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The Department of Applied Science, Security and Resilience

PhD Thesis
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The military effectiveness of the West Country Militia
at the time of the Monmouth Rebellion

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2011

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This work received a bursary from the Department of Applied Science, Security and Resilience of Cranfield University and also received a grant from the Society for Army Historical Research.
This thesis considers the military effectiveness of the late seventeenth century militia, focusing upon those county forces which took part in the Monmouth Rebellion campaign of 1685. If the militia were effective then there should be evidence of it fulfilling a set of specified criteria for effectiveness. After examining the militia’s historical purpose and context, as well as its relationship with society, these criteria were defined and then used to test evidence assembled from primary sources. Documents containing information and comments upon the nature, operation and performance of the militia were consulted, including records of contemporary official and personal material held both by local and national record offices.

The results showed the militia to have been militarily effective, thus lending support to the hypothesis that they were more effective than hitherto supposed. Further research was conducted using information gathered from personal accounts, private papers, letters, financial records, diaries and memoirs held in record offices, libraries and muniment rooms. These also supported the view that the militia was actually an efficient military organisation, according to the period expectations and demands made of it. The sheer number of references discovered, together with the nature and status of their authors, suggests that modern works have presented an inaccurate view of the militia and its qualities. In the light of this new evidence, it was concluded that the late seventeenth century militia were effective in contemporary terms, and recommends that current literature be revised.
PREFACE

My fascination with the militia of the Monmouth Rebellion began in 1985 during the 300th Anniversary Celebrations, when the civil war re-enactment regiment which I ran was employed by the cider brewer Gaymer’s to promote their wares. My group marched through several West Country towns dressed as royal troops of 1685 and read James II’s declaration against the Duke of Monmouth at each venue’s central location before distributing Gaymer’s samples in pewter pots. As part of the research for the project I read the pro-royalist accounts of the rebellion, especially the writings of John Churchill and the Earl of Feversham.

This had a profound effect upon my approach to studying military history because although until then a dedicated West Countryman and latter day Monmouth supporter, reading the accounts written by the traditional enemy opened my eyes to the folly of only seeing events through the eyes of one side in a military struggle. It caused me to question what I had hitherto accepted and seen repeated in history books purporting to be the truth. As the creator of the Guild of Battlefield Guides’ Validation Programme I now find myself frequently asking candidates presenting stories of battles to tell their audiences about the enemy perspective and which sources of enemy information they have consulted.

Moreover this questioning of the veracity of what is written in history books led to a growing appreciation of how bias and personal agendas play a part in most accounts. From my reading pertaining to the Monmouth Rebellion I began to perceive that the militia regiments which took part in the campaign were often sweepingly dismissed as ineffective and were proclaimed, in short, useless as military bodies. There seemed to be universal condemnation. This was therefore either a fundamental truth or a repeated myth that had, by repetition been accepted as such. In
all probability for such a generalisation across such a wide number of regiments to apply to all of them was unlikely. This sweeping dismissal of the militia of 1685 was seldom substantiated by contemporary evidence beyond the oft-repeated writings of John Churchill. I wanted to know what other contemporaries thought of the institution, especially the officers who commanded these county forces and the parliament which legislated for their funding.

The more I looked through the available history books the more aware I became that this work had never been seriously undertaken and the same sources of criticism were paraded again and again. This realisation coincided with a chance conversation over lunch with Professor Richard Holmes at the Royal United Service Institution in Whitehall. He persuaded me that this work would be an original study worthy of a PhD investigation. The results of my work are presented in this thesis.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

No thesis can be undertaken without the help of a wide circle of professional and amateur assistance and I am indebted to an array of academics, public servants, colleagues, and friends who have unstintingly given their help and support over the years of this project.

I would like to thank all the members of the various institutions I visited or contacted who have been helpful, sometimes bemusedly so. Regrettably I have not kept lists of their names, but if any reader works or has worked in a library, archive, museum, muniment room or record office and has assisted with an obscure militia enquiry, or dealt with a letter concerning county history or Restoration politics, or indeed has shared stories or discoveries with a stranger - I thank you all. I wish to thank specifically the Defence Academy Library (DCMT), Shrivenham, especially Ms. Amanda Smith for her unsurpassable skill in tracking down and borrowing obscure volumes and articles for my use, and Mr. Ian MacKay for his taking over of this role upon her promotion; his cheerful banter and continued interest were a great help. Friendly and supportive library staffs make all the difference to the rather isolated world of the researcher.

I am extremely grateful to my supervisor Professor Richard Holmes who suggested I should undertake this work under his tutelage at Cranfield University. His formidable knowledge of the period and the assistance and guidance so frequently and unreservedly given, were all of immense value, as were his shared discoveries and thoughts on the personality and career of John Churchill. I am thankful for his insistence upon a more academic style of writing than I had hitherto practiced and for his support in securing a research grant from the Society of Army Historical Research which made possible several more trips to various centres of learning. His untimely
death during the last months of the work was a great tragedy. Other members of Cranfield University were also a great help, particularly Dr. Peter Caddick-Adams and Dr. Michael Dunn who served on my Thesis Committee, and although my subject was somewhat alien to their own areas of expertise, they never failed to help focus my thinking and direct my studies. I owe similar Cranfield gratitude to Dr. Michael Edwards, and Dr. Charles Kirke, and I am also grateful to Ms. Anne Harbour, the department secretary for her support and optimism, and to Ms. Steph. Muir, who as the keeper of Professor Holmes’ diary, always managed to find me a slot in his crowded commitments whenever I made a request. For tightening my argument and the deletion of extraneous material I am grateful to my two examiners Professor Malcolm Wanklyn and Dr. Bryan Watters. I would also like to thank the Department of Applied Science, Security and Resilience of Cranfield University for their generous bursary, and the Society for Army Historical Research for both their grant and their willingness to publish my findings.

In addition to those who helped directly I would also like to thank my friends in The Battlefields Trust for their continued support and proffered ideas about sources and interpretation. Similar thanks are due to my colleagues in the Guild of Battlefield Guides who always forgive my obsession with pre-petrol engine days and frequent references to the Battle of Sedgemoor. The confidence derived from the support of these two learned and enthusiastic bodies is beyond measure.

I am also grateful to Dr. John Kirkaldy who as my Open University tutor encouraged me on the path of lifelong learning; this thesis is in no small way a result of his influence. Similarly I would like to acknowledge the interest ignited in me for military history by Donald Featherstone who, with Roger Snell, took me on annual explorations of the battlefields of Europe for many years. I also thank the late David
Chandler, who, apart from being a doyen of the Sedgemoor Campaign and a great friend, aroused my fascination with the events of 1685 and who was always a source of much-valued, jovial inspiration.

As presenting papers was a valued tool in clarifying thought and developing argument I would like to thank those bodies who invited me to speak on my research findings. These include Canfield University, the Guild of Battlefield Guides, the Historic Miniature Gamers Society of the USA, and the Historical Societies of Chiseldon, Wootton Bassett and Wroughton, and the Highworth Wine Circle.

I would particularly like to thank Dr. Eric Gruber von Arni who shared his journey to his own PhD. with me and then encouraged me to undertake one myself. I owe him a deep debt of gratitude for giving me access to his library of rare volumes and for being so liberal with his own research time to conduct investigations on my behalf. Alongside him I thank Dr. Andrew Phillipson whose proof-reading and questioning of my reasoning and my text I valued immensely. I am extremely grateful for both their help in acting as sounding boards for ideas and as filters for conclusions, as well as their guidance in layout and format.

Without the work and support of these people and institutions this thesis would not have been possible. However, my deepest thanks go to my wife, Pamela Golding MA. of New College, Swindon for… everything.
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CONVENTIONS

Dates prior to 1752 are recorded in Old Style with the year beginning 1 January not 25 March. Numbers up to nineteen are in words whilst numbers from 20 are in figures except in quotations or for ease of comparison. All monetary values and measurements stated are traditional English and Imperial. The symbol £ for livres in quotations is synonymous with £ for pounds.

The plural form lord lieutenants is used throughout.

The use of capital letters for military ranks or civil offices is restricted to references made to specific people or offices.

In spelling the text employs the use of the modern ‘ise’ rather than the ‘ize’ form of ending. The spelling of names often varied during the seventeenth century and many of those mentioned in the text appear in several formats in contemporary documents. The form chosen for each name is that used by a recent published authority, e.g. Rogers, M., Montacute House (Swindon: National Trust, 1991, reprinted 2004) refers to Colonel Edward Phelipps of the Somerset Militia although this surname can be read as Phelips, Pheilips, Pheillipps, Phillips, Philipps or Philips in original sources.

Quotations are preceded and ended by the use of the single parenthesis, whilst quotations of more than three lines in length are contained within a discrete paragraph of restricted width and close set type. Words from a foreign language are shown in italics including quotations taken from French sources.

In the Notes works are cited first with author’s surname and initials followed by the title and publishing details. If the work is cited again, only the surname appears followed by either the key word in the title or op.cit. or ibid and any page reference.
## GLOSSARY

Terms used throughout the text which may need some explanation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>The propellant and projectiles involved in the use of small arms fire – usually blackpowder and spherical lead balls of varying sizes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>A local authority officer representing the Crown and the Law in a designated area. Although a minor role at parish level this post carried status and influence at town or county level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributors</td>
<td>Persons whose wealth was assessed by county authorities and deemed eligible to contribute towards the costs of the county militia. Also called finders because of their duty to find money, men and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>Men of wealth, social status and influence assisting the lord lieutenant in local administration. They were usually responsible for governing a portion of the county and managing the militia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>An administrative region within a county – usually comprising a fourth or fifth of a county’s hundreds and under the direct control of a deputy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hundred</td>
<td>An administrative region within a division and comprising a number of parishes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia Money</td>
<td>A county-levied tax upon contributors to pay for the militia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musketeers</td>
<td>Soldiers trained in the use of single shot, muzzle-loading, smoothbore firearms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Men holding military rank and exercising authority over others. General Officers: men holding the rank of brigadier and above; Senior Field Officers: colonels, lieutenant-colonels and majors; Inferior Officers: captains and captain-lieutenants; Junior Officers: lieutenants, ensigns and cornets; Non-Commissioned Officers: quartermasters, sergeant-majors, sergeants and corporals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parish</td>
<td>An administrative region within a hundred. Ecclesiastical in origin, founded in law designed for the upkeep of a church.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pikemen</td>
<td>Soldiers trained in the use of a sixteen foot ash pole tipped with a razor sharp point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trophy</td>
<td>A panoply of arms and accoutrements – an artistically arrayed display featuring flags, drums, halberds, muskets, pikes and roundshot. Not to be confused with an artefact captured from an enemy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trophy Money</td>
<td>A county fund levied upon contributors to pay for the flags, drums, halberds and ammunition used by the militia.</td>
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ABBREVIATIONS

Record Offices:

TNA  The National Archive, Kew.
CRO.  Cornwall Record Office, Truro.
DRO.  Dorset Record Office, Dorchester.
ERO.  Devon Record Office, Exeter.
GRO.  Gloucestershire Record Office, Gloucester.
HRO.  Hampshire Record Office, Winchester.
ORO.  Oxfordshire Record Office, Oxford.
PRO.  Dorset Record Office, Poole.
SRO.  Somerset Record Office, Taunton.
W&SHC.  Wiltshire & Swindon History Centre, Chippenham.

Libraries:

BL.  British Library
BCL  Bath City Library
SCL  Salisbury City Library
SBL.  Swindon Borough Library

Museums:

BM.  British Museum
BIM.  Blake Museum, Bridgwater
DTM  Devizes Town Museum
HTM  Honiton Town Library
NAM.  National Amy Museum

Publications:

CSPD.  Calendar of State Papers, Domestic.
CSPT.  Calendar of State Papers, Treasury.
SoR  Statutes of the Realm.

Societies:

BT  Battlefields Trust
HA  Historical Association
IGBG  International Guild of Battlefield Guides
RHS  Royal Historical Society
SAHR  Society for Army Historical Research
1.1. THE WORK.

This work focuses upon the militia during the reign of James II, and investigates the question ‘Was the militia in the second half of the seventeenth century an effective military body?’ In particular the investigation focuses upon those units which took an active part in the Monmouth Rebellion campaign of 1685 - the historical context of which event can be seen in chapter two, pages 53-55.

Professional and amateur historians alike paint a picture of the late seventeenth century militia as unenthusiastic, ill-run, incompetent and non-effective. Chandler thought ‘it had little to offer as a serious military force in time of emergency’ whilst Manning even more forcefully states ‘It was ... made abundantly clear that the militia was tactically useless, undisciplined and lacking in courage’. Clifton claims he reiterates James II’s view of them that ‘The militia is a broken reed and should be discarded’. Harris dismisses militia units stating ‘they proved woefully inadequate; they were not only poorly trained and ill-equipped, but they also show a general reluctance to march against their neighbours who had joined the rebel force’, whilst Tincey in describing the events of a skirmish at Keynsham says that a troop of militia stationed to secure the royal force’s line of retreat were ‘left well out of harm’s way for fear they would not stand in a fight’. Chenevix-Trench dubs them ‘reluctant warriors’. Anderson goes further and ignores the Restoration Militia completely, telling us that ‘The Militia had been founded in 1757’. However, the recorded experience of officers and militiamen during 1685 and
contemporary reports on its general state do not confirm these assessments which are, as this thesis will demonstrate, based upon limited evidence and offer insufficient proof for such wide-sweeping condemnation.\footnote{7}

If there is indeed an established perception that the late seventeenth-century county militia was unfit for military duties the author believes it is rooted in evaluations based upon selective references and not upon properly researched study, and that this misperception is generally uncritically repeated by modern writers. This work seeks to examine whether the militia during the Monmouth Rebellion of 1685 was effective or not.

1.2 METHODOLOGY.

In order to gauge if the perception of the late seventeenth-century militia cited above is accurate, a basic question must be asked as to whether there is sufficient contemporary evidence to confirm or contradict that view. To this end the majority of the research engaged with contemporary sources from a much wider study than hitherto undertaken and analysed their content, purpose and implications.

However it was first necessary to examine if this perception of ineffectiveness is widely held and whether the published work of modern historians, including those mentioned above, is persuasive. This was done by interviewing persons concerned with communicating history who were either very familiar with or had an interest in the seventeenth century. The sample included professional and amateur historians and other professionals with substantial influence in telling the Monmouth Rebellion story. They were all asked the same open-ended question about their views on the effectiveness of the militia in 1685 (see page 5). This element of the research also took cognizance of current
museum displays, posters and labels and battlefield trail pamphlets and interpretation boards.

Having established a modern perception of the militia’s effectiveness it was then necessary to see from whence this perception stemmed and to determine if the literature concerning the militia confirmed or contradicted the view. This was done by conducting a literature review of the work of a range of writers from contemporary to recent historians who specialise in the study of the period, the land forces, the militia and the 1685 campaign. When the perception was shown to exist and to be the result of the literature, the study turned to both the notion behind the perception and the evidence for that notion. This involved tracing the origins of the idea of militia ineffectiveness and the motivation of the major source for it, King James II. During the research a study was made of the king’s pronouncements concerning the militia, coupled with an analysis of his character and the manner in which his personal judgment influenced his policies and those of his ministers and agents. This is not included in the work as it is tangential to the question of militia effectiveness, but there is sufficient evidence to support a claim that the perception of an ineffective militia was encouraged if not instigated by James II.

Because the investigation was to focus upon the militia’s effectiveness it was necessary to define exactly what that meant. Based upon the resulting definition a set of criteria was devised pertaining to military effectiveness. These were then filtered by consideration of the historical, political, social and economic contexts within which the militia operated and the contemporary expectations of it. Having established criteria for military effectiveness evidence was then sought from a wide range of contemporary sources to see if these could be claimed for the militia, or not.
1.3. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY.

The study of the Restoration Militia is important to understanding the late seventeenth century because its role, administration and operations are central to many of the political, social and economic frameworks of the period. Not only was the militia crucial to social control but it was also central to the debate concerning crown or parliament’s supremacy. Its structure was indicative of the close networks of family and factional influences on local and national government, and the financial policies and systems which enabled government and society to function. Understanding how the militia was formed and its historic tradition reveals a particular blend of capitalist and democratic ideology, while an investigation of the people who commanded it and those who paid for it helps illustrate the values, attitudes and beliefs of the age.

In addition such a study increases understanding of how contemporaries perceived their duty to the society in which they lived, and how they contributed to its defence. The militia was a major element in this relationship and this study also helps understand what people, great and small, expected from it. This study also informs the appreciation of the various comments and judgments passed upon the militia by generations of historians and other writers including those of the current era.

For the past 350 years the image of an ineffective militia during the Monmouth Rebellion has been uncritically taken on trust. If this study of the available contemporary evidence reveals a substantial number of primary source references which show the western militia to have been effective, it will contradict the current orthodoxy expressed in the current limited literature and as it is based on new empirical evidence its conclusions should be accepted by future historians.
1.4. THE PERCEPTION.

The popular perception of militia ineffectiveness was tested by enquiring among twenty published experts of the early modern period how they viewed the late seventeenth century militia. These were persons who specialise in communicating military history to the general public and authorities on the Monmouth Rebellion. The sample was chosen from among the membership of the British Commission for Military History, the Guild of Battlefield Guides and the Battlefields Trust known to be familiar with seventeenth century military history, and judged from past experience as likely to reply. Each person was asked ‘What is your perception of the military effectiveness of the late seventeenth-century militia at the time of the Monmouth Rebellion?’ All were asked to commit their comments to email. The simplified results of the survey were as follows:

Table 1.4.1: Survey responses concerning militia effectiveness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Responses Judged Ineffective</th>
<th>Judged Effective</th>
<th>No Judgment</th>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
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Source: Email responses from selected published historians.

Although somewhat informally and unscientifically done, the results were relatively unanimous and some of the received comments were telling.

Dr. Matthew Bennett, a senior lecturer at Sandhurst replied ‘I have always been under the impression that the militia was militarily ineffective. It is hard to shake the impression that they were often playing at being soldiers’. Dr. Eric Gruber von Arni, an authority on military medical services voiced the opinion ‘the militia of the period could be likened to the TA in the early nineteen sixties - a gentlemen’s club that had received little effective training for the job that they were intended for and, as a result, they responded badly during the rebellion’. Alan Turton, Curator of Basing House and author of several research publications on aspects of seventeenth-century armies, encapsulated
the perception: ‘The trouble with the militia was that the evidence shows that they were pretty useless’. He also commented that ‘It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the militia in the 1680s since they were not really put to the test until the Monmouth episode when the West Country contingents obviously had mixed loyalties’. Former Registrar of the Royal Armouries and civil wars authority, David Blackmore commented ‘Most militias were a bit of a joke with legal requirements complied to with a nod and a wink’. Dr. Lesley Prince of Birmingham University, another expert on the seventeenth century and noted military vexillogist wrote: ‘Everything I’ve read about them leads me to believe them to have been ineffective, if not a liability’. Dr. Manfred Brod of Oxford University’s Department of Continuing Education postulated ‘The militia county regiments were far inferior to the bodies of military volunteers, such as that raised from the dons and students of Oxford University. The fact that this unit had to be raised by the University indicates what a sorry and totally incapable lot the county militia was’.

In addition to these remarks comments were sought from various museum and tourist services. The author has seen no museum information pamphlet pertaining to the Monmouth Rebellion which mentions the role played by the militia in the campaign or in the culminating battle, whilst the Blake Museum in Bridgwater, which houses perhaps the most comprehensive display relating to the campaign, has neither artefacts nor any explanatory labels concerning the militia. The Bridgwater archivist reported that ‘Nobody is interested in people who did nothing’. Various public display panels featuring information about the Monmouth Rebellion across the West Country fail to mention the role of the militia, and the battlefield interpretation boards on Sedgemoor merely record the position of the Wiltshire Militia in the rear at Middlezoy. Although attempts were made to generate interest in the role of the militia in the campaign at several meetings of the Sedgemoor Re-interpretation Committee they were rebuffed and consequently their
story does not feature in the panels erected in 2008. At one meeting of this body set up by Somerset County Council to promote tourist interest in the Battle of Sedgemoor, Richard Brunning, Senior Levels and Moors Heritage Officer, voiced the opinion: ‘There is no need to waste time on the militia. They contributed nothing to the events of the campaign and consequently have nothing to do with our story.’ The local Tourist Publicity Officer added: ‘They have no tourist draw, no reference point for the general public, not like the Household Cavalry, so why bother?’ When asked why the militia were not included in the historical background issued to the non-historians on the committee, David Lane the Curator of the Bridgwater Museum who wrote the briefing story for the Committee and the Museum’s Education Services booklet said ‘I know so little about them, I just left them out. I am unaware that they contributed anything of significance to the campaign’. The consensus of opinion indicates a shared perception of an ineffective militia but the question arises ‘Where did this opinion come from?’ Those consulted are individuals with different backgrounds, areas of expertise, viewpoints and interpretations but they share one unifying factor, they have all read the literature.

1.5. LITERATURE REVIEW.

Despite being focused upon contemporary sources and the evidence they provide ‘every historical writer owes a debt to his predecessors in the field he is examining’. Historians’ conclusions and opinions form a platform for further development but it must be remembered that they have pitfalls, not the least being the quality and quantity of the research underpinning it. There is a danger in giving lasting credence to pronouncements which are subsequently disproved by newly discovered evidence. For example, following a lecture in St. Mary’s Church, Bridgwater which repeated the assertion that
Monmouth observed the royal camp at Westonzoyland from that church tower, the author gained access to the viewing platform and even with powerful modern binoculars could not see anything in detail at that distance.\textsuperscript{19}

Some works contain what can only be termed imaginative myths. At another lecture in the Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Westonzoyland, it was said that the rebel army paraded through the village on its march to Keynsham carrying banners bearing the names of the towns and villages from which they came.\textsuperscript{20} This is wholly unsubstantiated and is reminiscent of photographs of 1937 Coronation parades. Yet an author engaged to write the Council’s visitors’ booklet about the village in the Rebellion exclaimed ‘That is excellent local detail’. This evidence is clearly anecdotal but in such ways myths are perpetuated.

Most historians write for a target audience and are often inclined to render their work agreeable to their potential readership. This may mean consciously slanting information to suit them or writing in such a style that will guarantee their continued attention. Most historians also try to make their work exciting, readable and enjoyable. Totally objective history remains an ideal but seldom achieved goal as writers are shaped by the circumstances of their own lives; their work demonstrates unwitting bias which often tells readers about the values and mores of the times in which they were written. When approaching the literature concerning the late seventeenth century militia readers must ask of each book not only what level of research substantiates its claims but also for whom was it written and what were the prevailing beliefs at the time of writing.

Since 1685 the story of the Monmouth Rebellion has been told and retold many times and the role in it played by the militia has been subject to interpretation and comment. The following literature review outlines what has been written by those historians who had been alive during the events they describe, those who followed the
antiquarian vogue in the early 1800s or the profession of historical author in Victorian England, as well as writers of the twentieth century and of more recent times.

1.5.1. Contemporary Historians.

There are few accounts of the Monmouth Rebellion which can be described as the work of contemporary historians rather than as firsthand accounts or memoirs. The four major works are those of Andrew Paschall, Gilbert Burnet, John Oldmixon, and King James II.

Paschall was the Vicar of Chedzoy - a village on Sedgemoor - and although he recounted events outside his parish he focused his study on the battle itself and paid scant regard to the militia who were not actually involved in the fighting. He merely states ‘1,500 militiamen quarter in Middlezoy and Othery’. Yet when he does comment upon their campaign performance he makes sweeping judgments: ‘the Militia first in Dorset might easily have crushed that Serpent in the Egg… Next in Devon which…should have done more than run…Lastly in Somerset where the Militia men did leave the country open’. Regrettably being restricted to a paucity of news Paschall’s view of events is somewhat limited. He does not see the whole picture. Having mustered 4,000 men in Exeter the Devon Militia could have crushed the revolt in its infancy in Lyme but its lord lieutenant was under orders not to attempt it. Nor did the Devon Militia run at Axminster although he is accurate in that the Somerset Militia left the county open.

The Reverend Gilbert Burnet was a staunch Whig and also pro-Monmouth. He attended the leading Whig politician Lord William Russell on the scaffold and lost his various offices and appointments in 1684 after preaching an anti-Catholic sermon. When James II came to the throne he fled to the Continent to live in Holland where he became a friend and chaplain to William of Orange as well as a Dutch citizen to avoid treason charges in England. Burnet came over with William in 1688 and delivered the
coronation sermon. For all of which he was created Bishop of Salisbury and remained an influential figure throughout the reigns of William and Mary, and Anne. His *History of His Own Time* was published in 1724 with a second volume in 1734; it aroused accusations of misrepresentation due to his anti-Catholic stance.\(^\text{23}\) Burnet’s views on the Monmouth Rebellion are mixed but he has very little good to say about the conduct of the royal forces including the militia, commenting that ‘their ill affection appeared very evidently: many deserted, and all were cold in the service’.\(^\text{24}\) He also states that at Bridport, in a fight between the rebels and the militia (see pages 265-273), ‘the militia ran from them’.\(^\text{25}\)

John Oldmixon was a poet and playwright who was born and raised in Bridgwater where as a boy he witnessed some of the events of the Rebellion. His earliest work *Amores Britannici; Epistles historical and gallant* (1703) and the tragedy *The Governor of Cyprus* are poetic, romantic and highly dramatic. He was employed as a tract writer by the Whigs and his *Critical History of England* shows his bias. Oldmixon’s political leanings and fondness for dramatic prose are also evident in his *History of England during the Reigns of the Royal House of Stuart* in which he describes the events of the Monmouth Rebellion.\(^\text{26}\) Writing in the late 1720s his recall of events 40 years previously when he was 12 years old is unlikely to be perfect, as too must be the speeches he attributes to various people for which there are no other references, including ‘ “I know those men,” said Monmouth [upon seeing Dumbarton’s Regiment] “they will fight. If I had but them, all would go well” ’.\(^\text{27}\)

Oldmixon’s pro-Monmouth stance leads him to denigrate almost everything pro-James II. He makes much of a possible incident of the militiamen being deceived by *faux-cannon* and sweepingly asserts mass desertion and defection which no contemporary witness corroborates.
They had no sooner entered a narrow lane in their way than, observing the mouths of two or three hollow trees unluckily pointed to their front, they immediately turned tail and fled, every man to his own home, except such as staid for the Duke of Monmouth’s coming, and then went in to him.28

Oldmixon’s disposition is revealed in his frequent complaining that his services were unappreciated by those in power. A bitter and frustrated Whig he saw the militia at the time of his writing in the 1700s as an inept, Tory-controlled body and most likely considered it and its historical counterparts fair game for jibes and criticism.29 Oldmixon’s work is unsubstantiated by reference and arguably the product of circumstantial reasoning; he reported on the militia in a manner likely to confirm his readers’ opinions.

King James II was a keen historian who wrote several histories of his own times and his account of the rebellion displays an understandable anti-Monmouth bias.30 Much of his information is derived from the plethora of reports and letters sent to the Earl of Sunderland, Secretary to the Privy Council, and to himself, including detailed ones from his two senior military officers, Lieutenant General Louis Duras, Earl of Feversham the Commander in Chief in the West Country and his second in command Major General John Churchill. He was also privy to a lot of rebel information provided by Nathaniel Wade the erstwhile Adjutant General of Monmouth’s rebel army, both from his confession and his battlefield tour discourse.31 Although James gives a detailed account of Sedgemoor he includes no reference to the role of the militia in the campaign. He wrote his history during 1686-7, long after he had embraced the anti-militia stance he promulgated in his November 1685 address to Parliament.32

The contemporary historians have a personal and political bias. Oldmixon and Burnet are pro-Monmouth and have little to say about the militia although when they mention it their remarks are condemnatory. Both published in the early eighteenth
century their views of the militia of the 1680s are more applicable to the militia of the 1720s, perhaps confirming their readers’ experience of the current force. Paschall the royalist sympathiser, ignores the militia, as does King James whose political anti-militia stance over-ruled his impartiality. Paschall’s lack of comment perhaps indicates he had no understanding of the importance of the militia’s role in the campaign. These writers, for reasons of partisanship, self-interest or indeed simple ignorance, set in train the fashion for denigrating or ignoring the militia and its part in defeating the Monmouth Rebellion.

Historians of subsequent centuries are no different in having personal agendas, unwitting bias and the desire to please their readership. It is perhaps most useful to examine them by genre rather than by age.

1.5.2. Political Histories.

Thomas Babington Macaulay was a dominant figure of the mid-Victorian era and typical of the historians of his times. His *History of England* appeared in 1849 and his own Liberal political leanings are easily discernable. He is clearly anti-Jacobite with strong Whig sympathies. His historical work is not always accurate and he is prone to picturesque descriptions that are dependant more upon imagination and dramatic potential than primary sources. For instance he repeats a tale of the Monmouth Rebellion that he says came from Bishop Kennet, who had it from an officer of the Royal Regiment of Horse (Oxford’s) in 1718. It is third hand. He could be accused of including it for emotional effect for it strikes a chord with stories of indignities wrought by infidels in foreign lands upon demure heroines of Empire.

The report of the intended attack came to the ears of a young girl, who was zealous for the King. Though of modest character, she had the courage to resolve that she would herself bear the intelligence to Feversham. She stole out of Bridgwater, and made her way to the royal camp. But that camp was not a place where female innocence could be safe. Even the officers…and the
negligent general who commanded them, had indulged largely in
wine, and were ready for nay excess of licentiousness and cruelty.
One of them seized the unhappy maiden, refused to listen to her
errand, and brutally outraged her. She fled in agonies of rage and
shame, leaving the wicked army to its doom.33

Macaulay is also guilty of claiming to know the thoughts and motives of the
players in his historical dramas, even claiming to be able to unmask their pretending.
Thus he describes the relationship between the commander of the royal army and his
second in command:

The lieutenant [Churchill] conscious of superior abilities and
science, impatient of the control of a chief whom he despised
[Feversham], and trembling for the fate of the army, nevertheless
preserved his characteristic self-command, and dissembled his
feelings so well that Feversham praised his submissive
alacrity…34

Macaulay also makes generalised, unsupported statements about disloyalty of
whole sections of the community and the Devon Militia. He writes of the Duke of
Albemarle, lord lieutenant of Devon, being fearful that

Such was Monmouth’s popularity among the common people of
Devonshire that, if once the train[ed] bands had caught sight of
his well known face and figure, they would have probably gone
over to him in a body.35

It is necessary to question how Macaulay knows what Albemarle was thinking
and upon what grounds he predicts not sporadic but complete desertion. It is also hard to
believe that in an age of restricted visual imagery the average militia soldier would
recognise Monmouth’s face – at the most seen only once before during Monmouth’s so-
called royal progress through the West in August 1680.

Macaulay can also confuse his primary sources. He asserts that at Axminster
‘Albemarle ... thought it advisable to retreat. The retreat soon became a rout’ and he adds
that: ‘The whole country was strewn with the arms and uniforms which the fugitives had
thrown away; and, had Monmouth urged the pursuit with vigour, he would probably have
taken Exeter without a blow’. The Axminster incident will be discussed at length in chapter seven, but suffice it to state here that no evidence has been found for anything other than an orderly withdrawal of the Devon Militia. The original reference to discarded guns and coats was actually made by Wade in his *Narrative* and refers to the Somersetshire not the Devonshire Militia. As we shall see there is no evidence of the retreat of the Somerset Militia degenerating into a country-wide rout; in fact Wade initially reported ‘nothing very remarkable in this days march…’ As to the rebels taking Exeter, even if Macaulay erroneously believed that Albemarle’s men were indeed dispersed he ignores the fact that the Earl of Bath, lord lieutenant of Cornwall held the city with the Cornish Militia and that Churchill and his royal cavalry were nearby. Moreover the Exeter civil authorities were capable of robust action as they proved by slamming their gates in the face of William of Orange’s army three years later. To suggest Exeter could have been easily captured displays a lack of understanding of the military situation. Overall it is tempting to agree with the 1930s historian John Paget who said ‘Lord Macaulay is not to be trusted to narrate facts accurately, to state facts truly or to answer the judgment of history with impartiality’.

Until he was challenged by more reliable historians Macaulay’s influence spread and many of his false statements moved from myth to fact in popular perception, being frequently quoted as evidence by modern authors of works on the Rebellion. For all his lofty reputation Macaulay can display a tendency towards unfounded statements, prejudice and overuse of dramatic license.

Ogg is one of the leading protagonists of the argument that the continuity of family influence was ‘one of the fundamental things in English political life’. To illustrate this strong relationship between family and politics in the West Country he cites ‘the Seymours in Devon, the Godolphins in Cornwall, … the Churchills in Dorset’.
These are families whose influence was felt near the top of the political and social ladder. He could have added that an even more pervasive feature of county politics was the families which held local offices and sat as justices. Families like the Drakes, the Lutterells, the Strangways, the Portmans and the Wyndhams are important to this study because they provided both the deputy lieutenants who administered the county militias and the officers who commanded them.

In his recording of the Monmouth Rebellion, Ogg bows to others, saying the story ‘has been told by Macaulay with a dramatic intensity unmatched in historical literature, and with an accuracy of detail which has withstood the scrutiny, often niggling, sometimes vituperative, of more than a century’. For the campaign and battle he recommends Sir Winston Churchill, *Marlborough his Life and Times*, which is today regarded as somewhat biased not least because Churchill was a descendant of the man he liked to call Duke John. For a biography of Monmouth he recommends W.R. Emerson, who is rarely cited by other modern historians having been long superseded by more authoritative biographers. Ogg might not be so damning in his evaluation of the militia but he uncritically reiterates the judgments of Macaulay and the anti-militia opinions held by John Churchill restated by his descendant. Concerning encounters where the militia actually fought Ogg states ‘in skirmishes with the militia the rebels usually had the best of it.’ In fact the fights of Lyme Road and Ashill were inconclusive and at Bridport the rebels were actually beaten off by the militia. Ogg appears to take on trust that written by other writers and thus perpetuates misperceptions.

In 1985 Hutton identified a changing role of the militia during the Restoration period from that of national defence against external and internal threat, to that of cavalier crusading against the forces of republicanism and dissent. Whether it was perceived that way at the time is not proven but it substantiates the frequent government-
initiated moves to suppress political and religious dissent. Hutton motivates the whole militia movement with the desire to avenge the ills suffered by the royalist factions in their communities. Given the often pro-cavalier stance of many of the families which officered the militia and some commanders such as Sir Edward Phelipps harsh persecution of conventicles, it is a plausible theory.

Fletcher more recently challenged the simplistic view of the militia as military bumblers. However although he makes the point that it limited Monmouth’s Rebellion to the West Country by its very numbers and presence even he states that it disgraced itself in the face of the enemy. Fletcher concentrates upon the evolution of the militia’s role in local government but his suggestion that the militia actually might not have been as ineffective as was hitherto believed aroused the condemnation of Norrey, who did his best to refute this divergence from the accepted belief. Yet Norrey too is prone to creating arguments based upon slender evidence such as his avowal that ‘Epidemics of gout often accompanied notification of a deputies’ meeting,’ for which he cites only one incident from a single source. Norrey’s work focuses upon local government and as the militia is its prime instrument of power he spends six pages ridiculing its organisation and performance. Many of his examples derive from incidents in the very early years of the Restoration Militia while others are blatantly erroneous and lead him to make the unproven assertion that ‘it is difficult to escape the conclusion they [the militia] were at best paper tigers; unreliable, inefficient and certainly not a serious military force’.

In his work concerning war, money and the English State, Brewer agrees with Namier that ‘a great deal of what is peculiar in English History is due to the obvious fact that Great Britain is an island’. His argument reflects upon the question of a reduced need for a military force due to the country not being an easy prey to invasion and that under Cromwell and Charles II the navy became more important, and ‘it was the
combination of the militia with the major branch of the nation’s military might, the royal navy’ which prevented foreign invasion.\textsuperscript{52} Concerning the militia’s effectiveness, Brewer appreciates the militia was adequate for its role but militiamen ‘were hardly the stuff of which great armies are made’. He also accuses the militia of being ‘a largely ineffectual force which was rarely embodied and which therefore lacked military experience and expertise’.\textsuperscript{53}

1.5.3. Histories of the British Army.

Sir John Fortescue’s ground-breaking work \textit{A History of the British Army} condenses the early centuries into a single volume covering military history from Hastings in 1066 to the end of the Seven Years War in 1763.\textsuperscript{54} Writing during the 1880s at a time when the structure and function of auxiliary forces was the subject of fierce debate, Fortescue makes just two references to the militia of the mid 1680s. The first concerns the continuance of the standing army in lieu of the militia: ‘The courtiers had received their cue, and pointed to the flight of the western militia before Monmouth’s raw levies as proof sufficient of its untrustworthiness. The fact indeed was self evident’.\textsuperscript{55} ‘The second undermines the militia’s worth: ‘The old howl of “No Standing Army” had been raised, and reams of puerile and pedantic nonsense had been written to prove that the militia was amply sufficient for England’s needs’.\textsuperscript{56} Why Fortescue adopted this view as fact is evident in his reference to the events of the Monmouth Rebellion. He writes, ‘No reader, I am confidant, will blame me for leaving him with his Macaulay for the account of this insurrection’.\textsuperscript{57} The power of such a statement to transform myth into truth in public perception is revealed in the Sandhurst doggerel, ‘It must be true, it’s in Oman and Fortescue’; this was irony by the 1980s, but perhaps not so for preceding generations.\textsuperscript{58}

Rather than dismissing the militia in a few sentences several histories of the British Army have tackled the subject. However, most have done so as part of telling the story of
the regular army in which the militia plays an integrated if minor role. Barnett’s *Britain and Her Army* is typical of these works and although he makes frequent reference to the militia in general throughout the book, he confines his comments upon the late seventeenth-century militia to three pages.\(^{59}\) He makes a passing remark as to the quality of the militia under Charles II saying that ‘the only function it carried out effectively’ was ‘that of an amateur political police and riot force’.\(^{60}\)

Barnett draws heavily upon Western, citing the action at Landguard Fort in June 1667 and the lack of musters in certain counties during the 1670s. He does not make reference to the political arguments used to lobby for the raising of a Select Militia (see pages 66-67) or how they differed from the militia already established. He only champions the cause with the comment: ‘A select force could be better trained in formed bodies and it could be kept in being during an emergency, whereas men of the ordinary militia were urgently needed at home’.\(^{61}\) Barnett offers neither explanation for these assumptions nor any reasons as to why the ordinary militia which existed in formed bodies could not be trained, nor any reason why they should be tethered to their home counties in times of emergency. He settles instead for yet another attack on the militia by referring to the Select Militia as: ‘The only effective element of the constitutional force’.\(^{62}\) He does however, make a telling comment that ‘The militia ceased to be politically acceptable the moment it became militarily effective’.\(^{63}\) He leaves readers to assume that by ‘effective’ he means the converse of what he earlier lists as the disadvantages of the militia of the period, that is: ‘lack of mobility, difficulty of keeping forces in the field, the widening gap between trained and troops and civilian levies, and amateur officers’.\(^{64}\) Barnett thus appears to rely uncritically upon Western and deploys the same examples of inadequate performance to show the militia in a poor light.
It is this aspect which arouses suspicion. Authors in the current literature tend to repeat the same examples and the same quotations from the same sources without much apparent consideration of the context in which these original comments were made or the motives their authors might have had in writing as they did. This is also evident in works which seek to develop lines of applied thought or even sometimes to impose a sequentially logical framework upon events. Manning’s *An Apprenticeship in Arms* sees the development of the military as a series of peaks and troughs and, evidently seeing the New Model Army as a peak, entitles the next chapter for 1660 to 1688 ‘The Decay of Military Tradition’ thus setting a contextual trough for almost everything of that period. 65

As the study of military history developed army historians sought to concentrate upon more focused subjects or time periods for investigation. For the past thirty years Childs’ *The Army of Charles II* has been regarded as the definitive published study of the Restoration Army. 66 However, although Childs includes the militia the focus of his work is upon the royal army created by Charles, improved under the direction his natural son Monmouth and inherited by his brother James. It is a meticulous and wide-ranging study justifiably praised for its depth of research and both level and amount of detail included. References to the militia are an integral part of Childs’ story of the development of the royal force and serve to show how it survived the political struggle between those who worked for the establishment of a standing royal army and those who opposed it, preferring in its stead to rely for defence of king and country upon the traditional militia. 67 Childs also refers to the militia as a political pawn in the contest between king and parliament for what he sees as the battle for direct control of it. 68

Regarding the militia’s effectiveness as a military tool and its proficiency, Childs is somewhat uncommitted. At one point he says

These part-time soldiers of the Trained Bands were used to handling arms and knew something of the workings of martial
discipline. They were in fact ideal for the short term levies of 1666-7, 1672-4 and 1678-9, as they required little or no training.  

At another point however, he cites events at Landguard Fort: ‘The militia stood around and looked, having much to do to keep themselves from disorder… and …such fighting was left to the regulars’.  

His suggestion that the militia was a useful source for the royal army to draw upon for recruits may hint at disparagement but it could be argued that if they did not need much training to reach a par with the royal troops they must have been reasonably proficient according to the standards of the age. Childs remains ambivalent as to the militia’s general military value throughout, until his final words on the subject pronounce that: ‘Parliament knew that the militia was useless, riddled with inefficiency through negligence, and scarcely knew how to march let alone fight…’ He does not explore the idea further nor support the statement with evidence.  

In his second book, The Army, James II and The Revolution Childs joins in the general castigation of the militia. He does so again whilst discussing the argument between James II and parliament over the establishment and enlargement of a standing army but this time lists the ills of the Wiltshire Militia recorded by John Martin and cites a satirical poem by John Dryden. However, he presents a confusing assessment of the Wiltshire Militia’s lack of tents. He fails to mention this was standard practice among all militia units and even the royal army was well into the campaign before their tents arrived. He implies this was a fault of the militia’s own making, and that they were consequently obliged to be stationed behind the lines at Middlezoy rather than to camp with the main army at Westonzoyland. Yet he does not take the line of other historians such as Clifton by saying that this was due to Feversham not trusting them to be alongside the regulars. Childs cites instances of what was wrong with the militia at the time of the Monmouth Rebellion but tempers his criticism with caveats concerning James
II using selected material for propaganda purposes and his lack of encouragement of the militia. Indeed he goes on to quote the Earl of Ailesbury who ‘thought that the militia’s “hearts and inclinations were certainly good”’. 75

In his later work The British Army of William III, Childs makes only passing reference to the militia and its part in the standing army argument. 76 Although no great supporter of the militia, Childs does not condemn it at every opportunity; however, a measured assessment of its worth was not part of his remit.

Other studies of the Armies of Charles II and James II have appeared in various journals, in particular those by Davies printed in the Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, or Langeladdecke in the English Historical Review. 77 In these too the militia often remains outside the sphere of interest of the authors and receives only the briefest of mentions. Atkinson says, ‘…the King urging that, after the recent proof of the untrustworthiness of the Militia, he must increase the standing force,’ and gives a further paragraph expanding this debate with example. He also later reiterates that it was the peers and the country gentry who commanded them; beyond that he is silent. 78

1.5.4. Histories of the Militia.

More specific books taking the militia as their subject tend to devote very few paragraphs to the century between 1650 and 1750. Hay reviewed their history as part of an analysis of the militia and yeomanry units serving in the Boer War but limits his remarks concerning the Restoration Militia to what acts, ordinances and reforms were implemented during the period. 79 Cousins allocates two pages to the militia of the 1685 Rebellion in his The Defenders, A History of the British Volunteer but says little beyond commenting upon the comparative trustworthiness of various county forces and James II using the crisis as a reason to increase the royal army. 80 Stern in The Citizen Army devotes a paragraph to the political implications of supporting the royal army versus
militia argument, although he does make the point that James II was politically motivated in his denigration of the militia. He wrote: ‘Every one of the British kings who strove to abolish the liberties of his people tried first to suppress the militia’. Neither Haswell nor Zurcher refer to the Restoration militia in their respective studies of citizen armies and supplementary forces. With such little published interest shown in the period it comes as no surprise that few mention the Monmouth Rebellion, except perhaps to cite James II’s speech to Parliament made afterwards as part of his political manoeuvrings to enlarge the royal army. Indeed this speech appears to be the salient feature of much discussion concerning the militia of that period and will be examined later. Other sources cite the Axminster incident as evidence of militia incompetence but although they might describe events, scant regard is paid to their explanation. Where there is explanation for the failings of the militia it appears to be made in order to pre-empt an obvious rebuttal. Clifton makes the point that three companies of the Devon Militia ran away from the rebels when they reoccupied Bridgwater, and then, apparently somewhat grudgingly, adds that the force they faced was the whole rebel army.

Chiefly concerned with the militia of the eighteenth century Western sums up several of the purposes for which the seventeenth-century militia was maintained encapsulated in the phrase: ‘an amateur gendarmerie to counterbalance the malcontents,’ saying they had to deal with local risings, anticipate trouble, confiscate arms and generally show the flag for the authorities. He also maintains that the militia had a contrasting purpose, ‘to supplant the army or to assist it’. Although attempts were made to employ the militia against the royal army during the civil wars and Interregnum, universal supplanting would be very difficult to prove in post-Restoration times. Despite the control of the militia being a point of contention between crown and parliament after 1660, there does
not appear to be any evidence of a substantial effort to suborn it or direct its activities against the army.

Western’s chapter ‘Triumphs and Reverses’, covering 1660 to 1670, has useful information about militia activities but it draws somewhat selectively from The Calendar of State Papers Domestic and the Historic Manuscripts Commission, and is full of financial and political considerations rather than evidence of military operations or pronouncements on effectiveness. His chapter ‘Eighty Years of Decay’ notes several deeds of the militia, such as the Wiltshire Militia’s quelling of rebellion in Frome prior to Monmouth’s arrival, but his appreciation of events is influenced by his dependence upon the reports in the Stopford-Sackville Papers. Overall Western is a sound starting block as his methodology is thorough and his notes and referencing extensive, although he does not provide a bibliography.

1.5.5. Campaign Histories.

Works that tell the tales of the Monmouth Rebellion Campaign of 1685 or focus upon the Battle of Sedgemoor are common, but few surpass Little’s The Monmouth Episode for frequent references to the various militias involved in the campaign. However, the central topic of the book is the story of the Duke of Monmouth and the rebel army. The operations of the militia serve only as a backdrop or as external constraining elements which sometimes come to the foreground when paths cross. Little does however cite several instances which show the militia in a good light, such as the suppression of ‘the riot of clubmen’ in Frome, and he makes a case for their more than competent occupation, defence and control of Bristol. Yet when the opportunity to comment on their effectiveness arises Little cannot resist falling back upon the generally accepted view. Despite praising their precautions in Bristol he says Monmouth ‘had, against the Militia who actually formed most of Bristol’s garrison, a good chance of taking the
city…’ and he pokes Shakespeare-based fun at their local constables’ ‘Dogberry dithering’.  

Little is useful in three major respects. Firstly he gives an overall view of what several county militias did during that summer of 1685 and how their ranks were augmented by volunteer units. He supplies the general framework of the campaign and also provides simple time and location references for the movement of each of the composite militia units and several of their smaller bodies. Secondly he provides instances in which the militia were useful in performing military tasks during the campaign despite his general assessment. Thirdly he is meticulous in his referencing and thus provides pointers for further research or for checking the interpretation of evidence. A lot of his evidence comes from the Calendar State Papers and often-quoted texts such as Wade’s *Narrative*, the Axe papers and James II’s account, but he also refers to the rare 1874 transcript of the Axminster Ecclesiastica and the Churchwardens’ Accounts of Frome, Bridgwater and Westonzoyland. Little tells a stirring tale about the events of the Monmouth Rebellion and makes good use of primary sources but he accepts on trust the work of his predecessors and their bias against the militia.

Books which mention the late seventeenth-century militia as part of the story of the Monmouth Rebellion tend to fall into two categories: those which are aimed at the historical interest market, such as Chenevix-Trench’s *The Western Rising – An Account of the Monmouth Rebellion* or Wigfield’s *The Monmouth Rebellion A Social History*, and those designed for the more general reader including the lucrative markets of tourism and hobbies, such as Dunning’s *The Monmouth Rebellion – A Guide to the Rebellion and the Bloody Assizes* and While’s *Sedgemoor 1685*. There are also information and story booklets such as Clarke’s *Monmouth’s West Country Rebellion of 1685* and Scott’s *Out
for Monmouth. These two areas overlap in such works as David Chandler’s and John Tincey’s identically titled books Sedgemoor 1685.92

These authors all tend to use the same easily accessible primary and secondary material and reiterate the same criticism of the militia without delving too much beyond the statements made or opinions proffered by their sources. Although Chandler warns his readers against accepting biased primary or uncritical secondary sources, he sometimes gives credence to both.

1.5.6. Unpublished Theses.

A search of the centralised database of library-held unpublished theses revealed no works on the militia of the late seventeenth century. There are currently only two listed theses on the seventeenth-century militia and they deal with the early and mid 1600s. Both were useful for their citing of sources, as although they did not reference material directly relevant to this study they did supply starting points for document searches. Ive was useful for his recording of held accounts, rolls, pells, registers, order books and reports, and their locations, while Nagel provided a framework of understanding for the militia before and during the civil wars.93 Ive also showed how a study of county militias could be undertaken and then organised for presentation. There were several theses on the militia of the eighteenth century but the descriptions examined said they focussed upon the late 1700s and most began with the disputes concerning the Militia Bills of the 1750s. The nearest one to the late seventeenth century began with Queen Anne’s refusal of Royal Assent to the Scottish Militia Bill of 1707.

1.5.7. Summary of the Literature.

The late seventeenth-century militia’s military ineffectiveness is a central theme running through the literature and this has changed little since the contemporary controlling authorities published their version of events. There appears to be no serious
discussion of the Restoration Militia and although mentioned frequently the comments are mostly disparaging dismissals. Generations of historians have rethought and reappraised the social, political and economic contexts of various related institutions, such as Earle’s work on the social class and occupations of the rebels, Aylmer’s analysis of the institutions of government, Ogg’s stress upon family influence in national politics, or Butterfield’s political faction-based approach. They have examined the personalities involved, as in Namier’s prosopography or collective biography approach, and also the events of the period, such as in Harris’ appreciation of the tri-nation kingdom’s response to aspects of seventeenth-century British political history. Yet all seem to maintain, even in passing that the militia were of little military value.

When seeking the evidence upon which this general view is based the conclusion must be drawn that most of it derives from primary sources tainted by personal, social or political agendas. Both Charles II and James II used the argument of an ineffective militia to strengthen their cases for an enlarged royal army; it was perhaps the period equivalent of political spin. In addition it could be argued that all men who wrote of the inadequacies of the militia had their own interest at heart; a man whose personal advancement was dependant upon the monarch was highly unlikely to offer proof that what the king said was untrue. Similarly military officers such as John Churchill were unlikely to contradict their royal patron and praise the militia whose very existence would likely mean a reduced royal army and hence less promotion and restricted career prospects. Moreover, royal officers were not disposed to laud their counterparts in the militia whom they saw as amateurs in their trade. It is not surprising that evidence gathered from those who moved in court and royal army circles was critical of the militia.

Overall both primary and secondary published references to the militia of the late seventeenth century tend to be minimal, general and anecdotal in style. Collected
material relating to the militia of the period is sparse in published works, especially that which is useful in determining its role or nature. Equally sparse are collated sources of information regarding the technological and administrative aspects of militia system and operations. Yet across books, journals, magazines, unpublished manuscripts and the worldwide web, there was a body of hitherto uncollected and uncollated information, which had to be sought out and appraised.

There was a considerable body of literature concerning the militia of the eighteenth century much of which is corroborated by visual records by contemporary artists; some laudatory and others derisory. The Volunteer Force and Yeomanry of the nineteenth century too have a wealth of literature, paintings and engravings devoted to them, whilst the Territorial Army of the twentieth century surpasses even that in numbers of histories and other accounts, often supported by photographs. Although many of these books devote their early pages to the antecedents of their subject and spend several pages on the general history of the militia, there is a distinct paucity of references to units raised and operating between the absorption of many of the trained bands into the parliamentarian army during the civil wars and the raising of the militia to protect England from Jacobite incursions in 1715 and 1745. They tend to gloss over the militia which served Cromwell, Charles II, James II and even William III.

Compendiums covering the history of warfare are by their very nature, selective and generalist. Few provide evidence of primary research and rely upon information already gathered, which by repetition becomes accepted. For instance the wooden bottles containing a measured charge of gunpowder suspended from a seventeenth-century musketeer’s bandolier are often referred to as ‘the twelve apostles’. This term has passed into common parlance and although there is no cited contemporary reference the term has by repetition become an accepted truth.
General histories also tend to repeat what has been written before. Clark in his volume of *The Oxford History of England* sweepingly asserts: ‘the militia was almost entirely untrained.’ Some writers ignore the militia completely, such as Morley’s *A Thousand Lives – An Account of the English Revolutionary Movement*, which is surprising as the militia was the state’s main counter-revolutionary weapon. In contrast the biographies of the great men of the Restoration and Revolution are rewarding for placing events and comments in period, political and personality context. Ward’s story of the life of the Duke of Albemarle contains several sections concerning Christopher Monck’s efforts to ensure his militia regiments were well supplied and trained properly. Sir Edward Phelipps’ biographical commentator draws attention to the accepted code of behaviour among officers in dealing with their militiamen, and papers given at an Oxford University Continuing Education Conference discussed how the personality of James II interacted with prevailing period social, political and religious practices and beliefs. Yet these speakers too avoided mention of the militia, and dismissed it as irrelevant in questions.

Much of the modern perception of the 1680s militia is founded upon the judgments and bias of historians of the period. It was developed by Victorian authors who read the letters and accounts of witnesses without considering either their partisanship or personal agendas and, as with Macaulay, without being too exact in their reading of primary sources. The desire to write for a wider audience led some to over-dramatise and pass sweeping judgments. With such a wealth of published material seeming to confirm the judgment scholars have found little to excite their interest and have taken what was previously written on trust. Attitudes to the Restoration Militia have changed little, the major shift being an increase in a benign tolerance of a second rate force of part-timers incapable of matching the performance of regulars. Apart from
this posterity has adopted the traditional view that at the time of the Monmouth Rebellion the militia was not an effective body. No real change in thinking has occurred for nearly 330 years and crucial questions concerning effectiveness and peer expectation have never been addressed. If this work is to confirm or challenge the established perception those questions must be answered.

1.6. THE QUESTION.

This thesis therefore examines the qualities and operational effectiveness of the late seventeenth-century militia in general and during the 1685 Rebellion campaign in particular. After Monmouth’s rebellion James II harshly criticised the militias of the south western counties. He did so in the House of Commons in November 1685:

‘...when I reflect what an inconsiderable number of Men begun it and how long they carried it on without any Opposition, I hope everybody will be convinced that the Militia … is not sufficient upon such Occasions and that there is nothing but a good Force of well-disciplined Troops in constant pay that can defend us’.

He emphasised his dissatisfaction by decreeing that because of its poor quality and disloyalty the militia was not to be mustered again until he gave such instruction. Further condemnation followed, such as that voiced by Lord Preston: ‘We have lately had an unfortunate Proof how little we are to depend upon the Militia.’ Sir Richard Temple took the same view: ‘I must concur with the King that the Militia is not sufficient.’ However, as many critics were of the pro-court faction there is room for speculation that they followed the king’s lead rather than their own consciences.

To provide an answer to the question: ‘Was the militia in the second half of the seventeenth century an effective military body?’ the work first needs to establish and define the term ‘effective’ and then examine if the West Country militia met the criteria of the definition.
1.6.1. Definition of effectiveness.

John Hughes-Wilson said:

The effectiveness of military units, regular or militia, is intrinsically linked to the idea of being able to contribute positively to the defence of the nation, which in turn means the role of home security forces is identifying threats, reacting quickly and efficiently, and neutralising danger.\(^\text{107}\)

This is not a modern idea. It has been present throughout the history of those concerned with national security and the creation and maintenance of a force which is capable of undertaking this challenge and responsibility. It was for these purposes that the \textit{Liedang, Fyrd, Posse Comitatus} and the English Militia were conceived and constituted to augment and compliment the royal army.\(^\text{108}\) So as to be judged as effective the militias of each successive age had to fulfill these duties and it is interesting to note that part-time forces remained a substantial element in England’s defence for centuries.

Passing judgment upon the Restoration Militia is made difficult by the lack of any contemporary list of criteria which those in authority at the time thought of as necessary for a unit or institution to be judged as effective. To many of its contemporaries if the militia performed the aspects of their duties valued by the commentator then the institution was effective. To staunch Tory Anglicans units such as Phelipp’s Regiment in the Somerset Militia which ruthlessly suppressed and harassed dissenters and their conventicles were very effective. Yet there remains a need to measure the militia in terms which embrace far more than the prejudices of certain elements of society.

In the search for a wider definition it is tempting to turn to the writings of men who have served in the military, especially if they are also historians. These writers have an idea of what constitutes military effectiveness but they imbue their writings with value-judgments of their own age. Field Marshal Wolseley outlines what he thought effectiveness might have meant in the 1680s in his description of the Duke of Monmouth
as ‘one of that sort of cut-and-dried, old fashioned officers, who could not believe it possible that badly armed, slovenly looking regiments, untrained in the formal evolutions of a regular army, could be of any real military value’. His comments however say at least as much about his own era as the seventeenth century and although another later commentator Fortescue stated that mobility and the ability to keep in the field were desirable attributes of an effective militia it is better to restrict further investigation to contemporary writers.

In 1671 George Monck, Captain General of the Army and Master of the Horse under Charles II published his *Observations upon Military & Political Affairs* which sought to instruct commanders of armies in the Art of War. Although it mostly deals with unit and army deployment Monck also outlines the needs of an armed force if it is to be effective. He states that the ‘greatest virtue required of a Souldier is Obedience’ and then advocates that an army must be well supplied with money, men, arms, victuals, ammunition, artillery and clothes. He also stresses the need for training in drill, field manoeuvres and marching, adding that a general should ‘never suffer his Souldiers in any place to be idle’.

Although Monck’s *Observations* reveal certain criteria by which to judge a force’s effectiveness it is not a model, so if no Restoration model of effectiveness survives then it is not unreasonable to construct one. Despite wishing to focus upon contemporary sources in seeking guidance to construct a model of military effectiveness it was useful to initially take cognizance of modern practice. Regrettably consulting current unit reports was not possible due to Ministry of Defence restricted access. Professor Richard Holmes assured me that the qualities and attributes used to assess unit effectiveness today are similar to those already mentioned. However, there emerged from discussion of modern unit assessments that an emphasis is placed upon both
equipment and leadership. Whereas weaponry and other equipment are mentioned by Monck, leadership is not singled out for note apart from stating that officers should be ‘knowing and valiant.’ Much has been written on the theory and practice of leadership which is beyond the scope of this work. However, despite not being allocated a specific section in the model it was decided to examine command and control, both in relation to discipline and to the roles played during the 1685 crisis by the senior militia officers, namely the colonels where they are known, and their superiors the county force commanders, the lord lieutenants.

Although given a good indication of content the author chose not to draw too heavily from the described current unit report model because it is constructed to be focused upon the modern regular and territorial armies, and it could perhaps lead to a propensity to judge a seventeenth-century entity by twenty first-century standards. It was felt wiser to place more reliance on pronouncements upon the effectiveness of military forces by two great Captains whose times in command of armies bracketed the period under consideration and Monck’s observations. The first of these two men was Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden during the Thirty Years War.

An exceptional military commander of the Thirty Years War, Gustavus Adolphus wrote a memorandum in 1619 defining what he expected of a satisfactory army. ‘It should have a proper recruiting system; its units must be properly organised; it must be strictly mustered to prevent frauds; and it must be straitly disciplined’. Gustavus Adolphus also imposed order in his camps and reformed his army’s logistical systems to ensure that pay, food, clothing and training drastically improved. The writings of this Swedish king may well have impacted upon those British soldiers who served in the Thirty Years War and thus brought to English military thinking the desire for good turnout, known and applicable organisation, well administered musters with an emphasis
upon weapon proficiency, regular pay, and adequate food and clothing to augment what
Gustavus saw as a dependence upon good discipline.

During the civil wars in Britain of the 1640s and 50s great attention was paid to drill. It is not unreasonable to suggest that with the plethora of contemporary published drill manuals that many military men judged the effectiveness of units by the rank and file’s ability to perform according to the drill books. Attention was also paid to the raising and maintaining of strengths of regiments. It was common practice that those regiments that could not muster sufficient men were either disbanded or amalgamated. It was also understood that in order to keep an army in the field it had to be supplied with weapons, ammunition, food and clothing; all of which demanded adequate funding and the means to raise money. Cicero adroitly summed this up in: “Monies are the sinews of war.”

Seventeenth-century armies had no rank approximating to that of Inspector General but inspections were held at sporadic intervals such as Henry Seymour, Duke of Beaufort’s journey through Wales in 1685 to examine and report upon the state of the militia in those counties. His secretary Thomas Dinely recorded the Duke’s opinion of each county’s militia and made particular reference to their ability to drill, their bearing and their appearance. Throughout the English counties such inspections were carried out in the Restoration age by muster masters who counted the men, examined their weapons, oversaw the practice of drill and wrote reports to the lord lieutenants. Their standards were not prescribed but it is reasonable to suggest that their work approximated to a national system as most were ex-officers who had seen service in a royal army and were probably familiar with the same drill books and military treatises.

Although the rutted and often meandering roads of the age did not allow the marching feats of twenty five miles per day achieved by the Imperial Roman legions,
great store was also placed on the ability of units to march. As Monck and Gustavus Adolphus both mention it, it is an aspect that needs to be included in any model of effectiveness.

The elements cited above are also found in later writings relating to maintaining an effective military force, especially those of the second great Captain examined, Frederick the Great, King of Prussia during the Austro-Prussian and Seven Years Wars. Frederick states the need for disciplined, well-drilled, full strength, well-supplied units who were able to march at good speed. Noseworthy says Frederick can be relied upon because ‘His writings were intended for practical application. Frederick had a lot to lose by issuing faulty or inefficient instructions. What was written was based upon his experience...’ His thoughts may have been aimed at a full-time royal army but Frederick’s instructions were also disseminated to the German militias.

One more criterion of effectiveness emerges from a letter of complaint sent from James Wolfe when he was serving as a junior officer to his uncle Edward Wolfe. Among the criticism that the army in which he was serving was lazy and lax in discipline, training, marching and fighting, he also states that they were ‘easily put into disorder and hard to recover from it’. Despite there being no previous evidence for this quality discovered it is worthy of inclusion in the model, although under the more modern heading of post-action recovery.

From those concerned with military effectiveness during and both before and after the period under discussion it becomes evident that the model should include reference to discipline, organisation, numbers, training, drill, funding, pay, weapons and equipment, support systems and the ability to march and fight. However, given the contemporary tendency to judge of effectiveness based upon achievement of specific duties it is necessary to augment the military requirements for effectiveness by determining if
contemporary expectation was met. Was the militia fit for the purpose for which it was intended, which was to be a military body with well defined objectives?

Although no concise statement of these objectives as perceived by its contemporaries has been discovered, it is possible to unravel what they were by examining the records of the House of Commons and the instructions issued by the Privy Council. The preservation of state security from internal threat was foremost in the minds of the Government which issued an order to the militia in July 1660 that they desired, ‘... disaffected persons watched and not allowed to assemble, and their arms seized; fortresses to be secured, all risings suppressed; and vagrants apprehended...’¹²³ Members of Parliament who drew up the Militia Act of 1661 also professed that the militia’s first duty involved the preventing disturbances of the peace of the kingdom by religious or political dissenters.

... many evill and rebellious Principles have beene distilled into the minds of the People of this Kingdome which unless prevented may breake forth to the disturbance of the Peace and Quiet thereof.¹²⁴

The first Act also legislated for the safety and preservation of Charles II and his government, showing itself to be concerned with both external and internal threats:

... if any person or persons whatsoever ...shall within the Realme or without compass imagine invent devise or intend death or destrucc[i]on or any bodily harm tending to death or destrucc[i]on maim or wounding imprisonment or restraint of the Person of the same our Soveraigne Lord the King or to deprive or depose him from the Stile Honour or Kingly Name of the Imperiall Crowne of this Realme or of any [other] His Ma[jes]tie Dominions or Coun treys or to levy war against His Majestie within this Realme or without or to move or stirr any Foreiner or Strangers with force to invade this Realme or any other His Majesties Dominions or Coun treys being under His Majesties Obeysance.¹²⁵

A second article of the same Act of Parliament indicated that the militia was also used for social control and the officers and men were granted legal indemnity from prosecution for things done in the perseverance of their duties.
... Bee it therefore further Enacted ... That all and every person and persons whoe have or shall have acted or done any thing in execution of any Commission or Commissions of Leituenancy... shalbe and are hereby saved harmelesse and undempnifed in this behalfe ...  

This license was specific in describing what the militia was expected to do in order to exert control over their regions:

...any assaulting arresting detaining or imprisoning any person suspected to be Fanatick Sectary or Disturber of the Peace or seizing of Armes or searching of Houses for Armes or for suspected persons shall be and are hereby saved harmelesse and indemnified in that behalfe...  

That the militia was expected to undertake military as well as policing duties is evident from a Council order of 28 September 1660: ‘…The army is to be disbanded as soon as their arrears are paid, and the militia established, to be ready on occasion.’ That the men were to be drilled and kept in obedience is evidenced by almost every militia officer’s commission. For example, that of Sir John Fenwick commissioned to command the militia forces of Northumberland states that his duties included ‘causing them [the militia units] to be exercised in arms and kept in good order and discipline.’

In addition to order and discipline the 1661 Militia Act ordered that the militiamen were expected to undergo training and have weapons:

... the severall Leiutenants of the severall Counties Citties and ... their Deputie Leiutenants ... shall have power from time to time to lead traine exercise and putt in readinesse ... all or any of the persons raised arrayed or weaponed according to the said Act...  

In emergencies a county militia that appeared likely to come into contact with an enemy force was to be joined by royal troops and the Duke of Albemarle, commanding the Devon Militia, was not slow in requesting them or the Government slow in sending them, as the Earl of Sunderland confirms:

I received this morning your two letters of the 12 inst., in the first whereof you give an account of the Duke of Monmouth’s being landed, and of the forces with him ... As to the detachment you
desire, his Majsty has commanded four troops of horse, two
troops of dragoons and five companies of foot to march
immediately to Salisbury, to assist the Lords Lieutenants of the
counties thereabouts as his Majesty’s service shall require. They
will be there on Monday and Colonel Kirk with them.\textsuperscript{130}

The militia was also under direct instruction not to engage without the support of
royal troops and even then to be cautious in selecting where and when to fight.

The King is sending several troops towards you, which will soon
be with you, and he thinks fit that in the meantime, as long as the
Duke of Monmouth stays in Lyme, you should forbear to attempt
anything against him, except upon great advantages. He would
also have you endeavour to keep straggling people from going to
the Duke, and in case he should march out of Lime towards
Taunton or elsewhere, to attend his motions and to take any fitting
occasion to attack him.\textsuperscript{131}

The campaign duty of the militia when unsupported by royal units was
containment in whatsoever manner the lord lieutenant felt appropriate.

His Majesty is well satisfied with the order you have given to
prevent any further progress of the rebels, and has no further
directions to send you At the is time, but leaves it to your
discretion and conduct to act as you shall think best for his
service.\textsuperscript{132}

Those militias operating at some distance from any hostile force had other duties
including ‘stopping and examining all straggling and suspicious persons who shall be
found travelling up and down, and for securing such of them who cannot give a good
account of themselves.’\textsuperscript{133}

To summarise, firstly, the militia was to be a government agent of social control,
manifesting itself in the suppression of opposition by maintaining an intimidating
appearance and undertaking policing actions, such as watching or arresting suspicious
persons, seizing of arms or breaking up undesirable gatherings. Secondly, the militia was
to be a deterrent to invasion or armed insurrection and in the event of a landing or rising
to quickly form a delaying first line of defence by putting a substantial body of men into
the field. It was to contain any enemy force by denying strategic places to the enemy and
in the last resort to fight as support to the royal army. If the militia achieved these results then it could be deemed effective in contemporary eyes. How it was to achieve these objectives and execute its duties results from a complex amalgam of military and political judgments, guidelines on financial administration and the more specific aims of drill books, all of which will be examined later. However, there remains the need to construct a working model of effectiveness which can be applied to the late seventeenth-century militia.

The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of ‘effective’ lists six qualities: one, as having a definite or desired effect; two, as being powerful in visual, emotive, etc. effect; three, of actually existing in fact rather than officially or theoretically; four, being actually useable, realisable and equivalent in its effect; five, coming in to operation; and six, being fit for work or service. As a noun ‘an effective’ refers to a soldier available for service. 134

To avoid both the simplistic use of a dictionary definition and the judging one age by the standards of another it is necessary to combine these points with reported ideas from modern unit reports, the cited criteria of military effectiveness of Gustavus Adolphus, George Monck, Henry Somerset, Frederick the Great and James Wolfe and the contemporary understanding of the purpose of the militia. Employing these sources if the militia was effective then there should be evidence of it fulfilling the following criteria:

1. Having a definite or desired effect. Did it deter enemy invasion and internal risings and could it deliver local policing security? Did it fulfill its contract and obey orders?

2. Being military and powerful in visual appearance. Did it look the part, and appear impressive in uniform, with substantial numbers and the trappings of a military body?
3. Existing in fact rather than officially or theoretically. Could its administrative systems produce adequate turnout in men and equipment so as to achieve its purpose?

4. Being able to perform so as to be useable and valuable in its effect. Was its operational performance acceptable? Could it march, campaign and fight?

5. Being successful at coming into service. Could it be financed and supplied so as to be summoned, assembled and put into the field quickly?

6. Being fit and available for service. Was it able to perform as adequately trained and drilled soldiers?

If the militia can be shown to have met those criteria then it would be deemed effective.

