketing, which can be grouped into the relational exchanges involving suppliers, lateral organisations, customers or one's own employees or business units. The need for relationship marketing stems from the changing dynamics of the global marketplace and the changing requirements for competitive success.
18	Key words	Market strategy; market research; customer relations; professional relationships
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); trust; relational exchange; interdependence
22	Configuration Elements	Relationships (inter-organisational)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing relationship
24	Unit of analysis	Relationships (inter-organisational)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 91

01	Author of the article	Morgeson, Fredrick, P. // Hofman, David A.
02	Title of the article	The structure and function of collective constructs: Implications for multi-level research and theory development
03	Document name	Morgeson and Hofman, 1999
04	Journal title	The Academy of Management Review
05	Date of publication	1999
06	Volume	24
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	249-265
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This paper argues that that constructs can be described in terms of their structure and function. Structures emerge from interaction and can, over time, come to influence systems of interaction. Functions represent the causal outputs of constructs and provide a mechanism for integrating constructs across levels.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Because these interactions allow collective constructs to emerge and be maintained, focusing on the interactions that define and reinforce collective phenomena can provide a better understanding of how collective phenomena arise and continue, particularly in face of contextual or membership changes. • Because the emergence of some constructs is conditional and of others is inevitable, accounts of collective constructs should provide details about their developmental aspects and should specify the processes through which the constructs emerge, particularly in terms of the importance of critical events as compared to usual on goings. • In explicating the structure of a collective construct, one should acknowledge and understand the context within which individuals operate. Because the context limits the range of potential interaction, it may have a particularly influential role in determining the emergence of a construct and its structure. • Explicit consideration of a construct's function may allow scholars to integrate functionally similar (but structurally dissimilar) constructs into broader nomological networks of constructs. This can serve as an integrative mechanism in multilevel research and theory.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To understand the structure of a collective construct, it may be helpful to identify the role the outcome plays in the collective, particularly in terms of how it facilitates goal accomplishment. This can help provide insight into why the construct exists and why it persists over time. • Scholars could begin multilevel theory development with a functional analysis, examining the output of a given construct. This would identify commonalities across levels that could be used to provide insight into the construct's structure at a particular level. • Because a number of different structures can result in the same function, it is incumbent upon the researcher to specify the particular structure of a construct at a given level. As an area of research matures, identification and acknowledgment of the different structures or processes that account for the function should become a high priority. • Because similar structures can result in different functions, it is important for scholars to understand the factors that influence divergence in outcomes. Identification of the contextual factors or structural properties that regulate this divergence is important for an adequate understanding of the phenomena.
17	Abstract	Gaps in the multilevel organisational theory development literature by critically examining the structure and function of collective constructs are addressed. Structure emerges from interaction and can, over time, come to influence systems of interaction. Functions represent the causal outputs of constructs and provide a mechanism for integrating constructs across levels. Implications arising from this perspective are discussed and a set of guidelines for multilevel research and theory development are presented.
18	Key words	Organisation theory; guidelines; research
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Multilevel organisational theories
21	Mode of Governance	NA
22	Configuration Elements	NA
23	Relationship Directionality	NA
24	Unit of analysis	NA
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 92

01	Author of the article	Nair, Anand // Narasimhan, Ram // Choi, Thomas Y.
02	Title of the article	Supply networks as a complex adaptive system: Towards simulation-based theory building on evolutionary decision making
03	Document name	Nair et al., 2009
04	Journal title	Decision Sciences
05	Date of publication	2009
06	Volume	40
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	783-815
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Simulation based model)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	Eight cases of payoff matrix configurations.
13	Data collection method	Simulation model
14	Method of data analysis	Complex adaptive system are simulated using cellular automata CA
15	Study Characteristics	This research focuses on the development of theoretical insights regarding the evolution of cooperation in supply networks by means of computer-based simulation experiments.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In supply networks organisations do not necessarily cooperate even in the presence of repeated interactions; there is a threshold level of reward below which the buyer and suppliers would not cooperate • When both buyer and supplier trust each other for mutual cooperation, they will continue to cooperate even at the risk of extreme loss from cooperation. When there is trust for mutual cooperation, buyer and suppliers tend to behave in a risk-prone way. • Even in the presence of opportunistic decision-making behaviours in the supply network, organisations can continue to exhibit cooperative behaviours. • Retaliation/reaction to a supply chain partner's opportunism follows a complex, nonlinear pattern rather than a simple linear pattern. • Cooperative decision making can be expected to prevail in the long term as the size of the supply network increases. • Under certain conditions of interaction among supply network members, cooperation among members increases even with an increase in the payoff from acting opportunistically. • In mature industries, cooperative decision making is sustained if a supply network has expanding number of companies.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cooperative behaviour in a supply network can exist even if the payoff from mutual cooperation is not the highest.
17	Abstract	<p>In this article, we examine how the organisations embedded in supply networks engage in decision making over time. The supply networks as a complex adaptive system are simulated using cellular automata (CA) through a dynamic evolution of cooperation (i.e., “voice” decision) and defection (i.e., “exit” decision) among supply network agents (i.e., organisations). Simple local rules of interaction among organisations generate complex patterns of cooperation and defection decisions in the supply network. The incentive schemes underlying decision making are derived through different configurations of the payoff-matrix based on the game theory argument. The prisoner’s dilemma game allows capturing the localized decision-making process by rational agents, and the CA model allows the self-organizing outcome to emerge. By observing the evolution of decision making by cooperating and defecting agents, we offer testable propositions regarding relationship development and distributed nature of governance mechanisms for managing supply networks.</p>
18	Key words	Cellular automata; complex adaptive systems; complexity theory; supply networks; theory building
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Game Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Supply Networks
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 93

01	Author of the article	Nooteboom, Bart
02	Title of the article	Trust, opportunism, and governance
03	Document name	Nooteboom, 1996
04	Journal title	Organisational Studies
05	Date of publication	1996
06	Volume	17
07	Number	6
08	Page numbers	985-1010
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Process and Control Model)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study develops a process and control model. This model helps analyze combinations, balances and imbalances of trust and opportunism, formal and informal forms of governance, and viable sequences of strategies of governance.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In case of an organisation, the subjective probability associated with trust depends on an assessment of the: a) ethical stance and routines that form part of the culture of the organisation; b) "tightness" with which individuals are tied to it in their organisational roles; c) relevant characteristics (ethics and bonding) of the individual one is dealing with; and d) net effect on propensity of the individual towards opportunism. • Opportunism affects perceived probabilities of an ongoing relation. Renunciation of opportunities for opportunism will enhance trust. This may contribute directly to value by increasing intrinsic value, and indirectly by increasing perceived probabilities of an ongoing relation. • Spill-over of sensitive information to competitors, via the partner, is always a risk, but while the relation lasts the partner has an interest in preventing it. The risk is particularly high if the relation is broken on purpose rather than by accident. • Propensity towards opportunism belongs to the sources of trust: norms/values, ethics, customs, and bonds of kinship or friendship. • Trust tends to grow as the relation proceeds successfully, because bonds of empathy may get stronger, or because habituation occurs.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If an organisation's captivity becomes negative, because it has found a more attractive alternative partner, a plausible action would be to try and get out of the relation at the lowest possible cost. • Cooperative means of increasing partner's captivity include increasing one's relative value to the partner by: a) investing in further adaptation to the partner, and thereby incurring specific investments; and b) inviting hostages in the form of information about the partner's technology in order to improve cooperation in development of his products or processes. • Adversarial means of increasing partner's captivity include increasing one's relative value by: a) blocking the partner's access to alternative partners; and b) demanding hostages that do not add value for the partner.
17	Abstract	A process and control model is developed for the analysis and design of inter-organisational relations, in which both opportunism and trust play a role. The study's aim is to develop a tool for the analysis, diagnosis and design of inter-organisational partnerships. It takes into account the value of the partner, relative to alternatives, and the risk of the relation. Risk depends on the incentives that the partner may have toward opportunism, his opportunities for opportunism and his propensity toward opportunism. The latter is related to trust. A partner's incentives toward opportunism depend on the uniqueness of the value that he offers, on one's own switching costs and on the partner's dependence on the relation.
18	Key words	Organisational studies; intercompany transactions; alliances; strategic planning.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics; Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); trust; cooperation; interdependence
22	Configuration Elements	Alliance; relationships (inter-organisational)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Relationship (inter-organisational)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 94

01	Author of the article	Oliver, Christine
02	Title of the article	Determinants of IORs: Integration and future direction
03	Document name	Oliver, 1990
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Review
05	Date of publication	1990
06	Volume	15
07	Number	20
08	Page numbers	241-265
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	Based on an integration of the IOR literature from 1960 to the present, six critical contingencies of relationship formation are proposed as generalizable determinants of IORs across organisations, settings, and linkages: necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability, and legitimacy. These contingencies are the causes that prompt or motivate organisations to establish IORs, that is, they explain the reasons why organisations choose to enter into relationships with one another.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Critical contingencies of necessity, asymmetry, stability, and legitimacy are shaped primarily by external factors. • Efficiency contingencies are influenced largely by internal factors and the cost of the relationship itself. • Reciprocity contingencies are affected primarily by the relative or comparative properties of the participants and their degrees of congruence with one another. • Differences among current theoretical paradigms are partly attributable to differences in their locus of attention for explaining IORs. • An asymmetry-motivated reason for trade association formation is the exertion of political influence on behalf of its members. This contingency will be more likely to cause organisations to join together in a trade association when the threat of government intervention is strong. • Asymmetry contingencies are fundamental determinants of the formation of federations. Federations develop to increase the collective power of agencies by improving the affiliates' bargaining position relative to the environment. • The formation of joint ventures is more likely to occur for purposes of increasing market power when the potential for

		<p>erosion of either partner's competitive position is low.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint programs are developed for the purposes of increasing the influence of partners when program establishment increases the organisations' access to funds or authority. • According to the financial control model of interlocks banks exert extensive control over corporations through interlocks. In contrast, the management control model emphasizes the dominance of corporations and the relative powerlessness of directors to influence organisational activities.
17	Abstract	<p>This article integrates the literature on IORs into six generalizable determinants of relationship formation, applies these determinants to the prediction of six types of interorganisational relations, and proposes hypotheses for future research that specify the conditions under which each determinant will be more likely to predict different types of relations. These determinants provide the basis for a general theory of IORs and suggest that alternative theoretical perspectives on relationship formation provide important but only partial insights into why organisations enter into relationships with one another.</p>
18	Key words	<p>IORs; necessity; asymmetry; reciprocity; efficiency; stability; legitimacy; trade associations; federations; joint ventures; joint programs; financial control model; interlocks; corporations.</p>
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); financial control models; reciprocity; interdependence
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; trade associations; federations; joint ventures; relationships (inter-organisational)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Relationships (inter-organisational)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 95

01	Author of the article	Pilbeam, Colin// Alvarez, Gabriela// Wilson, Hugh
02	Title of the article	The governance of supply networks: a systematic literature review
03	Document name	Pilbeam et al., (2012)
04	Journal title	Supply Chain Management: An International Journal
05	Date of publication	2012
06	Volume	17
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	358-376
09	Paper Type	Literature review
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	44 conceptual and empirical studies
13	Data collection method	Systematic review methodology (Tranfield et al., 2003)
14	Method of data analysis	Thematic analysis the context-intervention-mechanism-outcomes (CIMO) logic.
15	Study Characteristics	This systematic literature review is focused towards how supply network governance leads to network outcomes, what mechanisms underlie this relationship, and how context impacts it.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selection and adoption of particular governance instruments to support changing organisational structure or technology in supply networks is influenced strongly by industry type and by access to technology. • Informal instruments: a) are adopted in dynamic and unstable circumstances defined as risky, uncertain, unpredictable or during organisational change; b) adopted where prior relationships exist between actors; and c) can result in coordination, control, viability and performance outcomes. • The six distinct categories of contextual circumstance are: 1) globalization; 2) changing organisational structure or technology; 3) uncertainty or unpredictability; 4) risk; 5) legislation; and 6) partner characteristics/relationship history, where there is empirical evidence. • Technology enabled control systems allow effective governance of the collaboration between decentralized members of a supply network. • There are: a) no studies exploring informal governance instruments in relation to risk; b) only a few studies examining formal instruments in relation to risk; and c) no studies that explored the influence of globalization on the use of informal governance instruments.

