The General as Statesman?
Exploring the professional need for commanders to support viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations as typified by the UK military approach

DEFENCE ACADEMY COLLEGE OF MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY
DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED SCIENCE, SECURITY AND RESILIENCE

PhD THESIS
The General as Statesman?
Exploring the professional need for commanders to support viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations as typified by the UK military approach

Supervisor: Professor C D Bellamy

August 2010

© Cranfield University 2010. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the written permission of the copyright owner
Abstract

The problem of theatre level politico-military arrangements during peace and stability operations is important because the intervening actors, working in complex and often ambiguous circumstances, need to calibrate the application of military and political means as a coherent interdependent whole. This is necessary in order to build peace, secure viable political outcomes and hence strategic successes; however it is not easy in practice. This thesis examines the hypothesis that, beyond their security-related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors in order to facilitate and sustain the local political process. This requires military cooperation with other relevant actors, responsiveness to political direction and the specific shaping of military operations to impact decisively on political outcomes.

This work establishes that Western and United Nations doctrinal guidance extols political primacy and civil-military cooperation but does not fully explain the central importance of the political process, nor does it capture the potential peace building role of the military component. Analysis of practice in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that military commanders retain a uniquely influential position and have generally used their military means to positively influence political progress and help coordinate multi-dimensional plans. On occasion, to secure momentum and fill a void, commanders have quietly assumed a political function. Doctrine now needs to be refreshed to reflect practice. It should explain the military role in supporting the political process, elaborate the politico-military relationship as the inner core of a comprehensive approach to peace building and provide candid guidance on the difficulties to be expected where politico-military and coordination arrangements are incoherent. Moreover further work is needed on the wider application of this doctrine by the United Nations and the preparation of civilian leaders for politico-military relationships.
Acknowledgements

My association with the business at hand stretches back into the Balkan campaigns of the 1990s. I am mindful of the many local people that I encountered in the course of my military duties in Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Iraq. It is they who bear the real burden of our difficulties in bringing peace and it is for them that we need to make a better job of it.

This thesis has had a long gestation period and I am truly grateful to my supervisor Professor Chris Bellamy for seeing the potential in me, for his forbearance throughout and for his succinct guidance. Thank you Chris: I know I have not exactly been a model student.

In the course of writing a chapter in *The Quest for Viable Peace* I became firm friends with Mike Dziedzic, Len Hawley and Jock Covey in the United States. It is through that project and their continuing support that much of the insight inherent in my thesis was developed. I would also like to thank Professor Bill Flavin at the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute who has been a long time friend and source of help and advice.

I have been struck by the passion and commitment of all those, civilian and military, whom I have interviewed about the challenges that I have tried to capture in this thesis. Without exception they were generous with their time and perceptive analysis. I am particularly grateful to General Rupert Smith and General David Richards for their candid observations and support. Colonel Alex Alderson provided an inspiring example with his own PhD thesis and has offered warm encouragement, helpful guidance and pertinent material.

Finally, but most importantly, my wife Stephanie has provided enormous moral support and practical help throughout the project. With a keen professional knowledge and insight, she has always been ready to read and comment incisively on texts. She has also put up with the inevitable disruption to normal domestic life which writing entails. Thank you Stephanie for doing so much to keep me going: this would not have been possible without your unbounded support and forbearance.
Contents

Abstract ii
Acknowledgements iv
Contents vi
List of Tables xii
List of Figures xii

Chapter 1 – Introduction 1

1. Setting the scene: complex operations demand political sensitivity 1
2. Reasons for undertaking the study 8
3. Research topic 11
4. Hypothesis 11
5. Aim 12
6. Objectives 12
7. Scope 12
8. Methodology 13
9. Thesis Structure 14

Chapter 2 - British Doctrine for Peace and Stability Operations 25

1. Scope of the Literature Review 25
3. A Successful Politico-Military Relationship in Kosovo in 1999 28
4. UK Military Doctrine for Stability, Counter Insurgency, and Peace Operations 29
   4.1 The Purpose of Doctrine 29
   4.2 Contemporary Stability Operations and Counter Insurgency Doctrine 30
   4.3 Earlier Experiences – Small Wars and Imperial Policing 31
   4.4 Countering Insurgency 32
4.5 Peace Operations Doctrine 35
4.6 Contemporary UK Peace Support Operations Doctrine 38
4.7 A “Comprehensive Approach”? 38
4.8 Contemporary Literature - Reflections by senior commanders and others 40

5. Conclusions 43
5.1 The literature 43
5.2 A Doctrinal Gap To Be Filled 44
5.3 An Emerging Model To Test Against The Multinational Challenge 45

**Chapter 3 – Contemporary US, UN and NATO Doctrine for Peace and Stability Operations** 55

1. Introduction 55
2. The United States 56
   2.1 The US Army and Marine Corps Counter Insurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5): “A moon without a planet” 56
   2.2 FM 3-07 The US Army Stability Operations Field Manual 61
   2.3 Recent Doctrinal Developments in US Civil Military Cooperation 63
   2.4 Conclusions on US doctrine 67

3. The United Nations 69
   3.2 UN Doctrine Following The Brahimi Report 72
   3.3 UN Capstone Doctrine 2008 73
   3.4 Updated UN CIMIC Policy in 2010 75
   3.5 Peace Challenges Forum – Emerging Guidance For Senior Leaders 76
   3.6 Conclusions on UN Doctrine 77

4. NATO 78
   4.1 Why Discuss NATO? 78
   4.2 NATO’s Policy Challenges 78
   4.3 NATO’s Comprehensive Approach 79
   4.4 NATO’s Military Counterinsurgency Doctrine 80
4.5 Conclusions on NATO doctrine 82

5. Conclusions 83

Chapter 4 - Kosovo: Keeping the Show on the Road 97

1. Introduction 97

2. The Problem Faced by the International Community in Kosovo in 1999-2000 98
   2.1 Security and the Rule of Law 99
   2.2 The Local Economy 100
   2.3 Social Issues and Attitudes in Kosovo 101
   2.4 Mandate 101
   2.5 Other Defining Instruments and Instructions 103
   2.6 KFOR’s Internal challenges 104

3. The Big Ideas: Campaign Design 106
   3.1 Approaches to the Politico-Military Relationship, Process and Strategy 106
   3.2 Communicating the Big Ideas: A Plan For Kosovo Without An End State 108
   3.3 An Example of Integrated Planning at the Local (Tactical) Level 111
   3.4 Planning with local actors 113

4. Executing the Big Ideas: Campaign Execution 113
   4.1 Achieving a Positive Political Effect Through Military Activity 113
   4.2 Constraints on Delivering Progress 117

5. Conclusions 119
   5.1 Practical Results 120
   5.2 Implications for Doctrine 121

Chapter 5 Iraq 2003-2008: Hard Lessons 133

1. Introduction 133

2. Post Invasion Iraq in 2003 135
   2.1 The Situation 135
   2.2 The Mandate 137

3. The Coalition Provisional Authority 2003-2004 138
   3.1 Approaches to the Politico-Military Relationship by Bremer and Sanchez 138
Chapter 6 - Afghanistan 2001-2010

1. Introduction
2. Post Invasion Afghanistan
3. The Evolution of the Mandate, the Afghan Government, and International Military Engagement
4. ISAF under General Richards (4 May 2006 to 4 February 2007)
   4.1 Politico-Military Relationships
   4.2 Campaign Design under Richards
   4.3 Campaign Execution under Richards
   4.4 Campaign Results under Richards
5. ISAF 2007 – 2009: A Deepening Crisis And A Developing Understanding
6. ISAF Under General McChrystal 2009-2010
   6.1 Politico-Military Relationships
   6.2 Deriving an Updated Campaign Strategy: The Big Ideas
   6.3 Campaign Design: Communicating The Big Ideas
   6.4 Executing the Big Ideas
   6.5 Campaign Results under McChrystal
Chapter 7 – Conclusions

1. Introduction
2. Review of the Main Arguments by Chapter
3. Application of the Model to the Case Studies
   3.1 Tenet 1. Primacy of the political or peace process is the dominant theme for coordination of politico-military activity
   3.2 Tenet 2. Military commanders at all levels must accept to some degree a role as a political actor and must support the political process. This is a professional imperative
   3.3 Tenet 3. A politico-military framework is needed to enable coordination to secure political ends. If this is missing then military commanders need to act to fill the void, at least in terms of coordination
4. Four Themes for Revised Doctrine
   4.1 Explain the central importance of the political process in securing strategic outcomes
   4.2 Explain the military role in supporting the political process
   4.3 Elaborate the politico-military relationship as the inner core of the comprehensive approach
   4.4 Provide candid guidance to the commander on the difficulties to be expected if politico-military and coordination arrangements are incoherent
5. Proposals for Further Study
   5.1 How might the successful elements of the politico-military approach described in this thesis be applied to United Nations doctrine and practice?
   5.2 How should potential senior civilian leaders in peace and stabilisation missions be prepared for their politico-military role?
6. Recommendations
### Bibliography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Sources</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions With Experts and Briefings Received</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Hearings</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Communications</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpublished Papers</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine Publications and Other Government Documents</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference Papers</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Sources</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD Theses and Dissertations</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports and Monographs</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal Articles</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Articles</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Articles</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web Pages</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1  Glossary</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2  Questions Used For Structured Interviews</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3  US and NATO Doctrine for Planning and Operating in Counter Insurgency and Stability Operations</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables

Table 3.1  *FM 3-24 Principles Contemporary Imperatives and Paradoxes*  57
Table 3.2  USIP Summary of End states Technical Sectors and Crosscutting Principles  64

List of Figures

Figure 1.1  The Security Gap  4
Figure 2.1  Elements of a Stable State  30
Figure 3.1  Notional Whole of Government Planning Initiative  66
Figure 3.2  Linkages and Grey Areas in UN Activities  74
Figure 4.1  Map of Kosovo  98
Figure 4.2  KFOR’s Tasks Under UNSCR 1244  102
Figure 4.3  An Initial Political Strategy  107
Figure 4.4  Kosovo - Developing The Lines of Operation  109
Figure 4.5  Interim End State for Kosovo in June 1999  110
Figure 4.6  COMKFOR’s General Directive 2000-2001  111
Figure 4.7  Multi-National Brigade (Centre) Illustration of the Effect of Key Positive and Negative Actions by KFOR on the Level of Violence in Kosovo during February – August 2000  112
Figure 5.1  Map of Iraq  135
Figure 5.2  Bremer’s 7 Steps Plan – “Iraq's Path to Sovereignty”  141
Figure 5.3  Iraqi Political Process 2004-5 – Key Milestones  143
Figure 5.4  Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance  152
Figure 5.5  Anaconda Strategy vs AQI  152
Figure 6.1  Map of Afghanistan  173
Figure 6.2  The Policy Action Group  179
Figure 6.3  Afghan Development Zone Concept  182
Figure 6.4  Overview of Security Situation and Poppy Cultivation 2007-2008  184
Figure 6.5  Insurgent Activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2007  186
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.6</td>
<td>ISAF Campaign Design 2009-2010</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure A1</td>
<td>&quot;Iterative counterinsurgency campaign design&quot;</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure A2</td>
<td>1st Marine Division’s operational design for Operation Iraqi Freedom 11</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure A3</td>
<td>Example logical lines of operations for a counterinsurgency</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure A4</td>
<td>An Integrated Approach to Stability Operations</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure A5</td>
<td>Example Stability Lines of Effort</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure A6</td>
<td>“SWEAT-MSO Lines of Effort, Objectives and End State</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure A7</td>
<td>Clear Hold and Build</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1 – Introduction

1. Setting the scene: complex operations demand political sensitivity

This study addresses ways to improve the effectiveness of global intervention operations through better military support to developing political solutions. It draws on the British experience and practice but also considers other recent developments, particularly in US practice, in order to suggest ways to improve cooperation at the nexus of politico-military planning and action in the field. The military instrument tends to be used as a “fire blanket”\(^1\) to manage violence and deal with security related problems in unstable situations, although as General Sir Rupert Smith points out in *The Utility of Force, the Art of War in the Modern World*,\(^2\) this might not necessarily be the right solution. These operations are commonly but not exclusively referred to as Peace Operations,\(^3\) Peace Support Operations (PSO)\(^4\), Stability Operations\(^5\) or Counter Insurgency\(^6\) (see Glossary at Appendix 1). The guiding idea behind this dissertation is that in these circumstances it is better to move beyond stasis and to nurture what might be termed a “viable peace”\(^7\) in part through deeper military engagement with, and hence support to, the political peace process.

Recent UK PSO and Stability Operations doctrine stresses the need to adopt “a comprehensive approach”,\(^8\) which means “a broader multi-agency and, often, multinational response”,\(^9\) of which the military force forms only a part, to resolve underlying problems. This approach necessitates civil-military structures to oversee field operations and the development of solutions to issues beyond the security domain.\(^10\) In the field, political considerations and direction guide a “rheostatic” (see glossary) application of force. At the same time intelligence-led security operations amongst the people,\(^11\) are intended to provide a secure environment for conflict resolution and to protect and reassure the population.\(^12\)

This first chapter describes the context for these post Cold War and post 11 September 2001 (9/11) operations with the broad themes driving the development of the UK military response. The reasons for conducting this study are primarily driven by a conviction that it is a professional necessity for commanders to support the practicalities of a peace process and so help to deliver viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations. This is done using the military means available to support - and not usurp - the political process. Conceptually this draws on Clausewitz’s suggestion that the commander in chief should also act as a statesman, as a member of the cabinet, “so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities”;\(^13\) albeit this did not mean that the commander would be the ultimate arbiter on political decisions. But is this relevant or appropriate to the contemporary theatre level challenge? Accepting that there can be no purely military solution in these circumstances; does the UK (and increasingly US) military practice regarding facilitating political outcomes in stability operations provide an effective model for enhanced multinational solutions? Primary source material obtained through interviews with senior commanders and other practitioners suggests that, applied with care, there is a role for commanders to act, usually behind the scenes, in support of the “peace’ or political process.\(^14\)
This thesis develops this theme and will suggest that although doctrine has long suggested the need for political primacy, there has in fact been little writing on how commanders should support this. The latter part of this chapter develops the basis for the dissertation with the research topic, hypothesis and aim, study objectives, scope, methodology and the outline chapter layout.

Kipling’s poem *The White Man’s Burden*, sardonically addressed the wars faced by the US following its conquest of the Philippine Islands, and described the “savage wars of peace”. This often repeated term, neatly captures the challenge, for the West, of contemporary campaigns. Perceived British success in Malaya (1950-60) is often suggested as the root of the UK Armed Forces’ capability to deal with such problems. Rupert Smith comments that “The Malayan emergency is held up to this day in militaries around the world as a successful example of counter-insurgency and counter-revolutionary war”. He goes on to suggest that the British achieved this effectively by removing the insurgents’ principal political objective through the promise of independence. Yet contemporary proponents are often unable to recount facts about what was learned in Malaya or elsewhere. This study suggests that some lessons from campaigns past and present may suggest pertinent solutions, at least in part, to some of the expanding challenges of contemporary multinational operations. The essential goal of which is to help create and maintain stability: “...a condition pertaining to a state where it has effective control and administration of its territory, population, and resources;” but to do so in circumstances of challenging underlying social, economic and political problems “within and across states” where there can be no purely military solution.

Whilst providing a basis of experience, earlier UK counter insurgency techniques may not be the answer to contemporary problems. The context for contemporary multinational stability operations, together with the prevailing legal and social imperatives, differ from those for operations previously conducted on a national basis in Malaya (1950-60) or Northern Ireland (1969-2007). Many aspects of contemporary multi-national operations are now much more complex and some approaches and techniques would not necessarily be appropriate or acceptable now. Recent UK Ministry of Defence Analysis suggests that the context for operations will be ever more challenging and uncertain. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary General of the United Nations had previously concluded:

“...The threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century include not just international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction...poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation... can have equally catastrophic consequences. All of these threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of them can undermine States as the basic unit of the international system.”

There is a real challenge in separating the overlapping meanings of terms used to explain and define both the nature of contemporary conflict and the types of operations mounted in response. In *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall provided a useful guide to the discourse on the various theories and descriptions of contemporary conflict encompassing: Huntington’s “clash of civilisations”; environmental conflict; the international political economy critique of conflict resolution with liberal governance interventions seen as “riot control”; the “new wars” interpretation of post cold war state decay; and the “greed versus grievance” debate over the importance of economic agendas. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* also suggests a framework for contemporary analysis using factors drawn from five levels: Global; Regional; State (social, economic, political), Conflict Party; and Elite / Individual.

The term “complex emergency”, which NATO defines as “a complex, multi-party, intra-state conflict resulting in a humanitarian disaster which might constitute multi-dimensional risks or threats to regional and international security...”, and “failed state”, referring to “countries with weak or non-existent central authority”, (see glossary) are often used to describe some of the severe problems highlighted by the UN Secretary General. A former US Marine Corps Commandant, General Krulak, coined the term “The Three Block War” to describe a situation requiring in response the simultaneous application of war fighting, peace support and humanitarian techniques close to each other in such circumstances. Paddy Ashdown terms this the “post-conflict reconstruction phase”, yet conflict may not have ended. Arguably the most difficult phase is the “post-war fighting, post intervention” or “pre-peace” phase of operations, where the long term outcome may still be very unclear, but where early actions will have a critical impact on what follows. This period has been termed “operations on the cusp”. This phase of transition starts at an indefinable moment (and there will be different moments across the battle space) and encompasses the most difficult and drawn out period before a “steady state” or “viable peace” can be said to exist.

For the 2003 Iraq intervention, the transition or “peace building” phase was known as “Phase 4”; it is clear that planning for this phase was, inadequate and the consequence was a “security gap” whereby neither international nor indigenous actors were in a position to provide adequate security. (See Figure 1 below). Failure at this stage will have long term consequences and this begs the question how should the international community be organized to conduct operations “on the cusp” and beyond? And how should military commanders respond? Clausewitz took the view that “War is not an independent phenomenon but the continuation of politics by different means...According to this point of view, there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it”. So the core issue is not only how to “nest” military objectives within political objectives, but how to use military capabilities to ease the forward progression of political solutions and “a better peace”.

3
**Figure 1.1 The Security Gap.** Source: Bellamy. Showing Iraq in 2003, this graphic developed by Bellamy demonstrates the how conflict tends to occur in a cycle and that, unless adequate preparations are in place, a security gap opens immediately after the conflict phase.

The term “stability operations” is widely applied by the US to describe military responses in such circumstances and this seems to be becoming synonymous with many aspects of “peace support operations” and also “counter insurgency” (see glossary). A recent RAND report characterised the campaigns in Malaya, Northern Ireland and Bosnia as “stability operations”; these might previously have been seen as counter insurgency (Malaya) and “aid to the civil power” (Northern Ireland) and Peace Support (Bosnia) respectively. Other work draws similar conclusions and suggests that the overriding driver of success is the security situation. Stability or stabilisation operations are relatively new terms in UK parlance. Although with the recent publication of extensive doctrine “Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution”, and the creation of a “Stabilisation Unit”, funded by the UK’s defence, foreign and development ministries, the term stabilisation is now firmly in the national lexicon, albeit no formal definition of stabilisation is provided by the doctrine. Stabilisation is nevertheless used to describe contemporary challenges faced by the armed forces, when dealing with contemporary conflict, with “new wars” in a multi-national and multi-actor setting. Often these wars involve weak states and the rise of the intractable “warlord” (see glossary), which John Mackinlay termed a “virus of the new strategic era”, whose vested interest lies in retaining power and making profit from chaos whilst resisting any peace process; here, war itself has a political
economy. British Army counter insurgency doctrine, which addresses similar circumstances, has also recently been updated. Chapter two will provide analysis of British stability operations and counter insurgency doctrine and the somewhat questionable relationship between the two).

In 1999 Tom Mockaitis, reflecting on the typologies of both the types of conflict and the doctrinal responses, suggested that this may be, in part, a question of “new names for old games”. However this view may now be slightly dated. Emerging terminology describes the evolution of: “hybrid conflict” or “hybrid warfare” or “hybrid threats” which exist where “conventional, irregular, and criminal capabilities are integrated operationally and tactically at the lowest level possible.” Both in and out of the theatre of operations. Here it is not entirely clear however if the emerging terminology refers to the nature of the conflict, the nature of the (Western) response, or both. In essence these terms extend the notion of “warfare” to aspects not traditionally included and which are consequences of instability. The UK MOD’s new Stability Operations Doctrine suggests that this is “where states or non-state actors choose to exploit all modes of war simultaneously using advanced conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and disruptive criminality to destabilise an existing order”. This places a premium on insight: “in order to develop effective strategies for ending conflict, one must first understand its complex dynamics and the various interests involved in perpetuating conflicts”. These then need to be stabilised through a range of responses from high intensity conflict to development and delivery of aid.

The coordination challenge posed by such operations is exemplified by the current NATO campaign in Afghanistan. Here, efforts to apply a comprehensive approach hang in the balance. Successful tactical level combat actions against the Taliban are achievable but these must be immediately followed up by political activity to separate the insurgent from the people and reconstruction activity in order to make the local population’s lives better, distance them from insurgent elements and so consolidate tactical military success. If this cannot be achieved there is no incentive for local people to do anything but support and accept insurgent dominance. Reconstruction in this context means providing basic services, economic opportunity, nascent rule of law and overarching all of this: effective governance. The provision of all of these elements, under stable security conditions will deliver operational success and can be termed a comprehensive approach. However this is not easy given the difficulty of deploying and coordinating reconstruction capabilities, usually sourced from other government departments or members of the “actor complex”, in an extremely unstable security situation. Beyond the security gap it is likely that there will be an overall governance gap and, worse, a coordination gap. Hence commanders of necessity find themselves inexorably drawn into the political domain, if only to secure and (help) coordinate the necessary civilian resources, at times in a political void.

Elsewhere, since the creation of the United Nations, a different phenomenon, military peacekeeping (see glossary), has arisen in the multinational arena. These operations have sought to support the pacific resolution of disputes Under Chapter
VI of the UN Charter. They imply and assume a reliance on consent as the peacekeeping force would adopt a neutral stance and thus, as a principle, use force only in self defence. “Effective United Nations peace-keeping requires the full consent and co-operation of the parties; United Nations peace-keepers must maintain their neutrality…”64. So, for peace keeping operations to be successful, there needed to be a “…peace to keep”65. But increasingly in the post cold war era, the mandates for such operations have sought to enforce the settlement of disputes, and latterly to attempt to get failed states back on their feet using integrated missions or “multi-dimensional peacekeeping”, 66 with consequent challenges for the military. Thus for the intervening “actor complex”,67 as with stability operations, the scope of operations was now widened to include reconstruction of the essential elements of a state: governance, the economy; the rule of law and political institutions. As the UN’s latest doctrine suggests:

“Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations deployed in the aftermath of an internal conflict face a particularly challenging environment. The State’s capacity to provide security to its population and maintain public order is often weak, and violence may still be ongoing in various parts of the country. Basic infrastructure is likely to have been destroyed and large sections of the population may have been displaced. Society may be divided along ethnic, religious and regional lines and grave human rights abuses may have been committed during the conflict, further complicating efforts to achieve national reconciliation.”68

This begs a question regarding the efficiency of politico-military contacts between senior military officers and their civilian heads of mission; yet neither recent literature or doctrine offers help in pulling this together.69 (This issue will be examined further in chapters 2 and 3).

Contemporary military operations in the circumstances described above demand careful political calibration. They are set within a context of poor (local) governance, an unstable security situation, a dire humanitarian situation and a lengthy reconstruction task in prospect. This brings stark coordination challenges. It has become a truism that “security without development is questionable, while development without security is impossible”70 and coordination is made more difficult by the multinational,71 and multifunctional nature of the response and the probable absence of legitimate local governance capabilities. Thus the challenge posed to theatre level commanders, their staffs and civilian contemporaries, together with local actors where available, in effecting civil-military coordination, is formidable.

General Sir Mike Jackson likened this situation to a rope with many strands. If woven together the rope was stronger than its component strands but, if not, the individual strands could easily be broken.72 To deliver this comprehensive approach and “weave[e] the strands of the rope”, 73 specifically mandated and constructed political-military structures, under a civilian political lead are needed. Such political primacy demands that the military element, although providing the ultimate power base,74 does not see itself as in charge and is sensitive to this fact,
operating in a pragmatic, flexible way adjusting its response according to local political guidance. Such awareness and readiness to be involved with political structures and the necessary daily “vertical integration” down through the levels of command or organisational structure must be seen as a professional necessity in order to achieve military success rather than as a hindrance to the application of military means. It implies a rheostatic approach to the use of force - where the “heat” can be turned up or down. It suggests employing only enough force to deal with the immediate tactical problem at hand whilst remaining aware of the potential long term ill effects caused by using too much force, or influence.

Beyond the rheostatic application of force, careful direction is required to oversee an intelligence-led approach to security operations, designed, in conjunction with the civilian political leadership to both remove or “fix” disruptive elements and so create a secure environment and reassure the population. Simultaneously employing the psychological dimension will help to separate the insurgent from the population and demonstrate that “peace pays” for all in tangible and material ways. “Winning the hearts and minds” of the population, of course also implies in part dealing with long term issues and grievances. The doctrinal approach to pulling this together will be examined in chapter 2.

There is a paradox here for military forces, at least for those from countries with healthy civil military relations. They are supposed to be non-political (at any rate non-partisan) and to provide strictly military advice and outputs: “we can do x, y or z; the cost in blood and treasure will be...”. Nevertheless UK practice is that, in the field, commanders can only really succeed by becoming in effect a local political actor, at least in some measure, and therefore by supporting the wider peace process through their actions. This implies designing and conducting military campaigns in ways that contribute actively to nurturing the local political peace process, as well as addressing strategic level political objectives. This can be seen as an un-stated professional necessity and is central to delivering a comprehensive approach. This goes beyond the domain of Civil-Military Cooperation or “CIMIC” which, whilst important, has become largely a matter of coordinating tactical level activity. Getting in tune with the politico-military realm may be uncomfortable for some actors operating at the political level and certainly for some military establishments who prefer to concentrate solely on specified “military” tasks given (through strategic-level political direction) rather than analysing and acting on the implied task which, in this case, is how to act and what activities to support in order that the wider political process succeeds. Given that significant elements of the host state’s capacity are missing in the failed state environment, such “mission development”, rather than “mission creep”, is necessary. This work will concentrate on policy interactions at the higher level in country, for example that between the relevant Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General (SRSG) and the military force commander – and the consequent “vertical integration” down (and up) through the levels of command and activity that necessarily follows.
2. Reasons for undertaking the study.

Recent analysis suggests that the global context will continue to present challenging conflict scenarios. It seems that war will remain a given and intervention, either for values or interests, seems likely to continue. Collective action may be demanded by the International Community, notwithstanding ongoing Western debate over the application of the values-led “liberal peace” concept and angst about interests-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such responses could be a “humanitarian intervention” on the basis of “the responsibility to protect”, in the face of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Or it could follow the pattern of earlier 9/11 era interventions involving forcible regime change and spreading “democracy by force”. Efforts to stabilise an existing operation by a third party or government (for example the UK operation to stabilise and support the UN operation in Sierra Leone in 2000 or the EU Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003) might also reoccur.

The reasons for conducting this study are based on the need to better understand the conduct of the “post conflict” and stability operations where often “contingent sovereignty” may be exercised over ineffective states. This remains a key issue in security studies today. Extensive personal professional exposure to the subject through field experience in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Iraq as well as in key planning roles in the European Union Military Staff and at NATO, together with research and writing over a 10 year period have led the author to conclude that the UK armed forces, and increasingly the US counterparts, have something to contribute, with others, to the global debate on how best to approach the politico-military aspects of contemporary operations, in particular by supporting viable political outcomes.

This thesis seeks to further develop the military application of a key principle, identified during operations in the Balkans in the 1990s, which should help provide more effective future outcomes. As a result of his experiences in the UN Mission in Bosnia in 1996 and Kosovo in 1999 as Principal Deputy SRSG to Bernard Kouchner, Jock Covey was insistent on “the primacy of the peace process” as the key to “aligning the efforts of all components of the mission”. He appreciated that “British officer[s] understood without NATO guidance the need to ‘support those who support the peace process’”. It is suggested that acting in this way is indeed a professional imperative for commanders and other actors. The real practical difficulty of applying the “primacy of the peace process” also forms part of the justification for this work. Involvement with the peace process, or in its absence a nascent political process, should matter more to the military than simply delivering achievable military benchmarks on a separate track from any wider political effort to secure conflict resolution process. For example in Iraq in 2005, the author observed MNF-I’s initial preference for pursuing a limited objective of Provincial Iraqi security control (that is setting up the army and police) rather than the more difficult provincial Iraqi control (implying full Iraqi governance). The latter would have required a significant governance input that the military just did not want (or feel able) to provide –
because the Corps Commander thought that he could not and should not be operating in that domain, even though the State Department clearly needed support to be able so to do.\textsuperscript{100} Covey suggests that this is essentially what happened earlier in Bosnia after the 1995 Dayton Agreement: “by insulating itself so effectively from the civilian component...the military ensured the failure of both”.\textsuperscript{101} This implies that the military should move beyond a narrow sectoral approach and help to actually “weave the strands of the rope”,\textsuperscript{102} at least at the higher level. This requires a deep understanding of and sympathy for the part that others have to play in the endeavour.\textsuperscript{103} But this is not always the case.

One almost universal issue which deployed commanders face is reconciling instructions from their superior multinational commanders in theatre with their own national chains of command. Often the theatre level imperative tends to give way to national constraints or preferences. Paradoxically this may partly be due to “political” instructions, or at least an interpretation of these, which demands that soldiers stay out of local “politics”; this may be entirely understandable in some cultures where democratic control remains fragile.\textsuperscript{104} However it does not augur well for in theatre coordination and political management. None of this is made easy by the reality that governments’ structures for the political control of deployed military forces are usually distinct from those for other strands. Also some other strands, such as the police, may be more dependent on the UN for instructions and guidance. (The impact of this issue is explored further in Chapter 4).

It is not suggested that a commander’s politico-military dexterity is the only factor needed for eventual success in such complex situations. Other essential enablers include: an empowering mandate,\textsuperscript{105} a framework for civil-military activity, well trained flexible forces with good doctrine, a nuanced approach to the application of force, the active and properly resourced presence of the other “strands of the rope”\textsuperscript{106} and of course financial resources, a strong information campaign and above all a do-able objective. All of these elements need to be in place, or at least on the way. Moreover, to help achieve viable political outcomes faster and more reliably, military commanders need intuitively to act in concert, with the local political manager. Robert Egnell is clear that this is “only achievable through a new military culture of flexibility and political understanding, as well as a civil-military structure that allows for true integration of the civilian and military aspects of counter-insurgency and peace operations”.\textsuperscript{107} It needs “mutual trust and understanding across the civil-military divide”.\textsuperscript{108} This requires commanders to be comfortable with taking instructions from local political managers, adapting military action to suit political imperatives and indeed actively seeking so to do.\textsuperscript{109} This approach is fine if political interlocutors exist and are up to the job; but what if not – how should the military commander respond when faced with a void?

Dealing with conflict being their business, it is arguable that soldiers have a role in educating and explaining what needs to be done for the benefit of others such as politicians, economists and policemen. Whilst not going as far as stating that this was a “professional imperative”, General Sir Frank Kitson sagely observed (if not without some controversy at the time,\textsuperscript{110} “all eyes turn to the soldier when
violence erupts...” and therefore “…solders have to advise on other government measures too...”

It is intended that this study will play such a role for an audience beyond the military and planning communities in a number of constituencies may benefit: The United Nations, United States; NATO; the European Union; and other regional organisations or, more probably, ad hoc groupings of all of the above.

Who might apply such an approach? Some UN operations might be improved with a more comprehensive approach within the generally understood limits of peacekeeping style operations: “…they don't often move on from peacekeeping to peacemaking. They tend, time and again, to freeze a bad situation in glum immobility.”

Indian commanders, for example, may tend to concentrate on security objectives only and thus retain a “traditional peacekeeping” mindset. The UN Security Council will also need to embrace a broad approach when mandating “regional arrangements” (as recognised under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter) or coalitions of the willing and when integrating military forces from such groupings with a UN civilian presence such as occurred in Kosovo and East Timor. This work is intended to improve global doctrine for civil-military teamwork in UN mandated missions.

In the aftermath of 9/11, US-led interventions saw the conquest of two countries, Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) and acquisition of responsibility for swathes of under-governed and unstable territory. It is always possible that there will be more US-led interventions and the 9/11 Commission Report hints at this. The urge to export a fundamental belief in democracy and a market based economic approach implies a need to go well beyond a “kick down the door and democracy will follow” approach and to enter the realm of “nation building”. US commanders are adept at applying resources to achieve “full spectrum” counterinsurgency and display an instinct to take overall charge. Arguably, the new FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, known as “the Petraeus Doctrine” - provides the US with doctrine to manage this and this might enable a (more) nuanced, intuitive population-centric approach to the conduct of counter insurgency and stability operations and the development of political solutions. It remains to be seen how successfully this will be applied over time.

Some EU focussed commentators, if not the EU as a body, suggest it should conduct challenging post conflict operations: Robert Cooper argued that Europeans have to be prepared to use force in “post-modern intervention... for values”. However the EU faces a difficult internal challenge of joining up its Brussels-based institutional framework in order to provide a comprehensive response to enable operations in the field effectively to employ the EU’s undoubted potential (or to cooperate with others). Description of what needs to be done in the field may enable higher level issues, particularly politico-military co-ordination, to be seen for what they are; this may assist with the development of consensus in designing appropriate policy solutions. The issues highlighted in this study may be equally applicable to other regional organisations such as NATO, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the African Union (and the regional blocks in Africa such as ECOWAS or SADC) and the ASEAN Regional Council.
But perhaps the most likely scenario is that ad-hoc groupings of any of the above will come together to address specific problems. Hence there will be a broad utility for an understanding or “doctrine” of how stability might best be created and nurtured towards viable peace.

3. **Research topic.**

Research is needed to examine\(^{122}\) a key UK lesson from previous operations that there is an absolute requirement for tight civil-military co-operation with a suitable enabling framework in order that political objectives may be successfully pursued, in part through the achievement of security objectives which in turn enable other activity and achieve wider effects. Within this framework, this thesis will establish that British commanders tend to accept that they are always a local political player, respond to political direction (even implied direction) by shaping operations that will impact decisively on short, medium and long term political outcomes and thus actively contribute to the peace process in its broader sense. This approach goes beyond setting up structures for CIMIC\(^{123}\) activity (which generally addresses routine cooperation and coordination issues at a relatively low level) and sits properly at the level of campaign direction as urged by extant British doctrine.\(^{124}\) British commanders tend to embody an innate sense that it is a professional imperative (albeit unstated) to be aware of political requirements and to ensure “vertical integration”\(^{125}\) of military activity down (and up) through the levels of command. This is necessary in order to achieve mission success efficiently. The question is how to use this to improve outcomes in future multinational operations?

4. **Hypothesis.**

The hypothesis and core theme for this study is that beyond their specific security-related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors in order to sustain the political process and facilitate viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations. This approach needs soldiers at all levels to co-operate with other relevant actors, respond to political direction and shape military operations that will impact decisively on political outcomes in order to help generate political progress towards sustainable peace. In practice, this means that “supporting those who support the peace process”\(^{126}\) becomes a professional imperative, and understanding that finding workable local political outcomes, rather than a simplistic exit strategy,\(^{127}\) is central to success. This suggests that the commander is always to some degree a local political actor\(^{128}\) who commits political acts which will be perceived as such. This mindset enables soldiers effectively to co-operate with other relevant actors, respond to political direction\(^{129}\) and shape operations that will impact decisively on short, medium and long term political outcomes; and so actively to contribute to the peace process in its broader sense. This does not imply any change to the Commander’s central focus on the military mission but guides campaign direction to achieve politico-military objectives.
5. **Aim.**

The aim is to examine the above hypothesis as an effective model for enhanced multinational solutions in future.

6. **Objectives.**

The study objectives are to establish:

6.1. What is the current context for multinational operations – the problem presented by New Wars?[^130]

6.2. What is the British military doctrinal approach to the politico-military relationship at the theatre / campaign level (including both historical and contemporary examples)?

6.3. What structures and processes are required to support this approach? What happens if any of these are absent?

6.4. What other relevant approaches exist in the multinational arena? What areas of good multinational practice exist?

6.5. What model(s) for politico-military teamwork should be adopted as a global doctrine for future UN mandated multinational Peace and Stability Operations?

7. **Scope.**

This is not intended to be a hubristic account of British success and others’ inadequacies: there have been plenty of difficulties and failures in the national experience, including recently. Avoiding rose-tinted spectacles, the literature review and case studies will illustrate the emergence and application of methods to deal with conflict in circumstances other than war. Whilst acknowledging the difficult and complex issues in stability operations; together with the absolute requirement for a comprehensive approach with the necessary enablers, and especially civilian resources, the focus will be on the military contribution to enabling the political discourse and peace process to go forward.

Military operations are generally described in terms of the grand strategic (or political), military strategic, operational (or theatre) and tactical levels.[^131] Given that the key relationships to be discussed will be at the operational / theatre and the higher tactical levels, the study will focus here but with reference to both higher and lower levels when needed to illustrate particular points. This encompasses the cliché of the “strategic corporal”[^132] which describes the circumstance where, in view of the compression of the levels of war, caused in part by the impact of modern communications, leadership and activities at the
tactical level in modern conflict inexorably impact beyond their tactical significance.

This study is about military operations but given that success cannot be achieved through military means alone, politico-military issues are important because the co-ordinated application of civilian, political and economic measures, together with the adroit application of force, are central to success. Therefore, of necessity, the work will include detailed reference to civilian activities where this helps to explain the overall context and the vital need for a close relationship between military and civilian actors and the specific demands that this places on both.

8. Methodology.

Drawing on doctrinal theories and field practice, primarily from the security domain but also from conflict resolution and development, the study acknowledges the requirement for a multidisciplinary set of solutions to the security gap. The thesis is essentially about behaviours hence the research method is qualitative in order to gain an understanding of decision making behaviours and the reasons behind these. Clearly some of the analysis remains subjective,\textsuperscript{133} and deductions cannot therefore be empirical; nevertheless it is intended that the quality, quantity and cross referencing of evidence will provide a compelling case. In addressing the core theme the study is practically grounded but also draws on appropriate theoretical work. The literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 analyses relevant doctrine: this tends to be an amalgam of past practice, conceptual theory and subjective prescription for the future.\textsuperscript{134} Beyond this, analysis of practice is developed by cross-referencing between primary sources. These include: interviews with senior commanders involved in all three case studies and other experienced practitioners (see list at bibliography); output from workshops and conferences; official reports and publications; together with the author’s personal and professional experience both in the field and in the doctrinal arena.\textsuperscript{135} Two sets of questions were developed to prepare interview subjects (see Appendix 2). The questions draw together the strands of the research approach and mirror the broad approach to the case studies. Interviews took the form of a structured discussion based on the questions.

No two military campaigns are alike in circumstance, conduct or outcome. However, the three case studies have been selected to illustrate the centrality of the requirement for military support to the political process across a variety of circumstances. Critical and thematic analysis of politico-military relations during operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan will illustrate the key theme and aspects of its development over approximately 10 years (although shortage of space precludes more than a snapshot view). Analysis of Afghanistan will follow that of Iraq in order to demonstrate significant US learning in Iraq and how it was later applied to Afghanistan. An outline of the main issues emerging from the case studies is provided in the thesis structure below. For each case study the research approach has sought to identify: structures and politico-military relationships; campaign design and conduct; and defining events before addressing a subjective view of performance and outcomes leading to
recommendations for improvement of doctrine. The concluding chapter will assess the results from the case studies, compare these against a model derived from the hypothesis and then make recommendations on doctrine and areas for further study. In terms of rigour and credibility, this approach remains mindful of the logical tests provided by the four case study design tests identified by Robert Yin, namely: “construct validity”; “internal validity”; “external validity”; and “reliability”. Practically applied, these tests suggest the following questions: are defining events really defining; are causal relationships correctly identified, are inferences accurate; can the findings be generalised beyond the study and could the results be accurately repeated?

Given that soldiers are unlikely to be able to materially affect the roots of the international system, the study adopts a “problem-solving” approach which accepts the parameters of the present situation and then attempts to solve problems encountered. This “neo-realist” stance will not include a critique on the international system and the policies that may lie behind the creation of the security gap or the international response to this. The thesis will however demonstrate the difficulties inherent in dealing with the aftermath of intervention. These difficulties suggest that, before intervening, policy makers should consider the ways and means for dealing with the aftermath at the same time as considering the ends. The alternative would be to adopt a critical approach then suggest an entirely new model; but this does not seem relevant here given the core theme that a model and doctrine for civil-military relations already exists: what is needed is wider and deeper understanding, then application.


The thesis will comprise the following chapters:

9.1. Introduction. Chapter 1 has outlined the context for operations in the era of new wars, introduced the question and the approach to answering it.

9.2. Chapter 2 – British Doctrine for Peace and Stability Operations. Chapter 2 will first examine the relevant aspects of Clausewitz’s work to establish the essentially political nature of war and how military means must relate to this reality before suggesting that this is also germane to contemporary activities after formal or initial hostilities as described in Chapter 1. Next, Jock Covey’s requirement for “primacy of the peace process” will be discussed in order to frame the politico-military discussion which follows. Contemporary literature, focussing on doctrine, covering the British military approach will then be examined. Looking further back, the essential building blocks which have shaped the British approach will be sketched as will relevant reflections by senior British commanders and others. The chapter concludes by suggesting there is a gap in the current literature; there remains an imbalance in doctrine between the emphasis placed on the principle of political primacy and the guidance provided to commanders in terms of how to support it.
9.3. Chapter 3 – Contemporary US, UN and NATO Doctrine for Peace and Stability Operations. Chapter 3 will examine how US, UN and NATO doctrine addresses politico-military cooperation in support of the political process at the theatre level. This chapter addresses imperatives important in two important but distinct communities. First is the imperative to underpin progress in state building practice by the US (and NATO) in the face of potentially countervailing arguments to focus on war fighting. Second is the imperative to support the UN in building on progress in complex peacekeeping through integrated missions; this is particularly important given the global scope and scale of UN operations.

9.4. Chapter 4 – Kosovo: Keeping the Show on the Road. Chapter 4 will be a case study of operations in Kosovo in 1999-2000 where a NATO military force was directly mandated to support a UN civilian mission under a United Nations Security Council Resolution. The following features emerged:

9.4.1. The advantages of an empowering mandate.

9.4.2. The development of a framework for civil-military planning and activity between the UN and NATO.

9.4.3. The positive impact of commanders’ active support to the political process in order to deliver interim political results and so help create the conditions for longer term development of political solutions.

9.4.4. The challenges provided by multi-nationality with notable differences in nations’ approaches.

9.5. Chapter 5 – Iraq: Hard Lessons. Chapter 5 will examine a coalition operation in Iraq (2003-2008) which was authorised by UN after the fact. Initially the post combat phase civil-military structure was inadequate given insufficient “Phase 4” planning and preparation following the regime change-driven intervention. Therefore at the beginning there was no political or peace process to give primacy to or support. The following features will be illustrated:

9.5.1. The UN presence was weak and most civil-military dealings were with the Coalition Provisional Authority and US Embassy and, over time, the Iraqi government. Lessons were learned from that.

9.5.2. The evolution of a new US doctrine and operational approach once the realisation dawned that state building was required to facilitate exit. The new doctrine – focussing on engagement with the people to deliver political reconciliation – was applied with vigour and success.

9.5.3. The emergence of an improved approach to politico-military campaign design and partnership with Iraqis in Baghdad. Intellectual primacy
remained with the civilian side and strong top down military support for the civilian effort paid dividends.

9.5.4. The likely difficulty of facilitating the drawdown of military forces and handoff to Iraqi authorities to come.

9.6. Chapter 6 – Afghanistan. Chapter 6 will examine a stabilisation operation initiated following invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 as part of the “war on terror” in response to 9/11. It will focus on the post-invasion arrangements which became a NATO mission with a supportive UN mandate but a relatively weak UN presence. The following features will be illustrated:

9.6.1. The example provided by UK ISAF commanders and to the NATO mission in terms of supporting the political process and enabling political progress.

9.6.2. The positive impact of new US doctrine and lessons from Iraq. The benefits of US military leaders’ eventual engagement with the political process and with local political leaders.

9.6.3. The development of UN and ISAF coordination.

9.6.4. An increasing realisation that the International Community as a whole needed to engage in state building to bring Afghanistan into some form of stability and facilitate its own exit; but that this could not be achieved without adequate security and Afghan leadership. Hence there remains a focus on holding the ring militarily, whilst building Afghan security capacity and also attempting to get governance, economic and social measures in place and so separating the insurgent from the people. This underscored the core requirement for successful politico-military cooperation and a process of political reconciliation in Afghanistan.

9.7. Chapter 7 – Conclusions. Chapter 7 will draw together the conclusions of the study in relation to the core premise. It will suggest the following broad themes:

9.7.1. Mindful of the difficulties of operating in a multi-actor, multinational context, the primacy of the political or peace process remains a key organising principle for the conduct of peace support and stability operations. The case studies demonstrate that it is adaptable to a variety of circumstances and should be applied more widely.

9.7.2. Understanding and acting on political requirements remains the professional imperative for commanders. Applying military capacity to facilitate the political process and political outcomes is key. Assuming that adequate military means are available, there is no better way to influence military mission success in post conflict environments. This implies that whilst not invariably a “statesman” in the sense suggested by
Clausewitz, the theatre commander is an important political actor in his own right and should be used as a key facilitator for the overall politico-military campaign including the political process.

9.7.3. Case studies demonstrate that, despite significant progress, the aptitude of the International Community to fully understand this relationship and create the necessary structures and processes varies. The absence of adequate political arrangements or civilian capacity may leave the military commander without a “socket” available to “plug in” his military capacity.

9.7.4. Notwithstanding the above, in the light of incomplete civilian capacity, any temptation to allow military capacity to become overweening and take charge politically must be avoided. Political and intellectual primacy must remain with the civilian side. Equally civilian leaders must understand the responsibilities and imperatives that are important to military commanders and that some decisions remain for the military commander alone.

9.7.5. Future UN mandated peace support and stability operations should apply this approach. This suggests that existing doctrine should be adapted to incorporate the requirement for soldiers specifically to support the primacy of the political or peace process, and underline the requirement for the political lead to remain with the political side. Doctrine also needs to be more honest about the issues that the military commander is likely to face. Broadly there are three scenarios: first a multinational operation where politico-military arrangements are mandated and effective; second an operation mounted by a single nation or coalition of a few nations where viable politico-military cooperation arrangements can be delivered relatively easily through either mandating or cooperation in the field; and finally, the more likely option of a multinational operation, with extensive international actor participation, where politico-military coordination arrangements do not deliver unity of command or purpose and the military commander may find himself facing a political void, or at best uncertainty. New doctrinal guidance needs to cater for all three of these eventualities.

9.7.6. Further research is needed on the civilian “socket” and the development of civilian leadership and supporting politico-military doctrine for these missions.

1 Where “something must be done” even if, as Ignatieff points out, we may not have the power to do much. Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1998), p 96.

2 Although this might not necessarily be the right solution. See Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force, the art of war in the Modern World* (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 214.
5 For a US definition see -- Headquarters Department of the Army, "FM 3-07 Stability Operations," (October 2008), vi. See also the more recent UK publication which does not define stability operations but suggests: security governance and development as overlapping areas of progress required for success - - UK MOD, "UK Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (JDP 3-40) Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution " (2009), 2-18.
6 - - UK MOD, "Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines)," (2001), Annex A to Parts 1 and 2 p A-2.
18 “Remember Malaya,” said the officer. ‘What we did there seemed to work, and Northern Ireland too. We have a great tradition in this sort of warfare.’ He was sphinx-like on detail but the reference appeared to be to the careful collection of intelligence among the local population allied with tactical surprise” Julian Manyon, “We don’t do Mountains,” The Spectator, 6 April 2002.
21 UK MOD suggests that there is a difference between Classical [British] COIN and contemporary stabilisation. The latter sees: state fragility and failure, a multitude of intervening actors, smaller intervening forces, global networks and conflict dynamics, a multitude of irregular actors and WME and hybrid threats MOD, “UK Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (JDP 3-40) Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution,” 2-17.
24 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution.
29 This was exemplified by the actions of 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines in Iraq during April 2003.———, “Operation Telic – BM Rolling Brief (3) As At 121030AApr03, DRM/ODI/03ID/04/15 03 (Author’s copy).” (12 April 2003).
32 NATO, "NATO Publication AJP 3.4.1, Peace Support Operations," 2-1.
34 Joyce, "Transformation of Military Operations on the Cusp."
37 Covey, Dziedzic, and Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation.
41 Clausewitz, On War, 7.
48 MOD, "UK Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (JDP 3-40) Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution ".
53 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 88.
54 MOD, "Countering Insurgency" (Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10. 10 October 2009).
A particular concern is the way in which threats and trends may combine. Hostile states, for example, can use terrorists to pursue non-attributable attacks. Terrorist groups can exploit fragile states or areas of states for basing and training - as we have seen in the Afghan - Pakistan border areas, but also in Yemen and Somalia. Terrorists and criminals will collaborate where they find common interests. Proliferation will increase the capabilities available to our adversaries. Defence, "Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review. Cm 7794," 15.

David Keen, "War and peace: What's the difference?," International Peacekeeping 7, no. 4, pp 1 - 22 (2000); 20.

Discussion with Wg Cdr (Ret) T Pemberton-Piggot, Doctrine Editor, UK MOD Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Shrivenham, UK, 21 Jan 2010.


David Richards, Lt Gen, 6 August 2007.


UN doctrine seeks a “shared vision” but offers scant guidance on integrating the military dimension into the political or peace process. See Section, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, 53-54.


A). Staff for leadership of multidisciplinary planning teams developing political policy goals into strategic

Delegation to NATO, Brussels

planning roles have helped the author form a comprehensive view of contemporary operations: UK

Programmes

Union military operation in 2003; Iraq working for Lieutenant General Petraeus as Director J5 Plans &


97 Jock Covey, a senior US State Department secondee, was the principal deputy special representative of the UN secretary-general for the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and senior deputy high representative in Bosnia.


101 Covey, "The Custodian of the Peace Process," 81.

102 Blair, Weaving The Strands Of The Rope: A Comprehensive Approach To Building Peace In Kosovo.

103 Smith, The Utility of Force, the art of war in the Modern World, 403.

104 William Durch, ed. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis

105 UNSC 1244 for Kosovo was perhaps the exemplar.

106 Blair, Weaving The Strands Of The Rope: A Comprehensive Approach To Building Peace In Kosovo.


109 Covey, "The Custodian of the Peace Process," 83.

110 Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, 187-188.)

111 Kitson, Bunch of Five, 299-300.


115 "-- "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (Kosovo) adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting on 10 June 1999."


120 "-- "FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency Field Manual." Headquarters Department of the US Army, December 2006.


122 Christopher Bellamy, "Dissertation Writing and Presentation," (Cranfield University. undated); Mohamed Hamza, "A Guide to Navigate Your Dissertation," (former member of Cranfield University
Disaster Management Centre. 2006); Patrick Dunleavy, Authoring a PhD (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

123 Fry (2001).
124 Covey, "The Custodian of the Peace Process," 79.
125 Ibid., 84.
126 This tendency has finally been acknowledged in the UK MOD’s new doctrine for Stability Operations. See MOD, "UK Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (JDP 3-40) Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution ", 4-4.
127 Or in its absence implied direction – General Richards in Afghanistan almost made up his own on occasion. Richards.
128 Kaldor, New and Old Wars.
130 Hence care needs to be taken over variations in what is actually said because “…consistency in utterances is over-emphasised, while inconsistencies are concealed” Mats Alvesson and Kaj Skoldberg, Reflexive Methodology - New Vistas for Qualitative Research, vol. Sage (London2000), 204. See also David Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research (London: Sage, 2005), 211.
132 See footnote 96 above on the author’s experience and previous work.
134 Not everyone sees it this way; for an example of the antithesis of the author’s approach see Michael Pugh’s coruscating attack on the “problem-solving purpose – to doctor the dysfunctions of the global political economy within a framework of liberal imperialism”. Pugh, "Peacekeeping and critical theory," p 39.
135 This might be termed a neo-realist stance, yet space precludes further analysis of the international system. See Ibid. p 54.
136 Smith, The Utility of Force, the art of war in the Modern World, xiv.
Chapter 2 - British Doctrine for Peace and Stability Operations

1. Scope of the Literature Review

This chapter will first examine the relevant aspects of Carl von Clausewitz’s work to establish the essentially political nature of war and how military means must relate to this reality before suggesting that this is also germane to contemporary activities after formal or initial hostilities as described in Chapter 1. The next section will, starting with Jock Covey’s requirement for “primacy of the peace process”, examine what contemporary literature and doctrine has to say about the British military approach to this. (Multinational responses will be examined in Chapter 3). Then, looking further back, a brief analysis of the essential building blocks which have shaped the British approach will be sketched. The chapter will conclude by establishing that there remains an imbalance in doctrine between the emphasis placed on the principle of political primacy and the guidance provided to commanders in terms of how to support it. An emerging model to test against case study material will be suggested and the case studies in the following chapters will demonstrate how generals operated in practice.

2. Clausewitz – The General as Statesman?

Carl von Clausewitz offers two practical ideas which, in combination, are central to the development of this thesis. The first, in terms of strategic ends, is the importance of political objectives in war. The second, in terms of practicalities, is the role of the general as a statesman, and therefore a political actor, in war. Clausewitz’s analysis of the aftermath of war, beyond the need for a peace treaty, is at best sketchy but perhaps points the way towards the application of similar principles.

Clausewitz with On War articulated clearly the linkage between political aims in war and its conduct. If “war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it… the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy then will permeate all military operations and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them”. Keegan criticises Clausewitz’s focus on war as a continuation of politics, seeing war more as a “habit” which threatens our survival. Nevertheless Clausewitz’s analysis seems relevant and mirrors a key strand in contemporary doctrinal thought; for example, the key principle in UK counterinsurgency doctrine remains “political primacy and political aim”. Hence the present analysis suggests that Clausewitz’s theory on the pursuit of political aims remains relevant to the pursuit of political objectives in the aftermath of war or “new wars” and thus to contemporary peace and stability operations, Wars that are not necessarily between states, as Clausewitz saw them, are nonetheless politically driven and dependent on political outcomes for closure. This remains topical; as General Stanley McChrystal, a former NATO commander in Afghanistan has recently commented: “…a political solution to all conflicts is the inevitable outcome. And it’s the right outcome.”
If “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means”, then surely the aftermath of war, between states and involving regime change, must be seen in the same light? This seems equally valid for “new wars”, including values-led interventions into failed states. However there is a problem here, if intervention merely removes a regime but does not replace it, then the underlying causes of instability inherent in failed states, including the absence of security, will remain until addressed. Rupert Smith points out that the “confrontation” remains, whilst Michael Dziedzic notes that in such circumstances “‘peace’ is but the continuation of conflict by other violent means” and therefore holistic action to transform the conflict is needed. Clausewitz saw this in the sense that the “subordination” and “permeation” of war by politics meant that there was no “purely military solution” to any military problem. Moreover, as Schadlow suggests, “…governance operations are the operational link needed to consolidate a state’s final political aims in war”. It is for the political element to conduct such governance operations, in partnership with local actors, and this thesis will explore and emphasise the critical enabling contribution to this effort which can be provided by military forces.

This study focuses on a post “war” or post intervention period and is not only about war between states in the customary sense. Therefore, for soldiers, many other considerations also apply; these include the obligations of an occupying power and involvement with post war “nation building” activity. Clausewitz stopped short of offering detailed prescriptions relevant to such a period beyond offering that:

“[w]e may occupy a country completely, but hostilities can be renewed again in the interior, or perhaps with allied help. This can also happen after the peace treaty, but this only shows that not every war necessarily leads to a final decision and settlement. But even if hostilities should occur again, a peace treaty will always extinguish a mass of sparks that might have gone on quietly smouldering...we must always consider that with the conclusion of peace the purpose of war has been achieved and its business is at an end.”

Later, Clausewitz goes on to state that, “No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it”. As Bernard Brodie observes: “What could be simpler and more obvious…!” So is there a mixed message here: a determination to address objectives in war; yet Clausewitz toys with, but does not substantially address, difficulties that may occur if “peace” (see glossary) cannot be achieved through the simple means of a peace treaty. Thomas Adams suggested that Clausewitz’s writing had “little application to warfare outside the conventional model”, yet it seems likely that this would follow had he addressed this “post-conflict” phase more directly.

So Clausewitz, without really developing the idea, offers some tantalising hints on the relationship of war as a political activity and its impact on the subsequent peace.

“War is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous …war is simply the continuation of political intercourse, ‘with the addition of other means’...war...does not suspend political intercourse.... The main lines
along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war and into the subsequent peace. How could it be otherwise.”

It seems logical that this notion might be applied to the contemporary “post-conflict” phase and it follows that if soldiers are still there, still engaged, “afterwards” then they will have to be part of that “political intercourse” and that their challenge will have been shaped by what has gone before because “…war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense”. Sun Tzu put it another way: “Strategy Without Tactics is the Slowest Route to Victory. Tactics Without Strategy is the Noise Before Defeat”.

Clausewitz also provides some useful observations on the dynamics of the politico-military relationship. “Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details. Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are the more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle”. Equally, from the opposite perspective… “[s]ubordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that has created war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, to subordinating the military point of view to the political”. Finally “…the assertion that a major military development, or the plan for one, should be a matter for purely military opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging.” But he did see an important role for soldiers in the political discourse.

The second element of Clausewitz’s writing relevant to this study, which is intertwined with the first, is that he saw the general as akin to a statesman in war. “If war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war, then unless statesman and soldier are combined in one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander in chief a member of the cabinet so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities”. Michael Howard and Peter Paret note that through changes to his original text in the second publication of his work, “[p]robably the most significant change”, which reflect that the commander in chief should be a member of cabinet so that the cabinet can share in the major aspect of his activities, “Clausewitz emphasises the cabinet’s participation in military decisions, not the soldier’s participation in political decisions”. However he must not cease to be the General. “He takes into view all the relations of the State on the one hand; on the other he must know exactly what he can do with the means at his disposal.” Anatol Rapoport’s analysis of this section suggests that this is not inconsistent with Clausewitz’s basic principle of the primacy of political authority over the military: “The General must know state policy, but he does not direct it.” This is of course fine unless state policy does not exist or is unclear; then the general is left with some difficulty.

