




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**SWP 16/90 THE ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE OF THE
ARMED FORCES: THE CASE OF THE
ISRAELI ARMY**

A CULTURAL ANALYSIS

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**Presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), 1989
Biennial Conference, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, October 27-29 1989.**

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Summary

Within the context of the ongoing debate on the origins and consequences of organisational culture, this paper attempts to marry a cultural model of institutional structures (Grid/Group Analysis) with the concerns of military organisations.

The model proposes sharp distinctions in the behaviours, perceptions and values of differing military units, based on their respective differing antecedents.

1 Introduction

My aim in this paper is, firstly, to discuss the place of a cultural model of institutionally driven cognitions in the field of organisational behaviour, with particular reference to the issue of organisational culture.

Secondly, to consider the compatibility of such a cultural model to explaining individual and group differences of military units in the armed forces. This will be done by examining the case of the Israeli Defence Forces.

1.1 What is Organisational Culture and How is it Created?

The notion of organisational culture has become such a frequently used idiom over the past decade, that it probably merits its classification as a cliché. Although seemingly everyone *knows* what organisational culture is all about, this could be an allusive and far from comprehensive metaphor, as Schein has shown in his seminal work on the subject¹.

A key question would be whether culture is *something* an organisation has, or is it *something* an organisation is². The distinction is critical, since it proposes a direction of origin, impact and change.

If culture is something an organisation has, then it would be the case, as Schneider³ puts it, that 'the people make the place'. Schneider proposes a natural self preservation process that takes place in organisations, whereby people become and stay members of an organisation by an attraction, selection and attribution cycle. In other words, an organisation and its culture are the sum total of its members and nothing else. Culture, then, is the result - not the reason for behaviour.

On the other hand, if culture is something an organisation is, then culture may well be the cause, not the effect. Like the whole that is larger than the total sum of its constituents, culture is seen as an independent variable. To take an extreme case, even with its members vanished, an organisation still possesses a culture, like a pharaohnate pyramid that transmits the values and shared beliefs of its society and people, many thousands of years after they perished under the sun.

1 Schein, G H *Organisational Culture and Leadership* Jossey-Bass Publishers San Francisco 1985

2 Meek, V L *Organisational Culture: Origins and Weaknesses* Organisation Studies 9/4 453-473 1988

3 Schneider, B *The People Make the Place* Personnel Psychology 40, 437-453 1987

This latter view of culture is the common approach borrowed from anthropology and it is within this context and from this perspective that Grid/Group Analysis has been developed.

A second key question is how organisational culture is created. One way to examine the creation of 'culture' is by following the recruitment, the entry and socialisation processes of newcomers into an organisation. Surely there are few as dramatic examples of this as is the case of the armed forces.

I remember vividly arriving, an 18 year old high-school graduate, to the gates of the Absorption and Selection Base of the Israeli Defence Forces. "Bassar Tari" (fresh meat) the 3-day old "veterans" welcomed with cries of glee the new arrivals, myself included. At the end of that day I transformed from a civilian, a citizen of the State of Israel who arrived wearing casual clothes and a modern haircut; into a seven-numbered serialised conscript, regulated under Marshall Law, fully uniformed, with standardised haircut. The following morning I learned to my amazement that from now on I have to start shaving daily or 'sign up' for a beard. Within days I forgot my addiction to coffee (only tea was supplied to trainees), I started smoking and swearing. The following week I stood amongst my new mates at the camp's gates welcoming with glee and shouts of "fresh meat" the new arrivals...

Perhaps even more amazing than this transformation of an 18 year old from civilian to soldier, is the twice and thrice annual transformation of Israeli civilians in their 20's-30's-40's and 50's into military reservists. I can testify, as would most of my Israeli peers, that this miraculous transformation takes hardly any longer as the years pass by.

With its marked distinctions, a separate legal codex, specified uniforms, regulated customs, a developed jargon and institutionalised rituals; it seems that in the armed forces the 'place makes the people' rather than the other way around.

Indeed, this is a suitable test case for a cultural model of individual and group behaviour that considers behaviour to be conditioned by environmental impacts.

2 Grid/Group Analysis

Grid/Group Analysis (thereafter: G/G) is a typological paradigm for comparing cultures and the forms of social organisation that support them, introduced by British anthropologist Mary Douglas, a decade ago⁴.