17	Abstract	<p>The purpose of this paper is to establish what is known regarding how supply network governance leads to network outcomes, what mechanisms underlie this relationship, and how context impacts it. A systematic literature review identified 44 conceptual and empirical studies. Purely dyadic studies were excluded. Synthesis used context-intervention-mechanism-outcomes (CIMO) logic. From a categorization of contexts, governance instruments, mechanisms and outcomes a contingent conceptual framework is developed in paper relating governance instruments to network outcomes dependent on context. In general, formal instruments are adopted in dynamic and unstable circumstances defined as risky, uncertain, unpredictable or during organisational change. These instruments can result in coordination, control, viability and performance outcomes. Informal instruments tend to be adopted in contexts where prior relationships exist between actors. Arising from conceptual framework three robust propositions are developed. A more nuanced view of power and trust is proposed to augment explanations provided by transaction costs and social embeddedness. This provides opportunities for further research, including longitudinal and comparative studies. Conceptual framework provides three propositions suggesting that in dynamic or unstable circumstances formal governance instruments can provide viability, control, coordination or performance outcomes. Informal governance instruments are more effectively used in established relationships to improve performance, control and viability. Synthesis reveals contingencies in appropriate governance modes of supply networks for desired outcomes in specific contexts, resolving apparent inconsistencies between prior studies.</p>
18	Key words	Supply network; governance; trust; power; systematic review; supply chain management.
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	NA
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Supply network
23	Relationship Directionality	NA
24	Unit of analysis	NA
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 96

01	Author of the article	Poppo, Laura // Schepker, Donald J.
02	Title of the article	Repairing public trust in organisations
03	Document name	Poppo and Schepker, 2010
04	Journal title	Corporate Reputation Review
05	Date of publication	2010
06	Volume	13
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	124-141
09	Paper Type	Analytical
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study develops an approach to understanding public trust – its relationship to other forms of trust; why institutional mechanisms are prone to be imperfect governance devices; and which trust repair strategies are more likely and therefore more effective
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To the extent that competence violations are perceived as more controllable and salient than integrity violations, competence-based violations will have a greater negative effect on the public's willingness to trust an organisation than integrity-based violations. • To the extent that competence violations are perceived as more controllable and salient, competence violations have a stronger negative effect on the public's collective assessment of its trust in the organisation's competence compared to the effect of integrity violations on the public's collective assessment of its trust in the organisation's integrity. • Competence violations have a greater negative effect on organisation performance than integrity violations. • Competence violations closer to a organisation's core operations will have a greater negative effect on organisation performance than competence violations further from the organisation's core operations. • Voluntary acknowledgement of an organisational failure and a commitment to a follow-up investigation has a greater positive impact on public trust than a no response strategy. • Organisations are more likely to communicate (quickly and transparently) to the public following competence-base trust violation than an integrity-based violation, which in turn has a

		<p>greater impact on public trust than the alternative.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organisations are more likely to respond to integrity violations by denying responsibility than by accepting responsibility, which in turn has a greater impact on public trust than the alternative. • Organisations are more likely to apologize for actions or effects without accepting responsibility for a competence violation than denying or accepting responsibility, which in turn has a greater impact on public trust than the alternative. • Organisations are more likely to fire and remove associated employees in response to an integrity violation than a competence violation, which in turn has a greater positive impact on public trust. • Organisations are more likely to implement structural, strategic and institutional reforms in response to a competence violation than an integrity violation, which in turn has a greater positive impact on public trust.
17	Abstract	<p>While past research has examined organisational trust with key stakeholders, including employees, little research has examined how organisations can repair trust with the general public. Public trust in an organisation is critical to ensuring legitimacy and organisation survival. However, the type of violation of public trust can impact the repair strategies organisations may choose to enact. This paper examines the construct of public trust, discusses the important aspects of trust violation and develops a framework for organisations to repair trust with the public. We argue that communication and strategic institutional reforms are necessary to repair trust, but are more important following competence, rather than integrity violations.</p>
18	Key words	Cooperation ; public trust ; reputation
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); trust
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; embedded relationships (inter-organisational)
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network (public)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 97

01	Author of the article	Poppo, Laura // Zenger, Todd
02	Title of the article	Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?
03	Document name	Poppo and Zenger, 2002
04	Journal title	Strategic Management Journal
05	Date of publication	2002
06	Volume	23
07	Number	8
08	Page numbers	707-725
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Computer industry
12	Sample size	285 top executives
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis including regression analysis (OLS and GLS)
15	Study Characteristics	This study uses data from a sample of information service exchanges to empirical support that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Managers tend to employ greater levels of relational norms as their contracts become increasingly customized, and to employ greater contractual complexity as they develop greater levels of relational governance. • Customized contracts specify contingencies, adaptive processes, and controls likely to mitigate opportunistic behaviour and thereby support relational governance. • Customized contracts do not guarantee the intent of mutuality, bilateralism, and continuance when conflict arises. • Relational governance complements adaptive limits of contracts by fostering continuance of the exchange and entrusting both parties with mutually agreeable outcomes. • Contractual complexity and relational governance function as complements in explaining satisfaction with exchange performance. • Relational governance and contract customization both directly and indirectly increase exchange performance as measured by satisfaction with the cost, quality, and responsiveness of the outsourced service. • Contract complexity indirectly increases exchange performance by increasing relational governance, which in turn increases exchange performance. • Greater relational governance appears to positively affect

		<p>contractual complexity, which in turn increases exchange performance.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Over time parties develop, test, observe, and confirm the existence of trust and the other requisite norms for cooperative relationship, and empirically confirm that parties with such a social history increasingly rely on relational norms to govern their exchange. • Managers use relational governance to encourage continuance amidst the rapidly changing information systems technology.
17	Abstract	<p>Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed as substitutes for complex contracts in interorganisational exchanges. Many argue that formal contracts actually undermine trust and thereby encourage the opportunistic behaviour they are designed to discourage. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative perspective: that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements. Using data from a sample of information service exchanges, we find empirical support for this proposition of complementarity. Managers appear to couple their increasingly customized contracts with high levels of relational governance (and vice versa). Moreover, this interdependence underlies their ability to generate improvements in exchange performance. Our results concerning the determinants of these governance choices show their distinct origins, which further augments their complementarity in practice.</p>
18	Key words	<p>Relational governance; corporate management; strategic management; hypotheses; statistical analysis; organisation theory; contracts; professional relationships; and relational norms.</p>
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory; Transaction Cost Economics
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and formal (explicit); contracts (customized); interdependence
22	Configuration Elements	Relationship (inter-organisational)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing relationships
24	Unit of analysis	Relationship (inter-organisational)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 98

01	Author of the article	Poppo, Laura // Zhou, Kevin Z. // Zenger, Todd R.
02	Title of the article	Examining the conditional limits of relational governance: specialized assets, performance ambiguity, and long-standing ties.
03	Document name	Poppo et al., 2008
04	Journal title	Journal of Management studies
05	Date of publication	2008
06	Volume	45
07	Number	7
08	Page numbers	1195-1215
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	Worldwide organisations from Fortune 500 companies
11	Context/Industry	IT outsourcing
12	Sample size	181 organisations
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire (completed by top executives)
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis including confirmatory factor analysis and regression analysis; slope test
15	Study Characteristics	Using data from IT industry, this empirical study demonstrates the conditional limits of relational governance by showing that its performance benefits erode for transactions characterized by exchange hazards and long-standing ties.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exchange hazards, namely, asset specificity and difficult performance measurement, weaken the positive relationship of relational governance and exchange performance, which suggests that trust, does not ensure fully cooperative behaviour. • Exchange tenure weakens the positive relationship between relational governance and exchange performance, which indicates that over time, partnerships come to lack the necessary restructuring efforts that ensure optimal exchange performance. • In high asset specificity settings, the positive association of relational governance and performance satisfaction declines significantly compared with low asset specificity settings, because of the opportunity for individual gain in high asset specificity settings. • Measurement difficulty dampens the positive association of relational governance and performance satisfaction, revealing that suppliers will shirk their expected effort levels and quality, as well as use this hidden information to augment their costs. • Negative relationship between trust and performance is

		<p>stronger under high behavioural uncertainty, specifically when parties work extensively together or compete with each other.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exchange history will moderate the relationship of relational governance and performance. As exchange tenure increases, the routines that characterize relationally governed exchanges become decoupled from those that optimally support the task. These include external information searches, knowledge of alternatives, and routine evaluations of the supplier, partnership, and fit with the external environment.
17	Abstract	<p>Despite recognition of the benefits of relational governance in inter-organisational exchanges, factors that may erode its value have received little examination. We extend the literature by asking whether self-interested opportunities and long-standing ties erode the positive association between relational governance and performance. Consistent with transaction cost and moral hazard logics, exchange hazards, particularly asset specificity and difficult performance measurement, dampen the positive association of relational governance and performance. We further find, consistent with recent inquiries into the dark side of embedded ties that the performance benefits associated with relational governance decline when parties rely on repeated partnerships.</p>
18	Key words	<p>Relational governance; inter-organisational exchanges; exchange tenure; asset specificity; contract duration.</p>
19	Organisation Field	<p>Strategic Management</p>
20	Theoretical Lens	<p>Social Exchange Theory</p>
21	Mode of Governance	<p>Formal (implicit) and formal (explicit); contracts (duration); interdependence</p>
22	Configuration Elements	<p>Relationship (inter-organisational)</p>
23	Relationship Directionality	<p>Organisation influencing relationships</p>
24	Unit of analysis	<p>Relationship (inter-organisational)</p>
25	Unit of data collection	<p>Individual</p>
26	Research perspective	<p>Cross sectional approach</p>
27	Quality Appraisal Score	<p>3.0</p>

Data Extraction Form Number 99

01	Author of the article	Powell, Walter, W.
02	Title of the article	Neither market nor hierarchy: Network formation of organisations
03	Document name	Powell, 1990
04	Journal title	Research in Organisational Behaviour
05	Date of publication	1990
06	Volume	12
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	295-336
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study argues that relational or net Data Extraction Form Numbers of organisations are a clearly identifiable form of economic exchange under certain specifiable circumstances.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Routines and hierarchical structures ensure communication between agents within a organisation, and administrative controls provide greater powers to monitor and discipline agents than a market structure permits • Non –market, non-hierarchical modes of exchange represent a particular form of collective action, one in which: a) cooperation can be sustained over the long run as an effective arrangement; b) networks create incentives for learning and the dissemination of information, thus allowing ideas to be translated into action quickly; c) the open ended quality of networks is most useful when the resources are variable and the environment uncertain; and d) networks offer a highly feasible means of utilizing and enhancing such intangible assets as tacit knowledge and technological innovation. • The degree to which economic actors rely on the marketplace, private enterprise, or net Data Extraction Form Numbers of relational contracting is determined, to a considerable attempt by state policies. • Network formation of organisation are particularly well-suited for: a) a highly skilled labour where participants possess knowledge that is not specific to a particular task but applicable to a wide range of activities; and b) where knowledge and skill do not lend themselves to either monopoly control or expropriation by the wealthiest bidder. • The more general, and more suitable are resources, the more

