CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY

EDWARD R FLINT

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH CIVIL AFFAIRS AND ITS EMPLOYMENT IN THE BRITISH SECTOR OF ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS DURING THE BATTLE OF NORMANDY, JUNE TO AUGUST 1944

CRANFIELD DEFENCE AND SECURITY SCHOOL
DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED SCIENCE, SECURITY AND RESILIENCE
SECURITY AND RESILIENCE GROUP

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September 2008
EDWARD R FLINT

The development of British Civil Affairs and its employment in the British sector of Allied military operations during the battle of Normandy, June to August 1944

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This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

Civil Affairs and its more robust sibling, Military Government, were military organisations designed to ensure that basic civil order and welfare were maintained in those allied and enemy states encountered on operations during the Second World War. In so doing, they enabled formation commanders to focus on defeating enemy forces without being distracted by possible civilian problems. Using the battle of Normandy as a case study, this research assesses the utility of Civil Affairs in supporting military needs during operations. This contrasts with previous studies that concentrate on aspects of social and diplomatic history.

If the need for Civil Affairs was generally axiomatic, there was much debate as to the extent and method of delivery required. Civil Affairs quickly recognised that in dealing with direct problems such as “disorganisation, disease and unrest” it was necessary for seemingly indirect aspects of civilian life to be maintained. Various forms of bureaucratic friction resulted and several Civil Affairs approaches were used, before the model for the North West Europe campaign was agreed. Nevertheless, the organisation employed in Normandy was arguably the most extensive and best prepared of the war. However, it also had to deal with many different civilian problems and in trying military circumstances. Consequently, the battle is fertile ground for the examination of the extent and nature of the organisation’s operational utility.

Using primary and secondary sources, this paper argues that Civil Affairs was militarily both useful and necessary. Furthermore, it was able to provide wider diplomatic and political benefits as well as serving core military needs. The research concludes by acknowledging that whilst mistakes were made, the various improvements made to Civil Affairs in preparation for, together with the lessons learnt during, Normandy stood the organisation in good stead for the significantly larger problems encountered later in the war.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Acknowledgements must go to many individuals and institutions, whose support made this thesis possible. I would like to thank Drs Simon Trew and Paul Latawski and Tim Bean of the Department of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst who supplied me with both copies of documents from the American National Archives and a number of general sources. In a similar fashion, Dr Ali Parchami and his wife Yvonne were extremely generous in finding articles through their connections at the Bodleian Library, Oxford. Andrew Orgill, John Pearce and Ken Franklin at the Central Library at Sandhurst in their typically unflappable and understated way have gone beyond the call of duty on numerous occasions in order to satisfy my seemingly insatiable demand for inter-library loans, books, theses and articles. The ever-helpful staffs at the National Archives at Kew, Trinity College and Churchill College archives at Cambridge and the archival collections at the Imperial War Museum in Lambeth gave much advice and assistance that is always rightly acknowledged by all researchers.

Isabelle Le Breton translated a number of French documents that were vital to the analysis of events surrounding the liberation of Caen. Dr Klaus Schmider translated German texts that were of importance in explaining refugee movements. Sidney Jary, ever helpful, was good enough to answer an extraordinary long list of questions I had regarding the practice and perceptions of Civil Affairs and civilian aspects of the battle in Normandy. Lucy Horner, Alan Flint and Michael Morgan supplied a great deal of advice on various aspects of animal husbandry and arable farming that helped with the sections on agriculture. Dr Tony Clayton provided much assistance in clarifying the role of wartime Field Security. Dr Tony Heathcote pointed me in the direction of the Indian Political Service and was a fund of knowledge on white gorget patches! A number of Medical and Dental Corps Officers at Sandhurst were willing prevailed upon to help me gain an understanding of various health conditions associated with wartime events. Neil Powell was supremely generous in providing me with a good number of images used in the photographic appendix. For supplying the latest versions of contemporary Civil Affairs doctrine (indeed the author of the forthcoming NATO CIMIC doctrine) special thanks must go to Stephen Henthorne whose comradeship and humour know no bounds.

A research thesis can be a remarkably lonely place as it is rather too far off the beaten track for most colleagues to be prepared to discuss in any detail. Nevertheless, I must express my gratitude to Professor Christopher Duffy and Drs Duncan Anderson, Jenny Medcalf, Stuart Gordon, Paul Harris and Klaus Schmider for their unstinting forbearance, encouragement and advice. Furthermore, many more colleagues have provided all-important practical support in covering my classes whilst I was on research leave in the summer of 2007. The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst provided funding and time.
without which I would have been unable to complete this research. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that this has become more generous in most recent times and for which the support of Sean McKnight, the Director of Studies, and Dr Francis Toase, the Head of the Defence and International Affairs Department, are thanked in particular.

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Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their ceaseless support and providing me with a refuge in rural Warwickshire where I could work away from the usual daily pressures.

RMAS
Camberley
June 2009
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>“G”</td>
<td>General’s Staff Branch of the British Army Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Q”</td>
<td>Quarter-Master-General’s Branch of the British Army Staff</td>
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<td>AC</td>
<td>Allied Commission (Italy, replaces ACC)</td>
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<td>ACA</td>
<td>Armistice Terms and Civil Administration Committee (Britain)</td>
</tr>
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<td>ACAO</td>
<td>Armistice Terms and Civil Administration Official Committee (Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Allied Control Commission (Italy, replaced by AC)</td>
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<td>ACOS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Of Staff (SHAEF)</td>
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<td>AFHQ</td>
<td>Allied Forces, Headquarters (Italy)</td>
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<td>AMG</td>
<td>Allied Military Government (Italy, replaces AMGOT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMGOT</td>
<td>Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories (Italy, replaced by AMG)</td>
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<td>APW</td>
<td>Armistice and Post-War Committee (Britain)</td>
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<td>ARAC</td>
<td>Army Refugee Assembly Centre</td>
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<td>AT(B)</td>
<td>Administration of Territories (Balkans) Committee (Britain)</td>
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<td>AT(E)</td>
<td>Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee (Britain)</td>
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<td>ATS</td>
<td>Auxiliary Territorial Service (British)</td>
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<td>BEF</td>
<td>British Expeditionary Force (France, 1940)</td>
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<td>BPD</td>
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<td>Base Supply Depot</td>
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<td>Civil Affairs Inland Depot</td>
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<td>CIGS</td>
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<td>Corps Refugee Transition Centre</td>
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<td>Director of Labour (British Army)</td>
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<td>Foreign Office (Britain)</td>
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<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTU</td>
<td>Officer Cadet Training Unit (British Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OETA</td>
<td>Occupied Enemy Territories Administration Committee (Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFEC</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Economic Coordination (America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFFRO</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFT</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Territories (America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORC</td>
<td>Overseas Reconstruction Committee (Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHP</td>
<td>Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-committee (Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Petrol, Oil, Lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTT</td>
<td>Post, Telephones and Telegraphs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUS</td>
<td>Permanent Under-Secretary (Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWD</td>
<td>Psychological Warfare Division (SHAEF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWE</td>
<td>Psychological Warfare Executive (Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMC</td>
<td>Royal Army Medical Corps (British Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAOC</td>
<td>Royal Army Ordnance Corps (British Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RASC</td>
<td>Royal Army Service Corps (British Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REME</td>
<td>Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (British Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Rear Maintenance Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSM</td>
<td>Regimental Sergeant Major (often used as shorthand for all types of Sergeant Major and Warrant Officer) (British Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAO</td>
<td>Senior Civil Affairs Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO1 to SO3</td>
<td>Staff Officer, 1st Grade (Lieutenant Colonel) to 3rd Grade (Captain) (British Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>Special Operations Executive (Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRRA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCI GS</td>
<td>Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff (British Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>War Office (Britain)</td>
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</table>
# Operational Codenames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABERLOUR</td>
<td>Cancelled Allied southerly assault west of Caen towards Authie and Carpiquet (late June 1944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLUECOAT</td>
<td>Allied southerly advance towards Vire and Mont Pinçon (late July/early August 1944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECLIPSE</td>
<td>Allied administrative control of Germany (1945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPSOM</td>
<td>Allied southerly assault west of Caen (late June 1944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENLINE</td>
<td>Allied southerly assault west of Caen (mid-July 1944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUSKY</td>
<td>Allied landings in Sicily (1943)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERLORD</td>
<td>Allied landings in Normandy (1944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RANKIN</td>
<td>Allied contingency plan in case of German collapse (1943)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROUNDUP</td>
<td>Proposed Allied landings in Normandy (1943)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORCH</td>
<td>Allied landings in French North Africa (1942)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALIZE</td>
<td>Allied south easterly assault along Caen to Falaise road (mid-August 1944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERITABLE</td>
<td>Allied clearance of the west bank of the River Rhine (1945)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>APPOINTMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td>Prefect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrondissement</td>
<td>Sub-Prefect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commune</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(In descending order of magnitude)

BRITISH ARMY FORMATIONS (NORTH WEST EUROPE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>CIVIL AFFAIRS APPOINTMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Group</td>
<td>DCCAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>SCAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>SCAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Civil Affairs liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade</td>
<td>Civil Affairs liaison officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(In descending order of magnitude)
**Dramatis Personæ**

*Italics = Image appears in Appendix P*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexander, General, Sir Harold</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Allied Forces (Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commander, 15th Army Group (Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attlee, Clement</td>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman, ACA Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bovenschen, Sir Frederick</strong></td>
<td>PUS, War Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bracken, Brendan</td>
<td>Minister of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges, Sir Edward L.</td>
<td>Secretary to the War Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan F.</strong></td>
<td>CIGS, War Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butler, Sir James</td>
<td>Editor, <em>History of the Second World War Series</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Director of Studies, CASC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Chevigné, Colonel Pierre</td>
<td>Professor of History, Trinity College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coulet, François</strong></td>
<td>Commander, Rouen region (Gaullist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commissioner, Rouen region (Gaullist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Daure, Pierre</strong></td>
<td>Prefect, Calvados department and Caen arrondissement (Gaullist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rector of the University of Caen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dill, Field Marshal Sir John G.</td>
<td>Senior British representative, CCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumbreck, Brigadier S.C.</td>
<td>Commandant, CASC, War Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunn, Brigadier P.D.W.</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Civil Affairs (Personnel and Training), War Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eden, Sir Anthony</td>
<td>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eisenhower, General Dwight D.</strong></td>
<td>Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, SHAEF (American)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Allied Forces (Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commander, Operation TORCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellias, Lieutenant Colonel D.R.</td>
<td>Civil Affairs staff officer, 21st Army Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erskine, Major General Sir George W.J.E.</td>
<td>Head, SHAEF Mission to Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French, Brigadier F.G.</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Civil Affairs (Military Government), War Office Staff officer, MO11, War Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grasset, Lieutenant General Sir Arthur E.</td>
<td>ACOS G-5, SHAEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grigg, Sir (Percy) James</td>
<td>Secretary of State for War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Guingand, Major General Sir Francis</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, 21st Army Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haining, Lieutenant General Sir Robert</td>
<td>VCIGS, War Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griset, Major General Sir Arthur E.</td>
<td>ACOS G-5, SHAEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heyman, Brigadier George</td>
<td>G-5 staff, SHAEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilldring, Major General John H.</td>
<td>Head of the Civil Affairs Division (American)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hodgkin, Brigadier A.E.</td>
<td>Civil Affairs staff officer, 21st Army Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollis, Major General Sir Leslie</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary (Military) to the War Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holmes, Colonel Julius C.</td>
<td>Deputy to ACOS G-5, SHAEF (American)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismay, Major General Sir Hastings</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary (Military) of the War Cabinet and Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob, Lieutenant General E. Ian C.</td>
<td>Military Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joyce, Major General Kenyon A.</td>
<td>Deputy President, ACC (American)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirby, Major General Stanley W.</td>
<td>Director of Civil Affairs, War Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kœnig, General Marie-Pierre</td>
<td>Senior exile French military officer in London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee, Brigadier S. Swinton</td>
<td>DCCAO, Home Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leith-Ross, Sir Frederick</td>
<td>Head, Relief Department and Chairman, Inter-Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[xxvi]
Lewis, Brigadier R.M.H.  
SCAO, British Second Army  
Deputy Director of Civil Affairs (Technical), War Office

Lindemann, Frederick A.  
The 1st Viscount Cherwell  
The Paymaster General

Lumley, Major General Sir Roger  
ACOS G-5, SHAEF  
Chief Staff Officer to CCAO (Designate), COSSAC

Macmillan, Harold  
British Resident Minister in the Mediterranean

Macready, Lieutenant General Sir Gordon  
British representative, CCS and CCAC

Mason Macfarlane, Lieutenant General Sir Noel  
Head, Allied Military Mission to Italy

McCloy, John J.  
Assistant Secretary of War and Chairman, CCAC (American)

McSherry, Brigadier General Frank J.  
G-5 staff, SHAEF (American)  
DCCAO, AMGOT

Mitchell, Sir Philip E.  
Chief Political Officer, OETA  
Governor of Uganda

Mocatta, Lieutenant Colonel Alan  
Secretary to the Army Council Secretariat, War Office

Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L.  
Commander, 21st Army Group

Morgan, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E.  
COSSAC

Morgenthau, Jr., Henry  
Secretary of the Treasury (American)

Morton, Major Sir Desmond  
Trusted advisor to Prime Minister

Murphy, Robert A.  
American Resident Minister in the Mediterranean

North, Rex  
War Correspondent

Nye, Lieutenant General Sir Archibald  
VCIGS, War Office

Picaud, Monsignor François-Marie  
Bishop of Bayeux

Pirie, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas G.  
Civil Affairs officer, Bayeux  
Assistant to Rennell, AMGOT

Pownall, Lieutenant General Sir Henry  
VCIGS, War Office  
Civil Affairs staff officer, 21st Army Group

de Pury, Captain E.G.  
Civil Affairs staff officer, 21st Army Group
Puttock, Major A.G.  
Civil Affairs officer, North West Europe

Reckitt, Lieutenant Colonel Basil  
Civil Affairs officer, Germany

Rennell Rodd, Major General Francis J.  
Official Historian, Civil Affairs in Africa  
CCAO, AMGOT  
Chief Political Officer, OETA  
The 2nd Baron Rennell (of Rodd)

Robbins, Brigadier Thomas  
DCCAO, 21st Army Group  
Commandant, CASC, War Office

Rochat, Pierre  
Sub-Prefect, Bayeux arrondissement (Vichy)

Sargent, Sir Orme  
Foreign Office official

Smith, Major General Walter Bedell  
Chief of Staff, SHAEF (American)

Speed, Sir Eric  
PUS (Finance), War Office

Stimson, Henry  
Secretary for War (American)

Stone, Captain Ellery  
Deputy President, ACC (American)

Stopford, R.J.  
Deputy Director of Civil Affairs (Economics), War Office

Templer, General Sir Gerald W.R.  
Director of Military Government, British sector of Germany (21st Army Group)

Triboulet, Raymond  
Sub-Prefect, Bayeux arrondissement (Gaullist)

Usher, Colonel Charles M.  
Civil Affairs officer, Caen

Ward, Dudley  
Relief Department official

Wedd, Brigadier E.B.  
SCAO, Canadian First Army (Canadian)

Weeks, Lieutenant General Sir Ronald  
DCIGS, War Office

Wellesley, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald  
The 7th Duke of Wellington  
Civil Affairs officer, AMGOT
INTRODUCTION

CIVIL AFFAIRS

The Army Council directive to Commanders in Chief of 26 January 1944 laid out the functions of Civil Affairs:

First, to assist the military plans in the forward battle areas by liaison with the civil authorities and by controlling the activities of the local inhabitants in such a way as to prevent disorganisation, disease and unrest hampering the activities of the fighting troops. Secondly, at a later stage, to exercise administrative control and supervision, in such areas as may be directed by the competent authority, in order that the civil machinery may be set going as early as possible and in such a way as to benefit the Allied War Effort and to ensure the preservation of law and order.¹

Civil Affairs carried out these largely emergency first aid functions in liberated allied states. Its sibling, Military Government, had similar if rather more extensive responsibilities in the occupation of enemy states. In some cases, such as during the Italian campaign it was possible to have a hybrid of Civil Affairs officers working within a Military Government (AMGOT, Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories), but generally the distinctions were rather more clear-cut. Civil Affairs, like Military Government, consisted of two elements. In the field, detachments of various sizes, but rarely of more than a dozen personnel, attempted to deal with localised problems as they arose. The extent to which these tasks were achieved with the assistance of local civil administration was dependent on the existence, competence and compliance of such an administration. At formation headquarters (typically Corps upwards), small Civil Affairs staff branches co-ordinated field detachments in line with military requirements, ensured they were properly supplied and, from trends established by their field reports, addressed any significant problems before they affected military operations. In American formations and in multi-national headquarters, such as North West Europe’s SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force), the staff division description G-5 was used.

Following the conclusion of Military Government, it was normal to handover to a civil Control Commission run by the victorious powers with the dual purpose of removing a belligerent’s material and ideological capacity for war and of reviving its capacity for peaceful national and international relations – nation building. This would last until such stage a peace treaty or similar resolution could be agreed between the victors and defeated state. After Civil Affairs, it was expected that some form of national authority, typically a provisional government, would take responsibility until new national elections could be called. In the case of states, like Italy, that had moved from belligerent to co-

¹
belligerent status a hybrid solution of a less pronounced Control Commission was typical.

To assist the liberated state following the conclusion of hostilities within their borders, international bodies such as UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) could take over from military organisations in provision of the financial, material and human resources necessary for the longer term task of reconstruction, but only if requested to do so by its national authorities. With UNRRA’s responsibility for displaced persons, most of who were still at large in enemy states at the end of the war, the nature of its work was not confined within the national boundaries of Allied states, but extended into enemy states. An added complication here was that for many there was no desire to return to their homeland, preferring instead to make a new start elsewhere.

21ST ARMY GROUP

The British headquarters (9 July 1943 to 25 August 1945) that was to command British forces (including Canadian and Polish troops, units and formations) throughout North West Europe and be additionally responsible for the operational direction of American forces in Normandy from D-Day until 1 August 1944. After this point, co-ordination and direction of the two Allied forces was conducted by SHAEF.²

BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH

Civil Affairs is an area of Second World War history little studied. Beyond interest taken in General Charles de Gaulle’s strong reaction against the prospect of having an all embracing Allied military administration running liberated France, and the various Military Government measures developed for Germany and Austria, little has been written about the organisation. Yet, Civil Affairs operated in all theatres of war and was responsible for the basic welfare of millions of people. It was one of the few multi-national organisations of the war and employed many hundreds of officers and men. Its tasks ranged across many disciplines from medical and agricultural, through administration, supply and protection of works of art to telecommunications. Consequently, it involved many different government departments. It has many modern parallels. Indeed, its modern British equivalent CIMIC (Civil Military Co-operation) is engaged in both Iraq and Afghanistan (see the Comparison with Modern Civil Affairs section at the end of this Introduction). For modern parallels to be drawn requires a firm foundation of historical analysis. It is a topic ripe for further research

Embracing both military and civilian needs, Civil Affairs sits most obviously astride the juncture between how war ends and how peace begins. In determining how war ends, it introduces the civilian dimension to a campaign and provides another perspective on how battles were conducted. In commenting on how peace begins, it gives a different view on how post-war
national order was established and how some of the structures for recovery were developed. Put simply, there are a wide number of research possibilities. Indeed, the literature review confirms that there are no restrictions to the scope or direction of research. Each possible area has its intrinsic interest. Yet, there seems to be an area of research that demands attention – that of the utility of Civil Affairs in supporting military needs. It was, after all, the fundamental point of the organisation. Instead, the focus, of the little literature that actually exists, is on Civil Affairs, not its primary customer. Even the official histories only touch on utility in passing.

Clearly, any assessment of Civil Affairs wartime utility requires an understanding of the dynamics (and their dimensions) that the organisation and its personnel were subject to during development and operations. To provide an understanding of the process of this development, this research makes historical comparisons in great measure and in a number of different ways. In so doing, it identifies the elements that needed to be addressed as plans were developed for Normandy. Chronological comparison helps to identify how the organisation developed with experience. Comparisons between the scopes of activity regarded as necessary for Civil Affairs to acquit itself properly are a particularly useful indicator of organisational development. Furthermore, comparisons between the operational benefits of individual Civil Affairs activities help to indicated the answers to such questions as which elements were (and were not) useful, which were (and were not) thought to be useful, which were fundamentally critical and which were window dressing, and which were critical but failed. To enable the necessary depth of analysis across such a wide scope of research demands a case study and there are many from which to choose. Two inter-related factors point to Normandy and a practical element points towards the British sector within it.

The first factor is the military significance of the battle of Normandy and the North West Europe campaign as a whole. Without wishing to trivialise other theatres of war, it was the first step of one of the great campaigns of the Second World War. It was a campaign designed to defeat an experienced German enemy in its heartland. Huge human and material resources were dedicated to its planning, preparation and execution. It was a campaign where preparations left little to chance and much use was made of learnt experience. It was (and remains) an exemplary example of campaign planning, organisation and preparation. If any campaign was going to succeed, it was the North West Europe campaign and this was as true for Civil Affairs as other military units.

Like the rest of 21st Army Group in Normandy, the Civil Affairs that landed with it on the beaches was the best prepared it has ever been. As an organisation, it had learnt many lessons in previous campaigns and was better trained, provisioned, organised and run. Furthermore, Civil Affairs was better incorporated into formation headquarters and more integrated multinational arrangements than previous Allied campaigns. Unlike Italy and Africa, there was an expectation that North West Europe for a host of political and practical reasons was going to be different (and needed to be different) and this encouraged a broad range of necessary improvements. Thus, whilst, inevitably
modest improvements could and were made during the campaign as it advanced towards Germany, if Civil Affairs was unable to get things generally right in Normandy then there was little hope for it elsewhere. Indeed, given the gold standards set for Normandy, any assessment of Civil Affairs during the Second World War must be set against its performance there. Moreover, Normandy provides examples of all the principal types of military activity. There were static and fluid periods of battle, there was war in open country, battles in cities, close quarter infantry battles and longer-range bombardments and above all it was a campaign fought amongst the people.

Indeed, the second factor relates to the challenge of France and the French. France despite the costs of occupation remained a modern state with modern needs. Its people required an element of centralisation with respect to organisation of labour, the provision of health care, humanitarian needs and communications. Thus, France needed an organisation like Civil Affairs to tide it over the initial period of liberation. Whilst, Normandy had much to commend it in terms of basic resources, in particular food, there was more than an element of danger. Firstly, France was anxious to re-establish its independence as quickly as possible after the German occupation, but with no government-in-exile, there were complications in this process. Indeed, a number of potential rivals might emerge to claim the title of provisional government, including the Gaullists, communists and even optimistic members of the Vichy authorities. Secondly, given Normandy’s relative isolation from the war, there was a possibility that unrealistically optimistic expectations of the standards of basic administrative and humanitarian provision might emerge. Therefore, the possibility for friction split two ways, between Civil Affairs and the French and between the French themselves. Furthermore, if things went wrong in Normandy, they might in turn produce a domino effect elsewhere in France as the campaign progressed. Yet, although the sense of danger was increased by de Gaulle’s hostility towards the Allies on the eve of D-Day, the diplomatic and political problems facing Civil Affairs in France were recognised. Thus, if Normandy provides the ability to assess gold standards in terms of organisational, material and human preparations, then so to can assessment be made of the contingencies for the long known and likely political milieu in France.

Whilst, other campaigns, of course, have their highlights, few for the British are as all encompassing, as consistently intense or as critical politically as Normandy. Although the individual political, humanitarian and military twists and turns of operations can rarely be predicted with any certainty, the anticipation of, planning and planning for a properly considered range of possibilities can help to gear a campaign in such a way that it can take almost any eventuality easily in its stride. Assessment of Civil Affairs in the battle of Normandy helps to identify the veracity of what can be achieved when planning and preparation is thorough.

The practical reason for looking at Civil Affairs in the British sector is one of management. There is neither the space nor the time to compare what went on in the British sector (across the great range of activities) with events in other
campaigns and with events in the American sector. On balance, the historical evolution provides for a better understanding of the emerging utility of Civil Affairs than by comparing transatlantic experience. This is not to say that the American sector is ignored. Indeed, in an Allied campaign involving multinational Civil Affairs detachments and staffs it is impossible to do so. Nevertheless, full comparisons with the American sector must, therefore await future research. In a similar vein, it is not possible to make anything but the briefest comparison with the quality of the German experience of civil administration following the occupation of France in 1940.

RESEARCH AIM

The aim of this research is to assess the utility of British Civil Affairs in supporting military operations during the Second World War. It uses as its principal case study events in the British sector of operation during the battle of Normandy (from D-Day to the ‘breakout’ in mid-August 1944). Here the combination of modern state civilian requirements, the politics of liberation and the pressures of battle against an experienced and substantial enemy provide the organisation with some of its greatest challenges and thus a broad range of evidence. It also provides, possibly the best wartimes examples of a well prepared Civil Affairs organisation and staff, of an organisation integrated into formation headquarters and of functioning multinational staff. To make sense of Normandy, it is necessary provide the context of the organisation’s development prior to the campaign by looking at previous examples of civil administration, institutional challenges and preparations. A more limited element is to make comparisons for reasons of context with what followed in North West Europe and to draw salient lessons for modern Civil Affairs. The research is based on examination of primary source material collected at The National Archives, other archives around the United Kingdom, memoirs and secondary sources.

DIMENSIONS OF UTILITY

If utility is the quality of being useful at something, then it is important to assess what that something is and for whom it is being done. The production of the happiest outcome for the group or individual concerned is at the heart of most definitions of utility. With Civil Affairs, the identification of utility is at one level straightforward – Was there enough of a problem to make it necessary and did it succeed in thwarting this problem? Clearly, there are limitations to such a straightforward interpretation. In particular, it does little justice to the nuances of understanding that give a more complete picture of the strengths and weaknesses of wartime Civil Affairs. Yet, if “disorganisation, disease and unrest” were evident or likely and averted by the work of Civil Affairs then, fundamentally, utility was achieved. Thankfully, there are examples of both success and need. The methods employed to control typhus in Naples during 1943 demonstrates both need and (after a fashion) success (see Chapters 3). Given that everyone accepted that there was a job at hand, the key issue facing
Civil Affairs during the Second World War was the perception of the organisation’s utility in accomplishing it.

The Naples example provides interesting material for consideration of the nature of utility. Here, civic work could be more easily observed because there was activity involved. People were deloused with DDT in Naples. The first issue is, therefore, whether Civil Affairs in order to be regarded as useful needs to be visibly active. Here there are two general problems when studying the organisation: much of its work involved passive measures such as talking with officials behind closed doors, and many of its decisions were in fact conducted by others. Local and Allied medical officials deloused the Neapolitans, a job only rarely done by Civil Affairs officers. If its work was not seen, did this make Civil Affairs less apparently useful to the military commander? Inevitably, this largely depended on whether the commander understood the nature of the work, trusted the organisation and respected the individuals who worked within it.

Arguably, given the information to hand and the professional experience of the Civil Affairs staff, the problems experienced in Naples should have been anticipated. The second issue is therefore whether the need to make such interventions is a sign of failure compared to preventative measures. Here, the first problem experienced was that prevention also tended to be passive and thus the utility of the organisation could be missed by the untrained eye or deliberately avoided by the malevolent one. Yet, to an extent, this could be overcome through good staff work that ensured the commander was aware of what was been done to support his needs. The second problem is that not everything can be prevented - the world and mankind was and remains imperfect – but the failure to prevent can be harmful to the perception of Civil Affairs’ utility.

Historically, an organisation can be seen to be an improvement on previous versions (a form of relative utility), but still not be sufficient to fulfil all of the requirements (failure of absolute utility). Each version of Civil Affairs around the Mediterranean made improvements, but substantial problems were still encountered in Italy (see Chapters 2 and 3). Indeed, it was the case in Italy that conditions found on the ground were worse than planned, so whilst the organisation as planned met expected levels of utility, it nevertheless failed.

In a perfect world, the needs of the commander will coincide with that of a liberated population. Yet, the commander in a resource intense campaign with a premium on transport is likely to want to keep Civil Affairs support to the local population as lean as possible. This was certainly the experience during the Second World War, where commanders were given political support in keeping humanitarian and administrative support to the most basic minimum. Furthermore, if there are local surpluses of food and other resources, a commander will seek to use these in order to take pressure off his supply system and reprioritise what is being sent through. The expectation and need of the commander is for a short campaign. He rarely has the human or material resources for anything long-term. Thus, the commander errs towards the bare minimum in terms of both resources and time used to support civilian needs. Unsurprisingly, the liberated civilian population often has a different set of
priorities and expectations. This is especially so after the initial shock of liberation has passed. The utility to the commander is not necessarily seen by the liberated population and this may in time increase the burdens faced by Civil Affairs.

Generally, two expectations will become apparent. The first, that comparisons will inevitably be made with events prior to liberation and the second, that minds will soon turn to recovery and reconstruction. Such attitudes may be encouraged by both allied and enemy propaganda. The unfulfilled expectations encouraged by Allied propaganda prior to the Italian campaign can be said to have created the circumstances where an impossible amount of additional altitude was added to an already uphill series of Civil Affairs problems. In such circumstances, question marks can be placed against whether the general military sense of Civil Affairs failure (or lack of utility) in Italy is valid. Furthermore, experienced Civil Affairs officers knew that the disparity between military and civilian needs would inevitably clash as soon as military relief and administrative measures failed to satisfy public demand. This situation was more likely if a campaign became protracted, as was found in Italy. Here the unwillingness to consider needs beyond first aid measures proved a false economy as deeper issues of rehabilitation required action, if political stability was to be maintained. Yet, terms as rehabilitation, recovery or reconstruction and the alternative of pushing such responsibilities onto bodies, like UNRRA, were fiercely resisted for fear of the likely denuding of military logistics needed for a speedy victory. Thus, the utility of Civil Affairs, when organisationally they may be prevented from making the proper preparations for a campaign, needs to be questioned.

Armies and political leaders, especially in the early stages of a conflict, tend to err towards the idea of a blinding fast campaign that will be over by Christmas, even when history indicates otherwise. Only after a substantial period of experience has elapsed do more informed opinions emerge, but this can be as true for Civil Affairs personnel. Critically therefore, any assessment of utility by military commanders, political leaders and Civil Affairs practitioners depends not just on the nature of the problems faced, but also their juncture in the war and the experience of the individuals involved. This also indicates that Civil Affairs could, through education and training improve its sense of utility in the chain of command and by other units. Greater familiarity with the intricacies associated with civil administration could produce a more informed understanding of utility of Civil Affairs and its people and even open doors to assistance (informed or co-opted utility). Indeed, earlier success may have been denied because obstacles are thoughtlessly erected as the result of ignorance of civilian needs by those fighting the campaign. Of course, even if commanders remained ignorant of such intricacies or did nothing (or could do nothing) to assuage problems, it is still possible to judge the merits of what was achieved.

Throughout its existence, Civil Affairs faced the problem that perceptions of its utility were often determined by misperceptions of the organisation’s purpose and its people. These could be held by military, civilian, enemy and ally alike. Yet, in many ways, Civil Affairs could be a very professional organisation often
directly recruiting those with relevant experience (see Chapter 4). The problem was that many of Civil Affairs officers came from a local authority or colonial background that did not understand the requirements of a military commander or the vagaries of military staff work. Many others from military backgrounds were thought to be better candidates for a retirement home than active military duty. This encouraged a somewhat mixed reception by the military and, on their behalf, some politicians (see Chapter 1). Commanders could be dismissive of both the staff and policies of the organisation, a matter that was particularly apparent in Italy (see Chapter 3). Here a difference can be established between perceived utility and objective utility. For Civil Affairs officers, whilst individually able to discharge their responsibilities could be generally regarded substandard.

Neither was the picture any rosier amongst the exiled communities of those about to be liberated. They saw elements of colonialism and feared for their sovereignty (see Chapters 1 and 5). Perceptions of Civil Affairs were also shaped by turf battles in Whitehall, across the Atlantic and between military headquarters (see Chapters 1 and 4). Consequently, any sense of utility is problematic when there is little of no respect for the individuals or the organisation for which they work. Indeed, success may be denied because obstacles are deliberately erected based on such prejudice. To an extent, education and information could help to modify perceptions and expectations, but often a poor image was only be reversed when good work was seen to be done. Yet, this could be difficult when various obstacles made the uphill struggle impossibly arduous and the nature of the work was more passive than active.

Thus, any assessment of the utility of Civil Affairs and its people during Normandy would be incomplete without an analysis of inter alia the political, practical, bureaucratic and historical context. Only with this in mind can a reasonable assessment of the utility of Civil Affairs in Normandy be made. Care is required in assessing the overall product of Civil Affairs, not just the utility of one of its specialist areas (such as fine arts and monuments). Care must also be taken in establishing the balance between Civil Affairs, other Allied units and the French authorities in terms of who can take the credit. Similarly, care must be exercised in establishing the balance between role of individual Civil Affairs officers and the role of the Civil Affairs organisation in producing utility. In each case, one is led by the evidence forthcoming from primary and secondary sources.

Inevitably, there are limitations on the extent to which utility can be assessed in this research. For reasons outlined above, it is not the purpose of this research to compare the utility of Civil Affairs between the American and British sectors. Nevertheless and where appropriate, transatlantic influences on the process of development will be included. Ultimately, a complete sense of utility in Normandy requires not just the context of what went before, but also what came after in North West Europe, the Far East and during more recent conflicts. For reasons of brevity, this is largely left for future research, as is a more fulsome assessment of French sources.
Issues regarding methodology are, of course, the very essence of academic work. New evidence and new combinations of evidence will continue to disprove, to prove and to resuscitate ideas and arguments. This research attempts to take forward knowledge and understanding of the impact of a hitherto insignificant military organisation. It has its own integrity in analysing British Civil Affairs developments prior to the battle of Normandy, and measuring the merit of these against the problems encountered in the British sector. Critically, it assesses the methods by which an improvised organisation created to deal with identified problems transformed itself into an increasingly professional organisation that was better placed to provide respected advice and better able to deal with civilian problems in a way that satisfied many competing demands. In such a way, it provides a lesson from the past for the future on why civilian administrative needs during a military campaign should never be ignored, on which organisational structures work best and why, and on how such an organisation can successfully transforms itself.

A COMPARISON WITH MODERN CIVIL AFFAIRS

The focus of this research is on the development of British Civil Affairs during the Second World War and in particular on the value of its employment in Normandy. Nevertheless, it is useful to keep in mind, if the lessons of the past are ever to have benefit for the future, an understanding of modern versions of Civil Affairs and the context in which they are used. Consequently, the general shape of present arrangements is detailed here in order for comparisons to be made. Whilst subsequent chapters do not make direct comparisons, many parallels nevertheless echo throughout and these are drawn together in the conclusion.

To put Civil Affairs of the Second World War into its modern context is at one level straightforward, for some units are in evidence. However, Second World War style Civil Affairs is seldom employed with the two invasions of Iraq (1991 and 2003) being the most significant exceptions to this trend. Yet, even here, the parallels are limited by virtue of the short-lived nature of both invasions. Very occasionally, support is also given to disaster relief operations such as those following the Tsunami in South-East Asia and flooding in Mozambique. Instead, most Civil Affairs is associated with peace support, humanitarian intervention and stabilisation operations.

In terms of units, American Civil Affairs is of an unparalleled scale and is alone in remaining as part of the order of battle since 1945. The United States Army has a substantial Civil Affairs component, which is divided between a regular battalion and several others, together with an entire Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, in the reserves. There are also Civil Affairs units in the United States Marine Corps, Navy and National Guards. Yet, despite an enviable scale, the American Civil Affairs community is arguably diminished by a series of factors. Within the Army Civil Affairs, there are internal philosophical differences and funding squabbles between the regular units that come under Special Operations Command (SOCOM, and from where the reserve

[9]
elements were taken in 2006) and reserve units that come under Army Reserve Command (ARCOM). The principle philosophical difference is that regular units focus on directly supporting the fighting units (especially other members of SOCOM) whilst reserve units take a more corporate Civil Affairs approach that focuses on what they believe to be important. There are differences between the integrationalist Marine and divisive Army approaches to working with Civil Affairs. There are huge differences of opinion over the utility of Civil Affairs between politically influential war fighters and Civil Affairs personnel.\(^7\)

Nevertheless, with the need in places like Afghanistan and Iraq to find a method by which a lasting and stable peace can be found, Civil Affairs may yet find greater support for its work. Certainly, recognition of the civilian element has been a key part of the General Petraeus inspired military surge in Iraq and a similar civilian departments’ surge is advocated by President Obama for Afghanistan.\(^8\) The latter is keenly supported by Britain.\(^9\) Indeed, it has recently become the norm for military formations on operations to show off their civilian capabilities.\(^10\) Furthermore, it is likely that the civilian surge can only be met by sending civilianised reservists such is the overall shortage of civilian specialists. Nevertheless, whether such changes have entirely shifted engrained negative attitudes towards Civil Affairs and their duties is still open to debate.\(^11\)

Britain too has a form of Civil Affairs, although it has been re-titled on several occasions. Like America, Britain draws its personnel from both regular and reserve forces, but unlike America, the two forces work as part of the same team. Also unlike America, British Civil Affairs was only reintroduced into the British order of battle in the mid-1990s during the nationalist wars in the Balkans, having been phased out shortly after the Suez crisis of 1956.\(^12\) In the intervening years, it was regarded as unnecessary given the existence of some variant of host nation support during the Cold War and wars of decolonisation.

The British Civil Affairs renaissance during the 1990s was mirrored by several other NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) armies, as solutions were sought to civilian related problems in the Balkans. The drivers for the renaissance during the 1990s were various, but the more substantial elements included: the need to find a response to practical civilian problems in operational theatres where the military were not the only functioning element, the need to establish some mechanism by which the military could engage with the burgeoning humanitarian and development communities found in operational theatres, the recognition that the development of civilian administration would facilitate an exit strategy and the need to have a politically credible humanitarian element as part of military operations. Whilst, some elements were clearly practical, the overall effect was to develop widespread legitimacy for military humanitarian intervention operations amongst the local population, the international community and the voting public. Thus, whilst the general aim of Civil Affairs in its various national incarnations did not change from the wartime aim of addressing civilian matters in support of a commander’s operational military needs, the tenor of some national versions did change.\(^13\)
Indeed, the recognition of both the transformation in the relationship between the military and other agencies, and the influence of a greater humanitarian agenda in guiding the politics of most modern operations, saw many armies use the more collaborative term CIMIC (Civil Military Co-operation) rather than Civil Affairs. Thus, in the British armed forces, the Army’s Civil Affairs Group (CAG) became the Joint CIMIC Group (JCG) involving all armed services and will shortly become the Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG) for reasons explored below.  

The collaborative CIMIC approach was recognised within NATO doctrine:

The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.

The idea was to make it easier for the armed forces to work more effectively with the myriad of local, national and international civil agencies. These can range from non-governmental organisations (e.g. OXFAM) through national development agencies (e.g. the UK’s Department for International Development, DFID) and local authorities to international governmental organisations (e.g. the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF)). The influence of these organisations is such that some have developed their own view on how civil-military relationships should be conducted. One of these, produced by the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) put a typical emphasis on a relationship that allows humanitarian agencies the space (so-called “humanitarian space”) in which to operate according to the requirements of humanitarian need:

United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training. Key elements include planning, information sharing and task division.

Unsurprisingly, the new ideas of the CIMIC renaissance (whether or not they went as far as OCHA) distanced many NATO members from the more focused remit used by the Americans. Indeed, in Kosovo a variety of different approaches were apparent between the divisional areas. Whilst the American approach (often referred to Civil-Military Operations) included elements of collaboration, it tended to be rather more orientated towards supporting express military needs:

Civil-Military Operations. The activities of a commander that establish collaborative relationships among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to
facilitate military operations are nested in support of the overall US objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur throughout the range of military operations. CMO is the responsibility of the command and will be executed by all members of the command. It is not the sole purview of the CA team. CMO are conducted across the range of military operations.20

Such differences of approach help to cloud the purpose of modern Civil Affairs work. Thus, it is easy to see how others in the military do not understand such work or reduce it to a simplified version (by focusing on a familiar set of skills like bridge building) that the broader aim is missed. That there are some who do not want to understand and even demean CIMIC simply makes the general military acceptance of the organisation’s purpose extremely difficult. Thus, CIMIC has come to be seen as a function on its own, it is something thrown at a problem when kinetic war fighting effects are either impossible or undesirable. War fighting units pride themselves on ‘doing some CIMIC’ by painting schools or clearing rubbish. When there are problems in working with relief agencies CIMIC is used to negotiate (a key CIMIC skill21) a way through. Few understand the effects that a coherent CIMIC approach can have. The separation of CIMIC (now typically J-9 having been renumbered from G-5) from operations (J-3) is felt to be symptomatic of the friction and misunderstanding between kinetic and civil effects during a campaign. For some war fighters, uncontrolled CIMIC projects are feared to take the military into both unfamiliar and unnecessary territory. The fear of ‘mission creep’ where focus is taken away from traditional areas of military expertise is both corporately uncomfortable for many and possibly dangerous as security hazards may develop.22 Such dangers were experienced on a daily basis by the British Army during its August 2004 battles to reopen the ‘CIMIC House’ located in the Iraqi town of Al Amarah.23

Nor is the uncertainty over the benefits of CIMIC limited to the military. Even where CIMIC has attempted to win war fighters support by policies to help dominate the battle space by building local consent for military operations this has resulted in criticism from the humanitarian and development communities. Many of the latter worry that well publicised military projects, so-called Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), whilst clearly designed to make the military look good and feel good about themselves do little to assist with sustainable local development. Many QIPs are unsustainable and ‘harm’ future development by encouraging aid dependency.24

Yet, driven by events in Iraq and Afghanistan there is an increasingly common political, humanitarian and military view that a broader and more joined up approach is the only method by which such conflicts can be turned into a lasting peace. Here, the perceived success of rebuilding Germany and Japan after the Second World War is thought to provide an optimistic vision of how state building can translate into peace building.25 To Germany and Japan are added the more recent examples of Cambodia and El Salvador. The realisation that all
elements need to work together provides an opportunity for CIMIC to help facilitate the process, but the nature and scale of its role is by no means certain.

The surges in Iraq and Afghanistan are symptomatic of the new ‘comprehensive’ approach that seeks to build lasting ‘stability’. However, how comprehensive, who needs to join in, what type of stability, who does the work, is it best done by agencies simultaneously or sequentially, is there a role for CIMIC, etc. are all questions that are regularly asked as the international community seeks to find common ground from which to move forward. Nevertheless, some frameworks are starting to appear. Many armies are developing ‘stabilisation (or stability) operations’ doctrine that links together counter-insurgency and state building ideas in both ending violent conflict and building lasting peace. Some governments have instituted methods of better co-ordinating their military and civilian agencies around a ‘comprehensive approach’ and across the international community interested parties come together to attempt to find that common ground.\(^\text{26}\)

In many ways, current British CIMIC doctrine published in 2006 takes a military lead in seeking to employ and encourage the comprehensive approach:

The UK approach, as articulated in UK CIMIC Policy, is that CIMIC allows military operations to make a coherent contribution to UK and international political objectives. The UK emphasises the need for a more comprehensive and long-term view of the strategic environment. Collaboration across government and beyond, in accordance with the principles of the Comprehensive Approach, will harmonise all contributions, enabling better identification and achievement of desired outcomes. This approach is supported at the operational and tactical level by integrating CIMIC staff and the CIMIC process into the chain of command.\(^\text{27}\)

Elsewhere both the British and American armed forces are developing stabilisation doctrine (JDP 3-40 and FM 3-07 respectively) that emphasis a comprehensive approach.\(^\text{28}\) NATO is presently re-writing its CIMIC doctrine to reflect better such ideas as stabilisation and the comprehensive approach.\(^\text{29}\) However, there are numerous and, often familiar, problems in translating this excellent work into practice.

There are many differences of purpose amongst the various actors (civil and military, government and non-governmental organisation, foreign ministry and international organisation, public bodies and the private sector, humanitarian and development worker). There are thorny issues of how to relate to the incumbent national authority, local groups and indigenous influential groups (but which may include criminal elements). There can be fundamental incompatibilities between the needs of different requirements by different organisations. Here, arresting a war criminal may make sense in international legal terms and may have longer term benefits in deterring others from committing such war crimes, but this makes little sense to a relief organisation if it results in their being denied accessed to people in need.\(^\text{30}\)
Resources often come with political and donor strings attached that may prevent the most effective use of monies given. International mandates can be too wide ranging, preventing any sense of clear direction or set of priorities. Each organisation works on its own time cycle with some extending their projects into many years whilst others focus on just a few months. Many government and military organisations cycle their staff through a conflict area every six months (or less) preventing any sense of overview and interrupting the development of theatre wide intelligence. In their very nature, each new military formation and newly arrive civilian organisation (of whatever complexion) seeks to find an innovative approach to solving the problems they face (or look for). This creates much turbulence, as policies are re-invented. There are problems getting the right numbers of both soldiers and civilian specialists (in particular) to do the job. There are even bigger issues associated with poor levels of expertise. Many individuals involved have poor local language skills, making issues of cultural awareness much more difficult.31

Organisations can be choosy about which elements of a project they undertake, thereby undermining the overall effect. There are problems with public, donor, political and practitioner exhaustion as large state building and stabilisation projects sap the energy and resources of industrialised countries. There are problems engaging non-Western countries such as the emergent powers of China and India in the process. Even within Western industrialised countries, there are variations in willingness to be involved in the process and this can produce policy distortions and seemingly insurmountable hurdles to progress within alliances like NATO.32

There are military issues too. Despite, the comprehensive strategies of some senior officers, the philosophical clash between warrior and stabilisation cultures is not easily solved. There are questions of whether organisational sequencing (fitting into traditional military ideas of phases 1-4 of an operation) is better than a simultaneous approach. There are even fundamental questions of whether the states in which stabilisation and state building are contemplated are best suited to being states. Some argue that actually they are in the final phases of throwing off the last vestiges of their post-colonial state system and moving towards some new international political organisational paradigm.33

The international community has not been slow in attempting to find means of improving working relationships and identifying common ground that might enable a comprehensive approach and from it stability. Much of this work stems from the 1990s when the international humanitarian and development communities found themselves working alongside the military in the Balkans and required better understanding of how each other worked.34 Yet, the scale of problems and the dangers encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq have seen these being taken a stage further.

Some like the United Nations brokered Bonn Agreement of 2001 work at the diplomatic level in getting states to agree what role they will play in an overall plan to help Afghanistan rebuild its state structures. Here different countries agreed to lead on different elements of strategy including economic development, institutional reform and counter narcotics. Whilst a worthy
attempt, Bonn has suffered from chronic underinvestment resulting in many projects progressing little further than an outline plan.\textsuperscript{35} The United Nations has also developed the idea of 'benchmarking' where standards are set for desired outcomes and if these are not achieved then the methods used to tackle the issue are reassessed. Elsewhere, the humanitarian and development communities have developed an agreed set of working standards that endeavour to encourage the highest standard of work and avoid doing harm to the sustainable development of a community. The SPHERE Project standards are typical of these.\textsuperscript{36}

Where institutional clashes occur, it is now common for organisations think in terms of possible 'tradeoffs' that might be made. However, in areas of fundamental difference (war criminal detention versus aid access) the scope of these has been limited.\textsuperscript{37} More recently, developments in America has seen the joint publication by the United States Institute of Peace and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) of the \textit{Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction} that seeks to provide an agreed framework for the 'end states' and 'conditions' that need to be developed in building a peaceful state and which agencies can use in giving their disparate activities common direction.\textsuperscript{38}

Yet, such principles have their limitations, as some civilian agencies fear that principles are shorthand for some kind of centrally controlled indoctrinated approach. Not understanding the purpose of military doctrine does little to dispel such myths. There are also issues of whether such an American approach should or can go much beyond American governmental agencies. Indeed, this is a common theme, for whom is the comprehensive approach, comprehensive. Some smaller bodies, like non-governmental organisations, simply do not have the available staff to spend time understanding the principles, they require immediate results that satisfy donors' demands and work within limited resources. From a military point of view, there are debates as to whether these new principles and the stabilisation doctrine mentioned above replace or simply add to existing doctrine for peace support operations or counter-insurgency operations. The desire to oversee a military culture shift in the armed forces towards a comprehensive stabilisation approach only makes sense if it is believed this type of warfare is now and will remain the norm. At the practical level, operationalising the comprehensive approach is made difficult by contrasting civilian and military approaches to planning. The military prefer to do lots of it, whilst civilian agencies prefer to move with events guided by their own principles and limitations imposed by donor resources.\textsuperscript{39}

The lack of leadership or of political accountability in the process is telling. In circumstances where success is not inevitable, the tendency to focus on simply the achievable (painting and equipping a school) or measurable (how many schools were refurbished) avoids the real needs. Furthermore, the utility of alliance politics enables members to blame one another rather than being assessed on their own efforts. The hope that guidelines like those of PKSOI will provide sufficient glue to hold together the myriad of disparate organisations is perhaps optimistic. Thus, as an attempt to force states into more coherent
thinking about the peace they wish to create out of the wars they fight there is a school of thought that an international legal framework needs to be developed. Here those who make the decision to go to war and those who fight it have to consider not just the moral and legal arguments for waging war (Jus ad Bellum) and how it is fought (Jus in Bello), but also the justice of what happens after conflict (Jus post Bellum). Whether, such an approach would have prevented the resentment and violence caused by the de-ba’athification of Iraq’s armed forces, police force and administrative structures is uncertain. Certainly, the political zeal of such measures (that presented as many problems as encountered by the de-nazification and de-fascification processes of the Second World War) might have been dimmed if there was a legal framework that enforced best practice. However, there are questions about even what constitutes best practice, as despite all the work associated in producing comprehensive approach principles and guidelines there is no overwhelming confidence that any of the ideas will work in producing stability in a Third World state. International law is perhaps too normative in this respect.

In all of this, the actual role of Civil Affairs/CIMIC remains uncertain. The organisation has many strengths. It can deploy personnel into war zones when other government agencies cannot. Indeed, as the result of shortages in the civilian government departments, the civilian surge into Afghanistan is being filled by multi-wearing members of ARCOM. However, there is recognition that despite the existence of some exceptionally good individuals, overall there is a shortage of expertise in CIMIC/Civil Affairs. Luckily, some of this can be found in other parts of the armed forces, such as engineers and medical staff and penny packets from some government agencies. In bringing these finite elements together a new beast has been created, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).