Based on ethnographies derived from non-industrial societies, the model has by now been applied to a variety of institutions, themes and areas, as far apart as Chinese medieval history, theatre, geology and mathematical sciences⁵, ecology⁶, occupational crime⁷ and industrial safety⁸.

4 Douglas, M Cultural Bias Royal Anthropological Institute Occasional Paper no 35, London 1978.

5 Douglas, M (ed) Essays in the Sociology of Perception Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982

6 Douglas, M & Wildavsky, A Risk and Culture University of California Press, 1982

7 Mars, G Cheats at Work Allen & Unwin, 1982

8 Gross, J L & Rayner, S Measuring Culture Columbia University Press, 1985

The model proposes that an individual's behaviour, perception, attitudes and values are shaped, regulated and controlled by constraints that can be grouped into two domains labelled as: group commitment and grid control.

Combined, these provide four prototypes: four possible scenarios of social life.

G r i d	Strong	B Weak Group Strong Grid	C Strong Group Strong Grid
	Weak	A Weak Group Weak Grid	D Strong Group Weak Grid
		Weak	Strong
		Group	

Group⁹

Group, the *horizontal* coordinate, represents the extent to which people are restricted in thought and action by their commitment to a social unit larger than the individual. High group strength results when people devote a lot of their available time to interacting with other members of their unit. In general, the more things they do together, and the longer they spend doing them, the higher the group strength.

Mars¹⁰ proposes four tests for group strength: the frequency of interpersonal interactions, linked to mutuality of interactions, the scope of these interactions and the boundary tightness (inclusion/exclusion). The more positively one can ascertain these elements - the stronger the group dimension.

Group strength is low when people negotiate their way through life on their own behalf as individuals, neither constrained by, nor reliant upon, a single group of others.

Grid

Grid, the *vertical* coordinate, is the complementary bundle of constraints on social interaction, a composite index of the extent to which people's behaviour is constrained by role differentiation, whether within or without membership of a group. Grid is high strength whenever roles are distributed on the basis of explicit public social classifications, such as sex, colour, position in a hierarchy, holding a

9 The following description of the constituents of G/G is taken, with few additions and omissions from Gross & Rayner, 1985 (op cit) pp 5-11

10 Mars, 1982 (op cit)

bureaucratic office, descent in a senior clan or lineage, or point of progression through an age-grade system. It is low strength when classificatory distinctions only weakly limit the range of social choices or activities open to people.

A low-grid social environment is one in which access to roles depends upon personal abilities to compete or negotiate for them, or even of formal regulations for taking equal turns. In either case, where access to roles is not dependent on any ascribed characteristics of rank or birth, we would recognize a low-grid condition.

Weak Grid/Weak Group

Quadrant A (weak grid/weak group) allows the maximum options for negotiating contracts or choosing allies. Consequently, it also allows for individual mobility up and down the scale of prestige and influence. No one cares about the past or about anyone's ancestry. Each person is responsible for himself and for whomsoever else he chooses, not for the weak or the needy, unless he wills it so.

Strong Grid/Weak Group

Quadrant B (strong grid/weak group) is an environment in which the way persons may behave is strongly regulated according to their socially assigned classifications. It is often a hierarchical environment in which most persons are classified out of the decision-making process. Perhaps the classifying criterion is ancestry, and all roles are based on its correlatives. Or maybe the criterion age, so that each person passes through a stream of age-related categories. Unlike quadrant A, the control exerted in this environment is not that of one person forcing his will upon another, but rather that of a whole society ready to negotiate only those deals that reinforce the pervasive social classifications.

Strong Grid/Strong Group

Quadrant C (strong grid/strong group) is where one might find tradition-bound institutions in which everyone knows his place, but in which that place might vary with time. Extensive security is obtained at the expense of most possibilities for overt competition and social mobility. Examples of this type of social organisation include bureaucracies that base their roles on seniority (an ascribed basis) rather than merit (an achieved basis), or a cohesive tribal society with hereditary roles. Such a bureaucratic environment might occur in civil service, an educational system, a strongly unionized industry, where promotion is based on length of service rather than competitively upon relative ability.

An individual in quadrant C who goes along with the system may expect eventual rewards, unless collective misfortune intervenes. In bad times, everyone sinks together. The king might be the first to die in battle, and the captain will go down with his ship. This is very much unlike weak grid/weak group quadrant A, in which a king (who is likely to have been a usurper) might have a refuge for himself and his family prepared in advance, and in which a captain would sail off with provisions in the best lifeboat. In quadrant A, some individuals might be privately negotiating with the enemy and others too busy fighting each other for power to notice the collective threat.