1.6.2. The Militia’s Limitations.

Before attempting such an analysis it is important to understand that as a military body the militia is necessarily not to be measured in the same terms as the royal army. Its part-time nature makes it fundamentally different; so too do the terms of service of its officers and men and the expectations made of them. In examining evidence of the nature, operation and performance of the militia there must also be an understanding of what it should not be expected to do. Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex’s remarked in 1588 that he looked for little service from the Elizabethan militia ‘when we shall mete the enemy’. Admittedly said nearly one hundred years before the Monmouth Rebellion this statement expresses the idea that although capable of being of limited use on campaign, the militia was not expected to fight pitched battles. By the 1680s that was the role of professional soldiers with their strong unit identity and loyalties engendered by being permanently constituted. The militia was not expected to perform as first line troops.
1.7. ORGANISATION.

1.7.1. The overall organisation of the work

As the majority of the criticisms of the militia are directed against their military rather than their policing roles, the criteria of effectiveness are primarily reduced to a series of more succinct and military-related subject areas. The organisation is based upon setting the militia in context and the thesis’s rationale for ‘effective’.

Table 1.7.1: The organisation of the work by chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Background: origins, history and relationship with the royal army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Organisation and Strength: structures, numbers and recruitment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Coming into Service: funding, pay and supply, summoning and readiness and speed of reaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fit for Service: training, drill and discipline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Appearance &amp; Bearing: uniform, equipment and weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Performance: marching, taking part in a campaign, fighting and post-action recovery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Expectations and Loyalty: purpose and expectations, and loyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Conclusion: conclusions and recommendations for further study</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the information was collected it was categorised into topic-related groupings. It was then analysed to determine its relevance to prove or refute the perception, and if deemed useful was incorporated into a chapter where its place in the argument was explained. At the end of each chapter a brief summary developed the overall argument. These thoughts are drawn together in the conclusion to put forward an answer to the core question of the thesis.

Whereas most of the chapters are based upon findings from original research chapter two is a necessary discussions of the contextual background and nature of the militia prior and during 1685. Each subsequent chapter examines how the militia satisfied or did not satisfy a particular criterion of effectiveness, as if each were a building block in the construction of a judgment to determine the militia’s success or failure as an effective home defence force.
Particularly relevant to the work was an awareness of the militia as a pawn in the battles of political will between crown and commons, and court and country factions, and indeed the role played during these struggles by the monarch himself. Each faction had an opinion, attitude or policy towards the militia and they praised or condemned the institution in accordance with their own agendas.

There also runs throughout the thesis an appreciation drawn from Harris that events in the south west of England must be seen as part of what was happening in the rest of England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland. This includes evidence pertaining to the militia drawn from the Duke of Beaufort’s inspection tour of Wales in 1684, and the defeats of the Covenanters’ in Scotland in 1679 and Argyle’s Rebellion in 1685.¹³⁶

Whether or not one subscribes to the romantic notion that each age has its soul - an intangible essence or zeitgeist - care must be taken to assess evidence in terms of the period’s wider context. During both research and writing consideration was given to the social, political, religious and indeed economic aspects and influences exerted upon the militia as no institution can be seen in isolation.

In an attempt to nullify the effects of deliberate or unwitting bias, the research was eclectic rather than selective, in both sources examined and material collected and included records and writings which presented evidence that both supported and ran counter to the generally held view of the militia. This all-embracing approach may risk seeing meaningful significance in every document examined but in practice uses the diversity of the voices consulted to draw conclusions without sheltering behind the inappropriateness of a central controlling thought process. Throughout the process the author remained focused upon the question of whether the militia was effective in the role it was expected to perform.
The likelihood of deliberate partisanship or unconscious bias wherein values influence content was taken into consideration; including any the author may harbour. Before stating something as fact evidence was cited and analysed, and its source examined to ascertain as far as possible what interpretation was being offered or reflected, rather than simply making a judgment upon the degree of credit they deserve.

Finally when challenging an accepted truth it is alluring to argue that previous writers have apparently dispensed with evidence which contradicted or challenged their accepted preconception, or indeed not even looked for it. It is necessary to be aware that this accusation could also be levelled at any challenge to accepted truth where researchers who set out to find evidence that supports their theory often duly discover it. The test comes in the level and frequency of evidence and the credibility of its interpretation.

1.7.2. Limitations of the Work.

The decision to focus upon the militias of South West England was based upon the idea that it was these units which played an active role in the containment and suppression of the Monmouth Rebellion, because this was an occasion when the militia was called upon to perform its combined purpose of campaigning and policing in local defence. It was also one of the rare occasions when the militia was tested in the field - called upon to undertake a military campaign and indeed to fight.

Although nationwide many militias were called out or placed upon alert during 1685 it was the militias of Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Somerset, and Wiltshire that played significant roles in the military campaign. It was felt more relevant to investigate those units rather than those county militias for which the response was only theoretical. Although the Monmouth Rebellion and William of Orange’s invasion were both of great significance the events of 1685 rather than those of 1688 are the focus of the work because it was in them and their reporting that the
perception of an ineffective militia began. Use of material from the whole decade has been made due the general paucity of surviving militia records. The work also draws upon evidence gathered from reign of Charles II and the early years of William III because the militia of the 1680s was still governed by the Militia Acts of the early Restoration and early Williamite sources tell of what existed before his militia reforms took effect.

1.8. SOURCES.

This investigation involved research amongst collections of papers, letters and accounts held in national and regional libraries, such as the National Archives at Kew, the Bodleian Library at Oxford and the British Library in London where a significant find was *A Method for Executing the Powers relating to the Militia* dated 1684.\textsuperscript{137} The collections of county record offices have been consulted and proved most informative. At the Wiltshire and Swindon History Centre at Chippenham a very useful muster list for the Salisbury Regiment of the Wiltshire Militia was found, which specified each man’s name, company affiliation and parish of origin.\textsuperscript{138} Also useful was a warrant giving instruction for training of the militia troop of Marlborough Horse.\textsuperscript{139} In addition personal papers in both public and private hands have been consulted, but regrettably with little result. Other research has been carried out in repositories such as the War Office Collection and Library and The Prince Consort’s Library, Aldershot and The National Army Museum. As well as document collections at other national institutions, local museums and libraries, particular attention was paid to local manuscripts, books, booklets and pamphlets in towns directly affected by the rising, such as those belonging to the Wiltshire Archaeological Society.\textsuperscript{140} The paper trail has also included libraries, and muniment rooms of descendants of various ministers of state, such as William Blathwayt,
and of various county lord lieutenants, such as the Earl of Pembroke, and their militia officers, such as Major Thomas Erle.\textsuperscript{141} In the case of searching collections of papers where the number of documents was numerous, advice was sought from supervising archivists and both their written and computerised catalogues especially those listed by the Historic Manuscripts Commission. They were searched by use of keywords and key names derived from the Literature Review.

Articles and academic papers published in institution and society journals have been consulted including the Journals of the House of Commons and House of Lords, and the Journals of the Society for Historical Army Research.\textsuperscript{142} Lack of background concerning the foreign policy, religious and social systems of the Stuart Age was addressed by a programme of supervisor-recommended reading as well as attendance at courses, including one held by the Oxford University Continuing Education Department on James II.\textsuperscript{143}

There are surprisingly quite a number of primary sources which refer to the militia during the 1685 crisis, although never as many as one would like. Over the last thirty years many have appeared as appendices in several Monmouth Rebellion-related books, and are noted in the Bibliography. Those which afford more pertinent insights into the effectiveness of the militia are: \textit{Feversham’s Despatches} to James II (in French) and \textit{The Movements of the Royal Army}, both in the Stopville-Sackville manuscripts.\textsuperscript{144} The rebel’s story is told in Wade’s \textit{Narrative} and John Coad’s account of his part in events, whilst the Wiltshire Militia’s own tale is told by Adam Wheeler.\textsuperscript{145}

Many militia-based internet sites discovered are American and are overtly political arguments for and against gun control, citing as evidence that the English state initially expected members of the militia not only to possess but to keep their weapons in their homes.\textsuperscript{146} Somehow, what happened in seventeenth-century England is interpreted as a
basis for what authors think should happen in twenty-first century America. These sites do however make reference to various legal conditions which governed the English militia but they often conflate notions of home and national defence. However, they are interesting because they quote English material to indicate that the Restoration militia was a political as well as a military body, ‘Sometimes the people thought of militia service as a right, but more often as a duty’ wrote Wagner, who continued as follows:

Then, during the political and religious strife of the 17th century, governments began using the militia more as a political police force…When the monarchy was restored under Charles II, he continued the trend of dominating the militia and building a professional army. He also began to systematically disarm those who were deemed politically unreliable. James II continued and expanded these policies and ended up being overthrown. All of this left the English people with a great dislike for standing armies, and a sense that their militia duties, while not always welcome, were nonetheless an important safeguard of their freedom. It also left them firmly convinced that government must not be allowed to disarm its citizens. The Declaration of Right, produced by the Parliament in 1689, included protection of citizen’s gun rights. In fact, it made possession of guns an independent right, not at all dependent upon membership of a militia.  

Comments such as this do show that the militia should not be simply seen and consequently judged as an extension of the royal army and contribute to an appreciation of it as a critical and independent body.

Moreover there also exists a body of largely unexamined and unpublished material. Into this category in the Wiltshire and Swindon History Centre come 20 collected pieces of paper, written in secretary script, frequently in a bad hand, in which the words ‘militia’, ‘powder’ or another word or name associated with them has been spotted by an archivist and the papers put together into an unsorted bundle.

Memoirs and letters are personal but they have their target audiences and often have their own agendas. Memoirs tend to be written with intentions beyond the mere recording of facts and events and sometimes justify actions, often promote causes and
have hidden subtexts or constraints. Many seventeenth-century memoirs are subtitled ‘A Vindication of...’ whilst Wade’s *Narrative* is known for not including names or deeds of rebels who were still alive at his time of writing.\(^{149}\) Paschall’s suppression of the incident in which the royal foot and the royal horse exchanged volleys in his account of the battle of Sedgemoor is a good example of judicious editing.\(^{150}\) Most notable are the plethora of reports and letters critical of the militia which have been penned by royal officers such as Feversham and Churchill who had careers both in the army and at court to protect and enhance, which they could do by espousing views concurrent with James II’s known aversion to the militia.\(^{151}\)

More dispassionate are the Calendar of State Papers (Domestic). The CSPD contain a series of letters from the Earl of Sunderland, Secretary of the Council, to the lord lieutenants with their orders concerning the Monmouth Rebellion, which throw new light on why Albemarle’s militia did not attack the rebels.\(^{152}\) Also dispassionate but full of financial detail concerning the cost of the military are the Exchequer files for the period, including those of the years that Fox was Paymaster General.\(^{153}\)

Financial accounts may have their pre-designated audience but unless there is some hidden agenda or deliberate falsification, they are often enlightening. The annual accounts of Thomas Naish, gunpowder supplier to the Mayor of Salisbury gives reliable information as to its consumption rate by the city’s militia company, whilst the itemised tailor’s bill presented to Francis Luttrell on his appointment as a colonel of the Somerset Militia, detailed on page 220, lists items of an officer’s dress and shows the need for a private income to uphold the dignity of the position.\(^{154}\) Unlike the mid-eighteenth century legal property qualifications for militia officers, the reliance upon wealthy and social elite families to provide sufficient men willing to serve in the militia was a more informal arrangement embracing a degree of *noblesse oblige*. However, it did ensure that
such men both had a vested interest or stake in the country and then preservation of the status quo, and could stand the expense of purchasing their uniforms and equipment.

Both primary and secondary published references to the militia of the late seventeenth century tend to be minimal, general and anecdotal in style. Collected material which directly relates to the militia of the period is hard to find in published works, especially that which is useful in determining its doctrine or nature. Equally sparse are collated sources of information regarding the technological and administrative aspects of the militia’s development.

1.9. CONCLUSION.

Until this thesis the subject of militia effectiveness does not appear to have been widely examined and what appraisal has been undertaken has generally begun from the assumption that the militia was inadequate and performed poorly.155 This perception appears to be derived from the literature which at times is insecurely founded in limited contemporary writings, and yet is frequently repeated uncritically by historians of this and earlier ages.

This work starts from a neutral standpoint and provides an analysis of available primary source material in both national and local repositories relating to the nature, operation and performance of the late seventeenth-century militia. It evaluates this new evidence within the framework of a constructed model of effectiveness drawn from the writings of military commanders and the expectations made of the militia by those who created and commanded it. The work examines each element in the model in turn so as to judge whether the militia met these criteria and by weight and value of this evidence makes a judgement to determine the military effectiveness of the West Country militia in 1685.
However, before examining these criteria it is necessary to investigate the militia's background so as to understand where and how it originated, why it was created and indeed continued to be funded. Coupled with this is its complicated relationship with the royal army with which it was intended to co-operate, and the question of how it fitted in with the society from which it was drawn and which it served.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

8. Bennett, M., E-mail 23 Nov. 2008. Matthew Bennett and the historians consulted gave permission for their views to be cited and were aware that this study might prove them incorrect.
11. Turton, A., E-mail 20 Nov. 2008.
15. Comments recorded during a visit to the Blake Museum, July 2007.
19. Lane, B., *Sedgemoor Conference, 5 July 2007. ‘Prelude to Sedgemoor’, St. Mary’s Church, Bridgwater. Although modern development and Victorian railway embankments now obscure the direct line of sight, clear views across the countryside are possible. However, the distance to Westonzyland is too far for the story that Monmouth recognised Dumbarton’s Regiment by its facings to be true.
27. *Ibid., p. 703. This is copied by Macaulay, *op.cit.* Vol. I., Chp.V.
28. King James II’s Account (of the Battle of Sedgemoor) B.L. Harl. MSS. 6845. Also in Chandler, *Sedgemoor*. Chandler lists him as contemporary witness but he was not present at any of the events.
29. Wade was pardoned after turning King’s Evidence and indeed conducted a battlefield tour of Sedgemoor for the King a year later.
33. *Ibid.

49
37 Wade, N., *Narrative B.L. Harleian Manuscript 6845*.
38 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p.125.
42 Ibid., p.147.
44 Ogg. op.cit., p.147.
47 Ibid. p. 343.
49 B.L. Add. MSS 32.
50 Norrey, op.cit., p.795.
52 Brewer, op.cit., p.53.
53 Ibid., p.9 & p.30.
55 Ibid. vol. I., p.300.
56 Ibid., p.384.
57 Ibid., p.299.
60 Ibid., p.112.
61 Barnett, op.cit., p.117.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
67 Ibid., p.213.
68 Ibid., p.218.
69 Ibid., p.22.
70 TNA. SP 29/208, f.105; Childs. *Charles II.*, p. 181.
71 Ibid., p. 232.
74 Clifton. op. cit., p.195.
78 Atkinson, CT., Two Hundred and Fifty Years Ago: James II and his Army in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, XIV. pp. 1-11.
83 Manning. op. cit., p.304

Clifton, op.cit., p.192.

Western, op.cit., p.5.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.55; Historical Manuscripts Commission appendix to the third report (1904), 2 Vols.


Ibid., pp.140 & 105.


Ibid., pp.134 & 136.

115


Chapter Two

BACKGROUND

‘They combine the character of defenders, contribute to the prosperity of the country, are connected with their fellow subjects, and interested in the support of the laws and good government of the Kingdom’

To judge the effectiveness of the late seventeenth-century militia it is necessary to understand its background. This chapter initially places the year of the rebellion in terms of the Restoration period and then presents a chronology of the events of the crisis. After that it deals with what the militia was, why it existed and how it evolved. The later part of the chapter concerns who controlled the militia and how the institution engaged with the society it served, the relationships between it and the royal army and then between it and James II, and lastly its policing role in state control of both political and religious dissent.

2.1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT.

Charles II was restored to the throne in 1660, yet throughout his exile he was regarded by many royalist sympathisers at home and abroad as having inherited the crown in 1649. Despite his long marriage to Catherine of Braganza he did not have any legal issue and upon his death in 1685 Charles’ younger brother James, Duke of York became king. Although his succession was welcomed by the majority of the population there was an attempt by Charles II’s eldest bastard, and James’ nephew, James Scott, Duke of Monmouth to claim the throne. The historical context of this rebellion and the events of 1685 are encapsulated in the following two tables:
Table 2.1.1: The Monmouth Rebellion within its historical context.

1649 King Charles I beheaded and Parliament became the supreme power.
1650 Prince Charles Stuart arrived in Scotland and signed the Act of Covenant.
1651 Charles crowned King of Scotland and invaded England. Oliver Cromwell and the English army defeated him and his Scottish army at Worcester.
1652 Trading disputes with the Netherlands escalated into the First Dutch War
1653 Cromwell became Lord Protector.
1654 Peace negotiated with the Netherlands.
1655 Cromwell died. His son Richard took office but resigned a year later.
1660 Charles proclaimed King of England and returned from exile to be restored to the throne. Many republicans fled to Holland.
1661 The first parliament of King Charles II met at Westminster. The Militia Act passed which vested control of the armed forces in the Crown.
1665 The Second Dutch War began and the Great Plague struck London.
1666 The Great Fire destroyed much of London.
1667 The Dutch destroyed much of the English fleet at anchor off Rochester, although a month later the War ended with favourable terms for England.
1668 Charles II’s eldest bastard James, Duke of Monmouth signed the Treaty of Dover with agents of Louis XIV which created an Anglo-French alliance.
1669 Charles’ younger brother James, Duke of York declared his Catholicism followed by an attempt to exclude him from the succession.
1670 A second attempt made to pass an Exclusion Bill to bar James, Duke of York from the throne. The Duke of Monmouth became the Protestant hope and darling of the newly named Whig Party.
1671 A third attempt to pass an Exclusion bill resulted in Charles imprisoning its champion the Earl of Shaftesbury who later fled to Holland.
1672 James II took measures to restore Catholicism in England, and set up an army camp of 13,000 troops at Hounslow to overawe nearby London.
1673 James issued the Declaration of Indulgence to suspend all laws against Catholics and Non-Conformists and to repeal the Test Act. His wife produced a son to guarantee the Catholic succession and the king sought to promote his Catholic supporters in Parliament, the Army and Clergy. Discontent with the attempts at personal control seven leading statesmen invited his daughter Mary and her husband, the Dutch Stadtholder, William of Orange to England to restore English liberties. This they did in what is now called the Glorious Revolution. James II fled to France.
Because of Monmouth’s rebellion 1685 was a period when the militia was tested on a regional scale over a sustained period of several weeks, rather than on a small local scale over a couple of days.

### Table 2.1.2: Movement of the major forces during the Monmouth Rebellion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Monmouth</th>
<th>Churchill</th>
<th>Feversham</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1685</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th June</td>
<td>Landing at Lyme</td>
<td>Lyme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>Rebels muster</td>
<td>Lyme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>Monmouth declared traitor</td>
<td>Lyme</td>
<td>Royal interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>Militia summoned</td>
<td>Lyme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skirmish at Bridport</td>
<td>Lyme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dorset Militia defend town</td>
<td>Lyme</td>
<td>Assembles troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th</td>
<td>Axminster Incident</td>
<td>Axminster</td>
<td>Leaves London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somerset Militia retreats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>Rebels advance</td>
<td>Chard</td>
<td>Reaches Bridport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>Continues advance</td>
<td>Ilminster</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>Enters Taunton</td>
<td>Taunton</td>
<td>Occupies Axminster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dorset Militia advance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>Skirmish at Ashill</td>
<td>Taunton</td>
<td>Chard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>Monmouth declared king</td>
<td>Taunton</td>
<td>Chard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>Continues advance</td>
<td>Bridgwater</td>
<td>Chard (Kirke Arrives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd</td>
<td>Continues advance</td>
<td>Glastonbury</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>Continues advance</td>
<td>Shepton Mallet</td>
<td>Bath &amp; Bristol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>Continues advance</td>
<td>Pensford</td>
<td>Rendezvous of the royal army near Bath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>Skirmish at Keynsham</td>
<td>Keynsham</td>
<td>Bath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>Attempt on Bath then</td>
<td>Norton St Phillip</td>
<td>Bradford-on-Avon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Begin the retreat</td>
<td>Norton St Phillip</td>
<td>Bradford-on-Avon/Norton St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th</td>
<td>Battle at Norton St. Phillip</td>
<td>Norton St Phillip</td>
<td>Bradford-on-Avon/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bradford-on-Avon/Norton St.</td>
<td>then back to Bradford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td>Continues retreat</td>
<td>Frome</td>
<td>Westbury (Treyne Arrives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th</td>
<td>Rests</td>
<td>Frome</td>
<td>Frome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>Continues retreat</td>
<td>Shepton Mallet</td>
<td>Frome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st July</td>
<td>Sacks Wells</td>
<td>Wells</td>
<td>Frome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Continues retreat</td>
<td>Nr Axbridge</td>
<td>Shepton Mallet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Re –enters Bridgwater</td>
<td>Bridgwater</td>
<td>Glastonbury/Somerton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Fortifies town</td>
<td>Bridgwater</td>
<td>Somerton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>Battle of Sedgemoor</td>
<td>Sedgemoor</td>
<td>Weston Zoyland/Sedgemoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wiltshire Militia reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>Militia hunt fugitives</td>
<td>Gillingham</td>
<td>Orders mopping up operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>Sussex Militia capture</td>
<td>Cranborne</td>
<td>Bridgwater</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.1.1. Origins and Development.

The beginnings of the English militia system are found long before the Restoration in the authority given by British kings to wealthy and powerful subjects to swell the ranks of their oath-sworn warrior bands with local, able-bodied men when situations required it. The first general to command a combined force of warriors and ordinary
British people was Cassivelaunus, chosen by the British tribal chiefs about the year 54 BC to oppose Caesar’s second invasion. The practice was continued under Romano-British rule which encouraged a warrior culture in which all men were expected to bear arms to maintain their community’s safety and security. Norse settlers from Scandinavia created the *Leidang* with notable leaders summoning a proportion of freemen from the households in their tribes to render temporary military service. Saxon England followed the custom but imposed a nationwide system enforcing conscription of men chosen by a local leader to be weaponmen of the shire, and ‘It seems universally agreed by historians, that King Alfred first settled a national militia in this kingdom...’ Saxon warrior elites under oath to serve warlords still existed, but this ability to summon men between sixteen and sixty for military service in national defence alongside the small units of household warriors was a levy, known as the *fyrd*. Saxon kings vested authority in their appointed local governors, the sheriffs of the county and enjoined them to record the names of those upon whom the duty to muster was levied. Sheriffs allocated the *fyrd* to fighting bands and exercised them to prepare for war, ‘Trayned men having abiliments of war to serve the Lord their King’.

There was mutual understanding of roles between the two elements. The *fyrd* was not expected to stand in the front ranks of the shieldwall which was the prerogative of full-time warriors, but to add depth to it or to protect its flanks with missile weapons. They were not professional soldiers, but tradesmen, farmers and labourers, servants and household slaves whose military duties were part-time. They were called for short periods of service to the shire and a sheriff, no matter how politically or militarily powerful, could only require them to leave their county in times of emergency when the security of the homeland was threatened. In an island
kingdom, this was usually interpreted as incursions by seaborne raiders or invasions by foreign powers or races intent upon seizing land upon which to settle. The *fyrd* performed well. It fought admirably against Danish incursions in Mercia in 796 and Wessex in 855, and it was the mainstay of Alfred’s armies and indeed of Harold’s success in 1066 at Stamford Bridge although its lack of battlefield experience cost him dearly at Hastings.⁹

The Normans did not replace the Saxon *fyrd* but adopted the levy as a means of increasing their feudal host with men not beholden to a feudal lord. Warren-Hollister argues that they took over the Saxon system of requiring each hundred to furnish twenty men - one for every five hides.¹⁰ Unlike those who served in the king’s army they were still summoned and commanded by the sheriff in whom Norman law reaffirmed the right to muster every male able to use a weapon in their county, excluding nobility and clergy. Not all able men served as there was still a selection process but the duty to muster was firmly established. Sheriffs chose whom they wanted in the force. The Normans called this body the *posse comitatus*, literally translated as the power of the county, an expression that lives on in so many American Westerns. Its civil rather than solely military role can be traced back to the 1181 Assize of Arms and the creation of *jurata ad arma*, an armed body of men at the disposal of the king for the purposes of keeping the peace. Mustered at times of threat, the *posse* was primarily intended as a peace-keeping organisation.

The difference between warrior and *fyrd* was perpetuated in the difference between those who served in the royal armies and those who served in the *posse*, whose role also included the control of civil disturbance and local policing duties.¹¹ Yet together they continued to perform well in meeting foreign threats, turning out and defeating the Danes in 1069, the Scots in 1072 and the Welsh in 1098; some even
went abroad and fought in Maine in 1073. A further development saw an additional creation called the select fyrd which was answerable to the local lord rather than the sheriff. However, by 1100 the select fyrd was almost absorbed into the feudal contingents of the royal armies, ‘merely serving cum militas’ at the wish of their Norman overlords. The posse was more representative of ordinary people with two commentators arguing that ‘The English militia concept was unique because of its plebeian character’.

In 1181 Henry II’s Assize of Arms required that every levied freeman was to produce weapons according to the worth of his possessions thus introducing proportional cost-bearing. This levy was divided into three categories: those under knights fee, the select fyrd and the grand fyrd or posse; the latter had to muster with an iron cap, a gambeson - a padded jerkin - and a lance or spear. Musters were held for annual inspection to confirm the men had acquired this equipment. In 1253 the levy was extended to include villeins and serfs meaning that those rich enough could send their human property to serve instead of appearing themselves, and again those raised were promised that they did not have to leave their home shire except in circumstances such as ‘the coming of strange enemies into the realm’. They served quite adequately during the de Montfort Rebellion of 1265 and in 1277 they were out again, but ‘few appeared to have served longer than one month although a picked body of 100 archers from Macclesfield was paid special rates to remain out longer than customary’. Edward I’s Statute of Winchester, 1285 prescribed the weapons and equipment each man in the posse should bring, dependent upon the size of his property holding. This was made easier by the listing of the most common and least inexpensive of weapons; ‘anyone else... shall keep bows and arrows’. The popularity of the longbow and the laws to encourage its practice made the posse a
formidable and inclusive body, and although payment in lieu of service, called scutage, was acceptable large numbers of men took their obligation personally and seriously. The *posse comitatus* began to evolve into a more select body of property-owners with legislation for periodic inspection of men and weaponry to ensure they met their obligations to the state.

The various plagues which swept late medieval Europe and the ensuing social revolutions fuelled by shortages of manpower changed the nature of the *posse*. In an era when manpower was scarce freed serfs and peasants sought paid employment rather than fulfilling unpaid duties, and similar values spilled over into the military with men of the levy asking for pay. Instead there was renewed legislation under Henry IV reaffirming that service was without pay. However, the Commission of Array in 1402 restated their right not to be required to leave their home counties except in dire emergencies.\(^{20}\) Another edict decreed that general musters were to be held in every county every three years to ensure there was always a force ready to resist invaders or suppress rebellions.\(^{21}\) These obligations were established by law in 1411 with the addition of a riot act which gave the *posse* policing powers under the direction of sheriffs - the *poair de counte* – the right to arrest rioters.\(^{22}\) They were called out to suppress Jack Cade’s Rebellion in 1450.

But as the king’s armies also needed to be constantly maintained an active and listed *posse* was a fertile recruiting ground for soldiers to fight the king’s wars. Many of these free and often skilful men were lured away by a system of indenture; military service governed by contract and rewarded with money. It reaffirmed the warrior class as professionals yet transfers from the *posse* widened its social profile. The renowned English and Welsh archers that served in England’s foreign wars were often drawn from the *posse*, whilst the defence of the kingdom in their absence was
entrusted to several great lords and their retainers and the county sheriffs with the
depleted posse. Never the first choice for fighting units but often the home of useful
skilled men the home defence force had by Henry V’s time firmly become, in general
perception if not in comparative practice, a second class army of amateurs albeit an
effective one. The difference between the two types of force had become set: the
king’s or royal army, those in paid, full-time service, and the posse, those in unpaid,
part-time service.

The so-called Wars of the Roses saw a proliferation of expanded professional
retinues paid and maintained by over-mighty subjects whilst the effectiveness and
standards of the posse went into decline along with its name - the term ‘militia’ began
to appear. Henry VII successfully limited these extended retinues but although he
inherited his father’s distrust of private armies he did little to encourage the militia.
As there was no standing royal army Henry VIII sought to create a national militia
during his reign and regular musters of county forces were called. Militia
organisation was codified according to population, each county being divided into
divisions. Wiltshire was divided into four divisions each comprising a number of
hundreds capable of supplying a specified number of men appropriate to their size.
The men appearing were carefully listed on a muster certificate and categorised
according to the arms they brought. A typical ‘Certyfycatt of the vewe of abull men’
for one of the two divisions of North Wiltshire lists 311 Archers, 505 Billmen, 329
Harnesses and 70 Horses; across the county this would translate into a force four
times those numbers – perhaps 4,500 Foot and 280 Horse. However some muster
rolls record low numbers of men appearing when summoned not only in times of
peace, but even when invasions or Scots incursions threatened, and when numbers
rose, many of those mustering were woefully short of the weapons and the
accoutrements they were supposed to bring. Market End parish of Bicester furnished 1 armoured and mounted billman but ‘there be 10 archers more in that town and 21 billmen able to serve the Kinge lackynge harnes and weapon’, and there were another seven weaponless men in Kynges End parish.

Measures were needed to stem the decline and under Mary I all previous militia legislation was repealed and a more cohesive set of laws introduced. These required property owners to be responsible for finding, keeping and maintaining such horses and armour for the defence of the realm as their wealth permitted. The legislation included penalties for absenteeism or equipment shortages and it made corporations responsible for the supply and storage of weapons in gatehouses or churches. It instructed local authorities to devise the means by which their forces could assemble at one hour’s notice. It also heralded the move towards a centrally controlled militia, which may have been the result of a Catholic government being apprehensive of the largely Protestant militia.

Elizabeth’s government enacted a militia statute in 1558. As there was still no standing royal army she employed a levy for raising royal troops for her Irish Wars and the prospect of pay, loot and free-billeting again encouraged the stripping of the militia of many of its best men. From the 1560s onwards the provision of soldiers in times of war was primarily the responsibility of the lord lieutenants of the counties (see below) and late Tudor government enforced its militia regulations. It ordered a nationwide inspection of all males of sixteen years and upwards from which each region was to draw ‘a convenient and sufficient number of the most able, by the reasonable charge of the inhabitants of every shire, to be armed and weaponed and so consequently taught and trained.’ This marked the introduction of training requirements and consequently the origin of the trained bands which, through their
exemption from being forced into service overseas, were safe from absorption into the royal armies. This condition encouraged another important change in the nature of militia service in that it encouraged men to volunteer for service rather than being pressed. The Elizabethan Militia was England’s army although the expectation of its ability to fight against well-trained professional solders or mercenaries was uncertain. However, despite the Earl of Leicester’s disparaging comment ‘I [know] what burgers be well enough,’ the militia put down the rebellion of the Earl of Essex in 1601 both in the street fighting and the rounding up of conspirators. Moreover, throughout Elizabeth’s reign the independent nature of the trained bands was being fostered. They were each essentially de jure, local in command and not under central government control, and they were also de facto, voluntary in recruitment and not bound in service.

Successive English governments tried to balance local and national priorities and to mollify a seemingly innate distrust of a centralised military answerable only to a socially elite minority. None of the Tudors, and neither James I nor Charles I before the civil wars had a standing royal army. They had a small core of royal guards and maintained garrisons in various parts of the country, relying upon short-term mass recruitment in emergencies. The trained bands satisfied the need in times of peace for a home defence force without raising and paying for a large body of professional, full-time soldiers. Although some aspects of compulsory service and obligation to supply equipment were present in the militia regulations, the traditions of localism and voluntarism held sway.

Being his national defence force, James I tried to improve the trained bands and inject a spirit of revival and renewal. Inspections were ordered and plans for
making good deficiencies in numbers and equipment set in motion, particularly in
London,

…supplying the roomes of Captains, souldiers and other
persons as are either dead, insufficient or removed out of the
City since the mustering of former times, with sufficient and
at men… also causing the defects of Armours, weapons and
other Furniture to be sufficiently repaired, armoured and
provided. And that the said Bandes may be trained and
exercised from tyme to tyme. 30

This included holidays such as Shrove Tuesday and May Day when the towns
looked to their trained bands not their watch to police any unruly behaviour by
apprentices or other young men.

When Charles I came to the throne in 1625 he expressed a desire to create an
exact or perfect militia; dutiful to the monarch, well equipped, up to strength, properly
disciplined and regularly trained. Issues of muskets and pikes replaced bows and bills
and the Privy Council issued edicts about absenteeism and the borrowing by one unit
of another unit’s weapons for different inspection days. 31 The new measures met with
some success. Throughout the 1630s interest in the trained bands grew and in the
shires interest was taken in the achievements of those in the capital as Letters from
Mercurius Civicus to Mercurius Rusticus testifies. 32 However, tension between the
king and his parliament grew into a struggle for constitutional control of the trained
bands. Relations between monarch and civil authorities worsened as Charles tried to
enforce a levy for the First Bishops’ War and reneged upon the ‘no foreign service’
agreement with the militia. 33 By 1641 the London Militia, the most numerous in the
country, had become disaffected and skeptics thought it could no longer be relied
upon to enact the king’s will and perform the duty of the former posse comitatus to
maintain the peace and keep order in times of civil unrest.
As the trained bands showed signs of increased military effectiveness whoever controlled them held the potential power of government. The spiral into civil war is not within the scope of this work but it is interesting to note that the first open disputes between king and parliament were over the control of the London Trained Bands and then the county militias. These arguments are detailed by Nagel and Wedgewood, and Charles I’s attempts to seize control of them in the three kingdoms are outlined in Kenyon & Ohlmeyer.  

With the raising of the royal standard at Nottingham in 1642 commissions of array and militia ordinances were issued and passed by both king and parliament respectively, instructing powerful and influential men to raise regiments of foot and troops of horse. The trained bands were the natural focus for early recruitment. Although ranks were swollen later by impressments, numbers were initially gathered through volunteers, and the militia system disintegrated as units were converted to full time troops. They often performed well in battle, a fact commented upon by several contemporaries even their surprised foes.

Militia regiments were again raised during the Interregnum and operated alongside the New Model Army. Under Cromwell this united force won itself a formidable reputation and proved to be as good as any in Europe, and it more than competently policed the rule of the Major Generals, 1655-57. The militia and the standing army numbered around 80,000 men across England, Scotland and Ireland, and the distinction between the two forces became blurred.

2.2. **THE ROYAL ARMY AND THE RESTORATION MILITIA.**

Disbanding parliament’s standing army and retaining only a small part of it as royal troops was one of the most popular steps taken by Charles II at the Restoration, as it
both removed the financial burden it imposed and ended its ability to interfere in politics. Childs states that the disbanding of the Interregnum’s standing army returned 40,000 men to civilian life.³⁶

On 6 November fifteen regiments of foot, four of horse and twenty-two garrison companies had been dissolved, leaving three of foot, nine of horse and eleven garrison units. By Christmas 1660 the New Model Army had ceased to exist except for Albemarle’s foot... and his own regiment of horse.

The much reduced military, mainly drawn from royalist troops returning from exile or from units loyal to Monck was returned to the pre-war state of guards and garrisons. This was a relatively small, permanent force paid for out of the royal purse from monies allocated to the king by his royalist parliament for his personal protection and the better governance of the country. Yet, it was still an unpopular entity and any attempt to increase its size or vote it additional funding was strenuously resisted.

The size of the royal army fluctuated due to wars with the Dutch, intervening periods of peace and the need to hold first Dunkirk and then Tangiers. However, the force grew steadily in numbers. In 1685 James II’s army to suppress the Monmouth Rebellion consisted of: The Royal Regiment of Horse Guards, The Royal Regiment of Horse, The Royal Regiment of Dragoons, The First Royal Regiment of Foot Guards, The Second Royal Regiment of Foot Guards, The Royal Regiment of Foot, The Queen Dowager's Regiment of Foot and The Queen Consort's Regiment of Foot, together with the Train of Artillery which was not part of the army establishment. In addition there were 22 specified garrisons including those posted on offshore islands such as Jersey. Although the army was controlled by the king it was administered centrally by a triumvirate of officials: the Secretary-at-War, the Muster-Master-General and the Paymaster.³⁷
The royal army during the Monmouth Rebellion campaigned with approximately 3,000 all arms and could have produced another 4,000 if the regiments mustered all their companies and troops and the garrisons had been called in. Additional to this home defence force there were other contingents on the Irish and the Scottish establishments and three regiments in service with the Dutch. The Irish establishment was smaller than the English establishment and the Scottish establishment smaller still but the overall total number of regular royal soldiers in 1685 amounted to approximately 17,000 spread across four countries. The royal army was considerably bigger than envisaged in the early 1660s but the militia could draw upon a much larger number of men. Hume maintains that by 1672 there were 130,000 militiamen in England, 22,000 in Scotland and 24,000 in Ireland. The militia regiments may not have matched the royal army in royal-affiliation titles and indeed professionalism, but they did number somewhere in the region of 176,000 men in the three kingdoms, with 30,000 in London alone.

An entrenched antithesis to a standing army coupled with a need for some form of large-scale, home defence force saw the rebirth and growth of the Restoration Militia. However, the Militia Bills of 1661 and 1663 met with opposition in parliament and were only passed by securing the support of former cavalier officers and exaggerating reports of plots and possible rebellions. Charles II then followed Cromwell’s example by creating a Select Militia. Barnett states that it was the ineffectiveness of the militia during the Second Dutch War that was responsible for the revival of the Select Mobile Militia in 1667, under which initiative a regiment of foot was raised plus three regiments of horse and seventeen independent troops. The regulations for the Select Militia insisted that both those responsible for providing men and the men themselves swore ‘that it is not lawful upon any pretense
whatsoever to take arms against the king.' Apart from these few units, this Select Militia never materialised, but the militia acts of the early Restoration abolished tenure in chivalry (or shield service), established legislation for the governance of the militia and created a national militia estimated at 160,000 locally-raised men funded by local contribution. Although the militia legislation of the 1660s had been fraught with argument the late-seventeenth-century militia had come into being.

With two military bodies in the country it was not surprising that rivalries existed and there were several areas of tension. Militia officers tended to be those who extolled loyalty to the Church of England, parliament and the local community, whilst royal army officers’ first allegiance was to the king upon whom they were dependent for pay, promotion and social advancement.

The militia and the royal army were also rivals for recruitment. Militiamen were frequently volunteers rather than men who had been pressed or forced by their wretched circumstances to enlist. They were usually of higher social standing than those in the royal army who were often the dregs of society. Western’s subtitle The Story of a Political Issue encourages readers to see the militia as a military body nominally assigned to parliament, with its ranks filled by small holders, craftsmen and men with a little social standing and some vested interest in the country; and the royal army as intrinsically bound to the court, full of men of lesser degree, usually landless and perhaps petty criminals, who had no say in the affairs of local government, and consequently could not be expected to care overmuch for the cause for which they were expected to fight. Being civilians the men in the militia often shared the general populace’s view of regulars as expressed by the Restoration playwright Thomas Otway in his play The Soldier’s Fortune. He calls them lousy redcoat-rakehells, dogs, enslavers, plunderers, ravishers and scoundrels. Although it cannot
be proved it is likely royal soldiers also looked down upon their part-time counterparts.

The two forces were thus separate bodies but they were expected to co-operate to achieve the goals of a campaign. To do so, senior officers had to understand the differences between them and their relative strengths and weaknesses. Problems arose because this was not understood or became confused. There appears to have been not only a degree of confusion over relative qualities in the eyes of those who exercised political control over the two institutions, but also in the relationship between the two officer cadres and the social groups from which they came. King’s work on the population of late seventeenth-century Britain describes the emergence of a discreet group of men who had bought commissions in the regular army or actively sought them through patronage, in order to achieve the political and social status enjoyed by militia officers, which would have ordinarily been denied them by the natural order of county social structures. King advances a view of society based upon a fixed social hierarchy and the importance of the household, and he suggests that these men were its enemies, holding transient appointments and being dependant more upon court and state patronage rather than established country and local power. If King is correct it is not surprising that the two bodies did not work together easily and seldom had a good word for each other.

Contemporary comparisons with the royal army were inevitable as they were the only model against which the militia could be measured as soldiers. But they were comparisons made on unsound ground. For example, the military experience of those in the royal army was far greater. Although some men would have retired upon their return from Tangiers in February 1684, Trelawney’s Regiments was destined for Ireland as a ready and available serving unit. There must have been a degree of
turnover of men in the royal ranks but it is reasonable to suggest that those serving in the mid 1670s constituted a significant core to each regiment in the mid 1680s. Most of the royal units that fought at Sedgemoor were experienced and had seen action.

**Table 2.2.1: Experience of the Sedgemoor regiments.**

His Majesty’s Regiment of Horse Guards - Some sea service then with Turenne in Flanders campaign 1672-78. Fought at Maastricht in 1673.

The Royal Regiment of Horse (Oxford’s) - Active in the policing of Oxford in 1681. One troop had served in the Tangier Garrison.

The Royal Regiment of Dragoons - Active in Tangiers, and recently helped suppress Argyle’s rebellion in Scotland.

His Majesty’s First Regiment of Foot Guards - Extensive sea service during Dutch Wars and with the English force on the Continent, both with Turenne then the Dutch in Flanders, plus home policing of the Oates Riots.

His Majesty’s Second Regiment of Foot Guards - Sea service and land campaign in Flanders, first against the Dutch then against the French. Some served in Tangiers.

The Royal Regiment of Foot (Dumbarton’s) - Served on the Irish establishment and recently returned from four years in Tangiers fighting Berbers.

The Queen Dowager's Regiment (Kirke’s) - Recently returned long term garrison of Tangiers, having been in many engagements with the Berbers.

The Queen Consort's Regiment (Trelawney’s) - Part of the garrison of Tangiers, having been raised in 1680 and in frequent action against the Berber tribes.


Many of these regiments were campaign-hardened and no battalion of militia could match this experience: nor could its men be adjudged more capable soldiers.

Despite his proficiency in drill and his personal courage, a Devon militiaman with eight days formal training per annum was never going to equal a veteran who had spent years in Tangiers in a state of endemic war. It is tempting to believe that the
militia’s politically motivated detractors knew exactly what they were doing when they held up the two forces for simplistic comparison.

By 1685 the competing existence of royal army and militia had changed the nature of reciprocal respect and expectation of co-operation between the warriors of the king and the weaponmen of the county. Adding fuel to this division was the king’s preference and public support for the royal army.

The royal army was subject to the orders of the king and that the militia was also under his control was enshrined in law by act of parliament:

Foresmuch as within all His Majesties Realmes and Dominions the sole Supreme Government Command and Disposition of the Militia and of all Forces by Sea and Land and of all Forts and Places of strength is and by the Lawes of England ever was the undoubted Right of His Majesty.

The number of royal regiments and their smallest establishment meant that the army could be tightly and centrally controlled. However, to be practical the administration and control of the militia had to be delegated.

Whereas the king could draw upon a cadre of professional military officers to command the royal army, the civilian nature of the militia required a different approach and different men. To control and command the militia Charles II instituted the pre-civil war system of lord lieutenants of the counties, men who were the monarch’s representatives in their shires. The office had been abolished under the Commonwealth but An Act for ordering the Forces in the several Counties of this Kingdom of 1662 declared that

...the King's most Excellent Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, shall and may from Time to Time, as Occasion shall require, issue forth several Commissions of Lieutenancy to such Persons as his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, shall think fit to be his Majesty's Lieutenants for the several and respective Counties, Cities and Places of England and Dominion of Wales, and Town of Berwick upon Tweed.
Charles II issued instructions for these men to ensure they had ‘volunteers who offer assistance formed in troops apart and trained; the officers to be numerous; disaffected persons watched and not allowed to assemble, and their arms seized’.49 The reinstated lord lieutenants were still primarily the king’s military representative in the county but their wide-reaching local influence took on greater significance. By the 1680s they and their deputy lord lieutenants were key figures in the intricately constructed military, judicial, economic, social and political framework of the counties, and each man was carefully selected from a close-knit circle of men loyal to the monarch. All were peers of the realm except the lord lieutenant of County Durham, Dr. Nathaniel Crew who was the Bishop of Durham (locum). All were also Tories. Some Whig families achieved high office under the Stuarts post 1681 but they were consistently excluded from that of lord lieutenant. The continued wealth and status of these men depended greatly upon the king’s goodwill.

Table 2.2.2: The lord lieutenants of the south western counties 1680 – 1690.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTY</th>
<th>1680</th>
<th>1681</th>
<th>1682</th>
<th>1683</th>
<th>1684</th>
<th>1685</th>
<th>1686</th>
<th>1687</th>
<th>1688</th>
<th>1689</th>
<th>1690</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cornwall</td>
<td>John Granville, Earl of Bath</td>
<td>Not known or Vacant</td>
<td>John Granville, Earl of Bath</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>Christopher Monck, Duke of Albemarle</td>
<td>Not known or Vacant</td>
<td>John Granville, Earl of Bath</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>John Digby, Earl of Bristol</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>James FitzJames, Duke of Berwick</td>
<td>Not known or Vacant</td>
<td>Charles Paulet, Duke of Bolton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>Henry Somerset, Duke of Beaufort</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>Maurice Berkeley, Viscount Fitzhardinge</td>
<td>Not known / Vacant</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke</td>
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</table>

* Shared with both William Cavendish, Duke of Devonshire and Charles Sackville, Earl of Dorset.
The lord lieutenants had deputies to assist them in their duties. The office of
deputy lord lieutenant, between three and six per county, was in the gift of the lord
lieutenant. Each was usually assigned a division of the county, often unrelated to
their residence, and they were supposed to meet with their fellow deputies or under
officers regularly in designated market towns. These men’s duties involved holding
musters, supervising the efforts of the muster master and the militia officers, and
applying the statutory rules for the assessments of property holders and the collecting
of all militia-related monies. They often held other offices, many having served as
sheriff of the county, others were justices of peace while some were Members of
Parliament. Such was the influence of deputy lieutenant and militia colonel Sir
William Portman that there is a note appended to the list of rebels condemned to
transportation by Judge Jefferies in 1685 that one man was pardoned at his request.
Most deputies were mature men of over 35 years of age who recognised the
advantages the position offered and valued the appointment.

The deputy lord lieutenants were drawn from the ranks of the leading county
gentry whose local knowledge, experience and standing served them and their office
well. They were known local figures and whilst not members of the aristocracy,
many were baronets and knights. Others were major landowners and merchants
whose wealth, property, status and influence had been achieved through trade, civil
war service, marriage and patronage. They had sometimes risen from quite humble
beginnings in a relatively short time: ‘appointments were all de novo’ but they all had
to be men known to be loyal to the Crown because they held local power when their
superior was at court or immersed in national affairs. In Nottinghamshire Gilbert,
Lord Haughton, a cavalier who had returned from exile, was created a deputy but his
father the Earl of Clare, who had been an Interregnum Member of Parliament, was
not. For young men it was often a career move to higher things and sometimes quite a family monopoly. In Somerset the Portman family provided several deputies during the seventeenth century, the first being Sir John Portman whose position secured him a baronetcy in 1612.\textsuperscript{54}

One of the duties of a lord lieutenant which he usually delegated to his deputies was to ensure that the required militia levies were raised and trained. They in turn often passed this responsibility to an array of militia officers and sub-officers of the civil administration, going as far down the scale as the parish constable who was responsible for its implementation at the lowest local level. To aid these men in performing this duty the lord lieutenant also appointed a county muster master to actually oversee musters and training and a secretary to arrange for the billeting of any troops sent into his county from elsewhere.\textsuperscript{55}

After the lessons of the civil wars the king knew he needed lord lieutenants, deputy lieutenants and militia colonels who shared his political values and derived some interest, influence or gain by upholding them. The lord lieutenants sat in the House of Lords and the deputies often had seats in the House of Commons, as did many of the colonels. The colonel of the Red Regiment of the Wiltshire Militia was John Wyndham who was also Member of Parliament for Sarum. Similarly in Cornwall Colonel Charles Godolphin was the member for Helston, and in Somerset at least four militia colonels held seats: Sir William Portman for Taunton; Sir Edward Phelipps for Ilchester; Edward Berkeley, Viscount Fitzharding for Bath and Francis Lutterell for Minehead.

The lord lieutenants were not instructed by Charles II ‘to require persons as have a certificate of their constant loyalty and fidelity’ before being appointed as militia officers, but he encouraged the appointment of those with a family history of
service to the crown. Members of families in the South West who had remained loyal throughout the civil wars and who had soldiered for his father’s cause or accompanied his exile were the obvious choices for appointments. Those of high social rank such as Francis Lutterell whose family had held Dunster Castle for Charles I and Sir Edmund Andros whose father had held Jersey, were appointed to the senior ranks of the militia whilst those of lesser social status or younger siblings became the inferior officers, such as lieutenants and ensigns. Proven family loyalty to the Crown was seen as an important criterion of loyalty and thus a factor in appointments.

Table 2.2.3: Those controlling the western militia in 1685 and their family association with the royal cause.

**Lord Lieutenants and Commanders of County Militias:**

**Cornwall**  John Granville, Earl of Bath – Father was Sir Bevil Grenville, hero of the Royalist Western Army killed at Lansdown.

**Devon**  Christopher Monck, Duke of Albemarle - Father engineered The Restoration and had served as Captain General of the Army.

**Dorset**  John Digby, Earl of Bristol - Father was Royalist cavalry general and Charles’ friend in exile.

**Gloucestershire**  Henry Somerset, Duke of Beaufort – Father had been created Earl of Worcester in 1642 and had held Raglan for Charles I.

**Somerset**  Charles Seymour, Duke of Somerset - Uncle was Charles I’s General in the West. Grandfather had been ennobled during the civil war.

**Wiltshire**  Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke – Grandfather had been a royal favourite before becoming a staunch supporter of parliament. The family home at Wilton had been the Royalist civil war Artillery Park,

**Militia Officers:**

**Cornwall**  Colonel Charles Godolphin – Father had been a Royalist colonel in the Cornish Foot, known as one of ‘the four wheels of Charles’ wain…’

**Devon**  Captain Robert Hawley – Father & uncle had been Royalist officers.

**Dorset**  Colonel Thomas Strangways– Father & uncle had been royalist colonels of horse and were captured at the storm of Sherborne Castle.

**Gloucestershire**  No officers’ names discovered

**Somerset**  Colonel Edward Phelipps – Father had been a royalist captain of horse under Charles I and sat in his Oxford Parliament in 1644. He was also jailed for his attempted rebellion for Charles II in 1655. Colonel Sir William Portman – Father had fought for Charles I. House had been a royalist HQ. Imprisoned and died in the Tower. Colonel Ralph, Lord Stawell, – Father had been a colonel of horse in General Hopton’s Royal Western Army. Defied Parliament’s authority in 1650 and imprisoned in the Tower until released at the Restoration.
Wiltshire

Colonel John Wyndham – Uncle had been royalist Governor of Bridgewater whose wife had nursed Charles II when he was a baby. Captain Sherrington Talbot – Father raised a regiment for Charles I. Captain Ashby – Father had been a colonel of horse in the civil wars and was created a baron in 1660, after which he led an investigation into the activities of Cromwell’s treasurers in Devon.


The spread of the influence of such men can be seen in the fact that ‘In the species of interregnum which prevailed in Poole from the issue of the Quo Warranto under the Grant of Charter of 8 December 1688 the duties of the Mayoralty were performed by Colonel John Wyndham of Salisbury, who was appointed to the Office by commission…’ The family of John Young, Wyndham’s lieutenant colonel, is not listed among the wealthy of the county but it was already producing militia officers. The chart below shows that across the southwest these militia officers also held important civilian offices as members of parliament, sheriffs, justices of the peace, and high ranking controllers of local business. Holding both a militia commission and a civil office could cause conflict of interests. As lord lieutenants were peers with seats in the House of Lords and their deputies were often MPs in the House of Commons many were frequently absent from their counties for part of their time. In 1661 the Wiltshire deputies urged to organise the militia quickly, petitioned the Council to increase their numbers as ‘none of the deputies are likely to be resident in the county and the militia by [is] no means settled.’
Table 2.2.4: A Selection of militia officers and their civil offices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Officers and Offices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cornwall</td>
<td>Colonel Charles Godolphin, justice of the peace and Assayer of Tin &amp; Coinage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colonel Thomas Strangways, MP for the county and deputy lord lieutenant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major Thomas Erle, MP for Wareham and deputy lord lieutenant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain of Horse, Richard Fowns, MP for Corfe Castle and deputy lord lieutenant of Dorset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>Colonel Thomas Strangways, MP for the county and deputy lord lieutenant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major Thomas Erle, MP for Wareham and deputy lord lieutenant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain of Horse, Richard Fowns, MP for Corfe Castle and deputy lord lieutenant of Dorset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>Colonel Sir Robert Holmes, MP for Newport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>Colonel William Portman, MP for Taunton and deputy lord lieutenant of both Somerset and Dorset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colonel Edward Phelipps, foreman of the grand jury, MP for Ilchester.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain of Horse, Sir Maurice Berkeley Viscount Fitzharding, MP for Bath,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>became lord lieutenant in 1688.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colonel Francis Luttrell, MP for Minehead, and deputy lord lieutenant of Dorset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>Colonel John Wyndham, MP for Sarum, high sheriff, mayor of Poole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colonel Henry Chivers, high sheriff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colonel Edward Baynton, justice of the peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain John Davenant, high sheriff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colonel of Horse Thomas Penruddock, former MP for Wilton and deputy lord lieutenant of Wiltshire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain of Horse, Sherrington Talbot, MP for Chippenham.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Militia officers were not only themselves well placed in local affairs but also had family connections in positions of power. Colonel Charles Godolphin’s uncle William had inherited his grandfather’s colonelcy of the local trained band and converted it into a field regiment fighting for Charles I. Charles’ cousin Colonel Sidney Godolphin was Governor of the Isles of Scilly. Another cousin and another Sidney Godolphin had been Monmouth’s Secretary, was MP for Helston and held several offices under Charles II including Gentleman of the Bedchamber. He became a baron in 1684. Under James II Sidney Godolphin became First Lord of the Treasury and Chamberlain to Queen Mary of Modena. Those who controlled and commanded the militia were well placed in both the political and social structures of the country and exerted influence.


2.3. **JAMES II AND THE MILITIA.**

The king’s role in the creation of the perception of an ineffective militia has already been mentioned but it is worth developing this point as part of the militia’s background. James II tended towards the view that both the state’s and his own personal security could only be ensured by a fully dependant and therefore loyal, royal army. The militia being controlled by the county lord lieutenants meant that the monarch was to a degree, dependent upon their goodwill. By careful placing of his own men and issuing frequent instructions Charles II had lessened their independence, so James II continued this policy. He kept the same beholden men in power and later appointed his illegitimate son James Fitzjames, Earl of Berwick to the lord lieutenancy of Hampshire in 1687 at the age of 17.

This desire for personal control was fuelled by his and his Tory government’s wariness of a militia influenced by the Whig Party, coupled with a memory that his father had lost his crown through having too small a military force to crush his parliamentarian opponents in early 1642. These fears manifested themselves in a desire to diminish the status and role of the militia, parliament’s potential military instrument, and to replace it with an enlarged royal army loyal to his person. This was a bold and controversial move as no previous monarch had sought to dispense with the local defence force.

James’ preference for the royal army was marked and his antipathy towards the militia hardened between May and June 1685. In May 1685 the right of a subject to refuse an appointment to a militia command was withdrawn and service was enforced by fine, but in June 1685 James suspended all militia training in Scotland and absolved people of the responsibility of paying to maintain the militia under the proclaimed intention of easing the burden imposed upon the people. He then
managed to persuade the Scottish Parliament to disband the militia entirely despite their very good showing in suppressing Argyle’s Rebellion.

Our sovereign lord, with consent of his estates of parliament, considering that it may contribute for the ease of the people to have the ordinary rendezvous of militia discharged, unless extraordinary occasions should otherwise require; therefore they discharge all rendezvous of the militia in time coming during his majesty’s royal pleasure and, until his pleasure be so declared, that no leaders nor assisters shall be liable for furnishing and contributing to buy or maintain horse or foot on that account, and they recommend to the secret council to take such courses for disposing of the militia arms in the respective shires as shall seem most expedient for his majesty's service, without prejudice always of the continuance of the former and present constitution of the militia during the present rebellion.62

It is worth considering if he saw this as a rehearsal for his plans for England.

Although it is not possible to prove that James II actually conceived a political strategy to increase the royal army at the expense of the militia the picture of the Restoration militia passed down to modern readers is at least part framed by the political intentions of James II. He may have harboured notions of ruling by Divine Right but in 1685, early in his reign, he needed to tread warily and take parliament and popular opinion with him. It was in his interest to encourage the image of militia incompetence fuelled by Feversham’s and Churchill’s biased reporting of events. He chose to interpret campaign reverses as the fault of the militia rather than recognise his nephew Monmouth’s military abilities. ‘Through the fault of the militia bands of Devon or Somerset the Rebels have opened their way toward Taunton’.63 The idea of using the situation to raise public awareness of the argument for a larger royal army also seems to have been formulated at this time and he took opportunities to promulgate this view: ‘I hope everybody will be convinced, that the Militia, which have hitherto been so much depended on, is not sufficient for such Occasions’.64
Militia officers may not have been aware that James was masterminding a campaign of denigration but they were well aware that one existed. One complained that: ‘…we are not beholding to the Gazet that trumpets the small acts of others and wholly omits what was of more consequence’.  

Monmouth’s Rebellion had served James’ purpose in that in response to the threat he raised several new regiments of horse and foot, some under the command of leading Catholics and issued instruction to increase the strength of every troop and company in the existing royal army. Although an enlarged royal army had been achieved there remained a need to discredit the view that the militia was the nation’s defender, and a need to find the funding to pay for the new regiments. If the militia could be denigrated and then abolished, the royal army was ready to replace it. Moreover the tax raised to pay for the militia could fund the new units. With an enlarged royal army and a redundant militia James could have absolute personal control.

James II’s personal correspondence reveals that he was playing political games to meet the need for a personally loyal armed force. He often refers to the failure of the militia in letters to royal officers and friends in both the military and state service, making them fully aware of his views. However, he sent praise and statements of confidence to the lord lieutenants via Sunderland. On 13 June he had a letter sent to Albemarle, stating that:

The King commands me to let you know he places an entire confidence in your conduct and zeal for his service, and therefore leaves it to your discretion to march with the forces of the county, and to proceed in all things as you shall see cause and judge best for his service, and his Majesty having authorised several Lords Lieutenants to march with the militia out of the counties I send enclosed a letter giving you the same authority.
He repeats this confidence on 16 June:

His Majesty is well satisfied with the orders you have given to prevent any further progress of the rebels, and has no further directions to send you. At this time, but leaves it to your discretion and conduct to act as you shall think best for his service.

However, the following letter is a carefully crafted political document which begins:

His Majesty commands me to acquaint your Grace that He is very well satisfied with the good Services you have done, and the Orders and Directions you have given for preserving that County and the Peace and Quiet thereof, being a matter of the Greatest importance at this time..."67

There is no hint of dissatisfaction. But, the same letter imposes the Earl of Feversham’s full authority over Albemarle and Bath, the lord lieutenant of Cornwall and joint commander of the forces in Exeter:

… the Duke of Albemarle will receive Directions from My Lord Feversham, that the King does expect he should act accordingly, which I am sure will be best done, if so good a friend as your Lord is, can be near him."68

Both men were instructed to subordinate themselves to the newly appointed royal army commander. John Granville, Earl of Bath was a king’s man, he had fought for Charles I, served on the Privy Council under Charles II, represented James II in Cornwall and indeed transferred allegiance to William of Orange once he was crowned. In 1685 James could trust Bath to do exactly as he was told, but it may be that James had perceived in Albemarle a desire to ally himself with the militia, and being conscious of Albemarle’s power and popular standing, was also beginning to undermine him. By suggesting that Bath joined Albemarle he was perhaps hoping that the elder and totally loyal man would be a controlling influence. As the son of the Captain General who had instigated the Restoration and as a Duke, Albemarle’s voice carried considerable weight: should he contradict the official line the king
intended to take regarding the militia it would be very embarrassing. It would appear
that as early as 16 June the king had begun to denigrate the militia and the reduction
of Albemarle’s influence was wholly consistent with this. If the king could
marginalise him and the role of the lord lieutenants he would enhance his own central
power.

Just four days after the defeat of Monmouth at Sedgemoor the king instructed
the militias all over the country be stood down.\textsuperscript{69} This was normal practice but for
those militias in the West there was still plenty of work to be done in re-establishing
royal authority, hunting down rebels and bringing them to what then passed for
justice. On 30 July, with Monmouth dead a fortnight, the lord lieutenants received a
further letter from Sunderland:

The King commands me to acquaint your Lordships that he
would have you give an order for an estimate to be forthwith
made of the expense of keeping up the Militia within your
Lieutenancies as large as by law they may be kept togeather
in one yeare and to transmit the same forthwith to me.\textsuperscript{70}

Coleby confirms that Edward Noel, lord lieutenant of Hampshire had a copy,
and comments ‘with a view to making alternative arrangements.’\textsuperscript{71} The request was
for a financial projection based upon the maximum cost likely to be incurred for a full
year’s spending, not simply the real cost of maintaining the militia during a campaign.
The government was preparing arguments to bring measures before parliament
backed by financial statistics which showed the militia to be too expensive. Coleby
also states that James intended to dismantle the militia and Miller confirms this with
the revelation that James had plans to take over their weapons.\textsuperscript{72} This was coupled
with several lord lieutenants being expressly forbidden from holding musters, and
others discouraged from doing so.\textsuperscript{73}
A deputy lieutenant of Essex, Sir John Bramston, was with Albemarle when he received his copy of the letter ordering that the militia was not to muster and remarked that ‘the design is visible’.\textsuperscript{74} In Bramston’s record of Albemarle’s reply the Duke did not try to hide the failure of the Somerset Militia at Axminster nor his reluctance to act without orders with his Devon Militia. He admitted that the militia’s performance had not been flawless and added that he was now sure that the king ‘would make no more use of them, but have the monie that expense came to, and mawteine [royal] forces in every countie proportionate. But that must be by Act of Parliament, and we shall heare more of that matter next meeting…’\textsuperscript{75} Albemarle was astute. Charles II had set the precedent of reallocating parliamentary monies in 1666 by putting much of the fleet out of commission thus releasing its funding for the royal army, and James intended to do something very similar.\textsuperscript{76} Miller states: ‘…in England James let the militia decay and planned to use the militia rates to maintain the standing army’.\textsuperscript{77} If the militia had to undergo decay and decline in order to be ineffective it can be argued that hitherto it had indeed been effective.

Albemarle fell from favour and was either ejected or resigned his various military appointments and public offices. The defence of the militia as an effective body was undertaken by Sir Thomas Clarges who insisted that both Albemarle and the militia would have achieved much more if they had been better supported.\textsuperscript{78} ‘To come first to the Militia, who (let me tell you) did considerable Service in the late Rebellion, and if a great Nobleman of this Kingdom had been supplied and assisted, it had soon been quelled’.\textsuperscript{79}

In May 1687 James II ordered the militias of Cornwall, Devon and Dorset not to muster until further notice: ‘The King would have you take care the militia within your Lieutenancies of Devon and Cornwall will not be mustered until you receive his
direction’. A similar missive went also to the Earl of Bristol concerning the Dorset Militia. Whether the militia of the southwest would have fought against William of Orange must remain a matter of speculation, but had they been in position to do so there is nothing to indicate that they would have behaved differently from the soldiers of his royal army in the face of a foreign invasion. It is very unlikely that the type of men who made up the militia in 1685 were different from those of 1688 and that the regiments ‘composed of honest yeoman and farmers fighting in defense of their lands, family and country would be a match for any invader.’

2.4. THE MILITIA’S ROLE IN POLICING.

Before leaving the militia’s background it is necessary to briefly examine their role in policing the state. The term ‘militia’ has its roots in various Latin expressions: miles meaning soldier; -itia indicating a state, activity, quality or condition of being - thus militia means soldier in state service. Although in English parlance earlier the word ‘militia’ was first recorded in 1590 in a book by Sir John Smythe, Certain Discourses Military. Uncritical observers may believe Charles II merely continued the institution of a part-time national defence force but the crown’s and the government’s survival depended on the militia.

The first Act of Parliament in 1661 legislated for the safety of Charles II, threatening reprisals against any who dared to:

… intend death or destruccion or any bodily harm ... or restraint of the Person of the same our Soveraigne Lord the King or to deprive or depose him from the Stile Honour or Kingly Name of the Imperiall Crowne...'".

Charles II’s guards may have been able to protect his person in a reasonably small confined location but a later Militia Act of 1661 outlined the necessity for the militia’s continuance to respond to the threat that:
... since the twenty fourth of June One thousand six hundred and sixty there have beene Insurrections by occasion whereof diverse of His Majesties good Subjects have beene murdered and for the securing the Peace of the Nation and preventing further disorders diverse persons suspected to be Fanaticks Sectaries or Disturbers of the Peace have beene assaulted arrested detained or imprisoned and diverse Armes have been seized and Houses searched for Armes or suspected persons Bee it therefore further Enacted by the Authority aforesaid. 

The need for protection was nationwide. In the early years of the Restoration, the state created the militia to guarantee its own security. Although the government paid political lip-service to the idea that the militia was maintained to guard against foreign incursions or invasions its main purpose was to defend the state against disturbances or insurrections among its own people. Beneath the veneer of protecting the nation from external threat the militia was the government’s military tool for internal social control.

The use of the militia at times of threats to national security was a laudable aim but whereas foreign invasion was easy to define, civil unrest and dissenter activities were harder to interpret. The militia could be useful to the local community in the peace-keeping role of the *posse comitatus* and as a quasi police force could suppress public disorder to ensure the safety of ordinary citizens. However, whether an outdoor church-meeting constituted a threat to civil order is a moot point but the lord lieutenants usually responded to instructions issued by the king or his Secretary of the Council. Although rhetoric suggested it would be called out to meet foreign threats local violence and internal threats to national and government security were often its real targets.

To judge how effective the militia was in policing the country it is necessary to examine how well they performed in that role. Whilst it is tempting to think of the militia’s enforcement of the law in the days before the formation of the civil police
force, as conducting operations against gangs of law-breakers or smugglers, militia policing was actually more focused upon maintaining the political status quo than rounding up thieves, armed robbers and fraudsters. The focus of their efforts was upon conducting searches for arms, dispersing conventicles and harassing dissenters in general, be they religious, such as Catholics and non-conformists, or political, such as old Cromwellians or republicans. This was specified in the requirement that ordered ‘disaffected persons [to be] watched and not allowed to assemble, and their arms seized; fortresses to be secured, all risings suppressed’. In some areas the militia may be accused of over-zealous policing especially where the suppression of non-conformists’ outdoor religious meetings or conventicles and the harassment of dissenters were concerned. Edward Phelipps, a country gentleman of traditional leanings and a senior officer in the Somerset Militia was described as

… a fierce enemy to his political rivals and an opponent of religious dissent. He was foreman of the grand jury (1680) on the Taunton radicals, and was described two years later as ‘very successful in bringing nonconformists to Church’. In the aftermath of the Rye House Plot (1683) he assisted in the search of the houses of ‘fanatics’ in Bridgwater and burned the furnishings of their chapel.

Searches of dissenters’ properties for weapons were also a great cause for both tension and resentment but accusations of uncivil behaviour towards those whose houses were searched were investigated. After such an enquiry into threatening behaviour lodged by Mr. William Herbert of Grafton Park, Sir Roger Norwich wrote to Secretary Jenkins that the complaint was malicious and a slight on the lieutenancy. He enclosed a disposition from Captain Edward Saunders of the Northamptonshire militia horse assuring that property was not damaged. A rebuttal to a similar charge was made in evidence given by Lieutenant James Bond of the Northamptonshire militia foot. Describing a search he reported that he had not ‘heard any of the soldiers
say, If you will not tell us where your master’s arms are, we will quarter with you a month’. Whether these investigations of hardships suffered by dissenters were thorough and unbiased or their findings genuine we cannot tell. However, it does emerge that the militia did as required and were effective in their policing role.

2.5. CONCLUSION.

The late seventeenth-century militia existed as part of an age-old institution providing the nation and the government with sufficient military might to guarantee its own safety and that of its subjects. From Roman times to present day part-time troops have been required to leave their civilian occupations and take up arms in order to protect the nation from threats, both external and internal, and they have done so with varying degrees of success whilst also maintaining a relatively stable relationship with the royal army.