Again, it seems logical that Clausewitz’s dictum should continue on to “afterwards” and equally that this should be extrapolated in some form to the context of contemporary new wars. There is obviously a clear link between going in to war (or
intervention), “winning” war, then military activities afterwards. This study focuses specifically the actions of generals “afterwards”. If “The object in war is to attain a better peace”, and assuming that there was no “peace” before, then military activity afterwards matters as much as during the war, in fact more so in order to create the conditions for peace. Success in the first part, winning the “war” is pointless unless a “better peace” subsequently exists; but this peace has to be nurtured. It follows that early preparation for this phase of conflict termination (“Phase 4” – see glossary) should be systematic and systemic, but also flexible, and it cannot be ad hoc. Given the “new wars” context discussed in Chapter 1, where reconstruction and state building (see glossary) are all important, then we need to look harder at the general as a political as well as military actor during stabilisation in the aftermath of intervention and irrespective of the reason for intervening. Through this, the present work will provide future commanders with support and direction as well as education for others, particularly in the political and diplomatic domains.

3. A Successful Politico-Military Relationship in Kosovo in 1999

To set the scene for a discussion of contemporary literature we go to Kosovo. In 1999, the context for “post conflict” activity was UNSCR 1244 which mandated NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) to support the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), yet NATO was slow to provide guidance to its field commander. Nevertheless Jock Covey, the Principal Deputy SRSG in UNMIK, observed that “[i]t was fortunate that the Kosovo Force started with a core of British officers at headquarters level and with General Michael Jackson in command…British officer[s] understood without NATO guidance the need to ‘support those who support the peace process’”. This statement begs a number of questions: how does Covey define the challenges faced by commanders in these circumstances; what had he observed (both in Bosnia and Kosovo); and why was he able to say did say what he did about the UK approach?

The backdrop to Covey’s requirement was that “[a]s custodian of the mandate, our immediate task was to set up an interim administration…to set up the mission and get things running… The Security Council had made very clear that the exercise of sovereignty rested with UNMIK, so we had to get in there and get the place running”. To achieve this Covey also needed a unified politico-military relationship and co-ordinating mechanism between UNMIK’s other major international player, NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). He had experienced the absence of this relationship in Bosnia, with near disastrous results. Covey argues that the “prime directive”, guiding and facilitating this civil military relationship and its actions, should be the “primacy of the peace process”. This principle was developed in Bosnia, where, at least initially, “joint civil-military planning was negligible …the military command … was very fearful that they not in any way take instructions, or even to be seen as taking instructions, from civilian officials.” In eventually overturning this situation a new concept emerged: “that the international military would no longer be neutral about the peace process”. This of course implied taking “instructions” from political managers.

Beyond commonsense based on an analysis of the situation, this begs the question what doctrine, training or experience might have prepared the British military
establishment and therefore General Jackson with his staff to see the professional imperative to support political primacy and the peace process, or in its absence the political process, without specific instructions to do so? Is this yet fully captured in doctrine? The remainder of this chapter will show that, although the British military reflex is actively to reach out to the political level and facilitate the latter’s progress, this is not yet covered in the literature in a way that fully explains the necessary support to political primacy encapsulated by the idea of the primacy of the peace process. 42

4. UK Military Doctrine for Stability, Counter Insurgency, and Peace Operations

4.1. The Purpose of Doctrine

Before examining the doctrine and other literature underpinning the UK armed forces’ approach to politico-military demands during operations “on the cusp”43, it is relevant briefly to consider the nature and purpose of doctrine. Doctrine “is what is taught” and has been described as one of the means of capturing the lessons of past and present in order to inform the future. 44 Alexander Alderson suggests that doctrine authors “should take due account of historical and more recent experience, contemporary pressures and identifiable trends, so that…it should represent military knowledge”. 45 Accessing and developing that knowledge is central to this thesis and thus doctrine and the literary discussion surrounding it will provide the central sources for this literature review. For the UK the application of doctrine is not regarded as being slavish; British Defence Doctrine quotes the NATO definition: “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application.” 46 It should be seen primarily as a guide to how, not what, to think about complex military problems and is perhaps best applied in the staff college classroom rather than in the field 47. Others suggest that doctrine has a more central role in terms of defining organisation, training and equipping needs. 48 It also provides a means to “learn and adapt” which has been noted as lacking in Iraq. 49 It is to doctrine that we shall return at the end of the thesis when considering recommendations for how to think about, and prepare for, future multinational peace and stability operations.

Has the challenge posed by operations in the era of new wars in the post cold war, post 9/11 and globalised era, which was outlined at Chapter 1, been met by doctrine in the UK and, bearing in mind differing interpretations of civil-military relations, 50 how does this doctrine address civil-military interaction over the peace process at the operational level? The relevant doctrinal debate, reviewed below, centres on a group of similar operations termed stability, counter insurgency, and peace respectively. At their root these share a common purpose, in the words of General Sir Mike Jackson, to “make it better”. 51 and, as Mats Berdal points out, the categorisation has “less to do with the operational environment… than…the wider objective [of military action]” which tends to be broadly humanitarian. 52 Another common thread, discussed after the doctrine below, is the necessity to establish a pan-government “comprehensive approach”.

29
**4.2. Contemporary Stability Operations and Counter Insurgency Doctrine**

The most up to date and relevant UK doctrinal works, both published late in 2009 address stability operations and counter insurgency. UK MOD’s *JWP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution* offers a sophisticated analysis of the politico-military relationship; the doctrine includes “influence” as “the guiding idea for the conduct of operations” and the principle of the “primacy of political purpose”. *JWP 3-40* offers a useful model depicting the elements of a stable state to help explain the government-wide actions necessary where these have failed and stabilisation activity is necessary. (See Figure 2.1 below). However, with a focus on security activity, the doctrine does not fully explain what military specific actions are needed to help deliver the necessary political settlement (and societal relationships) that are central to achieving stability. Hence the principle of primacy of political purpose is not fully supported by the doctrine.

**Figure 2.1 Elements of a Stable State.** Source UK MOD

For the British Army’s *Countering Insurgency*, the focus is on “securing the local population and gaining and maintaining popular support”. Primacy of political purpose is the first principle and it is stressed that: “counter insurgency is warfare; it is distinctly political, not primarily military; and it involves the people, the government, and the military. The strength of the relationship between these three groups generally determines the outcome of the campaign.” Whilst fully acknowledging the importance of political primacy, neither of these new documents provides doctrinal guidance on how this principle should be applied to generate stability.

Significant doctrinal developments have also occurred elsewhere, notably in the US with the publication in 2006 of the ground breaking US Army and US Marine Corps
FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency Field Manual. In 2008 the US Army also published FM 3-07 Stability Operations. These significant advances in doctrinal thought will be discussed along with other multinational approaches in Chapter 3.

4.3. Earlier Experiences – Small Wars and Imperial Policing

Before addressing counter insurgency, it is appropriate briefly to discuss the relevant literature covering the UK’s earlier experience of “small wars”, colonial administration, and “imperial policing”. Christopher Bellamy pointed out in 1998 that “Many of the [contemporary] military operations… have shown striking similarities to those a hundred years ago or more…operations which are not crucial to the originating nation state…” Bellamy highlighted the work of Callwell and his colleagues which “opens the way to resolving our own problems”. With Small Wars. Their Principles and Practice, first published in 1896, Callwell described the nature of “Small Wars” where “…campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellious and guerrilla forces in all parts of the world where organised armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field”. Bellamy also pointed out Callwell’s grasp of the problems of asymmetry and their “value in focussing on the contemporary struggle with non-state or sub-state actors, and maybe international terrorists”. Clearly there are contemporary parallels in Callwell’s suggestion that “If the enemy cannot be touched in his patriotism or his honour he can be touched through his pocket”. Nevertheless some of the objectives suggested are rather brutal by modern standards “to punish an insult or to chastise a people” and there is no specific guidance in Callwell’s chapters on strategy about coordination to effect political outcomes; although he did suggest that “[t]heir purpose is to achieve a lasting peace…[t]herefore… the overawing and not the exasperation of the enemy is the end to keep in view”.

Later strands of the British experience had foundations in the experiences of colonial or imperial policing. In 1934 two documents focussed on the military aspects of “imperial policing”. Major General Charles Gwynn’s Imperial Policing advised on measures for the restoration of civil authority. He saw policy making left to the civil government [we would now see this as political primacy]; the application of minimal force; the use of firm and timely action; co-operation with the police and civil administration. Yet Tom Mockaitis saw the weakness of Gwynn’s approach as lacking an appreciation of the need to meet the legitimate grievances of subject peoples. A War Office pamphlet Notes on Imperial Policing, whilst a step forward, contained little reference to cooperation with the administration and police, and none to politics.

In 1949 a new pamphlet entitled Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power focussed on the restoration of law and order by military means. It “…advocated that civil military cooperation be facilitated through the holding of periodic meetings between police, soldiers and administrators at district level”. It was clear on the distinct civil and military roles and the need to foster relationships: the military was in a supporting role, yet should be prepared to engage in civil
affairs. A requirement for senior commanders to concern themselves with political affairs was also hinted at but not developed.

4.4. Countering Insurgency.

British Colonial experience counted for much, but the core learning, in terms of political primacy and a coordinated approach, really gained momentum in the 1950s with the onset of independence movements and revolutionary war. The challenges of Marxist and Maoist inspired insurgencies as part of wider independence struggles after the Second World War provided a number of lessons, some of which remain relevant. For the purposes of this work, “insurgency” means: ‘An organised, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority’. Space precludes a detailed discussion of the nature of insurgency here, although Mao’s insight “to understand that the population was his vital ground” was succinctly described by Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy in 2007. The following is also illustrative of the scope and scale of the problem posed by insurgency: “Insurgency embraces forms of violence, often loosely controlled, with national or international political aims”, and “[it] has implied a politico-military campaign with the object of overthrowing the government of a state. In essence political, social, economic and psychological elements have been added to irregular military tactics with revolutionary intent”.

The post war UK response to insurgency was characterised by pragmatism rather than dogma and has involved a flexible rather than purely reactive stance. The UK “principles” for action by the government as a whole, not merely the military, are generally attributed to Robert Thompson in his influential work Defeating Communist Insurgency. First, (the government must have) a clear political aim; Second, function in accordance with the law; Third, have an overall plan; Fourth, give priority to defeating the political subversion not the guerrillas; and Fifth, secure base areas first. Ian Beckett pointed out that here, Thompson “readily demonstrated the interrelation of factors and the need for adaptation rather than attempting to slavishly apply some kind of template”. Frank Kitson’s considerable contribution in Low Intensity Operations and Bunch of Five focussed on coordination, the struggle for men’s minds – necessitating political and economic measures – together with intelligence-led operations amongst the populace - “a chain reaction of analysis alternating with action designed to get information” and also inducing the enemy to change sides. In sum, “coordinating machinery at every level for the direction of the campaign, arrangements for ensuring that the insurgents do not win the war for the minds of the people, and intelligence organisation suited to the circumstances, and a legal system adequate to the needs of the moment.”

Although, as Mockaitis suggested, there was an ad hoc approach to each campaign, “broad principles [were] transmitted informally from one generation of civil servants and soldiers to the next”. Over time the British counter insurgency principles evolved into: political primacy and political aim; co-ordination of the government machinery [through the levels]; the importance of intelligence and information; the need to separate the insurgent from his support [both physically and with hearts and minds]; neutralising the insurgent [with the minimum use of force]; and finally longer
term post-insurgency planning [to address grievances].\textsuperscript{97} It is immediately noteworthy that these (national) principles explicitly cover the civilian as well as military response; yet there is no record of comparable civilian doctrine. “COIN operations are carried out to complement those political, economic, psychological and civic actions necessary to defeat an armed insurgency.”\textsuperscript{98} The application of force was always measured; “[u]nless the security forces use force in a highly selective manner, they will have little chance of winning the loyalty of a population threatened by subversion”, \textsuperscript{99} and there remained a clear consciousness of always operating within the law under the civil authority.\textsuperscript{100} Subsequently in 1977, \textit{Counter-Revolutionary Operations} doctrine\textsuperscript{101} situated itself in the restoration of law and order and, as Alexander Alderson points out, included a requirement for “political awareness”\textsuperscript{102}.

The key organisational mechanism that emerged at the political level, first in Malaya, but replicated elsewhere, was co-ordination across government, using a committee system,\textsuperscript{103} usually under a “Director of Operations”\textsuperscript{104} to co-ordinate both planning and conduct of activities in all spheres: political; economic; police and military. Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs was the first, writing in 1951, he explained that:

“It was therefore decided by the High Commissioner of the Federation to ask for the appointment of a ‘Director of Operations’. In view of the necessity to maintain civil Government under the new Federation Agreement this appointment had to be in the nature of a compromise, and it was decided to appoint an officer of the rank of Lieutenant-General but in a civil capacity, ranking equal to the Chief Secretary, but with full powers of coordination of the Police, Naval, Military and Air Forces.”\textsuperscript{105}

Briggs also developed the eponymous plan\textsuperscript{106} for a coordinated approach; this was comprehensive and pan-government in nature and was based on his own politico-military appreciation of the situation (albeit as a soldier).\textsuperscript{107} This plan became the foundation for success in Malaya and the coordinated system of command and control became the model for similar campaigns after Malaya and until Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{108} These arrangements and the plan, with much else, were explained to the participants in locally produced doctrine.\textsuperscript{109} Shy and Collier described the British response in Malaya as being:

“... like that of their colonial tradition at its best: tight integration of civil and military authority, minimum force with police instead of army used when possible, good intelligence of the kind produced by "Special Branch" operatives, administrative tidiness… and a general readiness to negotiate for something less than total victory. On the military side the British colonial experience showed again its capacity to train effective local forces, a patient view of the time required for success, and a preference for the employment of small, highly skilled troops in well-planned operations rather than massive use of large numbers and heavy firepower. Exploiting ethnic divisions to mobilise Malays against Chinese rebels, the British still required more than a decade to put down the Malayan rebellion. Whether their flexible, patient methods would have succeeded against a more powerful revolutionary movement must remain a question.”\textsuperscript{110}
Planning and coordination was certainly not without its difficulties. In 1963 the doctrine explained that “...the heads of the three [armed] services, the police, the principal officers of the administration and the heads of intelligence and psychological operations...As soon as the situation permits prominent local political leaders and others may be co-opted... so as to associate the local people with the conduct of the emergency”.111 In 1967 Julian Paget explained the importance of including local officials in policy discussions and underlined the “highest standards of civil military cooperation”, which took time to establish, but was decisive in both defeating the insurgents and “establishing a political solution” (in Malaya).112 None of this was easy as John McCuen (also Frank Kitson and Richard Cousens) pointed out. “Unity of effort is however extremely difficult to achieve because it represents the fusion of civil and military functions to fight battles which have primarily political objectives...All the political, economic, psychological and military means must be marshalled as weapons under centralized co-ordination and direction.”113

For counter insurgency in the post colonial era, the military continued to operate with the clear understanding that it is not in overall charge and that there is no purely military solution to the problem. “Three broad fundamentals of policy have been developed and adapted... Minimum force, civil/military co-operation and tactical flexibility, continue to provide an essential backdrop for the newer and more recent forms of peace support operations”.114 This simple statement again plays down the essential requirement for a viable political lead to guide military action and for military commanders at all levels to be fully responsive to the nuances of supporting the political process. This national, and military, approach was also generally applied over three and a half decades of continuous operations in Northern Ireland; albeit the deployment was technically termed Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP),115 not Counter insurgency.116

Counter insurgency (or “COIN”) doctrine provides food for thought on a national politico-military approach in other circumstances. The earlier 2001 UK counter insurgency doctrine suggested that “in other situations some of the principles and tactics of counter insurgency may be applicable. For instance, in a period of fragile peace after a war (when the civil administration in a defeated or liberated country has broken down), or in a peace support operation (when armed factions interrupt humanitarian relief or attack peacekeepers), troops may need to employ selectively the relevant COIN tactics and techniques”.117 In 1999 Tom Mockaitis argued that:

“... recent intrastate conflicts.... and traditional insurgency have certain key characteristics in common. Both types often involve both regular military and paramilitary forces operating in difficult rural terrain or in the even more challenging environment of urban areas. Combat does not occur across clearly marked boundaries....The belligerents will almost certainly employ terrorism to enforce compliance amongst their own people and to intimidate their opponents. To combat these threats an intervention force may be required to do everything from conducting conventional military operations to performing police duties. Internal war also disrupts the infrastructure of a state, requiring a comprehensive, unified effort by military forces and civilian agencies to stop
the fighting, provide relief to the victims of war, and rebuild the institutions of civil society.\textsuperscript{118}

In these circumstances, as Major General Ken Perkins suggested nearly two decades earlier, when reflecting on campaigns in Malaya, the Dhofar and Northern Ireland, “it is not possible, even at the lowest level, to separate the military from the political. Thus it is essential for military commanders and politicians to be well informed about each other’s business”.\textsuperscript{119}

4.5. Peace Operations Doctrine

Operations conducted in the wake of the Cold War, as described in Chapter 1, saw a dynamic requirement in the West for new doctrinal guidance.\textsuperscript{120} “Second Generation” peacekeeping operations,\textsuperscript{121} were described in the resulting interim UK doctrine\textit{Wider Peacekeeping} (1994). This reflected the British military experience in Bosnia, a largely consent-based approach (under Chapter VI of the UN Charter), to dealing with intra state conflict and complex emergencies (see glossary). This had suggested a hands off\textsuperscript{122} approach: “coercion, even if practicable in the short term, will foster resentment and hostility and instability, engendering risk and instability which will ultimately prove counter productive.”\textsuperscript{123} But in reality, as Chris Bellamy explained in\textit{Knights in White Armour: The New Art of War and Peace}, this approach was attempting to deal with a “Chapter 6.5”\textsuperscript{124} situation and had failed in UNPROFOR and therefore the debate continued. Positive new ideas began to emerge, presumably partly under political pressure for doctrinal guidance leading to better results in the field. The debate was not without some acrimony. Richard Connaughton had been strongly critical of the concepts in\textit{Wider Peacekeeping} on the basis that “the doctrine of consent and impartiality carries little weight where the problem is not so much bad government as the absence of government” and an “absolutist philosophical approach [to the use of force – i.e. avoiding it]”\textsuperscript{125}. John Mackinlay however saw it as “an important step toward recognising [a changed] military role” beyond “arriving, deploying and departing” because “in reality the military elements are, de facto, part of an orchestrated process of stabilisation”.\textsuperscript{126}

John Mackinlay’s edited\textit{Guide to Peace Support Operations}\textsuperscript{127} in 1996 was an important step towards a contemporary (UK) politico-military doctrine for use in such “post conflict” circumstances. This introduced the international players to each other whilst explaining structures for co-operation between agencies, essentially the UN System. In discussing co-ordination, the guide advocated a “common operational approach”,\textsuperscript{128} but did not press the point. It also accepted that the military element may need to use force vigorously.\textsuperscript{129} During the mid 1990s the contradictions and limitations inherent in avoiding the use of force lest it cause uncontrollable escalation with no way back, which General Sir Michael Rose had termed staying behind the “Mogadishu Line”,\textsuperscript{130} were increasingly apparent to the military community. Colonel (then) John McColl (latterly DSACEUR) saw the need for more flexibility in the use of force up and down the spectrum.\textsuperscript{131} He also saw that impartiality “should relate to the pursuance of the mandate rather than the parties involved in the conflict”;\textsuperscript{132} this was a critically important insight. In 1998, drawing on the internal military debate, the\textit{Guide to Peace Support Operations}\textsuperscript{133} and other work, particularly by Chris
Bellamy, the UK MOD delivered its accumulated experience of responding to complex emergencies, particularly in Bosnia, in new doctrine *Peace Support Operations* UK Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50.

JWP 3-50 covered a spectrum of Peace Support Operations (see glossary) including peacekeeping. Notably it assumed the deployment of war fighting-capable forces prepared to conduct “Peace Enforcement” (see glossary), under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, when necessary, to secure mandated objectives. These objectives were generally seen in terms of humanitarian goals or creating self-sustaining peace. To deliver this, the doctrine suggested a carrot and stick approach and the principle of impartiality which provided a means of actually crossing the "Mogadishu Line" and then returning safely; previously this was seen as impossible for “peacekeeping” forces (see glossary). This meant the even-handed threat or use of force for coercive purposes, where necessary, and then, in order to maintain consent, at least at the operational if not tactical level, calibrating its application against the common baseline of the mandate.

This “Third Generation” operations doctrine went beyond the “Second Generation” Wider Peacekeeping, which contained scant reference to the need for co-ordination between military and civilian actors. The Author of the doctrine, Phillip Wilkinson, explained the weaknesses of Wider Peacekeeping and the evolution of the new approach in a thesis for Cranfield University. The “Third Generation” JWP 3-50 anticipated a multi-dimensional approach to conflict and a “composite response” to missions, including civilian-led planning, which implied a requirement for robust high level political leadership and direction, without which “operational activities alone are unlikely to achieve the desired end state”. Here the military was seen, rightly, as creating the necessary security conditions so that the efforts of civilian counterparts can bear fruit. “De-escalation and resolution involves three overlapping activities: controlling the physical violence in a conflict; producing an atmosphere conducive to the promotion of co-operation; and identifying the underlying causes and symptoms of the problem so as to facilitate reconstruction and longer term settlement.” Given the wider multi-functional context of these operations the politico-military interface was naturally seen as crucial and the military commander was expected to play a leading role in overall mission planning, albeit he was not in overall charge.

Third Generation operations relied on impartiality as the key determinant guiding the conduct of military operations advocated a robust, but suitably nuanced, approach to using force where necessary. JWP 3-50 suggests that “political considerations must permeate all military considerations and actions”. It provided a complex exposition of the likely operating environment, the problems likely to be faced and what had been learned about dealing with these. The doctrine was soon applied in Kosovo in 1999, and among other things it provided a sound basis for delivering Jock Covey’s requirement for a [unified] sophisticated politico-military relationship, at least for the British (see Chapter 4). Arguably it also enabled Covey to take impartiality, and the use of force, a step beyond simply enforcing a mandate or avoiding prejudicing the political outcome, and to link it directly to the primacy of the peace process: those against it could expect a rigorous response. It did not, however, go as far as suggesting how military commanders should actually relate to the political strand in
the sense of being a de facto local political actor, or as Clausewitz suggested, a
Statesman. Finally, it did not provide much guidance on what to do in the absence of
high level political direction. When interviewed, Generals Jackson, Richards, Smith
and McColl confirmed that this challenge remains topical. Thus it seems that it
only partially helped in terms of addressing the underlying political issues inherent in
these campaigns and adapting military planning and operations accordingly.

That said, the manoeuvrist approach, here intended to focus on the perceptions and
attitudes of the belligerents, and a flexible approach to operations execution,
enabled by mission command, implies perhaps that a commander might do this, but
it is not explicitly stated (and it is not designed for operations “amongst the people”).
Nor is this issue necessarily well understood elsewhere in the multinational civil-
military community which constitutes a defining reality of these operations. After a
number of difficulties in terms of interpretation, particularly over the use of force, had
been resolved, JWP 3-50 was eventually accepted, with some changes, by NATO in
2001 as Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.1 Peace Support Operations. The
process of gaining acceptance of the doctrine and the differences of view which this
revealed will be briefly examined in Chapter 3.

Richard Connaughton did not like this doctrinal shift either, calling John Mackinlay’s
guide “fatally flawed”. Responding, Mackinlay pointed out the value of
recognising the “spaghetti tangle of political, military and humanitarian interests that
prevail and asked for Connaughton’s own prescription. On the whole commentary
on the new approach was favourable. In particular Peter Viggo Jackobsen noted a
more flexible response to “grey area” operations (i.e. than Wider Peace Keeping).
He pointed out the significant influence of the more robust French
“Restauration de la Paix” approach on the eventual (Western) consensus captured
in JWP 3-50. The French applied “active impartiality” to defend the mandate as
opposed to maintaining consent at all costs. Viggo Jackobsen saw the doctrine as
enduring and noted that in solving the problem of variable consent, it follows that
more robustly equipped and prepared forces would need to be deployed. Michael
Pugh also examined the consequences of the doctrine and notably wondered about its
political acceptability to troop contributors and the risks of escalation in the use of
force or “vertical mission creep”. Pugh sounded a note of caution and suggested
that the stricter division of labour between civil and military implied by more
muscular military peacekeeping meant consequent “insularity from civilian and
conflict resolution functions” as well as encouraging “military fixes of deep-rooted
political problems…exacerbated by pressure for quick exit strategies”.

Much of the debate on Third Generation doctrine rightly surrounded the use of force
although the complexity of the new operations and the players involved was clearly
described; Mackinlay and Connaughton in particular pointed out the need for an
adequate response amongst all actors. Berdal noted that given its political impact
enforcement action cannot be impartial, he warned that where “escalation
dominance can supposedly be maintained, advocates of the so called middle ground
options [i.e. peace enforcement]…are allowing governments to avoid hard decisions
about the implications deploying military personnel. Quoting Rupert Smith, he
remained concerned about the political requirements for the effective use of force, that is “what [military force] can achieve as opposed to what it can do”.  

However whilst the implications of the doctrine discussed above may have been clear, none of the doctrine or debate surrounding it focussed on the specific need, having deployed military force, to employ, or calibrate, military activity directly to support a nascent political or peace process, however loosely defined. Indeed a critical tension emerged; on the one hand, as Mackinlay pointed out, the military was part of an “orchestrated process of stabilisation”. Yet Pugh had his finger on another possible problem: a sense of distance between civilian actors charged with resolving conflict and the military. The politico-military actors’ reaction to this dynamic to is central to this thesis.

4.6. Contemporary UK Peace Support Operations Doctrine

In 2004 the UK updated JWP 3-50. The new work, *Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 2nd Edition (JWP 3-50) The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*”, explicitly acknowledged the supporting role of the military. This arguably achieved a major step towards delivering, at least conceptually, a comprehensive approach. The key tenets of the doctrine were the theory of “campaign authority” and, again, emphasis on military involvement in overall planning through the principle of “comprehensive and complementary campaigning”. The former was seen as an amalgam of perceived legitimacy conferred by the mandate, compliance or consent, and the degree to which the operation meets local and other expectations. For the latter, the commander “may be required to develop” two complementary plans. A “Comprehensive Peace Support Operations Plan”, which was a master plan for the international community as a whole and a complementary “Peace Support Force Campaign Plan”. Hence military involvement in the whole is clearly required yet there is no specific guidance on how, or whether, the commander might relate to the political or peace process and how this complicated planning process might work in reality.

4.7. A “Comprehensive Approach”? 

Common to the stability, counter insurgency and peace support doctrines discussed above is the requirement for coordination across the span of the comprehensive government activity necessary to stabilise and resolve conflict. Military doctrine has long fully acknowledged the requirement for a comprehensive approach and has stressed that the military role is only a contribution to a greater whole. Clearly the approach needs to be comprehensive at a number of levels. First, both within and between capitals of involved states. Second within and between multilateral institutions. Third, and where the effect is delivered, between actors deployed in theatre. This thesis focuses on the actions of commanders in the latter category but the first two also impinge when attempting to stabilise failing or failed states. However, the immediate problem, as explained in *JWP 3-50 (2nd edition)*, is that “there remains a tendency for government mechanisms to be optimised for the demands of routine government…rather than the specific complex and protracted demands of [Peace Support Operations]”.

38
The debate has been somewhat complicated because of the interrelation between a comprehensive approach and an effects based approach. The doctrinal community has been cognisant for some time of this need, not least due to work on effects based planning. Earlier emerging doctrine for effects based planning “encourage[d] the adoption of a revised, broader thinking…” and “the way of thinking and specific processes that, together, enable the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution within a comprehensive approach”. In an attempt to draw the strands together, the UK Ministry of Defence led the charge in 2005 with Joint Discussion Note as an attempt to secure pan government consensus on adopting a Comprehensive Approach at the Strategic level in the UK. This, probably unsuccessful, tentative MOD attempt to lead other government departments “from the back” reminded a pan-government audience that the military instrument cannot be used in isolation and suggests that the Comprehensive Approach is a natural extension of the UK Military “Effects Based Approach”, focussed on actions and their influence on behaviour rather than on targets and attrition. Alluding to previous successful efforts in the field to adopt such a “whole of government” approach (particularly in Kosovo) the MOD urged that the same should be achieved down through the levels as a national strategy.

The whole effects based idea has, however, recently been rather debunked recently in JDP 3-40 “[it] simply does not work [in a mechanistic form] for complex and variable human systems.” Equally, given that such comprehensive solutions extend well beyond the purely military domain, an obvious difficulty will lie in gaining acceptance of, and then co-ordinating, such an approach. It implies that someone is in charge of it all, but who and how? “The idea of a supreme single authority to oversee and direct, on behalf of HMG, an unfolding and chaotic situation for which a thousand or more moving parts are in constant and yet uncoordinated motion is fanciful. Laws, authorities and responsibilities, risk procedures and systems are the responsibilities of each separate actor in these campaigns.” This reminds us of the core problem of delivering a comprehensive approach both in capitals and in theatre.

No capital finds this easy, space precludes discussion of similar travails elsewhere, but Andrew Rathmell’s explanation of the problem for the UK is perhaps typical: “COIN, especially in its modern, globalised manifestations, is a highly complex public policy challenge….the most challenging issues for the UK are around delivery…unfortunately, the literature…reminds us just how difficult the public sector finds it to deliver policy outcomes in complex environments that cut across domains”. He also points out that “we will fail if the host government is ineffective, incompetent or thoroughly discredited.”

There is also a problem of delivering the necessary civilian capacity to help bring a comprehensive approach together. Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy suggested that “British success in Malaya also depended on a caucus of talented individuals with considerable experience of the country and its culture, language and environment. This type of hands-on field-experienced, political personality, the would-be campaign director, was the product of a colonial service that no longer exists.” Mackinlay further explains in The Insurgent Archipelago that, more recently “the diplomats who
belatedly attempted to fill this role... crucially lacked the derring-do, local credibility and natural authority of their colonial era predecessors”.\textsuperscript{188} Efforts are now underway to select, prepare and train suitable individuals through a cross-department Stabilisation Unit in London which is “responsible for deploying a variety of different people to hostile environments, including civil servants, police officers and civilian experts.”\textsuperscript{189} Whether this will impact on senior civilian leaders remains a moot point.

So, in circumstances where coordination to deliver unity of effort is likely to prove challenging, how should the commander respond? The core argument in this thesis is that he should involve himself in the problem in order to support the progression of the political or peace process irrespective of gaps in the international tool kit. The military will to do this exists. Speaking at RUSI in 2007 Lieutenant General David Richards pointed out that General Templar in Malaya was able to achieve unity of command and “pull all of the necessary levers”. Today:

“…the theatre commander can achieve unity of effort at best and will need to involve himself with a range of political and diplomatic activities in order to achieve it. This is not something we soldiers should shy away from. The ‘Soldier Statesman’ is in our Genes…in certain phases of a conflict, a soldier may be best suited to playing the lead role, only he has the organisational strength to pull the issues and the key players together. If a commander does not take the risks involved in trying to achieve this, then he can hardly blame others when the conditions needed to exploit narrower success are not in place.”\textsuperscript{190}

4.8. Contemporary literature - Reflections by senior commanders and others

General Sir Rupert Smith’s \textit{The Utility of Force}\textsuperscript{191} is pre-eminent amongst the recent accounts by former commanders. He covers a broad sweep of the development of war in the industrial age – industrial war, and its antithesis “war amongst the people” where “political and military developments go hand in hand”.\textsuperscript{192} And in so doing he establishes the context for a modern utility of force, which needs to be understood at the political level.\textsuperscript{193} The political objective and the military strategic objective are not one and the same; one is nested within the other. You give utility to the force used by recognising that the [military] strategic rests within the political.\textsuperscript{194} And “one must avoid the trap of confusing activity with outcome”.\textsuperscript{195} Unfortunately, as in the case of NATO’s bombing campaign on Serbia in 1999, this does not happen.\textsuperscript{196}

Equally in terms of planning and conduct “…the paradigm of war amongst the people reflects a very different world from the one of industrial war: it is one in which the political and the military are both parts of the same continuum, often working together – with a main difference being that military representatives may be part of the political and diplomatic negotiations.”\textsuperscript{197} Here Smith begins to develop, but does not pursue, Clausewitz’s idea of the solider as statesman. At interview Smith underlined the importance of a level where politics as a whole is fused, including the locals. This is the theatre (not the operational) level. Commanding at this level is best through “partnerships” - using the law firm analogy. A shared vision of the outcome and achieving it is needed. So, in a law firm the role of the managing partner is in sequencing and supporting activities rather than giving orders. Individual players
need only be coordinated to do their task as part of a partnership (for example a plumber’s role in building a house). Activity is also more economical this way. However the significant difficulty is making it work in a campaign because contributions are not from a single source politically. Also, because of national constraints you cannot disaggregate authority and responsibility. Therefore little national fiefdoms result.  

Given the modern preoccupation with leaving as soon as possible after intervention Smith notes that we intervene “to establish a condition in which the political objective can be achieved by other means and in other ways.” (This suggests the notion of interim end-states which will be illustrated in Chapter 4 on Kosovo). And part of this condition is “to influence the will of the people”. Smith explained the critical requirement for time: the more the opponent adopts guerrilla methods, the longer it takes to reach the condition in which a strategic decision and be made and a solution found. And while it is being found the condition has to be maintained, and since in part at least it has been arrived at by force it must be maintained for he want of a strategic decision. Hence modern operations are timeless. Mike Jackson has also commented that we do “operations” rather than conventional war.

Particularly relevant to this study are Smith’s views on the Commander’s difficulties when operating in a political vacuum and generalship in these circumstances. Smith forcefully makes the point that force will have no utility unless it is used to obtain strategic objectives and these need to be carefully calibrated by asking a series of questions - about the context and what we want to achieve at the political and theatre levels - and then planning the means of achieving this with all of the agencies (not just military) involved. This takes us again straight into the challenge of effecting a “comprehensive approach”. Where “…the strategic object cannot now be achieved through the singular use of massive military force alone: in most cases military force can only achieve tactical results and to have more than passing value these must be stitched into a greater plan”… “Hence the analysis of the outcome required must be in sufficient detail to see what to attack, and to link these applications of military force to the applications of other levers of power.” “The true institutional difficulty is in bringing the agencies together to answer all the questions.” But it must be done otherwise the use of force reinforces the opponent’s position rather than leading to our outcome.

Elsewhere, in 2004 after operations in 2000 to stabilise the situation in Sierra Leone, the Force Commander, Major General David Richards, described the “flowering benefits of coherent and multi-dimensional action based on a widely understood and firmly directed plan”. He illustrated the military capability to analyse complex conflict and produce “a coherent plan and then to ensure coherence over time across the interdependent lines of operation (political, humanitarian, economic, financial, reconstruction, industrial, security…). Drawing parallels with Templar in Malaya, Gwyn Prins suggested that this was achieved by “daily meetings of all the elements of British presence….at the British High Commission.”

Smith is clear that the campaign as a whole needs to be connected over time and space. “By thinking of it as one confrontation in which conflict has a role the actions
that are taken in the early stages are conducted so as to contribute directly to, or at the
least to avoid the confounding of, the achievement of later ones. Answering the
[planning] questions…helps to clarify the matter as a whole, as also the connections
between various actors.”\textsuperscript{211} So, all agencies need to be involved. Implicit, yet un-
stated in Smith’s thesis, is the idea that the military commander must cooperate fully
with the wider political process, and help to enable it. He confirmed at interview that
the military component does not own the military means or the ways because the
ways must fit into the political purpose of the endeavour.\textsuperscript{212}

In closing, Smith avows that “[t]he commanders at these sub-strategic levels need to
have their actions firmly nested in a context that includes the political, economic and
social factors local to the achievement and exploitation of their objective. Without
this wider context commanders at all levels will not be able to achieve their
objectives, nor therefore enable the final attainment of the desired political outcome –
the overarching purpose of the activity. In other words force will not have utility”.\textsuperscript{213}

Smith’s contribution is of seminal relevance to this thesis. Having set the context for
the engagement of (Western) forces in contemporary conflict, amongst the people, he
distinguishes “something must be done” from strategic analysis and planning leading
to a relevant and integrated effort to secure political objectives and give utility to the
use of force, as but one element of the mix of tools applied. He is clear on the
difficulties of achieving this and although he does not specifically suggest how a
general should relate to and support the (peace) process in theatre. Robert Cooper
suggests that for Smith,

“Using force effectively is not just a matter of having the right forces. You
must also have the right direction and must tune the military campaign to the
political goals. Defence, foreign and aid policy need to be brought together.
Clausewitz recommended that the head of the armed forces should sit in the
cabinet, not so that the politicians should receive military advice, but so that
the army should understand exactly what political goals it was fighting for and
could conduct the campaign accordingly. We need to find the modern
equivalent.”\textsuperscript{214}

This is the point that this thesis is intended to develop.

Michael Rose, in \textit{Fighting for Peace}\textsuperscript{215} outlines in stark terms the problem, for the
military, of operating (in Bosnia) without adequate political will or unequivocal
direction on the use of force to “obtain a political settlement”,\textsuperscript{216} or an agreed
campaign plan based on a common strategy which would coordinate “political activity
with humanitarian and security elements of the mission”.\textsuperscript{217} He also highlighted the
difficulty, in a peacekeeping mission, of crossing “the Mogadishu line”\textsuperscript{218} by using
too much force and so going beyond the mandate and losing consent without a way
back. In \textit{Soldier} Mike Jackson highlights the change in strategic circumstances with
the “self-proclaimed declaration of war by Al-Qaida against the West and its
values.”\textsuperscript{219} Now its not about possession of terrain but values: a new sort of struggle.
The most up to date and, in all probability, influential analysis on the problem of contemporary insurgency is John Mackinlay’s 2009 seminal treatise The Insurgent Archipelago which updates the conception of insurgency. He highlights the importance of the propaganda of the deed. He suggests that globalised insurgency has moved far from its Maoist roots and that it now can be recognised through an evolving list of characteristics.

“First, it is essentially a political process... Second, the techniques of an insurgency evolve with the societies from which it emerges…. Third, organising an insurgency is an act of desperation...Fourth and most importantly an insurgency has to involve the population; its energy, its ability to sustain itself and to continuously replace and regenerate its losses, arises from popular support.”

This neatly captures the likely challenge and the operating backdrop for contemporary deployed commanders because, as Mackinlay explains:

“The insurgent’s art is to take advantage of an environment to exploit a society’s aspirations and the way it exists...to win back the population, the state needs to have a political manifesto. Just as important, at the operational level, it needs to have a counter-insurgent instrument that can engage the contemporary characteristics of the adversary.”

Albeit much of the thrust of Mackinlay’s discussion is about the perils of intervention and the impact on Muslim populations at home. Hence his conclusions focus more on domestic measures and not on the actions of the soldiers, whom despite his eloquent arguments, we will probably continue to deploy.

5. Conclusions

5.1. The literature.

The key point identified in Clausewitz’s writings above, to migrate analysis of the essentially political nature of war through to “Phase 4”, and for the soldier appropriately to involve himself in the necessary political discourse has not been fully developed in the literature reviewed above. There is much cogent material, particularly in contemporary UK doctrine, and also notably by Rupert Smith on the political imperatives which act as drivers for military operations and the consequent planning and coordination challenges facing commanders and others. There is much on the meshing of military planning with political objectives. Nevertheless, the body of work reviewed, with the exception of Covey’s brief statement of a requirement, does not cover the specific facilitation and nurturing of the political or peace process and so of political outcomes.

UK MOD’s JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution includes “influence as the central idea and the notion of the “primacy of political purpose”. The object is to use military means in pursuit of a political settlement:
hence, borrowing from Smith, “to have utility, military activity and particularly the
use of force, should shape and drive this political settlement as a part of the solution to
security and stabilisation problems”.225 But this does not include the specific
requirement to support the political process or provide doctrinal guidance to the
commander on how he might do so.

Earlier writing on imperial policing and counter insurgency established a tradition of
civil-military cooperation. This relationship is perhaps typified by the selection of
General Templer as High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya in 1952.226 The
Director of Operations may have embodied the peace process, yet there is no direct
evidence emerging from this post war period of policy or doctrinal guidance
providing for military support to a political process in people-centric campaigns
where the key to success was to focus on people not guerrillas.227 What did emerge
was a readiness to cooperate, a willingness to subordinate military activity to political
needs or the needs of the administration, and a willingness on both sides to
compromise over the niceties. This state of affairs can be partly ascribed to the
closeness of colonial administrators and military during an extended period of
“imperial policing” and of course a more direct civil-military involvement countering
a series of post war insurgencies.

5.2. A Doctrinal Gap To Be Filled.

Notwithstanding a number of relevant contributions, notably by Rupert Smith228 the
new UK stability operations doctrine229 and the new UK counter insurgency
document230; there remains an important gap in the literature over military support to
the political dimension of these operations. There is an imbalance in doctrine between
the emphasis placed on the principle of political primacy and the guidance provided to
commanders in terms of how to support it. The available literature does not cover the
requirement for military commanders at the operational or theatre level to actively
facilitate political outcomes through campaign actions and the “docking mechanisms”
with civilian authorities, in terms of the “comprehensive approach”, which are needed
to achieve this. Acting in concert with the local “political manager” and so supporting
the needs of the wider peace process should be seen as a professional necessity. The
relevance of this thesis to the current doctrinal debate is clear: the object is to bring to
life the “primacy of political purpose” at theatre level.

Material presented in the following case studies will provide the means to help fill this
gap and will help to provide tomorrow’s solutions. This means describing the key to
pulling it all together: the military contribution to enabling the political element and
political peace process to go forward successfully. This may on occasion need to go
as far as actually leading or influencing the political element when there is a void in
terms of presence on the ground or the ability, even willingness to act politically.
5.3. An Emerging Model To Test Against The Multinational Challenge

Drawing on the above, the author intends to test the following model against the case studies.

5.3.1. Primacy of the political or peace process is the dominant theme for coordination of politico-military activity. Civilian political managers and military commanders must embrace this as a focussed, politico-military, form of comprehensive approach and adjust their operations to suit. This will impact both at a conceptual level and in terms of practicalities.

5.3.2. Military commanders at all levels must accept to some degree a role as a political actor. This is a professional imperative.

5.3.3. A politico-military framework is needed to enable coordination to secure political ends. If this is missing then military commanders need to act to fill the void, at least in terms of coordination. However care is needed here in managing an ambiguous relationship and the military commander must judge when to push and when to step back.

Falling from the above a tentative recommendation for further study is to examine the political void: how can potential leaders in post conflict situations be best prepared for the politico-military aspects of their role?

Having described the context for contemporary conflict, Chapter 1 suggested the need for military commanders at the theatre level to adapt the planning and conduct of operations to specifically support political outcomes. Chapter 2 has examined the British doctrinal guidance available for this and has suggested that, whilst political issues are given prominence, there is no specific guidance for the military component on how to support political primacy and political outcomes. Chapter 3 will now examine the issues surrounding multinational approaches to the crucial politico-military relationship particularly in the US and UN communities.

---

5 - - UK MOD, "Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines)," (2001), B-3-2. (page 97 in the PDF version) See also ———, "UK Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (JDP 3-40) Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution" (2009), 4-24.
Clausewitz, *On War*, 87. See also Clausewitz’s letter to Röder in 1827 ———, *On War*, p 7.


13 “However important the local interlocutors are you have to deal with them, nurture, cajole, build capacity and protect consent for both the international presence and the actions of local political leaders”. See Stephanie A. Blair, "The Road to Self-Rule: International Administration and the Devolution of Authority in Kosovo" (London, 2009), 291.


17 Ibid., 579.

18 Ibid., 700.

19 Thomas K Adams, "LIC (Low Intensity Clausewitz)," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 1, no. 3, pp 266-275 (1990); p 274-275 footnote 222.


21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., 606.

23 Ibid., 607.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., p 608.

26 Ibid., p 608 first footnote.

27 Ibid.


29 Ibid.(and see footnote 68 on p 425)


33 The specific term “politicomilitary”, as distinct from the more general “civil military”, will be used for the remainder of the thesis to emphasise the core theme that the military instrument can and should assist with delivering political outcomes and that in the field a successful politico-military relationship is needed to enable this.


36 Covey, "The Custodian of the Peace Process," 79.

37 Hawley, "Interview of Jock Covey on The Custodian of the Peace Process" (San Francisco. 2002), 4.

38 Ibid., 5.

39 Ibid., 8.

40 Ibid., 6. In Bosnia relationships were not good. “Carl Bildt was not popular with the US Army who in turn were obsessed with mission creep”. General Sir Mike Jackson, (former Commander Kosovo Force (KFOR) 1999) Interview, (Shrivenham, UK. 14 February 2001).
Covey, “The Custodian of the Peace Process,” 78. See also UN Capstone Doctrine which suggests that “peacekeepers...should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate”. See --, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (New York, NY 10017: Department of Peacekeeping Operations United Nations Secretariat, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, 2008), p 33.

As case studies will reveal, the British are no longer unique in this approach


Holmes, ed. The Oxford Companion to Military History, 262-263.


UK MOD, "Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (JDP 0-01) (3rd Edition),” pp (August 2008): iii. CDS’s foreword to British Defence Doctrine also points the reader to Clausewitz’s comments on self-education for commanders. See: Clausewitz, On War, 141.

Whilst the UK’s experience of conflict has not always been captured as doctrine for this purpose, it has during the post-imperial era, to an increasing degree been captured either formally or informally. See: Thomas R Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the post-imperial era (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995), 133-139.


MOD, "UK Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (JDP 3-40) Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution ".

Ibid., 3-1.

This is similar to the earlier COIN principle: political primacy and political aim. See ———, “Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines),” B-3-2. (page 97 in the PDF version).


Ibid., i.

Ibid., 1-1.


C E Callwell, Small Wars. Their Principles and Practice (Abingdon: Purnell Book Services Ltd, 1976 (first published 1899, reprinted 1906)).


Callwell, Small Wars. Their Principles and Practice.


Callwell, Small Wars. Their Principles and Practice, 40.

Ibid., 27.


Mockaitis, British Counter Insurgency 1919-60, 182-183.


Mockaitis, British Counter Insurgency 1919-60, 183.

War Office, "Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power," 5-6.

Ibid., p 9.

Not just in Malaya, over which there may have been “a disturbing preoccupation”. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the post-imperial era, 136-137.

MOD, "Countering Insurgency ", 1-5. For an earlier definition: “The actions of a minority group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion propaganda and military pressure aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change.” See --- UK Army Field Manual, Army Code No 71596 (parts 1&2), Operations Other Than War: Counter Insurgency Operations Part 1 The Concept and Practice of Insurgency and Part 2 The Conduct of Counter Insurgency Operations, 1995, Annex A, p A-2.


Dr Gary Sheffield, "Counter Insurgency/Peace Support Operations Workshop (attended by staff from JSCSC/Cranfield University/JDCC)," (JDCC, Shivenham, UK 22 Jan 01).(Dr Gary Sheffield speaking - author’s notes).


Mockaitis, British Counter Insurgency 1919-60, 186.


Ibid., 296.

Ibid., 290-291.

Mockaitis, British Counter Insurgency 1919-60, 187.

Ibid., 188.

The additional text in brackets reflects the discussion of these principles at a Counter Insurgency/Peace Support Operations Workshop (attended by staff from JSCSC/Cranfield University/JDCC) held at JDCC on 22 Jan 01 (author’s notes). See also --- UK Army Field Manual, Army Code No 71596 (Parts 1&2), Volume V - Operations Other Than War: Counter Insurgency


99 Mockaitis, British Counter Insurgency 1919-60, 193.

100 Brigadier LC Rumsey, "Letter for Maj Gen P St Clair Ford re lecture at Staff College," (Director of Operations Staff, Bluff Road, Kuala Lumpur, Federation of Malaya [held in JSCSC library]. 27 July 1957).


102 Ibid., 38. See also Alderson, "The Validity of British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine After The War in Iraq 2003-2009", 90-91.


116 But elsewhere it was described as Military Assistance to the Civil Authorities (MACA) for which doctrine was not written. See G Bulloch, "The Development of Doctrine for Counter Insurgency - The British Experience," British Army Review, no. 111, pp 21-24 (1995): 23.


118 Thomas R Mockaitis, Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict The Sword or the Olive Branch? (Westport Praeger, 1999), 128-129.


123 UK MOD, "Wider Peacekeeping: Army Field Manual Volume 5 Operations Other Than War Part 2 " (HMSO. 1994), 4-1. Although it is fair to say that this took the debate beyond earlier ―First Generation‖ or ―Nordic‖ Peacekeeping, which remained entirely consent-based. During the cold war period the Nordic Countries (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland) provided one in four peacekeepers in UN missions. See Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Encyclopaedia of International Peacekeeping Operations (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999), 179.
128 Ibid., 20.
131 Ibid., 21.
133 Ibid., 1-2.
136 For a description of how this principle was introduced see Bellamy, Knights in White Armour: The New Art of War and Peace, 250-253.
137 Rose, Fighting For Peace, 242.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid., 2-4. See also Lovelock, "Securing a Viable Peace," 128.
144 Ibid., 5-1 – 5-4.
147 Jackson, Interview.
149 Covey, "The Custodian of the Peace Process," 79.
Interviews with senior commanders revealed that all faced this challenge. Jackson, Interview.

Lieutenant General David Richards, (Commander ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, Former Commander ISAF Afghanistan 2006), Interview, (Rheindalen, Germany. 26 November 2007); General Sir Rupert Smith, Interview, (Brussels, Belgium. 28 October 2009); General Sir John McColl, (former Commander ISAF 2001-2, Senior British Military Representative-Iraq 2003-4, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe 2008-10), Interview, (Mons, Belgium. 20 November 2009).


155 Ibid.

156 Ibid.

157 Ibid.


159 The author, as Custodian and Editor of AJP 3.4.1, (the original drafter was Phillip Wilkinson) was instrumental in the editing and negotiation process leading to ratification. An example of the difficulties encountered was that Spain simply did not understand either the concept or application of mission command in this or any other setting.


162 France had 3 categories of “missions de paix”: “le maintien de la paix” – traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI; “le restauration de la paix” – peace restoration operations under Chapter VII with the absence of a ceasefire or consent but no particular aggressor; “l'imposition de la paix” – peace imposition under Chapter VII to re-establish or impose peace through the use or threat of force against an identified aggressor. Shaun Gregory, "France And Missions De Paix," RUSI Journal Vol 145, no. 4, pp 58-63 (2000): p 62.


166 Pugh, From Mission Cringe to Mission Creep?, 20, 22.


168 Ibid.pp: 70.


172 Ibid., 3-5.

173 Ibid., 2-14.

174 Ibid., 4-1 – 4-3.

175 This acceptance is embodied in the titles of current Stability and Peace Operations doctrine: “The military contribution to...”


179 Andrew Rathmell, 19 November 2010.

180 MOD, "Joint Discussion Note 4/05, The Comprehensive Approach," iii. The Oxford English Dictionary defines effect as: “a change which is the result or consequence of an action or other cause”.

181 Where “political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risks failure in all others”. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States


154 Lt Gen GCM Lamb, "JV08 CJTF Observations," (December 2008). Author’s copy.


157 Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency." 12.


161 Smith, The Utility of Force, the art of war in the Modern World.

162 Ibid., xiii

163 Ibid., xix

164 Ibid., 215-217.

165 Ibid., 213-214.

166 Ibid., 291.

167 Ibid., 183.

168 ______, Interview.

169 ______, The Utility of Force, the art of war in the Modern World, [270-271.

170 Ibid., 277.

171 Ibid., 292.

172 Mike Jackson, Soldier (Bantam Press, 2007), 370.

173 Smith, The Utility of Force, the art of war in the Modern World, 314.


175 Smith, The Utility of Force, the art of war in the Modern World, 383-385.

176 Ibid., 373.

177 Ibid., 386.


179 Ibid.pp.


181 Smith, The Utility of Force, the art of war in the Modern World, 389.

182 ______, Interview.

183 ______, The Utility of Force, the art of war in the Modern World, 403.


185 Rose, Fighting For Peace.

186 Ibid., 241.

187 Ibid., 248-249.

188 Ibid., 242.

189 Jackson, Soldier, 372.

190 Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago.

191 Ibid., 4-5.

192 Ibid., 6.


194 Ibid.
Albeit we may not do this again. “Seldom will a democracy nowadays be prepared to invest plenipotentiary powers in a supremo, let alone a military one”. Waters, "Kermit Roosevelt Lecture. TDRC Reference 10202,” 33.

Smith, The Utility of Force, the art of war in the Modern World.

MOD, "UK Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (JDP 3-40) Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution ".

———, "Countering Insurgency ".

Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago, 51.
Chapter 3 – Contemporary US, UN and NATO Doctrine for Peace and Stability Operations

1. Introduction.

The aim of this chapter is briefly to examine the US, UN and NATO doctrines relevant to the contemporary debate on politico-military cooperation in support of the political process at the theatre level. All three of these entities have an important role and influence on the conduct of peace and stability operations globally and are directly relevant to the three subsequent case studies. This is important because, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, it is widely accepted that a comprehensive approach is necessary in the face of resolving complex conflicts. The mix of nations and other agencies taking part in, or influencing, peace and stability operations seems likely to become ever more complex thus delivering a comprehensive approach will remain challenging. As Lord Paddy Ashdown explained at interview, Western public opinion is shifting away from intervention and the move to a multi-polar world would mean the increased involvement of other powerful countries which have an interest particularly, China and India. Hence the UN may become more involved in implementation for any future contingencies; here Ashdown takes a “baleful view” of the UN which is “really necessary, important for specialist agencies, but not good at managing executive action”. Therefore it is suggested that contemporary doctrines need to be drawn together to ensure that the best available doctrinal practice supports state building and peace building activities and to deliver a truly comprehensive approach.

The emphasis in this chapter, as with Chapter 2, will be on the policies captured in the doctrinal debate and the literature immediately surrounding this. It is neither possible nor feasible to conduct a detailed review of the significant body of literature covering, for example, civil-military relations and state building in the case of the US, or peace keeping and peace building in the case of the UN. Space also precludes detailed analysis of field practice although reference will be made to this to illustrate key aspects of policy development, and the subsequent case studies in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will take up the significant themes. These issues will then be developed chapter 7.

This chapter will show that, as with the case of the UK, the US, UN and NATO have doctrinal guidance which suggests military support to political primacy and the political process. This should take the military component beyond merely providing a safe and secure environment and sees the military commander becoming a political actor. What is missing, however, is practical guidance on what this means in terms of substantive actions or practical military support to the political process at theatre level. Also absent is guidance on the civilian side on how to understand the military component as a political actor rather than solely an instrument of state power. Enhancing doctrine to include this would help to address the absence of unity of command and the difficulties of achieving unity of effort. It is here that the commander may need to act in a
statesmanlike manner to help keep the political process on track and maintain campaign progress towards a military end state, which in turn helps enable a strategic outcome.

2. The United States.

Given its importance derived from political and economic throw-weight, underpinned by conventional military power, the United States currently remains a paramount influence in the Western World in terms of intervention, stabilisation and peace operations. As such it is possibly the most likely future leader of coalition post intervention operations in the short to medium term. The approach adopted by US military commanders, and their civilian counterparts, now and in the future, remains a critical issue in the context addressed by this thesis. Understanding the current US doctrinal approach and the pressures underlying this will provide a valuable insight into behaviours which will be examined in the later case studies. It is also be important to recognize that the US military faces countervailing pressures and arguments to avoid entanglement and focus on war fighting rather than state building. Nonetheless the US military have moved on, rapidly, to understand this operational necessity. It is also germane here to underline the importance of doctrine to the US Army and Marine Corps as the conceptual catalyst in the “force development” process. Hence if US military doctrine is inappropriate it is likely that inappropriate military capabilities could be fielded for the task at hand.

2.1. The US Army and Marine Corps Counter Insurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5): “A moon without a planet”.

2.1.1. The problem: "mosaic war"

John Nagl explained that the US Army had been “unprepared” to fight an insurgency in Iraq in 2003, it “was organised, designed, trained, and equipped to defeat another conventional army ...”. It had been unwilling “to internalize and build on the lessons from [its last significant experience of insurgency in] Vietnam” in part because “we purged ourselves of everything that had to do with irregular warfare or insurgency; because it had to do with how we lost that war”. New doctrine for "war amongst the people" was needed. Alexander Alderson has provided a revealing, detailed and nuanced summation of the rapid development during 2005-6 and the initial employment in 2007 of Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency, principally under the hand of the experienced US Army General David Petraeus and US Marine Corps General James Mattis. In the foreword to the publication Petraeus and Amos (Mattis’s successor) underlined its purpose: to “fill the doctrinal gap”.

The new doctrine was firmly population-centric and not insurgent-focused. It was influenced by earlier British and French writings, especially Robert Thompson and David Galula; the latter notably stressed the need for civil-military unity of effort in counter insurgency (COIN). Petraeus was nevertheless clear that this was for a new kind of war beyond Maoist insurgency, where the ‘insurgents may use guerrilla tactics
in one province while executing terrorist attacks and an urban approach in another... The result is more than just a "three-block war": it is a shifting "mosaic war" that is difficult for counterinsurgents to envision as a coherent whole.\textsuperscript{25} It was also made clear that "any successful COIN operation must address the legitimate grievances insurgents used to generate popular support."\textsuperscript{26}

2.1.2. Core Ideas and Principles

The core ideas are that this is about political power, population security being key because it enables other essential grievance-resolving activities; hence the civilian is the centre of gravity to be insulated from insurgent pressure.\textsuperscript{27} Each side (that is insurgents and counter insurgents) “aims to get the people to accept its government's authority as legitimate”\textsuperscript{28} thus success is about gaining consent “to the [host nation] government’s rule”.\textsuperscript{29} Bringing together the necessary supporting economic, governance and essential service elements to achieve this, over a long period, unsurprisingly, require that “all elements of the United States Government ... must be integrated”.\textsuperscript{30} The following table, originally developed by Alex Alderson, summarises the principles, contemporary imperatives and paradoxes which are the main argument in \textit{FM 3-24}. Selective discussion of these follows.