Weak Grid/Strong Group

Finally, quadrant D (weak grid/strong group) is a social context in which the external group boundary is typically the dominant consideration. All other aspects of interpersonal relationships are ambiguous and open to negotiation. Leadership tends to be charismatic and lacking clear rules for succession. The suspicion of infiltration by outsiders or betrayal by group members is rampant here.

3 Grid/Group Analysis of the Armed Forces

3.1 The Armed Forces

Douglas does not clearly specify where do you start your analysis: is it on the individual level or the institutional one.

According to the model one can project either. That is: to draw expectations of individual behaviour based on institutional configurations; and to analyse individual behaviour, which in turn should throw a relief of the main institutional features.

I will start with a view from above and will try to answer the following question: **on the combined dimensions of Grid and Group, where will the main Forces fit, assessing them along these criteria:**

- how much is the core mission group dependent? and what intensity of face to face interaction does it require (Group dimensions)
- how much is the elementary fighting unit technology driven? (Grid dimension)
- how much is the detailed execution of the fighting mission command controlled? (Grid dimension)

To begin with, the main feature of the armed forces, any armed forces, is its emphasis on structure, hierarchy and discipline. In this sense it is strong Grid. Since most of its work is clearly interdependent, that is group bounded, therefore Quadrant C is the most appropriate to place the Armed Forces in. However, when considering the different Forces, some differentiation begins to show.

3.1.1 The Navy is still well placed in Quadrant C. Its core mission is very much group dependent: there can hardly be a tighter boundary than around a vessel at sea; interpersonal interactions are condensed in space, frequent and over a long span of time (Strong Group).

It is highly structured in terms of role specificity, expertise (professionalism) and areas of responsibility (Strong Grid). Its operation is clearly technology driven: without its 'technical senses' (Sonar, Radar, Radio) the vessel is at a loss (Strong Grid).

Both Grid elements result in a highly regulated form of "the way you do things". It was a direct result of this regulated behaviour patterns that the Israeli Navy suffered its heaviest loss in its history when the destroyer Yaffo was sunk in 1968 from a direct Egyptian missile hit. This was made possible since the vessel used a rigid patrol route and its captain prided himself of timing his rounds on the split of a minute.

It was not until it started to operate the smaller vessels - the missile boats - that the Navy has become a significant factor in the IDF war strategy, particularly since its success in the Yom Kippur War.

Missile boats are still high on both dimensions: Grid and Group, but its smaller size allows a somewhat less rigid form of operation and calls for local enterprise and initiative. It thus fits better into the corporate culture of the IDF, which although firmly rooted in quadrant 'C' (Strong Grid - Strong Group), has historically always leaned towards 'D' (Weak Grid - Strong Group).

Strong Grid
Strong Group

B	C Navy
A	D

3.1.2 The Air Force, although seemingly clearly placed in the same quadrant C (technology dependent, central command is capable of direct controlling of any operational aircraft; strong group identity: Air Force clearly differentiates itself from other Forces) reveals under closer scrutiny, a more complicated relief, .

The Air Force comprises of two parts: the airborne operation and the grounded, technological back-up. Furthermore, the elementary fighting unit is the single aircraft, which can and does operate as a separate entity (even though it would normally be part of a formation).

This individualistic constituent - the pilot - who is at the critical edge of a highly complex group and technological effort (the aircraft), complicates things.

While as a Force, the Air Force would be placed in Quadrant C, the pilot, and in particular a fighter ace, would need to be free of constraints of traditions, regulations and norms (Weak Grid) as well as of the impositions of group standards and pressures (Weak Group). When manoeuvring his way to the target, it is up to him and him alone, to interpret the situation and act to the best of his ability. Innovation, enterprise, risk taking, competition and thriving for excellence are the hallmarks of the successful fighter pilot who is the *crème de la crème*, the role model of the Israeli Air Force. His is the obvious case where only merit counts and status is a matter of personal achievement. In other words, a classical definition for an occupant of quadrant A.