		<p>likely they will be secured through short-term market transactions where as the exchange of distinctive competencies, like for instance knowledge or skill, is more likely to occur in networks.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The demand for speed to react to economic changes motivates organisations to form networks with other organisations. The aim is to reduce the risk and share the expense of developing costly products that have very short life spans. • Networks are more common in homogenous work settings in which participants have a common background (e.g. ethnic; ideological; professional). When the diversity of partners increases, trust recedes, and so does the willingness to enter into long term collaboration. • A key advantage of network arrangements is their ability to disseminate and interpret new information.
17	Abstract	<p>Network formation of organisations- typified by reciprocal patterns of communication and exchange –represent viable patterns of economic organisation. Networks are contrasted with market and hierarchical governance structures, and the distinctive features of networks are highlighted. Illustrative examples of network arrangements – in craft and high-technology industries, in regional economics, and in formerly vertically integrated fields are presented. The paper concluded with a discussion of the conditions that give rise to net Data Extraction Form Numbers.</p>
18	Key words	Network; market; hierarchy; communication; knowledge ; governance structures
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (explicit); information exchange
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; vertical integration; market; hierarchy
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 100

01	Author of the article	Powell, Walter, W.
02	Title of the article	Interorganisational collaboration and the locus of innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology.
03	Document name	Powell, 1996
04	Journal title	Administrative Science Quarterly
05	Date of publication	1996
06	Volume	41
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	116-145
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Biotechnology industry
12	Sample size	225 organisations
13	Data collection method	Five years of cross-sectional records obtained from BIOSCAN data base
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis; panel regression analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study attempts to explain the pattern of interorganisational agreements that structure learning in the field of biotechnology. These agreements are formal ties - frequently involving very expensive investments by both parties.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The descriptive measures for collaborative RandD experience and non-RandD network experience point to a distinctive pattern of organisational development for organisations that rely on network ties. While organisations always have the option of eliminating their reliance on external collaborations, it turns out that organisations that have ties for any length of time rarely do so. • Organisations are not "promiscuous" in their use of ties; rather, they are deepening their connectedness without adding substantial numbers of new ties. On average, organisations have ties of each variety, save for manufacturing and clinical ties. • In contrast to product life-cycle or transaction-cost thinking, as organisations grow older and larger they do not appear to reduce number and type of collaborations in which they are engaged. • Age has no effect, while size is an outcome, not a predictor of network behaviour. Growth is a process that requires time. Unlike biotic species, however, organisational growth is not programmed from age. Rather, it is the initiation of collaboration that sets the growth clock in motion, with centrality as a further stimulus. • Network position (central connectedness) has reciprocal influences on RandD alliances, investment ties, and total

		<p>collaboration. RandD ties, experience, and diversity produce central connectedness. Central connectedness cycles back to intensify an organisation's commitment to exploring through its network.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The development of experience enables an organisation to become more central, which in turn has two effects. First, regardless of the pathway, centrally located organisations are connected into the main component of the industry, providing access to critical information and resource flows needed for internal growth. The second effect is a feedback process in which centrality leads to the initiation and continuance of RandD alliances, thus sustaining the dynamics of learning.
17	Abstract	<p>It is argued that when the knowledge base of an industry is both complex and expanding and the sources of expertise are widely dispersed, the locus of innovation will be found in networks of learning, rather than in individual organisations. The large-scale reliance on interorganisational collaborations in the biotechnology industry reflects a fundamental and pervasive concern with access to knowledge. A network approach to organisational learning is developed, and a organisation-level, longitudinal hypotheses are derived that link research and development alliances, experience with managing IORs, network position, rates of growth and portfolios of collaborative activities. These hypotheses are tested on a sample of dedicated biotechnology organisations in the years 1990-1994. Results support a learning view and have broad implications for future theoretical and empirical research.</p>
18	Key words	Organisational studies; statistical analysis; learning; innovations; industrial research; biotechnology; alliances; organisation theory
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); collaboration;
22	Configuration Elements	Network; alliances; network position;
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network (alliances)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Longitudinal Study based on historical data
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 101

01	Author of the article	Provan, Keith // Kenis, Patrick
02	Title of the article	Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness
03	Document name	Provan and Kenis, 2008
04	Journal title	Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
05	Date of publication	2008
06	Volume	18
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	229-252
09	Paper Type	Analytical
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This study argues that when focusing on collectively generated network-level outcomes, the form of network governance adopted, and the management of tensions related to that form are critical for explaining network effectiveness.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The greater the inconsistency between critical contingency factors and a particular governance form (both in terms of the number of inconsistent factors and the extent to which these factors are inconsistent with characteristics of the governance form), the less likely that that particular form will be effective, leading either to overall network ineffectiveness, dissolution, or change in governance form. • Shared network governance will be most effective for achieving network-level outcomes when trust is widely shared among network participants (high-density, decentralized trust), when there are relatively few network participants, when network-level goal consensus is high, and when the need for network-level competencies is low. • Lead organisation network governance will be most effective for achieving network-level outcomes when trust is narrowly shared among network participants (low-density, highly centralized trust), when there are a relatively moderate number of network participants, when network-level goal consensus is moderately low, and when the need for network-level competencies is moderate. • Network governance will be most effective for achieving network-level outcomes when trust is moderately to widely shared among network participants (moderate density trust), when there are a moderate number to many network participants, when network-level goal consensus is moderately high, and

		<p>when need for network-level competencies is high.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assuming network survival over time, as network governance changes, it is likely to evolve in a predictable pattern from shared governance to a more brokered form and from participant governed to externally (NAO) governed. Evolution from shared governance to either brokered form is significantly more likely than evolution from a brokered form to shared governance. Once established, evolution from an NAO to another form is unlikely (i.e., inertia is strongest when the governance form is more formalized). • Networks face a tension between the need for internal and external legitimacy. In shared-governance networks, the tension will favour internal legitimacy; in lead organisation-governed networks, the tension will favour external legitimacy; and in • NAO-governed networks, both sides of the tension will be addressed but in a sequential fashion. • Networks face a tension between the need for flexibility and the need for stability. In shared-governance networks, the tension will favour flexibility; in NAO- and lead organisation-governed networks, the tension will favour stability. Networks face a tension between the need for administrative efficiency and inclusive decision making. In shared-governance networks, the tension will favour inclusion; • In lead organisation-governed networks, the tension will favour efficiency; and in NAO-governed networks, the tension will be more balanced but favour efficiency.
17	Abstract	This article examines the governance of organisational networks and the impact of governance on network effectiveness. Three basic models, or forms, of network governance are developed focusing on their distinct structural properties. Propositions are formulated examining conditions for effectiveness of each form. Tensions inherent in each form are then discussed, followed by the role that management may play in addressing these tensions. Finally, the evolution of governance is explored
18	Key words	Network governance, structure, effectiveness, tension, trust, evolution.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Network
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing networks and network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 102

01	Author of the article	Provan, Keith G. // Skinner, Steven J.
02	Title of the article	Interorganisational dependence and control as predictors of opportunism in dealer-supplier relations
03	Document name	Provan and Skinner, 1989
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Journal
05	Date of publication	1989
06	Volume	32
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	202-212
09	Paper Type	Empirical
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Farm and power equipment dealers
12	Sample size	226 farm and power equipment dealers
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Multiple regression
15	Study Characteristics	This study is an empirical work on opportunism IORs using the example of farm and power equipment dealers and their primary supplier organisation.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dealers view either method of decision control by a primary supplier, but particularly centralization, negatively, which leads to at least some resistance in the form of opportunistic behaviour. • The chance to behave opportunistically is greater for dealers when control over their decisions is through a supplier's rule and procedure, since the supplier's management would not be actively monitoring compliance • Dealers view attempts by suppliers to control the decisions (related to the daily running of the dealers' business) through direct involvement negatively, especially when the suppliers are physically far removed the dealers, their customers, and their problems. • Dealers view existence of supplier rules and procedures less constraining and controlling than centralization because of the formal, less personal way in which the former are imposed. • Rules and procedures related to the daily running of the business tend to change infrequently, thus giving both suppliers and dealers consistent guidelines within which all can operate reasonably effectively.
17	Abstract	This study examines Williamson's (1975) concept of opportunism in relations between farm and power equipment dealers and their primary supplier organisation. Results from a national survey generally support hypotheses predicting that dealer opportunism will be negatively related to dealer

		dependence on a primary supplier and positively related to supplier control over dealer decisions.
18	Key words	Power; opportunism; supplier control; organisational behaviour.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit);
22	Configuration Elements	Relationship (inter-organisational)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing relationship
24	Unit of analysis	Relationship (inter-organisational)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach

Data Extraction Form Number 103

01	Author of the article	Provan, Keith G.//Fish, Amy//Sydow, Joerg
02	Title of the article	Interorganisational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks
03	Document name	Provan et al., 2007
04	Journal title	Journal of Management
05	Date of publication	2007
06	Volume	33
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	479-516
09	Paper Type	Literature Review
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	26 studies over a period of 20 year (1985 – 2005)
13	Data collection method	Systematic literature review including: a) general search; b) initial selection based on relevance to the field of organisational studies; c) secondary selection based on abstract analysis; d) final selection based on the extent of focus towards interorganisational networks at the network level.
14	Method of data analysis	Content analysis based on the key findings from the selected articles
15	Study Characteristics	This study reviews the empirical literature on interorganisational networks at the network level of analysis – also referred to as “whole” networks.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Different network patterns differently age, with some past structures exerting stronger effects on performance than current ones. • Time may modify the flow through the network as density and centralization change and one form of network structure benefits over another. • High differentiation occurs with low centralization, suggesting that attempting a broad scope of activity is difficult to centrally coordinate. • Clusters can be created out of convenience, as in cases of geographic clustering. But they also can be created based on the provision of a certain set of services. • Cliques, sub-networks, or clusters within networks are prevalent and can play important roles in the creation of positive outcomes. • The development of the network is dependent on the knowledge of those mechanisms and the meanings, goals, and values of all organisations within the network. • Although networks are seen as mechanisms not only of social embeddedness but also of coordination and governance few empirical examinations exist exploring how activities occurring

		<p>within a network are managed and coordinated.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relationships between organisations in a network are either informally maintained, through the structure of the network and norms of reciprocity and trust, or formally maintained, through the existence of contracts, rules, and regulations. However, these formal and informal control mechanisms protect organisations in their relationships to each other (as dyads) and not the network's. • Shared governance networks occur when the organisations composing network collectively work to make both strategic and operational decisions about how network operates. • Lead-organisation or hub-organisation governance occurs in networks in which all organisations share a common purpose but where there is a more powerful/larger, organisation that has sufficient resources and legitimacy to play a lead role. • Unlike the lead organisation, the NAO is not involved in the manufacturing of goods or provision of services, as is the case with network members. The task of the NAO may be primarily to support (rather than execute) network leadership so that this type of governance may sometimes coexist with one of the other two.
17	Abstract	<p>This article reviews and discusses the empirical literature on interorganisational networks at the network level of analysis, or what is sometimes referred to as “whole” networks. An overview of the distinction between egocentric and network-level research is first introduced. Then, a review of the modest literature on whole networks is undertaken, along with a summary table outlining the main findings based on a thorough literature search. Finally, the authors offer a discussion concerning what future directions might be taken by researchers hoping to expand this important, but understudied, topic.</p>
18	Key words	Interorganisational networks; whole networks; network level of analysis; networks
19	Organisation Field	General Management
20	Theoretical Lens	NA
21	Mode of Governance	NA
22	Configuration Elements	NA
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing networks and network influencing organisation
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 104

