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The Role of Humanitarian NGOs: Impact on South Korean Food Aid Policy towards North Korea from 1995 to 2007

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ABSTRACT

The existing literature has provided only a partial explanation of the political role of South Korean humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in government food aid policy making towards North Korea between 1995 and 2007. Using a constructivist approach which includes non-state actor and normative factors in the analysis of state policy making, this thesis demonstrates that South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy was consequential in explaining changes in South Korea’s food aid policy making in respect of state agenda setting, the formation of a discursive position and institutional and policy development. Humanitarian NGO advocacy finally contributed to government establishment of a legal framework that could provide for more consistent and large scale food aid to North Korea, irrespective of the vagaries of inter-Korean political relations.

Despite humanitarian NGO advocacy, however, changes at different stages of state food aid policy making differed among the three administrations. This thesis demonstrates that these differences were attributable to the differing abilities of NGO to set agendas, network and graft new norms in respect of government policy on food aid to North Korea. These differing abilities resulted from changes in organisational mandates, funding capacities and the expertise of NGOs over time. Firstly, a strong humanitarian mandate between 1995 and 2000 was a key factor that enabled NGOs to overcome the organisational limits that stemmed from their poor funding capacity and lack of expertise. Secondly, stable funding capacity contributed to improvements in organisational expertise; however, increased reliance on government funding after 2000 resulted in the weakening of NGOs’ advocacy ability. Lastly, given the favourable operational environment after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the organisational expertise of NGOs developed to a level where it was possible to exert direct influence on government food aid policy making towards North Korea.
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ACRONYMS

AREP: Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection
ARS: The Automatic Response Service
Brother Love-Pan-national: Brotherly Love–Pan-national Movement for the Northern Brotherly Aid
CARE: Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.
CCEJ: Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice
CECA: Council for Fair Election Practice Citizen Movement
CPS: The Centre for Peace and Sharing
CSB: Corn-Soya Blended
DAC: Development Co-operation Committee of the OECD
DMZ: The Demilitarized Zone
DPRK: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
ECHO: European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection
FAC: Food Aid Convention
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FED: Food Entitlement Decline
GNI: Gross National Income
GNP: The Grand National Party
Healthcare Headquarters: Korean Sharing Movement Healthcare Cooperation Headquarters
ICF: International Corn Foundation
IFFR: International Emergency Food Reserve
IFRC: The International Federation of Red Cross
IMF: International Monetary Fund
Inter-religious Committee: Inter-religious Committee on the North Korean Flood Victim Aid
Junnong: National Confederation of Farmers Association
JSA: The Joint Security Area
JTS: The Joint Together Society
KAFTC: The Korea Agro-Fisheries Trade Corporation
KASM: Korean American Sharing Movement
KBSM: Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement
KCSI: Korea Civil Society Organizations’ Council
KCTU: Korean Confederation of Trade Unions
KDI: Korea Development Institute
KFI: Korea Food for the Hungry International
KINU: Korea Institution for National Unification
KOICA: Korea International Cooperation Agency
Korean Council: The Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation
KPAF: Korean People’s Artist Federation
KSM: Korean Sharing Movement
KTU: Korean Teachers & Educational Workers Union
KWAU: Korean Women’s Association United
LDC: Least Developed Countries
MDG: Millennium Development Goals
MICS: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MINBYUN: Lawyers for a Democratic Society
MOU: The Ministry of Unification
NADRK: National Alliance for Democracy & Reunification of Korea
National Committee: The National Committee on Advancing Inter-Korean Relations
National Convention: The National Convention of Civil Societies for the Northern Brotherly Aid
National Council: The National Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation
NCCK: The National Council of Churches in Korea
NCNP: The National Council for New Politics
NGO: Non-governmental Organisation
NGO Council: The NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea
NGO Meeting: NGO Meeting for North Korean Assistance
NIS: National Intelligence Services of the Republic of Korea
NSC: National Security Council
NUAC: The National Unification Advisory Council
ODA: Official Development Assistance
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC: Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries
PDS: Public Distribution System
PSPD: People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
ROK: The Republic of Korea
SOP: Standard Operating Procedures
The Advisory Committee: The National Assembly Advisory Committee
The Cooperation Fund: The Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund
The 6.15 Committee: The 6.15 Joint Statement South Korean Committee
UAM: The Unification Advisory Meeting
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNCAP: United Nations Consolidated Appeal Process
UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
WCC: World Council of Churches
WCRP: World Conference on Religion and Peace
WFP: United Nations World Food Programme
WHO: United Nations World Health Organisation
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS

1.1 Introduction

This chapter, as the introductory chapter to the thesis, presents the overview of the thesis. It first presents the overview of the study including the research problem and questions, hypotheses, analytical framework and argument of this thesis. This chapter next elaborates the contribution of this thesis. Lastly, it outlines the structure of the thesis.

1.2 Overview of the Study

This thesis provides an explanation of state food aid policy making, filling a gap in the current dominant state- and interest group-centred approaches to food aid policy making. The thesis focuses on the hitherto neglected issue of the impact of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on state food aid policy making.

Since 1995 when international development and relief organisations had recognised the existence of a chronic food deficit, South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy urging the South Korean government to provide humanitarian food aid to North Korea developed into a vigorous civil society movement. Given this operational environment, the South Korean government made official policy pronouncements that humanitarian food aid would be provided irrespective of political issues such as the nuclear development programme. During the severe food deficit in North Korea
between 1995 and 2007, however, the amount of food aid delivery from the South Korean government severely fluctuated. The pattern of fluctuation during this period did not relate to changes in North Korea’s food need.

Why was there a discrepancy between the South Korean government’s policy pronouncements and their actual behaviour relating to food aid to North Korea? Why did the amount of food aid to North Korea fluctuate and finally reach the stage of consistent food aid delivery with large scale bilateral food aid to North Korea throughout most of the years between 2000 and 2007? Based on these research problems, this thesis examines how and to what extent South Korean humanitarian NGOs have influenced their government food aid policy making on North Korea, and why the extent of the influence from NGOs has differed between administrations.

The dominant explanation of food aid policy making, however, adopts a state-centred approach which sees states as unitary political actors in food aid policy and consequently obscures the important role of humanitarian NGOs in influencing the formation of state food aid policy. To answer the research questions above, this thesis developed three hypotheses as follows:

*Hypothesis I: Organisational mandates, funding capacities and expertise were important in the constitution of each non-governmental organisation’s capacity to influence South Korean government food aid policy.*

*Hypothesis II: Differing non-governmental organisation capacities were consequential in explaining the capability of non-governmental organisation advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in*
respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea.

Hypothesis III: These differences in non-governmental organisation capacity shaped different outcomes at different stages of South Korea’s food aid policy-making. South Korea’s food aid policy processes are disaggregated according to the different stages of agenda setting, the formation of a discursive position, and institutional and policy development.

To demonstrate South Korean humanitarian NGO influence on the state policy making process, this thesis uses a constructivist approach which includes non-state actor and normative factors in the analysis of state policy making. The analytical framework of this thesis divides the NGO advocacy movement into the four stages of agenda framing, networking, grafting and institutionalisation. By analysing these differing stages, the thesis demonstrates that South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy was consequential in explaining changes in South Korea’s food aid policy making in respect of state agenda setting, the formation of a discursive position and institutional and policy development.

Firstly, South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy introduced new norms which are characterised as ‘humanitarianism, brotherly love’ and peaceful unification’ to the South Korean government and the civil society. Humanitarian NGO advocacy finally contributed to the incorporation of these new norms into the government agenda and discursive position of the South Korean government, particularly the Kim Young-Sam administration (1995-1997), changing the norm of hostility towards North Korea, which was dominant at the beginning of the North Korean food crisis, with these new norms
supporting the provision of food aid to North Korea.

Secondly, South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy contributed to the establishment of government institutions for the promotion of NGO participation in state food aid policy making and to the establishment of a legal basis assuring the consistent provision of food aid, irrespective of NGO advocacy and inter-Korean relations.

Lastly, humanitarian NGO advocacy contributed to the resumption of large scale government food aid to North Korea in 2000 by establishing a favourable operational environment enabling the convening of the Inter-Korean Summit in the Kim Dae-Jung administration (1998-2002) and to the institutionalisation of food aid to North Korea by urging the Roh Moo-Hyun administration (2003-2007) to assure the consistent provision of food aid to North Korea by law and official government policy. In 2005 and 2006, humanitarian NGO advocacy further contributed to the resumption of government food aid which was suspended by ruptured inter-Korean relations. The Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations thereby delivered the largest amount of food aid to North Korea throughout the entire period of the food crisis in North Korea between 1995 and 2007.

This thesis also shows that at the different stages the state food aid policy-making process differed between administrations. These differences in the Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations’ food aid policy making processes were attributable to the differing abilities of NGOs to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea. Organisational mandates, funding capacities and expertise were important in the constitution of the abilities of NGO advocacy.
Firstly, a strong humanitarian mandate adhered to by the South Korean humanitarian NGOs was a key factor which enabled the humanitarian NGOs to overcome the organisational limits coming from their poor funding capacities, the lack of expertise and the negative operational environment in the early years of the advocacy movement between 1995 and 2000. The strong humanitarian mandate thereby enabled the South Korean humanitarian NGOs to unfold a nationwide advocacy movement in the early years of the North Korean food crisis from 1995 to 1999. The self-steering role of the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations in the provision of food aid to North Korea after 2000, however, resulted in the diversification of the organisational mandates of South Korean humanitarian NGOs. Such diversification of organisational mandates accelerated the weakening of NGO advocacy to pressurise the South Korean government to provide food aid to North Korea.

Secondly, the stable funding capacity of humanitarian NGO contributed to the improvement of NGO expertise by enabling the humanitarian NGOs to establish divisions and to recruit experts which were specialised in the advocacy movement. Increased reliance on government funding after the government decision to fund NGO activities in 2000, however, resulted in the weakening of the ability of NGO advocacy to pressurise the South Korean government to resume the food aid to North Korea when the South Korean government suspended the provision of food aid given ruptured inter-Korean relations.

As South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy of food aid to North Korea continued, lastly, the organisational expertise to advocate the provision of food aid to North Korea gradually improved and finally reached the level where the humanitarian NGOs could exert direct influence on the different stages of the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh
Moo-Hyun administrations’ food aid policy making processes. In the early years of the advocacy movement from 1995 to 2000 humanitarian NGOs mainly relied on conventional movements, such as public campaigns. Such grafting strategy, which is a specific activity NGOs exploit to achieve their intended outcome, was effective in replacing the hostility towards North Korea with the norms of humanitarianism and brotherly love. The influence of this strategy on the state food aid policy change, however, was not enough to overcome the non-democratic government political structure in the Kim Young-Sam administration and the hostile inter-Korean relations in the early Kim Dae-Jung administration (between 1998 and 1999). Given the favourable operational environment after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, humanitarian non-governmental organisations improved their organisational expertise by widening and deepening direct networks with the government through various types of government and NGO bodies. Exploiting these government consultative bodies, humanitarian NGOs finally came to achieve the organisational expertise which made it possible to exert direct influence on the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations’ food aid policy making processes.

1.3 Contribution of the Thesis

This thesis makes both empirical and theoretical contributions. The thesis provides empirical evidence of the important role of NGOs in South Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea. By doing so, it contributes to the literature of the North Korean famine and international humanitarian assistance, and also the literature
of NGOs in domestic policy making. In terms of the theoretical aspect, by examining state food aid policy making and the role of NGOs in these processes from the perspective of international relations, this thesis will provide a new complementary approach to the existing literature of food aid studies, which has been dominated by the scholars of development and international political economy (IPE) studies. In addition to this, by applying the constructivist theory of international relations to the explanation of state food aid policy making, this thesis will widen the scope and validity of the application of constructivist theory, which has been hitherto limited to the analyses of customary areas of human rights, the environmental movement, apartheid and women’s suffrage.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis consists of a total of 8 chapters including Chapter 1. Introduction and Chapter 8. Conclusion. Chapter 2 provides the context for and methodology of the study. Chapter 3 and 4 examine the operational environment for NGO advocacy and the organisational capacities of NGOs respectively. Chapter 5 and 6 contain the case studies of NGOs’ advocacy of food aid to North Korea. Chapter 7 demonstrates how NGO advocacy changed state food aid policy making. Chapter 8 lastly summarises the thesis and presents limitations and future research.

Chapter 2 presents the research problems and questions, hypotheses, analytical framework, methodology, constraints and opportunities of the thesis. Chapter 2 first identifies the research problems through the literature review on the role of NGOs.
Based on the research problems identified, it outlines the research questions and hypotheses of this thesis. It next examines the appropriacy of a constructivist approach in the analysis of the role of non-state actors in state policy making. Based on the research questions and a constructivist approach, Chapter 2 presents the hypotheses of the thesis. It then outlines the analytical framework for analysis of NGO influence on state policy making and the methodology of the study. This chapter lastly outlines the constraints and opportunities of the thesis.

Using the constructive analytical framework developed, Chapter 3 examines the operational environment for where South Korean humanitarian NGOs worked. Chapter 3 first examines how the condition of the North Korean food crisis had changed between 1995 and 2007 through the examination of food supply and demand analysis, nutritional indicators and mortality rate. Chapter 3 next examines how the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making which responded to the North Korean famine changed over time.

Chapter 4, as the case study chapter, examines the differing NGO capacities which were consequential in explaining the capability of NGO advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea. It demonstrates the differing capabilities of the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) and Good Friends in respect of their advocacy of food aid to North Korea, by examining KSM and Good Friends organisational mandates, funding capacities and expertise.

Chapter 5 and 6 examine the KSM and Good Friends’ advocacy movement respectively. Each chapter first examines how these humanitarian NGOs framed the issue of food aid in order to proselytise the South Korean government and the public to
provide food aid to North Korea. Chapters next examine the types and quality of networks which were established by these humanitarian NGOs in order to maximize their influence on the state and civil society. The last sections of Chapter 5 and 6 examine how KSM and Good Friends endeavoured to changes existing norms within the state political system and the public by introducing new norms and ideas.

Chapter 7 tackles the individual administrations of Kim Young-Sam, from 1995 to 1997, Kim Dae-Jung, from 1998 to 2002, and Roh Moo-Hyun, from 2003 to 2007 respectively. This chapter examines to what extent the different influences of the KSM and Good Friends, stemming from the difference in the abilities of these NGOs, were finally internalised in each administration’s food aid policy making towards North Korea. It more specifically examines changes in the different aspects of state food aid policy making, which are changes in state agenda setting, discursive position, institution and policy.

Lastly, Chapter 8 summarise the thesis and presents limitations and future research.
North and South Korea are one ethnic group. Although both Koreas were divided after the Korean War in 1953, both North and South Korean people share a sense of brotherly love for their counterparts. In this context, the term ‘brotherly love’, which will be used in this thesis, conveys the sense of fraternity between the people of the Korean peninsula.

In Korean names the last name (family name) comes first and there is no middle name. This thesis uses names in two different formats. It uses the name of the three presidents, Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun, in the Korean style as this form is internationally accepted in respect of the naming of administrations. With regard to the writing of other Korean names in the main text and references, however, this thesis follows the western style which places the family name after the first name.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the research problem and questions, hypotheses, analytical framework, methodology, and constraints and opportunities of this thesis. This chapter first identifies the research problem and questions of the thesis. For this, Section 2.2 reviews the literature on the overall role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in politics and the role of humanitarian NGOs in state food aid policy making. This section then reviews the literature on the role of South Korean humanitarian NGOs in South Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea. In doing so, this section identifies the research problems of this thesis. Based on the research problems identified, the section presents the research questions of this thesis. Section 2.3 next demonstrates the usefulness of constructivist theory as a theoretical framework to explain NGO influence on state food aid policy making. Based on the research questions identified and the literature review on the constructive perspective, Section 2.4 presents the hypotheses of the thesis. This chapter then develops an analytical framework that will be used in this thesis to demonstrate the hypotheses of the thesis by explaining NGO influence on South Korean food aid policy making to North Korea. Drawing on the works of Thomas Risse-Kappen, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Section 2.5 first examines the operational environment which circumscribes or catalyses non-governmental organisation influence on state policy making. This section examines how the operational environment, which is identified as the issue
characteristics and the domestic political structure, circumscribes or catalyses NGO influence on state policy making. This section also examines NGO capacity which is directly related to the strength of its influence and is a product of mandates, funding capacities and expertise. This section draws particularly from the work of Richard Price, Keck and Sikkink. Section 2.6 then outlines the research methodology of this thesis. It provides the rationale for the NGO in this thesis. This section outlines how the analytical framework of this thesis was applied to the analyses of the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) and Good Friends advocacy in South Korean government food aid policy making. Section 2.7 lastly presents the constraints and opportunities of this study.

2.2 The Literature Review: Identifying the Research Problem

This section demonstrates the specific research problem derived from the analyses of South Korean food aid policy making towards North Korea between 1995 and 2007. It also examines the political role of NGOs in society and the role of humanitarian NGOs in state food policy making. This section then examines the literature on the role of South Korean humanitarian NGOs in North Korean famine relief. This section lastly examines the literature on South Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea between 1995 and 2007.

2.2.1 The Scholarship on Non-governmental Organisations
The focus of the literature of civil society and NGOs is the political role of NGOs in society. The literature shows how NGOs communicate with the state and the public through their unique three functions of research and educational provision, service delivery and advocacy. Studies of civil society and NGOs then conclude that the communication with the state and the public through these three functions enables them to interact with and exert influence on the state and civil society.

Scholars of civil society and NGO studies have examined the political role of NGOs in society. Ann Marie Clark argues that “while NGOs often challenge governments and sometimes complement government-provided services, they nearly always act in counterpoint with governmental actors.” Thomas Carothers and William Barndt argue that the objective of NGOs is not to replace governments or usurp state decision-making authority but to complement the state and business sector. Carothers and Barndt further note that NGOs persuade their government to adopt or abandon certain policies or positions, foster citizen participation and civic education, and provide certain services. Peter Willets and Nell P. Stromquist classify these various NGO activities into three categories. These are (i) research and educational provision, (ii) service delivery and (iii) advocacy. Using this categorisation, the following sections examine how NGOs work as a political actor in society.

Firstly, NGOs perform a research and educational function. In contrast to the state that deals with varied and competing policy concerns, NGO commitment to a single issue enables them to specialise and gather relatively high volumes of knowledge, information and expertise on the given issue area. NGOs’ close ties to the field and prompt responses to newly emerging issues are another factor that renders them more suited to perform a pioneering research function. By disseminating new and specific
information and accumulated expertise, NGOs exert influence on state policy making. In the humanitarian sector, Abby Stoddard has shown how U.S. humanitarian NGOs’ field information has contributed to increased knowledge for government policymakers, a better understanding of international crises and the framing of policy problems.\(^8\) Through the case studies of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Somalia, Stoddard argues that NGOs’ information has had significant influence on U.S. humanitarian aid policy making.\(^9\) NGOs’ close interaction with society also renders them better suited to foster citizen participation and perform civic education.\(^10\) By providing leadership training for young people who want to engage in civic life and issue-specific seminars for the public, for instance, NGOs perform an educational role in civil society. Anthony Bebbington and Roger Riddle add that the belief that NGOs contribute to democratisation by providing an educational role in civil society makes western donors provide funding to NGOs that are based in states undergoing democratisation.\(^11\)

Secondly, NGOs provide certain services that are ignored or cannot be delivered by the government or business sector.\(^12\) These services can be relief, welfare and basic skills. The countries in need of essential or proper services in general are not northern hemisphere countries but southern hemisphere countries. Northern NGOs provide those southern countries in need of services with their aid in the form of development or emergency assistance. Western donor countries and agencies more specifically prefer delivering their aid through northern NGOs or in collaboration with southern counterpart NGOs based in recipient countries. This preference for using NGOs, as Stromquist argues, comes from the belief that NGOs’ close ties to the local populations, sensitivity to local needs, flexibility of action and experience render them better suited to perform this service delivery function.\(^13\) Hugo Slim argues that NGOs’ neutral
characteristics and their humanitarian mandates render them suited to be aid distributors. Anthony Bebbington and Roger Riddle also note that since NGOs are considered as ‘better performers’ and more ‘cost-effective’ than recipient local or central governments, western donor countries or agencies allocate their aid through NGOs. These scholars consider NGOs as a counterpoint to the state, complementing the role of government.

Lastly, NGOs are advocacy organizations. NGO advocacy movements organise activities that exert influence on state policy. NGO advocacy movements tackle various issues in the areas of human rights, women’s rights, the protection of the environment, banning landmines, the anti-war movement, animal rights and so on. Through their advocacy, NGOs seek to achieve large-scale change promoted through influence on the state political system. In this regard, Julie Fisher argues that despite recipient governments’ suspicion and repression, advocacy NGOs have made significant contributions to the political development of the Third World. Many constructivist scholars, who tackle the role of norms and ideas in state policy making, see NGOs as a significant independent political actor rather than a passive agent of the state. In their work, NGOs are considered as a key constituent of civil society and as norm entrepreneurs. Constructivist scholars who examine the role of civil society in state policy making therefore focus on analysis of the role of NGOs. Margaret E. Keck, Kathryn Sikkink and Ann Florini in particular argue that NGOs and their transnational advocacy networks shape and change the policy and practice of states and international organisations. Audie Klotz in the area of anti-apartheid, David P. Forsythe and Kathryn Sikkink in human rights, Richard Price in banning landmines and Karl Raustiala in environmental institutions trace how norms and
ideas have changed state policies and practices. Through tremendous empirical studies, these scholars argue that non-state actors, such as NGOs and their transnational advocacy networks, play a significant political role in the process of state norm adoption and internalisation. With regard to the effectiveness of the NGO advocacy movement, however, there are some scholars who hold a sceptical view. Jonathan A. Fox and L.D. Brown,25 and Paul J. Nelson26 argue that not all NGO advocacy movements ensure state or international organisation policy changes. Although there were some progresses, they argue, NGOs either played a minor role or were involved solely during the implementation phase. Charlotte Ku,27 Dianne Otto,28 Peter Willetts,29 and Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker30 also recognise the deficiencies of the current system for international organisation-NGO interactions. They argue that under the current system the incorporation of NGO advocacy movements into the agenda and practice of international organisations is limited.

NGOs, in summary, communicate with the state and the public through these three functions of research and educational provision, service delivery and advocacy. As Peter Willetts argues, the distinction among these three types of NGO function is not as sharp as the labels suggest.31 NGOs which have their main aim as service delivery usually run regular campaigns in order to mobilise supporters and to attract publicity. Advocacy NGOs often operate by themselves or with other NGOs’ programmes that provide certain types of services in response to urgent needs in their policy domain. In the same way, NGOs’ role in research and education as producers and disseminator of information, knowledge and expertise overlaps with the activities of advocacy NGOs. A key feature which is found in these three main functions is that the communication with the state and the public through these three functions form NGOs’ unique channels and
political influence which enable them to interact with and exert influence on the state and the public.

2.2.2 South Korean Government Food Aid Policy Making Towards North Korea

Since 1995, international development and relief organisations had recognised the existence of a chronic food deficit and that deficit’s demographic impact on North Korea. Given this demonstrable humanitarian need for food assistance to North Korea, South Korean NGOs began their advocacy movement urging the South Korean government to provide humanitarian food aid to North Korea and prompting the public to participate in fundraising for humanitarian aid to North Korea. This advocacy movement, as shown in the above section, developed into the most vigorous civil society movement since the democratisation movement of the 1970s and 1980s which was the largest civil society movement in South Korean history after the end of the Korean War in 1953.

Given this operational environment, the South Korean government made official policy pronouncements that humanitarian food aid would be provided irrespective of political issues such as the nuclear development programme. With the South Korean government official policy pronouncements, the amount of food aid delivery to North Korea from the South Korean government radically increased and finally delivered the largest amount of food aid to North Korea, a total of 2,862,934 tonnes, between 1995 and 2007. The amount of food aid delivery however severely fluctuated, and the pattern of fluctuation during this period did not relate to changes in
Table 2.1 The Amount, Delivery Type and Contents of the South Korean Government Food Aid to North Korea (in tonnes; U.S. Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Multilateral Aid</th>
<th>Bilateral Aid</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paddy: 150,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>($232,000,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Mixed Grains: 3,409</td>
<td>Dried Milk: 203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($2,000,000)</td>
<td>($1,000,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Mixed Grains: 9,852</td>
<td>Dried Milk: 781</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($6,000,000)</td>
<td>($3,600,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maize: 50,000/Dried milk: 300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($10,530,000)</td>
<td>($4,000,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corn-Soya Blended: 8,389</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($4,000,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Maize: 30,000/Flour: 10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($11,000,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Rice: 500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($90,000,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Maize: 100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($17,250,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Maize: 100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($17,390,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Maize: 100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($18,000,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Maize: 100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($2,400,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Rice: 500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($150,000,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Rice: 100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($40,010,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Maize: 24,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soya beans: 12,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whole wheat: 5,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wheat flour: 2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dried milk: 1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($20,000,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Rice: 400,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($154,000,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($174,000,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>511,950</td>
<td>984</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($108,570,000)</td>
<td>($4,600,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,850,000</td>
<td>($994,340,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,862,934</td>
<td>($1,107,510,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

North Korea’s ‘import requirement’, indicating the amount of food which is not covered by national production. After the fluctuation of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 1999, the South Korean government was finally able to institutionalise its provision of large scale government food aid to North Korea between 2000 and 2007.

In 1995, two months before North Korea’s appeal for food aid to the international community on 23 August, the Kim Young-Sam administration had already pledged 150,000 tonnes of bilateral aid to North Korea in June and delivered it during the four months between June and October 1995. In 1996, the Kim Young-Sam administration responded to the appeal of the WFP and UNICEF again, when, on 11 June, the Minister of Unification Okie Kwon said that the government would provide $3 million worth of aid to North Korea through multilateral agencies. The WFP procured the equivalent of 3,409 tonnes of mixed grains and provided it to North Korean children. The South Korean government in addition delivered 203 tonnes of domestic dried milk, worth $1 million, to UNICEF. In 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration provided food aid worth $24.13 million to North Korea through the WFP and UNICEF. The 37th National Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation (the National Council) which was held on the following day decided to commit food aid worth $6 million to the WFP and the WFP provided 9,852 tonnes of mixed grains to North Korea. The 39th National Council on 20 June responded to the second UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal which covered the period from April 1997 to March 31 1998. The Council decided to provide food aid to North Korea through the WFP worth $10.53 million, comprising 50,000 tonnes of maize and 300 tonnes of domestic dried milk. On 23 August, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Unification said that the government would provide additional food aid through the WFP and UNICEF. Following the 41st
Council’s approval on 29 August 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration delivered $4 million in cash to the WFP,44 and the WFP provided 8,389 tonnes of corn-soya blended (CSB) to North Korea. The government donated domestic dried milk worth $3.6 million to UNICEF, the equivalent of 781 tonnes. Despite the severe financial situation in the aftermath of the 1997 currency crisis, the Kim Dae-Jung administration took office on 25 February 1998 and on 30 April 1998, it issued a press release announcing the provision of 30,000 tonnes of maize and 10,000 tonnes of flour.45 During 1999, the Kim Dae-Jung administration did not provide any humanitarian food aid, putting its emphasis on the provision of development assistance for the resuscitation of North Korea’s agriculture. For this reason, although the Kim Dae-Jung administration provided $28.25 million worth of chemical fertiliser, equivalent to 155,000 tonnes, food aid was not provided during 1999.46

After the fluctuation of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 1999, the South Korean government consistently committed to their pledges, delivering large scale bilateral food aid to North Korea between 2000 and 2007.47 Given the political rapprochement after the Inter-Korean Summit on 15 June 2000, there was a big change in the food aid delivery mode. Since 2000, a massive volume of food aid, an average of 50,000 tonnes on loan terms, continued to be shipped to North Korea until 2007 except the years 2001 and 2006. The discussions of food aid via loans were made through the institutionalised inter-Korean diplomatic channels, such as annual Inter-Korean Vice-Ministerial and Ministerial Talks, the Special Envoy Meetings and a series of meetings of the Committee on Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation. At these meetings, North Korea continuously requested the provision of large scale food aid. Considering the inter-Korean relations, the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administration
consistently provided large scale food aid to North Korea, except for the two years of 2001 and 2006. In 2001, the 76th National Council held on 8 February decided to provide $17.25 million worth of food aid to North Korea through the WFP. The Kim Dae-Jung administration, however, did not provide additional food aid on loan terms during 2001. The Kim Dae-Jung administration was not able to pledge food aid to North Korea under the unfavourable diplomatic environment between North Korea and the international community caused by the 9.11 Terror in the United States and the absence of the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks. North Korea’s missile experiment on 6 July 2006 acted as a disabling factor for the food loans which had continued since 2000. The day following the missile experiment, the South Korean government announced that their provision of food loans would cease in response to North Korea’s missile launch. While the diplomatic tension between North and South Korea became worse, severe flood damage occurred in North Korea in August 2006. The North Korean side of the 6.15 Joint Statement South Korean Committee (the 6.15 Committee) made an official request for flood recovery support to the 6.15 Committee. Public opinion urging the provision of flood recovery aid simultaneously formed at all levels of society in South Korea. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration, as a result, decided to provide 100,000 tonnes of food, equivalent to $40,010,000, and flood recovery equipment and goods worth a total of $229,670,000 as flood recovery support at the 175th National Council meeting on 25 August. In the middle of the process of transporting 100,000 tonnes of flood recovery food support in 2006, however, North Korea once again proceeded with a nuclear experiment on 9 October. After North Korea’s nuclear experiment, the South Korean government suspended the delivery of 100,000 tonnes of food aid for flood victims and the negotiation with North Korea on the resumption of bilateral food aid which had
been ongoing since 2000. In 2007, the South Korean government resumed the large scale of food aid and provided 444,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea.

2.2.3 The Research Problem and Questions

As shown above, there was a discrepancy between the South Korean government’s policy pronouncements and their actual behaviour relating to food aid to North Korea. The amount of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007 severely fluctuated and the pattern of fluctuation during this period also did not relate to changes in North Korea’s ‘import requirement’ which is not covered by national production. Why was there a discrepancy between the South Korean government’s policy pronouncements and their actual behaviour relating to food aid to North Korea? Why did the amount of food aid to North Korea fluctuate and finally reach the stage of consistent food aid delivery with large scale bilateral food aid to North Korea throughout most of the years between 2000 and 2007? The existing literature does not answer these questions.

Firstly, the attempt to answer the above questions has rarely been conducted. The main reason is that most studies treated South Korean humanitarian NGOs as a service provider merely serving as agents of a national government and therefore neglected the political role of humanitarian NGOs in the South Korean and U.S. food aid policy making. Under this assumption, the existing studies focused on the causes of the North Korean famine, the outcomes achieved by the efforts of states’ agencies and international humanitarian organisations, the role of NGOs as humanitarian and development aid providers and the operational constraints which the international
community has encountered inside North Korea during their humanitarian activities.\textsuperscript{52} Although there have been numerous analyses listing what international humanitarian NGOs have achieved in North Korea and what operational constraints they have encountered during this process, the analysis of South Korean government food aid policy making and the political of humanitarian NGOs have drawn few scholars’ attention.\textsuperscript{53}

Secondly, the handful of works which have attempted to explain the fluctuations identified in the provision of South Korean and U.S. food aid to North Korea are flawed, because many scholars in North Korean studies have adopted a ‘security-centred’ approach without scientific examination.\textsuperscript{54} Given the severe political confrontation between North Korea and the international community, in particular South Korea and the United States, the security-centred approach has become a dominant explanatory viewpoint in explaining all the other socio-economic and political issues. In this political and academic environment, scholars who adopted this security-centred approach showed a tendency to interpret all the interactions between North Korea and the international community as a supplementary issue that is subordinate to the national security matters. Andrew S. Natsios, Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Deok-Jun Kim and David Kelleher, for instance, argue that South Korea and the United States used food aid to North Korea as leverage to achieve their political interests in the negotiations with North Korea.\textsuperscript{55} Based on this approach, they interpret, without tremendous scientific examination, the provision of food aid as merely a ‘quid pro quo’ for an improvement in political relations between North Korea and the donor states.\textsuperscript{56} They also conclude that the fluctuations in the amount of food aid to North Korea were the inevitable and direct results of political oscillations between North Korea and South
Korea. This tendency has therefore resulted in weakening scientific scrutiny in scholars’ works on the major donor states’ food aid policy making towards North Korea.

Thirdly, scholars who have studied the major donor states’ food aid policy towards North Korea, mainly South Korea and the United States, have underestimated the dilemmas stemming from the clash of national security interests, humanitarian principles and human rights that were identified in South Korean and U.S. food aid policy making. Natsios, Haggard and Noland have recognised the dilemmas of humanitarian aid to North Korea as a critical factor in South Korean and U.S. food aid policy making. 57 They nevertheless did not pay proper attention to analysing these dilemmas, as they posited that national security interests ‘ultimately’ trump the other two values of humanitarian principles and human rights and the clash of these values. Although Michael Schloms has traced why these dilemmas occurred and how various humanitarian NGOs have dealt with it, 58 he has neither explained why and by whom these dilemmas were intensified nor how these dilemmas have affected major donors’ food aid decision making.

Lastly, scholars such as Natsios, Schloms, Haggard and Noland did not pay proper scholarly attention to the role of humanitarian NGOs in their governments’ food aid policy making. Since the securitised approach identified in North Korean studies considers the state as the unilateral actor in domestic and international politics, their analyses of food aid policy making have neglected the role of humanitarian NGOs despite their recognition on the role of humanitarian NGOs in their government food aid decision making. Thus, they did not pay scholarly attention to explaining how these NGOs changed their government’s food aid policy making.
Despite the significant political role of South Korean humanitarian NGOs, in summary, the existing literature has provided only a partial explanation of the fluctuation identified in the delivery of South Korean government food aid to North Korea, excluding humanitarian NGOs from their explanation. The scholars who adopted the realist approach therefore have not offered a comprehensive explanation of the discrepancy between states’ official policy pronouncements and their actual delivery of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007. To understand the food aid policy making of the South Korean government, this thesis therefore focuses on the role of South Korean humanitarian NGOs in their government food aid policy making towards North Korea.

Based on the research problem identified above, the research questions of this thesis are set out as follows:

*Given the demonstrable humanitarian need for food assistance in North Korea from 1995 to 2007, how and to what extent have South Korean humanitarian non-governmental organisations influenced their government food aid policy making on North Korea, and why has the extent of the influence from non-governmental organisations differed between administrations?*

This research question relates to the fundamental question of food aid study: why does a state provide food aid? This thesis, however, narrows down the scope of analysis to the role of NGOs in state food aid policy making. By doing so, this thesis brings proper scholarly attention to, and examines the role of, NGOs as a political actor that is already
significant in state food aid policy making. This thesis hence attempts to provide a complementary explanation to the existing approaches to food aid policy making that have neglected such roles as those of NGOs.

2.3 The Literature Review: The Constructivist Perspective

This section demonstrates the usefulness of constructivist theory as a framework of analysis to explain NGO influence on state food aid policy making. It examines how a constructivist approach incorporates norms and ideas, NGOs and dynamics of advocacy in the analysis of foreign policy making. In doing so, this section demonstrates that the constructivist theory is an alternative approach to explain how the South Korean humanitarian NGOs, advocating humanitarianism and brotherly love for food aid to North Korea, shaped and changed the South Korean government food aid policy towards North Korea.

Conventional realist accounts argue that food aid was motivated by the economic and political self-interests of the donor. These realist interpretations of food aid is that food aid has a surplus-food-disposal function and market-creating function in terms of economic self-interest. From this perspective, food aid acts as a leverage to induce recipient countries to comply with the foreign policy objectives of the donor in terms of political self-interest. This perspective can well be understood through the classical realist framework of international relations theory that denotes ‘maximization of interest and power,’ ‘state as unilateral actor in chaotic international politics’ and ‘interest as fixed or taken-for-granted goal.’
Peter Uvin and Raymond F. Hopkins, however, argue that in the field of food aid in the 1960s the realist interpretation was dominant, but as the international food aid regime has evolved objectives and mandates promoting donors to provide food aid have changed from economic and foreign policy interests to developmental and humanitarian preferences. Uvin and Hopkins argue that international food aid regime has evolved by the establishment of new international laws and institutions. In 1964, for instance, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), a United Nations organisation responsible for project and emergency food aid, was created. In 1967, a Food Aid Convention (FAC), which aimed to persuade rich countries to contribute more and to share the burden of food aid, in particular the United States (U.S.), was ratified by the major cereal trading nations. In 1976, an International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR), whose goal was to make sure that there would always be multilateral food aid available for a rapid response to emergencies, was established. These institutions, international laws and covenants, they argue, curb the conventional flow of food aid characterised by politically useful flexibility, surplus disposal and additionality to commercial flows.

By tracing the evolution of international food aid regime and the flow of international food aid, Uvin and Hopkins conclude that the flow of international food aid is increasingly governed by the international food aid regime that consists of those multilateral institutions, norms and procedures.

The international regime approach, however, has received criticisms. Christoper B. Barrett and Daniel G. Maxwell in particular argue that the international food aid regime has no enforcement mechanism to pressurise the signatories of international covenants or laws to comply with their legal and moral commitments or to put non-signatory countries under the influence of this international regime. Barrett and
Maxwell instead argue that in the United States three subgroups, domestic food processors, maritime interests and the NGO community, support international food aid. 67 Polly J. Diven in particular has demonstrated the relationship between commodity producer interests and food aid policy makers by tracing the empirical analysis of U.S. food aid flows. 68 These scholars have made a contribution to the development of food aid studies, expanding the object of food aid analysis from a state-centred approach to non-state actors.

Barrett, Maxwell and Diven’s work, however, only ended in the analysis of the role of interest groups driven by private interests. From this perspective, U.S. NGOs support food aid as they depend on food aid as a resource for their operations and an operating expense for their administrative costs. Humanitarian NGOs argue that their fundamental objectives are not self-interest driven by commercialism and the availability of donor funds but are based on normative principles. 69 In Britain, Save the Children Fund, the oldest of the non-governmental foreign aid organisations, was founded from the Fight the Famine Council as a response to humanitarian distress in Europe after World War I. 70 Oxfam was founded in Britain during World War II and campaigned for grain ships to be sent through the allied naval blockade to provide relief for women and children in enemy-occupied Greece. 71 As part of the same impetus, in the United States, CARE (initially formed as the ‘Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe,’ but now stands for ‘Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.’) was founded in 1945 to provide relief to the survivors of World War II. 72 With the end of the period of post-war reconstruction, then, these humanitarian NGOs broadened their objectives from immediate relief in the form of food aid programmes to development assistance in the form of projects. Although there are still
debates over using food aid as a resource for development, a progressive change has occurred within many NGOs. NGOs, especially U.S.-based NGOs, have gradually broadened their mandate from relieving the suffering caused by poverty to encouraging participation of the poor in the political process.

With the traditional role of delivering food aid and essential goods for living, humanitarian NGOs also affect the formation of state food aid policy making. Firstly, humanitarian NGOs provide an alternative source of information to the official state policy-making process in event of an emergency. Humanitarian NGOs have the merits of exploiting their high level of knowledge, information and expertise which is taken from their presence in the field. Secondly, through their advocacy movements in executive and legislative bodies, they exert influence on decision makers who direct state food aid policy. Lastly, by educating the public about an emergency and proselytising its active support to relief efforts, humanitarian NGOs shape public opinion and thereby affect policy.

Despite the humanitarian NGO role in state food aid policy making, the study of the political role of humanitarian NGOs in state food aid policy making has rarely been conducted. In the existing food aid studies, the analyses have mainly focused on the role of service delivery of NGOs. The dominant views based on the realist and international regime approach are still that the state is a unitary actor which has unchallenged authority to decide whether or not to provide food aid and that political, economic and foreign policy interests of a donor state are the key motivations of food aid decision making. However, these approaches do not explain why state interest changed over time and how non-state actors influenced the formation of state interest and its changes. Neither do these approaches explain the role of norms and ideas on state policy making.
Most scholars in the analysis of South Korean and U.S. food aid policy making, as discussed above, adopted the realist interpretation where a state is seen as a unitary political actor driven by self-economic and political interests. This realist interpretation has resulted in overlooking normative factors, such as humanitarianism and brotherly love, and the role of non-state actors such as humanitarian NGOs as norm entrepreneurs in the analysis of state food aid policy making. The constructivist approach, however, provides a framework to explore whether and how NGOs have exerted influence on and shaped state foreign policy formation. By providing a different understanding of ‘interest’ (‘exogenised’ or ‘indigenised’), ‘actors’ (individuals, states, non-state actors) and ‘dynamics’ (decision-making) in foreign policy analysis, the constructivist approach enables the explanation of the role of NGOs in state food aid policy making.

The constructivist approach views the world as socially ‘constructed’ through a process of interaction between various agents and the structure of their broader environment which firstly allows the explanation of national interest formation and change often identified in state policy making. Instead of assuming that a state has certain fixed and exogenised – or ‘taken-for-granted’ – interests, constructivists presume that national interests are constructed through a process of social interaction. The existing literature of food aid policy making was mostly underpinned by the realist approach that states are understood, primarily as being driven and motivated by political and economic interests. The scholars based in this realist approach consequently have not explained how and why these interests have changed. Contrary to this traditional approach to food aid policy making, a key assumption of the constructivist approach – that national interests are constructed through a process of social interaction – is a beginning point enabling scholars to explore how national interests in relation to food
aid policy are constructed and changed through a process of interaction with broader environments. This assumption in particular helps explain why state food aid policies sometimes appear to be in contradiction to stated national interests.

Secondly, constructivists put proper scholarly attention on normative and ideational factors in the analysis of state policy making. Although international relations scholars recognised the importance of normative and ideational factors in foreign policy analysis through the 1905s and 1960s, there were difficulties to theorise these processes. Realism excluded normative and ideational factors in foreign policy analysis because the limitation of the methodology made measurement difficult. In the 1970s and 1980s, this tendency to exclude normative and ideational factors for methodological reasons was further reinforced by the emerging infatuation of political scientists with economic methods: the dominance of economic models and methods in the study of U.S. politics. From the middle of 1980s, however, John Ruggie, Friedrich Kratochwil, Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, and Alexander Wendt introduced normative and ideational factors to the analysis of international politics. Finnemore and Sikkink’s article ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Changes’ in particular documented the origins and emergence of norms, the mechanism by which they exercise influence and the conditions under which norms will be influential. They argue that the tendency to analyse state behaviour from either a norm-based perspective or a rationalist perspective is not helpful in explaining state behaviour. Instead they argue that state policy and behaviour should be understood by analysing the mechanism of ‘strategic social construction’ through which actors rationally reconfigure their preferences, identities and social context. Based on the theoretical development of constructivism in foreign policy analysis, constructivists, such as Ann Florini, Audie
Klotz, Tomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C. Ropp, Kathryn Sikkink, David P. Forsythe, Margaret E. Keck and Abby Stoddard,\textsuperscript{89} have analysed norms and ideas in state foreign policy making. Through empirical studies in various policy areas, such as the environment movement, the ban on land mines, the anti-apartheid movement, women’s suffrage and human rights, these scholars have documented that differing national or international NGOs motivated by moral principles or commonly held values and norms have exerted significant influence on state policy making and international politics.\textsuperscript{90} This body of scholarship argues that the norms and ideas underpinning NGOs influence on state discursive positions, procedures, policies and behaviour, alters state self-perception of identities, interests and preferences.

Thirdly, the constructivist approach provides a tool to explain the role of NGOs in state policy making, considering them as norms and ideas entrepreneurs. By whom are norms and ideas initiated and catalysed? Constructivist scholars’ answer, in particular North-American/conventional constructivists, is that non-state actors and their networks at the domestic and transnational level have been significant actors as it is NGOs that have introduced and catalysed new norms and ideas.\textsuperscript{91} Constructivist scholars have documented how NGOs catalyse norms and ideas and how they have changed national interest. By doing so, these scholars supplemented the traditional foreign policy analysis approach by broadening its scope of actor analysis from its emphasis on national bureaucracies and actors to non-state actors as norms and ideas entrepreneurs. Viewed from the constructivist perspective, therefore, foreign policy analysis needs to take into account non-state actors and their advocacy movements.

Lastly, the constructivist approach incorporates new dynamics of decision making, such as ‘advocacy,’ ‘persuasion’ and ‘arguing’ which are mainly exploited by
NGOs, into the analysis of state policy making. A question raised by realist and liberalist scholars is whether constructivism can explain dynamics of decision making in foreign policy analysis. More specifically, how does constructivism explain ‘arguing’ and ‘persuasion’ which non-state actors use to shape or change state interest and preference in foreign policy analysis? The traditional view in the broader international relations literature has been to assume that the actors involved in the decision-making process are instrumentally rational and seek to maximise given interests. As international relations scholars have recognised, however, decision-making processes are not just about ‘hard-headed bargaining.’ Rather, constructivist scholars see the agents involved as ‘social’ actors who redefine and reshape their interests, preferences and ultimately their policies through the process of interaction. In this process of communicative interaction for decision making, as Johnston and Risse-Kappen documented, communicatively rational actors do not so much carefully calculate the costs and benefits; rather, these actors use the tactics of ‘persuasion,’ ‘arguing’ and ‘convincing’ in their decision-making process. Jeffrey T. Checkel, Alastair Iain Johnston, Tomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C. Ropp, Kathryn Sikkink and Audie Klotz have also documented that under certain conditions arguing and persuasion did affect both national and international policy making.

2.4 Hypotheses of the Thesis

As discussed in the literature review, humanitarian NGOs perform two main functions: service delivery and advocacy. The main function of humanitarian NGOs is to provide
humanitarian aid to people who are in humanitarian distresses, but they also play a political role. Humanitarian NGOs pressurise donor governments to provide humanitarian aid by providing ‘hands-on information’ from their field experience and by advocating humanitarianism. By doing so, humanitarian NGOs proselytise donor states to provide more humanitarian aid.

Given the humanitarian need in North Korea from 1995 when North Korea officially appealed to the international community for food aid, the international community provided humanitarian aid on the largest scale, mainly consisting of food aid, to North Korea. Among the total shipment from various donor states during this period, South Korea shipped the largest amount of food aid, 2,862,934 tonnes, to North Korea. As the biggest stakeholder which had mixed interests in the Korean Peninsula in terms of national security, regional and international security, the South Korean government experienced a serious dilemma between the conflicting interests of national security, humanitarian principles and human rights during the food aid policy making process. Since the South Korean government began shipping food aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996, South Korean humanitarian NGOs have indeed exercised differing influences over the policy makers in relation to food aid decision making and civil society.

Between 1995 and 2007, South Korean humanitarian NGOs, which are motivated and underpinned by religious beliefs and ethnic fraternalism, actively engaged in operations for the relief of humanitarian distress in North Korea. During this period the South Korean humanitarian NGOs, which usually consisted of humanitarian aid organisations and religious organisations, played an active advocacy role in pressurising the South Korean government to provide food aid to North Korea. For this
aim, the humanitarian NGOs exploited various advocacy activities, such as domestic and international conferences, public campaigns, fundraising events, petitions, and hearings for the public and policy makers.\textsuperscript{105} By organising consecutive international conferences, for instance, the South Korean humanitarian NGOs attempted to proselytise their government and the international community to provide food aid to North Korea.\textsuperscript{106} By building the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea and the Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy, the humanitarian NGOs sought to incorporate their voices and demands into government food aid policy making.\textsuperscript{107}

Given the food deficit in North Korea between 1995 and 2007, South Korean humanitarian NGOs have played an active role in advocacy movements in order to change their governments’ food aid policy towards compliance with their fundamental goals. Despite of the consistent advocacy movement by these South Korean humanitarian NGOs between 1995 and 2000, however, the provision of food aid from South Korea severely fluctuated and finally reached the stage of consistent delivery of food aid after 2000 until 2007. In the explanation of these fluctuations, this thesis demonstrates that the differences in the organisational capabilities of NGOs influenced the different stages of state food aid policy making. These differences in NGO abilities, in turn, contributed to the different outcomes at the different stages of the state’s food aid policy making, eventually inducing a fluctuation in the amount of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007. This thesis set the organisational capability of NGO and NGO’s capability to set agenda, network, graft and institutionalise new norms and ideas onto state policy making as key variables. However, the study of NGO and constructivist approach shows that the changes in the issue characteristics of
humanitarian distress and the domestic political structure of a target state are the secondary factors influencing the degree of NGO advocacy on state policy making process. In this sense, the thesis sets the issue characteristics of the North Korean famine and the domestic political structure of the South Korean government as the assumption of the study.

Drawing on the literature review and a constructivist approach, this thesis is based upon an assumption and develops three hypotheses as follows:

Assumption:

The issue characteristics of the North Korean food crisis and the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making changed over time, shaping the differing operational environment in which South Korean humanitarian non-governmental organisations worked.

Hypotheses:

Hypothesis I: Organisational mandates, funding capacities and expertise were important in the constitution of each non-governmental organisation’s capacity to influence South Korean government food aid policy.

Hypothesis II: Differing non-governmental organisation capacities were consequential in explaining the capability of non-governmental organisation
advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea.

Hypothesis III: These differences in non-governmental organisation capacity shaped different outcomes at different stages of South Korea’s food aid policy-making. South Korea’s food aid policy processes are disaggregated according to the different stages of agenda setting, the formation of a discursive position, and institutional and policy development.

2.5 Developing an Analytical Framework

A constructivist perspective assumes that state interest is not exogenised or ‘taken-for-granted’ but socially constructed through mutual interaction. For the constructivist, norms and ideas are one critical factor that influences state decision making and behaviour. With regard to actors in politics, the constructivist approach considers non-state actors, such as NGOs, as political actors in domestic and international politics. NGOs work as norm entrepreneurs in practice. In this sense, the constructivist perspective provides an analytical framework to explain how the norms of humanitarianism and brotherly love influenced South Korean government food aid policy making, by replacing the existing norms of hostility towards North Korea with humanitarianism and brotherly love. The constructivist scholars, however, do not elaborate on how NGOs, as norm entrepreneurs, incorporate new norms and ideas into
the norms of policy makers in the government and civil society. Neither do the existing literature and the constructivist approach provide an appropriate explanation of how NGOs, as norm entrepreneurs, maximise their influence over the state and state policy makers.

Using the analytical framework based on the constructivist approach, this thesis therefore focuses on the entire process of norm grafting by the NGOs: the operational environment which circumscribes or promotes NGO’s norm grafting, the agenda framing and networks which are exploited by NGOs to maximise norm grafting and the process of internalising norms in the differing stages of state policy making as a final process of norm grafting. This section outlines an analytical framework for the analysis of NGO influence on state food aid policy making, beginning with how the operational environment circumscribes or catalyses NGO influence. The two factors which comprise the operational environment that NGOs operate in are the issue characteristics and the domestic political structure. Another factor, which is directly related to the strength of NGO influence, is NGO organisational capacity which is subject to mandates, funding capacities and expertise. Drawing on the work of Richard Price, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, this section then outlines an analytical framework for evaluating NGO influence on state food aid policy making. The four stages which are identified in the process of the NGO advocacy movement are (i) agenda setting, (ii) networking, (iii) grafting and (iv) institutionalisation.

2.5.1 The Operational Environment for Non-governmental Organisation Advocacy
This section discusses how the operational environment circumscribes or catalyses NGO influence on state policy making. This section draws on the works of Thomas Risse-Kappen, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. The section first evaluates why some issue-specific NGOs have more impact on state policy making than others and how changes in the issue characteristics influence NGO advocacy. Secondly, this section explains how the domestic political structure shapes NGO influence on state policy making. To identify the characteristics of domestic political structure, this section examines the state policy making structure, institutions linking the state and NGOs, the degree to which the state accommodates humanitarianism and humanitarian institutions, and the diplomatic relationship between donor states and recipient states. Lastly, the section shows how differing mandates, funding capacities and expertise shape NGO organisational capability in advocacy.

2.5.1.1 Issue Characteristics

Keck and Sikkink argue that there are two variables that explain the relative influence of issue-specific NGOs on state policy making. One is related to issue characteristics itself; the other is NGOs’ ability to reframe the issue. With regard to the issue characteristics, bodily harm to vulnerable individuals is the more frequently and effectively tackled issue that led to the formation of transnational advocacy networks and their success in state policy change. Existing empirical studies of the environment movement, women’s suffrage, the anti-apartheid movement, the ban on land mines, anti-corruption movements, democracy movements and human rights show that not all principled ideas...
or NGO movements lead to success in influencing state policy change. Among them, as Keck and Sikkink argue, the issues related to bodily harm to vulnerable individuals such as humanitarian aid to individuals stricken by famine, domestic or inter-state conflicts, female circumcision, torture and disappearance are more amenable to NGOs than other issues such as anti-corruption movements or environmental issues. Issues involving bodily harm indeed tend to allow advocacy NGOs to recruit more volunteers and supporters and to infuse a strong normative meaning into these volunteer activities. Since these issues arouse strong feelings and are also strongly underpinned by various international principles, it is easier for these NGOs to raise material resources required for organisations’ administration and their operation of activities. NGOs advocating bodily harm issues, therefore, are more successful in resonating with the state policy-makers and the general public than with some other issues.

Secondly, NGOs’ ability to reframe the issue is another factor that helps to explain NGO policy impact on state policy. NGOs enhance their influence on state policy through the use of three different strategies. Firstly, Keck and Sikkink argue that issues involving bodily harm to populations perceived as vulnerable and innocent resonate more easily with the public and the national government and tend to be effective. It is therefore more effective to reframe the issue into bodily harm to the vulnerable and innocent. Secondly, Deborah A. Stone argues that NGOs can make the issues more convincing by reframing them into a ‘short’ and ‘clear causal chain’ that establishes who bears responsibility and how the issue raised can be improved. Lastly, Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom argues that when the issue is framed by the norms of international regime that is related to the issue, it is easy for NGOs to gain leverage in state policy change. More specifically, when the issues that NGOs advocate are
underpinned by international norms and principles, NGOs can easily build transnational advocacy networks that are considered as a critical factor required for the success of the NGO advocacy movement.115

2.5.1.2 The Domestic Political Structure

The domestic political structure of an NGO-based host state circumscribes or catalyses NGO influence by shaping the operational ground in which NGOs work, determining the availability of channels for NGOs into the political system and dictating the degree to which the state accommodates norms and ideas. The diplomatic relationship between donor state and recipient states also comprise the domestic political structure which shapes the operational environment in which NGOs work.116 This section first operationalises the concept of the domestic political structure. Secondly, it shows how the domestic political structure circumscribes or catalyses the influence of Noosing terms of the institutional features of the state. Thirdly, this section shows how policy networks linking the state and NGOs shape differing influence on NGO advocacy. Fourthly, this section addresses how the degree of government accommodation to norms and ideas and international institutions advocating these norms and ideas influenced NGO advocacy. Lastly, this section shows how the diplomatic relationship between donor states and recipient states determines the extent of NGO influence.

Originally developed in the field of comparative foreign economic policy,117 the notion of domestic political structure used in this thesis refers to the institutional features of the state, the policy networks linking state-society, the state’s embeddedness
in international institutions, the degree of state accommodation to international norms and ideas and the diplomatic relationship between donor states and recipient states. Contrary to the earlier conceptualisation of the domestic political structure which emphasised organisational and legal characteristics of political institutions, the domestic political structure as used here incorporates the concept of ‘political culture’ that is drawn from the insight of ‘new institutionalism.’ By including the concept of political culture that incorporates communicative action, duties, social obligations and norms of appropriate behaviour, it is possible to capture the normative structure of state-society.

The characteristics of domestic political structure can first be captured by the institutional features of the state. They can be analysed in terms of their extent or their degree of power of ‘centralisation’ in the decision-making process. This more specifically can be distinguished by to what extent executive power is concentrated in the hands of small groups of decision makers or in the specific institutions of decision-making procedure. Another characteristic is how the institutional features which regulate the relationship between the executive and the legislative constrain the national government’s ability to make policies and to implement those policies. ‘Centralised states’ would then be characterised by political institutions and cultures which concentrate executive power at the top of the political system, in which national governments enjoy considerable independence from legislatures. Those centralised states therefore are prone to be less sensitive to the influence of NGOs.

Secondly, the institutions of the policy networks which link state and society need to be examined in the analysis of domestic political structure. Intermediate organisations between state and society play a role to incorporate societal demands into
the political process. Organisational types of those intermediate institutions are political parties, national advisory councils and committees and consulting bodies such as think tanks. Whether or not those intermediate organisations exist within the state policymaking process, and if they do, to what degree those intermediate organisations aggregate societal demands and channel them into the state policy-making process, can be a factor facilitating or circumscribing the policy impact of NGOs in state policy making.122

Thirdly, the degree of state accommodation to new norms and ideas comprises one of the characteristics of domestic political structure. As Thomas Risse-Kappen argues, centralised states, in terms of the institutional features of the state, are less susceptible to new norms and ideas.123 States that have strong policy networking between state and society are more sensitive to new norms and ideas.124 The more the state is embedded in international institutions, the more vulnerable to new norms and ideas the state is.125 The more sensitive to new norms and ideas the domestic political structure of NGO-based host state or target states are, in short, the more significant influence NGOs can exert.

Fourthly, the domestic political structure can be captured by the state’s embeddedness in international institutions.126 Regime analysts, in particular Stephen D. Krasner, Friedrich V. Kratochwil and Volker Rittberger, argue that there are issue-specific international institutions. The international human rights regime for instance is supported and legitimised as an organisational platform exists in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Council.127 International food aid motivated by humanitarianism is legitimised by the World Food Summit and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. As organisational platforms, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have been established to defeat hunger by providing food aid and resonating these humanitarian principles with its member states.

Regime analysts argue that those international institutions influence national government’s policy formation and changes. Those regime analysts more specifically argue that international institutions can catalyse the influence of NGOs in two ways: by providing material support such as expertise and funds required for NGO advocacy movements, and playing a role in strengthening NGOs’ capabilities to gain access to national policy-making processes. If norms and goals that NGOs attempt to advocate are in compliance with international institutions’ principles, NGOs rely on these issue-specific international institutions in order to enhance their legitimacy. The international institutions also play a role in pressurising their member state to be more sensitive to the demands of NGOs. The more the state is embedded in the international institutions, the more the state is sensitive to the influence of NGOs. In this sense, NGOs exploit moral or material leverage to maximise their influence. Moral leverage – ‘name and shame’ – provides effective leverage for the countries that seek to belong to a normative community of nations. If the host or target states care about their status in international society, NGOs exploit this strategy of moral leverage. By exploiting a ‘name and shame’ strategy, NGOs pressurise their host or target state to change its policy and practice in compliance with their goals. To what extent the host or target states care about their reputation in the international community, therefore, dictates the effectiveness of the moral leverage exploited by NGOs and it in turn facilitates or limits
the policy impact of the NGO advocacy movement. The degree of state embeddedness in international institutions, therefore, catalyses or circumscribes the influence of NGOs.

Lastly, diplomatic relationships are another important variable that affects the influence of NGOs by creating an amicable or unfriendly operational environment. Diplomatic relationships however are not fixed over time. Changes in the bilateral diplomatic relationship between a host state and target state provide shifting opportunities and constraints for NGOs. NGO leverage on state food aid policy making therefore may vary with changes tithe diplomatic environment. As L. Gordon Flake and Scott A. Snyder have shown, for instance, when the United States as a NGO-based host state and North Korea as the target state maintained a close diplomatic relationship, the U.S. was more sensitive to the influence of humanitarian NGOs that were considered to promote the existing relationship. In this diplomatic environment, other NGOs that were considered to exert negative influence on the existing relationship, for instance human rights NGOs, were deliberately excluded by the U.S. government. When the diplomatic relationship between North Korea and the United States was hostile and the United States sought to improve it, the U.S. governments tended to be more sensitive to the demands from humanitarian NGOs which were deemed to improve the existing hostile diplomatic relationship. By using humanitarian NGOs as leverage to keep communication open with the target state, the U.S. governments sought to change the current diplomatic relationship. When the U.S. governments did not wish to improve the diplomatic relationship with North Korea, however, they tended to be more responsive to the voices from human rights NGOs which are more hostile to North Korea.

In summary, the domestic political structure of the NGO-based host state in terms of power centralisation, the relationship between the executive and legislative, and the
policy networks linking the state and NGOs determines to what extent NGOs are allowed to gain access to the political system. The degree of state accommodation to new norms and ideas, and international institutions advocating these norms and ideas along with the diplomatic relationship between donor states and recipient states shape differing domestic political structures which circumscribe or catalyse the influence NGOs have in state policy making. To understand the differing influence of NGOs in state policy making, therefore, it is necessary to examine the domestic political structure of state policy making.

2.5.1.3 Non-governmental Organisations’ Organisational Capability

This section examines the actor characteristics of NGOs separated from the operational environment. NGO organisational capabilities combined with the normative attraction of NGOs is an important factor in the explanation of the extent of NGO influence on state policy.132 Key organisational features are mandates, funding capacities and expertise. NGO organisational capabilities, however, are inherently limited and NGO influence on state policy making also relies on the normative appeal of NGOs. This, through the advocacy movement, is the main theme of this thesis and therefore the main chapters will tackle this theme later. This section shows how the differing mandates, funding capacities and expertise of NGOs shape NGO organisational capability.

The ideational and normative mandates of NGOs are important in evaluating the strength of NGOs’ influence. Peter Willetts and Lars Jørgensen defined an NGO as an independent organisation of people who have ‘freely chosen’ to support the organisation
and aims to pursue the ‘public interest.’\textsuperscript{133} It is rare for NGOs to use ‘illegal activities’ in order to try to effect changes in state policy. The limited and unstable financial structure of NGOs and their limited instruments means that they have inherent difficulties in achieving goals.\textsuperscript{134} NGO efforts do not assure their members and supporters economic compensation or a position of government. NGOs rely instead on material and normative support from their staff, supporters and volunteers. Since NGOs work in this limited operational environment, Finnemore and Sikkink argue, a strong ideational and normative mandate is created in respect of appropriate or desirable behaviour.\textsuperscript{135} The ideational and normative mandates that underpin NGO activity strengthen the unity of NGO members, staffs and supporters. In so doing, NGOs are able to overcome the constraints created by material and operational difficulties.\textsuperscript{136}

Secondly, stable and sufficient funding is an important factor for the sustainability and efficiency of NGO advocacy movements.\textsuperscript{137} NGO funding comes from a variety of sources including voluntary contributions, private corporations and state financing. Sustainability and efficiency of NGO activity is therefore constrained by the absence of a secure income stream. As Estelle James has argued, however, if NGOs become over-reliant on a single funding source they may become subject to the influence of funding organisations. Such overreliance on a single source of funding can damage the legitimacy of NGOs.\textsuperscript{138} Julie Fisher\textsuperscript{139} and Michael Edwards and David Hulme\textsuperscript{140} argue that NGOs’ funding mechanism, generally relying on state funding, makes it difficult to maintain NGOs’ organisational autonomy. These scholars argue that as NGOs grow larger and become more bureaucratic, they become increasingly reliant on state funding and in turn they may lose their autonomy and flexibility. Helga Baitenmann also argues that funding from governments or private corporations can
damage NGO legitimacy by undermining the autonomy and flexibility of NGO advocacy movements.\textsuperscript{141}

Lastly, NGOs’ expertise in a given issue area implies an ability to exploit appropriate tactics at the right time and to build dense networks in support of their goals. NGOs do not possess material instruments such as military power and normally do not have access to large economic resources. Their power and strength comes largely from issue-specific expertise which allows them to maintain their legitimacy and accountability in relation to the public and the state.\textsuperscript{142} This expertise includes the ability to identify economic, political or moral leverage to pressurise the state to change policy and to employ such leverage in a timely manner.\textsuperscript{143} The capability and experience to build dense networks also assists NGOs to support their activity. In this sense, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink argue that the extent of NGO influence on the state’s policy making is directly related to their expertise in exploiting appropriate tactics in respect of the target actor, the stage of the issue and the operational environment.\textsuperscript{144} They argue that there are likely to be five tactics generally used by NGOs.\textsuperscript{145} These are information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, accountability politics and networking politics. Keck and Sikkink characterise the tactic of \textit{information politics} as when NGOs quickly and credibly generate politically useful information and disseminate it in a timely manner to where it will have the most impact. \textit{Symbolic politics} is when NGOs exploit symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience that is usually distant from a humanitarian crisis. \textit{Leverage politics} is when NGOs use leverage to gain influence on target actors normally understood as beyond their direct influence to change target actors’ policy and practice. \textit{Accountability politics} is when NGOs use the official pronouncements or legal
commitments of target actors as opportunities to call upon those actors to be accountable for their actions. Networking politics refers to the ability of NGOs to build domestic and transnational networks around shared goals with international institutions to mobilise public support and to enhance the accountability and legitimacy of their own goals. By using these tactics, NGOs seek to pressurise target states to change their policies or practices and in this process NGOs’ expertise to exploit these different tactics effectively and in a timely manner is directly related to the strength of their influence.

