

CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY

CRANFIELD DEFENCE AND SECURITY

DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED SCIENCE, SECURITY AND RESILIENCE

PhD Thesis

Academic Year 2008 – 2009

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THE CONDUCT OF WAR AND THE NOTION OF VICTORY: A THEORY AND
DEFINITION OF VICTORY

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August 2009

This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for Doctorate of Philosophy.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It was an honour and a privilege to be part of the Cranfield Defence and Security research community. I have the most profound admiration for all those directly or indirectly associated with my research for their support and guidance that was essential for steering me through the many challenges I confronted.

First and foremost I wish to acknowledge Prof. Christopher Bellamy, my research supervisor, for the encouragement, guidance and direction I enjoyed from the very beginning through to the culmination of this research; Dr Laura Cleary, the research director, for her astute advice and continuous support and of course, a special mention of Prof. Richard Holmes, who has been a major inspiration throughout my academic pursuits.

Cranfield University provided the most congenial environment for research. I had the opportunity to interact with many bright minds; not all find a mention here but are acknowledged most humbly for enriching my research and making my stay pleasant. The support team at the Security Studies Institute deserves a separate mention. The entire administrative team which was initially headed by Steph Muir and later Anne Harbour were more than forthcoming in providing all kinds of assistance and, on many occasions, going out of their way.

Many of my colleagues have also been a source of influence and inspiration. Meriting special mention are the Commandants of the Command and Staff College, Quetta: Major General Mohsin Kamal, Major General Ahmed Shuja Pasha and Major General Khalid Nawaz Khan and from the National Defence University Major General Shahid Iqbal. I thank them for their trust and confidence in me, for facilitating my research and sharing their wisdom.

I owe the deepest gratitude to all my family and friends for their support and encouragement with a special mention for Kristine for her most valuable moral, intellectual and physical support as well as help in printing and distributing the final thesis; Tanveer for volunteering to give the final document a second proof read and share her impressions on the research. Last but not least my mother, who has always inspired me to seek knowledge and excel.

DEDICATION

To my mother

For all her toil, hard work, prayers and affection.

In twinkling of an eye¹

*And hiding the sun in sandy mist
The gale came down with paces swift
And cloaked the summer's day like purple night
Without reflection! What is dark and what is bright?*

W. F. Hussain (ca. 1952)

ABSTRACT

Clausewitz described military victory as a condition where the enemy's ability to enter battle, resist or resume hostilities is destroyed. The notion summarises the paradigms of success that preceded Clausewitz and survived through much of the 20th century. Is such a doctrine of victory still valid? The short answer is 'no'; and yet, despite increasingly paradoxical outcomes, military planners, strategists and statesmen continually seek answers for their failures in variously perceived causative influences. Few question the validity of the Clausewitzian doctrine of victory that drove their initiatives.

The rapid transformation in society and international culture has brought with it changes in geo-political and geo-economic relationships as well as warfare. While the traditional linkages between war and politics remain, the mechanisms driving these have altered. In less than 'absolute wars,' it is the wider bargain and the stakes in that bargain that make the 'enemy do our will' and not purely the opposition's inability to enter battle, resist or resume hostilities. The complexities surrounding contemporary war, diplomacy and strategy necessitate an organising theory to make better sense of policy and action.

War is ultimately a violent clash of societies and its character a reflection of opposing cultures, history and experiences. An external dimension to strategy is thus always at work even if not fully recognised; as is often the case. Such un-factored influences create a sort of volatility in victory and defeat adding new challenges while offering opportunities at the same time. Similarly, diplomacy, which invariably precedes and succeeds coercive or compelling use of violence, too is fettered by such external influences.

A bivariate approach that triangulates desired ends with the opposing notions of success and perception of defeat is argued. The theory presented here encapsulates traditional precepts, adds new ones and simplifies the complexities that have come to surround victory in contemporary times. Offered here are some valuable ingredients to flavour any strategic recipe, not just war and conflict. The eternal challenge of calibrating means and ends needed more systematic awareness of functional and dominant domains of victory which, it is argued, is possible through application of simple principles. The theory potentially allows for a more focused, proportionate, efficient and productive use of power. It is hoped that strategists and analysts alike, would find here new concepts and tools for use in praxis, perspective planning and retrospective analyses.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

EXPLANATION OF TERMS

3Z	The abbreviation is used as a collective reference to ‘Zan, Zar – Zamin.’ See also ‘Zan’, ‘Zar’ and ‘Zamin’.
Actuality:	The state or fact of being ‘actual.’ ² In a purely metaphysical context, as relevant to this thesis, the definition is broadened to include the reality of conditions or facts in addition to the state of actually existing objectively. See also reality.
Advantage (Measure of victory):	As a measure of degree of military success or victory measured in relation to the aims and objectives of the operation(s). Strategic advantage sits just above the level of stalemate. ³ ‘Advantage’ may not be decisive but serves policy nonetheless. See also ‘decisive victory’ and ‘success.’
Aggressor:	Refers to an entity that consciously initiates political violence to achieve leverage through violence or threat of violence. The degree of military success is leveraged for achieving political aims. Aggressor(s) may be a single state, an alliance, or a non-state group or a combination of these.
Aggressed:	The aggressed (or respondent) includes a single state, alliance, group or a combination of these in a state of conflict. The Aggressed is/are drawn into hostilities by an ‘aggressor’ who presents a political bargain which the aggressed entity defers.
Altered Expectation Argument (AEA)	An ‘Altered Expectation Argument’ is the impact on the notional Expectation Argument as a result of external factors such as psychological conditioning, information warfare, motivation and indoctrination etc. In a tactical sense, shaping the battlefields alters the expectation argument.
Awareness:	The ability to perceive, to feel, or to be conscious of events, objects or patterns. Awareness does not necessarily imply understanding.
Axioms:	Constitutive elements of each and every theory: basic assumptions, which, as it were, form the foundations of a theory, are regarded as ‘evident’ (directly accessible to the human mind) and are no longer questioned by scientists. Axioms are hardly ever made explicit in social science theories. An axiom would be, for example, the assumption of decision-making approaches that human beings behave rationally or that they all have certain interests, which they follow openly or subcutaneously in their political behaviour. ⁴
Calculus:	The term is used in this work to denote nonmathematical decision-making criteria: a nonmathematical evaluation, estimation, or computation.

Cognitive Dissonance:	Two cognitions are said to be dissonant if one cognition follows from the opposite of another. ⁵
Common Expectation Argument (CEA)	See first High Expectation Argument (HEA) and Low Expectation Argument (LEA) . A CEA represents a notion of evenly matched belligerents.
Conflict:	A disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns. Such a conflict can exist between friendly and cooperative groups. A more security related explanation is a clash of political, ideological or economic interests between two or more groups.
Conflict Termination:	Conflict terminates when the parties involved no longer present a threat to each other's interests OR when one side permanently abandons, regresses or accommodates the other party / parties such that they no longer pose a threat.
Capitulation:	See reversal.
Cultural Dissonance:	Cultural dissonance is often defined as social cognitive dissonance (see cognitive dissonance). It occurs when social groups of people collectively experience cognitive dissonance, and respond by generating false or mythological explanations. The greatest dissonance occurs in the most politicized issues.
Expectation Framework (EF)	Used as an organising framework for Expectation Arguments, see. IEA, EEA, HEA, LEA, CEA and AEA.
External Expectation Argument (EEA)	The EEA represents the expectational position of entities other than the belligerents.
Effectual Strategic Environment:	The operative influential elements and aspects of the environment connected to the 'friction – change' dynamic of the regional-domestic order, the international system in general and influential powers in particular that are affected by volatility or changes in the international system.
High Expectation Argument (HEA)	HEA represents a general notion of positive outcomes of a conflict situation as held by particular influence group. Such a group is likely to develop a sense of disappointments or failure when the expected (high) outcomes are not met.
Face Validity:	The extent to which a measure looks valid to the ordinary person. Face validity has nothing to do with scientific validity. ⁶ Face validity is concerned with how a measure or procedure appears. Unlike 'content validity', face validity does not depend on established theories for support.

Globalisation:	The term is used with reference to the acceleration and intensification of mechanisms, processes, and activities that promote global interdependence. It is a concept that involves the ‘deterritorialisation’ of social, political, economic, and cultural life. ⁷
General Case:	Used in reference to the nature of war as perceived by either belligerent. The general case implies that the magnitude of the threat to either side does not entail the very survival of the threatened entity. In other words, the objective is compellence, coercion or deterrence and not annihilation.
High Expectation Argument (HEA)	HEA suggests a general perception where unfavourable outcome – by way of military or political defeat – is expected for the entity to which a high expectation is attached.
Illusory Correlation:	An illusory correlation exists when there is no relationship (a zero correlation) between two variables, but a relationship is perceived to exist by some. ⁸ For example, the notion of negative correlation between Victory and defeat.
Impinged Entities:	Impinged entities include those directly affected. Such entities may or may not have an active role in fighting and those that join on either side not in pursuit or defence of a common political aim but their own separate interests.
Intermediate Objective:	An objective other than the main which either paves the way for the final objective or must be captured to allow manoeuvre to develop towards the final objective.
Internal Expectation Argument (IEA)	IEA represents how an instrument of power notionally visualises its own end state when applied in a given conflict environment. An IEA, like EEA and AEA, is itself represented as High, Low or Comm.
Levels of War:⁹	The British interpretation of the levels of war, as elaborated in the <i>British Defence Doctrine</i> ¹⁰ , is used throughout the thesis. These include: <i>The Grand Strategic Level:</i> The full use of issues associated with the maintenance of political independence and territorial integrity and the pursuit of wider national interests. <i>The Military Strategic Level:</i> This is the military component of grand strategy. The two are collectively referred to as ‘strategic level’. <i>The Operational Level:</i> The level at which campaigns are planned. It links military strategy to tactics. <i>The Tactical Level:</i> The level at which war-fighting actually takes place. It is the art of disposing forces for battle.
Low Expectation Argument (LEA):	A LEA implies a general perception where unfavourable outcome – by way of military or political defeat – is expected for the entity to which a low expectation is attached.

Market State:	The emerging constitutional order that promotes maximising the opportunity of a people, tending to privatise many state activities and making representative governments more responsive to the market. ¹¹
Military Strategy:	The art of developing and employing military forces consistent with grand strategic objectives. ¹²
Multivariate:	Having or involving a number of independent mathematical or statistical variables.
Nation State:	A nation state is a sovereign entity dominated by a single nation ¹³ and claims sovereignty over a fixed territory. ¹⁴ It is distinguished from other forms of state structures by its emphasis on a defined territory and the degree of organisation required to manage that territory. ¹⁵
Negative Correlation:	This a relationship between two variables in which the variables tend to change in opposite directions—when one is high or increases, the other tends to be low or decrease. ¹⁶
Notional Assessment Factor (NAF)	NAF indicates the relative variance between what victory or defeat is perceived to be among the belligerents. It is the condensed influence of a number of factors such as the nature of war, the political object, culture, history etc. It is not a mathematical coefficient but a notional argument. All belligerent develop a notional framework built around the standalone value attached to the 3Zs or their cumulative interplay. Understanding an opposition's NAF would theoretically allow attainment of the required political leverage towards satisfying own perception of victory though a more accurate calibration of violence and effects. The concept can be applied to inform planning ante and in bellum.
Observers:	Observers are entities that are either marginally influenced or totally unaffected by a state of violence between two belligerents. Observers take no part in the conflict except in the capacity of representing the international community and its responses.
OODA Loop:	The fundamental and cyclic decision making process 'observe' - 'orientate' - 'decide' - 'act' as introduced by Lt Col John Boyd, USAF (1927-1997). ¹⁷
Operational Art:	The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of campaigns or major operations. ¹⁸
Paradigm:	'A commitment to the same rule or standard'. ¹⁹ A general consensus so taken for granted as to be unconscious or even ideological.
Perception:	It is the process of attaining awareness or understanding of sensory information. From Latin <i>perceptio</i> , meaning 'receiving, collecting, action of taking possession, apprehension with the mind or senses.' ²⁰

Pre-theory or Pre-theory:	A pre-theory is a conceptual exploration designed to identify and observe relationships in a field of inquiry carefully, then to formulate organising principles and testable theories. It may be used to develop new and rudimentary ideas regarding political phenomena or to classify procedures and methods of research and analysis. ²¹
Positive Correlation:	This is a relationship between two variables in which both tend to change in the same direction—when one increases; the other also tends to increase. ²² The proportion of change may or may not be linear.
Post-positivism	Multi-perspective triangulation as opposed to empiricism. ²³
Quid nominis and quid rei:	<i>Quid nominis</i> (Latin: what the name says) and <i>quid rei</i> (essence of the thing). ‘A purely nominal definition is just a licence to abbreviate and raises no special problems; but a real definition postulates the existence or at least the possibility of that which is defined and therefore requires justification’. ²⁴ <i>Quid rei</i> is the thing's ‘quiddity’ whereas <i>quid nominis</i> is the quiddity of the name. A logical approach to explaining ‘quiddity’ was presented by Saccheri (1667- 1733), a mathematician and philosopher. According to Sacchari, a definition <i>quid nominis</i> becomes a definition <i>quid rei</i> ‘by means of a postulate, or when we come to the question whether the thing exists and it is answered affirmatively.’ Definitions <i>quid nominis</i> are in themselves quite arbitrary, and neither require nor are capable of proof; they are merely provisional, and are only intended to be turned as quickly as possible into definitions <i>quid rei</i> ‘by means of certain postulates of existence or constructions and by means of demonstrations or when we come to the question whether the thing exists and it is answered affirmatively.’ ²⁵
Realpolitik:	Politics based on practical and material factors rather than on theoretical or ethical objectives. ²⁶
Respondent:	See ‘aggressed’.
Reversal: (Measure of Victory)	Reversal is a large scale setback for an ‘aggressor’. It is distinguished from failure by the significant leverage acceded to the opposition. When used in the context of the aggressed, the term capitulation implies a general collapse.
Success (Measure of victory):	The middle tier in a three-level view of relative military achievement namely strategic victory, success and advantage. ²⁷ See also decisive victory and advantage.

Threat, Categories of :	A first degree threat is one where the very existence or continued existence in a form desired by the threatened party is at stake. A second degree threat is where the core interest of the threatened entity is at stake however; its existence is not at risk. A third degree threat is where the ante includes peripheral interests or where a first or second degree threat to an important ally is present.
Tugged Entities:	These are such groups that are drawn into a conflict as a result of treaty arrangements, secondary interests, moral obligation or any other causation that does not include self-defence, active or latent national objectives.
Victory (Measure of):	See ‘decisive victory’, ‘success’ and ‘advantage’.
War:	It is ‘an armed conflict between two or more parties, usually fought for political ends.’ ²⁸ The use of violence between organised groups aimed at achieving definable politico-military objectives directly—through war-fighting—or through gaining sufficient leverage by military and / or other means for favourable post war bargaining.
Warfare:	The conduct of war through use of military and/or other means. The term has at places been used to qualify an activity undertaken to weaken or destroy the opposition – for example economic warfare, psychological warfare, cyber warfare etc.
Zamin:	Territory seen as space, lebensraum, growth and expansion.
Zan:	The ideological, cultural and political value of objectives of war/conflict; for example, territory seen as ideological space.
Zar:	Voracity: wealth, resources, markets as motivation for conflict / war.
Zero Correlation:	A zero correlation explains the condition when there is no apparent linear relationship between two variables. ²⁹

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AEA	Altered Expectation Argument
C ²	Command and Control ³⁰
C ⁴ I ² SR	Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Information, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. ³¹
CEA	Common Expectation Argument
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EA	Expectation Argument (See also HEA, LEA, CEA and AEA)
EEA	External Expectation Argument
EF	Expectation Framework
G7 / G8	Group of seven industrialised countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the United States. Also known as the Haley Group. G8 is G7 plus Russia. ³²
HEA	High Expectation Argument
HIC	High Intensity Conflict
IW	Irregular Warfare
LEA	Low Expectation Argument
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction ³³
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NAF	Notional Assessment Factor or Framework
OODA	Observe – Orient – Decide – Act ³⁴
P.B.U.H	Peace Be Upon Him (a traditional Islamic suffix to the names of the prophets)

RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs ³⁵
UK	United Kingdom (used synonymous with Great Britain at places)
UN	United Nations
US	United States, United States of America
USA	United States of America
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction ³⁶
WW I	World War I
WW II	World War II

Chapter Notes and Reference

¹ W. F. Hussain, 'The Gale', *A collection of poems, sonnets and thoughts*, unpublished manuscript (Rawalpindi, ca. 1952).

² *Oxford English Dictionary: The Definitive Record of the English Language*, internet, <http://www.oed.com/actuality>, s.v., 'actuality,' accessed 2 May 2009.

³ Colin S. Gray, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory* (SSI, Carlisle, 2002), p. 10.

⁴ Major General Werner Widder, 'Auftragstaktik and Innerfuehrung: Trademark of German Leadership,' *Military Review* 3:9 (2002), also on internet, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct02/SepOct02/widder.pdf>

⁵ Cognitive dissonance theory was developed by Leon Festinger in 1957. It is concerned with the relationships among cognitions. See internet, Ithaca.edu. <http://www.ithaca.edu/faculty/stephens/cdback.html>, accessed 10 Feb 2009.

⁶ *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. by Simon Blackburn (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), s.v. 'face validity,'

⁷ Matrin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan, *International Relations: The Key Concepts* (Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, London and New York, 2002), pp.126-127.

⁸ *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, op. cit., s.v. 'illusory correlation.'

⁹ Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, *British Defence Doctrine*, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (JDP 0-01) 3rd ed. (DCDC, Shrivenham, 2008), pp. 2.6 – 2.7.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History* (Penguin, London, 2002), p. 912.

¹² Ibid.

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- ²¹ William C. Martel, *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007), p. 91.
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- ²⁴ William and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1984), p. 348.
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- ²⁶ Realpolitik is defined as politics based on practical and material factors rather than on theoretical or ethical objectives. See *Meriam Webster Online Dictionary*, internet, <http://mw1.m-w.com/dictionary/realpolitik>, s.v. 'realpolitik,' accessed 6 May 2009.
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- ²⁸ *Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, op.cit., s.v. 'war', p.521
- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ The United States Department of Defence (DOD), *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Internet, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/>, s.v. 'C2', accessed 29 December 2004.
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

Appearances to the mind are of four kinds. Things either are what they appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be.¹

Epictetus (AD 55–AD 135)

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

The outcome of a competition, a duel or an engagement is generally reflected in terms of shades of success or failure for example, a victory, a defeat, or something in between. The latter is usually referred to as a draw, if it is a single identifiable battle or, if protracted, a stalemate. In its everyday use, the word ‘victory’ is easy to comprehend as it generally corresponds to its synonyms: success, attainment, ascendancy, or triumph. However historically, the question of identifying winners and losers has never found entirely straightforward answers. The Second World War, the Cold War and its proxy conflicts such as Vietnam for example, point to a dualistic, even paradoxical usage the word. When applied in the context of the ‘war’ against terrorism or the struggles of states and peoples fighting for their identity, ideology or very survival, different perspectives and interpretations of physical and metaphysical dimensions of victory emerge. Perception of victory and defeat also appear to directly influence the process of attaining the former while avoiding the latter. For any party to a conflict, leverage – the very purpose of coercive and compelling strategies – is intimately tied to the opposing subjective and encultured notions of victory and defeat.

We know from the experiences of the 20th century and what we have seen of the current one (21st), that wars do not end the way they did for the great captains of the classical age or the relatively recent champions of the modern era.² Victory is not as simple to construe, describe, define, convey, internalise or externalise as it perhaps was in the past and is even harder to achieve politically even if attained militarily.

Success has many faces. Some clear and familiar, while others not so obvious and yet more that are even paradoxical to the physical outcome. Victory and defeat, while vaguely acknowledged in all their complexity, are accepted in rather simplistic and often abstract terms. Given the subjectivity of the process – that is to say strategy, to the

objective notion of victory – such assumptions are a potential recipe for wider unintended fallouts and even political and social disaster. It is argued that at the political level where policy is formed and action shaped, subjective, notional and in many ways volatile precepts of winning and losing that emerge constitute a major influence on policy, one that should never be ignored.

Any society or organised group that is in conflict with another generally seeks success according to its own understanding of what such success might mean. This, history tells us, has been the general way of things. This ‘internalised’ view of victory, non-victory and defeat combined with optimism in one’s capability as matched against that of the opposition has caused conflicts to erupt into wars, shaped the course of wars, set the desired goals for the use of coercive and compelling instruments of power, helped define the nature and choice of ends and indeed also the strategic choices in war initiation and war termination.

The opportunity to address these substantive issues and arrive at a better understanding of the notion and definition of victory and to present a theory thereof was indeed alluring. The decision to take-up the challenge and commit to a doctoral research however, finds its origins in the encouragement received from Prof. Christopher Bellamy who, when the topic was proposed for an MSc thesis, identified its merits for PhD. My preliminary research, and later, the survey of literature revealed that the field of study, in its dimension and scope as admitted in this inquiry, was in fact largely unaddressed.

SECTION 2: BACKGROUND

WHY DOES ‘VICTORY’ NEED A THEORY AND DEFINITION?

This research is motivated by the need to identify the condition beyond the frames and images of victory and defeat that are presented in historical accounts, literature, the media, by leaders, politicians and even societies in self-credit for their achievements. A historical analysis of the pursuit of victory suggests that the nature of victory sought, its dynamics and the paradigms shaping it govern – in a proactive sense, and shape – in a passive context, the conflict continuum. In turn, this influences the ways, as also, the means adopted to realise the desired ends of policy. If this thesis holds even partially, the consequences are profound. Both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz caution strategy and policy to understand the broader ambit of any military adventure. Sun Tzu argues that ‘weapons are

tools of ill omen. War is a grave matter; one is apprehensive lest men embark upon it without due refection.’³ Clausewitz, echoes a similar warning ‘no one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is the political purpose; the latter its operational objective.’⁴ Arguably, neither Sun Tzu, nor Clausewitz would object if we were to draw a direct relationship between what is to be achieved from violence and how that ought to relate to success by way of advancing policy. Clearly, ‘Victory’ as it applies to nations, states, military campaigns and more importantly, the course of politics, is not merely a word defining an ‘outcome’; rather, it takes the relevance of a term describing a ‘condition’ which is part of a larger ‘process’ drawn through time, space and cultural change.

Contemporary definitions of victory tend to relate to a comparative or competitive calculus of outcome as opposed to linking these with the purpose, utility, sustainability and effects of victory. Some common definitions are:

- The defeat of an enemy in battle, or of an antagonist in any contest; a gaining of the superiority in any struggle or competition; conquest; triumph; - the opposite of defeat.⁵
- The overcoming of an enemy or antagonist; achievement of mastery or success in a struggle or endeavour against odds or difficulties.⁶
- A conquest gained: success against an opponent.⁷

The explanations vary from antonym of ‘defeat’ to various degrees of success (superiority, triumph or conquest). It is also seen as a relative condition between two or more opponents wherein there are winners and losers. A point made by many theorists and writers on the notion of victory in warfare is that there has been relatively little direct research on the subject. This will be evident from Chapter II, where the relevant literature is analysed. Victory, as our sampling of definitions and meanings shows, is seen and perceived in a linear, straightforward light. There appears to be little more said beyond the fact that the victorious party takes the spoils and the world is divided up into winners and losers. This research shows that victory in war and success that should accrue from such a victory is often divorced in the complex global environment. Could a more

structured understanding of the notion of victory within a broad theory of victory allow strategists to manage fallouts? The answer is an emphatic ‘yes’.

In the absence of theory, a learning process begins with the very first line of operation adopted by the revisionist to attain their political objectives. With learning and action going along side by side, hostilities have a tendency to prolong as each side adjusts to the fluctuating goalposts until at least one of the belligerents learns to relate military effects with the nature of leverage that the military instrument offers for political utility. We find that actions of statesmen and military commanders in pursuit of political leverage and military success are governed by the peculiar prevalent notions and paradigms of victory as held by that particular society or group. This notion may be asymmetric, that is to say, not common or shared in form or perception as embraced by the other side. Furthermore, belligerents may not necessarily enter into a conflict for entirely the same reason or with opposing perceptions or ‘ends’. Relative suppositions of objectives – the notion or ‘situational-subjective’ definition of victory – may also differ to the extent of lacking any similarity. This relativity of meaning, within a given society, is due largely to changes in that society and how historical events are placed in the modern perspective.

Questions about the meaning of victory have been asked across a wide range of interests and disciplines: from the military perspective to psychological, political and philosophical perspectives and in its temporal dimension to an abstract, undefined vision – the victory awaited. In all its forms, the notion of victory has shaped human endeavours towards its attainment. This was manifested most intensely in the war-termination phase of WWII. With German and Japanese military defeat inevitable, the events during the last phase of the war were more indicative of what the allies perceived as victory as opposed to where the opposition believed itself to have conceded defeat.

It has become increasingly important to understand the meaning, effects, implications and indeed the place of military victory in the contemporary world. Tools that assist in predicting the effects of victory need to be developed with regard to the intersection between military action and national and international policy making. Accordingly, the domestic political agenda can determine the meaning of victory and what indicators one voices. This can, in turn, influence the conduct of the war. Secondly, the study of victory also relates the need, in the final assessment, to take into account the implications of

victory. Both these areas are to be seen from the military view of victory as well as the social and political aspects of it.

The social impact of victory or defeat is another area that has gained prominence particularly after the Vietnam War. The role of media and its influence on society in assessing victory – this includes the media’s criticism or promulgation of ideologies of victory – has long term and strategic consequences. For example Dick Polman, a political columnist at the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, writing for the *Tribune news Service* in September 2001 identified that while the then US President Mr Bush remained determined to win the first war of the 21st century, and that ‘it’s clear that most Americans want to flex military muscle in pursuit of victory, the problem is that administration officials and foreign policy analysts can’t agree on what victory is.’⁸ He argues that Americans ‘...can’t agree on an answer to the most fundamental questions: How do we know when we’ve won? Or if we’ve won at all?’⁹ Such predicaments can be found echoing in other parts of the world too. Such voids in understanding success are far too frequently and far too frequently filled through all the wrong means.

The nature of modern society and the prevailing international environment compels a review of the perception of success and failure and forces us to reassess the nature of military, political and psycho-social victory. Yet, despite a large amount of research in recent years (since 2004), no wholesome or conclusive theory has emerged. William C. Martel, the author of *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy* (2007), finds that ‘despite the vast literature on strategy and war, we do not have any clearly defined theory, set of concepts, or language of victory’ he further amplifies that ‘although the problem of victory is of immense importance, the language used to describe victory consists largely of terms whose usage is imprecise.’¹⁰

Such is the backdrop in which this research finds its origins, relevance and motivation. In objective, synthesis and approach, this research is charting relatively new territory.

AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

AIMS

The thesis has two broad aims:

- 1) to define victory as it relates to the synthesis of the politico-military and socio-cultural dimensions of war,
- 2) to develop a theory of victory and identify its influences on and diplomacy.

In addition to the above, as natural spill-over, the research also provides a useable framework and the essential tools for leadership, strategists and military commanders in the making of strategy and its execution as well as for scholarship and students of political science, international relations and military history for post analysis.

OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

In terms of purpose, this thesis can best be described as a simultaneous inductive and abductive handling of data addressing the research questions. Expressed schematically as two loops, a figure of ‘eight’ that intersect in the middle as expressed in Figure 1 below:



FIGURE 1: OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE
(AUTHOR'S OWN DIAGRAM)

In the first loop, through an inductive process, a generalised concept of victory, elements of victory and the relationship among the elements is established. In the second abductive loop, ‘phenomena’ are explained through hypotheses. From verified hypotheses a theory is generated. The understanding and definition of victory is then taken to the level where it’s utility towards informing policy and strategy is discussed. The thesis, therefore, extends into the development of an objectively framed, scenario-based concept for the purpose of war from the standpoint of an ever-evolving paradigm of victory.

‘No one has unique access to a trustworthy crystal ball’¹¹ and prediction, in meaning, scope or context comes with inherent pitfalls. This thesis is not predictive as far as warfare is concerned but does look at the evolving and ever changing environment in which war occurs.¹² It does not seek to predict or present the nature and character of future war in the military technical context. Rather, it looks at the ever changing environment in which war and operations ensue whether they are technically charged or primitive, and what ends such operations would or should seek to attain.

In everyday life, solutions are often a function of how one decides to frame a problem. Inversely, ‘the choice of the problem’ in Margaret Mead’s words ‘dictates both our choice of classification and our point of view – our intellectual stance.’¹³ This thesis argues that a political objective when interfaced with the notion of victory may suggest a different set of strategies and choices as opposed to allowing war’s inherent tendencies and mismatched political objectives from guiding choices and action.

In terms of temporal scope and value, the study uses evidence of the past, speculative and critical historiography,¹⁴ to inform the present and ‘predict’ a future course or trend. While some of the data admitted in the research dates to the earliest recorded events and battles, the notion of victory and its evolution is traced from modern¹⁵ to contemporary times. The future applicability of the emerging paradigms is built around tools for ‘contemplative reflection’ as opposed to ‘prescriptive theorisation’ and therefore not restrictive in temporal scope of application.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

‘What is victory?’ This simplistic enquiry constitutes the primary focus reflected in the three broad aims and objectives. Satisfying the scope and depth defined, focuses the research in three broad subcategories namely, the military dimension of victory, the psychosocial enquiry and political context that is invariably a combination of the two. The study is steered by a number of subordinate enquiries, namely: What are the components of victory; to what extent and measure have these individual elements contributed to the broader notion of victory? How have victory and defeat been perceived and manifested in international relations? What is the impact of globalization and the ‘market order’ on international politics and how might internal and international conflicts under the obtaining and projected environment impact the nature, scope and direction of military operations and, in turn, the desired end-state? What is the linkage between

military and political victory and how does this relationship inform the art and science of war-termination? What roles have belief systems, socio-political and cultural paradigms played in shaping the notion of victory? Have such perceptions remained absolute, and if not, what were/are their dynamics and the drivers? Is victory an enduring notion or do its precepts and perceptions change over time? How volatile is the change in the notion of success or failure during the course of war and conflict as well as after the hostilities have ended? And last, does a better understanding of the paradigms of victory serve any practical purpose for polity and the military in the higher strategic direction of war and for setting the conceptual contours of military operations?

THE THEORETICAL POSITION AND RELEVANCE OF THE THESIS

The nature of this inquiry spans several disciplines within the broad ambit of social sciences. In terms of input, predominantly resting in the domain of political science, strands of several sub-disciplines are synthesised; these include: international relations, war studies and strategic studies. History – more specifically military history, sociology and cultural studies are the other three sub-disciplines that this work spans. In terms of output, the thesis narrows down to political and military conflict, the domain of war and strategic studies as illustrated in Figure 2:




FIGURE 2: THE THEORETICAL POSITION OF THE THESIS
(AUTHOR'S OWN DIAGRAM)

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

The thesis aims to define and present a theory of Victory as it applies to the political and military dimension of war. The research questions are seminal enquiries that largely remain unanswered in literature. Through an analysis of how the notion of victory has influenced statecraft and the conduct of war in the past, the future course of international conflict, war, warfare and war-fighting will be determined. As such, albeit decidedly theoretical, in application this thesis has a predominantly practical focus and is intended to provide tools for better orientation at the operational, strategic and grand-strategic levels of competition in general and war and conflict in particular. These are tools that can help make better sense of the chaos that surrounds war and strategy in the absence of sound theory.

SECTION 3 – METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH METHODS

This is a qualitative research built around secondary analysis of data. The term qualitative research is applied variously in different fields.¹⁶ In the social sciences, qualitative research provides an approach for understanding the world and to construct meaning out of experiences. Epistemologically qualitative methods are not intended to invent a viewpoint; instead, they only attribute ideas in order that we can truly understand motives, reasons and actions.¹⁷ Defining or redefining victory through a process that involves reattribution of new ideas from existing data and facts, abating existential position premised on apparently exhaustive analysis and generating theory from within is a challenge this research, as indeed that of many social scientists, confronts.

THE NATURE OF THE STUDY

Philosophically, this study deals with theorising the condition and process of victory. Subjectively however, the abductive epitome of victory and the ‘practitioner’s’ notions also need to be synthesised towards developing theory. Essentially, this ‘back to front and back’ approach put to question the applicability of common qualitative research methods; thus, a tailored approach had to be adopted.

WHY GROUNDED THEORY?

A new perspective for social sciences research was established by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss. For over three decades, Grounded Theory has been progressively

developed and is currently considered to be one of the most comprehensive qualitative research methodologies available.¹⁸ The emphasis on explaining phenomena through theorising and hypothesising sits as the core of Grounded Theory and is as such the most suited approach for the nature of this inquiry. Grounded Theory is not discipline specific, is adaptable and its product verifiable. A good Grounded Theory is one that is:

- inductively derived from data,
- subjected to theoretical elaboration, and
- judged adequate to its domain with respect to a number of evaluative criteria.

Although developed for and principally used within the field of sociology, Grounded Theory can be, and has been, successfully employed by researchers and scholars in a variety of different disciplines as diverse as education, medicine, psychology and political science. Glaser and Strauss do not regard the procedures of Grounded Theory as discipline specific and encourage researchers to use and adapt the procedures for their own disciplinary purposes.¹⁹ Further explanation is contained in Appendix A.

APPLICATION OF GROUNDED THEORY APPROACH

This research is underpinned by an adapted grounded theory approach. However, the exhaustive data-handling procedures found in grounded theory are not fully applied. The digression finds its logic in the fact that this research is principally based on secondary analysis and does not contest the validity of these data except where indicated. Most data used was already axially and selectively coded. New data generated falls in the domain of generated theories thus falls in the realm of product rather than the process and is therefore outside the data management protocols of grounded theory. With this premise, demonstration of data-handling and its progressive coding was considered unnecessary and would have greatly reduced the readability of the text without adding value to the arguments presented.

RESEARCH DESIGN

A good research design is essential for focused research and works like ‘glue that holds the research together.’²⁰ It structures the research and shows ‘how all of the major parts of the research project - the samples or groups, measures, treatments or programs, and methods of assignment - work together to try to address the central research questions.’²¹

Research designs are intimately linked with the nature of data admitted. These range from experimental research designs, quasi-experimental designs to non-experimental designs. In *Designing Social Inquiry*, G. King et. al. point out that Positivism and verifiability require obviating some and precluding other possible approaches, a research design that is too strictly curtailed raises its own set of hazards.²²

In establishing valid, verifiable and sufficient open coded data, a ‘twin looped’ design has been adapted as alluded to earlier in Figure 1. The inductive loop was applied where sufficient data and its attendant parameters were available whereas an abductive loop (the best shot solution) applied where certain amount of hypothesising was necessitated. Figure 3 illustrates the design:




FIGURE 3: THE RESEARCH DESIGN
(AUTHOR’S OWN DIAGRAM)

An inherent flexibility accrued from this process that allowed data collection to remain open-ended; a basic necessity for a thesis that seeks to look into uncharted territory.

DATA FLOW AND INTRA-CHAPTER RELATIONSHIP

The processing and flow of data through the thesis is non-linear as would be expected in a grounded theory approach. The type of data generated, the processes involved and its structure and flow from chapter to chapter is illustrated in Figure 4 below:




FIGURE 4: DATA INPUT AND FLOW
(AUTHOR'S OWN DIAGRAM)

In the context of data flow, the thesis can be seen to be divided in three parts (note that such subdivision is not been formally used.) In the above diagram, the arrow heads (hereafter referred to as links) indicate linkage and process whereas the boxes denote the content of the chapters and the function of each chapter as a node for data coding. Coded data refers to axially coded information. The literature survey provides an initial sampling of data for inclusion (blue arrows labelled raw data source). Open coding is carried out in Chapter II and III. Simultaneously the process of initial hypothecation and some degree of axial coding commences (red arrows labelled 'Coded Data', yellow arrows labelled 'Hypothesis' and blue outline arrows labelled 'Thesis'.)

A synthesis of data is carried out in Part 2 where selectively coded data is generated. This manifests itself in the form of pre-theories (black outline arrows), theses (blue outline arrows) and syntheses (red outline arrows). The process is concluded in Part 3 where the theory is generated from the selectively coded data produced in Part 2.

ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS

The thesis is divided over eight chapters:

Chapter 1 introduced the topic, set the background and while elaboration the aim, scope and objectives, identified the research questions. It also succinctly explained the theoretical foundation and methodology for the research. A more detailed explanation of the methodology is contained in Appendix A.

A general survey of literature with a detailed analytical review of selected literature is presented in Chapter II. The chapter also serves to refine the research questions. Arguably an extension of the literature review, Chapter III explores war in the context of the space in which it occurs. The utility of the instrument and its application are discussed. The chapter essentially binds the study's theoretical framework with a broad understanding of the perspectives on war and conflict.

Chapter IV scopes existing concepts of victory and gleans nascent theories therefrom. Several pretheories are constructed which collectively define the various perspectives on victory and serve as a framework for case analysis. Chapter V charts selected cases from 680 AD to the present times. A mix of paradigmatic, deviant and critical cases has been used to explore the notion of victory in its fullest sense. Using frameworks for victory arrived at in Chapter IV, the grey areas and voids in theory are clearly discerned.

Chapter VI constructs a synthesised theory which is then used to re-establish a more informed relationship between policy, strategy and action in Chapter VII. Major findings, conclusions and recommendations are summed up in Chapter VIII.

Chapter Notes and References

¹ Epictetus, *Discourses* (Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1865), reprinted in *The Works of Epictetus*, consisting of his *Discourses*, in four books, *The Enchiridion*, and *Fragments* (Howard University Press, Cambridge, 2001), Chapter XXVII, p. 72.

² The classical age generally refers to the period from 500 BC to 500 AD. The Modern era of warfare can be said to have concluded with the American civil war although some scholars maintain that it extended into the 20th century. See Daniel Easington, 'Warfare and the Classical World,' internet, <http://www.suite101.com/content/classical-warfare-a190653>, 10 Jan 2010, accessed 23 Mar 2010.

³ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffiths (Oxford University Press, New York, 1971), p. 63.

⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New York, 1979), p. 579.

⁵ Dictionary Net, <http://www.dictionary.net/victory>, s.v. 'Victory', accessed December 25, 2005.

⁶ *Merriam-Webster English Dictionary and Thesaurus*, op. cit., s.v. 'Victory'

⁷ *Chambers 20th Century Dictionary*, eds. C. M. Schawartz et. al., (Chambers, Edinburgh, 1983), s.v. 'Victory.'

⁸ Dick Polman, 'Meaning of victory may mean many things', *Tribune News Service*, 17/9/2001.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ William C. Martel, op. cit., p. 291.

¹¹ Colin S. Gray in *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (Widenfeld and Nicolson, London, 2005), p. 38.

¹² The inherent pitfalls of the second dimension of the study, i.e. forecasting, are obvious. However, as Lewinsohn points out, humans have tried to anticipate the future, partly from curiosity, but mainly because knowledge of the future – even imperfect knowledge – may help to improve decisions in the present. See R. Lewinsohn, *Science, Prophecy and Prediction*, trans. Arnold J. Pomerans (Bell Publishing Company, New York, 1961).

¹³ Margaret Mead, *Continuities in Cultural Evolution* (Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1999), p.4.

¹⁴ Antony Flew, *A Dictionary of Philosophy* (Pan Books, London, 1979), pp. 138 – 139.

¹⁵ The term 'modern' is used to denote a period of time extending from the 18th century to contemporary times.

¹⁶ Howard S. Becker, *The Epistemology of Qualitative Research* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996), pp. 53-71.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Brian D. Haig, 'Grounded Theory as Scientific Method', *Scientific Method*, ed. Alven Neiman (PES Publications Office-University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1995), also on internet, <http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/eps/PES-Yearbook/default.asp>.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ William M. K. Torchim, *Research Methods Knowledge Base*, s.v. 'design,' internet, <http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/design.htm>, Accessed 29 Dec 2005.

²¹ Ibid.

²² In *Designing Social Inquiry*, G. King, R. O. Keohane and S. Verba opine that the 'first-rate social scientist does not regard a research design as a blueprint for a mechanical process of data-gathering and evaluation. To the contrary, the scholar must have the flexibility of mind to overturn old ways of looking at the world, to ask new questions, to revise research designs appropriately, and then to collect more data of a different type than originally intended.' See G. King, R. O. Keohane and S. Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994), p. 12.

CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW

The lessons of history are never clear. Clio is like the Delphic oracle: It is only in retrospect, and usually too late, that we understand what she was trying to say.¹

Sir Michael Howard (1983)

A simpler error that is related to the failure to describe the nature of evidence is the failure to distinguish between assertion and evidence.²

Baumeister and Leary (1997)

INTRODUCTION

An initial survey of literature between November 2004 and December 2005 revealed a surprisingly low volume of direct research dealing with theory and definition of victory.³ The ambiguity and inconsistency in the language and vocabulary of victory was immediately evident. However, during the course of the research, more and more literature began to appear. A particular surge was noted after 2006. With more and more research of varied depth and scope appearing, this chapter was continually revised accordingly.⁴ As such, a cut-off date for inputs to this chapter was set as 31 July 2007. Literature appearing after this date, particularly where apposite data was to be found, continued to be incorporated in the relevant chapters till 31 July 2009.

The flood of literature, on a subject left comparatively ignored, was apparently encouraged by the difficulties faced by the US and its allies in securing political success in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁵ Having followed a Clausewitzian script⁶ and disposed perceived centres of gravity of both the countries through swift military action, political and arguably total military success could not be accrued. It remained elusive even at the time of the final write-up of this thesis in Jul 2010.

Researching a topic on which the literature is not pre-organised as a result of prior enquires, necessitated the development of an appropriate framework for categorisation and classification of the data in a manner appropriate to the requirements, development and flow of the thesis as a whole. The lack of theoretical framework and broad-based research on the notion of victory presented, on the one hand, a major hurdle in establishing a foundation upon which the thesis could develop, while on the other, a

unique opportunity for developing such a framework and building upon some of the works that started to emerge.

The research questions registered in chapter I all relate to one or more of the dimensions of war namely: the politico-military, the military-strategic and the psycho-social. However, other quintessential areas that the literature review needs to address are culture and philosophy so as to provide a perspective on fundamental problems concerning matters such as drivers for human action, existence, knowledge, values, truth, reason, reality, and language as a whole. The literature survey thus spans works across a broad canvas encompassing the aforementioned areas of social science. The purpose of the survey is to grasp the tangible, empirically assessable notions, concepts and ideas that collectively contain an understanding of victory and defeat or allow for such an understanding to be aided or developed.

Owing to the peculiar relationship that the literature bears to the thrust of this study, the review is constructive and analytical in nature and hence voluminous. As for its scope, it is influenced in its breadth by the lack of formal research on the subject and, in its depth by the attendant question that stem from the basic enquiry.

Research on the literature was carried out in two phases. The first phase involved a broad survey with selective in-depth study to build an annotated bibliography and, using inductive method, establish precepts and pointers towards the understanding and treatment of victory. The second phase involved a fresh survey based on precepts and pointers as well as additional questions that emerged from the first survey. It also involved the selection of sources to be included and the basic coding of the data for further categorization, field segregation and relevance. A detailed study of the narrowed down literature followed.

With the bulk of the literature being generally indirectly related to the study at hand, a constructive secondary analysis of data was needed. Where specific issues emerged, deductive reasoning and post-positivism⁷ as opposed to empiricism and reductionism provided the necessary tools for analysis. The eclectic blending of 'notions' as well as the nomothetic paradigms of victory that emerged, provide some answers to the basic question 'what is victory?' and a foundation for the study to build upon.

SECTION 1: MILITARY VICTORY

War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war there is no substitute for victory.⁸

General Douglas MacArthur

THE VICTORY CONDITION

One of the earliest work describing the condition and strategy for victory is undoubtedly Sun Tzu's *Art of War*.⁹ Written between 400 to 320 BC but drawing from earlier texts, probably as old as 600 BC¹⁰ in what is now north China, *The Art of War* is one of the most enlightening, broad and central works that is in many ways unequalled. Sun Tzu links the pursuit of the 'ends' – the condition of victory – with 'ways', 'means' that is to say, the strategy and also the 'methods.' He posits that only with the strategy of taking 'whole,'¹¹ will the general find complete victory.¹² The military is thus kept intact, 'preserving both the advantage that leads to victory and the advantage that comes from victory.'¹³ Sun Tzu is deeply concerned with how victory is attained and not merely with the fact of its attainment. It thus implies a condition where the enemy, as Clausewitz puts it, is compelled to do our will¹⁴ without the need to destroy the 'whole'.

Clausewitz, of course, suggests a more direct approach and this notion is also shared by Baron Antoine Henri Jomini, a contemporary and in many ways a rival of Clausewitz. Jomini's work, *Précis on the Art of War*,¹⁵ stands its own ground in complexity and depth. Jomini too identifies the battle as the chief arbitrator of victory or defeat and in that sees the destruction of the enemy army as a means to the end of **occupying the enemy capital** (or threatening to), whereupon the enemy would have to make peace on the victors terms. Jomini to his credit also identified 'war of opinion' as a distinct category meriting separate strategic and political inquiry. His classification of such wars included national wars and civil wars.¹⁶ He arguably alludes to the understanding that the condition of victory apparent in such wars is quite different from that one may attain by occupying the capital or destroying an army.

Clausewitz does not advance a theory of victory; he does however describe the condition and the process that helps a general arrive to that condition. Clausewitz emphasises the need for victory, the condition, to be complete or decisive. He writes '*... the importance of victory is determined by the vigour with which the immediate pursuit is carried out. In other words, pursuit makes up the second act of the victory [decisive battle being the*

first] and in many cases is more important than the first. Strategy at this point draws nearer to tactics in order to receive the completed assignment from it; and its first exercise of authority is to demand that victory should really be complete.¹⁷

THE PURSUIT OF VICTORY

Threaded in the literature on the art of war from Sun Tzu to the great military minds of today are prescriptions for winning and cautions to avoid defeats. However, within the great works of antiquity like Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War*,¹⁸ more than prescription – or in the context of the latter, history – are to be found. Thucydides, for example, while describing a particular event in history – the Peloponnesian War – explores war in a larger context and tries to explain its causes through human nature, in the nature of power and the nature of the state. He examines methodically many events, paying special attention to facts. He also offers opinion from time to time, but does not judge actions as good or evil, he merely shows us that those that have power can use it as they see fit and that morality is nothing but a construct of power. Not surprisingly, Thucydides is described as the first realist,¹⁹ as Sun Tzu is perhaps the first rationalist theoretician.

The place of morality and honour in victory is vividly discernable. The Malian dialogue²⁰ on the one hand conveys the realist approach of 'might is right' and, on the other, the need for a morality for waging war. Thucydides presents a purely rational argument that in power 'there can be no compromise'. For power to be respected, it must be demonstrated, any challenger must be put down else others will sense weakness. There can be no peace in alliance – there can be only one, the powerful. Machiavelli echoes the same sentiments in *The Prince*.²¹ Machiavelli's advances what may be described today as the realist paradigm of victory: 'I believe that the man who adapts his course of action to the nature of the times will succeed and, likewise, that the man who sets his course of action out of tune with the times will come to grief.'²² He further states, 'one will discover that something which appears to be a virtue, if pursued, will end in his destruction; while some other thing which seems to be a vice, if pursued, will result in his safety and his well-being.'²³

Clausewitz describes the victory condition at length. An entire chapter of *On War* is devoted to it.²⁴ Clausewitz arrives at an important component of victory and defeat, namely the 'moral' dimension. He asserts that it is the defeated side that finds itself in a

vicious circle of material loss and loss of morale, each feeding on and intensifying the other:

... [T]he scale of victory does not increase simply at a rate commensurate with the increase in size of the defeated armies, but progressively. The outcome of a major battle has a greater effect on the loser than on the winner. This, in turn, gives rise to additional loss of material strength, which is echoed in loss of morale; the two become mutually interactive as each enhances and intensifies the other. ... on the victor's side however, all these factors only serve to increase his courage. So what happens is that the loser's scale falls much further below the line of the original equilibrium than the winner's rises above it.²⁵

Seen in this way, Clausewitz is arguably the father of a method of victory that manifested itself more than a century later, the physical and moral dislocation and paralysis of the enemy as opposed to its destruction.

A much less debated passage of *On War* identifies the nature of victory and its linkage to the nature of war. Clausewitz observes that:

Since war can be thought of in two different ways—its absolute form or one of the variant forms that it actually takes [real war]—**two different concepts of success arise**.... In the absolute form of war.... only one result counts: final victory. ...If we postulate the second concept, we will find **it legitimate to pursue minor advantages for their own sake and leave the future to itself**. [Emphasis added]²⁶

Clausewitz argues that historically neither form of war has existed exclusively or in totality, postulating that we will never find a war entirely in the second category to an extent where the first could be disregarded. Victory in parts—that flows from the second concept would always therefore be influenced by victories from the first, that is to say, the final victory in battle. In summary, Clausewitz offers two key concepts:

- 1) linkage between the form of war and the nature of victory and,
- 2) the moral influence of victory and defeat; most significantly, the asymmetry of moral and physical effects upon the loser as opposed to the benefits accrued by the victor.

The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein, by Brian Bond (1998)²⁷ is a perceptive and insightful starting point for advancing our discussion on the contemporary understanding of military victory. It provides insight into the changes with regard to the perception of victory against the background of historical and social developments.²⁸ The title 'The Pursuit of Victory' also suggests an ironic addition or qualification such as 'a mirage' or 'will-o-the-wisp', and this for two reasons:

First, in the purely military sphere, it would become increasingly difficult in the later nineteenth century for commanders to win victories which were 'decisive' in the sense that they annihilated the enemy's main army or battle fleet to the extent of making further organized resistance impossible. The second was the revolution in fire-power, the rapid spread of railways and the telegraph, and perhaps most significant of all, the ability of industrialized nation states to raise and maintain huge conscript armies and echelons of reserves--all these factors suggested that wars would be decided more by attrition than by decisive battles.²⁹

The above extract points to a core aspect which is central to any investigation and discussion on the modern view of victory and how it has changed over time. Another aspect that Bond deals with and which is central to the literature is the decisive nature or the idea of finality which is commonly associated with the term victory. In a traditional sense victory implies closure and brings an end or a conclusion to a certain social or political situation in the total favour of one party. In the past, as Bond states, the element of finality in victory was taken as an essential part of its meaning. However, in the modern age or the age of the multinational states and the transparency of borders, the situation with regard to final victory becomes more complex and multivalent. Bond suggests that 'the notion of 'decisiveness' implies political direction and control.'³⁰

THE SURRENDER

From the strategic perspective, surrender occurs when 'a military engagement or a war is terminated by an agreement under which active hostilities cease and control over the loser's remaining military capability is vested in the winner.'³¹ Such victory can be accomplished either through disruption, in which the enemy's ability to resist is either destroyed in pitched battle or disabled through attrition. 'Surrender means that winner and loser agree to dispense with a last round of fighting" and is such a rational decision on

both sides when a divergent trend of attrition becomes evident and irreversible. ‘What the loser avoids by offering to surrender is a last, chaotic round of fighting that would have the characteristics of a rout... [the winner] can obtain his objective without paying the costs of a last battle.’³² Take, for example, the French surrender of 1940; both sides clearly appreciated the political advantages of concluding an armistice, which is why it was successful.

The French government bargained its residual fighting capacity using the latent threat of retreating to Africa and waging the war from there, and could thus ‘disarm’ the Germans, who avoided costly terminal operations. The Germans did not press the French on the matter of the fleet. The Italian surrender of 1943, on the other hand, was confused and marred by opportunities lost to the Allies.³³ Unlike the Germans, the victorious Allies adopted an unusually rigid policy of unconditional surrender and refused to negotiate with Badoglio and the King except on their own terms. Although this did not seem to prolong Italian belligerency, ‘it did make the Allies’ fight in Italy harder because they could not avail themselves of friendly Italian units against the Germans, who moved quickly to disarm their former allies.’³⁴

THE FACE OF VICTORY: COLD WAR AND BEYOND

The many articles and studies on the Cold War provide insight into the meaning of victory and material for debate on the ambiguity of the term in the modern context. A valuable contribution in this regard is a journal article by Colin S. Gray entitled ‘How Has War Changed since the End of the Cold War?’³⁵ It is essential to appreciate the significance of the several contexts of war additional to the military. Above all else, the leading driver toward, and in, war, is the political context. Military performance in the conduct of warfare is frequently affected by the cultural context as Colin Gray points out:

... [W]ar is about the peace that will follow; it is not a self-validating occurrence. A heavy focus on military transformation tends to obscure the enduring fact that war is about a lot more than warfare. Pre-eminently, warfare always should be waged with as much regard to the character of the subsequent peace as immediate military necessity allows.³⁶

The above arguments point to an altered perception of warfare in the post-Cold War era. There is a realization that victory implies much more than initial military success.

An excellent introduction to this area of the literature is *Winning the World: Lessons for America's Future from the Cold War* by Thomas M. Nichols.³⁷ This study also refers specifically to the way that the Cold War has altered easy perceptions of victory and also to the fact that the results of the Cold War have in fact thrown traditional views of military success and victory into disarray.

From among the scholarly community, there has been a curious and unexpected silence about the Cold War, a reluctance to think about the nature of the Western victory—or even to think of it as ‘victory’ at all. ‘There have been some attempts to think through the end of the Cold War, but these have been arid academic forays, typically self-referential, into questions about why practitioners of social science disciplines obsessed by high theory were unable to cope with events right in front of their eyes—as though the answers to that were not already obvious.’³⁸ To be fair, historians and archivists have been struggling to mine ever larger sources of information as they come available, but as some observers have pointed out, there seems to be little tension or anticipation in the academy and almost no curiosity among policymakers about what those sources reveal.³⁹

Clausewitz warned that wars are contests between two active, willing enemies both of whom expect to win. Once begun, war—with its precise planning and cerebral doctrine—quickly devolves into a series of stratagems and counter stratagems as each side seeks to retain advantages long enough to achieve a decisive end by collapsing an enemy’s will to resist. Scales talks about how good the Western armies have become at fighting in the Clausewitzian legacy and, in the process, lost sight of how they may need to fight in the future. He writes:

Over the last fifty years Western militaries, particularly the U.S. Armed Forces, have been remarkably consistent in how they fight. ... However, in an era of limited war, the commitment to limited ends demands the use of limited means. Thus the lives of soldiers have become even more precious and there is a growing impetus to develop a method of warfare that will replace manpower expenditures with an ever multiplying application of firepower.⁴⁰

Drawing on the evidence of the US experience in Kosovo, Scales opines that the enemy is watching and improving. He explains:

They realize the preoccupation in the West with firepower. Therefore, we should not be surprised to eventually encounter an enemy who has learned how to nullify the advantages of firepower. ...As a result, the emerging ability of non-Western forces to counter firepower-centred warfare has been hidden in the shadows of unfamiliar military cultures.⁴¹

The Cold War and the development of nuclear strategy greatly influenced warfare and political interaction between nuclear armed competitors. The ‘polarised’ world saw new forms of warfare emerge and introduced new paradigms of selection of objectives and in turn success and victory. The end of the Cold War allowed the world to access a huge body knowledge that had remained out of reach in the Eastern Bloc’s. This literature provided a better understanding of the evolution of the notion of victory as was perceived on the other side of the Iron Curtain. It constitutes a vital link with the more contemporary literature that addresses components, notions, facets and perception of victory in both military and social frames of reference.

A seminar on Soviet-American Dialogue in the ‘Social Sciences: Research Workshop on Interdependence among Nations’ held in 1990 was one of the outcomes of the post-Cold War era, a new chapter in world history. In relation to the notion of victory, one of the most interesting and direct studies presented at the seminar was ‘Evolution of the Concept of Victory in Soviet Military – Political Thought After the Second World War’ by Andrey A. Kokoshin, Viktor M. Sergeev and Vadim L. Tsymbursky.

The trio present a summary of how the Soviets modified their perception of victory in harmony with what was attainable under the environment obtaining during various stages or phases of the Cold War in both the political and the military dimension. A theoretical, almost mechanical, framework for attaining victory in war appears to have dominated Soviet politico-military thought. A semantic structure with two intersecting axes where one axis reflects stages to the conception of a final point where war must be terminated in a manner considered ‘victorious’ and the second axis symbolising actions that need to be undertaken to achieve superiority over the enemy.⁴² The author’s interpretation is presented in Figure 5 below:




FIGURE 5: STAGES OF VICTORY⁴³

(AUTHOR’S OWN DIAGRAM / INTERPRETATION)

After the Second World War, victory was interpreted in Soviet military doctrine in terms of the Soviet experience in that war; based as it was on the full destruction of the opposition, the achievement of maximum destruction of its actual forces, capabilities, and the eventual capitulation of the opposition. The progression of the notion is summed up in the following passage:

By the middle of the 1980s, the phrase “the moral orientation of the military towards victory” was basically transformed into “preparation to retaliate decisively against the aggressor.” In practical military terms, the purely technical formulae of “repulsion” indicated a base line but no goals were defined in military action comparable to the goals that existed in politics, such as “the deterrence of the aggressor” or “the opposition's non-achievement of superiority.” This situation created disunity between the technical and the goal-oriented aspects of victory, insofar as each correlates with one of two conditions in the “ideology of deterrence”: namely, deterrence itself or an act of retribution if deterrence fails. It is precisely because of this disunity that the

military doctrine of the members of the Warsaw Pact proclaims the unusual military goal of “the banning or the non-assumption of war.”⁴⁴

SELECTION OF OBJECTIVE

Sun Tzu suggests that in offence, the object is to avoid battle while in defence the battle is sought. This is an important assertion and one that influences military strategy even today. Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s philosophy of the indirect approach is premised on similar tenets.⁴⁵

On occupation and invasion, Sun Tzu asserts that ‘taking a state whole is superior; destroying it is inferior to this.’ In the same passage he continues with that well known phrase ‘[T]herefore, one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the most skilful. Subduing the other’s military without battle is the most skilful.’⁴⁶ He writes that ‘...the superior military cuts down strategy; its inferior cuts down alliances; its inferior cuts down the military. The worst attacks walled cities.’⁴⁷ Note again the similarity with Clausewitz in the latter two assertions and with the duo of Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller for the former in the pursuit of military victory.⁴⁸

Jomini on the other had writes: ‘In a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the objective point.’⁴⁹ This is how war was viewed in the eighteenth-century and remained relevant till the end of the Second World War (similarities can be drawn with the 2003 Gulf War and the removal of Saddam Hussein, however, technically this was not a war of invasion but one of ‘lien’. Jomini’s work at first appears confined to the age of Napoleon and in that sense was probably out-dated even when published. Some of his ideas however, such as ‘geographical lines of operation’ and ‘objective points’ survive, perhaps because they became so well entrenched in post-Napoleonic military theory that their origins have been forgotten.⁵⁰

OFFENSIVE ACTION

Sun Tzu’s prescription for victory through offensive strategy is evident from the following excerpt from *The Art of War*:

One must take it whole when contending for all-under-heaven. Thus the military is not blunted and advantage can be whole. This is the method of the strategy of attack.⁵¹

The above passage points to the distinct similarity between Sun Tzu's perceptions of victory to the notion attributed to Clausewitz. The difference lies in the choices and priorities. For Sun Tzu, it is an inferior choice to seek decision through decisive battle. However, at times, one may have to destroy the enemy's state or armed forces, if so, Sun Tzu prescribes very similar methods to those of Clausewitz and, like Clausewitz, iterates the need to do so quickly and completely.

Clausewitz's notion of military victory is one that has been central to Western way of war. Clausewitz describes the state of military victory as one where the enemy's ability to enter battle, resist or resume hostilities is destroyed. This has tangible and intangible components. Intangibles such as will power, motivation and cause are qualities difficult to reduce to a strategic equation. The solution is the identification and destruction of the enemy's centre of gravity. To Clausewitz this is the ultimate and most decisive route to absolute victory and as such a military end has to be ruthlessly pursued. Clausewitz however does not suggest that such a victory yields political success of itself. He iterates that 'results in war are never final.'⁵² The ultimate or 'real' victory will have to be sought through diplomacy and bargain reinforced by the quality of leverage, the position of strength provided by a military victory. In a sort of an inverse relationship, an absolute victory (the military sense of it) is incomplete to the object of policy where as a 'real' victory serves policy upfront.

DECISIVE BATTLE

The strategy of 'decisive battle' began to emerge in the early 15th century with the Swiss who, unlike the practice of the time, gave no quarter, took no prisoners and ignored the sanctity of the officer cadre among the enemy. Charles VIII of France practised it with his use of artillery in Italy in 1494 and the practice continued under Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and of course Napoleon.⁵³ The dogma of the decisive battle took a new shape from the period of Napoleon till about 1945 where the annihilation of the enemy force was seen as manifestation of victory. Major General Gerard Chaliand, the author of *The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age*⁵⁴ makes an important distinction here between decisive battle and battle of annihilation and points to an error by some historians in tracing the origins of 'absolute war' to a much earlier period. He writes:

If we limit ourselves to what British and Americans call grand strategy, only battles whose historic military and political results are decisive should be considered decisive. In that sense, the conquest of Constantinople⁵⁵ in 1453 by the Turks and the Arab victories at the River Yarmuk and Kadisaya in 636, which – fought against Byzantium in the case of the former and the Persians in the case of the latter – gave them possession of Syria and Iraq, were decisive battles.⁵⁶

Clausewitz may not have ‘invented’ a new theory of war or presented the conceptual contours of a ‘new art’, he however summed up and consolidated centuries of military thought in precise simplicity terms that others before him failed to. Many historians and military thinkers who study Clausewitz forget one basic fact that Clausewitz actually talks about two kinds of wars: a theoretically perfect one that he calls ‘Absolute War’ and the other, not so perfect but one that men actually fight, ‘Real War’. Had he lived to review the entire work, the more obvious paradoxes would no doubt have been resolved. What more the genius of Clausewitz had to offer, we will never know.⁵⁷

CONTEMPORARY WARFARE AND THE EVOLVING NOTION OF VICTORY

Warfare is only an Invention - Not a Biological Necessity⁵⁸

Margaret Mead

In ‘The Changing Character of War’⁵⁹, writing in 2005, Alexandra Gheciu explores the perception of victory in the context of the changing nature of war and conflict. The idea of a distinct, if not linear, relationship and interaction between changing patterns of warfare and the notion of victory is central to Gheciu’s thesis. The Cold War period is offered as a case and evidence for the discernable and obvious difference between classical international and contemporary views of war.

In the classical international system, war involved a clash between two clearly identified and territorially defined parties, each seeking a decisive military victory over the other. By contrast, the Cold War did not involve an actual military confrontation between the superpowers. Framed in terms of an existential conflict between socio-politico-economic ideologies, it extensively scripted wars by proxy. The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new era, one where the focus came to be placed on humanitarian interventions, peace support operations, peacekeeping and peace building.⁶⁰ This was

soon followed by pursuit of long term interests and the sustaining of a favourable international climate (strategic environment) through use of the full range of instruments of hard and soft power available at the hands of the architect and inheritor of the new order – the USA. The success of the US in the cold war is as total as it could possibly have been and, one can reasonably construe, was earned skilfully and far more cheaply than taking the path of a more direct strategy⁶¹ against the USSR.

Concurrently, other lesser notions of victory emerged where no conclusive or final victory can be said to exist but rather a new assessment is necessary. These non-traditional approaches to victory find relevance in humanitarian and peace-keeping activities; particularly after a violent confrontation. In preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, prevention of violence is victory per se - what Prof. Christopher Bellamy describes as ‘... break the [enemy’s] will to initiate or recommence war.’⁶²

In an article entitled ‘Dangers of Victory Resisting the Demand to Widen the War’, William Pfaff dwells on the danger of victory in terms of the American assumption of power and dominance. The article points to the ambiguity of apparent victory as opposed to the wider ramifications and issues a word of warning. He identifies that despite what the government or administration in Washington may aspire for itself or its vision of the world, there is not going to be a Pax Americana.

The premise, according to Pfaff, is rested in the nature of the American people. He writes:

The reason is that the American people are not imperialists, do not imagine themselves imperialists, and lack the ruthlessness to impose and maintain an empire. If they don't themselves realize that now, or their representatives in Washington fail to do so, they will all, as in Vietnam, discover the truth the hard way.⁶³

An article, dealing with victory in the Balkans, points to the uncertainty and ambiguity of victory in its modern context. In ‘Victory Spoiled’, Bacevich reiterates the words of Wellington at the news of Waterloo in 1815. ‘Nothing except a battle lost can be half so melancholy as a battle won.’⁶⁴ He also relates this sense of ambiguity of victory to the Kosovo conflict.

Americans of all political persuasions rightly rejoice that the conflict ends with no U.S. combat fatalities and that Serbia's vicious campaign of ethnic

cleansing has at last run its course. Yet NATO's success in Kosovo should occasion sober reflection rather than euphoria. The legacy of this ill-conceived war will not lack for melancholy....⁶⁵

Another article which explores the changing perception of warfare in the modern world and its impact on the concept of victory is 'The American Way of Victory', by James Kurth. The article points to the various lessons that can be learnt from the aftermath of the Second World War. His article deals with the dangers of the modern views of conclusive victory and how a successful military campaign can become a Pyrrhic. He claims that the victory of the American forces over the Germans in the Second World War was in many ways, Pyrrhic.

The main reason was that its victory was in some sense a Pyrrhic one. The German enemy was replaced almost immediately by the Russian one, and the Japanese enemy was soon replaced by the Chinese one. Even more, since both enemies were communist and initially were in alliance, they could easily be seen as one enormous enemy⁶⁶

The above article also refers to the concept of victory in the Cold War era. This is an important conflict to consider in terms of the meaning of victory as it is an example of the changing world situation and the new type of warfare which has elicited a different view and understanding of victory in an international world.⁶⁷

This awareness of changing attitudes to warfare and the change in the way that war is fought has produced a plethora of literature on the subject. This also relates indirectly to the perception of what victory actually means in this new context. An article which deals with this aspect extends the view of the previous article and looks specifically at the changing attitude towards war and consequently victory in the United States. In the article entitled 'An American way of war or way of battle?' Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria, US Army, states:

...in the early days of the nation's existence, the American way of war centred on the desire to achieve a 'crushing' military victory—either through a strategy of attrition or one of annihilation—over an adversary. U.S. military men and political leaders typically saw the destruction of an opponent's

armed might and the occupation of his capital as marking the end of war and the beginning of post-war negotiations.⁶⁸

Stephen Biddle echoes similar sentiments:

Military power plays a pervasive role in the study of international politics; in fact, much of modern International Relations theory amounts to a debate on its influence over state behaviour. Yet all of this rests on very simplistic treatments of its nature and determinants. Theoretically, the literature relies on logically unsound, unitary notions of military capability that mask crucial trade-offs. Empirically, the use of weak proxies undermines existing findings and suggests that the literature may have underestimated capability's effects relative to audience costs, signalling, or resolve. Analyses of deterrence, power distribution, and polarity rest on especially thin ice given the weakness of the measures used to represent capability.⁶⁹

Colin S. Gray, in *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory* (2002), argues the relevance and attainability of decisive victory in the contemporary era. He provides three essential concepts and the language to assess levels of military victory⁷⁰ namely: decisive victory – which can be employed with operational, strategic and political meaning; strategic success and; strategic advantage.

SECTION 2: PERCEPTION OF VICTORY AND ITS UTILITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The political perspective on war is incomplete without reviewing the institution of war in international relations theory and practice. To understand what the literature on victory has to say in the politico-military context of the postmodern world, it is necessary to first explore the place of war and international conflict in the domain of international relations. A much acclaimed and widely cited work in this field is *International Relations Theory: The Three Traditions* by Martin Wight.⁷¹ In identifying the place of war, its nature and cause as well as the notion of victory, in International Theory, for the purpose of this survey the Wight's table titled 'Paradigms of International Theory'⁷² suffices. For the idealists, war is seen as an instrument of history, a search for liberation, equality and a condition of peace. Ethically, it signifies the prosecution of evil methods so that good

may prevail with ‘ends’ justifying the ‘means’. For the idealist, thus, victory lies in attainment of the ‘Kantian utopia’.⁷³

Wars are, or should be, fought for political purpose. For a statesmen war is a controllable instrument of political intercourse, which, given the right tools, will and capability, can be wielded successfully to further political interests. War is, as Martin Wright points out, ‘the ultimate feature of international relations as revolution is the ultimate feature of domestic politics’.⁷⁴ This section of the literature survey looks at some of the defining works identifying the linkage between statecraft and war.

Perceptions of victory often deviate substantially from the battlefield outcome, and these perceptions have dramatic consequences. Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney write that little research has addressed this phenomenon.⁷⁵ There are very few articles or books that even consider how people in general judge success and failure in international relations.⁷⁶ There are many writers since Alexis de Tocqueville who have commented on the ill-informed nature of public opinion, but they have rarely addressed the issue of public evaluations of success in foreign policy.⁷⁷ There are many studies related to military effectiveness but these works tend not to incorporate the role of perceptions of effectiveness.⁷⁸ In addition, there is a relevant literature on international crises, which looks at their causes and consequences, and how crises are managed and perceived by decision-makers.⁷⁹ Jonson observes that, ‘there are almost no studies that examine the processes by which states are perceived to win or lose crises.’⁸⁰ Furthermore, the literature on perception and misperception is well established, but mainly looks at the role of perceptions in the *decision-making process* (how leaders, politicians and bureaucrats see problems and how they respond to them). Jonson proceeds with an initial evaluation of previous events, as well as perceptions of events occurring at the time followed by a focus on outside observers as opposed to leader – i.e. those not involved in the decision-making process.⁸¹

WAR AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

The Rationalist school sees war as a natural passion for men and a breakdown of policy. War has limited objectives and is thus limited by such objectives and a negotiated peace is envisaged. Victory lies in the negotiated settlement of the issues of conflict; the nature of such victory, and conversely defeat, would always be such that it would be acceptable to the parties to the conflict. Ethically war is seen as a choice of a lesser evil and not all

means are justified⁸² It may thus be perceived as a give and take Victory where the belligerents can coexist and move on, perhaps both securing limited victory in the political and military sense. The Cuban missile crisis echoes this perspective.⁸³

For the Realists, war finds its place in the conflicting interests of the states and is a natural continuation of policy. By their nature wars are defined in terms of the ends sought and may, therefore, be unlimited in nature. Victory lies essentially in the realm of advancing interests and not necessarily in the outcomes of conflicts. However, practically, this all too often involves the unconditional surrender of the enemy. Ethically, expediency assumes priority over morality and justification is through necessity and success.⁸⁴

WAR AND POLICY

Sun Tzu and Thucydides both present war as an indispensable element of statecraft and an activity lending itself to an in depth and dispassionate analysis. Sun Tzu makes ‘war’ the focus and object of his work while Thucydides explains the phenomenon of war itself and explores the nature of man, the nature of war and morality in war. The linkage between war and politics, morality, strategy and military conflict is clearly established and with it the undisputed relationship of each with an inherently ‘dynamic’ concept of victory as it relates to the eternal political competition between states or, more precisely, centres of power.