01	Author of the article	Revron, Sophie // Chappuis, Jean-Marc
02	Title of the article	Effects of Swiss Retailers' Strategy on Governance Structure of Fresh Food Products Supply Chain
03	Document name	Revron and Chappuis, 2005
04	Journal title	Agribusiness
05	Date of publication	2005
06	Volume	21
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	237-252
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case Study)
10	Geographical Location	Switzerland
11	Context/Industry	Food retail sector
12	Sample size	2 case companies
13	Data collection method	Face-to-face interviews; longitudinal study spread over a 10 year period
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This paper argues that the New Institutional Economic theory is an effective tool for analyzing the new design of the food supply chains because it highlights the point of view of the buyer and his weaknesses regarding the risks on a quality defect.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hybrid organisations develop because of the advantages partners find in linking some of their investments. In doing so, they accept mutual dependence. The more specific are mutual investments, the higher the risks of opportunistic behaviour, and the tighter the forms of control will be. • Mechanisms chosen for monitoring the agreement, mechanisms that reserve the stability of the arrangement and the design of an adequate device for solving disputes contribute shaping hybrid arrangements. • Confronted by the consequential uncertainty, a hybrid organisation has to deal with major coordination issues: it must combine: a) adaptation, in order to keep the flexibility to adjust; b) control in order to reduce discrepancies among inputs, outputs, or quality in the process itself; and c) safeguards, in order to prevent opportunistic behaviour that uncertainties make difficult to detect. • The intensity of the needs for adaptation, control, and safeguards, partially mirrored in contractual clauses, provides a good predictor of the degree of centralization of the mechanisms to be implemented for dealing efficiently with the transactions at stake. • Trust operates as a (weak) form of government. Relational networks are a tighter mode of coordination than trust, with formal rules and conventions framing relationships among

		<p>agents and restricting the risk of opportunism.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hybrid arrangements may be coordinated by a leader. Leadership emerges as a mode of coordination when an organisation establishes its authority over the partners either because it holds specific competences or because it occupies a key position in the sequence of transactions required. • In formal organisations, although partners remain independent and may even compete on segments of their activities, a significant subset of their decisions is coordinated through a quasi-autonomous entity, functioning as a private bureau with some attributes of hierarchy.
17	Abstract	<p>On the initiative of the two main retailers, the structure of the Swiss food supply chains has changed in depth, with the construction of “normed systems,” characterized by quality insurance guarantees and of “partnerships” with alliances of producers and processing companies. These new forms of vertical organisations are different types of hybrid forms, according to New Institutional Economic theory. We highlight that these new organisations were chosen because of the lower degree of acceptance by the retailers of the asymmetry of information on quality, generally to their discredit, and in order to protect their reputation. Nevertheless, even in the case of products where the risk of acquiring a bad batch is particularly problematic for retailers, the latter do not seek to create bilateral governance systems directly with the producers, a situation that can lead to high tensions with the producers</p>
18	Key words	Vertical organisations; hybrid forms; food supply chain; normed system; new institutional economic theory; bilateral governance; retail; risk; Switzerland
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	New Institutional Economic Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit); bilateral governance
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; supply chains (food); vertical organisations
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing networks
24	Unit of analysis	Networks
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Longitudinal study
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 105

01	Author of the article	Ring, Peter S. // Van De Ven, Andrew H.
02	Title of the article	Structuring cooperative relationships between organisations
03	Document name	Ring and Van de Ven, 1992
04	Journal title	Strategic Management Journal
05	Date of publication	1992
06	Volume	17
07	Number	7
08	Page numbers	483-498
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual framework)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This paper provides a conceptual framework for understanding a broader variety of governance mechanisms than those typically accompanying a focus on markets and hierarchies.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The greater the risk in the transaction, the more complex the governance structure, <i>ceteris paribus</i>. • Trust is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for market transaction, <i>ceteris paribus</i>. • Reliance on trust will emerge only as a consequence of repeated market transactions between the parties affirming the observance of norms of equity of both parties. • The greater the ability to rely on trust, the less the risk inherent in transactions, <i>ceteris paribus</i>. • Varying levels of risk and reliance on trust will explain the governance structures of transactions. • Low risk, low reliance on trust transactions will be governed by markets, <i>ceteris paribus</i>. • High risk, low reliance on trust transactions will be governed by hierarchies, <i>ceteris paribus</i>. • Low risk, high reliance on trust transactions will be governed by recurrent contracts, <i>ceteris paribus</i>. • High risk, high reliance on trust transactions will be governed by relational governance, <i>ceteris paribus</i>. • The elaborateness of safeguards in relational contracts is a function of the perceived level of risk in a transaction and the reliance on trust by the parties to the exchange.
17	Abstract	Alliances and similar cooperative efforts are receiving increased attention in the strategic management literature. These

		relationships differ in significant ways from those governed by markets or hierarchies, and pose very different issues for researchers and managers. In this paper we address alternative forms of governance in cases where multiple organisations repeatedly cooperate. We explore their characteristics and follow this with a discussion of criteria which we believe bear on the choice of governance; risk and reliance on trust. We offer propositions on relationships between these criteria and the choice of governance mechanisms. In the concluding section of the paper we explore the implications of our analysis for managers and scholars.
18	Key words	Alliance; cooperative efforts; governance mechanisms; hierarchies; risk; reliance; trust.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics; Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); contracts; trust; cooperation; interdependence
22	Configuration Elements	Network; alliance
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	3.0

Data Extraction Form Number 106

01	Author of the article	Ring, Peter S. // Van De Ven, Andrew H.
02	Title of the article	Developing processes of cooperative IORs
03	Document name	Ring and Van de Ven, 1994
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Review
05	Date of publication	1994
06	Volume	19
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	90-118
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	The developmental processes of cooperative IORs (IORs) that we have elaborated in a set of propositions to explain how cooperative IORs emerge, evolve, and dissolve over time
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Congruent sense making among parties increases the likelihood of concluding formal negotiations to a cooperative IOR. • Congruent psychological contracts among parties increases the likelihood of establishing formal commitments to a cooperative IOR • If the individuals assigned to a cooperative IOR do not change, personal relationships increasingly supplement role relationships as a cooperative IOR develops over time • Informal psychological contracts increasingly compensate or substitute for formal contractual safeguards as reliance on trust among parties increases over time. • When the temporal duration of IORs is expected to exceed the tenure of agents, informal understandings and commitments will be formalized. • As the temporal duration of a cooperative IOR increases, the likelihood decreases that parties will terminate the relationship when a breach of commitments occurs. • When significant imbalances between formal and informal processes arise in repetitive sequences of negotiation, commitment, and execution stages over time, the likelihood of dissolving the cooperative IOR increases.
17	Abstract	This article examines the developmental process of cooperative

		IORs that entail transaction-specific investments in deals that cannot be fully specified or controlled by the parties in advance of their execution. A process framework is introduced that focuses on formal, legal, and informal social-psychological processes by which organisational parties jointly negotiate, commit to, and execute their relationship in ways that achieve efficient and equitable outcomes and internal solutions to conflicts when they arise. The framework is elaborated with a set of propositions that explain how and why cooperative IORs emerge, evolve, and dissolve. The propositions have academic implications for enriching IORs, transaction cost economics, agency theories, and practical implications for managing the relationship journey
18	Key words	Cooperative IORs; transaction-specific investments; process framework; social-psychological processes; formal; legal; informal; internal solutions; transaction cost economics; agency theories;
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics; Agency Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); contracts; trust; cooperation; interdependence
22	Configuration Elements	IORs
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing IORs
24	Unit of analysis	IORs
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 107

01	Author of the article	David, Robert J. // Han, Shin-Kap
02	Title of the article	A systematic assessment of the empirical support for transaction cost economics
03	Document name	Robert and Han, 2004
04	Journal title	Strategic Management Journal
05	Date of publication	2004
06	Volume	25
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	39-58
09	Paper Type	Literature Review
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	63 articles,
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	Comparative analysis
15	Study Characteristics	<p>This review seeks to reconcile the gap between TCE's prominence as a theoretical framework and the doubt about its empirical grounding. With clearly outlined procedures for selecting and evaluating empirical studies, this study sets out to gauge the level of support for TCE's core propositions and to thereby identify areas in which the theory is more (or less) successful. In order to situate the debate in a broader context, the issue of paradigm consensus within the empirical TCE literature is also investigated.</p>
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As asset specificity increases, transaction costs associated with market governance increase. • As asset specificity increases, hybrids and hierarchies become preferred over markets; at high levels of asset specificity, hierarchy becomes the preferred governance form. • When asset specificity is present to a nontrivial degree, uncertainty raises the transaction costs associated with market governance. • When asset specificity is present to a nontrivial degree, increasing uncertainty renders markets preferable to hybrids and hierarchies preferable to both hybrids and markets. • When both asset specificity and uncertainty are high, hierarchy is the most cost-effective governance mode. • Governance modes that are aligned with transaction characteristics should display performance advantages over other modes; for example, when both asset specificity and uncertainty are high, hierarchy should display performance advantages over markets and hybrids. • TCE predicts that uncertainty will only affect governance

		form when asset specificity is present to a nontrivial degree.
17	Abstract	Transaction cost economics (TCE) is one of the leading perspectives in management and organisational studies, yet debate continues regarding its empirical support. In this paper, we take stock of the large body of extant research and provide a systematic assessment of empirical evidence. In all, 308 statistical tests from 63 articles, selected according to a set of clear criteria, were examined across various dimensions. We assess not only the level of empirical support for the theory, but also the degree of paradigm consensus present in the empirical literature. Our analysis shows that results are mixed: while we found support in some areas (e.g., with regard to asset specificity), we also found considerable disagreement on how to operationalize some of TCE's central constructs and propositions, and relatively low levels of empirical support in other core areas (e.g., surrounding uncertainty and performance). We conclude that a more thorough empirical grounding of the theory's foundation is crucial to its future development, and offer several strategies for doing this.
18	Key words	Organisational structure; costs; transaction cost economics.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit); contracts
22	Configuration Elements	Markets; hierarchies; hybrids
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	NA
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 108

01	Author of the article	Rossetti, Christian L. // Choi, Thomas Y.
02	Title of the article	On the dark side of strategic sourcing: Experience from the aerospace industry
03	Document name	Rossetti and Choi, 2005
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Executives
05	Date of publication	2005
06	Volume	19
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	46-60
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Aerospace
12	Sample size	33 individuals working in 2 OEMS
13	Data collection method	Semi structured interviews
14	Method of data analysis	Thematic Analysis after transcription and coding of interviews
15	Study Characteristics	Empirical study , focused towards practioners using aerospace example
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Driven by 2 unfulfilled promises of strategic sourcing (lack of close working relationships and diminished competitive advantage) worst position OEMs can take is to focus on short-term profits and sacrifice long term gains. • Forced by the pressure placed on the purchasing department to deliver year-over-year price reduction, strategic sourcing and commodity management damage buyer-supplier relationship irretrievably. • Disillusioned suppliers refuse to tolerate broken long term agreements by saying ‘no’ to unfair practices and establish direct relationship with the customers bypassing the OEMs. • OEMs must: a) accept the fact that the SCD has occurred; b) realize that suppliers are practicing a new form of competition; c) form a closer coalition with aircraft operators; and d) build a relationship with final consumers— airline passengers. • Harnessing the full capabilities of a supplier requires a long-term, trusting relationship. Such a relationship is characterized by give-and-take attitudes, free-flowing technology and information, and the knowledge that neither party will be taken advantage of. • Trust allows organisations to plan for the future of a relationship as: a) engineering resources are fully committed to the buyer’s problems as the suppliers are

		focusing on the buying company's problems; b) inventory policies can be optimized facilitating postponement policies and transferring risk to the party best able to manage it; c) new product cycle times can be reduced since suppliers can purchase equipment without worrying about lengthy contract negotiations; and d) learning increases as suppliers no longer hold back key information to use as leverage in renegotiations.
17	Abstract	American manufacturing has undergone dramatic changes during the last two decades. Manufacturing organisations were re-engineered, downsized, and restructured. Employees were dismissed, divisions were scrapped, and subsidiaries were spun off. As a consequence, outsourcing to external suppliers increased significantly, which in turn resulted in the increased saliency of strategic sourcing and its economic implications. Strategic sourcing integrates the buying organisation's strategic decisions with those of its key suppliers, thus promoting trust and decreasing transaction costs. However, a dark side of strategic sourcing has emerged. Some organisations established long-term contracts with their suppliers, set up mutually dependent relationships, and then began to strangle suppliers with relentlessly short-term, cost-driven decisions. As a result, the buying organisations and their suppliers have now become competitors in the same market. Simply put, there is serious long-term risk associated with organisations becoming strategically integrated with suppliers and then mistreating them for short-term gains. This paper demonstrates that misapplying the tenets of strategic sourcing can result in the disintegration of the existing supply chain and weaken the buying organisation's long-term competitiveness
18	Key words	Coordination mechanism, distribution channels, multitier supply chains sourcing selection, supplier relationship management, supply chain contracts and incentives.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Balance Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); contracts; trust; interdependence
22	Configuration Elements	Network; triads
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 109