2.5.2 Framework for the Analysis of Non-governmental Organisation Influence on State Policy Making

This section draws up an analytical framework that allows for an examination of the research question and hypotheses of this thesis. It draws particularly from the works of Richard Price, Keck and Sikkink to provide an analytical framework for evaluating NGO influence on state food aid policy making. This thesis identifies four stages in the process of the NGO advocacy movement. These four stages are (i) agenda setting, (ii) networking, (iii) grafting and (iv) institutionalisation. At each stage of NGO advocacy, the different operational environments facilitate or circumscribe NGOs influence on state food aid policy making. The capability to set the agenda, build networks, graft norms and institutionalise policy goals within state food aid policy is different for each NGO and these different capacities are consequential. By tracing NGO activities through these four stages, therefore, it is possible to trace the evolution of NGO influence on state food aid policy making.
2.5.2.1 Agenda Setting

The NGO advocacy movement begins with ‘agenda setting.’ In this initial stage, an individual NGO generates attention towards issues that previously have not been a matter of public debate or that have not been considered as problems. To set a problem as a policy agenda, Keck and Sikkink argue, NGOs first of all attempt to change the ‘value context’ in which policy debates take place.148

To change the value context, NGOs exploit various tactics related to information politics and symbolic politics to resonate issues or ideas with both the state and public or even the international community. Firstly, NGOs try to disseminate facts related to the issues through the media, debates, hearings, testimonies, meetings on the issues and public campaigns. At this time, the facts must be reliable and well documented. Secondly, to maximise its effectiveness, information used by NGOs must be timely and dramatic. For this, as Deborah A. Stone argues, NGOs reframe the issues into sufficiently short and clear causal stories that identify the root of the problem, the responsible party or parties and credible solutions. This tactic allows NGOs to persuade the state and public more effectively.149 Thirdly, another tactic exploited by NGOs to make their issue dramatic is symbolic politics. NGOs try to reframe the issue by symbolic events. By developing convincing explanations for powerful symbolic events and linking them with the given issues, they catalyse domestic and transnational mobilisation and its support and thereby they seek to set new issues as policy agendas.150 In the same vein, whether a given issue is framed as a bodily harm issue or not151 is another factor that determines the success and failure of agenda setting. When a given issue is framed as bodily harm to vulnerable and innocent people, the issue
raises strong feelings so that it is easier to resonate with the public. As Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom argues, whether the issue is framed by norms of the international regime or not can also make it difficult or easy to set an agenda.152 When the given issues are framed by norms and ideas underpinned by international principles or regimes, NGOs find it easier to acquire support from the state or public. In summary, agenda setting, as the first stage of the NGO advocacy movement, is important in that it provides basic groundwork for the rest of the three stages, networking, grafting and institutionalisation. An individual NGO’s capability to generate reliable and well documented information, to reframe the issue by symbolic events or norms and values, and to exploit various tactics to disseminate this information effectively is an important factor required for this stage of agenda setting.

2.5.2.2 Networking

Networking follows agenda setting. It is an essential instrument for the successful NGO advocacy movement. Since NGOs have no powerful tools such as electoral punishment or financial power, their legitimacy to generate broad support from the public or leverage to proselytise government depends to a large extent on the NGOs’ ability to build different levels of networks. Networks, more specifically, enable NGOs to maximise their influence by facilitating an exchange of information about on-going issues and activities. Networks play a coordinating role linking individuals and organisations, consolidating them and mediating relationships between individuals and between organisations. Networks, as Richard Price argues, are deemed to provide
chances and forms of participation for the socialisation of individuals and organisations to specific sets of values.¹⁵³

For these reasons, NGOs endeavour to mobilise broad networks. These can be categorised into three levels: the individual level, inter-organisational level and transnational level. The individual level of networking refers to prior social ties operating as a basis for broader recruitment and networks. It becomes a locus of movement emergence. In this individual level of networking, relationships may be either direct or indirect ties, formal or informal ties, or private or public ties. Personal friends, relatives, colleagues and neighbours for instance may all affect individual decisions to become a member of a movement. In this stage and type of networking, by exploiting various kinds of relationships NGOs endeavour to amplify their quantitative influence through the recruitment of volunteers, staff and activists and through public support. NGOs also seek to deepen their qualitative network by recruiting technicians and experts, bureaucrats, political elites and leaders, journalists and reporters.

Secondly, inter-organisational networking is another form of NGO networking. It has the very same reasoning as individual networking, but in this type NGOs attempt to build more formal and public networks. This inter-organisational network provides the function of information production and circulation, the pooling of mobilisation resource and the allocation of mobilised resources. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam argue that this inter-organisational network facilitates the negotiation of agreed goals, joint participation in specific actions and events, exposure to the media, shared personnel and protection of small individual organisations against oppositional groups.¹⁵⁴

Thirdly, as Tomas Risse-Kappen has explored, transnational advocacy networks
is one of the critical factors that ensure successful advocacy movements. By building transnational networks, norm and idea entrepreneurs in particular, NGOs can acquire their legitimacy by relying on international principles underpinned by international society. Transnational networks also pressurise the host or target states to comply with policies and practices that NGOs pursue. It furthermore provides expertise and material resources.

2.5.2.3 Grafting

What happens before the institutionalisation of new norms or ideas introduced by NGOs and their networks? Richard Price uses the term ‘grafting’ to describe the process of norm adoption. The term ‘grafting’ refers to the process in which new norms and ideas introduced by NGOs compete with existing norms within the public and the state political system and then are finally accepted as a norm governing state behaviour or practices. If the previous two stages, agenda setting and networking, are the preparatory stages, this stage of grafting is a substantial stage where NGOs attempt to persuade the state and the public to embrace new norms and ideas through their advocacy movement and thereby seek to induce the state, as the fundamental target, to change their policy and practice.

Before looking at how NGOs incorporate their voices into state policy and practice, it is necessary to examine what motives induce states to adhere to new norms and ideas. There are two motives: material motives and normative motives. Some states generally in need of material resources such as the countries in the category of Least
Developed Countries (LDC) tend to adopt international norms and ideas in order to acquire material compensation or aid rather than to promote their reputation in the international community. For these countries, it is an effective strategy that makes material resources conditional on the promotion of international norms and ideas. A state with a normative motive desires to be a member of liberal democracy states and cares about their reputation or image as recognised by other states and international society. These states proclaim themselves to be and behave as protectors of liberal democratic values such as individual rights, equality of opportunity and the democratic decision-making process. These states therefore are sensitive to shaming, condemnation and blacklisting which are exploited by NGOs. To avoid these reputations that devastate their liberal democratic image, these states adhere to norms and ideas introduced by NGOs. By including demands of NGOs into state policy making, they attempt to show that they are a member of international society.

In this stage of grafting, then, how do NGOs incorporate their voices into state policy and practice? NGOs exert their influence through the mechanism of persuasion and argument. NGOs disseminate on-going information, reframe a given issue by international principles, symbolise events more dramatically, build broader networks and link the issue with normative and material leverage. By doing so, they endeavour to persuade the public and states to adopt new norms and ideas.

NGOs more specifically distinguish the target and deploy different movement strategies to each target: public campaigns for the public and lobbying for the state. There are advocacy strategies preferred by NGOs for each category of target, but these strategies, and objectives to be achieved by using these strategies, are neither mutually exclusive nor competitive. NGOs in general exploit both public campaigns and
lobbying policy makers simultaneously to achieve their fundamental goal. First, NGOs organise public campaigns to proselytise the public to change their norms and ideas embedded in their practice and attitude. NGOs exploit a broad range of ‘promotion and recruitment’ strategies using various communication skills. These include mass media such as TV, radio and newspapers, telecommunication methods such as the internet, telephone, email or paper-based letters, organisation’s periodicals, issue-specific reports and newsletters. NGOs also exploit face-to-face or door-to-door leafleting and petitioning, proselytising on pavements, at protests and parades, movement-sponsored events, conventions, festivals, conferences such as hearings, testimonies and seminars for the general public and experts. Secondly, as Thomas R. Dye argues, state policy making flows not only upward from the masses but also downward from the governing elites. For the same reason, NGOs target political elites, leaders and bureaucrats who are deemed to be significant within the state policy-making institutions. By lobbying these key policy makers, NGOs attempt to exert direct influence on the policy-making process. By recruiting lobbyists or establishing organisational units for lobbying within the organisation, NGOs monitor and assess policy-making institutions and the roles and activities of individuals and groups of key policy makers in the state policy making process. After identifying key persons or players as lobbying targets, NGOs mobilise human or material resources which can be exploited in lobbying the key players.

Another question raised is how one can explain or know which norms and ideas get selected and finally grafted. This question is related to the methodology to identify norm and idea change. The difficulty in measuring normative change in social science has resulted in intentional exclusion of normative and ideational factors in foreign policy analysis. With the efforts of constructivist scholars, however, it became
possible to explore how norms and ideas are incorporated into state policy through the
norm adoption process, which is referred to differently as ‘socialisation,’ ‘internalisation,’ or ‘institutionalisation.’ It also became possible to assess which norms and ideas emerge, cascade, and finally become internalised. By using empirical methodology such as tracing changes in public-opinion polls, the amount of media coverage, the number and scale of events such as parades and protests, and changes in human and material mobilisation of norm advocacy organisations, it is possible to recognise norm grafting and adoption. A more convincing and comprehensive methodology to assess norm and idea grafting, however, is to examine the stage of norm institutionalisation within the state policy-making structure. For this reason, this thesis separates norm institutionalisation from this stage of grafting. In this stage of grafting, therefore, the thesis will focus on what kinds of strategies NGOs exploit to incorporate new norms and ideas into public and state policy.

2.5.2.4 Institutionalisation

‘Institutionalisation’ is the final stage of incorporating NGO influence into state policy. The notion of ‘institutionalisation’ means to what extent the influence of NGOs is embedded in the state’s constitutional, regulative and judicial system, and in the attitudes and beliefs of political actors such as political leaders, politicians and bureaucrats. The different level of institutionalisation means, as Robert O. Keohane and Friedrich V. Kratochwil argue, the strength of norms and ideas that various entrepreneurs seek to resonate with the target states. Since NGOs’ fundamental goal
is to incorporate their advocacy movements into state policy and practice, it is important to assess to what extent NGOs have changed state policy and practice. To assess the influence of NGOs in state policy making, this thesis distinguishes the institutionalisation of NGO influence into four types: ‘state agenda setting,’ ‘discursive position change,’ ‘institutional change’ and ‘policy change and rule-consistent behaviour.’

The first type of institutionalisation of NGO influence can be identified from changes in ‘state agenda.’ NGOs endeavour to pressurise their government to adopt the issues that had never previously been a matter of public debate. When these discussions are held at official and public places such as conferences, meetings, or seminars convened or sponsored by government or at closed places such as the policy-making process in executive or legislative bodies, it signifies that the issue begins to germinate as a ‘state agenda.’ Although it is difficult to identify the existence of such debates when they are managed informally or in secret forms, as time goes on these kinds of debates rise to the surface, and then one can say that it is the beginning of state policy change.

The second type of institutionalisation is changes in the state discursive position. NGOs pressurise the state to support their norms and ideas. When the states change their position in relation to norms and ideas brought by NGOs by making public pronouncements for their commitment or supporting remarks on international covenants, laws and conventions, this second type of institutionalisation occurs. The public pronouncements or remarks themselves, however, do not carry an obligation to do anything. Since there is no enforcement mechanism in international politics to compel states to comply with their commitment to international conventions or declarations,
this second type of change is sometimes exploited by the state to divert NGOs or to save face temporarily.  

The third type of institutionalisation generally comes after verbal or normative changes in domestic and international politics: changes in ‘institutional procedures’ of the state policy-making process. NGOs pressurise the state to incorporate their ideas and norms into state policy making processes. In this process, NGOs proselytise the state to establish ‘official consulting bodies’ or ‘councils’ for the discussion of issues within the government institutions or to change state decision making procedures and institutions. These procedural and institutional changes contribute to the increase of opportunity for NGOs to contact with key policy-makers within the state policy making process. This change in institutional procedures becomes a precondition that lead to actual policy changes in the future. 

The final type of institutionalization of NGO influence is state ‘policy change’ and ‘rule-consistent behaviour.’ These two types are closely related but need to be differentiated. The main criterion to distinguish these two types is whether the states ‘consistently’ comply with their policy commitments or not. In the stage of ‘policy change,’ new policies initiated or consulted by NGOs are established. The states incorporate new norms and ideas into its policies by adopting domestic policies, legislation and international conventions. They try to establish relevant institutions and procedures to implement new policy. Despite state policy change, however, there can be still inconsistencies between the state policy and its actual behaviour. In this sense, Kathryn Sikkink, Margaret E. Keck, and Thomas Risse-Kappen differentiate the stage of ‘policy change’ from the stage of ‘rule-consistent behaviour.’ According to their differentiation between these two stages, the stage of ‘policy change’ can be defined as
‘prescriptive status’ that precedes ‘rule-consistent behaviour.’ As the final stage of ‘norm compliance’ and ‘self-reliance,’ the stage of rule-consistent behaviour comes when the states consistently commit themselves to their policy by exerting enforcement power as well as by making verbal or legislative commitments regardless of the existence of external monitoring or pressure. This stage of ‘rule-consistent behaviour’ thus comes when norms and ideas introduced by NGOs are fully institutionalised internally and organisationally so that ‘national governments are continuously pushed to live up to their claims.’

2.6 Research Methodology

South Korean humanitarian NGOs played a significant political role in pressurising their government in relation to food aid to North Korea. This thesis is based therefore on case studies of South Korean humanitarian NGOs. This section first defines the terms of civil society, civil society organisations, non-governmental organisation (NGO), civil society organisations, and humanitarian NGOs. It next shows the efforts of South Korean humanitarian NGOs in the North Korean famine relief between 1995 and 2007. It then justifies the rationale for selecting the Korean Sharing Movement and Good Friends as the case studies of this thesis. This section lastly explains how the thesis applies the analytical framework to the case studies.

2.6.1 Definitions of Terms
The most distinctive characteristic of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007 was that the advocacy was a nationwide movement. Before the examination of the scale and the role of Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), this section clarifies the key terms which will be used in this thesis, such as, relief Non-governmental Organisations (relief NGOs), civil society organisations and humanitarian Non-governmental Organisations (humanitarian NGOs).

Firstly, this thesis uses the basic definition of a Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) by Peter Willetts in his article ‘What is a Non-governmental Organization?’ Willetts defines a Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) as “an independent voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous basis, for some common purpose, other than achieving government office, making money or illegal activities.” Based on this definition, the thesis uses the term of ‘relief NGOs’ as the organisations which are mandated to deliver humanitarian and development aid to other countries. The term of civil society organisations is a broad concept that encompasses all types of NGOs, such as religious circles, relief NGOs and advocacy NGOs, and therefore the relief NGOs fall into this category of civil society organisations. However, this thesis uses the term of civil society organisations narrowly, by limiting it to non-relief NGOs to make it distinct from relief NGOs. By doing so, this thesis uses the term of humanitarian NGOs as a bridging concept. The definition of humanitarian NGOs which will be most frequently used in this thesis, uses the term of humanitarian NGOs as a concept to refer to the NGOs which are mandated to deliver humanitarian and development aid. Generally, relief NGOs fall into the category of humanitarian NGOs because these NGOs engage in either the delivery or advocacy of aid. This thesis also uses the term humanitarian NGOs as a concept referring to the civil society organisations that
expanded their original organisational mandates to include actively engaging in the advocacy of humanitarian and development aid. Between 1995 and 2007, religious groups and civil society organisations engaged in the advocacy and delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea by expanding their mandates or establishing independent aid delivery organisations within their main body irrespective of their original mandate. To cover these civil society organisations, this thesis uses the term of humanitarian NGOs as a concept which includes relief NGOs and civil society organisations which heavily engaged in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea.

2.6.2 South Korean Humanitarian Non-governmental Organisations and North Korean Famine Relief

Since North Korea’s appeal for food aid in August 1995, the South Korean humanitarian NGOs developed into a significant political actor in state food aid policy making, forming a favourable operational environment prompting the South Korean government to provide humanitarian food aid to North Korea. Between 1995 and 2007, various types of humanitarian NGOs that were committed to relieve the food crisis in North Korea were newly founded. Religious groups and civil society organisations engaged in the advocacy and delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea by expanding their mandates or establishing independent humanitarian NGOs within their main body.

In the beginning of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea from 1995 to 1997, more specifically under the Kim Young-Sam administration, the number of South
Korean humanitarian NGO’s was meagre. Instead, religious groups and civil society organisations played a steering role in the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea. As the severity of North Korean food deficits became known to the international community in 1996 and 1997, in particular, South Korean religious groups and civil society organisations began to take further steps to establish key humanitarian NGOs able to steer the advocacy of humanitarian aid to North Korea. Along with the establishment of new humanitarian NGOs, a wide range of networks, which mainly consisted of religious and civil society organisations, contributed to the participation of other religious and civil society organisations in the advocacy movement. As shown in Table 2.2, as a result, the total number of humanitarian NGOs, including the membership NGOs within the humanitarian networks, increased from 91 organisations in 1995 to 112 organisations in 1997.

Table 2.2 The Number of South Korean Humanitarian Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) during the Kim Young-Sam Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian NGOs 1)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newly Founded Humanitarian NGOs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 2)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1) Humanitarian NGOs refers to NGOs that engaged in the consistent advocacy movement or the delivery of humanitarian food aid to North Korea; 2) The figures include humanitarian NGOs, newly founded NGOs and all NGOs that participated in the campaigns and networks for humanitarian food aid to North Korea.

Source: Sarangbang Group for Human Rights, Bukhan Sujaemin Deonggum Mogum, 570ho [English title:
Given the lack of reliable data on the North Korean food deficits in 1995, the South Korean civil society organisations and religious groups played a steering role in the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea. During the first year of the advocacy movement the total number of NGOs in the advocacy networks was 91 which led the early civil society movements, such as the National Alliance for Democracy & Unification of Korea (NADRK) and the Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU). During 1996, then, the South Korean civil society organisations’ participation in the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea was not as significant as in 1995. The total number of NGOs, including humanitarian NGOs in the advocacy networks, decreased to 69 organisations. As the severity of North Korean food deficits became known to the international community in the early days of 1996, however, the religious and civil society organisations began to recognise the need for humanitarian NGOs to have permanent organisational ground and be mandated to relieve the North Korean food crisis. The six religious groups and the civil society organisations thus founded the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) as a successor to the Inter-religious Committee on the North Korean Flood Victim Aid (Inter-religious Committee). In December 1996, 33 Buddhist organisations founded the Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement, a predecessor of Good Friends, in order to strengthen the advocacy of humanitarian food aid. Under the steering role of KSM and Good Friends
in 1997, the South Korean humanitarian NGOs unfolded the most influential advocacy movement throughout the period of 1995 to 2007. During the year 1997, as the result of this vigorous advocacy movement, the total number of NGOs, including humanitarian NGOs, in the advocacy networks increased to 112 organisations. The humanitarian NGOs and the religious and civil society organisations organised a wide range of networks, which had stronger ties and focused on a strong mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea.

Table 2.3 The Number of South Korean Humanitarian Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) during the Kim Dae-Jung Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian NGOs 1)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>9 (24) 2)</td>
<td>13 (16) 3)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of NGO Council 5)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1) The humanitarian NGOs refer to the NGOs that were designated by the Ministry of Unification to open the bilateral channel with North Korea for the delivery of humanitarian and development assistances.; 2) The figure refers to the total number of NGOs that participated in ‘The Day of Fasting for the North Korean Compatriots Assistance’ on 28 April 1998.; 3) &4) These figures refer to the number of NGOs that could not open the bilateral delivery channel with North Korea.; 5) Member of NGO Council refers to the number of NGOs that joined NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea.; 6) & 7) These figures refer to the number of newly founded humanitarian NGOs that are committed to relieve the food crisis in North Korea.

At the beginning of the Kim Dae-Jung administration (1998-2002), then, the number of religious and civil society organisations actively engaged in the advocacy and delivery of humanitarian food assistance to North Korea continued to decrease. The number of humanitarian NGOs that were committed to the advocacy and delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea, however, increased consistently. Given the favourable operational environment where the government supported the role of humanitarian NGOs, the number of humanitarian NGOs designated by the Ministry of Unification to maintain the bilateral channel with North Korea, gradually increased from 9 NGOs in 1998 to 25 NGOs at the end of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 2002. Under such government support, the religious and civil society organisations that played a steering role in the advocacy and delivery of humanitarian food aid to North Korea on a temporary basis began to fade. Instead, the humanitarian NGOs that had permanent organisational ground and expertise in the advocacy and delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea became more dominant. From 2001 to 2002, in fact, a few dedicated humanitarian NGOs steered the advocacy movement and the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea became more apparent. The total number of NGOs that were designated to maintain the bilateral channel with North Korea continued to increase to 19 and 25 organisations in 2001 and 2002 respectively. During the same period other figures from the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (NCCK) also show that the membership organisation of NCCK increased from 21 NGOs in 2001 to 28 NGOs in 2002.

Lastly, during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration (2003-2007), a series of government policy changes contributed to a significant increase of South Korean humanitarian NGOs. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration the government relaxed
Table 2.4 The Number of South Korean Humanitarian Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) during the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian NGOs 1)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of NGO Council 2)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1) Humanitarian NGOs refer to NGOs that were designated by the Ministry of Unification to open the bilateral channel with North Korea for the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance; 2) Member of NGO Council refers to the number of NGOs that joined the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea.


the qualification for NGOs to be entitled to open the bilateral channel with North Korea.

The government also increased the government financial support for NGOs. These government policy changes finally resulted in a significant increase of South Korean humanitarian NGOs. This increase contributed to the expansion of the private level of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea, into a nationwide movement with many humanitarian NGOs, religious groups and civil society organisation. In 2003, more specifically, President Roh Moo-Hyun proclaimed the succession of engagement policy promoting inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Under this favourable political environment in 2003 and 2004, the number of humanitarian NGOs gradually increased. The humanitarian NGOs that were designated to maintain the bilateral
channel with North Korea increased to 31 in 2003 and 33 in 2004. The membership of the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (NCCK) also gradually increased to 31 in 2003 and to 39 in 2004.\textsuperscript{177} Then, in 2005, the number of humanitarian NGOs that maintained the bilateral channel with North Korea significantly increased from 33 in 2004 to 54 in 2005, 65 in 2006 and 77 in 2007. The membership of NCCK also continued to increase from 42 in 2005, to 51 in 2006 and 58 in 2007.\textsuperscript{178} Such a radical increase of humanitarian NGOs during these three years was attributable to the government policy change in 2005 that relaxed the qualification of NGOs for the bilateral humanitarian food aid to North Korea.\textsuperscript{179} The increase in NGOs was also possible as the religious and civil society organisations that terminated their delivery of assistance to North Korea after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, resumed their activities under favourable government policy.

Although the existing literature shows only the quantitative increase of South Korean humanitarian NGOs between 1995 and 2007, the South Korean humanitarian NGOs developed into a significant political actor demanding that the South Korean government change its food aid policy towards North Korea.

\subsection*{2.6.3 The Rationale for Selecting the Korean Sharing Movement and Good Friends}

To increase the reliability of argument in this thesis, it is necessary to examine the overall influence of humanitarian NGOs that participated in the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007. It is, however, impossible to examine the entire humanitarian NGO advocacy due to the limitation of
the study. The overall number of NGOs that participated in the advocacy and the
delivery of humanitarian food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007 was also over
112. Among them, the humanitarian NGOs that were designated by the government
to maintain the bilateral channel with North Korea increased from 9 organisations in
1999 to 77 in 2007. It is therefore difficult to examine the entire South Korean
humanitarian NGOs in this thesis.

The thesis instead selects the most influential South Korean humanitarian NGOs,
the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) and Good Friends, in respect of the advocacy of
humanitarian food aid to North Korea during the given period of 1995 to 2007. Some
relief NGOs such as World Vision Korea, Good Neighbours and KFHI had expertise in
humanitarian assistance and these relief NGOs engaged in the delivery of large scale
humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea from the beginning of the
food crisis in North Korea in 1995. These relief NGOs, however, mainly focused on
acquiring assistance materials through fundraising rather than on the advocacy
movement that targets the government and public. It is because these relief NGOs were
prone to place more emphasis on the achievement of organisational interests, to save as
many lives, by maximising the acquisition and delivery of humanitarian assistance to
the targeted recipients.

The KSM and Good Friends delivered direct humanitarian and development
assistance to North Korea too. The scale of this, however, was insignificant compared to
that of relief NGOs. Instead, the KSM and Good Friends played a key role in steering
the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea urging the South Korean
government and civil society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North
Korea. The KSM started it work as a consultative body linking differing social groups,
such as the South Korean humanitarian NGOs, six religious groups, civil society organisations, politicians, congressmen and women and state elders. Based on its networks, the KSM played a steering role in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007, exerting direct and indirect influence on the entire South Korean society. Good Friends’ organisational scale and capacity was not as significant as that of the KSM throughout the entire period of advocacy. Good Friends was a Buddhist organisation. In addition, in the later stages of the advocacy movement, Good Friends changed its organisational mandate from the advocacy of food aid to North Korea to a human rights movement for North Korean defectors. Nonetheless, Good Friends’ commitment to the field research on the North Korean famine and the dissemination of these on-going data contributed to the increase in public awareness of the humanitarian crisis in North Korea and thereby made the norms of brotherly love and humanitarianism resonate with South Korean civil society. Such norm grafting in South Korean civil society and government was consequential in the explanation of the changes in state food aid policy making towards North Korea.

In summary, the KSM which maintained a broad network with other humanitarian and civil society organisations was the most influential humanitarian NGO in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea from 1995 to 2007. Good Friends was also one of the pioneering NGOs regarding the increase in public awareness of the humanitarian crisis in North Korea and thereby made the government policy makers and South Korean civil society recognise the severity of the humanitarian crisis and support the norms of brotherly love and humanitarianism for food aid to North Korea. In this sense, the KSM and Good Friends were selected as the case studies to demonstrate the main argument of this thesis.
Despite the significant and representative role of the KSM and Good Friends in the aspect of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea from 1995 to 2007, the ability to generalise the key argument of this thesis (that the South Korean humanitarian NGOs were consequential in the explanation of the changes in state food aid policy making towards North Korea) is still limited as only two case studies were carried out. It is, however, difficult to examine the role of all the South Korean humanitarian NGOs in South Korean government food aid policy making due to the limitation of space in this thesis. To overcome this methodological constraint, the thesis focuses on the networks that the KSM and Good Friends maintained with other humanitarian and civil society organisations between 1995 and 2007. The thesis endeavours to examine the overall networks which the KSM and Good Friends had established with other humanitarian and civil society organisations. It further examines how the KSM and Good Friends exploited these networks in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. By examining how they exploited the networks to maximise their political influence on South Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea, this thesis therefore seeks to consider the role of all South Korean humanitarian NGOs during the advocacy of food aid from 1995 to 2007. In doing so, the thesis overcomes the methodological weakness which comes from focusing on just two case studies, those of the KSM and Good Friends.

2.6.4 Application of the Analytical Framework
This section outlines how the analytical framework above is applied into the analysis of KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid policy making. This section first shows how to examine the operational environment which circumscribed or catalysed the influence of KSM and Good Friends advocacy in South Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea. It more specifically outlines how to capture the issue characteristics of the food crisis in North Korea between 1995 and 2007. The section next outlines how to examine the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea and then provides the methodology used to trace changes in KSM and Good Friends organisational capabilities through the examination of mandates, funding capacities and expertise. After the identification of the operational environment, this section provides the methodology used to trace the influence of KSM and Good Friends advocacy in the South Korean government food aid policy towards North Korea through the examination of the stages of agenda setting, networking, grafting and institutionalisation.

2.6.4.1 The Operational Environment

This section outlines the methodology used to examine the operational environment which circumscribes or catalyses the influence of KSM and Good Friends advocacy in the South Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea. The operational environment consists of the issue characteristics of the North Korean food crisis, the domestic political structure and the organisational capability.
The Issue Characteristics

The severity of the North Korean food crisis first circumscribes or catalyses the influence of the KSM and Good Friends advocacy movement in relation to the South Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea. By examining the changing conditions in the North Korean food crisis over time, the thesis identifies the issue characteristics. For this, it examines domestic cereal production, Public Distribution System (PDS) data and the amount of overall cereal production including commercial import capacity and concessional imports. In addition, this thesis uses nutritional indicators and mortality rates to show the humanitarian impact of the North Korean food crisis.

The Domestic Political Structure

To understand the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making, the thesis examines the overall procedures of government food aid decision making, the institutions of policy networks linking the states and NGOs, the degree of government accommodation to humanitarianism and humanitarian institutions and the diplomatic relationship between South Korea and North Korea. It first evaluates the overall procedures of South Korean government food aid decision making. It aims to identify the extent of the concentration of executive power and the relationship between the executive and the legislative bodies in relation to South Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea. Secondly, the thesis
examines the structure of policy networks linking the South Korean government and NGOs. For this, it considers the intermediate organisations between the state and NGOs and the characteristics of the consensus-making process between the state and civil society. Thirdly, the thesis examines the South Korean governments’ normative identities to evaluate the degree of accommodation of each state to humanitarian principles and humanitarian institutions. It explores South Korean governments’ domestic and international goals and values in relation to humanitarianism and their embeddedness in international humanitarian institutions. For this, it examines the treaties and covenants that the state ratifies and implements, international organisation membership and to what extent policies and practices of the South Korean government comply with the tenets of ratified covenants. Lastly, the thesis examines the diplomatic relationship between South Korea and North Korea. It considers the political affairs and military provocations which affect their diplomatic relationship. It particularly examines each administration’s official policy towards North Korea between 1995 and 2007. The three consecutive presidential administrations which are under the consideration of this thesis are as follows: Kim Young-Sam (1995 to 1997), Kim Dae-Jung (1998 to 2002) and Roh Moo-Hyun (2003 to 2007).

*Non-governmental Organisations’ Organisational Capability*

The thesis examines the actor characteristics of the KSM and Good Friends in terms of mandates, funding capacity and expertise. In terms of organisational mandates, it analyses anniversary reports and white papers published by the KSM and Good Friends.
Anniversary reports and white papers\textsuperscript{182} of these NGOs provide the rules and regulations that stipulate the organisational mandates. They also include overall information on the activities of the KSM. Through the examination of their activities it is possible to identify the actual mandate of the KSM too. For the analysis of funding capacities, the thesis examines how NGOs raise funds and to what extent those NGOs depend on government funding, private funding, public donation or other types of funding. For this, it analyses the accounting reports issued by humanitarian NGOs and Unification White Papers showing government funding for humanitarian NGOs. Lastly, with regard to the analysis of organisational expertise, it evaluates organisational structure and human resource management, such as recruitment style and staff capacity. NGO expertise in exploiting tactics to make the advocacy movement effective will be examined in each substantive study of the KSM and Good Friends.

\textit{2.6.4.2 Non-governmental Organisation Advocacy Movement}

This section shows how the analytical framework outlined earlier is applied to a study demonstrating the relationship between KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea and changes in South Korean government food aid policy making. As shown in the section of the theoretical framework, the NGO advocacy movement generally goes through an agenda setting, networking, grafting and institutionalisation process. This section first shows how to examine agenda setting, networking and grafting by the KSM and Good Friends. The section then will outline how to examine
changes in the different stages of agenda setting, discursive position, institution and policy.

**Agenda Setting**

This section provides the methodology used to examine how the KSM and Good Friends attempted to set the agenda on North Korean food aid. The thesis assesses KSM and Good Friends capabilities to disseminate new facts and to frame and symbolise information and events in a timely and effective manner. It shows how the KSM and Good Friends attempted to frame issues persuasively as short and clear causal stories. These stories attempted to identify the cause of problem, the responsible party and to offer credible solutions. The thesis assesses KSM and Good Friends capabilities to frame their perspective on North Korea through internationally accepted norms. It also assesses how NGOs attempted to frame the issue into that which focused on bodily harm to vulnerable and innocent people. It lastly evaluates KSM and Good Friends capabilities to develop symbolic strategy such that the respective NGO perspective resonated with the public and the state.

**Networking**

The thesis assesses the networking capacity of the NGOs under consideration in this thesis. It examines what the KSM and Good Friends have done to build inter-
organisational networks, how these networks were established and what role these networks played in the effort to influence South Korean food aid policy making towards North Korea. It examines who the NGO networks were targeting in order to enhance their networking in terms of recruitment of volunteers, staff and activists and the targeted public. It further examines how the KSM and Good Friends attempted to link their goals with those of transnational networks and international institutions. It also assesses to what extent these transnational networks contributed to enhancing NGOs’ legitimacy and effectiveness through the provision of expertise and material resources. The thesis also examines NGO qualitative networking. Qualitative networking is the recruitment of technicians and experts, bureaucrats, political elites and leaders, journalists and reporters. In so doing it will assesses the organisational ability to build various levels of networks, the number of networks and members within the networks as well as the relationships between members and between networks.

**Grafting**

The thesis assesses how the KSM and Good Friends were able to graft norms onto South Korean government food aid policy towards North Korea. It starts by identifying dominant norms and ideas behind the public and the state in respect of food aid to North Korea. It focuses on the specific strategies exploited by NGOs to try to persuade the public and the state to adopt new norms in relation to this area. It next shows how new norms and ideas introduced and promoted by the KSM and Good Friends competed
with existing norms and ideas. In order to trace the ‘grafting’ process, the thesis mainly relies on tracing changes in public opinion polls in respect of food aid to North Korea.

**Institutionalisation**

The state’s institutionalisation of new norms provides the most convincing test as to whether and to what extent norms and ideas have been selected and grafted onto the policy process. The South Korean food aid policy process to North Korea can be understood through the prism of the state’s political agenda, discursive position, institution building and policy change in its food aid policy towards North Korea. If norms and ideas introduced by NGOs become adopted as part of the state’s own agenda and are internalised into the state’s discursive positions and institutions, it is fair to judge that NGOs have been successful in encouraging the grafting of new norms into state policy. This is not to say that NGO activity provides the only explanation of changes in South Korean food aid policy towards North Korea which is why each case study will examine carefully the linkages between NGO and state policy so as to attempt to determine the extent of NGO influence. The analysis of individual NGO activity will therefore be founded on a detailed empirical charting of the relations between the respective humanitarian NGOs so as to assess the extent of the contribution of NGOs to the institutionalisation of changing norms in South Korean food aid policy towards North Korea.

To identify state agenda change this thesis consults the official pronouncements of South Korean governments. Governmental sources include reports from
Congressional hearings. These sources also include policy conferences and seminars convened by the executive and legislative branches of government in South Korea. The thesis also uses as sources policy conferences or seminars convened by government sponsored policy institutes. It uses document research and elite interviews. Major interviewees will be researchers from bureaucrats in the Ministry of Unification dealing with food aid decision making towards North Korea.

In assessing changes in the South Korean discursive position in respect of food aid to North Korea, the thesis examines the official pronouncements written or spoken by government, political elites and highly positioned bureaucrats. For this, it draws on South Korean newspapers and internet sources since the media, especially key newspapers, provides details of changes made by government or key policymakers at that time.

Changes in state institutional procedures signify substantial incorporation of norms and ideas introduced by NGOs into state policy making. The thesis examines changes in the institutions and procedures of the South Korean government food aid policy making process. It traces the establishment or abolition of relevant institutions or procedures in respect of food aid policy making within the executive and legislative bodies. It also examines how these institutions or procedures worked in practice; more specifically, whether they were strengthened or weakened. It finally investigates whether such new institutions were stable and effective to incorporate the demands of NGOs into the state policy change.

To identify whether new norms and ideas finally induced the state to change their policy and practice, the thesis examines whether the state adopted new policies and if so, whether they complied with the tenets that NGOs attempted to advocate and how
such new policies were implemented in practice. It also examines whether such new policies were accompanied by the establishment of relevant enforcement institutions or implementing ordinances that made the state adhere to their policy commitment consistently. By doing so, it identifies whether the state lived up to its claims or just attempted to divert the demands of NGOs. Such examination allows the identification of where the state was positioned between the stage of ‘policy change’ and the stage of ‘rule-consistent behaviour.’

2.7 Overcoming Biases: Securitisation Paradigm, Experience-oriented Bias and Scientific Reliability

Potential problems regarding the methodology of this thesis need to be raised: the securitisation paradigm, the suspicion of the author’s favourable attitude towards NGOs and the scientific reliability of the argument.

Firstly, much of the scholarship on North Korea is handicapped by its commitment to what Hazel Smith has termed the securitisation paradigm.¹⁸³ This tendency comes from a lack of reliable sources. One result is the absence of tremendous scientific underpinning to much of the literature on North Korea and humanitarian aid to North Korea. Every secondary and tertiary source, as well as the primary sources, therefore, is scrupulously checked and cross-checked in this thesis.

With regard to collecting primary and secondary sources and arranging interviews, the author has work experience as an NGO activist in South Korea. Since 2003, the author has developed a personal network with government officials and NGOs in South Korea throughout the preparation of the research proposal for this thesis and
previous research projects. As regards interviewing, the author drew on interviewees who are relatively easy to access, as leverage to then access other interviewees whom it is more difficult to contact, for example high-ranking policy makers and officials in the South Korean government and the NGOs. The author’s NGO-friendly attitude and personal experience as a former NGO staff member, however, might result in a value-added outcome in the analysis. To remove this bias, the author endeavoured to maintain an analytical and scholarly perspective in the analysis of the given research topic. Such perspective enabled the author to demonstrate the political of the South Korean humanitarian NGOs in state food aid policy making. This scientific perspective also allowed the author to conclude that the humanitarian NGOs’ heavy reliance on government funding and their divergence from their organisational mandate resulted in the weakening of their advocacy of food aid to North Korea by jeopardising NGO independence and neutrality. This conclusion is enough to have a negative impact on the author’s personal relationship with the South Korean humanitarian NGOs which were deeply engaged in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea from 1995 to 2007.

This thesis demonstrated that the South Korean humanitarian NGOs were consequential in explaining changes in state food aid policy making. Given the limitations of space, this thesis examined the role of humanitarian NGOs through the case studies of two major humanitarian NGOs, the KSM and Good Friends, so as to demonstrate the argument of the thesis. Each NGO, however, has unique organisational capability and networks, which shape differing influence on state policy making. The influence of humanitarian NGOs in state food aid policy making therefore should be understood further as a whole, not as the outcome of individual NGO advocacy. In this sense, this thesis has an intrinsic limitation in the methodology of the thesis. To solve
this limitation, the thesis presented the rationale for the NGO selection in section 2.6.1 above. By choosing two humanitarian NGOs which were heavily involved, and played a steering role, in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007, the thesis endeavoured to enhance the scientific reliability of the argument. Nonetheless, this thesis recognises the fact that it might be possible to increase the reliability of the argument by increasing the number of case studies of humanitarian NGOs and their networks.


7 Ibid.


9 Ibid.


12 Stromquist, "NGOs in a new paradigm of civil society." pp. 31-76.; Willetts, "What is a Non-governmental Organization?"

13 Ibid.


16 Willetts, "What is a Non-governmental Organization?" (no page numbers).; Stromquist, *NGOs in a new paradigm of civil society*. pp. 31-76.


30 Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker, NGOs, the UN and global governance. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996.

31 Willetts, What is a Non-governmental Organization? (no page numbers).

32 UNICEF/WFP/EU, "Nutrition Survey of the Democratic People’s Republic of


35 ‘Import requirement’ as a concept used in “FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENT MISSION” consists of commercial import, concessional import, emergency food aid which is already delivered or pledged, and uncovered deficit. FAO/WFP, Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment.


41 Ibid.

85
42 Ibid.
47 WFP, "Food Aid Deliveries by Recipient Country in 1996-2006."
53 Schloms, North Korea and the timeless dilemma of aid: A study of humanitarian


57 Ibid.

58 Schloms, North Korea and the timeless dilemma of aid: A study of humanitarian action in famines.


64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.


70 Ibid.


72 Ibid.

73 Barrett, *Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting its Role.* pp. 128-132.


Ibid.


Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International norm dynamics and political

82 Ibid.


86 Ibid.

87 Finnemore, International norm dynamics and political change. pp. 887-917.

88 Ibid.


90 Finnemore, International norm dynamics and political change. pp. 887-917.


92 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Constructivism and Foreign policy." In: Steve Smith, Amelia

93 Checkel, *Constructivism and Foreign policy*. pp. 71-82.


101 Barrett, *Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting its Role*. pp. 98-104.


109 Ibid.

Advocacy networks in international politics.


112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.


119 Risse-Kappen, Bringing transnational relations back in: Non-state actors, domestic structures and international institutions. pp. 3-30.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid.


293-312.

Ibid.


Willetts, *What is a Non-governmental Organization?*


5–8 April.


142 Charnovitz, *Two centuries of participation: NGOs and international governance.* ; Ku, "The Developing Role of Non-governmental Organizations in Global Policy and Law Making."; Shaw, *Civil society and global politics: Beyond a social movements approach.*


The concepts of *information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics* are drawn from Keck and Sikkink (1998), but the concept of “networking” is adopted from Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995).


Stone, "*Causal stories and the formation of policy agendas.*" pp. 281-300.


Mario Diani and Doung McAdam, *Social movements and networks: relational


157 Finnemore, "International norm dynamics and political change." pp. 887-917.


160 Finnemore, "International norm dynamics and political change." pp. 887-917.


162 Finnemore, "International norm dynamics and political change." pp. 887-917.


164 Kratochwil, "Rules, norms, and decisions: on the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs." pp. 21-44.


168 Keck and Sikkink use “state behaviour” with the same meaning as “rule-consistent behaviour” adopted by Risse and Sikkink. Here, the thesis uses “rule-consistent behaviour” as this expression conveys a clearer meaning.


170 Ibid.


172 Ibid.


National Alliance for Democracy & Unification of Korea (NADRK), as one of the NGO alliance which led a democratisation movement in the South Korean civil society, consists of 27 progressive NGOs: 14 NGOs including the Council for National Labour Union, the National Confederation of Farmers Association, and the Council for National University Student Representatives; and 13 regional NGOs in Seoul, Pusan and Gwangju.; Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU) is a network for women’s rights.


Jong-Moo Lee, "Daebuk Indojiwon Sistemeui Banjeon Bangan Yeongu [English

177 National Archives of Korea, "NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea." (no page numbers).


179 National Archives of Korea, "NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea." (no page numbers).


CHAPTER 3. THE NORTH KOREAN FOOD CRISIS AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT FOOD AID DECISION MAKING TOWARDS NORTH KOREA

3.1 Introduction

This chapter demonstrates an assumption of this thesis. It demonstrates the underlying assumption that the issue characteristics of the North Korean food crisis and the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making changed over time, shaping differing operational environments in which South Korean humanitarian non-governmental organisations worked.

The first section demonstrates how and why the North Korean food crisis changed between 1995 and 2007 through the examination of food demand and supply analysis, nutritional indicators and famine deaths. As shown in the theoretical framework of Chapter 2 the issue characteristics of the operational environment circumscribe or catalyse non-governmental organisation (NGO) influence on state policy making. This chapter first identifies the issue-specific characteristics of the North Korean food crisis. It demonstrates that the severity of the crisis changed over time, going through three different stages: ‘a famine phase’ between 1995 and 1999, ‘a transition phase from an acute famine to a chronic food deficit’ between 1999 and 2001 and ‘a chronic food deficit phase’ between 2001 and 2007. How the issue characteristics of the North Korean food crisis circumscribed or catalysed the influence of the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) and Good Friends advocacy movement on state food aid
policy making is examined in Part Three: The Advocacy Movement of the Korean Sharing Movement and Good Friends.

The second section demonstrates how and why the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making changed, thus allowing for the promotion of NGO advocacy and a political role in state policy making. This section demonstrates that the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making became more transparent and democratic, establishing standard operating procedures (SOP) for state food aid policy making. Such changes increased the degree of state accommodation to NGO advocacy in state policy making. Secondly, this section demonstrates that the South Korean government gradually developed policy networks linking the state and NGOs and thereby these administrations came to have a political structure which was more sensitive to NGO advocacy. Thirdly, this section demonstrates that the level of government accommodation to humanitarian norms and international institutions advocating these norms gradually increased in the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations. Lastly, it demonstrates that the hostile inter-Korean relations improved, achieving political rapprochement.

3.2 The Phases of the North Korean Food Crisis

The severity of the North Korean food crisis is one of the factors which shaped the operational environment in which the South Korean NGOs operated. The changes in the severity of the food crisis circumscribed or catalysed the influence of humanitarian NGO advocacy in relation to state food aid policy making towards North Korea. This section therefore identifies three stages of the North Korean food crisis based on cereal
productions, the Public Distribution System (PDS ration) data, nutritional indicators and famine deaths in North Korea. The continued decline in cereal production and PDS rations led to a ‘famine’ between 1995 and 1999. In this first phase, the acute food crisis resulted in many deaths from starvation and malnutrition-related disease. The second phase from 1999 to 2001 was ‘a transition phase from an acute famine to a chronic food deficit.’ After the severe cereal production decline which had started in the late 1980s, two relatively stable cereal production years in 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 (October/November) appeared to produce a moderate recovery in food supply. The 1998/1999 marketing year here is a threshold point between famine and chronic food deficit. The cereal production in the 2000/2001 marketing year, however, had slumped again due to the combination of drought in 2000 and the cumulative effect of underlying problems. The third phase from 2001 to 2007 was ‘a chronic food deficit.’ In this phase, the cereal production and the PDS rations continued to improve but still remained a chronic food deficit, failing to reach minimum domestic needs.

To demonstrate the assumption of this thesis above, this chapter uses sources from international aid and development organisations, such as the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), individual scholars and NGO reports. The main reason that this thesis relies on these sources is that much of the literature on North Korean studies is scientifically problematic due to the lack of information on North Korea and the securitised perspective often used to understand and explain North Korean domestic and international politics.¹ Since the Korean War in 1953, North Korea has treated all social data as state secrets. North Korea deliberately attempted to insulate itself from the
outside world by preventing the international community from getting access to sources of information other than governmental and party-controlled output.

In addition, under the ideological and political confrontations since the Korean War in 1953, North Korea was viewed by South Korea as presenting an ever-present threat of war. It led to heavy commitments on a normative assumption that all tensions on the Korean peninsula came from the domestic and foreign politics of North Korea. This normative assumption is characterised by terms such as ‘bad’, ‘mad’ and ‘rogue state’ which are often used to describe North Korea. Since the food crisis in the early 1990s, North Korea’s continuation of a nuclear armament programme and long-range missile plans had further heightened its image as a ‘bad’ country. From the securitised perspective which was heavily committed to by this normative assumption, the food shortages were viewed without scientific scrutiny as a direct consequence of the militarisation of North Korea and the failure of its economic policy. To increase scientific reliability and scrutiny of sources, therefore, this chapter uses sources, mainly from international aid and development organisations, through cross-checks with other sources wherever possible.

This chapter mainly uses the data of cereal production and utilisation and the PDS ration. With regard to the nutritional indicator, UNICEF and the WFP in collaboration with the North Korean government conducted three nutrition surveys in order to assess the nutritional status of children in 1998, 2002 and 2004. With regard to the data on nutritional status for 2000, the chapter examines an independent Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) conducted by the North Korean government. Although these three surveys did not assess the nutritional status of the total population or the famine mortality, these surveys were considered the only scientific and reliable
references that allowed the international community to grasp the magnitude of the North Korean food crisis.

3.2.1 The Famine Phase from 1995 to 1999

Between 1995/1996 and 1998/1999 (marketing year: November/October), cereal production and PDS rations continued to decline and reached their lowest production and ration levels. During this period, the famine resulted in many deaths from starvation and malnutrition-related disease.

Since the late 1980s, North Korea continued to experience economic difficulties due to unfavourable changes in trade with its traditional partners. In the absence of significant external trade and assistance, North Korea’s domestic food production based on heavily intensive inputs of chemicals, machinery and irrigation began to collapse. The precarious foreign exchange situation at the time did not allow significant commercial food imports. A series of consecutive natural disasters, such as extremely cold weather in 1994, the two successive years of floods in 1995 and 1996 and prolonged drought in 1997, also affected agriculture with varying degrees of severity, with consequent adverse impacts on food production. These natural disasters made an already and rapidly deteriorating food supply situation much worse, weakening cereal production, the irrigation network, transport, property and the energy supply system. All these economic and natural constraints resulted in the continued decline of food production to far below minimum food requirements until the 1997/1998 marketing year.
Given the lack of reliable data from 1995 to 2004, the FAO/WFP in collaboration with the North Korean government provided relatively reliable data on North Korean cereal production through the ‘crop and food supply assessment missions.’ Figure 3.1 shows that cereal production was recorded at 4.077 million tonnes in 1995/1996 and fell to 2.837 million tonnes in 1996/1997. In 1997/1998, North Korean
cereal production recorded the worst level at only 2.663 million tonnes, which represented only 57.7 per cent of the minimum cereal requirement (‘Total Utilisation’). During the same period, the FAO/WFP estimated the capacity of North Korea commercial food imports as 0.7, 0.5 and 0.7 million tonnes each year. In spite of these commercial imports, North Korea was far below the average minimum cereal requirements of 5 million tonnes to feed the population. The uncovered food deficits remained in excess of 1.2 million tonnes from 1995/1996 to 1997/1998.

In North Korea, the PDS ration is another essential indicator that shows the severity of food security. The North Korean government divides the population into two broad categories in terms of food allocations: cooperative farmers and workers. The cooperative farmers constitute about 30 per cent of the total average population of 23 million, which represents seven million people. 12 Another 70 per cent, which are workers including officials, factory and state farm workers, and their families, about 16 million people, depend on the PDS for their supply of staple cereals. 13 As the North Korean government could not afford the existing PDS rations with the food production decline, they made adjustments to the PDS rations.

The lack of reliable data on the PDS rationing, however, constrains understanding of since when, from where and how the adjustment of PDS rations had occurred. International agencies, such as the WFP and FAO, and observers, such as Hazel Smith and Jon Bennett, regarded the PDS as a guarantee for an equitable distribution system across the whole population. They noted that food rations had been equitably allocated to workers and their families according to the PDS based on occupational status and age. As the government did not have access to sufficient food stocks to supply the PDS between 1994 and 1999, however, some counties had no food
to allocate at all in some months. From the late 1990s, Hazel Smith argues, the PDS evolved as an equitable supplier of last resort rations, adopting a notional common ‘flat-rate’ minimal ration of around 300 grams per day to those sectors of the population who were deemed most in need at any particular time.\textsuperscript{14}

For others, mainly François Jean, Andrew Natsios, Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, and Kwangmin Chung, the PDS was the opposite of an equitable distribution mechanism. These observers, who commonly adopted the Food Entitlement Decline (FED) approach and used refugee interviews as their main sources of argument,\textsuperscript{15} note that the central authorities responded to the breakdown of the PDS by the inequitable distribution of scarce food mainly according to rank and the triage of the north-eastern provinces. Amongst them, Andrew Natsios argued that in the north-eastern provinces food distribution became intermittent between 1992 and 1994 and at last stopped during the summer of 1994, though two to three days’ worth of rations were still distributed six times a year on national holidays.\textsuperscript{16} In 1994, he underlined, the central authorities coped with the sharp decline in food availability by shutting down any food shipments from other regions to the four north-eastern provinces (North Hamgyong, South Hamgyong, Ranggang, and Kangwon).\textsuperscript{17} These arguments were based on refugee interviews, so they received criticisms in terms of source reliability. These analyses nonetheless show that at least the famine had already begun in these north-eastern provinces by 1994.

Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland instead reviewed the data on the PDS rationing provided by North Korean authorities to the WFP and FAO assessment teams since the autumn of 1995.\textsuperscript{18} Figure 3.2, generated by Haggard and Noland, is broadly consistent with that generated by the refugee interviews. Figure 3.2 shows that the
Figure 3.2 Estimates of Daily per Capita Public Distribution System (PDS) Rations

Note: Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland generated this data based on the review of various reports provided by the North Korean authorities to the WFP and FAO assessment teams since the autumn of 1995. They note that in most cases averages were taken directly from WFP/FAO publications; Farm ration of 1997/98 was not available; Based on the FAO/WFP data, it revised a figure of 2003/04 from 300g to 305g.


average PDS rations, which already fell below the minimum human need of 457 grams per day before 1995, fell steadily to 196 grams until the end of 1999. PDS rations between November 1998 and October 1999, as Figure 3.2 shows, recorded the peak famine period while the food production began to revive at the end of 1998. It appears that the severely depleted PDS rations could not be resuscitated by only a year-round revival of food production.

During this phase of the famine, farmers and their families had better access to
food. Farmers received a share of the sale proceeds of the cooperative farm, proportionate to each member’s working days during the year. These amounts varied across the country as not all farms are able to produce equal quantities in excess of their members’ allocations. The amount also could be substantially lower than the workers’ salaries. Farmers and their households, nonetheless, were still better off than PDS-dependent workers and their families in terms of access to food, as their cereal rations were substantially higher. In addition, most cooperative farm households had kitchen gardens or sloping land. This enabled them to produce food for their own consumption as well as for sale in the consumer markets. They also had more livestock and small animals than urban populations.

During this phase of famine evolution and the peak period between 1994 and 1998/1999, the North Korean government attempted to deal with the food crisis by adopting some reform policies. Initially, after massive floods in 1995, the North Korean government, which had emphasised the ideology of self-reliance in the economy, appealed to the international community for assistance. International humanitarian and development agencies, such as the WFP, UNDP, FAO, and UNICEF, bilateral agencies such as the European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection (ECHO), and NGOs responded to the crisis through the provision of large-scale assistance.

Secondly, in 1996 the North Korean central authorities made a breakthrough decision to deal with the food deficits by decentralising authority for feeding the population from national bureaucracies in Pyongyang to county administrators. In January 1998, when the average daily per capita PDS rations continued to fall below the minimum daily human need of 457 grams, the North Korean government eventually announced through the government apparatus that each individual family was
henceforth responsible for feeding itself, rather than relying on the traditional public distribution as before the famine or on the county administrators since 1996.\textsuperscript{20}

Nutritional indicators are enough to identify the situation of the North Korean food deficit between 1995 and 1999 as a famine. In the WHO classification,\textsuperscript{21} stunting refers to a ‘low height-for-age’ that reflects a failure to reach linear growth potential as a result of long-term, cumulative inadequacies of health or nutrition. Stunting therefore is used as an indicator for ‘chronic malnutrition.’ Wasting refers to a ‘low weight-for-height,’ which indicates ‘acute malnutrition’ reflecting significant weight loss due to a recent and severe pathological process such as acute starvation and/or severe disease. Underweight lastly refers to ‘low weight-for-age,’ and it is an indicator of ‘general nutritional status.’ In 1998, the UNICEF, WFP, and the ECHO in collaboration with the North Korean government, conducted the first nutritional status assessment of 1,762 children from six months to seven years of age. The 1998 survey indicated that 62.3 per cent of all children surveyed suffered from chronic malnutrition which is referred to as ‘stunting,’ 15.6 per cent of them were acutely malnourished (wasting), and 60.6 per cent were underweight.\textsuperscript{22} These main findings put North Korea among the top 10 countries with the highest malnutrition rates in the world.\textsuperscript{23} The high figure of stunting, which reflects chronic malnutrition, at the same time indicated that widespread malnutrition must have affected a large population group, in particular children, for several years before the first nutrition survey was conducted in 1998.

3.2.2 The Phase of Transition from a Famine to a Chronic Food Deficit from 1999 to 2001
After the worst cereal production in 1998/1999, two relatively stable cereal production years in 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 appeared to indicate a moderate recovery in the cereal production and PDS rations. Cereal production in 2000/2001, however, again declined and recorded the worst level during the 11 years between 1995 and 2005. It was attributed to the combination of drought in 2000 and the cumulative effect of underlying problems. In this phase, although North Korea recovered slightly from the worst famine situation, North Korea entered into a chronic food deficit, far below the minimum human need level.

In 1998, the North Korean government and the international agencies promoted double crop production of wheat and barley and the production of potatoes in order to meet food requirements. From 1998/1999 to 1999/2000, a slight increase in rice and double crop production was attributed to the increased fertiliser input, and generally favourable irrigation, and the low onset of pest attacks. The volume of fertiliser in 1999 in particular was almost double compared with the amount in 1998 and it largely contributed to increasing the entire domestic cereal production.

Despite two relatively stable years in 1998/1999 and 1999/2000, the economic recession and the shortage of foreign exchange for the purchase of inputs and food continued to constrain agricultural production. While rice and potato production increased, the total amount of cereal production was offset by the reduction in maize output. The reduction was attributed to the decrease in arable land for maize production with the increased emphasis on potatoes and the restriction of maize cultivation on hill slopes to control degradation, as well as prolonged dry spells at critical stages in the crop cycle. The fertiliser use in 1999 and 2000 increased by almost double that in 1998, but supplies were still less than a third of needs. Given these constraints, the cereal
production in 2000/2001 again fell to 2.573 million tonnes, which was the worst cereal production during the 11 years between 1995 and 2005. This decline was due to the drought in 2000, at critical stages in the crop cycle, particularly planting. The lack of electricity and fuel with the economic recession and a chronic foreign exchange deficit hindered the operation of irrigation systems, resulting in lack of water in reservoirs and in arable fields at important periods during the crop season. As a result of these factors, there was a sizeable reduction in cereal production.

In the second period between 1998/1999 and 2001, cereal production levels indicate that North Korea entered a chronic food deficit phase. Even in the absence of major natural hazards, domestic food production remained well below minimum needs. In 1998/1999, domestic cereal production increased to 3.783 million tonnes but fell to 3.421 million tonnes in the following marketing year, 1999/2000. The uncovered cereal deficit in 1998/1999 recorded a level of 1.293 million tonnes, offsetting 0.3 million tonnes of estimated commercial import. With the same level of estimated commercial imports, domestic cereal production improvement narrowed this gap to 0.993 million tonnes in 1999/2000. A drought in 2000, however, again adversely affected cereal production. With an offsetting of 0.5 million tonnes of concessional imports from South Korea and 0.2 million tonnes of estimated commercial import, the uncovered cereal deficit in 2000/2001 reached 1.165 million tonnes.

Despite the revival of the domestic cereal production which began in 1998/1999, the PDS ration continued to fall to 196 grams in 1998/1999, which represented only 42 per cent of minimum human needs. In 1999/2000, average food distribution through the PDS increased to 271 grams, which meant an increase of 38 per cent from the worst PDS ration of 196 grams in 1998/1999. In the 2000/2001 marketing year, however,
cereal production decline caused by a drought in 2000 again led to a decrease in the PDS ration to 208 grams. With a little fluctuation in the PDS rations, it covered a small part of the individual's energy needs. This implied a higher rate of nutritional decline amongst the PDS dependants and their families. As indicated earlier, this meant that other coping strategies, such as purchasing food from markets, receiving food assistance from relatives in agricultural areas, rearing and selling small livestock, and activities to make foreign currency, increased in importance.

Farmers’ rations remained substantially higher than the PDS dependants and their families though the amount of farm rations varied. With the revival of cereal production beginning in the 1998/1999 marketing year, the farm rations continued to improve. Although the farm rations in 1998/1999 were below the minimum human need of 457 grams, they received an average post-harvest ration of 400 grams. Since then, during 1999/2000 and even though a cereal production decline in 2000/2001, the farm rations continued to increase and farmers received average post-harvest rations of 550 and 575 grams respectively, which were substantially higher than the minimum human need of 457 grams. The farmers in addition benefited from the supplementary food coming from the double crops of cereals and potatoes started in 1998 and the opportunity to grow food on family plots.

In 1999, the North Korean government took positive steps to optimise the domestic food production. These measures included: (i) prioritising food production in development planning and the allocation of resources, especially energy; (ii) introducing greater crop diversification to reduce the adverse effects of mono cropping of cereal; (iii) development of new rice varieties considered more fertiliser responsive; (iv) developing the use of microbial fertilisers to reduce dependence on chemical
fertilisers; and (vi) encouraging rearing of small livestock.\textsuperscript{44} In particular, the North Korean government collaborated closely with international agencies in developing and implementing appropriate strategies to enhance food production and reduce environmental damage. Through the Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection (AREP) plan which began in 1998, North Korea and the UNDP supported agricultural policy changes that put emphasis on double cropping, an introduction of potatoes as a staple crop, reorganisation of farm-working practices, and, more discreetly, the eventual acceptance of farmers’ markets as legitimate arenas for price-setting and distribution.\textsuperscript{45} These efforts combined with inputs from international assistance, in particular fertiliser assistance mainly from South Korea from 1999, contributed to increases in cereal production despite few signs of a resuscitation of the wider economy.\textsuperscript{46}

Lastly, during this period of transition between 1999 and 2001 the nutritional indicators showed that the severity of the North Korean food crisis became relieved, but it was still a desperate situation. After the 1998 survey, cereal production increased from 1999 and international humanitarian assistance improved the PDS rations in North Korea. In 2000, the North Korean government conducted an independent Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) without foreign participation.\textsuperscript{47} Although there was a controversy over the reliability of the survey,\textsuperscript{48} the WFP and UNICEF used the 2000 survey results citing that the results of the 2002 survey were consistent with the improvement observed by the 2000 survey.\textsuperscript{49} According to the 2000 survey, the overall nutritional status of children improved compared to the figures of the 1998 survey. The prevalence of stunting in 2000 fell from 62.3 per cent to 45.2 per cent and wasting fell from 15.6 per cent to 10.4 per cent. The percentage of underweight children fell from
60.6 per cent to 27.9 per cent. These figures show that North Korea began to get out of a famine phase, before entering the stage of a chronic food deficit which has continued since 2001.\textsuperscript{50}

3.2.3 The Phase of a Chronic Food Deficit from 2001 to 2007

From 2001 to August 2005 when the North Korean government proclaimed its decision to halt international humanitarian assistance, cereal production and PDS ration levels continued to improve. North Korea, however, still remained in a chronic food deficit, failing to achieve the minimum human needs in domestic cereal production.

Since 2001, North Korea continued its recovery in agricultural production. The production increase in 2001/2002 was attributed to more favourable weather.\textsuperscript{51} It also included a relatively low incidence of crop pests and diseases, improved irrigation facilities in the main cereal region of the country with the completion of the Kechan-Taesong Lake canal funded by OPEC, improved availability of electricity for irrigation pumping stations and enhanced mechanisation resulting from greater availability of fuel and spare parts.\textsuperscript{52} Farmers and international agencies in particular cited that the increased cereal production was attributable to the application of fertiliser provided through the international assistance.

The cereal production for 2001/2002 was at 3.657 million tonnes, which was a 42 per cent increase over the 2000/2001 production level of 2.573 million tonnes.\textsuperscript{53} During the three consecutive years since 2001/2002, cereal production gradually increased. Cereal production in 2002/2003 and 2003/2004, including garden and slope
production, went up to 3.969 and 4.079 million tonnes. The cereal production in 2004/05 was forecasted at 4.235 million tonnes, the best harvest over the last ten years since 1995 when the international agencies began to engage in North Korean humanitarian operations. In the 2001/2002 marketing year, the uncovered food deficit remained in excess of 1 million tonnes, around 1.201 million tonnes. Since then, continued improvement in cereal production, commercial imports estimated at 0.1 million tonnes, and the anticipated concessional imports at 0.3 million tonnes each marketing year from 2002/2003 to 2004/2005 contributed to the improvement in total food production. The uncovered food deficits of these three consecutive marketing years were as a result narrowed to 0.684, 0.544 and 0.492 million tonnes. Despite these consecutive improvements, however, domestic production still fell below minimum cereal needs and thus the country had to depend on the external assistance.

The more favourable harvest situation has had a positive overall effect on household food security, but as in previous years the PDS allocation of basic cereals fell far short of the all-time goal of 575 grams per person per day. For the urban population, increased domestic production and the concessional loan of 0.3 million tonnes of rice that the country received from South Korea have allowed the North Korean government to increase PDS rations to an average of 300 grams per person per day since the marketing year 2001/2002. This was 48 per cent higher than in the previous year. North Korea’s plan for the 2002/2003 marketing year was 270 grams, but the actual average was 319 grams, 18 per cent more than anticipated. During 2003/2004 and 2004/2005, the average actual allocation through the PDS was about 305 grams and 300 grams, which provides only half of a person’s daily energy needs. During the same period, the North Korean government increased farmers’ daily rations to 600 grams.
While the PDS rations were on the whole more favourable, they still provided less than 50 per cent of the minimum human need. The WFP Mission was concerned at the continuing significant urban/rural inequalities in access to food, the worst affected being urban populations in general. There was also clear regional disparity, which gives cause for concern. The predominantly industrial areas of the north and north-east remained the hardest hit in terms of food security. Situated in relatively infertile land, they had at the same time less produce available on the markets and less scope for successful kitchen garden cultivation. In an attempt to feed their families, desperate urban families in these regions walked long distances to mountain areas where they had found small plots to cultivate. For them, the other sources of food outside of the PDS were insufficient to make up the individual and family food deficit, particularly in the winter and spring months when commodities are scarce in urban markets. Vulnerable groups within the population as a whole, such as children, pregnant and lactating women and the elderly, were still far away from food security. The poorest groups thus continued to rely on wild foods, such as edible mountain grasses that might have a negative impact on the digestive system, particularly for children.

In July 2002, the North Korean government announced substantial increases in wages, prices and the currency exchange rate from previously highly subsidised or artificially low levels. The rice and maize prices in the public distribution centres were raised to 46 won and 24 won/per/kg, respectively, compared to about 0.9 and 0.7 won/kg before July 2002. Farm gate prices after the adjustment are 29 won/kg for paddy (or 42 won for rice) and 20 won/kg for maize. Prices of various inputs such as seed, fertiliser, pesticides, fuel, electricity, etc. went up and it seemed to have resulted in better overall economic incentives to farmers. Cash crops such as tobacco and cotton
were considered more profitable than the usual staple crops, but their cultivation was restricted until the targets for staple cereals are met.\textsuperscript{70} There was another market reform in June 2003; farmers’ markets for the first time were officially recognised in the country.\textsuperscript{71} All these activities have increased greatly over the 12 months since the economic reform in July 2002. In addition to food items from kitchen gardens, a variety of non-food items of all sorts were sold in these markets. Cooperative farm families, however, did not have direct access to these markets to sell their staple food commodities because these had to be sold to the government procurement agency.

The price reforms conducted in 2002 and 2003 had a positive impact on overall food security, widening the opportunity to access alternative foods for urban and rural households. Most favoured groups were the hard labourers such as coal miners and the people who could access foreign currency. The less favoured were the ‘non-productive’ urban dwellers, such as housewives, the elderly and those working in less productive industries. These groups had seen the free benefits which they enjoyed under the old coupon system disappear. At the same time, they had watched the disparity between their income and the standard of living, and the gap between them and the more ‘productive’ groups widen.