PRTs come in different forms and vary between different nations and between mobile and fixed variants. The British-led multinational PRT in Helmand Province is designed to help “the Afghan Government deliver effective government and security.” It comprises of 70 staff in Lashkah Gar, with further 12-person PRT Stabilisation Teams in the districts of Gereshk, Garmisir, Sangin and Musa Qalah. Each Stabilisation Team typically consists of two or three civilian stabilisation advisers, a political adviser and a six person Military Stabilisation Support Team (MSST). They bring together specialists with a range of backgrounds including development, politics, engineering and project management. Many working in the MSSTs and PRT are from CIMIC, although there are others from the engineers, signals and so forth. The PRT in Helmand is designed to deliver a province-level plan that has been agreed between the Government of Afghanistan and international agencies. The plan revolves around seven themes: Politics and Reconciliation; Governance; Rule of Law (Justice, Police and Prisons); Security; Economic and Social Development and Reconstruction; Counter Narcotics; and Strategic Communications. It is an attempt to develop a local comprehensive approach and fits well into British CIMIC doctrine. However, compared to the Second World War its role is a hybrid between Civil Affairs and the work of a Control Commission.
Yet, the PRT task is not an easy one given the problems of bringing on a failed state like Afghanistan that is plagued by tribal issues and militant Taliban activity, is strongly orientated around an economy based on narcotics and is riven by corruption, skills shortages, underdevelopment and educational shortcomings. The PRT approach is further complicated by such unsurprising factors as the different approaches taken by different PRTs, the dismissive views of some war fighters, the competition between the PRTs and war fighters in maximising their cut of finite national allocations of troops, the disruptive nature of new formation commanders wishing to adopt a fresh approach, the variations in national commitment within a coalition (Canada being one example) and certain PRT skills shortages. Thus, there are frequently significant mismatches between what is provided and what is required.

Amongst government departments, Britain has developed a series of governmental structures that encourage a comprehensive Whitehall approach. Within the Cabinet Office, there are interdepartmental committees that examine the needs of Afghanistan and a team has been established between the three departments that most are most exposed to stabilisation problems. The team, known as the Stabilisation Unit (formerly known as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, PCRU), was established in light of events in Afghanistan and comprises the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office and DFID. Its purpose is to provide "specialist, targeted assistance in countries emerging from violent conflict where the UK is helping to achieve a stable environment that will enable longer term development to take place." Furthermore, in providing a more joined up approach to dealing with the problems faced in the British sector of operations in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province a ‘Roadmap’ was developed in conjunction with the Stabilisation Unit in 2008. The roadmap is still in its infancy and time will tell if it turns out to be successful.

Similar attempts to join up the agencies and departments in Washington have also been made with under Presidential Declaration 44 Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization in 2005 instructing the State Department to take the lead on stabilisation. However, confusion over whether stabilisation replaces counter-insurgency, problems with getting sufficient civilian experts and the unrelenting nature of the Defence Department’s warrior culture have slowed the pace of change. There is also the thorny political issue of how to engage the independently minded Central Intelligence Agency in the process. One source of alternative expertise can be found by employing Private Security Companies (PSCs). Some of these, like Aegis, already have contracts for such work as civil administration co-ordination in Iraq. However, there remain issues associated with reliability, quality and the low standard of company ethics.

As will become clear in following chapters, there are many resonances between modern and wartime versions of Civil Affairs, however there are differences. The most obvious similarity is that the organisation is an enabler to bring about success. Yet, the needs of the campaign being fought are fundamentally different. Here instead of being in a supportive role to the war fighters, recent insurgency-based conflicts have placed the civilian elements increasingly front
of stage. Furthermore, the assumptions of who carries out the civilian component work are no longer purely in the hands of the military, even if they remain interested in the process.

The policy of the Second World War focused on doing no more than first aid work. Yet, the practice of the Second World War resulted on occasions in this necessarily extending across to rehabilitation and reconstruction work in order to prevent long-term civilian problems spilling over into domestic strife. The upset of commanders over such developments was largely mitigated by many of them having practical experience of similar issues during interwar tours of colonial policing and being familiar with the need for such developments. Thus, a modern similarity to wartime events is that there is now a generation of officers who better understand civilian dynamics in a theatre of conflict. Given recent experiences, it is unlikely that the mistakes made in Iraq during 2003 will be repeated soon. However, the frictions between the war fighters who wished to keep the scope of Civil Affairs to a bare minimum and those in Civil Affairs who were aware of the need to mitigate potential longer-term problems will no doubt continue. Indeed, the optimism that if one concentrates on just the fighting a war, it will be over sooner and then there will be more freedom to address civilian problems is consistently fashionable throughout military history, even if that history actually indicates otherwise.

A similarity also comes with the inter-governmental structures designed to coordinate strategy. The establishment of bodies like the Stabilisation Unit and cabinet bodies associated with Afghan reconstruction have clear parallels with wartime cabinet committees that brought together interested parties. Such work by such committees may be regarded as a strength of the British cabinet system of government and compares favourably to some of the problems found in Washington. Yet, during the Second World War, the clearer British requirements in defeating the enemy also allowed the scope of Civil Affairs to be kept within sensible and attainable boundaries compared to the potentially limitless commitments required in Afghanistan. Indeed, perhaps no committee, especially in the present economic climate, is capable of channelling the elements required to deal with the problems in this distant land if what is required is World War style mobilisation of resources. The Second World War had the problem of co-ordinating two allies, something that was overcome by the development of the transatlantic Combined Chiefs of Staff and something that is presently less easily managed with more actors within a permanent alliance.

A final means of comparison between wartime Civil Affairs and its modern equivalent is the sensitive issue of ever-changing military respectability. Civil Affairs today as in the Second World War is often considered low status. This is partly because it is not understood and partly because it is so very different in nature to war fighting. Generally, the closer an individual is to the historically normative task of fighting then the greater the likely benefits in terms of promotion. Employment in Civil Affairs by contrast can often be seen as a retrograde step. Because it is considered unimportant, it is easy for Civil Affairs to become a dumping ground for those not up to standard. And sadly, the many
good men of the organisation can be damned by their association with the less capable. Yet, Civil Affairs’ status can also flow as well as ebb. Indeed, PRTs and MSSTs have now developed kudos, matching events at the end of the Second World War when British officers keen to do well in the peacetime army queued to join Military Government in Germany and Austria.

Thus, there are political, institutional, structural and professional parallels between modern versions of Civil Affairs and wartime equivalents. As in the Second World War, there is recognition of the need to engage with the civilian component of a conflict and whilst there are mixed feelings of who might best fulfil that need, there is further recognition that the best civilian options are not easily operationalised. Civil Affairs is an option, that provides some but not all of the answers. Its utility is opaque and is complicated by its good work being marred by both the views of others (both civilian and military) and it’s the organisation’s own shortcomings.

OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

The literature review provides a survey of what has been written on or about Civil Affairs and Military Government covering the periods before, during and since the Second World War. Here an assessment is made of why so little has been written on the subject and where there are possibilities for further research. In providing a context for Civil Affairs operations in Normandy, the survey also examines sources that help to indicate the scale of political, civilian and military problems encountered before, during and after the campaign. Some of these sources also point towards wartime organisational developments that provide further context for Civil Affairs own developments.

The first chapter identifies the nature that both the obligations under international law and the personal, bureaucratic, political and diplomatic influences had on the development of Civil Affairs. These influences brought many varied and, at times asymmetric, pressures to bear on the organisation, helping to explain some its peculiarities, but also part of the basis for its inception. Details of the more substantial hostility exhibited towards aspects of the organisation and its staff are provided. As are the parts played tenacious Civil Affairs supporters in Whitehall, who ensured not just its survival, but also that it was given room to prepare for North West Europe.

The second chapter considers the influence earlier campaigns had on the identification of a military need for civil administration in operational areas. Indeed, the need for some form of organisation for North West Europe was clearly established during the 1940 campaign, but was matched by later developments in other theatres of operations. The debate on whether this role was best achieved inside or outside the military was often repeated, with a substantial rethink occurring when America joined the war. The influence of America upon Civil Affairs development is detailed because of its fundamental significance in shaping the process. In particular, the debate over the relative balance of work between the military units and UNRRA produced much last-minute acrimony at a time when staff officers at SHAEP were attempting to
make plans for Normandy, however, when resolved Civil Affairs found itself in a much stronger political and military position within the Western alliance.

The third chapter examines the lessons from the Italian campaign. The problems encountered by AMGOT and the associated Allied Control Commission were partly of the Allies’ making, but also the result of local political and civilian problems. Some of these civil problems are examined in detail in order to provide context for operations in Normandy. The organisation problems are examined to see what impact they had on North West Europe plans, preparations and organisational models.

The fourth chapter deals with the preparations made in Britain for Civil Affairs in the North West Europe campaign. An assessment is made of Civil Affairs methods to transform itself into an increasingly professional and (to the military) acceptable organisation. This involved measures taken to improve recruitment, training, field organisation and representation at formation headquarters. These developments are assessed to see what, if any, improvements were made. The variety of Civil Affairs plans made by both 21st Army Group and SHAEF for the forthcoming campaign are also assessed to see what impact they had on preparations and thinking at more junior levels.

The fifth chapter examines the political relationship between Civil Affairs and the French authorities and details the conditions expected on landing in France (a special emphasis is placed on the preparations made for the expected refugee problem). In dealing with the political relationship with the French authorities, the chapter identifies how the difficulties experienced at the diplomatic levels were interpreted by Civil Affairs at the operational level and what indicators were used to find reassurance that the needs of the campaign were still going to be served. In examining wartime France and, in particular, the refugee dimension an overview of the conditions is given that serves as a basis of comparison (extended into the next chapter) between what was expected, what was planned and what was actually found and done. It also illustrates the depth of theatre specific preparations made by Civil Affairs in advance of the Operation OVERLORD landings in Normandy, which serves as a useful comparison with the paucity of preparations made in previous campaigns (see Chapter 3).

The sixth chapter develops some of themes of the previous chapter, but focuses rather more on the practical side of relations with the French authorities. Here the methods used by Civil Affairs to ensure that the new Gaullist authorities had sufficient capacity to run the civil administration in a way that would not embarrass military operations are examined. Several components associated with a campaign free from disorganisation, disease and unrest are identified, including food supply, transportation and the legal system. How potential vulnerabilities were identified is also assessed. Finally, assessment is made of the means by which Civil Affairs ensured that local administrative capacity was robust enough to carry Normandy and the Normans through the battle.

The seventh chapter examines the methods by which Civil Affairs directly supported military activity. Fundamental threats to military operations like field
security problems, disease and refugee movement are put alongside those, which could be corrosive to the Allied cause in political and propaganda terms, such as looting. The nature of the relationship between Civil Affairs and the formations is also assessed, both in terms of evolving structural arrangements and in terms of the developing personal relationships.
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29. Continuing correspondence with Stephen E. Henthorne, who has had various Civil Affairs training and doctrine authorship appointments with US armed forces, Canadian forces and NATO, 2003 to 2009.


38 Details will be available shortly from the US Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) website at http://pksoi.army.mil/ [Accessed 29 April 2009].


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LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

In terms of English language literature,* the number of published sources that
deal directly with the breadth of Civil Affairs activities in the British sector of
Normandy goes no further than parts of the British official history of Civil
Affairs and Military Government in the North West Europe campaign by former
colonial civil servant Vernon Donnison and the patchy quality of a post-war
memoir by Civil Affairs officer, A.G. Puttock.¹ There are short special sections on
Civil Affairs in some of the British campaign official histories, but these add little
to that covered by their more substantial siblings.² The American sector does
little better with parts of the Civil Affairs official history, Soldiers become
Governors, by Harry Coles and Albert Weinberg and the edited diary of
American Civil Affairs officer John Maginnis.³ The volume by Coles and
Weinberg has the advantage of largely being a collection of documents excerpts
from British and American sources.

Where Civil Affairs does tend to be included is as an aspect of wider history.
Most prevalent of these is the nature of relations between the Allies, liberated
Normans and the Gaullist French authorities, but some aspects of the Italian
campaign pick up on Civil Affairs themes and there is a specialist literature
associated with the wartime protection fine arts and monuments. Regarding
France, there are certain elements on Civil Affairs in the largely unpublished
PhD thesis by Andrew Thomson on Franco-American relations in Normandy.⁴
Hilary Footitt and John Simmonds’ analysis of French aspects of the liberation,
Robert Aron’s De Gaulle Before Paris and Olivier Wieviorka’s assessment of the
battle of Normandy provide an understanding of Gaullist upset at the
development of a Civil Affairs organisation as well as making comment about
attitudes between the Allies, French civilians and the Gaullist French
authorities.⁵ in the case of Italy only Matthew Jones’ Britain, the United States
and the Mediterranean War makes any decent analysis of Civil Affairs, but this is
restricted to command relationships during a particular phase of the campaign.⁶
There are also two memoirs by one British and one American Civil Affairs
officers.⁷ Generally, coverage of the operational military utility of Civil Affairs is
light and only narrow perspectives of the work conduct by Civil Affairs is
assessed.

It is fair to say that study of the broad scope of Civil Affairs activities in the
British sector is not popular. The age of participants, historical and publishing
fashion, and institutional wartime obscurity (with eventual termination) go

* Foreign language sources are not investigated here, although certain French and German
published sources have been used as part of the research.
some way towards providing an explanation for the paucity of published and research materials. Unsurprisingly and withstanding the official histories, the most direct information comes in the form of wartime official reports and policy primary source documents held in national and other public archives, yet, although even these can vary in both number and quality. However, alternative sources such as campaign accounts, diplomatic histories and geographical studies, are valuable for they can provide much-needed context for Civil Affairs activities.

**Primary Sources**

Primary source materials come in the form of publicly available official, military and ministerial reports, handbooks, war diaries, telegrams, letters, notes, memoranda, briefing papers, instructions and such like associated with Civil Affairs activity. Most of those relating to events in the British sector are available at The National Archives of the United Kingdom at Kew, although the Churchill Archive Centre and Trinity College Library Archives at the University of Cambridge, the Special Collections of the Bodleian Library at Oxford University and the Collection at the Imperial War Museum at Lambeth contain official documentation and relevant correspondence of such individuals as Secretary of State for War, Sir Percy James Grigg (most frequently called Sir James or simply ‘P.J.’ and should not to be confused with Sir Edward Grigg, *Parliamentary* Under-Secretary for War). At Kew, there are a huge number of such files available, ranging from the lowest Civil Affairs detachment through staffs attached to divisions, Corps, Armies, Army Group and SHAEF to national war ministries and foreign offices and ultimately to cabinet committees and to the highest political executives. A simple search of The National Archives catalogue for the term “Civil Affairs” in War Office files for War Diaries in the British Element of the Allied Expeditionary Force, North West Europe (WO 171) produces 76 files. A similar search in the General Records of the War Office (WO 32) produces 158 files.

Of course, these are only snapshots and fuzzy ones at that. In the case of WO 32, many files associated with campaigns in the Far East and non-Second World War events are included. Not included are the files given more obscure descriptions in War Office, Cabinet Office, Prime Minister and Foreign Office files, such as those of the “Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee” (Cabinet Office Files CAB 21/1035) that was responsible for planning Civil Affairs in North West Europe. Given the military nature, but civilian working environment of Civil Affairs finding related relevant materials can be problematic as such areas of interest as “refugee issues” can be the responsibility of many elements within government. It is often difficult to narrow these down to simply refugee movements in Normandy. Civil Affairs War Diaries and other files can be equally patchy in this respect, as entries can be incomplete or numerical data subject to different forms of estimate and accountancy procedure.
Records held at National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at Washington, DC can help to fill some gaps where they exist. Furthermore, many of the key central policy documents are contained within Coles and Weinberg. Similarly, Hansard, the official report of debates in the British Parliament, provides a valuable source of information on political considerations. Many in the House of Lords had experience of civil administrative matters stemming from the end of the First World War. Nevertheless, what documents, held at The National Archives, do show from different layers within the War Office and Whitehall are the patterns of relationships. Furthermore, some War Diaries can be most illuminating in terms of detail, such that of No. 208 Civil Affairs Detachment that includes much in the way of reports and detail on operations. Others are far less comprehensive and only by examining all the War Diaries in a Civil Affairs Group (about 30, depending on the Group) can an reliable overview be generated.

The interviews and correspondence between Donnison and various participants in the North West Europe campaign (CAB 101/59-87) are most helpful. The historian of the volumes on Civil Affairs in North West Europe and Central Organisation and Planning, F.S. Vernon Donnison (an Indian Office civil servant with strong connections to Burma), conducted interviews and corresponded with many of the senior officials and military staff associated with the organisation. Only elements of these appear in print and many are extremely illuminating (perhaps indicating a perceived need to record history within living memory). The gap tends to be the few interviews conducted between Donnison and formation commanders; here almost nothing is said regarding Civil Affairs. This might indicate a lack of interest, but as Donnison comments in his notes on an interview with Lieutenant General Sir Brian G. Horrocks, he appeared to be a “rather stupid man, with an overdose of personality.” Nevertheless, one is rather thankful that Donnison placed his interview material in The National Archive at Kew, as the quality and pertinence of it is generally unmatched. No sound recordings at the Imperial War Museum cover Civil Affairs in Normandy and no living member of wartime Civil Affairs has been identified. Nevertheless, veteran and author of 18 Platoon, Sydney Jary has been helpful in answering general questions about the organisation and impressions of France and the French during the campaign.

CASTING THE NET WIDER

Sources that provide context to Civil Affairs during the battle of Normandy are readily placed into one of four groups of writing - military aspects of the battle of Normandy, aspects of France and the French during wartime, the relationship between civilians and war, and the part played by Civil Affairs and Military Government in other military operations.

Virtually, every aspect of the campaign and general military literature associated with ground operations in Normandy has some relevance. After all, the primary purpose of the organisation was to support the military needs of the war fighters and the logisticians and understanding the military and
command problems faced by the fighting forces is clearly relevant. The relevance of some sources and types of information can be rather surprising. Whilst the poor performance of Allied tanks in the face of certain German models is of little relevance, analysis of the performance of lorries and other soft skinned vehicles provided by technical histories can provide an understanding of why Civil Affairs units were frequently asked to maintain their vehicles. Generally, the most useful context comes in the form of the flow of events, an understanding of the military individuals and major political characters involved, a picture of the battlefield and a sense of the strategic, operational and tactical priorities at different levels of command and between the participating nations.

Official histories of the North West Europe campaign, such as those by Briton L.F. Ellis, American Gordon Harrison and Canadian C.P. Stacey provide just such an overview of events from the perspectives of the major fighting nations. These are complemented by those official histories that give similar information on other campaigns (which helped to inform preparations for Normandy) or provide the strategic overview or details of such aspects as Medical Services, North American Supply, the Economic Blockade of Germany, or Anglo-American command. More general histories give a perspective on the big debates of the battle of Normandy such as those surrounding the qualities of leadership, the varying performance of different units and countries, Allied differences over strategy, comparisons between German and Allied strengths and weaknesses, the policy and practice of joint service co-operation and the efficacy of bombing targets like Caen.

In the more specialised fields, sources like Stephen Hart’s Colossal Cracks provide insight into the manpower problems facing the British in Normandy. David French provides perspectives on the preparations made by the British Army for the campaign. Other specialist accounts look at battles in detail, provide perspectives on logistics or follow major units through the campaign. Here, some of the military technical areas that were subject to special study as part of the official British Army History of the Second World War Series including those that examined such areas as supply, transport, works services and maintenance are of great use. The details provided by these studies help to put into context the logistical and manpower restrictions placed on Civil Affairs, the importance of keeping the battlefields and logistical support routes clear and the need to utilise local resources as far as possible. Generally, military histories provide orientation in terms of time, space and priorities.

Sitting as easily with the next section on France and the French as with military aspects of the campaign, there are geological, geographical and meteorological perspectives that help to provide an understanding of the human, industrial and agricultural conditions facing Civil Affairs detachments in 1944. Some, including the Naval Intelligence Division country Handbooks, were written during the Second World War. Consequently, they give a good feel for what was known at the time. In also helping to flesh out the scene beyond the battlefield many memoirs, collections of letters and diaries and reminiscences can help to provide impressions of conditions experienced by civilians in Normandy. These
personal experiences cover various levels of employment from the most senior such as Montgomery and Eisenhower to battalion and platoon commanders to soldiers. They also cover various types of employment from fighting men to those in the rear areas such as doctors and nurses. However, as Sean Longden reveals in his account of crime, drunkenness and poor behaviour by British troops in North West Europe the impact of such a huge army in hitherto relatively tranquil Normandy did not always make relations with the local population easy. Nevertheless, whilst many accounts can be useful in giving a personal perspective and a snapshot peculiar to a time and a place, they can as a result be almost contradictory in providing an overview.

Unsurprisingly, it is useful to look to less military sources to provide a more complete overview of France, the French and their relations with the Allies. Generally, the literature provides context for two relevant areas for Civil Affairs - the impact of war on French society and its impact on French politics. The impact of the battle of Normandy on its people is little described in the English language outside the geographical account of post-war Norman reconstruction by Hugh Clout, a few lines found in studies of the liberation of Caen, Wieviorka’s Normandy, and Aron’s De Gaulle Before Paris. Like Wieviorka, Aron’s work was translated from its native French (Aron, a French historian and member of the Académie Française, worked in the French wartime provisional administrations established in Algiers after his escape from France) and both tend to provide a patriotic overview. Indeed, both challenge whether Civil Affairs was ever necessary in light of indigenous administrative preparations both inside and outside of France. Much more on the detail of impact the campaign had locally can be found in yet to be translated French sources.

The impact of war on French society as a whole is rather better described. This is particularly true of the movement of people around and out of wartime France and the impact of the war on women, children, racial and religious groups. Recently, study of the Exode, the flight of Frenchmen from the war zone in the north to safer areas in the south of France during the 1940 campaign and their eventual return has become a popular area of study, including Fleeing Hitler by Hanna Diamond. Clearly, such study helps to give a sense of perspective both of the experience of mass refugee movement found in different parts of France and of the mechanisms put in place to soften the upheaval by the French authorities. The general social histories of wartime France help to account for the wider changes in French society as women, with their men folk away in Germany, took a more prominent central role (although Normandy was already a strongly matriarchal society). Together with related themes of collaboration, resistance, labour movement, fraternisation with Allied soldiers and black marketeering, dimensions can be given to the difficulty and sensitivities associated with Civil Affairs work.

The political perspectives of the war cover a number of different subject areas with respect to Civil Affairs. On the ground, matters of collaboration and relations between the German and Vichy authorities and the French people helps to inform on the likelihood of negative reaction to the liberation. At a strategic level, the relationships between de Gaulle, Churchill and Roosevelt and
their lieutenants are frequently explored. Some of these perspectives come in the form of the official British Foreign Policy histories of the Second World War by Sir Llewellyn Woodward. In particular, such authors as Aron, Wieviorka, Footitt and Simmonds give dimensions to the desire by de Gaulle to avoid a Military Government style occupation of France by the Allies and one that was to manifest itself both on the eve of D-Day and in the days following.

The third area of literature of use in providing a context for Civil Affairs activities is that of the relationship between civilians and war. Here literature focuses on the suffering caused to civilians, the special cases of certain groups of civilians and the civilian measures taken provide relief outside of the battle zone.

The suffering caused to civilians typically concentrates on atrocities witnessed either by Allied soldiers on liberating concentration camps like Belsen or by the French in martyred villages like Oradour-sur-Glane. In the case of Belsen, although Joanne Reilly's doctoral thesis on Britain and Belsen (later published) refers to the work Military Government units involved in the liberation of the camp, its greater utility is in providing comparative dimensions to the problems found in Normandy. Other studies include the suffering of the Dutch during the winter of 1944 to 1945; suffering that was ultimately alleviated by Allied Civil Affairs food convoys and airdrops crossing into enemy-held territory. At the other end of assistance, Joan Beaumont has written about how the economic blockade of occupied Europe by Britain contributed to the continent's suffering. There are almost no assessments in English of the impact of battles of North West Europe on the civilian population. The exceptions are The Unknown Dead by Peter Schrijvers that details civilian events during the 1944 Ardennes offensive and The Bitter Road To Freedom by William Hitchcock that views civilian events across North West Europe but focuses on those in Germany.

The special studies made of certain groups focus on the plight of groups like displaced persons (who today would more likely be called refugees). Displaced persons who were particularly vulnerable to shifting political conditions as occupation turned to liberation having little refuge from the often violent outcomes of these changing fortunes. In some cases, research into this area has yet to be published such as that by R.M. Sylvia. It goes without saying that the plight of Europe's Jewish population follows a similar, but more established path of literature that focuses on a particular theme – in this case the holocaust.

In terms of the measures used to bring civilian relief outside of the battle zone, literature associated with the Second World War examines the part played by international organisations such as UNRRA and civilian and Christian relief charities such as national Red Cross societies. Although the term relief is used, most of the literature is rather more focused on activities that occur long after the battle has passed and errs towards assessment of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Indeed, it is not unusual for wartime activity to be left, as Ben Shepherd does in his article on relief planning, entirely in the hands of Donnison and his American equivalents. Nevertheless, in providing a context of what came after, data on population movement and, as Kenneth McCreedy argues, the
proven non-viability of these civilian bodies as alternatives makes such literature is extremely useful.48

The fourth area of literature is that of Civil Affairs and Military Government activities outside of the battle of Normandy. This provides a number of different aspects to the work of the organisation as well as the context of its evolution. Dealing with the latter first, there are four British official histories that deal with Civil Affairs and Military Government in the History of the Second World War Series and one that sits outside it. The group of four were under the series editorship of the late Sir James Butler, both a historian at Trinity College, Cambridge and a wartime lecturer at the Civil Affairs Staff Centre, Wimbledon.49

Donnison was responsible for the volumes on North West Europe, Central Organization and Planning, and, understandably for a civil servant from Burma, the volume on the Far East.50 The fourth volume was written by Reginald Harris, a former editor of Nineteenth Century, Fellow of All Souls and Civil Affairs officer in Italy.51 The additional fifth volume on Civil Affairs (actually published first) during the African campaigns was written by Major General Francis J. Rennell Rodd (The 2nd Baron Rennell (of Rodd)) who served as a Civil Affairs officer there and as Chief Civil Affairs Officer in Italy.52

As will be discovered Rennell was often a blunt individual and, like Butler, was in all probability as keen to get his version of events on paper. He was particularly keen to write the volume on Italy and despite asking repeatedly his offer was not accepted. The reason given by Grigg at the time was that for official histories someone less directly associated events was felt to be more suitable in giving an overview.53 Nevertheless, Harris’ intimate involvement in Italy as a Civil Affairs indicates that association was less important than trustworthiness (see Chapter 4). Compared to American official histories where there is the one major volume by Coles and Weinberg and a special study by Earl Ziemke on the occupation of Germany (that covers some aspects of Civil Affairs preparations), the British volumes provide an embarrassment of riches that can only be explained by the Butler’s role and influence.54

There are no Canadian volumes although a series of reports by the historical officer in Europe are publicly available.55

Even if they say little about the extent of utility to specific military operations, these volumes and reports provide much in the way of evolutionary context. They account for what happened before and after Normandy, they point to the necessary changes that had to be made, they provide a contrast between Civil Affairs and Military Government and the civilian Control Commissions that followed, they identify certain differences between American and British policies and interests, and in reading between them it is possible to see how similar issues were handled in different theatres. Such themes are amplified by other official histories and more general sources. Specialist official histories provide detail on medical aspects of Civil Affairs and earlier, Great War Series volumes provide the basis of comparisons with occupation of the Rhineland after the First World War.56

General published sources can focus on a particular Civil Affairs activity such as the work of the ‘monuments men’.57 However, as such work was merely located
with Civil Affairs for reasons of administrative convenience little is said about
the wider work of the organisation in these accounts. As mentioned above,
general sources can also focus on Civil Affairs aspects of a particular campaign,
as Matthew Jones does with respect theatre-level command and control in the
Mediterranean.

Wartime journal articles provide some insights into the thinking and priorities
of the day. These tend to be more numerous in America journals with both
Public Opinion Quarterly and The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science producing wartime special editions on Civil Affairs and
Military Government. Nevertheless, a speech by Rennell at Chatham House
was reproduced in article form in International Affairs and other senior officers
including Major General Gerald Templer had their speeches on Military
Government published at the war’s in the Royal United Services Institute
Journal.

Overall, however there is a bias towards publications on the occupation of
Germany. Many of these relate to events in the American sector. There are a
modest number of works on Military Government events in the British sector,
including B.N. Reckitt’s first-hand account, Diary. There is also a level of
British and American interest in the occupation of Austria. Both the British
and American Military Government policies are popular areas for PhD research.
Sadly, many of these remain unpublished, including Ian Turner’s thesis on the
restoration of the Volkswagen plant at Wolfsburg. By far the largest area of
publication comes in the form of the longer-term policies towards Germany both
during and after the war. Some of these focus on the development of the policies
towards Germany. Included here are views on the punitive policies advocated
by Henry Morgenthau. Other sources examine the putting of this policy into
practice, sometimes with practitioners such as Patricia Meehan giving their
views. Finally, there is some mileage in contrasting Allied and German styles
of civil administration policy. General sources on the experience of France and
the French during the war provide most of this, although there is a limited
amount of research available on events in Belgium and The Netherlands.

Clearly, in each group of historical literature, various types of writing can be
identified. These range from official histories and general histories, through
academic theses, monographs, edited volumes and articles, to memoirs,
collections of firsthand accounts and even works of fiction (see next section).
Some of these sources can be related to a specific historical category such as
diplomatic, geographical, medical, art, gender or social history.

Newspapers provide a good source of first hand impressions of Civil Affairs
activities and personnel. Certain professional journals, such as the medical
journal The Lancet, provide insights into specific aspects of Civil Affairs work; in
this case, aspects of disease control. Other types of sources can be included
photography, newsreels, personal accounts websites, interviews and sound
archives, but these are frequently not directly related to the work of Civil
Affairs. Some like Antony Penrose and David Scherman’s Lee Miller’s War about
the frontline photography work of Lee Miller and David Scherman fit into
different historical categories such as art or oral history.
It is important to point out that individual titles within the categories identified can be of varying utility. Harris’ British official history of the military administration of civilians during the Italian campaign provides a useful context for the development of Civil Affairs as an organisation, but rightly makes no comment about France. James Tent’s book (and the seeming myriad like it) on the re-education and de-nazification of post-war Germany, whilst useful on Military Government, makes no connection with Normandy and only an implied one with Civil Affairs. Peter Liddle’s compilation and commentary of wartime letters and diaries together with reminiscences provides examples of individual experience of the battles in Normandy, but not that of a community or a region. Yet, despite possible shortcomings of each group, such works can be of use in explaining if not the close proximity of Civil Affairs events then the broad trends about them.

The relationship can, of course, work the other way with Civil Affairs development and activities providing examples for comparison in other areas of historical research. Footitt and Simmonds have already exploited a tangent of Civil Affairs subject matter with respect to relations between the Allies and the Gaullists. However, as this work seeks to prove, there is rather greater capacity for developing and improving our understanding of the events of the battle of Normandy. By way of example, Allied measures taken to control refugee movement around the ‘Falaise Pocket’ in August 1944 undoubtedly helped with the prosecution of this action (see Chapter 7). In essence, examination of Civil Affairs can be seen as comparable to the way in which geographical and geological research by Hugh Clout, Edward Rose and Claude Pareyn have helped to provide new understandings of the campaign and its aftermath.

Possible investigation of Civil Affairs is, of course, not restricted just to Normandy. Although beyond the scope of this research, events in Belgium following its liberation have yet to be fully examined from a Civil Affairs perspective, even if some authors, like Geoffrey Warner, Robert Allen and Martin Conway have mentioned aspects in relation to the turmoil faced by that country in November 1944. These may be addressed by a forthcoming book by Peter Schrijvers on the Allies and Belgian Society. There are deficits in studies of the campaigns in The Netherlands, Southern France and Asia or the liberations of Denmark and Norway. As mentioned before there much more analysis of the occupations of Germany (both after the First and Second World Wars) and Austria. Yet, to re-iterate, even here (with the part exception of the official histories) the general emphasis is not on the utility to or impact on military operations, but rather on political and generally post-war aspects.

Following the Second World War there is nothing of Civil Affairs in the 1956 Suez Crisis, the last gasp of the organisation before its demise. Study of Civil Affairs and its close cousins in Vietnam, the 1991 Gulf War, the 1990s Balkans conflicts, the 2003 Gulf War and its aftermath and Afghanistan has been variable. Some like Michael Peterson’s Combined Action Platoons or Peter Caddick-Adams’ article on Civil Affairs in Bosnia do point towards the utility of the organisation (even at the operational level), but tend to focus on a moment in history. Others like John de Pauw and George Luz’s edited volume on The
Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action provide more overview, but only at the strategic level. Some accounts, particularly those of post-2003 Iraq are hybrids of personal accounts of Civil Affairs activities mixed with (often unrelated) political developments and nation/state building.

Elsewhere, many post-2003 reconstruction practitioners like Paul Bremer and Sir Hilary Synnott together with general observers have examined nation building in Iraq in more detail. Again, these focus on post-war events and say little about military civil administrative activities. Nevertheless, there are many studies looking at the utility of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in supporting operations in Afghanistan. These are, of course, matters of ongoing research as the conflict continues. Accounts of civil administration in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and so forth all touch on the importance of civil administrative measures as part of a counter-insurgency strategy. Much has been written on this subject. However, it is important when looking at Civil Affairs type activities to draw a difference between what is provided by indigenous authorities (even if these are colonial) and that provided or facilitated by foreign forces. This is not always easy to accomplish and in part explains why there is a fashion to focus upon a particular aspect of civil support. One such is how and whether armed forces should contribute to humanitarian support and the nature of their relationships with other humanitarian organisations.

In looking at nation building, there is deemed considerable mileage in making comparisons between the occupations of Germany (and occasionally Japan) with that of Iraq. Whilst an obvious comparison to make, it is nevertheless disappointing that more apposite examples are not employed. The many problems experienced by Military Government in wartime Italy following the fall of Mussolini is one obvious example (see Chapter 3 for an indication of the problems encountered in Italy). More generally, the impact of battle on civilian populations and military measures taken to mitigate such effects whether during the Second World War or more recently have received continued attention from historical and legal points of view, but tends towards abstract philosophical and legal styles of literature rather than detail the part played by Civil Affairs.

Overall, therefore there are many gaps with respect to Civil Affairs literature. Whilst Military Government is slightly better served, there is only the one substantial source by Donnison on Civil Affairs activities during the battle of Normandy and even recent campaigns tend to concentrate on the politics of events rather than military requirements.

Explaning the Paucity

A number of explanations can be advanced as to why relatively little has been written on Civil Affairs in general and on Civil Affairs during Normandy in particular. Firstly, that more works do not exist is perhaps not a surprise given the relatively few numbers of personnel who worked within Civil Affairs. At its peak, with the Military Government in Germany and Austria and various
commitments in Asia there were 15,000 officers and men working for the whole organisation. However, less than a thousand of these ever operated as British Civil Affairs in France, helping to identify why there are comparatively more works on occupation than the liberation of civilians. Typical is Basil Reckitt’s *Diary of Military Government in Germany* that hardly mentions anything prior to his deployment to Germany. Furthermore, despite directly recruiting some of its staff, Civil Affairs did not have its own cap badge and thus if any history is to be written it is that of the participant’s parent unit where a sense of regimental loyalty might be said to exist. Hero of Caen, Colonel Charles M. Usher (see Chapter 7) whilst mentioned on several occasions in the history of his regiment, the Gordon Highlanders, it is always in the context of his fighting not his Civil Affairs career.

The image that Civil Affairs operated safely behind the frontline although generally true is broken by some remarkable acts of personal bravery as in the case American Civil Affairs officer Colin MacDiarmid in ensuring the safety of civilians under gunfire on 15 August 1944 (see Chapter 7). Equally, it was not unusual for Civil Affairs units, like No. 218 Detachment, to be within enemy artillery range. Nevertheless, compared with infantry units the intensity and duration of violence was short for the majority of Civil Affairs personnel. In a similar fashion to the description of those who fought on in Italy as the ‘D-Day Dodgers’ there can be said to be a hierarchy of value in terms of whose war was more worthy. As explained so well by veteran Sydney Jary, the experience of rear area troops rarely had much value to those in the frontline.

At another level, publishers always identify what is likely to be a commercial success and thus have tended to focus on accounts of fighting, individuals and strategy. Civil Affairs only becomes popular in the context of the occupation of Germany and its potentially punitive treatment of Germans. Yet, even here as exemplified by Patricia Meehan and Lord Annan the emphasis is less on the wartime period and rather more on what followed. Nevertheless, with comparisons being made between events in Iraq and those in Germany and with the ever popular interest in every aspect of the Nazi regime (including the Nazi stay-behind ‘Werewolf’ movement that presented Military Government with a few problems) it is inevitable that research digs back into events during hostilities. The fascination with the Werewolf has even made it into film with the movie *Europa*. The work of Military Government has also made it onto the screen and into fiction. The movie *The Third Man* (covering the attempts of the Military Government in Vienna to control underground drug running activity) and Colin MacInnes’ (who served in Germany following the war) book *To The Victor The Spoils* being but two examples. Nevertheless, the Allied treatment of liberated civilians during the liberation is clearly less print or film worthy, despite an on-going fascination with aspects of wartime France such as collaboration, resistance and de Gaulle relations with the Allies.

It could be said that the higher than average age of those who worked for Civil Affairs might also account for so few memoirs as many might have died before the sense of wanting to forget about the war was replaced by the trend to remember it. In the Italian campaign, many Civil Affairs officers were known
collectively as Ancient Military Gentlemen On Tour, a nickname that reflected the title of their organisation AMGOT – Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory. However, this theory does not hold water as the only British memoir to be written about Civil Affairs during the battle of Normandy written by A.G. Puttock was published in 1947. Furthermore, to extend the idea by suggesting the reason for the dearth of material is because this was the generation that did not want to write is outweighed by the numbers of all ages, in other parts of the British Army, Foreign Office and political life, who did publish their memoirs within years of the war. Some of these even relate to the period of Military Government such as the Memos of senior Foreign Office representative Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick.

The lack of any sense of a culminating event is a problem for Civil Affairs. Whilst, historians may debate whether the partial destruction of German forces in the Falaise Pocket during August 1944 was a proper rout or not, either way there were demonstrable and positive outcomes in the form of enemy vehicles destroyed and personnel killed. Civil Affairs has greater problems in demonstrating its outcomes. In most cases meetings were had, decisions agreed, resources supplied and action taken with and by local civilians or other military units such as engineers, Town Majors and Military Police. There was little to show for the effort, which in any case could easily be claimed by someone else.

Indeed, the transport that might move civilians to safety was rarely overtly Civil Affairs. The assembly of individuals who might process refugees in forward areas would be a confusing mix of fighting troops, military police, field security and Civil Affairs. The lack of separate cap badge did not help (there was a shoulder badge but from photographic evidence this was only worn occasionally and mostly in the America sector). Any stay in a Civil Affairs refugee camp was likely to be very short, with most moving on within twenty-four hours and again it would tend to involve interaction with those wearing RAMC or French nursing staff badges. There were Civil Affairs offices, but these were not in every village and day-to-day activities were passed over to the French authorities within a matter of weeks. Most Civil Affairs activities were therefore rather obscure, if not invisible, and it is to be expected that they did not feature more prominently in post-war accounts.

With such problems in demonstrating success, it is hardly a surprise that in his account, A.G. Puttock spends considerable amounts of time describing the quality of his accommodation, the amount of champagne or the feasts of ham and eggs consumed! Unlike a successful campaign that moves through an area and ends in the defeat of enemy forces, Civil Affairs patches people up, but does not restore them to full function before concluding its operations. This long-term process of reconstruction is handled by governments and international agencies such as UNRRA. The latter, perhaps because its outcomes were more apparent, but certainly, because it was not overshadowed by the kudos of more prolific and exciting war fighting host has always had a faithful following in publishing terms. Similarly keen to record their exploits in war, many of the aid organisations, like the national Red Cross societies, have also put great store in publishing.
Although senior Civil Affairs and Military Government officers do write (mostly articles), these are, with the exception of Rennell, rarely more than a very brief overview. They are not a detailed demonstration of success. Indeed, they often build on the presumption that the reader is aware of the enormity of civilian problems and therefore that the justification and success of the organisation are implicit.\(^{103}\) Indeed, seldom is there substantial evidence of any measurement of success. Instead, there are the impressionistic comments of a job well done by senior officials such as the senior political adviser in occupied Germany, Lord Strang.\(^{104}\)

In such circumstances, one of the few times Civil Affairs becomes interesting is when there is personal conflict with senior command, as with John Springhall’s article regarding Major General Sir Herbert Hone’s civil administration policy differences with Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten in Singapore following the Second World War.\(^{105}\) The intoxicating mix of putting Nazis and art together has also been popular and helped to highlight the role of the monuments men of which Robert Edsel’s is the most dramatic.\(^{106}\) Interest has also focused on the ever-popular examination of the holocaust in examining the liberation of Concentration Camps including Ben Shephard’s work on the liberation of Belsen after Daybreak.\(^{107}\) Based on Shephard’s book, the Channel 4 docudrama The Relief of Belsen only made a rather brief and negative reference to Military Government, focusing instead on the work of Army doctors in the camp.\(^{108}\)

Reflecting an American interest in Italy, there has been the occasional article on Civil Affairs activities.\(^{109}\) Interest in the Mafia is almost as print worthy as the Nazis and arguments have been advanced that AMGOT was responsible for the re-establishment of organised crime.\(^{110}\) Elsewhere, John Hersey’s Pulitzer Prize winning novel A Bell for Adano depicts an American Civil Affairs officer’s attempts, in the face of senior army opposition, to improve local morale through the restoration of a town bell.\(^{111}\) Although ultimately successful in gaining the bell for the Sicilian town, the officer loses his appointment because of his preference to support civilian rather than military needs. Like MacInnes in post-war Germany, Hersey had experience of Civil Affairs in Sicily and although the story is fiction, the town of Adano is based on Licata\(^ {112}\) and the tension between military and civilian needs is not inconsistent with problems experienced in the campaign. The book was later made into a movie by the same title, directed by Henry King and starring Gene Tierney and John Hodiak.\(^ {113}\) Most recently, the book has been the subject of an article by Andrew Buchanan, which examines the paternal nature of America’s policies towards Italy.\(^ {114}\) Thus, whilst aspects of Civil Affairs have resonance with certain publications and publishers, outside military occupation these are generally rather sporadic.

The reference, made in docudrama The Relief of Belsen to the useless nature of the Military Government machine reflects wider misgivings over the quality of it and Civil Affairs. Some negative comment is hardly a surprise. Most French sources from de Gaulle (Unity) and Aron (De Gaulle Before Paris) to the most recent work by Wieviorka (Normandy) tend to cast the organisation as surplus to requirement, misguided or as much a danger to French sovereignty as the German occupation.\(^ {115}\) Some firsthand accounts like those of Alan Whicker’s
memoirs of his time in Italy or Patricia Meehan’s account of the British
occupation of Germany question the competence of Civil Affairs and Military
Government. Thus, mindful of such potential criticism, when blended with
the difficulties of establishing a clear-cut success record, it is hardly a surprise
that key individuals like Secretary of State for War, Grigg, made no mention of
the organisation in his memoirs. Furthermore, in his correspondence with
official historian Vernon Donnison, Grigg was often keen to ensure that the part
of individuals was recorded, but did not wish to court controversy.

The decision to mention Civil Affairs in the memoirs of senior officers,
politicians and officials varies. Some included Civil Affairs, some just aspects,
some nothing at all. Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery as commander
of 21st Army Group only briefly outlines the role of Civil Affairs in his account of
the North West Europe campaign, but goes in to some detail regarding post-
Guingand, Montgomery’s chief of staff in North West Europe, only briefly
mentions Civil Affairs in the context of the enormous relief effort mounted in
The Netherlands and the role of Military Government following the war’s end.
Lieutenant General Sir Brian Horrocks, one of the Corps commanders in
Normandy made no mention in his book A Full Life. At much lower levels,
such as that of Martin Lindsay, Commanding Officer of a Gordon Highlanders’
battalion, mention of Civil Affairs is rather more to do with meeting brother
officers who happen to be serving with the organisation and who might be able
to supply locally produced cider to the troops.

Lieutenant General Sir Gordon Macready as one of the senior British staff
officers working for the combined (Anglo-American) staffs in Washington wrote
a small section on the work of the CCAC (Combined Civil Affairs Committee)
there, but focused rather more on the general nature of the staffs. Nevertheless,
later in the book he wrote about his time with the Control Commission that
followed Military Government in Germany. Lieutenant General Sir Frederick
Morgan, one of the first planners for OVERLORD, who introduced a Civil Affairs
staff into the planning process, had rather more to say regarding his
innovation. General Dwight D. Eisenhower in his wartime account briefly
looks at the creation of Civil Affairs in America, almost avoids the problems
encountered with the French over administration and hardly mentions the
preparations for Military Government.

Even the politicians make little play of Civil Affairs. Churchill in the fifth volume
of his account of the Second World War mentions the controversy with de
Gaulle, but makes no mention of Civil Affairs. Henry Stimson, the American
Secretary for War, describes the political battles of Military Government within
Washington, but like Churchill does not comment on the organisation
operationally. Journalists can be better at commentating on Civil Affairs in
contemporary reports and a few, like Leonard Mosley of The Daily Express,
provide good descriptions that can be complimentary as well as critical of
Military Government units in their post-war accounts. However, Mosley’s
account, whilst enlightening, is in a book solely about events in Germany. Even,
in Italy, where there was much to criticise AMGOT about – indeed one could be
ruthless if so desired - Civil Affairs activities get scant mention in personal accounts. Thus, for any level of detailed account of wartime activity, it is necessary to fall back on the extremely useful official histories. Thankfully, the determination of Rennell and Butler to create their personalised historical memories of the organisation provides a wider utility.

CONCLUSION

In many of the following chapters, it is demonstrated that relations between many senior officers, like Montgomery, and their Civil Affairs staff officers could be uneasy, if not hostile. How this might show itself in terms of post-war publications could go one of two ways, either a battle to capture the high ground of historical memory or complete avoidance of the issue. Many debates regarding strategy and tactics during the North West Europe campaign have been aired in public. In the case of Civil Affairs, Rennell who had all the makings of someone who would happily rise to a fight was prevented from making waves over the Civil Affairs history of the Italian campaign. Instead, authorship was put by Butler into the rather more careful hands of Donnison and Harris. With no personal reputations to protect, there seems yet another reason not to publish. Yet, given that a smattering of university professors, senior professionals and other outgoing types who might enjoy recording their moment in history served in Civil Affairs, it is still perplexing that more was not written directly about the organisation and its politics.

Overall, with respect to Civil Affairs in supporting military operations there is still a great deal to be said, whether this relates in Normandy or elsewhere. There are potential comparisons to be made with recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan that go beyond the usual ones with Germany. There is much to argue in overturning the orthodoxy that Civil Affairs was unnecessary in France and beyond reproach in Italy. At an operational level, there are fresh perspectives to be made on the overall conduct of battles and campaigns. In sum, by the tendency to concentrate on a few well-trodden aspects of Civil Affairs and Military Government the way has been left clear for new research to begin the process assessing the good, the bad and the ugly aspects of this intriguing organisation.

2 Ellis, Major L. F. et al., Victory in the West; Volume 1, Battle of Normandy, London, HMSO, 1962, Appendix VIII.


6 Jones, Matthew, Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44 (St. Antony's Series), Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1996.


9 The National Archives of the United Kingdom catalogue is available online from the TNA website at http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/default.asp [Accessed 30 January 2008].


11 TNA, WO 171/3572, War Diary, No. 208 Civil Affairs Detachment.

12 Donnison, David V., Last of the Guardians; A Story of Burma, Britain and a Family, Newtown, Superscript, 2005.


Trinity College Library Archives: Trinity College, University of Cambridge, Papers of J.R.M. Butler, JMB J series.


53 Special Collections, Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Papers of Rodd, Francis James Rennell, 2nd Baron Rennell [Uncatalogued].


bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA450610&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf [Accessed 18 December 2007]).


87 TNA, WO 373/149, Award commendation (Military Cross) for Second Lieutenant Colin H. MacDiarmid US Army.

88 TNA, WO 171/3582, War Diary, No. 218 Civil Affairs Detachment, entries for June 1944.


*The Relief of Belsen*, 120 minutes, drama made for Channel 4 (broadcast in UK 2007) by Hardy & Sons, Twickenham Film Studios.


*A Bell for Adano*, directed by King, Henry, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, 103 minutes, released 21 June 1945.


118 TNA, CAB 101/87, various letters from Grigg to Donnison for Official History.


CHAPTER 1

WAR, CIVILIANS, LAW AND POLITICS

CIVILIANS AND WAR

War inevitably affects civilians and in turn, it is affected by them. Civilians are involved directly as casualties and victims of battle, as owners of property destroyed by military action or through policies requiring conscription and indirectly as the result of commodity shortages, property requisitioning, new industrial priorities or by restrictions on freedom of movement. Yet, war is influenced by the moral, political and legal obligations designed to limit its effect on a civilian population and the practical desire to keep the battlefield as clear and therefore as simple as possible. As weaponry has increased in range, lethality and mobility then so have the size of battlefields and with it, the likelihood of encountering civilians. Demands on local material and human resources have also expanded, with an ever-larger thirst for items such as food, fuel, transport, aggregates and labour required to support modern burgeoning armies. In rear areas ensuring that logistical routes are kept free from disorganised bands of refugees, disease, crime and disorder has become as important as doing so on the frontline.

However, as found in France in 1940, Military Police and Field Security teams can only cover certain aspects of civilian activity. With so many civilian elements to accommodate, it was perhaps inevitable that an organisation like Civil Affairs would be created. Either in a most basic form simply to oversee civilian activity or in a more developed form designed to judge when key indicators of stability are close to breaking and step in accordingly. However, because the guidance provided by international law was opaque and inevitably, because political and bureaucratic pressures would distort matters, the process and direction of creating a Civil Affairs organisation that in 1944 would embark on ships destined for Normandy was far from linear.

LEGAL OBLIGATIONS

Although the origins are very much older, the codification of war has been a consistent influence on warfare since the middle of the Nineteenth Century, through such laws and codes as the Lieber Code, Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions. Much of the body of law that emerged prior to the Second World War concentrated on the obligations of fighting forces to one another by emphasising such principles as limitation (removing methods and means of warfare that are unnecessarily injurious) as seen in the 1899 Declaration on the Use of Bullets Which Expand or Flatten Easily in the Human Body. The
obligations to civilian populations whilst clear in terms of avoiding the use of violence against them, said rather less about ensuring how basic humanitarian or administrative needs should be met.\textsuperscript{3} There were obligations in the protection of certain cultural objects and in the occupation of an enemy state. Yet, prior to the establishment of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention (\textit{Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War}) very little was said regarding military responsibilities towards civilians in liberated (as opposed to occupied) states.

