FOOTSTEPS ACROSS TIME

The Evolution, Use and Relevance of Battlefield Visits to the British Armed Forces

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Footsteps Across Time

ABSTRACT

This study examines the educational use made by military forces around the world, but primarily those of the United Kingdom, of visits to past battlefields. Investigation suggests this practice commenced formally in Prussia and may be nearing its 200th anniversary; certainly the British Army’s Staff College at Camberley has been visiting battlefields for educational purposes since at least 1885. To date, no extended academic study of this practice has been undertaken, and no specific use of the Staff College Battlefield Tour Archive has been made in this context. An examination is made of educational theory, by which the effectiveness and value of battlefield visiting can be measured. This study creates a typology of battlefield visiting, and thus acknowledges a much older civilian tradition of making pilgrimages to past scenes of conflict (initially to pray for the souls of the dead), which later evolved into civilian battlefield tourism to destinations such as Waterloo and Gettysburg.

The work examines the nature of British battlefield visiting, using the Staff College Battlefield Tour Archive, in four phases: before the First World War; during the inter-war period; during the post-Second World War and Cold War periods, and at the time of writing. Throughout the study, parallels are drawn with military battlefield visits undertaken by the American and German armed forces. The conclusion is made that battlefield visiting is a unique and valuable tool in military education that is not well managed, and that no recognition is given to its value in terms of classic education theory.
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‘The rekindling of old memories combined with the gathering of fresh information on historic events translated into positive lessons from the past for the future’

BH Liddell Hart

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

I have tried as much as possible to avoid abbreviations and acronyms, but inevitably some have crept in, particularly during quotations and footnotes; some of these have other meanings in a military context; all those cited here relate specifically to issues discussed in this thesis. As a general rule, where numbered infantry battalions are mentioned, I have designated them thus, 1/Newfoundland Regiment or 6/Gurkha Rifles; I have followed the same practice with numbered regiments and brigades, 6/Armoured Cavalry Regiment or 6/Airlanding Brigade. Again, I have followed military custom in numbering divisions in the usual format, 43rd (Wessex) Division or 21st Panzer Division, and corps using Roman numerals, XXX Corps, whilst army numbers are spelt out in full, British Second Army.

1a First General Staff Officer in German formations (= Chief of Staff)
1b First Intelligence Officer in German formations (= Chief G2 or J2)
ABMC American Battle Monuments Commission
AC Abstract Conceptualisation (Kolb’s Learning Cycle)
ACM Air Chief Marshal (RAF)
ACR Armored Cavalry Regiment (US)
ACSC Advanced Command and Staff Course
ADC Aide de Camp
AE Active Experimentation (Kolb’s Learning Cycle)
AEF American Expeditionary Force (WW1)
AFV Armoured Fighting Vehicle
AG Adjutant General
AGRE Army Group Royal Engineers
AHA American Historical Association
AHB Air Historical Branch
AM Air Marshal (RAF)
ANZAC Australian & New Zealand Army Corps
AOC Air Officer Commanding
APRE Army Personnel Research Establishment (UK)
ARRC Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (NATO)
ASC Army Staff Course (Camberley) or Army Service Corps
ASG Area Support Group (US)
ATR Army Training Regiment
AVM Air Vice Marshal (RAF)
BAOR British Army of the Rhine (1919-29; 1945-94, now BFG)
BAR British Army Review magazine
BATUS British Army Training Unit, Suffield (Canada)
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
Bde. Brigade
BEF British Expeditionary Force (WW1 & 2)
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BFG    British Forces Germany (ex-BAOR)
BGGS   Brigadier-General, General Staff
BM     Brigade Major (i.e. Brigade Chief of Staff)
Brig.  Brigadier
Brig.-Gen.  Brigadier-General
BS     Battlefield Studies
BSR    Battle Staff Ride
Bt.    Baronet
BTA    British Troops Austria
BTC    Battlefield Tour Collection (JSCSC Archives)
Capt.  Captain
CAS    Chief of the Air Staff or Close Air Support
CAT    Corporate Adventure Training (Chapter One)
CB     Commander of the Order of the Bath
CBA    Council for British Archaeology
CBE    Commander of the Order of the British Empire
CBNF   Canadian Battle of Normandy Foundation
CDS    Chief of Defence Staff
CE     Concrete Experience (Kolb’s Learning Cycle)
CEF    Canadian Expeditionary Force
CENTAG Central Army Group (NATO)
CGS    Chief of the General Staff
CH     Companion of Honour
CIGS   Chief of the Imperial General Staff (1908-64)
C-in-C  Commander in Chief
CMG    Commander of the Order of St Michael & St George
CMH    Center for Military History (US)
CO     Commanding Officer
Col.   Colonel
COM    Commander
COMBALTAP Commander Baltic Approaches (NATO)
COS    Chief of Staff
Cpl.   Corporal
CRA    Commander Royal Artillery
CRE    Commander Royal Engineers
CSM    Company Sergeant Major
CWGC   Commonwealth War Graves Commission (from 1960)
DAAG   Divisional Assistant Adjutant General
DCIGS  Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff
DCM    Distinguished Conduct Medal
DCMT   Defence College of Management & Technology (UK)
DCOS   Deputy Chief of Staff
D-Day  Invasion of Normandy (6 June 1944)
DG     Dragoon Guards or Director General
Div.   Division
DLI    Durham Light Infantry
### Footsteps Across Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DMI</td>
<td>Director of Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMO</td>
<td>Director of Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMT</td>
<td>Director of Military Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRA</td>
<td>Director Royal Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Directing Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSACEUR</td>
<td>Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSO</td>
<td>Distinguished Service Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBTD</td>
<td>Experience-Based Training and Development (Chapter One)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELT</td>
<td>Experiential Learning Theory (Kolb)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex.</td>
<td>Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFI</td>
<td><em>Forces Français de l’Interior</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOO</td>
<td>Forward Observation Officer (from Royal Artillery regiments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRCS</td>
<td>Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSA</td>
<td>Fellow of the Society of Antiquaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBE</td>
<td>Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCB</td>
<td>Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the Bath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic (i.e. East Germany, 1949-90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen.</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOC</td>
<td>General Officer Commanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSO1/2</td>
<td>General Staff Officer Grade 1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCSC</td>
<td>Higher Command and Staff Course (UK, 1988-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLTO</td>
<td>High Level Training Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMSO</td>
<td>His (Her) Majesty’s Stationary Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRH</td>
<td>His (Her) Royal Highness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICSC (L)</td>
<td>Intermediate Command and Staff Course (Land)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>Imperial Defence College (1927-71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Peace Implementation Force (Bosnia 1995-6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWGC</td>
<td>Imperial War Graves Commission (1917-60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWM</td>
<td>Imperial War Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHQ</td>
<td>Joint Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLC</td>
<td>Joint Lessons Cell (formerly TDRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCSC</td>
<td>Joint Services Command &amp; Staff College (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBE</td>
<td>Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCB</td>
<td>Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCVO</td>
<td>Knight Commander of the Victorian Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCMG</td>
<td>Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCL</td>
<td>King’s College, London (University)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRRRC</td>
<td>King’s Royal Rifle Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td>Light Dragoons (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHCMA</td>
<td>Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI</td>
<td>Light Infantry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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LLD  Doctor of Laws (Legum Doctor, LL.D.)
LoFC Line of Communications
LSI  Learning Styles Inventory (Kolb)
LST  Landing Ship, Tank
Lt.  Lieutenant
Lt-Col. Lieutenant Colonel
Lt-Gen. Lieutenant General
Maj.  Major
Maj-Gen. Major General
MASH Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (US)
MBA Master of Business Administration
MBE Member of the Order of the British Empire
MC  Military Cross
MD  Doctor of Medicine
MFA&A Monuments, Fine Arts & Archives Branch of SHAEF
MG Machine Gun Corps
MGFA Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt (Bundeswehr Military History Institute)
MM Military Medal
MOD Ministry of Defence
MP Member of Parliament
MTB Motor Torpedo Boat
NAAFI Navy, Army & Air Force Institution
NCO Non Commissioned Officer
NORTHAG Northern Army Group (NATO)
NSA National Security Agency (US)
NTC National Training Center (California, USA)
OBE Officer of the Order of the British Empire
OLE Operational Learning Experience
OMD Outdoor Management Development
Op. Operation
ORBAT Order of Battle
PARA Parachute Regiment
PLA People’s Liberation Army (of China)
PM Prime Minister
POW Prisoner of War
psc Passed Staff College
Pte. Private
QMG Quartermaster General
RA Royal Artillery
RAF Royal Air Force
RB Rifle Brigade
RCDS Royal College of Defence Studies (1971-)
RE Royal Engineers
Regt. Regiment
REME Royal Electrical & Mechanical Engineers
Footsteps Across Time

RFC Royal Flying Corps
RGJ Royal Green Jackets
RGS Royal Geographical Society
RMA Royal Military Academy Woolwich (1741-1947)
RMAS Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (1947-)
RMC Royal Military College (1802-1947, latterly at Sandhurst)
RMCS Royal Military College of Science (Shrivenham)
RN Royal Navy
RO Reflective Observation (Kolb’s Learning Cycle)
ROTE Review of Officer Training & Education (UK)
RTR Royal Tank Regiment
RUSI Royal United Services Institution (London)
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe (1950-)
SAS Special Air Service
SCSI Strategic and Combat Studies Institute (UK)
SF Special Forces
Sgt. Sergeant
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (1951-)
SMH Society of Military History (US)
SO1/2/3 Staff Officer Grade 1/2/3
Sqn Ldr Squadron Leader (RAF)
SRD Syndicate Room Discussion (at Staff College)
SRD Tactical Exercise without Troops
TOC-H WW1 Signaller’s phonetic alphabet for TH - Talbot House, the soldiers’ refuge in Poperinghe, Belgium (= ‘Tango Hotel’ today).
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command (US)
USAAF United States Army Air Force (until 1947)
USAF United States Air Force (1947-)
USAREUR US Army Europe
USAWC US Air Warfare Center
VAD Voluntary Aid Detachment
VAK Visual, Auditory & Kinaesthetic (forms of learning style)
VC Victoria Cross
VCIGS Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff
VDK Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge (German War Graves Commission)
VE Day Victory in Europe Day (8 May 1945)
VJ Day Victory over Japan Day (15 August 1945)
VQMG Vice Quartermaster General
Wg Cdr Wing Commander (RAF)
YMCA Young Men’s Christian Association
Footsteps Across Time

‘The past is a foreign country. They do things differently there.’

*L.P. Hartley, 1953*

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I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the help and support of my wife Stefania and daughter Emmanuelle, for their unfailing help, tolerance and fortitude during long periods of my self-enforced isolation whilst writing or absence when accompanying groups to explore battlefields (and, in their eyes at least, beaches and bars) afar.

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Gloucestershire County Library; the Groesbeek War Museum; L’Historial de la Grande Guerre, Peronne; The Imperial War Museum; The In Flanders Fields Museum, Ypres; The Joint Lessons Cell (formerly the Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Centre), Doctrine and Concepts Development Centre, UK Defence Academy; Keele University Library; La Gleize Military Museum, Belgium; Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King’s College, London; The Liddle Collection at the University of Leeds Brotherton Library; Le Mémorial de Caen; the Musée du Débarquement, Arromanches; the National Archives, Kew; The National Army Museum; Poteau-44 Museum; Prince Consort’s Library, Aldershot; RMAS Library; RUSI Library, London; Second World War Experience Centre, Leeds; Thiepval Visitor’s Centre; Thomas Cook’s Archives, Peterborough; the Gloucestershire County Record Office; the Royal Warwickshire, Gloucestershire and Staffordshire Regimental Museums; whose pencils I have snapped, coffee cups I have upset inadvertently, dusty shelves I have disordered and whose photocopiers I have overheated. Organising me, like good adjutants, have been the indispensable Steph Muir and Bella Platt, and latterly Anne Harbour.

Peter Caddick-Adams
West View Cottage
November 2007.

Footsteps Across Time: Introduction

‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it’

George Santayana, 1905

INTRODUCTION

Aim.

To chart the evolution of battlefield visits, in their various forms, and their influence on the British armed forces, and analyse their educational and training value, and make recommendations for their future use and development.

Objectives.

In pursuit of this aim, this thesis will:

1. Analyse classic education theory and its particular relevance to battlefield visits.
2. Create a typology of different types of battlefield visiting.
3. Analyse the origins, development, purpose and confluence of British military battlefield visits, in terms of pilgrimages, tourism and professional military study, from the Nineteenth Century to the present day.
4. Analyse, for comparison, the origins and development of battlefield visiting in Germany and the United States over the same period.
5. Analyse the influence of doctrine on battlefield visiting for the British, US and other armed forces since the Second World War.
6. Analyse appraisals of battlefield visits with specific relevance to the perceived value for military education and training.
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7. Briefly analyse the social and technological factors which contributed to the birth and expansion of battlefield visiting.
8. Analyse the evolution of battlefield visiting before the First World War, with special relevance to the Army Staff College archives.
9. Analyse the development of battlefield visiting in the inter-war period, with special relevance to the Army Staff College archives.
10. Analyse the development of battlefield visiting after the Second World War and during the Cold War, with special relevance to the Army Staff College archives.
11. Analyse the development of battlefield visiting during the post-Cold War era, with special relevance to archives of the wider UK military establishment.
12. Relate the value and characteristics of battlefield visits as observed in the above sections, to the educational theories enunciated above.
13. Make conclusions and recommendations for the future conduct of battlefield visits and for further research.

Reasons for Undertaking This Study

This thesis grew out of the author’s own organised expeditions (now numbering well over 200) to battlefields in company with British and NATO soldiers in the years after the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in 1990. Since then battlefield visits have become a cornerstone in the practical preparation for military operations of most modern armies, especially in Germany (where the concept was invented and nurtured (where they are known as *Schlachtfeldreisen*, although sometimes the English term ‘battlefield tour’ remains untranslated), in the United Kingdom (and its associated Commonwealth forces), and the United States.
The more I read of past military endeavours, the more I realised that generations of soldiers, civilians and leaders had visited battlefields for a wide variety of purposes. There is a certain inevitability about old soldiers returning to their fields of glory, as did Napoleon\(^3\) and Wellington\(^4\), and one might not be surprised that Patton and Montgomery had undertaken battlefield tours before they became famous, but so too did Hitler and Churchill\(^5\). Eisenhower not only wrote a battlefield guidebook on the First World War when a young major, but retired to live next to a battle site – Gettysburg. Many monarchs and royals have strode across battle terrain, including George IV at Waterloo\(^6\), George V and Edward VIII on the Great War Western Front, the Duke of Edinburgh in the Crimea, Alexander III at Borodino (in 1912) and Prince Charles through Isandhlwana, Rorke’s Drift, Arnhem and Normandy, where he met – at various times – Presidents Reagan, Clinton and both Bushes, father and son. Margaret Thatcher joined a pilgrimage to Gallipoli on the 75\(^{th}\) anniversary of the landings, and her government first subsidised British Legion pilgrimages in 1984. In the Eighteenth Century, Daniel Defoe recorded extensive visits to the Civil War battlegrounds of Marston Moor and Newbury\(^7\). Waterloo attracted many literary and artistic giants of the Nineteenth Century, including Walter Scott, William Wordsworth, Lord Byron, Robert Southey, J.M.W. Turner and, later on, John Ruskin, William Thackeray, Charles Dickens, Stendhal and Victor Hugo\(^8\). They were followed in the Twentieth Century by Jerome K. Jerome, whilst T.E. Lawrence visited Crécy, Agincourt, Rocroi, Malplaquet, Valmy and Sedan\(^9\) and F. Scott Fitzgerald and D.H. Lawrence explored the Somme. Many other public figures and writers made pilgrimages to the battlefield graves of loved ones, such as Herbert and Margot Asquith and Vera Brittain. The pacifist travel agent Thomas Cook’s first
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overseas venture was to Waterloo; and his first American trip incorporated Gettysburg. Far from being an exclusive habit of professional and amateur soldiers, travel to battlefields was a far more extensive practice that I had first realised, and not just a reflection of wealth and leisure time in the late Twentieth and early Twenty-First Centuries.

Absence of Literature

As I started to research the practice I realised this was virgin territory, for no one had ventured into this area of enquiry before. It is common for a research thesis to include an entire chapter as a literature review, exhaustively analysing all the other relevant secondary literature, in order to demonstrate the gap in existing knowledge. In this case a literature survey is unnecessary because there is a lacuna on the military habit of visiting battlefields for education. To date, there are two books in English (and none that I am aware of in other languages) relating to limited aspects of battlefield visiting: David W. Lloyd’s *Battlefield Tourism: Pilgrimage and Commemoration of the Great War in Britain, Australia and Canada 1919-1939* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1998), which deals only with civilian tourism and concentrates on one period and one conflict only; and Prof. Chris Ryan’s edited collection of essays, *Battlefield Tourism. History, Place and Interpretation* (Oxford and NJ: Elsevier Science: 2007). This latter appeared in July 2007, whilst this thesis was being completed, but deals only with the civilian and tourism aspects of battlefield tours. Ryan is a professor of tourism based in New Zealand and many of his chapters deal with tourism in the Pacific (Japan and China, for example), and selected case studies in the UK and USA. Like David Lloyd, he does not discuss military battlefield tours at all. A single edition of *Defence Studies Journal*, to which
the author contributed, has, however, dealt with military aspects of the subject: this was Defence Studies, Volume 5/1, March 2005, The Relevance and Role of Military History, Battlefield Tours and Staff Rides for Armed Forces in the 21st Century, edited by David Ian Hall.

Whilst memoirs may touch on past visits to battle terrain and many studies look at issues peripheral to this research, such as: military education; staff colleges; battlefield archaeology; the utility of military history; theories of leadership, command and management; tourism; or commemoration and remembrance, there is nothing recorded about the soldiers’ habit of visiting battlefields and military utility of battlefield tours. Specifically, I started to look at how and why the British army visited past battlefields – and what use was made of this particular resource then and now. This is the purpose of this thesis.

**Multi-national Practice**

The Influence of Germany, America and Great Britain in fostering military battlefield visits in the past and present has ensured that many others – in particular the English-speaking nations - follow their lead. But it is also a formal training method, employed by staff colleges and military commands as far afield as Sweden, where, for example, Maj. John Howard, DSO (1912-2000), ‘D’ Company commander 2/Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, who assaulted Pegasus Bridge on D-Day, recalled to Stephen Ambrose how he had got to know his contemporary and opponent Col. Hans von Luck (1911-1997), a regimental Commander in 21st Panzer Division in Normandy, when the two
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‘...had been brought together as lecturers on the attack and defence of bridges by the Swedish military academy, which every year brought its cadets to Pegasus Bridge...’

Tours are also undertaken by the armies of Holland; Greece; and Libya, where Lt-Col. Ababaker Abdelhadi, agreed that this was a common study method for the Libyan Army, adding that ‘the whole of Libya is one big battlefield’. They are used in Egypt; and Chile, where Lt-Col. Ivan Babic stated that students at the Chilean Staff College first study the battlefields within Chile, from their War of Independence (1817-24) and War of the Pacific (1879-1883), but also, during overseas study tours, key battlefields in Europe, including Normandy. Battlefield visits are made by Russian army officers (and senior NCOs) who attend military guided tours of the 1941 defence of Moscow, also Petersburg and Volgograd and visit the 1812 battlefield of Borodino as part of their training, when funding permits (which usually means if they live locally and can travel at their own expense); in 2006, HQ 39/Brigade and 7/Transport Regiment RLC undertook battlefield tours to Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad), in liaison with local Russian military units; by the Chinese; and Japanese, where The Department of the US Army in their Historical Summary, Financial Year 1989, noted a battlefield tour of Iwo Jima conducted jointly in the summer of 1989 by USAR/IX Corps [US Army Japan] and the History Department of the Japanese Ground Defense Force.

Also in the Indian and Pakistani armed forces, where officers immediately recognise the term ‘staff ride’, which is in regular use in both their armies; formally organised staff rides visit the scene of British NW frontier campaigns within Pakistan and of more recent actions along the border with India. Significant exceptions (despite their respective distinguished military histories) are Italy, France and
Switzerland\textsuperscript{22}, who have shown reluctance to use military history or tours of battlefields to educate their military personnel, although there is evidence that this attitude is changing. In 2000, Général de Brigade F. Juin thanked this author in writing for a leading staff ride with the words, ‘\textit{Merci beaucoup pour vos présentations historiques durant le Staff Ride du JHQ CENT d’Heidelberg. Elles était très intéressantes et toujours objectives...}’ \textsuperscript{23} In other words, there was no French word or phrase to be found for the concept of a staff ride. So far, the French military has not managed to translate the term ‘staff ride’ (see Appendix One).

In April 2004, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) G3 Branch conducted a battlefield tour to the Ardennes called Ex. ARRCADE OPSSTORY. 36 participants from across the headquarters attended, assisted by Lt-Gen. (retd.) Kjeld Hillingsø, former C-in-C of the Danish Army and ex-NATO Commander Baltic Approaches (COMBALTAP) as guest speaker and senior mentor. The HQ ARRC Summer 2004 Journal commented:

‘...The battlefield tour was of the advance of the German Panzer Force through the Ardennes and their breakthrough through the French lines at Sedan in May 1940. From the German perspective, the battle was successful beyond expectations and marked the ascendancy of fast, mobile, manoeuvre warfare over the doctrine of positional warfare, which had predominated since the end of the First World War. As a classic example of the blending of mobility, firepower and shock action, this operation provided an ideal case study... and contained valuable lessons regarding manoeuvre warfare and many principles of war. Maj. Petitjean, who works for the historical department of the French Army, also supported us to give us an impression of the French perspective of this battle...’ \textsuperscript{24}

Elsewhere a short note appeared in HÉRACLÈS (a French Army journal) in 2003:

‘Staff Ride Sedan 1940. Parmi ceux-ci, l’intérêt du voyage d’histoire militaire réalisé sur la zone de la percée allemande de 1940 dans les Ardennes est à souligner. Il contient l’ensemble des éléments pour organiser une activité de ce type pour l’unité ou l’état-
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major qui souhaiterait s’initier à la pratique des “Staff Ride”... Il est en outré particulièrement riche en enseignements tactiques et sur le commandement en opération...’.

Note that there is no attempt to translate the term ‘staff ride’ here, either.

In October 2007, Arlette Gondrée (proprietress of the Pegasus Bridge Café in Normandy) related that for the first time the French army are starting to visit her establishment as part of historical and tactical exercises held in the region, with two visits in 2007, including one from the officer school at St. Cyr. Led by President Yoweri Museveni, the Ugandan Army are starting to revisit the scenes of their civil war, in an effort to extract relevant military lessons. The Israeli Defence Forces are perhaps the most dynamic modern army in utilising battlefields to learn, train and prepare for present and future operations. During the Cold War, the 1967 (Six-Day), 1973 (Yom Kippur) and 1982 (Peace for Galilee) Middle East Wars were intensively studied with a view to their relevance to a possible major land war in Europe and visiting the these battlefields was seen as essential for any respectable analysis; as Professor Chris Bellamy observed, ‘I felt I had to have a breath of real life for my book [The Future of Land Warfare] and that meant visiting the battlefields of the 1973 war’.

The Tradition of Military Tourism.

I realised that today’s, quite sophisticated battlefield studies owed much to the developments in military education made in the Nineteenth Century, nurtured – though not exclusively – by the ideas of Clausewitz and following generations of Prussians. The American Civil War also inspired an undiminished number of soldiers, veterans, pilgrims and tourists, particularly to Gettysburg, which today
records up to two million visitors annually[^30] – a figure matched only by the D-Day beaches, where the US Cemetery at Colleville-sur-Mer recorded 1.8m in 2004 and 1.4m visitors in 2005[^31]

By the end of the Nineteenth Century, many soldiers were visiting battlefields seeking lessons, but enabled to do so by a second tradition of civilian travel and tourism. Thomas Cook may have devised packaged travel in Europe, but spawned many imitators and as travel became easier, the numbers swelled and visitors have explored further afield; for example, New Zealand TV News reported 10,000 ANZAC visitors to the Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey, on ANZAC Day 2006[^32]. To a certain extent Cook was also acknowledging an earlier tradition of religious travel, on pilgrimages[^33]. Many of those pilgrimages were to old battlefields and the shrines to fallen soldiers found there, so the tourism-battlefield wheel had come full circle.

**Staff College Archives.**

This thesis is built around a study of battlefield tours undertaken by the Army Staff College at Camberley (and some from elsewhere) for over a century. The early Camberley records are so poor and intermittent that we simply do not know when the first College-organised (as opposed to private) tour to a battlefield took place, but it was after the Franco-Prussian War, and certainly between 1881-5; there is evidence of a Camberley-organised tour visiting the Franco-Prussian battlefields in 1885, although Camberley students and staff are known to have visited battle sites in a private capacity earlier[^34]. Apart from the interruption of war and two years when financial crisis intervened to cancel them, they continued, with differing emphasis and to different destinations, until terminated by one determined Commandant in 1979.
Almost immediately a ‘gap’ in officer education was sensed, and tours were re-introduced, albeit on a smaller scale than before. In the mean time, army reforms and the introduction of a new staff course at a higher level, also conspired to re-introduce battlefield tours to the army – when examined at the operational level with great interactivity and participation, these are frequently referred to a ‘staff rides’, a term first used by the Prussians and later the Americans for their battlefield visiting and staff training activities.

It is perhaps blindingly obvious that visiting past fields of military endeavour may help today’s soldiers and leaders make sense of their profession, but this was not always the case. (Money, or lack of it, was usually the reason why visits to battlefields simply did not take place.) Battlefield excursions have had a surprisingly chequered history in the English-speaking armies. In the British army this also reflected that institution’s respect for the utility of military history and its understanding of that middle tier of the three levels of war – the operational level. Until this thinking was grasped, battlefield visits were used only to convey tactical notions and a sense of the atmosphere of war, often packaged to a British army lacking combat experience as the ‘reality of war’.

It also became apparent that battlefield tours had served other purposes too. Before the First World War, they were used as a means of liaising with other allies, usually the French, because – bizarrely – this did not happen in any formal way. In the 1930s, they were used to secretly test war plans (what to do about Belgium in the event of a European war with Germany, for example). Before the outbreak of war in 1939, battlefield tours became exercises in planning, as officers by syndicates had to
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device a battlefield excursion for a notional unit that would then be ‘tested’ by their peers. After the Second World War, battlefield tours appear to have had a sub-text of underlining the achievement of the British commander, Montgomery; thus – long after I began this study - I found that the army’s use of battlefields also reflected the evolution of staff college education and British army doctrine, making it far more significant than an interesting gallop into the past for its own sake.

Educational Validation.

Apart from examining the tours themselves, which turn out to very hugely influential in terms of the future commanders who undertook them when students, I have dwelt also on educational theory. It appears that once the army had settled on battlefield touring as a ‘good thing’, no attempt was made to validate the process in a way that most other training activities today are assessed. This is clearly important and an examination in Chapter One of various theories of learning investigates the argument that outdoor battlefield touring can be a more efficient way of imparting knowledge and skills than by indoor learning. A case must be made for the advantages of seeing the ground, otherwise all military history can be condemned to indoor study. As Geographer Peter Doyle puts it,

‘Terrain is another weapon of war. A good commander understands his or her terrain. Why is that? Because you have got a force and terrain can multiply the effect of that force. If you, for example, have only a few men and you can site them effectively on high ground channelling troops into the intervening space...then you are multiplying the action of that force...[at Gallipoli] terrain lost the battle for the British and French and won [it] for the Turks...[they] knew the landscape well and deployed effective tactics to exploit its natural advantages.’
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Need for a Battlefield Visiting Typology.

As some forms of battlefield visits today are also known as ‘staff rides’, I explore also the typology of battle terrain visits by differing audiences (I found that there were six separate traditions of visiting battlefields) and examine the evolution of the ‘staff ride’, a confusing term which conveys absolutely nothing to the uninitiated about the nature or purpose of the activity and probably (erroneously) engenders an unwarranted fear of horses or cycling. Consequently, the terminology has required some elaborate definitions, because there are differences - sometimes subtle - between a pilgrimage, a staff ride and a battlefield tour, which are explained in Chapter Two.

Doctrine, military history and battlefields.

That doctrine and military history are linked is unequivocal, argues Oliver J. Daddow. If doctrine can be loosely defined as ‘the lessons of the past and present used to inform the future’, then it becomes apparent that military history plays a vital rôle in the doctrine-making process. However, as Brig. Charles Grant observed of history in 1997,

‘the influence can work for good or evil. We must be sure to learn the right lessons, especially when faced with periods of rapid change socially, politically, economically, militarily and strategically’.

Staff rides can aid this process, and a good example of two armies extracting the opposite lessons from the same campaign can be found in the performance of the French and German armies in 1940, both having first studied the Western Front campaign of 1914-18 but drawn the opposite doctrinal conclusions.
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A full discussion from the military professional’s point-of-view of the relevance and utility of military history can be found in a wide-ranging collection of seven essays found in another Strategic and Combat studies Institute (SCSI) Occasional Paper, *Military History into the Twenty First Century*. Whilst Sir Michael Howard observes tellingly,

‘The lessons of history are never clear. Clio is like the Delphic oracle: it is only in retrospect, and usually too late, that we understand what she was trying to say…’

Group Capt. (now Air Commodore) Peter Gray provides two useful justifications for the staff ride to present day soldiers. Whilst acknowledging that ‘exact comparisons across the decades provide neither a blueprint for action nor precise guidance around the pitfalls to be avoided’, Gray argues that the intellectual exercise of studying human endeavour on the battlefield ‘is worth the while in its own right’.

In other words, the arguments of the Nineteenth century Prussians - of training good officers how to think – are still used today. Dr Alan Ryan of the Australian Land Warfare Studies Centre deploys a similar battery of arguments in his working paper, *Thinking Across Time: Concurrent Historical Analysis on Military Operations*, concluding that ‘the first step to learning from history is to develop greater self-awareness through formal processes of analysis…military history is a long-term and subtle, but extremely important combat multiplier…’ That, in the final analysis, is the core belief of this author: that battlefield visiting, done well, properly researched, conducted and validated, is a profound combat multiplier.
REFERENCES


2 The Warsaw Pact was established in 1955 to oppose NATO (itself established as a defensive alliance in 1949) and consisted of the Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. It was disbanded in July 1991.

3 Napoleon returned to Marengo on 11 May 1805, riding 50 miles and exhausting five horses. As a result, he ordered the historical section of the Dépôt de Guerre in Paris to revise their official account of the events of 14 June 1800. See David Chandler, Foreword to Donald Featherstone, The Battlefield Walker’s Handbook (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1998), p. 9.


5 See Chapter Six.


7 See Chapter Three.


11 For example, the (Dutch language) Engineer Instruction Center journal, Genieuws, No 1 (January 2006), contained an article on a battlefield tour of Verdun.

12 Interview with Col. Theodoros ‘Ted’ Antonopoulos, Greek Air Force, 19 October 1996. Conversations with Greek air force airborne and SF liaison officers at Maleme airbase, Crete, during staff rides held in July 2006 (Cranfield-Defence Academy Staff Ride) and May 2007 (HQ 145/Brigade Staff Ride), which both examined the 1941 campaign on Crete. Operation Mercury and its aftermath.


14 Interview 18 July 2002 with Maj. Colin Good, LD, graduate of the Egyptian Staff College, who commented that his course visited El Alamein and studied extensively the 1967 and 1973 wars with Israel.

15 Interview with Lt-Col. Ivan Babic, Chilean Army, 15 July 2006.

16 Interview with Maj. Oleg Stafeyev and Lt-Col. Dmitri Makhiev, Russian Army, at ITEC 2002 (International Defence Training, Education and Simulation Show/Conference, Lille, France, 10 April 2002).

17 Interview with Lt-Col. Jiyu (Jack) Zhang, PLA, 2 August 2006, who commented that most battlefields visited by military students related to the Chinese Civil War period.

18 Department of the US Army, Historical Summary, Financial Year 1989.

19 Interview with Col. Dewan Robin Soni, Indian Army (formerly CO of the Central Indian Horse), 18 October 2005


21 Interview with Maj. Gianluca Proietti, Italian Army Logistic Corps, during a staff ride to Monte Cassino and Anzio, 23 September 2006, who agreed that battlefield visits were an excellent idea, but felt that the difficult twenty-year period of Italian Fascism made the study of military history a challenge, but he felt this was beginning to change.

22 The Swiss Army do not undertake battlefield visits as part of their formal training (interview with Lt-Col. Christian Wolf, 31 July 2006), but officers are directed to a commercial company, that run battlefield tours all over Europe. Unfortunately, officers have to pay for their tours. See that tour company’s website at http://www.gms-reisen.ch/Reiseprogramm.htm.

23 Interview with Général de Brigade F. Juin of the Mission Militaire Française Auprès du Commandant Des Forces Terrestres Alliées en Centre-Europe, 29 September 2000. A copy of Juin’s thank-you note is at Appendix One.


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27 Interview with Lt-Col. Moses Rwakitarate, Ugandan Army, 17 October 2007.
28 Interview with Tim Kilvert-Jones, 10 April 2001, who attended an IDF staff ride around the Golan Heights in 1998.
29 Interview, Prof. Chris Bellamy 2 October 2006.
31 The 2004 figure no doubt reflects the 60th anniversary as well as interest inspired by the opening sequence of Steven Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan (1998), shot on location in the cemetery. The American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) Normandy Cemetery visitor numbers are on display in the Colleville-sur-Mer Visitor Centre. The detailed figures are 1,861,179 for 2004 and 1,421,120 for 2005.
33 See Chapter Two.
39 Ibid.
‘Wise travellers pause, to see the ways your fathers knew
That they may aid your climb, toward tomorrow’s view’

Anon ¹

CHAPTER ONE

Learning in the Field: Theory and Practice

The Commander.

The general halted suddenly in the dense pine woods and gestured. As his subordinates clustered about him, the weak autumn sun played on their camouflage fatigues, pine needles crunching underneath. Here the trees grew close together, occasionally blocking out the sunlight, but the hillcrest offered a rewarding view. A short distance away lay a squat concrete and steel fortress, dominating the landscape, his objective. At this time of year the undergrowth mostly hid the rusting barbed wire entanglements that would rob his infantry of manoeuvre. For three days his command team had explored the area, using the few roads wound laboriously around the contours, plunging into ravines and twisting up the valley sides. This was never going to be easy country for an assaulting force, he knew that; but he was also aware that the fort’s defenders knew that also and were off their guard. The general scanned the terrain with his field glasses, and felt the heavy responsibility on his shoulders – not just the lives of
his men, but the weight of history – his family had been soldiers for generations: one had risen as high in rank as he was now. Those with him took notes, pointed cameras, also turned their binoculars on the fortress and conversed in muted tones between themselves. Daylight heightened the washed-out shades of concrete and metalwork, but it was still a formidable objective by the standards of the day, with excellent fields of fire. This fort, and those linked to it represented a huge proportion of their country’s defence budget and seemed to the casual onlooker to offer a significant deterrent, incorporating the latest military technology of the day. ‘But that’s the point; new technology is not a panacea,’ thundered General Meigs, ‘There’s no silver bullet. What wins or loses is your ability to shatter the will of your opponent – that’s how you win wars’.2

It was autumn 2002; the commander of USAREUR, the US Army in Europe, Montgomery C. Meigs, led his colleagues towards the Maginot Line bunker. They included British, Russian and US Army officers; all were studying the May 1940 campaign of 62 years before, which gave the Germans command of France in just six weeks. As The Washington Post’s Pentagon correspondent Vernon Loeb, who accompanied the group, described it,

‘Meigs was leading a group…on what the Army calls a “staff ride”, a century-old teaching device that lets up-and-coming commanders walk historic battlefields, study the terrain and ponder the decisions taken by the great and no-so-great generals of the past…’,3

Meigs was a student of history. He knew that, according to German propaganda, it was a new doctrine (blitzkrieg) and tactics (co-ordinated armour and air power) that punched through the forbidding terrain of the Belgian Ardennes, outflanking France’s
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high-tech military investment in the Maginot Line\(^4\) against a German invasion. Yet Meigs was also aware that modern historians surmise it was actually the traditional military values of leadership, determination, training and discipline that took German infantrymen through the woods and over the River Meuse, creating a break-in for the *panzers* to exploit. It could be argued that the French in 1940 were over-reliant on new technology: ‘…this is a combination of what Patton called the false security of the fortress – and a misapplication of technology…’ Meigs observed.\(^5\) The four-star general was not out to learn tactics, but consider higher themes of warfare; in this case, Meigs questioned, ‘Why does the loser learn quicker and better than the winner? You’ve got to think about this, because right now the American military is the winner…’\(^6\) In 1940, both sides benefited from new technology (the allies collectively possessed more and better tanks than the *Wehrmacht*), but the Germans, as the losers of the First World War, realised that willpower and innovative thinking would give them the edge; and so it proved. Elsewhere, with a Clausewitzian turn-of-phrase, Meigs had observed,

‘…despite the best plans and the best training, the outcome is always subject to random factors and to error and… doubt. The difference between winning and not winning lies often in the faith of the unit in their leader and in the ability to persevere through the last final push that breaks the enemy’s will…’.\(^7\)

Meigs knew what he was talking about, having learned his trade in Vietnam and the 1991 First Gulf War and gained a history PhD in 1982; arguably, military leadership is in Meigs’ blood. His father, another Montgomery C. Meigs, died as a 24-year old battalion commander in 1944, whilst a great-great uncle had been the Union’s Quartermaster-General during the Civil War. This Meigs also used his September 2002
staff ride for another agenda. He was worried about the noises coming from the
Pentagon supporting Donald Rumsfeld’s proposals to realign US forces to rely on new
precision, stealth and high-speed data technologies, at the expenses of boots (and armour)
on the ground. Meigs’ gut feeling was that this was dangerous, citing NATO’s failure to
subdue the Serbs in Kosovo by airpower alone in 1999 and the inability of precision air-
delivered weapons to kill senior Al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan in December 2001. He
needed to confirm, then demonstrate to others, his anxiety that Rumsfeld and the
Pentagon could be behaving like the French in 1940 – relying on new, ‘silver bullet’
revolutions in military technology to overcome potential adversaries. Though no
Luddite – he commanded a brigade of M1A1 tanks in the 1991 Desert War – Meigs
sensed that true military change stemmed from technology, but from leadership and
creativity as well: the lessons he and his colleagues learned on their staff ride following
Heinz Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps through the Ardennes, in Meigs’ view, seemed to
illustrate this perfectly.

Many claims can be made for the value of studying war on actual battlefield
terrain, like General Meigs, which will be analysed in this thesis. This chapter deals
with one aspect often overlooked – not an issue of content, what you learn, but of
process, how you learn it. The educational benefits of using a staff-ride approach to
study and subsequent validation. This provides a framework both for understanding both
how students learn and how battlefield terrain studies address those students’ needs.
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Wider Education Theory and its Relevance to Battlefield Visits.

There is no academic analysis of any sort that has examined and quantified the educational nature of battlefield visits. Having established that the staff ride (the precise terminology attached to the concept of exploring battlefields through professional military eyes is examined in Chapter Two) is nearing its second century of practice, it is necessary to assess from an educational point of view how effective this method of learning is, compared with other approaches available to the military.

In measuring the utility of any learning activity, it is first essential to analyse the wealth of material on the educational process in whatever specific field; this presents the most scientific (if not necessarily the most complete) measure of its utility. One method is not so much to assess the nature of the learning material presented to and absorbed by students and its relevance to their careers, but to assess the unique way that staff rides educate their participants. One of the principal proposals of this thesis (and the subject of this chapter) is that well prepared staff rides can actually present military historical and contemporary data in a form unmatched by any other teaching resources. This point, as shown in the subsequent sections and chapters, is frequently missed by those questioning or praising the value of staff rides. It is not just the content (historical or otherwise) that is under the microscope here, but the efficacy of the educational processes in a staff ride that it is vital to consider as well. It is the blend of differing educational methods in a staff ride, like a field trip in other disciplines, which makes battlefield terrain study such a unique and valuable tool.
It is also fundamental to understand that learning in any context, and especially that of ‘continuing professional development’ implies change. Dr Chris Kyriacou in 1998 helpfully defined learning as ‘changes in behaviour which take place as a result of being engaged in an educational experience’. This behaviour can be conscious or unconscious, but suggests an ability to do something that either could not have been done before, or was done differently. This is clearly the aim with any kind of battlefield terrain study – to equip the participant with knowledge and understanding, so as to be able to manage a similar situation within his/her future career, highlighting the fact that they might have reacted differently prior to acquiring their new knowledge.

This section examines several educational theories and illustrates their particular appropriateness to staff rides. Although most educational psychology has focussed at the beginning of the human learning process, studying the way children learn and respond at primary and secondary school age, all the authors have then gone on to extend their studies to older generations and acknowledge that the same broad principles apply to adults, having been first applied and confirmed in childhood. Therefore many of the theories examined here began as studies of primary and secondary education but (as their authors have variously acknowledged) are none the less valid when applied to adults and – by extension - those undertaking studies of military history on battlefield terrain.

Having established that learning is about initiating change in an individual’s approach to challenges, it is also necessary to observe that a learning theory itself has been usefully defined by Marcy Driscoll in 1984 as ‘a set of constructs linking observed
changes in performance with what is thought to bring about those changes’.  

Change is achieved by appealing to different learning styles, which are a student’s consistent way of responding to and using stimuli in the context of learning. These are consistent throughout a student’s life, but refine with maturity. There are various instruments used to determine which stimuli a particular student will best respond to, and students can be categorised into various broad ‘types’ of learning style. A ‘learning style’ is the student’s general approach towards using particular types of educational activities. It is evidenced by attitudes towards and preferences for particular activities, which vary with individuals.

For example, whilst some shine in group discussions, others prefer learning out of doors, and some prefer to devour huge quantities of directed reading. Others prefer to contribute verbally to a discussion only when ‘shielded’ by general noise, whilst some are happy to speak out when there is silence. Learning style is also evidenced by the choices students make when given a degree of control over educational methods, and by a student’s approach towards types of tasks assigned to them. In every case, learning styles can be defined as a blend of these preferences, choices and approaches. It is then important to assess whether the staff ride meets the requirements of various learning styles.

The Behaviourist and Cognitive Schools.

Educationalists assess that there are two ‘umbrellas’ of learning theories, one embracing the ‘Behaviourist’ School, which believes that individuals are essentially
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passive in their learning and respond to stimuli. Thus students learn to respond in a particular way and initially (at least) are spoon-fed data to which they learn to respond. The measuring of response rates and consequent changes in frequency is at the heart of the behaviourist understanding of education and one might reflect that it is an approach frequently adopted by military instructors towards alien subject matter: in mastering approaches and processes not normally required in civilian life, instructors sometimes encourage students to lean heavily on the behaviourist approach. It has the advantage of sometimes being quicker, but runs the risk of bypassing a deeper self-understanding of ‘why’ and ‘how’.

The ‘Cognitive’ School argues that people are essentially interactive and learn from each other and build on knowledge they already possess. Whereas the behaviourist might teach a student to react in a given way, cognitive theory allows that students learn by deduction, reason and self-experimentation. In terms of military history, the behaviourist might assume that the student has no prior knowledge and ‘instructs’ the learner, whilst the cognitive school tries to find some historical or military knowledge the student already possesses and encourages them to build on that - whilst observing (and learning from) the efforts of their contemporaries also. This cognitive approach is summed up neatly in the words of Bruce A. Marlowe and Marilyn L. Page ‘...passively accumulating disconnected knowledge is not learning… to learn a student has to be mentally and often physically active. A student learns when they discover their own answers, solutions, concepts and relationships and create their own interpretations…’
This echoes the views of Neville Bennett and Elisabeth Dunne who argue that students make sense of the input of teachers

‘by constructing links with their prior knowledge. It is assumed that the construction of links is an active intellectual process involving the generation, checking and restructuring of ideas in the light of those already held. Construction of meaning is a continuous process.’\textsuperscript{13}

Educational psychology has developed greatly in the last thirty years, since David Kolb’s (see below), work on learning styles was first published in 1976\textsuperscript{14} with many studies being carried out on student groups of all age ranges, different sizes and all disciplines, from language learning to sciences and even sport.

It can be argued that no single measurement of style ensures that a learner’s needs will be met completely. It is arguably as important to assess which kind of learning environment best meets most learners’ personal styles. Key to this must be the approach of the instructor(s), who will have their own learning style. It is therefore important to recognise that instructors, too, may be in danger of forcing (often unintentionally) their own personally favoured learning method upon their students. Therefore, the more learning styles an educational process can address, the easier the instruction will be received by the learners. Therefore it is vital that staff rides be considered in terms of reaching the students’ needs (via their learning styles), not those of the instructors.\textsuperscript{15}

One of the implications when discussing the importance of learning styles is the impact on instructors and their methods. Since it is now commonly accepted that students differ in learning styles, it is important that directing staff use a variety of
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learning activities, so that students high in a certain learning style are not necessarily forced to learn in a non-preferred way that may be unsuitable for them. Maximum variation by staff in learning activities ensures that all participants will be taught in their preferred style for at least some of the time. However, students also need to be able to develop the ability to learn from a range of activities, and not to over-rely on their preferred learning style activities.\textsuperscript{16} Directing staff – teachers - do students no favours by consistently giving them assignments that match their preferences. Varied activities, such as those encountered throughout the staff ride process, can develop students’ versatility for learning. This is a strength of the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College, Watchfield, (JSCSC), and other military colleges around the world, where directing staff have themselves been students a few years previously, and understand the range of stimuli required and available. It is therefore not necessary to categorise students by learning style, to match activities to student preferences, or to attempt to recognise which style works best, but to recognise that all military exercises require as wide a variety of activities as possible, thus catering (equally, one hopes) to all learning styles, whilst at the same time, supporting participating students to develop their own repertoire of effective approaches to learning.

It should be observed that there are two contrasting types of experiential learning, which is the core of the staff ride/battlefield tour programme. First, there is the kind of learning undertaken by students who acquire and apply knowledge, skills and feelings in an immediate and relevant setting – on a past battlefield, for example. Experiential learning thus involves a ‘direct encounter with the phenomena being studied rather than merely thinking about the encounter, or only considering the possibility of doing
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This sort of learning is sponsored by an institution (with a battlefield study, it might be the JSCSC, or a brigade or division) and used on training programmes not just for the military, but for professions such as social workers, medical and teaching staff and on (amongst many others) business, geology, geography and archaeology university courses. The second type of experiential learning is education that occurs as a direct participation in the dramas of life – here, learning is not sponsored by some formal educational institution, but experienced by people themselves. It is heuristic learning achieved through reflection on everyday personal and professional experience, that could be categorised as informal education, based on instinct, experience and gut reaction.

Fire fighters around the world perhaps rely more on this second type of experiential learning than from simulation in a controlled environment (the first kind). The chief fire fighter tackling the explosion at the Buncefield Oil depot, Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire, in 1995 observed in a June 1997 interview that it was his gut reaction from over 20 years’ experience that led him to know what to do, whereas a ‘rookie’ just wouldn’t have the range of understanding about the way flames and fire can behave. In a military context, this kind of learning is someone’s past operational experience. This is as relevant on a staff ride, but the use of that experience needs to be controlled to allow the institutionally-sponsored experiential learning process to benefit all students equally.
A great number of different methods have been devised to explore learning styles, but a useful assessment from a staff riding point-of-view, is Kolb’s Learning Style Inventory. Since 1976, David A. Kolb (born 1939) has updated regularly his thinking on learning styles, most notably in his *Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development* of 1984. In it, Kolb acknowledges the early work on experiential learning by others, for example, Kolb states that he has built on Carl Jung’s assertion that learning styles result from people’s preferred ways of adapting in the world. Kolb points out that Jung’s assertion that there are ‘extraversion/introversion’ opposites correlates with the ‘Active/Reflective’ (doing/watching) learning types of his own model.

Nevertheless, Kolb remains an innovator in the field of learning styles and experiential learning theory and has devised both an Experiential Learning Theory (ELT), and Kolb’s Learning Styles Inventory (LSI), which are both acknowledged by academics, teachers, managers and trainers as fundamental concepts in the understanding and explanation of human learning behaviour, and therefore towards helping others to learn. Kolb remains (at the time of writing) active in researching adult development, experiential learning, learning style, and institutional development in higher education. His ideas remain a major influence on thinking about learning styles, and Kolb is seen as initiating a move within the education system generally to introduce the widest range of learning techniques, and has spawned a whole series of imitators and a range of theorists discussing his findings. Unsurprisingly many military instructors and university
lecturers are unaware of the impact of Kolb on education practice and are unable to recognise how uniquely well-suited staff rides are to his ideas.

Kolb’s experiential learning theory sets out four distinct learning styles (or preferences), which are based on a four-stage learning cycle. In this respect Kolb’s model is particularly suitable for assessing approaches to staff rides and battlefield tours, since it offers both a way to understand different learning styles, and his interpretation of a cycle of experiential learning that applies to everyone - how we perceive and process incoming data about the outside world, that is new and can fit with already assimilated facts. Kolb’s learning cycle is the key to his experiential learning theories, which have become popular with business leadership schools and MBA courses across the world.\(^{23}\)

His model uses two bi-polar dimensions to assess learning style: doing-watching versus thinking-feeling. He argues that learning involves a continuous four-stage process in two dimensions involving concrete experience (feeling), reflective observation (watching), abstract conceptualisation (thinking) and active experimentation (doing). (See Figure 1.1)

His cycle is progressive in that ‘concrete experiences’ provide a basis for ‘reflective observation’. These are assimilated and distilled into ‘abstract concepts’, which can be ‘actively tested’ in turn creating new experiences. Kolb also argues that this cycle becomes a spiral as the experimentation phase becomes concrete experience, and the cycle recommences.\(^{24}\) This process of learning, he argues, can be commenced at any stage within the cycle.
Kolb suggests that learning style preferences are actually the product of two pairs of variables (or separate choices), best expressed as Concrete Experience (CE), or feeling, versus Abstract Conceptualisation (AC), or thinking, and Active Experimentation (AE), or doing, versus Reflective Observation (RO), or watching.

By placing his two dimensions of feeling/thinking and doing/watching opposite each other, Kolb suggests that we cannot do both at the same time, feeling or thinking, doing or watching. However, he argues that individuals want to do both, which creates conflict, which is resolved through choice. This is an individual’s reaction each time when confronted with a new learning situation. The result of these choices is a preferred learning style, which is continually developed and refined through life. In Kolb’s
analysis, students choose a way of ‘grasping the experience’ (which defines his or her approach to it), and then finds a method of ‘transforming the experience’ into something meaningful and usable. Learning style, Kolb concludes, is a product of these two choices: in the approach to a task, a student prefers to do or watch (Kolb’s ‘grasping experience’) and their emotional response to the experience is summed up by preferring to think or feel – Kolb’s ‘transforming experience’.25

Using Kolb to understand and validate the staff ride/battlefield tour process, it is necessary to see whether battlefield visits are suitable both for students who approach tasks and experiences by using the tangible and known qualities of their own concrete experience (CE) or who are open to new information, gained by study, thought, analysis and planning (AC). At the same time, students need to be able to emotionally transform the experience of battlefield visits into something meaningful and useful by either watching others involved in the experience and reflecting on what happens (RO) or jumping in and testing ideas for themselves (AE). It can be observed that the wide range of students at staff college, or within the officer corps of the UK field army (or, less common for staff rides and battlefield tours, even from amongst Warrant Officers and NCOs within the army) comprise those with a degree and many without, some with operational experience and some without, and students from every arm and service – those from the intelligence world or technical corps, who may be thoughtful and more analytical in their approach, than their colleagues in medicine, the infantry or special forces, who may be inclined to speedy decisions and action first. Therefore, with an acknowledged wide range of personality types, it can be suggested that the variety of activities that form part of the William Glenn Robertson model for a staff ride (see later
on in this Chapter\textsuperscript{26}, meet the (perhaps excessively - and uniquely) wide range of learning styles found within the military.

![Figure 1.2. Kolb’s four learning styles linked as pairs (Diagram source: author)](image)

It is worth, therefore, examining Kolb’s ideas in more depth to see how they may match the range of learning styles typically found within the military. (See Figure 1.2). Everyone, argues Kolb, uses all four learning styles - concrete experience (or CE), reflective observation (RO), abstract conceptualisation (AC) and active experimentation (AE) – but he suggests that we all lean towards one of four learning types, (each representing the combination of two preferred styles). In staff ride/battlefield touring terms, someone with CE can reach back to a similar crisis or operational experience; an RO is best able to draw his or her conclusions by watching the operation unfold on the
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ground; an AC finds it easy to picture the campaign via abstract (perhaps literary or classroom) study, whilst the AE needs to put the lessons learned to the test before readily accepting the new data as valid. Kolb’s terms for these four learning types are:

(a) Kolb’s Diverging Learning Type, which is a blend of concrete experience and reflective observation (or CE/RO). These are ‘feeling and watching’ students, able to look at things from several different perspectives. They are sensitive, preferring to watch rather than do, and tend to gather information and use their imagination to solve problems. Kolb called this style ‘diverging’ because these people perform better in situations that require the generation of ideas – brainstorming, for example. Kolb states that ‘Divergers’ have broad cultural interests, are interested in people, tend to be imaginative and emotional; they prefer to work in groups, to listen with an open mind and to receive personal feedback. These types are useful on the problem-solving working groups so often found on military operations.

(b) Kolb’s Assimilating Learning Type, a mix of abstract conceptualisation and reflective observation (or AC/RO). Watchful and thoughtful, they prefer a quiet, logical approach, where ideas and concepts are more important than people; they require clear explanation rather than practical opportunity. Assimilating students excel at understanding wide-ranging information and organising it a clear logical format. Less focused on people, they excel in information and science-based environments. In formal learning situations, Kolb states, people with this style prefer readings, lectures, exploring analytical models, and having time to think things through. Here are types clearly with a role to play near a military operations room.
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(c) Kolb's Converging Learning Type, which is a fusion of abstract conceptualisation/active experimentation (or AC/AE). These are students who can solve problems and use their learning to find solutions to practical issues. Preferring technical tasks, they are less concerned with people and interpersonal situations. Kolb states that they find practical uses for ideas and theories, embrace new technology, experiment with new ideas, and in a military context, would enjoy war games and simulation.

(d) Kolb’s Accommodating Learning Type, the mix of concrete experience/active experimentation (or CE/AE). These are ‘hands-on’ students, who rely on intuition (gut reaction) rather than logical analysis and prefer to take a speedy, practical, experiential approach. They are attracted to new challenges and experiences, and to carrying out plans. People with an Accommodating learning style, according to Kolb, will tend to rely on others for information than carry out their own analysis. They prefer to work in teams to complete tasks, set targets and work actively in the field, trying different ways to achieve an objective. Clearly, this type can help drive the tempo of military operations at a pace fast enough to outwit opponents.

The identification of these different learning styles, via Kolb, is important validation for the battlefield visiting process, because in educational terms, students who have a clear learning style preference, will tend to learn more effectively if the learning process is orientated towards to their preference. For example, those who exhibit the ‘Assimilating’ learning style will not be comfortable being thrown in at the deep end without notes and instructions. People who identify with an ‘Accommodating’ learning style are likely to become frustrated if given huge amounts of directed reading, preferring
to get ‘hands on’ experience in the field, as soon as possible. Kolb suggests that most people exhibit clear, strong preferences for one of these four learning styles, and the ability to use or switch between alternate styles is not a facility commonly encountered.

However, it might be objected that Kolb’s model (and those that it inspired) are about learning rather than about development. Kolb himself admits this and also has an experiential learning theory of development. For example, Kolb’s cycle may not work in the CE-RO-AE-AC sequence for everyone, whilst some phases may be ‘jumped’ or bypassed. Nevertheless, Kolb initiated major thinking about learning styles over the last 25 years (some of which are explored below), throughout the English speaking world and beyond, awareness of which for the purposes of staff rides – as already observed – may easily have bypassed all but the most recently trained military instructors and university lecturers. Educationalists have responded to Kolb by advocating that teachers, lecturers and instructors should recognise that there are several different learning styles and make use of a wider variety of teaching techniques. For example, in presenting a single topic (say, a particular battle in history), the use of a mixture of small discussion groups, problem solving tasks, group and/or individual presentations, visual aids, project work and role play. Whilst these can all with effort be undertaken indoors, such a variety of educational tools lend themselves naturally to the al fresco setting of a battlefield.

Honey and Mumford.

Others, including Peter Honey and Alan Mumford, have developed alternative learning style theories, but using Kolb’s basic learning cycle model. (See Figure 1.3) In 1982, Honey and Mumford developed a Learning Style Questionnaire (still being
refined and issued today), which enabled individuals to place themselves (or others) in four stages of learning and four types of learning style, which are inter-related and inter-dependent. Their Stage One is ‘Having the Experience’ in which ‘Activists’, who are hands-on, here-and-now, gregarious individuals, but are inclined to boredom with long-term project implementation, seek challenge and immediate experience. Their Stage Two is ‘Reviewing the Experience’, where ‘Reflectors’ stand back, gather data, are thoughtful, ponder and analyse, and delay reaching conclusions. In Stage Three of the Honey and Mumford model, ‘Concluding from the Experience’, ‘Theorists’ think things through in logical steps, assimilate diverse facts into coherent theories, and are rationally objective. Finally, in Stage Four, ‘Planning the next Steps’, the ‘Pragmatists’ who are practical, down-to-earth, bored with long discussions and enjoy problem solving and quick decision-making, seek and try out new ideas. The Honey and Mumford stages and styles correspond closely to Kolb’s learning styles: their Activist corresponds to Kolb’s Accommodating style; their Reflector equals Kolb’s Diverging style; their Theorist equates to Kolb’s Assimilating style; their Pragmatist parallels Kolb’s Converging trait.
Another way of assessing the educational validity of staff riding is to study an equivalent experience of civilian managers. Dr. Roger Greenaway of the University of Lancaster, Centre for the Study of Management Learning has analysed residential development training courses at the Brathay Hall Trust (1988-9) in Cumbria. He defines development training as ‘a form of experiential learning which is intensified by the use of challenging activities’, which, arguably, may have a civilian equivalence to a staff ride. This kind of course is extremely common in the United Kingdom and United States, but rarely assessed from an academic and educational point-of-view. Such courses are also known as outdoor management development, experience-based training and development or corporate adventure training, all inevitably abbreviated to OMD, EBTD and CAT.  

Roger Greenaway.

Figure 1.3. Honey and Mumford’s four Learning Styles  
(Diagram source: author)
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Greenaway’s purpose was to discover the variety of learning and development experiences valued by course students, while also looking for patterns common to all (or most) of these experiences. Greenaway found that significant development is not necessarily accompanied by emotional turbulence. Students asserted that key learning experiences tended to happen more by accident than by design, that powerful learning experiences seemed to result from a positive attitude towards learning, when there were high levels of involvement and responsibility, a varied and eventful programme, and strong group support for risk taking. Much of this wider education theory is echoed by the military staff ride process, but the comment that key learning happened by accident rather than design is a powerful reminder that every aspect of a staff ride (as with all education) needs careful stage management, and discussions require moderation by instructors, to ensure that appropriate lessons emerge.

The participants’ main observations were that, even if re-learning an old lesson, they felt better for it - refreshed, rekindled, reaffirmed – because of the environment and context. That being part of a successful team, and appreciating the value of giving/receiving support was hugely important. The freedom to learn, in an environment where there were few barriers and in which creativity and risk-taking was supported, was vital. That the satisfaction of personal success (typically overcoming a personal fear, or leading/managing the group), broadening of horizons, doing new activities, experiencing a new learning culture and new learning was all valued. Students asserted that learning how to recover from a bad experience was important and led some to vow not to subject others to a similar experience. The importance of learning from feedback from others in the group (whether positive or negative) was reaffirmed. There was sometimes a sense
that a learning experience had been valuable, but individuals were sometimes not sure what to make of it. Finally, there was a sense of learning how to learn again and working out how to improve one’s own approach to learning.\footnote{\textsuperscript{33}}

The observation that creativity and risk-taking was encouraged again underlines the advantage of the staff ride approach, which is that students can (and will) make mistakes, but no one will die as a result. The sense that a learning experience was important, but un-interpreted surely points to the inability of the Brathay staff to supervise learning outcomes. Both staff rides and the Brathay approach arguably succeed in their aims of bringing new lessons to senior managers (or leaders) because of their use of different learning styles (evidenced by ‘the varied and eventful programme’ feedback comment at Brathay) to appeal to the entire range of learning types, as identified by Kolb.

\textbf{Marton and Entwistle.}

Other learning styles have been summarised as ‘see it, hear it, do it’ and are now formalised as visual, auditory and kinaesthetic (VAK) forms of learning style, whilst Ference Marton and Noel Entwistle in 1987 advocated three tiers of learning approaches – Deep, Surface and Strategic. Students exhibiting a deep approach to, say, understanding a battle, Marton and Entwistle might argue, are trying to understand for themselves and utilise evidence and logic in grappling with the topic to the fullest extent. Learners who adopt a surface approach whilst on a battlefield are more interested in picking up some elements only of the subject, sufficient for their short term needs, and deploy limited or minimal effort. A student who adopts a strategic approach on a staff ride focuses attention on those aspects which will gain the maximum impact, assessment
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or grade. Each approach is epitomised by an intention or process which leads to a qualitatively different outcome: the intention to understand for oneself (deep); the intention to apply only limited effort (surface); the intention to do well by highly organised study and effort (strategic). It is easy to envisage individuals possessing these three differing traits on a staff ride and the author regularly encounters all three types on the same tour.

Howard Gardner.

In 1983 Howard Earl Gardner (born 1943) identified eight learning styles or intelligences: musical, kinaesthetic, mathematical-logical, visual-spatial, linguistic, interpersonal, intrapersonal and naturalist. It is worth exploring Gardner’s influential theory further, as an alternative or supplemental approach to Kolb’s learning style preferences. Music is an underrated learning tool, and Gardner argues that it is important to incorporate music into learning. Musical intelligence is wider than music, encompassing an aptitude for rhythm and patterns of sound. Some individuals have a superb natural ability to be creative with any rhyme, rhythm or sound. Gardner observes there are some cultures (in Africa, for example) where this intelligence is more prominent than elsewhere. Learning styles appealing to musical intelligence may incorporate any of the following skills: vocal, composing, instrumental, or listening. He comments that everyone has at least some musical intellect and music can be a powerful tool in enhancing learning and memory. Even sound effects (such as gunshots, horses’ hoofs, tracked vehicle movement or shelling, for example), military music and audio broadcasts of reminiscences used on a staff ride would fall into this category.
With kinaesthetic intelligence, some people find that they are able to learn extremely well when they are involved in physical activity rather than sitting still. Gardener defines the core components of kinaesthetic intelligence as the ability to use one’s body in highly differentiated and skilled ways, where mental ability is used to coordinate bodily movement. This can be for expressive, as well as goal-directed purposes and involves fine motor movements (of fingers, for example) or whole body movement – thus encompassing surgeons and football players. Individuals with strong kinaesthetic skills fall into two categories: athletic skill or physical dexterity, thus this encompasses a range of abilities, from dancing or acting, to surgery, sculpture or vehicle maintenance. This author would observe that, certainly from experience of battlefield visits with civilian and military personnel, that the military incorporates a higher-than-average number of those with kinaesthetic intelligence and that the outdoor phase of a staff ride appeals to this type. This is as true for the guide/leader/instructor as it is for the student/participant. There is an element of ‘performance’ in the more accomplished tour leaders that put them in a category above mere guides reciting information.

Some individuals, says Gardner, are able to learn anything using their logical mathematical intelligence. They are able to calculate and work out relationships and connections, and enjoy mental challenges, seeking out solutions to logical, abstract and mathematical problems and have good deductive reasoning skills. Alternatively, they may simply excel at games involving skill and strategy such as chess or computer games. Gardner defines logical-mathematical intelligence as the ability to appreciate and calculate the effect of actions upon objects or ideas and the relationships among them. Those so equipped can apply deductive reasoning skills to provide solutions and
overcome complex mathematical and logical challenges, as well as solving critical and creative problems. By the very act of investigation and analysis, they can dive beneath the surface of an issue, and avoid taking it at face value. Logisticians and intelligence experts (particularly), who conform to this type, constantly amaze this author by their ability in the field to make connections in the context of a past campaign, that this author had not foreseen or appreciated.37

Those with visual-spatial intelligence, states Gardner, can visualise things with great accuracy; they can think three-dimensionally and can turn ideas into a working visual model, which they can adapt and modify as required. These individuals have an amazing ability to mentally map new territory, giving them a strong sense of where they are positioned in relation to the world around them. They are highly likely to be good at arts and crafts, including design work. There is an obvious aptitude for architectural design, map-reading, and an ability to conjure up an image of the landscape from the information on a map. They find flowcharts and diagrams very helpful ways of processing information. In military terms, those with spatial awareness excel at navigation, strategic eye-hand co-ordination to construct, arrange, decorate, design or camouflage things. They can also better than most picture a piece of terrain as it might have looked in the past, given appropriate visual tools (photographs, artefacts, memoirs) to do so. In the author’s experience, military personnel respond unusually well to this approach.

Individuals who have made communication an art are equipped with linguistic skills; they have the ability to write and or talk fluently, utilising a broad vocabulary to
express the precise meaning of what they wish to convey, and some can speak with changing intonations and rhythms of sound to express feelings and promote memory. Gardner’s definition of linguistic intelligence incorporates a sensitivity to the meaning of words, the order among words, sounds, rhythms, inflections, different functions of language, phonology, syntax and grammar. This in turn promotes a strong ability to recall information, which benefits writers, journalists, actors, lawyers and advocates, politicians and salesmen – and military leaders.

Interpersonal intelligence encompasses those able to establish rapport with others quickly and easily, making them feel at ease, and those able to read other peoples reactions and empathise. Gardner’s view is that the ability to communicate in this way is a vital human intelligence, so everyone is already equipped with the skills to perform this – supporting a relative or colleague, teaching or parenthood. He defines this skill as the ability to recognise distinctions between other people, to know their faces and voices; to react appropriately to their needs, to understand their motives, feelings and moods and to appreciate such perspectives with sensitivity and empathy. Whilst common enough for teachers, instructors and medical carers, this is an intelligence occasionally lost by (or absent from) instructors on battlefields!

Intrapersonal skills mean the ability to reflect and monitor one’s own progress, thoughts and feelings, strengths and weaknesses. Those few who do posses intrapersonal intelligence, argues Gardner, have often acquired it for themselves by taking an active interest in their ability to control their own destiny. His definition is sensitivity to one’s own feelings, wants and fears, personal histories, and an awareness of
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strengths and weaknesses, plans and goals. Garner observes that those so equipped are able to recognise and change behaviours and weaknesses, resulting in rapid development and goal orientated achievements.

Gardner’s final intelligence, naturalist, is the ability to recognise and classify artefacts and cultural icons. Gardner identified Charles Darwin (1809-1882) as a prime example of naturalist intelligence, which enables human beings to recognise and categorise features of the environment. It is also the ability to discriminate among living things (plants, animals) and sensitivity to other features of the natural world (clouds, rock configurations). This ability was clearly of value in the evolutionary past as hunters, gatherers, and farmers; it continues to be central in such roles as botanist or chef. He states that people with a preference for naturalist intelligence appreciate animals, fishing, gardening, investigating nature and need access to nature. It might also categorise those in the intelligence world who are good at equipment identification and, through the understanding and analysis of doctrine and tactics, appreciate enemy strategy. Gardner’s approach is that there are many human intelligences, common to all cultures, each with its own pattern of development and brain activity, and each different in kind from the others. He believes that the recognition, fostering and education of these multiple intelligences are the key to successful learning.

One of the attractions of Gardner’s approach is his suggestion that the intelligences are equally important and that they are rarely present in isolation. This means that students possess a blend of some/all of Gardner’s intelligences, though one is likely to be dominant. He argues that his eight intelligences are all required when facing
problems or acquiring skills: for example, ‘...a successful violinist requires bodily-kinaesthetic dexterity, and the interpersonal skills of relating to an audience and, in a different way, choosing a manager…’\textsuperscript{38} Similarly, staff rides involving a range of tasks and assessment techniques (for example, role play, mini lectureettes, map work, problem solving, use of diagrams, visual aids, demonstration of artefacts) in and out of doors can enable leaders to appeal to the widest possible range of students and learners to show how they engage in a task, what they know, understand and can do, in other words how they learn.\textsuperscript{39}

This reinforces the lessons implied by Kolb, that multiple learning techniques are required to satisfy the multiple learning styles of an average cohort of students, and overcomes the objections that Kolb overlooks development and focuses primarily on education. The multi-cultural objectivity of Gardiner is perhaps especially relevant in the field of multi-national and coalition military operations.

\textbf{Lev Vygotsky and successors.}

Many of the theories examined in this chapter relate to the individual and the way he/she learns.\textsuperscript{40} Several theorists have observed that the value of education is greatly increased with social interaction. It was the pioneering work of the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1894-1934) that underlined the benefits of social interaction in education, via two works posthumously translated into English in 1962 and 1978. Deploying his concept of a ‘zone of proximal development’ Vygotsky identified a gap between what an individual can do alone and unaided and what can be achieved with the help of more knowledgeable others. Writing of children but, he suggested, equally applicable to
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adults, Vygotsky observed ‘what a child can do today in co-operation, tomorrow he will be able to do on his own…’  

This rings true with the particular nature of group study on a battlefield, where it is actually often difficult to remain on one’s own to assess and contemplate the terrain and solve command challenges, there being a natural inclination to split into small groups when considering new terrain, where several pairs of eyes are better than one pair.  In a later translation (1978), Vygotsky also observed that ‘learning awakens a variety of internal developmental processes that are able to operate only when the child is interacting with people in his environment and in co-operation with his peers…’  

Vygotsky’s rediscovery - via his translations into English - influenced a generation of educational psychologists, particularly Jerome Bruner (born 1915), who observed in 1986 that learning is a communal activity, a sharing between those who have the same sense of belonging to the same culture.  