In August 2005, the North Korean government announced its decision to halt international humanitarian assistance. They pronounced the suspension of humanitarian operations which had focused on emergency assistance. They further highlighted the necessity of development assistance focusing on the resuscitation of agricultural productivity and overall economy which is essential to achieve self-reliance in food production. With this decision, the humanitarian assistance which had lasted over the previous 11 years since 1995 finally ended.
With regard to the people’s nutritional status during this period of a chronic food deficit from 2001 to 2007, nutritional indicators showed that the North Korean food crisis gradually improved, but chronic malnutrition remained. In October 2002, the North Korean government, in cooperation with the WFP and UNICEF, carried out another nutrition survey covering 6,000 children under 7 and their mothers. The survey indicated a continued improvement in the general nutritional status of children since the 2000 survey. Among the surveyed children the prevalence for stunting fell from 45.2 per cent to 39.2 per cent and wasting fell from 10.4 per cent to 8.1 per cent. Underweight children fell from 27.9 per cent to 20.2 per cent. In 2004, the WFP, UNICEF and the North Korean government, conducted another nutrition survey. The main finding of the 2004 survey was that though there was a little improvement in view of stunting and wasting since the 2002 survey, the malnutrition of children which had entered into the stage of chronic malnutrition continued. Stunting slightly fell from 39.2 percent to 37 per cent, but it was still 7 per cent higher than the WHO criterion which considers the prevalence of stunting higher than 30 percent as a severe public health problem. Wasting remained at 7 per cent – a slight fall from the 2002 figure of 8.1 per cent. The prevalence of underweight people in the survey had worsened by 3.3 per cent, from the 2002 figure of 20.1 per cent to 23.4 per cent in 2004.

3.3 The Domestic Political Structure of South Korean Government Food Aid Decision Making

This section examines another underlying assumption that the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making changed over time,
shaping differing operational environments in which South Korean humanitarian non-governmental organisations worked. As shown in 2.5.1.2, The Domestic Political Structure, in Chapter 2, the domestic political structure is identified as the domestic policy-making process, the institutions of policy networks linking the state and NGOs, the degree of government accommodation to humanitarianism and institutions advocating these humanitarian norms and the diplomatic relationship between both Koreas.

This section first demonstrates that the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making became more transparent and democratic, establishing SOP for state food aid policy making. Such changes increased the degree of state accommodation to NGO advocacy in state policy making. Secondly, this section demonstrates that contrary to the Kim Young-Sam administration which had a negative view of the role of NGOs, the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations gradually developed policy networks linking the state and NGOs and thereby these administrations came to have a political structure which was more sensitive to NGO advocacy. Thirdly, this section demonstrates that the level of government accommodation to humanitarian norms and international institutions advocating these norms gradually increased in the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations. In the early stage of the food crisis in North Korea between 1995 and 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration was less sensitive to this. The Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations, however, maintained a domestic political structure susceptible to the international efforts and institutions underpinned by the norms of humanitarianism. This section lastly demonstrates that the hostile inter-Korean relations improved, achieving political rapprochement. The Kim Young-Sam administration maintained
ideological, political and military confrontation which had continued since the Korean War ended in 1953. Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy, however, established the first ever cooperative and peaceful relationship between both Koreas. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration the external threats had a negative influence on inter-Korean relations. These external threats, however, did not rupture the cooperative and peaceful relations between both Koreas.

This section is composed of four sub-sections. In order to identify changes in the domestic political structure, each sub-section examines the characteristics of the three administrations’ domestic political structure in relation to North Korea. The first sub-section examines state food aid decision making. The second sub-section considers the institutions and policy networks linking the state and non-governmental organisations. The third sub-section examines the degree of government accommodation to the humanitarian norms. The last sub-section then examines the diplomatic relationship between South Korea and North Korea.

3.3.1 State Food Aid Decision Making

This section demonstrates that the overall procedures of South Korean government food aid decision making towards North Korea became more transparent and democratic, establishing and adhering to the standard operating procedures (SOP) and increasing the degree of state accommodation to NGO advocacy in state policy making. To demonstrate this argument, this section examines the extent of power centralisation between the executive bodies and the legislative bodies and between the state and NGOs in respect of state food aid decision making towards North Korea. This section
also examines transparency and accountability in the SOP of state food aid decision making, changes in the SOP and each administration’s adherence to them. For this, this section examines how each administration changed the SOP of state food aid policy making, to what extent each administration adhered to the SOP and to what extent each administration’s SOP were sensitive to NGO advocacy.

**The Kim Young-Sam Administration’s Food Aid Decision Making**

The Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid to North Korea was made through a non-democratic policy making process where the decisions of food aid to North Korea were made by a few of the highest decision makers in the Blue House (the Presidential Office), rather than through the SOP of state aid decision making as stipulated by laws and related ordinances.

In 1995 when the food crisis in North Korea broke out, the SOP of state aid decision making towards North Korea was as follows. The Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Unification first established a draft to provide aid to North Korea. The Unification Policy Bureau of the Ministry of Unification next coordinates aid to North Korea within the overall framework of inter-Korean relations. Afterwards, proposed aid arrangements are submitted to the Unification and National Security Policy Coordination Meeting (the Unification Meeting) of the Blue House, which is the final deliberation institution for unification, foreign affairs and security policy in the Blue, and for final approval by the President. When aid decisions are reached at this point, the Bureau of Inter-Korean Talks of the Ministry of Unification
discusses with North Korea the detailed support method, period, quantity and monitoring methods for the aid to North Korea. When the agreements are adopted through the Inter-Korean Talks, the National Council for the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation deliberates and adopts final resolutions on the provision of food aid to North Korea. The Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Bureau then becomes the
When North Korea requested food aid from the international community in 1995, however, the decision-making process for food aid to North Korea was not made in this way through the SOP of state food aid decision making as stipulated by laws and related ordinances. Nakseo Baek examined the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid decision-making process through investigating the case of rice aid to North Korea in 1995. He found the time and quantity of the direct aid to North Korea by the Kim Young-Sam administration in 1995 was unilaterally determined by the President and the Blue House rather than through the Inter-Korean Talks as the SOP of state food aid decision making. The decision to grant direct aid to North Korea was made through the Unification Meeting which was a presidential body. After food aid decisions were made at the Blue House and the Unification Meeting, a private task force, headed by Ji-Sun Hong and the staff of the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), not the personnel of the Ministry of Unification, took charge of negotiating with North Korea. Prior to the official meeting of the Beijing Inter-Korean Talks, this task force was an ad-hoc creation, not foreseen in state decision making SOP with regard to exchange and cooperation with North Korea. With regard to this decision of food aid to North Korea in 1995, the Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee of the National Assembly recommended through the parliamentary audit in 1995 that the observance of SOP in relation to state food aid decision making towards North Korea as well as the necessity of holding a Unification-related Ministerial Meeting as a policy coordination and deliberation process within the administration.

During the Kim Young-Sam administration, in addition, the National Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation (the National Council), which was the
highest decision-making institution by law in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, was a post approval institution. Unification Ministers and spokespersons officially announced most aid decisions for North Korea before the National Council promulgated a resolution.\textsuperscript{88} Many meetings of the National Council were also conducted in the form of ‘documentary meetings’ which the meetings for the discussion of agendas did not held, but instead the documents which were sent to the ministers and vice-ministers who were deemed to participate in the meetings were signed by these personnel without holding meetings. Since the establishment of the National Council in 1990, 76.4\% of council meetings in fact were in documentary form – 159 sessions out of the total of 208 sessions – until the end of September 2008.\textsuperscript{89} The Humanitarian Cooperation Bureau, lastly, was not established until 1996.\textsuperscript{90} This indicates that, as the Unification Minister Okie Kwon states, the Ministry of Unification during the Kim Young-Sam administration from 1995 and 1997 did not have expertise in the assessment of needs in North Korea and the establishment of aid plans, as the Kim Young-Sam administration did not recognise the severity of the food crisis in North Korea in 1995.\textsuperscript{91}

A strong political objective resulted in centralised presidential decision making in the decision of bilateral aid in 1995. The Kim Young-Sam administration looked at the humanitarian crisis in North Korea from the standpoint of brotherly love in that North Korean people are the same ethnic group, despite political and ideological differences.\textsuperscript{92} When the Japanese government decided to provide North Korea with rice aid, the Kim Young-Sam administration was embarrassed and upset.\textsuperscript{93} It perceived the preemptive support by Japan, which might be delivered to North Korea ahead of South Korea’s pledge, as a decision that might negatively portray the South Koreans as ignoring their same ethnic group’s humanitarian crisis.\textsuperscript{94} Given this recognition, the
Kim Young-Sam administration implemented its aid to North Korea in haste while putting pressure on Japan to prevent the Japanese Government sending support before South Korea did so.\textsuperscript{95}

As the international community increased the amount of aid in 1996 and 1997, the South Korean humanitarian NGOs and their advocacy of food aid to North Korea radically increased in 1996 and 1997. Given this operational environment demanding government food aid to North Korea, the Kim Young-Sam administration established the Humanitarian Cooperation Bureau within the Ministry of Unification to oversee government and private aid to North Korea in December 1996.\textsuperscript{96} With the National Assembly audit on the decision of food aid in 1995 and the establishment of related institutions within the Ministry of Unification at the end of 1996, there seemed to be an improvement in the Kim Young-Sam administration making state aid decisions through the SOP, but the aid decisions in 1996 and 1997 were still made through non-democratic decision making-processes driven by strong political objectives and the Presidential Office.\textsuperscript{97}

\textit{The Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Food Aid Decision Making}

The Kim Dae-Jung administration often made decisions about food aid to North Korea in a similar way to the Kim Young-Sam administration in those decisions were often made by a small number of political leaders such as the President and special envoys. The Kim Dae-Jung administration, however, gradually improved transparency in state food aid decision making, institutionalising aid decision-making procedures.
As various scholars, such as Dongwan Kang, Jeong-Ho Bae and Bong-Keun Jeon, have explained, the Kim Dae-Jung administration implemented its engagement policy by certain figures delegating authority. These include Dong-Won Lim and Jae-Gyu Park who were appointed to major posts and shared the same political view on policies towards North Korea. During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, Lim held key positions including the Director of National Intelligence Services (NIS), the Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Security of the Blue House, Unification Minister, the Secretary of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Special Envoy to North Korea. Lim exercised unparalleled influence within the NSC Standing Committee, the administration’s final policy making institution. After Lim was particularly appointed as the Special Envoy to North Korea in 2000 and 2001, he played a leadership role in formulating policy on aid to North Korea and on loan terms through the Special Envoy Talks.

The Kim Dae-Jung administration in addition did not hold Unification-related Ministerial Meetings which was a policy coordination procedure among differing ministries on inter-Korean exchange and cooperation issues. The Kim Dae-Jung administration replaced the National Council meetings with documentary meetings, where ministers signed off the meeting resolutions without real participation in the meeting. The deliberation and resolution of major issues related to North Korea should have been made with the attendance of vice-premier level government officials as stipulated by the law and regulations in accordance with the SOP. In fact, the National Council resolution for the first provision of food aid on loan terms in 2000 was made through a documentary meeting a month after the agreement was adopted on 28 September.
With the rapid increase of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation under the Engagement Policy, however, the Kim Dae-Jung administration also achieved improvements in transparency and accountability in state food aid decision making. The Kim Young-Sam administration had operated the Unification and National Security Policy Coordination Meeting without any legal basis. By revising the National Security Council Act, the Kim Dae-Jung administration established the NSC Standing Committee and Secretariat as the final policy making institution within the Blue House and established a parallel system with the Office of the Senior Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Security.\textsuperscript{101} As inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation increased along with the implementation of the engagement policy, the Kim Dae-Jung administration also took measures to elevate the status of the Ministry of Unification which had previously maintained a lower position than other ministries since its establishment at the ministerial level on 28 February 1998.\textsuperscript{102} Thirdly, the Kim Dae-Jung administration increased the authority of the Ministry of Unification in state food aid decision making towards North Korea.

Based on these procedural improvements, the decisions of food aid on loan terms in 2000 and 2002 were made in the following fashion. At the first stage in establishing aid policy, the Humanitarian Cooperation Bureau established the overall plan for the aid to North Korea through consultation with various experts, NGOs and policy research institutes. The Humanitarian Cooperation Bureau next established the outline of policies under the coordination of the Unification Policy Bureau and the Bureau of Inter-Korean Talks. The plans were then transmitted to the National Security Policy Coordination Meeting, the final policy-making institution, through deliberation by the NSC and the Office of the Senior Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Security.
At this point, provisional decisions were from the internal discussions on the provision of aid to North Korea. Based on these provisional decisions, Ministers and Special Envoys to North Korea discussed the proposed aid to North Korea along with other inter-Korean pending issues at the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks and the Special Envoy Talks. After the decision to grant aid to North Korea was reached, the
decision was communicated to the Bureau of Inter-Korean Talks for discussions on a practical level. Various types of Inter-Korean Talks – the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks, the Inter-Korean Vice-Ministerial Talks and the Committee on Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation – were held, at which detailed discussions and agreements were concluded. Afterwards, the Humanitarian Cooperation Bureau established detailed plans for the support method, quantity and monitoring and implemented the support, following deliberation and a resolution by the National Council on the agreement and the support plan.

The Roh Moo-Hyun Administration’s Food Aid Decision Making

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration increased the role of the Ministry of Unification and consultation with civil society and the National Assembly in state food aid decision making and adhered to the SOP of state food aid decision making. These efforts which started in the Kim Dae-Jung administration enabled the decision of food aid to North Korea to be made through transparent and accountable procedures rather than through anon-democratic procedure driven by an administration’s political interests or motivations.

During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the decisions on food aid to North Korea were made through the SOP of state food aid policy making as the Ministry of Unification had greater authority in the state food aid decision-making process. Firstly, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration strengthened the status of the Ministry of Unification in state aid policy making towards North Korea by appointing the Unification Minister
Figure 3.5 The Roh Moo-Hyun Administration’s Food Aid Decision-Making Process (Bilateral Aid in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007)

Note: 1) The Presidential Office 2) With regard to the agreements or legislation placing a significant financial burden on the government and taxpayer, the Law on Advancing Inter-Korean Relations stipulates that such agreements and legislation are subject to ratification by the National Assembly.


to the Chair of the Special Committee of NSC. In doing so, the Ministry of Unification played the major role in North Korea aid policy. This institutional change indicates that the Roh Moo-Hyun administration prioritised the Ministry of Unification over any
particular political figures, such as Dong-Won Lim and Jae-Gyu Park in the Kim Dae-Jung administration. Secondly, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration integrated the dual Kim Dae-Jung administration structure of the Office of the Secretary of Security and the Secretariat of the National Security Council into the single National Security Council, which was made the final decision-making institution. As mentioned above, the Chair of the Special Committee of the National Security Council was held by the Unification Minister.\textsuperscript{104} Lastly, the decisions on food aid to North Korea on loan terms were made through the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks which were held regularly rather than the Inter-Korean Special Envoy Talks which had been held on an irregular basis.\textsuperscript{105} The issue of food aid was therefore discussed through a more institutionalised procedure than in previous administrations.

Secondly, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration took measures to institutionalise the participation of other civil groups, administrative offices and the National Assembly in the process of making North Korea aid policies. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration improved transparency in the management of the National Council as a final institution determining the decisions of food aid to North Korea, by assuring the participation of civil society in the state food aid policy-making process. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration increased the number of National Council members from 15 to 18, including more than three civil members through the revision of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act on 31 May 2005.\textsuperscript{106} In addition, the Act of Advancing Inter-Korean Relations that was adopted on 29 December 2005 required that the National Assembly play a coordinating role, and engage in the food aid decision making.\textsuperscript{107} This act also institutionalised the participation of civil society by including in the National Committee on Advancing Inter-Korean Relations seven members
appointed by the Committee Chair who should have professional knowledge and in-depth experiences on inter-Korean relations.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{3.3.2 Policy Networks Linking the State and Non-governmental Organisations}

This section demonstrates that contrary to the Kim Young-Sam administration which had a negative view on the role of NGOs, the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administration gradually improved policy networks linking the state and NGOs and thereby these administrations came to have a political structure which was more sensitive to NGO advocacy. For this, this section first examines the existence of policy networks linking the state and NGOs through the examination of intermediate organisations between the South Korean government and NGOs. The section next examines how these policy networks worked in practice.

\textit{The Kim Young-Sam Administration’s Policy Networks}

During the Kim Young-Sam administration, policy networks linking the state and NGOs existed, but they were not significantly institutionalised. The Kim Young-Sam administration’s degree of accommodation to these policy networks was not significant.

The Kim Young-Sam administration maintained three consultative institutions linking the state and civil society. The first was the National Unification Advisory Council (NUAC). The administration created the NUAC as a direct consultative body for the President. The NUAC was established on 27 October 1980 to provide
recommendations on overall unification policies. The President served as the Chair of
the NUAC which had an independent secretariat and 16,000 members from all levels of
society with domestic and overseas representation.\textsuperscript{109} Within the structure of the NUAC,
the two standing subcommittees, the Welfare Subcommittee and the Human Rights
Special Committee, tackled the issue of humanitarian aid to North Korea. These
standing subcommittees consisted of private professionals in the field of inter-Korean
social welfare, humanitarian aid, human rights and refugee issues. These subcommittees
provided consultations/recommendations to the President through policy studies,
domestic and overseas activities in support of unification, and assessed public
opinion.\textsuperscript{110}

The second consultative institution, the Unification Advisory Meeting (UAM),
was originally established within the Ministry of Unification in 1969 to gather cross-
party, pan-national public opinions regarding the issue of unification and discuss
effective unification policies.\textsuperscript{111} The advisory members consisted of 60 ‘national elder
statesmen’ of scholarship and moral influence from various levels of society. On 31
December 1996, the Kim Young-Sam administration reformed the UAM, by reducing
the number of members from 60 to 40 and the term of office from four years to two
years.\textsuperscript{112}

The third consultative institution was the Policy Advisory Committee in the
Ministry of Unification which was originally established in 1981 in accordance with
Official Order 107 of the Ministry of Unification.\textsuperscript{113} The Policy Advisory Committee
responded to enquiries from the Unification Minister in hearing the opinions of
professionals from various circles in drafting, establishing and implementing important
policies in relation to unification.\textsuperscript{114} The Ministry of Unification was mandated to hold
general meetings of the Policy Advisory Committee, which consisting of private professionals – academics, research institutes and NGOs – at least once every year and one subcommittee meeting every quarter.

The Kim Young-Sam administration however was not significantly influenced by these institutions connecting government to these policy networks linking the state and NGOs. The Kim Young-Sam administration was basically a unilateral decision maker given the political and military confrontation that has lasted over a half-century and the lack of experience of democratic decision making coming from a short history of political democracy.\textsuperscript{115} Although the Kim Young-Sam administration maintained the consultative institutions, their involvement in state policy making was not substantial. The Kim Young-Sam administration did not recognise NGOs as counterparts\textsuperscript{116} and worried that NGO advocacy and their aid through private channels might threaten national security given the severe political and military inter-Korean confrontation. For this reason, the Kim Young-Sam administration sought to put NGO advocacy and private aid to North Korea under government control by not allowing fund raising and direct assistance through private channels. The Kim Young-Sam administration further strengthened the execution of the National Security Act, which prohibited direct contact with North Korea, to limit the scope of humanitarian and other civil society NGOs that attempted to provide aid to North Korea. Given this government stance on the role of NGOs and civil society in state policy making and execution, the government consultative institutions that were mandated to link the state and NGOs did not work effectively.
The Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Policy Networks

The Kim Dae-Jung administration recognised NGOs as an important counterpart to the government in the delivery of humanitarian and development aid to North Korea and as a means of implementing the engagement policy. Government consultative institutions recovered their fundamental functions through the policy networks linking the state and NGOs.

Since the food crisis in North Korea began in 1995, South Korea civil society and humanitarian NGOs pressurised the government to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea. A presidential election was held in the end of 1997 and Kim Dae-Jung, who maintained a close relationship with civil society and humanitarian NGOs, was elected as a new president. After winning the election, President Kim attended an NGO New Year’s Greeting on 4 January 1998 before his inauguration. The attendance of President Kim was interpreted by the media and researchers as implying a close relationship between the Kim Dae-Jung administration and NGOs.117 President Kim Dae-Jung argued that NGOs could serve as a catalyst for inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation through various areas of politics, the economy, society, culture and humanitarian assistance. The Kim Dae-Jung administration began to take steps towards improving the policy networks linking the state and NGOs. This was different from the policy of the previous administration that had maintained a closed process of policy making towards North Korea.

Seok-Chun Yoo found that NGO personnel who were recruited by the Kim Dae-Jung administration accounted for 36.1 per cent of a total of 416 positions in government bodies. Those personnel were mainly from the People’s Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy (PSPD) which was one of the leading NGOs in South Korea.\textsuperscript{118} This high level of recruitment indicates that the Kim Dae-Jung administration did form closer relationships with NGOs and civil society than the Kim Young-Sam administration.

Institutionalisation of policy networks linking the state and NGOs were made through the establishment of a new consultative body and the strengthening of the status of the existing consultative bodies. The Kim Dae-Jung administration perceived the civil society groups as important partners in implementing the policy of reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea.\textsuperscript{119} The Kim Dae-Jung administration established the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (the Korean Council) and the Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy (the Government-Civilian Council) in order to better canvass public and NGO opinion. Although the Korean Council was founded as an NGO, it exerted significant influence on government policy making. Such influence was possible as the Korean Council had quasi-government status. The Korean Council maintained a close relationship with the Ministry of Unification as it was established under the steering role of the Ministry of Unification. As President Kim stated in September 1998 “[in regard to the future role and status of the Korean Council] I think that the Korean Council would evolve as an organisation which handles the overall affairs of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation at both the levels of government and private,” \textsuperscript{120} the Korean Council had an organisational structure which was able to evolve such that it could participate in government decision making.

The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s effort to enhance NGO involvement continued with the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council in August 2001.
The Ministry of Unification had four preliminary public-private meetings with humanitarian NGOs—the first meeting on 17 November 2000, a second meeting on 24 November 2000, a third meeting on 6 October 2000 and a fourth meeting on 2 March 2001. Although the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council was realised towards the end of the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the preliminary meetings created a de facto government consultative body linking the Kim Dae-Jung administration and the humanitarian NGOs.

Lastly, the Kim Dae-Jung administration improved the status of existing government consultative bodies linking the state and NGOs, such as the NUAC and the UAM. The Kim Dae-Jung administration strengthened the function of NUAC in canvassing public opinion and conveying these opinions to the President. Under President Kim’s order on 22 April 1998, the elder statesmen from various circles and the representatives of humanitarian NGOs were appointed as advisors to the NUAC. The Kim Dae-Jung administration also strengthened the function of the UAM as the advisory organisation for the President on the issue of unification. The administration improved the status of the UAM by having the President appoint the chair of the UAM and by assuring the term of the UAM members to 30 months.

The Roh Moo-Hyun Administration’s Policy Networks

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration developed a political structure that was the most sensitive to NGO and civil society influence among the three administrations evaluated here. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration established new policy networks and new
institutions linking the state and NGOs incorporated in new and existing consultative bodies. The Roh administration also promoted NGO participation in state policy making as well as the execution of policy.

During the presidential election in 2002, Roh Moo-Hyun was supported by young voters and progressive groups, which became a decisive factor in the presidential election. After the election, President Roh Moo-Hyun attended an NGOs’ New Year’s Greeting event held on 6 January 2003, before his inauguration, and stated that “[I] could not win the presidential election if the civil society movement accumulated over a decade had not existed.” The Roh Moo-Hyun administration stressed participatory democracy as one of the government’s priority agendas. President Roh Moo-Hyun emphasised the participation of the public and NGOs in state policy making, implementation and evaluation. He adopted the phrase ‘the Participatory Government’ as the slogan for the administration.

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration recruited more NGO personnel for the government and the Blue House. From a total of 416 government positions, NGO personnel accounted for 50.5 per cent. President Roh Moo-Hyun appointed Jae-In Moon, who had an NGO background as the Senior Secretary to the President for Civil Affairs. This position worked as a communication channel to connect the President with civil society. Keun-Sik Kim argues that the Roh Moo-Hyun administration finally institutionalised the cooperative relationship between the state and NGOs in relation to state policy making towards North Korea.

At the beginning of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the National Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation (the National Council) played a similar role as that during the Kim Dae-Jung administration. The institutionalisation of the National
Council as a policy network linking the state and civil society, however, was made in the middle of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. On 31 May 2005, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration increased the number of the National Council to 18 members through revision of the legislation. The revised legislation stipulated that more than three private experts equipped with expertise and experiences in the inter-Korean exchange and cooperation be included in the National Council. It increased to four private members in 2007.128 The National Committee on Advancing Inter-Korean Relations was also established on 26 July 2007 through the enactment of the legislation in the Act of Advancing Inter-Korean Relations on 29 December 2005. The purpose of this legislation was to increase the transparency of policy making and implementation and to expand national level consensus. This new legislation institutionalised private participation by including nine civilians on the committee: seven persons are appointed by the Prime Minister and two persons are appointed by the Minister of Unification.

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration established new institutions to survey public opinion and to institutionalise it as part of the process of state policy making. During the period of the presidential takeover, the new President launched the Centre for Public Participation and the post of Senior Secretary to the President for Public Participation. The President appointed an NGO worker to this position. In doing so, he tried to incorporate the demands of civil society into the state policy-making process.129 Roh Moo-Hyun altered the position of Senior Secretary to the President for Public Participation, establishing the Senior Secretary for the President to Civil Society on 16 May 2004. Thus President Roh Moo-Hyun attempted to strengthen the role of the Blue House in coordinating various social demands, appointing Jae-In Moon, who was his closest senior secretary and former Senior Secretary to the President for Civil Affairs, to
The Roh Moo-Hyun administration established the Committee of Civil Society Development under the Prime Minister’s Office thus promoting civil and NGO participation in government policy making and execution in August 2003. The Committee of Civil Society Development acted as an official channel to convey the demands of civil society to the state. This Committee in particular adopted a recommendation advising the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to amend the Regulation Act on Fundraising and Donation. This recommendation finally contributed to the improvement of financial arrangements of NGOs, by making the Roh Moo-Hyun administration fund NGO activities and organisational management.

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration exploited ‘Open Forums,’ ‘Dialogue with the Minister of Unification’ and ‘Public Opinion Polls’ as official channels to communicate with the civil society. The Ministry of Unification held ‘Open Forums’ on the issues of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation eight times in 2003. The Ministry of Unification changed the ‘Open Forum’ to ‘Dialogue with the Unification Minister’ which was held three times and fourteen times in 2004 and 2005 respectively. From January to August 2006, for example, the Dialogue with the Unification Minister was held 12 times. The Ministry of Unification also organised on 212 occasions a ‘Dialogue with the Heads of Bureaus of the Ministry of Unification’ during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration used public opinion surveys to gather national public opinions on pending inter-Korean issues. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the Ministry of Unification conducted public opinion polls ten times between 2003 and 2005. These institutions finally contributed to the increase of the degree of government accommodation to NGO and civil society
3.3.3 The Degree of Government Accommodation to Humanitarianism

The level of accommodation to humanitarian norms and international institutions advocating these norms gradually increased in the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations. In the early stage of the food crisis in North Korea between 1995 and 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration was not sensitive to these norms and the international community advocating these norms. This low level of accommodation was attributable to the lack of the Kim Young-Sam administration’s normative identity and awareness of the international community’s effort to relieve the humanitarian crisis. Given the increase in the awareness of the humanitarian crisis in North Korea and the political rapprochement between both Koreas in 2000, however, the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations were more sensitive to the norms of humanitarianism and the international efforts underpinned by these norms.

To demonstrate this argument above, this section examines the Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations’ normative identities. To analyze each administration’s normative identities, this section uses the data of each administration’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) contribution, the ratio of grant aid to the overall ODA and examines each administration’s efforts in the international effort to relieve the humanitarian crisis.\textsuperscript{136}
The Kim Young-Sam Government’s Accommodation to Humanitarianism

The international community urged the Kim Young-Sam administration to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea, and the Kim Young-Sam administration became, for the first time, an aid donor. International humanitarian standards, however, remained only superficially applied, rather than being internalised in the policy and practice of the Kim Young-Sam administration. It participated passively in the efforts of the international community to relieve the humanitarian crisis overseas, only pledging a small amount of aid to the international community through the ODA.

After the end of the Korean War in 1953, South Korea was a major recipient of international assistance and foreign assistance continued until 1995. The development of international humanitarian organisations in South Korea began in 1991 after South Korea became a member nation of the United Nations and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) was established. KOICA is a government organisation mandated to deliver humanitarian and development assistance to developing countries at a government level. During the early 1990s the size of ODA, including grant, non-grant, expense sharing and investment, was merely $57,400,000 and $76,800,000 respectively in 1991 and 1992. Among these disbursements, humanitarian grant aid was only $25,040,000 in 1991 and $30,990,000 in 1992.

When the Kim Young-Sam administration came into power in 1993, the ODA contribution increased to 0.03 per cent of the GNP in 1993 to 0.042 per cent in 1997. The amount of grant aid increased by $22,090,000, from $32,680,000 in 1993 to $54,770,000 in 1997, giving an annual average expenditure of about $45,880,000. The Kim Young-Sam administration, however, allocated more to bilateral aid, to which it was easier to attach political and economic interest, than multilateral aid in the ODA.
contribution. More resources were allocated to loans, $69,900,000 in 1996 and $56,570,000 in 1997, than grant aid, $53,410,000 in 1996 and $54,770,000 in 1997.\textsuperscript{140} The small amount of ODA and high ratio of non-grant aid to grant aid, indicates that the Kim Young-Sam administration was not sensitive to the norms of humanitarianism and the efforts of international organisation advocating these norms.

\textit{The Kim Dae-Jung Government’s Accommodation to Humanitarianism}

During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the South Korean government was more sensitive to humanitarian norms and the international efforts to relieve the humanitarian crisis worldwide than its predecessor. The Kim Dae-Jung administration also increased its contribution both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The outbreak of the food crisis in North Korea raised the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s awareness of humanitarianism and international cooperation to relieve humanitarian crises worldwide as well as in North Korea. Such awareness became interwoven with the economic recovery in 2000. Given the improved awareness of the necessity of international cooperation and the recovery from the economic downturn, the Kim Dae-Jung administration expanded its contributions to the international efforts to relieve humanitarian crises worldwide. The administration increased the amount of ODA in general by 0.06 per cent of the GNP from 0.035 per cent in the Kim Young-Sam administration.\textsuperscript{141} ODA increased from $182,700,000 in 1998 to $278,780,000 in 2002.\textsuperscript{142} The Kim Dae-Jung administration proclaimed repeatedly that the South Korean government would participate in the international community’s effort to eradicate global hunger and poverty, and adopted the Millennium Development Goals
Table 3.1 South Korea’s Annual Official Development Assistance (ODA) Contribution Statistics (Million U.S. Dollar)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ODA</th>
<th>Bilateral Aid</th>
<th>Grant</th>
<th>Loan</th>
<th>Multilateral Aid</th>
<th>ODA/GNP (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>31.52</td>
<td>25.04</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>25.96</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>45.22</td>
<td>30.99</td>
<td>14.23</td>
<td>31.58</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>111.6</td>
<td>60.12</td>
<td>32.68</td>
<td>27.44</td>
<td>51.44</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>140.2</td>
<td>60.07</td>
<td>38.45</td>
<td>21.62</td>
<td>80.15</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>71.46</td>
<td>50.11</td>
<td>21.35</td>
<td>44.53</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>159.2</td>
<td>123.31</td>
<td>53.41</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>35.84</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>185.6</td>
<td>111.34</td>
<td>54.77</td>
<td>56.57</td>
<td>74.27</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>182.7</td>
<td>124.69</td>
<td>37.21</td>
<td>87.48</td>
<td>58.01</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>317.5</td>
<td>131.4</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>186.1</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>212.1</td>
<td>131.2</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>264.65</td>
<td>171.54</td>
<td>52.97</td>
<td>47.04</td>
<td>93.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>278.78</td>
<td>206.76</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>58.59</td>
<td>72.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>365.91</td>
<td>245.17</td>
<td>145.46</td>
<td>121.77</td>
<td>120.74</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>423.32</td>
<td>330.76</td>
<td>212.09</td>
<td>174.58</td>
<td>92.56</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>752.32</td>
<td>463.3</td>
<td>318.00</td>
<td>201.86</td>
<td>289.01</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>455.25</td>
<td>376.06</td>
<td>258.95</td>
<td>193.11</td>
<td>79.19</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>699.06</td>
<td>528.43</td>
<td>361.28</td>
<td>270.09</td>
<td>205.59</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(MDGs) in 2000. The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s humanitarian grant aid, however, only modestly increased from $37,210,000 in 1998 to $66,700,000 in 2002. The average amount of grant increased from $45,880,000 in the Kim Young-Sam administration to $48,730,000 in the Kim Dae-Jung administration. The Kim Dae-Jung administration did not therefore fully internalise the norms of humanitarianism into their policy and practices although the Kim Dae-Jung administration was susceptible to these norms and the institutions advocating them.
The Roh Moo-Hyun Government’s Accommodation to Humanitarianism

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration changed the practice that exploited the ODA as a channel to maximise national interests. It increased the size of the ODA and the ratio of grant aid to non-grant aid. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration thereby showed more accommodation to the norms of humanitarianism and the efforts of international institutions advocating these norms and proclaimed a collaborative policy with the international efforts to relieve the North Korean humanitarian crisis.

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration sharply increased the size of the ODA. Starting from $365,910,000 in 2003, the first year of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, ODA was increased up to $699,060,000 in 2007, equivalent to 0.068 per cent of the GNP. The amount of grant aid was drastically increased. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration provided more international aid than any past administration; spending an annual average of $259,150,000 from 2003 to 2007. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration sought to participate in the international community’s efforts to eradicate hunger and poverty by issuing ‘MDGs: Progress Report, Republic of Korea’ in 2005. The Plan for Improving International Development Cooperation which was adopted at the Cabinet Council in November 2005 also stated the year of 2010 as the anticipated time that South Korea would join the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) that deals with cooperation among the developing countries within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). At the conference commemorating the tenth anniversary of joining the OECD in September 2006, the Prime Minister announced a further increase in contributions to the international aid community.
3.3.4 The Diplomatic Relationship between South Korea and North Korea

As L. Gordon Flake and Scott A. Snyder have shown, the diplomatic relationship between the donor state and the recipient state is a key factor which is able to promote or circumscribe NGO influence on the donor state’s decision-making process, changing the operational environment for NGO advocacy. This section demonstrates that inter-Korean relations in the Kim Young-Sam administration were the product of ideological, political and military confrontation rather than the relations of cooperative partners. In this operational environment, the hostile policy in inter-Korean relations was dominant throughout the Kim Young-Sam administration. The Kim Dae-Jung administration emphasised engagement to forward inter-Korean reconciliation. The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy contributed to the mitigation of antagonistic inter-Korean relations. The Inter-Korean Summit Talk in 2000 provided momentum that achieved political rapprochement and ended the hostile political, military and ideological confrontation and established a more cooperative and peaceful relationship between both Koreas. The Roh administration also followed the engagement policy. During the Roh administration, the Bush administration’s hostile policy towards North Korea in relation to terrorism, North Korea’s human rights condition, the nuclear issue and North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test in 2006 had a negative influence on inter-Korean relations. These political and military incidents, however, did not change the cooperative and peaceful relations between both Koreas.

This section examines the political and military affairs between both Koreas, using the yearly Unification White Papers issued by the Ministry of Unification.
The adoption of the Geneva Agreement on North Korea’s nuclear development in 1994 contributed the alleviation of the diplomatic confrontation between North Korea and the international community.\(^{151}\) The diplomatic confrontation between both Koreas, however, was still continuing along the line of confrontation after the Korean War in 1953. Although the year of 1995 was the period in which the first large-scale aid was delivered to North Korea, inter-Korean relations was ideologically, politically and militarily confrontational rather than cooperative.

Between 1995 and 1997, the diplomatic confrontation mainly came from the differing views on the construction of Korean-type light-water reactors. As compensation for the suspension of the nuclear development programme in North Korea, the international community agreed to build a light-water reactor plant which would produce the electricity required in North Korea. By selecting two reactors which would be used in a nuclear plant in North Korea, the Kim Young-Sam administration emphasised the construction of Korean-type light-water reactors, but North Korea showed a negative response to this suggestion.\(^{152}\) The diplomatic relationship between both Koreas after the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid decision to North Korea was made worse by North Korea’s negative responses. The incident of raising the North Korean flag on the ship the Sea Apex that was shipping South Korea’s food aid to North Korea on 25 June 1995 and the incident of the detention of the crew of the Samsun Venus on 2 August 1995 resulted in negative public opinion on the provision of food aid to North Korea.\(^{153}\)

Although the decision was made to construct two Korean-type light-water
reactor in 1996, North Korea continued its military provocation at the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) between 5 and 7 April 1996. The invasion of 26 armed guerillas using a submarine in the East Sea of Korea on 18 September 1996 in particular was the incident that had a devastating effect on inter-Korean relations which had been in the process of gradually improving. These military provocations resulted in the suspension of inter-Korean cooperation on the issues of the nuclear development programme and humanitarian aid. With regard to North Korea’s military provocations, the Chair of the U.N., the South Korean National Assembly and the Kim Young-Sam administration adopted statements and resolutions condemning the behaviour of North Korea. In 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration renewed inter-Korean relations after an official apology from North Korea regarding the submarine incident, but relations were not substantially improved. Both the Kim Young-Sam administration and North Korea were waiting for the outcome of the South Korean presidential election.

The Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Diplomatic Relationship with North Korea

The Kim Dae-Jung administration was the first government from an opposition party to take power since the end of the Korean War in 1953. It sought to improve inter-Korean relations, adopting an engagement policy. The engagement policy, often called the Sunshine Policy, emphasised inter-Korean reconciliation through inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. The antagonistic relationship began to become less tense, and the Inter-Korean Summit Talk in 2000 finally provided the momentum for political rapprochement, alleviating the hostile political, military and ideological confrontation.
The period of 1998 to 2000 was one of policy formation towards North Korea and a time when North Korea tested the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy through continuous provocations. In 1998 North Korea dispatched a submarine and an armed spy to South Korea for espionage on 22 June and on 12 July respectively. In 1999 North Korea provoked the West Sea Battle on 15 June and detained Keumkang Mountain tourists on 20 June. Such provocations by North Korea weakened the engagement policy by causing conflict with the opposition party and worsening public opinion towards North Korea.

Despite the unfavourable diplomatic relations between 1998 and 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration continued with the engagement policy, advancing and expanding the quality and scope of inter-Korean exchanges and humanitarian cooperation. The Kim Dae-Jung administration implemented the macroscopic policy towards North Korea of perceiving North Korea as a cooperative ethnic partner from the standpoint of tolerance instead of a confrontational relation as in the previous administration. The Kim Dae-Jung administration made efforts to maintain stable inter-Korean relations under the principle of the separation of economy and politics.

With the Inter-Korean Summit Talk in 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy was recognised by both Koreas as a common policy for the reunification of the Korean peninsula. North Korea showed a new attitude and abstained from acts that could have negative influences on inter-Korean relations, which contributed to the improvement in the perception of hostility towards North Korea by South Korea. The political rapprochement between both Koreas resulted in an improvement in the cooperative and peaceful diplomatic relationship between the Kim Dae-Jung administration and North Korea, shaping the foundation for the promotion of
inter-Korean exchange and cooperation during the rest of the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 2000 to 2002.

The Roh Moo-Hyun Administration’s Diplomatic Relationship with North Korea

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration maintained and advanced the cooperative inter-Korean relations, expanding social, cultural, economic and humanitarian exchange and cooperation based on the engagement policy of the Kim Dae-Jung administration. Despite collaborative inter-Korean relations, the Bush administration’s hostile policy towards North Korea in relation to terrorism, North Korea’s human rights condition, the nuclear issue and North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test in 2006 had a negative influence on inter-Korean relations. These negative political affairs and military developments, however, did not change the existing cooperative and peaceful relations between both Koreas during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration.

Although the Roh Moo-Hyun administration proclaimed its succession of the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy in 2003, North Korea ruptured the positive inter-Korean relations which were achieved in the Kim Dae-Jung administration. At the beginning of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, North Korea acknowledged its development of enriched uranium in October 2002 and announced its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 10 January 2003. On 2 October 2003 North Korea, which judged that the Bush administration was not fulfilling the Geneva Agreement any more, began operating five megawatt nuclear reactors in Youngbyeon and reprocessing work on 8,000 spent fuel rod which could be used in the
production of nuclear weapon. The political confrontation between the Bush administration and North Korea, which resulted from the issue of counterfeit dollars and the nuclear weapons development programme, became more severe in 2006 when North Korea conducted missile and nuclear tests to put pressure on the U.S. government on 6 July. After North Korea’s missile test, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration suspended the provision of rice and fertiliser on 7 July. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration supported the sanctions on North Korea by the U.N. Security Council. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration also cast a vote of approval on the North Korea human rights resolution plan at the meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Council on 16 November 2006.

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration, however, consistently took the position of resuming dialogue, even when only a limited apology had been made by North Korea for their negative incidents. Such a policy of toleration towards North Korea irrespective of North Korea’s negative and irresponsible behaviour and policies became the foundation of maintaining the cooperative inter-Korean relations. As a result, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration was able to maintain stable diplomatic relations with North Korea.

During the political confrontation between the Bush administration and North Korea in 2003, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration consistently pressurised North Korea to hold Inter-Korean Ministerial and Vice-Ministerial Talks and the exchange of Special Envoys for the discussion of the issues of inter-Korean political, economic, social, cultural exchanges and humanitarian cooperation. Both Koreas in fact were able to hold the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks and the exchange of Special Envoys in the midst of this unfavourable political environment, and these meetings and talks contributed to the
maintenance of stable inter-Korean relations through the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. After the adoption of a resolution blaming North Korea in relation to the missile test in July 2006, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration also pledged flood aid to North Korea.\textsuperscript{165} Although the delivery of the flood recovery support was temporarily ceased again by North Korea’s nuclear experiment in October 2006, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration resumed its aid with the adoption of The Code of Conduct for the Nuclear Facilities Freeze of North Korea for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at the 6-Party Talk in 2007.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated the assumption of this thesis. It demonstrated that the underlying assumption that \textit{the issue characteristics of the North Korean food crisis and the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making changed over time, shaping differing operational environments in which South Korean humanitarian non-governmental organisations worked}. Through the examination of the issue characteristics of the North Korean food crisis and the domestic political structure of the South Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea from 1995 to 2007, this chapter demonstrated that there were the three different phases of the North Korean food crisis in North Korea between 1995 and 2007. It also demonstrated that the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making changed over time, allowing for the promotion of NGO advocacy and a political role in state policy making.
This chapter first demonstrated that there were the three different phases of the North Korean food crisis in North Korea between 1995 and 2007. These three phases were (i) a famine phase from 1995 to 1999; (ii) a transition phase from a famine to a chronic food deficit from 1999 to 2001; and (iii) a chronic food deficit phase from 2001 to 2007.

Firstly, at the stage of famine between 1995 and 1999 food production and the PDS rations continued to decline and reached their lowest production and ration levels. In 1997/1998, North Korea recorded the worst level of cereal production of only 2.663 million tonnes, which represented only 57.7 per cent of the minimum cereal requirement. With regard to the PDS rations on which 70 per cent of the entire North Korean population relied as their life line, the average PDS rations fell steadily to 196 grams per person per day, which represented only 34 per cent of an individual’s minimum energy needs, until the end of 1999. The radical decrease of food production and the collapse of PDS rations thereby resulted in the poor nutritional status of North Koreans. During this period, 62.3 per cent of all children surveyed suffered from chronic malnutrition which is referred to as ‘stunting,’ 15.6 per cent of them were acutely malnourished (wasting), and 60.6 per cent were underweight. These main findings put North Korea among the top 10 countries with the highest malnutrition rates in the world.

After the severe famine from 1995 to 1999, North Korea entered into a phase of chronic food deficit, far below the minimum human need level, with repeated increases and decreases in food production and PDS rations. After the worst cereal production in 1998/1999, two relatively stable cereal production years in 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 appeared to indicate a moderate recovery in food production and PDS rations. The food
production in 2000/2001, however, again declined and recorded the worst levels. During this period, PDS rations also fluctuated, 196 grams in 1998/1999, 271 grams in 1999/2000 and 208 grams in 2000/2001, covering a small part of an individual’s energy needs. While food production and PDS rations fluctuated, the severity of the North Korean food crisis in terms of the nutritional status of its people became relieved, but was still a desperate situation. A Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) in 2000 showed that the overall nutritional status of children improved compared to the figures of the 1998 survey. The prevalence of stunting in 2000 fell from 62.3 per cent to 45.2 per cent and wasting fell from 15.6 per cent to 10.4 per cent respectively. The percentage of underweight children fell from 60.6 per cent to 27.9 per cent. These figures, however, indicate that North Korea began to get out of a famine phase, before entering the stage of a chronic food deficit.

Lastly, from 2001 to 2007 food production adds ration levels continued to improve. North Korea, however, still remained in a chronic food deficit, failing to achieve the minimum human needs in domestic cereal production. With the increase of food production and the increased commercial and concessional imports during this period, the uncovered food deficit in 2004/2005 was narrowed to 0.492 million tonnes. Such increase in the total food production resulted in a positive overall effect on household food security, although PDS rations never reached the all-time goal of 575 grams per person per day throughout the entire period between 2001 and 2007. The increase in food production and PDS rations during this period contributed to the small improvement in the nutritional status, but North Korea still remained in a state of chronic malnutrition. Wasting fell from 10.4 per cent in 2000 to 8.1 per cent in 2002 and 7 per cent in 2004. Although underweight children fell from 27.9 per cent in 2000
to 20.2 per cent in 2002, it again worsened by 3.3 per cent, from 20.1 per cent in 2002 to 23.4 per cent in 2004. Among the surveyed children the prevalence of stunting fell from 45.2 per cent in 2000 to 39.2 per cent in 2002 and 37 per cent in 2004, but it was still 7 per cent higher than the WHO criterion which considers a prevalence of stunting higher than 30 percent as a severe public health problem. These figures indicate that North Korea was in a state of continued food deficit between 2001 and 2007 although North Korea came out of the phase of famine between 1995 and 1999.

This chapter also demonstrated that how and why the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making changed, thus allowing for the promotion of NGO advocacy and a political role in state policy making.

It first showed that the domestic political structure of state food aid policy making became more transparent and democratic between 1998 and 2007 through the SOP and increasing NGO participation. The Kim Young-Sam administration had a non-democratic decision-making structure, and therefore the domestic political structure of the Kim Young-Sam administration in relation to state food aid policy making was less sensitive to NGO advocacy. In contrast to the Kim Young-Sam administration, the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations emphasised adherence to the democratic SOP and the inclusion of government-NGO consultative bodies in state food aid policy making. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration further institutionalised the SOP of state food aid policy making and NGO participation in the state policy-making processes. The domestic political structure of state food aid policy making in Roh Moo-Hyun administrations thereby were highly sensitive to NGO advocacy.

With regard to policy networks linking the state and NGOs, the Kim Young-Sam administration had a negative view on the role of NGOs, and maintained a passive
stance on the establishment of policy networks assuring NGO participation in state policy making. In contrast to the Kim Young-Sam administration, the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations conceived NGOs as an important counterpart in state policy making and execution. They were active in the establishment of policy networks linking the state and NGOs, and these policy networks shaped an operational environment favourable to NGO advocacy.

This chapter showed that the level of government accommodation to humanitarian norms and international institutions advocating these norms gradually increased in the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations. In the early stage of the food crisis in North Korea between 1995 and 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration was less sensitive to the humanitarian norms and the influence of the international community advocating these norms due to lack of awareness of the humanitarian crisis in North Korea and experience in relation to the international effort to relieve humanitarian crises worldwide. With an increase in the awareness of the humanitarian crisis and the international efforts to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea, the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations gradually increased their participation in the international efforts. Such changes indicate that the domestic political structures of the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations became more sensitive to international efforts to relieve the humanitarian crisis and institutions advocating these norms.

Lastly, it demonstrated that hostile inter-Korean relations improved towards a political rapprochement which was favourable to NGO advocacy activities and which made the government more susceptible to NGO advocacy. The Kim Young-Sam administration maintained ideological, political and military confrontations, and such
confrontations shaped the operational environment so that it was less sensitive to NGO advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In the mid-Kim Dae-Jung administration in 2000, however, the engagement policy emphasising inter-Korean reconciliation achieved political rapprochement, establishing the first ever cooperative and peaceful relationship between both Koreas. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration a series of political and military incidents jeopardised the inter-Korean relations, but did not worsen the fundamental cooperative and peaceful relations between both Koreas.

2 Ibid.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.


19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 1999.” (no page numbers).

25 Ibid.


27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.


34 Ibid.


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.


40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.


50 Ibid.

51 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s

52 Ibid.


54 FAO/WFP began to add the production from gardens and sloping lands to the total annual cereal production since the 2003/2004 marketing year (November/October).


56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.


60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.


63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.
President Kim Dae-Jung proclaimed the engagement policy on 3 April 1998 for the first time when he visited Britain. Under the fundamental goal of the achievement of peace, reconciliation and cooperation in inter-Korean relations, the engagement policy emphasised the pursuit of inter-Korean exchange and collaboration.


78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
89 Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

The decisions of food aid to North Korea in 1996 and 1997 will be examined in Chapter 8: The Korean Sharing Movement and Good Friends Advocacy of Food Aid and Changes in the Kim Young-Sam Administration’s Food Aid Policy Making towards North Korea.


108 Ibid.


112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.


121 Kang, Policy Network Analysis Based Research into the Governance of N. Korea Aid Policies. pp. 91-172.


123 Ibid.


127 Kim, "4. Hanbando Pyeonghwabeonyoungeul Wihan Daebukjeongchaek
Geobeoneons Siltajosa [Jung] [English Translation: Research on the Peace and Prosperity Governance on Korean Peninsula (Second section)].” pp. 163-190.


132 Ministry of Unification, "Tongilgwangyejanggwangoieuiwunyeongschik [1991.3.29] [English Translation: The Operational Regulations on the Unification-related Ministerial Meeting].” (no page numbers).

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid.

135 Ibid.


137 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "UN: ROK's Relationships with the United Nations and Agencies."

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid.

140 National Human Rights Commission of Korea, "Introduction/About the Commission.” (no page numbers).

142 Ibid.

143 Ibid.

144 Ibid.


146 International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions (ICC), "Rules of Procedure for the ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation.”

147 Ibid.


149 Flake, Paved with good intentions: the NGO experience in North Korea. pp. 81-110.

In 1994, North Korea and the United States produced the Geneva Agreed Framework, which consisted of 1) freezing North Korea’s nuclear programme in exchange for the United States’ promise to construct two Light Water Reactors (civilian type of nuclear power) by 2003 and the supply of oil to North Korea, 2) United States’ assurance of non-aggression or use of nuclear weapons against North Korea, 3) Both sides would move towards the full normalisation of relations, with the gradual lifting of economic sanctions against North Korea.

The United States accused North Korea of counterfeiting U.S. $100 federal reserve notes and passing them off in various countries.
163 Ibid.

164 Ibid.

CHAPTER 4. THE ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY OF THE KOREAN SHARING MOVEMENT AND GOOD FRIENDS

4.1 Introduction

Non-governmental organisation (NGO) organisational capability is an important factor in the explanation of the extent of NGO influence on state policy. NGO organisational capability, however, is inherently limited because NGO influence on state policy making relies on the normative appeal of the NGOs. The core theme of this thesis is an investigation of NGO norm advocacy and subsequent chapters therefore deal with this issue in detail. This chapter, however, demonstrates how differing mandates, funding capacity and expertise of NGOs shape NGO organisational capability. This chapter instead demonstrates how and why the specific organisational mandates, funding capacity and expertise of the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) and Good Friends combined to permit the KSM and Good Friends to exert influence over South Korean government food aid policy.

This chapter demonstrates that in 1996 and 1997, the KSM had one single mandate to advocate for the provision of food aid to North Korea. After the inauguration of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998, however, the KSM expanded their mandates to the issues of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation and such expansion of organisational mandate diluted the previous single mandate. With regard to the funding capacity of the KSM, the KSM improved their funding capacity through the diversification of funding sources. The increase in reliance on government funding since the mid-Kim Dae-Jung administration, however, resulted in the blunting of KSM’s
advocacy role, by making it difficult for KSM to criticise or pressurise government policy. With regard to the organisational expertise, the KSM gradually improved its expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, by organisational restructuring. Such improvement and accumulated experience enhanced the expertise of the organisation and individual staff.

With regard to the organisational capacity of Good Friends, this chapter demonstrates, Good Friends adhered to a single mandate, which was to relieve the food crisis in North Korea until the end of 1998. After the inauguration of President Kim Dae-Jung, Good Friends began to diversify its mandate. Such diversification between 1999 and 2003 consequently resulted in the weakening of the Good Friends’ original humanitarian mandate. From the end of 2006, however, Good Friends resumed its full advocacy movement urging the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide additional food aid to North Korea, by adhering to the single mandate of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. This chapter next demonstrates that throughout the entire period of advocacy of food aid to North Korea from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends’ unique funding structure, as one of the Jungto Society-affiliated organisations, enabled them to keep their independent voice and adhere to an advocacy role free from the influence of funding sources. Lastly, it demonstrates that throughout the 12 years of the advocacy movement from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends improved its expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, but such expertise mainly came from individual personnel, rather than the organisational structure.

This chapter consists of two main sections and a conclusion. The first section examines how and why the organisational capacity of the KSM has changed over time, by examining the mandate, funding capacity and organisational expertise. Under an
identical analytical framework, the second section next examines the organisational capacity of Good Friends. The last section then provides a summary of the chapter.

4.2 The Organisational Capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement

This section demonstrates that in 1996 and 1997, the KSM had one single mandate to advocate for the provision of food aid to North Korea. As the South Korean government became more pro food and humanitarian assistance to North Korea after the inauguration of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998, the KSM expanded their mandates to the issues of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Such expansion of organisational mandate diluted the previous single mandate. The KSM improved their funding capacity through the diversification of funding sources. The increase in reliance on government funding since the mid-Kim Dae-Jung administration, however, resulted in the blunting of KSM’s advocacy role, by making it difficult for KSM to criticise or pressurise government policy. When inter-Korean relations were ruptured between 2005 and 2007 after which the South Korean government suspended food aid to North Korea, KSM advocacy in favour of food aid was constrained by its lack of organisational independence from the government. The KSM responded to these weaknesses by organisational restructuring. Such improvement and accumulated experience enhanced the expertise of the organisation and individual staff.

This section examines anniversary reports and white papers published by the KSM and interviews with KSM personnel. KSM anniversary reports and white papers provide the rules and regulations that stipulate the organisational mandates. These
reports and papers also include overall information on KSM activities which enables the actual mandate of the KSM and Good Friends to be identified. This chapter also uses interviews with KSM personnel and representatives.\textsuperscript{3} To examine KSM funding capacity, the chapter next mainly uses internal materials and annual reports from KSM and government archives. In regard to KSM funding capacity between 1996 and 2002, this chapter uses the data provided by KSM’s finance officer.\textsuperscript{4} These data do not provide absolute figures of funding due to the reason that the KSM was reluctant to open their financial data to the public, but the data include the ratio of each funding source to the entire funding. The KSM has published annual reports since 2002 and these reports include the funding capacity of KSM.\textsuperscript{5} In order to examine the scale of government funding for the KSM, this chapter also uses the ‘White Paper on the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund’ published by the South Korean government.\textsuperscript{6} To examine the organisational structure and the human resource management of the KSM, this section uses the organisational charts in the annual and anniversary reports and interviews with KSM personnel.\textsuperscript{7}

This section consists of three main parts. The first part examines the mandate of the KSM. The second section examines the funding capacity. The third part examines the organisational expertise of the KSM. The last part summarises the section.

4.2.1 The Mandates of the Korean Sharing Movement

In 1996 the newly established KSM had one single mandate. This was to advocate for the provision of food aid to North Korea. As the South Korean government became
more pro food and humanitarian assistance to North Korea since the inauguration of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998, the KSM expanded their mandates to include inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Such diversification of the organisational mandate resulted in the weakening of the humanitarian mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea, by diluting the previous single mandate and thereby by scattering the organisational resources.

The Mandates of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Kim Young-Sam Administration

Before North Korea’s appeal for food aid to the international community in August 1995, the South Korean NGOs broadly recognised the situation of the North Korean food deficits through North Korea’s appeal for food aid to Japan in 1994 and to South Korea in early 1995. At that time these NGOs conceived the North Korean food deficits as temporary, resulting from severe floods. After North Korea’s appeal, however, the largest six religious groups, Catholic, Confucianism, the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK), Chondogyo, Won-Buddhism and Chogye Order recognised the need for an organised advocacy movement to pressurise the Kim Young-Sam administration and South Korean civil society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. As a result the ‘Inter-religious Committee on the North Korean Flood Victim Aid’ (the Inter-religious Committee), the predecessor of the KSM, was founded as an inter-religious organisation for the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea. With the lack of information on the North Korean food deficits, the Inter-religious Committee was recognised as a temporary organisation. The Inter-religious
Committee also had a loose network which did not have administrative personnel. As the severity of the North Korean food deficits in the early 1996 became more widely known to the international community and South Korean civil society, the representatives of six religious groups, former presidents of relief NGOs, elder statesmen and leaders of civil society organisations began to recognise the need for a consolidated advocacy organisation mandated to advocate humanitarian food aid to North Korea. In June 1996, the six religious groups and civil society organisations finally agreed to establish the Korean Sharing Movement as a consolidated network as an independent administrative and executive body.

In 1995 and 1996 South Korean civil society and the Kim Young-Sam administration maintained a negative approach to the provision of food aid to North Korea. It was attributable to North Korea’s negative responses to the provision of 150,000 tonnes of rice assistance in 1995, the announcement of non-recognition of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North Korea and South Korea on 4 April 1996 and the dispatch of armed forces to the Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjom from 5 to 7 April 1996. Because of negative public opinion and the Kim Young-Sam administration’s passive view of the provision of food aid to North Korea, the preparatory meetings of the KSM argued for the necessity of a consistent and systematic advocacy movement and the delivery of private-level humanitarian food aid to North Korea. Clause 2 (objective) of the rules and regulations of the KSM stipulated that “KSM aims to prepare the ground for the unification of Korea through the inter-Korean cooperation, mainly the humanitarian food aid to the North Korean compatriots who confront the severe food deficits.” Clause 4 (projects) then specified that projects should include i) fundraising and assistance, ii) research and study, iii) civil education,
iv) expansion of membership and v) other projects that are deemed to require the pursuit of KSM’s objectives. The KSM actively advocated that the Kim Young-Sam administration should resume humanitarian food aid to North Korea which was suspended due to North Korea’s provocations. The KSM also organised a nationwide fundraising campaign in collaboration with other humanitarian NGOs, religious groups and civil society organisations.

The incident of 26 armed spies in the East Sea on 18 September 1996 interrupted the pursuit of KSM’s mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea, triggering negative public opinion towards the provision of food aid to North Korea. After the incident, the KSM was not able to continue the advocacy of food aid to North Korea and finally suspended the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea. After the suspension of the advocacy movement, the KSM mainly rolled out the ‘Movement for Korean-Chinese Victims of South Korean Fraud.’

As political relations between North Korea and South Korea improved in 1997, the KSM resumed its fundamental mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. On 29 December 1996 when North Korea made its official apology for the incident of 26 armed spies, the resentment of South Korean civil society over North Korea’s action was softened. Since 1996, in addition, the severity of the North Korean food deficits and its humanitarian impacts became known to the international community and South Korean civil society. In the context of this changed operational environment, the KSM extended its most active advocacy throughout all three administrations. The KSM was outspoken in its mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. It urged the Kim Young-Sam administration to resume government-level food aid to North Korea in various policy conferences, forums and international conference.
The Mandates of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Kim Dae-Jung Administration

In 1998 the Kim Dae-Jung administration, which maintained a more positive and active stance on the provision of large-scale government food aid to North Korea, took office. Given changes in the operational environment, the KSM began to diversify its mandates to the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea. The diversification of the KSM mandate consequently resulted in the weakening of KSM’s fundamental mandate urging the South Korean government and civil society to provide large scale food aid to North Korea irrespective of pending political issues.

During the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002, the economic and political environment made it inevitable that the KSM changed its mandate. South Korea’s economic downturn that started at the end of Kim Young-Sam administration in 1997 resulted in the weakening of KSM’s mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea, by diverting public interest from the issue of food crisis in North Korea to the issue of South Korean domestic economic recovery. After 1998, South Korea came under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with the foreign currency deficits until 1999. Unemployment resulting from the economic reform became a major social issue in South Korean civil society.

Under this operational environment between 1998 and 1999, the KSM continued to urge the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide government-level food aid to North
Korea, but it was difficult for the KSM to appeal to South Korean civil society for humanitarian food aid for North Korea.\textsuperscript{19} As the advocacy of food aid to North Korea had continued since 1995, South Korean civil society began to feel donor fatigue. This made it difficult for the KSM to proselytise the Kim Dae-Jung administration and civil society to provide emergency food aid to North Korea.\textsuperscript{20} Between 1998 and 1999, the KSM instead placed more emphasis on the provision of development assistance for North Korea’s agricultural resuscitation.

After the Inter-Korean Summit Talk in June 2000, both North Korea and South Korea reached a political rapprochement. The Inter-Korean Summit Talk in June 2000 provided momentum towards the institutionalisation of large-scale food and development aid to North Korea. From 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration maintained a favourable policy on the provision of humanitarian food and development aid to North Korea and delivered 500,000 tonnes of rice aid to North Korea in 2000 and 2002 respectively.\textsuperscript{21}

The Kim Dae-Jung administration took measures to promote private-level inter-Korean exchange and cooperation by humanitarian NGOs. Given the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s active and self-steering role in relation to the provision of food aid to North Korea, KSM’s advocacy was no longer necessary. Between the years 2000 and 2002 the KSM thereby adjusted its main objective from the advocacy of food aid to North Korea to an assistance provider, mainly of development aid to North Korea.\textsuperscript{22} The KSM emphasised that private-level humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea would have to run parallel with the government-level assistance to North Korea.\textsuperscript{23} Between the year 2000 and 2002, therefore, the KSM mainly engaged in the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea and the
implementation of development projects for the recovery of North Korean agriculture.\textsuperscript{24} In March 2001, the KSM was designated by the Ministry of Unification as one of the NGOs authorised to open a bilateral channel with North Korea for the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance.\textsuperscript{25} Such diversification of organisational mandate thereby resulted in the weakening of their fundamental mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea, by diluting the previous single mandate and distributing the organisational resources to multiple projects and activities.

\textit{The Mandates of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration}

From 2003 to 2007 KSM’s mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea continued to weaken as the South Korean government continued to provide large-scale food aid to North Korea irrespective of NGO advocacy. The KSM occasionally organised or engaged in the advocacy of humanitarian food aid and such advocacy achieved the intended outcomes, inducing the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to change its existing policy of food aid to North Korea. Because of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s positive view both about providing humanitarian food and development assistance to North Korea and the role of NGOs in state policy making and implementation, the KSM did not need to urge the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide food aid to North Korea.

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration institutionalised the provision of large-scale food aid on loan terms and chemical fertiliser on grant aid to North Korea.\textsuperscript{26} It also expanded financial support for humanitarian NGO operations in North Korea and took
various measures to promote the role of NGOs in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation.\textsuperscript{27} The Roh Moo-Hyun administration further assured the participation of NGOs in state policy making in respect of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation including the provision of humanitarian food and development assistance to North Korea.\textsuperscript{28}

In the context of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s active policy on the provision of food aid to North Korea, KSM’s fundamental mandate to advocate for the provision of food aid to North Korea was less relevant. The KSM instead advocated for food aid to North Korea when negative developments caused the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to suspend food aid. These negative developments included the second Bush administration’s hostile policy towards North Korea in 2005 and North Korea’s missile and nuclear test in 2006.\textsuperscript{29} Renewed advocacy by the KSM and other humanitarian NGOs contributed to the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s decision to resume food aid to North Korea. The advocacy of food aid to North Korea, as KSM’s fundamental mandate underpinning the establishment of KSM in 1996, however, was replaced by the other mandates of delivery of humanitarian and development aid to North Korea in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration.

4.2.2 The Funding Capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement

Until early 1997, the KSM maintained poor funding capacity. During the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002, the diversification of funding sources through new aid programmes, the government deregulation in relation to NGO fundraising and
government funding for humanitarian NGOs contributed to the stabilisation of KSM’s funding capacity. From 2003 to 2007, the KSM further stabilised its funding capacity by diversifying funding sources. This in turn contributed to KSM’s organisational development. During this period, however, the ratio of government funding to non-government funding increased to a level which might blunt KSM’s advocacy role of pressuring the government to provide food aid to North Korea.