The link first identified by Sun Tzu can be traced down to Clausewitz who summed it up in a single phrase: ‘war is continuation of political intercourse with the admixture of other means.’⁸⁵ Subsequent theorists have echoed these words in different forms but the bond between policy and purpose of war sustains. Among contemporary strategists Colin S. Gray has attempted to address the place of war, the function it serves and, the pervasive, consistent role of strategy in attaining policy objectives. Leaving aside for the time being his monograph *Defining and Attaining Decisive Victory*, we are concerned here with his other monumental work *Modern Strategy*. Gray maintains that ‘there is an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods of history because nothing vital to the nature and purpose of war and strategy changes.’⁸⁶

Clausewitz said that even the most decisive military victory is never final and hints at, but does not talk about in any detail, what we describe today as war termination and peace building.⁸⁷ Each war must terminate with and involve diplomatic and political

efforts to make victory acceptable and sustainable. Even when a total and decisive victory is achievable, limited goals are often more practical. It is on this assertion that Clausewitz introduces his notion of real war⁸⁸ - a war that does not conclude on logical policy, dynamics of escalation or annihilation of the enemy; instead is moderated by political calculations, uncertainties, the limits of strength, and psychological factors.⁸⁹

THE PLACE AND PURPOSE OF MILITARY VICTORY

An important idea introduced by Clausewitz is that the political aim must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration.⁹⁰ Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them. ‘War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other means.’⁹¹ We may then conclude that a military victory thus achieved will contribute to the original political objective sought.

In Europe’s feudal culture the internecine object of war was economically motivated and ritualistically pursued. Quite often the sole object was of taking knights prisoners in order to make them pay ransom. Even later, explains Chaliand, ‘in the Renaissance, the conception of war held by the condottieri was close to one of chivalry, in that both, aiming to secure ransom, sought not to annihilate the enemy but to capture him.’⁹²

Schelling, in *Arms and Influence*, writes that ‘victory inadequately expresses what a nation wants from its military forces. Mostly it wants, in these times, the influence that resides in latent force. It wants the bargaining power that comes from its capacity to hurt, not just the direct consequence of successful military action.’⁹³ He further elaborates the inherent incompleteness in even the best of military victory:

Even total victory over an enemy provides at best an opportunity for unopposed violence against the enemy populations. How to use that opportunity in the national interest, or in some wider interest, can be just as important as the achievement of victory itself; but traditional military suicide does not tell us how to use that capacity for inflicting pain.⁹⁴

The object of war is not to cause pain but to accrue political advantage. Pain, albeit inbuilt in war, should not be the object of war.

Schelling noted that in creating nuclear arsenal the very idea of violent confrontation among, or even within close allies of, nuclear rivals raises the stakes to such an absurd level that the possibility of outright victory for either side in a military encounter is simply ruled out. He writes:

Military strategy can no longer be thought of, as it could be in some countries in some eras, as the science of military victory. It is now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence. The instruments of war are more punitive than acquisitive. Military strategy, whether we like it or not, has become the diplomacy of violence.⁹⁵

This assertion is however in stark contrast to Colin S. Gray's work cited above which advances the continued relevance of the traditional theory that victory, even decisive victory, is not an out-dated concept, albeit with a slight twist.

MILITARY VICTORY AND POLITICAL DEFEAT

The volumes of literature available on the Vietnam War and its analysis from almost every conceivable angle make it perhaps one of the most written-about campaigns of the post-World War II period. The question as to who won the Vietnam War still remains heavily contested. However since the US adopted a defeatist demeanour, one can only assume that while North Vietnam did not win initially on the battlefield, the US was politically defeated. While popular opinion grants the laurels to North Vietnam, many including Richard M. Nixon, the US President at the time, opines otherwise. In his last book, *No More Vietnams*⁹⁶ the late Richard Nixon states that in 1973 the US had won the war and demonstrates how the anti-war protests in America soured the victory.⁹⁷ He writes 'we won the war and lost the peace, all that was won in 12 years of fighting was thrown away in a spasm of congressional irresponsibility'⁹⁸ that the media and the anti-war activists fed off each other and were easily fooled by North Vietnam's propaganda. 'The anti-war movement did not have a decisive effect on the outcome of the war from a military standpoint, but it had a decisive impact on the political battles that have been waged ever since'⁹⁹ The Vietcong made it appear they were fighting a civil war for freedom. The victory was incomplete and eventually overshadowed by the fall of Saigon in 1975.

Nixon felt the war was winnable, so he made five points in an attempt to end the war and gain peace. To allow an eventual withdrawal of US forces under favourable conditions, Nixon had an excellent theory in place. The idea was to push for Vietnamisation, pacification, diplomatic isolation and peace negotiations. This, Nixon believed, would pave the way for a gradual withdrawal of US forces.¹⁰⁰ South Vietnam could then be financially backed. This worked, albeit partially. The South Vietnamese became more able to defeat the Vietcong but results began to accrue only after the US suffered a huge political defeat and the Vietcong won in the end.

Analysis of the politico-military and the socio-political dimensions of the Vietnam War reveal that the political, military, socio-cultural and psycho-social objectives for the US lay on divergent planes. Vectoring towards positive along any of the ‘lines’ meant a regression towards defeat on the other. In the conceptualisation of dimensions of victory, this hypothesis will be developed in Chapter IV and tested in Chapter VI.

The Gulf War 2003 has become the focus of an intense debate on the means, effects and ends of that war. The issues predominantly debated are whether the quick and relatively easy ‘victory’ in this war is in fact a victory or, in the final analysis, a form of defeat. One of the many articles that addressed this issue was ‘HOLD ON THERE!!! Assessing the Meaning of Victory in Iraq’¹⁰¹ by Richard E. Berg-Anderson (2003). The article warned about the implications of victory and the dangers of an early optimistic appraisal that the war has been ‘won’. This implies that a realization has been gradually emerging since the late half of the last century, and particularly after the early victories and confidence of the Vietnam War, that initial military success does not always mean final victory.

THE POLITICAL COST AND PRICE OF VICTORY

The account of the Pyrrhic Wars by Plutarch presents a fascinatingly philosophical yet tangibly comprehensible face of victory that has not lost its currency even in the 21st century. The Pyrrhic War was fought by King Pyrrhus of Epirus against Rome and lasted from 280 BC to 275 BC.¹⁰² Plutarch introduces the military genius, courage and boldness of Pyrrhus with an account of the Battle of Ipsus ‘where so many kings were engaged, Pyrrhus taking part with Demetrius, though yet but a youth, routed those that encountered him, and highly signalled himself among all the soldiery’ he goes on to say that ‘his knowledge of military tactics and the art of a general... Hannibal of all great commanders

esteemed Pyrrhus as the first, Scipio the second and himself the third as is related in the life of Scipio.’¹⁰³

Plutarch contrasts Pyrrhus’ military genius against the larger social and political context, tacitly hinting the short term value and general futility of the victories won.

THE POLITY, THE PUBLIC AND THE PERCEPTIONAL PARADOX

Challenging the assumptions of many realist and neorealist thinkers on war and interstate conflict, Allan Stam showed, in 1996, how domestic political factors affect the outcome of war. Using a rational choice analysis, Stam looks at the factors that affect the decision makers' preferences for different outcomes of military conflict, as well as how the payoffs of those outcomes are affected by both domestic and structural factors. Structural factors, such as the state's population, define a state's power relative to that of other states and will affect the probability of a policy succeeding. Domestic factors, such as the positions taken by domestic political groups, will affect the preferences of the leaders for particular outcomes and their willingness to bear the costs associated with the payoffs and probabilities of the various outcomes.¹⁰⁴

HARD AND SOFT POWER AND PURSUIT OF POLITICAL VICTORY

The object of victory in war, Clausewitz tells us, is to be able to force our enemy to do our will. In the complex postmodern international order, particularly in an increasingly interdependent ‘globalised’ world, the need to be able to assert influentially over friends, foe and neutrals alike, is the main object of Joseph Nye’s work. The instrument of this ‘coercion’ is not the use or threat of use of military power but ‘soft power.’¹⁰⁵

Soft power is the use of instruments of power other than military, though the military instrument may indirectly be responsible for or be the source of ‘soft power’. In contrast to Stephen J. Cimbala who identified ‘soft power’ as military coercion short of war,¹⁰⁶ Nye defines it as ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment.’¹⁰⁷ Machiavelli prescribed that it is more advantageous to be feared than to be loved,¹⁰⁸ Nye proposes that winning the hearts and minds is equally, if not more, important in today’s world.

Building on the traditional meaning of power as ‘the ability to do things,’¹⁰⁹ Nye argues that power is essentially situational. ‘What wins in one game may not at all help in

another.’ He continues, ‘holding a winning poker hand does not help if the game is Bridge. Even if the game is poker, if you play your high hand poorly, you can still lose.’¹¹⁰ Nye ascribes political values, culture and foreign policy as the sources of soft power.¹¹¹

Jonathan Schell’s *Unconquerable World: Power, Why Peaceful Protest is Stronger than War* (2005) is an enlightening work which looks at many faces of victory. Underpinned by the assertion that the object of war is to further policy and that non-violence can achieve better ‘ends’ with lesser consequence than war, Schell dwells on the rise and fall of the war system and, in his section on nuclear war, goes on to assert that under the new paradigm ‘the critical link between military power and political power, which Clausewitz had struggled to preserve, was severed at the highest level of international operations.’ He goes on to say that the great powers had to conduct their business ‘in a world that was not going to replace the rule of force with the rule of law... the military was presented a role – to prevent its own use – that it had never previously played in that way before.’¹¹²

Schell advances, with evidence of history, the power of non-violent struggle and the durability of the ends thus earned. The concept of non-violent struggle will be discussed further in Chapters III and VI.

WAR INITIATION AND WAR TERMINATION

A very important section of the literature is that which deals with war initiation and termination. All rational wars are, or should be, begun and terminated with rational considerations. Thucydides provides the earliest ingredients for a rational war initiation strategy. He suggests that in addition to power and will, morality – legal and social – is needed, even against the weakest of foes.¹¹³ This argument endures. Modern theorist, such as Stephan Van Evera, have looked at the normative rationale for causes of war and war initiation and suggest present various hypotheses ranging from necessity to opportunity. In *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (1999), Stephen Van Evera suggests that false optimism coupled with illusions of victory, pre-emption and advantages of ‘jumping the gun, and power shifts allowing for exploitation of windows of opportunity encompass the root causes of war.’¹¹⁴ War initiation in all these cases is directly linked to chances of success or, a position of least disadvantage when a victory per se is not possible – a notional success is a substitute for victory.

Carole Alsharabati and Jacek Kugler (2008) find that ‘most war initiation theories tend to lead to a general contention that nations tend to enter a conflict when they are likely to win, and, since parity is associated with high uncertainty regarding the outcome of a war, it is also associated with peace.’¹¹⁵ The duo suggests that balance of power theory is empirically flawed. ‘Repeated empirical tests have shown that power parity in the last two centuries did not lead to peace.’¹¹⁶ An alternate theory – the power parity theory – is advanced. The theory of power preponderance suggests that nations are more likely to fight under parity than under preponderance. The logic behind the argument is that major wars are caused by a rising dissatisfied nation surpassing in relative power a declining dominant nation.¹¹⁷

A war may logically be terminated when one military defeats another. The nature of peace sought after the war makes this point rather difficult to identify. In ‘When is Victory Complete?’, Eliot A. Cohen, writing in 2005 and discussing the issue of war termination in the First Gulf War (1991), argues that by allowing the military to make important political judgments, the US civil administration bowed to the idea that war termination too was an issue decided on the battlefield.¹¹⁸ In 1945, Douglas MacArthur who pursued a war termination strategy at times in defiance of Washington also saw beyond the battlefield; a trait that often brought him in direct confrontation with his political masters. His victory address after the fall of Japan hinted at his logic and the importance of war termination:

We have known the bitterness of defeat and the exultation of triumph and from both we have learned there can be no turning back. We must go forward to preserve in peace what we won in war.¹¹⁹

In his farewell address to the congress six years later MacArthur had this to say:

The Japanese people, since the war, have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left in war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the supremacy of individual liberty and personal dignity; and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative government committed to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice. Politically, economically,

and socially Japan is now abreast of many free nations of the earth and will not again fail the universal trust...¹²⁰

The pivotal role played by Colin Powell in ending military operations once the ‘limited goal’ of removing Saddam’s forces from Kuwait had been achieved, argues Cohen, was incorrect since the Gulf War had truly not been won. The nature of victory was either incorrectly comprehended – ignoring the more subjective, and more political defines of victory – or incorrectly pursued beyond the simplistic assessment of whether all Iraqi soldiers had left Kuwait. In a meaningful sense, the victory was not complete and hence déjà-vu for the current President Bush. Cohen attributes ‘a case of the slows’, in Lincoln’s words to America’s generals and in Churchill’s words, success depended ‘less on professional expertise than on wide reading and massive common sense.’¹²¹ Although Cohen does not prescribe a road map for victory what he does do is to reiterate the primacy of political control and political direction in conduct of, and termination of war.

John T. Fishel, in his 1992 article ‘Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm,’ analyses the problems arising out of what he believes was an incomplete or an inaccurate vision of ‘ends’. He defines the ‘end state’ in the following words:

...what the leadership desires the battlefield and the surrounding political landscape to look like when the war is over, and it represents a range of acceptable political/military outcomes. Moreover, end-states suggest descriptions, in fairly great detail, of the goals of national policy.¹²²

Fishel believes that, as a consequence of an undefined end state, confusion existed about what path the United States should adopt in the post-war phase and indeed on the point at which hostile action should be called off and victory declared. Fishel writes: ‘The U.S. Government ... suggested another political objective for Kuwait that was not at all reflected in the end-state derived by the military planners. This objective was to move the Kuwaiti government to a more democratic mode.’¹²³ Fishel went on to note that public rhetoric by President Bush caused some concern about whether the removal of Saddam Hussein had become one of the criteria for war termination.¹²⁴ It may be argued on the contrary as noted by ... that it was for this very reason of an accurate, albeit late, vision of post war Iraq that Saddam Hussein was not removed and his regime allowed to operate for another eleven years.

Regardless of the whether the events immediately following Gulf War I were according to well laid out strategic plans or emergency corrective measures, the conclusion that emerges is that the declared position on victory in terms of objectives as well as the environment must be postulated in the war policy.

SECTION 3: THE PSYCHO-SOCIAL SPHERE

In this section, two important bodies of literature will be addressed. The first is the socio-cultural notion and second, the perceptual (without cultural contexts). Addressed within this body of literature is the social impact of victory and how it is perceived and possibly manipulated by the media and the public. This area of the literature is intertwined with various non-military aspects such as media perception, the use of language to project culture, ideology and the expectations of the public as opposed to the military facets. In essence, what this area of the literature points out is that the term victory has a ‘relative’ dynamic. In other words victory means different things to different people depending on cultural and / or perceptual contexts.

TRUTH AND REALITY

REALITY

Reality, in everyday usage, means ‘the state of things as they actually exist.’¹²⁵ In a wider context it includes everything that is, whether or not it is observable or comprehensible. Reality has different connotations when applied to nature or matter and quite different when it concerns life and existence. Reality in this sense includes ‘being’ and sometimes is considered to include ‘nothingness’, which in philosophy is a formal concept. Subjective interpretations of reality – the phenomenological perspective – include the selectivity involved in the personal interpretation of an event. Although in the strictest sense, it implies ‘reality’ as seen by one and only one individual, this form of reality might be common to others as well. Much of the kind of experience deemed spiritual occurs on this level of reality and hence it is possible that the experience may be common to the entire subset that is culturally so inclined. From a phenomenological perspective, reality is that which is phenomenally real and unreality is non-existent. Individual perception can be based upon an individual's personality, focus and style of attribution, causing him or her to see only what he or she wants to see or believes to be true. The various meanings of ‘reality’, according to *Encarta World Dictionary* include:¹²⁶

- real existence: actual being or existence, as opposed to an imaginary, idealized, or false nature,
- all that actually exists or happens: everything that actually does or could exist or happen in real life,
- something that exist or happens: something that has real existence and must be dealt with in real life – a vision that ignores the realities of the business world,
- type of existence: a kind of existence or universe, either connected with or independent from other kinds – fantastic notions of alternative realities,
- philosophy: the totality of real things in the world, independent of people’s knowledge or perception of them.

WHAT IS REALITY?

In philosophy, reality is contrasted with nonexistence. Trees, for example, do exist; so they are real and mere possibility. A mountain made of gold is merely possible, but such a mountain is not known to be real—that is, a golden mountain is possible rather than actual, unless one is discovered. Sometimes philosophers speak as though reality is contrasted with existence itself, though ordinary language and many other philosophers would treat these as synonyms. They have in mind the notion that there is a kind of reality — a mental or intentional reality, perhaps — that imaginary objects, such as the aforementioned golden mountain, has. Alexius Meinong is famous for holding that such things have a so-called subsistence, and thus a kind of reality, even while they do not actually exist.

Some schools of Buddhism hold that reality is something void of description, the formless which forms all illusions or ‘maya’. Buddhists hold that we can only discuss objects which are not reality themselves and that nothing can be said of reality which is true in any absolute sense. Discussions of a permanent self are necessarily about the reality of self which cannot be pointed to nor described in any way.¹²⁷ Similar is the Taoist saying that ‘the Tao that can be named is not the true Tao, or way.’¹²⁸

As for the realist and idealist concept of reality, the well-known German philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951), in *Zettel*, finds the difference to be one of only

semantics. Wittgenstein states that to the idealist physical objects only exist in so far as they are perceived; an unperceived physical object is like making predictions about future observations. Whereas, the realist would assert that physical objects exist independently of our capacity to perceive them. If the two philosophers raise their children to share their beliefs, both children will acquire and use a vocabulary about physical objects in exactly the same way. One child will be taught to say, ‘physical objects exist independently of our perceptions,’ and the other will be taught to deny this. If this is the only difference between the two children, says Wittgenstein, ‘Won't the difference be one only of battle-cry?’¹²⁹

TRUTH AND REALITY

The term truth, like reality, has no single definition and its usage is subjective to context and discipline. A typical dictionary definition is ‘the quality of being true, genuine, or factual.’¹³⁰ In postmodernism/post-structuralism, truth is purely subjective. When two or more individuals agree upon the interpretation and experience of a particular event, a consensus about an event and its experience begins to be formed. This being common to a few individuals or a larger group, then becomes the ‘truth’ as seen and agreed upon by a certain set of people — the consensus reality. Thus one particular group may have a certain set of agreed truths, while another group might have a different set of consensual ‘truths’. This lets different communities and societies have varied and extremely different notions of reality and truth of the external world. The religion and beliefs of people or communities are a fine example of this level of socially constructed ‘reality’. Truth cannot simply be considered truth if one speaks and another hears because individual bias and fallibility challenge the idea that certainty or objectivity are easily grasped. For anti-realists, the inaccessibility of any final, objective truth means that there is no truth beyond the socially-accepted consensus; although this means there are truths, not truth.

To summarise; for realists, the world is a set of definite facts, which obtain independently of humans (‘The world is all that is the case’ — *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*), or as Michael Dummett termed it ‘the principle of bivalence’ – Lady Macbeth had three children or she did not; a tree falls or it does not—A statement will be true if it corresponds to these facts — even if the correspondence cannot be established.¹³¹ Thus the dispute between the realist and anti-realist conception of truth hinges on reactions to the ‘epistemic accessibility (knowability, graspability) of facts. Philosophy addresses two

different aspects of the topic of reality: the nature of reality itself and the relationship between the mind¹³² (as well as language and culture) and reality. For this research we take the position that there are truths, not truth and reality can be defined in a way that links it to worldviews or parts of them (conceptual frameworks):

- Reality is the totality of all things, structures (actual and conceptual), events (past and present) and phenomena, whether observable or not.
- It is what a worldview – whether it is based on individual or shared human experience – ultimately attempts to describe or map.

PERCEPTION AS REALITY

The definition of victory clearly involves issues of perception versus reality. The importance of perception and media is also dealt with briefly in an insightful 2004 article titled, ‘Echoes of War: A Thousand Years of Military History in Popular Culture.’¹³³ Another brief article entitled ‘Day By Day We Are Becoming More Hated’,¹³⁴ also shows a more public and introspective view of victory, which once again places the meaning of victory in the arena of popular culture rather than in a military context. While not as in-depth or extensive as the articles previously discussed, yet it provides a common perception that victory in the war on terror is at very best an ambivalent one which cannot be measured according to the conventional norms of military victory. This is also an article which is characteristic of the increasing deluge of critical studies of the notion of victory that is promulgated by the erstwhile Bush Administration. An example is as follows.

Day by day we are creating more terrorists intent upon attacking the US and American citizens. ‘When it is over, if it is over, this war will have horrible consequences,’ says Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. ‘Instead of having one [Osama] bin Laden, we will have 100 bin Ladens.’ Does this fit Mr. Bush's concept of victory?’¹³⁵

CULTURE

‘Culture,’ Colin S. Gray speculates, ‘is pervasive... Future warfare, as with warfare in all periods, will in a sense be cultural; certainly it will be waged by inescapably distinctively encultured people.’¹³⁶ Culture influences thought and action. It shapes internal and

external behaviour, that is to say the emotional triggers and responses as well as the contextualised logical processing of information and in no lesser measure the calculated and considered responses. This assertion is evinced on matured social science research in culture and psychology. War indeed will be waged by what Gray calls ‘distinctively encultured people’ who will manifest facets of their culture in engagements, the battles, the campaign, the war and indeed the conflict as a whole. More significantly, because culture influences the notion of victory and the manner in which it is pursued, it influences the very nature and character of war.

According to Gregory R. Copley, ‘history tells us that no species is immune from obliteration; no culture, language, ethnic community, nation, or belief system has guaranteed its survival..., the survival and dominance of a society through history is its principal Victory.’ To develop his argument further, a whole spectrum of levels and tiers of victory opens up. As a minimum we have ‘the mere fact that one survives... the languages we speak, the generations which may – or, in defeat, may not – follow our family line, the welfare we enjoy...’,¹³⁷ that is to say the hard genetic dimension and the soft moral domain. On the opposite end is dominance and/or absorption – the ability to export, expand, absorb affiliate or shield other cultures. Whether we draw our premise from Darwinian logic or Copley’s observations, the common conclusion points towards the very essential and basic level of victory that lies in the realm of first, the biological continuity and second, physical preservation – the sustenance of the acquired cultural – social and political values that differentiate us in a tribal sense. Progression of the latter is itself a higher function.¹³⁸ Reality essentially creates a ‘parallel truth’, a contrast to the assertion that ‘perception is reality’.

Cross cultural research indicates that there are systematic cultural differences in the way people reason about the world. Such research suggests that human cognition has two major ‘modes’: the ‘intuitive or associative and the other analytic or rule-based.’¹³⁹ Theoretically, everyone is capable of thinking in both of these modes, but individual differences— and cultural ones—have been found to affect which mode is preferentially used.¹⁴⁰ Thinking among Westerners tends to be more analytic, that is, attention is focused on objects and their features and reasoning is decontextualized; conversely, thinking among East Asians (e.g. Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese) tends to be more holistic, that is, attention is dispersed to the field and reasoning is contextualized.¹⁴¹

Research by Emma E. Buchtel and Ara Norenzayan in intuition and logic in a cross-cultural context shows cognitive consequences of cultures stem from specific elements of those cultures, these elements in turn affect injunctive social norms. The Social norms vary *within* cultures along the same vectors that also define salient differences *between* cultures. ‘Human cognitive processes are embedded in a network of culturally-specific relationships between universal processes, perceptions of reality, cultural norms, and behaviour.’¹⁴² The profound conclusion we can draw from this is that cross-culturally ‘intuitive cognition’ is a better and more natural tool than interpreting or interacting with views in another culture through logical reasoning. The Chinese – American philosopher Dr. Yutang Lin had asserted something quite similar:

We see [in Chinese intellectuals] an opposition of ‘logic’ versus common sense, which takes the place of inductive and deductive reasoning in China. Common sense is often saner because the analytic reasoning looks at truth by cutting it up into various aspects, thus throwing them out of their natural bearings, while common sense seizes the situation as a living whole...Logic without such common sense is dangerous.¹⁴³

For this research, we need to explore further the cognitive differences, the normative status and the intuitive. The quest is purely functional, we need to be able to place whether these cognitive differences are encouraged by different value judgments, proximal causes or the social context.

DEFINING CULTURE

Cultures can be ‘understood as systems of symbols and meanings that even their creators contest, that lack fixed boundaries, that are constantly in flux, and that interact and compete with one another’¹⁴⁴

Culture influences the manner in which individuals understand their environment. ‘Culture is much like the air people breathe: it is taken for granted until there is an external stimulation that forces people to think about it.’¹⁴⁵ It is only when assumptions about this understanding are questioned that the existence of culture starts to become apparent to the individual.¹⁴⁶

Hofstede defined culture as ‘collective programming of the mind’¹⁴⁷ that lies between the universal nature of the human animal and an individual’s unique personality. Stocker in her research illustrates this as a pyramid:




FIGURE 6: THREE LEVELS OF MENTAL PROGRAMMING
SOURCE: STOCKER’S ADAPTATION OF HOFSTEDE¹⁴⁸

The semantic relationship suggests that while all cultures have a common foundation rested in human nature, personality can be acquired both as a subset of the culture as well as the individual or societies wider experiences. The defiling of these levels, particularly of culture as specific to group, contrasts with our earlier discussion. A group or a society can assume a bivalence as Drummett concluded based on its own history as well as that it shares with another. For example, the British colonies, while retaining their own cultures, adapted a special brand of ‘Britishness’ that continues to manifest itself in every functional walk of life such as art, literature, language, commerce, politics and bureaucracy.

The bivalence in construction combined with the intuitive and logical conception of interpreting reality implies cultural influences, at their extreme can create entirely opposite truths and thus realities. In the cross-cultural context, multiple realities can exist on the same phenomenon. Societies where adapted influences coexist, a natural flux in the traditional and the progressive brand of truth and reality creates a volatile cocktail. The identity crises that many colonies suffer, stems from this flux.

The use of the term culture in anthropology is traced to the nineteenth century anthropologist Edward Tylor. He identified that culture is manifested in human artefacts

and activities such as music, literature, lifestyle, food, painting and sculpture, theatre and film.¹⁴⁹ ‘Culture or civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense,’ is thus ‘that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.’¹⁵⁰

CULTURAL STIMULI AND NOTION OF VICTORY

Culture influences the use and meaning of violence. ‘Warfare between Maya cities was frequent, and its aim was largely the capture of royalty for torture and sacrifice rather than territorial expansion. Captives were often pitted against the conquering king in an ancient ballgame that was stacked in favour of the king; after inevitably losing the contest, captives were sacrificed and often decapitated, ‘the Maya believed that death called the soul to a type of hell known as Xibalba, where it faced a series of trials and competitions with the Lords of Death. Defeat doomed a soul to burial in the evil-smelling Xibalba, whereas victory allowed it to dance away and, with other reborn ancestors, guide its descendants.’¹⁵¹

The influence of culture in shaping behaviour, perception and action is well documented in the works of Margaret Mead. Of particular relevance to this thesis are *Continuities in Cultural Evolution*, 1964, *Culture and Commitment*, 1970 and *Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist Looks at America*, 1942. Mead believed that human beings have a capability of being moulded to grow and change and adapt beyond the range of their biological and cultural inheritance. She identifies the value of culture and its ability to influence. ‘If we are to fight, if we are to win, if we are to hold before us as we fight a goal we will count fighting for, that goal must be in American terms, in the mixture of faith in the right and faith in the power of science.’¹⁵² Mead’s goal, writes Varenne, was not cultural critique but cultural construction. In her most seminal work *Continuities in Cultural Evolution*, that we need now, a view of the future that neither minimizes the immediate peril nor generates despair. For her work, the perceptual impact consequential to how facts and information are interpreted suggest that success as too failure are deeply embedded in the moral domain and often more profoundly so than the physical realm that we understand all too well.

Sun Tzu’s presents a distinctly Confucian face of victory, the hard and the soft coexisting like yin and yang as the nature of all things. Barry Boyce elaborates this in the following words:

After a win, for example, people tend to be elated and a temporary surge of energy takes over, but soon that surge will be replaced with genuine tiredness and a sense of remorse that now that the battle is over, the thrill is gone and the toll has been paid—and must continue to be paid. This time gives opportunities to the adversary. A force that seemed invincible may suddenly be vulnerable (or ‘vincible’ in the term used in this translation), merely through the passage of time and the inevitable fluctuation of energies. If one regards the world as static, its solidity will always fight against you. Within the Sun Tzu, this point of view is never taken. Solid is only one side of the equation, a part of the fluctuation.¹⁵³

Sun Tzu asserts that for the best defence one goes outside the range of enemy, becoming ungraspable and thus unbeatable. Victory need not be achieved by will or devastation. The Griffith’s text reads: ‘One skilled at defence hides below the nine earths; one skilled at attack moves above the nine heavens. This possibly obscures the more powerful message that Sun Tzu might be trying to stimulate in the bamboo text, which points to a defence not based in conflict! ‘...of old those skilled at defence hid below the nine earths and moved above the nine heavens.’¹⁵⁴ Thus they could preserve themselves and be ‘all-victorious’.

Chaliand identifies that ‘for a long time, at different periods and in different societies, warfare took on a ritual character.... Battles were organised as the ultimate recourse to the judgement of God.’¹⁵⁵ He identifies the ‘high Middle Ages’ as the peak of this character and its most significant period in the West. The words of Henry, the son of William before the battle of Tinchebray, in 1106, echoed with this conviction as quoted by Jacques Duby:

I am going into battle only to come to the aid of the desolate people; I implore the creator of all things from the bottom of my soul that in today’s battle He may grant victory to whom He has chosen to secure protection and rest for His people.¹⁵⁶

In Aztec culture, writes Chaliand, victory was not measured in annihilation of the enemy but in terms of the prisoners taken, as these were later offered to the Gods as sacrifice. ‘An enemy was defeated when the leaders had been seized or when his temple was destroyed, a sign that his gods were less potent.’¹⁵⁷

Anthony Zimm, in his 2005 article ‘A Causal Model of Warfare’, dealing ostensibly with military strategy also refers to the psychological as well as the moral outcomes as basis for victory. It explores the advances of warfare strategy and its relation to the meaning of victory. Zimm writes:

There have been marvellous advances in sciences since Clausewitz’s time. Probability and statistics, sociology, psychology and organizational science all help us understand combat processes. Chaos and complexity theories offer new methodologies to understand what appears at first to be random, turbulent, disorganized and chaotic. We have a considerably larger arsenal with which to attack the problem.¹⁵⁸

Zimm also discusses and denies the conventional and one-dimensional view of victory, in the sense of a final extermination of the enemy. This, he states, is rarely the case and final victory in terms of extermination is hardly ever possible or even wished for in a military context.

In the physical mechanism of victory, the defeated side is utterly annihilated. Thermopylae (480 BC), Cannae (216 BC), Little Big Horn (1876), Isandhlwana (1879), the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad (1943)¹⁵⁹ and Iwo Jima (1945) are examples. It may be noted that of these only the victory at Cannae was strategic in nature all others were ‘battles’ in a larger campaign. In the vast reach of history, examples of annihilation yielding strategic victory are mercifully few. Such battles are the stuff of epics, and like epics, they are rare.¹⁶⁰ Zimm also states that idealistic views of victory are often erroneous and even interpretations of conventional victories such as the Battle of Waterloo often do not take account of the fact that most of the French troops were not killed but were surrounded or refused to fight.

The second body of the literature is concerned with the social impact of victory and how it is perceived and possibly manipulated. This complexity of the changing perception of victory from the point of view of the people is explored in ‘The Meaning of Victory’ (2005) by Olga Nikitina and Andrei Zolotov. This work refers to the changing perception of victory of the Russian people during and after the Second World War. In the past victory has been conventionally seen from the point of view of generals, kings or governments. Victory was the domain of military and political authorities. This article lends credence to the stance that this view of victory has changed in the modern world.

The expensive and costly victory that the Russians achieved over the German Reich is presented as a victory of the ordinary people.¹⁶¹ Similarly, In *War and Existence: A Philosophical Enquiry*, (1994) Michael Gelven observes that:

...if defeat is the only loss for the warrior, and victory the only triumph, it is not the same for those who seek to understand it. There is much that is puzzling in war, and the phenomenon itself seems totally incoherent. Men who do not even know one another are supremely dedicated to one another's annihilation. Good and honest soldiers on both sides seek to destroy one another with an almost universal approbation. ... If the warrior aches only for victory, the thinker aches for coherence. The general asks, 'how can we win?' The philosopher asks, 'how can war be thought without contradiction?'¹⁶²

The Battle of Karbala, fought in 680 AD between Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad P.B.U.H and the forces of Yazid, the then Caliph of Arabia stands out as the most significant battle in Islamic history not so much from the military perspective but more so from its religious and political fallout that casts its shadow to this day. The spiritual lineage emanating from the Prophet Muhammad's household, in which spiritual allegiance separated from political, was subscribed only to one appointee – referred to as the *Imam*. After the Prophet Mohammad's death, and particularly after Ali, the fourth Caliph, the subsequent political leadership saw the need for spiritual authority as a means to completion of their power which meant total control of the political and the religious spheres of society and the state.¹⁶³ The battle was fought in two perspectives of asymmetry, 'fundamental asymmetry'¹⁶⁴ in terms of the notion of victory held by the competing forces and 'dissymmetry'¹⁶⁵ in terms of numbers, weapons, logistics – the physical and moral components of fighting power.

The Battle of Karbala introduces two important faces of victory: The first, a temporary, yet complete victory in Clausewitzian terms, earned by Ziyad's Army in the battlefield and second, a more romantic and enduring victory, the one that was ultimately Hussein's. Importantly, because Hussein's strategy did not envisage winning the battle and a fundamental asymmetry existed in the purpose, immediate objectives, morals and ends of the war, it could be said that a new notion of victory emerged; one that perhaps terrorists and fundamentalists twist, misconstrue and misuse to justify suicide bombings and killing

of innocent civilians today. This finding will be developed further and tested in Chapters V and VI respectively.

The moral-cultural metric has been discussed at length by Gregory R. Copley *the Art of Victory*. In an address to the US army Command and General Staff College, Fort Belvoir Copley assessed what victory might mean for the Coalition in Iraq and the International Force in Afghanistan. His assertions suggested that the answer was to be found in philosophy and not the battlefield.¹⁶⁶

Culture plays a significant role in how individuals, groups and society as a whole handle and process information, its analysis and the construed outcome. The works of prominent anthropologists such as Margaret Mead suggest that a piece of information presented to members of different cultural heritage not only gets handled differently but also produces widely different perceptual outcome.

BELIEF SYSTEMS AND PERCEPTIONS OF VICTORY

We now move on to a body of literature that intrinsically influences perception and thought in general and in the context of the research as thane, the purpose of war and the nature of victory through war as seen in the major religions of the world.

In 610 AD Muhammad of Arabia revealed his prophet-hood and invited the Arabs and the known world to Islam. Four main religions prevailed at the time and collectively they formed the pivots of civilisation. These were Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism and Christianity. Each religion, either in its theological origins or the anthropological change that affected it, presented a rather similar perspective on victory. However, the ‘laws of war’, were treated quite differently by each.

The primary source used for an understanding of the place of war and the notion of success in each faith discussed is the central holy scripture(s) or book associated with that faith or the accepted and documented main source of religious guidance (in case there are several - as is the case in Hinduism). All the religions discussed here have several sects and sub-sects where theological sources are variously interpreted. In such cases, additional literature is also cross referenced with a view to inform the study with the diversity of such views. Broader analysis are not covered in this chapter as our main purpose here is to flag issues and focus on the notion of victory in theological teachings as interpreted (or evolved) over time.

BUDDHISM

Buddhism was founded by Gautama Siddhartha. There is a minor difference concerning the dates of its origins. Taking the Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) tradition, the year 544 B.C is taken as the year of death of the ‘Buddha’.¹⁶⁷ This implies that Buddhism preceded Christianity by at least half a millennium.

There are five tenets of morality in Buddhism called the Pancha Shila (tr. five moral precepts). These are: a) no killing, or harming any living thing, b) no stealing -- taking what is not yours to take, c) avoid sexual irresponsibility, which for monks and nuns means celibacy, d) no lying, or any hurtful speech and, e) no alcohol and drugs which diminish clarity of consciousness.¹⁶⁸

Cakkavattin, the ‘wheel turner’, in Buddhist political thought is seen as the Universal Monarch who ‘rules the Earth to the extent of its ocean boundaries, having conquered territories not by force of arms but by righteousness.’¹⁶⁹ The Cakkavattin is charged with the responsibility to provide protection, shelter, and security for all living things.¹⁷⁰ Cakkavattinism is a paradox in modern Buddhism since originally ‘The Buddha did not propound the theory of the Cakkavattin to any actual kings, ‘the Buddhists ... developed the idea of the Cakkavatti dhammiko dhammaraagaa who, by a just exercise of power would play a pivotal role in transforming society,’ as a counter to the excesses of actual kings.’¹⁷¹

The object of war in Buddhism can be seen as peace, security and preservation. ‘We cannot but help think that the central ethical precepts of Buddhism, *Ahimsa*, *Karuna*, and *Metta* (non-harm, compassion and loving-kindness) have somehow been lost. But in spite of the initial shock, the justifications we encounter are quite similar to those we find in the other world religions.’¹⁷²

HINDUISM

Hinduism, Wajid Ali Rizvi opines, is not a religion as such but a ritualistic culture. Vedas, Geetha and Mansometri are its most commonly referred books. ‘Geetha is the legacy of the peak of the Arian civilisation, the periods when two branches of the royal family...fought their famous war, which is its main subject... The main emphasis of Geetha is on inspiring, coaching and grooming people for fighting.’¹⁷³ Killing, particularly in war, is not seen as a bad thing since the soul of the dead is believed to

transmigrate in to another living form. This premise is used to justify wars for spoils as the following passages from various scriptures indicate:

With assistance of the deities we should top our coffers with wealth ad [Sic.] fill up its shelves, sufficient both for present and the future.¹⁷⁴

Rig Veda (1:17-20)

O Inder, enable us with much wealth to overpower our enemies in our war just as the skies dominate the earth. Give us such (quantity of) riches that become a source of grabbing the properties of thousands of conquered fertile fields and defecting enemies.¹⁷⁵

Rig Veda (6:20-21)

If you are killed (in battlefield) you will go to heaven, and if victorious you will enjoy dominance [and wealth]. Therefore rise with firm determination to fight.¹⁷⁶

The Geetha (2:30)

In the Hindu tradition, the ancient masterpiece of political science *Arthashastra* by Kautilya, a minister to a king in 4th Century BC, discusses how political and economic power should be wielded. Kautilya propounds that ‘the power of Counsel is superior (to sheer might and energy). For, the king with the eyes of intelligence and science (of politics) is able to take counsel with small effort and to over-reach his enemy possessed of energy or occult practices’¹⁷⁷ Success and victory have a distinctively material meaning. Consistent with Confucian philosophy of war, emphasis is on achieving ones goal, in this case generally material, through indirect means, ruses and stratagems.

An interesting article in the Indian daily, *The Hindu*, by Raj Mohan Gandhi titled ‘Peace, War and Hinduism’, presents a modern perspective on ancient Hindu texts. Drawing a comparison between Christianity and Hinduism, Gandhi finds that ‘Christian and Judaic teachers taught that the fear of the Lord was the beginning of wisdom, our Indian ancestors said that ‘gyan’ or wisdom would end fear.’¹⁷⁸ Challenging the thesis of war as a glorified act, he iterates Hinduism’s more pacifist face, the one presented by Mahatma Gandhi:

If some Hindus claimed that their ancient epic, the Mahabharata, sanctioned and indeed glorified war, Gandhi pointed to the empty stage with which the

epic ends — to the noble or ignoble killing of almost every one of its vast cast of characters — as ultimate proof of the folly of revenge and violence. And to those who spoke, as many do today, of the naturalness of war, Gandhi's reply, first expressed in 1909, was that war brutalises men of naturally gentle character and that its path of glory is red with the blood of murder.¹⁷⁹

JUDAISM

From an Islamic perspective, Judaism is the oldest of the 'heavenly' faiths. Again according to Islam, the newer faiths, Christianity and Islam itself honour the same God whereas the older ones reject the prophets, saints and indeed the 'god' of the religions that followed. To assume that a scarlet thread weaving a common philosophy on the treatment of violence and war in each of these religions would be suggestive of a purely Islam viewpoint of continuity and commonality whereas no such notion is endorsed by the Christians or the Jews. From a purely scientific perspective, we assume that there exists no such scarlet thread. Nonetheless, 'It would be hard,' writes David Little, 'to read the Old Testament, the New Testament, or the Qur'an [sic.] without encountering the questions of the legitimacy and limits of force.'¹⁸⁰ He goes on to say:

In each of these sacred books, and in the traditions that respectively flowed from them, the divine figure is extensively associated with efforts to restrict and regulate the use of force. Yahweh, God, and Allah are all predominantly characterized as exercising political and legal functions. They all perform these functions in such a way as to control certain illicit kinds of force, as well as other forms of disobedience, by themselves resorting to the use or threat of force, where necessary, as deterrence or punishment. Each deity, that is, is pictured as legitimating selected forms of force in the name of preventing or minimizing other kinds of 'illegitimate' and 'excessive' force. Max Weber described the God of the Old Testament as a 'God of Foreign Policy,' though the term could, with some adjustment, be applied to the God of the Qur'an as well. The deity in both traditions is centrally preoccupied with the regulation and direction of force in international relations.¹⁸¹

Judaism recognises the utility of war in the affairs of man and the affairs of God. This is manifest in several passages of the *Torah*. War is regarded as a possibility but non-violence is preferred. The *Torah* emphasises that no war is to be fought without offering

surrender terms first; this applied even to the mandatory wars against the Canaanites and the Amalekites (ordained wars). It lays down laws that come into play when the nation goes to war. It ordains several such laws that point towards the ideas of justice and fairness in the conduct of war, ‘Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue, so that you will live.’¹⁸² The latter passages of the Parashah¹⁸³ also point towards the issue of environmental protection: ‘when you besiege a city for many days in order to fight, do not destroy its trees by raising an axe against them for you will eat from it.’¹⁸⁴ The tradition remains, original scriptures are interpreted variously to accommodate the phenomenon of war in the modern political context; nonetheless in its theological origins the notion of limitation in scope, conduct and victory is unquestionable and profound.

The Jewish theological theories of war and victory through war, as with any religion, manifest themselves in history, culture and practice. According to Oz Almog, commenting on success over the Arabs in, and since, the War of Independence 1948, ‘Israel’s victory also received a mystical messianic interpretation in Israeli culture – even if only by implication – and this confirmed the Sabara’s¹⁸⁵ elitist self-image.’¹⁸⁶ The links between religion and holy war, militarism and messianism, and victory and the tribal cult are ancient ones. Victory in war has always been considered a concrete expression of superiority of the victor’s faith and community.

CHRISTIANITY

Christianity has been more dynamic in adapting to the ‘spirit of the age’. Its ancient tradition suggested a pacifist faith, rejecting all forms of warfare and introducing the idea of patience, perseverance and tolerance – turning the other cheek!¹⁸⁷ However, the inevitable fight for wealth, living space and needs of statecraft as well as the initial threat from Judaism and later Islam provided emotional, political, economic and pragmatic grounds for legitimising war and violence. The church condoned war-fighting amongst Christian nobles for spoils, territory and other worldly issues and even tried to regulate such fighting in various ways including restrictions on days and times for battle. It did not however place such restriction when war was imposed by or carried to the non-Christians or other sects. The natural tendency from the idealist towards the realist paradigms of war emerged the Just War Tradition. In context it serves as an instrument of control; setting standards for conduct and for the purpose of war. The two pillars of Just War Doctrine build upon the age old concepts of necessity and proportionality. The Just War tradition,

though arguably not theological in origin, forms the bedrock of mainstream Christian position on war. It is an adaptation from absolute limitation to moderated acceptance as Rick Fields points out in *The Codes of The Warrior*¹⁸⁸. Quoting Saint Bernard, Fields writes: ‘The soldier of Christ kills safely; he dies the more safely. He serves his own interest in dying, and Christ’s interest in killing! Not without cause does he bear the sword!’¹⁸⁹

The theological premise for the Just War tradition is clarified by David Little. ‘Pacifism, or the total renunciation of the use of force, was in general identified with the early Christian church to the time of Constantine, and later with many of the Christian sects that were established during and after the Reformation, such as the Mennonites, Quakers, and others,’ he goes on to say that ‘the advocates of the just war theory have taken the position that evil can be restrained by the coercive power of the state.’¹⁹⁰ The Gospels link Christian discipleship to a preference for non-violent benevolence.¹⁹¹ However, writes Little ‘at the same time, there are several famous passages that clearly authorize at least a restricted employment of force and thus provide a possible toehold for just war thinking.’

Jesus commands any disciple ‘who has no sword’ to sell his cloak ‘and buy one.’¹⁹² When a disciple attacks a member of the party coming to apprehend Jesus, Jesus not only exhorts the disciple to stop, but also promptly heals the man wounded by the disciple.¹⁹³ It is, in fact, the deep sense of ambivalence about the use of force apparent in this passage that seems to pervade the entire message of the New Testament.

The evolution of the notion of victory in the Christianity represents a development from its traditional theological strength of patience and perseverance to the need to institute war as an indispensable instrument of human existence and statecraft, governed within strict domain of legitimacy and proportionality. The modern paradigms of war and victory in war are grounded predominantly in the realist tradition and should not be confused with the faith’s perspectives on war.

ISLAM

Majid Khadduri has observed that the ultimate objective in the Islamic worldview is peace, not war.¹⁹⁴ More specifically, no purpose for war exists save that which fulfils the religious purpose of defending the interests of the Muslim community (umma), whose

members—contrary to the enemies of the divine truth—fear God and obey his prophets. War (*harb*), to the extent that it finds justification in Islamic law, is counted among the religious duties (*'ibadat*) and is defined by the Quranic notion of *jihad* (*fisabilillah*), ‘striving (in the path of God).’ *Jihad* comprises a large variety of individual and collective efforts to implement the life of pious submission (that is, Islam) to the will of God and requires, significantly, an Islamic polity to ensure worldly success. Peace (*salam*) is also a semantically rich concept in the Qur'an. In a just *jihad*, a ‘*mujahid*’ finds himself in a ‘win – win’ situation. The concept of ‘*Ghazi ya Shaheed*’ – victory leads to peace and prosperity on earth while martyrdom assures a place in heaven and forgiveness – invoke inner motivation for selfless submission in the path of God.

The Koran also ascribes the language ‘manifest victory’ to a treaty among Muslims and Mecca most influential tribe and Mohammad’s bitterest enemies, the Quraish of Mecca. The treaty is famously known as the Treaty of Hudaibia. The circumstances under which the treaty was arrived at were indeed surprising. With the Muslims, bargaining from a position of weakness but with a willingness to fight, the Quraish somehow agreed to a treaty that essentially granted the Prophet and his followers access to Mecca from the following year onwards.¹⁹⁵ The treaty carried four main provisions:¹⁹⁶

- Muslims would return to Medina that year without entering Mecca.
- They may return for Pilgrimage next year but would only remain in Mecca for 3 Days.
- If a Quraish from Mecca should join the Muslims he would be sent back but if a Muslim should join the Quraish he may remain at Mecca.
- There would be no fighting for ten years.

While apparently anything but a victorious settlement, Marmaduke Pickthall argues that this truce actually provided the space Islam needed to establish itself at that nascent stage. He assesses this apparent defeat to be the greatest victory that the Muslims had till then achieved. He writes that war had been a barrier between concerted Muslims and potential Muslims. The truce allowed both parties to meet and reunite. The new religion spread more rapidly. In the two years which elapsed between the signing of the truce and the fall of Mecca, the number of converts was greater than the total number of all previous

converts. When the Meccans broke the truce, the Muslims, now a strong force marched against them with an army of ten thousand.¹⁹⁷

A recent research by Dr Ahmed also finds that the subsequent events unfolded, this treaty did indeed prove exceptionally beneficial to the budding faith. It ended the constant atmosphere of hostility, the Meccans had a chance to study and soften up to the ‘Islamic way of life and resulted in a large number of conversions to Islam from among the most prominent members of the Quraish including their famed General Khalid Bin Walid.¹⁹⁸ Victory is mentioned at several places in the Qur’an, in most cases, a physical notion is advanced. In terms of superiority of moral purpose and struggle in the ‘right path’, the moral dimension of victory notwithstanding the outcome emerges as the most significant feature.

IMPACT OF FAITH SYSTEMS: A SUMMARY

This brief survey of the living religions allows for a comparative assessment of how success and failure at individual and collective level are construed under different belief systems. The theologising of victory and defeat affects the institution and practice of war. For example, religion as a motivational philosophy has worked well for the Taliban to carry their ‘war’. Suicide bombings and other means of mass murder and killing of the innocent is given a moral context that serves as the principal source of motivation. To the suicide bomber it is presented as a short cut to heaven. The killing of the innocent is presented as a just end in this world for the blasphemous and the incorrigible.¹⁹⁹ We find that the very character and nature of violence is a direct outcome of a theological interpretation of a just and unjust struggle defining both *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum*.

The opinions of the clergy, the analysts or the jurist notwithstanding, such restrictions based on religious or moral grounds seem to only serve a theoretical purpose. In practice one finds that religion and morality need only be invoked when in doing so some advantage or profit is seen:

We must search fully into their nature and meaning. What has now been said should make perfectly obvious the difference between Jesus' ethic of non-resistance and all forms of non-violent resistance, to which his views have sometimes been watered down in the interest of making them more plausible. It is plain that Jesus did not substitute the milder coercion of law courts and a system of claims and counter-claims for exacting an eye for an eye. Judaism

had already done that! Jesus' ethic is one of non-resisting, unclaiming [Sic.] love.²⁰⁰

There exists an inherent link between religion and holy war as prescribed or accepted within any religion, militarism and 'messianism'²⁰¹ that follows therefrom, and victory and the tribal cult are ancient ones. 'Victory in war has always been considered a concrete expression of superiority of the victor's faith and community. The triumph of the conqueror was proof of the power of their patron saint.'²⁰² While victory finds a theological explanation in divine intervention and moral right, defeat is also explained in the same logic inter alia, impurity in faith, conviction, blasphemy and impurity or pollution of the faith but never inferiority of faith or weakness of the 'saint'. While we may draw this general conclusion, there is at least one notable exception, Chief Seattle [1777 – 1866], a Native American who led the Squamish and Duwamish Tribes.²⁰³ In a speech supposedly delivered before a public gathering called by the Governor of Washington, Isaac Ingalls Stevens, on 11 March 1854, said:

Your God is not our God! Your God loves your people and hates mine! He folds his strong protecting arms lovingly about the paleface and leads him by the hand as a father leads an infant son. But, He has forsaken His Red children, if they really are His. Our God, the Great Spirit, seems also to have forsaken us. Your God makes your people wax stronger every day. Soon they will fill all the land. Our people are ebbing away like a rapidly receding tide that will never return. The white man's God cannot love our people or He would protect them. They seem to be orphans who can look nowhere for help. How then can we be brothers? How can your God become our God and renew our prosperity and awaken in us dreams of returning greatness? If we have a common Heavenly Father He must be partial, for He came to His paleface children. We never saw Him.²⁰⁴

Chief Seattle of the Squamish

There is another general rule that we may draw from among the contemporary faiths and confessions – including Hinduism – that religious philosophy of societal systems is inherently comparative and competitive. Each faith thus fosters or implants among its followers a principled belief of superiority of faith, if not of 'being'. It is often the faith that makes one 'worthy of being counted among the "children" of the "greater father,"'²⁰⁵

and in the case of a national religion, an elitism within the nation and among nations. Among the monotheist religions, this philosophy is most pronounced in Judaism as highlighted in the following verse from Deuteronomy:

For thou art the chosen people to the Lord thy God, and the Lord has chosen thee to be a special possession to himself, out of all the nations that are upon the earth.²⁰⁶

How do the theological and interpreted traditions in these religions go on to affect war and the notion of victory, particularly in postmodern era are the main arguments that will be covered in Chapter III and IV. What is clear in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, is that the controlling, channelling and, at times, directing of violence is a subject of deep theological significance. ‘Central to the beliefs of each tradition is the conviction that God possesses divine authority over force and establishes a just standard for its exercise.’²⁰⁷

Religion, whether Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity or Islam, has been used as a tool for motivation, inspiration and induced change. Religion forms the foundation and dissonance constitutes the process for altering individual, social and even national ethos which are then taken to the level of redefining fundamental concepts of right and wrong and good and evil. The notion of victory as we have seen is one among these. A common feature, more cultural than theological is that triumph and conquest are seen as a proof of the power of one’s god or patron saint while failure and defeat are earthly tests, trials and tribulations.

SECTION 4: ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT AND THE MINIMALIST

The Apolitical

By definition, war is political. Its means however can be and often are apolitical. The minimalist, according to General Alistair Irwin²⁰⁸, has all the advantages. He is bound by no rules and no inhibitions or limitations. ‘It seems to be the case that terrorists have the advantage of us in terms of the law and morality, just as much as they do operationally.’²⁰⁹

For the minimalist there are no rules, no uniforms, no front line, no inhibitions or limitations, no territory to defend. So the minimalist can choose where and when to strike; he can appear and disappear, cloaking himself in the darkness of the underworld. For those that oppose him, the

difficulties are intense. These are not two boxers facing each other in the dark (you will recall Liddell Hart's concept of the Man in the Dark), but rather two boxers one of whom is invisible. How can he be found if he cannot be seen? How can he be attacked if he cannot be found?²¹⁰

The question raised by General Irwin is, 'what do we do about it? Do we join them outside the law and fight them on their own ground? Or do we keep the moral advantage? These are questions that we have asked ourselves more than once during the 35 year campaign in Northern Ireland'.²¹¹ The parallel drawn with Northern Ireland here is quite interesting as it suggests a sense of similarity in the approach of the minimalist and that of organised governments trying to engage or defeat them.

The Political

Mao Tse-Tung's writings present an interesting perspective on the nature of victory in People's wars. Mao's famous slogan 'the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue,' summarizes one of the most central aspects of his concept of 'protracted war' and its cyclical, drawn-out character. Before the Japanese invasion, Mao strongly criticizes the idea of a constant advance or the need to cling on to territory. To him these concepts were unrealistic and potentially disastrous. He argued that the war could only be won slowly, after a long series of enemy offensives and retreats. The Maoist notion of success placed victory in protracting war; in that not just by bleeding the enemy slowly but attacking his nerves or his determination to continue fighting but more significantly in keeping hope alive for one's own cause. A particular and peculiar concept of victory resided in each stage of Mao's revolutionary campaign. For example, during the initial phase of the revolution, when the Communists were militarily weak a purely defensive strategy was adopted where invincibility was the objective. Later, while operating on interior lines, Mao adopted a 'defensive-offensive strategy'²¹² where possibilities for victory could be better explored.

The apparent strength of Mao's strategy, and a feature of success of people's war strategies, lies in how 'cheaply' victory is defined and how willing the revolutionaries are to accept casualties and remain hopeful. Cheaply defined victories invariably come at great human and material cost. Mao's approach in most western cultures would have been seen as a deliberate brutalisation of one's own people to sustain a political notion and not

perhaps the general good of the nation. Another inherent feature in people's wars is how even the most miniscule of successes finds great glory and how setbacks, even major ones, are seen as a manifestation of the peoples unrelenting will, devotion to the cause, and motivation to go on.

Max Boot's *Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*,²¹³ published in 2002 is arguably an Americanisation of Sir Alistair Horne's *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*.²¹⁴ Boot provides an in-depth view of the involvement of the United States in 'small wars', such as the Boxer and the Philippine Insurrections. He points out that these smaller conflicts were not fought with the express intention of achieving a conventional victory '... but for reasons related to inflicting punishment, ensuring protection, achieving pacification, and benefiting from profiteering.'²¹⁵ Rudyard Kipling's 'White Man's Burden' from where perhaps both the titles were inspired, echoes similar sentiments, albeit as something of a philosophical pun.²¹⁶

Another useful article which deals with the war on terror and the meaning of victory is 'Victory in Terror: War Has Many Meanings' by Pauline Jelinek. This article also questions conventional view of victory. 'Victory might mean a drop in the number of terror attacks, or a drop in the death tolls they inflict. But almost no one foresees a complete end to terror tactics that have succeeded in getting attention for Islamic extremists and others.'²¹⁷

Jelinek hints at the idea of a 'limited victory' regardless of the degree of success that may be achieved in such a conflict, the notion of a sense of diminishing returns. Is there a point beyond which each of the battles in the war on terror fails to yield results justifying the additional means committed? The analogy can be applied to a front, the war and, the campaign as a whole and indicates the importance of war termination, even in an unorthodox war such as the one against terrorism.

SECTION 5: RECENT STUDIES ON THEORY AND DEFINITION OF VICTORY

As stated at the beginning of the chapter, from a handful of studies at the time of the first round of literature survey carried out between 2004 – 2005, there has been in comparative terms, an explosion of research related to the concept, definition, theory, perception, notion and purpose of victory. Among the latter works, book lengths studies such as

Martel's *Victory in War: Foundation of Modern Military Policy*, (2007) has attempted to develop a theoretical framework for understanding victory. Such have been amply supported by numerous articles and even internet blog posts. Significant and important studies published up till end 2007 have been analysed and incorporated in this research.

In 2004 in a monograph *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory*, Gray set out a framework for strategic level analysis of military outcomes and contingent or resulting political impacts which is applicable both prospectively as well as retrospectively.²¹⁸ His framework defines the quality of victory at the strategic level. Gray asserts the purpose and utility of victory as a relative meaning in relation to the ends that policy seeks. On extreme end, the most desirable and complete from a policy perspective is 'decisive victory'; additionally, he adds two distinct classification to the vocabulary namely, 'strategic success' and 'strategic advantage.'²¹⁹ In terms of quality and utility these shades are obviously lower however, these are victories nonetheless. Gray finds that while decisive victory is still possible despite it being out of fashion through much of the cold war and beyond, strategic advantage and strategic success are equally important objectives for the use of military power and ones that can yield meaningful political results in the bargaining dynamic. Gray does not look outside the three shades discussed as of course anything short of strategic success would fall in the domain of stalemate, status quo or other shades of failure.

An interesting and useful addition to the literature has been *Victory before War*.²²⁰ It describes what its authors refer to as the worlds most ancient and complete homeland defence. Derived from the Vedic tradition of India, this ancient wisdom is used to explain causes of terrorism, the folly of using pre-emptive attacks as the principal strategy in the war on terrorism, and the principles of modern science and Vedic science that demonstrate the effectiveness of Maharishi's Vedic defence based on social order, justice, equality and dialogue. This work has a purely spiritual outlook and as such falls outside the scope of this research which deals with issues of theory and policy.

Robert Mandel in 'Reassessing Victory in Warfare' (2007) explains the inherent subjectivity of the victory notion. Mandel identifies the conceptual difficulties in assessing victory from the perspective of the 'end state, the cost-benefit analysis and the embedded subjectivity.'²²¹ He dissects the concept of victory in two distinct phases namely war winning and peace winning. Mandel identifies five important fallacies that

accompany a victory. First on his list are the military fallacies that arise from ‘overestimating the post war payoffs of military power,’²²² political fallacies that stem from overestimating the ease of transforming the defeated state’s post-war political system,²²³ economic fallacies stemming from underestimating the ‘costs of post-war economic assistance... underlying assumption that such economic reconstruction will be smooth, fast and inexpensive,’²²⁴ social fallacies that overestimate the vanquished society’s willingness to adopt the ‘victor’s social value system’ and last, diplomatic fallacies driven by the victors appreciation of external legitimacy of the post war arrangement by ‘assuming the outcome will serve as a positive model admired by onlookers.’²²⁵

In scope and comprehensiveness from among the recent literature, Martel’s *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy* (2007) presents a structured approach to assessing victory. Martel uses several case studies to induce a generic framework for assessing victory and provides a pre-theory.²²⁶ Ascribing a scale between military victory and ideological victory to the level of victory, Martel applies it to his three level analytical framework that looks at the achievement from the victory in ‘change of status quo’, ‘mobilisation for war’ and, ‘post conflict obligations.’ Victory in war is seen subjective to itself as opposed to what it leads to. Success is seen as a function of how well and how professionally something was done as opposed to what actually was achieved in terms of policy objectives.

In an unpublished seminar paper titled ‘Victory and Defeat in International Relations’ (2005), Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney presents a case for perception over reality and the inescapable influence of culture on the former.²²⁷ Their thesis suggests that no theory of victory is complete unless the end state is viewed within the absolute and relative cultural frameworks of the opposing sides. Two approaches, one entirely ‘correlational’, referred to as scorekeeping framework, and the other largely ‘perceptual’, the ‘match fixing framework’ are described. These are dealt with in detail in Chapter IV.

These recent works that collectively serve to inform or construe contemporary pre-theories of victory cannot be sufficiently underpinned by the foundations and language established in earlier works. According to Schelling, ‘victory’ inadequately expresses what a nation wants from its military forces. Mostly it wants the influence that resides in

latent force. It wants the bargaining power that comes from its capacity to hurt, not just the direct consequence of successful military action. Even total victory over an enemy provides at best an opportunity for unopposed violence against the enemy populations. ‘How to use that opportunity in the national interest, or in some wider interest, can be just as important as the achievement of victory itself; but traditional military suicide does not tell us how to use that capacity for inflicting pain.’²²⁸

Victory and defeat register on a sliding scale of possibilities. But a simple axis would miss much of the relevant action. Note Michael Howard’s plausible opinion that a war, fought for whatever reason, that does not aim at a solution which takes into account the fears, the interests and, not least, the honour of the defeated peoples is unlikely to decide anything for very long.²²⁹ As a military objective, decisive victory is not controversial. Whether or not the decision sought needs to be conclusive, if not necessarily quite of a Carthaginian character – *Carthago delenda est* (English: Carthage must be destroyed)²³⁰, is a matter initially for policy to decide and then for political-military dialogue as events unfold.²³¹ The quest for decisive success in the 21st century will more and more carry the risk of yielding only a painful Pyrrhic victory.

CONCLUSION

A review of the literature reveals that there has been little direct research by theorists and writers on the meaning and notion of victory. However, the black and white perception of victory has been sharply questioned, not only by literature and studies on the topic, but by the evolution in modern warfare; as well as changing global political events and the makeup of the multinational complex of the modern world. Victory is an essentially ambiguous and problematic concept.

An extensive array of questions and interpretations of victory exist. What was evidenced from the examination of the literature is the ambiguity and relativity of the treatment of ‘victory’. We have also found that the idea of the finality of victory has been discounted by many theorists. Critics have tended to study the aftermath of military victories and their results or outcomes in terms of the larger implication for politics, diplomacy and society.

Related literature, we find, predominantly deals indirectly with the idea of victory and its meaning, particularly in the analysis of military campaigns. Although one can identify a

wide range of issues and variable, the studies, reports and books cover areas of discussion from conventional correlational approaches – which deal mainly with outcomes and results of conflicts, both violent and non-violent in a simplistic way, that is the victor as opposed to the defeated – to a more contemporary and complex look at the impact of victory and defeat in relation to the purpose served, intended or otherwise.

Chapter notes and References

¹ Sir Michael Howard, 'The Use and Abuse of History,' in *The Causes of War, and other Essays*, ed. by idem (Temple Smith, London, 1983), p. 195.

² Roy F. Baumeister and Mark R. Leary, 'Doing Narrative Literature Reviews', *Review of General Psychology*, Vol 1, No. 3, September 1997, pp. 311-320 this p. 313.

³ Some of the works that contribute towards aspects of theory and definition of victory include: Stepan A. Tiushkevich, 'Military Leaders of the GPW: The Art of Victory - Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945', *Military Thought*, 1 May 2001, pp. 70-76; Barry C. Boyce, 'Whither Vincibility?', in an introduction to Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Denma Translation Group (Shambala Publications, Boston, 2002); Colin S. Gray, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory* op. cit., this monograph talks about the relevance decisive victory in an age where war appeared out of 'fashion' as an instrument of policy; and Stephen Biddle, *Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004), this book provides valuable insight to victory at the tactical level. Some of the works that partially addressed aspects of the theory of victory include: Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning and Recovery*, trans. by Jefferson Chase (Metropolitan Books, Markham, 2003), Brian Bond, *The Pursuit of Victory from Napoleon to Saddam Hussein* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) and Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means of Success in World Politics* (Public Affairs, New York, 2004).

⁴ Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, 'Essence of Victory: Winning and Losing International Crises', *Security Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, October 2004, Robert Keith Wallace and Jay B. Marcus, *Victory Before War* (Maharishi, New Delhi, 2006); Gregory R. Copley, *The Art of Victory: Strategies for Personal Success and Global Survival in a Changing World* (Threshold Editions, New York, 2006); Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, 'Wars of Perception', *New York Times*, 28 November 2006; Robert Mandel, 'Reassessing Victory in Warfare', *Armed Forces and Society*, 2007, No. 33, pp. 461 – 495; William C. Martel, *Victory in War*, 'op. cit.', Jan Angstorm and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, op. cit. Alex Weisiger, 'Victory Without Peace: Conquest, Insurgency, and War Termination', Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, (Palmer House Hotel, Chicago, April 2007), internet, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p198347_index.html.

⁵ This assertion is based on the topics and case studies that a vast majority of articles addressed. See Chapters IV and V .

⁶ A model of absolute war where political success is attained through an uncompromising military success or as total a military defeat of the enemy as possible. The enemy is then expected to submit to the will of the victor. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit., p. 75.

⁷ Post positivism suggests that human knowledge is based upon human conjectures and not unchallengeable, rock-solid foundations. It differs from positivism in two ways: first that the absolute separability of knower and known is not envisaged, and second, that a single, shared reality excluding all others realities is not necessary. See D.C. Phillips & Nicholas C. Burbules, *Postpositivism and Educational Research* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Boulder, 2000).

⁸ General Douglas MacArthur, Farewell address to Congress, 19 Apr 1951. Internet, [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/MacArthur's Farewell Speech to Congress](http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/MacArthur's_Farewell_Speech_to_Congress)

⁹ The text has been widely researched and extensively debated. Several translations in English language exist. However, owing to the complexity of both the work and the source language – in this case Chinese – and the brevity of the work, translations and interpretations vary considerably. For the purpose of this review, five different versions including four current translations of the original bamboo text have been used. These are Giles 1910 translation: Sunzi, *The Art of War*, trans. Lionel Giles, internet, Project Gutenberg, <http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/132>; The widely accepted and well-presented Griffiths translation: Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffiths (Oxford University Press, New York, 1971); Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, trans. Denma Translation Group, (Shambala Publications, Boston, 2002), and a modern Chinese – American translation by Chao-Wing Chohan and Abe Bellenteen Sun Tzu, *The Art of War: Corner Stone of Chinese Strategy* (Astrolog Publishing House, Hod Hasharon, 2003) and a recent work by Youan Shibing based on General Tao Hanzhang interpretation: Sun Tzu, *The Art of War: A Modern Chinese Interpretation*, trans. Youan Shibing (Sterling Publishing Company, New York, 2000).

¹⁰ See Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. by Lionel Giles, op. cit.

¹¹ The meaning of the apparent illusion of the ‘the whole’ is to be found in Confucian philosophy and not in *The Art of War*, though Sun Tzu does allude to it at places. The idea of ‘taking whole’ is central to the notion of ‘winning without battle’ as, like yin and yang, one is subdued by the other; thus the remark: ‘taking a state whole is superior.’ Sun Tzu looks below the superficial – in the classic Confucian style – and does not limit himself to military matters and tactical or technical details but endeavours to bring out the essence of strategy and its linkage with policy which cannot ignore the bigger, wider and deeper picture – *the whole*. Sun Tzu presents a basic principle of victory the yin and yang, the empty and the whole, the hard and the soft.

¹² Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, The Denma Translation Group, op. cit., p. 69.

¹³ See notes to the chapter, *Ibid.*, p. 142.

¹⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit., p. 75.

¹⁵ Baron Henri de Jomini’s *Summary of the Art of War*, published in 1836, quickly became a doctrinal text for those seeking to understand, and in many ways copy, Napoleon. Neither Jomini nor Clausewitz recognised any intermediate level between tactics and strategy. In modern warfare, the operational level of war was not distinguished from tactics. It would therefore be unfair to say that Jomini held a very simplistic notion of victory that did not stretch beyond the field of battle.

¹⁶ Baron Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill, internet, Gutenberg Project, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13549/13549-h.htm#article_i, p. 25.

¹⁷ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit., p. 267.

¹⁸ Thucydides, *History Of The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Robert Richard Crawley

(University of Chicago, Chicago, 1971).

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²⁰ Ibid., pp. 504 – 507.

²¹ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa (Oxford University Press, New York, 1998). *The Prince* is undoubtedly Machiavelli's most influential work. It also serves as a link to another important body of literature where war and the definition of success therein cannot be ignored namely, International Relations Theory. *The Prince* was written for a very specific purpose. In 1513, Machiavelli was living in forced retirement after the Medici family overthrew the republican government of Florence – where Machiavelli had served. During his service in the Florentine government, Machiavelli had had the opportunity to deal diplomatically with kings and princes from all parts of Europe. He wrote *The Prince* as a gift to the new Medici rulers of Florence as a sign of allegiance and to win back their favour.

²² Machiavelli, *The Prince*, op. cit., p. 82.

²³ Ibid., p. 53.

²⁴ See Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit., Chapter 10, pp. 253-257.

²⁵ op. cit., p. 253.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 582 – 583.

²⁷ Brian Bond, *The Pursuit of Victory*, op. cit., p 3.

²⁸ This work will be discussed in detail as it covers many of the foundational aspects and controversies related to this topic.

²⁹ Brian Bond, *The Pursuit of Victory*, op. cit., p 3.

³⁰ Ibid., p 4.

³¹ Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958), p. 9.

³² Ibid., p. 8.

³³ Ibid., pp. ix, 287.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 287.

³⁵ Gray, Colin S., 'How Has War Changed since the End of the Cold War?', *Parameters*, Vol. 35.1, 2005

³⁶ Ibid., p. 14.

³⁷ Thomas M Nicholos, *Winning the World : Lessons for America's Future from the Cold War* (Praeger, Westport, 2002).

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Robert H. Scales Jr., Major General, 'Achieving Victory by Avoiding Defeat', *JFQ*, Autumn/Winter 1999–2000, p. 7.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 8.

⁴² Andrey A. Kokoshin et. al., 'Evolution of the Concept of Victory in Soviet Military – Political Thought After the Second World War', in *Soviet-American Dialogue in the Social Sciences: Research Workshop on Interdependence among Nations* (National Academy Press, Washington D.C., 1990), p. 42.

⁴³ Andrey A. Kokoshin et. al., do not elaborate or explain their reference to the two axes, viz. level of victory and acts to attain these, graphically. What is presented here is purely the Author's own interpretation based on the description offered by the original source. The contents and, at places, implications of the text have been 'added to' for completing a vague or unfinished concept. Ibid., pp. 42-44.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 45-46.

⁴⁵ Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, 2nd Revised Ed. (Praeger, New York, 1968), pp. 348 – 349.

⁴⁶ Sun Tzu , Ibid., pp. 74-76.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Chapter 3, pp. 79-84.

⁴⁸ Both Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller maintain that the best strategy is one that seeks to defeat the enemy's plan and thus indirectly defeat its forces. In a military strategic sense, emphasis is on dislocation of the enemy's main force – the military centre of gravity - while for Clausewitz on the other hand, the destruction of the main force is imperative. The influence of Sun Tzu who said proposed that the superior military cuts down the enemy's strategy cannot be ignored.

⁴⁹ Jomini, op. cit., p. 468.

⁵⁰ See John Shy, 'Jomini,' in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Parret (Oxford University Press, New York, 1986) pp 143 - 185, this pp. 148-149, 158 - 159, 164 – 172.