\textbf{Table 3.1.} \textit{FM 3-24} Principles Contemporary Imperatives and Paradoxes. Source Alderson and \textit{FM 3-24} pp 1-20 – 1-28.\textsuperscript{31}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical Principles For Counterinsurgency</th>
<th>Contemporary Imperatives</th>
<th>Paradoxes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy Is the Main Objective</td>
<td>Manage Information and Expectations</td>
<td>Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of Effort Is Essential</td>
<td>Use Measured Force</td>
<td>Sometimes, the More Force Is Used, the Less Effective It Is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Factors Are Primary</td>
<td>Learn and Adapt</td>
<td>The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk Must Be Accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment</td>
<td>Empower the Lowest Level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Operations</td>
<td>Support the Host Nation</td>
<td>Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An early draft of *FM 3-24’s “principles imperatives and paradoxes was published in advance of the new doctrine in order to get the doctrine available for use in the field.* Interestingly, the article suggested that political primacy should be a principle in its own right.

"While all the elements of national power have a role in successful counterinsurgency, political objectives must retain primacy. All actions, kinetic or non-kinetic, must be planned and executed with consideration of their contribution towards strengthening the host governments legitimacy and achieving the US government political goals. The political and military aspects of an insurgency are usually so bound together as to be inseparable, and most insurgents recognise this fact. In counterinsurgencies military actions conducted without proper analysis of their political effects will at best be ineffective and at worst aid the enemy." 

This language closely reflects the key argument in this thesis; nevertheless it is interesting that the final version of the manual saw softer text. Political primacy became “Political Factors Are Primary” and the language is nuanced, perhaps to reduce the express reliance on political direction at theatre level; nevertheless it stresses the requirement for political and diplomatic leaders to actively participate throughout the conduct of COIN operations "the political and military aspects of the insurgencies are so bound together as to be inseparable". But the doctrine does not provide a clear statement of who is in charge and *FM 3-24 uses what seems compromise language to deal with the matter of unity of effort. "Ideally, a single counter insurgent leader has authority over all government agencies involved in COIN operations. Usually, however, military commanders work to achieve unity of effort through liaison with leaders of a wide variety of non-military agencies. The US Ambassador [and] ... senior [host nation]
representatives ... must be key players in higher level planning; similar connections are needed throughout the chain of command."\(^{37}\) Whilst this formulation probably reflects reality, it seems inadequate doctrinal guidance on the difficulty of achieving unity of effort in order to pursue the political solution. This is a core point which will be developed in Chapters 5 and 6.

The “paradoxes of counterinsurgency operations” (see Table 3.1 above), apparently innocuous, even obvious, homilies,\(^8\) for example, "sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be," bring to life the complexity and contradictory nature of counterinsurgency. Yet they mask fundamental policy issues for the US, notably over the use of force, risk taking, and its political consequences. This is illustrated by the nuanced imperative to "use the appropriate level of force"\(^{39}\) which is distinct from earlier war fighting approaches where the use of force was less discriminate – because, then, the objective was not the people themselves.\(^{40}\) As Sarah Sewell pointed out, "this is a radical message because it countermanded decades of conventional US military practice".\(^{41}\) Now, “because the civilian is fundamental to the COIN mission, force protection must...give way."\(^{42}\) And where defensive activity is needed for the restoration of public security, this "is a stark departure from the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of overwhelming and decisive offensive force."\(^{43}\) The relevance to this thesis here is the additional (domestic) political issue for commanders to consider.

In terms of objectives, “effective analysis of an insurgency requires identifying its strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective is the insurgents’ desired end state. Operational objectives are those that insurgents pursue to destroy government legitimacy and progressively establish their desired end state. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts."\(^{44}\) This of course begs the question what is the counter insurgent’s objective at those same three levels and what is their narrative? The doctrine suggests that legitimacy is the counterinsurgents’ main objective.\(^{45}\) Therefore a COIN campaign is not a military one and it needs political leadership. However, is this political leadership and decision-making to be done by a politician or a general? In reality: who calls the shots? Part of the answer is the people, because counterinsurgents "must continually diagnose what they understand legitimacy to mean to the host nation population. The population's expectations will influence all ensuing operations".\(^{46}\) Clearly intervening forces need a grasp of political issues at all levels.

2.1.3. Civil-Military Relationships

Given that “[n]on-military capacity is the exit strategy”,\(^{47}\) civil military relationships and hence unity of effort are essential. *FM 3-24* notes the importance of military efforts but these need integrating with other instruments of national power.\(^{48}\) But, again, who is in charge? Sarah Sewell sees the role of politics here and “military dependence not simply upon civilian political direction at all levels of operation, but also upon civilian capacities in the field. It asks the US civilian leadership and bureaucracy to take on more of the
responsibility and burden." She adds that "the primacy of the political requires significant and ongoing civilian involvement at virtually every level of operations. Political leadership may…deliver a negotiated solution…”⁴⁹ This seems clear but it leaves open the problem, for the military, of how to respond if the civilian capacity is not present. Equally, what if the military find themselves in the best position to negotiate political issues? Discussing the realistic division of labour, FM 3-24 suggests David Galula's observation that "to confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be done, and nobody else is available to undertake them, would be senseless [although ideally] it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians."⁵⁰

FM 3-24 is unambiguous about the interdependence of all actors' contributions to the counterinsurgency effort. It follows that the coordination of these will be where the operational art lies. But it is not clear who is the artist. The manual offers that "[Logical Lines of Operation] (LLOs) in COIN focus primarily on the populace. Each line depends on the others. The interdependence of the lines is total: if one fails the mission fails. Many LLOs require applying capabilities usually resident in civilian organisations; ...effective COIN leaders understand the interdependent relationship of all participants, military and civilian COIN leaders orchestrate their efforts to achieve unity of effort and coherent results."⁵¹ A few lines later ambiguity in the drafting suggests a requirement for a single leader in order to achieve unity of command.⁵² So how many leaders are there? There is however a useful sense of manoevrist flexibility. “Given the primacy of political considerations, military forces often support civilian efforts. However, the mosaic nature...means that the lead responsibility shifts amongst military, civilian, and [host nation] authorities. Regardless, military leaders should prepare to assume local leadership for COIN efforts…focusing on what needs to be done, not on who does it.”⁵³

This pragmatic advice reflects reality: a shared vision of purpose,⁵⁴ and not unity of command, is probably the best that can be achieved given the multiple actors involved, and that the situation will change according to the "mosaic" and the stage of the campaign. Achieving his would be easier in a single nation intervention than in a multinational, multi-actor effort. This thesis suggests that further developing this guidance to stress the support to the political process would provide a helpful means of keeping in mind the peace building as well as security aspects of such a vision of purpose. A requirement for politically savvy military leaders follows, particularly when dealing with the host nation. Commanders ―are required to lead through coordination, and communication, and consensus ... [they] often act as diplomats as well as warriors ...".⁵⁵ The solider-diplomat is a theme which will continue to emerge.

2.1.4. Operational Design, Planning and Execution of Operations

FM 3-24 strikes a balance between “targeting of irreconcilable insurgents and [persuading] less committed enemies [to give up using other] elements of power,”⁵⁶ and “support[ing] a [host nation] government in gaining legitimacy and the support of the populace”.⁵⁷ The complexity of these problems is such that "... the hardest part of the
problem is figuring out what the problem is". Thus, the importance of commanders leading the design of such a campaign, before staffs conduct detailed planning “to translate design into execution”, 58 is emphasised. Here FM 3-24 offers the helpful concept of "Iterative counterinsurgency campaign design". 59 (See Appendix 2 for details). This cycle of activity, designed to analyse and then unify is very helpful. But, as we will see with UN and NATO doctrines, it leaves the open the linkage with a wider political context and political process, for which there is no design. In this sense it remains rather tactical 60 begging a number of questions already posed by the author: who owns this design and planning process; how does it relate to the over arching political process and how does the commander help it along? The obvious difficulty here, and at the tactical level, is integrating and sequencing all of the civilian actors, the military and the host nation across the LLOs to deliver this outcome, particularly if all of the players do not show up. 61 (For further details see Appendix 2).

The US Army sees counterinsurgency operations as "full spectrum operations" which include offensive, defensive, and stability operations. This seems to indicate that stability operations are nested within counterinsurgency operations, although this is rather unclear in the doctrine. 62 Although, over time if COIN succeeds, perhaps it becomes a matter of maintaining stability so that gains are not lost? 63 As with the British doctrine 64 there remains some confusion and discussion over the relationship between counterinsurgency and stabilisation doctrines. The US version appears to see counterinsurgency as part of irregular warfare and stability operations as a subset of counterinsurgency. The next section will examine US stability operations doctrine.

2.2. FM 3-07 The US Army Stability Operations Field Manual

2.2.1. Problem statement

In 2005, the US Department of Defence directed that “Stability Operations are a core U.S. military mission”. 65 The ensuing doctrine, FM 3-07 Stability Operations was published by the US Army in 2008. Following soon after FM 3-24 it covers a wide canvas of potential operations. Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley set out the strategic context, remind of lessons learned at great cost, and suggest that "humility in accepting that US combat power alone cannot, in the end, produce lasting political change and enduring stability is the basic proposition at the core of FM 3-07...Such a proposition is as simple as it is revolutionary". 66 The “thick conceptual fog produced by strategic shocks ..." 67 remains a problem for policy makers and the emerging operational environment suggests the US military "will face three core challenges: rising tensions in the global commons, hybrid forms of warfare, and threats posed by weak and failing states". 68

As with FM 3-24, FM 3-07 was seen as a radical departure for the US military. 69 It fills a gap evident at the tactical level during early operations in Iraq and "the manual's emphasis on the "comprehensive approach" and the interagency approach to writing it,
"highlights the understanding that the military cannot succeed in these environments on its own." Janine Davidson insists that this is not,

"an attempted takeover by the military of core civilian functions [because for the majority of the] essential stability tasks FM 3-07 clearly articulates the military's role as a supporting one. ... A comprehensive approach ... recognises that there are many non-military actors with more appropriate skill sets than the military possess ... thus the doctrine calls for a division of labour in which military and civilians work together in the field toward a common objective and do not displace or compete with each other." She also points out the problem of limited civilian capacity and that military forces must be prepared to assume these responsibilities.

**2.2.2. Principles**

\textit{FM 3-07} does not offer principles (or imperatives or paradoxes). Instead it adopts an end state-based planning approach around a matrix of tasks, at different echelons of responsibility. Such a strategic matrix had been in the making for close to a decade and reflects work at the (former) U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). The key idea in the “strategic approach” - the “how” in \textit{FM 3-07} - is to foster the comprehensive approach: understanding that unity of command is impossible in a multi-agency environment; the doctrine makes great play of the requirement for unity of effort, "uniting all of the diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success in stability operations requires collaborative and cooperative paradigms that focused those capabilities towards a common goal". Beyond this a whole of (US) government approach and a comprehensive approach are vital; "a comprehensive approach is founded in the cooperative spirit of unity of effort". This is workable if all the players cooperate, but clearly difficult if not. Another element of the strategic approach, “conflict transformation” addresses the dynamics of conflict and attempts to turn these into processes for "constructive, positive change", through "reducing the means and motivations ... while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives ...".

The strategy (not strategic approach as discussed above) - the “what” - for stability operations is encapsulated in an "overarching framework" which is "founded on five broad conditions that describe the desired end state of successful stability operations. In turn, a series of objectives link the execution of tactical tasks to that end state. The end state conditions are: a safe and secure environment; established rule of law; social well-being; stable governance; and a sustainable economy."
2.2.3. Operational Design and Approaches to Stability

The operational design is provided by the end state framework and here the effort to link military and civilian efforts “creates a single model that forms the basis for developing lines of effort”.\(^{82}\) (See Appendix 2 for details) The manual describes work by the Department of State on post-conflict reconstruction essential tasks “the essential stability task matrix”\(^{83}\) which breaks down the tasks into “stability sectors”\(^{84}\) However, again, there is no guidance for the general on how to relate his efforts to the political process\(^{85}\) and the overarching question remains what links all of the tactical activity together? \(^{86}\)

*FM 3-07* provides a useful categorisation of tasks. Those where the military retain primary responsibility; where civilian agencies likely retain responsibility, but the military forces are prepared to execute; and tasks which civilian agencies or organisations retain primary responsibility. These primary stability tasks are each discussed in detail.\(^{86}\) Again, in a section on support to governance, there is no guidance on how to dovetail with political direction and how commanders should approach taking political decisions.\(^{87}\) Discussion of civil affairs operations at all levels hints at political imperatives but provides no guidance on supporting the political process or political primacy.\(^{88}\)

A chapter on transitional military authority, for use in circumstances immediately following intervention, discusses practical details yet, interestingly does not provide the familiar task matrix to guide planners.\(^{89}\) It hints at involvement with political issues yet it does not provide a scintilla of advice to commanders on how to help establish a viable political process as part of an initial state building effort, or how to orchestrate a handoff to civilian authority. This is a glaring omission, particularly in view of the promising quote at the beginning of the chapter referring to previous interventions where: “... US military leaders sometimes had to add to their traditional roles as soldiers those of a statesman and the politician.”\(^{90}\)

2.3. Recent Doctrinal Developments in US Civil Military Cooperation.

2.3.1. Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the US Army published “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction”\(^{91}\) in late 2009. The aim was to fill a longstanding gap in doctrine for civilian policy makers, planners and practitioners. Although the authors emphasise that this work is not government policy, the book is helpful in terms of thought leadership. It identifies “strategic principles for all major activities in [stability and reconstruction] missions in one place”.\(^{92}\) It seeks to foster common understanding and, with this, a comprehensive approach. As with *FM 3-07*, end states are outlined. These are linked to corresponding US government technical sectors\(^{93}\) and, distinct from *FM 3-07*, there is a set of overarching cross cutting principles.\(^{94}\) (See summary in Table 3.2.)
Table 3.2 USIP Summary of End states Technical Sectors and Crosscutting Principles. Source USIP.\textsuperscript{95}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End states</th>
<th>US Government Technical sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safe and Secure Environment</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Justice and Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Governance</td>
<td>Governance and Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable Economy</td>
<td>Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Well-being</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cross Cutting Principles**

- Host Nation Ownership and Capacity
- Political Primacy
- Legitimacy
- Unity of Effort
- Security
- Conflict Transformation
- Regional Engagement
The work provides a helpful explanation of the practical impact of political primacy, referred to as a cross cutting principle, which “means that a political settlement is the cornerstone of a sustainable peace. Every decision and every action has an impact on the possibility of forging political agreement.” Jock Covey’s “primacy of the peace process” (see chapter 2) is also cited although the context suggested is one of maintaining a safe and secure environment, not supporting the broader political process.


A new series of pamphlets, the “Unified Action Handbook Series” issued in January 2010 by United States Forces Command, is designed to “assist the joint force commander… [to] design, plan and execute a whole of government approach”. This explains a new doctrinal term “unified action” which is “the synchronisation, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort”. It underlines the centrality of war amongst the people where “a principal objective is to win the confidence of the population and convert the adversary to become a partner to contribute to stability”. This is distinct from the destructive aspect of conventional warfare. The handbook postulates a “notional whole of government planning initiative” (see figure 3.1 below), which sets out sensible lines of operation leading to sequenced military, civilian and host nation end states. These are supported (in the pamphlets) by a wealth of advice and material on the now accepted state-building requirement. The road already travelled by the US military, from the “avoidance of mission creep”, to a situation where some agencies complain that the military have gone too far in creating civil-military interdependencies, is acknowledged.
Among the principles for mission success, the handbook identifies a “focus on state building as the central objective” and a requirement to “recognise the links between political, security, and development objectives”, with consequent tradeoffs. Against such an ambitious backdrop, whilst the need for coordination is stressed, it is a pity that the work does not develop the state building idea to identify a central narrative for the political process to help achieve unity of effort. The handbook implies but does not underline the requirement for political primacy and hence political judgement when making the required tradeoffs between objectives. This had been clearly identified as a crosscutting principle in the earlier USIP work on guiding principles. Nor does it offer
guidance on precisely how the interesting “notional whole of government planning initiative” (see Figure 3.1) would be pulled together.

Much of the work in the Unified Action series and FM 3-07 is pulled together in draft doctrine, the *US Joint Chiefs of Staff Stability Operations Joint Publication (JP) 3-07*. This repeats the UK MOD’s elements of a stable state model and highlights the centrality of the political settlement as a strategy. Usefully the draft *JP 3-07 Stability Operations* asserts that,

> “all military action should be assessed by its contribution toward influencing the key conflict relationship and shaping a the eventual political settlement. At the heart of the political problem lies a contest between the way political power is organized, and who wields that power. A commander Leaders of peacemaking efforts will need to convince decisive elites that their interests are best served through an accommodation with the approved political settlement, rather than renewed conflict. Where this is not possible, the use of military force can influence and alter the political dynamics, which may remove the barriers to any accommodation.”

The above quotation is repeated showing the “Microsoft Word Track Changes” as found in the draft *JP 3-07 Stability Operations*. These perhaps reveal an interesting ongoing discussion and perhaps some tension over the limits to the role of US military forces in the peace building process.

### 2.4. Conclusions on US doctrine

The “demands of counterinsurgency” and state building captured in *FM 3-24* (and *FM 3-07*) certainly seem to “challenge much of what is holy about the American way of war” and this raises questions as much about which wars to fight as how: “The paradox here is that by discussing the conduct of war - *jus in bello*... ironically ... the manual’s value may lie in better informing ... *jus ad bellum* decisions.” The doctrine has been described as “something of an apotheosis of this genre”; it is, although there remain gaps. The first problem is not the quality or quantity of the military doctrine and the guidance that it provides, but the absence of an overarching civilian counterpart. Hence Sewall’s correct suggestion that *FM 3-24* was “a moon without a planet to orbit”. Equally the absence of guidance for politico-military relationships on the ground rather leaves the commander to his own devices in forging unity of effort.

Alderson points out that *FM 3-24* was not without its critics. Relevant to this thesis, is the criticism that the necessary inter-agency approach required by the doctrine would “leave the military practitioners to expect too much ... we all talk about a comprehensive whole government approach, but the US never really gets there ...”. Leaving aside the geo-strategic issues relating to US foreign policy, this leaves the apparent paradox that, absent top-level guidance, the doctrine was written anyway by the military - because the doctrine-driven army cannot operate successfully or change without it. Another paradox
here is the concomitant requirement for US officers to take on essentially political roles to make the doctrine work, here there is scope for what Robert Egnell termed a “Huntingtonian fear of military politicisation”.  

Beyond the impact of doctrine on the organisation of the army, there is another issue. *FM 3-24*, (and its stability operations counterpart *FM 3-07*), identifies civilian political and capability requirements that are vital to military strategic and overall success. A void here leaves the commander with some difficulty. Does he, as the US counterinsurgency doctrine implies, and as the US stability operations doctrine states, actually take the lead? Or should he adopt a more nuanced position whereby he provides the resources and the effort necessary to prop up the political effort whilst at the same time accepting that he is not and should not attempt to become, the dominant partner? Musing on the political nature of counterinsurgency, as elucidated by Galula, Alderson asks “how can doctrine be developed without a clearly articulated joint and inter-agency approach? In the absence of [this approach] Petraeus and his…team [made] *FM 3-24* at least a start point, one which he developed effectively with Crocker in Baghdad”.  

This is the gap which this thesis is intended to fill. It begs the question whether Petraeus realised the limitations of the appetite for doctrine in terms of politico-military cooperation, for which he personally did not need guidance, on the one hand, whilst on the other responding to the imperative to change the US Army, and its lower level tactics, in order to bring the situation in Iraq under control.

Turning to stability operations, *FM 3-07* provides an excellent tactical reference source for those contemplating state building; nevertheless there remain significant gaps in the advice, particularly over the higher level civil military relationships that are necessary to develop and sustain a viable political process leading to military transition and exit. The core idea – deciding end states across an ambitious range of sectors, and then prescribing unity of effort and synchronisation of a myriad of tasks – is not ground breaking advice at the theatre level. Davidson complimented the writing team on actively seeking the perspectives of other agencies and non-governmental organisations, “it is in every other way, shape, and form a true interagency, whole-of-government product”. Nevertheless, the doctrine lacks “connective tissue” and is remarkably light on guidance for the inevitable political interactions that such an all encompassing interagency effort will require of soldiers. It is also unduly dense and repetitive. Beyond the debate over whether the military approach to taking on civilian tasks is too muscular, there is no clear guidance on political primacy, and the nuanced support to political actors that this requires. There are also inconsistencies in the use of terminology. The delivery of this major doctrinal product, coming only two years after a similar effort to generate *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, also raises questions as to which doctrine the US Army is actually following on operations today.

The emerging US work on “whole of government approaches” does not yet provide sufficient clarity on the importance of the political process (which could also be used as a means to achieve unity of effort along the lines of Covey’s “primacy of the peace process
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2). The requirement for political primacy and hence political judgement when making the required tradeoffs between objectives has been clearly identified as a crosscutting principle in *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, but as yet there is no material designed to take this forward in practical terms. Helpfully, the political process theme is successfully taken up in the draft *JP 3-07 Stability Operations* which highlights the centrality of the political settlement; nevertheless it seems that there is an ongoing debate on the depth of US military involvement in the peace building process. Finally, it is important not to underestimate the potential global impact of the doctrines discussed above. This will range from US training assistance to other countries through to a significant impact on the US approach to insurgency and stability, and therefore on the UN and NATO, in Afghanistan. Turning to the global stage, the next section will address how policy and doctrinal work under the aegis of the UN addresses the problem of post conflict stability.

3. The United Nations

The United Nations Charter and the global scope and scale of UN involvement suggests that it remains the organisation of choice to conduct both complex peacekeeping and peace building activities: “as often as not, governments call the UN”.\(^{120}\) The UN is often a significant peace building player following interventions by other organisations or coalitions of the willing,\(^{121}\) and is “uniquely equipped with the legitimacy, experience, coordinating ability and logistics mechanisms to work in post conflict settings”.\(^{122}\) The UN is involved to a greater or lesser degree in the interventions to be examined in the case studies: Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.

In order to narrow the focus to the relevant contemporary debate, selective consideration of the UN will start with the “Brahimi Report”\(^{123}\) in 2000. This seminal analysis of the United Nations peace operations market, conducted in the light of failures during the 1990s,\(^{124}\) provides a comprehensive baseline for discussion. The policy, doctrinal and operational changes which flowed from it reveal significant challenges,\(^{125}\) and a real effort to move beyond “traditional peacekeeping”\(^{126}\) and to fit the UN for “integrated” peacekeeping operations where active peace building is a prerequisite for success.\(^{127}\) In terms of improving outcomes for complex peace operations, the best guidance for the Force Commander would be advice along the lines that he has a mandate which is primarily about creating security conditions, but that he should also look at supporting the political process through his planning and actions in order to help resolve underlying issues. For SRSGs the issue would be their ability to inform the Force Commander on what is required of him and accepting his help in supporting the political process.


Over a four-month period in 2000, Lakdar Brahimi led a panel "to assess the United Nations ability to conduct peace operations effectively and to offer frank, specific and realistic recommendations for ways in which to enhance that capacity."\(^{129}\) Much of the
work was orchestrated by Dr William Durch, a noted expert on peace operations. In a comprehensive document entitled *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (“The Brahimi Report”), the panel addressed various aspects of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace building drawing on the experience of the 1990s. They underlined the duality of projecting credible force whilst building peace in circumstances where the confrontation between the parties to the conflict remained. Thus "peacekeepers would work to maintain a secure environment while peace builders work to make sure that environment [is] self-sustaining ... [this] offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, making peacekeepers and peace builders inseparable partners". The consequent requirement to develop peace building strategies and programmes might suggest that the military (or civilian) peacekeepers have no role in peace building. Equally, in terms of definition there appeared to be clear blue water between peacekeeping and peace building, albeit there are some bridges.

The Brahimi Report validated the “bedrock principles” of peacekeeping as consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self defence but recommended a robust doctrine and realistic mandates for the future, underlining that impartiality requires adherence to the principles of the UN Charter; if its terms were broken, then equal treatment of transgressors would be ineffective and, at worst, could amount to “complicity with evil". This implies that impartiality must be in relation to achieving the mandate and not the parties to the conflict. The panel began to shape the outlines of improved mission guidance and leadership, suggesting that the new mission leadership team - including the force commander - should come together to facilitate pre-deployment planning at UN Headquarters.

The Brahimi Report defined the elements of United Nations peace operations as: conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building. Conflict Prevention deals with sources of conflict, whilst peacemaking attempts to stop ongoing conflict. Peacekeeping "is a 50 year old enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars". Whereas Peace-building,

"defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peace-building includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques."
The Brahimi Report offered a distinction between "traditional peacekeeping, which treats the symptoms rather than sources of conflict...[and has] no built in exit strategy", and post cold war peacekeeping which "has often combined with peace-building in complex peace operations deployed into settings of intra-state conflict". Moreover,

"United Nations operations ... do not deploy into post-conflict situations so much as they deploy to create such situations. That is, they work to divert the unfinished conflict, and the personal, political or other agendas that drove it, from the military to the political arena, and how to make that diversion permanent."

In a complex peace operation, the Brahimi panel saw the peacekeepers maintaining a secure local environment for peace building and the peace builders supporting political social and economic change to deliver self-sustaining peace. Peacekeepers and peace builders are "inseparable partners ... peace builders may not be able to function without peacekeepers ... [and] peacekeepers have no exit without ... peace builders." The potential overlap between peacekeeping and peace building activity in complex peace operations is relevant because, as with the counter insurgency and stability operations doctrines discussed above, it poses a question for military commanders: how can, and should, they support the peace building process? (So far in this thesis this process has been termed the “political or peace process”, but for practical purposes, given Brahimi’s definition above the author equates this with “peace building”). In terms of peacekeeping doctrine, Brahimi provides a robust endorsement for the use of (more) force, together with a call for realistic planning assumptions, yet there is nothing on the provision of military support to peace building or the political process. In a section on the multidimensional nature of peace building, the panel offered no direct mention of military support, this is gently implied, although there is a real sense of separateness between the military and civilian contributions.

The panel called for “clear, credible and achievable mandates” and “a clear chain of command and unity of effort” yet offered no guidance on civil-military coordination and cooperation. Nevertheless the approach suggested in this thesis appears to be endorsed by a statement that mission leadership should develop, before deploying, “a strategy for implementing the mandate while trying to establish the mission’s political/military centre of gravity and sustain a potentially fragile peace process”. This integrated and seemingly comprehensive approach was supported by a proposal to establish “integrated mission task forces” to conduct planning and provide centralised support for deployed missions. But there were apparent limits to the level of ambition. In addressing the “challenge of transitional civil administration”, the panel noted the inherent difficulties of providing governance and basic services whilst conducting what others would refer to as state building. Yet the panel noted the dilemma, for the UN Secretariat, given reluctance to “be in this business at all”, whilst being faced with a potential requirement to attempt it again and hence a need to avoid failure. The remainder of this section will examine the extent to which these issues have subsequently
been addressed in United Nations doctrine\textsuperscript{156} and the gap which remains as regards the questions posed by this thesis.

### 3.2. UN Doctrine following The Brahimi Report

Lack of space precludes discussion of the “rancorous debate”\textsuperscript{157} over the UN’s wider role\textsuperscript{158} in the wake of The Brahimi Report. This section therefore focuses on initial progress in developing doctrine after the report. A \textit{Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations}\textsuperscript{159} was published by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in December 2003.\textsuperscript{160} Military tasks were (rightly) centred on providing a secure environment with other roles such as Demobilisation Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) and de-mining.\textsuperscript{161} The requirement for coordination was stressed and, although there were 49 references to a peace process as a central political activity, the outline of such a process was not defined. There was scant acknowledgement of a role for the military commander as a key actor in supporting this process in either practical or substantive terms. Reflecting internal institutional difficulties within the UN Secretariat, the doctrine captured much of what Brahimi had termed “peace building” albeit under a “peacekeeping” rubric.\textsuperscript{162} It stated that DPKO was responsible for direction of peacekeeping missions yet it also noted that the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) was the focal point for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peace building.\textsuperscript{163} Later a United Nations World Summit in 2005 approved the new “Peacebuilding Commission” supported within the UN Secretariat by a “Peacebuilding Support Office” in order to take action on the challenges of peace building.\textsuperscript{164} Hence, at least doctrinally, the matter of who is in charge of the exit strategy remained wide open.

In the chapter on the responsibilities of and factors relevant to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG),\textsuperscript{165} the handbook describes the broad role as: facilitator of a political process; head of UN presence; head of mission; and interim or transitional administrator.\textsuperscript{166} Arguably the Force Commander would have influence or even some practical input to all of these roles yet he is barely mentioned as an interlocutor for the SRSG. The requirement for a chain of command in the field where military components are under UN authority is also left rather vague.\textsuperscript{167} Perhaps as reaction to UK thought leadership through Peace Support Operations (PSO) doctrine (discussed in Chapter 2), the requirement for a “comprehensive mandate implementation plan, developed by the mission,”\textsuperscript{168} which “can optimize the contributions of all partners by providing unity of purpose”\textsuperscript{169} is clearly stated. The parties to the conflict are rightly seen as “the main interlocutors for the SRSG in the political process”;\textsuperscript{170} these may shift given “evolving political and military realities”.\textsuperscript{171} Again no role for the Force Commander seems envisaged here, despite the stated linkage of the political with the military and the distinct likelihood that the Force Commander’s own interlocutors, most notably the parties to the conflict, would wield political as well as military influence.
In a chapter on military issues, the basic thrust is that the principal military role is to provide a secure environment so that other elements of the peace process can be implemented. Whilst "military capability ...[can] provide the space and opportunity for peacemaking and political negotiations", there is no mention of a military role beyond technical assistance or of a substantive part in peace building activity as a political actor. There is a helpful recognition that "the military component interacts with all other ... components". For the political component this means "joint strategic planning for mandate implementation and adjusting the tasks of the military component to the changing political realities on the ground", and "the military component must work with all other partners to help consolidate peace". Sadly this is at the end of the document thus perhaps unlikely to be read by an SRSG and there is no guidance on how to operationalise this advice. The handbook also lists useful integration techniques such as an integrated civil-military coordination cell and a joint operations centre.

A comprehensive assessment of progress since the Brahimi panel: The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations was provided in a 2003 report by Durch, Holt, Earle and Shanahan. This suggested that there had been improved performance in peacekeeping but more effort was needed on “peacebuilding elements that promote acceptable conditions for mission drawdown and exit”. The report emphasised the reality of many operations as a new model “post-enforcement peace building—where a coalition force maintains order while the UN addresses other pressing needs”. Nevertheless transitional administration remained a “touchy subject” in part due to perceived association with “colonial legacies”.

### 3.3. UN Capstone Doctrine 2008.

In a report to the UN General Assembly in 2006 the UN Secretary General suggested a reform strategy: “Peace Operations 2010”. Among the recommendations were requirements to continue work on lessons learned, best practices and doctrine, including defining the limits of peacekeeping. A key reform element would be integration as a “fundamental principle” and the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office was intended to implement this as part of an overall peacebuilding effort. Also noted for improvement was DPKO’s integrated mission planning process. Finally the Secretary General suggested that improved relationships with international financial institutions would help to secure success both in the immediate post conflict and later institution building stages.

Subsequent strategic level doctrinal guidance United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines was published by DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) in 2008. Referred to as UN Capstone Doctrine, and acknowledging Brahimi’s analysis, this was intended to capture the experiences and evolution of peacekeeping over 60 years and the shifting nature of conflict from inter-state towards intra-state. Jean Marie Guéhenno, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations stressed that beyond monitoring ceasefires, todays “multi-dimensional
peacekeeping operations are called upon to facilitate the political process”. The UN Capstone Doctrine underlined the need for an integrated approach and included an attempt to show the “linkages and grey areas” between the various peace related activities undertaken by the UN. (See figure 3.2 below). This helps to explain the difficulty over using force, and the blurring of the line between “robust” peacekeeping, peace enforcement and war, the main difference being that force is used to achieve tactical compliance in peacekeeping whereas in peace enforcement force is applied at the strategic level. For the post-conflict or post-ceasefire phase, the required progression in the political process is clearly illustrated and could be seen as synonymous with a peace process.

**Figure 3.2: Linkages and Grey Areas in UN Activities.** Source United Nations.

The UN Capstone Doctrine again highlighted the difficulty with "traditional" peacekeeping operations which do not have a role in political conflict resolution efforts. But in the light of the changed conflict and landscape, its focus is on "a new generation of 'multi-dimensional' UN peacekeeping operations". The core outputs would be to: create a secure and stable environment while building local capacity; facilitate the political process; and provide a framework to ensure coherence among external actors. For the military this would include the use of the minimum amount of force necessary to protect the peace process, but not to achieve the military defeat of any spoilers. Peace building activities in the security, rule of law, political and social and economic spheres are required for sustainable peace yet the guidelines suggest that UN peacekeeping operations are generally not adequately resourced for these. Nevertheless they may be required to “play a catalytic role” in a number of areas. Those of specific
interest to the military are DDR, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and support to the restoration and extension of state authority.  

The doctrine underscores the integrated approach and a shared vision from the planning stage forward, yet whilst rather long on words it does not paint a simple picture which might help to visualise this. Sensibly it points out that too much integration maybe counter-productive, particularly for humanitarian and development partners, in some circumstances. The integrated missions planning process is "intended to help the United Nations system arrive at a common understanding of its strategic objectives" by getting the right people and issues to the table.

A final section in the UN Capstone Doctrine on what amounts to the UN’s operational art describes mandate implementation and the necessary support over the life of a mission from deployment to exit. Accepting that the UN’s doctrine is intended to cover a range of types of operation and mandate, with or without external actors, including non-UN military formations, the guidance remains very broad. The “challenge of mission implementation and coordination” and the need for integration “guided by a common strategic vision” are mentioned. Yet missing is any tool or generic plan to help the SRSG and all concerned to capture, visualise, then integrate the various strands of effort needed. Nor is there guidance on how, even generically, the civilian and military actors might interact in pursuing and integrating these. This is an omission because, in a final section on transition, the doctrine offers a clue to the integration requirement through benchmarks for transition of mission responsibilities. These include, broadly, a satisfactory: security and human rights situation; completion of DDR, national security capability; judicial and corrections capability; restoration of state authority and basic services; return or resettlement of displaced persons; formation of political institutions with free and fair elections. However there is no mention of supporting a political settlement.

### 3.4. Updated UN CIMIC Policy in 2010

Other UN doctrinal documents give a flavour of the difficulty of integrating the military with the civilian and also, as with the US and NATO, the absence of guidance as to how to support political primacy and the peace process. A new UN policy document on Civil-Military coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC), issued in January 2010, provides an excellent rationale: "civil-military coordination ... should be conducted in support of the wider peace process and not solely in support of the military commander's intent or humanitarian objectives". The document goes beyond the military mission although it focuses on enabling civil affairs (fixing bridges and so on) rather than the political peace process. It is also tempered by the need to avoid problems for the humanitarian community, particularly over the political aspects of peacebuilding. Thus, coordination with this community is referred to separately as UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) as championed by UNOCHA. The UN-CIMIC document separates provision of a secure environment from support to the
political process and long-term social stability. The former being primarily a military function and the latter primarily a civilian activity. However in a complex situation such a separation seems simplistic. The policy helpfully stresses the need for soldiers to have "a solid understanding of the civilian effort, of the political and social context ... and of ways in which the military can make a constructive contribution", and also "maximising the comparative advantage of all actors ... the essential aim [being] to maximise and exploit opportunities to create enabling conditions for civilian organisations and partners, especially the host nation government, to accelerate the peace process and bring about the military and state".

Despite this excellent concept, the policy is self limiting in two senses. First the actual coordination function is limited to UN-CIMIC officers, and not the military mission as a whole, thus potentially limiting the opportunities for interaction; as US General Petraeus suggested, albeit in a different context, “everyone must do nation-building”. Second the policy sees UN Civil Affairs officers rather than UN Political Officers, as the primary interlocutors for UN-CIMIC Officers. Depending on the precise role of civil affairs staff, focussing here may tend to reduce emphasis on military support to the overall political process and, in UN parlance, peace building activity. In terms of the Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), the document suggests efforts "to develop an integrated strategic framework for peace consolidation", with military input. However there is no hint of what this would look like and, as Cedric de Coning had suggested earlier, the CIMIC concept is somewhat overtaken by the UN Integrated Mission concept, at least at the strategic level.


The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations (formerly the Peace Challenges Project), comprising policy makers, practitioners and academics, has since 1997 engaged with DPKO to develop peacekeeping doctrine. This has included work in support of the 2008 UN Capstone Doctrine. A recent draft report “Considerations for Senior Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Missions” was intended to build on the strategic level capstone doctrine with practical guidance for the mission leadership team at the operational level. It identifies key objectives, operational outputs, activities that need to be undertaken by the mission, benchmarks, and a framework based on short medium and long-term priorities. Whilst acknowledging that “the functions of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building become entwined”, the structure of this emerging product nevertheless persists with the separation of the political and the security strands, although acknowledging the "developing nexus between peacekeeping and peace building".

Significantly, this putative new doctrine stresses political primacy in peacekeeping and the "political engagement of the international community". This means that all actors are involved, including the force commander. Specifically, the engagement of the UN Mission Leadership Team should be a "skilled articulation of refined political
The question how the military commander should best support this requirement is unanswered, although helpful examples of politically charged issues which would involve the Force Commander, are identified. These include the establishment of mechanisms for dispute resolution and the separation of warring factions. Both would need careful coordination between political, military, and police elements to achieve the peacekeeping mission’s objectives. Helpfully integrated planning and action with standing coordination arrangements and an Integrated Strategic Framework - essentially a shared vision of objectives with results timelines and responsibilities - are detailed.

3.6. Conclusions on UN Doctrine.

This briefest of surveys has focussed on published and emerging UN doctrine and the work immediately surrounding this rather than the plethora of material on the role of the UN and the field missions themselves. It seems clear that the Brahimi report could be seen as the beginning of the UN’s comprehensive approach and the UN readily acknowledges that “no single organisation can presently conduct all of the multifaceted tasks required to support and consolidate peace processes”. The scope of potential types of missions remains broad and clearly, in terms of mandates, there can be no one size fits all. Notwithstanding this challenge a body of all-embracing doctrine now exists to provide guidance if not guaranteed political support and resources. Practice suggests that a UN mission is likely to find itself operating alongside a national or coalition element providing some or all of the security function, or acting as an emergency backup as in the case of the British intervention which rescued and then galvanised UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone in 2000. The UN’s involvement in this aspect of contemporary operations will be addressed in the case study chapters to follow.

It is helpful that the UN doctrine is civilian-focussed; this distinguishes it from the military led approaches in the UK and US. However three issues remain. First available UN doctrine does not tend to paint a picture of the multiple lines of activity across various sectors needed to deliver a comprehensive approach and the coordination challenge that this brings for the UN and other actors. Second, and building on the first point, there remains a sense of stove piping: peacekeeping and peace building activity are at best blurred, with as Paddy Ashdown suggests, scope for internal turf wars. Third, the potential military role in assisting peace building is not fully acknowledged or developed. There is little evidence in the doctrine of recognition of an emerging role for the military commander as a political actor in his own right. Clearly there should be sensible limits to military action in this realm. Nevertheless for the UN, the civilian and military roles currently remain distinct, as Durch et al suggest: “Peacekeepers protect peacebuilders, the substantive civilian members of a complex operation, who help create the conditions that enable peacekeepers to go home.” But the problem remains in “designing and implementing peacebuilding strategies that can facilitate responsible transition and exit”. Given that emerging UN doctrine for the theatre level does indicate a requirement for all actors to support political primacy, it is relevant to examine
what can the military do to help the political process. Equally how should their civilian counterparts take advantage of the military asset when implementing peace?

4. NATO

4.1. Why discuss NATO?

NATO is a Regional Organisation recognised under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Its core purpose is to foster Euro-Atlantic security. NATO has been involved in a number of stabilisation operations (Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Iraq, and Afghanistan). Given this experience, the significant military resources potentially available from its member states, efforts to analyse and prepare policies and doctrines for the future security environment, the increasing (albeit contentious) global reach of the Alliance, and its somewhat existential involvement in Afghanistan, NATO remains the most significant regional organisation. As the leader of significant numbers of non-NATO countries, NATO’s operational policies and doctrines are likely to have global reach, albeit amongst more developed troop contributing nations. NATO controls significant ongoing post-intervention operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. And whilst the EU has both pretensions and potential it currently does not conduct significant stability operations. Although contentions for some members, should the need arise the EU could draw on NATO capabilities through the "Berlin plus" arrangements for the use of NATO assets and capabilities. This would of course include NATO’s military doctrinal approach. As with the UN, lack of space precludes substantive analysis of the policy debate surrounding the security environment or NATO’s role, functions and reform of its institutions; this section will therefore concentrate on NATO doctrinal development in support of current and future peace and stability operations.

4.2. NATO’s policy challenges.

Overlaying the doctrinal debate in NATO is a difficulty in achieving a true shared analysis on a number of levels. These include debate on the necessity for intervention, the nature of any commitment and resources required and, importantly, the practical arrangements with other organisations. One consequence of the lack of shared analysis tends to be different approaches taken by different lead nations in different regions on operations (as exemplified in Kosovo and Afghanistan). At the tactical level, this also impacts on the military response to the political imperative as suggested by this thesis.

NATO currently faces several broad policy challenges in the doctrinal arena. First delivering its own internal comprehensive approach to help it effect coordination between international actors (such as the UN, the EU, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the African Union) at all levels. Second, for current operations and as the major military, and arguably political, player in what is clearly a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan (see Chapter 6), NATO needs to be part of a comprehensive approach and develop the ability to “draw on tools that complement”
what NATO can offer. Third, NATO needs to agree the relevant military doctrine to underpin this. The difficulty of delivering this both at the grand strategic level, and in the field, is exacerbated by the fact NATO remains a military alliance and some member states, for different reasons, wish to constrain its ability to reach out to, and consequently to coordinate with, other organisations in the non-military dimension.

Since the end of the Cold War a significant challenge for the Alliance has been agreeing military doctrine for “out of area” or "Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations"; in other words operations not in direct defence of Alliance territory. NATO’s Balkan interventions galvanised the process, and British PSO doctrine (see chapter 2), albeit somewhat watered down in order to achieve consensus, became the basis for NATO's *Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1 Peace Support Operations*. However, this long debated product was designed for a broadly consent based environment with a peace process to support, and, although providing a basis for NATO training since ratification, it has not met the demands of operations against insurgents, particularly in Afghanistan.

4.3. NATO’s comprehensive approach

As a major Regional Organisation, NATO understands that there are no solely military solutions to contemporary security problems and therefore a comprehensive approach from the strategic level downwards is needed. So what are the basic questions to be resolved from this perspective? Although policy is not agreed, NATO suggests that it is developing “pragmatic proposals” which seek to make improvements in five areas of work. First, the planning and conduct of operations, where “practical cooperation at all levels with all relevant organizations and actors in the planning and conduct of operations” is needed. This will promote unity of effort with “clear definition of strategies and objectives”; critically the effect on the local population must also be considered at the outset. Second, in the area of lessons learned, training, education and exercises, the key point is to improve trust and cooperation by encouraging joint training of civilian and military personnel amongst all relevant actors. Third, the effort to enhance cooperation with external actors would help achieve mutual understanding, trust, confidence and respect among the relevant organizations and actors whilst respecting their autonomy. Fourth, NATO understands that its public messaging needs sustained and coherent public messages and that the main actors’ information strategies need to complement not contradict each other. Finally, military stabilisation and reconstruction activities need to be improved. This is partly about delivering the right military (and civilian) capabilities but also needs better coordination between military and other IOs and NGOs as providers of essential stabilisation and reconstruction capabilities. It seems likely that resolving these issues will be a significant challenge to be addressed by the future Alliance Strategic Concept and the “International Community” as a whole.

Much of NATO’s emerging policy is focussed above theatre level and has left vague the matter of coordination of efforts between the international community and with local
political actors. Unity of command within the “international medley” of intervening actors remains impossible and understandably there is no sense of whom, if any one, might be in charge. However progress is being made at the operational level and as Sir Stewart Eldon, the UK Permanent Representative to NATO pointed out, “we must not let … Brussels get too far behind the practitioners”. He was referring to Exercise ARRCADE Fusion where the Ace Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) worked with “diplomats, development experts, media experts, NGOs and academics, all under a ‘UN Integrated Plan’. A Policy Steering Group brought together the UN Special Envoy, the President of the host government, the Commander, and other representatives of the military, diplomatic and development communities”. Other related UK-led work under the aegis of the ARRC, Project Tardis, seeks to operationalise the comprehensive approach. Taking the debate beyond the conceptual, it argues for the “required resources, political will and strategic patience” and a “holistic view of the mission’s strategic objectives…[with] flexible command and control [embracing] key civilian partners…”. However none of the work addresses the detail of military support to any specific political process. Hence, the proposition in this thesis is that this is an omission and commanders need to understand their position as significant political actors who can and should support and the demands of a political process. There is a further potential problem, on occasion, the discordance of the “international medley” may provide the commander with such a complex situation as to leave him with no choice other than to attempt to fill gaps left by the absence of civilian political capacity. In order to sustain progress he may be in a position where he is forced to decide for himself what might be the acceptable political bandwidth for military activity.

4.4. NATO’s military counterinsurgency doctrine.

“Military activities aim to protect the population and neutralise the insurgents. These activities will create favourable conditions for [host nation] and Alliance agencies and all other civil actors to gain access to the population and address core grievances. They will also allow the [host nation] government to broker a political solution which defeats the insurgency.”

Emerging, not yet ratified, NATO counter insurgency doctrine, *AJP 3.4.4 Doctrine for Counterinsurgency* is encapsulated in the above quotation. It is an interesting amalgam of the British stabilisation and US counter insurgency doctrines which repays the careful reader with some nuggets of useful advice. It concentrates on military stabilisation and reconstruction activities in countering insurgency but seems informed by the NATO debate on the comprehensive approach, with its inherent gaps. Focussing on the military contribution, but also intended to inform other actors, the draft doctrine describes the “complex operational environment” in terms familiar to the reader of British Security and Stabilisation doctrine *JDP 3-40* (see Chapter 2). Given intra-state conflict and the likely failed state problem, with its inherent inability to resolve conflict, the doctrine situates countering insurgency as the “most demanding” campaign theme in “countering irregular activity” (See Glossary).
As with the US version, the doctrine is population-focused; this underlines the need to moderate the use of force, resolve grievances and create incentives; hence a comprehensive approach is required. Given the broad range of activities required to deal with insurgency the draft helpfully underlines the significance of political considerations which “are of much greater importance than military considerations in a struggle for the consent of the population. Therefore, every action in [counterinsurgency] should support a political resolution to the problem.”

The importance of unity of effort and unity of purpose and hence good civil military relations are made clear. This is important given the likely reality that the civilian task of delivering security and stabilisation, will fall to the military, at least initially, should the security situation so dictate. In addressing this, NATO’s comprehensive approach would need complementary action at three levels: at the political-strategic level, building confidence and trust; at the theatre level, securing effective cooperation with indigenous and international actors; and at the operational level, delivering complex effects. There is useful advice on political realities: “commanders must…understand all military and civilian aspects of the comprehensive approach because of its impact upon the operational environment and resulting effects upon military requirements”. Nevertheless there is no real attempt to address the substantive or practical requirements of the political process needed for exit and the requirement that this places on commanders, particularly at theatre level.

As a basis for discussion on what is required to address state fragility, the doctrine draws on the British analysis of the elements of a stable state as an amalgam of security, economic and infrastructure development, and governance and the rule of law, these being drawn together by societal relationships and a political settlement (as discussed in Chapter 2). The sections on operational design, planning and execution of operations draw extensively on FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency discussed above. Focussing at the operational level, the draft doctrine emphasises the requirement for joint design and planning of operations whilst political primacy and unity of effort are again stressed:

“Political considerations in COIN require special attention to achieve unity of effort. The means to achieve unity of effort are a comprehensive approach - essentially all multinational, joint, intergovernmental, inter-agency, non-governmental and other actors working towards a common purpose. In its most basic terms, all actors should strive to counter an insurgency as a team.”

The second half of this quote seems highly aspirational in the face of the international medley, which may be discordant. It may not reflect operating realities, absent a significant diplomatic effort on the part of military and other leaders. The unity (of command) theme is pressed further in discussion of planning, the operational art and leadership. Depending on the progression of the campaign and the proportion of military,
development and diplomatic effort being applied, there is a requirement for a political or military supremo.

“Coordination requires leadership. Indeed, it also requires the existence of one top theatre authority (either civilian or military, depending on the phase, but it must be one authority)... One should keep in mind that the insurgent’s strategy often benefits in terms of time from the coexistence of equally high ranking leaders who may be unable to agree and are then unable or slow to trigger effort in given fields. The subsequent lack of unity of effort can protract the insurgency.”

Although perhaps a seductive idea, no clue is given as to how this is to be achieved by NATO in practical terms except, presumably, through a de facto reality and not a de jure arrangement. As the draft doctrine suggests:

“[T]he commander is pivotal in orchestrating the efforts of a wide variety of agencies into a comprehensive approach...through consensus and compromise as well as with traditional command practices. Commanders should promote the role and sovereignty of the [Host Nation]. Although NATO forces are endowed with immense military power, versatility and ... firepower, they have to operate in close coordination with non-military actors. This cooperative and collaborative effort is required to stabilise the environment and to contribute to the defeat of an insurgency. Commanders must act as diplomats as well as soldiers.”

4.5. Conclusions on NATO doctrine

The “gaps between... theory [in NATO HQ] and operational practice” are beginning to be filled. Emerging policies at NATO HQ, in operational level headquarters, and in the doctrinal arena provide a sound basis for improved strategic analysis, planning and conduct of operations at all levels. Challenges and gaps remain, not least inter- and intra-institutional reluctance to effect a comprehensive approach and the lack of civilian stabilisation and reconstruction capability either owned by NATO or member states. Doctrine will not solve that problem nor can it prevent other difficulties such as fiefdoms in theatre with separate regional approaches.

The doctrinal proposal that a military or civilian supremo is required harks back to distant counterinsurgency campaigns (see Chapter 2); yet, given that NATO does not own the whole problem or the solutions in theatre, this element of the comprehensive approach amongst the "international medley" is likely to remain aspirational. Nevertheless this hints that in some circumstances the commander may have to act as a de facto statesman and therefore take on such a role, particularly in the absence of either political direction or capable civilian interlocutors. The guidance discussed above should prove useful, at least in terms of driving a shared understanding of the problem, for
contemporary operations in Afghanistan and notwithstanding past and current public scepticism over any future interventions.

5. Conclusions

The core doctrinal debate has now moved from the use of force to how to operate amongst the people in a failed state scenario, deliver the necessary prescriptions to resolve grievances and so secure the required political authority. The literature recognises that a comprehensive approach is needed and that civilian leadership with political primacy are required to deliver this. Yet it is also clear that the civilian side needs a good deal of support from the military component, particularly where civilian capabilities are unavailable. The international medley of actors present, who may be discordant, the impossibility of achieving unity of command and the difficulty of achieving unity of effort across diverse strands all point to a continuing challenge for military commanders. The bottom line is that there is a quantity of doctrine spreading the mantra of integration, but this is light on guidance to both civilians and military on supporting political primacy and why this is important. So, how should the military commander effect positive military support to the political process? There is some emerging US doctrinal work on this and the centrality of the political settlement, but this work appears equivocal. This thesis advocates a significant role for the military component in this context and the following case study chapters will illustrate why the author believes this to be necessary.

It is helpful that doctrines now strike a sensible balance between force and persuasion. The last decade has seen the US reducing its reliance on force in the light of post intervention state building realities; whereas, in the wake of the The Brahimi Report, the UN now seems more prepared to apply force in complex peace operations. There remains some terminological confusion and differences, for example between US counterinsurgency and stability doctrines and between peacekeeping and peace building for the UN. Nevertheless as Larry Cable pointed out, before any of the doctrine reviewed above was written, there are more fundamental similarities, “the insurgent, the counter-insurgent, the peace enforcer and the peacekeeper all have the same goal: political authority over a specified population in a defined geographic venue.” Hence the central challenge remains the same – joining up civilian and military efforts.

In these circumstances, the operational art revolves around achieving unity of purpose through a shared vision and integrating multiple strands of activity. Achieving this will need dynamic activity and demand diplomatic skills, and in all probability statesman-like behaviour, of senior soldiers and senior civilians. Although the available doctrine variously implies such challenges for the general, there is no real guidance on specifically how he should support the political process or how others should view this. Additional challenges will include what to do if civilian capacity is absent or incomplete; or if civilian political instructions are lacking, or complex?
The global scope and scale of UN operations suggests a clear imperative to support the UN in building on progress in complex peacekeeping through integrated missions and also those where the UN acts alongside coalition forces. A key internal issue for the UN is bringing peacekeeping operations and peace building operations together properly and achieving synergy, because in some senses, given the UN's structural arrangements, as with US-led state building efforts, there may be a tendency to operate on a separate orbits. UN and other contemporary doctrines also need to be harmonised to ensure that the best available doctrinal practice supports state building and peace building activities and to better deliver a comprehensive approach.

So far this thesis has addressed the broad security environment and suggested a hypothesis for military interaction with, and support to, the political process in stability and complex peace operations. The thesis has suggested that British, US, UN and NATO doctrines, although extensive, do not fully meet this requirement. The purpose of doctrine is to capture experience and the following case studies will show that practice now indicates a requirement for further doctrinal guidance on supporting the political process. This would help to explain what is to be supported under the often repeated mantra of "political primacy". One approach for the soldier-statesman here would be to postulate deriving an “acceptable political bandwidth for military activity”. Such an approach would help judge the mix of military and political actions needed to keep the political process on track, accepting imperfections, and maintain positive progress towards eventual military exit. Equally, it is intended to suggest further research on the extent to which senior civilian actors understand the military commander’s latent potential to support the peace process.

The following chapter presents a case study of operations in Kosovo in 1999-2000 where a NATO military force was directly mandated to support a UN civilian mission under a United Nations Security Council Resolution. The case of Kosovo demonstrated significant and successful innovations in politico-military cooperation which helped to engender and sustain political progress and wider peace building activities.

---

1 The former UK Foreign Secretary also noted that Western power is shifting “we are moving into a multipolar age”. David Miliband, “The war in Afghanistan: How to end it. Speech by Rt Hon David Milliband MP Foreign Secretary on Afghanistan delivered as part of the eminent Compton lecture series,” http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/roller/miliband/entry/the_war_in_afghanistan.How. Accessed 28 July 2008
3 Ibid.
4 Albeit some is emerging and not yet agreed or used.
7 Albeit the number of US troops deployed on UN peacekeeping operations is low, the US foots a significant element of the UN’s peacekeeping costs.
11 Force Development in the US is driven under the headings of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF); doctrine being the initial driver.
13 Ibid., p xiii. There had been difficulty keeping the counterinsurgency “flame burning” even at a low level in the US Army. Steven Metz, "Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability," (Carlisle: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), p 24. And as Stephen Blank pointed out Counter Insurgency was “The war that dare not speak its name” and there was a confusing array of terminology for the wars that the Pentagon did not really want to fight. He also points out another term “multivariant war". Stephen Blank, "The War That Dare Not Speak Its Name," The Journal of International Security Affairs Spring 2005, no. 8, pp (2005): p 1-2. 7-8.
15 Ibid., p xii-xiv.
19 For an overview of lessons that Petraeus learned in Iraq (all were incorporated in the new doctrine) see Lieutenant General US Army Petraeus David H., "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering In Iraq," Military Review January February 2006pp 46-55 (2006). In September 2005 the author and his staff contributed to the identification of these lessons whilst serving in Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq under Petraeus.
20 --, "FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency Field Manual." (foreword - no page number)

See Chapter 1


See Chapter 1


See Chapter 1


See Chapter 1


See Chapter 1


See Chapter 1


See Chapter 1


See Chapter 1


See Chapter 1

57 Ibid., p 309.
58 ———, "FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency Field Manual," p 4-2.
59 Ibid., p 4-5.
60 Telephone discussion with Professor Anthony King on 24 March 2009.
62 ———, "FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency Field Manual," p 1-19. Here it seems likely that for, the US, COIN is nested within stability operations.
63 Ibid., p 5-2.
64 Amongst British doctrine writers there are also differences of view. The author of UK security and stabilisation doctrine sees COIN nested within stabilisation, COIN being a particularly difficult part. Alasdair Balgarnie, Lt Col. (MOD DCDC Team Leader JWP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation), Interview, (Shrivenham. 21 April 2010). Whereas the author of UK COIN doctrine saw this as less clear cut given that COIN can be a standalone operation. Alexander Alderson, (Colonel, MBE, PhD. MNF-I Strategic Planner November 2007-July 2008), Interview, (Warminster, UK. 8 February 2010).
67 Ibid., p vi.
68 Ibid., p vii. Flournoy and Brimley offer a conceptual grand strategy for this operational environment which would rest on two core pillars. That “the modern international system remains rooted in the power and efficacy of individual states ...; and that American power is best deployed in ... strengthen [ing] the international system”. A military strategy falling from this would see US forces into a near “directly countering those state or non-state actors who attack US interests ...; and pre-or post-conflict stability operations to prevent or redress state failure...”. So whilst such a grand strategy has yet to be publicly elucidated it seems that this doctrine is also a moon without a planet. -- Headquarters Department of the Army, "FM 3-07 Stability Operations," (October 2008), p vii-x.
70 Ibid., p xv.
71 Ibid., p xvi.
72 Ibid., p xvii. Davidson also characterises earlier non-war fighting doctrinal approaches such as FM 100-23 Peace Operations, in 1994, as reflecting the bottom-up experiences as opposed to the top-down process used by the Army to inculcate war fighting doctrine (FM-100). Here it seems reasonable to assume that this new doctrine based on top-down directives would benefit from similar energy at the implementation stage (see page xx).
88

77 Ibid., p 1-7.
80 Ibid., p 1-16.
81 The document discusses the detailed task requirements of achieving each of these end states. Ibid., p 1-26.
82 Ibid., p 2-7.
83 Ibid., p 2-4 – 2-6.
84 Ibid., p 2-8.
85 See for example the section on support to governance. Ibid., p 2-18.
86 Ibid., p 3-3 to 3-31.
87 Ibid., p 3-21.
88 Ibid., p 3-32.
89 Ibid., p 5-1 to 5-16.
90 Ibid., p 5-1.
92 Ibid., p 1-3.
93 Ibid., p 1-6. As with FM 3-07, see Army, "FM 3-07 Stability Operations," p 2-7 (figure 2.2 An Integrated Approach to Stability Operations
95 Ibid., p 1-6, 2-8 – 2-9.
97 Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, p 6-44.
99 Ibid., p i.
104 Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, p 3-12.
105 ---, "Joint Publication 3-07 Stability Operations (Final Coordination Draft)," (US Joint Chiefs of Staff. 22 April 2010).