The Funding Capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Kim Young-Sam Administration

After its establishment in 1996, government restrictions and poor public awareness about the necessity of humanitarian food aid to North Korea were the main reasons for the lack of organisational funding of the KSM. The Kim Young-Sam administration did not authorise NGO fundraising targeting civil society and the corporate sector. The Kim Young-Sam administration also exploited the Prohibition of Fundraising and Donation which was legislated in 1951. This prohibition act stipulated that NGOs must receive permission from the Minister of State Department or an equivalent level of local governors before fundraising. By maintaining this act, the Kim Young-Sam administration prohibited the autonomy of NGOs in fundraising. On 30 December 1995 the Kim Young-Sam administration changed the name of the act to the Regulation Act on Fundraising and Donation. The Kim Young-Sam administration, however, maintained the stipulation of government approval and even decreased the limit of expenditure for the administrative budget among the raised funds, from 5 per cent to 2 per cent. South Korean civil society had limited awareness of the need for
Table 4.1 Funding Capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Kim Young-Sam Administration from 1996 to 1997 (Korean Won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Budget (raised by public fundraising)</td>
<td>317,858,494 ($394,953) (^1)</td>
<td>5,896,307,927 ($7,326,426) (^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Administrative Budget</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages of Administrative Budget</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1) and 2): The exchange rate of the Korean won versus US dollar was about 804.8 in the year of 1996 and 1997. Source from Choi, Young-Sik, *Daehan Minguk Saengjoneui Gyungjehak* [English Translation: Republic of Korea: The Battle of Economic], Seoul: Reader’s Book. 2005.


humanitarian food aid to North Korea. The hostility against North Korea which was historically rooted from political and military confrontations was dominant in South Korean civil society.\(^3\) North Korea’s negative actions after the delivery of large-scale rice assistance from South Korea\(^3\) also worsened public opinion on food aid to North Korea.\(^3\) The lack of information on the North Korean food crisis and North Korea’s hermetic characteristics further made South Korean civil society hesitate to participate in fundraising for the humanitarian food aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996.\(^3\) Government restrictions, public antagonism against North Korea and limited public awareness about the severity of the food crisis in North Korea resulted in poor fundraising capacity for food aid to North Korea. The amount of KSM fundraising in 1996 was only 317,858,494 won which was the equivalent of $394,953.\(^3\) The
government restrictions stipulated that only two per cent could be used for administration.

In 1997, with an active advocacy underpinned by a strong normative motivation and the Kim Young-Sam administration’s deregulation of government rules and regulation related to fundraising, the KSM began to improve its funding capacity. On 31 March 1997 the Kim Young-Sam administration took a first step towards actual deregulation. It approved indoor fundraising activities for NGOs which allowed funds to be raised within a building but not in open public places such as the street or public squares. The Kim Young-Sam administration also allowed press releases, by mass media, giving the results of fundraising but not the advertising of fundraising.\(^\text{39}\) Despite government restrictions and poor public awareness, the KSM, which was motivated by a strong mandate of humanitarianism, organised active advocacy in 1997. This active advocacy along with deregulation resulted in a radical increase in fundraising in 1997.\(^\text{40}\) As shown in Table 5.1, the amount of fundraising by the KSM for humanitarian food aid to North Korea increased 18.5 times, from 317,858,494 won in 1996 to 5,896,307,927 won ($7,326,426) in 1997.

\textit{The Funding Capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Kim Dae-Jung Administration}

From 1998 to 2002, the diversification of funding sources through new aid programmes, government deregulation in relation to NGO fundraising and government funding for humanitarian NGOs contributed to the stabilisation of KSM funding capacity. From 1998 and 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s active policy in large-scale
government-level assistance to North Korea resulted in the weakening of NGO assistance to North Korea. The scale of KSM funding for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to North Korea decreased from 5,104,180,000 won in 1997 to 750,000,000 won in 1998 and 2,801,580,000 won in 1999.41

The KSM expanded its mandates and projects from the advocacy of food aid to North Korea to the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea and such expansion of mandates and projects contributed to the stabilisation of KSM funding capacity. The KSM expanded its organisational mandate from advocacy and general relief to health and medical support, agricultural recovery support and school feeding.42 The KSM encouraged the participation of the general public and other civil society organisations, corporations and local municipals in humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea.43 By delivering a coordinating and executive role in such humanitarian and development assistance, which attracted funding from local municipals and other NGOs, KSM diversified its funding sources.

The Kim Dae-Jung administration deregulated the existing government acts in relation to the private-level humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea. The KSM consistently engaged in advocacy urging the Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung administrations to adopt measures to improve humanitarian NGOs’ financial conditions. A series of government measures contributed to the stabilisation of KSM’s funding capacity. These included the promotion of private-level assistance to North Korea, the limited approval of fundraising for North Korea through the Automatic Response Service (ARS) and the approval of NGO assistance through the Korean Red Cross, on 18 September 1998.44 In 1999, the Kim Dae-Jung administration further
approved the opening and maintaining of the private-level aid channel with North Korea.45

Through these measures and deregulations, South Korean humanitarian NGOs and the KSM were able to visit North Korea for the purpose of project planning and coordination. Such deregulation consequently contributed to the promotion of civil, corporate, NGO and local municipal participation in the assistance to North Korea. The increase of opportunity for mutual exchange through the various aid programmes between both Koreas enabled South Korean civil society to better understand the severity of the North Korean food deficits. This, in turn, contributed to the improvement of KSM and other humanitarian NGOs’ funding capacities.46 The approval of the mass media and individual corporate events for the purpose of fundraising using the ARS further contributed to the improvement of KSM funding capacity, promoting civil and corporate participation in humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea.47

The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s decision to provide financial support for humanitarian NGOs from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund in 1999 and the passing of the Non-profit Organisation Support Act in 1999 contributed to improvement in the KSM’s funding capacity. Based on the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, the KSM received 352,000,000 won in 2000, which was increased to 549,000,000 won in 2001 and 1,347,000,000 won in 2002.48 The Rules of Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea under the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act stipulated that NGOs receiving the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund could spend 5 per cent of government funding on its administration.49

The Non-profit Organisation Support Act contributed to the reduction of the KSM’s administrative budget. The non-profit Organisation Support Act that stipulates
tax exemption, postal charge benefit and financial support was legislated on 16 December 1999. The KSM also received government funding of 66,000,000 won in 2000, 10,000,000 won in 2001, and 110,000,000 won in 2002, in addition to funding from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund. From this funding, the KSM was able to expend 2-5 per cent of received funding for their administrative budget. From 1998 to 2002, the various types of government funding for NGO activities consequently contributed to the stabilisation of KSM funding capacity.

The Funding Capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration

From 2003 to 2007 the KSM further stabilised its funding capacity by diversifying funding sources. KSM promoted cash and commodity donations from individuals, civil society organisations, corporate and local municipals, by organising various aid programmes, mainly general relief support, health and medical support, agricultural recovery support and school feeding.

In 2003, cash and commodity donations amounted to approximately 6,888 million Korean won, which was an increase of approximately 1,205 million won compared to the 5,683 million won in 2002. In 2004, the Ryongcheon Station Explosion contributed to a radical increase in cash and commodity donations for explosion victims. Cash and commodity donations in 2004 came to 8,236 million won. In 2005, they decreased by around 2,189 million won to about 6,046 million won. This decrease was attributable to North Korea’s official announcement which
Table 4.2 The Percentages of Government Funding among the Overall Korean Sharing Movement’s Administrative Budget during the Kim Dae-Jung Administration from 1998 to 2002 (Korean Won; U.S. Dollar)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Administrative Budget (USD)</td>
<td>153,167,316 ($131,524.36)</td>
<td>62,885,433 ($55,501.16)</td>
<td>284,663,941 ($226,193.72)</td>
<td>226,582,783 ($171,005.51)</td>
<td>276,299,945 ($230,681.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Funding (A / B)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>352,000,000 (286,000,000/66,000,000)</td>
<td>549,000,000 (539,000,000/10,000,000)</td>
<td>1,347,000,000 (1,237,000,000/110,000,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Funding for Administrative Budget (C / D)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17,600,000 (14,300,000/3,300,000)</td>
<td>27,450,000 (26,950,000/500,000)</td>
<td>37,350,000 (31,850,000/5,500,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages of Government Funding</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>12.11 $^6$</td>
<td>13.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1) To convert Korean won to U.S. dollar, it used a private currency convert calculator which is provided by Forex, calculator available at: http://forex-history.net/main/eng/a/convert.; 2) & 3) The thesis drew these figures using the stipulation of the Regulation Act on Fundraising and Donation that allows 2 per cent of raised funding for the administrative budget of organisation.; 4) KSM received the government funding based on two different government acts for the financial support for NGOs: the one ‘A’ is the Rules of Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea under the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, and the other one ‘B’ is Non-profit Organisation Support Act.; 5) The figures ‘C’ were reproduced based on Article 9, Section 2 of the Rules of Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea that stipulates the NGO is able to expend 5 per cent of funding received from the government for the organization’s administrative purpose. In regard to the government funding by Non-profit Organisation Support Act, the NGO is able to expend 5 per cent of total government funding maximum for its administrative budget.; 6) The figure should be understood as a maximum percentage as the figure of raised funding among the total administrative budget of KSM in 2001 is a minimum estimation.

Table 4.3 Funding Capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration from 2003 to 2007 (Korean won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cash &amp; Commodity</th>
<th>Government Funding</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5,683,006,351</td>
<td>1,347,155,860</td>
<td>63,152,360</td>
<td>7,093,314,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6,888,750,657</td>
<td>60,000,000</td>
<td>20,186,790</td>
<td>6,968,937,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8,236,517,838</td>
<td>1,437,346,420</td>
<td>111,819,670</td>
<td>9,785,683,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6,046,931,008</td>
<td>1,559,313,710</td>
<td>86,227,954</td>
<td>7,692,472,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>8,854,857,970</td>
<td>1,242,221,690</td>
<td>358,177,692</td>
<td>10,455,257,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7,642,042,834</td>
<td>1,137,109,880</td>
<td>410,197,436</td>
<td>9,189,350,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1) These figures were drawn from government reports on the expenditure of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund and government financial support for South Korean NGOs.; 2) Figures in the brackets are the percentages of each funding source.


appealed for development assistance, proclaiming the withdrawal of international NGOs engaged in the delivery of emergency assistance in 2006.

In 2007 the KSM still maintained a high level of cash and commodity funding of about 7,642 million won.58 Although the scale of donations in 2007 decreased to about 7,642 million won, it was the highest amount to be raised under a normal operational environment without any humanitarian disasters in North Korea.59

The overall increase of cash and commodity donations for the KSM contributed to the increase in their administration budget. Cash donations in 2003 and 2004 were in the region of 2,012 and 3,862 million won respectively.60 In 2005, cash donations

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Table 4.4 The Ratio of Cash Donations to Commodity Donation in the Funding of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration from 2003 to 2007 (Korean won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>3,780,129,030 (66.52)</td>
<td>2,012,160,598 (29.21)</td>
<td>3,862,783,261 (46.90)</td>
<td>3,977,586,458 (65.79)</td>
<td>7,959,119,649 (89.88)</td>
<td>5,492,766,468 (71.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>1,902,877,321 (33.48)</td>
<td>4,876,590,059 (70.79)</td>
<td>4,373,734,577 (53.10)</td>
<td>2,069,344,550 (34.21)</td>
<td>895,738,321 (10.12)</td>
<td>2,149,276,366 (28.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>5,683,006,351 (100)</td>
<td>6,888,750,657 (100)</td>
<td>8,236,517,838 (100)</td>
<td>6,046,931,008 (100)</td>
<td>8,854,857,970 (100)</td>
<td>7,642,042,834 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1) Figures in the brackets are the percentages of each funding source.

Table 4.5 The Percentages of Government Funding among the Overall Korean Sharing Movement’s Administrative Budget during the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration from 2003 to 2007 (Korean Won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>376,281,042</td>
<td>365,788,900</td>
<td>409,871,875</td>
<td>462,387,851</td>
<td>461,218,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>71,867,321</td>
<td>77,965,685</td>
<td>62,111,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>19.65</td>
<td>19.02</td>
<td>13.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of</td>
<td>of Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1) These figures are reproduced by the author based on Article 9, Section 2 of the Rules of Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea that stipulates the NGO is able to expend 5 per cent of funding received from the government for the organisation’s administrative purpose.; 2) This figure is applied to 8 per cent based on the Rules of Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea amended in 14 March 2007.
increased to roughly 3,977 million won and in 2006 it peaked at about 7,959 million won.

After its peak in 2006, cash donations in 2007 decreased to about 5,492 million won. As the Roh Moo-Hyun administration took measures increasing the percentage of administration among the raised funds, from 2 per cent to 15 per cent on 24 March 2006, the actual scale of the administrative budget available for the KSM increased considerably.

As shown in Table 5.5, the Roh administration increased financial support for humanitarian NGOs and the KSM received a substantial amount of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund. From 2003 to 2007 government funding accounted for an average of 12.01 per cent per year of the entire KSM funding.61 In absolute terms, government funding of the KSM increased to around 5,435 million won during the Roh administration.62 It increased by 2.64 times compared to about 2,062 million won that was available during the Kim Dae-Jung administration. 63 During the Roh administration, government funding covered around 14.52 per cent of the overall administrative budget of the KSM. With another deregulation which increased the administrative budget from 5 per cent to 8 per cent on 14 March 2007, the KSM’s budgetary reliance on government funding increased to 19.72 per cent in 2007.64

4.2.3 The Expertise of the Korean Sharing Movement

NGO expertise can be evaluated through the analyses of organisational structure, actual NGO performance and assessment of outcomes. Organisational structure shapes the
ground level of organisational expertise. How such ground level of organisational expertise shapes actual NGO expertise and performance can be understood through the examination of the overall advocacy of the NGO. This section examines the organisational structure of the KSM that shaped the ground level of organisational expertise. The actual NGO expertise in exploiting various tactics of information, symbol, leverage and networking will be examined in the next substantive chapters.

Organisational structure can be understood through the analyses of the overall structure, divisions, expertise of each division and coordination of the overall structure and divisions. This section demonstrates that, from 1995 to 2007, under the challenging economic and political environment, the KSM gradually improved its organisational expertise. By the end of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM maintained the highest level of organisational expertise.

*The Expertise of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Kim Young-Sam Administration*

In 1996 and 1997, the KSM’s organisational structure was not yet stabilised nor developed. The KSM nonetheless had a unique organisational structure which appointed social and political elders representing various circles and groups in South Korean civil society to the important positions in the KSM. This unique organisational structure enabled the KSM to encompass all of South Korean civil society for the advocacy of food aid to North Korea.

To encourage the participation of the overall civil society actors, the KSM appointed religious leaders, NGO personnel, scholars, elder statesmen and congressmen
to board-level positions. The KSM had a total of ninety-five positions at the board level playing a symbolic function representing the KSM, five executive personnel and around ten staff in the administration office. At the board level, the KSM had positions of three senior advisors, four executive representatives, 29 co-representatives, one chair and four vice-chairs of the central committee and 54 members of the National Assembly Advisory Committee. At the administrative level, the KSM had one chair and one co-chair of the executive committee, one secretary-general, one director of the executive office, one external accountant and around ten administration staff.

With regard to divisions, the KSM’s administration office was a single division until the establishment of a Planning Division in 1997. In 1996, the founders of the KSM perceived the advocacy of food aid to North Korea as a temporary movement. The KSM was considered as a temporary organisation mandated to steer the advocacy of food aid to North Korea and to promote the participation of civil society actors in the advocacy. As the fact that the North Korean food deficit was not a temporary but a chronic problem became known to the international community in late 1996 and 1997, the founders of the KSM recognised the need for the establishment of an organisation which was able to coordinate the overall advocacy on a permanent basis. The KSM thereby established the position of a Planning Officer in the administration office in 1997 to strengthen the function of coordination.

With regard to the expertise of each division, the administration office had expertise to organise nationwide advocacy encompassing the overall civil society actors. Considering the weak organisational ground of the KSM between 1996 and 1997, the expertise of NGO personnel in the administration office was a key factor determining the KSM’s organisational expertise. The chair and co-chair of the Executive Committee,
the Secretary-General and the Director of the Executive Office of the KSM were the key personnel who had a wide human and organisational network, expertise in the civil society movement and administrative capacity. The board members of the KSM were the personnel who were highly motivated by the inevitability of humanitarian food aid to North Korean compatriots. These personnel who had a strong motivation and expertise in the civil society movement provided solid organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea.

In regard to the coordination of the overall structure and divisions, the KSM provided a successful function of coordination. At the internal level, its board members and administration staff were mutually collaborative and maintained strong solidarity. The high level of mutual collaboration among members and staff was attributable to the constitution of its personnel consisting of religious leaders, elder NGO personnel, scholars and elder statesmen who were highly motivated by a strong humanitarianism.70 In addition to such a normative factor, KSM staff and executive personnel in the administration office already had expertise to coordinate the advocacy through many years of civil society movements. As the severity of North Korean food crisis became better known to the international community in 1996, the founders of the KSM recognised the importance of its coordination of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. By establishing the position of a Planning Officer in 1997, the KSM strengthened the function of coordination in the administration office.71

*The Expertise of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Kim Dae-Jung Administration*
During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KSM began to stabilise its organisational structure by restructuring it to a function-centred structure and division. The KSM improved its issue-specific expertise by establishing issue-specific committees and divisions and by appointing experienced experts to these new positions. It sought to strengthen coordination of the overall structure and divisions by strengthening the function of the Planning and Coordination Division and assigning more administration staff.

The KSM gradually improved its organisational efficiency by restructuring its board-level positions and administration office from a personnel-centred structure to a function-centred structure. During the Kim Young-Sam administration the KSM’s organisational structure was a personnel-centred structure which appointed key personnel to the important positions of organisation, and the rest of staff supported these key personnel. Through the gradual structural adjustment after 1998, however, the KSM sought to change such a personnel-centred structure to a function-centred structure and division. In 1998, it removed the central committee at the board level and instead put in place the three positions of the Chair of the Planning Committee, the Chair of the Organising Committee and the Chair of the Committee for Overseas Korean Issues. The KSM appointed the three Co-representatives who only played a symbolic role within these positions. In 1999, the KSM again removed the two positions of the Chair of the Planning Committee and the Chair of the Organising Committee. It instead strengthened the authority of the Head of the Planning Division in the administration office, changing the name of division from the Head of Planning Division to the Head of Planning and Coordination Division. During the year of 1999 the KSM also established the position of the Policy Committee at the board level and two positions of the head and vice-head
of the Policy Division at the administrative level. The KSM strengthened its role as a civil think tank mandated to produce policy recommendations in relation to the advocacy of and the humanitarian assistance to North Korea. It, in addition, founded two new positions, the Head of Advocacy and Research Division and the Head of General Affairs Division, in the same year.\textsuperscript{73} Despite the existence of official positions and personnel, however, the tasks of the general administrative staff were not clearly defined until 2001. In 2001, the KSM at last established four divisions of Planning and Coordination, Inter-Korean Cooperation Project, Education and Advocacy and Overseas Korean Issues under the Secretary General of the KSM.\textsuperscript{74} Administrative staff were assigned to these divisions based on their expertise and personal interests. In doing so, KSM staff finally came to have defined tasks according to their division.

The KSM improved its expertise in relation to advocacy and broadened the organisational network by putting in place new positions in the organisational structure. Recruitment of new personnel who represented differing groups or circles and who had expertise in specific issue areas implicated that the organisation recruiting those personnel was able to exploit the expertise and networks of the recruited personnel for their own purposes. In 1999, the KSM established the position of the Executive Committee.\textsuperscript{75} By appointing personnel from business and political circles and interest groups, it encouraged these circles and groups to participate in the advocacy. In 2000, the KSM established the Kwangjoo-Jeonnam Korean Sharing Movement in the local province of Kwangjoo. The KSM appointed local personnel to the positions of senior advisor, executive representative and co-representative of the Kwangjoo-Jeonnam branch. It also put in place an independent administration office for it.\textsuperscript{76} To encourage the participation of business circles, the KSM established six positions in the
Supervising Committee at the board level, and appointed personnel from the business circles. In 2001, the members of the Supervising Committee increased to eleven. By establishing new positions and branches, the KSM improved its organisational expertise in advocacy and networking.

The KSM improved its issue-specific expertise by establishing issue-specific committees and divisions within the board-level committee and administration office. It established the Policy Committee in 1999 and appointed academically outstanding researchers and scholars from government institutes, academia and civil think tanks to the position of the Policy Committee. These appointed scholars and researchers had expertise in inter-Korean relations and humanitarian and development aid. The personnel, who mostly engaged in the government food and humanitarian aid policy-making process through various channels, are as follows: Jong-Suk Lee, the 32nd Unification Minister from February to December 2006, Keum-Soon Lee, Sung-Ho Je and Hyeong-Jung Park, researchers from the Korea Institution for National Unification (KINU) which is a government institute for inter-Korean issues and unification, Won-Hyeok Lim, a researcher from the Korea Development Institute (KDI), Cheol-Young Choi, a senior researcher from the Korea Legislation Research Institute, Professor Dae-Suk Choi of Dongguk University, Professor Young-Soo Kim of Sogang University and Jong-Hoon Lee, a researcher from the Congress Research and Analysis Bureau. The KSM appointed health and medical experts to the positions in the Headquarters for Health and Medical Cooperation in 2000. The personnel, who were mostly doctors and experts in the health and medical community in South Korea, also contributed to the improvement of the KSM’s expertise in the health and medical cooperation between the two Koreas. By putting in place the positions of the Policy Committee in the
organisational structure and appointing experts to this position, the KSM improved the organisational expertise in policy research and recommendation in relation to the advocacy and delivery of assistance to North Korea.\textsuperscript{80}

The KSM gradually strengthened the function of coordination among divisions. As the KSM diversified its mandates and projects from 1999, its organisational structure became subdivided and administration staff also increased from around 10 in 1998 to 17 in 2001.\textsuperscript{81} As such organisational expansion and subdivision became more apparent during the part of the Kim Dae-Jung administration, coordination of the overall structure among divisions became more important. The KSM gradually strengthened the position of the Head of the Planning Division which had been established in 1997. In 1999, it gave the authority for coordination to the Head of the Planning Division, changing the official title to the Head of Planning and Coordination. The KSM additionally founded the position of Vice-head of the Planning Division.\textsuperscript{82} In 2001, the KSM put the Planning and Coordination Division at the highest position in the structure of the administration office. It also strengthened the function of coordination by assigning four administration staff to the Planning and Coordination Division.\textsuperscript{83}

The Expertise of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration

During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM established new committees at the board level in order to strengthen its role in advocacy, civil participation, policy research and development. It strengthened the function and expertise of each division by dividing the existing four administrative divisions into five divisions and two centres
according to its function. In doing so, the KSM was able to maintain the highest level of organisational expertise in the advocacy and the delivery of humanitarian and development aid to North Korea.

The KSM established new committees at the board level in order to strengthen policy research and development, their advocacy role and civil participation. On 26 November 2003 it established the Centre for Peace Sharing merging the previous two Policy Executive Committees to strengthen policy research and development.$^{84}$ The Centre for Peace Sharing contributed to broadening the KSM’s expert networking providing scholars, researchers in government and civil think tanks, and government officials with the opportunity to share their expertise and intelligence through periodic policy forums. The KSM also set up three committees of Civil Participation, Public Relations and Editing, and the Vision of 2010 Korean Compatriots at the board level to strengthen the advocacy role and encourage the public to participate in the advocacy of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea.$^{85}$ The Vision of 2010 Korean Compatriots Committee was founded to promote inter-Korean exchange and cooperation in social and cultural areas. On 13 September 2007 the KSM established the Busan-Kyungnam Korean Sharing Movement at the end of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. It was easy for the KSM to establish a local branch in Kwangjoo-Jeonnam province due to an already established positive disposition towards pro inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. By establishing the Busan-Kyungnam Korean Sharing Movement, the KSM at last prepared regional ground from which it was able to expand its advocacy to the Busan-Kyungnam region.

The KSM strengthened a function-centred structure and division, expanding the existing four divisions to five and two centres. In 2001, for the first time the KSM
established four clear-cut divisions of Planning and Coordination, the Inter-Korean Cooperation Project, Education and Advocacy and Overseas Korean Issues under the Secretary General. From 2003 to 2007 in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM transferred the function of planning and coordination to the Secretary General, the Vice-Secretary General and the Executive Committee, closing the Planning and Coordination Division. In 2003, the KSM transferred a part of the planning function, which had been entirely allocated to the Planning and Coordination Division, to the Centre for Peace Sharing that was newly established. The KSM subdivided the Inter-Korean Cooperation Project Division into two divisions. The division of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Project I was mandated to manage the inter-Korean agro-livestock cooperation. The division of Inter-Korean Cooperation Project II was mandated to manage inter-Korean health and medical cooperation. The KSM also subdivided the Education and Advocacy Division into the Resource Development Team and the Human Resource Development Centre. The Resource Development Team took charge of advocacy and membership management. The Human Resource Development Centre was mandated to develop human resource development in North Korea. The Centre for Peace Sharing also took charge of the education of South Korean civil society. The overseas Korean Issues Division was maintained. Two teams of General Affairs and Accounting were newly established to manage the general affairs of the administrative office and the funding capacity of the KSM.

The expertise of the division during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, a function-centred division that was adopted at the end of the Kim Dae-Jung administration contributed to the improvement of divisional expertise. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration the total number of administration staff decreased from 17 in
2001 to 15 in 2006. By maintaining a function-centred structure and division system, the KSM assured that each division was able to accumulate divisional expertise. The establishment of the Centre for Peace Sharing also contributed to the improvement of divisional expertise by promoting knowledge exchange between expert groups and the divisions of the KSM.

KSM closed the Planning and Coordination Division and transferred the function of planning and coordination to the Secretary General, the Vice-secretary General, the Executive Committee and the Centre for Peace Sharing. The closure of the Planning and Coordination Division was attributable to the decrease of administrative staff and the emphasis on pragmatism in restructuring the organisational structure of the KSM to a project-centred division. The KSM transferred the function of planning and coordination to the executive officers. It established the position of Vice-secretary General under the Secretary General. Through the amendment of the rules and regulations the KSM changed the management of the Executive Committee, which has authority to deliberate and make overall decisions on the issues of the KSM, to be more realistic and practical. In 2004, the KSM amended the number in the Executive Committee, from 30 personnel among the members of the Executive Committee, to 5 executive personnel who represented the major projects of the KSM. By changing the frequency of the executive meetings from monthly to every other month, the KSM improved the practicality of the management of the Executive Committee. In doing so, it strengthened the function of the Executive Committee in the coordination of the overall structure and divisions. The Centre for Peace Sharing took over some of the planning within the KSM. By organising periodic expert forums, the Centre for Peace Sharing played a role in the development of new policies and projects and the
improvement of the existing inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Such roles of the Centre for Peace Sharing replaced the planning function of the previous Planning and Coordination Division.

4.3 The Organisational Capacity of Good Friends

Using the identical analytical framework which is employed in the examination of the organisational capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement, this section demonstrates how and why the specific organisational mandates, funding capacity and expertise of Good Friends combined to permit Good Friends to exert influence over South Korean government food aid policy.

Until the end of 1998, Good Friends adhered to a single mandate, which was to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. After the inauguration of President Kim Dae-Jung, Good Friends began to diversify its mandate. Such diversification between 1999 and 2003 consequently resulted in the weakening of the Good Friends’ original humanitarian mandate. In 2003, Good Friends attempted to strengthen its humanitarian mandate, resuming active advocacy from 2004 and 2006. During this period, however, Good Friends’ commitment to the advocacy movement was occasional and secondary. From the end of 2006, however, Good Friends resumed its full advocacy movement urging the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide additional food aid to North Korea. This chapter next demonstrates that throughout the entire period of advocacy of food aid to North Korea from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends’ unique funding structure, as one of the Jungto Society-affiliated organisations, enabled them to keep their independent
voice and adhere to an advocacy role free from the influence of funding sources, such as
the South Korean government and the corporate sector. Lastly, it demonstrates that
throughout the 12 years of the advocacy movement from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends
improved its expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, but such expertise
mainly came from individual personnel, rather than the organisational structure. Good
Friends maintained a personnel-centred structure, in which a few founders of Good
Friends continued to play an overarching management role. Such distinctive
characteristics enabled Good Friends to maintain the relatively high level of
organisational expertise in relation to advocacy despite the downsizing of the
organisational structure of Good Friends from its peak at the beginning of the Kim Dae-
Jung administration in 1998.

This section uses anniversary reports, white papers and interviews with Good
Friends personnel. The anniversary reports and white papers provide the rules and
regulations that stipulate the organisational mandates.\textsuperscript{92} It also uses interviews with
Good Friends personnel.\textsuperscript{93} For the examination of Good Friends funding capacity, it
mainly uses internal materials and annual reports from Good Friends and government
archives. Good Friends was reluctant to open their accounting to the public and
researchers for the organisation’s internal reasons. Based on a telephone interview with
Good Friends personnel and government archives showing the list of NGOs that
received government financial support from 2000 to 2007,\textsuperscript{94} it examines the funding
capacity of Good Friends and its reliance on government funding. Good Friends
published a ‘10 year Foundation Anniversary Report’, other periodic newsletters and
reports do not include the details of organisational features or human resource
management. To examine the organisational structure and the human resource
management of Good Friends, this section therefore uses the data from interviews with An-Sook Jung, the former Secretary General of Good Friends and other personnel from Good Friends.\textsuperscript{95}

The first part examines the mandates of Good Friends and how and why they changed during each administration. The second part examines the funding capacity of Good Friends. The third part examines organisational expertise through an analysis of changes in organisational structure. In the analyses of the funding capacity and expertise, however, the second and third parts do not follow a chronology by administration due to the lack of reliable sources on the funding capacity and the organisational expertise of Good Friends.

\textbf{4.3.1 The Mandates of Good Friends}

This section demonstrates that until the end of 1998, Good Friends adhered to a single mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. Between 1999 and 2003, Good Friends diversified its mandates to the issues of North Korean human rights, defectors over the Chinese-Korean border and the reunification movement. Such diversification resulted in the weakening of Good Friends’ mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. Following the continued weakening of the humanitarian mandate, Good Friends then attempted to strengthen it again. Between 2004 and 2006, Good Friends resumed active advocacy of food aid to North Korea. During this period, however, Good Friends’ commitment to advocacy was occasional and secondary. At the end of 2006, Good Friends recognised the high possibility of a recurrence of the North Korean food crisis.
Throughout 2007 Good Friends engaged in advocacy that pressurised the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide additional food aid to North Korea.

_The Mandate of Good Friends during the Kim Young-Sam Administration_

From 1995, Good Friends maintained a single mandate to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. Between 1995 and 1996, the Jungto Society, which was a Buddhist ascetic exercise organisation, and other Buddhist organisations recognised the need for a more active role in Buddhist circles in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, but this recognition was not realised until the establishment of the Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement (KBSM) on 12 December 1996. In 1995 and 1996 the Jungto Society, which emphasised individual ascetic exercise and the role of Buddhists in civil society, engaged in the advocacy, prompting the Kim Young-Sam administration and South Korean civil society in fundraising campaigns. In 1995 and 1996, Buddhist circles also engaged in the establishment of the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) replacing the Inter-religious Committee on June 1996. Upon taking the position of Co-director of the Executive Committee of the KSM in particular, Revd Beobryun contributed to strengthening the KSM’s status as a collaborative network encompassing major religious groups and civil society organisations. At the end of 1996, 33 Buddhist organisations including the Jungto Society recognised the need for an advocacy NGO committed to relieving the food crisis in North Korea. On 12 December 1996, they finally founded the Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement (KBSM), the predecessor of Good Friends. After the establishment of the KBSM, it adhered to a single mandate to
relieve the food crisis in North Korea. Under the negative socio-political environment, which resulted from North Korea’s military actions and negative response to South Korea’s rice assistance in 1995, the KBSM recognised the need for active and religion-driven advocacy which was able to proselytise the Kim Young-Sam administration and South Korean civil society to change their negative view on the provision of food aid to North Korea. The KBSM committed to enhance public awareness about the severity of the North Korean food crisis, so that South Korean civil society would take action to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea. Under a single mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea in 1997, The KBSM consistently adhered to its mandate to advocate food aid to North Korea, and this strong mandate was a motivation which Good Friends was able to extend in its most active advocacy in 1997.

The Mandate of Good Friends during the Kim Dae-Jung Administration

Until the end of 1998, Good Friends adhered to a single mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. Between 1999 and 2002, Good Friends diversified its mandates to include the issues of North Korean human rights, defectors over the Chinese-Korean border and the reunification movement. Such diversification resulted in the weakening of Good Friends’ mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea.

In 1998, the first year of the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KBSM, the predecessor of Good Friends, still had in place its mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea and focused on pressing the Kim Dae-Jung administration. Although the Kim Dae-Jung administration was more pro food aid to North Korea than the Kim
Young-Sam administration, the Kim Dae-Jung administration had a lukewarm policy on food aid to North Korea. This was attributable to the situation in which the Kim Dae-Jung administration had not yet established its policy towards North Korea. Given this operational environment, the KBSM recognised the necessity for continued advocacy prompting the Kim Dae-Jung administration to establish a policy more favourable to the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea.\(^9\) In 1998, the KBSM therefore committed to a single mandate to advocate food aid to North Korea.

Between 1999 and 2002, the KBSM diversified its mandates to various North Korea-related issues changing its name to Good Friends. Such diversification resulted in the weakening of Good Friends’ fundamental mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. In 1999, the fact that the severity of the North Korean food crisis was relieved after its peak at the end of 1997 became known to the international community. The Kim Dae-Jung administration adopted a policy that strengthened the role of the government in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, as well as the provision of food and other humanitarian assistance to North Korea. In May 1999, under these changes, The KBSM expanded its single mandate to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea to various North Korea-related issues.\(^9\) Good Friends committed to a movement for North Korean defectors at the Korean-Chinese border and their human rights.\(^1\) In 2000, Good Friends engaged in the unification movement.\(^1\) Good Friends expanded its mandate to a movement for the Korean-Chinese victims of South Korean fraud at the Korean-Chinese border and a peace movement opposing the development of a Missile Defence System on the Korean peninsula.\(^2\) In 2002, the last year of the Kim Dae-Jung administration, Good Friends narrowed down its mandate to the unification movement.\(^3\) Such diversification of organisational mandates between 1999 and 2002
hence resulted in the weakening of Good Friends’ mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea.

*The Mandate of Good Friends during the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration*

After the continued weakening of the humanitarian mandate between 1999 and 2003, Good Friends attempted to strengthen its humanitarian mandate, extending active advocacy between 2004 and 2006. During this period, however, Good Friends’ commitment to the advocacy was occasional and secondary.

In 2003, the first year of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the weakening of the Good Friends’ humanitarian mandate continued. Under the establishment of the Roh Moo-Hyun government which encouraged the provision of large-scale government food aid to North Korea, the advocacy that proselytised the government to provide food aid to North Korea was no longer necessary. Given the operational environment in 2003, Good Friends mainly engaged in the unification and human rights movement and hence the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea was a secondary.

In 2004, although Good Friends resumed its mandate to advocate the provision of humanitarian food aid to North Korea, it was a temporary and occasional one for Good Friends. In February 2004, Good Friends framed the food crisis in North Korea’s violation of human rights, through the publication of the report ‘Human Rights in North Korea and The Food Crisis.’ Good Friends sought to improve public awareness of the recurrence of the food crisis in North Korea. In April 2004, it also pressurised the United Nations Human Rights Committee to take action to resolve the North Korean
food crisis. After the occurrence of the humanitarian disaster of the Ryongcheon Station Explosion on 22 April, Good Friends actively engaged in fundraising for humanitarian assistance to the North Korean victims and advocacy urging the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide humanitarian assistance, but it was a temporary movement responding to the incidents of the humanitarian disaster in 2004.

Between 2005 and 2006, under the unfavourable operational environment for the provision of food aid to North Korea, Good Friends engaged in advocacy encouraging the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide government-level food aid to North Korea, but it still was an occasional and secondary mandate for Good Friends. Negative political incidents, such as the second Bush administration’s hostile policy towards North Korea in 2005 and North Korea’s missile and nuclear test in 2006, resulted in the suspension of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s food aid. A flood in 2006 further resulted in severe damage in food production in North Korea. Under this operational environment, Good Friends continued to engage in the joint advocacy of food aid to North Korea. Good Friends’ engagement in advocacy, however, was indirect through the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, rather than an active role in organising the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea. During this period of 2005 and 2006, Good Friends’ major mandate was still the unification movement.

At the end of 2006, Good Friends recognised the high possibility of a recurrence of the North Korean food crisis. Under this recognition, Good Friends resumed advocacy that pushed the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide additional food aid to North Korea. On 26 December 2006, Good Friends began to strengthen its fundamental mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea, informing the South Korean civil society of the likelihood of the recurrence of a food crisis in North Korean
2007 at the conference titled ‘The North Korean Food Crisis, a Recurrence?’ \(^{108}\) After this conference, Good Friends consistently sought to enhance public awareness about the likelihood of the recurrence of the food crisis in North Korea.\(^ {109}\)

In mid-2007 when the actual victims of food deficits began to increase in North Korea, Good Friends further strengthened its organisational mandate to advocate food aid to North Korea and increased its advocacy activities. Given this strong mandate, Good Friends resumed various advocacy activities, such as issuing web-magazine providing information on the increase of famine victims in North Korea and fundraising for North Korean famine victims which was suspended with the establishment of the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations.\(^ {110}\)

4.3.2 The Funding Capacity of Good Friends

Throughout the entire period of advocacy from 1996 to 2007, the funding of Good Friends was not sufficient, due to its limited organisational capability to improve its funding source and scale. Despite this poor funding capacity, Good Friends’ unique funding source, as one of the Jungto Society-affiliated organisations, enabled Good Friends to keep their independent voice and adhere to its advocacy role which was free from the influence of funding organisations.

The main reason that Good Friends was not able to improve its funding capacity was that since its establishment, Good Friends consistently engaged in advocacies, such as food aid to North Korea, North Korean human rights and defectors, and the reunification movement. Good Friends’ strong adherence to these advocacies needed
less financial support from the general public, the corporate sector and the South Korean government compared to the KSM’s direct humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea. In May 1999, Good Friends expanded its mandate and major programmes but still remained as an advocacy NGO promoting the issues of food aid to North Korea, North Korean human rights and defectors, and the reunification movement. In 1999, Good Friends entrusted the delivery of direct humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea to the Joint Together Society (JTS), one of the Jungto Society-affiliated organisations.

Table 4.6 Government Funding for Good Friends from 2000 to 2007 (Thousand Korean won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>-</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24,000</td>
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</tbody>
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Note: 1) The Kim Dae-Jung administration adopted ‘Non-profit Organisation Support Act’ on 16 December 1999. Based on this act the South Korean civil society organisations including the humanitarian NGOs received the government financial support since 2000.


In contrast to other South Korean humanitarian NGOs which were able to increase their funding capacity by diversifying their mandates and programmes to direct humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea, Good Friends consistently
adhered to the advocacy activities which received less financial support from the general public, corporate bodies and the South Korean government. Since the South Korean government began to provide financial support for NGO projects in 2000, for instance, Good Friends only received a total of 170,000,000 won in eight years from 2000 to 2007. The legal basis for government financial support of Good Friends’ projects was not ‘The Rules of Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea’, a major basis of government funding for the KSM and other humanitarian NGOs. The ‘Non-profit Organisation Support Act’ enacted to support civil society organisations on 16 December 1999, instead, was the only legal basis of government funding for Good Friends projects.

Good Friends was one of the Jungto Society-affiliated organisations and was driven by a strong religious motivation based on Buddhism. The organisational structure and the religious motivation, both in terms of organisational structure and personnel levels, were enough to sustain the standing of Good Friends. Maintaining a close organisational relationship with the Jungto Society, Good Friends relied on human resource and material supports from them. The staff of Good Friends were all Buddhists working on a voluntary basis, driven by a strong religious motivation. The Jungto Society provided free board and accommodation for them in return. In regard to other organisational expenditures, Good Friends used the building of the Jungto Society another small amount of administrative costs were fulfilled by public donations through the Good Friends’ website or street fundraising.

Since Good Friends and its staff were free from financial burden, Good Friends did not have a strong motivation to improve its funding capacity. Due to the limitation of available data on the funding capacity of Good Friends, it is difficult to
examine any changes made. In contrast to the KSM which achieved significant organisation development since 1996 through the improvement in funding capacity, Good Friends was mostly reliant on small-scale public donations, such as membership fees and street fundraising. During the same period of 1996 to 2007, as a result, Good Friends was not able to achieve organisational development for sufficient and more effective advocacy. During the early years of Good Friends from 1996 until 2000, around 30 personnel, except for the President Revd Beobryun, worked for Good Friends, and then the number of full time staff gradually decreased. Around 2007, the full time staff of Good Friends decreased to around six personnel.

Due to the distinctive funding capacity above, Good Friends was free from over-reliance on a single funding source and therefore was able to maintain its critical voice in proselytising the South Korean government and civil society to take action to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. Good Friends’ unique funding capacity, as one of the Jungto Society-affiliated organisations and its organisational characteristics driven by a strong religious motivation, enabled Good Friends to keep its independent voice and adhere to its advocacy role, free from the influences of funding organisations, mainly the South Korean government. During the entire period from 1995 to 2007, consequently, negative political and military actions, such as North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test in 2006, made it difficult for the South Korean humanitarian NGOs to criticise the South Korean government’s policy which suspended food aid to North Korea because they were highly reliant on government funding. Good Friends, however, was able to advocate strongly, pressing the South Korean government and civil society to resume the provision of humanitarian food aid to North Korea, irrespective of political and military incidents.
4.3.3 The Expertise of Good Friends

Throughout the 12 years from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends improved its expertise in the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea, but the expertise of Good Friends mainly came from individual personnel, rather than the organisational structure. Good Friends maintained a personnel-centred structure in which a few founders continued to play an overarching management role. In contrast to other humanitarian NGOs which generally developed their organisational structure and expertise, the organisational structure of Good Friends became downsized after its peak at the beginning of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998. The individual expertise of key personnel thereby shaped the organisational expertise of Good Friends.

In 1996, Good Friends was founded with a function-centred structure and divisions. The major reason that Good Friends was able to establish such subdivided divisions in the early stages of its establishment was that it was free from the financial burden of administration, in particular salaries. The full time administrative staff of Good Friends did not receive any salary, as they were Buddhist who were fully motivated by the inevitability of humanitarian assistance to North Korean compatriots and Buddhism. From the establishment in 1996 until mid-2000 Good Friends was able to maintain seven divisions of Finance, Accounting, Planning and Coordination, Research and Analysis, Overseas Projects, General Affairs and Public Relations. Based on the function-centred structure and divisions from 1996 until mid-1999, Good Friends extended its most active and influential advocacy.

In 1999 and 2000, as the severity of the North Korean food crisis was relieved, the function-centred structure and divisions of Good Friends began to be replaced by a
personnel-centred structure. Changes in the operational environment in which Good Friends worked, resulted in the downsizing of its organisational structure. In 2000 the incident where four Good Friends personnel working at the Korean-Chinese border were detained by the Chinese government gave the momentum for Good Friends to reconsider its fundamental organisational objective. As the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations took the position of pro food and humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea, the need for advocacy to pressurise the government to take humanitarian action decreased. Given such changes in the operational environment, the status and function of the Korean Joint Together Society (JTS), which was an affiliated NGO of Good Friends and was mandated to deliver humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea, became more important. The role of Good Friends as an advocacy NGO, on the other hand, became relatively smaller. Good Friends thereby diversified its mandates to assistance to North Korean defectors, North Korean human rights, a peaceful unification movement and assistance to a North Korean defectors’ settlement in South Korea. In contrast to the KSM which was able to develop its organisational structure through the diversification of organisational mandates and projects, the diversification of Good Friends’ organisational mandate and projects resulted in a decline in its organisational structure.

In regard to the expertise of each division, despite the function-centred structure and divisions in the early stages of Good Friends, each division lacked divisional expertise, due to the qualifications of the personnel working for each division. Most administrative personnel were recruited from volunteer Buddhist believers therefore they lacked expertise in the divisional tasks. These personnel, instead, improved their expertise through learning by doing since its engagement in advocacy in
1996. From May 1999 until the diversification of the Good Friends mandates, each division actively engaged in their own tasks of research and analysis, fundraising, policy development and recommendation, and the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea. In doing so, each division was able to accumulate divisional expertise. After the diversification of organisational mandates, however, the organisational structure of Good Friends began to shrink and it facilitated the reformation from a function-centred structure and division to a personnel-centred structure. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the previous function-centred structure and division of Good Friends collapsed except for the Research and Analysis Division. Only this Division was maintained and continued to carry out the research and analysis project on the North Korean food crisis.

Lastly, in regard to the coordination of the overall structure and divisions, the President and other key personnel of Good Friends had authority in the coordination of the overall structure and projects. There was a Planning and Coordination Division within the structure of Good Friends, but it only worked until around May 1999. Revd Beobryun, the founder of Good Friends and the leader of the Jungto Society, and An-Sook Jung, the first Secretary General of Good Friends, instead played a key role in the planning and coordination of the overall structure and projects. As the function-centred structure of Good Friends began to be diluted after the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the role of these key personnel became more significant.

### 4.4 Conclusion
This chapter showed that the organisational mandates, funding capacity and expertise of the KSM and Good Friends were important in the constitution of each NGO’s capacity to influence South Korean government food aid policy.

This chapter first examined the organisational capacity of the KSM. With regard to the mandate of the KSM, this chapter demonstrated that in 1996 and 1997 the KSM strongly adhered to one single mandate to advocate for the provision of food aid to North Korea. After the inauguration of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998, the South Korean government became more pro food and humanitarian assistance to North Korea. The KSM therefore expanded their mandates to include inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Such diversification of the organisational mandate resulted in the weakening of the humanitarian mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea, by diluting the previous single mandate and thereby scattering the organisational resources.

With regard to the funding capacity of the KSM, until early 1997, under the Kim Young-Sam administration’s restriction, the KSM maintained poor funding capacity. From 1998 to 2002 in the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the diversification of funding sources through new aid programmes, government deregulation in relation to NGO fundraising and government funding for humanitarian NGOs’ activities in North Korea contributed to the stabilisation of KSM funding capacity. From 2003 to 2007, the KSM further stabilised its funding capacity by diversifying funding sources. The stabilisation of funding capacity in turn contributed to the KSM’s organisational development. During this period, however, the ratio of government funding to non-government funding increased to an extent which might blunt the KSM’s advocacy role of pressuring the government.
This chapter then demonstrated that the KSM gradually achieved the organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In 1996 and 1997 the KSM’s organisational structure was neither stabilised nor developed yet but had a unique structure encompassing various circles and groups in South Korean civil society. During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KSM began to stabilise its organisational structure by restructuring it to a function-centred structure, by establishing issue-specific committees and divisions and by appointing experienced experts to these new positions. The KSM also strengthened coordination of the overall structure and divisions by strengthening the function of the Planning and Coordination Division and assigning more administrative staff. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM further strengthened its role in advocacy, civil participation, policy research and development. It further stabilised its function-centred structure by dividing the existing four administrative divisions into five divisions and two centres according to its function. In doing so, the KSM was able to maintain the highest level of organisational expertise in the advocacy and delivery of humanitarian and development aid to North Korea.

Under the identical analytical framework, this chapter examined the organisational capacity of Good Friends and demonstrated that the organisational mandates, funding capacity and expertise of Good Friends changed over time. With regard to the organisational mandate, Good Friends diversified its mandates after adhering to a single mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea until mid-1999. Between 1999 and 2003 the diversification of mandates resulted in the weakening of Good Friends’ humanitarian mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. From 2004 and 2006, Good Friends then attempted to strengthen its humanitarian mandate,
but its commitment to advocacy was only occasional and secondary. From the end of 2006 until 2007, Good Friends at last resumed its advocacy prompting the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to increase the scale of food aid to North Korea.

With regard to funding capacity, Good Friends maintained a poor level of funding capacity. However, its unique funding capacity, as one of the Jungto Society-affiliated organisations, enabled them to keep its independent voice and adhere to an advocacy role which was free from the influence of funding organisations, mainly the South Korean government.

Lastly, throughout the 12 years of advocacy from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends improved its organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, but the expertise of Good Friends mainly came from individual personnel, rather than its organisational structure. Between 1996 and 1999, Good Friends had a function-centred structure and divisions, but the organisational expertise of Good Friends was low due to the lack of individual expertise in Good Friends’ personnel who were generally recruited from Buddhist volunteers. In contrast to other humanitarian NGOs who developed their organisational structure and expertise after government funding for NGO activities in 2000, the organisational structure of Good Friends gradually downsized with the weakening of its organisational mandate. Between 2000 and 2007, Good Friends maintained a personnel-centred structure in which the key personnel continued to play an overarching role. The individual expertise of key personnel thereby shaped the organisational expertise of Good Friends.

2 Annual reports and white papers that were published by KSM are as follows: *Daetonggge drinun Tanwonseo* [English Translation: A Petition to the President], *Wuriminjokseorodbgwundong Changrib 1junyeon Kinyeom Jaryojib* [English Translation: Report on the 1 year of the Korean Sharing Movement], *Wooriminjokseorodbgwyundong Changrib 3 junyeon Hwaldong Jaryojib* [English Translation: Report on the 3 years of the Korean Sharing Movement], *Changrib 5junyeon Hwaldong Jaryojib* [English Translation: Report on the 5 years of the Korean Sharing Movement], *Wooriminjokseorodeobgi 10 Junyeon Jarojib* [English Translation: Report on the 10 years of the Korean Sharing Movement].

3 Interviewees from KSM are as follows: Jong-Moo Lee (Director of Centre for Peace Sharing), Kyung-Suk Suh (Former Joint Representative), Young-Sik Kang (Secretary General), Mun-Kyu Kang (Former President), and Yong-Sun Lee (Chairman of the Steering Committee). An interviewee from Good Friends is Seung-Yong Lee (Director/Former Project Coordinator of Peace and Human Rights Bureau, Good Friends).


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9 Chondogyo as one of biggest religion in South Korea is rooted in Korean shamanism, Taoism and Korean Buddhism, with elements drawn from Christianity. Chondogyo has around 200 warship places and 45,000 believers. Won-Buddhism and Chogye Order are both religious bodies derived from Buddhism.


13 Ibid. p. 12.

14 Ibid. p. 12.


17 Ibid.


19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.


Ibid.


32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.


35 On 18 September 1996 26 North Korean armed guerillas attempted to infiltrate into South Korea using a submarine in the East Sea.


40 Ibid.

41 Namhee Yun, Internal material on the funding capacity of KSM from 1996 to 2007 on the request of the author. [Unpublished Material: KSM’s internal data], 2010.


43 Author, Interview with Young-Sik Kang, The Secretary General of the Korean Sharing Movement, in Seoul. 18/05/2009.

45 Ibid.

46 Author, Interview with Jong-Moo Lee, The Director of the Centre for Peace Sharing, Korean Sharing Movement, in Seoul. 06/05/2009.

47 Ibid.


50 Author, Interview with Yong-Sun Lee, The Chairman of the Steering Committee, Korean Sharing Movement, in Seoul. 12/05/2009.


In 2004 a train which was carrying chemical fertiliser exploded at the Ryongcheon Station. This caused around 161 casualties.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Author, Telephone interview with Young-Sik Kang, The Secretary General of the Korean Sharing Movement, on the organizational structure and human resource management of KSM. 08/02/2010.

67 Author, Telephone interview with Young-Sik Kang, The Secretary General of the Korean Sharing Movement, on the organizational structure and human resource management of KSM. 08/02/2010.


70 Author, Interview with Yong-Sun Lee, The Chairman of the Steering Committee, Korean Sharing Movement, in Seoul. 12/05/2009.


72 Ibid.


75 Korean Sharing Movement, Wooriminjokseorodobgwundong Changrib 3 junyeon

76 Ibid.


85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid.

88 Author, Interview with Jong-Moo Lee, The Director of the Centre for Peace Sharing, Korean Sharing Movement, in Seoul. 06/05/2009.


91 Author, Interview with Jong-Moo Lee, The Director of the Centre for Peace Sharing, Korean Sharing Movement, in Seoul. 06/05/2009.

92 Annual reports and white papers that were published by Good Friends are as follows: NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, *Daebukjiwon 10nyeon Baekseo* [English Translation: White Paper of the 10-years of Aids to North Korea] and Good Friends, *Joeunbeotdeul 10Junyeon Ginyeom Jaryogib* [English Translation: Good Friends 10-years of Foundation Anniversary Report].

93 Interviewees from Good Friends are as follows: An-Sook Junge (Former Secretary General), Seung-Yong Lee (Director/Former Project Coordinator of Peace and Human Rights Bureau, Good Friends), Yeo-Kyung Kang, (Director of Overseas Assistance of Peace Foundation and Good Friends from July 1997), and Dongwoo Seo, (Overseas Program Project Officer of the Joint Together Society which is the Good Friends-affiliated organization).

The details of interview are as follows: Seung-Yong Lee, The Secretary General of Good Friends and The Former Director of Peace and Human Rights Bureau of Good Friends, in Seoul, Dongwoo Seo, The Overseas Program Project Officer of the Joint Together Society, on the funding capacity of Good Friends and JTS, An-Sook Jung, The Former Secretary General of Good Friends, and Yeo-Kyung Kang, The Director of Overseas Assistance of Peace Foundation and Good Friends from July 1997.


Author, Interview with Seung-Yong Lee, The Secretary General of Good Friends and The Former Director of Peace and Human Rights Bureau of Good Friends, in Seoul. 07/05/2009.


Good Friends, Joeunbeotdeul 10Junyeon Ginyeom Jaryojib [English Translation:

101 Ibid. pp. 32-33.

102 Ibid. pp. 21-23.

103 Ibid. pp. 32-33.


106 Ibid.

107 Ibid.


profit Organizations chosen for the beneficiary of Government Support in the fiscal year 2007]. p. 34.

112 Author, Interview with Seung-Yong Lee, The Secretary General of Good Friends and The Former Director of Peace and Human Rights Bureau of Good Friends, in Seoul. 07/05/2009.

113 Author, Telephone interview with Dongwoo Seo, The Overseas Program Project Officer of the Joint Together Society, on the funding capacity of Good Friends and JTS. 10/01/2010.

114 The detailed data on funding is not known as Good Friends was reluctant to open their accounting to the public, even researchers.


116 Ibid.


118 Author, Telephone interview with An-Sook Jung, The Former Secretary General of Good Friends. 11/02/2010.

119 Ibid.

120 Author, Interview with Seung-Yong Lee, The Secretary General of Good Friends and The Former Director of Peace and Human Rights Bureau of Good Friends, in Seoul. 07/05/2009.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.
CHAPTER 5. THE ADVOCACY OF THE KOREAN SHARING MOVEMENT

This chapter demonstrates Hypothesis II: Differing non-governmental organisation capacities were consequential in explaining the ability of non-governmental organisation advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea. This thesis draws particularly from the works of Richard Price, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink \(^1\) to provide an analytical framework for evaluating non-governmental organisation (NGO) influence on state food aid policy making. As shown in the theoretical framework in Chapter Two, differing NGO capacities are demonstrated through (i) agenda framing – where NGOs reframe the issue of food aid so as to resonate with the government and the public, (ii) networking – where a NGO expands its network both in terms of quantity and quality and (iii) a norm grafting stage – where a NGO exploits various tactics and strategies in order to change existing norms and practices in the government and the public.

This chapter demonstrates that differences in the Korean Sharing Movement’s organisational capacity were consequential in explaining the ability of KSM advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of the Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s policy on food aid to North Korea. The ability of KSM advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of the South Korean government’s policy on food aid to North Korea, however, was not always timely and appropriate. This chapter demonstrates that changes in the issue characteristics of the food crisis, the South
Korean government’s domestic political structure and KSM capability circumscribed and, sometimes, promoted the ability of KSM advocacy to advocate for food aid to North Korea.

With regard to agenda setting, the KSM framed the issue of food aid to North Korea. In doing so, the KSM anticipated the issue of food aid would resonate with the government policy makers and South Korean civil society. This chapter first demonstrates that in the beginning of the advocacy movement between 1995 and 1997 the KSM which was highly motivated by a normative mandate of food aid but lacked the organisational expertise in the advocacy movement mainly appealed to the sense of brotherly love and humanitarianism. As the advocacy of food aid became prolonged throughout the Kim Dae-Jung administration, however, the KSM showed improved expertise in the agenda framing, by exploiting more practical and obligatory factors in framing food aid to North Korea. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM which changed its organisational mandate from the advocacy of food aid to the delivery of development aid was passive in the agenda framing of food aid to North Korea. Changes in the operational environment, such as the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004, North Korea’s missile and nuclear test and the severe flood damage in 2006, instead induced the KSM to frame the issue of food aid as ‘humanitarianism.’

This chapter secondly demonstrates that the KSM gradually developed its networks, which enabled the KSM to get access to the key government policy makers and finally to exert influence on South Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea. Such effective networking by the KSM was attributable to their unique organisational structure. In the beginning of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea in 1995, the KSM formed a wide range of networks with various religious groups
and civil society organisations. Such wide-ranging and high status networks enabled the KSM to exert political influence on state food aid policy making as well as on civil society. During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KSM further established a high status network with policy makers in the government and high-ranking politicians. The KSM particularly established NGO consultative bodies and their personnel were appointed to advisory positions in differing government consultative bodies. Such wide-ranging and high-status networks were consequential in the maximisation of the KSM influence on state food aid policy making. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, lastly, the KSM played a steering role in the institutionalisation of the NGO-government consultative body enabling the KSM and other humanitarian NGOs to obtain access to government aid policy makers. In 2004, the KSM’s cooperative relationship with the National Assembly Research Meeting and the establishment of the Centre for Peace Sharing under the structure of the KSM finally contributed to increasing the quality of KSM network.

Lastly, this chapter demonstrates that the KSM exploited differing grafting strategies to incorporate the norms and ideas which support the provision of food aid to North Korea into the norms and ideas of the South Korean government policy makers and civil society. These grafting strategies which were exploited by the KSM changed over time and gradually improved in respect of their impact on the state food aid policy-making process. Such improvement in their influence was attributable to the KSM’s consistent advocacy that demanded NGO participation in the state policy-making process and the KSM’s organisational capacity that enabled their consistent advocacy since 1996. The KSM which proselytised the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to embrace new norms in relation to the provision of food aid to North
Korea exploited conventional strategies, such as nationwide campaigns, press conferences, domestic and international conferences, to change existing government and civil society norms and practices. During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the ability of the KSM to exploit effective and timely grafting strategy, however, was not always effective. This chapter demonstrates that until the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, the KSM exploited conventional advocacy tactics. After the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 and through the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM actively exploited government and NGO consultative bodies which allowed it to gain access to the state food aid policy makers directly.

This chapter uses different resources according to the subjects of analysis. The chapter uses annual reports, conference proceedings, web-databases, newspaper articles and masters’ theses as the background materials for the examination of the KSM in advocacy. Annual reports published by the KSM provide background information on the activities of these NGOs. This chapter next uses conference proceedings, email newsletters and web-databases of NGOs and newspaper articles. As one of its major advocacy strategies, the KSM organised a series of policy conferences, symposiums, forums and international conferences targeting the government and public; this chapter therefore examines conference proceedings too. The representatives and high-ranking personnel of the KSM met the government decision makers and politicians, through official or unofficial channels, so as to pressurise the government to change existing policy. The representatives and high-ranking personnel of the KSM generally have more information on the advocacy in which they are involved. To examine the role of representatives and high-ranking personnel of the KSM, this chapter therefore uses interviews with them.
This chapter consists of three main sections, an introduction and conclusion section. The first section examines how the KSM framed the issue of food aid to North Korea. The second section next examines the networks which the KSM established so as to achieve its organisational goals. The third section lastly examines the grafting strategies which the KSM exploited to change existing norms and practices in the Kim Young-Sam administration and the public.

5.2 Agenda Framing

The KSM framed the issue of food aid to North Korea. By doing so, the KSM anticipated that the issue of food aid would resonate with the government policy makers and South Korean civil society. However, the agenda framing by the KSM changed over time. This section examines how the KSM framed the issue of food aid to North Korea throughout the three administrations of Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun. It next analyses the causal relationship between changes in the agenda framing and the KSM’s organisational capacity. In doing so, this section demonstrates that the KSM framed the issue of food aid to North Korea differently and the KSM organisational capacity was consequential in explaining the ability of KSM advocacy to set agendas. In the beginning of the advocacy movement between 1995 and 1997 the KSM which was highly motivated by a normative mandate of food aid but lacked the organisational expertise in the advocacy movement mainly appealed to the sense of brotherly love and humanitarianism. During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KSM that accumulated its expertise in the advocacy of food aid exploited more practical and
obligatory factors in framing food aid to North Korea. The KSM framed the issue of food aid in three different ways: ‘the obligation of government’ in 1998, ‘a peaceful unification movement’ in 1999 and 2000 and ‘a mutually winning movement’ in 2001 and 2002. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, however, the KSM was heavily engaged in the delivery of development aid to North Korea, but passive in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. Changes in the operational environment instead influenced the KSM agenda framing. The Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004 provided momentum so that the KSM framed the food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism.’ The North Korea’s missile and nuclear test and the severe flood damage in 2006 also induced the KSM to frame the issue of food aid as ‘humanitarianism.’

The first part examines how the KSM framed the issue of food aid to North Korea in the Kim Young-Sam administration from 1995 to 1997. The second part next examines the agenda framing by the KSM in the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002. The third part lastly examines the agenda framing in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration from 2003 to 2007.

5.2.1 Agenda Framing in the Kim Young-Sam Administration

The first three years of KSM advocacy between 1995 and 1997 were when it struggled to find the most effective agenda-framing strategy. The operational environment was a factor which influenced the KSM strategy of agenda framing. Given the hostility towards North Korea in the first year of advocacy in 1995, the KSM adopted the most fundamental framing strategy of appealing to nationalism. It framed the issue of food
aid as ‘brotherly love’ and ‘a peaceful unification movement.’ To overcome the severe political confrontation and the prolonged hostility of the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society in 1996, the KSM exploited the universal norm of humanitarianism for the first time. In 1997, however, the KSM again exploited the regional and ethnic distinctiveness of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea in issue framing, by framing the food aid as ‘a movement for preventing war and alleviating political and military tension on the Korean peninsula’.

In 1995, the Inter-religious Committee, the predecessor of the KSM, framed the provision of food aid to North Korea in two different ways. These were ‘brotherly love’ and ‘a peaceful unification movement.’ Despite Kim Young-Sam administration’s decision to provide large-scale rice aid to North Korea, North Korea’s negative responses worsened the South Korean government’s position and public opinion on food aid to North Korea.\(^9\) The lack of data on the severity of the North Korean food crisis in addition made it difficult for the South Korean humanitarian NGOs to persuade the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis.

The Inter-religious Committee, established in October 1995, was lacking in organisational capacity to frame the provision of food aid to North Korea as a persuasive agenda. It therefore framed the provision of food aid to North Korea in the context of ‘brotherly love’ and ‘a peaceful unification movement.’ The issue of food aid was framed as ‘brotherly love’ for North Korean compatriots facing severe flood damages.\(^10\) Despite the prolonged political and military confrontation and the political differences between both Koreas, South Korean civil society still considered the North Korean people as compatriots. Given the lack of reliable data on the severity of the
North Korean food deficits in 1995, the Inter-religious Committee perceived the advocacy of food aid to North Korea as a temporary movement that required urgent relief aid. In 1995, the newly founded Inter-religious Committee did not have the organisational capacity to develop sophisticated agenda framing. For these reasons, the Inter-religious Committee exploited a simple but fundamental appeal strategy aimed at the emotions of the South Korean people, framing the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘brotherly love for the North Korean compatriots’.

The Inter-religious Committee, the predecessor of the KSM, also framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘a part of the peaceful unification movement’. Before joining the establishment of the Inter-religious Committee, individual religious orders of the Inter-religious Committee were unfolding a unification movement. In the same vein, these religious orders framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as a practical activity for a peaceful unification movement. The year of 1995, more specifically, was the 50th anniversary of the independence of Korea from the Japanese occupation and many events to wish for a peaceful unification were actively carried out by religious circles. The Protestants were unfolding peaceful unification activities, declaring that 1995 was ‘the year of jubilee for peace and unification in the Korean peninsula’. After the manifestation of Cardinal Su-Hwan Kim on 7 January 1995 pertaining to his willingness to visit North Korea if the visit was deemed to contribute to building a reconciliation between both Koreas, the Catholics were unfolding a pan-national unification movement. The Kim Young-Sam administration’s position began to worsen, following a series of negative incidents during the process of rice aid shipment to North Korea. At the same time, the Inter-religious Committee was already unfolding a peaceful unification movement, framing
the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘a part of the peaceful unification movement.’

In 1996, the Inter-religious Committee which renamed to the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘a humanitarian movement’ along with exploiting the existing framing of ‘brotherly love’ and ‘a peaceful unification movement.’ While the KSM and other South Korean humanitarian NGOs were unfolding the advocacy urging the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis, the incident of the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration by North Korea in September 1996 worsened South Korean public opinion of North Korea as well as of the provision of food aid to North Korea. The South Korean government and civil society were furious about North Korea’s negative action and therefore it was difficult for the KSM to unfold its advocacy of food aid to North Korea.15

In the midst of the worsening inter-Korean relations, the KSM needed new agenda framing so as to proselytise South Korean civil society to stick to the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. The KSM newly framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as a ‘humanitarian movement,’ separating the North Korean people from the North Korean regime.16 The KSM emphasised that the food aid to North Korea was not in itself supporting the North Korean regime, but supporting the North Korean compatriots in the desperate famine.17

The KSM also exploited the framing of ‘brotherly love for the North Korean compatriots.’ At the press conference on 12 July for the ‘Declaration of a Pan-National Movement for Helping the North Korean Compatriots,’ the KSM emphasised that helping the North Korean compatriots was a pan-national movement and the South
Korean civil society needed to step forward. Through exploiting visual materials showing starving North Korean residents, a grandmother full of worries in a desolate field, a woman holding a child suffering malnutrition and the haggard appearance of women, KSM sought to appeal to the brotherly love of South Korean civil society. Framing the provision of food aid to North Korea in ‘brotherly love’ for the North Korean compatriots, the KSM emphasised that the desperate people in the pictures and posters were the Korean compatriots who are the same ethnic group throughout the world.