⁵¹ Jomini, op. cit., p. 142.

⁵² Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 80.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Gerard Chaliand, *The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age*, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1994)

⁵⁵ Chaliand also points out that in terms of consequences; the battle for Constantinople

was far more decisive than the Battle of Austerlitz or Cannes. Yet was far less striking an affair. See *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁵⁶ Gerard Chaliand, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁵⁷ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (1968), (Penguin Books, New York, 1991), p. 353.

⁵⁸ Margaret Mead, 'Warfare is only an Invention - Not a Biological Necessity,' in eds. Leon Bramson & George W. Goethals, *War, Studies from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology* (Basic Books, London, 1964).

⁵⁹ Alexandra Gheciu, 'The Changing Character of War', December 12, 2005, http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:VjAIBp9_V3wJ:ccw.politics.ox.ac.uk/material/M T04/What_is_War_Report_23-11-04.pdf+military+victory+filetype:pdf&hl=en&lr=lang_en&client=firefox-a

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Direct strategy implies compellence through use or threat of use of violence whereas indirect strategy seeks the same results through use of other instruments of power.

⁶² Christopher D. Bellamy, *Knights in White Armour: The New Art of War and Peace* (Pimlico, London, 1997), p. 225.

⁶³ William Pfaff, 'Dangers of Victory : Resisting the Demand to Widen the War,' *Commonwealth*, 7 Dec. 2001: p. 7.

⁶⁴ Andrew J. Bacevich, 'Victory Spoiled', *National Review*, 28 June 1999, p.18.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ James Kurth, 'The American Way of Victory', *The National Interest*, Summer 2000, p.5.

⁶⁷ While there are not many studies that could be found explicitly relating an analysis of the Cold War's concepts of victory, yet this relationship could be implicitly found in many places and through inferences within the texts.

⁶⁸ A. J. Echevarria, 'An American way of war or way of battle?', internet, http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:h5yoPeA0FIwJ:www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/newsletter/opeds/2004Jan.pdf+military+victory+filetype:pdf&hl=en&lr=lang_en&client=firefox-a, accessed 23 December 2005.

⁶⁹ Stephan Biddle, *Military Power*, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁷⁰ Colin S. Gray, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory*, *op. cit.*, pp. v, 10-12 and 14.

⁷¹ Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (Continuum, London, 1991).

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 274-278.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 206.

⁷⁵ Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, 'Victory and Defeat in International Relations', op. cit., All subsequent citations are from the original manuscript obtained from the conference. A revised version was published on the Internet on 2009-05-25, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p69842_index.html.

⁷⁶ One partial exception is Scott Gartner, *Strategic Assessment in War*, which focuses on how organizations assess their own success in conflicts.

⁷⁷ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945); Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Macmillan, 1922); George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy: 1900-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). For a more optimistic assessment of the influence of public opinion on foreign policy see Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, 'Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,' *American Political Science Review*, vol. 87, No. 3 (1993), pp. 624-638. 36 John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (John Riley & Sons Inc., New York, 1971).

⁷⁸ Two recent examples are Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002); and Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III, *Democracies at War* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002).

⁷⁹ Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis* (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1997); Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (John Hopkins, Baltimore, 1981).

⁸⁰ Dominic Johnson cites an earlier article that also considered on a similar theme. See Dominic Tierney, 'Essence of Victory: Winning and Losing International Crises,' *Security Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (October 2004).

⁸¹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976); Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt, eds., *Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence* (Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1994).

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ See Jonathan Schell, *The Unconquerable World: Why Peaceful Protest is better than War* (Penguin, London 2005), pp. 53-57.

⁸⁴ Robert Jervis, op. cit.

⁸⁵ Carl Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 87.

⁸⁶ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999), p. 1.

⁸⁷ Carl Von Clausewitz, op cit., p. 80.

⁸⁸ Strictly speaking, the idea of real war was not advanced by Clausewitz but existed already in the Prussia because it accorded with Prussian cultural and philosophical position. See Michael Howard, *Clausewitz* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983), p. 35.

⁸⁹ Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 579.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 603.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁹² See Gerard Chaliand, *op. cit.*. As the name suggests, the work is not only exhaustive in its historical depth but also the breadth of cultures and thoughts it includes. It is one of the few works where the evolution of military thought and its practice outside the West.

⁹³ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966), p. 31.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁹⁶ Richard M. Nixon, *No More Vietnams* (Arbor House Pub. Co., New York, 1985)

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 125 – 126.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-107.

¹⁰¹ Richard E. Berg-Andersson, 'HOLD ON THERE!!! Assessing the Meaning of Victory in Iraq,' *Research and Commentary*, The Green Papers Commentary, April 2003, internet, <http://www.thegreenpapers.com/PCom/?20030412-0>, accessed 1 February 2005.

¹⁰² Plutarch, 'The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans', *op. cit.*, pp. 314-332.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 315-316.

¹⁰⁴ While the factors affecting the initiation of war have been extensively studied, the factors that determine the outcome of war have been neglected. Using quantitative data and historical illustrations from the early 1800s to the late 1980s, Allan Stam investigates the relative effect on war outcomes of both the choices leaders must make during war and the resources they have at their disposal. See Allan C. Stam, *Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War* (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1996).

¹⁰⁵ See Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power op. cit.*

¹⁰⁶ Stephen J. Cimbala in *Military Persuasion in War and Policy: The Power of Soft* also elaborates the concept. He describes military coercion as 'military persuasion is the threat or use of armed force in order to obtain desired political or military goals. It is basically a psychological strategy intended to influence the decisions of other parties without necessarily having to destroy their armed forces or societies.' See Stephen J. Cimbala, *Military Persuasion in War and Policy: The Power of Soft* (Praeger, Westport, 2002), p.

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¹⁰⁷ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power*, op. cit., p. x.

¹⁰⁸ Niccolo Macivelli, *The Prince* (1998), op. cit., pp. 55-58.

¹⁰⁹ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power*, op. cit., p. 1.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹¹² Jonathan Schell, op. cit., pp. 48 – 51.

¹¹³ See ‘The Melian Dialogue’ in Thucydides, *History Of The Peloponnesian War*, op. cit.

¹¹⁴ Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Cornell University Press, New York, 1999), pp. 14, 35-37, 73-75.

¹¹⁵ Carole Alsharabati and Jacek Kugler, ‘War Initiation in a Changing World’, *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*, No. 4, Vol. 34, 1 Dec 2008, pp. 358 – 381, this pp. 358-359. Also available on internet, <http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/03050620802574960> , accessed 15 Dec 2008.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Eliot A. Cohen, ‘When is Victory Complete’, *Washington Post*, Internet, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53947-2004Sep1_2.html, Accessed Nov. 2005.

¹¹⁹ General Douglas MacArthur’s radio broadcast from the USS Missouri on the eve of the signing of the Japanese instrument of surrender, 2 Sep 1945. MacArthur Achieves, US War College, Norfolk Virginia.

¹²⁰ General Douglas MacArthur, Farewell address to Congress, op. cit.

¹²¹ Eliot A. Cohen, ‘When is Victory Complete’, op. cit.

¹²² John T. Fishel, *Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm* (Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 1992), p. 59.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 60

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 61

¹²⁵ *Oxford English Dictionary*, op. cit., s.v. ‘reality’, Full entry for *reality*: ‘reality’ noun (pl. realities) 1) the state of things as they actually exist, as opposed to an idealistic or notional idea of them. 2 a) thing that is actually experienced or seen. 3) the quality of being lifelike. 4) the state or quality of having existence or substance.

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- ¹²⁶ Microsoft Corporation, *Encarta World English Dictionary*, on DVD, (Bloomsbury Publishing Plc., 2002).
- ¹²⁷ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1967), p. 74.
- ¹²⁸ See Derek Lin, *Tao Te Ching: Annotated & Explained* (Skylight Paths Publishing, Los Angeles, 2001), Chapter 1.
- ¹²⁹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, op. cit., p. 74.
- ¹³⁰ *Collins Essential English Dictionary*, 2nd Ed. (HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 2006), s.v. 'truth'.
- ¹³¹ Benjamin Murphy, 'Michael Dummett', hosted in James Fieser and Bradley Dowden, eds., *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, internet, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/dummett.htm>, s.v. 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'.
- ¹³² Ibid.
- ¹³³ Mark D. Van Ells, 'Echoes of War: A Thousand Years of Military History in Popular Culture,' *Journal of Popular Culture*, Vol. 37, 2004.
- ¹³⁴ D. Krieger, 'Day By Day we are Becoming more Hated', internet, http://www.counterpunch.org/krieger_04042003.html, accessed 20 December 2005.
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- ¹³⁷ Gregory R. Copley, op. cit., pp. 27 – 28.
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¹⁴⁵ R. W. Brislin K. Kushner, *Intercultural Interactions: A Practical Guide* (Sage Publications Inc., Beverly Hills, 1986), p. 22. Also cited in Ashley Stocker, ‘The armed forces of Australia, Britain and Canada and the impact of culture on Joint, Combined and Multinational operations: A methodology for profiling national and organisational cultural values and assessing their influence in the international workplace,’ (PhD diss., Cranfield University, 2004), p. 1-8.

¹⁴⁶ Ashley Stocker, ‘The Armed Forces Of Australia, Britain And Canada And The Impact Of Culture On Joint, Combined And Multinational Operations: A Methodology For Profiling National And Organisational Cultural Values And Assessing Their Influence In The International Workplace’ (PhD diss., College of Defence Technology, Department of Defence Management and Security Analysis, Cranfield University, 2004), p. 25.

¹⁴⁷ Geert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the mind* (McGraw Hill, New York 1997), p. 16.

¹⁴⁸ Ashley Stocker, op. cit., p. 25.

¹⁴⁹ Raymond Williams, *A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, Revised. Ed. (Oxford University Press, New York 1983), pp. 87-93 and 236-8.

¹⁵⁰ Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive culture: researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, religion, art, and custom* (Gordon Press, New York, 1974, first published 1871). Modern distinction in culture also need to be pointed out here. Some scholars identify culture in terms of consumption and consumer goods with its own associated vocabulary—high culture, low culture, folk culture, or popular culture—anthropologists understand ‘culture’ to refer not only to consumption of goods, but to the general processes which produce such goods and give them meaning, and to the social relationships and practices in which such objects and processes become embedded. For them, culture thus includes art, science, as well as moral systems. See John Berger, *Ways of Seeing* (Peter Smith Pub. Inc., 1971).

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¹⁵² See Margaret Mead, *And Keep your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist Looks at America* (1942), (Berghan, New York, 2000).

¹⁵³ Barry C. Boyce, ‘Whither Vincibility?’ op. cit., Part III Essay Notes.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 142. See also the commentary to chapter 3 on p. 147.

¹⁵⁵ Gerard Chaliand, op. cit., p. 5.

¹⁵⁶ Jacques Duby, *La Bataille de Bouvines*, (Gallimard, Paris, 1982), pp. 14-15 cited in Gerard Chaliand, op. cit., p. 5 – 6.

¹⁵⁷ Gerard Chaliand, op. cit., p. 6.

¹⁵⁸ A. Zimm, ‘A Causal Model of Warfare’, internet,

http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:wdNXP36NTsUJ:usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JanFeb01/zimm.pdf+paradigms+of+victory+filetype:pdf&hl=en&lr=lang_en&client=firefox-a, accessed December 25, 2005.

¹⁵⁹ General der Panzertruppen Friedrich Paulus became commander of the 6th Army after Field Marshal von Reichenau died in an aircraft crash in January 1942. Paulus led the 6th Army to a major victory at the Second Battle of Kharkov during the spring of 1942. This victory sealed the 6th Army's destiny because it was selected by the OKH for the attack on Stalingrad. The 6th Army failed to obtain a quick victory; winter came and with it Operation Uranus – the massive attack of Soviet forces on the flanks of the German corridor between the Don and Volga rivers in November 22-23. The 6th Army was isolated and a major relief operation, (Operation Wintergewitter), which eventually failed, was undertaken by Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. Paulus was promoted by Hitler to the rank of Generalfeldmarschall on January 31, 1943 ostensibly in part because until that day no German Field Marshal had ever surrendered. Possibly, Adolf Hitler expected Paulus to commit suicide, but Paulus soon surrendered to the Soviet Forces, contrary to orders by his political chief. The remaining forces of the 6th Army, under the independent command of General Karl Strecker, surrendered three days later. Although not the definitive end of the 6th Army, it was one of the worst military disasters in German history. For the first time, an entire German field army had been completely destroyed. See Christopher Bellamy, *Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War* (Vintage, New York, 2007), pp. 547-553.

¹⁶⁰ A. Zimm, op. cit.

¹⁶¹ O. Nikitina and A. Zolotov, 'The Meaning of Victory' <http://www.russiaprofile.org/politics/2005/5/6/106.wbp>, Accessed December 13, 2005.

¹⁶² Michael Gelven, *War and Existence: A Philosophical Inquiry* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), p.4.

¹⁶³ While in *The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age*, Gerard Chaliand summarily cites a tradition by Al Tabari. The original text is also worth looking at as it provides a fuller context. See Muhammad ibn Jarir Al Tabari, *History of the Prophets and Kings, Volume XIX, The Caliphate of Yazid*, trans. by I.K.A Howard (Suny Press, 1991).

¹⁶⁴ Richard Holmes, 'Asymmetric Warfare', Lecture transcript, Cranfield University, RMCS, Shrivenham, 14 July 2005.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ These excerpts are taken from a lecture delivered at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia on May 21, 2007. Gregory R. Copley, 'Grand Strategy in an Age of Tactics,' internet, <http://www.artofvictory.com/Copley-GrandStrategy.htm>, accessed 17 Jul 2008.

¹⁶⁷ European scholars reject that date as incompatible with the dates of the Indian kings who were contemporaries of the Buddha. Thus a somewhat later date is sought. See Hajime Nakamura, 'Buddhism', in *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, Volume 1,

(Thompson & Gale, New York, 2004), pp. 248 -257, this p. 248.

¹⁶⁸ Dr. C. George Boeree, 'Buddhist Morality,' in *Introduction to Buddhism*, Shippensburg University, internet, <http://www.ship.edu/%7Ecgboree/buddhamorals.html>, Accessed Jan. 06.

¹⁶⁹ James A. Stroble, 'Buddhism and War: A Study of the Status of Violence in Early Buddhism', University of Hawai, Manoa, 1991, Internet, <http://www2.hawaii.edu/~stroble/buddwar.htm>, accessed Mar 11, 2008

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Uma Chakravarti, *The social dimensions of early Buddhism* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987), p. 176.

¹⁷² See James A. Stroble, op. cit.

¹⁷³ Syed Wajid Ali Rizvi, *War and the Laws of War in Islam: Does Islam Stand for Terrorism?*, (Army Education Publishing House, Rawalpindi, 2005), p. 25.

¹⁷⁴ *Rig Veda*, trans. Ralph T.H. Griffith, (Bloomfield, London, 1921), Verse 1: 17-706). Also available on internet, *The Rig Veda*, trans. Ralph T.H. Griffith (1896), <http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/rigveda/index.htm> and <http://hinduwebsite.com/sacredscripts/rigintro.htm>

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. Verses 6: 20-21.

¹⁷⁶ *Geetha*, The Geeta Tridandi, internet, <http://hinduwebsite.com/sacredscripts/rigintro.htm>, Verse 2:30.

¹⁷⁷ L. N. Rangarajan, *Kautilya – The Arthashastra*, (Penguin, New Delhi, 1992), p. 498. Also available online, Internet, http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~wldciv/world_civ_reader/world_civ_reader_1/arthashastra.html.

¹⁷⁸ Rajmohan Gandhi, 'War, Peace and Hinduism', *The Hindu*, Sun, 26 May, 2002, op. ed., also available on internet, <http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/mag/2002/05/26/stories/2002052600150400.htm>, accessed 12 Nov 2005.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ David Little, 'Holy War Appeals and Western Christianity: a Reconsideration of Bainton's Approach,' in *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions*, eds. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, (Greenwood Press, New York, 1991), p. 121.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² *The Torah*, Chabad.Org, Judaism 101, internet, <http://www.chabad.org/library/article.asp?AID=145402>, (16:18).

¹⁸³ See 'Parashah' and commentary on *The Torah*, internet,

<http://www.torah.org/hamaayan/5762.shoftim.html>, accessed Mar 2005. See also Sharon Pace, 'The Original Torah: The Political Intent of the Bible's Writers', *Theological Studies*, Vol. 65, 2004

¹⁸⁴ Torah, Deuteronomy, op. cit., 20:19

¹⁸⁵ 'Sabra' is a term used to define a Jew born in Israel. Oz Almog, *The Sabra: The Creation of the New Jew*, (University of California Press, London, 2000), p. 23.

¹⁸⁶ Oz Almog, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

¹⁸⁷ The exact text reads: 'But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.' *The Bible*, King James Bible, internet, <http://bibleresources.bible.com/>, Mathews 5:39 - 42. See also Luke 6:29 and Lam 3:30.

¹⁸⁸ Rick Fields, *The Code of the Warrior* (Harper Perennial, New York, 1991), p. 147.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ David Little, op. cit., p. 123.

¹⁹¹ See for example *The Bible*, King James Bible, op. cit., Matthew 5:38-40; Luke 6:27-29.

¹⁹² Ibid., Luke 22:37.

¹⁹³ Ibid., Luke 22:49-51.

¹⁹⁴ Majid Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar* (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1966), p. 17.

¹⁹⁵ Mohammad Mukarram Ahmad, Muzaffar Hussain Syed, *Encyclopedia of Islam* (Anmol, New Delhi, 2005), p. 165 - 167.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 165.

¹⁹⁷ Marmaduke Pickthall, *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran* (Amna Publications, new Delhi, 1996), p. x. See also Sayed Ali Asgher Razwy, *A Restatement of the History of Islam and Muslims: CE 570 – 661* (World Federation of KSI Muslim Press, London , 1995), ISBN ISBN 0-9509879-1-3, p.207.

¹⁹⁸ Mohammad Mukarram Ahmad, Muzaffar Hussain Syed, Op Cit., p. 166.

¹⁹⁹ The assertion is evinced in the various writing and training materials used by the Taliban as well as a general scan of how the orchestration of their 'holy war'. See also Jessica Stern, *Terror In The Name Of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (HarperCollins, New York, 2003).

²⁰⁰ Paul Ramsey, *Basic Christian Ethics*, (John Knox, Louisville, 1993), p. 68.

²⁰¹ 'Messianism' here is used in the context of liberator: relating or belonging to an inspirational leader, especially one claiming to be or regarded as a saviour or liberator.

²⁰² Oz Almog, op. cit., p. 75

²⁰³ This is an exception to this general rule that ‘man’ not ‘God’ is blamed for ill tidings. Chief Seattle cites the power and will of his God for the waxing of the age of the ‘white man’ and waning of the ‘red’. His speech is a subject of significant controversy and some believe that the translator, Dr. Henry A. Smith, concocted portions of it as he did not speak the native language. It is believed that if Chief Seattle actually said these words, someone else at the 1954 speech must have translated it from Salish into Chinook and Smith then made notes that he published 30 years later. See Clarence B. Bagley, ‘Chief Seattle and Angeline’, *Washington Historical Quarterly*, Volume 22, No. 4, October, 1931.

²⁰⁴ Chief Seattle of the Squamish, *The Speech of Chief Seattle* (Applewood Books, Massachusetts, 2000), p. 15.

²⁰⁵ Oz Almog, op. cit., p. 73

²⁰⁶ ‘Deuteronomy14:2’, *The Torah*, op. cit., Accessed 8 May 2007.

²⁰⁷ David Little, op. cit., p. 122.

²⁰⁸ Lt General Alistair Irwin, KCB CBE MA FCMI FInstCPD, was the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland and then Adjutant General, British Army. He is also a published author on military theory and history.

²⁰⁹ These are based on a private conversation between the author and Lt Gen Sir Alistair Irwin in April 2005.

²¹⁰ Lt Gen Sir Alistair Irwin, ‘Future Trends in Warfare’, Talk delivered to the 2005 Class of the Pakistan Army Staff Course and Command and Staff College, Quetta, 6 April 2005. See also R. K. Bluhm, ‘Military Power: Land Warfare in Theory and Practice, Edited by Brian Holden Reid’, *Journal of Military History*. Vol, 63, No. 1, 1999, p. 172 and Brian Holden Reid, *Military Power: Land Warfare in Theory and Practice* (London, Frank Cass, 1997).

²¹¹ Lt Gen Sir Alistair Irwin, ‘Future Trends...’ op. cit.

²¹² The term is used in the context advance by Willisen in 1840 suggesting that a force can either be on the offensive or on the defensive or a combination of the two at strategic and tactical planes respectively. See Karl Wilhelm von Willisen, *Theorie des Grossen Krieges (Theory of Great War)*, (Berlin, 1840), pp. 18, 76 and 105.

²¹³ Max Boot, *Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, (Basic Books, New York, 2002).

²¹⁴ *A Savage War of Peace* by Alistair Horne, first published in 1977, draws an important distinction between torture by the police and torture by the military. The former damages mainly individuals and need not be hugely damaging to the war effort; the latter, Horne quotes a former French officer as saying, involves the honour of the nation -- as it did at Abu Ghraib and other facilities where Iraqis were abused by American soldiers in 2003-04. Sir Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (The New York

Review of Books, New York, 2006).

²¹⁵ A. J. Echevarria, ‘An American way of war or way of battle?’ op. cit.

²¹⁶ Rudyard Kipling, ‘White Man’s Burden’, internet, <http://www.online-literature.com/kipling/922/>.

²¹⁷ Pauline Jelinek, ‘Victory in Terror War has Many Meanings’, *AP Online*, 9/1/2004, internet, <http://www.highbeam.com/library/doc0.asp?DOCID=1P1:98608045&num=1&ctrlInfo=Round18%3AMode18c%3ASR%3AResult&ao=&FreePremium=BOTH>

²¹⁸ Colin S. Gray, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory*, op. cit.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.

²²⁰ Robert Keith Wallace and Jay B. Marcus, op. cit.

²²¹ Robert Mandel, ‘Reassessing Victory in Warfare’, *Armed Forces and Society* Vol 33, (2007), pp. 464-465. The article was originally published online and is available at, <http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/33/4/461>.

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 480

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 483’

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 485

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 486-488.

²²⁶ Pre-theory, according to James Rosenau, is a step beyond data collection to render the raw materials comparable and ready for theorising. James Rosenau, ‘Pre-Theory and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ in ed. R. B. Farrell, *Approaches in Comparative and International Politics* (1966), p. 126. See also ‘A pre-theory revisited, World politics in an era of cascading interdependence,’ *International Studies Quarterly*, 28 (September 1984): 245 – 305.

²²⁷ Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, ‘Victory and Defeat...’, op. cit., p. 2-3.

²²⁸ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* op. cit., p. 3.

²²⁹ Michael Howard, cited *Ibid.*, p.12

²³⁰ Charles E. Little, ‘The Authenticity and Form of Cato's Saying “*Carthago Delenda Est*”’, *Classical Journal*, No. 29, 1934, pp. 429-435. The evolution of the phrasing towards its modern form has been further considered in Silvia Thürlemann-Rapperswil, ‘*Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam*’, *Gymnasium*, No. 81, 1974.

²³¹ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, op. cit., p. 32.

CHAPTER III – WAR AND POLITICS

It makes no difference what men think of war. ... War endures. ... War was always here. Before man was, war waited for him. The ultimate trade awaiting the ultimate practitioner.¹

Cormac McCarthy

INTRODUCTION

War, Quincy Wright suggests, has different appeal to different people.² It is a political act with, ideally, clear political direction and objectives. Direction here implies the pursuit of national interests towards attainment of which, in whole or part thereof, the war contributes. War also has an internal dynamic, one that has a tendency of making it an activity unto itself, devoid of external logic and often restraint or control. This tendency defies political objectivity and/or the moral and legal precepts that have governed war from time to time. When war becomes an act unto itself and success is judged in a co-relational context, victory in war and, ‘political victory’ through war, can run a tangential and dangerous course.

War is also a socio-cultural activity. It is shaped by and in turn shapes societies, culture and the psychological approach to war.³ Any attempt, therefore, to deconstruct victory or to identify and develop a theory thereof, cannot begin without adequate insight to war as a political act, a socio-cultural attraction⁴ and a competition – what Clausewitz sees as the primordial tendency in war.⁵

The nature of war, according to Liddell Hart, remains constant while every war exhibits, in every case, a new and unique character.⁶ As to what exactly defines the nature of war, and what attributes contribute to its character is a debate that scholarship has yet to unanimously reconcile. For now, we begin with a basic observation on the political intercourse of war.

A survey of conflicts on the 20th century as indeed the conclusions arrived at in *War and Anti-war* by Alvin and Heidi Toffler,⁷ brings us to the hypothesis that the political character of war in general mutates with every significant change in the international order and for any particular war it is affected by the international strategic environment before and during hostilities.

Taking the 20th century as a guide, the period up to the end of the First World War defined a particular international system with Europe as an undisputed power centre of the world, seen at a global scale as opposed to a regional metric. The League of Nations attempted to introduce a new international order after 1919. While it did create a distinctly different order, no significant redistribution of power occurred. It also ran tangentially to the nature and interests of states locked in an ‘anarchic’ system. Its collapse was accelerated on the one hand by the failure of the US to ratify it and on the other by the events that unfolded in the interwar years leading up to the Second World War. The Cold War produced an ideologically polarised international order spearheaded by the US and the erstwhile USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union and emergence of the US as a single most powerful state created a ‘unipolar’ world with a character distinctly different from what had preceded it. The biggest change since the Cold War has come in the shape of the economic interdependence among nations, emergence of mega-corporations that transcend national borders and in the way they treat capital, technology, goods and services. Whether we subscribe to the idea of globalism and globalisation or refer to it as selective economic liberalisation, the effect – which is of concern to this thesis – remains the same. In relation to the impact of the international environment on war, we find that such developments alone do not define how political disputes and wars draw their character. How success is gauged in a given order, is arguably a dominant dynamic of change in war’s character alongside technology and the legal aspects of warfare.

Plato summed the future of war in his prediction that ‘only the dead have seen the end of war.’⁸ Colin S. Gray has long maintained that the institution of war retains much of the utility and place it had come to enjoy in centuries past.⁹ While economic development needs the security and deterrence that military capability lends it, war is counterproductive in an interconnected world. In such an economic order, war, even the most localized affair, is international. The ripple effects notwithstanding, degree and quality of the belligerents interface at both the governmental and the commercial level is at stake. The moral justification for recourse to violence – in real and perceptual terms – as well as the outcome – again as perceived internationally and not just domestically – affect both belligerents. The consequences are indeed profound; partly because the synthesis of trade and liberalisation collectively serve to mitigate the role of governments and in turn that of traditionally oriented ‘nation states’, but largely because in a globalised

system, the trade agreements, market access, flow of information, technology and capital constitute what we may describe activity that may run contrary to policies of geographical dominions subscribing to the Westphalia model of the nation state. Today more than ever, stability, security and effective threat management are essential for economies to flourish.

SECTION 1: WAR AND CONFLICT

Before a deliberate study of war and the notion of victory in war can commence, it is essential to arrive at a definition of war and the wider issue of conflict. Definitions of war and conflict, like any social phenomena, are invariably with perspectives, masking a particular political or philosophical stance. They are as such varied. This section surveys some of the popular definitions of war and conflict from a variety of sources.

War in its popular sense is understood as a conflict among political groups involving hostilities of considerable duration and magnitude.¹⁰ This ‘descriptive’ definition of war and the apparent relationship it bears with ‘conflict’ does not adequately capture the essence or *war quid rei*. On the basis of interests, focus or analysis the study of war can generally be divided into several categories. The most frequent of such classifications are philosophical, political, economic, technological, legal, sociological, religious and psychological for each of which ‘stipulative’ definitions can be found. While these foci indicate how theoreticians treat war, most of the actual theories of war and conflict are in fact mixed. This is because the complexity of the phenomenon of ‘war’, both noun (a war) and verb (to war), cannot be encapsulated or explained through any single factor or mono-dimensional approach.

A list of generic and persuasive definitions representing the particular usage of various terms in this thesis has been presented earlier. However, war and conflict need to be addressed more deliberately as their understanding is foundational in nature. Definitions of war and conflict cannot and do not exist without context. Political, social, legal and military definitions of war present particular additives and omissions. These qualifications make the usage of the terms ‘war’ and ‘conflict’ subjective and contextual. The terms war and conflict are often used interchangeably for example, one definition of the ‘war’ is ‘a state of open, armed, often prolonged conflict carried on between nation, states, or parties.’ By this definition Vietnam was in fact a war. However, officially in the eyes of the United States government, it was a conflict,¹¹ because Congress never

declared war on Vietnam. In fact, the US has not declared war since 1941 in a legal sense of the term.¹²

CONFLICT

Definitions of conflict, as too those of war, are contextual and usually multilevel. For example, Galtung describes conflict is a political process (dynamic situation) in which engaged parties have incompatible attitudes and behaviours.¹³ It consists of: a conflict situation, manifested in expressing various political aims or conflict of interest, which cannot be simultaneously achieved and for that reason could be qualified as mutually exclusive; conflict behaviour at the first place aimed to achieve the mentioned political aims; and conflicting attitudes and perceptions, having emotional dimension (such as feeling of anger, mistrust, fear, disrespect, hate and revenge.) Some modern and measurable definitions of conflict also exist for example SIPRI¹⁴ defines it as violence among social groups, nations or states, which causes at least 1000 casualties per year.¹⁵

Conflict can be defined as a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns. Generally, if there is some level of difference in the positions of the two (or more) parties, regardless of the degree of enmity or amity between them, they can be said to be in conflict. When such disagreements are fundamental in nature and affect the core interests or values of either party, the conflict will invariably possess a volatile and escalatory trend. Another issue that needs attention is that of true disagreement versus the perceived disagreement. Arising out of mistrust, lack of communication or misunderstanding, the real and perceived issues can at times be quite different from one another. Contemporary conflicts and the trajectory for future ones – in terms of nature and scope – suggest an ever increasing complexity which require and equally complex or at least well considered response. War occurs when peaceful means for conflict resolution are either exhausted or are perceived to not have the capacity to yield meaningful results. Seen in this context, conflicts deal with issues while war provides an avenue for solution.

WAR

Political – rationalistic definitions of war and warfare tend to see war as a condition between states and organised forces. For example, according to the *Merriam Webster Dictionary* war is ‘a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between

states or nations,’ or ‘a period of such armed conflict’ or ‘a state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism... a struggle or competition between opposing forces for a particular end’ for example a class war or a war against disease.’ As an act, to war is to ‘be in active or vigorous conflict,’ or ‘to engage in warfare.’¹⁶ Similarly Rousseau argues that ‘war is constituted by a relation between things, and not between persons... War then is a relation, not between man and man, but between state and state...’¹⁷ Both definitions suggest that war only exists between states. In both cases, war is seen as a condition or state and a prequalification of formal declaration is added. John Keegan characterises such political-rationalist theories of war as essentially limiting since these assume war to be an orderly affair in which states are involved, in which there are declared beginnings and expected ends, easily identifiable combatants, and high levels of obedience by subordinates. Keegan notes that such nationalist theories do not deal well with pre-state or non-state peoples and their warfare.¹⁸

There are other schools of thought that seek to address war in a broader context and include in its fold the struggles of nomadic or displaced peoples, non-state groups, insurgencies and insurrections. For example, the *Oxford English Dictionary* expands the definition to include ‘any active hostility or struggle between living beings; a conflict between opposing forces or principles.’¹⁹ This avoids the narrowness of a political-rationalist conception by admitting the possibility of metaphorical, non-violent clashes between systems of thought, such as of religious doctrines or rival trading companies. This perhaps indicates too broad a definition, for trade is certainly a different kind of activity than war, although trade occurs in war, and trade often motivates wars. Such definitions suggest how change occurs when opposing forces act on each other. War is often both the product, as also the driver of the process.

The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* describes war in relation to the context or frame of reference. In its common and popular usage war is understood ‘as conflict among political groups involving hostilities of considerable duration and magnitude;’ while in the social science perspective, application of the term is restricted ‘to such conflicts only if they are initiated and conducted in accordance with socially recognized forms. They treat war as an institution recognized in custom or in law.’ Whereas ‘military writers usually confine the term to hostilities in which the contending groups are sufficiently equal in power to render the outcome uncertain for a time.’ The encyclopaedia also cites further distinction based on the relative strength and size of the contending belligerents: ‘armed conflicts of

powerful states with primitive peoples are usually called pacifications, military expeditions, or explorations; with small states, are called interventions or reprisals; and with internal groups, rebellions or insurrections. Such incidents, if the resistance is sufficiently strong or protracted, may achieve a magnitude that entitles them to the name ‘war.’²⁰

From these three influential dictionaries we have distinct definitions that connote particular philosophical positions. Alternative definitions of war premise on legal, ethical and moral precepts as well as biological ones that suggest war to be a fatalist, all-pervasive phenomenon of the universe also exist. War, we find, has been defined variously by scholars, statesmen and soldiers however, generally these definitions fall into two broad categories of act and state. A summary of the influential definitions follows:

- Cicero (106 – 43 BC) presents one of the earliest and simplest definitions of war. A ‘contending by force’²¹ is how he described it. This is a very general and broad definition but one that premises on the use of force. Cicero also wrote that ‘there is no intermediate state between war and peace’²², which hints at the idea that war can also be thought of as a state.
- Grotius adopted a legal approach that premised on and introduced the idea of war as a state. Grotius, initially critical of Cicero offered various definitions. From early works where he referred to it as the ‘act of putting arms to use’ to a later one, closer to Cicero’s which read: ‘the state of those contending by force.’²³
- Hobbes’ (1588 – 1679) definition of war posited an entirely different perspective: ‘war consisteth not in battle only, nor in the act of fighting’.²⁴ Fighting was not elemental to Hobbes view on war. It also defined a particular type of war common in international parlance where a state of war exists but no fighting takes place. The peculiar state of war between Germany and the Anglo-French alliance over Poland, the ‘phony war’²⁵ as it was called, involved no fighting. Hobbes’ definition thus describes the state of mind of the parties to a conflict – their will to be at war notwithstanding the absence of violence.
- In the 18th century, Emerich de Vattel wrote: ‘War is the state in which we prosecute our right by force’.²⁶ He described war as a method of settling

disputes.²⁷ A normative dimension that sees war as a prosecution of ‘rights’ and not interests.

- For Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), war is ‘a regrettable expedient for asserting one’s rights by force, with no court of justice available to judge with legal authority’.²⁸ Kant’s conception is somewhat limiting outside the revolutionist paradigm, as it presupposes a certain international order to which the belligerents subscribe.
- Carl Von Clausewitz defines war as duel at a larger scale and an ‘act’ of policy. His description of war as ‘an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’²⁹ incorporates elements of a ‘state’ or ‘condition’ together with the ‘act.’ Importantly, the act carries an aim without which it ceases to be war and becomes raw, wanton violence. An interesting thing to note in Clausewitz’s definition is that he makes no mention of nations or states; it follows that the definition can be adapted to wider conflict situations provided the act carries a political aim or objective.
- Among modern historians and strategists, Sir Michael Howard explains war as an ‘armed conflict between organised political groups’³⁰ while Colin S. Gray moves away from the ‘condition’ and ‘act’ definitions and suggests a more abstract notion where ‘war is a relationship between belligerents, not necessarily states’³¹ Taking a line closer to what Hobbes’ had suggested, Gray’s definition is incomplete unless qualified by the definition of warfare: ‘the conduct of war, primarily through not exclusively, by military means.’³² Seen in this way, war is free from the act of fighting, the means as well as the condition of violence making it more universal and enduring in an environment where the character of war is increasingly technology intensive and its purpose less total.

Having identified a spectrum of definitions, it is the political issue of war and its allied philosophical dimensions that concern this research. We need a definition that captures the clash of arms, the state of mutual tension and threat of violence between groups, the authorized declaration by a sovereign body with or without legal frameworks and last, definable ends and policy objectives. This would allow us to distinguish wars from riots and rebellions, collective violence from personal violence, metaphorical clashes of values

from actual or threatened clashes of arms. In wars with limited political aims, a more suited definition is:

The use or threat of use of violence between organised groups for politico-military objectives directly – through warfare and war-fighting – or through gaining sufficient leverage by military and / or other means of violence for favourable bargaining.

The definition holds good for most types of wars even those which involve a super power against an easily defeated smaller entity – what the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* calls pacifications.³³ The emphasis lies in both sides retaining the quality of limitation. When war becomes a total affair for any one of the parties, the rational calculus of ends and objectives ceases to retain a purely political meaning.

SECTION 2: WAR AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE POLITICS OF VICTORY AND DEFEAT

Politics is the womb in which war develops - where its outlines already exist in their hidden rudimentary form, like the characteristics of living creatures in their embryos.³⁴

Carl von Clausewitz

This section is not about how nations gain tangible material rewards such as territory, regime changes, or resources, nor does it deal with diplomacy, coercive or compellence strategies that they may employ to further their goals. History constantly reminds us that in international relations, military victory, or indeed the gain of any tangible reward at all, is neither necessary nor sufficient for domestic audience, allies or the international community to construe that a leader, nation or alliance has won. ‘Not necessary’ writes Dominic Johnson ‘because perceived victory can be obtained despite net losses: not sufficient because even substantial gains do not guarantee that people will view events as a success.’³⁵ Victory and perceived victory can be synonymous. Johnson cites the Second World War as an example, however, as this thesis will show, concurrence between perception and reality only applied to the USA and the erstwhile USSR in 1945. For the remaining allies, while not pyrrhic, there were expensive political trade-offs in the name of victory.

Quite often, however, ‘one side can exploit geography, technology and strategy to defeat an opponent militarily, yet still emerge as the perceived loser, with all the tribulations that

this status involves,³⁶ Vietnam is a case in point; the jury is still out on the fate of a prolonged conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the wisdom of Sun Tzu and lessons of history are any guides, material benefits and sweeping military victories notwithstanding, international and domestic perceptions for the USA and her allies are likely to steer away from the victory notion.

‘Defeat is an orphan’³⁷ as Thomas Campbell so avidly put it. Politically it is seldom that nations in a collective sense or more specifically leaders or parties accept failure as defeat. Stephen Van Evera argues that states tend to ‘embellish their past to aggrandize their prestige and deny their weaknesses. Countries are prone to ‘nationalist mythmaking’, in which they exaggerate their greatness in history and contemporary world affairs, and diminish the greatness of others, through a range of societal processes, including education, literature, and the political postures of elites. The system works well because, as a general rule, the peoples of one nation do not read the histories of another as closely. If they do, they cannot identify with it in the same way.’³⁸

From the perspective of international relations, the variations in perception, reality and the resulting construct of victory and defeat are aptly summed up by Elliot A. Cohen in the following passage taken from *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in War*:

Every war is begun, dominated, and ended by political considerations; without a nation, without a government, without money or credit, without popular enthusiasm which furnishes volunteers, or public support which endures conscription, there could be no army and no war - - neither beginning nor end of methodical hostilities.

War and politics, campaign and statecraft, are Siamese twins, inseparable and interdependent; and to talk of military operations without the direction and interference of an administration is as absurd as to plan a campaign without recruits, pay or rations...

There is no evidence that they understood any better than the civilian leadership the mentality of friend or foe [in the Vietnam War], or that they had any ideas for bringing the war to a conclusion on terms acceptable to American diplomacy and bearable for the American public.³⁹

PERSPECTIVES ON WAR

The socio-political perspective of war is incomplete without reviewing the institution of war in international relations theory and practice. Realism defines the predominant nature of inter and intra-state relations though there have been selective experiments in rationalism and idealism. Realism points to the anarchical state of the world – in terms of absence of a single authority over states – characterised by its competitive nature. Competition can lead to war and war is accepted as an essential instrument of political interaction. Balance of power is seen as the principal source of order and peace as its subjective element. In contrast, idealism sees international law and morality as key influences on international events as opposed to the overarching status of power in the realist paradigm. Human nature is perceived as basically good. Human development through education and the existence of international organizations – such as the UN – can yield peace, cooperation and help to facilitate good relations between nations. Idealists see the world as a community of nations which has the potential to work together to overcome mutual problems.⁴⁰ Balance of power, though useable, is second to the big brother, regional policemen – or a global power that arbitrates between states, ensures justice and resolves disputes while preventing violence. Idealism was manifested in the ill-fated League of Nations. Rationalism rests greater faith in the problem solving abilities of international institutions. ‘The object of war is peace and not vice versa’.⁴¹ War still remains a possibility. However, the balance of power is not seen as the only means of maintaining international order.

War is an inescapable reality, while interpretations of its function and utility vary; it remains the ‘ultimate feature of international relations, as revolution is the ultimate feature of domestic politics.’⁴² Martin Wight’s summation of the place of war in the ‘three traditions’ of international theory (discussed below), provides valuable insight to war’s purpose, conduct and, by reverse induction, for the core purpose of this thesis.

For the Rationalist school, war is a necessary evil, which is to be minimised as far as possible to serve the principal notion that the object of war is peace and not vice versa. ‘Peace is the norm and war the violation or exception; peace is logically prior to war.’⁴³ For the realist – ‘peace is the laboratory of war.’⁴⁴ The realist is constantly in a state of frictions with friends, allies and foe alike. With international anarchy as the common denominator, all ‘wars’ are in substance ‘battles’, peace is but a pause, a ‘revetment’ for

the next battle. This leads to the conclusion that even the most defining wars – what Philip Bobbitt referred to as ‘epochal wars’⁴⁵ - represent battles or campaigns in a wider unending conflict, a perpetual friction in relations among all states.

For the realist, peace is contested, war is the natural state. Effort, including violence is necessary to attain a desirable peace. In a more rationalist reduction, we can deduce that the object of war is not peace but *a different peace* as depicted in the diagram below:




FIGURE 7: THE TWO STATES OF PEACE,

SOURCE: AN ADAPTATION OF AN EARLIER MODEL DEVELOPED BY THE AUTHOR.⁴⁶

The principles of physics, applied in Figure 7, elaborate the states of peace:

- *In the absence of sufficient flux or ‘power’ or equal flux in both magnets, the pendulum would remain suspended in the zone of war and violence; though there may exist periods of apparent peace as indicated by ‘War Halted’*
- *Overwhelming flux on any one side draws the magnet out of war in to the zone of a desired peace – note that the process of drawing the magnet out is itself indicative of coercion or compellence and war.*

The revolutionists, like the rationalists do not consider power and war to be self-justifying. Peace is prior to war and war is a necessary evil, a step towards a more desired peace. Rationalist and the revolutionist differ in the sense that the rationalist frame of

reference is a single war whereas the revolutionist considers a series of wars leading to a perfect peace.⁴⁷

Clausewitz tells us that war is not merely an act, but also an instrument,⁴⁸ a continuation of political relations, carrying out of the same by other means.⁴⁹ It is an act of force which, in the context of Clausewitz's two wrestlers⁵⁰, is the manifestation of their individual power and skill, firmness of grip – balance and will. It is the moral, conceptual and physical manifestation of power accumulated as a result of exercise, reflection, training and nourishment. The Clausewitzian explanation of war as a duel at a larger scale hence serves wider meaning than war-fighting alone. In the context of states, the origins of state power were reflected in military power, its usage (that is to deter, coerce or compel) and ultimately, in the manner in which war served state interests by the nature of political leverage it provided. Clausewitzian notion of victory, in both political and military terms and more so in the latter context, was a direct outcome of what he had witnessed war to be in his time and his interpretation of history. Napoleon pursued pure military victory in a form of war that resembled Clausewitz's theoretically perfect war (absolute war).⁵¹ Clausewitz's also realised that war in its perfect form could not exist in reality; nonetheless it needed to be studied in this hypothetical form for purpose of theory. In essence he identified the political character of war which was a distinct aberration from its pure primordial form that vectored war's inherent inertia in sobering often paradoxical direction.

The pure, the absolute is the natural tendency of war, so Clausewitz warned us. This 'ghost of Napoleon' – Basil Liddell Hart's avid description of the smothering legacy of the French Revolution and resultant European order – lived on well into the 20th century and defined much of the socio-political intercourse that, in turn, tainted the character of war in an unprecedented manner. It was technology of mass destruction – the nuclear bomb – that put question marks on validity of the wisdom and future of age of mass warfare and echoed once again Machiavelli's assertion that war is useful only so long as it serves the interest of the state. What is thus of primary importance is the need to control war for the purpose it must serve and not war's own sake or the glory of a hollow victory.⁵²

Sun Tzu stresses that 'victory is the main object of war'⁵³ and thus, by implication, either the war aims or methods adopted (that is to say the objective and subjective elements of

war) must be shaped and kept in harmony with the principal purpose of attaining victory. There appears a deliberate delinking of the ‘desired’ and the ‘should be’ aims and objectives from the pursuit of a perceptual victory – even if such a victory slights any substantive aims and objectives. Analysing the relationship, John Keegan, writing in 1994, presents a case for military success concluding that ‘those who make war an end in itself are likely to be more successful than those who seek to moderate its character for political purpose.’⁵⁴

CAUSES OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

War is often said to perform a biological and a socio-political function. These contexts represent the two major schools of thought in the contemporary theories on the causes of war. Ethology is a relatively new field of study. Pioneered in the 1920s by the Dutch biologist Nikolas Tinbergen and Konrad Lorenz of Austria,⁵⁵ it is the study of animal and increasingly, human behaviour and places aggression on a continuum with, on one end, the absence of aggression or cooperative submission and on the other, the use of violence or war. Ethologists assert that instinct bound aggression is premised on self-preservation and self-improvement of a species necessitated by the functional distribution of limited resources in one part, and survival of the fittest by elimination of the weakest and the ill from the reproduction process on the other.⁵⁶ War is attributed to ‘certain innate biological and psychological factors or drivers.’⁵⁷ Ethology relates to animal behaviour in much the same way as psychology does to humans. For Ethologists too, violence – which is essential to war – draws a distinct set of theories as it does for psychologists and psychoanalysts. Among the various theories of war, these theories are collectively referred to as biological theories of war.

The Darwinian philosophy of natural selection combined with the biological theories is thus a combination of the ‘need, necessity, survival and interest’ school within the ‘urge and impulse’ school completing the biological theories subset. Although as modern discoveries and research point out, natural selection may not have defined our origins – as too that of other animals that survive today –⁵⁸ but to the social scientist interested in the study of war, it does present a thesis for unifying the biological and social theory of war. Tempting as it may be to delve deeper in to the issue, it is a digression from the object of this study.

The causes of war according to the second school of biological theorists are postulated in man's psychological nature. The hypotheses range from the very general to complex. The former, boasting proponents such as St Augustine and Spinoza look at the more intuitive dimensions such as moral, ethical and philosophical. Herfried Münkler finds that:

Modern writers utilizing psychological approaches emphasize the significance of psychological maladjustments or complexes and of false, stereotyped images held by decision makers of other countries and their leaders. Some psychologists posit an innate aggressiveness in man. Others concentrate upon public opinion and its influence, particularly in times of tension; others stress the importance of decision makers and the need for their careful selection and training. Most believe that an improved social adjustment of individuals would decrease frustration, insecurity, and fear and would reduce the likelihood of war. All of them believe in the importance of research and education.⁵⁹

The limitations of such approaches derive from their very generality. Whether such psychological premises are realistic or idealistic, the impact upon human behaviour of social and political institutions that give man the opportunities to exercise his good or evil propensities and to impose restraints upon him can never be ignored.

In sum, war and peace as far as behavioural research goes, are merely metaphorical terms for 'two opposing sets of indistinctly defined circumstances on a continuum representing species-preserving and species-increasing aggression.' The military has learnt to suppress the human impulse to flee from danger, developed weapons; drill and practices combined these with psychosocial motivations to enable war to remain an instinct-bound form of settling conflicts.⁶⁰ War 'can neither be attributed to degenerated, misguided animal instincts nor to necrophilia or other pathological degeneration of human sexual desire. War is not a functionless degeneration, but a specifically human form of inter-group aggression that is used by people to compete for land and natural resources.'⁶¹ Eibl-Eibesfeldt asserted that the development of weapons of war was a decisive step in the functional change of aggression:

There can be little doubt that weapons were a decisive factor in the development of destructive aggression. Weapons technology played its part in eroding our instinctive inhibitions. A swift blow with a weapon can take out a

fellow human before he has the chance to plea [Sic.] for mercy using the appropriate submissive gestures. This works even better when killing is done at a distance using an arrow, for example.⁶²

We have looked at the two extremes: first, theories that suggest man's destructive instinct that impels him to kill his fellow man and, the other where the instinct is not wanton but itself a derivative of an innate awareness of natural competition for resources. These biological theories tend to lump individuals, social groups and wider national or state groups together and largely premise on a degree of symmetry, or at least a level of consistency in triggers and responses among them. The former set of theories, the social theories of war, take off from essentially interest based approach and themselves fork into two broad streams namely the socialist and the liberal theories.

Liberal theorists differentiate between the individual, the society and the state. While an individual, a social group or a state may act symmetrically; this is not a general rule or a premise. The state, at least among the classical liberal theorists of the 18th and 19th century, could not exist without the individual and the society. Economy, decentralization, and freedom from governmental control were the classical liberal's main concerns, as shown particularly clearly in the writings of John Stuart Mill.⁶³ They accepted the necessity of maintaining defence but postulated the existence of a basic harmony of interests among states, which would minimize the incidence of wars. Economic cooperation based upon an international division of labour and upon free trade would be in the interest of everybody—commerce would be the great panacea, the rational substitute for war.

In explanation of wars that did occur, however, liberals emphasized a variety of factors. First, they focused on autocratic governments, which were presumed to wage war against the wishes of peacefully inclined people. It thus became a major tenet of liberal political philosophy that war could be eliminated by introducing universal suffrage because the people would surely vote out of office any belligerently inclined government. The course of the 19th century, however, and especially after the First World War, liberals began to accept the conclusion that an unregulated international society did not automatically tend toward peace and advocated international organization as a corrective.

Liberal ideas were manifest through political structures which they regarded as primary in determining a state's propensity towards war. Socialists however, saw the socio-economic

system as a prime mover. Whereas liberals concentrated on political structures, regarding them as of primary importance in determining the propensity of states to engage in war, socialists turned to the socioeconomic system of states as the primary factor. Early in the 20th century the two streams did, to some extent, converge, as evidenced by the fact that the English radical liberal John Hobson, in 1902, explained wars in terms later adopted by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in 1916.⁶⁴ Today again, free market system is increasingly adopting socialist policies at least within selected sectors. With the world economy headed towards a recession we have seen and perhaps will continue to see staunch ‘market states’ acting quite socialistically and bailing out private concerns on taxpayers money. Our socio-economic experiments as too testing the limits of liberalisation seem to have run their course, a full circle as we head back to what resembles a convergence in realism and rationalism.

GLOBALISATION AND WAR

Kenichi Ohmae asserts that ‘the nation state has become an unnatural, even dysfunctional, unit of organising human activity and managing economic endeavour in a borderless world. It represents no genuine, shared community of economic interest; it defines no meaningful flow of economic activity.’ Globalisation has three facets: trade, technology and liberalisation.⁶⁵ While schools of thought on the nature and impact of globalisation vary, the visible impacts of the subjective aspects of globalisation have brought about a change in the character of states and their governments; what Phillip Bobbitt avidly describes as the ‘market state’⁶⁶. Taking this school of thought to be correct would mean that the changed international political context rejects physical and geographical confines defined by international borders and asserts instead soft borders delineated by trade, commerce, economic cooperation – the stuff found often in agreements between trading groups as opposed to governments. The ‘market state’ therefore creates borders of its own – trade borders – spatial and extra-spatial dominions, of flow of capital, technology, goods and services manifest in fluid regional alliance, agreements, policies and operating systems.

If borders still exist with only their definition changed, it may be argued that the globalised international system itself possesses roots for future conflict. The flux in the dominion of common space between geographically organised insular states and the virtual boundaries of the ‘market state’ explains some of the conflicts that have ensued since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

In this synthesised geo-economics - geopolitical system, as indeed in the geo-political order that applied in the 19th and 20th centuries, the superpowers continue to play their traditional role. Today, it is the mega economies that, to quote Woods, ‘get to set (and enforce) many of the rules of the new global economy.’⁶⁷ To a limited extent, emerging economic power houses have also sufficient economic coercive power to make and amend the rules, set the terms of play and even cite the goal posts. The rise of India and Brazil is a case in point. It is believed that the so called BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India and China) would outstrip the G7 by 2032 and, by 2050, constitute the biggest economic group.⁶⁸ Whether they realise a common platform such as the EU model is an issue of speculation and debate. However projecting the trajectory of their military developments, any military alliances to which two or more of these powers lend weight would invariably enjoy substantial power sway if not decisive superiority. What we may well see is the emergence of first real challenge to military supremacy since that enjoyed by the Ottoman Empire before their crushing defeat at Vienna in 1683.⁶⁹

Economic progress and military power go hand in hand. Epic wars of the industrial age encouraged great leaps in technology. The Napoleonic Era, the First World War, the Second World War, the Cold War, the two Gulf Wars (1991, 2003) all manifest major leaps in technology and tempo of war – at least for one side – yielding a new character, quite distinct from the last, every time.

These developments were driven in part by the principle of necessity and in part by the momentum and resources that the momentum of such wars unlocked. While the march of technology would certainly not have been halted had these long wars not occurred, however the scale, pace and energy with which society and its resources, human material and moral, were mobilised could not have been realised in the absence of these wars. So, too, the pace at which military technology found civilian applications accelerated, and vice versa. Today however, wars no longer serve as a fillip to the new technologies on the scale that they did earlier. On the contrary, the competitive economic environment that defines today’s geo-economic environment requires stability and security.

MORALITY AND WAR

Without a pretext, no war follows.⁷⁰

Thucydides

Unlike the Mennonites, nearly every human society has experienced war in the course of its evolution. Indeed, it is probably fair to say that it is war that has most profoundly shaped the values of human society. Peaceful societies, when pressed by circumstances or interests – emerging realities – have transformed to face the challenge in a Darwinian manner – holding survival and self-perpetuation supreme. In any rational recourse to violence, the end state has a direct relationship with not only the cause but also the manner in which war is prosecuted. War, therefore, offers opportunity for a better, or at least a different, more acceptable peace.

‘Humaneness’ has only changed the face of warfare, not its incidence, frequency, brutality or inherent causes. The impulse to war rests in deep rooted factors: greed versus grievance, group motives such as horizontal inequalities, individual greed – the opportunity to profit from war as identified by Keen,⁷¹ Collier and Hoefler⁷² and the failure of the social contract manifested in inequality, poverty and lack of security. Thucydides, too, identifies these generic, instinctual issues, as the basic causes of the war and then takes the argument to a moral level. He sees freedom and peace as the purpose of war. The latter rests firmly in the rationalist paradigm but the former, in the absolute sense, is an idealist entity. Thucydides implicitly asserts that human history is causal, and that causes can be temporally proximate or long-term. He writes, ‘[M]en need a cause and a morality based on reason rather than force if war and slavery are to be avoided’⁷³, and, ‘that men accept from one another hearsay reports of former events, neglecting to test them...’ Citing the example of a historical error accepted by the Athenians, he goes on to say that ‘so averse to taking pains are most men in the search for the truth’ and ‘so prone are they to turn to what lies ready at hand...’⁷⁴

Among the root causes we also have the pre-state stage that one may relate to a certain extent with post-Cold War ‘failed states’⁷⁵, where then prevails, as Hobbes explains, ‘...a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition ... continual fear, and danger

of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.⁷⁶ Thucydides, writing in *History of The Peloponnesian War*, earlier reflected:

‘And for his putting first the narration of the public and avowed cause of this war, and after that the true and inward motive of the same; the reprehension is absurd. For it is plain, that a cause of war divulged and avowed, how slight so ever it be, comes within the task of the historiographer, no less than the war itself. For without a pretext, no war follows. This pretext is always an injury received, or pretended to be received. Whereas the inward motive to hostility is but conjectural; and not of that evidence, that a historiographer should be always bound to take notice of it: as envy to the greatness of another state, or fear of an injury to come.’⁷⁷

Thomas Schelling, a prominent US Nuclear strategist during the Cold War, argued that the propensity towards peace or war is inherently ‘embedded in the weaponry, the geography and the military organisation of the time.’⁷⁸ Stephan Van Evera advances the argument further and presents five hypotheses built around the three fundamentals noted by Schelling. Van Evera asserts that the likelihood of war increases when: (1) states fall prey to false optimism about the outcome of the conflict,⁷⁹ (2) advantage lies with the side that mobilises or strikes first,⁸⁰ (3) power of states fluctuates sharply creating larger windows of opportunity or vulnerability,⁸¹ (4) control of resources allows states to protect or acquire other resources – cumulative resources⁸² and (5) conquest is easy⁸³. Van Evera’s hypotheses rest firmly in the realist paradigm and point even more profoundly, though indirectly, towards the essence of what Thucydides tells us – ‘... but it hath been fixed, for the weaker to be kept under the stronger.’⁸⁴ Van Evera’s conceptualisation of the origins of interstate conflict is comprehensive but applies only to organised states wielding symmetric and possibly dissymmetric⁸⁵ military forces. The hypotheses begin to break down when applied to ideological, intrastate conflicts or to what Samuel P. Huntington defines as the clash of civilisations,⁸⁶ to what caused the attack on the twin towers in New York on 11 September 2001, how the non-state actor can and will interface with traditionally organised states and the emerging market states. Globalisation, demographic factors and humanitarian intervention are inescapable links that cannot be ignored as direct or contingent causes of conflict. Manufactured conflicts that serve covert purpose, politics, also elude defines of Van Evera’s hypotheses. However, as we shall see later, these hypotheses have immense secondary utility, more relevant to this

thesis, as they provide a framework for analysing the historical and contemporary paradigms of limitation in war.

In Indo - Persian philosophy, as revered in the East as that of ancient Greece is in the West, 'war' has been a subject of intense scrutiny, debate and discussion over the centuries. Origins of Persian philosophy, which came to dominate and spread as a natural consequence of the Persian empire, can be traced back as far as to old Iranian philosophical traditions and thoughts which originated in ancient Indo-Iranian roots and were considerably influenced by Zarathustra's⁸⁷ teachings. It is believed that the chronology of the subject and science of philosophy starts with the Indo-Iranians and dates back to 1500 BC.⁸⁸ 'Zarathushtra's philosophy entered to influence western tradition through Judaism, and therefore on Middle Platonism.'⁸⁹ War has material, moral and territorial origins. It can be explained as a play of the trinity of 'Zan', 'Zar' and 'Zamin'.⁹⁰ Literally translated it would read 'women', 'wealth' and 'territory'; however, the true context resident within has never really been developed among scholarship in the East. Let us briefly look at the individual components before taking the whole as a philosophy of war.

ZAN

Literal meaning 'woman,' the term refers to and embodies honour, respect, status, beliefs and, in derivative forms, revenge and ideology.

ZAMIN

Meaning 'territory,' is linked to the need for the state or group to expand and to protect the integrity of its physical boundaries. Territory is often synonymous with resources and wealth. The concept is quite akin to the notion of the state as a living organism that has an inherent urge to survive and to do so it must expand and grow or be taken up.⁹¹

ZAR

'Wealth' is self-explanatory and can be construed in the passive or submissive, defensive, offensive, preventive and pre-emptive contexts. Thomas Robert Malthus (1766 – 1834), an 18th century English economist believed that 'survival is the perpetual struggle for room and food.'⁹² In 'An Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society,' he presented what was referred to as Malthus' 'Dismal Theorem'⁹³ by his contemporaries.⁹⁴ Malthus was probably the first European to study at length the issue of resource – which he considered to be ultimately limited – and

demography. Around the same time Clausewitz was expanding his treatise *On War*. As Professor Christopher Bellamy points out in *Knights in White Armour*, the two never met.⁹⁵ Had they done so, a more comprehensive and compelling relationship between resource and recourse to war might have been established by Clausewitz. Malthus believed that population is limited by means of subsistence, that population invariably increases where means of subsistence increase, unless prevented by some very powerful and obvious check and that these checks, and the checks which repress the superior power of population and keeps its effects on a level with the means of subsistence, are all resolvable into moral restraint, vice, and misery.⁹⁶ A case certainly exists for demographic factors and resources as origins of conflict. Kerbs and Levy in *Demographic Change and Sources of International Conflict* identify the possible linkages between changes in population size and composition as well as resource scarcity and national power⁹⁷. The illustration of the linkages as identified by Kerbs and Levy is reproduced below:




FIGURE 8: DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND CONFLICT LINKAGE MODEL,
SOURCE: KERB AND LEVY⁹⁸

Works such as *Environment, Scarcity and Violence* by Thomas F. Homer-Dixon⁹⁹ and *Environmental Conflict* by Paul F. Dhiel and Niel Petter Gleiditsch,¹⁰⁰ present causal linkages between environmental issues particularly those of environmental scarcity and resource capture as direct or indirect causes of conflict. In retrospect, even in the light of relatively selective case studies presented by Thomas Homer-Dixon, these linkages are essentially indirect but profound.

THE 3Z (ZAN, ZAR AND ZAMIN): A PHILOSOPHY OF WAR

As a philosophy, ‘Zan, Zar and Zamin’ can be extended from the context of an individual, where indeed a woman may be the sole purpose of conflict – Helen of Troy for example – to society, cultural groups, religious groups, traditionally organised nation states and the emerging ‘market states’. It is the overlap dimensions of the 3Zs of conflict that is of particular interest since the notion of victory, as we shall subsequently discuss, is distinct in all three.

In the contemporary international system, with the geo-economic imperatives in the forefront, resource scarcity provides fertile ground for manufacturing conflicts. These may be overtly present under morally more justifiable origins and pursued to serve dual purpose. Some sceptics view the March – April 2003 Gulf War and the subsequent occupation of Iraq in this perspective. Object of victory in such conflicts becomes perception management and not necessarily the fulfilment in whole or part thereof of the ‘moral’ purpose for war. The anatomy of such conflicts and the aspect of perception management are discussed in more detail later in this section. The causes of war hitherto discussed are represented diagrammatically below:




FIGURE 9: ORIGINS OF CONFLICT – A BASIC MODEL¹⁰¹
(AUTHOR’S OWN DIAGRAM)

This graphical representation lends itself to further develop the model. The causes of war, as we have seen, are innumerable. These can broadly be divided into two groups: the Politico-Military and the Socio-Political Causes. Seldom does a single issue constitute the root cause of a conflict in our contemporary world. A chain of events invariably contribute in what can be described as a causal train¹⁰². In terms of violence and intensity, conflicts, whose roots lie in the realm of ‘Zar’, see Glossary, tend to be more limiting, the emphasis being on cost versus gains, and manifest greater degree of political and military control in their prosecution. Conflicts that fall in the defines of ‘Zan’, and less frequently ‘Zamin’, where the primitive instincts of war and indeed Maslow’s hierarchy of needs are highest¹⁰³, have the tendency to become pronounced and less ‘limiting’. Victory in the Zar domain can be a simple cost – benefit analysis whereas in the Zan and Zamin category have an air of limitlessness about them.

Another aspect that needs to be considered is that of time sensitivity and relative value of various causes. Honour, respect, status, beliefs, revenge and even ideology are all dynamic issues whose value and paradigms change with time, it follows that the notion of victory associated towards attainment of such ends would also change accordingly. This however is negated by the evidence of history. As links in the ‘causal train’ these issues will have varied influence in different times – religious wars that plagued Europe before the Peace of Westphalia became, relatively speaking, a thing of the past but in contrast, religious sentiments still remain current in Northern Ireland at the time of writing – and are thus temporal in nature. Similarly, resources and wealth are time critical issues. Oil had limited value up until the 19th century but today it alters the geo-political value of the Middle East and the Caspian region.

We can develop Figure 9 further and superimpose the two broad foundations of conflict – the socio-political and the politico-military spheres and the relationships that emerge from the overlap of the fundamental elements:




FIGURE 10: DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICT – A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL

A, B, C and D represent zones where the notion of victory cannot ordinarily be reduced to a score card. The perceptual dimension becomes more influential and if pronounced, can potentially supersede military success. The dominant spaces are the Zan and Zan-Zamin domains where the causes of war tend towards the indivisible and intra as well as post-war bargaining bear little value. The blue area is the area of conventional rational wars, wars of interest where bargaining is possible. The red area represents indivisible bargains where wars tend to be more 'total'.

(AUTHOR'S OWN DIAGRAM)

THE STUDY OF THREAT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International politics is characterized by the frequent occurrence of threats. Yet, although scholars have long acknowledged that threats are one of the most important concepts in the theory and practice of international politics, no theory of threats has been proposed. As one review on the subject remarks 'threat has generally been treated as a vital but presumably implicitly 'understood' facet of reality.'¹⁰⁴ The negligence to systematically examine threats is all the more troubling if one considers that threats figure prominently in research on international crises, strategic bargaining, foreign policy decision-making

and most importantly military policy and strategy. In a simplistic form, threat is often explained through the following:



EQUATION 1: THE THREAT EQUATION

Assessment of a defined or potential enemy at lower levels – tactical and operational – is driven by existing or emerging capability. Capability, seen as combination of the physical, intellectual and moral domain, that is – fighting power, represents means that make possible a choice of ends and a variety of ways to attain them. The possibilities and hypotheses that emerge from the foundations for building response which itself is summed-up in physical, moral and intellectual terms. At higher level, intents become more significant since capability can always be developed to match the ends desired. The terms ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ levels are quite deliberate. These levels are related to the nature and form that ‘capability’ takes. Between capability and intent, the key denominator is time. If the time required to re-orientate is less than that required for the enemy to develop significantly new capability, then response is a function of capability. When assessing threats over a long term perspective, ‘intent’ becomes more significant.

Military strategy, as a process, can be divided into two distinct but interactive processes: the ‘development strategy’ and ‘employment strategy’.¹⁰⁵ Employment strategy seeks to apply what is available against existential threats as well as orientate for threats in the near future – it essentially provides the ‘ways’. Developmental strategy typically looks beyond the horizon while also addressing near-term shortfalls – it addresses the ‘means’. Threat evaluation, orientation and response are a continuous process and collectively serve as instruments of deterrence or coercion during peace and are essential for strategic bargaining.

Although strategic bargaining makes an important point about the contingency between actions and expected responses, it fails to elaborate on the notion of appropriateness which would explain how this contingency is formed and operates in social interactions. According to Knorr, ‘the facts that all perception is fundamentally selective and that selection is normally governed by working assumptions, or beliefs, about the outside world permit predispositions to intervene in the act of threat perception’.¹⁰⁶

VIOLENCE AS INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

James D. Fearon in his research entitled ‘Rationalist Explanations of War’¹⁰⁷ argues that the occurrence of war is not sufficiently explained in traditional rationalist arguments. Premised on the sheer cost of war and the inherent risk that accompanies it, Fearon suggest that there should exist negotiated agreements that rationally led states in dispute would prefer to war. The emphasis is on the condition of rationality. Three causal mechanisms are presented that explain why bargaining sometimes fails and rationally led states choose to go to war:

- The combination of private information about resolve or capability and the incentives to misrepresent these.
- States’ inability, in specific circumstances, to commit to uphold a deal.
- Issue indivisibilities reduce the bargaining space so much that war is possible. The bargaining model of war is discussed in more detail in Section 3 of this chapter (page 131). The arguments presented are of immense value to the purpose of this research and in many ways help explain a rationalist calculus of political victory.

As a case for war, traditional arguments include:¹⁰⁸

- anarchy,
- expected benefits greater than expected costs,
- a rational preventative war,
- rational miscalculation due to lack of information, and
- rational miscalculation or disagreement about relative power.

These arguments either fail to address or to fully explain what prevents leaders from reaching *ex ante* (pre-war) bargains that would avoid the costs and risks of fighting. Fearon identifies three causal logics to explain war despite its cost and risk:

- *War due to private information and incentives to misrepresent:* Leaders know things about their military capabilities and willingness to fight that other states do not know, and in bargaining situations they can have incentives to misrepresent such private info in order to gain a better deal: Fearon suggests that although

costless signals are uninformative, costly signals (listed as building weapons, mobilizing troops, signing alliance treaties, supporting troops in a foreign land and creating domestic political costs) can be informative. They also increase the probability of war. – ‘a rational state may choose to run a real risk of (inefficient) war in order to signal that it will fight if not given a good deal in bargaining,’¹⁰⁹ with the caveat that states may have to use war to reveal private information.¹¹⁰

- *War as a consequence of commitment problems:* mutually preferable bargains may be unattainable because one or more states would have an incentive to renege on the terms.
- *Anarchy.* Anarchy is implicit here in that bargains would be enforceable, and thus war avoidable, if anarchy did not exist. It assumes states have no private information and motivations never change (although Fearon does suggest that commitment problems may lead to war by narrowing the bargaining space such that it exacerbates other causes.)¹¹¹
- *Pre-emptive war and offensive advantages.* Offensive advantage only creates problems for commitment if it means that a state’s odds of winning are better if it attacks rather than defends. Large enough first-strike incentives (relative to cost-benefit ratios) can make all agreements unenforceable and incredible.
- *Preventative war.* If one state A is increasing in power and another, B is declining, B can rationally wage preventive war on A – ‘if B’s expected decline in military power is too large relative to B’s costs for war, then state A’s inability to commit to restrain its foreign policy demands after it gains power makes preventative attack rational for state B’. Importantly, the declining states attacks because it fears the peace it will have to accept after its rival has grown stronger, not because it fears attack. The answer can be found if the determinants of military power can be transferred between states.¹¹²
- *War due to issue indivisibilities.* Some issues may not admit compromise; if the issue allows only a finite number of resolutions, none may fall within the range both states prefer to fighting. Fearon discounts this cause for three reasons:
 - 1) most issues are complex, with many dimensions and possible settlements;

- 2) if states can pay each other money or goods or make linkages with other issues, then any issue should be perfectly divisible;
- 3) some sort of random allocation or alternation between two resolutions could in principle serve to create intermediate bargains if an issue can only be settled in two ways.

On the question of what prevents leaders from creating intermediate settlements, Fearon believes that the answer is likely to be other mechanisms rather than the core issues themselves. This thesis posits that the explanation of ‘other mechanism’ can be found in the cultural domain that, as we have seen, influences policy, action and critical choices intra crisis. Asymmetric notions of victory play a critical role in decisions of ‘if’ and ‘when’ to stop fighting. If war termination is not consistent with rational judgments as seen from the perspective of one side, the logic of the bargaining model crumbles. This is a significant, but not inescapable paradox of the rational calculus.

WAR AND THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

War strategy seeks ends that far too frequently are measured in tangible terms. The true purpose of a limited war with limited objectives is to seek specific effects in the strategic environment. ‘For the state, the strategic environment is the realm in which the leadership interacts with other states or actors to advance the well-being of the state.’¹¹³

The strategic environment, according to Harry Yarger, writing in 2003, ‘consists of the internal and external context, conditions, relationships, trends, issues, threats, opportunities, interactions, and effects that influence the success of the state in relation to the physical world, other states and actors, chance, and the possible futures.’¹¹⁴ The US Army War College primer on strategic leadership describes the characteristics of the environment as ‘volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous.’¹¹⁵

The Strategic Environment can broadly be viewed as combination of a set of variables and conditions in the international system, the regional, domestic political and socio-cultural precepts that collectively generate the legal, moral, political constraints on use of violence and in turn affect the liberty of action and the logic on which subsequent decisions are premised. International strategic environment suggests the general international ‘mood’ of representative organisations of the international community as represented through individual states or international organisations such as the United

Nations, European Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Association of South East Asian Nations, Organisation of Islamic Countries and African Union to name a few. Increasingly, the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is also beginning to weigh heavily on state behaviour.