102 
103 "Joint Publication 3-07 Stability Operations (Final Coordination Draft)," p 1-14.


112 It was variously described as “philosophically flawed”, “too politically correct”, “irrelevant” for a civil war, “out of touch with contemporary realities”. Alderson, “The Validity of British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine After The War in Iraq 2003-2009”, p 245-246.

113 Ibid.


115 Ibid.

116 The Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot), Lt Gen Sir Robert Fry - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, 16 December 2009 2009, p xxii.

117 Term coined by the author in email correspondence with the Dr Michael Dziedzic of USIP on 12 Jan 07.


123 Durch, ed. Twenty-First Century Peace Operations, p 573-574.


127 Ibid., p iii.

128 Ibid.
Smith, *The Utility of Force, the art of war in the Modern World*, p 370.


Ibid., p ix.


A long held British view which challenged earlier UN orthodoxy. See J C McColl, Colonel OBE, "Wider Peacekeeping - A Developing Role?," (Higher Command and Staff Course, The Staff College, Camberley. 1996), p 21.


Ibid., p 2.

Ibid., p 2-3. Mark Malan provides more colour: “Peacekeeping is perhaps the most promiscuous word in the world of international relations. She is everybody’s whore and yet somehow retains her magic when her lover sees that her favours are being illicitly shared by many another. Indeed, even amid our pain at being denied her exclusive fidelity, we are proud of her adaptability to all sorts of circumstances, to all sorts of company – from Sinai to Sarajevo, from Cyprus to Cambodia, Liberia and Somalia”. See Mark Malan, "Peacekeeping in Africa - Trends and Responses," *Institute of Security Studies Occasion Paper No 31pp (June 1998): 1.*


Ibid., p 3.

Ibid., p 4.

Ibid., p 5.

Ibid., p 9-10.

Ibid., p 7-8.

Ibid., p 11.

Ibid., p 12.

Ibid., p 34. This was achieved in 2006 and would provide Advance Planning (strategic options and concept of operations), Operational Planning (draft mission plan and transfer to field), and Review and transition planning. This would draw the right UN players together, allocate responsibilities and provide realistic decision points at every planning stage. See --, "United Nations Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General on XX 2006," www.undg.org/docs/9907/IMPP-Revised-Guidelines-130606.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2010.


Ibid., p 13-14.

Ibid., p 14.

The author personally noted the palpable ambivalence of some senior UN Secretariat staff on this topic when visiting DPKO in UN Headquarters on 2 June 2005 as one of the chapter authors conducting a book launch for Covey, Dziedzic, and Hawley, eds., *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation.*
The Brahimi panel recommended that the DPKO lessons learned unit should be enhanced in order to feed lessons in to the “development of operational doctrine, plans, procedures or mandates” Brahimi, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ("The Brahimi Report"), A55/305, S2000/809”, p 38-39.


With the support, and presumably influence, of the UK and Germany.


Ibid., p 2.


Ibid., p 13.

Ibid., p 12.

Ibid.

Ibid., p 12 and 30.

Ibid., p 12.

Ibid., p 14.

Ibid., p 55-70.

Ibid., p 55.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p 68.

Ibid., p 70.

Ibid., p 69.


Ibid.


Ibid., p 6-10.

Ibid., p 8.

Ibid., p 9.


191 Ibid., p 8.

192 Ibid., p 6.

193 St-Pierre quotes Durch as stating that the “separation between war fighting and peacekeeping is breaking down largely due to the increased need for robust operations and the recognition that the international community has a responsibility to protect those affected by violent conflict”. See St-Pierre, "Then and Now: Understanding the Spectrum of Complex Peace Operations," p 10.


195 Ibid., p 19.

196 Ibid., p 21.

197 Ibid., p 22.

198 Ibid., p 23.

199 Ibid., p 35.

200 Ibid., p 24-26, 28.

201 Ibid., p 53.

202 Ibid., p 54.


205 Ibid., p 59-91.

206 Ibid., p 72-73.

207 Ibid., p 69.

208 Ibid., p 71.

209 The SRSG retains responsibility for planning and coordination. Ibid., p 72-73.

210 This is understandable given the longstanding reluctance of some major peacekeeping troop contributors to see the military role beyond the security aspects of the mandate and a reluctance to pursue integration. ———, "Notes on Anglo/Indian PSO Seminar at UK JDCC (authors copy)," (13/14 March 2001).


214 The “humanitarian space [needs to be preserved, the UN] “Secretary-General has stressed that, in order to save unnecessary pain and suffering, it is essential to ensure a conducive humanitarian operating environment, including safe and unimpeded access to vulnerable populations.” See Espen Barth Eide et al., "Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations " (Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, May 2005), p 28. Michael Pugh captured the difficulty of politicising humanitarian action, the unavoidable challenge presented by CIMIC and the need to maintain “the cosmopolitan distance” where state and non-state actors meet. Michael Pugh, "The Challenge of Civil-


216) Ibid., p 5.

217) Ibid.


225) Ibid.


227) Ibid., p 12.

228) Ibid., p 9-10.

229) Ibid., p 10.

230) Ibid., p 11.


234) Jones et al., "Peacekeeping in an era of Strategic Uncertainty - Report submitted to the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support For the 'New Horizons' Project," p i-v.


240) --, "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping," (New York.: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support July 2009), p ii..


244) Kosovo – 14 countries. Afghanistan – 20 countries.
The term Berlin Plus refers to three provisions in NATO’s 1999 Washington Summit Communiqué: For ‘operations in which the Alliance as whole is not engaged military as an Alliance’ there would be: assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations; the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations; and identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations under the European Deputy SACEUR. A series of technical agreements between NATO and the EU, finalised in March 2003, provide for crisis consultation arrangements, the exchange of classified information between the two organisations, and a contract for the release, monitoring and recall of NATO assets and capabilities.

See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27440.htm?selectedLocale=en accessed 20 April 2010. See also http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_20628.htm?selectedLocale=en accessed 20 April 2010. These arrangements are relevant to this thesis for two reasons. First the capabilities to be transferred would include conceptual and doctrinal approaches to conflict resolution. Second, the arrangements remain unpopular with some nations. The right of first refusal implicitly conferred on NATO and the potential for the US to influence the EU chain of command through NATO assets leads to calls for an independent EU command and control capability. In contrast, for Turkey, a perceived lack of transparency on EU plans and preparations provides a stumbling block for improved NATO-EU relations and the development of a NATO comprehensive approach partly because Turkey sees NATO-EU relations in this rather negative light. (Author’s observations whilst serving as a member of the UK Delegation to NATO 2006-2009).

For example the extensive debate in NATO HQ and in Capitals on the form and function of NATO’s Strategic Concept due to be agreed at the Alliance’s next Summit meeting scheduled in Portugal later in 2010. See http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html accessed 20 April 2010. For example improving situational awareness and political consultation for crisis management, the oversight and resourcing of current operations, and collective defence planning processes.

More bluntly, some Europeans are “Freeloading on the back of US military security” as suggested by John Hutton the former UK Defence Secretary in a Speech at Wilton Park on 15 January 2009. See John Hutton, "NATO at 60: Towards a new Strategic Concept (Speech by UK Defence Secretary) " (Wilton Park, 15 January 2009).

For further information see the UK Joint Delegation to NATO website http://uknato.fco.gov.uk/en/uk-in-nato/comprehensive-approach# accessed 20 April 2010. This is an incomplete list, other actors might include the World Bank and the International Organisation for Migration.

Albeit backed by US conventional military power.

Hutton, "NATO at 60: Towards a new Strategic Concept (Speech by UK Defence Secretary) ". The author’s observations whilst serving as a member of the UK Delegation to NATO 2006-2009 included the following broad themes. France seeks to promote the civilian role of the EU and to prevent NATO from encroaching on this. Turkey seeks to constrain NATO’s relationship with external actors, particularly the European Union, on the basis that the Turkish EU membership process is currently stalled. Germany remains uncomfortable, largely for domestic political reasons, with the notion of fighting a counterinsurgency campaign and hence the engagement and coordination this implies.


For example the NATO Peace Support Operations Course designed for commanders and staffs held at the NATO School, Oberammergau.

Balgarnie, Interview.

Stewart Eldon, "UK Permanent Representative to NATO Speech at NATO School Oberammergau - NATO: Bridging the Gaps," (January 2008).


Not easy in an Alliance of 28 Nations.

Eldon, "UK Permanent Representative to NATO Speech at NATO School Oberammergau - NATO: Bridging the Gaps."

From the musical world where a medley is multiple pieces strung together.

Albeit there is no simple answer to this. Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares Bringing Peace to the 21st Century, p 177.


The ARRCADE Fusion series of exercises have recently focussed on the demands of hybrid conflict inter agency planning and coordination. See http://www.arcc.nato.int/exercises/af09/AF09%20build_up.html accessed 28 April 2010.


The paper also aims to influence NATO’s new Strategic Concept by underlining the central importance of a comprehensive approach if NATO is to have operational utility.


It suffers from some repetition and inconsistencies as a result. Balgarnie, Interview. (MOD DCDC Team Leader JWP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation)

-- , "NATO Publication AJP 3.4.4 Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Ratification Draft 2) Unpublished.," pp: p 1-1.

Ibid.pp: p xiii.

Ibid.pp: p xiii and 1-3. Although the terms used to describe insurgency and irregular activity are remarkably similar, perhaps reflecting political exigencies. See Glossary. See also NATOs Allied Command Transformation Multiple Futures project which describes “irregular warfare or the hybrid threat” Transformation, "Multiple Futures Final Report."


Ibid.pp: p 1-3.


Particularly given the demands of the theatres in which the Alliance could find itself deploying.

-- , "NATO Publication AJP 3.4.4 Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Ratification Draft 2) Unpublished.," pp: p 1-6.


Ibid. What this does not do is provide the concomitant stabilisation model provided in UK doctrine.

-- , "NATO Publication AJP 3.4.4 Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Ratification Draft 2) Unpublished.," pp: p 4-1, 5-2.
Operational art is applied to determine how best to conduct operations (ways) using available forces and capabilities (means) to achieve the objectives (ends) efficiently and within acceptable risk parameters.”

Ibid.pp: p 4-6.

Eldon, "UK Permanent Representive to NATO Speech at NATO School Oberammergau - NATO: Bridging the Gaps."


Eldon, "UK Permanent Representive to NATO Speech at NATO School Oberammergau - NATO: Bridging the Gaps."

290 Discussion with Dr Stephanie Blair, Cranfield University, 27 April 2010. And also NATO document IMSM-0135-2010, author's copy.

291 General Klaus Reinhardt, Interview (by telephone), (24 March 2010). General Reinhardt was Commander KFOR from September 1999 to March 2000.


293 Max Manwaring’s prescient report, days before 9/11, suggested a future situation where “one or a dozen political actors are exerting differing types and levels of power within a set of cross-cutting alliances, the playing field, rules, and players are more complex, and identifying the objectives of the game is more perplexing.” Max G. Manwaring, "Internal Wars: Rethinking Problem and Response,” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. 1 September 2001), p 30.

Chapter 4 - Kosovo: Keeping the Show on the Road

“From the beginning, both civilian officials and military commanders need to meet in the middle not just to co-ordinate, they need to meet in the middle and join as partners. The lesson of Kosovo is that you can achieve effective joint planning if the two take seriously the needs of the other”.

1. Introduction

This chapter will examine the case of Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of intervention by NATO in 1999. The core issue was that a ninety percent Albanian majority in Kosovo had long wanted independence from the Republic of Serbia itself part of the Federal Yugoslav Republic (FRY). Under Milosevic, Serbia had annulled Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989. A Kosovo Albanian separatist guerrilla movement, the Kosovo Liberation Army provoked a repressive reaction by Serbia and the International Community’s attempts to broker peace in 1998-9 failed. NATO’s intervention took the form of an air campaign launched in March and, then in June following negotiations, and the exit of Serb forces from Kosovo, the entry of a 50,000 strong NATO-led military force into Kosovo to conduct a peace support operation under a UN mandate. The aim of the chapter is to establish evidence for the hypothesis that in such circumstances, beyond their specific security-related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors in order to sustain the political process and facilitate viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations. This requires soldiers at all levels to co-operate with other relevant actors, respond to political direction and shape military operations that will impact decisively on political outcomes in order to help generate political progress towards sustainable peace. Successive chapters will apply the same approach to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is important again to underline the distinction between the broad brush of civil-military interaction and the more specific politico-military interaction implied by this hypothesis.

The chapter will sketch the security, political, economic and social aftermath of war together with an analysis of the various elements comprising the mandate for the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and its civilian counterpart, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). This will be followed by discussion of politico-military cooperation and campaign design to illustrate the extent of integration between the military and the political in planning. Campaign execution will then be examined to demonstrate the effect of actions by commanders on the security and political domains. The chapter will conclude with a short assessment of the results of the approaches described and the doctrinal implications resulting from the application of the hypothesis to this case study. Analysis will be based on primary source material to the fullest extent possible and the earlier literature on specific doctrinal lessons has already been addressed in chapter 2.

The analysis will be limited to the first year following the entry of KFOR in June 1999 covering tenure of a British Lieutenant General, Mike Jackson, and his German
successor, General Klaus Reinhardt. This is not to suggest that the problems faced by Kosovo, not least the lack of a final status, were solved by mid-2000. The opposite was true; however what was in place was a workable, if imperfect, arrangement for detailed politico-military co-operation between KFOR and UNMIK in the pursuit of political ends over time. (Given the requirements of the mandate there was also a good deal of successful wider civil-military coordination, for example in the humanitarian field). The account will remain impressionistic and will focus narrowly on the political and security nexus during a specific period. There is insufficient space to provide an historical account of twelve centuries of conflict between Albanians and Serbs; the build up to NATO’s military intervention in Serbia including Kosovo in 1999; the development of the political process over time; the eventual declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2009; or subsequent events. Except where necessary to illustrate particular points on politico-military or multi-sector coordination, this chapter will not discuss the myriad of problems such as creating a viable international police force and integrating this with a 39 member NATO led military force; restarting the economy; or addressing the social consequences of ethnic war.

2. The Problem Faced by the International Community in Kosovo in 1999-2000

Figure 4.1 Map of Kosovo. Source CIA.

![Map of Kosovo](image-url)
2.1. Security and the Rule of Law

On 12 June 1999 a state of near anarchy greeted the arrival of the first elements of the NATO led Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo. By 20 June KFOR had conducted a “relief in place” of Serbian Security elements and whilst major conflict had been avoided, the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) were, temporarily, in the ascendancy. A climate of fear amongst Serbs and euphoria amongst Albanians prevailed. Of the original population of some 2 million, over half were refugees, whether Albanian or Serb. Many of the others were internally displaced with some 30-50% of the housing stock damaged or destroyed. Albanian refugees were streaming back into the province eager to return home and either regain their possessions or in some cases replace these with items removed from the Serb Community. Some Serbs were leaving and those that remained were frightened yet some were arrogant – having no real acceptance of the effect caused by the collective actions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

Both the Serb administration and the parallel Albanian version had largely disappeared. The infrastructure of the province was in a parlous state. Vital water and power supplies were largely off, with Kosovo’s own power stations abandoned. Hospitals were barely functioning; public health was at risk. Schools, refuse collection, busses, telephones and the fire brigade had ceased to operate; many of the essential workers for these functions having departed. There was no gainful employment. The general disenfranchisement of the Albanian population since the imposition of Serb domination a decade previously was having an impact as many Serbs, formerly in key managerial positions left their posts. Conversely the Albanian population, although in the main euphoric, were in a state of shock and in no position to pick up the reins of public services at that stage. In addition to this, NATO’s air forces had destroyed much infrastructure including certain bridges, fuel supplies and barrack accommodation during the earlier bombing campaign.

The security system had completely broken down at the point when KFOR’s mission commenced. There were no police, no judges and no jails: there was no law and order. There was a “dangerous vacuum” following the Serb withdrawal. Such conditions have previously been termed the “security gap” (as discussed in Chapter 1). In Kosovo this gap resulted in a climate of lawlessness, fear and apprehension. The situation was characterised by paramilitary activity, ostensibly in the name of the “victors” in the conflict whereby the actions of politically driven paramilitaries might be justified in terms of public need, or filling the “gap”. The KLA were quick to attempt to take on such a role to establish, consolidate and expand their power base in the immediate aftermath of the departure of the Serb Security forces from Kosovo. Some became self-styled ministers and argued that they were above the law. Albanian intimidation of Serbs was intense and many left following killing and abductions. Pristina initially saw
the highest apparent incidence of crime. Many returning Kosovar Albanians were drawn there because housing in the city had been largely untouched by Serb paramilitaries. Additionally it was the home of many Serb officials and other professionals who were considered as war criminals by ethnic Albanians, making their residences vulnerable to forced expropriation. Nevertheless, into this barely hospitable environment some 400,000 people moved back in the first week. As KFOR’s first commander explained “the refugee crisis solved itself” and the majority of the refugees were back in the first month.

The challenge facing the international response elements in the light of these conditions was immense. Under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) had overall responsibility for governing the province yet would need time to organise and deploy in sufficient numbers to make a difference. An administrative vacuum had been expected by KFOR, but not perhaps to the extent that became apparent as the summer wore on. Increasingly, as winter approached, concern would grow over UNMIK’s ability to deliver basic services and deal with the humanitarian challenge, let alone policing. This situation understandably had an impact on the perceptions of the host peoples. Initial euphoria turned into impatience and frustration as the inability of the mandated authorities to fully conduct their role became apparent.

KFOR faced regional as well as internal security issues. Richard Shirreff, a British Brigade Commander arriving in Spring 2000 found that a complex security situation was emerging. This comprised a real external threat from the FRY, nascent Albanian extremism and inter-ethnic violence, mainly characterised by attacks on minority Serbs as well as organised crime. The external threat was countered to a degree by the establishment of a safety zone within Serbia as part of the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement (MTA); however this threat still had to be deterred conventionally thus drawing military resources away from the internal security problem. Albanian political extremism included both attacks on Serbs, to drive them out, and internal rivalry between the KLA and the Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK), where the KLA sought to achieve dominance. As another former British commander explained “[h]ard line Albanian nationalists see themselves as victors in a war of national liberation and pursue their aims with the vigour and singularity that implies”. Inter-ethnic violence saw scores being settled by Albanians and attacks on Serb and Roma families. Overlaying all of this was endemic criminal violence and organised crime as criminal networks both external and internal to Kosovo took advantage of the security gap and the elements of the KLA transformed towards organised crime.

2.2. The Local Economy

The initial report provided by the interim SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello, indicated a precarious economic outlook,
“...Well into summer, much of Kosovo’s rich agricultural land lies fallow, a grave situation for a territory that relies heavily on agriculture for its livelihood. The industrial and manufacturing sector has been severely debilitated by a long-standing lack of capital investment, and by damage caused by the conflict and in some cases by the departure of Kosovo Serb managers and staff. While an encouraging revival of commercial activity is evident, significant economic activity will continue to be hampered by the existing system of discriminatory property rights, lack of commercial or industrial finance, currency instability and other impediments. Payments systems and the financial services sector are largely non-functional. At present, much of Kosovo’s current economic activity is confined to trading of scarce goods and services at inflated prices”

2.3. Social Issues and Attitudes in Kosovo.

Kosovo society up to 1999 had been diverse in character. There was a clear distinction between the urban and rural populations. Ethnically diversity had seen Roma, Gorani, Bosniacs, Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks existing side by side. There had also been a tendency for Serbs to occupy key leadership and managerial positions throughout society. Within the Albanian majority both the KLA and a slightly more moderate political party the LDK were held in high esteem, given their, success in engineering NATO's intervention and the "liberation" of Kosovo. Yet there were apparent contradictions, for example many Albanians (not all) where highly reverential towards the presence of the Serb patrimonial sites in the province. Many Albanians realised that security and civilian administration had at least been better organised under the Serbs. Equally the remaining Serbs were proud and bloody minded to the extreme. One observer described a “patchwork of disparate priorities and loyalties, with very little vertical influence or consensus about the appropriate use of political power”. This brief sketch of a complex society points to a significant challenge for commanders in KFOR in understanding the background calibrating the best response when violence or political problems erupted.

2.4. Mandate

The Security Council, with 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, tasked the Secretary-General, “with the assistance of the relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in order to provide an interim administration in Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy.” Bernard Kouchner, SRSG from July 1999 to January 2001, was clear that this implied “an administrative body, a government, and it was our task to build one even though we were not prepared for this task.” His Principal Deputy, Jock Covey commented that the “outcome of Kosovar sovereignty and all those things was intentionally clouded”.

101
No single agency had the capability to take on the enormity of the whole task and UNSCR 1244 mandated an “International Civil Presence” which would have a composite mission structure based on 4 pillars: Pillar 1, Humanitarian affairs was headed by UNHCR (Pillar 1 was later to become Police and Justice under the UN); Pillar II, Civil Administration, including the police, was headed by the UN (DPKO); Pillar III, Institution Building, including police training, was headed by the OSCE and Pillar IV, Reconstruction, was headed by the EU. The picture was completed by the NATO-led KFOR who were given responsibility for security. This seemed fine on paper however most of the civilian organisations were represented by a handful of people, if at all, in the initial period and were expanded painfully slowly as the summer progressed. The paucity of human resources and functional capability within UNMIK was to have an impact on KFOR.

UNMIK was mandated by the Security Council to administer Kosovo, therefore the SRSG could act as “the legitimate civilian authority for the use of coercive force.” This naturally would require KFOR to seek political guidance for planning and then, for specific operations, authority from UNMIK. That said, KFOR remained the ultimate power base and UNMIK would remain weak in both political and practical terms and UN police would be very slow to deploy. The “mission” given to the international security presence – the NATO-led KFOR - under UN Security Council Resolution 1244 was quite clear, from a purely tactical standpoint, as the tasks of the military and police presence were well delineated.

**Figure 4.2 KFOR’s Tasks Under UNSCR 1244 – Source UN**

**KFOR’s Tasks under UNSCR 1244**

- Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Serb military, police and paramilitary forces;
- Demilitarising the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups;
- Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons could return home in safety, the international civil presence could operate, a transitional administration could be established, and humanitarian aid could be delivered;
- Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence could take responsibility for this task;
- Supervising demining until the international civil presence could, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;
General Jackson observed that having absolute clarity on the tasks to be done was helpful, and in the absence of an end-state, mission command needed to be applied. This was not for him a problem and there was no need to get hung up on it. The absence of a political bottom line was not entirely advantageous, as Major General Fry pointed out “UNSCR 1244 avoids any definitive statement on Kosovo’s final status in a manner, which has given comfort to adventurists in both communities and will continue to do so until Kosovar political society is mature enough for the international community to seek to define its external relationships”. This reality would drive subsequent planning and action by KFOR and UNMIK.

### 2.5. Other Defining Instruments and Instructions

Three agreements with the warring parties were to be key to the broad mandate for KFOR and UNMIK. First a Military Technical Agreement with the Governments of the Federal Yugoslav Republic (FRY) and the Republic of Serbia, second an Undertaking from the KLA, and third the subsequent establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). The Military Technical Agreement (MTA) was signed by Jackson for KFOR and by representatives of the governments of the FYR and the Republic of Serbia at Kumanovo, in Macedonia, on June 9, 1999. The MTA stipulated that the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) was the territory within “a 5 kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of the FRY territory.” Eleven days after the entry into force of the agreement, all FRY forces were required to complete their withdrawal to areas outside Kosovo and not within the GSZ.

The KLA’s “Undertaking” to disarm was the result of direct negotiations between NATO and the KLA. A negotiating structure had been established before KFOR and UNMIK’s move to Kosovo and much of the politico-military negotiation was conducted for NATO in Albania by Major General John Reith. The final deal to renounce violence and acknowledge KFOR’s sole authority under UNSCR 1244 was hammered out in a KLA base in Kosovo after the arrival of KFOR by Reith and Jamie Rubin (US Assistant Secretary of State) and the KLA commander Hashim Thaci and his field commander Agim Ceku representing the KLA. Following the Undertaking, the next step was announced on 21 September after a difficult negotiation. UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 establishing the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Which stated that: “The Kosovo Protection Corps shall be established as a civilian emergency service agency”.

The KPC would provide disaster response services; perform search and rescue; provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas; assist in demining; and contribute...
to rebuilding infrastructure and communities. There was to be no role in law enforcement or the maintenance of law and order. This was to be only the beginning of a central strand of the Kosovo peace process: transforming the KLA.

Together these basic documents formed the “mandate” of the international security presence which guided the actions of KFOR (and UNMIK) and provided the basis for actions in support of the various remits - principally creating a secure environment. Taking into account the various aspects of the "mandate", General Jackson's assessment of his military mission was simple; he needed to “do something to make things better”. General Reinhardt, his successor saw it in equally simple terms “to command my forces and to ensure that the situation within Kosovo stays calm”. Yet these simple statements mask a difficult, complex and dangerous operating environment, where cooperative political and military action would be needed to bring ends ways and means into balance if violence was to be reduced and a viable political process established.

2.6. KFOR’s Internal challenges

Beyond the political boundary provided by the various elements of the mandate another issue would come to impact on Commander KFOR’s decision-making and would in effect form a military boundary for his planning and action. This was the practical effect of multi-nationality within the force. National constraints and national interests would mean that multinational brigades, and within these some units, would often act independently or on direct instructions from their capitals. This “fact of life” was to limit the commander's freedom to manoeuvre his forces to the fullest effect, and would become particularly difficult when sensitive local political issues were involved, such as in dealing with Mitrovica and in some areas with the KLA. Senior British officers also argued that there was an imbalance of capabilities in KFOR, with many of the troops deployed being un-employable for any more than low level peacekeeping or static guarding tasks. Moreover highly capable Special Forces troops would not tend to be released by national contingents for direct employment by Commander KFOR.

A Statesman-like General

"The responsibility of statesmen…is to resolve complexity, rather than to contemplate it".

There is no question that, throughout his time as Commander KFOR, General Jackson was acting under a political, media, humanitarian and military spotlight. The stakes were high. The political and military situation was tense, controversial and complex; it demanded much of Jackson's analytical, leadership and negotiation skills. External instructions were often contradictory or out of date; however he was under intense personal pressure to resolve problems which seemed beyond short term political solutions. There was perhaps an element of
the cult of personality in evidence, yet he remained self-effacing and not 
triumphal. Well aware that he was acting at the crucible of world opinion and of 
the human consequences of failure, he demonstrated the ability to influence the 
development of political will whilst acting as a coordinator and leader, driven by 
instinct and experience. Shaping local and international political will would be 
important to the General if he was to secure support at home and in the wider 
international community. Such political will would provide the means which in 
turn would deliver political and military momentum.

Two examples serve to illustrate how Jackson acted in a statesman-like manner, 
even before KFOR had arrived in Kosovo. The first was that he led the ostensibly 
military, but in reality political, negotiation to secure the Military Technical 
Agreement\(^\text{64}\) which would be the mechanism to get the Serbs out of Kosovo and 
the International NATO-led force in. This had to be closely choreographed with 
other moves on the international stage to halt the bombing campaign, secure a 
United Nations Security Council Resolution,\(^\text{65}\) and to deal with the Kosovo 
liberation Army (KLA) as they were cajoled towards both disarmament and 
recognising the authority of the international military force which would soon 
enter Kosovo. Given the somewhat chaotic external drafting process for the 
MTA, the on-off nature of the talks and the multiple stands of ongoing 
egotiation between various parties, Jackson was often left with either too many 
or too few external instructions; hence he had to rely on his own instincts in order 
to reassure the Serb side and facilitate the deal which would lead to a successful 
Serb withdrawal from Kosovo.

The second example was Jackson’s handling of the potentially explosive move by 
Russia to occupy Pristina airport on 11 June amid fears about possible partition of 
Kosovo and also over the nature of the command and control relationship 
between Russian troops and the NATO-led international military force to be 
deployed in Kosovo. Ordered twice by NATO's Supreme Commander, Gen 
Wesley Clark, to counter the Russian move by securing the airport, Jackson's 
instinct was to decline. He did this on the basis that such action would be in 
breach of the agreement with the Serbs, and the Russian move - whilst politically 
symbolic - had a negligible military impact on KFOR's needs. Blocking the 
airport would entail significant military risk and risk to the wider mission. It 
would probably have caused a confrontation with uncertain and potentially 
dangerous geo-political ramifications. Jackson's grasp of the wider picture helped 
him to act in a statesman-like manner, in the interests of the whole, yet amid 
conflicting intelligence reports and under significant pressure from the NATO 
Supreme Commander.\(^\text{66}\)
3. The Big Ideas: Campaign Design

3.1. Approaches to the Politico-Military Relationship, Process and Strategy

Striking the right tone in the politico-military relationship was vital. General Sir Rupert Smith, DSACEUR at the time, explained at interview that there was a “readiness to be multinational and subordinate for the collective good”. Many of the key players in Kosovo knew each other from Bosnia where initially the arrangements had failed. Jackson had seen the difficulties in Bosnia with the relationship between IFOR and Carl Bildt’s civil administration and he was not going to let this happen again. Here Jackson was clear that absolute control rested with the SRSG, he had been given plenipotentiary powers, and that public symbolism was important in underlining this. He went further, the “single sheet of music” was imperative and must not be jeopardised; both he and his successor General Reinhardt set a personal example in this respect. Sergio de Mello and later Bernard Kouchner had a common understanding of this critical relationship. On dealing with specific issues, Jackson described a two man canoe going through rapids. Paddlers would change places and the “civilian would move to the front in dodgy political water”, but the soldier would take the lead on the security task. Equally Jackson saw no problem in trying to influence the development of political will given the interwoven nature of the mission; here, daily meetings with SRSG were important to “help to keep things straight and avoid wedges developing”. Covey agreed that there should be “no ambiguity” and understood that the initial focus was on the military mission “because that was where lives were at risk”. Yet he was clear that the military mission would fail without a political process in tandem and the political mission could not succeed without military input. Political primacy was assured, but peace building was clearly not going to be easy. The initial political strategy to take Kosovo forward is shown at figure 4.3 below.
An Initial Political Strategy

The political strategy over the first year was to seek incremental progress towards a situation where competition for power could be conducted through non-violent processes. The lines of effort to achieve this were:

- Nurturing favourable conditions for political dialogue:
  - Humanitarian relief, Electrical Power, Demobilization,
  - Basic Services, Public Support, Victim’s Grievances,
  - Acquiescence of Influential Leaders
- Mediating conflict incrementally
- Building a working coalition to run a civil administration
- Containing obstructionism
- Channeling the competition for power into non-violent processes.

There was a clear need to sustain momentum and “keep the train moving” and this strategy would require KFOR’s active involvement at every stage.

Ensuring political primacy with, among other things, active military support, would be vital in taking the initial political strategy forward. In terms of working processes, Covey helped to flesh out the principle of political primacy by suggesting the “primacy of the peace process” as the overarching directive to guide all efforts in support of the mission strategy. This boiled down to “we support those who support 1244, and we oppose those who obstruct it”. All actions by mission members should be judged by this yardstick. This concept was fully embraced by Jackson and his staff.

This international political strategy – which was internal to UNMIK and KFOR - would need to be meshed with the local political process. The required outcome would be to establish a democratic process in Kosovo and through this to shape what “substantive authority” meant. Important in this would be setting up consultation processes, political structures then first municipal and later province-wide elections. Although local political parties were in being, there was no local or international-local political process at the outset. The UN Secretary-General underlined the need for confidence-building through involvement of political leaders of all communities in the decision-making processes of UNMIK in the medium term. Political consultations, led by UNMIK were soon underway to form a Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) in an
“attempt to bring together leaders of the various factions.” There would also be an Interim Administrative Council (IAC). The KTC was established by Sergio de Mello in mid-June. After difficult negotiations, the Albanians and then later the Serbs took part. But this was to be far from easy and later KFOR would play a significant role in facilitating this process and the eventual result. Here, General Reinhardt explained at interview that links between the military force and Kosovo’s political leaders were strengthened by Commander KFOR’s presence on the IAC, in effect he was in the Cabinet. Bernard Kouchner would subsequently emphasise that it was “absolutely normal” for KFOR to be involved in decision making, given the scope of problems and KFORs involvement. However the inclusion of locals in the administration, to help deliver the mandate, got off to a slow start and this increased frustration and a feeling of impotence.

3.2. Communicating the Big Ideas: A Plan For Kosovo Without An End State

Jackson explained that the military approach to planning was normally to use an ends ways means approach, but in Kosovo that was not possible: the ends were not clear. NATO’s strategic guidance had been slow in coming so he needed to accept reality and get on with what could be done upstream in order to discover ways and sequence the available means sensibly in the interim. Reality would bring out the multi actor and coordination problem. The KFOR headquarters planning staff and UNMIK had to develop a methodology that would deal with the practical situation, the lack of direction from NATO, the lack of an end state and of course the civilian dimension. Part of the solution was simply to apply the “supporting” (KFOR) and “supported” (UNMIK) approach, familiar from conventional military doctrine; and which was unequivocally mandated by UNSCR 1244. The main effort would define relationships and who does what; this would change over time as solutions emerged as part of the transformation process, but the clear imperative was to erase distinctions between different military objectives and civilian objectives. These must become “civil-military objectives”.

In delivering these, the stark reality was that, whilst retaining primacy, UNMIK lacked both planning capabilities and field administrators: it had to be bolstered with military staff.

In a lecture to the UK’s future senior military leaders, Major General Andrew Ridgway, Jackson’s Chief of Staff in Kosovo, explained how the campaign plan was developed. One thing that was clear was the direction provided by UNSCR 1244 and the requirement to support UNMIK. The innovative planning solution was to develop an interim end state which would describe the sort of things that were needed during the initial (undefined) period before the final end state was clear. (See Figure 4.4 below). This would help to suggest lines of operation and the key milestones, or decisive points, which would be needed to take things forward. He suggested that, by applying this approach, tactical, but not yet strategic, success had been achieved, partly because the required strategic outcome remained unclear, but also because there was no coordinated regional approach to planning to take account of other Balkan conflicts and synchronise the international response.
KFOR and UNMIK planners developed the detail in June 1999 and the resulting interim end state for Kosovo is shown at Figure 4.5 below. The military force did not possess either the mandate of the means to deliver the outcomes identified by the interim end state. Hence an integrated approach was required; all of the players would need to take part in each line of development to a greater or lesser extent. Therefore appropriate command arrangements could only come from politico-military unity of effort and this was needed from the outset. General Jackson later characterised the overall command and control process as “weaving the strands of the rope”, the result being to strengthen each actor’s efforts, although as Jackson pointed out “all strands have a breaking strain”. The United Nations did not have enough planners or other capabilities on the scale required to conduct the “weaving” process, hence a supported and supporting relationship was appropriate, with KFOR providing many of the necessary means, particularly planning.
Covey explained that the politico-military planning arrangement between UNMIK and KFOR would also extend beyond the overall plan to the detail of current operations. “On specific security operations, however, the joint planning framework became completely fused...as part of the operational planning cycle...[they]...produced a single piece of paper that integrated civilian and military activities”. All options were assessed against the simple yardstick: “Does this action support the larger strategy...[and if not why not]?” Covey further explained that both political and military leaders needed a nuanced understanding of each other’s business. Political managers needed to understand the importance, to military commanders, of balancing risks. They needed to provide commanders with objectives that were achievable, within a viable timeframe, and worthy of the military risks. Equally, commanders needed to embrace the key elements of the political strategy. This included, “the necessity to make incremental gains, to cultivate ambiguity about desired ends, to sustain the demobilization effort, to neutralize militants, and to support other key efforts of the political transformation effort... [T]he military commander has to appreciate a diplomat’s perspective...this is a process that continues in time as we reshape local attitudes, interests and behavior”.

Major General Robert Fry, a former commander of MNB(C), explained at interview that planning needed to be both horizontally and vertically integrated. There had to be political and military cohesion and cohesion in practical terms. This meant that, horizontally, there was no point running sophisticated operations, for example to support
the police in conducting a high profile arrest if the necessary capability to deal with evidence or the judicial process, or the means to deal with the inevitable public disorder were not in place. Equally, politically, actions needed to be vertically integrated because every action had a political effect which had to be thought through. The natural military urge was to have an effect rather than spectate, however effects should not be arbitrary, thus there needed to be cooperation and a rigorous planning process before deciding to take action and this action needed to be in unison. In early 2000 General Reinhardt issued a set of commander’s priorities under a general directive all of which were designed to provide practical support and to secure the population’s support to the peace process. (See figure 4.6 below) This built on the earlier planning work, although still with no political end state. In effect it provided guidance to commanders on priorities and a sense of direction for each of these and the requirement for vertical and horizontal planning was implicit.

Figure 4.6 COMKFOR’s General Directive 2000-2001. Source COS ARRC

3.3. An Example of Integrated Planning at the Local (tactical) level

Brigadier Richard Shirreff, the commander of 7 UK Armoured Brigade explained that he was not given a formal mission by KFOR on which to base his planning. Therefore he had to derive his own based on UNSCR 1244. The question was how to use military force in support of the Kosovan political process? The main issue was the security threat; the mission that Shirreff and his staff derived was to “maintain security within the
KFOR area of responsibility as part of the UNMIK-led political process in order to create peace and security…”\textsuperscript{116} Shirreff’s Chief of staff Major Richard Williams understood that they had to drive down violence in order to set conditions for a non-violent political dialogue, even if the strategic goal was a moving target,\textsuperscript{117} but this had to be done sensitively because "we or they can kick violence up or down".\textsuperscript{118} Figure 4.7 below illustrates the relationship between positive or negative actions by KFOR and the level of violence. Therefore Williams explained that the key planning constraint was:

\begin{quote}
“do not score home goals. When contemplating an action [or] operation, if it doesn’t advance the political process then do not do it in the way that you first planned. Try and adjust it so that the benefits outweigh the costs, if this can’t be done …do not do it.”\textsuperscript{119}
\end{quote}

\textbf{Figure 4.7 Multi-National Brigade (Centre) Illustration of the Effect of Key Positive and Negative Actions by KFOR on the Level of Violence in Kosovo during February – August 2000.} (Source 7 UK Armoured Brigade)\textsuperscript{120}

Shirreff assessed the “enemy” centre of gravity to be the Serbian or Kosovar “willingness to use violence to achieve political ends",\textsuperscript{121} Therefore a concept of operations was developed to focus security, information, and civil-military effort to have an effect on this centre of gravity. This brought a significant command and control challenge and emphasised the need for close political direction over the various lines of operation.\textsuperscript{122} Over time, the MNB(C) “campaign plan"\textsuperscript{123} to coordinate this effort evolved to include five lines of operation. First, providing security against the external threat from Serbia,
in accordance with the Military Technical Agreement. Second, providing a secure internal environment, stopping inter-ethnic killing, protecting key sites and conducting operations against crime (with the police). Third, transforming the Kosovo Protection Corps, including training on non-military lines, keeping them usefully occupied through constructing infrastructure, raising their standing, ensuring compliance, and seizing weapons). Fourth, conducting civil military operations (CIMIC) to support infrastructure and help the population. Finally, an overarching activity of information operations, using both media and psychological operations, to project positive messages in support of the overall effort. Designing and executing these complex plans would demand both politico-military and civil-military cohesion.

3.4. Planning with local actors

Military commanders made an effort regularly to meet key political players in Pristina and elsewhere. Interaction with local actors, particularly the KPC/KLA, was important. It provided information, context, and understanding of their ambitions and “the grounds of goodwill, reconciliation and multi-ethnicity” which would in turn help KFOR with planning. As discussed above, in the political domain the KFOR commander was a member (with observer status) of Kosovo’s then "Cabinet", The Kosovo Transitional Council. At interview General Reinhardt commented that he “met twice a week in the provisional government which gave us the chance to co-ordinate our activities with the local leaders.” These and frequent other meetings with local political leaders at province and local level were “intended to influence and change the course of events”. Among other things, these interactions would provide opportunities to manage the expectations of the KPC.

4. Executing the big ideas: campaign execution

This section will first illustrate specific examples of campaign execution in order to demonstrate the impact of positive actions by commanders both in the military and political spheres. It will then discuss more challenging issues compounded by the twin peril of divisions within the international and the local communities.

4.1. Achieving a Positive Political Effect Through Military Activity

Jackson explained that the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was established for military and security reasons, but with a political effect. This decision and the ensuing process were widely debated in capitals, but it was the best means for dealing with Ceku and his cohort. The former KLA had to be managed and kept visible, there was no stomach to fight them, and they needed to be locked into a democratic framework, yet retain some sense of identity, with “only harmless tasks” Even though the KLA in effect remained as a quasi-military organisation, the KPC solution would strategically “fix” or restrain the KLA, until such time as a different future role might emerge. For the short term they would be transformed into a 3,000-strong civilian defence body. This
would not prove to be easy particularly because the KLA was itself prone to inter-factional killing and had strong links with organised crime. The situation was particularly difficult at the outset during the key demobilisation and disarmament phase. This put a premium on cooperation with all agencies, not least because employment would need to be found for the disbanding members of the KLA who would not join KPC. One avenue here was for suitable individuals to join the new Kosovo Police Academy. This immediately emphasised the need to develop one of the "strands of the rope", the rule of law, and saw pressure from KFOR on the OSCE to accelerate the development of the a police Academy at Vucitrin which was part of the OSCE’s remit.\(^\text{138}\)

The KLA committed to disbandment as a military force along a prescribed 90 day timetable from the signing of the Undertaking on Demilitarization and Transformation by Thaci with Jackson on 21 June, known as K Day.\(^\text{139}\) As SRSG Kouchner pointed out, the terms of the Undertaking and the subsequent KPC establishment were to form an integral part of the Kosovo peace process with much political, military, police and economic peace building effort over the coming years. The concept of completing demilitarization through the transformation of former fighting forces was well established in peacekeeping practice, and it became important in the Kosovo peace process as a result of the KLA Undertaking presented to KFOR.\(^\text{140}\) From K Day secure weapon sites were to be established and KLA members were to move to assembly areas within 7 days; further disarmament, including rifles, was required within 30 days (a limited number of side arms were permitted for protection of certain individuals); and within 90 days (19 September) KFOR would take over weapons storage sites and KLA should have demilitarised.

Once the KLA had been demilitarised the KPC would be subject to the authority of UNMIK whilst KFOR would supervise the transformation process. Here KFOR used a Joint Implementation Committee both at Province level and with the KPC’s regional task groups, as a mechanism to check on progress and hold members of the KPC to account.\(^\text{141}\) Progress with the KPC would help to move things along politically, it helped send a message to the former KLA commanders that the only way ahead was through he democratic route and not by force of arms. Indeed some chose this route, however many members were simply thugs and self serving bandits, hence incidents, violence and intimidation continued. An ICG report in March 2000 suggested that former KLA activity then had four pillars: political, military, police and organised crime. KLA supporters had a political party, the Party of Democratic Progress of Kosovo (PPDK). Other members had joined the KPC,\(^\text{142}\) and some the Police Service (KPS). Such overt activities were acceptable yet the remaining element of KLA activity was “covert and utterly unacceptable – organised crime and violence”.\(^\text{143}\) These four strands were interwoven but each would need to be dealt with by the International Community. Much of the KLA’s violence would be directed against the minority groups, particularly the remaining Serbs. Dealing with this problem would form a locus for other interwoven problems in Kosovo, notably the absence of geo-strategic direction, the absence of rule of law capacities, and challenges to KFOR’s own cohesion, would intersect with the
intense difficulties faced in dealing with the minorities issue. Here KFOR’s actions would have mixed effects on the overall political situation.

The vertical integration imperative explained above is neatly illustrated by the matter of dealing with the Serb minority. As Bernard Kouchner explained in 2001, the remaining Serbs were just as important as the Albanians in Kosovo. The political intent here was to protect the minority and to give the Serbian leadership confidence to re-enter the political process. Reinhard spoke for the SRSG and himself. “The protection of minorities is a key component of the UNMIK/KFOR strategy...Both the SRSG and I are opposed to any further Serb isolation which would result in invent greater divisions within Kosovo”. To back up these words he shifted military effort towards dealing with crime, particularly that against ethnic minorities. At interview General Reinhardt explained that KFOR’s actions in breaking a freedom of movement imbroglio for the Serb enclave of Orahovac in the West of Kosovo, showed that his decisions on military activity helped move the political process forward. He and Kouchner visited Orahovac to understand the Serb minority’s concerns. In common with other similar groups the Serb community was “armed, frightened, angry and aggressive”. Serbs maintained their own checkpoints around the city in a form of standoff against the KFOR units in the area. The situation was further complicated by the presence of Russian KFOR units, overtly sympathetic to the to the Serb minority. Ultimately KFOR’s stubbornness in Orahovac through negotiation with both the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians solved the freedom of movement problem and provided much needed confidence to the Serb population in the area. However this essentially political effort, largely brokered by the local Netherlands Battalion Commander, did not please his national authorities. For them, this was beyond the military remit. Nevertheless it helps to illustrate the core point of this thesis.

Elsewhere in early 2000 Brigadier Shirreff, commander of MNB(C), recognised that attacks on the Serb minority were serious and could ultimately lead to wider mission failure for UNMIK. Therefore protecting the minorities against Albanian extremism had to have a high military priority, if the nascent political process was to succeed. This understanding was achieved through daily meetings with Jock Covey and other UNMIK key players. Following detailed joint planning, Operation Trojan was launched by KFOR and UNMIK to protect and reassure the Serb Minority population in MNB(C)’s area of operations.
On his arrival in the Province, Brigadier Shirreff, Commander MNB (C) assessed that action was necessary to alleviate the conditions of the minority population in his area of operations. The operation was designed not only to help the Serbs but in so doing to have a direct security, and therefore political, impact. Reducing the ongoing Serb exodus and encouraging their political leaders to join the political process was seen as a clear political imperative which needed to be achieved by June 2000, the 12 month anniversary of the entry of NATO and the planned UN review of UNSCR 1244.

The focus was on the Serb population, concentrated in Gracanica. This was steadily reducing in numbers due to intimidation by property agents, members of the KPC, thugs and arsonists. 1200 Serbs had left since October 1999. The aim of Operation Trojan was to protect and enhance all vital needs of the community: security; freedom of movement; and access to medical facilities, markets, communication media, jobs and churches. A staged approach was adopted with limited and achievable objectives. These included: information gathering, operations to protect crop planting, efforts to determine the needs of the Serbs, targeting of property agents, provision of a surge of medical support and policing the actions of the Kosovo Protection Corps in the area. Further operations were intended to detain and arrest key thugs, improve road access, provide for mobile markets, provide a radio station provide telephones, provide a confidential help line, deal with property law issues and assist with agricultural sales and trade. These were not all military activities, but represented a comprehensive approach in partnership with the humanitarian and political sectors.

Operation Trojan provides a good example of combined civil-military planning directed at the needs of the minority (primarily) Serb community, achieved, in part through helping NGOs to focus their spending power. The security effect of this essentially humanitarian work was magnified by information operations: Advertisements in Serb news papers, radio station broadcasts, and word of mouth spread by patrols on the ground were all used for this purpose, and future multi-ethnic projects were planned. This activity was coincident with the agreement of the first Serb leaders (Bishop Artimje, Dr Trajkovic, and Father Sava) to join the Joint Interim Administrative Structure as observers.

Operation Trojan, launched with the support of the Serb community, was not without its challenges and Albanian extremism continued. Nevertheless this KFOR-led and coordinated essentially humanitarian effort provides an example of KFOR’s efforts to improve the conditions for the Serb minority. This helped reassure key Serb figures (Bishop Artimje, Dr Trajkovic, and Father Sava) that UNMIK and KFOR were sensitive to the concerns of the Serb minority. The former decided to join the JIAC.
observers during the period of the operation and KFOR provided them with physical protection\(^{157}\) to enable their participation. Viewed at the theatre level, it is clear that the military effort to protect the Serb minority and its leaders delivered a direct political effect by protecting the peace process.

### 4.2. Constraints on Delivering Progress

Despite the positive developments indicated above there were significant constraints on progress. In early 2000, Reinhardt wrote that KFOR and UNMIK’s “synchronised strategic vision”,\(^ {158}\) was supported by practical assistance and joint planning. His strategic imperatives, drawn from UNSCR 1244 would support the political remit as discussed above.\(^ {159}\) Now more than ever before, KFOR and UNMIK were dependent on each other for success. However both faced significant constraints on helping to deliver wider political progress. KFOR’s internal challenges were driven by the multinational makeup of the force and differing political perspectives.\(^ {160}\) At interview General Reinhardt explained that most nations often did not allow their troops to be moved out of their assigned areas; also two nations pulled out forces because it was too dangerous. A force of 50,000 was reduced to 39,000 in two months without coordination with him and yet his mission was unchanged.\(^ {161}\) Many contributing governments also placed significant restrictions on their troops, forbidding redeployment across the province.\(^ {162}\) These restrictions were mainly to avoid risk and naturally each nation had its own political calculus for deploying troops. Yet cost also played a part because nations wanted to protect their financial investments in local reconstruction programmes. These constraints served to emphasise the absence of true unity of effort and the local nature of separate campaigns conducted in the MNB areas. Brigades would take root and hence limited Commander KFOR’s ability to conduct real manoeuvre and so deliver coherent improvement to the security situation.\(^ {163}\)

The problem was not confined to KFOR. A contemporary NATO briefing obliquely criticised nations for inadequately resourcing UNMIK, explaining that, “KFOR’s efforts would be even more effective if Kosovo had a stronger international police presence and a properly functioning judicial system. But UNMIK has been severely hampered by a shortage of financial resources and personnel, particularly police. The lack of an effective court system makes it extremely hard to crack down on criminals, giving them a feeling of impunity. This in turn makes it harder to deal with the most serious public order problem in Kosovo, the security of minority populations. These issues need to be addressed urgently.”\(^ {164}\)

Some KFOR contingents took a strict view on the primacy of military activities and these were not always coordinated directly to achieve a political effect, on occasion the reverse was the true. Dr Stephanie Blair, a former UNMIK municipal administrator in Djacovica/Gjakova, explained that a security operation may well achieve a narrow military objective but, unless planned and coordinated with the civilian authority, the
results could be negative, particularly in view of the fragility of the political situation. She described an incident where the local KFOR brigade arrested a KLA member who was also had a self-appointed political role. The effect of this was to inflame local opinion which resulted in public disturbances. This eroded local consent and put UNMIK in “a very precarious position in terms of operating, living even, in the town”. The locals’ “confidence in the overall integrity of the international community, be they civilian or military” was reduced and this caused unnecessary ripples in the political path. Unfortunately, such incidents of failure to coordinate were not unusual. Dr Blair further commented that the Brigade Commander in question “described himself as being on a ‘war footing’ and had no comprehension of the political impact of his actions”.

The crosscutting challenges for UNMIK and KFOR are well illustrated by the example of Mitrovica an ethnically divided city in the northern part of Kosovo which itself was part of an ethnically Serb area whose potential secession was a looming issue on the political agenda. Here Serbs mainly lived to the north of the River Ibar and Albanians to the south. The bridges across the river would provide a natural flashpoint for protest and violence and the opposing communities intimidated the other side’s minorities in their midst. The local KFOR contingent was a French Brigade. It is apparent that General Reinhardt, in common with those before and after him, was particularly bedevilled by this problem. He explained that “The challenge in Mitrovica, as in the whole of Kosovo, is to convince the population that there will be no partition and that it is possible for the two main communities to co-exist peacefully.” He understood that part of the problem would be sustaining the international community’s resolve and that the locals had to understand this or the donor money would dry up. Reinhardt wanted to change the situation in Mitrovica and crack down on the public order disturbances and violence by ethnic extremists on both sides. However the local brigade commander refused to obey Reinhardt’s direct instructions because he had contrary instructions from Paris. France, although strongly criticised for this, did not wish to upset their “Serb friends”. SACEUR could not help, nor could the NATO Secretary General. Equally the French SRSG would be in a difficult position over intervening with Paris.

Anthony Welch a former UNMIK Administrator in Mitrovica explained at interview that French commanders at the tactical (brigade) level made an effort to establish a relationship with him, fully understood the local problem, and coordinated their activities where possible. Yet, irrespective of the explicit requirements of UNSCR 1244, French sovereign policy was not to upset the Serbs and, for the military, tactical force protection was increasingly a priority. There were also doubts over what outcome the UN in New York wanted over this part of Kosovo: should they accept the on the ground de facto reality of partition or push against it? Thus, with no top level clarity on what was required, with inadequate UN police, and a contrary French military contingent concerned about casualties, (and a French SRSG), then decisive military action to quell and address the causes of the violence would not happen. Actions would be limited to addressing the symptoms at best and passivity at worst. Equally there is no evidence of local military efforts to nurture the local political process. Indeed they could be accused
of complicity with soft ethnic cleansing. One result was that both communities lost “all faith in the KFOR troops and UN police [ability] to keep law and order effectively or to protect their community from the predations of the paramilitaries on the other side”.\footnote{178} This meant that each side would retain its own defences. Paradoxically, this approach was not without cost for the French military contingent given their own high casualties in Mitrovica.\footnote{179} In the absence of security for the population it would not be possible for the international community to pursue the political or economic measures necessary to bring stability and build peace.\footnote{180} The bottom line was that the coalition of the willing supporting political primacy in theatre would only extend so far. It would not serve to help defuse the problem of Mitrovica because there was no such coalition of the willing at a higher level over the status of Kosovo as a whole or Mitrovica as a part of it: hence the incomplete answer provided by UNSCR 1244. Ultimately this meant that UNMIK was prevented from fully exercising its authority in Mitrovica and Northern Kosovo;\footnote{181} militant Albanians and Serbs in and around Mitrovica would continue to exploit this situation for their own ends.

5. **Conclusions**

This chapter has demonstrated that the case of Kosovo provides evidence to support the hypothesis that, beyond their specific security-related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors in order to sustain the political process and facilitate viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations. During the period in Kosovo in question this reality of contemporary operations was demonstrated by senior commanders who brought in theatre political primacy to life. They took specific actions to foster a healthy politico-military relationship with their civilian counterparts, who reciprocated with alacrity. Building on this relationship commanders’ helped plan and execute significant steps to help kick start the political process as part of a holistic approach. Here commanders’ contacts with local interlocutors on both sides of the ethnic divide were important. Getting the political process moving was a paramount requirement and notably KFOR helped to bring the Serbs to the table. Commanders also worked to deliver their given mission to provide a secure environment and provide practical support to the under-resourced civilian mission which needed significant assistance in order to keep the show on the road. This is not to suggest that all was rosy.

Notwithstanding an explicit mandate and significant First World troop contributions, the international community in Kosovo was hanging on precariously over a number of unresolved issues during the period in question. These included the political outcome and local political process, provision of security and policing, demilitarisation, administration,\footnote{182} and the ability to conduct decisive security operations. There was no international political consensus over a desired outcome and final status talks were a distant prospect.\footnote{183} Perhaps unsurprisingly there was no Balkans-wide strategy or campaign plan which would have helped to coordinate efforts to deal with cross border political and security issues.\footnote{184} KFOR was not able to match its apparent military potential due to troop contributors’ caveats and in some cases direct political control of
their contingents, hence top military commanders were constrained.\textsuperscript{185} The case of Mitrovica in particular demonstrates that military support to local political primacy had its limits.

In these circumstances politico-military planning had to be ad hoc and incremental. Violence against minorities remained pervasive and the population were not secure, particularly in minority enclaves or ethnic flashpoints. Providing a safe and secure environment remained a challenge and progress was incremental.\textsuperscript{186} KFOR would increasingly be criticised for not doing enough to protect Serb minorities or go after extremists. The UNMIK-led political process was slow to gain momentum, partly because the first municipal or province-wide elections had not yet taken place; hence Kouchner suggested that democracy was not implemented, nor was the “substantial autonomy” required by UNSCR 1244.\textsuperscript{187} Also, with a few exceptions, the economic prospects were poor. Meanwhile, a victorious separatist army, which had significant links with organised crime, had to adjust, to new realities. But not all members were willing to do so and Albanian extremism remained a pervasive problem.\textsuperscript{188} Policing was poor and crime rife; delivery of transitional authority and with this government services was patchy and under resourced.

5.1. Practical Results.

UNMIK’s weak capacity and KFOR’s multi national issues help to explain the challenge provided to commanders in this type of operation.\textsuperscript{189} Despite this seemingly non-viable situation, Kouchner and his first two military commanders, Jackson then Reinhardt set the right tone. There was a near fusion of civil and military leadership at the top.\textsuperscript{190} Kouchner was clear that without a tight civil-military relationship it would not have been possible to “implement politics and get a grip on the violence”,\textsuperscript{191} therefore “nous réagissions toujours ensemble, civils et militaires mêlés”.\textsuperscript{192} Here Clausewitz would have recognised a situation where the General was indeed a Statesman with a seat in Cabinet so that he could know and help shape, but not direct, state policy.\textsuperscript{193} This arrangement enabled innovative planning solutions;\textsuperscript{194} and senior leaders presented a united face to local interlocutors. The arrangement was “more successful than it had been in Bosnia”.\textsuperscript{195} New approaches included the establishment of a political strategy designed to make incremental gains and an interim end state for Kosovo to provide a sense of direction and enable detailed planning and execution. This was taken forward by a cross-sectoral approach to detailed planning or “weaving the strands of the rope”.\textsuperscript{196} KFOR’s mandate in this was principally to help take violence out of the political calculus and to support its weak and under resourced political partner.