After 1660 control of the militia was still nominally founded in the king but was also securely rooted in local authority with a complex interwoven pattern of roles and responsibilities and reliance upon an accepted social order. The Restoration Militia was active in the execution of its duty regarding both dealing with foreign threat and with internal disturbances, again with varying degrees of success. However, King James II was a force majeur in creating the image of the militia as ineffective in the military role. Yet, although lying outside the remit of this thesis, it appears to have performed its policing duties with zealous efficiency and proved itself most effective. It therefore remains to investigate whether this was repeated when it came to dealing with invasion and rebellion – whether it was also effective as a military force in 1685.
The first stage of this investigation is to examine whether this force with its traditional background was well-organised and effectively administered. To determine whether effective systems of funding existed and for raising adequate numbers of men, and then supplying them with equipment to fulfill their role? It is to these questions that attention now turns.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO

1. Davidson, Clerd of the Peace for Oxfordshire in his records of the Oxfordshire Militia quoted in Hay, op. cit., p. 11.
2. The term royal army is used to describe the army raised and maintained by the king. It carries with it the notion of a full-time, regular force then sometimes called the standing army. Hay, op. cit., p.8.
4. Blackstone, Sir W., Commentaries on the Laws of England, (Oxford, Clarendon 1765 - 1769), p.409. However, as a substantial part of England was in Danelaw, this was arguably not a national system. First mentioned in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle date 605. The laws of the West Saxon King, Ine dated about 690, note punishment for neglecting the fyrd: ‘If a gcestchund man owning land neglect the fyrd, let him pay 120 shillings, and forfeit his land; one not owning land 60 shillings; a ceorlsh man 30 shillings as fyrdwite.’
7. Blackstone, Sir W., Commentaries on the Laws of England, (Oxford, Clarendon 1765 - 1769), p.409. However, as a substantial part of England was in Danelaw, this was arguably not a national system. First mentioned in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle date 605. The laws of the West Saxon King, Ine dated about 690, note punishment for neglecting the fyrd: ‘If a gcestchund man owning land neglect the fyrd, let him pay 120 shillings, and forfeit his land; one not owning land 60 shillings; a ceorlsh man 30 shillings as fyrdwite.’
22. 5 Hen. 4. c.3., in Statutes of the Realm.
23. 13 Hen. 4. c.7., in Statutes of the Realm.
27. Boynton, op. cit. pp.9 -10; Cruikshank, op. cit., pp.4. 17.
31. Ibid., pp.314-315.
33. Correspondence of John Fowke and Alexander Normington in Letters from Mercurius Civicus to Mercurius Rusticus. Somers Tracts (London, 1750), I. p.582
34. To the contemporary mindset ‘foreign service’ meant serving out of county, not country.
38. Ibid
39. Ibid., ch.5; Aylmer, op. cit.,p.45.
Scott, C.L., The Armies and Uniforms of the Monmouth Rebellion (Leigh-on-Sea, Partizan, 2008), p. 34.

Hay, op.cit., p.110.

Henry Champion to Hugh Potter. 24 April 1660, in HMC Report III., op. cit., p.89.

Barnett, op.cit., p.117.

14 Car. 2, c. 3.:

12 Car. II. c.24; 13 Car. II. cap 6; 14 Car. II. cap. 3 and 15 Car. II. cap. 24.

The right to raise the militia finally disappeared from the statute books in 1953, although the authorities in the City of London are still legally able to levy trophy money under the legislation of 1662. Beckett I. W., op. cit., p. 51.


Gregory King (1648-171) was an English genealogist, civil servant and credited with being one of the first modern economic statisticians. His work is reprinted in Laslet, P., The World We Have Lost Further explored (London, Methuen, 1983), pp. 32-33.


CSPD, 1660, p.150.

In 1660 William Cavendish, Marquis of Newcastle and Lord Lieutenant of Nottinghamshire appointed 18 Deputies and had to justify his actions to Secretary Nicholas. Seddon, P.R., The Nottinghamshire Militia And The Defence of the Restoration Transactions of the Thoroton Society of Nottinghamshire 86 (1983), p.79.

They usually met in market taverns such as The Angel in Marlborough.

Locke, op. cit., p. 17.

Aylmer, op.cit., p.245.

Murphy, op.cit., p.9. Bloomfield, P. Sources for Military History (Gloucester, GRO., 2006), P.12.


Sir Edmund Andros was a Major in Prince Rupert’s Dragoons in 1672 and by 1674 he was Governor of New York (Callaghan’s Colonial History of New York) and of New England by 1686 (Clarendon Corr., Vol. I. p.393.)

PRO: Town Archive. 21. 8 December 1688.


B.L. Add. MSS 125.

Hay, op.cit., p. 108.


HMC. Appendix to the third report, Fitzharding to Somerset, June, 1685. p.98.

CSPD 1685, p.193.


Ibid., letter 11.

HMC appendix to the third report Warrant from the King to Charles Seymour, Duke of Somerset. 9 July, 1685, p.99.

CSPD 1685, p.286.

Coleby, op.cit., p.184.

Coleby, ibid.; Miller, cit.


Ibid.


Miller, J., James II – A Study in Kingship (Yale University Press, 200). p.211.


CSPD. 1686-87.p.437.

Ibid.


An Act for Safety and Preservation of His Majesties Person and Government against Treasonable and Seditious practices and attempts', op.cit., pp. 304-306

An Act declaring the sole Right of the Militia to be in King and for the present ordering & disposing the same.', *Ibid.*, pp. 308-309


Ibid.


CPSD.1683, pp. 299-300.
In its Public Service handout, *Military Records 2*, The National Archives at Kew unwisely questions the very existence of a militia in the post-Restoration period. So this chapter will firstly answer any doubts as to its existence and then investigate its structure during the period under consideration. It will examine its organisation as a military body, its systems of command and control, and assess its capacity to turn out in effective and creditable numbers.

In April 1660, the year of the restoration of the monarchy it was recorded that the City of London Militia remained very much in evidence: ‘this day was a general muster of the city militia in Hyde Park where there were about 30,000 men in arms’. Equally that same year the county militias were also in evidence in the West Country where the deputy lieutenants of Wiltshire reported calling out their troops:

...upon severall informations and allarums ... we ordered two companies of foot to be garrisoned in Malmesbury and one troop of horse in the Devizes to be diligent in these parts for the searching and seizing of arms in all suspected places and the securing of all justly suspected persons.

Three Militia Acts were passed in 1661, 1662 and 1663. Parliamentary records make frequent references to the militia, and the Calendar of State Papers, Domestic contains frequent letters and references to them. County records contain many lists of contributors to militia money and corporation books record expenditure on local militia, as will be discussed in chapter four. Moreover, numerous extant copies of commissions and orders issued by the lord lieutenants to various militia officers across England during the Restoration period will be referred to throughout the work.
This chapter will demonstrate that, in the face of incontrovertible evidence to the contrary, The National Archives’s above-mentioned information sheet is substantially incorrect although sadly this error is a fair reflection of the paucity of that institution’s holdings of material relevant to the Restoration Militia.

3.1. MILITIA ORGANISATION.

The organisation of the English Militia was county-based throughout much of its existence and by the late seventeenth century each county organised its force in a similar manner. The militia had a military structure akin to that of the royal army in that soldiers of both foot and horse were grouped into military units called regiments, which were subdivided into companies for the foot and troops for the horse. As a county force each of these regiments was commanded by the lord lieutenant or his appointed senior officer.

Higher costs combined with a limited availability of suitable horses meant that there were more regiments of infantry than cavalry. The usual establishment for a county militia included up to six regiments of foot and one regiment of horse. In 1638 Somerset produced a local force of some 4,000 infantry arrayed in five regiments and 300 troopers in a single regiment of cavalry. In 1685 Hampshire mustered 2,500 men in five regiments of foot and 120 troopers in one regiment of horse. However, no contemporary records of all the county forces for the Monmouth Rebellion have been discovered but from the work of Cruickshank, Miller and Wroughton and the examination of various County Record Offices’ manuscripts, a consistent pattern of four or five foot regiments and one horse regiment per county emerges.
Although the military structure of the militia mirrored that of the royal army its administration was firmly entrenched in the well-established practices of local government. Each county was subdivided into administrative units. The basic element of the system was the parish overseen by a parish constable. Parishes were grouped together into hundreds, a measurement based upon land area, and overseen by a constable of the hundred. Hundreds were further grouped together into county divisions which were named for their relative location, either East Division or West Division as in Cornwall, or for their dominant regional city or town, such as Taunton Division, Wells Division and so on in Somerset. Table 3.1.1 lists the hundreds in two county divisions supplying militiamen to two regiments based upon major cities in Somerset.

**Table 3.1.1: Contributing hundreds to the regiments of Bath and Wells**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bath Regiment</th>
<th>Wells Regiment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bath</td>
<td>Wells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chew</td>
<td>Galstonbury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frome</td>
<td>Chewton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedminster</td>
<td>Catsash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keynsham</td>
<td>Bruton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilingdon</td>
<td>Hawthorn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portbury</td>
<td>Norton Ferris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wells</td>
<td>Whitston</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SRO; DD/SH/5/402. A Specimen of the |Proportions of the County of Somerset... losted as late seventeenth century

The parish and smaller hundred groupings were the basis for militia companies whilst the groupings of the hundreds into divisions formed the framework for regiments. The lord lieutenant of Somerset advised: ‘…the Deputy Lieutenants [should] divide themselves so that three at least may Act in each of the five divisions that compose the five regiments of the County.’ The numbers of regiments in the South West and their division allocations are listed below.
Table 3.1.2: The county forces of the south west in 1685.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiments of Foot</th>
<th>Mustering Town for Division</th>
<th>Regiments of Horse</th>
<th>Mustering Town for County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cornwall</td>
<td>Liskeard</td>
<td>South Colombs</td>
<td>Bodmin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camelford</td>
<td>Helston</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plymouth</td>
<td>Four others not known</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>Blandford (Erle)</td>
<td>Dorchester</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bridport (Strangways)</td>
<td>Shaftesbury</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dorchester</td>
<td>Sherborne</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>Gloucester</td>
<td>Gloucester</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St Braivels</td>
<td>Cirencester</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire*</td>
<td>Andover &amp; Fawley</td>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alton</td>
<td>Basingstoke (Paulet)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Forest (Fleming)</td>
<td>Portsdown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portésdown</td>
<td>Winchester (Bolton)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>Bath</td>
<td>Taunton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bridgwater (Stawell/Phillips)</td>
<td>Yeovil/ Crewkerne (Helyer?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taunton (Lutterell)</td>
<td>Wells (Berkeley?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>Devizes (Chivers?)</td>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marlborough (Baynton)</td>
<td>Salisbury (Wyndham)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salisbury (Wyndham)</td>
<td>Warminster (Ducket?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In 1685 Hampshire Regiments included:

(Webb?) The Yellow Regiment of Andover
Fleming The Green Regiment of the New Forest
(Dean?) The Blue Regiment
(Norton?) The Grey Regiment

The White Regiment

Allocations to colonels, other than Fleming are speculative based upon names in Wyndham’s Account, Fversham’s account of events at Bath and family home locations.

Despite the interlude of the civil wars the organisation of the peacetime militia appears to have remained relatively stable with successive generations of administrators adopting the practices of their predecessors. For example the muster certificates for the Tudor Wiltshire Militia note that ‘the division of the whole shire’ contained four main groupings of the hundreds whence four regiments were raised, an arrangement retained under the early Stuarts and reconstituted following the Restoration.\textsuperscript{13} In 1662, three deputy lieutenants sitting at Winchester in Hampshire ordered the mustering of that county’s militia ‘to be carried out… by the militia officers of each division’, thus indicating a post-civil war return to a divisional structure for the militia.\textsuperscript{14} Across the West Country surviving records point to the same divisional format being applied in each county. The Egerton Manuscripts, which contain the muster returns for 1697 (see Table 3.1.3), indicate that the same traditional organisations, unit names and area allocations were retained for the Williamite Militia.\textsuperscript{15}

Regrettably decisions concerning the information recorded were left to the various lord lieutenants and muster masters and consequently a collated summary is incomplete, lacking as it does some colonels or regimental names or even the named division allocation in several counties.
Table 3.1.3: The composition of the county forces of the south west in 1697.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Companies</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rendezvous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>And Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamford</td>
<td>7 710</td>
<td></td>
<td>Exeter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drake</td>
<td>6 860</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davy</td>
<td>8 840</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yonge</td>
<td>8 850</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roll</td>
<td>6 800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arscot</td>
<td>6 860</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops of Horse</td>
<td>Ellwill</td>
<td>3 236</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>Guise</td>
<td>10 583</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutton</td>
<td>8 534</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephens</td>
<td>9 551</td>
<td>Blue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colchester</td>
<td>9 531</td>
<td></td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops of Horse</td>
<td>Dursley</td>
<td>3 243</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>D. of Bolton</td>
<td>6 366</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. of Winchester</td>
<td>6 435</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compton</td>
<td>6 399</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vacant</td>
<td>5 371</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>6 448</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawley</td>
<td>5 440</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops of Horse</td>
<td>D. of Bolton</td>
<td>2 120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>Trevellian</td>
<td>8 724</td>
<td>Bridgewater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td>8 726</td>
<td>Wells</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warr</td>
<td>8 650</td>
<td>Taunton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>8 547</td>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>Bath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henly</td>
<td>8 787</td>
<td></td>
<td>Crewkerne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops of Horse</td>
<td>D. of Ormond</td>
<td>5 269</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>Mompesson</td>
<td>6 543</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webb</td>
<td>6 749</td>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chivers</td>
<td>6 514</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Devizes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bainton</td>
<td>4 432</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Warminster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops of Horse</td>
<td>Penruddock</td>
<td>4 232</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Just as the number of regiments varied from county to county so too did the number of their constituent sub units, as can be seen in the figures recorded by Thomas Dineley (below) when, in 1684, the militias of the Welsh counties were mustered and inspected and the number of their companies and troops counted.
Table 3.1.4: The composition of the county militia regiments in Wales in 1684.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Foot Regiments</th>
<th>Companies of Foot</th>
<th>Troops of Horse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montgomeryshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denbighshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flintshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caernarvonshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglesey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>not known</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merionethshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radnorshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brecknockshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carmarthenshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>not known</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardiganshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pembrokeshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glamorganshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>not known</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monmouthshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>not known</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During Elizabethan times the militia in Cornwall is recorded as having a highly organised structure with 6,030 men in 58 companies forming 12 variously sized regiments, accompanied by a ‘trayne of artillery’ of six small field guns and all necessary tools and transports. Although no records exist for a change in administration a degree of rationalisation must have taken place to create the four divisional regiments of the Restoration. The most detailed records of the individual companies of a militia regiment of foot in the 1680s so far discovered are those of Colonel John Wyndham’s Regiment of the Wiltshire Militia. The Wiltshire county force under the lord lieutenant, Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, was typical of the forces raised in the West Country during the Rebellion and in 1685 Wyndham’s, or the Salisbury Red Regiment, was one of four regiments of foot and one regiment of horse which formed the county force. Table 3.1.5 shows how the force’s constituent regiments were based upon the county’s major towns and were also allocated the name of a distinguishing colour to identify them individually.
Table 3.1.5: The organisation of the militia forces in the county of Wiltshire.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiment / Company</th>
<th>Colour</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Salisbury Regiment</td>
<td>The Red Regiment</td>
<td>5 Companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Marlborough Regiment</td>
<td>The Blue Regiment</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Devizes Regiment</td>
<td>The Green Regiment</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Warminster Regiment</td>
<td>The Yellow Regiment</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Sarum Company</td>
<td>The Mayor’s Men</td>
<td>1 Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Wiltshire Horse</td>
<td>The Horse</td>
<td>4 Troops</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Collated from W&SHC: 490/1440 A list of the men who served in the Monmouth Rebellion in the Wiltshire Militia...; 1553/22 The Commonplace Book of Sir Edward Bayntun of Bromham; 1178/450 Warrant to the Constables of Kingsbridge Hundred; 413/11 The Militia in the several hundreds 1698... towards this the raising of the Yellow Militia Regiment in this Division of Warminster in the County; G23/1/41 A bundle of documents relating to the militia.

In addition to the county division regiments, city corporations, institutions and even the clergy raised further companies in times of trouble. Although nominally under the command of the county lord lieutenant, these units were expected to remain as a local defence force within the environs whence they were drawn. During the events of 1685 the City of Bristol Militia under lord lieutenant Henry Somerset, Earl of Beaufort was active in securing its vital seaport for the king. With the aid of several companies of Gloucestershire Militia also under Beaufort, they arrested rebel sympathisers and contained dissenters. The corporations of other cities and towns in the southwest had their own units and several institutions raised companies and troops, such as the University of Oxford Volunteers. Salisbury answered the summons from the Council stating ‘it shall be likewise expedient that such of the clergie that as have beene heretofore appoynted to finde armes, and others of them that are meeete to be charged, may be ordered to cause the same to be shewed at these musters.’ Although such companies were under the command of the lord lieutenants they were also answerable to their civic authorities and this tended to introduce management difficulties. Amongst the counties of the southwest letters reveal that the relationship between the lord lieutenants and the mayors and
corporations appear to have been generally cordial, if somewhat reproving.\textsuperscript{24} Table 3.1.6 shows how these urban units were deployed across the West Country.

**Table 3.1.6: Additional companies of militia in the south west in 1685.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiments of Foot</th>
<th>Companies of Foot</th>
<th>Troops of Horse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bath</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plymouth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penzance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truro</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucester</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Clergy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no conclusive proof that the same number of companies existed in 1685 as in 1697, although there is an indication that in Salisbury the Mayor’s Company of City Militia was absorbed into the Salisbury Regiment.\textsuperscript{25} There is however, no suggestion made that any re-designation of parishes amongst the hundreds or changes in local authority organisation occurred; neither were there major alterations to the arrangements for the assessment and collection of militia money as will be discussed in chapter four. William III’s reign did however see changes in personnel indicating how political militia officer appointments were. For example Sir Thomas Mompesson, a local political rival and staunch Whig replaced John Wyndham who was a High Tory, in the colonelcy of the Salisbury Regiment.

Although somewhat political we have seen that commissions as senior officers in the militia were in the gift of the lord lieutenants who were expected to make appointments from amongst the lesser nobility and gentry of the county. These were wealthy men, well-established in local society and often already post-holders in local civil institutions.\textsuperscript{26} In practice the colonelcies of the regiments were frequently also the prerogative of the more active deputy lieutenants, otherwise they went to
representatives of the older families of powerful landowners who could be relied upon to encourage their tenants, great and small to pay their militia money or serve in the ranks themselves. On average each company of foot had its commander, usually a captain who was assisted by a lieutenant, an ensign and six NCOs. A troop of horse had its captain, a lieutenant, a cornet, a quartermaster and five NCOs. Ideally these men had some military experience but it certainly was not essential as the responsibility for training and overseeing the efficiency of constituent units was delegated to the county’s muster master who was, at least in theory, a professional.27

Of those who served under these men little detail has been recorded, but they were not from the lowest level of society. Some militiamen were naturally drawn from estate workers and there were agricultural labourers in their ranks but the majority of the men were tradesmen and manufacturing craftsmen from the towns and rural craftsmen, yeomen and smallholders in the country. Many of those assessed to be contributors to Militia Money chose to serve themselves and were obviously men of property and some standing.

Militia service was no task for the feeble-bodied or even the feeble-minded: men in the ranks had to be capable of learning and performing complex drill routines, especially the musketeers who carried complicated equipment which needed specialist skills. Men chosen to serve by their parishes were styled ‘Able Men’ or ‘Picked Men’ in most muster lists from Tudor and earlier Stuart times, and although this criterion was certainly relaxed during the Civil Wars it appears to have been reinstated by Cromwell during the Interregnum. There is no contemporary definition of either description but it may be assumed it meant fit and healthy and able to bear arms. Existing contemporary muster lists and parish constable’s lists do not note men excused duty as do some later records. The men were required to be between 16 and
60 years old and remained registered as able to serve until age, infirmity or quitting the parish intervened. Childs asserts that the militiamen of the 1690s were ‘honest young men’ indicating they were of good character and youthful. In one or two Elizabethan muster rolls there is a heading suggesting that they were of the ‘second sort’, not large land owners nor menial labourers but small-holders, village craftsmen, senior servants or tradesmen.

Again stemming from Tudor tradition it would appear that single men were preferred but all had to be selected or approved by their parish constables, by whom they were given parish monies and were entrusted with expensive parish property: such men were not rogues or prison sweepings. The frequency of payments made in the Restoration period by parish constables under the Elizabethan Poor Laws, to unemployed undesirables in order to oust them from the parish indicates that they were also unacceptable for service in the militia. It can thus be argued that unlike the royal army the militia did not recruit among the dregs of society. Even if the accusations of the militia being something of a drinking circle were true, they might even reinforce the average militiaman’s standing in local society: vagabonds rarely receive invitations to join social clubs.

Recruitment was not by the ballot system which filled the ranks of the eighteenth-century militia. The feudal system of lords calling out their retinues had been replaced by commissioning the gentry to raise regiments, but this was modified by the merging of the Quota and Subsidy systems of taxation in a way which called for the assessment of individuals who could afford to pay for the militia, yet permitted the method of assessment and contribution to be decided at local level. The lord lieutenants and their deputies employed muster commissioners to rate local people and assign to them the provision of men and equipment according to a national scale.
of contribution. This and the funding system are discussed in chapter four but the result was to make recruitment the responsibility of the individual contributors who either had to serve as part of their civic duty or to find a replacement. The failure to either serve personally or to find a substitute soldier was punishable under law by the imposition of fines by local justices of the peace.\textsuperscript{32}

The community-based nature of this system meant that the behaviour of the men who served reflected upon the reputations of both their parish and the contributors who found them. Parish constables and contributors thus sought reliable men of good reputation; hence the majority probably came from hard-working, yeoman stock and counted themselves as loyal subjects of the legal king, whosoever he was. It was to this sentiment that Monmouth appealed after being proclaimed king in Taunton. Adult literacy was rising and many militiamen could read, so Monmouth’s published letter to the Duke of Albemarle, contained things designed to unsettle them. He, as king, complained that the militia was:

\begin{quotation*}
... raised in opposicion [\textit{sic}] to Us and Our Royall Authority… proclaimed King to succeed Our Royall Father…charge and command you… to cease all Hostilities and force of armes against us and all our loveing Subjects,
\end{quotation*}

Moreover:

\begin{quotation*}
We shall be obliged to proclaime … All those in Armes… Rebells and Traytors and shall proceed against them accordingly.\textsuperscript{33}
\end{quotation*}

From Albemarle’s reply it would seem these words did not unsettle the Duke, but their inclusion in this and other documents emanating from Monmouth’s propaganda machine were designed to trouble the consciences of the rank and file, both the faint-hearted and the ardent dissenters.\textsuperscript{34} Ordinary militiamen may have thought that the popular Protestant Duke’s rebellion might succeed and consequently the threat of a traitor’s death by hanging, drawing and quartering would loom over
them. Such an end would until then never have been imagined by the law-abiding, West Country citizenry and it would undoubtedly have had an effect. However, James II was *de facto* the king. Charles II, despite enormous pressure had never once deviated from his assertion that his brother was his successor, and that being illegitimate the Duke of Monmouth could not legally inherit the crown. To ask the population to turn against the legitimate heir to the throne was not only treason but to the majority asking them to turn against their fundamental belief in law and order. Moreover there remained the fear that to rise against the king was to go into rebellion against the Lord’s anointed and in that lay a risk more terrible than mere death of the body. The king was crowned in God’s name and he was God’s chosen ruler; to go against the choice of God meant a condemnation of the soul. ‘There was degree of conflation of God’s Will and the King’s will’.\(^{35}\)

Most office holders inherited working systems but their characters dictated how well their duties were performed. Whilst Philip Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, was lord lieutenant of Wiltshire the militia appears never to have received a high priority and so reform was ignored. However, the militia had been a major concern to his predecessor, the Earl of Hertford, and so, when Philip’s son Thomas Herbert assumed the Pembroke title and the lieutenancy in 1682 the organisation of the militia and the role of the muster-master of Wiltshire were as Hertford had directed during his time. Hertford had delegated several key tasks to the muster master. The first was to ensure that the maintenance costs of the militia were spread evenly across those who could afford them. Secondly, these folk were made responsible for gathering the men together for training and also for recording their attendance as well as, thirdly, the compilation of detailed accounts recording the state of equipment. Ideally the man employed as muster master would be a professional soldier, although in Hertford’s
time the post was held by the Earl’s secretary Josias Kirton, a man of no known military experience; an arrangement which caused some controversy (see below).

Militia colonels and their regimental officers were answerable to the muster-master for the efficient supervision and instruction of the men. During the 1680s all royal army officers were commissioned by royal appointment but the degree of influence or interest exerted by the king varied considerably from rank to rank and regiment to regiment. A similar situation existed in the militia. Although officer appointments were made by the lord lieutenants the documents bestowing them were still called commissions. Some posts, especially the more senior ranks which carried with them increased social standing in the county and further potential to ascend the social ladder, attracted many aspirants. Others of a more junior rank, such as ensign, cornet or quartermaster were often regarded as necessary staging posts to the more attractive and lucrative posts as well as stepping stones to social position and local office.36 Many royal officers regarded their military duties as part-time commitments and a means of acquiring money and status for minimal effort. In October 1688 ‘Ensign Thomas Carew had been absent from the Earl of Bath’s Regiment since March,’ and ‘Lieutenant Dering Bradshaw had requested a furlough of three days but had still not returned after three weeks.’37 With the militia officer structure being very similar to that of royal troops it would not be surprising if similar attitudes were present within the militia.

The county force was an army in miniature, with the lord lieutenant as its commander-in-chief and one of his deputies as his major general and second-in-command. The day-to-day administration and running of a force according to the orders of its commanders was orchestrated in the royal army by a colonel with the title of adjutant general. Another colonel holding the appointment of quartermaster
general oversaw communications, marching and encamping. The movement of supplies lay in the hands of the carriage master who was usually a well-paid civilian. No references to any of these roles appear in any of the militia papers in the southwest pertaining to the Restoration. However, Carew’s survey of Cornwall in Elizabethan times states,

> I will now set downe the principall Commanders & Officers, touching these martiall causes, together with the forces of the shire,’ and he lists not only the deputies with military responsibilities, but notes the men who performed the roles of: ‘Colonell Generall, Marshall, Treasurer, Master of the Ordinance, Colonell of the horse, Sergeant maior, Quarter Master, Prouost Marshall, Scowt Master, Corporals of the field, Ammunition Master, and Trench Master’.38

Several of these roles and ranks were in use by both sides in the civil wars and were revived at the Restoration in the royal army but whether they were reintroduced into the militia remains undiscovered. The militia forces may have become dependent upon royal staff officers after uniting with the army in the field, or that these duties may have been carried out by officers without holding formal appointments.

The direct control of individual regiments, irrespective of arm, was the responsibility of colonels who had a number of inferior and non-commissioned officers to assist them to administer, train and operate the regiment.
Table 3.1.7: Regimental ranks and appointments with their roles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Officers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Commanded the regiment, commanded a company /troop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>Assisted/replaced the colonel, commanded a company/troop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Senior administration officer, commanded a company/troop</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inferior Officers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Commanded a company/troop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Lieutenant</td>
<td>Commanded the colonel’s company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Assisted the Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign/Cornet</td>
<td>Carried the troop/company colour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Commissioned Officers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drum/Trumpet Major</td>
<td>Senior musician and administration NCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>Commanded half a company or a discreet arm element within it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>Commanded half a troop/assisted the sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musician</td>
<td>Trumpeter/drummer/fifer or piper/- clerk, messenger or orderly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Ranks</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>File Leader</td>
<td>Oversaw drill &amp; welfare of his file (Horse 2/3 men, Foot 4/8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trooper</td>
<td>Cavalryman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sentinel</td>
<td>Infantryman - pikeman or musketeer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saltpetreman</td>
<td>Made or distributed match (saltpetre-impregnated cord) for the muskets if required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Drawn from Cruso, J., *Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie* (1632), pp.3-16.

In writing a lieutenant colonel’s commission in the militia for Jonathan Rashleigh, the Earl of Bath quotes his own commission, signed by the king, stating that he has the power ‘…to nominate, appoint and give Commissions to such persons as you shall think fitt to be Colenell’s, Majors, Captains and Commission Officers of Regiments, Troopes and Companyes…’ Bath also adopts the practice of stating not only Rashleigh’s assigned rank within the regiment, but also his duties within his own company:

…you are hereby constituted and appointed Lieutenant Colonel of that Regiment of Foot whereof Sir John Carew Baronet is Colonel, and Captaine of a Company therein, being part of the Militia of the said County of Cornwall. Take into your charge And care the said regiment as Lieutenant Colonel, and company as Captaine thereof…

Rashleigh may have been the lieutenant colonel of Carew’s Regiment and done duty as second-in-command but similar to traditional practice he was also
captain of his own company within that regiment and was expected to do duty as such and accordingly drew two amounts of pay.

A county force was too small to create formal brigades, combining two or more regiments which would necessitate the appointment of brigadiers, but absenteeism among senior officers or their detachment to perform other duties meant that command of the regiment could often devolve upon inferior officers. Senior field officers needed their juniors to be capable of performing higher roles as and when required. Wyndham’s Muster Roll states that each company had its senior officer, either colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major or captain, two inferior officers, a lieutenant and an ensign, plus two or three sergeants – a total of five or six ‘commission officers’ and ‘non-commission officers’ to each company. The pattern seems to have varied little over the century as during the 1630s the Bristol Trained Bands were known to have had one hundred men per company with six officers. Gentlemen volunteers, reformadoes, drummers, lance pessadas, corporals and file leaders, were not counted as officers. This mirrored practice among the royal regiments, although in their ranks the senior lieutenant who often commanded the colonel’s company could still be styled captain-lieutenant; curiously no militia commission for this rank has been found.

Control within the military is a complex amalgam of sworn allegiance, duty, imposed discipline and formal regulation, often enhanced by regimental pride and comradeship. This control is demonstrated by soldiers performing according to the will of those set in authority over them. Although there is a temptation to become distracted by an investigation of leadership, it is the manipulation of followership, which in this context is the more useful study. In the militia the willingness of the men to follow the orders of their officers depended not so much upon a lord
lieutenant’s commission or one issued by the king but upon the interwoven nature of the governance of the local community. Community was an important factor in the command and control of the militia. Militia officers were often set in authority over men from their estates but also, and even more frequently, over those from the parishes surrounding their own. Many of Colonel Francis Luttrell’s Company within his Taunton Regiment of the Somerset Militia came from the north of the county in and around Dunster, his family home. Colonel Wyndham not only had a house in The Close at Salisbury but held the ancestral home at Norrington in Alvediston which lies in one of the hundreds ascribed to his own company within his regiment.

Table 3.1.8: Residences of Wyndham’s officers and their areas of command.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Hundreds Commanded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt.Col. John Young</td>
<td>Family – Ogbourne St George. Person - Tollard Royal</td>
<td>Amesbury, Part of Elstub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major William Hearst</td>
<td>not known</td>
<td>Cadworth Cawden Underditch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. John Davenant</td>
<td>Landford, Frustfield Hundred</td>
<td>Branch Dole</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Officers frequently lived in the regions from which their men were drawn. Table 3.1.8 above shows the close proximity of places where the officers in Wyndham’s Regiment lived and the homes of the men they commanded, and also instances of two designated residences – one of which they currently occupied, and the other on the family estates from where they drew their income.

The military be it royal or militia, interpreted unwillingness amongst the men in the ranks to behave according to an officer’s wishes as most undesirable and assigned to such incidents during wartime a sliding scale of criminal charges varying
from insubordination, punishable by stoppages of privileges, incarceration, or flogging, to mutiny, which often carried the death penalty. However, in peacetime militiamen were subject to civil law and answerable to civil authorities, even for military infractions. During musters and undergoing training they were still civilians. It was only when militia units were embodied for field service did they come under military law and were liable to suffer the same stricter penalties that their royal counterparts faced: hence Wyndham’s threat to execute anyone who broke ranks to loot on Sedgemoor.\textsuperscript{44} Being under civil law was not, however, a license to elude punishment because as localism prevailed the officers whose authority they flouted in committing crimes whilst attending musters, were also often the local justices of the peace before whom they appeared for judgment at the petty sessions. If accused of a more serious offence they would have appeared before the king’s justices at the quarter sessions.

Being civilians the basic system of militia recruitment was akin to general taxation and tied to the parish system of local government. The funding of the militia is dealt with in the next chapter but to summarise, each parish supplied a quantity of men according to the sum that its wealthier inhabitants could fund and the number of men who were both suitable and available. The men were usually resident in the parish and many of those assessed as contributors actually served themselves whilst others were substitutes paid to serve on behalf of those who wished to avoid personal service (see pages 110-111 below).\textsuperscript{45}

There was no universally-applied formal procedure for selecting men for the Restoration militia, because as stated before the responsibility for supplying men lay initially with those persons assessed to pay for and find them, together with the parish constables. The cheapest option for anyone wishing to avoid answering the summons
was to provide a volunteer in his place. Substitutions were permitted everywhere but the most frequent instances of this happening were in urban parishes where money was more plentiful, men for hire were more readily available, and the absence of a wealthy merchant on militia duties might interfere with business. A list of those paying for the Salisbury Militia in 1664 and the soldiers who appeared for them has four blocks of names: the first contains 17 names of people paying, with 16 soldiers supplied; the second has 41 payers of which 30 appeared in person amongst the 40 soldiers who attended the muster; and the third has 73 contributors, many paired, who returned 50 soldiers - only 1 contributor appeared in person and several soldiers were paid for by corporations.

Other factors encouraged substitutions. There was a lack of officer commissions for aspiring men who thought themselves above the common soldiery and would far rather find a substitute than serve in the ranks. Contributors who were invalids or ill, widows and wealthy spinsters could not serve. Religious dissenters were reluctant to serve themselves because one of the militia’s duties was the harassment of conventicles and their enlistment could result in a call to act against their friends or business associates. Circles of friends were also prone to decide as a body to either join or decline to serve and indeed what was locally considered socially fashionable could also influence the choice to serve or to find a substitute. Those paying for substitutes were not required to supply their reasons for doing and the authorities were more focused upon filling quotas than upon the individuals who appeared at musters.

The combination of conscience, obligation, family tradition, expectation of social betters, landlord or even peer pressure, all positively influenced volunteering. Added to these factors was the official approval implicit in being chosen by the
constable, the satisfaction of doing one’s patriotic duty and the sense of the adventure coupled with the change from routine that militia service could bring. Overlaid these considerations was the very masculine temptation of being taught to use firearms and handle other weapons, and to wear a uniform that was an attraction for members of the opposite sex. Added to all these benefits came the lure of pay and food which proved a powerful enough draw to achieve the enlistment of adequate numbers of recruits who would appear when summoned. The ballot was sometimes employed but it was used more as a means of reducing the numbers of those who had already volunteered rather than as coercion to enlistment.\textsuperscript{46} Even in the royal army coercion was not a popular form of recruitment and it was not until 1708 that those with no lawful calling or employment were enlisted compulsorily for service with the royal army.

As the contributors were usually respectable men, property owners, substantial tenants or traders, each with a vested interest in preserving the status quo, they would be unlikely to supply men whom they thought to be unfit for service or potentially disloyal. Moreover, they were liable if their substitute defaulted. Local reputations were invested in those representing contributors, who consequently sought men who would be a credit to them. Contributors and volunteers were sought first, in the belief that their willingness to answer the call would render them superior to intimidated or coerced or even bribed men.

However, there were problems. Joint assessments made upon two or three persons or upon corporations meant that no individual had the legal responsibility for ensuring turnout. The legal position was that all were equally responsible and those named had to come to an arrangement otherwise a fine would be imposed and a further demand made for a nominated militiaman.
At a muster, parish men were probably assigned to files, the basic level of organisation, consisting of similarly armed men and led by a file leader. The men were trained, accommodated and messed in their file; the number of men allocated to each of these files depended upon the muster master’s preference or the drill book he was following. The classic array had been in files of eight, but during the civil wars this was reduced to six, copying Livy. When arrayed in line to fight at Sedgemoor, Wheeler says the Wiltshire Militia was in three ranks which would mean half-files from six. Dinely’s illustrations depict various files going about camp duties. They numbered eight in Montgomeryshire, six in Merionethshire, and five in Radnorshire although this group of men might be a detached half file of four with a sergeant.\(^47\)

**Illustration 3.1.1: The Radnorshire Militia at Prestategne Church and the Montgomeryshire Militia at Welshpool Church.**

Parish files were assembled into groups by hundreds to form a number of divisions, usually numbering between 16 and 32 men according to the depth of their files.\(^48\) The men of the hundreds, in their divisions, were then allocated to a
company. Several divisions formed a company, (perhaps 96 men in 6 divisions of 16 men, arrayed in 12 files of 8 or 16 files of 6) which could be made up of men from the parishes of one, two or even three hundreds which were usually geographical neighbours.

Table 3.1.9: Parish contingents of Selkeley Hundred within the colonel’s company of the Marlborough Blue Regiment of the Wiltshire Militia 1677.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alborne</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>East &amp; West Kennet</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mildenhall</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bukhampton</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogborne St. George</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Winterborne Bassett</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preshutt &amp; Clatford</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Avebury</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogborne St. Andrew</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Catcombe</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterborne &amp; Montaine</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Broadhinton</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Lockridge</td>
<td>2½</td>
<td>Savernake Park, north side</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Lockeridge</td>
<td>1½</td>
<td>Marlborough Town</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Overton &amp; Shaw</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 94 men.

Source The Commonplace Book of Sir Edward Bayntun of Bromham Freeman, J., (ed.) (Devizes, 1988), p36. Note Winterborne & Mountaine is Winterborne Monkton, one mile north of Avebury. The spellings of place names are as they appear in the original. The ½ indicates that the provision of one man was shared between two adjacent parishes.

The intention behind this system was to ensure that militiamen served among friends and neighbours and were surrounded by people from villages that they knew. As Table 3.1.9 shows, the number of men furnished by parishes varied and consequently the number of hundreds needed to fill the ranks of one company varied. Sometimes a wealthy hundred with well-populated parishes, such as Selkeley with 94 or Carhampton Hundred in Somerset which furnished 69 soldiers, could produce a substantial number of men. Other, poorer hundreds could not especially if their parishes had few inhabitants wealthy enough to be charged with supplying men. Although Lockridge Hundred in Wiltshire covered a substantial area its contribution of just four men had to be spread across its two parishes. Variations in the numbers supplied meant that sometimes the simple grouping of hundreds did not produce
companies of equal numbers whereas a large hundred yielding a good number of men might be halved, as in the case of Elstub Hundred, (see Table 3.1.10 below).

The localised nature of the organisation with adjacent hundreds supplying one specified company also made company mustering easier as most men would have had relatively short distances to travel to attend. The parishes mentioned in Table 3.1.9 are all within ten miles of Marlborough. A warrant from Sir Edward Baynton ordered the ‘stated number of foot soldiers’ to be ‘sent from the places named …with two days’ pay and the muster master’s dues to appear at the Angel in Marleburgh at 10.am on 26 September [1677] to be sworn and trained’. Once a year companies were required to form their regiment by mustering at a county rendezvous but these were once again reasonably close geographically thereby encouraging attendance. This not only limited the militiamen’s travel but facilitated the speed and ease whereby non-attendees could be traced or absenteeism due to sickness verified by the constables who were required to compile returns. Stringent checks were made by the muster masters and defaulters listed and reported. Localism also meant parish constables who drew up the lists were not far away and could be called upon to verify absences or shortages. They might also attend musters and any misdemeanour exposed and condemnation be relayed back to the local community.

The northeast of Wiltshire with its weaving cottage industry was more densely populated than the sheep-grazing downlands of the rest of the county, so if Selkeley Hundred could produce sufficient men to make up the Colonel’s Company of the Blue Regiment, perhaps the other four hundreds of the county division, Highworth, Kingsbridge, Kingswardstone and Ramsbury, could furnish discreet companies too; especially as Highworth and Ramsbury were large market towns and Kingsbridge contained the wool-trading centre of Swindon. Where areas were sparsely populated
several hundreds had to be combined to ensure there were sufficient rich landowners as contributors and adequate numbers of the right sort of men as soldiers to fill a company. The number of hundreds needed to complete a company varied.

Table 3.1.10: The recruitment bases of Colonel Wyndham’s Regiment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent Companies</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Hundreds</th>
<th>Parishes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel John Wyndham’s Co.</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel John Young’s Co.</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1½</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major William Hearst’s Co.</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Gabriel Ashby’s Co.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2½</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain John Davenant’s Co.</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: W&SHC 490/1440 ‘A list of the men who served in the Monmouth Rebellion in the Wiltshire.’

The author of this list (see Appendix 1.) is not named but he recorded the numbers, names, hundreds and parishes of the men who formed the regiment’s five companies in 1685. His figures can be contrasted with the practice of seven companies per regiment employed in Norfolk and the nine in Surrey and Berkshire in 1690 (see Table 3.2.4 below). It is also worth noting that Table 3.1.10 shows that the militia followed the civil war and royal army practice of making the colonel’s company and that of the lieutenant colonel stronger than those of the other officers. A name not recorded by this anonymous writer is that of the colonel’s brother, Wadham Wyndham who joined the regiment during the campaign and wrote a journal of it. He was a militia officer but his rank is unrecorded. However, being sent with ‘an express sent to Colonel Wyndham from the Earl of Pembroke’ from Bath to Bradford then on to Trowbridge, he may have been on the lord lieutenant’s staff.

The record of Wyndham’s Regiment contains inscribed lists of names of men in each company ordered by hundred and parish. The penultimate folio provides a summary of numbers in the regiment and each of its five listed companies. As the booklet was designed to accommodate the regiment’s information it is improbable
that Wyndham’s had any other unrecorded companies. The list embraces all the
hundreds and parishes in the county division whence the men were drawn.

These listed parishes make up a swathe of adjoining hundreds in the south
eastern part of Wiltshire, and Map 3.1.2 below shows the localised approach to
organisation. The incongruous allocations of Wroughton parish to Elstubb & Eversley
Hundred or the parish of Kingston Deverill to the Amesbury Hundred in 1685 were
organisational, inter-divisional anomalies originating in medieval church politics and
tithing allocations.\(^{57}\) Ten men from Wroughton were included in Sir Edward
Baynton’s Regiment of Militia Foot based in Marlborough in 1677, but their names
are not recorded and therefore cannot be cross-referenced with those on the
Monmouth Rebellion list.\(^{58}\) However, the Marlborough allocation is more in keeping
with their geographical location. The reason for the different allocation may have
been that these ten men were raised by precept to the constables and tithingmen of the
parish rather than via the standard deputy’s warrant to the constable which, on the
same day raised men from 17 parishes in the surrounding Selkeley Hundred.\(^{59}\)

From work on the anonymous list the map of Wiltshire below shows the
parishes of the southeast of the county colour coded to show to which regimental
company its men were allocated. Indeed the micro-organisation of militia companies
was so embedded within the parish system that it embraced not only inter-divisional
but also inter-county allocations, the most obvious example being the inclusion of 15
men of Lieutenant Colonel Young’s Company of Wyndham’s Regiment who,
although allocated to this Salisbury unit, came from the parish of Oakingham, Hurst
and Swallowfield, near Reading in Berkshire.\(^{60}\)
Illustration 3.1.2: Wiltshire parishes furnishing men for Wyndham’s Regiment.

Source: Map of Wiltshire issued by Wiltshire C.C. and W&SHC:490/1440 ‘A list of the men who served in the Monmouth Rebellion....’ Parish boundaries may have been different in 1685.

KEY: Colonel John Wyndham’s Co. Magenta Salisbury supplied men to
Lieutenant Colonel John Young’s Co. Deep Yellow its own City Company
Major William Hearst’s Co. Purple under the Lord Mayor/
Captain Gabriel Ashby’s Co. Green
Captain John Davenant’s Co. Yellow
In default of further information it seems reasonable to presume that the other Wiltshire regiments were similarly organised with neighbouring hundreds grouping their parish contingents together to form companies of roughly similar sizes. In 1698 the Yellow (Warminster) Regiment numbered 422 soldiers, excluding officers, whereas three years earlier Wyndham’s Salisbury Red Regiment fielded 540. Compared to many counties Wiltshire, having a thinly populated region of central downland, did not have a large population. It is not surprising that Wyndham’s Regiment mustered only five companies compared to regiments in other, more densely populated counties such as Somerset. Interestingly the three royal line regiments involved during the Monmouth campaign also fielded just five companies each (see Table 3.2.3 below). Wyndham’s Regiment drew men from 12 adjacent hundreds centring on Salisbury whilst the Yellow Regiment was raised from eight separate hundreds and part of another, all of which were clustered around Warminster.\(^{61}\) This organisation was the same in 1689 as evidenced by a list of tythings around Warminster that supplied men to the county force.\(^{62}\)

With the exception of Wiltshire the counties of the southwest are coastal and in most maritime counties the militia were often in competition for manpower with the navy. In 1664 the following assessments of men for the navy were made: Cornwall 200, Somerset 150 and Devon 700. These legal quotas were filled by attracting volunteers using recruiting posters, ale-house inducements and press gangs, the latter being assisted by man-catchers who claimed rewards for delivering men.\(^{63}\) Impressments for sea service had been used since the time of Edward I but they were more frequently employed as a form of recruitment after the passing of the Vagrancy Act in 1597 which legalised the drafting of men of disrepute, usually homeless vagrants. These were not the type of men sought by the militia; moreover press gangs
seldom took landsmen, a category which embraced the majority of militiamen. However, if being enrolled in the militia gave protection against the press even if the country was at war, then militia recruitment in ports may have been easier because men usually preferred eight days’ service per year at a nearby town in the militia to the prospect of spending the duration of a conflict at sea in the navy.

The Militia Horse was organised on a similar pattern to the foot but the cost and funding implications meant that a county division usually raised a troop of 50 to 60 men rather than a regiment of 500 to 600. Only the most wealthy landowners and merchants could be assessed singly to provide a trooper and horse whilst those just below the stated financial threshold were banded together to do so to ensure turnout numbers were maintained. In Wiltshire the four divisions of Salisbury, Devizes, Marlborough and Warminster produced a four-troop regiment consisting in 1685 of troops under Colonel Penruddock, Captain Willoughby, Captain Maskelyn and Captain Talbot. Although their divisional allocations are undiscovered it is likely that Penruddock commanded the Warminster Troop as he was from Compton Chamberlain which is in Damerham Hundred and part of the Warminster Division, and similarly Talbot might have commanded the Devizes Troop as he lived in Lacock.

Each troop was raised from a swathe of parishes surrounding its divisional headquarters, the Marlborough troop originating from the northeast of the county.
Illustration 3.1.3: The parishes known to have provided mounted men in 1679 for the Kingsbridge Hundred’s contribution to the Marlborough Troop of Thomas Thynne’s Regiment of Militia Horse.

Although the recruitment of militia horse was also relatively local, the need to furnish horses and tack as well as men meant that the cavalry tended to be drawn from the horse-owning classes of higher social standing. A Privy Council instruction to the lord lieutenants insisted that persons to be charged with providing a horse were to be of sufficient wealth ‘so as to engage persons of quality and interest…’ Many of them owned farms and estates and consequently were fewer in number across the hundreds than those of more moderate incomes in the towns and villages.
Nevertheless this did not rule out substitutions. The business of running an estate could be demanding and it suited some landowners to send young men as substitutes to ride out with the militia horse.

The horse too had local mustering venues within their hundreds. The Kingsbridge Hundred troopers attended a Marlborough troop muster where they assembled before marching to their regimental training rendezvous at New Sarum (Salisbury). The basic level of organisation in the Horse was again the file but its maximum size was 4 troopers. In the field a file was more likely to be two or three troopers deep.

Despite its size and wealth Hampshire seems to have only produced two troops of Horse in 1685. One was commanded by Thomas Brocas Esq. and the record of his troop provides lists of names of the officers and troopers alongside those of their contributors and the number of horses supplied. Contributors were either named individuals or named places such as parish farms or parsonages and the list embraces the hundreds and parishes in the Eastern Division of the county, once again reflecting the localised approach to organisation.

Table 3.1.11: Places supplying horses to Captain Brocas’ Troop of the Hampshire Militia Regiment of Horse in 1685, plus those who supplied horses for the previous expedition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Riders</th>
<th>Horses</th>
<th>Owners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Kinch</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mr Young of Exton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Stary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sam Gawdon of Froyle Esq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Gunner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mr Marriott of Rapley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Wake</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jemy Hunt of Popham Esq.,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Felder</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mr Marriott of Rapley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Cammer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mr Wakeford of Blarkmore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Cleare</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bramshott and Headly Parsonages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Bonnam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Farrington farme and parsonage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will Kerry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wentworth Parsonage and Colsmor farm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Smith</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Alfford and Byton Parsonages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Goodyeare</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>West Meon and Hinton Parsonages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jos. Browne</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cheriton Parsonage and Mr Mathew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Twyford</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mr Cole of Lisse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Troop of Horse in the East Division of the County of Southton under the command of Thomas Brocas Esqr. 1685</td>
<td>Author: Thomas Brocas Esqr. 1685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Pinke</td>
<td>Mr Morley and others for Waltham Parsonages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neaton Farme and Newton Valence</td>
<td>Alton and Brimstead Parsonages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalton Parsonages Bouler his estate</td>
<td>Alverstoke and Marblington Parsonages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Droxford Farms and Parsonages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: HRO: 39M85/PC/E14. An edited List of the Troop of Horse in the East Division of the County of Southton under the command of Thomas Brocas Esqr. 1685. The full list is Appendix 2.

In a few cases the social position and wealth of a land-owning commanding officer meant that troops of horse could have greater local cohesion. Thomas Thynne of Longleat was a colonel of horse in the Wiltshire Militia and although his regiment comprised troops drawn from as far apart as Marlborough in the north to Salisbury in the south, many of his own troop were from his own estates. John Kidd, whom Monmouth knighted for his services as a rebel cavalry commander, had been the gamekeeper on the Thynne’s Longleat Estate and an NCO in the militia.

No matter whether foot or horse when summoned militiamen assembled in their parishes and marched to a specified place, probably the central town of one of the constituent hundreds for the mustering of their troop or company. They then marched again to either a regimental rendezvous in the nearest major town or city, or to a county rendezvous at the county town so as to muster the entire shire force. In 1685 the appointed place of muster for Wyndham’s Regiment was Salisbury and the call to arms went out on 17 June. Drummer Adam Wheeler who recorded the regiment’s involvement in the campaign presented himself for duty that same day suggesting that he lived in or around Salisbury. Others arrived over the next two days, the furthest coming from Wokingham near Reading. To perform the necessary administration, distribute the orders and assemble a regiment from an area with an average radius of twenty miles from Salisbury within three days so that it was ready
to march out on 20 July, was no mean feat. Overall, three days appears to be the usual time taken for a full regimental assembly during an emergency.

Localism, as well as making administration easier and encouraging muster attendance, also had another function involving unit trust, with possible links to performance. In his paper on *Issues in Integrating Territorial Army Soldiers into Regular British Units* Charles Kirke stresses the need for trust born of familiarity between units that are called upon to operate alongside each other. Although his examination addresses the relationship between members of the modern Territorial Army and the Regular Army, his findings indicate a fundamental factor whereby men operate together more effectively and perform better in stressful situations when they know each other. The localised structure underpinning the organisation of the militia system thus ensured that a man knew who he was expected to stand next to in the line, ...personal relationships...mean far more than political abstractions. ...When roundshot skipped across furrows and blade rasped from scabbard, men strove to seem valiant in order to gain or retain respect of their comrades. I am sure that the bonds of mateship and the charisma of a brave leader meant more than politics when matters came... to 'push of pike.'

Company and regimental musters amongst the foot were thus gatherings of near neighbours and therefore not surprisingly also took on a sense of social occasion. A high proportion of contributors to the mounted militia turned out riding their own horses and, like their companions in the foot, they too probably turned musters into social gatherings among their own class, perhaps including a hunt at some stage.

Much has been made of the drinking and raucous behaviour at militia musters. Dryden singled out drink as the sole reason for a muster when he commented that having carried out a little training men: ‘then hasten to be drunk, the business of the day.’ However, Kirke makes the point that ‘it is easier to trust someone (or some
group) after they have joined in a social occasion, ideally involving alcohol and some joint and joyous activity such as a pub crawl or games night.\(^74\) It appears therefore that if the militia did indulge in drink at musters they adopted the principles of community and socialising – a forerunner of a twenty-first century model of good practice.

Ineptitude caused by drunkenness is a repeated theme of descriptions of the militia. However, across centuries gatherings of warriors have entailed the consumption of copious amounts of alcohol. John Trusel writing in Winchester during the 1640s proclaimed:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{The soldiers love good liquor night and day} \\
\text{The ale-house keepers labour what they may...} \\
\text{Now every second house almost is made} \\
\text{A member of the strong ale-drapers trade} \quad 75
\end{align*}
\]

Restoration soldiers were no different. Many small alehouse-keepers in the West Country were reportedly driven out of business during the 1680s as a result of the depredations of troops quartered on them following Monmouth’s rebellion. After 1688 the national decline in the number of brewing victuallers was blamed on the quartering of soldiers upon trust and for small pay.\(^76\) Local tradition may also have had a significant part to play in the militia’s drinking fame. Waylen recounts one legend concerning the Bell Inn at Seend near Devizes. He tells a story that during their march back to Wiltshire after Sedgemoor, ‘the militia drank up an entire cask of liquor, which cask ever after bore the name of “Old Monmouth;” and when it was no longer serviceable for beer, it was sawn in two and used as a pair of wash-tubs’.\(^77\) It is a local tale with only coincidental substance. The militia did indeed pass through Seend but there is nothing to suggest they stopped, moreover it is a poor example of a drinking feat as one cask would not slake the thirst of a regiment of 550 men let alone the county force.
However, drinking was not universally condemned and may have been part of a tradition of reward for the services of part-time civil authorities:

… legislation was introduced which required the presence of representatives from dead soldiers’ regiments at military funerals. In the military hospitals, alcoholic drinks were invariably provided for the deceased’s fellow patients after the ceremony.\textsuperscript{78}

The town accounts for Poole list an entry where five shillings was provided for ‘beer for the watchmen at the town gate at the Insurrection’.\textsuperscript{79}

Inevitably soldiers sporadically got drunk but careful assessment must be made before labelling them as a permanently inebriate rabble. Over several chapters in \textit{The English Alehouse: A Social History} Peter Clark develops a convincing argument that between 1660 and 1750 there was a gradual evolution of respectability in the social world of the alehouse, in conjunction with a rise of regulation and improvement of accommodation and facilities. Such a movement would have had greater influence upon the civilian soldiers of the militia than upon those in the royal army. Given the social class of the majority of these militiamen, although they were doubtless capable of drinking and having a good time it is doubtful they descended into the alcoholic mayhem imagined by their critics.\textsuperscript{80}

\textbf{3.2. STRENGTH.}

Although the numbers of men turning out fluctuated according to national and local circumstances and the frequency of musters varied, nevertheless the organisation and administration of the militia remained reasonably constant during the later decades of the seventeenth century no matter the monarch, so it is reasonable to suggest militia turnouts were also similar. In 1697, twelve years after Monmouth was executed, not
content with estimates William III ordered accurate headcounts and full inspections at musters. The results for the West Country are listed in the table below.

**Table 3.2.1: The mustering of the county forces of the south west in 1697.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiments and Men Mustered</th>
<th>Additional City Companies</th>
<th>Troops of horse</th>
<th>Additional City Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cornwall</td>
<td>Not listed</td>
<td>Penzanace Truro</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Truro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plymouth</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plymouth</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>Not listed</td>
<td>Penzanace Truro</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Truro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>4 2,199</td>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>6 2,659</td>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>5 3,434</td>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>4 2,238</td>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although muster masters were required to make returns to the lord lieutenants and attempts were made to gather them together there seems to have been no central statement of nationwide statistics until 1697. Authors’ statements concerning the strengths of various militias have been based upon estimates and can vary. Chandler states that the Wiltshire Militia at Sedgemoor numbered 3,000 men. Tincey sets them at 1,500, while Little and Clifton ignore their numbers altogether. County force strengths could indeed vary as they depended upon the number of divisions in a county and their ability through the wealth of their inhabitants to furnish men. Table 3.2.3 below shows the number of militia regiments raised across the West Country.
Table 3.2.2: The numbers in the West Country county forces in 1685.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Regiments of Foot</th>
<th>Companies of Foot</th>
<th>Number of infantry</th>
<th>Regiments of Horse</th>
<th>Troops of Horse</th>
<th>Number of cavalry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cornwall</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers are rounded up or down to the nearest known approximate or quoted strength.

Despite an obvious disparity between the numbers raised, a rough average of five hundred men to the regiment and sixty men to the troop emerges. Comparison needs to be made with those regular regiments that undertook the 1685 campaign.

Table 3.2.3: Campaign strengths of the royal infantry regiments active in 1685.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Companies</th>
<th>Musketeers</th>
<th>Pikemen</th>
<th>Grenadiers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Royal Regiment of Foot</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Queen Dowager's Regiment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Queen Consort's Regiment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With an average 50 men to a royal company none of these units were at full strength, yet most authorities accept that a foot company strength for the period to have been around 60. The Duchess of York and Albany’s Regiment of Foot (Trelawney’s) were noted as having companies of 65 in September 1684 but one month later at the Putney Heath Rendezvous they were recorded as having 70 men per company present. On campaign numbers fell due to losses in action, accidental injuries, straggling, sickness and detachment to perform other duties so returning to an estimated 60 men of all ranks per company would seem a reasonable approximation.\(^85\)

The Royal Order of July 1685 reorganising the army decreed 50 per company, except for the 60 approved for the Guards.
There is further evidence that the simple assumption that the militia followed the royal army in size of units is incorrect. Documents describing the allocation of various battalions and companies of the Somerset Militia to their specific locations are held at Bath Record Office. Part of these listings includes a statement that the Bath Trained Bands numbered around 800 in seven companies. The militia company strength was thus the pre-civil war target of about 100 men to a company with more allocated to the senior officers’ units. Such a concept of larger sized militia companies is corroborated by evidence from the reviews of 1690 when William III’s militia reforms were rebuilding units to regain the state they had been in before James II neglected them.

Table 3.2.4: The militia in three counties under the Duke of Norfolk in 1690.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In The County of Norfolk</strong></td>
<td>A regiment of Horse, being 6 Troops, besides officers, having buff coats, backs, breasts and pots, and most of them carabines, and such as do want, the persons charged with finding them agreed to furnish them forthwith.</td>
<td>370 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Regiment of Foot consisting of 7 Companies, all clothed in blue, under Colonel Sir Jacob Astley.</td>
<td>818 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Regiment of Foot consisting of 7 Companies, all clothed in purple, under Colonel Sir Thom. Knivett.</td>
<td>847 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Regiment of Foot consisting of 7 Companies, all clothed in white, under Colonel Sir Wm. Cooke.</td>
<td>688 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Regiment of Foot consisting of 7 Companies, all clothed in yellow, under Colonel Sir Robert Walpole.</td>
<td>734 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Four Companies in Yarmouth clothed in red.</td>
<td>526 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two Companies in Lynne clothed in red.</td>
<td>258 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Regiment of the City of Norwich, consisting of 6 Companies, clothed in red.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In The County of Surrey</strong></td>
<td>A Regiment of Foot consisting of 9 Companies, having good arms and clothed in red coats.</td>
<td>1,000 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two Troops of Horse, of 60 each Troop.</td>
<td>120 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Regiment of Foot in the Borough of Southwark, consisting of 6 Companies, whereof the Lord Lieutenant is Colonel.</td>
<td>1,500 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In The County of Berks</strong></td>
<td>The Regiment of Foot consisting of 9 Companies, having good arms and clothed in grey.</td>
<td>900 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three Troops of Horse of betwixt 50 and 60 each Troop.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is rare to find such information about so many militia regiments in one document especially where the units recorded come from more than one county. The militia of the large coastal county of Norfolk consisted of one regiment of horse, five regiments of foot (four country and one borough) and two seemingly independent borough garrisons. The regiment of horse has six troops of between 50 and 60 troopers in each. The county’s four regiments had seven companies averaging 110 men whilst each of the three borough units listed had twelve companies between them. The outlying garrisons had an average company tally of 130 men. The only other borough regiment was listed under Surrey being that of Southwark with an average company strength of 250, which is indicative of the greater population density of the London boroughs compared with those in the rest of the country. Unfortunately, the Duke of Norfolk failed to list the number of men in the Norwich Regiment thereby obviating a more substantially-based comparison. It is beyond the scope of this work to attempt such a comparison but it is interesting to note that the Williamite Militia settled upon 110 to 120 men per company and seven companies to the regiment. Holden cites the Worcester Militia in 1697 as consisting of 786 infantrymen in one regiment of foot spread between seven companies, and 120 troopers in a regiment of horse divided into two troops.87

The most detailed information for the militia of the 1680s comes from the Wyndham Muster Roll as mentioned before wherein each company was counted and its officers’ and men’s names recorded.88 Many of these records were kept so as to pay the men for turning out and to enable written reports on ‘The State of the Militia’ to be submitted, although this example is unrelated to any specific function and appears to have been created solely to record those who took part in the Monmouth Rebellion Campaign.89
Table 3.2.5: Company strengths of Colonel Wyndham’s Regiment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Companies</th>
<th>Number of men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel John Wyndham’s Co.</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel John Young’s Co.</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major William Hearst’s Co.</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Gabriel Ashby’s Co.</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain John Davenant’s Co.</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.5.2 shows that Wyndham’s regiment returned a campaign regimental strength of 540 including all officers, and an average of 108 per company. This composition follows the pattern of pre-civil war militia regiments with an average of 100 men per company as a numerical target. If this was the case across all those militia units involved in suppressing the Monmouth Rebellion the numbers of men mustered appears highly significant. If the 34 regiments recorded in Table 3.2.2 above, each turned out between 500 and 600 men then the militia foot alone in the southwest could have numbered between 17,000 and 20,000. This number is significant when compared to Monmouth’s supposedly popular rebel army which numbered 7,500 at its height and averaged 3,500 all arms for the campaign.

In the royal horse, contemporary troop size is generally estimated at between 50 and 60 men. Roll returns for The Royal Regiment of Horse (Oxford’s) in 1684 record 50 per troop, including non-commissioned officers and trumpeters whilst the 1685 warrant for the Royal Dragoons puts the regiment at 60 per troop. A contemporary issue list records 360 helmets and 360 carbine belts and swivels allocated to a six-troop regiment.\(^{90}\) The Royal Order of July 1685 decreed 50 for a troop with the exception of Oxford’s Horse which was set at 80, but the numbers taking part in the 1685 campaign are set out below.
Table 3.2.6: Campaign strengths of the royal mounted regiments active in 1685.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Troopers</th>
<th>H.Grens</th>
<th>Dragoons</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>His Majesty’s Regiment of Horse Guards</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Royal Regiment of Horse (Oxford’s)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Royal Regiment of Dragoons (Royals)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tincey, J., Sedgemoor 1685 - Marlborough’s First Victory (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2005), p. 101; Scott, C.L., The Armies and Uniforms of the Monmouth Rebellion (Leigh-on-Sea, Partizan, 2008), pp. 31-34.91

The ability to raise regiments of militia cavalry at approximately double the numbers of the royal army, as seems to have been the case in the foot, was impeded by cost. Militia horse costs were higher due to the need to provide mounts, saddles, tack and forage as well as the services of a blacksmith. A single hundred did not usually have inhabitants of sufficient means to supply a full troop of cavalry but they could sometimes supply a significant number. The source for Table 3.1.3 above, a warrant dated 6 September 1679 from Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, to the Constables of Kingsbridge Hundred instructing them to muster the mounted militia of their hundred and attend a training rendezvous at New Sarum lists 22 troopers – about half the strength of a royal army troop.92 Because Wiltshire was more densely populated and had a greater distribution of wealth in the north of the county it is reasonable to suggest that the rate of 22 troopers per hundred was probably not sustained county-wide. If each hundred had enough persons able to supply about 20 troopers, then Wiltshire’s 50 hundreds should have raised 1,000 militia horse, whereas the total was nearer 200. The average troop size of horse militia in the south west was 55, with Devon fielding the greatest number of 80 men per troop and Gloucestershire’s 40 the least. Hampshire appears to have maintained the average with its two troops under Thomas Brocas and Thomas Jervoise producing 56 and 62 men respectively.93
Table 3.2.7: Contributors to part of the Marlborough Troop of Horse.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributors</th>
<th>Troopers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr Goddard of Swindon Mrs Beale of Westbrook and Mr Hains of Alborne</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Walter St. John &amp; his son</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Hide for the estate late Sir Francis Inglefields</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Lady Bullon and Sir William Holcroft</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Lady Cawley &amp; Oliver Cawley Esq.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Plodwell</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Bennett of Salthrop Esq.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Oliver Plodwell of Linam and Mr Turks and Mr Romain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr John Sadler of Chilton, Mrs Ann Sadler wid. And Mr Charles York</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Fisher of Lidon for his mother and the other occupiers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the estate late of his father and Mrs Morse of Badam</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Roger Ewan of Draycott and Mr Lidyards of Badbury</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr John Jacob Junior for his esdtate in Hilmartin and</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Plodwell of Grirklane</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Wildman for his estate in Wroughton Mr Will Strange</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will Law and Mr Richard Strange</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Arthur Billett of Swindon Mr Edwards Sadler for Mannington</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Giles Alworth and Mr Charles Billatt of Blackgrove</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Goddard of Swindon Mrs Beale of Westbrook and Mr Hains of Alborne</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doct Buol of Lidyard Trezoze and Mr Robt Jonnes of Lidyard Milicent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Shoa of Wootton Basat and Mr Bath of Purton</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir William Binrock for all his estates in Wilts and</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Wid Smith of Torkenham and her son</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Chamberlayne of Wanboro Mr Stratton of the same</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Mr Nurse of Mildonhall</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor Hodges of Wanborough Mr Goodon of the same</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor Morse of Hodson Mrs Morse and Mr Brunsdon of Wootton Bassatt</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Norton of Badbury and his mother and Major Noss of Bradley and his son</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 22 troopers


Based upon Table 3.2.7 above if an estimated 28 troops each turned out around 60 men then the militia Horse in the south west would have numbered nearly 2,000. Uniting foot and horse figures, those serving in the militias of the south west during the Monmouth Rebellion were probably between 19 and 22,000.
3.3. CONCLUSION.

In summary, the post-Restoration Militia had a structured organisation securely based upon the civil and ecclesiastic administrative systems of local government. This enabled it to operate smoothly in all the counties of the southwest. The gradual evolution from parish files to hundred companies and thence to regional troops and division regiments ensured that the men remained in familiar groups and simplified administration. Official control ranged from local constables to county deputy lieutenants and was firmly based in localism. This local nature ensured service was undertaken alongside and thus under the eyes of the men’s neighbours which encouraged good behaviour and a modicum of unit identity. Moreover geographical proximity meant less arduous marches to various rendezvous points and enabled scrutiny and checks of systems and personnel to be much easier.

The men came from a mixture of middle and lower classes but were deemed honest working men of some social standing amongst whom excessive drinking does not appear to have been a significant problem. Officers at all ranks were found from local worthies, landed gentry and some powerful high-born men. The system of muster masters’ inspections and reports ensured periodic turnout in satisfactory numbers. Misdemeanours were effectively investigated and deficiencies actively punished at the petty or quarter sessions. Company strengths among the militia foot tended to be double that of royal units and the numbers of cavalry matched that of troops of royal horse. Each county could field a significant contingent of thousands of men and when seen as a whole the militia of the southwest was a potentially large force. We turn now to seeing if this well organized and effectively mustered force was adequately financed and supplied, and whether its summoning systems were such that could turn out significant numbers of men in an emergency.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

2. Reply from duty archivist to the author’s questioning of this statement on 20 November 2008.
3. HMC. Appendix to the third, Report, p.89.
5. CSPD. 1660-1690 *passim*.
6. The term ‘regiment’ is used interchangeably with ‘battalion’ in many sources. A battalion as a subdivision of a regiment was applicable only to the Guards during the Monmouth Rebellion. This thesis uses ‘regiment’ to signify the grouping together of companies or troops in their permanent organisations, and restricts ‘battalion’ to references concerning the First Foot Guards.
8. HRO: PER98/18 Hampshire Militia Rolls no 1 to 18.
10. Tacitus claimed that ‘The Teutonic races divided their territory into hundreds’, Tacitus Germ. 6 and 12, but regrettably, it has not been possible to identify the basis for establishing a hundred – although some writers have conjectured that it was based upon groupings of one hundred families. White, W., *History Gazetteer of the County of Devon…* (London, Simpkin Marshall & Co, 1878), p.24.
12. These lists exclude companies raised in major cities for local defence, or units of local volunteers.
13. Murphy, *op. cit.*, pp.6-7
16. Pembrokeshire, with its coastal plain parishes, was more densely populated than many Welsh counties, especially Denbighshire with its mountainous regions.
18. The Blue Regiment appears to have mustered a similar number to that of The Red. In 1677 it listed 94 men from Selkeley hundred and ten men from Wroughton parish in the colonel’s company which formed one fifth of the regimental strength.
19. W&SHC G23/1/41
22. Brod, cit.
25. This addition was most probably the small Mayor’s City Regiment being absorbed as a sixth company, as references to it as a separate entity disappear from the accounts.
26. As seen in Table 2.3.
27. The role of the Muster Master is discussed in Chapter Six.
30. GRO. D2026 X23 Account of parish monies of St. Briavels by constable George Bond,
35 Spurr, cit.
36 Militia pay will be dealt with in Chapter Five.
38 Carew, R., op. cit., p.83.
39 CRO: CA/B44/47. Earl of Bath’s commission to Lieutenant Colonel Rashleigh. 10 March 1689.
40 The doubling of command roles or the appointment of assistants, was also a precaution against limiting the efficiency of the unit due to losses in action.
41 W&SHC: 490/1440. A list of the men who served in the Monmouth Rebellion in the Wiltshire Militia.
42 Gentlemen volunteers – men of higher social status serving in the ranks for a cause or amusement; reformadoes – officers from broken units returned to the ranks awaiting promotion; lance pessadas – cavalry troopers without mounts, deemed to be of superior status to foot-soldiers; Corporals and file Leaders – minor ranks with authority over 6 to12 men. The status of drummers varied, however, as the senior drummer, the drum major, might have been listed among the officers if he was of sufficient social standing, experience or education.
45 W&SHC: G23/1/41 1.
46 The universal levy by ballot for service in the militia appears to have been formally introduced by Georgian legislation contained within the Militia Bill of 1756.
47 Dinely, op.cit., pp. 77, 148 and 180.
48 A division in seventeenth-century civil parlance was an administrative sub division of a county, but in military parlance it was a sub-unit of a company. Nor should it be confused with the term’s Napoleonic era definition of a group of brigades with attached artillery.
49 A division of thirty-two men formed four files in eight ranks. It could thus road march four abreast and then by doubling its files to the front it could form a fighting element of a battel of 4 ranks, in which formation it could undertake its rank-rotational firings, and by doubling to its front yet again could form for salvee fire.
50 See Table 4.2.1.
51 SRO: DD/DR 53/1, f. 3.
53 *Ibid*.
54 W&SHC:413/11 Account…the Militia in the several hundreds 1698 towards this the raising of the Yellow Militia Regiment in this Division of Warminster in the County aforesaid.
55 The author might have been Adam Wheeler, a drummer in Wyndham’s Regiment, or Wadham Wyndam – see note below.
56 Wadham Wyndham’s Journal of the movements of the Regiment of Wiltshire Militia commanded by Colonel Wyndham during Monmouth's Rebellion. As Communicated by Wadham Wyndham Esq. to the late Mr. Hatcher the historian of Salisbury, in Waylen., op. cit.,pp.316-320.
57 This not rare in England’s parish histories. It occurs in almost every county a number of times and such parish allocations can even be across county borders. Oxfordshire has 15 cases of parishes not adjacent to others in their hundred, of which Caversfield is in a Buckinghamshire hundred, Shilton and Langford in Berkshire hundreds, and Widford in a Gloucestershire hundred whilst Lillingston Lovell in Buckinghamshire is part of Ploughley Hundred in Oxfordshire.
58 The spelling of this family name has several forms across contemporary documents and include: Baynton, Bainton and Baneton.
59 W&SHC 1553/22. There appears to have been something special about the administration of Wroughton but, as yet, this dilemma remains unresolved.
60 W&SHC: 490/1440 These three Berkshire villages were part of Amesbury Hundred in Wiltshire. For Oakingham read Wokingham.
61 The Damerham Hundred was divided into North and South due to the number of attached outlying parishes.
62 W&SHC:413/11.
64 Rogers, N.A.M., *The Press Gang: Naval Impressment and its Opponents in Georgian Britain*
Wyndham in Waylen, op cit. p.316. At some point during the campaign Talbot was perhaps promoted to major, but apart from mentions in Wyndham, evidence of this has not been discovered. 