The strategic environment is influenced by a long list of factors contained within the broad categories discussed earlier. However, not all components of the environment are critical or effective. In shaping the environment, it is thus essential to be able to separate the operating components from the dormant or less influential ones. Having done so, the subsets of constituents or components that remain are referred to in this thesis as the ‘effectual environment’.¹¹⁶ The quality of political leverage attainable is thus a direct function of how well the effectual components of the environment are manipulated.

The strategic environment is dynamic in nature; its operators may be external or internal, dependent or independent to the war or conflict in question. It encompasses political, economic, socio-cultural, moral, military and technical perspectives that influence war. This elusive, dichroic temper¹¹⁷ of the environment is not entirely fatalistic. The interplay of its concomitant factor – each of which can be influenced given direction, time and resources, shapes the environment. Chaos¹¹⁸ provides opportunity to initiate such change.



FIGURE 11: THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND ITS LINKAGES TO VIOLENCE
(AUTHOR’S OWN DIAGRAM)

To be successful, all wars big or small require a ‘favourable’ strategic and grand strategic environment. The ‘shaping’ of the environment for war is often the first step in war initiation strategy, although the ultimate object is also the strategic environment that the war in turn shapes. What we then have is a cyclic dynamic within the strategic environment shaped by action and chance in a volatility, uncertainty, complex and friction ridden media:




FIGURE 12: SHAPING THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
(AUTHOR’S OWN DIAGRAM)

The process can be extended in time depending upon the volatility in the system that is intended to be influenced or be triggered by a significant event which catalyses the process. Volatility is either intrinsic or extrinsic:




FIGURE 13: VOLATILITY
(AUTHOR'S OWN DIAGRAM)

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and the Twin Towers are an example of a trigger event that shaped the environment in favour of war; paving the way for the occupation of Afghanistan and later (in the US Government's contention, though the link was at best presumptuous and at worst completely invalid), Iraq. The wars that followed in turn shaped the regional and international environment. Without the trigger, the naked use of force, that arguably serves both the US short term security interests as well as the wider posture in the new great game, would have arguably been impossible. The environment is generally resilient to change unless volatility is induced in it. Trigger events generate a temporary instability, a chaos, an opportunity for expediency which may otherwise be repugnant to its nature and the earlier prevailing spirit – the one to which the environment will seek to return unless the opening is exploited and the course of change dominated.

Being dynamic and due to its linkage with war and political violence, the environment can be shaped through hard and soft means such as military, economic, political, socio-

cultural and information. This implies that the objective of war or conflict can be the creation of a particular environment that allows other political objectives to be pursued and of itself presents apparently no tangible gains or rewards from the immediate fighting or its outcomes. The role of will, friction and chance in shaping the strategic environment is represented in Figure 14.

The yellow area represents the possible extents of the strategic environment, anything outside the yellow is not going to happen and thus projection or reductions beyond this space represent gross errors in assessment of the trajectory of events. Within the yellow space, we have desirable and undesirable possibilities. Without action, the odds that chance creates a favourable outcome are poor. Steering the environment towards a carefully perceived desirable core involves the fine-tuning of its component parts through action. All actions occur in time and space. By applying sufficient resources, opposing will, friction and to an extent, chance can be overcome. An interim, artificial environment, referred as the shaped environment, is invariably essential to sustain any deliberate action that seeks to cause change. The attainment and sustainment of the desired environment in its perfect and absolute form is victory per se because the climate created, of itself, enables the desired physical and moral outcomes. The purpose of the transient, shaped environment can be summed up as enhancing one's own liberty of action while curtailing the adversary's. The extent to which the environment is conditioned describes the 'scale' of victory and the degree by which opposing forces are mitigated represents its 'quality':




FIGURE 14: WILL, FRICTION AND CHANCE: SHAPING THE ENVIRONMENT
(AUTHOR'S OWN DIAGRAM)

Figure 14 presents two separate graphics overlaid in the same space. The first is the set of five ovals rendered in three dimension. The vertical dimension represents the time continuum and the 'x' and 'y' axes represent action and reaction. Consider two actors 'A' and 'B' in conflict. At the base, the oval marked 'obtaining environment' represents the existential effectual environment as ascertained by actor A. The future possibilities are represented by the oval 'possible strategic environment'. In the absence of external influences, a default transition occurs over time which is not in the interest of either actor who seek ovals A and B respectively. For A to affect a course change from the default trajectory and counter B's efforts as too the play of friction and chance, effort along carefully determined lines of operations (A') is required. The second graphic – the set of three arrows – represents the change over a time continuum. Beyond a certain point, the usability value diminishes, analogous to Clausewitz's culminating point of victory. A must alter its strategy and re-orientate so as to maintain its strategic edge over B. The curved arrow to the extreme left indicates a notional point at which A, while still benefitting from the existential environment, must decide and act for the future.

SECTION 3: A STUDY OF WAR AND PURSUIT OF MILITARY VICTORY

We have established the relationship between international relations, the idea of victory and the use of war as a political tool. Clausewitz tells us that war is subordinated to policy but attaches a caveat that war's inherent nature is to serve only itself.

The pursuit of victory in war places demands on strategy, operations and the higher direction of war. These demands extend to both facets of strategy, that is, resource development and capability employment. A brief look at war from a subjective perspective – the dictates of strategy, operations and exigencies of war – is not just appropriate but imperative.

The Second World War has profoundly shaped our perspective on history. Even though the First World War resulted in the creation of new states such as Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the Irish Republic and the emergence of the League of Nations, it had relatively little influence on the redistribution of power in the international system. The Second World War – which, as Christopher Bellamy points out in *Absolute War*, was not one war¹¹⁹ but several conflicts played out concurrently in distinct and disconnected

‘theatres’ – however, was destined to profoundly alter the international environment and the way nations interacted and even the internal organisation of states. It was undoubtedly an ideological struggle. A distorted face of National Socialism manifest in Hitler, soviet communism, western liberalism and American capitalism. It was also a struggle for human values where ‘the Allies – Britain, the USA and even the Soviet Union – stressed, at least formally, their commitment to the humanistic values of the Enlightenment. ‘Hitler's Germany did away with them altogether, worshipping barbarian values like power and race instead, taking pride of its brazen contempt for morality, international conventions and the rule of law.’¹²⁰ This radical difference can best be illustrated by two diametrically opposed definitions of the aims of War. The first taken from the Encyclopaedia Britannica and the second from Adolf Hitler’s ‘Weltanschauung’:

‘Civilized warfare... is confined, as far as possible, to the disablement of the armed forces of the enemy; otherwise war would continue till one of the parties was exterminated.’¹²¹

Encyclopaedia Britannica

The aim of war is not to reach definite lines but to annihilate the enemy physically.¹²²

Adolf Hitler

The section title suggest a study of war which, in fact, would require several volumes itself, what is presented here is a brief overview beginning with definition of war, the nature and character of war and the evolution of war.

THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF WAR

War has served man individually and collectively. It has singularly and most profoundly shaped human behaviour, character, culture and societies. The nature of war is a reflection of the nature of man. In character, scholars observe, each war is different. Clausewitz attempted to explain the nature and character of war by looking at the subjective and objective elements.¹²³ With so much said, written and endured, why is it that man has not been able to comprehend or explain its true nature? War has different appeal and meaning to different people. As Quincy Wright said, ‘to some it is a plague which ought to be eliminated; to some, a mistake which should be avoided; to others a crime which ought to be punished; and to still others, an adventure which may be

interesting, an instrument which may be useful, a procedure which may be legitimate and appropriate, or a condition of existence for which one must be prepared.’¹²⁴

To a soldier, the nature of war is as a product of the means and methods of its conduct. To the general, the nature of war is defined by a series of strategic choices that manifest themselves through the operational and tactical designs of his manoeuvre. To the combatant, it is the stark reality of engagement the ultimate trade of life and death, success and failure; the most primitive reality of battle that shapes war’s nature and being.

For a statesmen, war is a temporary indulgence, an instrument of political intercourse, which, given the right tools, control, will and capability, can be wielded successfully to further political interests and arrive at a suitable bargain; war is thus an opportunity, a means to an end, a quality it has retained since Abel and Cain. As an arbitrator between states and alliances, it is as, Martin Wight points out, ‘the ultimate feature of international relations as revolution is the ultimate feature of domestic politics’.¹²⁵

The scholar’s conceit lies in a full understanding of the face of war, its causes, purpose and general manifestation in the politico-military and the socio-political spheres. Economists see it in the context of the political economy, cost and gain, opportunity and chaos. Last but not least, the lawyer observes war through an entirely different prism as for the jurists the legal paradigms, judgments and precedents are the principal subjective tools to assess and address its nature and character. Tools serve to provide avenues for recourse, as well as to limit war; making the legal instrument a statesman’s canvas and the military-man’s prison. Yet another primitive truth in war, the law of the jungle, remains part of its nature. Might is always right and victors write history. The lawyer too must bow to the underlying truth of war’s true nature.

THE SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF WAR

Clausewitz introduces subjective and objective elements while referring to the nature of war. For Clausewitz, the nature of war is manifested in its objective elements such as violence, friction, chance and uncertainty while the subjective nature—the character of war—encompasses aspects such as military forces, doctrines, weapons, and the environment (the medium of war – land, sea, air, space, cyber space). The objective and subjective natures of war interact continuously and as a result the nature of war cannot be

separated from the means and the actors involved in its conduct.¹²⁶ Indeed at its roots, the reality of war is death and destruction.

The character of war is highly dynamic and as pointed out by Colin S. Gray, every war manifests a unique character.¹²⁷ The nature of war remains more or less consistent. If it appears to have changed, the change only appears magnified by the narrow perspectives from which observers view or analyse war in their own time. In retrospect, the perspective of the age reflects minor spikes or changes as aspects of character and not nature.

The nature and character of war troubled Clausewitz. We may never know what he may have made of it had he lived long enough to review his initial thoughts. Clausewitz was concerned quite evidently with the practice of war as much as its theory. Acutely aware of the pure and the impure in war's political nature and character, Clausewitz arrived at the two fundamental types of war: 'Absolute War' and 'Real War'.¹²⁸ The former relates to the dictates of political intercourse while the latter to the exigencies of war and dictates of politics. Neither fully defines war's character but explains quite profoundly its prosecution. War's function as a scientific (rational) organization of violence 'a serious means to a serious end,'¹²⁹ is more enduring and can even explain conflict perpetrated by non-state actors. Terrorism as a means of organised violence requires a broader, less conventional, notion of organisation; but requires organisation nonetheless.

Clausewitz was intimately cognisant of the elusive and complex nature of war as John Keegan writes, 'Clausewitz was struggling to advance a universal theory of what war ought to be rather than what it actually was or had been.'¹³⁰ He did of course liken this adaptive nature to that of a chameleon. However, the tangible framework available to Clausewitz was provided by military history, his first-hand experience of Napoleonic campaigns, the available technology and the politics of his time.

The campaigns of Napoleon and Clausewitzian philosophy – as too to a large extent Jomini's – influenced the political approach and the conduct of war in Western society both in Europe and America. The US Civil War manifested facets of Napoleonic warfare built around Clausewitz's and Jomini's strategic thought.¹³¹ War continues to do so to this day. In fact, as correctly observed by Daniel Moran, the reason why Jomini apparently gets little attention in Western military thought is not because of the irrelevance of his work but, quite to the contrary, the very fact that Jomini's thoughts have been largely

absorbed in Western military art.¹³² In summary, war's subjective nature stems from the means of its prosecution and its objective from danger violence and chance.¹³³

EVOLUTION OF WARFARE AND ITS IMPACT ON VICTORY AND DEFEAT

Alvin and Heidi Toffler approached military revolutions in the framework of three waves defined broadly the way human society was organized and knowledge manifest in the ability to initiate change.¹³⁴ First wave Warfare was the consequence of the Agricultural Revolution of the Neolithic era and the consequent emergence of the first civilisations. It also introduced the idea of division of labour, though the author believes this concept became more pronounced during the second great, industrial, revolution. Organised armies and fortifications began to emerge. It is fair to say that the Agricultural Revolution started the first great wave of change as Professor Jeremy Adams writes:

Few may realize it amid today's swift changes, but the biggest technological shift in human history isn't the Internet. Instead, it was a process that took place more than 8,000 years ago and involved nothing more sophisticated than some seeds and a few crude hand tools. That shift was the Agricultural Revolution of the Neolithic Era or New Stone Age, which is what scholars call the time that began with the end of the last massive retreat of the ice caps, about 10,000 years ago.¹³⁵

The agricultural revolution is responsible for bringing about relatively stable and geographically confined organisation of human society which had up to that stage survived as hunter-gatherers. Farming required stability and continuity of effort. In return, it promised greater security; however, in that age it was also the cause of many wars. A link was established between war and soil that endures to this day. The modern peasant evolved as people were kept ignorant by their masters so as to keep them focused on farming and warfare. The soldiers were occupied for the most time of the year with working the fields. Volunteer soldiers came mainly from farms and their primary vocation only permitted a few months a year for campaigning. The armies were poorly organized and equipment often included farming tools. The Toffler's also note exceptions to this rule as manifest in the Roman Army that was not only well equipped and highly organized, but was also led by generals who learned and mastered their art.

According to the Toffler's, the industrial revolution marked the beginning of Second Wave warfare.¹³⁶ Its defining feature was mass production and developments in weapon technology. Revolutionary France epitomized the possibilities and the two World Wars the dangers. Often referred to incorrectly as the era of 'total war', Toffler's perceive this period to continue right through the two World Wars and well into the period of the Cold War. Arguably, the Second Wave begins not with 'industrialisation of war potential' but the replacement of bio-mechanical energy – mechanical, animal and human energy – with chemical energy. This constitutes an entirely different perspective as well as framework from that adopted by Alvin and Heidi Toffler. The change from First Wave to Second Wave warfare was not sudden; the transition period saw both types of armies take the field. A good example cited is that of the American Civil War (1861-65) where 'the industrialized North defeated the more agrarian South'.¹³⁷ Weapons were becoming cheaper, quicker to manufacture, easier to use and more accurate. Industrial age warfare brought to an unceremonious end the age of armoured knights and castles of the 15th – 16th centuries.

The machine gun and the artillery reduced warfare to what Professor Richard Holmes avidly describes as 'the locked front.'¹³⁸ Supremacy of firepower made manoeuvre, especially frontal attacks, bloody and futile, a lesson learnt at immense human cost during the First World War. Mechanisation, developments in air and sea warfare – particularly the aircraft carrier – restored the balance between offence and defence, attrition and manoeuvre and, for a while, manoeuvre became dominant as witnessed during World War II. The combination of dominant manoeuvre and exceptional firepower made war extremely destructive and blurred the distinction between combatants, non-combatants and the general civil populace. From the time of the French Revolution until the end of the Second World War, warfare embraced a new theory: mass destruction. The new character was a product of the time, one that would probably have made Clausewitz turn with disgust as this was if anything a perverse face of the absolute and in the end real.

Third Wave Warfare, according to Alvin and Heidi Toffler, is a product of the developments in technology during the 1970s and 1980s. The Information Revolution was already under way a decade or so earlier and the mass society slowly became a communication society. Warfare and the way armies were organised also adapted to the inherent opportunities and in turn the dictates of emerging technologies. The first Gulf War (1991), the Toffler's opine, was fought in a dual mode with low technology 'stupid'

bombs on the one hand and high technology precision weapons on the other. The theory is well grounded though the author tends to disagree with the over-liberal usage of the term ‘information warfare’ in describing the way allies fought the first Gulf War as well as the origins of the Third Wave which can be traced back to the inception of electronic communication in the early part of the 20th century – indeed as Prof. Christopher Bellamy points out, Electronic Warfare was waged during the First World War.

Additionally, Information War and information age warfare are different entities as pointed out by Colin Gray.¹³⁹ It would be more accurate to view the 1991 Gulf War in operational terms as the application of information technologies in fighting a conventional war with advanced weapon technology and increased accuracy. Information warfare of today is the advanced face of intelligence, deception, propaganda and electronic warfare. Just as agricultural wave armies were defeated by industrial age armies as reflected in Napoleonic Campaigns and the American Civil War, it remains a truism that Second Wave armies were defeated with relative ease by Third Wave armies as witnessed in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003. The relationship; however, needs to be confined to conventional war-fighting alone. The laws of physics tell us that to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction, in the realm of warfare, the reaction is often more profound and overwhelming. The reaction was, of course, and so should have been predicted, asymmetric.¹⁴⁰

Nuclear weapons and inter-continental ballistic missiles as developed during the Cold War affected war, warfare and war-fighting in an unprecedented manner. No longer did man intend to use maximum means to achieve victory but sought ways to prevent such escalation; a significant shift from the realist to the rationalist ideals of war-fighting. The dynamics of war changed under the shadow of nuclear weapons. Wars continued in the traditional manner in the Third World in the form of ‘proxy wars’¹⁴¹ – the threat of nuclear annihilation actually encouraged this process – or simply, disputes between two regional powers not involving a super power like the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflicts. Nuclear Age Warfare affected doctrines, strategy and tactics at the conceptual level and organisation, equipment, and training at the physical and moral level. The impact was and continues to be profound, meriting a classification of its own. The age of ‘Limited War’ – ‘wars in the minor key’¹⁴² – had dawned. Intense debates followed on the utility and purpose of war, escalation and workability of nuclear deterrence.

The dominant characteristics of each age as identified by Alvin and Heidi Toffler are tabulated in Table 1. The ‘nuclear wave’ does not really fit into the frame of reference used by the Toffler’s since the waves described by them depended on the predominant way in which human society was organised and run. Nuclear science has affected man significantly but not revolutionised our way of life. However, in the context of war-fighting, the author believes, it is the single most important influence since the invention of gunpowder. The table has been adapted to include the impact of the ‘nuclear age’:

	First Wave	Second Wave	Wave 'Two and a Half'	Third Wave
	Agricultural Age	Industrial Age	Nuclear Age*	Information Age
Physical Security provided by	A Warrior class, Mercenaries, Militia	Professionals Citizens	Deterrence/ compellence, Block/ alliance building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Information Knowledgeable leaders
Dominant Soc., Pol., Econ. Force	Tribe, City, State, Family	Nation-State, Factories	Nation-state, Technology	Global conglomerates
Economy dominant by	Trade	Money	Economic system	Symbols (e.g. in a database)
War Characterized by	Representational Conflict	Mass Armies, high casualties	Limitation and Proxy engagement	Information Attacks, low/no casualties
Destructive Capability	Gunpowder	WMD (nuclear, chemical...)	Nuclear War. Nuclear proliferation	Critical Data Deletion
Leadership	Hierarchical	Top down orders	Top Down and Lateral	Low level, flat structures
Information Based Warfare	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Information technology in war	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Information War	No	No	Yes	Yes

TABLE 1: EVOLUTIONS OF WARFARE – MODIFIED ALVIN AND HEIDI TOFFLER MODEL¹⁴³
*RELATIONSHIPS MODIFIED AND COLUMN ‘NUCLEAR AGE WARFARE’ ADDED BY AUTHOR

MILITARY VICTORY: THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Clausewitz points out that war has a natural tendency to serve only itself. When war breaks out, the influence of the military – including those in government and bureaucracy that serve or exist for the military – begins to have a direct and wider influence on political decision making. With the higher direction of war - the level of grand strategy merging with the politico-military dictates of the strategic level, the subjective demands of war-fighting – the consequence is a blurring of military objective with the military aim – the latter, as we saw in Chapter III, flowing from grand strategy while the former rests in the domain of military strategy and the level of operations. One of the conclusions we arrive at is that the separation of the grand strategic level from that of strategy is essential. The two are linked only by the political control on the military objective that must in turn serve the military aim. The influence of the military outcome also affects the military aim as Liddell Hart writes:

Whenever war has broken out, policy has too often been governed by the military aim--and this has been regarded as an end in itself, instead of as merely a means to the end. The ill effects have gone further. For by losing sight of the proper relationship between the object and the military aim--between policy and strategy --the military aim became distorted, and over-simplified.¹⁴⁴

In his critique of *On War*, Liddell Hart opines that Clausewitz's 'greatest contribution to the theory of war was in emphasizing the psychological factors. Raising his voice against the geometrical school of strategy, then fashionable, he [Clausewitz] showed that the human spirit was infinitely more important than operational lines and angles. He discussed the effect of danger and fatigue, the value of boldness and determination.'¹⁴⁵ Though Clausewitz's assertion was arguably only to highlight the importance of the human spirit as it applied to the military and its ability to fight, this is nonetheless an important observation. In bringing to fore the moral factors, Clausewitz too – like Sun Tzu – opens up the art of strategy and the conduct of war to the skill of winning without fighting, or minimal fighting such that the final blow is all but a coup de grace and there by taking the whole – that which comes through violence and that which is accrued without violence.

Liddell Hart's philosophy of physical and moral dislocation as the purpose of strategy – and therein the selection of military objectives – particularly at the operational and military strategic level – rests on the overarching importance he gives to the moral – psychological factors. Liddell Hart was joined and reinforced by an equally influential contemporary, Major General J. F. C. Fuller. Liddell Hart's emphasis on selecting operational lines that produced psychological dislocation and paralysis in the enemy's system of forces was demonstrated by the Germans in Poland, France, North Africa and Russia during the Second World War. The Russian also used the concept to good effect once they switched over to the offensive. It was the practical genius of Hans Guderian that was instrumental in developing doctrine and tactics that manifested the intellectual in the realm of the physical. The product was Blitzkrieg. It applied rapid manoeuvre, a higher tempo of operations than the enemy's ability to respond to create operational effects that exploited the fear of an impending and unavoidable defeat in the enemy's mind. It was more moral than physical. However, for the moral dimension to generate physical effects, a 'compliant' enemy, one who allows that apparent hopelessness to influence the decision making and ends up either psychologically unable to respond (paralysis), respond where the outcome would be inconsequential (distraction) or end up with ready and able forces in a zone other than where these are required (dislocation).

THE POST-WAR ENVIRONMENT

As noted, in an unlimited war, the destruction of the enemy (total defeat) is almost universally accepted as the political object. Consequently, the destruction of the enemy's military and political viability is a reasonable means of achieving the political goal, with the details regarding the post-war balance of power dictated by the victor after the fact.

However, in a limited war, the post-war landscape must be shaped prior to and during war termination since the opposing government will generally not be eliminated. Consequently, questions regarding post-war relative strength in-theatre must be addressed upfront rather than after the fact. Tradable military gains and the ability to pursue violence, causing serious or unacceptable damage will often constitute the most important bargaining tool.

Because the post-war environment must be considered and often shaped while conducting the current operations, difficult choices are presented in campaign planning at the

strategic level and aspects of military necessities for the operational commander when attempting to terminate war.

As articulated by Fred Ikle, ‘for any war effort...that is supposed to serve long-term national objectives, the most essential question is how the enemy might be forced to surrender, or failing that, what sort of bargain might be struck with him to terminate the war.’¹⁴⁶ In addition to simply terminating the war, Ikle implies that a nation prefers to terminate the war having achieved both its short (the original political goals) and long-term (post-war balance of power) interests. Since the operational commander impacts all aspects of the in-theatre war effort (including termination), it is important to review theoretical aspects in order to provide insight on how the termination effort can be favourably influenced.

THE RATIONAL CALCULUS OF VICTORY

In war the rational and irrational factors that relate ends to the means interact continuously and strategy correlates the ends and means. Using Clausewitz’s theory of culminating point of victory, Michael I. Handel advances a theory of the rational calculus of war. This theory presumes that nations fight wars in pursuit of post-war objectives whose benefits exceed the cost of attainment. Costs and benefits are weighed throughout the war effort and ‘once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.’¹⁴⁷ An essential presumption that must be made is that opposing combatants have one identifiable decision making centre; know precisely what they and their enemy are attempting to accomplish; have all available information; and can identify and compare the costs of available courses of action. The difficulty with the rational theory is that it is based on presumptions that are unrealistic due to three reasons:

- 1) First, the level of information required is exhaustive and simply unobtainable.
- 2) Second, even if complete information were available, the ability to measure costs versus benefits in an objective manner simply does not exist.
- 3) Third, the rational theory completely omits the passions/politics of the human element (political and military leaders) in examining/adjusting existing policies and in analysing available data (different people will draw different conclusions from the same data).

Clausewitzian, or more accurately, Prussian, calculus of war¹⁴⁸ is explained in the following diagram:




FIGURE 15 : THE RATIONAL CALCULUS OF WAR
(ADAPTED FROM MICHAEL I. HANDEL'S RENDERING¹⁴⁹)

The large rectangle denotes commencement of war (S) at its bottom left corner and possible conclusion depicted by the other three corners. The diagonal line joining (S) and (4) represents poor cost-benefit calculus towards its upper side and a better cost – benefit yield towards the lower half. Of course (2) would thus represent a perfect and efficient war with high yields and negligible comparative cost, zone (1) would be the exact opposite whereas (4) while still notionally a success, is attained at very high costs which may of itself outweigh the value of the gain.

‘Every war must end’ that reality is principally a mixture of the two theories discussed above. In essence, national leaders are guided by a concept of national interest. However, this concept is impacted by personal considerations, motivations and experiences. Consequently, different national leaders will have varying perceptions regarding the rational status of the military/political situation at any given time, optimism or pessimism of current operations, perception of the exact point where costs begin to exceed benefits;

most significantly, the issues of war termination and an answer to the question: when is victory complete or further punishment unacceptable?

This difference in perceptions is magnified by cultural differences that exist between states; consequently, it is very conceivable (and, in fact, probable) that one's enemy will perceive the military situation in a starkly different context than that perceived by one's own political and military leaders. Intra War Dialectics are of particular interest to the operational and military strategic commander. Political bargaining also follows the OODA¹⁵⁰ logic and is therefore time critical. With time as the common denominator between the leverage sought through military means and the bargain at play, several unique dangers arise that can profoundly affect military operations in-theatre. This is of course Clausewitz's 'Real War'¹⁵¹; it preys on the exigencies and dictates of war; the victory at hand, the war fighting, the unfinished ruse, the unfolding of the best laid plans. This is a reality that no military commander can or should disregard. The dynamics or hazards are:¹⁵²

- 1) First, the possibility that negotiations themselves can be used to impact the military balance of power. These phenomena will occur if the enemy is given time to rebuild due to a temporary ceasefire or cessation of offensive military operations.
- 2) Second, the possibility that negotiations will adversely affect the psychological balance of power. In essence, an erosion of 'national will' can occur in both military personnel within a theatre and the civilian population at large if early expectations of quick termination remain unfulfilled as negotiations drag out.
- 3) Third, the potential that a willingness to negotiate will communicate a perception of weakness, thus enhancing the enemy's resolve.
- 4) Finally, the possibility that political demands made during negotiations will seem so severe that the enemy's willingness to conclusively bargain will be eroded, thus actually increasing the enemy's willingness to continue fighting.

Such developments need to be recognized and managed as well as possible by the both the political and military leadership as well as those – the operational commander and diplomats for example – who translate policy into action.

THE BARGAINING MODEL OF WAR

Interest and studies on the bargaining model of war and its application have mushroomed over the last two decades. The concept that the whole process from war initiation to termination is part of a single bargain provides a number of significant opportunities in the study of war. It also helps explain bizarre choices that leaders appear to make and even why apparent victories get perceived as defeats. Most importantly, it emphasises the role of political control on war, the demotion of military considerations for success and their subordination to the political (bargaining) dictates of war. Clausewitz of course explained this tendency in his all-encompassing expression ‘real war’. As bargaining tool, war is not a pause in politics but an integral part of the political process; the classical continuation of political intercourse applying to varying degrees all elements of national power including violence. As a bargain it would suffice to use threat of escalation or continued punishment instead of total destruction. As a bargain, the initiation, prosecution, termination, and consequences of war are viewed as part of a single process within a larger bargaining dynamic between states.

Pioneered by Alistair Smith and Allan Stam,¹⁵³ the interest and debate drawn on the subject have made references to the bargaining model commonplace in conflict literature. The bargaining model has been used to explain ‘how wars begin, how wars end, and how long we can expect wars to last. In addition the model has been adapted to explain the durability of peace agreements, extended deterrence, territorial conflict, trade and conflict, and the democratic peace. The theoretical transport of this simple model is quite impressive. Like most formal models in political science, the bargaining model of war is an equilibrium model. That is, scholars use the bargaining framework to derive equilibrium solutions in order to make statements about how players make demands, and either avoid or enter conflict. The model’s linkage to and dependence on Game Theory¹⁵⁴ is indispensable. Game theoretic models in general produce sharp predictions but have little to say about when or why players might deviate from equilibrium strategies. Scholarly attention to the pursuit of a real or perceptual victory within the wider logic of the bargain is often missing.

In the Second World War, Japan realised that it had lost the war against USA well before the Atom Bombs were dropped. It had begun to signal for ‘an honourable exit’.¹⁵⁵ However, it failed to realise that the US perception of victory placed uncompromising

demands on war termination and required unconditional surrender even though these would have made no substantial material difference to the leverage accrued by the US. These demands, without the hindsight of the subsequent nuclear strikes, at that point in time were unacceptable to the Japanese for purely cultural and ceremonial reasons. However, concession to Japan at that point in time would have been culturally inconsistent and generated a feeling of an incomplete victory from a US perspective.

In essence, all bargaining models mainly serve to refine rationalist theories of war. They explain why mutually acceptable solutions fail and the states willingly move from the incentive – persuasion mode to the coercion-compellence dynamic. In practice, actors frequently divert from theoretical perfect response and display non-equilibrium behaviour. Such behaviour would render the standard bargaining model inefficient. Studies into equilibrium concepts designed to admit errors – or noise – and also account for ‘past action’ learning processes in decision making have yielded a more efficient variant of the standard model.¹⁵⁶ The advanced models neither assume that players are infinitely ‘rational’ – that is to say infinitely responsive to expected payoffs – nor do they assume that all players are perfectly responsive.

For Bargaining Models, the central puzzle is that wars are costly but nonetheless recur. This is then drawn into the bargaining perspective where rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all parties would prefer to the gamble of a costly war. Unless states enjoy the activity of fighting for its own sake, war is inefficient *ex post*. For war to be modelled as a process in a wider bargain, four assumptions are necessary:¹⁵⁷

- 1) The conflict is not a *fait accompli*. The probability that one state would win over another exists.
- 2) There is a rational calculus of risk and that states are either risk-averse or risk-neutral.
- 3) The Core issues that precipitate war are divisible. The willingness to give and take on both sides so as to arrive at a settlement suggests a continuous range of peaceful settlements exists.
- 4) Perceptions of victory and defeat (success or failure) are consistent with the terms of the bargain.

In practice we find that such rational logic does not apply. Core issues are often indivisible hence no trading can occur on the object of the conflict. There is thus no room for bargaining. The cost and risk nonetheless exist and yet an irrational war occurs. From the military perspective, The Yom-Kippur war, 1973 for example had no rational military payoffs for Egypt since no military plans existed to exploit the initial success and draw the war to its logical military conclusion – usually the disruption of the enemy’s military centre of gravity. However, while there was no military bargain to be had, a notional political leverage – the manifestation of a threat to Israeli sense of invincibility – was certainly available even through an apparent military defeat. For Egypt, therefore, the possibility of a political victory existed even in military defeat.

The bargaining model of war rests on the precept that war and politics are intimately tied. For it to work, a certain level of symmetry in political thought, political risk taking and limitation is essential. As benign and innocuous as this assertion may seem, it creates enormous opportunity for developing a unified theory of war tying together causes, prosecution, duration, termination, and consequences. The opportunities that arise when one views each of these stages as elements of the bargain are enormous.

Observers have long thought of the outbreak of war as representing the end of bargaining. However, bargaining can also be used to understand all phases of war, as bargaining continues during war, the termination of war is itself almost always a bargain, and the consequences of war are the nature of the war-settling bargain. In summary war starts because the attacker believes his power affords him a greater share of the benefits than he currently has and thus demands some concessions from the defender and because the defender believes that it does not need to make as many concessions as the attacker has demanded and thus refuses to concede.¹⁵⁸ War continues so long as the attacker continues to overestimate what defender will concede or in the event of a retreat, underestimate what he must give up. War ends when the attacker and defender’s beliefs about each other’s power converge sufficiently for one side to make a proposal acceptable to the other at each stage the attacker can obtain a concession only if its threat to attack is credible or, as soon as one side’s resources fall below the minimum level necessary to continue fighting.¹⁵⁹

Some hypotheses that emerge are:¹⁶⁰

- The attacker never retreats after winning first battle. In general, retreats follow losses not victories,
- The attacker is more likely to make proposals that involve a risk that a war begins or continues,
- if the attacker is optimistic that the defender is weak,
- if the attacker anticipates low resource losses from fighting,
- if the attacker's probability of winning battles conditional on the defender being weak is high,
- Since battle victories make the attacker more optimistic we expect that attacker is more likely to offer an acceptable settlement after a loss than a victory,
- Early losses for the attacker are conducive to a short war,
- The failure of negotiations makes the attacker more pessimistic. On average the duration of war will positively affect the likelihood that the war will end and negatively affect the attacker's prospects for victory,
- The final settlement responds to military variables. Diplomacy and force are linked.

THE APOLITICAL MODEL OF WAR AND NON-RATIONAL THEORY

An apolitical war is one which offers no rational calculus or bargaining. The object of war is serving elite or group interest as opposed to the interest of one or more entities at war and thus may be void interests that typically fall in the political domain. The apolitical model is not entirely without political objectives, however it presupposes that such objectives are either impossible or unlikely to be attained or represent the wishes of a very small number of people who may not represent a larger demographic subset. Al Qaeda would fit as an example of such an entity. The characteristics of the apolitical model are:¹⁶¹

- There is apparently no bargaining within war.

- The war-fighting process is seen as fundamentally mechanical rather than strategic or instrumental.
- The model flows from the Clausewitzian assertion that once violence begins, it adopts a logic of its own which is neither moral nor political. Albeit now rare as a casus belli between states, conflicts in the ‘Zan’ domain have a greater propensity towards this form.

Non rational theory argues that the policy for continuing or terminating war is shaped by competition between individuals and agencies that are pursuing their own interests rather than the rational interests of the nation or ethnic group as a whole. The drug cartels at work in South America (1980s onwards) and Afghanistan (1987 onwards) and the Diamond Wars of Africa (1990s) are examples. Given this lack of an objectively determined national objective, a rational calculus is almost impossible to establish.

With no clear ends except destruction and damage and no rules to subscribe to, the ‘ways’ and ‘means’ dimensions of the strategic equation – being of little or no consequence to the strategy itself – are thus left to innovation, experiment and change. There is little or no relation to political advantage gained, territory captured, own losses or even enemy killed. The strategy remains acceptable as long it serves to create and maintain chaos, anarchy, diminish state control and erode its regulating organs. The rational value of bargaining and favourable war termination is obviated by the absence of clear political objectives. Such ‘wars’ or ‘hostilities’ may not terminate even when a bargain is struck that serves the apolitical purpose of the entities.

CONCLUSION

This chapter established how war is perceived from different perspectives and different ‘traditions’ within international relations. The role and function of war within the war system was discussed and the importance of perception over reality in outcomes was highlighted. In the dominant realist tradition, war has the potential to provide political leverage, a bargaining platform where a position of strength or weakness depending on the ‘perceptual’ outcome of the war is traded for political outcomes.

Discussion on the Bargaining Model of War was picked up in the last section however; much of what preceded provided the platform for the efficacy of the model itself and its

utility in understanding victory and developing a theory thereof. The preliminary discussions included a study of the dimensions of war, the causes of war and its relationship to each dimension – the ‘Zan’, ‘Zar’, ‘Zamin’ matrix, morality of war and instruments of limitation. A generic model of threat assessment and response was followed by an analytical look at the importance of the strategic environment, its contours and influence on war initiation, war termination and intra-war diplomacy.

In the study of war, the thrust was on its direction and outcomes towards its political purpose as opposed to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ strategies. Having compared various definitions of war, a functional definition that sees war both as an act as well as a state - the Hobbes definition as adapted and modified by the author – was picked up as this addressed the spectrum of victory in all its probable domains and dimensions.

No discussion on war is complete without a reference to war’s nature and character. The Clausewitzian caveat of war’s tendency to serve only itself and in the process lose its objective purpose was discussed at length. We concluded that the cultural urge to succeed and the need to be seen to be victorious has often stripped war of its political value and purpose. The zeitgeist and its influence on the notion of victory using the framework of waves of change as posited by Alvin and Heidi Toffler was used to describe the dynamic nature of victory in both a macro as well as a micro timescale perspective. We then established that the bargaining model of war serves as a reasonable framework that unifies war initiation, intra war diplomacy and war termination as part of a wider bargaining process. Its applicability in both political and apolitical models was confirmed.

Before developing a definition and theory of victory, it is essential to identify what the victory notion encompasses, identify the language and vocabulary that is associated with it. Chapters II and III provide a firm foundation for a detailed look at what is essentially a ‘pre-theory’ of victory.

Chapter Notes and References

¹ Cormac McCarthy, *Blood Meridian, Or the Evening Redness in the West* (Vintage, New York, 1985), p. 248, cited in Barbara Ehrenreich, *Blood Rite: Origins and History of the Passions of War* (Virago, London, 1998), p. 117.

² Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1942), p. 3.

³ This is contested argument however, increasingly Alvin and Heidi Toffler's thesis on the linkage between waves of change, cultural manifestations in organisation and attitude as well as influence on war is becoming widely accepted. See Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti War: Making Sense of Today's Global Chaos* (Warner, New York, 1993), pp. 31-34.

⁴ Ludwig Von Mises, *Human Action*, 4th Revised Edition, (Fox and Wilkes, San Francisco, 1963), p. 170.

⁵ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit., p. 85.

⁶ This assertion has survived much criticism and continues to find high proponents. Colin S. Gray for example asserts that the language of war, its character, is embedded in technology and ..., the nature is embedded in the grammar that has remained constant. See Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future War*, op. cit.

⁷ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti War*, op. cit., pp. 31-34.

⁸ Cited in Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, op. cit.

⁹ See Gray's thesis on the future of war as presented in Chapter Two of *Another Bloody Century: Future War*. Op. cit.

¹⁰ See *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, op. cit., s.v. 'war'.

¹¹ See MSN Encarta, in *Microsoft Encarta Encyclopaedia* op. cit., s.v. 'United States History'.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Johan Galtung, *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means*, (United Nations, New York, 2000), p. 1.

¹⁴ SIPRI is an acronym for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

¹⁵ See Sharon Wiharta and Ian Anthony, 'Major Armed Conflicts', in *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), Chapter 2.

¹⁶ *Meriam Webster English Dictionary*, op. cit., s.v. 'War'.

¹⁷ See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Du Contract Social (The Social Contract)* (1762) (Meta Libri, Amsterdam, 2008), Book 1, Chapter 1. Rousseau's most comprehensive work on politics.

¹⁸ See John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (Pimlico, London, 1994), spec. Chapter One, pp. 1 - 61.

¹⁹ *Oxford English Dictionary: New Expanded Edition* op. cit., s.v. 'war'.

²⁰ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, op. cit., s.v. 'war'.

²¹ Cicero observes that there are two modes of contending, one by argument, and the other by force. Cited in Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace* (1901), trans. A. C. Campbell, (Elibron Classics, Washington, 2005), pp. 34-35.

²² M. T. Cicero, *Philippics: The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero*, trans. C. D. Yonge, (George Bell & Sons, London, 1903), internet version, <http://classics.mit.edu/Cicero/cic.phil.html>, accessed 6 January 2008.

²³ See Stephen C. Neff, *War and the Law of Nations: A General History* (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005), p. 102.

²⁴ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651), ed. C.B. Macpherson (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968), XIII.

²⁵ The term 'Phoney War' was first used, allegedly, by an American senator called William Edgar Borah. Winston Churchill referred to the same period as the 'twilight war' while the Germans referred to it as 'sitzkrieg' (trans. sitting war). See [historylearningsite.co.uk](http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk), 'The Phoney War', internet, http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/phoney_war.htm, accessed 3 May 2009.

²⁶ Emer de Vattel, *The Law of Nations* (Le droit des gens, ou, Principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains), trans. Charles G Fenwick (Carnegie Institution of Washington, Washington, 1916), p. 235

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace', in *Political Writings: Kant*, eds. Hugh Barr Nisbet, Hans Reiss (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1989), p. 96.

²⁹ Carl Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 75.

³⁰ Sir Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order* (Profile Books, London, 2000), p. 3.

³¹ Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future War*, op. cit., p. 37.

³² Ibid.

³³ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, op. cit., s.v. 'war'.

³⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 87.

³⁵ Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, 'Victory and Defeat ...', op. cit., pp. 3 – 11.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Thomas Campbell, 'Battle of the Baltic,' in *Historic Poems and Ballads*, ed. by Rupert S. Holland (George W. Jacobs & Co., Philadelphia, 1912). The text is incorrectly ascribed to John F. Kennedy who did however make it famous while responding to a question by Mr. Sandor Vanocour, a journalist at the Bay of Pigs Press Conference, 21 April 1961. Kennedy's exact words were '...there is an old saying, victory has a hundred fathers, defeat is an orphan'. For original audio file see internet, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/modules/diary/default.aspx?y=1961&m=4&d=21>, accessed 6 Dec 2008.

³⁸ Stephen Van Evera, 'Hypotheses on Nationalism and War', *International Security*, 18, 1998, pp. 5-39, this p. 8.

³⁹ Elliot A Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (Simon & Schuster, London, 2002).

⁴⁰ Martin Wight, *International Theory*, op. cit., p. 212.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 206, emphasis added.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

⁴⁵ Bobbitt defines epochal wars as 'wars that can embrace several conflicts that were thought to be separate wars by the participants, may comprise periods of apparent peace... and often do not maintain the same line up of enemies and allies throughout.' See Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles*, op. cit., p. 19.

⁴⁶ Colonel M. I. Zaidi, 'War, Warfare and Warfighting', MSc Thesis, Cranfield University, Royal Military College of Sciences, Security Studies Institute, 2003-2004.

⁴⁷ Martin Wight, op. cit., p. 208.

⁴⁸ Sir Michael Howard and Peter Parret's translation of *On War* interprets this as 'war is merely the continuation of policy by other means'. It is worth looking at the original German text and making a literal translation thereof. The original German text reads 'des politischen Verkehrs mit Ermischung anderer Mittel', in English: 'war is the continuation of political intercourse with the addition (mixing) of other means'. The literal translation is arguably more expressive, particularly the connotation of translating 'politics' as 'policy'. Understanding and explanation of absolute and real war are immediately impacted. Politics, not policy, tames war's nature and character, mitigating the object of war to the dictates of politics.

⁴⁹ Carl Von Clausewitz, op. cit., pp. 75, 80-87

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p.581.

⁵² Victory, in wars prosecuted through mercenaries was often a bargain. Christopher

Lynch explains in his translation of *Art of War* that Machiavelli saw the objective of the condottieri solely to make the Church a temporal power and not to make the state stronger through waging war with true commitment. Under the mercenaries, warfare became ritualistic, decisive engagements would seldom take place and, frequently, the decisions on the outcome of battles were taken off the field. See Niccolo Machiavelli, *Art of War*, trans. Christopher Lynch (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003), pp. 12, 52-53, 200.

⁵³ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, New York, 1971), p. 73.

⁵⁴ John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

⁵⁵ Encyclopaedia Britannica, op. cit., s.v. 'Ethology'.

⁵⁶ Herfried Münkler, 'Krieg und Frieden' (war and peace), in *Politikwissenschaft. Begriffe - Analysen - Theorien, Ein Grundkurs*, eds. Iring Fetscher and Herfried Münkler (Reinbek, Rowohlt, 1985), p. 280.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ See for example David Quammen, 'Was Darwin Wrong', *National Geographic Magazine*, Nov: 2004, Internet, <http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0411/feature1/index.html>, Accessed 10 Jul 2005.

⁵⁹ Herfried Münkler, op. cit., p. 280..

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 280-281.

⁶¹ Irenäus Eibl- Eibesfeldt, *The biology of peace and war : men, animals and aggression*, trans. by Eric Mosbacher, (Thames and Hudson, London, 1979), p. 77.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ English philosopher-economist John Stuart Mill defines the relationship between the individual and society. He believed that both the liberty of the individual and the security of society must be protected. See John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1975), esp. Chapter III.

⁶⁴ John Atkinson Hobson, a widely popular English economist, in *Imperialism: A Study*, written in opposition to the Boer War and first published in 1902, wrote: "of a small minority of white men, officials, traders, and industrial organisers, exercising political and economic sway over great hoards of population regarded as inferior and as incapable of exercising any considerable rights of self-government, in politics or industry". See John A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*, internet, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/hobson/1902/imperialism/index.htm>. Echoing the same sentiment in 'Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism', first published in 1916, Lenin claimed that the most important aspect of the capitalist economy from ca. 1870 was the transformation from an environment of competition to a situation where monopolies had formed. See Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 'Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism', internet, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/>, both sources accessed 3 June 2008.

- ⁶⁵ Kenichi Ohmae, *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy* (Harper Collins, London, 1990, rep. 1994), also cited in Ngaire Woods, 'International Political Economy' in *The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to World Politics*, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001), pp. 291 -292.
- ⁶⁶ Phillip Bobbitt, op.cit., p. xxi.
- ⁶⁷ Ngaire Woods, op. cit., p. 291.
- ⁶⁸ *The Economist*, BRIC 2050, internet, http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11075147, accessed 11 Dec 2008.
- ⁶⁹ The defeat of the Ottoman Turks by an allied European army at Vienna heralded the beginning of the Ottoman retreat from Central Europe and the rise of Austria as a powerful Danubian state. The Turkish defeat at Vienna began a series of military reverses that marked the Ottoman retreat from great power status and culminated in its final collapse in 1918. See Jeremy Black, *The Cambridge Illustrated Atlas – Warfare: Renaissance to Revolution 1492 – 1792* (Cambridge University Press, London, 1996), pp. 94 – 97.
- ⁷⁰ Thucydides, *History of The Peloponnesian War*, op. cit., p. 16.
- ⁷¹ See David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, (Adelphi Papers, 1998), p. 320.
- ⁷² See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War'. Oxford University, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Working Paper 2002-01.
- ⁷³ Thucydides, op. cit., Chapter XVII, 431 BC, sixteenth year of the war - The Malian Conference - Fate of Melos, Section 20
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, section 20.
- ⁷⁵ See William I. Zartmann ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1995).
- ⁷⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. by C.B. Macpherson, (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968), p. 186.
- ⁷⁷ Thucydides, op. cit., pp. 16-17
- ⁷⁸ Schelling first advanced the idea that war is a function of power, success and opportunity. See Stephan Van Evera, *Causes of War*, op. cit., pp. 4 – 5.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 14 – 16, 25 – 26, 30 – 32, 34.
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 35 – 53.
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 73 – 75.
- ⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 105 – 110.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 117 – 120.

⁸⁴ Thucydides, op. cit., pp. 64-65. See also Ronald R. Kerbs and Jack S. Levy, ‘Demographic Change and the Sources of International Conflict’ in eds. Myron Weiner, Sharon Stanton Russell, *Demography and National Security* (Berghahn Books, Oxford, 2001), p. 64.

⁸⁵ The term ‘dissymmetric’ is used in the context proposed by Sir Richard Holmes who posits that ‘fundamental’ disparity lies in the correlation of forces largely organised on the similar cultural and organisational philosophies. Richard Holmes, ‘Asymmetry: An Historical Perspective,’ op. cit.

⁸⁶ See Samuel P. Huntington, *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1997).

⁸⁷ The ancient Greeks speculated that Zarathustra lived six thousand years before the philosopher Plato and several scholars have argued for a date at the beginning of the sixth century BCE. Other scholars accept that Zarathustra is the author of the holy book *Gâthâ*'s which they date, on linguistic grounds, back to the fourteenth or thirteenth century BC. Similarly, on linguistic grounds, Zarathustra is believed to have belonged to a tribe that lived in the eastern part of Iran, in Afghanistan or Turkmenistan. This fits nicely with a tradition that connects Zarathustra with the ancient country Bactria and a cypress at Kâshmar in the Khorasan Province of Iran. See Mary Boyce ed. and tr., *Textual sources for the study of Zoroastrianism* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984), pp. 10-11 and Peter Clark, *Zoroastrianism. An Introduction to an Ancient Faith* (Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 1998), pp. 18-21 and 22-23.

⁸⁸ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 409.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ The term is common in the Khyber Pashtookkhwā (erstwhile North West Frontier Province) of Pakistan where it is generally interoperated in a literal sense. However the philosophical context is not so restrictive. The specific classifications and broader philosophical constriction presented in this thesis is the author's interpretation. The Pashtoon never really codified the honour system. It was in fact the British who first attempted to do so in order to better understand the enemy during the extension of British India to wards Afghanistan. Pashtoonwali as it is called, revolves around four concepts: malmastya, the obligation to show hospitality; ‘badal’, revenge; nanawaty, asylum; and nang, honour. For further reading see Nafisa Shah: ‘Honour killings: Code of dishonour’, *The Review*, 19-25 November 1998, p.7.; Also cited on the internet on Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress Country Studies Series at <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-9800.html>. See also Anon, *Pashtoonwali*, (Iqra Kutabhana, Lahore, 2001).

⁹¹ Geoffrey Parker, *Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century* (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1985), pp. 11-13.

⁹² Thomas Robert Malthus, *A Summary View of the Principle of Population* (London, John Murray, 1830), also on internet, <http://www.creativequotations.com/one/1355.htm>.

⁹³If the only check to population is misery, the population will grow until it is miserable enough to check its growth was referred to by Malthus' contemporaries as Malthus' 'Dismal Theorem'. See, Peter Landry, 'Biographies'; Internet; Blupete, <http://www.blupete.com/Literature/Biographies/Philosophy/Malthus.htm>, Accessed 14 August 2004.

⁹⁴ If the only check to population is misery, the result of any improvement is ultimately to enable a larger population than before to live in misery, so that resource-improvement actually increases the sum of misery, was referred to as 'Malthus' Utterly Dismal Theorem'. Ibid.

⁹⁵ Christopher D. Bellamy, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁹⁶ Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population...*, 'op. cit.', pp. 8-11, 19-22, 28-35, 87-93.

⁹⁷ Ronald R. Kerbs and Jack S. Levy, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-85.

⁹⁸ Ronald R. Kerbs and Jack S. Levy, *op.cit.*, p. 63.

⁹⁹ Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environmental Scarcity and Violence*, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999)

¹⁰⁰ Paul F. Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch, *Environmental Conflict*, (Westview, Boulder, 2001).

¹⁰¹ A similar model was first presented by the Author in 2004. This model has been further refined from the original work. See Mohammad Iftikhar Zaidi, 'War, Warfare and War-fighting,' *op. cit.*

The reference to various personalities in the diagram points to the various theories on the subject, however does not ascribe exclusivity of such theories to the individuals pointed out.

Karl Haushofer (1869 – 1946) was a German army officer, political geographer, and leading proponent of geopolitics, an academic discipline prominent in the period between the two World Wars but later in disrepute because of its identification with Nazi doctrines of world domination. See for example Gearóid Ó Tuathail et. al., *Geopolitics Reader* (Rutledge, Abingdon, 1998), pp.40 – 46.

Thomas Robert Malthus (1766 - 1834) was a British scholar, influential in political economy and demography. Malthus popularised the economic theory of rent.

Thomas Homer-Dixon and Samuel P. Huntington are contemporary theorists whose works on influence of Environment and Resources (Homer Dixon) and Culture (Huntington) are of some significance and influence today.

¹⁰² The idea of dormant conflicts being reinforced and escalated to the covert and the overt conflict stage as a consequence of additional causative factors being offloaded or transported from one region to another.

¹⁰³ Abraham Maslow cites five human needs in hierarchical order as: (1) Physiological

needs - the very basic needs such as air, water, food, sleep, sex. When these are not satisfied we may feel sickness, irritation, pain, discomfort. (2) Safety needs have to do with establishing stability and consistency in a chaotic world. (3) Love and belongingness are next on the ladder. Humans have a desire to belong to groups: clubs, work groups, religious groups, family, gangs, etc. (4) Esteem Needs are next. There are two types of esteem needs. First is self-esteem that results from competence or mastery of a task. Second, there's the attention and recognition that comes from others. (5) Last is the need for self-actualization. The desire to become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming. See Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, 2nd ed., (Harper & Row, New York, 1970). Also available on Internet, George Norwood, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, <http://www.connect.net/georgen/maslow.htm>, June, 1996.

¹⁰⁴ Jonathan Wilkenfeld et. al., *Foreign Policy Behavior: The Interstate Behavior Analysis Model* (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1980), p. 19.

¹⁰⁵ When 'ends' are indivisible, 'means' have to be developed consistent with the 'ways' available for attainment of such desired ends. This logic ties 'ends – ways – means', or future strategy in a circular complementary relationship of employment and development where each feeds the other. See also National Defence University, *Theory of War and Strategy: Operational Art*, new revised ed., (NDU Press, Islamabad, 2008)

¹⁰⁶ Klaus Knorr, 'Threat Perception', in *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, Klaus Knorr ed., (University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1976), pp.78-163; Also cited in Thomas Schmalberger, *Dangerous Liaisons: A Theory of Threat Relationships in International Politics* (Universitaire de Hautes Études, 1998), p. 112

¹⁰⁷ James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War', *International Organization*, 49(3) 1995, pp. 379-414. Also see James D. Fearon, 'Signalling Foreign Policy Interests', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41 (1997): pp. 68-90.

¹⁰⁸ See also Van Evera, *The Causes of War*, op. cit., pp. 259-262.

¹⁰⁹ James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War,' *International Organization* 49(3) 1995, pp. 379-414, this p. 397.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., this p. 400.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 404.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 406.

¹¹³ Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, 2003), p. 17.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Roderick R. Magee II, ed., *Strategic Leadership Primer* (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1998), p. 1.

¹¹⁶ The term 'effectual strategic environment' is coined by the author and implies the

operative influential elements and aspects of the environment connected to the ‘friction – change’ dynamic of the regional-domestic order, the international system in general and influential powers in particular that are affected by both the outbreak of the violence, its fallout and the end states being prosecuted by the antagonists. It presupposes that all factors and variables that have little or no relevance to the required volatility and the chaos in the environment have been factored out and only those that affect the requisite space environment within the environment have been identified.

¹¹⁷ The word dichroic is used as a metaphor comparing the environment with a crystal that appears to change colour to an extent that it appears to be a different colour (or entity) when viewed along a different axis.

¹¹⁸ For an overview see ‘chaos theory,’ Encyclopaedia Britannica, op. cit.

¹¹⁹ Christopher D. Bellamy, *Absolute War* op. cit., p. 3.

¹²⁰ Eric Hobsawm, ‘Barbarism: A User's Guide,’ in *On History*, ed. by idem (The New Press, 1997), p.253.

¹²¹ Encyclopaedia Britannica, op.cit., s.v. ‘war’,

¹²² Eric Hobsawm, op. cit., p.253.

¹²³ Carl Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 87.

¹²⁴ Quincy Wright, op. cit., p. 3.

¹²⁵ Martin Wight, op. cit., p. 206.

¹²⁶ Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Globalisation and Nature of War* (Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, 2003), pp. v-vi, 7-11.

¹²⁷ Colin S. Gray, ‘What is War?’, Excerpts of talk delivered as part of the Leverhume Programme on the Changing Character of War, Oxford, 24 Feb 2004, Internet, http://ccw.politics.ox.ac.uk/events/archives/ht04_gray.pdf

¹²⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz, op. cit., pp. 579-581.

¹²⁹ Ibid., pp. 86-87.

¹³⁰ John Keegan, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

¹³¹ See James C. Dougan, ‘The Bloody Bridge’, (Combat Studies Institute: Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth: Kansas, 2004), <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/csi/research/writing/Papers%20C600/CommendDugan.asp>. See also John Shy, ‘Jomini’, op. cit., p. 154, 165.

¹³² Daniel Moran, ‘Jomini, Baron Antoine-Henri de’, in Richard Holmes Ed., *Oxford Companion to Military History*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2001), p. 468. See also John Shy, ‘Jomini’, op. cit., pp. 143 - 185.

¹³³ Carl Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 85.

¹³⁴ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti War*, op. cit., pp. 31-34.

¹³⁵ Jeremy Adams, *Condemned to repeat it* (Viking, New York, 1998), pp. 7-11.

¹³⁶ The origins of the ‘second wave’ could be traced back to the invention of chemical energy propellants with rockets and, then, guns in the later Middle Ages and the 17th century ‘military revolution’. See Michael Roberts, ‘The Military Revolution 1560-1660’, in David B Ralston, (ed.), *Soldiers and States: Civil-Military Relations in Modern Europe* (Heath & Co, 1966); Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Antiwar*, op. cit., pp 41-46.

¹³⁷ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti War*, op. cit., p. 42.

¹³⁸ Richard Holmes, ‘From Locked Front to Deep Battle’, Lecture at RMCS, Shrivenham, 5 Global Security MSc Course, September 2003.

¹³⁹ For a detailed explanation see David J. Lonsdale, ‘Information Power: Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Fifth Dimension’, in Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (eds.), *Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy* (Frank Cass, London, 1999), pp. 137 – 155.

¹⁴⁰ Major General Khalid Nawaz Khan, the Commandant of the Pakistan Army’s Command and Staff College at Quetta holds that little has changed by way of patterns of war. The typical defensive cycle seeks to defeat the attacker through the counter offensive. The emphasis remains on the defeat of the attacker and not the means or methods that bring about the defeat. In Iraq, as too in Afghanistan, the operational cycle continues, it is only that the counter offensive has come in an unconventional mode.

¹⁴¹ A ‘Proxy War’ is defined as a war instigated by a major power that itself does not participate in the war-fighting. The Webster Dictionary describes it as a ‘war where two powers use third parties as a supplement or a substitute for fighting each other directly.’ Proxy wars were common in the Cold War as the two nuclear-armed superpowers (Soviet Union and the United States of America) did not wish to fight each other directly, which ran the risk of escalation to a nuclear war. Proxies were used in conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, Egypt, Vietnam and many other states. See *Webster Dictionary*; Internet; [http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/proxy% 20war](http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/proxy%20war), Accessed August 2004.

¹⁴² Richard Holmes, ‘Wars in the Minor Key’, Lecture at Cranfield University, RMCS, Shrivenham, 5 Global Security MSc Course, September 2003.

¹⁴³ Alvin and Heidi Toffler , op. cit., p. 42.

¹⁴⁴ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, op. cit., p. 351.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 353.

¹⁴⁶ Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War Must End* (Columbia University Press, New York 1991), 17-18.

¹⁴⁷ Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* (Frank Cass, London, 2002), p. 92.

¹⁴⁸ While Michael Handel describes this ‘rational calculus of war’ as ‘Clausewitzean’, it must be noted that such rational notions of war termination already existed in Prussian

military thought from as early as Fredric the Great. However, since Clausewitz was probably the first to consolidate the concept it continues to be generally thought of as Clausewitz's own contribution. This insert is based on a discussion between Commandant Armed Force War College, Pakistan, Major General Tariq Nadeem Gilani with Prof. Harry Yarger of the US Army War College, Carlisle on another study by the author where the same source is cited.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p.205.

¹⁵⁰ OODA loop introduced by Lt Col John Boyd is an acronym for Observe – Orientate – Decide – Act. See Ed Offley, 'Col. John Boyd: The Most Influential Unknown Hero', *Defence Watch*, internet, <http://www.sftt.org/dwa/2003/1/1/2.html>, accessed Dec 11, 2004.

¹⁵¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit., p. 579.

¹⁵² Gary Krizanowic, 'Operational Art in Limited War Termination: The Bridge Between the Strategic and Operational Levels of War,' Msc diss., (Naval War College, Newport, 1994), pp. 11-12.

¹⁵³ See Alastair Smith and Allan Stam, 'Domestic Political Institutions and a Bargaining Model of War', paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, Aug 27, 2003. Available on the internet at, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64476_index.html, accessed 10 Oct 2008.

¹⁵⁴ Game Theory according to Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (SEP) is the study of the ways in which *strategic interactions* among *rational players* produce *outcomes* with respect to the *preferences* (or *utilities*) of those players, none of which might have been intended by any of them. The mathematical theory of games was invented by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944. It however came to prominence owing to the works Sytem Theorists and Strategists with a mathematical tilt, such as Herman Kahn, who applied the principles in gaming enemy responses in the nuclear age. See SEP, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/>, accessed 11 Dec 2007.

¹⁵⁵ Although Japanese signals for peace had been sent out as early as September 1944, the real effort to end the war began in the spring of 1945. This effort stressed the role of the Soviet Union... In mid-April 1945 the US Joint Intelligence Committee reported that Japanese leaders were looking for a way to modify the surrender terms to end the war. The State Department was convinced the Emperor was actively seeking a way to stop the fighting. See Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam*, sec. rev. ed. (Pluto Press, New York, 1994), pp. 107, 108).

¹⁵⁶ See for example R. McKelvey and T. Palfrey, 'Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games', *Experimental Economics*, 1-1998, pp. 9-41.

¹⁵⁷ Dan Reiter, 'Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,' *Perspectives on Politics*, 1 : 2003, pp. 27-43, doi:10.1017.S1537592703000033.

¹⁵⁸ See S. Nageeb M. Ali, 'Waiting to settle: Multilateral bargaining with subjective biases', in *Journal of Economic Theory*, Volume 130, Issue 1, September 2006, pp. 109-137. For a game theory approach and detailed quantitative analysis of data see Darren

Filson and Suzanne Werner, 'A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War,' Draft Working Paper, Claremont College, 2001-02.

¹⁵⁹ Filson and Suzanne Werner, *op. cit.*

¹⁶⁰ Adapted for the scope and purpose of this research from Filson and Suzanne Werner, *op. cit.*

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER IV – THE CONTEMPORARY THEORY AND DEFINITION OF VICTORY: A PRE-THEORY

Wars are conflicts of societies, and can be fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting them. The roots of victory or defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield.¹

Sir Michael Howard

INTRODUCTION

Any conceptual exploration designed to identify and observe relationships in a field of inquiry carefully – in this instance the understanding of Victory, needs to be founded upon organising principles and testable methods; especially so when the process involves new and rudimentary ideas regarding political phenomena or the classification of procedures and methods of research and analysis.

Theory can be described as a system of ideas. According to Acharya and Buzan there are two definitions of theory: the harder positivist definition dominant in the United States and the softer reflectivist definition prevalent in Europe.² While the former strictly explains causal relations and contains ‘testable hypotheses of a causal nature’, the latter is ‘anything that organizes a field systematically, structures questions, and establishes a coherent and rigorous set of interrelated concepts and categories.’³

James Rosenau finds that theory cannot flourish ‘until the materials of the field are processed’ that is to say, ‘rendered comparable - through the use of pre-theories’⁴ He observes that pre-theory does not need to include or mean techniques related to data collection, management quantified techniques.⁵ When moving from absences of theory towards a pre-theory, there is no consciousness about or constrains or influence from the organising and channelling effects of an obtaining theory. Research is steered and evidence gleaned mainly by individual experiences and the intellectual wisdom organised by the scope and purpose of the study. There is also no immediate need or conscious effort to turn thoughts into a systematically constructed theoretical paradigm as that is the domain of theory and not pre-theory. The pre-theory stage also provides an opportunity to admit mixed disciplines. This is because pre-theory seeks disciplinary identity after the fact and not when it did not exist. A simple process for theory building is illustrated in the following flow chart:




FIGURE 16 : FROM ABSENCE TO THEORY
(AUTHOR'S OWN DIAGRAM)

This leads to the finished product – the refined theory. In this process we are essentially moving from deductively inferred hypotheses that describe, explain and link affective, cognitive and behavioural aspects of collectively experienced phenomena, in our case, the condition and process of Victory to a theory thereof. Theory leaning and evolution is generally evolutionary but can also follow a revolutionary path as indicated in Figure 16.

Deductively inferred hypotheses are in themselves pretheories. Notwithstanding even considerable challenge to their validity and relevance, as long as these pretheories serve the function of perseverance of core social-political and military cognitions and an organizing framework is established, the conditions of pre-theory are essentially met.

Theory is an essential tool for statecraft. It provides the framework for understanding, diagnosing and projecting events, explaining their causes and likely outcomes, prescribing responses, and evaluating the impact of policy options. Policy debates often rest on competing theoretical visions.⁶ The relationship between theory and policy, policy and action and, action and outcome extracts the value of a study of victory from a purely academic debate to the realm of strategy and action.

Scholarship may differ on theories of victory yet there appears a general consensus that with changing times the concepts of victory and defeat have changed. Little direct research exists on the nature of this change, however indirect analogies can be found in history. These will be dealt with in greater detail in the case studies that follow in Chapter

IV. Applying grounded theory approach, we can establish with reasonable accuracy the contours of the pre-theory and using inductive and deductive logic arrive at the broad contours and the building blocks of victory and its dynamic nature.

SECTION 1: A PRE-THEORY OF VICTORY

As stated in Chapter II (see page 17), there has been a flood of new literature since 2006 on the understanding of victory. This rich axial data is ripe for theorising and indeed some scholars as we shall see in this chapter have explicitly done so. However, any comparative study requires that colourful language often adopted in narrative be stripped to relieve data of any prejudice or exaggeration. In other words, data needs to be underpinned by scientific language without altering the context originally intended.

The character of war and the political purpose it serves is a direct product of the age. This according to John Mueller, explains why today's wars are not total affairs as was the case when 'marauding kings or warlords would conquer their enemies outright, steal their treasures, raze their towns, kill their warriors, and imprison or enslave whoever was left. This was a time when joy of victory and the ugly reality of defeat were self-evident to both the victor and the vanquished.'⁷

While Hannibal (248 – ca. 183 BC) and his turning move at the Battle of Cannae may have inspired General Schwarzkopf during the first Gulf War,⁸ how the vanquished enemy was dealt thereafter bears no resemblance. Alexander, after the siege of Tyre is 332 BC that lasted 7 months, 'slaughtered eight thousand Tyrians and the remaining thirty thousand inhabitants were sold into slavery. In early, pre-modern and modern wars, there was little room for the niceties of twentieth century diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, or UN brokerage. Since 1945, the wholesale conquest of rival states and populations has fortunately become rare.'⁹ Increasingly, in a world of limited wars, multi-ethnic civil wars, UN peace deals and international intervention, the relative winners and losers in the global chess game (or, indeed, of any single move) are much more ambiguous. Evaluations are more and more open to interpretation and influence by moral, cultural, perceptual and psychological biases.

SECTION 2: INDUCED THEORIES

The real key here is not how many enemy do I kill. The real key is how many allies do I grow...And that is a very important metric that they just don't get.¹⁰

Newt Gingrich

The literature alludes to a number of ‘non-theories’ and some generic pre-theories on victory. An increasing volume of literature however continues on the issue and theorists, scholars and practitioners are addressing the subject from a variety of perspectives. The available literature when scoped in combination with earlier studies provides sufficient data for developing substantive pre-theories.

Through a combination of inductive and deductive approaches as consistent with the nature of the data (inductive reasoning for the reflective and deductive for the contemplative) are succinctly presented in this section. The pre-theories have also been constructed from grounded theory approach with the exception of the Match-fixing and Scorekeeping Model.

PRE-THEORY 1: A RATIONALIST MODEL

Sun Tzu presents war as an indispensable element of statecraft and an activity lending itself to an in-depth and dispassionate analysis. This text has been widely researched and extensively debated. Several translations in English language exist. However, owing to the complexity of both the work and the source language – in this case Chinese – and, at times, the brevity of the work, translations and interpretations vary considerably. A number of Chinese scholars have begun to comment on *the Art of War* and present new perspectives. True comprehension of Sun Tzu’s text is not possible without some insight into the wider philosophical references it makes. For example, knowledge of the idea of ‘Shih,’ the ever-changing configuration of power in one's environment, alters the meaning and depth of some of the passages of the Chinese text. Most early translations simply ignore such detail. In effect, this is like referring to Zeus as merely an important Greek god! To avoid such errors and the associated pitfalls, what follows is an inductive analysis of Sun Tzu’s concept of victory based on the synthesis of four¹¹ popular English language translations of the original text. The emphasis on Sun Tzu is quite deliberate because not only does he present what may best be categorised as a rationalist perspective, but he brings with it a depth of insight into the cultural and temporal frameworks that, as we shall see, hugely impact the notion of victory.

Sun Tzu's opening chapter on 'Appraisals' sets out the basis for establishing military force, evolving a military strategy including developmental strategy and the need for training and discipline. Some of the retranslated text - instantly recognizable includes: The military is a great matter of the state.¹² It is the ground of death and life, The Tao¹³ of survival or extinction. One cannot but examine it.¹⁴

The usage of the term 'victory' by Sun Tzu is incredibly complex and deep. It cannot be separated from the Chinese civilisation and the philosophical thought or, to use a Clausewitz's phrase, 'spirit of the age'¹⁵. For example, Sun Tzu writes: '...the victorious military is first victorious and after that does battle. The defeated military first does battle and after that seeks victory.'¹⁶

The idea of victory expressed here is not immediately evident. Barry C. Boyce provides one answer in his article 'Applying Unconventional Power of the Sun Tzu to the Conventional World':

It is possible that victory may be an on-going condition, rather than a temporary state of affairs defined in relation to reversing an uncomfortable or undesirable situation that we find ourselves in. ...How is it possible, with our conventional understanding of victory, for the victory to be obtained before the battle? ...While this sense is implied in the Sun Tzu, a deeper sense may also be derived, namely that victory is a condition of confidence, knowledge of affairs, and innate curiosity, such that one knows what can be conquered, how, and when. This kind of victory can be cultivated. It is precisely the opposite of the pre-defeated mentality that believes that victory must be sought elsewhere, as the sum of a series of battles. Such conventional victory is already being diminished the moment it is attained.¹⁷

Avoiding battle yet seeking victory goes hand in hand with joining battle; much like the psychological dislocation and paralysis of the enemy propounded by Liddell Hart and Fuller. Manoeuvre to a position of indisputable advantage such that victory is assured. If the enemy does not succumb to a superior manoeuvre, then on joining battle, Sun Tzu prescribes a quick, swift blow. Boyce explains this in the following words:

A force that seemed invincible may suddenly be vulnerable (or 'vincible'), merely through the passage of time and the inevitable fluctuation of energies.

If one regards the world as static, its solidity will always fight against you. Within [the] Sun Tzu, this point of view is never taken. Solid is only one side of the equation, a part of the fluctuation.¹⁸

Only with the strategy of taking ‘whole’ will the general find complete victory.¹⁹ This means conceiving the perspective of the ‘whole’ at the outset of the campaign, before plans are laid out and the armies mobilised. The military is thus kept intact, ‘preserving both the advantage that leads to victory and the advantage that comes from victory.’²⁰ Sun Tzu’s doctrine of the attack suggests a distinctly indirect approach. His vision of the purpose of stratagem allude what modern strategists call the main effects; namely, disruption, dislocation or paralysis. The following excerpt from *The Art of War* further elucidates the point:

And so one skilled at employing the military subdues the other's military but does not do battle, uproots the other's walled city but does not attack, destroys the other's state but does not prolong. One must take it whole when contending for **all-under-heaven**. [emphasis added] Thus the military is not blunted and advantage can be whole. This is the method of the strategy of attack.²¹

The distinct similarity between Sun Tzu’s perceptions of victory to a notion attributed to Clausewitz is evident; the difference is in the relative emphasis on the means. For Sun Tzu, it is an inferior choice to seek battle and decision through war...