In March 1942, some of the first questions discussed by the War and Foreign Offices regarding civil administration in a North West Europe campaign were associated with the nature of legal obligations in liberated Allied states. In the discussions that followed, the needs to provide humanitarian relief, to ensure public order and field security and to provide commanders with a legitimising legal framework were raised. The main source of guidance came from Chapter Fourteen the \textit{Manual of Military Law} that gave advice on the rights and duties of commanders in enemy, but not allied states. Elsewhere, existing legal arrangements with The Netherlands gave a certain amount of latitude, but did not presume a military responsibility for all aspects of civil administration. Thus, given such a vacuum it was no surprise in June 1942 questions were still being asked by the MO11 branch of the Directorate of Military Operations at the War Office (responsible for administration of enemy territory and tasked with the earliest Civil Affairs work) regarding the nature of legal arrangements and responsibility for relief in Allied areas.\textsuperscript{4}

\textbf{\textit{Manual of Military Law}}

The War Office's 1929 edition (revised in 1936 and reprinted in 1939) of the \textit{Manual of Military Law} provided certain advice on the civil administration duties of a military commander in occupied territory.\textsuperscript{5} America had a similar manual in the form of Field Manual, FM 27-10, \textit{Rules of Land Warfare} produced in the late 1930s, with a section on obligations of Military Government.\textsuperscript{6} In more practical terms, British Army \textit{Field Service Regulations} distilled the key elements of the \textit{Manual} in pointing out a commanders' responsibility for Military Government in occupied areas.\textsuperscript{7} Later, the \textit{Military Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field} made explicit reference to the key importance of both Hague and the \textit{Manual of Military Law}.\textsuperscript{8}

Chapter Fourteen of the British \textit{Manual} focuses on the “Laws and Usages of War on Land” of the 1907 Hague Conventions, which laid out the obligations of a military commander during occupation of an enemy state.\textsuperscript{9} In essence, Hague allowed for a form of absolute government, albeit subject to certain safeguards. At no time was sovereignty removed, rather it was suspended and latent.\textsuperscript{10} Hague's Article 42 stated that occupation starts at the point when an army is able to exercise effective and exclusive control of all or part of an enemy state.\textsuperscript{11} The closest the \textit{Manual} comes to advising on the policy to adopt in friendly or neutral states is that the rules laid out in the manual “should be observed as far as possible in territories through which troops are passing and even on the
battlefield.” Nevertheless, that the principles of Hague applied in Allied states was not doubted as it was judged on both sides of the Atlantic that wherever it fought an army must be in a position to safeguard itself against all threats, including civilian ones. Thus, military necessity was likely to require the establishment of military government, in which case Hague rules applied. Typically, therefore the term Military Government became shorthand for any arrangements dealing with civil affairs in friendly or enemy states, a matter that would change in response to Allied sensitivities.

In enemy states, the Manual pointed to various requirements that must be fulfilled including: enemy national forces should not be in possession of weapons, inhabitants should have been disarmed and that measures should have been taken to protect life and property and to secure the prevalence of order. Indeed a central feature of Hague’s Article 43 was the need to “take all measures in a [belligerent’s] power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, whilst respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”

In reflecting the sovereignty of an enemy state as being latent, it was “no longer considered permissible for [the occupier] to work his will unhindered, altering the existing form of government, upsetting the constitution and the domestic laws, and ignoring the rights of inhabitants.” There was the capacity for commanders to alter or suspend laws if required by the exigencies of war and political laws “are as a matter of course suspended during an occupation.” Indeed, it was even possible to introduce new laws “but important changes can seldom be necessary and should be avoided as far as possible.” This facility therefore allowed for some legal movement, particularly when it came to suspending or abrogating laws by proclamation, but the extent to which such change could be made in advance of a peace treaty was subject to debate. Nevertheless, the facility was used in the Italian campaign to remove fascist laws.

Most of the advice in the Manual focused on the constitutional and legal mechanics of occupation. These tended to be interested in the rights over property, tax-raising powers, the ability to change laws, employment and rights of inhabitants and so forth. There were no specific references to the need to feed inhabitants or the provision of others forms of relief. However, there was sensitivity over ensuring that civilian food supply was not denuded by the demands of occupation forces (see next paragraph). There were obligations to ensure that “hospitals, asylums and similar institutions must be kept open” and that sanitation measures must be continued and increased as necessary. Moreover, in a paragraph on the effect of the possible flight of local officials it was recognised that this may pose “the occupant great difficulties,” although the problems were likely to be worse for the inhabitants, especially following the withdrawal of judges, magistrates, sanitary and police authorities.

With regards to the exploitation of an occupied enemy area for the purposes of aiding the war effort the Manual did allow for certain activities, but it was pointed out that the “unlimited right to seize and take property of every kind no longer exists.” This effectively outlawed the taking of booty. Nevertheless,
other rights remained acceptable including the use of local labour. Workers could not be compelled to take part in operations against their own country although they could be forced to work for legitimate purposes.\textsuperscript{24} Other resources included the raising of ‘contributions’ (new taxes were forbidden) to pay for the administration of the occupation.\textsuperscript{25} Property for purposes of billeting troops could be used and for which compensation would be paid (except in cases of damage caused by war).\textsuperscript{26} Food, fuel, alcohol, tobacco, cloth, leather and so forth could be procured, but it was specified that items taken could only be for the use of the army and that they must be in “proportion to the resources of the country.” This was defined as leaving enough food for “at least three days’ supply of food for a household, and rather more than that at outlying farms and villages.”\textsuperscript{27} This presumed, of course, that there was enough food in place in the first instance.

The \textit{Manual} reflected interwar legal thought, but as the Second World War progressed, it was acknowledged that existing legal arrangements, whether Hague or the \textit{Manual}, had little to do with the “real problems” faced by even an occupying power.\textsuperscript{28} Indeed, many legal advisors were faced with a dilemma in Italy. Although Allied policy removing fascist laws appeared acceptable it and was morally and politically justified, nevertheless, it seemed to go beyond what was outlined in Hague’s Article 43. Hague was judged by some practitioners and legal advisers to be out of date on civilian matters.\textsuperscript{29} In wartime with no international agreement, there was little room for international legal reform; this would have to wait until the publication of the 1949 Geneva and 1954 Hague Conventions. In some cases, bilateral legal arrangements (so-called Civil Affairs Agreements), were developed in conjunction with exiled Allied governments. Although, in the case of France with an exiled community, but not a recognised exiled government, the process was more tortuous (see section below). The Agreements in effect bolted additional practical and diplomatic benefits on to the tenets of Hague that continued to shape military obligations regardless of any other agreement.

Practically, the Agreements committed the exiled governments to providing rather more in the way of help to a campaign than was allowed under Hague. Diplomatically, they reassured these governments that the nature of a campaign commander’s “supreme responsibility and authority” over their territory was \textit{de facto}, temporary and geographic and end when it was no longer required for military purposes.\textsuperscript{30} There was no need to wait for a peace treaty or the surrender of an enemy. Indeed, it was possible for certain regions of an Allied state to be returned much earlier. As a symbol of the uninterrupted nature of control over their own administration, the Agreements encouraged a campaign commander to work with representatives appointed by the exile government. They in turn would facilitate local assistance to the campaign. However, little was said about legal obligations towards relief or basic humanity. Instead, direction was given by policies initiated at the military and political level. Thus, if basic by modern standards, by the time of Civil Affairs operations in North West Europe a sense of humanitarian obligation was established. It committed the Allies to fulfilling “common humanitarian principles.”\textsuperscript{31}
POLITICAL INTERESTS

It should not be forgotten that the campaigns in Italy and North West Europe were Allied affairs and, consequently, shaped not just by British, but also by American priorities. To politicians like President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill the practical need and diplomatic benefits of an organisation like Civil Affairs were clear. However, what tended to distort the creation of the organisation were a series of competing ideological, personal, political and bureaucratic pressures. Thus, an organisation that should be rather simple in terms of ensuring that basic human and military needs were met soon became tangled up with the need to delve into the structures of a state to expunge fascism. Whilst this was acceptable in enemy states like Italy (but later complicated by its withdrawal from the war), the concern facing many Allies, particularly the exiled French leader de Gaulle, was whether their sovereignty would be similarly compromised. These concerns would inevitably create problems when planning for the North West Europe campaign and might even cause problems during it.

EXPUNGING FASCISM

In a war against tyranny, the removal of its national-socialist causes was an unavoidable ingredient in any Allied model of victory. Indeed, preparations for landings in Sicily in 1943 involved measures, most notably Proclamation No. 7 Dissolution of Fascist Organisations and Repeal of Laws, designed to remove all fascists from office. Such policies reflected the very strong commitment by Roosevelt to removing fascism in its various forms around the World. Yet, Roosevelt was not anti-Italian. His aim was that Allied policy in Italy should take a benevolent approach towards the Italians, as long as they complied with military objectives and in removing fascist and pro-German threats.

A paper put to the British War Cabinet on 21 May 1943 by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Anthony Eden, indicated that differences were emerging between the American policy, which wished to remove all senior officials whether fascist or not (presumably on the grounds of complicity with fascism) and British policy that wished to use local “talents” if they were not fascist. Churchill agreed that prominent and malignant fascists should be removed, but he could not concur with Roosevelt’s wish to purge Italy of fascists down to the lower level including prefects and mayors. To Churchill it was important for Italy to run itself as much as possible. The manpower requirement to undertake such a task was prohibitive. Churchill was also concerned that it would be a “mistake to flood out all these places with many hundreds of British and American Gauleiters, however well-trained or well-meaning they maybe.”

In practice, whilst some officials were removed many others fled ahead of the Allies fearing a recrimination that itself was encouraged by Allied propaganda. Either way, finding suitable alternatives often proved difficult and burdened Civil Affairs with additional and unnecessary work. In some cases, members of the Mafia, church leaders and radical trade unionists were often appointed in
their place presenting new problems (see Chapter 3). The removal of fascist officials in Italy continued to be a politically contentious issue, with significant time given to the matter in the British Parliament, where questions were asked in both Houses throughout August and September 1943. The focus of several accusations made against the government was that AMGOT was in the habit of keeping fascist officials in place. The motives of those making the accusations varied between those who believed the government was attempting to prevent the emergence of socialism and those who believed the “old school tie” nature of those working for AMGOT were instinctively empathetic towards such officials. Others believed most of those working for AMGOT incompetent. The replies given by Churchill, Eden and Grigg rejected the accusations and pointed to the problems of keeping administration functioning in the war torn state.\(^41\)

The determination to expunge fascism and with it the threat another war was to cause problems in the design of a Military Government policy for Germany. American, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, in comments at a United States Treasury press conference in August 1944 was horrified by what he felt was the soft Allied Military Government policy towards the occupation of Germany.\(^42\) SHAEF regarded the policy as pragmatic. Nevertheless, the ensuing debate resulted in the more punitive Operation ECLIPSE plan; a well-publicised change that gave Germany an easy propaganda victory.\(^43\) In practice, however a small degree of flexibility was built into the new plan and this allowed for a less dramatic execution once the realities of war-ravaged Germany became evident.\(^44\) Even so, for Military Government staff it resulted in similar problems to those found in Italy. The practical need to use indigenous officials was hampered by the circumstances where virtually all had been members of the Nazi party. There were too few clearly trustworthy officials and it was too time consuming to differentiate (using the Fragenbogen questionnaire system) between those who had been genuinely committed to fascism and those who were only conveniently so.\(^45\) Military Government and later Control Commission staffs were necessarily large as a result, but not necessarily effective.\(^46\)

Civil Affairs and Military Government therefore were put in a difficult position. In a war being fought to bring about regime change that would rid the world of the future threat of conflict, several elements worked at cross purposes with one another. Everyone agreed that it was important not repeat the mistakes of the First World War, but this created a sense of urgency that from the time the first liberating boot was on the ground the policy for regime change must be in operation. This presumed that there would be sufficient numbers of viable alternative officials and that those in Military Government facilitating this change were numerous and competent enough. It also presumed that there was general agreement on what would follow, yet the forces of conservatism vied with those of socialism for both the liberators and the liberated.\(^47\) And whilst it was acknowledged that the world needed a greater degree of interdependence to make war less likely, this should not come at the cost of sovereignty. Thus, as the perceived vanguards of a new world order it is easy to see how leaders like de Gaulle or British parliamentarians regarded Civil Affairs and Military Government with the suspicion that they were but a crude attempt to ensure
that new regimes emerged that would play stooge to the conservative national interests of America and Britain. Caught between the rocks of ideological and sovereign interests and the hard place of practical requirements required much sensitive handling by Civil Affairs policy makers.

**Humanitarianism Rising**

The political commitment to the provision of relief gave direction to the development of Civil Affairs. It was driven by a mixture of diplomacy, propaganda, precedent and on both sides of the Atlantic, arguably, some genuine humanitarianism. These both complemented and complicated the practical concerns of many commanders in avoiding disease and disorder. Roosevelt’s commitment to providing relief to the population of Vichy French, made almost a year prior to America’s entry into the war, reflected how the matter of relief was never straightforward.

Diplomatically, Roosevelt’s view was that in the circumstances of Vichy France (but not enemy occupied areas) the provision of relief “under definite conditions and adequate safeguards would not benefit Germany but would help to win over the French people.” He thought it a suitable complement to the British bombing campaign that “must have brought to the French people that they are still in the war... a way of thwarting the collaborationists. It seems to me that it would be useful to supplement this by another method.”

Politically, humanitarianism was a means by which Roosevelt could assist the war against tyranny without the domestic political suicide of committing forces. Indeed, it might even help to assuage those within the United States who wanted to do more about alleviating the suffering of those civilians caught up in the war. In terms of precedent, Roosevelt was in many ways mirroring the humanitarian legacy left by Herbert Hoover (later himself a President) when he headed the Committee for Relief of Belgium during the First World War and later the American Relief Administration. To support his ideas in the field Roosevelt later proposed the creation of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) in a speech to Congress on 9 June 1942.

Such gestures as UNRRA support the idea that Roosevelt was a true humanitarian. In his correspondence with Churchill, Roosevelt raises frequent concern at the starvation of children in occupied Europe. Indeed, Herbert Hoover with the co-operation of the Belgian exile government and no doubt with the support of Roosevelt began to ship relief to feed 2,000,000 Belgian children, before it was stopped by British diplomatic pressure. Even after the entry of America into the war, Roosevelt was tempted in December 1942 to relieve the plight of starving Norwegian children by sending deliveries of aid via the American Red Cross and Swedish Red Cross. This followed a rather more purposeful and public commitment to mass relief by Roosevelt in a statement from the White House on 13 November 1942:

No-one will go hungry or be without other means of livelihood in any territory occupied by the United Nations, if it is humanly within our power to make the necessary supplies available to them.
A commitment that was put into motion by Roosevelt at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 when it was stated that there was a need to start “stockpiling” in order to prevent conditions upon liberation being worse than under German occupation.\textsuperscript{57}

Such humanitarian gestures, not matter how well intentioned, were not always easy to implement and cut across existing arrangements. The need for UNRRA to be “delineated” from the existing military Civil Affairs supply machinery was identified by the British at the end of 1942.\textsuperscript{58} A process not helped by its draft constitution that was considered in March 1943 to be a “vague and woolly document.”\textsuperscript{59} Nevertheless, despite periods of confusion and civil-military acrimony (see Chapter 2), UNRRA came into being on 9 November 1943.\textsuperscript{60}

Roosevelt’s policies were not easily accepted by Churchill who was convinced that the economic blockade of the enemy powers should be fully enforced.\textsuperscript{61} He was confident in his belief that a similar one had helped to bring German to its knees in the First World War.\textsuperscript{62} Initially, Churchill’s view in 1940 was that was enough food in Europe: “We know that in Norway when the German troops went in, there were food supplies to last for a year.” If a “famine” developed, it would be because of “German exactions or German failure to distribute the supplies which they command.”\textsuperscript{63} However, as reports of steadily worsening civilian conditions in Europe emerged in 1942 and 1943 it became clear that some form of action was required.\textsuperscript{64} For Churchill, lifting the blockade was not an option as he felt that inevitable provision of aid would, “lead quickly to our having the whole lot on our backs, a burden far beyond our strength.”\textsuperscript{65} In any case, Churchill supported the principle “that the enemy is responsible for the territories he has conquered.”\textsuperscript{66} A view that was partly based on the rules set forth in international law (see earlier section).

Instead, Churchill preferred to put greater store in the provision of relief following liberation. At this stage, the general British view was that relief provision was not necessarily a military task. Indeed, given the possible implications of civilian relief for military logistics, early British military thinking supported the idea of the establishment of a separate civilian agency.\textsuperscript{67} Thus, following the example of the First World War, relief would come as a distinct civilian phase after the war’s end, albeit with the improvement of a relief agency being readied in advance. To that end, Churchill had made a strong public commitment to relief on 20 August 1940 as part of the “The Few” speech delivered to the House of Commons:

...we can and we will arrange in advance for the speedy entry of food into any part of the enslaved area, when this part has been wholly cleared of German forces, and has genuinely regained its freedom. We shall do our best to encourage the building up of reserves of food all over the world, so that there will always be held up before the eyes of the peoples of Europe, including – I say deliberately – the German and Austrian peoples, the certainty that the shattering of the Nazi power will bring to them all immediate food, freedom and peace.\textsuperscript{68}
As a symbol of Britain’s commitment within days of the 1940 speech, efforts had been made to search world markets for possible surpluses that could be purchased in advance of a German collapse or defeat. The task of searching was put in the hands of special established Relief Department within the Ministry of Economic Warfare (responsible for running the blockade policy. Later the department would be transferred, firstly, in February 1942 to the Board of Trade (as the Post-War Commodity and Relief Department) and eventually in October 1943 to the Foreign Office. The Relief Department worked closely with the Inter-Allied Post-War Requirements Committee that was established between the Allies in September 1941 to aid the relief planning process. Politically, there was much support for a relief programme. In Debates in the House of Lords, of whom many had personal involvement in the relief programme that had followed the troops into the occupied Rhineland at the end of the First World War, there was considerable support for the development of readily deployable relief agencies.

Yet, the humanitarian motives of Churchill were questionable. Given the robust interest of Roosevelt and criticism made by exiled communities of his blockade policy, it can be argued that Churchill’s 1940 speech was largely designed to offset some of this pressure. The need to make such concessions to Allies would later see Churchill both supply using Swedish and Swiss intermediaries or support the supply by America and Canada of aid to several countries in occupied Europe. Churchill was not averse to exploiting the humanitarian burden on the enemy for strategic advantage. In November 1944, with the onset of a harsh winter, Churchill made it clear that he was not keen on elaborate plans for the supply of relief to occupied areas in the Netherlands, instead, preferring instead for the enemy to “stew” for the three to four weeks. There were limitations to Churchill’s generosity. In particular, Churchill was of the view that the impact of relief must not have repercussions domestically. In September 1943, in the first of many such enquiries, he wrote to the President of the Board of Trade and the Minister for Food enquiring as to whether any such repercussions were apparent. In October 1944, he wrote to the President of the Board of Trade enquiring as to the validity of an article in the Daily Mail newspaper: “Is there any truth in the suggestion that our people’s needs are being overridden by priorities for foreign relief?” In Churchill’s view Britain should not suffer nor be seen to suffer for the unjustified benefit of others.

Such were the concerns regarding domestic supply that Churchill, or at least his advisors, was apparently even happy to ignore the 1940 speech for reasons of appeasing potential political problems. At discussions in spring 1944 regarding relief supplies for the North West Europe campaign, it was suggest by Lord Frederick A. Lindemann (The 1st Viscount Cherwell, the Paymaster General and one of Churchill’s ‘Secret Circle’ of close advisors) that Churchill was particularly concerned at “any proposals hinting at any substantial [British] contribution to European Relief.” When it was pointed out by an official from the War Office’s Directorate of Civil Affairs that Churchill himself had pledged relief to Europe in 1940, Cherwell replied that the statement was irrelevant as it was made before the Americans and Soviets had entered the war.
view that the significance of the speech was of no political importance was not born out in parliament where regular relief debates in both Houses had consistently referred to it. For each parliamentarian who feared that the commitments made by Britain were too burdensome or that America should make similar domestic sacrifices for the sake of the war, others recognised the diplomatic, practical and moral importance of the relief commitment.

Nevertheless, Cherwell, in reporting his views on the paper to Churchill, indicated that the estimates made by the War Office were too high and that there was a risk that the Combined Boards, in trying to match insufficient supply to this demand, might make a commensurate cut to British domestic supply imports. Cherwell was of the view that in all probability the supply needs of Europe could be met locally. The estimated scales of food supply were considerable, enough for 23,000,000 civilians on full rations or for 92,000,000 supplying a quarter of the ration for six months. Yet, the head of the economics section, at the Directorate of Civil Affairs, R.J. Stopford, was of the opinion from his estimations that the figures were wholly justified. Organisations like Civil Affairs were not unaware of the political sensitivities of the food issue. Indeed, at its first meeting, the AT(E) Committee (an interdepartmental Civil Affairs planning committee, see section below) recognised that food was as an issue that probably could not be dealt with below the level of the War Cabinet. Thus, Stopford’s advice was not given without consideration of its political consequences. The War Cabinet discussion on 7 March 1944 concluded that whilst it was agreed the relief would be supplied there was still concern over the knock-on effect for Britain’s supply.

In reality, Churchill knew that there was little to fear in terms of any knock on effect to British domestic food supply. He was aware that the Civil Affairs estimates were for planning purposes only, actual supply would be governed by the Combined Boards (located in Washington, they specialised in Raw Materials, Shipping Adjustment, Production Resources and Food, and were tasked with allocating who was going to get what; they were not responsible for procurement, storage or auditing) on which Britain had full and effective representation and thereby protecting national interests. All estimates sent to the Combined Food Board for their views on likely allocation were always subject to War Cabinet approval. Thus, good humanitarian intentions were only possible if the resources were available.

Yet, Churchill was clearly keen to ensure that in light of the potential political interest his commitment to relief would not cause him problems. At least on the matter of financial expense, Churchill was largely unconcerned. In a note to the Chancellor and Secretary to the War Cabinet, Sir Edward L. Bridges earlier in October 1944 regarding the increased costs of relief in the period of military provision, he noted: “As we shall be completely broke after the War... I cannot see that this new act of generosity matters very much.” Yet, reducing the expectations of those about to be liberated of the level of supply they were to receive was an additional method by which domestic supply needs would be unaffected. On opening of northern European ports to civilian food imports in December 1944, Churchill cautioned against giving false hope to the civilian
population and suggested there should only be enough to prevent the commonly accepted measure of disease and disorder.\(^94\) At this stage of the war, Churchill’s caution was informed by reported impressions that except for large towns Europe’s food supply was generally in a better condition than that of Britain. Instead, the problem was not food but lack of transport.\(^95\)

There was much logic in Churchill’s idea. The unfulfilled promises of better food supply that had been promised in advance of the landings in Italy had resulted in a series of public disorder and political problems (see Chapter 3). However, explaining to near starved family man who had enjoyed better times during the occupation that he should be prepared to make further sacrifices had its limitations. Certainly British General George ‘Bobby’ Erskine (Head of the SHAEF Mission to Belgium) was aware that without greater food supply further Belgian political instability was likely to result.\(^96\)

Thus, for North West Europe, there was from an early point in the war a commitment to relief. Whether this was inspired by humanitarianism or diplomatic expediency, might be said to be the difference between Roosevelt and Churchill. Yet, whilst Churchill was probably, if only because of likely domestic political pressures, a reluctant humanitarian, he had nevertheless made a commitment to relief and in light of its need stuck to it. It had become increasingly apparent that relief requirements were unlikely to wait until a suitable point after the war and that civilian agencies were likely to be insufficient.\(^97\) Instead and for reasons of simplicity, effective battlefield control and military need, the only viable option was to use a military relief organisation (see Chapter 2). This development was largely asserted by the military themselves, but it was one that blended with political commitments, parliamentary interest and diplomatic necessity. Consequently, relief provision by the military was, as seen above, always likely to subject to a high degree of scrutiny by Whitehall and Westminster. Whilst there was little objection to the idea that relief was both necessary and useful in the uncertain circumstances of a liberation campaign there remained the need to answer the questions of how much relief was required, for how long, of what type, for which people and by whom it was to be delivered. Most of these questions were visited on several occasions on both sides of the Atlantic (see Chapter 2).

**A Rank Issue**

That big questions of expunging fascism and developing humanitarian policies inevitably influenced Civil Affairs is unsurprising, but so could seemingly trivial issues. One such was the result of Churchill’s “personal, direct, ubiquitous and continuous supervision” of all things military.\(^98\) In September 1943, Churchill noted the promotion of Sir Roger Lumley (former Governor of Bombay and later the Earl of Scarborough) from Captain to Major General and sent a message from the QUADRANT Conference at Quebec to Secretary of State for War, Grigg, seeking an explanation.\(^99\) Churchill was concerned that such promotions would have an adverse impact on Army morale.
Grigg’s reply pointed out that Lumley was needed by the COSSAC organisation (Chief of Staff to the Strategic Allied Commander, a forerunner of what would become SHAEF) to help plan for Civil Affairs operations in the forthcoming North West Europe campaign. The senior officer at COSSAC, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan, was keen to get Civil Affairs planning moving. From the bitter experience in Sicily, Morgan needed someone with a combination of sufficient rank and weight of experience to be able hold his own with other senior planners. Morgan thought Lumley was suited for the task and enquiries at the Foreign Office and elsewhere proved the recommendation credible. Whilst, Lumley’s colonial connections might not have suited American tastes the idea of bringing in expertise from the civilian sector was something that was embraced in order to generate novel approaches. This stood in contrast to the amateur tradition found in most parts of the British Army.

Seeking to appease Churchill, Grigg had suggested to Morgan that Brigadier was a sufficient rank, but the persuasive Morgan disagreed on the grounds of both the level of responsibilities and the need to be in a strong bargaining position at SHAEF. Nevertheless, realising Churchill was not happy with the speed of Lumley’s promotion, Grigg indicated this was only an appointment to the planning staff and if Lumley was to be posted to an operation, the Prime Minister would be immediately informed. Grigg was reputed to know the strengths and weaknesses of Churchill well and he enjoyed a close working relationship with both the Prime Minister and the influential Brooke (CIGS). Grigg also had the reputation of speaking his mind in the bluntest of terms, but this was often mitigated by his competence, precision and common sense. Other things remaining equal, it must be assumed that he was better placed to win the argument than most.

Notwithstanding the validity of such arguments, Churchill was insistent that the rank of Colonel was sufficient for a planning job and suggested if ceremony was needed then an honorary rank would suffice. Concerned what impact such promotions might have on the morale of combat forces he argued: “it is most undesirable to scatter the much-prized military titles among people who are not going to do any fighting or exercise military command.” Enquiries around Whitehall by Churchill’s trusted adviser, Major Sir Desmond Morton, indicated that both the Ministries of Food and Supply, who wished to send experts to Italy, had encountered a War Office ruling that they should have “bogus military ranks.” This appeared to Minister of Food, Lord Woolton, to be unnecessary, especially when the American military happily operated with plain-clothed civilian specialists. However, Woolton’s views did not in reality reflect an American military view. The need for such specialists to be under military authority was never in doubt.

Churchill continued to push his idea of an honorary rank, asking Grigg in October 1943 to indicate possible numbers in Italy. Grigg reported that there were 550 civilians given military rank, one quarter being Civil Affairs officers. He argued that such ranks enabled them to work more easily in a military environment where uniforms mattered, it was compliant with frontline American practice and Civil Affairs officers were as much part of the army as
medical staff. To change policy would cause much confusion. However, further investigations by Morton indicated that contrary to War Office practice, but with Foreign Office and the supply department’s support, the British head of Civil Affairs in Italy, Major General Francis J. Rennell Rodd (The 2nd Baron Rennell (of Rodd)), was already putting some of his staff into civilian clothing in rear areas. Rennell felt it helped to give an impression of indirect control over the new Italian government and it reflected American practice. Churchill asked Morton to put a paper together on the matter, in which he sought advice from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Minister for Economic Warfare to indicate the practices of MI5 and Special Operations Executive (SOE). Most of SOE were military personnel on transfer, but for the few civilians it was found their morale was “fortified” if they held a commission.

Morton’s report in late October goes beyond commenting on matters of rank. He argued that the Civil Affairs name and organisation should go, civilian issues on the battlefield should be handled by a specialist Quartermaster General’s unit (QMG(X)) and specialist civilians should only be used in rear non-combat areas under the control of civilian departments. Whether Morton’s views regarding Civil Affairs are personally motivated or reflect those of other government departments – the supply departments were notoriously hostile towards Civil Affairs – is unclear. What is more apparent is that views of Morton’s report were in a position to influence Churchill and in turn influence the development of Civil Affairs.

Nevertheless, Churchill sought views from the War Office. Although suggested that as a means of differentiation Civil Affairs officers should use of white gorget patches on their uniforms (as opposed to the red versions worn by officers of the General Staff [By this time all colonels and above wore red tabs – junior staff officers did not, having lost the distinction at the end of the First World War]). White patches and cap bands were traditionally used by Indian Political Service officers. By consequence of the substantial Indian Army involvement in North and East Africa during the Second World War, the patches were seen by Metropolitan Army officers causing a certain amount of confusion as to them white cap bands indicated an Officer Cadet.

Sensing a shift in Churchill’s opinion that might have undesired consequences for Civil Affairs, Grigg forwarded a copy of Morgan’s justification for Lumley to the Prime Minister. Morgan pointed to the need to look after British interests at the headquarters. The careful balance of Anglo-American staffing would be thrown into confusion if the role of individuals of Lumley was diminished, with the implication that British interests would come off worse.

What was rather more convincing on the matter were the views of the Executive Committee of the Army Council (the senior-most decision-making body of the army) who indicated that to de-militarise Civil Affairs officers was not practical. They considered that the “pin pricks” of such novelties as white gorget patches “usually have an adverse effect on morale,” but that an alternative and worthy distinguishing sign would be suggested. Furthermore, it was vital in an Allied environment to be in step with American practice in forward areas and that meant civilians wearing uniform. These views reflected those of the
Directorate of Military Operations (DMO), which was happy to accept some form of distinctive mark as an honourable badge, but thought in active areas only Civil Affairs officers of military rank should have executive authority.¹¹⁵ The practical need for civilian specialists, American practice and the need to maintain Civil Affairs morale thus drew War Office views away from those of Churchill. However, the uneasy relationship between military men and Civil Affairs was not insignificant and would be seen later in the disparaging views from 21st Army Group staff (see Chapter 4). Questions had already been raised in military and parliamentary circles as to the quality and motivation of Civil Affairs staff in Italy.¹¹⁶

Churchill would not give up and Grigg in a further attempt to appease the Prime Minister suggested that as Secretary of State he would be personally responsible for selection of specially promoted civilian specialists that those promoted above the rank of Colonel would passed before Churchill and that all civilians would move into plain clothes as soon as possible. However, the policy would not be retrospective and white gorget patches would be avoided.¹¹⁷ Churchill was unimpressed. He wanted white or pale blue gorget patches to be worn or some form of special “warrant” to be issued and he wanted a retrospective review of those already commissioned. He felt it was “contrary to the interests of the Army to have hoards of sham Major-Generals preening themselves in all directions.” A further survey of special civilian commissioned officers indicated that Civil Affairs had two Major Generals, 10 Brigadiers and 16 Colonels. This was many times the number to be found in SOE, SIS, M15, the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) and the Petroleum Warfare Department, but considerably fewer than the numbers of serving and re-employed retired officers serving in Civil Affairs (three Major Generals, 13 Brigadiers and 38 Colonels (including two RAF equivalents) recruited from serving officers, together with just two retired officers (both Major Generals)).¹¹⁸

Even the passage of time did not help, with Churchill asking Grigg at the end of January 1944 for an answer on the “gorgets and the bogus Major-Generals.”¹¹⁹ Rennell canvassed for his views by Grigg, indicated (and rather ironically for someone had been criticised for his financial and supposedly conservative background) that he too had suffered from “bogus bankers.”¹²⁰ Yet, by mid-February 1944, Churchill was able to see why specialists were brought into the military and that rank helped to attract the right quality of individual, even if he could not accept General Staff ranks.¹²¹ By late February, it was decided by Churchill to hand the problem over to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and no more was heard.¹²²

Thus, having stirred up a hornet’s nest, Churchill eventually relented, but it was clear to see his motivations in being concerned about wider morale in the fighting forces. It was also clear to see that many around him were bandwagoning at a time great difficulty for the Military Government in Italy. Churchill’s “habit” of involvement was according to Grigg, when reflecting on events after the war, not helped by his poor understanding of administration and tendency to indulge in competing channels of communication and making “odd appointments.”¹²³ Luckily, for Civil Affairs experience demonstrated that
specialists were needed and some of these need to be appointed to a senior rank. Even the military, whose morale Churchill was seeking to protect understood this. Yet in winning support for such specialists the need to have them properly trained and thereby giving them some military experience and kudos was recognised. Before long all specialists had to undertake training at an Officer Cadet Training Unit (OCTU) and bypassing this process was not allowed.\(^\text{124}\) Indeed, balancing an individual's specialism with practical military skills and acknowledgment of military priorities was an important factor in making Civil Affairs in North West Europe work. Churchill's interest was therefore ultimately, but ironically rather useful.

**Blatant Electioneering**

Although British Members of Parliament, including Major Simon Wingfield-Digby the Liberal-Unionist member for West Dorset, served as officers in Civil Affairs none confused their political life with their military job. They were certainly not debarred from joining.\(^\text{125}\) However, from Grigg's perspective, the determination of Americans, from Roosevelt downwards, to make the Second World War their war often saw the intrusion of domestic American politics.\(^\text{126}\) Although this was not as badly felt in Civil Affairs as other parts of the military establishment that is not to say the organisation was immune.

The links between Italian-Americans and particularly Sicilian-Americans and their ancestral homes had great political value.\(^\text{127}\) American interest in Italy was demonstrated by Roosevelt comments to Churchill in April 1943. Based on the anticipated positive views of Italians to Americans and of the more certain views of Americans to Italians, Roosevelt felt it was sensible for Military Government in Italy to be of an “American character” by appointing a large proportion of Americans to the organisation.\(^\text{128}\) Roosevelt as a former Governor of New York understood more than most the American interest in Italy.

Rather more blatant interest came with what Grigg referred to as the example of the “egregious” Civil Affairs officer, the American Brigadier General William O’Dwyer (Head of Economic Section, Allied Control Commission, a post, as will be seen, that there were great problems in filling) who only stayed long enough in Italy to produce a report that would help give him the Italian vote during the 1945 elections for Mayor of New York.\(^\text{129}\) Yet, political benefits of Civil Affairs could always swing both ways as it was noted by *TIME* in 1943 that New York’s ex-Governor (and before that Lieutenant Governor to Herbert H. Lehman), Lieutenant Colonel Charles Poletti, had been able to make it Sicily, but Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia was a notable absentee.\(^\text{130}\) Poletti was described by a British Civil Affairs officer as a man of great energy:

... one sees his name everywhere, on the hoardings and in the papers, connected with the affairs of Palermo province... he seems to have quite a ‘party machine’ around him. I have heard it said by American officers that he is ‘a power at the White House’ and he appears to be treated with becoming respect as a consequence. The Sicilians are not so respectful.
Because his name appears so often in the *Sicilia Liberata* I hear it is called by them the ‘Daily Poletti’.\(^{131}\)

The association of American politics with Italy could be a source of amusement. On 8 November 1944, the day after elections for both the United States House of Representatives and Roosevelt’s re-election, Churchill in a note to Grigg enquired as to why there was a new increase in the bread ration in Italy since there were no longer any American electoral interests.\(^{132}\) Whether a source of amusement or not, the implications for Civil Affairs were another source of distortion away from the job at hand. Luckily, for North West Europe there was less such blatant domestic political influence, instead the dramas were focused at the diplomatic level.

**RED TAPE AND PERFIDIOUS ALBION**

The start, in spring 1942, of preparations for the invasion of Europe by the War Office’s ROUNDDUP Planning Staff and MO11 (within the Directorate of Military Operations) quickly prompted the need for a decision on which part of government would be responsible for the policy, organisation and personnel associated with what became Civil Affairs.\(^{133}\) The War Office was not the only government department looking at civil administration either in its entirety or in part. Sir Orme Sargent at the Foreign Office noted in early June 1942, that was a “danger” of overlap. He identified that interest had been expressed in civilian matters by SOE, Chief of Combined Operations, Foreign Office, PWE and the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements (associated with the Relief Department). Little of their interest or work was co-ordinated.\(^{134}\) unsurprisingly, each organisation had its vested interests. It was thus likely with such bureaucratic interests (and later to be joined by similar American interests), that the development of Civil Affairs would be subjected to a series of distorting pressures.

The War Office passed the matter to the Secretary to the War Cabinet, Bridges. Realising the need for work to progress and for better co-ordination, Bridges on 23 June 1942 chaired a meeting of interested parties at the War Cabinet. Included were representatives from the Foreign Office (Senior Legal Adviser, Sir William Malkin and Roger Makins (later Baron Sherfield)) and War Office (Permanent Under-Secretary (Sir Frederick Bovenschen), Colonel Thomas Rigby, Deputy Director of Military Operations, Major General Sir Humfrey Myddelton Gale, Chief Administration Officer of Home Forces and Sir Findlater Stewart at Home Defence). The conclusions of the meeting were that any plans should meet military requirements. To ensure that this requirement was met, the Secretary of State for War would be given responsibility for such arrangements. These included the establishment of a planning section that was to consult with other government departments and possibly an interdepartmental committee. The ROUNDDUP Planning Staff were to be kept informed of all developments and they in turn would keep the Americans informed. Once a plan had been established for civil administration in North
West Europe, it was anticipated that a ministerial decisions would be required.\textsuperscript{135}

The interdepartmental committee was soon deemed necessary and was established as the Administration of Territories (European) Committee (AT(E) Committee). It was chaired by Bovenschen, with representatives initially from the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff (VCIGS), Adjutant General (AG), Quartermaster General (QMG), PUS (Finance) and Home Forces (ROUNDUP Planning Staff). Its terms of reference were agreed by Grigg on 29 June 1942:

\begin{quote}
To consider in conjunction with the Force Commanders concerned and with other Government Departments at the appropriate stages, the steps necessary on military grounds to ensure efficient civil administration of the territory liberated in Europe as the result of operations by the forces of the United Nations. For this purpose the necessary contact will be maintained with the Allied Governments concerned, the Principal Administrative Officers Committee and the Civil Affairs Committee of the United States Army Headquarters in the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{136}
\end{quote}

Despite the establishment of a committee, the parochial concerns of individual government departments did not disappear immediately. At the beginning of July 1942, Sargent suggested an additional committee chaired by the Foreign Office. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Anthony Eden (and formerly Secretary of State for War), thought there was no case for it. He viewed the problems of civil administration as mostly practical and not the work of the Foreign Office. In any case, Foreign Office interests were served by having a representative on the War Office committee and the likelihood that major decisions would go before the War Cabinet. Indeed there were dangers that another committee would encourage the War Office to work “behind the backs” of the Foreign Office.\textsuperscript{137} The idea was dropped.

In its co-ordinating role, the AT(E) Committee soon made contact within the War Office with the staffs of the Director of Transport, Director of Signals, Director of Military Intelligence and Judge Advocate General. Outside the War Office, it was seen as important to make contact with the Foreign Office (including the soon-to-be-permanent representative, Sargent\textsuperscript{138}), Treasury, SOE, PWE, Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Inter-Allied Committee (through the Relief Department). Outside British involvement, a representative from the American forces based in London was thought a sensible addition given the Anglo-American nature of any future operation.\textsuperscript{139} By March 1943, the Committee consisted of Bovenschen, Sargent, and representatives from the American embassy, the American army, the Relief Department and Home Forces.\textsuperscript{140} Others would join it and a sibling supply committee as needs developed.

The important part played by Bridges was clear to those close to the Committee. Lieutenant Colonel Alan Mocatta, Secretary to the Army Council Secretariat at the War Office (responsible for the administration of the AT(E) Committee), in 1964 still found himself astonished at:
...the prescience of Bridges (and I suppose of the War Cabinet) at the steps taken in June 1942 which led to the creation of the AT(E) Committee and all that flowed from it.\textsuperscript{141}

With its focus on supporting ROUNDUP, the creation of such a committee indicated the fundamental importance of making proper preparation for the North West Europe campaign. That Bovenschen was a rather apprehensive of the task was also recalled by Mocatta:

I remember Bovenschen calling me in and showing me Bridges’ letter suggesting the setting up of the Committee under War Office chairmanship. The PUS was somewhat in despair at being asked to take on such a job with absolutely nothing to go on.\textsuperscript{142}

Nevertheless, although difficulties would emerge, particularly regarding supply, the AT(E) Committee was regarded by Bovenschen as a “first class committee” where large numbers from different parts of Whitehall attended and there was a general lack of “departmental throat-cutting.”\textsuperscript{143} Grigg commented after the War that Bovenschen achieved success with the Committee:

... in spite of long standing prejudice against him by the brass hats and the desire of some of the civil departments in Whitehall to crab and interfere with him while shewing [sic] quite clearly that they were not prepared to take on his job.\textsuperscript{144}

General views of Bovenschen, both in wartime and after were mixed. For Bovenschen, a civil servant schooled first as assistant private secretary to Secretary of State for War R.B. Haldane, his approach was based on an “unimpeachable integrity and great ability.” He was known for “characteristic energy” and was described in his obituary as being a “loyal colleague and staunch friend.”\textsuperscript{145} According to one of his Assistant Secretaries at the War Office, V.G.F. Bovenizer, Bovenschen’s “painstaking mastery of detail,” in the circumstance of “exasperatingly confused decisions,” allowed him to apply “intellectual objectivity.” He was also regarded as having strong “powers of persuasion,” especially when it came to matters of Civil Affairs.\textsuperscript{146}

Yet, General Morgan had a very poor opinion of him, describing him as “Hitler’s Secret Weapon.”\textsuperscript{147} In contrast, Bovenschen thought that Morgan was mercurial.\textsuperscript{148} One post-war author, Tom Blower, from personal research judged Bovenschen “stubborn.”\textsuperscript{149} Sir Charles Key, head of the Civil Affairs finance branch F5 at the War Office, thought that that Grigg could not stand Bovenschen. Key suggests that Grigg, on his promotion by Churchill from PUS to Secretary of State for War, wanted Sir Eric Speed from the Treasury (who had previously been at the War Office between 1920 and 1934\textsuperscript{150}) as his PUS. Fortunately, for Bovenschen this could not be done within Civil Service precedent. Grigg nevertheless found a way of getting Speed by appointing two PUSs; Speed becoming PUS (Finance).\textsuperscript{151}

The attempt to keep Bovenschen from the top post may in part have been associated with his notorious willingness to side with the Treasury in making cuts to spending within his own ministry during the Interwar period. Whilst, a
not untypical move for many civil servants as they sought a career in what was regarded as the most significant government department of the day, the cuts lost Bovenschen many potential military allies that would later be useful during the war.\footnote{152} However, despite any real or perceived shortcomings, Bovenschen was determined to ensure that ‘his’ AT(E) Committee was well served and this in turn ensured that Civil Affairs had sufficient support within the War Office and Whitehall to properly plan, prepare and establish itself for operations in North West Europe.

The AT(E) Committee was part of a network of War Office and interdepartmental civil administration committees that were developed needs presented themselves. Some of these sat above AT(E) in the form of ministerial committees like the Armistice Terms and Civil Administration (ACA) Committee formed in August 1943 with the Deputy Prime Minister as chairman.\footnote{153} One of its first decisions was to keep Control Commission and Military Government matters in enemy states separate.\footnote{154} Others at the official level focused on other regions and sat alongside. The Occupied Enemy Territories Administration (OETA) Committee was created in March 1940 to look at events in Africa.\footnote{155} The Cairo-based Administration of Territories (Balkans) Committee was established in February 1943 to co-ordinate plans in Mediterranean Europe.\footnote{156} Others were sub-committees of the AT(E) engaged in functional work, such as the AT(E) Legal Sub-Committee created in March 1943.\footnote{157}

Furthermore, it was normal for these to evolve as circumstances changed. The ACA Committee was replaced in April 1944, by the ministerial Armistice and Post-War (APW) Committee and in July 1945 by the ministerial Overseas Reconstruction Committee (ORC).\footnote{158} Some committees whilst clearly separate nevertheless could easily touch on aspects of AT(E) work, including the Post-Hostilities Planning (PHP) Sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff that was interested in, amongst other matters, the military occupation of Germany.\footnote{159} PHP was thought by some to be the “worst committee that had ever been,” its business being mostly theoretical.\footnote{160} Much of its work on what became the Control Commission would be passed to Armistice Terms and Civil Administration Official (ACA0) Committee as it (with Bovenschen in its chair) took over from AT(E) Committee in November 1943.\footnote{161}

More importantly, by the end of May 1943, many of the “principal decisions” that would guide the development of Civil Affairs and Military Government in the North West Europe campaign had been sufficiently outlined for recruitment, training, organisation, planning and procurement to begin.\footnote{162} However, many of these would be later amended by the disruptive nature of the Anglo-American approach. Unsurprisingly, each nation recognised the need for similar areas of policy, but arrived at decisions at different times and from slightly different directions. Whilst, the need to provide a clear direction that would support preparations for OVERLORD was recognised by all, there was a division of views over whether London or Washington was the better location for its creation and decision.

In many ways, London was an ideal location for a policy committee like AT(E) to work. It had access to exile groups, OVERLORD planners at COSSAC (later
SHADEF), the European Advisory Commission (including representatives of Britain, America, the Soviet Union and from November 1944, France) and it was close to the campaign area. In London, there was a sense of immediacy to the forthcoming campaign.

The exile communities worked more comfortably in London and, by working closely with them, obvious benefits to the campaign could be exploited. With the exiles’ views of America ranging from “violently anti-American” to resentful at being “lumped” together as “Europeans” the calming influence of having British officers smoothing the way in London had its advantages. It was also true that benefits to British interests could also be exploited. However, in March 1943, the newly formed Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of the American War Department successfully encouraged the creation of an Anglo-American Civil Affairs supply policy body. What became the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC) worked to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) and was located in Washington. What started out as a body focusing on supply, by May 1943, had broadened its approach to cover wider areas of Civil Affairs policy, including armistice terms, Control Commission work, Civil Affairs supplies and civil administration in the theatres of war. The CCAC was set to rival AT(E) and this was a move that Bovenschen would not countenance.

Washington had its advantages. It was close to all the combined (largely Anglo-American) machinery of the various supply boards where ultimately all sizeable wartime supply decisions were made. This proximity would help in turning requests for Civil Affairs supplies into deliveries. Furthermore, in the context of North West Europe, COSSAC and later SHADE took their orders from the CCS. Surprisingly, despite being at the centre of American power, Britain was not at a disadvantage in Washington, as it was in a better position to co-ordinate a strong British line of argument amongst its small staff.

Nevertheless, the idea was received with caution in London as it was considered to duplicate, even “upset,” the work of the AT(E) Committee. Additionally, there was concern that CCAC might impinge on decisions relating to British territories in enemy control in the Far East. As an initial measure, it was suggested in April 1943 that the CCS be “reminded” of the work being conducted in Britain. The matter was further discussed in Whitehall at an ad hoc meeting convened by Bovenschen on 8 May 1943. With the focus of CCAC still on supply matters, most of the officials came from the supply departments, but others departments were present included Bridges and Viscount Strathallan (John David Drummond, Earl of Perth) from the War Cabinet Office and Civil Affairs officers Rennell, Lieutenant Colonel F.G. French and Brigadier S. Lee from the War Office.

This was the beginning of Bovenschen’s battle to save the influence of his AT(E) Committee. Some new arguments were advanced including the idea that the newly created Directorate of Civil Affairs (DCA) at the War Office and its American equivalent, CAD, when fully established would be a quicker and more convenient method of co-ordination. A combined capacity in Washington was not rejected all together for it could help the two allies keep in step. Fundamentally, however, it was viewed that the existing British system worked
well, had experience, involved the Americans (although more could be added if required) and did not need fixing.\textsuperscript{172} A telegram was sent to the CCS via the British staff in Washington outlining the objections to the CCAC.

Not everyone shared Bovenschen’s outlook. Bridges’ private view was that Bovenschen had a “phobia” about anything settled in Washington.\textsuperscript{173} The CCS, through the British staff in Washington graciously pointed out in reply to Bovenschen that he misunderstood the fundamental importance of Washington to combined planning. It was where all significant decisions were and would be made.\textsuperscript{174} The reaction from Washington was considered by Bridges to have knocked Bovenschen’s “long and elaborate telegram sideways.” Whilst those around Bovenschen, his “minions,” knew the game was lost, the “old man himself” was in a “stew.” Leaving Bovenschen to reconsider his views was considered wise. Privately, Bridges was contemptuous of Bovenschen: “Golly! What a mess. And what an unnecessary mess!!”\textsuperscript{175}

Remarkably, Bovenschen would not accept the view from Washington and began to draft a robust reply: “You do not \textit{even} refer to the important points...”\textsuperscript{176} To discuss the proposed reply and an alternative drafted by Bridges, a second \textit{ad hoc} meeting was convened on 25 May 1943.\textsuperscript{177} The alternative draft used more delicate language: “your explanation clears up much which had previously puzzled us, and we find ourselves in general agreement...”\textsuperscript{178} Unsurprisingly, the majority fell behind Bridges’ alternative.\textsuperscript{179} Thus, as long as British interests were safeguarded, London had seemingly acquiesced and accepted the creation of the CCAC. Concerns over colonial territory would see several amendments to the committee’s terms of reference over the following months.\textsuperscript{180}

However, not all was lost, for although Bridge’s telegram was more conciliatory it still stated the British objections to the loss of the London outpost. Furthermore, Bovenschen pointed out the useful work done by the AT(E)’s Legal Sub-committee in developing Civil Affairs Agreements with many exiled governments and this was seen as convincing evidence in Washington of the need to keep some decisions based in London.\textsuperscript{181} Bovenschen was clearly hoping to keep some of his committee’s work in London. Bridges in communication with Lieutenant General E. Ian C. Jacob, Military Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, thought Bovenschen considered himself “perfectly certain that he is doing it all perfectly, and nothing less than an 8,000lb bomb will persuade him to the contrary.”\textsuperscript{182} Jacob for his part hoped that the appointment of Major General S.W. Kirby (late Royal Engineers) as the Director of Civil Affairs would help to ease Bovenschen into line with the Cabinet Office view.\textsuperscript{183} Yet, a proposed charter was promulgated by the CCS on 3 July 1943 (after prompting from Roosevelt on 10 June 1943), included mention of the work at the “present time” of the “London Committee.”\textsuperscript{184} The CCAC held its first meeting on 15 July 1943, under its chairman American John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War. Included on the agenda was clarification of the role of the AT(E) Committee.\textsuperscript{185}

The frustration with CCAC was not just a matter of location. There were concerns that its charter allowed a military commander to ignore Civil Affairs
matters that he did not like or found inconvenient on the grounds of “paramount military requirements.” At this stage, the preference for the War Department was to avoid burdensome relief commitments, whereas the War Office had, based on experience, come to accept that there was no avoiding most of it. With objections from London to its charter, the CCAC had, by November 1943, made little progress. By way of return, American co-operation with the AT(E) Committee gradually ceased. In late autumn 1943, new attempts had to be made to break the impasse as time was running short at COSSAC in planning the Civil Affairs aspects of OVERLORD. With COSSAC’s need for direction, it was decided that the best way forward was for Churchill to raise the issue with Roosevelt when they next met. Consequently, from late October 1943, a briefing for the Prime Minister was assembled through meetings under the auspices of Cabinet sub-committee GEN 22.