In addition, the KSM consistently framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘a peaceful unification movement’ and further intensified its persuasive power by developing a more touching rationale for the necessity of food aid to North Korea. The KSM emphasised that the provision of food aid to North Korea was a first step in building a foundation for a peaceful unification movement on the Korean peninsula. It further emphasised that responsible and continuous food aid to North Korea, not temporary aid, would contribute to building trust between both Koreas.

In 1997, the last year of the Kim Young-Sam administration, the KSM framed food aid to North Korea as ‘a humanitarian movement.’ In 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration maintained a strategy to link the provision of food aid to North Korea with the Four-Party Talks. The conservative parties in South Korean civil society and political circles criticised the provision of food aid in the midst of a situation in which North Korea was not allowing the monitoring of aid distribution as meaningless, as it could be used to support the North Korean regime. To overcome this criticism, the KSM emphasised humanitarianism. It asserted that food aid was the correct interpretation of humanitarianism rather than adhering to the principle of ‘no monitoring,
no food aid.’ Framing food aid as a purely humanitarian movement, the KSM sought to criticise the conservative approach.

In 1997, the KSM also framed food aid as ‘a movement for preventing war and alleviating political and military tension on the Korean peninsula’. After North Korea’s official apology for the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration at the end of 1996, inter-Korean political relations improved, but South Korean public opinion on North Korea was still hostile. Given the worsened operational environment, the KSM sought to proselytise the Kim Young-Sam administration and South Korean civil society to resume the provision of food aid to North Korea. To replace the existing hostile public opinion on the North Korean regime with greater peace and cooperation, the KSM framed the food aid to North Korea as ‘a movement for preventing a war and alleviating political and military tension on the Korean peninsula’. It emphasised that the political and military competition between both Koreas would result in endless military confrontation and a security crisis. As long as the political and military competition continued, the KSM emphasised, the further away a peaceful unification on the Korean peninsula would be. It asserted that the provision of food aid to North Korea was a practical way to build mutual trust between both Koreas.

5.2.2 Agenda Framing in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration

During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KSM exploited more practical and obligatory factors in the framing of food aid to North Korea, rather than appealing to emotion and nationalism as it had in the Kim Young-Sam administration. In 1998, the
KSM framed the issue of food aid to North Korea as ‘the obligation of government’. In 1999 and 2000, it framed the issue of food aid as ‘a peaceful unification movement’. In 2001 and 2002, the KSM framed food aid as ‘a mutually winning movement’.

In 1998, the KSM framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘the obligation of new administration,’ criticising the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s adherence to a strict mutualism linking the provision of food aid to North Korea to pending political issues. In 1998 the Kim Dae-Jung administration, which held a positive view on the provision of humanitarian aid to North Korea, established the engagement policy which emphasised inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. This policy, however, was not yet incorporated into the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s specific policy towards North Korea. Given this operational environment, the KSM framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘the obligation of new administration.’ Bishop Chang-Mu Choi, the Executive Representative of the KSM, urged the Kim Dae-Jung administration to establish an active aid policy on humanitarian aid to North Korea at a policy discussion held with the theme of ‘Unification Policy and Humanitarian Aid for North Korea under the New Administration’ on 7 February 1998.25

The KSM further asserted the need for government-level food aid to North Korea through a ‘Petition to the President’ on 1 June and the policy debate on ‘The Evaluation of the Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Sunshine Policy [the engagement policy] and the Future Direction of Private-Level Aid to North Korea’.26 Through these petitions and debates the KSM emphasised that the provision of food aid to North Korea was ‘not the object of the strict application of mutualism.’ The KSM asserted that the strict application of mutualism in relation to the provision of food and other types of aid
to North Korea would worsen the humanitarian crisis in North Korea by narrowing the range of government policy options. In 1998, in fact, the Kim Dae-Jung administration designated the reunion of separated families as one of the core tasks of the new administration linking the reunion of separated families with chemical-fertiliser aid to North Korea at the Inter-Korean Vice-Ministerial Talk in April 1998. This talk, however, produced no result and the chemical-fertiliser aid became impossible. Through the petition to the President on 1 June and policy debate on 13 October, the KSM accordingly asserted that the North Korean elders, who would be the beneficiaries of the reunion of separated families, would become the primary victims of the food deficit crisis, if the provision of government-level food and other types of aid were not delivered to North Korea as a result of the government’s strict adherence to mutualism.27

In 1999 and 2000, the KSM framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘a part of a peaceful unification movement’ which was exploited in the Kim Young-Sam administration. In 1999 and 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration still hesitated to provide large-scale government food aid to North Korea. Although the Kim Dae-Jung administration sought to achieve political rapprochement between both Koreas, North Korea’s lukewarm attitude towards the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy made the Kim Dae-Jung administration adhere to strict reciprocity in the provision of food aid to North Korea. As the advocacy of food aid to North Korea became prolonged since 1995, in addition, the agenda framing which framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘brotherly love’ and ‘humanitarianism’ for the North Korean compatriots began to lose its persuasive power.28 Given changes in the operational environment and the organisational capacity in 1999 and 2000, the KSM
exploited rational agenda framing, rather than appealing to the emotion of South Koreans. The KSM framed the need for large-scale government-level food aid to North Korea as ‘a part of the peaceful unification movement,’ arguing that the provision of food aid to North Korea coincided with the pursuit of the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy.29 Based on this agenda framing, the KSM intensified pressure on the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide food aid to North Korea, particularly at the stage of agenda preparation for the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000.

In 2001 and 2002, the KSM framed food aid to North Korea as ‘a mutual winning movement,’ but the KSM’s agenda framing in this period was not significant due to its changes in mandate and the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s active role in the provision of food aid to North Korea. With the provision of large-scale government food aid to North Korea after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, South Korean civil society and the humanitarian NGOs began to perceive food aid to North Korea as the role of the government. With government policy change that allowed spending by the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund (the Cooperation Fund) for NGO humanitarian and development aid to North Korea, the South Korean humanitarian NGOs, including the KSM, began to initiate its own humanitarian and development aid to North Korea. Given changes in the operational environment in 2001 and 2002, the KSM changed its mandate to the delivery of development aid, and therefore the advocacy of food aid to North Korea became a secondary issue for it. The KSM re-used another group’s agenda framing. In 2001 and 2002, agricultural NGOs took the lead in steering food aid advocacy. Agricultural NGOs framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as the mutual winning movement which is mutually beneficial for the South Korean farmers and the
North Korean compatriots.\textsuperscript{30} These NGOs organised vigorous nationwide advocacy urging the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide surplus rice to North Korea. By adding their name to the statement issued by the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (the NGO Council), the KSM supported the argument of the agricultural NGOs.

\textsection{5.2.3 Agenda Framing in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration}

While the KSM re-used the existing agenda framing which was developed in the Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung administration, changes in the operational environment influenced KSM agenda framing. The Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004 provided momentum so that KSM framed food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism.’ The North Korea’s missile and nuclear test and the severe flood damage in 2006 also induced the KSM to frame the issue of food aid as ‘humanitarianism.’

In 2003, the KSM framed the issue of food aid as ‘a part of a peaceful unification movement’. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration took presidential office in 2003, emphasising ‘a participatory government.’ At his inaugural speech on 25 February 2003, President Roh Moo-Hyun revealed the ‘Peace and Prosperity Policy’ which amended the flaws of the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy.\textsuperscript{31} Under the Peace and Prosperity Policy, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration sought to further promote inter-Korean exchange and cooperation including humanitarian aid to North Korea. Despite Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s friendly policy towards North Korea, North Korea’s admittance of their uranium enrichment on 17 October 2002 radically
worsened South Korean public opinion on the provision of humanitarian and development aid to North Korea. The conservative political groups denounced North Korea’s behaviour, criticising the engagement policy of the Kim Dae-Jung administration, claiming it would result in the development of nuclear power in North Korea.\footnote{32} Given the operational environment, the KSM framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘a part of a peaceful unification movement’ and ‘a mutual winning movement’ to overcome the negative criticism on the provision of aid to North Korea.\footnote{33} The KSM asserted that the expansion of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation through humanitarian and development aid to North Korea was the one and only way to establish a foundation for peaceful unification.

With the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004, the KSM framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism’ for the victims. On 22 April 2004, the Ryongcheon Station Explosion brought about severe casualties in North Korea. The severity of the humanitarian crisis ignited a nationwide humanitarian aid movement for the victims. Framing the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism’ for the victims, the KSM disseminated various visual materials, such as photos, posters and press releases which exposed the severity of the Ryongcheon Station Explosion to South Korean civil society.\footnote{34} The KSM urged the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide large-scale additional food aid to North Korea as well as the urgent relief aid to North Korea.

In 2005, the KSM concentrated on the delivery of development aid to North Korea, framing it as ‘aid for sustainable and self-reliant development’. While the Roh Moo-Hyun administration consistently maintained a pro food aid to North Korea position in 2005, North Korea appealed for development aid instead of emergency food
aid rejecting the participation of the U.N. Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for 2005 in September 2004. As North Korea requested the ending of the emergency aid project of the U.N. organisations and international NGOs, including their withdrawal from North Korea in August 2005, the need for development aid to North Korea became more apparent. Given the operational environment in 2005, the KSM framed the provision of development aid to North Korea as ‘aid for sustainable and self-reliant development’.

Lastly, given the worsened inter-Korean relations following North Korea’s missile and nuclear test in 2006, the KSM resumed its advocacy, framing food aid as ‘humanitarianism’ and this framing continued in 2007. In 2006 and 2007, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration attempted to minimise the negative influence coming from the deterioration of inter-Korean relations by adhering to the policy separating non-political issues from politics. North Korea’s missile launch in July and nuclear test in October 2006 nonetheless made it difficult for the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to adhere to the existing policy of pro food and fertiliser aid to North Korea. In the midst of the unfavourable political environment caused by North Korea’s missile launch, the flood resulted in severe damage in North Korea. As the flood damage occurred in July, the KSM framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism’ for the North Korean flood victims. The KSM adopted an agenda-framing tactic which separated the provision of food aid to North Korea from the missile launch and nuclear test. The KSM asserted that although the missile launch and the nuclear test was a subject for criticism, the provision of food aid for the flood victims was a humanitarian activity. The provision of humanitarian aid, the KSM emphasised, should not be suspended for political reasons. Under this agenda framing, the KSM, along with other
NGOs from various areas of humanitarianism, peace, human rights and women’s rights, organised a joint press statement on 8 August and urged the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to resume the humanitarian action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea.39

5.3 Networking

This section demonstrates that the KSM gradually developed its networks, which enabled the KSM to gain access to the key government policy makers and finally to exert significant political influence on South Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea. Such effective networking of the KSM was attributable to its unique organisational structure.

In the beginning of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea in 1995, the KSM first formed a wide range of networks with various religious groups and civil society organisations. It gradually increased the quality of the networks through engaging with religious leaders, elder statesmen, expert groups, policy makers in the government and high-ranking politicians. Such wide ranging and high status networks were consequential in the maximisation of the influence of the KSM on state food aid policy making as well as on civil society. During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KSM consistently maintained a wide range of networks with various religious leaders, elder statesmen and expert groups. The KSM further established a high status network with policy makers in the government and high-ranking politicians. The KSM established NGO consultative bodies and their personnel were appointed to advisory positions in
differing government consultative bodies. Such wide-ranging and high-status networks were consequential in the maximisation of the KSM influence on state food aid policy making. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, lastly, the KSM played a steering role in the institutionalisation of the NGO-government consultative body enabling the KSM and other humanitarian NGOs to obtain access to government aid policy makers. In 2004, the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in April provided momentum so that the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (the NGO Council), which was a consultative body among NGOs, and the government agreed to establish an official government and NGO consultative body which would replace the NGO Meeting for North Korea Assistance (the NGO Meeting) managed on temporary base. In 2004, the KSM’s cooperative relationship with the National Assembly Research Meeting and the establishment of the Centre for Peace Sharing under the structure of the KSM also contributed to increasing the quality of KSM network.

The first part examines which kind of networks the KSM established in the Kim Young-Sam administration from 1995 to 1997. The second part next examines the networking by the KSM in the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002. The third part lastly examines the networking in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration from 2003 to 2007.

5.3.1 Networking in the Kim Young-Sam Administration

This section demonstrates that the unique organisational structure of the KSM enabled it to establish a wide high status of networks linking the whole South Korean civil society.
In 1995 the Inter-religious Committee, the predecessor of the KSM, was established as a broad network including the largest six South Korean religious orders. By including the rational-centrist NGOs, the KSM came to exercise its advocacy influence on the whole South Korean civil society as well as the six largest religious orders in 1996. In 1997 the KSM further broadened its network to overseas, while seeking to strengthen its network by establishing an umbrella body for the coordination of different networks and humanitarian NGOs.

In 1995, the Inter-religious Committee was established as a network of broad issue that was able to exert direct influence on the six largest South Korean religious orders. These included Catholicism, Won-Buddhism, Confucianism, Chondogyo, the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK) and the Chogye Order. These religious orders were the largest religious groups in South Korea in terms of the number of believers and its influence on civil society. The total number of believers of these religious orders was roughly 22,358,012, which accounted for around 50.18 per cent of the total South Korean population in 1995. The participation of these religious orders did not mean that all believers of each order participated in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. Considering the significant influence of the religious leaders in South Korean civil society, however, the engagement of the leaders in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea was enough to proselytise the Kim Young-Sam administration and South Korean civil society to embrace new norms of food aid to North Korea.

The Inter-religious Committee also formed a wide network with key civil society organisations. They built a network with the Korea Civil Society Organisations’ Council (KCSOC) consisting of 38 rational-centrist NGOs which had steered the civil society movement in South Korea since the mid-1980s. Based on the network with
the KCSOC, the Inter-religious Committee was able to establish a network with the Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU), which is a coalition network consisting of 20 NGOs in the women’s rights movement. Based on the network with the KCSOC, the Inter-religious Committee was also able to work together with the National Alliance for Democracy and the Reunification of Korea (NADRK). The NADRK, as a representative alliance for the civil society movement, consisted of 27 NGOs from 14 NGOs, such as the Council for National Labour Union, the National Confederation of Farmers Association, the Council for National University Student Representatives and 13 regional movement groups in Seoul, Pusan and Gwangju. The NADRK had steered the various civil society movements, such as democratisation, the unification movement and the labour movement. The establishment of a network with the NADRK contributed to expanding the KSM’s network to various civil society organisations.

In 1996, the civil society organisations and the six religious orders restructured the Inter-religious Committee into the KSM which had a permanent executive and administrative body. The Inter-religious Committee was a loose coalition network without an administrative body although the Inter-religious Committee maintained a wide network until the establishment of the KSM in June 1996. The strength of the network that the Inter-religious Committee established with other civil society organisations therefore was a weak network concerned with temporary issue. On 8 June 1996, the KSM put in place multilayered board-level positions within the organisational structure of the KSM. It appointed religious leaders, NGO personnel, scholars, elder statesmen and congressmen to these positions. The positions of these Senior Advisors, the highest position of the KSM, were held by Su-Hwan Kim, the Catholic Cardinal, Won-Yong Kang, the Senior Pastor of National Council of Churches
in Korea, and Suk-Ju Kang, the Leader of the Chogye Order. The positions of Executive Representatives of the KSM were held by Wol-Ju Song, the Managing Director of the Chogye Order, Chang-Mu Choi, the Bishop for Social Action of the Archdiocese of Seoul and Young-Hoon Seo, the President of the Civil Association for a Clean Election and the Former Director of the Korea Broadcasting System. The positions of Co-representatives of the KSM were held by Man-Gil Kang, the Chief Director of the Unification Association of Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, Moon-Kyu Kang, the Director of the Asian Citizen Movement Research Institute, Jae-Jung Kim, the Ordinance of Chondogyo, Han-Bin Lee, the former Deputy Prime Minister, Yoong-Gu Lee, the former President of World Vision Korea, Professor Bong-Ho Sohn, of Seoul National University and Co-representative of the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, Nak-Hwan Baek, the Chancellor of Inje University and Jin-Hyun Kim, the Chancellor of the University of Seoul. A further 22 personnel from religious organisations, civil society organisations and academia were also appointed to the position of co-representatives of the KSM. The position of Chair of the Central Committee was held by Nam-Ik Baek, the Secretary General of the Bishop Committee and the Vice-chairs were held by Jung-Ja Lee, the Secretary General of the Korea Civil Society Organisations’ Council, Young-Deok Park, the Executive of Hankook Ilbo and two other personnel from religious organisations. Appointing the Secretary General of KCSOC to the position of the Central Committee of the KSM, in particular, sought to strengthen the networks with other civil society organisations. The KSM lastly put in place the National Assembly Advisory Committee (the Advisory Committee) and a total of 54 national congressmen and women joined the Advisory Committee. Although these positions were symbolic ones, the constitution of the Advisory Committee was
very comprehensive including Hong-il Kim, the Congressman and first son of President Kim Dae-Jung, Hoi-Chang Lee, the President of the New Grand National Party and candidate for the 15th Presidential election, Dong-Young Jung, the 31st minister of Unification later in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and Myung-Bak Lee, the 17th President of South Korea from 2008 to 2012.\textsuperscript{51}

In addition to widening the KSM network, the KSM increased the quality of its network by establishing links with expert groups such as the ‘Headquarters for Healthcare Professionals’ ‘Fundraising for the North Korean Flood Victims’ and ‘Lawyers for a Democratic Society’ (MINBYUN).\textsuperscript{52} The network with health and medical expertise contributed in increasing the reliability of the advocacy by providing medical knowledge on the food crisis in North Korea. The participation of MINBYUN equipped with legal expertise, in particular, contributed in improving government law and regulations restricting South Korean humanitarian NGOs’ direct aid to North Korea and fundraising for North Korea.\textsuperscript{53}

While the KSM continued to expand its network in 1997, it also joined an umbrella body for the coordination of humanitarian activities among different networks and NGOs for the first time. In 1997, the KSM was active in networking with humanitarian NGOs such as Good Friends, World Vision Korea, Good Neighbours and other civil society organisations, such as the Labour Union of Nong-Hyup Bank, the National Federation of Finance Labour Union and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions.\textsuperscript{54} Based on these broadened networks, the KSM sought to develop active advocacy into a nationwide movement.

The KSM also improved the strength of the network by joining the umbrella network which coordinates the advocacy of food aid to North Korea and different
humanitarian aid activities. By joining ‘Brotherly Love Pan-national Movement for the North Korean Compatriots Aid’ (the Brotherly Love Pan-national), which was an alliance network that consisted of 30 NGOs, the KSM was also able to build stronger networks with MINBYUN, NADRK, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and the Korean People’s Artist Federation (KPAF). The Brotherly Love Pan-national established the ‘National Convention of Civil Societies for the Northern Brotherly Aid’ (National Convention) on 30 June 1997. The National Convention was the first and largest network consisting of a total of 112 organisations of humanitarian NGOs, civil society organisations and religious groups participating in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. The National Convention was mandated to resolve the restrictions in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, to increase the efficiency in humanitarian aid to North Korea, to increase domestic and international solidarity for humanitarian aid to North Korea, to extend the advocacy that targets the government, corporations and the press, and to unfold a nationwide advocacy targeting South Korean civil society. The National Convention was not able to carry out any further activities after the 1st National General Meeting on 5 September. The meeting, however, became the momentum the humanitarian NGOs needed to establish the coordinated body for the effective advocacy of food aid to North Korea.

The KSM established the international network with three main intentions: to proselytise the international community to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea, to publicise the advocacy of the South Korean humanitarian NGOs to the international community and to urge the international community to pressurise the South Korean government to resume food aid to North Korea. To this end, the KSM held the ‘International Council on the Food Shortage Crisis of North Korea’ in Seoul.
from 10 to 12 March 1997. About 60 personnel from the South Korean humanitarian NGOs and international NGOs participated in this conference to share opinions on the food crisis in North Korea and support humanitarian activities. From 24 to 25 June 1997, the KSM sponsored another international conference, the ‘Musgrove II: International Consultation on the Emergency Food Situation in North Korea’. This meeting was attended by around 40 personnel including Ellsworth Culver, the President of Mercy Corps International, Catherine Bertini, the Executive Director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), and Kathi Zellweger and Eric Weingartner from the WFP. Through these international conferences, the KSM expanded its human resource and organisational networks. In addition to these conferences, the KSM established the Korean American Sharing Movement (KASM) on 2 September 1997. In doing so, it strengthened its overseas networks which could be exploited to pressurise the South Korean government and the international community from outside the South Korean territory.

5.3.2 Networking in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration

The KSM improved its quality of networks by appointing various civil and government experts and scholars who had expertise in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation to the positions of the Policy Advisory Committee of the KSM. The KSM also strengthened its networks with other humanitarian NGOs, by establishing the official NGO consultative body of the ‘NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea’ (the NGO Council).

Given the establishment of the Kim Dae-Jung administration that maintained the
favourable policy towards the humanitarian NGOs in 1998, the key network that the KSM exploited in 1998 was the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (the Korean Council), which was a consultation body attended by the government, political parties, civil society and NGOs. As private organisations and NGOs in charge of overall inter-Korean exchange and cooperation increased under the engagement policy of the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the Korean Council was established in September 1998, under the steering role of the Ministry of Unification. On the government side, the Kim Dae-Jung administration needed public support for the engagement policy. Through the establishment of the Korean Council, the Kim Dae-Jung administration thereby attempted to subsume the political power and influence of rational-centrist NGOs. In doing so, the administration attempted to exploit these NGOs as the foundation of the Kim Dae-Jung administration for the implementation of its engagement policy towards North Korea. On the NGO side, the expectations of humanitarian NGOs and the KSM on the expansion of its advocacy influence on state policy making through the Korean Council was a major motivation of their attendance in the establishment of the Korean Council. The establishment of the Korean Council therefore became an official network which allowed the KSM access to key policy makers in state food aid policy making, as well as other humanitarian and civil society organisations.

At the international level, from 15 to 17 October 1998, the KSM organised an international conference to expand its overseas network. The KSM held the ‘KSM World Conference’ in Los Angeles. Around sixty representatives from the KSM headquarters of the United States, Canada, the South Pacific, Russia and South Korea attended the conference. At the conference, the participants of the KSM overseas
offices agreed to establish the ‘KSM World Council’ and set the issues of humanitarian aid to North Korea and the reunion of separated families as its main projects. By strengthening the KSM’s overseas networks, the KSM expanded the target of advocacy towards other countries, such as the United States, which were deemed to contribute in resolving the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. By exploiting overseas networks, the KSM also sought to pressurise the South Korean government to provide food aid to North Korea.64

In 1999 the most significant development in KSM networking was the establishment of the ‘NGO Meeting for North Korean Assistance’ (the NGO Meeting) and networking with professional groups and a local municipal. The KSM also increased the quality of networks by appointing various civil and government experts and scholars who had expertise in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation to positions of the Policy Advisory Committee of the KSM. The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s policy change that incorporated NGO personnel into the government consultative bodies contributed to the expansion of the KSM network. In 1999, lastly, the KSM made consistent efforts to establish a solidarity network with the international community.

On 19 April 1999, the KSM, along with another twenty most active humanitarian NGOs, founded the NGO Meeting as a loose consultative body. The Kim Dae-Jung administration perceived the humanitarian NGOs as government counterparts in the promotion of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation.65 The Ministry of Unification needed an organisation representing the humanitarian NGOs for the purpose of efficient communication with the government. The President of World Vision Korea, Jae-Sik Oh, responded to such a demand from the government. Although it was a loose
consultative organisation without an administrative body, the South Korean humanitarian NGOs established the NGO Meeting.\textsuperscript{66} With this established, the KSM exploited the NGO Meeting as a key channel to get access to the decision makers in government food aid policy making. The representatives of the NGO Meeting, consisting of the representatives of the humanitarian NGOs, had frequent meetings with President Kim Dae-Jung and other government decision makers in relation to humanitarian aid to North Korea. Such meetings enabled the NGO Meeting to develop into an important organisation with significant influence on state food aid policy making in 1999.\textsuperscript{67}

The KSM broadened its networks towards professional groups and local municipals. It established the ‘Korean Sharing Movement Healthcare Cooperation Headquarters’ (Healthcare Headquarters) consisting of the six largest healthcare professional associations: ‘Korea Medical Association,’ ‘Korean Pharmaceutical Association,’ ‘Korean Dentists Association,’ ‘The Association of Korea Oriental Medicine,’ ‘Korean Hospital Association,’ and ‘Korean Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.’\textsuperscript{68} In 1999 the KSM also established a network with a local municipal for the first time. Among the nine local municipals in South Korea, the KSM established a cooperative network with Jejudo.\textsuperscript{69} It became the first step that broadened the KSM networks with other local municipals in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration.

The KSM improved the quality of the network by appointing civil and government experts and scholars who had expertise in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation to positions in the Policy Advisory Committee of the KSM. These personnel, who mostly engaged in the government food and humanitarian aid policy-making process through various channels, were Jong-Suk Lee, the 32\textsuperscript{nd} Minister of
Unification from February 2006 to December 2006, Keum-Soon Lee, a researcher from KINU which is a government institute for inter-Korean issues and unification, Sung-Ho Je, a researcher from KINU, Hyeong-Jung Park, a researcher from KINU, Won-Hyeok Lim, a researcher from the Korea Development Institute, Cheol-Young Choi, a senior researcher from the Korea Legislation Research Institute, Professor Dae-Suk Choi of Dongguk University, Professor Young-Soo Kim of Sogang University and Jong-Hoon Lee, a researcher from the National Assembly Research and Analysis Bureau. Jong-Suk Lee in particular became the Minister of Unification later during the Kim Dae-Jung administration in February 2006. Such improvement in the quality of the network through the expanded human resource networks finally contributed to the increase of the KSM’s advocacy influence on state food aid policy making.

The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s policy change, which incorporated NGO personnel into government consultative bodies, contributed to the expansion of the KSM network. The representatives of the KSM were appointed to positions at the Unification Advisory Meeting, which is a unification policy advisory organisation that reports directly to the President. The executives of the KSM, such as Moon-Kyu Kang, Young-Hoon Suh, Revd Wol-Ju Song, Cardinal Su-Hwan Kim and Man-Gil Kang, were appointed as advisors at the Unification Advisory Meeting. The members of the Policy Advisory Committee of the KSM, Professor Dae-Suk Choi of Dongguk University and Professor Young-Su Kim of Sogang University, were also appointed to the positions as advisors at the Policy Advisory Committee of Humanitarian Support Bureau within the Ministry of Unification. In this way, the KSM came to exercise its influence on the early stages of the government policy-planning process.

The KSM actively carried out their activities to form a solidarity network with
the international community. For the purpose of both expanding networks and maximising the advocacy that pressurises the international community, the KSM organised the ‘Korea-Japan NGO Forum on the Humanitarian Aid for North Korea’ at the ‘Korea-Japan NGO Symposium’ in Tokyo from 19 to 23 February. Through this forum, the KSM established a network with the Japanese NGOs. Under the same objective, the KSM also participated in the ‘Beijing International NGO Conference on the Humanitarian Support for North Korea’ organised by InterAction in Beijing from 3 to 5 May 1999.

In 2000 and 2001, the KSM replaced the NGO Meeting with ‘The NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea’ (the NGO Council) as a key network to get access to government policy makers and other humanitarian NGOs. In 2001 the KSM and humanitarian NGOs founded an official NGO consultative body, the NGO Council, to replace the NGO Meeting. After the establishment of the NGO Council in 2001, the KSM began to build official networks with government decision makers. The KSM delivered the administrative function of the NGO Council, according to the rules and regulations of the NGO council. This stipulated that the NGO Council nominates one organisation among the member NGOs as an administrative organisation every two years. As stipulated in Article 4.3 of the rules and regulations of the NGO Council, the NGO Council delivered an advocacy function pressurising the government to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea. The fact that Dong-Won Lim, the Unification Minister and a key decision maker in the Kim Dae-Jung administration, attended the foundation ceremony of the NGO Council and delivered the congratulatory speech indicated that the government also recognised the importance of the NGO Council in the government-NGO relationship. Exploiting the NGO Council, the KSM
was able to expand its organisational networks with the government decision makers in 2001 and to improve the quality of its network. Young-Hoon Suh, the Senior Advisor of the KSM since its establishment in 1996, was promoted to the position of representative of the ruling party, the Democratic Party, from January to December 2000. In 2001, then, Young-Hoon Suh was appointed as the Secretary General of the South Korean Red Cross, which was an administrative organisation that took charge of all types of government-level humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea.

5.3.3 Networking in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration

The KSM and Roh Moo-Hyun administration institutionalised the NGO-government consultative body enabling the KSM and other humanitarian NGOs to exert direct influence on the state food aid policy process. In 2004, the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in April was the momentum that prompted the NGO Council, which was a consultative body among NGOs, and the government to establish ‘the Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy’ (Government-Civilian Council) as the official government and NGO consultative body in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. In 2004, the KSM’s cooperative relationship with the National Assembly Research Meeting and the establishment of the Centre for Peace Sharing under the structure of the KSM also contributed to increasing the quality of the KSM network.

With the inauguration of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration in 2003, there was some change in KSM networking. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration was pro civil
society organisations which advocated non-humanitarian issues rather than humanitarian aid NGOs. Only a few KSM personnel therefore maintained their positions as government policy advisors in 2003 and throughout the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. Young-Hoon Suh who was appointed as President of the South Korean Red Cross in the Kim Dae-Jung administration served until December 2003. Bishop Chang-Moon Choi, the Executive Representative of the KSM, was newly appointed to a position in the Unification Advisory Meeting for the President. The other executive members of the KSM who were appointed to positions in the Unification Advisory Meeting for the President in 1999 were not re-appointed in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. The KSM members who had positions on the Policy Advisory Committee of Humanitarian Support Bureau in the Ministry of Unification were not re-appointed, but instead other NGO personnel, who were mainly from the rational-centrist civil society NGOs, replaced them.

In 2004, the Ryongcheon Station Explosion provided momentum that strengthened the KSM network with religious and civil society organisations and the government through the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council. On 24 April, two days after the Ryongcheon Station Explosion, the NGO Council which was under the management of the KSM established the ‘North Korean Ryongcheon Station Explosion Victims’ Aid Movement’ (the Ryongcheon Movement) to help the explosion victims. A total of 55 NGOs, 30 NGOs from the NGO Council and another 25 NGOs from religious and civil society organisations, joined the Ryongcheon Movement. Under the coordination role of the NGO Council, the South Korean civil society and the Roh Moo-Hyun administration extended a successful nationwide aid movement. Such was the success of the movement that finally the humanitarian NGOs and the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration recognised the need for a consultative body between the South Korean NGOs and the government. The humanitarian NGOs and the Roh Moo-Hyun administration thereby agreed to establish the Government-Civilian Council on 1 September.

With the establishment of the National Assembly Research Meeting on 10 June 2004, the KSM also came to form a close relationship with the Congressmen and women. A total of 27 congressmen and women evenly from the ruling and opposition parties attended the National Assembly Research Meeting. They discussed with the humanitarian NGOs and academics the reform of legislation and institutions for active inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. The Centre for Peace Sharing (CPS) of the KSM maintained a collaborative relationship with the National Assembly Research Meeting. The CPS and the National Assembly Research Meeting, for instance, organised a policy seminar on ‘A Strategy of Legislation Reform for Inter-Korean Cooperation in the 17th National Assembly’ on 22 June. They also organised a seminar on ‘How to Change the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund?’ on 12 July. This indicates that the government became more sensitive to the voices of the humanitarian NGOs as the personnel who kept a close relationship with the humanitarian NGOs were appointed as high ranking government decision makers during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration.

The CPS, which was established under the structure of the KSM in 2004, continuously contributed in establishing a policy network that connected the government, academics, NGOs and think tanks through regular policy forums. Before the establishment of the CPS, the KSM and humanitarian NGOs were prone to concentrate on individual projects and the delivery of aid to North Korea given the
difficulty of building a policy network. The CPS engaged in organising the policy forums on a regular basis. Most experts who had expertise in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation from the government, academia, NGOs and think tanks attended these policy forums regularly. In doing so, the CPS played a role in expanding the networks of the KSM, bringing experts from various areas together.

Given the suspension of government food and fertiliser aid to North Korea after North Korea’s missile launch in July 2006, the KSM passively engaged in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. The KSM exploited the NGO Council to pressurise the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to resume the food and fertiliser aid to North Korea. Since North Korea informed South Korea of the postponement of the 8.15 National Celebrations due to the flood in August, the NGO Council initiated its flood-aid movement. On 8 August, in particular, the NGO Council organised a joint press conference urging the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to resume the provision of humanitarian flood aid to North Korea. At this joint conference, 25 NGOs including the KSM attended. This joint press conference was a loose and temporary network in terms of strength and its sustainability, but this network was successful in igniting the humanitarian flood-assistance movement under the hostile operational environment caused by the missile launch in July.

In 2006 the KSM exploited the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (the NGO Council) to proselytise the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to resume the provision of humanitarian flood aid to North Korea. The Korean Council was one of the most influential NGOs in that the Korean Council was established to gain public consensus on the peace and unification movement among the government, political parties, progressive and conservative NGOs and religious organisations. To
maintain the high status of the Korean Council in state policy making, the former ministers and vice-ministers of unification, elder statesmen and the leaders of the humanitarian NGOs who maintained pro inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, were appointed to the positions of Executive and Chair of the Korean Council. When the flood damage became severe in August 2006, in fact, Se-Hyeon Jeong, the Chair of the Korean Council and the former Unification Minister in the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations met Jong-Suk Lee, the Unification Minister in 2006 and urged the provision of large-scale government-level flood aid to North Korea irrespective of North Korea’s missile launch.87

Given the favourable operational environment in 2007, there was no need for the KSM to unfold advocacy urging the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and South Korean civil society to provide food aid to North Korea. KSM networking for the advocacy of food aid to North Korea therefore was insignificant in 2007.

5.4 Norm Grafting

This section demonstrates that the KSM exploited differing grafting strategies to incorporate the norms and ideas which support the provision of food aid to North Korea into the norms and ideas of the South Korean government policy makers and civil society. These grafting strategies which were exploited by the KSM changed over time and gradually improved in respective of its impact on the state food aid policy-making process. Such development in their influence was attributable to KSM’s consistent advocacy that demanded NGO participation in the state policy-making process and
KSM’s organisational capacity that enabled their consistent advocacy from 1996. The KSM first proselytised the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to embrace new norms in relation to the provision of food aid to North Korea. At the stage of norm grafting, the KSM exploited conventional strategies, such as nationwide campaigns, press conferences, domestic and international conferences, to change existing government and civil society norms and practices. During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KSM proselytised the government and civil society to embrace new norms in relation to the provision of food aid to North Korea. At the stage of norm grafting, the KSM exploited timely strategies to change existing norms and practices in the government and the public. The ability of the KSM, however, was not always effective. This chapter demonstrates that the grafting strategy during the Kim Dae-Jung administration was divided by period into two categories. Until the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, the KSM exploited conventional advocacy tactics, including public campaigns, policy workshops and a petition to the President. After the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the KSM exploited government and NGO consultative bodies. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, lastly, the KSM’s activities to change norms in civil society gradually decreased, but KSM grafting strategies were the most effective in respective of its impact on the state food aid policy-making process. It was possible as the KSM exploited the NGO and government consultative bodies which allowed it to gain access to the state food aid policy makers directly.

The first part examines which kind of grafting strategies the KSM exploited to incorporate the norms supporting the provision of food aid to North Korea into the government policy makers and the civil society in the Kim Young-Sam administration from 1995 to 1997. The second part next examines the norm grafting by the KSM in the

5.4.1 Norm Grafting in the Kim Young-Sam Administration

If the previous two stages of agenda setting and networking are the preparatory stages, the stage of grafting is the substantial stage when NGOs attempt to persuade the state and the public to embrace new norms and ideas through their advocacy, and thereby seek to induce the state as the fundamental target to change their policy and practice.

This section demonstrates that given the differing operational environment and organisational capacity between 1995 and 1997, the KSM exploited different strategies to proselytise the government and South Korean civil society to embrace the norm of food aid to North Korea. This section demonstrates the grafting strategies which the KSM mainly exploited. These were gradually developed from conventional activities, such as public campaigns, press releases and lobbying politicians, at the beginning of its advocacy in 1995 and 1996 to the more specialised activities, such as holding the presidential candidate debate and the international networks, in 1997.

In mid-1995 when the first 150,000 tonnes of rice aid was delivered to North Korea in June, the perception of ‘anticommunism and hostility towards North Korea’ was dominant in South Korean civil society although the Kim Young-Sam administration had decided to provide rice aid irrespective of the absence of the humanitarian NGOs who advocated the provision of food aid to North Korea. Given the accumulated ‘mistrust’ and ‘hostility’ towards North Korea which resulted from the
political and military confrontations during the half century of separation after the armistice of the Korean War in 1953, the conservatives of South Korean civil society perceived the food aid to North Korea as ‘an irresponsible and indiscreet behaviour supporting the North Korean regime.’ South Korean civil society understood the necessity of food aid to North Korea, but concern and antipathy that the food aid to North Korea would ultimately support the hostile North Korean regime, still remained as a dominant view in South Korean civil society.

Given this operational environment in 1995, the Inter-religious Committee, the predecessor of the KSM, exploited the strategy of information politics which disseminates ongoing information on the food crisis in North Korea, through public campaigns and press conferences. The Inter-religious Committee which consists of the six largest religious orders was relatively free from the hostility and the ideological disputes in South Korean civil society. By organising a series of continued public campaigns and exploiting the mass media, therefore, the KSM steered its advocacy. The Inter-religious Committee disseminated ongoing information on the food crisis in North Korea. Organising these public campaigns and press conferences, the religious leaders also actively appealed to South Korean civil society to participate in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In doing so, the Inter-religious Committee sought to replace the hostility towards North Korea and the negative view on the provision of food aid with ‘brotherly love’ and ‘a peaceful unification.’

The Inter-religious Committee also exploited a wide range of networks in developing its advocacy of food aid to North Korea into a nationwide movement. The Inter-religious Committee established various networks with differing civil society organisations that had steered the civil society movements since 1980. Exploiting the
wide networks with KCSOC, KWAU, CCEJ and NADRK, the Inter-religious Committee sought to develop its advocacy of food aid to North Korea into a nationwide movement. The Inter-religious Committee and the KCSOC, which consisted of 38 rational-centrist NGOs, held a joint press conference for ‘A Pan-national Fundraising Movement for Helping the North Korean Flood Victims’ on 5 September 1997. On 15 September, the KWAU, which is a coalition network that consisted of 20 NGOs in women’s rights movements, initiated its advocacy of food aid to North Korea by commencing the ‘Campaign to Help the North Korean Flood Victims’ for a month. On the same day, NADRK, which consisted 27 of the most pioneering civil society organisations, announced its engagement in advocacy and fundraising campaigns. NADRK asserted that the Kim Young-Sam administration which worried about the conservative parties in South Korean civil society was taking a lukewarm position on the provision of flood aid to North Korea.

After the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in September 1996, the KSM could not extend its advocacy of food aid to North Korea. To maximise the leverage of food aid, the Kim Young-Sam administration further pressurised the international community to refrain from providing unconditional food aid to North Korea. South Korean civil society, as shown by the public opinion poll taken by Gallup Korea right after the aftermath of 150,000 tonnes of rice aid in 1995, was divided into two parties: a group who maintained ‘hostility’ towards North Korea (41.3 per cent) and a group who perceived North Korea as the object of ‘cooperation’ (53.7 per cent).

Given this operational environment in 1996, the KSM exploited the public campaigns to proselytise the Kim Young-Sam administration and South Korean civil society to take action to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. On 15 January, the
religious leaders of the Inter-religious Committee organised a public campaign by framing the provision of food aid as ‘brotherly love that surpasses the differences in ideology and political system between both Koreas.’ On 29 and 31 January, NADRK maintained a network with the Inter-religious Committee urging the Kim Young-Sam administration to step forward in helping the North Korean flood victims, while announcing ‘Fundraising for the North Korean Flood Victims.’ NADRK also visited the Ministry of Unification on 8 February and urged the Kim Young-Sam administration for a more active and steering role in helping North Korea through criticisms that “the current policy where the Kim Young-Sam administration pressurised the Japanese and U.S. government not to provide large-scale government-level rice aid to North Korea at the Hawaii Meeting on 24 January was irresponsible behaviour, ignoring the humanitarian crisis in North Korea.” On 17 September, the KSM further extended the ‘Campaign for Thrift and Saving and Helping the North Korean Compatriots’ during Chusuk which is the biggest national holiday.

Through these public campaigns in 1996, the KSM sought to maximise the effectiveness of advocacy, by disseminating ongoing information of the severity of the North Korean food crisis and framing the food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism,’ ‘brotherly love,’ and ‘a part of a peaceful unification movement.’ At these public campaigns, the KSM used visual materials expressing the severity of the food crisis in North Korea such as photos of starving children and woman appearing haggard. Disseminating this ongoing information and newly framed agenda through mass media and press conferences with the major daily newspapers, such as Hankook Ilbo, JoongAng Daily and Hankyoreh, the KSM proselytised the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to resume the food aid to North Korea. In the same vein,
by appointing the executive of Hankook Ilbo, Young-Deok Park, to the position of Vice-chair of the Central Committee of the KSM, the KSM sought to maximise the effectiveness of the campaign. In fact, Hankook Ilbo was the most active newspaper company in publishing events and campaigns by the humanitarian NGOs and the KSM for food aid to North Korea.\textsuperscript{103}

In 1996, the KSM began to unfold the institution reform movement which demanded the improvement of policy and institutions in relation to the operational environment for NGOs. The Kim Young-Sam administration had prohibited fundraising by the humanitarian NGOs and private level aid to North Korea, while adhering to the policy that links food aid to North Korea with North Korea’s participation in the Four-Party Talks. Given the government policy, NADRK on 30 May and seven Protestant groups on 12 June urged the government to allow rice and cash aid to North Korea by NGOs.\textsuperscript{104} The KSM in particular initiated the ‘National Campaign for Helping the North Korean Compatriots’ at its inauguration ceremony on 12 July, and urged government institutional reform to allow private level emergency relief activities for North Korea, approve aid to North Korea through international agencies and pledge efforts at the government level in response to the structural and chronic food crisis in North Korea.

On 12 December, MINBYUN, which was a professional group that consists of lawyers, instituted an administrative litigation against the government decision that prohibits private-level aid, which was not through the South Korean Red Cross, to North Korea and the direct contact with North Korean residents.\textsuperscript{105}

In 1996, the KSM also exploited a policy network with the key policy makers in state food aid policy making towards North Korea, so as to pressurise the Kim Young-Sam administration to resume food aid to North Korea. On 16 July, the KSM organised
the ‘Meeting with the Representatives of Political Parties and Congressmen’ as a part of its advocacy. At this meeting, a total of 18 people, mainly congressmen, including Kim Dae-Jung, the President of the People’s Party and Kwan-Woong Park, the Chair of the Committee on Unification and Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly, and the representatives of humanitarian NGOs attended and adopted the statement. The statement urged inter-Korean meeting at government level, the government’s active role in the provision of aid to North Korea, the private level of aid to North Korea and the private level aid to North Korea through the international agencies. This meeting was the first case that the KSM exploited as a policy network, with the key policy makers in the National Assembly, to exercise more direct influence on state food aid policy making towards North Korea. Despite these efforts of the KSM in 1996, however, the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in September made it difficult for the KSM to continue to unfold its active advocacy that urged the Kim Young-Sam administration and the public to provide food aid to North Korea. In the midst of such a situation on 5 November, the KSM, along with other social and religious leaders, organised a press conference. At this press conference, the KSM framed the characteristics of food aid to North Korea as an expression of ‘brotherly love,’ by separating the North Korean residents from the North Korean regime. In doing so, the KSM sought to continue its advocacy urging for the resumption of aid for the North Korean compatriots.

In 1997, the last year of the Kim Young-Sam administration, the KSM could not unfold its advocacy of food aid to North Korea publicly due to the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in 1996. After North Korea’s official statement of apology on 29 December 1996, the Kim Young-Sam administration continued adhering to its policy that linked food aid to North Korea with the Four-Party Talks, and that the official
request by the North Korean government must come first to provide large-scale
government-level food aid. Public opinion on the provision of food aid to North Korea
was also at its worst as the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration gave the impression that
North Korea was still continuing its military action, in spite of South Korea’s aid.

The most distinctive feature of the KSM’s advocacy strategy in 1997 was in
exploiting a timely event: organising the ‘Presidential Candidate Policy Debate on the
Unification and Humanitarian Aid to North Korea.’ While the presidential election
campaign was going on, the KSM and Sisa Press, which is a weekly Korean publication,
organised the ‘Presidential Candidate Policy Debate on the Unification and
Humanitarian Aid to North Korea’ on 18 November. This event was possible due to
the organisational structure of the KSM was able to exercise its advocacy influence on
the six religious orders and civil society organisations, which made it difficult for the
presidential candidates to refuse to participate in the policy debate. At this presidential
candidate debate, the three presidential candidates of Lee Hoe-Chang, Kim Dae-Jung
and Lee In-Jae expressed their views on humanitarian aid to North Korea. Among
the presidential candidates, in particular, Kim Dae-Jung maintained the same view as
the Kim Young-Sam administration in relation to the condition of food aid, by stating
that “the inter-governmental talks must take place prior to the large-scale government-
level aid to North Korea.” Kim Dae-Jung, however, expressed his position of support
for the measure of aid-channel diversification and the promotion of private-level aid to
North Korea that had been consistently demanded by the KSM and other humanitarian
NGOs. Kim Dae-Jung also supported KSM’s rationale for food aid to North Korea,
presenting his opinion that three positive meanings exist in humanitarian aid to North
Korea: alleviating hunger of the North Korean compatriots, restoring brotherly love and
building peaceful inter-Korean relations. The convening of the presidential candidate
debate on the provision of humanitarian aid to North Korea itself was the movement
that proved how important the issue of humanitarian aid to North Korea was in South
Korean politics and civil society in that a presidential candidate debate with a single
subject has only been held twice in the history of the South Korean presidential election.
The presidential candidate debate was also the place designated by the KSM to
pressurise the presidential candidates to accept the demands of the humanitarian NGOs
in relation to the humanitarian aid to North Korea. Through the opening speech of the
presidential candidate debate, the KSM urged unconditional food aid irrespective of the
Four-Party Talks, government policy change allowing private-level aid to North Korea,
aid delivery channel diversification and large-scale government aid to North Korea.112

The KSM also exploited the international network to pressurise the Kim
Young-Sam administration and the international community to take action to relieve the
food crisis in North Korea. Through networking with the international NGOs and
international organisations such as the UNDP and WFP, the KSM sought to use the
international NGOs and organisation’s appeal for food aid to North Korea, as a rationale
to proselytise the Kim Young-Sam administration and South Korean civil society. The
KSM also collaborated with the international NGOs and organisations in advocacy that
urged the international community to step forward in the issue of humanitarian aid to
North Korea. For this, the KSM held the ‘International Council on the Food Shortage
Crisis of North Korea’ in Seoul from 10 to 12 March 1997.113 Around sixty personnel
from the South Korean humanitarian NGOs and international NGOs participated in this
conference, to share their opinions and information on the food crisis in North Korea
and support humanitarian activities. From 24 to 25 June 1997, the KSM held another
international conference: ‘Musgrove II: International Consultation on Emergency Food Situation in North Korea.’ At this meeting, around 40 well known personnel including Ellsworth Culver, the President of Mercy Corps International, Catherine Bertini, the Executive Director of the WFP, and Kathi Zellweger and Eric Weingartner from the WFP attended and appealed for the food aid for North Korea. Based on the agreement on the severity of the food crisis in North Korea, and the recognition of the international community and South Korean government’s passive role in humanitarian aid to North Korea, the participants of the Musgrove II asserted the need for the South Korean and U.S. governments to urgently provide food aid to North Korea. They emphasised the important role of the South Korean and U.S. governments in the relief of the food crisis in North Korea and the need of development aid for sustainable agricultural development. The participants of Musgrove II also agreed to search for a more active role for the South Korean NGOs in the alleviation of the food crisis in North Korea, to improve the information exchange system among the South Korean NGOs, international NGOs and agencies, and to strengthen international networks.

In 1997, the KSM exploited the movement to urge government institution change to improve the operational environment in which the humanitarian NGOs worked. On 21 February, NADRK maintained the network with the KSM and urged the Kim Young-Sam administration to allow private-level aid to North Korea, while welcoming the Kim Young-Sam administration’s decision to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea through the WFP on 20 February. After the government decision that allowed private-level aid to North Korea on 31 March, MINBYUN took a step further urging the Kim Young-Sam administration to abolish the policy that maintained a single channel through the South Korean Red Cross, while welcoming the policy change.
allowing private-level aid to North Korea.\textsuperscript{117} Through its public statement on 21 April, the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK), which is a rational-centrist Christian council that consisted of eight Christian religious bodies, urged the Kim Young-Sam administration on the following issues: i) to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea through the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Fund, which is the government funding allocated to the promotion of inter-Korean relations, ii) abolish the governmental measures that restrict corporation and mass media’s activities in relation to humanitarian aid to North Korea, iii) put in place the legal and institutional measures required for private-level direct aid to North Korea and iv) participate in the humanitarian activities of the international agencies such as the WFP and UNDP. In April, 717 female personnel in the field of women’s rights, in areas including academia, medicine, humanitarian NGOs and political circles, presented the same assertion as that of the NCCK.\textsuperscript{118}

The KSM also continued to exploit the public campaigns in 1997. On 8 February the KSM and Good Friends resumed their campaign for humanitarian aid to North Korea, which was suspended after the Submarine Infiltration incident, through the commencement of the ‘New Year’s Campaign for Helping the North Korean Compatriots.’\textsuperscript{119} On 12 February, the KSM again organised the ‘Meeting and Press Conference of the Elder Statesmen Concerning the State Affairs.’\textsuperscript{120} The KSM continuously initiated the ‘National Campaign for 10,000 tonnes of Maize Help for the North Korean Compatriots’ from 27 March to 2 April and developed the fundraising movement into the ‘National Campaign for 100,000 tonnes of Maize Aid to the North Korean Compatriots’ on 9 April.\textsuperscript{121} Under this fundraising movement, the KSM organised the ‘Maize Soup Dinner for People concerned about the Food Crisis in North
Korea’ event on 12 April. Around 700 participants consisting of elder statesmen, religious leaders from the six religious orders, scholars, businessmen, the representatives of humanitarian and civil society organisations and the congressmen from the Korean National Assembly attended the event. In particular, Man-Sub Lee, the former Chairman of the National Assembly, and Se-Hyung Cho, the Acting President of the People’s Party which was the major opposition party, attended the event and urged the Kim Young-Sam administration and the public to resume food aid to North Korea.\textsuperscript{122} Through this event, the KSM raised 1,889,560,000 won, which was equivalent to more than 10,000 tonnes of maize.\textsuperscript{123} This event also provided the momentum which made the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, which stopped after the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration, resume and become a national movement once again.

\subsection*{5.4.2 Norm Grafting in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration}

During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the grafting strategy exploited by the KSM was divided into two categories by period. Until the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, the KSM mainly exploited conventional advocacy strategies, such as public campaigns and policy workshops and a petition to the President. After the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the KSM mainly exploited government and NGO consultative bodies.

In 1998, the main strategies that the KSM exploited were policy workshops and a petition to the President, while exploiting public campaigns as one of the major grafting strategies. President Kim maintained a positive view on government-level food aid to North Korea. He also had a positive view on the role of humanitarian NGOs in
that they and their activities contributed in solving the humanitarian crisis in North Korea and building trust between both Koreas. The South Korean civil society also began to perceive North Korea and its residents as the object of unification and cooperation and as fellow Korean compatriots in 1998. Despite the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s positive view on the provision of food aid to North Korea at the macro level, however, the Kim Dae-Jung administration still maintained the policy that the inter-Korean talks at government level should precede any provision of food aid to North Korea. The IMF economic crisis and North Korea’s sceptical view on Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy made it difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide large-scale government-level food aid to North Korea.

Given the operational environment, the KSM exploited policy workshops and a petition to the President in order to pressurise President Kim Dae-Jung to implement his pledge of food aid to North Korea which he made before the presidential election. In 1998 the Kim Dae-Jung administration did not establish its policy on food aid to North Korea. To pressurise it, the KSM organised an internal policy workshop with the theme of ‘Unification Policy and Humanitarian Aid to North Korea under the New Administration’ on 7 February. At the workshop, the KSM and participants pressurised the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide large-scale food aid to North Korea.

On 1 June after the breakdown of the fertiliser aid at the Inter-Korean Vice-Ministerial Talk in April, the KSM urged four issues through its ‘A Petition to the President.’ The KSM criticised that the application of a strict mutualism might lead to a situation of diplomatic confrontation between both Koreas. Diplomatic confrontation would result in the death from starvation of the North Korean elderly,
people aged in their sixties, who might be the beneficiaries of the reunion of separated families that the Kim Dae-Jung administration prioritised in the government agenda. The KSM asserted that the Kim Dae-Jung administration must prevent large-scale death through famine, by supporting the resuscitation of North Korean agriculture, through the provision of chemical fertiliser aid to North Korea. The KSM also urged the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide large-scale government-level food aid to North Korea. It lastly urged the Kim Dae-Jung administration to allow private-level fundraising, the use of an Automatic Response Service (ARS) in fundraising and a matching fund system where the government matched the amount of funds an NGO raised.

On 13 October, the KSM held a policy workshop on ‘The Evaluation of the Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Sunshine Policy [the engagement policy] and the Future Direction of Private-Level Aid to North Korea.’ The KSM urged the Kim Dae-Jung administration to improve the transparency in aid distribution through aid delivery channel diversification and to abolish the Regulation Act on Fundraising and Donation that restricted private-level fundraising. At the workshop, the KSM pressurised the Kim Dae-Jung administration to establish a favourable environment in which the humanitarian NGOs, civil society and the corporate sector were able to participate in aid to North Korea through the benefit of tax exemption on donations.127

The KSM organised another policy workshop ‘Policy Direction for Revitalising Inter-Korean Exchange and Improving the Related Policies’ on 27 November. At this workshop, Sung-Ho Je, a member of the KSM’s Policy Advisory Committee, called for the participation of humanitarian NGOs in the government consultative body of the ‘Nation Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation,’
the institutional reform for the promotion of private-level aid to North Korea and the expenditure of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund for private-level aid to North Korea.\textsuperscript{128}

In 1998, the KSM consistently exploited public campaigns. It set 25 April as ‘The Day of International Fasting for Northern Brotherly Aid’ by holding a press conference on 20 April.\textsuperscript{129} The day of fasting event was held in 107 cities in 36 countries around the world and the six religious orders and 100 South Korean NGOs participated in the event in Seoul. Many politicians and religious leaders from around the world participated. In-Deok Kang, the Unification Minister, participated in the event in Seoul and Jimmy Carter, the former U.S. President, attended the event in the United States.\textsuperscript{130} From religious circles, Pope John Paul II, the Dalai Lama, Konrad Raiser, the President of the World Council of Churches, Pastor Billy Graham and June Bensor, the President of the World Evangelical Alliance participated in local events in their own countries to appeal for the need for humanitarian aid to North Korea.\textsuperscript{131} For this event, for the first time the Kim Dae-Jung administration allowed the use of ARS in fundraising.\textsuperscript{132} From 1 August to 6 September, the KSM also organised a ‘March to Overcome the National Crisis and Help Children of South and North Korea.’ On 3 December, the KSM organised a ‘Dinner to Help the North Korean Compatriots Come out of Winter’.\textsuperscript{133} In doing so, it sought to continue to sustain the advocacy of food aid to North Korea that was withering in the midst of the IMF economic crisis.

In 1999, the KSM mainly exploited government consultative bodies and international networks. Although the Kim Dae-Jung administration announced the engagement policy that encourages inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, the Kim Dae-Jung administration did not provide any of the government-level food aid that
President Kim pledged in the presidential election campaign in 1997. The Kim Dae-Jung administration adhered to the principle of mutualism in relation to the provision of food and development aid to North Korea, while proclaiming that the inter-Korean talks at government level must come first before the issue of food aid. This government position was a different one from that of the KSM which it had continued to assert since 1998. Given this operational environment, the KSM exploited the government consultative bodies to pressurise the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide government-level food aid to North Korea. The representatives of humanitarian NGOs, who had been at the forefront of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, were appointed to positions in the government’s consultative bodies and were able to exercise direct influence on state food aid policy making. The executives of the KSM, Moon-Kyu Kang, Young-Hoon Suh, Revd Wol-Ju Song, Cardinal Su-Hwan Kim and Man-Gil Kang were appointed as members of the Unification Advisory Meeting which is a direct advisory council to the President on unification policies. These personnel formed the channel through which the KSM was able to exercise their direct influence on the highest policy maker, the President. The status of the NGO Meeting consisted of representatives from humanitarian NGOs, mainly representatives from the KSM. In January the NGO Meeting organised a meeting with Se-Hyeon Jeong, the Vice-minister of the Ministry of Unification and urged the government to take the measure of allowing the private-level aid delivery channel to North Korea.

In 1999, the KSM exploited international networks for publicising the activities of the South Korean humanitarian NGOs to the international community, to pressurise the international community which was entering a stage of ‘donor fatigue,’ to continue to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea. In the ‘Korea-Japan NGO Symposium’
from 19 to 23 February, the KSM organised the ‘Korea-Japan NGO Forum on Humanitarian Aid for North Korea.’ At this forum, the KSM urged the South Korean and Japanese governments and the Japanese humanitarian NGOs to take further action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. The KSM also exploited this forum to urge the Kim Dae-Jung administration to step forward to promote private-level aid by adopting a matching fund system.136 In July the KSM and the NGO Meeting also organised the ‘Conference on the Current Situation of North Korea.’ At this conference, the KSM and the NGO Meeting invited Eric Weingartner, the NGO liaison officer for the WFP in North Korea. By emphasising the severity of the food crisis in North Korea at the conference, the KSM and the NGO Meeting proselytised the Kim Dae-Jung administration and South Korean civil society to take further action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea.137

In 2000 the KSM mainly exploited policy workshops and conferences and the international networks. On 15 March 2000, both Koreas finally agreed to hold the Inter-Korean Summit in June, and the Kim Dae-Jung administration began to collect agendas to be discussed at the Summit. Given this operational environment, on 15 May 2000, the KSM along with other humanitarian NGOs organised a workshop with the theme of ‘The Meaning of the Inter-Korean Summit and the Role of Humanitarian NGOs’ on 15 May.138 At this meeting, the KSM asserted that the humanitarian NGOs had been playing a steering role in leading public opinion and humanitarian aid to North Korea and should not be excluded in the process of expected humanitarian aid to North Korea, as the result of the government-level rapprochement after the Inter-Korean Summit.139 The KSM also organised ‘The 4th Anniversary Conference of the KSM’ on 7 July. At this conference, Yong-Sun Lee, the Secretary General of the KSM, criticised the decline
of public interest in humanitarian aid to North Korea and the withdrawal of the international NGOs from North Korea.\textsuperscript{140} Emphasising the ongoing food deficits in North Korea, Lee asserted that the role of the South Korean humanitarian NGOs and civil society were still important in the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis in North Korea.\textsuperscript{141} Lee further asserted the adoption of a matching fund system, the establishment of a government-NGO partnership in humanitarian aid to North Korea, and the involvement of NGO personnel in the National Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation.\textsuperscript{142}

The NGO Meeting also held a workshop for its member groups from 15 to 16 September on the Kim Dae-Jung administration's decision to provide government-level food aid, on loan terms, on 14 September.\textsuperscript{143} Criticising the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s unilateral aid excluding the humanitarian NGOs in the process of aid delivery to North Korea, the participants in the workshop reiterated the need for the provision of food aid through the NGO channel.\textsuperscript{144} The NGO Meeting urged the establishment of a North Korean development aid plan for sustainable development under joint government-private efforts, allowing the humanitarian NGOs to deliver and distribute the government-pledged food and fertiliser aid. The NGO Meeting also urged the establishment of a government-NGO consultative body.\textsuperscript{145} At the workshop, Kyung-Suk Suh, the Director of the Executive Committee of the KSM, further asserted that the Kim Dae-Jung administration had to collaborate with the international community to prevent a situation where the international community withdrew from North Korea, due to the South Korean government’s provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea.\textsuperscript{146} After the workshop, the NGO Meeting organised another meeting on 6 October inviting Jae-Kyu Park, the Unification Minister, and delivered their demands
from the workshop.\textsuperscript{147}

From 29 June to 1 July, Jong-Mu Lee, the Director of the Office of Planning and Coordination of the KSM and Kyung-Suk Suh, the Director of the Executive Committee of the KSM, participated in ‘The 2\textsuperscript{nd} International NGO Conference on Humanitarian Support to North Korea.’\textsuperscript{148} At the conference, they consistently asserted that the Kim Dae-Jung administration lacked serious consideration on the government-NGO role in relation to the delivery of food aid to North Korea. Lee and Suh also criticised the decline in humanitarian aid to North Korea by the international community, in spite of the continued food deficits in North Korea.\textsuperscript{149} By emphasising the continued foreign aid from the outside of North Korea, Lee and Suh asserted the international community’s continued aid to North Korea.

In 2001 KSM advocacy was insignificant compared to the previous years. While mainly focusing on the delivery of development aid to North Korea, the KSM mainly exploited the NGO Council and the international networks to pressurise the Kim Dae-Jung administration and the international community. After the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration decided to provide large-scale rice aid on loan terms in 2000. Given the operational environment in 2001, the KSM had diversified the direction of its mandates and projects to development aid to North Korea. The main strategies that the KSM exploited to proselytise South Korean civil society firstly was the NGO Council. The NGO Council organised a meeting on 20 July and fifteen NGOs and two personnel from the Ministry of Unification attended the meeting.\textsuperscript{150} At this meeting, the humanitarian NGOs decided to organise a public campaign to proselytise South Korean civil society to support the government plan to provide surplus-rice aid to North Korea through the 5\textsuperscript{th} Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk on September.\textsuperscript{151} On 28
September, the NGO Council meeting was held with fifteen NGOs and the participation of the personnel from the Ministry of Unification. At this meeting NGOs proposed the establishment of a government-NGO consultative body for cooperation between the government and NGOs in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Before this meeting, the executives of the Grand National Party (GNP) which consistently opposed the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea suddenly revealed its ratification of 300,000 tonnes of surplus-rice aid to North Korea. It, however, faced severe opposition from the conservative parties within the GNP and the conservative media, Chosun Ilbo. In this situation, the NGO Council, held on 28 September, agreed to organise a public campaign to pressurise the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide surplus-rice aid to North Korea. The last NGO Council meeting in 2001 was held on 30 November with fourteen NGOs and three personnel from the Ministry of Unification. On the day before the meeting, the NGO Council issued an official statement opposing the amendment of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act raised by the GNP. In the statement, the NGO Council criticised the amendment of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act in that it was possible to restrict the autonomy of government in pursuing the engagement policy toward North Korea. The NGO Council therefore decided to attend the public hearing organised by the National Assembly in relation to the amendment of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act. In addition, the NGO Council made a decision to pressurise the government to establish a government-NGO consultative body, in order to assess government and private-level aid to North Korea in 2001 and plan the projects of 2002. Through the NGO Council meeting, the humanitarian NGOs and the government made it possible to establish a cooperative relationship in relation to aid policy making towards North
Korea.

In 2001, the KSM exploited the international networks to pressurise the South Korean government and the international community to take further action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. The NGO Council organised two council meetings on 9 March and 20 April. Fourteen NGOs and a Deputy Director of the Humanitarian Assistance Bureau of the Ministry of Unification attended the meeting on 9 March. At the meeting on 20 April, eighteen NGOs and two personnel from the Ministry of Unification attended. At these meetings, the NGOs called for government cooperation in organising the international NGO conference and finally the NGO Council held ‘The 3rd International NGO Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea’ on 20 June. Attending this conference were 160 people from NGOs and the United Nations, and government personnel from fifteen countries including South Korea, New Zealand and Canada. The conference suggested continued support of the South Korean government for North Korea and cooperation between the government and NGOs. The conference also suggested networking among the U.N. agencies, government and NGOs and the establishment of ‘a code of conduct’ for the South Korean humanitarian NGOs in the North Korean aid. The conference further urged the U.S. and Japanese governments and their NGOs to take more active action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea.

Lastly, in 2002 the last year of the Kim Dae-Jung administration, KSM advocacy and its grafting strategy were not significant. Based on the recognition of the need for large-scale food aid to North Korea, the Kim Dae-Jung administration continued to proselytise North Korea to hold related talks to discuss food aid and other issues in 2002. Given the operational environment in 2002, the KSM did not need to
pressurise the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide food aid to North Korea. The KSM instead continued to support agricultural NGOs’ advocacy that sought to proselytise the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide surplus-rice aid to North Korea.

In 2002, the KSM exploited the NGO Council to support agricultural NGOs’ surplus-rice-aid movement. While KSM and humanitarian NGOs’ advocacy had withered since 2000, the National Confederation of Farmers Association (Junnong) initiated its advocacy urging the government to provide domestic surplus rice to North Korea. The Junnong’s ‘Unification Rice-Aid Movement’ started with the initiative of the GNP’s scheme to provide surplus rice in 2001. Although the provision of surplus-rice aid was not committed in 2001, the Junnong organised the Unification Rice-Aid Movement on 25 January 2002 and this movement developed into a nationwide farmers’ movement. From 22 April, the Junnong strengthened its movement, changing its name to the ‘Movement Urging the Government to Provide 450,000 tonnes of Rice to North Korea’. At the final date of the movement on 15 May, the Junnong, along with other NGOs involved in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, such as the National Alliance for Democracy and the Reunification of Korea and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, organised a press release and a protest at the front of the National Assembly. Through the press release and protest, the Junnong urged the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide surplus rice to North Korea. In the midst of the advocacy of surplus-rice aid to North Korea by the Junnong in 2002, the role of the NGO Council and the KSM was passive.