This would suggest that learning within a community that embraced a common culture (the British Army, for example) was easier for the whole group, than for loners, and less challenging when that community embraced the same common culture - rather than, say, a disparate group of civilians thrown together on a battlefield tour.

Military Educational Appraisals.

Amongst those cautious in their praise of staff rides, objective criticism has been voiced by Professor Eugenia C. Kiesling of the US Military Academy, West Point, (writing in 2001), who argued that there was an inevitable clash between the desire to discover what actually happened on a battlefield and the need to teach contemporary lessons.  She suggests that, for military purposes, in pursuance of the latter ‘historical details (are) dismissed as trees obscuring the forest’.  

She (rightly) observes that staff
rides have not had a continuous presence in US military education – nor have they had in the United Kingdom - (the reason in both cases for their presence or absence is either financial or global conflict) and therefore muses, ‘…given their relatively minor historical pedigree, why do staff rides have their modern reputation as the consummate tool for educating serving officers?’\textsuperscript{46} Her comments were pertinent, but she completely overlooks the educational process that staff rides represent; the ‘clash’ that Keisling identified is different from, but presents a parallel with, the content/method dichotomy identified in the previous section.

On the other hand, one of the most active proponents of staff riding within the US military community, Professor William Glenn Robertson, at the US Army Center of Military History, has described the ‘carefully designed and intelligently executed’ staff ride as ‘one of the most powerful instruments available for the professional development of US Army leaders’.\textsuperscript{47} Although Robertson hints at it, both professors in fact overlook the educational practice present in well structured staff rides and instead simply debate the issue of content. Similarly, a UK LAND Command paper on battlefield tours from 2004 observed, ‘…Battlefield tours have arguably a major impact on the intellectual training and morale of our future leaders at all levels, and by extension our military capability…’\textsuperscript{48} whilst the battlefield studies policy guide (most recently of 2005) merely states

‘Battlefield Studies (BS) is [sic] a proven and highly effective tool to reinforce all 3 elements of Fighting Power, taking account of specific environmental circumstances. It [sic] confirms commanders’ understanding of doctrine; allows deductive logic to be used to retrospectively examine decisions; and broadens the military experience of those participating.’\textsuperscript{49}
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There are no references to any educational theory, value, practice or validation, in either document and the papers concerned concentrate solely on procedure and content, without explaining why such studies are ‘a proven and highly effective tool’.

**Learning Outcomes.**

As William Glenn Robertson, author of the seminal US training publication, *The Staff Ride* (1987), has identified, it can be argued that staff rides have specific, but varied, learning outcomes. These may include studying leadership in battle, to equip a new generation of military leaders with a sense of decision-making in a complex emergency. Another learning outcome may be to give a sense of time, space and terrain to the business of staff planning, as in Clausewitz’s day, so that carefully studied classroom technique can be given a realistic dose of poor weather and logistics chaos. It may be that a better understanding of the challenges of tri-service, multi-agency or multinational operations is required, and replicated, with real ‘players’ on a ‘real’ battlefield. These are learning outcomes, which it is essential to identify before any kind of staff ride commences. For example, in 2006, the British Army Training Regiments at Winchester, Lichfield, Pirbright, and Bassingbourne and the Apprentice College at Harrogate all took their recruits on battlefield study tours to Ypres and Dunkirk with very clear learning objectives, which included (a) a sense of values and standards; (b) an understanding of selfless commitment; (c) the Law of Armed Conflict; (d) morality in war; (d) an understanding of current-day soldiering. These objectives were outlined in pre-tour briefings and reinforced by ‘best books’ which the participants had to write after the
At a different level, in May 2003, the five stated High Level Training Objectives (HLTOs) of the Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC), including the staff ride phase, were (1) Revitalization of Professional Interest; (2) Development of the Ability to Identify and Focus on Key Issues; (3) Gain a Common Understanding of the Approach to the Employment of Military Force at the Higher Levels; (4) Gain a Practical Understanding of the Characteristics of Maritime, Land and Air Environments at the Operational Level; (5) Gain an Understanding of the Nature of High Command; with an End-State Objective, To Have Developed a Mind that is Able to Analyze Complex Issues of a Joint and Combined Nature from First Principles in order to make Timely Decisions at the Higher Level of Influence and Command.

Carolyn Johnstone.

A different area that can be used to validate the staff ride concept is the work of Maj. Carolyn Johnstone on Syndicate Room Discussions (SRDs) at the Staff College, Camberley. In 1996 Johnstone studied this specific form of educational technique developed at Camberley. She focussed on the behaviour and roles of both tutors and students, and considered the institutional and societal context in which these discussions were carried out. She analysed the effectiveness of this peculiar and very specific teaching method, in terms of achieving the learning objectives set and meeting the needs of the students, whose staff college year amounted to a professional development course. Using archival material, Johnstone compared modern discussions with those of earlier courses and the reasons for curricular changes. Her work is important and relevant to the subject of this author’s study, for the British Army’s most important battlefield visits (whether they are staff rides or battlefield tours is discussed in later chapters) are
launched from the staff college, and to a certain extent, the tradition and spirit of the syndicate room discussion travels with students, their directing staff and academic experts on these overseas tours, too, although the syndicates tend to grow in size. In conjunction with a TV documentary about the Staff College, the BBC’s Listener magazine explained in 1980, ‘every student belongs to a discussion group of ten…chaired by a colonel and [including] at least one foreign student. The aim is for the students to learn by bouncing their ideas and experiences off one another’.\textsuperscript{54}

The learning objectives then in force (1996) for SRDs included the following:

‘(a) to enable students to put forward new ideas or to express any strong views they may hold; (b) to ensure that officers benefit from each other’s experience. The breadth of experience in a syndicate is extensive, particularly as officers of other services and of overseas armed forces can give their opinions and explain their methods; (c) to practise students in speaking clearly and convincingly in committee; in presenting a case and arguing it with others; in obeying the rules of argument and clear thinking and, when appointed by the DS [directing staff], in taking the chair at a meeting…’\textsuperscript{55}

It might be observed that these are all valid learning outcomes (if somewhat incidental) for a battlefield visit.

Johnstone concludes that, despite some weaknesses,

‘…it is clear that SRDs could be seen as an ideal vehicle for professional development. By exposing people to others in their profession and allowing them time to explore ideas, feelings of trust and shared values are developed and recognised by individuals…Formally arranged discussions can also assist students in developing skills as self-directed learners, which can be transferred easily to place of work…the students have to apply their expertise in diverse circumstances and the learning environment should reflect the fact that clear-cut answers are not always available: teaching through group discussions is appropriate in such circumstances as it permits students to explore ideas lacking in clarity, without imposing on the staff the need to produce solutions…students
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were more than capable of sustaining discussions on relevant topics, and were sometimes more expert than the staff member in particular areas. The Directing Staff are very close in age to the students and share their professional values and the discussions could be a powerful vehicle for developing the military profession…”

This is important analysis, since the early (phase one) part of a staff ride should involve (for staff college at least) this type of learning discussion, in preparation for the field study phase. One can then make a case for these discussions to continue on and off the battlefield for the rest of the staff ride, directed (moderated) in the same way, by directing staff. However, amongst the weaknesses of SRDs, Johnstone found that

‘…at the level of the individual learner, SRDs offered few opportunities for learners to develop their learning strategies; discussions were too tightly structured and controlled for students to experiment in this area. The individual contributions to discussions by students were not received in an encouraging manner and – particularly for students from overseas – this resulted in silence or in very “safe” contributions being made. The constraints on the time available and topics permitted in the discussion periods also limit the effectiveness of SRDs at the group level. Such constraints are incompatible with the need for professionals to develop abilities to work autonomously and with the diverse nature of their future tasks…”

These weaknesses are also evident on battlefield visits, where some students are clearly reluctant to share ideas with the rest of the group. As Robertson observed, the larger the student-staff ratio, the more the quality of learning and interaction declines. It is this author’s experience that with larger groups operating around single instructors on battlefield visits, participation is often dominated by a few, whilst in a typical group of thirty (three times the number of a syndicate), some students remain on the fringes throughout and do not contribute at all, unless prompted. It should be recognised also, that time, as in the classroom (and for prior research) is also a constraint.
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Clearly there is a balance to be struck between tightly directed discussion and free expression of thought. On a staff ride, totally free expression (and choice of topic) may result in some vital lessons being lost, and, as Robertson and Brig. Melvin\textsuperscript{59} imply, the best staff rides and battlefield tours are carefully and intimately stage managed, but do not appear so. Therefore, this author would have trouble in accepting one of Johnstone’s recommendations, that

‘…in direct contrast to the 1947 advice of the Department of the Scientific Advisor to the Army Council, we recommend that the system of issuing students with questions to answer in preparation for Syndicate Room Discussions and giving Directing Staff notes on ‘ideal’ solutions be discontinued. Instead, each group should determine the areas of most relevance and interest to them and structure their discussions accordingly…’\textsuperscript{60}

Clearly, Johnstone is assessing syndicate room discussions, which are not staff rides. However, both could be (and have been) undertaken by the same cohort of students, so the parallel is worth pursuing. This author has found the issue of pre-determined questions to be discussed at various stands or viewpoints enormously beneficial. It ensures a lack of repetition, and determines in advance that all relevant themes and topics are debated.\textsuperscript{61} On a staff ride, the ‘ideal’ solution is, of course, the actual events that unfolded. So there is benefit in hauling such a known quantity as the syndicate room discussion onto the battlefield, and continuing the debate, accompanied by directing staff, on the ground.

There has been precious little observation and assessment of student behaviour on staff rides to validate these educational theories, but it can be observed that the \textit{al fresco} setting of battlefield terrain study (in good weather) naturally and easily harnesses more
aspects of these theories than the classroom. All is possible indoors, but it is more cumbersome and time consuming to organise, and to a certain extent removes the experiential ‘discovery’ element that walking the terrain brings.

Walter Schumm.

Amongst the limited military educational validations of the staff ride concept is that of Brigadier (and PhD) Walter Schumm of the Missouri Army Reserve who in 2003 observed 42 personnel of his command undertake a ‘beyond-the-classroom’ staff ride to a US Civil War battlefield site. The participants included one-third officers and two thirds enlisted personnel, some with previous staff ride experience, but there were few differences between officers and enlisted personnel in terms of the outcomes evaluated. Responding to a two-page evaluation form, nearly all (93 percent) reported a desire to participate in another ride, whilst 88 percent said the event was very or mostly interesting. 38 percent reported an increase in interest of Civil War history whilst none reported a decline. All personnel agreed with the concept of an all-ranks staff ride. Participants with some previous staff ride experience (1-2 rides) reported learning most, whereas those with no previous experience or many previous rides (5+) reported learning less (the choices in answer to the question ‘How much did you learn?’ were, almost nothing, a little bit, a good deal or a tremendous amount). The range of responses here may well indicate Gardner’s multiple intelligences and other learning styles in operation; whilst the limited rise in interest of Civil War history may reflect Maton and Entwistle’s deep, surface and strategic learning styles at work. The (perhaps surprising) fact that those with prior experience of a staff ride learned most would seem to validate constructivist theories of Marlowe and Page and Bennett and Dunne, that learning is
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about constructing links with prior knowledge, checking and restructuring ideas in the light of those already held and arriving at one’s own subsequent interpretations. One can understand that knowledge of how to make these links might be stronger after previous experience of a staff ride, but the interest and novelty would tail off after experience of multiple rides.

The Higher Command and Staff Course.

The UK Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC) validate each year’s course, including the staff ride phase, by means of student questionnaire. The important difference here is that the staff ride phase (described as a core element of the course) comes at the end of the whole course, thus building on the other six phases, in the manner, once again, of the constructivist theories of Marlowe and Page and Bennett and Dunne. One comment from HCSC 03 particularly emphasised this constructivism: ‘…it [the staff ride] is an essential part of drawing the threads of the course together, more valuable than the Theatre War Game…’

Given that the whole course is a blend of lectures, discussions, role play, war-gaming, writing a research paper and travel (in other words, already appealing to a wide variety of learning styles and intelligences), each year since the inception of the 15-week residential course in 1986, the highest scores by a long margin have always been for the staff ride phase. For example, the Staff Ride was judged by 75 percent of students on HCSC 03 to have achieved its objectives ‘very well’. The next highest score on the same course was for the Crisis Response and Peace Support Operations phase, which achieved a ‘very well’ score of 52 percent, whilst the Theatre War-game achieved a ‘very well’ score of just twelve percent.
HCSC 2001 highlighted the success of ‘…the mix of teaching methods and in particular the value of Campaign Case Studies and the Staff Ride’, which were considered ‘extremely valuable tools’. All but one (96 percent) of HCSC 2002 felt that the staff ride had achieved its objectives well or very well. HSCS 03 felt the staff ride ‘one of the highlights of the course’, meeting its objectives very well (75 percent) and well (25 percent). HSCS 04 were more divided at 38 percent (very well), 54 percent (well) and eight percent (satisfactory), but most still considered the staff ride ‘…the cream on the cake’ and ‘…an essential part of the course – it would be considerably lessened without it’. Yet, clearly demonstrating that learning styles and intelligences are different, the only dissenting voice (that of an airman) on the staff ride phase for HCSC 04 recorded,

‘…enjoyable, but on balance not the value I hoped for…I am not convinced by the Staff Ride as currently formed. There is huge benefit from the Course mixing away from Shrivenham but the contemporary value of a range of historical battles, whilst interesting, is marginal…’

Perhaps the student was exhibiting traits of Marton and Entwistle’s surface or strategic, as opposed to deep, learning? Contrast this view with that of a fellow student on the same course, ‘…Without the staff ride, I would go away from this course with a lesser understanding of my business than I do now…’ - which is possibly a demonstration of ‘deep’ learning.

The staff ride phase involves the presentation of papers which students variously felt, ‘…the balance of history and the future was correct with the production of the papers contributing significantly to the end state…’ (HCSC 03); ‘…an interesting task. I enjoyed listening to the other presentations…’ (HSC 04); ‘…My topic – Falaise Pocket
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and risk – had a good historical underpinning and topical/relevant pull-through…’ (HCSC 04); ‘…whilst I was initially sceptical about the value of writing the paper, the research was interesting and it certainly generated discussion on the staff side. It also refreshed my professional interest…’ (HCSC 04). These four student responses to the same task (researching, writing and during the ride, presenting their paper) - while all positive - clearly indicate, by their different emphases, Gardner’s different intelligences and learning styles at work.

Author’s Experience.

This author has led many all-ranks staff rides for US Army units and collects a simple evaluation questionnaire at the end of each. These assess the appeal of different aspects of a staff ride, including (a) pre-tour reading, (b) pre-tour classroom instruction, (c) visits to battle sites, (d) terrain walks, (e) visits to museums, (f) student study assignments, (g) instructor performance, (h) en route instruction (i.e. audio visual broadcasts and passive instructor commentary), (i) study guides and other in-tour hand-outs; (j) morning/evening seminars during the tour and (k) aspects of administration. Students are asked to grade each activity/aspect from 4 (highest) to 1 (lowest). Most activities relate to a different learning style or intelligence and it is not surprising that for each of nine such tours carried out over the last seven years (of 35, 32, 28, 18, 28, 21, 26, 25 and 19 personnel), averaging 26 personnel, no two questionnaires have ever matched – in every case, participants have varied in what they have graded top. A sample questionnaire is included at Appendix Seven.
Or take these reactions, from a platoon of 44 recruits aged between 17 and 19, in their fourth week of basic training at the Army Training Regiment, Pirbright, to a Realities of War tour to Ypres and the Somme in 2006. Standing in a cemetery, one recruit observed ‘…being here makes me feel inspired, and hearing about what they did makes me want to go through with it even more’, whilst another mused, ‘…some of these graves are for guys younger than me…I try not to think about it too much’ and a third - named Ryan Marshall - stated, ‘…I have seen a lot of graves with the name Marshall on them…’ These reactions recorded from the same cohort of students in the same location varied widely, and reflected their different learning approaches – perhaps the first was expressing Kolb’s Converging trait, the second Assimilating and the third, Diverging.

Mike Bechtold, Canadian Battle of Normandy Foundation.

A similarly wide spread of impressions was recorded by a Canadian academic, Mike Bechtold, of students on 12-strong Canadian Battle of Normandy Foundation (CBNF) study tours to Europe, in reaction to the same task, a TEWT (tactical exercise without troops) defending the Normandy village of Bretteville, as a means of understanding the battle there in 1944. One student focussed on leadership (perhaps expressing Gardner’s interpersonal intelligence), concluding,

‘…our TEWT of the Bretteville defence has left me with disdain for those who would criticize military commanders after the fact. These men bore what must have been crushing responsibility; what right do we have to pass judgement on their actions without walking a mile in their shoes?’
Another, drawn to the ground (and exhibiting Gardner’s visual-spatial intelligence), thought,

‘…The opportunity to study actual battlefields was of incredible value in helping me better understand the events that took place. I have a new and much improved understanding now of the importance of terrain and how it dictates the way a battle is fought….I’ve read hundreds of books and studied maps, watched documentaries, but nothing can replace the experiences of being there and seeing it for yourself…’

Whilst a colleague warmed to the planning process (showing Gardner’s logical-mathematical intelligence at work), recalled,

‘…we were not allowed to ‘forget’ that the troops were tired, that some equipment was missing, that casualties strained morale and strength, etc. We had to take all those factors into account when making our plans. It only made the exercise more realistic, more valuable…’

It is worth noting that all three would also have been displaying at least Gardner’s kinaesthetic intelligence, in the way they moved around the battlefield, and visual-spatial intelligence, from their appreciation of the terrain and relating it to maps, photographs and diagrams.

**Conclusion.**

If we accept Kyriacou’s definition of learning as ‘changes in behaviour which take place as a result of being engaged in an educational experience’, then there also needs to be a way of measuring that pre- and post-event change to validate (in this case) the use of battlefield visits as an educational method. The foregoing examples (the Schumm survey, the HCSC validation process, US Army questionnaires and interviews) represent approaches to that process, but this is not uniform or mandatory with the UK armed forces. A 2001-02 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General on staff college training observed that good practice in the validation of learning works on three tiers. Level one is the individuals’ immediate reaction to the event, usually achieved by
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a post-learning questionnaire; level two is the validation of the learning itself and involves (1) pre- and post-learning activity tests (for example, self assessments, written tests or practical tests); (2) questionnaires; and (3) structured interviews. Level three is the intermediate impact on individual performance and their contribution towards their team; this is accomplished by structured interviews, questionnaires and feedback within 4-6 months of the event. The 2002 Report observed that similar methods of validation had been observed by its authors at ‘overseas staff colleges, civilian providers of management training and private sector customers of such courses.’

Such validation is arguably very appropriate to battlefield visiting and has been embraced by the HCSC process (which includes an extended internal validation where students of two years previously are sent a 23-question survey). If such validation is recommended for aspects of Staff College training (as the 2002 Report does) it is surprising that questionnaires (at least) have not been made a mandatory part of the battlefield visiting process, which is also a form of training. None of the UK LAND policy documents on battlefield visiting, including one from January 2004, which terms battlefield visits as the ‘Operational Learning Experience’ (OLE) and talks of relevancy, aim, participation and method; and that of September 2005, cited earlier, (as well as ignoring educational theory) discusses any form of validation practice.

In the range of teaching facilities available to military organisations, the staff ride approach to study thus benefits over indoor lectures and classroom work by being experiential, but additionally it embraces a wider range of intelligences and learning
styles than indoors instruction can easily manage. As Richard Holmes has observed, ‘there is a dynamic on the ground that you don’t get in the classroom’. These interpretations of the views of educational theorists, such as Kolb, Honey and Mumford, Garner or Vygotsky may suit staff rides very well, but this is by way of happy accident. Their theories may have largely escaped the military community and its associated historians because most influential (Kolb) dates from 1976 and at this time the traditional Camberley staff college battlefield tour was firmly rooted in the experiences of veterans.

By the time of Gardner (1983), the staff college tours had ended and the new-model HCSC staff ride had yet to commence (the first was in 1986 – see Chapter Eight), and the battle to justify the expense and need of the HSCS was not waged on the ground of educational theory. Most modern British models of staff ride or battlefield tour have borrowed from the Camberley or HCSC types, where recent educational theory plays no role whatsoever.

Clearly more work needs to be undertaken in evaluating the overall achievement of staff rides and breaking down rides into separate activities, to assess how they meet the different learning styles and intelligences advocated by Kolb, Gardner and the other theorists examined, through a rigorous and routine validation process. In summary, the author observes that the more that is uncovered about the complexities of how human beings learn, the better equipped a staff ride seems to be to meet those wide-ranging needs. Where it can be measured, via the limited results presented here, it is already apparent that various different learning approaches are being met and can be embraced by well planned and thoughtful staff ride activity.
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REFERENCES


2 This opening scene was rewritten from an article by Vernon Loeb, ‘For the US Military, A Transforming View From the Maginot Line’, which appeared in The Washington Post, page B02, Sunday 6 October 2002. It is also partly the result of the author having served for several months with Meigs, as NATO Historian in Bosnia, October 1996-March 1997, when Meigs commanded Multi-National Division North [MND (N)] as part of the IFOR/SFOR deployment. Meigs (1945-) graduated from West Point in 1967, and his early commands were with armoured cavalry units in Germany and Vietnam. He commanded 3rd Infantry Division from July 1995 and deployed with the 1st Infantry Division to Bosnia in October 1996 where the author met him frequently; from 1997-8, he was Commandant of the US Army Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, then becoming Commander of USAREUR and SFOR in October 1998-December 2002. Many had thought that Meigs would become SACEUR in 2003, but instead he retired the following January. There is speculation that Meigs was not appointed SACEUR precisely because of his scepticism (as expressed in the Loeb article) of Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld’s attempted ‘transformation’ policies. The Washington Post article brought this viewpoint, shared by many other senior officers (which Rumsfeld knew), to the Secretary’s attention, which apparently annoyed Rumsfeld. This had a bearing on the size of force Rumsfeld was preparing to send to Iraq – small enough for a high-tech invasion but too small for an occupation (as many at the time, Meigs included, warned). Meigs was belatedly appointed Director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in December 2005, with responsibility ‘to lead, advocate, and coordinate all Department of Defense actions in support of the Combatant Commands’ efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices (IED) as weapons of strategic influence’

3 Ibid.

4 Named after André Maginot (1877-1932), who served in the infantry during the Great War, and was wounded in 1914. Maginot was French Minister for Defence and initiated the project in 1930, but he died before its completion of typhoid fever in 1932. A bust was erected to him at Verdun, the front where he had served in the war and whose defence inspired him to build a wall of forts to protect France.

5 Vernon Loeb, op. cit.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.


14 David A. Kolb, Learning Style Inventory: A Technical Manual (Boston, Massachusetts: McBer & Co. 1976). Here, I ought to acknowledge the help of my wife, Stefania, for drawing my attention to Kolb and other theorists.

15 See, for example, D. Boud and N. Miller (eds.), Working With Experience: Animating Learning, (London: Routledge 1997) and W. Fraser, Learning From Experience: Empowerment or Incorporation, (Leicester: National Institute of Adult Continuing Education 1995).


18 The oil depot exploded without warning at around 0600 on 11 December 2005 and has been rated as one of the largest peacetime explosions in Europe, with 150 fire fighters from 17 brigades tackling the blaze; 75% of Hertfordshire’s fire fighters were involved in controlling the incident, which took two days to finally extinguish. See Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, Recommendations on the Emergency Preparedness for, Response to and Recovery from Incidents, July 2007, available online at http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/preparedness.pdf, accessed 25 Jul 2007.


20 Kolb (1984), op cit, Chapter One.


23 For example, on the MBA programmes of Cranfield University and the Open University and at Ashridge Management College, amongst many others.

24 Kolb (1984), op cit, Chapter Two.

25 Kolb (1984), op cit, Chapter Five.

26 William Glenn Robertson, *The Staff Ride*, op cit.


31 One hundred students (who were all senior civilian managers) completed questionnaires about the experiences which most affected their learning and development and selected individuals were then interviewed personally by Greenaway. The Brathay trainers were also asked to describe the kinds of experiences which they felt were of greatest value to their clients. Interestingly, the trainers’ perspectives differed significantly from those of participants.

32 Greenaway, op cit, Chapter Four.

33 Greenaway, op cit, Chapter Six


35 Gardner is quoted frequently in Department for Education and Skills (DfES) national strategy documents, for example, *National Strategy Key Stage 3: Learning Styles and Writing in Modern Foreign Languages* (London 2002).


37 An example of this was during a battlefield tour of Marlborough’s 1704 Blenheim campaign, where one of the students, a Royal Engineers staff sergeant, conducted an Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
(IPB) survey of the terrain through which John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, marched his forces at an amazing pace, from the Netherlands to Bavaria, to join forces with Eugene of Savoy, and fight at Blenheim (13 August 1704). He found that Churchill’s route corresponded exactly with the manoeuvre corridor suggested by the modern military IPB process.


40 Other relevant, notable theorists currently enjoying prominence are Colin Rose’s 1985 Theory of Accelerated Learning and Stephen Krashen’s 1981 Theory of Second Language Acquisition.


44 Eugenia C Kiesling, ‘The United States Army’s Historical Staff Rides: History and Historiography’, Chapter V in Defence Studies, Volume 5/1, March 2005, The Relevance and Role of Military History, Battlefield Tours and Staff Rides for Armed Forces in the 21st Century, edited by David Ian Hall, pp.48-58. Kiesling’s chapter sprang from a paper she gave to the Society for Military History’s 68th Annual Conference at the University of Calgary, Canada, in company with this author.

45 Kiesling, op cit, p.56.

46 Kiesling, op cit, p.48.


49 UK Land Command AGAIS Volume I Chapter 23, Battlefield Studies Policy Issue No 143, Reference Land BS SO1 Indiv Trg email DTG 121916ASep05 (One Star Circulation), paragraph 23.004.


51 Interview with the Commanding Officer of Lichfield Army Training Regiment, Whittington Barracks, 31 August 2006.

52 JSCSC, HCSC 2003 Validation.

53 Maj. Carolyn Johnstone, Syndicate Room Discussions at the Staff College, Camberley, Dissertation submitted in part requirement for the MEd Degree of the University of Sheffield (1996), copy held at JSCSC, Watchfield.

54 The Listener, 10 January 1980, Vol. 103, No.2644, p.35.

55 Johnstone, op cit, p. 25.

56 Ibid, p. 76.

57 Ibid, pp. 75-6.

58 William Glenn Robertson, The Staff Ride, op cit.


60 Ibid, p.77.

61 For example, directing staff at the Royal Military College of Science (RMCS, now DCMT) at the UK Defence Academy has undertaken four week-long staff rides in the summers of 2004 - 07 in conjunction with civilian staff from its academic partner, Cranfield University. The directed discussions at various stands (viewpoints) were felt to be enormously helpful to the mix of personnel present, both tri-service military and civilian, and were specifically designed to encourage all present to make a contribution.

62 Dr Walter R Schumm, Kansas State University, ‘Evaluating an All-Ranks Military Staff Ride’, in Psychological Reports, 2003, volume 93, pp.1156-1158, and author’s correspondence with Dr Schumm.

Bennett & Dunne, op cit, p.51.

Marlowe and Page, op cit, p.12

HCSC Validation 2003.

Ibid.


HCSC 2003 Validation, comparison with HCSC 2002.

HCSC 2003 Validation, Staff Ride Phase.

HCSC 2004 Validation, Staff Ride Phase.

Ibid.

Peter Caddick-Adams, Student Evaluation Forms for REEP Battle Staff Rides, 2001-2007.

This tour and the recruits’ reactions was reported by Catriona Davies in the Daily Telegraph, 7 November 2006.

Quoted in Mike Bechthold, ‘One of the Greatest Moments in My Life’, Lessons Learned on the Canadian Battle of Normandy Foundation Battlefield Tours’, Chapter III in Defence Studies, Volume 5/1, The Relevance and Role of Military History, Battlefield Tours and Staff Rides for Armed Forces in the 21st Century, op cit, p.33.

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Bechthold, op cit, p.31.

Chris Kyriacou, Essential Teaching Skills, op cit, p.22.


‘Training the Conceptual Component of Fighting Power: The “Operational Learning Experience” (OLE)’, policy letter to COS LAND on Staff Rides, TEWTs, Battlefield Tours and War Walks, by Lt-Col. CMS Ottowell SO1 TA Trg. Impl., dated 26 January 2004.

UK Land Command AGAIS Volume 1 Chapter 23, Battlefield Studies Policy Issue No 143, Reference Land BS SO1 Indiv. Trg. email DTG 121916ASep05 (One Star Circulation), paragraph 23.004, op cit.

Professor Richard Holmes, conversation whilst on a Staff Ride in Normandy, 18 October 2007.

The theories discussed here are all educational and relate to how a staff ride is presented. Staff ride content can also include discussion of some of the endless theories of leadership, or for example, Abraham Maslow’s ‘hierarchy of needs’, many of which are pertinent to soldiers on a battlefield. Using Maslow, by way of example, it might be appropriate to encourage a staff ride audience to prioritise the needs of soldiers in peacetime, compared with their needs in the midst of a battle; this might develop into a discussion of how commanders can best meet those needs and the qualities needed in a good leader in order to persuade troops to continue fighting and operating without those needs being met.
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‘When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less. The question is whether you can make words mean so many different things’

*Lewis Carroll, 1871*

# CHAPTER TWO

## Key Definitions

**Typology of Battlefield Visiting.**

In order to apply the educational criteria just examined, it is necessary to understand exactly what is meant in the context of this thesis by battlefield visiting. In a military context, this is usually described as a battlefield tour or staff ride - but there is so much more to the process that a stroll across a muddy field. Writing in 2004, Brig. (now Maj-Gen.) RAMS Melvin, a distinguished practitioner of many battlefield tours and staff rides, identified three distinct kinds of exercise where military activity could be combined with historical battle analysis, out of doors – army battlefield tours, staff rides and TEWTs (Tactical Exercises Without Troops), which is illustrated at Figure 2.1. This chapter proposes that there are a further three kinds of activity that need to be taken into account, when making studies of past actions on the ground – pilgrimages, civilian historical tours and manoeuvres - making six in all, and it will examine each concept for its similarities and differences in turn.
Collectively this activity can all be labelled battlefield visiting. Melvin also suggested that battlefield terrain activities can be assessed by (a) the degree of preparation required beforehand by each student, whether directed reading, personal research or via lectures; study days and group discussions; (b) whether the historical content is incidental to the exercise or a cornerstone of it; and (c) the amount of participation required from each student, whether via role play, presentation of papers, or ‘ownership’ of a given halt or viewpoint during the itinerary.2

![Diagram of Training Audience Preparation & Participation](image)

**Figure 2.1: Melvin’s Staff Ride Model of 2004.**
(Source: Defence Studies 5/1, p.61)

This chapter observes that (d) a post-exercise debrief and assessment phase is also crucial to the process, to confirm the lessons learned, but also – as the preceding chapter argues, the post-exercise phase validates the students’ learning outcomes as well as providing direction for the instructing staff in the future. Melvin’s work was prompted by the [US] Society for Military History’s 68th Annual Conference, held at the University of Calgary, Canada, in May 2001. A panel of four academic military

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historians, including this author,³ presented papers on different aspects of the use of battlefield tours and staff rides. The author had several subsequent conversations both with Melvin and another of the panellists, Dr. David Hall, which resulted in the *Defence Studies Journal* special edition on battlefield tours, including Melvin’s paper, written after the Calgary Conference - which is the only written examination in the public domain of the military use of battlefield visits of which this author is aware.⁴

From personal experience, and building on Melvin’s identification of types of battlefield terrain exercises, this author has identified six separate and distinct forms of visiting past battlefields. Their complicated and not always mutually exclusive relationship to one another, and types, are identified in Figure 2.2. It can be seen from this that some battlefield visiting activities have much in common with others - for example the army battlefield tour and staff ride - yet others, like the civilian historical tour, have little overlap. It might be observed that manoeuvres and TEWTs do not need to take place on former battlefields at all, but some may do so.

![Figure 2.2: The Inter-relationship of Different Battlefield Visiting Activities. (Source: author)](image)
Tourism

Whilst it is fairly evident that tourism in some form has always existed, it was not until the Nineteenth Century that tourism itself became an industry, with the revolution of transport (railways, steamships and Thomas Cook all contributing – as Chapter Three explains), easier money granting access to more of the population, growing literacy, the advent of holidays from work and the industrialisation of book, newspaper and periodical production and distribution. In 1999, anthropologist Katherine Verdery analysed the specific form of tourism that incorporates visits to battlefields and suggests the resultant and inevitable proximity of sudden and violent death appeals to a particular kind of person, who (amongst other precise objectives) needs to visit something sacred or desires to dwell on ideas of mortality. ‘They are especially useful and effective symbols for revising the past’, she argues. In this respect, surely she is right – it is not an undertaking that appeals to everyone; in this author’s experience, even some service personnel have trouble with attending a battlefield visit – they may not question the reason or process, but anticipate unwelcome calls on their emotions. Visitors to a battlefield, whether accidental tourists or determined students, arrive with their own personal agenda; indeed it is almost impossible not to.

In their work on tourism research, Elizabeth Fine and Jean Haskell have suggested that oral commentaries during a tour (whether of a battlefield or other attraction) are a vital part of elevating a site from the mundane to the sacred, a point that battlefield guides ought to take on board. Paul Gough has observed in this context that
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death in warfare has always had an iconography of its own. Although the graves of the
dead (and therefore battlefields) in earlier eras may not have been marked, military
endeavours and death in particular have come to be symbolised by trees, especially oaks
and firs (in Germany), the Cypress and Weeping Willow (from the pre-Christian Middle
East) and the Yew (in England), or by flowers – particularly, roses or poppies. This
arboreal symbology substituted for battlefield markers and memorials in earlier times,
and has taken on a new significance in the planting of Commonwealth War Cemeteries
(and those of other nations). Gough has also explored the development of battlefield
parks, using the Newfoundland Memorial Park at Beaumont Hamel as a case study.

Whilst Jozsef Borocz, defines tourism as a stage in the development of a capitalist
economy, John B. Allcock has defined it as ‘an ideal means to mediate ideological
processes of state legitimation and politicisation of the past’. It can be argued therefore
that even for the armed forces of any given state, battlefield visits can represent an
official (or semi-official) attempt to confirm and legitimise earlier military endeavours.
Allcock poses the valid and wise question, ‘What is tourism for?’ and observes astutely
that tourism ‘cements’ national identities by showing visitors alternative peoples, cultures
and views. He suggests, therefore, that by highlighting the differences of other races,
tourism confirms the travellers’ own cultural identity, and that this is carried to an
extreme in battlefield tourism, where opposing cultures are attacked. That ‘Ground
Zero’ (the site of the World Trade Centre) in New York City following the 11 September
2001 terrorist attacks has become an ‘attraction’, is a chilling reminder of the way the
tourist process continues to operate, even today. ‘Ground Zero’ has produced both

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pilgrims and tourists, with solemn memorials for the dead and vendors selling souvenirs.¹¹

Others have attempted to label this battlefield activity as ‘thanatourism’.¹² A.V. Seaton defined this in 1996 as ‘travel to a location [that is] wholly, or partially, motivated by the desire for actual or symbolic encounters with death’.¹³ Seaton argues that humankind has always been fascinated by death and throughout history there has always been a desire to travel to places associated with death. For Seaton, the earliest forms of ‘thanatourism’ in Christian Western Europe can be found in medieval mystery and passion plays, as well as pilgrimages. Seaton refers to this as ‘thanatopsis’ (the contemplation of death), which somehow ‘regularised death in everyday life’, making the concept less traumatic. But as industrialisation diminished traditional religious and superstitious attitudes to death, the resultant secular societies developed ‘thanatourism’ to replace ‘thanatopsis’. Seaton argues that ‘violent death became a consumer commodity, a spectator sport like tourism’.¹⁴ Certainly the advent of spectators to Solferino (1859)¹⁵ or the First Manassas (1861)¹⁶ battlefields - amongst many others - would seem to confirm this observation.

John Lennon and Malcolm Foley note that ‘thanatourism’ (which they call ‘dark tourism’) is very much a recent phenomenon. They observe that a consumer culture has evolved where everything has become a commodity, even, war, death and destruction. They argue that the Great War battlefields qualify as some of the first ‘dark tourism’ sites because the conflict touched almost every European family all the time through
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newspapers, letter writing, conversation and early cinemas. Controversially, they insist that instead of contempt and disgust with the war, familiarity bred the desire to seek it out, hence the enormous numbers of ‘dark tourists’ to war-torn France and Belgium in the inter-war period.\(^{17}\) Stuart Semmel\(^ {18}\) has written of Waterloo as a centre of tourism and Jay Winter has given the Great War a similar treatment.\(^ {19}\) The formation in the UK of the *Guild of Battlefield Guides* in 2003 (with two hundred paid-up members) is a recognition of just how extensive British battlefield tourism has become, and a recognition amongst the guides themselves of the need for (albeit self-regulated) professional standards of guiding and etiquette.

Lennon and Foley have a point; as will be explored in Chapter Five, the success of battlefield tourism in the interwar years was phenomenal, especially in the latter part of the 1920s. It is difficult to quantify, but the sale of two million *Michelin Guides to the Battlefields* and many other guidebooks surely indicate that something significant was taking place.\(^ {20}\) George Mosse and Modris Elksteins have observed that in 1929 (the year of the Wall Street crash), French authorities recorded the arrival of almost two million foreign visitors (suggesting that whilst not all, of course, were bound for the battlefields, a fair number were, and at some considerable personal sacrifice)\(^ {21}\) and that during three months of 1930 over 100,000 people signed the visitors’ book at the Menin Gate in Ypres.\(^ {22}\) In 1975 Paul Fussell produced the *Great War and Modern Memory* in which he analysed the reaction to the Great War in the writings of its literary veterans and those of the Second World War. Writing at a time when it was still relatively common to find Great War ex-servicemen still drawing their pensions, Fussell - himself a US Army

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combat veteran of 1944-5 - found that wartime experience haunted his literary subjects in their use of language, imagery and ideas; they constantly revisited the trenches, if not physically (though many did, in fact, return) then in their minds.\(^{23}\)

Dr. Sandie Holguín of the University of Oklahoma has written of intriguing attempts in the late 1930s by Franco’s Spain to attract visitors to its recent battlefields. Although designed for tourists (particularly from fellow Fascist countries), not soldiers, the concept seems to have been a success and was developed partly for its propaganda value, as well as being financially rewarding for the state. Holguín concludes that

‘...despite the macabre and dangerous nature of these tours, the Nationalists succeeded in bringing tourists to war-ravaged Spain...Although there are no reliable statistics on the number of people who took the tours, one could estimate from a sampling of the tour logs that between 1938 and 1945, anywhere between 6,670 and 20,010 people travelled the Rutas de Guerra...’\(^{24}\)

Holguín assesses that this was because of the tradition already established of huge numbers of tourists visiting the post-war Western Front, the US Civil War battlefields and Waterloo.

Pilgrimages.

The *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*’s defines a pilgrim as ‘one who journeys, usually a long distance, to some sacred place as an act of religious devotion’.\(^{25}\) It is apparent that many ex-servicemen returning to a battlefield where they had fought could also be classified as such. The act of pilgrimage, therefore, can include veterans (whether serving or retired) or relatives of service personnel killed journeying to the appropriate field of battle. The word pilgrim – a blend of old French and Latin – dates
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from c.1200, and pilgrimage from c.1250. Writing in Middle English, Geoffrey Chaucer (1342-1400) brought the concept to life in his *Canterbury Tales* (written 1387-1400). Pilgrimage is subtly different to tourism (the activity of those who travel for pleasure, culture or recreation), a word which the same dictionary notes, was first recorded only in 1800. It might be observed that the *process* is the same, but the *purpose* is different; yet a pilgrimage might include some tourism, in addition to the sacred purpose of the journey (or vice versa). With visitors to battlefields, it might be difficult sometimes to disentangle the two, and perhaps there is a little bit of the pilgrim in *anyone* wanting to visit an old battlefield. However, in its purest sense, there are clearly those whose primary or only purpose of visiting a battleground is pilgrimage.

Diana Webb, in her *Pilgrimage in Medieval England* (2000) has also suggested that there is an implication of distance in the concept of pilgrimage, which usually included at least one overnight stay in a pilgrimage hostel, accommodation which was necessarily Spartan. Pilgrimages were also closely associated with the Crusades to the Holy Land (1095-1291), and thus for centuries have carried military connotations; after all, the monastic military orders were founded partly to protect pilgrims. In a learning sense, a pilgrimage might involve some historical content, minimal participation, but no preparation or debriefing phases. Currently, for example, the Royal British Legion runs pilgrimages (which are marketed as such) to battlefields via its tour arm, *Remembrance Travel*. They take (amongst others) service widows, whose husbands died on active service 1914-1967 and were buried overseas, to visit the husbands’ grave or memorial. Although this activity is frequently mixed with military tourism (see
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civilian battlefield tours, below), the primary motivation on a pilgrimage is commemoration, with history as a secondary result.\textsuperscript{33} Although King George V had already visited Ypres in 1918 (see Figure 2.3), he and Queen Mary made their own pilgrimage (as it was described at the time) in May 1922, to the half-finished cemeteries of France and Flanders. A 100-page, illustrated book of his visit, \textit{The King's Pilgrimage}\textsuperscript{34} sold in huge numbers; it included a poem by Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936) still grieving over the loss (without trace) of his son, John, at Loos in 1915.\textsuperscript{35} After the war, in 1920, to promote the specific acts of commemoration and pilgrimage, the Ypres League was founded, open to all who had served in the Ypres Salient, and to those whose

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure2.3.jpg}
\caption{Figure 2.3: King George V makes his first pilgrimage to Ypres in December 1918. (source: \textit{The War Illustrated} magazine, 11 January 1919, p.364).}
\end{figure}
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Close relatives or friends had died there. This was

‘that they may have a record of that service for themselves and their descendants, and belong to the comradeship of men and women who understand and remember all that Ypres meant in suffering and endurance’. 36

Life membership of the Ypres League was £2/10s; annual membership cost five shillings, with concessions to those who could not afford the subscription. The Life membership would equate to roughly a week’s wages, and the annual membership was still a considerable outlay, being half a days’ wage for the unskilled. 37 Reading the ‘Aims and Objectives of the League’, it is apparent that its main purpose was to facilitate battlefield visits to the Ypres area, primarily of the pilgrimage type. An Ypres League Pilgrimage Centre was established, with bedrooms offered at ‘very reduced prices by those too poor or too old or shaken to bear hotel life’. 38 The League supervised pilgrimages and

‘...where in any place there exists a group of members exceeding 100, one of the poorer members may be selected and arrangements made by Headquarters for his or her participation in a pilgrimage free of charge...’ 39

In 1925, John Murray published for the League The Immortal Salient: an Historical Record and Complete Guide for Pilgrims to Ypres, written jointly by Miss Beatrix Brice and Lt-Gen. Sir William Pulteney. 40 Brice followed this up in 1927 (the tenth anniversary of Passchendaele) with The Battle Book of Ypres. 41 In his foreword to the latter, FM Lord Plumer of Messines wrote

‘The inception of this book was the desire to publish a memorial book of Ypres in furtherance of the aims of the Ypres League; ‘To perpetuate the tradition of the four years’ defence of the Salient as an ideal, and a
source of inspiration for all time’... Ypres does not stand for a ruined town, but for a very high ideal built up by the lives of men..."42

At the end, Brice concluded under the heading of ‘Envoi’, as follows: ‘Ypres is near to you. Fighters there not ten years ago; pilgrims today....’ 43 As soon as the war had ended, many hundreds of parents were recorded as making ‘pilgrimages’ to the graves of their sons, such as the those of Private C.R. Jones of the 1/15 Londons (Prince of Wales’s Own Civil Service Rifles), who died on the Somme on 15 September 1916.44

At the same time, the St. Barnabas Society began arranging subsidised pilgrimages from Britain for those too poor to visit war graves at their own expense; the society was established in 1919 by the Rev. Matthew Mullineaux and named after the saint who befriended Paul after his dramatic conversion on the road to Damascus and encouraged him to begin a new life. Astutely, Mullineaux perceived that those who were visiting the war cemeteries might find it emotionally and physically easier if they were in the company of others, also mourning fallen soldiers. The visits run by the St Barnabas Society were true pilgrimages, being devoid of comfort and luxury. Passengers travelled third class by train and were met at Calais by a St. Barnabas helper, taken to the appropriate cemetery by car, then returned to a modest hotel in time for their return to England the following day.45 Other organisations such as the Church Army, British Legion and Red Cross ran battlefield tours; in 1920 the YMCA offered an inclusive £6 tour of the Somme battlefields.46 In 1930, five veterans collectively recorded this kind of visit to Ypres in the form of a lengthy poem (The Pilgrimage 1930), recently found and published by the Western Front Association.47
Many individuals made their own pilgrimages, even if they were unfamiliar with the term. For example, when interviewed c.1970 by historian Martin Middlebrook, former Private H.C. Bloor of the Accrington Pals (11/East Lancashire Regt.) agreed,

'...I first went back to the Somme on a motor-bike in 1935. I have been back twelve times since then and I intend to keep going as long as I can; I try to be there on 1 July. I go out and, at 7.30 am, I stand at the exact spot where we went over the top in 1916'.

Thirteen times to the same spot; but why? Middlebrook later supplies the answer – the Accrington Pals suffered 585 casualties (out of 720) in their first few hours of battle on 1 July 1916. Bloor was so clearly making pilgrimages to be with his mates who remained in the mud of the Somme.

For others of means, there were extensive private pilgrimages to far-off places; one of the better-known literary post-war ones being that of former VAD nurse and author Vera Brittain to the graves of her brother Edward, on the Asiago Plateau in Northern Italy, and her fiancé, Roland Leighton, mortally wounded with the 1/7 Worcesters at Hébuterne in December 1915. Brittain described her pilgrimage to their separate graves in Testament of Youth (1933), her classic war memoir. The journey to her brother’s grave in Italy was particularly poignant, as his battlefield was in remote, uninhabited alpine area of north eastern Italy (then unknown to the Thomas Cook’s representative in Venice), and equally remote when visited by this author in October 1996. Brittain represented the privileged classes - in 1914 she had been an undergraduate at Oxford but volunteered to become a nurse to help the war effort; after the war she wrote Testament of Youth, married, and became the mother of former Labour
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Cabinet Minister Baroness Shirley Williams. Prime Minister Herbert Asquith (1852-1928) lost the eldest of his four sons, Raymond, on 15 September 1916 during the battle of the Somme. He had met Raymond, a 3/Grenadier Guards lieutenant, just nine days earlier when visiting the Somme front with Douglas Haig; although all Asquith’s sons were in uniform, Raymond was held to be the most amiable and generally gifted of the four. Aged 37, he was a barrister, had been President of the Union at Oxford, won three scholarships, a First in Greats and a Fellowship at All Souls. According to one of his biographers, Roy Jenkins, this threw the wartime PM off-balance for the next few months, and he and Margot made pilgrimages to Raymond’s grave after the war.53 Much of the concept of the ‘lost generation’ comes from the death of Raymond and others from his social set.54

It appears in this context that the concept and usage of the words ‘pilgrim’ and ‘pilgrimage’ came back into common usage immediately after the First World War, in conversation and print, to explain the return of servicemen or their next-of-kin to the battlefields, these terms hitherto having had a minimal significance to most people’s lives in the Protestant United Kingdom. However, pilgrimages to the Great War battlefields were extremely common within inter-war (Catholic) France, as this railway platform poster, c.1928 (Figure 2.4, below)55 from the Chemin de Fer du Nord, illustrates (note that this pilgrimage was to a less frequented battlefield for the French, and one more usually associated with the British). The original is displayed in the L’Historial de la Grande Guerre, Peronne.
Ancient Battlefield Commemoration.

Alan Borg\textsuperscript{56} has observed that military memorials are as ancient as history itself and their typology divides into those built at a location distant from where the events commemorated took place (for example in a capital city) and those rarer memorials established on or near the site of an actual battlefield. The Parthenon\textsuperscript{57} on the Acropolis in Athens, built 448-432 BC to commemorate victories over the Persians at Marathon
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(490 BC) and Salamis (480 BC), or the Victory Column in Berlin (erected in 1869-73 to celebrate the defeat of Denmark, Austria and France by Prussia) are examples of the former, whilst the various monuments established on the Serbian battlefield of Kosovo (15 June 1389) or the Lion Mound at Waterloo (built 1823-6) are exemplars of the latter. Most state-sponsored memorials (as the early ones all were) also reflect an element of propaganda, as Borg notes, ‘a characteristic of ancient war memorials is that they commemorate war itself, and specifically victory, rather than recording the loss and suffering of individuals’. 58 He also cites Trajan’s Column in Rome (erected 113 AD), commemorating victory over the Dacians, and the Bayeux Tapestry as part of this ‘continuous tradition’ of commemorative war narrative. 59 Dr. Philip Morgan of the University of Keele has written persuasively that pilgrimages to and commemoration of battlefields is not just a Nineteenth or Twentieth Century phenomenon. 60 He argues that in England (at least), battlefields have undergone three phases of preservation and ritual. In the first, pre-Reformation phase, he argues, battlefields were often commemorated by the erection of chapels and other permanent memorials, where individuals could pray for the souls of the slain, then believed to be in purgatory. He cites examples in England of the church at Battlefield, Shropshire, commemorating the battle of Shrewsbury (1403), another church at Ashdon, South East of Cambridge, commemorating the battle of Assandun (1016), the abbey at Battle, commemorating Hastings (1066), the chapel erected at Towton (after the 1461 battle) another at Evesham (fought in 1265), and the cross at Blore Heath (1459), near Market Drayton. Many other churches and chapels, he argues, have been lost to time and a great many disappeared in the reign of Henry VIII (reigned 1509-47). The cross erected at Crécy (1346) shortly after the battle, often

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visited by this author, is another example of this category. Some of these religious structures were political statements, erected to confirm a victory, or commemorate the death of an individual (for example, Lord Audley at Blore Heath), but the point was that a permanent memorial was established on or near a battlefield soon after the event, to act as a focus for official remembrance. Morgan includes the foundation of All Soul’s College in 1437 by Henry Chichele, Archbishop of Canterbury, to serve as a memorial to Henry V (reigned 1413-1422) and the English dead of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453), in this *genre* also. Diana Webb argues that Edward II bestowed the Great East Window in Gloucester Cathedral, which ‘...was in effect a Crécy war memorial (and in which Edward II is most probably depicted)...’ 61 As few people in the Middle Ages travelled far, any visit to a distant battlefield would have been for a specific and committed religious (or political) purpose. Therefore, the very nature of battlefield tourism in the Middle Ages was pilgrimage, rather than curiosity.

Morgan goes on to suggest that the second wave began when the Reformation shattered the traditional forms of commemoration connected with battles. The abolition of purgatory (via Protestantism) meant that the military dead were left alone, where they lay, with no need to for the faithful to intercede proactively on their behalf. Therefore, the English Civil War (1642-51) generated no similar pattern of memorial chapels, and indeed Morgan argues that between 1540 and 1800, there was no known memorial erected in connection with a battle within Britain or Ireland. Morgan, however, overlooks the obelisk erected in 1736 on the site of the battle of the Boyne 62 (fought in 1690) – a protestant political statement erected in the reign of George II (reigned 1727-
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1760). Arguably, the first wave of commemoration continued into the Nineteenth Century, in other European countries unaffected by Protestantism, such as Orthodox European Russia (chapels near Austerlitz after 1805 and Borodino after 1812) and Catholic Austria (chapels and memorials at Wagram after 1809). In overall terms, however, Morgan's argument is a valid one.

Civilian Historical Tours.

These encompass visits to battlefields - or other historic military sites - undertaken by adults for interest or perhaps by schools for the education of children. Battlefield tourists may, indeed, even be serving military professionals, but acting as individuals, in a civilian capacity. These visits - usually of short duration - have a minimal (apart from personal curiosity) educational value (in a military sense of learning lessons), and they require no preparation, participation or debriefing phase afterwards. Increasing numbers of secondary school battlefield visits have become a major feature of this category, as they are unconnected - for the purposes of this thesis - with pilgrimages or organised military tours (where personnel are seeking to learn purely military lessons). Such historical tours can even take the form of an excursion during another type of holiday - a day's visit from a cruise ship, for example. Battlefield visits offered by commercial companies exclusively fall into this category (though some may be mixed with pilgrimages).⁶³

Figure 2.5 (below) interprets battlefield visiting not in terms of the visitors themselves, or their motivation, but in terms of their participation and the relevance of
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historical narrative to the visit, which is different with each activity. It can be seen that pilgrimages and civilian battlefield tours require minimal participation, if any at all (in the form of proactive learning activity) in contrast to professional military visits, where the opposite is true; it is staff rides that maximise both historical content and participation, whilst battlefield tours emphasise history, rather than participation; TEWTs and manoeuvres require little or no historical content, but full participation. Whilst most battlefield tourists and their commercial hosts treat former battle zones with dignity and respect, sometimes the sheer number of visitors calls the motivation of visitors (who may just be the curious day-tripper) into question.

![Diagram of battlefield visiting activities]

**Figure 2.5:** Interpreting Battlefield Visiting Activities in terms of Participation and Historical Content. *(Diagram Source: author)*

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In 1934, Sir Philip Gibbs, who had made his name (and fortune) as a war correspondent on the Western Front 1914-18\textsuperscript{64} toured Europe with two companions, and ending his prolonged tour of central Europe with a visit to Verdun, of which he wrote:

‘...We were following the roads behind the old front line of the last war as it was fought in France. The trees along the road were very young, we noticed. They were not more than sixteen years old. Here and there, in chalk quarries, and sunken roads, we came across old gun emplacements, and dug outs. Then we came to a town called Verdun, where most of the roofs were new, although, to our surprise, there were houses which must have been there before this name was another word for death, for colossal sacrifice, for human heroism tried to its uttermost, for the tears and agony of France. Now Verdun is a rendezvous for tourists, who go to see the battlefields, though there is little to see of the horror that happened there. In front of the restaurants and cafes were notice boards: “Tour of the Front. Visits to Forts Vaux and Douaumont. The Trench of Bayonets. The Cemeteries of the Dead.”

“Revolting!” said the artist who had been wounded in the war. “They’ve made a peepshow of it all”. The novelist laughed bitterly at the mockery of life. Here at Verdun a million men had died – French and Germans. Now there was talk of another war. Now tourists came to get a thrill out of this zone of death, delighted if they could pick up a shell-cap or a German bullet...\textsuperscript{65}

The reaction of Gibbs and his comrades to the tourism apparent in Verdun is not an uncommon one (and one still expressed today by some visitors to battlefields) and certainly finds an echo in venturers to Waterloo. It underlines the challenge that any historic battlefield has, of striking a balance between meeting the needs of remembrance and decorum for smaller numbers of pilgrims, and satisfying the curiosity and educational requirements of greater numbers of tourists.

Army Battlefield Tours.

The definition here of a ‘battlefield’ encompasses more than just old combat zones, but in the widest military sense, includes any historic military site from which
lessons can be learned, not just a scene of fighting. These might include logistics bases, dressing stations and command posts. Battlefield tours are undertaken by military units, in other words, organised (and directed) groups which concentrate on tactical studies, can be used to further regimental spirit, as a commander’s team-bonding exercise and often incorporate studies of combat connected to the ancestry of the unit taking tour. They may be of a single days’ duration, or last for several days, certainly require some preparation, maximum historical content, possible participation, but the debrief/assessment phase is often overlooked. Although the historical content is high, the educational outcomes can be limited in a strictly military sense. They can be (but are not always) led by an academic or other expert, may include veterans’ contributions, and can stimulate thought and encourage student discussion but within the limitations set by the lack of systematic preparation and involvement. A military battlefield tour uses both terrain and historical context but does not have an in-depth preliminary study phase: a pre-tour lecture package of a few hours (if anything at all) is the most that military battlefield tourers would expect. It is noticeable how, in the last few years, military tours have also started to use civilian re-enactors to demonstrate aspects of dress and tactics, engaging the interest of modern soldiers. These re-enactors undoubtedly add to the ‘experience’ of tours, and can be used to draw attention to the loads that past infantrymen had to carry, the complexity of their weapons drill or the primitive nature of their eating and sleeping arrangements. 66

This kind of battlefield excursion specifically involves the serving military professional visiting the terrain, whose feel for the ground can sometimes be at odds with
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that of the historian. The late Brig. Peter Young and Professor John Adair, both then
lecturers in War Studies at Sandhurst observed in their Hastings to Culloden (1964) that

‘...as to First Newbury [fought in 1643], a class of officer cadets at
Sandhurst who visited the field declined to accept the traditional view as
to how the battle was fought, compelling us to reconsider the whole
engagement...’

The army battlefield tour is, in fact, the most common kind of battleground visit
undertaken by British service personnel, both today and for (at least) the last one hundred
years. Commonwealth forces (those of Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South
Africa) have practised similar tours, as have many US Army and Bundeswehr units.
These tours differ from civilian visits in that they are practised by groups of service
personnel (rather than individuals) and that there is a common overriding learning
outcome to be achieved. A majority of the (over 200) battlefield tours in which this
author has participated have been this type of battlefield visit, even though some have
been more grandly termed ‘staff rides’. Although the US Army call their battlefield
visits ‘battle staff rides’ (BSR’s), blending the terminology of both the battlefield tour
and staff ride (see below), they, too, are essentially battlefield tours.

An early British example of such a tour was published as Report of a Professional
Tour of Officers of the Royal Artillery in 1865. This tour undertaken by serving Royal
Artillery officers was designed, amongst other missions, ‘... to follow over the ground of
the campaign of 1864 [i.e. that of the Prusso-Danish war] to obtain information relevant
to operations and engagements of that year’. This was one of a series of visits made by
artillery officers to overseas battlefields and fortifications during the period 1861-6.
Another professional tour was reported in the *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution* in 1872, ‘A Visit to Some of the Battle Fields and Ambulances of the North of France’, by Surgeon-Maj. F.J. Mouat, MD, FRCS. Mouat described his February 1871 visit, with other officers, to the battlefields of 1815 and 1870 and mentions in passing that he had also visited the Boyne battlefield.\(^71\) In 1887, Lt-Col. W.G. Ross, Royal Engineers, compiled an account of the science of fortification and siege craft during the English Civil War, which was published in the *Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers*. His sources included contemporary manuals and accounts as well as visits to the sites he discusses. His text and footnotes make it clear that he was writing as much a guidebook to the extant remnants of English Civil War siege works for his professional and academic colleagues, as he was analysing the military engineering of the era.\(^72\) In 1906 Capt. R.A. Steel of the 17\(^{th}\) (Indian) Cavalry wrote his *Journal of a Visit to Manchuria After the War, Prepared in the Division of the Chief of Staff (India)*, which was, in effect, a post-Russo-Japanese War battlefield tour.\(^73\)

Maj-Gen. Julian Thompson (who commanded 3/Commando Brigade in the 1982 Falklands War), as a result of a visit to Chancellorsville (fought in 1863), listed the many benefits that military visitors to former battlefields can experience,

‘...I found myself easily identifying with the men who fought there... I can fully understand his [Gen Stonewall Jackson's] consuming impatience to get forward to conduct a personal reconnaissance - something every commander feels. It is so easy to visualise the chaos that ensued when Jackson was wounded, leaving no one to grip the situation... The after-action reports by both sides reminded me that in the chaos of battle things may not be what they seem... and that two people participating in the same event may view it differently... Our visit reminded me... what an enormous amount soldiers can learn from a
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study of old battlefields. The tactics in themselves are not so important, they may change. What is important is that battles are fought and commanded by men and they do not change. That Jackson went left flanking at Chancellorsville...is of academic interest. What is of greater interest is that good reconnaissance, the ability to think “on your feet” and adapt your plan as new information comes in...the ability to move fast and hit from an unexpected direction: to name but few of the lessons...are as relevant today as they were in 1863. All the manuals list the prerequisites for military success, but only a study of how our predecessors applied, or failed to apply these principles, can breathe life into them..."

Julian Thompson’s observations are absolutely key to the purpose of military study visits to battlefields. It is this kind of battlefield visit and the staff ride with which the later chapters of this thesis primarily deal.

At the end of the Iraq War in April 2003, this author received an invitation issued by Headquarters, 7th Armoured Brigade (of 1st UK Armoured Division) to attend a battlefield tour, being run for commanders of sub-units within the brigade, the purpose being to examine the ground over which the formation had recently fought. This echoes the experience of a soldier attached to 2/Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, during the First Gulf War (1991) who recalled in his diary that after the fighting, during March 1991,

‘during the next few days a church service was held, intelligence debriefs and battlefield tours were carried out and significant quantities of undamaged Iraqi equipment were moved to the Divisional collection point...’

These last two examples conform to the battlefield tour model, of minimal preparation (although in both cases, the tour participants had been doing the fighting), little required educational interaction during the visit, and no formal debriefing session afterwards (whilst debriefing happened throughout both tours, there was no formal summary of the
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lessons learned). One of the assertions of this chapter is that the British Army has rarely aspired to undertake battle terrain visits at any level beyond the level of the battlefield tour.

**Staff Rides.**

When serving with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), Brig. (now Maj-Gen.) Mungo Melvin initiated an excursion to study the 1943 Allied operation that liberated Sicily, Ex. ARRCADE ROVER 2002, which closely followed the traditional model of a staff ride. Emphasising the pitfalls of choosing appropriate terrain, the *HQ ARRC Journal* noted,

‘...the historical element of the tour followed operations on the Eastern part of the island...This was ...an acknowledgement that the Western part...has been significantly developed during the intervening 60 years and the terrain no longer lends itself to a battlefield tour...’

The tour began on the beaches; in keeping with the staff ride concept - integrating staff work exercises with current doctrine and historical study on the ground – Brig. Jeremy Thorn, the Chief Engineer observed that the group considered:

‘...the problems faced by a large invasion force and the considerable Joint and Combined challenges that had to be overcome...we ventured North to explore the Primosole Bridge area and address the complexity of airborne and link-up operations...Now came the Melvin surprise! Not only would we be invited to study history, but we would put our operational planning skills to good use, working through a modern day scenario...and a most successful discussion followed...Whilst the combination of historical analysis and modern day scenario was a first, it was deemed to be a highly successful teaching medium and the post tour questionnaire asked for more...’

Here is the Kolb Experiential Learning Cycle in action: students arrived with their own Concrete Experience (CE) and had studied that of others before them; the directed

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staff ride at the Primosole Bridge prompted Reflective Observation (RO) and the Melvin exercise involved Abstract Conceptualisation (AC); Active Experimentation (AE) may then have taken place both on the staff ride and subsequently in the students’ own careers – this in due course will lead to more Concrete Experience and thus the cycle recommences. Although the traditional staff ride had always incorporated staff-work exercises, here is an illustration that this practice has lapsed of late; witness the gentle (and polite) surprise at Melvin’s exercise; the use of a questionnaire is also noteworthy, which provided a useful barometer to such activities during the ride.

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The staff ride is a kind of battlefield visit significantly different to an army battlefield tour, but often confused with it. It is part of a process of military education for staff officers, studying (usually) the operational level of war. It is unlikely to take a single day, but will (almost certainly) last several days, and maximum preparation, participation, and an assessment and debrief phase are all essential elements. The historical content is very important, and the visit may involve possible rôle play by students of commanders, presentation of papers at outdoor viewpoints ('stands'), and the detailed examination of the terrain in relation to problems studied beforehand.

In 1987, William Glenn Robertson wrote a 30-page pamphlet, *The Staff Ride*, for the US Army's Center for Military History (CMH) as a training aid. It is an explicit definition of the history, aims and conduct of a staff ride, as practised by the US military currently. In the absence of a UK military equivalent publication (this author is bridging this lacuna with a publication for the military of his own), it is worth examining Robertson's understanding of staff rides, for his pamphlet also demonstrates how they differ from battlefield tours, TEWTs and Manoeuvres (below). The pamphlet cover reproduces Don Stivers' painting, *The Staff Ride*, commissioned by the 1981 centennial class of the US Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. The original was a gift to the college from the 1981 class and hangs in the main lobby of Bell Hall, a mark of how important Leavenworth considers staff riding (illustrated at Figure 2.6 below).
The Staff Ride process, as outlined by Robertson, has an overall objective of using the past to prepare its students for the future, and in this sense, staff rides vary considerably from pilgrimages, civilian historical tours and army battlefield tours, where the primary object is to commemorate the past in some way or other, as Figure 2.7 (below) illustrates.
Robertson argues that staff rides link historical events, systematic preliminary study, and actual terrain to produce battle analysis in three dimensions. He states that its main purpose is to further the professional development of army leaders, but that it can achieve many other objectives, dependent on circumstances, including: exposure of students to the dynamics of battle, especially those factors which interact to produce victory and defeat; exposing students to the ‘face of battle’ - the timeless human dimensions of warfare; to provide case studies in the application of the principles of war; in the operational art; in combined arms operations or in the operations of a single arm or branch; in the relationship between technology and doctrine; in leadership, at any level desired; in unit cohesion; in how logistical considerations affect operations; to demonstrate the effects of terrain upon plans and their implementation; to provide an analytical framework for the systematic study of campaigns and battles; to encourage officers to study their profession through the use of military history, and (for Robertson and the American military) to kindle or reinforce an interest in the heritage of the US
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Army. Robertson omits to observe that they have added relevance in the 21st Century as a means of studying tri-service (Joint), multi-national (Combined) and multi-agency (Comprehensive) operations, as well as the politics of Coalition warfare, perhaps this was because he was writing in 1987, when these last issues had lesser relevance in the Cold War era.

Staff rides can also consider, at the operational level of war, the employment of forces which are difficult to track at the tactical level on the ground, yet who have a significant impact in the modern battle-space. For example, Special Forces troops, personnel engaged in signals interception and those engaged in psychological or media operations. It is challenging, for example, to trace the tactical level movements of the SAS in North Africa 1941-3 or North West Europe in 1944-5, yet clearly they had a significant impact (raiding airfields in Libya and Tunisia, co-ordinating the French resistance and delaying the deployment of panzer formations to the invasion front, and deep reconnaissance in the spring of 1945). Rommel’s 621 Signals Intelligence Company (until its capture in July 1942 near Alamein) gave the Afrika Korps an operational edge over British Eighth Army, yet is almost impossible to place them on the ground (were one to visit the Libyan desert). From where can one consider the impact of loudspeakers or leaflets dropped from the air, which contributed to the collapse of Austro-Hungarian and German troops in 1918 or Italian, German and Japanese forces in 1943-5? How does the battlefield visitor relate the impact of media relations to the progress of a campaign, a factor key to the shaping of modern campaigns? It would be appropriate, for example, for a staff ride to visit an airfield (or the site of a temporary airstrip) as a vehicle for considering the influence of air component in a given campaign,
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whether a strategic bombing campaign, logistics, reconnaissance or close air support. For example, any staff ride to the Stalingrad area should visit the airfield at Pitomik, the main German airfield through which the *Luftwaffe* attempted to re-supply von Paulus’s encircled Sixth Army. Bomber Command airfields in East Anglia, the many temporary fields Normandy, and the site of former Royal Flying Corps (RFC) aerodromes in the vicinity of Arras on the Western Front, all fall into this category. Staff rides can include these operational-level elements in student discussions on the ground, without needing to visit every physical location, thus making staff rides relevant in an era of Effects Based Operations. Other issues can be embraced by staff rides; for example, when considering morality and legality in war, the *Bundeswehr* currently take their young officers to the *Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz* (the villa where, on 20 January 1942, Heydrich convened a meeting to organise the *Endlösung* – Final Solution) and the Bendler-Block of the old German War Ministry (where, on 20 July 1944, Count Claus von Stauffenberg was shot with fellow anti-Hitler conspirators), both in Berlin.81 The protection of cultural heritage sites was an issue that arose during the Iraq War of 2003 and although mosques largely survived, the main museums in Baghdad did not. This had been an issue in North West Europe during 1944-5 and, arguably, a modern staff ride study of the Anglo-US Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives (MFA&A) Branch of Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAOF), 1943-5, would have been instructive and beneficial to the 2003 campaign in this respect.82

A civilian historical equivalent might be an intention to study the international slave trade of the 17th-19th Centuries, but where to go to gain the best possible appreciation of the events and the issues surrounding slavery? Historians and students of
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such matters often head for the stone-built Elmina slave castle, one of several constructed by Europeans on the West African coast, in this case in what is present-day Ghana. Thus the location provides the trigger for a number of interrelated discussions, not all of which pertain to the actual site.