A troop of about 60 men formed by 15 files in 4 ranks. It could thus road march 3 abreast, form for firing pistols in a caracole in 4 ranks, and by doubling could form for a charge, or good round trot, into melee.

Thynne was stripped of command in 1681 for supporting an attempt to have the Duke of York impeached as a papist; W&SHC. 1178/450 Warrant to the Constables of Kingsbridge Hundred; Wigfield, W.McD., op. cit., p.30; Earle,P., op. cit., p.176.

A troop of about 60 men formed by 15 files in 4 ranks. It could thus road march 3 abreast, form for firing pistols in a caracole in 4 ranks, and by doubling could form for a charge, or good round trot, into melee.

Thynne was stripped of command in 1681 for supporting an attempt to have the Duke of York impeached as a papist; W&SHC. 1178/450 Warrant to the Constables of Kingsbridge Hundred; Wigfield, W.McD., op. cit., p.30; Earle,P., op. cit., p.176.

A troop of about 60 men formed by 15 files in 4 ranks. It could thus road march 3 abreast, form for firing pistols in a caracole in 4 ranks, and by doubling could form for a charge, or good round trot, into melee.

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Chapter Four

COMING INTO OPERATION

‘The Militia…now under the power of Lieutenants or their Deputies shall be exercised, ordered and managed…’

This chapter will examine the extent to which the militia as a functioning body was adequately funded and supplied, and whether its financial systems were ordered and allowed it to function as required. Moreover it will look at its summoning systems to see if they were effectively operated so as to put a substantial body of troops into the field. The chapter investigates the militia’s administration systems to determine if it was effective in coming into operation during an emergency.

4.1 FUNDING.

Until the civil wars, the militia was funded jointly by direct instruction from the crown to property owners to find and equip men, with additional expenses covered by the crown and paid for out of taxation. Part of the crown’s prerogative was to collect general revenues as tax and to distribute such sums as it deemed necessary into whatever aspect of the state’s activities it thought fit. This included funding the militia.

The early Stuart government had discontinued the Elizabethan quota system, whereby each county was charged to produce a certain number of armed men leaving the means by which this was achieved to local discretion. Gradually this changed to a subsidy system in which the government set criteria for the assessment of local landowners’ wealth and approved an annual tax on that wealth. This tax was collected in monthly instalments via the justices of the peace acting in the role of commissioners for the militia. Both systems were fraught with difficulty as they were
dependent upon men being willing to assess their neighbours and ‘although there was statutory backing, the resulting militia rates were contentious.’ High evaluation of property led to reduction in local support for the militia, infrequent musters and poor turnouts, whereas low evaluation resulted in limited resources for the militia and difficulties over pay for the men. The Restoration solution was a combination of both systems and a shift of responsibility from the authorities to the contributors. Although this work uses the word ‘contributor’ for those who contributed to the funding of the militia, such people were also known as ‘finders’ as it was their duty both to find the men and to assume responsibility for their turning out when summoned. The rate of contribution was fixed nationally according to bands of assessed wealth but collected and spent locally. Contributors could either serve in the militia themselves, bringing their own equipment, or find replacements who they had to both equip and pay. Equally they might pay the required sums to the Sheriff’s Office who distributed it to the Parish Constables to find the necessary men and equipment, and provide their pay.

Financing the militia had been a simple affair when the major expense was that of equipping the men but when paying men a daily rate for their service was introduced a new structure was required to collect, control and disburse money on a regular basis. Viroli cites the need to pay militia soldiers as an indication of the decline of respublica – the quasi moral concept aimed at the preservation of communities of individuals living together in justice. This he coupled with the contemporary growth of social and financial systems designed to support the state and its government. Payment for trained band soldiers was made in 1573 at the advised rate of 8d. per day, which was to be found by the relevant contributors. However, the notion that service in the trained bands was seen as an unpaid obligation for all fit males between certain ages persisted with payment between provider and server being
a personal affair. As payments did not go by way of a third party certain compromises could be made, although pressure could be brought to bear on defaulting payees by withholding of service or by complaining to county authorities. Enforcement would be applied through the county quarter sessions. The advised rate of 8d a day was increased during the early seventeenth century to 1s per day although, conversely, the quarter sessions grew steadily more reluctant to enforce payment. In 1655 Cromwell’s new militia was raised from volunteers who agreed to attend quarterly musters and appear at other times when required for £8 per year. This was a formal contract backed by legislation.

Payments made directly to militiamen for service were also not regarded as part of centralised expenditure. Cromwell’s government had funded it separately, from a specific tax levied upon rich, former supporters of the king who, although at liberty, were described as malignants; the men whom the militia were raised to watch were obliged to pay for their watchers with their contributions being collected at local level. In this arrangement lay the seeds of the future transfer of full funding of the militia, including soldiers’ pay, away from central to local funds. During the Interregnum the simple system of general taxation and payment by the central government evolved into a new fiscal structure. Monies previously collected on behalf of the monarch and paid directly to the Exchequer were augmented by a range of new demands levied and collected by officials who administered such taxes locally.

Despite frequent attempts during the Interregnum to give the Exchequer sole authority over all revenue, in the event it never regained full control of county taxation assessment nor indeed of certain national taxes such as customs and excise. The latter set a precedent in being managed locally through a board of commissioners composed of aldermen of the corporations and men of good standing. Possibly
through vested interest, each county authority kept a tight rein on country finances. The county treasuries became effectively administrative executives beyond government control whose prerogative was only challenged at the Restoration in 1660. Charles II’s first government mounted this challenge by delegating all county affairs to the lord lieutenants. The militias could only operate if there were sufficient funds to pay for them so, rather than fund an increase in the royal army, parliament voted to allow the king to raise money to pay for the militia – should he deem it necessary for it to be embodied. To guarantee this money was collected the Militia Acts of 1662 and 1663 empowered the king to raise it through the Militia Money tax, based upon an amount equal to the sum of a county monthly quota according to the assessment of 1661. In more simple terms this meant that across the nation £210,000 was to be raised over a three year period, to be collected in three annual tranches of £70,000.

The Restoration Militia Acts also specified how these sums were to be raised. At its operative level funding for the militia primarily consisted of passing on the cost of its raising and maintenance to the wealthier people of each county. The lord lieutenants were to make an assessment of the wealth of their counties’ property-owning inhabitants and to calculate a pro-rata costing before issuing orders listing the names of specified contributors who were to provide men, weapons and ammunition, horses, transport and supplies. For example, a reasonably wealthy farmer would be assessed as possessing sufficient property to warrant him providing a man as a foot soldier, equipped with a musket and accoutrements, to whatever rendezvous was ordered. A wealthier property owner might be assessed at a rate warranting he sent a man as cavalry trooper, equipped with a sword, pistols and accoutrements, plus a horse, saddle and tack to the rendezvous. Thus the cost of the Restoration Militia was
still to be borne by local property owners but rather than being taxed by the office of the King’s Revenues, it was imposed by way of the requirement to provide men and equipment according to local assessment of wealth. These nominal assessed sums were known as Militia Money and were collected from a contributor if he/she could not find a man to serve. Financial contributions could be kept down by contributors if they served themselves and/or directly supplied equipment such as weapons, armour or horse furniture, otherwise they paid in coin. All such monies were paid directly to the individual parish constables who forwarded them to the Constable of their hundred or spent them on local militia requirements, keeping accurate records of collections and disbursements. Holding cash on behalf of the parish could have its dangers, especially in times of unrest. Thomas Smith, Constable of Chardstock, was relieved of some militia money by a party of Monmouth’s rebels.

With this revenue duly legalised, Charles II called for it to be increased in 1662, 1663 and 1664 as a result of so-called ‘plots and conspiracies’ that necessitated the summoning of the militia. The amounts collected are shown in Tables 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 below.

The number of men to be raised, equipped and trained fell within whatever sum the county could afford and was thus proportionate to the value of property in that county. So as not to lay the financial burden solely upon the landed gentry and nobility and to include urban merchants, the lord lieutenants had a provision for the assessment of goods and capital as well as land possession. ‘Property values’ was a somewhat ill-defined term, but it had legal basis in the old church and poor rates of previous eras and was a familiar and recognised method of taxation. Determining the rateable value of goods and money was equally difficult as in both cases assessors had no right to demand access to a property in order to conduct a detailed examination of
a holding, an estate or financial accounts. Consequently allocated assessments were sometimes arbitrary, a problem partially solved by banding, that is to say allocating valuations either around or in between specified sums. The rates applied for the assessment of militia money contributions are set out below.

**Table 4.1.1: Rules for determining liability to provide Horse and Foot in 1663.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis of the Charge (whichever was larger)</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amount</strong></td>
<td><strong>Subject</strong></td>
<td><strong>Amount</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above £500</td>
<td>Land in Possession</td>
<td>Above £6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£500</td>
<td>Land in Possession</td>
<td>£6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£200 - £500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>£2,400 - £6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£200</td>
<td>Estate</td>
<td>£2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£100 - £200</td>
<td>Estate</td>
<td>£1,200 - £2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£100</td>
<td>In possession in lands, tenements, hereditaments, lease &amp; copyholds</td>
<td>£1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£50 - £100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>£600 - £1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£50</td>
<td>In possession</td>
<td>£600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to £50</td>
<td>In possession</td>
<td>Up to £600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Militia Act of 1663.

Disputes were relatively rare, suggesting that assessments were often well below true value with rapid settlement effected in order to avoid a more expensive reassessment. There were of course challenges (see below) but as those responsible for assessing the wealth and levying the charges were also responsible for hearing appeals, such protests may have been considered somewhat futile.

Although the process was speedily put into operation there was a degree of connivance at rateable values among the nobility where the sums to be paid appear to
be based upon gentlemen’s agreements among social equals. Landowners whose extensive holdings lay in a variety of counties, such as those of Algernon Percy, Earl of Northumberland were often arbitrarily assessed by fellow landowners. Northumberland received several letters from Charles Howard, Earl of Carlisle and lord lieutenant of Cumberland and Westmorland in 1662 indicating a somewhat laissez-faire approach to assessment.

It being the King’s pleasure that the value of Peers’ estates should be returned to the Lieutenants of the counties where they lie, to the intent that they be rated towards finding of horse for the trained bands by the commissioners appointed by the King, I have presumed to trouble you to cause your steward or other officer to certify me at what value you would have your estate in Cumberland to be returned.\(^\text{12}\)

Northumberland was being permitted to set his own rateable value. He also received similar letters requesting self-evaluation regarding his estates in Yorkshire’s East Riding, the West Riding, and also in Dorset.\(^\text{13}\) Northumberland’s reciprocal cooperation was probably most appreciated, as he wrote in his role as lord lieutenant of Northumberland to William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, ‘…if you will let us understand what will be the most agreeable to your Lordship we shall endeavour to give you satisfaction.’\(^\text{14}\) Although their assessments were probably lower than they should have been the aristocracy did pay up and there is no evidence of them endeavouring to avoid payment completely. Northumberland paid £2,200 for his estates in the East Riding, £700 for the West Riding, £800 for the North Riding and £60 for Dorset, whilst William Cavendish, Marquis of Newcastle-upon-Tyne paid £1,400 and the Earl of Carlisle £1,600 on their properties in Northumberland.\(^\text{15}\)

As no statutory requirements for disclosure existed, the lord lieutenants or their deputies appointed assessors from among substantial landowners with knowledge and experience when valuing the incomes and property of those not of the
nobility. They estimated the size and nature of holdings, not just the value of the land but buildings, crops and stock too, sometimes so as not to trespass, resorting to inspection at a distance from public footpaths or accepting the word of servants regarding the contents of barns and storehouses. Assessments could be complicated as large families often had several members holding lands and properties in trust for others. Part-ownership of estates was common as were estates comprising properties scattered around the county.

With perhaps a degree of creative accounting the summary schedules for each parish were drawn up to form the quotas for the individual hundreds for collection or material provision. Braddick maintains that recruitment was also part of a moral code: ‘Wisps of evidence about the criteria for valuation suggests that social values were important – wealth was set against family commitments of the taxpayer, their attitude to the poor and whether or not they kept a good home’.  

The financial duties of the reinstated lord lieutenants and their staffs meant the county treasurers had been rendered superfluous. But these lord lieutenants were often creatures of the king and parliament was not anxious to see financial control of local government, including the militia, solely in their hands, especially as some were erstwhile or potential opponents of parliamentarian rule. Therefore parliament established ad hoc committees to take the place of the Exchequer and administered areas such as local sequestrations and accounts, as well as the newly-formed county militias, with each national committee retaining its own treasurers and collectors.

Having its own committees controlling the finances of the militia meant that parliament held the means to impose its will over that of the monarch. The king may be invested with absolute authority over the militia and his lord lieutenants may control it, but by establishing the various financial management committees at
national level, parliament tried to take hold of the purse-strings and attempted to dictate what the lord lieutenants could do. One way of exerting control was to establish a fixed national rate of payment levied upon contributors. The militia rate was initially set during the Interregnum with the cost for each assessed individual rated to provide or pay for either a fully equipped foot soldier or a trooper and these rates had remained reasonably stable during the 1650s. However, to realise the sum allocated by the Restoration Parliament of £70,000 a year the rate rose, and did so again when Charles II said that he wanted it increased.

Table 4.1.2: The annual charges of the Militia Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>To Pay for a Foot Soldier</th>
<th>Levied on property assessed at</th>
<th>To Pay for a Trooper</th>
<th>Levied on property assessed at</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1650</td>
<td>£20</td>
<td>£200</td>
<td>£200</td>
<td>£2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1659</td>
<td>£20</td>
<td>£200</td>
<td>£300</td>
<td>£4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1660</td>
<td>£40</td>
<td>£300</td>
<td>£500</td>
<td>£6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1662</td>
<td>£50</td>
<td>£600</td>
<td>£500</td>
<td>£6,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ordinances of 1650-1660 and the Militia Act of 1662.

It is interesting to note that although the property value band increased by about 200%, in real terms contributors individual amounts fell. The Interregnum government exacted one pound for every ten pounds of assessed wealth, whereas the Restoration government decreased the rate to one for every twelve. Parliament was able to afford this reduction in demand upon the wealthy by the widening of the assessment band. During the Interregnum a lower band of annual income was set at £200, below which property owners did not have to contribute. This disappeared at the Restoration when less wealthy landowners were obliged to share the costs of providing militiamen amongst themselves as several contributors’ payments could now be amalgamated to fund an infantryman or trooper.
In 1663 parish constables and their assistants were empowered to formulate a pro-rata scale of contributions to embrace all landed estates in their parishes. The Restoration militia rate fell upon a wider section of property owners encompassing far more of those from the lower end of the scale as the cost of maintaining the militia spread down the social ladder. As previously the monies were initially collected by the parish constable, who paid them to a receiver in the county treasurer’s office, either the county treasurer himself or one of his assistant clerks. The furnishing of men and equipment was recorded by both constables and county clerks who also checked who and what appeared at militia musters against the list of what was expected by assessment. To encourage diligence and discourage fraud, treasurers and clerks delivered their militia fundraising accounts, muster rolls and reports on oath to the lieutenant every six months.

Table 4.1.3: Militia fundraising account for the parish of Shobrook in Devon.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. John Rowe</td>
<td>45.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Dally</td>
<td>05.00</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tho: Dyer</td>
<td>42.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The widd. Radmore</td>
<td>08.00</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Willm Bradford</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willm Tomson</td>
<td>18.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tho: Hugh</td>
<td>18.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The widd. Faddon</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurence Rowe</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurence Browne Junr</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs Mary Dyer widd</td>
<td>95.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tho: Poyntingdon Esq.</td>
<td>05.00</td>
<td>100 – 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willm Rowe</td>
<td>40.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Dauby</td>
<td>09.03</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Reynolds</td>
<td>41.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tho: Holman</td>
<td>09.03</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurence Browne Senr</td>
<td>41.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Stirling</td>
<td>08.03</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jo: Lane</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Pridham</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Dally</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jo: Parker</td>
<td>12.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Board</td>
<td>12.12</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Wescroff</td>
<td>21.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The widd. Hollihole</td>
<td>14.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Jarobb</td>
<td>13.07</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathew Frost</td>
<td>18.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willst Maunder</td>
<td>18.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Shapland</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Ham</td>
<td>22.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tho: Esworthy</td>
<td>22.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ro: Roode</td>
<td>05.00</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tho: Trofe Gent.</td>
<td>21.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John More</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The widd. Gibb</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Hull</td>
<td>21.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Lane</td>
<td>17.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Hogg</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Burnbury</td>
<td>18.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willst Lake</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willst Asrott</td>
<td>13.10</td>
<td>50 – 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To the Lord
The heiress of Jo Turkfield Esq. for ye Barton 123.15
Moore for Lay tennant 046.00
Moore for parte of Frilford 015.00
Sir John Rollo for Faddon Barton 123.15
More for the late Mrs Lothbridges tennant 046.00
More for the Birkham downes 007.10
Henry Frost Esq for Jonward Barton 123.15
Morr for Lower Jonwartt 020.00
Jo: Quirk Esq. 015.00
Doctor George Harris for Sertory [surgery] 200.00

Source: Devon PRO: 1049M/94-5. The information is duplicated on a second document and the date of the collection is left blank on both, which could mean these were copies prepared for use on future separate occasions or were retained copies of an original which had been sent to the Lord Lieutenant.

In addition to the papers made out by those levying the charge it appears to have been necessary for them to secure a written statement that notice of the requirement had been received and, furthermore, that all stipulated payments were agreed by those making the payments. It does not appear that such documents were universally required. Few are extant whereas assessment accounts are commonplace.
Nor were they signed by everyone who was to be taxed, but they were prepared and signed by the richest contributors – those who bore the greatest financial burden, as shown below.

**Table 4.1.4: The Woodrow Agreement. September 21st 1683**

An agreement for sending three soldiers laodd ipon Woodrow Tything

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>s.</th>
<th>d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tho: Bearmen for queen field</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Cook</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Burkly</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Norris for Buthery</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is to finde one soouldier</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Jeremy Rough</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambrose Audry</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Smith</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is to finde one soouldier</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Paradise</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widdo Kelson</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arther Pearce</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Markes</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Coxeter</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Mitchel</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Jennings</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Pearce and Jo: Briye</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Beines</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This was agreed upon by whose names are hear unto subscribed</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Shobrook and Woodrow documents, and also numerous similar extant accounts, indicate that property valued at £50 incurred the responsibility of providing a footsoldier. The Shobrook Accounts, as shown in Table 4.1.4 above, show that Sir John Rollo was assessed at £123 15s for his home property of Faddon Barton, a
further £46 for the land he let via Mrs Lothbridge, and another £7 10s for some
downland that he owned, making £177 5s his total assessed contribution. Sir John’s
income may have made him one of the wealthiest men in the parish, although he
appears to have got off lightly compared to the assessment made upon Dr. Harris for
his surgery.

The number of persons contributing within a parish was dependant upon their
wealth, but it would appear that adjustments would be made at times to ensure the
figures balanced. The warrant from the lord lieutenant of Wiltshire to the constables
of Kingsbridge referred to in chapter three lists seven persons associated with the
parish of Swindon who were deemed wealthy enough to furnish two troopers between
them.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{Table 4.1.5: Contributors to the horse for the parish of Swindon.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributors</th>
<th>Number of Troopers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr Arthur Billett of Swindon, Mr Edwards Sadler for Manington,</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Giles Alworth and Mr Charles Billatt of Blackgrove</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Goddard of Swindon, Mrs Beale of Westbrook and Mr Hains of Alborne</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Surprisingly neither Westbrook nor Aldbourne were part of the parish of Swindon,
although Billett and Billatt are, presumably, corruptions of the well-established
Swindon family of Villet. Goddard was lord of the manor. The payments derived
from contributors from several parishes have thus been conflated to fund two
troopers. The list of Swindon contributors to the foot has not been discovered but it
would seem that, of the parish’s 580 inhabitants (less those under 16 years old) some
140 were free-hold tenants, amongst whom only 5 paid for a cavalryman, and nobody
bore more than a one-third share.\textsuperscript{19}

Individuals could challenge the assessment, either its amount or their ability to pay. A plaintiff could appear before the deputies at a local market town, appeal
against their decision, and go before the lord lieutenant and/or the county treasurer to argue their case. During the early 1660s, when the tax was new, there was some resistance to paying, and to the very formation of the revived military force. In Wiltshire Sir James Thynne received ‘many complaints of persons refusing to contribute and pay the soldiers’ alongside outbursts concerning their behaviour.  

Complaints were frequently of a minor nature, often revolving around how the rules were manipulated and how to deal with low level problems. In 1661 Colonel William Strode of Barrington in Somerset complained of being over-rated, and about the treatment that two of his horses received at the hands of their militia riders. As Strode was an ex-Cromwellian officer and influential in the community, the lord lieutenant thought he might incite others to withhold payment so had him arrested. His refusal to pay was considered a political act and in retribution he was imprisoned, harangued and threatened before being sent to London where he was forced to make a submission to the king before the Privy Council. At other times the authorities appeared more lenient. The Duke of Bolton, lord lieutenant of Hampshire wrote to his deputies, ‘Having had severall complaints concerning the unequal levying both of Horse and Foot to serve in the Militia; it is my desire that it might be taken in due consideration by you and others of the Lieutenancy and that it may be better afforded…’

Yet there was a tradition of resistance to other militia-related payments, especially by the richer men of the county. Trouble began in Wiltshire as early as 1602 when the deputy lord lieutenant, Sir Hugh Portman, resented paying ‘for entertainment to be given to the muster master’. He and others thought that the muster levy should be sufficient to bear all the expenses associated with the militia without the necessity to impose additional taxes at the apparent whim of the
lieutenant. Although lord lieutenant Hertford withdrew Portman’s office as deputy from him, others joined in the protest, including many of the justices of the peace. By 1606 the quarrel had reached parliament where Sir Henry Poole stated that ‘the compulsory tax laid upon subjects in divers counties, by lieutenants and their deputies, to maintain muster masters and such like things, at the charge of the subjects for non-payment thereof, is grievous and unjust.’ Subsequently, the matter went before the Privy Council and, although their ruling was unrecorded, it would appear that a compromise was reached. Hertford’s wish for an additional sum to be extracted was upheld, but the justices gained the right for their petty sessions to confirm the appointment of the muster master and also determine his rate and method of payment.  

Paying for muster masters aside it might be assumed that generally the people resented paying for the militia but there were no widespread or organised protests in response to the imposition of militia taxes. In time people became accustomed to paying. Indeed the militia appears to have been well regarded by contemporary civil powers, and it was to the militia that they first turned during crises, including the Monmouth Rebellion. At the first opportunity after quitting Lyme just ahead of the invaders, customs men Dassall and Thorold sent letters to Albemarle of the Devon Militia and to the colonels of the Somerset Militia. The mayor of Lyme Gregory Alford rode directly from Lyme to meet Albemarle, stopping only to alert other authorities and to write to London. These civic leaders had no hesitation in contacting the militia, whom they clearly believed capable of decisive action.

Possibly the penalties for not paying were a deterrent. Lord and deputy lieutenants had authority, by act of distraint, to punish failure to pay or to ensure that the demands of providing men or equipment were met, by imposing fines. For such
penalties a standardised and nationally applicable system of appropriate amounts was applied when punishing defaulters. In 1672 the fine for not finding a horse soldier was £20 and for not providing a foot soldier £5, whilst the original assessment remained to be paid. A threat of a fine brought to a head a simmering fifteen year old dispute between two contributors in 1700 when William Gore petitioned the lord lieutenant of Monmouthshire.\textsuperscript{25} He and his father had contributed two fifths of the cost of a militia trooper for nearly fifty years but at the time of the Monmouth Rebellion the partners in this arrangement changed. In 1685 the Gores were partnered with a Mr Kemys and his mother, and their contribution share increased to one half. At the Rebellion the new partnership could not hire Gore’s usual horse and were obliged to purchase one with a new saddle, arms and other furniture. However, Kemys also used the horse for private occasions, and in 1690 deeming the beast too old for service succeeded in obtaining a county order for Gore to jointly buy another which was to be in the care of Kemys with Gore sharing its maintenance costs. In 1695 Gore received a county threat of a fine as his partner Kemys had supplied a worn out saddle and ill conditioned arms to the general muster. Kemys demanded that Gore should pay half towards new equipment and yet another new horse. Gore sought a compromise over payment and usage, but Kemys refused all negotiations, despite Gore continuing to pay his half share of powder, ball, cleaning of arms, saddle and furniture repairs, besides the hire of their trooper and other charges. Finally in 1700 Gore had grown weary of Kemys and sought redress of his grievances and restitution of his expenses, including enough money to purchase all the new militia requirements and maintain them. He further requested the lord lieutenant to order that the jointly owned horse and equipment should be kept in readiness only for militia use.
Mediation between ill-disposed conjoined contributors was just one of the tribulations of involved in the administration of the funding system.

Although a constable’s valuations were made upon residents of his parish, the men charged with that office sometimes took their duties beyond what was strictly required of them. In the constable’s evaluation of Cornwall’s Liskeard Parish for 12 March 1661 the early columns of figures state how much each person paid, and towards how many men they contributed. The last column, that of ‘Adjustments of the said parish’, provides a list indicating persons who owned land in the parish but were non-resident. Such people were entitled to a seat in church but did not have to meet the majority of parish demands, as to do so would mean they would be liable for more than one assessment and would, therefore, be contributing twice: this was deemed unfair. However, by listing the adjustments, the four constables who drew up this list thereby ensured that the value of the holdings of the absentee was recorded and available for addition to their liability in their parish of domicile. There is no record of parishes recouping any payment made upon these holdings from the landowners’ parishes of residence, although this may have been the intention behind their listing by the constables of Liskeard.

It has been mentioned that there was a degree of connivance between landowning lord lieutenants and it seems likely that this state of affairs percolated down the social scale. There is no proof of malpractice but it would be interesting to know why a rich and populated county such as Hampshire only turned out 120 troopers (see Table 3.2.2, page 127) when most southwest counties fielded 250.

By the Militia Acts the lord lieutenants were also permitted to exact an additional quarter of one month’s assessment to fund ammunition, other military necessities and supplies in an additional tax known as Trophy Money. Trophy Money
was so-called because rather than pay for the militiamen and their personal equipment it paid for such items of regimental military impedimenta as are usually depicted in trophies of arms – flags, drums, extra shot, extra barrels of powder, halberds and so forth. The encompassing nature of these expenses is shown in a page from the accounts pertaining to militia spending in Salisbury, which is illustrated below and records items such as a drum strap (hanger) and the redeeming of a pledged halberd.

**Illustration 4.1.1: Payments made from trophy money**

Source: W&SHC: G23/1/41 A bundle of documents: Item 7. A note of disbursements of Trophy Money paid by Mr Mayor of Salisbury bears the date 24 July 1671 but is assigned to 1674.

There is an undated order from the lord lieutenant of Hampshire to his deputies and to Richard Cobb, treasurer to the militia to meet at Winchester and there
to issue warrants ‘for the lewing of Trophy Money so the Militia may be mustered as the earliest opportunity’. Once purchased, the major items secured by Trophy Money would seldom need to be replaced.

From his studies of the Herefordshire Militia Assessments and financial papers, Faraday asserts ‘the cost of the annual fortnight’s duty was about £55 and £120 for commissioned officers of horse respectively, and £23 and £30 for their inferior officers. This, together with the cost of drums and ammunition, was charged to the special militia tax funds.’ It would seem officers’ expenses were paid for out of the lord lieutenant of Herefordshire’s ‘quarter and trophy’ money and not through the base militia rate which provided the troopers’ and foot soldiers’ pay and expenses. The Herefordshire Assessment records appear to be the only substantial extant body of militia accounts and although being ‘so ravelled and perplexed’ that they cannot be taken for a model across all counties, they are a good indication of a nation-wide system in all its imperfection.

It is also worth noting that stemming from legislation initially passed during the Interregnum the lord lieutenant was also empowered in times of crisis to give orders, personally or by delegation to his chief officers, for the requisition of wagons, carts, and draught animals from private individuals to furnish a transport system for the county forces. Promissory notes would be issued allowing recompense to the owners at the rate of sixpence a mile for a cart drawn by six horses or five oxen and one penny a mile for a horse – whether this was to supplement the draught horses or as additional beasts is not clear.
4.2. PAY AND SUPPLY.

The annual payment of eight pounds per man for Cromwell’s new militia had reintroduced the idea of paying militiamen for service. The adoption of the Interregnum model, proposed and passed by members of the Restoration government, continued this arrangement by agreeing that ‘The Militia…shall be exercised, ordered and managed…in the same manner as the same now is actually exercised, ordered and managed.’ A paper, supposedly in Clarendon’s hand, also advocated that the men’s pay should remain the same. Later, this must have seemed unnecessarily generous to the Cavalier Parliament as a rate of two shillings a day for horse and one shilling a day for foot was introduced in 1661 and, except for a further rise of sixpence a day for the cavalry authorised in 1663, this remuneration remained fixed. Consequently in the 1680s, the minimum requirement of eight days mustering and training per year was thus worth two pounds a year to a trooper and eight shillings a year to a foot soldier; a far cry from the Cromwellian 1659 eight pounds and a far smaller budget for local taxation to provide.

This basic pay system was complicated by another statute that stated that when a man was called out on active service he was to receive one month’s pay in hand from his contributor for his immediate campaign expenses. This sum could be recouped from the public treasury upon application and was presumably paid out of the collected militia money. The sums involved were far from negligible. In 1685 one month’s pay at one shilling per day translated as thirty shillings per man, a sum the county would eventually be obliged to find. The basic cost of paying Wyndham’s 540 strong regiment for one month’s active service was therefore £810 and, if four foot and one horse regiment per county was the pattern, each county would have to find some £3,720 for its militia during the crisis. It can be calculated that Cornwall,
Devon, Dorset, Somerset, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire spent over £2.5M in modern money.

During any campaign in which their services were retained after the initial county-funded month elapsed the responsibility for payment of the militia was transferred to the campaign war chest of the royal army’s commander in chief, a situation from which the county treasuries benefited. However, in the absence of national emergencies the various county and corporation authorities held the disbursement of collected monies in their power and, amongst other things, payments to the soldiers for attendance at musters were provided from their funds. For example, the City of Bath Records for 1670 show ‘£1 15s 0d paid to the trained soldiers at the last day’s muster’ and ‘£4 1s 0d for the soldiers’ at a two day muster as well as ‘£8 2s 0d for the soldiers’ at for a four day muster in 1683.\(^35\) However in drawing up rules governing such payments, the counties appear to have discontinued the Tudor practice of paying ‘Drink Money’ at the rate of one groat for every five miles marched.\(^36\)

The issue of pay was important both as a matter of necessity and principle. When it was not forthcoming the men felt betrayed and that their contract had been broken. Unlike royal troops civilian soldiers were not dependant upon the authorities for their livelihood which made them more prone to taking action when feeling aggrieved. Possibly due to the lax attitude of the Duke of Somerset many of his regiments had not been paid at the time of the 1685 Rebellion and the consequences are explained in chapter seven, page 285.

Regarding payment met by the campaign war-chest for staying out over the allocated one month, during the 1665 Dutch invasion threat the Berkshire Militia augmented the garrison of the Isle of Wight until with the threat was nullified when the lord lieutenant, Lord Lovelace petitioned for them to return home. The king
consented and authorised their dismissal, ‘after examining what pay was due to them for serving beyond the month, and to answer for their debts or borrow money in the island to pay them, which was to be repaid without delay’. 37 If the militia was still required to continue on active service following completion of its initial month’s of service, and this service was not set against a specified campaign war chest, the militia would not be paid by the regular military authority, but remained the responsibility of the contributors. Hence a note by John Evelyn in which he complains that: ‘the two horse-men which My Son & myself sent into the County Troopes were now come home,’ but instead of returning home at the end of one month’s service they had remained with their unit for nearly another month: ‘To our extraordinary charge’. 38

There were ways in which certain militiamen could earn more pay, especially drummers who were called upon to perform at civic occasions. Jonathon Michell, a drummer under Captain Richard Davy in the Salisbury City Trained Band, was paid £1 1s 0d for beating his drum on the occasion ‘when the King went to Oxford.’ 39 Similarly Jonathon Greene was paid 12s 0d for six days’ drumming in 1671. 40 Gifts were also forthcoming for those on guard duties. In Poole the men had beer issued, whilst in 1679 the militiamen in Reading were given one bushel of sea-coal every night at 8d per bushel. 41

Supplying the militia was a locally managed affair, with clothing and some weapons being paid for by contributors and acquired from a variety of sources as will be detailed in chapter six. In addition, the men’s immediate campaign expenses including food and any additional comforts were also covered by their contributors. However, there was also a co-existing supply system through local centralised depots. With the recreation of the county militias it was necessary for several urban centres to
restock their armouries, previously stripped during the civil wars. In 1662 Bath City Council purchased 27 swords and scabbards, 27 belts, 12 pikes, 16 muskets, 16 sets of bandoleers and 37 pounds of black-powder. From this it may be deduced that, initially, the Bath Company of the newly raised Somerset Militia mustered at least 28 men. Additional purchases continued as late as the 1690s when a two-year weapons maintenance contract with John Ditchen for the cleaning and repair of eight swords was extended.42

The billeting of militiamen was yet another logistic and financial problem to be solved. Although the regulars had tents, there was no routine issue of tents or hurdles for huts to the militia. They were usually lodged in inns, farms or private residences. Never popular, billeting at least meant the militiamen had shelter for the night. Wyndham’s Regiment was posted in Middlezoy on the eve of battle of Sedgemoor because the Royal Horse, also without tents, had filled Weston Zoyland. However, two of Dinely’s drawings illustrating Beaufort’s tour of Wales, one of which is illustrated below, depict a militia camp with a variety of bell and ridge tents, spread over a fairly wide area with soldiers among them. Whether these tents were supplied from the militia rate, from trophy money, or paid for by the commanding officer is unknown.
Illustration 4.2.1: The camp of the Carmarthen Militia, 8 August 1684.

Officers, however, could and did have their own more luxurious tentage. An entry for Cardiganshire states that:

… his Grace’s company made a halt to view the Regiment of Militia Foot which their Colonel had ordered to be drawn up there in his Graces way where Sir Rice Williams in his own tents which were very large had prepared an ample entertainment: To which after his Grace had seen the Regiment exercise, and some close volleys were made, sat down.⁴³

To describe Sir Rice Williams’ tents as ‘his own’ would imply that the men had tents of their own or were more likely in billets, but the colonel’s accommodation was separate and considerably larger and more comfortable. The colonel’s tent would be full of his own furniture including a properly made bed, and carpeting on the floor, but comfort was never a high priority for the rank and file, although if encamped for some time the men may have constructed timber frame beds with cross-strung match and a straw-filled palliasse similar to those used in field hospitals at the time.⁴⁴

Source Dinely, op. cit., p.224.
4.3. SUMMONING AND READINESS.

The Government called out the militia by letters to the lord lieutenants. Written in the king’s name they were usually sent by the Secretary of the Council and carried to the counties by royal messenger. There is conflicting evidence as to whether there was an exclusive nationwide express system in operation or not, although it is widely held that the large stables maintained at Basing House in Elizabethan days were part of such an organisation. A branch of the Royal Household, known as The Messengers, delivered letters on the king’s service, taking precedence over all other communications. On receipt of such a communication the lord lieutenant would send his orders to his deputies and the sheriff by couriers. The deputies wrote summoning orders to the constables of the hundreds who, in their turn, instructed their parish constables to turn out their men and send them to the nominated rendezvous.

Exactly how the men were roused is conjecture, but many systems were tried. The mayor of London kept a select band of armed men ready to muster on the tolling of St. Paul’s bell whilst in Southampton men were turned out ‘by raising the gare and ringing of church bells’. The old Tudor system of fire beacons could also have been in use but the coastal communications system, which used flags by day and lanterns by night, had been discontinued due to interference with the signals used by the navy. On a local level the traditional ringing of church bells would have signalled an alarm but, for a peacetime muster with several days notice, it is not unreasonable to imagine that constables ran around their village and sought out the men directly or devolved the responsibility by instructing the contributors to find their substitutes. In answer to a French threat in 1690 the authorities at Poole instructed: ‘Imprimis - An extraordinary watch of thirteen every night (every man in his own person if at home and of ability of body) do watch at such places as the captain of the watch for every
night shall see fit.⁴⁹ The Poole Council, however, could also be more specific about the location of men keeping watch and how they should signal:

Item – The four men be appointed as a sea watch or guard, two of which to go in the King’s scout and two to be at the castle of Brownsea, the former to give notice of any approaching danger and the others on such notice or sign, by firing a gun, to give notice to the town.⁵⁰

Once assembled in their parish groups, the men marched to join their companies and thence to their regimental rendezvous. The organisation of the militias by parishes, hundreds and counties as outlined in the previous chapter, meant that upon summoning, a force of some five to six hundred foot plus a troop of fifty to sixty horse would assemble in a large town. In Wiltshire in 1685, such musters were held in Devizes, Marlborough, Salisbury and Warminster where orders from the Earl of Pembroke coordinating their subsequent movements were delivered. In Somerset the mustering towns were Bath, Bridgewater, Crewkerne, Taunton and Wells but the Duke of Somerset had no coordination system and the battalions once assembled were left bereft of orders.

At Sarum in 1086 William I’s Council had affirmed that every free man in a shire was to be in readiness to take the field anywhere against a national foe.⁵¹ Although in 1685 the summons was not so all-encompassing, yet the intention remained that a general rendezvous of the county’s forces would provide a small army consisting of both foot and horse at short notice. Albemarle called such a rendezvous for 11 June 1685 and such was the effectiveness of his summoning system that he had over 4,000 men at his Exeter muster. Their readiness to march in three days proves that little was needed beyond having the men perform regimental exercises efficiently whilst awaiting the arrival of those who had furthest to travel. The men may have been quite capable of performing company drill but it is likely that it took two or three
days to familiarise both officers and men with the demands of operating in much larger formations. Regimental deployments and drills were necessary if the county force was to operate cohesively and effectively.

Most militias had identified assembly points and these were firmly ingrained in tradition. In Cornwall the county’s nine very large hundreds were divided into four administrative divisions upon which the militia regiments were based. The troops from each hundred had their own assembly point which was probably also the rendezvous for company drill, whilst regimental drill was conducted at the division assembly points. In order to keep travel to a minimum, two regiments met for regional musters, reserving the grand all-county muster for the county capital at Bodmin. Saltash was chosen over Bodmin for the 1685 emergency because it was closer to the seat of the rebellion at Lyme Regis.

**Table 4.3.1: Assembly points of the Cornwall Militia.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Hundred Assembly</th>
<th>No. of Parishes</th>
<th>District Assembly</th>
<th>Division Assembly</th>
<th>Regional Assembly</th>
<th>County Assembly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>West dibishere</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Lanreath</td>
<td>Liskeard</td>
<td>Launceston</td>
<td>Bodmin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East dibishere</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Kellington</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Trigg</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Bodmin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lesnewth</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Camelford</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stratton</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Stratton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>Penwith</td>
<td>25*</td>
<td>Penzance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Truro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kerrier</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Helston</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>Pydar</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>South Colombs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Powder</td>
<td>38*</td>
<td>Grampond</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes the major town parishes of Penzance and Truro, each with a large contingent of men, which might have remained behind for home defence. The town parish of Liskeard raised 42 men for service. It is to be expected both Penzance and Truro, being wealthier and larger, raised more.


The speed at which the militias mustered and made ready to march is an indication of their efficiency and effectiveness. During emergencies not only was the
rate of assembly and numbers of the men appearing tested, but so too were the militia administration and supply systems. Most local constables knew the routine dates of the county musters to which they were to marshal the prescribed men, indeed most of those involved would be aware of what was expected of them and the deadlines that they had to meet. Responding to an emergency was different: there was no time to prepare and everything had to be set in motion in as short as time as possible.

The coastal counties of the southwest have a reputation for their rapid response at times of alarms such as threats of foreign invasion and pirate raids. The Cornwall Militia turned out at Falmouth in June 1666 in answer to the Dutch Admiral Ruyter’s progress along the south coast of Britain, and then again in August as a show of strength in the face of his pretended raid. However, not having access to ships or boats restricted the militia’s usefulness against seaborne enemies and consequently the ports placed greater reliance upon the navy for defence. The same is true about the militia’s role in counter-piracy operations. The Cornwall Militia turned out when Padstow was blockaded by pirates in 1692 but, although they responded rapidly the pirates did not land and the militia could only watch as the pirates took five coastal trading ships in one day. If pirates managed to land they were often dealt with by the militia but though it was more than adequate for that task, as an all-embracing, anti-pirate force it was out of its depth. Criticism of the militia’s performance following the Dutch raid on Chatham is similarly ill-founded for although it responded and assembled quickly, it had neither the ships nor the cannon to strike at the Dutch. However, where they did land the militia effectively repulsed them. The militia’s duties were never intended to include sea warfare.

The same is true of its role in supporting the representatives of His Majesty’s Customs. To investigate any of the western militias’ involvement with smuggling is
fraught with the dangers of imaginative storytelling and hearsay. However, smuggling was an all-pervasive activity connived at by all strata of society and it is unlikely that the officers and men of the militia, being members of local communities, were keen to put an end to this lucrative, albeit illicit trade.

The militia not only responded with alacrity to threats of incursions but was also quick at coming to the aid of the civil authorities. When, in June 1683, following the discovery of the Rye House Plot, Secretary Jenkins demanded that a search be made of dissenters’ houses, the lord lieutenant of Hampshire, Edward Noel, Earl of Gainsborough, sent word to the militia officers in the major towns to execute his orders. John Speed reported back to Jenkins that ‘the magistrates and militia officers of Southampton responded very rapidly’. They had searched all suspects, restricted movement overseas, disarmed all dissenters and arrested Nathaniel Robinson a non-conformist minister.\(^5^4\)

The lord lieutenants were also capable of taking the initiative by assembling their county forces without specific orders from the king or the council, as Albemarle did in June 1685. Whether this was in response to having gained some prior knowledge of the imminent arrival of Monmouth’s invasion fleet or was part of Albemarle’s drive to improve his Devon Militia is unknown.

James II it seems did not take the possibility of a foreign invasion seriously, being more concerned with searching households for arms and seeking out and harassing dissenters. Charles II had been different. In 1679 he put the militias of the south coast on standby several times and his Secretary of State, Williamson had ordered a report on the current state of the militia together with a report on their deployments in 1672, 1673 and 1675.\(^5^5\) However, James’ peaceful accession had done much to allay fears. Although informed by the Dutch almost immediately that
Monmouth was at sea, it was only two days before the landing at Lyme Regis that an order went to Gainsborough, lord lieutenant of Hampshire to arrest Thomas Dore, mayor of Lymington, a known activist and Monmouth supporter. They missed him. It was two days after the landing, 13 June, that the order to raise the militia went out and indeed a caveat was added that only such parts of the militia as seen fit should be called out. Even then the government was slow to co-ordinate militia troop movements. Gainsborough had reported that his militia was ready by 14 June but no marching orders were written or dispatched until 17 June. Such delays in response were not due to the failings of individual militias but to the slowness of the central government. This, however, did not prevent accusations of tardiness being included in the criticism leveled against the militia in general.

Having landed on 11 June Monmouth’s army was arrayed in regiments, armed and perfunctorily drilled, and was ready to march out of Lyme Regis on 15 June. Information gathered from the records of the various militias indicates that they too were able to muster and march within four days, as shown in Table 4.3.2 below. The rebels were perhaps quicker to muster as the majority of those who assembled at Lyme came from close by and did not have to first attend company or regional musters before marching to the army’s assembly point; men simply left their homes and walked to Lyme. In contrast the distances travelled by militiamen going from home to muster were sometimes great: organising arms, equipment and provisions and then walking, say, the sixty miles from Ilfracombe to Exeter was no easy feat. Yet, with the summoning systems in place the men came in. Even after the Battle of Sedgemoor militiamen from distant villages continued to arrive at their muster points. A witness in a case before the Devon quarter sessions recounted that ‘the Posse men were coming in in swarms, and he [Albemarle] was sending out expresses to stop
them, but they were to be ready at an hour’s warning, if occasion. This meant that having reached Exeter, they were told to go home, but to hold themselves in readiness to return immediately if required. No accounts of protest have been found.

The speed in which the men were assembled may have varied according to the distances they had to walk, but the time between them mustering and being ready to march appears relatively consistent. It was usually one day, although the Red Regiment of the Dorset Militia assembled and fought at Bridport on 14 June.

Table 4.3.2: The mustering of militias involved in the Monmouth Rebellion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County Force</th>
<th>Rendezvous</th>
<th>Summoned</th>
<th>Mustered</th>
<th>Marched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td>13 June</td>
<td>11 June*</td>
<td>14 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>Bridport</td>
<td>13 June</td>
<td>14 June</td>
<td>18 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>Gloucester</td>
<td>13 June</td>
<td>not known</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>13 June</td>
<td>16 June</td>
<td>17 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>Taunton</td>
<td>13 June</td>
<td>14 June</td>
<td>14 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bath</td>
<td>13 June</td>
<td>13 June</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>13 June</td>
<td>17 June</td>
<td>20 June</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Albemarle summoned his militia on his own authority, without waiting for the king’s letter.


Having mustered, the militias were reviewed and allocated their initial campaign stations, sometimes after a prolonged wait for instructions from those coordinating the national deployment. The accusation that the southwest militias were unready and not allocated to tasks is refuted by Bishop Trelawney. James II began his political campaign against the militia in the early days following Sedgemoor and struck first at its leaders. However, the day before Monmouth’s execution Trelawney wrote to Sunderland with the:
...true accompt of the demission of Mr Rashleigh, the present Sheriff of Cornwall, from the trust of the Lieutenancy… according to this just sense of duty he shew himself the whole time of this rebellion. He not only joined me in signing all the commissions but accompanied me throughout the whole country to review and dispose the regiments…  

The bishop thus bears witness that although some deputy lieutenants may have been lax in their duties it did not impair the loyal effectiveness of the administration and initial operation of the militia in Cornwall.

In chapter five it will be established that the militia underwent training, was drilled, and performed its military exercises to the satisfaction of its commanders. To judge whether its preparation was sufficient to meet the needs of the civil and military command co-ordinating the anti-rebellion operations, it is necessary to summarise what each southwest county militia achieved and contributed to the overall campaign.

The Somerset Militia assembled at its designated towns within three days and the regiments under Phelipps and Lutterel marched smartly to intercept the rebels once they had moved out of Lyme, as ordered. Although one part of the force panicked and ran, it did not disperse but quickly reassembled and shut down Monmouth’s ability to recruit from eastern Somerset. Another part of the county force secured Bath and denied Monmouth access to the city, its bridge over the Avon and its control of the Great West Road thereby forcing him to retreat into Somerset instead of striking for London.

The Gloucestershire Militia responded very quickly and occupied Bristol. Together with the Bristol City Militia they arrested known dissenters, eliminated the potentially massive support that the city might have offered to the rebels, and effectively denied Monmouth access to a major supply port. It was ineffective when failing to completely destroy the medieval stone bridge at Keynsham, but the record of the engineers during Moore’s retreat to Corunna over a hundred years later
illustrates the difficulty of that type of task. The Gloucestershire Militia successfully kept watch on any rebel activity south of Bristol and hemmed in Monmouth from the north by patrolling the north bank of the River Avon.

The Dorset Militia assembled a significant portion of its force in Bridport within twenty-four hours of being summoned. There it fought off a raid in strength under the rebels’ most experienced and senior officers Venner, Grey and Wade. After the rebels marched out of Lyme the militia quickly entered it and then patrolled the coast, closing down any move south and possible supply for the rebels from the Channel. It also accompanied Churchill as his only infantry until Kirke’s Regiment of royal foot arrived, at which point they handed over the role and moved to secure the southeast of the region. Clifton’s map of rebel support on page 321 illustrates their effectiveness inasmuch as very few rebels came from east of a line drawn between Bridport and Yeovil.  

The Wiltshire Militia marched quickly towards Bath, covering 49 miles in three days, and mounted a demonstration of force to the populace of their county. Despite Wyndham’s Regiment’s flight from Bradford-on-Avon it rallied and fought at Frome, dispersing potential recruits and arresting local leaders. It blocked any possible move east by the rebel army and effectively denied Wiltshire as a rebel recruiting ground. One of its cavalry troops rode in Oglethorpe’s pacification of the Chew Valley and covered his attack on Keynsham. It provided the second line at Norton St. Philip and Sedgemoor and took an active part in securing and guarding prisoners after the battle. It then escorted the artillery until it was safely out of the West.

The Hampshire Militia assembled within three days and marched on the fourth. It initially secured the south coast and the key towns of Southampton and
Portsmouth. Although its instructions to take Thomas Dore at Lymington were late in arriving it prevented any risings that Christopher Battiscombe may have instigated in their county. It was also instrumental in aiding the Wiltshire Militia in preventing any rebel move eastwards, south of the Great West Road. Although two regiments were sent back to Hampshire for supposed indiscipline, Feversham kept the Blue Regiment to support his numbers and the Green Regiment was at Burrow Bridge during the battle at Sedgemoor. Presumably, the other regiment, out of the county’s total of five, held Wiltshire.

The Devon Militia under Albemarle had begun mustering two days before the king’s letter summoning it to arms actually arrived. Given that the average strength of a militia battalion was 500 men and a militia regiment of horse numbered around 250, the six foot battalions and one mounted regiment of the Devon Militia mustered a surprising 4,000. A gift of £1,000 from the bishop of Exeter paid for more arms and equipment, which were efficiently acquired and issued. The letter which summoned it arrived on 13 June and it marched the next day 14 June, in response to instructions to shadow the rebels whilst forbearing to ‘attempt anything against him, except upon great advantages…’ When Monmouth did leave Lyme, on 15 June, Albemarle, wisely, did not attack the rebels’ prepared position in Axminster, but fell back to secure the West whilst continuing to press and harass Monmouth’s force from that direction – just as Churchill did with the Dorset Militia from the south. The militia then re-established royal authority in rebellious Taunton and its presence prevented the rebels from slipping westward after their retreat to Bridgwater. It also severely limited Monmouth’s ability to raise recruits. Only five parishes west of Wellington contributed men to the rebel cause. After the Battle of Sedgemoor the Devon
Militia was active in rounding up and interrogating prisoners, and gathering information. On 8 July, by order of the Duke of Albemarle, the sheriff was advised:

To send out scouts in your northern partes, to apprehend such as are scattered there. Some were examined here yesterday, who confess that about two hundred of them went towards Ilfracombe and dispersed, some one way some another, neere that place, and one of the witnesess saith hee, with Ferguson and about thirty others, went off in a boate at sea at Ilfracombe, but were driven back, seeing the King’s shipping making toward them.69

Further afield, the Sussex Militia were active in securing the port of Poole in Dorset and patrolling Hampshire. From their base in Ringwood, one of its various parties, probing Cranborne Chase towards Shaftesbury, arrested Monmouth’s escaping entourage including his second in command Lord Grey of Wark. Near Verwood, a small party of Sussex Militia Horse headed by Trooper Henry Martin apprehended the rebel Duke himself, subsequently holding him in custody and escorting him to London.

4.4. CONCLUSION.

Although few military bodies consider themselves properly resourced the militias of the southwest were adequately financed by a local county-based finance system which operated well. The wealth of the county’s land-owning and merchant classes was reasonably assessed and adapted every year the militia rate was increased. Whilst there was some dissatisfaction with the application of the rules, several petty neighbour disputes and a degree of mutual connivance by the aristocracy over amounts levied, overall there was little voiced objection to paying either Militia or Trophy Money. The local authorities assessed, collected and spent the money effectively, usually making sure that the men were paid via the county or the royal campaign chest, and supplied with the necessities of their role. They also kept detailed records of their collections and disbursements as well as keeping track of
contributors’ individual payments to balance cash and items supplied. When the system broke down it was a sufficiently rare occasion to cause comment and action.

The authorities and officers also maintained effective summoning systems ensuring that the men assembled promptly and in sufficient numbers to perform their duties. Although procedures were not codified they were effective and forces mustered over considerable distances. The authorities were also effective in accounting for defaulters and following up absences or shortages in weapon provision. In the emergency of 1685 some county forces were more successful than others in mustering and marching but in general the militias of the southwest responded quickly to their summoning and put substantial bodies of troops into the field – any delay in marching can often by laid at the feet of central government not issuing orders.

However, they could not have achieved this without being adequately trained and drilled, a subject that will be addressed in the following chapter.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR


5 Militia Act of 1655.


7 GRO. P354 CO 1/1. Various Constables’ accounts, including lists of persons providing arms, lists of cloth delivered to make soldiers’ coats and accounts for their manufacture, pay accounts for militia soldiers and accounts for the purchase of arms etc., 1684-86.

8 Locke, op. cit., p. 3.

9 CSPD, 1663–64, p.458.

10 The banding system exists today in the assessment of properties for payment of Council Tax.


12 HMC Appendix to the third report. Carlisle to Northumberland. 7 October 1662, p.91.

13 Ibid, John Belasyse, to Northumberland. 6 December 1662, p.91; Buckingham to Northumberland. 13 January 1663, p.92; Richmond and Lennox to Northumberland. 17 December 1662, p.91.


16 Braddick, op. cit., p.236.

17 The first two entries appear to be in the hand of Ambrose Audry while the third appears to be the hand of Henry Smith - possibly Constables or other local government or church officers.

18 W&SHC: 1178/4501178/450

19 Bishop Compton’s Census of 1676 cited by Tallamy H.S., op. cit., p.49.

20 B.L. Ass. MSS 32 & 324.


22 HRO: 44M69/F6/8/1, Letters to Thomas Jervoise, sorted alphabetically by name of correspondent 1679–1698, f. 2, Letter from the Duke of Bolton 1690/91 regarding militia matters 16 March 1690

23 HMC 9, Salisbury, xii, pp 478-479.


25 SRO: DD\GB 148/69 Petition to the Hon. Lieutenant [of Monmouthshire?] of Mr Gore respecting the provision of a horse for the Militia by Mr Kems, c.1700

26 Ibid.

27 Certificates to prevent double entering could be acquired. ‘These are to certifie all whom it may concern that Mr David Yea and Maddam Woode are charged to the Militia Horse of this County and therefore ought not to be charged to the Foot.’ SRO: DD\DR 53/1 Item 4.

28 CRO: BLIS/321a., The yeerly Valew of the Anhabitants of the prish of Liskeard. Constable’s evaluation of Liskeard Parish

29 Militia Trophy money had no connection with sums paid to soldiers who captured trophies.

30 HRO: 11M49/F/05. Memoranda relating to Charles, 1st Duke of Bolton as Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire, 1672-1699, f. 12, Copy order for the Deputy Lieutenants and Richard Cobb Treasurer to the militia… Lewing is a corruption of levying.

31 Faraday op. cit., p.7.

32 Ibid. p.8.


34 Faraday op. cit. passim.

35 Wroughton. op. cit., p.45.
36 Beauchamp, op. cit., p. xxiv.
37 Thoys, op.cit. p. 54.
40 W&SHC: G23/1/41 A bundle of documents: Item 7. A note of disbursements of Trophy Money paid by Mr Mayor. It bears the date 24 July 1671 but is assigned to 1674
41 W&SHC, op.cit., p. 55.
42 Wroughton, op. cit., p.51.
43 Ibid. p.245.
48 Ibid.p.12.
49 Sydenham, J., History of the Town and County of Poole (Poole, Sydenham, 1839), p.138.
51 Hay, op cit., p.15.
52 CRO. BLIS/321a Constable’s evaluation of Liskeard Parish.
54 CSPD. January-June 1683, p.361; Coleby op. cit., p.182.
55 Coleby, op. cit., p.181.
59 Harleian MSS 6845. Wade, N., Narrative & Harleian MSS 6845. Wade, N., Further Narrative
60 www.archive.org/stream/quartersessionsf00hamiuoft/quartersessionsf00hamiuoft_djvu.txt
61 Another part of the County force arrived on 15 June having marched from Blandford.
62 Coleby, op. cit.,p.181.
63 Trelawny Papers. S.P. 31/3, fol. 69. Letter of 14 June 1685. Jonathan Rashleigh was also the lieutenant colonel of Carew’s Regiment of Cornwall Militia.
64 Clifton, op.cit., p.250.
65 Christopher Battiscombe was a lawyer sent by Monmouth to stir up local support in Dorset and Hampshire. He was captain lieutenant to Monmouth’s own company and was executed on Lyme Beach. Scott, C.L., Out pp.16-18.
66 Clifton, op.cit., p.164.
67 CSPD, 1685, p. 193.
68 Ibid., p.250.
69 Quarter session, James II, 235.
Chapter Five
FIT FOR SERVICE

‘I account a Rich Publick Treasure… and a people well trained in Martial Affairs to be the two pillars (next under God) that will preserve a Kingdom or State from ruine and danger.’

The previous chapter examined how the militia was summoned and mustered, so this chapter will investigate its capacity to achieve what was asked of it once assembled. Military readiness demands that units should be fit for service and available to undertake operations whenever called upon to do so. In order to achieve this, training to march, manoeuvre, handle weapons, and to obey orders in a disciplined fashion is essential.

With the memory of the civil wars being reasonably fresh, one is tempted to ask if the ordinary Restoration Englishman still had a taste for militarism. There is evidence to say he did. In his examination of a serious riot of 1686 in York, Withington writes ‘…civic militarism as embodied in the civic militia was an entrenched feature of corporate citizenship’ and he convincingly argues that whilst historians are fully aware of the religious and politically partisan basis of conflict in the later seventeenth century, they are less attuned to its corporate dimensions – in particular, the manner in which militarism continued to insinuate itself into the everyday lives of citizens. Withington contextualises the riot in terms of antagonism between the citizens of York and the royal soldiers of its garrison, stating that these social identities served as a palimpsest for other tensions, and that the foremost agitators on the side of the civic faction were the militia. Further, he postulates that after militarism was given full reign during the civil wars, it was suppressed at the Restoration and only allowed public expression in the ranks of the militia, where it
flourished. In his unpacking of what he claims to be a hitherto unidentified aspect of urban society, Withington maintains that this innate militarism gave rise, within the military, to a clearly defined corporate identity and a coagulated focus for communal animosities. Further work is required in this direction, yet Withington’s ideas lend weight to a concept that the militia’s ranks contained many men attracted to and somewhat naturally disposed to the military. Men who willingly undertook training and obeyed commands.

5.1. TRAINING.

Militia training in the earlier part of the century was a matter of government policy. A lord lieutenant had the power to muster the king’s subjects and according to his commission they were to be made ‘apt for the wars’ and armed and equipped ‘after their abilities, degrees and faculties’. Although each lord lieutenant usually awaited orders from the council prior to arraying his forces in a time of emergency, he was also required to ensure that they were in a state of constant preparedness. Much of this preparation was undertaken by the county muster master whose task was, initially, to train calivermen (musketeers) in the handling of their specialist equipment and weapons, but their role gradually expanded to embrace all arms. They were to undertake inspections of arms and armour, to determine men’s suitability to serve and to oversee the compilation and production of the necessary certificates or lists of attendees and their arms on behalf of the deputies.

Muster masters were usually professional military officers with campaign experience, ‘familiar with modern techniques in drilling soldiers, [and with] new tactics and armaments, which were being introduced on the continent.’ Their arrival in Tudor times had been funded by the crown, but early Stuart transference of
responsibility for their maintenance and pay to local government resulted in their appointment and tenure becoming dependent upon the lord lieutenants or their deputies to whom they were responsible on either a singular or a regional basis.

Once under county control, local officials exerted their authority, investigating both the finances and effectiveness of the muster masters who reported to them. In 1630, the deputy lieutenants of Hampshire wrote to Lord Conway concerning their muster master’s entertainment and expenses, pointing out the necessity to ensure that ‘the job is done correctly, that the trained bands are of good quality and well trained, and that their weapons are of good quality too.’ They did not see that paying for his entertainment whilst undertaking these duties was part of the contract.5

Such control aside, muster masters were pivotal in establishing a trained militia, especially where the gentrified local officers possessed little military knowledge or experience. These experienced military men did so by touring the county, making inspections and attending and supervising musters large and small at both regional and parish level, where they directed activities and issued instruction.

Muster masters could not have attended every local muster and there is no evidence to identify where these small parish gatherings took place – but perhaps some indications, however tenuous, persist. In the village of Charlton, northwest of Malmesbury in Wiltshire, there is a plot of land known as Pikemen’s Field where, folklore holds, in past times, local men drilled. Swindon metal-detectorists have recovered considerable numbers of musket balls from the slope south of Akers Way in Moredon.6 There is no evidence to suggest that any conflict ever took place within miles of Moredon, and the steep slope there may well have been the practice butts of the local militia. Moreover in the local church of St. Mary’s, Moredon, lies a tablet dedicated to Wadham Strangways who was killed by rebels at the Bull Inn, Bridport,
during the battle fought there early in the Monmouth Rebellion. Wadham Strangways was a deputy lieutenant of Dorset, and the brother of Thomas Strangways, a colonel of the Dorset Militia with overall command of the county forces. Regrettably, nothing has been found to also link Wadham Strangways to the Blue Regiment of the Wiltshire Militia, in whose ranks men from the Swindon area served.

Throughout every county men were to muster within half a day’s march of their parish, both for the convenience of the men and to keep the expense of training to a minimum. Horse and foot were to be counted, recorded and their arms inspected; any defaulter, both absentee and those with equipment deficiencies, being noted with the expectation that deficiencies would be made good by the miscreant prior to the next muster on pain of a fine which would be imposed at the next petty or quarter sessions. The men were to be trained to be ‘perfect in the use of their weapons and to know their marches’ whilst supplies of ammunition and match were held ready for this purpose at appointed places. Subsequently, the muster master produced a muster certificate which verified all the names, weapons, accoutrements and stocks of powder seen. This he presented to the lord lieutenant.

The established practice for training was to require the men to appear by 9.00 am at a place specified by the constables of their hundred, usually central to the group of parishes from which they came. They were to attend fully uniformed and accoutred four times a year for one day’s training as a company and then, once a year, to muster in the same way prior to marching on to a regimental muster where they experienced four days’ joint training as a full regiment – or indeed as a county force. In this way, the requisite eight days’ training a year was achieved, although it may be that that some groups of men met within their own parishes for additional practice – especially before a muster when their skills would be on display and under scrutiny by
men from other villages. There being little public recognition or status in general parish life, it seems unlikely that men with an opportunity to exhibit manly skills would willingly court ridicule by not being proficient in weapon handling.

A summons from the lord lieutenant of Wiltshire to attend training and the requirements therein was sent to the constables of the various hundreds as a warrant upon which they were instructed to act:

In [in response to] an order to me directed for the training,… and mustering of the horse of the Militia horse … of Marlborough in the County aforesaid under my command. These are to will and require you immediately on sight hereof to give notice to the several persons hereunder named charged to the finding of horse armes and rider within your hundred … of whom they shall stand jointly and soundly charged …[to move with] their respective horses and riders to Wilton in the said county completely armed according to the directions of the law … with powder and bullets and four dayes pay in order to [join] the March unto the Rendezvous of the Regt of the Militia horse raised within the county aforesaid Commanded by the honourable Coll. Thinne at the City of New Sarum on Wednesday the third day of October next by nine of ye clock in the forenoon then and there to be trained … As the law directs and to … be with their Colours at Amesbury in the said county by two of the clock in the afternoon of the same day.
Dated the sixth day of September Anno Domini 1679.¹⁰

According to Childs the military theory of the early Restoration relied upon past precedent and experience so training was based on what had gone on during the Thirty Years’ War and the civil wars. The key drill book resulting from that age was Richard Elton’s *Complete Body of the Art Military* (1650) which was reproduced unchanged in 1668 and Childs affirms that ‘until the flintlock and bayonet became standardised at the end of the century there was no real incentive or requirement to adjust drill and minor tactics’.¹¹ Other military theory writers of influence were James Turner, George Monck and Robert Boyle, Earl of Orrery.¹² However during 1674 a letter was sent to all royal army senior officers advising them of the
forthcoming publication of a new drill manual entitled *An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline*, known colloquially as *The Abridgement*, or *Monmouth’s Drill Book*, (who was in command of the army when it was published) or *Bill’s Drill Book* (after its printer, John Bill), and 100 copies were duly published and distributed in 1675. This was followed by a further 1,500 copies a year later and by 1679 it was in general use by the Scottish Establishment and available for general public purchase. It was thought to be somewhat too much in the French manner for some senior officers but ‘it pleases so well that the king says he likes it far better than ours.’ This was a very successful publication, being reprinted several times for use by the regular army. As both senior royal officers Monmouth and Feversham were protégés of Turenne and the French system its influence spread. Editions vary slightly. The 1678 edition, which is pocket-book size, condenses five pages of the original onto one side and contains only two illustrations. The 1682 reprint increases the number of drawings, especially for the more complex evolutions. Further editions appeared in 1685 and 1689, and its content continued to be reproduced in various forms as late as 1745 such as that in a booklet entitled *The Gentleman Volunteer’s Pocket Companion*. It appears that by the mid eighteenth century *The Abridgement* had percolated throughout the military. Although there is no evidence to confirm that *The Abridgement* was the accepted drill book of the late seventeenth century militia, its universal popularity, numerous revisions and reprints provide strong evidence in support of just such a hypothesis.

As the militia tended to emulate the practices of the royal army it is likely that the training undertaken by many of them was based upon Elton’s *Complete Body of the Art Military* or the *The Abridgement*. The latter manual is divided into chapters entitled: ‘Of the Exercise of the Foot, Of the Exercise of Horse, Exercise of Dragoons,
and Exercise of Grenadeers’, whilst the chapter devoted to the infantry provides sections giving comprehensive instructions for the exercise of muskets and pikes both individually and together, as well as for closings and openings, doublings, reducing, firing, forming, marching, drawing up, saluting, wheeling, encamping, passing defiles and for arraying in battle. Modern-day re-enactors of the period testify that both the *Complete Body of the Art Military* and *The Abridgement* are based upon common sense, are easy to perform, give clear instruction and provide for frequent repetition over a short period of time.\textsuperscript{17}

Re-enactment gives some indication of the time it would take groups of young men to learn and adequately perform seventeenth century weapon postures and drill using instructions derived from a period drill book. Table 5.1.1 has been compiled from information obtained according to the research methodology advocated by Dr. Charles Kirke of Cranfield University, from interviews with a range of re-enactors of seventeenth-century drill who are experienced in teaching new recruits and refreshing the skills of older members.\textsuperscript{18}

**Table 5.1.1:**  **Training hours for 17\textsuperscript{th}C infantry re-enactors to become proficient.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experienced re-enactment officers</th>
<th>To learn the postures of Pike</th>
<th>To learn the postures of Musket</th>
<th>To learn basic marching and manoeuvring drill</th>
<th>To perform adequately</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berry</td>
<td>6 New Refresh 4 Refresh</td>
<td>6 3</td>
<td>3 1</td>
<td>12 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cullen</td>
<td>4 1</td>
<td>4 1</td>
<td>3 1</td>
<td>10 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frame</td>
<td>2 1</td>
<td>3 1</td>
<td>2-5 1</td>
<td>10 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickson</td>
<td>6 4</td>
<td>7 4</td>
<td>4 4</td>
<td>10 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turton</td>
<td>3 1</td>
<td>4 1</td>
<td>4 2</td>
<td>10 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson\textsuperscript{20}</td>
<td>15 20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>4 2</td>
<td>5 2</td>
<td>4 2</td>
<td>10 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.1.2: Training hours for 17th C cavalry re-enactors to become proficient.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experienced re-enactment officers</th>
<th>To learn to ride in formation</th>
<th>To learn the sword work</th>
<th>To learn basic marching and manoeuvring drill</th>
<th>To perform adequately</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old Refresh</td>
<td>New Refresh</td>
<td>New Refresh</td>
<td>New Refresh</td>
<td>New Refresh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackmore</td>
<td>6 ½</td>
<td>6 ½</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 ½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jennings</td>
<td>3 ½</td>
<td>2 ½</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 ½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outhwaite</td>
<td>2 ½</td>
<td>2 ½</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1 ½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>3 ½</td>
<td>3 ½</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 ½</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information regarding time taken to accustom horses to mock battles not gathered.