5.4.3 Norm Grafting in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration
During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM’s activities to change norms in civil society decreased, but KSM grafting strategies were the most effective in that the KSM exploited the NGO and government consultative bodies which allowed the KSM to get access to the state food aid policy makers directly.

In 2003, the KSM sought to increase its influence on state policy making in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation including the provision of food aid to North Korea. The KSM first exploited the Centre for Peace Sharing (CPS). The CPS was established as a civil think tank specialised in policy research and development in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. The CPS was mandated to expand domestic networking among NGOs, academia and the government. During the year of 2003, after its establishment in November, the CPS organised a policy seminar in December. On 1 December, the government personnel from the Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Agriculture, NGO personnel and academics attended the foundation memorial seminar. These personnel evaluated the former Kim Dae-Jung administration’s policy towards North Korea and suggested policy recommendations for the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. At this seminar, in particular, Gi-Beom Lee, the President of Okedongmu, which was a humanitarian NGO specialised in aid for North Korean children, raised that the humanitarian NGOs began to lose their regulatory and advocacy role against the government since the South Korean humanitarian NGOs received government financial support from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund. He asserted the need for independent roles for NGOs so they could be able to regulate the government and advocate new norms and values being ignored by the government. In this way, the CPS became an influential civil think tank collecting civil policy suggestions in relation to government policy on inter-Korean exchange and cooperation.
The CPS also facilitated the consultative network that connects NGOs, academics and the government. Exploiting the CPS, the KSM continued to pressurise the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to maintain and further develop inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, as well as the provision of food aid to North Korea.

In 2004, the KSM exploited the CPS as a key method to pressurise the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to incorporate NGO personnel into the state policy-making process in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. On 22 June, the CPS and the Korean Council organised a policy seminar, and at this seminar the KSM emphasised the role of the National Assembly in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. After the KSM’s recommendation at the seminar on 22 June, the KSM and the National Assembly Research Meeting jointly organised a seminar on ‘How to Change the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund?’ on 12 July. At this seminar, Jong-Moo Lee, the Head of the CPS suggested the allocation of 1 per cent of the national budget to the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund, the permanent establishment of the National Council for the Management of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund, the transformation of the National Council to a government-civilian consultative body and the expenditure of 20 per cent of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund through NGOs. Lee in particular supported the legislation of ‘The Basic Act of Advancing Inter-Korean Relations’ that Congressman Chae-Jung Lim proposed to improve transparency and consensus in the implementation of government policy towards North Korea. Gi-Sun Won, the Head of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund of the Ministry of Unification, revealed the government decision to establish the Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy that consisted of NGOs, the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Also, the CPS organised a series of 10 policy forums during the
year of 2004. Through these policy seminars and conferences, the KSM continued to pressurise the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and the law makers at the National Assembly to improve government policy and regulations that restricted NGO participation in state policy making in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation.

The outbreak of the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in April 2004 provided momentum which ignited the advocacy of humanitarian aid to North Korea that was gradually fading after the government’s decision to provide government-level food and development aid to North Korea since 2000. After the Explosion, the KSM and the NGO Council established a network of the ‘Ryongcheon Movement’ consisting of 55 NGOs. Despite this being a temporary network for 3 months, the Ryongcheon Movement actively engaged in organising public campaigns, press releases, lobbying the government, fundraising and delivering emergency and recovery aid directly to North Korea. In terms of the scale of fundraising, as a result, the Ryongcheon Movement raised $24.56 million, which was the largest fundraising amount that had been made for such a short period in Korean history. In addition, the successful role of the Ryongcheon Movement in steering and coordinating various humanitarian activities and actors became a critical force leading to the Roh Moo-Hyun administration finally establishing the ‘Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy’ (the Government-Civilian Council) on 1 September.

Like the year 2004, the KSM in 2005 consistently sought to improve the role of NGOs in state policy making in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. To achieve these organisational goals, the main strategies that the KSM exploited were NGO and government consultative bodies, such as the Government-Civilian Council.
The KSM first exploited the Government-Civilian Council that was established on 1 September. At the preparatory meetings for the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council, the KSM delivered the administrative function of the NGO Council which was a counterpart of the government representing the humanitarian NGOs. Here the KSM insisted that the status of the Government-Civilian Council should be raised to the rank of Ministerial level.\textsuperscript{174} As a result of the Ministry of Unification’s persuasion, the Government-Civilian Council was established as a Vice-ministerial level body. After the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council, the NGO Council and the government agreed to establish the ‘Common Plan for 2005,’ ‘the Preparation of the Master Plan and Joint Projects for 2005’ (Master Plan) and ‘The Publication of the Proceeding of 10 years of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea’. Although the Government and NGOs agreed to prepare the Master Plan, however, it was dissipated in the preparation because of the passive government stance. Some humanitarian NGOs also opposed the preparation of the Master Plan because of the lack of coordinative capability of the NGO Council as the consultative body among the humanitarian NGOs. These NGOs opposing the Master Plan also worried that the Master Plan might result in the restriction of NGO activities.\textsuperscript{175} In addition, the Government-Civilian Council proved inefficient to drive the preparation of the Master Plan, due to the absence of its permanent executive body. The Ministry of Unification and the NGO designated to the administrative organisation of the NGO Council took charge of the administrative role of the Government-Civilian Council. Without an increase in budget and personnel for managing the Government-Civilian Council, it was impossible to maintain efficiency.\textsuperscript{176} The Government-Civilian Council meetings in fact were inefficient due to the lack of meeting information, the absence of preparation and coordination before the meeting,
and thereby the outcomes of the meeting were often too general. In this sense, Dong-Wan Kang, Hyeon-Mo Yang and Won-Suk Suh evaluated the Government-Civilian Council as the policy implementation body, not the consultative body for policy making. Although both movements of the promotion of the status of the Government-Civilian Council and the establishment of the Master Plan were not successful, the efforts of the NGO Council and the KSM that actively engaged in that process were meaningful in that these movements attempted to improve the influence of the humanitarian NGOs in the state policy-making process, by increasing the participation of NGO personnel.

In 2005 the KSM exploited the CPS to institutionalise the provision of food aid to North Korea into state law and the participation of civil society in the state policy-making process. The CPS held nine policy forums and four seminars in 2005. The topics of these policy forums and seminars were four aid related issues, two peace and unification related issues, three inter-Korean related issues and three general North Korea related issues. At these policy forums and seminars, the personnel from the government, NGOs, academics and the research institutes attended and made legal and institutional recommendations for the government and the National Assembly. The CPS, for instance, organised a policy forum with the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) on the theme of ‘A Strategy of Development Assistance to North Korea’ on 25 October. At the forum, Professor Dae-Suk Choi of Dongguk University and the Policy Advisor of the KSM, asserted that the Government-Civilian Council was a consultative body that had no legal ground and therefore was an inefficient body. To be an efficient consultative body between the government and NGOs, Choi recommended that the executive body of the Government-Civilian Council and the
Inter-Korean Cooperation Foundation, which are supported by a legal foundation, should be established.\textsuperscript{181}

Under the suspension of government food and fertiliser aid after the missile launch in July, the flood damage in August 2006 was the momentum that motivated the unfolding of the humanitarian flood-aid movement by the KSM. Given the operational environment, the KSM sought to proselytise the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to resume the flood and food aid to North Korea irrespective of North Korea’s missile launch. For this, the KSM exploited the existing consultative bodies of the NGO Council. The NGO Council extended the humanitarian flood-aid movement, separating the flood and food aid from the missile issue.\textsuperscript{182} After the missile launch in July, the representatives of the KSM gathered twice on 20 and 28 July and discussed the position of the KSM on North Korea’s missile launch. As a result of the two meetings, the representatives of the KSM adopted the official statement that the humanitarian flood aid, including the food and fertiliser aid, should be separated from the military and political issues while assuring transparency in the aid distribution.\textsuperscript{183} As the outbreak of the flood damage became known to South Korean Society in August, then, the KSM and the NGO Council organised an issue network that consisted of humanitarian, civil society, human rights and woman NGOs. Through the adoption of the Joint Statement, these NGOs and the KSM urged the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to resume humanitarian flood and food aid to North Korea.\textsuperscript{184}

The Korean Council, within which the KSM worked as a member, engaged in the advocacy of flood and food aid to North Korea. The Korean Council was active in the policy recommendation for the promotion of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation and the public consensus on the humanitarian aid to North Korea. At the 25th Sub-
committee for Welfare on 7 March, the Korean Council suggested the establishment of a government agency to support private-level aid to North Korea. The 27th Sub-committee for Welfare on 19 September recommended the government and NGOs work to improve public awareness over the contribution of the South Korean government in the humanitarian relief in North Korea and the necessity of continued aid to North Korea. After North Korea’s nuclear test, the 28th Sub-committee for Welfare on 23 November suggested delivering the humanitarian food aid through the WFP rather than the bilateral channel. With the outbreak of the flood in July, in particular, Se-Hyeon Jeong, the President of the Korean Council and the former Minister of Unification, met Jong-Seok Lee, the Minister of Unification and urged the government to resume the humanitarian food and fertiliser aid to North Korea.

The 6.15 Joint Statement South Korean Committee (the 6.15 Committee) that was established in 2005 also engaged in the advocacy of flood aid to North Korea. The 6.15 Committee was an umbrella body that consists of personnel mainly from the humanitarian NGOs including the KSM, former politicians and the unification movement NGOs. In this sense, the 6.15 Committee was one of the most influential networks to exert significant influence in state policy making towards North Korea. Given the suspension of food and fertiliser aid by the Roh Moo-Hyun administration after North Korea’s missile launch in July, the 6.15 Joint Statement North Korean Committee which was a counterpart in North Korea requested flood aid through the 6.15 Committee on 9 August. Responding to the request, the 6.15 Committee met Jong-Seok Lee and urged for government resumption of the emergency aid for the North Korean flood victims. At the meeting, the 6.15 Committee further emphasised that the scale of aid should not be a symbolic, but a significant amount including the food aid.
In 2007, the last year of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM, along with the NGO Council, were devoted to improving NGO practices in relation to humanitarian and development aid to North Korea. The KSM and the NGO Council engaged in the preparation of ‘A Code of Conduct’ that provided guidelines in the delivery of humanitarian and development aid to North Korea. After the peak of the North Korean food deficits around 1998, the international community and the domestic conservative groups criticised the South Korean humanitarian NGOs in that they did not secure transparency in the delivery of aid, heavily emphasising brotherly love and humanitarianism. Despite the public opinion polls that called for the improvement of monitoring aid distribution in North Korea, the humanitarian NGOs were not able to improve this monitoring. In this situation, donor fatigue regarding the continued aid to North Korea began to accumulate in South Korean civil society.\(^{189}\) Given this operational environment, the NGO Council started a preparatory meeting for the establishment of ‘A Code of Conduct’ in 2007 and held two preparatory meetings on 28 May and 18 September.\(^{190}\)

In 2007, the KSM sought to evaluate the role and activities of humanitarian NGOs during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and provide policy recommendations for the future direction of humanitarian NGOs in the new administration in 2008. In this process, the KSM exploited the CPS and the Korean Council. The CPS and the Korean Council organised six policy forums and expert conferences in 2007. Through these joint forums and conferences, the KSM and the Korean Council sought to evaluate the role and activities of humanitarian NGOs during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. The KSM and the Korean Council next sought to identify the role of NGOs and government in the new administration.\(^{191}\) At the policy forum on 9 October, in
particular, Jeong-Soo Kim, the Head of the Humanitarian Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Unification, for the first time as a government official, suggested that the government needed to establish the policy and legal foundations to allow the government to provide humanitarian and development aid to North Korea prior to/without the official request of North Korea.\textsuperscript{192}

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that the KSM’s capacities were consequential in explaining the ability of KSM advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of the Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations’ policy on food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007.

In the beginning of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 1997, the lack of organisational experience and expertise in the advocacy of food aid which resulted from KSM’s short organisational activities resulted in adopting the existing agenda framing although the existing agenda framing was the most fundamental framing strategy appealing to the emotion of people. The KSM first adopted the most fundamental framing strategy of appealing to nationalism by framing food aid to North Korea as ‘brotherly love’ and ‘a peaceful unification movement.’ By doing so, the KSM sought to mitigate the hostility inherent in South Korean civil society. To overcome the severe political confrontation and the prolonged hostility behind the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society in 1996, the KSM exploited the universal norm of humanitarianism for the first time. In 1997, the KSM again exploited
the regional and ethnic distinctiveness of its advocacy in issue framing by framing the food aid to North Korea as ‘a movement for preventing war and alleviating political and military tension on the Korean peninsula’.

However, a strong mandate to advocate food aid to North Korea and the distinctive organisational structure consisting of a wide range of networks and advocacy instead enabled the KSM to unfold its influential advocacy nationwide. During the Kim Young-Sam administration, firstly, the unique organisational structure of the KSM enabled it to establish a wide range of high-status networks able to influence the whole South Korean civil society. In 1995, the Inter-religious Committee, the predecessor of the KSM, was established as a broad network including the largest six South Korean religious orders. By including the rational-centrist NGOs in the establishment of the KSM, the KSM came to exercise its advocacy influence on the whole South Korean civil society as well as the six largest religious orders in 1996. In 1997 the KSM further broadened its network to overseas, while seeking to strengthen its network by establishing an umbrella body for the coordination of different networks and humanitarian NGOs.

With regard to norm grafting in the Kim Young-Sam administration, the grafting strategies which the KSM mainly exploited gradually developed from 1995. Although the Inter-religious Committee, the predecessor of the KSM, was established in 1995, the representatives, directors, board members, secretary and staff of the KSM already had expertise in social movement through South Korea’s democratisation movement during the 1970s and 1980s. In the beginning of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea from 1995 and 1996, however, the KSM largely relied on conventional activities, such as public campaigns, press releases and lobbying politicians. It was attributable to the fact
that the KSM had no experience in the advocacy of aid during that time. The KSM which accumulated its expertise in the advocacy of food aid through the two years of movement then moved to a more developed form of grafting strategy in 1997, exploiting more influential and nationwide movements. A presidential candidate debate on the issue of food aid to North Korea in particular was a movement that was able to convey the KSM and other humanitarian NGOs’ demands to the state food aid policy makers. The reason that the KSM was able to exploit such influential and vigorous nationwide grafting strategies in 1997 was that the KSM was motivated by a strong humanitarian mandate and that the KSM had a broad network which was established as an overarching constitution enabled them to network with various groups in South Korean civil society.

The advocacy of the KSM in the Kim Dae-Jung administration can be divided into two stages at the point of the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000. The style of the advocacy of the KSM was closely related to the changes in KSM organisational capacity at this time. Before the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the KSM adhered to their mandate to advocate for the provision of food aid to North Korea although this had become weakened in comparison to the mandate in the Kim Young-Sam administration. As the advocacy of food aid to North Korean continued, the KSM was also able to accumulate organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. Based on these improvements in organisational capacity, the ability of the KSM in agenda framing, networking and norm grafting consistently developed. The KSM was timely in its framing of the issue of food aid and effectively responding to changes in inter-Korean relations. When the Kim Dae-Jung administration had not yet established its policy towards North Korea in 1998, the KSM framed the food aid to North Korea as
‘the obligation of government.’ When the Kim Dae-Jung administration proclaimed its engagement policy in 1999 and 2000, the KSM framed the food aid as ‘a peaceful unification movement.’ With regard to the networking during this period, the KSM consistently broadened its networks with other humanitarian and social movement NGOs and also increased the status of networks by networking with government policy makers, experts groups and social and political elders. With regard to the norm grafting during this period, the KSM mainly exploited conventional advocacy strategies, such as public campaigns, policy workshops for the increase of public awareness about the food crisis in North Korea and a petition to the President. The KSM in addition exploited the government consultative bodies, such as the Unification Advisory Meeting, the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation and the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea.

After the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, then, the KSM expanded their mandates to include inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Such diversification of the organisational mandate resulted in the weakening of the humanitarian mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea, by diluting the previous single mandate and thereby scattering the organisational resources. On the contrary, with regard to the funding capacity, the KSM expanded its funding sources and therefore stabilised its organisational ground. The diversification of funding sources through new aid programmes, government deregulation in relation to NGO fundraising and government funding for humanitarian NGOs’ activities in North Korea contributed to the stabilisation of KSM funding capacity. With improvement in the funding capacity, the KSM began to stabilise its organisational structure by restructuring it to a function-centred structure, by establishing issue-specific committees and divisions and by
appointing experienced experts to these new positions. The KSM further strengthened coordination of the overall structure and divisions by strengthening the function of the Planning and Coordination Division and assigning more administrative staff.

Changes in the political operational environment in where the KSM worked and in the organisational capacity of the KSM resulted in changes in the ability of the KSM in the agenda framing, networking and norm grafting. The mandate of the KSM which was weakened after the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000 resulted in the weakening of the ability of KSM in the agenda framing. In 2001 and 2002, the KSM framed the food aid to North Korea as ‘a mutually winning movement’ for both South and North Korea but it was less appealing framing compared to appealing to the sense of brotherly love and humanitarianism. During this period between 2000 and 2002, however, the KSM consistently improved its quality of networks. By exploiting its unique organisational structure, the KSM appointed various civil and government experts and scholars who had expertise in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation to positions on the Policy Advisory Committee of the KSM. The KSM also strengthened its networks with other humanitarian NGOs, by establishing the official NGO consultative body of the ‘NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea.’ Based on these high status networks, the KSM exploited these networks as main grafting strategy. After the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, more specifically, the exploited the government and NGO consultative bodies, such as the Unification Advisory Meeting, the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation and the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, rather than the conventional advocacy strategies. Between 2000 and 2002, the KSM in addition organised various advocacy activities abroad. Through these activities at the international level, the KSM pressurised the international community to take further
action to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. Through these international activities, the KSM sought to pressurise the Kim Dae-Jung administration from the outside.

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration was the most active government in respect of the institutionalisation of NGO participation in state policy making and the provision of aid to North Korea. Given this operational environment, the KSM diversified its mandate to the delivery of development aid to North Korea. The diversification of KSM organisational mandate resulted in the weakening of the humanitarian mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea, by diluting the previous single mandate and thereby scattering the organisational resources. KSM advocacy of food aid therefore was not the primary mandate. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM thereby was prone to re-use existing agenda framing which was developed during the previous administrations.

During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, however, the KSM strengthened its role in civil participation, policy research and development. It further stabilised its function-centred structure by dividing the existing four administrative divisions into five divisions and two centres according to its function. In doing so, the KSM was able to maintain the highest level of organisational expertise in the advocacy and delivery of humanitarian and development aid to North Korea. Such improvement in the organisational expertise enabled the KSM to increase the quality of networks. In addition, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s institutionalisation of government-NGO consultative bodies in the state policy-making process enabled the KSM to expand its networks with state policy makers. In 2004, the NGO Council, which was steered by the KSM, and the Roh Moo-Hyun administration established ‘the Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy’ as the official government and NGO consultative
body in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. In this year of 2004, the KSM’s cooperative relationship with the National Assembly Research Meeting and the establishment of the Centre for Peace Sharing under the structure of the KSM also increased the quality of the KSM network, enabling the KSM to get access to congress law makers, experts from other humanitarian NGOs, academia and think tanks, and government officials. In the same vein, the KSM exploited these networks as a main grafting strategy. KSM advocacy targeting civil society decreased, but the KSM grafting strategies were the most effective in respect of its influence on the state policy-making process. The KSM strengthened the role of NGO consultative bodies as the counterpart of government in state aid policy making. Based on these consolidated networks, the KSM engaged in the establishment of government consultative bodies and exploited these institutions to get access to state food aid policy makers directly.


4 The thesis used proceedings mainly from NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, KSM and Centre for Peace Sharing.

5 The thesis mainly referred to the databases of KSM (www.ksm.or.kr), SARANGBANG Group for Human Rights (www.sarangbang.or.kr/kr/new/index.php), and Cyber NGO Materials (www.demos.or.kr/bbs/zboard.php?id=english). These web-databases provide email newsletters, conference proceedings, statements, press releases, reports, and collection of newspaper and magazine articles on the activities of humanitarian NGOs as well as their own materials.

6 The thesis used the newspaper articles from the major publishers in South Korea such as Chosun Ilbo, Hangyoreh, Munhwa Ilbo, Segye Ilbo, Joongang Ilbon, Tongil News, Yonhap News, and Hankook Ilbo, etc.


8 Author interviewed key personnel who played a steering role in the humanitarian food aid movement since 1995. These key interviewees include Jong-Moo Lee, the Director of Centre for Peace Sharing, KSM, Yong-Sun Lee, the Chairman of Steering Committee, KSM, Mun-Kyu Kang, the Former President of KSM, Young-Sik Kang, the Secretary
General of KSM, Il-Ha Lee, the President of Good Neighbours, Kyung-Suk Suh, the Former Member of Joint Representative of KSM, Jae-Sik Oh, the Former President of World Vision Korea, and Changbin Park, the Chief Operating Officer of World Vision.


12 Ibid.


14 Ibid.


16 Korean Sharing Movement, *Changrib 5junyeon Hwaldong Jaryojib* [English Translation: Report on the 5 years of the Korean Sharing Movement]. pp. 15-21. In this thesis, the term ‘regime’ will be used as ‘a set of governing arrangements.’


18 Ibid.


21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.


24 Ibid.


27 Ibid.


30 NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, *Daebukjiwon 10nyeon Baekseo* [English Translation: White Paper of the 10-years of Aids to North Korea]. pp. 31-68.

31 The 16th Committee of the Presidency Takeover, "'Kukminchamyeo' deung 5dae
Mokpyo Jesi [English Translation: Establishment of 5 Big Objectives including Public Participation]." GOVP1200320620, Seoul: 03/02/2003.


33 Ibid.


36 Author, Interview with Young-Sik Kang, The Secretary General of the Korean Sharing Movement, in Seoul. 18/05/2009.


38 Ibid.


40 NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, Daebukjiwon 10nyeon Baekseo [English Translation: White Paper of the 10-years of Aids to North Korea]. pp. 31-68.


42 Ibid.

43 The Committee of Civil Society Development, Hanguksiminsaho Baljeonul wihan Cheongsajin [English Translation: The Blueprint for the Korean Civil Society
Development]. pp. 24-25.

44 NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, *Daebukjiwon 10nyeon Baekseo* [English Translation: White Paper of the 10-years of Aids to North Korea]. pp. 31-68.


48 Ibid.


52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.


55 Sarangbang Group for Human Rights, "861ho, Tongileul Hyanghae Hanminjokui Maeumeul Moeuija [English Translation: Let's be together for the Unification]."


58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.


62 Hong, "Hanguk Siminsahoiui Jeongchisahoijeok Geoboneonswa Jeongbu [English Translation: Socio-political Governance of Korean Civil Society and the Government-Civil Relationship]." pp. 73-100


64 Author, Interview with Yong-Sun Lee, The Chairman of the Steering Committee, Korean Sharing Movement, in Seoul. 12/05/2009.

65 Ibid.

66 Author, Interview with Jae-Sik Oh, The Former President of World Vision Korea and The Director of Asia Institute, in Seoul. 28/05/2009.


69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Interview with Mun-Kyu Kang, The Former President of the Korean Sharing Movement, in Seoul. 13/05/2009.


78 Ibid.


83 Ibid.

84 The 8.15 National Celebrations is an inter-Korean event that celebrates both Koreas’ independence from the Japanese colonisation on 15 August 1945.


87 Hyunjeong Lee, "Mingan, Jeongchigwon Buk Suhaejiwon Umjikim Hwalbal [English Translation: NGOs and Politicians Urge to Provide Flood Assistance to North Korea]." [Newspaper Article], Tongil News. 05/08/2006.; Yong-Sun Lee, "Bukhan Suhaejiwoni Nambuk Gyeongsaeulk Punun Jeongiga Doiaya [English Translation: North Korean Flood Assistance should Become a Momentum of the Inter-Korean Rapprochement]." [Magazine Article], Changbi Weekly Commentary. 08/08/2006.; Deokhoon Lee, "Buk Misail Yeonsokbalsa Chunggyeok, Jeong Se-Hyeon Jeon Toingilbujangkwan, Ha Young-Sun, Seouldae Gyosu Daedam: Buk, 9.11 Tereo Ijeon Bangsikeuro Wihyeob [English Translation: Talks with Jeong Se-hyeon, Former Minister of Unification and Ha Young-Sun, Professor of Seoul National University,

88 NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, *Daebukjiwon 10nyeon Baekseo* [English Translation: White Paper of the 10-years of Aids to North Korea]. pp. 31-68.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.


93 Ibid.

94 Sarangbang Group for Human Rights, "Je 485ho Bukhan Sujaemin Dobgi Campaign [English Translation: The 485th Campaign for the North Korean Flood Aid]."

95 Ibid.


98 Sisapress, "[Chojeom] 6 dae Jonggyo Jidoja Bukhan Dongpo dobgi Dajim [English..."


100 Sarangbang Group for Human Rights, "580 ho, Jeongbu Bukhan Dobgie Naseoya [English Translation: No. 580, The Government have to unfold the humanitarian aid to North Korea]."


102 Kim, Commodification of Poverty and Starvation: Marketing Strategies of South Korean Humanitarian NGOs Assisting the North. pp. 119-150.


104 Sarangbang Group for Human Rights, "655ho, Ssal Jiwon Heoyoung Hara [English Translation: No. 655 Allow the Provision of Rice]."


107 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.


113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid.

116 Sarangbang Group for Human Rights, "828ho, Jeongukyeonhab, Daebuk Minganjiwon Injeonghara [English Translation: No. 828, National Alliance for Democracy & Reunification of Korea, Allow NGOs' assistance to North Korea]."

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.


123 Ibid.


130 Ibid.

131 NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, Daebukjiwon 10nyeon Baekseo [English Translation: White Paper of the 10-years of Aids to North Korea]. pp. 31-68.


134 Author, Interview with Mun-Kyu Kang, The Former President of the Korean Sharing Movement, in Seoul. 13/05/2009; Author, Interview with Jae-Sik Oh, The Former President of World Vision Korea and The Director of Asia Institute, in Seoul. 28/05/2009.


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137 Ibid.


139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
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148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.

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154 Ibid.

155 Ibid.

156 Ibid.

157 Ibid.


159 Ibid.

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid.

162 Ibid.


166 Ibid.


Lee, "17dae Gukhoieseoeui Nambukhyeobryeok Beobjedo Jeongbi Bangan [English Translation: The Strategy of Legislative Change for the Inter-Korean Cooperation at the 17th Congress]."

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CHAPTER 6. THE ADVOCACY OF GOOD FRIENDS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter demonstrates that differing non-governmental organisation (NGO) capacities were consequential in explaining the ability of NGO advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea.

With regard to agenda framing, Good Friends framed the issue of food aid to North Korea in four different ways: ‘brotherly love,’ ‘a facilitator for the improvement of North Korean human rights and the peaceful unification,’ ‘the protection of human rights’ and ‘humanitarianism.’

In regard to networking, Good Friends was active in networking with other humanitarian NGOs particularly the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) and NGO consultative bodies, such as the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (the NGO Council), the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (the Korean Council) and the 6.15 Joint Statement South Korean Committee (the 6.15 Committee). The distinctive characteristic of Good Friends networking, however, was that Good Friends established a wide network with the international community particularly NGOs, government personnel in the United States and Japan and United Nations agencies.

Based on such agenda framing and established networking, Good Friends pressurised the government and South Korean civil society to embrace new norms in relation to food aid to North Korea. At this stage of norm grafting, Good Friends mainly
used information politics, which collects ongoing information on the severity of food shortages in North Korea and disseminates the information through various channels of public campaigns, the mass media and press conferences, workshops and policy conferences, and publishing reports. The ability of Good Friends advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea, however, was not always timely or effective. This chapter demonstrates that changes in the issue characteristics of the food crisis, the domestic political structure and changes in Good Friends’ capability circumscribed or promoted the advocacy capacity of Good Friends.

For the examination of Good Friends advocacy, this chapter uses annual reports, conference proceedings, web-databases, newspaper articles and masters’ theses as the background materials. Annual reports published by Good Friends also provide background information on the activities of Good Friends. To have access to detailed data on their activities, this chapter uses conference proceedings, email newsletters and web-databases of NGOs and newspaper articles. As one of the major strategies for advocacy directed at the government and the public, Good Friends organised a series of policy conferences, symposiums, forums and international conferences; the chapters therefore examine conference proceedings too. The representatives and high-ranking personnel of Good Friends generally have more information on the advocacy in which they were involved. To examine the role of representatives and high-ranking personnel of Good Friends, the chapter therefore uses interviews with the representatives and high-ranking personnel.

This chapter consists of three main sections, an introduction and conclusion section. The first section examines how Good Friends framed the issue of food aid to
North Korea. The second section next examines the networks which Good Friends established so as to achieve its organisational goals. The third section lastly examines the grafting strategies which Good Friends exploited to change the existing norms and practices of the government and the public with new norms and practices.

6.2 Agenda Setting

This section demonstrates that by reframing the issue of food aid to North Korea, Good Friends sought to promote the new norm of food aid to North Korea to resonate with the government and civil society. Good Friends framed the issue of food aid to North Korea in four different ways: ‘brotherly love,’ ‘a facilitator for the improvement of North Korean human rights and the peaceful unification,’ ‘the protection of human rights’ and ‘humanitarianism.’ Changes in the operational environment and the organisational capacity of Good Friends explain these different ways of agenda framing. To demonstrate this argument, this section examines how Good Friends framed the issue of food aid to North Korea and shows why the ways of Good Friends agenda framing changed over time.

6.2.1 Agenda Framing in the Kim Young-Sam Administration

During the Kim Young-Sam administration, Good Friends’ agenda framing was consistent in seeking to replace the dominant hostility towards North Korea with
‘brotherly love,’ allowing South Korean civil society to recognise the North Korean people as their compatriots, thereby helping them, irrespective of the differences in ideology and the political system. In this sense, Good Friends consistently framed the food aid to North Korea as ‘brother love’ for the North Korean compatriots during the Kim Young-Sam administration.

In 1995, the Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement (KBSM), the predecessor of Good Friends, concluded that appealing to ‘brotherly love’ produced the strongest persuasive power to overcome the dominant hostility towards North Korea.8 Good Friends therefore used ‘brotherly love’ for the North Korean compatriots as a main frame to support South Korean civil society.

On 12 December 1996, Good Friends was established at the time that the KSM’s advocacy was almost suspended by the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in September 1996. Given the suspension of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, Good Friends sought to press the Kim Young-Sam administration and South Korean civil society to resume the humanitarian aid to North Korea.9 Good Friends recognised that the only rationale able to overcome the ideological hostility towards North Korea was to press South Korean civil society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea through ‘brotherly love’ for the North Korean compatriots.10 Based on this basic concept and the agenda framing, Good Friends endeavoured to collect ongoing information and visual data concerning the situation of food deficits through a refuge survey at the Korean-Chinese border.11 Disseminating this ongoing information and visual data, Good Friends created a sense of ‘urgency’ and ‘compassion’ in South Korean civil society, by allowing them to imagine the painful situation of their North Korean compatriots and children, who might die after only a few hours or days, without
urgent food aid.\textsuperscript{12}

\subsection*{6.2.2 Agenda Framing in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration}

From 1998 until 1999, Good Friends consistently engaged in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea pressurising the Kim Dae-Jung administration and the international community to provide food aid to North Korea. In the agenda framing during this period, Good Friends used a different agenda framing strategy, dividing the object of the advocacy movement into the two groups of South Korean civil society and the international community. Similarly with its activities, Good Friends continuously framed food aid to North Korea as that of a norm of ‘brotherly love’ for compatriots.\textsuperscript{13} With regard to the agenda framing for the international community, however, Good Friends used the universal value of ‘humanitarianism.’ Good Friends visited the United States six times between 1997 and 1999 and Japan four times between 1998 and 1999. Good Friends sought to urge the policy makers and NGOs in the U.S., Japanese NGOs and the international agencies, such as the WFP, UNDP and UNICEF, to take further action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea.\textsuperscript{14} In these advocacy activities to press the international community, Good Friends appealed to the norm of ‘humanitarianism.’

From 2000 to 2002, Good Friends framed food aid to North Korea as a ‘facilitator’ for the improvement of the North Korean human rights condition and unification. Given the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s pledge of government-level food aid to North Korea after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, Good Friends began to
diversify its mandate to the issues of North Korean human rights and refugees at the Korean-Chinese border and the reunification movement. Good Friends, however, did not terminate the advocacy of food aid entirely. Good Friends consistently incorporated the advocacy of food aid to North Korea into the diversified mandates along with projects of North Korean human rights and the peaceful unification movement. Good Friends, for instance, organised ‘24 Hours, 1000 Days Devotional Service for the National Reconciliation and Unification’ from 1 March 2000 to 26 November 2002. Good Friends also advocated for the Kim Dae-Jung administration and South Korean civil society to take further action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. In these advocacy activities, Good Friends framed the food aid to North Korea as a ‘facilitator’ for the improvement of North Korean human rights and inter-Korean reconciliation.

6.2.3 Agenda Framing in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration

Good Friends exploited the universal values of human rights and humanitarianism in agenda framing. Good Friends framed the food aid to North Korea as ‘the protection of the right to food’ in 2003, 2004 and 2005. With the resumption of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea in 2006, Good Friends framed the food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism,’ separating the North Korean flood victims from the North Korean regime which conducted negative military actions, such as the missile and nuclear test in 2006, in the midst of the internal humanitarian crisis.

In 2003, Good Friends framed the food aid to North Korea as ‘the protection of
basic human rights.’ Before Good Friends’ human rights framing in 2003, the South Korean humanitarian NGOs had described the provision of humanitarian aid to North Korea as ‘an activity of improving human rights of the North Korean People’ at ‘The 3rd International NGO Conference on Humanitarian Aid to North Korea’ from 17 to 20 June 2001.\(^{18}\) This framing, however, aimed to pressurise the international community, who were showing donor fatigue in relation to humanitarian aid to North Korea, to take more action to relieve the crisis. From 2003, Good Friends adopted this framing for the domestic advocacy movement. Framing the food aid to North Korea as ‘the protection of the right to food for North Korean compatriots,’ Good Friends asserted that North Korean human rights had deteriorated as a consequence of the food crisis.\(^{19}\) Although Good Friends concluded the importance of the civil and political rights of the North Korean people, Good Friends also denounced the human rights movement of these NGOs. Good Friends worried that the human rights movement were prone to be diverted into a regime change movement due to their heavy focus on civil and political rights. Good Friends therefore asserted that under the severe food deficit, the right to food which was derived from the economic rights was much more critical for North Korean people than their civil and political rights.\(^{20}\)

In the midst of the worsening public opinion due to North Korea’s missile launch on 5 July and nuclear test on 9 October in 2006, Good Friends framed the food aid to North Korea as the action of ‘humanitarianism’. North Korea’s missile and nuclear test in 2006 were enough to stir a sense of betrayal in South Korean civil society as these military provocations occurred while the Roh administration and South Korean civil society continued to provide large-scale food and development aid to North Korea.\(^{21}\) Immediately after the missile launch and nuclear test in July 2006, Good Friends came
to understand the high possibility of the recurrence of a second food deficit crisis in North Korea resulting from the flood damage in July 2006. Given this operational environment, Good Friends separated the North Korean flood victims from the North Koran regime, appealing to the universal norm of ‘humanitarianism.’ In doing so, Good Friends attempted to overcome the sense of betrayal in South Korean civil society and thereby resume the food aid for flood victims in North Korea.

6.3 Networking

The distinctive characteristics of Good Friends’ networks were that Good Friends focused on building international networks and that Good Friends networking was limited to a specific period between 1996 and 1999. Since its inception in December 1996 Good Friends established a wide network with the international community, particularly the policy makers in the U.S. government, U.S. and Japanese NGOs, and the U.N. agencies of the WFP, UNDP and UNICEF. With the diversification of the Good Friends’ mandate and the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s positive policy on the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea late in its administration, however, Good Friends networking focused on maintaining the existing networks.

6.3.1 Networking in the Kim Young-Sam Administration

Good Friends was established by 33 Buddhist organisations. Good Friends further
maintained a wide collaborative network with other humanitarian NGOs in relation to the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. The distinctive characteristic of Good Friends networking, however, was its effort to establish the international network in 1997.

Good Friends maintained a strong network with the Buddhist organisations. As examined in the chapter on the organisational mandate, the KBSM, the predecessor of Good Friends, was established by 33 Buddhist organisations in late 1996. For this reason, Good Friends played a steering role in the Buddhist organisations in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. During the year of 1997, Good Friends organised twelve workshops and eight independent public campaigns, along with various Buddhist groups in 1997. Good Friends also issued an appeal letter to Buddhist leaders on 18 April. On 4 June, Good Friends, in addition, held a workshop urging the leaders and executives of Buddhist organisations to take further action to relieve the food crisis in North Korea.

Good Friends was active in establishing networks with other humanitarian NGOs. The President of Good Friends, Revd Beobryun, strengthened its network with the KSM by accepting the position of Co-chair of the Executive Committee of the KSM. In doing so, Good Friends actively engaged in the preparation of most events and campaigns by the KSM. Good Friends also expanded its network by joining the Brotherly Love Pan-national which was an alliance network consisting of 30 NGOs. The Brotherly Love Pan-national then established the National Convention of Civil Societies for Northern Brotherly Aid’ (the National Convention) on 30 June 1997. The National Convention was the first and largest network consisting of a total of 112 organisations of humanitarian NGOs, civil society organisations and religious groups participating in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. By actively joining these
networks, Good Friends widened its networks with other humanitarian NGOs.

Good Friends was the most active in building international networks. Good Friends actively attended international conferences, including the ‘International Council on the Food Shortage Crisis of North Korea’ in Seoul from 10-12 March 1997 and the ‘Musgrove II: International Consultation on Emergency Food Situation in North Korea’ from 24 to 25 June 1997. In doing so, Good Friends sought to expand its international networks.

Good Friends endeavoured to establish its own networks in the United States. In 1997, Good Friends visited the United States three times. For the first trip from 13 to 25 March, Good Friends visited five areas of San Diego, Los Angeles, Orange County, Chicago and New York. For the second trip, from 31 August to 10 September, Good Friends visited Washington, D.C., Los Angeles and New York. During the last trip from 15 to 20 December 1997, they visited Washington, D.C. and New York. The main objectives of these trips were to establish a network with the local Korean community leaders and Korean-Americans, the relief NGOs, the U.S. government officials and the U.N. agencies. In doing so, Good Friends pressed these groups to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. In 1997, however, the first and second trips had a limited outcome in that Good Friends had difficulties in getting access to the policy makers in the U.S. government and the U.N. agencies. The last trip from 15 to 20 December 1997 resulted in the status of Good Friends in the United States improving after they issued ‘The Report of ’97 Food Deficits Testified by 204 Food Refugees.’ This was important as at that time there was a lack of reliable and ongoing information regarding the North Korea food crisis. Before going to the U.S., Good Friends prepared ‘The Report of Food Deficits Testified by 472 North Korean Food Refugees’
which was a more developed version of ‘The Report of ’97 Food Deficits Testified by 204 Food Refugees’ in 1997. The report contributed to increasing Good Friends’ international network by allowing Good Friends to obtain access to the policy makers in the U.S. government and the international agencies which began to recognise the value of the scientific data of the food crisis in North Korea.

Based on this report, Good Friends was able to get access to U.N. agencies, the policy makers in the U.S. government and the U.S. NGOs. Good Friends established networks with U.N. personnel, such as Xiaolin Chai, the Programme Officer for the Asia Section of UNICEF, Mohamed Kouhene from the WFP, and Andres Ramirez and Kazuhide Kuroda, the Emergency Relief Coordinators of the UNHCR. Good Friends also met Tony P. Hall, a Congressman of the House of Representatives, Leonard Rogers and David N. Hagen from the Bureau for Humanitarian Response Office of Food for Peace of the U.S. Agency for International Development Bureau (USAID) and Richard F. Ragan, Director for Democracy, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Affairs of the National Security Council in the White House. Good Friends also established networks with U.S. NGOs, such as Stephen W. Linton, the President of the Eugene Bell Foundation, Andrew Natsios, the Vice President of World Vision, Mike Jedrejczyk, the Human Rights Watch Representative of Washington, D.C. and James K. Bishop, a Representative of InterAction.

6.3.2 Networking in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration

From 1998 to 1999, Good Friends established networks with the international
community in particular the policy makers in the U.S. government, U.S. and Japanese NGOs and U.N. agencies. With the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s active policy on the provision of food aid to North Korea and the deregulation of NGO participation in the state policy making process after the political rapprochement in June 2000, Good Friends came to establish a network which was able to gain access to state policy makers and to strengthen a collaborative network with other humanitarian NGOs.

Following the first trip in December 1997, Good Friends made a second trip to the U.S. from 20 to 27 February 1998. After this second trip and networking, Good Friends organised two other trips to the U.S. in 1998 and another trip in 1999. Good Friends also carried out three trips to Japan in 1998 and another trip in 1999.38 Also, Good Friends exploited international conferences to widen its international networks. Good Friends, along with the KSM, the International Corn Foundation and Okedongmu held the ‘Korea-Japan NGO Forum on the Humanitarian Aid for North Korea’ at the ‘Korea-Japan NGO Symposium’ in Tokyo from 19 to 22 February 1999.39 Good Friends participated in the ‘Beijing International NGO Conference on the Humanitarian Support for North Korea’ in Beijing from 3 to 5 May 1999.40 On 13 October 1999, Good Friends also held a workshop ‘The Situation of Refugees in Asia and the Role of NGOs to Solve the North Korean Refugee Issues’ during the ‘International NGO Conference in Seoul.’41

After the political rapprochement in June 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration was more active in the promotion of NGO participation in state policy making. Given this operational environment, Good Friends began to institutionalise networks with the state as well as other humanitarian NGOs. An-Sook Jung, the Secretary General of Good Friends was appointed to the position of Policy Advisory to
the Committee of Humanitarian Support Bureau within the Ministry of Unification from August 2000 to July 2001.\textsuperscript{42} Good Friends also appointed Hee-Ryong Won, the Congressman of the Grand National Party, to the position of Joint-representative of Good Friends in 2000.\textsuperscript{43} In doing so, Good Friends came to have a network which was able to exert direct influence on the state policy-making process.

Besides, Good Friend consistently maintained a collaborative network with the KSM and other humanitarian NGOs, attending the establishment of the NGO consultative body. In January 2001, Good Friends and other humanitarian NGOs finally developed the 'NGO Meeting for North Korean Assistance' which was a temporary NGO consultative body established in April 1999 to ‘the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (the NGO Council) which had permanent status and an administrative body.\textsuperscript{44} With the establishment of the NGO Council, Good Friends came to have an institutionalised network which was able to enable Good Friends and other humanitarian NGOs to coordinate their advocacy and aid programmes. The NGO Council also played the role of representing the humanitarian NGOs at the discussion table with the government in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation including food aid to North Korea. Good Friends thereby came to have an official network linking them with other humanitarian NGOs and the state too.

6.3.3 Networking in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration

From 2003 until 2005, Good Friends endeavoured to establish its international network to publicise framing the norm of ‘the right to food’ to the international community. With
the establishment of the Peace Foundation in 2004, Good Friends further strengthened its network with various social and religious leaders and distinguished academics. In the advocacy of food aid to North Korea which resumed after the flood damage in 2006 and 2007, Good Friends mainly exploited NGO consultative bodies, such as the Korean Council, the NGO Council and the 6.15 Committee, to get access to other humanitarian NGOs and the state food aid decision makers.


At the domestic level, the establishment of the Peace Foundation in 2004 provided Good Friends with a strong network. The Peace Foundation aimed to advocate peace and unification in the Korean peninsula, but the Peace Foundation often engaged in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In respect of networking, Revd Beobryun
maintained his two positions as the President of Good Friends and the President of the Peace Foundation. An-Sook Jung, the former Secretary General of Good Friends, was also appointed to the position of Secretary General of the Peace Foundation. Through this process, the wide network of the Peace Foundation was exploited for the advocacy of food aid to North Korea.

Sik An, a Policy Advisor of Good Friends, proposed ‘The Special Act for the Humanitarian Aid to the North Korean Residents’ at the Peace Foundation’s policy symposium on 15 November 2005. The executive boards of the Peace Foundation consisted of personnel who maintained a close relationship with Good Friends. Young-Hoon Suh, the former President of the Korean Red Cross and as Advisor of the KSM, knew Good Friends through the joint activities with the KSM since 1996. Jae-Sik Oh, the former President of World Vision Korea and Steve Linton, the President of the Eugene Bell Foundation, sat on the advisory committee. Both were personnel who had worked with Good Friends since 1997. Min Cho, a senior researcher from the KINU, Professor Young-Soo Kim of Sogang University and Sung-Ryeol Cho, the Director of the Centre for International Relations Studies of the Research Institute for International Affairs were appointed to the Board of Directors and were also actively engaged in Good Friends’ activities. Nak-Cheong Baek, who was the Executive Director of the 6.15 Committee, exercised direct influence on the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s policy towards North Korea in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Baek was one member of the advisory committee of the Peace Foundation. Such wide networks of the Peace Foundation were exploited by Good Friends too.

With the suspension of government food aid to North Korea after North Korea’s missile test in July 2006, Good Friends resumed its advocacy exploiting its
collaborative networks, such as the Korean Council, the NGO Council and the 6.15 Committee. Good Friends urged the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and South Korean civil society to resume the flood aid and government food aid suspended after the missile and nuclear test.

6.4 Norm Grafting

Good Friends exploited the differing grafting strategies to promote the government and South Korean civil society to embrace the norm of food aid to North Korea. The main grafting strategy which Good Friends exploited to pressurise the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea was to increase public awareness of food aid to North Korea. To this end, Good Friends mainly exploited the conventional grafting strategies of public education on the issue, press releases and press conferences, public campaigns and lobbying politicians, political parties and the government.

Until the resumption of the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s large-scale food aid in 2000, Good Friends consistently exploited information politics and international networks as the main grafting strategies. Between 1998 and 2000, Good Friends particularly devoted time to the research of and publication on the severity of the food crisis in North Korea and disseminating this ongoing information to South Korean civil society through various channels. Another distinctive characteristic in this period was the advocacy movement exploiting international networks. Good Friends organised advocacy trips to the United States and Japan to let the international community know
the severity of the food crisis in North Korea and thereby take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea.

After the Inter-Korean Summit Talk in June 2000, the large-scale government food aid to North Korea accelerated the diversification of the Good Friends organisational mandate. Such diversification resulted in the weakening of Good Friends activity for norm grafting until the suspension of food aid after the missile launch in June 2006.

The flood damage in July 2006 became a strong motivation for Good Friends to resume its advocacy movement urging for the recommencement of food and flood aid to North Korea. Given changes in the operational environment, Good Friends exploited two major grafting strategies: information politics, which publicises the recurrence of severe famine in North Korea, and accountability politics, which proselytises the relevant authority, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis.

6.4.1 Norm Grafting in the Kim Young-Sam Administration

Good Friends extended the most vigorous advocacy of food aid to North Korea throughout its entire advocacy from 1996 to 2007. The main grafting strategy which Good Friends exploited to press the Kim Young-Sam administration and the civil society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea was to increase public awareness of the food aid to North Korea. To this end, Good Friends mainly exploited the conventional grafting strategies of public education on the issue, press
releases and press conferences, public campaigns and lobbying politicians, political parties and the government.

Good Friends exploited information politics. Good Friends quickly and credibly generated ongoing information on the situation of food deficits and disseminated it in a timely manner to press the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to resume the food aid to North Korea. In 1996 and 1997 the actual condition of the food crisis in North Korea became known to the international society, but the awareness of the food deficits was still low in South Korean civil society. To identify the severity of the food deficits in North Korea, Good Friends carried out ten field surveys through interviews with North Korean refugees at the Korean-Chinese border during the year 1997 starting with the first on 17 December 1996.52

Based on these field surveys, the tactics that Good Friends exploited to urge the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to resume food aid to North Korea were through public lectures, conferences and publishing related reports. In 1997 Good Friends organised a total of 58 public lectures and these public lectures targeted influential political and social groups. Good Friends organised two lectures for congressional aides on 3 and 25 April and one public lecture for the judicial apprentices at the Government Judicial Research and Training Institute on 2 June.53 Good Friends held four public lectures for the biggest and most influential civil movement NGOs in South Korea; four public lectures for the local branches of the National Alliance for Democracy & Reunification of Korea; one public lecture for the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy on 9 July; and one public lecture for the Korean Teachers & Educational Workers Union on 10 June.54 Good Friends delivered lectures at thirteen different universities and three youth clubs. Also, good Friends informed the seminar
and conference participants of the severity of the food crisis in North Korea, attending seven seminars and conferences pertaining to the food crisis in North Korea. Lastly, Good Friends published three reports on the situation of food deficits in North Korea, during the year 1996 and 1997, with press conferences. These reports were ‘A Report on the Field Survey in Korean-Chinese’ on 23 December 1996, ‘1600 km along the Yalu River and Dumen River’ on 31 January 1997 and ‘Child Malnutrition and Cause of Death’ on 28 October 1997.

Good Friends exploited the mass media and press conferences to disseminate ongoing information on the food deficits in North Korea, and thereby promoted government food aid to North Korea. In the year 1995 and 1996 the press was not active in reporting the advocacy by Good Friends and other humanitarian NGOs. It was attributable to the hostility towards North Korea in the aftermath of the submarine incident and more fundamentally the Kim Young-Sam administration’s restriction on the press releases of public campaigns. The press consequently took a passive position on the advocacy of food aid to North Korea until 1996. As the advocacy by Good Friends and other humanitarian NGOs came to expand to a nationwide movement in 1997, the mass media in South Korea began to report the activities of advocacy of food aid to North Korea. Good Friends also actively organised interviews and press conferences, perceiving the importance of the mass media in the advocacy. In 1997 Good Friends organised seventeen press conferences urging the Kim Young-Sam administration and the civil society to resume food aid to North Korea. Good Friends also actively acceded to significant press interviews; Good Friends interviewed seventeen different media, including newspapers, radio, television and magazines 27 times during the year of 1997.
The public campaign was one of a major grafting tactic that Good Friends exploited in 1996 and 1997. Good Friends, along with the KSM, organised a movement of ‘One Million Signatures for Helping the North Korean Compatriots’ on 5 July. For one month as from 15 August, a total of 1,078,453 people, including 348 representatives from religious, business and civil society circles, 70 congressmen and women and 20,000 overseas Koreans, participated in the movement and signed the list. The signature list was delivered to the Ministry of Unification after the press conference on 26 August. Good Friends was also active in organising joint campaigns, such as the ‘National Campaign for 10,000 tonnes of Maize Help for the North Korean Compatriots’ from 27 March to 2 April, the ‘National Campaign for 100,000 tonnes of Maize Aid to the North Korean Compatriots’ from 9 April to 8 June, the ‘National Campaign for 30,000 tonnes of Maize Help for the North Korean Compatriots’ on 13 June and ‘The Peace March for the North Korean Compatriots in Hunger’ on 17 July. Good Friends also organised independent street campaigns and fundraising at eight provinces, including Seoul, Busan, Daegu and Daejeon, every Saturday throughout the year of 1997. Through these national and independent campaigns, Good Friends disseminated ongoing information on the severity of the food crisis in North Korea, and urged the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to resume food aid to North Korea.

Good Friends was active in urging the government for food aid to North Korea, through its direct lobbying of the Ministry of Unification, the National Assembly, the political parties and other policy makers in the Kim Young-Sam administration. Good Friends extended the advocacy targeting the Ministry of Unification, which was a major policy-making body in relation to food aid to North Korea. During the year 1997 Good
Friends visited the Ministry of Unification four times – 14 January, 15 May, 25 September and 10 October – to urge the government to provide food aid to North Korea. Good Friends delivered the result of the ‘One Million Signatures for Helping the North Korean Compatriots’ to the Ministry of Unification on 26 August. In addition, Good Friends delivered another petition, the ‘NGOs’ Opinion on the Food Aid to North Korea,’ to the Unification Minister on 9 September. Good Friends also visited the People’s Party (the major opposition party) on 9 July and the National Assembly on 15 July. Good Friends met the leaders of the Grand National Party (the ruling party) and the People’s Party on 18 July and urged an active role for Congress in relation to food aid to North Korea. On 23 July, Good Friends also delivered ‘A Petition Urging the Active Role of Government in the Relief of Humanitarian Crisis in DPRK’ to the National Assembly. Good Friends met Gi-Moon Ban, a Senior Advisor on Foreign Affairs and Security for the President, on 14 July and urged the provision of food aid to North Korea.

6.4.2 Norm Grafting in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration

Until the resumption of large-scale food aid in 2000, Good Friends consistently exploited information politics and international networks as the main grafting strategies. Between 1998 and 2000, Good Friends activity continued to focus on research and publication about the severity of the food crisis in North Korea. It disseminated this ongoing information to South Korean civil society through various channels, such as reports and books, press releases and conferences, public lectures, workshops and
seminars. Another distinctive characteristic in this period was that the advocacy movement exploited international networks. Good Friends organised an advocacy trip to the United States and Japan to let the international community know about the severity of the food crisis and to promote action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea.

In 1998 and 1999, Good Friends was the most active NGO in research and publication on the severity of the food crisis in North Korea. Good Friends was also active in improving public awareness of the food crisis in North Korea by disseminating these research outcomes through various channels. Good Friends published a second evaluation paper on the mortality rate per family and village, infant mortality and the causes of death, titled ‘Report on the Food Deficits Testified by 472 North Korean Food Refugees’ in February 1998, following the first report in December 1997. Good Friends then published more two reports and increased the number of interviewees to 770 and 1,019 in April and May 1998 respectively. In a report based on 1,694 interviewees published in December 1998, Good Friends provided the specific figure of 3.5 million as the overall death toll by famine. These reports in 1998 were the first reports publicising the severity of food deficits in North Korea to South Korean civil society and the international community and the results shocked them. These reports were then used as basic sources, in various academic debates and policy workshops, on the causes and impact of the North Korean famine. The death toll of 3.5 million which was extrapolated by Good Friends was frequently exploited as the maximum figure despite scientific suspicion of its reliability.

Good Friends continuously disseminated ongoing information on the food crisis in North Korea through publishing various reports and books: ‘The Status of the North Korean Food Refugees in China and their Human Rights’ in March, ‘Searching for a
National Hope’ in May, ‘People Crossing the Dumen River’ in August, and ‘[ I ] Want to Live as a Human Being’ and ‘A Hard March’ in December 1999. In March 1998, Good Friends, along with Hankyoreh which was a daily newspaper with a progressive disposition, published a series of articles in the name of ‘Ah! Starving North Korea’ from 10 March. These articles showed the appalling sights of North Korean refugees at the Korean-Chinese border. As Young-Sun Lee, the former Secretary General of the KSM, evaluated, these articles contributed to resuscitating the public interest in the food aid to North Korea which lessened after the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in 1996.

Good Friends held eighteen lectures in 1998 and three lectures in 1999 which targeted civil society NGOs, universities and religious organisations. Good Friends also organised four policy meetings, three workshops, three forums and symposiums and one seminar. Through these various forms of awareness activities, Good Friends pressed the Kim Dae-Jung administration, and South Korean civil society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea.

Good Friends visited the United States three times in 1998 and once in 1999. Good Friends met the U.S. government personnel of the Korean Division and the Human Rights Division of the U.S. State Department and the USAID, the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Good Friends met the personnel of U.N. agencies, such as UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, WHO and OCHCR. Good Friends also organised meetings with the NGO personnel from World Vision, Human Rights Watch and InterAction. Good Friends exploited their reports on every trip to the United States. Good Friends also visited Japan three times in 1998 and once in 1999. Good Friends met the representatives from Japanese civil society, such as the Japanese
Cardinal, the Nippon Foundation, the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP) and Caritas Japan, and pressurised Japanese civil society to take further action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. Good Friends also exploited the Japanese mass media, such as TV-Asahi, NHK and Nippon TV. Good Friends was active in interviewing the overseas media, such as the BBC and CNN. Good Friends interviewed these overseas media twelve times in 1998 and seven times in 1999. Through these activities, Good Friends sought to proselytise the international community to take further action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea.

After the Inter-Korean Summit Talk in June 2000, Good Friends activities for norm grafting radically lessened, and from 2000 to 2002, the organisation maintained a minimal level of advocacy. From 1 March 2000 until 26 November 2002 Good Friends organised ‘24 Hours, 1000 Days Devotional Service for the National Reconciliation and Unification.’ During this movement, Good Friends organised a street campaign too, which urged continued public interest in the humanitarian aid to North Korea and fundraising. As a result of the street campaign and fundraising, Good Friends delivered 30,000,000 won’s worth of humanitarian aid, which was equivalent to $23,715.47, through the Korean Joint Together Society (JTS), which is affiliated to Good Friends, to North Korea in 2000 and 100,000,000 won, which was equivalent to $75,872.76 in 2001. Good Friends also organised ‘A Place for Unification Dialogue,’ a series of informal meetings where various experts were invited by Good Friends to speak about the topics of unification, human rights and peace. Good Friends organised 143 meetings from 3 March 2000 to 22 November 2002, but only four of these meetings were on the topic of the food crisis in North Korea. This indicates that changes in the organisational mandate of Good Friends between 2000 and 2002 resulted in the
weakening of organisational activities related to the advocacy of food aid to North Korea.

6.4.3 Norm Grafting in the Roh Administration

Between 2003, when the Roh administration took office, and June 2005 when Good Friends began to recognise the recurrence of the food deficits in North Korea, Good Friends activities in respect of norm grafting were not as significant as the activities in the Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung administrations. A few activities organised by Good Friends both at the domestic and international level were meaningful in terms of the norm grafting in relation to the food aid to North Korea.

Good Friends organised a series of dialogue meetings on the topic of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation between May 2003 and June 2005.\textsuperscript{79} The topic of food aid to North Korea was not the primary topic of these meetings. The dialogue meetings from October to November 2004, however, contributed to sustaining advocacy of food aid to North Korea.

Good Friends invited key NGO personnel who played a steering role in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea since 1995 to increase public awareness about continued food aid to North Korea. Good Friends invited Ok-Jae Roh, the Secretary General of Good Friends, Young-Sik Kang, the Secretary General of the KSM, two North Korean refugees who settled in South Korea, Stephen W. Linton, the President of the Eugene Bell Foundation and Sung-Hoon Kim, the Joint-representative of the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, as guest speakers at the dialogue meetings.\textsuperscript{80}
These personnel urged continued assistance to North Korea, and improved accountability and transparency in the implementation of aid held at a policy symposium on 15 November 2005. At this symposium, Sik An, a Policy Advisor to Good Friends, recommended that the government pass legislation which he called ‘The Special Act for Humanitarian Aid to the North Korean Residents.’ Through this petition, Good Friends urged the Roh administration to assure a consistent provision of food, agricultural and medical aid to North Korea, the continuation of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, the allocation of 1 per cent of the national budget to humanitarian aid to North Korea and improved transparency in aid distribution in North Korea. The basis of this symposium was that as the provision of government food aid to North Korea was made without a legal basis it was therefore highly influenced by inter-Korean relations. Good Friends suggested for the first time that legislation assuring the stable and consistent provision of food aid to North Korea irrespective of the inter-Korean relations should be made.

U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea. All these activities were ostensibly the advocacy of human rights in North Korea, but Good Friends focused more on economic, social and cultural rights which are closely linked with the right to food, rather than civil and political rights. Through these activities, Good Friends urged the international community, in particular the U.N. human rights agencies, to take more action to relieve the food crisis in North Korea.83

Good Friends focused on activities to publicise the recurrence of the second food crisis in North Korea to South Korean civil society through its organisational periodical ‘North Korea Today’ and the mass media. From March 2006, Good Friends strengthened the function in the delivery of ongoing information on the internal situation of North Korea. For this, Good Friends increased the frequency of ‘North Korea Today,’ which had been issued as the organisational periodical of Good Friends since 2004, from monthly to biweekly. ‘North Korea Today’ delivered the most detailed and ongoing information of the flood damage in North Korea.

In mid-2006, North Korea’s cancellation of the ‘8.15 Unification Celebration,’ which was an event to celebrate the national independence of Korea from the Japanese occupation on 15 August 1945, was prompted the mass media to begin to show their interest in the severity of the flood damage in North Korea. In this situation, Good Friends exploited the mass media to publicise the issue to South Korean civil society. Good Friends, along with the Peace Foundation, held the ‘Expert Conference on the Possibility of Food Crisis’ on 26 December 2006. At this conference, Revd Beobryun urged urgent and large-scale food aid to North Korea, asserting that the suspension of food aid and the radical decrease of food production due to the flood in July would result in the food deficit in North Korea in 2007.84 After the conference, the agenda of
the second food crisis began to be taken up by various popular media. As a result of this conference on December 2006 up until 22 April 2007, when the Roh administration decided to resume the government food aid to North Korea, the popular media in South Korea printed the activities of Good Friends 20 times.85

While Good Friends focused on the increase in public awareness about the food crisis through its organisational periodical and the mass media, Good Friends had consistently asserted that the immediate food aid, around 800,000 tonnes of maize which was additional to the 500,000 tonnes of government food aid on loan terms, should be delivered to North Korea.86 To achieve this goal, Good Friends organised an independent public campaign of ‘The Movement of 1,000 tonnes of Life-Saving Maize Aid to North Korea’ on 2 August 2007. Such grafting activities in 2006 and 2007 contributed to awakening the public interest on the recurrence of the North Korean food crisis. Such efforts finally made the Roh administration, which was gathering the agenda for the Summit Talk in Pyongyang in October 2007, discuss the agenda of additional food aid with North Korea at the Summit Talk.87

Good Friends and Hyung-Geun Jeong, the Congressman of the Grand National Party, organised a policy conference for the discussion of legislative reform to assure the legal basis for food aid to North Korea. At this conference on 4 September 2007, Good Friends suggested ‘The Act of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea,’ which was a more developed version of the first version which Sik An, a Policy Advisor of Good Friends, proposed at the policy symposium on 15 November 2005.88 The background of this recommendation was that by urging the adoption of this act, Good Friends sought to increase the South Korean government’s responsibility, aid effectiveness, and transparency and consensus in state aid policy making. In this sense,
Good Friends asserted that the provision of food aid to North Korea should be institutionalised by law and therefore should be delivered irrespective of inter-Korean political issues. Good Friends also asserted the need for improved monitoring and restrictions on government food aid to North Korea. Good Friends lastly recommended the establishment of the Special Committee of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea consisting of the government, the National Assembly, local municipals and NGOs to improve the consensus on government food aid policy making.89

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that differing NGO capacities were consequential in explaining the ability of NGO advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea.

During the Kim Young-Sam administration, Good Friends lacked expertise in the advocacy movement due to its voluntary-based recruitment, but Good Friends was driven by a strong mandate to proselytise South Korean civil society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. Under this strong mandate, Good Friends’ agenda framing was consistent in seeking to replacing the dominant hostility towards North Korea with ‘brotherly love,’ so that South Korean civil society recognised the North Korean people as their compatriots and so help them irrespective of the differences in ideology and the political system. In this sense, during the Kim Young-Sam administration Good Friends consistently framed the food aid to North
Korea as ‘brotherly love’ for the North Korean compatriots.

With regard to networking in the Kim Young-Sam administration, Good Friends represented the Buddhist circle. Good Friends further maintained a wide collaborative network with other humanitarian NGOs. The distinctive characteristic of Good Friends networking, however, was its effort to establish an international network particularly in 1997.

Based on the agenda of framing and networking above, Good Friends extended the most vigorous advocacy of food aid to North Korea throughout its entire advocacy movement between 1996 and 2007. The main grafting strategy which Good Friends exploited to pressurise the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea was to increase public awareness of the necessity of food aid for North Korea. To this end, Good Friends mainly exploited conventional grafting strategies, such as public education, press releases, press conferences, public campaigns and lobbying politicians, political parties and the government.

During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the strong mandate of Good Friends was consequential in explaining the distinctive characteristics of Good Friends agenda framing. In the early Kim Dae-Jung administration Good Friends consistently framed the issue of food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism.’ Improvement in the inter-Korean relations after the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, however, induced Good Friends to diversify its organisational mandate, and this resulted in changes in agenda framing. After the Inter-Korean Summit Talk in June 2000, therefore, Good Friends framed the agenda of the issue of food aid to North Korea as a ‘facilitator for the improvement of North Korean human rights and peaceful unification’.
With regard to networking in the Kim Dae-Jung administration, during the two early years of the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 1999, Good Friends was driven by a strong mandate to establish networks with the international community. The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s deregulation of NGO participation in the state policy-making process also provided momentum that enabled Good Friends to establish a network allowing them to obtain access to state policy makers and to strengthen collaboration with other humanitarian NGOs. With the resumption of government food aid in 2000, however, the ability of Good Friends to establish networks and maintain these networks began to weaken as the organisational mandate of Good Friends diminished.

With regard to norm grafting in the Kim Dae-Jung administration, Good Friends exploited information politics and the international networks in which Good Friends had a relatively high level of expertise given the poor funding arrangements and a less competitive organisational structure. Between 1998 and 2000, Good Friends devoted its attention to research and publication on the severity of the food crisis in North Korea and disseminating this ongoing information to the South Korean civil society through various channels, such as reports and books, press releases and conferences, public lectures, workshops and seminars. Another distinctive characteristic in this period was the advocacy movement exploiting international networks. Good Friends organised advocacy trip to the United States and Japan to let the international community know the severity of food crisis in North Korea and thereby take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. After the Inter-Korean Summit Talk in June 2000, the large-scale government food aid to North Korea resulted in the weakening of Good Friends’ grafting activities, weakening Good Friends organisational
mandate of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea.