Illustrating a logistics-orientated staff ride, in September 1999, the US Army’s fifth annual Quartermaster-Sergeants-Major Conference undertook a staff ride to City Point, the Union logistics base during the siege of Petersburg (Virginia), 25 miles south of the Confederate capital of Richmond. In 1864 Grant’s Army of the Potomac had failed to take Petersburg and a siege began; the Union’s senior quartermaster (Maj-Gen. Montgomery Meigs, whose descendent we met in Chapter One) selected City Point, strategically located at the confluence of the James and Appomattox Rivers, as his main forward supply depot and overnight this obscure site became one of the busiest ports in the world. Miles of wharves were built, with scores of buildings and warehouses, and a railway terminal with a line to the front, capable of delivering 1,500 tons daily to the siege-lines at Petersburg, eight miles away (Map 6). As with the Allied victory in Normandy (1944), it was such overwhelming material superiority that ensured the triumph of one side over their adversary. It is worth noting that although City Point was never a battlefield, it was a site of supreme military importance and a counterpart, perhaps, to the artificial harbour at Arromanches-les-Bains, Normandy, of 1944 (Maps 14 and 19). The Command Sergeant Major of the Quartermaster Corps, hosting the conference, wrote of City Point,

‘...On an average day, the Union Army stored 9 million meals for the soldiers and 12,000 tons of oats for their horses. The only food not

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imported from the northern states was bread, which was produced on site. The Union Army baked more than 100,000 loaves of bread per day to send by train to the soldiers on the front line. This staff ride is an educational tool to bring to life the historic encounters of the Civil War on the very terrain where it took place. Conference participants will be reminded of the leadership, tactics and strategy, communication, use of terrain and, above all, the psychology of men in battle - applicable today as in the past. Valuable information on this historical tour offers the time to excerpt lessons from the past and to develop new leadership strategies for the new millennium...

Staff rides, Robertson argues, can illuminate any principle or lesson at any chosen level and that because their unique blend of classroom and field study facilitates student involvement, they ensure that any educational benefits are more likely to be retained. Robertson goes on to suggest that a commander should view staff rides as part of a training programme to educate subordinates. Staff Rides should be exercised, critiqued, and improved upon. Whilst the focus may vary according to the level of command to be exercised, the lessons to be emphasised, or the type of operation to be studied, Robertson regards the staff ride as a continuing professional development exercise which will outlive any commander's tour. He argues that directing staff must be true subject-matter experts: they should be able to identify all the important facets of an extremely complex human event and understand how these relate to each other. Having mastered their subject, instructors should impart this knowledge to students using current military doctrine and terminology wherever possible.

The Robertson Staff Ride doctrine (which should not be regarded as cardinal rules) requires that students, too, must attain an in-depth knowledge of the campaign beforehand, and ought not to visit the campaign site without a working knowledge of the events, nor should they be passive spectators at any stage in the exercise. In the pre-tour
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study phase, he argues that the students’ exchange of information, stimulation of thought, and collective analysis of the military operation will reap huge benefits when on the ground. To him, the preliminary study and field study phases are individual parts of a larger whole.

‘...Standing alone, they cannot drive home the desired lessons with the same force as a truly integrated presentation. Without the field study phase, the preliminary study phase is an incomplete form of battle analysis, taught in a classroom environment. Without the systematic analysis of the preliminary study phase, the field study phase is simply a battlefield tour. Carefully integrated, the two activities generate optimal understanding and analytical thought...’ 84

Robertson highlights other ways in which staff rides differ from battlefield tours, apart from the level of pre-tour preparation. Staff rides, he suggests, work best with campaigns that illuminate timeless command and staff problems at the operational level (this author would agree that minor tactics work better for battlefield tours), and are complex enough to serve as excellent teaching vehicles for any level of command – for staffs educate commanders, as well as staff officers. They work equally well in virtually any type of terrain and suit all arms of service. Most campaigns – he suggests - provide opportunities for studying the operations of infantry, artillery, and cavalry units, either singly or as combined arms; similarly, logistical and support functions can usually be addressed in any campaign.

A good (if ambitious) example of an operational level staff ride, full of interactive learning opportunities, was the March 2000 tour to study the 1947-8 battles for Jerusalem undertaken by mature postgraduate students at John Hopkins University. The 27 participants (one of whom was an officer in the IDF) commented afterwards,
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‘we learned something not merely about the past...but about what shapes battle, studying the strategic choices made by Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian leaders, and the long-term consequences of the battles’.\(^{85}\)

With extensive pre-tour research, and working in syndicates, they rôle-played leaders like David Ben Gurion\(^{86}\), King Abdulla of Jordan, Yitzhak Rabin\(^{87}\) and Ariel Sharon\(^{88}\), frequently asking, ‘At this, juncture did the commander make the right decision?’ The staff ride package also included lectures by Israeli and Palestinian leaders, presentations by the students themselves as well as visits to battle sites; their academic leader also observed that the ride provided the opportunity to study conflict management and conflict resolution; ‘students from widely differing backgrounds pondered one of the world’s more persistent conflicts in a spirit of inquisitiveness, toleration and friendship’.\(^{89}\) This well illustrates the importance of pre-tour preparation, the wide variety of instructional techniques that can be used, the student participation, and the range of learning outcomes that a good staff ride can offer; post-tour discussions were also undertaken to confirm the lessons learned.

With care, Robertson advocates that campaigns should be selected to include (where appropriate) engineers, armour and aviation, although open-minded students guided by imaginative instructors can study these branches by analogy and on pre-mechanised battlefields. Also, he observes that as the degree of historical integrity of battlefield sites declines, the task of the directing staff becomes more difficult; students have enough difficulty in mastering the details of past organisations and events - their task is made all the more difficult if they are required to block out many modern roads and structures as well. Another key factor is the availability of primary and secondary
accounts, to assist students in their rapid assimilation of the forces, organisation, context and opposing commanders.

Very little work has been undertaken to assess the suitability of non-US battle sites for military audiences, but in 2005 Maj. Paul Bailey submitted an MA dissertation on the utility of staff rides to British battlefields for Junior NCOs. He assessed 78 battlefields and concluded that 26 were suitable for staff rides, on the basis that they (a) contained aspects of significant manoeuvre that illustrated many of the Principles of War, as taught in UK Defence Doctrine; (b) the location of the battlefield was certain; (c) the terrain bore some resemblance to the time of battle; (d) there was some availability of archives for students to research the battle further; he studied three – Flodden (1513), Naseby (1645) and Sedgemoor (1685) – in detail.

The Robertson doctrine for staff rides observes that the most beneficial preliminary activity combines lectures, individual study, and group discussion, moderated by the directing staff - rather than individual reading or pre-tour packs of information. Robertson found that giving students specific subjects to investigate then discuss with their peer group, either in a formal classroom setting or during the field study phase, encouraged active student participation. Creating mini-experts on particular subtopics, he observes, virtually guarantees lively discussion and divergent viewpoints. Arguably, a blend of individual and collective preliminary study is best. His findings include the observation that it is not just the knowledge that students assimilate that is key to a successful staff ride, but the way students learn. Basic knowledge acquired before the field study should include the organisation, strength, armament, and doctrine.
of the opposing forces; biographical and personality details of significant leaders; relevant weapons characteristics; relevant terrain and climatic considerations and the general outline and chronology of significant events. Crucially, students on a staff ride must develop an intellectual perception of the campaign that will be either reinforced or modified during the field study phase.

Robertson’s theory was justified with the experience of the US 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2 ACR) during 1990-1. Following the breach of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Iron Curtain, in January 1990, 2/ACR ended its patrol mission along the Czech border, bringing its 45-year frontier deployment to an end; yet it (and its parent VII Corps) had no idea of what future tasks lay ahead. In the spring of 1990 its commander, Col. Don Hodder, ran a series of officer professional development workshops to discuss meeting engagements and hasty attacks. Reinforcing practice manoeuvres and theory, Hodder led a staff ride to the Austro-Prussian battlefield of Königgratz (3 July 1866), crossing the Czech frontier, to study an historic encounter battle (Map 2). Shortly afterwards, 2 ACR was deployed to Kuwait in August 1990, providing an armoured screen and engaging in encounter battles with Iraqi armour in the subsequent ground war. Post-conflict, 2 ACR’s leaders, when asked, all felt that they were well prepared and rehearsed for the combat rôle they subsequently undertook and that the staff ride was a key aspect of this successful preparation.
For Robertson,

‘...the field study phase most readily distinguishes the staff ride from other forms of systematic historical study. It culminates all previous efforts by instructors and students to understand selected historical events, to analyse the significance of those events, and to derive relevant lessons for professional development. Because field study builds so heavily upon preliminary study, each phase must be designed to produce a coherent, integrated learning experience...the field study phase is the most effective way to stimulate the student’s intellectual involvement and to ensure that he or she retains any analytical conclusions reached at any point in the staff ride process...’

95
Robertson advances some cardinal rules for staff rides (that are often overlooked on military and civilian battlefield visits), for example that sites be visited in chronological order to avoid confusion and unnecessary complexity, the schedule is flexible enough to permit brief unplanned stops to address issues that students raise spontaneously, that there is time for students to share their findings and stimulate discussion on the ground, that primary sources, such as vivid personal accounts or period photographs, are linked to visited sites, that as much of the route as possible should be traversed on foot - many terrain features which seem insignificant or are even invisible from vehicles suddenly become prominent when viewed from the foot soldier's perspective. This is reflected in Figure 2.8 (above), which suggests how understanding terrain during the field study phase of a staff ride is linked firmly to prior knowledge and
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analysis, whereas on a battlefield tour it remains as ‘ground’, and is illuminated by relatively little knowledge or analysis of the events.

Equations for Military Visits to Battlefields

**BFT = G + H**

Battlefield Tours = Ground plus History

**SR = (CFF + PW) x TA**

Staff Rides = Components of Fighting Force plus Principles of War multiplied by Terrain Analysis

*Figure 2.9, The Differing Components of Staff Rides and Battlefield Tours (Diagram source: author)*

Directing staff need to ensure that students are correctly orientated both chronologically and spatially throughout the exercise - this should be a continuous process, as most students will become disoriented at some point, particularly in either close terrain or a highly complex historical situation – a partial solution is that all students carry compasses, maps, and a battlefield study guide. At every opportunity during the field study phase, instructors should stimulate student discussion and relate it to similar discussions held during preliminary study and current doctrine. Figure 2.9 (above) illustrates, by way of equation, the various components that might go into a
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stimulating and successful staff ride, by comparison with the fewer aspects that will be encountered during a battlefield tour.

Robertson advocates (and this author agrees) that the staff-to-student ratio will determine the quality of the field study phase, that thirty-five to forty students (this author would argue for a maximum of thirty, with an ideal of twelve to fifteen) are the most a single instructor can lead and retain any degree of personal interchange; as the instructor-to-student ratio declines, so does student involvement and discussion. Finally, that appropriate seasonal protective clothing is carried by all, otherwise attention and interest instantly evaporates in adverse conditions.

The final aspect that distinguishes a staff ride from all other battlefield visits is the integration phase, a formal or informal opportunity for students and instructors to reflect jointly upon their experience. This requires students to integrate what they have learned in previous phases into a coherent, overall view; it provides a mechanism through which they can articulate the lessons derived from the campaign under analysis and develop new insights by sharing those ideas with their contemporaries and instructors. The integration phase is most successful when it follows field study as quickly as time permits. As with the first two phases, discussions should be moderated, and the requirement of a post-exercise paper or essay may be appropriate.96 This lengthy analysis of Robertson’s recommendations, with which this author concurs, demonstrate how radically different a staff ride can be to a military battlefield tour, TEWTs or manoeuvres (below).
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The educational value of a US 1st Infantry Division April 2006 staff ride was highlighted in that Division’s journal, which reported that over forty of the Big Red One’s senior leaders had visited the Meuse-Argonne American battlefields of 1918. Apart from the staff ride pre-tour briefing package and post-tour summing up, each evening the participants took part in seminars designed to stimulate discussion of the topics covered during the day. A 1918 battlefield was chosen because in the view of one of the accompanying historians, ‘...the change we [the US Army] are facing now is very similar to the level of change we were facing in 1917...’97 The sites visited, reported the correspondent, ‘...typified the goal of the staff ride: educational, not simply historical; training, not leisure....’98 Although history was the vehicle for exploring issues such as change management, therefore, the staff ride was not an historical tour. One of the academic tour directors observed,

‘You want to stretch their thinking by setting up the history in such a way that it naturally leads them to think about those challenges...Human beings, when they see history laid out properly, will think to themselves, “how would I handle that if I were the person? ” Staff rides are about the future, not the past...’99

Like the Meigs staff ride of 2002, cited earlier, army transformation was a concern to these divisional-level leaders. The Command Sergeant Major of the newly-constituted 4/Infantry Brigade Combat Team observed that

‘...we’re building a new brigade...we’re still learning our techniques, tactics and procedures and building new relationships. This [the staff ride] is going to help the fight on the modern-day battlefield and help our new mission set...’100

Participants could see for themselves the parallels with the US Army of 1917-18 which was composed of independent regiments and battalions with no organised staffs above
those levels and no doctrine. Within a year, it had established regiments, brigades, divisions, corps and armies from scratch, which became the model for the next ninety years.\textsuperscript{101}

![Diagram of TACTICAL and OPERATIONAL]

**TACTICAL**

**Discovery of Military History**  
Staff-led

**OPERATIONAL**

**Application of Knowledge**  
Student-led

**INDIVIDUALS**

- Battlefied Tours
  - Nature of War
  - Coach-bound & Museum visits

**SYNDICATES**

- Nature of Leadership & Command
- Walking the ground & Planning Exercises

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**Figure 2.10:** The Cursor: how the Learning Content and Style of a Battlefield Visit can be adjusted to produce either a Battlefield Tour or a Staff Ride.  
*(From an idea by Richard Holmes. Diagram source: author)*

There are many themes that a staff ride can address but a successful ride needs to be scripted and prepared beforehand with great care. Many battlefield tours masquerade as staff rides, and current British Army practice of merging staff rides and battlefield tours together as ‘Battlefield Studies’ only serves to muddy the water, not cleanse it. Building on an idea supplied by Professor Richard Holmes during a May 2007 conference on how to run battlefield visits\textsuperscript{102}, Figure 2.10 serves to illustrate another argument of this chapter: that staff rides and battlefield tours are really of the same family and that by moving a metaphorical cursor the activity can be raised to the levels of a ride,
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or diluted to reflect the needs of a tour. The cursor itself is the way ‘realities of war’ material is used, which brings combat and command to life. Delivered passively, the process remains a tour, but used proactively, perhaps role-played, stimulating group discussion and steered to a certain extent by the students themselves, battlefield visiting can begin to take on the mantle of a staff ride.

Tactical Exercises without Troops (TEWTs).

This author has already observed that ‘staff ride’ is a confusing term, the very words concealing rather than revealing the nature of the activity. If that were not enough, in late Nineteenth Century and early Twentieth Century military terminology, a ‘Staff Ride’ meant something quite different - a TEWT (Tactical Exercise Without Troops), for which the terms ‘Scheme’, ‘Skeleton manoeuvres’ or ‘Staff Tour’ were also used. Although the TEWT meaning of ‘staff ride’ appears to have disappeared from military used in the 1930s, some military libraries still file TEWT-type ‘staff rides’ under ‘battlefield tours’ – which they are not. For example, the US Army Military History Institute (MHI)’s bibliography for Staff Rides and Terrain Walks runs to fifteen pages, but none of the pre World War II material relates to visiting a battlefield at all.103

This study will refer to these earlier designations of TEWTs, and examine the origins of this terminology, and how a Twenty-First Century ‘Staff Ride’ has come to mean a completely different form of military exercise to a Nineteenth Century ‘Staff Ride’. In The Science of War (1905), a posthumous collection of essays and lectures by the Staff College lecturer, Col. GFR Henderson, the subject states,
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‘It may be remarked, however, that ‘staff-rides’, [author’s emphasis] as exercises on the ground without troops have come to be called, are just as effective a means of teaching strategy as field days are of teaching tactics; in fact, a better means, for they bear a far closer resemblance to strategical work on a campaign than do the mimic battles of the manoeuvre ground...’

Three years later, the Commandant of the Staff College at Camberley, Brig-Gen. HW (later FM Sir Henry) Wilson, DSO, lectured on ‘Staff Tours’ to the Royal United Services Institution on 26 February 1908, from which it is clear that he is referring to what are today known as TEWTs. On concluding, Wilson then entered into a lively discussion on their merits with the chairman, Lt-Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, KCB, DSO, who in his comments referred only to ‘Staff Rides’, proving that the terminology was interchangeable in 1908, and that both terms then actually referred to manoeuvres without troops. During the First World War, the term staff ride was still used by the British Army to mean a TEWT, usually to train officers in tactics. Amongst many other units, the Essex Yeomanry – then still a mounted reconnaissance regiment (in 3rd Cavalry Division), stationed on the Western Front in 1915-6, was sending its officers on brigade or regimental ‘staff rides’, whilst training behind the lines. Figure 2.11 traces the evolution of this terminology.
A TEWT is a form of military training relevant at every level of command, still practised today. It involves maximum preparation beforehand, participation during and assessment/debrief afterwards, but the historical content is of only marginal relevance. TEWTs are usually used to explain the processes of command, logistics and staff-work at every level; at lower levels, it is a proven way of teaching tactics. Soldiers are not usually present, or if so, are placed so as to designate the presence of larger numbers of troops, armour, artillery or other arms, on the terrain. The concept is nicely caught in an undated Punch cartoon (Figure 2.12, of circa 1890, illustrated below).¹⁰⁹
"Hullo! He-ar! You surrender to this company!" "Beg pardon, sir! It's the other way, sir. We're a brigade, sir!!!"

Our Manoeuvres.—Captain of Shirmishers (rushing in to seize picket sentries of the enemy).

**Figure 2.12, Punch cartoon, circa 1890. (Source: Mr Punch on the Warpath)**

A TEWT can be enacted on former battlefield, but this is not a necessary prerequisite, and can be enacted on any terrain resembling a specific battlefield or reflecting tactical/operational requirements. It is centred on current military doctrine and uses terrain, rather than history, as the educational vehicle.

This was the main form of early staff ride, as Jacob Hamric has shown. He observed that in 1869 Moltke issued a series of rules and regulations for training the General Staff - *Instructions for Large Unit Commanders* - and developed two separate teaching methods, manoeuvres and war games. The former
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'which often included entire divisions, involved simulated war exercises on realistic terrain; war games primarily featured theoretical war situations in huge sandboxes. The most important exercise was the annual staff ride. It included both manoeuvres and war games and involved intimate contact between the chief umpire and a small group of officers chosen for combat. These games often resulted in promotions and provided strategy for future wars. Since the purpose of manoeuvres, war games, and staff rides was to form leaders of one mind, these exercises were taken very seriously. A unique characteristic of warfare quickly developed. The Prussian General Staff was the first organization to formulate a "common body of military doctrine."..."\(^{111}\)

This author has participated in several military exercises designed round the idea of a reserve demolition – that is a structure (usually a bridge) due for demolition to delay an enemy advance, but only on the explicit command of a nominated senior commander, and often only when the enemy is within small arms range. One exercise was conducted on an actual rail bridge in Staffordshire by 143rd (West Midlands) Brigade in May 1994 – this was a TEWT, using real terrain, but no troops. Beforehand, historical examples of reserve demolitions were studied in a classroom environment, and then the challenges of guarding a bridge designated for a reserve demolition in war were examined on the ground, though the bridge itself was left unharmed. In December 1999, the Commander Royal Engineers (CRE) of UK 3rd Division mounted another reserve demolition exercise at the site of a real (albeit failed) German reserve demolition attempt on the Ludendorff Railway Bridge, spanning the Rhine at Remagen, Exercise IRON PYTHON.\(^{112}\) Interestingly, this was one of the historic examples studied on the previous (1994) TEWT. The 1999 exercise became a battlefield tour, studying the attempted sabotage and subsequent surprise capture of the bridge on 7 March 1945 by elements of US 9th Armoured Division, using the actual battlefield terrain.\(^{113}\)
Manoeuvres.

These are best described as tactical exercises with troops, which are less common today (usually for fiscal, operational and sheer logistical reasons) and were more common in late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. Computers, too, have sounded the death-knell of large-scale military manoeuvres as software is able to mimic the activities of sizeable military formations with passable (even superior) accuracy. Manoeuvres involve maximum preparation beforehand, participation and an assessment/debrief phase. Sometimes, when conducted in front of an audience (such as in 1930s Germany), manoeuvres also have a propaganda value, to raise domestic morale and intimidate neighbours. Historical content is usually absent, except that, like a TEWT, manoeuvres can be held on a former battlefield (or ground resembling – or made to resemble - a specific battlefield) to explore ‘what if’ scenarios. The US Army’s National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California (established 1981), and the British Army Training Unit, Suffield, (BATUS), Alberta, Canada (established 1972), are examples of areas where current large-scale (up to brigade/regimental strength) military manoeuvres are performed on terrain designed to resemble potential foreign battlefields, against a realistically-equipped opposing force. BATUS was designed to replace training facilities sited on Second World War battlefields in Libya, closed to the British Army by Colonel Muammar al Gadhafi, when he seized power in September 1969.
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Historically, many nations held large-scale manoeuvres annually, or less frequently. These became part-tactical and part-parade review, with public spectators witnessing sham fights. A famous example of early 19th Century manoeuvres was described (albeit in a work of fiction) by Charles Dickens (1812-1870) in Chapter IV of his first work, The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club (first issued in instalments between March 1836 and November 1837)\textsuperscript{114}:

‘...The whole population of Rochester and the adjoining towns rose from their beds at an early hour of the following morning, in a state of the utmost bustle and excitement. A grand review was to take place upon the Lines. The manoeuvres of half-a-dozen regiments were to be inspected by the eagle eye of the commander-in-chief; temporary fortifications had been erected, the citadel was to be attacked and taken, and a mine was to be sprung...’\textsuperscript{115}

American battlefield parks were also established with the intention of providing terrain for military manoeuvres. The original bill to the House of Representatives was commended with the observation that the parks would not only benefit the Regular Army but also

‘the National Guard... in the practical instruction to be given and thus raise the military standing of the guard and make of it an efficient national body which in time of war may act in full accord with the War Department and forces of the Regular Army.’\textsuperscript{116}

The British War Office first purchased land on Salisbury Plain for military manoeuvres in 1897, and by 1902 the training area amounted to 43,000 acres (17,400 hectares), reflecting that the size of Britain’s Regular forces was 250,000, supported by a similar number of militia, volunteers and yeomanry.\textsuperscript{117}
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In 1890, Brevet-Maj. Henderson (York and Lancaster Regt.), Instructor in Tactics, RMC, reported in the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution on German full-scale manoeuvres around Metz in August 1890. He discusses the battle of Metz (1870) with the aid of a map, then continues,

"...There are officers in Germany who believe that had the attack of the [German] VIIth and VIIIth Corps been more skilfully conducted, the reserve and the entrenchments on the French left might have been turned and perhaps carried. On 19th of August this year, the day after the twentieth anniversary of Gravelotte, this probability was practically tested by the Metz Army Corps, and it was my good fortune to witness this interesting experiment...Reaching the Point du Jour at 8 A.M. on the day of manoeuvre, I found the position of the French troops indicated exactly as on my map, annexed by detachments of [German] infantry and a few guns... In the German service, on such manoeuvres as the present, the enemy is represented by small bodies of troops carrying...dummy targets painted red; a triangular canvas representing a battalion, a square canvas a company, and with this system all ranks seem perfectly familiar....I afterwards learned that twelve battalions and two batteries were employed in this attack...there were also several batteries in the Mance Valley...".

Here is an example of a battle re-fought on the original terrain during ‘manoeuvres’ on a scale, that whilst employing smaller numbers that the original (this still involved over 15,000 men), cannot be considered ‘Without Troops’. Thus, the armies of all nations have traditionally busied themselves in times of peace rehearsing either on special-purpose manoeuvre grounds or in countryside that replicated likely future battlefields. Sometimes these activities also took place on historic battlefields, when lessons from past campaigns, staff work, leadership and the realities of war could also be taught.
Zuber’s Thesis.

In the context of this Chapter, we need also to recognise that an important debate has arisen in recent years, following Terence Zuber’s 1999 thesis about German war aims in 1914 and war plans prior to the First World War. According to Annika Mombauer, Zuber’s thesis is that

‘there never was a Schlieffen Plan and that German war planning in 1914, far from having the aggressive edge that historians have attributed to it for decades, was in fact designed to deal with a Franco-German attack on Germany’.\(^{120}\)

That Imperial Germany used manoeuvres and staff rides (TEWTs) to train her army for war before 1914 is beyond doubt; at issue is whether that was their primary purpose. Hew Strachan has observed that ‘probably no single episode in the military history of the First World War attracted so much controversy in the inter-war years as the events of the first six weeks on the Western Front’.\(^{121}\) Interpretations of this ultimate failure to achieve the German strategic aim (the quick defeat of France) revolve around the extent of German preparations for war. Zuber’s hugely controversial thesis challenges the traditional view that Germany was preparing extensively for war, and that this was evident from records of her pre-war staff rides (TEWTs) for officers and troop manoeuvres. Robert Foley and Hew Strachan\(^{122}\) both demonstrate that Schlieffen used the annual cycle of General Staff rides and war games, but as much to train staff officers as to evaluate strategic options; as Annika Mombauer observes,

‘Foley also points to Zuber’s misunderstanding of the purpose of General Staff Rides and the resulting misinterpretation of their use. Using staff rides as evidence for war planning is, according to Foley, ‘problematic’, because Zuber mistakenly believes ‘that Schlieffen and
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Moltke used their annual staff rides to test their war planning directly'. In contrast, Foley argues that rides were used for the training of staff officers who were to be educated in coping with a variety of scenarios. In addition, they were a way of assessing candidates for promotion. His argument is underlined by the fact that staff rides were not long kept secret, which they most certainly would have been if the real war plan had been tested in them. Rather than a war planning service, staff rides need to be seen primarily as a ‘training tool’. The fact that the [Schlieffen] memorandum of 1905 was not tested by them does not mean that the intentions expressed in it were not to provide the basis for future war planning.”

Thus, understanding the nature of both staff rides and manoeuvres in pre-1914 Germany – many of which (according to Strachan) have Cannae or Königgratz-like qualities about them – provides an insight into the potential of staff rides, TEWTs and battlefield visits to explore issues other than the historical matter in hand.

Conclusion.

This chapter has illustrated that there are six separate kinds of battlefield visiting activity, which overlap in terms of preparation, participation and intent. Of these, this thesis concentrates on the army battlefield tour and the staff ride and has shown how the two differ; however, using the ‘cursor’ concept, one can be adjusted up or down to become the other. Staff Rides (particularly) can examine much more than tactical issues on the ground, and apart from training staff officers may, indeed, have an even wider agenda – such as helping to prepare a nation for war, or as in the case of Gen. Meigs in Chapter One, assess one’s reliance on new military technology. Terminology over the last 200 years of formalised battlefield visits has become confusing, particularly in terms of the staff ride; if the educational validation of the previous chapter is to be used, then some of these activities lend themselves to closer scrutiny better than others, particularly
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in the post-exercise phase, and this of itself thus becomes another way of distinguishing between the different kinds of activity. As will be seen, army battlefield tours and staff rides evolved partly out of a military application of the civilian historical tour and pilgrimage traditions, which are much older concepts, and partly from the military tradition of manoeuvres (now largely replaced by computer simulation and thus almost obsolete) and the TEWT.

![Image](image_url)

**Figure 2.13:** Postcard circa 1900 showing the annual German military manoeuvres attended by the Kaiser, illustrating an additional propaganda value.
(Source: author’s collection)

REFERENCES

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3 The four academics presenting papers at Calgary were this author, Dr Mike Bechtold [Wilfrid Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies], Dr David Hall [King’s College, London and JSCSC] and Prof Eugenia C. Kiesling [US Military Academy, West Point]. Longer versions of the papers they presented were included in the Defence Studies Journal, Vol.5/1 (March 2005), with that of Brig. RAMS Melvin and others. Details of all the contributions are fully referenced in the Bibliography.

4 Brig. RAMS Melvin, ‘Contemporary Battlefield Tours’, op. cit.

5 She suggests that the conquest of the past that can ‘add the necessary patina of respectability to sometimes questionable military and political conquests’ and calls this process ‘dead-body politics’. Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Post-Socialist Change (New York: Columbia University Press 1999), pp. 3 & 25.


12 See Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Volume 2. From the Greek, thauma, meaning death; as in thanatography (an account of a person’s death), or thanatology (the scientific study of death).


15 Henri Dunant (1828-1910) was a voluntary spectator to the battle of Solferino (25 June 1859). The suffering he witnessed of some 38,000 casualties from the battle persuaded him to form an international body to alleviate suffering, which eventually became the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). See Caroline Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross (London: HarperCollins 1999).

16 Fought on 21 July 1861, otherwise known as First Bull Run and near to Washington DC, many of the capital’s inhabitants flocked to see the Union beat the South in the first major land encounter of the US Civil War. The shock of defeat caused a major panic as fleeing civilians mingled with retreating soldiers. See Ted Ballard, Staff Ride Guide to the Battle of First Bull Run (Washington DC: Center of Military History US Army 2004).


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23 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York & London: Oxford University Press 1975). In 2003 Fussell wrote The Boys’ Crusade, (New York: The Modern Library), a brief (184pp) account of the American infantry in North Western Europe 1944-5. It is in fact a highly emotive account, charged by his own experiences in the 104/Infantry Regiment; in this sense, he is just as haunted by ‘his’ war, as were his subjects in the earlier book haunted by the First World War.

24 Sandie Holguín, ‘National Spain Invites You: Battlefield Tourism during the Spanish Civil War’, article in The American Historical Review, Vol. 110, Issue 5. Also online at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/110.5/holguin.html, accessed 23 June 2006. Rutas de Guerra were the War Routes devised by the government for tourists to follow; later they became known as the Rutas Nacionales de España, Spain’s National Routes. Holguin writes in her introduction: ‘...Although battlefield tourism had been around since at least the Battle of Waterloo, organized visits to battle sites increased dramatically after World War I, when the unfathomable death toll compelled many people to travel to places such as Verdun or the Somme as pilgrims wishing to hallow the dead or as thrill-seekers desiring a vicarious experience of trench warfare. But the Nationalists’ Rutas Nacionales de Guerra were different from these forms of battlefield tourism. This was the first time that a regime whose claim to legitimacy remained very much in question had sponsored and conducted tours before the completion of a civil war. The tours also inaugurated a novel combination of solemn battlefield tourism with a more traditional brand of recreational tourism, juxtaposing the great deeds of Nationalist soldiers alongside ‘attractive seaside resorts’. The evidence from tourist brochures, ‘scripts’ that tour guides were supposed to read, tour logs, memos, memoirs, and newspaper accounts makes clear that the Nationalists believed that the tours could accomplish many disparate goals. Tourism could bring much-needed cash to the regime’s war economy. More important, the very idea that the Nationalists could conduct tours during wartime gave them a legitimacy that they wanted and needed from the international community. They hoped to establish friendly links with groups in other authoritarian and fascist countries and attract tourists sympathetic to their cause. The tours also became an avenue to convince the international community that the Nationalist uprising in July 1936 had been absolutely necessary to save Spain from the disasters inflicted on it by supporters of the Second Republic. Finally, these tours served to sacralize both the battle sites and the Nationalist soldiers who had conquered the land. They played a critical role in creating and consecrating a series of narratives that the Franco regime would repeat obsessively until its demise in 1975, and helped to fashion a Franco-ist vision of national identity that - the Nationalists claimed - had temporarily been stolen by the architects of the Second Republic. On these tours, the Nationalists depicted the war as both a Crusade and a new Reconquista, thereby exalting a Nationalist heroism that depended on the complete humiliation of the ‘Red’ enemy...’


27 Ibid. This would have been an attempt to define the activities of late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Century men of means undertaking their Grand Tour (usually of Italy), during the height of the Classical revival.

28 This might be interpreted as a ‘quest’ or sacred duty in the Arthurian sense, as Paul Fussell points out.


30 The Royal British Legion was founded in 1921 as a voice for the ex-Service community to safeguard their welfare, interests and memory. In 2006 it has over 450,000 members. See http://www.britishlegion.org.uk/who/index.asp, accessed 11 July 2006.

31 Founded in 1985 as a result of the then Minister of State for Defence, John Stanley, visiting Bayeux during the 40th anniversary celebrations for D-Day. Talking to war widows, he was struck by the comfort they received from visiting the graves of their loved ones and on return, urged Margaret Thatcher (whose PPS he had been) to support a scheme to enable war widows to visit their husbands’ graves at one-eighth of the normal cost, the Royal British Legion bearing the balance. The story of the founding of the Pilgrimage Department and of a pilgrimage to Imphal and Kohima, Burma, is related in After the Battle, No. 74, pp.36-41.

32 This can be funded by the War Widows Grant-in-Aid Scheme, administered on behalf of the Ministry of Defence by Remembrance Travel, which was introduced in 1985 to provide financial assistance to those
who have not done so before at public expense. See www.veteransagency.mod.uk, accessed 20 November 2004.


34 The King’s Pilgrimage (London: Hodder and Stoughton 1922), in the author’s collection.

35 John Kipling’s grave was eventually identified, long after Rudyard Kipling’s own death in 1936. The discovery has been recounted in Tony and Valmai Holt, My Boy Jack: The Search For John Kipling. A Detective Biography (London: Pen and Sword/Leo Cooper 1998).

36 From a 1925 leaflet on the Ypres League (Incorporated), 36 Eaton Place, London SW1, text by Sir Philip Gibbs KBE, in the author’s collection.

37 Throughout the inter-war period, industrial wage for British men and boys remained constant, and low. The average was £3 per week (about 10 shillings per day). There was no statutory ‘holiday pay’ and in 1937, some four million workers (out of a workforce of 18½m) earning £250 per annum or less were entitled to paid holidays. In 1939 one-third of workers earning £4 per week could afford a holiday. See John Stevenson, British Society, 1914–1945 (London: Harmondsworth, 1984), p.122.

38 The Pilgrimage Centre was in Ypres town centre. Ypres League leaflet, op cit.

39 Ypres League leaflet, op cit.


43 Ibid, p.265.

44 CR Jones papers, Imperial War Museum Reading Room Library, box 05/9/1.


46 This was the equivalent of more than an average week’s wage for an unskilled factory worker in 1920.


48 Martin Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme 1 July 1916 (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press 1971), p.314. The Accrington Pals (94/Brigade, 31st Division) suffered 21 officer and 564 other rank casualties on 1 July 1916, though not all of these were killed. This totalled 585 out of the 720 who started, or 81.25%. The Battalion War Diary analyses these as follows: officers killed 7, missing 1, wounded 13 including the Commanding Officer. Other ranks killed 86, wounded 338, missing 140. (PRO WO95/2366)

49 VAD Nurse – Volunteer Aid Detachments of ‘genteel girls’ who staffed medical hospitals in the United Kingdom.

50 Britain served with the 11/Nottinghamshire and Derby Regiment (Sherwood Foresters) in France, where he was wounded on the first day of the Somme, and awarded later the MC. He was killed on 15 June 1918 during the last major Austrian assault on British lines in Italy of the Great War.

51 Vera Brittain, Testament of Youth: An Autobiographical Study of the Years 1900-1925 (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd 1933), pp. 521-7 (visiting Edward’s grave) and 532-4 (visiting Roland’s grave).

52 The author visited his grave on the Asiago Plateau during the 143rd Brigade battlefield tour of the region in October 1996.


55 Illustration from La Guerre 14-18 magazine, No.33/Août/Septembre 2006, p.68. The original advertisement is in the Historiume Museum, Peronne.


58 Borg, op. cit., page x.
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59 Ibid., pp. 29-31.
60 Dr. Philip Morgan, paper presented to the Shropshire Archaeological Society, 11 January 2003.
63 The UK market leaders in this field would seem to be (at the time of writing), Titan Tours (incorporating Major and Mrs Holt’s Battlefield Tours) and Leger Tours.
64 Sir Philip Gibbs (1877-1962) was one of five official British reporters during the Great War. Initially arrested and sent home because correspondents were not welcome at the front, with four other men he was eventually officially accredited as a war correspondent, his work appearing in the *Daily Telegraph* and *Daily Chronicle*, but all of his work was to be vetted by the official censor at GHQ, C.E. Montague, formerly of the Manchester Guardian. He produced newspaper articles and a series of books: *The Soul of the War* (1915), *The Battle of the Somme* (1917), *From Bapaume to Passchendaele* (1918) and *The Realities of War* (1920) and was knighted in 1919; his literary output continued after the war, and he continued as a war correspondent during the Second World War.
66 Military re-enactors started in the UK with the Sealed Knot Society of Cavaliers and Roundheads (founded by Brig. Peter Young in 1968) and today include several hundred ‘living history’ groups, dedicated to recreating everything from Roman legionary detachments, Viking war parties, Saxon housecarls, Mediaeval knights and longbowmen, the aforementioned English Civil War roundheads and cavaliers, Marlburian soldiers, Napoleonic-era regiments, American Civil war units, including cavalry detachments and artillery, First and Second World War battalions of every conceivable nation and service; with the latter, restored 1939-45 era military vehicles frequently arrive, adding to the spectacle; even Cold War Eastern bloc detachments are beginning to appear. When used intelligently, these people are great assets who can provide deep insights into the soldiers of their chosen era, and many individual re-enactors have read extensively into their period. In the UK, they are co-ordinated through the bi-monthly periodical, *Skirmish* (Dragoon Publishing, Congleton , UK).
69 The very comprehensive objectives (of considerable ambition, as befitted the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich) were: 1. To visit Copenhagen and other places of professional military interest in Denmark. 2. Following over the ground of the campaign of 1864 to obtain information relevant to the operations and engagements of that year. 3. To visit Berlin and attend German and French manouevres. 4. To attend siege operations at Neisse in Prussian Silesia. 5. To visit Vienna. 6. To visit Mr Krupp at Essen. 7. To visit the Prussian IV Corps at Merseburg. Specifically, by visiting Denmark, Schleswig and Holstein and passing over the ground of the campaigns of 1864, to obtain information relative to the various operations and engagements of that year, to trace the route followed by the Austro-Prussian army, and ascertain the distances marched by them; the manner of obtaining supplies; the general working of the [logistics] train and non-combatant services & etc.; to find out, by conversations with the officers and soldiers of the Danish and Russian armies, the general opinions as to the merits, or otherwise, of the “needle gun”, the ordnance used on both sides; the nature of the ammunition employed and, by contrasting the various accounts, to endeavour to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion*. Copy held in the Gibraltar Garrison Library, to whose librarian I am indebted.
70 See also, Royal Artillery Institution, *Professional Visits of Artillery Officers 1861-66* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode 1867). I am indebted to Professor Chris Bellamy for this reference.
73 Capt. R.A. Steel, *Journal of a Visit to Manchuria After the War, Prepared in the Division of the Chief of Staff* (Simla: The Government Monotype Office 1906). This was a 45-page confidential memoir (200
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copies only being printed) of a professional tour of all the main Russo-Japanese War battlefields, with notes on operations provided by officers who acted as Steel’s guides, with 12 sketches, panoramic views, maps and plans.

77 23 (Gibraltar) Battery, attached to 2/Field Rgt RA.
77 The author has run three workshops for military audiences in 2006-7, under the title ‘Timeless Terrain – Running Better Battlefield Tours’, accompanied by a 30-page booklet of the same title.
77 I am grateful to James Taylor of the Imperial War Museum (interview 13 September 2006) for reminding me of this fact. Both sites first visited by the author in Berlin, August 1994, and frequently since.
77 The MFA & A initially compiled official lists of monuments to be protected, to which they could add as the campaign progressed. As the 1944 invasion progressed, they then had four tasks: to prevent unnecessary damage to monuments in enemy-occupied territory; to temporarily repair damaged monuments under allied occupation; to protect monuments from damage and misuse by allied troops and to record thefts of works of art by the enemy. See: Lord Methuen, Normandy Diary: Being a Record of Survivals and Losses of Historical Monuments in North-Western France, together with those in the island of Walcheren and in that part of Belgium traversed by 21st Army Group in 1944-5 (London: Robert Hale Ltd 1952).
78 I am grateful to Command Sgt-Maj. John F. Lee of the US Army Quartermaster Corps for sending me the details of his 5th Annual Conference.
78 Robertson, Staff Ride, op cit. p.6.
78 The students were from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at JHU. I am most grateful to Mrs Helen Haislmaier for sending me details of this Staff Ride in the SAIS Reports for April 2000
78 David Ben-Gurion (1886-1973) was instrumental in the founding of the state of Israel at the expiration of the British Mandate, carrying Israel through the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and leading his country in its early years until retiring in 1970.
78 Yitzhak Rabin (1922-1995) commanded the Harel Brigade, defending Jerusalem. He was assassinated 1995 when Prime Minister.
78 Ariel Sharon (born 1928) was a platoon commander in 1947-8, when he gained attention for his leadership, was severely wounded, recovered and was promoted to company commander. He was promoted Major-General just before the 1967 war. In the 1973 conflict, Israeli forces under his command captured Egypt’s Third Army. That year, Sharon resigned from the army, helped establish the right-wing Likud party, and won a seat in the Israeli parliament. He served as Security Adviser to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (1975-77), as Minister of Agriculture (1977-81), and Defence Minister in 1981-3 under Menachem Begin. Under Benjamin Netanyahu, he was first Minister of National Infrastructure (1996-98), then Foreign Minister (1998-9). Following the election of Ehud Barak’s Labour party, Sharon became leader of the Likud party and was elected Prime Minister in 2001, but suffered a major stroke in January 2006.
78 Led by Dr. Eliot Cohen, the ride was undertaken between 20-4 March 2000 by 27 students, staff and was accompanied by Paul Wolfowitz and the former US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defence, Douglas Feith. During the ride, they met Faisal el-Husseini, Palestinian Minister of Jerusalem Affairs, and Brigadier-General Reuben Benkler, Head of Doctrine for the IDF. I am most grateful to Mrs Helen Haislmaier for sending me details of this Staff Ride in the SAIS Reports for April 2000.
78 Maj. PD Bailey, (R Anglian), Does the Study of Battles Fought on British Soil, through the Medium of the Staff Ride, have any Military Utility and Educational Value for the British Army Junior NCO?,

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Dissertation submitted for the award of Master of Arts by Cranfield University (October 2005). This author acted as Supervisor for the dissertation.

Ibid.

Robertson, Staff Ride, op cit, p.11.

2 ACR provided the advance guard of VII (US) Corps in offensive operations during Op. DESERT STORM. Hodder subsequently rose to full General.

Stephen P. Gehring, From the Falda Gap to Kuwait, the History of USAREUR (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History 1998), Chapter 2.

Robertson, op cit, p. 13.

Ibid, p. 20.

1-1D leaders visit Meuse-Argonne region during staff ride', article by SPC Stephen Baack, 1st Infantry Division Public Affairs, article in First Infantry Division News, April 2006

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Timeless Terrain: Running Better Battlefield Tours was a one day conference held by this author on 2 May 2007 in the Sudbury House Hotel, Faringdon, Oxfordshire, at which Professor Richard Holmes spoke and produced the verbal metaphor of the cursor. I have expanded and visualised the metaphor to include most of the other concepts depicted.


After Staff College, Sir Henry Wilson (1864-1922) served as Director of Military Operations (DMO) in the years immediately prior to war in 1914, and ultimately as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) in 1918. Retiring in February 1922 having been promoted Field Marshal, Wilson became a Member of Parliament (representing North Down), prominently opposing Irish independence. He was murdered by IRA terrorists in June 1922 while returning home from a formal dinner. Wilson has since been regarded as the most outstanding Commandant of the Camberley Staff College in its history, at perhaps its most critical period of a crucial time, when educating a generation of military leaders just before the First World War.


Then C-in-C of Aldershot Command. Sir Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien (1858-1930) was a veteran of Isandlwana (1879) and the Second Boer War (1899-1902). He commanded II Corps of Sir John French's British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in 1914-15. Smith-Dorrien fell foul of French, who replaced him with Herbert Plumer; Smith-Dorrien served as governor of Gibraltar (1918-23), and died in 1930.

Several entries from the Essex Yeomanry War Diary illustrate the continued use of the term to mean a TEWT at regimental, brigade [8th Cavalry Brigade] and divisional [3rd Cavalry Division] level whilst serving on the Western Front, 1915-16. Although the content is not recorded, this implies the continuous, fastidious training of all officers, up to divisional level. Not that the EY's officers were necessarily 'green'; the regiment had already been bloodied in combat, making a dismounted bayonet charge on 13 May 1915 in Flanders, losing their CO and 69 others killed, 91 wounded (a total of 161 casualties out of 302 in the attack).

1...20 July 1915: 2 digging parties left (a) Neuve Eglise under Maj. Gold 4 officers and 132 men (b) Elverdinghe under Maj. Buxton 4 officers and 165 men. Both parties went by bus. Staff ride under GOC Brigade for remaining officers.

5 November 1915: 3rd Cav. Div. 1st Staff Ride.

8 November 1915: CO inspects ground in neighbourhood of Laires and Beaumetz-les Aire for Regtl. Staff Ride.

9 November 1915: Regtl. Staff Ride.


21 March 1916: Brigade staff ride postponed owing to wet.
8 April 1916: Sqn. parades. Brigade staff ride Lebize Royon Torcy Crecy in direction of Bois-de-Crecy.
12 April 1916: Sqn. parades. Regimental staff ride Bois-de-Lebize...’ See War Diaries in the National Archives.


110 Mr Punch On The Warpath, op cit.


112 Accompanied by several veterans (including Sydney Jary MC) and held over 28 November – 3 December 1999, Ex. IRON PYTHON also examined Ops. VERITABLE and PLUNDER, the allied set-piece assault crossing of the River Rhine in March 1945. The bridge at Remagen subsequently collapsed whilst in use, but part of the site remains preserved as a war museum today.

113 The bridge subsequently collapsed, but one of the bridge towers is now the site of an excellent little war museum.


115 1887 (two-volume) edition, pp.49-50. The Peninsular War (1808-14) revealed deficiencies in the training and knowledge of British Army personnel in the conduct of sieges operations and bridging. The few engineer officers available to Wellington had to direct working parties, often of two or three thousand men, demonstrating the simplest tasks, often while under enemy fire. Several officers were lost who could not be replaced and a better system of training for siege operations was required. On 23 April 1812 an establishment was authorised by Royal Warrant, to teach ‘Sapping, Mining, and other Military Fieldworks’ to the junior officers of the Corps of Royal Engineers and the Corps of Royal Military Artificers, Sappers and Miners. The location chosen was Chatham which was, at that time, already a strongly fortified naval town – there had been a military base on the high ground above Chatham built to defend the dockyard since 1708; the town was surrounded by batteries, bastions and ditches designed to be defended by 7,000 men and so provided excellent areas for training in siege operations. From 1833, bridging skills were demonstrated annually by the building of a pontoon bridge across the Medway which was then utilised by the infantry of the Garrison and cavalry from Maidstone. These summer demonstrations had become a popular spectacle for the local people by 1843, when 43,000 came to watch a field day laid on to test a method of assaulting earthworks for a report to the Inspector General of Fortifications. It was one of these field days that Dickens (a Rochester-Chatham native) was describing, when he penned Chapter IV in 1835.


119 Ibid.


123 Mombauer, op cit, p.864.
‘At every crossway on the road to the future, each progressive spirit is opposed by a thousand men appointed to guard the past’

Count Maurice de Maeterlinck

CHAPTER THREE

The Evolution of Battlefield Tourism

Experiencing military history in the pre-tourism era.

There is a certain inevitability of the military professional colliding with an old battlefield. That corner of north east France and southern Belgium, including the Flanders Plain, to south of Brussels and the old French province of Artois, has more than its fair share. Not for nothing is it known as ‘the cock-pit of Europe’, a phrase first coined by James Howell (1594-1666), an English traveller, writing during the Thirty Years War (1618-48). Howell was aware that the ‘cock-pit’ was as well known to Caesar’s legionaries as to the knights and archers of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453). Since Howell’s day Marlborough, Napoleon, Wellington and three generations of Germans have overrun it. Howell went on to advise the ‘forreine traveller’ that ‘...if there be any leaguers [sieges] afoot, or armies in motion, it should be time well spent to see them…’.

In other words, military activity in the region was commonplace and as natural to visit as a trade fair today. The Cockpit of Europe also became the title of a battlefield guidebook by Howard Green in 1976.
The author considered to be the first true novelist (that is, publishing a full-length work of fiction, rather than satirical pamphleteering), Daniel Defoe (c.1660-1731), can also considered to be a quasi-military historian and battlefield visitor. Although best-known for Robinson Crusoe (1719), he also published Memoirs of A Cavalier (1720), allegedly the recollections of an English Civil War warrior, but in fact based partly on published sources and Defoe’s own visits to battlefields. Between 1724-6 he published the three-volume Tour Through Great Britain,\(^5\) in which he visits several battlefields, which clearly fascinated him, judging by the amount of text he devotes to describing them. Letter IV of Volume 2 (published 1726) sees him at ‘Newbery’ (Newbury), where he recounts at length the two Civil War battles; in Letter IX of Volume 3 (published 1726), he visited specifically Towton, Naseby, Flodden Field and spent a whole day exploring Marston Moor from York, in each case hiring local guides, and explaining the battles anecdotally in his text. Although most of his visits are undated, there is considerable evidence, as J.H. Andrews has noted, that many of them pre-date 1700.\(^6\) Thus, Defoe’s visit to Marston Moor (Map 8) provided the background material for his 1720 Cavalier, whom Defoe had fighting both there and at Naseby. The Civil War battlefields (Maps 3 and 8) he explored had been fought over only sixty years (or a generation) earlier, a similar time lapse from the Second World War to the research for this thesis. The fact that he could hire guides who walked him over (allegedly) the correct terrain suggests that he was not the only interested party in visiting the civil war battlefields at this juncture.
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Early in the Nineteenth Century, a correspondent to the *Church of Scotland Newspaper* on 12 April 1826 expressed ‘surprise that there is neither a stick nor a stone to mark the site of Culloden Battlefield’ (fought 16 April 1746). Possibly the (Protestant) monarchy and establishment actively suppressed memorials commemorating resistance by Catholics or the Scots. Keele University’s Philip Morgan (in Chapter Two) cites a third wave of battlefield preservation, of the rediscovery of battlefields by antiquarians from the mid-18th Century. He suggests the erection of memorial obelisks at Naseby (fought 14 June 1645 – Map 8) in 1771 and 1823 mark this new departure. Although a descendant of the Civil War Royalist commander Sir Bevil Grenville (1596-1643) erected a memorial in 1780 to his part in the battle of Lansdown Hill (fought 5 July 1643 – Map 3), this author suggests that 1800 is a more satisfactory general date for the commencement of this third wave, as most date from after this benchmark. The advent of war with revolutionary France (and threat of invasion) certainly focussed English minds on military affairs, neglected for generations, as Peter A. Lloyd has observed in *The French Are Coming!* For example, the Glenfinnan Monument, erected in 1815 by Alexander Macdonald of Glenaladale at the head of Loch Shiel, in tribute to the clansmen who fought and died in the cause of Prince Charles Edward Stuart, is one of the earliest of this third wave of memorials. They were erected by private money or public subscription, and were prompted in part by the interest in history generated by (for example) the novels of Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832), particularly *Waverley* (1814), *Rob Roy* (1817) and *Ivanhoe* (1819).
One early limitation on battlefield visits was that of the sheer difficulty and expense, prior to railways, of travelling any distance. Whilst some actual battlefields were visited, others were replicated on similar terrain in the home nation, or replicated in model form in a suitable location. An early instance of such battlefield replication, albeit in a country garden for the enjoyment of an eccentric gentleman, is portrayed in Laurence Sterne’s novel *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman* (1759-67), where the fictional characters Uncle Toby and his servant Corporal Trim replicate the defences of Namur where they served (in 1695) in an acre of garden. Himself the son a regular officer, Sterne’s use of this scenario to explore his characters suggests that battlefield replication (if eccentric) was by no means strange to Eighteenth Century military officers. Edward Ryan has noted in *Paper Soldiers* (1995) how model soldiers grew in popularity at the same time.\(^{13}\)
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In place of visiting actual battlefields, there arose in London and elsewhere the tradition of visiting a depiction of combat transferred onto large painted canvases, called panoramas. John Zarobell, Martin Samuels and others have written of the panorama-cyclororama tradition, which lasted for a century until replaced by cinemas and is all but extinct today; in their day they were an important measure of public interest in battles and battlefields. Throughout the Nineteenth Century, panorama painters were stimulating interest in military history, which may have inspired some of their visitors to visit the battlefields, but the artists themselves also travelled to the battlegrounds in order to render an accurate depiction of their battles on canvas. Zarobell, of the Philadelphia Museum of Art, observed that many of the canvases were reused to produce new panoramas

‘...unlike works of art, these objects were made as entertainment, and therefore lost their value as soon as the audience was no longer interested. All that is left are fragments, shreds of evidence, and traces of once-glorious edifices...this history of the nineteenth century comes together like fragments of a dream...’\(^14\)

Though invented in London by the Barkers (father and son)\(^15\), the best-known panorama painter was a former officer in Napoleon’s army, Col. Jean-Charles Langlois (1789-1870), who travelled Europe executing commissions in many countries. Each of Langlois’ panoramas reconstructed a moment within the battle (a ‘freeze-frame’), making the viewer feel they were living through the actual event. Martin Samuels has written that his historical spectacles provided public images of history ‘in as visually realistic manner as possible...[and] provided perspectives through which new individual and national identities could take shape through the consumption of a version of the past...’\(^16\) Langlois visited each battlefield, sketching, painting and photographing before
producing his panoramas, which commenced with the naval Battle of Navarino (fought 1827, first exhibited 1830 and considered so realistic it was used as a training aid for French naval cadets) and concluded with the Siege of Sebastopol (1855, exhibited 1860), which received 400,000 visitors before being replaced by Langlois’ last panorama, the Battle of Solferino (fought 1859, exhibited from 1865). Tony Wolf has also noted how tournaments and combative exhibitions also became popular in Victorian England. He traces their evolution to ‘patriotic spectacles’ where battles were re-enacted; for example, Astley’s Amphitheatre advertised the Battle of Waterloo in 1824, using some genuine Waterloo veterans; allegedly ‘...the Duke of Wellington was so pleased with it that he watched it twice... The Amphitheatre’s cavernous arena space allowed re-enactments on a truly grand scale, featuring hundreds of actors, horses and cannons…’ These evolved into military gymkhanas and, eventually, the Royal Tournament, founded as the Grand Military Tournament and Assault at Arms, first held at the Agricultural Hall, Islington in 1880, which was a series of competitions between the regular and volunteer units of the Army.

The upsurge of interest in military affairs began in the early Nineteenth Century, argues Professor Betty T. Bennett, who has demonstrated that the war with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France (1793-1802; 1803-1815) generated a huge volume of romantic war poetry, drama, painting and literature. English aristocrats, needing to win back credibility against revolutionary French ideas, presented a public increasingly afraid of French invasion with a new heroic mould, wearing uniforms in public and commissioning romantic paintings of death in battle, argues Andy Evans. He suggests
that Parliament echoed this new fascination with all things military by deciding to place statues of naval and military heroes in St Paul’s Cathedral, a departure from previous practice, and by the state funeral given to Horatio Nelson (January 1806). The construction (1823-6) of the Lion Mound at Waterloo in Belgium (itself a commemorating of the spot where the Prince of Orange, Grand Duke of Luxembourg and King of the Netherlands (1772-1843) was wounded on 18 June 1815) reflected this interest overseas, although the battle dead were simply buried in unmarked mass graves. The Gordon monument on the battleground of Waterloo (built in 1817 in memory of one of Wellington’s ADCs, by his family) is a reminder of the fact that in this era, any battlefield commemoration was a private affair, funded only by those with ample means. The unprecedented Nineteenth Century interest in war and military affairs was even maintained at the demise of the Century’s two great military colossi. Andrew Roberts has observed how in 1852 the state funeral of the Duke of Wellington (1769-1852) was also a riposte to that of Napoleon (1769-1821). On 18 November 1852, Roberts observed, ‘approximately one and a half million people watched the state funeral procession from Horse Guards to St Paul’s Cathedral. ‘On no public occasion has anything at all approaching it ever been manifested,’ reported a black-bordered edition of The Times that morning’. Roberts continues: ‘In the second battle Wellington fought against Napoleon, that of their funerals, the result was a draw. Napoleon’s funeral had been a magnificent display, and, just as his nephew was about to ascend the French throne, the British were determined that Wellington’s should be no less memorable. Historians have since seen Wellington’s funeral as a self-conscious ‘answer’ to the entombment of Napoleon at Les Invalides twelve years earlier.’
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Where had this military interest come from? At the height of the French invasion scare, in 1804, over 400,000 men had responded to the 1798 Defence of the Realm Act’s requirement for a home guard to be formed in the event of invasion. ‘Out of a population of 15 million’, notes Simon Schama,

‘3¾ million men were of an age (17-55) to bear arms. And over 800,000 – one in five – were in fact part of the national defence; 386,000 as volunteers, of whom 266,000 were in the army and 120,000 in the navy…When George III reviewed 27,000 volunteers in Hyde Park in October 1803 a crowd of half a million watched the spectacular parade’.  

Although an anti-war poem, The Battle of Blenheim, penned in 1799 by Robert Southey (1774-1843), later Poet Laureate, is one of the best known literary examples of the renewed interest in military topics. Southey’s brief, 11-verse poem tells of a little girl finding a human skull on an old battlefield and of her grandfather’s explanation of the battle. Significantly, Blenheim had been fought 95 years earlier (13 August 1704) against an earlier generation of Frenchmen, and was virtually ancient history. Evans and Bennett argue that Southey deliberately used Blenheim to strike a chord with his readers because war was in the news again. As his readers were unlikely ever to visit Blenheim (in Bavaria, on the left bank of the river Danube), writers like Southey had a heavy responsibility, being responsible for the common understanding of past and present military dramas. Southey’s poem also implies strongly that in his day (the late Eighteenth Century) the only usual commemoration of a battlefield was via informal oral history, passed down through family members in the manner of an Icelandic saga. Indeed Southey himself would later visit the scene of Wellington’s triumph soon after the battle and pen The Poet’s Pilgrimage to Waterloo (1816); other battlefield visitors there

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would soon include Walter Scott, William Wordsworth, JMW Turner and Lord Byron, later on William Thackeray and Anthony Trollope, all equally keen to exploit the literary and artistic opportunities presented by a public familiar with the events of the great battle.

**Waterloo and British Battlefield Tourism** (Map 4).

An early example of a civilian battlefield tour was the visit of the poet and novelist Walter Scott (1771-1832) to Waterloo. At the height of his fame and fortune, Scott was impatient to see the scene of Napoleon’s final defeat and to visit Continental Europe which had been closed to British visitors for more than a decade. Within two months of the battle (August 1815), Scott was apparently amongst the first British civilians to tour the battlefield of Waterloo, accompanied by Major Pryse Lockhart Gordon (1762-1845). In newly-liberated Paris, Scott interviewed officers present at the battle, including the Duke of Wellington himself, whose lack of conceit and pretension apparently greatly impressed him. The result was *The Field of Waterloo; A Poem*, published in October 1815. The following year (4 May 1816), George Gordon Noel, 6th Baron Byron (1788-1824) also visited Waterloo, some eleven months after the battle, where he was shown around by Scott’s guide, Pryse Lockhart Gordon, who was a friend of Byron’s mother. The visit inspired part of the lengthy poem *Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage*, in which Canto the Third deals with Waterloo. This rush to Waterloo by Scott and Byron, at a time when Continental travel was rare, suggests that both felt they could ‘cash in’ on the existing public fascination with war – something earlier writers had been unable to do. In successive years, many other writers visited the Waterloo area; in
1823, Joanna Baillie (1762-1851) edited a collection of poems, which included *Lines Written on the Field of Quatre Bras* (1821).\(^{33}\)

Most modern battlefield tourism dates back to Waterloo, the most important of the Napoleonic battlegrounds - which (unusually for a battle) decided Europe's future for the following century - in a single day's combat. Ever since, literally millions of visitors - both military and civilian - have paced every inch of that particular battlefield, perhaps lured as much by its proximity to Brussels as by the fact that it has remained little changed since 18 June 1815. The shadow of Waterloo has loomed in fact and fiction ever since, arguably dominating the plots of Stendhal’s *The Charterhouse of Parma* (1839)\(^{34}\), William Makepeace Thackeray's (1811-63) epic novel *Vanity Fair* (1848); and Victor Hugo’s (1802-1885) *Les Misérables* (1862). Hugo’s work was inspired by his father Léopold, who had been one of Napoleon’s generals, and by visits to Waterloo. His biographer Samuel Edwards asserts that he actually wrote the Waterloo chapter whilst on the battlefield in 1860, intending to complete the novel there that June (in the month the battle occurred), though it took him another eleven months.\(^{35}\) Battlefields have always attracted writers, like iron filings to a magnet, and Honoré de Balzac (1799-1850) was drawn, during an 1835 visit to Vienna, to Essling (fought May 1809) and Wagram (July 1809); we know he took extensive notes, and mentioned his research in correspondence to friends, but never actually wrote of Napoleon’s first defeat on land in Western Europe.\(^{36}\)

After Waterloo, one of the victors returned and married a local girl and until his death, Sgt-Maj. Edward Cotton (c.1792-1849), late of the 7\(^{th}\) Hussars, was famous for his
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guided tours around the battlefield where he had fought in 1815. Cotton left the army in 1835 and settled in Mont St. Jean village, where his battlefield guiding became renowned, in an era when battlefield guides were most uncommon. Cotton’s chosen profession reflected a demand, created in the post-Napoleonic era by this second type of battlefield visitor – the civilian undertaking an historical tour. His credibility increased with the publication of A Voice from Waterloo, first published in 1846, which had run to thirteen editions by 1913. 37
Map 4: The quartet of battles that comprise the much-studied Waterloo campaign. Quatre Bras and Ligny were fought on 16 June and Waterloo, (on the Mont St. Jean ridge and three miles south of Waterloo village), and Wavre took place on 18 June 1815. Only Waterloo has acquired fame and special status. Source: Andrew Roberts, *Napoleon and Wellington* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 2001), p.146.
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In 1845, the Naval and Military Gazette described Cotton as, ‘intelligent, active and a good-looking man of fifty-three and the very cut as a Hussar’. Until Napoleon’s mass armies and Nineteenth Century industrialisation (in the form of railway and steamship travel, printed books and newspapers, a corresponding rise in literacy rates and, later on, photography) started to give many civilians an understanding of war, the novelty of both war and travel provided soldiers and mariners with a unique hold over an audience or readership. Cotton built up a formidable knowledge of the battle from correspondence with veterans and founded a museum containing a collection of memorabilia (now dispersed). Lt-Gen. Sir Hussey Vivian wrote to him in 1839,

‘I sincerely hope that [with the] occupation you have undertaken, you will derive the means of passing the remainder of your days in competence and comfort; and thus heap [reap?] the rewards of your intelligence on a field where you had proved your courage…”

Hussey’s son would later publish a biography of his father’s distinguished military life in 1897. Meanwhile, Baron von Müffling (Prussian liaison officer at Wellington’s HQ) had penned his 105-page A Sketch of the Battle of Waterloo to Which Are Added Official Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington; Field Marshal Prince Blücher; and Reflections on the Battles of Ligny & Waterloo (1842), which was a pocket-sized work for visitors to those battlefields and may have inspired Cotton’s work.

Organised visits to Waterloo coincide with the origins of British ‘package tourism’ – or did they cause it? Although Mr Thomas Cook’s (1808-1892) first venture was to organise a journey by train for 570 from Leicester to Loughborough for a temperance meeting in July 1841 (at a shilling each), his first tour overseas was to
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Waterloo, in 1845. In 1866, Cook took his first group of European tourists to America, visiting New York and the Civil War battlefields of Virginia. An early competitor, Henry Glaze, had already taken his first party to visit Brussels and Waterloo in 1854. Waterloo retained its popularity with tourists and day-trippers throughout the Nineteenth Century, which increased with the arrival of a local railway line (as Figure 3.1 shows).

A thriving industry in the sale of relics and souvenirs developed at the site (echoing countless pilgrimages to religious shrines and the Holy Land), which led Thomas Cook's 1913 guide to warn travellers:

Figure 3.1: Postcard depicting a twin-horse tourist coach from Brussels disgorging passengers at the south gate of Hougoumont Farm. Posted in 1902, the card provides early photographic evidence of the popularity of the Waterloo battlefield. (Source: author's collection)
‘…It is hardly necessary to say that buttons, spurs, helmets or sword-handles can be purchased cheaper in Sheffield or Birmingham, where they are manufactured, than on the field of Waterloo; nor must we forget that the battle was fought in the year 1815, and therefore the numerous guides of about fifty years of age who declare they were in the engagement are not to be relied upon implicitly…’ 43

A similar observation was made in 1841, by Dr. Charles Mackay (1814-1889), later editor of the Illustrated London News. In the final chapter of Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, MacKay discusses the importance of relics to mankind, and how the faithful have been exploited over the centuries by the godless.44 He observed that a desire for religious relics had given way in the mid-Nineteenth Century to relics associated with criminals or the famous, because relics gave one a link with the past, whether a battlefield or a famous or infamous person. ‘The undoubted relics of great men, or of great events, will always possess attractions for the thinking and refined’. 45 Writing just 26 years after Waterloo, Mackay conveys a sense of the importance of the battle site for Nineteenth Century travellers (and the opportunities it offered to exploit the unwary):46

‘…Among the most favourite relics of modern times, in Europe, are Shakespeare’s mulberry-tree, Napoleon’s willow, and the table at Waterloo on which the emperor wrote his despatches… Many a piece of alien wood passes under this name… The original has long since been destroyed, and a round dozen of counterfeits along with it… Bullets from the field of Waterloo, and buttons from the coats of the soldiers who fell in the fight, are still favourite relics in Europe. But the same ingenuity which found new tables after the old one was destroyed, has cast new bullets for the curious. Many a one who thinks himself the possessor of a bullet which aided in giving peace to the world on that memorable day, is the owner of a dump, first extracted from the ore a dozen years afterwards. Let all lovers of genuine relics look well to their money before they part with it to the ciceroni that swarm in the village of Waterloo!’ 47
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MacCannell’s ‘Marking’ Process.

Dean MacCannell\textsuperscript{48} and AV Seaton\textsuperscript{49} have separately observed that Waterloo has become a destination of choice amongst tourists worldwide, because the battle is extremely well-known. This, they have argued, is because Waterloo has acquired a special status, having gone through five distinct ‘marking’ processes in terms of tourism; they are:

1. Naming - the battle took place in a specific, small geographical locale, unlike other vaguer battles such as the Somme, Normandy, and within a specific, brief, time-frame, unlike Ypres, Verdun, Monte Cassino or Anzio. The name is easy to remember and pronounce in many languages; it has become shorthand for referring to a campaign that actually encompassed four battles – Ligny, Quatre Bras, Wavre and Waterloo.

2. Framing and Elevation (by which the authors mean display); at Waterloo, this is aided by the Lion Mound and other monuments put up around the site and on the surviving buildings such as Hougoumont and La Haie Sainte; see Figure 6.4.

3. Enshrinement (where some of the buildings themselves become attractions); most of the buildings on the battlefield (chiefly the museums and panorama) and some near to it (Le Caillou, Napoleon’s HQ, for example), fall into this category.

4. Mechanical Reproduction; Waterloo coincided with the industrial revolution and prints of the commanders and the site, and books on the battle have been mass produced.

5. Social Reproduction (whereby the battle has entered everyday usage); this is evidenced by Waterloo streets and inns; towns named Waterloo worldwide; a railway station and common phraseology (‘to meet one’s Waterloo’).
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This is a powerful analysis of the magnet of Waterloo, and may also explain the popularity of Gettysburg in the United States and the Invasion Beaches in Normandy, which have all gone through similar processes. In its day Blenheim (1704) was as important to Europe’s future, yet acquired none of the status of Waterloo, and is hardly visited, even by historians or soldiers. When Charles Spencer asks at the end of his 2004 work on the battle - ‘Why has Blenheim largely been forgotten? …If you visit the battle site today, there is little to commemorate the engagement whose scale and consequence thrilled contemporary Europe’50 – the answer seems to lie in the MacCannell’s tourism ‘marking’ process. It also meant that when soldiers in the Nineteenth Century cast around for battlefields to study, Waterloo would have been the destination of choice until displaced by the Franco-Prussian war. For the general public, Waterloo ruled unchallenged for over a century, until supplanted by the 1914-18 battlefields. The stereoscopic view (at Figures 3.2 and 3.3 below), sold by an American company (circa 1910), is an illustration of the continued international popularity of Waterloo. The postcard at Figure 3.4 illustrates the specially-built rotunda which still houses the panorama, first unveiled in 1912 and painted by Demoulin between 1904-12. This is part of the ‘Framing and Elevation’ and ‘Enshrinement’ processes (above) that have made Waterloo so special.
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Figures 3.2 and 3.3: Stereoscopic photograph (and reverse) of the Lion Mound at Waterloo (circa 1910). This is an illustration of the ‘Mechanical Reproduction’ phase of ‘marking’ Waterloo as a special tourist site. Note the manufacturer (Keystone, USA), underlining the appeal of Waterloo outside Europe, and the pro-German caption.