Sun Tzu asserts that for the best defence one goes outside the range of enemy, becoming ungraspable and thus unbeatable. Victory need not be achieved by will or devastation. The Griffith’s text reads: ‘One skilled at defence hides below the nine earths; one skilled at attack moves above the nine heavens. This possibly obscures the more powerful message that Sun Tzu might be trying to stimulate in the bamboo text, which points to a defence not based in conflict! ‘...Of old those skilled at defence hid below the nine earths and moved above the nine heavens.’²² Thus they could preserve themselves and be ‘all-victorious’.

On taking states intact, Sun Tzu says that ‘[T]aking a state whole is superior; destroying it is inferior to this.’ And in the same passage continues with that well known phrase ‘[T]herefore, one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the most skilful.

Subduing the other's military without battle is the most skilful.²³ Sun Tzu then presents a further set of principles:

And so the superior military cuts down strategy. Its inferior cuts down alliances; its inferior cuts down the military. The worst attacks walled cities.²⁴

The contrast in acuity from that of later military writers can be explained through understanding Sun Tzu's definition of war. He does not see war as a 'duel at a larger scale'²⁵ but as a much wider phenomenon that includes any situation of conflict, including non-violent conflict. Victory is viewed in terms of the ability of persuading others (furthering policy and politics) without ever having to battle (resort to other means).²⁶ Sun Tzu advocates the use of military power as the last resort, but he is by no means a pacifist; what he tries to tell us, in the context of the 'whole', is that better victories are won without fighting.

Sun Tzu is aware of the philosophy of power and the human need for recognition. In war such an obsession can be costly but man is impelled towards the hazards none the less. Sun Tzu identifies why, as interesting passage indicates:

Anciently those skilled in war conquered an enemy easily conquered. And therefore victories won by a master of war gain him neither reputation for wisdom nor merit for valour.

Tu Mu: **A victory gained before the situation has crystallized is one the common man does not comprehend.** Thus its author gains no reputation for sagacity. Before he has bloodied his blade the enemy state has already submitted [emphasis added].

Ho Yen-his: ... When you subdue your enemy without fighting, who will pronounce you valorous [or victorious].²⁷

For he wins his victories without erring; 'without erring' means whatever he does insures [sic.] his victory; he conquers an enemy already defeated.

Chen Hao: In planning, never a useless move; in strategy, no step taken in vain.

Therefore, the skilful commander takes up a position in which he cannot be defeated and misses no opportunity to master his enemy.

Thus **a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle**; an army destined to defeat fights in the hope of winning.²⁸ [Emphasis added]

An intriguing, somewhat paradoxical passage in comparison to what has been presented above is found in the chapter titled ‘Form’. While hinting at the idea of ‘nature of victory’ and war termination, it also suggests that for the skilled general wisdom lies in the fact and not the perception:

In seeing victory, not going beyond what everyone knows is not skilled. **Victory in battle that all-under-heaven calls skilled is not skilled.** Thus lifting the down of an autumn leaf does not mean great strength. Seeing the sun and the moon does not mean a clear eye. Hearing thunder does not mean a keen ear. So-called skill is to be victorious over the easily defeated. Thus the **battles of the skilled are without extraordinary victory**, without reputation for wisdom, and without merit for courage.²⁹ [Emphasis added]

Sun Tzu’s Principles for Victory can be summed up as:

- Best victory is attained with minimal fighting and absorbs the enemy as a whole.³⁰ This implies both physical and moral victory which manifests its self in politico-military success, military attainability and socio-political sustainability.
- Avoid fighting; if you join battle keep it swift.³¹
- Defeat the enemy’s source of power or his strategy instead of trying to attack his military (military is the manifestation not the source of power).³²
- It is important to be seen to be victorious and to find glory in that victory. Fight that enemy who is easily defeated; some blood is essential for glory and glory essential for esteem.³³

PRE-THEORY 2: A REALIST MODEL

Machiavelli may be described as the father of realism. For Machiavelli, quality of success or victory is not judged on a moral-ethical scale that seeks to qualify the loss or gain with the added baggage of honour – dishonour, moral – immoral or ethics and chivalry.

Machiavelli sees nothing as permanent and everlasting hence the ‘here’ and ‘now’ takes precedent over the ‘who’ and ‘how’. To Machiavelli, success is often short lived and failure usually permanent. This philosophy gives rise to the irony in his political view, premised both on the narrow scale of time and the perception of human beings as opportunists, greedy and power-hungry animals.

However, a dispassionate read ‘to attach to Machiavelli's advice some moral vision similar to an early anticipation of utilitarianism--to argue, in effect, that Machiavelli is urging the Prince to think of the greatest good of the greatest number and thus use his unscrupulous tactics for the long-term betterment of as many people as possible.’ While this view does not deny the harshness of Machiavellian tactics, it at least seeks to mitigate the moral unease one feels by suggesting that there is a long-term moral goal in view.³⁴ Machiavelli writes:

I believe that this [how one is judged] depends upon whether cruel deeds are committed well or badly. They may be called well committed (if one may use the word 'well' of that which is evil) when they are all committed at once, because they are necessary for establishing one's power and are not afterwards persisted in, but changed for measures as beneficial as possible to one's subjects. Badly committed are those that at first are few in number, but increase with time rather than diminish. Those who follow the first method can in some measure remedy their standing both with God and with man. . . . Those who follow the second cannot possible maintain their power.³⁵

Machiavelli concludes *The Prince* with some very gloomy reflections on the nature of fortune, the shifting circumstances rulers face and the general impossibility of any success lasting for very long. He warns that the things that have worked towards gaining the Prince his power will be the very things that make him vulnerable to the next power. In such an unstable world, he concludes, it is better to be impetuous than calculating.³⁶ Machiavelli exhibits rationalist sentiments alongside his characteristic realist pessimism. His emphasis that loyalty of his people, good laws, and good weapons are the best security a ruler can possess as a universal and lasting precept for peace, stability and deterrence is indeed a very rational conclusion.

Machiavelli's realism in victory can be summed up as ‘interests justify the means.’ Following precepts of victory emerge:

- Protecting oneself from invasion and foreign control is of paramount importance. This is victory per se.
- One who deceives will always find those who allow themselves to be deceived.
- Whosoever desires constant success must change his conduct with the times.
- Politics need not have a relationship with morals; interests supersede morals.
- Perpetuation of one's success is the only 'victory' that matters.

PRE-THEORY 3: AN ABSOLUTIST FRAMEWORK

Clausewitz's *On War*, remains the most dominant text on strategy and the study of war in the West. The Clausewitzian notion of victory is, at first sight, simplistic in comparison to Sun Tzu. The destruction of the enemy's ability to enter battle, resist or resume hostilities is, as Clausewitz tells us, the ultimate victory and an objective to be ruthlessly pursued. However, Clausewitz too, like Sun Tzu, emphasises the need to keep war purposeful. The object of war is first and foremost to further policy.

Clausewitz identifies that even the most decisive military victory is never final and hints at, but does not talk about in any detail, what we describe today as war termination and peace building.³⁷ Each war must terminate. It must involve diplomatic and political efforts to make victory acceptable and sustainable. Even when a total and decisive victory is achievable, limited goals are often more practical. It is on this assertion that Clausewitz introduces his notion of real war - a war that does not conclude on the theoretically perfect dynamics of escalation or annihilation of the enemy; instead is moderated by political calculations, uncertainties, the limits of strength, and psychological factors.³⁸

An important idea introduced by Clausewitz is that the political aim must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration.³⁹ Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them. 'War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other means'.⁴⁰ We may then conclude that a military success when achieved is a victory only when it has the potential to contribute to the original political objective; in other words, the quality of leverage.

Clausewitz's definition of war concludes with the famous dictum: 'War is thus an act of violence to compel our enemy to do our will.'⁴¹ Unlike Sun Tzu, Clausewitz identifies the inherent tendency of war to escalate independent of political logic or military prudence. War, according to Clausewitz will follow its nature, the inherent, primordial tendency towards violence and search for the ultimate victory. It is this tendency in the nature of war that perhaps propelled Clausewitz to conclude that any victory – in war – short of total destruction of the enemy's 'hub of power'⁴² is incomplete.

Clausewitz emphasises that the shortest, quickest, and most effective way to win a war is through destruction of the opponent's army in a decisive battle. His idea of identifying and relentlessly – blow after blow – attacking the 'centre of gravity' remains current even today. Finding and attacking the most critical point in the enemy's position is a problem that inevitably occupies every military strategist.⁴³

Clausewitz defines the centre of gravity in the context of his experience and the evidence of history: when one keeps the dominant characteristic of both belligerents in mind, '[o]ut of these characteristics a certain centre of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.' Once the enemy is off balance, 'he must not be given time to recover. Blow after blow must be aimed in the same direction'. He concludes that 'by constantly seeking out the centre of his power, by daring all to win all, will one really defeat the enemy.'⁴⁴

Clausewitz points to several centres of gravity which may exist concurrently; be it in the levels of war or the geographical implications of force. In Book 6, Clausewitz reiterates this point:

Our position, then, is that a theatre of war, be it large or small, and the forces stationed there, no matter what their size, represent the sort of **unity**⁴⁵ [emphasis added] in which a single centre of gravity can be identified. That is the place where the decision should be reached; a victory at that point is in its fullest sense identical with the defence of the theatre of operations.⁴⁶

For Clausewitz, typically, the most important centre of gravity remained the enemy's army.⁴⁷ He opines that great military leaders whose entire careers depended on their military success, victory on the battlefield was everything. If their army had been destroyed, they would all have gone down in history as failures.⁴⁸ On defeating the

enemy, the destruction of the enemy's forces comes first on his list.⁴⁹ Clausewitz saw the destruction of the force as a guarantee for sustainability of victory – through denuding the enemy's ability to continue of enter hostilities.

On decisive blows, Clausewitz also suggests that these should be delivered without geographical overextension, a direct lesson from Napoleon's ill-fated march on Moscow in 1812.

The 'Clausewitzian'⁵⁰ absolutist framework of victory is summarised below:

- Quality of Victory is judged by one's ability to impose one's will on the enemy and vice-versa, the enemy's ability of continued resistance.⁵¹
- 'Absolute victory,' in a military sense, is attained in two parts: first is destruction of the enemy's center of gravity (C of G) and the second, the completion of victory through pursuit. Disabling the C of G or failing to complete the victory allows the enemy to eventually recover and continue resistance which is against the object of war.⁵²
- Clausewitz recognizes war as a political instrument. There is however a fundamental assumption that the closer the military success is to the absolute, the greater its value for politics and diplomacy.
- Clausewitz does not use any metric to qualify the context or quality of victory. However from his insistence on the second state of victory, the pursuit, it is evident that, not necessarily annihilation of the enemy but, elimination of his will to resist is the ultimate victory.⁵³
- The realization of a cost-benefit dynamic in strategy and nature of victory can be construed from Clausewitz's discussion on the culminating point of victory.⁵⁴

PRE-THEORY 4: A MANOEUVRIST'S FRAMEWORK

The acquisitive state, inherently unsatisfied, needs to gain victory in order to gain its object—and must therefore court greater risks in the attempt. The conservative State can achieve its object by merely inducing the aggressor to drop his attempt at conquest. ...Its victory is, in a real sense, attained by foiling the other side's bid for victory.⁵⁵

Liddell Hart

The Art of Winning was how the Russian military leader Alexander Suvorov called his book in which he laid the foundations of Russian and arguably, Soviet military science. ‘He brilliantly applied them in battles and never lost one’ writes Major General Tiushkevich in an article entitled ‘Military Leaders of the Great Patriotic War: The Art of Victory’,⁵⁶

He finds that military theoreticians looked at victory and defeat as two sides of the same phenomenon whether an engagement, a battle, an operation or the campaign as a whole. ‘In the course of time the idea of victory became associated with a complete defeat of the armed forces and with the destructive impact on the enemy's rear’.⁵⁷ This typical nineteenth century notion of victory survived through the next one hundred years until the end of the Second World War. ‘It should be added’, writes Tiushkevich ‘that the concept of the military victory was imbibing the features and trends of each particular epoch which boosted its significance and intensified its social and political dimensions.’ The two world wars, exerted tremendous impact on the course of history and resulted in a new theory of victory....Regrettably,’ continues Tiushkevich, ‘the problem of the price of victory had not been elaborated within the military theory of victory--it was merely touched upon on the tactical level.’⁵⁸

The existence of a theory of victory in Russian politico-military thought is alluded to but none is explained. However, no codified evidence of a formal theory has been found. We can assume that a notional theoretical framework therefore did and does exist which exhibited all the characteristics of a wholesome theory including the aspect of progression and evolution. No such theory.

With the experience of the two world wars, the massive destructive potential exhibited at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a number of theorists in the mid-20th century grappled with the meaning and purpose of war in the nuclear age. Some focused on the nuclear dimension while others, like Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller focused on keeping conventional war relevant and less bloody; in effect these theorists modernised the manoeuvrist approach and led an advance towards keeping conventional war relevant. The theory essentially accompanied a unique notion of victory that was premised on and underpinned by a combination of moral and physical effect – essentially dislocation and paralysis – induced

through manoeuvre and firepower with ideally minimal of fighting. As Liddell Hart explains:

The atomic bomb in 1945 looked to the responsible statesmen of the West an easy and simple way of assuring a swift and complete victory.... They did not look beyond the immediate strategic aim of 'winning the war,' and were content to assume that military victory would assure peace--an assumption contrary to the general experience of history. The outcome has been the latest of many lessons that pure military strategy needs to be guided by the longer and wider view from the higher plane of 'grand strategy.'⁵⁹

War is a violent clash of not just the armed forces but also the societies in competition. There is always therefore an external dimension to strategy as Sir Michael Howard also suggests that, if drawn in extended time and across cultural and social change, would suggest a change in both the object and its pursuit.⁶⁰ Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart and to a very large extent Major General J. F. C. Fuller predicted and observed this transition in not just the notion of victory and its moral-cultural undertones but also the means and methods of its pursuit. Perhaps also taking a cue from Sun Tzu and the less quoted passages of *On War*, Liddell Hart presented a framework for application of strategy that sought not the destruction but the disruption of the enemy.⁶¹ A concept that attacked a system of forces or a strategy rather than the main strength of the force itself. The idea was contrary to Clausewitz, for what was being professed was the marginalising of the main force or its centre of gravity while continuing to attach the critical requirements and vulnerabilities of the centre of gravity.

He posited that through increased tempo of operations, a state of relative time could be created wherein for the superior military time runs in slow motion whereas the other is always out of it. Through manoeuvre and concentration at decisive points and while isolating, separating, dividing or dispersing the enemy, conditions of superiority could be created such that a sane enemy would concede without battle and should the enemy decide to pursue battle, a defeat was inevitable.

The objective of manoeuvre is to seek specific 'effects' and not battle; principally, '*strategic dislocation*' whereby the enemy's main force is rendered ineffective at the point where decision is sought. The inability to act both physically and or deliver timely decisions for forces that could act was another main effect namely '*paralysis*'. The

‘pocketing’ of the British Expeditionary Force in the battle of France was essentially a *dislocation*. The inability of the French to respond to the swift mechanised thrusts, *paralysis*.

Liddell Hart of course was addressing a particular level of war – what we now know as the operational level (though it was not recognised then in the English language). Understanding of the operational level matured to a great extent during the Second World War with the combined influence of long range fires, strategic and tactical communications which collectively enlarged the canvas of warfare.

The main flaw with this theory, one that leaves a gaping hole when we look at asymmetric conflict in particular, is that it requires a compliant enemy who shares identical if not similar precepts of military power, pain and pleasure, loss and gain and ascribes to a comparable cost - benefit logic to victory and defeat. A fundamental symmetry⁶² is thus a prerequisite for manoeuvre to substitute attrition in the context of the ultimate outcome and not just the battle.

PRE-THEORY 5: A NON-VICTORY (SCARCITY) FRAMEWORK

T. C. Schelling struggled to adapt the Clausewitzian distinction between defence and attack in applying the conventional mechanics of victory to the nuclear age. Realising that diplomacy had become inherently violent and that a permanent threat of violence existed, the natural conclusion Schelling arrived at was that coercion through the threat of violence and not compellence – the use of that violence – would define how one would impose one’s will on the enemy.⁶³ According to Schelling, ‘victory’ inadequately expressed what a nation wants from its military forces.⁶⁴ He believed that nations mostly want the influence that resides in latent force, the bargaining power that comes from its capacity to hurt and not just the direct consequence of a successful military action.⁶⁵

In contrast to Gray’s assertion of relevance and attainability of decisive victory, Schelling argues that while total victory over an enemy provides at best an opportunity for unopposed violence against the enemy populations, ‘how to use that opportunity in the national interest, or in some wider interest, can be just as important as the achievement of victory itself; but traditional military suicide does not tell us how to use that capacity for inflicting pain.’⁶⁶ Schelling posits that even a substantial military victory is a scarce

concept in the contemporary world and likens the pursuit of such a military victory to actual or virtual suicide.

Schelling presents a nonlinear view of Victory. While victory may be a scarce possibility, defeat, at least in relation to the purpose of victory, is far more probable. Victory and defeat do not, therefore, register on a comparable sliding scale of possibilities since a simple axis would miss much of the relevant action.⁶⁷ It echoes Michael Howard's opinion that 'a war, fought for whatever reason, that does not aim at a solution which takes into account the fears, the interests and, not least, the honour of the defeated peoples is unlikely to decide anything for very long.'⁶⁸ As a military objective, decisive victory is not controversial. Whether or not the decision sought needs to be conclusive, not necessarily of a Carthaginian character, is a matter initially for policy to decide and then for political-military dialogue as events unfold.⁶⁹

Schelling is suggestive of an inherent inadequacy in pure military success without a linkage with interests. The quest for decisive success in the 21st century will more and more carry the risk of yielding only a painful Pyrrhic victory.

PRE-THEORY 6: A RELATIVITY FRAMEWORK

Victory and defeat register on a sliding scale of possibilities.⁷⁰

Colin S. Gray

In *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory*, Colin S. Gray lays out a theoretical framework for describing and assessing levels of victory. Gray finds that 'decisive victory, though a meaningful concept, is not a clear-cut alternative to defeat, or even to indecisive victory.'⁷¹ He finds that in terms of achievements, victory allows for more and for less and that while decisive victory is achievable, there is no guarantee of its attainability. Gray introduces, two lesser grades of achievement, namely: 'strategic success' and 'strategic advantage' with a qualifying emphasis on the ability of these lower shades to remain 'positively decisive':

Although the concept of decisive victory in principle is distinguishable from strategic success or strategic advantage, in practice either of the two more modest achievements can be positively decisive.⁷²

Gray's framework parents a utilitarian assessment. It is both prospective and retrospective. Its simplicity in relation to the purpose of victory lies in the question, what does it mean for policy, strategy and the operational domain? The framework, or grades of victory, can be applied across the full range of levels of war, even the achievements in the technical domain.



In describing the quality and utility of victory, implicit between the lines is that grades below strategic success fall outside the victory domain being best classified as stalemates or in the zone of failures. Additionally, Gray leaves the question of 'defeat' largely unaddressed and its relationship to victory open ended.

The framework does not constitute a theory or comprehensive pre-theory but it does provide a tool for assessing victory and conveying scientific language that is sufficiently precise and adequately vague to serve the needs of a political theory. In explaining the characteristics of the lower shades of victory, Gray correctly asserts that depending on the nature of the issue and the type of bargain sought, strategic advantage and strategic success can in themselves be the defined end states for violence. In other words, usability of victory is more a function of how diplomacy uses what leverage the military provided.

The limitation of Gray's framework is that it tends to presuppose defeat as relative to and an opposite of victory. Although this may be true at the tactical level, at higher levels, as we have shown earlier, outcomes are diffused in perceptual frameworks. Additionally, how does one apply the framework to counter insurgencies and terrorism? Since terrorists often seek attention, are not averse to loss of combatants, supporters or even sympathetic elements in the target society, terrorists may actually benefit from a tactical defeat or apparent losses. This necessitates an additional temporal framework which can be an organising argument for immediate, short and long-term implication of victory.

PRE-THEORY 7: A POST ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

From the recent flood of literature, one of the most comprehensive and structured research comes from Martel who uses several case studies to induce generic framework for assessing victory and provides what he terms as pre-theory⁷³ of victory. Martel presents an analytical framework that plots the level of victory against the quality of victory for each of parameters B – D (see Figure below):



Graphic continued on next page




FIGURE 17: LEVEL OF VICTORY⁷⁴

SOURCE: WILLIAM C. MARTEL, *VICTORY IN WAR: FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN MILITARY POLICY* (FRAMEWORK ANNOTATIONS INSERTED BY AUTHOR.)

The main limitation is the correlational emphasis on constructs of victory, neglecting the value of victory towards policy objectives, its sustainability, the overall cost and the absence of perceptual and cultural consideration.

PRE-THEORY 8: AN ELEMENTAL FRAMEWORK

Robert Mandel criticizes traditional understanding of victory, both in terms of end-state or cost-benefit metrics. Recognising the multifaceted nature of victory in war, Mandel provides a definition of strategic victory encompassing ‘informational’, ‘military’, ‘political’, ‘economic’ and ‘diplomatic elements’. By approaching victory in this way, Mandel posits that it is possible to develop a more complex and comprehensive picture of war outcomes. Achieving victory, accordingly becomes a problem of balancing various trade-offs between the elements of victory in the post-violence setting.⁷⁵ This further explains the inherent subjectivity of the victory notion and points to the conceptual difficulties in assessing victory from the perspective of the ‘end state, the cost-benefit analysis and the embedded subjectivity.’⁷⁶ He dissects the concept of victory in two distinct phases namely war winning and peace winning. Five important fallacies that accompany the victory notion are:⁷⁷

- military fallacies that arise from overestimating the post war payoffs of military power,
- political fallacies that stem from overestimating the ease of transforming the defeated state's post-war political system,
- economic fallacies stemming from underestimating the costs of post-war economic assistance... underlying assumption that such economic reconstruction will be smooth, fast and inexpensive,
- social fallacies that overestimate the vanquished society's willingness to adopt the victor's social value system and last,
- diplomatic fallacies driven by the victor's appreciation of external legitimacy of the post war arrangement by assuming the outcome will serve as a positive model admired by onlookers.
- Victory is what it is made out to be.

Robert Mandel suggests dissecting victory into its constituent elements and assessing outcomes in each separately. The elements identified are: the 'informational', 'military', 'political', 'economic' and 'diplomatic'. When assessing victory separately, a need arises to balance various trade-offs between the elements of victory in the post-violence setting. This implies deliberately aiming at identified or fine-tuned ends to be sought in each of the elements such that the collective impact of the parts is capable of producing the ends desired by policy. This would invariably involve trade-offs, limiting greater success or investing more effort in another with a view to attaining a particular calibrated level of success in each element.

Mandel addresses symptoms of non-victory as opposed to providing any nascent theory or an organising framework for pre-theory.

PRE-THEORY 9: A SCOREKEEPING AND MATCH-FIXING MODEL

Given the requirements of a theory as pointed in the introduction to this chapter, the closest attempt to present a theory of victory is to be found in a seminar paper entitled 'Victory and Defeat in International Relations' by Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney. The duo, emphasizing the moral factors, present a case for perception over

reality and the inescapable influence of culture on the former. Their thesis suggests that no theory of victory is complete unless the end state is viewed within the absolute and relative cultural frameworks of the opposing sides.

Through a survey of wars and political crises short of war, Johnson and Tierney opine that the outcome is seen in the context of reality. As such observers ‘perceive’ reality and thus perceive the outcome of war and engagements.⁷⁸ Their definition of insiders and outsiders needs to be elaborated. Everyone is an observer, insiders are observers that include decision-makers, administration and bureaucrats; whereas outsiders are those who were not personally involved in making the foreign policy upon which they now cast judgment. Outsiders include opposition politicians, the media, the general public at home and abroad, allies and partners and the world community at large,⁷⁹

People’s evaluations according to Johnson are ‘quasi-attitudes made up on the spot, half-hearted, even random reactions.’⁸⁰ Insiders and outsiders can be highly judgmental because attitudes pre-exist in people’s minds, or are formed rapidly when prompted. ‘Key attributes of human nature include systematic tendencies to reach and hold judgments of people and events, to form them quickly, to be influenced by others, for first impressions to last, for emotional responses to shape opinions, and for people to find it hard to shake-off established images.’⁸¹ ‘Westerners’, writes Nisbet, ‘for example, have a tendency to categorize even complex issues into black and white choices.’⁸² People from the east in comparison are happy with shades of grey. ‘At times, people disagree strongly about the performance of their leaders or armies; at other times almost everyone agrees about who won and lost.’ The two questions, Johnson and Tierney ask are: how are these judgments made? And why do they vary? A common answer explains this as a two-stage process:




FIGURE 18: JOHNSON AND TIERNEY’S TWO STAGE EVALUATION PROCESS

SOURCE: JOHNSON AND TIERNEY, ‘VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS’, CONFERENCE PAPER / UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT, HAWAII, 2004.


First, observers need a set of criteria – a metric – against which an outcome is to be measured. It has two components.⁸³

- a ‘yardstick’ of what to measure (such as territory, or body counts);
- a ‘threshold’ to mark when success has been achieved (for example, a strategic target captured, or half of an enemy army destroyed).

Second, once observers have selected a metric (or have had one imposed on them by the political elite, the media or peers), they need information about the conflict outcome to determine whether side X has reached the relevant threshold on the yardstick or not.

FRAMEWORK ONE: SCORE KEEPING

A Scorekeeping analysis adjusts for the existing material strengths of each side in the dispute by assessing difficulty. What Scorekeeping really measures is the success of each side’s *strategy*, or how effectively they use their resources, given the particular environment, to make gains (especially core objectives). Hence, a Scorekeeping judgment of victory involves a comparison of the material gains made by each side, plus the achievement of material aims in the context of importance and difficulty.⁸⁴ The relationship is summarised in the equation below. The main development from the previous equation is that the aims and gains are modified by the interaction of importance and difficulty:



EQUATION 2: THE AIMS AND GAINS RELATIONSHIP

SOURCE: JOHNSON AND TIERNEY, ‘VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS’, CONFERENCE PAPER / UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT, HAWAII, 2004.

In theory, a scorekeeping analysis would have to compare fact against a ‘what if’ theses. The inherent pitfalls of assessing fact against fiction make such an analysis questionable. In practice such a counter-factual analysis is very difficult, is rarely employed and cannot usually explain the process by which observers do in fact evaluate outcomes. Usually,

observers also do not have uniform perfect information and are generally unaware of courses and options open to policymakers. This suggests only a ‘best fit’ analysis.

A scorekeeping analysis also assumes that observers’ perceptions are driven by data about material gains and aims, and not by pre-existing theories or beliefs. In cricket for example, the metric for victory is, of course, scoring the most runs and the time factor or overs. Since the result has to be attained in a particular timeframe, say five days for a test match, either time or the score board would tell, and consulting the scoreboard provides concrete information about which side has achieved victory or how a draw was achieved.

Johnson’s score sheet matrix for ‘quality of victory’ is presented in Table 2:

		STATE 2 achieves:			
		Nothing	Aims only	Gains only	Both
STATE 1 achieves:	Nothing	Ambiguous	State 2 minor victory	State 2 minor victory	State 2 major victory
	Aims only	State 1 minor victory	Ambiguous	Ambiguous	State 2 minor victory
	Gains only	State 1 minor victory	Ambiguous	Ambiguous	State 2 minor victory
	Both	State 1 major victory	State 1 minor victory	State 1 minor victory	Ambiguous

TABLE 2: ASSESSMENT SCORE SHEET

SOURCE: JOHNSON AND TIERNEY, ‘VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS’, CONFERENCE PAPER / UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT, HAWAII, 2004.

FRAMEWORK TWO: ‘MATCH FIXING’

Observers often fail to evaluate on the basis of a Framework 1 Scorekeeping analysis. If so, what determines their choice of metric and information? In this section we build an alternative approach to understanding perceptions of victory and defeat, which we call *Framework Two*, or ‘Match-fixing’. In contrast to *Framework One*’s focus on striving for an objective evaluation of material gains and aims achieved, *Framework Two* offers a model of victory and defeat based on real human beings whose perceptions of the world are shaped – and therefore can be understood and predicted – by logical inferences and by

well-established psychological biases. Figure 19 depicts three major sets of influences on perceptions of victory and defeat which operate in a chronological order: (1) mind-sets (before the event), (2) salient events (during the event), and (3) social pressure (before, during, and after the event). These variables capture the essentials of a causal account of how perceptions of victory are formed.⁸⁵

In Figure 19, factors influencing the transmission of information into a final judgment of victory and defeat (column 1) plus the effects of each of these factors in the process of evaluation: shaping and distorting metrics (column 2) and information (column 3).

Match-fixing outcomes can be a representative when the psychological outcomes are profound and over shadow the physical – see the Battle of Karbala in Chapter V. This implies that match-fixing is not itself constructive but could well be part of an alternate reality. It ‘does not inherently create *incorrect* views of the winners and losers because determining the ‘*real*’ winner is difficult, and involves consideration not only of material, but also of psychological gains made by each side. Match-fixing factors often, but not always, encourage deviations from ideal standards of information processing (for example, through cognitive dissonance, or if media manipulation leaves key facts about the outcome unknown).’⁸⁶

	Contributing Factors	Impact of bias on:		
		Metric		Information
Framework 1	Battlefield results <input type="checkbox"/> Material change <input type="checkbox"/> Achievement of aims	None, in theory		None, in theory
	Mindset E.g. national culture World-view Organizational position Individual beliefs	<input type="checkbox"/> Cognitive dissonance <input type="checkbox"/> Expectations		<input type="checkbox"/> Cognitive dissonance <input type="checkbox"/> Expectations
Framework 2	Salient events Day to day unfolding of crisis and framing of key issues	<input type="checkbox"/> Timeframes <input type="checkbox"/> Settlement process		<input type="checkbox"/> Symbolic events <input type="checkbox"/> Rally phenomena
	Social pressure The deliberate manipulation of observer's evaluation of victory and defeat	Manipulating metrics		Manipulating information
	Judgment of victory and defeat			

FIGURE 19: MATCH-FIXING MATRIX.

SOURCE: JOHNSON AND TIERNEY, ‘VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS’, CONFERENCE PAPER / UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT, HAWAII, 2004.

In some cases, match-fixing can be the result of ‘simple variation in beliefs and attitudes, rather than unconscious biases.’ A pacifist and soldier, for example, might both be fully aware of all the key facts about an outcome, ‘but assess that outcome with a different set of philosophical or ideational concerns.’ They will not necessarily perceive the outcome incorrectly; ‘instead different metrics will be selected. In the following sections we explain how each stage in the evaluation process is influenced by the three match-fixing factors: mind-sets, salient events, and social pressures.’⁸⁷

The use of cognitive dissonance as a match-fixing tool is somewhat limiting, particularly if we look at both the definitional and the implicational usage of the condition. Cultural dissonance however serves to better describe the phenomenon.

The model is a useful tool for an ex-ante analysis from the perspective of only one of the sides. It attempts to relate the notion of success and failure from a single cultural perspective and tries to factor the other side’s perspective for what it should be and not for what it is. Another limitation of the framework in its narrow applicability to various levels of war as well as to unconventional or asymmetric warfare. Additionally, the match-fixing metric can be used to explain the cultural impact on information processing and assessment of end states – what Mandel refers to as the social-value system of the antagonists. The assessment sheet for scorekeeping is somewhat limiting but can be useful in ex-ante analysis as well as the calculating the utility of the bargaining leverage.

The two frameworks presented by the term are rather process oriented as opposed to content oriented. While major elements of victory and defeat are addressed, this contextual quality is lost in the assessment process. They do not identify the temporal influence on outcomes both in the political and the military contexts. Finally, the somewhat predictive and prophetic tendency that the framework encourages is an exercise in automation as opposed to broad-based ‘consider all factors’ analysis.

In sum, the main criticism of both frameworks is their failure to recognise or define reality itself. A notion of victory in a single culture context is being used as a yardstick. This premise leads to induced errors of all other notions as ‘perception’. Margaret Mead’s works on physical and cultural reality discussed earlier reinforce this assertion. Reality in one culture can quite frequently be construed as perception in another.

PRETHEORIES: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

An appraisal of the pre-theories, assessment criteria and most significantly, constructs of victory suggests that the notion of victory is approached variously and often inconsistently. The research and analysis shows that no functional definition is offered in classical or contemporary thought. Definition remains at best confined to the dictionary equivalents. The term is used frequently with adjectives to express its quality however the usage of such qualifiers is highly subjective and often sensational without adding information of any considerable academic or critical value.

From a functional perspective, two kinds of victory emerge, the *quid nominis* and the *quid rei*. The essential difference between the two is that the former is the correlational perspective and hence a nominal assessment of victory. It comes with a latent leverage that diplomacy must realise towards policy. Of itself, victory *quid nominis* serves neither policy nor politics. The process of leveraging victory *quid nominis* produces victory *quid rei*. It presents leverage, value and utility. It is coherent with and adapted to the strategic environment, seeks specific changes in the effectual environment and skilfully harnesses the potential of violence and the moral precepts of the outcome.

In terms of advancing a theory, the above survey reveals at least two distinct approaches towards a pre-theory of victory, namely the context and the content-based approaches. In the absence of a definition of what is exactly being theorised, the objective value of such theories remains suspect as theory must serve some practical value. However, from a general pre-theory a working definition of victory can be gleaned:

Victory through war is the successful attainment of military objectives aimed at compelling the enemy to do ones will. The military instrument serves as a vehicle for violence and leverages the threat of punishment, further punishment or political annihilation to the point that compliance is achieved. The degree of compliance is typically a function of the other side's resilience, morale and will power. For any substantial objectives, a disproportionate degree of military punishment is usually necessary.

Pre-theories, metrics, models and frameworks are summarised in Table 3:

Metric	Examples	Approach
• Cultural – Perceptual – Ideological	❖ Johnson's 'Match Fixing'	✓ Cultural Dissonance
• Physical – Correlational	❖ Johnson's Score Keeping ❖ Clausewitzian Absolutism ❖ Martel's Post Analysis Model	✓ Correlational ✓ Military aim and objective viz, military outcome (forces and flags, Territory etc.)
• Moral	❖ Liddell Hart's Manoeuvrist Model	✓ Rational, Effects based,
• Cost – Benefit	❖ Machiavellian Realism, ❖ Clausewitzian Absolutism ❖ Gray's Strategic Context ❖ Schelling's Scarcity Framework	✓ Logical Analysis
• Effort – Value – Effect	❖ Sun Tzu's Rationalism ❖ Gray's Strategic Context ❖ Liddell Hart's Manoeuvrist Model ❖ Martel's Post Analysis Model ❖ Mandel's Elemental Framework	✓ Inferential, Deductive

TABLE 3: PRETHEORIES: SUMMARY OF MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS
(AUTHOR'S OWN TABLE)

Areas where deduced pretheories are either silent, do not sufficiently explain the concept or proffer appropriate language include:

- Qualification of actors and their intimacy to the object of war, particularly the aggressor – aggressed metric and the differences in the internalised notion of success for each.
- Asymmetric matchups and the expectant metric.⁸⁸
- Temporal – Moral Metric.
- Physical – Temporal – Moral Metric, the issue of limited war and limited victory.
- The need to understand the value of success or quality of victory in war, through war, and from war.
- The usability metric.

Chapter Notes and References

¹ Sir Michael Howard, 'The Use and Abuse of History', *Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College*, Vol XI, No. 1, pp. 9-14, this p. 14.

² Amitaz Acharya and Barry Buzan, 'Why is there no non-Western IR theory: reflections on and from Asia', *Oxford Journals on Line*, Internet, <http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/lcm011v1>, accessed 15 Dec 2007.

³ Ibid.

⁴ James N. Rosenau, op. cit., pp. 27-92.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Stephen M. Walt, 'The relationship between theory and policy in international relations,' *Annual Review of Political Science*, June 2005, Vol. 8, pp. 23-48, this p. 27.

⁷ John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (Basic Books, New York, 1989), p. 16.

⁸ General Schwarzkopf likened his manoeuvre to Hannibal's crossing of the Alps during the Second Punic War (218 – 202 BC) whereas Prof. Christopher Bellamy, in *Expert Witness: A defence Correspondent's Gulf War 1990-1991*, (1993 described it with reference to the Battle of Cannae (216 BC). See Christopher D. Bellamy, *Expert Witness: A Defence Correspondent's Gulf War 1990-1991* (Brassey's, London, 1993), p. 111.

⁹ John Mueller, op. cit., p. 16.

¹⁰ Newt Gingrich, cited in J. S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 1st ed. (New York, 2004), in the context of Iraq and the elusive victory despite termination of 'major operations' in Mar 2003.

¹¹ The four translated versions of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* are: tr. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford University Press, New York, 1971); tr. Denma Translation Group, (Shambala Publications, Boston, 2002); *The Art of War: Corner Stone of Chinese Strategy*, trs. Chao-Wing Chohan and Abe Bellenteen (Astrolog Publishing House, Hod Hasharon, 2003) and *The Art of War: A Modern Chinese Interpretation*, ed. A General Tao Hanzhang, trans. Youan Shibing (Sterling Publishing Company, New York, 2000).

¹² The Griffith's translation reads: 'War is a matter of vital importance for the state...'. The use of the word 'military' instead of 'war' in the Denma Translation presents an interesting perspective as it alters the object of Sun Tzu's study. It appears that Sun Tzu is concerned with the 'instrument' and not the 'process'! See Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, op. cit., 63.

¹³ In Chinese (Mandarin) pronounced d'ao, it simply means 'way'. In Confucianism as well as its classical literary use, it is the right manner of human activity and virtuous conduct seen as stemming from universal criteria and ideals governing right, wrong, and other categories of existence. *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (2008) describes it as: 'the source and principle of cosmic order; the constant flow of the life source (chi) in

unceasing change. As a cosmic principle the tao bears some similarity to logos although it is also elusive, deep and obscure and cannot be expressed in words.’

¹⁴ Sun Tzu, *The Denma Translation*, op. cit., Chapter 1.

¹⁵ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit., p. 593-594.

¹⁶ Sun Tzu, *The Denma Translation*, op. cit., pp. 146-50 and commentaries pp.163-64. The Samuel B. Griffith’s translation reads: ‘The victorious army wins its battles before seeking battle; an army destined to defeat fights in the hope of winning’. Sun Tzu, *Griffith Translation*, op. cit., p. 87.

¹⁷ Barry C. Boyce, op. cit., p. xi.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Sun Tzu, *Denma Translation*, op. cit., p. 69.

²⁰ See notes to the chapter, *Ibid.*, p. 142.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.* See also the commentary to Chapter 3 on p.147.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 74-76.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Chapter 3, pp 79-84.

²⁵ Clausewitz’s defines war as a ‘duel at a larger scale.’ He draws similarity between war among nations with a duel between two wrestlers. See Clausewitz , *On War*, op. cit., p. 75.

²⁶ A direct link is being drawn to the famous Clausewitzian dictum: ‘War is a continuation of politics by other means’, see Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit., p. 87.

²⁷ The need to send the message to the masses or other states and competitors is pressing. The US, for example, after having been shamed in Vietnam, was looking for opportunities to regain the lost ‘valour’ and save face particularly in front of the Soviet Union.

²⁸ Sun Tzu, *Griffiths Translation*, op. cit., p. 87.

²⁹ Sun Tzu, *Denma Translation*, op. cit., For an explanation of this logic, see commentary in the footnotes, p. 148.

³⁰ Sun Tzu, *Griffiths Translation*, op. cit., p. 77.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 77, 85, 97.100-101.

³³ *Ibid.*, 85.

³⁴ Ian Jonson, excerpts from a lecture delivered in Liberal Studies, Seminar on *The*

Prince, in February 2002, Transcript available on internet, <http://records.viu.ca/~Johnstoi/introser/machiavelli.htm>, accessed Feb 2006.

³⁵ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ed. Quentin Skinner, op. cit., p. 33.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 87.

³⁷ Carl Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 80.

³⁸ Ibid, 579.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 603.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 87.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 75.

⁴² Clausewitz borrows the term ‘Centre of Gravity’ from Newtonian physics. He defines it as the hub of power, movement, influence and action. See Clausewitz, op. cit., pp. 595-600.

⁴³ The concept is discussed at length in *On War*, op. cit., pp. 597—599 and p. 617; and Chapter 27 of Book 6, pp. 484—487.

⁴⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, op. cit., pp. 595—596; for detailed discussion, see also pp. 485—486. Note: Clausewitz’s emphasis on the importance of taking high risks to succeed, as well as on his insistence on not allowing the enemy to recover.

⁴⁵ Clausewitz does not define what he means by ‘unity’. If used in the context of the ‘hard and soft’, we may then infer that the objective could be the ‘unity’ instead of the centre of gravity. Compare this with Sun Tzu notion of the ‘whole’ and one realises further similarities, but differences in emphasis, between the two thinkers.

⁴⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit., p. 487

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 596

⁴⁹ Clausewitz writes: ‘Destruction of his army, if it is at all significant’, Ibid.

⁵⁰ *On War* was still unfinished when Clausewitz died. His reflection on Real War is evidently a late realisation or insertion and one that he never got around to dilate upon fully in the book. The paradoxes in *On War*, arise not from the confusion in Clausewitz but the incompleteness of his manuscripts that Marie Von Clausewitz, his wife, worked from. It can be argued that had Clausewitz survived to complete his work and refine his notes, a more wholesome and dynamic concept and probably even a theory of victory might well have been presented by him. The seeds are certainly there in *On War*. Evidence of a rapprochement between Clausewitzian prescription and the Confucian notions exists within the ideas of Clausewitz; a distinct side of Clausewitz that his untimely death stole from this true Genius of the Modern Era.

⁵¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit, pp. 595-600.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 585 – 594.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 263-270.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 528.

⁵⁵ Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, op. cit., p. 368.

⁵⁶ Stepan A. Tiushkevich, op. cit., pp. 70-76. Also available on Internet at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JAP/is_3_10/?tag=content;coll.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, op. cit., p. 15.

⁶⁰ Michael Howard writes: ‘Wars are conflicts of societies, and can be fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting them. The roots of victory or defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield.’ Strategy must therefore also seek to factor in the aspects away from the battlefield, ones that are frequently over looked. See Sir Michael Howard, ‘The Use and Abuse of History’, op. cit., p. 14.

⁶¹ Disruption is the product of a combination of paralysis, dislocation or the destruction of the enemy’s centre of gravity (with none of the three attained or sought in absolute measure) or its internal and external sources of power. It is both physical and psychological.

⁶² This is a manipulation of a term ‘Fundamental Asymmetry’ as used by Prof. Richard Holmes. See Richard Holmes, ‘Asymmetry: An Historical Perspective,’ op. cit.

⁶³ See Raymond Aron, *Clausewitz: Philosopher of War*, (Routledge, London, 1976), p. 328. The analysis is presented in a comparison of Schelling and Clausewitz on the changed nature of war in the nuclear age.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966), p. 3-6, 71.

⁶⁶ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, op. cit., 1966), p. 3.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 12, 30.

⁶⁸ Sir Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace*, op. cit., p. 23.

⁶⁹ Thomas C. Schelling, op. cit., p. 32.

⁷⁰ Colin S. Gray, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory*, op. cit., p. 12.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 34.

⁷² Ibid., p. 12.

⁷³ James Rosenau, a scholar of international relations, advances the concept of a pre-theory as a step beyond data collection to render the raw materials comparable and ready for theorising. Reasenau asserts that one has to decide on the set of variables that contribute most to external behaviour. See James N. Rosenau, 'Pre-theories and Theories in Foreign Policy' op. cit., p. 80. Also cited in William C. Martel, *Victory in War*, op. cit., p. 91.

⁷⁴ William C. Martel, op. cit., pp. 294 - 297.

⁷⁵ Robert Mandel, 'The Eye of the Beholder, Victory and defeat in US military Operations,' in *Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War*, eds. Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (Routledge, Oxford, 2007), Part 1, Chapter Two.

⁷⁶ Robert Mandel, 'Reassessing Victory in Warfare', *Armed Forces and Society*, 2007; 33; 461 – 495, this pp. 464-465. The article was originally published online and is available at, <http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/33/4/461>.

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 480, 483, 485 – 488.

⁷⁸ Wars are large-scale institutionally organized lethal violence, usually fought for the control of territory. See Bruce Russett, 'The Fact of Democratic Peace,' in eds. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, *Debating the Democratic Peace* (MIT Press, Cambridge, 2001), p. 69. According to Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, crises are characterized by the perception of an increased probability of war, the existence of a threat to basic values, and an awareness of the finite time that exists to resolve matters. Classic examples are the 1938 Munich Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis*, op. cit., p. 3-4.

⁷⁹ For evaluations about performance by bureaucracies see Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1991).

⁸⁰ Russell W. Neuman, *The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate* (Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 268.

⁸¹ Robert Jervis, op. cit.; Jerel A. Rosati, 'The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 2, 2001, pp. 45-75; Philip E. Tetlock, 'Social psychology and world politics,' in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. by D. Gilbert, S. Fiske and G. Lindzey (McGraw Hill, New York, 1998); Rose McDermott, *Political psychology in international relations, Analytical perspectives on politics* (The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2001).

⁸² See Richard E. Nisbett, op. cit.

⁸³ Johnson, Dominic and Dominic Tierney, op. cit.

⁸⁴ One potential issue is that outcomes may represent 'absolute' or 'relative' gains. Absolute gains are the total value of the gains to oneself, without regard to the opponent. Relative gains are the comparative gains, or lesser losses, made over and above the opponent. When states are concerned only about *absolute* gains, then both sides could 'win' in terms of achieving positive benefits, or both sides could 'lose' in terms of

incurring costs. However, states are sometimes more concerned about *relative* gains – that is, whether the overall balance of gains or losses puts them into an advantageous or disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the opponent. This may be particularly important if incremental advantages can be translated into further exploitation of the disadvantaged state (e.g. by using an improved military position to extract further concessions later on). Most of the disputes we analyse involve explicit relative gains. Robert Powell, ‘Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,’ *American Political Science Review* 85 (1991), pp. 1303-1320; Michael Nicholson, ‘Interdependent Utility Functions: Implications for Co-operation and Conflict,’ in *Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence*, ed. Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt (Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1994), pp. 77-96; Arthur Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990), p. 126; Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1999).

⁸⁵ Johnson and Tierney, op. cit.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ ‘It is not the size of the dog in the fight but the size of the fight in the dog that matters.’ See Beverly R. David and Alan Gribben, *Mark Twain and His Illustrators: 1869-1875*, (Whitston Pub. Co., 1986), p. 86.

CHAPTER V – CASE STUDIES

The greatest civilisations of the time are also the most efficient killers.¹

Christopher Bellamy (2007)

There are two roads to the reformation of mankind—one through misfortune of their own, the other through misfortunes of others; the former is the most unmistakable, the latter the less painful.²

Polybius (203-120 BC)

INTRODUCTION

In chapter IV we established an organising framework, a contemporary pre-theory and arrived at a general definition of victory. Armed with this framework, we are now in a position to look at case studies in the light of the research questions that collectively bind the thesis of this research.

Presented here are nine studies spanning a period from the Napoleonic era to the present day with the exception of the Battle of Karbala [680 AD], included as deviant case.³ The selection of cases was a deliberate and purposed process. The cases presented here are included for their comparative information oriented sampling value, as opposed to paradigmatic context. All cases are formally well documented and extensively debated by scholarship and therefore a general consensus on perceived outcomes and effects is held. The wealth of analysis and debate existing in each instance reduces induced errors from situated premise thereby obviating the need for a basic or initial scrutiny of data. In context and nature, the case studies represent conflicts in the politico-military and the socio-cultural domains.

Each case study is organised along a similar framework of analysis developed along following lines:

- Brief strategic environment, background and causes.
- Initial and modified political aims (including analysis where necessary).
- Initial and subsequent war aims.
- Outline political and military strategy.

- Important intra-war decisions including revisions and changes to political and military aims, strategy and operations.
- Outcome and Analysis: Vocabulary of Victory and Defeat.

SECTION 1: CASE STUDIES

CASE 1: THE BATTLE OF KARBALA

Background and Causes

The Battle of Karbala took place on either the 9th or the 10th of October, 680 AD at Karbala, in what is now Iraq.⁴ The battle owed its origins to the violent uprising and political fallouts after the third Caliph, Hazrat Usman Ghani's assassination. Ali Ibn Abi Talib, Muhammad's cousin and son in law, was elected as the fourth Caliph with mixed support and allegiance. Muawiya, the Governor of Syria, refused allegiance to Ali which resulted in the Battle of Seffin. As tension between the House of Muhammad and prominent tribal chieftains vying for power grew, a new group called the Kharijites⁵ emerged. Politically and ideologically at a tangent from the House of Muhammad, the group had mixed allegiances with various other competing centres of power. This splinter group essentially professed that any Muslim could be the spiritual and political leader.⁶ From a religious standpoint, the group propounded literalism and conservatism with the exception of reconstruction and re-interpretation of selective source as a tool for inspiration and motivation. This is the earliest evidence of the notions of Dar al Aman or Dar Al Harb (the house of god or the house of war). The group, as part of its political agenda, decided the removal through assassination of the three main leaders namely Ali, Muawiya who was the governor of Syria and Amr Ibn Al As who was the ruler of Egypt.

Only a token effort was made on the lives of Muawiya and Amr who easily escaped the assassination attempts but Ali was struck by a poisoned sword while in the famous Kufa Mosque. The Shiites widely believe that it was Muawiya who was backing the Kharijites and that the botched assassination attempt on his own life was only intended to prevent fingers being pointed at him for Ali's assassination.

Ali's death hastened the total control of the Muslim Empire under the Umayyad dynasty. Hassan, Ali's eldest son and spiritual successor (Imam, as referred to by the Shia Sect), proceeded to sign a conditional truce with Muawiya. On assuming power Muawiya

moved swiftly to consolidate his position, He had Hassan poisoned and continued persecuting those that continued to pay allegiance to the new Imam, Hussein Ibn Ali.

At his death, Muawiya appointed his son, Yazid as successor. Hussein believed that Yazid would destroy the spirit of republicanism nurtured and developed so assiduously during the Prophet's era and would recreate a hereditary kingship which was repugnant to the original political teachings of Islam.

Yazid was an ambitious and ruthless man and was obsessed with consolidating his throne. He believed this to be only possible when he embodied both political and spiritual leadership within the territories he controlled. While Yazid enjoyed unparalleled political power, the spiritual powerhouse and therefore an eternal threat remained in the House of Muhammad. To redress this, he had to either get Hussein to swear allegiance to him or have him and his companions eliminated such that the threat is removed and with it any political or religious restraints that the House of Muhammad, through the House of Ali might possibly pose.

While at Mecca, Hussein received many letters of support and allegiance from the people and prominent elders of Kufa, a city on the Euphrates River in Central Iraq. Kufa had been the fourth Caliph's capital. The Kufans had two motives, one religious and the other political. In the latter, they hoped to restore Kufa's power over Damascus which had been Muawiya's and now Yazid's seat of government.

To address the Kufan concerns, Hussein sent his most trusted and eminent emissary, Muslim Ibn Aqeel to assess the situation. Simultaneously however, Yazid and his governors mobilised and quickly persecuted those that had extended allegiance to Hussein. The Governor of Kufa created examples out of those believed to be supporting Hussein. Aqeel was assassinated while another group of assassins was sent to Mecca to eliminate Hussein during his Hajj pilgrimage there. Hussein abandoned Hajj and decided to go to Iraq. He delivered a famous sermon before undertaking the journey. This sermon points to Hussein's clear and conscious understanding of what he was embarking on, the fate that awaited his non-military mission and his notion of victory post diplomacy and a possible battle. In the latter case, with annihilation as an all too possible outcome, victory lay in another dimension that Hussein understood all too well:

The death is a certainty for mankind... And I am enamoured of my ancestors like eagerness of Jacob to Joseph ... Everyone, who is going to devote his blood for our sake and is prepared to meet Allah, must depart with us...⁷

Hussein left Mecca with an entourage that had no resemblance to an army on a mission of conquest. The figures vary, but a party of over a hundred men, women and children left Mecca. The actual combatants that could be drawn from this party were seventy two which consisted of notable members of Muhammad's close family, including his 6 month old great grandson. The Battle of Karbala has assumed a 'holy' status particularly among the Shia Muslims. Accounts of the battle vary considerably from source to source and exaggerations and omissions are all too common. However, there are five primary sources that survive and serve as a good source for research. These have been used to construct the event and their political and ideological fallout.⁸

Politico-military Objectives

Yazid's political objective was to assimilate and assume uncontested political and spiritual power. Through this, perpetuate power of the House of Muawiya. The strategy adopted was total; a direct elimination of the threat posed by Hussein and his companions. His approach was to lure Hussein and his small contingent into battle and destroy the centre of gravity which he recognised as embodied in the personage of Hussein and the male members of the House of Muhammad.

In contrast, Hussein's political objectives were:

- to establish and defend an ideological line that defined the values of Islam as embodied and prescribed by the Prophet Muhammad and preserve the spirit of republicanism nurtured and developed assiduously until Ali's death,
- to defy hereditary kingship, as a political right. This was repugnant to the original teachings of Islam and never prescribed by Muhammad or the 'Rightfully guided Caliphs'⁹ among them Ali his father.
- to reiterate the Imamate as the spiritual fountain head of Islamic teaching and guidance.

His military objectives were neither leverage, nor territory or power.¹⁰ Given his small party, the outcome of the battle was a fait accompli. It was the usability of the end that

Hussein expected that was more important than victory *quid nominis*. The military objectives were spiritually inspiring. His choice to include in his party the old, the young, women and children is suggestive of how the moral objectives were to be attained. Spirit of sacrifice for what he believed and the message of commitment on the part of every man woman and child in his party were his moral objectives.

Conduct

The battlefield of Karbala was a desert region located adjacent to one of the tributaries of the Euphrates River. Hussein arrived at Karbala on 2nd Muharram in the 61st year of the Islamic calendar (680 AD). He ordered his force to camp by the river. The news of Muslim Ibn Aqeel's death at the hands of Ziyad, Kufa's new Governor, had reached Hussein a few days earlier. He also learnt of the shift in the allegiances of the people of Kufa.¹¹ Hussein continued his advance despite the troubling news. He was met by a vanguard contingent from Ziyad's army led by Hurr. Hussein dialogue with Hurr's party is recorded in the following words; the opening phrase was eventually to be made more famous in the West by President Bush in gathering his post 9/11 alliance against Afghanistan:

Hussein: 'With us or against us?'

Hurr: 'Of course against you, oh Aba Abd Allah!'


Hussein: '... So if you are different from what I received from your letters and from your messengers then I will return to where I came from.'

Hurr: 'No, but select a way neither toward Kufa nor Medina enabling me to find a pretence before Ibn Ziyad that you would have disagreed with me on the way.'¹²

Hussein: 'It has happened from the events what you have seen. And the world has been changed and become abominable and its goodness turns ... Don't you see that the truth is not put into action and the false is not prohibited?'

The believer has got to be fond of meeting his God justly. So I do not consider the death but blessedness and living with the oppressors other than abjectness.’¹³

Hussein was forced to break camp and move away from the River. See Map 1:



MAP 1: THE BATTLEFIELD OF KARBALA

SOURCE: [HTTP://WWW.ABSOLUTEASTRONOMY.COM/TOPICS/BATTLE OF KARBALA](http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/battle_of_karbala).¹⁴

THE MAP DEPICTS THE POSITIONS AND DEPLOYMENTS OF OPPOSING FORCES ON 7TH OF MUHARRAM. (ANNOTATIONS INSERTED BY AUTHOR)

By the evening of the 9th of Muharram, Hussein's camp was completely besieged. This night, Hussein gathered his men turned out the lamps in the camp and offered all those

that wanted to leave and save their lives an open offer to do so. He also warned those that remained that only death would meet them the coming day. Historians record that no one left the camp and on the contrary a senior commander along with his sons from the opposite camp joined Hussein to share the Imam's fate.¹⁵

Before the Battle on the 10th of Muharram (11 Oct 680), Hussein addressed his party:

Lo and behold; an ignoble (Ibn Ziyad), son of another ignoble (Ziyad ibn Abihi), has entangled me in a bifurcation, between either unsheathing the swords or accepting abjectness. And far be it that we accept abjectness. Allah abominates that for us, plus his prophet, believers, the chaste pure gentlewomen, those who do not accept oppression as well as the souls who do not submit to meanness abominate it. They disapprove that we prefer obedience of scrooges to the best sites of murder. Beware; I assault you together with this family....¹⁶

The Battle ensued for much of the day with individual combats and larger skirmishes continuing. By late afternoon, only the fifty four year old Hussein survived and having spent most of the day burying his companions including his brother, nephews and two sons. It was then Hussein's turn to battle. Historians record the display of bravery and skill that had been attributed to his father, Ali until he was killed while prostrating in prayer during combat. Looting followed, the dead that had been buried were exhumed looted and accounted while the women and children were expelled from the tents and left for some time in the open desert. The camp was set on fire.

By 11th Muharram (11th October 11, 680), all captives including women and children were loaded onto camels and moved toward Kufa and later on to Damascus to be presented before Yazid. Among the captives was Hussein's sister a woman of great substance and eloquence, Zainab bint Ali. Zainab's most famous sermon was delivered in Yazid's court:

Oh Yazid! Do you think that by making us prisoners in such a way that we are being taken from one place to another in humiliation - do you think that by this you have humiliated us in the sight of Allah and have earned respect for yourself?

This apparent success of yours is the result of grandeur of your might and lofty status for which you are proud.... You feel that you have conquered the whole world and your affairs are organised and that our domain is now under your control... And are you forgetting that Allah has said:

'Surely those who have bought unbelief at the price of faith shall do no harm at all to Allah, and they shall have a painful chastisement'. (Quran 3:177)

... By Allah! O Yazid, by killing 'Husayn [Hussein] you have not torn but your own skin and you have not cut but your own flesh. You will be brought to the Prophet with the crimes of spilling the blood of his children and humiliating his family.¹⁷

Yazid held his captives for a year. Spiritually, the masses remained aligned to Muhammad's family and Yazid could not afford to create more trouble for himself. Caught in a trap, Yazid could neither afford to kill nor completely isolate his prisoners. The people of Damascus began to frequent the prison, and Zainab used that as an opportunity to further propagate the message of Hussein. As public opinion against Yazid began to foment in Syria, Iraq, Mecca and Medina, Yazid ordered the release of the prisoners in the hope that through cunning he may better dispose of them at a later stage.

Outcome and Analysis

The Battle of Karbala assumes a deviant status as a case study. It was a total military defeat that yielded an enduring ideological victory for the militarily defeated. Politically, the Umayyad rule, though not Yazid or his immediate line, sustained but had to reconcile with the sheer momentum of the now clearly bifurcating movement that saw itself as the preservers of the true Islamic faith as prescribed by Mohammad, the last prophet of Allah, the movement was labelled as the Shiites, it is a name given to and not adopted by the movement. Hussein's achievement is summed up the words of one of his great grandson:

Some people think that victory means the total destruction of your opponent but there is another broader meaning to consider. If the values you have been fighting for endure, this is a greater indicator of victory.¹⁸

The quote presents two important facets of victory, its *usability* and *sustainability*.

The battle accounts and histories of events have taken on a romantic colouring. The details of the battles and the horrendous treatment meted to the defeated are insignificant, the undisputed aspects such as aims, objectives and outcomes suffice to make the Battle of Karbala a ‘must-read’ for any study on the notion and understanding of victory and defeat.

Clearly, the battle resulted in a comprehensive military and political victory for the armies loyal to Yazid whose immediate politico-military objectives were fully attained. The victory however failed to yield any of the long-term personal political advantages Yazid had set for himself. His rule became even more troublesome and his own son refused the crown, disowned Yazid and disappeared. The line was broken. The battle also had significant effects on formation of subsequent revolts against the Umayyad dynasty leading to its eventual down fall.

As for Hussein, the political objectives were attained in spite of the military disaster. The Shi’ite philosophy, for which Hussein stood, flourished even though it remained subjected to over a millennium of persecution. With time, even those that were at the head of this Yazid’s military achievement began to disown it. Yazid’s military victory came to be seen as a comprehensive defeat, exactly as Zainab bint Ali had foretold in her rebuttal at Yazid’s Court.

In much of Arabia the political enmity with Muhammad’s family continued but the lines had been drawn in the sands of Karbala that constrained every successive dynasty. While the Shia – Salafi split can be traced back to 632 AD, which is immediately after the death of the Prophet Muhammad,¹⁹ the origins of a permanent schism between Salafism²⁰ and the Shiite Sect can certainly be dated to the events of Karbala. Shia – Sunni differences are peripheral whereas those between Salafist off-shoots are more elemental and fundamental in nature.

The transmogrification of a comprehensive defeat into a total victory, denotes a relationship between the moral-temporal domain of victory that is almost absent in literature and strategy. The Battle of Karbala is thus a unique and symbolic event in history that grows far beyond its negligible military significance due its profound strategic value. The notion of victory, that is to say Hussein’s triumph at Karbala is thus a

shared vision between the mainstream Sunnis and the Shi'ites whereas the Salafist offshoots tend to regard it as a military and political victory for Yazid and his Army.

CASE 2: NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF RUSSIA, 1812

Background and Causes

In June 1812 Napoleon marched on Russia with the largest army ever assembled in Europe till that time.²¹ Before the Russian campaign, Napoleon's influence extended to virtually whole of continental Europe, either under direct control or through treaties favourable to France. Mainland Europe was not in a position to contest France either militarily or economically and for the Tsar it made political sense to ally with France, particularly after Russia's defeat in the Battle of Friedland (14 Jun 1807).²²

Although France and Russia had been official allies since 1807, they were never reliable friends.²³ The continental system set up by Napoleon was great for France but the trade boycott with Britain hurt Russian economy which had little resilience. Covertly ignoring the provisions of the treaty however made good economic sense for Russia. The Tsar turned a blind eye to the defaulters who continued to trade with Great Britain.

Albeit rich in raw materials and resources, Russia had little by way of manufacturing and above all, while in treaty with France, she could not undertake trade that was so vital to her economy. Russia was forced to default from the continental system out of sheer necessity; however, such defiance could not possibly be tolerated by Napoleon who was at the peak of his achievements.²⁴

Economy and trade were not the only sources of growing bitterness between France and Russia. Alexander was uneasy with the provisions of the 1809 Austrian war treaty which annexed Western Galicia from Austria to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. This posed a direct physical threat to Russia.²⁵ It was only a matter of time before Napoleon turned east.

Politico-military Objectives


Napoleon's main political objective was to bring Russia back on track as an ally. However, to garner support from his Polish troops, Napoleon himself referred to this campaign as the Second Polish War.²⁶ His decree to the troops on 22nd of June, 1812 at the head of River Neman expressed his overt objective:

Soldiers, the second war of Poland is started; the first finished in Tilsit. In Tilsit, Russia swore eternal alliance in France and war in England. It violates its oaths today. Russia is pulled by its fate; its destinies must be achieved. Does it thus believe us degenerated? Thus let us go ahead; let us pass Neman River, carry the war on its territory. The second war of Poland will be glorious with the French Armies like the first one.²⁷

As such, the recreation of Poland – to be carved from territories of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Belarus and the Ukraine – became the official declared goals of the war.


His military objectives were not so clear. As always, none of his senior commanders knew what was expected of them in the overall context; except that was revealed to them from time to time. What is clear, however, is his initial strategy where he sought – as was done with such precision in earlier campaigns – to separate enemy forces and deal with each individually. Here, the initial operation intended to split Marshal Petr Bagration's Second Western Army from Marshal Barclay de Tolly's First Western Army by driving to Vilna.

Napoleon had probably expected to meet and defeat the Russian Army either at Smolensk or, more favourably for the French, piecemeal engagements between Vilna and Smolensk (see Maps 2 and 3 below).



MAP 2: HISTORICAL MAP OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 1812

SOURCE: INTERNET, EMERSENKENT.COM ²⁸



MAP 3: NAPOLEON'S ADVANCE TO AND RETREAT FROM MOSCOW

SOURCE: INTERNET, [HTTP://WWW.NAPOLEONGUIDE.COM/CAMPAIGN_RUSSIA.HTM](http://www.napoleonguide.com/campaign_russia.htm)
(ADVANCE ROUTE TO MOSCOW ANNOTATED BY AUTHOR)

The Conduct

On June 24, 1812 Napoleon's troops began crossing the Neman River and entered Russian Poland. Met with little resistance, the mass of French forces moved quickly. Napoleon rushed towards Vilna with his other columns advancing on the other side of River Vilna where he expected to find battle.

On June 26, Tsar Alexander left Vilna, leaving Barclay de Tolly in overall command. Earlier, when news of Napoleon's crossing arrived, orders were sent out to Marshal Bagration and Marshal Ataman Platov to take the offensive. However, on reassessing the hopelessness of the situation, Barclay decided to retreat and ordered Vilna's magazines burned and its bridge dismantled. Barclay continued his retreat further east almost unhindered by French forces offering occasional resistance and rear-guard action to facilitate his withdrawal. Rapid marches, harsh weather and poor logistics caused physical dilution of troops in space while affecting morale through desertion, starvation and disease. Logistics trains lost horses by their thousands, further exacerbating the problems. The tactics that had served Napoleon so well in central Europe did not work in the Russian expanse. 'Some 50,000 stragglers and deserters became a lawless mob

warring with local peasantry that further hindered supplies reaching the Grande Armée already down to 95,000 men.²⁹ As Napoleon progressed further, serious problems in foraging surfaced, aggravated by scorched earth policy advocated by Karl Ludwig von Phull.³⁰


Barclay believed that facing the French in an open battle without proper preparation would be a pointless sacrifice. His unwillingness to give battle was increasingly being viewed as intransigence by the populace and led to his removal from the position of commander-in-chief. He was replaced by the boastful Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov, who, though allegedly instrumental in creating political pressure for Barclay's removal, largely followed the strategy and direction that had earlier been adopted by Barclay.

The strategy of trading space for time and allowing dreadful weather, poor logistics, and dwindling morale to take its toll was repeated over and over again until Napoleon finally had his battle at Borodino following an indecisive clash at Smolensk.

The Battle of Borodino on 7th September, 1812 was the bloodiest single day of battle of all Napoleonic Wars. Although there have been battles with higher casualties, the hourly casualty rate at Borodino – 6,500 per hour or 108 men per minute – is truly staggering. The total losses (dead and wounded) on both sides were in excess of 77000.³¹ The Russian army could only muster half of its strength on 8th September and was forced to retreat, leaving the road to Moscow open. Kutuzov also ordered the evacuation of the city.³² Napoleon entered Moscow on September 14, 1812 to find it empty, burning and devoid of materials and supplies. Napoleon, as had been the honoured tradition, had expected Tsar Alexander-I to accept defeat and offer his capitulation at the Poklonnaya Hill. No such delegation awaited him.³³

Despite an apparent military success in spite of the cost, Russian defiance continued and the surrender never came. All this while, his troops continued to suffer for want of rations and supplies. Napoleon's grand victory turned sour and as Napoleon faced the inevitable and decided to retreat, one of the greatest disasters in military history began. Early snows, failure to heed to good advice and adopting already plundered territory despite better supplied routes being available, the most impressive armies ever to be formed became a rout.

Bonaparte left his army on the 5th of December to return to Paris amidst a failed coup attempt against him. His intent was to raise another army. On 7th of December, the Grande Armée army finally crossed the Niemen out of Russian territory. Only a fraction had survived. In 1859 Charles Joseph Minard, a Surveyor,³⁴ depicted the catastrophe of the march, capturing the horror in one graphic. Overlaid on a rough map, Minard illustrates the state of the advancing and retreating army together with temperatures recorded. Many colourful and annotated versions are available; presented here is an image of Minard’s original work.³⁵



Outcome

The French invasion of Russia in 1812 was a turning point in the Napoleonic Wars. The campaign reduced Napoleon's French and allied invasion forces to a tiny fraction of their initial strength. In using violence as an instrument of bargain, Napoleon miscalculated Tsar Alexander's breaking point and as result ended up stretching the war in temporal and geographical terms beyond what his strategy had provided for.

The Russian success over the French army in 1812 marked a huge blow to Napoleon's ambitions of European dominance. Out of an original force of 450,000-600,000, only 20,000 to 40,000 frost-bitten and half-starved survivors stumbled back into France. The Russian campaign was the decisive turning-point of the Napoleonic Wars. It put an end to Napoleon's reputation of invincibility, the undefeated military genius. Napoleon, however, never lost hope, foreseeing the fall out of failure, rushed back to France before word of the disaster became widespread and successfully quelled a coup attempt by the republicans.

For Russia the term Patriotic War (an English rendition of the Russian Отечественная война) formed a symbol for a strengthened national identity that was to affect Russian patriotism not just through the 19th century but also become an inspiration through to the next when another ill-fated march towards Moscow was to occur. In 1941, at the peak of his power, Hitler marched on Russia. The Germans repeated many of the same mistakes and made some new ones. In failing to draw on any of the lessons of history, Hitler and through him, Germany, met a fate worse than Napoleon's.

If we go by Clausewitzian framework of victory—to force our enemy to do our will—then Napoleon certainly failed, but then so did Russia – at least in an immediate sense however, they did reach Paris in 1815. For Russia the outcome was neither a decisive victory nor a strategic success but did provide a strategic advantage that came from denying victory to the enemy. Russia, in hindsight, failed to build politically and benefit externally from Napoleon's defeat even after their march on Paris in 1815. Internal troubles continued. Revolutions brewed just as they might have in spite of the success. Although the war did shape Russian culture and perceptions in a profound way, as is evident from Tolstoy's *War and Peace*.³⁶ Externally, urged on by Prussian nationalists

and Russian commanders, the failure encouraged a general revolt among German nationalists across the Confederation of the Rhine and Prussia which was to result in Napoleon's German Campaign of 1813.

Napoleon on his part too was not 'defeated' as neither hope nor purpose was lost despite a failure short of reversal in Russia. Having successfully foiled a coup attempt in Paris, he would march the following year at the head of a 400,000 strong French force supported by a quarter of a million allied troops to Dresden (August 26-27, 1813) where despite being outnumbered, he secured a military victory over the sixth coalition.³⁷ It was not until Leipzig, the Battle of Nations (October 16–19, 1813) that he was finally defeated. The British effort in the Peninsular War, the so called Spanish Ulcer, from 1808-1814 also bled Napoleon's forces and defeated his Marshals even if not Napoleon directly.³⁸ With these series of reversals, Napoleon no longer had the necessary troops to stop the Coalition's invasion of France. He was eventually exiled to Elba in 1814. Russia took on the might of Napoleon's army singlehanded. Its only ally, Sweden supported neither in troops nor materials however it did allow the Russian to withdraw 45,000 troops from the Steinheil Corps as reinforcements, 20,000 of these were eventually stationed at Riga.³⁹

Comparing the outcome to some of the frameworks established in the previous chapter, we find that this campaign highlights the limitations of Mandel's framework, the fallacy of alliance building as a measure of success. It also points to the complexity of identifying military objectives that have the potential to yield political success. Another, even more profound lesson is the cultural dimension of victory and defeat. Napoleon's disappointment at Poklonnaya Hill stemmed from his enemy's refusal to accept what was culturally an obvious sign of victory for the French. 'Is victory complete until the enemy accepts defeat?' is a question that begs an answer in the light of this campaign.

To the outside observers, the outcome was contrary to expectations. No power in Europe expected Napoleon's defeat; least of all, Napoleon's own army which was as much driven by the rush of victory as by any causal motivations and associations the soldier may have held with the campaigns. The 'expectational framework' again comes to fore. Anything short of decisive victory, with expectations soaring high, would essentially have been a notional defeat. In reality it was worse.