During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the advocacy of food aid to North Korea was not the primary mandate of Good Friends. The poor level of funding continued and resulted in the shrinking of Good Friends’ organisational structure and divisions. The Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004 and the consecutive flood in 2006 and 2007, provided momentum to renew the advocacy of food aid to North Korea as a key organisational mandate. Good Friends exploited the universal values of human rights and humanitarianism in agenda framing. Good Friends framed the food aid to North Korea as ‘the protection of right to food’ in 2003, 2004 and 2005. With the resumption of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea in 2006, Good Friends framed the food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism,’ separating the North Korean flood victims from the North Korean regime which conducted the missile and nuclear test.

With regard to networking in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, Good Friends endeavoured to establish an international network to publicise the framing of ‘the right to food’ from 2003 until 2005. With the establishment of the Peace Foundation in 2004, Good Friends further strengthened its network with various social and religious leaders and distinguished academics. From 2006 to 2007, Good Friends exploited NGO consultative bodies, such as the Korean Council, the NGO Council and the 6.15 Committee, to obtain access to other humanitarian NGOs and state food aid decision makers.

With regard to norm grafting, while the Roh Moo-Hyun administration continued to provide large-scale food aid to North Korea, Good Friends’ activities remained minimal until 2006. In the midst of the suspension of food aid after the missile launch in June 2006, the flood damage in July became a strong motivation for Good
Friends to resume advocacy urging the recommencement of food and flood aid. Good Friends exploited two major grafting strategies. Good Friends endeavoured to increase public awareness about the recurrence of severe famine in North Korea and proselytised the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide flood aid to North Korea.

It mainly used the white papers and annual reports as follows: NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, *Daebukjiwon 10nyeon Baekseo* [English Translation: White Paper of the 10-years of Aids to North Korea]; Good Friends, *Joeunbeotdeul 10Junyeon Ginyeom Jaryogib* [English Translation: Good Friends 10-years of Foundation Anniversary Report].

It used proceedings mainly from Good Friends and NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea.

It mainly referred to the databases of Good Friends (www.goodfriends.or.kr), KSM (www.ksm.or.kr), SARANGBANG Group for Human Rights (www.sarangbang.or.kr/kr/new/index.php), and Cyber NGO Materials (www.demos.or.kr/bbs/zboard.php?&id=english). These web-databases provide email newsletters, conference proceedings, statements, press releases, reports, and collection of newspaper and magazine articles on the activities of humanitarian NGOs as well as their own materials.

It used the newspaper articles from the major publishers in South Korea such as
Chosun Ilbo, Hangyoreh, Munhwa Ilbo, Segye Ilbo, Joongang Ilbon, Tongil News, Yonhap News, and Hankook Ilbo, etc.


7 The key interviewees include Seung-Yong Lee, the Former Project Coordinator of Peace and Human Rights Bureau, Good Friends, Il-Ha Lee, the President of Good Neighbours, Kyung-Suk Suh, Former Member of Joint Representative of KSM, Jae-Sik Oh, the Former President of World Vision Korea, and Changbin Park, the Chief Operating Officer of World Vision.

8 The name of ‘Good Friends’ substituted ‘KBSM’ in May 1999. In order to avoid confusion coming from using ‘KBSM’ together with ‘Good Friends,’ this chapter consistently uses Good Friends to refer to ‘KBSM.’


14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.


17 Ibid.


20 Author, Interview with Seung-Yong Lee, The Secretary General of Good Friends and The Former Director of Peace and Human Rights Bureau of Good Friends, in Seoul. 07/05/2009.
21 Ibid.


25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.


29 Ibid.

30 Sarangbang Group for Human Rights, "861ho, Tongileul Hyanghae Hanminjokui Maeumeul Moeuija [English Translation: Let's be together for the Unification]."

31 Ibid.

32 National Council for the Aid to North Korean Compatriots, *Buknyeokdongpodobiundongeui Hyeonhwanggwa ihu Gwaje* [English Translation: The
Present Situation of the North Korean Aid Movement and its Dilemma.


35 Ibid.


40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.


43 Interview with Seung-Yong Lee, The Secretary General of Good Friends and The Former Director of Peace and Human Rights Bureau of Good Friends, in Seoul.
44 Ibid.

45 In 2004, the Jeongto Society, which is an affiliate organisation of Good Friends, established the Peace Foundation as an organisation advocating peaceful unification between both Koreas.


48 Interview with Seung-Yong Lee, The Secretary General of Good Friends and The Former Director of Peace and Human Rights Bureau of Good Friends, in Seoul. 07/05/2009.

49 Ibid.


These two rivers form the geographical border between North Korea and China. In this thesis, author used the name of the Yalu River for ‘Amnokkang’ or ‘Amnok River,’ which is used internationally. Good Friends, Joeunbeotdeul 10Junyeon Ginyeom Jaryogib [English Translation: Good Friends 10-years of Foundation Anniversary Report].


67 Good Friends, Bukhan Sikryangnanmin 1,694 myeong Myeondamjosa Gyeolkwa Bogoseo [English Translation: Report on the Food Deficits Testified by 1,694 North Korean Food Refugees].

68 Good Friends, Bukhan Sikryangnanmin 1,694 myeong Myeondamjosa Gyeolkwa Bogoseo [English Translation: Report on the Food Deficits Testified by 1,694 North Korean Food Refugees].

69 This book of ‘[ I ] Want to Live as a Human Being’ was the final version of the North Korean food refugee interviews, adding 161 further refugee interviews to the previous ‘Report on the Food Deficits in North Korea Testified by 1,694 North Korean Food Refugees.’ Good Friends, Joeunbeotdeul 10Junyeon Ginyeom Jaryogib [English Translation: Good Friends 10-years of Foundation Anniversary Report].

70 Author, Telephone interview with Seung-Yong Lee, The Director of Good Friends, on the funding capacity of Good Friends. 12/01/2010.


73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.
Ohmynews, "Minganeseodo Daebukjiwon Teukbyeolbeob Jean 'Nungil' [English Translation: NGO Proposal of North Korean Assistance Special Act]."

Author, Interview with Seung-Yong Lee, The Secretary General of Good Friends and The Former Director of Peace and Human Rights Bureau of Good Friends, in Seoul. 07/05/2009.


Ohmynews, "Minganseodo Daebukjiwon Teukbyeolbeob Jean 'Nungil' [English Translation: NGO Proposal of North Korean Assistance Special Act].”

7.1 Introduction

This chapter demonstrates Hypothesis Three: *The differences in non-governmental organisation capacity shaped different outcomes at different stages of South Korea’s food aid policy making. South Korea’s food aid policy processes are disaggregated according to the different stages of agenda setting, the formation of a discursive position, and institutional and policy development.*

In the previous chapters, this thesis demonstrated the assumption and two hypotheses of this thesis. Chapter 3 demonstrated the assumption of this thesis that the issue characteristics of the North Korean food crisis and the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making changed over time, shaping the differing operational environment in which South Korean humanitarian NGOs worked. Chapter 4 next demonstrated that organisational mandates, funding arrangements and expertise were important in the constitution of each NGO’s capacity to influence South Korean government food aid policy. Chapter 5 and 6 then demonstrated that differing NGO capacities were consequential in explaining the ability of NGO advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea. Based on the examination of the operational environment and NGO advocacy of food aid to North Korea in the previous chapters, this chapter demonstrates that South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy was
consequential in explaining changes in South Korea’s food aid policy making in respect of state agenda setting, the formation of a discursive position and institutional and policy development. Humanitarian NGO advocacy finally contributed to government establishment of a legal framework that could provide for more consistent and large scale food aid to North Korea. However, the changes at different stages of the state’s food aid policy-making processes, as the outcome of humanitarian NGO advocacy of food aid to North Korea, were different. This chapter demonstrates that these differences were attributable to the differing abilities of NGO to set agendas, network and graft new norms in respect of government policy on food aid to North Korea and the changes at the operational environment in which humanitarian NGOs worked.

This chapter consists of four main sections. The first section examines how successful the KSM and Good Friends were in norm grafting in public opinion and civil society. The second section examines KSM and Good Friends’ influence on government agenda and discursive position change. The third section examines how successful the KSM and Good Friends were in grafting new norms within government institutions. The last section demonstrates how successful KSM and Good Friends advocacy was in changes in government food aid policy and why these changes took place. Each section consists of three parts, the Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations, and examines each topic within them.

7.2 Norm Competition in Civil Society

Richard Price argues that norm competition and adoption in civil society generally
precedes changes in the government policy-making process. Before the examination of changes in South Korean government food aid policy towards North Korea, this section demonstrates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea shaped different outcomes at the stage of norm grafting in South Korean civil society.

This section demonstrates that in 1995 and 1997 the KSM and Good Friends successfully introduced the new norm of brotherly love into South Korean civil society replacing the dominant norm of hostility towards North Korea. Despite the less organised advocacy in this period, the KSM and Good Friends appealed to the emotion of the South Korean people by framing the food aid to North Korea as an expression of brotherly love. Such agenda framing began to replace the predominant norm of hostility towards North Korea with the norm of brotherly love.

In the early Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 1999, KSM and Good Friends advocacy continued to replace hostility towards North Korea with the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism. During this period, however, the more significant contribution of KSM and Good Friends advocacy was the establishment of the favourable operational environment in which the Kim Dae-Jung administration was able to sustain the engagement policy towards North Korea. Given the favourable operational environment, the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000 finally provided the momentum from which the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism became more set in the South Korean civil society.

This section lastly demonstrates that during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration from 2003 to 2007 the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism underpinning the provision of food aid to North Korea became dominant norms in South Korean civil society. The influence of the KSM and Good
Friends in norm grafting, however, was less significant compared to the previous two administrations. Given the weakened organisational mandate of KSM and Good Friends in the Roh Mo-Hyun administration, the political rapprochement between both Koreas was a decisive factor which enabled these norms to be self-reliant irrespective of NGO advocacy.

To demonstrate the arguments above, the following section examines the impact of KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea on norm grafting in South Korean civil society and how this impact differed in each administration. It also examines the causal relationship between the differences in norm grafting and NGO abilities. This section consists of three parts. Each part examines how KSM and Good Friends advocacy changed norms in South Korean civil society under the three different administrations of Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun.

7.2.1 Norm Competition in Civil Society under the Kim Young-Sam Administration

This part demonstrates that in 1995 and 1996 the KSM and Good Friends successfully introduced the new norm of brotherly love into South Korean civil society replacing the dominant norm of hostility towards North Korea. During this period, the funding capacities and the organisational structures of the KSM and Good Friends were not developed yet. The motivation of the KSM and Good Friends which was driven by a strong mandate to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea enabled them to unfold nationwide advocacy of food aid to North Korea. The persuasive agenda framing and active advocacy activities by the KSM and Good Friends finally contributed to the
mitigation of hostility towards North Korea which had been revived after the incident of
the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in September 1996.

Before the advocacy movement by the humanitarian NGOs in June 1995, only
20.3 per cent supported the rice aid. In August, a public opinion poll indicated that this
had increased to 53.7 per cent with 41.3 per cent perceiving that the food aid to North
Korea as a wrong decision. Public opinion on food aid to North Korea was still evenly
divided, but South Korean civil society began to recognise North Korea as the object of
aid. A public opinion poll in 1996 showed no change in public opinion from 1995. It is,
however, possible to extrapolate the norm grafting in civil society by looking at change
in the scale of private fundraising. Private fundraising by humanitarian NGOs in 1996
increased by 6.2 times to $1,550,000 compared to $250,000 in 1995. This radical
increase in the scale of private fundraising can be understood as the increase of public
participation in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. This can be further interpreted
as the norm of brotherly love compared to the norm of hostility towards North Korea.
This significant change within a relatively short period was possible due to the effective
agenda framing by the KSM and Good Friends.

The advocacy spread throughout the nation in 1996; however, the Kangreung
Submarine Infiltration discouraged the movement and resulted in public opinion on the
provision of humanitarian aid to North Korea worsening. With North Korea’s official
statement of apology on 29 December 1996, the favourable operational environment
allowed the humanitarian NGOs resume advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In this
new operational environment, the KSM and Good Friends attempted to convert hostility
towards North Korea into a movement for preventing war and alleviating political and
military tension on the Korean peninsula. As a result, private fundraising increased by
15 times to $20.56 million compared to 1996. This fundraising was made while the activities of humanitarian NGOs were restricted through the adoption of various measures and acts. These measures and acts included the prohibition of private aid to North Korea by ‘The Measure of Aid Channel Unification,’ the restriction of media coverage of NGO fundraising events by ‘The Measure of the Press Report on the Event of Fundraising,’ the restriction of NGO fundraisings by ‘The Regulation Act on Fundraising and Donation’ and prosecutor’s accusation of humanitarian NGOs in 1997. Considering this operational environment, the drastic increase in public participation in fundraising for humanitarian aid to North Korea indicated that the existing hostility after the submarine incident was replaced by a desire for aid to North Korea. The result of the public opinion poll by Gwangju Social Research Centre on 30 April 1997 showed that 79.1 per cent supported the food aid to North Korea. Such a result indicates that the norm in civil society had changed from the worst public opinion after the submarine incident.

7.2.2 Norm Competition in Civil Society under the Kim Dae-Jung Administration

In 1998 and 1999 KSM and Good Friends advocacy replaced hostility towards North Korea with the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism. During this period, the contribution of the KSM and Good Friends in particular was the establishment of a favourable operational environment. As KSM and Good Friends’ advocacy of food aid to North Korea continued from 1995, KSM and Good Friends’ organisational capability in the exploitation of effective norm-grafting strategy became
more sophisticated. The KSM and Good Friends consistently increased the quality and quantity of their networks which allowed them to reach differing social groups and organisations. Exploiting these wide-ranging networks, the KSM and Good Friends focused on the establishment of a favourable operational environment in which the Kim Dae-Jung administration was able to sustain the engagement policy towards North Korea, rather than the advocacy of food aid to North Korean itself. The Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, as the outcome of a continued engagement policy, finally provided momentum from which the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism became set in South Korean civil society.

During the early years of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998 and 1999, KSM and Good Friends advocacy replaced the hostility towards North Korea with the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism. Public opinion in November 1998 supporting the provision of food aid to North Korea increased to 67.5 per cent. The opinion poll also showed 80.4 per cent of the respondents viewed the food deficits in North Korea as at ‘a serious level.’ In 1999, although 88.9 per cent still supported food aid to North Korea, North Korea’s military action, in the West Sea Battle in 1999, made South Korean civil society perceive that more conditions should be placed on the provision of food aid to North Korea.

The political rapprochement after the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000 provided momentum from which the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism introduced by the KSM and Good Friends became set in South Korean civil society. The political rapprochement, however, was possible due to KSM and Good Friends advocacy contributing to the establishment of a favourable operational environment which the Kim Dae-Jung administration was able to sustain the
engagement policy towards North Korea. KSM and Good Friends advocacy improved public awareness about the severity of the food crisis in North Korea. Recognition of the ongoing situation in North Korea contributed to the increase of support for the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy.\textsuperscript{9} The public support for the engagement policy in turn shaped a favourable operational environment in which the Kim Dae-Jung administration was able to sustain its policy amidst the consecutive military actions by North Korea between 1998 and 1999. The two Korean summits in June 2000 finally achieved political rapprochement in the Korean peninsula. In this sense, Unification Minister Jae-Gyu Park thanked the humanitarian NGOs for the Inter-Korean Summit.\textsuperscript{10} The Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 accelerated norm grafting in South Korean civil society, assuring the advent of peaceful inter-Korean relations. South Korean civil society which watched the historic event of the Inter-Korean Summit came to realise that the situation of extreme hostility towards North Korea could no longer be sustained. In the public opinion poll after the Inter-Korean Summit 78.7 per cent of the respondents supported the humanitarian aid to North Korea.\textsuperscript{11} This figure implicates that the political rapprochement between both Koreas was a critical incident in which the norms of peace and reconciliation introduced by the KSM and Good Friends finally became set in South Korean civil society.

\subsection*{7.2.3 Norm Competition in Civil Society under the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration}

From 2003 to 2007 the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism became more dominant in South Korean civil society. The influence of
the KSM and Good Friends in norm grafting during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, however, was not significant compared to the previous two administrations. The increase in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation and the political rapprochement instead were the decisive factors which enabled the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism to be self-reliant irrespective of NGO advocacy. While the Roh Moo-Hyun administration maintained an active policy towards North Korea in relation to the provision of food aid, the KSM and Good Friends engaged in the delivery of development aid to North Korea and the advocacy of North Korean human rights respectively. The influence of KSM and Good Friends in norm grafting behind South Korean civil society therefore was not significant.

During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism underpinning the provision of food aid to North Korea became dominant norms in South Korean civil society. Public opinion polls in March 2003 and February 2004 showed that 66.7 per cent and 66 per cent of the public respectively supported the provision of food aid to North Korea. Such positive opinion continued in the midst of the negative operational environment during North Korea’s military action in 2006. After North Korea’s missile launch in July and nuclear test in October 2006, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration suspended all types of aid to North Korea, but public opinion which supported the humanitarian aid to North Korea did not change much. South Korean civil society instead demanded that the Roh Moo-Hyun administration make food aid to North Korean conditional on inter-Korean issues. The public opinion poll from 17 to 18 October in 2006 after the nuclear test showed that 62.3 per cent suggested the partial amendment of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s aid policy, 16.8 per cent suggested the suspension of aid and 15.2 per cent supported the
current aid policy. These results indicate that the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism were concrete as much as free from the negative external environment.

The scale of private aid to North Korea made it possible to grasp changes in the norm of South Korean civil society. In 2003 the scale of private aid increased to $63,860,000 from $45,770,000 in 2002. In 2004, the scale of private aid radically increased to $132,500,000, which was the largest amount since the outbreak of the food crisis in 1995. Such a large amount of private aid in 2004 was attributable to the Ryongcheon Station Explosion incident. The total funding which was raised through campaigns for the Ryongcheon Station victims was $23,580,000 in 3 months from April to July. After the Ryongcheon Station Explosion, the scale of private aid in 2005, 2006 and 2007 were still high although there was a slight decrease after North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test in 2006. In 2005 the scale of private aid to North Korea was $76,660,000. In 2006 the scale of private aid was recorded at $70,880,000. In 2007, it again increased to $96,980,000. In conclusion, since the Kim Young-Sam administration the average scale of private aid radically increased. During the Kim Young-Sam administration the average scale of private aid was $7,453,300, and it increased to $35,560,000 during the Kim Dae-Jung administration. This figure then reached $70,000,000 in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. Such a consistent and radical increase of private aid to North Korea indicates the increase of civil participation in North Korean relief operations. The increase of civil participation implies that the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism underpinning the provision of private aid to North Korea were the dominant norms in South Korean civil society.
The influence of the KSM and Good Friends in norm grafting during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, however, was not significant compared to the previous two administrations of Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung. Given the operational environment in 2003 in which the Roh Moo-Hyun administration consistently proclaimed the provision of large-scale government food aid to North Korea, the KSM and Good Friends converted their organisational mandates and activities to non-food aid issues, such as the delivery of development aid, the advocacy of North Korean human rights and policy recommendations for aid effectiveness and unification. Although the agricultural NGOs advocated the provision of surplus rice aid to North Korea in 2003, the KSM and Good Friends were passive in this movement.

In 2004, the incident of the Ryongcheon Station Explosion was the momentum which ignited the resumption of KSM and Good Friends advocacy. The advocacy of food aid to North Korea, however, was not the major mandate of the KSM and Good Friends during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. In 2004, the KSM and Good Friends exploited information politics which disseminated ongoing information about the humanitarian crisis of the Ryongcheon Station Explosion to increase public awareness. Such KSM and Good Friends advocacy contributed to the revitalisation of the sense of brotherly love and humanitarianism.19

After the Ryongcheon movement in 2005, the KSM and Good Friends again strived for the delivery of development aid to North Korea and the advocacy of North Korean human rights respectively, framing these issues as the peaceful unification movement. The KSM advocated the need for development aid to North Korea in that only development was able to solve the fundamental causes of the food crisis in North Korea. The policy conferences and seminars therefore aimed to search for efficient
development aid strategy and practice. Good Friends extended a movement urging the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to establish rules and policies which assure stable humanitarian aid to North Korea irrespective of inter-Korean political and economic issues. It also held a related conference in 2005.

With North Korea’s missile launch in July 2006, the KSM and Good Friends resumed their advocacy of food aid, separating North Korea’s military action from the issue of food aid. In this process, KSM and Good Friends advocacy mainly exploited various government-NGO consultative channels, rather than targeting the general public.

Although the KSM and Good Friends continued the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, it was not the major mandate and focus of activities for the KSM and Good Friends during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. In addition, KSM and Good Friends advocacy usually did not target civil society. The influence of the KSM and Good Friends in norm grafting during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration therefore was not significant compared to the previous two administrations of Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung.

The political rapprochement which became more concrete during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, instead, was the decisive factor which enabled the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism to be self-reliant. Under the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s ‘Peace and Prosperity Policy’ towards North Korea, and inter-Korean exchange and cooperation at both the private and government level radically increased. During the Kim Young-Sam administration the cases of private inter-Korean exchange and cooperation remained at a minimal level – 221 cases – and the number of civil participants who visited North Korea was only 1,727 during the five years from 1993 to 1997. Under the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement
policy and the political rapprochement in 2000, these figures significantly increased to 3,417 and 37,572. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration it radically increased to 50,827 and the number of civil participant increased to 387,529. Such increases of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation and public participation in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation programmes enabled the South Korean civil society to perceive North Korea as the target of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism. The improvement of public awareness finally contributed to making the norms of brotherly love and humanitarianism more concrete in South Korean civil society.

7.3 Changes in Government Agenda and Discursive Position

This section examines KSM and Good Friends’ influence on government agenda and discursive position change. This section demonstrates that the KSM and Good Friends were consequential in changes in the Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations’ agenda and discursive positions. However, the domestic political structure of each administration and the issue characteristics of humanitarian crisis in North Korea circumscribed or promoted KSM and Good Friends’ influence on state agenda setting and discursive position changes too.

This section first demonstrates that between 1995 and 1997, KSM and Good Friends advocacy began to incorporate the issue of food aid to North Korea into the Kim Young-Sam administration’s agenda and discursive position. The Kim Young-Sam administration, however, still attached its political interests to the provision of food aid
to North Korea contrary to the demand of the humanitarian NGOs which emphasised humanitarianism. The main reason which the Kim Young-Sam administration still maintained the stance of conditional aid to North Korea was attributable to its non-democratic policy making structure and a negative view on the role of NGO in state policy making. In addition, given this operational environment the KSM and Good Friends who, had just initiated its advocacy movement, did not develop an effective advocacy strategy to pressurise the Kim Young-Sam administration although the KSM and Good Friends were good at conventional advocacy activities such as nationwide public campaigns.

KSM and Good Friends advocacy promoted changes in the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s agenda and discursive position. As Kim Dae-Jung, who maintained a close relationship with humanitarian NGOs, was elected as the 15th President, the KSM and Good Friends were easily able to incorporate the issue of food aid into the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s agenda throughout the administration. During this period, the KSM and Good Friends also improved their expertise to exert direct influence on the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s food aid policy making process. The Kim Dae-Jung administration, however, still stuck to the principle of strict reciprocity linking food aid to North Korea with political and military issues. This was because the opposition from the conservative party and mass media in South Korean society and the low level of political confrontation even after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 made it difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide unconditional aid to North Korea.

This section lastly demonstrates that the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s agenda and discursive position favourable to the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea was secure throughout the administration from 2003 to 2007. It implies that KSM
and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea entered the self-steering stage in which a state seeks to adhere to the specific norms introduced irrespective of external pressure such as from NGO advocacy. This favourable agenda setting and discursive position of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration first of all was attributable to the high degree of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s accommodation to NGO advocacy. Secondly, humanitarian crises, such as the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004 and the flood damage in 2006, provided momentum which made humanitarian NGOs resume their advocacy of humanitarian aid to North Korea. The resumption of NGO advocacy set favourable public opinion on government food aid to North Korea in concrete.

The following section consists of three parts. Each part examines how the KSM and Good Friends influenced changes in government agenda and discursive position in the three different administrations of Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun.

### 7.3.1 Changes in the Kim Young-Sam Administration’s Agenda and Discursive Position

In 1995 and 1996, changes in the Kim Young-Sam administration’s agenda and discursive position were not significant although the Kim Young-Sam administration recognised the outbreak of the food crisis in North Korea. This was attributable to the Kim Young-Sam administration’s closed political structure and the lack of organisational expertise and activities of the KSM and Good Friends. North Korea’s continued military provocations in 1996 further made it difficult for the Kim Young-
Sam administration to maintain a positive position in relation to the provision of food aid to North Korea. Given this operational environment, the Kim Young-Sam administration still conceived the food aid to North Korea as leverage to solve inter-Korean political and military issues although it began to incorporate the issue of food aid to North Korea, which the KSM and Good Friends consistently urged, in the government agenda.

Before June 1995, the severity of food crisis in North Korea was not known to South Korean civil society. The domestic political structure of government food aid policy making in the Kim Young-Sam administration was non-democratic. The first food aid of 150,000 tonnes of rice in 1995 was made by a few policy makers within the Blue House to solve the nuclear issue. Change in the government agenda in relation to the first food aid in June, began with North Korea’s request to Japan for food aid in the autumn of 1994 and January 1995. In January 1995, President Kim Young-Sam, who heard about North Korea’s food request to Japan, gave a strict order to take all necessary measures to provide rice aid prior to the delivery of the Japanese aid. President Kim overtly expressed his intention to provide grain and raw materials to North Korea at his visit to Berlin on 7 March 1995. After this change in the official discursive position, President Kim and the Unification Minister Ung-Bae Na consistently expressed a government intention to provide food aid to North Korea through various channels. President Kim announced the food aid to North Korea on 15 May. Unification Minister Na and Vice-Minister Young-Dae Song in May and June pressurised North Korea into participating in the Beijing Talks for the discussion of 150,000 tonnes of rice aid in June.

As the severity of the food crisis in North Korea became known to the
international community in 1996, the negative responses by North Korea in the process of rice aid shipment in 1995, however, worsened the Kim Young-Sam administration’s position towards North Korea. President Kim stated as “[we] can’t shake hands with those who have nuclear.” On 24 January 1996 the Kim Young-Sam administration, along with the U.S. and Japan, held the ‘High-Ranking Policy Meeting on Rice Aid to North Korea’ in Hawaii and agreed not to provide large-scale food aid to North Korea anymore.

In the midst of the Kim Young-Sam administration’s adherence to its hard-line position towards food aid to North Korea in 1997, the KSM organised various campaigns, public statements and fundraising for humanitarian aid to North Korea based on their extensive network with other religious and civil society organisations and professional groups. As the result of the active advocacy movement under the steering role of the KSM, public participation in the advocacy movement and the scale of fundraising radically increased. Given the increased support for the provision of food aid, the Kim Young-Sam administration was not able to exclude the demands of the NGOs and public urging the Kim Young-Sam administration’s active action to relieve the food crisis in North Korea from the government agenda. Through various statements, the Kim Young-Sam administration referred to the food aid to North Korea. Although it took the policy linking the provision of food aid to North Korea with inter-Korean political issues, this policy itself indicates that the issue of food aid to North Korea was incorporated into the government agenda. In May Unification Minister Okie Kwon stated that the food aid to North Korea could be made on three conditions: an official request by North Korea, holding food-aid related talks and the cessation of North Korea’s broadcast slandering South Korea in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). On 15
July, Prime Minister Su-Sung Lee revealed that food aid to North Korea would be possible when North Korea accepted the Four-Party Talks for the discussion of the nuclear issue. On 31 July, 15 August and 8 September, President Kim also consistently assured its policy linking the Four-Party Talks to the food aid to North Korea.

While the KSM and Good Friends were unfolding active advocacy in 1997, public opinion supporting food aid to North Korea increased to 79.1 per cent, which was the highest figure throughout the entire period of the advocacy movement from 1995 to 2007. Despite this nationwide support, the discursive position of the Kim Young-Sam administration, which linked food aid to the Four-Party Talks, did not change in 1997.

The Kim Young-Sam administration’s consistent adherence to the policy linking food aid to political issues resulted from three factors: Firstly, North Korea’s continued provocations made the Kim Young-Sam administration adhere to a realist and practical approach. Secondly, the Kim Young-Sam administration was passive in exploiting the policy network linking the government and NGOs. The high-ranking decision makers in relation to food aid to North Korea in the Kim Young-Sam administration, such as the Unification Minister and Vice-minister, perceived the humanitarian NGOs as interest groups with narrow organisational interests. Thirdly, despite the worst food deficits in 1997, even the humanitarian NGOs including the KSM and Good Friends were not aware of the severity of the food crisis in North Korea. The KSM and Good Friends, who had just initiated their first ever advocacy movement of food aid, did not recognise the importance of research of the on-going humanitarian impact on the North Korean people in the planning of their advocacy movement. The lack of reliable information on the food crisis in North Korea in turn resulted in the decision makers in the Kim Young-
Sam administration having a sceptical view of the need for food aid to North Korea and the NGO activities advocating for food aid to North Korea. Kwon, the Unification Minister, stated at the Unification and National Security Policy Coordination Meeting on 11 April that “the government food aid to North Korea is impossible without holding the Four-Party Talks, although the government is able to provide emergency food aid when the famine situation worsens in North Korea.” In 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration’s discursive position linking food aid to political issues therefore did not change in 1997 although the advocacy movement by the KSM and Good Friends developed into a nationwide movement.

7.3.2 Changes in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Agenda and Discursive Position

As Kim Dae-Jung, who maintained a close relationship with the humanitarian NGOs, was elected as the 15th President in 1998, the KSM and Good Friends easily incorporated the issue of food aid into the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s agenda throughout the administration. Given the favourable operational environment until the Inter-Korean Summit, the KSM and Good Friends improved their expertise to exert direct influence on the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s food aid policy making process, and finally contributed to favourable changes in the Kim Dae-Jung administration agenda and discursive positions in relation to food aid to North Korea. The Kim Dae-Jung administration, however, still stuck to the principle of strict reciprocity linking food aid to North Korea with political and military issues. This was because the opposition from the conservative party and mass media in South Korean society and the
low level of political confrontation even after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 made it difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide unconditional aid to North Korea. The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s active role in relation to the food aid to North Korea after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 in addition began to mitigate organisational mandate of the KSM and Good Friends. The weakened organisational mandate of the KSM and Good Friends in turn resulted in the undermining of entire advocacy of food aid to North Korea.

From 1998 to 2002, the issue of food aid to North Korea which had been advocated by KSM and Good Friends was the main agenda of the Kim Dae-Jung administration. Between 1995 and 1997, Kim Dae-Jung who was the President of the National Council for New Politics (NCNP) and the opposition party, maintained a positive stance on food aid to North Korea and the role of humanitarian NGOs in the aspect of advocacy and delivery of humanitarian aid to North Korea. Such positive stance were identified through the statements which Kim Dae-Jung and other party leaders delivered at various events. These events were a congress policy meeting organised by the KSM in July 1996, the Dinner of North Korean Corn Stew organised by the KSM and Good Friends on 12 April 1997, and the presidential candidate debate organised by the KSM on 18 November 1997. After Kim Dae-Jung was elected as the 15th President at the end of 1998, he showed a positive perception on the role of humanitarian NGOs, delivering his thanks for their efforts at the New Year’s Greetings of the Korea Civil Society Organisations’ Council (KCSOC) on 4 January 1998.

The Kim Dae-Jung administration overtly proclaimed its favourable discursive position on food aid to North Korea. President Kim announced that “the government will not spare any efforts in the provision of food aid to North Korea” at his inaugural
speech on 25 February 1998. The Kim Dae-Jung administration included the issue of large-scale food aid on the agenda of the Inter-Korean Vice-ministerial Talk in June 1999. In 2001, Dong-Won Lim, who was the Special Envoy to North Korea, also revealed the government position of food aid to North Korea through the special speech at the 4th International NGO Conference for Aid to North Korea on 20 June 2001. In particular, the email newsletter issued by the Ministry of Unification in May 2001, ‘Fact Paper: Humanitarian Aid,’ clearly showed the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s discursive position favourable to the provision of food aid to North Korea.

Despite the active advocacy of ‘unconditional’ food aid to North Korea by humanitarian NGOs between 1998 and 1999, however, the Kim Dae-Jung administration still adhered to the principle of strict reciprocity linking food aid to North Korea with political and military issues. Such positions of the Kim Dae-Jung administration were found in President Kim’s statement in 2000. On 9 March 2000 President Kim delivered an important statement in Berlin where he made government food aid to North Korea conditional on the holding of inter-Korean talks. The main reason the Kim Dae-Jung administration adhered to the principle of strict reciprocity was that North Korea was continuing military action, such as the West Sea Battle in 1999, despite the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy. Given this operational environment, the Kim Dae-Jung administration needed North Korea to behave responsibly in order to avoid criticism from the opposition party and conservative groups. The Kim Dae-Jung administration therefore maintained the principle of strict reciprocity despite KSM and Good Friends advocacy.

Opposition from the conservative party and the media was another reason why the Kim Dae-Jung administration adhered to the principle of strict reciprocity in the
provision of food aid to North Korea. After the first provision of large-scale food aid in 2000, the opposition party, the Grand National Party (GNP) and the conservative media (mainly the Chosun Ilbo) vigorously criticised the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s decision. Such severe criticism eventually made it difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to commit themselves to the additional pledge of 100,000 tonnes through the WFP in 2000.

Lastly, the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s active role in relation to the food aid to North Korea after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 began to mitigate the organisational mandate of the KSM and Good Friends. The weakened organisational mandate of the KSM and Good Friends in turn resulted in the undermining of the entire advocacy of food aid to North Korea. While the Kim Dae-Jung administration had proclaimed its engagement policy towards North Korea since 1998, the KSM and Good Friends began to move its organisational mandate from the advocacy of food aid to the delivery of development aid and the human rights movement respectively. As large-scale food aid to North Korea resumed after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, such changed accelerated. KSM and Good Friends advocacy between 2000 and 2002 therefore was not enough to induce the Kim Dae-Jung administration to relinquish its principle of strict reciprocity from the food aid to North Korea.

### 7.3.3 Changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration’s Agenda and Discursive Position

From 2003 to 2007, the agenda and discursive position of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration favourable to the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea was
secure throughout the administration. Such concrete agenda setting and a discursive position continued in the midst of the rupture of the inter-Korean relations in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. It was attributable to the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s positive view on the provision of food aid to North Korea. Firstly, such a positive view was possible since the Roh Moo-Hyun administration inherited the engagement policy of the Kim Dae-Jung administration. Secondly, South Korean humanitarian NGOs, including the KSM and Good Friends and the rational-centrist NGOs that achieved radical organisational development under financial and institutional support from the Kim Dae-Jung administration, contributed to the establishment of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration at the Presidential election in 2002. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration, therefore, was receptive to the demand of the humanitarian NGOs to provide food aid to North Korea. Lastly, humanitarian crises in North Korea in 2004 and 2006 provided momentum that made the KSM and Good Friends resume their advocacy of humanitarian aid to North Korea. The public support for food aid to North Korea that was resuscitated by KSM and Good Friends advocacy enabled the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to maintain its agenda and discursive position favourable to food aid to North Korea even in the midst of the unfavourable operational environment in 2004, 2005 and 2006.

President Roh started his presidency in 2003 while there was increasing criticism that the engagement policy resulted in the development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons after North Korea’s admission of uranium enrichment activity on 17 October 2002. On 4 November 2004 the Bush administration, which pursued a hostile policy towards North Korea, was re-elected on 4 November 2004. Given this hostile policy, in 2005 North Korea proclaimed its participation in the Six-Party Talks on 10
February. On 19 April 2005 Sung-Ryeol Han, the Vice-ambassador of North Korea to the U.N., further announced the plan to extract weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel rods in order to make nuclear weapons. On 13 July 2006, although the Roh Moo-Hyun administration established a plan for large-scale food and fertiliser aid to North Korea, one week ahead of the 19th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk, North Korea conducted middle and long-range missile tests.

Despite such a negative operational environment in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration maintained an active and positive stance on the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea. At his inaugural speech in 2003, President Roh proclaimed the continuation of large-scale food aid to North Korea. In 2004 the Roh Moo-Hyun administration pledged a total of 500,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea irrespective of the criticism from the opposition party. While the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk for the discussion of food aid became uncertain under the advent of the second Bush administration in 2005, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration consistently pressurised North Korea to respond to its request to hold the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk to discuss food aid and other pending issues. On 3 and 9 August 2006 after North Korea’s missile test, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration which suspended the provision of large-scale food and chemical fertiliser aid to North Korea revealed its intention to resume humanitarian aid to North Korea, stating “With increased requests from the political parties and NGOs, the Government is sincerely considering the resumption of humanitarian aid to North Korea.”

The formation of Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s agenda and discursive position favourable to large-scale food aid to North Korea was attributable to the effort of humanitarian NGOs. In 2002 there was a strong movement urging for the amendment
of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and South Korea after the incident where two Korean students were run down and killed by a U.S. armed vehicle. In the movement that took place during the presidential election in 2002, humanitarian NGOs and other rational-centrist NGOs including the KSM and Good Friends played a steering role in the anti-U.S. movement. This anti-U.S. movement evolved into a nationwide movement, urging for the amendment of SOFA. The nationwide movement established an environment favourable to Roh Moo-Hyun who maintained a critical stance on the U.S.-Korean alliance and inherited the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy. He was finally elected as the 16th President in 2002. This decisive role of humanitarian and other civil society NGOs in the presidential election was identified in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s statement. After winning the election, President Roh Moo-Hyun attributed his victory to the efforts of humanitarian NGOs and civil society organisations at the ‘New Years’ Greeting of NGOs’ on 6 January 2003. At this event President Roh Moo-Hyun stated “[I] could not be elected without the civil society movement that has been prolonged for several decades.”

Humanitarian crises in North Korea in 2004 and 2006 were the momentum which made humanitarian NGOs resume their advocacy of humanitarian aid to North Korea. NGO advocacy contributed to the formation of favourable public opinion which made the Roh Moo-Hyun administration maintain its policy towards North Korea in the midst of North Korea’s negative actions in 2004 and 2006. As the result of the National Assembly Election in April 2004, the opposition party that maintained a negative stance on large-scale food aid to North Korea became the majority in the National Assembly. North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test in 2006 were the incidents which put the
Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s positive stance on the provision of food aid to North Korea in jeopardy.

With the incidents of the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004 and the floods in 2006, however, humanitarian NGOs came to have an opportunity to overcome these negative political environments. Immediately after the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004, the KSM, Good Friends and other humanitarian NGOs extended their active advocacy of humanitarian aid to North Korea, disseminating ongoing information of the humanitarian crisis in the Ryongcheon station area. As a result of this movement, humanitarian NGOs raised $132,500,000, which was the largest amount since the outbreak of North Korean food crisis in 1995. This radical increase of civil participation in the campaign for the Ryongcheon Station Victims indicates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy established a favourable operational environment in which the Roh Moo-Hyun administration was able to maintain its pro food aid stance in the midst of the unfavourable political environment in 2004.

While the Roh Moo-Hyun administration suspended all types of aid including food aid to North Korea after North Korea’s missile launch in 2006, flood struck North Korea and resulted in severe grain loss and casualties in North Korea. Humanitarian NGOs including the KSM and Good Friends resumed advocacy of flood aid to North Korea and exploited government and NGO consultative bodies, such as the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, the Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy, the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (the Korean Council) and the 6.15 Joint Statement South Korean Committee. With the radical and swift expansion of the flood aid movement, the opposition party, the Grand National Party (GNP), which had opposed large-scale government food aid to North Korea,
changed its discursive position, expressing “The GNP consistently supports the ‘humanitarian’ assistance to North Korea.” On 8 August, the President of the Korean Council met Jong-Suk Lee, the Unification Minister, to urge the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to resume humanitarian aid to North Korea. On 9 August, the members of the 6.15 Joint Statement South Korean Committee and the NGO Council also visited the Ministry of Unification and met Unification Minister Lee. On 10 August, the government official then revealed that the government would resume the provision of government flood aid to North Korea.

7.4 Changes in Government Institutions

This section demonstrates that the KSM and Good Friends were successful in grafting new norms within government institutions and finally entering into the stage of rule-consistent behaviour in which a state seeks to commit itself to their policy by deregulating rules and government regulations and establishing relevant procedures and institutions irrespective of the existence of external monitoring or pressure.

In 1995 and 1996, despite KSM and Good Friends advocacy that urged for government institutional change allowing private aid to North Korea, the Kim Young-Sam administration’s approach to the demands of humanitarian NGOs was passive. Such passive position of the Kim Young-Sam administration in relation to institutional change was due to its non-democratic political structure that was not receptive to NGO advocacy and the lack of organisational expertise of the KSM and Good Friends. As the advocacy of food aid to North Korea continued in 1997, however, the KSM and
Good Friends came to recognise the value of institutional change to effect efficient aid to North Korea, and they therefore promoted a movement urging institutional change in the Kim Young-Sam administration. This movement contributed to the deregulation of the Kim Young-Sam administration’s rules and regulations that circumscribed the private food and humanitarian aid to North Korea and the operational environment for NGO activity.

During the Kim Dae-Jung administration between 1998 and 2002, KSM and Good Friends advocacy entered into the initial stage of rule-consistent behaviour in which a state seeks to commit itself to their policy by establishing relevant procedures and institutions irrespective of the existence of external monitoring or pressure. From 1996, the KSM and Good Friends gradually increased their advocacy of institutional changes. Given the favourable operational environment after the establishment of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998, the KSM and Good Friends augmented the quality of advocacy demanding institutional changes. Between 1998 and 1999, as a result, the Kim Dae-Jung administration made various institutional changes promoting civil participation in state food aid policy making and NGO activities in the aspect of the delivery of aid to North Korea, fundraising and public campaigns. The political rapprochement in 2000 in particular provided the momentum for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to establish a government procedure and institution for large-scale government food aid policy making.

This section lastly demonstrates that the Roh Moo-Hyun administration was also active in institutional changes for the provision of large and stable food aid to North Korea. Legislation by the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and an inter-Korean summit statement stipulated the provision of stable food aid to North Korea irrespective of inter-
Korean relations and issues. In addition, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration was active in the preparation of rules and regulations assuring NGO and civil society participation in the state food aid policy-making process. Such institutional change was attributable to the political stance of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration which maintained a positive stance on the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea and NGO participation in state policy making and execution. With regard to KSM and Good Friends influence on changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s food aid policy making institution, during the Roh-Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM and Good Friends mainly engaged in the delivery of development aid to North Korea and the advocacy of North Korean human rights respectively. By exploiting government-NGO consultative bodies, however, the KSM and Good Friends consistently urged for the institutionalisation of food aid to North Korea and NGO and civil participation in state food aid policy making process. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration was receptive to the demands of NGOs. The institutional changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration therefore indicates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy entered into the stage of rule-consistent behaviour in which the South Korean government sought to commit itself to the provision of food aid to North Korea through institutional change.

The next section consists of three parts. Each part examines how KSM and Good Friends advocacy changed norms in South Korean civil society under the three different administrations of Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun.

7.4.1 Changes in the Government Institutions of the Kim Young-Sam Administration
Despite the fact that Kim Young-Sam did not respond to the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, the KSM and Good Friends in 1995 and 1996 began to press for government institutional change to allow private aid to North Korea. Despite KSM and Good Friends advocacy that urged for government institutional change, however, the Kim Young-Sam administration’s approach to the demands of humanitarian NGOs was passive. Such passive position was due to its non-democratic political structure that was not receptive to NGO advocacy. In addition, the KSM and Good Friends did not develop their expertise in the advocacy of institutional reform due to its limited organisational experience. While the demand for private channel to deliver humanitarian aid to North Korea radically increased in 1997, then, the KSM and Good Friends advocacy that urged for the deregulation allowing private aid to North Korea contributed to institutional change in respect of food aid to North Korea and to the operational environment for NGO activity.

The Kim Young-Sam administration adopted ‘A Policy to Unify Private Aid to North Korea through the Red Cross Channel,’ which allowed the delivery of private aid to North Korea through the Red Cross channel on 14 September. This first institutional change, however, was the Kim Young-Sam administration’s measure to reflect the increase of private aid to North Korea through overseas channels. As private aid radically increased after August, the Kim Young-Sam administration understood that they could not prevent the direct delivery of aid to North Korea as the private aid to North Korea was delivered through overseas channels. The Kim Young-Sam administration therefore authorised the delivery of private aid to North Korea through the national Red Cross. This measure, however, was a passive change whereby the Kim Young-Sam administration aimed to regulate NGO activities, rather than to deregulate
NGO activities in relation to aid to North Korea. This measure still restricted rice and cash assistance by the public, the participation of individual corporations and the media in public campaigns and fundraising, the direct delivery of aid to North Korea and fundraising targeting unspecified individuals and the public.\textsuperscript{57} The one contribution of this measure was it assured the domestic operational condition in which the humanitarian NGOs were able to continue their advocacy, fundraising and other related activities in relation to humanitarian aid to North Korea.

In 1995 and 1996, the Kim Young-Sam administration still regulated the advocacy movement by the humanitarian NGOs. On 30 December 1995, the Kim Young-Sam administration abolished the act of ‘The Prohibition of Fundraising and Donation,’ which was enacted in 1951, and replaced it with the newly established ‘The Regulation Act on Fundraising and Donation.’ This new act, however, was the same as the old act except its name had changed. This act which was enforced on 1 July 1996 was a measure to regulate private fundraising by the humanitarian NGOs. It stipulated the need for government permission for fundraising and that expenses for administration be within 2 per cent of the raised fund.\textsuperscript{58} In reality the Kim Young-Sam administration was not active in giving permission for private fundraising. Given such poor funding arrangements in 1996, humanitarian NGOs’ development of their organisational capacity and activities was restricted. Based on this act, the Kim Young-Sam administration also prosecuted the KSM and the National Alliance for Democracy and Reunification of Korea (NADRK) in 1997.

On 17 December 1996, the Kim Young-Sam administration established the Humanitarian Support Bureau within the Ministry of Unification. One of reasons behind this was, as Unification Minister Kwon said, to curb the vigorous activities of the
humanitarian NGOs and to improve the role of government in relation to aid to North Korea. The Humanitarian Bureau was in charge of the government-level aid to North Korea, the coordination of private aid to North Korea and the cooperation with the U.N. agencies in relation to the aid to North Korea.

In 1997, the radical increase of private aid to North Korea and the consistent nationwide advocacy movement by the KSM and Good Friends began to change the Kim Young-Sam administration’s institution in relation to the provision of food aid to North Korea and the operational environment for NGO activity. Given the vigorous demands from the humanitarian NGOs and the external environment, 1997 was a transition point for the Kim Young-Sam administration in respect of the government institutional change. Responding to the consistent demands of the KSM and Good Friends, the Kim Young-Sam administration adopted a measure on 31 March expanding the items of aid allowed for North Korea. It authorised the delivery of private aid through the U.N. agencies, but still did not authorise the private delivery channel to North Korea. The Kim Young-Sam administration authorised corporate participation in humanitarian aid to North Korea through economic organisations. This measure authorised indoor fundraising and the media reporting on the breakdown of the fundraising but not fundraising advertisements. On 26 May 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration adopted the ‘Agreement on Aid Delivery Procedure between the South and North Korean Red Cross.’ As the result of this agreement, the government and private-level aid to North Korea, which had been delivered through the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), could be delivered through direct inter-Korean channels. Although this agreement pertained to inter-government level aid, this agreement accommodated most of the demands that had been made by the KSM, Good
Friends and other humanitarian NGOs, such as direct inter-Korean aid, the expansion of aid beneficiary areas, the specification of the donor and designated donation.  

7.4.2 Changes in the Government Institutions of the Kim Dae-Jung Administration

Between 1998 and 2002, President Kim Dae-Jung undertook institutional changes promoting civil participation in government food aid policy making. The Kim Dae-Jung administration also took various measures to improve the operational environment for NGO activity in terms of the delivery of aid to North Korea, fundraising and public campaigns. Such changes firstly were attributable to the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s positive view that perceived the humanitarian NGOs as an important counterpart in the maintenance of inter-Korean relations. Secondly, the efforts of the KSM and Good Friends, which consistently urged for deregulation in respect of food aid to North Korea and the operational environment for NGO activity, were successful. From 1996, in fact, the KSM and Good Friends gradually increased their advocacy of institutional changes. With the establishment of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998, the KSM and Good Friends augmented the quality of their advocacy demanding institutional changes. Between 1998 and 1999, as a result, the Kim Dae-Jung administration made various institutional changes promoting civil participation in state food aid policy making and NGO activities in the aspect of the delivery of aid to North Korea, fundraising and public campaigns. The political rapprochement in 2000 further provided the momentum for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to establish a government procedure and institution for large-scale government food aid policy making although the worsened inter-Korean relations in 2002 temporarily interrupted the discussion of food aid through this procedure and these institutions. These institutional changes in government aid
policy-making procedures and institutions indicates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy finally entered into the initial stage of rule-consistent behaviour in which a state seeks to commit itself to their policy by establishing relevant procedures and institutions irrespective of the existence of external monitoring or pressure.

President Kim Dae-Jung took action on civil participation in government aid policy making, proclaiming the name of the administration as the ‘People’s Government’ at his inaugural speech in 1998. The most distinctive institutional change was the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy (the Government-Civilian Council) in 2001. Although both Koreas reached political rapprochement after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration still perceived the importance of confidence building between both Koreas through the expansion of private inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. In this sense, the Kim Dae-Jung administration and the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (the NGO Council) started meeting on the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council in December 2000. In 2001, the Kim Dae-Jung administration and the NGO Council held the 1st Government-NGO Meeting on 21 March with seven NGO personnel from the NGO Council, four government personnel and two personnel from the Blue House. At this meeting, the KSM and Good Friends personnel urged for the official establishment of the Government-Civilian Council. In August 2001 the Kim Dae-Jung administration finally established the Government-Civilian Council which consisted of the Ministry of Unification, the NGO Council and civil experts from academics and government think tanks. The establishment of the Government-Civilian Council was a significant improvement in government institution change in that the Kim Dae-Jung administration, for the first time, established an official government-NGO consultative body assuring NGO participation in government
aid policy making.

The Kim Dae-Jung administration next established the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (the Korean Council) in order to strengthen a government function to canvass public opinion. Although the Korean Council was founded as a NGO, the Korean Council exerted significant influence on the government policy-making process. Such influence was possible as the Korean Council had characteristics of quasi-government status. The Korean Council maintained a close relationship with the Ministry of Unification as it was established under the steering role of the Ministry of Unification. President Kim stated in September 1998 that “[in regard to the future role and status of the Korean Council] I think that the Korean Council will evolve as an organisation which handles the overall affairs of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation at both government and private levels.” The executives of the Korean Council also consisted of former government personnel who were able to exert direct influence on the government aid policy making. These personnel included the former Unification Ministers and Vice-ministers and the former Chiefs of various bureaus of government, the representatives from various NGOs, congressmen and women and experts from civil and government think tanks and academics. Representatives of the KSM and Good Friends and other humanitarian NGOs were also appointed to the executive membership of the Korean Council. With the establishment of the Korean Council, therefore, the KSM and Good Friends came to convey their demands directly to government aid policy making, in particular the Ministry of Unification.

The Kim Dae-Jung administration expanded civil participation in the highest government aid policy-making process by improving the status of policy advisory organisations to the President, such as the National Unification Advisory Council
NUAC) and the Unification Advisory Meeting (UAM). The Kim Dae-Jung administration strengthened the function of NUAC by canvassing public opinion and conveying these opinions to the President. Under President Kim’s order on 22 April 1998, the elder statesmen from various circles and the representatives of humanitarian NGOs were newly appointed to be advisors to the NUAC. The Kim Dae-Jung administration also strengthened the function of the UAM as an advisory organisation to the President on the issue of unification. The Kim Dae-Jung administration improved the status of the UAM by having the President appoint the chair of the UAM and assuring the term of the UAM members to 30 months. Given the improved organisational status of the UAM, the elder executives of the KSM, such as Moon-Kyu Kang, Young-Hoon Suh, Wol-Ju Song, Cardinal Su-Hwan Kim and Man-Gil were appointed to be advisors to the UAM on 19 May 1999. As a result, the humanitarian NGOs including the KSM and Good Friends came to secure a direct communication channel allowing the humanitarian NGOs to reach the highest decision maker, the President, through the quarterly meetings with the President.

In 1999, the civil experts who maintained a close relationship with the humanitarian NGOs were appointed to be expert advisory members of the Policy Advisory Committee of the Humanitarian Support Bureau within the Ministry of Unification. The policy advisory members of the KSM, such as Professor Dae-Suh Choi of Dongguk University, and Professor Young-Su Kim of Sogang University, played the role of delivering the KSM and Good Friends’ demands to government food aid policy making. In 2000 other KSM advisors, Keum-Soon Lee and Jong-Hoon Lee, and An-Sook Jung, the Secretary General of Good Friends, were newly appointed to the government advisory committee in August 2000. Also, on 20 January 2000 Young-Hoon
Suh, who had been involved in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea as a Senior Adviser of the KSM since its establishment, was promoted to the role of President of the National Council for New Politics (NCNP), the ruling party, on 20 January 2000.

The Kim Dae-Jung administration was favourable to the demand of humanitarian NGOs which urged for an improvement in the operational environment for NGO activity. The Kim Dae-Jung administration first did this in relation to North Korea. The Kim Dae-Jung administration took ‘The Measure to Revitalize Private Aid to North Korea’ on 18 March 1998. This measure approved the participation of humanitarian NGOs in the delivery of aid to North Korea through the South Korean Red Cross, and NGO visits to North Korea. This measure also allowed the participation of the media and individual companies in sponsorship, donation and events for humanitarian aid to North Korea. On 10 February 1999 the Kim Dae-Jung administration adopted ‘The Measure for Delivery Channel Diversification for Private Humanitarian Aid to North Korea.’ With the adoption of this measure, the government allowed the humanitarian NGOs to directly engage in negotiation with North Korea for project planning, acquisition, distribution, monitoring and assessment.

The Kim Dae-Jung administration approved the Audio Response System (ARS) for NGO fundraising. The KSM, for the first time, organised the event of ‘The Day of International Fasting for the North Korean Compatriots’ using the ARS on 25 April 1998. The adoption of the ARS in fundraising contributed to the radical increase in fundraising for food aid to North Korea. The scale of funds which was raised through the ARS at the event of ‘24 Hours of Hunger Experience’ by World Vision Korea in June recorded 2.37 billion won, which was the equivalent of 16,470 tonnes of
maize.\textsuperscript{80}

On 16 December 1999, the ‘Non-profit Organisation Support Act’ suggested by Sang-Cheon Park and 91 other Congressmen was passed.\textsuperscript{81} Since its first attempt in the name of the ‘Civil Movement Assistance Act’ by the NCNP, the opposition party at that time in 1997, the discussion on the legislation of this act continued in 1998 and it was finally adopted in 1999. This act was presented to promote the civil society movement by providing government support for NGO activity for which the humanitarian NGOs consistently urged. According to this act, the Kim Dae-Jung administration provided NGOs with financial support for NGO activity and projects, tax reduction and postal service.\textsuperscript{82}

On 21 October 1999, the Kim Dae-Jung administration adopted a measure of the ‘Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund for Private Humanitarian Aid to North Korea.’\textsuperscript{83} With the adoption of this measure, humanitarian NGOs came to receive government financial support for their aid to North Korea. All the measures above influenced the increase in NGO advocacy in government aid policy making by allowing the humanitarian NGOs to improve their organisational development for efficient and systemic advocacy. In fact, the deregulation of NGO activities related to North Korea aid contributed to the revitalisation of NGO activity and public participation in NGO advocacy and aid operations. As examined in Chapter 3, the approval of fundraising using the ARS and the financial support for humanitarian NGOs contributed to the stabilisation of funding capacity of humanitarian NGOs who were in chronic financial difficulties.\textsuperscript{84}

Given the political rapprochement after the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration took the first step for institutional reform for large-scale food aid to North Korea. After the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the public
support for food aid to North Korea formed a favourable operational environment enabling the Kim Dae-Jung administration to prepare the institutional ground for stable and large-scale aid to North Korea. At the preparatory stage, the Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance within the Ministry of Unification first calculated the scale of food aid through consultation with the humanitarian NGOs, NGO consultative bodies and experts from the private and government research institutes and academics. The Blue House also consulted on the issue with the unification policy advisors within the UAM and the NUAC. The National Security Policy Coordination Meeting within the Blue House then decided the maximum limit of food aid and the conditions which would be discussed at the envoy meeting table and entrust these decisions to the special envoy. The special envoy then discussed the issue of food aid with other pending issues at the envoy meeting table and made a provisional agreement on the provision of food aid, generally by including the phrase ‘both Koreas agreed to cooperate with each other based on the principle of mutual cooperation, brotherly love and humanitarianism’ in the agreement of the special envoy meeting. After the special meeting, the Inter-Korean Ministerial or Vice-ministerial Talk was held for more specific discussion on the pending issues including the issue of food aid and then made the decision on food aid and the scale official. The Committee of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation next discussed the delivery method, the exact amount of aid, the type of food delivered, monitoring and the other conditions of aid. After final approval from the National Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation which was a meeting attended by most of the Ministers, the Ministry of Unification shipped the food aid to North Korea. In 2001 the suspension of the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk after the 9.11 Terror made it difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to discuss the issue of food aid. This
procedure and institution, however, became standard for the provision of government food aid to North Korea once it resumed in 2002.

7.4.3 Changes in the Government Institutions of the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration established institutions to be responsible for stable food aid to North Korea, free from inter-Korean political and military issues. Such changes in institutions by the Roh Moo-Hyun administration were attributable to its political stance which maintained a positive view of the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea and NGO participation in government policy making. With regard to KSM and Good Friends influence on changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s food aid policy making institution, during the Roh-Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM and Good Friends mainly engaged in the delivery of development aid to North Korea and the advocacy of North Korean human rights respectively. By exploiting government-NGO consultative bodies, however, the KSM and Good Friends consistently urged for the institutionalisation of food aid to North Korea and NGO and civil participation in state food aid policy making process. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration was receptive to such demands of NGOs that urged for institutional reform. The active institutional changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration therefore indicates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy entered into the stage of rule-consistent behaviour in which the South Korean government sought to commit itself to the provision of food aid to North Korea through institutional change.

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration established institutions responsible for stable
food aid, free from inter-Korean political and military issues. On 18 June 2004, Gyung-Bin Ko, the Head of the Social and Cultural Exchange Bureau at the Ministry of Unification, revealed the government plan of the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy (The Government-Civilian Council) at the NGO Council workshop. On 1 September, the Ministry of Unification established the Government-Civilian Council. The Government-Civilian Council which consists of an equal number of NGO and government personnel aimed to establish a macro plan on government and private aid to North Korea and to coordinate the role of government and NGOs in the provision of aid to North Korea. Under these objectives, the Government-Civilian Council was mandated to establish the ‘Government-NGO Master Plan for Aid to North Korea in 2005.’ Although the master plan was not accomplished in 2005 due to the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s concern over reduced government autonomy in the decision of government aid to North Korea, the Government-Civilian Council adopted ‘The Assessment of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea in 2004 and Plan for 2005.’ This plan for 2005 as a macro plan covering government and NGO aid to North Korea stipulated the continued provision of government food and fertiliser aid to North Korea.

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration adopted the ‘Act of Advancing Inter-Korean Relations’ on 29 December 2005. This act aimed to regulate overall government and NGO aid to North Korea and to assure the provision of stable and consensus-based government aid policy towards North Korea. This act stipulated the establishment of the ‘Basic Plan for Advancing Inter-Korean Relations’ every five years. The Basic Plan for 2008 and 2012 which was adopted in 2007 stipulated the continued provision of food and humanitarian aid to North Korea under improved monitoring in cooperation
with NGOs. This act stipulated the establishment of the Inter-Korean Emergency Management and Cooperation System for efficient emergency aid to the vulnerable and flood victims in North Korea. The act also stipulated the improvement of legal and institutional grounds for advancing inter-Korean relations, the improvement of consensus on the pursuit of government policy toward North Korea and the pursuit of consistent cooperation with the international community through participation in U.N. agency appeals and operations.99

On 4 October 2007 both Koreas adopted the ‘Statement of Advancing Inter-Korean Relations and Peaceful Prosperity’ at the Inter-Korean Summit. According to this statement, Article 7 stipulated “Both Koreas continue to cooperate with each other in the pursuit of humanitarian cooperation projects.”100 With regard to the inclusion of this article in the summit statement, Yong-Sun Lee, the Chairman of the Steering Committee of the KSM, interpreted the inclusion of this stipulation as a simple reference assuring that the South Korean government would provide humanitarian aid to North Korea once North Korea confronts the severe floods and natural disasters in the future.101 The inclusion of this article was the first institutionalisation of humanitarian aid between both Koreas. Before this agreement, both Koreas adopted various agreements and declarations on the provision of food aid at the ministerial and vice-ministerial level.102 These agreements and declarations, however, had a temporary effect covering ‘one-shot provision of food aid to North Korea’. With the inclusion of the continuation of humanitarian aid in the statement at the summit level, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration came to have a legal foundation enabling the provision of stable food aid to North Korea which was free from inter-Korean political and military issues.

The establishment of institutions assuring the South Korean government’s stable
and large-scale food aid to North Korea was attributable to the political stance of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. With the establishment of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration in 2003, President Roh Moo-Hyun proclaimed the succession of the engagement policy which sought to promote inter-Korean trust and peace through inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration recognised that the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s strict adherence to the principle of reciprocity in the pursuit of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation resulted in a limited role for the Kim Dae-Jung administration in the severe food crisis in North Korea from 1998 to 1999. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration took a position which was more active in the provision of aid to North Korea, by easing the application of the principle of reciprocity in the aid to North Korea. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration therefore was more active in the provision of food aid to North Korea.

With regard to the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s stance on NGO participation in the government aid policy making, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration took a more active policy compared to the Kim Dae-Jung administration which assured NGO participation in the execution of government aid policy towards North Korea. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration assured NGO participation in government aid policy making towards North Korea as well as in the execution of government aid policy. The reason for this was attributable to the personal career of President Roh Moo-Hyun. As a human rights lawyer President Roh Moo-Hyun had maintained a close relationship with NGOs since before his victory in the presidential election. During the presidential election in 2002, the rational-centrist NGOs including humanitarian NGOs influenced the establishment of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. For these reasons the Roh Moo-Hyun administration was active in promoting civil and NGO participation in
During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration from 2003 to 2007, it recruited NGO personnel for the government and the Blue House. Among a total of 416 government positions, NGO personnel accounted for 50.5 per cent in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration.\(^{105}\) It was also active in the establishment of institutions assuring NGO participation in government policy making. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration established the Committee of Civil Society Development under the Prime Minister’s Office for the discussion of institutional development promoting civil and NGO participation in government policy making and execution.\(^{106}\) This Committee contributed to the improvement of the financial arrangements of NGOs enabling the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to amend the Regulation Act on Fundraising and Donation.\(^{107}\) Such an improved funding capacity of humanitarian NGOs eventually influenced the improvement of NGO advocacy influence over the administration and the public.

The Roh Moo-Hyun administration appointed civil and NGO personnel to positions in the government consultative bodies for aid policy making towards North Korea. Nine civilian personnel were appointed to the membership of the National Committee on Advancing Inter-Korean Relations.\(^{108}\) Three civilian personnel were appointed to positions in the National Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation. Such civilian personnel were mostly from NGOs or were those who maintained a close relationship with humanitarian NGOs.\(^{109}\) The Roh Moo-Hyun administration also established the Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy which consisted of equal numbers of NGO and government personnel.\(^{110}\)

Given the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s favourable stance, KSM and Good
Friends advocacy which consistently urged for the institutionalisation of stable and large-scale government food aid to North Korea and NGO participation in government aid policy making contributed to the institutional changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. President Roh Moo-Hyun in his inaugural speech showed democratic leadership in state policy making, implementation and assessment, emphasising the concept of ‘good governance.’¹¹¹ In this sense, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration was active in the deregulation of government rules and regulations.

Humanitarian NGOs contributed to the establishment of government institutions, pressurising the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to take progressive actions expanding NGO participation in government policy making. With regard to the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council on 1 September 2004, humanitarian NGOs had consistently urged for the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council since 2000. Following the establishment of the NGO Council, which is a consultative body among humanitarian NGOs, in 2000, humanitarian NGOs had consistently urged for the establishment of a government and civilian consultative body.¹¹² The incident of the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004 finally provided momentum which made the Roh Moo-Hyun administration realise the need for coordinated aid to North Korea through the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council.¹¹³

On 29 December 2005, humanitarian NGOs supported government efforts to adopt ‘The Act of Advancing Inter-Korean Relations’. This act was proposed by Chae-Jung Lim, a Congressman of the ruling party, on 28 April 2003 for the first time, but it did not receive support from the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and humanitarian NGOs at that time.¹¹⁴ In 2004 Congressman Lim again proposed this act on 3 August 2004 with the cooperation of the Ministry of Unification. In this process of legislation,
humanitarian NGOs, mainly from the KSM and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), supported the adoption of this act. This act aimed to improve the legal and institutional grounds for advancing inter-Korean relations, to improve the consensus among the national congress, government and civil society on the pursuit of government policy toward North Korea, and to prepare a basic plan for a stable and consistent aid policy towards North Korea. With the support from the humanitarian NGOs and the ruling party, this act was finally adopted.

On 4 October 2007, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and North Korea adopted the ‘Statement of Advancing Inter-Korean Relations and Peaceful Prosperity’ at the Inter-Korean Summit, which stipulated the cooperation for humanitarian and development aid between both Koreas in Article 7. The inclusion of this article into the statement indicates that a demand for stable and consistent aid to North Korea from the humanitarian NGOs was institutionalised. On 20 August 2007 before the Inter-Korean Summit the humanitarian NGOs who had consistently advocated for large-scale food aid to North Korea met government personnel at the Government-NGO meeting. At this meeting the KSM and Good Friends urged for the continuation of humanitarian and development aid to North Korea. Good Friends in particular pressurised the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide more food aid to North Korea, additional to the bilateral food aid to North Korea on loan terms, emphasising the dangers of a second famine in North Korea after the severe floods in 2006 and 2007.