As the campaign unfolded, KFOR would play an important role in delivering security. This involved efforts to deter an external threat, protect the population and important sites as well as operations against extremists and organised crime which would involve killing or capturing of miscreants in coordination with the police. Beyond this, KFOR had direct access to many of the local political players and was deeply involved in
nurturing the political process. This peace building activity went beyond the UN Security Council Mandate and involved working on both Albanians and Serbs in the political dimension. On the Albanian side Ceku would be persuaded, partly through security operations, but also via the grind of the JIC process, that there was ultimately no alternative to the political route, and that meaningful activity for the KPC would at least sustain some form of aspiration for a different future. Equally a small number of the Serb community’s leaders were given the confidence and also physical security to participate in the political process.

Much was achieved, albeit many problems could not be solved. Using a most basic yardstick; the murder rate was significantly reduced over the first year from an average of over 50 a week to 3-4. Of equal importance, and as a direct result of an improving security situation for minorities and the efforts to contain the KLA/KPC, violence for political ends was reduced and the local political process was underway. UNMIK and KFOR had “finally won the confidence and cooperation of both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs”. This would set the conditions for eventual elections and further developments to the political process both within and outside Kosovo. The challenge would remain the resourcing and co-ordination of the overall peace implementation process at the province level: without this the military, and by extension police, effort could not progress beyond local containment.

5.2. Implications for doctrine

An updated version of UK peace support operations doctrine (JWP 3-50 2nd ed) captured some of the innovations described above in terms of planning and the notion of adopting a comprehensive approach which is now mainstreamed, at least as a concept. The idea of the primacy of the peace process was also published elsewhere. Jackson’s point that “everything you do has an effect on attitudes” took a decade to emerge in British stability operations doctrine; today the “idea that all activity has influence” is a core theme. However the important and specific role of commanders in supporting the political or peace process has not been captured. Beyond creating a safe and secure environment, a specific peace building role emerged whereby the military commander would enable political solutions by helping to secure active local engagement in the political process. He would do this by actively designing and conducting operations at the tactical level to achieve a political effect – taking violence out of the local political equation - and so contribute to peace building. This had not been seen before in a mission supporting a UN operation or as a feature of UN peacekeeping. Here KFOR designed and executed security operations specifically to meet and nurture UNMIK’s political peace building purpose. In this respect the relationship was well in advance of that rather tentatively suggested in the UN’s “Capstone Doctrine” for complex peace operations issued nearly a decade later which was reviewed in Chapter 3.

To bring this to life it is helpful again to envisage an “acceptable political bandwidth for military activity” as an emerging conceptual model for the design and conduct of
campaigns. The basic intent is to help sustain open ended positive political progress. There are two subjective virtual boundaries that the commander needs to bear in mind. On one side there lie the requirements of the military mission and the permissions granted in terms of the application of military force. Here, matters of mission accomplishment, military risk, acceptability and legality need to be judged. On the other side lies a political boundary. This would be an assessment of the impact on the level of violence and on the political process of proposed or past actions. The ability to make or hinder political progress is the core yardstick against which all actions would be judged. Practice in Kosovo in 1999-2000 suggests that these military and political boundaries were understood by commanders in their wider political dealings and campaign execution.

The requirement for politico-military synergy, for the commander to be in the political mind, and in some cases to be the political mind, seems clear. This mitigates for the relationship with the senior civilian partner, to be seen as fundamentally political. This suggests that the cooperative model at this level should be described as a politico-military rather than the more usual civil-military relationship. This is not to say that broader civil-military relationships are not important; KFOR clearly demonstrated this with its response to the humanitarian problem and support to reconstruction efforts. Nevertheless the core point in this thesis is that commanders need to act to secure political outcomes and this requires a central politico-military relationship at the top. Other civil-military layers can be built on this as necessary.

The next chapter will discuss the case of Iraq and will illustrate some alternative approaches to the politico-military relationship in the wake of an intervention in 2003 which was followed by state breakdown, an extremely violent and virulent insurgency and near civil war. The US led Coalition response was at first seriously inadequate and suffered a series of reverses in the face of growing violence, not least because the Coalition failed to conceive, plan, resource and execute a coherent politico-military campaign. Amongst other things this situation provided the stimulus for the development of a new US counterinsurgency doctrine in 2006. As discussed in Chapter 3, this doctrine essentially embraced a population-centric state building approach which would necessitate a close politico military relationship at its core and the deployment of significant numbers of US troops and civilians in order to address insurgency and foster host nation solutions. This doctrinal approach was later adopted with some success in 2007-2008 and saw efforts to secure the population in advance of a planned hand off to Iraqi security forces.
2 Hawley, "Interview of Jock Covey on The Custodian of the Peace Process " (San Francisco. 2002), 8.
10 Brigadier CBE ADC Rollo W.R., "Interview." (Bovington, UK, 27 June 2001). Brigadier Rollo was Commander UK 4 Armd Bde on entry into Kosovo in June 1999, his Brigade subsequently became Multinational Brigade (Centre) and remained in Kosovo until September 1999. Rollo stated that, “We were determined that we would set the rules, and the best way of doing this was to pre-empt the KLA by occupying the vital ground – the towns, and in particular the government buildings and police stations before they did. We were therefore able to implement a policy of no Long Barreled Weapons in the towns, which did not prevent individual murders, but prevented a complete breakdown”.
11 Mike Jackson, Soldier (Bantam Press, 2007), p 244.
12 Author’s personal observation in Pristina, Kosovo during July 2001. Ibid., p 277.
14 This account draws on unpublished briefing material provided to the author by the Commander 4 Armoured Brigade and his briefing notes. 4 Armoured Brigade ---, "Script for After Action Briefing on 1999 Kosovo Deployment as MNB(C) (author's copy)," (27 June 2001). See also T Cross, Brigadier, CBE. Former Commander 101 Logistic Brigade supporting NATO/KFOR in Macedonia and Kosovo in 1999, "Comfortable with Chaos. Working with the UNHCR and NGOs: Reflections from the 1999 Kosovo Refugee Crisis" (Royal College of Defence Studies, 2000), p 9-10.
15 Jackson, Soldier, p 277, 285, 291.
18 Jackson, Soldier, p 294.
20 Jackson sold his Serb-owned flat in Pristina in July 1999. The author’s rented Serb-owned flat in Pristina was burgled in August 1999 and all white goods were removed. Graffiti left behind suggested that the perpetrators were Albanian.
21 Competition for housing was also a cause of violence elsewhere in the province. In the MNB(E) area, “the greatest source of conflict...was the methodical threatening and then the forceful eviction of Serbs from their houses so that Albanians could move in...the typical pattern included verbal threats, physical...assaults, hand grenades and eventually killings or arson.”Richard Swengros, W. LTC, "Military Police Functions in Kosovo," IWS - The Information Warfare Site (May 2000), http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/call/swengros.htm. Accessed 12 May 2010.
Around 5,000 inter-


32 Jackson, Soldier, p 277.

33 Wilson, "Kosovo Questions - Visit 21-25 Jan 00 [author's copy]," p 4.

34 --, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (Kosovo) adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting on 10 June 1999," (1999). The US wanted to maintain momentum towards quasi-
independence, avoiding dealing with the issue immediately but locking in progress. Europeans were even less inclined to be specific on final status. Hawley, "Interview of Jock Covey on The Custodian of the Peace Process", p 4.

35 Kouchner, "A First-Hand Perspective from Kosovo," p139.

36 Hawley, "Interview of Jock Covey on The Custodian of the Peace Process", p 2.

37 Also there had been a turf war over who would do what. Connaughton, Military Intervention and Peacekeeping: the Reality, p232-233.


39 Covey, Dziedzic, and Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation, p 30-31.

40 --, "Waiting For UNMIK: Local Administration in Kosovo."


42 Around 5,000 international police were due to deploy to establish law and order, however after 9 months there were less than 2000, leaving KFOR with an unintended role. (This increased to 4500 by November 2000). --, "Kosovo Facts and figures," NATO Website, http://www.nato.int/issues/kosovo/figures.html. Accessed 19 May 2010.
43 ———, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (Kosovo) adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting on 10 June 1999."


45 ———, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (Kosovo) adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting on 10 June 1999."


47 Jackson.

48 Fry, R.A., "A View From Kosovo," pp: p 10. General Wesley Clark, SACEUR, was watchful, the "ultimate division of power has not been settled" quoted by Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War (London: Chatto and Windus, 2000), p 94.

49 John Reith, Major General, (former commander NATO Albania Force in 1999), "Lecture to UK Higher Command and Staff Course Shrivenham, UK," (7 March 2001).

50 Jackson, Soldier, 285-288.

51 Ibid., p 298-300.


53 Ibid.


55 General Klaus Reinhardt, Interview (by telephone), (24 March 2010).


57 Klaus Reinhardt, Interview (by telephone); Shirreff, Interview.

58 Jackson, Soldier, p 285.


61 Jackson, Soldier, p 241-275.


65 Rupert Smith, Interview 28 October 2009.

66 Hayley, "Interview of Jock Covey on The Custodian of the Peace Process", p 5. Although Paddy Ashdown later explained that later this had been rectified and as High Representative, he had a sound relationship with Commander SFOR, Paddy Ashdown, Interview, (London, UK, 2010).

67 He had also noted the US obsession with “mission creep” in Bosnia which meant that US forces would only conduct tasks specifically mandated by the Dayton Agreement (Annex 1A). Jackson; ———, "KFOR: The Inside Story," 18.

68 In Bosnia he had learned that his relationships with Civilian leadership were vital. Soldiers are subject to civilian political authority so this needed to be a reality publicly and privately. Social contact helps: have a party! Jackson, "Speaking at: "An Integrated Approach to Complex Emergencies: The Kosovo Experience". Conference co-hosted by the UK MOD Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre and Cranfield University."; ———, Soldier, p 290.
His successor agreed: "there must be no split" Klaus Reinhardt, Interview (by telephone).


Jackson, "Speaking at: "An Integrated Approach to Complex Emergencies: The Kosovo Experience". Conference co-hosted by the UK MOD Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre and Cranfield University."

General Reinhardt also emphasised close cooperation and daily coordination as well as weekly planning meetings. Klaus Reinhardt, Interview (by telephone).

Len Hawley, "Transcript of interview by Len Hawley of Jock Covey former Principal Deputy SRSG Kosovo, 1999-2001. (Author's copy)," (San Francisco, USA 6 November 2002), p 5.

Ibid.

Covey, Dziedzic, and Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation, 105-115.

Hawley, "Interview of Jock Covey on The Custodian of the Peace Process", p 10.

Covey, Dziedzic, and Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation, p 78-79.

Ibid., p 78.

Here there was a real danger of imposing external ideas rather than facilitating the growth of a local solution. Tania Mechelenborg, . Former UNMIK Political Officer 2000-2002, "Interview," (London 25 March 2010).


Jackson, Soldier, p 290.

Sometimes referred to by KFOR as the JIAC.


Klaus Reinhardt, Interview (by telephone).

Bernard Kouchner, Les Guerriers de la Paix: Du Kosovo à l'Irak (Grasset, 2004), p 143.

Wilson, "Kosovo Questions - Visit 21-25 Jan 00 [author's copy]," p 1-3.

Jackson, "Speaking at: "An Integrated Approach to Complex Emergencies: The Kosovo Experience". Conference co-hosted by the UK MOD Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre and Cranfield University."

Arriving 6 weeks after KFOR's entry into Kosovo, SACEUR OPLAN 10413 dated 19 Jul 99 provided the following end state: "At the end of this operation, the military conditions of the MTA/Undertaking/Peace Settlement have been met; conditions for IDP and refugee return are established; a self-sustaining secure environment exists for civil administrations and responsibilities have transferred to appropriate civil organisations”. Andrew. P. Ridgway, Major General CB CBE Chief of Staff ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, "Presentation to the Higher Command and Staff Course: Peace Support Operations - Campaign Planning," (15 March 2001).

Speaking in 2007, Jackson suggested that a generic end state would be “to achieve a country at peace with itself and its neighbours, with a representative government, capable security forces, and economy moving forward and a future better than the past”. General Sir Mike Jackson, "Speaking at: "Hearts and Minds" British Counter Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq" conference at RUSI in association with Kingston University London," (London, UK 21 September 2007).

Ridgway, "Presentation to the Higher Command and Staff Course: Peace Support Operations - Campaign Planning."

This subject was discussed at length during a conference ‘An Integrated Approach to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: The Kosovo Experience’ co-hosted by UK MOD Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre and Cranfield University, 10-11 May, 2001, Eynsham Hall. "...[M]ost inter-agency actors feel much more comfortable discussing operational, rather than strategic, issues in planning. Most would also agree that the concept of ‘emergent planning’, a management tool used in the absence of any clear end
state, has greater applicability than strategic planning. Emergent planning implies less control and more learning whereas strategic planning involves more control and less learning. Arguably, the former approach is more appropriate for planning around a high proportion of unforeseeable events involving a set of such diverse actors, many of which can take on different levels of importance and involvement depending on the dynamics of the peace continuum.” FitzGerald, Ann, unpublished paper, author's copy.


98 In the form of a US civil affairs unit. Ridgway, "Presentation to the Higher Command and Staff Course: Peace Support Operations - Campaign Planning." However as General Reinhardt pointed out care is needed not to take over here because “the military is like a steam roller”. Klaus Reinhardt, "Interview (by telephone)."

99 Although a campaign plan was developed by KFOR, clearly this could not be a true campaign plan as it was developed by only one component (land) of a much larger operation. Ridgway, "Presentation to the Higher Command and Staff Course: Peace Support Operations - Campaign Planning."

100 To achieve unity of effort, this would need Joint Civil Commissions for various sectors: Media, Health and Sanitation, Education and Culture, Banking, Finance and Economy, Governance, Justice and Law Enforcement, Energy and Fuel, Water and Electricity, Post, Telegraph and Telecommunications, Agriculture. Ibid.

101 Ibid.


103 Ridgway, "Presentation to the Higher Command and Staff Course: Peace Support Operations - Campaign Planning."

104 Jackson.


106 Blair, Weaving The Strands Of The Rope: A Comprehensive Approach To Building Peace In Kosovo. See also Lovelock, "Securing a Viable Peace," 138. This issue is explained in more detail in Chapter 1.

107 Jackson, "Speaking at: "Hearts and Minds" British Counter Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq” conference at RUSI in association with Kingston University London.”

108 Supporting and supported is a doctrinal expression that clarifies relationships. Where the main effort lies defines the relationship which changes over time. Here UNMIK was supported by KFOR.

109 Ridgway, "Presentation to the Higher Command and Staff Course: Peace Support Operations - Campaign Planning." See also Jacksons view on generic objectives for intervention which would have informed this. Jackson, Soldier, p 281.

110 Hawley, "Transcript of interview by Len Hawley of Jock Covey former Principal Deputy SRSG Kosovo, 1999-2001. (Author’s copy)," p 6.

111 Ibid., p 7.

112 Ibid., p 7-8. See also Covey, Dziedzic, and Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation, 105-115.

113 R A Fry, Major General, MBE, Interview (Portsmouth, UK. 16 July 2001). Max Manwaring also suggested that “vertical and horizontal unity of effort” was needed in these circumstances Max G. Manwaring, "Internal Wars: Rethinking Problem and Response," (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. 1 September 2001), p 33.

114 Tim Ripley, "Interview: Brig Robert Fry Commander of Kosovo Force's Multinational Brigade (Centre)," Janes Defence Weekly 27 September 2000. Gordon Messenger, Fry’s chief of staff, explained that Military operations, police operations and the development of the judiciary all had to be taken forward in step; in the in the meanwhile the relative capabilities of police and military led to a “pseudo-police led” operation where the military would prop up the police throughout. Lt Col Messenger G.,. (Chief of Staff,
3 Cdo Bde RM which formed the framework of MNB (C) during the period Aug 2000 – Mar 2001) “Fax to Author - Kosovo Chapter,” (1 May 2001), p 2-3.

115 Ridgway, "Presentation to the Higher Command and Staff Course: Peace Support Operations - Campaign Planning."

116 Shirreff, Interview. Shirreff was not alone in finding that the impact of KFOR’s planning did not always reach as far as the Multinational Brigades. Fry experienced the same. Fry, "Interview ."


118 Ibid.

119 Ibid. See also Lovelock, "Securing a Viable Peace," p 141.

120 Williams, “Speaking at: An Integrated Approach to Complex Emergencies: The Kosovo Experience, conference co-hosted by the UK MOD Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre and Cranfield University."

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid. For further detail of how this “campaign” was planned and executed see Lovelock, "Securing a Viable Peace,” p 140-147.


124 This included operations to prevent Serb Special Forces conducting terrorist attacks on the Albanian community. S Kirkpatrick,. Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding Officer 1 Princess of Wales Regiment, "Presentation to the Joint Doctrine and Concept Centre: Peace Support Operations in Kosovo during 2000,” (7 May 2001).

125 Messenger G., "Fax to Author - Kosovo Chapter,” p 10.

126 Ripley, “Interview: Brig Robert Fry Commander of Kosovo Force's Multinational Brigade (Centre)."

127 Klaus Reinhardt, Interview (by telephone).


130 ———, Soldier, p 297.

131 One issue was whether this solution would in effect condone war crimes committed by the KLA?

Mechelenborg, Interview.

132 Jackson, Soldier, p 297.

133 Ibid., p 295.

134 Mechelenborg, Interview.

135 ———, “What Happened to the KLA?.”


137 This would be after Kosovo’s independence. The KPC was “formally dissolved on 14 June 2009. In parallel, the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was developed to ensure that key capabilities were available for emergency situations.” --, "NATO's role in Kosovo.” Accessed

138 Author’s observation July-August 1999 as a member of the OSCE mission.

139 Hashim Thaci, the Commander in Chief, Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves (UCK) (also known as Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), signed the “Undertaking” on June 21, 1999.

140 Kouchner, "Statement at a press conference following agreement on demilitarization and transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Pristina, Kosovo, Yugoslavia: 21 September 1999.”

141 Jackson, Soldier, 285-288.


Ibid. 16.

Klaus Reinhardt, Interview (by telephone).

Wilson, "Kosovo Questions - Visit 21-25 Jan 00 [author's copy]." p 6.

Klaus Reinhardt, Interview (by telephone).

Hawley, "Interview of Jock Covey on The Custodian of the Peace Process", p 15.

Shirreff, Interview.

Ibid. Williams, "Speaking at: An Integrated Approach to Complex Emergencies: The Kosovo Experience, conference co-hosted by the UK MOD Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre and Cranfield University."


Serb religious leaders, as Jackson pointed out, were among the only surviving figures in authority in that community. Jackson, Soldier, p 282.


Hawley, "Interview of Jock Covey on The Custodian of the Peace Process"; p 10.

British Military Police were deployed to provide close protection in order to enable Serb leaders some freedom of movement and to participate in the political process. Foster-Knight E.


But he could not “go public” or ask for help because of the perception and cohesion problem which this would cause thus risking alliance coherence. Klaus Reinhardt, Interview (by telephone).


Anthony Welch explained that Commander KFOR had varying degrees of control over the national contingents as follows: Russians – nil; French – difficult and only if Paris agreed; British – obeyed all instructions; Italians – as for British; US – similar to French, they had picked a quiet area and force protection was important; German – stayed in their own area, force protection a major issue. Anthony Welch,. Former head of DFID Kosovo Office 1999 and UNMIK Administrator at Mitrovica 2001-2002, Interview, (Shrivenham, UK. 21 May 2010). British troops tended to act as the operational reserve, but they would often deploy into an information vacuum because the local KFOR units were not operating amongst the people. Kirkpatrick, "Presentation to the Joint Doctrine and Concept Centre: Peace Support Operations in Kosovo during 2000." See also: Richard Beeston, "British troops quell Mitrovica riots," The Times 2001.


Dr Stephanie Blair,. (former UNMIK Municipal Administrator January - July 2000), Interview, (Toronto, Canada 14 August 2010).

Belgrade continued to influence the lives of those living in the area. --. "Kosovo's Lynchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica."
For a detailed account of the makeup of the communities, the local political structures and the tensions that this mixture generated at the time see: Ibid.


--. "Kosovo's Lynchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica."

Discussion with senior officer.

Klaus Reinhardt, Interview (by telephone).

See also --. "Kosovo's Lynchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica."

Ibid.

Although though there had been a poor relationship with his predecessor in 2000. Welch, Interview.

This would also serve in particular to fuel local Serb contempt for KFOR. David Wilson, Lt Col, former Kosovar Liaison Officer in OSCE Mission in Kosovo, (OMIK), "Email to Author," (21 February 2000).


Albeit even Rugova, the most moderate Albanian leader, made it clear that “independence is unavoidable”. Reinhardt, " Commanding KFOR,” pp: p 4.

Shirreff, Interview.; Ridgway, "Presentation to the Higher Command and Staff Course: Peace Support Operations - Campaign Planning."


Ripley, "Interview: Brig Robert Fry Commander of Kosovo Force's Multinational Brigade (Centre)."

Kouchner, "A First-Hand Perspective from Kosovo,” p 146.

Some Albanian miscreants remained at large because the international community basically lacked the means and evidence to incarcerate them. Hawley, "Transcript of interview by Len Hawley of Jock Covey former Principal Deputy SRSG Kosovo, 1999-2001. (Author’s copy),” p18-19.

Fry, Interview.

Later Kouchner and Reinhardt became known as “twin brothers”. Their body language clearly demonstrated a close rapport (from a report by Col Fiona Walthall after a conference on Kosovo held February 2001 by the Center for International Studies (CIS) at ETH Zurich). Kouchner, "A First-Hand Perspective from Kosovo,” p 137.

Ibid., p 139.

Les Guerriers de la Paix: Du Kosovo à l'Irk, p 166.


Lovelock, "Securing a Viable Peace,” p 133.


Blair, Weaving The Strands Of The Rope: A Comprehensive Approach To Building Peace In Kosovo.


130
One slight danger with this is that it might be misinterpreted as a recipe to simply avoid rocking the boat. Covey, Dziedzic, and Hawley, eds., *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation*, p 78-79.

Jackson, "Speaking at: "Hearts and Minds" British Counter Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq” conference at RUSI in association with Kingston University London."


General Sir Mike Jackson, Discussion with Author, (London, UK 21 September 2007).


Although views varied on the way to achieve the necessary civil-military interaction. The British preference was to see CIMIC as a means to an end, not an end in itself. This meant minimising the number of specialists working on CIMIC issues and treating these issues as routine responsibilities for all commanders and staffs. P Wilkinson, "The Development of Doctrine for Peace Support Operations" (Cranfield University, July 2001), p 100-101. US and NATO approaches were different. For a detailed account of the plethora of civil-military activities by civil affairs units in Kosovo during 1999-2000, some of which were useful, see: Christoper Holshek, "The Operational Art of Civil-Military Operations: Promoting Unity of Effort," in *Lessons from Kosovo: the KFOR Experience*, ed. Larry Wentz (Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, 2002).
Chapter 5 Iraq 2003-2008: Hard Lessons

“If war is a battle of wills, then counterinsurgency, which we know is the darkest and the infernal place in Hell itself, is the resolve of everyone’s will.” Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb

1. Introduction

The US led campaign in Iraq, a major episode in the “war on terror” in the post-9/11 era, saw Saddam Hussein's assumed possession of WMD used as a pretext to effect regime change. A short state-on-state conflict from 20 March to 9 April 2003 succeeded due to the United States’ technical and mechanical advantages. However there was no clearly understood sense of what Iraq was supposed to look like after regime change had been effected or how this was to be achieved after the termination of combat operations. The aim of this chapter is to establish evidence, from the case of Iraq, for the hypothesis that in such circumstances, beyond their specific security-related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors in order to sustain the political process and facilitate viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations. This approach needs soldiers at all levels to co-operate with other relevant actors, respond to political direction and shape military operations that will impact decisively on political outcomes in order to help generate political progress towards sustainable peace.

It is now widely understood that, in Iraq, “[t]here was no Coalition civil-military plan for the post invasion phase,” this phase is known amongst military planners as “Phase 4”. On the face of it, this is surprising given the plethora of debate and advice available from the think tank community and within the US Army itself, as well as the well documented post World War Two experience of reconstruction operations. Pre-war estimates had suggested that a significant force of 500,000 troops would be needed to maintain security in post war Iraq. But this did not sit well with US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s view of military transformation which envisioned smaller agile units backed by technological enablers; therefore troop numbers were restricted. Equally, the US Administration assumed that there would be a rapid Iraqi political transformation, with resumption of sovereignty, governance and security by Iraqis. Thus, with the benefit of hindsight, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Coalition response was at first seriously inadequate in both political and military terms and suffered a series of reverses leading to near collapse. An approach of essentially ignoring the emerging insurgency would fail by early 2004. A subsequent strategic shift to transition, with an emphasis on building up and supporting Iraqi security forces, could not surmount a toxic mixture of Sunni insurgency, Al Qaeda in Iraq, Shiite militancy and latent Kurdish unrest, and this intensified into a sectarian conflict in 2006. The Iraqis would not be able to protect themselves or their political and economic reconstruction in the face of these real challenges.

The imbalance of ends ways and means would eventually be addressed by a politico-military “surge” during 2007-8. This “New Way Forward” strategy sought to deliver specific improvements to the security, political and economic situation. The ways would be the application of a new US counterinsurgency doctrine (discussed in
Chapter 3) which embraced a population-centric state building approach and necessitated a close politico military relationship at its core. The means would be an increased number of US troops, additional financial resources, diplomatic efforts and a new partnership with the Iraqis. The surge would provide the protection for the people and the process necessary to kick-start a more positive future. This might at least provide Iraqis with the option of not using force to resolve political questions.

This chapter will focus narrowly on the political and security nexus. There is insufficient space to provide an historical account of a complex campaign with a shifting mosaic of actors, events and problems. The security, political, economic and social aftermath of the Coalition Intervention in Iraq in 2003 together with an analysis of the various elements comprising the mandate for the civilian and military presence will be sketched. However, the political lead up to war, the specific issues involved or the detail of military preparations and conduct during the invasion of Iraq by the US and UK in 2003 will not. The discussion will focus on two periods. The first will be the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) from May 2003 to June 2004 with Ambassador Bremer and Lieutenant General Sanchez as the key interlocutors and the second between February 2007 and September 2008 with Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus. As with Chapter 4, analysis of politico-military cooperation and campaign design will illustrate the extent of politico-military integration during planning and execution. This will demonstrate the effect of positive or negative actions by commanders on the security and political domains. The chapter will conclude with a short assessment of the results of the approaches described and the doctrinal implications.
2. **Post Invasion Iraq in 2003**

2.1. **The Situation**

The predominant view amongst US forces was that with the defeat of Iraqi forces and the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime, their task was complete. However a security gap rapidly emerged and Iraqis seized on the opportunity to take revenge. As Ambassador Bremer later explained,
Coalition troops had no orders to stop the looting and the Iraqi police in all major cities had deserted their posts. The looting was done out of rage, revenge and for profit...some looting was also part of a prewar plan of Saddam Hussein’s intelligence services. The unchecked violence had three consequences. First ... the enormous economic damage...[T]he economic cost of the looting [was] $12 billion, an amount equal to half Iraq’s prewar GDP. Secondly, focusing ...on hated Iraqi governmental institutions, the looters destroyed a large part of the physical infrastructure of the government. The Baghdad headquarters of 21 of 25 ministries were...destroyed...All the country’s police stations were ransacked...Iraq’s military bases and barracks in most cases were entirely disassembled - windows, doors, furniture, pipes and bathroom fixtures...But the most pernicious effect of the unchecked looting was to send a message to the Iraqi people, and to enemies of the Coalition, that the Coalition military would not, or could not, provide security for Iraqis, the most basic of government functions".

This message was further confirmed by significant reductions in the number of troops at end of April 2003. However as General McColl, former Deputy Commander Multi-National Force-Iraq, explained to the UK’s Enquiry into Iraq, overlaying the physical destruction and absence of public security, a complex security situation was emerging. This saw “a threefold threat, the Sunni rejectionists, the Shia militia, the Al-Qaeda and their associates...were beginning to crystallise during that period”. Unfortunately these hostile elements would have access to plenty of arms and ammunition which the coalition had failed to destroy.

The civilian administration had largely disappeared and the country was in a poor state. However as another senior British military officer stated,

“The Coalition failed to appreciate (or find out about) the state of the country, prior to the invasion: the effects of UN sanctions, fear of Saddam and the Ba’athist regime; broken infrastructure, impatience, revenge, inadequate life support, poor/non-existent communications, access to weapons, conflicting internal and external international and regional agendas....The Coalition failed to understand the dynamics of the country – Shia/Sunni/ Kurd tensions and malevolent influences inside the country and the region; or to exploit the potential benefits that could be achieved through other influencers, especially the Sheiks”.

There was no political settlement or political process in Iraq. Under Saddam the Sunni minority had been in charge and the majority Shiites in the South and the Kurds in the north were repressed. Hitherto, membership of the Ba’ath party had been essential to obtain government or other professional employment. Political experience was lacking. Tribal religious and organisational groups had disparate priorities and loyalties, with very little vertical influence or consensus about the appropriate use of political power."
started on 15 April with exiled Iraqi groups, local leaders and tribal leaders (although
the main Shia groups did not participate at that stage). A UK MOD report stated that
a process of de-Ba’thification was also agreed, although the level was unclear. Later Bremer
explained that, getting the political system going again would be
difficult, “[t]here are no election rolls, no election law, no political parties law and no
electoral districts”.

2.2. The Mandate
In the wake of the invasion, the legality of which remains disputed, the Coalition's
“mandate” in Iraq was derived from its legal duties as an occupying power. However
the ends were unclear with imprecise objectives and command and control
arrangements were confused. As Lieutenant General Viggers, the senior British
officer in Baghdad at the time, explained to the Iraq Enquiry,

“we lacked clear statements from Capitals on Coalition political –military
objectives, timelines, what the end state should look like or how we were to
get there. At the outset, we had no clearly stated definition of what “success”
would look like for the Iraqis, the region or the international community.”

The ways were also vague and the task of taking forward the mandate would change
hands frequently. At the outset, Lieutenant General McKiernan, who had commanded
combat operations (Phase 3) remained in charge. The idea for Phase 4 was that power
would then be exercised by a retired Lieutenant General, Jay Garner, leading the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) under the line authority
of General Franks’s United States Central Command. But this was to be short lived.
On April 16 Franks issued a “Freedom Message” saying that the US would only be in
Iraq temporarily, and that an American civilian authority known as the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) would soon take over from the military. This meant that
the military means would also be reduced. On 21 April Secretary of Defence Donald
Rumsfeld, on Franks’s advice, cancelled the deployment of 50,000 additional troops
to Iraq; this dismayed commanders on the ground who wanted more troops to handle
security.

On 8 May 2003 the US and UK wrote to the UN Security Council confirming their
obligations under international law and informing that they would establish a
Coalition Provisional Authority to “exercise powers of government temporarily, and
as necessary, especially to provide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid,
and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction.” Subsequently UN Security Council
resolution 1483 recognised the CPA, which would report through the US and UK, the
joint occupying powers, to the Security Council. It placed no other specific
obligations on the Coalition beyond its obligations under international law. The
resolution also put a UN SRSG onto the map. However the tenuous international
legitimacy of the coalition enterprise meant that the peace building effort would not
benefit from international reconstruction and transitional authority expertise such as
had been available in Kosovo. The United Nations’ new mission would later be
literally bombed out of Iraq in the Summer of 2003, and with the death of the SRSG Sergio de Mello, Britain’s senior civilian in Iraq, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, later commented that he “had lost a real partner.”

In early May 2003 President Bush appointed Ambassador L. Paul “Jerry” Bremer as Presidential Envoy and Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, “which would serve as the legal executive authority of Iraq — a much more authoritative mandate than ORHA had held.” Bremer arrived in Baghdad to replace Garner on 9 May 2003, he reported through the Secretary of Defense to the President. Part of his task was to help Iraqi civil servants to get Iraqi ministries going again. On 15 June, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez assumed command of Coalition military forces with a scratch headquarters named CJTF-7. He reported directly to Commander US Central Command and through him to the Secretary of Defense. Apparently “at the same time, CJTF-7 served in ‘direct support’ to CPA.” However the precise relationship remained vague and Sanchez’s military task was not clearly defined.

A CPA planner, Dr Andrew Rathmell, later explained that there had not been much focus on the phase 4: Rumsfeld had provided clear direction to Franks. The operation should be rapid, with a quick transition; there was no real need to plan for afterwards. The US administration thought that Iraq would function and survive, so they only planned for a humanitarian problem and not governance. State Department (DOS) questions on these matters were ignored by the Department of Defence (DOD) so Garner’s organisation was under prepared and under resourced. The situation had been miss-appreciated; the available intelligence had been around orders of battle and not about how governance worked and what would happen if the regime was decapitated. Once in Iraq, the US administration began to see the scale of the problem. But they had not prepared the military units for a law and order task. They were short a division of ground troops, because of a difficulty gaining passage through Turkey, and they did not have the right equipment.


3.1. Approaches to the Politico-Military Relationship by Bremer and Sanchez

Bremer reported to Rumsfeld and the President; but he knew how Washington DC worked, so he drew his authority directly from the President in order to obtain assets. As pro-consul he seemed determined to make full use of that authority and his nature was to retain control. He was known as a hard charger and was insistent that he had secured his position as the “President’s man… with full authority over all US government personnel, activities and funds…empowered with all executive, legislative and judicial functions in Iraq.” However this did not include authority over the military which was arguably the key element needed to plan a successful political strategy.

Both Bremer and Sanchez publicly acknowledged the requirement for cooperation and there is little in their published writing to suggest that this did not exist. Yet there
was “scant evidence of cooperation between the CPA and the U.S. military under [Sanchez’s] watch”, 44 they did not connect and they did not really communicate. 45

Greenstock explained that “the whole American effort between the civilian and the military aspects was compartmentalised, stovepiped is the word that is often used… The military and civilian arms were not working smoothly together”. 46 Other commentators suggest that there was disunity in leadership. Thomas Ricks suggested that "it was very clear they hated each other. They lived in the same palace and didn't talk to each other.” 47 Equally Bremer was “aggressive” 48 and not experienced in dealing with the military and was not by nature a team builder. 49 Nor was he receptive to advice, even from his most senior partner. 50

Defending himself, Sanchez later stated that the military had called for the “focused, synchronized application of all elements of national power” 51 in Washington and cited the lack of an entity with the authority to direct the interagency as the root of the unity of effort problem. But he seemed unable to take part in the synchronisation process at theatre level and was not willing to subordinate himself for the sake of unity of purpose and to support the man who was obviously his political master. In June 2003, Len Hawley, one of a team of experts commissioned by the Pentagon advised Sanchez to work closely with Bremer and pointed out that they both worked for the same boss (CPA was a DOD entity). Whilst military orders would come from the military chain of command, political direction ought to have come from Bremer. 52 The lack of a widely accepted civil-military doctrine or the disinterest of his higher headquarters did not help Sanchez. The Commander of Central Command, General Franks, had disengaged 53 and his staff saw the task as one essentially of drawing down and not ramping up. 54 Hence the problems of unity of command and the absence of mass were not really identified.

3.2. The CPA’s Political Policies and Plans

Despite optimistic US assumptions on suitable Iraqis reassuming sovereignty, there was no effective long term political settlement or political structures in Iraq. 55 Opinions varied on whether to hand over quickly to an émigré interim government, to facilitate early exit, 56 or take the time needed to establish a path to representative democracy before handing over sovereignty. 57 In the event a 25 Member Iraqi Governing Council was established in July; 58 but the Coalition retained sovereignty. Bremer characterised three major challenges: 59 to provide security for the citizens of Iraq; to help the Iraqis rebuild their economy; and to help the Iraqi people put their country on the path to representative government. Bremer stated that the Coalition military had responsibility for the first task; the CPA for the other two. However this compartmentalised approach would become the core problem in resolving any of these issues. Bremer's early moves reflected US administration assumptions and his approach was to stamp his authority. His first order, “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1 De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society”, 60 went beyond earlier assumptions concerning only the most senior regime figures. 61 This left ministries unable to function, “with no alternative sources of leadership”. 62 ORHA staff had already been working with some Ba’athists in ministries who would later be banned. Rumsvelt and Bremer knew that banning Baathists would make running government more difficult. But it was a political requirement. 63
With his second order, "Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2 Dissolution of Entities", Bremer also dissolved the armed forces. Many had simply melted away but US forces and ORHA were working with the remainder and had identified 125,000 who were prepared to serve the new Iraq. The disbandment was a missed opportunity to "take advantage of the Iraqi army". It put four hundred thousand soldiers out of work at a stroke and magnified the security problem by providing recruits for insurgent groups. Inevitably this led to unrest in May and June. As General Petraeus later pointed out, "most adult Iraqi males...found themselves unemployed, feeling disenfranchised, and angry. This perfect storm represented a perfect opportunity for what became known as al Qaeda in Iraq". Another missed opportunity at this stage was a failure also to recognise that Iraq remained a tribal society. This was important because, as John Keegan put it, the "key to pacification lies in identifying tribal leaders and other big men".

Bremer later suggested that it did not help that the "pre-war planning had been inadequate, largely because it was based on incorrect assumptions about the nature of the post-war situation on the ground in Iraq". This begs the question why, in theatre, such destabilising moves as de-ba’athification and disbanding the armed forces were even contemplated and why the politico-military consequences and effect on the Iraqi body politic where not thought through? These were to be particularly devastating mistakes given that the necessary constabulary capabilities had not been put in place by the intervening powers.

Initially Bremer devised a "7 Steps plan" for the return of sovereignty (see Figure 5.2 below). This drew some fire because it implied a long nation building timeline and the Administration wanted a swift handover of sovereignty prior to the US presidential election in November 2004. The plan, which would have run in tandem with market reforms, was seen as impractical by both military and civilian officials in the field. There were also political difficulties, as Greenstock pointed out, with (the Shia religious leader) Sistani, although these were brushed aside by Bremer.
Eventually, over the summer of 2003, Bremer’s team designed a strategic plan called “A vision to empower Iraqis”. The ambitious ultimate goal envisioned was, “a unified and stable, democratic Iraq that provides effective and representative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms and a growing market economy; is able to defend itself but no longer poses a threat to its neighbors or international security.”

Sanchez’s CJTF-7 planners were instructed to help refine the CPA plan which was sent to Congress on 23 July 2003 in order to secure funding and support. A vision document was produced with objectives familiar from Kosovo and similar to the CSIS strategic task framework (discussed in Chapter 3). Bremer stated that the plan included objectives, metrics and timetables for a number of sectors. Security was identified as the top priority. Iraqis would need to be able to defend themselves. Essential services would be needed to improve their everyday lives. The conditions needed to be created for the eventual transition to a market economy. Oil production needed to be restarted, a currency, a banking system as well as commercial and investment laws needed attention. Representative government was needed but first, an understanding of democratic principles and a constitution were required. The planners understood that “These objectives are intertwined: none can be pursued in
isolation. Political and economic progress depends in part on security, but should it self help to create a safer environment". 86

From July to October the plan was further elaborated87 as “a truly systematic planning tool that brought together civilian and military lines of operation”88 which was used to measure progress. Subsequent CPA reports would trumpet successes across the sectors: many of the milestones had been met or exceeded.89 The plan codified reality by capturing ongoing Coalition programmes but it did not provide a structured response to the underlying problem, deliver a sense of political progress, an improving security situation or real capability. “The coalition had failed to produce an integrated political–military plan for Iraq. This meant that the CPA had to fit such a plan retrospectively on to activities already under way in the summer of 2003”.90

An accelerated91 timetable was announced on 15 November,92 after much debate in Washington and Baghdad, and with a rapidly worsening security situation (see figure 5.3 below). The multi-year occupation was abandoned and a more rapid transition strategy would see sovereignty handed over by July 2004. This was a surprise to many in the CPA.93 The planning effort shifted to transition, not reconstruction, and the lead would go from DOD to DOS. Therefore the imperative was to produce a good enough government and security apparatus, in a hurry. Development of the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps was accelerated to get “boots on the ground”.94 The idea was to get Iraqis to take responsibility and ownership of decisions but General McColl suggested that this was uncomfortable for CJTF-7, which was a war fighting force unused to working with emerging security forces.95
Throughout the CPA period there was a shortage of civilian planning capacity and field administrators, it remained "always a work in progress". As Lieutenant General Viggers, then UK’s senior officer in Baghdad, explained, “At the outset, the CPA had no machinery or processes to turn policy decisions into coordinated delivery at national level and in the regions. [The] CPA was disjointed, stove piped and reactive. This improved over the first few months as the different elements of the CPA became familiar with combined working”. He further commented that “the military contribution to reconstruction was vital – coordination with the civilian agencies inside the CPA, and with contractors had not been thought through at the outset”.  

### 3.3. Campaign Design under CJTF-7

Sanchez had seen politico military realities in Kosovo, although his account of that campaign reads more as that of a bemused outsider than a committed participant. His experience was not apparent in his approach in Iraq where, according to one commentator, he appeared overwhelmed by the situation and the strategic problem hence he focused on quantifying tactical progress and did not have a "strategic or
There is little evidence of Sanchez’ conceptual thought in terms of operational level campaign design. Neither a campaign plan nor commander’s intent was communicated to the divisions on the ground in the early stages. He wanted to “ensure that the presence of American soldiers is felt”, but presence alone could not be described as a concept of operations. Lieutenant General Viggers explained that initially military planning under Central Command and CJTF-7 went ahead in isolation from CPA and was not fully synchronised with “civilian aspects (governance, reconstruction, the economy, medical, education etc) until much later”. It seems apparent that what passed for operational art did not embrace the concept of political primacy or actively supporting a political process and advising political masters accordingly. Sanchez was clearly not comfortable taking instructions from civilians. According to Andrew Bacevich’s review of Sanchez’s account ‘Wiser in Battle’ the book contains

“little to suggest that he understood the actual nature of the problem in Iraq … [his] distaste for politics, which is intrinsic to war and from the outset played a central role in this particular conflict, indicates that understanding lay beyond his ability”.

The CPA’s change agenda for Iraq drew violent reactions from the Iraqi population which the military would be unable to handle. More fundamentally, the coalition structures lacked the politico military gearing needed to handle this both at the planning and execution stages. Unhelpfully, at the working staff level, the CPA was often “at odds” with its military partner. Part of the friction was caused by fundamentally different conceptions, and hence pacing, of what the US was doing in Iraq. The CPA was focused on long term change and the military was solely concerned about exit and keeping the peace. Worse, planners in Baghdad’s protected “Green Zone” were increasingly disconnected from life outside. Many in the US military, including rising stars Petraeus and Mattis, understood the problem and that what had been unleashed meant that others were belligerent in the face of unrest. Hence there would be a need to see people as the centre of gravity and to empower them. However more broadly and despite the legal obligations of the occupying power, there was a sense that creating a safe and secure environment was not what the US military should be doing.

### 3.4. Campaign Execution

Campaign execution would not be easy given that the coincidence of political policy and military un-preparedness would allow an insurgency to grow. Delivering a coordinated politico-military response would also be difficult because some CPA agencies “did not…understand how the military could contribute [and were] reluctant to engage in detailed planning prior to launching a task.”

As the security situation worsened Sanchez described four major thrusts of enemy attacks: direct action against coalition forces; attacks on politicians; attacks on the international community, particularly the United Nations and the Italians; and attacks designed to split the coalition. But apparently Sanchez did not join up the dots and realise that he faced a guerrilla campaign. The attack on the UN on 19 August...
2003 was a particular blow to the UN and to the enterprise in Iraq. The coalition lost a bridge to grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and the Shi’ite community, and the absence of security allowed Muqtada al Sadr time to build up his Shia militia. International organisations and NGOs began to pull out.

The divisions deployed across Iraq had not been brought into the planning by CPA and CJTF-7 and were concerned about managing the practical impact of excessive de-Ba’athification and free-market economic policies, which would put people out of work. In the absence of central direction the division commanders were left to make their own tactical choices. Under Major General Petraeus in Mosul there was no security gap. He understood that consent would be finite and that there was a relationship between governance, service delivery and security. Hence money was important in order to deliver this and kick start the economy. Andrew Rathmell explained that “buying people off” drew some criticism from CPA; but arguably it worked. Petraeus used his military dominance effectively to secure politico-military ends. Conscious of the limited time available he gave Iraqis a stake by drawing them into the team. Petraeus had studied counterinsurgency and understood the direct relationship between military activities and their effect on attitudes. His key question was “Will this operation produce more bad guys than it takes off the streets by the way it's conducted?”

Immediately after the invasion Mattis, the commander of the USMC division saw it as his job to set up a working government; however the rug was effectively pulled by the disbandment of the army and the de-Ba’athification process without consultation by CPA. Mattis later carefully prepared his team for its return to Iraq early in 2004. His approach was to be culturally sensitive, aiming to win popular support through a tough approach, but without excessive force. The Marines would fight the insurgency not the insurgent, because “the people are the prize”. However events drew the Marines into a bloody confrontation in the city of Falluja following the deaths of US contractors there which caused an over reaction down the political chain of command. Washington and Bremer wanted action and Sanchez did not attempt to prevent this. Consequently, whilst knowing that “this is what the enemy wants”, Mattis was instructed to deal with Falluja and the results of the assault on this insurgent stronghold were predictably bloody. The focus on Falluja would prevent the execution of earlier counter insurgency orientated plans and cause a strain on the coalition.

Elsewhere consent promotion was not a priority. Tactics were often more aggressive and not leavened with political subtlety. In the Sunni Triangle, “Saddam’s Heartland,” Major General Odierno, commander of the 4th Infantry Division, took a very firm line, using tough tactics, including the use of artillery, to deal with security problems. The security situation was clearly becoming difficult, but Andrew Rathmell suggested that “he did stoke the insurgency”. A further problem was the absence of intelligence, environmental knowledge or cultural understanding. The proliferation of roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) would make US forces wary about operating amongst the people to gain intelligence. This led to bad targeting, indiscriminate searches, poor prisoner handling facilities and hence at every stage alienated Iraqi people. In some cases permissiveness would see widespread
abuses committed by uncomprehending US soldiers against Iraqi prisoners. No effort had been made to prepare soldiers for operations in what amounted to a failed state with an unfamiliar culture.

3.5. Campaign Results under CPA and CJTF -7

Sovereignty was passed from CPA to the interim Iraqi government on 28 June 2004, the CPA disbanded and Bremer left Iraq that day. The overall impact of the CPA and CJTF-7’s efforts was a deteriorating security situation which prevented economic and political reconstruction in Iraq as discussed above. The CPA’s underlying political assumptions and resulting programmes had been bold and needed time which was not available. The planning and execution of a coordinated campaign took too long. After the fact Bremer was critical of the US military for taking a rosy view of the security situation. But this might be seen as a smokescreen for his decision to disband the Iraqi army. In 2005 Anthony Cordesman argued that these factors “sowed many of the seeds of both the present low intensity war and many of the current uncertainties in Iraq”.

In Iraq during 2003-4 military support to the political process was inadequate; nevertheless the military had a confused and inadequate political partner which was attempting a gargantuan task. As Andrew Rathmell explained, the civilian leadership only “sporadically acknowledged the causal linkages between security and…political and economic reforms. The military leadership…did not do a good job of conceptualizing the campaign as an integrated political–military effort, sometimes failing to put tactical military operations in the broader political context”. Also the confused command and control arrangements, which only came together in Washington, and constant staff shortages did not facilitate civil military planning in theatre.

The haste to achieve military exit and a military transformation agenda which reduced available “boots on the ground” was a further structural problem. Post combat inactivity permitted a security gap to emerge which became progressively wider. Looting, which some troops regarded as a “jolly redistribution of wealth” reduced Iraqi ministry level capacity and also encouraged more serious crime. The removal of Iraqi capacity through CPA Orders 1 and 2 decapitated ministries and left large numbers of men of fighting age with a grievance as outlined above. Looking back, these decisions seem inexplicable, but they were discussed within a narrow politico-military circle in Washington, London and Baghdad without apparent dissent. The CPA’s economic policies would also remove jobs. Equally, the effort to train Iraqis was slow to deliver real capability. The inability to defuse security problems meant that the coalition lost local support. These issues sent a negative message to the Iraqi people as a whole and as the security situation deteriorated it became progressively harder to deliver reconstruction in order to make peoples lives better. Whilst the political message about shortage of troops was apparently passed, there seemed little capability or will to address this in Central Command or Washington.
4. 2004-2006: Transition

With the dissolution of the CPA, the US civilian political and reconstruction efforts in Iraq were subsumed into the US Embassy under Ambassador Negroponte. The military command and control structure was revamped: a 4 star headquarters, Multi-National Force-Iraq under General Casey would oversee the mission in Iraq with two subordinate three star headquarters; a Corps HQ to fight the insurgency and the Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq to train and equip Iraqi security forces. MNF-I operated in support of Iraqi Ministry of Interior but initially had Iraqi ministry of defence forces under command. The arrangement was authorised under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1511 and 1546. The British Deputy Force Commander, General McColl, explained that there was a change in politico-military attitudes; Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey “were determined that they would be entirely interwoven in [their] approach.”

A campaign plan was developed with four lines of operation: security, governance, economic development and strategic communications (in 2005 a fifth, coalition transformation, was added). Casey instituted a Campaign Assessment Steering Board which included political input from the embassy and senior civilian participation. The strategy was to transition responsibilities to the Iraqi Transitional Government and exit. However, Iraqi security forces had failed in combat in early 2004 and it would take time to build their capability. US forces would need to hold the ring in the meantime and then withdraw to a series of large bases as “Provincial Iraqi Control” was achieved across Iraqi. However this became increasingly difficult as significant combat power had to be diverted from early 2005 to mentor Iraqi units and provide essential combat enablers such as intelligence and air support.

There was some political progress although violence remained a restraint. An historic election took place in January 2005 to select a Constitutional Convention. Another in December 2005 would elect a parliament. Although the elections had an Iraqi face, MNF-I was instrumental in delivering election logistics and a relatively secure environment to enable voting. However a political follow-up by the Iraqis would continue to be hampered by their own internal divisions, and the escalating violence. The security situation continued to deteriorate, as Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb who was Deputy Commander MNF-I at the time, explained to the Iraq enquiry, there were four interwoven threats to stability. These were crime and corruption; Iranian backed militias; “Saddamists, who continued to unpick any feeling of success;” and Al-Qaeda, supported by the Sunni insurgency. Sectarian tensions were also mounting.

The turning point in the campaign was the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara by Al Qaeda in February 2006. It became clear that neither the Iraqis nor the US would be able to contain the Shia-Sunni civil war of murder and ethnic cleansing which followed. Lieutenant General Lamb explained that, since 2003, the security situation evolved “from the war to civil disorder to an insurgency on steroids, to sectarian violence.” In August 2006, he further explained that the
“Americans in Anbar were...experiencing about 80 attacks a day. The governor, Mahmoud, was besieged in the Green Zone in Baghdad. His council had either gone to Jordan or had been killed. Ramadi was broadly lost. There were no policemen in Hit....Al-Qaeda had claimed Anbar as a caliphate....Mosul always remained potentially...unstable … and Baghdad just was in the throes of beginning to get the full measure of the vehicle borne IEDs and the attacks that were being placed upon it.”

In the face of these difficulties Casey and Ambassadors Negroponte and Kalilzad were not in conflict with each other, they were collaborative. Yet the transition strategy with US troops training Iraqis and “commuting to war”154 from ever fewer large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) was failing to deliver a positive political effect: the IEDs in particular gave the sense of “failing and a failing nation”.155 With time running out until the expiration of the UN mandate and the US presidential election at the end of 2008, it would simply not be possible to produce enough capable Iraqi security forces to master the violence. For the US, the ends ways and means were not aligned. The strategy was not appropriate for the situation. The objectives were not realistic and appropriate forces and resources were not available.156 The strategic initiative157 had been lost. Could it be regained?

5. The Crocker-Petraeus Team In Iraq in 2007-2008: “Relentless”158

“In the end, Iraqis will decide the outcome of this struggle. Our task is to help them gain the time they need to save their country.” General David Petraeus159

In January 2007 President Bush announced a new strategy for Iraq which would lead to a surge of some 20,000 extra American forces together with an expanded political and economic effort. Former retired Army General Keane, supported by Lieutenant General Petraeus among others, had advocated a new strategy to deliver both political and security progress through protecting the population, in particular in Baghdad,160 something the extant transition strategy could not achieve.161 It would be “one last shot at success”.162 Promoted to four star general, Petraeus was selected to command MNF-I with a temporary US troop level increase from about 135,000 in January 2007, to about 168,000 at its peak in October.163 The surge included a strong political and economic element at its core and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, an experienced Arabist,164 was selected to head the US Embassy team. This section will cover the period from Petraeus’s arrival in Baghdad on 10 February 2007 until his departure on 16 September 2008.

5.1. The Politico-Military Relationship

There was immediately a close working relationship between Crocker and Petraeus and they both recognised they had to approach the enterprise together to deal with the pressure produce political objectives and provide focus for the multidisciplinary team.165 Speaking in London in 2010 Petraeus lauded Crocker as his "wonderful diplomatic wingman";166 (earlier he had characterised Odierno, the Corps Commander as his “operational wingman”).167 He saw the campaign as a “truly civil-military
endeavour" and both he and Crocker “work[ed] hard to achieve civil military unity of effort...as part of a comprehensive whole of government approach. [It] had to be a true team effort-military, civilian, coalition, and Iraqi. And [we] wanted there to be no doubt that there was an un-shakeable commitment to teamwork at the top”.

Petraeus was always scrupulous about deferring to Crocker in public and his Deputy Graeme Lamb explained that "Crocker understood the relationship and forced the embassy to do that as well and to set the conditions for the untidy mess of politics". As David Kilcullen, Petraeus’s counterinsurgency advisor put it, Petraeus and Crocker were “in each other’s heads". In the absence of a formal system to bring the convergence of approaches and actions, the environment created by Petraeus and Crocker enabled people to exploit opportunities that only they could see in their own domain; as Lamb explained, “above all you need a shared understanding, with that you can go off in different directions, but you know you are.”

Although theirs was an attitude of cooperation, not conflict, one insider commented that "Crocker seemed to be the junior partner". Their personalities were compatible and Crocker “was clearly supporting what Petraeus wanted to do (and providing advice and guidance as appropriate when the military mindset became too prevalent)”. Equally, Crocker was clearly the master of regional and local political issues. But at lower levels, this was not easy, and there were inevitable tensions, partly because many foreign service officers had been sent to Baghdad without specialist knowledge or training and according to Andrew Rathmell, who was there at the time, it was "them and us at various times".

5.2. The Big Ideas.

5.2.1. The Political Strategy.

President Bush’s January 2007 strategy update, “The New Way Forward" had envisaged a US political and military surge (20,000 soldiers) into Iraq. The top level objective was a "unified, democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror". There were to be specific security, legislative and economic goals. But what was the heart of the problem? Testifying to Congress in 2007 and again in 2008 Petraeus explained the "fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources." In the face of an extremely violent insurgency, the US could not “kill or capture [its] way out” but instead needed to address the underlying factors. Crocker’s testimony echoed Petraeus’s, “Iraqis are facing some of the most profound political, economic, and security challenges imaginable. They are not simply grappling with the issue of who rules Iraq, but they are asking what kind of country Iraq will be, how it will be governed, and how Iraqis will share power and resources among each other...[But] We will continue our efforts to assist Iraqis in the pursuit of national reconciliation".
There is no specific evidence of a US political approach on the ground; there were some "vague ideas about pushing forward the political process but not a clear, structured overall plan". But this would be a political struggle and Crocker explained that to resolve it Iraq needed time with help at the local and national levels and these would need to be connected together. There was also recognition that from a political and military perspective, Baghdad was the centre of gravity, it needed to be secure to enable government to work. Nationally, there was a need to get the political process moving, find political accommodation and ultimately reconciliation. To achieve this end some significant pieces of legislation, such as an oil law, needed to be in place. At the local level, much of the problem was still about service delivery. Petraeus recognised the need to protect both the political process and political progress: this could not be done without protecting the people, hence he explained that the military side would need “to improve security so that the Iraqi government can resolve the tough issues it faces and so that the economy and basic services can be improved”.

5.2.2. The Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) and the Campaign Plan

The overall plan, in theatre, to enable the above vision to secure Iraq and build was initially developed through a Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) established by Crocker and Petraeus and jointly led by Col H R McMaster and David Pearce. This joint team comprising military, diplomatic, economic, development, and prominent think tank experts, would establish what would be needed both to secure Iraq and build confidence for the political line of effort. There was a need to get buy in from Washington, including influential think tanks. Andrew Rathmell, a member of the team explained that The JSAT process was "touted as zero-based, but I sensed at the time there was already a clear set of ideas". Nevertheless as Petraeus stated, it was important to get a “common understanding of the tasks at hand, to refine goals and objectives, and to determine how to bring the tools and our respective agencies possessed to bear on the problem”. The JSAT dismantled the earlier campaign planning assumptions and, as Alexander Alderson explained, suggested an updated approach using the template in FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency.

On the ground, the key operational change was already clear. Much of the conceptual thinking on the security line of operation had been done at the end of 2006 by the Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Odierno and had resulted in a request for more troops which became the “surge”. Petraeus acknowledged at his Senate Confirmation hearing in January 2007 that the situation was dire and there was no military solution. Now, to secure the population, US units would provide what he termed a “persistent presence” in areas they had cleared. Applying the precepts of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, clearing and holding would then provide the opportunity to build and for Iraqis to “make the political deals and compromises necessary for long-term stability”.

The JSAT delivered a report which was then drawn on by MNF-I, MNC-I and U.S. Embassy staff to refine the campaign plan. The purpose of this holistic joint civil military plan was to lay out the steps that all agencies needed to take and, as Petraeus
put it, to detail “how actions in one area, such as security or reconstruction, enabled and complemented efforts in other areas, such as political reconciliation”. The key goal was to deliver a lasting Iraqi political accommodation leading to Iraqi political reconciliation in the longer term. The joint campaign plan comprised four lines of operation: political, security, economic and diplomatic. All four were underpinned by strategic communications which would sell their message and help build confidence (both in Baghdad and Washington). A significant shift from the earlier plan was the inclusion of diplomatic and regional aspects in the political line of operation, and the focus on reintegration and partnership with the Iraqis. The main effort for all of these lines was focused on achieving the political goal of accommodation. For the military, the tactical effort would be on securing the population and transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi Security Forces.