CASE 3: THE FIRST WORLD WAR

BACKGROUND AND CAUSES

The First World War was the first ‘total war’⁴⁰ in the sense that the war effort transcended all spheres of activity within the belligerent countries – political, economic, social, cultural, educational, media and technological efforts were singularly directed towards the object of attaining victory. Governments, both democratic and autocratic, increasingly regulated everyday life within their dominions. In many ways, the First World War served little political purpose beyond feeding the nature of war to serve only itself as opposed to the purpose for which it is intended.⁴¹ As the war lingered on, fronts became locked and frustration grew whereas, in contrast the means – in terms of weapons equipment, logistics and supply of troops – became virtually limitless. The annihilation of opposing forces became the military objective on all sides, and broad, elusive objectives such as honour and prestige (Zan) became the acquired national aims.

The Industrial age brought with it large scale corporatism and capitalism. ‘Capitalism implies competition’.⁴² Large corporate politics brought with it monopoly capitalism making this competition assume a politico-economic dimension and hence a military-economic one. The quest for markets and raw materials brought states and their imperialist armies also into direct competition and confrontation on the fringes. ‘The destructiveness of such competition became increasingly pronounced, amidst a growing trend towards militarisation and its ideological reflection: the justification and glorification of war.’⁴³

The outward spill of national capital, industrialisation and the inherent demands on materials and resources, led to breakneck competition for trade routes from where such resources and raw materials flowed both within and outside Europe. ‘Between 1876 and 1914 European powers managed to annex some eleven million square miles of territory, mainly in Asia and Africa.’⁴⁴ The colonial empires thus created were a temporary answer to the problem that Mandel describes as the disproportion between development of productive forces and the political form – the nation state – within which this development had taken place. Despite large empires, the big colonial powers found it difficult to find new markets as their colonies remained largely underdeveloped and had little demand for the manufactured goods.

The imperial system had benefitted the early powers and left the later industrial giants such as Germany, USA, Japan and increasingly Russia out of the race. These emerging industrial giants found it difficult to cultivate markets resulting in the creation of extreme flux which reached staggering proportions early in the twentieth century. Conventional diplomacy had no answer for the ‘burgeoning productive forces and the prevailing political structures’ and the coalitions that this structure fostered merely exasperated the problem. Germany was the technology giant and was most affected by a lack of markets. A new, more favourable order would mean that she could gain substantially in wealth, prosperity, power and influence.⁴⁵ With the assassination of the Arch Duke Ferdinand serving as a trigger, an unstoppable chain of events unfolded (see Figures 11-13.)

POLITICAL AIMS: AGGRESSORS

German belief in its capacity to force a change and its timing has often led to theorising on the causes of the First World War. The Fischer thesis,⁴⁶ a revisionist theory presented in the 1970s, suggests that Germany more or less provoked the war. Fischer presents sizeable evidence to advance his conclusion supported by documentation from German government archives. The thesis is premised on the logic of German interest and opportunity:

- in 1914 Germany enjoyed a temporary advantage over its rivals,
- Russia was rapidly industrializing, and Britain would soon embark on a big naval arms build-up, therefore time was not on Germany’s side,
- the Turks could probably be counted on now, but possibly not later, and
- a general war in Europe was probably going to happen sooner or later and it was greatly to Germany’s advantage for it to happen sooner.

Acting upon that analysis, they pushed Austria to take a very hard line against Serbia, which almost certainly had no hand in Arch Duke Ferdinand’s assassination and which, in any event, had largely capitulated to Austria's demands.

By questioning the status quo Germany stood to gain the most. As the industrial leader, it also wanted to assume the political share of its role in Europe and more importantly the colonial share that favoured Britain and France. It now had the means and reason to do so through force of arms. German political aims were thus a progressive domination of

Europe and access to world markets and resources. German objectives had to be carved out of British, French and Russian interests. The military objectives were, as had been the practice before, conquest and destruction of the enemy thus waning his will to resist.

POLITICAL AIMS: AGGRESSED (FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, SERBIA)

The war aims of Serbia and Britain emerged post facto. While Britain had clear sights on the opportunities offered by the First World War in the shape of the post war order, Serbia had no preconceived war aims at all until after they were pushed unwillingly into a war they tried to avoid.

It is difficult to ascertain with any degree of accuracy what war aims Serbia developed. Serbia ended up with a small empire as a result of their participation on the winning side, lobbied in all probability after the war was over; the creation of a state of Yugoslavia was certainly not a war aim at the outset. From hoping to survive the experience — hardly a foregone conclusion they ended up with Yugoslavia, comprising Serbia plus elements of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Britain, an ‘aggrieved’ power, clearly had definite geopolitical aims in mind once the opportunity presented itself. These were:

- a favourable outcome of the disposition of the moribund Ottoman Empire,
- secure possession of Egypt, which were essential to its continued and secure possession of India;
- secure possession of Palestine which was essential to its secure possession of Egypt.
- A later aim, once Russia was out of the game, was to make sure the Germans did not get their hands on the Baku oil fields.⁴⁷

The French had territorial scores to settle with Germany; the legacy from the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. France sought to address her future security by eliminating once and for all the threat from her eastern neighbour, Germany.

OUTCOMES AND ANALYSIS

Germany failed to achieve any of her war aims but survived complete defeat because, in part, her residual military power in 1918 was still sufficient to defensibly counterbalance Britain, France and the USA and also because the victorious alliance was weary of pushing for a total defeat of Germany owing to the scale of carnage that had occurred since 1914. Because German strength lay in its human resource and not so much in mineral wealth or territory, on a material level, a total defeat of Germany offered no great spoils as there was no empire to be carved up and shared among the victors. The unexpected appearance of a radically new regime in Russia and the genuine fear that its influence might spread throughout the European working classes who had suffered so horribly in two wars was also an undeniable factor. One must also not forget that British interests in Europe also required a Germany capable of counterbalancing France subsequently – Britain had long held that neither France nor Germany could be allowed to gain decisive superiority in the continent.

Serbia did very well, albeit at huge cost in lives,⁴⁸ perhaps the worse per capita loss of any state. For Britain and France, there were political benefits to be had from the strategic advantage the war provided. The price was far too high in moral and physical terms. While Britain attained her war aims, the strategic periscope was blurred. Her traditional ambitions for territory continued in to an age where Empires were crumbling all around. The British Empire was never larger than after WW-I. Britain enhanced her control over Egypt and added Mesopotamia and Palestine. The trouble was that the war had broken Britain economically and emotionally. The country lacked the will and resources to manage even the Empire she had before the war, much less the expanded Empire after the war. Iraq and Palestine proved particularly unmanageable and the most economical means were sought.⁴⁹ Lastly there was the certain old problem of Ireland. Parliament had passed the Irish Home Rule Bill in Sep 1914 but it was shelved because of the complexity of implementing it. Ireland was finally partitioned at the end of 1920.⁵⁰

For Britain, therefore, the First World War was a pyrrhic victory. The last call had begun; its final stanza was played out during World War II, when the sun finally set on the empire, leaving mere fragments to remind of a bygone glory. Britain had won her victory, but victories won in strategic disillusionment—incorrect projection of the probable future—are usually short lived, expensive, temporal victories.

The clarity of a war won or a war lost is not always immediately apparent. While the end favoured Britain, the middle was not so sweet. The British led a campaign to forge a new front at the rear of Germany and Austria-Hungary with a view to relieve German pressure on Russia. This was to be achieved through landings at Gallipoli on the Turkish Dardanelles on April 25, 1915. It was a disaster. Allied and Turkish losses soared before the Allies withdrew nine months later. According to Gregory R. Copley, the author of *The Art of Victory: Strategies for Personal Success and Global Survival in a Changing World*⁵¹ Turkey's greatness as an empire was finally sealed in the pages of history but it emerged no less victorious than Great Britain for example at the end of the Second World War. Gregory R. Copley, in a talk delivered at the US Army Command and General Staff College, comes to the same conclusion as the Author albeit he uses a passive framework, a 'fatalistic' view of the course and impact of history where as the Author views the same events in a proactive context of notion of, and strategy for, Victory.

Indeed, Copley is correct to assert that there were things to rejoice for Turkey after the First World War and Britain after the Second World War. 'Modern Turkey arose from the ashes of the fractured Ottoman Empire... from defeat in the war but success in a major battle' writes Copley, the other 'two nations among the victors of the First World War were the most heroically defeated armies of Gallipoli: Australia and New Zealand. And it was from the iconic saga of their defeat in that nine month campaign that they forged national identities which shape their destinies to this day.'⁵²

France came out of the war with territory and a hefty reward in the form of reparations from Germany. A political victory, as it not only satisfied her core aims but also allowed additional benefits to be drawn from the outcome. The reality was that while France had the territory she wanted; Germany was broken so badly that it did not have the means to honour the treaty. Here lay the problem. When the opportunity presented, France pushed for more and more out of her victory, losing to an extent the original purpose. The nature of the bargain entered, altered from the physical divisibility of the territorial issue to the moral indivisibility of continued existence of Germany. The very foundation of the Second World War, the premise and catalyst for German 'Hitlerism' lay in exploitation of a morally indivisible bargain.

If this was not enough, France wanted still more. In 1922, Britain and France developed serious differences about the amount of reparations to be extracted from Germany and in

1923 Franco-German Ruhr Crisis followed. The French ultimately withdrew from the Ruhr, which they had occupied to force Germany to pay reparations, thus representing the accomplishment of a clear German aim. On the other hand, German finances had been temporarily ruined and the new German government led by Gustav Stresemann had called off passive resistance against the French occupation. According to recent work by Conan Fischer, the Weimar Republic was deeply compromised by the economic and political costs of the crisis.⁵³ The subsequent Dawes Plan led to renewed, although reduced, payments of reparations to France. Despite an apparently unclear result, the Ruhr Crisis became widely seen as a French failure, with Paris perceived as bowing to the pressure of Britain and the United States, and losing its grip over its ‘defeated’ enemy. The French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré soon fell from power.⁵⁴

As noted above, the First World War gave birth to the socialist revolutions that for Russia meant the consolidation of Bolshevik power from 1917 – 22 and the appearance of the Soviet Union from 1922 onwards and, with it, the division of the world on ideological lines.

CASE 4: THE SECOND WORLD WAR

‘Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be.’⁵⁵

Winston Churchill

BACKGROUND

The Second World War was a war for world hegemony, the opening up of world markets outside the closed colonial systems that had governed them. While historians trace the causes of the war to the Treaty of Versailles few acknowledge that the treaty exacerbated the problems, it did not create them. The peculiar relationship developing between China, Japan and the USA, according to Ernst Mandel writing in *The Meaning of The Second World War*, provides some answer.⁵⁶ China was the most populous country and rich in mineral resources. Despite growing cooperation between US and Japan, the Japanese policy towards China was however not in US interests. The economic crises of the twenties forced USA to reconsider its isolationist policies and look for strategic insertions via various forms of hegemony over selected regions in the pacific. This brought Japan and the USA in a direct conflict of interests.

European and Japanese interests also ran rough waters, particularly in relation to colonies in the Far East. Hitler was quite conscious of the long term conflict of interests between German and Japanese imperialism.⁵⁷ On the rapid conquest of East Asia by Japan he stated:

East Asia could have been kept if all the white states had formed a coalition, Japan wouldn't have moved against it....

The struggle for hegemony in the world will be decided for Europe by the possession of the Russian space. Any idea of world politics (for Germany) is ridiculous as long as it does not dominate the continent.... If we are masters of Europe, we shall have the dominant position in the world. If the Empire [reference here is to the British Empire] were to collapse today through our arms, we would not be its heirs [hence Hitler's original desire to seek an alliance and not confrontation with Britain]. Russia would take India, Japan East Asia, and America.⁵⁸

The alliance that eventually defeated Germany comprised of three principal allies Great Britain, Russia and the United States, while China and France (the free French movement under Charles De Gaulle) constituted the other two. Each of the three principal allies, as indeed De Gaulle's Free French Movement and China had widely differing views of their own place in the post war world. Neither of the allies ever lost sight of their individual interests throughout the war. What held the alliance together, and emerged as the common aim, was the firm commitment to defeat the Axis Powers.

Before discussing the political aims and objectives of the antagonists, it is necessary to briefly survey the obtaining international environment in which the war broke out and ensued.

Germany

The German inner front was mainly influenced by the treatment Germany received after the First World War.⁵⁹ The Treaty of Versailles left Germany at the verge of economic and socio-political collapse; a number of smaller states were created (breaking the Austro-Hungarian Empire into separate states). Germany also saw her territory reduced with the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the creation of Poland that now controlled the strategic Danzig Corridor. These smaller states encircled Germany as

buffers and were to prevent it from rising to power or to threaten its neighbours beyond. Extreme economic depression and slowdown followed as part of the general world economic crises and internal problems resulted. Adolf Hitler rose to power in this political climate and soon received wider public support for the changes he promised to bring about. He undertook to rid Germany of the capitalistic shackles of economic subservience, and acquire Lebensraum (living space) for the German nation.

France

After its 'victory' in the First World War, France maintained its military pre-eminence, though on the lines of the old school of defensive – static mind-set. France was the biggest direct beneficiary from the war and ensured the harshest terms against Germany in the Treaty of Versailles. France was offered Anglo-American guarantee for territorial integrity in place of territorial safeguards that France had sought in the Rhineland during the Peace Conference. Interestingly, and later to Hitler's advantage, in rejecting the Treaty of Versailles, the United States Senate also rejected this guarantee for territorial integrity of France. With this British guarantee also lapsed. In January 1923, The French announced that the Germans were in default on their coal deliveries. A few days later they occupied the Ruhr district of Germany in order to forcibly obtain coal. The German people and government pursued a policy of passive resistance. The French behaviour and actions simply reinforced the idea that something had to give way, and Germany had done what was necessary.

Great Britain

After the First World War the British maintained her imperial image and her military commitments were prioritised accordingly. Despite the carnage of the First World War, Great Britain strongly believed that the fate of Europe depended upon Anglo-German collaboration and continued to appease Hitler for averting war. Great Britain relied heavily on the League of Nations for post First World War security and thus actively participated in the League. Britain had quite a different outlook from her European neighbours; her proximity to the Continent did not necessarily dictate an orientation towards Europe and European concerns.

Due to economic recession all over the world, Britain diverted most of her resources towards economic revival, thereby neglecting defence preparations. In response to the

sudden military developments in Germany, she had little choice but to adopt a policy of appeasement so as to prevent confrontation on the continent. Britain sought to revise or reconstruct the entire Versailles system in such a way so as to bring Germany into satisfactory treaty relations with all her neighbours and avert war. After the Berlin Crisis and subsequent German invasion of Czechoslovakia, Britain, along with France entered into a pact with Poland guaranteeing her independence.

Britain had still more territorial ambitions. Intervention in East Africa, mopping up the Italian colonies, liquidation of the French enclave in the Near East, eyes on Iran and preparations for the invasion of the Balkans with the evident purpose of making Greece a stepping stone for replacing French satellite states in Eastern Europe. She was also looking at influence in Latin America by encouraging Juan Piron against American imperialism. All this was envisioned despite the fact that Britain's means had become disproportionate to the ends.⁶⁰

The USSR

Meanwhile, the USSR was undergoing a process of overall reformation under Joseph Stalin. Following the ambiguous events of the 1920s, Stalin took effective charge in about 1929. The Soviet military was being transformed into a well-equipped and fully mechanized force. However, this process required time and resources that the Soviets did not possess at the time. Knowing that his Armed Forces were ill prepared to face a possible German attack, he preferred an alliance with Germany and in doing so sought to divert German attention towards the west, or at least gain time to prepare for a possible German expansion eastwards. Stalin had his eyes fixed on Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Eastern Poland and Eastern Rumania. Germany seemed willing to accede to the bargain, thus an apparent, if only temporary, confluence of interests emerged.

The USA

American imperialism was conscious of its destiny to become a world leader. Though not manifest openly till announcement of a decision by Roosevelt in 1940 to 'commit the United States to the assumption of responsibility for nothing less than the leadership of the world.'⁶¹ The scope of US imperialism was outlined in a statement by the Secretary of State Cordell Hull in Jul 1942:

Leadership towards a new system of international relationships in trade and other economic affairs will devolve largely upon the United States because of our great economic strength. We should assume the leadership, and the responsibility that goes with it, primarily for the reasons of pure national self-interest.⁶²

It is clear that the United States must assume today the task that Great Britain performed so well in the 19th Century- the protection of western civilization from external danger... a world order will come not by a gentlemen's agreement, but through so decisive a victory by one of the great powers that it will be able to dictate and enforce international law as Rome did from Augustus to Aurelius⁶³

The sudden crash of the New York Stock Market in 1929 plunged the world into economic recession which had serious effects on the policy formulation of all the countries including the USA. US analysts considered the imperial influences of colonial powers as the main hurdle to US economic interests and her lack of access to international markets. For the US to succeed and become truly great, European colonialism, including the British Empire, had to be ended. The Second World War was to be the great leveller.

The US Neutrality law forbade international expeditionary warfare. United States' Senate did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles and thus withdrew itself into isolation. 'Neutrality Law' passed by the Senate prohibited all kinds of material assistance to any party during the course of conflicts. US neutrality ended with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. As the US engagement in the war progressed to combat support and eventually leadership of the alliance, her wider motives and world view became more apparent – more so under Roosevelt than his successor, Harry S. Truman.

GERMAN GRAND STRATEGY

On assuming power, Hitler set a new direction for Germany, imbibed new spirit into the nation and introduced a special brand of nationalism based around the philosophy of 'superior nation'. Objectives for the German nation had been cemented in his mind even before he rose to power. He saw himself as the only means for Germany to realise its 'true' position among the comity of nations.⁶⁴ Accordingly, his grand strategy was

devised to achieve an ambitious set of objectives. Germany started the war with a perfect juxtaposition of the principles of political and military strategy, using the two instruments in sequence and concert. Hitler made three profound mistakes in planning, first was the underestimation of the USSR and the second, an incorrect assessment of British response – Hitler imagined a world order where Germany and Britain shared power and influence over the world; Britain in her empire and Germany in Europe. Last, but not least, how the US camel, whose capabilities he had grossly misjudged, would sit.

German military strategy was carefully envisioned; however, the desired end state and important contours of grand strategy were not well defined. If clear in Hitler's mind, it was not discernable or clearly understood by those connected with animating the strategy. Peace at the conclusion of war was not clearly calculated and planned. Each front or objective in the war appeared to create new ones without moving closer to the attainment of the war aims. In strategy, time and resource consuming errors are unforgiving.

Germany's main objectives were territorial and lay in the Soviet space.⁶⁵ Occupation of France as such was a military necessity to secure flanks. Settling an old score by way of revenge against French behaviour after the First World War was arguably a secondary consideration in a bigger contest. In the process of application of military strategy, however, Hitler only managed to open new fronts, invite new enemies and overextend his limited and diminishing resources.

The German invasion of France was based on a strategic gamble. Hitler anticipated that with the fall of France, the British government would see reason (from his point of view) and give-in, one-way or the other. He expected that the Great Britain would accept a negotiated peace. Any success towards the east was contingent upon the gamble paying off. This miscalculation was perhaps the single most important factor shaping the course and outcome of the war.⁶⁶

Hitler accepted the British Empire as a reality to be worked with and had apparently no plans to threaten it. Western hatred for the Soviet Bolshevism was also a reality too well known and something Hitler had hoped to exploit in its dealings with Britain. However, Germany failed to conclude any significant agreement with Britain for mutually agreed balance of power in Europe and maintaining her eastward focus.

Although 1941, the United States was still a largely unwilling and uncertain ally against Germany. It did however see opportunity emerging from the war in Europe. In the early stages of the war, Americans were neither dismissive nor supportive of German policy. The Americans in general felt that this was not their war as it could affect no vital American interests as long as the power denomination in Europe did not alter. Even having committed material support to Britain, in what was essentially a business like contract (lend-lease); America was divided on how to deal with Germany. Hitler's declaration of war on the United States in December 1941 was a turning point. By adding the United States to the list of overt enemies at a time when Germany was fighting both Great Britain and the USSR, Hitler sealed his fate.⁶⁷

Hitler's problem vis-à-vis Russia, was one of time and space. He had to defeat her and establish his lebensraum before United States intervened in the war. If not, then the inactive western theatre would once again become charged and Germany could be caught between two fronts. His initial strategy of avoiding a multi-front war failed and became his nemesis.

Hitler wanted to make Germany independent of international loan-capitalism. Germany refused foreign interest-bearing loans and based its currency on production instead of gold.⁶⁸ This antagonized the major trading nations, particularly the United States and Great Britain, who between them represented the Money Power of the world. The notion was flawed from the outset as some argue that even if he had succeeded he would have still have faced the loan capitalists sooner or later.⁶⁹

The Russo-German Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, which greatly facilitated the German invasion of Poland and seriously upset the Allies' calculation about early containment of Germany, was the most significant strategic alliance of the pre-war period. However, subsequently and during more critical stages of the war, the Axis powers failed to take advantage of alliances. This was owing to the fact that the members had largely divergent national interests, no contiguity of borders with the common enemy and functioned without a common strategic command and control system.⁷⁰ Germany's alliance with Italy proved of little consequence. Mussolini sought to realize his dream of an Italian Mediterranean empire. In the late summer and early autumn of 1940 he launched an offensive from Libya against the British in Egypt and an invasion of Greece from Albania (which he had occupied in 1939). Both enterprises eventually proved

disastrous for the Italians. German forces were sent to rescue the Italians resulting in the diversion of German forces and resources away from the primary objectives.⁷¹

Germany and Japan largely operated independent of each other and were isolated by the Allies for piecemeal treatment. Hitler failed to coordinate his invasion of Russia with Japan which would have made this alliance more meaningful in a practical rather than notional sense. In fact Japan signed a pact of neutrality with the Soviet Union just before Operation Barbarossa,⁷² which was paradoxical to the idea of an alliance as it released Soviet Forces that were tied down against the Japanese in the east.

BRITISH AIMS, GOALS AND STRATEGIES

British acquiescence in a European continent dominated by Germany without the existence of a powerful independent French army was contrary to British interests. Britain understood, and correctly so, that peace with any power – friendly or hostile, that completely dominated Europe would only be an interlude before an all-out war against the Empire. Hitler's economic interests and desired economic system ran contrary to British interests. Military objectives evolved over time. The initial objective can quite simply be summarised as 'continued defiance'.⁷³ Due to slow rearmament in the pre-war period, the loss of equipment at Dunkirk (summer 1940) and limited industrial capacity as compared to Germany, Great Britain could not hope to cope with the material demands of a protracted war all by herself. She hoped to acquire US assistance initially on gold payments and subsequently as aid. Britain's three pronged war policy was built around these premises and included:

- The security of United Kingdom and its imperial possessions.
- Command of the Home Waters.
- Development of resources for a major offensive.

British strategy addressed the above concerns through:

Pact with Russia

The day Germany attacked Russia, 22 June 1941; Churchill made an evening broadcast in which he offered assistance to the Soviet Union. Initially there was no response from the Soviets but later they requested that the British Government receive their military mission

for negotiations.⁷⁴ On July 12, 1941 an agreement was signed between Great Britain and Russia for provision of war assistance and support of all kinds. It also included a clause restricting both signatories from concluding an armistice or treaty of peace with Germany except by mutual agreement.⁷⁵

Involvement of the USA

In September 1940, Great Britain offered to the US a series of air and naval bases in the West Indies and Newfoundland on ninety-nine-year lease in return for 50 reconditioned destroyers.⁷⁶ The transfer to Great Britain of these fifty American warships was a clearly un-neutral act and brought the United States closer to the war in Europe. It marked the passage of the United States from being neutral to being non-belligerent.⁷⁷

Indirect Approach

British grand strategy was influenced by military, political and economic caution. A strategy of fighting the enemy at the periphery instead of a direct approach was formulated. Despite reservations, Britain offered support to Russia, even realizing that Soviet victory might bring troubles later. The British Government attached great importance to aiding General de Gaulle and the Free French. The object was to raise the Free French flag in West Africa, to occupy Dakar, and thus consolidate the French colonies in west and equatorial Africa for General de Gaulle.⁷⁸

The British eventual military aim was total defeat of Germany and elimination of Nazism. British military strategy evolved during the course of the war and can broadly be divided into three phases:

Formative Phase. Once Britain declared war on Germany, her military strategy in mainland Europe conformed to the Anglo-French defensive mindset. After the fall of France, Britain found itself on the front line and that too without a clear cut military strategy to deal with the threat. Still not fully aware of Hitler's long term intents, particularly during the so called phoney war, Britain remained cautious of the possibilities of a powerful France emerging from any adventure that saw a total collapse of Germany – a legacy of institutional knowledge developed over the centuries. The British political beacon soon honed on to the probability of a bleak future which prescribed danger to her domestic and global interests, particularly after the fall of France when Britain found itself under the shadow of German violence.

Additionally, engaging Germany had financial underpinning ‘so that one may not look at only political but also military appeasement.’⁷⁹

Middle Phase. After Hitler’s failure to gain supremacy over the RAF, Churchill was convinced that Britain was safe from the threat of physical invasion. The focus now was her wider interests and the colonies. Accordingly, British military strategy evolved to include the following:

- Hit Germany around the edges of the continent and gradually weaken it.
- Support occupied countries by subversion against Germany.
- Launch an intensified air offensive against vital economic and industrial targets.
- Help Russia, the principal land combatant, in order to weave the Russian effort into the wider texture of the war.⁸⁰
- Engage German Army on land at selected places since the British could not match immense strength of the Germans in any theatre where their main power could be brought to bear. By use of sea and air power, Great Britain decided to meet German armies in regions where only small forces could be brought into action.
- Bomb German Industry to weaken her war potential and her cities to weaken the will of the German people. Britain selected five main targets for the air force, namely, military targets, industries of all types to cut production, urban areas to demoralize inhabitants, sources of energy, and the communication infrastructure including railways.

Actualisation Phase. Strike at the heart of Germany.

US AIMS GOALS AND STRATEGY

Political Aim and Strategy

The breakdown of the world’s economy in the 1920s and the exclusive trading blocs centred around leading European nations and their colonies – the largest of which was the ‘sterling block’ - imperilled not only American markets but also her supply of raw materials. The war in Europe was to be the great leveller on a world stage. It would open

whole of the world's markets and resources to wider and non-European exploitation. The opportunities were endless. US political strategy could be summarised as follows:

- Diversification of the American economic interests and their consequent expansion overseas, coupled with growth in American power.
- Prevent the war from reaching USA and protect the sea trade routes through control of the Pacific by the United States Navy and the Atlantic by the British Navy.
- Preserve and protect the capitalist economic system.
- Render all possible material assistance to Great Britain and Russia in their fight against German aggression. To this end, in March 1941, the Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, which authorized the United States to provide war materials for nations under Axis attack.⁸¹

Military Aim and Strategy

The US military aim was to mobilise the American people and war industry to defeat the Axis forces indirectly by aiding countries in war with them or directly in collaboration with the affected countries. This was later modified to the unconditional surrender of Axis powers.⁸² The US was acutely sensitive to that fact that the defeat of Germany and Japan critically depended on the ability of the Grand Alliance to hammer out a coordinated strategy. This was a complex proposition all members of the alliance possessed ideological differences, divergent geopolitical aims, and dissimilar visions about the post-war international order. In addition, they were sharply divided about what strategy they should follow to defeat the Axis Powers, in particular Germany and Japan.⁸³

The Allies finally decided on the following military strategy:

- Diminish Axis economic power to wage war by blockade, raids and a sustained air offensive and protect the sea lanes of communications of the Allied powers.
- Work closely with Royal navy and Royal Canadian Navy to develop innovative methods and new weapons for antisubmarine warfare.
- Use 1942 as a year for preparation for major assault against Germany.

- Wear down German resistance in 1942 by strategic air bombardment.
- Materially assist the USSR and Great Britain in their war against Germany.
- Try to gain the entire North African coast, disperse German forces in secondary theatres and support insurgencies in Nazi-occupied Europe.
- In 1943 initiate a large-scale land offensive against Germany across either the Mediterranean Sea or the English Channel.

The US had some critical decisions to make:⁸⁴

- **Germany vis-à-vis Japan.** America had the option to either take on both Japan and Germany simultaneously or take each adversary at a time. It was generally agreed that the defeat of Germany would leave Japan exposed to overwhelming force, whereas the defeat of Japan would not have brought the war to an end. It was, therefore, decided by America and Great Britain to remain on strategic defensive in the Pacific while defeating Germany first.
- **Mediterranean vis-à-vis English Channel.** Within Europe, America had the option to either launch its offensive against Germany through the Mediterranean, or opt for a cross Channel attack on France. The latter option was adopted.

SOVIET AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

Although the USSR was prematurely drawn into the war by Hitler's surprise timings in opening a new front, Stalin secretly acknowledged the inevitability of war with Germany. There is also the thesis that he 'used Hitler as 'an icebreaker', to weaken the Western democracies before Stalin himself overran Europe.'⁸⁵ In the context of the Second World War, the Soviet Union was constrained to defeating Germany only by the conditions that accompanied US material support although immediately afterwards it moved quickly to gather other territories in Eastern Europe.⁸⁶

Whether it was a pre-emptive or preventive war for Hitler or, the object of naked German aggression, Stalin had clear aims and objectives that were political, territorial and extended to a predominant role in the post-world war order.

His military aim, as for the other allies, was the total defeat of Germany and capture of maximum German Territory to force a favourable settlement with its allies.⁸⁷

OUTCOME AND ANALYSIS

The Second World War presents a comprehensive case depicting paradigmatic, deviant and critical characters. A significant lesson relearned out of the war is that victory is not the objective of war, victory only opens the doors to the objective, while defeat shuts them unequivocally. Whether analysed from Martel's, Gray's, Clausewitz's or any other perspective, the defeat of Germany and Japan and, the comprehensiveness of the Allied military victory cannot be disputed yet the impact of defeat and victory on the various players was, as we have seen, quite different.

If we look at British political objectives and the ends achieved after defeating Germany, one finds a largely *quid nominis* victory. When Winston Churchill was asked during the course of the Second World War what was Britain's objective, he responded: 'Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be; for without victory there is no survival.'⁸⁸ Romantic and poetic as it may be, the statement said nothing and served no purpose for those whose business it is to translate political aims into objectives, objectives in to strategy of which military strategy is but a constituent part and indeed translates political objectives in to military aim and military objectives. In reality however, Britain failed to secure some of her core objectives.

During the war, Churchill reluctantly agreed to rethink his visions of Britain and the empire. Winning the war was at the cost of seceding much of British wealth and influence in Europe and the rest of the world the US. Most telling was the loss of exclusive trading position in the colonies, particularly in the Pacific, which became the exclusive domain of the US. The biggest political gain came in the shape of a pre-eminent position in the United Nations and preventing an invasion of the British Isles.

France lost much of what it had started with but considering it was occupied by the Germans, actually did very well. It earned a more than proportionality share of the victory and benefited in terms of territory as well as security.

China, Russia and the US were the biggest beneficiaries. Russia and the US would spearhead the bipolar order that followed and each preserved its political ideology which was directly threatened by the war. The US, Soviet Union and Chinese victory can be

described as Strategic victory while other allies ranged from strategic success to strategic advantage.

Among the Western allies, clearly Great Britain had the tougher time in terms of casualties than the United States, destruction of property and economic drain, her losses at a *proportional* rate were at least six times greater than those borne by the United States. In comparison to the Soviets and the Chinese, these casualties were insignificant as the two combined (although China was split), sustained twenty-six times the number of fatalities.⁸⁹ America acted with a more global view.⁹⁰ It did not suffer as badly and took a lion's share of the spoils. A clearer, wider picture guided US strategy that served to translate military victories in to realising political interests.

Victory too has subjective and objective elements. Unless success is achieved at the objective end, outcomes in the subjective fields are irrelevant.⁹¹

CASE 5: THE COLD WAR

The ideological standoff between the communist Soviet bloc and capitalism, led by the United States, the so called cold war, was underpinned in nature and character by the precepts on violence as moderated by the emergence and perfection of Nuclear weapons. Characterised by the need to avoid a direct confrontation between the superpowers, the cold war played out in the form of hot diplomacy and proxy wars. Occasional mobilisation and diplomatic showdowns as well as posturing of the sort epitomised in the Cuban Missile Crisis were, luckily, somewhat rare.

The cold war appeared to threaten the 'war system' of diplomacy, the days of vast armies confronting each other on the battlefield appeared to have ended apparently severing with them the critical link between war and strategy that the Clausewitzian school had intricately established and preserved. This was realised as early as the late 1940s and the 50s as evident from the writings of Liddell Hart and Schelling.

There were numerous major wars involving one of the superpowers directly and another minor power or superpower indirectly. Significant among these were Korea and Vietnam involving the US directly and China covertly and, Afghanistan (1979 – 1987) involving the Soviet Union directly and the US covertly. In each of these wars, the philosophy of

force and Clausewitzian maxim of war and its linkage to policy was stood on its head; battlefield results had little or no bearing on the final political outcomes.

There were also major wars among client or neutral states, or where the US and the Soviet Union did not overtly interfere, support militarily or diplomatically. For example, India and Pakistan engaged in two wars in 1965 and 1971. The Iran – Iraq war that continued through most of the 1980s was quite ‘total’ given the resources each antagonist had at its disposal. Britain and Argentina had a relatively short and conventional showdown over the Falkland Islands in 1982. This was arguably a classic ‘limited war’. Each of these wars took place under a peculiar international political climate and the outcome in each had a distinct relationship with intended political aims.

Deterrence was a reinvented and evolving science, one that ran its full course during the Cold War. We can never really know how well or if at all it worked, as Freedman points out that only failure of deterrence produces empirical results.⁹² The ‘essence of the problem, wrote Lawrence Freedman, would be ‘in attaching rationality whatsoever to the chain of events that could well end in utter devastation of one’s own society (even assuming indifference to the fate of the enemy society’.⁹³ These signals included public acknowledgment by Harry S. Truman, the US President from 1945 – 1953, that ‘starting an atomic war is totally unthinkable for rational men’⁹⁴ and from Khrushchev, the Soviet leader from 1953 – 1964, in a letter to J. F. Kennedy stating that only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish or destroy the whole world before they die would start a nuclear war;⁹⁵ the latter comment coming at the height of the Cuban Missile crisis. Such signals, nuclear strategists would argue dilute the value of deterrence which relies on capability, will and communication to be of value. In sum, the Cold War and the great nuclear bluff produced a very hot peace.

The Soviets on their part successfully reconsolidated their influence in Eastern Europe by crushing anti-communist/Soviet movement and re-installation of a pro-Soviet government in Budapest in November 1956⁹⁶ and in Czechoslovakia in Aug 1968.⁹⁷ Soviet attempt to annex Afghanistan to their zone of influence was their nemesis. The Afghan Mujahedeen were not intimidated by Soviet occupation of their capital city, always thought to be the Afghan centre of gravity. Their true ‘centre of gravity,’ one that still holds, was to be found as much in their conception of struggle as in a powerful mix of motivational factors including religion, nationalism, xenophobia and ethnicity.

Victory had a profoundly different meaning to what it had assumed during the conventional wars that had preceded it. This empirical study of the cold war looks at selected, non-paradigm, cases with a view to draw conclusions on language and aspects of victory that conventional references ignore.

CASE 5A: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

They talk about who won and who lost. Human reason won. Mankind won.⁹⁸

Nikita Khrushchev


The Cuban Missile Crisis is both a critical as well as a deviant case. This dual character stems from the overt and covert diplomacy, bargaining and trade-offs that, while the crisis ensued, were not public information and as such played no role in perception building on either side. The crisis occurred at a point when the political psyche of the cold war had already sunk deep into the minds of governments and the public on both sides of the ideological divide as well as the observers at large. While deterrence stood, the threat of a nuclear war was perceived as all too present and missile posturing that had already affected the Soviet Union with US Missiles in Turkey now came to the Americas in the shape of SS-5 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) allegedly being staged in Cuba.

Background

The crisis occurred at a time when the ‘peculiar rules of the nuclear game were in full force, and the progress of the crisis reveals them in full force.’⁹⁹ Since Fidel Castro assumed power in Jan 1959 and aligned himself unequivocally with the USSR, the US was deeply uneasy, fearing the ‘domino effect’ of Communist expansion in the Americas. In an attempt to overthrow Castro, CIA backed Cuban exiles landed on the Bay of Pigs on 17 April 1961. The plan failed miserably, resulting in the capture of over one thousand rebels.¹⁰⁰

The Soviet logic for basing the missiles in Cuba is still an issue of debate, when seen in the context of the indirect approach and an indirect strategy, the objectives begin to crystallize. In July 1962 Castro announced that Cuba and the USSR had taken steps that would make a direct attack on Cuban soil by the US impossible. This of course involved basing Soviet Missiles on Cuban soils as well as IL 28 bombers. The implications from a

capability perspective are evident from the declassified CIA annotation depicting ranges of Soviet missiles (marked in concentric red circles) below (Map 4):



MAP 4: SOVIET MISSILE RANGES (SRBM AND IRBM)

SOURCE: JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, CUBAN MISSILE CRISES- HISTORICAL, ACHIEVES AND MANUSCRIPTS, PLATE 15 (ELECTRONIC), COLUMBIA POINT, BOSTON: MA. (MISSILE NAMES AND SCALE INSERTED BY AUTHOR)

The red circle indicate missile ranges for the SS-3 (Russian: R-5, Shyster) with a range of 630 NMs, the SS-4 Scandal (Russian: P-12 Двина – read ‘Dvina’) with a range of 1020 NM and the SS-5 Skean (Russian: P 14: Чусовая, read ‘Chusovaya’) with a range of 3700 KMs (2200 NMs).¹⁰¹

Robert McNamara, backed by experts and some other presidential advisors, opined that the missiles would not materially alter the strategic balance. Why then would the Soviet Union risk a nuclear war to achieve an end that served no strategic value; what exactly were Khrushchev’s motives? ‘A consensus’ writes Schell, ‘on this matter has subsequently emerged among historians.’ The defensive value of the missiles to future US adventurism was obviously one, but probably a secondary issue. The primary reason is to be found in Kennedy’s presidential campaign. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the US possessed six thousand nuclear warheads, the Soviet Union had only three hundred or so of which ‘a fraction were mounted on mere thirty five missiles capable of reaching the United States. This of course was private information to which only Khrushchev and his inner circle had access. However, in his presidential campaign, Kennedy claimed a ‘missile gap’ with the Soviet Union. The error suited the Soviets and they adopted a policy of ‘bluster and bluff’. Alexander Shelepin, the head of the KGB, launched a campaign of disinformation to reinforce the US perception.¹⁰² It was not until Kennedy entered office that he called the Soviet bluff. The US Under Secretary of Defence Gilpatric Roswell, in an address delivered in October 1961 stated:

The destructive power which the United States could bring to bear even after a surprise Soviet attack upon our forces would be as great as, perhaps greater than, the total undamaged forces which the enemy can threaten to launch against us in a first strike.¹⁰³

It is widely acknowledged that, despite the real and present threat, war was avoided only because of back-door diplomacy that ensued parallel to the public show of strength from both leaders. It was in secret dealings with Kennedy that Soviet material motives came to fore. Khrushchev sent two letters to Kennedy, one public and one private. In the public letter he set forth the condition of removal of US missiles from Turkey. In his private letter he sought commitment that the US would not invade Cuba once missiles had been removed.¹⁰⁴

In the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. hammered out a deal that brought the world back from the brink of nuclear war. The settlement involved compromises and concessions on both sides, yet all over the world, this event was seen as a major defeat for Moscow, and the Soviet leader Khrushchev was soon thrown out of office. The belief that the U.S. triumphed in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 produced the subsequent ‘lessons’ that nuclear crises are manageable, or inherently winnable, and that a tough stand will always make the Soviets retreat. American policymakers became convinced that the Soviet Union had backed away from a show of resolute force by the United States, and members of the Kennedy administration thought that the same logic would apply if they were steadfast in Vietnam. President Johnson’s Press Secretary, Bill Moyers, said, after resigning, that in the Johnson inner circle: ‘there was a confidence, it was never bragged about, it was just there – a residue, perhaps of the confrontation over the missiles in Cuba – that when the chips were really down, the other people would fold.’¹⁰⁵ However, a closer examination of the missile crisis illustrates that it was the willingness of both sides to compromise that diffused the situation, and whilst nuclear war was unlikely, it was a real possibility. As Graham Allison writes:

No event demonstrates more clearly than the missile crisis that with respect to nuclear war there is an awesome crack between *unlikelihood* and *impossibility*.¹⁰⁶

Such caution about reading too much into supposed triumphs echoes the ancient Greeks, for as Plato wrote: ‘Many a victory has been and will be suicidal to the victors.’ **If genuine triumphs can breed an unhealthy level of hubris, the danger is even greater when the victory is more imagined than real.**¹⁰⁷ [Emphasis added]

A post analysis of the Cuban Missile crisis suggests that while from a policy perspective and the dialectic between the two major ideological blocks, the Soviets came out clearly on top; publically it was the US that benefitted from a notional victory.

... Midway through the crises, it was clear that the US was to be content with image at home and among its allies while in real terms having already **receded** on Turkish Missile Bases which was more significant to the Russians than basing in Cuba. The very fact that this pact was to be kept secret, and

indeed with Khrushchev locked in a catch 22 situation, the US success was complete. The impact on Senior Soviet polity was immense.....¹⁰⁸

US intervention in Vietnam is linked by revisionists to the perceived success in the Cuban Missile Crisis and with a strengthening of the limits of deterrence as Lebow writes: ‘Kennedy’s successful use of coercive diplomacy led ineluctably to American intervention in Vietnam.’¹⁰⁹

CASE 5B: THE VIETNAM WAR

The Vietnam conflict, also known as the Second Indochina War, from its onset to the humiliating retreat of US forces presents an interesting critical case for this thesis. The conflict occurred in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and ensued for twenty four years. US active involvement in the conflict escalated in early 1960s when combat units began to be deployed. The war was fought between the communist North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The north was supported by its communist allies, principally China who remained in the background while the United States supported by the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) took on the fighting for the South.

In 1949, President Truman and U.S. Democrats were accused of ‘losing’ China to the communists during the Chinese Civil War, because they provided insufficient support. ‘The criticism stuck, despite the fact that the United States would have had to send tens or hundreds of thousands of troops to avert a communist victory.’¹¹⁰ The loss was followed by yet another; this time Korea. Shortly after the supposed defeat for the U.S. in China, North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950. U.S. and allied forces succeeded in preventing a communist takeover of South Korea, but following China’s intervention, the allies lost virtually all their earlier gains in the North. The war became increasingly unpopular in the United States, and by 1952, was widely seen as an attritional failure.¹¹¹ The hat trick in the Pacific was completed with the outcome of the Vietnam War. Johnson, fearful of being seen to ‘lose’ Vietnam to communism, escalated U.S. intervention and brought the US in active involvement in the fighting. Johnson declared that the earlier setback for the Democrats in 1949 would be ‘chickenshit compared with what might happen if we lost Vietnam.’¹¹²

The US entered the war as part of her wider strategy of containment that sought to restrict the spread of communism in the Pacific Rim, an area of vital US security and strategic

interests. As the conflict progressed, the US became increasingly entrenched and drawn into a dynamic that appeared to increasingly lose political purpose and domestic support. US involvement peaked in early 1968 around the time of the famous Tet offensive.

In January 1968, the Vietcong unleashed a surprise offensive that was to go down in history as the greatest American battlefield defeat of the cold war.¹¹³ By any rational battlefield analysis, Tet was by no means a defeat. It was if anything, a disaster for the communists. ‘Despite the advantages of surprise, the South Vietnamese insurgents, the Vietcong, failed to hold on to a single target in South Vietnam and suffered staggering losses. Of the 80,000 attackers, as many as half were killed in the first month alone, and the Vietcong never recovered.’¹¹⁴

Faced with increased domestic pressure and political failure, the US, under a policy called Vietnamisation,¹¹⁵ began to withdraw as South Vietnamese troops were trained and armed. A peace treaty was signed by all parties in January 1973 however the fighting continued. In the mid of that year, US forces were constitutionally forbidden to take further part in the war as a result of the Case-Church Amendment¹¹⁶ passed by the US Congress in Jun 1973.

In April 1975, North Vietnam captured Saigon. North and South Vietnam were reunified the following year.

The war had a major impact on U.S. politics, culture and foreign relations. Americans were deeply divided over the U.S. Government’s justification for, and means of fighting the war. Opposition to the war contributed to the counterculture youth movement of the 1960s. It exacted a huge human cost in terms of Vietnamese fatalities that exceeded total German military casualties during the Second World War.¹¹⁷ Direct US casualties in the war as a whole were in excess of 59,000.

Political Outcome and Analysis

The Vietnam War has been a subject of intense debate in and outside the USA. While the US clearly failed to achieve its political objectives, militarily it was quite successful. Even the infamous Tet offensive was a military defeat for the North. Important lessons of the Vietnam War can be found in the nature of war rather than the attainment or failure to realise political and military objectives. At the strategic level, the concept of victory between the Vietcong and the United States was starkly different. The United States

sought to eliminate communism from the Vietnamese peninsula and to do so was firmly committed to fighting a limited war in the geographical sense of the term. The Vietcong, however, were fighting a war that was quite total, a war of survival in the ideological sense. The notion of victory, as too the strategic objectives of the main antagonists, thus lay on different planes. Rational calculus of war and the notion of bargaining leverages to be accrued from violence thus bore no counter relationships; one side's ability to hurt the other had no direct consequence to the purpose for that violence or its political utility. The usability of military gains was thus completely lacking for the US. For the Vietcong, mere survival, in spite of the cost, was enough to be construed as victory. Both sides were therefore evaluating the outcomes in completely different ideological metrics.

The cultural dissonance does not however explain why most Americans saw the Tet offensive as a failure for the United States. The answer to this is again to be found outside the battlefield. Leading up to the Tet offensive, President Johnson had been running a 'progress campaign' to convince Americans that victory in Vietnam was just around the corner. The bullish victory rhetoric accompanied comments convincing the Americans on the hapless situation of the enemy and the imminent success of American forces and policy. The campaign that ensued in a relative calm before the storm created overblown expectations among the American public.

When Tet finally happened, its sheer scale and surprise sent a shock wave through the American psyche. Its occurrence and not its outcome were the source of shock and sense of failure. As Johnson's former aide, Robert Komer, later recalled, 'Boom, 40 towns get attacked, and they didn't believe us anymore.'¹¹⁸ The illusion of defeat was heightened by two powerful symbolic events and the media.

First, the communists attacked the American Embassy in Saigon. It was one of the smallest-scale actions of the Tet offensive, but it captured America's attention. The attackers had assaulted the pre-eminent symbol of the United States presence in South Vietnam. The media incorrectly reported that the embassy had been captured whereas in reality none of the attackers made it past the courtyard.

Second, Eddie Adams's photograph of South Vietnam's police chief executing a Vietcong captive in the street caused a sensation. After he fired the shot, the police chief

told nearby reporters: ‘They killed many Americans and many of my men. Buddha will understand. Do you?’¹¹⁹

Finally, the American news media painted a picture of disaster in Vietnam. Even though communist forces incurred enormous losses and strategic setbacks, opinion columns and the media in general tended to laud their performance. As the *Times* war correspondent Peter Braestrup put it, ‘To have portrayed such a setback for one side as a defeat for the other — in a major crisis abroad — cannot be counted as a triumph for American journalism.’¹²⁰

To the average American, the circumstance and the images spoke powerfully of a brutal and unjust war.¹²¹ For some Americans, this image was associated with the Tet offensive. The military facts of the Vietcong failure did not matter, the fact of the offensive not its outcome was sufficient for a notion of failure. The role of the media in distorting or reinforcing perception became most evident. The dynamics of preparing the domestic and international audience, information and its packaging has since been a major consideration for the strategy and conduct of war ever since. The backdrop and the media shape how information is processed by the audience, as primary evidence, the media, and particularly visual media are first instant contributors to the impressions of victory and defeat. Any subsequent processing or re-packaging of information occurs in a friction medium setup by the original impressions; as such no theory of victory, no theory that is comprehensive, can ignore the information dimension. The contextual framework for assessing winner and losers cannot be ignored by strategy.

The influence of culture shaping notion of success and failure is also evident from the war. Both in the context of Vietnam and the United States, the cultural disparities and their impact on how information was processed and understood distorted relative impressions of perception and reality. Culture – domestic, international and most profoundly so that of the enemy and its population – is indispensable to the respective constructs of victory and defeat. Culture emerges as the single most significant factor in the moral dimension of victory.

CASE 6: ARAB – ISRAEL WAR 1973

The 1973 Arab-Israel War, also known as the Yom Kippur War, was fought from October 6 to October 26, 1973 by a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria against Israel.

The war began with a surprise joint attack by Egypt and Syria on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement and in the month of Ramadan (hence the other names for the war). In the third Arab-Israel War, Israel had captured the Golan and the Sinai. In the years following that war, Israel erected lines of fortification in both the Sinai and the Golan Heights. In 1971 Israel spent \$500 million fortifying its positions on the Suez Canal, a chain of fortifications and gigantic earthworks known as the Bar Lev Line, named after Israeli General Chaim Bar-Lev were set up. This was Israel's 'Maginot Line' the 'impregnable' defence of the Sinai that ran on eastern side of the canal and housed formidable fortifications and bunkers.

Under US mediation, rapprochement between Israel and Egypt continued. The US, other than security of Israel had its own direct interests involved, namely reducing Soviet influence in Egypt. According to Chaim Herzog 'on June 19, 1967, the National Unity Government of Israel voted unanimously to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in return for peace agreements.'¹²² The proposal was to include demilitarisation of the Golan Heights and special arrangement for the Straits of Tiran. 'The government also resolved to open negotiations with King Hussein of Jordan regarding the eastern border.'¹²³

The Israeli decision was to be conveyed to the Arab states by the U.S. government. The U.S. was informed of the decision, but not that it was to transmit it. There is no evidence of receipt from Egypt or Syria, who apparently never received the offer. The decision was kept a closely-guarded secret within Israeli government circles and the offer was withdrawn in October, 1967.¹²⁴

Both Egypt and Syria desired the return of lost territories however at the Khartoum Arab Summit but the policy arrived at on conclusion of the conference left few options. It appeared in the form of the famous three 'no's': no peace, no recognition and no negotiations. This was followed in 1970 by the death of Gamal Abdul Nasser, the Egyptian President. His successor Anwar Sadat resolved to fight and win back the territories. On mediation through Gunnar Jarring, the UN intermediary, Sadat softened and offered peace if Israel withdraws to pre 1967 lines. This time, the Israelis refused.

To break the deadlock, restore pride and create hope for regaining lost territories essentially through diplomatic negotiations, Sadat decided to strike Israel. The objective

was not grand; he hoped that a military adventure would break the deadlock. There were other concerns, in the three years Sadat had been in office, the domestic economic crises had worsened; War, specially a successful one, felt Sadat, could be a good diversion. In his biography of Sadat, Raphael Israeli writes that the issue of ‘shame’ over the Six Day War had also to be removed before any reforms could be introduced.¹²⁵

Egyptian military aims were modest. These included an assault across the Sinai breaching the Bar-Lev line and a shallow thrust into Israeli defences while remaining within Egyptian Surface to Air Missile coverage.¹²⁶ The military aims were therefore essentially tactical while the war aim was strategic, the reopening of a constructive dialogue. Clausewitz tells us that to compel our enemy to do our will, the destruction of the enemy’s centre of gravity and with it rendering him vulnerable should be the object of war.¹²⁷

Strategists have long construed that what Clausewitz suggests is that strategic gains require strategic military operations at a strategic scale. Clausewitz does not however limit, in prescriptive terms, what a centre of gravity is and where it may be found. His assertion that it is the hub of all power and movement are contemplative in spirit. The Yom Kippur war demonstrates how an essentially tactical operation, in this case a bridgehead and a foothold, a lodgement in enemy controlled territory, can in given the wider influence of the strategic environment in which it occurs, yield strategic outcomes. Textbooks on operations of war will typically describe bridgeheads as ‘preliminary operations’, ruptures in defences that create conditions for manoeuvre to occur. Sadat’s logic, if transported to the opening of the western front in 1944 would imply an allied plan that would demonstrate the ability to land armies on the beaches of Normandy and on that fact, assume that Hitler would sue for peace on Allied terms!


Under the international strategic environment and the Israeli mind-set at the time, a consequence of the sense of impregnability behind the 500 million dollar Bar-Lev Line, a mere lodgement would have just the right impact, a display of the vulnerability. As such, Sadat’s war aims are an excellent example of well defined, attainable military objective that create the desired political outcome through inducing the specific volatility in the effectual environment. It is another example of the usability of an outcome not necessarily victorious.

The plan was to secure crossing across the Suez and limited spaces within the air defence umbrella of the SAM 6 missiles system with a view to break the myth of Israeli invincibility and encourage her back to the negotiating table. Sadat also probably understood the international environment and the extent to which Russians would allow an Israeli reappraisal. It was a gamble he took and one that paid off. In this backdrop, his war directive that would otherwise have sounded like military suicide is worth reading:

To challenge the Israeli security theory by carrying out a military action according to the capabilities of the armed forces aimed at inflicting the heaviest losses on the enemy and convincing him that continued occupation of our land exacts a price too high for him to pay, and that consequently his theory of security - based as it is on psychological, political, and military intimidations - is not an impregnable shield of steel which could protect him today or in the future.¹²⁸

Conduct

The Egyptians and the Syrians triumphed in as far as their military objective visualised. No plans for deeper thrust, provisions for logistics or the vital air cover that would be essential were ever prepared. The shallow advance of the Egyptian and Syrian forces came to a halt within the first 24–48 hours. Thereafter, the Israelis began to recover, and by the second week of the war, the Syrians had been pushed out of the Golan Heights. In the Sinai to the south, after valuable intelligence provided by the Americans, the Israelis crossed the Suez and struck at the seam between two Egyptian armies and cut off the Egyptian Third Army just as a United Nations cease-fire came into effect.¹²⁹ The Israeli counter offensive, a relatively small scale operation, was masterly and created effects, as Christopher Bellamy puts it, ‘disproportionate to its size in tipping the enemy [Egypt] off balance operationally and, by appearing on his home territory.’¹³⁰ Map 5 depicts the operation:



MAP 5: THE ISRAELI COUNTER OFFENSIVE

(SOURCE: CHRISTOPHER D. BELLAMY. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN LAND WARFARE¹³¹)

The counter offensive took the battle to Egyptian territory. This was an enormous military achievement for Israeli forces, yet when the war ended, it was Egypt that was considered ‘victorious’. The Arab world, which had been humiliated by the lopsided defeat of the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian alliance during the Six-Day war, felt psychologically vindicated by its string of victories early in the conflict. This vindication paved the way for the peace process that followed, as well as liberalizations such as Egypt's ‘infitah policy’¹³². The Camp David accords, which came soon after, led to normalized relations between Egypt and Israel—the first time any Arab country had recognized the Israeli state. Egypt, which had already been drifting away from the Soviet Union, then left the Soviet sphere of influence entirely.¹³³ It was a win-win situation for all.

The Arab Israel war of 1973 provides three important lessons: 1) contrary to the conventional school of strategic thought, tactical victories, even half victories can yield strategic advantage or even success, 2) the strategic environment as well as the enemy’s mind-set are critically influential on enemy’s behavioural coefficient that can multiply or mitigate the actual leverage attained by military outcomes and, 3) the value of the contextual framework and the expectational argument is again highlighted; in this case the former appears more important than the score-keeping or match-fixing frameworks.

CASE 7: THE ISRAEL-LEBANON WAR 2006

Background and Causes

The Israel-Lebanon War of summer 2006, more appropriately the Israel – Hezbollah skirmishes, is part of a continuous low intensity affair that has become something of a “romance” between Hezbollah and the Israelis. While appealing to be deviant in character but when analysed closely, the Israel-Lebanon War 2006 is in fact a paradigm case.

To understand the dynamics of this conflict it is essential to look at the origins of the parties at war. Israel was carved out of Palestinian territory as part of the post war arrangement of the Second World War. Churchill had in fact written a white paper on how an Israeli state may be created already in the 1930s. The actual state that emerged was not very different. The creation of a state on territories already inhabited by myriads of cultures and faiths in a balance that was established over two millennia was suddenly upset. A permanent state of conflict was thus created between societies that were unlikely to reconcile in spirit regardless of what political expediencies may drive them.

Hezbollah has a far more recent origin, as Pierre Tristram points out:

Around lunchtime on April 19, 1983, a suicide bomber slammed a truck packed with 2,000 pounds of explosives through the entrance of the American Embassy along one of Beirut's fashionable seaside avenues on the Mediterranean. The attack killed 63 people, most of them Lebanese employees at the embassy or visa applicants, 17 of them American. Six months later two suicide bombers simultaneously attacked U.S. Marines' barracks south of Beirut and French barracks in the eastern part of the Lebanese capital, killing 241 American soldiers and 57 French paratroopers. Hezbollah, the 'Party of God,' a militant Lebanese Shiite organization, was born out of those bombings.¹³⁴

Born as the 'Islamic Jihad', Hezbollah showed it's leaning towards Iran when in the 1980s it targeted French interests in Lebanon because of French support to Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war.¹³⁵

The June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon had driven out the Palestine Liberation Organization's 'state-within-a-state' which it had built there since 1970. 'The invasion forced 6,000 PLO militants to leave the country. Mediating those militants out of Lebanon is what brought the U.S. Marines, the French and some Italian forces to Lebanon.' Israel thought its problems in South Lebanon were over.¹³⁶

South Lebanon is overwhelmingly Shiite. Largely neglected by the central government, with the country's Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims generally sharing power, there already existed scope for a political movement. When the PLO was forced out, Hezbollah saw its opportunity and filled the vacuum, both to Israel's and the central government's surprise.

Hezbollah began a campaign of opposing all things western taking numerous Americans hostage and conducting a relentless guerrilla war against the Israeli occupation until Israel finally withdrew completely from Lebanon in 2000. This was Hezbollah notional victory and was termed by them, as too by many Lebanese, as the 'liberation' of Lebanon. To Israel and the United States, Hezbollah was just the latest Lebanese terrorist organization to wreak havoc on the country and on Israel.¹³⁷ To Hezbollah, its actions against Israel weren't terrorism, but legitimate resistance. Following the 2000 Israeli withdrawal,

Hezbollah took a far more politically minded road in Lebanese affairs. Hezbollah politicians were elected to the Lebanese parliament. But the organization continued the fight against Israel, because Hezbollah (and the Lebanese government) claimed that Israel had not completely withdrawn: It still held on to a small strip of land in southern Lebanon called Shebaa Farms (Map 6).



MAP 6: SHEBA FARMS

Source: Internet, http://www.theisraelproject.org/atf/Account16894/images/_271105212552084.jpg¹³⁸

Minor incidents continued between Israel and Hezbollah from 2000 to 2005. Then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon took the chronic strife as the price of living with a hostile frontier, a price not nearly as heavy as the one Israel was paying for its proximity to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Sharon, who had been the architect of the 1982 invasion and lost enormous prestige from that invasion's ultimate failure, was not about to ratchet up the battle with Hezbollah.

His successor, Ehud Olmert, had different ideas. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah militants fired on an Israeli patrol on Israel's side of the border fence, killing three Israeli soldiers and seizing two of them. This was in retaliation to an earlier killing of a Lebanese family in a mistaken attack by Israel. Olmert opted for a disproportionate response and bombarded parts of south and eastern Lebanon. Widening the bombing campaign, most of Lebanon was attacked in what became a 34-day all-out war between Hezbollah and Israel. Hezbollah retaliated with intense, daily, indiscriminate missile barrages at towns in northern Israel, and as far south as Haifa.¹³⁹

Politico-Military Aims and Objectives

Olmert publically pledged to destroy Hezbollah's military capacity rendering it incapable of fire bombings in Israeli territory. Politically, he hoped to create deterrence by punishment; forcing Hezbollah to not use violence for fear of unacceptable consequences. Hezbollah on its part had no tall objectives except maintaining its pledge not to stop its barrage until Israel ceased its operations.

Conduct and Outcome

The war lasted 34 days. The Hezbollah rockets carried on firing, while the wider destruction that Israel caused did not deter Hezbollah. Most significantly, the whole of Lebanon began to associate itself with Hezbollah and its defiant attitude. It was not until August, 14 that a cease-fired brokered by the United Nations ended hostilities. About 1,000 people, mostly Lebanese civilians, were killed, and one million Lebanese civilians and some 300,000 to 400,000 Israelis temporarily displaced. Both countries' economies suffered, although Lebanon's suffered far more as much of its infrastructure—roads, bridges, electricity and water plants—were damaged by Israel's bombing campaign.¹⁴⁰

Israel's objectives were not met. Hezbollah's military capability was temporarily diminished but not destroyed, and 'its political stock rose in the eyes of Lebanese, including in the eyes of Christians who had previously opposed Hezbollah.'¹⁴¹ Syria and Iran reportedly restocked Hezbollah's arsenal of missiles. Hezbollah's boycott of the Lebanese government, which was backed by the Western, created a political stalemate, but also strengthened Hezbollah's hand as a force in Lebanon's future.

The 2006 Lebanon War, in sum, killed many, destroyed much, but failed to advance Israel's politico-military aims. Since technically Lebanon was not at war and had no agenda except its survival and existence, it clearly succeeded in both. Hezbollah emerged from the conflict stronger than before it began, even though Lebanese army troops deployed in south Lebanon.

The minimalist framework and the notion of victory for a non or sub state actor are decidedly different from the conventional frameworks we have looked at up until now. The minimalist, the terrorist and most sub-state organisations that neither possesses the finance, the resources nor the military muscle to force a change through the outcome of violence, use violence to attract violence. Victory is not gauged by any match fixing or

scorekeeping analysis but in the perpetuation, politicisation and publicity received as a consequence. In the acknowledgement of their existence and capability to inflict pain, even if pinpricks, the minimalist policy is advanced. Reappraisals and any response short of decisive victory thus seem to serve only the minimalist.

The contextual framework for assessing winner and losers in the ensuing war against terrorism needs to be informed by both the cultural dimension of the societies at war as well as the nature and character of the war itself – its objective and subjective dimension.

SECTION 2: PROBLEMS WITH CONTEMPORARY THEORY

ANTAGONISTS, THE AFFECTED AND OBSERVERS: A FUNCTIONAL GROUPING

The range of case studies selected collectively highlight the deficiency of existing pretheories and how in certain cases even all the pretheories combined fail to present a cohesive theory that can be applied as a general case. The need for language, scope of association of belligerents and non-belligerents to the violence or the conflict is another area where language is clearly lacking.

The three fundamental considerations for victory that emerge as an interim focus for any subsequent theory are the attainability, sustainability and the usability of victory.

Clearly evident is the fact that it is not necessarily the degree of leverage earned through violence but the quality of diplomacy and post war strategy that affects political outcomes.

This chapter, through empirical study, identified the voids in the definition and theory of victory that the contemporary understanding discussed in Chapter IV either fails to address or addresses incompletely. We have also concluded that:

- Perceptions are not reality. Perceptions are, however, often more important than reality. Evaluations of victory and defeat are more open to interpretation and influenced by the psychological biases.
- The existing pre-theory of victory and defeat is insufficient to explain the wider application and implication of the victory notion.

- Additional frameworks are needed to develop a more comprehensive theory of victory.
- The constructs of victory and defeat, albeit intrinsically understood, are not formally described in language and vocabulary.
- History reflects that military success, particularly when coercive violence fails to further or catalyse the wider bargaining process towards the objects of policy, is not sufficient to serve the notion of victory.
- Victory sought, its dynamics and the paradigms shaping it govern – in a proactive sense – and shape – in a passive context – the conflict continuum. In turn, this influences the ways, as also, the means adopted to realise the desired end.
- The contemporary concept of victory does not adequately serve the purpose of theory. The contours of the pretheories however, do find selective relevance and in varying degrees. The main limitations being not so much their correctness or validity but of the voids within.
- Scientific language of victory and defeat needs to be developed. To allow for a more specific reference to context, an interim set of terminologies related to war and conflict is presented below which is intended to serve subsequent use in the research:

INTIMACY TO VIOLENCE

Aggressor

The ‘aggressor’ is defined as a person or country that attacks or starts a war, fight, or argument, often without being provoked.¹⁴² In international relations the term has varied and distinct usage both as a concept and as a form of proscribed behaviour. In law it is used ‘to distinguish between just and unjust wars and between legal and illegal use of force.’¹⁴³ In this thesis, however, the term aggressor is neither used in a condemnatory nor pejorative sense but refers to an entity that consciously initiates political violence in pursuit of leverage to serve political aims. Aggressor may include a single state, alliance, group or a combination of these. It includes instigators that may cause a third party to pursue war without themselves taking active part in hostilities. To qualify as an aggressor

or its abetted party must, in a military sense, be strategically on the offensive and pursue an offensive military strategy in the conventional and unconventional sense.

Respondents or Aggressed

The term ‘Respondents’ include a single state, alliance, group or a combination of these that is drawn into politically motivated violence and is threatened by the ‘initiators’ with – on initiation of hostilities – an unacceptable political bargain. The respondent either chooses or is drawn into war instead of concession. The ‘Aggressed’ may adopt an offensive or defensive strategic posture consistent with outlook, capabilities, war aims and objectives. It may in turn also have additional political objectives that, given the opportunity, may be explored and exploited. It may also initiate hostilities employing offensive actions consistent in an overall strategically defensive posture such as preventive war, pre-emption and the counter offensive.

Tugged Entities

‘Tugged’ entities are those that are drawn into a conflict as a result of treaty arrangements, moral obligation or any other causation that does not include self-defence, active or latent objectives. A ‘tugged’ entity is identified by its apolitical disposition to the war outcomes.

Impinged Entities

Impinged entities includes those directly affected, with or without an active role in the fighting and those that join on either side not in pursuit or defence of a common political aim but their own separate aim. The alliance is thus against a common enemy and not a common cause. Russia and China in the Second World War – as seen from the perspective of Britain or the USA are good examples however; these states in their own capacity had been directly involved against an aggressor and were threatened in the first degree (see below).

Observers

Observers are entities that are disaffected or marginally influenced by the violence. They generally take no part in the conflict in their own capacity but may also represent the international community and its response.

CATEGORISATION OF THREAT

Quantifying the nature of threat is essential to the understanding of the purpose and degree of commitment of a threatened entity. It influences the nature of coercion and violence on the part of the aggressor (the source of the threat) and the nature and depth of response from the aggressed.

Threat can vary from an acute nature to peripheral significance. Three shades or degrees of threat can sufficiently embody the concept:

First Degree Threat

A first degree threat is one where the very existence or continued existence of the threatened entity is at stake. It should be noted that who initiated the war is not important, it is the nature of outcome sought that sets the bargain.

Second Degree

A second degree threat is where the core interest of the threatened entity is at stake however; its existence is not at risk.

Third Degree

A third degree threat is where the ante includes peripheral interests or where a first or second degree threat to an important ally is present.

CATEGORISATION OF WARS AND CONFLICT

From the survey of history we have seen that wars are either limited or total. Based on the generic but useful premise on Total War and other lesser severe forms of war, the following sub-categorisation are considered useful:

Total War in the First Degree

When the objectives are unlimited and one side seeks the complete political destruction of the other, the war is total in the first degree. The notion of victory for either side is set on extreme poles, for one it is the revisionist ends that seek the political destruction of the opponent while for the other, a lesser notion of success is sufficient. This will usually involve continuity on one end of the scale to existence and survival on the other. Progress

would be a bonus. Serbia for example in World War One was drawn into a total war in the first degree but came out of more powerful than it had ever been.

Total War in the Second Degree

When the entire resources of a nation are applied to the military effort, the war is total in the second degree. By implications, a second degree total war may have limited objectives; it is the means that are total. It implies the readiness of the nation to continue the war effort despite the losses. For example, the Iran – Iraq war was total in the second degree for both the countries and probably more so for Iran. The objectives were far from total, but neither side was prepared to limit the ‘means’ hence the war extended in time and geographical scope but remained nonetheless limited as far as objectives were concerned.

Limited War

Limited war and limitation in war are two separate notions. The former developed in the context of cold war and embodies comprehensive body of language in support of the concept. Limited war generally suggested conventional war below nuclear threshold or short of nuclear options for either of the belligerents. By implication, one of the belligerents or allies in support of the belligerents had to possess nuclear weapons.

Restrained War

War has always been restricted in one form or another. Even the most total affairs were, in hindsight, restricted. For war and violence to remain restrained, both sides must consciously manifest qualities of limitation. A restrained war embodies following qualities in varying degrees:

- Non total Purpose; found in the aims and objectives. Must be for bargainable commodities and goods.
- Mode and means; manifest in character of war and the form that it takes for example LIC, open conflict, terrorism, coercive diplomacy, direct or indirect approach; also type of forces and nature of weapons.
- Scale and Scope; deliberate geographical confinement, impacted and affected populations, scale of violence, selection of targets and degree of punishment.

Chapter Notes and References

¹ Christopher Bellamy, *Absolute War*, op. cit., p. 17.

² Polybius, *The Histories of Polybius: Book One*, tr. by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, (In Parentheses publications, Cambridge, 2002), p. 30.

³ A deviant case is (also called extreme case) is one where by the general understanding of the topic, or common sense, represents a dependent variable that deviates from the expected outcome; a paradigm case serves as prototype or ‘perfect’ example; a critical cases (also called crucial case) is defined as a case that offers particularly compelling evidence for or against a proposition. Inferences from such cases can having strategic importance in relation to a general problem. For details and reference see Appendix A.

⁴ The Battle was fought on the 10th of Muharram in the 61st year of the Muslim Calendar which according to the Western – Islamic Calendar relationship comes to 9th or 10th of October 680 AD. For an online tabular arithmetical convertor see http://www.phys.uu.nl/~vgent/islam/islam_tabcal.htm.

⁵ The literal Arabic meaning of ‘Kharijites’ is ‘those who went out’. For more insight into the political, religious and ideological differences from other sects see ‘Schisms and Heterodoxy among the Muslims’, hosted on irfi.org, internet, http://www.irfi.org/articles/articles_201_250/schisms_and_heterodoxy_among_mus.htm, accessed 15 Mar 2007.

⁶ In contrast to the Kharijites, Shi’ite philosophy of religion and politics essential points to a separation of the two functions in society. Religious auth is strictly under the Imam or his appointee whereas political leadership can be devolved to any pious individual capable of discharging the responsibilities that accompany. See Hugh Kennedy, *The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State*, (Routledge, London, 2001).

⁷ Sayyid ibn Tawoos, *Lohouf*, tr. Anonymous, (Suny Publishers, New Delhi, 2001), Tradition No.72.

⁸ Abi Mikhnaf who died in 774 AD is reputed to be the first historian to systematically collect, collate and reconstruct the event based on eyewitnesses accounts in *Ketab Maqatal Al-Husayn* (The history (book) of the Martyrdom of Hussein). No copy of the original text has been discovered, what survives is transmitted through his student Hisham Al-Kalbi. There are four manuscripts of the *Maqatal*, located at Gotha (No. 1836), Berlin (Sprenger, Nos. 159-160), Leiden (No. 792), and St. Petersburg (Am No. 78) libraries. An internet version is also available at <http://www.sicm.org.uk/knowledge/Kitab%20Maqatal%20al-Husayn.pdf>. The other sources are ‘Maqatal al-Husayn’ of Abu Mikhnaf, the ‘Maqatal al-Husayn’ of Ibn Sa’d-Sunni Historian-, the ‘Maqatal al-Husayn’ of Baladhuri -Sunni Historian-, the ‘Maqatal al-Husayn’ of Dinawari, and the ‘Maqatal al-Husayn’ of Ibn A’tam. Some of these sources have been reclassified by historians as secondary based on the generational removal from the actual event. For example Veccia Vaglieri has found that Baladhuri (died 279AH/892-893CE), Al Tabari has used Abi Mikhnaf but hasn't mentioned his name. Ibn A’tam uses and cites Mikhnaf in ‘Al-Futuh’ thus he should be recognized as a secondary source.