With regard to the amendment of the ‘Regulation Act on Fundraising and Donation,’ the KSM had consistently urged for the deregulation of rules on NGO fundraising and the increase of administrative expenses through the amendment of the ‘Regulation Act on Fundraising and Donation.’ Given these consistent demands from
humanitarian NGOs, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration which maintained a close relationship with NGOs established the Committee of Civil Society Development under the Prime Minister’s Office in 2003. Under the recommendation of this committee, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration replaced the existing ‘Regulation Act on fundraising and Donation’ with the ‘Act on Fundraising and Expense’ on 24 March 2006. This amended act increased the rate of expenses for NGO administration from 2 per cent to 15 per cent. This act also deregulated the need for NGOs to gain government approval for fundraising events to a simple registration system which did not need government permission.120

With regard to the institutional changes for the improvement of the operational environment for NGOs and NGO participation in government policy making, the KSM and Good Friends had consistently urged for an increase in government financial support for humanitarian NGOs and civil participation in government aid policy making towards North Korea based on the ‘Law on Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund’ and ‘Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act’ since 1998.121 On 8 March 2005 the Roh Moo-Hyun administration finally adopted the ‘Relaxation of Regulation on the NGO Qualification for North Korea Assistance,’ which resulted in an increase in the number of NGOs receiving government financial support.122 On 31 May 2005 the Roh Moo-Hyun administration also appointed three civilian personnel who were engaged in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea and the civil society movement to the members of the ‘National Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation’ which is the final decision making institution in relation to the provision of aid to North Korea.123
7.5 Changes in Government Food Aid Policy

This section demonstrates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy was consequential in explaining changes in the amount of South Korea’s food aid to North Korea. KSM and Good Friends advocacy contributed to government establishment of a legal framework that could provide for more consistent and large scale food aid to North Korea. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration finally delivered the largest and consistent amount of food aid to North Korea.

This section demonstrates that in the early stage of KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996, the KSM and Good Friends’ influence on the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid policy making was not significant. In this period, the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid decision-making structure was a highly non-democratic one which had been driven by political interests. In addition, KSM and Good Friends’ organisational capacities were not strong enough to change the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid policy making. In 1997, then, the Kim Young-Sam administration made three consecutive decisions about food aid to North Korea. The direct trigger of these decisions was the recovered inter-Korean relations. In addition to this direct trigger, the Kim Young-Sam administration was not able to ignore KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea that developed into a nationwide movement in 1997.

During the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002, KSM and Good Friends advocacy contributed to the resumption of food aid to North Korea and finally paved the way for the institutionalisation of the large scale of food aid to North Korea. While the Kim Dae-Jung administration maintained a favourable policy towards NGOs
in 1998 and 1999, the KSM and Good Friends gradually improved their organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. Despite such organisational development in 1998 and 1999, however, the KSM and Good Friends were not able to overcome the severe political and military confrontations between both Koreas, and therefore the amount of government food aid to North Korea in this period proved to be only 40,000 tonnes. In 2000, then, the Inter-Korean Summit that made sure of the incoming political rapprochement in the Korean peninsula was a decisive factor that finally enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to pledge 500,000 tonnes of rice aid to North Korea on loan terms from 2000 onwards. The role of the KSM and Good Friends in the resumption of large-scale food aid to North Korea was to consistently promote the advocacy of food aid to North Korea based on strong humanitarian mandates and improved funding and organisational expertise in advocacy. Such advocacy finally contributed to the establishment of a favourable operational environment in which the Kim Dae-Jung administration was able to accomplish the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000.

This section lastly demonstrates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy contributed to government establishment of a legal framework that could provide for more consistent and large scale food aid to North Korea. The Roh Moo-Hyun institutionalised the provision of food aid to North Korea, irrespective of varies of inter-Korean relations. Based on this institutionalised mechanism, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration sought to commit to the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea throughout its administration. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration delivered an average of 400,000-500,000 tonnes of food aid annually to North Korea in fact. The breakdown in inter-Korean relations in 2005 and 2006 however made it difficult for the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to continue providing food aid to North Korea. While the Roh
Moo-Hyun administration suspended food aid to North Korea in 2005 and 2006, the KSM and Good Friends played a decisive role in making the Roh Moo-Hyun administration resume the food aid to North Korea. In 2005, as a result, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration resumed its food aid to North Korea. In 2006, however, the KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea did not overcome the aftermath of the North Korean nuclear test. After KSM and Good Friends’ vigorous advocacy of food aid for flood victims in North Korea in 2006, instead, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration resumed 100,000 tonnes of food aid for flood victims.

7.5.1 Changes in the Kim Young-Sam Administration’s Food Aid Policy

In the early stage of KSM and Good Friends advocacy when the KSM and Good Friends were driven by a strong mandate but did not develop their expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996, KSM and Good Friends influence on the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid policy making was not significant. In 1995, the KSM and Good Friends organisational capacity was not strong enough to overcome the hostile inter-Korean relations and the Kim Young-Sam administration’s non-democratic decision making. On 11 June 1996, then, the active advocacy of the Inter-Religious Committee, the predecessor of the KSM, and other humanitarian NGOs pressed the Kim Young-Sam administration to pledge $3 million’s worth of food aid to North Korea, but the military provocation of North Korea again acted as an obstacle to the Kim Young-Sam administration’s direct food aid to North Korea. In 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration resumed the food aid to
North Korea by delivering relatively large scale of food aid through the three consecutive decisions on food aid to North Korea. The direct trigger of these decisions was the recovered inter-Korean relations. In addition to this direct trigger, the KSM and Good Friends improved their organisational expertise in advocacy movement through the past three years of activities and therefore were successful in the organising a nationwide movement in 1997. While South Korean civil society and NGOs were vigorously demanding the provision of food aid to North Korea in 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration was not able to ignore such demands.

After 1995, the Kim Young-Sam administration maintained a practical approach to food aid to North Korea, linking food aid to North Korea to political issues. Given this operational environment, the rice-aid decision in 1995 was made by a few high-ranking politicians and the Blue House irrespective of an official standard operational procedure – institutions, legislation and procedure – for government decision making in relation to North Korea. Ji-Sun Hong, Chief of the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), received a direct order from the Blue House and met the officials from the North Korean government to discuss food aid in China on 6 June. Hong and the North Korean government agreed to hold the inter-Korean talks in order to discuss rice aid. Finally, the ‘Beijing Rice Talks’ for the discussion of rice aid was held in Beijing from 17 to 21June.

On 23 August 1995, the Kim Young-Sam administration prepared another plan to provide additional aid worth $2 million to North Korea through the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC). This plan was made for two underlying reasons. The Kim Young-Sam administration first was sensitive to the normative leverage of being a leading state in the international community in their
efforts to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. In this sense, the Kim Young-Sam administration pledged this additional food aid to North Korea, proclaiming the importance of the collaboration with the international community.\textsuperscript{129} Secondly, the Kim Young-Sam administration perceived that the provision of food aid to North Korea would contribute to improving their bargaining power at the Four-Party Talks, by increasing the leverage of engagement of the South Korean government.\textsuperscript{130} The ruling party which maintained a conservative view on food aid to North Korea in the aftermath of the first rice aid in June 1995, however, put a break on the scale of the government aid plan. The ruling party insisted on conditional aid requiring an official request by North Korea and it decreased the aid from $2 million to $50,000.\textsuperscript{131} The pledge of $2 million of aid through the IFRC eventually died out in 1995.

After the withdrawal of the $2 million pledge in 1995, the Kim Young-Sam administration established its basic policy of food aid to North Korea, which was based on a practical approach linking food aid to political issues. On 27 September 1995, the Kim Young-Sam administration attended the Rice Aid Talks in Beijing and presented three principles required for government food aid. This principle included an official request for aid by the North Korean authorities, holding the related inter-Korean talks within the Korean peninsula and the release of the abducted crew of the Woosung.\textsuperscript{132} North Korea, however, did not accept these principles, and thereby additional food aid at the inter-government level in 1995 was not made.

On 11 June 1996, the Kim Young-Sam administration pledged $3 million’s worth of food aid through the WFP and UNICEF. As Unification Minister Kwon stated “The government, as a member state of the U.N., decided to provide $3 million of food aid through the U.N. agencies”\textsuperscript{133} at the press conference, the normative leverage
saving its face in the international community was a major underlying trigger behind the $3 million of aid in June. This pledge, however, was also influenced by the advocacy of food aid to North Korea by the KSM and Good Friends. As Unification Minister Kwon testifies, $3 million’s worth of food aid was made to appease the increasing demands of humanitarian NGOs that urged the Kim Young-Sam administration to resume the food aid to North Korea.\(^{134}\) After this decision was made in June 1996, North Korea’s military actions, the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in September 1996, made the Kim Young-Sam administration suspend all type of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation including the humanitarian aid to North Korea.

On 29 December 1996, North Korea’s official apology became a direct trigger which enabled the Kim Young-Sam administration to resume the food aid to North Korea. After North Korea’s apology, the Kim Young-Sam administration revealed its plan to provide 9,852 tonnes of food aid through the WFP on 20 February.\(^{135}\) On 20 June the Kim Young-Sam administration decided to provide more large-scale food aid, a total of 50,300 tonnes – 50,000 tonnes of maize and 300 tonnes of dried milk – through the WFP.\(^{136}\) The direct trigger of these decisions was the recovered inter-Korean relations. On 29 May, South Korea, the U.S. and North Korea resumed discussion on the Four-Party Talks which was followed by a second meeting on 18 June. This took place after the meeting between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan concerning North Korea policy coordination on 9 June. During this process the U.S. government proposed the Kim Young-Sam administration provide additional food aid to North Korea to entice North Korea into the Four-Party Talks.\(^{137}\) The Kim Young-Sam administration accordingly decided to provide 50,300 tonnes of food aid through the WFP on 20 June. After this decision, South Korea, the U.S. and North Korea agreed to hold the
Preliminary Talks on 5 August, and finally the first Four-Party Talks were held in Geneva on 9 December 1997.

In the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid decisions in 1997, it was not able to ignore the public and NGO demands on food aid to North Korea which developed into a nationwide movement in 1997. Throughout 1997, the KSM and Good Friends extended their most active advocacy movement urging the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to resume food aid to North Korea in 1997. As the public opinion poll on 30 April 1997 showed that 79.1 per cent of the respondents were in favour of food aid to North Korea, the KSM and Good Friends contributed to mitigating the hostility towards North Korea by improving public awareness about the severity of the food crisis in North Korea and appealing to brotherly love and humanitarianism. Given the favourable public opinion on the provision of food aid to North Korea in 1997, the issue of the food aid to North Korea was a major issue for the Kim Young-Sam administration in 1997. Although the Kim Young-Sam administration made the provision of food aid to North Korea conditional on inter-Korean politics, the Kim Young-Sam administration was not able to ignore the demands from the humanitarian NGOs and civil society particularly in this year of 1997. It was an important period in terms of canvassing public opinion in view of the presidential election which was held later in that year.

The influence of the advocacy by the KSM and Good Friends was more definite in the decision made in August 1997. On 23 August the Kim Young-Sam administration pledged another 8,398 tonnes of corn-soya blend and 781 tonnes of dried milk through the WFP. The background to this decision can be narrowed down into two factors. Firstly, given the absence of political issues in August 1997, such as the Four-Party
Talks and North Korea’s appeal for food aid, public opinion demanding food aid to North Korea was a direct trigger for an additional pledge in August. Jong-Yeol Lee, the Chief of the Humanitarian Support Bureau within the Ministry of Unification, stated at a press interview on the additional pledge that “[the additional aid] is in accordance with the government policy of providing humanitarian aid to the North Korean compatriots from brotherly love and humanitarianism.”  At that time, the KSM and Good Friends organised a nationwide movement urging the Kim Young-Sam administration to take further action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea through the ‘One Million Signatures for Helping the North Korean Compatriots’ from 5 July to 15 August. As public opinion on the food aid to North Korea developed into a nationwide movement in an explosive manner, the Kim Young-Sam administration pledged this additional food aid to North Korea.  

7.5.2 Changes in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Food Aid Policy

During the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002, KSM and Good Friends advocacy contributed to the resumption of food aid to North Korea and finally paved the way for the institutionalisation of the large scale of food aid to North Korea. While the Kim Dae-Jung administration maintained a favourable policy towards NGOs in 1998 and 1999, the KSM and Good Friends gradually improved their organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. Despite such organisational development in 1998 and 1999, however, the KSM and Good Friends were not able to overcome the severe political and military confrontations between both Koreas, and
therefore the amount of government food aid to North Korea in this period proved to be only 40,000 tonnes. The Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 which made sure of the incoming political rapprochement in the Korean peninsula was a decisive factor which enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to pledge 500,000 tonnes of rice aid to North Korea from 2000 onwards. The role of the KSM and Good Friends in the resumption of large-scale food aid to North Korea was to consistently promote the advocacy of food aid to North Korea based on strong humanitarian mandates and improved funding and organisational expertise in advocacy. Such advocacy finally contributed to the establishment of a favourable operational environment in which the Kim Dae-Jung administration was able to accomplish the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000.

Right after the inauguration of President Kim in 1998, more specifically, the Kim Dae-Jung administration pledged 40,000 tonnes, which was distributed through the WFP. The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s quick decision was possible as President Kim had overtly supported the demand of the provision of food aid to North Korea from humanitarian NGOs, from the time when he was the President of the NCNP during the Kim Young-Sam administration. After winning the presidential election, President Kim maintained a close relationship with the humanitarian NGOs and expressed his positive stance on the provision of food aid to North Korea through his inaugural speech on 25 February, stating “[I will be] flexible in the provision of humanitarian aid to North Korea for the relief of the food crisis in North Korea,” and then pledged 40,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea in March 1998.

Despite the severe food deficits in North Korea and the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s positive stance on the provision of food aid to North Korea between 1998 and 1999, however, the amount of food aid in 1998 was just 40,000 tonnes and no
food aid was made in 1999.144 The reason that such a small amount of food aid in 1998 and 1999 was made despite the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s positive discursive position on the provision of food aid to North Korea was attributable to the weakening of KSM and Good Friends advocacy and the political confrontation between both Koreas.

As the Kim Dae-Jung administration overtly expressed its positive stance on the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea in 1998 and 1999, the KSM and Good Friends expected that the Kim Dae-Jung administration would soon provide large-scale food aid to North Korea.145 Given this prospect, the KSM began to convert its main mandate from the advocacy of food aid to direct delivery of humanitarian and development aid to North Korea.146 Good Friends also changed the priority of its movement to the issue of North Korean human rights and refugees.147 During this period between 1998 and 1999, therefore, KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea still continued, but the scale of advocacy gradually diminished.

Meanwhile, the Kim Dae-Jung administration adhered to the principle of strict reciprocity in the provision of food aid to North Korea during this period. Although the Kim Dae-Jung administration adopted the engagement policy, which emphasised peace building in the Korean peninsula through inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, as the main policy towards North Korea, there was still severe political confrontation and mistrust between both Koreas which had been ongoing since the Korean War in 1950.148 In addition, North Korea’s military action, such as the West Sea Battle in June 1999, made it difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung administration, to execute its aid policy, which included the issue of food aid in the government main agenda, by rupturing the inter-Korean talks which were expected to discuss the issue of food aid.149 To make North
Korea terminate its military actions and respond to the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy, therefore, the Kim Dae-Jung administration made the provision of food aid conditional on favourable behaviour from North Korea and the holding of inter-Korean talks, adhering to the principle of reciprocity.\(^{150}\)

The Inter-Korean Summit which made sure of incoming political rapprochement in the Korean peninsula was a decisive factor which enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to pledge 500,000 tonnes of rice aid to North Korea. The influence of KSM and Good Friends advocacy in this decision was identified in two aspects: the establishment of a favourable operational environment for the Inter-Korean Summit and active participation in the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s aid policy making.

In the early years of the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 until the Inter-Korean Summit, the KSM and Good Friends exploited information politics disseminating ongoing information on the desperate situation in North Korea in order to improve public awareness about the severity of the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. As shown in the section on norm grafting in this chapter, such efforts contributed to an increase in public support for the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy as well as support for the provision of food aid to North Korea, replacing the hostility towards North Korea with the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism. The increase in private level inter-Korean exchange and cooperation by humanitarian NGOs prevented inter-Korean relations from developing into the breakdown of inter-Korean communication in the situation of political and military confrontation.\(^{151}\) Based on support from the South Korean civil society for the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy, the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998 and 1999 was able to maintain its engagement policy in the midst of the rupture of inter-
Korean relations. In 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration was finally able to visit North Korea for the Inter-Korean Summit. The political rapprochement between both Koreas enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to resume large-scale food aid to North Korea in 2000. In this sense, Jae-Gyu Park, the Unification Minister in 2000, attributed the accomplishment of the Inter-Korean Summit to the efforts of the humanitarian NGOs through his statement at the NGO Council meeting on 6 October in 2000.152

The demands of the KSM and Good Friends which was delivered to government aid policy makers through the government consultation of the humanitarian NGOs were incorporated into the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s food aid decision in 2000. After the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, the 2nd Ministerial Talk which discussed the issue of food aid was held on 29 August 2000.153 Before North Korea’s appeal for food aid at the 2nd Ministerial Talk, the South Korean government already knew that the issue of food aid would be raised at the 2nd Ministerial Talk, through consultation with humanitarian NGOs.154 The chiefs and directors of the Humanitarian Support Bureau of the Ministry of Unification, who were responsible for the humanitarian aid to North Korea, already perceived the importance of food aid issue through consultation with NGO personnel in the meetings of the NGO Council.155 NGO personnel, who were appointed as advisors to the government consultative bodies, delivered their opinions on the urgent need of large-scale food aid to North Korea to the government policy makers. As the result of these consultations with the humanitarian NGOs, the Kim Dae-Jung administration came to make the internal decision on the provision of around 600,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea before the 2nd Ministerial Talk.156

The worsened international environment after the 9.11 Terror in 2001
temporarily made it difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to pledge food aid to North Korea in 2001. With the pledge of 500,000 tonnes of food aid in 2002, however, KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea finally entered into the stage of ‘rule-consistent behaviour’ which the South Korean government sought to ‘consistently’ commit themselves to in their policy of food aid to North Korea. Since the 9.11 Terror in the United States, the Kim Dae-Jung administration maintained a military alert. At the 6th Ministerial Talk on 9 November North Korea denounced the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s military alert, and the Ministerial Talk which was expected to discuss the provision of food aid broke down.\textsuperscript{157} The provision of government food aid in 2001 therefore ended up with the provision of only 100,000 tonnes of maize through the WFP, which was pledged in 2000 but could not be committed due to severe criticism from the opposition party and conservative media.

In 2002, the Kim Dae-Jung administration resumed food aid to North Korea and the decision on food aid was made through the same procedures and institutions in which the pledge of aid in 2000 was made. After 2002, the South Korean government continued to provide around 500,000 tonnes of food aid yearly throughout the Roh Moo-Hyun administration except for 2006. This continuous food aid to North Korea indicates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea entered into the stage of ‘rule-consistent behaviour’ which the South Korean government sought to ‘consistently’ commit themselves to in their policy of food aid to North Korea, irrespective of NGO pressure.

The institutionalised aid policy-making process in 2002 was as follow. At the internal preparatory meetings before the Special Envoy Meetings which were the very first procedure in the government food-aid decision, the government canvassed public
opinion on the provision of food aid to North Korea through public opinion polls and consultation with the humanitarian NGOs. At this stage humanitarian NGOs which consistently urged for large-scale government food aid to North Korea exploited government consultative bodies, such as the UAM, the Korean Council, the NUAC and the Policy Advisory Committee of the Humanitarian Support Bureau within the Ministry of Unification. The NGO personnel who were appointed to the membership of these consultative bodies pressurised the government food aid decision makers within the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide large-scale food aid to North Korea. Such consultation with civil society and the humanitarian NGOs at the early stage of government aid policy making finally influenced the establishment of provisional plans for food aid, 500,000 tonnes in 2000 and 300,000 tonnes in 2002, at the preparatory meetings before the Special Envoy Meetings. In this sense, Lim the Special Envoy to North Korea in 2000 and 2002 stated that the amount of aid cannot be decided without public consensus. After the establishment of the provisional plans for food aid to North Korea, the authority to execute them was entirely the government decision makers’, the Special Envoys’ or the Unification Ministers’.

7.5.3 Changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration’s Food Aid Policy

During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, KSM and Good Friends advocacy contributed to government establishment of a legal framework that could provide for more consistent and large scale food aid to North Korea. The Roh Moo-Hyun sought to institutionalise the provision of food aid to North Korea, irrespective of varies of inter-
Korean relations. Based on this institutionalised mechanism, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration committed to the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea throughout its administration. In fact, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration delivered an average of 400,000-500,000 tonnes of food aid annually to North Korea throughout its period. The breakdown in inter-Korean relations in 2005 and 2006, however, made the Roh Moo-Hyun administration suspend food aid to North Korea. Given the suspension of government food aid in 2005 and 2006, the KSM and Good Friends already had the highest level of organisational expertise in respect of the impact of advocacy movement. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM and Good Friends maintained multiple channels that allowed them to get access to the key food aid decision makers in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and that allowed them to establish the strong and systemic issue networks for an efficient advocacy movement pressurising the civil society. The KSM and Good Friends consequently played a decisive role in making government resume the food aid to North Korea. In 2005, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration resumed 500,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea. After the North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006, however, the KSM and Good Friends were not able to organise the advocacy of food aid to North Korea due to the negative public opinion on the North Korea’s nuclear test. Given the devastated operational environment, the KSM and Good Friends unfolded the movement for food aid to flood victims in North Korea. After KSM and Good Friends’ vigorous advocacy of food aid for flood victims in North Korea in 2006, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration resumed 100,000 tonnes of food aid for flood victims.

Between 2003 and 2007 the South Korean government delivered a total of 2,044,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea, which was the largest amount given
exceeding by 173,000 tonnes the amount that was delivered from the United States during the same period. With regard to the type of delivery and the continuity, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration consistently delivered 400,000 tonnes of bilateral food aid on loan terms in each of the years 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007. In 2003 the Roh Moo-Hyun administration delivered 400,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea, and 100,000 tonnes of food aid was distributed to North Korea through the WFP channel. In 2004, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration shipped 400,000 tonnes of food aid on loan terms and pledged 100,000 tonnes through the WFP. After North Korea’s decision to withdraw from the U.N. Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) in late 2004, however, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration converted 100,000 tonnes of food aid which was due to be distributed to North Korea through the WFP in 2005 to bilateral aid. The total amount of bilateral aid in 2005 therefore became 500,000 tonnes. In 2006, food aid through the multilateral agencies such as the WFP, UNICEF and UNDP was not made. The large-scale food aid on loan terms which had been consistently delivered since 2002 was not made. In 2006, instead, 100,000 tonnes of food aid for flood victims was made. In 2007, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration resumed 400,000 tonnes of food aid on loan terms and 44,000 tonnes through the multilateral channel. After the Inter-Korean Summit, the Roh administration pledged another 50,000 tonnes of maize aid to North Korea, but this pledge was not realised. Such consistent food aid to North Korea from the Roh Moo-Hyun administration finally ranked the South Korean government as the largest food aid donor between 1995 and 2007. The South Korean government delivered 3,406,934 tonnes of food aid to North Korea, which was 1,320,240 tonnes more than the 2,086,694 tonnes from the second largest donor, the United States. Among the total amount of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007, 59.95 per
cent was made by the Roh Moo-Hyun administration.

The consistent food aid to North Korea was attributable to the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s positive stance on the provision of food aid to North Korea. It had a positive stance on food aid to North Korea and finally institutionalised this stance into government policies and the inter-Korean agreement. In 2003 President Roh Moo-Hyun proclaimed the ‘Peace and Prosperity Policy’ which succeeded the engagement policy. To assure the continuity of the engagement policy in 2003, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration reappointed Se-Hyeon Jeong, the last Unification Minister in the Kim Dae-Jung administration, to the first Unification Minister of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. Jeong who was one of key policy makers in the pursuit of the engagement policy towards North Korea in the Kim Dae-Jung administration transplanted the engagement policy into the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. In the same vein, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration succeeded Kim Dae-Jung administration’s positive stance on large-scale food aid to North Korea and exploited Kim Dae-Jung administration’s procedures and institutions for aid decision making without any radical changes. 165 The Roh Moo-Hyun administration also eased the application of the principle of reciprocity in the provision of food aid to North Korea. 166 Given this operational environment, the 100,000 tonnes of food aid through the WFP was made without any serious political consideration in April right after President Roh Moo-Hyun’s inauguration in February 2003. 167 In May 2003 the Roh Moo-Hyun administration agreed on 400,000 tonnes of bilateral food aid to North Korea.

The political rapprochement between both Koreas shaped the favourable operational environment for the decision making of large-scale food aid in 2003, 2004 and 2007. On 27 April 2003 both Koreas made an agreement on the inter-Korean road
and railway connection, the Gaesung Industrial Park and the Kumgang Mountain Tourist Project at the 10th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk. In this favourable environment, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration was able to make a tentative pledge on the provision of food and fertiliser aid, by including the sentence of ‘[Both Koreas] cooperate to solve the humanitarian issues based on brotherly love’ in the meeting agreement of the 10th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk.\textsuperscript{168} Such a favourable operational environment continued in 2004. At the 14th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk in May 2004 North Korea agreed to hold the Inter-Korean Military Talk which had been consistently requested by the South Korean government.\textsuperscript{169} Both Koreas also agreed to collaborate with each other in the issues raised by each counterpart.\textsuperscript{170} After this agreement, the 9th Committee on Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation was held to discuss the provision of food aid and other inter-Korean exchange and cooperation issues and finally the decision of 400,000 tonnes of rice aid was made.\textsuperscript{171} On 9 October 2006, North Korea’s nuclear test resulted in the suspension of this bilateral food aid. With the adoption of the ‘2.13 Agreement’ that agreed the freeze of North Korea’s nuclear facilities and compensation for the freeze in February 2007, both Koreas held the 20th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk from 27 February to 2 March.\textsuperscript{172} This talk made an agreement on the separated families, the holding of the 13th Committee on Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation and the next Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk. Given this favourable environment, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration made a provisional agreement to resume large-scale food aid on loan terms.\textsuperscript{173} The Committee on Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation in April finally agreed to provide 400,000 tonnes of rice aid.\textsuperscript{174} 

In 2005 and 2006, the rupture of inter-Korean relations resulted in the suspension of the inter-Korean talks for the discussion of food aid to North Korea. KSM
and Good Friends advocacy provided the momentum to make a favourable operational environment which enabled the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to resume its bilateral food aid to North Korea in 2005, emergency food aid for flood victims in 2006 and bilateral aid on loan terms in 2007. Despite the political rapprochement in the inter-Korean relations in 2005, the Bush administration’s hostile policy towards North Korea which had continued since the 9.11 Terror in 2001 resulted in North Korea’s strong response. On 19 April 2005 North Korea revealed that they would reprocess a spent fuel rod to develop nuclear weapons. North Korea’s declaration prevented the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk for the discussion of bilateral food aid to North Korea being held. Given this worsened operational environment, the 6.15 Committee, to which the KSM and Good Friends were affiliated, played a decisive role enabling the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to resume its large-scale bilateral food aid. The 6.15 Committee held the event of the ‘Grand Celebration for 6.15 Unification’ in Pyongyang from 14 to 17 June 2005. The committee included Dong-Young Jeong, the Unification Minister, in the membership of the exchange which visited Pyongyang for the event. During the event in Pyongyang, Unification Minister Jeong met Kim Jeong-Il as the Special Envoy to North Korea. This envoy meeting finally contributed to the recovery of inter-Korean relations that had deteriorated after the nuclear issue. After the Special Envoy Meeting, the 15th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk was held on 23 June and the Roh Moo-Hyun administration came to resume the provision of 500,000 tonnes of rice aid to North Korea in 2005. In this regard, the key decision makers such as Unification Minister Jeong and Vice-minister Bong-Jo Rhee who engaged in the recovery of inter-Korean relations and the resumption of bilateral food aid to North Korea appreciated the efforts of humanitarian and unification NGOs which contributed to the situation,
maintaining momentum and preventing inter-Korean relations from evolving into an irreversible position.179

In 2006, many government officials in the Ministry of Unification, such as Gyoung-Bin Ko, the former Director of the Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, and Chang-Seok Yang, the Director General of the Inter-Korean Transit Office, evaluated the provision of 100,000 tonnes of food aid for flood victims in North Korea as a representative case where humanitarian NGO advocacy had changed a government decision.180 After North Korea’s missile test on 6 July 2006, the sense of betrayal towards North Korea increased in South Korean civil society.181 The Roh Moo-Hyun administration eventually suspended the provision of bilateral food aid to North Korea. With this decision, humanitarian NGOs resumed their advocacy of food aid for flood victims. In their advocacy, humanitarian NGOs mainly exploited various institutions that were already institutionalised in government food aid policy making, such as the National Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation, the Unification Advisory Meeting and the Policy Advisory Committee of the Humanitarian Support Bureau of the Ministry of Unification. Humanitarian NGOs also exploited the Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy and the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea. The Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation and the 6.15 Committee also supported humanitarian NGO advocacy in late 2006.

Humanitarian NGOs, in particular Good Friends, appealed for flood relief in North Korea, disseminating ongoing information of flood damage in North Korea. In doing so, Good Friends and other humanitarian NGO sought to overcome the sense of betrayal in South Korean civil society which resulted from North Korea’s missile test. Such efforts by humanitarian NGOs were successful in changing government aid policy
towards North Korea. On 20 August 2006 the Roh Moo-Hyun administration finally made a decision to give 100,000 tonnes of food aid to the flood victims in North Korea.\textsuperscript{182} The Roh Moo-Hyun administration, however, did not resume its general bilateral food aid of 400,000 tonnes because of North Korea’s nuclear test on 9 October 2006.

7.6 Conclusion

Based on the examination of the operational environment and NGO advocacy of food aid to North Korea in the previous chapters, this chapter demonstrated that South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy was consequential in explaining changes in South Korea’s food aid policy making in respect of the norm grafting in civil society, state agenda setting, the formation of a discursive position and institutional and policy development. Humanitarian NGO advocacy finally contributed to government establishment of a legal framework that could provide for more consistent and large scale food aid to North Korea. However, the changes at different stages of the state’s food aid policy-making processes, as the outcome of humanitarian NGO advocacy of food aid to North Korea, were different. This chapter demonstrated that these differences were attributable to the differing abilities of NGO to set agendas, network and graft new norms and the changes at the operational environment in where humanitarian NGOs worked.

As this chapter has demonstrated, despite the fact that the advocacy movement was less organised at its inception in 1995 and 1996 due to a lack of organisational
expertise in the advocacy of food aid, a strong humanitarian mandate and brotherly love motivated the KSM and Good Friends. Such a strong mandate was consequential in explaining changes in norms in South Korean civil society and Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid policy making in respect of state agenda setting, the formation of a discursive position and institutional and policy development. During this period, the KSM and Good Friends appealed to brotherly love and humanitarianism and such agenda framing contributed to mitigating the predominant norm of hostility towards North Korea. In 1997, as the advocacy of food aid to North Korea prolonged, KSM and Good Friends advocacy began to ease the hostility towards North Korea that had been revived after the incident of the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in September 1996, replacing the norms of brotherly love and humanitarianism.

With regard to changes in the government’s agenda and discursive position, in 1995 and 1996 the KSM and Good Friends influence on the Kim Young-Sam administration was significant, but it did not lead to the clear changes in the Kim Young-Sam administration’s discursive position on food aid to North Korea. Firstly, the Kim Young-Sam administration maintained a negative view on the role of humanitarian NGOs in state food aid policy making process. Secondly, North Korea’s continued negative actions in 1995 and 1996 made it difficult for the Kim Young-Sam administration to maintain a positive position in relation to the provision of food aid to North Korea. Lastly, the low level of the organisational expertise of the KSM and Good Friends in respect of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996 was not able to overcome Kim Young-Sam administration’s negative view on humanitarian NGOs and North Korea’s negative actions. Under the recovered inter-Korean relations in 1997, nationwide advocacy by the KSM and Good Friends that improved their
organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea were finally able to incorporate the issue of food aid to North Korea into the agenda of the Kim Young-Sam administration.

This chapter also showed that despite KSM and Good Friends advocacy which pressed for government institutional change to allow private aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996, the Kim Young-Sam administration was passive towards the demands of the NGOs. During this period of 1995 and 1996, the KSM and Good Friends advocacy demanding the deregulation of government rules and acts circumscribing NGO activities in relation to advocacy of and aid to North Korea was not significant since the KSM and Good Friends focused on the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, rather than demanding deregulation. In addition, Kim Young-Sam administration’s passive attitude in relation to institutional change was attributable to its political structure which maintained a negative view on the role of humanitarian NGOs in state policy making. In 1997, however, the radical increase of private aid to North Korea and the consistent nationwide advocacy movement by the KSM and Good Friends finally induced the Kim Young Sam administration to improve government institutions and rules in relation to the provision of food aid to North Korea and the operational environment for NGO activity.

With regard to changes in the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid policy as the final stage and fundamental goal of NGO advocacy, in the beginning of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996, KSM and Good Friends influence on the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid policy making was not significant. In this period, the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid decision making was made through a non-democratic process which was driven by political
interests. KSM and Good Friends capacities to influence state food aid policy making in addition was not enough to overcome the non-democratic structure of the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid policy making. KSM and Good Friends advocacy in 1996 therefore ended up with achieving the outcome of influencing the Kim Young-Sam administration to pledge $3 million’s worth of food aid to North Korea. In 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration made three consecutive decisions about food aid to North Korea. The direct trigger of these decisions was the recovered inter-Korean relations. Given the favourable political environment, however, the KSM and Good Friends which were highly motivated by humanitarianism and brotherly love and which achieved organisational improvement through the prolonged advocacy movement since 1995 extended their most vigorous nationwide advocacy throughout 1997, and such activity made the Kim Young-Sam administration pledge additional food aid to North Korea.

During the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002, KSM and Good Friends advocacy achieved radical changes in the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s agenda setting, discursive position, institution, and policy in relation to the provision of food aid to North Korea. KSM and Good Friends advocacy replaced the hostility towards North Korea in 1998 and 1999 with the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism which supported the food aid to North Korea. During this period, the more significant contribution of KSM and Good Friends advocacy was the accomplishment of political rapprochement between both Koreas. KSM and Good Friends advocacy contributed to the establishment of sustainable ground which the Kim Dae-Jung administration was able to pursue in its engagement policy. The Kim Dae-Jung administration finally achieved political rapprochement through the Inter-Korean
Summit in 2000. The political rapprochement in turn provided momentum so that the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism, which the KSM and Good Friends had consistently advocated, became set in South Korean civil society.

As Kim Dae-Jung who maintained a favourable view on the role of NGOs in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea was elected as the 15th president, the KSM and Good Friends were easily able to incorporate the issue of food aid to North Korea into one of the key government agenda items. In fact, the Kim Dae-Jung administration consistently proclaimed the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea throughout the Kim Dae-Jung administration. Despite KSM and Good Friends advocacy that consistently urged for ‘unconditional’ aid to North Korea, however, the Kim Dae-Jung administration adhered to the principle of strict reciprocity linking food aid to North Korea with inter-Korean issues. It was because of the political confrontation between both Koreas and the criticism from the conservative party that made it difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide unconditional aid to North Korea. From 2000 onwards, the thing that made it possible to ease the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s application of strict reciprocity policy was the political rapprochement after the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000. Given the political rapprochement, the Kim Dae-Jung administration was more susceptible to the demand of humanitarian NGOs urging for unconditioned aid to North Korea.

With regard to changes in government institutions, KSM and Good Friends advocacy promoted the improvement of government institution in relation to state food aid policy making and the operational environment for NGO activities. President Kim who perceived humanitarian NGOs as an importance counterpart in the maintenance of inter-Korean relations undertook institutional changes promoting civil participation in
government food aid policy making. The Kim Dae-Jung administration also took various measures to improve the operational environment for NGO activity in respect of the delivery of aid to North Korea, fundraising and public campaigns. Given the political rapprochement in 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration took the first step for the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea for which the KSM and Good Friends had consistently urged. In 2001, the worsened inter-Korean relations temporarily interrupted the discussion of food aid through these procedures and institutions. The establishment of government aid policy making procedures and institutions in the Kim Dae-Jung administration, however, indicates that KSM and Good Friends’ organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea reached at the level of which they successfully pressurise changes in government institutions in respect of food aid to North Korea. Such improvement indicates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy finally entered into the initial stage of rule-consistent behaviour in which a state seeks to commit itself to their policy by establishing relevant procedures and institutions irrespective of the existence of external monitoring or pressure.

The chapter also demonstrated that KSM and Good Friends advocacy promoted changes in the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s food aid policy. Between 1998 and 1999, the amount of government food aid to North Korea was only 40,000 tonnes. During this period, the Kim Dae-Jung administration maintained a positive discursive position supporting large-scale food aid to North Korea, but the Kim Dae-Jung administration also made food aid conditional on the inter-Korean talks. While the Kim Dae-Jung administration maintained a positive discursive position on the provision of food aid to North Korea between 1998 and 1999, the KSM and Good Friends began to diversify their organisational mandates. Such diversification of organisational mandates resulted
in the weakening of KSM and Good Friends advocacy. It thereby was not enough to overcome the political and military confrontations between both Koreas between 1998 and 1999. The Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 was then a decisive factor that enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to pledge 500,000 tonnes of rice aid to North Korea. With regard to the political rapprochement, KSM and Good Friends advocacy contributed to the establishment of a favourable operational environment that made it possible for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to maintain the engagement policy. Under the favourable operational environment with the inauguration of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998, the KSM and Good Friends continued its advocacy of food aid to North Korea and newly organised a peaceful unification movement targeting the South Korean civil society throughout 1998 and 1999. Under the institutional and financial support from the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998 and 1999, in addition, the KSM and Good Friends radically improved their organisational expertise, by widening and strengthening their networks with key state policy makers in the Kim Dae-Jung administration. The KSM and Good Friends’ organisational expertise improved enabled them to establish a favourable operational environment that made it possible for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to maintain the engagement policy. The engagement policy adhered to by the Kim Dae-Jung administration finally resulted in the Inter-Korean Summit successfully being held in 2000. Given the political rapprochement after the Inter-Korean Summit, the Kim Dae-Jung administration made the first pledge of 500,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea in 2000. The worsened international environment after the 9.11 Terror in 2001 temporarily made it difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to pledge food aid to North Korea. With the pledge of another 500,000 tonnes of food aid in 2002, however, KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food
aid to North Korea entered into the stage of ‘rule-consistent behaviour’ in which the South Korean government sought to commit itself to their policy of food aid to North Korea irrespective of NGO advocacy and pressure.

Lastly, this chapter demonstrated that during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration from 2003 to 2007 KSM and Good Friends advocacy finally reached the stage of rule-consistent behaviour in which the South Korean government sought to commit itself to their policy of pro food aid to North Korea. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism underpinning the provision of food aid to North Korea became dominant norms in South Korean civil society. The role of the KSM and Good Friends in norm grafting, however, was not significant compared to the previous two administrations of Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung. While the political rapprochement was a decisive factor that enabled these norms to be self-reliant, the KSM and Good Friends diverted their organisational capacities into the delivery of development aid to North Korea and the human rights movement. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, KSM and Good Friends influence on the norm grafting behind the civil society therefore was not significant.

With regard to changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s agenda and discursive position, it was solid throughout the administration. The incorporation of the food aid issue into the government agenda, positive agenda setting and a positive discursive position was certain even in the midst of unfavourable operational environments in 2004, 2005 and 2006. Firstly, the positive discursive position of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration was attributable to the political orientation of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration that consistently supported the provision of food aid to North
Korea. Secondly, the positive discursive position was attributable to the efforts of humanitarian NGOs that consistently urged for food aid although the scale of advocacy movement was not significant compared to the one in the Kim Dae-Jung administration. Humanitarian crises in North Korea in 2004 and 2006, lastly, made the humanitarian NGOs resume their advocacy of humanitarian aid to North Korea. The resumption of NGO advocacy in turn influenced the formation of public opinion which pressurised the Roh Moo-Hyun administration in the midst of an unfavourable operational environment to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in 2004, 2005 and 2006.

With regard to changes in government institutions, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration established institutions for stable food aid that were free from inter-Korean political and military issues. The establishment of these institutions was attributable to the political stance of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration that maintained a positive stance on the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea and NGO participation in government policy making and execution. Considering the fact that institutional changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration were the things for which the KSM and Good Friends consistently urged, however, the institutionalisation of stable and large-scale government food aid to North Korea, and NGO participation in government aid policy making in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration were also attributable to the efforts of KSM and Good Friends.

With regard to changes in state food aid policy towards North Korea, this chapter demonstrated that KSM and Good Friends advocacy reached the stage of rule-consistent behaviour in which the South Korean government provided large-scale food aid to North Korea on a consistent basis. The consistent food aid to North Korea was firstly attributable to the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s positive stance on the
provision of food aid to North Korea. Secondly, the political rapprochement between both Koreas shaped a favourable operational environment for the decision making of large-scale food aid to North Korea in the years of 2003, 2004 and 2007. The rupture of inter-Korean relations, however, still worked as a factor which made it difficult for the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to commit to their policy. The worsened operational environment resulted in the suspension of the inter-Korean talks for the discussion of government food aid to North Korea in 2005 and 2006. Given this operational environment, the KSM and Good Friends did not heavily engaged in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea since the KSM and Good Friends already diverted its organisational capacities into non-food aid issues, such as the delivery of development aid to North Korea and the human rights movement. The KSM and Good Friends however showed their improved organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, by establishing and exploiting effective channels that allowed them to exert direct influence on the Roh Moo-Hyun administrations’ food aid policy making process. KSM and Good Friends advocacy finally provided momentum that made the Roh Moo-Hyun administration resume its bilateral food aid.

Lastly, this chapter demonstrated that changes at various stages of the state’s food aid policy-making process were different. These differences were attributable to the differing abilities of the NGOs to set agendas, network and graft new norms. Organisational mandates, funding capacities and expertise were important in the constitution of the differing abilities of the NGOs.

Firstly, during the Kim Young-Sam administration the KSM and Good Friends were heavily engaged in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. While the funding capacity and organisational expertise of the KSM and Good Friends was not yet fully
developed, a strong mandate to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea propelled KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In addition, the KSM had a wide network that embraced differing social, religious and political groups and NGOs which enabled the KSM to organise a nationwide advocacy movement that pressurised the Kim Young-Sam administration. On the other hand, Good Friends, as a coalition body among the Buddhist circle, had exerted relatively limited influence on South Korean civil society as a whole in the Kim Young-Sam administration.

During the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002, both the KSM and Good Friends were dedicated to the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. The strategies that the KSM and Good Friends exploited, however, were different from each other. By exploiting its wide networks, the KSM entered into the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s food aid policy-making process, and thereby the KSM sought to exert direct influence on the state food aid decisions towards North Korea. On the other hand, during the Kim Dae-Jung administration Good Friends built up its expertise in the research of the North Korean food crisis and then devoted time to disseminating the research outcomes to South Korean civil society to increase public awareness of the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. Such efforts contributed to the formation of favourable public opinion on the provision of food aid to North Korea. This favourable public opinion led to the increase in public support for the engagement policy that was the momentum which enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to resume the large-scale food aid to North Korea in 2000.

Lastly, in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration KSM and Good Friends’ influence in changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s food aid policy making was different. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM maintained a high level of
organisational expertise in that the KSM institutionalised its participation in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s food aid policy-making process. After 2000, however, the KSM changed its mandate from the advocacy of food aid to North Korea to the delivery of development aid and increased its reliance on government funding. Such changes in their organisational mandate and funding structure resulted in the weakening of KSM advocacy when the Roh Moo-Hyun administration encountered the situation where it could not provide food aid to North Korea due to the rupture of inter-Korean relations. On the other hand, although Good Friends changed its organisational mandate from the advocacy of food aid to North Korea to the human rights movement after 2000, Good Friends consistently maintained its primary organisational mandate, by framing the provision of food aid as protecting North Korea’s human rights. With regard to funding capacity, Good Friends was able to maintain its independence from donors, particularly the South Korean government as a main funding source. Although the scale of funding was insignificant throughout the entire period from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends, as a Jungto Society-affiliated organisation, received its funding from individual members and the Jungto Society which is a Buddhist ascetic exercise organisation. Unlike the KSM and other humanitarian NGOs in the advocacy movement that were passive in criticising the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s suspension of food aid to North Korea, Good Friends promoted an active advocacy movement that urged the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to resume the large-scale food aid to North Korea irrespective of inter-Korean relations.


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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT FOOD AID POLICY MAKING TOWARDS NORTH KOREA FROM 1995 TO 2007

As the conclusion of the thesis, this chapter provides the argument of the thesis, the contribution and limitations of the thesis, and future research agendas. This chapter first gives a summary of the overall thesis, which includes research questions, hypotheses, methodology and the key proven argument of the thesis. The chapter next reviews the academic and practical contribution of the thesis. It then clarifies the limitations of the thesis and tackles criticisms on the key argument of the thesis. This chapter, lastly, provides future research agendas that need further investigation.

The Argument of the Thesis

Given the demonstrable food crisis in North Korea from 1995 to 2007, the amount of food aid delivery from the South Korean government severely fluctuated, and the pattern of fluctuation did not relate to changes in North Korea’s food need. With regard to the explanation of the fluctuations during this period, the dominant approach that adopted a realist analytical framework however has provided only a partial explanation, ignoring the role of South Korean humanitarian NGOs in state food aid policy making despite their significant political role in state food aid policy making. This thesis therefore sought to provide an alternative explanation of state food aid policy making,
filling a gap in the current dominant state- and interest group-centred approaches to food aid policy making. The thesis focused on the hitherto neglected issue of the impact of NGOs on state food aid policy making.

From the literature review, this thesis first identified the research problems inherent in the analyses of South Korean government food aid policy making between 1995 and 2007. These problems are why there was a discrepancy between the South Korean government’s policy pronouncements and their actual behaviour relating to food aid to North Korea; why the amount of food aid to North Korea fluctuated and finally reached the stage of consistent food aid delivery with large scale bilateral food aid to North Korea throughout most of the years between 2000 and 2007. To answer these two fundamental questions, this thesis questioned how and to what extent South Korean humanitarian NGOs have influenced their government food aid policy making on North Korea and why the extent of the influence from NGOs has differed between administrations.

To answer the research questions, this thesis developed three hypotheses as follows:

**Hypothesis I:** Organisational mandates, funding capacities and expertise were important in the constitution of each non-governmental organisation’s capacity to influence South Korean government food aid policy.

**Hypothesis II:** Differing non-governmental organisation capacities were consequential in explaining the capability of non-governmental organisation advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in
Hypothesis III: These differences in non-governmental organisation capacity shaped different outcomes at different stages of South Korea’s food aid policy-making. South Korea’s food aid policy processes are disaggregated according to the different stages of agenda setting, the formation of a discursive position, and institutional and policy development.

To demonstrate NGO influence on the state policy-making process, this thesis used a constructivist approach that includes non-state actor and normative factors in the analysis of state policy making. The thesis divided the NGO advocacy movement into the four stages of agenda framing, networking, grafting and institutionalisation in order to demonstrate the differing impacts of NGO advocacy on the state policy making-process. By analysing these differing stages, it demonstrated that organisational mandates, funding capacities and the expertise of NGOs were important in the constitution of each NGO’s capacity to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea. By analysing the causal relationship between the differing stages of state policy making and NGO advocacy, the thesis then demonstrated that NGO advocacy was consequential in explaining changes in South Korea’s food aid policy making. It also demonstrated that the differences in NGO capacity shaped different outcomes at different stages of South Korea’s food aid policy-making in respect of state agenda setting, the formation of a discursive position and institutional and policy development.

Finally, this thesis demonstrated that strong organisational mandates and
networks are the critical factors that enable NGOs to overcome the poor funding capacity and under-developed expertise they experience at the beginning of an advocacy movement. In 1995 and 1996, the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) and Good Friends had poor funding and an unstable organisational structure. During this period, however, the KSM and Good Friends were driven by a strong mandate to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. The KSM and Good Friends also had a wide network encompassing most of social groups. Such a strong mandate and wide networks enabled the KSM and Good Friends to incorporate the norms of brotherly love and humanitarianism that support the food aid to North Korea into the Kim Young-Sam administration’s agenda and to change discursive position. In 1997, a single mandate to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea still motivated the KSM and Good Friends to steer the advocacy of food aid to North Korea and led to a nationwide advocacy. Such advocacy contributed to incorporating the norms of brotherly love and humanitarianism into the dominant norms in South Korean civil society. KSM and Good Friends advocacy finally made the Kim Young-Sam administration resume food aid to North Korea although the amount of food aid was not significant. While the Kim Dae-Jung administration maintained a favourable stance on the large scale of food aid to North Korea in 1998 and 1999, however, the KSM and Good Friends, who had expected the pledge of large-scale food aid with the inauguration of President Kim Dae-Jung, began to diversify their organisational mandates towards other non-food aid issues. The diversification of their organisational mandate led to the weakening of KSM and Good Friends advocacy to pressurise the Kim Dae-Jung administration to resume food aid to North Korea. The amount of food aid to North Korea in this period therefore was smaller than that of the Kim Young-Sam administration from 1995 to 1997.
Secondly, it demonstrated that NGO funding capacity stabilised since 2000 and its organisational expertise accumulated through the prolonged advocacy movement since 1995 contributed to the maximisation of NGO influence on state food aid policy making process. Under the government financial support and the diversification of organisational mandates from 2000, the KSM and Good Friends gradually improved their funding arrangements. As the advocacy of food aid to North Korea prolonged since 1995, in addition, the KSM and Good Friends accumulated their expertise in advocacy movement. Between 2003 and 2007, the KSM and Good Friends thereby maintained the highest level of organisational expertise that enabled them to exert direct influence on government policy makers and institutions. During this period, KSM and Good Friends advocacy contributed to the institutionalisation of large-scale food aid to North Korea. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration delivered an average of 400,000 to 500,000 tonnes of food aid annually to North Korea, except for 2006. In 2007, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration finally institutionalised the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea by establishing ‘The 1st Basic Plan for Advancing Inter-Korean Relations’ and ‘2007 Inter-Korean Summit Statement.’ This plan and statement stipulated the provision of food aid to North Korea on a regular basis. These consistent food aid and the adoption of plan and statement indicates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy reached the stage of rule-consistent behaviour in which the South Korean government sought to commit itself to the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea irrespective of changes in the inter-Korean relations and external pressure, such as humanitarian NGO advocacy.

Thirdly, the thesis demonstrated that the high reliance on government funding resulted in the weakening of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration, KSM and Good Friends’ influence in changes in the state food aid policy making was different. After 2000, the KSM increased its reliance on government funding, by diversifying its mandate from the advocacy of food aid to North Korea to the delivery of development aid. This high reliance on government funding resulted in the weakening of KSM advocacy when the Roh Moo-Hyun administration encountered the situation where it could not provide food aid to North Korea due to the rupture of inter-Korean relations. On the other hand, although Good Friends changed its organisational mandate from the advocacy of food aid to North Korea to the human rights movement after 2000, Good Friends consistently maintained organisational independence from external pressure, particularly the South Korean government as a main funding entity. Although the scale of funding was insignificant throughout the entire period from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends, as a Jungto Society-affiliated organisation, received its funding from individual members and the Jungto Society, which is a Buddhist ascetic exercise organisation. Unlike the KSM and other humanitarian NGOs in the advocacy movement that were passive in criticising the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s suspension of food aid to North Korea, Good Friends were able to promote an active advocacy movement that urged the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to resume the large-scale food aid to North Korea irrespective of inter-Korean relations.

Drawing on the literature review and a constructivist approach, this thesis was based upon an assumption that the issue characteristics of the North Korean food crisis and the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making changed over time, shaping the differing operational environment in which South Korean humanitarian NGOs worked.
This thesis firstly demonstrated that the outbreak of the food crisis in North Korea itself did not lead to the provision of food aid, but it was an important factor that increased government susceptibility to NGO advocacy. Despite the worst food crisis in North Korea from 1995 to 1999, in fact, the amount of food aid from the Kim Young-Sam administration (1995-1997) and the Kim Dae-Jung administration (1998-1999) was insignificant. During this period, the humanitarian crisis of food shortages in North Korea gave the momentum that South Korean humanitarian NGOs needed to promote the most vigorous nationwide advocacy movement. The nationwide advocacy finally contributed to the increase of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 1999. In this period, the South Korean government recognised the necessity of food aid to North Korea, but the actual delivery of food aid to North Korea was not significant. The amount of food aid to North Korea instead radically increased between 2000 and 2007 when the severity of the North Korean food crisis was relieved compared to the severity between 1995 and 1999. It indicates that the incident itself was not a factor that led to the pledge of food aid by donors, but was a necessary factor that ignited NGO advocacy and increased government susceptibility to NGO advocacy.

Secondly, this thesis demonstrated that the domestic political structure in respect of government-NGO relationship and donor-recipient relations played as a factor that circumscribes NGO influence on state policy making process. A strong mandate and wide networks in 1996 and 1997 enabled the KSM and Good Friends to incorporate the norms of brotherly love and humanitarianism into the Kim Young-Sam administration’s agenda and to change discursive position. During this period, however, changes in the Kim Young-Sam’s administration’s agenda setting and discursive position did not lead to institutional changes and the pledge of food aid to North Korea. Given the hostile
inter-Korean relations in 1995 and 1996, KSM and Good Friends advocacy were not
enough to overcome such hostile inter-Korean relations. During this period, the Kim
Young-Sam administration also maintained a non-democratic political structure in
respect of state food aid policy making, by excluding non-state actors in state policy
making process. The provision of food aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996 therefore
was not made. During the first two years of the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998
to 1999, in addition, KSM and Good Friends advocacy was successful in incorporating
the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism into government
agenda and discursive position. In this period, however, the amount of food aid to North
Korea was not significant. While the Kim Dae-Jung administration still made food aid
conditional on inter-Korean political and military issues, North Korea continued to
perpetrate negative military actions, criticising the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s
engagement policy. Although the Kim Dae-Jung administration officially pledged the
provision of food aid to North Korea, the hostile inter-Korean relations made it difficult
for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to deliver food aid to North Korea in 1998 and
1999.

As shown above, the domestic political structure in respect of donor-recipient
relations and a government-NGO relationship circumscribed NGO influence on state
policy making. On the other hand, NGOs advocacy changed the domestic political
structure of South Korean government and thereby contributed to the resumption of
government food aid to North Korea. Throughout 1997 when the presidential election
was held, the KSM and Good Friends unfolded a nationwide advocacy of food aid to
North Korea. KSM and Good Friends’ nationwide advocacy formed a favourable
operational environment for presidential candidate Kim Dae-Jung who consistently
proclaimed the necessity for large scale food aid to North Korea. In 2000, the Inter-Korean Summit, which signified the political rapprochement, provided momentum that enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to resume food aid to North Korea. The role of the KSM and Good Friends in the achievement of political rapprochement and the resumption of food aid to North Korea was founded in two different aspects. Humanitarian NGOs including the KSM and Good Friends first consistently proselytised the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide food aid to North Korea. Such advocacy was successful in incorporating the issue of large-scale food aid to North Korea into the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s key agenda. Humanitarian NGO advocacy secondly contributed to the increase of public support for the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy. The increase of public support for the engagement policy enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to maintain its policy in the midst of North Korea’s negative actions that jeopardised the beginning of the engagement policy between 1998 and 1999. The political rapprochement after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 finally enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to resume large-scale food aid to North Korea.

NGOs advocacy also contributed to the establishment of a favourable government-NGO relationship and donor-recipient relations. As President Roh Moo-Hyun revealed at the NGO New Year’s Greeting in 2003, a civil movement which the KSM, Good Friends and other rational-centrist organisations unfolded at the nationwide level in the late 2002 contributed to the favourable environment for the winning of Roh Moo-Hyun administration at the presidential election in 2002. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration therefore maintained a cooperative relationship with NGOs and was receptive to the demands of humanitarian NGOs throughout its administration. NGOs
advocacy also contributed to the establishment of favourable donor-recipient relations, by promoting the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s inter-Korean relations. Throughout the Roh Moo-Hyun administration from 2003 to 2007, South Korean government sought to commit itself to the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea. The rupture of inter-Korean relations however made it difficult for the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to commit them to provide food aid to North Korea. Given the suspension of government food aid in 2005 and 2006, the KSM and Good Friends played a decisive role in making the Roh Moo-Hyun administration resume food aid to North Korea. After the rupture of the Inter-Korean Talks in 2005, the KSM and Good Friends with other government-NGO consultative bodies provided momentum that enabled the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and North Korea to resume the Inter-Korean Talks for food aid. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration finally resumed food aid to North Korea in 2005. In 2006 when the Roh Moo-Hyun administration suspended food aid after North Korea’s missile and nuclear test, KSM and Good Friends unfolded an active advocacy of food aid for flood victims in 2006. This advocacy movement provided momentum that the Roh Moo-Hyun administration resumed 100,000 tonnes of food aid for the flood victims in 2006. The resumption of food aid in 2006 became a breakthrough that contributed to the recovery of inter-Korean relations in 2006 and 2007. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration thereby resumed 400,000 tonnes of government food aid in 2007, and after the 2^{nd} Inter-Korean Summit the Roh Moo-Hyun administration pledged additional flood aid, 50,000 tonnes of maize, to North Korea. When a government-NGO relationship was amicable, such as in the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations, in sum, government was more receptive to the demands of humanitarian NGOs that urged for the large scale of food aid to North
Korea. As shown above, in addition, the donor-recipient relations was not only an independent variable that affected NGO influence on state policy making but also a dependent variable that was affected by NGO advocacy.

Discussion of the Thesis

There are two criticisms that refute the key argument of this thesis that South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy contributed to changes in state food aid policy making. The first challenge the realist scholars make is that the decisions concerning food aid to North Korea were highly motivated by the South Korean government's political interests. As the grounds for the argument, the realist scholars present a causal relationship: that South Korean government food aid pledges were made at the time when both Koreas adopted the inter-Korean agreements on political, economic and military issues. As this thesis demonstrated, however, the decisions concerning food aid to North Korea had been made prior to the inter-Korean talks. The inter-Korean talks, where representatives from both Koreas signed most of the food aid agreements, were just a formality. Before the inter-Korean talks, more specifically, the South Korean government canvassed agendas that should be discussed at the talks. At this process, South Korean humanitarian NGOs were a significant political actor that influenced state food aid decision making by raising the issue of food aid with North Korea. As a result, the agreements regarding food aid to North Korea were made at this preparation stage of the inter-Korean talks. The inter-Korean talks were just a platform for both Koreas to formally announce and sign the agreements. When one focuses on the time when the
decisions regarding food aid to North Korea were made and the outcomes of the inter-
Korean talks were proclaimed, the argument by the realist scholars looks like gaining
reliability. As the thesis demonstrated, however, examination of the entire state food aid
decision-making process shows that political interest was not a unilateral factor that
induced the South Korean government to provide food aid to North Korea.

Secondly, there is a criticism that no food aid was made in the Lee Myung-Bak
administration (2008-2011) despite the key argument of this thesis that the provision of
food aid to North Korea was institutionalised in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration
(2003-2007). During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the South Korean government
consistently provided large-scale food aid to North Korea, by institutionalising the
provision of food aid to North Korea through the adoption of a government act and an
Inter-Korean Summit Statement in 2007. These changes in policy and institution
indicates that South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy entered into the stage of rule-
consistent behaviour in which the state sought to commit itself to their pledge or policy
irrespective of external pressure or monitoring. After the Roh Moo-Hyun administration
(2003-2007), however, the Lee Myung-Bak administration suspended all types of aid to
North Korea and invalidated the government act and statement that stipulated the
provision of stable food aid to North Korea irrespective of changes in inter-Korean
relations.

The radical changes in the Lee Myung-Bak administration that counter the key
argument of this thesis that NGO advocacy finally reached at the rule-consistent
behaviour needs a proper explanation from the author. The suspension of food aid to
North Korea in the Lee Myung-Bak administration can be attributable to the
incompleteness of the institutionalisation of food aid to North Korea, the mitigation of
the North Korean food crisis, the rupture of inter-Korean relations, the absence of NGO advocacy, and a unique relationship between a threat to national security and the norm of humanitarianism in South Korean civil society.

Firstly, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration institutionalised the provision of food aid to North Korea through the adoption of the Law on Advancing Inter-Korean Relations in 2005 and the Inter-Korean Summit Statement in 2007. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration and humanitarian NGOs, however, failed to secure the legitimacy of this law and statement. While the opposition party consistently opposed the adoption of this law that stipulated stable food aid to North Korea, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and the ruling party enforced the adoption of the law. The opposition party also opposed the provision of food aid to North Korea, which was stipulated in the Inter-Korean Summit Statement in 2007, on the grounds that large-scale food aid to North Korea would be likely to be diverted to the military. The lack of legitimacy in the adoption of the law and statement consequently resulted in the law and statement dying out as the opposition party came to power in 2008. In addition, the adoption of the law and statement were made in the late Roh Moo-Hyun administration. This short period was not enough for these institutions to legitimise large-scale food aid to North Korea and for it to be internalised into South Korean civil society. Consequently, food aid institutions died out with the inauguration of the Lee Myung-Bak administration in 2008.

Secondly, the mitigation of the North Korean food crisis and the consecutive military actions by North Korea made it difficult for the Lee Myung-Bak administration to continue the provision of food aid to North Korea. A humanitarian crisis itself does not lead to the resumption of food aid, but it is a necessary condition that ignites NGO
advocacy and increases government susceptibility to NGO demand. During the Lee Myung-Bak administration, however, the food crisis in North Korea became relieved. In addition to this, the unfavourable operational environment that made it difficult for the Lee Myung-Bak administration to resume food aid to North Korea was North Korea’s consecutive military actions. In July 2008, a South Korean tourist who visited Keumgang Mountain in North Korea was shot by the North Korean army. In March and November 2010, North Korea torpedoed a South Korean naval ship and bombarded Yeonpyung Island in South Korea. These negative actions by North Korea significantly damaged South Korea’s public opinion on the provision of humanitarian aid to North Korea.

Thirdly, the suspension of food aid to North Korea in the Lee Myung-Bak administration was attributable to the absence of NGO advocacy that urged the Lee Myung-Bak administration to resume food aid to North Korea. As mentioned earlier, the mitigation of the North Korean food crisis and the consecutive military actions by North Korea formed a negative operational environment that made it difficult for South Korean humanitarian NGOs to promote the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In addition to this, however, humanitarian NGOs’ financial reliance on government funding jeopardised their organisational independence from government. As a result, while the Lee Myung-Bak administration suspended all types of humanitarian aid to North Korea under the negative inter-Korean relations, the humanitarian NGOs that vigorously promoted the advocacy movement between 1995 and 2007 kept silent, losing their critical role pressurising the government to resume food aid to North Korea irrespective of inter-Korean relations.

Lastly, the thesis argued that South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy
replaced the existing hostility towards North Korea with the norms of brotherly love and humanitarianism. Despite the norm changes in South Korean civil society which gradually progressed between 1995 and 2007, however, the hostility towards North Korea became dominant again in South Korean civil society during the Lee Myung-Bak administration. Such quick norm shifting is attributable to a unique relationship between the sense of national security and the norm of humanitarianism in the Korean peninsula. Due to the unique political environment resulting from a divided country, North Korea is a security threat to South Korean civil society. Given the demonstrable food shortage, North Korea is also an entity in need of help from South Korean civil society. During the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations, humanitarian NGOs were easily able to replace the hostility towards North Korea with the norms of brotherly love and humanitarianism, by framing food aid to North Korea as an act to achieve national security. It was successful in the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administration. Under North Korea’s consecutive military actions in the Lee Myung-Bak administration, however, negative propaganda that naive humanitarianism towards North Korea would threaten the national security of South Korea was quickly spread throughout South Korean civil society. Whilst hostility towards North Korea overwhelms the norms of brotherly love and humanitarianism, food aid to North Korea in the Lee Myung-Bak administration is consequently suspended.

**Future Research Agendas**

Given the demonstrable famine in North Korea between 1995 and 2007, the United
States provided the second largest food aid to North Korea. With regard to the motivation of U.S. food aid to North Korea, the dominant explanation is Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard’s argument that the U.S. government used food aid to North Korea as a *quid pro quo* to solve political and military issues. At the beginning of the food crisis in North Korea, U.S. humanitarian NGOs organised active advocacy to pressurise U.S. and South Korean governments and the international community to provide food aid to North Korea. The political role of U.S. humanitarian NGOs in U.S. government food aid policy making towards North Korea hitherto has not received proper scholarly attention. More research could be done in this area.

Future research might take the perspective of South Korean government attitudes to NGOs. South Korean government attitudes to NGOs changed over time. The Kim Young-Sam administration (1993-1997) perceived all types of NGOs as irresponsible actors pursuing organisational interests. The Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2002) administration perceived humanitarian NGOs as an important counterpart in the execution of government policy. The Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-2007) administration perceived NGOs as an important counterpart in state policy making as well as in the execution of government policy. In contrast to the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration maintained a close relationship with civil society NGOs rather than humanitarian NGOs. Future study might examine why and how South Korean government attitudes to NGOs changed over time.
Appendix I. The Basic Procedure of South Korean Government Food Aid Decision Making

Decision Making I

Resolution

Agreement on HOPE Plan

Response

Resolution

Decision Making II

Approval of Resolution between North Korea

Agreement on HOPE Plan

Response

Resolution
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