(Source: author’s collection)
To help the traveller make sense of past battles, where ordinary people had made history, guide books grew in popularity. A contemporary of Thomas Cook was the German printer Karl Baedeker (1801-1859), who pioneered the market for travel guides, which were crucial to 19th Century tourists travelling abroad. Indeed the surname has become shorthand for a travel guide, his first appeared in 1839; many of the 266 various English language editions which appeared before 1914 contained notes and detailed maps of battlefields, particularly in France, Italy, Belgium, Germany and the United States.\(^{51}\)
It is perhaps no coincidence that Baedeker’s *Paris and Northern France: Handbook for Travellers, First edition* appeared in 1867 and the *Second edition* in 1870, both preceding the Franco-Prussian War. Baedeker was also astute, devoting less space to Waterloo in the French language version of his guide to Belgium and Holland than in the English language version.\(^{52}\)

Popular accounts of military history also stimulated the imagination and caused some, who could afford it, to visit ancient battlefields. Perhaps one of the key texts here was Sir Edward Creasy’s *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: from Marathon to Waterloo*, first published in 1851.\(^{53}\) As evidenced by the fact that its sub-title found its way into the Maj-General’s patter-song from *Pirates of Penzance*\(^ {54}\) (‘From Marathon to Waterloo in Order Categorical’), Creasy’s *Decisive Battles* was arguably one of the most influential works of non-scholarly military history published. Creasy (1812-1878), was the first to establish the notion of the decisive battle, which remains a popular concept, though hotly debated, today. In the aftermath of the First World War, Twentieth Century historians came to belittle and ridicule the concept of decisive battles, preferring to believe that human events are rarely determined solely on the battlefield. Nevertheless, Creasy caught the popular imagination, his brand of military history became fashionable and sold well in its day – by 1905 the book had been in print continuously for fifty-four years and reprinted no less than forty-five times\(^ {55}\) - and remains in print in the Twenty-First Century, probably because of the quality of its descriptive writing (rather than its historical objectivity). His Anglo centricity (a third of the battles - Hastings, Orleans, Blenheim, Saratoga and Waterloo - involve the British) appealed to his Imperial readership; with each battle, Creasy uses military history to
suggest that Europeans were destined to triumph and rule the world. His rampant Euro
centrism (only one of his wars - the American War of Independence - took place beyond
European frontiers, while three of them - Marathon, Chalons, and Tours - were defeats
for Asian powers - Persians, Huns, and Saracens - who challenged Europe) means that he
tends to be ignored as insufficiently multicultural, but his influence on the travelling
public of Nineteenth Century Britain was large.

Artists exploited the subject matter of warfare and in late-Victorian Britain their
images were widely available in periodicals of the time, as were prints, engravings and
aquatints of military themes, commanders and battles, published by Ackermann’s of
London or uniform prints executed for journals by artists such as Richard Simkin (1851-
1926). Some of this engraved art, particularly that of the military artist Richard Caton
Woodville (1856-1927) and Lady [Elisabeth] Butler (1846-1933) found its way into the
illustrated periodicals of the era, such as The Illustrated London News (established 1841),
The Sphere and The Graphic (first published 1869). Philip J. Haythornthwaite has
pointed out, however, that with military art, ‘…the question of accuracy looms larger
than for art critics, and on the subject of ‘realism’…’ Victorian scenes of combat,
(such as that shown in Figure 3.5) accordingly, shut out the real horrors of the battlefield
- mutilated men and horses - portraying war only for those with delicate stomachs and
bottomless purses, and so compromising realism in what was supposedly an accurate
historical record of a battle or deed - and this may have propelled some towards a military
career under false pretenses.
Similarly, Victorian artists took little account of torn, shoddy, bloodied or muddied uniforms, preferring to rely on noble ‘thin red line’ type, unrepresentative images. Apart from Mathew Brady’s pictures of corpses at Gettysburg, early portrait photographs repeated this sanitisation of war, making the prospect of scampering around an old battlefield rather appealing for a post-war tourist. This lack of understanding of war also drew spectators to watch battles in progress and, no doubt, encouraged others to enlist. The tradition of self-censorship by war artists also continued into the Twentieth Century.
Century, with the picture postcard (illustrated at Figure 3.6, below) produced for home consumption in Germany.

![Figure 3.6: German propaganda postcard (circa 1915) depicting, for home consumption, the idea of a clean, noble death for a wounded officer; the lack of gore is striking. (Source: author’s collection).](image)

**Later Nineteenth Century Understanding of History and War.**

After the Napoleonic era, this enormous volume of drama, writing, music and art that reflected hitherto neglected military themes meant that public curiosity in all things military and historical remained, and within a few years it became possible to visit some of the nearer sites, like Waterloo, or pay homage to some of the heroes, such as Nelson (and eventually Wellington). The comfortable chronological distance of battles fought on British soil, an easing of anxiety over Scotland, the passing of the Catholic
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Emancipation Act (1829) and the use of the military, militia and yeomanry as an auxiliary police force to quell urban and rural unrest, c.1816-48 also sharpened public interest in past military history.\(^{58}\) Gary Taylor has noted how renewed interest in the historical plays of Shakespeare (especially Richard III\(^{59}\) and Henry V), \(^{60}\) breathed new life onto the mid-Victorian stage, in time making it respectable, which hitherto it had not been.\(^{61}\)

Also reflecting (and stimulating) this interest was the formation of bodies like the United (later Royal United) Services Institution (founded by the Duke of Wellington in 1831)\(^{62}\), the British Archaeological Association (1843)\(^{63}\), the Royal Historical Society (1868)\(^{64}\), and the American Historical Association (1884)\(^{65}\), each founded with national membership, and a published journal, to study and promote debate in areas of military affairs and military history (in the case of RUSI) or more general historical matters.\(^{66}\) Journals began in this era which discussed contemporary military topics, but also military history, including: *The United Service Gazette and Naval and Military Chronicle* (1831-1921), *The Naval and Military Gazette and Weekly Chronicle of the United Service* (1833-1886), the United (later Royal United) *Services Institution Journal* (1858-ongoing), *The Volunteer Service Gazette and Military Dispatch* (1859-1925), *The Army & Navy Gazette* (1860-1957).\(^{67}\) These societies and bodies were enabled and encouraged by the Museums Act of 1849 which had led to the success of the Great Exhibition in 1851 and in turn fostered the foundation of what became the Victoria and Albert, Natural History and Science Museums in 1852.\(^{68}\) The Public Libraries Act of 1850, which followed a Select Committee on Public Libraries (1849), reflected both
mechanical innovation enabling publishers to mass-produce books and a massive rise in adult literacy creating a demand for works of history, patriotic appeal and inspiring fiction. 69

Richard Brooke, Esq., FSA, reflected this renewed interest in military affairs with his early guidebook, *Visits to Fields of Battle in England of the Fifteenth Century* (1857). 70 Fourteen years earlier (1843) a local antiquary had erected a memorial obelisk to the parliamentarian John Hampden, on the battlefield where he had been mortally wounded, Chalgrove Field in Oxfordshire (18 June 1644). 71 The Wallace Monument at Stirling is also typical of this same genre of memorials, built with local and expatriate Scots money in 1869. It commemorates William Wallace (1267-1305), who defeated an English army at Stirling (fought 11 September 1297) and was erected on the rocky crag from which Wallace watched the English army gather on the South side of Stirling Bridge. It is worth observing, though, that many of this wave of memorials commemorated principally individuals, and only incidentally the battles in which they fought. In England, the conscious preservation of landscapes and old buildings began with the National Trust (1895) 72, though with no intrinsic military interest, and surprisingly - it took nearly another century for the Battlefields Trust to be founded, though this owns no property or land. 73

Although much of this era approximates to the reign of Victoria (1837-1901), the earlier years of the Nineteenth Century should also be included, when considering the ‘Victorians’ in this military context. The huge Nineteenth Century leap of adult literacy also contributed to public interest in history and motivated some to enlist in the army and
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a smaller number to visit battlefields. William Cobbett (1762-1835, the author of Rural Rides) is an example of this earlier group, who enlisted as a literate private soldier and was promoted to sergeant-major before leaving the service aged 29. 74 There was also a sense for the first time amongst early Victorians that study of the past could play a part in improving the present. 75

Raymond Chapman in The Sense of the Past in Victorian Literature (1986) asserts that Victorians (unlike their Eighteenth Century predecessors) valued history and the gathering of accurate historical information. 76 Chapman goes on to observe that there ‘…was a growing recognition that the past had been the present for people as real as any then living, and that it was possible to come closer to them than ruins and dates of battles…’ 77 This amounted to a break with the antiquaries of the past, who merely collected relics; the Victorians (and their Nineteenth Century contemporaries across Europe and America) were the first to desire contemporary accounts of ordinary people experiencing great events. Sidney H. Moore, a private battlefield visitor to La Albuera (fought in 1811) in Spain, was unassisted by a guide in his visit, when he wrote to The Times in 1890,

‘…Sir, Yesterday I had the melancholy pleasure of visiting …a battlefield hallowed and forever sacred to many a British hearth and home. On asking if there was anything which commemorated the Englishmen who had fallen… I was shown on the plaza a monument in the last state of decay…One has only to ride over the heights to the south-west of the village to imagine what the fire of the French batteries was like…’ 78

Philip J. Haythornthwaite 79 has noted that this desire was reflected by first British ‘official histories’ of campaigns, The Record of the Expedition to Abyssinia (1870) 80 and
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the Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879 (1881),\textsuperscript{81} published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO). Within the military profession (and of relevance to the auxiliary forces), the early Nineteenth Century also saw many official drill and tactical manuals published\textsuperscript{82} and most regiments began to capture and publish their histories after the Napoleonic fighting was over.\textsuperscript{83} Readers in the late Victorian world were hugely influenced by the fictional output of George Alfred Henty (1832-1902), who had a considerable knowledge of military affairs. Henty’s prolific influence (106 ripping novels, all in his pseudo-historical heroic style) lingered well into the Twentieth Century; according to Philip J. Haythornthwaite, as a professional war correspondent, Henty reported,

‘…the Austro-Italian War of 1866, Garibaldi, Abyssinia, the Carlist War of 1873-6, Russia at the time of the conquest of Khiva and the Turko-Serbian War which led to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8…Within the confines of his genre, Henty’s books are of high standard, and many are instructional: descriptions of real battles and even tactical maps are included…’.\textsuperscript{84}

Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936), too, was a hugely influential figure in ‘literary imperialism’, no doubt – with Henty and others - influencing many to read military history, explore battlefields (if the opportunity arose) or take up a career in the army, navy, or colonial services.

By the mid-Nineteenth Century, Alfred, Lord Tennyson (1809-1892) would write his Charge of the Light Brigade (glorifying an event that occurred during the battle of Balaclava, 25 October 1854), exploiting popular interest in a recent war, in his case in the Crimea.\textsuperscript{85} However, Tennyson’s poem came about not because of a battlefield visit, but
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because he was Poet Laureate (1850-96) at the time of the charge. His information came from reading William Howard Russell’s (now famous) despatches, published in The Times.\textsuperscript{86} Tennyson’s poem, still hugely popular today, first appeared in a newspaper, The Examiner, and was also printed as a leaflet for distribution to the troops before its appearance in book-form.\textsuperscript{87} Again, the popularity of Tennyson’s poem (and Russell’s despatches) emphasises the general thirst for military information in mid-Victorian Britain and this was also reflected in 1850s France. The Crimea (see Map 5) was hugely important for public awareness of battles, too.\textsuperscript{88} It produced the Victoria Cross, Britain’s premier medal for extraordinary gallantry;\textsuperscript{89} there was much nationwide attention given to the first distribution of Victoria Crosses on 26 June 1856 to sixty-one recipients, and 522 had been awarded by 1914.\textsuperscript{90} Arguably, this followed the tradition established by Napoleon I with the establishment of the Légion d’Honneur in May 1802 for distinguished military and civil service. Open to ordinary soldiers, sailors and civilians, it was awarded in five grades, usually with great ceremony and remains France’s premier decoration.\textsuperscript{91}

Case Study of Russian Battlefield Tourism.

Early battlefield commemoration also developed in European Russia. On the field of Borodino (fought 7 September 1812) the widow of one of the Russian commanders first built a house in 1817, then a church, on the spot where her husband had died. A tradition sprung up of celebrating each anniversary of the battle with a procession and the last rites near the hastily-dug soldiers’ burial pits. The Church, which remains preserved today (and is a throwback to the battlefield churches of a much earlier
period in England), became the first monument at Borodino to commemorate the dead.  

By 1839 a formal state-sponsored memorial was built at the site of the Raevsky Battery, the highest point on the battlefield, and dedicated in the presence of Nicholas I and 120,000 troops. Christopher Duffy has noted that ‘monuments began to sprout on the battlefield of Borodino, and in 1867, Tolstoy visited an already well-marked site when he was gathering material for his epic novel War and Peace.’

By the Centenary celebrations (1912), some 33 monuments commemorating the various regiments and
units of the Russian Army had been erected. The following year (1913) the French Government was allowed to build a granite obelisk to the dead of la Grande Armée at the Schewardino Redoubt, Napoleon’s main command post during the battle, and where high-ranking French officers were buried immediately afterwards. Writing in 1972, Duffy wryly observed of Borodino that ‘the field is best described as a kind of Russian Gettysburg, part national shrine and part tourist attraction, complete with notice boards, monuments, souvenir stalls and vehicle parks…’

**Conclusion.**

Inspired by this third wave of anniversary and glorification of the past, increasing numbers of people started to visit historical sites of battle and heroism that they had read about. Battlefield visitors became the curious – tourists, driven by nostalgia - unless specifically next-of-kin. Meeting their needs came in two forms – monuments, and (eventually) preserved battlefields. With this purpose in mind, it can be argued that earlier battlefield pilgrimage opened the door to Twentieth Century battlefield tourism. Hints of this development could already be seen with the popularity of the wax figures of Madame Marie Tussaud (1761-1850), where military heroes, such as Nelson and Wellington featured prominently in her displays, and the popularity of Captain William Siborne’s (1797-1849) models of the battle of Waterloo. His first model (now in the National Army Museum) went on display in October 1838 in the Egyptian Hall in Piccadilly, London and a detailed guidebook was published at the same time; it later toured the country, and over 100,000 people paid to see it. A second, smaller model was
The appeal of battleground tourism (for government and people) now begins to make some sense. Not only was there a long historical and spiritual precedent for pilgrims visiting battlefields, but latterly (from the early Nineteenth Century onwards), tourists were lured to battlegrounds, driven by waves of intense interest in history and contemporary military affairs (whether war with Napoleonic France, threatened war with France from the late 1850s, or other, distant wars in the Crimea, United States, France (1870), South Africa, or the Western Front after 1918). These developments and more are neatly captured in a 2006 review of Consuming Passions: Leisure and Pleasure in Victorian Britain (2006), which commented that:

‘…The Victorians changed the world. They also changed the way they lived in it…Their was an age when the benefits of industrialisation were reaped with extraordinary energy and enthusiasm: an age of innovation…and, above all, prosperity. Prosperity brought many things, but most of all it brought time. And time brought Leisure with a capital L. Over the course of the 19th Century, a whole new world opened up to an ever-growing section of the population – a world of retail choice, of travel for pleasure, of cultural and sporting diversion…’

In the Twentieth Century, this battleground visiting habit increased with the availability of media images and the sight and sounds of the war, communicated through photography, cinema news reels and feature films, radio broadcasts, photojournalism and ultimately television; (today, we might add the internet). It is also worth observing that the ease of intra-country travel must have begun to assist tourists in comparing what they read in print or saw on film, with the reality of the battlefields they witnessed on their
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tours.\textsuperscript{98} It can be argued that military tourism (and its cousin, heritage tourism) are linked inextricably to interpretations of history, politics, and identity. Thus, the opening of any kind of historic site to visitors can help create a collective memory of the past and help to forge a nation or culture’s understanding of its present and therefore, future direction.

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\item \url{www.electricscotland.com/history/highlands/index.htm}, accessed 20 November 2004. The Culloden memorials now evident are all 20th Century creations. Visits by the author, October 1996, August 2000, and August 2002. There was also a curious link between Culloden and a battlefield memorial on the Somme (1916). On the edge of High Wood is a cairn to the 1/9th Highland Light Infantry, that commemorates the 192 Glasgow Highlanders killed here on 15 July 1916. Built in 1972, its form is derived from a Scottish Highland custom that required each warrior going into battle to add a stone to a pile, each survivor removing one afterwards; the remaining stones representing the number of casualties. The cairn in France is made up of 192 stones hand-picked from the fields around Culloden and, symbolically, is exactly 5 feet 7 inches high - the minimum height for recruitment to that battalion. See Martin & Mary Middlebrook, \textit{The Somme Battlefields} (London: Penguin books 1994), pp.170-1, and \textit{Major and Mrs Holt’s Guide to the Somme} (Barnsley: Leo Cooper revised edition 2003), p.566.
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\end{enumerate}
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passed back and forth through eastern France...’ See Edward Ryan, *Paper Soldiers. An Illustrated History of Printed Paper Armies of the 18th, 19th and 20th Centuries* (London: Golden Age Editions 1995), p.13. Flat metal and paper soldiers that slotted into bases (and their accoutrements such as horses, cannon, bands, wagons and tents) gained in popularity, with the industrial revolution enabling mass production; they remained finely-produced, hand-painted figures of great accuracy, originally serving as toys for the young children of affluent families throughout Europe, who used them to replicate battles. This anticipated the start of many a military career, in battles to and fro across the nursery floor - notably that of Winston Churchill, who recorded in *My Early Life* (1930), ‘...I was now embarked on a military career. This orientation was entirely due to my collection of soldiers. I had ultimately nearly fifteen hundred. They were all of one size, all British, and organized as an infantry division with a cavalry brigade...’ (Winston S. Churchill, *My Early Life*, London: Odhams Press 1963 edition), pp. 24-5. James Opie states that flat tin armies gave way to lead soldiers, made from a hollow-cast technique devised by William Britain in 1893. ‘Nuremberg’ (i.e. flat) model soldiers were incorporated into Prussian *kriegsspielen* at an early stage, with strict ratios (depending on the scenario) of one to five, ten or thirty, at military academies from the early 1800s. (James Opie, *British Toy Soldiers: 1893 to the Present. An illustrated Reference Guide for Collectors*, London: Arms and Armour Press 1985).

In 1793 Robert Barker had invented and patented the idea of a huge, 360-degree painting, that literally surrounded the viewer, which he named a *Panorama* (the first use of the term), to be displayed in a purpose-built rotunda. Visitors bought a programme containing a verbal description and a fold-out plan of the circular painting on canvas, highlighting its main features. In his Leicester Square rotunda, Barker displayed the *Battle of Agincourt Panorama* in 1805, whilst in 1814, the 12-page brochure for Barker’s latest extravaganza read: ‘Hurry, Hurry - Come See the Patriotic Panorama!’ Description of A View of the Battle of Vittoria, and the great victory gained by the Marquis of Wellington over the French army under Joseph Bonaparte, now exhibiting in Henry Aston Barker’s Panorama, Leicester Square’. By early 1816, the Barkers were charging visitors sixpence apiece to see their newly-commissioned *Battlefield of Waterloo Panorama*. Their Panoramas (and those of other rival entrepreneurs) became one of London’s best-known attractions for over sixty years, lasting well beyond the Crimean War; the key to their success was apparently to change the canvas at least every year, in response to contemporary affairs; not infrequently the subjects were battles, reflecting a public thirst for military matters. Specialists firms of artists developed, skilled in painting giant panoramas; judging by the best-known surviving Panoramic painting (at Waterloo), the vivid canvasses seem to have been the next best thing to visiting an actual battlefield – beyond the bounds of possibility for most. Barker and his son made a great deal of money from the Panorama idea, which was extensively copied throughout Europe and the Americas. See Bernard Comment, *The Panorama* (London: Reaktion Books 1999) which contains many illustrations of Nineteenth Century military panoramas. The idea eventually gave rise to the Cyclorama, where the panorama moved slowly around the static visitors. Effectively, Panoramas and Cycloramas were ‘virtual’ battlefield excursions; three battlefield panoramas have somehow survived and are located at Waterloo, Gettysburg and Borodino.


17 His paintings, sketches and photographs were the subject of an exhibition at the Musée d’Orsay in 2004.


21 Several major monuments were erected in Nelson’s honour long before the famous statue in Trafalgar Square (built 1840-43); these include ones at Glasgow (1806), Dublin (1808), Birmingham and Montreal.
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(both 1809) and Great Yarmouth (started before his death, completed in 1819). See also Simon Schama, A History of Britain Volume 3 The Fate of Empire 1776-2000 (London: BBC Books 2002), pp. 112-115.

22 Lt-Col Gordon was mortally wounded by a cannon ball. The memorial erected by his family consists of a fluted column standing on the only patch of ground which retained its original height before the construction of the Lion Mound. Access is given by a stone stair of 23 steps. Last visited by the author, October 2005.

23 Andrew Roberts, Napoleon and Wellington (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2001). This author possesses an ‘inhabitants’ pass ticket’, issued to an ancestor of his for the ‘Funeral of F.M. the DUKE OF WELLINGTON’, allowing ‘the Bearer through the Barriers, on foot, to No. 82 Fleet Street, up to the hour of Eight O’CLOCK’, issued by ‘DW Harvey, Commissioner of Police of the City of London, City Police Office, Nov. 18, 1852.’ This underlines the extent of the preparations for crowd control, more reminiscent of the Twentieth than the mid-Nineteenth Century.

24 Simon Schama, A History of Britain Volume 3, op cit, pp. 109-110. Also relevant here are Geoffrey Cousins’ The Defenders. A History of the British Volunteer (London: Frederick Muller 1968) which traces a long pedigree of British volunteer forces, observing that in the absence of conscription, the public enthusiasm for drilling and wearing uniform in times of crisis was much greater than it otherwise might have been, even if the professionalism was lacking. Ian F.W. Beckett’s Riflemen Form! A Study of the Rifle Volunteer Movement 1859-1908 (Aldershot: The Ogilby Trusts 1982) analyses a later wave of patriotic volunteering. He observes that the Volunteer movement rose in strength from 161,000 in 1861 to a peak of 288,000 in 1901 (during the Boer War) and that for much of this period 1:100 of the population wore uniform as an auxiliary soldier. These later waves of patriotic enthusiasm also fuelled interest in military affairs and no doubt contributed to Volunteer officers visiting Waterloo and elsewhere. Books such as Brevet-Major G.F.R. Henderson’s The Campaign of Fredericksburg, November-December 1862: A Study for Officers of Volunteers (London: K. Paul, Trench, and Company, 1886) surely also reflected and stimulated battlefield visiting habits.

25 I am indebted to Professor Anthony Grayling of Birkbeck College, London, for reminding me of Southey’s poem in this context. See W.A. Speck, Robert Southey, Entire Man of Letters (London: Yale University Press 2006).


27 Robert Southey, The Poet’s Pilgrimage to Waterloo (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown 1816)

28 In 1828, Gordon (a noted socialist) published A Companion for the Visitor at Brussels with Notes of a Tour in Italy (London: Hunt and Clarke, 1828), 198pp, which included notes on Waterloo.


30 Walter Scott, The Field of Waterloo; A Poem (Edinburgh; Printed by James Ballantyne and Co. For Archibald Constable and Co. Edinburgh; And Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, and John Murray, London, 1815). There was an initial run of 6,000 copies which appeared on 23 October 1815. The poem sold well and went into a third edition by the end of year


32 Written between 1812-1818.

33 Joanna Baillie, A Collection of Poems, Chiefly Manuscript, and from Living Authors, Edited for the Benefit of a Friend (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1823). ‘Lines written on the Field of Quatre Bras, 1821’ appears on pages 242-4, but is unattributed.

34 Stendhal was the pen-name of the Frenchman Henri-Marie Beyle (1783-1842).


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comprehensive 32-page index. The Introduction is a major work in itself, extending to 100 pages or nearly half the book. Cotton’s account of the battle takes up 57 pages and is a general history rather than personal reminiscence. Although much involved in the fighting (he had a horse shot from under him), Cotton makes little reference to his own experiences. His work was warmly received when it first appeared and is a well-written and graphic account. There are many footnotes: both in the original text and those added by the editor, explained in detail in Part ‘C’.

30 Sir Richard Hussey Vivian, later 1st Baron Vivian of Truro (1775-1842), who commanded 6/Cavalry Brigade at Waterloo. Cotton served in the 7th Hussars of 5/Cavalry Brigade.

31 Quoted in Cotton, A Voice, op cit. It has not so far been possible to identify which edition, but The Naval & Military Gazette and Weekly Chronicle of the United Service was published weekly in London from 1833 – 1886. Cotton was buried in the grounds of Hougoumont Chateau, until his grave was relocated in 1890.


33 A Sketch of the Battle of Waterloo To Which Are added Official Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington; Field Marshal Prince Blücher; And Reflections on the Battles of Ligny & Waterloo (Brussels: Gerard 1842). In the Library of the East India Club, St James’s Square, London.

34 See Piers Rendon, Thomas Cook: 150 years of Popular Tourism, London: Secker & Warburg, 1991, Chapter Two; also Edmund Swinglehurst, Cook’s Tours: The Story of Popular Travel, Poole, Dorset: Blandford Press, 1982. Ironically, by 1884 Thomas Cook was creating battlefields as well as visiting them, for in this year, he arranged to transport a force of 18,000 men up the Nile to relieve General Charles Gordon.

35 David W Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, op cit, p. 20.


37 Mackay, Memoirs, op cit, p. 702.

38 Mackay was also reflecting a growing Nineteenth Century mood that it was ordinary people that made and influenced history, not just monarchs and the few touched by greatness, or political and religious ideas. The appearance of commemorative obelisks to iconic leaders, referred to earlier, also supports this thesis. This trend is best emphasised by the appearance of two national institutions commemorating the achievements of ‘ordinary’ individuals. The first was the founding of the National Portrait Gallery in London (1856), whilst the second was the arrival of Volume One of the Dictionary of National Biography, published in London on 1 January 1885. Hugely popular, successive volumes appeared quarterly until Midsummer 1900, when the initial series closed with Volume 63. Both gallery and dictionary included a considerable number of soldiers and sailors; additionally other notable public figures were often portrayed in military (or quasi-military) uniform.

39 Mackay, op cit, pp. 701-2.


became Professor of History at King’s College, London in 1840 and in 1860 Chief Justice of Ceylon, when he was knighted.

52 The comic operetta \textit{The Pirates of Penzance} by Sir Arthur Sullivan (music) and Sir William Gilbert (libretto) was first performed in 1879.

53 The publishing history appears in the author’s illustrated (1905) edition, published by Macmillan.

54 Architecture, too, reflected a new love affair with the past, especially Augustus Welby Pugin’s (1812-1852) Gothic Revival, inspired by the builders and craftsmen of the Fourteenth Century. He harked back to a ‘lost’ mediaeval world of virtue, grace and integrity in sympathy with Carlyle, the great Victorian art historian, John Ruskin (1819-1900) and designer William Morris (1834-96). Pugin joined Sir Charles Barry (1795-1860) in redesigning the Houses of Parliament which had been burned down in 1834, and many country houses in a self-conscious historical style, which looked back, not forwards.

55 The military, militia and yeomanry were frequently called upon to quell unrest, until the establishment of the Metropolitan Police (date) and county constabularies (dates).

56 \textit{Richard III} is assessed to be one of Shakespeare’s earliest plays, written c. 1592 and first published in 1602.

57 \textit{Henry V} was first performed in 1599.

58 Details from the RUSI website, \url{http://www.rusi.org/}, accessed 14 July 2006.


61 Alan Rogers, \textit{This Was Their World: Approaches to Local History} (London: BBC Books 1972), pp.222-237.

62 The American Historical Association (AHA) was founded in 1884 and incorporated by Act of Congress in 1889. See its website, \url{http://www.historians.org/}, accessed 14 July 2006.

63 Of equal relevance is that many English county archaeological or history societies trace their foundation dates to the mid Nineteenth Century, including the Cambridge Antiquarian Society (1840), the Archaeological and History Societies of Oxfordshire (1839), Lincolnshire (1844), Suffolk (1848), Essex (1852), Leicestershire (1855) and Shropshire (1877), and the Archaeology Societies of Sussex (1846), Norfolk (1846), Chester (1849), Surrey (1854), Worcestershire (1854), Kent (1857), Yorkshire (1863) and Berkshire (1871).

64 The military, militia and yeomanry were frequently called upon to quell unrest, until the establishment of the Metropolitan Police (date) and county constabularies (dates).


66 Visit by this author May 2001.

67 This originated from an international conference, ‘Ancient Battlefields as National Treasures’ held at Leicester University in 1991. Plans to bisect the perfectly preserved battlefield of Naseby with a motorway link in 1992 acted as a spur and in 1993 the Battlefields Trust was registered as a charity. See the Battlefields Trust website, \url{http://www.battlefieldstrust.com/history.asp}, accessed 9 July 2006.
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As Simon Schama has wryly noted of the early Nineteenth Century: ‘…It was exactly at this moment [during the war with Napoleonic France] that the mythology of Merrie England, of the sceptred isle, was born, complete with especially passionate revivals of the appropriate shakespeare histories. Anything [Schama’s emphasis] historical found an enthusiastic following, a market, as now, perhaps for the first time, the past became a pastime, but a serious pastime – a way to discover Britishness…Meeting the craving to make contact with the ancestors, books on historical costume, furniture, sports, weapons and armour all appeared. After the great authority on mediaeval arms and armour, Samuel Rush Meyrick, was invited by George IV to reorganize the collection at Windsor Castle so that phantom knights could be stood beneath the big histories painted by Benjamin West, an entire generation of country gentlemen went to their barns and attics to clean the rust off ancient swords and helms and reassembled them in their newly Gothicized ‘Great Hall’. As well as the chronicle of their own war, history had become patriotic entertainment…’ See Simon Schama, A History of Britain Volume 3: The Fate of Empire 1776-2000 (London: BBC Books 2002), pp.110-112.

Although the London Gazette ran throughout this period (first published in 1665, remains in print today) consider, for example, that of the classic reference books, Burke’s Peerage and Landed Gentry began in 1826, Dodd’s Parliamentary Companion in 1832, Bradshaw’s Railway Timetables date from 1839, as does Hart’s Quarterly Army List; Kelly’s Directories of the provinces commenced in 1845, Who’s Who in 1848, Wisden’s Cricketers Almanac in 1864, whilst Whittaker’s Almanac was first published in 1868; and of the classic, log-running periodicals of era valuable to historians today, Punch Magazine commenced in 1841, the Illustrated London News, the following year, The Economist in 1843 and The Field in 1856. The most immediate method for the transmission of military information was newspapers; their circulation increased after the reduction of newspaper duty to one penny in 1836 and climbed rapidly after its abolition in 1855. Different interpretations of history arose through the 19th Century, but they all contributed towards a fascination with the past. Firmly refuting history as the triumph of individuals, the ‘Whig view’ of history instead saw the triumph of ideas taking events from an imperfect past to a more perfect present, and this school of thought was largely sponsored by the M.P. Thomas Babington (later Lord) Macaulay (1800-59), who had been Secretary of State for War in 1839. His three volumes of Critical and Historical Essays (1843) and five-volume History of England from the Accession of James II (1848-61) sold extremely well; volumes One and Two of his History of England sold over 13,000 copies in four months; volumes Three and Four sold 26,500 copies in ten weeks. Other prolific historians and biographers of influence, such as Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), John Ruskin (1819-1900) and the Rev. John Richard Green (1837-83), whose four-volume Short History of the English People (1874) had run to six editions by 1907, encouraged greater understanding and enquiry into the past, which had an effect on how battles and battlefields were visited and interpreted.

Raymond Chapman, The Sense of the Past in Victorian Literature, (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p.11. The Times, 11 November 1890, quoted in the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, Vol. LII, March 1908, pp. 305-308. This author has visited La Albuera battlefield four times between 2000-2004. Haythornthwaite, op cit., p.355. Major T.J. Holland & Captain H.M. Hozier, The Record of the Expedition to Abyssinia (London: HMSO 1870) Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879, Prepared by the Intelligence Branch of the Quartermaster’s Department (London: HMSO 1881) The first had been Rules and Regulations for the Movements of His Majesty’s Infantry (1792). Anniversaries of battles were nothing new, although probably a 19th Century phenomenon. Whilst Punch magazine (founded 1841) observed the fiftieth anniversary of Waterloo, devoting a whole page cartoon to ‘The Golden Wedding; Or, Fifty Years’ Jubilee of Peace’ on 18 June 1865, there is no evidence of British troops commemorating the 50th anniversary of Waterloo on the battlefield. Haythornthwaite, op cit., p.341. Written at Farringford, Freshwater, Isle of Wight in October 1854, as Tennyson read newspaper accounts of the battle. Original manuscript in the University of Virginia Special Collection. William Howard Russell (1821-1907) was an Irish journalist working for The Times in Ireland, serving as their parliamentary reporter from 1843. With the outbreak of the Crimean War (1854), he was sent by his paper as a special correspondent to the British forces, and his despatches via telegraph from there were enormously significant: this was the first time the public could read about the reality of warfare within a
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day or two of the event. (Wellington, for example had written his own despatches from the Peninsular, which took up to six weeks, and Waterloo, which took four days). Public opinion, stirred by Russell’s ground-breaking reporting led the Government to improve the standard of care for British troops on operations. He was close to Lord Raglan, whom he avoided criticising, but was disliked by Codrington, who became commander in 1855. Russell’s despatches from the Crimea will remain his most enduring legacy as, for the first time, he brought the realities of war, both good and bad, home to readers. Thus he helped to diminish the distance between the home front and remote battle fields, which may have stimulated more interest in battlefield visiting (though probably not to the Crimea). Russell left Crimea in December 1855; in 1856 he was sent to Moscow to describe the coronation of Tsar Alexander II, and in the following year went to India where he witnessed the siege of Lucknow (1858). In 1861 Russell observed the US Civil War, returning in 1863; he retired as a battlefield correspondent in 1882, stood unsuccessfully as a Conservative candidate for Parliament, and founded the Army and Navy Gazette. He was knighted in May 1895.

87 ‘The Charge of the Light Brigade’ was first included in Maud and Other Poems (London: Edward Moxon 1855).

88 It was also the Crimean War that brought cigarettes to Britain, when soldiers and sailors returned with a new style of smoking tobacco in tissue paper, shown to them by their Turkish and French allies and Russian prisoners of war. There has always been a close association between tobacco and soldiering. As many have observed, the nicotine acts as an appetite supplement, keeps servicemen awake when they are drowsy, a cigar, cigarette or pipe gives a soldier something to fiddle with in times of anxiety (a modern equivalent would be an executive’s ‘stress-ball’) and the act of lighting cigarettes, often at night, gives troops a much-needed moment of intimacy and comradeship, though accompanied by risk. Tobacco and cigarettes particularly became objects for barter, hugely necessary in a military environment, shorn of the consumables of civilian life and are an international sign of friendship, common to all cultures. Primarily an urban and military vice during the preceding decade (the word cigarette dates from 1842) in France, after the Crimea, cigarettes soon challenged the era of snuff, pipes and cigars, and Bond Street shops in London began soon to hand-roll and promote the new habit. The first cigarette factory was established by Robert Gloag in London in 1856 and Chris Mullen has noted in Cigarette Pack Art that the first surviving Nineteenth Century cigarette packets most frequently included military names. These included Lusby’s Iron Duke, inspired by the Duke of Wellington; Martin’s Glory Boys (which depicted a Victoria Cross); Archer’s Zouaves (French colonial troops on the packet); Player’s Navy Cut, Cope’s Man of War and Lambert and Butler’s Gunboat (all with naval illustrations); and Smith’s Forage Cap (which depicted military uniforms). Military imagery on packets also inspired pre-First World War cigarette sales, when the smoking habit was at its peak. For example, Ogden’s Guinea Gold and Wills’ United Services both featured Field Marshal Lord Roberts and later Lord Kitchener. Nathan’s British Heroes and Player’s Drumhead also date from this patriotic, militaristic era which was echoed in Germany, America and France, where the winged, Gallic war helmet (still evident today) first appeared on a packet of Gauloises before 1914. Cigarette cards (first introduced by WD and HO Wills in 1886) were offered by most manufacturers from 1888 featured military badges, flags uniforms, heroes and warships, and in their ‘golden age’ (1900-17), such cards were obsessively military. In other words, in the precise era when smoking was developing as a new, glamorous habit with mass appeal, it was very closely associated with the military – a reflection of and further stimulus to the widespread public interest in military affairs and battles. This would result in Princess Mary’s despatch of 335,000 embossed brass cigarette boxes (containing 20 cigarettes, a pipe, an ounce of tobacco, lighter and a card) to all British Empire troops on active service for Christmas 1914. However, it was not just cigarette advertising that hijacked the military. This was an era when everything from Camp Coffee Essence, Bovril, Cadbury’s Cocoa and Bird’s Custard Powder to Huntley & Palmer’s Biscuits, Keen’s Mustard, Bryant & May’s Safety Matches and Victory Lozenges enlisted a soldier or two in their artwork to promote their consumables to a patriotic marketplace. See Chris Mullen, Cigarette Pack Art (London: Galley Press 1979).

89 As Stanley Weintraub has observed in Albert, Uncrowned King (1997), although it was Victoria who desired the medal, ‘...it was the methodical Albert [who] designed it and composed the Royal Warrant, which referred to “officers or men who have served Us in the presence of the enemy and then shall have performed some signal act of valour or devotion to their country”...’ Significantly it was the Nineteenth Century which saw British campaign medals awarded to all who had served in a particular war, with bars
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for specific battles (previously the state awarded gold medals to senior officers and some limited-distribution private medals were also struck). The first was the Waterloo Medal, initiated by Wellington, and issued in 1816-17; the Military General Service Medal was for the 29 separate engagements of the Peninsular War, but only granted in 1847 and issued to surviving soldiers the following year. There was a Crimean Medal, authorized in 1854 whilst the war was in progress. The relevance of these awards was the status they bestowed on the recipients, who could (and as early lithographs and photographs suggest, did) wear them with pride in public. Thus there was heightened awareness of war in Victorian England via the medal-wearers and the associated ceremonies when they were awarded. See Stanley Weintraub, *Albert, Uncrowned King* (London: John Murray 1997), p. 325.

- Details of all medals and awards from Captain H. Taprell Dorling DSO, RN, *Ribbon and Medals, Naval, Military, Air Force and Civil* (London: George Philip & Son Ltd 1916; numerous editions since), pp.20-23; 53-5; 58 and 64.


- The widow was Margarita Michailovna, wife of Maj-Gen. A. A. Touchkov of the Second Army of the West, who immediately started to search for the body of her husband, but between November 1812-May 1813, the local militia were also – when the winter snows permitted - burying the dead, afraid of disease spreading from the estimated 50,000 men and 36,000 horses that then lay on the battlefield. Consequently her husband was never found, but she was so devastated by what she saw that she sold all her estates and property and in 1817, built a house where she was told her husband had been killed. Her church dates from 1820 and later became the Borodino Convent. In 1961 the battlefield became an official museum-reserve, administered and protected by the Russian Government; today, it contains nearly 68 square miles of protected land and buildings, including some 300 recreated military positions and fortifications, bearing explanatory plaques, and monuments, along with a museum in Borodino village. Footage Farm Ltd also has some very early Russian newsreel footage that shows Nicholas II attending the 1912 centenary celebrations at Borodino. See ‘Borodino 190 – that Great Battle under the Walls of Moscow’, article by Eman Vovsi, in the *Napoleon Series Review* (an online magazine reviewing books, magazines, miniatures, games, periodicals, web sites and CD ROMs currently in and out of print on the Napoleonic era), at: http://www.napoleon-series.org/reviews/c_reviews.html, accessed 17 July 2006. Annual Borodino re-enactments each September have become very popular indeed since the advent of glasnost in the late 1980s.

- Christopher Duffy, *Borodino and the War of 1812* (London: Seeley, Service & Co Ltd 1972), pp.163-4; I am grateful to Toby Macleod Esq for bringing this volume to my attention.


- In France, Tussaud had created wax death masks of the Revolution’s prominent victims. Apparently, she would search through corpses to find the decapitated heads of the citizens which the death masks were to depict. Unable to return to France after a visit to London in 1802, she travelled throughout Great Britain with her collection of wax sculptures, eventually establishing a permanent museum in Baker Street. See Teresa Ransom, *Madame Tussaud: A Life and A Time* (Stroud, UK: Sutton, 2003).

- The large model incorporates 75,000 small tin figures (1 figure for every 2 soldiers), each one about 10mm high and hand-painted with absolute regimental accuracy. See Peter Hofschroer, *Wellington’s Smallest Victory: The Duke, the Model Maker and the Secret of Waterloo* (London: Faber & Faber 2004).


- Sometimes this gap between perception and reality was shockingly wide; for example in an oft-quoted story, when Lt-Gen. Sir Launcelot Kiggell (Haig’s Chief of Staff of the British Armies in France, 1915-18) visited the muddy, corpse-ridden morass of the Third Ypres battlefield in 1917, he allegedly broke down in tears, exclaiming, ‘Good God, did we really send men to fight in that?’ The story illustrated the fact that Haig’s staff (allegedly) rarely visited the battlefields on which they sent troops to fight. The tale may indeed be apocryphal, but was perceived by many to be the truth and has been repeated by writers, including JFC Fuller and Leon Wolff (Leon Wolff, *In Flanders Fields* (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1958) and a review of it in *Time Magazine* 13 October 1958). Haig and his staff did visit the terrain before battles, but some staff officers and headquarters personnel would not have done, so observations of the perception/reality ‘gap’ remain valid.
‘If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth, and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead’

*Carl von Clausewitz* 1832

**CHAPTER FOUR**

**From Clausewitz to Cook**

**German Staff Training**

In Clausewitz’s *Principles of War* (1812), the Prussian military philosopher had written, ‘…Only the study of military history is capable of giving those who have no experience of their own a clear picture of what I have just called the friction of the whole machine…’. The proximity of key battlefields (where large numbers were involved or history was shaped) to cities virtually dictated that local soldiers would acquire the habit of visiting them professionally, and it should therefore come as no surprise that a central European power, Prussia (surrounded – in her eyes at least – by numerous foes), developed the idea of visiting process and that the Americans (with their numerous Civil war battlefields) continued them. Walter Görlitz notes that as president of the *Militärakademie* from 1801, amongst the reforms that Gerhard Scharnhorst (1755-1813) introduced were ‘staff journeys’ for staff officers. They were begun sometime after 1809, dropped in the euphoria of a peaceful post Napoleonic era, but the practice was
revived by Friedrich Karl, Freiherr von Müffling on his appointment as Chief of the General Staff in 1821. According to Görlitz, Müffling’s staff journeys reflected the anxiety that Prussia might be attacked by a coalition of enemies on several fronts. Certainly, between 1858 and 1869, Helmuth von Moltke, as Chief of Staff of the Prussian General Staff introduced annual staff rides – stabsreisen - that considered hypothetical situations, based upon possible plans of operations against Prussia’s enemies. These were staff training activities and not necessarily tours of battlefields per se, but explored the same themes as would be encountered in war, over wide areas of suitable territory (potential battlefields, some of which in time became actual battlefields; Gumbinnen, Metz and the Ardennes are a good examples of this). The point was that this type of exercise was training staff officers, who in order to appreciate every aspect of a campaign, were required to remain mobile, in other words ride (as did all field-grade officers and above, in any case). Sitting atop a mount brought the rider not only status and much-needed mobility, but elevated him so as to gain a significantly different view of the terrain. Staff rides were as much about teaching the officer to acquire a military eye for the ground as practising them in staff work or tactics. The concept was exported to Britain and the US surprisingly late, as Moltke’s mounted rides were translated as Moltke’s Tactical Problems From 1858-1882 and published in London in 1903.

In early Nineteenth century Prussia, staff rides did not stand alone, but were incorporated by Müffling into annual cycles of war games – kriegsspielen - using sand tables, where integrated staff solutions of real and hypothetical problems, combined with horseback examination of historical battlefields tested junior officers’ tactical sense,
initiative and leadership. The extraordinary run of victories that Prussian and German armies managed to achieve in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries, from triumphs over Napoleon at Leipzig (1813) and Waterloo (1815), to quick, decisive victories over Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870) and the stupendous efforts of both world wars are ascribed to the training of its officers, specifically its General Staff officers, all of whom undertook staff rides as part of their formal military education. Görlitz (in his early post-Second World War study, *History of the German General Staff*)\(^9\), identified the effect of the French Revolution on military thought amongst Prussian officers and the growth of huge citizen armies in the Napoleonic era, which required a specialised staff to handle and move them. Görlitz ascribes a long continuity to the Prussian/German General Staff and interprets the General Staff as becoming an institution for whom war became an end in itself.

Holger H. Hervig observed, ‘from Thomas Carlyle to Martin van Creveld, Prussian-German military prowess has attracted more than its share of homage from soldiers and military historians alike’.\(^{10}\) Studies either portray (prior to the formation of the *Bundeswehr* in 1955) how Prussian/German militarism went wrong, or how efficient it was. In both cases, academics and the military were searching for simple interpretations to either beware of in the future, or to harness against the Soviet war machine, should the need arise. John Wheeler-Bennett’s masterful study of 1954, *The Nemesis of Power, the German Army in Politics 1918-45*, contains three quotations in the introduction which underline the author’s view that Prussian/German militarism sprang from a long, aggressive tradition of which the *Wehrmacht* was the inheritor.\(^{11}\) Therefore,
early Cold War historians have tended to see the techniques used to train the key enablers of this aggressive tradition (i.e. the General Staff) as crucial to understanding the nature of German militarism itself. Revisionist historians question whether there is any actual continuity in German foreign and military policy and suggest that the Third Reich period (at least) was a ‘break’ with the past, rather than continuity\textsuperscript{12}.

**Wargaming.**

However, little has been written about the techniques of war games or the staff rides themselves, though all commentators agree on their importance. Post 1870, other armies began to model their officer education on the German-Prussian example, so effective had this proved, which included the introduction of formal, outdoor staff rides. Hans Georg Model acknowledged these antecedents in 1968,\textsuperscript{13} though his study only began with the post-First World War period, but his conclusion was that certain elements of the officer education – including the staff ride - were firmly grounded on older historical models that had proved their utility in war. Many other commentators have observed the continuity of Prussian/German officer training, including David Hall, who ascribes the birth of this process to the formal establishment of the Prussian *Kriegsakademie* in 1810.\textsuperscript{14} He argues that the staff ride was one device that grew out of the *kriegsspiel*, a strategy board game that itself evolved from chess.

Lt-Col. David Lee traced the evolution of chess from an Indian board game, via a warlike board game, devised in 1664 by Christopher Weikmann of Ulm, to the tactical sand table, which was introduced in Prussia in 1811 by Baron von Reisswitz and later
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developed by his son, both officers. The sand table was to a specific scale and was in effect a map grid. In his Master’s thesis, Col. Wilbur Gray has noted that Leutnant von Reisswitz introduced the concept to his contemporary Leutnant Helmuth von Moltke (of the Topographical Bureau) who founded a war game club (Kriegsspieler Verein) in 1828, which published its own periodical. When von Moltke became Chief of the Prussian General Staff in 1857, war-gaming and its associated concepts became enshrined in Prussian officer training on an annual basis. It was a small step to take the kriegsspiel outdoors, both to visit actual battlefields (as Frederick the Great had done) or test students with staff work problems in real terrain. Robert Foley observes that both war game and staff ride complemented one another as students witnessed theory nurtured in the classroom torn to pieces by Clausewitzian friction on real terrain and in war.

Andrew Wilson’s key survey of this subject, Wargaming (1968), was motivated by contemporary issues of simulating nuclear war. First published as The Computer and the Bomb, his first two chapters trace the evolution of war gaming in Prussia/Germany as a form of preparation for war. He recognises this is a crucial distinction, for in peacetime armies, activities such as the formal staff ride prepare those who have not experienced the Clausewitzian fog, chaos and friction of war, whereas post-war, students are analysing what they have already experienced. Staff rides are therefore a form of simulation, and as taught in Prussia, most often focused on war at the operational level. Wilson argues correctly that Moltke’s untried and relatively unorthodox methods were proven by the three wars of unification fought from 1864-70, whilst ‘the Prussian army was still learning its trade. But the wars against Austria (1866) and France (1870)
Moltke had achieved something more than walking old battlefields with men who had fought on them – he had learned how to *use* battlegrounds to train another generation.

It was the 1870 victory against another major power that made the world sit up and take notice of the Prussian army and its training methods. This victory was in part attributed (correctly) to the training of staff officers, as devised by von Moltke (the elder) during his lengthy time as Chief of the General Staff (1857-87). The Prussian General Staff system - inherited from Scharnhorst and developed by Gneisenau and Clausewitz - gave the General Staff quasi-autonomy within the much larger War Ministry. Entrance to the *Kriegsakademie* for the three-year course was by competitive examination (by contrast up to the First World War, many British candidates for Camberley were nominated for selection, rather than examined). Of the *Kriegsakademie*’s graduates (around a third of the 150 who had been admitted), the top twelve from each year’s class were selected for further training over two years as General Staff officers and were given an understanding of what later came to be called the operational level of war. After they had participated in the annual staff ride under the personal supervision of von Moltke (or his successors) three or four candidates only were made permanent members of the General Staff. Much of their operational perspective was attained via staff rides, as well as map exercises, war games and real-time large-scale manoeuvres. By 1870, most brigade and divisional commanders had studied under Moltke, as had all their Chiefs of Staff. The result was a hitherto unprecedented uniformity of doctrine within the Prussian senior command that went to war in 1870.
Staff Rides.

At this stage, the terminology of outdoor visits is confusing, as Col. Dominic R Sette has noted, in that war tours (kriegsreisen), staff tours (stabsreisen), training ground travels (übungsreisen im Gelände), tactical practice rides (taktischen übungsritten), tactical training walks (taktischen übungsgangen) battlefield studies and historical rides all refer to the same genre of activity.\(^{21}\) Translation of these terms into English in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries by the US and British armies further complicate the issue, with terminology including regimental tours\(^ {22}\), practice rides\(^ {23}\), practice tours\(^ {24}\), tactical walks\(^ {25}\) and staff tours\(^ {26}\), entering common currency, and all meaning roughly the same activity, usually away from an actual battlefield, unless the words ‘historical’ or ‘battlefield’ appear in the title. Whilst the English language is vague in its terminology for staff rides and battlefield tours, Germanic precision indicates the exact nature of each activity, if not necessarily on an actual battlefield. Staff rides were for staff officers and tactical rides for junior and non-staff officers. Rides were of short (one-to-three days) duration, tours were longer events, often exceeding a week in the saddle.\(^ {27}\) Arguably, the German staff ride tradition was even older. Herwig has observed how under Frederick William I (ruled 1713-40) the Prussians annually went through formal autumn or spring manoeuvres, beginning with staff work exercises.\(^ {28}\) Christopher Duffy in *Frederick the Great: A Military Life* has noted how his son, Frederick the Great (ruled 1740-86), in the 1730s walked the battlefield of Fehrbellin, ‘…where he sought to recreate the events of 1675 by walking the ground in the company of old men who had seen the Great Elector’s famous victory…’\(^ {29}\)
Carl von Clausewitz.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) is an important starting point for an assessment of the importance of a formalised education for military staff officers. Prior to the Prussian system, officers in general and staff officers particularly were of an enormous range of abilities and operated completely independently from one another, responding to the (often eccentric) whims of individual commanders, which hampered the coordination of forces on campaign.\(^{30}\)

Figure 4.1: Carl von Clausewitz; still considered influential enough in German history to merit a (West German) postage stamp on the 150\(^{th}\) anniversary of his death in 1981. (Source: author’s collection).

In the Napoleonic era (and into the Crimea for the British) the armies, corps and divisions of most countries were commanded by contradictory and rival personalities, who fought (or avoided combat), driven by different agendas. Their own staff officers (who were, in effect, little more than aides) reflected the competing visions of how their troops should operate on the battlefield, hence the novelty of successful, co-ordinated...
staff work in the Franco-Prussian war. Roger Parkinson’s biography outlines the impact Gerhardt von Scharnhorst, Clausewitz and Prince August von Gneisenau had on the Prussian army of their day, but does not examine the specifics of their reforms. Crucial to understanding the Clausewitz that emerges from Parkinson and from Michael Howard’s definitive translation of On War is the fact that his own experiences as an officer in the Prussian army shaped his writings and thought. He witnessed combat for the first time as an ill-prepared 13-year old infantry ensign (fahnenjunker) at the siege of Mainz (1793) and later at Auerstädt (1806), where he also observed the shoddy and confusing staff work that contributed towards a crushing Prussian defeat. His desire in promoting a military education that would better prepare his successors for war can be understood in this light.

In Chapter Two, the author observed that Hew Strachan, Robert Foley and Terence Zuber have shown how staff rides under Schlieffen and the younger Moltke, (see Figure 4.2, nephew of the architect of the 1870 victory) - immediately prior to the 1914-18 war - also became the vehicle for staff officers to work through possible alternatives in their annual revisions of Germany’s war plans. Thus, the term ‘staff ride’ to the German General Staff embraced more than just staff training in the open air; they were very large-scale TEWTs for future battles, as well. The time and resources devoted to staff rides by 1914 also reflects the size of the German General Staff at that time, which numbered some 650 officers. Both Foley and Zuber – who have opposing interpretations of the significance of these pre-war staff rides (see Chapter Two) - observe that Schlieffen (Chief of the German General Staff 1891- 1906) trained his officers in the field with both Denkshifts (studies) and Generalstabsreisen (rides for the
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General Staff), which changed every year between 1897-1905, as he considered the alternatives for fighting a war on two fronts.\(^{37}\) Whilst other nations had perceived some of the value of staff rides by 1914, it was unlikely that any realised that the Germans were also using them to test future offensive war plans.\(^{38}\) Ironically, this was the exact opposite of the use that Müffling had seen for staff journeys in the 1820s, when he saw them as an opportunity for Prussia to test her defensive plans against aggressive neighbours.\(^{39}\) Part of the early importance of staff rides is that they are also a measure of the wide overseas influence of German staff techniques, which spread outside Germany following the 1870 victory over France.\(^{40}\)

![Figure 4.2: Postcard of Helmuth von Moltke (1848-1916) ‘the younger’, when Chief of the General Staff. The fact that a CGS was featured on a postcard illustrates the importance of the post in contemporary German society. (Source: author’s collection)](image-url)
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American Staff Training.

Waves of Scots immigration to the United States carried a sense of history with them and in 1815, Dr. William McLean purchased and erected a memorial on the King’s Mountain battlefield, South Carolina (fought 7 October 1780). In 1825 the cornerstone of a monument at the Revolutionary War battleground of Bunker Hill, Massachusetts, (fought 17 June 1775) was laid with great ceremony on the 50th anniversary of the battle, although it was not completed and dedicated until 1843. An earlier private monument erected on the site in 1794 was in commemoration of ‘Dr. Joseph Warren, fallen patriot and mason’. Between 1876 and 1886, the US Congress allocated funds to erect monuments in seven States, observing the centenary of eight Revolutionary War (1775-1783) battlefields. Interestingly, it was the visit of former soldiers from Virginia and South Carolina to participate in the centennial celebrations for Revolutionary War battlefield of Bunker Hill in 1875 that led to the first Civil War reunions, where ‘veterans of both armies met for the sole reason of rejoicing that they were no longer foes’. Whilst Waterloo was perhaps the first battlefield anywhere to be consciously preserved, in 1886, the American Judge David Schenck (1835-1902) determined to buy the site of the battle of Guildford Courthouse, North Carolina (fought in 15 March 1781) ‘to redeem the battlefield from oblivion’ and formed a company which duly purchased thirty acres of former battlefield the following year. The company was formed,

‘…for the benevolent purpose of preserving and adorning the grounds on and over which the battle of Guildford Courthouse was fought… and the erection thereon of monuments, tombstones, or other memorials to commemorate the heroic deeds of the American patriots who participated in this battle for liberty and independence…’
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Glenn Small Homewood has observed that whilst C-in-C of the US Army (1869-1883), Gen. William T. Sherman (1820-91) encouraged his staff officers to return to the Civil War battlefields to work out what had happened in an engagement, get inside the minds of the field commanders and learn lessons that could be applied later. It was during his tenure as C-in-C that Sherman founded the School for Application of Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1881. US staff ride terminology is confusing and has altered over the years. The conduct of a staff ride on an actual battlefield was not, initially, necessary and the earliest designated ‘staff rides’ were not battlefield visits at all, but Tactical Exercises without Troops (TEWTs), occasionally conducted on battlefields - but this was not a requirement - the overall aim being to exercise staff officers on horseback, hence the original terminology. Homewood observes that until the battle of Normandy, Gettysburg was probably the most studied battlefield for staff ride purposes. The proximity of battlegrounds to military academies and training institutions – particularly those of the US Civil and Franco-Prussian wars – led to the staff ride and battlefield tour merging; the mix of staff training and military history at a single location was advanced by the setting up of America’s first national battlefield parks at the end of the Nineteenth Century. The original four parks established were Chickamauga and Chattanooga (1890), Shiloh (1894), Gettysburg (1895) and Vicksburg (1899). These parks, and others subsequently established, were to serve as lasting memorials to the armies of both North and South that had fought in the Civil War of 1861-4.

The four parks were each adjacent to war cemeteries, of which Gettysburg was perhaps the most famous. There, during the war, on 19 November 1863, the Soldiers’
National Cemetery was dedicated in a ceremony where Abraham Lincoln (1809-65) delivered his notable Gettysburg Address. The cemetery was completed in March 1864 when the last of 3,512 bodies were interred. Although termed a ‘national cemetery’ in May 1872, when its administration was transferred to the US War Department, it holds only Union dead. That the parks passed into the responsibility of the US Secretary of War was therefore not surprising, but significant, for Congress also passed a measure in 1896 that specified that the parks ‘...and their approaches [were] to be national fields for military maneuvers for the Regular Army of the United States and the National Guard of the States’. In connection with the national military parks scheme, on 14 February 1896, Representative John P. Tracey of Missouri made the connection between historical terrain and military education. In commending the battlefield of Chickamauga-Chattanooga Tracey said,

‘...as a theatre for military instruction, with its 10 square miles of battlefield and 40 miles of approaches, it can not be excelled. No other government owns such a theatre of notable engagements. A month’s campaigning for practical study on such a field of maneuvers by the Corps of West Point cadets, where lines of battles and the movements in the engagement of nearly every organization of each side have been ascertained and...marked with historical tablets...would be worth an entire course in textbooks on the strategy of a campaign and battle tactics...’

To assist this instruction, the US War Department erected hosts of plaques that described the units, their leaders, and their contributions. Veterans’ groups and many state governments also erected monuments, so that by the 1890s Gettysburg had one of the largest outdoor collections of bronze and granite statues anywhere in the world.

Virtually every Union regiment, battery, brigade, division or corps has a monument, generally placed where that unit made the greatest contribution (as judged by
The principal battles under examination are Gettysburg (Maryland); Antietam (also known as Sharpsburg, in West Virginia); Manassas (or Bull Run), Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, all in Virginia. The surrender took place at Appomattox. Source: *American Military History* (Washington DC: US Army CMH 1985), pp. 194-5.
the veterans themselves). Most also have markers placed to show their positions in defensive lines or for their assaults. There are fewer Confederate monuments on the battlefield, because the initial emphasis was to preserve the land on which the Union army fought, and the Southerners were reluctant to place monuments where the Union Army defeated them; former Confederate soldiers were also poorer than their Union contemporaries after the war, so instead they erected state monuments. The result is that there are over 1,600 monuments and markers on the field, making the battle easy to understand for soldiers and civilians alike. In 1933, control of the battlefields was surrendered by the War Department to the National Park Service of the US Department of the Interior, where it remains today.

In parallel with the post-Civil War US Army use of Gettysburg and other Civil War battle sites, a thriving tourist industry developed immediately. In the case of Gettysburg, this occurred even before the war had finished. Immediately after the battle, thousands of Northern relatives arrived in search of their dead and wounded; in their wake followed the curious. This was rarely the case with other battle sites, because most battlefields were located in the South, where civilians were engaged in fleeing from Northern troops, or had not the means to travel to the combat zones. Gettysburg was not only in Northern territory, but close to the capital, Washington, and the other major eastern cities which provided most of the Union forces. For this reason of proximity to a large urban area, after the war Gettysburg became the most popular tourist destination of all the US Civil War battlefields, in the manner of Waterloo, post 1815. The railway handbill, Figure 4.3 (below) illustrates this well, and dates from c.1888, the 25th
anniversary of Gettysburg. Tourism was aided by a railway spur constructed to the battleground, and three great reunions at the battlefield for the 25<sup>th</sup>, 50<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> anniversaries. Veterans of the US Civil War earned a living until the early 1900s escorting the curious around ‘their’ battlefields. For example, in November 1913, Capt. Arthur Lloyd-Baker in the Volunteer Battalion of the Buckinghamshire Light Infantry undertook his own private tour of the USA and Canada, spending two weeks visiting Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Harper's Ferry, Bull Run (Manassas) and Gettysburg, guided by those who had (supposedly) fought there fifty years earlier.

![Western Maryland Rail Road Advertising Handbill](image)

**Figure 4.3:** Western Maryland Rail Road advertising handbill, illustrating the tourist interest in Gettysburg battlefield. It dates from circa 1888, the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Gettysburg. (*Source: author’s collection*)
Figure 4.4: Gettysburg anniversary bibles that were issued to veterans, next-of-kin and US Army soldiers attending the 50th anniversary celebrations, which were led by Brig-Gen. Joshua Chamberlain, Medal of Honor winner, for his leadership of 20/Maine Regt. at Gettysburg. (Source: author’s collection).

Figure 4.5: The oldest printed evidence this author has seen of organised tourism to Gettysburg (1863) – a handbill of 1893 – though visits started as soon as the battle was over. (Source: author’s collection).
British Staff Training.

In the first Occasional Paper published by the Strategic & Combat Studies Institute (SCSI), Dr Brian Holden Reid in 1991 produced an important survey of war studies at the Camberley Staff College, 1890-1930. He contends that 1880-1914 was a golden intellectual era of British military education when Spencer Wilkinson’s In The Brain of an Army and the translation of The Duties of the General Staff by Bronsart von Schellendorf found wide circulation. The Staff College (Figure 4.6) was then limited to thirty places a year, but until the creation of the General Staff in 1906, there was little incentive to gain a place. Holden Reid observes that it was the Staff College lecturer Col. GFR Henderson who developed a justification for the study of military history ‘which has stood the test of time remarkably well. In his [Henderson’s] view, the study of the military past was both a substitute for actual experience of active service, and an aid to the understanding of the moral dimension of leadership…’ Henderson argued that military history lends the student the ability ‘to assume…the responsibilities of the leaders who were called upon to meet these situations; to come to a definite decision to test the soundness of that decision by actual event…’ Henderson’s historical output included his Campaign of Fredericksburg, November-December 1862: A Study for Officers of Volunteers, and The Battle of Spicheren August 6th 1870, and Events that Preceded it: A Study in Practical Tactics and War Training, which, as the titles suggest, were not military history for its own sake, but an attempt to use the past to study military leadership and other skills. A biographer of Henry Wilson (a future Commandant and CIGS) described Henderson as:
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‘a persuasive speaker… [who] exercised a profound and lasting effect on almost everyone who heard his lectures… His hero [Stonewall] Jackson made an instant appeal to Staff College students…Henderson soon succeeded in making him the most admired commander in British eyes since Napoleon, and a potent influence on Wilson [also Robertson, Rawlinson, Haig and Allenby] and his generation…’

William Robertson (another future Commandant and CIGS) later recalled ‘…“Hender” as he was familiarly known to us, was a past-master in his work, and his lovable and unselfish companionship was of itself a moral and professional education of life-long benefit. He was devoted to his pupils’; whilst James Edmonds (the future Official Historian) observed that on his arrival at the College in 1896,

‘Kipling’s Jungle Book had recently appeared, and we found that the Commandant, tall and gaunt and given to long walks by himself, was called “Achela”, the lone grey wolf;…Henderson, large and cheery [was known] as “Balu, the bear”…[he] was a really brilliant and unconventional lecturer: he never told us what we could read for ourselves in books, but tried to extract experiences, using the story as a basis. When lecturing on the Waterloo campaign, for instance, he suggested what “Stonewall” Jackson…would have done had he been Grouchy.’

Henderson seems to have been an innovative teacher, unconsciously employing and encouraging each stage of Kolb’s Concrete Experience (CE), Reflective Observation (RO), Abstract Conceptualisation (AC), and Active Experimentation (AE), cycle (discussed in Chapter One). After his death in 1903 a collection of his essays and lectures appeared under the title The Science of War, with an account of his life by FM Earl Roberts, who observed that the birth of Henderson’s outdoors teaching technique was established earlier in his career,

‘Henderson spent three most useful years at Sandhurst [1889-92]. His teaching was not limited to lectures in the classroom. A practical soldier himself, he felt that theory and practice should go hand in hand and that demonstrations in the field were necessary to the perfect
comprehension of his theoretical teaching; accordingly he obtained permission to take the cadets out skirmishing and patrolling...As at Sandhurst, so at the Staff College, Henderson introduced original methods of teaching. He added largely to the practical out-of-door work, and in his personally conducted tours to the battlefields of the campaigns upon which he had been lecturing, his intimate knowledge of the ground and his splendid memory for detail enabled him to describe to his auditors what actually took place, with a realistic directness which created a lasting impression on their minds’.  

The fact that it was one of the Empire’s foremost soldiers - FM Lord Roberts (who was not a Staff College graduate, but had won a VC in the Indian mutiny and whose son had just been awarded a posthumous VC in the recent Boer War)  - penning these words underlines not only how well Henderson was regarded but the extent to which Henderson’s teaching methods generally and his battlefield tours specifically had become accepted as mainstream officer education techniques.
Laudable though Henderson and his writings may have been, Duncan Anderson has drawn attention to the fact that his books seem also to have been an attempt to prove ‘the superiority of manoeuvre against every other operation of war’; his Fredericksburg book ignores the later attritional trench warfare (which included mining, tunnelling, trenches and cheveux-de-frise more commonly associated with the Great War) around Petersburg, whilst his work on the Franco-Prussian War, ‘stopped at 1 September 1870, with the capitulation of the French at Sedan, completely ignoring the fact…[that war continued] into the following spring’. It is indeed tempting to hijack Holden Reid’s further argument promoting military history - that in studying the higher levels of war, ‘military history offers a better vantage point than experience itself’ – when considering the immediate utility of staff rides. ‘The platform is loftier, and every phase of warfare from the marches of great armies to the forays of the guerrilla, come under observation…And in this process the application of the principles of war…becomes a matter of instinct’. Holden Reid suggests that practical experience, tracing cause and effect, ‘supplemented by staff rides, was of far greater value in Henderson’s opinion than the simply passive experience of listening to lectures’. The trouble was, Holden Reid concludes, that after Henderson’s premature death in 1903, ‘there was too much teaching of Military History for its own sake at Camberley, and no sustained effort was made to extract the lessons which might be applicable to modern war’. Yet a detailed examination of the Staff College archives suggests an alternative view.
The First Overseas Tour.

The Staff College mounted two different kinds of expeditions away from Camberley to enable its students to put theory into practice. The first of these were the ‘Staff Tours’ or ‘Staff Rides’ (the term appears to have been interchangeable), which commenced in 1895 - large scale TEWTs held in the United Kingdom - which were, as Brian Bond has observed, ‘…in imitation of a system of training that had been in vogue for years in Germany and has been called “the best means ever invented of teaching officers their duties in the field”…’. The other kind of major exercise was the annual battlefield tour. The Staff College practised staff work on staff rides in the United Kingdom, whilst the annual visit to the European battlefields was a separate activity more associated with military history. As there are no extant Staff College archives for this period, there is considerable debate as to when the first Staff College-organised battlefield tour took place, which is important for this thesis. Nick Evans asserts ‘it seems possible that Gen. Hamley began them during his period as Commandant (1870-77). Hamley as an instructor at Camberley 1859-65 made several Napoleonic battlefield tours and was keen to increase the course’s practical nature.’ Students also undertook these in their leave; Evans observes that Redvers Buller whilst a student at Camberley had made a tour of the 1870 battlefields as early as 1873, but in a private capacity. Yet, we know that the domineering Duke of Cambridge, C-in-C of the army (1856-1890) had taken against the Staff College and possibly, by extension, Hamley (indeed after his tour of Commandant at Camberley, Hamley received no military appointment until Wolseley secured the command of an army corps for him in the autumn manoeuvres of 1882), and thus the Duke would not have looked favourably on any attempt to extent
Camberley’s curriculum. The most likely contender as initiator of British military battlefield visiting seems to be Col. JF Maurice (a serving officer and published military historian), who was appointed Professor of Military Art and History at the Staff College in 1885, by his friend the Adjutant-General, Sir (later FM the Viscount and C-in-C of the army) Garnet Wolseley (1833-1913), who had commented, ‘the officer who has not studied war as an applied science, and who is ignorant of modern military history, is of little use beyond the rank of captain’.

Although there is no claim (according to his son’s biography of him) that Maurice himself, rather than Hamley, pioneered foreign tours as part of the Camberley syllabus, Jay Luvaas has observed that Maurice’s predecessor was ‘steady, persevering but uninspiring’ and that the well-connected Maurice (who had previously written military history, been an instructor at Sandhurst and had campaign experience) was appointed as a new broom, to improve the level of instruction. Whilst Commandant Hamley is credited with introducing the Prussian kriegsspiele concept to Camberley, and possibly also that other Prussian-inspired training method, the ‘staff ride’ (‘staff tour’, or TEWT) at the same time, it is not unreasonable also to assert that it was Maurice (not the ‘outcast’ Hamley) who initiated the first Camberley-organised battlefield tours in 1885 as the new professor. He certainly had plenty of external support (from Wolseley) for innovations like a foreign tour of Franco-Prussian battlefields, whilst the baleful influence of the Duke of Cambridge was on the wane. Maj-Gen. Sir John Adye (a contemporary of Horace Smith-Dorrien in 1887-8) later recalled of Maurice,

‘In my day there were only four military professors at the college, and of these the most accomplished was undoubtedly Col. Maurice, the
professor of military history, who had a great brain and great knowledge of the military art, but unfortunately, was not a good lecturer or at all easy to follow’.  