- ⁹ The first four Caliphs after the Death of Muhammad (P.B.U.H), were Abu Bakar Siddique, Umar Farooq, Uthman Ghani and Ali Ibn Abi Talib.
- ¹⁰ John Esposito writes that the ‘brave and charismatic grandson of Muhammad (P.B.U.H) was trying to regain power and reinstate the true values of Islam.’ See John Esposito, *Unholy War*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002), p.37.
- ¹¹ Israr Ahmad, *The Tragedy of Karbala* (Society of the Servants of Al-Quran, Lahore, 1999), pg. 23
- ¹² Abi Mikhnaf, *Ketab Maktal Al Huseyn*, Internet, <http://www.sicm.org.uk/knowledge/Kitab%20Maqtal%20al-Husayn.pdf>, accessed Jul 2006.
- ¹³ Sayyid ibn Tawoos, op. cit., Tradition No.72.
- ¹⁴ ‘The Battle of Karbala, *The New World Encyclopaedia*, internet, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Battle_of_Karbala, Accessed 9 May 2009. For an annotated version see, ‘Battle of Karbala, *Channel Four*, internet, http://www.channel4.com/culture/microsites/K/karbala/his_massacre.html, ‘History’, Accessed 9 May 2009.
- ¹⁵ Abi Minkhanaf, op. cit.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., Tradition No.136-139.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., Tradition No. 255 to 279.
- ¹⁸ Imam Reza, ‘Sayings of Imam Reza’, Internet, <http://www.imamreza.net/eng/imamreza.php?print=6466>, accessed 27 Apr 2006.
- ¹⁹ Ali is the central figure in the Shia / Sunni split which occurred in the decades immediately following the death of the Prophet in 632. Sunnis regard Ali as the fourth and last of the "rightly guided caliphs" (successors to the Prophet Mohammed as leader of the Muslims) following on from Abu Bakr 632-634, Umar 634-644 and Uthman 644-656. While generally Shias feel that Ali should have been the first caliph, not many realise that the concept of Imamate and Caliphate are not synonymous in shite Islam. It was the imamate and with it spiritual leadership that ought to pass down only to direct descendants of Mohammed via Ali and Fatima and not the political leadership or governance. See Ali Ibn Abu Talib, *Peak of Eloquence*, internet, <http://www.nahjulbalagha.org/>, Letter 28 sent in reply to acquisitions levelled by Muawia. See also Hussein Abdulwaheed Amin, ‘The Origins of the Sunni/Shia split in Islam’, Internet, <http://www.islamfortoday.com/shia.htm>, accessed 9 May 2009.
- ²⁰ See Trevor Stanley, ‘Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism’, *The Jamestown Foundation*, Internet, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=528&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=180&no_cache=1, Accessed 9 May 2009.
- ²¹ The exact figure is difficult to ascertain as historians are divided in their opinion. Figures on how many men Napoleon took into Russia and how many eventually came out vary rather widely. A general consensus puts the Grand Armeé in excess of 500,00 men.

Some available figures are: Georges Lefebvre, 600,000 at the time of crossing the Neman River of which half were French troops while the remaining comprised mainly Germans and Poles, Felix Markham arrives at a figure of 450,000 at Neman suggesting that only 40,000 re-crossed the same point on the retreat in anything like a recognizable military formation; James Marshall-Cornwall says 510,000 Imperial troops entered Russia; Eugene Tarle believes that 420,000 crossed with Napoleon and 150,000 eventually followed, for a grand total of 570,000. Richard K. Riehn provides the following figures: 685,000 men marched into Russia in 1812, of whom around 355,000 were French; 31,000 soldiers marched out again in some sort of military formation, with perhaps another 35,000 stragglers, for a total of less than 70,000 known survivors. The most popular and oft quoted reference comes from M. Minard. His ingenious graphic depiction showing the size of the advancing army proportionally by the width of the line suggests 422,000 crossing the Neman with Napoleon, 22,000 taking a side trip in the beginning, 100,000 surviving the battles en route to Moscow, and of the 100,000 departing Moscow, only 4,000 surviving joined up by 6,000 that survived that initial 22,000 in the feint attack northward, to leave only 10,000 crossing back to France out of the initial 422,000. See Georges Lefebvre, *Napoleon from Tilsit to Waterloo*, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), vol. II, pp. 311–12; Felix Markham, *Napoleon* (Mentor, New York, 1963), pp. 190, 199; James Marshall-Cornwall, *Napoleon as Military Commander* (Batsford, London, 1967), p. 220; Eugene Tarle, *Napoleon's Invasion of Russia 1812* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1942), p. 397; Richard K. Riehn, *1812: Napoleon's Russian Campaign* (John Wiley, New York, 1991), pp. 77 and 501.

²² Napoleon defeated the Russians at the Battle of Friedland on June 13-14 and on July 9, 1807 Russia made peace with France accepting a ban on trade with Great Britain. July 9 After making peace with Russia, Napoleon bans trade with Great Britain. See Richard K. Riehn, *op. cit.*, pp. 10–20.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24-25.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁶ The First Polish War was fought by the Fourth Coalition for liberation of Polish territories from Russia, Prussia and Austria.

²⁷ On June 22 Napoleon issued a proclamation to his army officially announcing the start of the war. Cited in George B. Hereford, *Napoleon's Invasion of Russia* (Empirical Books, London, 2002), p. 81.

²⁸ Emerson Kent, 'History for the Relaxed Historians', internet, www.emersonkent.com/russian_campaign.htm, accessed 9 May 2009.

²⁹ Richard K. Riehn, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

³⁰ George Nafziger, 'Napoleon's Invasion of Russia', ISBN 0-88254-681-3, 1984. Also cited in George Nafziger, 'Rear services and foraging in the 1812 campaign: Reasons of Napoleon's defeat', Genstab.ru, internet, http://genstab.ru/nap_sup_1812.htm, accessed 2 Mar 2008.

³¹ Alexander Mikaberidze, *The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon's Hollow Victory* (Pen & Sword Military, New York, 2007), p vii.

³² Prof. Christopher Bellamy, 'The Battle of Borodino', Lecture notes MSc Global Security, Cranfield University, Session 2003-2004.

³³ At the approach of a victorious General, the civil authorities customarily presented themselves at the gates of the city with the keys to the city in an attempt to safeguard the population and their property. As nobody received Napoleon he sent his aides into the city, seeking out officials with whom the arrangements for the occupation could be made. When none could be found it became clear that the Russians had left the city unconditionally.

³⁴ See Edward R. Tufte, internet, <http://www.edwardtufte.com/tufte/minard-obit>.

³⁵ See Edward R. Tufte, *The Visual Display of Qualitative Information* (Graphics Press, Cheshire, 2001), p. 40.

³⁶ See Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1998).

³⁷ See Peter Hofschroer, *Leipzig 1813: The Battle of the Nations*, (Osprey, 1993). Hofschroer presents a brief account of the entire German campaign of 1813 that opened with success for Napoleon at Dresden but a few month later led to his defeat in the Battle of Nations.

³⁸ Andrew C Jackson, 'The Peninsular War', internet, http://www.peninsularwar.org/penwar_e.htm, accessed 7 May 2009.

³⁹ Helmert and Usczek, *Europäische Befreiungskriege 1808 bis 1814/15*, (Berlin, 1986).

⁴⁰ Erich Ludendorff, summarizes the precepts of Total War in an oft quoted passage from his book *Der Totale Krieg (English, the Total War)*: 'what made this war different from all others was the manner in which the home populations supported and reinforced the Armed Forces. In this war it was impossible to distinguish where the sphere of the Army and Navy began and that of the people ended. Army and people were one. The world witnessed a war of Nations in the most literal sense of the word. In this mighty concentration of effort the great powers of Earth faced each other. And not only between the Armed Forces did the combat rage between those huge fronts and distant oceans. The moral and vital forces of the **hostile populations were assailed for the purpose of corruption and paralyzing them**'. See Erich Von Ludendorff, *Der Totale Krieg* (1935) (English: *The Total War*), trans. Dr A. S. Rappoport as *The Nation in Arms* (Hutchinson, London, 1936), p. 14-15. Also see commentary by Prof. Christopher Bellamy in *Knights in White Armour*, op. cit., p. 51.

⁴¹ Clausewitz warns that the true nature of war is to only serve its self and not the political object, the advancing or attainment of which is its intended purpose. See Carl Von Clausewitz, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

⁴² Ernest Mandel, *The Meaning of the Second World War* (Verso, London, 1984), p. 11.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 11-12.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 11-17.

⁴⁶ Fritz Fischer, op. cit. For a commentary see Matthew Stibbe, ‘The Fischer controversy over German war aims in the first world war and its reception by East German historians, 1961–1989,’ *The Historical Journal*, 2003, No. 46, Vol. 3, pp. 649-688.

⁴⁷ Anita Prazmowska, *Britain and Poland, 1939-1943: The Betrayed Ally* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), p. 59.

⁴⁸ The Serbian Army was decimated towards the end of the war, falling from about 420,000 at its peak to about 100,000 at the end of the War. See Correlates of War project (COW), internet., <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>, dataset MID v3.1, s.v. ‘The Balkans’.

⁴⁹ The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the question of accession of territories it possessed was a principle consideration for Great Britain who not only wanted to attain more colonies but also saw Ottoman territories in the ‘wrong hands’ as a direct threat to her existing possessions. The Middle East, as we know it today, emerged from decisions made by the Allies during and after the First World War. Issues such as The Allenby Declaration establishing nominal independence for Egypt, the Palestine Mandate and the Churchill White Paper (from which Israel and Jordan sprang), the installing of Hashemite leaders of predominantly Shi'ite territories, new leaders for Egypt and Iraq, the Russian declaration of a Soviet Union intent on re-establishing her rule over Central Asia were the products of the First World War. See David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace* (Orion Publishing Group, London, 2000), pp. 61 - 66.

⁵⁰ Christopher Bellamy, ‘Northern Ireland’, lecture notes, MSc Global Security, Cranfield University, Royal Military College of Science, Jan 2004.

⁵¹ Gregory R. Copley, *The Art of Victory*, op. cit.

⁵² Gregory R. Copley, ‘Grand Strategy in an Age of Tactics,’ op. cit.

⁵³ See Conan Fischer, *The Ruhr Crisis 1923-1924* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003)

⁵⁴ Sally Marks, *The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918-1933* (Macmillan, London, 1976), pp. 49-55.

⁵⁵ Excerpt from Churchill’s first speech to the House of Commons on becoming prime Minister. The complete context is: “You ask, What is our policy? I will say; It is to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us. . . . That is our policy. You ask, What is our aim? I can answer with one word: Victory--victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.” Sir Winston Churchill, Prime Minister Inaugural Address to the House of Commons, London, 13 May 1940, internet, www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=391, accessed May 8, 2009.

⁵⁶ See Ernst Mandel, op. cit.

⁵⁷ Oscar Pinkus, *The war aims and strategies of Adolf Hitler* (McFarland & Co., New York, 2005), pp. 27-28.

⁵⁸ Adolf Hitler, Recorded monologues See Werner Jochmann, ed., *Monologue im Fuehrerhauptquartier 1941-1944* (Albrecht Knaus Verlag, Hamburg, 1980), p. 163. Explanations added by author. Hitler's comments were more explicitly stated by Goebbels: 'Europe, and in the first place Germany, have a high standard of living, which has to be further increased. It will be faced sooner or later in East Asia with a block of 500 million people of yellow race with a substantially lower standard of living, a fact which will not be without effect on Europe.', *Ibid* p. 264. Note also Hitler's naivety over American power potential, assuming it to become part of Japanese zone of influence.

⁵⁹ Ernst Mandel, *op. cit.*, pp. 15.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp 15-17.

⁶¹ Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York, 1950), p. 151.

⁶² Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945* (New York, 1970), p. 251.

⁶³ Will and Ariel Durant, *Lessons of History* (M F J Publishers, New York, 1997), p. 87.

⁶⁴ Ernst Mandel, *op. cit.*, pp. 15 – 23.

⁶⁵ Writing in, *Mein Kampf* (English: My Struggle), in 1924, Hitler declared the conceptual contours of what was eventually to translate into his war aims for the next great war: "We National Socialists consciously draw a line through the foreign policy trend of our pre-War period. We take up at the halting place of six hundred years ago. We terminate the endless German drive to the south and west of Europe, and turn our gaze toward the lands in the east. We finally terminate the colonial and trade policy of the pre-War period and proceed to the territorial policy of the future ... if we talk about new soil and territory in Europe today, we can think primarily only of Russia and its vassal border states." See Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (1924), 8th Ed., (Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1939), pp. 950-951.

⁶⁶ R. J. Overy, *The Origins of the Second World War*, 2nd Ed. (Pearson, Harlow, 1998), pp. 31-33, 46-51.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-100.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-33. See also Ernst Mandel, *op. cit.*, pp 15 – 23.

⁶⁹ Ernst Mandel, *op. cit.*, pp 15 – 23.

⁷⁰ Victor Rothwell, *War Aims in the Second World War* (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2005), pp. 27 – 35.

⁷¹ John Keegan ed., *The Times Atlas of the Second World War* (Times Books, 1989), pp. 114-117.

⁷² Ibiblio online texts of International Treaties, internet, <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/410413a.html>, s.v. ‘Soviet-Japanese Neutrality and Denunciation,’ accessed 3 May 2008.

⁷³ R. J. Overy, op. cit., pp. 64 – 93.

⁷⁴ Christopher Bellamy, *Absolute War: op. cit.*, p. 411.

⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 411-414.

⁷⁶ E. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, September 4 and 28, and October 3, 1940, Borchard Papers. Cited in Justus D. Doenecke, ‘Edwin M. Borchard, John Bassett Moore, and Opposition to American Intervention in World War II’, *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, Vol. VI, No. 1 Winter 1982, pp. 17-18. See also Edwin M. Borchard, ‘The Attorney General’s Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases,’ *American Journal of International Law*, Vol: 34 (October 1940), pp. 690-697.

⁷⁷ See World War 2 wwii.com, ‘World War 2: Diplomatic History - Allied War Aims and Policies for Peace 1943 to 1945,’ internet, <http://worldwar2-wwii.com/14c-world-war-2-wwii-Diplomatic-History-allies-peace-policies.htm>, accessed January 11, 2009.

Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Oscar Pinkus, op. cit., p. 23

⁸⁰ Christopher Bellamy, *Absolute War*, op. cit., p. 419.

⁸¹ R. J. Overy, op. cit., pp. 96-97, 100, 102-109. ‘World War 2, Diplomatic History - Allied War Aims and Policies for Peace 1943 to 1945,’ internet, <http://worldwar2-wwii.com/14c-world-war-2-wwii-Diplomatic-History-allies-peace-policies.htm>.

⁸² Charles B. Macdonald, ‘Grand Strategy and the Washington High Command,’ in *American Military History*, (United States Army, Carlisle, No Date), Chapter 21, internet, <http://www.history.army.mil/books/amh/amh-21.htm>, accessed September 13, 2007.

⁸³ Ibid. See also R. J. Overy, op. cit., pp. 95 – 109.

⁸⁴ Charles B. Macdonald, op. cit.

⁸⁵ Christopher Bellamy, *Absolute War*, op. cit., p. 419.

⁸⁶ 2WorldWar2.com, ‘Russia in World War 2,’ internet, <http://www.2worldwar2.com/russia.htm>, accessed September 17, 2007.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Excerpt from Churchill’s first speech to the House of Commons, op. cit.

⁸⁹ Correlates of War Project, internet, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>, s.v. ‘WW II.’

⁹⁰ George M. Hall, *The Fifth Star: High Command in an Era of Global War* (Praeger

Publishers, 1994), p. 185

⁹¹ Subjective components of victory implied here are ‘winning battles’ and ‘winning wars’ as well as success in activities that lead up to these. Objective elements of victory are: correct assessment of the strategic environment, correct identification of political aim and objectives, correct translation of these aims and objectives into military aims and objectives and translation of military success to political success.

⁹² Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 5th ed. (Macmillan, London, 2003), pp. 397-399.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival* (Random House, New York, 1988), p. 235.

⁹⁵ Ernst R. May and Philip D. Zelikov, *The Kennedy Tapes* (Belknap Press, Cambridge, 1997), p. 487.

⁹⁶ United Nations, *Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary*, General Assembly Official Records: 11th Session, Supplement No 18 (A/3592), New York, 1957.

⁹⁷ The period of Political Liberalisation that commenced under the reformist Alexander Dubcek and eventually crushed by the Soviet – Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in Aug 1968. See Kieran Williams, *The Prague Spring and its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968 – 1970* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), pp. 5-11, 18-29, 47, 55, 156, 164, 170.

⁹⁸ Nikita Khrushchev, when asked about the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow, Nov 11, 1962.

⁹⁹ Jonathan Schell, op. cit., p. 53.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 53-57.

¹⁰¹ The ranges are somewhat exaggerated by the CIA, perhaps on account of incomplete, incorrect or conflicting information. The actual ranges are: SS-3, 1200 KMs (648 NMs); SS-4, 2080 KMs (1123 NMs) and SS-5, 3700 KMs (1998 NMs). See Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, Internet, <http://jmr.janes.com/public/jmr/index.shtml>.

¹⁰² Jonathan Schell, op. cit., pp. 47-62.

¹⁰³ Michael R. Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*, (Harper Collins, New York, 1991), p.330.

¹⁰⁴ Jonathan Schell, op. cit., pp 58-62.

¹⁰⁵ I. L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1972), p. 120.

¹⁰⁶ Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 2nd ed., (Longman, New York, 1999), p. xii.

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- ¹⁰⁷ Richard Hobbs, *The Myth of Victory: What is Victory in War?* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), p. 1.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59.
- ¹⁰⁹ R. N. Lebow, 'Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis', *Diplomatic History*, 14 (1990), pp. 471-492, this p. 488.
- ¹¹⁰ Wikipedia, internet, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCarthyism>, s.v. 'McCarthyism.'
- ¹¹¹ A few years later (by the mid-1950s), opinion polls suggested that Americans now viewed the Korean War as a qualified success. See Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*, (New Hersey Univ. Press, Princeton, 1992), pp. 114-115.
- ¹¹² J. Garofano, 'Tragedy or Choice in Vietnam? Learning to Think Outside the Archival Box', *International Security*, 26, (2002), pp. 143-168.
- ¹¹³ Marc Jason Gilbert and William Head, 'Introduction', in *The Tet Offensive*, Marc Jason Gilbert and William Head eds., (Praeger, Westport, 1996), pp. 1-2.
- ¹¹⁴ Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, 'Wars of Perception', *New York Times*, Op. Ed., 28 November 2006.
- ¹¹⁵ The Encyclopedia Britannica, op. cit., s.v. 'Vietnamisation'
- ¹¹⁶ Wikipedia, internet, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case-Church_Amendment, s.v. 'Case-Church Amendment'
- ¹¹⁷ Exact figures of Vietnamese casualties on both sides were 3 to 4 million from both sides, 1.5 to 2 million Laotians and Cambodians, and 58,159 U.S. soldiers. As regards German military casualties in World War II, a research by Ruedigef Overmans puts the German figure at 5.3 million. See Ruedigef Overmans, *Deutsche Militairsche Verlueste in Zweiten Welt Krieg*, (Taschenbuch, Oldenburg, 2000).
- ¹¹⁸ Robert Koner, cited in Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, 'The Wars of Perception', op. cit.
- ¹¹⁹ Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, 'Wars of Perception', op. cit.
- ¹²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹²¹ Bruce Jackson, a distinguished professor at the SUNY summarised the impact of the media in perception building during his address at the 'Mehdi and War Symposium' at Buffalo University. See Bruce Jackson, 'Media and War: Bringing it all back home, Keynote address at the "Media and War" symposium, University at Buffalo, 17-18 November, 2003.
- ¹²² Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, (W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2001), p.254.
- ¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ See Raphael Israeli, *Man of Defiance: A Political Biography of Anwar Sadat*, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1987)

¹²⁶ E. A. S. Bokhari, Col., October 1973 War & Lessons for the Arabs, Internet, <http://www.defencejournal.com/nov98/warlessonsarabs.htm>, Accessed July 2007.

¹²⁷ The text is paraphrased from several sections of *On War*, Clausewitz consolidates his thoughts in Book Eight, Chapter 6. See Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit., pp. 719-746, esp. pp. 720-721.

¹²⁸ Lester A. Sobel, *Israel and the Arabs: The October 1973 War*, (Facts on File, New York, 1974), pp. 8-39.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Christopher D. Bellamy, *Evolution of Land Warfare: Theory and Practice*, (Rutledge, London, 1990), p. 117.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 116.

¹³² ‘*Infitah*’ is an Arabic Word. The policy loosely described Anwar Sadat’s liberalisation of Egyption economy and introduction of other free-market reforms. It is often called the ‘open door’ policy. See Marvin G. Weinbaum, ‘Egypt’s *Infitah* and the Politics of US Economic Assistance’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol 21, No. 2, (Apr., 1985), pp. 206 – 222, this p. 222.

¹³³ Lester A. Sobel, op. cit., p. 38-39.

¹³⁴ Pierre Tristam, ‘The 2006 Lebanon War: Israel and Hezbollah Square Off’, *About.com*, internet, <http://middleeast.about.com/od/lebanon/a/me070918.htm>, accessed 21 June 2007.

¹³⁵ Augustus Robert Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History*, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007), pp. 27-34.

¹³⁶ Pierre Tristam, op. cit.

¹³⁷ Augustus Robert Norton, op. cit., pp. 69-79.

¹³⁸ ‘Sheba Farms’, Internet, <http://www.theisraelproject.org/atf/Account16894/images/271105212552084.jpg>. The upper inset is from Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia, Internet, http://En.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shebaa_Farms, Accessed May 2009.

¹³⁹ Pierre Tristam, op. cit.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² *Encarta World English Dictionary*, op. cit.

¹⁴³ Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *Dictionary of International Relations* (Penguin Books, London, 1998), pp. 10-11.

CHAPTER VI – TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY

Victory always starts in the head. It's a state of mind. It then spreads with such radiance and such affirmations that destiny can do nothing but obey.¹

Douchan Gersi

Victory and defeat should not be seen as opposites on a common continuum. The physical dimension notwithstanding, both are notional and contextual. For one side to be victorious, the other is not necessarily defeated.

Author

INTRODUCTION

The complexity surrounding the notion of victory and defeat are embedded as much in the cultural and temporal domains as they are in the physical and moral. We identified that interpretation and information processing while influenced to a large extent by media and propaganda, accompany deeply ingrained psychological biases that lend themselves to external and internal influences. The pre-theories of victory as applied in the analyses of the case studies suggest deficiencies in all the three fundamentals of victory namely attainability, usability and sustainability. A synthesis and theory development to fill the voids is needed to explain the wider context, application and implication of the victory and defeat.

Culture shapes perceptions; it shapes reality and human action. Assuming interpretations of victory in one culture to be largely symmetrical in another without applying contextual corrections is not only inadequate but can also be very dangerous. Napoleon discovered it at the cost of half a million men in Russia, 1812; the British fared just as poorly in Afghanistan in their two solo adventures (1838-1842 and 1878-1881). The jury is still out on how the US and its allies might ultimately fare in Afghanistan. All these campaigns are beset with one common problem, the assumption of a symmetrical notion and context of what might constitute defeat for the enemy.

From the recent research in the definition of victory, scholarship unanimously acknowledges the need to look beyond the physical and alludes to the linkage between the physical, the moral and the cultural contexts. The exact nature of this linkage is what the any new theory of victory needs to address comprehensively.

SECTION 1: THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF WAR

Based on the precepts gleaned in Chapter IV, we can summarise drivers of the nature and character of war. The scope of definitions and descriptions may vary; in essence, there are five principal constructs that influence and drive the wider phenomena shaping war's nature:

- 1) the psychosocial construct,
- 2) the socio-political construct,
- 3) the politico military construct,
- 4) the military cultural and,
- 5) the military technical construct.

The psychosocial construct drives a society's propensity towards violence and its moral, ethical and proportionality notions. It is an innate and primordial tendency that would be cloaked in widely accepted or tolerable façades. The socio-political dimension encompasses various descriptions found in International Relations theory: nationhood and statecraft, economic and political interests. It is itself a product of the individual and pan-social dimension that generates ideology, socio-cultural as well as the psychosocial propensities and the individual and collective political will and therefore in a national context borrows heavily from the psychosocial construct. It can be manifest in a single person who through the synthesis of his charisma, leadership, influence and authority can derail an entire people or a limited but sufficiently motivated following – Hitler and Osama Bin Laden being obvious examples.

The politico-military dimension is less philosophical. It generally confines itself to real objectives and gains, means and methods, chances of success – risk analysis and, strategies, the ends, ways and means. The politico-military dimension at its top layer represents the way states interact and how militaries are organised and equipped to convey information to partners, observers and foes. It embodies the political framework for the system within which war occurs, the tools – including legal and rational – as well as aspects that fall purely in the military domain. The military culture of a society is embedded in part in its history and in part the society. It also borrows from lessons and experience of the past as internalised in the way that military does its business.

The military technical; construct in largely manifest in wars character however has an influence on the nature of war too by virtue of creating efficient militaries that have become exceptionally good at their ability to use focused or large scale violence as well as the non-state actors that have become equally efficient at using other – non traditional technologies to do what they do and avoiding what needs to be avoided.

Every dimension of war is subjective to man, the principal reality and the most enduring feature upon which the changelessness in all conflict is premised.

The individual and pan-social perspective shapes how facts and acts are received and perceived in each of the wars constructs and domains of victory. Unless these alter significantly, the nature of war remains more or less unchanged. It may then be argued that the nature of war, like a zeitgeist, remains relatively consistent as long as the way human beings, societies and cultures organise and interact among themselves does not undergo a revolutionary change. Arguably, no such change has occurred since the state was made the functional arbitrator of human societies. Whether globalisation is destined to play a revolutionary role remains to be seen. We will perhaps only know of the change in retrospect and not as we live it.

SECTION 1: UNDERSTANDING ‘DEFEAT’

In considering the effects of a victory, we are particularly interested in those that manifest themselves in the losing side.²

Clausewitz

The moral effects of defeat are universally acknowledged. However, this agreement is not without perspectives. Clausewitz captures the essence in characteristic brevity: ‘when a battle is lost, the strength of the army is broken—it’s moral even more than its physical strength.’³ Clausewitz also identifies the loser’s perspective in the political realm where conflict continues beyond battles. If the defeat is not total, that is to say the state survives no matter how weakened and subdued, ‘even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitional evil; for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.’⁴

Clausewitz dwells at length over the impact and implications of defeat. ‘When one is losing,’ writes Clausewitz, ‘the first thing that strikes one’s imagination, and indeed one’s

intellect is the melting away of numbers. This is followed by loss of ground, ... Next comes the break-up of the original line of battle, the confusion of units, and the dangers inherent in the retreat...' Beyond the physical effects, Clausewitz enumerates the moral impact:

The feeling of having been defeated ... runs through the ranks, down to the very privates. It is aggravated by the horrible necessity of having to abandon to the enemy so many worthy comrades, whom one had come to appreciate, especially in the heat of battle. Worse still is the growing loss of confidence in the high command, which is held more or less responsible by every subordinate for his own wasted efforts. What is worse, the sense of being beaten is not a mere nightmare that may pass; it has become a palpable fact that the enemy is stronger.⁵

The fine line between loss of 'will' to continue the struggle and 'hope' of a favourable outcome becomes prominent. Defeat is essentially a mental state. Liddell Hart identified the loss of hope as the tipping point. According to him, the loss battles, wars, life, comfort, happiness or any of the expendable commodities is insignificant as long as there is hope. Only when hope is lost is one defeated. 'Victory has many fathers while defeat is an orphan.'⁶ While victory cannot be separated from the collected interplay of its moral, physical and psychosocial domains, defeat is essentially moral in nature, hence an orphan. Its physical dimension is invariable always temporary. The moral dimension of defeat is distilled down to just two elements 'will'⁷, the lesser as it is manifest in motivation, leadership and the interplay of the physical domain and 'hope'⁸, manifest in what drives will, means, time and the propensity to accept the costs of failure and in the belief that despite loss of the physical, there is hope and hence a reason to keep the struggle alive.




Figure 21 maps the relationship of the dimensions and elements of Defeat:

FIGURE 21: ELEMENTS AND DIMENSIONS OF DEFEAT EXPLAINED
(AUTHOR'S OWN DIAGRAM)

Will: As separated from intent, is constructed in purpose (not to be confused with aim and objective, its usage here is 'sense of purpose'), leadership, moral, motivation and means.

Hope: Hope is intrinsic in human optimism. It is nurtured and embedded in the long march of man, the struggle and change. Hope is constructed in ideology, and will. Both 'Will' and 'Hope' have attributes that are psychological and physical.

Time: Time is to be seen in its criticality to the purpose and means.

Means: It is the least significant element of defeat. It is found in the tools and instruments of power and change, for example the physical components of power.

At a subjective level, hope has physical and psychological connotations. In its psychological context, it lives in the shape of an idea. As long as the idea survives, defeat is a victory awaited, regardless whether those that originally held the idea and the will to pursue it to the extreme, survive or are vanquished. In a lesser context and in its overlap with 'will', hope can also exist in the shape of 'will'. If means are temporarily denied, but the will is not lost, then hope exists and the struggle continues. Such a defeat is purely temporal and may lay seeds for a future victory. Again, in its physical context, when means are lost but purpose and will survive and, time is not critical to the purpose, hope exists and thus defeat is incomplete. This is because means can be regenerated, the lost time is not critical. Since 'will' persists, defeat is but temporary.

In sum, defeat is set foremost when hope is abandoned or critical time is lost and thus the impossibility of attaining the aim and objectives that generated the conflict or war. This theory of defeat is meaningless unless it tells us something beyond the hair-splitting of its various components. The theory must add to a better understanding and explanation of the past, and more profoundly, guide policy and action towards its avoidance.

Defeat, to the defeated, is entirely in the mind - a 'mental' state, whereas to the victor the other-side's defeat is constructed largely in its physical dimension. The most significant inference that the theory provides is that when judging the enemy defeated, it is an error to assess the 'mental state' purely through the physical. In combating terrorism, the failure of coercive tools – the collective term for military and other elements of power that expound threat of physical loss and suffering – to subdue or eradicate the 'will' towards acts of terrorism is largely due to this misunderstanding. Israel frequently adopts punitive actions with the aim of defeating the terrorists 'will' and alter their behaviour, essentially deterrence by punishment. But as we have seen, the outcome is only a temporary diminishing of the enemy's means and gaining time; paradoxically, the will is strengthened and hope ignited resulting only in the perpetuation of the conflict and expansion of its base.

Weak minds can be influenced by coercive tools and their compelling use, particularly where 'will' is rested more in the means and less in its other cohorts; however strong minds may lose will or means but usually never hope. Hope is nested deeper and cannot be eliminated purely by kinetic tools short of annihilating all those who hold, or have the

potential to hold or have the propensity to acquire motivations which if held are considered a threat.

What is the solution? The question to be asked is that do we want to win or do we want to defeat the enemy? To win, the enemy's defeat is not essential. But in order to defeat the enemy, a decisive physical victory may be necessary and the price of success, instead of the more tangible shades of physical and moral victory, may be Pyrrhic.

SECTION 2: VICTORY

THE MORAL-TEMPORAL-PHYSICAL FRAMEWORK

Thus far, we have identified, developed and used pretheories of victory without assembling the thoughts or language in a concise cohesive form. Such an exercise is however essential to close the discussion on the theory and definition of victory and set the stage for a review of history. Through the prism of the case studies and subsequently, discussion on the utility and true purpose victory, this thesis can serve its true value.

THE DOMAINS OF VICTORY

Victory is a synthesis of the physical and the moral through the ever dynamic medium of time – the spirit of the age. The impact of the latter can be from minimal to profound thus justifying its consideration as a separate domain tying the physical and the moral to a continuous trajectory of change. Within each of these domains operate a number of tangible and intangible dimensions or elements. The domains, as too the elements therein, are neither watertight nor do they have any exclusivity of role beyond the tactical level. The higher the level, the greater the osmosis and complexity of relationship between the parts.

THE PHYSICAL DOMAIN

The 'physical', in terms of actions and correlational or spatial outcomes is a matter of 'fact.' If removed from judgemental criteria such as legality, ethics and proportionality, what we have is essentially a tangible constant. This 'fact' has an interpretive perspective over and above the factual. The former, as we have seen from the discussions of reception and cultural contexts, is more significant. This is because it is the interpretational context of the physical that influences the important and enduring moral domain.

How the constant, that is to say the factual physical (the correlational outcome, used interchangeably), is perceived is itself a function of the moral domain and within that most significantly the cultural dimension. The timeframe for the interpretational physical is immediate to short term, limited within the confines of the military and political phases of war termination.

Victory and defeat, in the politico-military context, do not lie on the same continuum and should not be seen as antonyms but rather separate conditions that can coexist mutually or exclusively. Unless total, defeat is a temporal state of a victory awaited. Unless defeat occurs, the value the physical component of victory is thus short lived, the temporal domain and its dynamics then take over either during or after the war termination phase. The impact of the temporal domain, history reminds us, can shape the most decisive military success to yield little long term political value (for example, with the Sixth Army's defeat at Stalingrad on 2 Feb 1943 (see Case Study 4), Germany could not have lost more against Russia (but probably not won). At Karbala in 680 AD (see Case Study 1, Outcomes) we find the paradox of the 'physical,' repeatedly come to fore in the form of counterproductive political outcomes.

Let us now consolidate these thoughts into a basic theory of the factual physical component of victory. We have shown that the moral influence on the physical domain is a function of time, scale and the catalysts of change, both in the subjective context and the wider 'environment' in which it is assessed. To express these as a function, the following set of equations is presented:

The Factual Physical is constructed thus:

$$\text{Factual Physical (P}_f\text{)} = f \text{ Effects (Spatial, Correllational, Material)}$$

EQUATION 3: CONSTRUCTION OF FACTUAL PHYSICAL VICTORY
(AUTHOR'S OWN EQUATION)

The Interpretative Physical is constructed thus:

$$\text{Interpretative Physical (P}_i\text{)} = f(\text{Time} \times \text{Change (+ve/-ve)})$$

Here the moral influences are reduced to a single element 'Change' and expressed as a positive (+ve) or negative(-ve) trend

This syllogism is not intended to yield a mathematical result, but add notional clarity to visual explanations that will follow.

EQUATION 4: CONSTRUCTION OF INTERPRETATIONAL PHYSICAL VICTORY
(AUTHOR'S OWN EQUATION)

Combining the two, we can conclude the discussion on the constructs of physical victory:

$$\text{Physical Victory (V}_p\text{)} = f \text{ Factual Physical (P}_f\text{)} + \text{Interpretative Physical}$$

EQUATION 5: PHYSICAL VICTORY—RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FACT AND INTERPRETATION
(AUTHOR'S OWN EQUATION)

To simplify the relationship and assuming the '=' sign to represent the functional rather than mathematical connotation, we end up with:

$$V_p = P_f + P_i$$

EQUATION 6: THE CONSTRUCTS OF PHYSICAL VICTORY
(AUTHOR'S OWN EQUATION)

The various constituent elements of the physical domain namely, military, economic, diplomatic and the political, collectively shape physical victory. The above equation when applied across the elements yields a unique result. It is not correct to merely collate the individual results to arrive at the physical component of victory (V_p); one further correction is needed.

From cultural and perceptual contexts we know that each of the four elements influences the belligerents differently. It is no good assessing structural losses in

Afghanistan in terms of numbers or dollars on a scale a similar loss may be seen in the West. The equation, as unfortunately such is reality, also holds good for civilian and combatant casualties. The relative impact of the elements has thus to be established to reasonable accuracy and monitored through the course of the conflict as their relationship can be highly dynamic.

THE MORAL DOMAIN

The Moral Domain, as our earlier discussions have revealed, is more complex as well as the most influential. Its elements and in each, their constructs, are in themselves vast fields of debate. The moral includes the ethical, psychological, social, religious, ideographic, political, historical, expectational and the inter as well as intra cultural elements. We can reduce these to three separate categories namely: Cultural, Political and Ideographical. The political element here is confined to the aspirational influence on the polity. National aims and objectives are translated into political aims and objectives.

While the political aims and the strategies animated for their attainment ought to be in harmony with the wider public aspiration, at times this is not so. Vietnam is a case in point.




FIGURE 22: DIMENSIONS OF THE MORAL DOMAIN
(AUTHORS' OWN DIAGRAM)

Like any living entity, culture too is both resilient and dynamic. While some facets change in one period they may remain static over another. From the relatively short term perspective of strategy, the dynamic aspects are in a constant flux while the static are more resilient to the effects of ‘time slice’ and the changing environment. If we are able to reduce the dynamic and the static, the framework of change is potentially projectable and hence predictable.

When values that govern a set of decision today cease to hold relevance tomorrow, the interpretations of reality of tomorrow can be, in the worst case, paradoxical to that of today. For example, the Iranian Revolution had a profound impact on the vast majority of Iranians who in a very short span of time adapted, at least outwardly, to new values that the revolution brought.⁹ A similar case was argued by the Taliban in 1996 after their takeover of Kabul. However since theirs was an imposed values system, enforced through fear and punishment, it survived only the duration of the regime itself.¹⁰ Values alter when either the physical denominator or the moral denominator alters. For example, a struggle for particular natural resources is valid only as long as that resource lasts. Once secured, such ends only serve meaning during the life expectancy of the purpose for which they were sought in the first place. There is thus a ‘time value’ of victory.

THE CULTURAL FRAMEWORK

Nations do not usually embrace defeat in their mythology. Indeed, they do everything in their power to deny it or to turn the tables by imagining the victor as the loser of the next round of warfare.¹¹

Wolfgang Schivelbusch

The cultural framework deals with aspects of culture that are enduring and less volatile to short term change. It includes for example religious colourings, mythological influences and deep culture.¹² After its defeat in the Second World War, the German nation did not suddenly become repopulated by those that rejected the Third Reich. There were still those that rallied behind Hitler and cheered German successes in the war.¹³ Selectivity among parallel realities both of which are ‘true’ and thus, real, provide a possible explanation. Essentially, the two realities, the bivalence that operated therein, subdued the rational for the radical, once either is removed, the other takes over. A deeper probe on

how selectivity and dissonance interact in moral and ‘life-threatening’ situations could possibly explain the rapid transition.

Cultural framework is also embedded in religious, ideological, legal and ethical precept operating exclusively or collectively. It co-exists with the moral-temporal-physical framework but rests exclusively in the Zan dimension.

TEMPORAL DOMAIN

We have discussed that the dynamic elements are in constant flux with the present as seen through recent past; this can be negative, positive or indeed neutral. These conclusions were however based on the subjective influence of time. The Temporal Dimension is distinct from the effect of time discussed in the *Interpretational Physical* dimension. The primary difference is in terms of ‘time scale’ and ‘level of change’; distinguishing reflective change (recent and near recent events), spirit of the age and, revolutionary change – waves in history. The temporal domain has two parameters, the predictive and the reflective. Consider the following diagram:




FIGURE 23: THE ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
(AUTHOR’S ADAPTATION)

We can be reasonably, though not entirely, accurate in locating the parameters of the present environment through observation and assessment. Induced or analytical errors may still exist; nonetheless, assuming the cumulative errors are minimal, a reasonably accurate picture can be built.

When we try to predict the future environment complications emerge. Is the future likely to be built on the trends of the past? If so, are these trajectories linear? To what extent is the future environment dependent on trigger events that cannot be predicted? How risk resilient is the prediction, for example, trigger events such as 9/11 totally altered the strategic picture towards attainment or shaping of which many courtiers had mobilised resources in the period preceding the event.

Trigger events can be catastrophic as indeed the September 11, 2001 attacks (9/11) were for the USA and very quickly, the rest of the world. July 7, 2005 (7/7) for the UK had similar implications. Triggers generate volatility which can often go ignored or wielded to an advantage. Positive manipulation of volatility can alter the course of the future as it has done so for all of recorded history. The US and the UK used triggers to initiate a more proactive response which may otherwise have met severe criticism. The volatility justified the response. There are examples where triggers create contrary effect. For example, the March 2004 attack in Madrid was catastrophic for Spain. Instead of consolidating national and international resolve, this trigger forced major policy change, in this case, withdrawal of troops from allied effort against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.¹⁴ Triggers feed chaos and chaos generates volatility and volatility breeds challenges and opportunity. Volatility from its utility can be positive or negative.

The Predictive

Projecting into the future presents several possibilities that stem from inherent problems with crystal-ball gazing. Assume that one had the ability to travel into the future and with benefit of hindsight assess the environment obtaining at a given point in time. A fairly accurate assessment would be possible. However, since time travel has not yet been realised we can only guess or predict. In either case, if the outcome of such an exercise suggests an environment unacceptable to one's interests, efforts to alter or shape its course ought to be a natural outcome.

This accurate prediction is represented by the confines of the pink circle (actual future). Without the privilege of time travel, scenario building or other similar predictive tools allow us to generate possible futures. The assessed future, should ideally be a subset of the actual future' As we saw in the case analysis of World War II, leaders who were seeking a future that was not on the cards, ended up committing resources towards a world view that was not to be. Those, like the US and to an extent the USSR and China, who had a reasonably better perception of the possible future, were better able to plant their own place within it; thus synergising their potential and the environment in their favour.

The Reflective

The reflective temporal parameter concerns the impact of outcomes sought in the present and reflected for their utility and value in the future. Again, taking World War II as an example, strategies animated to create strategic advantage towards Britain's imperial compulsions were arguably time and resource wasting errors. Since the objective could never be realised as these were premised on a conception that lay outside the possible future (Assessed future – 2 the preceding diagram).

The impact of time can be evolutionary or revolutionary to the context. Time, more accurately the temporal framework can alter reality when it does so drastically, it can be said to be revolutionary and when the change is limited, it is evolutionary. A linearity of change is not implied in any of the conditions.

Time alters culture both domestic and international. It is also the medium in which change occurs in other fields. It is only logical that the temporal domain also impacts warfare by way of 'means, methods or ends'. The impact of the temporal domain can be 'Degradative' (in the contra-political ideographic sense); it can be a reflective or predictive change within a given context of the politico-military aspects collectively referred to as 'Creative', or it can be 'Mutative' (that is, a change of framework or perspective – shifting the goal post). The impact of Temporal Domain is expressed graphically in Figure 24:




FIGURE 24: IMPACT OF THE TEMPORAL DOMAN
(AUTHOR’S OWN DIAGRAM)

THE CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK

Interpretations of victory as too of defeat are embedded in the context defined by purpose. When the enemy offers no quarter, there is no bargain to be struck, the goals or contested positions remain indivisible, survival then become the objective, a subset of ‘Zan’. All material loss and pain that comes in the process of preservation of indivisible moral issues are immaterial. When division of the indivisible is sought by the enemy, to be not vanquished is to be invincible and thus victorious. If war is pursued in the realm of ‘Zar’ or ‘Zamin’, whether for material acquisition, resources, territory or its contemporary derivatives of trade and markets, the context is altered, bargaining models become relevant, cost-benefit analysis, the rational calculus of war and with it the application of normative logic, assumes an elevated position in assessing outcomes. Many conflicts however present elements of Zan, Zar and Zamin simultaneously (see Figure 10: Development of Conflict – A Comprehensive Model).

This overlap can be incidental or deliberate. For example, ethnic violence frequently has or ends up as having physical or territorial linkages, additional benefits that the victor or its supporters can accrue.

When two antagonists view the same conflict in different dimensions of war that is to say one sees the conflict as wholly moral (Zan) and the other as wholly physical (Zar and Zamin), both can emerge winners in their own ‘true’ realities. Both will be philosophically, culturally and even militarily correct.

The precondition for both to emerge successful is that their moral constructs must produce different realities. The other possibility is when one side seeks material gains while the other, purely ‘moral’ ones. This was the case immediately after the Battle of Karbala where physically Yazid secured a decisive victory whereas Hussein sought success in another domain. Similarly, every positive engagement of terrorists is described by the US and her allies as success in the struggle against terrorism yet, the terrorists themselves see these ‘losses’ as their success too. The driver again is the context. In summary, to an outside observer intimate with both realities, A’s success is also B’s success, only the contexts are altered.

THE EXPECTATIONAL FRAMEWORK

Embedded in culture, history, faith, leadership, instruments of power – both hard and soft – and history, every challenge—most of all war—builds among the leaders and the societies in conflict an expectation outcome. Observers too apply the same context to build their own expectation arguments. For example, after Gulf War 1 (1991) which in the application of US military power assumes the status of a symbolic event, any military campaign involving the US and its alliances is expected to mirror that symbolic event. People are generally not bothered with details and form their opinions based on what they see or what is presented to them. This is synthesised with their background on the issue and what they expect. Americans, therefore, came out of the Gulf War with a stature that was built in part on reality and in part on how that reality was fed.¹⁵ The perception of US power and its application against any hostile state creates internally and externally an image of a ‘cake walk’ for the US and a *fait accompli* for its enemies. An inability to master Afghanistan despite so much time and effort therefore runs contrary to world external and internal expectations. Small failures, just as in Vietnam, come to be seen as major setbacks, slow progress is seen as no progress and so on. High expectations are

dangerous as setbacks become exponentially painful. Lyndon Johnson learnt this from the Tet Offensive.¹⁶

We find therefore that there is an influencing notion at work, an ‘expectation argument’ rallying the moral and physical elements to predict an outcome. For those directly involved or intimately affected by the conflict there is an emotional component that amplifies like a rising torrent.

The Expectation Argument is influenced by history, past action theory, the physical as manifest in capability, the moral-cultural and psychosocial makeup of the peoples and groups in question. Its public outcome can take the form of political resolve, public resolve and emotional outbursts. The Expectation Argument directly impacts the contents and framework of competing realities and adds a moral colouring to the actual outcome. The argument can be broken down into three shades:

High Expectational Argument (HEA)

A HEA exists when a very favourable outcome is expected to yield from the conflict. In the Gulf War (1991), the Republican Guards were played up as an exceptionally potent elite force. In reality, this force was never used in meaningful numbers and made little difference to the outcome. It was the Iraqi Army that suffered the greatest casualties with up to 70% of the force and its best equipment destroyed.¹⁷ Despite the reversals of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), a high expectation coefficient was associated with this force by Saddam Hussein as well as the US intelligence community. Regular army units that were beefed up by the Republican Guards did give a better account of themselves.¹⁸

Soon after the war anti Saddam insurgencies erupted in Southern and Northern Iraq with Shia and Kurdish groups respectively. These groups backed their abilities against a demoralised Iraqi Army which was unable to manage the situation. In March 1991, the Special Republican Guards were sent to the rescue, Saddam as well as the CIA associated a high expectation argument with this force. It delivered. However, for Saddam and his support base in the country who associated a high expectation argument with the Iraqi Army as well, particularly against lightly armed, poorly trained, hurriedly mobilised rebels, the poor performance was a shock that shook Saddam and forced him to respond with his elite Special Republican Guards.¹⁹

In the Second Gulf War, elite force again became a centre of discussion, at least among the media. This time it was engaged and tested. It performed no better than the Army had done in the earlier encounter. Those that sympathised with Saddam Hussein quickly lost hope once the Guards units fell, the moral impact of the performance of this force was extremely negative. In the other camp, prior to any engagements, a natural safety valve was created for the advancing US forces. Had the Republican Guards managed to create a small dent, the lowered expectation coefficient would have served to justify the performance. Where domestic and international expectations are high, the scales are adversely tilted. Partial gains or strategic advantage can frequently be construed as loss or failure, stalemates as defeat and setbacks as reversals. Enemy's insignificant gains become material and significant.

An expectation argument is always present. If not induced or cultured, it develops from within, it is a product of our creative and predictive faculties, our need to be in control of ourselves and our surroundings. As an object of influence, it deserves special attention in shaping the environment. According a High Expectation Argument (HEA) to an enemy can yield quick moral dividends especially if the HEA is illusory.

Nurturing a high HEA among a friendly population is a great morale booster but can be a double edged, especially if the projected capabilities are false or fail to create desired results. When it works, it begets even greater emotional approval, as the essayist, novelist and historian, Sir Arthur Helps put it 'nothing succeeds like success.'²⁰ But when it fails, it causes a 'Vietnamisation' of the conflict.

Low Expectational Argument

Take the myth of David and Goliath, without the advantage of prior knowledge, a rational calculus of David's chances against Goliath would generate a very low expectation coefficient. One may praise David's courage and resolve; the predicted outcome would suggest David's defeat. Now, any outcome, that is a notch higher than that the expectational, even if David is 'defeated' or at best achieves a stalemate, would still be notionally David's success and Goliath's failure. Such victories become inspirational and the stuff of legends. Small gains take bigger meanings and the expanding effects of 'defeat' begin to impact the opposing side.

Common and Altered Expectation Argument (CEA and AEA)

When observers see a matchup as more or less even, a Common Expectation Argument applies. An ‘Altered Expectation Argument’ is the impact on the actual notional EA as a result of external factors such as psychological and information operations, media perspectives, motivation and indoctrination or false objectives. AEA is an object of information strategy while the other arguments its starting points.

SECTION 3: A DEFINITION AND TAXONOMY OF VICTORY

Having looked at the components of victory and their interrelationship, we are now in a position to proffer a grounded definition of victory in the military and the political context. This initial definition also serves to generically communicate the linkage between use of violence and the how the outcomes are expected to contribute to the purpose for that violence:

Military victory is the deliberate, consequential or incidental success accrued through direct or indirect use of the instruments of violence.

It provides useable political advantage that can be leveraged in concert with other elements of power to attain or advance ends of policy. Quid rei, it is the actual conversion of such leverage in to sustainable success or advantage consistent with the strategic environment and spirit of the age.

Author

TAXONOMY

The research has thus far collected all the elements that go towards completing the framework for a theory of victory. This chapter will assemble the various components or elements in to the three broad taxonomical first order roots of victory; that is to say the physical, moral and temporal domains. A graphical interrelationship of second order components to the three domains is illustrated below:



FIGURE 25: THE TAXONOMY OF VICTORY
AUTHOR’S OWN DIAGRAM

The inner triangle (Vc) presents the overall outcome of the three first order taxonomical components – the domains of victory which are depicted along the sides of the inner triangle. The second order components are reflected alongside their respective first order domain. The arrangement of the first and second order components is directly related to the three dimensions of war: Zan, Zamin and Zar. Not reflected in the diagram are the third and fourth order components of victory however the basic relational framework has been established and can be populated as required.

For war to be purposeful and manifest the essential limitations, it is desirable to draw it away from and contain war in the Zar and Zamin dimensions of war. As evident from the placement of the Zamin dimension, it has invariable tendencies towards Zan, hence the most ideal object of war that the above taxonomy suggests and one where victory is most easily created is therefore the Zar dimension.

Another important inference that such a relational placement of influential factors reveals is the role of the second order components, for example ‘Military Correlational’ in the Physical Domain. These central components serve as link fields to the more desirable (in this case military-economic) and the less desirable (special) components. Strategy can

potentially use these link domains as controlling mechanisms towards attaining the desirable and avoiding the less desirable.

QUALITY AND VALUE OF VICTORY: A FUNDAMENTAL FRAMEWORK

LEVELS OF VICTORY AND SHADES OF DEFEAT

Quantitative assessment of qualitative data is a complex and often misleading exercise. Qualitative data requires a framework that deals with shades and effects rather than numbers and quantities. To this end, Gray's dissection of three shades of victory²¹ in to three progressive levels is very useful. Strategic advantage, strategic success, and decisive victory can be used to sufficiently convey the quality of victory. Treating the levels as nouns and with the adjective of 'strategic' removed; we can develop a framework which lends applicability to all levels of war and politics. As a verb, adverbs can be attached to describe the process towards rationally calculated ends that do not necessarily seek nominal equivalence. In other words, a process or action is a complete success when it attains the objective it was intended to yield even though the objective was short of being decisive. A parallel notion in political science can be described as Realpolitik. This means: strive for, and attain, what a state *can* rather, than what it wants to achieve.²²

For a theory of victory however, the framework is incomplete. We need to extend this framework towards the direction of non-victory. With stalemate or status quo at its centre, we can apply similar logic of shades to the opposite side of a linear scale and using relatively similar shades. Loss, failure and reversal are nominally suggestive and hence adopted. The language of defeat is thus explained in following terms:

- **Loss**. This implies the conceding of politico-military advantage to the opposition which it can use as leverage towards non-critical and peripheral objectives,
- **Failure**. It is the ceding of substantial advantage to the enemy which allows translation of military setbacks into clear political leverage by the opposition
- **Reversal or Capitulation**. Reversal or capitulation suggests large-scale fallout for an aggressor or the respondent respectively. It is distinguished from failure by the significance in scale and scope of the leverage ceded to the opposition. When used in the context of the aggressed, the term capitulation implies a general collapse.

We can now graphically develop a comprehensive two dimensional framework for assessment of any one particular actor towards the quality of victory or defeat achieved by it or by the opposition. The primary concept is illustrated below:



FIGURE 26: A RAW ASSESSMENT SCALE
(AUTHOR'S OWN DIAGRAM)

The word 'defeat' has deliberately been avoided here. This is based on the findings on the context of defeat. Essentially strategy yields failure, success or stalemate.

It is important not to attempt to place more than one actor on one-side of the scale as that would imply that victory for one side and defeat for the other lie on a common continuum which is contrary to the findings of this research. However, by placing competitors on opposite sides of the scale two things can automatically be discerned: first is the relative achievement of both sides and the second, their interrelationship. For sake of simplicity, we will refer to one side as RED and the other as BLUE. Consider the diagram below:




FIGURE 27: THE DIALECTICAL CORRELATION OF OPPOSING PERCEPTIONS
(AUTHOR'S OWN DIAGRAM)

In the above diagram a linear relationship between side ‘Red’ and ‘Blue’ is depicted. The zone in the middle (between the two diagonal lines w-w’ and x-x’) indicates the existing stalemated position. The lines also suggest the tipping point where stalemate yields to either loss or advantage.

At the outset of a conflict situation, negotiation or war, the relative advantage enjoyed by either side is expressed by the offset of the starting points of each. Elements of power and strategies of incentive, persuasion, coercion or compellence are applied by the revisionist, in this case Red, to force the desired change. The object for the revisionist and the rejectionist is common, to side their present position rightwards towards the zones of success.

The angle of the diagonal line to the right suggests that Red would have to achieve more than blue to move into the field of ‘advantage’. Since Red is the revisionist, a status quo would signify success for Blue. While Red has to achieve more, Blue on the other hand, has to do comparatively little to achieve a position of advantage.

In a conflict where one side attempts to force change through violence (Red in the graphic above) while the other as first priority, only resists such change without additional agenda (Blue), an outcome that remains within the band of status quo is inherently success for the latter, since its core objective is fulfilled. The function served by the two diagonal lines goes beyond defining the extents of a status quo zone and needs to be examined in detail. It is clearly a relative function which could range from being common, or say a value of ‘1’ to being more or less for one or the other side (a fraction for one and a number greater than one for the other). Whether we use quantitative or qualitative prefixes, what we are essentially doing is ascribing a ‘Notional Assessment Factor’ (NAF) to each side.

The framework is incomplete unless it is linked to the dimensions of conflict established earlier. In a race for flags with both sides evenly matched, the competition is entirely for Zar. The NAF is even or common. However, in a war where the very existence of one side is threatened or any of its indivisible values, the war takes the dynamic in the Zan dimension. For Blue and Red, the NAF would create a very large gap. The following graphic illustrates this point:




FIGURE 28: RED – BLUE CORRELATION IN 'ZAN' DIMENSION
(AUTHOR'S OWN DIAGRAM)

Note the offset of the scales for Red and Blue as well as the exaggerated gap created by the NAF. Short of decisive victory, there can be little available to side Red to leverage for attainment of political objectives in the post war bargain. Red either annihilates Blue or must settle for failure. For Blue on the other hand, the field of play is much larger, more to give, more capacity to accept losses and yet only a small gain may push the marker to attainment of strategic advantage and beyond. The asymmetric moral effects of the victory on the losing side discussed earlier in this section come into play.

When the conflict is more complex that is to say that each side has an agenda beyond the status quo, each belligerent, aggressor, agressed, tugged or impinged may seek a wider political agenda. We saw this in the case of the Second World War where beyond defeat of the Axis Powers, Britain, USA, Soviet Union, China and France – to mention the main five – each had a specific post-war agenda. This agenda played a significant role from the emergence of this alliance of interests till the fall of Berlin and Tokyo. The comparative nature of objectives and intended war outcomes means that Red and Blue produces a relative notion of success and advantage. In Zan domain, Blue will define victory cheaply and Red is invariable set a more demanding outcome.

The NAF determines the degree of temporal and physical space between the shades through the angle and orientation of the lines depicting it in the above diagram. For example, two parallel vertical lines depict both Red and Blue have a symmetric or

common NAF. The space between the lines, the ‘NAF Gap’, represents how expensive or cheaply the transition out of ‘status quo’ or ‘stalemate’ is ‘notioned’ by either side. The wider the gap towards any given side, the greater the effort, investment, effects and outcomes needed to proceed out of the commencing state.

Taking Nazi Germany as an example, despite the popularity and public support that Hitler may have enjoyed from his subjects, essentially in a controlled information and insulated environment regime, the power elite can effectively ‘hijack’ the public opinion and the masses. This can be through psychological operations, indoctrination (to which the youth are most susceptible), incentives, or fear. In such a case, Hitler and Saddam Hussein serve as good examples. ‘Defeat’ of the regime does not necessarily imply a defeat for the people. This is because there is an internal latent conflict situation enclosed within an external, more apparent, conflict.

It is on the NAF that the cultural as well as the Expectation Frameworks bear their influence and with it alter the space between its positive and negative extremes.

STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF VICTORY

The survey of literature and the case studies allowed us to provisionally conclude that military victory does not guarantee political success. We also find that with multiple lines of operation, which are essential for any good strategy, political success does not necessarily require a resounding victory in war. The fine tuning of each line of operation and synergising the various lines is far more productive. In theory, Victory cannot be complete unless it is attained in requisite measures in all, or at least the dominant, of its three domains: the physical, the moral-ideographical and the temporal. While the fundamentals of victory identified in the previous chapter, namely: *attainability*, *sustainability* and *usability*, refer to the end state, they are equally useful notions to assess each line of operation and its value towards creative victory.

An explanation of the fundamentals follows:

Attainability

Attainability relates to the ways and means to an end and is to be found predominantly in the physical domain. This is but one part of strategy, the easier and obvious part. Military victory in Iraq was, according to the then US President, Mr George W. Bush, ‘attained’ on 2 May 2003.²³ It was automatically concluded that this

would swiftly translate into a political victory. We find however, that the victory was neither militarily nor politically attained since the former, as Clausewitz tells us, is only complete when the enemy is no longer able to resist. In Iraq even military victory was incomplete and prematurely declared since the defensive operational cycle for the Iraqi resistance was not complete.²⁴ Seen from the point of view of the attacker, the offensive operational cycle was also, obviously, incomplete since the attack failed to defeat the opposition's final initiative – in this case an asymmetric counter offensive.

Sustainability

Sustainability is the key to victory. Any victory that is not sustainable, at least for the minimum period of its utility and advantage intended to be accrued from it, is inconsequential and merely a temporary comfort. Sustainability of victory depends on all three domains that is to say, the moral, temporal and physical. Strategy frequently ignores the sustainability aspect beyond the physical domain and concentrates primarily on the attainability fundamental.

Sustainability is simple to explain and theorize but complex to manifest in strategy. This is because it to be found in all three domains of Victory and is a highly subjective notion. The subjectivity can, however, be rationalised to immutable principles, provided a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the conflict and its accurate placement in the 3Z (Zan, Zar, Zamin) trinity is used as a backdrop to the analysis of the strategic environment and the development of threat scenarios therefrom.

Usability

This fundamental demands the correct reduction of a desired set of interest to mutually contributing objectives along different lines of operations. The synthesis between selecting appropriate strategic lines, the relative value of each in contributing to the overall aim and the objectives for each line is a complex three dimensional equation that strategy – both military and non-military – must balance. Three basic questions need to be answered: 1) what exactly is to be achieved, 2) how much or in what degree or intensity and, 3) for how long the environment thus created is to be sustained.

We can conclude that, focusing only on the attainability aspect renders victory to chance and frequently, if not invariably, result in pursuit of time and resource intensive notions of

success that may, when seen as a whole, be mutually non-contributing or worse, counterproductive. The common symptoms of ignoring sustainability and usability at the political level are prolonged or secondary conflicts, lack of ownership, disharmony and panic. For the military this appears in the shape of poor resourcing, mission creep, loss of purpose and de-motivation. The ultimate result is erosion of public and political support.

SECTION 4: THE THEORY TESTED

What can the individual learn from history? Not what to do, but what to strive for. And what to avoid in striving. The importance of seeing clearly.... To face life with clear eyes – desirous to see the truth... while achieving such conditions as to enable a man to get the best out of life, is enough for ambition – and a high ambition. Only as a man progresses towards it, does he realize what effort it entails, and how large is the distance to go.²⁵

Basil H. Liddell Hart

Having established a theory and definition of victory, we now move to the next stated objective, that of verification. Additionally, the application of the taxonomy as well as the assessment framework provides a further opportunity for explanation of its usage. As highlighted in the introductory chapter, verification essentially falls outside the requirements of grounded theory however, since our research was premised on secondary analysis we can revisit and reanalyse the data in the light of the theory established in this chapter. Additionally, a look at the global struggle against terrorism from one possible terrorist group's perspective provides a complex and deviant case for analysis.

CASE STUDIES REVISITED

Presented here are post analyses of two case studies. Since we now have a theory, these are no longer deviant cases but paradigm cases. While the remaining case studies have also been validated through the framework, they are not produced here since the object is the validation of the theory and not conclusion of the case.

THE BATTLE OF KARBALA

We know that the battle was waged in a culturally symmetrical environment however under two distinct ideological leanings. These leanings had already begun to divide Arabia after the death of the Prophet Muhammad among two clear poles, on the one hand were those that saw no role for the progeny of Muhammad in the religious or political affairs of the land and on the other, those that saw an inalienable allegiance to the

‘Imams’ and the progeny of Muhammad as the primary source for spiritual guidance. A third sub group also saw a political role for the Imams. A victory for Yazid would be a victory for the former school while that for Hussein, a victory for the latter two. Let us assess the same in the physical domain:

Factual Physical: $P_f = f$ Effects (Spatial + Correlational + Material). We know that in terms of territory, remaining military capability and material gains, Yazid secured a decisive victory. This extended also in the economic, diplomatic and political fields over the short term (approximately 1 year in this case).

Interpretive Physical: $P_i = f$ (Time x Change). In this the coefficient of change was exponentially negatively charged. As time went by, the interpretive physical began to see Hussein’s loss as a supreme sacrifice for a just and principled cause. This naturally created a negative trend that overshadowed the overwhelming physical success Yazid had so carefully managed.

In the final analysis physical victory which we established as $V_p = P_f + P_i$, yielded a negative value owing to a negative (–ve) x *Time* yielding a larger negative ‘ P_i ’ in relation to ‘ P_f ’.

The moral domain which began to kick in as early as the arrival of the battered remnants of Hussein’s household in Syria. As more and more people became aware, the ideological and moral-political context began to overshadow custom and culture yielding a decisive victory for Hussein. However Yazid was not defeated, neither was the Umayyad dynasty established by his father. It did, however, eventually result in the assassination of Yazid and transfer of power outside his household. The house of Muhammad became a force which now drew wider allegiance and would eventually overpower much of northern and eastern Arabia, Persia and Central Asia.

The temporal domain was highly mutative; degradative for Yazid and creative for Hussein. It would eventually culminate into the Shiite’ school as a distinct and progressive branch of Islam in contrast to the Umayyad school that was eventually to go on and profess a literalist approach. Today this literalist school can be found in shape of the ideology that feeds groups like, *inter alia*, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

The Battle of Karbala shows that in ideological conflicts, the temporal domain is by far the most significant and the most important. If the object of war is a lasting peace and not a temporary gain, such conflicts must address and, as far as possible, be kept out of the ‘Zan’ sphere. The strategy laid out needs to ensure, as a minimum, victory in the temporal framework of policy.

THE VIETNAM WAR AND PARALLELS WITH AFGHANISTAN

The operational level of war ties individual battles towards the ends of the war, and the war, in turn, through the strategic level ties the outcome to the political objective. Militarily the US scored several victories in the 1965-1975 Vietnam War. In Vietnam the US planning to win, was from the very start strategizing how not to lose. The political objective was premised in the belief that the fall of South Vietnam would have dire consequences and an instant – or, at any rate, short-term, politico-military objective was to prevent such an outcome. Both Kennedy and Johnson avoided the question of whether to accept the true costs of victory or defeat.

A surge in US commitment, it was hoped, would cause the Communists to cease and desist. The point that both administrations missed was that while the US was fighting a limited war - at least in terms of the total means at her disposal, for the Vietnamese, it was a total war in the first degree. As our analysis in Chapter V show, the US efforts to indigenize the war only pushed it further in the ‘Zan’ domain (see Chapter V, Case 5b Vietnam War). With the security and integrity of North Vietnam guaranteed, there was no scope for disaster. Despite their military losses, and purely because of the nature of the war, the Vietcong fought the war in a very large band of advantage the NAF was positively charged for the Vietcong and created a huge gap for the US. Once the US had committed herself to the surge, there was simply no room for an ‘honourable’ exit without first creating a semblance of Victory. This is illustrated below:




FIGURE 29: VIETCONG AND THE IMPACT OF THE ‘ZAN’ DIMENSION
(AUTHOR’S OWN DIAGRAM)

With a NAF gap as large as the one that existed in Vietnam, the relationship was loaded in favour of the Vietcong in the moral and the temporal domains. We find that, as the war progressed, and battles lost linkage with the political objectives and began to assume logic of their own, the temporal domain became mutative. Military success began to be viewed with scepticism and the People–Military–Government trinity lost its coherence (see Chapter V, Case 5b Vietnam War).

Although in the physical domain, the US maintained without any doubt an upper hand. The Vietnam War was lost to the Vietcong in the moral – temporal domains. For the US it was no worse than a stalemate in terms of effects.

An assessment of the war from the expectational perspective is also important. The expectational framework which perceived Vietnam as a mere ‘pacification’²⁶ as opposed to a ‘proper war’²⁷ soon took a polarised view of US military capabilities and its inability to attain victory envisioned by the politicians or that expected by the American public. The media, the body bags and images of helpless Vietnamese civilians for whom the US forces were no comfort, soon took a moral – political turn and with it, any chance of victory, even a cheaply defined notional success, became remote.

When a ‘Zar’ conflict is deliberately or accidentally pushed into the ‘Zan’ dimension, it is Zar, and with it political rationality that gives way and the conflict assumes an indivisible totalistic character. The troughs and lulls, are not to be mistaken for ‘turnarounds’ in the conflict continuum, but respites, bound towards new summits.

For the US, Vietnam was a rational war fought for rational ends. For North Vietnam, it was more total in character. A war that started out as a rational-realist conflict descended early into the 'Zan'. Competitions in the 'Zar' and 'Zamin' are interchangeable and exhibit a fluid character but as these 'interest' begin to contest in the 'Zan', war assumes or begins to exhibit a different character. From the rational, it tends towards the total where the stakes, the ones that begin to drive the violence, are indivisible and thus apolitical.

This progression is inherently dangerous. Unlike ends in 'Zar' and 'Zamin', where the cost and gains bear intimate relationship and hence keep the level of violence as well as the objectives bargainable, hence divisible and regressable, in 'Zan', there is little or nothing to trade since every bargain hits at the moral, psychosocial and cultural fabric of the society concerned. War descends along an irreversible path – a one way transfer to the total, the absolute.

The pre-theory of defeat arrived at in this research (see Chapter IV, Section 1) tells us that an absolute victory is not possible unless the enemy accepts defeat with all its implications, preconditions and commitments it carries or is vanquished. Contemporary wars, and the projection of war in the foreseeable future, do not suggest a return to the sort of notion of victory or the treatment of the defeated that Alexander the Great or Hannibal might have carried. Wars with limited objectives can produce decisive victories, albeit such victories are not complete in themselves, but are, nonetheless, an essential step towards the ultimate objective of war – to force our enemy to concede to our will. In contemporary wars, victory and defeat will be relative to the object of the war and the object itself constrained by the nature of victory attainable. Political purpose must dominate the strategy which must clearly understand the notion of victory and non-victory on both sides and only having done so can strategy truly balance the ends sought with the means available

Victory can mean different things at different levels. Tactical victories do not carry the same defining characteristics as victory in the operational or strategic plane. If this difference is not understood, war becomes a bloody and attritional affair. Such strategy for war robs victory of the benefits that should accrue from victory. The argument presented for the effects of victory and failure in the Falklands war for Britain and Argentina respectively is a case in point (see Chapter V, page 211).

The temporal dimension of victory tells us that translation of ends to the notion of victory must look beyond the horizon. Victory that retains a positive physical and moral meaning through time is better than one that outlives its utility before the objective life of the policy it served is ended. Physical victory that is not quickly translated into ideological success and an acceptable failure for the opposition will tend to flow towards the volatile temporal mode.

Victory in war and political success are related but not synonymous. Defeating the enemy is desirable but not essential. However, if defeat of the enemy is essential for policy, the defeat must be achieved along the physical and the moral domains simultaneously or sequentially. The concept is explained in Figure 30:




FIGURE 30: DEFEATING THE ENEMY – A PRE-THEORY
AUTHOR’S OWN DIAGRAM

From a theoretical perspective, defeating the enemy physically would not usually be sufficient. Military victory and political victory bear a complex relationship. This raises a fundamental question for strategy – the need to relate nature of political leverage with the scope and quality of military victory. To know exactly what is to be accomplished, to visualise the end before the beginning – what Clausewitz points out as the first, the foremost and most supreme act of judgment.²⁸

In the conduct of war, the defender and the attacker follow certain distinct set of action that tie the opposing wills – animated through defensive or offensive operations – to a common framework, the decisive battle²⁹ where the enemy's defeat is sought both physically and morally.

A typical offensive cycle may comprise a preparatory manoeuvre followed by the assault which may then have to beat back the enemy's counter offensive and finally destruction and exploitation of the enemy follow. A defensive cycle would comprise the preparations for defence, the attrition of the enemy, the main battle followed by the destruction of the enemy through the counter offensive. The counter offensive is critical to both the offensive and the defensive cycles. For the offensive, the ability to defeat the counter offensive and thereafter destroy the enemy and be able to exploit the gains is the basic measure of success. For the defender, a successful counter offensive marks the destruction of the enemy's offensive potential and hence is a measure of a successful defence.