Various views were taken including those of Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee (chairman of the ACA Committee), Grigg, Bridges, Bovenschen and ministers and officials from the supply departments. The brief was produced on 9 November 1943 for use at the earliest opportunity. It argued for a London-based version of the CCAC. Views from Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to Washington cautioned that any London version of CCAC would have to be modelled on the Washington version if it was to have any chance of long-term success. The target meeting with Roosevelt was to be the first of the SEXTANT conferences to be held in Cairo on 23-6 November. Major General Sir Leslie Hollis, Deputy Secretary (Military) to the War Cabinet, suggested to the Prime Minister that it was best not to bother the British Chiefs of Staff with the job of arguing for it at the conference, as hitherto they had been kept clear of Civil Affairs matters at such events. Churchill stated by return that he would take up the matter at Cairo and that sending of experts was unnecessary, as “the arguments seem simple and even obvious.”

Churchill did not find the time to raise the matter with Roosevelt. Fortuitously, Kirby (Director of Civil Affairs) was also at SEXTANT and he together with Eden, were able to discuss matters with McCloy (Chairman of CCAC). McCloy pointed out in no uncertain terms that the London Committee was unlikely to succeed for a number of substantial reasons. Roosevelt was being briefed against it. American public opinion would not understand something that was apparently designed to undermine the work of the CCS and centrality of Washington in decision making. Such a misunderstanding could increase views of isolationism in America and consequently London-based decisions would be turned down by the Senate when sent for approval for funding. Many Americans were already suspicious of European diplomats, even of Americans who had gone abroad and these moves would simply add fuel to the fire. McCloy suggested that compared to London, the result of the same discussion held in Washington would be accepted without demur. Furthermore, in McCloy’s view the CCAC he chaired was an excellent body and doing good work. Aware of such views, attempts were made to persuade Churchill to argue at the second SEXTANT conference (4-6 December 1943) for the reduced position of just more American involvement in Civil Affairs planning in London rather than a
full-blown committee. However, the Prime Minister felt there was too little time to prepare. In the New Year, a new approach was tried. Bovenschen travelled out to Washington to argue the case for himself. Briefed by Sargent that any committee created in London would find its work being done again in Washington, Bovenschen would have few illusions about the limitations of his proposals. Nevertheless, Bovenschen had support and luck. Grigg in communication with Field Marshal Sir John G. Dill, the senior British representative on the CCS, stated his determination to ensure that Bovenschen got a “deal.” Getting a deal could even come before getting a transatlantic consensus on what line to take with de Gaulle on any Civil Affairs Agreement. As the likelihood of the latter was so small, its use by Grigg was probably more symbolic of his support for Bovenschen. Grigg, regardless of his views of Bovenschen, was keen for him to achieve success on his own for to do so after being “very badly treated by the Foreign Office... will both put up his stock and wipe their eye.” On this occasion, departmental politics came before personal indifferences. Despite Sargent’s pessimistic briefing, chances of success were considered to be good by the War Office. Dill had offered his support, Eisenhower and his Chief of Staff at SHAEF American Major General Walter Bedell Smith were persuadable and McCloy was “very affronted at being patronised by the Foreign Office during SEXTANT.” Furthermore, Grigg even promised to fly out to Washington if “things looked like sticking.”

Bovenschen was successful in Washington in more than one respect. As an incidental matter, he helped to ensure successful transatlantic agreement on the Civil Affairs Agreements with Belgium and the Netherlands. More importantly for him, as far as the London Committee was concerned, it was decided that it would provide guidance not instructions for SHAEF and deal with any too large for SHAEF, but too small for Washington. CCS approved the changes to CCAC on 28 January 1944, with the proposal put forward by British Lieutenant General Sir Gordon Macready being supported in a “very loud voice” by American Major General John H. Hilldring Head of the Civil Affairs Division at the War Department. The “bugle-voiced boss” of CAD would, in 1947 be Assistant Secretary of State to General Marshall. However, in 1944 Hilldring always a proponent of the Washington-based CCAC arguably saw the ‘deal’ as way of keeping the London version in its place. The reality was that CCAC in its London form hardly functioned. American members would not and could not undermine the Washington version. Moreover, SHAEF always took its orders directly from the CCS.

Whilst ultimately a failure, AT(E) had in fact done most of the key transatlantic work in developing Civil Affairs Agreements, estimating and ordering initial relief supplies and providing direction for COSSAC planning through influence of Lumley. At a national level, it was able to assist the establishment and development of British Civil Affairs by co-ordinating between government departments in creating the Directorate of Civil Affairs at the War Office. The directorate would assist in establishing units and administering Civil Affairs training, recruiting and policy (with guidance from AT(E)). At the heart of AT(E)
was Bovenschen and although to some, he was a difficult character, his
diligence, commitment and energy ensured that the fundamental components of
British and Allied Civil Affairs preparations were fit for purpose and that in
Whitehall it was largely protected from withering bureaucratic politics. Whilst,
Bridges was responsible for the interdepartmental machinery that became the
AT(E) Committee it was Bovenschen’s consultative approach and his
determination to produce something that was of use and that was to prove so
useful in North West Europe. Bridges despite his later misgivings had made a
fine choice in appointing him chairman. As General Lumley reflected after the
war, “A quiet debt is owed to Bovenschen.”

**EXILED ALLIES**

The final form of political behaviour that distorted Civil Affairs planning and
development came from the influence of exiled Allied communities. Typically,
most interest falls on the difficulties experienced with French exiles led by de
Gaulle. However, to an extent all groups were able to influence the organisation.
Various forms of influence can be identified: bilateral negotiations associated
with the Civil Affairs Agreements, assistance given in estimating supply
requirements, choosing the contents of relief rations packs, and providing
estimates of refugee numbers and conditions (see Chapter 5). Exile groups as
mentioned above campaigned for the lifting of the blockade of enemy-occupied
Europe and even started to procure their own foodstuffs in anticipation of
liberation, in both cases putting pressure on London and Washington to be seen
to be doing more.

In terms of Civil Affairs Agreements, the Norwegians had been the first to
propose a binding legal arrangement. At the same time, the Dutch had
established practical arrangements, with liaison officers vested with sovereign
authority working with Allied formations. In general, the work started by the
British and later adopted by the Americans on the Agreements with Belgium,
the Netherlands and Norway was uncontroversial. Agreements were modestly
different in detail but not in substance. In the case of Luxembourg, CAD in
Washington needed to be reminded by the Foreign Office that a group
arrangement with Belgium was undesirable. Indeed, it was a British decision
that a separate approach should be taken towards the liberated states. The
Belgian Civil Affairs Agreement was substantially assisted by the good
relationship between British Judge Advocate General, Henry MacGeagh, and the
Belgian Minister of the Interior, August De Schrijver, both of whom shared a
passion for rowing. By the end of May 1944, Civil Affairs Agreements had
been signed (Britain and America signing separate versions to avoid the added
complication of including the Soviet Union in negotiations) with Belgium, the
Netherlands and Norway. Luxembourg would join them in June 1944 and
Denmark (without an exile government in London, but still regarded as an ally)
in May 1945.

France was an altogether thornier problem. The details of its machinations are
widely covered elsewhere. The outcome for Civil Affairs was that American
and often British reluctance to recognise de Gaulle as the legitimate representative of France made concluding a Civil Affairs Agreement with the General’s provisional authorities impossible. Impossible, that is, until Allied press and Civil Affairs reports from within liberated France made it clear that although not democratically elected as Roosevelt would prefer, de Gaulle nevertheless had popular support. Together with continued (if judicious) support for the General from influential policy makers like Stimson and Eden both London and Washington accepted on the eve of the liberation of Paris the need to sign a Civil Affairs Agreement with the Gaullist provisional authorities.

It was not always this way as on 7 September 1943 the Allied planners willingly accepted Gaullist proposals for the administration of France. These included dividing the country into three zones (Combat, Military and Interior) where increasingly lighter amounts of Allied control would be involved as the French took over responsibility for themselves. A French delegate was to be attached to the staff of the North West Europe campaign commander to facilitate assistance. French liaison officers were to help at the tactical level in ensuring police powers were exercised and defining the responsibilities of the local authorities. Ironically, despite the angst that followed the SHAEF plan for France did not deviate dramatically from such proposals.212

From the French perspective, concerns encouraged by the AMGOT approach employed in Italy as to the true purpose of Civil Affairs, by repeated attempts to introduce a AMGOT model at SHAEF (rejected by the dogged determination of Lumley), by poor communications between the Allies and Gaullists (in which mutual suspicion dominated) and an Allied decision to proceed with producing their own emergency supplemental French currency (rather than seek additional currency from de Gaulle’s provisional authorities) soured relations. This was despite the 1943 Quebec conference deciding that there would be no Military Government in the Allied states of North West Europe.213 However, with problems emerging in the winter of 1943/44, as OVERLORD approached, de Gaulle imposed increasingly heavy restrictions on co-ordination between French liaison officers (who were to assist Civil Affairs detachments and formation staffs) and the Allies, before banning all levels of co-operation. At a time when there were concerns over what to expect in France and over what line to take with Gaullists the additional and increasing turmoil caused from the beginning of 1944 was to play havoc with Civil Affairs planning and policy guidance development (see Chapter 5). That elements of co-operation were still possible, owes much to the resourcefulness of many Allied and French officers. Nevertheless, the unnecessary work, not to mention anxiety produced in the build up to OVERLORD indicated how diplomatic pressures could produce practical problems.

CONCLUSION

Influence on the development of Civil Affairs came in many shapes and forms. Others still will be explored and developed in later chapters. Overall, the relative influence of each was at times surprising. Today, international legal obligations
regarding the responsibilities of a military power are far more developed, but
during the Second World War, they were in large part exhausted, in need of
reform and provided little in the way of detailed advice. By contrast, Churchill’s
obsession regarding gorget patches and over-promoted civilians, despite its
insignificance within the immensity of the North West Europe campaign, was
significant in the encouraging War Office’s acceptance of Civil Affairs anomalies.
Some influences were specific to a time and a place, such as the Italian thread
running through domestic American politics. Other influences were less
surprising. That Churchill was concerned about domestic reactions to any
perceived further cuts to the supply of everyday rations was to be expected,
even if the threat was never likely to be as great as some feared. In a war
involving and requiring exile communities their influence was bound to show
through on occasions when they were able to exercise it; typically, when the
transatlantic Allies required assistance. That one of the Allies, France as an
acknowledged pre-war power, was able despite its lack of officially recognised
exile government to disrupt Civil Affairs preparations is equally unsurprising.
So too was the natural extension in publically supported commitment from the
end of the First World War regarding the provision of relief albeit given a new
twist by the personal commitment of Roosevelt and the influence of exile
governments.

Other influences were less predictable. How the process of regime change in
states like Italy would play out with so many variable factors, perspectives and
needs provides one example. The clearly different needs and views of Churchill,
Roosevelt, Morgenthau, SHAEF and AMGOT, not to mention parliamentary
involvement could and did place unenviable pressures on Civil Affairs. Luckily,
the need for practicality in the conditions of war torn Europe were quickly
adopted and politically prevailed. Another, unpredictable influence came in the
form of the strength of personal interest and commitment at different levels.
Here British Civil Affairs and arguably much of Allied Civil Affairs would have
come to nothing or would have been a very different American model without
the prescience of Bridges and dogged determination of Bovenschen.

However, what was important for Civil Affairs was the sum of these political and
legal effects. Here it was clear that relief would inevitably be provided, that it
would be provided quicker than before, but that only enough to meet very basic
needs could afford to be provided. It became clear that this was to be a military
task (see Chapter 2). However, once this was established there was an
expectation that Britain would develop its own approach. It was clear that
despite the awkwardness of many exiles there would be separate British
approaches towards liberated and conquered European states. What was less
clear was how the influence of American power would play out, as messages
and policies could be mixed. It is perhaps ironic that despite the drama of
Bovenschen’s London committee and differences of opinion over fascist
officials, the survival of British Civil Affairs ironically relied on American Civil
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Chapter 1 Endnotes


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CHAPTER 2

EXPERIENCE AND CONFLICTING NEEDS

MEMORY

If an example was needed to justify the establishment of a military body to deal with civilian issues around the battlefield, it was the scenes of mass refugees flooding through Belgium and France during the campaign of 1940. Furthermore, the experience was not just important because of the problems encountered at the time. The Exode also shaped collective memory amongst British officers, French officials and the general population of France. However, if the 1940 campaign was but a single example, its lessons may never have been fully investigated or planned against. Other examples from before and during the Second World War were to be as influential in generating a collective understanding of the implications of conflict on a civilian population. All would provide direction for organisational developments. Both memory and practice helped to form an idea of what was required in order to serve military interests in Normandy; an ideal utility.

Yet, these memories and experiences were not simply the preserve of war ministries for on both sides of the Atlantic, relief organisations also had their views. They tended to think beyond the battlefield needs of the military and onto post-war recovery. This had the potential to conflict with the collective military and war ministry point of view, where the simple needs for civil administration during battle might easily become pointlessly and expensively extended if the views of the relief organisations became persuasive in the melting pot of interdepartmental and intergovernmental politics. As a result, military needs and priorities might be undermined and essential supplies and transport directed elsewhere. None of this would help win a war. The simple and the straightforward approach was always preferred by the military. As General Morgan, wrote about his work as COSSAC in preparing the way for Eisenhower, the main part of it was to “minimise our Commander’s responsibilities in every way.”1 Morgan was of the view that elements of Civil Affairs took too much attention away from military matters.2

FRANCE 1940, A MILITARY NEED ESTABLISHED

In a TIME article about a suggested (and surprising high) 10,000 journalists who went to report on the German westward offensive of 1940, the lasting popular impressions of the campaign were summarised:
From the German side, pictures of tanks and motorized columns going into action, from the Allies pictures of bombed nuns and refugees flashed across the Atlantic by wirephoto.\(^3\)

The large number of refugees encountered in Belgium and northern France in 1940 provided the Allied armies, including the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) with a host of problems in their attempts to prosecute the campaign. Yet, overwhelming refugee problems were not encountered immediately. It is only on 15 May that problems started to develop for British forces following the twin impact of the bombing of towns like Tournai on the British supply routes and the French decision to close the Belgian frontier to “pedestrian and horsed traffic.”\(^4\) At this point, many civilians began to leave their homes in northern France and Belgium. By 17 May, significant numbers of Belgium refugees were observed around Béthune in northern France. Roads were crammed with refugees. Around Abbeville and Montreuil, many dead and wounded civilians were observed by passing British units. By 20 May, the streets of Boulogne were “thronged” with French and Belgian refugees.\(^5\)

In France, the exodus came before authorities had an opportunity to put into operation the pre-arranged evacuation plan. With no French officials and no troops to be spared, the problem soon became “acute.” Movement was in all directions. Having gone first westwards from Belgium, many columns then met the enemy in the Somme area and turned back on themselves. Famine, though expected, did not occur, which was as well given the paucity of British rations. Nevertheless, the images were lasting, the official report on the campaign in The London Gazette stated: “Scenes of misery were everywhere, and the distress of women, children and aged people was pitiable.”\(^6\) Refugees were not simply confined to the countryside. Many crowded into towns like Boulogne.\(^7\) Dunkirk was described as “congested” with refugees.\(^8\) Nor was the problem limited to the north, the short-lived BEF operation in Normandy in 1940 also encountered refugees throughout the region and where the later Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, was serving as a formation commander.\(^9\)

According to the official history of the campaign, in Flanders, British 5\(^{th}\) Division found itself stemming “an almost overwhelming stream of refugees that was flooding westwards” across Belgium.\(^10\) RAF photographic reconnaissance reports frequently referred to the density of refugee traffic. Fortunately, German forces appeared to be equally held up by these vast and slow-moving groups.\(^11\) Many of those refugees who were overtaken by German forces were given assistance by a civilian German aid agency, The Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt (NSV), which mirrored much of the work of its French counterpart the Secours National, in providing relief.\(^12\)

Sir James Butler, lecturer at the Civil Affairs Staff Centre was later of the view that refugees impeded operations.\(^13\) At the time, troop movement was judged by at least one French staff officer to have been “incredibly hampered” and in some cases “paralysed” by the refugee movement. Moreover, the view held that the Germans had systematically used bombardment and “fifth-column methods” to create panic.\(^14\) With routes blocked, British artillery found it difficult to relocate
quickly to where it was needed. The delays in the movement of formations from one area to another resulted in even less time to study orders and make a reconnaissance of the new ground. The construction and establishment of Allied roadblocks was hampered by refugee movement, especially around Calais. Without such roadblocks, it was judged that espionage increased.

Other problems caused by refugees, included difficulties encountered by allied aircrews in drawing a distinction between enemy forces and refugee columns. There were even suggestions that refugees had been used as form of human shield. On 21 May, near Maulde, it was reported that a number of enemy crossed the nearby river disguised as refugees, but had been detected and "driven out with the bayonet." It was further suggested that on other occasions some enemy “disguised as civilians, even as nuns, and attempted to cross with the refugees, horses and cattle.” Rumour and hearsay fed panic. Terror amongst civilians was amplified by stories of refugees being machine-gunned from the air and left in “heaps, unburied, where they had fallen.” The use of the telephone network by German agents or Fifth Columnists to spread false evacuation orders to local officials was suggested. However, the involvement of a Fifth Column is much debated. Although activities were suspected at the time, on further analysis, such reports turned out to be exaggerations. Nevertheless, the impact on military memory had been made and this provided the ‘evidence’ that some form of civil administrative arrangements to work alongside field security (who specifically countered espionage and sabotage) on operations were necessary.

However, to suggest that no preparations were made by the BEF is wrong. Special arrangements had been made for the control of traffic, including refugees in its area. Refugee routes had been allotted and troops had been allocated to make the ‘road control organisation’ plan work. Indeed, it was reported there were few refugee problems in the opening phase of the campaign. Later as chaos began to take hold, BEF corps commanders were given a free hand in developing plans to stop refugees blocking Allied movement. Typically, civilian vehicles were turned into the fields in order to keep the roads clear and refugees were often forced into makeshift camps. However, despite daytime problems, according to one first hand report by Belgian Rene Falkenau, military movement was much easier at night, when most refugee traffic ceased. The problem was that as the campaign continued there was a military requirement to move throughout the day. Consequently, the Military Police, whose war role included control of military movement, were overburdened by the associated need to control mass refugee movement.

It was clear to the BEF commander, General the Viscount Gort, that an enlarged or separate body was required to deal with refugee problems in future campaigns. Two elements were fundamental, some form of population movement control and the ability to screen refugees for reasons field security. The road control organisation operating under the Quartermaster General had been partly, but inconclusively trialled in France and this might provide a solution to the first requirement. In preventing panic and rumour, the need to avert the misuse of communications infrastructure like telegraph and telephone
services, preferably through the establishment of a trustworthy public information network, was important.\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{British Memories}

Many British officers who would later serve in Normandy or were involved in its planning had experience of the 1940 campaign. A very crude list of those who in some capacity served in both the 1940 and North West Europe campaigns (although not necessarily in Normandy) and includes Generals Adair, Brooke, Bucknall, Bullen-Smith, A.J.H. Cassels, Crocker, Dempsey, H.M. Gale, Horrocks, Montgomery, F.E. Morgan, Rawlins, Rennie, Ritchie, Templer, Verney and Whistler.\textsuperscript{31} Lieutenant General Sir Brian Horrocks commenting after the war about the move to Dunkirk noted that:

\begin{quote}
Retreats are always nightmares of confusion, and this was no exception. The roads were packed with refugees, many of them old people and children trudging hopelessly along with all their pathetic bits and pieces piled high on hand-carts or even prams, their eyes constantly scanning the skies for German bombers which seemed perpetually overhead.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

Brooke had experience of operations in both Flanders and Normandy during 1940. He noted in his diary in May 1940, that the refugees were “a desperate encumbrance on all roads.”\textsuperscript{33} Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan, one of the key planners for the Allied invasion of 1944 recalled after the war: “One will forever remember those ghastly columns of miserable refugees met in France in 1940.” More importantly, he was keen for the future to “ensure that military operations are not hampered by mobs of refugees either by hazard or by the enemy’s design.”\textsuperscript{34} Morgan’s central part in establishing Civil Affairs at COSSAC was matched by his good understanding of the nature of Civil Affairs issues and his “capacity” to engage with all aspects of the subject area.\textsuperscript{35}

However, such observations were not simply limited to military commanders. Churchill was aware of the “thousands of refugees” filling the secondary roads bound for Dunkirk.\textsuperscript{36} Furthermore, earlier during the campaign he had directed on 23 May that: “The refugees should be driven into the fields and parked there, as proposed by General Weygand, so that the roads can be kept clear.”\textsuperscript{37} Churchill also had personal experience. A flying visit to meet French political leaders in Tours (a party that included General Ismay) during June 1940 coincided with much refugee movement around the city.\textsuperscript{38} Churchill noted the “streets crowded with refugees’ cars.”\textsuperscript{39} In Parliament too, there was recognition in June and July 1940 of the movement problems caused by refugees.\textsuperscript{40} Although, there were those, like Morton, around Churchill who were not always enthusiastic about Civil Affairs, that some form of refugee control organisation was perceived as necessary and would be supported at the highest levels was not in doubt.

As an indication of the impact of 1940 in military planning, at least one refugee camp was established at Sompting, near Brighton, Sussex, as a contingency in case sufficient expansion was not possible in the first thirty days of OVERLORD.\textsuperscript{41} Despite, the general North West Europe policy being not to\[100\]
evacuate across the Channel, these facilities were developed as a sensible contingency in light of the experience of 1940. Such was the fear of the refugee issue that accommodation and facilities for 6,000 refugees, supported by 3,000 British staff, was justified. To ensure that any refugees sent to Britain were free from disease and to prevent epidemics being introduced into Britain, all were to be divided on arrival between “clean” and “dirty” and sent to corresponding camps. At the latter, they would be “thoroughly cleaned-up” and fed by the Women’s Voluntary Service. Security was also a concern. Intelligence suggested that at least ten percent of refugees would be enemy agents and thus, all would have to be screened. However, despite such preparations, it was reported that only “customer” was one “Norman peasant and his goat” who had been found wandering confused around a landing beach on D-Day and pushed onto a landing craft going back across the Channel! Nevertheless, the contingency accommodation, a mix of requisitioned housing and tents, was still available for exclusive use by refugees in July. This was despite the public (if naïve, given the temporary nature of the accommodation) demands of British citizens who had been made homeless by the V-bomb attacks starting the week after D-Day.

**French Memories**

Even if exact figures vary between sources, without a doubt, there was much movement of people, running to many hundreds of thousands, around France before and during the war. And of which the *Exode* of 1940 was a significant part. Figures, assembled shortly after the War by former SHAEF refugees planning officer Malcolm Proudfoot indicate that between 1933 and 1939, France received an estimated 388,000 refugees from Germany, Saarland, Austria, Danzig, Memel, the Sudetenland and Spain; of whom the largest component were 300,000 Spanish Republicans. Furthermore, during the preparations for war in the West, 300,000 Frenchmen were evacuated away from the area of the Maginot Line in September 1939. However, most significantly, it is thought over 4,000,000 Frenchmen fled south in May and June 1940. They were joined by an estimated 1,000,000 Belgians, 70,000 from Luxembourg, 50,000 Dutch, 50,000 German and Austrian Jews and 30,000 Poles. Of that 1940 total, some 125,000 of all nationalities were able to make an onward journey beyond French borders to neutral or friendly territory (12,000 to Britain). Of those who remained, most were able to return home within the year. Nevertheless, in 1941, there were still 871,000 French (543,000 in Vichy-controlled areas) yet to make that journey.

The refugee movements in and out of Paris during June 1940 were particularly remarkable. Indeed, reflecting the ever-changing nature of the wartime population in the city, figures from 1944 suggested that from a pre-war population of 2,800,000 (1936), by the outbreak of war in September 1939 it had fallen to 1,800,000, increasing by spring 1940 to 2,200,000, falling to just 900,000 after the mass flight from the city on 7 July 1940, before returning to a wartime norm of 2,300,000 (based on the ration card count, 10 January 1942).
National French population movement was later amplified by various German and Vichy policies. An estimated 1,000,000 Frenchmen were evacuated from coastal areas by German order. Some 120,000 Jews of France’s multinational population of 350,000 (November 1942) were seized and deported by the end of the war. The initial German policy of releasing French prisoners of war captured during 1940 soon relented, as labour was required to service their war industries. They were joined by firstly volunteer and then conscripted civilian French labour. Total French labour (civilian and prisoner of war) stood at 500,000 in October 1940 and thereafter steadily increased from 1,298,600 (September 1941) to 1,550,000 (January 1943) to 1,970,000 (January 1944, including 870,000 French prisoners of war).

However, accurate figures are never easy to obtain, especially when they have been subjected to deliberate attempts to mislead an audience in the true size of numbers involved. Thus, figures for French civilian labour in Germany during spring 1944 can vary between 600,000 and 1,200,000. Figures for wartime Jewish victims can also vary. An alternative arrangement puts figures at some 80,000 victims (75,721 were deported and 4,000 died in France) of whom 24,000 were French Jews, 56,500 were foreign Jews living in France and 2,500 (of any nationality) returned to France after the war. Unsurprisingly, given the numbers involved, figures for the Exode can vary substantially. French official figures for July 1940 put the number of refugees at 8,000,000, including 6,200,000 French (one third from Paris), 1,800,000 Belgians and 150,000 from the Netherlands and Luxembourg. However, such accuracy is perhaps less important than the step change of arrangements required when considering tens of thousands as opposed to hundreds.

The causes of the 1940 Exode can be regarded as an instinctive reaction to avoid an approaching threat of violence, but it was also informed by historical memory. As both a collective memory and from personal experience, many who became refugees wished to avoid the levels of violent destruction witnessed during the First World War. This memory and its associated desire to seek refuge were reflected by interwar French policy developments that saw evacuation as preferable to living alongside another long running campaign in Flanders. As such, the attitude prevailing publically and politically in France was markedly different from that in Germany. In Germany, the preference of the national-socialists was to build shelters and for populations to stay put. Standing fast was regarded as heroic, evacuation was by contrast cowardly, defeatist and disruptive. However, evacuating others during war was perfectly acceptable and was often done with little regard for local morale. By way of example, between 1943 and 1944 German occupation forces ordered 38,000 of Cherbourg’s 51,000 strong population to leave. Only those useful to the German authorities were allowed to stay.

The failure of French national evacuation policy to work in 1940 was not want of trying. A considerable amount of French governmental planning, together with a limited amount of pre-invasion practice had gone into the 1940 evacuation plans. They included details such as the identification and readying of various sensible destination locations. For Paris this included Calvados, Orne,
Eure, Eure-et-Loire and Sarthe. When the invasion came, most refugees did indeed go in predictable directions west and south. Those French departments that received the lions’ share were Creuse (over 300,000), Dordogne, Corrèze (200,000 each), Hérault, Tarn-et-Garonne, Haute Garonne (100,000 each) and the six Breton departments (including Mayenne, 200,000 each). However, the evacuation was poorly executed by officials and most Frenchmen decided to act independently. Rumour abetted the development of increasing fear and panic. Effective control became impossible as official structures collapsed. Although, most who fled came from the north of France nearly every corner of the country was able relate directly to the experience of the Exode and its aftermath. Indeed, many refugees were unable to return home until after the war. After 1940, few Frenchmen would have welcomed the prospect of becoming a refugee.

The experience of the Exode, the needs of its aftermath and new needs resulting from the Allied bombing campaign brought with them substantial improvements to Vichy humanitarian and refugee handling capacity. Although, communes naturally remained the focus, in the first instance, for feeding and housing war victims and refugees, a series of central government arrangements were developed. Institutionally, the Ministry of the Interior was tasked with refugees handling which it did so through the refugees and disaster branch of the Civil Defence Directorate. The directorate involved several government departments in looking after refugees, evacuation and victims. Practical humanitarian experience was soon gained in running Centres de Repliement and organising the use of subsidised accommodation at holiday resorts for Exode refugees. As the Allied air campaign gathered pace, a mobile service was created, designed to hand out clothing and building materials at bombed locations. To ensure all government ministries were properly co-ordinated an additional agency was established by the Vichy authorities in the form of Service interministeriel de Protection contre les Evénements de Guerre. These public bodies worked alongside private relief organisations such as Secours National and the German-financed Comité Ouvrier de Secours Immédiat (dealing with civilian problems following air raids). Most significantly, in light of the 1940 experience, as invasion became increasingly likely in April and May 1944, Vichy authorities distributed Duties of the Administrative Authorities in the Battle Zone to Prefects and Sub-Prefects. It instructed them to take all necessary measures to assure the safety and feeding of their inhabitants, should they find themselves isolated from the central authority. Clearly all possible national measures were to be taken to avoid repeating the earlier disaster. However, whether such structures would stand up in 1944 when they had failed in 1940 was a concern for the British and justified the continued development of Civil Affairs. In the circumstances of an enemy deliberately using refugees in order to hamper Allied movement and firepower, the French plans might face an insurmountable challenge to their capabilities. Yet, other things remaining equal, French preparations stood every chance of negating or severely reducing the need for Civil Affairs.
INFORMED BY HISTORY?

Whether experience provides one with the knowledge that is required to complete a task or encourages one to take the wrong path is debateable. Indeed, whilst there was little debate as to the utility of the lessons of the 1940 campaign in planning for OVERLORD, some Civil Affairs officers in the Italian campaign believed that too much emphasis was placed on using Rhineland lessons instead of concentrating on the needs of present. As far back as the mid-1930s, the American Army had made use of the Rhineland experience in the production a Military Government Basic Field Manual (FM 27-5) and in the creation of Staff College Military Government planning exercises.\(^60\) Furthermore, during the Second World War, use was often made of previous Civil Affairs experience and historical lessons in American handbooks and British lectures.\(^61\) History gave the appearance of a decent military pedigree. Furthermore, it could be used to underline a respectable purpose to cynical audiences. In America, examples were drawn from military involvement in New Mexico, California, New Orleans, Memphis, Cuba, Manila, Mindanao, Samoa, Guam, Vera Cruz and Koblenz.\(^62\) In Britain, examples were drawn from Pliny’s letter to Maximus, Napoleonic times, the Rhineland occupation and even German and Japanese forms of occupation.\(^63\) However, arguably the benefits of such lessons can be put into some doubt as they often involved examples in lesser-developed colonies not modern European states. Even when they did, there were complications in adapting the lessons and the laws of the past to compensate for the impact of ideology on industrial and administrative infrastructure.

Nevertheless, the utility of previous experience was not entirely without merit. It was serendipitous that General Sir Archibald Wavell, with his knowledge of Occupied Enemy Territories Administration (OETA) in Palestine at the end of the First World War, was able on the turn of 1940 to foresee problems that were likely to be encountered with the occupation of Italian Cyrenaica.\(^64\) He initiated a request to Whitehall for direction and policy.\(^65\) Wavell’s first Chief Political Officer, Sir Philip E. Mitchell (Governor of Uganda\(^66\)), was in turn was able to draw from his First World War experiences in Tanganyika.\(^67\) Furthermore, those like Wavell with experiences of Palestine or the Rhineland were, at the very least, able to recognise instinctively the potential for civilian problems during and after military operations even if the details requirements of operations like OVERLORD needed a substantial changing of gears.

However, this depended very much on the wisdom of the individual. Wavell is considered fortunate in this respect.\(^68\) For others their intellect might be considered dubious, they may have had no experience, or they may have chosen to ignore what experiences they did have. Certainly, at a corporate British Army level the lack of interest in developing an understanding of Civil Affairs and Military Government did not help. What lessons commanders, like Montgomery, were able to draw from personal experience of policing in India, Egypt and Palestine is difficult to measure and probably varied between each of them.\(^69\) That is not to say there was no interest in or experience of such matters
generally. Many in the Lords who had served during the First World War or had otherwise been involved in events the followed during the occupation of the Rhineland were keenly aware of the potential problems.\textsuperscript{70}

The problem in part was that during the First World War most other civil administrative problems were handled by the Colonial, Foreign and India Offices. Rennell inevitably recorded that there was a “singular absence of study, direction and material” in the British Army during the interwar period. This even included the lack of any work at the Army Staff College, Camberley. If the lessons survived, they tended to lie “buried in the records of the Colonial Office [and] Foreign Office.”\textsuperscript{71} It is unsurprising, that the immediate reaction of the War Office regarding administrative needs in North Africa during early 1941 was one of attempting to pass the responsibility to other government departments.\textsuperscript{72}

\textbf{THE OCCUPATION OF THE RHINELAND, 1918-1929}

The occupation of the Rhineland by the armies of Britain, Belgium, France and America was “a purely military measure to safeguard the military position of the Allied and Associated Powers and to secure the fulfilment of the Peace Terms.”\textsuperscript{73} The number of civil administrators in the military (and called Civil Affairs officers) was restricted to a handful of advisors. They provided only modest guidance as the existing local authorities continued to handle most of the civil administrative duties.\textsuperscript{74} There was no attempt to re-educate the population away from “pernicious political doctrines,” rather the nature of administration was to support the concept of self-determination put forward in American President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points.\textsuperscript{75} Nevertheless, the occupation embodied certain robust Military Government elements, including supervision of civil legislative bodies, elections, executive officials, judiciary and police, together with restrictions on political activity and the use of summary justice.\textsuperscript{76} There was no doubt in the Rhineland that this was an occupation by a foreign force, as it was required that all local uniformed officials saluted all Allied officials.\textsuperscript{77}

If the Rhineland was principally an example of Military Government, it nevertheless presented a series of general Civil Affairs lessons. Principal amongst these were dealing with the civil effects of political instability and famine caused by the sudden collapse of both government and local administration.\textsuperscript{78} One lesson keenly felt at the time was that problems could have been significantly reduced if the occupying forces had taken swifter control of the Rhineland area following the collapse of German national authority in November 1918.\textsuperscript{79} Indeed, the problems encountered left a lasting impression amongst many senior British parliamentarians and government ministers, including Eden.\textsuperscript{80}

In many ways, the task in the Rhineland seemed relatively simple, as the area had not been bombed or fought over. There was disruption to food supply and transport networks, but the economic, political and social conditions were good, the population co-operative, the bureaucracy was intact and happy to carry on
under Allied orders, there was little ill will and, despite the revolution of 1918-
19, few law and order threats. In the American Third Army sector, it was felt
that whilst there were problems with both food distribution and reserves there
was nevertheless “no danger of starvation.”

Yet, Germany’s position was fragile as the result of years of Allied naval
blockade. Even if there was not an actual shortage of basic commodities in the
Rhineland at the beginning of the occupation, the legacy of the blockade had yet
to be rectified. Furthermore, across the whole of Germany the picture was
gloomy. German figures charted the daily calorific consumption within its
borders as having fallen from 3,500 prior to the war, to 3,000 in 1914, 2,000 in
1915, 1,500, in 1916 and 1,200 in the winter of 1917-18. For over half the war
most had existed on less than the recommended intake of 2,000 calories and
more for a man doing hard labour. The shortage of food became apparent in
1919 and resulted in many of the occupying powers supplying relief. Britain
supplied food to the occupied Rhineland areas between 1919 and 1920 and this
was later extended to other areas of Germany. The scale of relief work and the
dietary information gained on calorific intake provided valuable information
during the Second World War to Civil Affairs planners, the supply ministries
and for parliamentary debate.

Not everyone was so convinced of the problem. There was a view that given the
dependency of the Rhineland on other parts of Germany for food, elements in
the rest of Germany sought to embarrass the occupiers and score political
points by surreptitiously cutting food supplies even though there was enough
for all across the country. Nevertheless, there was a willingness by Britain to
supply food, which was driven by perceived need, by a genuine belief in the
warnings given by German representatives of possible unrest and by the
influence of the “purely humanitarian motives” of Prime Minister Lloyd
George. Furthermore, unlike the American Third Army, Britain’s Second Army
had the burden of the largest city in the occupied zone, Cologne, to administer.
An additional factor was a human one. General Sir Herbert Plumer (General
Officer Commanding, British Army of the Rhine) was worried about the negative
effects on the morale of his men of seeing civilians starve as many had been
found to be feeding the Germans from their own rations.

One of the most significant lessons from the Rhineland was the need to make an
early start with the co-ordination of the relief. Planning had to consider the
provision of a large scale of relief, which in turn required a substantial logistical
infrastructure. Between January and August 1919, 5,000,000 tons of aid was
delivered to Germany. In many ways, the occupying powers were in a
fortunate position, as a considerable amount of German commercial shipping
was lying idle in ports following the blockade and additionally there was a good
supply of shipping available from neutral sources. The same was known not be
true during or after the Second World War. The cost of relief was estimated to
be £350,000,000, most of which was paid or borrowed by Germany. The
overall lessons were not good and were put in blunt terms by Sir Frederick
Leith-Ross (from the Relief Department of the Board of Trade and who had
much experience of the Rhineland occupation) to a Civil Affairs training course
in March 1943, where he stated that the relief was inadequate, started too late, ended too early and was badly co-ordinated between countries.  

There were lessons too in other, but associated areas of the occupation, namely those of law and order. In the state of political flux that developed in Germany following the end of the war, disorder was allowed to breed. Resulting law and order problems were diverse and included looting, rioting over food and fuel shortages, and even full-scale rebellions in the Spartakist uprising and Kapp Putsch. None of these was helped by the scale of the task in re-organising the local Police.

Furthermore, there were Civil Affairs institutional problems in virtual all of the national zones of occupation. Few of those selected for the British Rhineland civil administration were either trained for the purpose or employed because of suitable experience or qualifications. There were greater problems in the American sector beyond the complete lack of trained or even loosely prepared Civil Affairs staff available at the start of the operation. Control of local officials was delegated to divisional commanders, who with little professional advice, handled matters as he saw fit. Thus, commanders tended to be influenced by military and not political or administrative factors. Typically, boundaries conformed to American and not German civilian requirements, with the result that the small Civil Affairs team (often just an appointed officer) for each Division had to maintain contact with several officials in several Kreise, who in turn received different instructions from a number of different Divisions. Furthermore, Divisions often moved location and those appointed to Civil Affairs duties moved with them and, at first, the freshly appointed Civil Affairs officer with the new division was, like his predecessor, untrained and unprepared. Nevertheless, as Divisions were withdrawn to the United States, Colonel Irwin L. Hunt from his position as Officer-in-Charge of Civil Affairs in the United States Third Army was able to better organise what remained. Yet, given the paucity of its staff, Civil Affairs could never be more than “tactical” as there were too few to cover ground on a “territorial” basis. Furthermore, it was never possible to achieve a unified approach across either the whole of the American or Allied occupied areas. Indeed, general relations between the occupiers were sometimes described as being less than cordial. Matters were not eased by the number of poorly co-ordinated civilian commissions established to deal with economy and other higher-level matters. Yet, Hunt’s view was that American results were better than might be expected in the circumstances and, in particular, judgements made by people on the ground were nearly always appropriate.

Hunt’s 1920 Report identified three fundamental problems common to all Allied areas – a lack of training, no preparation and poor organisation. The Report neatly summarised the strengths and weaknesses in other sectors. The French strengths were the creation of a bureau to control Civil Affairs, administration focused on the whole of the French area, the creation of a special section within the general staff to deal with civil matters and the senior most commander being recognised as head of both military and civil administration. However, many of the French structures were not repeated at lower formations, thus
undermining the benefits and generally, the French authorities had a too limited view on the range of civil matters to be covered. British staff arrangements were viewed as similarly comprehensive to those of the French, but extended down to lower formations. Furthermore, Hunt felt that:

... by reason of his broad experience, the senior British officer is by nature and training an excellent civil administrator. He is broad-minded, essentially fair and just, always dignified but withal firm. ... The philosophy of the magnanimity of the victor was never better demonstrated. 

However, despite reports like those of Hunt, there was little in the way of corporate military memory or debate to come out of the Rhineland amongst any of the Allies. This was especially the case in Britain. Edmonds official history on the British part of the occupation was not published until 1944. America was slightly better served, with Hunt’s Report helping the development of Military Government in the *Rules of Land Warfare* and *Military Government Field Manuals*. Yet, as the views of those in Italy indicate such American publications focused rather heavily on historical examples without considering what had changed.

Despite the development of British Military Government and Civil Affairs thought during the interwar period, it could be compensated by personal experience, impressions and knowledge. Indeed, the fear of the consequences of a sudden enemy collapse saw from 1942 the development at COSSAC of contingency plans that would eventually result in three concurrent versions of Operation RANKIN to cover all the likely possibilities. The personal knowledge of Leith-Ross was later to prove indispensable in planning for Second World War Civil Affairs. At a political level, the determination to ensure a smooth transition from Military Government to a Control Commission and covering all of Germany was also not lost. Eden in his 1943 paper pointed out there was much to learn from the 1918 and indicated reports to be found in the House of Commons Library entitled “The German Collapse of 1918” and “The German Revolution of 1918.” However, such papers whilst useful accounts, provided only an overview and little in the way of detail about what military Civil Affairs and Military Government structures were required.

**SECOND WORLD WAR AFRICA**

The lessons provided for North West Europe by experience garnered during the Second World War campaigns in African were a similar mixture of the useful, the inappropriate and the irrelevant. Certainly, connections can be established between the campaigns. At a basic level, the Second World War experiences, like the Rhineland experience, reinforced the need to plan and prepare for Civil Affairs work. Individuals like Rennell, whose experience in Africa was considered suitable for operations in Italy, who advised planners for North West Europe and gave lectures on the subject matter are illustrative of such a common line of development. Furthermore, American lessons from their campaign in French North Africa had profound effects on the development of
future requirements. Indeed, the general result of British and American experience was the requirement that civil administration in the first instance had to be a military affair in support of the needs of a military commander.

THE BRITISH IN AFRICA

The British military administrations in Ethiopia (including the ‘reserved areas’), Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, Eritrea, Assab, Cyrenaica, Kufra, Tripolitania, Madagascar and the Dodecanese Islands all varied in size and scope of activities. Most took their lead from the first administration to be considered, Cyrenaica where the first question asked regarded which government department was to be responsible for such aspects as planning, policy, recruitment and organisation. The question had been prompted by Wavell and was discussed in Whitehall during January and February 1941. Inevitably, in answering it comparisons were made with the Governorships of Gibraltar and Malta and from experience in the administration of enemy territories in Africa during First World War. Wavell, asked for his views by the Secretary of State for War, made it clear that any policy must not produce the potential for interdepartmental conflicts that might undermine the needs of the campaign commander; his needs were paramount. This view was quickly supported by officials from the War, Foreign, Colonial and India Offices, Treasury and Bank of England, the commander “must, for operational reasons, be responsible for both civil and military administration in the territories.”

At a ministerial meeting on 19 February 1941, it was decided that only one department, the War Office, could be in charge. Nevertheless, other departments would assist and advise, principally, the Colonial and Foreign Offices. Coordinating the various government departments was the job of a standing interdepartmental committee, the OETA (Occupied Enemy Territories Africa) Committee. Thus, from an early date it was clear from a British perspective that civil administration was designed to serve military interests, even if some of its staff came from other government departments. Many of the officers were recruited from the Colonial Service. Indeed, many of the senior Civil Affairs (sometimes called Political Officers in the India Army tradition) officers had “years of experience in the colonies.”

In British areas of North and East Africa during 1941 and 1942, experienced was gained in dealing with such issues as healthcare, supply distribution, sanitation, law and order, looting, tribal infighting, revenge attacks by indigenous peoples on their former colonial masters, relief, and accommodation needs. However, whilst such dangers as disease and disorder could be seen as ubiquitous, in Africa there was perceived to be a greater degree of self-sufficiency given the more rural and primitive living conditions. The scale of the relief effort was therefore comparatively light, even if some of the Italian colonists in places like Eritrea did need more sophisticated help (and for whom there was a greater predisposition to support). In attempts to reduce deliberately the impact of relief work on the military, much store was put in utilising local labour and transport and in using the services of voluntary
agencies like the American Red Cross. However, in some circumstances, the Army did arrange for the airlifting of fresh milk for mothers and children.\textsuperscript{120} Furthermore, many of the problems faced were far from straightforward and necessitated an increasing amount of work by the military administration. Distribution in particular was not helped by looting and general theft, requiring the recreation of a local police force from the remnants of the Fascist system. As in the rest of East Africa, relief problems were often exacerbated by a lack of local agricultural supply, a lack of cash (often having been destroyed on orders from Rome), too few breadwinners (as many were serving in the Italian Army), high unemployment with the collapse of industry and too little housing (not helped by billeting of British troops).\textsuperscript{121} Conditions for the 45,000 Italians living in Asmara, the capital of Eritrea located on a windswept plateau, were described as “dismal.” There was no industry, no agriculture and no work in the city. Indeed, there was little else in the rest of the colony either.\textsuperscript{122} These problems were only partially mitigated by the repatriation of women, children and the sick to Italy. Moreover, the provision of sanitation, administration and healthcare frequently collapsed as the result of Fascist officials ransacking offices and deserting their posts. The breakdown in administration also had broader consequences, as malaria-ridden areas had not received the routine spraying; threatening civilian and soldier alike. Yet, to reinstate the hard-line members of the previous regime was politically unacceptable and, thus, required British officials to direct local bodies.\textsuperscript{123} Inevitably, the practical experience of these events was giving Civil Affairs officers “a conscious sense of the order of things to be done” and even prompted the creation of the organisation’s motto \textit{First things First}.\textsuperscript{124} Overall, the need to consider civil administrative requirements from the start of all campaign planning was now apparent.

Elsewhere, the British-led invasion of French Madagascar in summer 1942, illustrated the potential for political problems to emerge. A post-action report submitted by the Foreign Office to the War Office in August 1942 highlighted a number of points. Inevitably, some of these were practical, including the need to employ staff with appropriate linguistic skills and greater familiarity with the “character” of the territory. There needed to be a clearer division of labour between the senior political officer (War Office) and senior civil administrator (Foreign Office). However, others were political. Military commanders needed to be better aware of the local, international and British political context. The ambiguities between sovereignty and military primacy needed to be resolved. The report also recommended improved interdepartmental and inter-Allied planning in London.\textsuperscript{125} Other views pointed to the considerable difficulties found in controlling rival French groups, all of whom claimed sovereignty.\textsuperscript{126} Certainly, experience of the operation was judged by Rennell to have “stood [him] in very good stead in the actual mounting of a Civil Affairs Administration” for Sicily.\textsuperscript{127}

A general problem that emerged from the experiences of military administration in Africa was that it concentrated on just the combined needs of battle and first order care and maintenance measures. It tended to ignore

[110]
longer-term civilian rehabilitation and development needs. However, the longer an army controlled an area the more apparent these needs became and inevitably, at some stage there was a requirement to take some action. In October 1942, in considering the requirements for Eastern Africa, the Chief Political Officer in the Middle East asked Whitehall for policy direction on broader matters including agriculture, forestry, medical, educational, public works and works services. A modestly extended commitment was agreed in the same month. The problem was not just one of a separate military philosophy. It was also financial. Although most relief was generally sold to recipients, not given away, Civil Affairs was far from being completely cost neutral. In the two and a half years to June 1943, the net cost of administering East Africa was £3,463,400. However, whilst longer-term requirements were understood, a corresponding debate remained open on the extent of the military’s liability for it.

For North West Europe the basic lessons were clear. A War Office report from March 1942 identified the main Civil Affairs problems experienced in Cyrenaica and East Africa as the failure to properly plan, the insufficient scope of War Office expertise and the need to employ better interdepartmental machinery. For future operations, it was clear that an ad hoc plan and a focus on just emergency measures would no longer suffice. However, if the basic lessons were clear, the details for North West Europe were likely to very different. As pointed out to visiting Members of Parliament in October 1943 at the Civil Affairs Staff Centre (CASC) at Wimbledon by Kirby (Director of Civil Affairs at the War Office) the larger civilian populations in North West Europe and Northern Italy were likely to present Civil Affairs with a serious liability.

A “SCHOOL FOR GAULEITERS”

Whilst, the need to support the operational needs of the campaign commander was never a topic of debate, the extent and nature of the involvement of civilian relief and development agencies and their co-ordination provided much more fertile ground. Here, American experiences during Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942, helped to illustrate some of these problems. That the operation was America’s baptism of fire in the Second World War provided much experience of not just co-ordination, but also practical and diplomatic problems. Indeed, deals designed to ease civil administration that were variously hatched between American commanders and the pro-Vichy (or, at least, pro-Pétainist) Frenchmen General Giraud and Admiral Darlan in advance of and during TORCH had a significant backlash for relations between the transatlantic partners and de Gaulle during the build up to the Normandy landings. Britain’s view sitting as an observer rather than participant in Civil Affairs aspects of the operation (or its planning) was that the American approach was subject to much “ad hocery.”

Civil Affairs planning for TORCH started on 15 August 1942 at Allied Forces Headquarters, at that point located in London. The plan was to consider political, diplomatic and economic matter in detail and public health matters in
part. In mid-September, recent graduates of the American School of Military Government at Charlottesville arrived to assist the planning process. Although regular army medical staff worked on civilian medical problems from the invasion onwards, actual Civil Affairs staff did not begin to arrive in theatre until late November 1942, two weeks after the landings.\textsuperscript{136}

By December 1942, the first major problems were emerging. Civilian supply shortages in were having a noticeably “adverse political effect” and were potentially “dangerous” in not meeting “minimum needs.”\textsuperscript{137} There were significant public health problems and these were encouraged by the breakdown of French administrative control and by only partly prepared American plans.\textsuperscript{138} In terms of disease, malaria and typhus were regarded as constant dangers and venereal disease as endemic.\textsuperscript{139} All were potential threats to military effectiveness. With poor public health and sanitation controls, intestinal, insect-borne and respiratory diseases and plagues were to follow.\textsuperscript{140}

At the political level, the commander of the landings, General Dwight D. Eisenhower (later to command operations in Sicily, Italy and North West Europe) blunted reported that he had encountered “considerable difficulties” in dealing with French authorities.\textsuperscript{141} Lessons identified in January 1943 recognised that the “plan was incomplete for the TORCH Operation.” It was also recognised that better training was needed along with better political and field security intelligence.\textsuperscript{142} Many of the reported problems were similar to those encountered by the British in Madagascar some months before. However, during TORCH, Eisenhower was also unhappy with the “disordered jumble of United States civilian agencies dabbling in civil administration.”\textsuperscript{143}

Poor Civil Affairs planning by the military was seen as largely the result of poor internal co-ordination between War Department branches and a widespread lack of interest in Civil Affairs issues by military staffs.\textsuperscript{144} These military problems began to be addressed following the creation within the War Department of the Washington-based Civil Affairs Division on 1 March 1943.\textsuperscript{145} Dealing with the jumble of agencies was altogether a different problem. The jumble was the result of political battles in Washington that split too finely civil administrative responsibilities between government departments and their agencies. The battles revolved around a dispute regarding who was best suited to handle civilian relief and administration. The touchstone for the dispute was the reaction in Washington to the establishment to School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia. The school had opened in May 1942 (a naval equivalent was established at Columbia University\textsuperscript{146}) after approved was given by Chief of Staff to the Army, General George C. Marshall (on 6 January 1942) and by Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson (on 2 April 1942).\textsuperscript{147} That the military should consider civil administration and furthermore start its own programme of training came as a shock to many political Americans and by August 1942, it had become the target for political attack. It was known in many American newspapers as a “School for Gauleiters” and the furore sponsored an investigation by both Roosevelt and Congress. Only passing interest in Charlottesville was expressed in Britain.\textsuperscript{148}
In Washington in September 1942, Henry Morgenthau Jr. rejected the assumption by the War Department that it should be responsible for civil planning for TORCH. His view was that civilian departments were better equipped for such work, especially those responsible for the ‘New Deal’ economic recovery programme of the interwar period. In particular, many ‘New Dealers’ felt that they were better qualified to teach and practise operationally the fiscal and economic matters taught at the School. Charlottesville’s case was not helped by the suggested poor quality of some of its military and academic staff. Additionally, there were ideological concerns with Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes suggesting in October 1942 that Military Government training contained the “germ of imperialism.” Indeed, the commandant of the School, Brigadier General Allen W. Gullion was accused on 27 August of being a fascist.