01	Author of the article	Rossetti, Christian L. // Choi, Thomas Y.
02	Title of the article	Supply chain management under high goal incongruence: An empirical examination of disintermediation in the aerospace supply chain
03	Document name	Rossetti and Choi, 2008
04	Journal title	Decision Sciences
05	Date of publication	2008
06	Volume	39
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	507-540
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Mixed methods)
10	Geographical location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Aerospace
12	Sample size	134 business-to-business relationships consisting of 27 OEMs and 107 suppliers
13	Data collection Method	Internet-based survey using self-administered questionnaire; archival data
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis; hypothesis testing using SEM (Lisrel 8.7)
15	Study Characteristics	This study examine SCD as a contracting problem by contextualizing agency constructs which result in testable relationships to predict the degree to which a supplier will enter its OEM buyer's aftermarket.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buyer-supplier research has not examined relationships where the supplier has the strategic option of SCD. Researchers have implicitly assumed that buyers can change suppliers as long as switching costs are low. • Goal incongruence can be caused by three factors: contract compensation, attractiveness of alternatives, and contractual flexibility. • Goal incongruence need not lead to opportunistic behaviour due to the two moderating conditions: a) the principal's ability to enforce the contract through monitoring and penalties; and b) the agent may not be capable of opportunistic behaviour. • OEM buyers by not creating efficient contracts, increase goal incongruence in their buyer-supplier relationship forcing suppliers to behave opportunistically and sell parts directly to aftermarket customers. • In normal buyer-supplier relationship, it is presumed that OEM buyer is the principal; however nature of the agency problem changes when the OEM resells the part produced by the supplier to an aftermarket. • When goals cannot be aligned in the relationship, buyers typically use monitoring and threat of penalties to decrease the

		<p>probability of opportunistic behaviour.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When a supplier can hide its activities from the buyer, there is greater probability that the supplier will successfully engage in SCD.
17	Abstract	<p>Aftermarket sales and profits are becoming an increasingly important part of an OEM's business model. Because replacement parts often do not require further manufacturing, OEMs act as intermediaries in the aftermarket. As with any intermediary, the OEM must concern itself with suppliers disintermediating its supply chain selling replacement parts directly to the OEM's customers. We frame SCD (SCD) as a principal-agent contracting problem between an OEM buyer and a supplier. Hypotheses relate contract conditions, goal incongruence, supplier capabilities and contract enforcement to SCD. The data are collected from the aerospace industry using a multi-method study, combining an Internet-based survey with archival data. Causal modeling with structural equation modeling (SEM) shows general support for the hypotheses. Particularly, SCD is positively related to buyer-supplier goal incongruence. The agency model offers insights that differ from previous transaction-cost-based models of buyer-supplier relationships. OEM buyers with a lucrative aftermarket should consider aligning goals through incentives rather than relying entirely on economic hostages associated with specific assets.</p>
18	Key words	Agency theory, coordination mechanism, distribution channels, multitier supply chains sourcing selection, supplier relationship management, supply chain contracts and incentives.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Agency Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); contracts; trust; interdependence
22	Configuration Elements	Network; triads
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 110

01	Author of the article	Rowley, Tim // Behrens, Dean // Krackhardt, David
02	Title of the article	Redundant governance structures: An analysis of structural and relational embeddedness in the steel and semiconductor industries
03	Document name	Rowley et al., 2000
04	Journal title	Strategic Management Journal
05	Date of publication	2000
06	Volume	21
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	369-386
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Steel industry; semiconductors industry
12	Sample size	270 alliances (including 138 from steel industry and 132 from semi conductor industry)
13	Data collection method	Alliance data from electronic data bases: CMP Media Inc.; Dow Jones; Metal Bulletin
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis including factor analysis and regression analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study is useful for identifying sources of competitive advantage in interorganisational networks by reconciling some of the competing arguments surrounding how relational and structural embeddedness factors influence organisation performance.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The argument that strong ties can lead to effective inter-organisational linkages and competitive advantage because they build trust-based governance and lead to norms of reciprocity and mutual gain is not supported by the results. • This study offers empirical support for a contingency based argument, which suggests that both strong and weak ties are beneficial to organisations, but under different conditions-for different purposes and at different times. • Dense interconnections and strong ties are alternative social control mechanisms, which in combination provide little additional benefit. Because there are costs associated with forming and maintaining strategic ties, especially strong ties, the utilization of strong ties in a dense network takes resources away from other functions that can add value to the organisation. • The weak and strong tie arguments need to be bound by particular populations and/or purposes. The strong tie argument is credible when dealing with lower environmental uncertainty and a competitive environment demanding a high degree of exploration. The results provide support for the weak tie argument, especially within an uncertain environment, which demand more exploration into new

		<p>innovations and alternative strategic directions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interconnectedness among an organisation's partners inhibits the organisation's ability to gain access to multiple, non-redundant information sources. A densely interconnected ego network, however, furnishes the organisation with access to redundant information sources, which provide a means for evaluating and improving the information received from each source.
17	Abstract	<p>Network researchers have argued that both relational embeddedness-characteristics of relationships - and structural embeddedness - characteristics of the relational structure - influence organisation behaviour and performance. Using strategic alliance networks in the semiconductor and steel industries, past embeddedness research is built on by examining the interaction of these factors. It is argued that the roles relational and structural embeddedness play in organisation performance can only be understood with reference to the other. Moreover, it is argued that the influence of these factors on organisation performance is contingent on industry context. More specifically, the empirical analysis suggests that strong ties in a highly interconnected strategic alliance network negatively impact organisation performance. This network configuration is especially suboptimal for organisations in the semiconductor industry. Furthermore, strong and weak ties are positively related to organisation performance in the steel and semiconductor industries, respectively.</p>
18	Key words	Organisational studies; organisational structure; steel industry; semiconductors; alliances; strategic management; comparative analysis; statistical analysis.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); relational norms
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; strategic alliances
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 111

01	Author of the article	Rowley, Timothy J.
02	Title of the article	Moving beyond dyadic ties: A network theory of stakeholder influences
03	Document name	Rowley, 1997
04	Journal title	Academy of Management Review
05	Date of publication	1997
06	Volume	22
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	887-910
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	The core argument of this paper is that to build a stakeholder theory of the organisation, researchers must move beyond the analysis of dyadic relationships. This article contributes to stakeholder research by providing a mechanism for describing the simultaneous influence of multiple stakeholders and for predicting organisations' responses.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As network density increases, the ability of a focal organisation's stakeholders to constrain the organisation's actions increases. • As the focal organisation's centrality increases, its ability to resist stakeholder pressures increases. • Other things being equal, under conditions of high density and high centrality, the focal organisation will adopt a compromiser role, attempting to negotiate with its stakeholders. • Other things being equal, under conditions of low density and high centrality, the focal organisation will adopt a commander role, attempting to control stakeholder behaviours and expectations. • Other things being equal, under conditions of high density and low centrality, the focal organisation will adopt a subordinate role, attempting to comply with stakeholder expectations. • Other things being equal, under conditions of low density and low centrality, the focal organisation will adopt a solitarian role, attempting to avoid stakeholder pressures.
17	Abstract	Stakeholder theory development has increased in recent years, in part because of its emphasis on explaining and predicting how an

		organisation functions with respect to the relationships and influences existing in its environment. Thus far, most researchers have concentrated on dyadic relationships between individual stakeholders and a focal organisation. Using social network analysis, a theory of stakeholder influences is constructed, which accommodates multiple, interdependent stakeholder demands and predicts how organisations respond to the simultaneous influence of multiple stakeholders.
18	Key words	Stake holder theory; organisational relationships; influence; social network analysis
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Stakeholder Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Network; density; centrality
23	Relationship Directionality	Network influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 112

01	Author of the article	Schurr, Paul H.
02	Title of the article	Buyer-seller relationship development episodes: theories and methods
03	Document name	Schurr, 2007
04	Journal title	Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing
05	Date of publication	2007
06	Volume	22
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	161-170
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This paper investigates the critical and non-critical interaction episodes that fundamentally strengthen or fatally weaken IOR development.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relationship constructs refer to characteristics that are more generalized and more long-term in nature than interaction episodes. Interactions are short-term, dynamic, and comprised of actions associated with exchange and adaptation between organisations. Exchanges may include social, informational, and economic content. • Interaction episodes are acts closely connected in time involving business associates, and relationships are (conceptually) higher-level manifestations of connected episodes. • Interaction episodes are events that are distinctive and separate although part of a larger series. A critical interaction episode causes significant change in a relationship • A non-critical episode by itself does not cause significant change. However, in combination with a larger series of other non-critical episodes, relationship change occurs. • The five characteristics to explain the hurdles faced in business relationships are: a) social distance is inversely related to the degree of familiarity buyers and sellers have with each other; b) cultural distance is inversely related to similarity in norms, values, and working methods; c) differences in a buyer's and a seller's product and process technologies is termed technological distance; d) time distance concerns separation between events in a purchase process; and e) geographical distance refers to physical miles

		<p>between two locations. All five forms of distance are reduced by interaction.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reputation refers to the overall quality or character of a person or business as judged by others in the network. A strong, positive reputation shortens the trust-building process and reduces transaction uncertainty. A negative, damaged reputation substantially increases the number of episodes devoted to building trust.
17	Abstract	<p>For the benefit of those who want to address gaps in our understanding of business relationships, this paper considers the importance of non-critical episodes in business relationships. Particular attention is paid to the enduring yet frequently modified critical incident technique associated with Flanagan. Episode relationship theory, the qualitative/quantitative debate, and the critical incident technique (CIT) literature are selectively reviewed and critically assessed. First, because business relationships tend to persist, episode research must advance beyond relationship dissolution studies and progress into investigations of how different types of interactions change relationships. New types of episodes need to be studied, such as the generative, degenerative, and neutral episodes discussed here. Also, functionally distinct characteristic and non-critical episodes are conceptualized. Second, the methods review suggests that useful qualitative methods deserve more attention. Third, though CIT research is prevalent in the marketing literature, it is at present incompletely adapted to business marketing research and needs development along the lines suggested in this article. The interaction perspective on business relationships is given a dynamic framework at the interaction episode level while keeping the connection to the more macro relationship development models that conceptualize relationship states and processes.</p>
18	Key words	Episode relationship theory; critical incident technique; buyers; sellers; relationships.
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Not provided
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit);
22	Configuration Elements	Relationships (buyer-seller)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing relationships
24	Unit of analysis	Relationships (buyer-seller)
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 113

01	Author of the article	Uzzi, Brian
02	Title of the article	Social structure and competition in inter-organisational networks: The paradox of embeddedness
03	Document name	Uzzi, 1997
04	Journal title	Administrative Science Quarterly
05	Date of publication	1997
06	Volume	42
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	35-67
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Apparel industry
12	Sample size	23 entrepreneurial organisations
13	Data collection method	Ethnographic Field Work including open ended interviews and field observations
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis; grounded theory building techniques
15	Study Characteristics	This paper offers an explanation of the links between social structure, micro behavioural decision-making processes, and economic outcomes within the context of organisational networks.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Different accounts of transacting can be accurately summarized by two forms of exchange: arm's-length ties (market relationships) and embedded ties (close or special relationships). • Trust is the belief that an exchange partner would not act in self-interest at another's expense and appeared to operate not like calculated risk but like a heuristic--a predilection to assume the best when interpreting another's motives and actions. • Trust is a governance structure that resides in the social relationship between and among individuals and cognitively is based on heuristic rather than calculative processing. In this sense, trust is fundamentally a social process. • Information exchange in embedded relationships is more proprietary and tacit than the price and quantity data that are traded in arm's-length ties. • Fine-grained information transfer benefits networked organisations by increasing the breadth and ordering of their behavioural options and the accuracy of their long-run forecasts. Fine-grained information transfer is also more than a matter of asset-specific know-how or reducing information asymmetry between parties, because the social relationship enriches information with reliability and meaning beyond its