And yet, and yet. In his brief centenary *Story of the Staff College 1858-1958*, its Librarian, Lt-Col. FW Young asserts that ‘In 1881…the first battlefield tour took place; a party was conducted by Col. [Lonsdale] Hale to Metz and its neighbourhood’. Young does not cite his sources and no documentary evidence has been uncovered in the Staff College archives (so far) to support this claim; nor does there seem to have been any sudden stimulus to commence touring battlefields several hundred miles distant at considerable expense. Perhaps 1881 was a one-off, or an unofficial venture? Besides, Metz and Mars la Tour with Lonsdale Hale may have been a mixed blessing. JFC Fuller later recalled in *The Army in My Time* (1935) that Col. Lonsdale Hale had so minutely studied the Franco-Prussian War that ‘he could inform an enquirer of the exact position of all the German and French units down to companies at any given time during 1870 and 1871’. Fuller called this ‘meticulous memorisation’ of detail for its own sake, the ‘Lonsdale Hale Convention’, which he saw as a ‘pernicious influence’ within the Staff College, rendering the many advantages of historical illumination completely sterile. Whilst James Edmonds credited Hale with the first use of the phrase ‘Fog of War’, in a lecture he gave about the Prusso-Austrian War of 1866, Hale’s influence continued long after his retirement from the army, for he then proceeded to run a ‘crammer’ school in South Kensington preparing students for the Staff College exam, which (as Wavell later recalled) in 1908 totalled *eighteen* three-hour exams on obligatory and chosen subjects.
So we are not sure, but can place the earliest Camberley tour within an 1881-5 bracket. Certainly in 1885, Col. Maurice arrived at the same time as Capt. (later Maj-Gen. Sir) Charles Callwell, a student in 1885-6 (and the future author of Small Wars), who remembered Maurice as somewhat absent-minded, ‘a bad man to go visiting foreign battlefields with; his interpretation of a time-table was of the sort which lands you at some hole-and-corner wayside station in time to meet an up-train which when it steams in turns out to be a down-train’95 Callwell (writing in 1923) recalled that his first few months at Camberley ‘passed without our undertaking any practical work other than some mild surveying and military sketching, for one declined to accept the digging of shelter trenches as practical work for officers who were under training for the staff’,96 but at the end of the year during the long summer leave, he visited the Franco-Prussian battlefields on his own, although his class was due to visit them in the course of the following year.

‘I repaired that first summer to the Continent to make acquaintance with the principal battlefields of the Franco-German War, not having crossed the Channel since Haileybury days…With that part of the German Official Account of the campaign…secreted in a pocket, it was possible to follow the course of quite minor tactical incidents on the ground. They have no doubt lost much of their interest from the professional point of view…but in one respect visiting their scenes in 1885 was a more illuminating experience than is visiting what is left of the Western Front of 1914-18. Sedan, Mars la Tour, Gravelotte, Wörth, Spicheren, all of them remained practically as they had been when they were being immortalised by the encounters around them of 1870. Landmarks had not been obliterated, nor was the surface of the ground scarred and pitted by huge shell-holes…those battlefields of Alsace-Lorraine presented exactly the same conditions as they had…when the struggle took place…’97

The battlefields are illustrated at Map 7 (below). Amongst Callwell’s colleagues was Capt. Herbert Plumer (later FM Viscount Plumer of Messines)98 - who himself was a

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regimental contemporary of GFR Henderson, the future Staff College lecturer. Another
exact contemporary, Capt. Charles À Court Repington\(^{99}\) recalled of this era,

‘We had a particularly nice set of fellows there…We had all served in
different parts of the world, and we learnt a lot from each other. We all
worked hard, and the Library…supplied us with all the literature we
required. The healthy open-air life…the interesting companionship
combined with two years’ freedom from regimental duty in which we
had wasted so much of our time without profit, were all a great
attraction’.\(^{100}\)

This mention of learning from each other is a good example of Vygotsky’s ‘zone
of proximal development’ (where individuals achieve more with the help of
knowledgeable others than they can do alone), and is also an illustration of Gardner’s
interpersonal intelligence at work. The Camberley students borrowed the civilian
traditions associated with visiting Waterloo, leaning heavily on the travelling facilities
offered by Messrs. Thomas Cook & Co., and apparently, these early tours led first by
Maurice, then Henderson, were voluntary, or for a selected few). In 1885 Callwell met
up with the Camberley senior division in Metz, who had embarked on adventures
foreshadowing the ‘bottlefield tour’ variety of the 1950s and 1960s,

‘At Metz there was a select official touring party belonging to the
second year at the Staff College installed, and to this I attached myself –
official parties had their expenses paid, pursued their studies with the
assistance of the Camberley Professors, and were a prerogative of the
seniors. While at Metz two tough centurions of the party one evening
accepted the hospitality of a German cavalry mess, and they evidently
spent a lurid night. They looked as if they had the next morning. For
after being obliged to sample every known brand of wine and liqueur
during the early hours of darkness, they were moved on to the beer-
swilling stage which lasted until dawn’\(^{101}\)
This mention of Metz in the summer of 1885 by Callwell provides the first evidence of a Camberley-organised tour to a battlefield. Capt. Callwell returned to the 1870 battlefields in 1886 with the Camberley senior division, observing, ‘Mars la Tour was to my mind the most interesting to see…but all of them were well worthy of a visit and required to be taken very quietly, map and book in hand’.102
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**The Early Tours.**

Wine also dominated the memory of another Staff College student three years later; on the 1887 tour with Maurice, Capt. (later Maj-Gen Sir) John Adye recalled, ‘Our annual visit to the Continent to go over some of the battlefields of the Franco-German War was also very interesting, and I particularly remember some excellent Burgundy we got in a delightful small spa in the Vosges.’

Six years after that, in 1893, Capt. Henry Wilson (the future Commandant) entered Staff College, the year that Col. Henderson took over as Professor of Military History and Tactics. Maurice’s son is quite clear that Maurice *père* recommended the like-minded Henderson as his successor and persuaded Wolseley to overcome objections that Henderson was too junior. Henderson continued with the battlefield tours that Maurice had developed and Henry Wilson’s biographer recounts that his subject in March 1893 ‘proceeded with a party to visit the battlefields of 1870… [and his] baggage somehow went astray and that he therefore tramped these scenes of bloodshed in singular tail-coat, of obvious Irish extraction and fashioned out of a material of a violent nature, his long figure decked out in this garment (with his hands always clasped behind him under the tails) exciting no little astonishment amongst the peasants as they tilled their fields. He went on alone from Sedan to Brussels to view the field of Waterloo…’

At the end of their course in 1894, Wilson and his contemporary Henry Rawlinson (another future Commandant) made a more leisurely tour of the 1870 battlefields and as the latter’s biographer (Maurice, the former Camberley historian) observed ‘during this trip, the two saw something of the French and German Armies, and Rawlinson was much impressed by the German troops. “The Germans”, he wrote, “are miles ahead of the French in organization, equipment and training, and both are miles ahead of us.”
Our battalions are just as good as their battalions, but there we end. We live in watertight compartments, the infantry know nothing about the artillery, nor artillery anything about the infantry, the cavalry know nothing about either. In the big garrisons like Metz the troops are always working together, and their brigades and divisions are realities, not paper organizations like ours are.’  

Rawlinson subsequently spent his post-course winter leave (1894) in the Mediterranean, returning home with his wife via Spain, visiting a number of Peninsular War battlefields.

Capt. Stanley Maude, who arrived at Camberley in 1895 enjoyed the practical work; ‘reconnaissance, bivouac schemes, staff rides, were the order of the day’  

His biographer supplies an educational validation of the kind discussed in Chapter One, which justifies the outdoor learning approach of staff rides (and, implicitly of battlefield tours):

‘Framing an appreciation of a military situation, real or imaginary, always had a fascination for him, and he developed a great aptitude in the art. When on the war path in later years, the attention which he had given to this subject at the Staff College indeed frequently stood him in good stead; while campaigning in France, at the Dardanelles, and later on in Mesopotamia, he made it a habit frequently to draw up an appreciation of the situation in the theatre where his command was operating…This practice made it easier for him to produce one at short notice if called upon by superior authority…’

Capt. James Edmonds (a Sapper), who arrived at Camberley with the future field marshals Douglas Haig (of the 7th Hussars) and Edmund Allenby (6th Dragoons) in 1896, reminds us that not all the Camberley men in each senior year joined Henderson’s overseas tour, but only: ‘a selected party of “good boys” were taken on tour over the 1870-1 battlefields’.  

This explains why not all memoirs of Staff College graduates mention the battlefield tours – because not all went on them (some later historians –
erroneously - have taken the absence of any references to battlefield tours in memoirs pertaining to certain years to indicate that they did not take place annually). One of Haig’s biographers stated that Henderson ‘was the outstanding personality on the instructional staff’ and (writing in 1929) that he was ‘probably the finest teacher of the art of war that the British Army has yet produced. [He] taught and inspired not only by lectures and set schemes. He delighted in assembling round him small batches of the students, and discussing each problem with them’. Henderson’s varied teaching methods provide us with a good example of (albeit unconsciously) recognising many of Gardner’s eight learning style intelligences (see Chapter One). It was also Henderson who allegedly stated to Edmonds and others, ‘there is a fellow in your batch [meaning Haig] who one of these days will be Commander-in-Chief’. Allenby’s biographer asserts that Henderson and his course on strategy and tactics ‘exerted an extraordinary influence and his theories made a deep impression on Haig and, to a lesser extent, on Allenby, both of whom relied on them when they held high command twenty years later’. Henderson’s notes on ‘Strategy and Tactics’ were still being issued to Camberley students in 1910, seven years after his death, as the Staff College archives testify. Capt. (later Commandant, and ultimately, FM Sir) William Robertson accompanied the last (as it turned out) tour guided by Henderson (who would die in 1903), in the summer of 1898.

‘The senior division…made the customary visit to the principal battlefields of the 1870 war – Wörth, Spicheren, Vionville, and Gravelotte – under the guidance of Henderson. These visits enabled us to picture on the ground itself the operations which took place, and to grasp the lessons they taught far better than could be done by merely reading about them…I left England some days in advance, in order to see certain places of interest before joining the main party at Metz. We went first to Waterloo and Ligny, and afterwards spent a few days in the
Belgian Ardennes and Meuse valley, which was already recognised as a probable line of operations in the event of war between Germany and France…’

Of course, this region was to prove equally significant in 1940 and 1944, but even here Robertson was making history work for him and using the visit for more than just military history for its own sake.

**The Post-Boer War era.**

A real tragedy is the fact that the Staff College archives date only from 1903, when it re-opened its doors after the Boer War; even then, they are erratic and unpredictable in the records they include; later ‘weeding’ has deprived the scholar of much information as to what officers studied, apart from their own memoirs and a single history of the Staff College itself. It seems that the annual tour to the battlefields for the Senior Division (students passed from the Junior to the Senior Division halfway through their two-year course at Camberley) had become something of a tradition, but during the Boer War the College was run down, but not actually closed, as its staff and students mostly deployed to South Africa. During this period, the ‘continental tours’ were suspended for three years (1899-1901), but resumed in 1902. Each year consisted of three terms of ten or eleven weeks (January to mid-April, a month’s break then mid-May to July, summer leave, then October to mid December); the earliest battlefield tours had been mounted in August, but gradually the event moved to the Easter break; the earliest reference to a battlefield tour in the Staff College archives appears in the form of a list of participating students in the bound archives for 1903. (This appears as Appendix Two) As there is more detail from subsequent years (the 1907-1911 tour administrative
instructions have been retained in the Staff College Archives, which are identical for each year), there is no reason to think that the visits differed to any great extent for the entire 1885-1913 period during which tours were mounted to the Franco-Prussian battlefields, apart from the inclusion of extra destinations in ‘Wully’ Robertson’s day. The tour was preceded by lectures at Camberley on aspects of the Franco-Prussian war - which explored not just the operational level of the campaign and tactics (at Gravelotte, for example), but the function of headquarters and where leaders should place themselves in battle.\textsuperscript{117} The lionisation of the German commanders and consequent denigration of the French also amounted to a study of the principles of Mission Command, although both the term and concept were unknown in this period. For example, prior to the 1909 battlefield tour, students were told that

‘The battles of SPICHEREN, COLOMBY and MARS-LA-TOUR were brought about by the initiative of subordinate commanders. 1. Discuss the action taken by von Kameke, von der Göltz and von Alvensleben from the dual standpoint of (a) Discipline; (b) Tactics. 2. Show what – if any – essential difference existed in the judgement displayed by the three commanders concerned.’\textsuperscript{118}

Study of the exercise of unit and sub-unit command was repeated each year; in 1912 the Senior Division (prior to their battlefield tour) were obliged to

‘Taking instances from the 1870 campaign up to and including 6 August, discuss the exercise or absence of initiative on the part of subordinate commanders and deduce any lessons which apply to our army’.\textsuperscript{119}

Starting in May 1902 (then led by Lt-Cols. May and Haking\textsuperscript{120}), two parties - each of around 20 students - put up at the Villa Matthis, Niederbronn and the Grand Hotel de Metz, swapping quarters after four days.\textsuperscript{121} The diet was purely the 1870-1 war and students roamed overseas in civilian garb; May later recalled of the 1902 visit,
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‘Staff College Officers in the mass, in mufti, have never been an impressive sight…in plain clothes the Staff College makes a sorry show…On the Continent the Staff College student seems to cast all restraint to the winds. The bluff, insular, conservative sportsman appears in the shaggiest tweeds and the most bizarre headgear, bedecked perhaps with salmon flies. Riding-breeches, knickerbockers, and very plus-fours appear cheek by jowl with biscuit colour and silver-grey trousers, with here and there…spats…though Colonel May’s party were unable to display plus-fours and Shetland ‘pull-overs’ they were truly representative and could show some good examples of deerstalker caps, ‘boaters’, Norfolk jackets, and cycling knickers’. 122

On arriving at Metz, the above tour found, to their embarrassment, that an Imperial Review of German troops was in progress and that the Kaiser wished to meet the Staff College officers. The senior officer

‘formed up his ragged-looking parade in line and called them out one by one. Whatever regiment he named, the Emperor had a surprising knowledge of its history, and after the introductions had the party placed in a proud position by themselves, close to the saluting point…’ 123

Upon return, students composed a ‘memoir’ (apparently a lengthy essay, of up to 6,000 words); in 1905 they had to

‘1. Discuss, from the point of view of modern view, what you consider to be the most instructive lessons that you learn[t] from your visit to the battlefields in the spring. 2. Two lessons only should be deduced from each of the battles of KONIGGRATZ, WORTH, SPICHEREN & GRAVELOTTE, and one from each of the other engagements…’ 124

That the College continued to visit the Franco-Prussian battlefields with Henderson, rather than, say, Waterloo, was the direct result of his being a Franco-Prussian scholar rather than a Napoleonic one, as well as the fact that the former battles had a more ‘modern’ feel about them. (He was also an American Civil War expert, but those battlefields were impossibly far off in this era.) What is interesting is that after Henderson’s premature death in 1903, the College carried on with the Franco-Prussian
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Perhaps this was stimulated by Henry Wilson’s enjoyment of cycling round those quiet fields, but it was more likely that fact that the major threat in the 1903-13 period was Germany, with whom France had been at war in 1870-1. In 1815 at Waterloo, the Prussians had been allies rather than opponents; nevertheless there remained an obsession with travelling overseas to study a battlefield, when the United Kingdom could have offered many examples instead.

By 1908, the battlefield tour ‘memoir’ was strengthened with the addition of a daily staff writing exercise: students were told that daily ‘Intelligence Reports and War Diaries will, in future, be adhered to [in other words, written-up] on all Staff Rides from the Staff College.’\(^\text{125}\) Other expeditions, not abroad, took the form of TEWTs; for example in 1903 (and each year until 1913), the Senior Division held a three-day ‘Staff Tour’ in Wales, examining Indian Frontier warfare and the staff challenges connected with it and another (called a ‘Staff Ride’) on the south coast, which studied an encounter battle with a Redland Force that had successfully invaded Southern England. In 1907, lecture notes issued to students stated that their south coast ‘Inspection Staff Tour’ was based on Radetzky’s Italian campaign of 1849.\(^\text{126}\) Records of 1904 do not include details of the Senior Division’s battlefield tour, but the syllabus (approved by Col. Lancelot Kiggell, future Commandant from October 1913 until the outbreak of war)\(^\text{127}\) for the Junior Division in 1905 illustrates that they studied military history extensively, including Wolfe’s expedition to Quebec of 1759, the Waterloo campaign, Jackson in Virginia 1862 and the Austro-Prussian campaign of 1866.\(^\text{128}\) The wide range of historical examples rarely changed: in 1913, the Junior Division were each asked to write a memorandum as
the military advisor to Jefferson Davis on the best way to defend Richmond from Union attack in February 1862.\textsuperscript{129} Another 1,500-word task the same year instructed students, ‘Comparing Lee’s attack at Chancellorsville with Marmont’s at Salamanca, bring out the essential causes of success and failure in each case and the bearing which they have upon the employment of enveloping tactics in battle at the present time’.\textsuperscript{130} Exercises included writing orders and appreciations of the 1866 war from the Austrian point-of-view;\textsuperscript{131} and issuing orders to liaise with Blucher before Waterloo ‘as a Staff Officer on the HQ of the Duke of Wellington’s Army [but with the advantage] that the telegraph is available’.\textsuperscript{132} Lecture notes on overseas armies at this time noted that the regular US Army was 61,968 strong, with a National Guard of 116,542.\textsuperscript{133}

Military History was linked to current developments; in November 1905, Senior Division students were asked to write a 40-page ‘memoir’ on ‘How far are the strategical and tactical lessons drawn from the campaigns of 1815, 1862, 1866 and 1870 confirmed, or modified, by the experiences of the recent war in Manchuria?’\textsuperscript{134} Shortly afterwards in December 1905, Big-Gen. Henry Rawlinson\textsuperscript{135} arrived as Commandant, ushering in an era when three future military giants of the First World War (‘Rawly’, Henry Wilson and ‘Wully’ Robertson) held sway as Commandants at Camberley, whilst for the first time the instructors became ‘Directing Staff’ (DS), a term that remains today. Keith Jeffrey has observed that the three

‘transformed the place into something approaching an effective, modern ‘war school’ whose contribution helped to make the British army much more adequately prepared to go to war in 1914 than had been the case in 1899.’\textsuperscript{136}
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The 1906 Junior Division had to ‘State your views on the lessons of the South African and Manchurian wars as regards entrenching in the field’. One of the 1906 Senior Division was Capt. (later Brig-Gen.) Francis Aylmer Maxwell, whose diaries of his two years at Camberley have been preserved, including the details of the 1906 battlefield tour between 25 April -10 May. Although we know from James Edmonds that only the selected ‘good boys’ attended the battlefield tours (although this appears to have changed under Rawlinson or Wilson), Ian Beckett has observed that ‘it was often the practice for students to spend their leave between Staff College terms in visits to foreign manoeuvres or battlefields’. Brevet-Maj. Tom Bridges, for example, did both and journeyed as far as the United States to view the battlefields of the American Civil War’ in 1905. With uncanny foresight the Senior Division in 1905 had to ‘Discuss the present relations of the powers of the world, and state what course of events you consider will be most likely to lead up to the violation of the neutrality of Belgium, and thus necessitate the intervention of Great Britain.’ This was followed by Haking’s lectures on the ‘Scheme for the defence of Belgium’ and a course in Imperial Strategy (with a reading list including Mahan on sea-power) and Tactics of Savage Wars (in other years this was ‘Warfare in uncivilised countries’), with direct reference to Callwell’s Small Wars. ‘The Sudan Campaign of 1884-5 [was studied as] an illustration of success based on careful forethought and commonsense application of means to an end. That of Adowa [scene of an Italian defeat inflicted by Ethiopia in 1896] of failure consequent on insufficient preparation.’
In 1905, Lord Kitchener (as C-in-C India) had lobbied for and got a Staff College for the Indian Army, which duly opened at Quetta two years later. There had been objections that alternative military thinking might develop in an Indian Staff College to that of Camberley but Kitchener crushed dissent with his observation that the Army had ‘no school of military thought’ in any case and got his way. The Quetta Staff College was to be subservient to Camberley doctrine and ideas, and follow its syllabus; clearly a visit to the Franco-Prussian battlefields was out of the question, but in April 1907, twenty students visited the Manchurian battlefields of 1904-5 and others toured those of the North West Frontier. From 1906 Rawlinson initiated a ‘Joint Naval and Military Tour’ with students of the Camberley and Greenwich Staff College together reconnoitring the coast, to select suitable landing places and witnessing the actual disembarkation of a token expeditionary force at Great Yarmouth (in later years this was at Cowes), the aim being to practice officers in ‘the joint duties which the disembarkation of a British expedition on a foreign shore imposes on Naval and Military officers...’ Foreshadowing Gallipoli (six years later), the 1909 syllabus shows that officers were shown ‘arrangements on the beach for disembarkation’ of an expeditionary force. This aspect of Joint operations (then, interestingly, referred to as ‘Joint’) underlines what could have been achieved with more integration of the two Staff Colleges, and appears to have been largely discontinued in the inter-war period.

Henry Wilson.

In January 1907, Brig-Gen (later FM Sir and future CIGS) Henry Wilson arrived as Commandant and that year’s battlefield tour instructions are more complete and show
that – apart from the travelling, students in two parties spent ten days exploring the 1870 battlefields with a mid-point ‘rest day’; destinations included Weissenburg, Wörth, Spicheren, Colombey, Mouilly, Vionville-Mars-la-Tour, Gravelotte-St. Privat and Metz\(^{149}\) (see Map 7), providing a neat chronological tour. A footnote observed that ‘Officers wishing to visit Waterloo must make their own arrangements to do so, either before assembling at Niederbronn, or after leaving Metz…’\(^{150}\)

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**Figure 4.7:** Picture Postcard, circa 1920, of Sir Henry Wilson, when a Field Marshal. Source: author’s collection.

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Given an allowance for the tour, students were left to their own devices ‘as to procuring tickets for the journey. *Rundreise* Tickets [i.e. round trip] can be obtained from Messrs Cook & Sons and result in a saving of expense…’  

In the month prior to the April 1907 tour, students were given a series of ‘Problems’, which entailed issuing orders as a members of the French and German General Staffs. One of the students on Wilson’s first tour was Capt. (later Gen. Sir) Charles ‘Tim’ Harington 152 of the Liverpool Regt., who had arrived in 1906 and recalled the strenuous physical exercise required at Staff College,

‘When I was at Staff College no motor cars were allowed. We bicycled fifty miles a day three or four days a week and thought nothing of it. The idea of it was to see whether we could still write orders and appreciations, and still keep our tempers when we were tired after a long day. In later years, in the [August 1914] Retreat, and in those long and tiring days and nights of the war, I used often to think how much we owed to those old bicycles of the Staff College’. 153

As well as replicating some of the Clausewitzian friction of war, this is an example of Gardner’s different intelligences at work: the cycling and study mentioned in the passage implies a unique blend of the kinaesthetic, mathematical-logical, visual-spatial and interpersonal skills. Henry Wilson (himself a fitness fanatic) was described by one biographer as ‘a brilliantly clever, imaginative, versatile officer from Northern Ireland, possibly more politician than soldier, and with a flair for intelligence…cheerful, amusing and a born raconteur’. 154 Archibald Wavell, a student who arrived (unusually as a lieutenant) in January 1909 recalled his ‘quick and agile brain’ and that he as more interested in ‘higher strategy, in the relations between statesmen and soldiers, in the conduct of war at its highest level, than in details of staff work or tactics. He was happier in dealing with the movement of great continental forces on a map that with the
manoeuvring of a brigade or division on the ground’. From these descriptions, we might describe Wilson in terms of Kolb (Chapter One), as a Converging learning type - a blend of Abstract Conceptualisation (AC) and Active Experimentation (AE) – ‘they find practical uses for ideas and theories; embrace new technology, experiment with new ideas, and in a military context, would enjoy war games and simulation’. Wilson’s close friendship with Ferdinand Foch, Commandant of the Ecole de Guerre Supérieure (whom he had visited on his own initiative in 1909) resulted in the import of ‘Allez, allez’ exercises at Camberley, where students had to carry out tactical schemes at the double, replicating the pressure of war. Wavell recalled these and observed that ‘there was a good deal of outdoor work, which the students did on their bicycles. Henry Wilson had introduced a practice...of having frequent small outdoor exercises with answers given unprepared, on the ground, by the students.’ Some of Wilson’s Allez-Allez schemes are to be found in the relevant Staff College archives. Wilson was passionate about exercise and a keen cyclist; and habitually spent part of his summer holidays travelling by bicycle and train along the French and Belgian frontiers, ‘to traverse much of the country that might conceivably become the theatre of war in the event of a fresh contest breaking out between the traditional foes’. In 1909, for instance, he spent ten days travelling from Valenciennes to Belfort; he visited other battlefields, apart from those of 1870, accompanied by one or more of his staff;

‘Thus in 1908 he made a tour of the 1866 campaign in Bohemia – Trautenau, Nacod and Sadowa – and then travelled on to Brunn to view the scene at Austerlitz. In 1909 he visited the principal battlefields of Napoleon’s campaign of 1814 – La Rothière, Montmirail, Vauchamps, and Champaubert.’
Wilson not only led the annual tours to the 1870 battlefields, but required students, on occasion, to run over them. According to his diary for 5 May 1909:

‘My 45th birthday. We did Vionville- Mars la Tour [16 August 1870], lunching at the latter place and seeing a small field-day at Frescati on the way out. A beautiful day except for a high east wind. After lunch we went on to look at the statue which, I think, the most beautiful of all those on the battlefields, and then we ran von Bredow’s charge, Moreton Gage as v. Bredow and Henley and Hill Whitson as the two C.O.s [of the two Prussian cavalry regiments in the charge]. I took the extreme left, and so had much the furthest to go, and yet was easily first; Perks [Col. Perceval, DS of the Senior Division] coming next. No bad on my 45th birthday – 2 miles over plough and young seed.’

Instructions for the 1909 tour are included at Appendix Three; they are identical to those of 1907-8. On Wilson’s last battlefield tour, the charge was again re-enacted on foot, with ‘Wilson himself and his assistants and the students…wearing serviceable country clothes and sturdy footwear’, 161 (Wilson bedecked himself in a ‘creation in the loudest of checks, which was known to successive batches of Staff College students as the “Wilson tartan”’) 162 but accompanied by a German staff officer in full dress uniform, including double-breasted frock coat, boots and spurs, resembling more the occupant of a ‘bandstand in a Rhineland garrison town in pre-war days. For this running business he was wholly unprepared. But he was not one to draw back when he saw a band of British officers – and a general to boot – start on foot at a smart double to traverse the ground over which von Bredow’s troopers had galloped to their death a generation earlier. Herr Kamerad doubled too, and he actually stayed the course’. 163

Writing in 2005, Brig. Mungo Melvin has observed that the Mars La Tour stand is ‘still used today by the HCSC on its annual staff ride. Today’s students, however, do not have to complete the run; rather, they stand somewhat in awe, captivated by Professor Richard Holmes’ epic account of the battle’. 164
Wilson continued with his Continental touring habits and just before the outbreak of war in August 1913, when Director of Military Operations (DMO) at the War Office – after attending French military manoeuvres – motored with two others from Rheims to the Belgian frontier, through Luxembourg and into Germany via Trier and Aachen and back through the Ardennes, in precisely the area where he feared the next land war would develop.\textsuperscript{165} This observation may have more than a whiff of hindsight about it; nevertheless, Wilson was an extremely insightful individual at the military-strategic level and it has to be said that he had been travelling the Franco-German-Belgian borders for many summers, with this sort of eventuality (another European war) in mind. In this respect, the battlefield tours had another utility and were used as a \textit{cover} by Wilson and his staff to assess the potential of terrain as sites for military operations, rather in the manner of the Duke of Wellington before Waterloo.

The syllabus had not generally altered in 1909, but more records have survived of the content, which included exercises as the DMI to the Duke of Wellington during Napoleon’s 1814 campaign, much work on von Moltke’s planning during 1866, detailed studies of Austerlitz\textsuperscript{166}, Salamanca\textsuperscript{167}, the Lines of Torres Vedras\textsuperscript{168} and the assault on the Malakoff battery at Sevastopol\textsuperscript{169} (Map 5) as a model of a night attack; the Commandant, Henry Wilson (identified by his initials) issued orders for a ‘memoir’ on ‘the co-operation of the 3 arms on the battlefield, and the part which will be taken, in future wars, by the R.E\textsuperscript{170} and there was also much historical study on the use of cavalry, particularly during the Napoleonic era. This was a very much a live issue as a debate was raging as
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to whether the cavalry arm should ‘convert’ to a mounted infantry rôle, rather than the flank protection, reconnaissance and shock-action tasks it then had. The success of German cavalry was much explored in relation to 1870, including the occasional operational (referred to as ‘strategical’) impact it had on the campaign. In 1910, although studying cavalary action at Ligny (1815) in the classroom, the later battlefield tour (to Metz and elsewhere) did not link-in with this lesson; its focus was 1870 and – although students were encouraged to return under their own steam via Waterloo - Ligny was not mentioned and this extra battlefield visit was not, in any case, compulsory. The 1910 Junior Division also studied the significant English Civil War cavalry actions at Marston Moor (1644) and Naseby (1645) with the aid of notes, directed reading and detailed sketch maps; students later undertook a ‘staff tour’ to the East Midlands, but there was no attempt to visit nearby Naseby (see Map 8). Indeed it is highly significant that no English Civil War battlefields were visited, even though they were accessible; were well-researched and documented historically; demonstrated significant manoeuvre and leadership skills at the tactical level; involved the interplay of the various arms (infantry, cavalry and artillery) in combat; and were in reasonably pristine condition. Both these instances, when other battlefields that related to coursework could have been toured, and were en route to other Staff College activities, but were not visited, suggests that it was only the 1870 terrain that was firmly lodged in the Camberley brain as worth visiting, for there would arguably have been no extra outlay in terms of time or cost to visit the others. One cannot but sense a missed opportunity here. The Quatre Bras-Wavre-Ligny-Waterloo (see Map 4) quartet of battlefields would have made a particularly useful study both of differing examples of leadership and of the operational
level of war. The more so then, before the advent of the road network that bedevils these sites today. Being so close to the travel hub of Brussels, they would have been easy to access even a century ago. Yet, English Civil war battlefields at least were recognised destinations for civilians (and could have been usefully visited by Staff College, considering some were actually part of the curriculum) - as the postcard of Edgehill (fought 23 October 1642), illustrated in Figure 4.8 (below) shows.

![Figure 4.8](https://example.com/figure4.8.jpg)

**Figure 4.8** (above): Photographic postcard of Edge Hill battlefield, posted in 1910, demonstrating the popularity of battlefields to civilian visitors. *(Source: author’s collection)*

Despite the meeting with the Kaiser during the 1902 battlefield tour, there remained the underlying Anglo-German tension; the 1909 syllabus contained several studies on the use of cavalry, railways (very much regarded as a German tool of war) and an interesting paper,
‘as an officer of the Great German General Staff in Berlin you are asked to suggest, in the event of Germany meditating war with England, what hostile acts, if any, should be committed by the former before a formal outbreak of hostilities. Such acts are not intended to include naval operation against the English fleets at sea, but comprise all landing raids on the shores of the United Kingdom and naval operations against her ports and shipping lanes therein. It may be anticipated that France will throw in her lot with England’.

Map 8: English Civil War battles that Camberley students studied. (Source: Tristram Hunt, *The English Civil War At First Hand* (London: Orion 2003), p.1.)
In 1909 Commandant Wilson also ordered a ‘study of operations involving the employment of the British Expeditionary Force on the Continent of Europe’ but warned students that ‘the scheme…as outlined below, and all work connected therewith, must be regarded as SECRET’. The scenario was that relations between France and Germany had become strained, but Germany was the aggressor; students had to prepare a memorandum for the Cabinet, setting forth the options available to the CIGS for deploying a BEF on the Continent. In a similar vein, Commandant Robertson’s outline for a war game exists from 1912, where the general idea (which was not SECRET, or restricted in any way) was that

“The relations between BLUeland (Belgium) and REDand (Rhenish Prussia and Luxemburg) have been strained for some time, and each country has mobilised its land forces. War may be declared at any moment...BLUeland has a fleet of 20 aeroplanes, whereas REDland has only 6…”

This sense of tension is confirmed by the inclusion in the 1909 battlefield tour instructions of the (translated and highly bureaucratic) German ‘Regulations for Foreign Officers Travelling in Germany’; also appended were the equivalent French and Belgian laws – clearly there was concern that military officers roaming the countryside in civilian garb with field glasses, maps, notebooks and compasses could be mistaken for spies. Most travelling in this period was by train – the more unreliable car was in its infancy and a much less common mode of conveyance; nevertheless, it is clear from the 1908-9 battlefield tour instructions that cars and outsiders were welcomed, ‘If any officer contemplates making motor arrangements with a friend – that friend not being a member of the College – I should be glad to be informed, as early as possible, so that sanction may be obtained for his inclusion in the party…” (See Appendix Three)
In 1910 (when Wavell was a student), the former Camberley student and influential future Great War Official Historian, Col. JE Edmonds, RE, returned to deliver a (13-page) lecture on ‘The Laws and Usages of War on Land’ (corrected to July, 1910), which appears to be the first inclusion of material on what is now the Law of Armed Conflict. He was frank that the British had not fully understood the implementation of the Geneva Convention of 1864 in South Africa, but also highlighted German excesses against civilians in 1870-1.\(^{178}\) By 1912, the syllabus had added International Law (‘as it affects the war on land’) to the examination on Military Law.\(^{179}\) This is very much a subject of modern concern, and one much discussed during 21st Century battlefield visits; it is doubly fascinating that its author (a Staff College contemporary of Douglas Haig) would become perhaps the most important of all British interpreters of 1914-18 land operations during the inter-war period. Equally forward-looking was the requirement that year to ‘1. Discuss the general principles which govern the employment of machine guns in War. 2. Amplify these principles by considering in detail their application to the handling on the machine guns of (a) a Cavalry Brigade or (b) an Infantry Brigade…’\(^{180}\) Brian Bond has observed how Wilson used the battlefield tours to underline his own doctrinal thinking; for example, ‘the absolute and vital necessity for having a plan. There was none at Wissembourg, none at Wörth …The best way to decide on a line of defence is to choose that one which allows you to employ three arms whilst confining the enemy to one or two…’\(^{181}\)
‘Wully’ Robertson.

It is noticeable how the tone and pace of exercises recorded in the archives change with the arrival of Maj-Gen WR ‘Wully’ Robertson (a self-made, studious officer, who would become the first soldier to progress from Private to Field Marshal, CIGS and a peerage, Figure 4.9) in August 1910. Although his predecessor, Henry Wilson, was also regarded as a whirlwind of ideas and innovation, it is Robertson who has left more of a legacy in the remaining Staff College records. Wavell remembered him as a ‘blunt, commonsense, practical soldier’, but thought ‘a good staff officer must be able to produce clear orders or instructions at very short notice. We did not do enough of this’; 182 this was despite Wilson’s ‘Allez-Allez’ schemes, which continued long after his departure. To those who experienced both at Camberley, their contrasting personalities were explained as ‘the difference between the agile greyhound and the tenacious bulldog… Wilson’s eyes searching the horizon, Robertson’s closely scanning the objects at hand’. 183 It is fascinating to compare these two personality types – clearly they were very different people. Robertson seems to embrace Kolb’s Concrete Experience (CE) and Active Experimentation (AE) learning styles, and can thus be interpreted as an Accommodating learning type (‘hands-on’ students who rely on intuition (gut reaction) rather than logical analysis and prefer to take a speedy, practical, experiential approach’). Yet both believed in the battlefield tour, for it represented more than mere outdoors historical study. Wilson (observed his biographer Keith Jeffrey) told his students on the battlefields in 1909 that ‘the same thread of disaster and victory ran through all the battles [of 1870] and for the same cause – want of purpose on one side and purpose on the other, due to a School of Thought’. 184 Wilson firmly believed that the idea of the Staff College
was not just to produce a corps of officers with uniform methods of work and a common approach to problems, but beyond that, to form a ‘school of military thought’, and the Franco-Prussian campaign demonstrated how important this was.\textsuperscript{185} Wilson also believed there were qualities essential for a good staff officer or commander, including ‘administrative knowledge; physical superiority; sound judgement of men & affairs; and constant reading & reflection on the campaigns of the great masters’\textsuperscript{186}, all of which (staff work, fitness, judgement and military history) came together on touring the 1870 battlefields. The fact that Wilson also personally believed that a Franco-German clash was inevitable along France’s frontier with Belgium or Germany provided added reason for the tours after 1907, when Wilson arrived. Although Rawlinson and Robertson appear also to have subscribed to these views, Ian Beckett argues that because of this rationale, under Wilson the battlefield tours ‘became an even more significant feature at the end of the first term of the students’ second year’.\textsuperscript{187}

The 1911 Camberley archives contain seven pages of deeply thoughtful feedback notes from Robertson on the subject and styles of students’ ‘memoirs’ submitted to him. In a wide-ranging soliloquy, Robertson’s pages capture the essence of British military thinking in 1911 and he is worth exploring at greater length, for he has an engaging, expressive style. On aeroplanes (the Wright Brothers first flew in 1903), he mused, ‘many of you seem to think that they will revolutionise the whole of military science. It is difficult to forecast what the consequences of their introduction may be, but history proves that the military art is one of evolution rather than revolution, and I think it would be well to withhold judgement for the present. There is, in fact, a considerable difference of opinion amongst aeronauts themselves as to what can and cannot be done…’\textsuperscript{188}

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This provides the interesting insight that debates about the extent of ‘revolutions in military affairs’ are not a recent innovation at military academies. In October 1911, Robertson had held an outdoor ‘staff ride’ to reconnoitre gun lines at Bentley (East Sussex) to counter a Redland attack, previously identified by aircraft. In November that year, Staff College students were told in a lecture that 37 soldiers, eight sailors and 101 civilians held a pilot’s certificate, whilst the Army owned 13 aeroplanes, provided by eight different manufacturers, three dirigibles, and were expected to form an Air Battalion of four companies. The Army was also trialling nine monoplanes, 20 bi-planes and two tri-planes at Rheims in France, ‘most of which have a speed of over 50 miles an hour’; one was ‘still in pieces after accident’ and it was noted that only seven pilots had
experience of cross-country flying. In 1913 a Staff College-issued paper assessed the 1912 aeronautical strengths of Germany as 145 army and navy aircraft with 150 trained pilots; France had 507 military aircraft with 750 pilots; Russia, 182 aeroplanes and 125 pilots; Italy, 70 aircraft with 100 pilots; Austria-Hungary 48 craft and 85 pilots whilst the USA (which had witnessed the birth of manned flight) possessed just 15 military aeroplanes and an unknown number of pilots. With aircraft still in their infancy, it is perhaps remarkable how quickly airpower was incorporated into TEWTs, plans and exercises by the DS. The Junior Division 1912 Syllabus for ‘Strategy and Tactics’ stated that

‘special stress has been laid upon:- 1. Night operations. 2. The developments taking place in Aeronautics. 3. Co-operation of all arms. 4. Handling of cavalry...5. The principles regarding the exercise of command in the field. 6. Fire superiority – what it means, how obtained, and how essential it is to enable troops to move on the battlefield.’

This last factor, of course, was paramount to the conduct of these same students, when commanding battalions and brigades in the series of battles beginning with Neuve Chapelle in 1915, continuing with Loos, the Somme, Passchendaela and concluding with Amiens and the Hundred Days of 1918. It is striking how quickly new technologies were embraced at the Staff College (manned flight had commenced only eight years earlier) and its future debated; the same was true of machine guns. Frequently, British military commanders at the outset of both world wars have been accused by historians of being out-of-date and preparing for the last war. The evidence here of the Commandant’s comments on these papers submitted by his students suggests otherwise. There was, actually, always a very progressive debate; the ‘gap’ came (particularly in the inter-war period) with the application of new ideas, and was due frequently (then, as
now) to political ‘brakes’ applied to military spending, which resulted in not only a lack of procurement, but in a dearth of staff to administer and write doctrine for new concepts.

Apart from thoughts on aircraft, Robertson went on to consider other issues in his 1911 ‘memoir’ feedback:

Others held rather strongly that modern armament renders envelopment necessary…A commander must act much as a carpenter with a bag of tools, and take out the tool which is best adapted to the situation. At one time it will be the pincers, at another the hammer, at another the gimlet…”

The remarkably erudite Robertson explored the differences between ‘the so-called French and German tactical systems’ - ‘envelopment versus penetration’ (as he saw it) and the confusion by some students between doctrine and method; he argued that the former ‘is a general law, a principle or set of principles; it is not a method. A method is the application of the doctrine or principle. A particular way of doing a particular thing…”

Then he went on to expound,

‘Remember what our doctrine is – “Decisive success in battle can be gained only by a vigorous offensive”. That means that we must throw in every man, horse and gun at the earliest possible moment, but it does not mean that we are to do this without any regard whatsoever to reconnaissance, deliberation, and reasonable precaution. It is largely a question of knowing when the earliest possible moment is.”

Whilst this passage (in contrast to the others cited here) has not aged well, Robertson concluded with a very modern-sounding, cautionary note about warfare,

‘…make sure that you have a true conception of what a battle is like. It is especially necessary for everyone here, staff as well as students, to take a pull at themselves occasionally, and to ascertain whether they are on the right path, because we have no troops, even with blank ammunition, to help keep us on the right lines. It is well therefore to make a sort of mental picture of what battle is like, and when we feel we
are drifting away from the realities of war to take a look at that picture’. 195

This understanding of the ‘realities of war’ has become a major way of justifying the battlefield tour process today; yet here is Robertson urging that this be understood (though, admittedly, not necessarily by battlefield visit). His biographer acknowledged that Robertson and his generation encouraged the cult of ‘the offensive, and the idea of fighting on the defensive was thought to be so obnoxious’ 196 Robertson recognised, however, that a commander had to possess sound judgement, and an iron will; that his staff had to be accurate in their calculations and honest in their assessments and their troops had to have high morale. Accordingly he switched some of the destinations on the annual tour to take in the lesser-known 1870 battlefields,

‘near Amiens, Orleans and Le Mans - which had been fought by partially trained and hastily raised French troops, after the opening campaign was over and lost; and he questioned a senior French officer who had taken part in them as a young man.’ 197

Robertson was brutally honest in his ‘realities’: in February 1912 he tasked his Senior Division to write a six-page memorandum,

‘I want you to tell me, supposing the whole of our Expeditionary Force to be employed in N.W. Europe against a 1st class Power, what amount of wastage in personnel we may expect to have to make good in 1 month, 3 months and 6 months respectively…Of course the amount of wastage will largely depend upon the amount of actual fighting that takes place, and the nature of that fighting…take it that at least one general engagement will be fought before the end of the first month.’ 198

In fact the British fought two, at Mons and Le Cateau within the first three weeks of deployment, during August 1914 (Map 9). Today’s battlefield visits tend very much to emphasise the ‘realities of war’ on the battlefield, using memoirs or (less frequently
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now) veterans; indeed, this became a central pivot of the 1947-79 Camberley annual battlefield tours. Robertson’s battlefield visits (and those of Commandants before him), though, appear to have had a different purpose altogether and were designed to stress campaign planning, the interplay of actions at the operational level and the function of terrain in shaping and altering tactical plans. For example, in 1912, the Junior Division were tasked to

‘Describe any instance you have seen in war, or peacetime actions, of artillery support to an infantry assault. If you have not seen one, describe a case you have read of. Add your own comments, and mention what influence the ground had in limiting or increasing power of artillery support.’

The same division undertook the usual round of ‘staff rides’ or ‘staff tours’; notable was the commander of Redland forces in 1912: Lt-Gen Sir Douglas Haig. The future C-in-C had studied at Brasenose, Oxford, though without graduating had gone through Staff College in 1896-7 and was convinced of the value of visiting old battlefields, such was the legacy of his tour of the 1870 battlefields with Col. Henderson. In a written exchange in October 1907 with a younger colleague (the future Brig. Philip Howell CMG) who was a Staff College DS and more sceptical of their value, Haig observed,

‘On the contrary, I hold that the study of history on actual ground is of great value in bringing home to us the effect of ground on tactics. After all, the ground is the mould, and by visiting a Battlefield one sees how under a particular set of circs [sic] the troops were fitted into it – with success or otherwise etc, etc, and then by looking at a whole number of cases in various periods of history, one discovers something beyond ground & tactics and one notes that the fundamental principles and truths of the art of war are immutable!’
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Contrary to today’s widely-held view (of Haig ‘the butcher’), he was considered one of the pre-war ‘progressives’ and championed staff rides and battlefield tours as a means of replicating the friction and confusion of campaigning. When Chief of Staff in India he wrote prophetically in his review of the 1911 Staff Tour (in other words, a TEWT),

‘No plan of operations can with any safety include more than the first collision with the enemy’s force… Plans aiming far beyond the strategical deployment and first collision have been submitted. Such speculations may become harmful if they are allowed to hamper the judgment as the campaign progresses, and to impede initiative. Commanders in war have been known to become so imbued with an idea as never to think of any other contingency; and what we wish for we like to hope and believe…’

Haig obviously warmed to Henderson’s teaching of military history and his battlefield tour, when at Camberley. In 1907 Col. Haig published the proceedings of his early staff rides in *Cavalry Studies* (1907), observing – with remarkable prophecy - in the introduction,

‘Certainly a knowledge of military history is all-important to an officer. In studying it we see the great masters at work. We learn from their experience and become acquainted with the difficulties to be encountered in applying principles. But such work contributes little to developing our powers of decision. On the other hand, “War Games” and “Staff Rides” should be framed chiefly with the latter object… Military history teaches us that the whole question of cooperation with an ally is fraught with difficulties and danger. When the theatre of operations lies within the country of the ally, these difficulties increase, for war can rarely benefit the inhabitants on the spot, and ill feeling is certain to arise…’

This was Haig, writing in India in 1905-6, when the outbreak of a European war was by no means likely; these passages are full of Reflective Observation (RO) and
Abstract Conceptualisation (AC), giving us one of Kolb’s Assimilating characters, for whom ‘ideas and concepts are more important than people’ (Chapter One).

Whilst much of this Staff College activity took place in seminar rooms and lecture theatres, it provided context to the Senior Division’s battlefield visit during April-May of their second year, when this accumulated knowledge and honed analytical skills were applied to study a series of actions in situ. The importance, then, of this survey of pre-war Staff College archives is that they provide the context for the annual battlefield visits. Alas, we do not know exactly what students said when on the ground, so these College notes and exercises flesh out the nature of the work before and after each tour, and thus provide an insight as to the conduct of the tours. However, we have some of the notes on the battlefields visited, issued prior to the 1913 tour, which - after an outline of events leading up to the battle - then include ‘strategical considerations, discussed at Camberley and which will not be touched on when on the ground’ and other ‘tactical considerations for discussion on the ground’. From these it is clear that the Franco-Prussian battlefields were used to explore operational (‘strategical’) and tactical issues, but only the latter were studied al fresco. Typical of the myriad of tactical points for discussion was ‘The battle in 1870 developed into the attack and defence of villages and enclosures; would modern guns and rifles have any effect in altering this?’ and ‘Examine the ground from the point of view of the French and Germans to find suitably concealed artillery positions with good observation stations’ (both issued for Coulmiers in April 1913).
By 1912, the annual visit to the battlefields had shifted slightly to study Coulmiers, Loigny, Poupry, Beaune la Rolande and Le Mans, as well as Wörth, Wissembourg and Spicheren, (see Map 7) and the battlefield of Villers-Bretonneux. This last encounter is of interest today, because it was fought over exactly the terrain that dominated allied campaigning throughout 1916, was the site of a major battle in 1918, and witnessed the world’s first tank-versus-tank engagement on 24 April 1918.

Indeed the town, a small community on the old St Quentin-Amiens Roman road, is unremarkable, except for its association with war: nearby is the Australian National War Memorial (which bears the shrapnel scars of a May 1940 engagement between a British rearguard and a panzer column) and its school also contains an excellent ANZAC museum on the first floor.

Robertson led the last tours for a decade (as it turned out) in April-May 1913, with three separate parties totalling 51 students visiting Villers-Bretonneux, Loigny-Poupry, Coulmiers, Woerth, Spicheren and Vionville. Each group had the same packed programme of trains to catch and battles to study over the course of nine days, though travel arrangements were left to students, who could opt for first or second class travel and whether to bring their bicycles; (the stated Thomas Cook return railway fare for the tour was £7.17/- first class and £5.17/- second class). Amongst those on these last pre-war tours was the Indian Army gunner, Capt. (later Air Chief Marshal Lord) Dowding, who had arrived in 1912; he learned to fly whilst at Camberley, passing his civilian flying test on the Vickers-owned aerodrome at Brooklands at first light on the same day, when hours later, he graduated from Staff College. These last pre-war tour instructions
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(which are the most complete for the entire 1903-13 period), plus the ‘tactical considerations for discussion on the ground’ are included at Appendix Four.

Robertson also dragooned his students into considering the future; in 1912 he demanded a memoir from the Senior Division on ‘The battle of the future. What are likely to be its demands with regard to frontages and depth, and what part may be played in it by woods and villages?’ This requirement has not dated in the least; in 2003, this author addressed a Brigade Study Day in Germany on precisely the same topic word-for-word, which also involved an element of a mini-battlefield tour and a TEWT. In October 1913, Robertson departed for the War Office and Launcelot Kiggell took over as Commandant. Robertson’s parting shot was to require a 7,000 word ‘memoir’ from each of the Senior Division, on the ‘to be handed in to the Adjutant’s Office not later than October 8th’.

‘Assume that you are employed under the DMT [Director of Military Training] at the War Office, and that he sends for you and says:- “I want you to give me your opinion regarding the tactical training of our Expeditionary Force for war. I want you to consider particularly the employment of the various arms in co-operation…Give me your views on the form of a memorandum, and show to what extent you consider the training to be sound; point out any defects; and show how they can be remedied. I cannot tell you my wishes more definitely than by saying that I want to be satisfied that we are doing the best that can be done to ensure our beating the enemy when we meet him, and if we are not, what changes we ought to make.” You may support your views by reference to any military operations which have taken place during the last 50 years…’

As ever, Robertson looked to military history and all the lessons his students had learned on and off the world’s battlefields to come to the aid of current military thinking; the ‘if’ of meeting the enemy had become a ‘when’. The eighth of October 1913 was
Robertson’s last day; on the morrow he would arrive at the War Office as its Director of Military Training; within ten months Britain would be at war.

**Conclusion.**

It can be argued that Camberley demonstrated a certain merit in visiting battlefields as a useful preparation for war. Whether such visits are planned or unplanned, battlefields have always attracted soldiers and it is important therefore to understand and study the use of former combat zones by military men. None of the Camberley visitors to the Franco-Prussian battlefields in this period had experienced the extreme pressure of a years-long European war; they were about to be put to the test. What does translate across history is how well Henry Wilson and Douglas Haig foresaw the problems of cooperating with an ally. One of the ways the BEF sought to correct this was via a handful of French-speaking liaison officers, the most prominent of whom was Capt. Spears of the 11th Hussars, who by 1917, had become Head of the British Military Mission to Paris (a post he held again in 1940). He, too, was enchanted by history and when Maj-Gen. Sir Edward Spears, MP (1886-1974), wrote an extraordinarily moving and beautiful account of a September 1956 battlefield tour he undertook to Poitiers (1356), where he reinterpreted the Fourteenth Century battle where an ancestor fought, through Twentieth Century military eyes. Camberley until 1913 prepared its officers (though not enough of them) extremely well for the combat of 1914-18, and – contrary to Holden Reid’s argument – used history well, as one of the tools at its disposal. Yes, Camberley’s battlefield tours could have been more testing and rigorous (though galloping after Henry Wilson across ploughed fields would have been challenging),
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whilst Waterloo and certain British battlefields might have been visited (as they were already on the syllabus), but that is also to introduce a whiff of hindsight into the debate.

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7 Moltkès Generalstabsreisen aus Den Jahren 1858 bis 1869 (Berlin: Mittler 1906). [Moltke's General Staff Ride Journeys during the years 1858-1869], with a separately bound portfolio containing maps.
8 Moltke's Tactical Problems from 1858 to 1882, edited by the Prussian Grand General Staff, translated by Karl von Donat (London: Hugh Rees Ltd, 1903). This includes 66 problems, their solutions and detailed scale maps for each problem. I am grateful to Professor Chris Bellamy for the loan of his copy. In Chapter 7 of Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945 (Oxford University Press, 1994), Christopher Bassford observes that no English translation was ever made of Moltke's Essays on Strategy (1871) or Instructions for the Senior Troop Commanders (1869). Other works were translated, but only after a considerable time lag, in the 1890s or 1900s. Collectively, this suggests a lack of willingness to understand or embrace Prussian staff methods. Moltke's tours dealt primarily with defensive battles, fighting hypothetical enemies, but out of the class room and on ground where the actual future battle might be fought. In this sense, his tours were like many Cold War BAOR manoeuvres on the North German Plain, with individual units practising their concepts of defence within their actual, allotted zones. In this genre, some writers used a fictional invasion by a foreign power to alert the public to military shortcomings. Colonel (of the Royal Engineers) Sir George Chesney's The Battle of Dorking: Reminiscences of a Volunteer, which first appeared in Blackwood's Magazine Edinburgh Magazine, Volume CIX, No. DCLXVII (May 1871), was key in this respect. Perhaps significantly, Sir George Tomkyn Chesney's (1830-95) elder brother was Col. Charles Chesney, R.E. (1826-76) who had recently been Professor of Military History at the Staff College; that both brothers were Royal Engineers, extensively trained at RMA Woolwich, with a greater awareness of current affairs, doctrine and weapons may also be significant. In reacting to the just-finished Franco-Prussian War, in The Battle of Dorking, Chesney, Jr. summoned up the ghost of an un-named country (but obviously Germany) always ready and willing to pursue her political goals with military action, an approach that Chesney, Sr. saw as a natural extension of Clausewitz's subordination of war to national policy. The Battle of Dorking described the successful invasion of Britain from a vantage point fifty years in the future; the price of defeat was shocking, with Britain shorn of its empire, commerce, and industry and reduced to utter insignificance. For this hypothetical defeat, Chesney blamed Britain's heroic but thoroughly unprofessional land forces. Many commentators have likened its style and effect to that of H.G. Wells's War of the Worlds. In 1858 Chesney, Sr. had been appointed Professor of Military History at RMC Sandhurst, then (1864) Professor of Military Art and History at the new, adjacent Staff College at Camberley. This Chesney was a devotee of Clausewitz and (unusually) had actually read On War. This is important, because it reveals that some Prussian educational ideas (the staff ride had yet to follow) were permeating through to the British military establishment before the Franco-Prussian War and before Vom Kriege was translated into English in 1873. Chesney, Sr. also served on the Royal Commission on Military Education (1868-1870) and was an official observer of the Franco-Prussian War, later working with the Secretary of State for War, Edward Cardwell, on the latter's military reforms. Charles Chesney was, then, extremely well-placed to convert his studies of
Clausewitz into practice; he was particularly taken by the Germans' successful decentralization of authority, which had often proved (and would continue so to do for a long time afterwards) so elusive to the British. Chesney's concern was the essence of what has subsequently been termed Auftragstaktik, but was never resolved in his lifetime. The issue also vexed British military reformers after the Second Boer War (1899-1902) and American reformers following the Vietnam War. One running joke in England at the time was an injury, such as a bruise or scrape, was attributed to a wound received at the battle of Dorking! It emphasised a popular mood of unease at the remarkably swift Prussian invasion and conquest of France, caused much parliamentary debate, and had enormous influence. H.G. Wells (1866-1946) most successfully repeated the formula in War of the Worlds (1898), taking his reader to familiar places in London and Surrey – the battlefields where his war against an invading army (this time from Mars) was fought. Orson Welles famously repeated this success (and anxiety) by adapting War of the Worlds for CBS radio on Hallowe'en, 1938; Welles' Mercury Theatre on the Air broadcast War of the Worlds, but with martians landing in New Jersey and attacking New York on 31 October 1938. See H.G. Wells, Prophesying War 1789-1938 (Oxford: University Press 1966), Chapter 2; HG Wells, War of the Worlds (London: Heinemann; New York: Harper, Harper & Brothers; Leipzig: Tauchnitz; and Rotterdam: Cohen Zonen, all 1898).

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16 Col Wilbur Gray, Playing War: the Applicability of Commercial Conflict Simulations to Military Intelligence Planning and Education (DIA Joint Military Intelligence College, Rolling AFB, 1995)
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22 As in Col. RCB Haking, Staff Rides and Regimental Tours (London: Rees 1908)
23 The terms tactical ride and practice ride are both used in Ferrand Sayre, Map Maneuvers and Tactical Rides (Springfield 1911).
24 The term is used in Thomas E Fowler, Notes on Staff Rides and Regimental and Tactical Tours for Beginners (London: Gale and Polden 1908)
25 For example, William H Waldron, Tactical Walks, (Washington DC: US Infantry Association 1917)
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26 Used at Camberley from 1895 to describe manoeuvres where student staff officers were tested in the field over a six-day period. See Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914, (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), p.175.
27 For example, see: Eintagige Übungsritte: Apregungen und Beispiele (Berlin: Liebelsche, 1911) [One-Day Practice Rides, Suggestions and Examples].
28 Holger H Hervig, op cit, p.70.
30 The need for large retinues of staff officers only really grew with the massive expansion of armies in the Napoleonic era, but from timeless tradition, young staff officers were chosen because of their noble birth, friendship or kinship to the commander, rather than any degree of merit. They were also chosen because they (or their family) had already demonstrated loyalty to their patron and were utterly reliable. They would be expected to carry out their commander’s wishes and override any alternative orders from other leaders within their own army.
35 In 1920, FM von Hindenburg unapologetically recalled his early service on the German General Staff, its purpose and some staff rides, ‘...In April, 1878, my transfer to the General Staff followed, and I was promoted to the rank of captain. A few weeks later I was posted to the Headquarters Staff of the 2nd Army Corps at Stettin... The General Staff was certainly one of the most remarkable structures within the framework of our German Army. Side by side with the distinctly hierarchical form of the commands, it constituted a special element which had its foundation in the great intellectual prestige of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Field-Marshal Count von Moltke. The peace training of the General Staff officer offered a guarantee that in case of war all the commanders in the field should be controlled from a single source, and all their plans governed by a common aim. The influence of the General Staff on those commanders was not regulated by any binding order. It depended far more on the military and personal qualities of the individual officer. The first requirement of the General Staff officer was that he should keep his own personality and actions entirely in the background. He had to work out of sight, and therefore be more than he seemed to be. I believe that, taking it all round, the German General Staff has known how to perform its extraordinarily difficult tasks. Its achievements were masterly to the last, though there may have been mistakes and failures in individual cases. I could imagine no more honourable testimony in its favour than the fact that the enemy has demanded its dissolution in the Peace conditions. It has been suggested in many quarters that there was something mysterious about the work of the General Staff. Nothing more preposterous could be imagined. As has been the case with all our military achievements, those of the General Staff are the result of the application of sound reasoning to the immediate problem in hand. Accordingly it is often necessary for the General Staff officer to turn his attention to all sorts of trivial affairs as well as to high military questions... It was only in the annual General Staff rides that I had a chance of interesting myself in higher matters, in my capacity as the handy-man of the Corps Commander. At this time I also took part in the first Fortress General Staff Ride at Königsberg conducted by General Count Waldessee, Chief of Staff of the 10th Army Corps. My Corps Commander was General Hans von Weyherrn, an experienced soldier who had fought in the service of Schleswig-Holstein in his youth, commanded a Cavalry Division in 1866, and an Infantry Division in 1870-1. It was a real pleasure to see the old officer, a magnificent rider, on horseback in the uniform of his Blücher Hussars...’ See Paul von Hindenburg, Aus meinen Leben, op cit, pp. 54-6.
36 Generalfeldmarschall Alfred, Graf von Schlieffen, 1833-1913.
37 In 1905, Schlieffen considered for the first time breaching Belgium’s neutrality in a major sweep to attack Paris from the West, the eventual plan, in diluted form, enacted by his successor in 1914. Foley and Zuber argue convincingly that there is no evidence that this particular staff ride was meant to be official
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German policy and Strachan observes, ‘The so-called ‘Schlieffen plan’, published for the first time in 1956, is nothing of the sort. It is a memorandum written for his successor and for the war minister, which survived because it was kept by Schlieffen in his private papers’. After the war, some apologist German generals argued that the younger Moltke had not fulfilled the ‘Schlieffen Plan’, but in reality, the ‘plan’ (if it ever existed at all, and Zuber suggests that it did not) was just one of several staff ride alternatives. Thus, recent scholarship is re-examining the causes of the First World War in terms of staff ride-interpretation, although the primary archives for this remain, alas, incomplete, having been largely destroyed by bombing in 1945. See Hew Strachan, op cit, p.166.

38 Evaluation of other staff rides, whether on or off a battlefield, may throw light on other, subsequent campaigns: for example, Heinz Guderian (1888-1954-last Chief of the German General Staff) attended the temporary German Staff College at Sedan in 1918, undertaking local staff rides; in May 1940 he was commanding XIX Panzer Corps attacking across the Meuse near his old billet at Sedan. George S Patton studied the fighting at Metz in 1870 extensively when at Staff College in the United States; by October 1944 he was fighting German rearguards around the old fortress of Metz. See Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle (London: Heinemann 1967), Chapter 2.

39 German staff methods were also ‘exported’ overseas, where they were hugely influential. Part of the early importance of staff rides is that they are also a measure of the wide overseas influence of German staff techniques, which spread outside Germany following the 1870 victory over France. In 1883, the Japanese Minister of the Army toured Europe and asked von Moltke to send an instructor to the newly-created Japanese War College. Professor Yoshio Suginoo has observed that the German instructor, Maj. (later Maj-Gen.) Klemens Wilhelm Jakob Meckel (1842-1906), who served in Japan from 1885 to 1888, ‘…emphasised practical strategic and tactical education as well as military history…manoeuvre exercises and staff rides…’ (See Yashio Suginoo (Professor Dept of Defence Science, National Defence Academy, Japan), ‘The Causes of Japan’s Defeat in 1945’ (China in the 21st Century: International Reception Hall, Taiwan University, Taipei, Nov. 6-7, 1999), accessed on www.future-china.org/csipl/activity/19991106/mj9911_06e, 2 April 2004; also: Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945 (Oxford: University Press 1994), Chapter 8). Elsewhere, as French military influence in Chile was supplanted by German, Hauptmann Emil Körner arrived in Santiago in 1885 with a brief to improve the military educational system, which resulted in the establishment of the Chilean War Academy. Körner (who acted as CGS in the subsequent Chilean Civil War of 1891 and was promoted a Chilean general, retiring in 1910) subsequently requested and got thirty-six German instructors who reorganized the army, developed the General Staff and established the NCO school. Today’s distinctive Chilean army dress uniform is based on that of Nineteenth Century Prussia. (Interview with Lt-Col Ivan Babic, Chilean Army, 15 July 2006.) In Peking, Maj. (later Gen.) Erich von Falkenhayn (1861-1922) served as a military advisor the Chinese army from 1899-1903; I am grateful to Lt-Col Jiuy (Jack) Zhang, PLA (interview, 2 August 2006) for drawing my attention to this fact. In Chile and China, military education and staff rides were incorporated into the formal educational curriculum, where they remain today.

40 Between 1875-6, US Army Maj-Gen. Emory Upton (1839-1881), a Civil War hero and Commandant of West Point, toured Europe, specifically to discover what had made the Prusso-German army so successful. In his resultant The Armies of Asia and Europe (1878), Upton recommended numerous changes to the size, structure, recruitment and training of the US military, to bring it up to the standards of European armies; but without the presence of an obvious threat (apart from the remnants of the Plains Indian tribes and - possibly - Mexican bandits) and in a climate of financial austerity, his pleas went unheard. See Gen. Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe, Embracing Official Reports on the Armies of Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany, France, and England (New York: Appleton 1878), 376pp; and Stephen E. Ambrose, Upton and the Army (Louisiana: State University Press 1992), Chapter VI, pp. 85-111.

41 Believed to be the earliest such battlefield memorial in the United States. Visit to King’s Mountain by the author, August 2003. A very early example of a battlefield guide, a pamphlet entitled The Battle of King's Mountain by Isaac Shelby, was published in April 1823, and has been reprinted by the US National Parks Service, available at the King’s Mountain Visitor Centre. See also Patricia L Hudson & Sandra L Ballard, The Smithsonian Guide to Historic America: The Carolinas and the Appalachian States (New York: Stewart, Tabori & Chang 1989), pp. 141-2.
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44 Ibid.
49 John Plank Tracey (1836-1910) served in the Civil War, enlisting as a private in the Union Army in March 1862, and leaving in March 1865 as 1st Lt. He was subsequently commissioned Lt-Col. in the Missouri Militia in April 1865. He later practised as a lawyer and journalist before being elected as a Republican to the 54th Congress (1895-1897).
50 Ronald F. Lee, op cit.
51 Brig-Gen. Joshua Chamberlain (1828-1914), who won a Medal of Honor at Gettysburg, presided over the fiftieth anniversary in 1913, to which all veterans in the Grand Army of the Republic and the United Confederate Veterans were invited, forty thousand accepting. The highlight of the event on 3 July 1913, which early newsreels captured, was a re-enactment by Confederate veterans of Pickett’s Charge; at the wall that marked their furthest advance, they were greeted by outstretched hands of friendship from the Union survivors.
52 The American Civil War was covered by many guidebooks, including the very early John Townsend Trowbridge’s The South: A Tour of its Battlefields and Ruined Cities, a Journey Through the Desolated States, and Talks with the People (First published 1867; republished and edited by J.H. Segars: Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 2006). It is noteworthy that Trowbridge’s (1827-1916) title suggests he is visiting another country, not fellow Americans! Another early example of this genre reflecting the growing number of civilian tours in America (and an early example of marketing, linking tourism to hotel-keeping) was A Guide to the Fortifications and Battlefields Around Petersburg, with a Splendid Map, from Actual Surveys made by the US Engineer Dep’t: Prepared And Published as a Handbook by the Proprietors of Jarratt’s Hotel, Petersburg, Va. (1866; facsimile edition in author’s possession, republished by Eastern National, 2003 & sold at the Petersburg Battlefield Visitor Centre). Many commercial guidebooks have focussed on Gettysburg over the years, funded by advertising, of which L.W. Minnigh, The Battlefield of Gettysburg: How to See and Understand It; The Tourist’s Guide and Hand-Book With Explanatory Map And Roster of the Armies (Gettysburg: Gettysburg Battlefield with Memorial Association, 1888), published for the 25th anniversary celebrations, is typical example.
53 Joyce Popplewell (ed.), A Gloucestershire Diarist: Lt-Col. AB Lloyd Baker of Harwinec Court: The Early Years 1897-1919 (Gloucester: Thornhill Press 1993) pp. 111-116. William David Holtzworth (1843-1891) was a twice-wounded Civil War veteran who became one of the first Gettysburg battlefield guides. His knowledge of the battle was widely respected and he spent many winters lecturing throughout the United States. Among the guests he guided around the battlefield were Presidents Grant, Hayes and Cleveland; Generals Meade, Sheridan, Sherman, Hancock, Sickles, Warren, Slocum, Gregg, Hooker, Crawford and Longstreet. The battle continued to act as a magnet into the following century; for the 75th anniversary (1938) there were only 8,000 known living veterans of the war. Of these, 1,845 veterans were able to attend - 1,359 from the North and 486 from the South - although only 65 of them had been at the battle. Their average age was 94 and special arrangements had to be made to care for these elderly men. The highlight of this reunion was the lighting of the eternal flame and dedication of the National Peace Memorial on Oak Hill by President Roosevelt the evening of 3 July.
54 Brian Holden Reid, War Studies at the Staff College 1890-1930, SCSI Occasional Paper No. 1 (1992)
55 In The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff (Westminster: A. Constable 1895). Spenser Wilkinson (1853-1937) was a civilian trained as a lawyer, but entered journalism in 1882 (having been invited by the Manchester Guardian to write editorials on the Egyptian campaign). He wrote for the Morning Post in London (1895-1914) and became in 1909 the first Chichele Professor of Military
History at Oxford. Illustrating his own beliefs and the state of the army at the time, he later wrote: ‘...in 1874, when I was twenty-one and at Oxford, I found myself puzzled by the existence of large armies on the Continent and of a small one, said to be inefficient, at home. I determined to find out what it meant, so I began to read books about war. They were full of technicalities which I did not understand, so hoping to get the practical knowledge which would explain them I became a private in the University Volunteer corps. I learned my drill and began to understand the books but found the corps a sham. I got up a Kriegsspiel club and read more books, English, French and German. Four or five years later I was offered a commission in the best of the Manchester corps and accepted it thinking it would be a better chance to learn. By 1880 I had got a company and made my position as a practical officer; at the time I was called to the Bar and beginning to get briefs. I knew then as much about war as could be got from textbooks; was satisfied that the Army was not what it should be and determined to give ten years of my life, so far as the necessity for getting a living would allow, to the attempt to get the army put right...’