While entrepreneurial individualism is rewarded, Air Force pilots are also members of an exclusive club. "Hatovim-La'tayiss": "the best (in plural) - for aviation", is the wording of an advertisement, successfully employed by Air Force recruiters for the past three decades. A compulsory minimum of five years service, a prolonged probation period and compulsory living on the base compound (bachelors and families alike), encourage the creation of a strong group, which is marked by a surprising lack of emphasis on differentiation along lines of rank or seniority. Entry is difficult enough to make the selected few become full members of an egalitarian elite. When on the ground then, pilots are in quadrant D, typical to small scale egalitarian societies, where the Group dimension is strong and the Grid dimensions is weak.

Similar is the case with Air Force technical support staff. A professional force, it is based on specialised, long-term service teams, emphasising technical know-how.

The long working hours in small interdependent teams, the living in shared quarters and the identical professional training, help to create and maintain a strong external boundary, while de-emphasising in-group differences of rank, seniority or any

personal peculiarities (ethnic origin, for instance, is a major source of differentiation in Israeli society). Like pilots, ground support staff form their own exclusive clubs. They would also be best characterised by behaviours, expectations and values typical to people in quadrant D (Strong Group, Weak Grid).

The composite positioning of the Air Force is therefore as follows:



This composite relief highlights the problematics of the concept of Organisational Culture. Which one is true? Surely all of them. Here we have the corporate culture (C) which is however dramatically different from the operational culture (A) and both are still dissimilar to the working culture (D).

This outline also highlights the potential in-built conflicts within the system, some of which will be discussed under a separate heading (Section 4).

3.1.3 The Army is even more complex to place than the Air Force. The Army as a centralised form of command is a fairly recent development in the IDF. It followed years of heated debates, the General Staff putting arguments for and against. Historically there was a separation between the two main Forces: Infantry and the Armoured Corps, each developing their identities, and each under direct (and separate) command of the Chief of Staff.

"Milhamot Ha'generalim" (the wars of the generals) as these have been coined since 1973 (when the failures in the Yom Kippur War triggered public accusations and counter-accusations by senior army officers) are echoed among the rank and file. In a series of well know incidents, in the immediate aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, infantry teams were transferred en masse to the Armoured Corps, to fill the immediate gaps in manpower. The transplants proved disastrous both to the transferees as well as to the absorbing regiments. G/G illuminates this (unavoidable) cultural clash.

The small group is central to the formation of Infantry, since it is the platoon (Mahlaka) and the company (Pluga) that make the elementary fighting unit. While the battalion (Gdud), which is still small enough to allow close relations among its members (Strong Group) would be credited with major operational responsibility.

Since technology is only secondary to man and operational command is localised (Weak Grid), this combination of Strong Group and Weak Grid (quadrant D) drives a strong localised (regimental) identity.


When in operational service, the Infantry is firmly in quadrant 'D'.

The successful infantry units are renown for their *esprit d'corps*, a manifestation of a tight boundary, separating insiders from the outside world. Loyalty to peers and the group is legendary among the paratroopers, the elite infantry brigade. A major motivator to continue and volunteer¹¹ for reserve service is "not to let down the lads".

Golani, now a renown infantry regiment, was referred to twenty years ago under the derogatory term "the Mau-Mau riff-raff". It had a reputation of unreliability and poor standards. Whoever took the decision to change this image had the right insight. By painstakingly introducing "new blood" into the system, a new identity was encouraged. It is a slow process but the only one that works with quadrant 'D' type cultures. Enforcement from above, would have resulted with resistance from the system. A 'D' type culture resists imposed change and has the means (informal leadership) and framework (local identity) to do so.

Possibly the same principle was in mind when more recently a new infantry brigade - Givati - was created. It was renamed after the renown brigade from the War of Independence, as a way to instil a recognition of excellence and of continuity. Tradition is of importance in a Strong Group culture.

From a central command perspective, the handicap of a Strong Group - Weak Grid framework (quadrant D) is its tendency to create autonomy. Fiefdoms are the bureaucrat's nightmare, firstly, because they incline to challenge regulations and procedures; secondly, because effective hands-on control from central command is made impossible. The IDF found it to its cost both in Beirut in 1983 and presently, in the Intifada (uprising) on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is platoon commanders, not the Chief of Staff who really decide the do's and don'ts of the daily engagements with the hostile population. To quadrant 'D' people, what counts is not "who you are" but "are you one of us". And the longer the operational field period (as opposed to the training, base-bound period) the 'D' culture becomes stronger.



¹¹ One volunteers to the paratroopers and has to voluntarily reaffirm his commitment as a reservist.