Certain parallels can be drawn between re-enactors and the Restoration militias: both sets of participants train with the same weapons and perform the same drills, but for all their serious intent and endeavours, both are not full time soldiers and bear a ‘weekend warrior’ sobriquet from their contemporary popular press. Frame, possibly the most efficient and experienced re-enactment trainer, believed that his shorter hours brought recruits to the point where they could handle their weapons adequately without making simple mistakes. However, he added that it took much longer for the men to be accustomed to performing in a fight albeit a mock one, with its noise, hectic activity, tiredness, and pressure to keep up with others. It is known that the London militias staged mock battles, although whether to merely entertain crowds or to accustom the men to an approximation of combat is uncertain.

The most complicated and potentially dangerous element of drill for both contemporary and re-enactment seventeenth-century soldiers is the loading and firing of the musket. *The Abridgement* gives thirty separate instructions for this operation which through repetition in training would have been committed to memory and performed almost subconsciously. It was not only the method of choice in making the men more familiar with the task but also a means of ensuring that they loaded safely and correctly. The group of re-enactment officers indicated that, on average, it takes a
re-enactment recruit some five hours to learn the required postures but, once learnt, only two hours following a winter’s layoff to refresh their memories and to return to former proficiency. This would easily be achieved in eight days training.

The militia sometimes also trained using powder. The Salisbury City Company being drawn from men in a relatively small area possibly trained together more frequently than those disbursed across the countryside so their consumption of ammunition was likely to be higher than most but they seem to have used an enormous amount.

Table 5.1.3: Powder bill submitted to the Mayor of Salisbury.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>16 lbs – 15 of powder</td>
<td>01 – 0 – 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>30 pounds of powder</td>
<td>02 – 0 – 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 pounds of powder</td>
<td>02 – 0 – 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 pounds of powder</td>
<td>02 – 0 – 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 pounds of powder</td>
<td>01 – 0 – 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 pounds of powder</td>
<td>01 – 0 – 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 pounds of powder</td>
<td>02 – 0 – 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>12 pounds of powder and ½ powder</td>
<td>16 – 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 pounds of powder</td>
<td>02 – 0 – 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 pounds of powder</td>
<td>02 – 0 – 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 pounds of powder</td>
<td>02 – 0 – 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60 pounds of bullets</td>
<td>01 – 5 – 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>32 pounds of powder</td>
<td>02 – 2 – 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 pounds of powder</td>
<td>02 – 0 – 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

June 21
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 pounds of powder and ½ powder</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1671 Turner wrote, ‘Fifty years ago the Calibre of the Musket was ordain’d by most Princes... to receive a Bullet, whereof ten were to be cast of one pound of Lead; that hath not been thought convenient since, and therefore most allow twelve balls to one pound of Lead for a Musket’. This meant balls weighed 1 ounce, losing the ¼ ounce in casting sprue. Consequently in the 1680s the 60 pounds of bullets would realise 720 balls (12 bore), and as the mayor of Salisbury’s company had approximately 72 musketeers this probably meant each man was issued with 10 balls during the month of June. Unfortunately the document in Table 5.1.3 is
undated but has an unacknowledged annotation stating 1685. If this bill was written during the year of the Monmouth Crisis then it may indicate the men trained with powder but not ball, only being issued bullets in an emergency.

Turner also states that ‘To a Musketeer belongs also a Bandelier of Leather, at which he should have hanging eleven or twelve shot of Powder, a bag for his ball, a primer, and a cleaner.’ These wooden powder charge bottles on extant bandoliers hold approx three drachms (½oz in apothecary measure). The men would need six ounces of powder per bandolier of twelve bottles. The Salisbury men could thus fill the 72 bandoliers for the company’s musketeers with 27 pounds of powder which approximates the units of 15, 30 and 60 lbs bulk purchases as half, full and double bandoliers. There are no records of the City having cannon for use in celebrations, so in May it would seem each man used five bandoliers’ worth of powder which is sixty rounds fired in training during the one month. If this was the training rate then the men had more than ample time to become familiar with their weapons even if the authorities were vigilant in enforcing the law that they could not take them home.

The tradition of gun ownership for self-sufficiency was severely curtailed by the introduction of the 1671 Game Act. Ostensibly passed to limit poaching, the act contained several clauses designed to implement gun control and, for the majority of the population, made the keeping of weapons illegal. Article II stated that:

…every person and persons not having lands and tenements or some other estate or inheritance … of the clear yearly value of one hundred pounds per annum, or for term of life or having leases of ninety nine years…of the clear yearly value of one hundred and fifty pounds per annum… stocked with deer or conies… are hereby declared to be persons by the laws of this realm not allowed to have or keep for themselves or any other person or persons any guns, bows, greyhounds, setting dogs, ferrets…but shall be and are hereby prohibited to have, keep or use the same…
Only substantial house and landowners, capable of allocating considerable tracts of land to stocking private game reserves were thereby permitted to own guns or keep them at home, and indeed they were the only persons permitted to use them. All stocks of arms or even a single weapon in a private citizen’s possession were deemed illegally held and could be seized. Only those with an income of £100 a year, or holding a lease for land which generated £150 a year, were allowed to kill game and thus keep small arms in their homes. Holmes states that ‘those owning property worth one hundred pounds a year were perhaps half of one percent of the population’ which would mean ninety nine and half percent of the nation were forbidden to hold arms and liable to have any that were in their possession confiscated. This meant that having a personal weapon at home was restricted to the squirearchy and above, the classes from which militia officers were drawn and to whom the men owed allegiance as officers, landlords or employers. Entries in the State Papers Domestic indicate that many searches were executed under the authority of either the Militia Acts or the Game Act even after the crushing of Monmouth’s Rebellion.

The Game Act might also have had an effect upon the militiamen’s proficiency as prior to its passing to shoot flying game was considered a valued skill and one at which ordinary men might compete with their betters. After 1671 the ability to shoot birds in flight became a social marker. On the surface the Game Act struck a perhaps ineffectual blow against poaching but it would appear to have contained within it the more political intention of disarming the general population by providing a legal means by which arms control could be enforced.

Despite the introduction of this law James II’s concern about the number of guns in civilian hands persisted, and he wrote to several lord lieutenants informing
them that he had heard that ‘a great many persons not qualified by law under pretence of shooting matches keep muskets or other guns in their houses.’ This might have been directed at the militia as it is difficult to understand what other sectors of society would have had legal access to firearms and the opportunity to occasionally take them into their homes.

Shooting competitions were not the sole province of the militia but they were apparently a militia tradition. In Poole, James Reade, a ‘captain of the Bande trayne soldiers [had] sett vp a Maye poole w’th a parret vppon the topp thereof’ with instructions to the men ‘to shoote at him there own costes and charges without danger to any p’son.’ It is interesting to note that by engaging in shooting competitions the men using the weapons were accustomed to firing ball rather than the powder-only discharges used at training musters, displays and reviews.

It would appear that the Game Act and the endeavours of the authorities to disarm the populace met with only partial success and that even early in William III’s reign there were weapons remaining in private hands. The Victorian historian of Poole J. Sydenham cites an entry dated 21 June 1690 from an official record book that is no longer extant, outlining the defensive actions necessary to put the town in readiness to resist a possible French landing:

Item – That all persons that have muskets, fowling pieces, blunderbusses, pistols, powder, bullets or other arms or ammunition of defence, do bring them into the town all, and there an account is to be taken of them, and care taken for the cleansing of them and making them fit for use, and that the fixing and cleansing of the arms and the cost of the powder and shot shall be made good to the furnishers, at the general charge of the whole town, to be levied by an equal rate as the law shall allow.

Despite the efforts of central government to regulate the ownership of arms, some militiamen, most of them probably contributors who served and whose wealth
qualified them to keep guns, would not only have owned weapons but would also have been proficient in their use and care.

The Duke of Albemarle went to great lengths to make his views clear to his deputies that the Devon Militia was to be properly trained, whilst in Somerset Sir Edward Phelipps may have been somewhat zealous in its delivery. Rogers implies that Phelipps was a martinet with a reputation for being a hard taskmaster. As presumably his inferior officers would have followed his lead and the tone he had set, it is reasonable to suggest his regiment of the Somerset Militia, although unhappy and resentful were drilled to proficiency. The state of their morale may well have been another influential factor in their behaviour at Axminster.

Although able to drill and fire, militiamen would still need to be honed into a fighting unit. File drill in sixes or eights may have produced a degree of uniformity but time was needed for these small units, no matter how proficient in themselves, to be welded into a cohesive larger formation capable of acting under discipline. Wheeler, of the Wiltshire Militia, omits to say what happened in June 1685 following Wyndham’s regimental muster parade in Salisbury. Yet, after three days he declared his regiment ‘exactly completed by his Honor and accommodated fitt for Warr according Military Discipline.’ Although Wheeler does not specify the activities undertaken during 18 and 19 June whilst waiting those who lived further away to arrive it would be strange if those assembled failed to drill.

On 28 June, after marching to join the royal army at Box near Bathampton, the Wiltshire Militia attended a rendezvous of the army and were ‘set in Batalia, as if presently to engage the enemy’ by Feversham and Grafton. Dressing and manoeuvring in battalia would have demanded competency in the handling of arms and more than a basic understanding of deployment and drill.
Ineffectiveness has frequently been remarked upon by commentators as noted earlier but efforts taken to address the situation have been generally ignored. Albemarle took great pains to see that the units under his command were competent and in a good state of preparedness. He kept strict lists of those who served and indeed encouraged his own estates’ staffs to serve, especially in Essex where many appeared as militia lieutenants (Albemarle was lord lieutenant of Essex as well as Devon). He was also a keen participator in the training of his charges. In April 1676, the day following the king’s departure after a short stay at Albemarle’s house at Newhall rather than go with the king to court in London, “he remained at home to exercise his militia on the Ox-eye Green, near Chelmsford.” Several lord lieutenants commanding elements of the late seventeenth century militia may have been disinterested in military affairs, one such in the West being Charles Seymour, Duke of Somerset. Under the governance of men like this the efficiency and practice of the militia probably deteriorated, but such a charge cannot be made against Albemarle. When he became a joint lord lieutenant of Devonshire in 1675, one of the first things he did was to instigate a report upon the county militia. He then undertook a series of reforms which apparently did not occasion the improvement he sought. On 23 April 1681, he circulated a letter to his deputy lieutenants:

GENTLEMEN – I have received yours of the 15th from Exeter at your last meeting there and I am sorry to heare that the militia is in noe better posture and that you make noe greater appearance at your general meetings, which I desire may be amended for the future, as a matter very conducing to his Ma’ties Service, especially in these times when loyall men ought frequently to meet and joyne together to disappoint the wicked designs of rebellious and seditious people for the preservation of the peace of the government as it is established in Church and State by Law, Whereby and by noe other rule his Ma’tie intends to governe according to his late most gracious declaration. I need say noe more to persons so loyall and well affected to his Ma’ties service only to desire you according to your wonted care & zeale to meet as often as you
may till you have settled the militia in such a good posture as it ought to be, & therein you shall be sure to have the best assistance that I can give you, expecting to heare constantly from you of your proceedings therein. So wishin you all good success & happiness, I rest, Gentlemen, Your most assured and affectionate friend to Serve you.38

The above quotation is useful in providing an insight into Albermarle’s feelings at the time and it gives a clear idea of what he was insisting should happen. He leaves the recipients, Sir Coplestone Bampfield, Sir Henry Ackland, Sir Thomas Carew and the remaining deputy lieutenants at Exeter in no doubt as to his thoughts regarding their current performance and what he wanted done about it. Earlier requests for reform via his county office might have not been implemented with alacrity or diligence but this letter was directly from the lord lieutenant of the county, a gartered Duke and personal friend of the king. It would have been extremely unlikely that, in the strictly structured, hierarchical society of the day, his wishes would have been flouted, especially as he said he expected to hear reports of proceedings from his deputies frequently. Given that he was a man who sought to attain standards acceptable to his father, there is little to suggest that the state of affairs reported upon in 1681 remained unchanged in 1685.

However, the charge of laxity in the desire to train – and hence lose effectiveness – must also be seen in the context of government direction. Instructions to the lord lieutenants were not always precise and were open to interpretation. They could, indeed, be seen to have encouraged them to be less than diligent, especially if such diligence brought about increased spending. When coupled with the very real apprehension of an effective, trained militia capable of becoming the cornerstone of an armed population with a recent history of rebellion, the unenthusiastic nature of government support is understandable.
However, evidence exists that many of the militia regiments were both proficient in their drill and well turned out. Thomas Dinely, accompanying the Duke of Beaufort’s Tour of Wales in 1684, recorded how the various Welsh militias paraded before the duke for inspection during his progress. Dinely makes complimentary comments on what he saw and, as the duke’s scribe, it is reasonable to suggest that he also recorded the duke’s opinion:

…his Grace was met soon after by those of the county… and at a convenient place in the Road was their troop drawn up, their officers being in very noble equipage. Advancing further towards Welshpool his Grace found the Foot likewise drawn up with all their officers at the head of them.  

He also makes the following comments, county by county, regarding the performance of individual militias.

**Table 5.1.4: The state of the Welsh county militias.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglesea</td>
<td>Militia of Anglesea Horse and Foot well accodated … giving severall Vollies of shot. p.127.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brecknockshire</td>
<td>…well satisfied with the Good Order he found the Militia in both horse and foot. p.221.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caernarvonshire</td>
<td>Giving severall volleyes… p.101.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caermarthenshire</td>
<td>…some close volleyes were made. p.245.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flintshire</td>
<td>…exercised in various figures … which they performed with great exactitude and their volleyes and fireings were second to none …his Grace extramely well satisfied. p.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomeryshire</td>
<td>…exercise and make several good volleyes. The Horse in like manner performed their duty. p.75.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merionmethshire</td>
<td>…made severall good volleyes and after his Grace to his satisfaction had seen both the horse and foot exercise. p.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radnorshire</td>
<td>…a good volley being given. p.176.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pembrokeshire</td>
<td>The County Troop also appeared near Pembroke on the shore making severall good and close fireings. p.269.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monmouthshire</td>
<td>Doublings, Countermarches, Wheelings variety of exercise and good and close fireings were made…the militia horse led then by Sir Charles Kemis gave severall volleyes. p.370.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From these comments, the type of exercises performed by the militia becomes clear. Having the regiments and troops ‘drawn up’ meant that the men were capable of arraying in ranks and files, for which they would need to have understood their company structures, placings and degrees of dignity, as well as arranging organisational and administrative files.\(^40\) Being able to give several volleys meant that they could both fire their muskets safely and also reload proficiently according to their drill books. Moreover, to have fired ‘good’ or ‘close volleys’ meant that they were able to fire together, not an easy task with a matchlock weapon.\(^41\) Only the Pembrokeshire Militia were completely firelock armed.\(^42\)

To be able to undertake ‘fireings’ was evidence of the men’s drill and other abilities. Firings were the four methods of shooting in battle: firing by rank maintaining, gaining and losing ground and by salvo wherein all the body fired at the same time. The first three were complicated drill manoeuvres which entailed musketeers stepping up to a stationary or mobile mark, firing, turning to their right and then marching to the rear of their block before returning to their respective places whilst reloading on the move. It is a difficult process, prone to induce misfires or marching errors. The fourth requires the body to double its files to the front and its ranks to kneel, stoop and harrow. In order to undertake these firings, they would of necessity have been able to successfully perform other manoeuvres such as closings and openings, doublings, reducing and firing, all of which were specified in *The Abridgement*.

Doubling files to the front or rear in order to halve ranks or change a body from open to close order were part of standard practice in arraying a body of troops in its fighting formation but countermarching and wheeling were refinements to drill and demand a lot more practice. The foot of the Monmouthshire Militia might have been
staging a special show, performing their ‘Doublings, Countermarches, Wheelings, variety of exercise and good and close fireings’ but, no matter the circumstances, they demonstrated good training and even, perhaps, an expert level of effectiveness.

It is also noticeable that not only the foot but also the horse of Montgomeryshire, Pembrokeshire and Monmouthshire are recorded as firing volleys. The description did not mention dismounting, therefore it is reasonable to suggest that the ranks of troopers fired mounted using the old fashioned practice of the caracole, a procedure whereby, as the horses circled, pistols or carbines were fired from the saddle in rotation. All such tasks combined the complications of firing, manoeuvre and drill practised by the foot but, additionally, demanded more than competent horsemanship. It is small wonder that Beaufort was well satisfied, and Dinely reported that everybody was:

… extreamly satisfied with the good Order in which his Grace found the Militia not onely of the Principality of Wales but this of the County of Monmouth commanded by Charles, The most illustrious and powerful Prince Henry Duke of Beaufort, Marquis and Earle of Worcester, Baron Herbert of Ragland, Chepstow and Gower, Lord President of Wales, Lord Lieutenant of the Counties of Gloucester, Hereford and Monmouth, of His Ma\textsuperscript{ies} most Hon\textsuperscript{ble} Privy Council, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, etc… Earl of Worcester etc. …

Despite having little personal military experience Beaufort was accustomed to inspection parades and was impressed with the proficiency of the militia in Wales. The troops seen were in good order and could perform efficiently. The circumstances of a visit by a personage such as Beaufort may have meant that a certain degree of special effort was spent rehearsing the exercises for this inspection. However, all the lord lieutenants were men of great importance, social standing and power and there is little to suggest that any inspection by any lord lieutenant would not have prompted a similar response. If Beaufort conducted inspections in Gloucestershire and other
diligent lord lieutenants like Albemarle in Devon, and Pembroke in Wiltshire did the same, the overall picture of good standards of militia performance in those counties was most likely to be similar. Moreover Dinely’s noting of the weapon-handling skills of the various Welsh militias indicated that the militia met the contemporary requirement of skill level. It is also most unlikely that the Duke of Beaufort would have accepted lower standards and been satisfied with poor drill performances when he inspected the militia of any of his three English counties wherein he was lord lieutenant. Although drill parades cannot approximate actual combat and nobody was under fire, it may be that the militia in general was better able to function in action than has hitherto been believed.

5.2. OBEDIENCE.

Militiamen might have had the discipline to execute orders required for proficiently performing in training and drills, but they also needed to obey their officers under the more stressful and distracting conditions of action. Examples of disciplined response in action will be discussed in chapter seven, however the memoirs of Adam Wheeler illustrate that military discipline could be strictly enforced by militia officers. When asked permission by members of his regiment to pillage the field after the rebels had run at Sedgemoor Wyndham’s command was ‘upon Paine of Death not a man of his Regimt should move from his post.’ He refused to allow his men to join in the general looting, despite the example of the royal troops. Wyndham, with his threat of applying the death penalty, obviously regarded his powers of command as being regulated by military law as the unit was attached to a royal force. Despite punishment for military infringements being normally meted out by justices of the peace under civil law as mentioned earlier, officers could
impose fines, which included terms of imprisonment for non-payment.\textsuperscript{46} Clode describe this as ‘feeble punishment for the crime of desertion or neglect to attend military duty.’\textsuperscript{47} However, not all militia officers were slack when it came to discipline. In his role as a colonel of the Somerset Militia, Colonel Sir Edward Phelips imposed strict and perhaps questionable discipline as ‘the severities used by him towards them, which were different from the carriage of all other who are in command’.\textsuperscript{48}

Although the most serious collapse of militia discipline occurred at Axminster amongst the Somerset Militia a separate, incident involving the Wiltshire Militia occurred in Bradford-on-Avon. On 24 June, according to Adam Wheeler, the Red Regiment took fright during the night and appears to have bolted. It fled to Trowbridge where it rallied during the following morning.\textsuperscript{49} It was obviously a serious incident as Wadham Wyndham mentions that it occasioned his marching in the company of Colonel John Dean’s Regiment of Hampshire Militia from Bradford to Trowbridge.\textsuperscript{50} Wheeler makes no reference to the Wiltshire Militia Horse being with the Red Regiment but he does state that a few days later they were joined by the Blue Regiment as Pembroke gathered his forces. It is likely that being a lone regiment of foot they were alarmed by tales that Monmouth’s whole army was nearby and ran. This is not surprising if the men believed that they had been surprised at night by a force reputedly outnumbering them ten to one.\textsuperscript{51}

However, even this discreditable incident was not quite the blind panic identified by some critics. The militiamen appear to have taken Colonel Wyndham’s carriage with them, which would have required its team of horses to be brought from their stables and harnessed – a somewhat time-consuming process. Later, at Trowbridge, Wheeler took it upon himself to guard this carriage and, in a somewhat
theatrical gesture, ‘resolved to hazard my life by Ball or Sword, rather than loose any part thereof.’

Equally, the flight did not preclude the officers’ night-necessaries from being packed and loaded intact – a most unlikely event during an undisciplined rout. The speed of flight must also have allowed for a wheeled vehicle to keep pace with the troops over rutted country roads in the dark. This would have taken time and although there is little question that the Red Regiment took off in unseemly haste, there is no evidence to indicate a rout and wide dispersal. Indeed, the regiment was sufficiently well-ordered to march out from Trowbridge to Frome on 26 June where, according to Wadham Wyndham it fought with 1,500 rebels, then arrested the constable and forced the locals to lay down their arms.

Even those who fled at Bradford were not cowards. On 27 June the united county force returned to the Bath area for a rendezvous of the army and on 28 June, having once more left the company of the royal army, when it received an alarm that the enemy was near, it stood at Bratton Lane and prepared to face the foe.

The discipline of the militia’s senior commanders should also be examined to see whether their ability to perform as expected or ordered encouraged or impeded the effectiveness of operations. Clifton makes a general criticism of the militia’s actions and the associated deficiencies in the command abilities of the lord lieutenants during the 1685 campaign thus: ‘militia commanders displayed incompetence of nearly equal proportions’ and goes on to say, ‘with their commanders displaying incompetence… the low morale of the militia rank and file is not surprising.’ He attacks Albemarle for lacking the genius of his father, but most of the evidence he cites relates to the Duke of Somerset whose poor decisions and repeated failures to act did display a lamentable lack of military understanding and which encouraged, on the wider scene, contemporary criticism of the militia. The Duke of Beaufort tried to undertake some
of the work for Somerset via the messenger communication system that the militia
had established, but the latter displayed gross inefficiency in its use, as Beaufort
complained:

I had sooner sent back your messenger but I expected the
return of mine, which I thought would have enabled me to be
positive when I could march towards you, by acquainting me
by what time the militia from the remote part of
Gloucestershire could be up with me; but he not being come, I
can only tell your Grace that so soon as they are come up,
there being here at present only a few companies of the hither
part of the country, I will march towards you; but I think in the
meantime you would do well to send to Lord Churchill, who
is on this side of Salisbury, to march towards you with the
King’s forces he has with him; all yours as you tell me fled. I
shall expect to hear further from you as the enemy advances.  

Although addressing a fellow lord lieutenant and not having the authority to
do so, Beaufort is politely but firmly telling Somerset to remain where he is and
advising him that he, Beaufort, would arrive at his location as soon as possible. He
also implies criticism not only of Somerset’s silence but also his exaggeration on
claiming all his forces had fled.

Beaufort eventually gave up trying to oversee Somerset and refused either to
send him men from the Gloucestershire Militia or to abandon Bristol in order to join
him behind the walls of Bath. He added: ‘I have to defend this place where you
should be very welcome, if you think fit to come…’  Churchill also refused to aid
Somerset, suggesting he asked Albemarle. The eventual solution was for Feversham
to instruct Somerset to march with all the men that he had under his command, except
those garrisoning Bath, to join him at Bristol and in the meantime to destroy the
bridge at Keynsham, where another sorry tale of Somerset’s inefficiency unfolded.

Although breaking a medieval stone bridge would have been very difficult, it stood no
chance of being done if no orders to do so were issued. The Earl of Pembroke seems
to have been better disposed towards aiding Somerset and promised to send him men
from the Wiltshire Militia – even going so far as to offer to go himself if circumstances permitted.\textsuperscript{60}

Apparently the king also lost faith in Somerset as, on 21 June, he ordered him to take all of his remaining militiamen to Bristol having left four companies in Bath, and repeated the order to destroy the both bridge at Keynsham and another at Bath.\textsuperscript{61} Not only did Somerset leave the destruction of the Keynsham Bridge to Beaufort’s militia but that at Bath remained intact when Monmouth’s army arrived on 26 June.

Somerset appears to have been both ineffective and inefficient no matter the area of his responsibility and he needed frequent reminding by letter of things he was supposedly undertaking. In September 1682 Sir Thomas Thynne had to remind him that he required documents to affirm the reinstatement of his dukedom and that he had not yet sent word as to where and how he wanted these delivered to him.\textsuperscript{62} Following the Rye House Plot, Sir Leoline Jenkins wrote to require him to instruct his militia officers to be alert to suspicious persons, and that he had been instructed by the king to convey to him the need to disarm dangerous persons – presumably setting out the expected action to be taken simply and clearly.\textsuperscript{63} Somerset seems to have passed the responsibility to his deputies, for it was they who replied.\textsuperscript{64} On another occasion the Treasury wrote to him about the need to collect large outstanding tax arrears in Yorkshire where he was also lord lieutenant: apparently he had not been diligent in implementing or overseeing tax collection.\textsuperscript{65} To cap it all, on 3 April 1684, he had had to be reminded by the king himself to attend court to receive his Garter, which had been awarded to him the previous January: he was given the deadline of 7 April to collect it.\textsuperscript{66}

Perhaps the Privy Council too was wary of Somerset. In February 1685, Sunderland wrote informing him that Charles II had suffered a fit and warning him to
issue the necessary orders to his deputy lieutenants and justices of the peace to prevent any possible disorders in the event of false reports of his death. Whether they did not trust him to do so without further prompting is not certain but in May 1685 they wrote expressing concern that he not acted upon earlier instructions to account for seized arms:

The Earl of Dartmouth, Master-General of the Ordnance, having by letter of 16 June last [1684] acquainted you with the King’s pleasure touching the arms seized and taken from dangerous and disaffected persons…and forasmuch as it does not appear to this office how those arms (mentioned in the enclosed list) seized in co. Somerset, under your grace’s command, were lodged and disposed of; we desire you will please that we may receive an account where and to whom the said arms were delivered, that care may be taken for bringing the same into his Majesty’s stores.

The officers of the Ordnance tried to prevent Somerset from obfuscating by supplying him with a full list of the arms sent in by his deputies, for which he was accountable. It may be deduced that although the Somerset Militia was not in itself ineffective, its commander certainly was, despite having able men to assist him. This is further corroborated by Sunderland’s practice of sending orders directly to Sir Edward Phelipps, thereby by-passing Somerset and the chain of command:

The King…directs me to tell you he doubts you not but you and the rest of the deputy lieutenants and justices of the peace will take all possible care to preserve matters quiet in co. Somerset; in order to which he thinks it requisite that you should continue your meetings and secure such persons as you shall think dangerous.

Remarkably, Sunderland makes no reference to Phelipps having to refer to his superior. On 18 June, nine days later, Sunderland wrote to Somerset stating the king was sending Colonel Canon to assist him. The next day, after receiving from Kirke a copy of a letter Somerset had written to Churchill bewailing the loss of his force and calling for Churchill to march to his aid with his royal troops, Sunderland again wrote
to inform Somerset that Feversham had been placed in overall command of all troops including the militia, thereby effectively relieving him of independent command.69

This communication also placed the rest of the lord lieutenants and the senior royal officers in the region under Feversham’s command. It was not accepted without comment. Churchill complained to Clarendon of being superseded, ‘I see plainly that I am to have the trouble, and that the honour will be another’s’.70 Albemarle also became petulant in his wording of official reports:

My Lord Churchill has not yet joyned me, and having noe order to attack the enemy without him would not attempt it; if it had been done when I first desired it, I believe the Rebels would have mett with some defeat before this time.

Somerset did not protest.

It is likely that Lord Fitzharding welcomed this move. He implied that the lack of Somerset’s leadership and presence was limiting the Somerset Militia’s will to fight: ‘If you were amongst us I could no doubt recover the credit of our forces; for at Wells when the alarm was, I know they would have fought like lion[s].’ Fitzharding was also unhappy with the way that the alleged failures of the militia were already being reported: ‘we are not beholding to the Gazet that trumpets the small acts of others and wholly omits what was of more consequence, our keeping Bath – they behaved themselves to a miracle.’71 The deputies in Bath were also unhappy with both the dispersed nature of the county forces and the absence of their leader from the field. The other lord lieutenants in the southwest had held or ordered a rendezvous of their county forces, amassing their regiments and troops so as not to act in a piecemeal fashion. The Somersetshire deputies exchanged increasingly acrimonious letters with Somerset requesting that he joined them or appointed somebody to take command, questioned his inactivity regarding destroying Keynsham Bridge, pressed him to allocate the county’s guns – which, apparently, he had not done – and likening
the situation to being tied by the leg. Churchill, however, possibly more wary of
criticising a man of influence, lays the blame for the Somerset Militia’s failures at the
door of the militiamen themselves and not at that of their commander.

As soon as the danger of rebellion was passed, the king sent orders on 9 July
to Somerset to dismiss his militias, both in Somerset and the East Riding of
Yorkshire. By 15 July the duke was in correspondence with the county treasurer,
John Stylman, with an application to use the money raised for the militia for other
purposes. Perhaps it was Somerset’s frequent mismanagement and lack of personal
and military discipline that exposed the Somerset Militia in particular, and the whole
militia in general, to such criticism both in the late 1680s and in subsequent histories.
Equally, Somerset’s letters, which exaggerated the peril of the situation and criticised
his own men, may have contributed to James II’s decision to replace the militia with
an enlarged royal army.

Apart from the Duke of Somerset, the most senior leadership of the militia was
effective as proven by Beaufort at Bristol, Albemarle at Axminster, Strangways at
Bridport and Pembroke at Frome and Sedgemoor. Napoleon may have argued, ‘There
are no bad Regiments, there are only bad colonels’ but those militia colonels whose
names are known were effective. Colonels Wyndham and Helyar were particularly
good officers and despite his inexperience Francis Lutterell proved capable post
Axminster. Although Somerset’s mismanaged decisions were not overridden by his
colonels they were certainly recognised and instigated protests. Junior officers too did
their jobs. Major Talbot commanded his troop with discipline at Keynsham and
whilst Lieutenant Noys of the Wiltshire Militia may have been sick with fear at
Lavington he still marched to war at the head of his company. Overall the militia
officers performed as well as second line officers could be expected to perform, if not
better. There is no reason to believe that despite a lack of military experience the leadership of the militia was significantly different from that of the royal army.

5.3. CONCLUSION.

Throughout the early 1680s in England and Wales, the militia attended regular musters and underwent training in order that they could march and carry out weapon drills effectively according to one of the drill manuals shared with the royal army. They drilled reasonably regularly and were practiced in the handling of their weapons. At various inspections both foot and horse showed a satisfactory level of military effectiveness in terms of drill and military manoeuvres and at times achieved excellence. In the field they showed themselves to be capable as support troops and maintained their military discipline apart from two serious breakdowns in extraordinary situations.

The military effectiveness of those militiamen who had been trained and had seen several years of service albeit part time, seems not to have been in doubt in the eyes of their commanding officers. However, Colonel Edward Berkeley, Lord Fitzharding, remained wary of the newly raised men in his command when he wrote to his lord lieutenant: ‘I find there is little trust in these new men’, singling out those who had just come in as replacements or recruits to his regiment then based at Bruton. Apprehension concerning the future behaviour of untrained, untried and unknown new men is not limited to James II’s Militia.

The Duke of Somerset may have been an exception to the rule but the militia’s commanders were also effective with good decision making and incisive action. Similarly their senior officers usually acted promptly and displayed a degree of
military understanding and skill in most situations. As will be seen later, even in action they proved effective.

The militia of 1685 were not troops in full time training, regularly undertaking drill and being subject to continual imposed discipline but, within the time constraints under which they operated they reached a level of proficiency acceptable to the authorities of the day. The militia was fit for service and available to undertake operations whenever called upon to do so. Its training in marching, manoeuvring, and handling weapons may not have been up to the standard of those who trained on a daily basis, but it was effective and, ignoring the obvious failings of one lord lieutenant, so too was the men’s ability to obey orders in a disciplined fashion.

Being fit for service in its abilities, its appearance and bearing must also be examined to see if it conformed to the period’s understanding of what soldiers looked like.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

5. HRO: 44M69/G5/50/57, Bundle of military papers, f. 3, a copy letter from the deputy lieutenants to Lord Conway, d. 26 February 1630.
6. The author has seen these artefacts (three collections numbering 15-20 balls in each), but, the finds are not logged nor GPS referenced. Consequently their locations remain hearsay.
7. Site visit, September 2006.
8. CSPD 1685, p. 165.
10. W&SHC: 1178/450
13. CSPD, Entry Book 41, p. 411. A warrant for 100 copies, d. 8 December 1675. The Duke had been *de facto* Captain General of the Army in December 1675 when it was introduced; Tincey, J., *Monmouth’s Drill Book* (Leigh on Sea, Partizan, 1986), p. 4; CSPD Car.II 384 No.1721. A receipt for the delivery of 1,500 additional copies, d. 28 September 1675. There was a further edition in 1678 and CSPD Entry Book 69 No. 21 is an order for another issue for as many copies as necessary for the Guards—presumably at an issue rate of one copy each.
14. Sloane MSS 1487. A pocket book containing prayers, poems, shorthand notes and mathematical equations plus a handwritten copy of *The Abridgement* with some orders changed or missing, while the copy of the 1682 edition in the BL has handwritten notes to clarify or simplify the instructions added in the margins.
16. Blackmore D; Frame, S; Turton A; re-enactment officers interviewed during 2008 as part of the work leading to Table 6.1.1.
17. Kirke, C. *op. cit.*, p. 3. The views were gathered from six infantry and three cavalry officers from seventeenth-century re-enactment regiments who were familiar with training recruits.
18. Drill is taken to mean marching in line and in column of division, halting, changing from column into line and wheeling. It also includes arraying in close order, order, open order and distant order. For musketiers it also includes the Firings (ranks losing, maintaining and gaining ground, forlorn files and salvee—which includes doubling or halving the front either by rank entire or by half-files.
19. Watson’s figures also include mock-battle experience.
20. Drill for the horse is taken to mean marching in line and column, gaining speed, halting, changing from column into line and wheeling. It also includes changing order and rallying.
24. There is always a degree of spillage and waste when filling bottles and some may have used to fill priming flasks.
27. CSPD 1686-87, p. 314; CSPD 1687-89, p. 89.
28. PRO: Town Archive 124(81) Letter from Sir Harry Ashley to the Mayor of Poole, May 21 1587.
29. Sydenham, J., *History of the Town and County of Poole* (Poole, Sydenham, 1839), p. 138. Regrettably, the Poole Council archivists reported that many items, although listed, were missing when they took over the management of the collection in 1966.
Ward, op. cit., p.123; Rogers, op.cit., pp. 19-20

Wheeler in Chandler, Sedgemoor, p.131.

‘Battalia’ was the contemporary expression meaning the basic fighting unit. It usually consisted of one regiment or groups of small regiments put together to form a fighting unit of between two hundred and one thousand men. To be set in battalia was to have the regiments in their own battle formation in their assigned position in the army’s deployment for action on a battlefield.

Ward, op. cit., p.86.

CSPD., Entry Book, vol.44. No.29.

Montagu House MSS, quoted in Ward, op. cit., p.123.

Dinely op cit. p.75.

In common with most contemporary drill manuals, all of these elements of deployment are laid out and explained in The Abridgement.

The matchlock musket was fired by the insertion of a lit piece of saltpetre-infused cord into the weapon’s firing pan, whereas the firelock, sometimes referred to as a snaphaunce or flintlock musket, was fitted with an internal spring which when released by pulling the trigger caused a flint to strike a case-hardened frizzen and produce a shower of sparks to ignite the priming powder.

Dinely op cit. p.268.

Ibid, p.38

Ibid. passim.


Clode, op cit. p.35.

Ibid.


Wheeler in Chandler, Sedgemoor, pp. 130 - 137.

Wyndham in Waylen., op. cit., p.316.

The rebel army was estimated at 5,000 whereas the Red Regiment numbered 540.

Wheeler in Chandler, Sedgemoor, p.131.

Wyndham in Waylen., op. cit. p.317.

Wheeler in Chandler, Sedgemoor, p.132. It would appear that Pembroke, having his whole county force of approximately 2,500, was prepared to stand at odds of two to one against Monmouth’s 5,000.

Clifton. op. cit., pp., 195-195.


Ibid., Beaufort to Somerset. 19 June 1685, p.97.

Ibid., John Churchill to Somerset. 20 June 1685.

Ibid., Louis Duras, Earl of Feversham to Somerset. 21 June 1685.

Ibid., Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke to Somerset. 21 June 1685. It would be convenient if he honoured this promise as it would explain why the Wiltshire Militia, estimated at 2,500 were only 1,500 at Sedgemoor – two regiments at Bath would solve the anomaly.

Ibid., The James II King of England to Somerset. 21 June, 1685. p.96.

Ibid., Sir Thomas Thynne of Longleat to Somerset, 23 September 1682.

Ibid., Thynne to Somerset, 11 July 1683.

Ibid., The deputy lord lieutenants of Somerset meeting in Wells, to King James II. 6 August 1683.

Ibid., Somerset 18 December, 1683.

Ibid., The king to Somerset. 18 December, 1683.

Ibid., The king to Somerset. 2 February, 1685.

Ibid., The Office of Ordnance to Somerset. 9 May, 1685.

Ibid., Sunderland to Somerset. 18 June, 1685, p.97.


Ibid. The deputy lieutenants of Somerset in Bath to Somerset. 1 and 2 July, 1685. Every county had a number of cannon, usually in coastal defences. They could be used in an emergency as field pieces but often being old and mounted on garrison carriages they were of limited use and seldom deployed by the militia. Monmouth is thought to have had makeshift field carriages constructed for four guns from Lyme Regis harbour.

Ibid. Warrant from the king to Somerset. 9 July, 1685

Ibid., p.100.


HMC. Appendix to the third report. Fitzharing to Somerset, 17 June, 1683, p. 97.
Chapter Six

APPEARANCE AND BEARING

‘... it was, and still is, heresy to hold that a man can be capable of doing a soldier’s work unless he is dressed like a cockatoo.’¹

The previous chapter indicated that the militia was a drilled body and able to perform on parade in a manner that was acceptable to men accustomed to reviewing troops, with several units showing themselves worthy of great praise. Yet in order to be thought of as a proper military body by the people who saw them, the militia also needed to look like soldiers. That the militia looked like a military force is evidenced by their being used as an example when Members of Parliament assembled on 23 December 1680 to discuss The Petition against sitting at Oxford. Their appearance in arms and unifying field signs caused them to be likened to the militia:

Those for the City of London came with a numerous Body of well arm’d Horse, having Ribbands in their Hats, with these Words woven in them, No Popery, No Slavery! And many others of the Members were attended in the like Manner, ... the Manner of their Assembling (says Mr. Echard) look’d more like the Rendezvous of a Country-Militia, than the regular Meeting of a Parliament.²

Yet to evoke the gravitas of a military unit the militia not only had to be dressed in much the same way as the regulars, but also carry the same weapons, be furnished with the same equipment and display similar symbols including flags and drums. The impact of appearance was more powerful in an age of limited travel and media both to local populations and to foreign invaders. The visual image of royal troops during the reign of James II is well documented, so whether the militias of the southwest counties had a military appearance and bearing in order to appear equivalent to the royal army needs to be investigated.³
As we have seen the cost of furnishing the militia with arms, clothing and the accoutrements fell mostly upon the local communities so ordering of clothing and equipment was the task of the local constables under the direction of the high constable and deputy lieutenants. Contributors could provide their own coats as they could their equipment but more likely they paid to have them made up. Officers did acquire their own uniforms, Colonel Francis Lutterel’s whole apparel being ordered through his London tailor. Although there is no evidence of snapsacks actually being issued to militiamen, few men in the ranks would march without them for personal belongings and food. They were essential kit and being everyday items it is reasonable to suggest men brought their own.

6.1. UNIFORM.

To understand the methods of clothing issues to the militia in the 1680s requires an appreciation of earlier Elizabethan practice. In some counties, when coat money was extracted from militia contributors, the question of uniformity and its implementation was the responsibility of the lord lieutenants, commanding officers or whoever sponsored a regiment, be it nobility, clergy or corporation. In 1543 the London Militia was issued with white smocks or shirts emblazoned front and back with a red cross and in 1545 the Privy Council allocated 4s each for coats to militia men mustered in Gloucestershire. The Gloucestershire magnate, Richard Whitgift, chose to uniform his troop of horse in tawny or blue, while the Duke of Suffolk dressed his men in red and yellow coats, caps and hose. This poorly-regulated situation continued into the immediate post-Restoration militia with the wearing of uniform still not nationally implemented. Clothing the militia was seen by the contributors as
an additional expense and no legislation or official promulgation of orders regarding its dress was issued.

By 1666, however, the militia was becoming uniformed. Coleby remarks that there is mention of the Royal White Trained Bands of Hampshire in the Verney Memoirs, its name being derived from its coats which were made from undyed wool, whilst those in charge of the Andover Regiment purchased yellow coats for their militiamen. In 1668 when Charles Stewart, Duke of Richmond and of Lennox, temporarily acting as lord lieutenant of Kent, ordered that county’s militia to cease wearing armour and adopt knee-length coats, ‘as is the custom of soldiers’, he expected the cost, administration and implementation of the change to be borne by the contributors who were already providing the men, their pay and equipment. Indeed, Richmond instructed all captains to report any who failed to provide their men with the new red coats lined in black. ‘In 1685 we read of ‘red and yellow liveries’ and these seem to have been widely popular coat colours, perhaps because they were cheap dyes derived from madder and onion skins, although a full range of colours seems to have appeared, including purples and greens. Red or scarlet coats were popular with the militia across the country but were by no means universally adopted. There was sometimes a common county coat colour but it seems likely that regiments from different divisions of a county wore different colour coats despite the inherent difficulties and costs involved as seen earlier in Table 3.1.3. Although there are references to various distinguishing coloured uniform coats there is no mention of shirts or breeches. The cut of the coat and style of hat worn echoed that of civilian clothing of the period as did that of the royal army but there would have been savings in cloth by judicious cutting, minimal hemming, and skimping on buttons,
button-hole ribboning, or lacing. The militiaman’s other clothes followed the fashion for breeches, stockings and shoes.

Illustration 6.1.1: An officer, musketeer and pikeman of militia circa 1685.

Source: Drawing by Neil Wright from evidence from James II’s Colour Book.  

To equip battalions several hundred strong some sort of group purchasing is likely to have taken place but the only evidence discovered suggests that ordering was undertaken on a small scale at parish constable level. The constable was the civil officer who collected the militia money from his parish and spent it on those militiamen raised by his parish. For example from an unrecorded parish in Gloucestershire, Constable Aylbertsons (Albertson?) noted in his accounts for 1683, ‘Paid Robert Punter for four blue cotes £3 5s. 0d’. These were presumably finished articles whereas another entry states, ‘Paid James Arlyef for making four blue cotes
12s. 0d.’ As the tailor Arlyef (or perhaps Arless?) charged three shillings to make up each coat but unlike Punter he must have been supplied with the raw materials. Other entries also record their costs.

**Table 6.1.1: Entries from a list of Constable Aylbertsons’ of accounts, 1683.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paid William Lysons gent for 9 yards of blue cloth</td>
<td>£2. 11s.0d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4½ yards of blue clote</td>
<td>£1. 17s. 0d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 doz of buttons</td>
<td>5s. 0d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 yards of ribin</td>
<td>3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GRO. P354 CO 1/1. Constable Joseph Aylbertsons’ Disbursements for the Armes, including lists of persons providing arms, lists of cloth delivered to make soldiers’ coats and accounts for their manufacture, pay accounts for militia soldiers and 1684-86.

No commercial tradesman would fail to make a profit out of his transactions so if the cost of a ready-made garment was 16s 3d and the usual rate for manufacture was 3s each, then the materials must have cost substantially less than 13s per coat. Unfortunately there is nothing to indicate the quality of the coats Constable Aylbertsons bought from Punter or if they were new or second hand, nor is there any note as to how many coats were made out of Lyson’s materials so further comparison becomes almost impossible.

The naming of regiments by colours such as ‘the Blew Regiment’ is ambiguous; it could allude to either the coats the men wore or the flags they carried; or even both. For example, during the civil wars the established pattern amongst the London Trained Bands was for regiments to assume names after the colour of their flags, as in the Red Regiment of the City Trained Bands or The White Regiment of the City of London Auxiliaries. When there was no initial issue of uniform coats the troops wore their own clothing. When reissues were necessary from a central purchasing source a colonel may have wished for the same coat colour but did not always receive it. In December 1643 the Earl of Manchester received ‘Coates ready made 106...Scarlet coloured’ and ‘Coates providing for foote soldiers 200 Green and
100 Red in all 300’. However, civil war regiments did sometimes adopt names from their coats such as Samuel Jones’ Greencoats or Sir John Meyrick’s Greycoats. Other coat colour combinations were more esoteric.

Illustration 6.1.2: A well-equipped and well-dressed militiaman.

Drawing by Bob Marrion, based upon evidence drawn from *James II’s Colour Book* (See Chapter 9, p.347) and records of coat colours listed in the Egerton MSS. BL. Eg. 1626. Army. List of the Militia and of Lords Lieutenants in England and Wales 1697.

With the post-Restoration militia, the situation becomes even more confusing as although regiments received issues of coats of the same colour, regimental titles were derived from its colonel’s name, its regimental muster point, its distinguishing colour, or sometimes a mixture of all three. For example, one Wiltshire militia regiment was known variously as Colonel Wyndham’s Regiment, the Salisbury Regiment and the Red Regiment, and despite having three titles the actual colour of flags or coats remains unrecorded.
Various constables’ accounts from Gloucestershire refer to blue coats being purchased or ordered to be made up but their ordering is not as specific as the commissioning documents that survive:

Appointment of Richard Hill as Lieutenant in the Red Regiment of Militia in the Forest Division of Gloucestershire. 1694.
Appointment of an ensign in a Company of the Green Regiment of Militia for service in Kingsgate Hundred. 1702.
Commission of Giles Nash as lieutenant in the White Regiment of Militia. 1715. 18

Although these commissions are post 1685 William III improved and restored the militia, countering James II’s neglect, yet without radically changing its basic organisation. According to Brewer, ‘Britain’s military activity after the Glorious Revolution retained much of the pattern it had assumed before 1688… England continued to rely on the militia as a means of national defence’ and the use of colours as a means of projecting unit identity continued. 19 During the Monmouth Rebellion, lacking the aristocratic colonels whose names they would otherwise have taken, the rebel regiments were identified by different colours. They may have emulated the naming system of the local militia regiments which the ordinary recruits would have known, but it cannot be proved. However, when these names were first adopted Monmouth’s four regiments had neither uniforms nor flags. A fifth regiment raised in Taunton and named the Blue Regiment were given the red-lined-purple coats which had been brought over from Holland, so the name probably referred to their flag. 20 Frustratingly, although whilst in that town all of the rebel regiments were presented with silk and taffeta flags there are no known descriptions of their general design or colour. 21 Regrettably evidence to resolve the puzzle of names relating to coat, flag or both has been elusive despite the reference to the Royal White Trained Bands of Hampshire’s undyed wool coats.
The uniform for the militia may well have extended to issues of small clothes. During Monmouth’s 1680 visit to Exeter 1,000 men in linen waistcoats and breeches escorted him into the city.\textsuperscript{22} There is no evidence that they were militia but finding 1,000 men to dress and act as body without recourse to the militia would have been very difficult. This may have been so important an occasion that men were all volunteers and these items were manufactured by special order, but no record of their commissioning or delivery has survived. However, as unarmed militiamen not wearing coats their presence could have been interpreted by contemporary political commentators as the county authorities’ attempt to show due deference to the king’s son without the least suspicion of promising him armed support. Indeed, ST, the otherwise unidentified author of a contemporary Monmouth biography of 1683, was at pains to point out that these men were harmless.\textsuperscript{23}

In addition to coats, militiamen also needed other items of apparel. As stated above no references to militiamen’s breeches appear in any accounts, and as all men needed to wear them it is supposed that the militia followed the established civil war practice of wearing their own. This would have kept down costs. The same may be said of their footwear and there were no regulations forbidding or dictating styles, ‘boots and shoes being worn indiscriminately’.\textsuperscript{24} As he was discussing foot soldiers the writer does not mean riding boots but start-ups - half-shin, lace-up country boots, commonly worn in agricultural communities. Hats would have been personal possessions too, usually wide-brimmed and made of a wool/felt blend, with an external hatband to adjust size. These bands may have been issued in a regimental colour as became practice in the royal army of James II and alluded to for the militia in reference to the assembly on members of parliament on page 206.\textsuperscript{25}
The militiamen of the Welsh counties were drawn by Thomas Dinely as he observed them during his master Beaufort’s 1685 inspection tour of Wales. His drawings are very small and must be to a degree representational, but nevertheless many of the men are depicted wearing breeches and short coats rather than the fashionable knee length coats of the royal army. His drawing of the Radnorshire Militia at Presteigne Church is in this vein. Whilst depicting an officer in a Brandenburg (riding cassock) it also shows in the foreground several pikemen who appear to be wearing long coats, broad-brimmed hats and back & breast plates, together with waist scarves (sashes) and even decorative or distinguishing shoulder knots. One figure sports a helmet with a flounce or plume at the back.

Unfortunately Dinely only states the county of origin of the militia units reviewed by Beaufort and does not specifically name them. Perhaps this is because being sparsely populated each county only boasted one regiment of foot, but he does, upon occasion, note details of their clothing.

Table 6.1.2: The clothing of the county militia foot regiments in Wales in 1684.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Foot Regiments</th>
<th>Horse Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coats</td>
<td>Lining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flintshire</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brecknockshire</td>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>not noted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glamorganshire</td>
<td>Purple</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dinely, op.cit., pp. 92, 201,297.

The 1684 manual advising county officials and militia officers on how to conform to the militia laws unfortunately contains no references to soldiers’ clothing. However, Aylbertsons’ meticulously noted disbursements alongside references to other clothing orders illustrate that the militia was indeed uniformed to a certain degree with coats of the same colour. Regimental uniformity of coat colour may not have been universal, but it was widespread. If regularised uniforms appeared
in remote parts of Wales the likelihood is that uniformity was at least, if not more common in central and southern England.

A reference to the Lancashire Militia in 1689, and a letter from the Earl of Macclesfield to his deputies in Herefordshire in 1691 informing them that other counties were clothing their militia and hoping they were doing the same, leads Western to surmise that uniformity was not really accomplished until the reign of William III. If the county militias were not universally uniformed then those counties clothing their militias for the first time in 1691 did so perhaps as part of a new reign initiative. However, neither the Lancashire clothing order nor the Herefordshire letter indicates if these were initial issues or replacements for worn and faded uniforms. Although infrequently worn, it is reasonable to suggest that militia re-issues would have been necessary in William’s reign to replace militia coats distributed in the early years of the Restoration, some thirty years earlier. Royal troops received annual reissues.

One suit of clothes shall be taken every year out of the off-reckonings in the infantry, the first year one coat, 1 pr. Breeches, one cap or hat, two shirts, two Cravats, two pairs of stockings and two pairs of shoes, the second year one surtoute, one pair of breeches, one shirt, one Cravat, one pair of stockings, and one pair of shoes.

As militiamen did not wear their uniforms on a daily basis it is reasonable to suggest there were expectations that theirs would last a lot longer than those of royal soldiers. Various writers hold that as the royal troops’ coats were replaced regimental tailors turned the old items into waistcoats. However, given the pecuniary system whereby near-proprietor colonels would with government blessing, ‘buy them where they like’ and the close social contact maintained by officers in both branches of the service and local government, it is possible that old coats were also sometimes sold to
the local militias. If this was the case the near-universal adoption of the red coat becomes easy to understand.

Albeit piecemeal the introduction of uniform for the militia did not go unchallenged. In Kent in 1668, deputy lieutenant Sir Roger Twysden’s refusal to promulgate the Earl of Richmond and Lennox’s instruction to adopt red coats cost him his office: he argued that legislation ‘provides for conduct money but no whit for coating the soldier’. In his defence he cited that ‘coat and conduct money to have been of the first things layd hold on to make the late good Prince odious.’

It was not just the foot for whom central purchasing was undertaken. Again Aylbertsons’ disbursements list payment to Guy Bellamy for ‘two boof coats’ at a cost of £2 10s 0d and a further £2 0s 0d to Widow Feddman, for a ‘buft cot’ Made popular during the civil wars, by the 1680’s buff coats were old fashioned, stout, double-thickness leather coats worn by the cavalry. These expensive items could turn a sword cut if kept supple and were worn either under or over the regular woollen coats. During the 1640s Sir Samuel Luke paid £58 15s to equip his troop with buff coats. Captain John Bird’s troop was issued fifty three buff coats & fifty two pairs of gloves for £100 9s. Three troopers of Lt. Col. Thorpe’s troop each received buff coats costing 30s and this apparently remained the average price 40 years later. The constable appears to have secured a bargain from Bellamy whose name appears elsewhere in the lists as a supplier of various other items. He may have been a general contractor who dealt in military equipment, whereas the widow’s coat might have been a better quality leftover from her late husband’s service in the civil wars and offered for purchase to the parish. Being of hide they may have been branded as parish property as another entry appears to pay James Frost 10s 0d for additional work
in ‘marking to cotes’\textsuperscript{42} It is not known how many he marked, what system or emblem he employed nor what tool he employed to mark them, possibly a branding iron.

The only discovered extant examples of militia clothing are three cavalry buffcoats exhibited in the Rochester City Museum.\textsuperscript{43} They are of good quality buffalo hide, cut in the style of late seventeenth century civilian coats but with full overlapping skirts to protect the thighs when mounted and typical of cavalry issue. They have added and turned-back dark green velvet cuffs. Donated to the museum by Rochester Cathedral they are believed to have come from the troop of horse paid for by the clergy during 1684. Armour believed to have belonged to the local militia foot is displayed on a manikin of a seated pikeman who is dressed in reproduction clothing.\textsuperscript{44} This pikeman, along with a central manikin representing a seated officer and another representing a musketeer with a musket and rest, form part of a curious tableau said to depict soldiers at the time of the Dutch Raid on Rochester in 1667.

\textbf{Illustration 6.1.3: The pikeman and officer manikins in Rochester Museum.}
The label for the display states that ‘The Dean and Chapter of Rochester Cathedral were required to supply a troop of six soldiers; the buff leather coats... swords and sword belt displayed here are the only surviving relics of their dress and equipment.’ It further states, that ‘although some of the equipment dates from the middle of the seventeenth century, the Cathedral’s archives reveal that the buff leather coats were renewed in 1684 at a cost of £15 2s 6d for six.’ Regrettably the officer is in shoes rather than the more appropriate cavalry boots and the musketeer is fanciful as the coat is for a trooper not a foot soldier. He also carries a late seventeenth century fowling piece and a reproduction rest, the use of which was discontinued during the early 1640s.

Illustration 6.1.4: The musketeer manikin in Rochester Museum.
Not all militia troopers could have afforded buffcoats and many would have turned out in the standard long coat of the period. Whether the horse in general was uniformed remains uncertain but it is likely. If the foot acquired uniform coats then it is more than probable that the horse did likewise. As the horse was often recruited from those who thought themselves socially superior, the desire to demonstrate collective identity through a common uniform must have been strong. Both they and their contributors could often afford better equipment, including ‘lobster-tail’ helmets and back and breast plates which were manufactured in considerable numbers during the Interregnum and continued in production under Charles II. Like the foot, troopers would have provided their own breeches and footwear although in their case this meant riding boots.

Illustration 6.1.5. A militia cavalryman.

Source: Drawing by C.Famer based upon descriptions and drawings in James II’s Colour Book.
As noted previously militia officers provided their own uniforms. Like their regular counterparts they were not bound by conventions, although fashion had a great influence upon what was worn and the style in which it was cut, made up and adapted. Militia officers appear to have favoured as much gold or silver lacing as their rank, status and purse could warrant. In August 1681 the following bill was sent from William Franklyn, a tailor in Covent Garden to Francis Lutterell shortly after Lutterell’s appointment as a colonel in the Somerset Militia.

**Table 6.1.3: Taylor’s bill for clothing Colonel Francis Lutterell, 1681.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Making a rich laced cloath suite</td>
<td>1/18s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A pair of scarlet silk stockings with gold</td>
<td>1/15s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckles to the britches</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk to line the britches</td>
<td>10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pockets and staying ape</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A set of rich gold buttons</td>
<td>2/14s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich gold brest buttons</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine drawing the suite</td>
<td>3s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ½ yards of superfine gray cloath</td>
<td>2/12s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckram and canvas</td>
<td>1s 3d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 ½ yards of rich Florence satin to line the coate</td>
<td>4/14s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarlett plain ribbon</td>
<td>1/5s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 yards rich gold and scarlet ribbon</td>
<td>6/5s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 yards rich gold orar lace for coate and britches</td>
<td>18/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold chaine to the suite</td>
<td>14s 9d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich gold needle for the gloves</td>
<td>10/5s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A pair of gloves, making and facing</td>
<td>9s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A scarlet fether</td>
<td>1/8s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich gold needle gold fring for a scarffe</td>
<td>35/5s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk for a scarffe and making it</td>
<td>18s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This was a very expensive uniform totalling £74 3s 0d. To this he would undoubtedly have added a silk shirt and lace-trimmed stock, a laced beaver hat, a breastplate, a quality sword with a decorated baldric and scabbard and a pair of tall leather riding boots and spurs; together with a new wig at £6 0s 0d, producing a bill of some £200.
Officers below the rank of colonel would not have worn such expensive uniforms but they certainly would have reflected the wearer’s standing in the community and looked impressive to both the general population and their men. They would have emulated royal officers, in particular copying the military style of having contrasting colours to the coat’s large cuffs, wearing a dramatic waist scarf, lacing the hat in a distinctive metal braid and sporting the ubiquitous plume, sometimes accompanied by a military field sign. The wealth of the country gentry could also ensure that among the junior ranks at least, the quality of dress surpassed that worn by their royal army counterparts.
Illustration 6.1.7: A militia cavalry officer.

Source: Drawing by Bob Marrion based upon records of coat colours in the Egerton MSS. BL. Eg. 1626. Extract: LISTS of the Militia, with names of officers, in the several counties of. England and Wales, 1697; and of Lord Lieutenants of counties.. Paper; XVII\textsuperscript{th} cent. Folio. From the Farnborough Fund.

6.2. EQUIPMENT.

Military accoutrements and weapons distinguished the soldier from the civilian and enabled him to wage war. They included bandoliers or cartridge pouches, baldrics (sword belts worn over the shoulder) and various pieces of armour, together with horses-tack, holsters and slings. The militia had need of them all if they were called out, as well as ammunition and provisions. At the time of the Dutch incursion at Chatham, Pepys, safe in London, wrote:
[I had] a great deal of serious talk with my wife about the sad state we are in, and especially from the beating of drums this night for the train-bands upon pain of death, to appear in arms tomorrow morning, with bullet and powder and money to supply themselves with victuals for the fortnight...  

The most expensive piece of equipment, if it can be so termed, was the trooper’s horse. If an assessed property-holder appeared in person and he owned one he would naturally ride his own beast and fulfil his obligation at no additional cost. However, if did not own one or he was loath to risk his own animal he would have to fund a horse by purchase or hire for himself or any man who substituted for him, even if the mount belonged to the man taking his place. If he knew of nowhere to secure a horse he could ask the parish constable to hire one at his expense and thus devolve the responsibility. The average purchase price of a horse had returned to pre-civil wars rates of between £7 and £10. Finding and supplying a horse was not always easy as a tenant wrote to his landlord and local captain of militia:

Sir, I am concerned my mans horse should meet with (illegible) mischief – whereby to be disabled performing every days duty in your troop, I have ordered him to procure as good a horse as he can … (illegible) the other be recovered I being incapable of supplying him at present out of my owne stables, our Wiltshire Troops being likewise upon four … (illegible)  

Sick horses were the responsibility of their riders and blood-letting was a frequent cure-all. At times it would appear that horses for the militia could have been acquired by other means: ‘Order to Henry Dawley, George Bridge and Richard Cobb esqs. and JPs and all bailiffs, constables and tithingmen to seize any horses above the value of £5 belonging to Anthony Brown and any other popish dissenters.’ Dawley had been promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Fawley and Andover Regiment eight months previously. Whether seizure would be compensated is unclear.

Additionally all troopers also required tack, the costs of which were similar if not slightly higher to those of 1643 as seen in Table 6.2.1 below. Stirrup leathers were
8d a pair, stirrups 6d a pair, cruppers 8d, breastplates 1s. 3d and a great bridle and bit 3s. The New Model Contract Books indicate that saddles were not cheap, but having been mass-produced in the 1640s and 50s they sold at 16s 6d. Yet buyers still required a woollen under-blanket. Cheaper saddles were available in the form of those made for dragoon use during the civil wars, and these sold for 7s 10d.

Cavalrymen also had devices for keeping their firearms with them while riding. Pistols were encased in pairs of leather holders slung and strapped across the horses’ necks while carbines were suspended by a dogclip and ring from a single wide crossbelt known as a sling and worn across one shoulder.

Troopers were also furnished with protective armour. This usually included an English tri-bar, lobster-tail helmet and a back and breast. Quality varied but they were both usually heavy, able to stop sword thrusts or cuts and even resistant to pistol shot. They were fairly common items as they had been mass produced during the civil wars and the Interregnum. Militia cavalry officers may have worn bridle arms, steel vanbraces to enclose the lower left wrist and forearm which was otherwise often the target for enemy sword cuts.

The defensive accoutrements for the pikemen of the foot included a helmet, a throat-protecting gorget, back and breast plates, and thigh and groin guards known as tassets, but it is unlikely that the militia had more than a helmet and breastplate: even among the royal troops wearing the full panoply was a thing of the past. The Earl of Richmond and Lennox may have permitted his militiamen to cease wearing armour, but in practice it was still in use in 1699 by men who ‘still had confidence in “coats of armour”, flexible and otherwise, the fashion in head pieces being a skull cap or basin form.’ These skull caps, sometimes called secrets, were worn under felt hats, affording the wearer undisclosed head protection. They were popular with those
cavalry troopers who had not been issued with the usual cavalry helmet or whose former old-fashioned helmets had been withdrawn. Some musketeers wore them as their only defensive accoutrement. Royal infantrymen are known to have still been wearing secrets under their hats during the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745/6.\textsuperscript{56}

Furnishing a militiaman’s equipment was not cheap although prices were relatively stable.

Table 6.2.1: Cost of items of equipment supplied to soldiers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pair of Holsters</td>
<td>2s 6d</td>
<td>1640s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>£7 10s 0d</td>
<td>1640s &amp; 1696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sword Girdle</td>
<td>1s 9d</td>
<td>1660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 lb musket powder</td>
<td>1s</td>
<td>1675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 lb powder</td>
<td>1s 4d</td>
<td>1684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 lbs bullet</td>
<td>£1 5s</td>
<td>1684</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By the 1680s more controlled purchasing systems had all but eradicated early abuses in the supply of horses and tack. The first cavalry militias of the Restoration had to suffer riding broken-down mounts furnished with old and rotting leatherwork. Henry Coker, an officer in the Warminster Troop of Militia during the mid 1660s, complained to the local deputy that ‘both horses and furniture are so extreme bad that an officer that ever saw anything of war or discipline may be ashamed to muster them; many of the horses have not come in.’\textsuperscript{58} However, this might be exaggeration, as from further reading of his reports, Coker sounds very much the retired regular officer for whom nothing was quite as good as when he was young.

Excluding consumables, such as powder, once the capital outlay had been made there was little to find annually except funding for minor repairs and occasional
equipment replacement. Apart from the muskets, which as we have seen were forbidden in general private ownership and were thus kept in parish stores, the equipment remained the property of the contributor or the parish, which was an asset, especially in the case of a horse.

As with the coats there may have been a trade in army cast-offs or surplus equipment. Ample supplies were available as indicated in a 1678 warrant for a regular regiment which relates, ‘…give the whole regiment every three years what they call the small armament Vizt. One Sword, one Bayonet, one Belt, one Cartridge Box with furniture and slings.’ Weapons, metalwork and leatherwork may have become worn but they would certainly have remained serviceable after three years. The Robert Punter with whom Aylbertsons dealt may well have been a go-between for the constable and a regular colonel’s agent.

This expensive militia equipment whether publicly or privately owned was counted and recorded, continuing the practice of completing muster returns as in previous reigns. Some equipment was deliberately marked to show ownership by parish or person, or to prevent the same item being recorded on different muster days as belonging to different people. Due to the geographic spread of muster locations and the need for a muster master to be at each of them they were often called on different days making borrowing of equipment feasible. Such abuse, noted in the New Model Army and legislated against by the Articles of War, was taken just as seriously by the militia muster masters of James II. Public parish stores did much to eradicate the practice of borrowing to hide shortfalls in equipment. Before the creation of parish stores there was no way of knowing whether men who appeared for musters had their own equipment or had borrowed it for the occasion. The same accoutrement or weapon might have been listed three or four times as the property of different men.
Marking items by painting or branding made identification easier but locking them away in unit-specific stores under the supervision of the authorities was far more effective.\textsuperscript{62}

Turning to items furnished by Trophy Money, the militia seem to have been well supplied with drums, halberds and flags. The Wiltshire Red Regiment had eleven drums for the eleven drummers, being two per company plus an additional musician in the colonel’s company who probably acted as the drum major although this rank is not stated. Drummers were special, for their drums and their coats, (most probably heavily decorated with braided tape), were paid for out of Trophy Money. Three drum coats cost 10s and seven drum heads [skins] for the Salisbury City Company in 1674 cost 11s 8d. Another entry states that Drummer Mallard’s hanger and his drum cost 2s 6.\textsuperscript{63}

The Wiltshire Red Regiment had ten sergeants, two per company, all of whom would have carried a halberd as their sign of rank.\textsuperscript{64} There is a curious entry in the Salisbury City financial records which lists a halberd being redeemed for two shillings – whether it was in pawn or had to be bought from a previous owner is unknown.\textsuperscript{65} Each Wiltshire Red Regiment company also had an ensign whose duty it was to carry the company colour, which meant that trophy money had to buy five flags and staffs and finials, and supposedly five sets of decorative cords and tassels.

Military drums were large and were carried by men who held titular non-commissioned officer rank not by boys, and the halberds were most probably the standard axe-headed pole arm of the civil wars. Very few descriptions of militia flags remain although what evidence there is suggests a colour-coded system similar to that established by the London Trained Bands before the civil wars as discussed previously.\textsuperscript{66} Accounts such as Wheeler’s and Wyndham’s, and descriptions of the
militia in the Egerton Manuscripts show that this was the case in the West; Gloucestershire had White, Green, Blue and Red Regiments, Hampshire had Yellow, Green, Blue, Grey, White and one other, whilst Wiltshire had a Red, a Blue, a Green and a Yellow Regiment. Again whether this was due to their flag, coat colour or both is not certain.

Military vexillogist Lesley Prince has suggested that the ‘mystery flag’ in the National Army Museum, that has the appearance of a civil war colour and is blue with white piles wavy, belonged to one of the Militia companies of the 1680s.67

Illustration 6.2.1: The National Army Museum ‘mystery flag’.

The tradition of distinctive militia colours can be traced to Elizabethan units when elements of the militia were raised by the upper echelons of the clergy. In 1599 Archbishop Richard Whitgift had his ‘Standards …crafted of silk, taffeta and damask. His arms had to be emblazoned with sufficient accuracy and style so these flags would not be confused with the standards of a private gentlemen’s they were to be wrought in oyle upon the silke to endure the weather…’68
Descriptions also exist for flags carried by the Oxford University Volunteers raised and maintained during the 1685 crisis to defend Oxford, particularly the colleges, should an army of dissenting rebels, bent upon the destruction of symbols of the Anglican establishment, descend upon the city.69

Dinely notes several colours for both Foot and Horse, illustrated by several drawings with accompanying notes.

Table 6.2.2: **Flags carried by the county militia regiments in Wales in 1684.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Foot Colours</th>
<th>Horse Cornet</th>
<th>Fringes &amp; Tassels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montgomeryshire</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>White with a scroll PRO REGE surmounted</td>
<td>Gold &amp; Silver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>by a right arm in natural colours holding a red heart</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merionethshire</td>
<td>St George in canton upon</td>
<td>Crimson with a scroll NEC TEMERE NEC</td>
<td>Gold &amp; silk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Co. Red &amp;</td>
<td>TIMIDE surmounted by coronet from which emerges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Cos. Blue.</td>
<td>a bull’s head facing left</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brecknockshire</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Gold &amp; Silver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carmarthenshire</td>
<td>St George in canton with fields divided gyronny</td>
<td>Colour unspecified but bearing crowned CR royal cipher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardiganshire</td>
<td>St George in canton, field colour unspecified</td>
<td>Colour unspecified but bearing a scroll FOR GOD AND THE KING</td>
<td>Gold &amp; silk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pembrokeshire</td>
<td>Colour unspecified but colour unspecified</td>
<td>Colour unspecified but bearing a scroll ALTERA SECURITAS surmounted by a portcullis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glamorganshire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 6.2.2: Flags of the Militia Cavalry Regiments in Wales in 1684.

Merionethshire, Glamorganshire and Cardiganshire


Food supplies for the militia were the responsibility of the force commander who frequently devolved the problem to the householders upon whom the men were compulsorily billeted. As well as dispensing with the need to issue tents the practice also meant the county was not obliged to supply and transport cooking utensils and firewood. The militia horse was expected to find forage where it could. Senior militia officers had personal carriages for their campaign kit and regiments also had ammunition carts, but other equipment, especially for the rank and file, was minimal and personal including, perhaps, blankets. Some items might be loaded into the few ammunition carts or into a shared battalion wagon of the sort in which royal units carried their tents and medical kit, otherwise anything the men wanted, such as additional food, spare shirts, socks or horseshoes, had to be carried in their snapsacks. It is impossible to tell whether the militia was issued with axes, billhooks, spades or other tools.
6.3.  WEAPONS.