57 Gen. Bronsart von Schellendorf (1832-1891)

58 Both of which (according to Spiers), Haldane read in his first month of office in December 1905 and influenced him profoundly. (Spiers, Haldane, op cit, p. 120).


60 Col. George Francis Robert Henderson, CB (1854-1903) was a highly charismatic professor of military history at Camberley, best known for his work regarding the American Civil War and Stonewall Jackson. He was commissioned in 1878, served in India and Egypt, receiving citations for bravery and was promoted captain in 1886. In 1889 he became Instructor in Tactics, Military Law and Administration at Sandhurst, then Professor of Military Art and History to the Staff College (1892-1899). In the Second Boer War (1899-1902), Henderson was Director of Intelligence on the staff of Lord Roberts, but overwork and malaria broke his health, and he had to return home, being eventually selected to write the official history of the war. His health failed and he died in 1903; his lectures and papers were collected and published in 1905 as The Science of War; to this collection a memoir was contributed by Lord Roberts.

61 Holden-Reid, War Studies, op cit, p.7.


65 FM Sir Henry Wilson (1864-1922); an Ulsterman, entered Rifle Brigade 1882; fluent in French and German; wounded in Third Burmese War; served Second Boer war (DSO), then Assistant Mil Secretary to Lord Roberts. Commandant Staff College 1907-10, then DMO at the Wear Office; promoted CIGS in 1918 by Lloyd George, FM and Baronet 1919; resigned from the army and became MP for North Down. Murdered by two IRA men on his doorstep in London on 22 June 1922.


67 Sir William Robertson, Bart., From Private to Field Marshal (London: Constable and Co. 1921), p.82.


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70 Frederick Roberts VC, 1st Earl Roberts of Kandahar (1832-1914). Son of a general, entered Bengal Artillery 1851; VC (Indian Mutiny) 1858; commanded forces in Abyssinia and Afghanistan 1862-78 and relieved Kandahar; C-in-C India 1885; promoted General 1890, Baron Roberts 1892; FM 1895, commanded British forces in first year of Second Boer War 1899.

71 Apart from his frequent visits to the Franco-Prussian battlegrounds, Roberts recorded Henderson’s visits to Virginia (in 1885) and the South African battlefields (in 1901-02), where he had been appointed the Official Historian.

72 Dr. Duncan Anderson, paper presented to the conference on The Importance of the Study of Military History and its Impact in Contemporary Society, held at the Academia de Guerra del Ejército, Santiago, Chile, 24 November 2004.

73 Ibid.

74 Holden-Reid, War Studies, op cit, p.7.

75 Ibid., p.8.

76 Ibid., p.10.

77 Founded originally in 1801 as the Senior Department of the Royal Military College, Great Marlow, under Col. John Gaspard Le Marchant; the course (for which students had to pay until 1858) lasted two years. The Department moved to Sandhurst in 1820 and after the Crimean War, the name was changed to the Staff College (1857) and made independent of the Royal Military College in the following year. It was given new buildings in 1859-63, accommodating 40 students for a two-year course. By 1870, each staff course had 30 students; by 1884 there were places for 48 students, the potential intake being raised to 60 (including 8 from the Indian Army) in 1886, though there was a considerable shortfall in the numbers taking up places, until the foundation of the General Staff in 1906. See Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and Staff College 1854-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen 1972).

78 Ibid, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, op cit, p. 175.

79 Nick Evans, ‘Staff Rides, Tours and Battlefield Tours. A Historical Perspective 1890-1914’, article in British Commission for Military History Newsletter No.13 (Summer 2005), p.5.


84 Evans, op cit, p.5 and Lt-Col. F Maurice, Sir Frederick Maurice: A Record of His Work and Opinions (London: Edward Arnold 1913), pp.60-1.


86 Ibid, op cit, p.152.

87 Ibid.


89 Lt-Col. FW Young MBE, (Librarian, Staff College), The Story of the Staff College 1858-1958 (Camberley June 1958).


91 Holden Reid, War Studies, op cit, p.5.

92 Ibid.


97 Ibid, pp.284-5.

98 FM Viscount Plumer of Messines, 1857-1932, a successful army commander, who emerged from the Great War with his military reputation intact and enhanced.

99 Later Col. Charles À Court Repington, 1858-1925, subsequently a military correspondent for the Times and military historian.
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101 Callwell, Stray Recollections, op cit, p.286.
102 Ibid, p.287.
111 Charteris, op cit, p.12.
112 Ibid.
114 FM Sir William Robertson (1860-1933) held the unusual distinction of being the only man to rise from Private to Field Marshal in the British army. He enlisted aged 17 as a Private in the 16/Lancers in November 1877, was commissioned in 1888 into the 3/Dragoon Guards, and entered Staff College in January 1895. Having been promoted Colonel in 1904, Robertson held the key post of Commandant at the Army Staff College, Camberley (June 1910-October 1913), after Henry Wilson and was subsequently DMT at the War Office. He is regarded as having been one of the three most outstanding Staff College Commandants (with Wilson, his predecessor and Rawlinson, his successor). Robertson was QMG to Sir John French's British Expeditionary Force (BEF), then GCS until 1918 (renamed in December 1915, CIGS, when he received promotion to Lt-Gen.). A staunch supporter of Sir Douglas Haig, Robertson blocked Lloyd George's attempts to divert effort from the Western to the Eastern Front; unlike Lloyd George, Robertson was a keen ‘Westerner’, believing that the war could only be won on the Western Front. Robertson's name had earlier been mooted as a possible contender for French's position as British C-in-C; in the event Haig received the appointment; historians speculate that Robertson's humble beginnings as a Private worked against him. Having thus antagonised the Prime Minister, Robertson resigned in February 1918, taking instead the lesser role of C-in-C of the British Home Forces (replacing Sir John French) and was himself replaced by FM Sir Henry Wilson, whom he had succeeded as Commandant of the Staff College. Commanding the British forces on the Rhine from 1919-20; Robertson was first made Bt. in 1919, then FM in March 1920. He published his autobiography, From Private to Field Marshal, the following year and died in 1933.
117 ‘Some Notes suggested by the German experiences at Gravelotte’, by E.S.M., undated, Records for 1903.
118 Senior Division 1909, Scheme III, issued March 16 1909 by W.P.B., Records for 1909, JSCSC Archives.
119 Senior Division 1912, 1870 Campaign, Exercise I by E.M.P., 22nd January 1912, Records for 1912, JSCSC Archives.
120 Later Lt-Gen. Sir Richard Haking (1862-1945); GOC 5/Brigade August 1914; wounded. GOC 1st Division, Dec. 1914-Sept. 1915; thereafter GOC XI Corps until the war’s end, during which time he took it to Italy (November 1917-February 1918); took temporary command of First Army in September 1916. Later High Commissioner for ther League of Nations of the Free City of Danzig and Hon. Col. Of the Hampshire Regt..
121 Letter dated 8.4.03, Parties for the Battlefields, Signed E.S.M. (Lt-Col. ES May), Records for 1903, JSCSC Archives. This is at Appendix Two.
122 Godwin-Austen, op cit, p.238
123 Ibid, p.239.
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124 Senior Division 1905. Subject for Memoir. Issued 24th March 1905, due in on 5th August 1905 by R.H., Records for 1905, JSCSC Archives.
125 Instructions for Keeping and Writing Up War Diaries and Intelligence Reports, Staff College 25th May 1908, Records for 1908, JSCSC Archives.
126 FM Count Radetzky, 1766-1858, a Czech nobleman, led Austrian troops to defeat Sardinian rebels in Italy, but is better known for the march that Johann Strauss composed years later in his honour.
127 Douglas Haig’s Chief of Staff; later Lt-Gen. Sir Lancelot Kiggell, 1862-1954.
129 Junior Division 1913. Problem in Connection with the American Civil War by W.R.R., 2.4.13, Records for 1913, JSCSC Archives.
130 Junior Division 1913, 2nd Paper, American Civil War by F.M., October 4th 1913, Records for 1913, JSCSC Archives.
131 FM Count Radetzky, 1766-1858, a Czech nobleman, led Austrian troops to defeat Sardinian rebels in Italy, but is better known for the march that Johann Strauss composed years later in his honour.
133 Junior Division 1906. Paper on Field Entrenchments. Issued 4.4.06 by J.P.D.C., Records for 1906, JSCSC Archives.
134 The diary is in the National Army Museum at 7807/25-7.
136 Later Lt-Gen. Sir Tom Bridges, 1871-1939, KCMG, KCB, post-war Governor of South Australia.
139 Battlefield Tour 1907. Programme. Dated 18th February 1907. Records for 1907, JSCSC Archives.
140 Ibid.
141 Gen. Sir Charles Harington (1872-1940), BGGS 1915-17, COS Italy 1917-18; Maj-Gen., COS of Second Army 1918; DCIGS 1918-20; later GOC Aldershot Command 1931-3; Governor of Gibraltar 1933-8.
145 Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914, op cit, p.261.
146 John Connell, Wavell, op cit., p.63.
147 Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Vol. 1, op cit, p.72.
148 Callwell, op cit, p.72.
149 Ibid. p.71.
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162 Ibid, p.76.
163 Ibid.
165 Basil Collier, Brass hat, op cit, pp.134-5.
166 2 December, 1805.
167 22 July, 1812.
168 Built by Wellington’s engineers around Lisbon, 1809-10.
169 Captured by the French on 8 September 1855, during the Crimean War.
170 Memoir, Senior Division 1909 Task No.10 by H.W., February 6, 1909, Records for 1909, JSCSC Archives.
171 See the notes on Recapitulation of Some of the Ways in Which Cavalry Can Co-operate, as Illustrated by the Napoleonic Battle, by G.B., February 10, 1910, Records for 1910, JSCSC Archives.
172 See the 1910 notes on Railways in War, by R.W., January 26, 1910, Records for 1910, JSCSC Archives.
174 Senior Division 1909, Study of operations involving the employment of the British Expeditionary Force on the Continent of Europe, Task No.78, by H.W., November 8, 1909, Records for 1909, JSCSC Archives.
175 Ibid.
176 Senior Division 1912, War Game 12th, 13th and 14th March by E.M.P., Records for 1912, JSCSC Archives.
177 Senior Division. Battlefield Tour 1909, dated January 30, 1909, issued by W.P.B, [repeated from 1908] Records for 1909, JSCSC Archives; this is included at Appendix Three.
179 Junior Division, 1912, Syllabus for Examination in “Military, Martial and International Law”, by J.G., October 1912, Records for 1912, JSCSC Archives.
181 Bond, The Victorian Army, op cit, p.255.
182 Schofield, Wavell, op cit, p.33.
183 Keith Jeffrey, Sir Henry Wilson, op cit, p.81.
184 Ibid, p.72.
185 Ibid, p.68.
186 Ibid, p.69.
187 Ian FW Beckett, Johnnie Gough VC, op cit, p.139.
188 Senior Division 1911, Comments by the Commandant on memoirs written on one or more of the following subjects. (a) How to ensure concentration of superior force at the decisive point. (b) The employment of cavalry in co-operation with other arms. (c) The principles of command. - page 3, Records for 1911, JSCSC Archives.
189 Military Aviation Notes by H.R.M. B.-P, 3rd November 1911, Records for 1911, JSCSC Archives.
190 Summary of Aeronautical Strengths in Foreign Countries, 1912, Staff College, Camberley, 15.5.13, Records for 1913, JSCSC Archives.
191 Junior Division 1912, Syllabus for Examination in “Strategy and Tactics” by J.G., October 1912, Records for 1912, JSCSC Archives.
192 Senior Division 1911, Comments by the Commandant, op cit, Records for 1911, JSCSC Archives.
193 Ibid, p.5.
197 Ibid, p.72.
198 Senior Division 1912, Exercise on Wastage of Personnel in War, 8-2-12, by W.R.R., Records for 1912, JSCSC Archives. In 1913, ‘Wully’ also issued a ‘Comparison of Casualties in the Russo-Japanese War 1904-5 and that of the Franco-German War of 1870-01’ to all students.
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199 Junior Division 1912, Artillery Exercise No.1, by H.S.J., 11th February 1912, Records for 1912, JSCSC Archives.
200 The failure to graduate was by no means uncommon in this era, when an Oxbridge degree was (arguably) merely a ‘nice polish’ to an expensive public school education, and future careers did not rest on possession of a degree. Attendance at university, however, was relatively unusual for army officers and a mark of Haig’s aptitude and intelligence.
201 1877-1916.
202 Letter D. Haig to P. Howell, 3 October 1907, Philip Howell (18770-1916) Papers, LHCMA, KCL, Howell 2/18. I am most grateful to Prof. Gary Sheffield for bringing this reference to my attention.
204 Douglas Haig, Cavalry Studies: Strategic and Tactical (London: Hugh Rees 1907).
206 Supplied for several years; see Senior Division 1913, Instructions for the Visit to Foreign Battlefields, Notes for Coulmiers, by L.J.B., April 1913, Records for 1913, JSCSC Archives.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
209 Coulmiers, 9 November 1870; Loigny-Poupry, 2 December 1870; Beaune la Rolande, 28 November 1870; Le Mans, 10-12 January 1871; Villers-Bretonneux, 26 November 1870.
210 See Peter Pedersen, Villers-Bretonneux (Pen & Sword Battleground Europe Series 2004)
211 Most recently visited by this author in July 2007.
213 Senior Division 1912, Memoir by W.R.R. 1.7.12, Records for 1912, JSCSC Archives.
214 Senior Division 1913, Memoir, Records for 1913, JSCSC Archives.
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‘This was a battle, but its significance as an event in human experience transcends the military. The tactical, technical and logistic problems it raised are often of high and absorbing interest. More and more, however, those of us who fought through this battle have become aware that what remains with us can best be described as a spiritual experience’

General Sir John Hackett

CHAPTER FIVE

The Shadow of the Somme

Western Front Tourism.

Given the tradition of battlefield tours to Waterloo and Gettysburg in the Nineteenth Century that we have encountered in Chapters Three and Four, it should come as no surprise that visitors flooded to the Western Front after 1918. Perhaps what was surprising was the speed with which they arrived. Although this chapter considers post-Great War battlefield tourism as a primarily a civilian phenomenon (which, in terms of numbers, it was), its relevance to this thesis is that the Staff College at Camberley and other military institutions sponsored many battlefield visits, using the ordinary tourist infrastructure. What separates the visitors to the First World War battlefields in the 1920s from all those who had gone to battlegrounds before (or would travel to any battle terrain in the future), was that these were predominantly veterans, returning to ‘their’ terrain, where huge numbers of them had served – for example, around five million British and Commonwealth service personnel served on the Western Front. Most passed through or near Ypres, which – although in ruins – rapidly became the centre of a thriving tourist industry.
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Why had this not happened earlier? The First World War involved an unprecedented number of people. About seven million men passed through the ranks of the British army during 1914-18, but in a uniquely concentrated fashion; a substantial proportion – 5.3 million - served on the Western Front at some stage (mainly Ypres or on the Somme), and suffered an unprecedented number of casualties.\(^2\) Within the first year of peace (September 1919), Maj. Bernard Law Montgomery (1887-1976) was undertaking a battlefield tour, having been asked by the C-in-C of the Rhineland Occupation Army (FM Sir ‘Wully’ Robertson) to take a civilian friend of his on a tour of the French battlefields. The frugal Monty wrote to his mother, ‘...The trip will be Wiesbaden – Strasbourg – Nancy – Metz - St Mihiel – Rheims - Chemin des Dames – Soissons – Mons – Maubeuge – Louvain - Cologne. A nice round trip and over 1000 miles by car altogether…He is a rich man and I get all my expenses paid...’\(^3\) An immediate observation to be made from this itinerary and many early (post-1918) tours is that the early destinations were rarely exclusively ‘British’. The detritus of war that drew the visitors were deposited by many nationalities – British, Belgian, French, American and German.

**Early Guide Books.**

To assist the travellers like Montgomery perhaps the most famous series of battlefield guides of the Twentieth Century were published between 1917-38 by the pneumatic tyre manufacturers *Michelin* of Clermont Ferrand (France), Fulham (London) and Milltown (New Jersey); in an effort to promote automobile tourism, they published a series of fifteen *Illustrated Michelin Guides to the Battle-Fields (1914-18)* in English, thirty-one titles in French, four in Italian and one in German.\(^4\) Numerous photographs in each show extremely well the destruction still evident in
post war France, Belgium and Italy; they were dedicated to the memory of *Michelin* employees who died for their country; intriguingly the earliest guide was the *Battlefields of the Marne 1914*, and copyrighted in 1917, before the fighting was over, and before one of the most dangerous moments – the German March 1918 offensive – threatened final victory. The translated Foreword for the original volume stated:

‘...For the benefit of tourists who wish to visit the battle-fields and mutilated towns of France we have tried to produce a work combining a practical guide and a history. Such a visit should be a pilgrimage, not merely a journey across the ravaged land. Seeing is not enough, one must understand; a ruin is more moving when one knows what has caused it; a stretch of country which might seem dull and uninteresting to the unenlightened eye, becomes transformed at the thought of the battles which have raged there…This book appears before the end of the war, but the country over which it leads the reader has long been freed. The wealth of illustration in this work allows the intending tourist to make a preliminary trip in imagination, until such time as circumstances permit his undertaking the journey in reality, beneath the sunny skies of France…’.  

In other words, *Michelin* had anticipated a wave of battlefield tourists before the 1914-18 conflict had even ended. The rest of the series, though, appeared after the war’s end, the first English edition being *Ypres* (1919). Seven of the English-language editions from the author’s collection are illustrated at Figure 5.1 (below).

The series was phenomenally successful and sales totalled over two million copies, the profits being recycled into French war charities. After the Second World War, instead of guidebooks, *Michelin* (in 1947) produced a series of four special ‘battle maps’ tracing the path of the Allied armies liberating France in 1944-5. Both the First World War guides and the Second World War maps have recently been reprinted with great success.
Figure 5.1: Some of the English-language version Michelin ‘Guides to the Battlefields 1914-18’ series. (Source: author’s collection.)

Figure 5.1 English language editions of the Michelin battlefield guides from 1919-20. (Source: author’s collection.)
Another early guidebook was Douglas Wilson Johnson’s Battlefields of the World War, Western and Southern Fronts. A Study in Military Geography, with a Foreword by Gen. Tasker H. Bliss was published in 1921. Although published by Oxford University Press and written by an academic, it would have appealed to few outside the military profession and it is significant that its author had worn uniform during 1917-19. Johnson had travelled the whole extent of Western Front (and into Northern Italy) as a major in US Military Intelligence and his book was part-guide, part-geological analysis of the battlefields, which he had surveyed personally during and after the fighting, from the point-of-view of both a soldier and a professor of geography. Johnson wrote pairs of chapters, one dealing in great detail with the topography of a region, the other detailing the military operations upon it. His important work is all but forgotten, but he makes several key observations; which have resonance today:

‘each “revolution” in methods of combat brings in its train a body of opinion intent on demonstrating that, under the new conditions of fighting, topographic obstacles have lost their significance, strategic gateways no longer exist, and commanding heights no longer “command”. Then, as opposing forces share in the new discoveries, or profit in equal measure by new systems, the fundamental importance of topography reasserts itself, and each side maneuvers for an advantageous position on the terrain as one of the prerequisites to victory in battle...’

This viewpoint is similar to that of the geographer Peter Doyle, cited in the Introduction. Johnson goes on to suggest that two elements are key to understanding the relationship of topography to modern warfare:

‘...the first is a reasonably accurate mental image of each battlefield, a picture of those salient features of the terrain which might be expected to influence the dispositions and movements of armies. The second is a record of the military operations on each battlefield presented...’

Johnson here identifies the basis on which most military battlefield excursions and studies take place, and the reason for doing so on the ground, rather than in the
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classroom. It is difficult to place Johnson’s book in terms of readership, for he states,

‘if these…chapters prove of service to the future historian of the war….if they aid the military student in analyzing the operations of each battle and campaign….if they furnish the intelligent traveler with a new form of guide to the European battlefields….the author’s labours will be most abundantly rewarded….’ ¹¹

Johnson is writing not just of tactics on the ground, or the operational level of war (not that he would have used the term) but is making an impassioned plea to decision-makers at the political-strategic level, that the nature of the ground remains paramount, illustrating the cause and continuing need for battlefield tours and staff rides. One could read this passage (written in 1919-20) in 2006 with Afghanistan or Iraq at the back of one’s mind:

‘…One object of the present volume is to demonstrate the fallacy of the contention that modern methods of warfare have reduced to insignificance the rôle of the terrain in strategy and tactics. This demonstration might be made by abstract argument: by showing that, despite the enormous improvement in the artillery and other arms of service, it is still the infantry which must drive back the enemy and conquer the ground on which he stands, and whatever affects the movement of infantry remains a vital element in the fighting…’ ¹²

This observation – that whilst air can affect the course of the fighting, and help take terrain – land is the only military component it that ultimately can hold ground, was vigorously re-emphasised in a June 2002 speech by Maj-Gen. Thomas Metz,

‘You could fly over the land for ever, you could bomb it, atomize it, pulverize and wipe it clean, but if you desire to defend it, protect it and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground. The way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men in the mud. That means infantrymen lead the way and they are as valuable and needed today as they have been throughout the course of mankind’ ¹³

Being able to anticipate large numbers of civilian and military tourists visiting the battlefields, as Michelin did, implies that the tradition was well practised before the Great War, as Chapters Three and Four have concluded. This anticipation of
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future battlefield tourism was also echoed by a First World War poet, Lt. John Stanley Purvis, 1890-1968, who (writing as Philip Johnston) penned in 1918 the remarkable High Wood, which was where he had fought and been wounded in 1916. As it is both prophetic and very much in keeping with the theme of this thesis, it is quoted in full, here:

‘Ladies and gentlemen, this is High Wood,
Called by the French, Bois des Fourceaux,
The famous spot which in Nineteen-Sixteen,
July, August and September was the scene
Of long and bitterly contested strife,
By reason of its High commanding site.
Observe the effect of shell-fire in the trees
Standing and fallen; here is wire; this trench
For months inhabited, twelve times changed hands;
(They soon fall in), used later as a grave.
It has been said on good authority
That in the fighting for this patch of wood
Were killed somewhere above eight thousand men,
Of whom the greater part were buried here,
This mound on which you stand being.... Madame, please,
You are requested kindly not to touch
Or take away the Company's property
As souvenirs; you'll find we have on sale
A large variety, all guaranteed.
As I was saying, all is as it was,
This is an unknown British officer,
The tunic having lately rotted off.
Please follow me - this way ..... the path, sir, please,
The ground which was secured at great expense
The Company keeps absolutely untouched,
And in that dug-out (genuine) we provide
Refreshments at a reasonable rate.
You are requested not to leave about
Paper, or ginger-beer bottles, or orange peel,
There are waste-paper baskets at the gate...

The Fatal Avenue.

Even before the First World War had ended, the War Office invited the writer and later Poet Laureate John Masefield (1878-1967) to write an account of what the Western Front looked like, a battlefield guide for those civilians who could not or
were not permitted to visit it (today we might call this a ‘virtual’ guide). The result was a slim, 85-page volume, *The Old Front Line*, published in 1917.\(^\text{15}\)  Masefield’s extraordinary book is unique, for he was writing of the Somme before the war had ended; he was not to know that the German March 1918 offensive and the subsequent battles to recover the lost ground had yet to sweep over the battle terrain he was describing. Photographs in the first British and American editions illustrate several of the locations, making this the earliest actual battlefield guide to any of the 1914-18 battlegrounds (it may have inspired the first *Michelin* guide, also published in 1917); Masefield observed the ground closely and thoughtfully and occasionally leapt forward to how the ground might look to a future generation, finishing his account on the morning of 1 July 1916:

‘…To most of the British soldiers who took part in the Battle of the Somme, the town of Albert must be a central point in a reckoning of distances…It will be, quite certainly, the centre from which, in time to come, travellers will start to see the battle-field from where such deeds were done by men of our race…It is not now (after three years of war and bombardments) an attractive town; probably it never was \(^\text{16}\)…Long after we are gone, perhaps stray English tourists, wandering in Picardy, will see names scratched in a barn, some mark or notice on a door, some sign-post, some little line of graves, or hear, on the lips of a native, some slang phrase of English, learned long before in the war-time, in childhood, when the English we there. All the villages behind our front line were thronged with our people \(^\text{17}\)… It may be some years before those whose fathers, husbands and brothers were killed in this great battle, may be able to visit the battlefield where their dead are buried. Perhaps many of them, from brooding on the map, and from dreams and visions in the night, have in their minds an image or picture of that place. The following pages may help some few others, who have not already formed that image, to see the scene as it appears today. What it was like on the day of battle cannot be imagined by those who were not there…’\(^\text{18}\)

In 1934 a young French officer would write of the same area,

‘…This breach in its ramparts is France’s age-old weakness. Through it Roman Gaul saw the barbarians rush in on its riches. It was there that the monarchy struggled with difficulty against the power of the Holy Roman Empire. There Louis XIV defended his power against the
European coalition. The Revolution almost perished there. Napoleon succumbed there. In 1870 disaster and disgrace took no other road. In this fatal avenue we have just buried one-third of our youth’. 19

This was the young Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970), who was not to know that six years after he penned these words an even greater national disgrace and horrendous casualties would occur within the same fatal avenue. Unsurprisingly, Richard Holmes used the term ‘Fatal Avenue’ for his traveller’s history of northern France and Flanders. Sir John Keegan has noted how the route taken by the German *panzers* in May 1940,

‘…apparently an unconfined romp across open country once the tanks that led it had broken the barrier of the Ardennes forest and the River Meuse, turns out to have followed very closely the line of *Route Nationale* 43, which for much of its length is the Roman road laid out soon after Caesar’s conquest of Gaul in the First Century BC…’ 20

The quickest of glances at a map of the Arras-Bapaume-Cambrai-Peronne- Albert-Amiens area of Northern France reveals a network of dead-straight roads, all of which were laid down by Roman engineers, underlining the region’s military significance even two millennia ago. Maps 10 and 11 show geologically why armies have been drawn to this manoeuvre corridor throughout the ages. A well-known 1914 photograph makes the same point, with British officers pictured inspecting the memorial obelisk on the battlefield of Malplaquet, erected by the French to commemorate the two hundredth anniversary of the battle, fought on 11 September 1709. This understanding of terrain is important, because it can help military commanders, even today, choose appropriate campaigns to study, according to their needs. For example, before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, USAEUR V Corps units based in Germany studied Guderian’s crossing of the River Meuse (1940), because they reasoned (correctly) that they would have to undertake assault river crossings. 21
Maps 10 (above) and 11 (below) showing geological aspects of the Fatal Avenue. The Somme area (Map 10) is sandwiched between the low-lying Flanders Plain and the Ardennes hills. Higher ground is ruled in Map 11. This has caused armies through the centuries to fight in this small area. Source: Douglas Wilson Johnson, *Battlefields of the First World War: A Study in Military Geography* (Oxford: University Press 1921), pp.86 and 92.
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Other images echo this sense of *déjà vu*; in 1918, photographs (Figures 5.2 and 5.3, below) published in *The War Illustrated*, a weekly part-work magazine which appeared throughout the First World War, showed British troops on 21 November 1918, on their way to occupy the Rhineland marching past the Lion Mound at Waterloo (with the Panorama building in the background), and officers outside the Wellington Hotel at the same site – two British armies on the same spot, separated by 103 years.22

Figure 5.2: Sketch of British soldiers passing the Lion Mound at Waterloo on 21 November 1918. Although this may be artists’ licence, they appear to have come from Nivelles and are marching North East, towards Brussels and occupation duties in Germany.

Published in the *War Illustrated* on 21 December 1918, p.310. (Author’s collection)
Military history repeating itself over the same terrain was not limited to Western Europe, but the ever-shifting frontiers of Eastern Europe with Russia have also prompted a sense of *déjà-vu* by John Keegan and others. The German First World War commander Paul von Hindenburg (1847-1934) had the unusual experience in August 1914 of directing the Battle of Tannenberg (26-30 August 1914) over ground he had personally studied 30 years previously during a staff ride,

‘...By a freak of fortune it was in Osterode, one of the villages which we made our Headquarters during the battle, that I received one of the two captured Russian Corps Commanders, in the same inn at which I had
been quartered during a General Staff Ride in 1881 when I was a young staff officer…24

Within a year of the Armistice, Capt. Atherton Fleming had written the 124-page *How to see the Battlefields*, published by Cassell at half a crown (two shillings and sixpence or twelve-and-a-half pence today), the equivalent of half a day’s wage in 1919 prices).25 In 1920 Talbot House, the soldiers’ refuge in Poperinghe, Belgium (also known as ‘Toc H’) founded by the Rev. ‘Tubby’ Clayton, published a 91-page *Pilgrim’s Guide to the Ypres Salient*, by local resident Herbert Reiach. This was one of the earliest guidebooks to the Ypres area and contains a mix of historical articles, advice on visiting, a list of cemeteries and many period advertisements (which betray the method of its funding).26 The same year, Lt-Col. TA Lowe DSO, MC, published *The Western Battlefields. A Guide to the British Line* (Figure 5.4, below).27

![Image of The Western Battlefields book cover](image-url)
Lowe’s advice in this volume extended to the sartorial:

‘…What to Wear: As for clothes, an old golfing suit is the most suitable, with stout boots and leggings: the latter protect the shin against sharp ends of wire, for there is still a certain amount lying about in the undergrowth. A mackintosh coat or cape should always be carried except when there is no doubt about the weather…Ladies should wear strong boots, thick woollen stockins, and short skirts, with woollen jumper or jersey, if they wish to really enjoy the tour. The country is so rough that any lighter form of kit would be absurd… Field gasses and a camera complete the outfit, except that I strongly recommend the addition of a Small First Aid outfit containing some antiseptic which can be dabbed on cuts and scratches…’  

Camberley Reopens.

The Staff College at Camberley reopened its doors in January 1919, having terminated its last pre-apocalyptic course in August 1914, with the outbreak of war; students on the first three year-long post-war courses (1919-21) were specially selected on the basis of their aptitude and experience in the late war, and thus only spent a shorter time at Camberley. The pre-war tradition of visiting battlefields was thus dropped as it was recognised that most, if not all, students (who included Henry Maitland ‘Tiny’ Wilson, Alan Brooke, Percy Hobart, and the VC's - Bernard Freyberg, Jack Gort and Philip Neame) of that first Staff College course had just fought over them (indeed their performance in the late war was a factor in gaining a place on the course). Neither was there time, as the course lasted just one year – so there were no Senior or Junior divisions. Consequently there is no evidence that a battlefield tour of First World War (or any other) battlefields took place from Camberley in 1919, or in 1920. Nevertheless, James Marshall-Cornwall recalled ‘the Staff College course was strenuous, but our weekends were free from work’ and was amused to encounter on a train up to London, Bernard Freyberg ‘reading a life of Napoleon…He was certainly a very ambitious soldier and endeavoured by intense study to make up for his previous lack of education.’
Presided over by the Chief Instructor, Brig-Gen. (later FM Sir John) Dill, all the 104 students of 1920 seem to have had a ‘good war’ and their ranks included (excluding bars) sixteen awards of a CB or CMG, 78 DSOs, 36 MCs, and thirteen with a CBE or OBE; whilst nine possessed no decorations (mostly Indian army, cavalry or colonial forces); whilst two each were from the RN and RAF. Three were colonels and 37 lieutenant-colonels, but most – like Maj. Bernard Montgomery, DSO – had held higher acting rank (Monty had been a Lt-Col. GSO1 and later commanded 17/Royal Fusiliers in the Rhine Occupation Army). The Staff College historian noted that the 1919 and 1920 courses together fielded 20 officers who had served as brigadier-generals, and their ranks included five VCs, 38 CBs and CMGs, plus 170 DSO (three of whom had bars). Amongst Monty’s exact contemporaries at Staff College were Maj. Victor Fortune, an unlucky divisional commander in 1940 and - both as fellow student and later, fellow instructor and corps commander – Maj. Richard O’Connor (1889-1981) who had commanded the 2/Honourable Artillery Company and won two DSOs and an MC. O’Connor, however, undertook a private battlefield tour during his summer leave in August-September 1920; with his mother and a fellow officer, touring the French and Belgian battlefields in a chauffeur-driven car before resuming his studies in September. The expedition was voluntary and clearly O’Connor (besides showing his mother where he had fought) also felt he could learn something by revisiting the scenes of his earlier endeavours.

The third year (1921) at Camberley was sub-divided into 57 Senior and 52 Junior division students, only five of whom had no decorations, whilst one (Maj. FC Roberts, Worcesters) had a VC, DSO and MC; altogether, 76 had DSOs and 56 an MC; like the preceding two courses, the Seniors studied for only a year, but the 1921 Junior division – being the first two-year course, became the Senior division of
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1922. One of the reasons for a paucity of records within the Staff College Archives for the immediate post-war period was the arrival of the new Chief Instructor, Col. JFC Fuller in January 1923. Fuller had attended most of the last pre-war Staff Course, arriving in January 1913, so experiencing Robertson’s last year and Kiggell’s first, but narrowly missed the summer battlefield tour, which was cancelled due to the outbreak of war in August 1914 when the College closed. Fuller had experienced an exceptionally ‘good’ war, emerging as the GSO1 of the new Tank Corps in 1917 (and was instrumental in saving it, post-war). With reference to his pre-war Staff College training, Fuller later observed that before the war he had been,

‘an 1870 soldier. My sojourn in the Tank Corps has dissipated these ideas. Today I am a believer in war mechanics, that is, in a mechanical army which requires few men and powerful machines’. According to his Memoirs of An Unconventional Soldier,

‘my intention was to start with a clean slate. I did not want old schemes to amend or old lectures to re-hash. So, when the time came, I entered my office, rang the bell, and to the consternation of the head clerk asked him to have all papers, documents and schemes removed and burnt. And I sincerely hope that my successor did the same…’

Fuller’s behaviour was partly the act of the enquiring mind he possessed, and partly a reaction that most of his generation shared against that which had gone before (the Great War, and the road that led to it). In terms of Kolb, we can assess Fuller as a blend of Abstract Conceptualisation (AC), and Reflective Observation (RO), in other words, an Assimilating Learning Type, or Honey and Mumford’s ‘Theorist’. Fuller’s destructive tendency towards the Staff College archives was confirmed by the Commandant (Maj-Gen RJ Collins) in 1940, via a memorandum pasted into the flyleaf of the surviving Camberley records:
‘The Commandant has agreed that the Staff College files containing the year’s work for BOTH the Senior and Junior Divisions of the under mentioned years will be kept. The remainder to be destroyed:-
1923. Ironside Period
1929 Gwynne ‘’
1933 Dill ‘’
1935 Armitage ‘’
1936 onwards ALL to be kept…[signed]…18 Jun 40…’

In 1923 Fuller also published his fifth book, *The Reformation of War*, in spite of the opposition of the CIGS, FM the Earl of Cavan, who began the destructive process (which continues to this day) of actively discouraging (then banning) serving officers from publishing books - which (to put it kindly) might be regarded as an expression of institutional anti-intellectualism. In *The Reformation*, Fuller looked forward to tri-service strategy and the ‘mechanicalizing’ of transport, artillery and infantry within twenty years, stating ‘the age of the present naval Brontosaurus is nearing its end’. Another aspect of Kolb’s Assimilating types is that ‘ideas and concepts are more important than people’ (Chapter One) and Fuller, alas, made as many friends as enemies with his ideas.

With the blessing of his Commandant (Maj-Gen. Edmund ‘Tiny’ Ironside, who had requested him, and whom Brian Holden Reid states was Fuller’s mentor), it was Fuller himself (Jay Luvass says that Ironside gave him a ‘free reign’) who initiated the new-style battlefield tours for the Senior Division of 1923, in four-man unaccompanied syndicates to destinations of their own choosing. This division could muster a VC (GRP Roupell, East Surreys), 26 DSOs, 24 MCs and nine other decorations between 49 students. According to a Staff College memoir, sufficient funds were allotted for a ten-day visit in civilian clothes, and the meat of the exercise was the comprehensive report the syndicate penned afterwards, which was marked by syndicate and divisional Directing Staff.
The New Battlefield Tours.

The Staff College have kept records of only some tours in nine years (of the seventeen years they ran, 1923-39), as follows: 1923 (seven tours); 1926 (ten tours); 1927 (11 tours); 1928 (13 tours); 1929 (16 tours); 1930 (12 tours); 1931 (11 tours), 1938 (eight tours) and 1939 (nine tours). From the start, these were known as ‘Foreign Tours’, not ‘battlefield tours’ and the 1923 tours took place during January or April-May. Half the 1923 reports are missing; despite there being 49 students in the 1923 Senior Division, reports from only seven four-man syndicates survive; as most locations differ, the surmise is that the reports had been ‘weeded’ for repetition (perhaps by Fuller himself, or perhaps his successors in 1940) and only a representative sample survive.

The 1923 tours visited Alsace-Lorraine; Verdun-Rheims-Soissons; Metz-Verdun-Rheims; East Prussia; Northern Italy; South-East Europe; whilst two tours went to areas of the Italian battlefields (where the British fought in 1917-18). Instantly, one can observe that this kind of tour was very different to the pre-war idea of the whole division touring the Franco-Prussian battlefields. There was a huge onus on the individuals to first agree their campaign, then prepare by intensive reading, and conclude with a post-tour phase of report-writing; but validation was difficult because no DS accompanied the syndicates, who were marked only on their written work and campaign narrative, rather than their apparent profound understanding of the terrain and its effect on leadership and decision-making. It is difficult to comprehend why such small groups were despatched, when the ready-made formula of the traditional Camberley syndicate (ten), plus a DS, was available and could easily have accomplished the same result, with the DS stimulating and moderating discussions, as in the syndicate room.

Maj. Carolyn Johnstone’s thesis,
discussed in Chapter One, observed that syndicate room discussions ‘could be seen as an ideal vehicle for professional development...Formally arranged discussions can also assist students in developing skills as self-directed learners’, 49 which may have been Fuller’s aim, but Johnstone also argues also that the discussions ‘can be transferred easily to place of work...the students have to apply their expertise in diverse circumstances and the learning environment should reflect the fact that clear-cut answers are not always available...’50 The post-war tours provided an opportunity for this and, conducted in syndicates or groups of syndicates, would have provided continuity with the Camberley methodology.

Apart from Fuller’s idiosyncratic objectives, perhaps the answer lies also in the nature of the report submitted, as a model of service writing and report-making; there is also a sense of the students adding to the history of warfare on the Staff College shelves (as the first post-Second World War tours of 1947 were also designed to do).51 Whilst requiring much engagement from students, the overseas element of the tour was essentially passive, with the students having to do little more than survey the terrain in conjunction with narrative histories; but this is also an example of Fuller’s approach – less ‘spoon-feeding’ and more making the student think for himself: in 1926, Fuller had observed, ‘The Staff College was run like a school (absurd)...I, in my division, changed it into a university’.52

The group visiting Metz-Verdun-Rheims between 11-17 January 1923 (see Map 9), spent five days on the ground, with and without their French hosts; alas, they do not state why they chose their destinations or what their learning outcome was to be. Their report53 highlights aspects of battlefield touring war-torn France and Belgium in the 1920s,
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‘…1. The size of the syndicate should be kept down; four is suggested as a maximum so as to allow room in a five-seated car, for a guide if required. 2. The syndicate should be composed of all arms if possible, but infantry and artillery officers are essential. 3. Each member of the syndicate should prepare a paper on the operations…allotted to him for study. It is essential that such papers should be produced in sufficient time to allow their being thoroughly digested before the tour commences, as…the journal and discussions will take up all the time available…4. When a programme has been arranged, it should be sent, in ample time, to the Military Attaché at PARIS together with a request for any further information that may be required… 6. A car is essential if any benefit is to be obtained from the visit….’

The points about all-arms syndicates and preparing papers beforehand (in the manner of a present-day HCSC Staff Ride), emphasises Vygotsky’s concepts of the importance of learning from each other, and is an excellent example of Kolb’s whole CE-RO-AC-AE Learning Cycle at work. Administratively, the syndicate observed,

‘1. Use of car. A car, whether taken over, or hired locally, is essential, if full benefit is to be obtained for time spent…a powerful car is required in the devastated areas. In the ARGONNE especially, gradients are steep and road surfaces thoroughly bad. When off the beaten track, the road, where it crosses the front trench systems, should be carefully reconnoitred…2. Hotel Accommodation. Varies considerably. METZ. Grand Hotel. Moderate. Room 15 frs. Dejeuner 10 frs. Dinner 10 frs. But extras charged for. Bill for four persons, from 11 p.m. Wednesday to 3 p.m. Friday, including one dinner to a French officer was 550 frs. (£8.7.0). REIMS. Grand Hotel du Nord. Very reasonable. Room 15 frs. Double room 25 frs. All meals out, so the bill would be an unfair comparison. VERDUN. The party was accommodated by the French Army…Meals. Good in hotels, but expensive. In station buffets, good and cheap. Restaurant cars should be avoided if possible. In the HAVRE-PARIS train, lunch for four came to 55 frs. In the REIMS Station buffet, a very much better lunch came to 32 frs. Beer in this district was light and good, and a better drink than the “vin ordinaire”. Food on the SOUTHAMPTON-HAVRE boat is bad and very expensive. 3. Liaison with local Officials. In this instance, a first call was paid at METZ, as a consequence, Staff cars were provided at METZ and VERDUN, and accommodation at VERDUN….In each place visited, arrangements were made for a French officer to meet the party and act as guide. 4. Kit. Boots are badly cleaned and always scraped with a knife. Also the battlefields still abound in old wire, half buried. As a consequence, old boots, provided they are watertight, are recommended. A dinner jacket is not required. But in view of the necessity of entertaining French Officers, a good dark or blue serge lounge suit should be taken…7. The French Staff and Officers start earlier, and keep
different hours to those looked on as normal in England. If the programme demands it, a start at 7.30 a.m. is not looked upon as anything out of the way. 8. It is essential that each such party should include a good linguist of the country or countries visited. It is also an advantage for the party to be composed of different arms, including at least one R.A. and one R.E. officer...10. *Finance.* Allowances easily covered expenses, but this was almost entirely due to:- (a) The provision of a free car for 4 out of the 6 days. Car hire for the last came to 740 frs. (over £13.). (b) The provision of free accommodation at VERDUN. (c) The favourable rate of exchange, averaging 66 frs. to the sovereign...**55**

This is a lost era of boot-boys and sovereigns; but the report reads partly like a modern traveller’s ‘Rough Guide’ and has been written by and for those un-used to visiting war-torn France. The advice about cars would equate to an enjoinder to use a 4x4 vehicle today and it is interesting to note that the HCSC Staff Ride (Chapter Eight) adopts this self-drive, syndicate-per-car approach today. Most British officers travelling in France five years earlier (in 1918) would have been doing so at their Government’s expense, in uniform, with no knowledge or consideration of exchange rates, car hire charges, tipping habits or where to eat cheaply. This had altered considerably and the nature of the Administrative Report perhaps implies a gulf between expectations and reality. It also points up a profound isolationism in understanding Continental habits (‘French...officers... keep different hours to those looked upon as normal in England’). Still in 1923, Charles Carrington, MC,**56** formerly of the 1/5th Royal Warwicks, was exploring the ground he had fought over six years earlier, at Biaches on the Somme - with unexpected results. He found,

‘A trench full of the flotsam and jetsam of war. I dug an old gun out of the mud and found to my surprise that it was not a modern rifle but a Brown Bess musket, dropped there by some British soldier during Wellington’s last action against a French rearguard in 1815...**57**

**The Caddick-Adams Tour.**

Other travellers enduring the same challenges of war-torn France and Belgium included many veterans, including this author’s grandfather, Charles Caddick-Adams,
MC (1889-1969), who took his wife - whom he had married on leave in 1915 - on a three-week private battlefield tour in 1921. Travelling by train and chauffeur-driven car, they visited the areas where he had led his battalion, his old billets where his wartime civilian hosts still resided, and cemeteries at Ypres, Loos and on the Somme containing fallen comrades from the 1/5th North Staffordshire Territorials, into which he had been commissioned in 1910. They also visited popular sites with which he had no personal connection, such as Zeebrugge (scene of a coastal raid on 23 April 1918). The photograph album they compiled of this tour (now in the author’s possession) also contained many picture postcards of battlefield tourist attractions, such as coastal guns and wreckage at Zeebrugge (Figure 5.8) and Ostend, craters (on the Somme) and ruined buildings (at Ypres, Lens and Bethune, Figure 5.5) and churches (at Arras and Amiens); thus the tour was part pilgrimage (the cemeteries and billets) and partly a tour of battlefield curiosities. In his diary, Charles recorded

**Figure 5.5:** picture postcard of a military cemetery at Bethune, purchased during the Caddick-Adams battlefield tour of May 1921, before the Imperial War Graves Commission had installed their distinctive headstones. *(Source: author’s collection).*
Figure 5.6 (above) is a picture postcard from the Caddick-Adams 1921 tour showing the primitive nature of refreshments on the immediate post-war battlefields, but hinting at an immediate tourist industry (note the caption is in English). Judging from the landscape, the postcard would seem to date from 1918-19. Figure 5.7 (below) shows an aspect of the Loos battlefield, c.1919; this is further evidence of the instantaneous arrival of tourists on the 1914-18 battlefields. The civilian in the foreground gives a good sense of scale alongside the trenches. The author’s grandfather led his battalion (1/5th North Staffordshire Regt.) over this terrain on 13 October 1915. (Source: author’s collection)
Figure 5.8 (above): postcard commemorating the Zeebrugge raid of 23 April 1918; note the multi-lingual caption for tourists. This is evidence of the substantial post-war battlefield tourist industry - the captions are in French, Flemish and English.

Figure 5.9 (below): fragment of a trench map of Gommecourt and Fonquevillers on the Somme, where CC-A’s battalion attacked with heavy loss on 1 July 1916; (note the trench called ‘Stafford Avenue’). The map was taken on the 1921 tour.

(Source: both author’s collection)
Figure 5.10 (above): tourist postcard of wrecked British tank at Ypres railway station, purchased by Charles Caddick-Adams in a later tour (circa 1930, to judge by the reconstruction in the background). Figure 5.11 (below): this is the same tank, photographed in May 1940, purchased by the author in 2001. (Both author’s collection)
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finding shrapnel balls next to a War Cemetery at Gommecourt (on the Somme, Figure 5.9), where some of his brother officers were buried, and buying ‘trench art’ engraved shell cases, a letter opener and pair of ashtrays made from cartridge cases, at Ypres (these are now in the author’s possession); these and the widespread availability of postcards\(^{60}\) portraying post-war destruction and remains of trenches and bunkers in France and Belgium demonstrate that battlefield tourism was already in full swing.

From annotations in the margins, it is clear that the couple also made use of several *Michelin* guidebooks to the battlefields. The immediate popularity of battlefield tourism is reinforced by the image of the wrecked British tank outside the Ypres railway station (Figure 5.10); whereas many war-damaged tanks were still visible around Ypres during the inter-war years, this one was deliberately displayed at the railway station as a tourist attraction, which proved embarrassing on the arrival of new ‘tourists’ in May 1940! (Figure 5.11).

**Further Camberley Tours.**

At Camberley, ‘Boney’ Fuller\(^{61}\) and ‘Tiny’ Ironside obviously had no qualms about syndicates striking further afield than Flanders (to SE Europe and Italy) – no mean feat in the Europe of 1923, providing they delivered the goods. Amongst the 1923 arrivals at Camberley was Brevet-Maj. Arthur Percival, DSO and bar, OBE, MC,\(^{62}\) (who was later to surrender Singapore), whose biographer observed,

‘In many ways the highlight of the course was the foreign tour which all students undertook. Percival teamed up with a Grenadier Guards officer for a tour of the countries of Eastern Europe and an evaluation of the defence forces of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary on which a detailed report had to be written’.\(^{63}\)

Although no formal Staff College archival records survive for 1924-5, an article in *Owl Pie* for 1925, ‘Impression of East Prussia’, indicates that the ‘Foreign
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Tours’ continued.\textsuperscript{64} The anonymous piece was of a tour ‘during the closing months of 1924 through Germany, which finally led us to visit Königsberg, Fusterberg, Allenstein, [and] the battlefields of Tannenberg and Goeben’.\textsuperscript{65} It is difficult to conclude whether other tours took place in 1924-5, but the next set that survive are from 1926. Fuller himself had an enormous influence at Camberley but it is instructive to note that his DS included at this time (1925) the very able Lt-Cols. AF Brooke\textsuperscript{66}, RF Adam\textsuperscript{67} and HE Franklyn\textsuperscript{68}. \textit{Owl Pie} (which was edited by the students) observed in the Christmas 1925 edition, ‘Although it is not our rôle to comment on the changes of the changing year, perhaps we may be permitted to congratulate the Army on the appointment of Col. Fuller as Assistant to the new CIGS. Too many generations of students owe too much to “Boney” for us to say less – or more…’\textsuperscript{69} The magazine then carried an article by Fuller of a 1924 battlefield visit he had personally undertaken of Wolfe’s attack on Quebec in 1759 – a fitting \textit{adieu}.\textsuperscript{70}

In January 1926, Lt-Cols. Montgomery, Paget\textsuperscript{71} (who had attended Staff College with Monty in 1920) and Pownall\textsuperscript{72} (Staff College 1921) arrived as Directing Staff. Whilst all the DS had either a DSO or MC, the service of the 52 students was more varied than before: they could still field 12 DSOs, 29 MCs and 8 other decorations, but 16 of the students had no ‘gongs’ (not that this denoted a lack of war service - one of these was Frank Messervy, had fought with Hodson’s Horse 1914-18, and would hold high command in the Desert and Burma campaigns).\textsuperscript{73} The records of ten foreign tours survive; what is interesting here is that all the operations they studied on location relate to 1914 campaigns, many of them exclusively French: Mons; Lorraine; Guise-St Quentin (28-9 August 1914); Operations of the BEF; Mulhouse-Alsace (7-9 August 1914); the BEF up to 25 August 1914; the Ourcq; the
French Armies 4-9 September 1914; the Marne 6-9 September 1914 (twice). This time, the exercise seems dominated by a theme (the encounter battles of 1914), plus the opportunities afforded for liaison with the French, perceived as the major military power on the Continent, and occupying the Ruhr with Belgium until 1929; interestingly, some of these early battles were not regarded as French achievements at the time (Guise and the Ourcq, for example). Other years contain all the DS’s remarks for each syndicate’s work. It is indeed a great shame that few of the instructors’ comments have been preserved from the 1926-8 period, which is exactly when Montgomery was on the Staff. He may not have been involved directly with the foreign tours, but the battlefield tour reports are the only papers extant from this period at the Staff College. Messervy’s syndicate (in strident political overtones) chose the battle of the Marne, 6-9 September 1914 because,

‘...the battle affords an example of what may well recur as long as the British Government maintains its accustomed attitude of balance of power. This inevitably results in:- A small expeditionary force fighting as a unit in a large continental Army to defeat an enemy seeking world power. Its commander with his hands tied by special instructions from the Government, which preclude him risking severe losses, owing to the fact that his specialist force must supply the cadre of instructors for the nation’s army when formed. A lack of trust in allies, due to the evident superiority, man for man, of British long service troops over continental conscripts...’

They also visited the military college at St Cyr, observing that:

‘Much time is spent on Military History and cadets are crammed with knowledge of campaigns from the time of Alexander the Great to modern times. It is doubtful whether real value is obtained as the cadet cannot apply his knowledge, and the tendency must be to try to assimilate a large number of facts without learning the lessons which they bring out’.

The same syndicate also recorded the ‘general impression gained was that FRANCE was disappointed with her late allies...the man in the street undoubtedly considers
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that although both countries fought with him, they both made peace against him…that resentment against the USA was deeper than that against GREAT BRITAIN…76

Capt. FS Tuker77 of the 2/Gurkha Rifles (who would command 4th Indian Division in Tunisia and Italy and demand the aerial bombing of the abbey at Monte Cassino) and his syndicate looked at Mons 1914 and then assessed how the battle would be fought with modern weapons in 1940 (of all apocryphal years). They correctly decided to ‘ignore’ the limitations imposed by the Versailles Treaty but did not foresee a great increase in the number of RAF aircraft; ‘all artillery will be mechanicalized’ they stated, but also ‘the need is now apparent for an increased number of [horsed] cavalry [to act] as Divisional Cavalry…to seize, resist, demoralize and destroy’; they foresaw a BEF of two Corps, each of two divisions (which was the case in 1939).78 Another syndicate in 1926 were more sceptical about the future,

‘financial considerations will not permit of vast schemes of mechanicalization…Though the next war will undoubtedly bring about radical changes, there can be little doubt that at its commencement manpower and horsepower will not have been entirely replaced by mechanical power…it is considered that infantry transport should remain horsed until the infantryman himself is carried in a cross country vehicle…’79

Although 1926 was the year of the General Strike, the reference to ‘financial considerations’ is interesting, because reductions in defence expenditure became acute only in 1932. Not even in the early stages of Normandy (1944), were British infantry housed in cross-country vehicles; perhaps these scatter-gun guesses about the future can be explained by the fact that looking ahead a decade or so was not a common practice in the inter-war period; although military development had been fast in 1914-18, it had been preceded and succeeded by relatively slow periods (although the lessons were present in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 for anyone who cared to
search). Accepting consistently rapid progress and gazing into the future is more of a post-Second World War phenomenon. However, it certainly disproves the common belief that the Staff College (and by extension their battlefield tours) were stuck ‘fighting the last war’. Others thought more about process than outcome; the 1926 syndicate dealing with the Operations of the BEF, 6-9 September 1914 did so because ‘They form an example of mobile warfare which was peculiarly dependent for its success on the ability of the Staff to deal with rapidly changing situations…The operations were of particular interest as the BEF was acting in co-operation with Allies. The syndicate considers that such circumstances may reasonably be expected to recur.’

Several tours of battlefields were conducted apart from those of the Camberley Staff College, by British military formations at this time. For example, the Karslake papers at the IWM contain details of a tour in March 1926, when twenty officers (eight officers of Southern Command HQ and twelve from 3rd Division) conducted a five-day tour in *mufti* of Mons, Le Cateau, Lille and Aubers Ridge, to ‘practise writing orders and comparing 1914 with the present day’.

**O’Connor and Alexander.**

Lt-Col. Richard O’Connor joined the DS in 1927, when the Senior Division was 62-strong, including a VC, DSO, MC (Hudson, Sherwood Foresters), another 12 DSOs, 40 MCs, seven with other decorations and 16 with none. Students included Harold Alexander and Douglas Wimberley. Eleven studies remain from this cohort, all of which bar one (Battle of the Selle, 1918), again studied campaigns of 1914, and seven of these concentrated on exclusively French battles. The Foreign Tour Instructions for 1927 are included at Appendix Five. For their foreign tours during the Easter Vacation (between 15 April-15 May), syndicates for 1927 were
allowed £22-10-0 each, which was designed to be sufficient for a 10-12 day tour in France or Belgium and had to undertake

‘...the examination of any phase of mobile warfare of “The Great War” which lends itself to profitable study on the ground from the points of view of: (a) What happened with the resources available and why. (b) What might have been done, if improvement was possible, in the light of the information available now as compared with then. (c) Briefly how, in the syndicate’s opinion, based on their similar knowledge of probable future developments, a similar situation would present itself and be dealt with 15 years hence [1942]. Static warfare problems are ruled out.’

They had to write subsequently an 8,000 word report answering these questions; typical was Alexander’s four-man syndicate who looked at the battle of the Ourcq, 1914\textsuperscript{85}, as one had done the year before. Unlike the studies of 1925-6, those of 1927 stated the rationale behind their choice of battle. Those who chose the battle of the Marne (6-9 August 1914) did so because ‘It involved the co-operation of the small BEF with a continental army – a condition likely to be repeated in the future’.\textsuperscript{86} Alex’s patrician syndicate\textsuperscript{87} argued that the reason for choosing their campaign was that France was then Britain’s foremost coalition partner (retaining a large, conscript army), and studying the French army’s recent history was a good way of understanding their \textit{modus operandi}:

‘If it is confined to the exploits of the students’ own nation, military study becomes narrow and fails to achieve that breadth of view so necessary in those who would direct war successfully. This is particularly applicable to the British Army, which is seldom likely to be called upon to fight a European war, except in conjunction with foreign allies. The syndicate felt that by studying an operation carried out by the French army they would get a comprehensive picture of that army’s organization at the beginning of the Great War, and a glimpse of the nation’s mentality….The Battle of the OURCQ, in particular, was chosen as providing an instance of joint action between allied forces at a vital juncture.’\textsuperscript{88}

This is a fascinating way of exploiting a battlefield tour – as a means of studying a coalition partner, and one that we would value today. They were also obliged to
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anticipate fifteen years hence, ‘how the battle might be re-fought under the conditions likely to prevail in 1942’ and to apply modern conditions to the historic battle of the Ourcq. Here again, we can see Kolb’s ideas at work, particularly using their Concrete Experience (CE) and encouraged to embrace Abstract Conceptualisation (AC). This is a strikingly pro-active use of a battlefield tour; their reaction to the challenge illustrates how forward-thinking some junior officers were in 1927, for when asked to cast their minds forward, they were broadly correct in their predictions, though the group badly misjudged the future of the tank:

‘Tanks not being a commercial proposition, it is unlikely that we shall see a very large increase in their numbers, even in fifteen years time. Such increase as there is will be the product of money set aside for this form of military specialisation and will therefore be limited. On the other hand, the production of armoured cars is so much akin to that of touring and commercial vehicles that …a considerable increase in these weapons may be looked for in the near future…’,

However they were correct in their thinking about anti-tank weaponry and machine guns, misjudged chemical weapons, but were right about general mechanisation:

‘…The presence of tanks, even in limited numbers, in the hands of the enemy, constitute so great a threat that every effort will be made to procure an anti-dote. The next few years will see the introduction of improved anti-tank artillery and mines…Automatic rifles and machine guns proved the most deadly weapons to the infantry in the open during the Great War. They are the essence of fire-power and more economical to maintain than rifles; machine gun units will therefore increase considerably, and a number of them will be mechanized [the Machine Gun Corps (MGC), raised in October 1915 had recently been disbanded as a cost-cutting measure, in 1922]… Chemical Warfare…will show a marked increase. Humanitarian objections will not be strong enough to prevail… MOTOR TRACTION… Improvements in cross-country vehicles, particularly six-wheelers, and the mechanization of an increased proportion of field artillery will add greatly to the mobility and radius of action of formations [nearly all field artillery in 1927 was still horse-drawn]… Improved organization, such as the introduction of extra machine gun units and the provision of anti-tank and close support weapons as part of the Infantry will increase mobility and firepower. [This prediction was accurate for 1940.] While the development of wireless, the increase in motor despatch riders
and improvement in methods of signal routine will speed up the circulation of information and orders in the modern battle...”

They concluded, ‘in modern war, owing to greater mobility and fire power and more rapid means of communication, the vulnerability of flanks is infinitely greater’. Hindsight reveals, of course, that this flank vulnerability was exactly the German problem in their blitzkrieg through France thirteen years after Alex and his syndicate penned their thoughts. They also applied modern conditions to the 1914 battle, with a predominance of air and armoured assets. Fuller’s legacy demonstrates how in 1927 the aims of battlefield tours could be startlingly original and forced students to think out of the narrow confines in which they operated.

Another 1927 syndicate chose the Retreat from Mons with remarkable foresight because,

‘As the size of her [Great Britain’s] contingent is likely to be no greater at the beginning of the next European War than of the last, she may be early surprised by the attack of greatly superior enemy forces, and be forced hurriedly to convert an advance into a retreat; especially in view of the fact that she will probably be fighting without unity of command, and so without guarantee of co-ordinated action, by the side of Allies who may act independently...The employment of cavalry with mechanized forces also requires consideration, as the future of this arm will depend on its ability to maintain an equal relative speed to the rest of the army’.  

Although this syndicate were scoring first-round hits with every observation, their DS merely criticised their poor English; the syndicate went on to observe,

‘In BELGIUM, the people believe that there will be another big European War within the next 10 years, and that their country will again be the scene of operations. They were evidently afraid of an invasion...by GERMANY and did not seem to be very trustful of support from ENGLAND...They did not have a high opinion of the efficiency of their own army. As one graphically put it, they thought their army would retire to SPAIN if GERMANY invaded BELGIUM... The future of army mechanization appears to lie with BRITAIN and
GERMANY, French and Belgian machinery is likely to prove unreliable…’

The Sapper Maj. Brian Robertson, DSO, MC (son of ‘Wully’ Robertson), was at Camberley between 1926-7; in May 1926, his biographer states that the Camberley students were encouraged to volunteer to help keep essential services running during the General Strike, and went up to London dressed in their oldest clothes (to infiltrate the picket lines) and work as bus, tram or tube drivers and guards. The following year, as his biographer relates,

‘Probably the most enjoyable part of the course took place during Easter 1927. Small groups of students were given sufficient money to travel to France or Belgium and study a First World War battle of their own choice. An interesting light was shed on the more congenial aspects of this tour in an article in La Vie Parisienne: Chaque soir vêts d’impeccable smokings ils dînent ensemble et discutent tactique et stratégie …Les problèmes de stratégie sont multiplis, et les officiers anglais en soutenant leurs forces d’un peu de champagne et de brandy…’

This - and the following passage - reveal the easy route that Staff College tours can take, from battlefield to bottlefield, and recall Callwell’s description of the ‘lurid night’ in a German cavalry mess in Metz (1885) enjoyed by his colleagues, and is an issue which has cropped-up throughout their history (and would do so after the Second World War). The Staff College historian (Maj. Godwin-Austen) also noted in 1927 that,

‘Another welcome part of the [Camberley] programme is the foreign tour, for which officers arrange their own syndicates and, unaccompanied nowadays, embark for the Continent to study some phase of the Great War. Their projected trip, with its objects, is laid before the Commandant, and they are then left to their own devices, equipped with sufficient funds …to spend some ten days abroad. On return they must compile a report revealing the value of their trip. If at any time, in some Continental resort, you come across a motley crew whose business you find it hard to guess, or perhaps remark that some six or eight young men tasting the night life of a gay city in a manner that a slight thinness on the crown seems hard to justify, do not blame
them: they are more syndicate than sinning, and will duly produce an elaborate thesis which, no doubt, will deal with the psychology of the nation whose hospitality they are enjoying.\textsuperscript{97}

Camberley in 1928.

Some thirteen tours (which may be all of them) from the 59 students of the 1928 Senior Division (who included EH ‘Bubbles’ Barker\textsuperscript{98}, RC Bridgeman\textsuperscript{99}, EE ‘Chink’ Dorman-Smith\textsuperscript{100}, JLI Hawkesworth\textsuperscript{101}, OWH Leese\textsuperscript{102} (who also captained the Camberley Cricket 1\textsuperscript{st} XI) and WRC ‘Ronnie’ Penney\textsuperscript{103}) survive. Leese recalled of his Camberley days,

‘You were presented with almost every known military problem in the many syndicates and schemes with which you were confronted...you came away with complete confidence that no matter what problem might face you, either in peace or war, you would always be able to find a solution. You learned, too, at Staff College how to work. You were only given a limited time to get your exercise finished, and you knew that you had got to get it done in that time; you therefore learnt very quickly how to organise your work and how best to get it done in time, so that you were ready for whatever problem which might next be shot at you’.\textsuperscript{104}

The well-organised and brusque Oliver Leese is here expressing characteristics of Marton and Entwistle’s Strategic Learning Approach; Leese is writing of Staff College generally, but one might observe that impossibly tight deadlines were also an aspect that could have been inserted into the battlefield tours, (as the Germans had been doing for decades and American staff rides at this juncture were also doing, see below) – a supreme sense of urgency that to a degree replicated some of the friction of war; but this was not done.

Students generally spent a week away during the Easter Vacation, and again looked mostly at battles of 1914; six examined French campaigns of that year; five examined British, whilst two looked at Italian operations of 1915. For three years
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running, students had pondered the battles of 1914, and were certainly avoiding any studies of the 1915-17 era of static, trench warfare. The prevailing mood amongst all the former belligerent powers was certainly that trench warfare was so costly that no nation wanted to venture towards anything similar in the future – therefore encounter battles of the open warfare type, commonly associated with 1914 were embraced for study; but nothing of the combined arms success at Amiens in 1918 had yet been examined by any of the syndicates until now. So far, there is a sense, from the battles the syndicates examined in 1923-8, of denial of all military experience after 1914.

All fifteen tours from the Senior Division of 1929 survive; in contrast to the foregoing reports, these syndicates ranged far and wide, taking in many battles from 1918 and very few from 1914. Four looked at French operations in 1914; one, the Defence of Belgium, none at the BEF operations of 1914; one examined the Russo-German battles of Stalluponen and Gumbinnen in East Prussia (August 1914 – the first study of combat from the German point-of-view); another visited Loos (1915); the syndicate led by Major Gerard (Jerry) Bucknall looked at Cambrai (1917) – the first such Staff College report on this innovative battle – whilst six looked at operations in 1918, one made a topographical report on the Franco-German border and one produced a study of three counter-attacks (Lagnicourt, Gouzeaucourt and Villers Bretonneux, from 1917-8). On the face of it, there seems no particular reason for the sudden explosion of interest in the rest of the war years, 1915-8, or the profusion of destinations visited in May 1929. Perhaps because a decade had now passed since the most recent battles studied, it was easier to return and criticise; Douglas Haig had also died in January 1928; this may not have had an impact on the tours for 1928, but it may have meant it was more acceptable to re-examine his generalship in 1929.
There may have been another more cultural reason for this wide-ranging interest at Staff College in 1928-9 (the tenth anniversary of the Armistice and Versailles), that had not been expressed earlier. For a brief time there was an literary outpouring of wartime nostalgia as physical and mental scars healed, which commenced with the appearance in 1928-30 of several works, most notably Erich Maria Remarque’s *Im Westen Nichts Neues* - first serialised in the *Vossische Zeitung* from 10 November 1928 (a significant date in itself) - and subsequently published as a book in January 1929, where it caused a sensation, selling 200,000 copies in three weeks. By March it had been translated into English as *All Quiet on the Western Front* and had sold 260,000 copies by September; by December 1929 Remarque had sold a million copies in German and a further million in translation. Universal Pictures immediately bought an option and it became Lewis Milestone’s hit feature film of 1930. Remarque was writing ten years (1928) after the war had ended and this time-lapse of a decade from the last of the fighting prompted many to rush into print, such as Robert Graves, Siegfried Sassoon, Edmund Blunden, Ernest Hemingway and Ernst Junger. *All Quiet’s* arrival coincided to the month with *Journey’s End*, still considered to be one of the best Great War plays, by a thirty-two year old insurance official, R.C. Sherriff. The single, collective experience – the war on the Western Front - was remarkably similar, whichever side of No Man’s Land the authors found themselves. None of the other hard-fought campaigns (in the East, Italy, Salonika, Mesopotamia, Palestine, the Balkans, Gallipoli, Africa or even the Naval war) caught the public imagination in the same way (although this is beginning to alter now). Contrast this with the Second World War, where accounts are as common from the Eastern Front in Russia as from Italy, Burma, Normandy or the North African Desert. Never before or since have so many works of literature
and memoirs from a single conflict appeared over such a short (two-year) time-span and whilst this was a cathartic, literary return to the 1914-18 battlefields for many authors, many physically returned also. Ironically, just as this outpouring may have stimulated many of their readership – with the passage of time - to travel to ‘their’ old battlefields, events conspired to rob them of the financial means to do so. May 1926 had seen the General Strike in Britain and October 1929 witnessed the Wall Street Crash, sending wages spiralling down and unemployment climbing to a peak of three million (in the UK) by 1932; this curtailed the ability of most to undertake trips abroad and indicates that the 1929-30 publishing boom in war memoirs was all the more remarkable, for it began just as the means to buy the books diminished.¹¹¹

Re-fighting Cambrai (Map 12).