Seeing the whole enemy and not just his armed forces as a system, the counter offensive can come in conventional or an unconventional mode.³⁰ The latter to sustain itself needs external³¹ support, For example, after the rapid fall of France in 1940, the French resistance movement constituted elements of the civilian population and members of the defeated French military that escaped capture.³² The resistance did not have the capacity to destroy or evict the enemy or cause major setbacks, as would be expected from large scale counter offensive; however it had the capacity to keep the Germans unsettled and engaged. To succeed, this movement needed leadership and external moral and material support. De Gaulle provided the former while the allies, the latter. Similar analogies can be drawn from the Vietnam War, Korean War, Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). What we see in asymmetric warfare is not a digression from the conventional operational cycles but a transformation of the war from conventional to the irregular form where, for the stronger military, the counteroffensive comes as a slow long attritional bleed. Theory of asymmetric warfare needs to remain cognisant of the character and form of the counteroffensive, its aim and purpose.

Consider the following diagram:




FIGURE 31: CREATING VICTORY – A PRE-THEORY
(AUTHOR’S OWN DIAGRAM)

Figure 32 above depicts two possible progressions of a *Physical Victory* achieved through the use of military instrument. The clockwise progression (broad green arrow) draws the physical ends achieved – most significantly the interpretational component thereof since that includes cultural underpinnings – through the ‘Temporal domain’ in a creative mode leading to the positive notional end indicated by the green space in the victory notion (‘V’ where the quantum of green portion represents the quality of notional victory in the victory zone). The second scenario – anti clockwise progression – depicts early influence of cultural, ideographic and political dimension over the moral domain resulting in a victory influenced more by moral perspectives as opposed to tangible ends that violence can attain. This can of course be either positive or negative. In either case, the impact of time can be progressively mutative and a potentially volatile state of victory is achieved, one that can easily transmogrify into a defeat of nominal or phenomenal proportions.

The third case, is a relatively linear translation of the physical ends into the notion of victory, that is to say, the physical outcome broadly defines the notional outcome. This is of course the simplest case where a level of ‘V’ is attained corresponding to the quality of

physical victory. Even in such a direct arrangement, there can be some degree of negativity manifest in emotional undertones, objections over means and/or methods – as indicated by the band of red in the Victory zone. While the theory of victory provides the tools for assessing how the physical is likely to be interpreted as too, more importantly, how it can be tailored to be interpreted, it remains up to strategy to be first cognisant of this dimension and, subsequently, intimately animate itself according to the desired progression and notional implications in the transition and interpretation of victory.

We have rejected the ideas of total victory (described as comprehensive, absolute and complete victory) as a notion that may only be relevant at tactical level or in minor engagements (see Summary and Conclusion to Chapter IV, p. 174). Wars in the 21st century would continue to serve complex ends where success could also accompany failures and the only sure gauge of victory would be the quality of its service – the leverage earned – for policy.

Victory is a function of the ‘age’. It cannot be, and should not be, separated from its social and cultural meanings. We have already seen the manifestation of culture and the creative or degradative influence of time on the physical domain of victory (see Conclusion to Chapter IV, page 174 and Chapter VI, page 262). We have also proffered some possible answers to obvious but pressing questions, inter alia, when is the enemy defeated? Which is that point at which operations, if stopped, would yield the bargain sought and their further continuation would not yield any considerable purchase (as the economists put it, the law of diminishing returns) for a better bargain? Additionally a, deliberate study of cultures and the notion of success and failure among peoples and polities has thrown up answers to the paradox of the physical and the notional that premised this study. Where does all this take us? We identified in Chapter III that while an enabling environment is essential for any military undertaking, it is the post war environment that is wholly or in part, the ultimate objective of violence.

Chapter Notes and References

¹ Douchan Gersi is a Slovak-born, Belgium-raised, Los Angeles-based documentary filmmaker and author, producer/star of *Explore*, a PBS mini-series. He is the author of numerous books including *Faces in the Smoke: An Eyewitness Experience of Voodoo, Shamanism, Psychic Healing, and Other Amazing Human Powers* and *Explorer*. Douchan Gersi cited in Simran Khurana, about .com, 'Quotes on Victory: A Collection of Quotes on Victory', internet, <http://www.quotations.about.com/cs/inspirationalquotes/a/victory2.htm>

² Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit., p. 253.

³ Ibid., p. 271.

⁴ Ibid., p. 80.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 254-255.

⁶ There are several versions of the saying. John F. Kennedy cited one at a news conference in 1962. His version was 'There's an old saying that victory has 100 fathers and defeat is an orphan.' See J. F. Kennedy, 'News Conference', 21 Apr 1961, in *Public Papers of Presidents of U.S.*, p. 312. Also available on line, Internet, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/index.html>. Another version is 'Victory has a hundred fathers, and no one acknowledges a failure.', G. Ciano, *Diary 1942 -1946*, Vol II, p. 196.

⁷ 'Will' is a product of psychological and physical motivators. It is garnered through the existence of means towards attainment of an end. These means are physical, moral and emotional.

⁸ 'Hope' implies a loss in faith of the elements that generate 'will'. It is far more fundamental and elemental in its origins and outcomes. It is more psychological and less physical.

⁹ H. M. Keshavarz, 'Forms of address in post-revolutionary Iranian Persian: a sociolinguistic analysis', *Language in Society* No. 17, 1988, pp. 565-575.

¹⁰ William Maley ed., *Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan Under the Taliban* (NYU Press, New York, 1998), pp. 2-3.

¹¹ Wolfgang Schivelbusch, op. cit., p. 60.

¹² Steven Van Evera, 'Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,' op. cit., pp. 5-39.

¹³ Frank M. Buscher, 'Kurt Schumacher, German Social Democracy and the Punishment of Nazi Crimes, *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1990, pp. 261-273.

¹⁴ Spain had been a close ally of the United States, It sent 1,300 troops to Iraq. The incident triggered Spain's pull out from the 'physical' support to the Allied 'post war' effort in Afghanistan. See Micheal J. O'Brien, 'Al Qaeda's Victory', *The Wednesday Report: Canada's Aerospace Defence Weekly*, Vol. 18, No. 14, March 31, 2004, internet,

<http://www.thewednesdayreport.com/twr/twr14v18-Al-Qaeda.htm>, accessed 6 May 2009.

¹⁵ Adrian R. Lewis, *The American Culture of War: A History of US Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Routledge, London, 2006) pp. 349, 347, 351-352.

¹⁶ Suite101.com, 'Barry Vale, Lyndon Johnson and the Tet Offensive: Media Coverage of Vietnam Fuelled Anti-War Protests in US', internet, http://modern-us-history.suite101.com/article.cfm/a_military_victory_but_a_political_defeat#ixzz0FHvn7oGW&A, accessed 6 May 2009.

¹⁷ National Intelligence Council, 'Iraqi Ground Forces: An assessment', declassified CIA document, NIC-M91-10003, CIA Achieves, Nov 2005, accessed May 2006.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. iii,1. See also Christopher D. Bellamy, *Expert Witness*, op. cit.

¹⁹ Christopher D. Bellamy, *Expert Witness*, op. cit., See Chapter 9 'Aftershocks'.

²⁰ Implying that success breeds more success. While its origins are unclear, the earliest print appears to be by Sir Arthur Helps. See Arthur Helps, *Realmah* (1868), (MacMillan and Co., London, 1868), p. 68.

²¹ Colin S. Gray, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory*, op. cit., p. 12. See also author's discussion in Chapter V, 'Relativity Framework'.

²² Realpolitik is based on practical and material factors rather than theoretical or ethical objectives. See *Meriam Webster Online Dictionary*, op. cit., s.v. 'Realpolitik,' accessed 6 May 2009.

²³ Matt Frei, 'Bush declares victory in Iraq', *BBC News*, internet, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2989459.stm, accessed 3 Nov 2008.

²⁴ This was touched upon in Chapter V, Case Study 2. A theoretical discussion on this aspect is taken up in Chapter VII, Section 1.

²⁵ Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Why Don't We Learn from History?* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1946), p. 11.

²⁶ Richard Nixon, op. cit., pp. 104-107.

²⁷ The logic for a distinction between war and pacification becomes apparent here. See *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, op. cit. s.v. 'war'.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 88-89

²⁹ The decisive battle, that is to say, defeating the counter offensive, can by one's own or the enemy's design, occur at two places, either after attaining the strategic objective, or by the drawing response at an objective point of manoeuvre before attaining the strategic objective. Exploitation in either case will usually follow.

³⁰ I would like to thank Major General (now Lieutenant General) Khalid Nawaz Khan, the Commandant at the Command and Staff College, Quetta for pointing me in this direction

and sharing the possible mechanics of an unconventional counter offensive.

³¹ External here implies outside of the system. For example Britain's support to the free French movement and Al Qaeda's support to Iraqi Insurgencies or the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban are supports external to the system being supported.

³² The French Resistance movement is an umbrella term which covered numerous anti-German resistance movements that were based within France. There were resistance movements that took direct orders from the Special Operations Executive, there was the communist resistance, groups loyal to de Gaulle, regional resistance movements that wanted independence etc. In the north, the target was simply the Germans while in the south, the Vichy government was a target as well as the Germans. The first resistance movements were in the north, such as the OCM (Organisation Civile et Militaire) and by the end of 1940, six underground newspapers were being regularly printed in the north. In May 1941, the first SOE agent was dropped into northern France to assist the work of the resistance. The French Resistance supplied the Allies with vital intelligence reports as well as doing a huge amount of work to disrupt the German supply and communication lines within France. See 'French Resistance Movement', *History Learning*, Internet, http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/french_resistance.htm, accessed 13 Nov 2008.

CHAPTER VII – INFORMING POLICY, STRATEGY AND ACTION

Nothing vital to the nature and function of war and strategy changes.¹

Colin S. Gray

INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses the second part of the aim set for this inquiry, that is to say, how our comprehensive theory and definition of victory can guide strategy? We begin by taking a cue from the findings of Chapter VI, the impact of contemporary notion(s) of victory on policy, and how policy utilises instruments of power towards realisations of objectives. Colin S. Gray asserts that ‘nothing vital to the function of war strategy changes.’² Alongside the time trusted and enduring principles of strategy, alluded to in Gray’s argument, the application of an informed theory of victory and applying its basic fundamentals may not change elements vital to strategy but it will certainly affect the approaches to it.

We have thus far looked at strategy simplistically as the relationship between ways – means and ends. While this argument holds its own in any definition of strategy, it is inherently insufficient as it neither provides the essence of, nor presents the challenges to strategy. Strategy controls war³ and in doing so not only informs objectives, sets priorities but also defines the very purpose of war, its scope, intensity and the vigour with which it is to be pursued.

This chapter explores the influence of the theory of victory on applied strategy.

SECTION 1 – RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICTORY AND STRATEGY

Clausewitz states that the purpose of war is to make the enemy do our will.⁴ It is interesting that while Clausewitz lays considerable emphasis on the concept of absolute victory, in defining or identifying the purpose of war he links it to ‘will’ rather than victory. The clarity of Clausewitz’s thought is impeccable. Victory, unless complete, absolute or total does not guarantee any particular degree of compliance from the enemy. Victory is achieved by merging what the policy wants with what is possible. Prof. James Mowbray, a member of the faculty of the US Air War College points out that:

Chief among those policies to be settled upon by the political leadership is selection of national objectives, such as ‘what is our goal in the course of military operations,’ and ‘what should the world look like after the smoke clears.’ The national objectives in the model are national objectives for the nation whose strategy is under consideration, or a coalition objective, and may be thought of as the objective for which the war is being waged. It is a result of policy from the political leadership at the national level, influenced by military inputs to both the objective making process and to the strategy, or strategic plan. That input is primarily what the military tells the civilian leadership it can and cannot accomplish at the level of military strategy. In cases where there are allies involved, their input to the coalition objectives and the strategic plan (strategy) will strongly influence what may or may not be undertaken. Be careful to distinguish between formal alliances between nations, and informal arrangements which spring up on short notice. They do tend to work differently.⁵

In modern military parlance, selection of objective and maintenance of aim within the available means or resources is among the crucial strategic decision.⁶ This decision is often complicated by an objective analysis of the political aim that may be abstract, specific, stated as an effect or a desired end state. Since militaries deal in violence, translation of a politico-military aim, end state or objective is an art and not an exact science. Take the Gulf War – 1 for example. One of the criticisms levied against Colin Powell has been the premature termination of war whereby Iraq’s will to resist or continue further violence was not fully removed.⁷ Colin Powell presents a rational explanation to this premised on the aim and objectives spelled out to him and his translation of these into clear military objectives.⁸

In the 2003 Gulf War, some theorists present the opposite argument. The revised objective of regime change was prosecuted with excessive infrastructural damage that made the post-war obligations for the allies an enormous challenge.⁹ This not only raised the scale and scope of the post war obligations for the US and her allies but also cast a doubt on who the ‘good guys’, were? The, ‘destructive’ liberator promising a government of the people for the people by the people;¹⁰ or, the ‘oppressive’ the old regime in spite of its shortcomings.

Defeat, as we discussed in Chapter VI (see Figure 21), is complete when, in the moral domain, both will and hope are lost and in the physical, means and time are lost. As long as the enemy retains hope and a will to continue, the available means, however meagre, will invariably be applied in a most effective mode at hand. This is precisely in keeping with the ends – way – means approach, or more appropriately, ‘revised ends’, ‘expendable means’ and ‘most profitable ways’. The ends in this form need not be decisive as long as time is bought and the enemy bled in the argument. While this form of war will seldom yield decisive victory or strategic advantage, it does ensure that a side reduced only to ‘hope’ in a clash of arms, travels clockwise along the defeat continuum to defeat’s least decisive form – that is only the means to attain victory. Given time and sustained external support, asymmetric counteroffensives can defeat even the most determined of enemies as was shown by the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union.

Arguably, the rapid infrastructural collapse of the Iraqi government and the system of force of the Iraqi armed forces as well as law enforcement agencies and the civil administrative dispensations rendered state organs ineffective. The absence of a formal surrender whereby the allies could have taken charge of whatever remained of the country meant that every singly institution had to be raised afresh. The enemy that melted away into the common masses re-emerged to launch a counteroffensive in an unconventional mode.¹¹

SECTION 2 – THE ENVIRONMENT: SCOPING VICTORY

A point that has repeatedly been made is that Victory finds specific meaning in the context and spirit of the age. The strategic environment projected through time is at best an informed guess. Britain, as discussed in the case study on World War II, consumed the entire first phase of the war towards realisation of a post war environment where her Empire strengthened or at least survived. The argument is abstracted in the following graphic:




FIGURE 32: THE CREATIVE ENVIRONMENT
AUTHOR'S OWN DIAGRAM

When an actor analyses the possible future environment, one of three things can happen. The first is an accurate projection of the future and correct rendering of the effectual strategic environment with a set of objectives or interests required to be achieved over a period of time ‘*t*.’ In assessing the strategic environment, the sum of opportunities and challenges need to be crystallised from the time of initial assessment ‘*t*₀’ up to time ‘*t*₁’ when results are desired and ‘*t*_f’, the duration for which the effects must continue so as to accrue the desired advantage, three possible scenarios emerge:

In the first scenario, a reasonably accurate picture of the possible future, identifying the main challenges and opportunities occurs. The play of friction, chance and opposing will are also abstracted and an embryonic assessment of the required change emerges (indicated by the green arrows marked ‘E₁.’)

In the second scenario, some errors in assessment of one or more of the variables result in a misperception of the future environment and, in turn, the impact on one's interests. This ‘*False*’ assessment is described by the dotted blue oval.¹² Efforts assessed as necessary to shape the desired future would either be misdirected, or misplaced.

In the third scenario, a deliberate effort is made to project a ‘*Faked*’ future. This faking could be for many reasons for example, to rally additional support and resources, build alliances or in a more sinister mode, cover own weaknesses and failure. By projecting a future that suggests the undesired faked outcome as indicated in Figure 33, the supposed attainment of the actual undesired future can be projected as success. This supposed success is achieved through effort E₂, against an imaginary opposing will E₃. Whereas in actual fact, it has arrived only at the undesirable end of the true realm of possibilities, unable to withstand threat E₃.

We can use the diagram to explain Al-Qaeda's strategic objectives, strategic approach and its generic design for achieving the organisation's aims and objectives. The principal objective of Al-Qaeda from which all other intermediate objectives flow is ‘puritanical Salafist Islamic reform in Muslim societies and the necessity of armed resistance in the face of perceived aggression.’¹³ The Al Qaeda professes a barbaric image of the West and its allies.¹⁴ Its disciples, the ‘mujahidin’, work towards the desired future with minimal guidance – mission type approach. Their strategies, synergised by the inherent advantage of the minimalist, are win – win. Since their object bears no relation to the methods and, at times, even the targets or their violence, victory is to be found in being heard, noticed,

feared, accommodated and tolerated. The rest is achieved through the incremental nature of their political agenda. With every small achievement, the cycle begins again.

SECTION 3: WAR INITIATION AND WAR TERMINATION

WAR INITIATION

A country's decision to initiate a war is at least as much influenced by political as by military considerations. Such a decision is also based on domestic, regional and global political variables. Indeed, a compelling set of political circumstances must emerge before a country thinks seriously about war initiation. To put it another way, the mere existence of conditions, that from a military viewpoint, favour war initiation, is not by itself sufficient to use war as an instrument of change. In 1967, for example, Israeli leaders would not have thought about war initiation if a number of Arab countries had not first engaged in a series of very provocative actions that directly threatened Israel's security. Similarly, in 1973, Egyptian and Syrian leaders would not have thought about war initiation if they had not been deeply disturbed by the prevailing territorial and diplomatic status quo. In short, a country's decision to initiate a war is always complex, and what follows is not intended to deny this reality.

We find that when parties to a conflict no longer see the existential political approach yielding fruitful results within a cost – gain scenario, they invariably explore other options to resolve or address the issues. A decisive war or a conflict short of decisive ends is not usually an obvious choice, but remains a political option in the bargaining process.

Opting for war as an arbitrator brings a number of preconditions or factors that the initiator invariably considers. These mostly deal with the moral, the cost – benefit and long term effects of the undertaking. For the weaker state, war avoidance is usually the most preferred option. War avoidance, however, is not possible without yielding to some of the core demands of the potential aggressor; it, therefore, premises on concessions or regression. When such concessions themselves strike at the core values of the weaker state, war avoidance may no longer be possible. Notwithstanding the power differential, the weaker, or smaller, threatened state, in such situations, may itself initiate a defensive or pre-emptive war. The Arab – Israel War of 1967 is a case in point. Victory is measured in the ability to prevent or limit the adversary's anticipated war potential and would be deemed as decisive if war aims and objectives of the stronger state are foiled.

War has never been an easy option, even for the most powerful. An actor that sees resort to war at some point in the future as a likely political consciously creates or shapes the environment to facilitate the nature of its possible future undertaking. This of course would be one of many strategies developed and one of many kept in the active list.

Today's conflicts and wars, even internalized conflicts are fought in an increasingly globalised and interdependent world. Strategy must remain cognizant of the external influences that curtail the initiators liberty of action and move decisively to create windows of opportunity through triggers that create the required volatility in the strategic environment (see Figure 12, page 114).

War initiation strategy needs to be animated well in advance to permit adequate time for various instruments of national power to achieve the desired effects thereby enhancing the liberty of action of the initiator. This will invariably involve external manoeuvres and other initiatives to limit the choices of the aggressed entity. A preliminary exercise may involve:

- waiting for or creation of internationally acceptable moral grounds for use of force,
- identification of the nature of war and its aims and objectives consistent with the obtaining environment / international and regional climate,
- identification of a desired end state and possible end states that may result, including exit strategies,
- a cost - benefit analysis followed by a provisional decision to include war as a bargaining option, and
- a capability development strategy that seeks to enhance relevant elements of national power, gives credence to coercive strategies, deters threat adventurism and creates material as well as psycho-social conditions for prosecution of war.

Once the above is set in motion war initiation may follow. The process could develop along a liner or non-liner continuum that includes display of:

- moral high-ground (even if selective) among the influential regional and international actors,

- strength in essential elements of national power,
- a discernable edge (even if notional) in military capability (moral, physical and intellectual),
- continual offers to negotiate – giving peace a chance – even if only a façade,
- create casus belli legitimizing the transition from peaceful bargaining to violence,
- mobilisation of forces may precede or succeed the casus belli, either as part of the bargaining process or on purely military considerations of time required for assembly, and
- deliberate pauses may be injected to aid the bargaining process.

In the above political context, military strategy will invariably be called upon to:

- psychologically dominate the enemy and aid in negotiation, evolve employment and development strategies, demonstrate and communicate military capability,
- undertake, complement or supplement low intensity conflict,
- transit rapidly and efficiently from peace / hot diplomacy to war,
- identify military objectives towards attaining political ends of violence,
- undertake focused military operations,
- develop military operations in a manner that they can be regulated to complement application of other elements of national power, and
- obtain position of discernable / clear advantage at the end of hostilities to aid favourable political settlement of war / conflict.

INTRA-WAR DIALECTICS

The term-intra-war deterrence was introduced by Herman Kahn in his seminal 1962 work entitled *Thinking about the Unthinkable*.¹⁵ While it encouraged much debate and criticism in nuclear parlance, it has some relevance in the conventional context. In political choices for policy advancement we talked about four options or loosely speaking – strategic choices namely: incentives, persuasion, coercion and compellence. The status quo power,

confronted with the threat posed by the aggressor responds with either regression, concession, deterrence or punishment.

Let us have a look at the coercion dynamic:




FIGURE 33: THE COERCION DYNAMIC
(AUTHOR'S ADAPTATION)

Deterrence operates predominantly in the framework of coercive strategies though it has understandable overlap in compellence too. The flow chart (Figure 33) represents the basic deterrent equation:

$$\text{DETERRENCE} = \text{CAPABILITY} \times \text{WILL} \times \text{COMMUNICATION}$$

EQUATION 7: DETERRENCE
(AUTHOR'S OWN ADAPTATION)

The flowchart suggests that while a response may be expected by combining the three pillars of deterrence, in reality, the process is more involved. Each of the three components is processed by the deterred party through a set of filters which either reinforce or weaken the deterrent value of the entity. This process of filtering yields a

perceived will and a perceived capability. It is this deterrent that is processed for risks before a response is initiated.

The flowchart applies to all forms of conflict including LIC and asymmetric war. If deterrence fails, forces may be called upon to fight. The nature of the fight can vary widely, depending on the scope and intensity of the operation. Specific operations will also be characterized by different approaches, varying the mix of objectives among coercion, prevention compellence, and intra-war deterrence:

Intra-war deterrence is important in cases where the enemy has the capacity to expand the conflict beyond the scope within which it was preferred to be contained. This objective demands both superior military capabilities at higher rungs on the “escalation ladder” and a rational adversary.

WAR TERMINATION

Absolute war seeks the destruction of the enemy (total defeat) and with it prevents continued or future resistance to the political object. Consequently, the destruction of the enemy's military and political viability is a reasonable means of achieving the political goal. However, in wars with limited objectives, the post-war landscape must be shaped prior to and during war termination since the opposing government will generally not be eliminated. Consequently, questions regarding post-war relative strength in-theatre must be addressed upfront rather than after the fact. Tradable military gains and the ability to pursue violence, causing serious or unacceptable damage will often constitute the most important bargaining tool.

Because the post-war environment must be considered and often shaped while conducting the current operations, difficult choices are presented in campaign planning at the strategic level and for the aspects of military necessities for the operational commander when attempting to terminate war.

As articulated by Fred Ikle, ‘for any war effort...that is supposed to serve long-term national objectives, the most essential question is how the enemy might be forced to surrender, or failing that, what sort of bargain might be struck with him to terminate the war.’¹⁶ In addition to simply terminating the war, to attain victory, it is important that both short-term (the original political goals) and long-term (post-war balance of power) interests are served. Since it is at the operational level of military strategy that all aspects

of the war effort are impacted, a review of theoretical aspects is necessary in order to provide insight on how the termination effort can be favourably influenced.¹⁷

The discussion thus far has been on aspects germane to war termination at the strategic plane. Let us now turn to practical aspects in thought and action that could assist the military strategic and operational aspects of war termination.

Clausewitz’s theory of war termination advanced the concept of culmination point of attack at the operational level and culminating point of victory in the strategic domain. When neither side can bring a war to a decisive military conclusion, Clausewitz suggests that both sides must end the war through negotiations, ‘we see then that if one side cannot completely disarm the other, the desire for peace on either side will rise and fall with the probability of further success and the amount of effort these would require. If such incentives were equal for both sides, the two would meet half way. If they grow for one side, they would diminish for the other. Peace will result if their sum total is sufficient – though the side that feels lesser urge for peace will naturally get the better bargain.¹⁸ Handel illustrates this in the following manner:




FIGURE 34: WAR TERMINATION AND THE STALEMATED WAR: VIOLENCE WITHOUT PURPOSE

SOURCE: MICHAEL I HANDLE, *MASTERS OF WAR*¹⁹

The two questions that emerge, both the rational and irrational calculus, are 1) what is the ideal condition to begin negotiating? and, 2) what is the ideal time for negotiation?

The strategic environment is charged and multifaceted in any form of war; it is particularly complex in asymmetric or limited wars. An understanding of the effectual environment is critical to the appropriate application of any instrument of power and more so the military. If successful war termination is to be achieved, particularly in conflicts that exhibit elements of 'Zan', a positive control on both war and how progression of war feeds back in to the environment is essential. Information operations can serve to create the required space but may not be sufficient without the controls alluded to earlier.

Problems at the military strategic and operational level are:

- the political objective is often unclear, unclearly stated or incoherent with the military instrument,
- less than complete surrender of the enemy – decisive victory – usually demands a direct, usually immediate relationship between means and ends,
- the political purpose is more resilient than the objectives. As such objectives are subject to change as diplomatic and military activities alter the perceptions of politicians (own, allies and enemy),
- "national will" is a factor which often works against the politics of war, especially if a nation's physical security is not directly threatened during the violence,
- consideration for shaping of the post-war environment can set in motion unintended consequences that may directly impact war termination strategies, and,
- the enemy's willingness to negotiate (and ultimately accept agreeable termination conditions) will not only be impacted by the current military situation, but will also by perceptions of future diplomatic and military success or failure.

An initial strategic assessment should relate military capabilities to political objectives. This is absolutely essential towards successful war termination. The factors to be considered are:

- A clear understanding of political objectives. To this end, first, as Clausewitz argues, that the military commander should ideally be a part of the cabinet to ensure that political objectives are understood and can be addressed by the military instrument. It is also imperative that, at the operational level, the relationship between such political objective(s) and the military aim is clearly understood and conveyed. If this understanding is lacking, the misapplication of the military instrument is almost certain to follow with dire political and military consequences resulting.
- Ability of the military instrument to achieve stated political objective(s). given the resource and political constraints that will apply during a limited war, this issue is often overlooked as both politicians and military leaders focus on the means of conducting war versus the larger strategic question of whether the military instrument can, in fact, deliver the political objective.²⁰ When this situation occurs (or a situation where resources provided appear insufficient), the military must advise political leaders upfront that the ability of the military instrument to deliver the political objective is suspect.
- Focus the military instrument in a manner that will achieve the political objective. Traditional military thinking has often focused on battlefield victory with minimal attention to achievement of the political end. All elements on national power must contribute effectively towards the ultimate objective. Each ‘line of operation’ will usually have its own point from where the role that it must play in war termination must be set in to motion. This is illustrated below:




FIGURE 35: CALIBRATING WAR TERMINATION AND LINES OF OPERATIONS

AUTHOR'S OWN DIAGRAM

- All military battles must be carefully woven into the tapestry of the campaign and the campaigns into the progression of the war. ‘A battle won should count on the plus side only if it fits into a larger design for ending the war on favourable terms; otherwise it might have as disastrous consequences for the winner as did the battle the Japanese won at Pearl Harbour.’²¹
- Above all, the military instrument must be applied as a coercive lever to achieve political ends, not simply as a means to defeat the enemy's armed forces. It is the quality of leverage attained by the military instrument is proportional to the quality of victory.

Chapter Notes and References

¹ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, op.cit., p.1.

² Ibid.

³ Gray advances six inherent controlling mechanisms in war the first is ‘Cost’, the second ‘Policy’, the third ‘Strategy’, the fourth ‘Power’, the fifth ‘Fear’ and last in this thesis not the least, ‘Culture’. Neither is exclusive, each exist in an essential unity with the others regulating and or regulated. See Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future War*, op. cit., p. 363.

⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit., p.75.

⁵ James A. Mowbray, ‘A Primer of Strategy Analysis’, *Military Theory Series*, US Air War College, Internet, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/mowbray/mowbmodl.htm>, accessed 10 Dec 2008.

⁶ Maintenance of Aim and Selection of Objective are principles of war commonly adopted by many countries including Great Britain, United States, Russia (as too the ex Soviet Union), China, India, Pakistan. See National Defence University, *Principles of War*, (NDU Press, Islamabad, 2003), pp. 1-6 and Annex A, p. 67. See also, Christopher D. Bellamy, *Evolution of Land Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Rutledge, London, 1990), p. 14.

⁷ George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1998), p. 488.

⁸ Bobby Inman et al., "Lessons from the Gulf War," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 15, Winter 1992, p. 70.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ The phrase is attributed to Abraham Lincoln. It was part of his famous ‘**Gettysburg Address**’, one of the most quoted speeches in United States history. It was delivered at the dedication of the Soldiers' National Cemetery in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on 19 November 1863. See Abraham Lincoln, ‘The Gettysburg Address’, *The History Place*, internet, <http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/gettysburg.htm>, accessed 11 November 2008.

¹¹ Major General Khalid Nawaz Khan, produced from transcripts of discussions on ‘the Completion of the Defensive Operational Cycle in Gulf War II’, Command and Staff College, Quetta, Pakistan, Mar 2006.

¹² It may be noted that while the diagram shows that this space also include the environment that would eventually be realised (orange circle – *Possible Future*), the error could in fact lead to an assessment that visualises only a subset or the *Possible Future* or, worse, excludes partially, or entirely, the *Possible Future*.

¹³ Christopher M. Blanchard, ‘Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology’, *CRS Report for Congress*, updated July 9, 2007, internet,

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32759.pdf>, p. 2, accessed 3 May 2008.

¹⁴ See, for example, the contents of an alleged Al Qaeda training pamphlet found by Manchester Police. A scanned and translated copy is available on line, internet, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf, accessed 9 May 2009.

¹⁵ Herman Kahn, *Thinking about the Unthinkable* (Horizon Press, New York, 1962)

¹⁶ Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War Must End* (Columbia University Press, New York 1991), pp. 17-18.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit., p. 92.

¹⁹ Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War*, op. cit., pp. 208-212.

²⁰ The Vietnam War provides an example of military activity being so constrained (no invasion of North Vietnam and no bombing of sanctuaries for much of the war) that the political goal (of retaining an independent South Vietnam) was virtually impossible to achieve from the start.

²¹ Fred Charles Ikle, op. cit., p. 43

CHAPTER VIII – MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

So here we are, at an age of movement; global movement. Everything, in a strategic sense, is in a state of flux, and we can make of the new world whatever we will. ...instead, I find a totally new world of chaos and adventure. All things are once again possible; both to win and to lose.¹

Gregory R. Copley (2008)

For millennia, policymakers and statesmen have grappled with questions about the concept of victory in war.... How long does it take to achieve victory and how do we know when victory is achieved? And ... is it possible to win a war and yet lose the peace?²

William C. Martel(2007)

INTRODUCTION

At the time of taking up this research, there was little research that could yield a specific or general theory and definition of victory. This vacuum was both a challenge and an opportunity. During the course of this research, from October 2004 till May 2009, and to an extent the phase of writing up the theses that extended till July 2010, more and more research and empirical data became available. William C. Martel in *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy* which appeared in 2006 presented a pre-theory of victory and concluded his work with the comment that this ‘... is a preliminary framework for discussion among scholars and policy makers of the factors that apparently are related to what we may mean by the term ‘victory’. He however pointed out that ‘the central problem for scholars is to sharpen the language that governs what victory is and what it has come to mean for the current generation of policy makers, so that discussions of war can be conducted with much greater rigour and clarity.’³

This thesis, from the outset, intended to go beyond that threshold and was designed to advance a comprehensive theory and definition of victory. It also charted a distinctly different path to arrive the findings presented in the preceding chapters. This chapter outlines the major findings of the study and their implications for policy and strategy. It also identifies areas that beg further study in the light of this research and enumerates the contours and thrust lines for such studies.

OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED

The essential elements of a wholesome theory according to Gregory D. Foster are adequate terminology and definitions; premises, assumptions and limitations that underpin the theory; substantive propositions translated into testable hypotheses; and methods to test the hypotheses and modify the theory as required.⁴ The last element is essential as it gives theory a living quality, the strength to learn and adapt. All of the above have been aptly addressed within the scope set out for this research.

The stated objectives of developing a theory and definition of victory and relating the theory to the realm of praxis are fully realised. The language and grammar of victory as well as defeat has also been adequately developed to allow for a more scientific and structured frame of reference to complex issues and notions that hitherto remained ambiguously addressed.

THE LANGUAGE OF VICTORY

In addressing the various components and facets of victory, a comprehensive scientific vocabulary emerged ranging from specific forms of reference to the belligerents, constructs of victory and the domains to sub theories, terms and definitions of interrelated subjects. The vocabulary developed remains representatively precise yet sufficiently vague to serve the requirements of disciplines of social sciences.

In Chapter 1 and IV, we began with a set of definitions of victory *quid nominis*. Having identified and argued the inadequacy of a simplistic view of victory, Historical examples (case studies) were used to demonstrate that not only were such definitions arbitrary and insufficient but also paradoxical to the purpose, utility and strategic value of victory. Premised on the correlational physical context, these simplistic definitions neither required nor were capable of substantive proof and hence did not result from cogent theories. These definitions were turned into definitions *quid rei* through postulates.⁵

By way of complementary theories, The 3Z philosophy of war – which potentially unifies the origins of conflict, causes, nature, character and prosecution of war and the notion of victory in a single dynamic – is posited along with specific and precise language (see glossary of terms) to serve as a foundation for developing and refining related terminologies of victory and defeat. While the model for unifying war through the 3Z

philosophy remains inherently theoretical, it does present basic lines of thought that lend themselves to further critique and development.

THE GRAMMAR OF VICTORY

We have advanced an intimate relationship between the nature of war and the notion of victory and found that the more a conflict tends towards the ‘Zan’ dimension, the more indivisible is the bargain and as such the meaning of victory alters to an extent of making reversals – short of total annihilation impossible. Similarly, wars of interest and wars of survival produce their own brands of victory with the latter spiralling towards the apolitical model of war and the notion of victory invoked by the indivisibility of the bargain. Thus far GWOT appears to be straying deeper into an indivisible mode, it will be a long drawn and permanent affair, something that subsequent generations would continue to grapple with.

Military victory does not guarantee political success and neither does political success necessarily require a resounding victory in war; often a notional defeat can be more rewarding than a perceived victory condition. Such is the notion of victory. We have found that Victory is never complete unless it is attained in requisite measures in all, or at least the dominant, of its three domains: the physical, the moral-ideographical and the temporal. This trinity brings to fore the fundamental principles of Victory: the attainability, sustainability and usability of the victory condition. We find that attainability – the ways and means to an end – is but one part of strategy, sustainability – both moral and physical – is the aspect strategy frequently ignores. Addressing the fundamentals of victory allows every aspect of strategy to contribute to the larger notion of victory as opposed to pursuit of time and resource intensive impressions of success that may, when seen as a whole, be mutually non-contributing or worse, counterproductive.

The theory of Victory serves a dual purpose. It unites victory *quid nominis* and victory *quid rei* and, more significantly, informs policy, strategy and the military art right through the spectrum from war initiation, war-fighting, war termination down to the post war environment and obligations of the victor. If correctly applied, the theory boasts the ability to prevent mission creep, poor resourcing, lack of political direction and control and above all the need to seek a redefinition of objectives midway through a conflict.

THE LANGUAGE OF DEFEAT

In a quest towards understanding victory, a basic theory of defeat was developed. We found that defeat is set only when ‘will’ and ‘hope’ are abandoned or critical time is lost. Loss of either critical time or hope implies that the aims and objectives that generated the conflict or war can no longer be attained and as such, space for initiating or continuing a rational war is lost.

A theory of defeat is meaningless unless it tells us something, adds to a better understanding and explanation of the past, or more profoundly, guides policy and action. We discovered that defeat, to the defeated, is entirely in the mind - a ‘mental’ state, whereas to the victor, the other-side’s defeat is constructed largely in its physical dimension. The ‘mental state’ is often erroneously construed through the physical. In combating terrorism, for example, the failure of coercive tools – the collective term for military and other elements of power that expound threat of physical loss and suffering – to subdue or eradicate the ‘will’ towards acts of terrorism is largely due to this misunderstanding. Israel frequently adopted punitive actions with the aim of defeating the terrorist’s ‘will’ and alter their behaviour; an approach that falls squarely in the realm of deterrence by punishment. They succeed only in diminishing the means and gaining time; the will and hope endures and glorification of ‘victory’ acts only as a catalyst for a new breed of enemy, a crop that sees terror tactics as the only available way forward.

THEORY SUMMARISED

In contemporary wars, victory and defeat are notions relative to the object of the war but the object itself constrained by the nature of victory attainable. The theory of victory presented is underpinned by a direct linkage between ‘desired ends’ and the ‘to be attained ends’ – the notion of Victory consistent with the nature and character of war. The value of victory revolves around three fundamental principles of attainability, sustainability and usability. A careful synthesis of the political aims, the applied means or elements of national power towards carefully considered ends within a risk matrix consistent with the cost – benefit of the probable and the possible is a complex equation that strategy has always sought to address. It continues to be so, indeed nothing fundamental or elemental to strategy has changed. A more structured and wholesome comprehension of victory helps inform the basic elements of the strategic equation. It informs the ends of military and other national strategies. The theory potentially guides

each element of power towards the quality of leverage they must provide in their respective physical, moral and the temporal contexts. Approaching strategy in this ‘ends first’ approach, allows every action to contribute to the larger notion of victory as opposed to pursuit of meaningless and costly success that may, when seen as a whole, be mutually non-contributing.

The theory induces a complex paradox by stating that victory and defeat lie in different continuums. This suggests that efforts to achieve one’s own victory and to convince the enemy that it has been defeated may need to be assessed separately. A favourable bargain is not possible until the other side concedes leverage (to be found from within in that side’s notion of success and failure.) It will usually not be sufficient to symmetrically apply one’s own precepts to the other side.

The notion of Victory is a synthesis of the physical and the moral suspended through the ever dynamic medium of time and the spirit of the age. The impact of the latter two can be from minimal to profound and one that ties the physical and the moral to an eternal trajectory of change. Within each of these domains operate a number of tangible and intangible dimension or elements. The domains, as too the elements therein, are neither watertight nor do they have any exclusive role beyond the tactical level. The higher the level, the greater the osmosis and complexity of relationship between the parts. A full taxonomy of victory can be found in Chapter VI, page 281 – see Figure 26.

To allow quantification of moral factors in notional appraisal of victory, the concept of and *Expectational Framework (EF)* that comprises high expectation argument, low and common expectation argument, has been advanced and serves to effectively reduce a set of complex variables to a three useable contexts: HEA, LEA and CEA collectively referred to as the expectation framework (EF).

An organising framework for assessment of victory and defeat has been expanded from a basic model to a more comprehensive tool for prospective and retrospective analysis. The ability to scale the quality of victory or magnitude of failure in useful measures along a continuum that can be applied to oneself or the enemy is powerful aid for strategy and analysis. The measures of victory ranging from stalemate to advantage, success and decisive victory on the positive axis and of failure/non victory from loss, failure and reversal/capitulation on the negative axis is universally applicable and should serve as a powerful tool for the strategist as well as the academics (see Figure 27, page 272). This

framework was adapted to represent war in various dimensions of 3Z and led to the important conclusion that when one opponent fights in the ‘Zan’ dimension and the other in either or both of the other two, a notional victory is far more likely and more cheaply premised for the Zan entity as opposed to the Zar and Zamin. This is because Zan bargains are generally indivisible and less likely to yield a consensual acceptance of defeat. The graphical tools provided in aid of the theory, allows many such inferences to be drawn based on sound prearrangement of the variables, constants and coefficients built in to the framework.

SECTION 2: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND STRATEGY

Understanding victory and a formal theory of victory allows for better strategies and indeed approaches to international competition. Redefining winning is like shifting the goalposts! We find that actions of statesmen and generals in pursuit of military victory and political leverage sought there-from are governed by the peculiar prevalent notions and paradigms of victory. These paradigms and notions are formed in the yoke of the domains of victory and the interplay of their component parts.

Clausewitz defined strategy as the use of engagements or combat, or the threat thereof, for the purpose of war.⁶ While a sound strategy is the surest way towards victory, the purpose of war is political leverage that is typically proportional to the quality of victory. We saw in the bargaining model, it is the nature and quality of this victory that defines the position of strength that the victor brings to the bargain and it is this strength that is leveraged in exchange for public and private goods, the ends of policy. Clausewitz reminds us that ‘the original means of strategy is victory—that is tactical success; its ends, in the final analysis, are those objectives which lead directly to peace.’⁷ Smaller victories accumulating and contributing towards the attainment of the final objective - the desired peace.

This research has provided one full cycle of generating postulates on victory. The theory presented is scientifically grounded and both methodologically and practically – through the medium of verification – sound. It also dwelled at length on how policy can be shaped and strategy tuned to attain its purpose efficiently and effectively.

SECTION 3: OBSERVATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

We have seen the practical utility of this research as an aid to policy and strategy. The theory of victory outlined is supported by a comprehensive set of terminologies and definitions. However, the inquiry needs to extend vertically and horizontally and be subjected to open criticism from scholarship, strategists and the student of the military art before its foundations can truly settle. There are invariably certain premises and assumptions in any predictive study. Some of the aspects that merit mention are listed below:

- The major challenge came in the form of a lack of benchmarking for theory developing and theory building on a subject such as ‘victory’; a word so commonly used and apparently intrinsically well understood.
- In realizing the objectives, there was little direct research available in the literature; however, some parallel inquiries did appear in print during the course of this study.
- There are inherent limitations and problems associated with prospective analysis and prediction, particularly in cultural and anthropological studies. Assessment and quantification of variables has a natural tendency towards assuming the researchers perspective and may not accurately take into account cultural dissonance.
- There are obvious problems associated with treatment of qualitative data and association of mathematical values to notional arguments. Methods and approaches refined through game theory may potentially provide more accurate answers. These approaches, being out of the scope of this research, were not considered. Instead ready coded data was used towards secondary analysis. Linked with this, induced errors due to possible biases inherent in the source data cannot be ruled out.
- A relatively narrow band of time has been used to generate empirical axial data. There is a definite need to probe vertically and horizontally in time bands to see how notion of victory and warfare evolved, and which, if at all, drove the other?

- Development of a hypotheses built around the original thesis statement and the inclusion of additional hypotheses that emerged during the course of theory development have the potential danger of inducing circular logic where one set of hypotheses and presumptions supports other set of hypotheses and presumptions. A conscious effort was made to guard against this by including external validation which is not intrinsic to the approach followed for theory building.
- In addition to case based validation, empirical tests and modeling was not used to validate theory. Although grounded theory does not require rigorous validation since the process of theory development takes that into account, nonetheless, modeling and scenario based analysis could lend addition substance to or further improve the theory.
- Informing theory through secondary analysis can only be as good as the original data. While efforts were made to use diverse sources and opinions on all major areas of the study, such inclusions have been by no means exhaustive.
- There is a need for assessment of end states and the use of pre-theory and post theory secondary analysis to inform notional outcomes in a more scientific and comparative manner.
- A good theory requires a self-informing and modifying framework. While this has been established to some extent in the taxonomical approach, the rules of business and guidelines need to be further evolved.
- The study has remained predominantly focused on use or threat of use of violence. Other elements of power have been identified however, owing to the limited scope of this treatise, these were not adequately addressed.

SECTION 4: RECOMMENDATIONS

In the course of the research a number of areas that require a deeper and more deliberate analysis also emerged. Below is an inducted topical summary that suggests broad areas for further study:

- The cross cultural variations in the notion of victory. A look at individual cultures through the prism of history and that society's response to stimuli of outcomes.

Essentially based on secondary analysis of existing data and historical data, it would serve to identify the Expectational Framework (EF) and the Notional Assessment Factor (NAF) as well as the essential components of the Cultural – Ideographic context.

- Notion of Victory and the War System – Are there alternatives?
- We find that the minimalist is in a win-win situation in the physical plane as well as the narrow cultural context of the moral plane:
 - What strategy is needed to defeat the minimalist’s design and how can the three faces of such strategy be animated namely: the minimalists and its sympathetic group, the affected groups and the world at large.
 - How to approach the minimalists in the moral plane.
 - What is the impact of engagements on the enemy and what purpose do engagements serve for the object of the campaign.
 - What exactly is the notion of victory for various non-state and sub-state actors? Are the overt causes correct or are there underlying personal motives that need to be understood?
 - How do conventional gauges of victory and defeat affect a sub or non-state actor’s cause?
- Victory is a function of the ‘age’. It cannot be and should not be separated from its social and cultural meanings. When is the enemy defeated? Which is that point at which operations if stopped would yield the bargain sought and their further continuation would not yield any considerable purchase on a better bargain? We know that the answer exists. It just needs to be found. A deliberate study of cultures and the notion of success and failure among peoples and polities may well prove to be a very useful exercise.
- Some secondary hypotheses emerged during the research, these found intimate linkage with the research and while generally conclusive arguments could be rendered, they did open up new avenues for research. These listed below:

- The structural progression which suggested that the concepts of victory and defeat have changed with changing times in a direct relationship with the spirit of the age.
- The change in the meaning of victory is proportionate in nature, with the waves of change, in character, with the socio-political environment and in intensity, with the cultural precepts governing the societies in conflict.
- The notion of victory has continually acquired new constructs that have either added onto or replaced those that existed before and, more importantly, that this process of acquisition, addition and relegation has not been linear or consistent across the myriad cultures, peoples, social groups and ideologies. This finding offers immense scope for a cross cultural research to determine the notional coefficients of assessment of victory and the inherent tendencies of their war to ease into or remain out of the more complex 'Zan' dimension. Such a study can provide valuable data linking peoples to cultures and nations in an anthropological sense and nation states, regions or dominions in a political sense.
- Each major change in the notion of victory brought its own social and political perspective on war, broadening or narrowing its scope in terms of the level and content of violence as well as its nature and character.
- A disaggregated approach to understanding victory and defeat, a lack of structural framework as too the exploration of perspectives on the dimensions of war as condensed by the societal and cultural influences to the context of the 3Z, is victory's and defeat's true measure. Simply stated, all internalized concepts of victory are measured against how the outcome relates to the 3Zs (Zan, Zar and Zamin) on the scales of success and failure; all else is temporal, a passing phase, be it a low one or high.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The notion of victory that governed war and conflict through violence and diplomacy, one that Clausewitz had so veritably summarised, finally ran asunder when confronted with a new brand of ‘real’ wars where military logic of compellence became overshadowed by the globalisation and de-nationalisation of interests, war and conflict. If the nature of war survived the change, the nature of inter-state and intrastate politics arguably did not, the impact on the place and purpose of war and coercive use of national power was certainly profound. While the change began as early as the middle of the cold war, it went unnoticed and largely ignored as states and militaries went about their business as they had always done. It was the increasingly paradoxical outcomes that began to emerge in the 20th century that forced military planners, strategists, analysts and statesmen to question the validity of the ‘Clausewitzian’ paradigm.

This research has presents a modern and living theory that encapsulates traditional precepts, adds new ones and simplifies the complexities that have come to surround the notions of victory and defeat in contemporary times. Its real value however is to be found in the realm of praxis, where, its application is more an art than a science. It is hoped, the theory would allow calibrated means and the ends to be placed in a cyclic relationship with one moderating and informing the other within an overarching framework of the notion of victory, its attainability, usability and sustainability. It is a contemplative and not prescriptive formula that provides an idea of influences if not answers, effects if not strategies and a concepts if not doctrine.

The theory is by no means exhaustive, nothing is. Critique and challenge of the simplest to the more complex ideas contained in this treatise is fundamental to the evolution of the theory of victory and its application. It is through re-evaluation, continuous appraisal, debate and application that this effort can evolve into competing or complementing theories and sub-theories.

Chapter Notes and References

¹ Gregory R. Copley, ‘Grand Strategy in an Age of Tactics,’ op. cit.

² See William C. Martel, o. cit., pp. 308 – 309.

³ Ibid., p. 292.

⁴ Gregory D. Foster, ‘A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy,’ *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 13, Issue 1, Winter, 1990: pp. 43-59, this p. 43.

⁵ As Saccheri observes that such provisional definition serve no purpose and for their true value to be realised, they need to be turned as quickly as possible into definitions *quid rei*. See Girolamo Saccheri, *Logica Demonstrativa*, op. cit., pp viii- ix

⁶ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, op. cit., pp. 128, 177.

⁷ Ibid., p. 143.

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APPENDIX A – METHODOLOGY

RESEARCH METHODS AND METHODOLOGY

An overview of the human quest for knowledge and the scientific approaches developed towards its attainment is considered essential for any meaningful research. This is a vast subject even when narrowed down to a study of areas relevant to this study and therefore what follows is only summary of a much wider body of knowledge. This research is qualitative. The term qualitative research is applied variously in different fields. In the social sciences, qualitative research provides an approach for understanding the world and to construct meaning out of experiences. Epistemologically qualitative methods are not intended to invent a viewpoint; instead, they only attribute ideas in order that we can truly understand motives, reasons and actions.¹

From a Philosophical perspective, this thesis deals with theorising the phenomenon of victory. Subjectively, this implies the ‘abductive’² epitome of victory with a perspective on both the academic and the practitioner’s context to be also synthesised towards developing a comprehensive theory. A Grounded Theory approach was adopted as it provided the necessary tools to address, in varying degrees of application, the complete context of the study.

GROUNDED THEORY

Grounded Theory is a qualitative methodology which derives its name from the practice of generating theory from research which is ‘grounded’ in data. It was formally introduced in 1967 by the sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*³. Subsequent developments – particularly after Glaser and Strauss started working independently – yielded two distinct theories. Whereas many of the central components the theory as outlined in *The Discovery* (including constant comparison, theoretical sampling, coding procedures), survived, many subsequent publications by Glaser and Strauss began to reflect important differences in how these scholars envisioned grounded theory and its use. With the schism in theory, two somewhat distinct methodologies have evolved; both based on the original 1967 work and each with its own underlying epistemology and attendant properties.⁴ This inquiry is not a classical manifestation of either methodologies but adopts precepts of both while being

closer to Glaser's approach as set out in *Basis of Grounded Theory Analysis*.⁵ This is because for Glaser's version appeared to be considerably more flexible and adaptable, being guided primarily by informants and their socially-constructed realities.⁶

HOW GROUNDED THEORY WORKS

A summary of the salient features of grounded theory is presented below:

- Grounded theory is, and has been applied in this thesis as a general method of comparative analysis.⁷
- It is designed for handling, manipulating and interoperating any kind or mix of data, is multivariate, readily modifiable and particularly useful with qualitative data.⁸
- The methodology is particularly useful for analysis linked with data collection that uses a systematically applied set of methods to generate an inductive theory about a substantive area.⁹
- The methodology is repetitive and, therefore, self-corrective.¹⁰
- The theories developed through the methodology can be advanced towards conceptualizing an integrated set of hypotheses.¹¹
- The theory itself is based on a concept-indicator model, which directs the conceptual coding of a set of empirical indicators.¹²
- Grounded theory uses a three level approach: the first level is the data; the second level perspective is the conceptualization of the data into categories and their properties and the third level is the conceptual perspective analysis.¹³
- The methodology builds theory from data, hence the name grounded theory, and is then illustrated by characteristic examples of data. It is useable for descriptive (or narrative) and empirical data.¹⁴

Grounded theory uses the classical methods of logical reasoning namely induction, deduction and the more recent addition, 'abduction'¹⁵. However, for validation, the

internal processes of grounded theory have been supplemented by methods proposed by Liz Spencer et. al. in *Quality in Qualitative Research*.¹⁶

The use of narratives as data lends itself to a degree of philosophical scepticism but nonetheless presents valuable input to any discourse on the human condition as Dr. David Carr of the University of Illinois, points out: ‘it reflects widespread contemporary resistance to reductionist, empiricist and naïve realist conceptions of the relationship of knowledge to the world’¹⁷ On its utility for research, despite the lack of scientific scrutiny of such text, he asserts:

[I]t is a timely and welcome reminder that human discourse can be meaningful in ways not reducible to the empirical data of natural or other science. It also reflects, however, the deep significance for personal and social self-understanding — not least for moral agency and identity — of stories of moral or other human agency: humans perhaps more readily conceive themselves as actors in the dramas of life, than as passively manipulated processes of blind material forces.¹⁸

DATA PROTOCOLS IN GROUNDED THEORY

At the heart of grounded theory analysis is the coding process which consists of three types: open, axial, and selective.

OPEN CODING

This is the initial process which involves breaking down, analysis, comparison, and categorization of data. In open coding, incidents or events are labelled and grouped together via constant comparison to form categories and properties.

AXIAL CODING

Axially labelled data represents the delineation of hypothetical relationships between categories and subcategories.

SELECTIVE CODING

This is the process by which categories are related to the core category ultimately becoming the basis for the grounded theory.

GROUNDED THEORY AND LOGICAL REASONING

Reasoning is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy as ‘any process of drawing a conclusion from a set of premises.’¹⁹ It is a process of using existing knowledge to construct explanations, draw new or additional conclusions or make predictions. Qualitative research relies heavily on the inductive logic which aims at observing specific cases to arrive at a general conclusion. Other methods of reasoning are the deductive and abductive approaches. All three approaches are used in this research. The most suited approach consistent with the broader methodological framework, enabled through the use of grounded theory, is adopted. For clarity, a brief note on methods adopted is included wherever necessary. The three approaches are succinctly explained below:

DEDUCTIVE, INDUCTIVE AND ABDUCTIVE REASONING

INDUCTIVE REASONING

Inductive reasoning moves from the specific to the general; that is to say, from a survey of specific observations typically limited or controlled in scope, a general case or conclusion is induced. The generalized conclusion represents something that is likely, but not certain. The quality of the conclusion is determined by the quality and accuracy of the accumulated evidence. Inductive method involves gathering evidence, seeking patterns, and forming a hypothesis or theory to explain what is seen. It is usually not possible to guarantee that all the facts and possible evidence has been gathered, conclusions arrived at through the inductive process are not logical necessities. The fact that there may exist further unobserved evidence does not invalidate a hypothesis nor do conclusions arrived at even if all possible evidence was gathered.

Scientific research avoids language of absolutes and instead ‘uses more cautious language, the language of inductively reached, probable conclusions. Because inductive conclusions are not logical necessities, inductive arguments are not simply true. Rather, they are cogent: that is, the evidence seems complete, relevant, and generally convincing, and the conclusion is therefore probably true. Nor are inductive arguments simply false; rather, they are *not cogent*.’²⁰ While inductive reasoning cannot yield an absolutely certain conclusion, it nonetheless amplifies knowledge and also has the ability to makes predictions about future.

DEDUCTIVE REASONING

Essentially the opposite of the inductive process, deductive reasoning starts with a general rule and proceeds to a specific conclusion. Deductive reasoning, a process commonly used in hard sciences, can guarantee absolute conclusions that is to say, if the original assertions are true, then the conclusion must also be true. For example:

$$\text{If } x=5 \text{ and } y=3 \text{ then } x+y=8$$

In social sciences, formal, symbolic logic uses a language that looks rather like the math equality above, complete with its own operators and syntax. For example:

$$\text{Threat} = \text{capability} + \text{intent}$$

More complex equations and functional relationships exist. Deductive reasoning also uses *sylogism* (the plain-English version of a mathematical equality) that allows mathematical symbols and logical operators to be expressed in ordinary language to depict relationship between variables, constants and results.

ABDUCTIVE REASONING

Abductive reasoning is creative in character. It allows for the best solution to be reached in the absence of sufficient evidence. It is in many ways speculative but the speculations are grounded in a logical process of assessment and that typically begins with an incomplete set of observations and proceeds to the likeliest possible explanation. As a process, it may involve a combination of partial induction and information starved deductions. ‘While cogent inductive reasoning requires that the evidence that might shed light on the subject be fairly complete, whether positive or negative, abductive reasoning is characterized by lack of completeness, either in the evidence, or in the explanation, or both.... Einstein's work, for example, was not just inductive and deductive, but involved a creative leap of imagination and visualization that scarcely seemed warranted by the mere observation of moving trains and falling elevators. The abductive process can be creative, intuitive, and even revolutionary.’²¹

HISTORIOGRAPHY

History is “a record of all that the senses of man can perceive and all that the intellect of man can apprehend.”²² Historiography is the method of doing historical research or gathering and analysing historical evidence. There are four types of historical evidence:

primary sources, secondary sources, running records, and recollections. Historians rely mostly on primary sources which are also called *archival data* because they are kept in museums, archives, libraries, or private collections. Emphasis is given to the written word on paper, although modern historiography can involve any medium. Secondary sources are the work of other historians writing history. Running records are documentaries maintained by private or non-profit organizations. Recollections are autobiographies, memoirs, or oral histories. Archival research, which is the most common, involves long hours of sifting through dusty old papers, yet inspection of untouched documents can yield surprising new facts, connections, or ideas. Historiographers are careful to check and double-check their sources of information, and this lends a good deal of validity and reliability to their conclusions. Inferences about intent, motive, and character are common, with the understanding of appropriateness to the context of the time period. Historical-comparative researchers who do historiography often have to make even more disclaimers about meanings in context, such as how they avoided western bias.

SECONDARY ANALYSIS

Secondary Analysis is the reanalysis of data that was originally compiled by another researcher for other purposes than the one the present researcher intends to use it for. Often, secondary analysis will involve adding an additional variable to an existing dataset. This variable will be something that the researcher collects on their own, from another dataset, or from a common source of information. As such, in the context of grounded theory, this form of data lends its self to be axially coded. Secondary data analysis is only limited by the researcher's imagination. While the technique is mostly quantitative, limitations exist that often force such researchers to have some qualitative means of garnering information also. In such cases selective coding has been applied and to ensure an additional level of check, the qualitative part of the study is used as a validity check on the quantitative part. Where the results of one or more studies on the same issue yielded different or contradictory results a technique called meta-analysis has been applied. This is decidedly a quantitative method, but involves sorting and coding techniques more common to qualitative research. Meta-analysis is not an established technique in grounded theory and therefore its application has been restricted to components of this research that occur after theories and hypotheses have been developed.

NARRATIVE

Narrative as form of data is essential in this inquiry. From a scientific perspective, the contents of religious scriptures which, on grounds of their theological origins, are not put to scientific scrutiny are in fact, narratives. As David Carr points out:

“The term narrative is often given wide application, and — in circumstances of philosophical scepticism regarding the epistemic priority of any one narrative over another — human agency may appear to be indifferently inspired or guided by a variety of scientific, religious, aesthetic or other stories: in this light, evolutionary theory might be just as much a story by which people can morally or otherwise live, as the Bhagavad-Gita or Don Quixote.” It is also arguable, on the one hand, that extreme non-realist (for example postmodern) tendencies to regard scientific, religious, and literary narratives as on much the same epistemic level is far too indiscriminate: for one thing, if everything is story, then we might as well say that nothing is — since any and all significant contrast between what is and what is not story is thereby obliterated.... Recent social theory has certainly raised our awareness of the importance for human identity, agency and education of great religious and other narratives; perhaps it is now time to begin taking them seriously. But before they can be part of any meaningful education, they must also be properly understood.²³

The treatment of narrative data has been forced to the selective category to allow for an additional level of correlation. Constructive treatment of such data is invariably accompanied by logical explanations of the extent and consequence of induced errors. Since this thesis deals with such data in the cultural domain, the scrutiny of empirical evidence from the cultural subset using secondary analysis allows for a more accurate and replicable method of theorising. It can therefore be claimed that in addition to the strength and value of narrative data as revealed through modern epistemological methods, the use of grounded theory adds a further level of scientific scrutiny.

LANGUAGE AND FRAMING OF DEFINITIONS

SCIENCE OF DEFINITIONS

A definition in classical thought was taken to be a statement of the essence of a thing. According to Aristotle an object's essential attributes form its 'essential nature', and therefore a definition of the object must include these essential attributes.²⁴ For the purpose of this study we are more concerned with the normative understanding in the nominal and real sense where the essence of the thing and not purely its nominal sense is required.²⁵ The idea that a definition should state the essence of a thing led to the distinction between nominal and real essence, originating with Aristotle. In a passage from the *Posterior Analytics*,²⁶ Aristotle states that we can know the meaning of a made-up name for example 'goat stag', if such a thing existed, without knowing what the essential nature of the thing that the name would denote. 'This led medieval logicians to distinguish between the so-called *quid nominis* or 'whatness of the name', and the underlying nature common to all the things it names, which they called the *quid rei* or 'whatness of the thing.' (Early modern philosophers like Locke used the corresponding English terms 'nominal essence' and 'real essence').²⁷

STIPULATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE DEFINITION

Definitions are either descriptive that is to say they give the meaning that a term bears in general or stipulative, a construction imposed upon a term for the purpose of its usage. A stipulative definition differ from a descriptive definition in that it allows for a new meaning to a term already in use or to a new term. By this analogy, this thesis seeks stipulative definition of victory since the term and the word already carry various meanings and explanations. While a descriptive definition can be shown to be right or wrong by comparison to usage, a stipulative definition bears the authority and logic of its creator.

C.L. Stevenson presented another form of stipulative definition which he referred to as a 'persuasive definition.' It differed from a stipulative definition when its explanation becomes paradoxical to the term's descriptive definition. Stevenson also notes that some definitions are 'legal' or 'coercive', whose object is to create or alter rights, duties or crimes.²⁸

USE OF CONCEPT MAPS, FLOWCHARTS AND GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATIONS

A picture tells a thousand words. Knowledge, relationships, processes and structures that can be graphically expressed do just that. Illustrative representation of knowledge serves as a powerful tool for explaining and learning. While some scholars criticize their academic value²⁹ and also their ability to inform the general public, they are none the less a very useful supplement to narrative explanations. According to Duplass, a professor of philosophy at the University of South Florida, graphical representations have particular value and relevance to social science and for problem solving.³⁰

All processes, parent-child relationships of data and concepts can usually be expressed graphically either as flow charts, cognitive maps, diagrams, tables or graphs. This thesis uses the classification system developed by Gillespie. All graphical and tabular renderings are classified in to five groups:³¹

- 1) Sequential: these include flow charts, time lines, organisational charts, and process charts.
- 2) Qualitative: number lines, bar graphs, line graphs, pictographs, and pie charts.
- 3) Maps: political, physical and spatial purpose maps.
- 4) Diagrams: crosscutting, blue prints and machine drawings.
- 5) Tables/charts: row by column matrices.

FLOW CHART

A flow chart provides a model for flow of information, material, activities and people through an environment or system. ‘The primary purpose of a flow chart is to identify the activities taking place within a system and to enable this information to be represented graphically’³²

COGNITIVE MAPS

Edward Chace Toulman, a behavioural scientist, is attributed with coining the term Cognitive Mapping.³³ ‘Cognitive maps, mental maps, mind maps, cognitive models or mental models are a type of mental processing composed of a series of psychological transformations by which an individual can acquire, code, store, recall, and decode

information about the relative location and attributes of phenomena in their everyday or metaphorical spatial environment.’³⁴

GRAPHS

Graphs can be multidimensional and in qualitative research can represent an abstract as opposed to a finite scale. ‘Graphs are taken to be those graphic forms that illustrate relationships among variables at least one of which is continuous’³⁵ for example ‘time’.

CASE STUDIES

A case study is ‘a research approach, situated between concrete data taking techniques and methodological paradigms.’³⁶ It is one of several ways of doing research whether it is social science related or even socially related. ‘It allows for a scientific analysis of historical events, actions and decisions using comparative frameworks to either reinforce an existing view or arrive at new conclusions. A corollary in hard sciences would be experiments and among the soft sciences, surveys, multiple histories and analysis of archival information.’³⁷

Bent Flyvbjerg points out that ‘rather than using samples and following a rigid protocol to examine limited number of variables, case study methods involve an in-depth, longitudinal examination of a single instance or event: a case.’ He opines that they provide a systematic way of looking at events, collecting data analysing information, and reporting the results. ‘As a result the researcher may gain a sharpened understanding of why the instance happened as it did, and what might become important to look at more extensively in future research. Case studies lend themselves to both generating and testing hypotheses.’³⁸

The cases selected for this research are not random. They follow the principle of information oriented sampling. Based on a broader survey of history, the selected studies bring home a general case solution to particular aspects of the notion and definition of victory. Information oriented sampling for selection of case studies as opposed to random sampling is supported by experts because the typical or average case is often not the richest in information. Extreme or atypical cases reveal more information because they activate more basic mechanisms and more actors in the situation studied.

Three types of information-oriented cases may be distinguished:

- 1) Critical cases (also called Crucial Case) are defined as a case that offers particularly compelling evidence for or against a proposition. Inferences from such cases can have strategic importance in relation to a general problem.³⁹
- 2) Paradigmatic cases (also called the general cases), one that serves as prototype or ‘perfect’ example.⁴⁰
- 3) Deviant Case (also called Extreme Case), that by general understanding of the topic, or common sense, represents a dependent variable that deviates from the expected outcome.⁴¹

Wars and conflicts seldom present sharp lines that allow cases to be neatly classified into one of the above categories. Most conflicts tend to represent a mix of all three in different instances and contexts. Each case presented in Chapter V is labelled according to one or more of the above classifications as applicable or relevant to the scope of and the aspect under discussion.

Notes and References

¹ Howard S. Becker, *The Epistemology of Qualitative Research* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996), pp. 53-71.

² Abduction is the process of both generating hypotheses and selecting some for further pursuit, *deduction* draws out their testable consequences, while *induction* evaluates them. (Tomis Kapitan, “Peirce and the Autonomy of Abductive Reasoning”, internet, <http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan/abduction.html>, accessed 26 Dec 2005. See also C. Harstshorne et. al., eds, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, (Harvard University, Cambridge, 1958), pp. 171, 468-477.). Besides this difference of roles in the process of scientific inquiry, Peirce added that reasoning within each kind utilizes distinctive methods or forms, and that there are diverse senses in which these methods can be described as valid or as legitimate means of extending our knowledge.

³ B. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss, *The Discovery Of Grounded Theory: Strategies For Qualitative Research* (Aldine, Chicago, 1967)

⁴ Grounded theory methodology received its first systematic formulation in B. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss, *The Discovery Of Grounded Theory: Strategies For Qualitative Research*, op. cit. Subsequently the two developed the theory in progressively different ways. Reader’s attention is drawn to Glaser’s *Theoretical Sensitivity*, (Sociology Press, Mill Valley, 1978), and Strauss’, *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987) which present distinctly different perspectives on a theory that carries a common name.

⁵ The principles and practices are summed up in Barney G. Glaser, *Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis* (Sociology Press, Mill Valley, 1992).

⁶ Wayne A. Babchuk, ‘Glaser or Strauss?: Grounded Theory and Adult Education’, Lecture transcript, Presented at the Midwest Research-to-Practice Conference in Adult, Continuing, and Community Education, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, Nebraska, October 17-19, 1996, published by Michigan State University, East Lansing, October 15-17, 1997.

⁷ Barney. G. Glaser, *Doing Grounded Theory: Issues and Discussions* (Sociology Press, Mill Valley, 1998), p. 1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

⁹ Glaser, *Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis*, op. cit., p. 16.

¹⁰ Glaser, *Doing Grounded Theory*, op. cit., p. 150.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹² Glaser, *Theoretical Sensitivity*, op. cit., p. 62.

¹³ Glaser, *Doing Grounded Theory*, op. cit., p. 136.

¹⁴ Glaser and Strauss, *The Discovery*, op. cit., p. 5.

¹⁵ Abduction is the process of both generating hypotheses and selecting some for further pursuit, *deduction* draws out testable consequences, while *induction* evaluates them. Sww Tomis Kapitan, op. cit. See also *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, op. cit., pp. 171, 468-477.) Besides this difference of roles in the process of scientific inquiry, Peirce added that reasoning within each kind utilizes distinctive methods or forms, and that there are diverse senses in which these methods can be described as valid or as legitimate means of extending our knowledge.

¹⁶ See Liz Spencer et. al., *Quality in Qualitative Research* (Government Chief Social Researcher's Office, London, 2003).

¹⁷ David Carr, 'Taking Narrative Seriously: Exploring the Educational Value of Story and Myth', in Kal Alston, ed., *Philosophy of Education: Yearbook 2003* (PES Publications Office-University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2004), pp. 81 – 89, this p. 81. Also available on Internet, <http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/eps/PES-Yearbook/default.asp>.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, op. cit., p.309

²⁰ Thagard, Paul and Cameron Shelley, 'Abductive reasoning: Logic, visual thinking, and coherence,' Waterloo, Ontario: Philosophy Department, Univerisity of Waterloo, 1997. June 2, 2005, internet, <http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/Articles/Pages/%7FAbductive.html>.

²¹ Ibid.

²² John Fortescue, op. cit., p. 1.

²³ David Carr, Op. Cit., p. 81.

²⁴ *A history of Western Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 210

²⁵ Wikipedia, op. cit., s.v. 'Definitions'

²⁶ Claude Lévi-Strauss. 'Discussion of Lévi-Strauss's paper 'Social Structure' (1952-1962), in Sol Tax, ed., *An appraisal of anthropology today* (University of Chicago Press, 1953)

²⁷ Wikipedia, op. cit., s.v. 'Definitions'.

²⁸ C. L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language*, Connecticut 1944.

²⁹ While most critics question the viability of graphical methods for material intended for a wider public reading, they do highlight that these are of immense value within a common knowledge based environment and informed audience. See James A. Duplass, "Charts, Graphs, and Diagrams: An Approach for Social Studies Teachers", *Social Studies*, Vol. 87, Issue 1, pp. 32 – 38.

³⁰ James A. Duplass, op. cit., p. 32.

³¹ Cindy S. Gillespie, 'Reading graphic displays: What teachers should know', *Journal of Reading*, Vol. 36, No. 5, February 1993, pp. 350 – 354, this p. 350, also available on

internet, <http://www.jstor.org/pss/40033324>, accessed July 13, 2005.

³² John Pallister and Jonathon Law, *A Dictionary of Business and Management* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), pp. 150, 225.

³³ E. C. Toulman, 'Cognitive maps in rats and men', *Psychological Review*, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 189-208.

³⁴ Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia, internet, http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/cognitive_map#cite_note—pmid18870876-0, accessed 15 Mar 2006.

³⁵ James A Duplass, 'Charts, Graphs, and Diagrams: An Approach for Social Studies Teachers', *Social Studies*, Vol. 87, Issue 1, pp. 32 – 38, this p. 32.

³⁶ Siegfried Lamnek, *Qualitative Sozialforschung* (Weihnhein, Basel, 2005).

³⁷ Robert K. Yin. *Case Study Research. Design and Methods*, 3rd Ed., Applied social research method series Vol. 5, (Sage Publications, California, 2002).

³⁸ Bent Flyvbjerg, 'Five Misunderstandings About Case Study Research,' *Qualitative Inquiry*, Vol. 12, No. 2, April 2006, pp. 219-245.

³⁹ John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007), p. 213.

⁴⁰ Nationmaster.com, Internet, [http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Sampling-\(case-studies\)](http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Sampling-(case-studies)), accessed 13 Mar 2007.

⁴¹ John Gerring, op. cit., p. 105.