In preparing for the investigations in November 1942, it became apparent to Stimson in September that the support of Cordell Hull at the State Department would be required if the school was to survive and there was no doubt to Stimson that it should. In return for Hull’s support, Stimson accepted State Department’s role in formulating and co-ordinating aspects of civil administrative policy – particularly relief provision. Eisenhower, as commander of TORCH, was uneasy about this dependency on State Department supplies, fearing a division in his responsibilities. Further complications were added after Roosevelt, in October, told Stimson after a “stormy cabinet meeting” that civil administration was predominantly a civilian task. Roosevelt formalised this statement on 18 November 1942, giving primacy on all economic, political, and fiscal policy questions in liberated areas to the State Department (working in conjunction with the Board of Economic Warfare and Office of Lend Lease who would provide relief supplies). Eisenhower was effectively responsible to two masters.

Within Washington, the civilian departments created a number of associated agencies; including the Office of Foreign Territories (OFT), the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee (IAC), the Committee of Combined Boards and the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO). Some of whom would co-ordinate with their British counterparts in the supply ministries. However, many accomplished little having terms of reference that were vague, did not involve the War Department or were limited solely to events in North Africa. In some cases, items sent to North Africa were not urgently required, rather than wheat, stockings and nail polish were provided. Nevertheless, OFRRO was rather more capable and supplied both relief and development to liberated states.

Whilst in preparation for TORCH there was a necessary reluctance (despite the valiant attempts of Stimson) to make a stand over the involvement of the jumble of agencies, following it there was now the evidence to challenge their role. American military planners were by now convinced that during active military periods the planning, organisation and supply of items like relief by the War Department was an operational necessity. For military commanders, like Eisenhower, the sensible duration of this period was an area had been entirely
cleared of German forces and was no longer required for military purpose. Eisenhower also rejected the policy of serving two Washington masters and in which he was supported by the influential American Resident Minister in the Mediterranean, Robert A. Murphy. Furthermore, by the end of November, Marshall was able to gain support on the matter from the State Department.  

Surprisingly, given the previous acrimony expressed in some quarters, support was also forthcoming from bodies like OFRRO. Whilst, they continued to insist on having control over the development of policy and plans in Washington and for procurement of relief supplies (a moot point, all procurement had to be endorsed by the military), they agreed that for operational planning and activity during the war-fighting phase should rest with the military. It was obvious to OFRRO’s director, Governor Herbert H. Lehman (later to be Director of UNRRA), that his organisation lacked the capacity to deal with relief during the opening phase of operations. Thus, soon responsibility during the first 90 days (at least) for operational procurement, distribution and administration of relief was transferred to the War Department in spring 1943. Furthermore, Lehman encouraged the War Department to develop an organisation capable of dealing with all aspects of civil administration that saw the creation of CAD.  

In order to ensure better civilian co-ordination Roosevelt created the Office of Foreign Economic Coordination (OFEC), but soon found it was hampered by many agencies refusing to surrender their prerogatives and in September 1943, it was replaced by the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA). Being directly responsible to Roosevelt, the FEA had greater freedom for movement. It soon absorbed many of the agencies and after an intervening period of confusion, solved many of the problems. Nevertheless, whilst policy was still a matter of civilian control, operational civil administrative control was by spring 1943 comfortably in the hands of military.  

**Transatlantic Supply**  

The Americans were not alone in debating which government department was best equipped to supply and distribute relief. Following Churchill’s 1940 speech, Whitehall began a series of similar debates. However, on both side of the Atlantic these were not just debates over departmental responsibility but also the commitments made by the duration, scale and territorial scope of policy. They were complicated by the asynchronous nature of debates on each side of the Ocean. Furthermore, with America’s unassailably strong position in terms of resources and despite sitting on the Combined Boards, it was clear that British policy, as the junior partner needed to be concordant with that of the senior partner. Who was going to supply what, how much and to whom inevitably drew on events in Washington. At times, the policies coming out of the debates seemed produce humanitarian supply obligations that outweighed any possible benefits to supporting the needs of a campaign commander. Thankfully, at other levels, some aspects of supply were mercifully straightforward. At an early stage in planning for the North West Europe campaign, it was clear that the
differences between British and American supply systems could not be resolved and must remain separate.\textsuperscript{165}

**British Supply Debates**

Inevitably, there was plenty of discussion within Whitehall over such supply matters as who was to write policy, to plan it, to estimate needs, to work with exiled Allies, to co-ordinate the various departments and allies, to co-ordinate with the Americans, to co-ordinate the transition from military to civilian phases and to procure necessary items.\textsuperscript{166} No one organisation held or wanted to hold all of the cards, but several wanted to dominate the pack. Principal amongst these were the turf battles between Leith-Ross of the Relief Department and Bovenschen at the War Office.\textsuperscript{167}

The Relief Department not only had the experience of Leith-Ross but also through him had connections to the Inter-Allied Post-War Requirements Committee (IAC). The IAC was the product of a British-run conference involving the exiled Europeans held at St. James’ Palace, London, in September 1941. The conference, whose main aim was to allow the exile governments the space to debate and eventually agree with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, also made time to consider “the problem of the re-provisioning of Europe with foodstuffs and raw materials after the war.”\textsuperscript{168} The IAC and its associated Bureau (under the chairmanship of Leith-Ross) was designed to prepare estimates of the “kinds and amounts of foodstuffs and raw materials required for the re-provisioning of its territories and the order of priority in which it would desire supplies to be delivered as soon as circumstances permit.”\textsuperscript{169} Together with the supply departments, these bodies would provide much useful advice in estimating the amount and type of relief supplies required.\textsuperscript{170}

However, their practical shortcomings were readily apparent from as early as June 1942 and frequently re-iterated especially following American experience during TORCH.\textsuperscript{171} Leith-Ross acknowledged that together with the Relief Department, the Inter-Allied Bureau whilst useful at providing estimates of requirements neither were ever in a position to do much more.\textsuperscript{172} Thus, it seemed inevitable that the supply and distribution of relief would pass to the War Office.

In terms of procurement, Bovenschen appeared to be comfortable with the idea that it would be easier if another department assumed the burden.\textsuperscript{173} It was also easier because there was a level of awkwardness between the departments. There was acrimony between Bovenschen and Leith-Ross. There were differences between the short-term approach of the military and the longer-term ones of the Relief Department. Indeed, with American debates over relief responsibility not fully resolved, there was War Office concern that impractical policies would be foisted upon them and at times, it seemed that British supply departments followed their American equivalents. There were practical problems in estimating what amount of relief was required during a campaign of indeterminate length.\textsuperscript{174} The continued status quo was unacceptable to Secretary to the War Cabinet, Bridges, who after a meeting on 1 March 1943...
with Bovenschen noted that it was “clear that the Departments are at sixes and sevens on this point, and I think it would be a good plan to hold a meeting to clear our heads on it.”175 Given domestic political concerns over British food imports, it was too important a matter to be left uncoordinated. The result was the creation of a committee to be responsible for co-ordinating supply; the Shipping and Supply Subcommittee, a sub-committee of the AT(E) Committee.176 It included many representatives from other government departments, but equally important, in ensuring immediate military needs were properly harmonised with the potentially longer-term rehabilitation needs, was the decision to rotate its chairman between Leith-Ross and Bovenschen depending on the nature of the issue.177

The consensus of the committee became mostly easier as, on both sides of the Atlantic, the battlefield shortcomings of the civilian relief agencies were recognised. Even during the planning stages of Roosevelt’s grand idea of an international civilian relief organisation (later to become UNRRA), it had become clear after much hyperbole that it too had battlefield limitations and would, like its national siblings be confined to deal with events after the guns had fallen silent.178 Speaking after the war, Brigadier Thomas Robbins, senior Civil Affairs officer at 21 Army Group suggested that:

… UNRRA was a superlative piece of supererogation; it could undertake nothing which did not involve complete reliance upon the military organisation; it competed for men and material, transport etc. and proved to be unnecessarily costly, extravagantly so.179

By May 1943 and with such consensus, several aspects of British supply policy had been decided. Estimates of needs were to be conducted by both the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Relief Department. Supplies were procured by the Interdepartmental supply committee after the Ministry of Production had sought and gained approval from various combined boards in Washington. During operations, relief would be a military responsibility and the campaign commander would make the decision on military grounds as to when to hand over this responsibility to local authorities (and through them UNRRA). For reasons of interdepartmental transparency, the supply committee was responsible for both the military period and that which followed. To overcome the problem of how to divide relief procurement between different Allied forces in a theatre of operations where there was uncertainty both of individual regional relief requirements in North West Europe and over where the campaign would venture, it was decided as a British initiative, to procure all relief stocks for the entire first phase of operations in the whole campaign area.180 Despite the magnanimous nature of the British initiative in getting procurement underway and in time for OVERLORD, certain details remained to be clarified and others were revisited. In particular, a common Allied view on the duration of relief responsibility in North West Europe, the scale and type of relief provided and the geographical scope of relief provision needed to be developed.
**Duration of Relief**

Whilst the duration of the period of military responsibility was “indeterminate,” there were nevertheless for planning purposes, assumptions made as to the extent of military liability.\(^{181}\) The need to establish some planning guidelines had been prompted in July 1942 by the Ministry of Food and Inter-Allied Committee keen to work out how procurement was going to be divided between the agencies.\(^{182}\) A figure was derived within the War Office (but no clue as to how or why) that the period of military relief would be no more than 42 days.\(^{183}\) It was enough to serve a purpose and by March 1943, “ready to consume” food had been ordered for this period through the Ministry of Food.\(^{184}\) However, soon military planners, working on Operation ROUNDUP, concluded that 42 days might not be long enough. Indeed, there was a strong possibility that areas might be fought over for months not days.\(^{185}\)

Furthermore, ports and communications in liberated areas would need to remain in military hands for some considerable time after liberation. Civilian use of these facilities might compete with those of the military and the former could easily lose out to military priorities. It was important therefore that a commander’s responsibility for an area and its people was extended so that a proper balance between relief and military logistical needs could be achieved. Military planners advised that it was better to plan “wide” and go “narrow” later in order to mitigate possible friction between competing military and civilian interests.\(^{186}\) Interestingly a version of this friction later emerged in Italy (see Chapter 3). Thus, with the need for a decision, in the spring of 1943 Bovenschen proposed the period of military responsibility be extended to six months. As a calculation of what period was necessary, it was an “arbitrary estimate.”\(^{187}\) Nevertheless, as described by one witness to Bovenschen’s announcement, it served more than one purpose:

> He produced this out of the blue at an ATE meeting. Dudley Ward [Relief Department at the Board of Trade] could hardly believe his ears. It was a remarkable gesture by the War Office and Bovenschen in particular and very useful it was for planning.\(^{188}\)

Thankfully, it proved easy to sell the idea to the military in Washington as six months was almost the same period of time it took months to capture Tunis after the North African landings.\(^{189}\) However, some in Congress were, at first, reluctant to accept the timescale fearing renewed attempts at British “carpet bagging [sic]” of their supplies.\(^{190}\) Nevertheless, their support was achieved by the beginning of September 1943 and was soon adopted by Roosevelt.\(^{191}\) In November 1943, the President directed that the War Department was to be responsible by for the procurement of all relief and rehabilitation supplies for all parts of an operational theatre for the first six months after liberation.\(^{192}\) This was both good and questionably bad news.

On the positive side, planning could now proceed using the yardsticks of 42 days (this was finessed when detailed plans for OVERLORD were made, see Chapter 6) on emergency or ‘hard’ rations followed by a further six months of
‘bulk’ relief (flour and other items).\textsuperscript{193} If the military needs extended beyond or below six months then a sliding scale arrangement with the civilian agencies and UNRRA would be used.\textsuperscript{194} Any work conducted by UNRRA work during the military period was subject to the “assent” of the campaign commander, until he handed over control for an area.\textsuperscript{195}

However, although the British had been happy to procure both British and American relief supplies for the 42 days, the extension to six months was beyond national capabilities (including those of the Empire). In any case, it was time for others with greater resources to help share the burden. In this, there was little disagreement and through such bodies as the CCAC in Washington, it was agreed that for the six-month period, fifty percent of items would be procured by America, thirty percent by Britain (and the Empire) and twenty percent by third party states. The financial cost was always on the assumption that those receiving relief would pay for the majority of it. Thus, it was estimated that eighty percent of items would be supplied to countries that were in a position to repay the cost of purchase.\textsuperscript{196} Yet, other questions associated with the six-month commitment remained the subject of debate.

\textit{Scale of Relief}

In this context, scale related to both the amount and type of food and related items (e.g. medical supplies, soap and clothing) that an individual should receive in order to keep them healthy and disinclined to steal simply to survive. Estimates of the amount were informed by the work of the Inter-Allied Committee and the Ministry of Food. The agreed view was a basic ration of 2,000 calories per person per day was necessary to avoid disease and disorder. Supplements were given to children and mothers, and additional rations to men engaged in hard labour.\textsuperscript{197} The 2,000-calorie figure was viewed as the basic minimum and those associated with Relief Department were keen to see it closer to 2,500.\textsuperscript{198} However, later experience showed that human life could be sustained at a more meagre intake for short periods. During 1948, in parts of British-occupied Germany, many Germans survived on a regular ration of 1,100 calories and even as low as 800 calories.\textsuperscript{199}

The type of rations supplied was subject to some transatlantic differences of opinion. Whilst the American military preferred to stick to a narrower catalogue of supplies, in reality, there were only marginal differences between British and American views and it did not affect rations during the first phase of operations only later when the needs of rehabilitation were being considered. American “luxuries” that were procured by civilian ministries or UNRRA, and shipped and distributed by the military, would only be forthcoming if the operational situation permitted.\textsuperscript{200} During the first phase of operations, it was widely recognised that ‘treat’ and ‘home comforts’ food had a significant benefit in improving morale, which in turn would improve general health.\textsuperscript{201} Keen to ensure that wartime rations would have a psychological as well as a nutritional benefit for liberated Europeans, the Inter-Allied Committee argued successfully for an increase in the coffee ration.\textsuperscript{202}
The American reluctance to supply luxuries reflected a worry that armies had on both sides of the Atlantic that they would be forced into supplying items that went beyond emergency relief measures. Especially with the extension of military responsibility to six months (and during which there was possible handover to UNRRA) there grew a concern that relief would develop unchecked into rehabilitation and then into recovery. The problem was made more threatening by virtue that nearly all of UNRRA’s supplies would have to be shipped in vessels controlled by the military. Shipping was at a premium. Furthermore, there was a concern that domestic political support for UNRRA would prevail over military needs. Indeed, the November 1943 decision by Roosevelt to give the War Department responsibility for carrying out a “longer range programme of relief” seemed to point in this direction.

The concerns of the military were easy to comprehend; they wanted to concentrate on defeating the enemy and not on serving the results of bureaucratic territorial battles in Washington. However, the focus on such territorial battles was misleading for two rather different reasons. Firstly, because the direction of Roosevelt’s thinking on relief and recovery was never that it should undermine the military effort, but rather that the Allies should be in a better position to respond following the end of hostilities. Operational experience provided clear practical arguments for why events like recovery and reconstruction had to come later than first thought. Secondly, it was misleading because it avoided the facts established in Africa and Italy that simple emergency relief had its limitations. Within weeks, liberated people would need more substantial forms of salvation such as paid employment and a full range of health care and welfare services. This required consideration of something in between relief and recovery. Whilst the military wanted a limited liability, there was actually little option but to plan for something bigger. In an attempt to calm military UNRRA’s director, Lehman at the end of 1943 informed the CCS in Washington that rehabilitation was not reconstruction, that was of a “more permanent and far-reaching character.” Rather rehabilitation was “coterminous” with relief. Items shipped would be essentials not luxuries. However, Lehman with his Washington political connections was in all probability the wrong person to argue such a point. It needed a soldier and many had already made the intellectual jump.

**Scope of Relief**

If the scale and type of relief were a problem in certain military quarters then the scope of where it was to be sent was made matters worse. From a military point of view, it was logical that their responsibility in terms of the geographical scope of relief would extend no further than those areas directly associated with military operations and logistical support. Other areas, known as “hiatus areas” (e.g. south west France), would not be a military priority as they were not of operational interest. Initial British policy followed the logic of such thought. The hiatus areas were regarded as having the possibility of “such incalculable developments” that planning was almost impossible. Indeed, there was much anticipation of a “scorched earth” style of German withdrawal leaving too few
essential commodities in its destructive wake.\textsuperscript{206} In light of military operational needs, it was regarded as more sensible to leave such areas to the post-war civilian relief organisations.\textsuperscript{207} However, such views held in 1942 were modified following the establishment of the interdepartmental supply sub-committee in 1943 when the humanitarian needs of occupied Allies were properly considered in the context of all their human, moral, practical and diplomatic consequences. Here a compromise was reached in late 1943 whereby relief would be shipped by the military to hiatus areas, but with distribution left entirely in the hands of local bodies.\textsuperscript{208}

In America, the War Department had taken a view similar to the initial British view and when in November 1943, Roosevelt decided that hiatus areas would now be a military responsibility there was seemingly much reluctance to change.\textsuperscript{209} Led by the Operations Division (OPD) the aim appeared to be to make the President’s directive “meaningless.” Something British officers in Washington found “inconceivable morally and politically alike.”\textsuperscript{210} However, it soon became clear that this was mere campaigning by the War Department for additional monies from Congress in order to fund the scheme rather than any matter of principle.\textsuperscript{211} Thus, the War Department agreed to provide relief for the whole of Europe (except neutral countries and those areas uncovered by the Soviet Union). Planning was based on a series of scenarios ranging from optimistic to worst cases. In all cases a minimum intake of 2,000 calories per person would be guaranteed and other luxury items such as clothes and medical supplies and items used for rehabilitation would be included (the latter would be procured by other government departments). Distribution in active areas would form part of the military responsibilities and where hiatus areas (whether stable or chaotic) would be procured, shipped and audited, but not distributed through War Department channels.\textsuperscript{212} To co-ordinate this work amongst government departments in Washington, various interdepartmental committees were created.\textsuperscript{213}

Thus, military priorities on both side of the Atlantic were therefore protected, but the longer-term needs of relief organisations were also largely satisfied. For Normandy, SHAEF instructions were clear commanders of the Army Groups were responsible for calling forward relief items (after assessing if local supply was insufficient), they were able to use Allied shipping to transport relief forward, they could for practical reasons use their own supply depots to receive items, but except in the direst circumstances onward distribution (including vehicles, people and administration) was to an indigenous responsibility even in forward areas.\textsuperscript{214} In the area of military operations, basic emergency relief was to be distributed by Civil Affairs in support of military interests. Commanders would be required to consider relief requirements over the likely duration of a campaign and in all areas. Therefore, Commanders would have to balance military and civilian needs in terms of shipping priorities. However, there were sensible limits placed on the scale and scope of relief that mitigated this burden to acceptable levels. It should, if the estimates were right, provide just enough relief, just in time to just the people who needed it.
CONCLUSION

Second World War experience in France and Africa, in their different ways, demonstrated a clear military requirement for the creation of a wartime organisation dealing with the civil administration needs on all future campaigns. It was logical, but now also evident that civil problems could not be ignored. Leaving the task to existing military structures had not worked in France in 1940. Something different was required, but leaving the task to just a small staff was also problematic as discovered in the Rhineland. The organisation needed to be of a suitable scale. Dividing responsibility between military and civilian departments did not work as the Americans had found (and observed by the British) in North Africa. As Wavell had argued and Eisenhower experienced, a campaign commander need full control over all components (military and civilian) both during a campaign and in logistically important areas following. Civil administration, whilst probably better handled and understood by civilian agencies, was proven not work in this first phase of operations. The priorities and experience of the two systems were just too different to work together practically. Giving responsibility to a campaign commander was therefore a practical method by which all aspects of a campaign would be considered and their priorities balanced. Thus, necessarily, civil administration during the opening part of a campaign had to be conducted by the military, under military control and focused on supporting the needs of a military commander if it was to work, be seen as useful and willingly implemented. Unsurprisingly, it was increasingly recognised that to make it work would require effective policy planning, proper operational preparation and better training (see Chapter 4).

Military experience in Africa had also revealed the need to consider longer-term civilian needs. Planners for ROUNDUP had also realised that the longer term was, at least, a possibility. Separately and with more Whitehall influence, characters like Leith-Ross were able to draw on their experience of the Rhineland occupation to advance the view that planning, procuring and organising relief for the longer-term and non-operational ‘hiatus areas’ was both necessary and useful. Leith-Ross was helped by both the remit given in Churchill’s 1940 speech and the support of exile groups in London. However, bringing together military and supply department views was not easy. It required several pushes, one by Bridges in Whitehall and one by Roosevelt in Washington. There was now a method of both supporting military battlefield needs and removing of any period of Rhineland-type vacuum. A continuum of relief had been achieved, at least in theory. Furthermore, experience in the Italian campaign (see Chapter 3) demonstrated that the interdepartmental co-ordination encouraged by experience and demanded by Bridges served the preparations for OVERLORD well in ensuring an effective and workmanlike capability.

Perhaps, the wider issue is one of armies consider the problems set by politicians before them. There is an observed preference in military circles for focusing on the immediate and the kinetic. Furthermore, this tends to work with the tendency to avoid messy and difficult unmilitary matters, which in any case
are not readily or willingly understood. None of this is comes as a surprise as the obviously military elements of war are what attracts people to the profession in the first instance. It is a view that does not appear to be abating with recent feminine influence on the approaches taken by modern armies. A logic develops that if a conflict is fought hard enough and cleverly enough with the fighting components then it will be over sooner. Yet, experience shows it is not always so easy and that the civilian component is one that needs to be recognised albeit on an ascending scale of difficulty as one moves from conventional war to counter-insurgency.

Untapped experience can only go so far, as it depends on the influence and intellectual capacity of individuals. For many on the receiving end, there has to be a willingness and interest to take on board such ideas. Sadly, a Civil Affairs posting in any modern armed force, as during the Second World War, is rarely considered career enhancing; the job tends to be where it is loud and noisy. Thus, two related problems are identified, namely how to institutionalise Civil Affairs knowledge and how to create professional interest. With these elements in place, the task required and the methods to achieve them become more straightforward and the process partly expedited. Institutionalising processes that encourage the development of Civil Affairs thought must not produce institutionalised thought. Indeed, achieving these goals is far from easily solved as the Americans found when using the lessons of the Rhineland, peacetime tendencies to replay the previous war have their limitation. Clearly, a wider sample of historical experience helps, but so does the consideration of a military hierarchy that has plenty of wide-ranging operational experience. They might even support a career path that takes an individual through Civil Affairs. Therefore, the simple answer to the question of whether it was better to have a Wavell or a Field Manual is, of course, both.
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CHAPTER 3

ITALIAN LESSONS

SOMETHING TO REPEAT?

The Italian Campaign illustrated the impact on Civil Affairs of the significantly larger problems associated with the civil administration in an industrialised nation compared to the conditions experienced in Africa. With a large population that was dependent on a functioning civil administration and as a European state whose sovereignty was not confused by colonial status, it was inevitable that Civil Affairs work in Italy would come under greater scrutiny, both locally and in Allied capitals.¹

Yet, Italy was also shattered by the violent and disruptive nature of campaign that ran from Sicily slowly up the peninsular and hampered by the political turmoil that followed the fall of Mussolini.² It lacked the administrative capacity to restore immediate, effective and comprehensive control over itself. Only at the most local of levels and in specific areas of medical administration were strengths found. Thus, there was no real alternative to some form of foreign administrative intervention. This came in the forms of the well-known AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories, becoming just AMG on 24 October 1943³) and the less well-known Allied Control Commission (ACC, becoming Allied Commission on 27 October 1944⁴).

However, the Italian problems encountered were only part of the problem for Civil Affairs. There were also problems variably with organisational aspects of the organisation, with the knowledge and experience of Civil Affairs officers, with the expectations of AMGOT and ACC by military formations and with the impact of bureaucratic politics. As a result and despite some areas of success, the institutional memory of politicians and military commanders was one that regarded AMGOT as an abject failure. Moreover, the scale and nature of AMGOT's intervention into the sovereign affairs of Italy was seen as setting a dangerous precedent by de Gaulle.

INNOVATION AND LIMITATION

Despite later problems, there were nevertheless a series of impressive innovations made both prior to and during the campaign. Italy was an Allied campaign, that is one where both British (including those of the Commonwealth) and American forces fought alongside one another and under an Anglo-American headquarters (Allied Forces Headquarters, AFHQ) that was commanded by firstly the American, Eisenhower and later by the British General, Sir Harold Alexander. Consequently, AMGOT was not just Allied in
name, but also in structure. Both Britain and America were to be military governors of the enemy territory. This was considered the first example of ‘joint’ occupants within the meaning of Article 43 of the Hague rules on occupation. Furthermore, Military Government was conducted as an “equality of effort” with the integration of American and British personnel into a “single military government.” Indeed, Allied Civil Affairs in Italy was arguably more integrated than any other aspect of the campaign. It was typical for American Civil Affairs officers to work alongside their British counterparts in the British sector of operations and vice versa. There were inevitably some problems in joining servicemen of the two countries together. Principle differences included scales of equipment, Part II orders, vehicles and Army legislation. Administrative communications from national chains of command to their officers in an opposing sector could also be a problem, however major differences if they occurred tended to be at the senior most levels of command.

In practical terms, AMGOT’s Civil Affairs officers worked to the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, 15th Army Group (at first General Alexander) who was invested with the actual exercise of authority as Military Governor. He was subject to general direction on larger questions of policy by Eisenhower as Supreme Commander at AFHQ and in turn the CCS in Washington. Advising the Military Governor in the field and handling routine matters was the Chief Civil Affairs Officer (CCAO) of AMGOT, British Major General Major General Francis J. Rennell Rodd (The 2nd Baron Rennell (of Rodd)). Rennell had been appointed AMGOT senior planning officer on 30 March 1943, before being appointed CCAO on 1 May 1943. In the spirit of complete equity that marked Civil Affairs in Italy, Rennell’s deputy was American Brigadier General Frank J. McSherry. Advising Eisenhower at AFHQ was a Military Government Section (later becoming the G-5 Division of headquarters’ staff) headed by American Colonel Julius C. Holmes (who had landed by submarine in North Africa to make contact with Darlan in the opening phase of TORCH). The section was responsible (in theory) for much of the formulation of higher policy for operations on the Italian mainland. In later developments, the role of Military Governor would be placed in the hands of the Supreme Commander, with Commander-in-Chief, 15th Army Group acting as his deputy.

The tasks of AMGOT were principally to relieve combat troops of the necessity of providing for civil administration, to restore law and order and normal conditions among the civil population as soon as possible, to procure the necessary food supplies for them (and where necessary provide relief and maintenance for the destitute within available resources), to assist in making available to the occupying forces the economic resources of the occupied territory, and to assist Allied political and military objectives through efficient government and the application of the policies laid down by the campaign commander. In terms of size, the AMGOT started with a total of 440 officers and 1,000 other ranks, equally divided between the Americans and British. The organisation (including AMGOT and ACC, but not including the military section of the latter) was never much larger than 1,500 officers and often was
considerably smaller. The peak numbers deployed by America were 829 officers and 1,060 enlisted men and by Britain 895 officers (including at the peak 37 Canadians and a “few” South African officers) and 1,031 other ranks. Allied civilians working for the ACC were fewer than 100.

Another innovation was the production of a Civil Affairs handbook, the “AMGOT Bible,” designed to assist Civil Affairs officers in their duties. The ‘bible’ contained details of the overall AMGOT plan, copies of proclamations, general policy guides and specific procedures for Civil Affairs officers on health, finance, police, civilian supply, enemy property, legal matters, monuments, education, use of flags and banking. A ‘Do’s and Don’ts in Italy’ instruction was also issued to Civil Affairs officers to provide a practical guide. Furthermore, a Pamphlet for Troops (four sides of A5 sized paper) was issued to all officers from company commanders upwards that gave information on the purpose of AMGOT, its organisation in the field and how relations would work between units.

In preparation for the landings in Sicily, an initiative was taken to provide Civil Affairs officers with pre-deployment training. This was held at Chréa a town in the Atlas Mountains 40 miles from Algiers. Some 200 British and 200 American officers were brought together for six weeks training. The training covered a wide range of topics, including administration and Italian. The course was mainly lecture based, with Rennell, McSherry and Harold Macmillan MP (British Resident Minister in the Mediterranean) amongst those presenting. To Rennell it “seemed to be a success” adding that he would be “interested to see the effect in the Island.” In the meantime a second course was run. However, some participants later saw the training as being of dubious quality, doing little to prepare them for operations. Both in training and throughout the campaign it was judged that the “dead experience” of historical lessons easily became useless dogma that was difficult to reverse in the field without some form of additional training. That most of the planners had experience of law not of public administration did not help.

Based on American lessons learnt from TORCH, civil administration was to be part of military operations, rather than a separate civilian departments’ responsibility. Indeed, Civil Affairs would come ashore with the troops as they landed on Sicily and the mainland. Some 60 officers and men (both British and American) in two groups landed on D-Day in Sicily, by D+9 there were 150 officers ashore. TORCH had also taught the Americans that it was not always possible to rely on a functioning civilian administration. Consequently, AMGOT must be able to govern Italy until such time that a reliable successor in the form of a Control Commission could be established. After all, AMGOT, as its name suggested, was designed as Military Government to occupy, what at the planning stage had to be considered, an enemy state.

Nevertheless, the extent to which AMGOT should take a direct or indirect role in running the administration of civilian matters in Italy was much debated in the weeks prior to the invasion of Sicily. The generally held American view was that a direct role was preferred, the British opting for something less direct and manpower intensive. The agreed policy was that civil administration by the military should be as indirect as possible following the initial phase.
melding of Rhineland and TORCH experiences it was hardly a surprise that an American emphasis on the need for officers to take charge of affairs emerged. Consequently, many inexperienced, but over-zealous Civil Affairs officers found themselves overburdened during initial operations in Sicily.\textsuperscript{36} Yet, it was also evident that circumstances on the ground often required a greater degree of direct rule.

Whilst there were innovations, there were also elements that were of a questionable quality or purpose. At a wider military level, only very rarely was Italy regarded as whole. Instead, it was contemplated in series of operational steps and Military Government had to follow suit. Consequently, plans for a Military Government in Sicily (agreed by the CCS in Washington on 28 June 1943) considered just the island.\textsuperscript{37} Only later were the plans extended to cover the mainland, but even here, only as far north as Rome (agreed by the CCS on 21 July 1943, earlier versions had made plans for as far north as the Po basin). Furthermore, in planning for the eventuality that central government had collapsed, AFHQ preferred to run Italy in a decentralised fashion through nine Military Government regions with only a small central staff. This reflected a strongly held view at AFHQ that believed regionalism better suited Italy and the Italians. Consequently, on operations, AMGOT units tended to contemplate Italy in purely provincial terms, thus risking the possibility that nationwide requirements would be ignored or underplayed. Indeed, it was recognised by some Military Government planners that the regional approach encouraged short-termism that could have serious implications if the campaign became bogged down and national level co-ordination was required.\textsuperscript{38}

However, there was logic to taking the regional approach. By allowing Civil Affairs to focus on the needs of a region once it had come under allied control, helped to avoid the problems experience in the Rhineland where constant military movement had wreaked havoc with the needs of civil administration. It would also help those Civil Affairs officers permanently allocated to a region (who would take over from ‘spearhead’ Civil Affairs officers dealing with battlefield problems) to develop a better understanding of local matters and local officials.\textsuperscript{39} The piecemeal regional approach was encouraged by the military who wanted to keep civil administration as simple as possible during the campaign. Military Government was to prevent disease and disorder distracting the fighting forces. It was not to become involved in costly and pointless matters of national rehabilitation and recovery. A view supported by war ministries in London and Washington.\textsuperscript{40} They agreed that such matters as economic development would take a “secondary and limited place.”\textsuperscript{41} This was not a view necessarily shared by all in AMGOT, who felt that without a comprehensive Allied plan, too much was left to improvisation and Italian political life was left “free and undirected” to fill its own gaps.\textsuperscript{42}

**A Sample of Practical Problems in Italy**

Indicative of some of the practical problems faced by AMGOT in Italy was that of population movement. Administration in both Sicily and later the mainland was
made difficult by widespread population movement. This movement included both civilian refugees from battle and troops returning home as Italy withdrew from the war. Both clogged roads and either brought infection with them or lived in conditions that helped it to spread. Many civilians fled in advance of an Allied operation only to return later. Before the liberation of the city, many Neapolitans joined refugees from other towns in fleeing to Rome. Its population was reported in June 1944 to have swollen by an estimated 750,000 to 2,000,000. By the beginning of 1945, hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners of war and labourers were returning home from Germany. All needed feeding and, for reasons of field security, screening. Furthermore, with the combination of narrow Italian roads and constant traffic the number of accidents rose steeply.46

However, the first problems came in Sicily with reports of 2,000 refugees using a “dark, stifling, fly-infested” cave near Bronte with many travelling the 30 miles from Catania to get there. At landings at Salerno in September 1943, refugees and “significant numbers” of Italian deserters clogged roads required by Allied forces. Feeding them was hindered both by German forces taking local food and transport with them as they withdrew and by Allied troops and local civilians looting what remained. Despite the general disruption to vital communications between towns and villages around Salerno, AMGOT officers were nevertheless eventually able to alleviate much of the suffering by organising the movement of food.49

Dramatically large numbers of numbers of refugees were uncovered as the campaign moved up the Italian peninsular. The number of refugees moving south was reported to have increased a hundredfold in November 1943. This necessitated AMGOT, working with provincial and municipal relief organisations, to establish a refugee evacuation chain in order to keep military roads clear. Despite Allied assurances of food, shelter and medical care, the condition of the “pitiful parade” was described as being beyond “the hope of salvage.” A refugee camp at Campobasso (50 miles north east of Naples) was reported to have handled up to 600 refugees per day over the period of a fortnight. Many of its refugees had suffered war injuries, others had died from sickness along the way and most were in an extremely exhausted state. Ninety percent suffered from scabies and nearly all were infested with lice. Travelling over frozen mountain ranges, with little food and poor clothing and against a background of months on a poor diet resulted in many cases of tuberculosis. Some had travelled 400 miles from Venice to reach safety.50

By the end of February 1944, AMGOT had evacuated 47,000 refugees from battle areas. The eruption of Mount Vesuvius in March resulted in the evacuation of a further 20,000. Matters would get worse with the spring 1944 offensive and by the summer the average monthly flow was between 10,000 and 15,000 persons. By this stage, AMGOT would control refugee movement in the frontline by holding them in forward reception centres, before they were transferred to permanent and semi-permanent camps in the rear run by the Refugees Sub-Commission of the ACC. Displaced persons (international refugees by modern standards) were sometimes transferred to camps in North Africa
and the Middle East, with the help of UNRRA from April 1945.\textsuperscript{51} By contrast with the number of refugees found in Normandy, the numbers where overwhelming, but are rather more manageable than the millions of refugees and displaced persons handled at the end of North West Europe campaign. Experience in Italy was clearly helpful for planning later campaigns. From a military perspective, the control measures employed satisfied operational needs.

\textbf{STATE BUILDING PROBLEMS}

In the period that followed the fall from power and arrest of Fascist leader Benito Mussolini on 25 July 1943, Italy was never in the position to govern itself properly. This would have been so irrespective of the Civil Affairs regional policy. The two governments that followed the fascists each lasted only a year (those of Marshal Pietro Badoglio 25 July 1943 to 18 June 1944 and Ivanoe Bonomi who remained in office until 19 June 1945\textsuperscript{52}) and in the meantime, King Victor Emmanuel III abdicated on 5 June 1944.\textsuperscript{53} The ability to govern over the vast distances of the country was not helped by poor communications and transport resulting from the campaign.\textsuperscript{54} However, the competence of the Italian governments and their willingness to govern was also questioned by Allied authorities on several occasions. To start with the Badoglio government, in what became known as the ‘King’s Italy’, consisted of a mere small handful of ministers each of rather questionable ability. In its refuge outside direct Allied control in the heel of Italy, the consensus prevailed that there was little point to governing the Allied occupied areas until Rome had been liberated.\textsuperscript{55} Rome was not liberated until a year after the first landings on Sicily. That general political disruption occurred across Italy was inevitable.\textsuperscript{56}

In terms of practical local administration, it was typical for a vacuum to precede Allied occupation as fascist officials deserted their posts.\textsuperscript{57} Into this vacuum came groups and individuals with varying qualities of administrative capability. In Sicily and later on the mainland, local priests frequently emerged as local leaders and to whom many Sicilians instinctively and willingly turned.\textsuperscript{58} If priests were generally capable and well meaning, in other places those with rather narrower interests in corruption and criminal intent emerged.\textsuperscript{59} So too could those with self-interested ideological ambitions.\textsuperscript{60} In parts of Italy, particularly north of Rome, criminal and ideological motivation could manifest itself in powerful and well-armed gangs and individuals. A few later joined the Italian Army, but there many difficulties converting partisans from “a freebooting fighter… into a law-abiding citizen.” Many became “problem citizens” and significant numbers only appeared after the withdrawal of German forces as “last-minute ‘patriots’” and self-imposed “saviours of Italy.”\textsuperscript{61} At times, it was easy to get the impression that Italy was a Second World War version of the Wild West:

At the Carabinieri Station [Afragola, January 1944] I found the Brigadiere [corporal] in a state of shock, sitting at his desk staring into space. He was suffering from daily gunfights between rival gangs, bandits, pillaging
army deserters, vendettas, kidnappings, mysterious disappearances, reported cases of typhus, the non-arrival of his pay and the shortage of supplies of every kind, including ammunition...

The thinning of administrative capacity as the result of fascist officials deserting their posts was compounded by Roosevelt’s policy (see Chapter 1) of removing many of those that remained; typically, those purged were pernicious fascists or of senior rank (irrespective of their ideological convictions). Finding suitable alternatives was found to be difficult in Sicily as the general level of illiteracy there was so high. Neither was the process helped by understaffing of the organisation established to assess whether a fascist qualified for removal. In such circumstances, Civil Affairs officers would often have to judge matters for themselves. Media reports critical Allied retention of fascist officials did not make the process any easier and consequently this was raised in parliament (see Chapter 1). It was hardly a surprise that given the paucity of suitable individuals, Civil Affairs officers turned to confident organisations like the Church as a source of administration. Rather more contentiously, they enlisted the support of organised criminal groups like the Mafia. In preparation for the landings in Sicily, this may have been done deliberately by Allied intelligence organisations in order to gain information useful for military operations. Later, in reporting locally-held views in towns to the north of Naples in January 1944, Field Security officer, Norman Lewis, wrote that most of the newly Military Government appointed mayors were members of the criminal group Camorra. They were assisted into position by the influence exercised by American gangster Vito Genovese who was employed in an “unassailable position” as an interpreter in the Military Government. However, mostly there appeared to be genuine naivety amongst Civil Affairs officers and thus they tended to go with what seemed to be the most credible non-fascist individual in the area. It was judged that many Civil Affairs officers could easily be taken in by seemingly convincing locals. To some casual observers, like post-war journalist Alan Whicker, Civil Affairs officers were regarded as “unworldly.”

Elsewhere, Civil Affairs’ haste to remove fascists from bodies like the government labour organisation created new problems in their wake as other ideological groups took over. Communist groups especially became notoriously difficult to manage and in some parts of Italy were often responsible for encouraging industrial action. Thus, whether undermined by Allied polices or circumstances of their own making, the ability of the Italians to govern themselves could not be achieved except without substantial Allied support.

In the normal course of events, a Control Commission would have the time to leisurely observe the work of the Military Government until a suitable point of transfer was arranged, which was ideally some months after the end of hostilities. There was no such option in Italy. Not only did the ACC have to be rushed into being, but also the ever-changing status of Italy from enemy towards ally to co-belligerent added their own complications in terms of what type of control policy to adopt. Whilst this happened, parts of Italy continued to
be battlefield, in which Allied commanders and AMGOT had objectives that were focused on first aid measures.

The first ‘short terms’ Italian armistice was made with Allies on 3 September 1943, leading to the formal surrender of Italy on 8 September and later to a second ‘long terms’ armistice with the Allies on 29 September 1943. Clause 37 of the ‘long terms’ established the ACC and which came into being on 10 November 1943. The ACC came under the deputy presidency of American Major General Kenyon A. Joyce and replaced the Allied Military Mission to Italy that had handled relations hitherto (headed by Lieutenant General Sir Noel Mason Macfarlane, who now returned to his former post as Governor of Gibraltar before returning to run the ACC in January 1944 and before ill health forced him to hand over to American Naval Captain Ellery Stone in June 1944⁷５). In the meantime, Italy declared war on Germany on 13 October 1943, becoming a co-belligerent on 14 October 1943. Italy eventually regained its full sovereignty with the Italian Peace Treaty, signed in Paris on 10 February 1947. In preparation for which the ACC (by now simple the Allied Commission) was dissolved at midnight on 31 January 1947.⁷⁸

To advise and supervise the Italian government with the transition back to full sovereignty five independent sub-commissions (Navy, Army, Air Force, Communications and War Materials Disposal) were established by the ACC together with a number of sections: Regional Control and Military Government (Army-level Allied Military Government, regional teams and sub-commissions on displaced persons, refugees, and general administration), Economic (finance, agriculture, labour, industry and commerce, shipping, transportation, public works and utilities and food sub-commissions), Administrative (interior/local government, legal, education, public health, public safety, property control, and monuments, fine arts and archives sub-commissions) and a short-lived Political Section (removed as the Commission’s role changed from supervision to advice).⁷⁹ It role was never easy as it wrestled with the difficulties of employing immature control commission policy designed for use in an enemy state, but using it in a state of ever changing allied status during an on-going campaign in a country that was experiencing severe administrative difficulties.

Organisational Difficulties

Nevertheless, during the battle phase, AMGOT could work surprisingly well. Civil Affairs officers in AMGOT were regarded, by some, as "resourceful and
energetic” in helping to get the Italians back on their feet.\textsuperscript{80} The British had employed a system of Civil Affairs liaison officers working with formations during the landings in Sicily. This was judged more flexible and thus successful than the corresponding centralised American approach.\textsuperscript{81} Consequently, having Civil Affairs officers directly supporting formations in forward (battle) areas soon became the norm.\textsuperscript{82}

Typically, an AMGOT Senior Civil Affairs Officer (SCAO) worked with each Army Headquarters FORWARD, from where he was able to oversee a good proportion of the frontline area and its civilian needs. A 'spearhead' Civil Affairs liaison officer was attached to each Corps and Division. These acted both as information gatherers for the SCAO and dealt with any immediate problems acting on a tactical not territorial basis. A pool of Civil Affairs officers, based at Army Headquarters MAIN, would follow up behind. They would consolidate the gains made and deal with any problems that were either too large for the spearhead officers or which had been identified by the military commander. With their greater likelihood of problems, there was naturally a tendency to focus on towns and cities.\textsuperscript{83} In October 1943 there were 56 officers working with American Fifth Army, 68 with British Eighth Army (who had a rather larger to cover) and 28 specialists (health, police, etc.) with 15\textsuperscript{th} Army Group.\textsuperscript{84} In the winter of 1944, Fifth Army had 71 officers and Eighth Army 74.\textsuperscript{85}

Battle phase tasks included the posting of proclamations and orders setting out the extent of AMGOT control and the responsibilities of citizens, the disposal of refugees, the burying of civilian dead, overseeing the removal of debris, the reinstitution of the Carabinieri, the reorganisation or, if necessary, the establishment of sanitation and the provision of food, possibly from Allied emergency stocks if not found locally.\textsuperscript{86} It was felt by some observers that this sort of work – immediate and directly supporting military needs – was where Civil Affairs in Italy both worked best and was best appreciated.\textsuperscript{87}

Following this battle phase, a more permanent commitment would be made by AMGOT to an area. As soon as possible, a Civil Affairs officer was stationed in all towns above 12,000 inhabitants, one was appointed to oversee the province and others might be placed in areas of interest such as ports.\textsuperscript{88} When the provincial capital was occupied, a provincial headquarters team under an SCAO was established within it. The team would stay there until it was judged sensible to merge control of several provinces (especially smaller provinces) under a single AMGOT team. Teams worked through the provincial SCAO in taking direction from AMGOT at Army Group. The purpose of working directly (effectively a separate chain of command) was to remove the burden of civil administration issues from the remit of a formation commander. However, it was also easy to see how these anonymous late arrivals, which deliberately bypassed Corps and Divisional headquarters, focused on longer-term civilian needs and sometimes had little to do with even Army Headquarters, were regarded by formations with suspicion and were often bad-mouthed by them.\textsuperscript{89}

The severing of links between military formations and the static Civil Affairs teams encouraged formations to lose interest in civilian matters and with it any sense of obligation to help. Yet, Civil Affairs officers needed to request demands
for supplies through these formations and thus any hope that a balancing of civilian with military priorities might easily be achieved was often dashed. The loss of personal contact made resolving any problems ever the more difficult and a sense of animosity on the part of both groups could develop and spread easily. Nevertheless, the nature of relationship often varied between formations, with Army-level headquarters tending to remain helpful in the provision of transport and engineering support, whilst lower and rearward formations being less so.\textsuperscript{90}

However, the problem of having separate chains of command (sometimes referred to as being in a separate ‘stove pipe’) became particularly acute when it was decided in autumn 1943 to zone the civil administration of Italy into three areas under shades of ACC control. These were AMGOT in forward areas under Army Group control, but with some ACC oversight of administration; AMGOT in rear areas under ACC control; and the King’s Italy area that was under the supervised control of ACC. Whilst the change was made largely for diplomatic reasons, to reflect the emergence of the King’s Italy as a co-belligerent and thus play down the Military Government origins of AMGOT, it was to have many practical and political repercussions.

Luckily, in forward active military areas there were few changes in terms of relationships and routine working practice. At this level sterling work continued to be achieved by Civil Affairs officers like British Colonel Temperly, whose work in Foggia was seen as a “monument as to how Military Government should operate.”\textsuperscript{91} During October and November 1943, Foggia was in particularly rough state, it was as badly devastated as Naples, had around 30,000 homeless, with a further 800 refugees arriving from the north per day, there was no hospital and the sewer broken in up to 20 places.\textsuperscript{92}

However, problems began to occur elsewhere. One of the added complications to the new arrangements was that more headquarters became responsible for policy matters and the procurement of supplies. In October 1943, there were five headquarters in two continents dealing with Military Government in Italy.\textsuperscript{93} Relations between the Military Government staffs at 15\textsuperscript{th} Army Group and AFHQ were often ‘testy’\textsuperscript{94}. Furthermore, in the rear areas (now arranged into ACC ‘regions’) nearly all links between Military Government and the Armies were severed under the influence of ACC.\textsuperscript{95} What had hitherto been an occasional example of mild military frustration with Civil Affairs now began to turn sour. Sometimes relations got so bad that the only means of resolution was to push a problem up to where the military and ACC chains of command met – typically with the Supreme Commander.\textsuperscript{96} Frustration with the ACC was not simply the preserve of military formations. Civil Affairs officers within AMGOT and now working under the direction of ACC resented the new arrangements. There was a general view that Military Government achieved their best results when under the command of an Army.\textsuperscript{97} Indeed, in summing up the work of the Allied Military Government in his area, General Mark Clark (Commander of the United States Fifth Army) wrote in November 1944:

... The plans made by the AMG personnel... have proven sound and their execution efficient. The army command has never had to concern itself

[146]
with problems of civil government, which would inevitably have been a serious burden had AMG failed... In numerous ... cities and towns... AMG has created effective government. All of these cities had known the ravages of war and the destruction caused by a ruthless foe. The inhabitants were, as a rule, all but starving; public utilities were wrecked; banks and courts were closed; political unrest was widespread; educational institutions and art centers were either ruined or closed. So effective have been the efforts of AMG that these conditions were corrected in a remarkably brief time. Refugees have received special care. ...Allied Military Government has earned the gratitude of the United Nations for a distinct and important contribution to the winning of the war ....\[98\

The differences in approach between the military and ACC were palpable. The military needs of an Army would never tolerate such occurrences as strike action that might prevent the building of bridges or the repair of railway networks. By contrast, ACC was less interventionist, even seeing strike action as the return of normal political activity.\[99\] The military utility of the new arrangements was therefore easily questioned. ACC case was not helped by further questions of the competence of its staff at public administration.\[100\] Only one regional ACC commissioner was deemed to have appropriate experience.\[101\] It had become a haven for those AMGOT officers who failed to meet the mark in forward areas.\[102\] Many were considered by some AMGOT officers to be “so completely ignorant of what has to be done they do not make any decisions....”\[103\] Recruitment was not helped by national army postings branches, unfamiliar with the requirements of the job, filling ACC posts with surplus high-ranking officers of variable quality. Those that were competent ensured that they soon found postings elsewhere.\[104\] The few civilian specialists working for ACC were regarded as “often less than no help at all.”\[105\]

Attempts at disciplining those who were “incompetent, indifferent or corrupt” ran into the immediate problem how to admonish someone who in civilian life was a senior professional. Once established in Rome, rarely did ACC headquarters officers seem to visit the regions and when regional officers went to Rome, the advice was limited. One account put it bluntly: “If a regional officer asked for ‘orders’ he probably would be told, ‘You are doing all right, just deal with the problems as they come up.’” Consequently, regions often improvised different policies for the same problems. Sometimes the reverse was true, such as in the area of nutritional expertise, but these examples of specialist advantage did not compensate for problems of a general nature.\[106\]

Civil Affairs officers in order to get essential work completed often made decisions that were the responsibility of the ACC. Worryingly, as problems continued into November 1943, it was judged that the ability to perform “fast, speedy, and efficient work which was so characteristic of this Military Government” was now close to breaking point.\[107\] By now, the frustration that the good work of AMGOT was being sullied by ACC had spilt over in personal approaches to the War Office. Rennell had written to Grigg in October (whom Rennell appears to know well enough to call him “PJ”) stating that the
developments under ACC were all a “DOGS BREAKFAST & CATSHIT.” However, the problem was that most observers did not differentiate between the two types of civil administration. Rennell had taken the view from an early stage that ACC was “unwieldy” in size and constitution, that the number of officers (and their training) would make it difficult for any Italian government to survive “being overlaid by such a nursery governess” and that the “mere number of such officers is a guarantee that they will interfere in matters which will render any Italian Civil Service machine inoperable.”