At Camberley, ‘Jerry’ Bucknall’s 1929 archived report (Syndicate No.13) is as interesting for the comments of the DS marking it, as for the research itself. This report was triple-marked and all three DS (who did not accompany Bucknall’s tour) appear to have been present at Cambrai, whereas none of the students had been. This produced almost a battlefield tour in reverse, with the eye-witnesses contributing back in Blighty, once the tour had completed. It is an extreme version of Fuller’s desire to promote self-education (rather than spoon-feeding), but one cannot help feeling in this case, that the DS could have contributed more by accompanying what was clearly a fascinating and well-rounded tour. The DS observations included,

‘…We certainly gathered from Lord R[awlinson] that GHQ wanted to rethink the number of Divisions used + that GHQ looked on the whole thing as a rather doubtful experiment that Cambrai might be raided but not held…’¹¹²;

‘…the tanks were destroyed by guns run out on the flanks of the village [Flesquieres] on to which the tanks piled themselves up. I saw the result of this on the following day. From an infantry point of view the
exhaustion of the troops was largely due to the over weighting of the men. You mention the 29th Div. carrying 60lbs. my recollection is that in many cases it was nearer 76…¹¹³

The DS comments here might be related to Kolb’s Diverging learning type (from Chapter One), which blended Concrete Experience and Reflective Observation (or CE/RO), whom Kolb felt were ‘feeling and watching’ individuals, able to look at things from several different perspectives. The terrain at Cambrai taught the syndicate many lessons, but one cannot help feeling they might have been learned perhaps even more vividly if comments like these were pointed out on location by eye-witnesses (albeit their DS), rather than afterwards in exchanges of words. The tour also provided a useful teaching vehicle on the operational level of war (not that the term was in use then). One of the DS mused in his comments,

‘Why was Cambrai fought at all? It was actually suggested soon after the battle that it had been fought to score off the political enemies of GHQ at home! You set out all the official reasons, but I must confess that none of them seem very convincing now, unless one tries to put oneself back into the position of GHQ in October 1917… Moral[e] effect of 3rd battle of Ypres. You could well stress this more than you have. The British Army was definitely tired by Nov. 1917…’¹¹⁴

Another syndicate in 1929, led by Capt. AF ‘John’ Harding¹¹⁵ of the Somerset Light Infantry, examined aspects of the 1918 battle of Amiens. Apart from examining their chosen battle on the ground, all the syndicates had to consider fighting their campaign ‘with the possible effect of modern improvements in equipment and organisation’.¹¹⁶ Again, the battlefield tour prompted DS comments which brought out some useful lessons that Harding and his generation were to apply in 1944-5:

‘The arrangements for artillery support [at Amiens] after the first barrage seem to have failed completely. What was the reason? The control of a considerable amount seems to have been decentralized to Infantry Brigades. Possibly as a result of Trench Warfare, brigades may
never have had artillery under their command before and so had had no experience in handling it."\textsuperscript{117}


Apart from Bucknall and Harding, the 1929 Senior Division included Capt PGS Gregson-Ellis\textsuperscript{118}, Wg Cdr AT Harris\textsuperscript{119}, Major RL McCreery\textsuperscript{120}, Capt GHA
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MacMillan\textsuperscript{121} and GWR Templer\textsuperscript{122}; (Harding, McCreery and Templer all also held office in the Staff College Drag Hunt), whilst the DS who marked the lone syndicate that went to East Prussia was Lt-Col Richard O’Connor (Montgomery’s contemporary as a student in 1920); his observations would be as pertinent to his own handling of the Western Desert Force, British Troops Egypt and VIII Corps (in 1940-44) as they were valuable to his students,

‘…It would have been of interest to consider how far an indifferent form of operations order was responsible for the various misunderstandings, indecision + counter orders which occurred in various operations. And possibly most important of all – how lack of determined leadership on whichever side it occurred, invariably was followed by confusion + lack of success…’\textsuperscript{123}

Gerald Templer’s syndicate studied the Fifth French Army during August 1914 and offered some observations on leadership and ‘tank country’, stating that it:

‘…has proved interesting in presenting the difficulties of co-ordination and the failure of subordinate commanders to appreciate correctly the intentions of the commander in the opening stages of a campaign…In considering …what better action could have been taken…the open rolling country, of which these battlefields were very largely composed, was ideal for the movement of AFVs.\textsuperscript{124} An attack by Tanks would, however, have to be supported by a large amount of neutralizing fire or smoke, on account of the excellent field of fire provided for anti-tank weapons…The existence of so many rivers emphasized the necessity of having a large quantity of bridging materials for AFVs accompanying the Field Army…’\textsuperscript{125}

Note this early use of the abbreviation, AFV. The DS and students’ identities point up another interesting aspect of staff rides, namely that instructors can benefit hugely from the process – whether intellectually (as here with O’Connor), or in terms (as Montgomery would do) of getting to know a generation of staff officers and thus be well-placed to pick trusty subordinates in war. It also benefitted the Joint approach to war (actually, mixed-service operations were then called ‘Combined’) –
as witnessed by Arthur Harris’ presence on the course. According to his biographer, ‘Bomber’ (as he later became) Harris was struck by Monty

‘…as an excellent instructor and a man with advanced ideas on the likely pattern of future warfare…Ten years later [in 1939]…Harris drew on this knowledge of Montgomery and described him to his ADC as a ‘very good soldier who will make a damned good general. Incidentally he is the first soldier I have come across who has a proper grasp of the vital role of a tactical air force in land battles…’” 126

Apparently at the end of his last year, Harris was asked to stay on and join the staff but declined to do so. 127

Defending Belgium.

One 1929 battlefield tour was (uniquely) marked ‘Secret’ immediately, and a series of Ministry letters still attached show that it was requested and retained MI3(a) at the War Office in 1933, as the only study of its kind, for the tour examined the ‘Defence of Belgium’, and began,

‘It appears probable that BELGIUM will be the scene of operations in the initial phase of the next war in Europe. Throughout history BELGIUM has been one of the battlefields of Europe and, since the only war which seems at all possible in this area in the future is one between FRANCE and GERMANY, BELGIUM may again become involved, as she was in 1914…The subject affords scope for the study of a problem facing a militarily weak power opposed by a relatively strong enemy. It also includes study of:- (a) Delaying power of demolitions and modern Artillery. (b) The future of fortresses. (c) The choice of defensive positions.’ 128

This appears to be very similar to the German General Staff’s use of staff rides, prior to the First World War, as a way of investigating and trialling real war plans on the actual terrain, where history becomes the cover story, rather than the guide, or metaphor. This, of course, was also Henry Wilson’s approach to battlefield tours prior to 1914 – exploring likely areas of future operations. In a separate, attached letter, the syndicate observed that they had been accompanied by
'Lt-Col Duvivier, who...is employed in the Historical Section of the Belgian General Staff. While discussing very fully and frankly the various aspects of the problem of Belgian Defence, he was, naturally, unable to discuss the present day Belgian Plan'.

Touring in 1929, before Belgium adopted neutrality in 1936, this trip was a hybrid – part terrain study, part TEWT examining the combat options of third-party countries, part report on an ally and part exploration of some of the Belgian battlefields of 1914. One of the areas it studied was mobility in the northern Ardennes, around Malmedy – exactly the route chosen by the German Peiper battle-group in December 1944 (and was explored in the 1970s Ex. PIED PEIPER series of battlefield tours, see Chapter Seven).

**Wider Tourism.**

As the staff college students were touring the battlefields of 1914-18 with education in mind, they would have encountered many other groups of former and serving soldiers there for different purposes. For civilians, pilgrims and ex-military men, from as early as 1921 Thomas Cook and Son was offering one-day ‘Organised Automobile Tours of the battlefields of the Somme or Vimy Ridge’ for 150 Francs, inclusive of guide, meals and first class rail travel'. Lurking amongst the advertisements for hotels, restaurants and travelling valises in the 1921 *Cook's Guide* already were the following establishments (Figures 5.12 and 5.13, below), demonstrating the quick emergence of a war-tourism industry:
Figures 5.12 (above) and 5.13 (below): advertisements from the Thomas Cook and Son April 1921 promotional booklet, *How To see Paris and the Battlefields - Automobile Tours*.

The 53-page April 1921 promotional booklet, *How To see Paris and the Battlefields - Automobile Tours* contained twelve separate tours to battlefields ranging from Flanders, Vimy, the Somme and the Marne, to Chateau-Thierry, the Chemin des Dames, Rheims, the Argonne, Verdun and St. Mihiel. Thus the Cook’s tours were aimed as much at American (hence the Argonne, St Mihiel and a tour to Compiègne) as British visitors. The Thomas Cook’s brochure for *Motor Tours, Paris & environs, & the Battlefields, July 1928* was similar but more comprehensive, in containing maps, route maps and photographs. The Great War had become an affair of tourists and souvenirs. In this context, the Great War poet, David Jones, acknowledged that Cook’s tourists were visiting ‘his’ old battlefield is his epic poem of 1937, *In Parenthesis* - just as Philip Johnston, cited earlier, had anticipated the same eventuality before the Armistice. Jones’ own notes to the following lines in his poem, which appear at the very end of the work, state
‘...This may appear to be an anachronism, but I remember in 1917 discussing with a friend the possibilities of tourist activity if peace ever came. I remember we went into details and wondered if the unexploded projectile lying near us would ever go up under a holiday-maker, and how people would stand to be photographed on our parapets. I recall feeling very angry about this, as you do if you think of strangers ever occupying a house you live in, and which has, for you, particular associations.’

_In Parenthesis_ mirrored Jones’ own eight months on the Western Front with the 15/Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and described the adventures of (the fictional) Private John Ball and his battalion from training to an attack on Mametz Wood (10 July 1916), where many of his battalion were killed and Ball himself was wounded (as was Jones). In this sense, it can be argued also that _In Parenthesis_ was Jones’ (literary) return to the Somme. At the very end of the work, as the wounded Ball crawls away, he has to dump his rifle and webbing, which are hampering his movements:

‘...It’s difficult with the weight of the rifle. Leave it – under the oak. Leave it for a salvage-bloke let it lie bruised for a monument...’

At the gate of the wood you try a last adjustment, but slung so, it’s an impediment, it’s of detriment to your hopes, you had best be rid of it – the sagging webbing and all and what’s left of your two fifty – but it were wise to hold on to your mask. You’re clumsy in your feebleness, you implicate your tin-hat rim with the slack sling of it. Let it lie for the dews to rust it, or you ought to decently cover the working parts. Its dark barrel, where you leave it under the oak, reflects the solemn star that rises urgently from Cliff Trench. It’s a beautiful doll for us. It’s the Last Reputable Arm. But leave it - under the oak. Leave it for a Cook’s tourist to the Devastated areas and crawl as far as you can and wait for the bearers...’

The costs associated with battlefield visits and mention of first class travel in the Cook’s brochure is a reminder that early civilian historical tours were still an
upper middle class phenomenon, although this may have altered in the late 1920s, as numbers permitted a temporary reduction in costs. Nevertheless travel had never been easier. According to Bradshaw’s Railway Timetable for 1921, the battlefield visitor could leave Victoria Station in London at 0845hrs and arrive at Ypres railway station by 2017hrs for a cost of £1/2s/11d [£1.15] single. Numbers climbed through the decade, in spite of unemployment and David Lloyd has observed that whilst 67,787 people signed War Graves Commission cemetery registers in the year 1926-7, this figure had increased to 104,000 in a four-month (May-August) period of 1931.

The Menin Gate and Pilgrimages.

On 24 July 1927, a crowd of 50,000 (mostly Britons) attended the unveiling of the Menin Gate by FM the Lord Plumer of Messines and Bilton (1857-1932), attended by HRH King Albert of Belgium and Marshal Foch of France, an occasion which was broadcast live by the BBC (in itself a most unusual occurrence) back to the United Kingdom, where it caused a ripple of sympathy and understanding throughout the land. This was partly because Plumer was an able public speaker and produced a truly memorable speech. The ceremony resulted in the nightly playing of the Last Post by buglers of the local fire brigade, a ceremony still conducted today, interrupted only by the German occupation of 1940-44.

It also inspired the powerful and atmospheric painting The Menin Gate at Midnight by the Australian artist Will Longstaff (1879-1953) who had attended the ceremony and painted the dream he had experienced the night after the unveiling; in it, the ghosts of British soldiers rise out of the marshes surrounding the newly-built
Menin Gate at Ypres. Longstaff’s still-powerful and very atmospheric *Menin Gate at Midnight* (1927), which now resides in the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, is pictured (Figure 5.14) below. The ghostly outlines of the British soldiers are just discernable in the foreground, assembling with rifles slung to pick their way across the marshes towards their own, newly-constructed memorial. The same month as the Menin Gate ceremony, *Punch* Magazine tipped its hat to pilgrimages and pilgrims by publishing a full-page caricature of The Rev. ‘Tubby’ Clayton, founder of ‘Toc H’ in Poperinghe, and sanctuary (as it still is) to many Ypres pilgrims.

In August 1928, eleven thousand former servicemen had travelled by road, rail, ferry and charabanc to visit the old Western Front on a pilgrimage (as it was described at the time) organised by the Royal British Legion and the British Empire Service League, at a cost of £4/0s/0d a head. It was later recounted in the hard-back 152-page *A Souvenir of the Battlefields Pilgrimage* (1928), which contained letters of support from Edward, Prince of Wales and Earl Jellicoe, who also took part; it was to have been led by Haig, but he had died in January of that year.

Some married couples attended and photographs within the Souvenir book show not just solemn services and commemoration, but smiling faces exploring the Newfoundland Memorial Park and Vimy, wearing rusty helmets and clutching the metalwork of old rifles (see Figures 5.16 and 5.17, below), time on the beach at Calais, and the memory of others at Vimy: ‘Please, miss, would you snap me where I was wounded?’ said a sturdy little Welshman to a ‘Pilgrimess’, who bore a camera. The ‘Pilgrimess’ looked embarrassed. ‘Over there, in the trenches’, he explained… In other words, this trip, hosted by the French 51/Infantry Regiment,
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based at Amiens, was a mixture of pilgrimage and tourist holiday. Also present were 265 ex-Service women and the same number of war widows, pilgrims from the Irish Free State, as well as young men who would have missed the fighting, which had started fourteen years earlier. Elsewhere that year, English tourists in Bruges were being tempted to day trips by luxury car to Ypres and Dixmude for 26/- (a princely sum), by handbills, such as the one illustrated at Figure 5.15.

Eleven of the Camberley tours to foreign battlefields from 1930 survive in the archives; their stated aim was ‘to write a report in such a form that it could be used as a basis either for a lecture or of an article for publication’, which seems a rather self-defeating limitation. One might have expected some of the excitement of walking the ground to be communicated via the report, to encourage others to do the same, but this does not seem to be the case. Following the 1929 pattern of disparate

Figure 5.14: Australian artist Will Longstaff’s evocative *Menin Gate at Midnight* (1927). Source: the Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
destinations, five examined various British and French operations of 1918; one returned to Cambrai; three studied the BEF in 1914 and one the French in 1914; whilst the first studies appeared of the German attack on Verdun (21 Feb-22 Mar 1916) and the 1916 Austrian attack in the Trentino region of Northern Italy.

Amongst these, the syndicate that included the future X Corps commander, Capt. Herbert Lumsden of the 12th Lancers, looked at the BEF’s cavalry and concluded that in August 1914,

‘...Cavalry units in many cases were without rations and forage. Although their efficiency suffered in consequence, they were still able to carry on. Today, if a similar failure occurred in the supply arrangements, a complete breakdown would result in the mechanized portion of the Cavalry Division.’
Figure 5.16 (above) shows veterans with war relics at the Newfoundland Memorial Park, on the Somme, in August 1928 (Source: A Souvenir of the Battlefields Pilgrimage, p.45). Figure 5.17 (below) illustrates veterans and family members from North West England inspecting the trenches on Vimy Ridge, August 1928 (Source: A Souvenir of the Battlefields Pilgrimage, p.103).
Figure 5.18: Booklets of postcards picturing battlefields, c.1920-30, illustrating the growth of inter-war battlefield tourism (Source: author’s collection)
This is what would happen to the BEF in May 1940 and to Lumsden himself when pursing Rommel’s *Afrika Korps* after Alamein in late 1942 (and which resulted in his dismissal by Montgomery that December). Another syndicate looked at the German March 1918 attack on Fifth Army, surmising,

‘The fact that no Battle Zone had been broken since trench warfare commenced led to a false sense of security, which made surprise all the more complete when the German penetration took place in fog’.

After the Second World War, many British commanders saw parallels between March 1918 and the German Ardennes attack of December 1944, likewise launched in poor weather and fog; these were links the US high command in 1944 were unable to understand because they had not studied this 1918 battle; for example, in 1968 Miles Dempsey wrote to the historian Ronald Lewin about the so-called Battle of the Bulge:

‘The Americans of course had not experienced this sort of thing before. March 1918 and Dunkirk were part of our lives. I really do believe that this explains most of what happened in the Ardennes, and all the dramatic stories which have been written.’

**Jack Slessor.**

In 1931 John Dill returned to the Staff College as Commandant, with Col HM ‘Jumbo’ Wilson as one of the divisional colonels and Lt-Col John Smyth, VC, MC and Sqn Ldr John (Jack) Slessor, MC arrived as Directing Staff. Smyth remembered Dill as ‘a terrific worker [with] few interests outside soldiering’ and visited Germany with the Slessors, at the end of which,

‘on our way back through France we spent a night at Bethune and, with the aid of some locally purchased maps, went in search of ‘the Glory Hole’ in Richebourg L’Avoué, where I had won my VC in 1915…In many places…one could still trace the trenches and one would suddenly come upon a bit of trench which had been left just as it was. To my
great delight we discovered ‘the Glory Hole’ trench in this condition with an old rusted shell and some bombs [i.e. hand grenades] lying beside it…’

Whilst the formal Camberley instructional tours took place, less formal battlefield tours, such as the Slessor-Smyth one, were happening all the time. Slessor spent some twenty pages of his autobiography commenting on his Camberley days, and underlined the success of ‘Jointery’:

‘I think it is difficult to overrate the importance of such personal friendships between officers of the different services…At that age one learns more from one’s contemporaries and equals than from any Directing Staff, and if there had been more mixing of the Services in the earlier days, there would have been less inter-Service friction than there was between the wars…’

This author can observe with the safety of hindsight that one way of addressing such friction might have been to pick suitable multi-Service battlefield tours, such as (in 1930 terms) Gallipoli, or closer to home, the landings at Zeebrugge or the Battle of Amiens.

**US Army Staff RIDes in the Inter-war Period.**

It is instructive to contrast the battlefield touring activity of the British Staff College with that of other nations at this time. We have seen how the US Civil War battlefields themselves became manoeuvre grounds and encouraged both military exercises and military tourism in late Nineteenth Century America. What of the inter-war period?

The archives at the US Military College, West Point, New York (established by Thomas Jefferson’s Presidential decree in 1802), indicate that the earliest organised battlefield visit by a US Army school involved the graduating class of West Point visiting Gettysburg in 1902. Annual Reports by the Superintendent of the US
Military Academy and the Gettysburg National Military Park Commission indicate similar trips until 1916, with the (unexplained) exception of 1908. These were not to learn staff techniques, but to assist the intense study of Civil War, as required by the curriculum.\textsuperscript{154} As a result of these West Point visits, military history captivated two of America’s foremost Second World War commanders. Both Patton (who graduated in June 1909) and Eisenhower (graduate of June 1915) studied the American Civil War battlefields extensively as students, then returning many times afterwards. Patton’s biographer, Carlo D’Este, observes that

‘during the interwar period Patton was able to indulge fully his interest in the Civil War and frequently took his family on outings to various battlefields, delivering detailed orations on the battle fought there….the German military attaché, Gen. Friedrich von Bötticher, accompanied the Pattons on the day in the 1930s when they visited the sites of the Battle of the Wilderness…’

In 1932, without notes or maps, Patton unerringly took his family and guests to the place where his great-uncle had fallen at Gettysburg.\textsuperscript{155} Back in 1913 at the 50\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of the battle of Gettysburg, the US Army had sent 1,500 soldiers to assist the 40,000 veterans who attended. An Act of Congress authorized $150,000 (around $4.5 million today) to support the event which was matched by a further $150,000 from the State of Pennsylvania. One of the officers who had proudly participated was Lt. Patton, who rode from Fort Myer with his 1\textsuperscript{st} Squadron of the 15/US Cavalry Regiment.\textsuperscript{156} (See Figure 5.19 for photographs of the 75\textsuperscript{th} anniversary celebrations.) For US Army officers stationed in Germany as part of the Rhineland occupation force, battlefield study guides were produced, designed to further military education via in situ study of battle terrain. \textit{A Staff Ride to the Battlefields of Metz (War of 1870-71)} was published in 1920 and, importantly, seems to be the first occasion when an educational battlefield visit (other than by West Point, Leavenworth or Carlisle) was specifically referred to as a ‘staff ride’; the book is literally just a
battlefield tour guidebook, without any of the accompanying staff exercises, syndicate work, or rôle-playing instructions that one might expect to find with an excursion grandly labelled as a ‘staff ride’.  

In the aftermath of the Great War, US Gen. John J Pershing (1860-1948) began a series of battlefield tours of the late European battlefields for his officers, which evolved into A Guide to the American Battle Fields in Europe, published by the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) in 1927 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of America’s entry into the war. This was designed for US Army officers and was a comprehensive work. The 1992 reprint of the 1938 edition runs to 547 pages. One of its authors, assigned to the ABMC in 1926, was Maj. Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890-1969). Leaving for War College (September 1927-June 1928), Ike then returned to the ABMC for a year of duty in France gathering information for a revised guidebook. The project was closely supervised by Pershing, the American Expeditionary Force commander, who personally vetted every officer assigned to him. For Eisenhower, this in some ways made up for his lack of combat service in France during 1917-8 and gave him valuable insights for the European war to come.

Yet another type of battlefield guide intended for the military user appeared in 1934, published by the US Army under the title Infantry in Battle. In over 386 pages it describes many small unit actions (grouped in twenty-seven themes such as surprise, mobility, infiltration and night attacks) from the Great War with detailed maps, followed by discussion points. In his Foreword, Gen. Edward Croft tellingly stated:
Figure 5.19: Photographs of the 75th anniversary gathering at Gettysburg in 1938, attended by President Roosevelt. Such a close association between veterans, the US army, civilians and the Civil War battlefields did much to encourage the affection that many Americans still feel for their armed forces today. (Source: author’s collection).
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‘Sixty-five years ago a French officer, Col. Ardant du Picq, foreshadowed the need for a work of this kind. He wrote in Battle Studies: “Deductions should be based upon study of modern combat, and that study cannot be made from accounts of historians alone…”’ \(^\text{163}\).

Which, one might argue, is the point of taking serving soldiers onto old battlefields, where they can add their own observations to that of the historian in a real combat zone. The project was overseen by one Col. of Infantry George C. Marshall (who went on to become the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Second World War and Alanbrooke’s counterpart as CIGS).\(^\text{164}\) Marshall’s Introduction observed,

‘…This volume is designed to give the peace-trained officer something of the viewpoint of the veteran…By the use of numerous historical examples which tell of the absence of information, the lack of time, and the confusion of battle, the reader is acquainted with the realities of war and the extremely difficult conditions under which tactical problems must be solved in the face of the enemy….’\(^\text{165}\)

This volume directly linked military training to Great War military history, although without setting foot on the ground (but this was for financial rather than educational reasons, because the US Army was training in America, not Europe).\(^\text{166}\)

Eisenhower became so hooked that he eventually bought his retirement farm on land adjacent to the Gettysburg battlefield.\(^\text{167}\) As his biographer records,

‘…Gettysburg was a place that possessed a special attraction for Eisenhower. He was very knowledgeable about every aspect of the desperate battles fought there in July 1863, both from a battlefield tour in 1915 [whilst at West Point] and from his extensive reading …Eisenhower found solace tramping the battlefield alone whenever he could spare some time for himself. Later on, when Mamie [his wife] arrived, he would take her to the various battlefield sites and explain the events that had taken place there. Even though it was no a subject that particularly interested her, Mamie was proud that her husband was so knowledgeable that he “knew every rock of that battlefield”…’\(^\text{168}\)
As Eugenia C. Kiesling has observed\textsuperscript{169}, a change in West Point’s curriculum in 1922 led to a cessation of visits to Gettysburg.\textsuperscript{170} The US Command and General Staff College archives at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, show that the various military schools at Fort Leavenworth (established in 1881) were also conducting battlefield trips by 1906, when Maj. (later Maj-Gen.) Eben Swift (1854-1938), the assistant commandant, took a party of twelve to study the North Georgian campaign of 1864. Previously ‘terrain rides’ had been conducted in and around Leavenworth. T.R. Brereton has traced how in 1894, during the opening year of the US Infantry and Cavalry School, on-site instruction for students had been recommended by Col. Arthur L Wagner (1853-1905) at ‘some of the most noted battlefields of the War of Secession’ but this was only realised in 1906 as a ‘staff ride’.\textsuperscript{171} Subsequent years visited Manassas, Chickamauga-Chattanooga and Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign.\textsuperscript{172}

The US Army War College (founded in 1903 and then equivalent of the Imperial Defence College [now the Royal College of Defence Studies], established in 1927) – essential for selection to higher level command and promotion to general officer - became the third major school to visit US Civil War battlefields between 1909 and 1940, when the curriculum changed. Little military history had been studied until the arrival of Maj. Eben Swift from Fort Leavenworth, who introduced a wide range of tactical and staff problems, gradually increasing in complexity, which moved from model, to map, then onto historic battlefields. Col. Dominic R Sette’s Military Studies Program Paper argues convincingly that Swift made a huge contribution to the intellectual growth of the War College.\textsuperscript{173} Its archives, shared with the US Military History Institute and the Omar Bradley Collection at Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania, (to where it moved in 1951) include background notes and detailed blueprint maps of the battlefields visited, detailed terrain studies, records of attendance and notes of the discussion exercises. Military history, taught both in the classroom and on Civil War battlefields, provided a central focus for the early War College curriculum; it remains an important element, though is no longer the central focus of its activities. Prior to 1940, the historical ride (which was a true ‘staff ride’) was the centrepiece of the War College course; held annually in May and June, historical rides lasted two to three weeks and covered up to five hundred miles in the saddle, journeying between historic battlefields, following old military routes. According to Col. Sette, ‘Frequently the Secretary of War accompanied by the President of the Army War College would join the student party during these rides and participate for up to 2-3 days’. This is far more in keeping with the German model, and contrasts vividly with the more leisurely Camberley approach to battlefield visiting.

Conclusion.

The use of Camberley’s undirected battlefield tours, where syndicates chose their own destinations and travelled unaccompanied by Directing Staff, was undoubtedly Fuller’s legacy in giving Staff College students ‘something of the university of life’. What is striking is not so much their comments on the terrain they saw, but their observations on other European nations – France and Belgium particularly. This was an era when foreign travel was still a relative novelty and news media was still in its infancy; thus nations were far more ‘isolationist’ than today and consequently their soldiers far more ignorant of each other than is the norm at the time of writing. Observations on the French or Belgians penned in these
battlefield tour reports can thus appear naïve to the reader now, but were relatively profound at the time; this was one of the subliminal values of these tours – introducing soldiers not just to foreign terrain, but foreign culture as well. After all, it was anticipated that the French and Belgians would be allies in the next war, and therefore one needed to know something of them. The tour reports also hint that there was a general feeling of the inevitability of another European war, sometimes explicitly stated, but always present. Thus whilst these tours may not have prepared students tactically for fighting the next war, in terms of gaining an eye for the ground, staff work and liaison with Allies, they may have been excellent training at the operational level.

This Chapter’s heading was inspired by conversations in 1999 with one Second World War British infantry platoon commander, who recalled that the Somme dominated his teenage years in the 1930s and his army life in the early 1940s – as it would have done all those who attended any staff college in this period;

‘It seemed to me that the German infantry still followed the same defensive tactics which they had used so effectively in 1916…I remember with horror being “locked” into the timetables of meticulously planned large battles…Undoubtedly, far shadows from the Somme clouded my emotions, but instinct told me that this kind of show would be unlikely to succeed…The Somme had also cast its shadows on our artillery and armoured commanders. Both genuinely believed that in their hands they had the panacea which would protect us, the infantry, from the terrible slaughter of 1916…Now in my sixties, I do not underestimate the influence that the Somme had on the British military psyche…’177

REFERENCES

1 Cited in John Waddy, A Tour of the Arnhem Battlefields (Barnsley: Leo Cooper 1999), p.10.
2 According to the Army Medals Office, the British (not including Commonwealth forces) awarded 6 million 1914-20 War Medals and 5.75 million Victory Medals to its service personnel. The essential figures were that Britain mobilized about 8,375,000 men, of whom 702,410 were killed out of a population of 45.75 million, or 1.53% of the population (or one in sixty-five). There were 6,218,540

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non fatal casualties recorded in the war, in all theatres, some of which represented multiple incidents to the same individuals. 65% were non-battle casualties; 57% of casualties on the Western Front were not related to enemy action; these could include non-fatal sufferers of the ‘flu epidemic of 1918, disease, included VD, broken bones and cuts from accidents and falls from horses, range accidents and vehicle collisions. Apart from the Army Medal Office figures, all figures (other sources have minor variations to these) from Gordon Corrigan, Mud, Blood and Poppycock (London: Cassell & Co. 2003), Chapter 2, ‘The Lost Generation’, pp.52-76. In modern parlance, the entire population were ‘stakeholders’ in the war, in a way they had not been since the Civil Wars of the 1640s. Thus, many had an incentive to visit the battlefields, and in staggering numbers. Never before had travel to the old battlegrounds been easier; they were geographically close, located on terrain owned by neighbouring friendly powers, possessed a dramatic quality of their own in terms of the memorials, cemeteries, wire, trenches, bunkers and destruction that marked their presence, and institutions such as Old Comrades’ Associations, the British Legion and tour companies removed much of the stress of solo visits by offering packaged trips for a low, fixed price.

3 Nigel Hamilton, Monty, Volume One: The Making of a General 1887-1942 (London: Hamish Hamilton 1981), pp. 142-3. As soon as the tour had ended, Montgomery found that Robertson had caused his name to be added to the January 1920 intake of the Camberley Staff College, the second since its closure during 1914-18. Montgomery also attended the British Staff School, established in France, during 1918. Due to the recent ending of the war and that fact that every one of the intake had combat experience, no battlefield tour was undertaken in this year. The Senior Division had contained Bernard Freyberg VC, Viscount Gort VC and three other VC-winners.

4 The first English language edition of these was Ypres and the Battles of Ypres. The others were The Americans in the Great War (3 volumes); Arras; The Yser; Amiens; Lille; Rheims; Soissons; The Somme (2 volumes); Verdun; The Yser; and The Marne 1914. All are currently reprinted by the Naval and Military Press, UK. Original prices (1922) for the English editions ranged between Two and Four Shillings per volume, or Thirty Shillings for the set of 15; quite an investment in the early 1920s.

5 Battlefields of the Marne 1914 (Paris: Michelin & Cie. 1917), Foreword.  


7 In the scale of 3.15 miles to the inch. They were Michelin Map No. 102 The Battle of Normandy, June-August 1944; No. 103 The Battle of Provence, August 1944; No. 104 The Battle of Alsace, Nov 1944-March 1945; and No. 105 The Road to Liberty, June 1944-January 1945. All have since been reprinted.

8 Douglas Wilson Johnson, Battlefields of the World War, Western and Southern Fronts: A Study in Military Geography, With a Foreword by General Tasker H. Bliss (American Geographical Society, Research Series No.3; Oxford and New York: University Press 1921). The book, which included 165 maps also came with a slip case containing a further 11 topographical maps, diagrams and panoramas; Johnson (1878-1944) was Professor of Physiography at Columbia University and was writing for the US market; he had earlier published Topography and Strategy (New York: Henry Holt 1917) and Plain Words from America: A Letter to a German Professor (Columbia: University Press, 1917) Originally written in reply to a letter, pleading the cause of Germany, received from a German colleague, first published in the Revue de Paris, September, 1916. Book and maps in the author’s collection

9 Johnson, Battlefields, op cit, Introduction, p. xv.

10 Ibid, p. xviii.
11 Ibid, p.xix.
12 Ibid, p.xvi.
13 Metz (b. 1948) was COS CENTCOM October 2003-January 2003; commanded US III Corps in 2003; the Multi-national Corps, Iraq 2004; and since 2006 has been COS of TRADOC; Metz’s speech of 28 June 2002 is oft-used in NATO circles, but actually comes from TR Fehrenbach (b.1925), a former WW2 platoon commander and company commander in Korea, in This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan 1963), p.427.

14 High Wood has been allowed to return to its 1914 boundary and covers about 75 acres (0.12 sq. miles). On the 1 July 1916, High Wood was well behind the German front line trenches and the battle for it only developed in the second phase of the campaign (14 July-12 September). At 500ft elevation, High Wood was the main artillery observation post for this sector of the battlefield, and German gunners exploited this to great effect when stemming the advance of Fourth Army northwards in the first week of July 1916. It was the last major wood to be taken, and the most fought (over - 64 days) and well deserved the sobriquets, ‘the hell of High Wood’ and ‘the rottenest place on the Somme’. High Wood was silhouetted on top of the Bazentin ridge line, dominating the advancing British
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soldiers. It lurked in the landscape (as it does today) like a black fist. One website estimates that as many as 10,000 British and Germans soldiers still lie unrecovered within the bounds of High Wood, making it, in effect, a huge mass grave.


In the anthology Vain Glory (London: Cassell 1937) editor Guy Chapman states that the poem was published in the Nation on 16 February 1918, which was taken over by the New Statesman in 1931. Brian Gardner repeats this in his anthology, Up the Line to Death (London: Methuen 1964, intro. by Edmund Blunden) but gives no biographical details for Philip Johnston. Born in 1890, Lt. John Stanley Purvis, 5/Prince of Wales's Own Regiment of Yorkshire, was invalided out of the army having been gassed during the 1916 Battle of the Somme. Following the war he returned to Cranleigh School in Surrey where he had previously taught. He then took holy orders and at the age of 50 he settled in York, becoming a Canon of the Minster. Here he gained an international reputation as the translator of the York Mystery Plays and was awarded the OBE for his work on the York Minster archives. He died in 1968.

This was following Masefield’s earlier (very successful) account of the Gallipoli campaign (Gallipoli, published in 1916 by Heinemann), which he had witnessed when attached to a Red Cross unit. John Masefield, The Old Front Line (London: William Heinemann 1917), new edition published by Pen & Sword books, 2003, with preface by Martin Middlebrook and introduction by Col. Howard Green MC.

17 The author helped prepare these units by leading staff rides to Sedan in 2002.
19 John Keegan has identified several other locations where a clash of arms seems to be inevitable, largely because of geography and geology. He suggests a ‘Quadrilateral’ between Mantua, Verona, Peschiera and Legano in Northern Italy but, he says, ‘...the most arresting example is Adrianople, now Edirne, on the extreme North-West border of European Turkey, where fifteen battles or sieges have been recorded, the first in AD 323 and the last in July 1913...’ The city straddles the main movement corridor between the Balkans and Istanbul (Constantinople).

20 See John Keegan, A History of Warfare, op cit, pp. 69-70; but see the whole of ‘Interlude One: Limitations on Warmaking’, pp.63-76.
22 Author’s figures, taken from University of Essex website for average wages and relative values of money, http://privatewvw.essex.ac.uk/~alan/family/N-Money.html#1264.
23 Herbert Reiaich, The Pilgrim’s Guide to the Ypres Salient (Poperinghe: Talbot House 1920). The guide includes three good maps and essays on various aspects of service in the Salient, including Hugh Pollard on the infantry and Walter Gardiner on mining. Author’s collection.
24 Aldershot: Gale and Polden Ltd (1920), author’s collection.
25 Lowe, The Western Battlefields, op cit, p.3.
26 Later Gen. Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, 1887-1985, led Brit Mil Mission to French Tenth Army 1940; GOC Brit Mil Mission to Turkey 1940-1; GOC Western District 1941-3; retired; later Editor-in-Chief of captured German archives 1948-51; Pres of the RGS 1954-8; died aged 99.
28 Ibid.
29 Author’s calculations from Owt Pie 1920, list of students.
30 Godwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College, op cit, p.272.
31 Maj-Gen. Victor Fortune, 1883-1947, was later captured by Maj-Gen Erwin Rommel in 1940, when commanding 51st Highland Division at St Valery. He spent the war as a POW.
32 Lt-Col. Sir John Baynes, Bt., The Forgotten Victor: Gen. Sir Richard O’Connor (London: Brassey’s 1989), p 29. O’Connor subsequently became a Corps commander in Monty’s 21st Army Group; his subordinate position was due to his unlucky capture in April 1941 by Rommel’s Afrika Korps. O’Connor subsequently escaped from an Italian prison camp and was immediately employed as VIII Corps commander. Baynes argues convincingly that O’Connor may well have taken Eighth Army to victory, rather than Montgomery, had he not been captured, and therefore might have commanded
either 21st Army Group or Second Army in Normandy. The author had several conversations with the
delightful John Baynes (1928-2005), father of a school friend, about his earlier book Morale: A Study
of Men and Courage: the Second Scottish Rifles at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle 1915 (London: Cassell
1967) and about Richard O’Connor. (John Baynes also told me that the man who published a book
without an index ought to be damned ten miles beyond Hell, where the Devil could not get for sting ing
nettles’.

Author’s calculations from Owl Pie 1921 and 1922, list of students.
1936), p.419.

For example in 1935 Senior Division Records Vol. I, JSCSC Archives.
Col. JFC Fuller, The Reformation of War (London: Hutchinson 1923).
Fuller, Reformation, op cit, p. ix.
Later FM the Lord Ironside, 1880-1959, CIGS in 1940.
Kenneth White (Staff College Librarian), ‘The Last Battlefield Tour 1979: An Historical Memoir’,
article in Owl Pie, December 1979, p.21.
JSCSC Archives. The battlefield tour collection is prefixed with the letters BTC.
See my Recommendations for these and all future archives in Chapter Nine.
Maj. Carolyn Johnstone, Syndicate Room Discussions at the Staff College, Camberley, op cit, p. 76.
Ibid.
Several Commandants and DS make comments to their students to the effect that ‘I’m sure this will
add much to our understanding of…[campaign]’.
Holden Reid, op cit, p.83.
Maj. RG Money, MC, Maj. FM Montresor, MC, Maj. CJV Shepherd, DSO & Capt JH Woods,
Foreign Tour Report, January 1923, BTC 005, JSCSC Archives.
Ibid, Notes on the organisation of a Trip to visit the battlefronts in France, p.26-7, BTC 005, JSCSC
Archives.
Charles Edmund Carrington, 1897-1990.
Maj. Charles Caddick-Adams MC, Scrapbook and Photograph Album of European Tour, 10-31 May
1921. Author’s archives.
(1889-1969), commissioned into the Territorial Force in 1910, served with 1/5 North Staffordshire
Regt and later, the Machine Gun Corps. This was partly a honeymoon, for he had married on leave in
1915. He subsequently undertook a second tour with his younger brother, Capt. Thomas Geoffrey
Caddick-Adams, MC, who had served with the 9/North Staffordshire Regt.
that ‘…before the postcard was a year old it was involved in war. At the end of July 1870 war broke
out between France and Prussia, and by September Paris was surrounded and under siege. Only the
balloon could get in and out of the city and special light postcards were produced for the balloon
post…’ (p.79). They go on to state that ‘…At the turn of the century, the mass communication media
were not established as they are today. Literacy was not high and radio did not exist. The picture
postcard may well have commanded more readers than the newspapers…’ (p. 80).
Fuller was so-nicknamed because of his resemblance to Napoleon.
Later Lt-Gen. AE Percival, GOC Malaya from April 1942 until surrender in January 1942; invited by
MacArthur to be present on USS Missouri for Japanese surrender in 1945.
Maj. AE Percival’s syndicate report is at BTC004 in the JSCSC Archives.
Owl Pie, Christmas 1925, Some Impressions of East Prussia, pp.56-57.
Ibid, p.56.
Owl Pie, Christmas 1925, editorial, p.1.
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70 Col. Fuller, ‘Wolfe’s Cove: September 13, 1759’ article in Owl Pie, Christmas 1925, pp.6-7
74 Report of No.6 Syndicate (Maj EGWW Harrison, Capts. FW Messervy, RH Campbell & MB Burrows), The Battle of the Marne Sept 6th-9th 1914, Foreign Tour, BTC 016, JSCSC Archives.
78 Foreign Tour Report on Operations of the BEF, Mons 1914, BTC008, JSCSC Archives.
79 Report on the Operations of the French Armies, 4-9th September 1914, BTC015, JSCSC Archives. Operations of the BEF, 6th to 9th September 1914, BTC017, JSCSC Archives.
80 Sir Henry Karslake Papers, Imperial War Museum, box 02/41/2. The tour took place 11-16 March, 1926, travelling by road and rail.
82 Foreign Tours during Easter Vacation 1927, Administrative Instructions, BTC021. Because of the destruction of nearly all Camberley archives during this period, the only set of instructions that dealt with the administration of battlefield tours were found bound into one of the syndicate reports atBTC021. See Appendix Five.
83 BTC024, JSCSC Archives.
84 Foreign Tour. Battle of the Marne, 6th to 9th Sept. 1914, p.1, BTC026, JSCSC Archives.
85 The syndicate was Lt-Col. the Hon HRLG Alexander DSO, MC, Irish Guards; Maj. ESD Martin DSO, MC, 5th Inniskilling DG; Maj. GHB De Chair, OBE, MC, Royal Sussex; Capt. JAC Whitaker, Coldstream Guards.
86 Foreword to syndicate report, BTC024, JSCSC Archives.
87 Ibid.
89 Ibid, pp. 2-3.
91 Report on the Retreat from Mons, BTC018, JSCSC Archives.
92 Ibid, Annex B.
93 Ibid.
94 Later Gen. the Lord Robertson of Oakridge, Bt., GCB, GBE, KCMG, KCVO, DSO, MC, Chief Admin Officer, 15th Army Group, Italy 1943-5; Deputy Mil Governor, Germany Control Commission 1945-7; C-in-C Occupation Zone 1947-9; C-in-C Mid East 1951-3; Chairman of Brit Transport Commission 1953-61; Life Peer 1961.
96 Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College, op cit, p.290.
98 Later the Viscount Bridgeman, 1896-1982, KBE, DG Home Guard & TA 1941-4, then DAG.
99 Later Maj-Gen. EE Dorman-Smith (originally O’Gowan), 1895-1969, later an instructor at Camberley (1936-7), but had fallen foul of Monty whilst he was a student at Staff College, publicly burning his lecture notes on graduation. COS to Auchinleck at 8th Army in 1942 but purged with his boss and after brigade command at Anzio was dismissed from the army in 1944. The brilliant ‘Chink’s’ spat with Montgomery ultimately wrecked his subsequent career. See the useful biography by Lavinia Greacen, Chink: a Biography (London: Macmillan 1990).
100 Later Maj-Gen. Sir Leslie Hawkesworth, KBE, GOC 46th Div in Italy, X Corps Nov 1944, Heart attack, May 1945.
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105 Later Lt-Gen. GC Bucknall, 1894-1980, GOC5th Division in Sicily 1943, then XXX Corps 1944, sacked July 1944 and replaced by Horrocks.
106 The Vossische Zeitung was the principal German newspaper published in Berlin (1721–1934); it was generally regarded as the national newspaper of record, like The Times and Le Monde, but was discontinued by the Nazi Party (perhaps on account of its liberal views, and not least because it had serialised All Quiet) and replaced by the NSDAP’s newspaper, Der Völkische Beobachter.
108 Erich Maria Remarque (1898-1970). Details from author’s G.P Putnam’s Sons (Sept 1929) edition, translated by A.W. Wheen. All Quiet’s sequel, Der Weg Zurück (The Way Back), appeared in 1931, but neither it nor any of Remarque’s subsequent writing achieved the acclaim of his first work. In the 1930s Remarque’s books were banned in Germany by the Nazis and publicly burnt. The film’s premiere was disrupted by Nazi gangs, Remarque was accused of pacifism and in 1938 he lost his German citizenship. He had moved to Switzerland in 1932 and in 1939 emigrated to the United States, where in 1947 he became a citizen. After the war he returned to Switzerland, where and wrote a play (Die Letzte Station, 1956) about the fall of the Third Reich, and died in 1970.
109 Milestone starred in and directed the film, winning one of the two Academy Awards given to All Quiet. It also had five other nominations and, according to Halliwell’s Film Guide (2004) it was ‘a landmark of American cinema and Universal’s biggest and most serious undertaking until the sixties; this highly emotive war film with its occasional outbursts of bravura direction fixed in millions of minds the popular image of what it was like in the trenches, even more so than Journey’s End which had shown the Allied viewpoint. Despite dated moments, it retains its overall power and remains a great pacifist work.’
110 Robert Cedric Sherriff (1896–1975) served as a Captain in the 9/East Surreys and was wounded at Passchendaele. Journey’ End was first published by Samuel French in 1928 as Remarque was finishing All Quiet. The play opened at the end of 1928, starring the unknown Lawrence Olivier (then 21) and soon transferred to the Savoy Theatre in January 1929 and opened on Broadway in 1930. By the autumn of 1929 it was playing by 14 companies in English and 17 in other languages; it, too, was made into a film version in 1930. It was one of BBC television’s first plays, broadcast on Armistice Day 1937, and more recently, was revived very successfully in January 2004 for what turned out to be a two-year run. See reviews in the Radio Times (4 March 1960) of a radio play version, and reviews of its revival in the West End. Sherriff later wrote the screenplays to Goodbye, Mr Chips (1933) and The Dambusters (1955), both of which were nominated for Awards.
111 Craftsmen in Southern England received an average annual wage of £178; between 1918-38 labourers £139, and agricultural labourers an average weekly wage of £1.12s (£1.60) or about £83 a year. Rates in Northern England would have been considerably less. Author’s figures, taken from University of Essex website for average wages and relative values of money, http://privateww.essex.ac.uk/~alan/family/N-Money.html#1264.
112 Report on the Operations by the British at Cambrai 1917, including the attack by Third Army 20 November and the German Counter-Attack 30 November, by Maj GC Bucknall’s syndicate, DS mss comments I, p.1, BTC056, JSCSC Archives.
114 Ibid, DS typed comments III, p.1
116 Foreign Tour of Syndicate No.11, Report on Operations of the 4th Army 8-12 Aug. 1918 with a special reference to the Canadian Corps, Part XIV, p.27, BTC 054, JSCSC Archives.
118 Later Maj-Gen. Philip Gregson-Ellis, 1898-1956; GOC of 5th Div. at Anzio; later Commandant Staff College 1945-6; retired 1950.
122 Later FM Sir Gerald Templer, 1898-1979.
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124 Note this early use of the abbreviation, AFV.
125 Operations of the Fifth French Army During August 1914; With Special Reference to the Battles of Charleroi and Gaise, pp. 83-5, BTC05-, JSCSC Archives.
126 Air Commodore Henry Probert, Bomber Harris His Life and Times (London: Greenhill Books, 2001), pp. 59-61
127 Ibid, p.61.
128 Senior Division 1929, Report on Foreign Tour – May 1929, The Defence of Belgium, by Capt. A Galloway MC; JOM Ashley; CdeL Gaussen MC; KL Stewart MBE, BTC045, JSCSC Archives, p.1; Galloway was later Gen Sir Alexander Galloway, 1895-977.
129 Ibid.
130 I am most grateful to Graham Ross for lending me his copy of How To see Paris and the battlefields, Automobile Tours Organised by Thos. Cook & Son, Paris, Season 1921.
131 Copy held in the Nottinghamshire Archives, Gandy Family Papers, ref DD/2243/52/49.
132 David Jones (1895–1974) was the son of a Welsh father and an English mother. He studied at the Camberwell School of Art before joining the army in January 1915, serving as a Private in 15/Royal Welsh Fusiliers. These experiences provided the material for In Parenthesis (1937), which is epic in scope and tone, and builds its narrative around very ordinary characters, who are presented in vivid silhouettes, sudden stabs of personal memory, or reflected in the eyes of their fellow soldiers. Private John Ball is the central figure, suggesting the poet himself – pretty much the only, though wounded, survivor of his unit at the book's end. I am grateful to Professor Paul Gough of the University of the West of England (UWE, Bristol), for drawing these lines to my attention.
134 In Parenthesis, op cit., p. 183.
135 Ibid., p.186.
136 Bradshaw Railway Timetable, in author’s collection. This was, however, nearly a weekly wage for the very lowest paid.
138 Plumer’s speech was recorded in the Radio Times, all major newspapers and by Gen. Sir Charles ‘Tim’ Harington GCB, GBE, (1872-1940, who was with Plumer both on the day and as his Chief of Staff, in Ypres during the war), in Plumer of Messines (London: John Murray 1935). Plumer’s powerful speech, which resonates through the decades, concluded: ‘…One of the most tragic features of the Great War was the number of casualties reported as “Missing, believed killed”. To their relatives there must have been added to their grief a tinge of bitterness and a feeling that everything possible had not been done to recover heir loved ones’ bodies and give them reverent burial. That feeling no longer exists; it ceased to exist when the conditions under which the fighting was being carried out were realised. But when peace came and the last ray of hope had been extinguished, the void seemed deeper and the outlook more forlorn for those who had no grave to visit, no place where they could lay tokens of loving remembrance…It was resolved that here at Ypres, where so many of the ‘Missing’ are known to have fallen, there should be erected a memorial worthy of them which should give expression to the nation’s gratitude for their sacrifice and its sympathy with those who mourned them. A memorial has been erected which, in its simple grandeur, fulfils this object, and now it can be said of each one in whose honour we are assembled here today: “he is not missing; he is here”…’
139 The painting can be seen in the Australian National War Memorial in Canberra, Australia.
140 Punch Magazine, 31 August 1927, p.249.
141 A smaller British Legion-sponsored pilgrimage had been organised in 1927, which encouraged the Legion to mount the 1928 expedition. Scrapbook in the South Wales Borderers Museum, the Castle, Brecon, viewed by the author in May 1998, and A Souvenir of the Battlefields Pilgrimage, a 152-page, fully-illustrated hardback souvenir book of the tour, published by the British Legion, 1928 (author’s possession). Despite its success, the immense logistical undertaking meant that the pilgrimage was not repeated.
142 A Souvenir, op cit., p.97.
143 The stated aim (copying DS instructions) is actually reiterated in only one report, Operations at Cambrai, 20 Nov-29 Nov 1917, by Maj. NK Jolley, Capts. EH Allen, BS Challen, MHS Penhale and JE Barrett, BTC065, JSCSC Archives.
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144 Later Lt-Gen. Herbert Lumsden, 1897-1945, GOC 1st Armoured Div 1941-2, X Corps 1942, then sent as British observer to the Pacific and killed by Kamikaze attack on USS New Mexico.


148 Later FM Sir John Dill, 1881-1944.

149 Later FM Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, 1881-1964.


152 Sir John Smyth VC, Milestones (London; Sิดgwick and Jackson 1979), pp.96-9


154 US Army Military History Institute, Memorandum on US Army Use of Battlefield Sites for Staff Rides, 3 November 1999. I am indebted to Lt Col. (retired) Dr. Roger Cirillo for bringing this document to my attention.


157 G-3 Section, American Forces in Germany, A Staff Ride to the Battlefields of Metz (War of 1870-71), (US Army: Coblenz 1922)

158 Born in 1860, in the era of Indian wars, Pershing lived through extraordinary military transformations, including both World Wars, and dying in the age of the atom bomb, in 1948. He was an 1886 graduate of West Point and a veteran of the Spanish-American War of 1898. In 1917-18, he trained and led the huge US Army deployed to Europe (the American Expeditionary Force), insisting that US troops fight as an American army, rather than being seconded to French and British formations depleted by years of trench warfare. Afterwards, with George C. Marshall as his ADC, the two developed a close working relationship - Pershing was the best man at Marshall’s second wedding in 1930. When Marshall was Chief of Staff, he continued to visit his mentor, then an invalid at the hospital where he died in 1948.


160 Born in Texas in 1890, Eisenhower graduated from West Point in 1915 with Omar Bradley. He missed service in France during the Great War, but after Pearl Harbour, George C. Marshall called him to Washington to run the War Plans Department. He commanded the Allied Forces landing in North Africa in November 1942 and was Supreme Commander of the troops invading France on D-Day 1944. After the war, he became President of Columbia University, then Supreme Commander of the new NATO forces being assembled in 1951. Republicans persuaded him to run for President in 1952. In September 1955, Eisenhower suffered a heart attack but in November ran and was elected for his second term. He left office in January 1961, retiring to his farm adjacent to the Gettysburg battlefield and died in March 1969.


162 However, the book was written by regular officers and two valid criticisms can be levelled at it. First, it provides very little context to the tactical actions it describes (although the maps are excellent), therefore losing any much potential benefit from discussing the operational level of war; in this sense it is almost a military manual. Secondly, it skips over most activities of the National Guard and National
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(war-raised) Army, concentrating on the activities of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd (Regular) Divisions, particularly the Big Red One (the First Infantry Division), which was Pershing’s favourite. David C. Homsher observes that the writers were ‘directed and edited by Regular Army personnel who had no use at all, before, during, or after the war, for the divisions of the National Guard’. He goes on to speculate that ‘possibly this occurred because in most cases the non-regular divisions equalled, and in some cases even excelled the general performance of the much-touted Regulars’. See Homsher, op cit, accessed 3 December 2005.


George Catlett Marshall (1880-1959), graduated first from the Virginia Military Institute in 1901, then Fort Leavenworth in 1907 and from the Army Staff College in 1908. During the Great War, he served in all the key US battles of Canting, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne. After acting as ADC Pershing (1919-24), q.v., Marshall served in China from 1924-7, at the Army War College (1927), as assistant commandant of the Infantry School from 1927-32. He commanded 8/Infantry Regt in 1933 and, as Brigadier-General, 5/Infantry Brigade (1936-8), when he joined General Staff in Washington, DC and in September 1939 was promoted Army Chief of Staff by President Roosevelt. He participated in all the wartime summit conferences (the Atlantic Charter, 1941-1942, and in those at Casablanca, Quebec, Cairo & Teheran, 1943, Yalta and Potsdam, 1945, in January 1947 served Secretary of State; in the spring of 1947 he outlined in a speech at Harvard University the plan of economic aid (the Marshall Plan). For one year during the Korean War General Marshall was Secretary of Defence, but resigned in September, 1951, three months before his 75th birthday, retiring from public service. His diplomatic work brought him a Nobel Peace Prize in 1953 and he died in 1959. See especially Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General (New York: Viking Press 1963), which contains an excellent bibliography.

Colonel George C. Marshall, Introduction to Infantry in Battle, pp.ix-x.

At the height of the Second World War, George C. Marshall took a small party including Field Marshal Sir John Dill (1881-1944, head of the British Military Mission to the USA 1941-4), on a private battlefield tour of Gettysburg. In mufti, they hired a licensed battlefield guide but eventually dispensed with his services as Marshall’s superior knowledge led to his guiding the group. ‘The guide was heard to mutter ‘I wonder who those people think they are?’ without realising he was dealing with two of the free world’s most senior military commanders. See Gettysburg Battlefield: An Army Interest Well After Civil War, Kim Holien, Fort Myer Military Community (FMMC) Historian, op cit.


Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower, op cit, p. 128.

Kiesling, Defence Studies, op cit.


Richard D Terrell, The Army War College Curriculum, Implications of Design (USAWC Study Project 1986); GB Hunter, AWC Historical Ride 1939, Work Notes & Miscellaneous Data (USAWC File #355-39/5); Army War College, Course in Military Art 1908-09, Exercises, Solutions, Discussions, Records of Attendance and Miscellaneous Papers, Vol. 2.


Sette, op cit, p. 15

‘So as through a glass, and darkly
The age-old strife I see
Where I fight under many guises
Many names – but always me’

George S. Patton, Junior

CHAPTER EIGHT

Out of the Shadows

The Future of the Tour.

In 1976, Hugh Beach handed over the Camberley Commandant’s baton to John Stanier and the lead DS for the 6th Airborne day (Map 20) had become Peter de la Billière. At the top, Roy Mason had handed the Defence portfolio over to another unsympathetic ear - Fred Mulley (who as the Intelligence Sergeant of 7/Worcesters had been wounded and captured at Dunkirk, spending the war as a POW, but would become more famous for falling asleep during an RAF fly-past). In the course of a nice letter to Freddie de Guingand in May, inviting the latter to Camberley to speak, Stanier - sensing the tour might be seen as out of step with the times observed,

‘There are, of course, people outside the Staff College who accuse us of looking too far back in studying the last war. They, however, do not realize the great value which our students obtain from a study of the human elements at war. Without exception those who have attended our Battlefield Tours return totally convinced of its value; I share this view entirely myself…’

Stanier was clearly worried and after the 1975 tour asked for ways of cutting the tour’s costs. One of the divisional colonels noted,

‘1. I agree than money could be saved. 2. I believe that reducing the strain on guest artists might be even more important but that if we want
to earn the maximum number of Green Shield stamps in MOD we should stress the financial side. 3. The guest artists hate change. It would be, therefore, prudent to consult them before floating any changes…'

Arguably, the Staff College had to contend not only with a shortage of money, but also a shortage of enthusiasm for military history in general, expressed by a younger generation. During the 1960s and ‘70s, the interpretation of military history (inspired by and coinciding with the 50th anniversaries of the 1914-18 battles) was heavily influenced in its conclusions by external events such as the Vietnam War, the unrest in Northern Ireland and Paris, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Arab-Israeli wars and the proliferation of nuclear weapons; this interpretation was also reflected in contemporary culture, for example by the Lennon-McCartney record Revolution. Younger historians expressed a general mood of youthful rebellion against authority and wrote of the incompetence of senior military officers in the First World War (though, arguably, it was really Vietnam that was never far from their deliberations). Their work included Alan Clark’s The Donkeys (1961) which inspired Joan Littlewood’s play Oh What a Lovely War! (1963), Reginald Pound’s The Lost Generation (1964), and, later on, Norman Dixon’s surprising, best-selling scientific analysis of commanders, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence and Paul Fussell’s work of literary analysis, The Great War and Modern Memory, which both appeared in 1975, amongst others. When working in Westminster in the early 1980s, this author used to meet The Donkeys author Alan Clark, then a Conservative Defence Minister, and discussion sometimes turned to the First World War; there was never - on his part - any acknowledgement that scholarship had moved on and that his rather harsh pronouncements on Great War British generalship, made twenty years earlier, were dated and the subject was being reassessed by scholars. Anthologies of
First World War poetry also followed this mood, as with Brian Gardner’s *Up the Line to Death* (1964) and I.M. Parsons’ *Men Who March Away* (1965), which emphasised themes of slaughter and despair (and were penned by a remarkably small and unrepresentative group of middle class officers), and overlooked the fact that many soldiers and officers felt their war service was a positive step in their own self development and were not anti-authority at all. Although dealing with later wars, this was also the era of the irreverent, hugely influential and anti-war *M*A*S*H* (book 1968, film 1970, TV series 1972-83, play 1973) and the profoundly anti-patriotic, anti-authority *Catch-22* (novel by Joseph Heller, 1961, and film of 1970).

**Sir John Stanier.**

Consequently, partly buoyed up by this general wave of pacifism and anti-militarism in the West, military history both within and without the military took a back seat. Against this wider backdrop, the annual Camberley Battlefield Tour was fighting for survival. Gen. Sir Mike Jackson, though he does not mention his Camberley battlefield tour, does paint a good picture of life at Staff College during his year there as a student, in 1976, and hints that it was the 1973 Yom Kippur War that was more influential than the events of 1944. John Stanier – a cavalry officer who had recently commanded 1st Armoured Division (and 20/Armoured Brigade and the Royal Scots Greys before that) privately may also have felt out of sympathy with his Airborne brethren and that 50th Division’s battles and GOODWOOD offered little to his perception of future armoured warfare (studying what was essentially a British defeat) on the North German Plain. There were clearly ‘mutterings’ about the future during the 1976 tour, for Stanier felt it necessary to write to Gen. Napier Crookenden (one of the speakers) and reassure him immediately afterwards, ‘In your letter you
indicate that next year’s tour may be in question. I can reassure you that this is not the case and that it will continue as before…”21 But this was not actually the case; by October, Stanier had revised his view and wrote to the senior guest speakers (Gens. Crookenden, d’Avigdor-Goldsmid22, Mogg23 and Roberts) in the following vein,

‘…I am writing to you about the future of the Battlefield Tour. Those who have not had the chance to attend the tour often accuse us of living in the past and attempting to teach the lessons of the last war. It is only those of us lucky enough to hear the accounts of the operations who realize that, not only is there still a need to hear about the exploits of the past but as experience of war recedes the need for the young officer to be told what war is all about becomes increasingly important. This year once more the tour was rated by the students as the highlight of the course.

It would be easy for me to leave matters to run indefinitely; however I realize that one day, sooner or later, the Tour will have to end and I believe that, with the passing of thirty two years since the battles, the end is probably not very far off.

It occurs to me therefore that it might be better to appoint a final year for the tour, so that it could be brought to a close on the crest of a wave, rather than allowing it to sink into decline as fewer and fewer of the star speakers are able to come.

You may think that this is unnecessarily pessimistic but you must realize that if it is to be concluded, I shall have to consider very carefully what should take its place in the Staff College course and planning for this must also be put in hand well ahead.

I would therefore like to propose that during next summer’s Tour we should find an opportunity to discuss the future. I am writing to you well in advance so that you can, if you wish, obtain the views of the other members of your team…”24

He convened a meeting on 5 June during the 1977 tour, attended by the DS and senior speakers and ten days later they had received the minutes,

‘The purpose of the meeting was to hear the views of the guest artists. It was not intended that the meeting should take any decision on an ending to the Tour. Such a decision would in any event concern other senior officers with responsibilities towards the Staff College. The senior guest artists expressed the view that the Tour was assured for the next two years and all hoped that they would be able to give it their support for longer.’25

Stanier played his cards close to his chest and when one DS was offered a new guest speaker in 1977, the offer was gently turned down with the (perhaps bizarre)
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observation, ‘My immediate reaction is that, as the Battlefield Tour has few years to run, it is late in the day to introduce another speaker’; yet, another DS was happy to welcome back Brig. James Hill for 1979, even though he had not spoken on the tour since 1974. The formal announcement of the end came in his \textit{Staff College Report for 1977} (dated 28 February 1978), where John Stanier stated that,

‘The Battlefield tour was again a resounding success. 1977 was particularly noteworthy in that the College was in France on the occasion of HM The Queen’s Silver Jubilee….It was with great regret that, on the advice of the principal Guest Artists, I recommended that the last of the present Tours should take place in 1979. Following the Army Board’s approval of this proposal, planning for the New Tour [a series of visits to modern European military institutions], to begin in 1980, has now started. I think it appropriate here to record the immense debt owed by the college to all the Guest Artists who have so generously given their time and unique experience to successive Courses over the last 31 years’.

Yet, this does not seem to be correct; none of the evidence uncovered so far suggests the veterans had recommended this course of action, were ready or even willing to see an end to the tours. The DS all report them happy to continue. The DS had explored this course in 1974, but recommended the tours continue, in a different format – but still saw the tours continuing for another ten years (i.e. until 1984 – which for the fortieth anniversary of D-Day, might have been a more logical time to terminate them). If not the veterans getting older, was there another reason? Finance was clearly an issue, and would begin to affect the College in 1979-80, but was only on the horizon in 1977 and would emerge during someone else’s ‘watch’. Perhaps Stanier wanted to reassert control over a programme he felt was not his, or had indeed become fed up with the ‘Battlefield’ aspects of the enterprise – but these details were his to change. The fact that the Army board approved his decision suggests he was appealing to like-minds, but it is curious that he made no effort to
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retain any form of battlefield tour. The 1978 students were aware they were witnessing history, as Owl Pie observed,

‘It was for all of us a unique and humbling experience to listen to these accounts of war from the men who had fought there. The tour had put a lot of the theory and discussion that we had had into perspective and left us all with a great deal to think about. It was undoubtedly the highlight of the year at Camberley and it is indeed sad that this was the penultimate tour…’

It had long been an ambition to film the tour; this had been done several times earlier. In 1968, extracts of the tour (with Hans von Luck and Stan Hollis) were included in a commercially-made programme about the Staff College, This is My Contract, made for military consumption. Coverage of the 1973 visit had been commissioned but there were concerns over its technical quality. A third filming project began in 1975, whilst the DS review of speakers was underway. New potential speakers were shown the earlier film and invited on the 1975 tour, so as to warn them what to expect. The new filming project was realised in 1977 by the Services Kinema Corporation (SKC), but it was noted, the film was ‘to illustrate command and leadership in the stress of battle. The human element therefore has priority over historical record.’ This illustrates perfectly the tension that Professor Eugenia Kiesling alluded to in Chapter One: the clash between the desire to discover what actually happened on a battlefield and the need to teach contemporary lessons (in this case command and leadership in the stress of battle); what Kiesling fails to take into account in her argument is that if the military are paying her salary, then they get to dictate the priorities – the trade is a fair one, because it then provides the funding for the historian to practice their craft.
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In September 1978, Army Training News gave a curious impression that battlefield tours were time-consuming and expensive to organise, implying perhaps that they did not offer value for money. Certainly in the days of currency controls, and before Euros, credit cards and the Channel Tunnel, they were less straightforward to undertake, but not excessively so. Most family holidays were taken across the Channel travelling by ferry, and much army routine involved motoring between Germany and the UK, so the ‘organisational’ argument seems difficult to sustain. At this stage, Army Training News was promoting the SKC film to the wider army (as part of a War Studies package), which was arguably an institutional attempt to find an alternative to studying Normandy in situ.

‘The dangers of fighting the last war are often stressed but there is an equal danger of ignoring the lessons which only war teaches. Battlefield tours are the best way of portraying the atmosphere of war but they are expensive in time and money and impossible for most of us to organise. We have undertaken an experiment to find out how we can capture the atmosphere of a battle in a form which is relevant to the needs of a wide range of audiences and flexible enough to be used in several different ways…a War Studies package containing a film, some slides [and] a booklet….The film may be used in its entirety or split up as the presenter wishes…For 30 years the Staff College has visited Normandy to study events which occurred in June and July 1944. GOODWOOD was the codename given to the attack by three British Armoured Divisions to the east of Caen on 18 July 1944. It is this story which War Study Operation GOODWOOD tells. The conduct of the defence against a massive armoured attack which was supported by overwhelming artillery and air bombardment has obvious relevance to our present situation, but there are many other lessons such as the value of intelligence, the training of junior leaders and soldiers, the value of all arms co-operation, the effects of continuous action on morale and the effect of the individual in the battle.’

The Last Tour.

It was only in late 1978 that the Staff College Librarian [Kenneth White] initiated the first formal effort, ‘to ensure that the material used on tours over the many years is not lost. It is intended to collate all the material and have it properly...
preserved in the Staff College archives’. Thus it seems that none of the material for each year’s tour was held centrally in the library, but handed from DS to DS, implying very much a decentralised control of the tour; this is reflected in the correspondence saved by various DS. Some clearly made strenuous efforts for the tour each year, tracking down long-lost veterans, compiling ORBATs and collating veterans’ accounts from books, regimental journals and tape recordings. The DS in charge of the 6th Airborne presentation felt moved to write in 1979, ‘The time has come once again to send out the letters on travel arrangements for the Battlefield Tour. It is very sad to reflect that this will be the last such letter…’

The attitude of the Commandant played a role in this; Nigel Poett’s memoirs seem to indicate he was ‘hands-off’, whilst the warm and appreciative thank-you letters from Hugh Beach demonstrate a boss who took a close interest in the tour. On the last battlefield tour, 9-15 June 1979, nine speakers addressed the Airborne stands; seven spoke on the 50th Division day and five at the GOODWOOD presentations; BBC-Panorama also appeared to take some footage.

By the time of the last tour, John Stanier had handed over to Frank Kitson, who wrote a series of effusive letters of thanks to the final speakers, peppered with the right phrases: ‘Several generations of Staff College students have been privileged to listen to your vivid and enthralling account of the capture of Bréville and it is very sad to think that subsequent courses will not be able to re-live that battle with you’; ‘I find your particular story quite fascinating and your vivid description of life in very close and confused contact with the enemy is exactly what the students need to bring some reality into their studies’, and ‘your...story [is] one of the most intriguing of the Tour and feel it really deserved a whole day on its own. It is a quite remarkable
illustration of leadership and determination of the highest order which have provided Staff College students over the years with a most valuable lesson.38

Owl Pie provided a worthy tribute to the last Staff College tour in December 1979, with an historical memoir by the Librarian (Figure 8.1, below), poems and photographs (of the battlefield variety, alas). A final dinner was held in October 1979 for all present and past speakers, DS and Commandants. Exactly 100 sat down, including 26 officers of one-star rank (brigadiers) and above.39 Over the years, 74 speakers had addressed 32 tours on the ground or the 1952 tour in the UK, of these sixteen had spoken on more than ten occasions, and 28 on more than five occasions. The GOODWOOD Day was the most consistent, having been in the programme almost from the start. Here, two speakers (Maj-Gen. Pip Roberts & Maj. Bill Close) had addressed the stands on 20 and 23 occasions, respectively; Hans von Luck had managed 15 tours, and two others had spoken for 16 and 11 years. The 6th Airborne Day had seven speakers who had spoken on ten or more occasions, including John Howard40 (14 times). On the day covering 50th (Northumberland) Division’s battles, Gen. Jackie d’Avigdor-Goldsmid, Robin Hastings, Alistair Morrison and Peter Dickens had spoken on ten or eleven occasions.41

So why had the Staff College battlefield tour drawn to a close? Ironically, if the Staff College Commandants were concerned about MOD budgets under Labour, the advent of a Tory administration under Margaret Thatcher on 3 May 1979 brought an immediate 25 percent increase in forces’ pay, which the Callaghan government had allowed to fall behind in real terms. The decision to terminate the tour was really the Staff College Commandant’s, but it had long sown the seeds of its own
demise by being primarily reliant on the speakers. Towards the end, there was a constant battle to find new speakers, and the figure of 74 individuals to deliver about fifteen stands illustrates the point. So does the longevity of some of the ‘guest artists’ (a displeasing term if ever there was one): the same speakers (very good though they may have been) for fifteen or twenty years illustrates the fossilisation that had taken place.

Figure 8.1. Cover of the booklet issued at the time of the last Staff College battlefield tour to Normandy in 1979. (Source: author’s collection)
Arguably the tour had very low expectations in learning outcomes, merely using the tour to bring out tactical decision-making and the ‘atmosphere’ of war; the treasures of the terrain were often overlooked in favour of the story the speaker had to tell, and there was no attempt to interpret the history at the operational level.