Weapons are the tools of the soldiers’ trade, and although the cavalry also carried pistols and carbines the three basic personal weapons of the militia were the musket, the pike and the sword. Whilst the musket and the pike were the specific arms of two elements of the foot, the sword was a universal soldiers’ weapon.

By 1662 each militia musketeer was required to carry a musket with a barrel measuring no less than three feet in length.\(^{71}\) The smooth-bore, muzzle-loading, blackpowder musket remained the same throughout the reigns of Charles II and James II although the technology of the firing mechanism began to change. During the latter years of Charles II’s reign royal army regiments began converting from matchlock to flintlock or snapaunce muskets.\(^{72}\) There are no records concerning militia units receiving snapaunces and, given the rarity of these weapons in the royal army (newly raised units were equipping at a ratio of five to one) and the cost, it seems reasonable to suggest the militia was armed with matchlocks.\(^{73}\) The matchlock musket was the main weapon of the civil wars, and during the mid 1680s the matchlock was still the foot’s main missile weapon. Most existing examples have no royal or militia provenance but are all about four feet long and weigh about twelve pounds. Calibres, or barrel widths, vary from half to three-quarters of an inch and the weight of the musket balls fired varied from ten to sixteen to the pound. Earlier muskets fired balls of about two ounces - eight bore, but on average those of the mid seventeenth century were between one and a quarter to one and a half ounces. The muskets manufactured in England under the influence of the Dutch military system tended to be twelve bore.\(^{74}\)

Although reimbursement was available in some cases, ammunition for both muskets and pistols had to be supplied initially by the individual contributors.
And it is hereby further provided and enacted That at every Muster Training and Exercise every Musquetier shall bring with him halfe a pound of Powder and halfe a pound of Bullets, and every Musquetier that serves with a Match locke shall bring with him three yards of Match both which are to be found accordingly at the charge of such person or persons as provide the said Foote Soldier and Armes nd every Horseman is to bring with him a quarter of a pound of Powder and a quarter of a pound of Bullets at the charge of such person or persons as provide the said Horseman and Armes who are hereby required to finde and beare the same upon paine of forfeiting Five shillings for every omission thereof...

Whether bullet moulds were issued or also provided by the contributors remains uncertain but consistency of ammunition would need to be addressed once the individual’s half or quarter pound of bullet had been expended. Powder and ball could be provided from central or county depots after the initial self-supplied stocks were exhausted. The law and frequent arms searches had made the keeping of private arms a hazardous business consequently the need for individuals to keep bullet moulds in their homes would also have been be dramatically decreased. In any event individuals intending to use their guns for shooting game would have little use for 12-bore solid shot, multiple ‘birding shot’ was far more common.

Some city authorities bought their own ammunition, introducing central purchasing so as to maintain standard bullet size and powder quality. In the 1670s the Salisbury City Company had powder supplied by Thomas Naish and paid for by the mayor, John Joyce out of the Trophy Money.
Table 6.3.1: An account for powder from the Mayor of Salisbury’s office.

A note of Trophy Money paid by Mr Mayor / old debts July 24: 71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>39 l</td>
<td>powder at 11 d</td>
<td>1 – 12 - 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 l</td>
<td>powder at 9 d</td>
<td>1 – 8 - 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 13:74</td>
<td>16 l powder at 11 d</td>
<td>0 – 14 - 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 12:</td>
<td>32 l powder at 11 d</td>
<td>1 – 9 - 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>32 l powder</td>
<td>1 – 9 - 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More ½ l powder</td>
<td>0 – 0 – 5½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pd the porter</td>
<td>0 – 0 – 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 – 19 – 0½</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Naish presented invoices for powder and ball between 1674 and 1685. The men were obviously firing and so in all probability, militia musketeers, like their counterparts in the royal army, wore collars of powder bottles or cartridge bags, powder horns and an accompanying bullet bags. This is also corroborated by purchases of these items by various parish constables for their militiamen.76

A militia pikeman was required to present himself at musters armed with an ash pike of some sixteen feet in length. Tipped with a sharp, steel, leaf-shaped or needle point the pike was used to thrust into the body of an opponent. It was principally an anti-cavalry weapon although it could still be used en masse to fight infantry. When pikes in a body are held in a threatening posture, the enemy sees a mass of sharp, steel, stabbing spikes pointed directly at him. It was usually enough to cause horses, already distressed by the sounds of gunfire and the smell of blood to veer away despite the urging of their riders. In the militia the likelihood of a horse being trained well enough to charge home against pike would have been slim, the bright hedge of steel being sufficient to deter most cavalry attacks, especially if the muskets had caused casualties as the cavalry rode in.

What Shakespeare had called ‘the puissant pike’ may have required more physical robustness to handle but it was hardly demanding of great skill. During the
Restoration its cheap cost and its relatively easier handling meant the weapon remained popular in the militia throughout the seventeenth century.

Militia cavalrymen had to muster with a sword and a pair of pistols with barrels of no less than fourteen inches. New swords could be commissioned for five shillings each during the Restoration period. The militia trooper’s mortuary sword had the advantage of being slightly longer than the infantry’s tuck and was useful for both cutting and thrusting, and its guard gave better protection to the user’s hand. Officers and mounted gentlemen of higher social standing among the cavalry probably used their own swords or even heirlooms such as the longer, much more efficiently balanced and more expensive Pappenheimer – a German design of rapier carried by many of those who had seen service on the continent. Cheap swords were notoriously weighty, blade-heavy, clumsy and difficult to use. The swords used by the horse could cut but their design did not approach the quality of the extremely effective light cavalry sabre of later eras, and they were not well suited for slicing down fleeing infantry.

Ideally batches of new weapons would have been purchased by the county lieutenancy or a senior militia officer but there is no evidence of this happening. Instead it would appear that county authorities generally followed the usual system of devolving the finding of appropriate arms to local parish constables with costs charged to the contributors. A document from the constable of St. Briavels, by virtue of Warrant from deputy lieutenants Sir Duncombe Colchester, William Cooke and Robert Cotherington, to raise the Militia in the Forest of Dean in 1677 requires an unnamed parish constable ‘to collect together the horse, horsemen & armes, in like manner foote soldiers and armes to serve in his Majesties militia…as paid for by the assessment and levied among the inhabitants, and to bring them to the forementioned
lieutenants at the sign of the Bell in Gloucester’. Sent on 20 October 1677, this order gave the parish constables eleven days until 1 November to complete the task. In certain instances arms would have been easy to source from former serving militiamen: one civil officer mentions ‘as belonging to each person are: his musket sord belt and bandoleer (bondyliers) or his pike, sord belt and buufe coate’. Elsewhere, an entry in the accounts of an unspecified Gloucestershire parish constable, states that Thomas Wintle was paid £1 10s 0d for a ‘musket and sord belt and bondylire’, which points to a possible second hand trade in equipment.

In most parishes the availability of new weapons and the money to pay for them would have been limited, and older weapons from ex-royal army sources would have made up the numbers. It is to be wondered if a comment by John Martin, directed at the Lavington men of the Wiltshire Militia’s Devizes Regiment that ‘the [musket] locks being almost eat to pieces with rust’, was not a universal condemnation of militia weapons but rather evidence of one parish constable’s financially prudent, if unwise, purchases. Alternatively some local contributors, many being militiamen themselves, might well have taken good care of their personal weapons held in the parish store, but neglected those allocated for general use.

In major cities and towns such as Bath with its well-run public finances, the militia’s weapons were often well stored and cared for. Bath Guildhall had been equipped as an armoury in the 1570s and in 1621 it was fitted with ‘racks to put the pikes on and pins to hang the armour on’. In 1638 John Gray was the Guildhall armourer in receipt of payments to maintain it which included ‘scouring the armour’ and ‘mending the faults in the armoury’. After the restoration, the Ditcher family inherited the role of resident keeper of the arms. In 1662, the armoury restocked its equipment with the purchase of 27 swords and scabbards, 12 pikes, 16 muskets, 16
sets of bandoliers, 27 belts and 37 pounds of powder. Then, just prior to the
Monmouth Rebellion, another refurbishment was undertaken with the following
expenditure:

Table 6.3.2: Items drawn from the Bath Corporation payment accounts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paid Samuel Ditcher for mending a sword &amp; Pyke</td>
<td>1s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid John Doulton for two Pikes heads which he pd for at the p.ton.</td>
<td>4s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid Geo. Newman which he laid out for a Pykes head at Wells</td>
<td>1s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid to a soldier Richard Short for mending his musket</td>
<td>6d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BRO. The Chamberlain’s Rolls, Accounts rendered to the Corporation of the City of Bath. General Payments 1685-86

John Ditcher was supervisor of leather on 27 September 1686 and he was still
in post, possibly with increased duties, in 1690 when he was paid 5s for ‘cleansing 8
swords and keeping them in repair for two years.’

Small parishes did not have this degree of civic support and those weapons
recorded by Martin at Lavington may also have been brought out of the parish store at
the time of the crisis to arm newly raised men and subsequently found to be in a sorry
condition due to neglect. However, Martin does not say that these muskets were
discarded because of their rusted firing mechanisms. Even damaged muskets could
still be employed. Without a serpentine to grip the match or indeed a lock of any sort,
a matchlock could still be used effectively by manual touch-firing – holding the lit
match between finger and thumb and jabbing it into the primed pan. Despite Martin’s
derisory comments there is no evidence that the condition of these particular weapons
prevented the militiamen of Lavington from going on campaign or that anybody
marched unarmed. It may be that those whose muskets were unusable were re-
equipped with pikes but there is no record of such action.

Before the civil wars many corporations and parishes had owned weapons, but
most of these were requisitioned by royal or parliamentarian forces during the 1640s.
However, there were stocks of guns remaining in private hands through the 1660s and 1670s. Such items were available for purchase by constables in small quantities from individuals anxious not to fall foul of the Game Act, and in larger numbers as part of the seizures of arms conducted by the militia themselves. Many privately owned guns would have been fowling pieces designed to fire birdshot rather than ball but were nevertheless seized before 1683. However, there were sufficient numbers of military style muskets collected to help arm or re-arm those who seized them.

His Majesty having received an account concerning the arms seized from dangerous and disaffected persons in Cornwall, would have you give order to your Deputy Lieutenants that such of them as are useful for arming the militia be deposited for that purpose in such place as you shall think most convenient and that the rest be sent to Pendennis and delivered to the Kepper of the Magazine there.

Similar letters went to other lord lieutenants. The frequent arms searches undertaken by the militia upon orders from the Secretary of State gave the opportunity for several lord lieutenants through the assizes to gather reports from their deputies and militia officers about the arms held in their counties. Forbidden by Secretary Jenkins’ letter of 10 July 1683 from confiscating dress swords and fowling pieces, Gainsborough, lord lieutenant of Hampshire wrote reports which stated that many of the arms found were those purchased by contributors for arming the militia and stored by their owners for issue to the men when they were called to muster. Any repercussions from this flouting of the law by those connected with the militia is not recorded, however Gainsborough’s reports brought about another Council edict that these weapons too were to be collected along with any others suitable for the militia and stored somewhere centrally. On 28 May 1683 Sunderland wrote to the Earl of Bridgewater, lord lieutenant of Buckinghamshire & Hertfordshire:
I have acquainted the king with your letter of the 23rd, desiring directions whether you may return to those who are assessed for the militia such arms as they are appointed to send. His intention is that such arms as were seized and belonged to the militia should be kept for the use of the militia and should not be returned to the persons they were taken from, but be employed for arming the persons who appear on the trainings without arms by reason those who send them had their arms taken from them.  

Similar letters were sent to other lord lieutenants.

The locations of these stores and their security were local decisions: some weapons went to town or guild halls, as in Bath and Devizes, while others went to church towers where pikes could be accommodated. In Hampshire those that did not go into local authority stores were sent to the Great Magazine at Portsmouth.

There was no problem of supply among the militia officers who purchased their own weaponry; Francis Lutterell laying out 1l 2s for a leading pike with a gold head, 1l 8s for a partisan, and 3l 7s for a gold sword. Militia foot officers might have carried a pistol of their own as, under the Game Act, gentlemen were permitted the possession of more discreet firearms for personal protection, but in military use pistols were essentially cavalry weapons for delivering close-range fire upon targets in order to weaken them before a melee, for fighting at close quarters, and for alarm signalling on patrol. The flintlock pistol was adopted to make loading on horseback easier than its wheel-lock predecessor. Pistols with lock inscriptions denoting they were issued during the reign of James II are very rare and most royal troopers carried the weapons of the previous reign, although the possibility exists that some older militia troopers might have retained a wheel-lock out of personal choice. Pistols varied in length according to the beliefs and styles of the gunsmith. By a royal order of 1630 pistol dimensions were set at eighteen inch barrels and twenty six inches overall but shorter versions evolved later in the century. Pistols were issued in pairs.
with holsters which were strapped over the pommel of the saddle. Pistol bores varied too, with examples ranging up to 36 balls per pound weight, although the 24 bore was common.  No references discovered indicate the militia cavalry had pistols issued centrally, although they do appear to have carried them along with carbines, all supposedly supplied by contributors. In March 1689 one contributor, keen to excuse his substitute for appearing without a helmet lists the accoutrements he provided in 1685 thus:

I have sent my man & horse to wait upon you with pistols, Carabin, sword and buff coat onely he hath never a pot nor doe I know where to have one of present till I have sent to London. If after the discontinuance of the Militia for five yeares we have not everything in readiness at the first muster of horse you will do me the favour to excuse me that the next meeting every thing shall be compleat. If I had known that a pot had been required I would have had one as well as other armes, but as I remember there was no such thing demanded in the Duke of Monmouth's invasion wch was the last time I think of raying the horse.

Despite the advance in technology the pike was still regarded as the nobler weapon of the foot. It cost substantially less than a musket so it is feasible that the number of pikemen in a company of militia would have been higher than that found in the royal army. During the civil wars the ratio of musketeers to pikemen had gradually diminished. Beginning at one musketeer to two pikemen it gradually evolved into two musketeers to one pikeman. Chandler maintains that by 1685 the ratio was generally five musketeers for each pikeman, and yet the numbers deduced from examining various sources relative to the royal battalions at Sedgemoor convey a different picture.
Table 6.3.3: The strengths of the royal foot at the Battle of Sedgemoor, 1685.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Companies</th>
<th>Musketeers</th>
<th>Pikemen</th>
<th>Grenadiers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The First Regiment of Foot Guards, 1st Battalion</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First Regiment of Foot Guards, 2nd Battalion</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Second Regiment of Foot Guards (Coldstreams)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Royal Regiment of Foot (Dumbarton's)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Queen Dowager's Regiment (Kirke's)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Queen Consort's Regiment (Trelawney's)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1,038</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6.3.3: above shows an average of just over two musketeers for every pikeman in the Guards and three to one in the line regiments. It is unlikely that the numbers of musket-armed men in the militia would have varied much from this ratio.

The document ‘A list of Trayned Band Soldiers within the City of New Sarum under the command of Captaine Richard David’ lists, ‘35 muskets 30 corseletts 37 muskets’ 97 This statement also sounds like the tactical layout of the company with pikemen in the centre with sleeves of shot on either flank. As the New Sarum Company contained many of the wealthier urban tradesmen it is likely that their ratio of approximately seven musketeers to three pikeman might be higher than the rural parish-based units.

As stated above, each cavalryman carried a sword as his primary weapon but the sword was also the symbol of the soldier. During the civil wars Parliament commissioned vast numbers of cheap, unbalanced hacking broad or short swords, or tucks, with a rudimentary guard at a basic cost of 4s 6d. 98 Cavalry swords were more expensive at 7s 6d. 99 It is likely that many of these weapons went into private hands after the wars and resurfaced as contributions to arming the militia. Local constables were thus probably quite able to meet the militia demand for second-hand swords.
Table 6.3.4: The cost of weapons and equipment supplied to soldiers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Back, breast &amp; pot</td>
<td>14s 6d</td>
<td>1640s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot Sword</td>
<td>4s 6d</td>
<td>1640s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse Sword</td>
<td>7s 6d</td>
<td>1640s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pike</td>
<td>3s 4d</td>
<td>1657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse Sword</td>
<td>8s</td>
<td>1660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sword &amp; belt</td>
<td>10s</td>
<td>1683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols &amp; sword</td>
<td>£1 14s</td>
<td>1696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot sword</td>
<td>5s</td>
<td>1696</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6.4. CONCLUSION.

There is ample evidence to show that most militia units had a military appearance and bearing. Although probably having to wear their own civilian breeches and shirts the majority of the militia foot regiments, and probably most cavalry troops, had uniform regimental coats and whilst the style and cut may have varied there was an intention that the colour should not. However, results from period dyes may have caused a problem and a somewhat varied appearance. Many militia units also had uniformly coloured stockings, notably in Wales. Although unable to compare with the Guards, as neither the county, the contributors nor the militia officers could afford or wished to incur comparable expenditure on their men’s clothing or equipment, militiamen dressed as soldiers and their senior officers would have been largely indistinguishable from those of the royal army.

They carried similar weapons to those of the royal troops, including that universal symbol of the soldier, the sword, and although they likely lacked their share of flintlocks, the populations of the towns through which they paraded would probably not have noticed the difference. The fact that they carried firearms and pikes would have underlined their special military status, and the crowds would also
have seen military style flags, ammunition carts and officers’ carriages akin to those of the royal army.

The militias sounded military too. There are no records of militia bands, and the introduction of the military fife was still some time in the future, but people would have heard the steady cadence of the drums and their distinctive calls which could summon, dismiss or cause the men to perform manoeuvres. They would also hear the rhythmic rattle of the bottles on the bandoliers typical of any passing body of soldiers. The militia marched like most troops of the period with drums beating and colours flying.

The Duke of Beaufort was impressed by militia displays in 1685 at which large numbers of men performed disciplined drills. During these martial demonstrations a slight lack of synchronisation of movements might have betrayed the fact that these were not full-time troops, but their overall appearance did not. To those who saw them the militias conformed to the visually powerful image of soldiers with a military appearance and bearing which led people to regard them as an effective military body, encouraging an associated mystique and sense of awe.

Having established that the militia was effective in appearing like soldiers and were armed like them too, the next chapter investigates if they could perform like them especially in a time of emergency.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. Wolseley, op.cit., p. 274.


3. Atkinson, C.T., Two Hundred and Fifty Years Ago: James II and his Army in Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, XIV, pp. 1-11. Childs, Charles II; Childs, James II; Ede-Borrett, S., op.cit.; Scott, Armies.; Tincey, J., British Army.

4. GRO. P354 CO 1/1. Various Constables’ accounts, including lists of persons providing arms, lists of cloth delivered to make soldiers’ coats and accounts for their manufacture, pay accounts for militia soldiers and accounts for the purchase of arms etc., 1684-86.


6. Snapsacks were personal leather, sausage-shaped, draw-string kit bags slung on a strap across an infantryman’s shoulder or hung somewhere off a cavalryman’s horse-furniture.

7. Beauchamp, P.C., op. cit., p. 24. This was such a large amount of money at that time that the coats might have been emblazoned or even finished with lacing and ornate buttons.


10. BL. Add.34176, f.80.


13. James II’s Colour Book lists and depicts all his regiments’ uniforms and colours. Its unknown author created it in 1686 and it is held in the Royal Library at Windsor Castle.

14. Nothing substantially threatening was happening in February 1683 the date of these accounts. Charles II was ill but he had been so before. There is nothing to suggest this spending on the militia was anything out of the ordinary.

15. NA. SP28/299/991.


17. Given the variable quality of dye and dyers’ processes, although the core colour of regiment’s coats may have been the same it is not unreasonable to suggest that shades varied, as they did in the royal army, although probably not to the same degree.

18. GRO. D9125/923; GRO. D2079/111/30 and GRO. D1637/Z1 G


20. The description is ambiguous in Wade, and has provoked debate, notably between Tincey and Ede-Borrett. ‘Warfare in the Seventeenth Century Conference sponsored by the Royal Armouries, Leeds 1992. Although these colours could have been reversed, it is generally held that these coats were red wool lined with purple serge.


23. Ibid.


28. Shoulder knots were loops of ribbon gathered at a point and stitched into the shoulder seam of a coat for decoration. A flounce was a similar item but worn elsewhere, usually on a hat or helmet or to the side of the knee – the term could also be applied to garters of cascading lace worn below the knee.

29. Throughout his account Dinely pays great attention to recording to inscriptions, monuments and effigies in churches but leaves blanks for a lot of the small detail regarding the militia such as officers’ names and flag and coat colours; it would seem he never returned to complete his text.

GRO. P354 CO 1/1 Various Constables’ accounts, etc.; W&SHC; 1553/22 The Commonplace Book of Sir Edward Baynton of Bromham; Dinley, op.cit., pp. 92, 201,297. See also Source references to Table 4.1.2.


Tincey, ibid.


GRO. P354 CO 1/1. op cit.


NA. SP28/127/part 3

NA. SP28/147/243

NA. SP28/35/640

GRO. P354 CO 1/1. Various Constables’ accounts, etc.

Rochester Guildhall Museum, accession numbers: A3086, A3087 & A3088. Referred to in the Rochester Cathedral Accounts for May 31st 1684: ‘Six new buff coats £15.2s.6d. Paid 1s.6d. for bringing them down from London’.

The provenance of the pikeman’s armour, accession numbers: A3101 and A3102, is proffered Rochester Museum Assistant Curator Stephen Nye, working from a predecessor’s notes.

Case label in Rochester Museum.

To distinguish one side from another in an age when opposing armies could look identical the men would fasten distinctive badges to their headwear such as sprigs of greenery or pieces of paper.


Richard Chandler to Thomas Jervoise, HRO: 44M69/F6/8/1 sorted alphabetically by name of correspondent 1679 – 1698. Item 4. 1690.

HRO: 11M49/F/05 Volume containing memoranda relating to Charles, 1st Duke of Bolton as Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire, Lord Warden of the New Forest, lord of various manors in Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Hampshire and Wiltshire, and Colonel of a Regiment of foot in the Hampshire Volunteer Force. 1672-1699. Item 11. 20 December 1689

Ibid Item 4. 23 April 1689.

NA. SP2819/393


The usual helmet, or pot, worn by the cavalry had a face guard with three vertical bars attached to a protruding brim forming a defence which could be raised when not required. These helmets were also fitted with ear pieces and a neck guard with ribbed strengthening. The back and breast were two body-shaped armour plates, hung from the shoulders and held together by leather belts.

Hay, op. cit., p.56.


Probably calculated at a halfpenny each then a discount deducted for bulk purchase.

Norrey, op.cit., p. 791

Tincey, op. cit. p.18.

GRO. P354 CO 1/1.


W&SHC. 490/1410

Nagel, L.C. op. cit.

Dr. L. Prince of Birmingham University, September 2008.


Brod, cit.


Whale, op. cit., p.131.

Blackmore, D. op. cit., p.69.


GRO. P354 CO 1/1 Various Constables’ accounts, including lists of persons providing arms, lists of cloth delivered to make soldiers’ coats and accounts for their manufacture, pay accounts for militia soldiers and accounts for the purchase of arms etc., 1684-86...

*Statutes at Large, from the fifth year of King James the First to the tenth year of King William the Third* (London, 1763), vol. VIII, 13 and 14 Car.II. cap. 3, s. 21.

GRO. D2026 X23 Document from the Constable of St. Briavels to raise the militia in the Forest of Dean, 1677. Account of parish monies of St. Briavels by constable George Bond, including report on repairs to roads & bridges and the militia. 1681.

GRO. P354 CO 1/1 Various Constables’ accounts, etc.

Ibid.


Wroughton, op.cit., p.49.

Ibid.

BRO. Bath Council Book No 3 1684 – 1711 Council Minutes, vol II., p.8; Chamberlain’s Rolls, op. cit.

HRO: 11M49/F/05 Item 10 – Copy Order to the keepers of the New Forest and all constables and tithingmen in the counties of Dorset, Hampshire and Wiltshire to search for ‘Gunnes, Grayhoundes, dogges, nettes or other Engines’ used to destroy game in the New Forest and to ensure that offenders are brought before a Justice of the Peace. 22 July 1689.

CSPD Entry Book 56. p 99.

CSPD 1683, pp. 93 -94.

CSPD. Entry Book 56, p. 105.


Maxwell-Lyte, op.cit., p.204 -210. A leading pike was a six foot pole arm topped with an ornate engraved or filigree-worked blade-shaped head and was used to indicate direction of march.


Blackmore, op.cit., p.47.

Ibid.

Thomas Higgens to Thomas Jervoise, HRO: 44M69/F6/8/1 sorted alphabetically by name of correspondent 1679 – 1698. Item 10.


Chandler, op.cit., p.184.

W&SHC. G23/1/41 As musketeers were sometimes known as muskets or shotte, so pikemen were called pike or corselettes which was the name given to their armour.

The tuck was a short, heavy, cheap sword, mass-produced for the military.

Turton, *Chief Strength...* op.cit., p.12.

The sound of the rattling bottles was the distinctive sound of seventeenth-century soldiers.
Chapter Seven

PERFORMANCE

‘It is clear from the letters written by the commanders at the front to Sunderland that though they wished to attack they feared to move without direct orders from the King.’

Having established that the militia was fit for service it remains to see if it was effective in being able to perform its duties when required to do so. It should be able to demonstrate mobility, the ability to engage in combat and the ability to reorganise. This involves being able to be at the right place within expected time limits and, once there, to achieve the objectives determined by the high command. Having completed a task an effective military body should be able to react quickly to alternative orders, including returning to action if it had been fighting. This chapter examines evidence relating to the West Country militias’ performances – their ability to meet these requirements.

7.1. MARCHING.

Seventeenth-century soldiers, whether mounted or not, marched everywhere, carrying most of their equipment. For the infantry moving meant walking. Cavalry troopers rode but it was no less a strenuous and demanding exercise, especially when feeding, watering and generally caring for their horses preceded any attention to personal comfort at the beginning and end of each day. Troops were often accompanied by wagons carrying ammunition, barrels of powder and in the royal army some larger equipment such as tents or split-hazel hurdles for shelters. When units marched a train of carriages travelled with it. The militia were never issued with
tents or shelters but its marches included the movement of wagons requisitioned by the lord lieutenants for the transport of supplies.

The accepted day’s march distance for a seventeenth-century army was approximately twelve miles per day. Table 7.1.1 is an analysis of the marches made by the two forces prior to the battle of Naseby in 1645, some fifteen years before the Restoration.

Table 7.1.1: The marches of the armies before Naseby in 1645

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>FACTION</th>
<th>DEPART</th>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>MILES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 June</td>
<td>Royalist</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>Market Harborough</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 June</td>
<td>Parliamentarian</td>
<td>Oxford area</td>
<td>Marsh Gibeon</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 June</td>
<td>Parliamentarian</td>
<td>Marsh Gibeon</td>
<td>Great Brickill</td>
<td>12 or 17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/7 June</td>
<td>Royalist</td>
<td>Market Harborough</td>
<td>Daventry</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 June</td>
<td>Parliamentarian</td>
<td>Great Brickell</td>
<td>Sherington</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 June</td>
<td>Parliamentarian</td>
<td>Sherington</td>
<td>Stony Stratford</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 June</td>
<td>Parliamentarian</td>
<td>Stony Stratford</td>
<td>Wootton</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 June</td>
<td>Parliamentarian</td>
<td>Wootton</td>
<td>Kislingbury</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/12 June</td>
<td>Royalist</td>
<td>Daventry</td>
<td>Market Harborough</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 June</td>
<td>Parliamentarian</td>
<td>Kislingbury</td>
<td>Guilsborough</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 June</td>
<td>Royalist</td>
<td>Market Harborough</td>
<td>Naseby</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 June</td>
<td>Parliamentarian</td>
<td>Guilsborough</td>
<td>Naseby</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*The army marched by two different routes.

The average daily rate for these marches was thirteen and half miles per day. In a forced march when time was short, the foot, unencumbered by large wheeled transports, could achieve double this rate and horse even more. However, senior officers had to ensure they did not exhaust their men and that their provisions could keep pace with them.² The demands of campaign marching, the time of year, the condition of the roads and the loads to be carried had not changed in the forty years between the Naseby and Sedgemoor campaigns and the march record of the Salisbury Regiment of the Wiltshire Militia records the following daily distances during 1685.
Table 7.1.2: The marches of Wyndham’s Regiment in 1685.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DEPART</th>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>MILES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 June</td>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>Wilton</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-20 June</td>
<td>Presumably provisioning &amp; training at Wilton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 June</td>
<td>Wilton</td>
<td>Market Lavington</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June</td>
<td>Market Lavington</td>
<td>Chippenham</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 June</td>
<td>Chippenham</td>
<td>Bath</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June</td>
<td>Bath</td>
<td>Bradford-on Avon</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June</td>
<td>Bradford-on-Avon</td>
<td>Trowbridge</td>
<td>4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 June</td>
<td>Trowbridge</td>
<td>Frome then Trowbridge</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 June</td>
<td>Trowbridge</td>
<td>Bath</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June</td>
<td>Bath</td>
<td>Bradford-on-Avon then Bath</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>Bath</td>
<td>Frome</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>Fighting at, then pacifying Frome &amp; implementing the King’s Pardon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July</td>
<td>Frome</td>
<td>Shepton Mallet</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 July</td>
<td>Shepton Mallet</td>
<td>Somerton, Sedgemoor then Charlton</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 July</td>
<td>There is no entry for 3 July, presumably resting with the army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 July</td>
<td>Charlton</td>
<td>Middlezoy</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 July</td>
<td>There is no entry for 5 July – some postings to Othery.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 July</td>
<td>The regiment was involved in rounding up and guarding prisoners around Sedgemoor and Westonzoyland.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 July</td>
<td>Middlezoy</td>
<td>Glastonbury</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July</td>
<td>Glastonbury</td>
<td>Wells then Norton St Philip</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 July</td>
<td>Norton St. Philip</td>
<td>Devizes</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A very hurried withdrawal.

Italicics indicate what the regiment did when it remained in one location


The table shows that during 22 days on campaign Wyndham’s Regiment of Militia covered approximately 212 miles at an average rate of nine and two thirds miles per day or, approximately, thirteen and a third miles per day in sixteen days marching. There were only two so-called rest days and their rate of march would have been slightly faster if the four-mile hasty retreat to Trowbridge is discounted. The non-march days were spent undergoing training and rounding up rebels, not resting. Wheeler records some long marches for the period, notably 21 June and 22 June, as well as 2 July and 7 July. They well exceed the expected daily distance.
Wadham Wyndham’s Journal gives different mileages which are slightly less and his dates and locations can also vary. He notes the taking of Frome as 25 June whereas Wheeler’s realigned schedule puts it 30 June. Wyndham had no scale map, his distances were estimates, and it would appear that he either marched with a different regiment or undertook slightly different marches. For example although Wheeler states that John Wyndham’s Red Regiment marched from Glastonbury to Sedgemoor and then back to Charlton, Wadham Wyndham notes a move directly from Glastonbury to Charlton. He estimates the march from Charlton to Middlezoy the next day as eight miles but on a scale map the distance is double that. Waylen notes the source for Wyndham as ‘Communicated by Wadham Wyndham Esq. to the late Mr. Hatcher the historian of Salisbury’ which makes the account third hand. Wheeler’s account is a contemporary primary source for march details, and modern scale maps are more accurate than contemporary estimates of mileages.

To compare these march distances with those of royal troops, Colonel Piercy Kirke’s Regiment of veteran royal soldiers, which had served for several years in Tangiers, left Hounslow Camp on 15 June and arrived in Chard on 21 June; a distance of about 130 miles in 6 days at an average speed of 20 miles per day. Given that Kirke’s was a march in extremis, then Wyndham’s militia average of 13, and on some days covering 23 or 25 miles, was a good effort for men unaccustomed to prolonged marching. Albermarle’s Devon Militia managed the 18 miles from Exeter to Honiton in a day whilst Lutterell’s Somerset Militia undertook 17 miles from Crewkerne to Axminster in one day. None of these militia marches are recorded as forced, and were accepted by Wheeler as normal campaign marches.

An examination of Wyndham’s march to Sedgemoor and Marlborough’s famous march to the Danube provides a near-contemporary comparison between a
royal army and a militia campaign march. Both Wyndham’s militiamen and Marlborough’s royal troops covered over 200 miles accompanied by ammunition carts and officers’ baggage vehicles, and both forces used major roads. Wyndham’s, however did not march alongside a substantial river which considerably eased transport burdens. Although the condition of the roads cannot be accurately assessed it should be borne in mind that Wyndham’s men spent the last four days of their march in torrential rain which must have slowed progress and sapped the men’s strength. Although generally accepted as a prodigious achievement, Marlborough’s battalions did not undertake a forced march. The March to the Danube took place only nineteen years after the Monmouth Rebellion and there is plenty of primary source evidence. Captain Robert Parker of the Royal Irish Regiment recalled: ‘We frequently marched three sometimes four days successively then halted a day… four leagues or four and a half each day’. A British league is approximately three miles, and with a daily march of four leagues it meant they covered twelve miles per day. Parker’s rate of three marching and one resting days, indicates coverage of approximately 36 miles every four days or an average of 9 miles per day overall.

This march was regarded as a considerable feat, yet its average of nine miles per day is less than Wyndham’s Regiment’s nine and a half. Nor did Marlborough’s men find it easy. Kit Davies, the so-called female dragoon because of military service disguised as a man, recalled ‘…long, tiresome marches which greatly harassed our Foot…’. If Parker maintains the average daily march was four leagues, (twelve miles) Wyndham’s Regiment exceeded this nine times, equaled it twice, and doubled it on two occasions. Marlborough’s Army departed Bedburg 19 May 1704 and arrived near Ulm 28 June 1704 having covered 250 miles in 40 days, an average of just over six miles per day, whereas Wyndham’s Regiment covered 212 miles in 22 days.
averaging just over nine and a half miles per day. A lot of Marlborough’s regiments had their kit in barges on the Danube but when Wyndham’s was encumbered by a train, as it was between 6 and 8 July when ordered to escort the Royal guns, it marched from Weston Zoyland to Devizes, some 54 miles, averaging fourteen miles a day. Examining the marches of the various militia units during 1685 makes it clear that the West Country militia could march effectively when called upon to do so.

7.2. TAKING PART IN A CAMPAIGN.
The operational role of the militia was to take part in a defensive campaign against ‘any Foreiner or Strangers with force to invade this Realme’\(^9\) This meant having to contain a hostile invasion force near to its landing point until the arrival of royal forces and, thereafter, to co-operate with them by securing strategic objectives or supporting field operations as a reserve. The conduct of such a campaign was left to the judgment of the lord lieutenants and their individual interpretation of their instructions from the Secretary of the Privy Council, as influenced by local circumstances. However the achievement of militia objectives to thwart rebellion or invasion can be identified according to specific campaign tasks, namely: resisting landings; containment by securing towns, ports, roads and bridges; securing lines of communications; preventing reinforcements reaching invaders or rebels; and suppressing sympathetic uprisings in potentially disaffected locations.

In the popular imagination guarding against invasion meant resisting a landing by hostile forces, conjuring up images of fighting on beaches. For the militia to be successful in this task it was dependent upon the receipt of timely intelligence of such attacks being received in order to permit them to assemble and march to the specified invasion site in advance of any landing. This had been possible at Falmouth in 1666.
as de Ruyter made no secret of his intentions, and his progress down the Channel was well observed and alarms raised.\textsuperscript{11} Similarly, the Cornwall Militia’s rapid assembly and appearance at the quayside in Padstow was sufficient to deter a landing by pirates in 1692.\textsuperscript{12} Although rumour was rife in 1685 the Council did not despatch instructions to summon the militia to muster until 13 June, two days after Monmouth had landed and even then it failed to specify that they should assemble at the ports or man the south coast sea defences.\textsuperscript{13} In Exeter, Albemarle was the first lord lieutenant to hear of Monmouth’s arrival. Whether by sagacious, pre-emptive action or by coincidence he had mustered the Devon Militia at Exeter on 11 June but was not alerted to the landing until a message sent at midnight from deputy searcher of customs, Samuel Dassul, arrived during the early hours of 12 June.\textsuperscript{14} Lack of intelligence rendered the militias too late to resist the landing. Had Albemarle or Strangways gained foreknowledge of the invasion, a show of force on the shore would probably have deterred the landing force of just 82 men.

However, the militias were not too late to contain the rebels by denying them access to major roads into the hinterland of Lyme Regis. This was an important campaign objective when resisting an invasion or port-based insurrection, especially where holding bridges across rivers. After the Battle of Bridport, the Dorset Militia operating in the Yeovil area hovered on Monmouth’s south-eastern flank, protecting the line of the upper River Parrett and screening the major south coast road. After the incident at Axminster the Devon Militia denied the rebels the road to the west by holding Honiton and the line of the River Otter. They then spent the remainder of the campaign closing down Monmouth’s westward options – firstly by securing Taunton and the River Tone and then blockading the western approaches to Bridgwater.

Pembroke, with the Wiltshire Militia and several battalions of the Hampshire Militia,
prevented the rebels from taking the major road east via Warminster and Devizes. The Somerset Militia held Bath, a major crossing of the River Avon. Conversely, the failure to destroy Keynsham Bridge allowed the rebels to cross into Gloucestershire but subsequent bad weather caused them to retire back over the bridge to seek shelter in the town. News of the presence of the Gloucestershire Militia in Bristol and the supposed proximity of the royal army on the northern bank deterred them from re-crossing. The Gloucestershire Militia also denied Monmouth the roads to Bristol and northwards to Gloucester thereby preventing a crossing of the River Severn and so into the Welsh Marches where another rising was planned to take place.

In any campaign rivers pose considerable barriers to movement, bridges being vital to an army’s wheeled transport and guns. The importance of bridges during the western rising was evident in the number of letters sent to the Duke of Somerset insisting he destroyed Keynsham Bridge, and the alacrity with which Pembroke’s Wiltshire Militia took possession of the bridge at Frome. At Bridport, Strangways with the Dorset Militia, made the mistake of entrusting the town’s west bridge to a small detachment which proved to be no match for the number of rebels sent against it. Nevertheless, the regiment proved themselves more than able to defend the east bridge which, had it fallen, would have opened the rebels’ way to Dorchester. Illustration 7.2.1 shows the effective surrounding of Monmouth’s army.

As a popular figure, Monmouth enjoyed good intelligence of the whereabouts of the various royal forces and, as an experienced soldier, he knew the quality of his men. For this and perhaps others reasons he was unlikely to risk assaults upon concentrated or well fortified militia troops, as at Bath.\textsuperscript{15} Despite there being no discovered evidence of planned co-ordination, by denying him the options of major roads and bridges, the West Country militias forced Monmouth to abandon his
campaign objectives of advancing first on Bristol and thence to London and, subsequently, obliged him to retreat into the West. There they implemented the second stage of a successful containment campaign, in conjunction with the royal army, by slowly tightening the net around him.

Illustration 7.2.1: Strategic positions of the county militias in July 1685.

Source: Adapted from Scott, C.L., *The Armies and Uniforms of the Monmouth Rebellion* (Leigh-on-Sea, Partizan, 2008).
Containment also entails denying the enemy strategic positions, shelter and supplies which necessitates securing towns and especially ports which would facilitate provisioning by sea by a foreign power. Monmouth’s men were made welcome and readily supplied in Chard, Taunton and Bridgwater, all of which the lord lieutenant of Somerset failed to defend in sufficient force but, thereafter, their reception was increasingly muted as towns realised that as quickly as the rebels departed Churchill, Albemarle or one of Somerset’s colonels re-entered and re-established royal control. Royal army commanders were more ruthless than militia officers in demonstrating royal power: Pembroke merely imprisoned Richard Smith, constable of Frome, for declaring the town for Monmouth and attempting to raise men for him. On the other hand, Edward Dummer recorded that during Churchill’s march towards Bristol, ‘Jarvice the Feltmaker’ was hanged ‘about a mile from Pensford, who dyes obstinately’. Equally, Kirke showed no hesitation in hanging rebel prisoners along the Bridgwater Road after the Battle of Sedgemoor. Colonel Wyndham soon learnt the ways of the royal army when ‘His honours Regimt Marched from Glastonbury (where six men were left hanging on the Signe-Post) to Wells’. This is corroborated by Wadham Wyndham: ‘Glastonbury, where we hanged on the White Hart sign post six of the rebels, one of them a lieutenant in Monmouth's army; and immediately stripped naked, in which posture they hung there till about 9 o'clock the next morning.’

Sometimes the militia were effective in dissuading towns from provisioning the rebels despite their arrival being imminent. At Frome the Wiltshire Militia arrived before the rebel vanguard, attacked the rebellious townspeople and seized the bridge. They then entered and secured the town where they read the offer of pardon, arrested the constable for proclaiming Monmouth, disarmed the rebel sympathisers and
promised punishment for any who did not submit. This had the desired effect. At Bridgwater although Somerset’s three hundred men fell back before Monmouth’s reoccupation of the town, the lesson of inevitable retribution had been inculcated into the population. The writer of the *Anonymous Account* related the change in the rebels’ reception: ‘We came well back again to Bridgwater, and were received with wonted love’.21 When Monmouth attempted to fortify the town, ‘the townsmen disapproving it’, he desisted.22

Perhaps influenced by the threat of foreign intervention and ever suspicious of the Dutch, the royal commanders were keen to prevent the rebels taking a major port. One of Monmouth’s prime targets was Bristol where significant numbers of dissenters could aid his cause. If Bristol, the third city and second port in England, fell to him along with its wealth, Dutch arms and even troops could be imported and such a success could encourage other major cities to declare for him. Its ships would also enable communication with other coastal towns, including those in Scotland where Argyle’s Rebellion was supposedly in progress, as well as up the Severn to Gloucester and beyond where more support was promised. Moreover Bristol’s warehouses could supply vast amounts of food and other goods. Bristol was quickly occupied by the Gloucestershire Militia, effectively bolstering that city’s own seven hundred strong militia regiment. Between them they defended the gates and walls, placed eminent dissenters regarded as pro-Monmouth troublemakers under house arrest and locked up numerous potential rebel sympathisers in their chapels by moving against them on a Sunday. Beaufort even threatened to fire the city at the first sign of any insurrection, a gesture that achieved instant compliance from the influential merchant classes.23 As a result, Bristol would not offer the rebels a welcome nor access to its ships, harbours and wharfs.
The West’s next biggest port, Exeter, was secured by the Cornwall Militia whilst Albemarle also installed garrisons at Minehead and Lyme which were both active commercial ports in 1685. Within a week of being summoned the Sussex Militia reinforced the town and city militias of Poole, Lymington, Southampton and Portsmouth. Supported by the navy in the English and Bristol channels, the West Country militias had effectively closed the ports to any potential rebel support from the sea.

Armies need lines of communication connecting them to their supply bases and, sometimes, to their decision-making headquarters. The interruption of enemy supplies, reinforcements and instructions to front-line units is an important campaign goal, as is keeping open one’s own lines of communication. As these often stretch back beyond the theatre of operations, maintaining their security is frequently a role for second line troops such as the militia. Generals always try to keep a substantial friendly force between their supply depots and the enemy but, at one point in his campaign, Feversham made a mistake. As part of the royal army was south of the rebels at Chard with Churchill, by assembling the remainder at Bath Feversham opened a corridor eastwards across southern England running through Westbury, Devizes, Newbury and Reading. Monmouth had the option to cut the royal lines of communication and strike at London. Fortunately for Feversham such a move was forestalled by the Wiltshire and Hampshire Militias who marched to Westbury, whilst the Berkshire Militia stationed themselves at Reading with the Oxfordshire Militia in support. The royal army’s communications were in imminent danger but they were secured by the militia, a debt that was never acknowledged.

The rebels may have received potential succour from towns where they had been warmly received but the speed of the militia’s reoccupation ensured it was not
forthcoming. Monmouth’s army may not have had lines of communication in the strict sense of the term, but whilst Churchill harried the rebels’ rear with his royal troops, Albemarle put the militia into Lyme, Taunton and Bridgwater and kept the major sources of rebel succour from the west under constant threat. Meanwhile Beaufort, Pembroke and Strangways did likewise to the north, east and south. All the lord lieutenants in the field also kept their own communications secure: Albemarle to Exeter, Strangways to Dorchester, Pembroke to Salisbury, Beaufort to Bristol and even Somerset to Bath. As a result of these deployments the militia succeeded in accomplishing another of the strategic functions assigned to them – protecting friendly lines of communication and harrassing or severing those of the enemy.

The prevention of significant numbers of recruits from joining the rebel army had a profound effect on the campaign. All armies need men, especially in a rebellion that seeks to demonstrate its popular appeal. As he had landed with a mere 82 men and initially rallied only a couple of thousand to his cause, recruitment was the lifeblood of Monmouth’s rebellion. Preventing reinforcements from joining the rebel army in the field was therefore a crucial campaign task. Regrettably for the royal cause Somerset failed in this task and allowed Monmouth to march through his county raising significant numbers along the way. A fifth regiment of foot and two troops of horse were added to the rebel army’s strength in Taunton with sufficient additional recruits to add companies of approximately two hundred scythesmen to each of his five regiments in Bridgwater.

Other militias were far more successful. The Gloucestershire and Bristol Militias kept potential recruits under guard in Bristol whilst the Somerset Militia did likewise in Bath. The Gloucestershire Militia even arbitrarily moved potential trouble-makers or recruits. ‘Dissenters were sent prisoners from Bristol to Gloucester
till the rebellion was over. Sixty were sent in a vessel from Rownham, without a mittimus or having been taken before a justice of the peace.27

Upon hearing of Monmouth’s landing Strangway’s Dorset Militia threw a ring of outposts around Bridport to prevent men going to Lyme, and then performed the same function around Yeovil and across north Dorset. Albemarle’s rapid march towards Axminster was a show of force to the villages of East Devon. Pembroke and the Wiltshire Militia were successful in preventing a considerable body of Horse from the Warminster and Westbury region from reaching Monmouth at Norton St Philip as had been promised by a Mr. Adlam.28 Simply showing a presence was often enough - Captain Talbot’s Troop of the Wiltshire Militia Horse rode through the Chew Valley with Oglethorpe’s cavalry patrol as a demonstration of royal power. Both the general pardon and the rain were effective agencies in sapping Monmouth’s numbers but the presence of militia soldiers was an important factor in preventing their replacement. Those who deserted Monmouth were soon arrested and ‘… upon the whole fared worse than those who stood by their leader, as they speedily found themselves in the hands of the militia, who were widely spread over the country.’ 29

Preventing the insurrection from spreading was a major campaign concern and the militia was effective in the suppression of potential rebellion in their own counties and elsewhere. The Gloucestershire Militia’s occupation of Bristol and the Wiltshire Militia’s strike at Frome, ‘where he [Pembroke] forced the Rebels to lay down their armes’, neatly nipped local risings in the bud and militia marches across the rest of their counties appear to have dashed rebel hopes of sympathetic insurrections.30 Monmouth had great expectation of gathering recruits from Frome but the Wiltshire Militia’s response to the town’s early declaration for his cause was reported to the king by Pembroke. It was later published in the London Gazette.
Being informed that the rabble at Frome, headed by the constable, had put up in the market-place the traitorous declaration of Monmouth, he marched thither on Thursday, 25th June last, with 160 horse, and mounted behind some of them thirty-six musketeers. Being arrived near the town, he heard great shouting and beating of drums, and was informed that between 2000 and 3000, upon the notice they had of his coming, were assembled from Warminster and Westbury, some with muskets, some with pistols, some with pikes, and others with scythes. Notwithstanding the small number the Earl of Pembroke had with him, he marched into the town at the head of his muskets, followed by the horse. The assembled multitude seemed at first very resolute; and as the Earl came in at the gate, one fired at him, bidding the rest to fire, when his Lordship came to a particular spot; but in a moment they all threw down their arms, and fled out at the other end of the town. Lord Pembroke, having caused the Declaration to be pulled down, made the constable write, with his own hand, an abhorrence of the same, and a declaration that Monmouth was a traitor, and put it up in the same place, and then committed him to prison.  

The Wiltshire Militia’s success in Frome was in fact rather more difficult to achieve as will be discussed later but the outcome was hailed as a militia success and commemorated on a set of contemporary playing cards. There is no known criticism of this event being depicted as a triumph nor the truth of what occurred disputed. The militia’s effective performance appears to have been accepted as a normal state of affairs. They were expected to beat disorganised rebels and they did so.
Illustration 7.2.1: The Wiltshire Militia dispersing potential rebels in Frome.

Source: Illustrated playing cards produced in 1685 to commemorate the defeat of the Monmouth and Argyll Rebellions; Somerset County Museum.

After the Devon Militia marched out of Exeter any potential rising there was quickly quashed by the arrival of the Cornwall Militia. The Sussex Militia effectively foiled attempts by Christopher Battiscombe, Monmouth’s principal agent, to incite Colonel Dove to raise Lymington whilst the Hampshire Militia did likewise to Sir Francis Rolle’s attempt in the east of the county. By these actions the militia restricted the area of unrest and rebellion to Somersetshire, the one county where the lord lieutenant happened to be a fickle and incapable man who whilst not disloyal, failed to take his responsibilities seriously and when he did act often revealed incompetence. His senior officers may have been wiser to disobey and conduct the campaign as they saw fit rather than follow his instructions – when he bothered to send any.
In order to perform all these essential second line duties it was important that the militia were not thrown away in actions which would hasten their destruction. The government were well aware that in order to be effective in the roles expected of them they had to be kept intact and more importantly alive. Sunderland’s instructions to the lord lieutenants make this abundantly clear. They were told they were trusted to do what they could but to ‘forbear to attempt anything against him, except upon great advantages...’

Beaufort was told to send out troops ‘but at such as distance as to be out of danger and yet so as to give them trouble...’ Whilst even on campaign a strategic warning went out to Albemarle: ‘It being possible that the Duke of Monmouth may go westward, the King would have you keep yourself upon your guard’. Rather than the militia commanders, perhaps it was the council which was overly cautious.

Although it can be shown that the militias of the south west achieved their campaign objectives there remains the overriding question of would they fight, and if they did, would they do so successfully.

7.3. FIGHTING.

Although regarded as part-time soldiers and therefore thought not as proficient or steady as the royal army, the county militias did not have a reputation for running from a fight or being incapable of fighting before 1685. Throughout the civil wars the militias had formed the nuclei of many active regiments, and the Red and the Blue Regiments of the London Trained Bands had proved themselves more than capable of standing under fire and fighting for hours on end at the First Battle of Newbury. Cromwell had used militia regiments within his armies at Preston, Colchester, Dunbar
and Worcester and never once did they fail him. An official letter to Berkshire stated that the militia troops who had charged did good service at the battle of Worcester.  

When reformed in 1660, the concept of the militia fighting as part of the country’s field army was firmly entrenched. Of the Restoration Militia the Duke of Beaufort wrote that he found: ‘...all the gentlemen well inclined to do the King’s service, and the Militia is in very good order for Militia’. During the Dutch Wars they had given good service at Landguard Fort and in Essex during the raid on Rochester where they repulsed a raiding force.

...the Dutch landed some men on Canvey Island in Essex, where they burned down barns and housed and killed some sheep to take on board for provisions. The local militia however, eventually drove them off. The pause in the Dutch operation gave the Englishmen time to move the merchantmen higher up the river, above Gravesend, where the Dutch, uncertain of the state of the shore defences, decided it was too risky to press the attack.  

Moreover it seems that Albemarle despatched some of them to defend Upnor Fort across the Medway from Chatham, putting up ‘a stout resistance in which our Men showed infinite courage, with considerable loss to the enemy.’  

Although the Somerset Militia have a reputation for cowardice and reluctance to fight during the 1685 crisis, Colonel William Helyar wrote of his regiment ‘... Here is fighting every day and horse and foot (anywhere else but where an enemy is) are useless… The way to restore our peace is to beat those who disturb it, and not to be afraid of those that may do it…’ His men were obviously disgruntled and their morale was poor but they still fought. Helyar, however, was optimistic and regarded their fighting spirit as the source of their redemption.

Although second line troops during 1685 most of the western militias came close to action in battlefield support roles. A troop of Wiltshire Horse guarded Oglethorpe’s escape route at Keynsham whilst their foot was in the rear at Norton St
Philip and Sedgemoor. The Green Regiment of the Hampshire Militia secured the bridges over the Parrett during Sedgemoor and was also at Norton St Philip where too the Somerset, Dorsetshire and Oxfordshire Militias were ‘drawn up and posted to the best advantage…’ More Wiltshire Militia Foot and Horse had been in action at Frome whilst mounted Dorset and Devon militiamen were involved in small cavalry skirmishes between Lyme and Bridport and in the Chard area. A party of the Somerset Militia Horse were at Ashill and were involved in smaller clashes when patrols or probes met the rebels elsewhere. The horse from the Gloucestershire Militia was supposedly engaged near Bridgwater but no evidence has been found to substantiate this. We do know, however, that they were sent out.

... it would be very much for his service if you would send out some of your militia horse under good officers to hinder the country from sending in provisions to the rebel...

There were two major engagements of the militia during the crisis. The first took place at Frome as mentioned above. However, Pembroke did not have the encounter all his own way as the London Gazette suggests. Wadham Wyndham gives more information:

... This afternoon, the Earl of Pembroke with three troops of horse, viz. Colonel Penruddoeke's, Captain Willoughby's, and Captain Maskelyn's, and some of our regiment of foot being mounted behind some troopers, and others of the foot on small single horses, marched to Frome, where were gathered together near 1500 rebels armed with muskets, fowling pieces, prongs, &c. They maintained for some time the bridge, but at last were routed.

This passage indicates that three troops of Wiltshire Militia, with some foot mounted for the march, sustained an attack for some time against a substantial number of rebel defenders. Wyndham does not say how 180 troopers and perhaps 200 foot managed to rout an estimated 1,500 rebels. The enemy number is probably a wild
exaggeration but the only way to prevail in this situation was to inflict more casualties in the fighting, have better morale and show a more determined fighting spirit.

The second major engagement was the Dorset Militia’s street battle in Bridport on Sunday 14 June. It is worth examining this event in depth and the events that preceded it. The first blood of the Rebellion had been shed on 12 June at an unknown location between Lyme Regis and Bridport when Major Manley with fifteen rebel troopers intent upon recruiting in Bridport, met a party of the Dorset Militia Horse supported by the constable’s watch. Wade describes the rebels involved as ‘officers and gentlemen that came over with the D.’ who were probably more experienced in military affairs than their opponents, whom they duly charged. Wade does not record numbers but says that, on first contact with one of the militia troops, the rebels killed two men and routed them. However, this flight did not communicate itself to the rest of the militia present, or even to the watch, as Manley, finding the initial militia unit supported by a greater force, turned and retired to Lyme. Whether the fifteen rebels had engaged a leading section of one troop and the ‘greater force’ was the rest, another troop or some of the foot who had occupied Bridport, or even the watch, is unknown. But, despite an element having being overwhelmed, the rest of the militia stood firm. The absence of the exact location is frustrating as an examination of ground would be useful in understanding events – especially if Manley’s men could not see the supporting troops when they first attacked. If lines of sight were obscured the militia horse would also have had no idea of the size of force they were encountering. Wade reports this action as described to him by rebels who took part. They might have reported a militia rout when in fact what they had witnessed was very different. A basic cavalry manoeuvre of the age was to charge into contact, melee briefly then retire quickly and rally. The party that did not retire would claim to
have routed their foes when what they had achieved was to force their enemy to retire first. At Lutzen in 1632 the Imperialist Horse under Piccolomini charged the Swedes seven times. Routs conjure up pictures of fleeing men being cut down amidst wrecked and looted baggage and care must be taken not to confuse the two events.

Manley’s cavalry skirmish was followed up, on 14 June, by part of the rebel army attacking militia forces in the town of Bridport. Forde, Lord Grey, second in command of the rebel forces led the operation but was enjoined to take advice from Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Venner, whom Chandler calls a military man citing his experience as Cromwellian captain. Grey took 300 of the Red Regiment under Major Wade, 100 of the White under Captain Francis Goodenough and 40 cavalry.

On approaching Bridport the vanguard, consisting of Lieutenant Mitchell with 40 of the most experienced musketeers and Captain Thompson with another 100 muskets, pushed ahead. Covered by a thick mist which obscured vision and deadened sound, they surprised the militia sentries before securing and crossing the west bridge. Critics say the militia had neglected to set pickets or vedettes. This view was based upon Wade’s statement that: ‘They had no outguards at all but what we mett with just at the Town’s end…’ Wade was not a military man and the small force Mitchell met was the militia outguard, stationed at an obstacle within the drillbook-prescribed distance from the militia mainguard. The practice of setting vedettes and pickets in front of the outguard was a mid-eighteenth century development, possibly perfected by Marshal Saxe’s light cavalry, and it is inappropriate to expect it in the 1680s.

Wade thought that a scout should have been set further out to give earlier warning but the militia commander Colonel Thomas Strangways, obviously did not. The west bridge was the correct outguard position in relation to the location of his camp to the east of the town. Another site for such an outpost would have been atop a rise on the
Lyme road, a further half a mile away. Strangways may have deemed this too far from the camp to be advisable or practical for an outguard.

Unaware of the size of the attacking force the Militia outguard of about twelve men withdrew upon its mainguard and together they stood to face whatever appeared, as advocated by the drill manual. The rebels advanced towards the mainguard at the crossroads in the town centre and the forces exchanged a volley. The militia are criticised for ‘enduring only one volley’, but a mainguard was composed of a lieutenant, together with a sergeant, a corporal, a drummer and 32 private sentinels. Many of those present would have been pikemen so the mainguard, perhaps having some 20 musketeers, did not engage in a fire-fight with 140 rebel musketeers but quite properly fell back along the High Street to their main camp at the eastern bridge, and en route alerted a party of officers and volunteers billeted in The Bull Inn.

**Illustration 7.3.1: Map of the area of the Battle of Bridport.**

Mitchell’s men easily captured the west of the town, but the Dorset Militia seemingly had no intention of offering serious resistance at that stage, although some dismounted militia troopers apparently got involved in desultory skirmishing among the buildings in West Street. Strangways did not leave an account of his intentions, but it seems he had decided to hold the east bridge in strength. Losing the west of the town did not matter provided he held the east bridge and protected his camp - which Illustration 7.3.3 shows he did by choosing his ground, fortifying it and obliging his adversary to advance into a firetrap.

The rebels gradually prevailed in the street skirmish with the dismounted militia horse, driving them back, securing their untethered horses and advancing up the High Street. Rebel Lieutenants Lillingstone and Brinscombe took small detachments along the north and south roads either side of the main crossroads to provide flank cover while Venner pressed on to the east bridge beyond which were the meadows in which lay the militia camp and stores.

Lieutenant Ascue and a small rearguard of a stand of pikes plus two or three files of musketeers, about 30 men, held the rebel exit route over the west bridge whilst Venner advanced in two parties: one to attack the east bridge frontally and the other to act as a second wave with Grey’s Horse in support. As the second body of rebels passed the main crossroads, several militia officers quartered in The Bull Inn and few troopers in adjoining houses opened fire with pistols and carbines from the windows of their billets. They halted the rebel advance.

Wade joined his commander and ordered the breaking in of the doors, following which the rebels overwhelmed and captured the occupants. Several defenders fled, one hid in the attic while another got out the back door and hid in a bean field. However, another man, Edward Coker, came out from one of these
buildings and shot Venner in the waist but fell dead to Venner’s return of fire. Yet another man, Wadham Strangways, was shot by a rebel musketeer as he tried to pistol rebel Captain Goodenough and take his horse. Both dead men were deputy lieutenants of Dorset, and Strangways was related to Colonel Thomas Strangways, another deputy, who commanded the Dorset Militia in the absence of the lord lieutenant.

Thomas Strangways, although colonel of the Bridport Regiment, is not mentioned as taking a leading role in the fighting and it could be that as a newly appointed king’s emissary placed in temporary overall command of all the county’s forces and recently arrived from London, he may have had the sense to leave the action to a more experienced officer, Colonel Thomas Erle, who as well as being colonel of the Blandford Regiment of Dorset Militia was a major in the royal army. It appears that Erle, having earlier been in Blandford, arrived in time for the fight and may have brought some of his men with him.

The militia force numbered around 1,200 and whilst the cavalry stood in their usual support role, the muskets manned the defences. The east bridge was barricaded and well defended by muskets perhaps performing the eight or six rank firings advocated by contemporary drill books. Whoever set the deployment also placed men in the buildings lining the street as it approached the barricade. This was a skilfully managed plan of defence which obliged the attackers to advance into a constricted place where they would be subjected to close range crossfire. This they duly did in some disorder, due in no small part to the way the road narrows as it approaches the bridge. Had the rebels been advancing down East Street in an ordered line they would have been gradually forced to edge left as the gap between the houses narrowed by about thirty percent, causing ranks to bunch and order to be lost.
Illustration 7.3.2: East Street as it approaches the bridge. The narrowing of the thoroughfare can be clearly seen.

If such bunching occurred then it is more than likely that the rebels would have arrived before the barricade in disorder with restricted room to perform their firings. Illustration 7.3.3 shows how the Militia defenders were able to bring more fire to bear from the barricade, the riverbank and the surrounding houses than could the rebels at the entrance to the main street.

Illustration 7.3.3: Diagram map of the fight at Bridport’s East Bridge.

Source: Author’s drawing after site visit. Not to scale. North is to the right.
Illustration 7.3.4: The East Bridge area at Bridport Today.
Taken from the site of the militia line near the river. The bridge (far left) is wide enough for ten files of musketeers while a further forty files had a line of sight within arc

Source: Author’s collection

With Venner wounded, Wade led the attack followed by Grey’s Horse. Mitchell’s musketeers gave the barricade a volley which shook the militia defenders, but their ‘officers had with much adoe prevailed upon theyre souldiers to stand’, maintain their line, and return fire. Grey pushed the rebel cavalry through its foot and tried to advance upon the barricade but another volley from the militiamen killed two of Mitchell’s infantry and caused them to shrink backwards. Some fled, upon which the mounted force broke and bolted for Lyme. The discouraged rebels wavered but Wade steadied them by bringing up his second body. However, before the reinforcements could make any difference Venner ordered a retreat, then rode off to Lyme himself. Wade extracted the force in good order, bringing in the two flank guards and performing a fighting retreat, first back up East Street and then down West Street. The militia left their barricade and firing sporadically advanced to retake the ground they had earlier abandoned, including the crossroads and the western part of
the town. Edward Dummer, who was not present but was with the Royal Trayne of Artillery, claims that the Dorset Militia, ‘charg’d the Rebells, kill’d 7 of them and took 23 prisoners; the rest retiring in disorder to Lyme’. The retreating rebels made a stand at the west bridge and set up ‘an ambuscade of musketeers … near the bridge to give them good entertainment’. Wade states that the Dorset militiamen would not come on, preferring to shout abuse and take the odd random shot from the safety of the middle of the town.

Chandler says ‘the affair at Bridport petered out’. He also claims ‘a fair number of red-coated militiamen also deserted to join the cause’, but provides no evidence for either assertion. Macaulay styles it, ‘A confused and indecisive action … such as was to be expected when two bands of ploughmen, officered by country gentlemen and barristers, were opposed to each other.’ Clifton describes the engagement in a brief paragraph, relegating it to a minor skirmish. These descriptions are surprising given that Venner and Wade planned and executed a daring action and Strangways and Erle defended their position well. It is also curious that the performance of the Dorset Militia at Bridport is dismissed lightly particularly considering Erle’s later military career (see Appendix 3, page 365).

The image of the Dorset Militia fighting adequately at Bridport did not sit comfortably with the pattern of universal denigration that was apparently already being organised in London. Six days after the engagement on 20 June, Sunderland told Lord Abingdon that Churchill had arrived at Bridport with nine companies of regular foot, thus implying that the town was now safe and reliance upon the militia was at an end. However, Churchill and his cavalry had reached Bridport on 17 June, three days after the engagement. The royal infantry en route were Kirke’s five companies which were no further than Chard on 21 June. Belittling the militia’s
efforts, Sunderland implied that the engagement at Bridport would have been a very different affair had royal companies been present. Undoubtedly it would have been as in action second line troops cannot be compared to front line units. However, no royal foot could have been at Bridport in time and there is certainly no mention of them being present in the letter Colonel Strangways sent to Colonel William Helyar on 17 June.  

It is however not the success at Bridport but the failure at Axminster on 15 June that features more prominently in accounts of the militia’s performance during the Monmouth Rebellion. Therefore, that too is worthy of closer examination. On Monday 15 June 1685 three forces converged on the small town of Axminster. To the modern tactician it would appear that the Devon and Somersetshire Militias had caught Monmouth’s Army in a two pronged manoeuvre and being of superior strength and possibly of better quality, should have successfully performed a pincer attack and won a victory. However, the two militia forces not only left the rebels unmolested but withdrew, leaving them in possession of both the town and the road to Taunton. Macaulay says that both militia forces refused to fight, ran away, and substantial numbers of them deserted or went over to the rebels. James II used this incident as an example of the militia’s inability to fight and to perform in the field and by extension it became a major fulcrum to decry the ineffectiveness and loyalty of the militia in general. The king’s attitude was echoed by his contemporary political supporters and also by subsequent historians, some of whom also accuse the Devon Militia of succumbing to a panic-stricken flight.

Albemarle, who commanded the Devon Militia at Axminster, was a courtier by disposition rather than a soldier, but as mentioned earlier he was from a West Country family and he was a high-ranking peer whose father had been Commander in
Chief of the Army and the author of a book on how to engage in war.\textsuperscript{75} Although Captain and Colonel of His Majesty’s Troop of Horse Guards which effectively made him Commander in Chief of the royal army, Albemarle was without military experience and held a titular, honorific appointment. Rather than riding with his royal regiment Albemarle exercised his right to field command of the Devon Militia force and was respected and trusted by his men. The Duke of Somerset, the lord lieutenant of Somerset, was not at Axminster but at Bath and had given command to local regiment commanders of the Somerset Militia rather than concentrating his force.

The two local commanding officers were Colonel Francis Lutterell and Colonel Sir Edward Phelipps who had both held rank as militia officers for some time. Lutterell had been commissioned as a colonel in 1681 despite his having little military experience but like many of the gentry, he appears to have managed his peacetime role adequately.\textsuperscript{76} Phelipps had been an officer of the militia since his gaining his lieutenancy in 1661. He became a lieutenant colonel in 1666 and colonel in 1679, acquiring a reputation for severity both with his men and in his conduct during house searches and the disruption of conventicles.\textsuperscript{77} There was no question of excusing the militia’s conduct at Axminster by claiming that the men were serving under lenient or unfamiliar local officers. By proposing an Axminster rendezvous, Albemarle was trying to gather all available local forces to bar Monmouth’s way in a defensive position and to offer battle in advantageous circumstances according to his orders, but the decision had its implications. By rendezvousing in Axminster the men of Lutterells’ and Phelipps’ Regiments would cross the county line, and had they joined forces Albemarle would assume overall command by virtue of holding senior rank and the king’s orders that:
In the case of two or more Lieutenants shall be together, the Lieutenant who is in his own county shall command, and next under him such others as shall be there according to their qualities.  

The Militia was not usually expected to operate out of its home county. During the civil wars, a cry of the Southern and Western Association Armies had been ‘Six pence a day and no foreign service!’ - by which they had meant no service outside their county. Moreover, there was also inter-county rivalry and enmity between the men of Somerset and Devon. Should the Somerset troops rendezvous with those from Devon at Axminster there was no doubt that they would effectively be transferred to the command of an unfamiliar senior officer. Even before reaching the environs of Axminster the Somerset Militia may have been uneasy about this situation but they would have certainly been worried by the understanding that they were heading into combat. Yet they persevered in their march to intercept the rebels.

Roberts states that Monmouth’s route from Lyme brought him to a high point above Hunter’s Lodge, just south of Axminster, from where he could see the Devon Militia on Shute Hill, about four miles west of Axminster, and the Somerset Militia about two hours march away on the Chard Road. Wade quickened the pace and his rebel vanguard entered the town, driving out the Somerset Militia cavalry scouts who subsequently reported these events to Lutterell. Wade marched through the town and secured both approach roads by deploying his musketeers into hedgerows in fields either side of the narrow lanes. When the rest of Monmouth’s force came up artillery was positioned within the lanes themselves.

With Axminster in enemy hands the militia had the option to attack, but their two forces had failed to unite and only one communication seems to have been sent by Albemarle. Effective cooperation seemed impossible and so two uncoordinated attacks were the only option. Both the Devon and the Somerset Militias still advanced
upon Axminster. Clifton states that ‘Albemarle’s Devonshire men approached to
within a few hundred yards but then withdrew’, adding that they ‘retired in good
order’.

However, Macaulay states,

Albemarle, therefore, though he had a great superiority of
force, thought it advisable to retreat. The retreat soon became
a rout. The whole country was strewn with the arms and
uniforms which the fugitives had thrown away; and, had
Monmouth urged the pursuit with vigour, he would probably
have taken Exeter without a blow.

Consequently, Beckett claims, ‘the Devon Militia disintegrated before his
[Monmouth’s] advance and some joined the rebels’

Beckett offers no sources but a
Macaulay footnote cites the Axe Papers, Oldmixon and Wade. The Axe Papers, or
*The Axminster Ecclesiastica*, were written by an unknown dissenting minister who
dramatically recounted the flight of the militia, but did not distinguish between the
Devon Militia to the west and the Somerset Militia to the northeast.

According to
Macaulay, Oldmixon lived nearby but in reality he lived in Bridgwater, some 30
miles away, and he was twelve years old at the time. Wade who was present states,

…the horse of the Devonshire forces advanced within a
quarter of a mile of our advanced post. But discovering that
wee had lined the hedges they retreated. Wee advanced upon
them but the Duke came and commanded us back telling us
that the Somersetshire forces were likewise retired on the
other side …

No contemporary evidence for Macaulay’s assertion that the Devon Militia
routed has been discovered and yet tells of the men throwing away weapons and
coats.