Which is partly why in peace times the infantry units alternate between operational periods (border patrol) and training periods, to instil a higher degree of Grid (discipline, rank) and bring the infantry closer to the army's core culture ('C')¹².

The Armoured Corps, in contrast, and in particular the Artillery Corps, are literally worlds apart. For them, technology has an overriding importance. The tank has a team at its core, but it is the functional roles that are emphasised not their social correlates. Close team spirit is to an extent even discouraged because of the tactical necessity during battle, to compose teams (by function) according to availability. Furthermore, the doctrine dictates that the solitary tank is not the basic fighting unit, but rather the Pluga (squadron) comprising of 3-4 tanks (although of course each of them is fully self-sufficient).

While Group is discounted, Grid is emphasised. Compartmentalisation and insulation are at the core of the tank design. The men are physically bounded to their niches, each performing just one task and they do not communicate face to face, but through signals (the tank commander steers the vehicle by tapping on the driver's head and shoulders) and via the internal communication system.

The Armoured Corps have by far the strictest discipline, among the major Forces. Regulations, procedures and standards are keenly observed and the tanks annual inspection parades lean heavily towards perfection of appearance and cleanliness (of the tanks, that is).

The Artillery has similarly a Strong Grid - Weak Group culture. Its dependency on technology is probably greater than is the case with the Armoured Corps. The operation of a modern artillery battery requires a highly specified technological know-how. Timing, punctuality, strict adherence to regulations and orders is paramount for its successful operation. Similar to the tank, a gun's design is heavily restrictive to its operators.

As an operational unit the Artillery (unlike the Armoured Corps) is a service function par excellence. That is, it is entirely externally commanded. In fact, its head is not even integral to its formation. Rather, he acts as counsel to the Regimental (Divisional) command.

The batteries are dispersed among 'Core Forces', like the Infantry or the Armoured Corps, responding to requests (or rather demands) for assistance.

Its technology and core mission confine the battery to the periphery of the battle field. The long fire range imposes the frustrating set-up for its operators, rarely to know who is it they are firing at and rarely been given immediate feedback of results. They move, form and fire when ordered and their supplies are centrally provided. In short, they are never pro-active.

The emphasised dependency, the structural fragmentation and the institutionalised lack of initiative interfere with the creation of a Strong Group. There is no way in which a regimental identity as in the Infantry can develop. Identity would tend to be xenophobic (that is, externally and negatively defined) rather than internally and positively stated, as say, with the Infantry.

¹² During the long involvement in Lebanon in the early 1980's, the international border between Lebanon and Israel was also known among infantry men as the "marshall law line". Re-entering Israel, soldiers would smarten their appearance and reduce travel speed to comply with army regulations.

4 Grid/Group Analysis of the individual in the Armed Forces

The scope of this presentation is too limited to allow a comprehensive discussion on the place of the individual in the Armed Forces. I would like therefore to focus on two key aspects, both interlinked: organisational rivalry and deviance.


4.1 Organisational Rivalry

G/G is conducive to highlighting differences in values, perceptions and preferences, as a result of an organisation's positioning along the dimensions of Grid and Group. The intense indoctrination a new recruit goes through, facilitates his transformation into an "organisation man" and one's commitment is further sustained by powerful organisational symbols such as a specified uniform.

Disagreements between Forces on an organisational level via its representatives, the individual soldiers, is only to be expected.

The difficulty in transforming an Infantry man into an Armoured Corps man has been discussed. Another traditional rivalry is between the Military Police and, in particular, the paratroopers, a rivalry that can escalate from individual conflict to Regimental Staff confrontation, necessitating interventions from the Chief of Staff¹³.

The reasons for this clash are apparent, when considering that both groups are positioned at the very extreme opposites of the cultural map.



The paratroopers, (Strong Group - Weak Grid) as an elite force of the Infantry, are bounded by a Strong Group boundary, emphasising in-group egalitarianism ("we are all the same") which will manifest itself as solidarity in out-group contacts. Their organisational culture encourages the development of initiative, personal responsibility and improvisation and to adversely respond to (external) authority, regulations and order. Paratroopers thrive in ambiguity and the chaos of the battlefield. Part of their shared ethos is a sloppy appearance. This goes against the grain of the Military Police. They are the personification of order, discipline and

13 Milshtein, U Milhamot Ha'tsanhanim 1971

law enforcement. Theirs is the power of authority. Their role is entirely functional and whether it is executed in solo or in teams is of no consequence to their mission. If they have a group identity it is often a reaction from the world outside. No one likes the people who do the dirty work.