		<p>face value.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embedded ties entail problem-solving mechanisms that enable actors to coordinate functions and work out problems "on the fly." These arrangements typically consist of routines of negotiation and mutual adjustment that flexibly resolve problem. • Embeddedness promotes economies of time (the ability to capitalize quickly on market opportunities), because the transactional details normally worked out to protect against opportunism (contracts, price negotiations, scheduling) in arm's-length relationships prior to production are negotiated on the fly or after production is completed. • In embedded ties: a) contracting costs are avoided, because organisations trust that payoffs will be divided equitably, even when comparative market transactions do not exist; b) fine-grained information transfer speeds data exchange and helps organisations understand each other's production methods so that decision making can be quickened; and c) joint problem-solving arrangements also increase the speed at which products are brought to market by resolving problems in real time during production.
17	Abstract	<p>A study develops a systematic understanding of embeddedness and organisation networks. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted at 23 entrepreneurial organisations, study identifies the components of embedded relationships and explicates the devices by which embeddedness shapes organisational and economic outcomes. Findings suggest that embeddedness is logic of exchange that promotes economies of time, integrative agreements, Pareto improvements in allocative efficiency, and complex adaptation. These positive effects rise up to a threshold, however, after which embeddedness can derail economic performance by making organisations vulnerable to exogenous shocks or insulating them from information that exists beyond their network. The framework explains how these properties vary with quality of social ties, structure of the organisational network, and an organisation's structural position in network.</p>
18	Key words	<p>Organisational studies; behavioural sciences; economics; competition; clothing industry; cooperation; efficiency; embeddedness; networks</p>
19	Organisation Field	<p>Strategic Management</p>
20	Theoretical Lens	<p>Social Exchange Theory</p>
21	Mode of Governance	<p>Informal (implicit)</p>
22	Configuration Elements	<p>Network; embedded ties</p>
23	Relationship Directionality	<p>Organisation influencing network</p>
24	Unit of analysis	<p>Network</p>
25	Unit of data collection	<p>Individual</p>
26	Research perspective	<p>Cross-sectional approach</p>
27	Quality Appraisal Score	<p>2.0</p>

Data Extraction Form Number 114

01	Author of the article	van der Valk, Wendy // van Iwaarden, Jos
02	Title of the article	Monitoring in Service Triads Consisting of Buyers, Subcontractors, and End Customers
03	Document name	van der Valk and van Iwaarden, 2011
04	Journal title	Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management
05	Date of publication	2011
06	Volume	17
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	198-206
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	The Netherlands
11	Context/Industry	Exhibition centre planner
12	Sample size	2 service providing organisations
13	Data collection method	Semi-structured interviews (face-to-face and telephonic); document studies; participant observations
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study attempts to examine the impact of contractual agreements and buyer-sub-contractor or monitoring activities in service triads
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outsourced service production can be properly governed by the right combination of contracts and monitoring activities. • Relational governance outweighs contractual governance. Although behaviour-based contracts may not always be preferred, the presence of social contract may aid in preventing the subcontractor from displaying reactant behaviour and behave according to that social norm.
17	Abstract	Organisations increasingly outsource service delivery to specialist subcontractors. These buyers, their subcontractors and their end customers operate in a triadic service relationship. In these triads, the buyer lacks direct control over service delivery and completely depends on the subcontractor for its performance towards its end customers. Subcontractors are confronted with two principals (buyer and end customer) who may have conflicting objectives. Although traditionally focusing on dyadic buyer-seller relationships rather than triads, Agency Theory provides valuable suggestions on the type of contract to be used and the type of monitoring to be employed. We adopt Agency Theory as an analytical lens to look at the buyer-subcontractor-end customer triad and develop propositions on the design of contractual arrangements and monitoring activities. We use the results of two cases of service triads to provide some initial validation for these propositions.
18	Key words	Business services; service triads; agency theory; social contracts;

		monitoring
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Agency Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Network; triad
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross section approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 115

01	Author of the article	Villena, Veronica H.// Revilla E.// Choi, Thomas.Y.
02	Title of the article	The dark side of buyer-supplier relationships: A social capital perspective
03	Document name	Vellena et al., 2011
04	Journal title	Journal of Operations Management
05	Date of publication	2011
06	Volume	29
07	Number	6
08	Page numbers	561-576
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	Spain
11	Context/Industry	6 industrial sectors including: a) food and beverage; b) chemical and pharmaceutical; c) automotive; d) textile; e) paper; f) electronic; and g) metal.
12	Sample size	132 supply chain managers at strategic decision-making levels.
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire; archival data
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis; OLS regression
15	Study Characteristics	Empirical based and theory driven study evaluating how social capital in its cognitive, relational, and structural forms contributes to or impedes value creation within BSR
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collaboration between supply chain members can become a key mechanism to reduce conflicts and foster teamwork. But, if taken to extreme, it can also inhibit the partnering companies' capabilities to effectively adapt to changing markets. • Relational social capital is more critical as compared with cognitive or structural social capital when the buyer and supplier pursue strategic benefits. • The strength of social relations (relational capital) has a higher marginal effect on performance than the frequency and diversity of contacts (structural capital); shared vision (cognitive capital) has a positive linear relationship with performance. • Buyers should expect that when they are working with a collaborative supplier to achieve operational benefits they will reach the point of diminishing return faster than when they are pursuing strategic benefits.
17	Abstract	The literature on supply chain management (SCM) has consistently promoted the "bright side" of collaborative buyer-supplier relationships (BSRs). Based on the social capital argument, SCM scholars have investigated how a buyer can gain access to and leverage resources through its collaborative

		BSRs. Our study extends this research stream by considering the “dark side” of social capital in BSRs. It evaluates how social capital in its cognitive, relational, and structural forms contributes to or impedes value creation within BSRs. Both primary survey measures and secondary objective measures have been used in data analysis. The results show the presence of both the bright side, confirming the existing literature, and the dark side, extending the literature. There is an inverted curvilinear relationship between social capital and performance: Either too little or too much social capital can hurt performance. This study confirms that building social capital in a collaborative BSR positively affects buyer performance, but that if taken to an extreme it can reduce the buyer’s ability to be objective and make effective decisions as well as increase the supplier’s opportunistic behaviour. Our study also examines how a buyer can delay the emergence of the dark side. It opens up new research avenues in the collaborative BSR context and suggests directions for future research and practice.
18	Key words	Social capital, buyer-supplier relationships, performance
19	Organisation Field	Operations Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Capital Perspective
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (implicit); collaboration; interdependence
22	Configuration Elements	Relationships (buyer-seller)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing relationships
24	Unit of analysis	Relationships (buyer-seller)
25	Unit of data collection	Individuals
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach

Data Extraction Form Number 116

01	Author of the article	Verwaal, Ernst // Hesselmanns, Maurice
02	Title of the article	Drivers of supply network governance
03	Document name	Verwaal and Hesselmanns, 2004
04	Journal title	European Management Journal
05	Date of publication	2004
06	Volume	22
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	442-451
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	The Netherlands
11	Context/Industry	Chemical Industry
12	Sample size	6 case companies
13	Data collection method	Face-to-face interviews with the CEO's; archival data
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study used data collected from the Dutch chemical industry to tests propositions based on leading theoretical perspectives on governance structures.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supply network governance is a hybrid form of governance where the participants in a supply chain have created a set of collaboration processes that allows them to work together as an integrated organisation. • In a dominated supply network a few players in the supply chain coordinate the network activities on a permanent basis where as in an equal partner supply network reputation, trust and tacit collusion establish the network identity. • A transaction is characterized by structural features such as asset-specific investment and uncertainty. When an organisation has highly specific assets these should be owned and controlled internally. Non-specific transactions on the other hand can be handled by market exchange, since markets more efficiently organize these. • To avoid the risks of opportunistic behaviour, organisations prefer more integrated governance structures. Thus, asset-specific investment is expected to be present in more integrated governance structures. • Both market and technological uncertainty can effectively be dealt with through long-term partnerships in which partner organisations share the costs of unexpected events and developments. • Supply networks are a useful governance structure to deal with: a) uncertainty since it enables organisations to be specialized and flexible; and b) fast technological

		<p>changes than a pure market relationship because of more extensive knowledge sharing.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where interdependence among organisational activities is: a) low the organisations studied indicated a preference market exchange; and b) high the organisational structure tended to be more integrated. For non-core activities long-term partnerships are preferred above market exchange because of the high level of asset-specific investments that is required. • Organisations achieve relational rents through shared investments in non-core activities. The role of relational rents is secondary to the role of interdependence of activities, as relational rents are sacrificed to maintain control over the core activities of the organisation. • Knowledge sharing is a: a) weak driver of supply network governance; and b) a positive consequence of a long-term relationship.
17	Abstract	<p>The authors identify a number of drivers of supply network governance, a widely appraised governance form aimed at reaping the benefits of both vertical integration and market exchange. Case studies conducted in the Dutch chemical industry are used to explore these drivers. The findings identify interdependence of organisational activities and asset-specific investments as the key drivers of supply network governance in the chemical industry. Organisations enjoy relational rents and tend to share knowledge in supply network relationships, however these factors seem to strengthen supply network relationships rather than create them.</p>
18	Key words	Supply networks, Governance structures, Chemical industry
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Informal (explicit); information exchange; relational rents
22	Configuration Elements	Supply Networks; markets; vertical integration
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Networks
25	Unit of data collection	Individuals
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.5

Data Extraction Form Number 117

01	Author of the article	Wathne, Kenneth // Heide, Jan B.
02	Title of the article	Relational governance in a supply chain network
03	Document name	Wathne and Heide, 2004
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing
05	Date of publication	2004
06	Volume	68
07	Number	NA
08	Page numbers	73-89
09	Paper Type	Empirical
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Standard Industrial Classification Group 23 (apparel manufacturing) and their relationships with (upstream) contractors and (downstream) retailers
12	Sample size	Sample of 421 apparel companies from the first phase of data collection with the subsample of 81 apparel companies.
13	Data collection method	Mail survey questionnaires
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis
15	Study Characteristics	The main premise of the theoretical argument is that flexibility downstream is partly a function of a manufacturer's governance efforts in the upstream supply market.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • By dedicating assets, the supplier essentially reduces its ability (and thus becomes a 'hostage') to replace the particular manufacturer, because the assets can be used only in that particular relationship. • The ability of an upstream supplier hostage to promote flexible adaptation to changing circumstances downstream depends on both the level of the supplier's hostage and the match with a manufacturer hostage. • The effect of a supplier hostage is contingent on the extent to which the manufacturer has made a corresponding investment in the relationship. If both parties commit, a condition of mutual lock-in is created. Ultimately, from the supplier's standpoint, a bilateral exchange of hostages significantly reduces the ongoing expropriation risks in the relationship. • Individual relationships in a larger network are connected and the ability to adapt to uncertainty in one relationship depends in part on an organisation having deployed particular governance mechanisms (qualification and hostages) in another. • The manufacturer needs to consider possible constraints throughout the supply chain that may affect its ability to meet customers' needs. The constraints include possible governance problems due to incompatible goals and/or