Nigel Bagnall.

The scalpel was undoubtedly wielded by John Stanier (announced formally in February 1978), who must have decided very early on what he was going to do – perhaps three years beforehand (he had departed before the final act) – and left Frank Kitson to do the deed. On one hand there must be sympathy for his decision (there were undoubtedly financial worries and in 1979 the College suffered a reduction in establishment of two DS posts, a five percent cut in civilian manpower and a ten percent reduction in civilian overtime), but the tour had long since become an exercise in nostalgia and the issues of civilian clothes, yachts, wives and ‘bottlefields’ undoubtedly detracted from its gravitas. Yet, Stanier had the opportunity to turn the tour into something else along the lines of a staff ride. This he chose to forego, which is puzzling; he himself had attended the College (and its tour) in 1964-6 and had also been an Assistant Instructor GSO1 at the Imperial Defence College, 1968-70. The institutional lack of understanding of the operational level of war until the 1980s is perhaps pertinent to his line of thought. In his obituary of another field marshal - Nigel Bagnall (1927-2002) - John Keegan credited the latter ‘…with introducing the Army to the “operational level”, a concept borrowed from the panzer generals which he successfully domesticated by brilliant exposition. He also made the study of war respectable and transformed the outlook of a whole generation of officers’. 
Footsteps Across Time: Chapter Eight: Out of the Shadows

Bagnall had served as GCS (1985-9) and in retirement published *The Punic Wars* (1990) on which he had been working when in office, which deserves to be better known than it is today. In his Epilogue, he observed,

‘…As Polybius pointed out, the study of history provides a means of learning from the experience of others, so avoiding some of the mistakes of our predecessors…let me reinforce this opening statement by quoting Capt. Mahan… “History both suggests strategic study and illustrates the principles of war by the facts which it transmits. But if these lessons are to be of any value, they must be shown to have a practical application.”… We can at least introduce an element of predictability in assessing the likely consequences of our actions by applying the lessons of the past, although care must be taken that those lessons are not reduced to dogmas. They should be regarded only as signposts or guidelines for future action, which can then be formulated into policy through debate…’

Bagnall analysed very specifically the strategic and operational conduct of the distant Punic Wars in terms of contemporary lessons for the West, as the Soviet Union was disintegrating. Yet Bagnall was not the only senior soldier at this time to employ military history to illustrate current military thinking. Gen. Sir Frank Kitson published *Directing Operations* in 1989, about the qualities needed by modern army officers; in it he argued that

‘there are certain principles…that seem to have remained the same throughout history, and it is worth realizing that success in the past has usually been achieved by acting in accordance with these principles. They are, in effect, a distillation of the combined experiences of the many thousands of commanders who have operated throughout recorded history…The value of understanding the underlying principles governing the conduct of operations was greatly stressed at one time, but is now largely neglected in the British Army. The reason for this is not clear…it is none the less useful to absorb the distilled experience of the ages, particularly in peacetime when it is difficult to gain experience at firsthand…’

Kitson saw there were two ways to absorb the principles of war: through personal experience or by studying military history (which included touring battlefields); to illustrate the eternal nature of the British Army’s ten principles of war,
he included in *Directing Operations* a brief historical study of Wolfe’s capture of Quebec in 1759 ‘to show how practical experience can be gained from studying a past campaign in the light of the principles of war’. At the time Kitson was writing his book, Bagnall as CGS had lent his weight to the establishment of a resident civilian historian at Staff College (this was Brian Holden-Reid - in retrospect it is surprising that this happened as late as it did) and to the establishment of the Higher Command and Staff Course.

Arguably then, it may have been Stanier who in 1979 was not forward-looking enough, rather than the tour itself. Stanier was Commandant at a time when, in some minds at least, there was a nagging doubt that military history had less relevance in an era of acute technological change, and that operational research, decision-making theory, systems analysis and computer simulation offered more than those who studied or possessed military experience. A 1981 paper by US historian Walter Millis summarised succinctly this Cold War-era doctrinal myopia:

‘… The military professional who must today preside over the design, production and employment of the giant weapons of mass destruction cannot really learn much from Napoleon, or Jackson, or Lee, or Grant – who were all managers of men in combat, not of ‘weapons systems’ about which one of the most salient points is that they must never… be allowed to come into collision… It is the belief of the present writer that military history has largely lost its function… the old tales are increasingly irrelevant to modern international politics, to modern war and modern citizenship… it is not immediately apparent why the strategy and tactics of Nelson, Lee or even Bradley or Montgomery should be taught to young men who are being trained to manage the unmanageable military colossi of today…’

It was this view that Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor also reflected when writing of pre-war battlefield tours (discussed in Chapter Six) in his 1956 memoirs, *The Central Blue:*
‘...but tactics change, or should change, so quickly with the development of weapons that I am very doubtful whether there is anything to be gained – whether indeed there is not positive disadvantage – from detailed tactical study of past campaigns on the ground...’\textsuperscript{53}

Stanier’s official - and rather lame - argument - quoted in \textit{Owl Pie} and elsewhere at the time (‘it would have been disastrous to let it [the tour] fall off gradually as one after another of the eye-witnesses on which all depended, succumbed to the effect of time’\textsuperscript{54} certainly has not been borne out in fact. Indeed the evidence suggests that the tour closed despite the protests of the guests that they were fit and happy to carry on. John Howard, Hans von Luck, Bill Close, John Mogg, James Hill and many others whom this author met in Normandy, carried on with unit and formation tours and pilgrimages for another twenty years, and battlefield tours have undergone an upsurge in interest and participation beyond all levels experienced in 1979.

The very next year, 1980, for example, Gen. ‘Pip’ Roberts, Hans von Luck and Brig. Jack Churcher were to be found in Normandy, conducting their \textsc{GOODWOOD} stands for the Old Comrades of the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry.\textsuperscript{55} The immediate reaction of two serving, former Staff College DS, Christopher Dunphie and Gary Johnson, was informative: in 1980 they wrote-up the Staff College tour and published it commercially as \textit{Brightly Shone the Dawn};\textsuperscript{56} Dunphie has since written another book about Op. \textsc{GOODWOOD}, specifically incorporating much Staff College material.\textsuperscript{57} John Stanier also could have opted to carry on with the tours, using a mix of veterans and historians – as happens today – and ironically in 2003 this author met Stanier preparing to do just that - guide a battlefield tour himself of the Cassino area! The newspaper obituaries of Luck\textsuperscript{58}, Howard\textsuperscript{59}, Close\textsuperscript{60} and Morrison\textsuperscript{61} all stressed
their lecturing roles on the Staff College battlefield tours – suggesting that speaking to
the College on ‘their’ old battlefields was an achievement in its own right. Most
recently, Morrison’s (in April 2007) was titled ‘Major Alastair Morrison, who has
died aged 83, won an MC in Holland in 1944 and was well-known for his lectures on
battlefield tours of the Normandy beaches’.

Strangely, other solutions lay open to Stanier which he chose to ignore. He
could not only have altered the emphasis, but the changed the locations. The original
Camberley tour of 1947 had produced templates for subsequent tours to which BAOR
had added. The result was the series of seven battlefield tour books: GOODWOOD –
BLUECOAT – TOTALIZE - NEPTUNE, and VERITABLE – PLUNDER - VARSITY,
which had been published with the BAOR imprint in 1947-8. The Directing Staff
editions contain all the maps, photographs, lecture scripts and stand details necessary
for a very professional tour. In the author’s experience they have been used many
times since and prove a very robust and comprehensive training aid; many of the
locations today remain appropriate and unaffected by modern construction. These
were in any case designed to be undertaken without the original eye-witnesses and
required interaction and participation from the students. In a sample study of the
1956 Camberley tour, the pre-tour DS instructions indicate that the BAOR Goodwood
books were issued to each DS, who were also recommended to study Chester
Wilmot’s Struggle for Europe and the relevant chapters of the VIII Corps history,
Normandy to the Rhine and Taurus Pursuant (the history of 11th Armoured
Division). Choosing other areas, such as the Ardennes (relevant to 1940 and
1944) or going back to the BAOR studies of other battles had been raised as an
option in 1974 but was not pursued - partly, one suspects, because the administrative
support had become so comfortably ensconced in Cabourg. Neither had Lt-Col. Peter Inge’s very sensible suggestion of carrying on, using professional historians rather than senior former commanders – which is what happens today - been further investigated.

It appears the termination of the annual tour thus need not have happened at all. The story of the Staff College Battlefield Tour to 1979 was a tale of a marvelous learning tool first growing stale, being under-used, mis-applied and then neglected. At the end of the same year that Camberley’s detailed examination of the planning and execution of a large-scale land operation had been terminated, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.  

A Tour to Arnhem (Map 21).

Frank Kitson reviewed the end of the tour in his Staff College Report for 1979, admitting ‘there is no doubt it will be sadly missed on future courses’. However, he went on to loyally defend Stanier’s decision (- how could he otherwise?), ‘I have little doubt however that the decision to end it at this juncture was correct…’ Yet, it was not long before there was a sense in the Staff College of having tilted against history too far in dropping the tour. The very next year -1980 – Owl Pie recorded the visit of some officers to Ypres. ‘Quite why we chose Ypres neither of us knows, but we were determined to do something other than spend our time on coaches visiting Waterloo or Brugge’, mused the article’s author. This was a thought-provoking, private day-long tour, undertaken during the free day of the European visit, but perhaps underlines the fact that touring battlefields was in the Staff College institutional blood; note that there was already an organised visit to Waterloo at the
same time. The days previously occupied by the Normandy battlefield trip were filled by a European Tour, when the Staff College visited organisations like SHAPE and BAOR; however the many non-NATO students (with a few British warriors) were given an alternative programme for the more militarily-sensitive days of the tour. This included a few days studying the airborne landings at Arnhem. Owl Pie recorded as early as 1981, ‘After weeks of “chinagraph battles” it was a rewarding and sobering experience to stand on the spot where an entire battalion or even a brigade had made its last stand. This was the value of the visit in May by a party from the Staff College to Arnhem’. 70

The return of a mini-battlefield tour *in the programme* and so soon after the termination of the Normandy one, during the reign of Frank Kitson’s successor (Maj-Gen. DB Alexander-Sinclair), suggests an early, institutional about-face; even the methodology was the same, using veteran eye-witnesses, geared to the tactical level, but the tour seems to have been a stand-alone, and not stitched into the curriculum:

‘As we were conducted around Arnhem and Nijmegen we were fascinated and enthralled by intimate accounts of battles and individual incidents by those who participated in Op. MARKET GARDEN. Lt-Col. Doug Crawley MC (Retd.) who commanded ‘B’ Coy 2/Para near the bridge itself, gave a graphic account of the fierce fighting in that area. Mr Tex Banwall, BEM, late of 10/Para, regaled us all with revealing and candid stories of the operations of his battalion and of events within the Hartenstein perimeter leading to the night river crossing from Oosterbeek Church…Those of us fortunate to visit Arnhem were able to experience a battlefield tour in miniature and to profit from the experience of those who actually took part in the fighting. It was a memorable few days’.  

Within four years of its demise, the next Commandant, Maj-Gen. John Akehurst was reviewing 1982 in his annual report (of March 1983) and observed that during Part 1 of the European Tour, the non-NATO students had visited Arnhem battlefield and during Part 2,

‘During our stay in Brussels we arranged 4 battlefield visits, to the Ardennes, Fontenoy, Waterloo and Ypres, which were led by RMAS War Studies lecturers. These visits were highly popular with the students, but primarily filled a spare day forced upon us by programming difficulties’.  

‘We Really Do Miss The Tour’.

Already, albeit through the back door, tours were back in the programme. Akehurst - who had commanded a brigade against Communist rebels in Dhofar 1974-5 with enormous success - was described in his obituary (February 2007) as ‘one of the most successful and popular commandants since the war, being particularly adept
at summing up after lectures delivered by the great and good.\footnote{74} He was remarkably forthright in his 1983 review: in posing the question, ‘What effect has the loss of the Battlefield Tour had on our instructions?’ Akehurst stated,

‘We really do miss the Battlefield Tour but the Battlefield Stress Study (2 days) has been extremely successful in dealing with the Human Factors in War. Instead of just hearing from veterans, as we did on the old tours, we now approach the subject from 4 angles; the veterans, the military historian (this year Corelli Barnett); the psychologist (Prof Norman Dixon); and APRE [Army Personnel Research Establishment]. The veterans are invited on a scale of one per syndicate and one of them (this year Brig Thompson) speaks centrally on the Commander’s view of stress in battle. I should add at this point that I was offered staff support for a Staff College tour to the Falkland Islands. I politely declined on the grounds that the arduous journey, potentially awful weather and lack of accommodation and Calvados (or its equivalent) would only be tolerable if a really effective tour could be assured on arrival. This seemed unlikely. Instead a party of DS visited in Jan 83 to film and photograph the ground and to research up-to-date material for input to our tactics presentation, emphasising the All-Arms battle. Also the second European Tour is an extremely important alternative [to the battlefield] tour to us in Term 4 and it provides an excellent and well-earned break from the class-room’.\footnote{75}

From this passage, it is perhaps significant that Akehurst (who had been a DS at Camberley in 1966-8, but not a student, and whose main operational expertise was irregular war in Dhofar – nothing like the high intensity war of Normandy) personally felt that the battlefield tour concept had continued relevance. The fact that he felt he could say this in his annual report [to the Army Council] indicates he may have assumed he had a sympathetic audience. Although he had turned down a College tour of the Falklands, the fact that the old tour was still missed - and the perception that it was still of value is important - because during the year under review the army had undertaken its first major joint operation since Korea (Op CORPORATE, to free the Falklands). Experiences from the Falklands (including talks from the participants and the Governor, Rex Hunt) were fed into that year’s course, but there remained the sense that something akin to the old-style Normandy tour was still needed. Once the
original battlefield tour had gone, however, financial considerations were never going to permit Akehurst (or any other Commandant) to re-introduce it and his report was full of the frustrations of defence cuts, limitations of civilian staff and their overtime; these were the result of the wide-ranging defence review, announced by the incoming Secretary of State, John Nott (a former regular 2/Gurkha Rifles officer), in 1981.

The student critique of the Arnhem visit stated that it,

‘was rated a success and the administrative arrangements were much appreciated. It was felt that in future the commentaries should be more structured and informative, some felt that a German veteran and a speaker from 30 Corps or 43 Div should be included…Overall the general view was that the visit underlined that there was still an unquestionable need at the Staff College for a comprehensive battlefield tour to illustrate the chaos, confusion and unpredictability of war, to balance theoretical studies’. 76

This is very significant feedback, for none of the students had had previous experience of the old Staff College tour, yet perceived that the Battlefield Stress Study Day did not entirely address the issues of leadership in war. The DS response, however, was geared to finance:

‘The point on the commentaries is noted. As the Arnhem visit is not classified as a ‘battlefield tour’, it is unlikely that financial cover would be made available for additional speakers…We are aware of the widespread feeling that there is a place for a battlefield tour in the syllabus but this is a matter for the Course Committee to discuss.’ 77

Within five years of its demise, during his tenure as Commandant (1984-6), Maj-Gen. CPR (now Gen. Sir Charles) Palmer78 acknowledged the lack of a battlefield tour had left a ‘gap’ and initiated a study tour of the British armoured counter-stroke at Arras of 21 May 1940, but to be undertaken out of College hours. A battlefield guide to Arras was issued by the Staff College in 1985 to all its students, introduced by Palmer in the following terms:
‘Until 1979 the Staff College made an annual visit to the Normandy battlefields to study the realities of combat. The visit was invaluable as a means of passing on the previous generation’s practical experience to future commanders and staff officers. It also did much to kindle interest in military history…’

This was perhaps an unexpected by-product of the tour that John Stanier hadn’t fully understood, that it also encouraged a professional understanding of the use of military history. This was before Camberley had its resident civilian historian; Palmer continued,

‘Sadly the Battlefield Tour had to end in 1979. Its place has been partly taken by the annual Stress Study held at Camberley. However the more academic Stress Study cannot entirely replace a Battlefield Tour on the ground.’

In Frank Kitson’s Planning Directive for the last (1979) tour, he had directed that the visit include ‘a lecture on Morale and Battlefield Psychology’ and that the 1980 course include a new Battlefield Stress Study Day, which was designed to replace

‘…some aspects of the discontinued Battlefield Tour…to permit students to study and discuss human behaviour under the stress of battle. It will consist of a number of presentations given by outside speakers with medical, historical and personal experience…’

Here, perhaps, is one of the areas where the old battlefield tour had stumbled, by not exploiting the unique, out-of-doors nature of the learning, its experiential qualities, and the examples of terrain affecting operations all about. None of the educational values outlined in Chapter One were mentioned or even recognised in connection with its demise. In their defence, it is unlikely that the Commandant and his staff were aware of the learning cycles of Kolb or Honey and Mumford, or Gardner’s multiple intelligences, but it may be that their successors are still unaware, which is less defensible.
It seems – to a degree, at least – that the tour had become a series of lectures given out of doors, which were (relatively easily) then moved indoors and transferred to Camberley. The 1981 Battlefield Stress Study ran over two days in September and its robust selection of speakers included Dr Norman Dixon (author of *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*), John Keegan and Maj-Gen. Joachim Oster$^{83}$ (a founder of the *Bundeswehr*, who had commanded a tank company at Stalingrad and whose father had been executed for his rôle in the 20 July 1944 plot), who lectured on ‘a military commander’s view of stress in battle’. Each syndicate also had a veteran to contribute to syndicate discussions; these included some of the old Battlefield Tour speakers (Brig. Peter Young, Alistair Morrison, Peter Dickens, John Howard and Bill Close), but also Max Hastings, David Chandler$^{84}$ and Maj-Gen. ‘Bala’ Bredin,$^{85}$ amongst others. Charles Palmer’s 1985 study guide introduction continued:

‘This reduction in the emphasis placed on the study of Military History has been partly offset by the increased use of historical examples in the tactical studies undertaken at the Staff College, but I still wish to take every opportunity to encourage further and deeper study of Military History.

The next step in this process is this Battlefield Guide. It is intended for you to use on your next continental holiday, or on your way to your next posting in BAOR. It is a good example of what can be achieved using available material and does not demand enormous resources. Any one of you could produce a similar guide when you get your next job, on any action you consider appropriate; and that is exactly what I hope you will do…’$^{86}$

In many ways, this was a bizarre exhortation – drag your family around a battlefield; the route to follow the 1940 battles around the industrial town of Arras is not conducive to gentle motor excursions or family holidays – it is an affair of busy roads, war cemeteries and muddy farm tracks where there are no restaurants and
facilities to help make the exploration more pleasurable. Arras in size and hospitality is not dissimilar to Coventry – not necessarily a destination to visit or linger in, unless there is specific and enticing purpose. Gen. Palmer’s study guide (it is not his fault) betrays the army’s lack of understanding of educational theory – how we learn – for one of the major benefits of outdoor terrain study is peer discussion. This is the learning where Vygotsky (explored in Chapter One) identified a rift between what an individual can do alone and unaided and what can be achieved with the help of more knowledgeable others. Palmer’s battlefield tour was maybe a poor substitute, but nevertheless an attempt to plug the ‘gap’ that was universally perceived to have opened up with the demise of the tour; and it was arguably an acknowledgement the scrapping the annual tour had been a mistake.

Gradually, a ‘diversion’ via Arnhem (Map 21) became a fixture on the Camberley European Tour, as Owl Pie observed in 1988.

‘It is a place about which much has been written and around which many stories have sprung up. We were very lucky to be part of a well-researched tour that was brought to life by veterans who had fought on the operation. Our party consisted mainly of overseas students and more than a few officers who wore parachute wings themselves. By the end of our brief visit the myths were dispelled and the true story of a bold operation bravely carried out was told…Here too, we were given the factual rather than the Hollywood version of events [a reference to the 1977 film A Bridge Too Far].’

The tour was still an adjunct to the main European Tour and a way of entertaining non-NATO students, but was also becoming a focus for the airborne mafiosi, and at no little expense; three veterans were organised to lead the various stands (Maj-Gen Tony Jones, Col. Geoffrey Powell and Capt. Jim Flavell). The Owl Pie’s author was clearly moved and motivated by the experience, and conscious
of the expense, provided an erudite justification of the exercise, which – alas – not all
his year could share:

‘In an age of financial constraint critics are quick to point out that ‘jollies’ such as battlefield tours have outlived their usefulness. Most of our guides commanded nothing grander than a company in the battle. After weeks of moving divisional symbols across maps in the syndicate room it was a chastening experience to hear men, now old, tell their very personal tale of battle. It was not a war story in the pejorative sense. We heard first-hand accounts about hardship and individual bravery that are far removed from our own peacetime experience. For most of us our next command will be at the same humble level. It was the face of battle exposed with great clarity and humility. The lessons learned are the ones that should be told again and again.’

Yet this piece hints at the fact that the Arnhem experience did not attempt to build on other lessons from the whole course, and there is no direct reference to the Battlefield Stress day; in 1990, *Owl Pie* carried a page of photographs from the Arnhem visit, but no article.

**TDRC and Battlefield Tours.**

In 1994, *Army Doctrine and Training News* issued a second list of battlefield tour reports held by the Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell, which amounted to 36 destinations, visited by 189 tours, of which 13 were by foreign units and 18 were papers relating to visits made by the new Higher Command and Staff Course. This represented a considerable leap from the mere 27 listed in *Army Training News*, only seven years earlier, in 1987. A few earlier tours had ‘crept in’, which were not listed in 1987 – but the striking fact is how many tours were mounted after 1985, when Sir Nigel Bagnall became GCS – 132 out of 158 (removing the US and HCSC contributions), which equates to 84 percent; this does not take into account those tours mounted in 1985 (eleven). What is different about these new tours was that they were being conducted by formation headquarters – 35 by brigade HQs and 14 by
divisional staff, as well as 29 by regiments and battalions themselves. As observed in
the previous chapter, this data may be inaccurate, in that there was (and, alas remains)
no obligation to lodge details of tours with the TDRC (or its successor, the Joint
Lessons Cell), but it does at least give a minimum indication of what was happening
in the army.

The 1994 data from TDRC for the 24-year period is illustrated at Figure 8.1 (below).

![Figure 8.1: Chart illustrating the Growth in the number of Army Battlefield Visits, whose details were lodged with the Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell, 1970-94, (as recorded in Army Doctrine and Training News, No.2, November 1994). Visits recorded for five-yearly intervals, until 1991-4. Note the totals for 1986-90 (60 tours) and for 1991-94 (a four year period), at 59 tours.](image)

The British army had always undertaken battlefield tours throughout the
Twentieth Century, whether as regimental pilgrimages or at a higher aspirational
level. Only world war or economic crisis (in 1932 and 1952) had interrupted the
Staff College tour, which was seen as the final arbiter of best practice throughout the
field army. The important thing that had happened with the demise of the annual tour
in 1979, was that for the first time, Staff College had surrendered the initiative and
methodology of running and encouraging battlefield visiting, to the field army - it was
as if Camberley were saying, ‘carry on, but we’re not interested in this any more’. If
the fundamental role of the General Staff is to introduce or maintain a uniform, co-
ordinated approach to training and operations, then Staff College, arguably, is the place where those practices should be taught – but that baton had now been passed to the rest of the army instead.

**Ex. SEELOW STRIKE.**

As it turned out, two factors helped to resuscitate the battlefield tour, one from outside the Staff College, the other from within. On 9 November 1989 the Berlin Wall was breached by Germans from both sides and within a remarkably short space of time the Iron Curtain across Europe was swept away; German unification followed in less than a year and was concluded on 3 October 1990; by June 1991, the Cold War seemed a such thing of the past and travelling restrictions into the old GDR had been eased; in this benign atmosphere, British military units based in Germany, including HQ 1st Armoured Division under Maj-Gen. Rupert Smith, fresh from service in the First Gulf War, and the Berlin Infantry Brigade, led by Brig. David Bromhead, mounted battlefield tours of a kind it would have been impossible to have achieved in the past – crossing into the east of Germany, they examined Marshal Zhukov’s 1945 assault across the River Oder, over the Seelow heights and into Berlin itself. These tours were highly significant and hugely influential for two reasons: first, because they embraced warfare at the operational level, something – as previously observed – the British were only beginning (and belatedly) to recognise.

Secondly, they were guided by a mix of professional historians and veterans, unlike the Staff College tours to Normandy. For Ex. SEELOW STRIKE, mounted by the Berlin Infantry Brigade, 22-24 October 1991, Professors Brian Holden-Reid and Richard Holmes, joined forces with Lt-Col. (retd.) Tony LeTissier (formerly the
Assistant Provost Marshal for Berlin and the last Governor of Spandau Prison, turned historian), and veterans Karl-Heinz Tams (a 21-year old company commander in PanzerGrenadier Regt. 76) and Lt-Gen. HJ von Hopfgarten (commissioned into the Wehrmacht in 1935 and subsequently a Bundeswehr Divisional commander); these guest speakers led five different stands over 48 hours and delivered several lectures, embracing not just vignettes from the past, but issues like ‘Manoeuvre Warfare’, ‘Urban Combat’, and ‘Soviet Philosophy of War’. The 48 people taking part were divided into three 15-strong syndicates who had to pre-read themselves into the campaign, discuss questions at the stands and present syndicate solutions. This was, in many ways a departure from the traditional, passive battlefield tour and incorporated elements of a TEWT, to create something approaching a true staff ride, as identified in Chapter Two. In reviewing the merits of Battle for Berlin staff rides, Prof. Chris Bellamy has recently observed,

‘it has everything. Most fascinating is the bitter rivalry and antipathy between different methods and style of the two principal Soviet commanders. Zhukov in his clay bunker banging his head against the Seelow Heights; Koniev in a castle slipping across the River Neisse and up the autobahn like a racing snake. You get the bunkers at Zossen, first the HQ of the Wehrmacht, then of the Warsaw Pact; and you get the issue of choice of final objective – the Reichstag - defining and announcing victory and all the Russian war means; all the war cemeteries you want without going to Russia and it can be done comfortably in three days without a visa.’

Although regiments and units had occasionally run other tours in the meantime, such as the PIED PEIPER series of Mike Reynolds and the NORTHAG Terrain Study Tours, examined earlier, these Berlin visits were hugely influential because of the level of war they studied and the inter-active nature of the exercise - and were thus completely different to any similar activity the participants had experienced before. The tours were no longer conducted as history for its own sake –

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which is arguably what the Staff College Normandy tours had become – but events where history became the *metaphor* for discussing current military operations.

**Map 22:** The Battle for Berlin, 1945, showing the envelopment of the city by Zhukov (to the North) and Koniev (to the South). Source: Maj. Claude R Sasso, *Soviet Night Operations in World War II*, Leavenworth Paper No.6 (Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute 1982).
The participants on the 1st Armoured Division and Berlin Infantry Brigade tours, many of whom had just returned from a major war in the Gulf, were soon themselves organising tours for their units and sub-units, and the new-style battlefield touring ‘habit’ rapidly cascaded through the army stationed in Germany and elsewhere. This gave rise to the current wave of requests for battlefield tours that the army is now experiencing; for example within a year of Ex. SEELOW STRIKE, in September 1992, 5/Airborne Brigade, based in Aldershot, undertook an ambitious four-day battlefield tour of the Somme, Arnhem and Eben Emael (Belgium).\textsuperscript{94} In the same period (1992), 3rd Division visited Normandy, South East District travelled to Arnhem, 19/Brigade to Le Cateau, Arras and Sedan; 7/Armoured Brigade toured Sedan, the Berlin Infantry Brigade took-in Jena-Auerstadt (1806), which 6/Brigade also visited along with Lutzen-Bautzen (1813).\textsuperscript{95}

**The Higher Command and Staff Course.**

The second factor which shaped future battlefield touring was born in April 1986 when the Army Board endorsed a recommendation of the Review of Officer Training and Education (ROTE) that a twelve-week Higher Command and Staff Course be established at Camberley.\textsuperscript{96} The first cohort of 20 students (including Lt-Cols. Patrick Cordingley, Jack Deverell, Tim Granville-Chapman, Cols. Roddy Cordy-Simpson, Charles Vyvyan and Oberst Hans Speidel of the Bundeswehr) began in January 1988 and concluded with a Staff Ride of the Ardennes. This exercise specifically looked at the higher levels of war and, guided to an extent by the resident historians, the students researched the campaign thoroughly and presented papers at each stand. Although the campaigns covered have now extended back to include
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1870, 1914 and 1940 as well as 1944 and guest lecturers have been incorporated into the programme, such as *Generalmajor* Heinz-Günther Guderian\(^97\) (son of Heinz, and 1a – Chief Operations Officer - for 116\(^{th}\) Panzer Division during 1944-5; later – as his father had been - Inspector of Armoured Forces, but for the *Bundeswehr*), the format and emphasis on the higher levels of war have been retained. As graduates from the HCSC return to their units and are promoted, they have been promoting the HCSC brand of participative staff ride to stretch the talent amongst their subordinates, as well as provide an interesting few days on unfamiliar terrain. Staff Rides initially and necessarily reflected lessons from land warfare, but the HCSC focuses on Joint Warfare, where elements of armies, navies, air forces (and in the US case, marines) fight in close co-operation; indeed, validation on the British Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC, for colonels and their equivalents) suggests the staff ride itself is considered the highlight of the three-month course by all participants, regardless of arm or service\(^98\). Wisely, Nigel Bagnall - who lobbied hard to get the course instituted - felt that NATO interoperability was so important that four of the HCSC places should be reserved for NATO allies (usually Americans, Germans, French and the Dutch); this provides an added dimension for the week-long staff ride, which is the penultimate phase of the HCSC and is designed ‘to link historical events, preliminary research and the actual terrain, to analyse the key lessons for application to future major operations and campaigns’\(^99\). It is also designed to demonstrate some characteristics of conflict and command at the operational level. Although following stands, it does not follow the format of a battlefield tour but, in the manner of Clausewitz, or the US model for staff rides, special emphasis is given to student preparation, participation and analysis, with an element of guidance and narration from the accompanying historians. Students also write and present a 3500 - 5000
word paper prior to most stands, which is followed by a theatre wargame, where principles learned are put into practice. Gen. Sir Mike Jackson is probably the first HCSC graduate to have written his memoirs, and recalled the second HCSC in 1989, ‘it was three months of concentrated intellectual study and hard work, but enormously stimulating and rewarding…The course involved lectures, syndicate discussions, private study, map exercises and the so-called ‘staff ride’, a sequence of battlefield tours that took us to sites in Normandy, Verdun and the Ardennes, among others. We were fortunate that our tour was conducted by Professor Richard Holmes. There was a lot one could learn from studying these past campaigns on the ground. Though of course the tactics and technology were completely different, many of the principles remained the same.’

Like the Berlin battlefield tour, the HCSC Staff ride has cascaded down to formations; for example, in 1993 1/Mechanised Brigade undertook a major (and ambitious) tour, studying the 1870 Franco-Prussian War (Map 7), Verdun in 1916, Guderian on the Meuse in 1940 and the Lorraine Campaign of 1944 – all prior destinations of the HCSC. The following year, 24/Air Mobile Brigade visited the Somme (1916 – Maps 10 and 11), Cambrai (1917 – Map 12) and the sites of the battle of Ramillies (1706) and Ops. VERTIABLE and PLUNDER (both 1945 – Map 16). In these cases and those of the other brigades and divisions cited above, more than one campaign and historical period was studied. The resultant range of wide range of examples suggests a fundamental reassessment of military history had taken place, both through the Bagnall reforms and the arrival of the HCSC; history was now being used as a metaphor to discuss current military issues at the operational level, rather than merely to discover the ‘realities of war’.

A good example of this is the study of the Ardennes battles of December 1944. At the time the surprise German counter-stroke caught the US Army completely off-guard and for many days their chain of command was paralysed with
exaggerated fears of the German threat. Having experienced the German March 1918 offensive, senior British commanders, led by Montgomery and Dempsey, were noticeably less anxious than their flustered allies. In other words, actual experience of other, similar situations, or study of the same, can prepare commanders for the same eventualities, particularly at the operational level.

Conclusion.

The Camberley tours had surrendered the benefits of studying operational-level military history but the Bagnall-inspired battlefield tours and HCSC staff rides hauled this professional use of history back into the army. The achievement of the HCSC was reinforced by the publication in 1989 of a selection of eleven essays submitted during the course under the title, *The British Army and the Operational Level of War*, introduced by Bagnall and edited by Jeremy Mackenzie and Brian Holden Reid. This upsurge of interest in using military history again was also reflected in the articles published in the army’s house journal, *British Army Review* – ‘Surprise: The Neglected Principle’ by Brig. JJG MacKenzie (No.88, April 1988); “‘The Lessons of Yesterday!’ The Relevance of Military History to the Teaching of Tactics in Today’s Army’ by Maj. HGR Boscawen (No.90, December 1988) and ‘The Value of the Study of Past Conflicts’ (which won The Bertrand Stewart Prize Essay in 1989), by Capt. P. Miller, (No.94, April 1990). None of these were ground-breaking and are thoroughly mainstream thinking today, but in 1988-90, arguably had amounted to cries in the wilderness.

It is difficult to avoid coming to the conclusion that Camberley gained nothing by terminating the annual tour to Normandy (except a financial saving), especially as
tours gradually crept into the syllabus again. None of the speakers, whatever they may or may not have said to Sir John Stanier, appear to have given up lecturing on ‘their’ old battlefields and some (including Hans von Luck) were inspired to write their memoirs.\(^{104}\) If one of the rôles of the Staff College is (in Henry Wilson’s words) to create a school of thought, then the annual battlefield tour was one of the tools to help create that concept, and the College was negligent in surrendering this important aid. However, a combination of the HCSC (from 1988) and the wider field army (on the conclusion of the Cold War) has wrested the initiative back. The next chapter explores where this process is today.

REFERENCES

2 He lost the Defence portfolio with the arrival of Margaret Thatcher in May 1979; later Lord Mulley of Manor Park, 1918-95.
3 Letter, Maj-Gen. JW Stanier to Sir Francis de Guingand, 4 May 1976, BTC218, JSCSC Archives.
4 Memo, Col. J Chapman to Col. OR Tweedy, Battlefield Tour, Ref Your 139/1 of 21 Jun 76. BTC218, JSCSC Archives
5 The North Vietnamese Tet offensive of February 1968 brought television pictures of the ugly reality of the Vietnam War (including executions at pistol point) into Western living rooms, provoking angry protest marches in the USA and Europe against American military imperialism. This sparked a famous pitched battle between police and 100,000 anti-war marchers outside the US Embassy in Grosvenor Square on 17 March. Later students took over some British University campuses (such as the LSE). As Ian MacDonald has observed, ‘...as if to drive the point home, Martin Luther King’s assassination a week weeks later confirmed a brutal Zeitgeist shift from love and peace to politics and struggle...’ (Ian MacDonald, *Revolution in the Head. The Beatles’ Records and the Sixties*, (London: Pimlico 1994), p.226. Earlier, in April 1967, the American Civil Rights activist Martin Luther King had already outlined his reasons for opposing the Vietnam War. In March 1968, King was shot and killed as he stood on the balcony of a motel. His death was followed by rioting in 125 cities and resulted in 46 people being killed. On 4 May 1970 the Ohio National Guard fired on a crowd of Kent State University anti-Vietnam demonstrators, killing four and wounding nine students. The impact of the incident was dramatic, triggering a nationwide student strike that forced hundreds of colleges and universities to close; the shootings symbolised the deep political and social divisions of America during the Vietnam War era. Already in 1968, Lt. William Calley had led two platoons into the Vietnamese village of My Lai, where over 500 villagers were massacred on 16 March. The story was broken by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh only in 1969 and Calley was court-martialled. My Lai represented one of the low points in US military achievements, and fuelled the already considerable anti-war movement and general left wing (and student) hostility to those in (any and all) authority.
6 In Ulster the Civil Rights movement comprised Nationalist Catholics who felt (with justification) they were being treated as second class citizens by the Stormont government. The first marches took place in August 1968; Stormont (the Northern Irish parliament) banned them on the grounds that the police had not been notified of them in advance; this led to marchers ignoring the ban and being attacked and beaten by the (predominantly Protestant) police with batons; Stormont (embodying as it did, the Crown’s authority in Ulster) received condemnation from around the world.
In May 1968 students rose up in Paris and elsewhere, over new visitation rules that forbade the opposite sex from visiting bedrooms. Students saw this as an unwarranted invasion of privacy and organised protest marches. These were attacked by the paramilitary CRS police and eventually two thirds of French workers were out on strike, in sympathy with the students. The battles were seen very much as struggles between the revolutionary left and the forces of reaction. De Gaulle reacted by dissolving the French National assembly in July. Again, this resulted in an anti-military, anti-police culture in France.

In 1968, Czechoslovakia experienced a period of political liberalism (the ‘Prague Spring’), led by Alexander Dubček, which included proposals to democratise its armed forces, limit the role of the Communist Party and retune defence strategy to its own (not Russia’s) geopolitical interests. Unsettled by these developments, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia on 20 August 1968 in a meticulously planned operation, with half a million Warsaw Pact troops.

Revolution was recorded in July and released in August 1968, although Ian MacDonald suggests that Lennon was himself anti-revolution. (Ian MacDonald, op cit)

[1] An early example of this school of thought was Leon Wolff’s In Flanders’s Fields (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1958), which appeared just after the 40th anniversary of the Armistice. The author’s Pan paperback edition (1961) on the rear cover reads: ‘The most insane and savage bloodbath in the history of war. Field Marshal Haig, the British C-in-C, believed himself a ‘Man of Destiny’ – he found 70% casualties ‘highly satisfactory’. Lloyd George, the Prime Minister referred to Haig as ‘brutal’ and ‘fatuous’ but lacked the courage to replace him. Staff Officers falsified reports – gains of 200 yards of desolation were hailed as ‘great victories’ – but the cost in lives was so appalling that the Government concealed the figures. In four months of butchery two British armies suffered half a million casualties. Cut to pieces by German machine guns, often waist-deep in mud, they advanced in that time four and a half miles! Vanity and incompetence at the top, merciless carnage lit by incredible courage on the field of battle, IN FLANDERS FIELDS is a shocking story that must never be forgotten.’


[3] Oh! What A Lovely War began life in 1963 as a stage musical by Joan Littlewood (a noted left-wing activist) and her London Theatre Workshop, based on Alan Clark’s book, with some scenes adapted from The Good Soldier Schweik (1920-3), by the Czech author Jaroslav Hasek, (1883-1923). In 1969, Richard Attenborough directed the film of the same name.

[4] Reginald Pound, The Lost Generation (London: Constable 1964). Pound sought to magnify the tragedy of 1914-18 by suggesting that a whole generation of Britain’s most able youth had perished, which impacted on British society and leadership afterwards.


[8] Joseph Heller, Catch-22 (London: Collins 1961). M*A*S*H was a good example of a subliminal message in a ‘war book’ (albeit a novel); the story was set in a US Mobile Army Surgical Hospital in the Korean War of 1950-3, yet all readers and viewers would have been aware that it was commenting on the contemporary Vietnam War (c.1965-75), then at its height. The Battle of Algiers (1965), portraying that country’s fight for independence and the bitter French colonial reaction, and Oh What A Lovely War (1969) were equally sceptical of military authority and government policy. Other feature films of the time, like the black comedy Dr. Strangelove: Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and...
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*Love the Bomb* (1964), *The Charge of the Light Brigade* (1968, which carried cheap shots against class and authority) and *Waterloo* (1970, containing a bizarre anti-war sequence in the main battle) and latterly, *Zulu Dawn* (1979) and *The Big Red One* (1980) also reflected this angry, rebellious mood and their stance seems all the more radical when contrasted with movies like the semi-documentary hit *The Longest Day* (1962, which was played during the Staff College tours and ‘much enjoyed’), the heroic *Lawrence of Arabia* (also 1962), *Zulu* (1964) and *Patton* (1970) of exactly the same era.

19 A pop historian described this era in the following terms: “…After the social uprising of the first half of the decade, the Vietnam war incited a moral uprising in the second half; but it was not till Mao Tsetung launched his Cultural Revolution in 1966 that the European Left found a faith to replace the one shattered by Khrushchev’s exposure of Stalin in 1956. The attraction of 1966-vintage Maoist revolution in the age of instantaneity was that it eliminated the preparatory phases of Lenin’s model, positing a direct leap to the Communist millennium which would expunge all class distinctions at a stroke. This, decided the excited young ideologues of the West, amounted to a ‘break with history’. All that remained was to take to the streets and ‘tear down the walls’...” See Ian MacDonald, *Revolution in the Head*, op cit, p.23.


22 Maj-Gen. Sir James d’Avigdor-Goldsmid, 1912-87, was OC ‘A’ Sqn. 4/7DG in Normandy.

23 Gen. Sir John Mogg, 1913-2001, was 2IC of 9/DLI on D-Day.

24 Letter JW Stanier to Generals Crookenden, d’Avigdor-Goldsmid, Mogg and Roberts, 14 October 1976, BTC218 JSCSC Archives.

25 Memo, Col. R Plummer to all DS, 15 June 1977, BTC223, JSCSC Archives.

26 Letter Lt-Col. WE Rous to Sidney Vines, 13 August 1977, BTC223, JSCSC Archives


30 Letters, Lt-Col. AFK Walker to Roger Gage, Westward TV, 8 March 1973 and reply, 13 March 73, BTC 208, JSCSC Archives.

31 Letter Lt-Col. WRC Timpson to Staff College D Comdt. & DS, 29 Mar 76, BTC208.


33 Letter Lt-Col. PS Morton to 6 AB Speakers, BTC252, JSCSC Archives.

34 Letters Lt-Col. DNA Blair to Team Leaders, 50 Div, 6 AB, Goodwood, 23 November 1978, Maj DJ Ralls to Team Leaders, 14 December 1978 and Maj DJ Ralls to Army School of Industrial Technology, Beaconsfield, 26 February 1979. BTC241, JSCSC Archives.


37 Letter Maj-Gen. FE Kitson to D Woodcraft Esq., 18 June 1979. BTC241, JSCSC Archives

38 Letter Maj-Gen. FE Kitson to Lt-Col. AJM Parry MC, 18 June 1979. BTC241, JSCSC Archives

39 Seating Plan for final tour dinner, BTC218, JSCSC Archives.

40 Maj John Howard, 1912-1999, was OC ‘D’ Company 2/Ox and Bucks LI on D-Day.

41 Survey of all speakers for final tour dinner, 18 October 1979, op cit, BTC236, JSCSC Archives

42 He has refused to be drawn on this point, interview with Sir John Stanier, Italy, September 2003.


44 Army Gradation List 1970.


51 This was an era when it would be commonly held that historical studies, for example, of the events leading to Custer’s death at Little Big Horn (25 June 1876), the defeat at Isandhlwana (22 January 1879) or numerous invasions of far-off Afghanistan (1838-42; 1878-80, 1919; constant North West Frontier/Waziristan operations and the Soviet invasion of 1979-89) had nothing to contribute to an improved understanding of the nature of war in the nuclear age; a visit to the actual battlefields themselves would offer little of professional use, and drain the public purse in an unjustifiable way.
(At the time of writing, in an age of asymmetric conflict with groups who are able to inflict losses on professional armies in remote territories, it might be felt that those far-off events in Montana, Zululand or Afghanistan have a resonance for modern doctrine in a way not appreciated in the Cold War.)


53 Ibid.

54 Owl Pie, December 1979, p.25.

55 Interview, Andy Robertshaw, Head of Education, National Army Museum, 10 August 2006.

56 Brightly Shone the Dawn (London: Frederick Warne 1980).


58 Daily Telegraph, 12 August 1997, Obituary of Col. Hans von Luck

59 Daily Telegraph, 7 May 1999, ‘Death of a hero who blazed the trail on D-Day’.

60 Daily Telegraph, 1 June 2006, Obituary of Maj. Bill Close.


62 Ibid.

63 Battlefield Tour 1956 Goodwood Gen Instrs – DS, BTC155, JSCSC Archives.

64 Even decades after the fighting had finished, the battlefield debris of combat encounters remained in the Ardennes, as Brig. Peter Macdonald recorded of his time in Germany in the 1980s, ‘…Not far from Malmedy and about twenty miles from Bastogne, a bit off the beaten track but near to a minor public road, we found a forest of tall pines, amongst which were the remains of an American battalion defensive position. We walked around and identified the headquarters dugout, the company command posts, and the platoon foxholes. There were bullets everywhere, and ammunition clips; whole hand grenades and the remains of rifles and steel helmets; even, on the lip of a crumbling fox-hole, an old, rusty field cooker. And scattered human bones. I picked up shins and arms and pieces of feet and fingers, looked for skulls but could not find any. It was quite unbelievable. Standing looking down a slope, the road dipped, then turned away into the trees. The sleepy-eyed soldiers in that position must have been looking down the road when German tanks came straight at them, just before Christmas 1944. There must have been a short, sharp firefight and then the weight of armour in von Rundstedt’s last fling, the final spasm of the Nazi war machine, threw them back violently. The Americans pulled back without even having time to retrieve their dead, let alone their equipment. The whole place must have been blanketed with deep snow, then after the battle moved on, more snow fell through a long winter. It was many months before the thaw came. When it did, foxes pulled the human remains apart, gnawed them and scattered them around. They, and all the military paraphernalia, settled into the loam and slowly bleached and rusted as the seasons passed. Why nobody had found them before is inexplicable…’ See Brig. Peter Macdonald, Corners of My Mind, (Bristol: Petmac Publications 1998), p. 180.

65 The invasion began on 24 December 1979.

66 Staff College Second Term Planning Directive 1979, p.6, ASC 13, Records of 1979, JSCSC Archives.

67 Ibid.


69 Ibid.


71 Ibid.


75 Akehurst, Report for 1982, op cit, pp.11-12.


77 Ibid.

78 Commandant 1984-6, b.1933


80 Ibid.


82 Ibid, p.7
Generalmajor Joachim Oster, b. 1914, commissioned 1935, attended General Staff School 1942-3 and 1a (1st Operations Officer) of a division at Monte Cassino.

David G Chandler, 1934-2004, formerly Head of War Studies at Sandhurst.


Lt-Col. Geoffrey Powell MC (1914-2005), who commanded a company of 156/Para at Arnhem, had earlier written Men at Arnhem, under the pseudonym Tom Angus (London: Leo Cooper 1976) and later wrote The Devil’s Birthday. The Bridges to Arnhem 1944 (London: Buchan and Enright 1984).

Ibid.

Owl Pie, 1990, p.36.


Prof. Chris Bellamy, interview 2 October 2006. Prof. Bellamy has led two Battle for Berlin staff rides, in December 2003 and March 2007.

See study guide at BTC 255, JSCSC Archives.


HCSC Booklet, p.3, bound into HCSC 1 Records, JSCSC Archives.


Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC), Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC) 2003 Validation, p.35


'After all, the really important function of any kind of military history is not primarily to serve as interesting material for the general reader, but to enable commanders and staff officers of the future to be wise before the event, and to learn not only from the successes but from the failures of their predecessors…'

Wing Commander John Slessor, 1936

CHAPTER NINE

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Story Today.

So where do battlefield tours and staff rides sit with the defence establishment (for they are of relevance to far more than the land component) today? In fact, because of multi-national operations and NATO co-operation, single-service, single-nationality battlefield visits should be a thing of the past – certainly if looking at the operational level of war. In recent years, US Army organisations of every kind have used battlefield visits to illustrate a plethora of military lessons, not necessarily connected with direct combat; for example in 1990, the US Army’s VII Corps’ 2/Support Command logisticians studied the logistical lessons of the 1805 Napoleonic campaign near Ulm in Germany.

Or take this very clear explanation of the aims and relevance to modern war of a three-day operational-level staff ride, which was reported by the US Army Europe (USAREUR) in 2005, in their journal:

‘...Studying historic military campaigns provide current soldiers and leaders with an excellent opportunity to reflect on their calling and prepare mentally for future challenges. When a rejuvenated German army attacked into the Belgian Ardennes [on] Dec. 16, 1944, the soldiers
and leaders of the US Army at all levels reacted in a way that reflected a hard-won tactical and operational maturity with a commensurate ability to react to the unexpected. It drew senior leaders of the US Army, Europe, led by Gen. B.B. Bell, for an operational-level staff ride in November 2005. These leaders looked at the problems of turning from offensive operations to defending against an unexpected and massive German armoured attack. They studied in detail how an alliance reacted to an unanticipated assault. The USAREUR November 2005 staff ride focussed on the three phases of the battle. The initial day studied what happened when the Germans attacked two ‘green’ infantry divisions, the 99th and the 106th… The second day of the staff ride looked at Gen. Hasso von Manteuffel’s 5th Panzer Army’s push to take St. Vith and beyond, and at the American reaction to this offensive… The final day of the ride addressed the role of British divisions holding the crossing of the Meuse at the tip of the Bulge and Allied counter-attack… Commanders have to look ahead, and consider not just what they expect, but also what a thinking enemy might do. They must be prepared to stop enemy initiatives before they become too dangerous. When the unexpected happens, they must act quickly and creatively. Maximum force must be applied in the proper place to achieve the desired goals. Those goals must be crystal clear. Soldiers have to be trained, supplied and led properly. With these prerequisites the soldiers of a democracy cannot be defeated… Staff rides are one of many training techniques that have wide applicability. Properly done, like all training, they address not only past successes and deficiencies, but also current and future problems. USAREUR’s recent rides have focussed on learning and reinforcing operational lessons unique to senior officers. They are experts in the tactics of their profession, but in many cases are building proficiency at the operational and strategic levels of war. This staff ride, with a higher focus for both American and German forces, allowed the participants to reflect on and polish their skills for conducting war in the 21st Century…”

Staff riding (the compound verb is a logical one!) has extended in the USAF to the concept of the Air Ride, evolved as a counterpoint to the purely land-based traditional Staff Ride. Other government agencies can benefit directly from the process, too. For example, in 2005 the US National Security Agency (NSA) announced that it was planning to take its senior leadership on a staff ride to Antietam, the object for them was:

‘…to learn how intelligence—both very good and very bad—played a central role in shaping the way Gen. McClellan maneuvered the Army of the Potomac. And by understanding how McClellan interacted with his intelligence leaders (Pinkerton detectives hired by the Union forces), the
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NSA’s future leaders will gain some valuable insights into issues that still challenge intelligence professionals and commanders today…” 5

A US battalion-sized logistics command, the Area Support Tam-Livorno (AST-L) 6 based in Italy, undertook a four-day staff ride of Tunisia in February 2000, with two objectives. ‘The first’, noted the ALMC Journal,

‘…was to study the logistics of Operation TORCH, focusing on the final months of the campaign that ended in northern Tunisia in May 1943. The second…was to build unit cohesion and camaraderie, while exposing officers to an area of the world in which they may have to conduct logistics operations someday…The staff ride was conducted in two phases…In the first, the AST-L commander presented intense training…[which] included an overview of the logistics perspectives of conducting an operation on North African terrain, a map exercise to familiarize the officers with the terrain they would encounter, and classes on Arab culture and some basic Arab words and phrases…” 7

The second phase was the actual ride; the conduct of which followed the aspirations of a model staff ride:

‘…some officers were assigned to rôle-play the key Operation TORCH players such as Eisenhower, Patton and Rommel… [Other] officers…were each assigned a certain area of the battlefield on which to give a 30-minute class on that area’s logistics importance…On the final day of the staff ride, the officers gathered…to review the logistics lessons learned…and conduct an after-action review…” 8

Thus, it can be seen that some units work hard at integrating a battlefield excursion into their operational rôle, as well as making them totally interactive, reflecting one of the staff ride’s fundamental aims, which is ongoing professional development. Support for the battlefield visiting concept varies from considering such activities as ‘key to an officers’ preparation for war’ via a perception that they are ‘a nice-to-have facility if the training budget can be stretched’ to the dismissive conclusion that they degenerate into ‘an officers’ jolly overseas, with more emphasis on the ‘bottle than the battle’. In this author’s experience some military battlefield
visits have certainly proved they are in the first category, whilst occasionally, some have strayed into the last. The specific military purposes of officers’ staff college-type battlefield visits are several, but usually focus on gaining an awareness of campaign planning, drafting orders, writing estimates and appreciations and studying decision-making at the operational level of war. Unit or formation all-ranks’ battlefield visits have other aspirations besides these, including studies of leadership. Battlefield visits can also demonstrate the realities of executing beautifully-crafted plans (and watching them crumble on first contact with the enemy), and uncover past examples of the long screwdriver of political pressure making its unwelcome appearance on the battlefield.

The fact that military service, either in war or through peacetime conscription, has faded into a distant, painless memory (the last UK conscripts completed their service in 1962) may also have prompted a growth in civilian battlefield visiting and renewed interest in military history. Battlefields are perhaps more ‘comfortable’ places for civilians to visit, when the recollection of their own compulsory military service has dimmed and the likelihood of their having to don uniform at some stage in the future for another war, fades. This author has also encountered numerous cases of relatives accompanying a veteran on a last visit to ‘his’ battlefield, where there is an opportunity to pass thoughts and observations down through the generations, prompted by a need to confront a painful episode buried in the past.\(^9\)

**The American and German Experience.**

As both the USA and Germany have also seen a growth in civilian battlefield visiting, is the same true in those countries as well? It can be argued that as US
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conscription (the ‘draft’) ended in 1973, American civilians were probably ready to confront battlefields and military history a decade later (and, indeed, battlefield tours to Vietnam are now being advertised). In Germany, conscription is limited to nine months military or society service, and a relatively small proportion actually serve in a uniformed organisation. Arguably a whole generation has passed since the Nazi era, and as the Bundeswehr has just celebrated its 50th birthday (2005), perhaps German civilians also are more comfortable about military history and battlefields. Indeed, on many occasions, this author has met German veterans and their families conducting their own battlefield tours.  

It is noticeable, however, that the two world wars have also created national agendas for visiting battlefields. Whereas the battlegrounds of the Napoleonic, Crimean, Franco-Prussian and Zulu wars attract enthusiasts of military history from all nations, this author has witnessed a tendency for tourists to visit the world war battlefields connected only with their own nation. Therefore, it is rare to find Americans on the old Western Front, apart from the Belleau Wood, Meuse-Argonne and St Mihiel sectors; Verdun, the Marne or Chemin des Dames are not popular destinations for Britons (compared with the Somme); Arnhem is not frequented by Americans, nor the Hürtgen Forest by the British. Canadians will visit Normandy and Ypres, but not usually Dunkirk; this may have more to do with marketing and successful tourist strategies. Conversely, Bastogne (with which British forces had no connection in 1944-5) is probably visited by as many Englishmen as Americans (again, ‘branding’ may have a rôle to play here).
Military Periodicals.

The periodicals and journals of military formations (which are themselves a relatively recent innovation) also help track the rise of military battlefield excursions. The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) has held annual tours, usually at the staff ride level (although the correspondents to the journal confuse the terminology with that of a battlefield tour). A one correspondent to their journal wrote of the 2003 series of staff rides,

‘…The ARRCADE BUGLE group of exercises comprises 3 battlefield tours [sic], aimed at ACOS level and below, which are designed to improve the effectiveness of ARRC staff officers through the study of relevant historical conflicts. Given the nature and range of possible operations in which HQ ARRC may be involved at the higher end of the spectrum of conflict, the aim and objectives of ARRCADE BUGLE 2 were particularly relevant…To study and tour the transition from “Sitzkrieg to Blitzkrieg” during OP. SICHEL-SCHNITT by examining the German crossing of the river Meuse…which led to the evacuation of the BEF…’

Ex. ARRCADE BUGLE 1, held prior to the Meuse tour, had been designed ‘…to study and tour a WW2 campaign at the Corps and Army level in order to prepare HQ ARRC junior officers for operations and exercises…’ More usually staff rides have confirmed the lessons learned on exercises, but this reversal (preparation for exercises) underlines the utility of the activity. Stressing the staff ride formula of pre-tour briefings and outlining the stand management, the writer continued,

‘…the exercise began with a number of presentations. While the briefings focused on the combat operations around the Scheldt, the emphasis was on the strategic importance of the port itself and the actions leading up to the battles which would determine the course of the allied campaign…The ride consisted of nine stands and took place in Belgium and the Netherlands. Each stand had a similar format; a strategic overview; the detailed tactical picture and then, at different stages, specialist points of view were added. Contributions came from the Engineer Branch, G2, G6, Combat Support and Combat Service Support, Fire Coord, AOCC, and SF…Ex. ARRCADE BUGLE 1…provided an insight to the complex tasks of organising multi service,
and multinational, formations for combat and synchronising ground, air
and amphibious operations…'.

**British battlefield visiting today.**

The Army Staff College, latterly (since 1997) the Joint Services Command
and Staff College, gradually introduced a single day’s marathon battlefield tour to
Normandy for the whole course (air, land and maritime components) encompassing
seven stands and geared to the operational level. Students remained in their
syndicates, which were then grouped together and these larger groups rotated through
the various stands (these changed between 1998-2004 but incorporated Pegasus
Bridge, Omaha, Gold and Sword beaches, Arromanches and – in some years – Juno
or Utah). An element of a hybrid staff ride/battlefield tour was introduced in 2004,
with students (in the manner of the HCSC) giving limited presentations at the stands,
with narrative assistance from the College historians, but the tour remained focused
on the assault and breakout phases. With the ten-month revised Advanced
Command and Staff Course (ACSC) for lieutenant-colonels, a new-style tour was
introduced in 2006, much closer to the Staff Ride model discussed in Chapter Two,
where students present by syndicates (led by DS) at stands incorporating Pegasus
Bridge, the German strongpoint at Hillman (see Map 14), Sword, Juno and Omaha
beaches, and an RAF airfield. Throughout, there is an effort to link the events of
1944, as seen through the stands, to the present and to operational campaign planning
tools.

This is still regarded – as in the past – as the highlight of the course, and takes
place in the summer, on the heels of the ‘Realities of War’ package; critics observe
that it is hampered by a lack of preparation (there is a single study day beforehand)
and a lack of cohesion. Syndicates start at different stands, so chronology is lost, and are engaged only at the stand where they are presenting, and merely spectate for the rest. This clearly loses some of the advantages of the various educational theories outlined in Chapter One. For example, the impact of Kolb’s Experiential Learning Cycle is not fully realised, nor Vygotsky’s Zone of Proximal Development, where students learn from each other through discussion. Thus, students may be encouraged to adopt Marton and Entwistle’s Surface learning approach, rather than their deep or strategic versions.

Each new Intermediate Command and Staff Course (Land) – an intake of approximately 200 majors per 26-week course – undertakes a five-day study tour of Op. MARKET GARDEN, focused on Arnhem, and mounted on bicycles. This method of conveyance (whilst appropriate and practical in Henry Wilson’s day) provides logistical and Heath and Safety challenges of its own; led by Staff College historians, this inevitably (due to the nature of the battles), focuses more on tactical than operational lessons, but there is also a clear attempt to foster an interest in military history, as also with the ACSC and HCSC. A tradition has emerged for ICSC and ACSC staff to also mount their own tours (usually called staff rides), for example the Naval Staff on the ICSC (Maritime) undertake a very professional staff ride, following a routine for each stand of four elements: orientation; historian’s narrative; student paper and ‘pull-through’ to the present; general discussion, and each day is concluded by a summary phase, as is the whole tour. This, with the continued HCSC staff ride, seems closest to the ideal Robertson Staff Ride model, examined in Chapter Two. The RAF are beginning to mount their tours, usually labelled Ex. TALLY HO!, steered by the very pro-active Air Historical Branch
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(AHB), and the Army Training Regiments and RMA Sandhurst also mount battlefield tours (see Chapter One) for soldier and officer recruits.

Thus, whilst the number of battlefield visits mounted by training establishments, formations and units is at an all-time high, there could be a tendency to confuse activity with achievement. A particular weakness of British military battlefield visiting in that there is no central direction of how to mount them, which speakers to use, or templates to use – directives from LAND or the repository of the Joint Lessons Cell (formerly TDRC) are passive in this respect. For example, the Army Training Regiments and the Army Apprentices College at Harrogate use commercial organisations - who bring their own (distinguished) speakers - to run their tours; the Staff College (HCSC, ACSC and ICSC) tours use the College historians (not all of whom are talented battlefield guides); whilst the RAF appear to run Ex. TALLY HO! in complete isolation to the rest of the rest of the military community. So whilst the quantity is pleasing, the quality – and therefore value for money – may, indeed, be highly variable. This gives rise to another reason for concern, which is that there is no routine (let alone compulsory) educational validation of battlefield visits - apart from those of the HCSC the author referred to in Chapter One - so it is difficult to assess their value across the defence community.

Gaps in Knowledge.

This thesis had addressed several ‘gaps’ in the institutional knowledge of British military battlefield visits, which no one has attempted to study before. It has identified a whole new range of primary source material in the Staff College Battlefield Tour Archive (not all of which is yet catalogued) that, hitherto, researchers
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(to the knowledge of this author) have not studied. It has shown that battlefield visits can reflect changes in military doctrine (the Bagnall reforms, for example) and can be used for a variety of purposes, influenced by bigger-issue agendas (such as cooperation with an ally, testing potential war plans, confirming the reputation of a commander, or reinforcing Joint doctrine). It has identified that fact that the terminology of battlefield visiting is confusing (some might observe in the staff ride, misleading) and is probably in need of reform. It has identified that tours have disappeared, been rediscovered and reinvented; British battlefield visits have had a remarkably chequered history, not least because of defence budgetary crises, and occasionally have been cut altogether. Yet, they have always managed to re-invent themselves and have existed under a variety of different guises, with radically different aims. In the inter-war period they were not only used as a means by which quite junior officers might discover the chaos and confusion of earlier wars themselves, or understanding how terrain has moulded decisions, but were used also to test hypothetical military operations (as with the German General Staff before the First World War – encapsulated in the whole debate around Terence Zuber’s thesis - or the Dempsey syndicate tour to East Prussia in 1931) or to understand and assess allies (as in tours to France and Belgium), or to give officers experience in researching, running and guiding a battlefield tour themselves (in 1938-9). After the Second World War, tours have performed a variety of functions, including writing a draft of British military history (Richard Hull’s Camberley tours of 1947), confirming Montgomery’s reputation, passing-down institutional knowledge to another generation of Royal Engineers leaders, explaining the challenges of leadership at all levels, understanding the nature of Joint operations or bringing the atmosphere of war to generations who had not experienced this.
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This thesis has identified a general recognition by students of the value of battlefield visiting, and has uncovered surprisingly little criticism of them (the two cases identified were both, as it happens, by senior airmen). It has also examined the tendency of battles to repeat themselves in several geographic locations, moulded by the terrain and the confluence of opposing cultures (the ‘Fatal Avenue’ of North West France and Edirne have been cited, to which one might add Yugoslavia, Sevastopol, Mesopotamia and Afghanistan). This provides an additional justification for examining past encounters in these areas.

This thesis was also written at a time when the general popularity of military history has increased enormously, as witnessed by the number of new books available, documentaries on the History and Discovery TV channels, widely celebrated military anniversaries, frequent references to military history and leaders in the media and the widespread marketing of battlefield tours for civilians, which is reflected in the British military’s new-found love of history and battlefield visiting. This may be explained partly by the fact that Britain is currently ‘at war’ (in Iraq and Afghanistan) in a manner unknown since Korea, as well as a move towards world war history projects in the current GCSE secondary schools curriculum.

In Chapter One this thesis set out to identify how we learn and concluded that, valuable though the learning theories developed in the last quarter-century are, for the most part they have been ignored by the military community (and military history lecturers of a certain age), through ignorance. It is important to realise that these theories are not only beneficial, but that the rest of the educational community and
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most industrial and commercial leadership training has taken note and builds on them. Then there is the (less tangible) observation of Richard Holmes, that ‘there is a dynamic on the ground that you don’t get in the classroom’.\cite{Holmes}

In Chapter Two’s typology of battlefield visiting, this thesis concluded that there were many different ways to visit a battlefield, dependent on the professionalism of the audience and their purpose. Of the different forms of battle terrain exploration, the military commonly undertake (predominantly) passive battlefield tours or more proactive staff rides, but even this terminology has been misleading and confusing. With more general awareness of the educational theories identified, training on battlefields could benefit by being more participative and less passive, but this depends of the learning outcome desired (usually defined as ‘commander’s intent’). Often units are capable of mounting a staff ride, but set their fence too low and merely aim for a battlefield tour.

Over the remaining chapters, this thesis has identified how battlefield tours and staff rides have evolved, primarily in the British Army at its Camberley Staff College (being the most consistent sponsor of them), but also in other countries as well. Initially, they leant very heavily on the civilian traditions associated with the growth of tourism in the Nineteenth Century, and established by tourists visiting Waterloo and Gettysburg, and later the Western Front. Package tours by Thomas Cook (and his descendents like Holt’s Battlefield Tours) have played a huge part in this. Battlefield visiting is still capable of achieving a wide range of challenging objectives, but frequently today, none of them are attempted.
For most of the period examined, British battlefield visits, foreign tours, staff rides – whatever they were called – were content to cover only the tactical level of war. The Imperial Defence College tours in the inter-war years offered great potential (but, one suspects, their full utility was not exploited by Gen. Montgomery-Massingberd). Rarely was the operational level (if that term was even understood) examined, and in consequence tours had a habit every few years of ‘drifting’ back into the tactical ‘weeds’. Interesting and satisfying though those weeds may have been to examine, it has always left the battlefield tour vulnerable to closure and being moved indoors to the classroom. This ‘drift’ is probably natural, as scripts and details are passed between individuals, who work to the ‘lowest common denominator’ of personal understanding. The full essence of being out of doors and letting the terrain speak for itself can easily get bypassed by the speakers (whether veterans or historians) enthraling audiences with exciting tales of deeds past. The major utility of battlefield visits should be what they can tell us about the nature of war today and tomorrow, not the moribund campaign details of yesteryear (as Sir John Slessor’s quote at the start of this Chapter observes). Some enlightened commanders from the past and present have realised this, but the temptation may be to stay within the ‘comfort zone’ and concentrate on what one knows best – often what one leaned first – which usually means the tactical level.

Finally, this thesis has shown that the higher the aim for a battlefield visit and the more interactive the nature of the exercise, then the more beneficial the process can be to any audience, and that it is possible to adjust one’s sights from battlefield tour towards staff ride (or, indeed, in the other direction) by means of a metaphorical cursor (as illustrated in Figure 2.10 of Chapter Two, p.105). Higher, more advanced
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learning outcomes for tours exploit many of the educational advantages identified in
the Chapter One and may play a part in giving battlefield visits a firmer future in this
era when all armed forces are trying to extract the utmost value for money. Failure to
raise ambitions for battlefield visits will result in missed opportunities and the same
historical cycle of growth, expansion, contraction and termination.

Recommendations.

The unique value of military battlefield visiting needs to be further studied in
terms of its educational value. In due course, this should provide concrete, statistical
justification for the process, rather than ‘intuition’ and ‘gut reaction’ that this is a
‘good thing’.

Questionnaires for all battlefield visiting activities should be made compulsory
and organised to a common standard in order to provide accurate empirical evidence
to support educational validation. It is significant that during the many years of
research for this thesis no one in the defence community was ever able to tell this
author how many battlefield visits were undertaken in any given year or period.

Details of all tours need to be compiled at a central, accessible database, for
guidance on best practice and to provide a template for a model tour. This is
currently done to a limited extent by the Joint Lessons Cell at Shrivenham, but this is
not compulsory and not their primary function.

Post-tour reports are as important as the tour itself, and a confirmation that
learning objectives have been met (see Chapter Two). These should be made
compulsory and lodged at a central, accessible database.

There is much to commend further academic and military study of the
Battlefield Tour Archive in the JSCSC Library, with much primary source material
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collected in 1947 on the Second World War battles, and interesting material collected about First World War battles during the inter-war period. However a huge amount of incalculable value was lost during the ‘weeding’ in the 1920s under Fuller, and subsequently. It is recommended that a full set of the extant Staff College archives be copied and transferred also to the National Archives, Kew, beyond the grasp of tidy-minded Commandants, for safe keeping in the national interest, and that this process be continued on an annual basis hereafter.

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4 Participants on an Air Ride study the planning of an actual historic (usually World War 2) mission, visit the departure point (if possible), and then fly the mission, if practicable. They then visit the target area and study concepts such as battlefield damage assessment, using original materials. Logistics of temporary wartime airbases and the German V-weapons programme are also discussed.
6 The Area Support Team –Livorno is based at Camp Darby, on the west coast of Italy, near Livorno and Pisa. It is part of 22/Area Support Group (ASG), based in Vicenza. Its mission is to provide a logistics platform for US forces in the Mediterranean, Balkan and North Africa. The base dates from 1944, when it was constructed to support operations in northern Italy. In 2000 AST-L was commanded by Maj. Thomas D. Little, the staff ride director.
8 Ibid.
9 This is how Steven Spielberg’s movie *Saving Private Ryan* (1998) opens, with the fictional Ryan returning to Normandy with his family, then recalling his war service there in June 1944.
10 In Northern France (April 1995), the Ardennes (June 1995 and March 2005) Salerno (October 2000), at Monte Cassino (October 2002) and in Normandy on numerous occasions.
12 Ibid.
14 Interview with Dr. David Hall, JSCSC, 22 October 2007.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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‘The practical value of history is to throw the film of the past through the material projector of the present on to the screen of the future’.

Basil Liddell Hart

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Appendix One

Thank-you note from Général de Brigade Juin to the author