The Military Police are very strong on Grid and weak on Group. Their culture emphasizes dependency, discipline, orderlines, clear cut distinction between "right" and "wrong". As the only mediating factor between the two is power - formal coercion (Military Police) against group cohesion (Paratroopers) - violent clashes are the means of communication.

4.2 Interpersonal and Institutional Deviance

In a system of which power is a critical constituent and which uses conscription as the main method of recruitment, deviance plays an important role.

An individual who does not fit into the Force, has little chance of escape. There are established terms of exit, but most bear a high cost for the individual - some unpopular Forces (eg. the Military Police) practically put a bar on voluntary exit. Disengagement is therefore often limited to crises, which would imply either breach of rules followed by a court martial (typically followed by imprisonment and possible transfer); or an attempt of discharge from Military Service altogether, via the medical route (typically on the grounds of mental health unsuitability). Yet a third possibility is to rebel against the system, which is sometimes a not entirely conscious attempt to seek attention and solicit help (sort of a Levinian avoidance - avoidance trap).

It is by investigating such deviant occurrences that one can shed light on important aspects of the system and G/G offer some useful insights on what shape these may take.

It is hypothesised that deviance will manifest itself as aggression against what is perceived to be the key to an individual misery, as follows:

Weak Group Strong Grid	Against the Organisation	Against the Organisation and/or Against the Group	Strong Group Strong Grid
Weak Group Weak Grid	Against Self	Against Group (Against Self)	Strong Group Weak Grid

Where Strong Group - Weak Grid prevails, the individual is likely to rebel against the group. As Douglas¹⁴ suggests, an egalitarian group has limited sanctions against its deviating members. Its means are informal (moral pressure, social control, informal boycott) and the only real sanction is ultimate expulsion.

¹⁴ Douglas, M 1978 (op cit)

Discontent will therefore express itself by (personal) poor performance which necessarily will impact on the group as a whole (indirect rebellion); or by informing on the group to a higher authority (direct rebellion) as did a newly arrived to a small infantry unit who felt rejected by the established group.

However, sometimes Group pressure may lead to inability to react against the group, particularly if one identifies with the group or with the norm of group solidarity. In frustration, aggression will be turned against one's self. Cases of self-inflicted injury and suicide are not uncommon in the elite Infantry units.

Where Strong Group - Strong Grid prevail, individuals will react against the group and/or the organisation. Deviants will be more easily found among those who do not have an immediate strong support group, such as the case of a cook in the Navy who felt alienated from the group (as the only cook on the vessel) and got himself discharged due to 'incompetence': his cooking put the personnel at risk. His mate from the same vessel was less lucky. He rebelled against the system and was jailed for several years for jeopardising an operation. He raised a false alarm over alleged malfunction and the vessel was forced to return to base.

Deviance in a Weak Group - Strong Grid environment is a particularly sad affair. It would be directed either against the repressive authority or-and against the not less repressive machinery, which although operated by the person, actually 'operates' him.

The common case is of "Sseruv Pkuda" (refusal to carry out a command). This is a no-win situation, and all the individual gains is to register his (ineffective) protest against authority and thereby asserting his individuality in a system that aims to discard individualism.

In the Artillery Corps, an artillery battery during the Lebanon War discharged itself by wrongly operating the equipment. Both equipment and men were inflicted: the system was damaged, the men were injured.

In a well publicised case in the early 1980's, a number of Armoured Corps technical staff were found guilty of damaging the engines of tanks (instead of repairing them). They rebelled against the system by reacting against the machines that were controlling their lives.

Finally, in the case of a Weak Group - Weak Grid culture, there is no one to rebel against. Aggression is therefore self-directed. However, since quadrant 'A' is rather atypical to the Armed Forces it is rather uncommon. Although, in quite a few fatal accidents there were rumours that they may have of pilots in the Air Force been self-inflicted.

5 Final Note

The case of the Israeli Defence Forces was put forward as a model for analysing organisational culture in the Armed Forces.

The IDF shares a great deal in common with all other Armed Forces, but it is of course a specific case. The IDF is set within a given society (which impacts its values) in a particular geopolitical situation and it is a conscript army, to mention some of the main features.

Grid/Group Analysis, as a universalistic cultural model,, may be a suitable framework for a comparative study of the Armed Forces in different societies and in different historical periods.