Wade’s reference to the discarded guns and coats was written about the
Somersetshire Militia.

We marched early the next morning from thence [Axminster]
to Chard… There happened nothing very remarkable in this
day’s march… Here [Chard] we learnt that the retreat of the
Somersetheire [sic] forces was little better than a flight, many
of the soldiers coats and arms being recovered and brought to
us.
Wade saw nothing dramatic in the incident and although described as many he did not deem the number of arms and coats brought in as remarkable. He is clear that the Devonshire Militia fell back and the Somersetshire’s retreat was little better than flight, but he does not mention either force’s movement degenerating into a rout nor anything about the countryside being strewn with arms and coats. Nor do such exaggerated claims appear in the highly imaginative and propagandist Axminster Ecclesiastica. Had Wade seen the Devon Militia disintegrate he would certainly have described it. Instead he says their horse came, looked and withdrew. There can be little doubt that upon their report Albemarle ordered the Devon Militia to withdraw.

Macaulay may have based his thoughts on The Anonymous Account, although he does not cite it. Attributed to the rebel officer Venner and written abroad some years after the event, it reiterates what Wade wrote, ‘he [Albemarle] wisely retired,’ then adds what he could not have witnessed, ‘his men being in great disorder and confusion, supposing we had pursued them.’\(^{89}\) This may well have been the case but there is no evidence. The reason for the Devon Militia’s retirement may be deduced from the orders issued by the King’s Secretary. Sunderland to Albemarle,

As long as the Duke of Monmouth stays in Lyme you should forbear to attempt anything against him, except upon great advantages… in case he should march out of Lyme towards Taunton or elsewhere, attend his motions and take any fitting occasion to attack him.\(^{90}\)

Albemarle is firmly instructed to attempt little unless, in his personal judgment, it is a ‘fitting occasion’, that is to say one in which he has advantages if not ‘great’ ones. The circumstances at Axminster were far from advantageous and Wade listed the defensive measures taken by Monmouth:

The Duke possessed himself of the town and seized on the passes regarding each army, which he guarded with cannon & musqueteers, the places by reason of the thick hedges and straight wyes being very advantageous for that purpose.\(^{91}\)
Both the Devon and the Somerset Militias would have had to assault up relatively straight country roads with constricting linear hedges and across adjoining open fields against musketeers and guns in prepared positions behind lateral hedgerows. The Devon Militia had the more hazardous approach. The land between Shute Hill and Axminster Hill is a valley with two major waterways running north to south, the River Axe and the River Yarty, as well as other narrower yet distinct watercourses. These disordering features lay directly across Albemarle’s intended line of advance. There is also an enclosed spur of land between the two rivers perpendicular to the road with its southern tip almost touching the thoroughfare.

Had the Devon Militia succeeded in attacking across these rivers and ditches and successfully driven Wade’s men from the hedges, they would still have had to attack up a steep hill along the narrow roadways and alleys before storming occupied town houses and walled gardens.\textsuperscript{92} Assaults on prepared positions are notoriously difficult and costly. Albemarle may have had sufficient men to batter his way through Wade’s force which faced him, but he knew Monmouth’s other regiments were in the town and that he did not have enough men to complete the task. He had no idea that Monmouth had landed with less than 100 men, and only one of them a Dutch professional, and he was probably conscious that militiamen would not be effective troops for an assault over such ground. When the royal army faced a similar tactical situation at Norton St Philip Feversham allocated the task to his elite – the Grenadier Companies of the Foot Guards supported by dismounted Horse Grenadiers of the Horse Guards – and entrusted the operation to the experienced Colonel of the First Battalion of the First Foot Guards, Henry Fitzroy, Duke of Grafton.\textsuperscript{93} They nevertheless failed in their attempt.
Albemarle’s militia horse probed forward and as a result of their reconnaissance he was aware of the extremely hazardous nature of the undertaking. Conscious that he had little experience Albemarle would have relied upon what he had read about military campaigning especially in his father’s book. Albemarle had a fortified town before him and his father recommends seven ways to take such a place but none suited the circumstances. He advised ‘never to assault a town or place without great probability of obtaining that which he desireth’. He further advised ‘A General must be careful never to hazard a Battel with his Enemy when he findeth him embatteld in a good advantage although he do outnumber him much with men.’ So Albemarle complied with his instructions from Sunderland regarding caution and trusting his own judgment he ordered a withdrawal. His father had also written ‘...to make an honourable retreat is one of the two principal points of Military Art and worthiest the knowledge of a General, to be able upon occasion to make a safe and sure retreat.’

There could also have been little doubt in Albemarle’s mind as to the authority of his decisions. He was empowered by James II to do what he thought best. A letter prior to the affair at Axminster stated,

... the King commands me to let you know that he places entire confidence in your conduct and zeal for his service, and therefore leaves it to your discretion to march with the forces of your county and to proceed in all things as you shall see cause and judge best for his service...

It was soldierly good sense. The subsequent events of Norton St. Philip underlined the wisdom of his decision for there, although the rebels had no guns in the line, Feversham’s carefully selected attacking force came to grief and sustained a casualty ratio of 18 rebels to 80 regulars killed. Surprisingly, Macaulay ascribes Albemarle’s decision not to wisdom but to the likely disloyalty of the militia.
Albemarle, however, was less alarmed by the preparations of the enemy than by the spirit which appeared in his own ranks. Such was Monmouth's popularity among the common people of Devonshire that, if once the trainbands had caught sight of his well-known face and figure, they would have probably gone over to him in a body.  

As well as seeming to know the minds of the militiamen Macaulay also claims to know what was in Albemarle’s mind and implies that he predicted total desertion resulting from seeing Monmouth’s face. This assertion revolves around a notion that in an age of restricted visual imagery an ordinary militia soldier would recognise Monmouth’s face – possibly seen at a distance some six years earlier during the Duke’s Western Progress. Macaulay also confuses the relative army strengths. He asserts ‘Albemarle … had a great superiority of force...’ whilst, at this stage in the Rebellion, the Devon Militia had about 4,000 and Monmouth about 3,000.

Albemarle’s tactical understanding and strategic thinking were exemplary, both in keeping his force intact by refusing to make a difficult assault with inappropriate troops, and in obeying written orders to only attack in advantageous situations. With royal troops on their way, to throw away the local force on a dangerous gamble would have been very foolish. He also displayed shrewd judgment in drawing his men away from a situation in which they might have been called upon to confront local loyalties and ties. In addition, having been blocked on the road eastwards at Axminster, they could still threaten Taunton from Honiton.

The Somerset Militia most certainly ran, but this too demands careful examination to determine why it occurred and if it was, indeed, a panic-stricken rout. Two regiments of Somerset Foot, one just four companies strong, and some horse advanced towards Axminster, ostensibly to join up with the Devonshire Militia. If the Somerset Militia’s numbers matched those of other county regiments they would have numbered about one thousand and consequently only in concert with the Devon
contingent could they hope to face the whole rebel army. Even if the Duke of
Somerset had not sent copies of Sunderland’s letters to his subordinates, the tenor of
the campaign strategy – shadow, contain, engage only if risk was minimal – would
have been abundantly clear. Alone they could not expect anything but defeat, so
Colonel Lutterell took the horse, his own foot and part of Phelipps’ regiments ahead
in an attempt to seize Axminster. Presumably Phelipps retained some companies to
bring up the baggage.

The exact sequence of events is uncertain as there are problems with the major
source, a letter from Phelipps to fellow militia officer Colonel Berkeley. Although
this document is contemporary, Phelipps was not present at the action and his
comments display a desire to avert blame. He stated that the Somerset Militia’s
morale had already been undermined ‘by busie Phanatiques that they were fighting
against their Religion’. Morale in Phelipps’ Regiment may already have been
strained following the over-zealous training methods referred to in chapter six. Whilst
resting at Stockland, news spread throughout Luttrell’s force that Albemarle had met
with Monmouth and shaken hands. Had the men been of a weak disposition and
disinclined to fight, that news alone might have caused them to halt or even fall back.
Had Albemarle joined Monmouth, Lutterell’s 1,000 would be marching to engage a
rebel force some 7,000 strong. Yet they continued their march, sending mounted
scouts into Axminster, which they reported to be empty. However, Albemarle’s
promised men were not at the appointed rendezvous.

This news did not halt their advance and the Somerset Militia continued to the
outskirts of the town. It was only when their scouts had been driven out by
Monmouth’s advance guard and they had discovered that instead of friends the place
was now occupied by the enemy that a connection was made with the earlier totally
untrue rumour of Albemarle’s defection. Even then they did not break, although ‘they cried out they were betrayed, and would not march a foot further, and no persuasion could prevail.’ It is tempting to believe that had they been left stationary, in order and been reassured, the outcome might have been different. Unfortunately, Phelipps intimates that further pressure was unwittingly applied by a Captain Hawley who had been sent by Albemarle to bring news that he was engaged and for them to hasten forward. Being near enough to hear any fighting it was clear none was in progress, and Albemarle’s wording, designed to hurry their march, actually gave the impression that he was lying.

The men, and most of the officers too, must have been unsure of what was happening, and some were apparently convinced that it was a trap and that only death awaited those who ventured into the town. Already suspicious of operating out of their county and of being technically under Albemarle’s command, and having left a portion of Phelipps’ regiment behind, the men were probably aware that they were being marched towards an enemy army of unknown size whose numbers would have been dramatically increased if Albemarle’s men had joined them. It is not known what commands Lutterell issued but one officer, Captain Littleton, a royal officer seconded to the militia as a muster master, believed the rumours and proclaimed, ‘they were drawn thither to have their throats cut, for begod they would be…’ As Phelipps was not present the evidence is weak but he claimed that Littleton ran, and ‘Upon this some of both sorts ran as he had, which was most shamefully…’ Phelipps, however, did not mention a rout nor did he say the entire force ran – he wrote ‘some’. Phelipps’ main complaint is that the men of his rear echelon would not march towards Honiton but wanted to retire to Chard, presumably to defend their homes and stay in their own county.
What happened next is unreported because Phelipps left them. Receiving reports that Monmouth was bearing down upon him Phelipps deserted his command, albeit one in disarray and unlikely to mount any resistance. Sensible that he had ‘lost honour never to be gained’, his account could be regarded as a blame-shifting exercise, inasmuch that it implies the defeat was the fault of the men’s disaffection if not disloyalty and not that of the senior officers’ inability to appreciate the situation fully or to quell the fears of their subordinates.106

However, even one of those who ran, John Coad, did not mention a total flight. He recorded ‘fear gripped our ranks and most were driven off backward.’ Yet ‘being driven off’ is different from the Independent Congregation writer who maintained that the Lord appeared and sent a hornet of fear amongst them, causing them to fight each other and run away with amazement, ‘bereft of their reason like distracted persons. Others threw away their weapons of war…’107 Calls for direct intervention by the deity and a hyperbolic style were typical of zealous non-conformist tracts and speeches in the seventeenth century. The difference was that Coad took part in the retreat whereas the Congregationalist scribe did not. Had the Somerset Militia been broken and fled in rout, Coad would have quit their ranks and joined Monmouth immediately giving his troubled conscience some ease, his commitment to the militia being terminated when his regiment ceased to exist. In fact he remained with his colours for the time being.

Over the next days Monmouth marched steadily to Taunton but there no evidence of his army having collecting abandoned wagons or for his cavalry having harried fugitives. There are no references to colours being taken, officers or baggage being captured, stores being abandoned or a slaughter in pursuit which are all the usual reported hallmarks of any rout. If it had been thus, Wade would have reported it as
such. Instead, Wade says of the day after the incident ‘nothing very remarkable happened’.

Further evidence to substantiate that this was not the rout of legend can be found in Coad’s statement that ‘most were driven off backward’, inferring that they were driven in a body rather than running off, dispersing in all directions. Coad deserted at Chard, the next morning by wading through a river to escape the watch. Evidently the Somerset Militia was still together. Routed forces lose all discipline and disperse; they do not remain together and set watches.

The *Axminster Ecclesiastica* notes that, as Monmouth’s Army pushed forward, so ‘companies of soldiers belonging to King James pursued after but durst not overtake them.’ These companies could have been from the Dorset Militia, which, after Bridport, was active in the area. Local Honiton historian Angela Dudley states that the militia followed them and as the Axminster incident had occurred on 15 June and Churchill reached Axminster on 18 June, these companies were not from the royal army. Dudley also mentions that over these crucial days, until after the skirmish at Ashill, deserters to Monmouth’s forces thought twice about quitting their militia units and rejoined.

Turning to the motivation for fighting, the morale of many militiamen was influenced by the fact that many had not been paid. Pay and its significance has been discussed earlier in chapter four and it is not surprising that a colonel of the Somerset Militia warned that, without their pay, his battalion would desert the colours. Desertions over lack of pay began before 15 June, and the perceived betrayal at Axminster might have induced even more to return home. The colonel also declares: ‘One company here only received four days’ pay and that is the way to destroy an army without fighting.’ If the men imagined they were being betrayed both in
terms of pay and disloyalty among their senior officers, they may have harboured a
very real anxiety concerning the stability of the very establishment they were serving
to uphold. It is probably that there was a good deal more to the events at Axminster
than a simple description of events can reveal.

Not an eyewitness as he was en route from London to Bridport at the time,
Churchill reported the reverse at Axminster to both James II and the Duke of
Beaufort. He said of Phelipps’ and Lutterell’s men that ‘those two regiments run
away a second time’, despite there being no report of when or where the first occasion
took place.\footnote{115} Churchill also stated that ‘half if not the greatest part, are gone to the
rebels’, which neither Wade nor any other account confirmed.\footnote{116} He expanded upon
an already exaggerated tale. As to the militia’s fighting ability he stated ‘there is not
any relying on these regiments unless we had some of your Majesty’s standing
forces’.\footnote{117} Churchill evidently still thought the militia capable with some royal army
stiffening.

Churchill also requested more men from the Duke of Beaufort’s command be
sent to Chard and Crewkerne, where he was bound.\footnote{118} He might have thought the
militia unreliable in action, yet he sought to be reinforced by another 4,000 of them.
There is no way of telling if his projected use for them included combat alongside
standing forces or in guarding lines of communication and other second line duties,
and yet he is often cited as the primary source that described them as unfit for
purpose. If they were so, it would appear to have been caused by the failing of the
Somerset Militia’s morale. Under pre-combat stress and concerned about going out of
its county, lack of pay, rumoured betrayal of a superior officer, vastly outnumbered
and being told they were going to have their throats cut, were powerful incentives to
flight rather than fight.
Undoubtedly Axminster was a blow for the militia forces, but it was not the unmitigated debacle of popular legend. Although withdrawn to Honiton, Albemarle’s force was intact and still in the field and, whilst the Duke of Somerset had lost a portion of his force, he still had concentrations at Bristol and Bath. Even the senior officers present at Axminster had managed to rally their men and regroup at Bruton.

The events of Axminster may not have had a permanent effect upon the western militia’s fighting capability, but adverse comments did. Albemarle smarted under criticism of his withdrawal. His pique was fanned by the king appointing the Earl of Feversham as commander-in-chief in the West, with command of both royal and militia forces. Albemarle’s response was a refusal to engage without regular support. Nevertheless, rather than endorsing Churchill’s view of the militia, he announced that he would not have been averse to fighting if he had had the authority to act.

My Lord, - Nothing considerable has passed Since my last to y’ Lord119. My Lord Churchill has not yet joyned me, and having noe order to attack the enemy without him would not attempt it; if it had been done when I first desired it, I believe the Rebels would have met with some defeat before this time.119

In reply Sunderland sent him the king’s thanks and compliments on his action, not recriminations for his men’s misdeeds.

Feversham’s sending home of three regiments of the Hampshire Militia has been interpreted as illustrating the royal commander’s total dissatisfaction with the militia in general.120 Yet, he had commended them previously: ‘la compagnie de Mr bartlee [Berkeley] est sans raillerie fort belle, et un regiment d’hamshier commende par un nomme Mr. fleming, que je lasse ici aujourd’hui, ayant marche toute la nuict avec le canon que je fait marcher pour me joindre’.121 At Norton St. Philip Feversham’s own account tells how he continued to employ several units of militia in his army. ‘The rest of our foot together with the Somersetshire, Dorsetshire and
Oxfordshire Militia...as they came in were drawne up and posted to the best advantage...\textsuperscript{122} Although on this occasion they were not called upon to fight there was a succession of incidents in which they were. Perhaps they displayed no great military skill nor did they face a determined or proficient enemy, but they fought and did so successfully sometimes under difficult circumstances.

On 24 June a party of the Gloucester Militia Horse met with reverse at Keynsham. Tincey comments that:

Monmouth’s Horse …proved more than a match for the supposedly trained and disciplined militia Horse, who fled before them in such disorder that a militia trooper and two horses fell into rebel hands,\textsuperscript{123}

The contemporary account by Wade stated:

At Capt. Tily’s coming to the Towne there was in it a troop of militia horse of Glaucestersheire [sic] who at his approach immediately retired and left behind them 2 horses and one of theyr party prisoner.\textsuperscript{124}

The modern historian infers the militia fought poorly and fled, while the contemporary source calls it a retirement and mentions no disorder. Undoubtedly a militia trooper was captured but whether he was on the wrong side of the bridge or elsewhere in the town upon some other business is unrecorded.

Later that night a skirmish took place in the streets of Keynsham ‘where the enemy came upon us at unawares and assaulted three passages into the town but could not prevail. They retreated with the loss of about 20 men.’\textsuperscript{125} One of the Royal parties was Colonel Theopholis Oglethorpe’s patrol in strength returning from scouting and pacifying the Chew Valley. As well as his royal horse, Oglethorpe had with him Talbot’s troop of Wiltshire Militia Horse which, according to Feversham’s account, was left ‘at the enterance of the towne to make good their retreat.’\textsuperscript{126} They were placed to cover a withdrawal, which Oglethorpe was in the event obliged to perform.
There is no record of them failing in their duty and there is no evidence to substantiate Tincey’s reading of Oglethorpe’s mind to suggest that ‘the militia troop of Captain Talbot having been left well out of harm’s way for fear that they would not stand in a fight.’ Ogglethorpe sensibly took the men he knew into action and left the militia in a second line troops’ role, which proved to be not just useful but necessary.

Similar interpretations of Feversham’s intentions concerning the Wiltshire Militia claim that they were stationed at Middlezoy about two miles to the rear of the royal camp in Westonzoyland, in order to keep them safely in the rear during the battle of Sedgemoor. Chandler has a footnote declaring, ‘In fact Feversham and Churchill were careful to keep the unreliable militia regiments in reserve.’ Clifton says, ‘They were kept safely in the rear as a reserve,’ whilst Tincey does not include them in his numerical calculations for Sedgemoor and states they were ‘well placed to support Captain’s Coy’s Dragoons at Burrow Bridge’ which crossed the River Parrott a further two miles to the rear.

As mentioned in chapter four (pages 159-160) the militia unlike the royal Foot were not issued with tents and were thus obliged to find billets or camp as best they could. The royal army had them, as Sunderland had informed Feversham on 29 June that the king ‘…has commanded me to let you know that there are tents for 3,000 men with the artillery, which he hope you may soon have with you’. The general staff, senior officers and the royal cavalry had commandeered the buildings of Westonzoyland and, whilst Chedzoy was nearby, it was forward of the royal camp and occupied by Lieutenant Colonel Francis Compton as the centre for his scouting operations. Consequently, the Wiltshire Militia (possibly three regiments) went to Middlezoy as the nearest habitation capable of housing troops. Their commander, the Earl of Pembroke, was probably asleep at the army headquarters in Weston Court in
Westonzoyland when the alarm was raised whereupon he apparently mounted and ‘rode in haste’ to arouse his militia. As to their performance, Drummer Adam Wheeler records that Lord Pembroke alerted Colonel Wyndham:

...between Twelve and One of the Clock in the Morning, calling out …‘Colonl Windham, Colonll Windham - The Enemy is Engadged,’ and asking for his Drums; the Colonll answer was that he was ready, and soe forwith prepared himself.’ Pembroke ‘immediately commanded him [Drummer Wheeler] to beate an Alarum [following which] … The Regimt marched through Weston into Weston Moore with as much expeditioon as possible could be, where They were drawne up Three deep in order to engadge if Occasion required.\(^{131}\)

Wheeler may be inaccurate with his timings, as Dummer says the general alarm came at 2.00 am, but there appears to have been neither delay nor reticence in assembling and marching the mile or so to the battlefield, arriving in time to deploy in line and to witness the end of the fighting. Wheeler adds that he was posted on the right of the formation and actually asked permission to quit his post to join in the pillaging of the dead ‘after the Enemy began to run.’ Wyndham’s reply illustrates the discipline he maintained over his militiamen: ‘That upon Paine of Death not a Man of his Regmt should move from his Post.’ \(^{132}\)

Monmouth’s night attack had come as great surprise to the royal army. Although one officer, Captain Macintosh of Dumbarton’s, had marked out emergency assembly points for his company the rest of the army had taken little if any precautions against an attack. \(^{133}\) A major engagement was not expected so being placed in the rear for an unexpected battle seems to be a tenuous conclusion. However, when alarmed, the Wiltshire Militia rapidly turned out of quarters, marched to the field and deployed ready to fight, although it was not called upon to do so. Neither were Kirke’s or Trelawney’s royal regiments. \(^{134}\)
After the fighting was over Wheeler recorded: ‘The Right Honorable the Earle of Feversham, Generall of his Maties Army came to the head of Colonlls Windhams Regimt and gave him many Thanks for his readynesse, Saying his Matie should not hear of it by Letter, but by Word of Mouth…’ Wadham Wyndham said: ‘The General rode along the front of our regiment with his hat off and gave us thanks for our forwardness and readiness in being so early in the field’. Feversham cast no aspersions on the militia’s performance.

The diarist Evelyn indirectly shed light on the question of the militia and its sense of martial honour and prowess when he related an incident after the rebellion was put down:

... some words first in jeast then in heate twixt Sherrington Talbot a worthy Gent. (son to Sir Jo: Talbot & who behaved himself very handsomely) and one Capt. Love, both commanders of the Militia of the Country, whose soldiars fought best; both drawing their Swords & passing at one another Sherrigton was wounded to death…

Adam Wheeler and Wadham Wyndham both corroborate the statement regarding the duel, saying that it took place at The White Hart in Glastonbury and it arose over comments made after a false alarm. As the quarrel grew it apparently embraced the behaviour of the troops at Keynsham. Whatever the circumstances, at least two men thought the Wiltshire Militia’s reputation for fighting was worth risking death for.

7.4. POST-ACTION RECOVERY.

An important test of a military unit’s performance effectiveness is its ability to reform and return to duty after involvement in a fight. In Elizabethan times the Cornish Militia surprised Carlos Amezquita and his raiding Spaniards by running before them at Penzance on 3 August 1595, only to drive them from Marazion the next day.
Admittedly they were accompanied by some royal troops on 4 August but the bulk of the force was men who had fled one day and returned to fight again the next.\textsuperscript{139} There is nothing in the accounts about the time taken to recover by the militia troopers who fought at Ashill, but those involved in the fight on the Lyme Road on 12 June were in action again on 14 June fighting dismounted in the streets of Bridport. The most telling evidence available concerning the militia’s ability to retake the field derives from the events immediately after the Battle of Bridport. Beckett sums up the currently popularly accepted picture when he says: ‘The Dorset Militia failed to prevent Monmouth’s landing and holed up in Bridport’.\textsuperscript{140} He contradicts the contemporary evidence from Colonel Strangways and Colonel Helyer who were involved in the campaign and whose Dorset and Somerset Militias both campaigned and fought shortly after they had been in action.

Rather than being holed up in Bridport the Dorset Militia was very busy after its engagement. The battle for the town took place on 14 June and Strangways wrote three days later:

\begin{quote}
... I shall only desire you immediately to send word to the chief officers of the militia of your county that tomorrow morning [we] shall march hence with all our militia, who are very courageous. We shall quarter tomorrow night at Winsham in three miles of Chard, and thenceforward to follow the enemy... If your militia will shew themselves to be good subjects, now is their time, and take their measure according to what I have said, to meet as soon as may be.\textsuperscript{141}
\end{quote}

There is no indication that the militia was in shock or needed time to recover from its efforts. In fact there is praise for the bravery it had shown. It is likely that the militiamen at Bridport received reinforcements during 15 and 16 June as the remainder of Erle’s Regiment from Blandford arrived, and they would have known that the rest of the county’s forces were assembling and would be marching to join them. Strangways may have indulged in bravado, but there is no evidence that the
Dorset Militia did anything but march out of Bridport on 18 June with the intention of shadowing the rebel force in accordance with orders from Sunderland.¹⁴² The high command was also aware that it was with Churchill and marching well: ‘la milice de dorcesthier non pas par la mesme raison par ce qu’ils ont este tout le temps avec milord churchill et que les marches et les tourment fort...’¹⁴³

Equally, the Somerset Militia was still involved in small-scale fighting after the incident at Axminster. Of the men involved at Axminster Phelipps wrote: ‘they soon came to their arms and so we retreated…and intend tomorrow to join with his Grace if he does not countermand us.’¹⁴⁴ Several fights that occurred as Monmouth marched to and then rested in Taunton were not undertaken by any royal force, except a cavalry clash at Ashill between a rebel troop of horse and a patrol from Oxford’s Blues – although, even there, some authors state the Somerset Militia were involved.¹⁴⁵ Colonel Helyar’s writes, ‘Here, [between Ilchester and Crewkerene] is fighting every day.’¹⁴⁶ Churchill might exclaim: ‘….unless speedy action be taken, we are likely to lose this county to the rebels,’ and ‘There is not any relying on these regiments left behind unless we had some of Your Majesty’s standing army to lead them on’, but Helyar’s appeal for reinforcements was not for royal troops who were still marching for Chard or Bath, but for men from ‘the whole force of the county’.¹⁴⁷ He had sufficient faith in the men under his command to commit them in various skirmishes and trust in other militia units from which he solicited aid.

The militia was not only skirmishing in front of the rebels’ advance during the first part of the campaign, but continued to do so later during their retreat. On 2 July, the only available news was that the enemy had been defeated in another skirmish, and was said to be coming back to Taunton.¹⁴⁸ The two units that had been involved in action, the Dorset and the Somerset Militias, were able to recover and return to
duty. In some instances, they were again skirmishing with the rebels within a very short space of time.

7.5. CONCLUSION.

Despite Clifton’s assertion that the Somerset and Devon men had run when confronted by the rebels, and that the Dorset troops had performed poorly at Bridport, close examination of the events and recorded material can be said to demonstrate that when called upon to fight the late seventeenth-century militia of the southwest were able to perform adequately for second line troops.\(^{149}\)

Despite James II’s hope that, ‘every body will be convinced, that the Militia … is not sufficient for such Occasions [Rebellions]’ it would appear that the West County militias could sustain and at times surpass the rate of march expected of the royal army. The marching achievements of the Wiltshire Militia to Sedgemoor surpassed that achieved by Marlborough’s army in its famous march along the Danube.

They also proved effective on campaign and their officers could manoeuvre with them so as to thwart an enemy’s intentions. They were effective in denying strategic points to the rebels, securing the royal army’s lines of communication and their own, and in throwing a containment cordon around the theatre of operations preventing reinforcements from reaching Monmouth and surpassing any attempts to rise for him. Although moving judiciously they tightened this ring around the rebels and boxed them up in Bridgwater allowing the royal army to camp nearby ready to pounce and destroy them.

Moreover, despite the assertions of Macaulay and the accusations of modern historians such as Lane, who maintain categorically that the militia would not fight their fellow West Countrymen, the militiamen from Dorset, Somerset and Wiltshire
did fight and fought hard – within their limited training and expectation. Inferences that they were deliberately kept ‘well back out of the battle of Sedgemoor’ due to lack of trust or fighting ability are unfounded and ignore the reason for their having been billeted in Middlezoy.\textsuperscript{150} Belief that the failure of the Somerset Militia at Axminster rendered them incapable of fighting thereafter was not justified by events: no records of mass desertions have been found, and they returned to action quickly. Furthermore, it is unwise to describe those units that did not engage at Sedgemoor as lacking in fighting spirit, for then the mantle of cowardice might also be cast over Piercy Kirke’s and Charles Trelawney’s royal regiments – the Tangier veterans. The Wiltshire Militia may not have fired in anger during the battle, but neither did they engage in a fire-fight with their own side, as did Kirke’s and Trelawney’s who, in the early morning mist, fired upon the Life Guards having mistaken them for rebel cavalry.\textsuperscript{151}

The assertion that the militia was cowardly and ineffective in time of crisis, and that ‘The country people are only valiant where there are none to oppose them’, is untrue.\textsuperscript{152} Although not front line soldiers the West Country militias behaved adequately and played a significant role in the response to the Monmouth Rebellion. They may have lacked the professionalism and expertise of the royal army but they marched, campaigned and indeed fought when called upon to do so.

The rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth, whom from the time of his unfortunate landing at Lyme… until his overthrow at Sedgemoor, was opposed by the Militia of all the south-western counties…. The brunt of the fighting was borne by this Militia army, and the poor Duke was afterwards captured by them…’\textsuperscript{153}
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

1 Ward, op. cit., p.199.
2 The Field Service Pocket Books for 1914 and for 1932 both state that 15 miles a day, with one day's rest a week, is normal distance for all arms. That Roman forts are approximately 15 miles apart would appear to be no accident.
4 Waylen, op.cit. p.318.
5 Add. MSS 31956, A Journal of the Proceedings of the Duke of Monmouth in his Invading England; with the Progress and issew of the Rebellion attending it. Kept by Mr. Edward Dummer then serving in the Train of Artillery employ'd by His Majesty for the suppression of the same (London, 1672), a copy of the original held in Pepysian Library, Magdalene College, Cambridge; HMC. Appendix to the third report, Churchill to Somerset 21 June 1685. P. 98; also in Chandler, D., op cit., pp. 124-130.
6 Chandler, Parker and Merode-Westerloo p.31.
7 British leagues differ from French, Dutch, Flemish Spanish, Hessian and Bavarian, but Parker being a British officer in a British regiment most likely used British leagues.
8 The Memoirs of Captain George Carlton and the Life of Mrs Christian Davies commonly called Mother Ross... (London, 1840), p. 288.
12 Ibid.
13 CSPD.1685, pp.193-194.
14 Clifton, R., op. cit., p. 159.
15 From his Scottish campaign Monmouth knew militias could fight. They had been particularly effective at Bothwell Bridge 1679.
19 Wheeler in Chandler, Sedgemoor, p.137.
20 Wyndham in Waylen, op. cit. p. 317.
21 The Anonymous Account, possibly Venner’s, first printed in The Protestant Martyrs or the Bloody Assizes (1689) and reprinted in Chandler, pp. 118-124. Andrew Paschall’s account, op.cit.
23 Both Feversham and Churchill were obliged to keep in regular communication with the king in London.
24 Strangways is included as he commanded the Dorset Militia on the King’s authority. The lord lieutenant of Dorset, the John Digby, Earl of Bristol, did not take the field.
25 Strangways is included as he commanded the Dorset Militia on the King’s authority. The lord lieutenant of Dorset, the John Digby, Earl of Bristol, did not take the field.
26 Wade’s ‘Narrative’ and ‘Further Information’, BL. Harleian Mss. ff. 6845. in Wigfield, op. cit.,p. 166; Chandler, Sedgemoor. p.29..
30 Tincey, Sedgemoor., p.66; Wheeler in Chandler, Sedgemoor., p.132.
31 London Gazette. June 25 to 29. 1685
32 Chenevix Trench, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
33 The performance of the Duke of Somerset both before and during the rebellion has been discussed previously, but Mallinson puts some of the blame for the county falling to the rebels down to the ‘reckless independence that has frequently characterized the Count of Somerset.’ Mallinson, A., The Making of the British Army (London, Bantam, 2009), p.33.
34 CSPD 1685, p.196.
35 CSPD 1685, p.239.
36 Ibid.
The men were apparently unhappy about lack of pay and, although they would fight the enemy, they were unwilling to conform to other orders. *Ibid.*

59 The story of the Battle of Bridport is taken from Nathaniel Wade’s ‘Narrative’ and ‘Further Information’, BL. Harleian Mss. Ff. 6845 and in Wigfield, W. McD., *op. cit.*

60 Legend says it was the front door of The Bull,

61 There is a memorial to Wadham Stangeways in Moredon Church, Swindon. The inscription relates how he was killed by the rebels in that fight. There is another memorial in St Mary the Virgin, Bradford Abbas to William Harvey who ‘died of wounds he received in the service of King James II at Bridport on the second of July 1685’ but who he was or how or where he was killed is not known.

62 The main lateral thoroughfare of Bridport was used in the manufacture of rope and is wide up to the point where the working area came to an end, thereafter it reverts to normal carriageway width.


64 The rebels had 40 casualties out of 400. Another 17 deserted


66 Wade in Wigfield,


68 Macaulay, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Chp.V.

Churchill’s letter reporting the Axminster incident might have been a catalyst for Sunderland and James II to institute a strategy for gilding the case of the increased royal army.


The *Anonymous Account* in Chandler, op. cit., p. 119; Macaulay, op. cit., Vol. 3, Ch. 5; www.strecorsoc.org/macaulay/m05c.html

Ward, op. cit., p. 123.

Maxwell-Lyte, op. cit.

Rogers, op. cit., pp. 19-20

CSPD 1685, p. 193.

Alan Turton, HCC Curator Basing House, June 2007; Dr. Eric Gruber von Arni, July 2008.

Roberts, op. cit., p. 287.

Wade in Wigfield, op. cit., p. 165.

Clifton, op. cit., pp. 163.

Macaulay, op. cit., Vol. 3, Chp. 5; www.strecorsoc.org/macaulay/m05c.html


Wade in Wigfield, op. cit., p. 165.

Harl. MSS. 6845, F. 277

Wade in Wigfield, *ibid*.


CSPD 1685, p. 196.

Wade in Wigfield, op. cit.,


Philippsnorton is today called Norton St. Philip and an account of this engagement is in Feversham ‘The movements of the Royal Army’, HMC. Appendix to the third report, Tincay, J., op. cit., p. 166-171.


*ibid*., p. 131.

*ibid*., p. 94.

*ibid*., p. 111.

CSPD 1685, 193.

Macaulay, op. cit.

Wade in Wigfield, p. 165.


*ibid*.

*ibid*.

*ibid*.

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Wade in Wigfield op.cit., p.167.

Coad’s Narrative, op. cit., p.1.


Tincey, Sedgemoor, p.65


Clifton, op. cit., p.195; Tincey, op. cit. p.100.

Jas.II,2, p.42.

Wheeler in Chandler, Sedgemoor, p.133.

Ibid, p.52.

That is discounting their engaging their own horse and the action of their detached grenadiers.

Chandler, Sedgemoor p. 52.

Wyndham in Waylen, op cit., p.317.


Meino-Navvarro, J.F., La Armada Espanola en el Siglo XVII, cited by Lopez, N.I., ‘A Pike in
England’ Miniature Wargames (Nottingham, Pireme, 2010), Vol.331, p. 36.

Beckett, op.cit., p.54.


Until Kirke’s arrival at Chard with his regulars on 21 June, the Dorset Militia were probably
Churchill’s only foot units.

HMC. Appendix to the third report, Feversham to the King, 30 June 1685, I p.10.

Ibid, Phelipps to Berkeley (Fitzharding), 15 June 1685, pp.1-2.


HMC. Appendix to the third report Helyer to Somerset. June, 1685, p.98.

Ibid.

236 Quarter Sessions under James II. ‘Quarter Sessions from Queen Elizabeth to Queen Anne’;
URL:www.archive.org/stream/quartersesssionsf00haminuoft/quartersessions f00haminuoft_djvu.txt,
date accessed 27 June 2008.

Clifton. op.cit., p. 194.

Lane, B., ‘The Monmouth Rebellion’, Sedgemoor Anniversary Lecture, 5 July 2005, St. Mary the
Virgin’s Church, Westonzoyland, ; Beckett, op.cit., p.55.

Tincey, Sedgemoor, pp.146-148.

Vice-Admiral of Somerset NA. 29/81/16.

Davis, op.cit., p. 70.
Chapter Eight

EXPECTATIONS AND LOYALTY

‘Our security is the militia; that will defend us and Never conquer us.’¹

For a military unit to both justify its existence and achieve the effect desired by those who raised and sustained it, it must be able and prepared to carry out the orders of its officers and political masters. The previous chapter dealt with the practical expectations of mobility, combat and reorganisation so this chapter focuses upon whether or not the militia fulfilled the government and society’s tangible and more intangible expectations. Firstly, it answers the question of whether the militia served its purpose and, secondly, if it proved loyal to the king and those who created and commanded it.

8.1. PURPOSE AND EXPECTATIONS.

The primary role of the militia was to be the means by which the king and parliament met the fundamental requirement of government – the protection of its citizens.² The society they governed expected it to uphold law and order and provide security against foreign invasion or internal insurrection. The Council’s Instructions to the lord lieutenants regarding the militia go into greater detail in that:

‘they were to be regular exercised, their full numbers to be kept up, well effected officers chosen and numerous, disaffected persons watched and not allowed to assemble, and their arms seized; fortresses to be secured, all rising suppressed, vagrants apprehended and accounts of proceedings to be sent in to the Council.’³
The stability of Charles II’s restored throne depended upon its ability to fulfill these expectations and nullify the threat of physical harm to life and property posed by enemies bent upon using might to impose their will upon the nation.

During the period addressed by this thesis, the perceived threats were seen as likely to come from two foreign and one domestic source. In Europe both France and Holland had expansionist aspirations which would be aided greatly by an England gravely weakened whilst at home the government needed to ‘be very vigilant over those of the Republican party, there being too much reason to believe that there is a design among men of desperate fortunes to make some sudden insurrection.’ A force of trained soldiers was therefore imperative to provide the nation with sufficient physical might to defend both itself and its subjects from external and internal threats. Social, economic and political circumstances dictated that this force was the militia.

The Restoration Militia’s ability to react in time of foreign invasion has already been examined and although its performance during the Dutch Wars at Landguard Fort and Rochester was adequate if not inspiring, it was satisfactory for second line troops. It served its purpose in providing support for the royal troops in Essex and in repulsing further Dutch landings on Canvey Island and in Kent. As well as being able to deter, counter or contain an invasion, the militia’s other protection role was to quell internal disquiet by the subjugation of plots and attempted rebellions. This required the militia to act as the government’s instrument for keeping dissenting factions in disarray and for restricting the activities of any leading figures capable of focusing and coordinating rebellious activities. Both these purposes were part of an undefined but understood three-way contract between the militia, the government and society.
The expectations of the relationship between government, society and those who serve in its armed forces are today still imprecise, encapsulated in an all-embracing term, ‘the military covenant’. During the Restoration period this was an even more informal agreement, particularly for the militia. Militiamen received pay for service but exactly what that service was to be was very flexible and although ostensibly military in nature, as described previously it embraced both military and civil aspects.

The fact that the arrangement appears to have been loosely understood and was never committed to paper except in general terms gave rise to a range of vague expectations and ways in which they were to be met. Legally the conditions of service were one-sided, with legislation covering time to be spent in mustering and those things to be supplied by the contributors – all underscored by fines for those who did not conform. The dates and frequency of musters were left to the discretion of the deputy lieutenants whilst the drill taught or instruction given was the choice of the muster masters. In return the men expected payment for their time and free quarter when called away from their homes – although there is no evidence of a commissariat assigned to billeting the militia. Sometimes ad hoc inducements were proffered, mostly in the form of alcohol. The informal, but understood, covenant with the royal troops was better as it included billeted accommodation, and sometimes even barracks. It also included food supplies and regular clothing and equipment reissues. Even so, these were all set against the men’s pay.

The expectation of both government and society was that the militia would be their protection: ‘Our security is the militia’. As with the royal army, the militia was expected to do the sovereign’s bidding at a day’s notice but, unlike their royal colleagues they had to leave their occupations, families and homes to do so. If called
upon, they too had to risk life and limb because, although not front line troops, they were expected to fight if the occasion arose.

Brewer argues that the militia was a means whereby England obtained national land-based security at minimal cost whilst expenditure was diverted into the building of the Navy.⁹ This is might be the reason for whenever the militia’s services in the field were no longer needed they were stood down with the result that their service pay stopped – whether it came from county or royal army funds was immaterial. This meant that pay ceased from the moment the force was dismissed. The Wiltshire Militia, having mustered at its home bases of Salisbury, Devizes, Warminster and Marlborough in June 1685 was disbanded at Devizes following which the men had to walk back to their parishes, wherever they were, at no cost to the authorities.¹⁰ The Wiltshire Militia present at Sedgemoor numbered some 1,500, and included the Red Regiment from Salisbury and the Blewe Regiment from Marlborough, but whether the Green Regiment from Devizes or the Yellow Regiment from Warminster or parts of both were also present is not known. The average time for the majority of men to walk home to their respective parishes from Devizes was two days. This translates as a collective saving of 3,000 days’ payment. Prior to that, Feversham dismissed two regiments of the Hampshire Militia at Bath, claiming that they were ill-disciplined but, as he had sufficient militiamen with his army relevant to the size of the rebel force, the cost reduction was an attractive option especially because being attached to the royal army his war-chest was paying them. The combined strength of the dismissed regiments of the Hampshire Militia is unknown but they faced several days march in returning to their homes: the financial saving would have been substantial.
Conversely, the men were expected to remain in service for as long as their lord lieutenant required. In Devon, Albemarle’s own regiment was kept out when the county’s other regiments were discharged.¹¹ The east of the county was not quiet and, consequently, both a higher level of policing and a show of strength were necessary at least until Monmouth was executed. This appears to have been accepted without resentment which was perhaps, a consequence of Albemarle’s reputation for efficiency, including his management of the distribution of their pay.

During the rebellion the militia was expected to prevent sympathetic risings at which it was particularly successful in both Bristol and Bath. It denied access to the rebel army when it appeared before Bath by keeping the gates firmly closed, manning the walls and shooting dead Monmouth’s trumpeter thereby forestalling any negotiation.¹² On 4 July, when a report was received that rebel scouts had reached Tiverton and Cullompton, it was conjectured that Monmouth intended to march on the northern ports of Devonshire. Albemarle wrote to his inferior officers:

I question not but you have already sett good and strict watches att all the ports and creakes in your parts, as Appledore, Barnstaple, Biddeford, Combe Martyn, Ilfracombe, Clovelly, and other adjacent places, to view, search, and take an account of all ships and vessels that shall come in and go out at those places.¹³

As expected and desired the presence of the militia was a forceful deterrent to dissuade potential rebellious factions from becoming active. In troubled times the militia cavalry was also expected to undertake scouting duties, to move as a body towards a location and then to spread out in small groups across the district to gather information. The Gloucester Militia Horse from Bristol investigated Keynsham and, upon reporting the bridge still intact, was ordered to destroy it.¹⁴ It also supposedly performed reconnaissance probes towards Bridgwater whilst Captain Talbot’s Troop of the Wiltshire Militia helped search the Chew Valley.¹⁵ On 8 July, after Sedgemoor,
Albemarle ordered the sheriff ‘to send out scouts in your northern partes, to apprehend such as are scattered there.’\textsuperscript{16} They were successful in that:

\begin{quote}
...about two hundred of them [rebels] went towards Ilfracombe and dispersed, some one way some another, neere that place, and one of the witnesses saith hee, with Ferguson and about thirty others, went off in a boate at sea at Ilfracombe, but were driven back, seeing the King's shipping making toward them.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

Most of the party were taken, although Ferguson eluded them. Whilst rounding up scattered rebels was primarily the duty of the horse, the foot was also frequently employed in mopping up operations and the militia, as second line troops, bore a large share of this work. The Wiltshire Militia was assigned to guarding prisoners in Westonzoyland church, and the drummer of Colonel Wyndham’s Company, Adam Wheeler, was tasked with keeping ‘An Account of the Prisoners’ which he wrote on his drumhead. His record is full of harrowing detail.\textsuperscript{18} There is an unsubstantiated local legend that the Wiltshire Militia also erected a series of temporary gallows along the Bridgwater Road, although it was Kirke’s men who hanged the rebels on them.\textsuperscript{19} On 2 July, a quarter session witness also recounts that, ‘the Posse men were ordered to convey the disaffected persons from Exeter to Plymouth.’\textsuperscript{20}

The militia was also expected to co-operate with the royal army. How they did so in a campaign of manoeuvre has been discussed in chapter seven to which it might be added that after Sedgemoor Wyndham records that: ‘We continued in King's Sedgmoor till near six o'clock in the evening, our regiment being exercised there by some of the chief Commanders of the army, and had their applause...’\textsuperscript{21} Co-operation on more mundane levels was also expected. Sometimes this did not go smoothly. Feversham requested Lord Fitzharding, the militia commander in Bath, to hand over to him the transport wagons and carts that had been requisitioned by the lord
lieutenant of Somerset. Fitzharding complied as part of the expected co-operation but was subsequently soundly chastised by the Duke of Somerset for directly accepting orders from a royal officer, albeit a lieutenant general and the commander in chief, without going through what he deemed the proper chain of command.22

When not responding to a national emergency, the expectation was for the militia to act as a policing force. The constable and the watch dealt with petty crime but the militia was expected to deal with more serious matters – especially when greater numbers were required. Following the Titus Oates affair, ‘several messengers and officers visited Poole in March 1679, for the discovery and apprehension of persons suspected of being involved in the conspiracy’ and the militia was turned out and put to work.23 Such policing continued under William III. In July 1689 the Duke of Bolton, the new lord lieutenant of Hampshire, ordered the keepers of the New Forest, as well as the constable and tithingmen of the counties of Dorset, Hampshire and Wiltshire, to search for all ‘Gunnes, Grayhoundes, dogges, nettes or other Engines’ used to destroy game in the New Forest’ and to ensure that offenders were arraigned before a justice of the peace.24 No express commands were given concerning the militia but whilst inside the New Forest the Verderers and Adjisters as keepers of the forest’s law carried out the work, the town and village constables and tithingmen had no other efficient force beside the militia to call upon.25

There also appears to have been an additional expectation of the militia to provide a general emergency service. On 4 September 1666, Charles II called out the Middlesex, Hertfordshire and Surrey Militia to assist in fighting the Great Fire of London.26 They were provided with food for 48 hours, carts loaded with pickaxes, ropes and buckets and, from accounts of the Fire, they served well in creating firebreaks and dousing burnt-out buildings. They were praised for their actions, and
there were no accusations claiming cowardice in the face of danger. But there were other less heroic tasks given to them. In 1685, Judge Jefferies instructed the sheriff of Somerset that: ‘you, yourself, together with a guard of forty able men at the least, to be present by eight o’clock of the morning to be aiding and assisting me or my deputy to see the said rebels executed’. The sheriff had no power to call upon royal troops for this unpleasant duty and there was no available alternative source from which to find forty ‘able’ men. It was probably viewed as part of the informal covenant for the militia to form the guard at every execution and at the nailing up of quartered limbs in the towns and villages of the South West following the Bloody Assizes.

The purpose of the militia thus covered a wide range of activities but expectations of a covenant or contract, especially if ill-defined, can be interpreted differently by either party. Since local government was responsible for collecting money for the men’s pay from the contributors, it also had the duty to honour its side of the bargain in distributing it. Unfortunately this was not always the case and the men were forced to take action to put pressure on the authorities to issue the wages to which they were entitled. Such pressure involved not obeying the orders of their officers. It is tempting to see this action in terms of a twentieth-century industrial strike and perhaps to couple it with a reluctance to fight. However such was their sense of duty that those units in such straits staged more of a work to rule than a strike. This is evident in a letter from Colonel Helyer to Somerset regarding lack of pay. There appears to have been several small-scale actions in the Yeovil, Chard and Crewkerne area during which the militia fought willingly enough, but their hearts did not appear to be in the routine work of general soldiering without pay.
...horse and foot (anywhere else but where an enemy is) are useless, and we were as good as have none at all, as to have them anywhere else but where they are necessary. The way to restore our peace is to beat those who disturb it, and not to be afraid of those that may do it; few I believe, will now join that party who are proclaimed rebels; and the principal rebels being suppressed the confederates will be able to do nothing. If your Grace will be pleased to order pay for this regiment to be sent them, it will do well; else they will leave their colours as divers of them have done already...  

As a result of the Duke of Somerset’s failure to properly organise the distribution of pay, the willingness of his militiamen to respond to orders was adversely affected. Helyer’s men were fractious when not in action. The reason for their discontent had nothing to do with co-religionists, compatriots or cowardice but rather a failure to meet their expectations that in return for service the authorities would fulfil their side of the bargain and pay them. The military usually construes any action other than complete obedience as tantamount to mutiny and presumably reports like Helyer’s fanned the embers of perceived disloyalty, although Helyer does not mention mutiny or reluctance to fight, although he does warn about likely desertion.

Whether it was because it met society’s expectations or not, the militia was possibly held in better general regard during the seventeenth than the eighteenth century. It had a certain honorific position in society and militia uniforms had some peculiar significance. On 23 October 1689, evidence was given at the Somerset quarter sessions alleging that David Ford of Lydeard St Lawrence, threatened ‘to cut John Cox’s and Christopher Sanders’ guts out, and to abscond with his militia uniforms.’ The discarded coats found after Axminster, were ‘the ornament of Monmouth’s Army’. Similarly, militia affairs were at times deemed important. Although melodramatic in tone, an address wrapper for an item pertaining to militia affairs reads:
To my Lord of Norfolks Grace
In post hast
Post hast
Hast for thy
Lief and
uppon payn of hanging 33

To summarise, the Restoration militia’s purpose was the protection of the state in war and peace, and through it the kingdom was protected against foreign invasion or internal rebellion. It not only adequately fulfilled its part of the covenant with the government and society but was held in a degree of esteem for doing so. Although expected to put up some sort of resistance if required it was not expected to perform as royal soldiers and its role was as second line troops. It also honoured the expectation to co-operate with the royal army in both strategic and more immediate practical concerns. It more than adequately fulfilled its policing role whilst undertaking duties which exceeded expectations regarding the more gruesome element of law enforcement. The militias of the southwest ably fulfilled their purpose and yet, as seen in the Helyer letter above, there was fear among those in power concerning their loyalty.

8.2. LOYALTY.

Charles II had initially been wary of both the militia and the standing army. The militia had been used by parliament in the early days of the civil wars as the nucleus of its own armed force, and although the army had under Monck’s guidance initiated the events that led to his restoration, it had been the instrument that had defeated his father and brought about his execution. Initially Charles II’s royal army was small, embracing many who had served the king in exile and even though he slowly expanded it, he was careful to entrust its command to officers of proven loyalty or vested interest in the preservation of his crown. Legal reassurance of control of the
militia was given by the Militia Act of 1661: ‘according to the ancient known Laws, we have declared the sole Right of the Militia to be in your Majesty’, and throughout his reign Charles sought to secure the loyalty of the militia by the same means as he used for the royal army, namely putting it under men he could trust and had a personal interest in the preservation of the status quo.\textsuperscript{34}

For all his later faults and mismanagement James II’s accession was greeted with jubilant demonstrations and addresses of public support and loyalty. Contemporary Erasmus Warren commented that ‘the whole nation’ was caught up in ‘a vice of loyalty’.\textsuperscript{35} There is no reason to believe that the militia as a body harboured any contrary sentiment. The London Gazette reported that in the southwest the Corporation of Lyme Regis, known as a centre for dissent, had twenty four bottles of wine sent to the Town Hall for the drinking of a loyal toast following the proclamation and in various towns spontaneous celebratory bonfires were lit. Harris states that on 23 April at the Coronation, the Gazette further reported ‘Expressions of an Universal Joy’.\textsuperscript{36} At Lyme a procession of three hundred virgins pledged ‘their Majesties healths’, there was a firework display, cannon were fired, bonfires lit and free wine was piped into the streets.\textsuperscript{37} Although Mayor George Alford may have been a staunch Tory and staged a good party, it is doubtful if religious principles could be bought for a few fireworks and a few draughts of cheap wine. However, there is no record of dissenters at Lyme not joining in the celebrations or of any public expression of objection to the new king.

Similarly there are no discovered reports of civil disturbances greeting the news of James II’s coronation anywhere else in the kingdom. It seems to have been accompanied by revelry and general rejoicing. If the militia reflected the general mood of the country then this is important in measuring its attitude and consequently
loyalty. There may have been a few dissenters in the ranks who may have been apprehensive of the Catholic king, but they did not take part in any riots or protests or give any indication that they were in favour of rebellion.

Even in the so-called fractious southwest James II’s reign began with the approbation of the people. Harris argues this may have been greatly influenced by both the position of power which the court faction with their pro-absolutist stance had established through the period of Charles II’ reign, known as the Tory Reaction, and a speech that James made to his Council upon the death of his brother in which he promised to ‘preserve this Government both in Church and State as it now by Law Establish’d.’ This speech was printed, widely distributed and read from all Anglican pulpits and its promise to protect the Established Church and the rights of his subjects was repeated by James at the opening of parliament in May 1685. Once again it was followed by formal expressions of loyalty, public celebrations and people lighting bonfires.

The militia mirrored the population – ‘the attachment to the people was the hallmark of the militia’ - and there seems to be little doubt of a widespread acceptance and approval of James II rather than seething disloyalty. James inherited the stability of his brother’s reign, of which Hutton says ‘the position of the monarchy was fundamentally so strong that, only providing he did not show consistent folly, James’ control of his realms was never in doubt’. Harris affirms that ‘The Restoration monarchy was – in theory at least – irresistible.’ However, Hutton also states that if this position was to be threatened, it first had to be undermined from within by the actions of the king himself. By the time of the Monmouth Rebellion in June 1685, James might have begun his series of follies that would lead to his overthrow but they had not had time between May and June to multiply, to be consistent or to come to
public attention. To the militiamen, indeed to the vast majority of the king’s subjects, including those of dissenting persuasion, the monarchy was secure and strong.

However, for James II loyalty was a simpler and more personal affair. He was determined that any military force in the country, royal or militia, should be under his direct control and loyal to him personally. It became an obsession as seen in his sending authorities to determine the state and loyalty of the militia - such as the Duke the Beaufort being dispatched into Wales in 1684 - and his readiness to risk proposing that the militia, the perceived mainstay of social control and national defence, was: ‘not sufficient for such Occasions [as the recent rebellion]’. Moreover, having been so frequently attacked because of his Catholicism he began to favour Catholic royal officers who: ‘always approved the Loyalty’ and he thought them: ‘fit to be employed under me, and … that, after having had the Benefit of their Services in such time of need and danger, I will neither expose them to disgrace, nor my self to the want of them, if there should be another Rebellion to make them necessary to me’.

The criticisms of the militia which emanated from the king were founded on an assertion that: ‘...there is nothing but a good Force of well-disciplined Troops in constant Pay that can defend us...’ Those under his influence, such as Feversham and Churchill, insisted that the militia was not only cowardly, unwilling to obey commands and to serve in general, but that it was also antagonistic to royal authority. This theme has been developed by later historians into accusations of disloyalty that are exaggerated and untrue. Wolseley states that at Bridport:

...had Grey behaved with even ordinary courage... there is little doubt that many of the militiamen would have openly joined him, and the moral effect of this would have been great in London as well as in the locality.

There is considerable doubt that the militia would have joined Monmouth. Colonel Helyer was convinced his men of the Somerset Militia would not: ‘few I
believe, will now join that party who are proclaimed rebels...\(^46\)

Had men of the Dorset Militia harboured ardent feelings of disloyalty to the crown they would not have prevented volunteers to the rebel cause from leaving Bridport to join Monmouth in Lyme. Indeed, they would probably have encouraged it and they were capable of absconding to Monmouth themselves had they wished to do so. When they were attacked they could easily have gone over to Grey as Wolseley suggests, refused to fight, or even run away. They did none of these things.

If Macaulay is to be believed, after the Axminster incident some 90% of the Somerset Militia present and half the entire Devon Militia changed sides. That would mean Monmouth’s army received an influx of some 3,000 men, doubling its strength. Such an influx of recruits directly after Axminster is not recorded by Wade, who noted all significant reinforcements to Monmouth’s army. Wigfield lists those who joined between Axminster and Taunton as ‘...80 men of Axminster...Chard Town provided 99 recruits; Chardland 58, Combe St. Nicholas 22 and Winsham 8 ... Ilminster recruits numbered 54 and a ‘company of ragged horse’... Shoreditch 2.’\(^47\) If other unrecorded villages also supplied men the number of recruits might reach 350. Nor can the inclusion of 3,000 more men be explained by the numbers who joined Bovett’s Blue Regiment in Taunton. Indeed in forming a large body of 600 men so quickly, Wade accuses Bovett of bolstering his new regiment by requisitioning all the Taunton men from the already-established rebel regiments. Monmouth and his supporters believed that far men more would flock to his banner, and indeed expected the majority of the militia to turn their coats. They did not.

The militia remained loyal to the king and their officers, and stood and fought. These were not professionals, dependant for their livelihood on the king and his magnates. Earle’s work has proved that the majority of West Countrymen who did
join Monmouth were capable of making up their own minds and acting upon their own decisions, despite the awful retribution that would follow failure.\textsuperscript{48} The militiamen were of the same stock and independent nature. Woodley states ‘It is important to note the republican and the Restoration militia was comprised, as far as possible, of men with politically correct views. They were, to this extent, not general, but select, politically oriented militia’.\textsuperscript{49} Moreover, many of those in the ranks would have heard of Ware Field or Saffron Waldon, or other great rendezvous of the army during the Interregnum, where the democratic voice of the soldiery had been heard. It was the government and the elite who would use such emotive words as ‘disloyalty’ and ‘mutiny’. Had the militia been mutinous the men were all capable of acting upon their consciences as Somerset militiaman John Coad and perhaps one or two others did; but Coad was far from representative of the institution. The vast majority assembled, marched or fought for the royal cause.

That is not to say that all militiamen were unsympathetic to the rebellion. Some did indeed have doubts about continuing their service, especially those with dissenter leanings, such as Coad, who wrote:

\begin{quote}
After the death of King Charles II and the advance of the Duke of York to the Crowne, Popery and arbitrary government did more visibly appear in continual and unwearied plotting and contriving to weaken the Protestant party. This gave us great cause for fear of the subversion of our Religion and Liberties, from which we had great hopes of deliverance by the Duke of Monmouth’s appearance, strengthened by his declaration for the protestant religion and liberty.\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

Coad, wrote several years after the rebellion and cannot be regarded as wholly reliable, but the sentiment of his opening sentence may well express the feelings of the more enthusiastic Protestant militiamen as well as growing suspicions in the nation at large. Indeed, not all in the ranks of official bodies were trusted by those set
in authority over them. Axe states that: ‘The Sheriff of Dorset called out the 12th and 13th June the Posse Comitatus; but discharged all but the militia, as many of the others were badly armed and not to be trusted.’ Thomas Axe was a dissenting Axminster minister, a fanatical anti-Catholic and opposed to central government and its instrument the militia. For him to state that the militia was trusted by the authorities carries weight.

A major aspect of loyalty is a shared cause and an important element in the control of men is the sharing of goals and aspirations between leaders and those over whom they hold authority. In 1681 Colonel Wyndham of the militia presented an address from Salisbury to King Charles II. It expressed their continuing loyalty and their detestation of ‘all popish and phanatical principles and practices, tending to sedition and rebellion’. This address was approved by 355 loyal citizens and by the companies of clothworkers and barber surgeons. He had the support of the people of Salisbury which included its militiamen. The city’s loyalty to James II was steadfast too.

Militia officers and men had a shared interest in preventing the outbreak of widespread civil unrest and even war: the cry ‘[16]42 is come again’ had a chilling resonance. Equally, they had the shared experience of seizing arms from Catholics and breaking up dissenter conventicles in the cause of maintaining the peace. They were assured that their goals would be achieved by taking action against people they saw as religious fundamentalists, even though they were fellow West Countrymen. They shared a belief which Callow asserts was ‘firmly grounded in the English Protestant tradition which had flourished since the late sixteenth century.’

In the literature, a lack of animosity between neighbours plays an important role in justifying the idea of militia reluctance to fight. The argument is frequently
expressed that the men’s supposed disloyalty was attributable to their unwillingness to
fight their own countrymen. There appears to be a consensus that, ‘the militia and the
posse comitatus, composed of local men reluctant to fire upon their poor neighbours,
were clearly unreliable.’\textsuperscript{54} Despite knowledge of the internecine struggles of the civil
wars it is also repeated in popular lectures:

\begin{quote}
West country militiamen would not fight brother West
countrymen. Men from Bridgwater would never raise their
hands against men from Taunton – against Londoners perhaps
but not fellow Somerset men.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

A counter argument revolves around local community loyalties. Reports of
inter-community rivalry, fighting and public disorder have dominated the news for
generations and they appear to harness a taste for fighting among the general
population. There are some who have voiced the opinion that violence is an English
trait: ‘Beware the English - a nation with the potential for aggression and violence.’\textsuperscript{56}
Prior to the seventeenth century, Shakespeare, an astute social commentator, has his
Henry IV describe his people as, ‘fickle changelings and poor discontents which gape
and rub at the elbow of hurly-burly innovation… moody beggars, starving for a time
of pellmell havoc and confusion.’\textsuperscript{57}

The manifestation of tribal hatred and regional animosity can be seen today at
local football derbies, which evoke passionate if illogical hatred and engender
instances of extreme aggression and violent clashes, including stabbings and
occasional murders.\textsuperscript{58} These attacks involve the expression of loyalty to a local
community and institution. For the men of the Restoration militia, the opportunity to
seize upon an authority-endorsed excuse to attack the men of a nearby community
may have been tempting.

The popularity of the idea of the young men of a county militia being reluctant
to fight is perhaps more of a pastoral idyll than a real reflection of the feelings and
attitudes of the 1680s. During the rebellion two neighbouring towns in North Somerset took opposing stands; the men of Burnham supported Monmouth whilst those of Huntspill favoured James II. On 23 May 1687 a victualler, Stephen Wride, who had been out for Monmouth, upbraided a man from Huntspill for riding with the king’s army. They both gathered supporters and a fight ensued. Later, on 29 June, about a hundred Burnham men attacked the Huntspill Fair. They carried a bloody handkerchief saying they were Monmouth’s colours and set about the Huntspill men whom they called ‘papist rogues’. There was no reluctance to fight one’s neighbours.

The authorities’ concern for the militia’s loyalty was no greater than their worries about the loyalty of the population as a whole, but both were heightened when the 1685 crisis brought to a head all the old fears of Whig-fanned exclusionist arguments and the fears about the newly crowned Catholic king. James II became obsessed with loyalty, a preoccupation to which he gave free rein when all seemed to be crumbling around him in 1688, as a letter to Feversham illustrates:

... I am obliged to ... endeavour to secure myself the best I can, in hopes that it will please God, out of his infinite mercy to this unhappy passion, to touch their [my enemies’] hearts again with true loyalty and honour. If I could have relied on all my troops I might not have been put to this extremity .... But though I know there are amongst you very many loyal and brave men, both officers and soldiers, yet you know that both yourself and several of the general officers of the Army told me it was no ways advisable for me to venture myself at their head or to think to fight the Prince of Orange with them. And there remains only for me to thank you and all those, both officers and soldiers, who have stuck to me and been truly loyal, and hope you will still retain the same fidelity to me. And though I do not expect you should expose yourselves by resisting a foreign army and a poisoned nation, yet I hope your former principles are so rooted in you, that you will keep yourselves free from associations and such pernicious things. Time presses me so that I can say no more. J.R.
I must add this, that as I have always found you loyal, so you have found me a kind master as you shall still find me. J.R. 
Since the early years of Charles II’s reign it was mandatory for those who held civil and ecclesiastical office to swear the usual oaths of allegiance and supremacy, as well as additional oaths renouncing all armed resistance to the monarch or those acting under his commission. It was one thing for those who had not sworn such oaths to enjoy liberty of conscience, but many of the officers and men in the militia would almost certainly have taken them. Part of the conditions set to demonstrate loyalty involved militia officers taking an oath of affirmation that the men concerned had taken the holy sacrament in a Protestant ceremony.61

For those who wished to renounce their sworn loyalty there would be the notional rationalisation that an oath sworn to Charles II was not binding under James II, or that an oath sworn before a Protestant altar did not extend to the service of a Catholic monarch. However, there are no extant examples of such arguments being cited, except by the king himself who, when rebuking Albemarle, reminded him that his commission was the gift of his brother, not of himself as ruling monarch.62

Turning to the events of 1685 it is interesting to note that, where strong local leadership associated with the stability of the state was provided, the men of the militia remained loyal; fighting under Strangways and Erle at Bridport, campaigning under Beaufort at Bristol and with Albemarle at Honiton and Taunton, and mounting supporting actions under Pembroke at Norton St. Philip and Sedgemoor. Only when a break in the contract over pay or life or death crisis could be coupled with a rumoured betrayal by those in authority did a small portion of the militiamen desert, many perhaps being motivated by self-preservation, peer pressure or panic rather than political disloyalty.63

Criticism of the militia’s supposed fickle nature owes much to one of their officers, Lord Fitzharding, who wrote of his concern and about their ability to stand.
Although his worries were articulated, their cause was not. It was not necessarily disloyalty. In command of an isolated regiment of perhaps between 250 to 450 men, Fitzharding would have been understandably apprehensive of facing the rebels, known to be around 5,000 strong at that time. Perhaps he was also rightly suspicious of Somerset’s military ability and his strategy of dividing and dispersing the regiments of his militia rather than amassing them in one large county force as Albemarle and Pembroke had done with the Devon and Wiltshire Militia respectively. ‘Tis my humble opinion that all the force of this county should be drawn together in Wells, and that orders be despatched accordingly to Colonel Horner’s regiment,’ he wrote. Colonel Helyer expressed the same concern that he, his inferior officers and Colonel Berkeley [Fitzharding] ‘are of the opinion that if the whole force of the county be not ordered to march towards us, that perhaps this county may be in danger’.

Despite later romanticising, support for the rebel Duke and his cause in the southwest was poor. The country appeared content with the promises made by the king and his government to promote toleration and freedom from the extremist elements of both Catholicism and non-conformity. Disloyalty among the people may have existed: indeed, Deborah Hawkins of Holborn said that if there was a war she would ‘put on breeches… to fight for the Duke of Monmouth.’ But most of country was quiet, including the dissenters of Taunton, although the mayor of Bridgwater, Robert Hoare, received letters expressing concern over the new king’s ‘too forward and ungovernable zeal for Catholicism.’ Fountainhall, Luttrell, Hutton, Harris and Miller, all published authors of works on the reign of James II present no evidence of a disaffected militia.
Disloyalty may have been latent among some individual militiamen, but not within the larger institution. The established church exerted significant authority in local matters and the direct contact between some clergymen and their high-ranking militia officer patrons had an influence upon the frequency and severity of the anti-dissenter activities undertaken by their troops or companies. For instance, the personal chaplain to Colonel Sir Edward Phelipps of Montacute, no friend of dissenters, was a strong supporter of the established Anglican Church. Most of Somerset’s clergy were under the firm control of the pro-royalist Peter Mews, Bishop of Winchester (erstwhile Bishop of Bath and Wells), whilst Dorset reflected the views of William Gulston, Bishop of Bristol, another arch Anglican Tory.

There are no recorded incidents of opposition or reluctance to enforce the various acts passed to restrict religious dissent. The militia rounded up and imprisoned 200 Quakers in 1662 and in December 1664 five of the nine Dorchester nonconformist ministers were in jail on suspicion of being involved in a rising where they were joined by another minister and a further 70 lay folk incarcerated for nonconformity. Throughout the reign of Charles II the militia had loyally done its duty and suppressed potential and actual outbreaks of disorder and under Sir Edward Phelipps they did so with harsh effectiveness. There is no reason to suggest they would not continue to do so under James II.

The militia reflected the general views of the people but the argument that the militias of the southwest were inherently disloyal and prone to rebellion is ill-founded. Although certain parts of Somerset may have been dissenter strongholds, dissent was certainly not universal from Salisbury west to Bodmin. The map of rebel support in the West, based upon analysis of the Monmouth Roll, shows an almost equal balance in area between those parishes which furnished rebels and those which
Parishes that did not produce rebels (shown as white irregular blocks) lay in swathes to the east and west of the immediate centre of rebellion and even within it they are spread across the region like archipelagos of loyalty.

Illustration 8.2.1: Map of rebel support by parishes.


All parishes were required to furnish militiamen and undoubtedly some men did not turn out, but there is no reliable evidence to suggest that the western militias were below expected strengths upon mustering. The fact that the southwest was thought a region of dissent does not appear to have had a serious impact upon the turnout of the militia. Some militiamen were undoubtedly greatly troubled by their consciences over religious concerns, and some as seen above did change sides, but their numbers
were few and did not approach those suggested by several contemporary accounts or by the reports written and published by the government.

James II had little to fear if only the most extreme dissenting militiaman could find a home in the ranks of Monmouth’s rebels. Dissenters were few in proportion to the total inhabitants of each county but remarks concerning the religious context of the militia need also to be seen in context of the religious census reports of the period.