		<p>opportunism in the upstream supply market. On the basis of an assessment of the potential problems, the manufacturer can deploy particular governance mechanisms in the relationship.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The effect of downstream uncertainty on apparel company flexibility will shift across the range of upstream qualification and incentive structure.
17	Abstract	<p>The authors examine how an organisation's strategy in a (downstream) customer relationship is contingent on how a related relationship outside of the focal dyad is organized. Drawing on emerging perspectives on inter-organisational governance and networks, the authors propose that the ability to show flexibility toward a (downstream) customer under uncertain market conditions depends on the governance mechanisms that have been deployed in an (upstream) supplier relationship. The governance mechanisms take the form of (1) supplier qualification programs and (2) incentive structures based on hostages. The authors develop a set of contingency predictions and test them empirically in the context of vertical supply chain networks in the apparel industry. The tests show good support for the hypotheses. The authors discuss the implications of the findings for marketing theory and practice.</p>
18	Key words	Governance mechanism; network; vertical supply chain; buyer; supplier; apparel
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit); supplier qualification programs; incentive structures based on hostages
22	Configuration Elements	Supply network; vertical supply chain; buyer-supplier relationship
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing network
24	Unit of analysis	Networks
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 118

01	Author of the article	Wilding, Richard // Humphries, Andrew S.
02	Title of the article	Understanding collaborative supply chain relationships through the application of the Williamson organisational failure framework
03	Document name	Wilding and Humphries, 2006
04	Journal title	International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management
05	Date of publication	2006
06	Volume	36
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	309-329
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	UK
11	Context/Industry	Defence industry (procurement)
12	Sample size	115 individuals representing 54 monopolistic B2B relationships
13	Data collection method	Face-to-face semi structured interviews
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study highlights that C ³ (co-operative, co-coordinating, collaborative) counteracts negative behaviour influencing long-term, close collaborations.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C³ behaviour inevitably puts pressure on relationships because compromises that reduce freedom of action cannot be avoided. • C³ behaviour reduces sources of frustration that generate negative behaviours by taking joint actions to seek innovative ways of dealing with “environmental” problems such as old products, obsolescence, staff and organisational upheavals, poor end-customer visibility and lack of investment in modern procedures and systems. • To halt negative behaviour spirals, the following steps should be taken: a) setting synchronized objectives; b) pursuing joint approaches to service and product delivery; c) lowering costs and risks; and d) promoting measures to support the growth of trust appear. • Lack of investment in specific assets such as work force stability and product/process development, the use of inadequate performance measures, opportunistically providing poor goods and services and, using proprietary information as a weapon, reduces chances of achieving positively oriented, interdependence and perceptions of equitable outcomes.
17	Abstract	Within the supply chain the need for much closer, long-term relationships is increasing due to supplier rationalization and globalization and more information about these interactions is required. The research specifically tested the well-accepted Williamson’s economic organisations failure framework as a

		<p>theoretical model through which long-term collaborative relationships can be viewed. An exploratory research project was designed and carried out on a self-selected census of 54 monopolistic relationships representing £575.8 m annual spend on equipment and associated services within the UK defence procurement organisation (a 10 per cent sample). Its aims were to understand the relationship dynamics within long-term, sustained monopolies and to determine if generic success factors could be found to assist managers to break out of the essentially negative situation. A triangulated data capture approach was employed using both quantitative and qualitative methods from both the industry and MoD sides of each relationship and the research instruments concentrated on the five dimensions of the theoretical model with questions grounded in the literature. The study demonstrated that the theoretical model could provide powerful insights into the research subject and especially revealed the important part played by co-operation, co-ordination and collaboration (C³ behaviour) in reducing the inherently negative effects of close proximity and limited choice relationships. The research has used a narrow view through a specific theoretical model lens to achieve a broad understanding of business relationships within a single, albeit large, organisation. Managers can reduce sources of frustration that generate negative behaviours by taking joint actions. Central to achieving this is C³ behaviour where setting synchronized objectives, pursuing joint approaches to service and product delivery, lowering costs and risks and promoting measures to support the growth of trust appear to be the best ways of halting negative behaviour spirals. This exploratory research exposes the relationship dynamics within a large sample of long-term, collaborative supply chain business dyads using an integrated application of Williamson's organisations failure framework.</p>
18	Key words	Cooperation; coordination; collaboration; relationships; defence industry; procurement
19	Organisation Field	Supply Chain Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); cooperation; coordination; collaboration; relationships
22	Configuration Elements	Supply Chain; relationships (inter-organisational)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing
24	Unit of analysis	Relationships (inter-organisational)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 119

01	Author of the article	Wilke, Ricky // Ritter, Thomas
02	Title of the article	Levels of analysis in business-to-business marketing
03	Document name	Wilke and Ritter, 2006
04	Journal title	Journal of business-to-business marketing
05	Date of publication	2006
06	Volume	13
07	Number	3
08	Page numbers	39-64
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	This paper provides a detailed framework of different levels of analysis for both actors and structure.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Descriptions of society and its subsystems rest upon a system theory approach, while empirically tested theories are usually oriented towards one of the most important explanations after the principle of linear causality (causal effect occurring sequentially). By breaking the subsystems down into simpler components (such as structures, relationships or individuals) causal effect may become more understandable. • Individuals can be seen as the lowest level of analysis, which fulfill a certain role in a given context. Groups, teams or departments are collections of individuals all aligned to a joint task and, thus, sharing some values and work practices. Organisations are seen as larger collections of groups with potentially different values and work practices. The level of abstraction and complexity increases as various corporate visions, strategies and cultures are considered at the level of industries. • At the lowest level of analysis within business-to-business marketing, an individual's characteristics are analyzed. Hereby variables are considered, such as an individual's personality, age or educational background. • At the group level issues like group processes, division of labour, portfolio of qualifications in the group are considered. • At the organisation level, studies analyze the interplay between different department, e.g., sales and marketing, marketing and finance, marketing and production. • At the dyad level, focus is placed on exchange episodes (a

		<p>delivery, a payment, a meeting) and the coordination of the two organisations' activities and the development of the relationship between the two actors.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On the portfolio level, the studies are on customer and supplier portfolios. Most studies try either to differentiate relationships into different groups or to detect interconnections within the set of relationships. • The study of triads and nets forms the next level. The network level examines the formal or informal connections between various relationships. A network can be interpreted as all systems that meet the necessary criteria in order to characterize them as social systems.
17	Abstract	<p>Over the last 50 plus years, many authors have contributed to our understanding of business markets. As this research area is complex, researchers have addressed issues from different levels of analysis hereby also using a variety of theories (e.g., economics, sociology, psychology). In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of those contributions and to shed light on research in business-to-business marketing as a discipline, it is important to define the different levels of analysis so that the different studies can be viewed in relation to each other. Therefore, this paper develops such framework for business-to-business marketing. The framework also sensitizes researchers to the relationship between the level of analysis and the level at which data is collected. Furthermore, the framework can be applied to map the research areas within the business-to-business marketing field and to define areas of further investigation.</p>
18	Key words	Level of analysis; observations; paradigms; research; theory; business marketing; industrial marketing
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Mutli-level theories
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; portfolio; dyad; organisation; group; individual
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influence network
24	Unit of analysis	Networks; portfolio; dyad; organisation; group; individual
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 120

01	Author of the article	Williamson, Oliver E.
02	Title of the article	Comparative Economic Organisation: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives
03	Document name	Williamson, 1991
04	Journal title	Administrative Science Quarterly
05	Date of publication	1991
06	Volume	36
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	269-296
09	Paper Type	Analytical (Conceptual)
10	Geographical Location	NA
11	Context/Industry	NA
12	Sample size	NA
13	Data collection method	NA
14	Method of data analysis	NA
15	Study Characteristics	<p>This paper approaches the study of economic organisation from a comparative institutional point of view in which transaction cost economizing is featured purpose in this paper is to extend and refine the apparatus out of which transaction cost economics works, thereby to respond to some of the leading criticisms by posing the problem of organisation as one of discrete structural analysis.</p>
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Beyond the contractual framework, each governance structure employs different means to regulate adaptability in transactions and to ensure coordination, enabling the various parties 'to work through their differences and get on with the job'. In TCE, this coordination is characterized by a trade-off between incentive and control intensities. • Transactions are organized through various governance structures, each with specific functioning costs. The choice of governance structure should be aligned with the characteristics of transactions, especially the specific investments required by transactions. Economic agents enjoy superior performance if transactions are properly aligned with a corresponding governance structure. • Market, hierarchical, or network formation of organisation are discrete structural alternatives for any transaction. Each is supported by a different contract law. Any governance structure is grounded in a contractual framework but is also characterized by control and incentive mechanisms that enable it to govern transactions • Markets are supported by classical contract law, by which the identities of the transacting parties are irrelevant and dependence slight. In market, strict adherence to contractual

		<p>terms prevails and courts are appealed to in case of dispute.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hybrid organisations are supported by neoclassical contracts in which parties are bilaterally dependent but remain autonomous and their identities matter. • Long-term contracts promote adaptation to absorb disturbances. They favour arbitration over litigation but do not exclude legal recourse. • Hierarchy is supported by employment contracts and is grounded on the principle of forbearance. The parties in a dispute resolve their differences internally, drawing on fiat (authority) that cannot be exercised in market.
17	Abstract	<p>This paper combines institutional economics with aspects of contract law and organisation theory to identify and explicate the key differences that distinguish three generic forms of economic organisation—market, hybrid, and hierarchy. The analysis shows that the three generic forms are distinguished by different coordinating and control mechanisms and by different abilities to adapt to disturbances. Also, each generic form is supported and defined by a distinctive type of contract law. The cost-effective choice of organisation form is shown to vary systematically with the attributes of transactions. The paper unifies two hitherto disjoint areas of institutional economics—the institutional environment and the institutions of governance—by treating the institutional environment as a locus of parameters, changes in which parameters bring about shifts in the comparative costs of governance. Changes in property rights, contract law, reputation effects, and uncertainty are investigated.'</p>
18	Key words	Studies; transaction costs; economic theory; organisational behaviour; antitrust
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit); contract law;
22	Configuration Elements	Market; hybrid; hierarchy
23	Relationship Directionality	NA
24	Unit of analysis	Organisation
25	Unit of data collection	NA
26	Research perspective	NA
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 121

01	Author of the article	Wu, Zhaohui // Choi, Thomas Y.
02	Title of the article	Supplier–supplier relationships in buyer–supplier triad: Building theories from eight case studies
03	Document name	Wu and Choi, 2005
04	Journal title	Journal of Operations Management
05	Date of publication	2005
06	Volume	24
07	Number	1
08	Page numbers	27-52
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Case study)
10	Geographical Location	Asia
11	Context/Industry	Computers; aerospace; telecommunication; automobile; pharmaceutical
12	Sample size	8 case studies (a case study equals a customer and its two suppliers)
13	Data collection method	Semi structured interviews (grounded theory building approach)
14	Method of data analysis	Content analysis after transcribing and coding of interview data (Miles and Huberman, 1994)
15	Study Characteristics	Using eight cases, this study identified five archetypes of supplier–supplier relationships. These archetypes capture the intricacies of the cooperative and competitive relational dynamics between suppliers.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The long-term buyer–supplier relationship does not prevent the buyer from finding alternate suppliers to create competition among suppliers. • Risk mitigation is the most salient driving force for the buyer in forging a particular type of supplier–supplier relationship. • When the supplier does not take the buyer’s intent personally and is able to rationalize it, this supplier ends up performing well in terms of competing against other suppliers and gaining future business from the buyer. • A supplier that is able to rationalize the contracting relationship from multiple, competing perspectives is more likely to collaborate than a supplier that interprets the relationship from only its own perspective. • Suppliers that focus on competition for excellence and continuous improvement are more likely to collaborate with competing suppliers than suppliers that only focus on immediate contractual gains. • A supplier that manages its relationships with other suppliers well is more likely to become a solution provider and consequently attains a larger share of supply responsibility from the buyer.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suppliers supplying complementary or interdependent products or services are more conducive to a collaborative supplier–supplier relationship than competing suppliers supplying identical products or services. • Suppliers, whose operations have become tightly coupled, willingly or unwillingly, are more likely to gain tacit knowledge than those suppliers whose operations are de-coupled.
17	Abstract	<p>Many researchers have studied how the buying company manages its relationship with suppliers (i.e. buyer–supplier relationship). Extending this genre of study, researchers have recently shown interest in investigating how the buying company manages relationships between the suppliers (i.e. supplier–supplier relationship). In other words, just as the relationship with the suppliers does, the relationships between suppliers have strategic implications for the buyer. We present in this study eight cases that describe supplier–supplier relationship dynamics. Using theory building through case studies, we identify five archetypes of supplier–supplier relationships. Each type of relationship is a unique configuration of the relational characteristics. We also present working propositions that associate the antecedent conditions that lead to these archetypes and eventual performance implications.</p>
18	Key words	Supplier–supplier relationships; buyer–supplier relationships; supply chain management; archetypes; operations strategy; case studies
19	Organisation Field	Operations Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Grounded Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; triads; relationships (buyer-supplier)
23	Relationship Directionality	Relationships influencing networks
24	Unit of analysis	Relationships (buyer-supplier) embedded in triads
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 122