In late 1944, roughly 400 worked at ACC headquarters, 387 in the regions and in the frontline and around 200 were preparing to take control of their regions when the fighting moved forward. After any major move forward, officers were progressively from rearmost regions as these were either handed over to the Italian authorities or amalgamated within the ACC. There were more American than British officers at ACC, however Britain through its over-promotion system was able to get many more of the influential sub-commissioner jobs and this caused resentment. Other posts were difficult to fill. The American’s found it near impossible to fill the head Economic Section post (arguably the most important position in the ACC), as the result of bureaucratic differences between the State and War departments. None of those nominated managed to stay for longer than 90 days and there were significant gaps in between. Even British attempts to find a suitable individual were unsuccessful. All added to the perceived chaos of the organisation.

Overall, the failure of ACC was viewed as the result of no clear-cut policy, few practical plans, incomplete (even faulty and poorly conceived) training and the poor quality of officers and Allied civilian staff assigned to the organisation. Macmillan, commenting at the beginning of 1944 took the view that:

planning of ACC by academic methods thousands of miles from the scene of operation, without comprehension of the situation regarding, transport, accommodation, light, communications likely to exist in conquered and largely devastated territory, has produced and organisation, especially in the case of ACC, ill-conceived, ill-staffed and ill-equipped for its purpose. The exaggerated insistence of exact Anglo-American parallelism has led to too much weight at the top. It is overstaffed throughout.

Only substantial organisational reforms, beginning in January 1944, managed to make any kind of impact and even this was considered questionable. Yet, by then the problems of the late autumn had had an impact on the views politicians and senior commanders. Indeed, any utilisation of the Italian model for North West Europe was dropped from planning consideration on 28 October 1943. Nevertheless, that some individuals, associated with, knowledgeable of and proud of AMGOT’s (as opposed to ACC’s) successes and strengths, attempted to reintroduce the model for OVERLORD when they joined the planning staffs in London in the New Year was hardly a surprise (see Chapter 4).
Typhus

The multiplicity of competing headquarters was to have profound effects in attempts to control an outbreak of typhus in Naples. On liberating Naples in October 1943, the Allies were faced with several serious public health problems. In particular, the city was “smitten by an epidemic of typhus.” Whilst other communicable diseases were evident in Italy, including of smallpox, typhoid, dysentery, diphtheria, malaria and venereal disease, typhus was especially concerning because of its potential for epidemics (venereal disease was responsible for casualty rates of 3,500 civilians and military per month and malaria accounted for twice the number of casualties than the fighting in Sicily).

The occurrence of typhus in Naples was particularly concerning because as a key port it was crammed full of servicemen, who often lived in close proximity to the civilian population. Many locals worked as cooks or waiters for the military and many soldiers were billeted with civilian families. Furthermore, unlike American forces, only about seventy percent of British troops were inoculated and for British merchant seaman the figure was almost none.

The outbreak of typhus resulted from a number of related problems. Between 20,000 and 30,000 of the city’s remaining 1,000,000 people lived “more or less permanently” in air-raid shelters whose crammed unhygienic conditions helped to foster the spread of the disease. Like other Neapolitans living in their own homes, they were malnourished, unwashed and suffered from low morale. Many itinerant labourers thronged the streets making the spread of the disease both more likely and more difficult to supervise. There were 500 unburied bodies found on arrival in Naples and efforts to bury these were initially thwarted by the insistence of Neapolitans that coffins should be used, but there was neither the wood nor the workshops to build them. Food shortages were not helped by the lack of transport and what food there was became inflated by black market prices. Olive oil was only available through black market sources at an “exorbitant” 200 Lire per litre.

The Germans had blown the main 55-mile long Sereno aqueduct into Naples in seven places. As result, the city had no running water for three weeks. Drinking water was only available from 60 wells in the port area. Thousands of people crowded around these with buckets and jugs, before walking miles back to their homes in the residential areas located on the hills surrounding the city. There was just enough water for drinking, but there was insufficient for the sewerage system to function properly and this was compounded by a lack of electricity to power the necessary pumps. One of the largest hospitals had been largely destroyed by bombing and what little of it remained was used by Allied forces as a military hospital. Furthermore, on entering the city, initial reports indicated (wrongly) that there was no cholera or typhus. The confusion was largely caused by Allied unfamiliarity with the dual meaning of the Italian word tifo, meaning both typhus and the less threatening typhoid.

Most Italians had not experienced typhus since a slight outbreak in 1927. The first incidents during the Second World War had occurred in Bari in March and
Aversa in April 1943, with Naples experiencing its first outbreak in July 1943. Nevertheless, outbreaks began to increase with the onset from October of the winter conditions in which the diseased thrived. Yet, despite a mortality rate of fifteen percent (fifty percent for those over fifty years old), in many ways, the situation in Naples was fortunate, as the strain of typhus was not the severe form found in North Africa. Instead, it was thought to be a version of the milder outbreaks prior to the war. In all probability, it was introduced by Italian servicemen returning from the Balkans avoiding the normally stringent disinfection border controls. Overall, the 699 reported cases in Italy during 1943 contrasted favourably with the 5,058 in Germany (1944 figures: 1,215 and 2,467; 1945 figures 198 and 18,000 respectively). Cases in Naples peaked at 300 per week in January 1944, but by mid-February were under control in the city centre, although a small peak of about 50 cases per week appeared in the surrounding areas in mid-March.

In terms of the impact on Allied forces, there “few cases” amongst American forces and a “somewhat larger number” amongst British forces. It is thought that only one British soldier, a deserter, died from the disease in Naples. There were no cases amongst civilian permanent staff working for the British Forces, although some casual workers did succumb. To put this into context of the 65 British military cases of typhus that occurred in Sicily, North Africa and Italy during 1943 and 1944, two occurred in Sicily during 1944, eight in Italy in 1943 and nine in Italy in 1944; there were eleven deaths in total. The conclusion from Naples was that an army could live and work in a typhus-ridden city provided “discipline [was] maintained” and dusting occurred on a regular and efficient basis.

At one level, the response made by Civil Affairs officers in AMGOT, to events in Naples did much to improve the situation. In the view of one Military Government officer, Civil Affairs action in co-operating with military engineers in restoring clean water supplies undoubtedly contributed to the control of many communicable diseases. This included AMGOT organising the distillation of seawater from the Bay of Naples. AMGOT also made itself useful in other ways by co-ordinating local health authorities and practitioners.

However, there were also many shortfalls. In an attempt to seize the initiative on learning in early September 1943 of typhus in the city requests had been made by Rennell to the Military Government Section at AFHQ asking for additional medical staff, medical stores and food, however, these had largely been rejected as AFHQ did not believe there was as great a problem as reported. The Chief Surgeon (not Civil Affairs, but regular forces) at AFHQ felt that on the evidence of the aqueduct being smashed that the greater threat came from typhoid and that any small outbreak of typhus could be covered by existing stocks of anti-typhus vaccine with the field forces. Initial military attempts to limit contact between civilians and servicemen or put restrictions on purchase of food or drink were only partially successful and AMGOT was insufficiently staffed to oversee the civilian aspects of such a policy. AMGOT medical expertise only went so far, as the organisation had been staffed with an emphasis on Civil Police Officers to the cost of such specialists. There were
tensions too between British and American views on what control measures to use. It was fortunate in such circumstances that as Director of the Public Health Sub-commission of the ACC, British Brigadier George S. Parkinson (former Dean of the London School of Tropical Medicine) was able to inspire, through non-favouritism and sincerity, both British and American staff.

The multiplicity of headquarters did not help. Fewer problems would have occurred if there had been clearer divisions of administrative and geographical responsibility. Instead, there was considerable overlap. Naples was an especially confusing place in that it involved not just the headquarters of AMGOT forward elements and the Army, but there were also forward echelons from AFHQ, ACC and the US Navy. Such overlap was not assisted by the distances involved. Some headquarters were as far away as Palermo and Algiers or in the process of moving forward. Any combination of which increased the risk of communication breakdown. There were no co-ordinating officers in key headquarters to help bring individual priorities together. The lack of a specialist Civil Affairs medical officer at AFHQ was regarded as a particular weakness. Furthermore, those headquarters that controlled resources tended to hold sway over the others. Thus, with the failure of AMGOT and ACC between them to control typhus, AFHQ's Advanced Administrative Echelon (often known by its telegraphic address FLAMBO) stepped forward. It established a Typhus Control Board at the end of 1943. Despite AMGOT representation on the board, the Board effectively took control of the typhus control programme away from Civil Affairs. Effectively, AMGOT served as a functionary not as the facilitator.

With the establishment of Typhus Control Board, the services of the American-run Typhus Commission (wearing the uniform of the American Red Cross) were called upon. With their advice measures were put into place to control the spread of the disease by controlling civilian movement, eradicating the disease through disinfection at public dusting stations (insecticide powder was applied by dust-guns that did not require the removal of clothes) and preventing its return through better hygienic controls (for which soap was issued). By the end of February 1944, 60,000 Neapolitans were being dusted per day, 2,000,000 in total had been dusted by this stage and 30,000 civilians working for the British Army were being dusted every fortnight. The use of DDT (along with similar MYL and AL63 powders) from 15 December 1943 helped to destroy the carriers of the disease, lice. Just over one ounce of the powder per person was required for effective dusting that would endure for two weeks.

Nevertheless, under the Board’s direction, AMGOT helped to improve support for dusting public information through doctors, priests, posters, films, lectures and the media about controlling the disease. It helped to establish both a system of hospitals for treatment, with British forces providing nursing and medical staff and a network of ambulances (including a mix of taxis, military ambulances and vehicles of the Friends’ Ambulance Unit). It also helped to co-ordinate matters of civilian movement control with local authorities. Overall, however, AMGOT did not come out of the experience well and together with the problems of ACC’s competence, it was easy to see why many in Whitehall did not want to repeat the approach in North West Europe.
DEEPER ITALIAN PROBLEMS

Civilian conditions in Italy had come as something of a shock, but reflected poor levels of intelligence about the humanitarian conditions. In the run up to the landings in Sicily, such intelligence about conditions on the island was almost non-existent. What little there was suggested better conditions than actually existed. Better knowledge would undoubtedly have helped AMGOT to make better arrangements for anticipated problems. Relief was one area where the disparity between what was shipped, what was expected and what was promised would soon present problems. Outside the control of AMGOT, Allied pre-invasion propaganda had stated that food supply would be better than under the Germans. It was a short sighted and politically inspired promise that could not be kept. Indeed the broadcasts made on the BBC and American radio stations were so well known across Italy, that inhabitants would often ask when the desperately needed supplies were coming. In fact, Allied supply problems meant that civilian rations had to be “sharply reduced,” which did not sit comfortably with the “extravagant promises of plentiful food” made by Allied propaganda. Nor was this just a problem for the just the Italians, the noticeable levels of disease, starvation and lack of clothing amongst the local people had a noticeably harmful impact on troops' morale that was difficult to prevent. In some cases, troops gave up part of their rations to help stem the acute food shortage.

Food supply was an enormous problem in Italy, both on the mainland and in Sicily. The average Italian ration amounted to only 1,000 calories per person per day, which was significantly below the 2,000 calories regarded as acceptable. Whilst this was partially offset by items not rationed such as fruit and vegetables, the general scarcity of food and, in particular, staples was worrying. Food supply was not helped by the administration disruption, by refugee flows and by German sabotage of food stocks during their withdrawal. Even if food was not directly sabotaged, various elements in its growing, harvesting, processing and distribution process were often subject to the ravages of war. In withdrawing from an area Germany forces would often destroy power lines, steal cabling and mine roads. Indeed, in January 1945 it was estimated that there were 3,000,000 German mines in liberated areas. Of these 114,311 had been cleared during December 1944 alone. Getting farmers onto the land and their produce away to markets and food processors in such circumstances could be difficult and dangerous. With the loss of power cables problems were inevitably caused as almost all Italian flourmills were electrically powered. Theft and disruptions to supply process also meant that there was a shortage of spare parts for vehicles and agricultural machinery.

Furthermore, indigenous solutions were not easily forthcoming as after years of fascist control few Italians were naturally willing to take the initiative. The burden was therefore very firmly placed on the shoulders of AMGOT. Matters were not helped by the actions of the Allied forces. In Sicily where there was already an acute shortage of civilian transport, the use by other military units of what little there remained and the lack of any Civil Affairs transport made
supply problems worse. Even mule trains were seized by troops for their own purposes. Educating forward military elements about the needs responsibilities of Civil Affairs was clearly necessary.

As the problems of relief increased, the spectre of public disorder threatened. Whilst, newspaper reports in September 1943 indicated that there was broadly enough food in Sicily, with the harvest just in, it was hard to expect anything else. The cold reality was without bumper stocks, Allied promises could not be kept and more likely was that circumstances would get worse. Even if nobody starved, it was likely that the public would suffer from the effects of inflation and black marketeering. Indeed, soon many staples simply did not appear on the open market as the black markets took over. A kilo of bread bought on the black market was roughly three times the daily wage of an unskilled worker. Because of low food stocks, rationed bread could not make up the difference and was often substantially less than the desired 200 grams per person per day.

The picture across the whole of Italy was bleak as harvests turned in low yields. The plight of the Italians was recognised by many troops, who soon reached near starvation in a country stripped of its food by the Germans and made worse by both the conflict and the cold wet winter that went into 1944. The only food in seemingly abundance was grapes, but these were hardly filling. With such difficult conditions, unrest and violent outbursts were never far away. On 19 October 1943 protests in Palermo over food resulted in Italian police killing 14 locals (other reports put the figures at 26 dead and over 150 wounded).

Towards the end of 1943, there was a serious prospect of famine in Italy. The reputation of the Allies in handling such matters, it was suggested by The Times, was no doubt being carefully monitored in the rest of Europe. A Civil Affairs opinion poll conducted by 70 pollsters amongst 3,000 people in the major towns of Sicily at the beginning of 1944 highlighted the views of many. As well as reporting such worrisome facts as their consumption of bread and macaroni had halved and that the black market was charging ten times the official prices, they also expressed their frustration at the lack of action taken in dealing with black marketeers and farmers who hoarded their stocks. Many advocated the use of the death penalty in punishing such cases. As the campaign slowly progressed north, the effects of long-term under-nourishment became increasingly evident across Allied controlled Italy. In September 1944, ACC reported that infant mortality was quadruple pre-war levels, the general mortality rate had doubled within a year, tuberculosis had tripled and most Italian adults had lost five to ten pounds in weight.

Throughout the campaign, AMGOT and ACC took a variety of measures to help improve humanitarian conditions across Italy. Some were simple measures designed to help the Italians help themselves. In the summer of 1944, over 100 Civil Affairs officers were employed to help find practical means to improve harvest yields in Southern Italy. Some using Civil Affairs police officers to direct Italian police were designed to reduce the black market by making arrests and by February 1944, there were around 3,000 prosecutions per month. Measures to control the black market and inflation could also taken amongst
Allied forces by preventing troops from buying items in short supply, by controlling the wages paid to Italians working for the Allies and by preventing them selling items to black marketeers. In case of the former, British and Canadian forces achieved some measure of success through withholding part of servicemen’s pay. However, this measure was not used by the Americans. Wage control methods were used to some effect in British sectors. However, in order to guarantee a ready supply of labour, American units, often acting independently of any policy, continued to pay exorbitant wages. The problem of allied items sold to the black market was not helped by American forces importing more than they could consume. It was estimated that between one and two thirds of shipments into Naples were illegally sold on and soon guarding of warehouses became necessary.

Another method employed to alleviate the humanitarian problems was to import relief. Following problems in the relief of Naples in October 1943, Eisenhower made it clear that he saw the feeding of a population as a military task and one to which it was sometimes necessary to divert military resources in order to avoid any civilian “interference with military operations.”

Between July 1943 and September 1945 ($100,000,000 had been spent by September 1944), total imports of flour and grain to Italy amounted to 2,464,100 tonnes (Britain procured 632,000 tonnes) costing $490,000,000 (Britain spent $95,000,000). By the spring of 1945, 24,000,000 Italians were being fed by the Allies and UNRRA, with UNRRA (overseen by 200 UNRRA staff) shipping an average of 15,000 tons of relief per month to supplement the diets of an estimated 2,000,000 Italian mothers and children.

However, such measures had their limitations, as there were both questions over the quality of some of AMGOT/ACC’s policies and the fundamental problem that there were no alternatives to importing costly solutions. Questions of the quality of AMGOT’s policies derived from such matters as the extremely slow acceptance by the Americans that the British preference for price controls was necessary in tackling inflation and the black market even if the did interfere with the free market. Whilst relief imports were clearly required, it was not until the arrival at the ACC of trained nutrition officers in November 1943 that there was any clear indication exactly what and how much was required. Rather more fundamentally, the problems in Italy could not be solved by just relief alone, and longer-term solutions were needed. Whilst relief was necessarily being imported, it was difficult with wartime military pressures to justify additional shipping space being used for transporting items needed for rehabilitation. This was despite both the prospect of net reductions in shipping requirements and the fact that wheat taking up more valuable shipping space than farm machinery.

Nevertheless, the creation of local resource boards at AFHQ helped to balance the conflicting civilian and military demands for shipping. Using professional experts to educate formation staffs helped to gain a better understanding of the consequences of such issues as prolonged food shortages. By involving commanders and their staffs in the problem, workable solutions could be found. This, of course, went against the original purpose of AMGOT which was to
remove the burden of civilian issues from such staffs. Thus, with the worsening conditions of late 1943, some changes towards rehabilitation were allowed. More than 30,000 tons of seed potatoes were imported from Canada, America and Britain in spring 1944. But these and similar concessions were marginal advances when industrial and economic rehabilitation was needed in order to beat inflation and unemployment. The real need was for a comprehensive rehabilitation plan, but this was not to come until towards end of the war. In the meantime, most shipping was still required for the military campaign.

MEMORY

The enduring image of AMGOT for policy-makers in London preparing for the invasion of North West Europe was one of failure. Furthermore, for many Allied governments, the prospect of a Military Government shaping their destiny was too much to bear. However, the influence of the AMGOT model in helping to shape ideas for North West Europe was a case of ebb and flow as torchbearers both for and against its repetition were able to sway policy in London both in Whitehall and at SHAEF.

Certainly, the initial view was favourable. Rennell himself had been advising COSSAC since 19 May 1943. Rennell, furthermore, was supported in Whitehall by Bovenschen, who was a “firm believer in AMGOT theory” and would take “strong exception” to the mention of any critical views. At a more practical level, but one that helped to engender some level of Civil Affairs corporate view, support came from learned experience and personal contact with AMGOT. Lectures regarding the Italian, Madagascar and North Africa Civil Affairs experiences were given to those attending Civil Affairs staff courses at Wimbledon. Some graduates, including Canadian officers, were sent to gain experience in Italy and Sicily (the first course sent students to Tripolitania for about three weeks). In early August 1943, Kirby at the Directorate of Civil Affairs sent Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Kellett out to Italy in order to interview Rennell on the lessons learnt in Italy for North West Europe. Thus, the general view in the War Office, at CASC, and “everywhere” was that AMGOT was accepted practice and whilst there were problems, it was not broken.

However, even without the problems experienced in Italy, there were others in Whitehall who were not convinced that a Military Government approach was right for Allied countries. The Foreign Office was not convinced. The presumption, when matters of civil administration had been discussed by the Foreign Office and MO11 in spring 1942, was that different mechanisms to those employed with Military Government would be used in North West Europe. The senior Civil Affairs planner at COSSAC, Lumley, agreed with them that a different approach was required. Lumley suggested after the war that this was a view shared by Morgan at COSSAC and even Bovenschen had seen “the light” by the end of 1943.

When problems emerged in Italy, Lumley pushed for COSSAC planning to move away from the AMGOT approach. Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory at COSSAC endorsed Lumley’s changes. By the end of October 1943,
having started out with an AMGOT view, COSSAC had shifted direction towards something approaching the model eventually employed in Normandy.\textsuperscript{199} However, this was to be upset again with the movement of Americans McSherry and Holmes with Eisenhower to the now re-named SHAEF headquarters at the beginning of 1944 (see Chapter 4). Rennell would also continue to support the AMGOT approach for North West Europe.

The 48-year-old Rennell had plenty of experience. He was familiar with many aspects of Italy as his father who served as British Ambassador in Rome between 1908 and 1919. Indeed, his knowledge of Italy was viewed as extensive.\textsuperscript{200} He served in the Royal Artillery during the First World War, being sent to France (1914–15), Italy, Libya, Egypt, Sinai, Palestine and Syria.\textsuperscript{201} He explored the Sahara during the interwar period.\textsuperscript{202} From the 1930s and in part because of his “brilliant financial mind,” Rennell found employment as a partner at the Morgan Grenfell. At the beginning of the war, he worked for the Ministry of Economic Warfare in Italy, attempting to buy up war materials that might otherwise find their way to Germany and generally providing industrial and agricultural intelligence to the ministry. From mid-1940, he served with the British Army as an officer in charge of paramilitary forces in West Africa. In 1941, he joined Mitchell in East Africa Command as chief financial control for the civil administration and taking over from Mitchell as Chief Political Officer in the autumn of 1942.\textsuperscript{203} Rennell was also well connected. His father-in-law was Lord Bicester, who amongst other appointments was a director of Morgan Grenfell.\textsuperscript{204} He was a member of the House of Lords, taking up his seat on 11 November 1941.\textsuperscript{205} He corresponded with Wavell, Grigg and Bovenschen and many other business, government and international contacts, evidently being able to address many of them on personal terms.\textsuperscript{206} Unsurprisingly, in January 1943, Grigg made it clear that he was keen to have Rennell as a “Super CPO [Chief Political Officer]” for the Italian campaign.\textsuperscript{207}

Yet, Rennell also delivered. At his suggestion, the positions of Chief Political Officer in North and East Africa were merged at the end of 1942 as a means by which staff numbers could be saved and divergent polices avoided. The financial accounts had been co-ordinated since the end of 1941.\textsuperscript{208} Whilst, AMGOT was dropped from North West Europe many of Rennell’s ideas survived, including that of Civil Affairs staffs working within formation headquarters.\textsuperscript{209} Indeed, Rennell was always happy to point out failures in AMGOT if it meant improving on the model. Thus, he was of the view that in Sicily there was a tendency for AMGOT to do too much and to use too many staff. What could have been achieved with 260 personnel took all of the 430 who were sent (by October 1944 there were still 35 officers in Sicily\textsuperscript{210}). He preferred the simple approach that helped the military achieve its aim. Consequently, Rennell’s advice was always considered pertinent in War Office circles. In December 1942, he was asked by VCIGS, Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Nye, to speak on issues associated with the control of occupied territories. In particular, Nye was keen to ensure that CIGS position was not weakened with respect to ensuring that the needs of operational commanders would prevail.\textsuperscript{211} His operational experience was seen by many in the House of Lords as being of great benefit during debates
on many wartime matters.\textsuperscript{212} Yet, that was not to say that his views would inevitably lead to a panacea. His simple approach in Italy tended to militate against large numbers of specialists who later proved to be essential in dealing with issues of labour and nutrition.\textsuperscript{213}

However, to Rennell the AMGOT model was superior to the one developed for North West Europe. To him it provided a more robust method of dealing with local issues than the North West Europe approach that was compromised by its greater level of influence from the governments in exile.\textsuperscript{214} Rennell was convinced that many in the military, even in Italy, did not understand AMGOT properly and often ruined things as a result.\textsuperscript{215} Rennell felt that AMGOT was a useful “absolute government” (albeit tempered by international treaty and custom) that allowed a Commander-in-Chief to do precisely what he wanted.\textsuperscript{216}

On 21 December 1943, Rennell and Lieutenant Colonel Douglas G. Pirie Coldstream Guards, his Military Advisor, flew back to London, leaving Brigadier Lush as CCAO in Italy. With his eye on the North West Europe job, he had little intention of returning and on 22 January 1944 asked for his kit to be sent home.\textsuperscript{217} Rennell was clearly keen to ensure that he and AMGOT succeeded in the new campaign (see Chapter 4).

Montgomery (who commanded Eighth Army in Italy and was later to command 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group in North West Europe) was amongst the most influential senior officers in pushing the view that AMGOT (although he never seemed to differentiate between AMGOT Forward, AMGOT Regions and ACC even though he would have worked with the former) was a problem. In part, his views were clouded by friction between him and Rennell whom he described, rather ironically, as “pompous” and “superior.” Montgomery’s personal criticisms of Rennell were matched by a general dislike for the man in the Foreign Office and a degree of concern amongst some in both Houses of parliament that his banking credentials and peerage made him naturally incline towards political conservatism of the worst kind.\textsuperscript{219} Yet, Montgomery had genuine misgivings, and considered AMGOT to have hampered operations and not to have done its job properly.\textsuperscript{220} It was in Montgomery’s view an organisation that needed to “sort itself out,” if not, it would “make matters worse.” It was part of the Army “not a mutual congratulation society” (possibly a reference to ACC). Moreover, Montgomery’s view of the personnel was not high. They, in his view, were a “poor lot,” made up of “old school tie, the peerage, diseased Guardsmen etc.”\textsuperscript{221}

On a wider level, Montgomery when leaving for North West Europe felt the Italian campaign had become a “mess” through poor administration.\textsuperscript{222} AMGOT and ACC could be interpreted as part of this mess. Montgomery’s preference for all decisions to go “through” him was at odds with AMGOT’s separate chain of command.\textsuperscript{223} Consequently, he was unlikely to respond well to any requests made by AMGOT or to regard the organisation with any degree of worth. One AMGOT officer serving in Sicily, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Wellesley (The 7\textsuperscript{th} Duke of Wellington\textsuperscript{224}) Grenadier Guards, met Montgomery in Catania during August 1943. The impression Montgomery gave of Civil Affairs needs was “very pleasant, nice and sympathetic.” However, the general stated that “all he really
cared about” was for the streets to be cleared of rubble and wires sufficiently to get his transport through.225

AMGOT also had a general problem of image, which was difficult to shake off. Some thought it was unworldly, others ossified. AMGOT was known to some as “Ancient (or Aged) Military Gentlemen On Tour” and the relatively advanced years of many officers gave the impression (sometimes borne out) that the organisation lacked stamina and dynamism.226 In reality, most of the older officers were associated with the rear party and not frontline detachments.227 Furthermore, an offer of his services to AMGOT by Captain Hugh Moreton Frewen in a letter to his cousin Prime Minister Churchill in August 1943 was declined by the War Office because his age (60) was too great and that fit men were needed “particularly in the early stages.”228 However, the focus on age followed a tradition of rather demeaning descriptions for Civil Affairs work. In Africa and the Middle East, OETA was often referred to as the Old Etonians Touring (or Tie) Association.229 Even the enemy saw AMGOT as a suitable target for their propaganda. The standing for the organisation was questioned by Lord Haw-Haw (William Joyce) in the autumn of 1943 who suggested that the word amgot when spoken was Turkish for horse manure (some accounts mention camel dung).230 Churchill, ever mindful of the power of propaganda, sought an explanation of the word from the Foreign Office, receiving a reply from Eden that in Turkish ahm and kot were closer to what an “English Schoolboy would, not incorrectly, translate as CUNT and ARSE. So maybe you will still wish to propose a change of name.”231 Nevertheless, although such geriatrics and semantics might have caught the attention of some, the real problem was the perception of organisational failure.

CONCLUSION

The beginning of the solution to the military part in dealing with Italy’s civil problems was found in the integration not separation of AMGOT. Involvement of commanders in questions of civil administration made things work better. AMGOT SCAO’s worked best when as part of an Army headquarters not tucked away in a provincial capital and the various typhus and resource boards produced results only when all the parties were brought together. At a tactical level co-operation ensured that when military Bailey bridges were required for military purposes further forward they were only removed following consultation with AMGOT, benefitting the needs of both parties.232 The stove piping of chains of command and the separation of civil and military requirements rarely brought anything but frustration, competition and mutual suspicion. Ironically, these problems of separating commanders from their civilian responsibilities had been foreseen by AT(E) Committee members sometime before events in Italy (see Chapter 1). Furthermore, the military had nothing to fear by a more integrated approach as they continued to hold the supply cards, but at least now, there was the room to consider all long and short-term matters holistically. Of course, separation did allow bodies like ACC to focus on their work with its longer-term and wider emphasis, but to do so

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when they had no control over the supply of necessary resources was bound to result in disquiet.

Whilst AMGOT did a reasonably decent job in forward areas, it was tarred by the failure of ACC in the rear and a general lack of co-ordination. Seen as a whole the organisation never seemed to deliver and at times that was true. In particular, the combined effects of the perception of its failure during the autumn of 1943 and the unwillingness to delineate between AMGOT and ACC ensured that the Italian approach was not used in North West Europe. All this added to the preferences already extant within many parts of Whitehall to treat North West Europe differently. These, in part reflected the attitudes of exile groups, but came before the views of de Gaulle had properly matured. A second wind for AMGOT at SHAEF in early 1944 gave de Gaulle something to be concerned about, but it was really the last gasp of an approach that was unacceptable to London. It was a position with which Eisenhower, mindful of the diminishing reputation of AMGOT (that he had witnessed for himself) was unlikely to fight against when commanding SHAEF. Fortunately for all, by July 1944, *TIME* was reporting that Civil Affairs had “learned well the lesson of AMG in Italy,” the new policy was “Let the French do it.”

But there were lessons, both good and bad to emerge from AMGOT. The trial by fire had resulted in many improvements and successes. These included, in particular: the need to have acceptable specialists working at all levels who could cut through bureaucratic emotion with professional expertise; the benefits of the spearhead Civil Affairs officers in creating a sense and evidence of immediate response to problems uncovered by the military forces; the need for proper intelligence on civilian matters to be gathered in advance of operations to allow better planning and preparation; the need for good recruiting and training of Civil Affairs staff; the need to instil a sense of direct responsibility towards the civilian population amongst the fighting forces; the need for constant communication between all levels of these forces and Civil Affairs (no stove pipe) and the avoidance, if possible, of directly running local affairs. Italy indicated that the utility of Civil Affairs was a two-way conversation, best conducted in the circumstances of mutual respect and understanding of each other’s needs, amongst professionals and against the backdrop of a common campaign goal. The role of Civil Affairs in these circumstances was as much about helping a commander to understand the needs of Civil Affairs as Civil Affairs supporting the needs of the commander. So if AMGOT was not to be repeated in its Italian form in North West Europe, nevertheless lessons were learnt, mistakes avoided and many successes continued.
Chapter 3 Endnotes


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Chapter 4

Making Civil Affairs Work in North West Europe

Civil Affairs for North West Europe

Planning for the Allied return to North West Europe began in earnest from early 1942. The plans built on pipe dreams that followed the conclusion of the evacuation of the BEF from Dunkirk in June 1940. The objective of the North West Europe campaign was simply to defeat, if they did not collapse of their own accord, German fighting forces in the area. If Germany did collapse, Operation RANKIN (catering for three different scenarios: A, B, C) would be employed to ensure speedier control of the enemy state than had been experienced in 1918. Presuming that the Germans would not collapse immediately, the campaign was to start with a cross-Channel assault into northern Europe. A number of plans for assault were developed, each with different landing dates and invasion beaches, before it was decided with Operation OVERLORD to concentrate on landing in Normandy in summer 1944. One of these earlier plans was Operation ROUNDUP. Its target date for 1943 was too optimistic, nevertheless, much of the planning and many of the staff were transferred over to OVERLORD and consequently many of the associated processes involved can be viewed as a continuum rather than series of disruptive fresh starts.

From the outset, there was recognition of the need to identify and mitigate any possible civil administrative dangers. That such a process of consideration was even contemplated can be regarded as a natural reaction to events witnessed in France and Belgium, but it also built upon memories of the Rhineland and more recent experiences in Africa and Italy. It was also clear that in liberating Allied nations a different approach was necessary. Yet to put matters in context, with the anticipated difficulties of the cross-Channel invasion across the spectrum of military activities there was a strong emphasis on the need for thorough planning and preparation across the range of these activities. North West Europe was to be the key campaign in winning the war in Europe and made more so by the pressure form the Soviet Union for a “Second Front.” Thus, for all sorts of reasons it was expected that what became Operation OVERLORD was going to be bigger and different from what had passed before and this was equally true for Civil Affairs part in it. Consequently, great efforts were made to shape the organisation into something that was not just seen to be useful, but also one that was actually useful in dealing with many competing demands. Many of the lessons from prior campaigns were used to give the new organisation the best start. Not least of these were the aspects of organisation, personnel and preparation. Whilst, the arrival of AMGOT men at SHAEF can be
viewed as throwing Civil Affairs planning into turmoil, this can be contrasted with the double benefits of allowing adjustments to be made and for the sturdiness of the organisation to be thoroughly tested.

British planning for ROUNDUP, from the first meeting held on 29 May 1942, considered the need for a civil administrative component. They thought that the key areas of interest were likely to include civilian government, police, arms and ammunition for “patriot forces,” labour issues, food provision, currency requirements and air-raid precautions. Nevertheless, it was equally evident with military logistics at a premium any civilian commitment would have to be limited and in any case must always be in support of military needs. ROUNDUP planners and the Secretary to the War Cabinet, Bridges, soon recognised that if civilian needs were to be properly balanced by military priorities a number of organisational developments were required. These included cross-departmental consultation structures, the assignment of responsibility for civilian administration to a specific government department and the possible creation of an organisation within the War Office to co-ordinate such matters from a military perspective. It was soon decided that the War Office was to be responsible for taking the lead both in the provision of what became Civil Affairs and in co-ordinating the work of contributing departments (through its chairmanship of the AT(E) committee, see Chapter 1). The creation of the War Office organisation would take several more months, however its requirement became apparent when the huge scale of planning for Civil Affairs in North West Europe necessitated its separation from more general Civil Affairs work.

**Directorate of Civil Affairs**

Consideration of what became the Directorate of Civil Affairs (DCA) began to move forward in March 1943, prompted by Bovenschen. He saw it as important to create an organisation with a “Grade A” director. It must be capable enough to deal with any civil administrative problem across all theatres of war and strong enough to ensure that operational military interests were protected against the narrow-minded interests of any other department. The MO11 organisation had already been working on civil administrative issues (created in March 1941 under the Director of Military Operations), but was considered too small for the scale of the task. Instead, a structure capable of working with senior War Office staffs such as the General Staff, Quartermaster General and Adjutant General was needed. An American equivalent, the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) was established at the American War Department on 1 March 1943 and was seen as something of role model.

The establishment of the directorate on 21 June 1943 followed the appointment of its first director, Major General Stanley W. Kirby on 14 June. The director was to fall under the PUS’s area of responsibility. Close liaison was to be maintained with other parts of the War Office, other government departments and exiled Allies (as approved by the War Cabinet). Importantly, correspondence on non-technical matters to and from the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (DCCAO, the operational level planner) for North West Europe.
was to be routed via the commander of the operation. This was to ensure that all interested parties were kept informed of developments and no one felt marginalised. Kirby, who eventually became the Deputy Commissioner, British Element, Control Commission for Germany, was considered by at least one of his peers to be “good.” In particular, his ability to come around, rather sooner than most, to the abandonment of the disliked AMGOT model for OVERLORD was seen as the “sign of a big man.” Others were not so sure, Bovensch thought him mercurial. Brigadier Thomas Robbins, DCCAO at 21 Army Group, thought that the War Office in general was useless on Civil Affairs and that Kirby was particularly useless. Only Brigadier P.D.W. Dunn (one of the deputy directors at DCA), he maintained, did any good in doing his best to get the required personnel for North West Europe.

DCA became responsible for many aspects of Civil Affairs planning in both North West Europe and elsewhere around the world. Its various branches covered different regions, personnel and training, research (including that of the Rhineland, British methods in 1941, American methods and enemy methods), publications and pamphlets, civilian relief supply, civilian relief transport, commerce and industry, agriculture, labour and oil, coals and minerals. Senior personnel in October 1943 included as Deputy Directors of Civil Affairs, Brigadier F.G. French (Military Government from MO11), Colonel R.M.H. Lewis (Technical and later to be SCAO at British Second Army), Mr R.J. Stopford (Economics and with experience in banking and American finance) and Brigadier P.D.W. Dunn (Personnel and Training). By the end of November 1943, the number of senior officers at DCA amounted to one major general (the Director), three brigadiers, two colonels (one local) and 16 lieutenant colonels. The main offices were at 38 Hyde Park Gate, Kensington, allowing an easy walk to DCCAO. Later, specialists like Lieutenant Colonel Sir Bernard Woolley from the British Museum would be appointed. Some 30 government departments and 22 other sources (mainly from commerce and industry) provided help in the form of both advice and personnel to support DCA’s interests across all theatres of war. In working with other organisations, figures from March 1944 indicated that DCA worked with a total of 91 departments, ministries and other groups.

In marked contrast to the small handful of financial, legal and policing concerns that Wavell had identified earlier in the war, Civil Affairs tasks now contemplated by DCA were as diverse as finance, custody of enemy property, police services, prison services, fire services, civil defence, unexploded bomb disposal, demolition, clearance of minefields, legal affairs, intelligence and security, petrol and lubricant supply, gas supply, electricity supply, water supply, sewerage and drainage, bridges, construction and demolition of buildings, works services, railways, inland water transport, ports, roads, postal services, telecommunications, postal censorship, food production, processing, marketing and rationing, trade (wholesale and retail), distribution, industrial manufacturing, clothing supply and production, mining and mineral extraction, industrial engineering, imports of supplies, agriculture, fisheries, labour exchange, printing, stationary, publications, public health and hygiene,
emergency relief, education, fine arts, ancient monuments, and liaison with the Allies. To ensure both that these, at times, competing demands functioned together in North West Europe and that skills deficiencies, which had emerged in other campaigns, were reversed required the recruitment and effective training of good quality officers.

**RECRUITMENT**

Recruitment for Civil Affairs officers fell into two areas, that for staff officers working in formation headquarters and that for officers working in detachments. Most staff officers were typically posted through the normal Military Secretary channels and came either directly from the army staff course at Camberley or from commands and districts. To convert them to the ways of Civil Affairs they would attend special staff officers’ courses at the Civil Affairs Staff Centre (CASC), Wimbledon. Detachment officers tended also to come through the Military Secretary channels, being sent to Wimbledon for a longer period of training. Other ranks (as translators, cooks, drivers and dealing with routine military administration) were posted in by Army Records when mobilisation required them and were given, along with the officers, pre-deployment training.

Most Civil Affairs officers of all types were recruited from amongst the regular, reserve, territorial, retired and conscripted Army officers (for more detail see *Illustration A1.1: Sources of British Civil Affairs Officer Recruitment for the North West Europe Campaign* at Appendix A). Only a few of the 3,591 successful candidates that completed their training for North West Europe (most destined for Germany) came from the other services. From the Army there was a wide range of regiments and corps represented within the organisation. Generally, there appeared to be little preference for any particular cap badge amongst staffs and field detachments, although for Civil Affairs supply depots it was judged that the extra value of recruiting trained RASC, RAOC and RAMC officers was desirable, if not always easy. Not all elements of Civil Affairs work could be recruited through normal military channels. Sometimes in order to enlist certain skills and expertise it was necessary to recruit directly from the civilian world and for which Civil Affairs became notorious (see Chapter 1). Despite the notoriety in Whitehall circles of some high profile cases of the few hundred recruited in this way, the vast majority were junior police officers.

Civil Affairs was seemingly a popular destination and many applied, but of these, only a few were acceptable. Of the 34,000 who applied to join Civil Affairs between 1943 and 1946 (27,000 sought service in Europe or Africa), two thirds survived the first vetting and of these one third (7,000 for all theatres of war, roughly half of these went to North West Europe) were selected for training as officers. Many were attracted by the prospect of better pay. As a historical hang over, Civil Affairs officers were considered staff officers and thus gained an additional wage of five shillings per day. Yet, the legacy also had wartime benefits in helping to attract individuals over from higher paid civilian employment. However, to some on the Civil Affairs staff at 21st Army Group
the extra pay caused untold extra work and was felt to be unjustified. Many Civil Affairs officers were simply not up to the quality of regular staff officers. Royal Air Force officers working for Civil Affairs did not attract the additional pay, which may account for their paucity in terms of numbers.

Whilst, quality was a problem that diminished as the war came to a conclusion, but in earlier phases of it getting enough officers that were suitable for Civil Affairs work proved difficult. The ability to acquit oneself well in terms of unit administration and reports was still important, even if it was acknowledged that Civil Affairs officers might be more gregarious than most others. Ideal candidates needed maturity, linguistic ability and a diplomatic character. In November 1943, DCA made it clear that Civil Affairs officers must be manifestly capable of ruling and “ruling tactfully.” On no account could they be “blustering,” rather they must be men of education. The February 1944 Military Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field specified that Civil Affairs officers as representatives of the campaign commander’s authority required “very high personal qualities.” These were required wherever he went:

He is always on duty, whether in his office, touring the district, taking meals at a hotel, relaxing at a theatre or in his quarters, or even when on leave outside of his own district. ... He must always remember that it is by his conduct, even more than by that of other officers of the Army, that his country will be judged.

Furthermore, the Manual stated that Civil Affairs officers were to abstain from politics, ensure that military interests came first, make changes slowly by going with that which works, have good relations, sympathy and patience with the local population and avoid favour or intrigue. Civil Affairs officers must be self-reliant and be able to employ initiative.

In searching for suitable officers, Civil Affairs found itself knocking on many doors, including the War Office’s AG12(F) Placing of Misfit Officers Branch. The acrimonious relationship between Staff Duties (who were also looking for personnel) and DCA did not help.

Civil Affairs did not restrict itself to the more obvious branches such as the RAOC, RAMC and Royal Engineers, although many did come from these corps (many of the senior officers in Civil Affairs came from the Royal Engineers, including Lieutenant General Sir Arthur E. Grasset at SHAEF and Kirby at DCA). A snapshot taken from December 1943 revealed that some 35 branches of the War Office provided staff (including the Infantry, Catering, Labour, and Veterinarian branches). Only a few came from the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy (the most famous RAF Civil Affairs officer and former banker was Group Captain C.E. Benson DSO, but he served in Italy). The uptake of officers improved as the fortunes of war changed, with many transferring from now redundant backwaters to the organisation. Lieutenant Colonel Basil Reckitt began the process of making the move in early 1944 when it was clear that his job with Anti-Aircraft Artillery in Northern Ireland looked “unpromising.”

With the war close to its end in Europe and the arrival of the soldier Major General Sir Gerald W.R. Templer as their new senior officer in North West Europe recruiting fortunes for Civil Affairs and Military Government changed still further.
Military Government went up in the social scale; so much so, that, after
the surrender, there was an absolute rush to get places in our party – and
many got let in who knew nothing about what the job was.39

Employment of women was an option and Chief Commander H.V. Webb helped
to co-ordinate the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) at DCA. However,
deployment of women to combat areas was deemed viable only towards the end
of the war as part of Military Government. The women’s employment was not
always to everyone’s liking (reflecting attitudes and compounding policies of
the day), with most viewed as “an unmitigated nuisance in the field” and much
time was spent moving them to “places where they would be out of the way.”40

One of the central problems in achieving suitability amongst the men was
going the right combination of age and experience. With age came experience
and in most cases maturity, however, in forward areas of operations fitness was
also a requirement and this erred towards youth. Furthermore, the image (if not
the reality) of ranks of aged officers did not always serve the reputation of Civil
Affairs well, as AMGOT found. Yet, every part of the army wanted young, fit and
capable officers. Personnel branches were naturally inclined to serve the needs
of the combat arms first. Undeterred, Civil Affairs determination to get the right
balance of age, experience and numbers saw a continuing battle with the
personnel branches of the War Office. DCA pushed for rather more leniency in
the categories of less fit, but youthful types who might be used for Civil Affairs.41
After much campaigning, it eventually became as easy to recruit those under 35
who were permanently medical “Category B” as those in the traditional
recruiting group in the 35 to 55 age category.42 Whilst, this change helped, it did
not stop the wider tendency of personnel branches to regard Civil Affairs as a
“dump or refuge for unwanted or unsuccessful officers.”43

Indeed, at times Civil Affairs appeared awash with retired colonels who were
attracted by the better pay. From a 21st Army Group Civil Affairs perspective,
the “Retired Colonels” sent by the War Office were “NO GOOD.” The nature of
their military experience and their learnt military approach was of little use. By
contrast, the “Ordinary Chap” was considered “an outstanding success.” The
process of removing retired colonels often proved a “real” headache.44 The use
of retired colonels became particularly evident after the Home Guard was stood
down in December 1944 and redundant sub-area and district staffs were
transferred into Civil Affairs. They were not trained in civil affairs, but were put
in charge of those who were and this was judged by Major Sir Frank Markham
MP (Nottingham, South) to have done much harm to the organisation.45

However, overall retired officers (as opposed to those who should have been
retired) accounted for less than one percent of those recruited, even if their
characters seemed larger. Furthermore, in the run up to North West Europe, in
an attempt to ensure a decent quality threshold of officer saw the employment
of the Civil Service Commission and their recruiting techniques.46 Two boards
were used, one civilian and one military to ensure a good balance between
military needs and civilian experience.47 Of those rejected were included a
legless candidate, “a potential murderer” (according to the War Office Selection

[180]
Board psychiatrist), a 78-year-old general, a solicitor struck off the rolls and an officer certified as insane.\textsuperscript{48}

There were other methods available to make up the shortfall. One such was to use officers from the British Dominions. In communication with Canadian military authorities in January 1944, the Director of Civil Affairs made it clear that their people were needed. Consequently, Canada supplied 244 officers and 366 other ranks to the general pool of detachment staff for North West Europe.\textsuperscript{49} Another method was by employing fewer and arguably more realistic, numbers of staff officers at formations. Shortly after assuming his post as SCAO of Canadian First Army, Canadian Brigadier E.B. Wedd concluded that the War Establishment (number of staff) allotted to him at Army (34 officers and 62 other ranks) and Corps (9 officers and 16 other ranks) levels were far more than required. In discussion with his equivalent, Brigadier Richard M.H. Lewis, at British Second Army, the two agreed to cut numbers modestly. Lewis suggested that such large numbers were only required during Military Government or static phases. For Normandy, Civil Affairs numbers were always short of the full War Establishment.\textsuperscript{50} Ironically, this took figures back towards those first considered in September 1943.\textsuperscript{51} Similar realistic thinking in April 1944 saw SHAEF reduce the number demanded for Normandy to a theatre total of 1,214 officers and 2,065 men. This helped to alleviate particular pressures on soldier recruiting, but even officer recruiting at this stage was hampered by a dismal success rate at the boards. Only twenty percent of candidates passed selection for training.\textsuperscript{52}

Recruiting directly from civilian sources was often difficult to justify in light of certain concerns expressed by Churchill (see Chapter 1).\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, in circumstances where many civilian experts had already been conscripted (some finding their way into Civil Affairs) asking for yet further numbers from overstretched private and public organisations became difficult. Recruiting policemen into Civil Affairs as Public Safety Officers added to the already large burden of commitment made by the force to the armed forces. In June 1944, The Times reported that since the introduction of National Service there had been no fresh intake of police. Instead, many had been released to the armed forces with 1,999 transferred to general role and a further 81 transferred to Civil Affairs in 1943 alone.\textsuperscript{54} However, police were typical of the nature of expertise that could only be gained by recruiting directly from civilian sources. Furthermore, the professionalism that most were able to bring did much to improve the image of Civil Affairs in the field.

There were 500 British policemen of all ranks recruited into Civil Affairs for the North West Europe campaign.\textsuperscript{55} This helped meet the requirement that Public Safety Officers were to be included in every Civil Affairs detachment (a lesson gained in Italy).\textsuperscript{56} Of those recruited, lower ranks were regarded as “first-class,” but higher ranks (Chief Constables upwards) were “quite appalling.”\textsuperscript{57} Fortunately, the overwhelming number was in the former category. The quality of British policemen was ensured in part, because they were recruited centrally through the Home Office and in part, because they came from good jobs as volunteers. They had good motivation and in most cases good experience. There
were fewer American policemen, mainly because they had no equivalent of the Home Office. To make up the deficit generalists were appointed to the role, but were considered “politically” motivated and poor quality. In practice, most British policemen did more than police work. At the time of the “unscrambling” of Civil Affairs detachments (into separate national rather than combined Allied units) from the beginning of September 1944, many of the American-run detachments refused to let their British police officers go, as in some cases they were know to be “bolstering” the detachment.

The nature of the work engaged in by these policemen is captured in a vignette from the occupation of Hanover in April 1945, as described by British journalist, Leonard O. Mosley. Here two policemen in their early 30s from Cambridgeshire serving with a British Military Government detachment as Public Safety Officer Lieutenants had to deal with incredible conditions. In a badly damaged Hanover where 28,000 had been killed in recent air raids, they found 500,000 people (at least 250,000 Germans, 100,000 foreign workers and upwards of 50,000 former Allied prisoners of war). The situation that greeted them was described:

... no Wild West town of the last century could compare with the lawlessness of the life they lived... foreign workers... thousands of them drunk, and thousands of them marauding the city with guns and knives, on the search for loot or for women.

However, within days the two policemen had restored order, by organising Dutch policemen (brought in during wartime by the Germans to keep order during the air raids) into patrols and by giving British and French former POWs arms and orders to patrol the city in their “looted” cars.

The American dependency on British police was reflected in the account of the American commander of Civil Affairs detachment C2B1 (the Americans used a different numbering system to the British) in the American sector. After the posting on of the previous (American) Public Safety Officer, a British policeman, Captain John Kerman, who was already responsible for civil welfare, utilities, communications, public health and education in the unit, was given the additional responsibility of public safety. The American commander, Major John J. Maginnis, in commentary on his wartime diary wrote, “It was a relief to me to have an experienced policeman in this sensitive spot.” Maginnis also contrasted the different styles of “scrounging” in his unit; one officer did deals, his sergeant “just plain appropriated things,” but Kerman “used the police approach – talk loud, look official (as though you were going to make an arrest), and walk off with whatever you are after at the moment.” Thus, in more than one respect, were policemen recruited into Civil Affairs successful and seen to be so.

Whilst decent numbers of police were achieved for North West Europe, the same could not be said in the case of medical staff. The army wide shortage of medical staff meant that there were no spare “active list” medical officers available for Civil Affairs. Some ways were found around the problem by training individuals to be hygiene officers (courses were established at 21st Army Group and CASC) and by better utilising the advice given by the Director of Medical Services located at formation headquarters (although he had military
needs to address first). However, this did not solve the fundamental shortage of staff. Suggestions of bringing doctors over from the Republic of Ireland were short-lived as many had already joined medical units in the fighting forces and doctors from exile communities were either not available or of poor standard. A number of French nurses were trained by Civil Affairs for medical work in their homeland. Although wearing French insignia and uniforms they were nevertheless often referred to as 'French Civil Affairs nurses.' Additionally, some gains were made by bringing American medical officers over into British Civil Affairs (and balancing their deficits of police), but it was a problem never fully addressed. Meeting the medical needs of those liberated at Belsen in 1945 was only achieved by using regular army doctors and civilian staff brought over from London medical schools.

**EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

The difficulty in getting a good foundation in terms of a balance of numbers, ages and experience could be partly compensated by ensuring a better overall quality through training. This reflected the view that to be a good Civil Affairs officer was not “innate,” but rather had to be learnt. Indeed, well before the establishment of even AMGOT, training had been identified as a key component of Civil Affairs. It was decided in October 1942 by senior Civil Affairs officer, Brigadier S. Swinton Lee (shortly before his appointment as DCCAO for Home Forces), that a Civil Affairs Staff Centre (CASC) would be developed to train Civil Affairs officers. This was established at Southlands House, Wimbledon with courses starting in February 1943. Its first Commandant (later DCCAO of 21st Army Group) was Brigadier Thomas Robbins. He was replaced by Brigadier S.C. Dumbreck on 23 January 1944 who came from being commandant at the Civil Affairs School in the Middle East. CASC was divided into three wings. The two “Senior” wings looked at North West Europe (“A”) and the Far East (“B”). In July 1943, the “Junior” (“C”) wing of CASC was opened at Peel House, Regency Street, London by the War Office. Its primary purpose was to train policemen for Civil Affairs duties, with Commander W.J.A. Willis RN, as Commandant.

CASC was something of a confusing title, as although most Civil Affairs officers were nominally staff officers and some would work on the staffs of formations, most of them would work with detachments where they were rather more akin to field officers. The centre and its wings therefore provided both field and specialist staff officer training. Nearly all officers went through CASC or one of its wings at some stage. However, on entering Germany, the pressure for increased numbers changed matters and significant numbers came into Military Government directly from other sources, including those from the Home Guard mentioned earlier.

CASC did not teach the very first civil administration related courses. Intelligence Training Centre "political-military" courses at St. John’s College, University of Cambridge were run spasmodically from June 1941. Robbins had taught on these courses. However, London was considered a better location than Cambridge (Oxford was also considered) as it allowed speakers to make an
easy wartime trip for speakers from the War Office, other government departments and numerous universities outside London.76

The idea of courses at CASC caused some disquiet. In September 1942, some officials at the Foreign Office were alarmed by the idea of political-military courses. They had no wish for British officers to run the Continent’s administration, even if they could do it. However, others there saw the need as a practical one and, because war had become more chaotic, necessary. They argued that those proposing the courses were not “dyed in the wool militarists” but rather ordinary, sensible ex-civilians. It was considered useful to have something that stood between the “traditional WO Blimps” and the “professional amateurs of foreign affairs who swarm in the Universities.” Nevertheless, it was regarded as desirous to have Foreign Office involvement in giving direction to the courses.77 A matter that was largely achieved through the AT(E) Committee. However, Foreign Office concerns regarding the diplomatic sensitivity of such courses were never far away. Reports in late November 1942 in The Sunday Times regarding the development of the American School of Military Government at Charlottesville worried the Foreign Secretary that courses like these had little consideration for the sensitivities of exiled Allied governments.78

Nevertheless, the American system did provide some insights in terms of course content for staff at CASC. Indeed, Robbins visited Charlottesville prior to his appointment as Commandant at Wimbledon.79 However, whilst broad similarities can be identified between the courses, the more limited resources available in Britain (in addition to Charlottesville the Americans were able to run courses held at Fort Custer in Michigan, Harvard, Yale, Michigan, Chicago, Boston, Pittsburgh, Wisconsin, Northwestern, Western Reserve and Stanford universities.80), the different experiences of Civil Affairs by the British and the oversight by the Foreign Office, largely kept the two apart in practical and philosophical terms.

The first Civil Affairs staff course at CASC commenced on 25 February 1943, with 150 officers, including 14 Canadian and 19 American officers.81 Soon courses with double the number of students would be run. Alongside British, Canadian and American students were those from Australia, South Africa, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Poland would attend.82 This included 264 Canadian, 14 South Africans, two Australians, 79 French, 38 from Belgium and Luxembourg, 62 Dutch, 21 Norwegians, 26 Poles, 100 US Army, 63 US Navy, 111 British police and two Czechoslovakian officers.83 Canada also sent officers to the American school at Charlottesville and later developed its own course at its Royal Military College, Kingston.84

From the beginning, an American officer was appointed as a member of staff and was later joined by individual Dutch, Canadian and South African officers, as well as a French officer holding a British commission.85 The original War Establishment allowed for a Colonel as Commandant, two Chief Instructors, 16 Directors of Studies, a liaison officer and two other officers.86 Yet, numbers and ranks of staff increased as the throughput of students increased. Amongst the
advisers and lecturers were Lieutenant Colonel J.R.M. Butler, A.J.P. Taylor, Lord Hankey, Sir R. Vansittart and E.L. Woodward. The spread of expertise amongst lecturing staff included backgrounds in trade and industry, education, law, the regular army, civil service, banking and accountancy.\textsuperscript{87}

The first course lasted for 13 weeks, used a draft syllabus approved by the AT(E) Committee and was taught by military and non-military lectures. The background lectures were taught by a mixture of outside scholars, ministerial officials and government researchers. These were supplemented by study groups looking at both various regions and specialist Civil Affairs functions. Each student would attend all background lectures and then choose two regional subjects (out of six) and one of the ten functional areas (police, health, law, etc.). The last month of the course involved an exercise where students were confronted on a mythical military operation with a range of likely problems.\textsuperscript{88} Much was learnt from the first course, which was considered an experiment. It had no War Office Civil Affairs manuals to go on, few of the directing staff at this stage had much in the way of personal operational Civil Affairs experience and only a few examples were available from events in Africa.\textsuperscript{89} Subsequent courses immediately benefited from the many lessons around the Mediterranean. This was complimented by staff visiting these overseas theatres to study latest developments.\textsuperscript{90}

The new course was shortened to five weeks, with many fewer background lectures, but with general administrative training included. Students were taught all subjects in syndicates of 15 (allowing staff to get to know students) and were both assigned a region (along with Germany) and a functional group in which to specialise. The final exercise was cut to a week and later moved to earlier in the course. There were more test papers and demonstrations of activities (such as running military courts).\textsuperscript{91} By September 1944, the course at Wimbledon was six weeks long. At this stage in war, it focused exclusively on Germany and was conveyed with a great sense of urgency, which reflected concerns that a sudden German collapse was about to occur. Nevertheless, the course also focused on the provision of support during combat operations. One attendee, Basil Reckitt, judged the course especially good on ‘first aid’ Civil Affairs measures including the paramount importance of policing and the maintenance of law and order. There was a huge mass of information on the course. Yet in retrospect, Reckitt considered that he had learnt more than he thought at the time. Few failed the course.\textsuperscript{92} Success rates are difficult to establish, but together with figures mentioned earlier Canadian figures indicate that course failure rates were around twenty to twenty-five percent.\textsuperscript{93} However, these figures do not indicate whether this was just the basic or amongst all courses run.

Following attendance at CASC, many officers were then given additional practical training in military skills, driving, maintenance, languages and so forth at various locations around Britain, including Manchester and Kettering.\textsuperscript{94} For those posted as depot staff additional instruction was conducted at RASC training centres.\textsuperscript{95} Further specialist courses were held in civil defence (provided by the National Fire Service) and first aid nursing.\textsuperscript{96} Similar shorter
courses were given on prison administration (at Wakefield Prison) and on rationing, food supply and distribution (by the Ministry of Food at the Carlton Hotel, London). The latter took place at the request of the British Council and was also attended by Allied Governments, members of UNRRA and the Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad providing an opportunity for a useful exchange of ideas.

Later, courses were run for senior Civil Affairs officers. These included a mixture of lectures and round table discussions looking at aspects of organisation, administration, courts, safety and military primacy. The lecturers on these included Robbins and Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Wellesley (The 7th Duke of Wellington), who had practical experience of six months in Asmara and AMGOT in Sicily. Some field Civil Affairs officers were sent to the Sandhurst Wing of Staff College at Camberley to train as staff officers. Others who had already conducted staff training and coming in from other units were sent on specialist Civil Affairs staff officer courses. Basil Reckitt attended the staff course at Camberley in early 1945 during his extended mobilisation training, which was lengthened owing to the lack of requirement for Military Government detachments until the borders of Germany had been crossed. The six-week Camberley course was a “potted” version of the six-month course. It was extremely hard work, but did benefit from the amassing of Civil Affairs officers, many of which had practical operational experience in The Netherlands, Belgium and France. The requirement to do the course reflected the need to correct the “profound” ignorance amongst many Civil Affairs officers of military staff procedures. As many as possible were to attend the course at Camberley. Reckitt judged that whilst some attending did have some experience of military procedure, most had none. The mismatch in abilities made teaching the course difficult and the recall of many back to the frontline during the course simply compounded the problem. Nevertheless, that a training gap had been identified and attempts were made to address it provided some indications of professional standards.

Views on all the courses at CASC were mixed. Its commandant, Robbins in an address on 29 October 1943 to visiting Members of Parliament, ventured that much had been learnt from the first courses. One of its Directors of Study, Lieutenant Colonel James Butler, in speaking to the same group, emphasised both the practicality of the functional and regional studies training, and the quality of instruction. In a noncommittal fashion, one student, who later went on to command a detachment, recalled struggling to learn French in six weeks. However, another officer who was at the centre as student and instructor, and became later Robbins’ deputy at 21st Army Group, Brigadier A.E. Hodgkin, thought it had the wrong commandant with Robbins, the wrong syllabus, poor quality students, some worthless staff, and that much of the teaching was too “airy-fairy” and irrelevant. Some views expressed after the war were damning.

British Civil Affairs staff officer, Major A.G. Puttock, first heard about his likely posting during the Commandant’s final address at Staff College (who apologised for the paucity of decent staff jobs) at the beginning of 1944: “speculation was
rife, as it was the first we had heard of Civil Affairs.”

On arriving in Yorkshire, Puttock and another new Civil Affairs staff officer decided to combine their knowledge of Civil Affairs: “the sum total still amounting to nothing.” After being given some literature, the officers were sent, in March 1944, to Peel House to attend a three-week Civil Affairs staff officers’ course. However, in Puttock’s view it was a “complete farce” and:

... the instructors though probably very good with rather slow and stolid ex-policeman, were quite incapable of dealing with some forty ex-Staff College graduates who had been taught to criticize and pick holes in the subject matter produced.

This particular course was not repeated, but was thought to be useful in allowing Civil Affairs officers “to understand each other's foibles and frailties.”

Training also involved briefing and educating formation staffs on the aims and functions of Civil Affairs. The aim was to engender their support on operations and reverse some of the mistakes of AMGOT. Consequently, three four-day courses run by DCA, briefing 300 senior officers in total (from Major Generals downwards), were held at CASC from September 1943 onwards. Similar briefings were also held for Members of Parliament. Topics on both courses covered included Civil Affairs purpose, training, tasks in the field, supplies, the American involvement, an overview of Belgium and France and a “Brains Trusts” any questions spot.

Briefings were given by senior staff like Kirby, Rennell, Robbins and Butler. The briefings went some way to alleviating concerns that Civil Affairs activities in North West Europe would not repeat the mistakes in Italy. Nevertheless, reflecting some of the problems with recruitment, many senior officers were disappointed to reacquaint themselves with officers they had previously sacked or recommended for transfer. Staff from CASC also visited units and formations to brief more junior officers on the aims of Civil Affairs.

Contrary to the views of Puttock, there was some level of Civil Affairs instruction at Staff College, although exactly what was taught on the various senior and junior courses is difficult to establish. Certainly, on the 16-week long Short [Intermediate] War Course a Civil Affairs element was generally included after the middle of 1943. However, lectures were typically given at the end of the working day and without a précis being issued. Nevertheless, lecturers included both Lee (25 June 1943) and Kirby (28 March 1944 and 12 September 1944), and as the war in Europe concluded in 1945 even included Templer. Kirby’s lecture in September 1944 was to be followed by Lieutenant Colonel J.F. Millard on “Civil Affairs as it affects Staff Officers at Division and Brigade HQ” although this was postponed and possibly cancelled. Clearly operational requirements in North West Europe had stimulated a need study in this area.

Prior to operations in North West Europe, mobilisation centres were established at the Grand Hotel, Eastbourne in April 1944 for British Civil Affairs and at Shrivenham (later moving to Manchester) in December 1943 (first contingent arrive on 27 January 1944) for American Civil Affairs. These courses
gave Civil Affairs officers additional practical training, language training and briefings on the latest versions of Civil Affairs policy for North West Europe. After the course, officers went on to their staffs or detachments and meet the other ranks. Mobilisation was conducted by national authorities, but pre-deployment training at the centres was the responsibility of SHAEF’s G-5 Division.\textsuperscript{115} At “Shiveringham,” in addition to the study of French and German governmental organisation and military skills training, the “good dose of physical exercise” became “quite popular” as the only way of staying warm in the unheated barracks.\textsuperscript{116} Some officers from each establishment would spend some of their time at the other in order to train with their counterparts with whom they would soon be working as part of multinational detachments in Normandy.\textsuperscript{117} Both the British and American courses were regarded as good.\textsuperscript{118} The scale of Shrivenham was immense, and to one British observer from SHAEF much larger than anything Britain could achieve.\textsuperscript{119} Inevitably, there was a range of views of such courses. On courses run at Eastbourne in the Doldrums between D-Day and the entry into Germany, there was little training and much hanging around. Many found this irritating and boring, but at least they were able to get away on leave. Levels of irritation were not helped by the doors at the hotel constantly banging, as the result of the removal of their catches by an over-zealous fire officer. The training when it occurred was reasonable, but punctuated by “ineffectual exercises.” To compensate and with time on their hands, some Civil Affairs officers, like Basil Reckitt (a Trade and Industry specialist) generated their own training and paid visits to suitable businesses around Britain.\textsuperscript{120}

British Civil Affairs education and training could be seen as something of a mixed bag of success. For most, it had the benefits of a series of courses that helped to consolidate experience and understanding. At the very least, contact was made with other Civil Affairs officers. Civil Affairs for North West Europe was seen to be making a break from AMGOT. There were the improvements of training for all and attempts to make systematic contact with formations. Whether some of the speakers were too focused on theory, when students really required more practical advice was an important weakness, but improvements were gradually made in this respect. Garnering political support through visits by MPs was sensible from a Civil Affairs institutional point of view at a time when there were concerns over AMGOT. It also served the interests of the Foreign Office in demonstrating that the views of allies were considered. It helped to allay the fears of Allies over Civil Affairs, as their students reported back on courses attended. Education and training was bound to be difficult when the range of Civil Affairs activities was so broad. It was also difficult if either the students or the staff were not up to the mark. However, despite the imperfections, it was the best training available within the resources, it engendered a sense of purpose, it helped to sell the idea of professionalism to others and it demonstrated it by attempting to learn from previous mistakes.
A “Senior Soldier”

Another of the ideas to fall out of early AT(E) Committee discussions was the need for a “senior soldier” to assist with the planning of the cross-Channel operation. It was an idea that would soon develop into the position of Chief Civil Affairs Officer (CCAO). The CCAO was to serve on the staff of the campaign commander and to be part of the planning process from the start. In fact, the deputy (DCCAO) was appointed first, reflecting a wartime preference to decide upon the senior-most positions of an operation at a later stage of the process. The AT(E) Committee felt that experience and standing of DCCAO were as important as rank and soon likely names were being requested from the Commander of Home Forces (General Sir Bernard Paget, also responsible for the first drafts of British cross-Channel planning), the Treasury, Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare. That so many organisations were asked reflected the need to get the “right man” and the process was not acrimonious. As an initial focus for British preparations, the first DCCAO appointee would in time be succeeded by one at 21st Army Group and in the meantime be joined by one at COSSAC.

DCCAO: Focus for British Preparations

The creation of a post to provide a focus for British Civil Affairs in North West Europe occurred in October 1942 with the appointment of Brigadier Stanlake Swinton Lee. His task, in theory at least, was threefold: to act as a point for data collection, to examine all possible civil problems in the campaign area and to prepare plans for the period during which the “Army [was] responsible.” He was to work under the direction of and report to both the AT(E) Committee and PUS at the War Office. He was to collaborate with the Foreign Office, the ROUNDUP staff (working under the command of Home Forces), the American staff in Europe, the Inter-Allied Committee (both via AT(E)) and the exiled Allied governments (but only with the Foreign Office and on War Cabinet approval). He was to liaise with MO11 (on recruitment), with various War Office experts and with the Political Warfare Executive (whose SOE would assist in the production of handbooks). The American equivalent of Lee (the Civil Affairs section of the American forces in Europe (ETOUSA) was created in August 1942) was also on the AT(E) committee. With their advice, the committee could begin the process of procuring supplies, endorsing decisions and passing these and more political issues to the ministerial level for approval or decision. That so much free flowing liaison with other government departments and War Office staffs was a necessary part of DCCAO’s job reflected a generally held view in the Foreign Office that traditional forms of military organisation would not have worked for this particular post:

“...the impossibility of compressing these complicated matters within the rigid military machine, with its craving for elaborate orders literally executed.”
Lee was considered the best available amongst the seven shortlisted, but the competition was not strong and there were concerns regarding Lee’s overall capabilities. Nevertheless, he had experience of working with the French and was able to speak French fluently (his daughter, Annie Swinton Lee, even fought in the French Army from 1944, where she won the *Croix de Guerre*\(^{128}\)), however it was suggested by some at the Foreign Office that “there is singularly little about Col. Lee. He will have to be a biggish man to cope with this job.”\(^{129}\) When DCA was created in June 1943, its first director, Kirby, found Lee working on matters beyond his remit (including recruiting) and at a time when he should have been concentrating on North West Europe. Kirby thought Lee guilty of “Empire Building.” He took back recruitment and relocated Lee away from the War Office to Princes’ Gardens from Whitehall Court.\(^{130}\) Lee was described by post-war recollections as clever, but with dissolute tendencies and by some even as “nuts.”\(^{131}\) Nevertheless, it was Lee (or possibly his staff) who pointed out the need to extend the period of 42 days for relief provision and suggested that DCA looked at co-ordinating their work with that of Brigadier van Cutsem’s Control Commission.\(^{132}\)

**Chief Staff Officer to CCAO (Des.), COSSAC**

With the creation of the COSSAC organisation in spring 1943, it was not long before the need for an equivalent post to DCCAO became apparent. Its chief, Morgan had been consulting with Rennell on Civil Affairs matters since 19 May.\(^{133}\) On 21 June, a request for suitable officers was made to the CCS and soon two lieutenant colonel (one British and one American) and a few advisers were put to work under the Major General in charge of “Administration.” It was immediately clear that such numbers were insufficient, either to conduct a decent level Civil Affairs planning for forthcoming operations at COSSAC or even to act as a post box for Civil Affairs issues at the headquarters. Furthermore, it was clear that better co-ordination international was urgently necessary, as, despite the work of AT(E), there remained many practical differences between the hitherto nationally focused arrangements of British and American Civil Affairs planning staffs.\(^{134}\) Consequently, in July 1943, Morgan contacted the War Office and proposed the appointment of a Chief Staff Officer to CCAO (Designate) - effectively a DCCAO – and supported by a slightly enlarged staff.\(^{135}\) At the British end, Morgan’s ideas were supported by VCIGS, Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Nye, who was aware of the lessons of 1918 and wished for better preparations covering all eventualities to be made.\(^{136}\)

Morgan’s plan was for the new appointee (located at the central headquarters at Norfolk House, St. James’ Square) and his supporting staff to collaborate with both national organisations and COSSAC’s own planning staff in an attempt to improve overall co-ordination. The staff would be organised on both a functional and national basis. The latter, in the form of “country sections” would provide a link to Allies and help formations prepare for the needs of individual countries to be encountered as part of operations. The country approach deliberately mirrored the regional approach taken by AMGOT in Italy. In terms of staffing, in the spirit of transatlantic integration, each appointment would be
balanced by a *duplicate* from the other side of the ocean.\textsuperscript{137} However, the War Office had certain reservations about the scheme: Civil Affairs planning should not get ahead of operational planning (it should be “*pari passu*”), country planning should not duplicate similar work at the War Office (in DCA) and the staff at COSSAC should be “interlarded not duplicated.” However, despite such concerns there was full agreement that there was a fundamental need for a senior officer to lead on Civil Affairs.\textsuperscript{138}

As his Chief Staff Officer to CCAO (Designate) Morgan appointed Major General Sir Roger Lumley. Lumley’s meteoric rise in rank to this position (later re-designated Assistant Chief of Staff or ACOS G-5) would soon attract the attentions of Churchill (see Chapter 1). Lumley worked at first with American, Colonel Cornelius E. Ryan who was quickly succeeded by Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen.\textsuperscript{139} Whilst, Ryan was considered by Lumley to be “stupid,” he nevertheless went on to head American 12\textsuperscript{th} Army Group G-5 in Normandy.\textsuperscript{140} Bendetsen considered both good at his job and a brilliant lawyer, would only last until the arrival of Eisenhower.\textsuperscript{141} It was reported after the war that his ousting was because he previously “got across” one of Eisenhower’s brothers.\textsuperscript{142} The problems associated with working at a multinational headquarters were never simple and both Morgan and his deputy were accused of allowing themselves to come under undue influence from each other’s nations.\textsuperscript{143}

In time, the G-5 staff would rise to 325 strong, including 116 officers.\textsuperscript{144} It would have responsibility for policy-making, for Civil Affairs advice to the Supreme Commander, for preparation of Civil Affairs plans for his approval, for monitoring of their execution, for staffing any revisions and for general Civil Affairs co-ordination.\textsuperscript{145} To assist with smoothing relations with the exiled governments in autumn 1943 Morgan requested from Roosevelt the services of American Ambassador Anthony Drexel who served as a colonel on his Civil Affairs staff.\textsuperscript{146}

Despite his appointment to COSSAC thwarting any personal hopes of rejoining his old regiment, Lumley reportedly never regretted joining Civil Affairs.\textsuperscript{147} Morgan considered Lumley, at the time of his appointment, best for the job. He was viewed by Robbins as gifted.\textsuperscript{148} Official historian Donnison thought Lumley an “attractive, modest person.” However, others, like British Brigadier George Heyman at SHAEF, did not think that Lumley was up to the job and was certainly no match for his later deputy, American Brigadier General Julius C. Holmes (who came over with Eisenhower from AFHQ in Italy).\textsuperscript{149} Senior Civil Affairs police officer T.E. St. Johnston thought Lumley unqualified.\textsuperscript{150} Speaking after the war, even Morgan thought him a mistake, but did not specify why.\textsuperscript{151} Nevertheless, whilst opinions varied, Lumley moved COSSAC away from the AMGOT model and ensured that it was kept at a distance when new attempts were made to reintroduce it in 1944.

**DCCAO, 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group**

On 17 December, Brigadier Thomas Robbins, formerly Commandant at CASC, was appointed DCCAO, 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group.\textsuperscript{152} A small Civil Affairs cell had already
been established at 21st Army Group on 5 November 1943, four months after the creation of the headquarters and shortly before Montgomery took command at the start of 1944. Initially, it was under the direction of Colonel Geo de Chair, who was described as having “fine pair of field boots, two Aberdeen terriers, and a brain like a shrivelled pea.” Unsurprisingly, he “disappeared overnight.”

In anticipation of the arrival of Robbins, a more workmanlike staff started to form at 16 Catherine Place, in central London from 6 December 1943. As 21st Army Group, from the beginning of 1944, began to prepare for operations, its Civil Affairs staff correspondingly increased in size, moved location and divided itself. Soon Civil Affairs personnel at 21st Army Group grew to its maximum size of near 80 officers and 164 support staff. They were divided between 21st Army Group Headquarters REAR and MAIN; no Civil Affairs officers were located at Montgomery’s forward or TAC Headquarters. Most were located at REAR, with only a small party joining MAIN on 22 May 1944. The MAIN party was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel D.R. Ellias (SO1 Executive), with Major P.E. Russell as his SO2 and Major E.J. Boulton as SO2 Liaison. In keeping with Montgomery’s decision to relocate 21st Army Group headquarters to Hammersmith, Civil Affairs staff at REAR moved to Gunterstone Road in January 1944. They were sub-divided into executive, displaced persons, administrative, legal, financial, public safety, public health, supply/economics and technical sections. Whilst Robbins remained the most senior Civil Affairs officer at REAR, he was joined by two other brigadiers in charge of the finance and supply/economics sections. Their ranks indicated both the importance of these roles and the need to attract capable individuals to them via the incentive of decent status and pay. Robbins, despite his Military Cross (that might otherwise indicate a level of military respect), never had an easy time with 21st Army Group. He was regarded by his deputy, Colonel A.E. Hodgkin, as a “cardinal mistake” and whilst a “delightful man in many ways (and very good to [Hodgkin]),” was “without the soldier’s mind, and fundamentally antagonistic to regular officers.” Others too thought him a great “misfit.” Nevertheless, some of the French representatives who worked with Robbins in both London and Normandy had much warmth and admiration for the man. However, the most telling indicator of Robbins’ failure at 21st Army Group was the significant and effortlessly observed improvement in Civil Affairs relations at the headquarters in May 1945 following the arrival of Montgomery’s man and trusted soldier, Major General Templer as his replacement. Relations were judged to improve “with a snap” on the appointment. Templer’s arrival coincided with a number of fundamental and related changes that resulted from the evident proximity to the end of the war in Europe. Corporately, 21st Army Group needed to turn its attention to the post-war needs of Military Government and individually, many regular officers, including Montgomery, at the headquarters (as well as beyond) began to consider their post-war careers and a job in Military Government provided them with a degree of security. Thus, it was an appropriate time to allow the needs of Civil Affairs and Military Government to dominate military considerations and the impact on
the process of Templer might be regarded as incidental. However, irrespective of the reason for change, the contrast with the attitudes that had prevailed hitherto was distinct and the reason for these went beyond the foibles of Robbins.

One of the more obvious problems faced by Civil Affairs at the headquarters was the level of prejudice exhibited towards the organisation by Montgomery. It was one happily copied by his subordinates and with little respect from the top, Civil Affairs was an easy target for 21st Army Group ridicule. Montgomery made it clear to many (including War Secretary Grigg) that he had no time to spare for Civil Affairs issues. Indeed, both Montgomery and his Chief of Staff de Guingand were seen to cold shoulder Civil Affairs. With such prevalent views at 21st Army Group, it was easy to see how Civil Affairs relations with Brigadier Sir Randle G. Feilden, Deputy Quartermaster General and "Q" in general became particularly difficult "from the beginning" and those with Staff Duties generally problematic or how Civil Affairs brigadiers were not even invited to become "members of the Brigadiers Mess." However, Civil Affairs were not alone in experiencing problems at 21st Army Group where the general tenor encouraged at the headquarters was one of factionalism.

In broader term, Civil Affairs were not helped by the apparently vague nature of their work. Only Military Government appeared to have a purpose, but this only occurred as the pace of the fight irreversibly slowed towards a conclusion. According to Morgan, there was "never any object to the exercise" of Civil Affairs. When Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke as CIGS was "repeatedly" asked what the object of Civil Affairs was, his reply came: "Berlin." After the war, Morgan speculated that if the object had been to establish new governments, the organisation would have had attracted both standing and status. However, during the North West Europe campaign most regular officers shunned Civil Affairs seeing it as a short-term wartime measure and thus a career setback. The vague nature of Civil Affairs work might have been mitigated if there was a better understanding at 21st Army Group of the necessary nuances of its work. However, despite the attempts of Civil Affairs to educate others as to their purpose, the overall lack of instinctive knowledge that went with the absence of Civil Affairs on the pre-war Staff College curriculum was judged by Robbins to have made the development of any wartime understanding close to impossible. Instead, the understanding of Civil Affairs was generally narrowly focused on simple and immediate military tasks. Typical were the views of the Chief of Staff at 21st Army Group, Major General Sir Francis de Guingand, who stated on 9 January 1944, that, "It must also be made quite clear that the Civil Affairs Branch has but one objective, to further the purpose of the Commander."

Mocking attitudes at 21st Army Group were only encouraged by the obvious difference between many of the Civil Affairs officers sent to the headquarters and their regular counterparts. Many like Robbins did not sit easily alongside their career war fighter equivalents. Most Civil Affairs officers were regarded as "funnies," "rejects" or "elderly". Ironically, such differences, where they existed, tended to become more pronounced when Civil Affairs turned into
Military Government with its heady mix of freshly transferred regular officers, the deadwood from decommissioned formations (like the Home Guard) and the arrival of inexperienced Civil Affairs officers and uniformed civilians.\textsuperscript{170} Even during the North West Europe campaign, given that most Civil Affairs officers were not from the regular army, their inability to know how to “sell” themselves to other soldiers or which “buttons” to press to get results presented difficulties in getting aspects of work done.\textsuperscript{171}

Compounding the personal attitudes towards Civil Affairs was a British structural disadvantage. Unlike COSSAC/SHAEF and American Army formation headquarters, 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group did not organise Civil Affairs into a separate staff division. Furthermore, within the British command system Civil Affairs did not have the benefaction of being a direct responsibility of any of the three existing staffs (“G,” “A,” “Q”). Instead, it worked with the staff most associated with the task in hand. DCCAO (SCAO at Army and Corps) did have a role in providing professional advice, much as the Commander Royal Engineers (CRE) provided technical advice on engineering matters, but it was advice not direction. Consequently, in hierarchy terms Civil Affairs was regarded as a supporting service that would be tasked by others to support their needs.\textsuperscript{172}

Effectively, Civil Affairs was unable to advance easily either their requirements or corporate view. Whilst, they worked very well within themselves, outside Civil Affairs were dependent on the mercies of the staff divisions that stood between them and the commander. Unsurprisingly, the British approach often ended with “many tears” and the “situation was always uneasy.” Typically, the only way of making headway was for an exasperated Robbins or one of his SO1s to ask de Guingand for a solution. However, this was not always easy given de Guingand’s views towards Civil Affairs and this circumvented approach did little to win support for the organisation from other parts of the headquarters.\textsuperscript{173} Yet, de Guingand was intellectually bright, had many diplomatic qualities, was charming, easy to befriend and liked entertaining. Thus, on a good day he may have been amenable to an approach by Civil Affairs. With experience of military intelligence and in his role of both putting Montgomery’s strategy into operation and as his lead inter-Allied liaison officer, he was also aware of what was happening regarding population movements, American developments and such like. Later in the war, de Guingand was heavily involved in Civil Affairs work in the relief of famine in The Netherlands and the establishment of Military Government.\textsuperscript{174}

By contrast, the COSSAC approach (an innovation was claimed by Morgan) of having five separate staff divisions (Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics and Civil Affairs) enabled Civil Affairs to have a direct say in the conduct of a campaign.\textsuperscript{175} Some working at 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group thought the COSSAC approach had its merits for not only did the scope and diverse nature of Civil Affairs work justify a separate staff branch, but also and most importantly, the considerably higher status given to G-5 in both COSSAC/SHAEF and American Army headquarters allowed the organisation the momentum it deserved.\textsuperscript{176} Support for Civil Affairs was enhanced by the better level of understanding of its work amongst American commanders. Consequently, they
were always keen to use Civil Affairs in forward areas and provided the organisation with a great deal of support, which in turn produced better results. Indeed, control of the key port of Cherbourg was judged much more efficient than Antwerp, where the British were largely unprepared. However, American Army conceptions of Civil Affairs tended to be closer to the Military Government models and whilst this was appealing to many American commanders, it was feared by leaders like de Gaulle.177

Ironically, both British and COSSAC Civil Affairs staff approaches were attempts to improve upon the perceived failures of AMGOT in creating a model that was integrated into military operations. Indeed, both utilised the concept of the DCCAO issuing only technical instructions (professional or administrative information) not orders (movement, aim, tasks, etc.) to subordinate detachments or staffs. Orders were only issued by formation commanders in an attempt both to make Civil Affairs a military responsibility and consideration, and to ensure a proper balance between military and civilian needs.178 Whilst, the G-5 approach circumvented the problems of the dual chains of command experienced in Italy it was unlikely to have been accepted by Montgomery, even if it had been by the Foreign Office. Such was his dislike of AMGOT and its people that even if it had been forced upon him it is safe to assume that the organisation would have been effectively sidelined. Whether Montgomery’s views would have changed if there were fewer Robbins and greater numbers of conventionally trained and capable staff officers is a moot point. The problem for Robbins at 21st Army Group was that the poor image of Civil Affairs officers was compounded by a lack of corporate position, which in turn was denied as the result of the poor images stemming from Italy. Luckily, for those on the ground in Normandy, most Civil Affairs problems could be and were dealt with at an Army level or below and where attitudes were, generally, shaped by operational needs (see Chapter 7).

**Civil Affairs Models for North West Europe**

The earlier rejection by COSSAC (led by Lumley) of the AMGOT model, with its emphasis on Military Government style authority, for North West Europe was not accepted by all. Many Americans found great appeal in the AMGOT approach. Indeed, it was one inculcated at training centres like Charlottesville, where great emphasis was placed on the lessons of the Hunt report in the Rhineland.179 That a softer approach with less of an “object to the exercise” had resulted from a view that AMGOT and ACC were both failures and had emerged in London (capital of the ‘manipulative’ British) as the result of the strange convolutions of a British government committee compromise and the influence of exiled Allies was bound to cause offence when AMGOT men arrived with Eisenhower at SHAEF.

The discussions at SHAEF saw an attempt by both McSherry (Rennell’s deputy in Italy as well as Chief Civil Affairs Officer in Sicily180) and Holmes (on the G-5 staff at AFHQ and now deputy to Lumley) to amend the November 1943 COSSAC Civil Affairs *Standard Policy and Procedure (SP&P)* guide to something
approximating an AMGOT model. Lumley disagreed with the challenge and fought back. The attempt resulted in six weeks of delay as views went back and forth. McSherry and Holmes were not alone in their views and were joined by various individuals and groups. There was support from within Civil Affairs police circles for the AMGOT approach as it had given them much freedom of movement during operations in Italy. Unsurprisingly, Rennell also became a very keen and vocal advocate of a return to the AMGOT model.

Having returned to Britain in late December 1943, he was soon on the offensive driving support behind a return to the AMGOT model he had created for North West Europe with Morgan in the previous spring. Rennell used various methods to enlist support. Publically, he spoke on the benefits of AMGOT at Chatham House on 1 February 1944. This reinforced lectures given at the Fourth Senior Officers Course at CASC between 20 and 22 January. He accepted an offer by the Special Services Section of ETOUSA (a responsibility of McSherry at Shrivenham) to write an article in Army Talks on AMGOT in January.

Meanwhile, he was in correspondence with both Bovenschen and Grigg at the War Office. However, the validity or otherwise of the AMGOT model became muddled with the attempts by Rennell and Holmes to replace Lumley at SHAEF. Indeed, when on 22 January 1944 Rennell asked for his kit to be returned from Italy, his intentions became clear. Yet, whilst the battles of will between Lumley, Holmes and Rennell were of importance in determining who would lead Allied Civil Affairs into North West Europe, the war over which model to use had already been lost.

To change SP&P was judged merely to encourage confusion (although amending supplements were allowed) and with the prevailing mood, being against AMGOT the challenge was not to survive. In particular, Lumley was able to argue successfully in early March that the central failure of AMGOT had been the lack of close Civil Affairs integration with “normal staffs throughout the chain of command” and it was therefore important to “avoid AMGOT organisation.” Furthermore, it has been argued that the approach taken by SHAEF was one where the performance expectations were functional, focusing on the speed of utility restoration not on political matters. This was reflected in recruitment and in the stated desire to work with existing structures and people where possible.

Nevertheless, the episode cost Lumley his job, he was replaced by Lieutenant General Sir Arthur E. Grasett (a Canadian born Briton) in mid-April 1944, supported by Holmes (who some argue was effectively in control of G-5) and McSherry. Rennell had been removed from the equation in mid-February being told by Grigg that Lumley was being kept on and thus there was no room for him at SHAEF. Keen to ensure that an unemployed Rennell would not stir up renewed trouble for Civil Affairs at SHAEF he was denied a position as Civil Affairs historian.

Time consuming and emotional as it was, the renewed debate over AMGOT had little impact at 21st Army Group. The influence of SP&P was summarised by a 21st Army Group Civil Affairs staff officer: “I suppose we paid some attention to this on matters of principle, but I have no clear recollection of being unduly
It is dubious whether any of the amendments would have changed the British approach eventually used in Normandy. The prevailing mood within 21st Army Group was anti-AMGOT. This came from the top, as Montgomery wanted “everything to go through him.” He “wanted to be king of his own castle” and many of his subordinates at 21st Army Group took “their colours from him.” His Civil Affairs staff also planned to avoid another AMGOT and not withstanding problems within 21st Army Group headquarters as an organisation the North West Europe Civil Affairs approach was seen by some as successful:

... warned by the shocking fiasco in Italy, due to Rennell of Rodd’s forceful but misguided personality, we determined that at all costs Military Government was going to be a really integral part of the Army Group, we had to fight hard for this, nobody helping us at all, and some hindering. We won. ... it turned out to be proper workable organisation ... that worked clockwork.

With such strong views of Rennell, it was no surprise that he was sidelined in 1944, as it was equally clear that AMGOT was to be avoided at all costs. However, that SHAEF (or even the War Office) was in a position to provide better direction was also judged untrue:

They put out no end of high-minded principles and so forth... they took no steps whatever to consider how, when, or where, these principles could be put into practice in the field; without 21 Army Group’s planning staff, we should have had Rennell’s Italian fiasco all over again.

That 21st Army Group took a poor view of SHAEF was hardly surprising. Conceptually, they had different priorities with 21st Army Group focussing on the area around the battle and SHAEF focusing on the area around the campaign. The 21st Army Group Civil Affairs staff view that the huge staff at SHAEF did nothing apart from ordering supplies and that planning for Normandy was “all worked out by [21st Army Group] in London” if designed to be critical was nevertheless the main purpose of each headquarters.

The 21st Army Group Civil Affairs view of the American officers at SHAEF did not help to amend any misunderstanding. They were regarded as having no idea of planning or staff work, their staff officers did “literally nothing.” Even British officers at SHAEF judged them to be of mostly fine quality, having given up “big jobs with a sense of mission,” but without much “worldly wisdom” especially when it came to dealings with the French. Any sense of either collegiality or work progress at SHAEF was almost impossible, given the American practice of constantly posting their officers on to new appointments.

At SHAEF, the Army Group’s sense of independence on Civil Affairs and other matters was always regarded as “intolerable” and it was judged to have become worse under Montgomery. Morgan saw the Army Group as the “most insubordinate of subordinate formations.” They were supported by the lack of interest in SHAEF at the War Office and No.10 Downing Street. Brooke (CIGS) and Churchill only ever paid a single visit. Lumley felt that it was never fully
appreciated by the War Office that SHAEF was “genuinely Anglo-American” and not a “façade.”

Matters were further complicated by SHAEF focusing during the first quarter of 1944 on the utility of the AMGOT model, thus knocking back its planning cycle. It took SHAEF until spring to begin the process of better co-ordinating the various Civil Affairs planning agencies. In theory, the process was for SHAEF G-5 to cascade work to the Special Staff at Shrivenham and on to the Army Group, and who in turn would produce instructions for lower formations. However, this initiative came only after 21 Army Group had completed the bulk of the work it required for the organisation of and general plan for Civil Affairs in Normandy. Ironically, a limited inter-branch and inter-section conference at Norfolk House on 24 February had provided enough direction for 21st Army Group to move forward. Furthermore, many of the political aspects of Civil Affairs planning, in particular details of how to work with the French authorities, required SHAEF involvement if the Civil Affairs aspects Allied operations in Normandy were to remain undivided and thus effective.

21ST ARMY GROUP CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING

Civil Affairs staff at 21st Army Group Headquarters REAR spent the first few weeks of its existence drafting Civil Affairs policy for most likely operations by the Army Group. Their work coincided with the publication on 5 February 1944 of the War Office’s Military Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field giving direction on general as well as functional duties. By 10 February 1944, drafts for RANKIN C (action to be taken in the event of unconditional surrender by Germany and the cessation of all organised resistance in North-West Europe) had been completed. This was followed five days later by draft plans for OVERLORD. The speed of planning was helped by the gradual increase in staff numbers during February. A second draft was approved on 8 March 1944 and issued on 15 March. Civil Affairs Administration Instructions for Normandy were approved on 11 March 1944 and issued on 17 March. Following a series of conferences with SHAEF in April and May, Technical Instructions were issued on 19 May 1944. Thus, by mid-February there was direction on the general approach to take for North West Europe, by mid-March, there were detailed plans of what to do and the organisation of to do it and by mid-May, there was a clearer understanding of the technical mechanisms by which it was going to be done.

To build on the work of CASC in improving knowledge of the purpose and structure of Civil Affairs across from 21st Army Group as well as to assist those officers joining the organisation, Civil Affairs staff at the headquarters issued Notes for Guidance on Civil Affairs Organisation and Procedures on 18 April. The Notes stated the role of Civil Affairs was:

... to provide Commanders with machinery, additional to that required for the conduct of tactical operations against the enemy, by which they may deal with problems in connection with the civil population in the areas and between the boundaries for which they are responsible.
The tardiness in issuing technical instructions was the result of Eisenhower’s last minute decision (as a means of reconciling de Gaulle) to opt for the least direct form of Allied administration possible. In practice, the delay resulted in subordinate formations only receiving the instructions on the eve of D-Day. Even at the level of British Second Army nothing was formally received until a “day or two” before, if partly mitigated by previous informal discussions with 21st Army Group and a look at the drafts. The efficiency by which instructions and information cascaded down from formation to formation depends on both the quality of the staff of the formation sending the information and the determination of the staff of the receiving formation to seek out information when they needed it. Generally, across the British army, the patchy nature by which subordinate units received or read senior formation materials was normal. At least one Civil Affairs officer was of the view that any inefficiency was far from critical:

...information never failed not to reach us until the operations for which they were intended were over – thank goodness.

**BRITISH 21ST ARMY GROUP CIVIL AFFAIRS**

The structure of Civil Affairs within 21st Army Group consisted of staffs attached to formation headquarters, detachments (arranged into groups for reasons of Civil Affairs administration) under the direction of formation commanders and a separate chain of Civil Affairs depots. The staffs at Corps, Army and Army Group headquarters (and division in the American sector), together with Lines of Communication and Lines of Communication Sub-Areas headquarters, each comprised a SCAO (or in the case of the Army Group, DCCAO) with varying numbers of staff working to them. At Army headquarters, there were roughly 34 officers and 62 support staff and at Corps headquarters nine officers and 16 support staff (For a diagram indicating typical responsibilities of staff officers at a Corps during the battle of Normandy see Illustration B1.1: British 30 Corps Civil Affairs Staff Arrangements, July 1944 at Appendix B). The function of each SCAO mirrored that of the DCCAO in providing technical advice to the formation commander. Although the formal structure of Civil Affairs staff in the British sector went no lower than Corps, the SHAEF Handbook did envisage that it was possible, as in Normandy, for staffs on a temporary basis to work down to Brigade level where necessary.

**The “Basic Det.”**

For both British and American sectors in North West Europe (and unlike previous incarnations of Civil Affairs), “the fundamental unit was the ‘Basic Det.’” The Civil Affairs detachment was a team of officers and soldiers that mixed general skills with both specialists’ capabilities and basic self-administration. As in Italy, police (Public Safety) officers were viewed as the “basis of the whole thing.” The dual purpose of each detachment was to deal with problems on the ground as they emerged and to act as the eyes and ears on civilian matters allowing formations’ Civil Affairs staff the facility to anticipate
problems. Detachments were to be located in all prefectures, all principal ports and all towns of importance. Some would specialise in dealing with displaced persons and refugees.\textsuperscript{228}

The “Det.” was a 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group invention.\textsuperscript{229} One largely attributed to Colonel A.E. Hodgkin, Robbins’ deputy and staffing expert at 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group REAR headquarters.\textsuperscript{230} In trials, attempts were made to ensure that there was an officer with military experience, one with police experience, a doctor and a communications specialist in each detachment.\textsuperscript{231} However, with the staffing shortages this was not possible. Consequently, the basic detachment consisted of two generalist officers, two public safety officers, two clerks (one being an interpreter where possible), one cook, one batman and two drivers. The detachment was commanded by a Major who could be either a generalist or public safety officer. To add weight of expertise, most detachments were given an increment of specialists in any combination of finance, legal matters, supply, health and so forth, together with additional clerks and drivers as necessary.\textsuperscript{232}

The increment was supplied by Civil Affairs Group headquarters. Numbers of incremental staff varied depending on the needs of the detachment, overall needs and who was available. The more significant detachments such as those responsible for working at regional and Département levels would not only be boosted with incremental staff but would often be commanded by a generalist Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel whose greater rank would be of assistance when working with senior officials from the French authorities. To assist, French Liaison Officers, in theory at least, were attached to as many detachments as possible.\textsuperscript{233} This was, of course, subject to French political agreement.

In terms of transport, each basic detachment had one 3-ton lorry, one 15-cwt truck and two motorcycles.\textsuperscript{234} Although SHAEF preferred a policy of relying on military units for transport, as had been the case in Italy, Robbins at 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group refused to accept this, arguing that Civil Affairs needed their own transport in order to conduct their activities where problems arose not where troops wished to go. Independent transport was less of a burden to the troops.\textsuperscript{235} By contrast, American Civil Affairs detachments were rather more sensibly provisioned, typically with a motorcycle, two ¼-ton jeeps (one with a ½-ton trailer), one or two ¾-ton vehicles and even a ¾-ton weapons carrier (halftrack) and a 1-ton trailer.\textsuperscript{236} Despite Robbins success in getting transport for each detachment, in practice, there was rarely enough of the right type to meet even standards requirements (see Chapters 6 and 7). Civil Affairs detachments were also provided with all the equipment necessary to sustain them in the field and to conduct basic activities. Inevitably, some the equipment provided was unnecessary whilst other elements were in short supply. The anti-gas equipment and photographic equipment (for use in recording works of art and monuments) was regarded by many as largely unnecessary and cumbersome.\textsuperscript{237}

Civil Affairs detachments in the British sector (the Americans had slightly different arrangements) were arranged into “Groups” of 30 basic detachments, incremental staff and a small headquarters.\textsuperscript{238} The group was designed in Military Government usage to cover an area of an English county, but in Civil
Affairs’ usage, they covered rather greater areas. For the Normandy campaign, No. 2 Group, Civil Affairs with elements of No. 3 Group, Civil Affairs predominated, other groups arrived from September 1944 onwards (their focus tended to be on preparations for Military Government). The Groups system was another 21st Army Group invention; it was “simple and it worked.” When boundaries changed between 21st Army Group and Lines of Communication the group simply re-allocated the detachments and made them answerable to the new commander. An aggregation of Groups formed a Civil Affairs Pool. The Pool was later to have political resonance in the hiatus that developed in advance of the spring 1945 offensive into the heart of Germany. Speaking just prior to the offensive, Major Sir Frank Markham MP considered that not more than fifty percent of Civil Affairs officers were “doing a really good day’s work,” with many of the rest being “held in pools or waiting around for a job.”

The War Establishment for a Group was 244 officers and 366 men. The most numerous officers in a typical Civil Affairs group were general administrative officers at 66, but were closely followed by public safety at 62, with 24 finance officers, 13 supply officers, 12 relief officers and 10 medical officers. For other ranks, most were either clerks at 129 (half of whom were interpreters) or drivers at 114. In terms of officer ranks the rough proportions were four Colonels, 28 Lieutenant Colonels, 120 Majors, 62 Captains and 20 Lieutenants (the latter all public safety officer). Half of British Civil Affairs officers in the Civil Affairs Groups were deployed to the American sector with an equivalent number coming the other way. The quality of support staff varied considerably, in 1945 it was judged on the evidence of one detachment that whilst the drivers were reasonable, the clerks could hardly spell, the Senior NCOs were with Civil Affairs as they had nowhere else to go and only the Sergeant Major was properly effective.

In terms of Civil Affairs supply network four types of depot were developed, the Base Port Depot (BPD) and three versions of the Civil Affairs Inland Depot (CAID). The BPD had a permanent staff of 8 officers and 59 men and the CAIDs varied from 4 to 7 officers and between 21 and 38 men. Some of these were specialists brought in from the RAOC, RASC and RAMC. These depots were designed for the purpose of receiving and issuing civilian stores and were kept apart, in theory, from military stores in order to allow the process of billing Allied nations for items supplied to be kept as simple as possible. Generally, these stores were relief supplies including food, soap, emergency feeding equipment, blankets, clothing, sanitary supplies and most medical supplies. However, some items, like Royal Engineer items, fuel, anti-gas equipment, newsprint, telecommunications items, postal supplies, transport equipment, coal, agricultural equipment, industrial first aid equipment, seeds, fertilisers and fire fighting equipment, were necessarily handled by regular Ordnance Depots and similar stores. A single point of control for these items, whether civilian or military in origin, also ensured that Allied operational needs were served if the military supply system was found lacking. Unlike staffs and detachments, personnel at the depots did not included Americans. There were also small
specialist Civil Affairs sections working at ports and at other locations handling and forwarding stores.\textsuperscript{251}

Estimating numbers of Civil Affairs personnel and staff officers involved with operations of the Normandy campaign is an opaque process as some individuals such the port sections do not obviously feature in the records or accounts. Civil Affairs Order of Battle on 31 August 1944 was (excluding those on formation staffs) one BPD, five CAIDs, 27 detachments with Second Army (16 in No. 2 Group and 11 in No. 3 Group), 19 detachments with First Canadian Army (8 in No. 2 Group and 11 in No. 3 Group) and 14 detachments with Lines of Communication (6 in No. 2 Group and 8 in No. 3 Group) (For an overview of detachment locations throughout the battle of Normandy see \textit{Table C1.1: Command Arrangements, Tasks and Locations of Units of No. 2 Group, Civil Affairs, 18 June to 5 August 1944} at Appendix A).\textsuperscript{252} Figures for the entire Allied area for D+60 were put at 3,600 officers and men (less than twenty percent of the mobilised strength for North West Europe), although American depots were not included in this total and for the most part of the campaign numbers were rather fewer (For a graph indicating the build up of Allied detachments see \textit{Illustration D1.1: Numbers of Civil Affairs Detachments in British and American Sectors, D-Day to D+60} at Appendix B).\textsuperscript{253} These figures do not include civilian or French military personnel employed in support of Civil Affairs.