**Table 8.2.1: The calculated percentage of faiths in county populations in 1676.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Nonconformists</th>
<th>Conformists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cornwall &amp; Devon</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>1 - 3%</td>
<td>96.75 - 98.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>0.25 - 0.5%</td>
<td>3 - 4%</td>
<td>95.5 - 96.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>3 - 4%</td>
<td>95.75 - 96.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>0.5 - 1%</td>
<td>4 - 5%</td>
<td>94.5 - 95.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>3 - 4%</td>
<td>95.75 - 96.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>0.5 - 1%</td>
<td>3 - 4%</td>
<td>95 - 96.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table 8.2.2: The numbers of various faiths in diocesan areas, 1693.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diocese</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Nonconformists</th>
<th>Conformists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bath &amp; Wells</td>
<td>151,496</td>
<td>176 (0.2%)</td>
<td>5,856 (3.8%)</td>
<td>145,464 (96%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td>213,274</td>
<td>298 (0.2%)</td>
<td>5,406 (2.5%)</td>
<td>207,570 (97.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucester</td>
<td>67,227</td>
<td>128 (0.2%)</td>
<td>2,363 (3.5%)</td>
<td>64,734 (96.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>108,294</td>
<td>548 (0.6%)</td>
<td>4,075 (3.7%)</td>
<td>103,671 (95.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>159,809</td>
<td>968 (0.6%)</td>
<td>7,904 (4.9%)</td>
<td>150,937 (94.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>699,098</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,118(0.3%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,604 (3.5%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>672,376 (96.2%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CSPD. Census of 1693. pp. 448-450. Calculations drawn from Browning, *Ibid*. The picture is very similar at parish level. Bishop Burnham’s Census lists the parish of Swindon in Wiltshire as containing 578 Anglicans (99.87%), 8 Non-Conformists (0.13%) and no Catholics. 72
These figures may be higher than elsewhere in the country thus affording the West a greater dissenter population than elsewhere, but in terms of numbers to influence the character of the militia it is not significant. The claim that the whole Devon Militia would probably have gone over to Monmouth because of its dissenting background can be dismissed as nonsense. In extrapolating the figures, of 4,000 militiamen with a top estimate of 3% dissenters the maximum number in the ranks would have been around 120. If those dissenting voices were spread among the six regiments of foot and one of horse then each regiment may have contained 17 men, about one or two in a company, whose religious opinions may have induced them to be disloyal and desert. Whether they would simply abscond or actually join the rebels would be more of a personal decision than a religious one.

Nor is there any reason to suggest that the charismatic Monmouth’s popularity in the West influence matters. Told in Spring 1685 that Monmouth might lead an invasion, Phelipps’ Regiment turned out and performed its duty without protest. Ardent dissenting militiamen unhappy about resisting the Protestant Duke would, on that alarm, have also been struggling with their consciences especially if, like Coad, they had ‘great cause for fear of the subversion of our Religion and Liberties, from which we had great hopes of deliverance by the Duke of Monmouth’s appearance’. Yet they duly mustered at this false alarm, and did so again in June when called out to counter the rebellion.

Monmouth had been persuaded that he was universally popular in the southwest and that not only the people but the gentry and the militia would come over to him. However, he must have been aware of the Tory leanings among many of the militia officers such as Phelipps and country gentry such as Winston Churchill, the MP for Lyme and father of John Churchill, an up-and-coming royal officer. The
gentry were mostly Anglican, with a few exceptions such as the Thynnes, Speakes and Fords, as were the majority of the population from which the militia was drawn. There were pockets of dissenters in the population of Somerset, especially in the urban areas such as Chard, Frome, Lyme and Taunton and their surrounding villages, which had long been non-conformist and had supported of the parliamentarian cause in the civil wars. But did this cause the militia to waver in its loyalty to the crown?

Earle suggests that:

…this particular area, with its heavy concentration of Nonconformity and industrial workers, had been ever since 1660 the most factious and militant region in the country, with the possible exception of London.

However, during the mid 1650s the same region was, for the same reason of fractious, militant discontent, the target of a cavalier rising. In 1655 Colonel John Penruddock and his rebellion met with initial enthusiasm which soon dwindled away, and he himself was captured and executed. Monmouth was doomed to the same fate. The majority of those upon whom both Penruddock and Monmouth relied for a massive turnout preferred to stay at home and obey the commands of those in power. The numbers of militiamen who turned out in 1685 are very difficult to calculate exactly but they far outnumbered Monmouth’s adherents - 7,000 being the most optimistic estimate of his strength at the height of his rebellion, he had an estimated 3,500 at Sedgemoor. As seen earlier the militias of the six active counties dwarfed this number.

Broadly speaking the nation was royalist and was more disposed towards a monarchy than towards a republic. Monmouth’s declaration and proclamation as king at Taunton was an attempt to improve recruitment, especially from among the gentry. The rebel army might cheer Monmouth’s claim to the throne but the militia, like the majority of the population, generally supported the legitimacy of James II’s claim.
The men of the militia were ordered by the king’s instruction to serve, were mustered by the king’s lieutenants, wore variations of the king’s uniform, carried the king’s colours, drew pay bearing the king’s likeness from taxes gathered by the king’s agents, operated according to the king’s laws and the king’s sanctioned military regulations and drill books, and, as such, they enacted the king’s will.

Later in the reign, after James II had alienated many of his Protestant subjects, those in his service were still loath to be disloyal. When William of Orange first landed the common council of Exeter published an address against the Dutch. On 9 November, even with William before their gates, the Exeter magistrates tried to prevent his entry and the city clergy refused to read his Declaration from their pulpits. During the 1688 campaign political opportunists such as John Churchill and William Portman may have deserted the king but very few ordinary soldiers turned their coats. Nor is there any evidence to indicate that the remnants of the southwest counties’ militia following James’ neglect of them were disloyal until William’s success appeared inevitable. Only then did they change sides and then neither upon their own volition nor upon orders of their officers, but under the direction of their lord lieutenants. The Gloucestershire Militia not only remained loyal but fought at Cirencester to secure a party of some seventy ‘well appointed men’ under Lord Lovelace who were trying to join William.

On the landing of William of Orange, in 1688, the inhabitants [of Cirencester] influenced by the Duke of Beaufort, declared for James II; and Lord Lovelace, on his march through the town with a party to join the prince, was attacked by Captain Lorange of the county militia, made prisoner and sent to Gloucester gaol. In this encounter flowed the first blood that was shed in the Revolution.

After James II deserted his army at Salisbury and returned to London, the mood of the country and the militia seems to have changed. The Duke of Norfolk had
already raised the militia in East Anglia for William and had occupied Norwich and Kings Lynn. Only when Princess Anne the king’s daughter and Prince George of Denmark his son-in-law, Churchill, second in command of the army, Viscount Cornbury a senior officer, the Duke of Grafton his royal nephew and many other leading officers had gone over to William, was the monarch no longer in a position to fulfill his office. Then everybody’s loyalty was dramatically affected not just that of militiamen. At Nottingham, the gentry and commons assembled to justify their disloyalty by asserting that James II ‘was always accounted a tyrant that made his Will the Law; and to resist such an one [was] no rebellion but a necessary defence.’ Under similar terms of self-justification the Dorset Militia was mustered for William by the local nobility without any sign of trouble.

Despite the accusations of the king and his dependants in the royal army there is little evidence and even less proof that the militia harboured any feelings of disloyalty in 1685, and it changed sides in 1688 only after most of the leaders of the political nation had already done so.

8.3. CONCLUSION.

Bearing in mind the limitations of a part-time force the Restoration militia carried out its duty of providing security against invasion or insurrection effectively. The people’s and the government’s perception of the militia’s purpose may have had a difference in emphasis as to which element of this duty was of primary importance but both saw them as a necessary body which could respond locally to threat.

The expectation that the militia was to deter, counter or contain an invasion was met by the West Country militia for years before and during the Monmouth crisis. In 1685 they fulfilled the role of second line troops during the campaign well
despite there being friction between one county force and its lord lieutenant. Perhaps coordinated by a royal officer the southwest militias acted in concert to effectively contain the rebellion and then gradually to bring about its demise by obliging Monmouth to take the desperate gamble of fighting at Sedgemoor. They certainly met the expectation that could deal locally with an insurrection or an invasion albeit they were not up against foreign professional soldiers. They also several undertook other duties required by the authorities despite several of them being unpleasant.

The militia also proved itself to be loyal to both its officers and its king despite ties of community and religion. The notion that West Countryman would not fight West Countryman is a romantic nonsense and in extreme circumstances several militia regiments proved themselves more than willing to go into action against the rebels. Similarly religion appears not to have been an influence upon militia loyalty or performance and the fear of widespread religious dissent in the ranks provoking the men to be disloyal was ill-founded. Dissenters would normally not have sought service in the militia but even if and when they did the overall percentage of potential malcontents was insignificant. Religious dissent meant much to people holding those views but seemingly little to the average militiaman; certainly not enough to influence the loyalty of the institution.

The militia proved that they were able to fulfil expectations but as with all military units, they needed to be well officered to do so. The abilities of the country gentry appear to have been adequate in this respect, especially at field-officer level. Even *in extremis* and under fire ‘the officers had with much adoe prevailed with theyre soldiers to stand’ and to give volleys.\(^1\) At a higher level the lord lieutenants or their deputies whether they had military experience or not, conducted the campaign with
skill and at times judicious daring, with the notable exception of Charles Seymour, Duke of Somerset.

The Earl of Ailesbury, a steadfast supporter of James II, ‘thought that the militia’s “hearts and inclinations were certainly good”,’ whilst Sir Henry Capel said in the House that ‘Our security is the militia; that will defend us and Never conquer us’. Both statements illustrate the confidence that members of both houses had in the institution, not only to render the nation secure but also to remain loyal and not to pose a threat that it would use its might to overthrow the government.

The militia fulfilled its assigned role and carried out the will of its officers and its political masters. There were incidents of individuals and units not performing as they should, but in general the militia fulfilled its purpose and maintained its loyalty to those who created and commanded it.
NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT


2. Albeit in the seventeenth century there was an emphasis upon protection of property, especially that of the ruling elite.

3. Albeit in modern Suffolk, Landguard Fort was considered part of Essex until the 19thC.

4. Although the militia was the instrument, its operations were often targeted by the Stuart secret service under Henry Guy.

5. Military Covenant is a term coined by the Ministry of Defence in ‘Soldiering – The Military Covenant’ (April 2000). It has now entered political discourse as a way of measuring whether the government and society have kept to their obligations to support members of the military.

6. Although in the seventeenth century there was an emphasis upon protection of property, especially that of the ruling elite.

7. See note 1.


10. 236 Quarter Sessions under James II Full text of 'Quarter Sessions from Queen Elizabeth to Queen Anne Anne'; www.archive.org/stream/quartersessionsf00hamiuoft/quartersessionsf00hamiuoft_djvu.txt


15. Sydenham op cit., p.137

16. Ibid. Ferguson was Monmouth’s chaplain and chief rabble-rouser.

17. Wheeler in Chandler Sedgemoor 1685.

18. Had the Wiltshire Militia been involved it is very likely Wheeler would have recorded it, as he did regarding the rebels hanged by the Regiment on an inn sign at Glastonbury.


22. Titus Oates brought accusations against several leading figures of the day including the Duke of York’s wife. of a subversive Catholic plot to kill Charles II and return the country to Catholicism by installing York as king; Sydenham, History of the Town and County of Poole (Poole, Sydenham, 1839), p.137.

23. HRO: 11M49/F/05, Volume containing memoranda relating to Charles, 1st Duke of Bolton as Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire, 1672-1699. Item 10. In Lyndhurst, the administrative town for the New Forest there is a public house called The Crown Stirrup which recalls the measure. Only dogs able to pass through a stirrup had the crown’s permission to be in the forest.

24. The Watch, where it existed, may have been able to assist but they had very little and limited jurisdiction or numbers. They were satisfactory as persons able to apprehend local miscreants. Whether these Posse men were the militia is uncertain as the distinction between two terms appears to vary according to location and writer.


28. Ibid.

29. The cartoons of Thomas Gilray were particularly savage. Viz. Illustration 6.1.1.

30. SRO: Q/SR/178/19-22, Informations. Evidence of Edward Collard, and Joan Sanders wife of Simon Sanders, Mr Charles Rich, Edward Collard and Christopher Sanders all of Lydeard St Lawrence


32. SRO: DDSH/5/409 A militia ‘envelope’?


34. Warren, E., Religious Loyalty or Old Allegiance to the New King (1685) quoted in Harris, Revolution, op.cit., p. 47.

35. Harris, Revolution p.281-283.

36. LC, MSSS 18,124, IX, fol. 195.
78 Harris, Revolution p.285.

79 *The Declaration of the Nobility, Gentry and Commonality at the Rendezvous a Nottingham. November 22 1688* (1688). Quoted in Harris, *ibid.* p. 286.

80 Morrice, Q, 322 (Whittel) *Exact Diary,* p.51. Quoted in Harris, *ibid.* p. 283.

81 Wade in Wigfield, p.164.

Chapter Nine

CONCLUSION

“…it is difficult to escape the conclusion they were at best paper tigers; unreliable, inefficient and certainly not a serious military force.”

The tradition of a part time military force for the protection of the community was established from the earliest times, especially in the role of support troops to the warrior elite. This part-time force which complemented the various royal armies also acquired civil policing duties to meet threats to law and order, and performed adequately in both roles for hundreds of years. Despite inter-unit rivalry the royal army and the militia co-existed and at times of national emergency united cohesively into a practicable field army, forming a mutually supportive relationship until the civil wars blurred the distinction.

Following the Restoration differentiation between the militia and royal troops was redrawn as political fears resulted in the militia being seen as a counter-balance to the royal army. Despite this however, the roles were sufficiently well defined with expectations of service being force-specific and well understood. That co-operation was evident throughout the reign of Charles II. However, although the militia was an effective and necessary part of national defence the West Country militia regiments active during the Monmouth Rebellion have a reputation for ineffectiveness, a stain affixed to their character with royal sanction if not by royal instigation.

James II saw a strong affinity between monarch and standing royal army as essential to both his and his government’s security. In early 1685, if not earlier the king realised that he could hasten the expansion of his royal army by rubbingish the militia, and that in order to succeed he had to break the symbiotic relationship that existed between them and society.
The militia’s ranks were filled by civilians who shared the sentiments, political affiliations and consciences of the country’s population but the government of king and council, as well as leading Tories in both houses, feared the creation of a Whig militia. Yet the Whig politicians never attempted to undermine it or to turn it from its duty. Republican sentiment also existed but it too was not a popular cause in the militia. Overall, the militia remained in favour of stability, which meant espousing the establishment stance and being monarchist, pro-Anglican and susceptible to Tory guidance. Militiamen might not have been enthusiastic about some of the duties they were called upon to undertake but they were certainly not sufficiently hostile towards them to quit their loyalties or their colours.

To achieve his military aims James II needed to create both an imperative requirement for a large standing army and a source of financial savings to fund it. The Monmouth Rebellion played into his hands and he used the laxity of the lord lieutenant of Somerset, and the failure of his militiamen at Axminster to spearhead a general attack upon the institution, to denigrate its effectiveness and perhaps to reallocate its funding.³ It is not possible to identify exactly the point at which James decided to sacrifice the militia but it seems to have been in May or June 1685, and for three years he so neglected it that when threatened by William of Orange’s invasion, his attempts to reconstitute and summon it were mostly futile. Much of the evidence for James’ criticism of the militia came from senior royal officers with their own nests to feather.⁴ The militia’s cause went unsupported by the very men who should have seen the nation’s defence as a priority.

Being an obstacle to James’ plans to enlarge of his royal army was reason enough for the king to neglect the militia’s maintenance, malign its reputation and even seek to destroy it. Although many of his contemporaries did not believe it,
James’s political spin created a picture of an ineffective militia and over three years changes in its administration and the withholding of its funding naturally changed the nature, efficiency and effectiveness of the militia as a body. The militia of 1688, the product of James’s deliberate neglect may well have merited criticism, but it was not the militia of 1685 and it is unreasonable to build an argument of militia ineffectiveness from material relating to them.

Part of the people’s preference for the militia over the royal army stemmed from the fact that it was under the command of the country nobility and gentry and as such it was also an instrument of local authority and an effective agent of social control. Militia officers were intricately bound with ties of loyalty to both the crown and the county and were often men who held land and office who were dependent upon the established order and social structure for their continued financial well-being and position. They had a vested interest in the preservation of the status quo and also belonged to a landowning class where family loyalty was of great concern and marriages for family alliance frequent. Nepotism in the appointment to local offices was also widely prevalent amongst these families. When it came to the appointment of militia officers, social status, financial power and family influence held sway. The only concession to professionalism was the choice of muster master who was often a veteran soldier who had held rank in the royal forces. Charles II and his government understood and manipulated this network to advantage. James II did not.

There is nothing to suggest that any major flaw in command and control existed as long as the lord lieutenants and their deputies were diligent in the execution of their duties. The county muster master and the militia regimental colonels maintained effective discipline whilst the other militia officers exercised their authority within a command structure that mirrored that of the royal army. However,
it must be conceded that the willingness of the militiamen to follow the orders of their officers depended not only upon their commissions but also owed a great deal to the interwoven nature of the governance of the local community. Community-based orientation with innate respect for status and obedience to social superiors was an important factor in the command and control of the militia.

Militia officers could not hold their men accountable under military law, unless attached to a regular command. Militiamen were subject to civil jurisprudence and answerable to civil authorities even for military infractions but inherent localism often ensured that their military officers were the same men to whom, in their civil offices, they answered for militia-based misdemeanors. However there are few references in petty or quarter sessions records of militiamen appearing before justices to answer such accusations.

Similarly although extant lists of names of militiamen and their units are plentiful little relating to their occupations survives. Yet there is sufficient evidence to show that the majority of men were craftsmen, stockmen and small-holders in the rural parishes and tradesmen, manufacturers and shopkeepers in the urban ones, with a substantial proportion of them also being contributors. There is nothing to suggest that the ranks were full of unemployed men or known rogues.

From the beginning of the reign of Charles II the militia had both a strong administrative and military framework. Each county organised its forces in a similar manner mirroring the well-established, effective practices and systems of the royal army, local authority government and the church. Both infantry regiments and cavalry troops were raised from the various civil divisions of the counties and were based upon a county’s major towns, often being named after a distinguishing colour or their commanding officer. This system was effective and fit for purpose, and
indeed did not undergo major administrative or structural change during the reign of William III although unit sizes were increased.

Not only was the organisation of the militia effective but so too was its ability to turn out in substantial numbers. Finding men was the responsibility of the contributors and organising them in files and companies was done by parish and hundred constables with the civil authorities ensuring compliance. These methods worked with organisation reflecting local identities: a parish mustered alongside neighbouring parishes and hundreds formed regional companies and regiments. There were abuses of the system, such as absentees, missing weapons or accoutrements, but these were easily investigated and punished due to the localised nature of the relevant authorities.¹⁰

Localism made administration and muster attendance easier, and it also encouraged unit trust which in turn assisted performance. Unit strengths varied according to the number of hundreds in each county division and their respective abilities to furnish men through the wealth of their inhabitants, but muster masters’ certificates show that musters were usually well attended and units achieved expected quotas. In 1685 the militia in the southwest numbered some 20,000 foot and 2,000 horse and was thus capable of turning out a considerable force when required.¹¹

None of this or the militia’s ability to function in its allotted role would have been possible without efficient funding, pay and supply or an effective means of bringing the men into action. The Restoration government shifted responsibility from itself to local authorities and contributors. These contributors could serve unpaid in the militia themselves, find substitutes or pay assessed sums to the sheriff’s office as Militia Money from which the parish constables had to find men, equipment and their pay.¹² Parliament empowered the king to raise Militia Money via a separate assessed
taxation over a set period and payable in annual tranches, and this was assessed and collected effectively.\textsuperscript{13} The lord lieutenants were also permitted to exact and collect an additional tax to fund other military necessities and supplies under the auspices of Trophy Money.\textsuperscript{14} This too was done effectively.

Although there were attempts by parliament to take financial control by setting a national militia rate the local systems of collection and distribution remained constant and produced sufficient money to fund the county forces. Magistrates quashed any slight resistance that emerged but complaints regarding over-assessment were often heard impartially and resolved fairly.\textsuperscript{15} Legal seizure of transport vehicles and draught animals for militia use was the one area where pressure by the authorities could be intrusive despite arrangements to pay for such on a hire basis. Nevertheless, there was no widespread or organised protest in response to this or the imposition of Militia or Trophy Money taxation. Indeed the militia appears to have been well regarded by the civil powers and the people, who showed no hesitation in turning to them in a crisis.

The speed at which militia units were summoned and mustered was impressive given the communications and the transport infrastructure of the age. The rallying points for each stage of mustering a county force were known and entire county contingents could be drawn together within three days.\textsuperscript{16} Naturally there would have been stragglers but the general speed of assembling was remarkably quick, especially when danger threatened. Invasion threats were rare but more frequently there were calls for aid in resisting pirates, containing smugglers, or responding to summonses to search suspected properties for weapons. These seem to have all met with the same rapid response.
To be effective military units have to be fit for service and be available to undertake operations when ordered. This thesis has shown that the militia was indeed available, whilst their training made them able to perform as required. The men of the Restoration militia did not regard militarism as an anathema and attended training musters willing. Although the specific drill books used by the muster masters cannot be proved they are very likely to have been the same as those employed in the royal army and inspection reports testify to their satisfactory employment. Payment and the chance to socialise were of course inducements to attend but training was also a government requirement with the lord lieutenants charged with ensuring it took place and that it was effective.

During the Monmouth emergency thanks to their rapid assembly and delays in receiving orders the men had time to drill and practice operating in larger formations before marching, and once joined with the royal army, Feversham ensured that they practiced working as part of the combined force. Some inefficiency was noted but the more energetic lord lieutenants were quick to identify and rectify it, even in the face of ambiguous or even contradictory government instructions. Inspections and assessments of military proficiency repeatedly record satisfaction by those in authority and other observers. They also indicate the level of drill and types of complex manoeuvres the men in both the foot and the horse were able to perform.

Discipline does not appear to have been a problem within the militia. No instances of formal complaints against militia officers have been found although it is known that one and possibly more martinets existed. Officers did not doubt the effectiveness of their trained militiamen although at times reservations were expressed regarding new recruits. Unlike royal troops the militia did not receive full time training but it succeeded in achieving a level of proficiency that was acceptable to
contemporary authorities, and evidence from William III’s reign indicates a strong desire to return the militia to the level of effectiveness that it had achieved prior to James II’s deliberate neglect.\textsuperscript{21}

The militiamen may have been proficient but in order to be thought of as a proper military body by the people they needed to resemble the royal soldiers that the public might have seen. When assembled the militia regiments paraded with drums, colours and all the impedimenta of a royal fighting force which was funded centrally by Trophy Money. Whilst the wearing of uniform may not have followed a specific universal code it was widespread and generally emulated the royal army’s dress. This was especially true amongst officers whose position in society made it imperative that they were not outshone by their royal counterparts.\textsuperscript{22} An established tradition of wearing uniform coats was continued by the Restoration militia in increasing numbers, although it did not become universal until William III’s reign. Many of the West Country militia regiments of 1685 had uniform coats and equipment and to those who saw them they would have provided a visually powerful image of soldiery whilst their military appearance and bearing suggested to bystanders that they were indeed an effective body.\textsuperscript{23}

During the Monmouth Rebellion the various militia forces covered the required march distances without major problems. There were no recorded incidents of late arrivals or large numbers of stragglers, nor any disorderly or slovenly marches. The Wiltshire Red Regiment comfortably exceeded expected daily mileages even in comparison with royal troops and the same unit showed an ability to launch an unexpected lightning strike at an objective by mounting infantrymen behind troopers.\textsuperscript{24} The West Country militia could march effectively when called to do so.
The campaign role of the militia was to contain an invading force close to its landing point, or a rebellion to its area of inception until the arrival of royal forces and subsequently to co-operate with them by securing strategic objectives or by supporting field operations as a second line reserve. During the Dutch Wars the militia responded well to foreign threats and throughout the age to those of pirates.25 Lack of intelligence prevented the militias from resisting Monmouth’s landing but they responded quickly and after an initial setback at Axminster were able to fulfil their role of seizing strategic objectives whilst containing the rebellion within Somerset. The Duke of Somerset’s distribution of his force in penny packets permitted the rebels to march unchecked through Somerset but other militias were far better handled. The militia forestalled potential risings in major towns and cities, undertook raids and scouting duties, denied Monmouth use of major roads and bridges, obliged him to abandon his attempt on Bristol and forced him to retire westward. During the latter part of the campaign they manoeuvred to gradually hem in the rebel army, drawing the net around it ever tighter as it retreated. They were effective in rapidly re-entering places vacated by the rebels thereby re-establishing royal control. They also severed Monmouth’s communications with his main areas of support and adroitly prevented reinforcements and aid reaching the rebels.

Although not a primary requisite of second line troops, when required to do so the militia fought effectively. The actions in which militia troops were involved were by no means big battles and were not fought against professional troops but the men stood, did not run, and often gained the upper hand. The accusation that the militia were unreliable and were kept in the rear during action is mainly based on ill-informed opinion rather than fact. The Wiltshire Militia’s posting at Middlezoy, two miles east of Westonzoyland, was a billeting solution not the result of their being
deemed ineffective.26 They also assembled quickly and marched forward to take part in the action on Sedgemoor and their contribution as the reserve was praised by the commander-in-chief.27 Similarly several militia units that were involved in fighting, notably the Dorset Militia at Bridport and the Wiltshire Militia at Frome, were able to march the next or even the same day, thereby demonstrating a remarkably effective rate of post-action recovery. Even that part of the Somerset Militia which fled at Axminster was able to rapidly regroup and return to active duty.28

Prior to the events of 1685 the militia proved more than adequate when supporting royal troops to resist foreign threats and were effective in controlling dissenter opposition. As second-line troops, they provided the means whereby national land-based security could be had at minimal cost and during the Monmouth Rebellion not only did they co-operate in the royal campaign of containment but their very presence dissuaded potential rebellious factions from mobilising. All of this was conducted at the expense of local authorities and inhabitants, with minimal charge to government funds. The Restoration militia adequately fulfilled its purpose of being the protectors of the state in war and peacetime and was held in a degree of esteem for doing so, and yet those in power remained constantly concerned about their loyalty.

Control of the militia and the maintenance of its loyalty were continuing political issues throughout the seventeenth century and crossed several of the fault-lines of the age: the tensions between king, parliament and army; Tory and Whig; centralism and localism; country versus court factions; and between conformity and dissent. The first Restoration Parliament tried to make a definitive statement by placing the militia directly under the king but circumstances soon revived the debate. Although there is no real evidence for it these debates helped foster an underlying
perception that the militia, although capable of doing what was required, did so unwillingly.

Despite a popular misconception that the West Country with its high proportion of dissenting residents was ripe for resistance to the commands of a Catholic king, a study of religious affiliation reveals that the numbers of both Catholics and Non-Conformists in these counties and cities were relatively small and that corresponding numbers in the militia would have been inconsequential. The idea that religious convictions made the militia deliberately and wilfully obstructive to the orders and policies of James II has been shown to be false. To ensure loyalty to the Anglican faith, as well as reliability of service to the established ecclesiastic order, the church maintained sufficient influence through the pulpit and the chaplains who attended the militia’s senior officers. There was the occasional extremist who might have deserted the ranks of the militia on religious grounds but they were very few. The situation was further improved by changes in government policy which resulted in fewer calls upon the militia to enforce the Clarendon Code.

The contemporary concept of loyalty was complex in that it embraced several constituent aspects, including national, local and family identities as well as political allegiance and religious persuasion. Given James II’s dislike of anything other than immediate and complete compliance and his already strong preference for an enlarged royal army, he was quick to identify the militia with opposition factions. His dissatisfaction with the militia was fanned by senior royal officers who saw advancement in curtailing the militia and by politicians anxious to be seen supporting the king.

No evidence has been found to show that the militia harboured any desire to go over to Monmouth. Apart from a very small but well-publicised number of
incidents of individual coat-turning, it remained loyal to the king and its officers whilst campaigning for the royal cause. Perhaps many militiamen retained silent sympathies for Monmouth’s Protestant/Whig affiliation and were wary of James’ popery, yet the overwhelming majority remained loyal, and three years later several militia units remained faithful to James even when his senior army commanders and many royal troops deserted him. There are no recorded incidents of mutiny amongst the militia, even when its members were treated badly by authorities who withheld pay: commanders reported only a quasi ‘work to rule’ rather than wanton disobedience. Accusations of fickle loyalty in the field stemmed from extraordinary circumstances rather than inherent disloyalty.

However, two aspects associated with the nature and operation of the militia prevented it from being deemed equal to the royal army. Firstly, it mustered for very short periods of time after which the men returned to their civilian occupations. It had no permanent billeting accommodation, no regimental home and places in the ranks could be substituted at will. Although militiamen could establish a unit identity and a degree of cohesion unlike the royal troops they were never together long enough to hone it to a sharp cutting edge. For all their drill and training they remained ad hoc units. Secondly by dint of parish call-up individuals must have known neighbours and others who stood in the ranks alongside them, but there was no large corps of trusted comrades. Travel in the 1600s was limited amongst the social classes that made up the ranks of the militia with only journeymen leaving their parishes on a regular basis. There was little opportunity to create ‘mutual trust and inter-dependency which forge the bonds of mateship’, an important factor amongst fighting men and regarded by many soldiers as the one factor that keeps men in action when reason and personal survival instincts tell them to run. Denied such core elements, it
would be unreasonable to expect militiamen to perform like royal units under fire. Although the fighting at Bridport proved their ability to stand their ground in action, this had been achieved in a very favourable position against a foe of limited ability, and at Frome the enemy did not possess even the rudimentary organisation and discipline of the rebel army.

Returning to reputation, in 1685 many of the men called out may not have regarded Monmouth’s invasion as a national emergency. They faced a rabble of fellow English co-religionists led by a popular English figurehead, not an invasion by a French or Spanish army of Catholic foreigners. It was regarded as a threat and as such merited hostile action, but it was not one which was likely to engender intense passions.

However, no matter how ill founded fear of the potential for the militia to rise remained. Wariness bred resentment and the image of a steadfast and effective militia was contradicted by a few well-publicised if misrepresented events. However few, these incidents were enough to warrant censure but the individuals who condemned them were either non-military men such as the Reverend Paschall, who failed to grasp the concept of comradeship born of regular service, or officers such as Feversham and Churchill, who had to consider their careers in the king’s royal army.32

Contemporary comments denigrating the militia were heavily outnumbered by satisfactory reports, factual statements of achievements and thanks for service – even from the king. Criticism of the militia was derived from a false expectation that they should behave like first-line troops, fanned by both unwitting bias and outright partisanship, all bolstered by a prejudice born of self-interest.

The modern perception of the late seventeenth-century militia is a blend of cultural memories based on the limited research of Victorian historians, unhistorical
illustration work of political cartoonists and satirists in the eighteenth century. The situation is compounded by writers uncritically repeating secondary sources when the subject matter it is not central to their research.

Many elements have to be taken into consideration before a judgment regarding the effectiveness of the militia can be reached. When a body of hitherto unused evidence is examined, the holistic picture of the militia that emerges provides sufficient evidence for questioning established perceptions. Deliberately obfuscated evidence has previously been taken at face value and the criteria by which the seventeenth-century militia has heretofore been judged have been inappropriately influenced by an evaluation made out of time and context. The contention of this thesis is therefore that on the basis of the evidence discovered the reputation of an ineffective militia is ill-founded.

Certain aspects concerning the historiography and the contextualising of the militia merit further work. A study of those other militias which also mustered during the 1685 emergency might be undertaken to determine if they too meet the criteria for effectiveness. Further work might also encompass the militias of the rest of England, Scotland and Wales over a larger period so as to establish a nationwide picture rather than one centred upon Southwest England.

Other aspects of this work which could be developed include:

- An examination of the influence exerted upon historians by the behaviour and practices of the militia of their own age. For example, it would be interesting to discover the opinion Macaulay held of the militia of his day to determine if he was perhaps predisposed to associating the militia of the Monmouth Rebellion with any ineptitude
and poor morale he ascribed to his contemporaries. Did he project his own values onto his interpretation of the source material?

- A comparison of similarities and differences between the militia of the 1680s and the modern Territorial Army seeking to complement the work of Schwoerer and Strachan.\(^{33}\) A study of the relationship between the modern regular and territorial armies could attempt to draw comparisons between the royal army and militia of the Restoration period. The current debate concerning the role of second line troops in the field, and the extent to which part-time soldiers can take their place in the front line alongside regulars, is the source of investigative studies of modern practice.\(^{34}\)

- An investigation of the manufacture of armour for militia troops and where they may have been made. This was deemed too tangential for the current work, especially given the inability of both the Royal Armouries and the Worshipful Guild of Armourers and Braziers to locate any records pertaining to militia armour for the period, and the lack of specific county order books.

- A study of improvements introduced by William III to counter the neglect of James II, how these were implemented, what they achieved and their effect.

Whilst undertaking this work amid collections of original source documents held in local county libraries and record offices, one major obstacle arose worthy of note. Frustratingly, the National Archives at Kew contested the very existence of the Restoration militia. Their public service handout, *Military Records Information 2*, last updated on 28 June 2004, states that ‘after the Civil War, the militia was in
abeyance until 1757’. On 20 November 2008, the duty archivist dealing with enquiries reaffirmed the use of the word ‘abeyance’ as meaning ‘it did not exist’ and further asserted that the institution would hold no records pertaining to non-existent bodies.\footnote{Another obstacle, albeit of a minor nature, was encountered with the Royal Library at Windsor Castle. The author was told that the illustrator Bob Marrion, whose work was used in chapter six, had in the past been granted access to a collection item known as *James II’s Colour Book*. The work depicts the regimental uniforms of that reign and from it he gathered his specialist information. The author made several attempts to contact the library without success, but Professor Richard Holmes replied to an appeal for support by stating: ‘There is effectively nothing you can do. Windsor had a policy of not helping doctoral students, and I suspect this has not changed.’\footnote{Consequently references to that work do not include a call number.}

However, this investigation hinges upon the declared intention in chapter one of evaluating the 1685 militia against a set of specified criteria of effectiveness. If the militia was effective then evidence of it having fulfilled them has to be demonstrated. This thesis has examined the historical purpose and context of the militia during the period specified as well as its relationship with society and these criteria have been tested against collected evidence. The militia was found to have an undoubted existence, an adequate organisation, with satisfactory recruitment and turnout at musters. It was able to come into operation efficiently thanks to a workable funding system ensuring the men were paid and reasonably supplied. More than adequate systems of summoning existed and in times of emergency the men showed a commendable readiness by responding reasonably quickly to calls upon them for duty. The men were available for service, adequately trained and proficient in both
drill and discipline. With an adequate supply of uniform, equipment and weapons the militia maintained the appearance and bearing of soldiers and was impressive as a body. More importantly, its men showed that they could march, achieve campaign objectives, even fight when required and indeed recover their order, morale and general state of readiness after action. The militia understood and complied with its terms of service and its contract with society, and, in obeying orders and remaining loyal to its officers and the king, the militia achieved the desired effect for which it was raised and fulfilled its purpose as required by legislation.

Evidence proves that the militia not only met the criteria for military effectiveness but also took an active part in containing and suppressing the Monmouth Rebellion, and should, therefore, be deemed to have been effective. It was an effective military body which did not deserve the reputation for gross inefficiency and disloyalty that its king heaped upon it in his machinations to increase his royal army. Equally the view of an ineffective West Country militia advanced by current literature should be revised.
NOTES TO CHAPTER NINE

2 Chapter two, pp. 55-63.
3 Chapter two, pp. 78-79.
4 Chapter two, p. 75.
5 Chapter two, pp. 70-73.
6 Chapter three, p. 109.
7 Chapter three, pp. 100-101.
8 Chapter three, pp. 92-93.
9 Chapter three, p. 97.
10 Chapter three, p. 114.
11 Chapter three, pp. 131-132.
12 Chapter four, p. 141.
13 Chapter four, p. 140.
15 Chapter four, pp. 150-151.
16 Chapter four, pp. 163-164.
17 Chapter five, p. 188-189.
18 Chapter five, p. 190-191.
19 Chapter five, p. 194.
20 Chapter five, p. 201.
21 Chapter two, p. 82, chapter three, p.128, chapter six, p. 212.
22 Chapter six, p. 220.
23 Chapter six, p. 242.
24 Chapter seven, p. 260.
25 Chapter seven, p. 263, chapter four, p.163.
26 Chapter seven, p. 289.
27 Chapter seven, p. 290-291.
28 Chapter seven, p. 291-294.
29 Chapter eight, pp. 322-323.
30 Chapter eight, pp. 325-326.
32 Andrew Paschall’s account, op. cit.
34 Kirke, op. cit.
APPENDIX 1.

Wiltshire and Swindon History Centre, Chippenham, Wiltshire. 490/1410

A handwritten manuscript comprising nine sheets of folded cartridge paper folded and stitched into a small 3x9 ins booklet of thirty six sides containing lists of names by company, hundred and parish plus a summary of totals.

List of Reg.\(^{1}\) at Monmouths rising
J: Wyndham Colonell
J: Young Lieut.\(^{1}\) Colonell
Wm\(^{m}\) Hearst Major
3 blank sides

Wils 13\(^{th}\) June 1685

Coll.\(^{s}\) Company

John Wyndham Esq.\(^{r}\) Colonell
Gyles Wastfield Gentl Lieut.\(^{r}\)
Peter Harvy Gentl Ensign

Rob.\(^{r}\) Godfry
Wm\(^{m}\) Watts \{Serj.\(^{ts}\)

Rob.\(^{r}\) Wheeler
Adam Wheeler \} Drum.\(^{rs}\)
Rob.\(^{r}\) Hooke

Alderbury Hundred

Alderbury. \(\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots 5\)  Pitton & Farley. \(\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots 4\)
John Bungy
Rich.\(^{d}\) Bungy
Wm\(^{m}\) Tubb
Tho.\(^{t}\) Pilgrim
Tho.\(^{t}\) White

Idmiston. \(\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots 3\)  Plaitford. \(\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots 4\)
Tho.\(^{t}\) Bath
Nich.\(^{s}\) Yates
Tho.\(^{t}\) London

Laverstock & Ford. \(\ldots \ldots \ldots 5\)  Porton & Gumbleton. \(\ldots \ldots \ldots 2\)
Geo.\(^{s}\) Welsh
Henry Grey
Tho.\(^{t}\) Exford
Roger Croucht
Tho.\(^{t}\) Holloway

Timothy Grace
Rich.\(^{d}\) Lywood
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Jasper Jarvis
John Furnage
W. m Jones
Geo. t Holmes

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and Hulcott        4
Ambrose Tucker
Sam. t Deere
W. m Snoswell
John Johnson

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John Young Esq. t Lieut. t Coll.
Will. t Turner Gentl Lieut.
Hampton Jay Gentl Ensign

John Barford     }
W. m Parker      } Serj. t

W. m Bishop      }
Adam Wheeler     } Drum. rs

Amesbury Hundred

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John Dyer
Rich. d Croomes
W. m Newby
James Bryant

Brigmiston
And Milton       3
Edw. d Biddlecome
Edw. d Peck
W. m Hilliar

Bulford          2
Tho. s Sturgis
W. m Sturgis

Compton          2
Rob. t Fry
W. m Richards

Kingston Deverill 3
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W. m Scamell

Durnford Magna    9
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Edw. d Waters
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John Carter
John Dowling
Tho. s Vincent
Tho. s Waters
W. m Waters

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W. m Brunsdon
Rich. d Haydon

Cholderton        3
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Rich. d Talbott

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Alex: Miller

353
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Great & Little

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  John Pitman
  John Woodford
  Tho. Syer
  John Croaker
  Anthony Philpott
  Rob. Syer

Ludgershall &
Burden's Dean. . . . . . . . . . 4
  John Newman
  Tho. Cook
  Edw. Flory
  Jeffery Butler

Newton Toney. . . . . . . . . . . 4
  John Cherke
  Wm Hogget
  Tho. Olden
  Rich. Scamell

Oakingham, Hurst
& Swallowfield. . . . . . . . . 15
  Rich. Ham
  John Gifford
  John Tinham
  Wm Tinham
  Tho. Wheeler
  James Backford
  Tho. Elliott
  Henry Wheeler
  Wm West
  John Randy
  Rob. Syer
  Tho. Lie
  John Bradford
  Wm Bishop
  Wm Parker

West Wellow. . . . . . . . . . . 3
  John Kent
  James Palmer
  Tho. Munday

East Winterslow. . . . . . . . . 2
  Edw. Windsor
  Wm Parnell

Marden. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
  John Tew
  Tho. Woodhams
  John Wilmott
  John Lacy

Part of Elstubb & Everly Hundred

Alton & Stowell. . . . . . . . . 3
  Wm Head
  Rob. Lacy
  Roger Lamborne

Collingborne Ducis. . . . . . . 6
  Henry Moore
  John Dudman
  Rob. Carpenter
  Rob. Smith
  Wm Newman
  Wm Lawrence

Buston. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
  Wm Wheeler
  Rich. Phillips
  Rob. Hamond

LittleHinton. . . . . . . . . . . 6
  Henry Sheppard
  Wm Swift
  Rich. Lacy
  Anthony Tarvy
  John Hinton
  Rob. Peirce
Overton & Hilfield. . . . . . .5
Cha. Coocke
Edm. Pennycourt
Rob. Green
Tho. Bisley
Christop. Lacy

Wroughton. . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Rich. Gilmore
Jos. Beastly
Tho. Cope
John Wilkes
John Snow

Westwood & Ford. . . . . .4
John Dagger
Wm. Dagger
John Smith
John Harman

William Hearst Esq. Major
Daniel Hunt Gent Lieut.
Peter Burgoine Gentl Ensign

Edw. Phillips
Tho. Stevens
John Keele
Rob. Parker

Cawden & Cadworth Hundred

Barford S. Martin. . . . . . .8
Edw. Vaughan
John Atkins
John Rowden
Henry Jeffery
Geo. Norris
Rich. Goodfellow
Rob. Hartford
James Carpenter

Britford. . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Stephen Bancks
Guy Waterman
John Baily
John Grumbleton
Edw. Grant
Rich. Russell
John Eaton
John Oliver

Baberstock. . . . . . . . . . . .1
Leonard Bony

Comb Bissett. . . . . . . . . . .7
Wm. Hibbert
Rich. Palmer
Tho. Luxon
Wm. Lipps
John Barber
Andrew Brine
Andrew Russell

Bramshire. . . . . . . . . . . .6
John Pointer
John Chaper
John Turner
Antho: Willsnow
John Pointer Jun.
Edw. Lucas
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| Gabriel Ashby Esq.5 Capt.4 |
| Thomas Stevens Gentl Lieut.3 |
| Edw.4 Naish Gentl Ensign    |

| John Bacon             |
| John Meggs             |
| And.4 Littlefield      |
| John Bevois            |

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| Rob.3 Daniel           |
| Rich.4 Blake           |
| W.4 Perrier            |
| W.4 Tivitoe            |
| Edw.4 Lively           |
|                       | Church Tything. ............5|
|                       | David Dove                |
|                       | W.4 Littlecott            |
|                       | Tho.4 Webb                |
|                       | W.4 Gyles                 |
|                       | John Newman               |</p>
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<td>Francis Filmore</td>
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<td>Nathan. d. Silverhouse</td>
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<td>Edw. d. Hatchman</td>
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<td>Edw. d Harris</td>
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<td>Gilbert Drewett</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Deere</td>
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<td>James Hopkins</td>
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<th>John Davenant Esq. r Capt. n</th>
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<tr>
<td>Edward Hearst Gentl Lieut. t</td>
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<tr>
<td>W. m Westfield Gentl Ensign</td>
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| Stephen Gibb | } |
| Isaac Wilson | } Serj. cs |

| John Porter | } |
| Henry Hatchett | } Drum. cs |

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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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APPENDIX 2.

Hampshire County Record Office, Winchester, Hampshire. HRO: 39M85/PC/E14

A handwritten muster roll containing lists of names of riders and the owners of the horses they rode for a troop of horse in the Eastern Division of the county in 1685.

The Troop of Horse in the East Division of the County of Southton under the command of Thomas Brocas Esqr.

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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will. Blundon</td>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>Sir William Gardiner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Morton</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>John Kinch</td>
<td>Corporall</td>
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<tr>
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APPENDIX 3.

Below is a list of those with major roles in the story of the West Country County Militias during the Monmouth Rebellion. The information supplies general personal background and significant facts relating to their contribution to themes covered in this work.

C

John Churchill, (1650 – 1722), was a brigadier general and second in command of the royal army. He was the son of a cavalier officer and MP Sir Winston Churchill, and brother of the Duke of York’s mistress Arabella Churchill. A page to the future James II he was commissioned into the army and served under Monmouth in Flanders, where he distinguished himself at Nimegan and Maastrict. He then acted as an ambassador to Holland. Appointed Gentleman of the Bedchamber and ennobled in 1685 as Baron Churchill of Sandridge, he commanded the first royal army force into the West during Monmouth’s rebellion and performed well. Changing sides in 1688 Churchill rose steadily if slowly under William. His wife Sarah’s friendship with Queen Anne gained him further promotion and he commanded the Allied army during the War of Spanish Succession and established a reputation as one of the great statesmen and generals of Europe. For his services he was created Duke of Marlborough and awarded money to build Blenheim Palace.

John Coad was a Somerset militiaman who, changing sides after Axminster, served as a pikeman in the rebel army and was the author of a contemporary account.

D

Edward Dummer was a captain and quartermaster of the ordnance, who marched into the West with the London Train of Artillery from the Tower. He was the author of a contemporary account of the campaign and Battle of Sedgemoor and left a series of explicit maps of the conflict.
Louis Duras de Dufort, Earl of Feversham, (1640? – 1709), was the lieutenant general and commander of the royal army in the West. A Huguenot and nephew of the Great Turenne, he came to England as part of the Duke of York’s suite in 1665. He became a court favourite and a protégé of the Duke of York, being employed as an ambassador to France and Holland. He commanded the 3rd then 2nd Troop of Horse Guards and was Lord Chamberlain to the Queen, then Lord of the Bedchamber to Charles II. He joined the Privy Council on the accession of James II and was entrusted with suppressing Monmouth’s rebellion. Given command of the entire army as a reward for his service in 1685, he also had command of the 1st Troop of Horse Guards. He skilfully survived William of Orange’s arrival remaining in the service of the Dowager Queen and was a pall bearer at Pepys’s funeral.

E

Thomas Erle, (1650-1720), was a major in the royal army, MP for Wareham, a county deputy lieutenant and a militia colonel of the Dorset Militia based in Blandford. He was present and probably did much to engineer the rebel’s defeat at the Battle of Bridport. He fought for William III as a colonel at the Boyne, Limerick and Aughrim where he distinguished himself. Rising to brigadier general at Steinkirk and Landen, he later commanded the covering army at Namur. Promoted to major general in 1696 he commanded in Ireland in 1702 and became a lieutenant general in 1703, commanding the centre at Almanza in 1707. Erle had an independent command of a Mediterranean invasion force but was thwarted by a lack of naval co-operation. However he successfully transferred his force to the Siege of Lille where he did well. He retired as Commander in Chief of South Britain.
Henry Fitzroy, Duke of Grafton, (1662-1630), was a natural son of Charles II and rose to become Colonel of His Majesty’s First Foot Guards. The son of Barbara Villiers, Countess of Castlemaine, he was created Earl of Southampton, then Baron of Newbury. He was an able soldier during the Monmouth Rebellion leading the Grenadier Companies of the Guards in their ill-fated assault at Norton St. Philip. He commanded the Guards at Sedgemoor and may have commanded the attack of the combined grenadiers across the Bussex Rhine in the latter stages of the action. He too changed sides in 1688 but took little or no part in politics although he sat as the Duke of Cleveland in the House of Lords.

Granville, John, Earl of Bath, was lord lieutenant of Cornwall and commander in chief of the Cornish Militia, and although he also held a colonelcy in the royal army it was only a titular appointment. Despite being a king’s man he was a dedicated friend to Albemarle. He fought in the civil war for Charles I in his father’s regiment and was knighted for bravery and appointed a Lord of the Bedchamber to the Prince of Wales, with whom went into exile. In 1660, Granville took part in negotiations with George Monck which resulted in the restoration of the king. He was created Earl of Bath, Viscount Granville, and Baron Granville, and joined the Privy Council in 1663. In 1665, he was the titular Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, but never visited the island. Bath was appointed colonel of the 10th Regiment of Foot, first in 1685 then again in 1688 after siding with William of Orange. He died in London.
Forde Grey, Lord of Warke, (*d.1701*), was the only aristocrat to join Monmouth’s cause and was appointed second in command of the rebel army. An MP and hero of the Whig party, he was arrested for involvement in the Rye House Plot, but he escaped and fled to Holland where he joined Monmouth. Captured after the battle of Sedgemoor, he turned king’s evidence and was pardoned after paying Sunderland 40,000l. After a brief exile he returned to take an active role in Whig politics and under William III joined the Privy Council being created Earl of Tankerville and having numerous other offices heaped upon him.

H

Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, (*1656-1733*), was lord lieutenant of Wiltshire and commander in chief of the Wiltshire Militia as well as the City Militia of Salisbury. He succeeded to the earldom in 1683 after the deaths of two elder brothers and reshaped the county militia after a period of neglect. In 1685 he campaigned with his militia and was present at Sedgemoor. He became a noted politician under William III and then Anne, being appointed First Lord of the Admiralty and later Lord Privy Seal. In 1697 he was employed as the first plenipotentiary of Great Britain at the congress of Ryswick.
George Jeffreys, Baron Wem, as Lord Chief Justice he conducted the Bloody Assizes to punish the West Country for its rebellion. His father had fought for Charles I during the civil war and he emulated his grandfather and studied law at the Inner Temple in 1663. His legal career prospered, becoming a Common Serjeant of London in 1671 and then Solicitor General to the Duke of York with whom, despite his Protestant upbringing, he found favour. Knighted in 1677, he was Chief Justice of Chester, Counsel for the Crown at Ludlow and Justice of the Peace for Flintshire by 1680. Charles II created him a baronet in 1681, and two years later, he was Chief Justice of the King’s Bench and joined the Privy Council. Jeffreys became Lord Chief Justice in 1683 and presided at the trial of Algernon Sidney, who had been implicated in the Rye House Plot. On James II’s accession to the throne in 1685, he named Jeffreys as Lord Chancellor. He presided over the Bloody Assizes and handed out harsh sentences to Monmouth’s followers having over 300 people executed, and more than 800 transported to the colonies as indentured labourers. He remained loyal to James in 1688 trying to run the government after the king fled. He was taken, imprisoned in the Tower and died in custody.

Percy Kirke, (1646?-1691) of Whitehaigh in Derbyshire. He was the son of a court official and was commissioned into the Duke of York’s maritime regiment and later served under both Monmouth and Turenne in Flanders before raising a regiment to garrison Tangiers in 1682. He proved an energetic and capable officer, if somewhat brutal. In 1684 he returned to England and refitted his regiment which he took down to the West Country in 1685 to support Churchill. He was promoted to brigadier general just before Sedgemoor and after the battle ordered mass executions of rebels and extracted bribes for the pardoning of others. His cruelty to the population of the West Country earned a sardonic interpretation of his regiment’s nickname of ‘Kirke’s Lambs’. He was arrested during William of Orange’s invasion but promoted to major general by the new king. He commanded the Derry relief force and served at the Boyne and Limerick. Whilst campaigning in Flanders he died in Brussels ‘of a loathsome disease’.
Francis Lutterell was colonel of the Taunton Regiment of the Somerset Militia. He was Lord of Dunster Castle and wealthy from interests in the wool and dyeing trade. He was elected Member of Parliament for Minehead aged 20, and married into the Tregonwell family to enjoy a large private income. He does not appear to have had any military experience before his appointment as colonel in the militia in 1681 although he served throughout the Monmouth Rebellion. He opposed James II in 1687 and went over to William of Orange in 1688. He transferred to the royal army under William for whom he raised his own regiment, the 19th of Foot.

Christopher Monck, Duke of Albermarle, (1653-1688), was lord lieutenant of Devon and Essex and commander in chief of both county militias. He was the son of Captain General George Monck who engineered the Restoration and he was a great favourite at court, rivalling Monmouth. He became a colonel of a regiment of foot in 1673 and was promoted to command the 1st Troop of Horse Guards, the titular commander of the army. He took an active role in containing the rebels but fell out with James II over the king’s attempt to denigrate the militia. He retired to the country but returned to become Governor of Jamaica where he died early in his tenancy.
Sir Edward Phellips of Montacute, (1638 – 1699) was the issue of his father’s second marriage and lived at the family home. He inherited not only the house but also the office of MP for Ilchester and entered militia service as a young man rising to become a captain with his own troop of horse. He was infamous for his persecution of his political enemies and those who appeared against him elections had ‘ever since had but little quiet, where it has been in his power to trouble them’. Active in the harassment of dissenters he assisted Col. Richard Stawell to suppress the ‘fanatics of Bridgwater’ and burnt the furnishings of their chapel. He drove his men hard and had a reputation for being a martinet. In 1685 he was also acting colonel of Stawell’s Regiment of foot in the Somerset Militia but failed as a military field officer and was absent when a number of his men made their ‘rapid withdrawal’ from Axminster. In 1687 he was so incensed during an argument with a Whig opponent that he exhibited such ‘outrageous fury that he foamed at the mouth’. He appears to have been very unpopular with fellow members of parliament and there was considerable opposition to him regaining his militia commission under William III.

Sir William Portman, sixth baronet of Orchard Portman, (1641?-1690), was a county MP, a deputy lord lieutenant and a colonel in the Somerset Militia. In May 1685 whilst visiting parliament he was mysteriously warned of Monmouth's landing and rising in the West Country and organised searches of correspondence in and out of Taunton looking for evidence of treason. He also took an active part in investigating the causes of disaffection, and in organising the militia. He was appointed to oversee the operations of the Sussex Militia in the New Forest. There he was involved in the capture of Monmouth. Like many influential Tories he changed sides in 1688, rallying to William of Orange at Exeter, but died before he could be rewarded.
Charles Sackville, Earl of Dorset, (1638-1706), was lord lieutenant of Sussex, and commander in chief of the Sussex Militia. He inherited the earldom of Middlesex in 1674 and succeeded to his father's estates and title of Earl of Dorset in August 1677. He was MP for East Grinstead but showed little interest in politics. However, he had a reputation as a witty courtier as well as a rake and hellraiser. In 1665 he served under the Duke of York in the war against the Dutch and was present at the victory off Harwich. One of original lovers of Nell Gwyn he stepped aside for his king but his scurrilous verses got him into trouble with James II and he retired from court. He supported William III’s invasion and was promoted to the Privy Council and then Lord Chamberlain and a Lord Chief Justices of the Realm. He died at Bath.

Charles Seymour, Duke of Somerset, (1662-1748), was lord lieutenant of Somerset and the East Riding of Yorkshire, and commander in chief of both county militias. Sometimes referred to as ‘The Proud Duke’, he was extremely wealthy having inherited a fortune and married the Earl of Northumberland’s daughter. A post in the
king’s household, was followed by a colonelcy of dragoons in 1685. He supported William of Orange in 1688, and was a favourite of Queen Anne becoming her Master of Horse in 1702. Fond of ceremony and pageantry he was a poor administrator and did not do well as a military commander and it was due to his incompetency that Somerset fell so easily to the rebels. Neither was he tactful and during Anne’s reign he incurred the displeasure of the Marlboroughs. Although he kept his place at court under George I, he was dismissed in 1716 and retired to Petworth where he died.

James Scott, Duke of Monmouth, (1649-1685), was a pretender to the throne and captain general of the rebel army. Born in Rotterdam, the eldest illegitimate son of Charles II and his mistress, Lucy Walter, who had followed him into continental exile after the execution of Charles I. He took his wife's name upon marriage to Anne Scott, Duchess of Buccleuch. However, he claimed his parents were married if initially only in private, and was the darling of Charles II’s court. He was feted and rose steadily to command the army but fell from favour due to his involvement with Whig politicians and their schemes to exclude his uncle, the Duke of York, from the succession. Briefly exiled to Holland he was there when his father died. After leading an unsuccessful invasion and attempt to overthrow his uncle and seize the throne Monmouth was executed in 1685.
**Henry Somerset, Duke of Beaufort, (1629-1699),** was lord lieutenant of Gloucestershire, Hertfordshire and Monmouthshire and commander in chief of all three county militias as well as the City of Bristol Militia. He was also Lord President of Wales and lord lieutenant of north and south Wales from 1672 to 1689. He joined the Privy Council and became a Knight of the Garter in 1672 and sat on the committee of the East India Company between 1684 and 1690. He was a favourite of James II who appointed him as a Gentleman of the Bedchamber and gave him the lord lieutenancy of the Isle of Purbeck to add to his many responsibilities. An able administrator who took the work of his offices seriously, he also proved himself an able military commander during the rebellion and secured Bristol and north Somerset for the royal cause.

**Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland, (1641-1702),** was Secretary of the Council of State. Born in Paris he inherited his earldom at the age of three. In the Army, he reached the rank of captain in Prince Rupert's Regiment of Horse and proceeded to serve successively as ambassador to Madrid (1671–1672), Paris (1672–1673), and the United Provinces (1673). He served as a Gentleman of the Bedchamber from 1673 to
1679, was then made a Privy Councillor and appointed Secretary of State for the northern department in 1679, being sent briefly to Paris as Ambassador Extraordinary. In 1687 he embraced the Roman Catholic faith to please the king. That year, he was also made a Knight of the Garter but was summarily dismissed in October 1688, fleeing to Holland. William III was cautious about appointing him but eventually he became Lord Chamberlain of the Household in April 1697, and was a Lord Justice for a short period, but retired from public life in December of that year.

Thomas Strangways was a deputy lord lieutenant of Dorset along with his brother Wadham. He was the colonel of the Red (Western) Regiment of the Dorset Militia and was appointed by the king to command the whole Dorset Militia at the time of the Monmouth crisis. He was a noted local dignitary and landowner, and became MP for Shaftesbury in 1701.

Charles Stuart, King of England, (1630-1685). A teenage Prince of Wales during the civil wars he returned from exile to lead a rising against Cromwell in 1651 but was defeated at Worcester and fled abroad again. After Cromwell died various political crises resulted in his restoration in May 1660. Charles favoured religious tolerance but his leaning towards Catholic France embroiled England in the Second Dutch War. In 1670, Charles entered into a secret treaty with his first patron Louis XIV, whereby for aid in a third Dutch war France paid him a pension. He also secretly agreed to convert to Catholicism and attempted unsuccessfully to introduce religious freedom for Catholics and Protestant dissenters with his 1672 Royal Declaration of Indulgence. In 1679 Titus Oates's accusations of a 'Popish Plot' fermented the Exclusion Crisis - an attempt to debar Charles' Catholic brother and heir James, from the throne. Charles abandoned Parliament in 1681 and ruled alone. The discovery of the Rye House Plot to assassinate both him and James in 1683 resulted in several Whig leaders being executed or exiled. Charles converted to Catholicism on his deathbed. His wife Catherine of Braganza bore no children, but he acknowledged at least 12 illegitimate children by several mistresses, the eldest of which was the Duke of Monmouth.
James Stuart, King of England (1633-1701) was Charles’ younger brother. Formerly known as the Duke of York he was in exile abroad until the Restoration. He was appointed Admiral of England and was the hero of the naval battle off Harwich. Surviving the Exclusion Crisis he was crowned in 1685 he was initially a popular monarch but his intolerant nature and suspicion of disloyalty lead him to make great mistakes in government which gradually alienated many of his subjects who finally entreated Protestant William of Orange his son-in-law to come over and take control. James fled the country after William’s invasion in 1688. He later led a Jacobite Rising in Ireland which failed and he remained in exile in France until he died.

V

Samuel Venner was a lieutenant colonel and third in command of the rebel army. One of the original landing party, he was part of Monmouth’s inner circle and was valued for his military experience. He had been a captain in Cromwell’s army and, initially, had the role, if not the title, of Sergeant-Major General of the rebel army. Wounded at Bridport he stayed with the army until Norton St. Phillip when he was sent to Holland. Later he wrote what is known as The Anonymous Account.

W

Nathaniel Wade was a Bristol lawyer, who became adjutant general and fourth in command of the rebel army. Although a major he commanded the Red Regiment. Captured after the battle of Sedgemoor, he turned king’s evidence and was pardoned. In his testimony - a major source for study of the rebellion - he gave only the names of the dead and convicted to his interrogators. After being pardoned he took James II on a battlefield tour of Sedgemoor and was made Town Clerk of Bristol.

John Wyndham was the colonel of the Red (Salisbury) Regiment of the Wiltshire Militia during the rebellion and proved himself to be a steady and reliable field officer. He became a Tory MP alongside four other family members, and sat for New Sarum in James II’s first parliament in 1685. He also became High Sheriff of the county and being from a family of established lawyers, was called to the bar at Lincolns Inn in 1688.
Primary Manuscript.

**Bath Record Office**
Bath Chamberlain Accounts, 1603 – 1734 passim.
Bath Council Minute Books, Nos. 1, 2, and 3. (1613 -1715).

**Bodleian Library**

**British Library**
Add. 32, 79, 98, 125, 324.
Add. 15551 Extract: The Several Debates of the House of Commons, pro et contra, relating to the establishment of the Militia, disbarding the new raised forces and raising a present supply for his Majestie, 9 Nov.20. Nov. 1685, f. 1.
Add. 19,399, fo.138.Albemarle to Sunderland, 21 June 1685 BL.
Add. 28050. Lord Dunblane’s letter to his father, the Earl of Danby,
Add. 28082 Extract: ESTABLISHMENT, muster-rolls, accounts and other papers, relating to the army; 1640 - 1702.
Add. 31956 A Journal of the Proceedings of the Duke of Monmouth in his Invading England; with the Progress and issue of the Rebellion attending it. Kept by Mr. Edward Dummer then serving in the Train of Artillery employ'd by His Majesty for the suppression of the same, (London, 1672), copy of original held in Pepysian Library, Magdalene College, Cambridge.
Add. 41804. MIDDLETON PAPERS. Vol. II (ff. 318). Papers rel. mainly to the suppression of Monmouth's rebellion, the apprehension of, and information against rebels, and reports on English conspirators in Holland, including intercepted letters, July 1685-Dec. 1687.
1. ff. 1-4v. Information relating to James, Duke of York, particularly of James Holloway, Bristol merchant, concerning the Rye House Plot, a longer and somewhat differing text of which is printed as The Free and Voluntary Confession and Narrative of James Holloway (1684); 1680-1684.
2. ff. 5-8. Passes for apprehending suspected rebels, the first to Robert Gargrave, Sergeant-General of the King's Carriages; 1685.
3. ff. 9-34. Bonds taken by Gargrave from suspected rebels for their appearance at the assizes at Frome, co. Som., with brief notes about the strength of the evidence against them; 1685.
4. ff. 37-42. List of peers at the trial of Lord Delamere for his rising in Cheshire, with drafts of two speeches of Lord Jeffreys as Lord Steward at the trial on 9 Jan. 1686, apparently in the hand of the Solicitor-General, Heneage Finch, 1st Earl of Aylesford; 1686. The speeches are printed with somewhat differing texts in Howell, State Trials, XI, cols. 515-516, 526-528.
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6. ff. 79-84v. Letter from Sir Roger L'Estrange to Lord Middleton as Secretary of State, enclosing informations of Thomas Babington, Joseph Harvey and Richard Raw concerning
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RD/1578 Commission granted by George, Duke of Albemarle, to James Rodd, esquire, of Stoke Canon, Devon, 1660. Commission granted by George, Duke of Albemarle, to James Rodd, esquire, of Stoke Canon, appointing him captain of a company in Sir Copleston Bampfylde's regiment of militia foot.
RP/2/14 Commission, John Rogers, ensign in infantry regiment and captain in Cornish militia, 2 June, 1685.
Appointment by John, earl of Bath, lord lieutenant etc of John Rogers as ensign of a company of foot in the regiment of which Sir William Godolphin, baronet is colonel and captain in the militia of the County of Cornwall.
RP/2/19 Commission, John Rogers, gentleman, lieutenant in infantry regiment and captain in part of militia, 10 May 1690. Appointment by the Lord Lieutenant John, earl of Bath, of John Rogers as lieutenant of a company of foot in the regiment of which Sir John St Aubyn was colonel and captain, part of the militia.
RP/2/21 Commission, John Rogers, gentleman, lieutenant and captain, 9 May 1692. Commission by the Earl of Bath and his son Charles Lord Granville of John Rogers as lieutenant of regiment under command of Charles Lord Granville as colonel and captain being the western regiment and part of the militia in Cornwall.
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John Gold of Upway (Dorchester) to be Lieut. Col. of Thomas Stangways’ Regiment 16 Jan 1679/80.
16. 22 January 1578 ‘A Direction for the Commissioners for the musters in the Towne of Poole howe they shall proceede in the execution of said commission.
21. 8 December 1688 Grant of Charter of 8/12/1688.
124 (81) 21 May 1587. Letter from Sir Harry Asheley to the Mayor of Poole to James Reade, Captain of the Trained Band concerning the setting up if a target.
166(A5) 28 August 1655? Town Accounts including reference to beer for the watchmen at the Insurrection.

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GRO. D1637/Z1 Commission of Giles Nash as lieutena nt in the White Regiment of Militia. 1715.
GRO. D2026 X23 Document from the Constable of St. Briavels to raise the militia in the Forest of Dean, 1677. Account of parish monies of St. Briavels by constable George Bond, including a report on repairs to roads & bridges and the militia. 1681.
GRO. D2079/111/30 Appointment of an ensign in a Company of the Green Regiment of Militia for service in Kingsgate Hundred. 1702.
GRO. D9125/923 Appointment of Richard Hill as Lieutenant in the Red Regiment of Militia in the Forest Division of Gloucestershire. 1694.
GRO. P244 CO 1/1 The Book of the Constables of Painswick: Receipts and disbursements. 1684 to 1714.
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  2 Copy of letters patent appointing Charles, Marquis of Winchester a colonel of a Regiment of Foot 8 Mar 1699.
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  10 Copy Order to the keepers of the New Forest and all constables and tithingmen in the counties of Dorset, Hampshire and Wiltshire to search for all ‘Gunnes, Grayhoundes, dogges, nettes or other Engines’ used to destroy game in the New Forest and to ensure that offenders are brought before a Justice of the Peace. 22 July 1689.
  11 Copy order to Henry Dawley, George Bridge and Richard Cobb esqs and all bailiffs, constables and tithingmen to seize any horses above the value of £5 belonging to Anthony Brown and any other popish dissenters. 20 December 1689.
  12 Copy order for the Deputy Lieutenants and Richard Cobb Treasurer to the militia to meet at Winchester and issue warrants for the lewing of Trophy Money so the Militia may be mustered as the earliest opportunity, nd.
  35 List of Officers of various Regiments of Militia and numbers of men mustered Nov 1699 for Alton Division, Portsdown Division, Fawley Andover Division, New Forest Division, Basingstoke Division, two troops of Horse, Independent Companies in Southampton and Winchester.
HRO: 12M55 Portsmouth Sacrament certificates.
HRO: 21M57/C30/43 Letter concerning militiamen swearing an oath.
HRO: 39M85/PC/E14 Muster Roll for a troop of horse in the Eastern Division of the county under the command of Thomas Brocas. 1685.
HRO: 44M69/F6/8/1 Letters to Thomas Jervoise, sorted alphabetically by name of correspondent1679 – 1698.
  2 Letter from the Duke of Bolton 1690/91 militia matters Blackwood 16 March 1690.
  4 Letter from Richard Chandler re horses and the militia, 1690.
  10 Letter from Thomas Higgens re militia matters, 1689/90.
HRO: 44M69/F6/9/26 Letters to TJ from Mr R Calthorp re elections and provision ...for the militia 2 Nov. 1697.
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HRO: 44M69/G5/30/07 Muster Book of the Ringwood or New Forest Militia 1629.
HRO: 44M69/G5/50/57 Bundle of military papers, possibly original.
  3 Copy letter from the deputy lieutenants to Lord Conway 26 February 1630, re his letter about the settling of the Master Master’s entertainment and expenses.
  4 Letter from William Withers at Manydown to Sir Thomas Jervoise 20 September 1631 re the charges for setting up the trained bands.
HRO: 44M69/G5/50/86 Order to Captain Jervoise from the deputy lieutenants of the county re militia horse raised throughout the last month which is to continue together and to exercise/train.
HRO: 44M69/G5/50/112 A list of the names of all persons who furnished horse in the Militia Troop commanded by Captain Jervoise. Undated but ascribed to the 1680s.
HRO: 44M69/G6 Militia Papers mainly correspondence and other papers re organisation and management of the North Hants Militia 1702 – 1840s.
HRO: PER98/2 Hampshire Militia Rolls no 2: City of Winchester. Winchester Company. 1622-1638.
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HRO: Q213/6/1 Roll of qualifications of Deputy Lieutenants and officers of the militia
HRO: Q25/2/24 Sacrament certificate for John Serle, Ensign to Sir Richard Worseley’s Company of the Militia of Foote belonging to the West Medina regiment, taken and issued at the parish of Northwood on the Isle of Wight.
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DDDR 53/1 Order re Militia (David Yea), 1662.
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DDIAS/H342/1 Appointment. By James, Duke of Ormond, Lord Lieutenant, of John Burland, Esq., to be captain of the militia company of Foot in the Regiment of which Ralph Stawell, Esq., is Colonel, 1669.
DDIAS/H342/4 Appointment. By James, Duke of Ormond, their Majesties Lieutenant of Somerset, of John Burland, Esq., to be captain of a company in the Regiment of Foot in the Militia called Bridgewater Regiment, 1691.
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Q/SR/169, nos 1-12.
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1178/450 a warrant from the Lord Lieutenant to the Constables of Kingsbridge Hundred.
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  2. A list of the Trayned Band …. The said cittie under the command of Capt Richard Davy Settled …. By the Mayor and Justices of the Peace of the said cittie the 31st day of June 1670 and 16 May1671. Divided into three blocks: a. 44 contributors paying for 35 musketeers, b. 45 contributors paying for 30 corselets, c. 50 contributors paying for 37 musketeers.
  3. A Warrant of Trophy Money being a list of 15 persons and their assessment, 2 at 5s and 13 at 2/6, signed by the Constable.
  4. A second list of 15 names and assessments, 8 at 2/6, 4 at 5/- and 1 at 7/6.
  5. A third list of 10 names and assessments, 9 at 2/6 and 1 at 5/-.
  6. A fourth list of 31 names and assessments, 25 at 2/6, 5 At 5/-, and 1 at 10/-.
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