01	Author of the article	Wu, Zhaohui // Choi, Thomas Y. // Rungtusanatham, Johnny M.
02	Title of the article	Supplier–supplier relationships in buyer–supplier–supplier triads: Implications for supplier performance
03	Document name	Wu et al., 2010
04	Journal title	Journal of Operations Management
05	Date of publication	2010
06	Volume	28
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	115-123
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Mixed methods)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Aerospace-related manufacturing
12	Sample size	43 triads
13	Data collection method	Interviews (Telephonic and face-to-face); Statistical analysis
14	Method of data analysis	Qualitative inductive analysis; confirmatory factor analysis; regression analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This study focuses on co-coopetitive supplier–supplier relationships in buyer–supplier–supplier triads. Specifically, the analytical linkages among supplier–supplier co-coopetition, buyer influence (i.e., the buyer’s behaviour in managing supplier–supplier co-coopetition), and overall supplier performance.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In a buyer–supplier–supplier triad, buyer influence has a direct and positive effect on supplier–supplier co-coopetition such that stronger buyer influence is associated with more intense supplier–supplier co-coopetition. • In a buyer–supplier–supplier triad, supplier–supplier co-coopetition has a direct and positive effect on supplier performance such that more intense supplier–supplier co-coopetition is associated with better supplier performance.
17	Abstract	A growing number of studies and evidence from industries suggest that, besides managing the relationship with its suppliers, a buyer needs to proactively manage the relationships between those suppliers. In a buyer–supplier–supplier relationship triad, the buyer, as the contracting entity, influences the suppliers’ behaviours and the relationship between them. By considering the relationships in such a triad, we are able to gain a richer and more realistic perspective of buyer–supplier relationships. In this study, our goal is to examine supplier–supplier relationships in buyer–supplier–supplier triads, focusing on how such relationships impact the supplier performance. We frame the supplier–supplier relationship as co-coopetition—one in which competing suppliers work together to meet the buyer’s requirements. We investigate the

		role of the buyer on such relationships, and how the buyer and cooperative supplier–supplier relationships affect supplier performance. We find mixed empirical support for our hypotheses. However, we are able to demonstrate the dynamics of supplier–supplier co-competition in the buyer–supplier–supplier triad. We point out the need for further studies in this area.
18	Key words	Supplier–supplier relationships Triads; co-competition; supplier performance
19	Organisation Field	Operations Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Game Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit); co-competition;
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; triads; relationships (buyer-supplier)
23	Relationship Directionality	Relationships influencing networks
24	Unit of analysis	Relationships (buyer-supplier) embedded in triads
25	Unit of data collection	Organisation
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 123

01	Author of the article	Wuyts, Stefan// Stermersch Stefan, Van den Bulte, Christopher// Franses, Philip H.
02	Title of the article	Vertical Marketing System for Complex Products: A Triadic Perspective.
03	Document name	Wuyts et al., 2004
04	Journal title	Journal of Marketing Research
05	Date of publication	2004
06	Volume	41
07	Number	4
08	Page numbers	479-487
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	Netherlands
11	Context/Industry	Study based on organisations belonging to four industries: a) industrial services; b) food production; c) machine production; and d) transportation
12	Sample size	167 organisations
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire (consisting of conjoint experiment)
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis; conjoint analysis.
15	Study Characteristics	This study investigates business buyers' preferences for specific types of vertical triads that consist of suppliers, a vendor, and a buyer in a technology-intensive market that exhibits extensive knowledge flows.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buyers go beyond the channel dyads they are involved in when they assess the appeal of a channel • Buyers value a sequence of strong ties that run from suppliers through the vendor to the buyer • Buyers' preference for intensive buyer-vendor ties and intensive vendor-supplier ties is depressed when vendors have ties to many suppliers
17	Abstract	Products that require extensive and complex information flows among suppliers, intermediary vendors, and customers often pose particular challenges to the vertical marketing system. Using social network theory, the authors investigate buyers' preferences for specific patterns of relationships among buyers, intermediary vendors, and suppliers of complex products. Using a conjoint experiment with actual and prospective buyers of integrated computer networks and services, the authors find that beyond their dyadic interaction with a vendor, buyers take into account the buyer—vendor—supplier triad. Specifically, buyers value sequences of selective strong ties as well as sequences of more numerous weak ties. This is consistent with analytical propositions that strong ties facilitate the mobilization of support and the transfer of complex knowledge, whereas non-overlapping weak ties facilitate the gathering of intelligence and the monitoring of new

		developments. The authors find only mixed evidence that buyers value direct access to suppliers when strong ties exist between the vendor and suppliers, as predicted by the third-party sanctioning argument in social network theory. In addition, they find that interaction intensity and valence do not always have the same effects, thus providing criterion validation to the bi-dimensional nature of tie strength that has been documented in previous research.
18	Key words	Social network theory, complex products, vertical marketing systems, triad.
19	Organisation Field	Marketing
20	Theoretical Lens	Social Network Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit)
22	Configuration Elements	Networks; triad; vertical marketing systems; ties (vendor-supplier)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influence network
24	Unit of analysis	Network
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 124

01	Author of the article	Zaheer, Akbar // Venkatraman, N.
02	Title of the article	Relational governance as an interorganisational strategy: An empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange
03	Document name	Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995
04	Journal title	Strategic Management Journal
05	Date of publication	1995
06	Volume	16
07	Number	5
08	Page numbers	373-402
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Property and casualty insurance industry
12	Sample size	329 agencies
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis; hierarchical regression analysis
15	Study Characteristics	This paper integrates the economic and sociological perspectives to explicate the determinants of relational governance. It demonstrates that viewing relational governance in terms of both structure and process is important since a combination of structural and process dimensions more completely describes the complexity
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The two combined perspectives (economic and sociological) explain a significantly greater proportion of variance in the structural manifestation of intermediate forms of IOR. • The structural dimension by itself was inadequate in explaining the process aspect of relational governance. • Asset specificity is positively and significantly associated with greater degrees of quasi-integration. • Trust is positively and significantly associated with greater degrees of quasi-integration. • A mode of quasi-integration that included variables from both economic and sociological perspectives will have significantly increase explanatory power than the model that includes only the economic variables. • Quasi-integration and joint action are positively and significantly related. • The model of joint action that includes trust will have significantly greater explanatory power than a model that includes only quasi-integration.
17	Abstract	We develop a model of relational governance as a specific form of interorganisational strategy that is distinct from the traditional

		<p>modes of markets and hierarchies. We conceptualize this form of strategy in terms of structural and process dimensions and derive a model of its determinants through arguments drawn from transaction cost economics and the sociological exchange literature. Hierarchical regression modelling is employed to test the analytical model on data collected from a sample of 329 independent insurance agencies. We include the relational variable of trust and demonstrate that the combined model explains relational governance better than a model with the traditional determinants of governance form alone. Further, we observe that governance structure and process are related and discuss implications of the dynamic link between them. Directions for extensions are developed for strategic management research and practice.</p>
18	Key words	Relational governance; trust; interorganisational strategy; economic exchange
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics; Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (implicit); trust
22	Configuration Elements	Relationships (inter-organisational)
23	Relationship Directionality	Organisation influencing inter-organisational relationship
24	Unit of analysis	Relationships (inter-organisational)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0

Data Extraction Form Number 125

01	Author of the article	Zaheer, Akbar // McEvily, Bill // Perrone Vincenzo
02	Title of the article	Does trust matter? Exploring the effects interorganisational and interpersonal trust on performance
03	Document name	Zaheer et al., 1998
04	Journal title	Organisation Science
05	Date of publication	1998
06	Volume	9
07	Number	2
08	Page numbers	141-159
09	Paper Type	Empirical (Statistical sampling)
10	Geographical Location	USA
11	Context/Industry	Electronic, electrical equipment and components manufacturers and their suppliers
12	Sample size	205 managers responsible for purchasing decisions.
13	Data collection method	Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire.
14	Method of data analysis	Statistical analysis using correlation model and structural model using LISREL 7.
15	Study Characteristics	This study examined trust-based relational exchange to explicate a mechanism for the connection between trust and performance, and to distinguish between the consequences of interorganisational and interpersonal trust.
16	Key findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interorganisational trust emerges as the overriding driver of exchange performance, negotiation and conflict, whereas interpersonal trust exerts little direct influence on those outcomes. • The more one trusts the supplier representative with whom one deals, the more one's organisation trusts the supplier organisation. • Although interorganisational trust may appear to be the more important influence in relational exchange, interpersonal trust must also be considered for its effects on interorganisational trust. • Interpersonal and interorganisational trust operates quite differently within relational exchange. Interorganisational trust is associated strongly with lowered costs of negotiation and conflict, but interpersonal trust is not related to conflict and showed a seemingly anomalous positive association with negotiation costs. These findings imply that the effects of trust in the interorganisational context are distinct at the individual and organisational levels of analysis. • Eased negotiations and reduced conflict resulting from interorganisational trust are enabling conditions allowing exchange partners to pursue a variety of bilateral governance mechanisms (e.g., exchange of personnel and shared decision making) that lead to

		<p>improved performance.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong direct relationship between interorganisational trust and performance indicates that the performance of inter-organisational exchange is in fact associated with the level of interorganisational trust. • In low trust situations, suspicion of the partner's motives may result in dysfunctional conflict and impede effective exchange processes. • Even though individuals across dyads may not trust each other, as long as institutionalized structures accompanying high interorganisational trust are in place, negotiating costs will be down. • High interorganisational trust and low interpersonal trust can coexist in the same relationship given that boundary-spanning individuals come and go, whereas the institutionalized structures and processes accompanying interorganisational trust are more stable and enduring.
17	Abstract	<p>A conceptual challenge in exploring the role of trust in inter-organisational exchange is translating an inherently individual-level concept—trust—to the organisational-level outcome of performance. We define interpersonal and interorganisational trust as distinct constructs and draw on theories of interorganisational relations to derive a model of exchange performance. Specifically, we investigate the role of trust in inter-organisational exchange at two levels of analysis and assess its effects on negotiation costs, conflict, and ultimately performance. Propositions were tested with data from a sample of 107 buyer-supplier IORs in the electrical equipment manufacturing industry using a structural equation model. The results indicate that interpersonal and interorganisational trust are related but distinct constructs, and play different roles in affecting negotiation processes and exchange performance. Further, the hypotheses linking trust to performance receive some support, although the precise nature of the link is somewhat different than initially proposed. Overall, the results show that trust in inter-organisational exchange relations clearly matters.</p>
18	Key words	Interorganisational trust; inter-organisational relations; relational governance.
19	Organisation Field	Strategic Management
20	Theoretical Lens	Transaction Cost Economics; Social Exchange Theory
21	Mode of Governance	Formal (explicit) and informal (implicit); trust
22	Configuration Elements	Relationships (inter-organisational and inter-personal)
23	Relationship Directionality	Bidirectional
24	Unit of analysis	Relationships (inter-organisational and inter-personal)
25	Unit of data collection	Individual
26	Research perspective	Cross sectional approach
27	Quality Appraisal Score	2.0