5.3. Executing the Big Ideas

"The political line of operation was our main effort...to which we subordinated our other activities...If, for example, a military operation was assessed as likely to produce short-term gains in security but to undermine our long-term political efforts, we didn't conduct it ... this could not have been achieved had we not planned civil and military activities together." General David Petraeus

Petraeus issued written “counterinsurgency guidance” under 25 headings on how the campaign should be fought. The main headings are briefly summarised at figure 5.4 below and reflect the advice provided by FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. A schematic complemented these instructions (see figure 5.5 below) and this illustrated both the complexity of the challenge and the need for an integrated approach. Petraeus and Crocker sought to execute the plan “as one, [they] linked arms, pursuing the same mission and objectives and jointly asking for the resources we needed”. They communicated with Washington together (by video conference or in person), they made key decisions together and met all visitors together. They insisted on the same approach at lower levels across Iraq and created civil military cells to synchronise effort on specific functional activities. Crocker assured Congress that “I am constantly assessing our efforts and seeking to ensure that they are coordinated with and complementary to the efforts of our military”.

Petraeus maintained a constant watch on progress, using visits to the field and the daily Battlefield Update Assessment (BUA) sessions to ask detailed questions and give direction. He later commented that after a few months he and Crocker were leading organisations “that worked nearly as one, a joint civil-military counterinsurgency organisation [comprising] diplomats, soldiers, intelligence professionals, [and] development experts...”.
Figure 5.4 Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance. Source: Petraeus.214

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secure and serve the population</th>
<th>Live among the people</th>
<th>Hold areas that have been secured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pursue the enemy relentlessly</td>
<td>Employ all assets to isolate and defeat the terrorists and insurgents</td>
<td>Generate unity of effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote reconciliation</td>
<td>Defeat the network, not just the attack</td>
<td>Foster Iraqi legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punch above your weight class</td>
<td>Employ money as a weapon system</td>
<td>Fight for intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walk</td>
<td>Understand the neighborhood</td>
<td>Build relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Look for sustainable solutions</td>
<td>Maintain continuity and tempo through transitions</td>
<td>Manage expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be first with the truth</td>
<td>Fight the information war relentlessly</td>
<td>Live our values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise initiative</td>
<td>Empower subordinates</td>
<td>Prepare for and exploit opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Learn and adapt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.5 Anaconda Strategy vs AQI. Source: Petraeus215
There was of course a difference between dealing with the irreconcilable and the reconcilable amongst insurgent and militia groups. Communal warfare (between sects or sub-sects) was another problem needing specific tactics to break the cycle of violence at every stage. Both kinetic and non-kinetic operations were needed to drive a wedge between these barely distinguishable groups and protect the population. A significant proportion of the military effort was directly focused on disrupting Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Shia militia extremists. Once the surge forces were in place in June 2007, a series of operations were initiated in Anbar province and to defeat Al Qaeda safe havens in critical towns in the belts surrounding Baghdad from whence attacks on the population came. Initially this was difficult because the level of violence, and the number of US casualties, had to increase in order to force out the insurgents. Careful strategic communications were needed to explain this. At the same time a dialogue was conducted with "insurgent groups and tribes".

Relentless Special Forces operations to kill or capture key individuals and dismantle insurgent networks also helped to change the political dynamic. Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) applied "collaborative warfare," using every available intelligence tool to understand the networks then generate high tempo operations against "al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni insurgency and [irreconcilable] Shia militias". These operations were so effective that they removed insurgent capability faster than it could be regenerated. Lieutenant General Robert Fry later suggested that this attrition of Al Qaeda-Iraq and Jaish Al Mahdi would help create space for understanding in the Sunni community, subsequently with the Shia, and that a different way forward was now possible.

The "Anbar awakening", starting in late 2006, saw the rejection of Al Qaeda by the Sunni tribes in Anbar province, and a successful US effort to capitalise on this and develop momentum for "a chain reaction of awakenings" in other areas of Iraq. Al Qaeda had simply gone too far with the tribes in Anbar province with a horrific degree of brutality including murder and kidnapping and rape. A number of tribal sheiks realised this nihilistic approach meant a struggle for their survival. They started to form their own militias to fight Al Qaeda and approached the coalition for help. Petraeus grabbed the opportunity: "this was the opening we needed". A series of risky coalition initiatives would seek to foster tribal cooperation, form tactical alliances, and build trust whilst concurrently conducting kinetic operations against Al Qaeda based on the information provided by the tribes. Training, equipment and funding was provided to help the tribes protect their people. Once areas had been cleared infrastructure governance and the rule of law could be rebuilt.

A Force Strategic Engagement Cell, which had been created by Petraeus’s deputy Lieutenant General Lamb, oversaw the political reconciliation effort and eventually helped to manage, train and equip some 103,000 so-called “Sons of Iraq”. There was a dramatic reduction in violence between October 2006 and August 2007 in the previously lost Anbar province. Petraeus characterised this as a local rejection of Al Qaeda and their willingness to volunteer to serve in the army or police. Reaching out to the Sunnis was not universally popular but it was effective and reduced
violence, helping the US to gain some form of strategic success.\textsuperscript{238} One difficulty was that using tribal militia would undercut central government, so effort would be needed to link the local to the national. Also the tribes were not trained or equipped to the previously accepted standard, resulting in immature police.\textsuperscript{239} However the ethical issues were surmounted by the practical imperative to improve security. The initiative enabled civic life to be re-established, “then it spread into Baghdad and elsewhere”.\textsuperscript{240} According to Petraeus, the Anbar Awakening “had a transformative effect on the security environment…serving as the basis for the subsequent political progress…”.\textsuperscript{241} Crocker explained that his challenge then was to link this progress to the central government.\textsuperscript{242}

Another “unexpected stroke of good luck”\textsuperscript{243} for the Coalition occurred on 29 August 2007 when the militant Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his Mehdi Army militia for to ceasefire for six months.\textsuperscript{244} This followed violence between the Mahdi Army and Iraqi forces in the holy city of Karbala, during which more than 50 Shia pilgrims gathering for an annual festival had been killed and another 275 wounded. This move may have reflected Al-Sadr’s understanding of a need to distance his forces from violence or face being destroyed as a military player and marginalised as a political one. He would later acquiesce to Iraqi forces re-entering the Sadr City Shia area in Baghdad.\textsuperscript{245} Preceding Moqtada al-Sadr’s ceasefire, the Force Strategic Engagement Cell had also made moves towards reconciling some (not all) of the Shia milita. Lamb explained to the UK’s Iraq enquiry that by “July 2007…the situation was stabilising…the insurgency… Ansar Al Sunna, Jaish Al Islami, Jaish Al Mujahideen, the 1920 Brigade…[were] now beginning to contest Al-Qaeda and see them for what they were”.\textsuperscript{246} The problem was far from solved but these developments would provide Iraqis with a political choice which they could not have had a year earlier.

The effective defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Shia militia extremists and the Anbar Awakening would help to shape the political landscape during 2007-8. The next challenge would be to convert these developments into a political accommodation. To this end Crocker and Petraeus attended weekly Iraqi ministerial meetings on the security situation and there would also be daily meetings with ministers on specific topics.\textsuperscript{247} Just as Jackson had described in Kosovo, Crocker and Petraeus would swap places in the canoe; as Petraeus put it, "changing chairs during the meetings ... as we shifted from predominantly diplomatic to predominantly security issues ...".\textsuperscript{248} Their positive engagement sought to ensure that Prime Minister Maliki and his ministers recognised their political responsibilities\textsuperscript{249} and worked for the whole of Iraq,\textsuperscript{250} not sectarian advantage.\textsuperscript{251} It was also important to ensure that gains secured at the local level were acted on nationally; to ensure that the Iraqi Army was used impartially; to keep the Iraqis to the agenda and to recognise the political decisions they, the Iraqis, had to take.\textsuperscript{252} Political progress was hard fought for by Ambassador Crocker and his team and the overall thrust was to help the Iraqis hold their nerve and enact the necessary legislation to drive progress and reconciliation.

The US political engagement effort was not confined to the Green Zone. Division and Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commanders were engaged at provincial and district level across Iraq; by late 2007 they were expected to be taking the lead, or ideally supporting, at every level. Battalion commanders would help district councils; BCT
commanders would help mayors or city leadership. There was not a great deal they could do politically, but they provided energy, practical support and moral pressure. The "warrior-builder-diplomat spirit" which Petraeus encouraged saw efforts across Iraq by US forces to get basic governance and commercial life going again. Damaged infrastructure was repaired and schools refurbished. Achieving this demanded effective civil military cooperation: BCT commanders and Provincial Reconstruction Team leaders coordinated to ensure that "they're complementing each other, not competing" on the provincial capacity development effort.

Resolving the situation in the South East of Iraq would become both a problem and an opportunity in 2008. Despite acute domestic political pressure to withdraw from Iraq, senior British officers understood that the US needed British forces to hold on in Basra for the sake of wider campaign coherence. The decision to take forward "Provincial Iraqi Control" in Basra in December 2007 was greeted with significant scepticism amongst some US military and diplomatic planners. They were proved right several months later when the situation in Basra deteriorated. Disregarding deliberate planning for a long term solution, Prime Minister Maliki decided to act immediately. The Iraqi "Charge of the Knights" operation in Basra launched in March 2008 would provide MNF-I with an opportunity to support an Iraqi political move and demonstrate Iraqi success. However the success was not guaranteed at the outset. The Iraqi prime minister's move was a surprise to the coalition and the local British headquarters was not initially in a position to provide the assistance needed to ensure Iraqi success. British policy was to transition and not conduct Counter Insurgency. MNC-I therefore rapidly had to fill the gap. Maliki probably realised that the US would not let him fail and Petraeus supported him. Thus Maliki gained the political credit. This episode drew visceral criticism of the UK in Baghdad, perhaps with some justification: "the short version is that the Brits have lost Basra, if indeed they ever had it". Petraeus nevertheless saw the danger of a schism in the coalition and as Alexander Alderson, who was there explained, he quietly but effectively stamped out criticisms in Baghdad.

5.4. Campaign Results under Crocker and Petraeus

The effective defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sunni reconciliation and containment of Shia militancy would enable a changed political dynamic in Iraq. In testimony to Congress in July 2008, the US Government Accounting Office (GAO) confirmed that progress had been made against the president's security legislative and economic objectives. Violence had decreased about 80% from 2007, Iraqi security forces were more capable of leading their own operations, but over 90% still needed coalition support and the "security environment remain[ed] volatile and dangerous". GAO attributed the improved security to the increase in US combat forces, the creation of Iraqi and non-governmental security forces and the Shia Mahdi Army's ceasefire. Iraq had passed legislation dealing with the return of Ba'athists to government, amnesty for detainees and provincial powers. However the sharing of oil revenues, disarming of militias and rules for provincial elections were not resolved. Iraqi budget execution remained a problem, oil production was below target, water production was improved but electricity supply remained at approximately 50% of demand. Overall the situation remained fragile and reversible.
According to Graeme Lamb, Petraeus “was able to present [the] sense that…it is hard but not hopeless and we can see how this is unfolding”. In a letter to the troops on 7 September 2007, sent shortly before he and Crocker briefed Congress, he explained that the situation was complex, but operations since surge forces were available in mid June had produced rapid progress. The number of attacks had declined to a level not seen since mid-2006; beyond the security gains, Iraqis were being helped to get basic services going and provide local governance. This engendered confidence amongst the people. This was further helped by efforts to facilitate local reconciliation. "Local Iraqi leaders are coming forward, opposing extremists, and establishing provisional units of neighbourhood security volunteers. ... [Which] are being integrated into legitimate security institutions". Petraeus underlined the significance of these efforts and pointed out that "extremists cannot survive without the support of the population". Yet, despite these positive developments there were significant constraints on progress, attacks by Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups and militia continued on both coalition and Iraqi forces. Iraqi governmental capacity was limited with reconstruction ongoing and corruption still a problem. There remained "a climate of distrust and fear that stems from the sectarian violence that did so much damage to the fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and into 2007". Petraeus was careful to explain however that progress was not uniform and some areas remained particularly challenging.

Ultimately Petraeus was clear that protecting the population helped Iraq avoid civil war and provided space to resolve the fundamental political issues. Testifying to Congress again in April 2008, he indicated that a number of factors in the security arena had contributed to this progress. Both the US and Iraq had conducted a surge, with Iraq adding 100,000 soldiers and police in 2007. US and Iraqi forces had been actively employed on counterinsurgency operations to “safeguard the…people, pursue Al Qaeda…combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local reconciliation and to enable political and economic progress”. There had been a change of attitudes among some parts of the population who had turned against Al Qaeda and many now contributed to local security. "The popular rejection of Al Qaeda and and its ideology…helped transform Anbar … from one of the most dangerous areas…to one of the safest". A continuing Shia ceasefire also contributed to the reduction of violence and the rejection of extremism in some Sunni areas would begin to be mirrored in Shia areas. What he did not say was that politico-military cooperation had been fundamental to designing and executing the campaign.

Petraeus complained openly that national reconciliation had not worked out as a rapidly as he had hoped. There was "halting progress [on] initiatives such as the oil framework law, revenue sharing, and de-ba’athification reform"; he did however recognise the "truly fundamental" nature of these issues for Iraqis, and commended the seriousness of ongoing efforts to secure agreement. It is interesting that Petraeus chose to make such explicit comments regarding the political process; the fact that he did indicates the depth of his involvement in political issues whilst Crocker was clearly entirely happy with this approach in the light of their common endeavour.

The changed dynamic in Iraq, where “ethno-sectarian competition [was] now more through debate and less through violence”, enabled an evolving relationship
between the Coalition and Iraq. Perhaps it was not yet clear that Iraq was on what
Petraeus termed “an irreversible trajectory to national reconciliation and sustainable
economic development”; however the surge had set the conditions for progress and
change. Ian Rigden, the lead campaign planner in MNF-I in 2008-9, recalled that
the “ball was now with the Iraqis”. The next joint campaign plan, developed in
2008 shifted the US strategy again to partnership working towards transition. At
the time of writing, the outlook remains unclear. An Iraqi parliamentary election was
held in March 2010, however this did not deliver a decisive result for either Sunni or
Shia parties and negotiations continue over the formation of a new coalition
government. In the meanwhile tensions simmer, notably over the management of
members of the Awakening groups, who face uncertain support from the Shia
dominated caretaker government and attacks by Al Qaeda.

6. Conclusions

6.1. Reflections on the Campaign

This case of Iraq has outlined two vivid examples which support the hypothesis that,
beyond their specific security-related tasks, military commanders must provide direct
support to civilian interlocutors in order to sustain the political process and facilitate
viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations. Moreover it is clear that
the military needs a willing and capable civilian partner to provide the political lead in
this endeavour.

The external atmospherics over the invasion as well as a specific political timeline
driven by the 2004 US Presidential election did not help the civilian CPA or military
CJTF-7 in 2003-4. The US Administration was unable to follow Thompson’s first
principle that the government must have a clear political aim; nor did it identify the
emerging insurgency or act accordingly. As Hoffman pointed out, “90% of insurgency
is political, social, economic and ideological”, but under Sanchez’s watch many of
the US military retained a focus on war fighting. They were unable to advise the
political side on the likely security effects of political decisions and they were unable
to coordinate civil-military action. Instead, the security challenge was compounded by
the political decisions and military actions. For example, if disbanding the army truly
was the only viable option, why did the military not insist on a disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration programme? As Dobbins pointed out this is the
norm in post conflict scenarios; and it would have enabled the military to stay in
touch with former Iraqi commanders rather than have them emerge as adversaries.

There was plenty of effort on an ad hoc basis, by the under resourced and separate
civilian and military teams which were working to unrealistic timelines and with an
over ambitious programme. That it took time for cooperative working to emerge is
not surprising. With a bifurcated chain of command there was no unity of command
or real attempt to engender a team approach to deliver unity of effort or unity of
purpose. It would be a mistake to blame the military commander alone, he did not
have a receptive political partner and the forces under his command were collectively
not prepared for what they would face. Few saw the need to help grip the political
situation, Sanchez did not engage meaningfully with the Governing Council over security issues and some early opportunities engage the tribes were missed.

Inter agency efforts were not well integrated. There was some understanding of the need for the political and military cogs to fit together but these were never really meshed at either the policy or delivery levels. For the US military, as explained in Chapter 3, state building or counter insurgency doctrine had not been seriously taught since the Vietnam imbroglio. In 2003-4, although there were some notable exceptions, neither the body of the US military nor most of its leadership saw “shaping...economic and political conditions” or any form of peace building as part of the military role. Equally some in the CPA were unhappy with generals being involved with politics. The military focus was on combat operations (which had been successful) and then exit. There was evidence of the attempted application of the available inter agency doctrinal ideas, but this was too late and failed in execution. Instead of delivering a seamlessly executed plan leading to a positive local political impact this would increasingly become a blame game.

Although beyond the scope of this study, it remains to be seen whether the initially disastrous approach was due to idiosyncratic behaviour, systemic failures or a combination of the two. What is clear is that the Coalition “did not understand the scale of the forces they were releasing in Iraq”. This strategic error was compounded by attempting a major state building effort, which would require both peace building and security measures, without a unified civil military approach and unified leadership at the country level or the necessary military and civilian resources: in short the ends, ways and means were out of balance.

Lessons were learned however and these were captured in an extraordinary multi actor effort develop a doctrine to address the systemic issues of countering insurgency (as discussed in Chapter 3). With improved ways emerging, but a dire situation in Iraq, a bold attempt to secure success revised the ends with a new “surge” strategy enabled by enhanced military and civilian means. The senior diplomat and the senior soldier chosen for the enterprise immediately forged a watertight working partnership. This was not without difficulty or strain at the lower levels; but it enabled joint planning and action. The military truly did support the political effort, on occasion, particularly at the local level, they were the political effort; in turn coalition political moves were synchronised with military action. This approach, which included the “kinetic” as well as the softer side of the US military, all designed to protect the population, delivered tangible improvements to the security situation and hence provided political space for reconciliation. It was helped by a fortuitous accommodation with both Sunni tribes and Shia militia and it engendered a degree of Iraqi political reconciliation and some economic progress. Iraqis were slowly moving to a position where confrontation could be conducted without recourse to violence.

6.2. The General as Statesman?

Having written a doctorate on the impact of counterinsurgency in Vietnam, Petraeus had learned the hard practicalities between 2003 and 2005. He had then been instrumental in developing a new counterinsurgency doctrine and changing the force
posture of the US Army during 2006. He had helped advocate one more effort, the surge, to deliver potential strategic success in Iraq by "making the political space for the Iraqi government to start governing Iraq". He was politically astute and understood how to play the political scene in Washington, in Coalition capitals and on the ground in theatre. Petraeus’s reports to Congress focused on the security problem and actions of Coalition and Iraqi military; whilst he acknowledged the links to politics, he did not as a rule develop these, leaving this to Crocker.

There is no question that Petraeus was a political actor in Iraq. His letters to the troops in Theatre revealed the true politico military nature of the campaign and the critical military role in enabling political progress. He was active locally, mostly out of the public eye to drive the peace process forward. There was also a public element which saw Petraeus engaging both with the man on the street and at national level. On 16 May 2007 he wrote an open letter to the Iraqi people in which he asked them "to take an active role in the rebirth of your nation ... to reject violence and the sectarianism that fuels it".

In Crocker, an experienced Arabist, Petraeus had the right US Ambassador. Petraeus continually reinforced the point that he was subordinate to Crocker, but equally Crocker seemed to know what was required of him. Their relationship "defines a new standard of understanding and effectiveness". Petraeus and Crocker had an "image of cooperation" and a politico-military focus. Where did this leave political primacy? There is a sense that Crocker and Petraeus, both anointed by the US President and Congress, together carried the mantle of political primacy - given that political decisions were taken together. Here Petraeus truly was a political actor, participating in the political process; he understood state policy on three levels, in terms of the US, the Coalition, and the Iraqis. Clausewitz would have approved.

6.3. Doctrinal Implications

This thesis argues that the military should support political primacy and the political process in theatre as an essential enabler for strategic success. This did not happen during the CPA-CJTF-7 period in Iraq. Hence the positive doctrinal lessons which emerged centre on case studies of how not to do it. Even after new doctrine had been developed, this still did not fully address the matters of providing a truly unified chain of command or the practicalities of supporting political primacy to deliver political outcomes. This left Petraeus and Crocker “banging together the skulls of subordinates” to achieve unity of effort and a continuing reliance on “compatible personalities” at all levels to achieve strategic goals. That said, the 2007-8 period provides a good example of actively designing and executing security operations specifically to enable a peace building purpose. Military leaders at all levels influenced, negotiated and helped to deliver real practical progress. This thought leadership would in turn have a beneficial effect on the national political process because the calculus was changed from one of pure sectarian interest to one where national considerations applied and violence was progressively removed from the political equation.
Chapter 4 suggested an “acceptable political bandwidth for military activity” whereby subjective boundaries comprising military and political factors would guide commander’s actions as they judged potential actions designed to secure political progress. The case of Iraq suggests that the situation is in fact more complicated. A series of factors need to be kept in balance if there is to be productive military activity within a civil-military context. These are: coalition military; external political; local political and local military. All of these factors need to be kept in balance if campaign progress (with local security and political progress inherent in this) is to be delivered.

However, beyond the matter of the judgements a general must make, this chapter has demonstrated, above all else, the value of collaborative planning, decision-making and action at the politico-military interface. Whilst the matter of unity of command remains cloudy, unity of purpose can be delivered through a collaborative approach as demonstrated in Iraq. With this and a holistic people-centric approach it is possible to deliver real political effects, notably the beginnings of a political settlement, and thus create momentum, delivered by the people themselves, rather than external actors. The military role in this facet of contemporary peace and stability operations is not yet adequately captured in doctrine.

Chapter 6 will now examine a stabilisation operation initiated following invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 as part of the “war on terror” in response to 9/11. It will outline on the post-invasion arrangements which became a NATO mission with a supportive UN mandate but a relatively weak UN presence. The chapter will illustrate the largely positive recent impact of new US doctrine and lessons from Iraq. It will discuss the increasing realisation, in the teeth of a worsening insurgency, that in order to facilitate eventual exit, the International Community needed to engage in state building to bring Afghanistan into some form of stability. Yet this would be intensely difficult without adequate security and Afghan leadership. As with Iraq, this would demand significant external military effort to control the situation, whilst building Afghan security, and to enable civilian delivery of governance capacity, with economic and social measures. Together these efforts were designed to separate the insurgent from the people. This unfinished work underlines the requirement for politico-military cooperation and the need for reintegration of some insurgent elements which ultimately could support a political settlement in Afghanistan.
2 The Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot), Lt Gen Graeme Lamb - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, 9 December 2009, p 26.
4 A UK government view provided a generic strategic description but not operational details. “We would like Iraq to become a stable, united and law abiding state, within its present borders, cooperating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, abiding by all its international obligations and providing effective and representative government for its own people.” -- "Written Ministerial Statements. Iraq. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Jack Straw)," (Hansard House of Commons (online). 7 January 2003). See also James Dobbins, Occupying Iraq : a history of the Coalition Provisional Authority (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2009), p 31. Also "Operations in Iraq: First Reflections," (UK Ministry of Defence. July 2003).
5 The Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot), Notes provided by Lieutenant General (Retired) Sir Freddie Viggers to The Iraq Enquiry, 8 December 2009, p 3.
6 The phases of a traditional military operation are normally conceived along the following lines: 1. Planning; 2. Deployment; 3. Combat; 4. Post Combat Reconstruction; and 5. Redeployment.
12 John Keegan, "Like it or not, America is becoming an imperial power" Telegraph (online) 13 Nov 2003.
13 Greenstock, "Introduction," p x.
16 The Iraq Inqiry (Chilcot), Statement by Ambassador Bremer provided to The Iraq Enquiry, 18 May 2010.
17 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 136 and 144.
19 In 2004 McColl was the senior British military officer in Baghdad. The Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot), General Sir John McColl - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, 8 February 2010, p 15. Al Qaeda was not mentioned in earlier UK MOD (public) reports. --, "Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future," (UK Ministry of Defence. December 2003), p 66.
20 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 145.
21 Notes provided by Lieutenant General (Retired) Sir Freddie Viggers to The Iraq Enquiry, p 5.


24 "We suffered from lack of clarity about Ends, Ways and Means. The Plan emerged piecemeal and was prone to dislocation by breaking news and by events". Notes provided by Lieutenant General (Retired) Sir Freddie Viggers to The Iraq Enquiry, p 3.


27 For a nuanced view of the realities of this relationship see The Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot), Sir Jeremy Greenstock - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, 15 December 2009, p 43-44.


30 Sir Jeremy Greenstock - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, p 51.

31 Bremer, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope, p 27.


33 Andrew Rathmell, Dr,. (former CPA Strategic Planner 2003-4, member of MNF-I Joint Strategy Assessment Team Spring 2007), Interview, (Shrivenham, UK. 18 June 2010).

34 "I needed to be sure that whatever responsibility I had was aligned with the authority. It’s very important not to have a lot of responsibility and not enough authority." --, "Interview Transcript. The Last Year In Iraq. L Paul Bremer III," PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/bremer.html. Accessed 27 May 2010. See also Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 158.


37 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 180.

38 Sir Jeremy Greenstock - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, p 70.

39 --, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 324.

40 Robert Perito, M, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?: America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press 2003), p 316.

The relationship between CPA and the GC was difficult given the time pressure on CPA. General Sir John McColl - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, p 17.

52- "Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1 De-Ba`athification of Iraqi Society," (Coalition Provisional Authority. 16 May 2003).
53 - Dobbins had argued that it needed to be “systematic and politically sensitive”. Dobbins, America’s role in nation-building: from Germany to Iraq, p 172.
54 - Notes provided by Lieutenant General (Retired) Sir Freddie Viggers to The Iraq Enquiry, p 5.
56 - “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2 Dissolution of Entities,” (Coalition Provisional Authority. 23 May 2003).
57 And Senior CPA figures talked this up despite objections from senior US military figures including Petraeus. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 161 and 165.
58 - "Interview Transcript. The Lost Year In Iraq. L Paul Bremer III." Accessed 27 May 2010. ‘برايمير’
59 - The strongest tribe: war, politics, and the endgame in Iraq, p 16-17.
60 - Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?: America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force, p 317; West, The strongest tribe: war, politics, and the endgame in Iraq, p 9.
62 - Keegan, "Like it or not, America is becoming an imperial power".
63 - "Statement by Ambassador Bremer provided to The Iraq Enquiry." See also Greenstock’s pungent comments on best case scenario planning. Sir Jeremy Greenstock - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, p 68.
64 - Dobbins, America’s role in nation-building: from Germany to Iraq, p 197.
65 - Rathmell, Interview.
68 - Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 254.
69 - Greenstock was concerned that there seemed no political flexibility to deal with local objections, for example Ayatollah Al-Sistani had issued a fatwa against the proposal for a constitution before there were elections, Sir Jeremy Greenstock - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, p 63-65.
70 - "Bremer’s Seven-Step Plan for Iraqi Sovereignty.” See also Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 254-255.
71 - Bremer, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope p 115.
73 - “Achieving the Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty to the Iraqi People (Strategic Plan),” ed. Coalition Provisional Authority, (Baghdad, Iraq. 2003 (Working Draft 1 October 2003)), p 5. Also Bremer, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope p 115.
74 - Rathmell, Interview.
75 - Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Association of the United States Army (USA), "Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework,” (Washington DC: CSIS. May 2002).
The strategy had “four principal objectives or core foundations: Security-establishing a secure and safe environment; Essential services-restoring basic services to help stabilise Iraq; Economy-creating the conditions for economic growth; Governance enabling the transition to transparent and inclusive democratic governance. --- "Achieving the Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty to the Iraqi People (Strategic Plan)," p 5-6.


Rathmell, "Planning post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq: what can we learn?" p 1028.


Dobbins, Occupying Iraq: a history of the Coalition Provisional Authority, p 141.

Rathmell, "Interview," Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 255.


Rathmell, Interview.


Rathmell, "Planning post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq: what can we learn?" p 1025.

Notes provided by Lieutenant General (Retired) Sir Freddie Viggers to The Iraq Enquiry, p 3.

Ibid., p 5.

Sanchez, Wiser in Battle, p 121-122.

Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 173-175.

Ibid., p 212 and 226. Despite the absence of the Theatre commander’s imprint, eventually there was “a clear plan”, at least in Baghdad, albeit this “spoke in terms of full spectrum operations, rather than speaking in terms of COIN.” General Sir John McColl - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, p 9.

Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 192.

Notes provided by Lieutenant General (Retired) Sir Freddie Viggers to The Iraq Enquiry, p 3.


Rathmell, Interview.


Ibid., p 208.

Ibid., p138-144.

Ibid., p 152-154.

Notes provided by Lieutenant General (Retired) Sir Freddie Viggers to The Iraq Enquiry, p 4.


West, The strongest tribe: war, politics, and the endgame in Iraq, p 10-11.

Discussion with Senior UN official in New York, 2 June 2005.

Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 216.


Rathmell, Interview, p 180-181.


West, The strongest tribe: war, politics, and the endgame in Iraq, p 12.

With brigade commanders acting as temporary governors. Ibid.

Rathmell, Interview.

Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 231.

Mattis an avid scholar was familiar with earlier USMC experiences of delivering governance captured in the 1940 Small Wars Manual. See West, The strongest tribe: war, politics, and the

127 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 314-319.

128 Ibid., p 318. See Chapter 3 for a description of how Mattis’s approach to counter insurgency campaign design was developed during this period and subsequently incorporated in new US Counterinsurgency doctrine - FM 3-24.

129 Rathmell, Interview.

130 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 332.

131 Keegan, "Like it or not, America is becoming an imperial power".

132 Rathmell, Interview.

133 West, The strongest tribe: war, politics, and the endgame in Iraq, p 18-19; Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 217-223.

134 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 238-239.

135 Ibid., p 192.


137 Bremer, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope p 235.


139 “The CPA was trying to achieve multiple and un-sequenced missions, all at the same time: build itself; try to run the country day-to-day; kick start the economy; deliver “democracy”; maintain security within the country and along its borders; deal with increasing terrorist and criminal activity; create confidence in the international effort among Iraqi organisations and on the street. Iraqis were impatient and suspicious, eg where was the oil revenue going.” Notes provided by Lieutenant General (Retired) Sir Freddie Viggers to The Iraq Enquiry, p 5.

140 Rathmell, "Planning post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq: what can we learn?," p 1031.

141 Dobbins, Occupying Iraq: a history of the Coalition Provisional Authority, p244.


143 Except from Jay Garner. See Dobbins, Occupying Iraq: a history of the Coalition Provisional Authority, p 102-103.

144 Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq p 326-327.


146 Abizaid thought more troops would make the problem worse. West, The strongest tribe: war, politics, and the endgame in Iraq, p 20.

147 The US Army was learning from the experience and significant efforts were made to institutionalise this learning in the US with the publication of interim counterinsurgency doctrine and in Iraq with the establishment of a counter insurgency training school at Taji. MBE Alexander Alderson (Colonel, PhD, "The Army Brain," RUSI Journal 155 no. 3, pp 10–15 (June/July 2010) pp 13.


149 Author’s observations, Baghdad December 2004-September 2005.

150 Lt Gen Graeme Lamb - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, p 16-17.


152 Lt Gen Graeme Lamb - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, p 3.

153 Ibid., p 10-11.

154 British Army report.

155 Lt Gen Graeme Lamb - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, p 14.


158 "Relentless" was Thomas Ricks’s one word summary of Petraeus’s approach in Iraq. Thomas, E Ricks, "In Afghanistan, Petraeus will have difficulty replicating his Iraq success,” Washington Post (online) 27 June 2010.

British Army Report. 


Martin, "Email: RE: J R Martin (UNCLASSIFIED)."


Crocker had also experienced the CPA. 

Alderson, Interview. 


Petraeus David H., "Speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference." 

Ibid. 

Alderson, Interview. 

Graeme Lamb, (former Deputy Commander MNF-I and Senior British Military Representative-Iraq 2006-7), Interview, (Tervuren, Belgium. 9 November 2009). 


Lamb, Interview. 


Alderson, Interview. 

Martin, "Email: RE: J R Martin (UNCLASSIFIED)." 


Alderson, Interview. 

Rathmell, Interview. This may be because some individuals had “invested in the transition strategy” and were not initially replaced by Crocker. Martin, Interview (by telephone). 

Petraeus explained to Ricks that as a commander at his level there were three tasks: coming up with the big ideas; communicating the big ideas and executing the big ideas. Ricks, "In Afghanistan, Petraeus will have difficulty replicating his Iraq success.” 

The strategy comprised 6 “fundamental elements”: Let the Iraqis lead; Help Iraqis protect the population; Isolate extremists; Create space for political progress; Diversify political and economic efforts; and situate the strategy in a regional approach. For details see --, "Press Release: The New Way Forward In Iraq," See also ———, "Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed. GAO-08-1021T," (United States Government Accountability Office. 23 July 2008), p 14. 

--, "Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed. GAO-08-1021T." 


In other words apply a counterinsurgency approach as envisaged in --, "FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency Field Manual," (Headquarters Department of the US Army. December 2006). 


Alderson, Interview.


Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, p 133.

Rathmell, Interview.

Petraeus, Interview.

—, Interview.

Martín, Interview (by telephone).


British Army Report. Martín, Interview.

Martin, Interview (by telephone); —. Email: RE: J R Martin (UNCLASSIFIED).

Initial resistance came from Embassy and from MNF-I. Martín, "Email: RE: J R Martin (UNCLASSIFIED),” Some state department officials where also "badly bitten by hard driving army officers determined to answer the question”. Alderson, Interview.

Petraeus David H., "Speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference."

Alderson, Interview.

—, Interview. Rathmell, Interview.


Ibid.

Petraeus David H., "Speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference."


Martín, Interview (by telephone).


British Army Report. Martín, Interview.

Initial resistance came from Embassy and from MNF-I. Martín, "Email: RE: J R Martin (UNCLASSIFIED),” Some state department officials where also "badly bitten by hard driving army officers determined to answer the question”. Alderson, Interview.

Petraeus David H., "Speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference."

Ibid.

For example the energy fusion cell dealt with oil and electricity.

Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Iraq: The Crocker-Petraeus Report, One Hundred Tenth Congress First Session, September 11 2007.

Petraeus David H., "Speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference."

For further information on the detailed guidance provided under each heading see: David Petraeus, H. General U.S. Army, "Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance," Military Review September-October 2008 p 210-212.

Ibid.p 211.

Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, p 34-38, 141-143.


---, "Commander's Remarks, MNC-I Transfer of Authority Ceremony."

Petraeus David H., "Speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference."

Petraeus, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq."


Lt Gen Graeme Lamb - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, p 22-25.

Woodward, "Why Did Violence Plummet? It Wasn't Just the Surge."

R A Fry, Lieutenant General KCB, CBE, Interview, (London, UK. 19 January 2010); Alderson, Interview.

For a detailed account of the Iraqi tribal revolt against Al Qaeda see Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, p 154-176.
Petraeus, "Marine Corps Association Annual Dinner Keynote Speech."


British Army report.


British Army report.


Petraeus David H., "Speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference."

Petraeus, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq," p 4-5.

"It was still hard to get through the inter-agency piece". Rathmell, Interview.

A very senior Sunni cleric commented to Lamb that “you do not threaten our faith, nor threaten our way of life, Al-Qaeda does.” Lt Gen Graeme Lamb - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, p 32-33.

Martin, "Email: RE: J R Martin (UNCLASSIFIED)."

———, "Email: Baghdad, 15 Oct 07."


Ibid.


Patrick Cockburn, "Sadr calls six-month ceasefire to prevent civil war," The Independent (online) 30 August 2007.


Alderson, Interview.

Petraeus David H., "Speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference."

Alderson, Interview.

One tension was the Shia fear of a return to Sunni oppression, hence the Shi’a in the government feared the Coalition was arming the Sunni tribes for further resistance. “Courageous steps” by the Shi’a would be needed to accommodate this. Martin, "Email: Baghdad, 15 Oct 07."

Fry, "Interview." British Army report.

Crocker commented that there were ‘two clocks...the Washington clock and the Baghdad clock. The former is running much faster than the latter. Prime Minister Maliki has and is attempting to meet the benchmarks but these are complex pieces of legislation. Clarke and McNamee, "Assessing the Surge: A RUSI Interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker," pp: p 37.

Alderson, Interview.


Petraeus, "Commander's Remarks, MNC-I Transfer of Authority Ceremony."

Iraq: The Crocker-Petraeus Report, p 77. Every Surge BCT came with its own embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) with experts from agriculture, utilities, anticorruption, rule of law. Some were phenomenally successful in energising local administration and reconstruction. These teams were semi-autonomous, reporting via the State Department. Alderson, “Interview.”


Lt Gen Graeme Lamb - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, p27.

To “drive out the Mahdi Army” immediately, rather than wait until later in the year after Petraeus had dealt with Mosul. Anthony King, "Colonel Iron and the Charge of the Nights " Prospect 2009, p 41.

In part because British views differed on the nature of the campaign, some policy makers saw this as a Peace Support Operation. British policy was not to fight alongside Iraqis thus it was difficult to provide a steadying influence and essential combat enablers. It was also argued British effort was under resourced because of the demands of Afghanistan and dissipated because it lacked central coordination. British Army report.


King, "Colonel Iron and the Charge of the Nights ", p 42.


King, "Colonel Iron and the Charge of the Nights ", p 43.

Alderson, Interview.

Fry, Interview.


Ibid., p 1-4.

Lt Gen Graeme Lamb - Transcript of Oral Evidence to The Iraq Enquiry, p 29.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Leila Fadel, "Iraq's Supreme Court ratifies election results," Washington Post (online) 1 June 2010.


Hoffman, "Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in Iraq."

Dobbins, Occupying Iraq: a history of the Coalition Provisional Authority, p 104.

Ibid., 27.


Dobbins, Occupying Iraq: a history of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 17.

Although to be fair to him, this engagement was concentrated within Bremer’s governance team. Rathmell, "Interview."; Dobbins, Occupying Iraq: a history of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 0 32-34.


Ibid., p 15.
Such as the post conflict task matrix produced by CSIS (CSIS) and (AUSA), "Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework." See also Bowen, "Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience," p 323.

Martin, Interview (by telephone).

Fry, Interview.

Alderson, Interview.


Alderson, Interview.

Ibid.

Martin, "Email: RE: J R Martin (UNCLASSIFIED)."


Chapter 6 - Afghanistan 2001-2010

1. Introduction

The attacks on the United States by Al Qaeda on 11 September 2001 (9/11) prompted a rapid US-led campaign starting on 7 October to destroy the terrorist organisation Al Qaeda's base in Afghanistan and the Taliban regime which supported it. After the intervention a UK-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as a coalition of the willing, was eventually established in the capital, Kabul, during December 2001. As the then UK Chief of Defence Staff put it, the force’s role was to “facilitate the political process”¹ and provide a stable seat of government,² effectively as a partner, for The Interim Administration of Afghanistan. Under the Bush administration there was little or no interest in “nation building”³ in Afghanistan and ISAF was separate and distinct from “Operation Enduring Freedom”, a United States-led coalition which was conducting operations throughout Afghanistan with the intent of rooting out Al Qaeda sanctuaries as part of the “war on terror”.⁴ Over time, command of ISAF was transferred to NATO and from 2003, with UN authority, ISAF began to expand its stabilisation remit across the country. The international community, in various guises, also commenced a reconstruction effort and supported the establishment of a unitary Afghan state. Debate ranged over how and to what extent this exercise should be attempted. Some protagonists wanted to build a liberal democracy, yet according to Professor Anthony King in reality this was “an ideological vision which undermines the achievement of a doable military mission”.⁵

External efforts to root out extremists and transform Afghanistan's society and infrastructure provoked an insurgent backlash by the Taliban, particularly in the south and east of the country, and over time development in these areas became virtually impossible unless protected by significant military force. Therefore the essential dynamic in Afghanistan became a struggle to build Afghan security forces and governance structures in the face of a growing insurgency which was fuelled in part by a lucrative drug trade. A US focus on Iraq from 2002 proved to be a strategic distraction which denied the resources and attention that Afghanistan needed thus exacerbating the challenge. Hence intervening forces found themselves forced to hold the ring in an increasingly bloody campaign and counter insurgency efforts in Afghanistan got off to a slow start. Nevertheless some of the learning on countering insurgency in Iraq would prove to be relevant to Afghanistan; notably a population-centric focus and efforts to deal with the insurgency not the insurgent. However establishing stability could not be straightforward given an increasing insurgent threat plus a weak, corrupt and manipulative Afghan leadership with insufficient governance capabilities to deliver stability at the national or local level.

Another problem (and a challenge to this thesis) was the absence of a single political supremo, representing the international community, who could pull together the assortment of actors needed for a comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. That these actors did not necessarily have a shared understanding of the problem underlined the inherent difficulties in joining up a "comprehensive approach" at the Theatre level. The Afghan national leadership meanwhile found difficulty connecting to the local level and has been slow to come to
terms with the prospect of political reconciliation with some elements of the Taliban as part of a path to stability. These issues, compounded by waning strategic patience amongst troop contributors in the light of mounting Afghan and international casualties and costs, leading to persistent questions over whether the war was worth fighting or could be won, have provided real problems for successive ISAF commanders. They have experienced difficulty in establishing the extent of their political direction and often had to act as de facto coordinator of the overall international effort.

This chapter will provide evidence from the case of Afghanistan for the hypothesis that in the above circumstances, beyond their specific security-related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors, in order to sustain the political process and facilitate viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations. This approach needs soldiers at all levels to co-operate with other relevant actors, respond to political direction and shape military operations that will impact decisively on political outcomes in order to help generate political progress towards sustainable peace. This is not an easy or obvious path in Afghanistan given the security situation and coordination challenge. However this chapter will demonstrate that the hypothesis does have validity because helping to enable Afghan political solutions, at all levels from local and national, as well as providing the means to maintain a semblance of security, represents the only path to exit with some degree of strategic success. Shortage of space precludes a full historical treatment of the campaign in Afghanistan to date. Therefore after outlining the situation in Afghanistan and capturing the initial actions by the first ISAF commander, Major General John McColl (UK) (December 2001 to June 2002), the chapter will focus on two commanders. First, General David Richards (UK) (4 May 2006 to 4 February 2007 and then General Stanley McChrystal (US) (15 June 2009 to 23 June 2010).

2. Post Invasion Afghanistan

In December 2001 Afghanistan was a failed state which needed a government, an administration and security provision. These essentials needed to be in place, and the country stabilised, before substantial reconstruction efforts, including infrastructure, health and education could begin. A 2001 World Bank Report summarised the social and economic situation.

“Afghanistan—suffering from more than 20 years of conflict, a three-year drought, loss or degradation of most of its infrastructure, depletion of its human resource base, and erosion of social capital—is one of the poorest and certainly the longest-suffering country among the members of the World Bank. With an estimated seven million people vulnerable to famine and millions already displaced from their homes (domestically or as refugees to neighboring countries), Afghanistan faces a dire humanitarian emergency. This requires an immediate, concerted response from the international assistance community (led by the UN). In addition the political situation in Afghanistan is fluid, and what will emerge in the short run is hard to predict.”
But would the necessary political, governance and security arrangements be in place to enable reconstruction? Once the Taliban regime had been ousted, there was no peace agreement or capability to govern in Afghanistan. The remaining parties would need to find a political settlement in Kabul and between Kabul and the provincial and regional levels. In terms of governance, General McColl explained to the House of Commons Defence Committee that, in 2001–02, “there was nothing in the ministries—no desks, no people, no middle-class—the politicians were people who had been at war with each other for … years; there was simply no governance at all”.  

**Figure 6.1 Map of Afghanistan.** Source Central Intelligence Agency

In early 2002 the security situation was becoming increasingly perilous, particularly beyond Kabul which had an international security presence. Whilst no longer running a national government, the Taliban had not gone away. Although there was no single cohesive focus of leadership for the emerging insurgency, there were a number of different groups who would cooperate to different degrees in different areas. Members of the former government under Mullah Omar had gone to the South. Whereas the Haqqani network and Hizb-e Islami operated in the East. There was also difficulty over the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan which provided a refuge for
insurgents. Local practice allowed tribal movement across the border (known as the Durand line) and Afghan groups in Pakistan had links to Al Qaeda and the powerful Haqqani network.

Additional sources of instability were the narcotic industry (90% of the heroin in UK originated in Afghanistan), friction between rival militia groups and a permissive environment for banditry. According to ICG, there was a plentiful supply of weapons, money and influence from Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Russia, China, India, France, the United States and elsewhere. ICG further suggested talk of “Pentagon-created warlords”. Whether true or not, there certainly were warlords controlling swathes of territory and not in accordance with international norms. There were plenty of people with combat experience in Afghanistan. However those in the police or army could not be regarded as an effective stabilising influence. Nor were they under the authority of any effective institutional structure.

3. The Evolution of the Mandate, the Afghan Government, and International Military Engagement

The interdependent establishment of the international “mandate” in Afghanistan, as well as Afghanistan’s government and international military engagement has taken time to evolve and continues to develop. Initially it was important to fill the political void, particularly in view of the influence of Warlords who would otherwise claim political legitimacy. In December 2001 Afghan political leaders, with UN and international community representatives met at Bonn to form an interim, post-Taliban governing regime and to set up a framework for reconstruction including physical, political, and economic aspects. The Bonn Agreement sought international help to prepare new national security forces and called for an interim international force at Kabul which could be expanded later. It also prepared the way for a UN mission in Afghanistan.

As envisaged by the Bonn Agreement, the first International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a UK-led coalition of the willing, was authorised by the United Nations Security Council on 20 December 2001 by Resolution 1386. This Chapter VII authorised mission was to “assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the UN can operate in a secure environment”. Nations participating in ISAF were also called to “to help the Afghan Interim Authority in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces.” A Military Technical Agreement between the Afghan Interim Authority and ISAF on 31 December 2001 gave ISAF freedom of movement throughout Afghanistan and authorized the use of force to protect ISAF and its mission. The three way partnership between the Afghan Interim Authority, ISAF and the UN was completed with the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) by UN Security Council Resolution 1401 (2002) on 28 March 2002. This “light footprint” mission had a political role to assist in drafting a constitution and organising elections. It was also mandated to manage humanitarian, relief, recovery and reconstruction activities.
Political reconstruction efforts included a Loya Jirga in 2002 to appoint a transitional government and a new constitution was ratified by the 2003 Loya Jirga. This restructured the government as an Islamic republic consisting of three branches, executive, legislative and judicial. In December 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected president of The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the National Assembly was inaugurated after elections in December 2005. Karzai was re-elected in November 2009 for a second term.

**General McColl – Supporting the Early Political Process**

General John McColl, the first ISAF commander (then a Major General), stated at interview that there was a role for the theatre level commander to act in a political fashion at both the local and international levels: the operational art was now about the politico-military aspects of the campaign. The challenge was to balance the permanent tension between the desire to make progress in theatre on one hand and how much to air the difficult political issues with those you serve at home on the other. Sometimes he needed to define how to fill that gap. The means to do so are the military force and the ability to influence. Specifics needed to be calibrated depending on the circumstances as they unfolded. McColl was heavily involved in politics in the early days of ISAF, particularly before the signing of the military technical agreement when he acted as a go-between to establish a political process between members of a febrile coalition which became the Interim Administration. Here he had to judge how to treat each player. The degree to which he was able to do this primarily depended on the level of understanding in the UK. Some in the chain of command were nervous, yet ministers understood because they saw the immediacy of the political issues; therefore he could be open with them during ministerial visits. There was no question of “educating” politicians because the levers that needed to be pulled, the chances available, and the risks entailed were all foreign to them. Therefore politicians would offer little direction beyond “make it a better place”; indeed ISAF had deployed without a clear mission or role. Hence he obtained the overall political intent from the UK Prime Minister's press statements, which evolved over time. Judging how much to fight his corner over specific issues such as the potential expansion of ISAF, which was discussed from 2002, would depend on the context; and unreasonable demands were best avoided.

McColl had a sound relationship with the SRSG Brahimi, a “wise old man who had been involved in Afghanistan for a long time”. The SRSG’s role was to coordinate not command, but McColl saw the requirement to reinforce the SRSG's position and enhance his authority. This was helpful in coordinating the international community. Behind-the-scenes facilitation of political events was also important. An emergency Loya Jirga in 2002 was enabled by the international community, nevertheless the general avoided the limelight and was careful to keep ISAF behind the scenes during these political events. He was also responsive to the short term needs of the Afghan government, helping Karzai to make things happen.
Following up on the Bonn Agreement, with the London Compact in 2006 the international community acknowledged the requirement for multi-year engagement in Afghanistan and committed to both an expanded ISAF and development assistance. Aid pledges amounted to $10.5 billion and the compact established ambitious five year development, security governance, reconstruction and counter narcotics “outcomes, benchmarks and mutual obligations in an attempt to coordinate efforts and create greater synergies between the [GIRoA] and the international community”.35 This was followed by further commitments through an Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS),36 a Conference in Paris in June 2008 and the Afghanistan Conference in London in January 2010.37 The most recent conference, in Kabul on 20 July 2010, saw a significant commitment from Karzai38 to a transition of security responsibility and lead for military operations from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by the end of 2014. In return for continued international support and aid, the conference also saw ambitious Afghan commitments to: improve governance; deal with corruption; address narcotics; implement women’s rights; increase economic development; improve financial management; and a programme to “reintegrate those insurgents who agree to renounce violence and sever ties to Al Qaeda”;39 as well as a trade agreement with Pakistan.

A practical reality influencing ISAF has been the presence of the separate US military Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, as well as drone strikes against targets in Pakistan; both part of the US “War on Terror” and operating to a separate campaign plan. This has led to ambiguity and suspicions amongst the local people, the humanitarian community and international partners, given that the short term goals of counter terrorism could be inimical to the longer term interests of building peace and stability.40 This situation required continuous attention by ISAF commanders in an effort to maintain coherence and de-conflict specific activities.41

With ISAF having initially provided a cocoon and a sense of international legitimacy to develop a political process in Kabul during 2001-2002, the natural question for the international community was how, and when, could the reach of government, and with it stability, be extended across Afghanistan? The North Atlantic Council eventually agreed that NATO should take on ISAF in August 2003 and ISAF’s mandate was expanded by UN Security Council Resolution 151042 to include the whole of Afghanistan in October 2003. Although at that time NATO did not realise that it was taking on a virulent insurgency. Remaining under UN authority, NATO’s Operation Plan envisaged 5 Phases to deliver stability: 1. Assessment and Preparation (2003); 2. Geographic Expansion (2003-2006); 3. Stability (2003 – ongoing); Phase 4. Transition (planned to be incremental); and 5. Reployment. The aim of stabilisation, mainly centred on the use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, was to assist the Afghan government in extending and exercising its authority.43 Beyond this, views amongst nations differed on whether the mission was essentially one of support to reconstruction and governance,44 with minimal exposure to the risks of combat, or a full blown counter insurgency effort. This would become an issue later on as the insurgency deepened and the imperative to develop and support viable Afghan security forces became clearer.
The NATO ISAF mission gradually increased in size, first in the North in 2003 and the West in 2005. Further expansion into the largely ethnically Pashtun and Taliban dominated South and East in 2006 would see a step change in terms of scale and conflict intensity (the East had been under control of the US Operation Enduring Freedom). The 2006 expansion also included taking on much of the role of training the Afghan Army, previously conducted by US forces. This would involve the creation of NATO Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams to help develop the Afghan army. Lieutenant General (later General) David Richards (UK) was selected to command ISAF and he would soon find that, whilst the military mission had expanded, military resources were insufficient and the concomitant local political process and progress were missing.

4. ISAF under General Richards (4 May 2006 to 4 February 2007)

4.1. Politico-Military Relationships

At interview Richards agreed with the hypothesis that supporting the peace process is a professional imperative for commanders and that they should help to find workable local political outcomes. He had applied this approach as a Commander in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. He also explained that “military activity that is not underpinned by clear and properly resourced political objective will count for little”. However, the practicalities in Afghanistan were that he received little or no direction and guidance on the political interface or how to improve it. Indeed some in the chain of command actively tried to limit his political role; Richards contrasted this with his US counterpart who had regular VTC contact with the Secretary of Defence. Therefore, following instinct, he had simply accepted a political role as an implied task. He created expressly political organs and concepts such as the Policy Action Group and the Afghan Development Zone concept whilst adopting a more active coordinating role in Kabul than was expected or had been evident before. He had learned on previous operations not to ask before initiating such initiatives, so he took risks, knowing that he would never get formal authority to do them.

Richards’ principal political problem was that there was “no single international approach” to the Afghan government. He was a direct partner to the UN Mission’s SRSG Tom Koenigs (Brahimi’s successor from February 2006), but there was a limit to the latter’s authority and reach. Later Richards called for a “single political leader” to improve unity of effort across the breadth of the international counter insurgency effort. In reality, Richards’ primary political interlocutor was President Karzai and he developed a strong and supportive relationship with the head of state. As a Theatre Commander, but without the authority to compel other actors, Richards’ mantra was “Listen-Influence-Coordinate”. The process of listening and being seen to listen with leaders at the local, regional and international level was very important. This effort encompassed Tribal Elders, President Karzai (often several times a day), President Musharraf of Pakistan and visiting political leaders. Richards spent much of his time understanding what they wanted and persuading them of his intent. He explained that he then used the “power of the military headquarters coordinate and implement, in a way that no one else seems to be able to do”.
ISAF under NATO, was of course, not in charge of the Afghan campaign as a whole. Therefore arguably it could not legitimately provide guidance to its commanders beyond the security domain. Hence NATO’s overall direction remained vague. It was widely understood, however, that the desired outcome was a stable, secure and self sustainable Afghanistan. This would require a democratic government, which could deliver basic services, a sustainable security environment, a market economy to provide for social needs and reduce poverty with a decrease in poppy cultivation and the trafficking of narcotics. In these circumstances Richards’ approach was that, as a Theatre commander in a counter insurgency operation charged with providing security to enable political and economic development, a high political profile was a necessity along with his security role. Coordinated political engagement by the Commander and his subordinates was needed at the regional, national government and local levels. Richards explained that “constructive engagement with all elements of the Afghan government” was needed first to help get the local political process moving and secondly to energise the spectrum of cross government activity needed to deal with the insurgency. At the local level, engagement with tribal elders, using Shuras, was needed in order to understand local issues, justify and explain NATO’s actions, and begin separating irreconcilable hard core Taliban from those who could be reconciled and drawn into the government’s influence.

The specified military task of expanding the NATO presence into the south and east, was as Richards explained, relatively straightforward. More challenging was the problem of converting military gains into wider operational impact, to “create the right operating ‘environment’ for this … we had…to achieve …unity of effort”. This was achieved by creating a new government mechanism, the Policy Action Group (PAG), to bring key Afghan and International Community players together, “systematically, to discuss and agree the way ahead”. Karzai had tended to run Afghanistan “like a tribal elder by a mobile phone” and individual Ambassadors or ministers would do deals which were unknown to others. Richards explained that there was no process or records and it was “absolutely anarchic”. Therefore, leveraging the impact of rioting in Kabul on 29 May 2006, he persuaded Karzai that a war cabinet or Policy Action Group (PAG) would improve top-level governance and coordination, with a specific focus on key aspects of the insurgency. Richards explained that the PAG would also help to expand “the writ of the government into all areas”. (The structure and composition of the PAG is explained at Figure 6.2 below).

The PAG was chaired by the President with ministers in attendance as well as international participants (ISAF, the US Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), UNAMA, European Union, and relevant national embassies). Individual ministers chaired implementation and coordination groups in the following areas: intelligence, security, strategic communications, and reconstruction and development and governance. The PAG met every week and was serviced by a secretariat provided by ISAF and the UN, without which it would not have functioned. At its first meeting on 9 July 2006 the PAG considered objectives across the span of government and international activity (Governance, Political Engagement, External Issues, Diplomatic Issues, Security, Development, Communication and Social Issues). The PAG certainly improved matters but it did not deliver real “hyper-
connectivity”\textsuperscript{75} to achieve both unity of purpose and unity of effort. Also, as Brigadier Phil Jones, the military advisor to the SRSG at the time explained, in Afghanistan, “there was no peace process and no political primacy in one person, so there was no clear guiding light”.\textsuperscript{76}

**Figure 6.2 The Policy Action Group.** Source: Richards\textsuperscript{77}
The influence of Pakistan was another political problem which needed to be addressed. To provide a means of bringing Afghans and Pakistanis together to "discuss matters of mutual security interest," and to enable collaborative security efforts in border areas, Richards emphasised and enhanced the role of the Tripartite Commission. This included senior military representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, ISAF and the US led coalition. A Joint Operations Centre was established to assist with information sharing as well as an Operational Coordination Group. Richards also visited Pakistan in order to establish a working relationship with President Musharraf.

4.2. Campaign Design under Richards

General Richards’ recipe for campaign success was “Reconstruction and Development, Governance, Pakistan relations, cloaked in Security, all done synergistically” (RGDPS). On the security side the key problem was dealing with the Taliban and separating them from the population. An irreconcilable Islamic fundamentalist hard-core who wished to return to power in Kabul, had to be destroyed or interdicted. Those whose motivations where about local power and money, and who fed off tribal feuding banditry and narcotics, had to be disrupted and deterred. A third group of locally recruited part-timers whose sole objective was to earn money would simply need to be engaged and provided with alternatives. The military effort would buy space and time but the problem was pulling all of the RGDPS elements together in time and space.

With the expansion of the NATO presence, Richards gave direction in July 2006 to plan and implement focused military-led action in support of GIRoA in specific geographic Afghan Development Zones (ADZ) (See Figure 6.3 below). Focused action was necessary because ISAF lacked the force levels, and there was insufficient development funding to operate everywhere. The key would be to select areas where examples of good governance, reconstruction and development could work within a secure environment in order to restore the confidence of the people and convince them to support GIRoA. This would counter the Taliban’s powerful claim that the GIRoA and International Community were not delivering. In these zones all GIRoA and international community efforts would be focused; this would form a stable base from which the government could extend its reach, thereby undermining support for the insurgency. The intent was through unity of effort to secure the Afghan population from the Taliban and others; to provide the population with the incentive, means, resolve and courage to stand up to the insurgents. ISAF would align its operations with those of the government and with the expectations of the local citizens: they would seek to reinvigorate traditional forms of influence and authority; local views would influence priorities and build a sense of ownership. The ADZ concept would create political space by the application of military force in support of governance and development initiatives. ADZs would be selected on the basis of geography, demography and available forces together with the capability of the government and international community to deliver progress on the ground and to plan, coordinate and lead operations supported by ISAF. Effective partnering of ANSF by ISAF would be important. The bottom line, however, remained that, whilst this allowed NATO to seize the initiative in the selected areas, the available
resources were slim; Richards admitted that they “were making the best of a bad job”.90
Figure 6.3 Afghan Development Zone Concept. Source Richards⁹¹
4.3. Campaign Execution under Richards

During the summer of 2006 ISAF’s expansion into the south was soon challenged by the Taliban. At Kandahar they prepared defences to threaten the city and Highway 1, the main road between Kabul and Herat in the West. Canadian forces, backed by the US (with non-NATO forces) eventually defeated the Taliban, although not without difficulty. Richards explained that the political stakes were high; losing this battle would have meant disaster for the NATO operation, and arguably NATO’s own survival. Had the Taliban entered Kandahar, “the consent of the Pashtun population [in the South] to President Karzai and the International Community would have been lost, he would almost certainly have fallen from power”. However, notwithstanding the seriousness of the military position, the difficulties of multinational operations were soon evident, “very few nations, over focused on their own narrow problems, were prepared to come to the Canadians assistance”. In the end the result of this conventional battle was significant; the Taliban suffered a comprehensive tactical defeat, despite reinforcing their position.” NATO had provide that it could fight, which was an important signal, and the Taliban were forced to disperse and alter their tactics relying on infiltration, suicide bombs and “asymmetric’ attacks”. Nevertheless despite this tactical success, a shortage of troops, both Western and Afghan, meant that NATO could not completely hold the ground that they had cleared, and this would become a perennial feature.

An ISAF-wide operation in the winter of 2006-2007 (Operation Oqab) sought to establish and expand selected focus ADZs along Afghanistan's ring road – Highway 1. The first phase was to secure the selected areas. The second phase was to disrupt insurgent infiltration and exfiltration activity, in coordination with Pakistan. This increased security would then allow governance, reconstruction and development to be improved demonstrating that the government was better able to meet the needs of the people than the alternatives; thus separating the population from the insurgents. There was an effort to ensure an Afghan face and to partner with the expanding Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Adopting an integrated approach was also important, but difficult.

Another crosscutting challenge was delivering an integrated politico-military counter narcotics effort. There was no real International Community consensus over policy either on poppy crop eradication or dealing with the trade by eliminating factories and distribution networks. The genuine dilemma was whether to eradicate crops (favoured by the US), but risk losing local consent and influence; or to accept the reality of the problem and seek to replace the poppy as a crop. This would need alternative legal livelihoods and infrastructure as part of the wider economic picture as well as counter narcotics institutions. Meanwhile the Taliban and narco-warlords were well linked and the Taliban drew income, and hence arms, from the trade so this needed to be dealt with. Figure 6.4 below provides an overview of the security situation and poppy cultivation in 2007-8. Clearly some broad parallels can be drawn between the two, particularly in the southern and eastern provinces.
4.4. Campaign Results under Richards

Richards attempted to apply a number of classic features familiar from Templer’s handling of Malaya in the 1950s. Demonstrating the power of leadership, advocacy and military organisation to catalyze political solutions, he was instrumental, assisted by Chris Alexander (UNAMA DSRSG), in establishing a political structure the Policy Action Group to get things moving in Afghanistan. This war cabinet, with a supporting committee system, improved coordination and unity of effort in the counter insurgency campaign. There were evident sensitivities over this from some political quarters, but those same critics were not able to provide an alternative to the jury-rigged international and local structures in Afghanistan. However it enabled Karzai to set his priorities, and according to a UNAMA report, it “increased levels of cooperation and coordination both between GoA and the international community and among each of those groups”. On the ground, a version of the “ink spot” strategy initiated by Richards would begin to solve the insurgency problem through the Afghan Development Zone concept. He commented that these zones were “about joint action and unity of effort, not just development”. However the aim of “restoring Afghan people’s confidence” was continually frustrated by the difficulty of getting Afghan delivery, difficulty coordinating efforts, a shortage of troops and, in non-US areas, a simple shortage of money. Another recurring problem highlighted by commanders was that the shortage of ground troops meant there would be times when air power had to cover the gap. This tended to cause civilian casualties and collateral damage.
The struggle to convince a critical mass of the Pashtun population, many of whom were struggling for survival, that their best option was to support the government and not the Taliban, or warlords, was far from over. As Richards commented: “if you are an Afghan who has spent thirty years fighting, you have learned not to put your faith in the wrong side.” Information operations could help to counter negative perceptions but, as Richards pointed out, they had to be “founded on substance and not spin”. Delivering the substance through real governance, supported by Afghan security, was difficult and hence it was perhaps not surprising that the Taliban were, according to a SENLIS assessment, “increasingly able to fill the political space” and provided de-facto government in large areas of the Pashtun belt in the south (see Figure 6.5 below); albeit that the Pashtuns do not naturally follow the Taliban’s form of Islam. Areas that had been taken by NATO often could not be held. Moreover the porous uncontrolled border with Pakistan provided ready access to recruits, funding and ideological support from Al Qaeda. According to the UN Secretary General, this state of affairs, indicated, “an insurgency emboldened by their strategic successes, rather than disheartened by tactical failures.”
At the national level the legitimacy of the GIRoA continued to be undermined by the perception of widespread corruption, despite attempts through the PAG to address governance and reconciliation. The perception that the government was unable to provide security also grew, partly due to attacks but also the increasing level of civilian casualties. At the national level line ministries were over bureaucratic and only able to spend approximately 60% of their budgets, internal government coordination remained poor and legislative progress was slow. At the sub national level service delivery saw little progress. The shortage of Afghan human capacity remained a pervasive problem throughout. Some coordination was achieved between the international community and the GIRoA through the PAG; nevertheless there was
no unanimity of views amongst the NGOs and international organisations and the role of the UN was not always clear: was it to take a back seat or a more active coordinating role?\textsuperscript{133} On a positive note there was improvement in the education and health sectors,\textsuperscript{134} but overall progress remained hampered by the lack of local capacity and implementing plans and policies.\textsuperscript{135}

As Richards explained, ISAF had successfully expanded into areas where “previously there had been few or no international forces, extending the writ of the Afghan government in the process”\textsuperscript{136} Nevertheless the paucity of Afghan National Army troops and the corrupt and ineffective nature of the Afghan National Police meant that success in delivering a secure environment to enable reconstruction in these areas was mixed. Numbers present for duty were often below 50% of the authorised strength (then 70,000). In early 2007 insurgent activity levels were on the increase particularly in the South using well-prepared IEDs and attacks against high profile targets. In the North, attacks on NGOs increased. This meant that many Afghan army troops were required on fixed force protection roles in garrisons and outposts.\textsuperscript{137}

In Kabul, HQ ISAF was the dominant organisation, military or civilian, because it had new ideas and the power to implement them. Although this would cause some resentment because it indicated that other approaches were wrong or “not invented here.”\textsuperscript{138} Richards own prognosis in 2007 was that the campaign was “winnable”.\textsuperscript{139} Security had been stabilised, there was economic growth, significant spending on reconstruction and development, ISAF was being reinforced, and 78% of the population were still in favour of ISAF's engagement whereas the Taliban only had 10% support.\textsuperscript{140} The ingredients for success were in place but the expectations of the people were high and time to effect meaningful change was running out. NATO was not winning the information war. There was no strategic plan and messages were not consistent with audiences.\textsuperscript{141} The Taliban were mounting an increasingly effective information campaign whilst NATO, at both the operational and strategic levels, was finding it increasingly difficult to counter this with coordinated master messages.\textsuperscript{142} So, would the military effort be able to hold the ring and sustain consent whilst waiting for the other elements of the campaign to deliver?\textsuperscript{143}

5. ISAF 2007 – 2009: a deepening crisis and a developing understanding

During the period from mid-2007 until mid-2009 the pattern of the essentially Pashtun insurgency continued in Afghanistan. In terms of geography, insurgent activity tended to correspond to the spread of NATO, albeit the intensity was on the increase. The insurgent objective remained to undermine the government and to make the alternatives look better. Here the problem was not so much that the insurgency was strong but the government was weak; legitimate economic activity was stifled by corruption; and tribal society lent itself to the sort of parallel structures offered by the Taliban. They applied available tools, including the information domain, to achieve this effect. The Taliban were notably effective in magnifying the effects of non-combatant casualties, many of which they caused, but which were readily seized upon by the media.\textsuperscript{144}
NATO simply did not have enough troops (around 50,000 during 2008) and some were restricted by caveats. Therefore combat power was focused specifically to separate insurgents from the people and this needed to be synchronised with state building activities including counter narcotics, governance and reconstruction activities. There was clear recognition for the need to align planning; there was no sense in conducting military clear and hold operations without the necessary civilian agencies in place for the build. However coordination amongst international military and civilian actors remained challenging. The NATO campaign plans had lines of development for security, social / economic development and governance; with information as a crosscutting activity. But NATO did not own the whole problem. Another problem explained by David Couzens, an ISAF campaign planner at the time was the fact that military planning was partly conducted at Brunssum in the Netherlands. This did not help in securing buy-in from UNAMA and there were doubts whether the planning had traction with the regional level of command in ISAF.

The ISAF Commanders (McNeil and later McKiernan) were not in a position to deliver governance or political change. Responsibility for this lay with the UN agencies under UNAMA and with the Afghans. Arguably the NATO Senior Civilian Representative should have helped deliver the political connections to do this. Yet NATO was undergoing its own internal debate. Eventually, in April 2008 NATO agreed a “Comprehensive Political Military Plan.” This was to guide NATO’s civil-military activity in relation to Afghanistan at the strategic political level. But there seemed no real sense of securing a clear political end in Afghanistan. David Couzens remarked that “the political was not part of it”. Inevitably some participants were beginning to highlight the need for outreach to certain insurgent groups, because as a senior British officer commented, “no insurgency ends without this.” Nevertheless here was no effective work on reconciliation and no local buy in to that. The SRSG Kai Eide, although a former Norwegian Ambassador to NATO, “seemed to have a fundamental dislike of NATO” and did not seize the opportunity to work closely with NATO, preferring to preserve the independence of UNAMA and conduct his own efforts independently. Hence although there were frequent coordination discussions the UN and NATO’s political effort was “not delivering much”. Moreover, uncertainty given the election approaching in 2009 had also affected political progress.

In terms of Afghan politics, Karzai’s focus was on Kabul and not the provinces. Perhaps under rated by the media, he had a huge task. Pressed by many international interlocutors he tended to walk a tightrope attempting to keep all happy but tending not to follow up on undertakings made. He saw advantage of the EU with its resources and links to the World Bank. Hence the EU had political and economic influence. With NATO he was as cooperative politically as he could afford to be. However a recurring theme of deep concern to Karzai was the incidence of civilian casualties. Eventually ISAF addressed this through a new tactical directive, limiting the use of force, but this did not completely solve the problem. UNAMA and others saw NATO’s approach as “too kinetic”. The problem of excessive losses of international convoys also had effects on the local population. These issues would
eventually help ISAF to begin thinking more broadly about the perceptions of the locals and what was meant by security.\textsuperscript{158}

In 2008, after 8 years in Afghanistan, the international community began to understand\textsuperscript{159} the complexity of the situation and the needed response. Improved understanding did not deliver immediate change but (as with Iraq and the surge) this would start to shape thinking, particularly in the US, on the art of the possible.\textsuperscript{160} Had there previously been any doubt, it was obvious that the elusive Al Qaeda and the Taliban were successfully feeding off the actions of the international military forces. The battle space was now the people and hence any notion of "shattering the cohesion" of the enemy was meaningless. A different approach was needed; just as Clausewitz had described war as the "continuation of politics by other means,"\textsuperscript{161} then so to politics it needed to return in Afghanistan. But this needed to be facilitated and here it was important to understand that, as Graeme Lamb a seasoned British commander put it, "everything we do needs to set the conditions for a successful political outcome".\textsuperscript{162}

General McKiernan had seen the need to change the approach to the insurgency, this would need more troops, and he had requested these. In February 2009 his US boss, General Petraeus (now Commander Central Command), publicly mapped out the elements of a culturally sensitive population-centric counter insurgency approach for Afghanistan, applying lessons from Iraq, separating irreconcilables from reconcilables while making the latter part of the solution. He stressed the need for a comprehensive approach and hence the need for unity of effort.\textsuperscript{163} Finally, in March 2009 the US administration updated its approach to Afghanistan: President Barack Obama recognised that the mission had been under resourced\textsuperscript{164} and stated that,

"we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future...To achieve our goals, we need a stronger, smarter and comprehensive strategy."\textsuperscript{165}

To implement this regional strategy Obama appointed Richard Holbrooke as his special representative and agreed the deployment of more US troops. Obama’s policy objective was however short on detail and could be interpreted as either an engagement strategy, a containment strategy,\textsuperscript{166} or both. Unfortunately this did not offer any real clue as to the political outcome required in Afghanistan, albeit Obama mentioned a requirement for reconciliation. In large measure it would be left of the generals, first McKiernan\textsuperscript{167} and later his replacement McChrystal to map out what needed to be done and to judge this against practical realities. Notwithstanding NATO’s security-oriented mandate, the reality was that no other actor had the capacity or reach across Afghanistan to do this; but securing unity of effort would remain a problem.\textsuperscript{168}

In July 2009 the British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, led the charge on mapping out a political solution for Afghanistan. In a speech at NATO headquarters he averred that whilst military operations could “deny insurgents the space to operate”,\textsuperscript{169} “strategic progress relies on undermining the insurgency through
This meant developing a political strategy to deliver reintegration and reconciliation of suitable insurgents and to cater for the needs of the wider population. This would depend on "credible, clean local government at provincial and district level that works with the grain of tribal Afghan society". At the grassroots level, the Afghan government needed to deliver alternatives to fighting. At the higher level irreconcilable ideologues had to be separated from those who could be taken into the political process. To reassure the population, security had to be provided by effective Afghan forces; governance had to be delivered; and Shuras of local elders needed to guide the delivery of international aid. Finally, viable relations had to be established with Afghanistan's neighbours, particularly Pakistan, in view of the cross-border movement of insurgents and Pakistan's own Taliban insurgency in the north-west of the country; regional countries needed to support an independent Afghanistan.

6. ISAF Under General McChrystal 2009-2010

6.1. Politico-Military Relationships

General Stanley McChrystal took command of ISAF and US Forces in Afghanistan on 15 June 2009. He was selected partly due to his counter insurgency expertise but also his special forces background, which had included the synchronisation of multiple effects, notably in Iraq. This would also be needed for operations against Al Qaeda, including in Pakistan. An extraordinary, charismatic, analytical and straight talking figure, McChrystal's biggest difficulty would be that, in Afghanistan, in contrast to Iraq, there was no politico-military alignment. Nor was policy at the strategic, operational execution, and tactical levels fully aligned and this created a "weak seam". Obtaining the politico-military synergy and effective unity of command created by the Crocker-Petraeus team in the US led coalition in Iraq simply was not possible in Afghanistan.

There was no unified stabilisation policy and no single individual was answerable for international efforts on governance or social and economic reconstruction. UNAMA, was, as Lieutenant General James Dutton (UK) the ISAF Deputy Commander put it, "enthusiastic but not an organisation" and its leadership did not have the confidence to work outside its very restrictive mandate. In terms of a local political partner, the international community had effectively committed itself to Karzai during 2004 to 2005; a situation cemented by an imperfect election in 2009 which saw Karzai returned for a second term as president. The international community, led by the US, nevertheless decided to continue to support this elected administration partly because it shared, at least in principle, the same aims and objectives. Frequently criticised, and lacking a prime minister to help carry the load, Karzai would see upwards of 50 national ambassadors or visiting ministers, as well as those of NATO and the EU who pushed individual lines to Karzai. Hence the ISAF Commander, as the single most powerful international actor in Afghanistan, would face the challenge of delivering the military part of a comprehensive counter insurgency solution whilst operating with a fissiparous set of international political actors and a local partner, under severe pressure, whose legitimacy was questionable.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, according to McChrystal’s deputy, General Dutton, he was “hugely ambitious to sort out Afghanistan”. Occasionally fiery yet possessing humility and an inclusive approach in the search for ideas, McChrystal entirely understood the civil-military nature of the problem and was determined to obtain the necessary civilian support. Arguably the ISAF commander was best placed to support (and influence) Karzai and the international community. Yet McChrystal did not seek to become a “Templar” figure; instead, respecting civilian political primacy, he took his place in the weekly cabal including the SRS, NATO Civilian Representative and ambassadors from US, UK, EU, France and Germany. Intended to act a guiding body for Karzai and others, the group was not however particularly successful.

### 6.2. Deriving an updated campaign strategy: the big ideas

US Secretary of Defence Gates, and later the NATO Secretary General, directed McChrystal to produce an assessment of the campaign after 60 days in post. Shortly before issuing his report, McChrystal and US Ambassador Eikenberry published a new Civilian-Military Campaign Plan to integrate US efforts across the country. Whilst not an internationally agreed document, this plan outlined the situation and US intentions. The strategic goal remained as Obama had outlined in March. In terms of ways, the report stated that “our every action must help secure mobilise and support the Afghan people and their government to defeat the insurgency”. It stressed the need for Afghan leadership and underlined the scale of the challenge facing both the Afghans and the international community as well as stressing the need for adequate means. This report presaged part of McChrystal’s own assessment.

McChrystal delivered his unequivocal confidential assessment of the situation, which was subsequently leaked to the press, on 30 August 2009. The assessment, in itself an impressive thesis on contemporary counter insurgency, which clearly drew on the tenets of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, advocated a population-centric approach to generating political momentum in Afghanistan. It was inherently demanding of international political will. McChrystal summarised the situation as "serious…[with] a resilient and growing insurgency [and] a crisis of confidence among Afghans…A perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents". The threat was organised, determined, insurgent groups who sought to “expel international forces, separate the Afghan people from GIRoA, and gain control of the population”. Much of this crisis of confidence stemmed from inadequate governance at the national level and a failure to connect with the people. The government was weak and endemically corrupt, comprising thinly disguised interest groups.

McChrystal explained a number of recurring themes emerging from his civil-military expert team’s analysis: the objective was the will of the people, this required interaction with the population and a focus on delivering stability; ISAF’s conventional warfare culture was a problem; ultimately Afghans had to defeat the insurgency; unity of effort had to improve significantly, both within ISAF and across the international effort; and protecting the people meant “shielding them from insurgent violence, corruption, and coercion”. Less clear was his view on how this
approach would create political space for an Afghan political settlement to emerge or how NATO would assist in that process, although he commented that “…a political solution to all conflicts is the inevitable outcome. And it’s the right outcome”. 194 McChrystal explained the need to change the campaign strategy and the operational approach. This had to be credible and sustainable, it needed to be properly resourced and executed through an "integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign that earns the support of the Afghan[s]… and provides them… a secure environment”. 195

By the time McChrystal was in Kabul, many of the ideas suggested by the Bonn agreement on social engineering to change the Afghan way of life had in effect been abandoned. 196 The ideas themselves were worthy but change would need to come, as General Dutton put it, “from the inside out and not be provided from the outside in.” 197 McChrystal’s 60 day report focussed simply on the essentials needed to get Afghanistan on a path to stability. Whilst the assessment was sobering, McChrystal’s view was that ISAF could achieve the mission. The ways would be an updated people-centric indirect strategy 198 and of course the additional means, both military and civilian would be needed. In articulating these needs, McChrystal had in effect explained to the political community what needed to be done more clearly than any politician had hitherto. He forced the pace on the need to address the totality of the insurgency with a “full spectrum” approach applied by a diverse group of actors and stated that ISAF must “preserve, bolster and help focus this diverse partnership”. 199 No aspect of the situation or the campaign could be reviewed in isolation; this wicked problem, comprising interconnecting relationships had to be viewed holistically. And the main actors were the people, the government, ISAF, the insurgency, and external players. 200

The people-centric approach included a new operational culture. ISAF had to reduce its preoccupation with force protection and get closer to the people; it had to improve its understanding of and respect for their culture; personal relationships were required with Afghan partners; and the risks needed to be shared. McChrystal stated that insurgencies typically were concluded by a combination of military and political effort which drove host nation reconciliation with some insurgent element. 201 Although beyond its responsibilities, ISAF must be “in a position to support appropriate reconciliation policies”. Insurgents would have the choice to “fight, flee or reintegrate”. 202 For its part, ISAF would need to work on reintegrating fighters and lower level leaders in coordination with the government.

The overall ISAF strategy resulting from McChrystal’s assessment included four elements. First, to deepen integration and partnering with the Afghan national security forces; this would enable faster Afghan capacity development with a view to taking on security. Second, supporting governance at all levels would be as important as security. Third the initial focus would be “gaining the initiative and reversing the momentum of the insurgency”. 203 Finally, ISAF would prioritise resources where the population was most threatened. 204 Gaining the initiative would later enable “strategic consolidation” as Afghan capacity increased and the insurgency diminished over 12 to 24 months. McChrystal’s approach to facilitating political outcomes at the Theatre level would, he argued, deliver strategic success.
After protracted consideration \(^{205}\) lasting into December 2009 the Obama Administration finally decided to provide McChrystal with an additional 30,000 US troops in addition to the 68,000 US and 39,000 troops from other nations already deployed. There would also be additional civilian assistance. Obama’s dithering left the international community dangling, was hardly propitious and wasted critical time.\(^{206}\) Worse, the caveat was that this US force level would only remain for 18 months,\(^{207}\) hence a political timeline for extraction began to emerge.\(^{208}\)

6.3. Campaign Design: Communicating The Big Ideas\(^{209}\)

The key themes in McChrystal’s assessment where addressed in a new ISAF Campaign Design. This is shown at figure 6.6 below which explains the Ends, Ways and Means. The ambitious Ends were,

> “Phase 3 ends when the insurgency is defeated and no longer able to threaten the survival of GIRoA, Afghanistan is stabilised, legitimate governance extends to local levels, socio-economic programs benefit the majority of the Afghan people, and GIRoA, with ISAF in support is capable of assuming the lead for the provision of security.” \(^{210}\)

The people were the objective and this was explicitly communicated through the 5 Lines of Operation and the operational objectives for each. The lines of operation were: Protect the Population; Enable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); Neutralize Malign Influence; Support Extension of Governance; and Support Socio-Economic Development. A requirement for strong civil-military cooperation and strategic communications was infused throughout. In demonstrating the totality of military and civilian effort required, the campaign design reflected a “full spectrum” approach to countering the insurgency, albeit the difficulty of integrating these remained as discussed above. The first security line of operation, Protecting the Population, required effort to be prioritised in areas of high population density, primarily Pashtun populations. Civilian casualties also had to be reduced. The second military line of operation, Enable ANSF, demanded the delivery of indigenous security forces (both in terms of capacity and capability) to be accelerated and expanded. Partnering was needed at every level. The Neutralise Malign Influence effort required corruption to be pinpointed, the influence of narcotics to be reduced and illegitimate governance replaced with legitimate instruments. The fourth line of operation, Supporting the Extension of Governance, was intended to secure popular support by empowering sub national leaders in providing effective population security. It would also enable reconciliation. The final line of operation, Support Socio-Economic Development, also sought to gain popular support, here by creating security conditions for community economic development.\(^{211}\) As pursuit of these lines of effort shifted from security to stability, so the responsibility for delivery shifted away from ISAF.

With this explicit approach McChrystal went beyond the doctrinal suggestions in *FM 3-24* and *FM 3-07* and used words that had not been used before to communicate his intent. The military role was to stem the insurgency whilst concurrently developing
Afghan security forces so that these can take responsibility for their own security. The idea was that this would be easier once the insurgency has been reduced. However in order to deliver the operational objectives, this military plan also required deep and extensive coordination with all other actors to make progress along all lines and deliver stability. It was understood that whilst it was relatively easy to provide security (given adequate resources), issues such as governance development where a longer term proposition, and, critically, there was no unity of command: parallel chains of command for the military and civil efforts persisted. Furthermore this approach demanded more of the UN’s mission and arguably stretched its mandate well beyond Brahimi’s light footprint approach.

Figure 6.6 ISAF Campaign Design 2009-2010. Source CSIS

6.4. Executing the Big Ideas.

From the outset, McChrystal was determined to effect a cultural change in the whole way that ISAF operated. For his approach of defeating the insurgency, not the insurgent to succeed, it was important to have his whole command understand the rationale for protecting and connecting with the people. This needed a mixture of strict controls on the application of force and guidance on how to operate. The political imperative was to reduce civilian casualties whilst also fighting the insurgents. Thus restraining the use of force was an urgent priority and McChrystal updated McKiernan’s earlier Tactical Directive, his intent was to reduce reliance on “kinetic” activity and bring a substantial focus on providing security to the Afghans through “courageous restraint” over using force. This would be at the expense of
higher risks for his own units. Beyond modifying the use of force, McChrystal’s thoughtful Counter Insurgency Guidance, a 7 page document packed with clear instructions, stressed that the people were the objective, “protecting the people is the mission...ISAF will succeed when GIRoA earns the support of the people”. To achieve this, ISAF’s operating culture had to shift from killing insurgents to getting the people involved in their future. Every action mattered, be it interacting with the people, driving, flying, patrolling, using force or using money. Insurgent attacks had to be seen for what they were: “a secondary effort to discredit the government and provoke a... response that alienates the people”. Beyond issuing guidance, the Commander and his team also reiterated these points at every opportunity and in every forum throughout the theatre.

NATO had agreed in April 2009 that the ISAF commander should focus more on civil-military cooperation. Although he was not in charge, this would in theory help McChrystal integrate the military with the multinational diplomatic and economic effort. One of McChrystal’s early moves was to adjust the practical command and control arrangements in HQ ISAF in order to give his headquarters a more comprehensive and strategic role working ‘outwards and upwards’. This facilitated closer liaison with UNAMA and the rest of the International Community. Understandably, in common with many multinational missions, the ISAF NATO headquarters was oversized and could not be as efficient as a purely national (or small coalition) structure.

A physical troop presence was the first essential element of providing a sense of security for the Afghan people; but much more was needed to secure the will of the people. McChrystal explained that “an effective ‘offensive’ operation ... is one that takes from the insurgent what he cannot afford to lose – control of the population”. Hence they had to be persuaded their government’s control was enough to prevent the return of insurgents. This meant delivering security, local governance and international aid. General Dutton saw examples of this being successfully achieved across the country, but he stressed the need for rapid follow-up once a "security space" had been established. ISAF did not formally take on the non-military lines of operations in those areas where the security situation precluded civilian organisations from operating. But he saw ISAF having a responsibility to help deliver good governance and there is no doubt that, in Kabul, McChrystal was active in the role of “primary integrator” in order to ensure that the needed follow up could happen.

But was any of this going to deliver a lasting political reconciliation in Afghanistan and what was the military role, if any, in supporting this? Some Taliban members were ideologically motivated, whilst others were more tribally and financially motivated or simply intimidated. A relevant military role was to assist with reintegration of those fighters who were not so ideologically committed and wished become part of the lawful security forces. In the light of his experience supporting the Anbar Awakening in Iraq (discussed in chapter 5), a retired British General, Graeme Lamb was employed to develop and facilitate a reintegration programme which would promote, and in reality be closely linked to, reconciliation. This approach had been at the core of campaign design in Iraq. In Afghanistan, ISAF’s broader
security efforts on countering insurgency and building Afghan forces put it in contact, particularly at the tactical level, with fighters who could potentially be integrated into legitimate forces or found alternative employment. At the operational/strategic level there would also be more senior players who would be relevant to reconciliation. Dealing with this latter group would be a sensitive issue within NATO, with UNAMR and with the GIRoA; nevertheless the military could clearly play some supporting role, particularly in areas where others were unwilling to go.

6.5. Campaign Results under McChrystal

President Obama fired McChrystal was on 24 June 2010, following unflattering remarks about members of the US Administration and its conduct of the war made by McChrystal and members of his inner team and reported in a Rolling Stone magazine article. McChrystal was rightly criticised for this gaffe, and paid the price. Civilian control of the military was, rightly, reasserted. McChrystal’s undermining of political trust should not however mask the clarity of his analysis and prescription for Afghanistan. He was prepared to attempt a seemingly impossible task against unclear and shifting strategic ends. McChrystal’s drive and enthusiasm rapidly changed perceptions on the art of the possible in Afghanistan, albeit many of his policies were a continuation of those of his predecessors. The debate surrounding his departure reveals that notwithstanding his blunder, significant external-to- theatre difficulties remained in executing the rather vague strategy and tentative commitment offered by Obama and the West. Some pundits have suggested that in fact McChrystal had recognised the impossibility of his situation and the shortage of time to effect his strategy in the face of pressure to remove US and other troops from Afghanistan. Indeed he had reportedly briefed NATO Defence Ministers on his “serious concerns over levels of security, violence and corruption within the Afghan administration” and critical shortages of NATO capabilities to address these issues. This was not helpful for a “face saving exit”.

Professor Michael Clarke recently stated that historically a prerequisite for successful counter insurgency was the “complete unity of view between political and military establishments”, and mused that this was increasingly absent in the US. Some commentators point out that the increasing international political tendency to speak of deadlines for withdrawal merely plays into the hands of a resilient foe that could simply wait. One commentator has written of a “conceptual withdrawal” having already occurred in Washington. In these circumstances the needed improvement to unity of effort in theatre appears largely illusory. McChrystal did not benefit from a Kouchner or Crocker figure. The senior civilians present, notably the UN SRSG Kai Eide and US Ambassador Eikenberry, although all seemingly working together, apparently did little to help. Indeed Eikenberry has been repeatedly criticised for obstructing McChrystal’s policies behind the scenes: a strange state of affairs given that ISAF was clearly the US’s most effective delivery mechanism in Afghanistan.

In assessing the results of the changes instituted by McChrystal it is important to remember that NATO is still conducting Phase 3 – the ‘stabilisation’ phase – of its plan. Hence the desired political impact had not yet been achieved. Moreover the additional troops authorised by Obama were still in the course of deploying. The
NATO mission had not yet moved to the planned Phase 4, when troops could start to withdraw. As General Dutton, McChrystal's deputy explained, NATO’s objectives for this phase where that the insurgency no longer threatens the survival of the Government, legitimate governance extends to local levels, socio-economic programmes benefit the majority of the Afghan people, Afghanistan is stabilised, and the Government can assume the lead for security provision (albeit with ISAF support). 244 McChrystal had reported that the Taliban and other insurgents’ momentum had been halted (if not reversed). 245 But the other conditions had not been met. 246 Anthony Cordesman recently provided a succinct summary of the overall situation in Afghanistan, viewed from a Western perspective.

―More than eight years into the war, the last Presidential election is still a political nightmare, the legislative election is in limbo, and Afghan power brokers have become far stronger while Afghan capacity in governance has made limited progress. Nearly 40% of the population is partially dependent on UN food aid for basic subsistence, and most Afghans have to do anything they can to survive – whether this involves opium or what the West calls corruption. It is the Taliban that established the real rule of law in many areas, and the civil authorities and police remain largely corrupt and ineffective in much of the country. As for human rights, traditional Afghans remain traditional Afghans, and issues like the rights of women make token progress at best outside the areas where such rights already existed before the Taliban took over.‖ 247

Against this reality, McChrystal had designed a pragmatic campaign with a limited objective which could deliver, as Cordesman put it ―a meaningful form of victory‖ 248 for the West and in Afghan terms. Part of the challenge here was holding the Afghan government to account. The lack of a credible government was arguably Afghanistan’s biggest problem 249 and this was hardly propitious for successful counter insurgency. This was complicated by the reality that individual nations’ motivations differed; and Karzai was effective at “divide and rule”. 250 But, as Graeme Lamb explained, “the one guy who's established a positive relationship with Karzai is McChrystal”. 251

Views on the state and capability of the Taliban vary. Irrespective of their military capability, there seems little doubt that they remain extremely effective in the local and global information domain, particularly over the matter of exploiting civilian casualties. Here, despite McChrystal’s efforts, a steady stream of civilian casualties continued and were exploited by the Taliban (including those they had caused). Taliban attempts to further spread their influence beyond Pashtuns 252 and into the North and West have also been reported. 253 On the ground they do not enjoy wide popular support and do not win force on force engagements with ISAF; yet the Taliban are effective at coercion. Hence simply being more popular than them is not enough. Intimidation has to be reduced partly by killing hard core Taliban but also by reconciling those suitable. Part of the solution here may be arming local militia which would provide security and economic livelihoods therefore reducing the number of Taliban recruits. Here the military commander is once again drawn into political territory.
As one example, Operation Moshtarak, the first significant operation launched by the US and UK after Obama’s “surge” of 30,000 additional US troops, commenced in February 2010 in Helmand province. Analysis suggests that McChrystal’s strategy, “political-led, population-centric, and more fully in partnership with ANSF,” was being successful. In simple terms this would shape, clear, hold and build on territory previously dominated by the Taliban. Planning stressed meeting the needs of the locals and the emphasis was on rapid delivery of sustainable governance which had primacy during execution. Notably the operation was also initiated by the Afghans after joint planning with ISAF and partnering was made a reality at every level. Civilian casualties were kept to a minimum through McChrystal’s policy of courageous restraint. However patience was required, in one area (Nad-e-Ali), this operation was part of the culmination of 18 months stabilising and shaping work. As a British intelligence officer put it six months earlier. “The government enjoyed no instinctive loyalty from the local population ... the Taliban was much better able to engage with traditional and tribal society than ISAF or the government.” This meant they could provide functional governance in large areas. Never a homogenous whole, Afghanistan's regional ethnic and sectarian divisions meant that delivering effective governance here would have to reflect the realities of Afghan power structures. These would need to be co-opted rather than transformed to provide an alternative to the Taliban and tensions between local and national priorities would need to be managed. The key point emerging from this example is that other similar operations in contested areas would need a similar amount of commitment, resources, understanding and above all, time.

7. Conclusions

7.1. The General as Statesman?

The case of Afghanistan has provided significant evidence to substantiate the hypothesis that beyond their specific security-related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors, in order to sustain the political process and facilitate viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations. This approach needs soldiers at all levels to co-operate with other relevant actors, respond to political direction and shape military operations that will impact decisively on political outcomes in order to help generate political progress towards sustainable peace.

Generals Richards and McChrystal (and McColl at the outset) found themselves filling a political void in Afghanistan. This is a de facto reality and Richards commented that “in certain phases of a conflict, a soldier may be best suited to playing the lead role. Often only he has the organisational strength to pull the issues and key players together”. Whether McChrystal was ultimately suited to an essentially political role is a moot point. He did deliver a clear eyed assessment and a robust, nuanced civil-military plan which he executed energetically. Both McChrystal and Richards saw that the narrow military task could not be achieved without setting the necessary political and economic conditions, and taking risks to do so. They indirectly supported political primacy in this endeavour, even though
it had no properly identified or capable torch bearers beyond questionable authority of Karzai, the President of Afghanistan. 267 Worse, they were hampered by the absence of a strategy that could provide “a coherent Information Operation framework from top to bottom”. 268 Richards commented that “it is no good individual countries having a strategy without an international one which is devolved to theatre for execution”. 269 This meant that a strategy of securing stability, based on a rather vague NATO operation plan, had to be assumed by commanders. They had a sense of where they were going but often could not ask the big questions of capitals. Politicians would tend to visit to find out what was going on rather than to help provide direction – and of course the political rug could be pulled. Lacking the advantage enjoyed by Templer, the soldier-statesman in Malaya who, as pro-consul, with the absolute power to coordinate, 270 conducted a single nation’s campaign with considerable freedom, 271 they both worked to improve unity of effort. This naturally needed political and diplomatic interaction and sadly this was not enhanced by the incoherent political guidance provided by the international community which meant that no one ambassador predominated and the generals essentially became the chief advisor to Karzai. 272 But beyond this they both influenced the political process itself, in order to deliver political progress towards reconciliation and stability just as Petraeus had done in Iraq and Jackson and Reinhardt in Kosovo.

Looking to the future of the campaign, with neither unity of command or unity of purpose firmly established, the challenge for the military leadership is only increasing at the time of writing. 273 Irrespective of the prevailing security situation in Afghanistan and progress being made, the external political agenda is now moving rapidly towards transition. This would see phase 4 of NATO’s operation plan occurring at different times in different places across Afghanistan as Afghan capacity comes on line. The political and military tone will inevitably change as Afghans increasingly take the lead, and make moves or mistakes that are uncomfortable for the West. It remains to be seen whether the combination of the NATO-led force, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Afghan security forces can hold the ring in order that reconstruction, governance and economic activity may provide a sceptical population, particularly in the Pashtun areas, with a choice that they feel able to back. Relying on coercion, the Taliban is not a particularly strong insurgent movement because they struggle to capture the hearts and minds of the population. Pressure continues to mount for Afghans to take real responsibility for security 274 and for a negotiated settlement. The former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband is quoted as saying “now is the time for the Afghans to pursue a political settlement with as much vigor and energy as we are pursuing the military and civilian effort”. 275 Karzai has called for a “peace jirga” 276 and, if the Afghans can achieve this, there could be real substance in senior military practitioners’ belief that an acceptable level of success could be achieved in Afghanistan and that the campaign is "eminently winnable". 277 Providing of course that the West sustains political will. Beyond this, the choice will be one of containment 278 and arming selected groups to keep the Taliban at bay. 279

As Anthony Cordesman put it, the war “may well still be winnable, but it is not going to be won by denying the risks, the complexity, and the time that any real hope of victory will take.” 280 Speaking to the House of Commons Defence Committee in June
2009, General McColl clarified the inherent problem of stability operations and the response:

If you analyse the future threats that we might face, they are largely bracketed around the concept of instability, and the lines of operation that deliver you strategic success in respect of instability problems are economics and governance; the security operation simply holds the ring. [...] we have 40 nations in the alliance. Each of them has three or more departments involved in this issue of the Comprehensive Approach. We then have at least ten others who are critical players in the country. We have international organisations—another 20—we then have NGOs, who run into their hundreds. Then on top of that, of course, we have the Afghan National Government. [...] Therefore, what we have to have is a concept which enables us to coordinate…in a coherent way, and the Comprehensive Approach, as we have heard, is the language of common currency in Afghanistan and in many of these theatres, because it is commonly understood that we need to work together.

So where does this leave the theatre commander? The case of Afghanistan has demonstrated that campaign design and execution has been oriented to underpinning political progress in Afghanistan (although this is not the stated military objective). The paradox is clear: NATO’s commander has neither the mandate nor means to act on all aspects of the problem; but nor does anyone else. McColl explained that part of the problem for NATO here is that it needs governance and economics to deliver strategic success and it does not control those so best you can do is organise the plug ins to influence the process. Here there also has to be an important assumption that the Afghan administration shares, at least in principle, the aims and objectives of the international community and in particular NATO. Then, in the absence of a true political supremo, the theatre commander has to fill the role of “master integrator” if he is to succeed. Beyond this he has to play a role in the political discussion on the way ahead particularly in terms of delivering self sustaining security forces that can guarantee adequate security and facilitating reintegration and so nurturing reconciliation. Further complicating factors here were that some international forces were participating in the war on terror whilst others were “providing the political space” for peace building. However there was no political authority over both as a unified campaign. So the ends ways and means were again out of balance.

7.2. Doctrinal Implications

The international community could not have delivered the progress that has been achieved in Afghanistan, however halting and incomplete it may be, without generals taking an active and assertive role in the political process and specifically designing their operations to secure political ends. This may offend sensibilities in the salons of NATO, the UN and some capitals. However the reality of contemporary peace and stability operations suggests that the international community cannot deliver satisfactory leadership and coordination arrangements, except in rare circumstances. So it is time that doctrine became more honest in the way it addressed the politico-
military challenge. Evasive wording designed to secure a consensus draft will no longer suffice.

The next chapter will conclude this thesis by drawing together the strands from the introduction, the reviews of doctrine for peace support operations, stability operations and counter insurgency as well as the three case studies on Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. The conclusion will highlight the recurring themes surrounding political direction, politico-military coordination and the statesman-like role often required of generals in complex circumstances. Frequently, the imperative becomes to conduct military security operations whilst at the same time nurturing consent and building popular support and confidence, dealing with the parties to the conflict, establishing or helping to establish coordination structures, getting the local political process moving, and as military diplomats resolving disputes amongst international actors.

---

2 Ibid.
3 Simon Jenkins, "By jingo, our brave boys are off to tame the Afghan. And they'll fail," *Sunday Times* 29 January 2006.
4 "Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’)." (HQ ISAF and Interim Administration of Afghanistan [Held in the UK National Archive online]. 31 December 2001).
5 Anthony King, Prof., 4 March 2010. A former ISAF commander suggested that establishing self determination was possible but a “Jeffersonian democracy” was not. General Dan McNeill, "The Interview," (UK: BBC World Service. 25 July 2009).
6 Colum Lynch and Joshua Partlow, "Karzai to push for removing up to 50 ex-Taliban officials from U.N. blacklist," *Washington Post (online)* 12 July 2010.
13 David Miliband, "NATO's mission in Afghanistan the political strategy," (Brussels: Speech by Rt Hon David Miliband MP FOREIGN Secretary at NATO Headquarters. 27 July 2009), p 2.
16 Ibid., p 3.
17 Ibid., p 4.
22 The Bonn Agreement established an Afghan Interim Authority, to administer the country for six months; a Judicial Commission, to rebuild the domestic justice system; a Central Bank of Afghanistan, to regulate the money supply; a Civil Service Commission, to provide a list of candidates for key posts in the administrative departments; a Human Rights Commission, to monitor and investigate human rights; and a Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga. The Loya Jirga, a gathering of 1,500 elected and appointed representatives from around the country, met from June 11-19 to establish a two-year Transitional Administration for the country that is to lead to the drafting of a constitution, national elections, and a permanent government. --, "Security in Afghanistan: The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)," (The Henry L Stimson Center. June 2002).
23 The UK Chief of Defence Staff had earlier mused on options for such a [UK] force ranging from protecting the “UK Office” [Embassy] in Kabul to a full blown multinational stabilisation force. See Boyce, "UK Strategic Choices Following the Strategic Defence Review and 11th September,:" p 4.
25 Ibid., p 2.
26 Ibid., p 3.
27 "Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration”),." p 4.
29 General Sir John McColl, (former Commander ISAF 2001-2, Senior British Military Representative-Iraq 2003-4, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe 2008-10), Interview, (Mons, Belgium. 20 November 2009).
30 Phil Jones, Brigadier (former Military Advisor to SRSG UNAMA Jun 06 - Jul 07), Interview (by telephone), (19 February 2010).
31 --, "SO1 Peace Support Operations Visit Report - Afghanistan JDCC/20/6/1 26 May to 5 June 2002 (authors copy),”
32 Although self-effacing about this, McColl clearly impressed both the UN and the Afghan community: he was later considered by Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, as a possible SRSG for UNAMA. McColl, Interview.
33 Ibid.
He recalled providing airlift support to enable Afghans to attend the Hajj in 2002 because the former minister of aviation had taken the money, subsequently been shot, thus there was no ministry and no aeroplanes. McColl diverted some of his own airlift and coordinated aircraft from other sources so that Karzai could “made it happen”. Ibid.


Senior Spanish diplomat speaking at UK Briefing February 2007.

Although the exact mission here apparently remained rather unclear. See Jenkins, "By jingo, our brave boys are off to tame the Afghan. And they'll fail."

71 Richards, Interview. Also "Senior Officer Briefing at NATO HQ Brussels."
72 Richards, Interview.
73 --, "UNAMA Policy Action Group PowerPoint Briefing," (Authors copy. 28 August 2006).
74 Demonstrating how the PAG helped to pull efforts together, these objectives were derived from a
joint paper prepared in late June by the Government of Afghanistan, Canada, CFC-A, ISAF, 
Netherlands, UK and US Governments and UNAMA. Assessment of Factors Contributing to Insecurity 
in Afghanistan ——, "UNAMA Policy Action Group Backgrounder."
75 Jones, Interview (by telephone).
76 Ibid.
77 Provided to author during interview. Richards, Interview.
78 ———, "A firm foundation."
79 ———, Interview.
80 --, "Afghanistan Rolling Brief .
81 Cobbold, "RUSI Interview with General David Richards," p 30.
82 "Senior Officer Briefing at NATO HQ Brussels."
83 Richards, Interview.
84 ———, "Script of RUSI speech Future Army: Challenges in the Modern Environment [author's 
copy]." p 8.
85 Ibid.
86 Cobbold, "RUSI Interview with General David Richards," p 29.
87 Richards, "Script of RUSI speech Future Army: Challenges in the Modern Environment [author's 
copy]." p 8.
88 ISAF internal report.
89 Richards, "Script of RUSI speech Future Army: Challenges in the Modern Environment [author's 
copy]." p 9.
90 Ibid., p 8.
91 Provided to author during interview. ————, Interview.
92 With non-NATO forces drawn from Operation Enduring Freedom.
94 Richards, "Script of RUSI speech Future Army: Challenges in the Modern Environment [author's 
copy]." p 7. Richards also commented that the Northern Alliance might have attempted to prevent the 
95 Richards, "Script of RUSI speech Future Army: Challenges in the Modern Environment [author's 
copy]." p 7.
96 Cobbold, "RUSI Interview with General David Richards," p 25.
97 Richards, "A firm foundation."
98 Cobbold, "RUSI Interview with General David Richards," p 30.
99 Richards, "A firm foundation."
100 Cobbold, "RUSI Interview with General David Richards," p 28.
101 Overall, both commanders and politicians expressed surprise at the extent and intensity of the 
fighting following NATO's expansion into the South of Afghanistan. See Christina Lamb, "Taking the 
102 Albeit by Afghans under their National Drug control Strategy, not by NATO.
103 Simon Jenkins, "Fall back, men, Afghanistan is a nasty war we can never win," Sunday Times 3 
February 2008.
104 "Senior Officer Briefing at NATO HQ Brussels."
105 "Discussion with senior British diplomat," (Brussels, Belgium. 20 April 2007).
107 Nations United, "Report of the Secretary-General on The situation in Afghanistan and its 
implications for international peace and security A/61/799-S/2007/152," (General Assembly and 
108 BBC, "Nato to attack Afghan opium labs," http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7663204.stm#top. Accessed 20 July 2010. See also: 
109 Phil Jones, Brigadier (former Military Advisor to SRSG UNAMA Jun 06 - Jul 07), "Email to author: 
Afghanistan Interview Follow Up," (1 March 2010).
Richards, Interview. Sometimes the PAG was known as “Please Ask the General”. Colloquially known as “Please Ask the General”! Greg Mills, From Africa to Afghanistan: with Richards and NATO to Kabul (Johannesburg, South Africa: Wits University Press, 2007), p. 208.


Although on Richards’ departure it reduced in prominence. Richards, Interview. Also Couzens, Interview.

Jones, "Email to author: Afghanistan Interview Follow Up."


Richards, Interview.

"Senior Officer Briefing at NATO HQ Brussels."

Richards, Interview.

--. "Script of RUSI speech Future Army: Challenges in the Modern Environment [author’s copy]." p. 8; "Senior Officer Briefing at NATO HQ Brussels."

"Discussion with senior British diplomat."

Cobbold, "RUSI Interview with General David Richards," p. 28-30.

Richards, Interview.


Ibid., p. 8.

Ibid., p. 17.

"Senior Officer Briefing at NATO HQ Brussels."

Mills, From Africa to Afghanistan: with Richards and NATO to Kabul, p. 208.

"Senior Officer Briefing at NATO HQ Brussels."

Ibid.

Garry Robison, Maj Gen (Former Deputy Commander Stability ISAF Afghanistan 2008), Interview, (Portsmouth, UK 3 February 2010).

ISAF internal report.

Richards, "A firm foundation."

ISAF internal report.

Richards, Interview.

Ibid; ———, "Script of RUSI speech Future Army: Challenges in the Modern Environment [author’s copy]."

"Senior Officer Briefing at NATO HQ Brussels."

Ibid.

Particularly in view of differing positions on strategy and the use of force. Author’s observation during 2007 at NATO HQ, Brussels.

"Senior Officer Briefing at NATO HQ Brussels."

"If it bleeds it leads”. "British Senior Officer Briefing at Brussels,” (May 2008).

Although this is less of a problem for the US with PRTs embedded in the military chain and with CERP funding available. Nick Lindley, Col. (former MA to DCOM ISAF Jun-Dec 2008. MOD DCDC Leader for Functional Doctrine), Interview, (Shrivenham. 8 July 2010).

Couzens, Interview.

Whilst Richards had been a political general, prepared to fill a political void, his successor McNeil was more a soldiers’ general who did not have the same touch. "Discussion with senior British
diplomat.” However, to be fair to him, he had been told by the NATO Secretary General to "stay in the military lane”. Lindley, Interview. Perhaps it was therefore understandable that some of the politico military structures established by Richards were allowed to lapse somewhat.

148 Lindley, Interview.

149 "House of Commons Defence Committee Seventh Report of Session 2009-10. The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace," p EV 43.

150 Couzens, Interview.

151 "British Senior Officer Briefing at Brussels.

152 Lindley, Interview.

153 COMISAF, SCR NATO and SRSG Eide met over breakfast on alternate weeks as a discussion forum and to join up approaches. Couzens, Interview.

154 Lindley, Interview.

155 Ibid.

156 Ibid.

157 Ibid.

158 Ibid.


166 McKiernan was fired on 11 May 2009 to make way for McChrystal’s “fresh eyes”. --, "A general’s marching orders," The Economist 16 May 2009.


168 David Miliband, "NATO's mission in Afghanistan the political strategy," p 2.

169 Ibid., p 4.

170 Ibid.

171 This would be easier said than done however. Karzai had earlier expelled “outside agents” thought to be negotiating with the Taliban. See Jenkins, "Fall back, men, Afghanistan is a nasty war we can never win.”

172 Miliband, "NATO's mission in Afghanistan the political strategy," p 6.

173 Ibid., p 6-8.


176 --, "A general's marching orders."


However there were plenty of problems, not least strains over corruption and Karzai's personality-based management style. See Daniel Dombey and Matthew Green, "Display of unity fails to hide lack of clarity," Financial Times 15 May 2010.

Dutton, Interview.

Thomas E Ricks, "In Afghanistan, Petraeus will have difficulty replicating his Iraq success," Washington Post (online) 27 June 2010.


Ibid., p 1.

Ibid., p i. See also McChrystal, "COMISAF's Initial Assessment," p 1-1.


A redacted version was subsequently placed on the Washington Post website. McChrystal, "COMISAF's Initial Assessment."

Ibid., p 1-1.

Ibid., p 2-5. There were no clear line must separating the insurgent groups, criminal networks and corrupt government officials. ———, "COMISAF's Initial Assessment," p 2-9 – 2-10.

Few Government members had their families in Afghanistan and there was evidence of capital flight.

Discussion with senior officer.

McChrystal, "COMISAF's Initial Assessment," p 1-2 – 1-3.


McChrystal, "COMISAF's Initial Assessment," p 1-1.

Cordesman and Lemieux, "The Afghan War: A Campaign Overview [online article]."

Dutton, Interview.


Ibid.

In stating this he was drawing extensively but not exclusively on the Iraq experience.


Ibid., p 2-15.

Ibid.

Consideration included debate on whether to use a counter insurgency or containment approach.

Chandrasekaran, "Civilian, Military Officials at Odds Over Resources Needed for Afghan Mission."

Cordesman and Lemieux, "The Afghan War: A Campaign Overview [online article]."


British Government statements in June-July 2010 have added to this pressure.

Ricks, "In Afghanistan, Petraeus will have difficulty replicating his Iraq success."


Ibid.

Dutton, Interview.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Cordesman and Lemieux, "The Afghan War: A Campaign Overview [metrics slides]."


The direct use of military weapons.


221 Ibid., p 2.
222 Dutton, Interview.
223 Lamb and Cinnamond, "Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan," p 3.
225 Ibid., p 6.
226 Dutton, Interview.
227 Of course he learned much about the integration of multiple effects whilst extirpating Al Qaeda in Iraq
228 Jones, Interview (by telephone).
230 Albeit this was far from easy given the delicacy surrounding any contact with senior Taliban figures.
232 Graeme Lamb, (former Deputy Commander MNF-I and Senior British Military Representative-Iraq 2006-7), Interview, (Tervuren, Belgium. 9 November 2009).
235 Cordesman and Lemieux, "The Afghan War: A Campaign Overview [online article]."
239 Ibid.
241 Cordesman and Lemieux, "The Afghan War: A Campaign Overview [online article]."
243 Ricks, "In Afghanistan, Petraeus will have difficulty replicating his Iraq success." Chris McGreel and Jon Boone, "McChrystal puts Obama in quandary: War commander ordered to the White House after mocking senior US figures in Rolling Stone magazine
245 Dutton, Interview.
246 Cordesman and Lemieux, "The Afghan War: A Campaign Overview [online article]." See also Craig Whitlock, "Gen McChrystal says conditions in Afghanistan war are no longer deteriorating," The Washington Post (online) 5 February 2010. --, "The War in Afghanistan: Bombs and baksheesh."
247 Dutton, Interview.
248 Cordesman and Lemieux, "The Afghan War: A Campaign Overview [online article]."
249 Ibid.
250 Christina Lamb, "More troops will just mean more targets," The Spectator 31 October 2009, p 15.
251 Discussion with senior officer.
252 Lamb, Interview.
253 --, "More troops will just mean more targets," p 14.


Ibid., p 7.


Cordesman and Lemieux, “The Afghan War: A Campaign Overview [online article].”

“House of Commons Defence Committee Seventh Report of Session 2009-10. The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace,” p 62.


Richards, “Email to author: Your MPhil Questions.”


One pundit wondered whether there could be counter insurgency without a “legitimate government whose authority can be asserted”. Sullivan, “A prisoner of his generals.”

Richards, “A firm foundation.”

Interview. See also ———, “A firm foundation.”

Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, p 159-160.


Ricks, “In Afghanistan, Petraeus will have difficulty replicating his Iraq success.”


“...The War in Afghanistan: Bombs and baksheesh.”

Dutton, Interview.

“McChrystal paves the way out.”


Cordesman and Lemieux, “The Afghan War: A Campaign Overview [online article].”

See also Lamb and Cinnamond, “Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan,” pp: p 3.

“House of Commons Defence Committee Seventh Report of Session 2009-10. The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace,” p 18.

Ibid., p Ev 47.


Lamb and Cinnamond, “Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan,” p 1.

Dutton, Interview.
Chapter 7 – Conclusions

“and he shall appear to the envious a scholar, a statesman and a soldier. ...He professes to have received no sinister measure from his judge...” William Shakespeare

1. Introduction

This thesis has discussed the problem of politico-military arrangements during contemporary peace and stability operations. Asking the question: “The General as Statesman?” the thesis has explored the professional need for Theatre Commanders and their subordinates to support viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations as typified by the UK military approach. It has examined the hypothesis that in these operations, beyond their specific security-related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors in order to sustain the political process and facilitate viable political outcomes. This requires soldiers at all levels to co-operate with other relevant actors, respond to political direction and shape military operations that will impact decisively on political outcomes in order to help generate political progress towards sustainable peace. Successive chapters which have reviewed the relevant doctrinal literature and then conducted case studies of operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, suggest that there is ample evidence to support the hypothesis and therefore that doctrine needs to be refreshed to reflect actual practice. Moreover further study is needed on the wider application of such a doctrine by the United Nations and the preparation of civilian leaders for politico military relationships. Here it is important to underline the distinction between the broad brush of civil-military interaction and the more specific politico-military interaction implicit in this hypothesis.

This chapter will first review the main arguments presented in the preceding chapters. It will then evaluate the material discussed in the case studies against the three tenets of the model identified in Chapter 2. These are: that primacy of the political or peace process is the dominant theme for coordination of politico-military activity; that military commanders at all levels must accept to some degree a role as a political actor; that civilian leadership must provide a politico-military framework and political guidance for the military, but if this wanting then military commanders need to act to fill the void, at least in terms of coordination. Having reviewed the case studies, the doctrinal implications which flow from these will be discussed. The final part of the chapter will present two questions that merit further study. First, how might the successful elements of the politico-military approach described in this thesis be applied to United Nations doctrine and practice? Second, how should potential senior civilian leaders in peace and stabilisation missions be prepared for their politico-military role? This will be followed by a summary of recommendations.
2. Review of the Main Arguments by Chapter

This work addresses operations which are commonly but not exclusively referred to as Peace Operations, Peace Support Operations (PSO), Stability Operations or Counter Insurgency (see glossary). Chapter 1 outlined the context for contemporary conflict which increasingly sees intra state conflict as the norm. Should the International Community, or part of it, decide to intervene, these complex “new wars”, which may become “hybrid threats” where “conventional, irregular, and criminal capabilities are integrated operationally and tactically at the lowest level possible”, demand a complex response. Accepting both the reality of this ever more challenging and uncertain type of conflict and the continuing likelihood of intervention, this thesis takes a “neo realist” stance and postulates the hypothesis that global intervention operations would be more efficient if military support was provided to developing political solutions as well as the more traditional military security and combat related missions. This builds on Clausewitz’s view that “War is not an independent phenomenon but the continuation of politics by different means…According to this point of view, there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it”. Therefore, as Rupert Smith suggested, the challenge is to establish military objectives within political objectives. This thesis develops this and proposes the use of the military instrument to ease the forward progression of political solutions.

Doctrine stresses the need to adopt “a comprehensive approach”, using a variety of actors to resolve underlying problems in conflict situations. This means “a broader multi-agency and, often, multinational response”, and the military force is part of this. This demands civil-military structures to oversee field operations and find answers beyond the security domain. Here, this thesis goes further and argues for improved cooperation at the politico-military nexus at the theatre level. The guiding idea is that it is better to move beyond stasis and to nurture what might be termed a “viable peace” and that this can only be done with active military support to the political peace process. Hence the question posted by the title of this thesis. Chapter 1 suggests that an improved politico-military approach would benefit not only the Western coalition which has conducted a number of recent interventions but also the United Nations and the broader community of regional organisations which have to contemplate stabilising conflicts in their own back yard. Finally Chapter 1 provided a framework for the remaining chapters. These would first address the relevant military doctrines of the UK, US, UN and NATO in order to establish what guidance exists and second examine case studies of the politico military arrangements following interventions in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan in order demonstrate how generals operated in practice and establish evidence for the hypothesis.

Chapter 2 examined the relevant aspects of Carl von Clausewitz’s work to establish the essentially political nature of war, how military means must relate to this reality and suggested that this remains relevant. A review of contemporary British doctrinal literature and its antecedents revealed that whilst there is much emphasis placed on the principle of political primacy and political solutions, there is no guidance provided to
commanders in terms of how to support such primacy, the political process or political outcomes. The chapter then suggested the three tenets of a model (already discussed above) to test against the case studies.

Chapter 3 addressed the issues surrounding multinational military approaches to the crucial politico-military relationship and support of the political process, particularly in the influential US, UN and NATO communities. This addresses two distinct imperatives. First is the requirement to sustain progress in state building practice by the US (and NATO) in the face of arguments to focus on war fighting (combat operations). Second, bearing in mind the global scope and scale of UN operations, the requirement to support the UN in building on progress in complex peacekeeping through integrated missions is particularly important. This might be assisted through harmonising doctrine and practice so that military support to peace building could better facilitate political outcomes. In common with the examination of UK doctrine, Chapter 3 found that increasingly useful US, UN and NATO doctrinal guidance exists although it does not adequately deal with the issues raised by the hypothesis. The doctrine reviewed variously implies such challenges for the general, yet does not provide sufficient guidance on specifically how he should support the political process, or how others should view this. Additional challenges will include what to do if civilian capacity is absent or incomplete; or if civilian political instructions are lacking, or over-complex? Turning from doctrine to contemporary field practice, these questions were examined in the succeeding case studies.

This thesis suggests that practice is ahead of doctrine and the case study chapters illustrate this. Chapter 4 analysed operations in Kosovo in 1999-2000 where a NATO military force was directly mandated to support a UN civilian mission under a United Nations Security Council Resolution. The SRSG was Bernard Kouchner, his Principal Deputy (PDSRSG) was Jock Covey and the military commanders were Lieutenant General Mike Jackson and later General Klaus Reinhardt. The case of Kosovo demonstrated significant and successful innovations in politico-military cooperation (which had been largely absent 4 years earlier in Bosnia). This helped to engender and sustain local political progress and wider peace building activities. This was relatively straightforward given the clear mandating arrangementsTs and minimal violence against the international community. Military commanders generally demonstrated a good understanding of the relationship between military actions and politically positive or negative effects. This suggests that there is an “acceptable political bandwidth for military activity” and that the mission leadership team need to judge the mix of military and political actions needed to keep the political process on track, accepting imperfections, and maintain positive progress towards eventual military exit. This also demands that senior civilian actors understand the military commander’s latent potential to support the peace process.

Chapter 5 illustrates the case of Iraq after a Coalition intervention in 2003. The periods covered are from 2003-2004 (Ambassador L Paul Bremmer and Lieutenant General
Ricardo Sanchez) and then 2007-2008 (Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus). Initially, despite incidences of successful practice, the Coalition Provisional Authority and its military counterpart CJTF-7, were on separate orbits with no unity of command or purpose. They lacked the ability to mesh together and understand or respond to the politico-military realities of the situation which the Coalition had unleashed in Iraq, and were unable to deliver security, reconstruction, or political progress in the face of mounting violence. This situation was compounded by the introduction of political policies which aggravated the economic and security situation and basically made Iraq ungovernable. The result was state breakdown, an extremely violent and virulent insurgency and near civil war.

In 2007 a revised people-centric state building approach (drawing on new doctrine as discussed in Chapter 3) was applied in Iraq. This saw a tight politico-military relationship at its core and increased civilian and military resources. What amounted to joint leadership by the US Ambassador and the military commander set the tone for politico-military cooperation at all levels. After a difficult start, the new approach increasingly delivered improved security and, with this, a positive impact on peoples’ lives. The result was to kick start political progress, change the political calculus for Iraqis and to provide at least the possibility of alternative path away from mass violence. The case of Iraq demonstrated, above all else, the value of collaborative planning, decision-making and action at the politico-military interface. Whilst the matter of unity of command remains cloudy, unity of purpose can be delivered through such a collaborative approach. With this and a holistic people-centric approach it is possible to deliver real political effects, notably the beginnings of a political settlement, and thus create momentum, delivered by the people themselves, rather than external actors. The military role in this facet of contemporary peace and stability operations is not yet adequately captured in doctrine.

Chapter 6 examined a stabilisation operation initiated following invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 as part of the “war on terror” in response to 9/11. The periods reviewed were the initial arrangements in 2001 (SRSG Lakdar Brahimi and Major General McColl), then 2006-2007 (SRSG Tom Koenigs and General David Richards) and 2009-2010 (SRSG Kai Eide (mostly) plus an assortment of other Ambassadors with varying degrees of influence and General Stanley McChrystal). Having started as a coalition of the willing, the International Security Assistance Force evolved into a NATO mission with a supportive UN mandate but a relatively weak UN presence. With strategic drift and a worsening insurgency in 2008, there was an increasing realisation that the International Community needed to engage in state building to bring Afghanistan into some form of stability. Yet this would be intensely difficult without adequate security and Afghan leadership. Also the medley of international actors in Afghanistan, which is notable for the variety of contributing nations and civilian agencies including the UN and EU, inevitably means a difficult coordination challenge. Here the NATO military commander, although not formally in charge of the whole effort, has taken on a key role
in designing a complex civil-military effort to deliver local political momentum. He was then faced with the role of “master integrator”.17

As with Iraq, the plan for Afghanistan demands significant external military effort to control the situation, whilst building Afghan security, and to enable civilian delivery of governance capacity, with economic and social measures. Together these efforts were designed to separate the insurgent from the people. This unfinished work underlines the requirement for politico-military cooperation and the need for reintegration of some insurgent elements which ultimately could support a political settlement in Afghanistan. At the time of writing the desired political effect of kick starting a political settlement has not been achieved. Hence, against a difficult backdrop of waning international patience, there remains a focus on holding the ring militarily, whilst building Afghan security capacity and also attempting to get governance, economic and social measures in place and so separating the insurgent from the people. This underscored the core requirement for successful politico-military cooperation and a process of political reconciliation in Afghanistan.

3. Application of the Model to the Case Studies

This section addresses each of the tenets of the model identified in Chapter 2 and considers the extent to which the experience of Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate their validity.

3.1. Tenet 1. Primacy of the political or peace process is the dominant theme for coordination of politico-military activity.

The “primacy of the peace process”,18 as voiced by the PDSRSG Jock Covey was the guiding idea within the politico-military coordination process in Kosovo during the period studied. Ensuring political primacy with, among other things, active military support was vital in taking the initial political strategy forward. This boiled down to “we support those who support [UNSCR] 1244, and we oppose those who obstruct it”.19 All actions by mission members were judged against this. This concept was fully embraced by the military commanders who fostered a healthy politico-military relationship with their civilian partners. Joint planning and execution led to significant steps to help kick start the political process, which itself was shrouded in strategic uncertainty given that the future status of Kosovo was unclear. In these circumstances actions by the military and political elements were carefully considered, together, in order to judge their effect on the political process. As a rule, actions which would not support the political effort were avoided. Commanders also worked to keep the show on the road and deliver their given mission which was essentially to provide a secure environment and provide practical support to the civilian mission. The latter was under-resourced and needed significant assistance simply in order to operate. This is not to suggest that all was rosy. At a more tactical level some KFOR contingents took a strict view on the primacy of military activities and these were not always coordinated directly to achieve a political effect. This
was particularly notable in the case of Mitrovica where there was no international consensus on a way ahead and hence the political primacy of UNMIK was not fully sustained by local French military commanders who operated under specific instructions from Paris.

Initially in Iraq there was, in practical terms, no local Coalition political primacy over Coalition military activity. there was no unity of command, unity of purpose was lacking and plans differed across the politico-military divide, particularly in terms of the timeline. In another sense political primacy was simply assumed by the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority. However the military commander did not see it as his role to support the political purpose: his focus was security and exit. Actions on one side of the political or military divide were not considered jointly. Worse, there were significant political actions with a negative security effect. Hence for example, a political de-ba’athification policy would see ministries crippled and also the disbandment of the armed forces had obvious security effects. But the absence of a real political-military discourse in theatre meant that such issues were only discussed after the fact. As an example, a political over-reaction to the deaths of US contractors in the city of Falluja drew US forces into a bloody confrontation which the overall military commander, Sanchez, did not attempt to prevent. This particular move would prevent the execution of previously planned population-centric security tactics by the local military commander. In sum, there was political primacy of a sort, but this did not result in beneficial political outcomes.

Lessons were learned from the initial experience and the situation improved over time. A new “surge” strategy in 2007 saw the military commander, General David Petraeus, explicitly subordinate himself to the US Ambassador Ryan Crocker. The military component remained the dominant instrument for planning and execution at all levels; although, intellectual and political primacy remained with the political side. This combination enabled collaborative planning, execution and decision making at all levels. Military and other efforts were judged first against their political effect. This was not without its difficulties but the result was to deliver a population centric politico-military strategy for the Coalition in Iraq that explicitly sought to kick start the Iraqi political process with a view to engendering confidence and eventual reconciliation. This strategy of protecting the population would avoid civil war, provide breathing space for capacity building, reconstruction and, ultimately, resolution of some of the fundamental political issues facing Iraq.

In Afghanistan, the situation was different. There was no obvious politico-military alignment, nor was policy at the strategic, operational execution, and tactical levels fully aligned. Difficulties with the security situation meant that the external focus was invariably on military attempts to gain the upper hand rather than the political process. Nevertheless both General Richards and General McChrystal saw the imperative to enable coordinating activity which would help get the political process moving. McChrystal’s campaign design further shifted the effort to a holistic approach. This was
demanding of political involvement and was intended to deliver human security through military, governance and economic effects. It was designed to protect the people and was an indirect attempt to kick start the political process. Another politically related facet was ISAF’s increasing involvement in activities to reintegrate some members of the Taliban using government sponsored programmes. Again this would lead to a political effect.

Military commanders in the field at the theatre level operate in the cockpit of political and practical reality. They understand that political outcomes are needed to generate some form of strategic success; therefore they instinctively tend to support the political process even if this implies making assumptions, taking risk or deviating from a strict interpretation of instructions. Analysis of the application of the “primacy of the political or peace process” suggests that it is a practical approach to shaping the politico-military relationship, and through this, supporting political outcomes. However it is not necessarily easy to deliver unless specifically mandated or where a mutual understanding exists between senior civilian and military figures in theatre. Unsurprisingly it is more difficult where mandating arrangements and the absence of resources leave a situation which is unclear; or where not all troop contributing nations wish to comply with the common theme. Whilst the relevant political authorities should address these mandating problems, the unresolved issues need to be accepted as an operating reality for military commanders and doctrine should address this reality.

3.2. Tenet 2. Military commanders at all levels must accept to some degree a role as a political actor and must support the political process. This is a professional imperative.

Clausewitz suggested that the commander in chief should become a member of the cabinet in order that he could understand state policy, (not direct it), and thus organise his military operations accordingly. The title of this thesis suggests that the contemporary general may have a similar role as statesman, at least in terms of the theatre he commands.

In Kosovo it is clear that both commanders during the period reviewed saw that they had a political role and the importance of sustaining the political process. Jackson in particular was well aware that he was under global attention and that failure would have significant human consequences. He was able to influence political will and secure support at home and in the wider international community. KFOR had direct access to many of the local political players and was deeply involved in nurturing the political process. Locally both Jackson and Reinhardt were influential in the political scene, particularly helping to guide the victorious KLA away from violence and also reassuring the minority Serb population. Their contacts with local interlocutors and efforts to assist the people on both sides of the ethnic divide were important. Notably KFOR helped to contain the militant elements of the KLA and to bring the Serbs to the political table. This peace building activity went beyond the UN Security Council Mandate and involved working on both Albanians and Serbs in the political dimension. At a level below the
theatre commander in Kosovo, the picture was patchier. Some tactical commanders displayed considerable political acumen and personally helped to move the political process forward. Others followed a more traditional military-security rather than a politico-military paradigm and their efforts did little to support the political process, indeed there were reverses. Here caveats imposed by troop contributing capitals had a significantly negative influence which proved impossible for the Theatre Commander to resolve.

In Iraq, the initial period examined saw a commander, Sanchez, who was disinterested in a political role, preferring to immerse himself in military tactics. Whereas, during the second period, Petraeus was an effective political actor. Sanchez had seen politico-military realities before (for example in Kosovo) yet he had a poor relationship with Bremer, his political boss, who in turn was not adept at grasping politico-military issues. Sanchez’s focus on war fighting and Bremer’s disinclination to consult meant that politico-military issues were not seen as such. Hence decision making was flawed and this had both security and political implications. Beyond the mechanics of establishing constitutional arrangements, the delivery of a political settlement did not progress.

Later it is clear that Petraeus was an important political actor, fully participating in the political process; he understood state policy on three levels, in terms of the US, the Coalition, and the Iraqis. Whilst he was entirely self effacing and deferential to all political authorities, especially his “political wing man”, Ambassador Crocker, Petraeus took on the mantra of a statesman. This was particularly notable with his skilful advocacy regarding military issues in order to sustain the political consensus and obtain the resources he needed back in Washington DC and from the wider coalition. A recent newspaper editorial suggested that “The skill of [Petraeus] is to use his reputation as a military tactician to conceal political manoeuvres”. Although generally sticking to military matters, he was also fully involved in the specifics of influencing the local political process in Iraq. Petraeus’s correspondence revealed the depth of the politico-military nature of the campaign and the critical military role in enabling local political progress towards a political settlement for Iraq. In these circumstances it seems that Crocker and Petraeus together carried the mantle of political primacy - given that political decisions were effectively taken together. Here Clausewitz would probably have approved.

In Afghanistan. Generals Richards and McChrystal found themselves filling a political void (as did McColl at the outset). Political primacy could only be indirectly supported given the absence of a truly empowered pro-consul figure, the melange of international actors in Kabul, along with the questionable authority of Karzai, the President of Afghanistan. Here Richards realised that he needed to take on a political role in order to galvanise the political process in the counter insurgency campaign. He was instrumental, in establishing coordination structures (see section 3.3 below), beyond this he engaged Afghanistan’s neighbour Pakistan to initiate dialogue over political issues. Later Richards commented that “in certain phases of a conflict, a soldier may be best
suited to playing the lead role. Often only he has the organisational strength to pull the issues and key players together.”

McChrystal, although in the end found wanting in terms of his handling of the US Administration, whose trust he undermined, perhaps in frustration, was generally an adept and skilful advocate for the totality of the politico-military efforts needed. Whether these could be delivered in time to bring Afghanistan to some state of stability remains a moot point. Irrespective of McChrystal’s suitability for an essentially political role, he quickly delivered a frank and realistic assessment of the situation and a pragmatic, nuanced civil-military plan. He saw that the narrow military task could not be achieved without setting the necessary political and economic conditions, and taking risks to do so. Hence his campaign design was inherently political, “our every action must help secure mobilise and support the Afghan people and their government to defeat the insurgency”. Whilst he was undoubtedly energetic, McChrystal was of course not in charge of the overall effort to execute the plan. This meant that he, and his deputy, had to be active as “military diplomats” behind the scenes to defuse political difficulties amongst the international actors and with the government in Kabul in order to maintain momentum.

So what? The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the contemporary Theatre Commander is definitely a political actor who can deliver political effects in theatre and at home. What Jackson, Reinhardt, McColl, Richards, Petraeus and McCrystal did was to nurture something febrile. This was necessary because they were deployed in difficult political and military circumstances and they alone had the power to produce a result amid ambiguity. Attempting to escape this reality or removing the military from the political debate would only tend to delay political progress and, to take up Rupert Smith’s argument, reduce the utility of the forces deployed. Accepting a role as a political actor has to be seen as a professional imperative. Theatre Commanders need a highly nuanced understanding of political factors influencing the intervening force, the local situation and the possible solutions. They also need to design their operations specifically to help achieve those political solutions and they need to be active advocates and diplomats to ensure progress and coordination. The commander may or may not have the attributes of a statesman but he definitely needs a seat at the cabinet table in theatre and he should be used to support and influence the political process.

3.3. Tenet 3. A politico-military framework is needed to enable coordination to secure political ends. If this is missing then military commanders need to act to fill the void, at least in terms of coordination.

The requirement for politico-military synergy, for the commander to be in the political mind, is clear as argued above. This mitigates for the relationship with the senior civilian partner, to be seen as fundamentally political. This suggests that the cooperative model at this level should be described as a politico-military rather than the more usual civil-military relationship. The overall requirement for a comprehensive approach, to draw all
actors together, in response to contemporary conflict also seems incontrovertible. In an ideal world, the comprehensive approach (or integrated) would be a reality and this would enable the narrower focus on the politico-military decision making core as argued by this thesis. However, invariably there are difficulties over mandating and practical issues which mean that this may not be the case. Nevertheless the military commander needs to find a path through this if he is to secure strategic success.

The keys to successful politico-military coordination in Kosovo were, first, the empowering mandate which required both the UN and NATO to cooperate with each other, and second, the fact that many of the key personalities knew each other from earlier operations in Bosnia and had learned from the difficulties encountered there. The mandate enabled joint planning and execution of operations to rapidly become a reality, albeit the military side needed to provide planning capabilities to assist the under-resourced civilian mission. A truly cooperative approach was adopted and when the military or political side needed the advice or guidance of the other, this was immediately available. Here there was no need for commanders to attempt to fill a void and the politico-military relationship remained in a good state of health.

In Iraq the situation in 2003-2004 was different and more difficult. Initially the Coalition did not have a clear political aim. The civilian side, as Andrew Rathmell put it, only “sporadically acknowledged the causal linkages between security and…political and economic reforms”. Although attempting a state building effort, which needed both peace building and security measures, there was no unified civil military approach and the civilian side were unable to provide consistent political direction. On the military side, despite the fact that, “90% of insurgency is political, social, economic and ideological”, the US military planners in Baghdad remained focussed on combat operations and exit. Unable to see the broader political context or advise the political side on the security effects of political decisions, they could not successfully cooperate in order to coordinate politico-military action. Rather, the security problem was worsened by the uncoordinated political decisions and military actions. For the US military, state building or counterinsurgency doctrine had not been seriously taught since Vietnam. Hence, although there were some notable exceptions, neither the body of the US military nor most of its leadership saw “shaping…economic and political conditions” or any form of peace building as part of the military role.

Later, in 2007-2008, following the decision to conduct a politico-military surge in an attempt to stabilise the situation, the senior US diplomat and soldier chosen for the task forged a strong working partnership and required their subordinates to follow suit. This was not without difficulty or strain at the lower levels; but it enabled joint planning and action. The theatre level planning team was completely combined and the military truly did support the political effort; in turn coalition political moves were synchronised with military action. On occasion, particularly at the local level, the military forces were the face of the political effort. This approach, which included the “kinetic” as well as the softer side of the US military, all designed to protect the population, delivered tangible
improvements to the security situation and hence provided political space for resolution and progress towards a political settlement. It was helped by a fortuitous accommodation with both Sunni tribes and Shia militia and it engendered a degree of Iraqi political reconciliation and some economic progress. Iraqis were slowly moving to a position where confrontation could be conducted without recourse to violence.

Throughout the period since 2001 in Kabul, HQ ISAF has been the dominant organisation, military or civilian because it had the military power, new ideas and the ability to implement them. It is clear that both Richards and McChrystal worked to improve unity of effort and influence the political process. General Richards, facing a chaotic political situation, was instrumental in advocating and establishing the Policy Action Group, a political structure intended to generate political momentum in Afghanistan to address the worsening insurgency. This was in effect a war cabinet with a supporting committee system designed to improve coordination and unity of effort. In the field, Richards’s Afghan Development Zone Concept, a version of the ink spot strategy, was also designed to provide prioritisation and coordination of military and civilian security, governance and economic effects to deliver a political effect.

Later General McChrystal would face the continuing challenge of delivering the military part of a comprehensive counter insurgency solution whilst operating with a fissiparous set of international political actors and a pressurised local partner who had questionable legitimacy. McChrystal became the “master integrator” but he did not overtly seek to become a “Templar” figure instead, respecting civilian political primacy, he took his place in the weekly cabal of international Ambassadors with the SRSG. This naturally needed continuous political and diplomatic interaction and sadly this was not helped by the incoherent political guidance provided by the international community. No one ambassador predominated and McChrystal essentially became the chief advisor to Karzai. But beyond coordination, both Richards and McChrystal both influenced the political process itself, in order to deliver political progress towards reconciliation and stability just as Jackson and Reinhardt had done in Kosovo and Petraeus in Iraq.

So what? The evidence analysed in this thesis suggests that achieving close politico-military coordination is a necessary prerequisite to achieving political momentum towards some form of political settlement. Ideally coordination arrangements should be mandated before intervention. However practice suggests that this will not always be the case, thus theatre commanders and their political counterparts may have to navigate uncertain waters in order to deliver unity of purpose at the least. Care is clearly needed here in managing an ambiguous relationship and the military commander must know when to push and when to step back. It would be helpful if doctrinal guidance were provided for these circumstances.
4. Four Themes for Revised Doctrine

It is clear from the material presented above that doctrine is not yet honest\textsuperscript{36} or up to date on the challenges faced by contemporary commanders. Nor is it yet a civil-military product.\textsuperscript{37} This is important given the likelihood that some interventions may be needed in future and the danger that politicians may shy away from these given the prospect of failure.\textsuperscript{38} With some exceptions, notably work produced by the UN and also by the US Institute of Peace (see Chapter 3), the available doctrinal guidance remains distinctly military against a distinctly politico-military challenge. Much has been made of achieving unity of command. This may be a laudable aim but is realistically only likely to be possible for single nation or Coalitions with small numbers of participants. In the more likely case involving wide multinational actor participation, the operational art will revolve around achieving unity of purpose through a shared vision and integrating multiple strands of activity. Achieving this will need dynamic activity and demand diplomatic skills, and in all probability statesman-like behaviour, of senior soldiers and senior civilians. The following paragraphs identify four themes which need to be developed in updated Western doctrine for peace, stability and counter insurgency operations. These encompass: explaining the central importance of the political process in securing strategic outcomes; explaining the military role in supporting the political process; elaborating the politico-military relationship; and providing candid guidance to the commander on the difficulties to be expected if politico-military and coordination arrangements are incoherent. Taken together, the implications of these proposed doctrinal changes are profound. They imply that the military operational level, as currently understood, would be redundant. Equally a purely military strategy is no longer relevant.\textsuperscript{39}

4.1. Explain the central importance of the political process in securing strategic outcomes

British doctrine for stability operations explains the elements of a stable state\textsuperscript{40} (see Chapter 2) and identifies the requirement for a political settlement as part of this. Practice on recent operations suggests that this is understood. However the available doctrine does not really explain the central importance of the political process, or how commanders need to become involved in this to help enable progress. The political settlement theme is taken up by emerging US military doctrine\textsuperscript{41} although this remains equivocal. Future doctrine needs to be clear that the primacy of the political or peace process is a key organising principle for the conduct of peace support and stability operations and that the purpose of this is, ultimately, to deliver a political settlement.

4.2. Explain the military role in supporting the political process

Whilst perhaps not invariably a “statesman” in the sense suggested by Clausewitz, the Theatre Commander is an important political actor in his own right and should be used as a key facilitator for the overall politico-military campaign which should include
supporting the political process. Understanding and acting on political requirements remains the professional imperative for commanders. In practical terms the application of military capacity to facilitate the political process and political outcomes is key. Assuming that adequate military means are available, there may be no better way to influence military mission success in post conflict environments.

Here the military can help because, as General Richards explained to the author, they “have a unique understanding of this business and have developed campaign planning tools that allow solid analysis to lead to coherent multi-dimensional plans. Further they are trained and accustomed to taking timely decisions, and are not focused primarily on the processing and analysing of information”. Some commentators have hinted that the “soldier-diplomat” may be attempting too much here, but as General Dutton suggested, “those of us who are actually involved in doing things instead of commenting on them, have to move forward. We are where we are.”

4.3. Elaborate the politico-military relationship as the inner core of the comprehensive approach

This thesis examines the idea of the comprehensive approach and suggests that its inner core should be a politico-military relationship in theatre. Nevertheless at this locus, as McCuen previously pointed out, “Unity of effort is however extremely difficult to achieve because it represents the fusion of civil and military functions to fight battles which have primarily political objectives...All the political, economic, psychological and military means must be marshalled as weapons under centralized co-ordination and direction”.

In order to achieve this, the ideal is to adopt collaborative planning and decision making as exemplified by Crocker and Petraeus in Iraq. At interview General Rupert Smith stressed the importance of a level where politics as a whole is fused, including the locals. He explained that this is the theatre, not operational level. Commanding at this level is best through “partnerships” (using the law firm analogy). Leaders need a shared vision of the outcome and achieving it. So in a law firm the role of the managing partner is in sequencing and supporting activities rather than giving orders. Individual players need only be coordinated to do their role as part of a partnership (for example a plumber’s role in building a house). This is economical, however the difficulty is making it work in a campaign because contributions are not from a single source politically. Also, because of national constrains you cannot disaggregate authority and responsibility. Therefore small fiefdoms become inevitable.

Lieutenant Colonel David Couzens, an experienced inter agency planner and doctrine writer, stated that: “you cannot plan collaboratively. You have to get together to work out who or what the problem is (counter insurgency, counter terror, development) and then get a common understanding, even over what your differences are. Otherwise you go forward in a haphazard incoherent way”. Colonel Nick Lindley, a former
assistant to the ISAF Deputy Commander, suggested a further problem for the collaborative planner. “It takes time to develop an understanding. If you kick a ball at several others they go everywhere. So the campaign doesn't work in normal sequenced way, therefore campaign objectives need to be broad because you need time to understand how to design these”. These are interactively complex or wicked problems and the understanding of their complexity needs to extend to the local level.

A recent successful example of collaborative planning and decision making at the tactical level was provided by the final UK Commander of the Multi-National Division South East in Iraq. At interview Major General Andy Salmon commented that he saw the need to understand and work with his political partners to further the political process. His planning was iterative and it was important that it was open and transparent. This work became the basis of a “joint interagency approach” which harnessed military processes to deliver all activities. All decisions were taken by a team of three: the General, the Consul General and the Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader, no one had primacy. That said, the “political ellipse had to be predominant, so it became a question of enabling the Consul General”.

For the future, Salmon saw the need for the development of hybrid multi-agency skills and pointed out the potential problem with existing military chains of command given the requirement for an inter agency approach. Again, the notion of the military operational level is now in question.

4.4. Provide candid guidance to the commander on the difficulties to be expected if politico-military and coordination arrangements are incoherent.

The case studies have shown that the International Community does not always fully understand the politico-military relationship or create the necessary structures and processes to facilitate it. Doctrine needs to advise the military commander on the likely situation and requirement for extemporisation in the absence of adequate political arrangements or civilian capacity. It is likely that there will be three scenarios. First, a multinational operation with mandated and effective politico-military arrangements. Second a single nation or small coalition operation where politico-military cooperation is delivered by either mandating or cooperation in the field. Finally, and more likely, a multinational operation, with extensive international actor participation, but without unity of command or purpose over politico-military coordination.

This last scenario may leave the military commander facing a political void, or at best uncertainty. As General Dutton commented at interview, the international community needs “a proper set of policies standards and doctrines, but in the shorter term you do your best in a very imperfect situation…although the military should not lead, if no one else is prepared to you should crack on”. In these circumstances the commander will need to establish coordination mechanisms and derive an “acceptable political bandwidth for military activity” against which to judge his actions against their potential to secure progress towards political settlement. A number of factors need to be kept in balance if
there is to be productive military activity within a politico-military context. These include: coalition military; external political; local political and local military.

As Brigadier Phil Jones, the former military adviser to UNAMA, explained, “doctrine is not yet honest about the fact that the military must be ready to see and fill the vacuum, for example with construction work or even in the political domain”.56 Here David Galula’s observation springs to mind, "to confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be done, and nobody else is available to undertake them, would be senseless [although ideally] it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians".57 This situation also implies the need for a “primary integrator”,58 who is proactive and takes responsibility for building the team but is not its leader.

Notwithstanding the above, any temptation to allow the military force to become overweening and take charge politically must be strictly avoided. Political and intellectual primacy must remain with the civilian side. Albeit guidance remains absent on the civilian side on how to understand the military component as a political actor beyond simply being an instrument of state power. Through doctrine civilian leaders should be helped to understand what can be achieved and also the responsibilities and imperatives that are important to military commanders. Some decisions, such as over force protection or the precise application of force, remain for the military commander alone. Enhancing doctrine to include this would help to address the absence of unity of command and the difficulties of achieving unity of effort.59 Two further issues merit further study. The first is the application of the approach described above to UN operations and the second is to examine the preparation of potential senior civilian leaders for the politico-military aspects of their role.

5. Proposals for Further Study

5.1. How might the successful elements of the politico-military approach described in this thesis be applied to United Nations doctrine and practice?

The global scope and scale of UN operations indicates that the UN should be supported to further improve doctrine for complex peacekeeping missions and also those where the UN acts alongside coalition forces. The UN’s role may become increasingly relevant in the multi-polar world as explained in Chapter 3. The UN possesses extensive doctrine on complex peace operations which is, helpfully, written from a largely civilian perspective. What this doctrine lacks, however, is a clear connection between the peace building efforts of civilians and the role that military leaders can play as demonstrated in this thesis. Therefore it is suggested that further study is needed on harmonising UN and other contemporary doctrines to ensure that the best available doctrinal practice supports the UN’s own state building and peace building activities and also to better deliver a comprehensive politico-military approach for those circumstances where the UN operates with coalition or other partners.
5.2. How should potential senior civilian leaders in peace and stabilisation missions be prepared for their politico-military role?

This thesis has demonstrated some excellent examples of civilian politico-military leadership but also others where the point was completely missed. Bearing in mind the absence of civilian doctrine for contemporary operations and the tendency for some civilian leaders to be unprepared for the politico-military aspects of their role, it is suggested that further study is now needed on how to better prepare them for this. Here mention should also be made of host nation leaders who increasingly will have to take on decision making roles in the mature stages of stabilisation operations.

6. Recommendations

The following recommendations are offered.

6.1. Western doctrine for peace, stability and counter insurgency operations needs to be updated to:

6.1.1. Explain the central importance of the political process in securing strategic outcomes.

6.1.2. Explain the military role in supporting the political process.

6.1.3. Elaborate the politico-military relationship as the inner core of the comprehensive approach.

6.1.4. Provide candid guidance to the commander on the difficulties to be expected if politico-military and coordination arrangements are incoherent.

6.2. Further study should be conducted to answer the following questions:

6.2.1. How might the successful elements of the politico-military approach described in this thesis be applied to United Nations doctrine and practice?

6.2.2. How should potential senior civilian leaders in peace and stabilisation missions be prepared for their politico-military role?
1 Measure for Measure Act III, Scene II.
5 For a US definition see --, "FM 3-07 Stability Operations," (Headquarters Department of the US Army. October 2008), p vi. See also the more recent UK publication, which does not define stability operations but suggests: security governance and development as overlapping areas of progress required for success. - - UK MOD, "UK Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (JDP 3-40) Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution " (2009), p 2-18.
6 - - UK MOD, "Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines)," (2001), Annex A to Parts 1 and 2 p A-2.
16 Albeit as explained in Chapter 3, the UN Secretariat was not entirely comfortable with this type of mission and the precedent it suggested.
17 Phil Jones, Brigadier (former Military Advisor to SRSG UNAMA Jun 06 - Jul 07), Interview (by telephone), (19 February 2010).
Covey, Dziedzic, and Hawley, eds., *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation*, p 78-79.

Andrew Rathmell, Dr., (former CPA Strategic Planner 2003-4, member of MNF-I Joint Strategy Assessment Team Spring 2007), Interview, (Shrivenham, UK. 18 June 2010).


Clausewitz, *On War*, p 606. See also chapter 2.


One pundit wondered whether there could be counter insurgency without a "legitimate government whose authority can be asserted". Andrew Sullivan, "A prisoner of his generals," *The Sunday Times* 27 June 2010.


David Richards, Lt Gen, "Email to author: Your MPhil Questions," (6 August 2007).


James Dutton, Lieutenant General. (former Deputy Commander ISAF November 2008 - December 2009), Interview, (Portsmouth, UK. 2 March 2010).


Jones, "Interview (by telephone)."


"British Senior Officer Briefing at Brussels," (May 2008).

Drawing on a discussion with Professor Chris Bellamy at Cranfield University, Shrivenham, UK on 31 March 2010.


"Joint Publication 3-07 Stability Operations (Final Coordination Draft)," (US Joint Chiefs of Staff. 22 April 2010), p 1-14.

Richards, "Email to author: Your MPhil Questions."

Burke, "Leaving the civilians behind: The "soldier-diplomat" in Afghanistan and Iraq".

Dutton, Interview.

See Chapter 2 which suggested a comprehensive approach at a number of levels. First, both within and between capitals of involved states. Second within and between Multilateral institutions. Third, and where the effect is delivered, between actors deployed in theatre. The problem is that the first two naturally impinge on the last one.


47 General Sir Rupert Smith, Interview, (Brussels, Belgium. 28 October 2009).
48 David Cousens, Lt Col. (former member Strategic Advisory Group HQ ISAF Jun-Dec 2008. MOD DCDC expert on integrated doctrine), Interview, (Shrivenham. 8 July 2010).
49 Nick Lindley, Col. (former MA to DCOM ISAF Jun-Dec 2008. MOD DCDC Leader for Functional Doctrine), Interview, (Shrivenham. 8 July 2010).
52 Andrew Salmon,. (Major General - former Commander Multi-National Division South East, Iraq August 2008 - May 2009), Interview (by telephone), (4 June 2010).
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Dutton, Interview. He went on to state that this should be without political instructions if need be because these tend to be slow in coming.
56 Jones, Interview (by telephone).
58 Jones, Interview (by telephone).
Bibliography

1. Primary Sources

Interviews


Jones, Phil, Brigadier (former Military Advisor to SRSG UNAMA Jun 06 - Jul 07). (By telephone), 19 February 2010.

Lamb, Graeme, Lieutenant General, (former Deputy Commander MNF-I and Senior British Military Representative-Iraq 2006-7). Tervuren, Belgium, 9 November 2009.


Salmon, Andrew, Major General, (Former Commander Multi-National Division South East, Iraq August 2008 - May 2009). (By telephone), 4 June 2010.


Discussions With Experts and Briefings Received


Discussion with senior UN official in UN Headquarters New York, USA, 2 June 2005.


King, Anthony, Professor. Telephone discussion with author, 4 March 2010.

Wilson, David, Lieutenant Colonel, (Former Kosovar Liaison Officer in OSCE Mission in Kosovo, (OMIK)). Discussion with author at Worthydown, UK, 12 July 2001.


Senior Officer Briefing at NATO HQ Brussels. February 2007.


Public Hearings


Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Iraq: The Crocker-Petraeus Report, One Hundred Tenth Congress First Session, September 11 2007.


The Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot). *Notes provided by Lieutenant General (Retired) Sir Freddie Viggers to The Iraq Enquiry*, 8 December 2009.


United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. *The Situation in Iraq and Progress Made By the Government of Iraq in Meeting Benchmarks and Achieving Reconciliation*, One Hundred Tenth Congress Second Session, April 8, 9, and 10, 2008.

The Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot). *Statement by Ambassador Bremer provided to The Iraq Enquiry*, 18 May 2010.

House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services *The Status of the War and Political Developments in Iraq*, One Hundred Tenth Congress Second Session, April 9 2008.

**Personal Communications**

Hawley, Len, Email to author "Re:Request for information on CPA-CJTF-7 Relationship". 28 June 2010.

Jones, Phil, Brigadier (former Military Advisor to SRSG UNAMA Jun 06 - Jul 07). Email to author: "Afghanistan Interview Follow Up." 1 March 2010.

Rathmell, Andrew, Dr,. (former CPA Strategic Planner 2003-4, member of MNF-I Joint Strategy Assessment Team Spring 2007). Email to author. 21 June 2010.

Richards, David, Lieutenant General, Email to author: "Your MPhil Questions." 6 August 2007.


Wilson, David, Lt Col, former Kosovar Liaison Officer in OSCE Mission in Kosovo, (OMIK). Email to author. 21 February 2000.

Unpublished Papers

--. "NATO Publication AJP 3.4.4 Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Ratification Draft 2) Unpublished.", 2010.


--. "Notes on Anglo/Indian PSO Seminar at UK JDCC (authors copy)." 13/14 March 2001.


———. "Transcript of interview by Len Hawley of Jock Covey former Principal Deputy SRSG Kosovo, 1999-2001. (Author’s copy)." San Francisco, USA 6 November 2002.


Richards, David, "Colonel Blimp Really is Dead - ACGS Oxford Union Speech [author's copy]." 4 November 2003.


Doctrine Publications and Other Government Documents

-- "Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’).": HQ ISAF and Interim Administration of Afghanistan [Held in the UK National Archive online], 31 December 2001.


-- "A/60/696. Overview of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations: budget performance for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 and budget


———. "Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1 De-Ba`athification of Iraqi Society." Coalition Provisional Authority, 16 May 2003.

———. "Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2 Dissolution of Entities." Coalition Provisional Authority, 23 May 2003.


———. "Defence internal brief. Deployment of UK forces to Afghanistan." UK MOD, 26 January 2006.


———. "Joint Publication 3-07 Stability Operations (Final Coordination Draft)." US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 April 2010.


——. "Operation Telic – RM Rolling Brief (3) As At 121030AApr03, DRM/OD1/03D/04/15 03 (Author’s copy)", 12 April 2003.


———. "Written Ministerial Statements. Iraq. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Jack Straw)." Hansard House of Commons (on line), 7 January 2003.


- UK MOD. "Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines)." 2001.


———. "Notes on Imperial Policing." 1934.


Rumsey, Brigadier LC. "Letter for Maj Gen P St Clair Ford re lecture at Staff College." Director of Operations Staff, Bluff Road, Kuala Lumpur, Federation of Malaya [held in JSCSC library], 27 July 1957.


Conference Papers


Hutton, John. "NATO at 60: Towards a new Strategic Concept (Speech by UK Defence Secretary) ", Wilton Park, 15 January 2009.

2. Secondary Sources

Books


Dziedzic, Michael, and Benjamin Lovelock. "An Evolving 'Post-Conflict' Role for the Military: Providing a Secure Environment and Supporting the Rule of Law." In


**PhD Theses and Dissertations**


Reports and Monographs


Bellamy, Christopher. "Dissertation Writing and Presentation." Cranfield University, undated.


———. "Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Removing Saddam Hussein by Force." In Operation Iraqi Freedom Key Decisions Monograph Series edited by
John R. Martin: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, February 2010.


Journal Articles


Adams, Thomas K. "LIC (Low Intensity Clausewitz)." Small Wars & Insurgencies 1, no. 3 (1990): 266-275.


Denaro, A. G. "Warrior or worrier: Is the British army producing the right man to command its troops on operations?" The RUSI Journal 140, no. 3 (1995): 37-42.


Electronic Articles


**Newspaper Articles**


Cockburn, Patrick "Al-Sadr ceasefire allows troops to enter Shia slum." The Independent (online), 13 May 2008.

——. "Sadr calls six-month ceasefire to prevent civil war." The Independent (online), 30 August 2007.

Cornwell, Rupert. "This country can't resist a man in uniform." The Independent on Sunday, 27 June 2010, 36.


Fadel, Leila. "Iraq's Supreme Court ratifies election results." Washington Post (online), 1 June 2010.


Harnden, Toby, and Damien McElroy. "Gen David Petraeus to review 'courageous restraint'." *Telegraph (on line)*, 24 June 2010.


Jenkins, Simon. "By jingo, our brave boys are off to tame the Afghan. And they'll fail." *Sunday Times*, 29 January 2006, 16.

———. "Fall back, men, Afghanistan is a nasty war we can never win." *Sunday Times*, 3 February 2008, 16.

Keegan, John. "Like it or not, America is becoming an imperial power" *Telegraph (on line)*, 13 Nov 2003.


Manyon, Julian "We don't do Mountains." *The Spectator*, 6 April 2002.


Ricks, Thomas. E. "In Afghanistan, Petraeus will have difficulty replicating his Iraq success." *Washington Post (online)*, 27 June 2010.


Whitlock, Craig. "Gen McChrystal says conditions in Afghanistan war are no longer deteriorating." *The Washington Post (online)*, 5 February 2010.


Web Pages


Appendix 1 - Glossary

Complex Emergency

UN OCHA sees a complex emergency as, “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme”.¹ This seems to centre the problem entirely on the humanitarian issue and restricts the available response actors to the UN family alone. A broader definition might be that used by NATO, “A complex, multi-party, intra-state conflict resulting in a humanitarian disaster which might constitute multi-dimensional risks or threats to regional and international security. Frequently within such conflicts, state institutions collapse, law and order break down, banditry and chaos prevail and portions of the civilian population migrate. Therefore international activities to restore peace could include political, diplomatic, economic, military and humanitarian efforts and the use of information to promote national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government”.²

Counter Insurgency (often referred to as COIN)

UK doctrine describes Counter Insurgency as ‘Those military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, while addressing the root causes’.³ US doctrine suggests “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency”.⁴ Emerging NATO doctrine brings these together and suggests that “COIN is defined as the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances”.⁵

Earlier UK doctrine suggested that counter insurgency was “a generic term to describe the operations which forces may have to undertake when maintaining and restoring law and order in support of an established government. These operations will have to counter threats posed by civil disturbances, terrorism and organized insurgency, irrespective of whether they are nationalist, communist or racially inspired, or directed from within or outside the state concerned.”⁶

Failed State

Mary Kaldor observes that Madeleine Albright, the former US Secretary of State, has used the term failed states to describe countries with weak or non-existent central authority. Kaldor also points out Jeffrey Herbst’s argument that many African States never enjoyed state sovereignty in the modern sense – that is, “unquestioned physical control over the defined territory, but also an administrative presence throughout the country and the allegiance of the population to the idea of the state”.⁷ However these definitions lack mention of the monopoly of violence and the provision of services which seem to be key attributes of successful states. Further analytical granularity, using social, economic and political indicators, is provided by The Fund For Peace
which maintains an index of failed and failing states. Their approach is to suggest that “a state that is failing has several attributes. One of the most common is the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other attributes of state failure include the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community. The 12 indicators cover a wide range of state failure risk elements such as extensive corruption and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination, severe demographic pressures, brain drain, and environmental decay. States can fail at varying rates through explosion, implosion, erosion, or invasion over different time periods”.

Force Protection

“Force Protection (FP) aims to conserve the fighting potential of the deployed force by countering the wider threat to all its elements from adversary, natural and human hazards, and fratricide”. This challenge has increasingly become a paradox in intervention operations where a trade off has to be made between the absolute requirements of force protection and the requirement to operate “amongst the people”.

Insurgency

UK doctrine *Countering Insurgency* offers the following definition, ‘An organised, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority’. The US military definition is “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” Emerging NATO doctrine suggests: “The actions of an organised, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion”. Interestingly, this draft NATO definition does not situate insurgency within a recognised state.

Earlier UK counter insurgency doctrine suggested, “…[T]he actions of a minority group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change”.

Irregular Activity

Emerging NATO doctrine suggests that “Irregular activity is defined as the use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority.”
Peace Operation

Originally (in 1994), a US “umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities; activities with predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and two complementary, predominately military, activities (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement)”. This was broadly intended to cover similar ground as the UK’s peace support operations (below). It is no longer in mainstream use by the US military but remains in use elsewhere as a catch all term. The Stimson Centre’s current interpretation is helpful and captures the core element of activities likely to be undertaken by the United Nations, with or without partners. “Peace operations comprise peacekeeping – the provision of temporary postconflict security by internationally mandated forces – and peacebuilding – those efforts undertaken by the international community to help a war-torn society create a self-sustaining peace”.17

Peace Support Operation

This study will apply the peace support operation definition used in the current UK doctrine, “The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations”, which in turn applies the NATO definition: “An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations”.18 The ensuing definitions of the other activities listed are as shown below.

“Conflict Prevention. A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and - when necessary - military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities”.19

“Peace Support Force. A military force assigned to a peace support operation”.20

“Peacemaking. A peace support operation, conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement, that involves primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets” 21

“Peace Enforcement. A peace support operation conducted to maintain a ceasefire or a peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. A Peace Support Force (PSF) must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the peace agreement impartially”.22

“Peacekeeping. A peace support operation following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self-defence”.23
Peace Building. A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and, when necessary, military means, to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support operations. It is interesting that the potential military role in Peace Building is somewhat caveated by the UK/NATO definition. Whereas the following UN definition, taken from UN Capstone Doctrine makes no mention of any of the actors involved. “Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions”.

Rheostatic application of force.

Applying a rheostatic approach to the use of force means literally that what Chris Bellamy describes as the “heat” can be turned up or down. It suggests employing only enough force to deal with the immediate tactical problem at hand whilst remaining aware of the potential long term ill effects caused by using too much force. This requires an element of sensitivity and implies that the military unit is both mentally and physically prepared to rapidly adjust its posture and force levels.

Stability Operations

Stability could be defined as “…a condition pertaining to a state where it has effective control and administration of its territory, population, and resources” and Stabilisation Operations as “military operations primarily intended to increase the stability of a state”. The US Army states that “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning”.

State Building

Francis Fukuyama offers a simple definition: “State building is the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones”. In its “Principles For Good International Engagement In Fragile States & Situations” OECD argues for a focus on state building and suggests that “priority functions include: ensuring security and justice; mobilizing revenue; establishing an enabling environment for basic service delivery, strong economic performance and employment generation. Support to these areas will in turn strengthen citizens’ confidence, trust and
engagement with state institutions. Civil society has a key role both in demanding good governance and in service delivery”.31

**Warfighting**

“The ability to collectively combine the full range of single-Service capabilities into a cohesive joint force that can conduct a campaign against a similarly capable adversary”.32

**Warlord**

Warlords have become a key problem in failed states, “…the term ‘warlord’ refers to the leader of an armed band, possibly numbering up to several thousand fighters, who can hold territory locally and, at the same time, act financially and politically in the international system without interference from the state in which he is based” 33

---

1 See --, "IASC Reference Paper,"(28 June 2004), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,REFERENCE,IASC,,,4289ea8c4,0.html. 28 August 2010
5 ———, "NATO Publication AJP 3.4.4 Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Ratification Draft 2) Unpublished.," (2010), p 1-3.
10 Drawing on Rupert Smith’s term, see Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force, the art of war in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 2005), p xiii; --, "FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency Field Manual.” (foreword - no page number)
11 MOD, "Countering Insurgency ":p 1-5
13 ———, "NATO Publication AJP 3.4.4 Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Ratification Draft 2) Unpublished.," p Lexicon - 4.
15 ---, "NATO Publication AJP 3.4.4 Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Ratification Draft 2) Unpublished.," p 1-3.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 ---, "UK Joint Warfare Publication 3-0 (JWP 3-0) Operations," (UK MOD. 2001), p 1-1.
Appendix 2 - Questions Used For Structured Interviews

Two sets of questions were developed to prepare interview subjects. The questions draw together the strands of the research approach and mirror the broad approach to case studies. Interviews took the form of a structured discussion based on the questions using either Question List 1 (for military commanders and Staffs), or Question List 2 (for civilian experts), as appropriate.

QUESTION LIST 1
USED FOR INTERVIEWS WITH MILITARY COMMANDERS AND STAFFS

A. THEORY

The hypothesis for this study is that the relationship between the military strand and the civilian political strand in contemporary stability operations is all important and that military action should be designed and adjusted to meet (local) political objectives and the needs of the overall political or peace process and so shape political outcomes. This is a professional imperative for commanders at all levels but particularly at the theatre level.

1. Do you see it this way?

2. Is the UK approach to the politico-military interface unique?

3. Do you see any alternative approaches?

B. PRACTICE

Setting the scene

4. Mandate.
   a. What was the mandate as you saw it?
   b. Was this translated into a “peace process”?

   a. What was the military mission as you saw it?
   b. How did you see this being married with the political dimension?

   a. What structures existed within the International Community and with local authorities to facilitate joint planning and action by civilian political leaders (managers) and the military?
7. **Views.**
   a. What were your initial views on what needed to be done with regard to the pol-mil interface?
   b. What helped you to form these views – doctrine, training, experience?

8. **Direction.**
   a. What direction did you receive from the political level?
   b. What direction did you receive through the military chain of command?

**What did you do? (…or were you able to do?)**

9. **Structures and relationships.**
   a. What structures did you or others establish to facilitate joint planning and action by civilian political leaders (managers) and the military?
   b. Were you able to establish workable relationships?
   c. If not, what were the obstacles?

10. **Planning.**
    a. Did you drive campaign planning with political objectives and the “peace process” in mind?
    b. What was your desired outcome in this respect?

11. **Campaign conduct.**
    a. Did you adapt operations with the peace process in mind?
    b. How far down the chain of command did this have an influence?
    c. Did it work across different national elements? If not, what were the obstacles?

12. **Significant or defining events.**
    a. What were they?
    b. How did they shape your approach?
What were the outcomes?

13. Objectives.
   a. Did you achieve your stated objectives?
   b. Or did they have to change?
   c. What worked, what did not?

14. Resources.
   a. Were there any gaps in external (civilian) resource provision in terms of the comprehensive approach?

15. Multinational Issues.
   a. How did your approach work with multinational military partners?
   b. Did any of them have alternative approaches or views?

C. THE FUTURE

Recommendations for future action to improve the outcome of stability operations

16. Lessons. What lessons did you take away from the experience?

17. Resources. What additional or different resources are needed (including in the civilian domain)?

18. Doctrine. Are any changes to doctrine needed?

19. Training. What training is needed?

20. Wider Utility. Does the UK approach to politico-military cooperation at the theatre level have wider utility. If so how?

D. INFORMATION

Recommendations for other sources of information


22. Documents.
QUESTION LIST 2
USED FOR INTERVIEWS WITH CIVILIAN EXPERTS

The hypothesis for this study is that the relationship between the military strand and the civilian political strand in contemporary stability operations is all important and that military action should be designed and adjusted to meet (local) political objectives and the needs of the overall political or peace process and so shape political outcomes. This is a professional imperative for commanders at all levels but particularly at the theatre level.

Do you agree with the hypothesis?

How do you see the peace process?

Who is in charge? (Can this be a double act)?

How should military commanders support the peace process in practical terms and as political actors in their own right?

What are the pitfalls of such military engagement from a political point of view?

How should civilian political actors prepare themselves to understand and apply the military tool?

How does the UN as an institution see these issues?
Appendix 3
US and NATO Doctrine for Planning and Operating in Counter Insurgency and Stability Operations

1. Aim.

The aim of this appendix is to provide details and analysis of US and NATO doctrine for planning and operating in counter insurgency and stability operations.

2. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency

2.1. Campaign Design

*FM 3-24* offers the helpful concept of "Iterative counterinsurgency campaign design".¹ This is illustrated at Figure A1 below. A continuous cycle of activity is intended to analyse the environment and then unify the purpose of the available tools (these become the logical lines of operation).² The design “should reflect a comprehensive approach that works across all [Logical Lines of Operations]...[there] should be one campaign and therefore one design. This single campaign should bring in all players ...".³

Having described operational design *FM 3-24* provides an example (see figure A2 below). This is sophisticated, yet it remains rather tactical⁴ because it leaves the open the linkage with a wider political context and peace process, for which there is no design.
Figure A1. "Iterative counterinsurgency campaign design". Source FM 3-24

Figure A2. 1st Marine Division’s operational design for Operation Iraqi Freedom 11. Source FM 3-24
2.2. Campaign Planning

The organising method for turning operational design into activity, is to apply “logical lines of operation” (LLOs) to sequence activity in “conceptual categories” designed to impact on the attitude of the populace and increase government support. These categories are illustrated at figure A3 below. The relationship of the LLOs to the whole is similar to the strands of a rope, which as General Mike Jackson and Stephanie Blair pointed out, are stronger when woven.8

Figure A3. Example logical lines of operations for a counterinsurgency. Source FM 3-24.9

2.3. Campaign Execution

One tactical approach in FM 3-24 needs mention. Where insurgents dominate, the idea of Clear-Hold-Build,10 has potential geo-political impact and also illustrates the requirement for politico-military coordination in theatre. The objective is to: “create a secure a physical and psychological environment; establish firm government control of the populace and area; gain the populace's support.”11 The obvious difficulty here is sequencing all of the civilian actors, the military and the host nation across the LLOs to deliver this outcome, particularly if all of the players do not show up.12

To describe the execution of operations, FM 3-24 uses an apt medial analogy: stop the bleeding; inpatient care-recovery; outpatient care-move to self-sufficiency.13 The discussion of outpatient care-moving to self-sufficiency seeds the expansion of stability operations, ideally using indigenous forces and the goal being to transition to
the host nation. Over time, more functions across all sectors are performed by the host
nation, with some help.14

3. FM 3-07 Stability Operations

3.1. Campaign Design

The basic operational design is provided by the end state framework and here the
effort to link military and civilian efforts “creates a single model that forms the basis
for developing lines of effort”.15 Then manual describes work by the Department of
State on post-conflict reconstruction essential tasks "the essential stability task
matrix”16 which breaks down the tasks into "stability sectors” each of which are then
discussed in detail (see figure A4 below).17 Within this there is no guidance for the
general on how to relate his efforts to the political process18 and the overarching
question is what links all of the tactical activity together?

Figure A4 - An Integrated Approach to Stability Operations19

* * *

*FM 3-07* provides a useful categorisation of tasks. Those: where the military retain
primary responsibility; where civilian agencies likely retain responsibility, but the
military forces are prepared to execute; and tasks which civilian agencies or
organisations retain primary responsibility. These primary stability tasks are each
discussed in detail.20 Again, in a section on support to governance there is no
guidance on how to dovetail with political direction and how commanders should
approach taking what amount to political decisions.21 Discussion of civil affairs
operations at all levels hints at political imperatives but provides no guidance on
supporting the political process or political primacy.22

3.2. Campaign Planning

The chapter on planning stability operations in *FM 3-07* (chapter 4) lacks the
incisiveness of its Counterinsurgency counterpart and repeats well known campaign
planning material.23 The five “stability sectors” and the five “primary stability tasks”
provide “a framework for identifying the individual tasks that exert the greatest influence on the operational environment” and are illustrated at Figure A5 below.  

Figure A5: Example Stability Lines of Effort.  Source FM 3-07

The “stability lines of effort” shown at figure A5 are then further broken down to the tactical (military) level, where most, but not all, activity contributes to the “establish civil” security line of effort. The resulting security lines of operation at this level are described by the pneumonic “SWEAT-MSO” (see figure A6 below). In a discussion of the decisive points, and relevant to the lines of development, political factors, such as obtaining political support from key tribal leaders, are briefly mentioned but there is no guidance on how to approach and coordinate this. This will be particularly difficult in a non-benign environment where civilian presence and activity will be restricted and or limited.
4. **Draft NATO Counter Insurgency Doctrine AJP 3.4.4**

Emerging NATO doctrine draws heavily on the earlier British and US models in terms of campaign design and planning. The preferred approach at the tactical level of “clear hold and build” using “offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities” mirrors *FM 3-24*. As suggested in Figure A7 below, this approach “establishes control over the population and areas so that [host nation] governance and internal development programmes can be pursued in a secure environment. It also supports development operations by preventing insurgent interference”. This of course emphasises the absolute requirement for civil-military coordination at all levels in order to contest the ungoverned areas and prevent resurgence of insurgent control. Whilst the ultimate effect may be similar to the UN’s peace building process, this US and NATO model does not address the specific requirements of the political process at either the national, regional or local level or how the commander should relate his planning and campaign activity to these. The question remains where does clear hold and build sit in relation to this?
This approach also signalled the beginning of the end of the effects based approach with its endless search for ground truth. "[S]ubjective and intuitive assessment must not be replaced by an exclusive focus on data or metrics. Commanders must exercise their professional judgement in determining the proper balance." Ibid., p 4-6 figure 4-2. Given that Gen Mattis wrote this chapter, it is now clear why he later directed JFCOM not to pursue EBO. See his instructions on the matter at J N General USMC.


4 Anthony King, Professor, "Telephone discussion with author," (4 March 2010).

5 The approach here is closely linked to the “learn and adapt” imperative. --, "FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency Field Manual," 4-5.

6 Ibid., p 4-9.

7 Ibid., p 5-3.

8 Ibid., p 5-6. Although not quoted in either US or British doctrine, the original source of this idea, drawn from the Kosovo campaign, was General Mike Jackson. This was later illustrated in detail by Stephanie Blair. See Stephanie Blair, "Weaving The Strands Of The Rope: A Comprehensive Approach to Building A Self-Sustaining Peace in Kosovo" (Cranfield University, 2001), and ———, Weaving The Strands Of The Rope: A Comprehensive Approach To Building Peace In Kosovo (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies Dalhousie University, 2002).

9 --, "FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency Field Manual," p 5-3.

10 Other approaches being combined action with, or providing limited support to, the host nation. See Ibid., p 5-18.

11 Ibid.


14 Ibid.


16 Ibid., p 2-4 – 2-6.

17 Ibid., p 2-8.

18 See for example the section on support to governance. Ibid., p 2-18.

19 Ibid., p 2-7 (figure 2.2 An Integrated Approach to Stability Operations.

20 Ibid., p 3-3 to 3-31.

21 Ibid., p 3-21.

22 Ibid., p 3-32.

23 Ibid., p 4-1 to 4-10.

24 Ibid., p 4-16.

25 Ibid., p 4-17 figure 14-11.

26 Ibid., p 4-16.

27 Ibid., p 4-18 to 14-19.

28 Ibid., p 4-18 figure 14-12.

29 ———, "NATO Publication AJP 3.4.4 Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Ratification Draft 2 Unpublished..)," p 5-14.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., p 5-15.