\textbf{INTEGRATION}

The integration or “scrambling” of Americans and British officers into each other’s detachments followed on from AMGOT. It was designed to demonstrate unity of purpose as the result of “political considerations” and the “suspicions” of the French, not for reasons of “military efficiency.”\textsuperscript{254} It was judged politically important that the integration be maintained during the liberation of both Paris and Brussels, even if separation necessarily followed in preparation for the national zones of occupation in Germany.\textsuperscript{255} In the meantime, in order to present the image of an integrated approach, buildings used by Civil Affairs detachments were to display British and United States flags along with a sign indicating:

\begin{quote}
\textit{AEF Civil Affairs Office – AEF Bureau des Affaires Civiles}\textsuperscript{256}
\end{quote}

The Americans had wanted equal numbers of British and American officers in each unit, but this was impossible because there were not enough to go around.\textsuperscript{257} The larger detachments with rather more specialists, such as those associated with provincial level work were closer to equality, but field detachments less so. No. 229 (P[rovincial]) Detachment in the British sector had fifty percent American, ten percent Canadian and forty percent British officers, with an American as deputy commander.\textsuperscript{258}

Whilst, detachments were “unscrambled” from the beginning of September, most formation staffs remained unchanged for longer. The unscrambling of detachments could took several weeks although was officially complete on 20 October 1944.\textsuperscript{259} Yet, American Civil Affairs officer, Maginnis noted in his diary that his five British officers did not leave his detachment in the American sector...
until 25 October 1944. In an example from Civil Affairs staff at British 8 Corps headquarters, despite most of the Americans leaving the associated detachments on 17 September, they retained two at headquarters (one of whom was a doctor). Whether scrambling (integration) worked seemed to be a matter of personal opinion. At British Second Army, Lewis thought it did not work. He felt that whilst the Americans were “good fight next to and work alongside,” they were not good to be integrated with. There were clear differences in staff work at SHAEF as noted above. In the field, the British commander of No. 229 Detachment viewed his Americans as “babyish” in never questioning an order, never taking responsibility and not liking their senior American officer. By comparison, Maginnis, after conducting interviews with his new detachment in early September 1944, noted that his British officers were content and got on with their work. Their only concerned was with the loose way in which the detachment had been run previously.

Some French officials in the British sector of Normandy found it easier to work with the British largely because it was easier to identify the responsible officer. They found that American junior officers never appeared to know who was responsible for what, but that British officers would only be stumped if the officer required was American. The two nations could, at times, appear to be highly compartmentalised. Nevertheless, overall the British approach appeared to produce a better team. Maginnis noted that his British deputy, Major Charles A. Barkshire, was far better at facilitating a change of command than most Americans in his position.

Nevertheless, American shortcomings did not always translate into poor results. An American, “Murf of Memphis,” joined the Civil Affairs staff at British 8 Corps headquarters on 2 August:

He was always at loggerheads with everyone... would never move without an assignment in writing... was terribly rank conscious, but nevertheless an extremely efficient worker who produced some most excellent reports.

There were also amusing incidents stemming from transatlantic differences. The instance by British Civil Affairs officers in the American sector on tea being taken daily at four o’clock initially resulted in much American amusement, before most were soon found to be “observing teatime too.” Friendly competition also had its place. Visiting a detachment in the American sector on 20 June, Robbins noted that there was no British flag displayed outside their office. An excuse was offered that none had been issued. Robbins ensured that the one he sent through was twice the size of the American flag and that it arrived on 4 July. From British 8 Corps Headquarters Civil Affairs perspective, when unscrambling occurred they said a sad goodbye to their "American friends."
Operational Preparation

At formation level, pre-deployment training and preparation came in a variety of forms ranging from conferences to exercises. At the most senior level, General Grasett from SHAEF briefed senior staffs on 22 May. Lewis, who attended this brief, in turn addressed his officers at British Second Army headquarters on 24 May.271 Lewis also held his own conferences, including one on refugee problems on 31 March 1944 and a more general conference on 28 April.272 At Canadian First Army, regular conferences were held whose purpose was to enable Civil Affairs staff officers to “tackle any problem which will arise.” By luck more than design the conferences also facilitated the writing of Standing Orders (standing operational procedures in the absence of “firm” policy from more senior levels). These were later tested during regular field and classroom exercises conducted by both staffs and detachments.273

Equally important in this process was establishing, better than any course in Wimbledon might, a relationship with other elements in the formation. General military or specialist Civil Affairs exercises were particularly helpful in this regard, as they defined the exact nature of working practices for each formation. There were many examples of Civil Affairs involvement in combat training exercises, including the infamous Exercise TIGER at Slapton Sands during April 1944.274 Here British Civil Affairs officers working with American detachments and staffs may have witnessed the German E-Boats torpedoing of American landing craft that resulted in over 700 deaths.

Elsewhere, Civil Affairs staffs of British 30 Corps were involved with Exercise LIGHTFOOT on 15 May 1944. This was a corps signals exercise where the sending of messages between the Civil Affairs staff and “G,” “A” and “Q” staff of the headquarters was practiced. Later in May (23-24 May), Civil Affairs units of this corps also attended Exercise CONQUEROR II, a large scale combat and staff training scheme.275 Earlier, members of Canadian First Army Civil Affairs staff had taken part in a six-day “telephone battle” to test procedures with other members of the headquarters during Exercise FLIT (began 6 May).276

In preparation for D-Day, members of British 8 Corps Civil Affairs staff invited the heads of Corps’ branches and services to dinner at Worth Hall, West Sussex (Corps MAIN and REAR Headquarters were located at nearby Worth Priory). As well as dinner in fine surroundings that few wished to refuse, guests also participated in “a little tactical exercise” run with the aid of a blackboard. The exercises were designed to “see how Civil Affairs would fit into the Army picture and to make the most of the opportunity to exchange views and liaise generally.” They had the “most far-reaching results” in producing a “complete understanding which was so essential when operations finally started.”277 More typical was for staffs to visit those with whom they would soon be working. British 30 Corps Civil Affairs staff visited 50 Division on 16 May and talked with various staff officers including the Assistant Quartermaster General (vital if transport was to be furnished for Civil Affairs needs). Later on 27 May, a staff officer from the same headquarters visited 21 Army Group Headquarters and made contact with a number of the Civil Affairs sections there.278
In training detachments, tactical exercises were often run. In the case of detachments in British 8 Corps, training took place about once a week during May 1944 and reflected the latest understandings learnt from Corps’ headquarters. This headquarters also gave lectures to the detachments to educate them on the organisation of the military units they would be working alongside.279 Indeed, in the War Diary of one of 8 Corps’ detachments, No. 217 (C), it lists amongst its activities from late May onwards, many lectures on overseas operations and Civil Affairs in the field, which continued until embarkation on 21 June.280

At British 12 Corps in Kent, exercises for detachments included on 30 May the practicing of “making a preliminary recce” of a large town; in this case Tunbridge Wells.281 British 12 Corps were part of the follow-up to the initial invasion wave, making it more difficult to predict and train for their likely roles.282 Fortunately, as a direct benefit of the slow breakout from the Normandy bridgehead, there was time to undertake in-theatre training. On arrival in Normandy, one of the Corps’ detachments, No. 229 (P) Detachment recorded that it did “nothing but training” for four weeks.283

Thus, although there was no substitute for reality, genuine efforts were made to thoroughly prepare both detachments and staff both for operations and for as full as integration with formations as was possible. Whilst, relations between military and Civil Affairs staff at formations varied, at British 8 Corps, if not elsewhere, it appeared to be genuinely friendly, professional and open to ideas.

Once detachments and staffs were “bigoted” (told of the details of Operation OVERLORD) towards the end of May 1944, work began on preparing for the tasks set out in formation operational orders.284 Beyond intelligence briefs, writing of orders, work at this time also involved preparing vehicles for amphibious landing and carefully planning what needed to be carried on each packet of vehicles arriving with each party. Typically, the arrival of a detachment in Normandy would be phased in over a fortnight or so with three parties. Getting both the assortment of items right and staying within strict weight limitations was of key importance.285

CONCLUSION

 Whilst problems remained for Civil Affairs, the preparations for North West Europe indicated how much better the organisation could be with the time to organise, recruit, train, plan and prepare. Of course, it helped that the campaign was both of fundamental importance to the end of the war and needed huge planning and preparation if it was to be successful. Naturally, there remained general problems for Civil Affairs, including the reputation of the organisation amongst the ‘soldiers,’ the quality of some of its staff, the lack of clear object and the vicissitudes of how senior Civil Affairs officers (DCCAO and SCAOs) would get along with their military masters in battle. It was ironic that despite being despised by many, Rennell may have had a point about the readily understood strengths of a Military Government model. The general problems were often matched and confused by such specific problems as the shortage of doctors,
problem personalities, transatlantic developments and the relations with the French (see Chapters 1 and 5). Yet, many feats had been achieved.

The quality of the police, at least in the junior officer ranks, would provide a capability that was appreciated by British and Americans alike. The development of the “Basic Det.” was one where civilian expertise could be maximised and carefully integrated with more practical ‘soldier’ Civil Affairs generalist officers. Indeed, the careful mix of staff officers, detachment officers and specialists helped to maintain a balance between practical need and practical politics. Notwithstanding the oddball nature of Robbins and the post-war views of Bovenschen, that having a soldier in charge of Civil Affairs was unnecessary, having a soldier as front man did help formation commanders focus on the issues at hand rather than the personalities in their headquarters. Kirby at DCA, Grasset at SHAEF and later Major General “Bobby” Erskine as head of SHAEF’s Mission to Belgium indicated what could be achieved.

The message was and remained that to be taken seriously and to get the job done required appropriate professionalism. That was not to say those who had gone before in Italy and elsewhere were unprofessional, but the excesses of civilian orientated professionalism that was institutionalised in structures like AMGOT and, especially, ACC were not readily understood by all those in command of the fighting forces. Of course, getting the balance right between useful experience and being acceptable to military commanders, ever-watchful politicians like Churchill and interested parties like the Foreign Office was never going to be easy. It was apparent that the practical experience of civilian matters by such leaders as Montgomery could only stretch so far in providing support for Civil Affairs. The organisation had to make up the gap.

This required careful selection and decent training in practical skills, staff work and Civil Affairs specialisms. Training for North West Europe was assisted, of course, by the time to prepare and the volume of information that was available from academic, government, military and exile sources (see Chapter 5). However, the more taxing problem was recruiting the right quality of individual given the demands of war. Clearly, in some cases, it failed to deliver, but in others there was success (see Chapter 7). Whilst, there were undoubtedly perceptions of poor quality, it was generally the case that for each one who was substandard there were plenty more who were an asset. Despite their short numbers, Civil Affairs now also had the advantage that it was a large enough organisation to hide away a few of their misfits.

During the HUSKY landings in Sicily, it was reported that the inclusion of Civil Affairs had been overlooked by those in charge of loading the invasion fleet. Reportedly, Civil Affairs only managed to get a respectable number ashore on D-Day by smuggling some of their officers on board one of the ships. Included amongst them as one of the first ashore was Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Wellesley (The 7th Duke of Wellington). Embarkation matters were not helped either by having officers spread out between America and Madagascar or by the last 100 only arriving at final transit points on D-11. Such difficulties were never a feature of events in North West Europe and the scale of effort
exhibited during its preparations put pay to many of the images and memories of AMGOT. Not that it seemed likely in British circles to have ever presented a danger in North West Europe. It had philosophically, politically and structurally been expunged.

For North West Europe, widespread contact with formations and the understanding and co-operation it developed was key to making the organisation work. This helped to mitigate the “king of his own castle” tendencies of Montgomery and other senior commanders. Personal involvement and professional connections made Civil Affairs work as the relations developed over dinner at Worth Hall proved. Something approaching a mutual understanding was starting to appear. In preparing for D-Day the exchange visits between the two mobilisation centres, briefings to senior officers, brainstorming with other elements on the staff of a formation headquarters and field exercises all helped to cement relationships that would ensure Civil Affairs officers would not have to stow away on board ship again.
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CHAPTER 5

THE FRENCH AND FRANCE

CIVIL AFFAIRS AND FRENCH AUTHORITIES

At a most basic level, Civil Affairs needed to ensure that French administration worked well enough to avoid the much-feared disorganisation, disease and unrest. Previous experience indicated that for stability to be produced, several overlapping aspects of administration needed to function including, healthcare, food supply and distribution, police, labour, transport, communications, public information, welfare, hygiene and population movement control. It also indicated the key part played by local authorities in co-ordinating the various elements. Indeed, Italian experience demonstrated that it was important to support established methods of local administration, not employ ones the Allies found more convenient. Overall, popular support for the new administrative arrangements amongst the liberated would quickly be measured against what had gone before, what had been promised in advance, how well the administration delivered desired needs and how well it was being seen to do so. Logically, therefore the chances of success would improve if Civil Affairs knew in advance, both the nature of the problems they were likely to face and whom, if anyone, they were likely to work.

Yet, if Civil Affairs were well informed as to likely practical conditions in France (see section below), the deteriorating diplomatic relationship between Roosevelt, Churchill and de Gaulle in the weeks before D-Day simply confused the issue of the nature of the relationship with the French authorities. A whole series of imponderables were linked to the basic questions of with whom and how relations were to work. These included issues of whether Allied control was better directly or indirectly imposed on the French authorities, whether it was better for the Allies to work with the experience of the Vichy authorities (albeit with the ideologically extremists elements removed) or the ideological clean sheet of the Vichy opposition, which of the various opposition groups (Gaullists, communists, etc.) were the most reliable, which was the most capable and which was the most representative of French national consciousness. Further complications were presented in calculating whether an approach designed for politically conservative areas like Normandy would work equally well in the ideologically more volatile areas of industrial northern France or in those areas like Nord or Alsace where administrative control had been transferred across nearby international borders during the occupation. The costs of making the wrong decision could in the short-term be public disorder and armed resistance (already well practiced against the occupiers in advance
of D-Day) behind Allied lines and in the long-term poisonous international relations with the French.

Yet, as SHAEF interminably awaited direction from CCS, who in turn waited for decisions from the White House and Whitehall (who also waited for Roosevelt to decide), 21st Army Group had to get on with planning and in so doing had to make some assumptions on the nature of Franco-Allied relations. This was not as difficult as may first seem, for by the beginning of 1944 in many respects the narrative of the French drama was known, even if some of the scenes had yet to be finalised, and this provided direction enough for policy to develop. Indeed, although Roosevelt (and often joined by Churchill) continued to be irritated with de Gaulle, many foreign advisors (including Stimson and Eden) had by this stage come round to the view that, imperfect as he was, de Gaulle represented the most likely future for France. It was a view that was matched by press opinion on both sides of the Atlantic. In allowing Civil Affairs to adapt to any set of circumstances in France (or anywhere in North West Europe), it was clear that flexibility was going to be the most important underpinning element in its approach to problem solving:

Stability tempered by flexibility is the guiding principle of a successful [Civil Affairs] plan.

For such flexibility to be maintained required several interlocking elements: a policy that provided options not dogma, accurate and timely intelligence on which to work, and capable executive officers that had the wherewithal to employ good judgement in a diplomatic fashion.

**Practical Vs Political Needs**

The deteriorating diplomatic relationship did little to keep issues of higher politics and sovereignty separate from practical battlefield needs. The need to keep the two separate was made all the more difficult by the tendency during the squabble to conflate the various levels of French political authority into one seamless mass. Most Civil Affairs work needed the facilities of the lowest levels of French administrative authority (typically mayors and sub-prefects), most of the political debate focused on control of the highest levels (regional and national authorities). That AMGOT and ACC between them had seemingly

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* Normandy was otherwise known as Rouen Région consisted of the five Département of Calvados, Eure, Manche, Orne and Seine-Inférieure each controlled by a prefect and then further sub-divided into Arrondissement generally under a sub-prefect. For Calvados, its arrondissement amounted to Bayeux, Vire, Caen and Lisieux, with Caen as the principal arrondissement being run by the prefect for the department. Arrondissement where divided into Canton (a simple grouping arrangement, largely without any political infrastructure) and finally into Commune under a mayor. Consequently, it was possible in cities like Caen for there to be a mayor of the commune and a prefect covering both the department and arrondissement (Sketch maps E1.1 to E1.3 illustrating administrative areas of Normandy can be found at Appendix E).
directed decisions at every level of Italian politics and had imposed regions together with (wholly impractical) rumours that the syllabus at Charlottesville was preparing Civil Affairs officers to replace every French mayor did little to appease Gaullist perspectives. All of which was made worse by the personal nature of Roosevelt’s attack on de Gaulle and the acerbic determination of de Gaulle to ensure his political survival.

With lessons learnt from the damage done by Civil Affairs exuberance and ideological fervour in Italy there was now an Allied preference to keep local administrative systems in being. Officials need only be removed if they were a security threat (by Field Security, if not by Allied recognised French authority) or ineffective (by Civil Affairs, if not by Allied recognised French authority). Indeed, even during Military Government the Military Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field made it clear that local officials were to be used “subject to security considerations.” Capacity is a better qualification than sympathy in a candidate prepared to serve, provided his political or moral record is not adjudged a bar.

Furthermore, at this level in France, most prefects and mayors were not passionate Vichyites or even supporters of Vichy and German authority. Some were put into the bracket of Pétainists many of whom de Gaulle despised as treacherous Vichyites, but others regarded as lovers of an independent and sovereign France that chose to remain after 1940 to preserve their nation by working within the German system of occupation. That many lower ranked officials had conducted their duties correctly and patriotically was recognised by the Gaullists and the position of mayors rarely presented any political problems. Indeed, that there was turmoil over the first major official to be encountered in Normandy (a sub-prefect in Bayeux) was only significant because an example needed to be set, not because he was an ardent Vichyite (see Chapter 6). However, at the level of prefect and regional commissioner, the expressed needs of Civil Affairs to draw upon the practical experience of the incumbent met head on with the needs of the Gaullists to facilitate a political change.

From the Gaullist perspective, in advance of D-Day they had through the efforts of their Algiers-based Comité Français de Libération Nationale (CFLN), produced a list of suitable replacements for all regional administrators, virtually all prefects, some sub-prefects and a few mayors. A mayor’s chances of removal increased if he had been appointed during the occupation, but were assuaged if the individual had held the post pre-war (many did as replacements for younger men working in Germany). Where replacements were necessary, the policy was to either make a further recall pre-war mayors and officials or where this was not possible, make locally acceptable appointments reflecting the tone of pre-war elections. Agreed in Algiers on 21 April 1944, the policy also specified that local council elections were to be held two months after liberation in order to reflect more accurately French public opinion. In practice, such was the determination to use the perceived pedigree of pre-war mayors that even in the circumstances of individual weakness, such as that identified in early July 1944 by Civil Affairs officers of British 8 Corps where the mayor of Lantheuil
regarded as “inefficient,” the reply of the Gaullist sub-prefect in Bayeux was that he must stay.\textsuperscript{11} Thus, if a clash was to occur it seemed inevitable that it do so at the prefect/regional commissioner level.

However, such policies also demonstrated that whilst not perfectly formed the Gaullists were in a strong political position within France. In addition, de Gaulle through French General Marie-Pierre Kœnig (senior French officer in London), also had access to and direction over various resistance groups and alliances from across the political spectrum assembled under the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur (FFI).\textsuperscript{12} Thus, when in late May 1944, the CFLN became the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française (GPRF), the Gaullists looked increasingly likely to become, if not, the new liberation government, then a significant part of it.\textsuperscript{13} Compared to the position taken by the Foreign Office in March 1942, which presumed there was “no intention” of bringing de Gaulle with the Allies or “trying to set him up as the authority in France” it was clear that events had moved those arguments on.\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, despite de Gaulle’s seemingly strong position, questions were expressed by Roosevelt as to the influence of alternative like the communists or Pétainists (whom he regarded as a better custodian of the French nation) and the true nature of real French popular feeling. Therefore, political squabbles from the end of 1943 interfered with what otherwise should have been a practical discussion and whilst the gambling man in Civil Affairs saw favourable odds in working with most Gaullists, he had to find alternative means by which to place his bet.

\textit{Alternative French Liaisons}

With the failure to secure a Civil Affairs Agreement at the end of 1943 (see Chapter 1), alternative methods were used to ensure a smooth transfer of power in France. On 6 January 1944, Morgan asked through the British chain of command for French liaison officers to be attached to Allied headquarters soon to be serving in North West Europe in an attempt to formalise a practical working relationship with the Gaullists. Whilst, accepted the co-operation of these officers were later withdrawn by de Gaulle as relations soured.\textsuperscript{15} Publically, Grasett attempted to boost Gaullist confidence in the honourable intentions of Civil Affairs towards their homeland. He sought to confirm that military operations in France were a means to defeating Germany, not an end in themselves. He stated his determination to use the French authorities as much as possible, to work with the resistance, to dispense with the Vichy regime, to not use anyone who worked against common Allied interests (including those of the exiles), that the duration of Civil Affairs was to be as short as possible and that is termination depended wholly on the military operational needs of the Supreme Commander. Furthermore, the SHAEF Operation OVERLORD plan, published on 19 April 1944, cogently assumed that the Allied forces would be working the Gaullist authorities.\textsuperscript{16}

However, although private negotiations in April 1944, between Grasset and Kœnig made some headway regarding civil administration, as the result of the continued irritation between the three political leaders in the weeks before D-
Day (and despite the personal interventions by Eden, the King and others) this ultimately was put to an end.\textsuperscript{17} Even, direct attempts by Eisenhower to win over de Gaulle on the eve of D-Day were unsuccessful and, in many respects, made matters worse.\textsuperscript{18} Shown a copy of Eisenhower’s \textit{People of Western Europe} message, de Gaulle not only found it unsatisfactory in not recognising his provisional government (quoted below), but also after his alternative message was spurned, (unsurprisingly as there was no time to reprint it) removed the support of French liaison officers working with Civil Affairs fearing that they were to be used as Allied Military Government stooges.\textsuperscript{19} The 160 French liaison officers were part of the \textit{Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative} (MMLA) that was established in August 1943, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hettier de Boislambert, with (female) Captain de Rothschild commanding the component of 50 women. Mostly civilians, they nevertheless wore uniforms with white badges of rank. They were sent to the Staff College at Camberley for training on liaison with Allied staffs (lectures included ones by Frenchmen on the situation in France) and later attended Civil Affairs courses in order to make contact with the British Civil Affairs officers with whom they would later work.\textsuperscript{20} They were recruited for their administration experience and their purposes were functional (to carry out administrative and co-ordination tasks), constitutional (to maintain civil supremacy), political (to ensure recognition of civil officials appointed by the resistance) and national (to ensure no delegation of French sovereignty).\textsuperscript{21} Their preparation was assisted by a wealth of intelligence reports and by the time of D-Day, de Boislambert was getting some 6,000 a day from within occupied France.\textsuperscript{22} Their removal on the eve of D-Day in all probability was most felt at senior most military as well as diplomatic levels, for at detachment level no mention is made of their removal or even non-appearance in war diaries. In practice, their quality varied considerably. The first to arrive at British 30 Corps was viewed as less than adequate, but his replacement as excellent.\textsuperscript{23} Of the 20 liaison officers that landed in France on 8 June 1944, they did what had always been intended namely facilitate Gaullist authority, even if relations with Civil Affairs were initially uncomfortable.\textsuperscript{24} Despite, such local teething problems as working relationships sorted themselves out, at an operational level, the threats of liaison officer removal that had been made throughout the first part of 1944 had only encouraged Allied Civil Affairs to seek methods by which all possible French political outcomes could be accommodated.

\textbf{Allied Military Responses to French Sensitivities}

At both SHAEF and 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group, whilst waiting for political direction, much detailed work was conducted on Civil Affairs policy towards the French. On 25 May 1944, SHAEF made the unilateral decision to issue a set of instructions on policy in France. In most respects the overall tenor remained the same, an indirect approach would prevail. However, the key difference was that the option of Military Government was now specifically excluded.\textsuperscript{25} This was clearly
an attempt to appease many of the concerns of the Gaullists and undoubtedly, Kœnig would have been aware of Eisenhower’s decision. The instructions clearly stated that for the purposes of planning, the emphasis was on the French administering themselves, to make as much use of French liaison officers as possible and that the Gaullists were to be recognised as a substitute for a properly constituted government. The only matter that could play upon the sensitivities of de Gaulle was Eisenhower’s careful insistence that no one French group would receive the endorsement of SHAEF.26

The 21st Army Group Civil Affairs plan had already made similar assumptions, the provisional government was regarded as the Allied national authority for France and that it would command the allegiance of the local authorities.27 This built upon the advice contained in the Military Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field that stated British policy was to hand over to a legitimate Allied government (as recognised by His Majesty's Government) and where this was not possible recognition would depend on political developments. However, in all cases full use was to be made inter alia of “loyal” local authorities and Allied liaison officers. Furthermore, it was assumed that the local population would be helpful during operations and in re-establishing civil administration.28 Even in Military Government, the Manual stated that direct control was to be avoided and only used to achieve military objectives. In liberated Allied territory, the amount of direct control required was judged to require many fewer Civil Affairs officers and consist of aiding rather than controlling local officials. Any control employed in Allied areas was to be the least “irksome” as possible, without undermining military needs.29

Nevertheless, with diplomatic relations worsening, the sensitivity of the French political situation continued to be recognised by both SHAEF and 21st Army Group. The draft of the SHAEF Field Handbook of Civil Affairs, France (eventually released for use on 16 June 1944) stated:

The Allied Forces will enter France at a critical time in her history. She is willing and eager to assist these forces in their task of liberating her territory and Europe from the enemy. She will continue to welcome and assist them provided that they come as soldiers and liberators; she will do neither if they should ever give her reason to believe that she has only exchanged the burdens and restrictions of one occupation for those of another.30

Furthermore, it was stated:

It is therefore the policy of the Supreme Commander that no other burdens and restrictions than those which are directly involved in the defeat of a common enemy shall be imposed. It is also policy that the French authorities shall assume responsibility for all actions involved in assistance to the Allied Forces and in the reconstruction of their country.31

The practical needs of Civil Affairs were not come at the cost of French sovereignty. As with Civil Affairs Agreements, the powers of the Supreme Commander were limited to what was militarily required. For operations in
France, the powers of the were identified as having *de facto*, “supreme responsibility and authority at all times and in all areas to the full extent necessitated by the military situation and in accordance with the rules and customs of war.” It was specifically *not* intended to establish Military Government in liberated France. Furthermore, it was to be the case that civil administration in all areas would normally be controlled by the French themselves. Indeed commanders were to make “every effort to ensure that any action required be taken by the French Civil Authorities.” If the French were unable to provide such administration then the Allies were only to take such executive action as required for reasons of security or the success of military operations.

The particular sensitivity of Civil Affairs was also noted:

The actions of all officers concerned with civil administration will at all times conform to the highest standards of impartiality and integrity. The delicacies of the political situation which will obtain lends additional emphasis to this point. The utmost care must be taken that no impression is given which may be construed as forwarding the political interests of any particular group, faction, or party. The capacity of the French authorities to implement the requirements of the Military Commander will depend in a large measure on the willing obedience of all classes of inhabitants to the orders and instructions which may be issued. That willingness will be largely conditioned by the atmosphere of cooperation which must be apparent in the relationships between officers concerned with civil administration, the French Liaison Officers and the local officials with whom they have to deal.

Civil Affairs direct involvement in the running of French administration always focused on the “temporary and exceptional” nature of the work. This phrase was a constant theme running throughout the *Handbook*. The “termination” of the Vichy regime was to be carried out by the French. Only when militarily necessary and in the circumstances where no French authority existed could the Allies remove individuals and even then French liaison officers were to be utilised; unless they refused to take the action deemed necessary. If the Allies did remove an individual then they were to inform the French authorities that there was a post to be filled. However, there was the capacity to make a temporary appointment. Indeed, it was stated:

No action will be taken, except as may be dictated by military necessity, which will impede the earliest possible restoration of a French government freely chosen by the French people and only those restrictions upon freedom of speech and the civil liberties of the people will be imposed which are necessary for the successful prosecution of the war.

The original 21st Army Group Civil Affairs plan estimated that the attitude of the French civil population at the outset would be one of co-operation and assistance. It was anticipated that the psychological effect of the Allied arrival would be “profound.” It was stated that everything possible must be done to
preserve such an attitude. This required a continuous watch being made by field security (sometimes called counter-intelligence), publicity, psychological warfare and Civil Affairs over civil developments. As far as possible, Allied administrative control was to be indirect and interference was to be minimal.\(^{38}\)

Of course, the outward image of 21st Army Group to the French population was seen as equally important. Good discipline of staff was emphasised. Given the close contact with the French population, it was felt that such contact “will have lasting effect for good or ill according to the impressions produced.”\(^{39}\)

One means by which such impressions could be engendered was by teaching soldiers what was seen as good behaviour in France and pointing out areas of French sensitivity and types of conversation to avoid. Consequently, a soldiers’ pocket guide, *Instructions for British Servicemen in France*, was produced in cooperation between the Foreign Office and Political Warfare Executive and issued to every serviceman.\(^{40}\) Its success was questionable given the scale of criminality some soldiers engaged in during their stay.\(^{41}\) Nevertheless, as an attempt to forestall problems, it had merit. The BBC commented on its overseas news on 9 June that:

> ...every Allied soldier on French territory is his own ambassador, and the function of this useful little book is to suggest that while war is a big thing, personal relationships are just as big.\(^{42}\)

American troops were issued with a similar handbook, *Instructions for American Servicemen in France*.\(^{43}\) Interestingly as local relations between the Americans and French deteriorated in 1945 after a period of euphoria following liberation another booklet, *112 Gripes About The French*, was produced in an attempt to better educate soldiers about French misgivings and eccentricities.\(^{44}\)

There was some fluctuation in the 21st Army Group approach following Eisenhower’s 25 May decision, but, largely, the pertinent administrative and technical instructions continued unchanged. In better reflecting Eisenhower’s view that Military Government would not be established in France and that the French would be responsible for all aspects of civil administration, formation commanders, in discharging their duties, would use French liaison officers as a direct channel to local authorities. Moreover, proclamations in normal circumstances of French co-operation were no longer to be issued, the exception being Eisenhower’s message to the French people. The preferred method was for less politically sensitive notices to be posted under the name of the French authorities.\(^{45}\)

In the view of SHAEF, French liaison officers were to be attached to Civil Affairs staffs and detachments where they would be employed by the SCAO or the senior detachment officer to secure from the civil authorities and the civil population compliance with the “wishes of the Commander.”\(^{46}\) They were to negotiate with French officials and advise on relations with the French administration and population. It was stated that such officers were “at the complete disposal of the Commander,” but that they “remain under the orders of the French Military authorities from whom they receive their general instructions.” It was pointed out that after consultation with the Allied
commander's staff they could act upon French instructions as far as they were consistent with the needs of the commander. Thus, despite the crisis over the French liaison officers, the emphasis by the Allied military was and for all sorts of reasons always had been on a France run very definitely by the French.

Although Roosevelt’s view that the French should chose their new leader at the ballot box was impractical and driven by his fanatic dislike of de Gaulle, the nature of the popular mood could still be gauged even in wartime. Indeed, Grasett, speaking after the war, took the view that if de Gaulle had been rejected on 14 June 1944 in Bayeux’s Place du Château (renamed Place Charles de Gaulle in 1946) during his first visit to liberated France, and direct Allied involvement had become necessary, it would only have been a temporary problem. The French would have quickly let it be known very quickly, whom they did want in power. Thus, whilst a France run by the French was always ultimately likely, the problem was that in the meantime practical problems could develop. As the Italians had shown before, if matters were not to the liking of the local population then the Allies were likely to know about it extremely quickly and having contingencies in case trouble arose was only sensible.

**Expectations and Contingencies**

Post-war history has often pointed to a speculative range of possible French popular reactions to their liberation. Each has painted a slightly different picture of the sympathies, loyalties, fears, beliefs, desires and hopes that existed on the eve of D-Day in urban and rural France. Nevertheless, across France, this has generally depicted a level of sympathy with Pétain, a flagging regard for the increasing dysfunctional and German-controlled Vichy authorities, an interest in the ideas portrayed by both the Gaullists and communism and a general loathing of French paramilitary bodies like La Légion Française des Combattants and Milice Française. It has also depicted a France where many simply wanted to survive the war, the occupation and the liberation.

In Normandy, “toned down” German control measures, which were motivated by a self-interested need to maintain the supply of food from this agriculturally rich region, had left more authority in the hands of the local Vichy regime, who often made decisions without reference to the central authorities. As the bombing campaign became directed against the French road and rail networks during the first part of 1944, many farmers were happy to sell their produce to local German forces as it became increasingly difficult to transport items to traditional markets in cities like Paris. This might mistakenly give the appearance that many Normans were willing collaborators with their occupiers. “Self-assured and individualistic” were viewed as typical traits in rural Normandy. In particular, the area had not been exposed to the types of “physical sufferings that incite rebellion.”

Across France, it was estimated by SOE that there were 350,000 members of the resistance, of whom 100,000 had serviceable weapons and of these 10,000 had ammunition. Most of the active work of the resistance came in the form of intelligence collection and sabotage. There were supporters of the resistance
in Normandy, but numbers were generally small. Figures for the Bayeux arrondissement were comparatively small at an estimated 200 members (Orne by contrast had 1,800 fighters, of which 600 had weapons55) with no more than 2,000 people associated with the resistance across Calvados. Some 200 resistance members from across the region were killed in the six months prior to D-Day.56 Moreover, the membership reflected a wide cross section of political opinion.57 The less forthright Norman approach did not necessarily mean that the lack of support for the resistance or being conservative or modestly pro- Pétainist was the same as being anti-de Gaulle or pro-German or anti-Allied. Indeed, on his appointment on 15 June as sub-prefect in Bayeux, Raymond Triboulet (formerly leader of the resistance committee in the Caen area), reportedly spent much time convincing the newly arrived Gaullist officials that non-resistant did not mean collaborator.58 The overall sense conveyed is that at liberation most Normans erred towards being cautious of de Gaulle (or indeed any newcomer), comfortable with the familiar Vichy authorities, generally desirous of seeing France free of German control, aware that they had escaped the worst of the bombing and uncertain of the Allies.

That there was a range of possible outcomes within France was known in Allied circles. A report of 31 May 1944, by the clandestine London-based French intelligence agency, Direction Générale des Services Spéciaux, indicated that according to a foreign observer in France ten percent of French were happy with France as it stood, fifty percent (mainly in Paris) anti-German, but pro-Pétain and forty percent anti-Pétain and anti-German.59 There were plenty of similar views available from exiles and through organisations like SOE. At SHAEF, there were fears of a “widespread insurrection.”60 American Civil Affairs officers at Charlottesville supposedly fed on a poor diet of tourist guides and historical worst-case examples were rumoured to be expecting to find France in a position of administrative dislocation, political discord that was close to civil war and a people starved and ragged.61 There was also a persistent view amongst many Allies, the Americans especially, that the French in general and the Normans in particular had been won over by the Germans.62 It must have come as shock to find just a few fanatics, much civic decorum and healthy looking locals.63

At 21st Army Group, if nowhere else, there was a tendency to eschew speculation and instead concentrate both on what was known and only taking measures that dealt with potential problems as sympathetically as possible. Indeed, as mentioned above, it was assumed in the Military Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field that the local population would be helpful both during operations and in re-establishing civil administration. Nevertheless, it was equally recognised that resentment may grow if necessary Allied controls were imposed seemingly without limitation. The first method in prevent such resentment deteriorating into chaos was the use of “tact and understanding” by Civil Affairs officers.64 Furthermore, the Manual stated that Civil Affairs officers were encourage stability by abstaining from politics, through good relations, sympathy and patience with the local population and by avoiding favour or
intrigue. Treatment of the civilian population was to be “just and reasonable” on the grounds of both “a matter of common humanity” and being “in our own interests.”

In terms of what was known, there was (and with French and intelligence organisation assistance had been for some time) a list identifying potential troublemakers. All of whom were in some way associated with fascism or the more extreme elements Vichy regime. There were also lists of trustworthy individuals. Unsurprisingly the two lists were referred to as the “Black List” and the “White List” respectively. In addition to named individuals, various forms of employment were also identified as potentially friendly or dangerous elements within French society. British 30 Corps Civil Affairs gave such details to its Civil Affairs detachments in mid and late May 1944 as they prepared for the initial wave of the invasion, in the form of intelligence summaries.

On the “White List,” there were only three reliable officials across Normandy. These were the Chief of Police in Caen, the Mayor of Honfleur and a protestant preacher in Lisieux. Even here, the “alleged” pro-Allied intentions of the first two stemmed from intelligence gathered in 1940. The thankfully wider pool of trustworthy types amounted to the gendarmerie, municipal police, the Gardes Champêtres (rural police) and the Police Urbaine. The idea of releasing political prisoners as a ready source of trustworthy officials was cautioned against, as it was suggested that many local officials “who have turned their coats in the expectation of Allied victory have recently been imprisoned.” Careful scrutiny of these individuals was recommended.

The “Black List” was equally short with eight named individuals, of whom two were only suspected and, at least, four were living out of the immediate battle area, east of the River Orne. Nevertheless, a rather greater number of types were listed. Again, the focus was on police units. Included were anti-communist police units (including Milice Française), anti-Jewish police, members of Groupes Mobile de Réserve, senior ranked officers in the Police Spéciale and Police Judiciaire, any policeman appointed or promoted since Joseph Darnand (a fervent fascist) took office as interior affairs minister in February 1944, any policeman left with arms by Germans, any new recruits from state youth camps and any “actively employed” immediately prior to the landings. Critically, members of pro-Vichy parties were not automatically regarded as suspect, except where they were employed in the identified police groups. Instead, they were to be given the benefit of the doubt until their credentials were established. It was specified that if those on the “Black List” were arrested or fled, new officials would have to be appointed.

In terms of taking measures to deal with problems, a variety was on offer, some resulting in locally direct methods being employed and others indirect. The key concern for any formation commander was the distracting effect of public disorder. Ensuring that disorder was never the population’s likely response, was clearly important. At the most passive level, this entailed careful monitoring of public opinion and issues that might affect it, such as poor food supply, poor welfare and morale. Consequently, Civil Affairs detachments constantly gathered information, passing it back up the chain of command for analysis (see
Chapter 6). Once a trend had been established, or a source of vulnerability identified, then measures could be taken. It was also possible to employ measures to disrupt the opportunity for disorder and insurrection to take place. These often coincided with field security policies designed to prevent espionage and sabotage. They came in the form of obligatory declarations of Allied policy and covered such matters as the use of field glasses, cameras and carrier pigeons, the carrying of firearms, the establishment of curfews and blackouts, and the control of public movement. The declarations came in a number of formats, with some regarded as politically inflammatory. Proclamations were instructions that were given with the weight of the Supreme Commander’s authority over the area of a campaign. Typically and historically, they were employed in an enemy state as part of Military Government or during times of siege and they were embodied in the Hague Rules. They could, if interpreted in a certain way, be regarded as a threat to sovereignty. However, they were a wartime measure and as the Civil Affairs Agreements confirmed such authority was *de facto*, temporary and geographically restricted to that part of a country where the campaign was fought (see Chapter 1). Only two proclamations were issued in France, Eisenhower’s *People of Western Europe* message and declaring the issuing of supplemental francs as valid (for which there was seemingly no softer alternative).73

In attempting to prevent potential problems, Eisenhower’s message was designed to impress upon the people and especially the resistance fighters of Northwest Europe (although its focus was on France) the need to sit tight and not take charge of events themselves. They would be liberated, but there was little point in “patriots” spilling blood ahead of that time. Eisenhower was keen to avoid unnecessary activity that might result in political upheaval. Liberated citizens needed to wait for orders. Furthermore, it was designed to prevent unnecessary political upheaval by encouraging the citizenry to bide its time and wait for post-war elections:

> Effective civil administration of France must be provided by Frenchmen. All persons must continue in their present duties unless otherwise instructed. Those who have made common cause with the enemy and so betrayed their country will be removed. As France is liberated from her oppressors, you yourselves will choose your representatives, and the government under which you wish to live.74

It was designed to forestall political problems in France and buy time for the campaign. It told the people of France, what their new (temporary) commander wanted them to do, albeit in friendly terms. The Allies were not the only ones concerned about uprisings. The local German military authorities at OB West contacted their Vichy equivalents early on 6 June to ensure that measures were taken to prevent revolt, sabotage and obstruction. Members of the SS were particularly concerned about the communist overtones of any uprising and came down hard when they had an opportunity. The Vichy authorities were fearful of civil war across still occupied France.75
However, Eisenhower’s proclamation was not the only means of exercising control. There were methods that appeared softer because they were more related to tactical, rather than campaign needs. In light of de Gaulle’s sensitivity, their use made sense. They amounted to Ordinances (whether for the whole of the liberated area or just part of it) that could be issued by Montgomery as Eisenhower’s delegated field commander, and Notices (that directed specific action in a designated area) and Orders (direction to a person or a class of persons) that could be issued at lower levels of command.\textsuperscript{76} Even better, was to have such declarations issued under French authority and better still in a French version (\textit{Arrêt, Arrêté} and \textit{Avis}, with some coming under the French \textit{État de Siège}).\textsuperscript{77} Of course, one of the first posted by the Gaullist authorities shortly after their arrival was \textit{Aux Populations Libérées} that stated the need to support the Allied war effort, but made it clear that the right of sovereignty was being exercised by the new authorities.\textsuperscript{78}

Nevertheless, if the Allied measures failed then direct action could be taken. If there was a total or temporary breakdown in the ability of the French civil authority to govern or, worse, their refusal to co-operate (generally or in a particular area) this was considered a “real emergency.” In such circumstances, the Allies acted under an operational military order that was accommodated by both the Hague Rules and the French \textit{État de Siège}.\textsuperscript{79} They had no need to impose foreign laws or enactments in these circumstances, which SHAEF planners, intended to provide yet further evidence that there was no desire to undermine the sovereignty of France.\textsuperscript{80} It allowed persons to be arrested, but not tried or punished. Instead, they would be kept in detention until the point at which the French judicial system was re-established.\textsuperscript{81} The lightness of touch suggested by these Technical Instructions must nevertheless be set the general tendency of the day to employ what would now be considered extremely robust techniques in dealing with any matter of public disorder or panic where military aid was needed by the civil power.\textsuperscript{82}

Troops could also be used in the “maintenance of public morale” following a period of intense military activity. Here it was hoped that the mere appearance of troops would be enough to diffuse matters. However, there were also the options of “persuasive but firm methods” and the “use of force” depending on the level of “panic.” In all cases, troops were only seen as a reserve to the civil authorities and only employed when these were “exhausted or otherwise employed.” Other possible tasks that could be performed by troops (hopefully in conjunction with local police and at the request of authorities) included intervention to prevent crowds forming, controlling crowds and dispersing crowds. It was viewed that the most likely need for troops was to prevent crowds hindering the emergency services or stampeding for transport or food. Troops were also available to cordon areas contaminated by gas, to move vehicles inhibiting either civilian or military movement and to clear looters from a bombed area.\textsuperscript{83}

Although not needed in Normandy, British troops and armoured vehicles were visibly present and ready to be used to disperse crowds (should gendarmerie lines break) during a violent demonstration in Brussels on 25 November 1944.
The demonstration came against a background of political turmoil following the return of the exile government and involved BREN light machine guns being fired from Universal Carriers by Belgian gendarmes, several grenades being thrown from the crowd and municipal police lines breaking under crowd pressure. It resulted in over 30 civilian wounded.84 Thus, the Allies had the means in both legal and physical terms to remove likely troublemakers, to deter trouble through a show of force and to stop it if it did.

However, these were largely measures of the last resort and the preference was to work with a competent and popular local administration that could do most of the work. Enabling the local authorities was an important task, but one that had to be handled sensitively and lightness of touch.85 Any sense of Civil Affairs turning into overbearing Military Government would be counter-productive. Key to the successful remedy of any potential or actual difficulty was good intelligence that would point to patterns of behaviour, problem individuals or gaps in provision of basic needs.86 Good Civil Affairs was about having a fingertip feel for a place and its people, albeit with access to coercive measures should these fail.

**Events and Reactions in Normandy**

It was hardly surprising that Civil Affairs officers on arrival in Normandy worked with the existing Vichy authorities. That they did so can be attributed to a number of factors, but none of these was part of a deliberate campaign to snub the Gaullists. Moreover, it was an expedient until the political and administrative picture in France clarified. Perhaps the most pronounced reasons for working with the Vichy included the enigmatic reaction of the local general population that generally refrained from remonstration over what type of administration they desired, desire by Civil Affairs to benefit from the obvious experience and general competence of the Vichy men (few of whom appeared to be fervent fascists), the inability to draw upon the expertise of French liaison officers, the difficulty in ascertaining the credentials of the few local Gaullists and the personal foibles of some Civil Affairs officers. Whilst, the *Military Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field* did encourage Civil Affairs officers to make changes slowly and err towards that which was already working, it was balanced by any form of favour or intrigue or involvement in politics being prohibited.87 As a guide to how relations with the Vichy could work, in occupied areas, the *Manual* specified that local officials, were to be respected “due to their office” and relations with officials were to be “correct,” but social and personal relations “limited to formal occasions.”88 Thus if the Vichy status quo was a logical first step, events would soon change matters.

Cheers, embraces and flowers greeted soldiers as they entered Bayeux on 7 June.89 Police even had to control a small crowd that gathered to watch soldiers of the 7th Battalion of the Essex Regiment clear the last remaining Germans, eight telephone operators and three field police, from the central post office.90 However, in political terms, the Norman population was found to be largely passive. A 21st Army Group Civil Affairs report covering the first month of
operations described the region as typified by the “sturdy individualism of folk,” with “independently minded farmers” who were “conservative in outlook.” Furthermore, most Normans, with their “undemonstrative bent” appeared to be cautious of both the “populist front” of de Gaulle and the communist movement. Little evidence from Civil Affairs sources during the first fortnight of the campaign indicated any particular political passion one way or another.

Even at the end of August when the Vichy “vanished” from across liberated France, there was still little political activity reported in the region. Only in the traditionally more politically active cities like Cherbourg and Rennes were the first signs of activity emerging with the posting of party posters. Nevertheless, rather greater political activity was found by the British in Le Havre upon its liberation in September. By November, political activity was seen across liberated France, with communist and socialist groups actively reforming cadres and recruiting new members. Other parties were also making themselves known, although the right wing were struggling to find an organisation that could gel anti-communist support without being tainted by fascist pedigree in the process. Yet, even at this point, the masses were judged uninterested in politics, wishing to put their efforts instead into supporting a “unified orderly effort to re-build the country.” The only area of active public interest were upset over the lack of action taken to deal with traitors and war profiteers, and a strike at an Allied ordnance depot in Normandy for better wages. By early December, SHAEF expressed concern that in forthcoming elections the communists were the best organised party and likely to do extremely well. Reports at this time also pointed to the levels of public upset and agitation in central and southern France at worsening basic conditions and the reported ineptitude of officials.

Yet, even here how much radical political activity was actually occurring as opposed to being perceived by some Civil Affairs officers was open to question. Some French officials reported after the war that in their view there was a tendency by many Americans to see any political activity as communism or radicalism, even when this was far from the truth. Certainly, many American reports went to great efforts to highlight political activity. However, this may was in all likelihood a mixture of American inexperience of European politics and the dogmatic following of Civil Affairs manuals that often emphasised the requirement to prohibit politics.

Conversely, there was a danger that by expending energy looking for the few extremists Civil Affairs stood a chance of missing the more likely causes of local upset. In this respect, the undemonstrative bent of the Normans hid their deeper concerns. This bent conspired with Allied preferences to keep existing officials in post so long as they did not present security concerns and erred towards the status quo. After the war, the resistance-appointed prefect of Calvados, Pierre Daure (Rector of the University of Caen), stated that if, what he called, the Pétainist authorities had continued in Normandy there would have been a public “explosion.” The Pétainists were both very unpopular and full of collaborators. Luckily, when the time came Allied Civil Affairs recognised that the incumbent officials had out lived their utility (see section below).
However, such purges by the new Gaullist authorities were “mild and few in number.” They too needed competent administrators and as the Allies found there were very few extremists amongst the ranks of officials in Normandy. An argument can be advanced that elements of this official purge was an act of tokenism to prove that the Gaullists were now in charge and this did not always sit happily with everyone in Civil Affairs. Yet, widespread official purges were unlikely given the scale of collaboration and the numbers of officials that had worked during the occupation. Moreover, the more important job of the Gaullists was as Daure commented to *The Times* in July 1944 was to be seen governing and this meant dealing with the many practical problems thrown up by the passage of war:

...if [the French government] wished to be recognised by the Great Powers it should make itself recognised by France.

Whilst, in practical terms collaboration could not be easily dealt with given wartime exigencies for officials, there was nevertheless much popular pressure for justice to be served, which only increased when the war concluded. In being seen to govern, the purging of collaborators was for many an indicator of competence. With figures that suggest up to a million French denounced their fellow countrymen to the Vichy and German authorities during the occupation, it was little wonder that justice was demanded. By the autumn of 1944 dossiers had been established by the French authorities on 300,000 suspects, tens of thousands had been arrested (although this included many displaced persons who had been caught fending for themselves by looting) and a camp had been established at Sully near Bayeux. Alongside collaboration, war profiteering was regarded in some parts of France as a worse crime. However, overall in either activity few felt that justice was ever properly served and with the small-time nature of much of the activity, it was hardly likely that it ever could be.

Nevertheless, the popular determination to make amends for wartime injustices presented the potential for instability. Fortunately, although the purge of collaborators and war profiteers started soon after liberation, in its most vigorous form it was limited to central and southern France where there was less supervision by officials. In Normandy, there were a few examples of the public shaving off of female collaborators hair (an estimated 20,000 women were shaved across liberated France in the period to the end of September 1944) and examples of individuals being placed under house arrest or put through private shaming (hair shaved but in private). At Flers a small riot broke out as Vichy officials were removed by the resistance, however this was untypical for the area. There were similar problems in Rennes. Unlike in the south, there were fewer potential targets for popular justice. Indeed, it was thought that there were fewer than 20 collaborators in the canton of Trévières (in the American part of Calvados). Even if collaboration and the desire to deal with it had been more widespread, it was likely with the levels of Gaullist, Field Security and Civil Affairs interest in the area that any purges would have been short lived. Moreover, whilst there were examples of gangland involvement, unlawful imprisonment, bombings and murder in the south that
extended into the post-war period there was no societal breakdown or types of problem that might embarrass a military campaign. Indeed, as peoples trials held on street corners turned into gangland style retribution there was public pressure was put on officials to control events.\textsuperscript{108} Compared to one summary execution in Manche, 12 in Calvados and 43 in Orne there were 375 in Dordogne.\textsuperscript{109}

\textit{Events in Bayeux}

Generally, the initial view from 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group Civil Affairs was that administrative relations with the existing French authorities had gone well, the proclamations met with favour and the notices had not caused problems in controlling public movement. Furthermore, many of the notices were signed off by mayors (many of whom had the added cachet of being elected prior to the war). From the first days of the liberation, the local authorities proved cooperative with the Allies and capable of taking fair share of the administrative burden within the resources they had available.\textsuperscript{110}

Typical of the competence of many Vichy administrators was Pierre Rochat, sub-prefect for the Bayeux arrondissement. As the invasion took place, Rochat had done his job, as any Frenchman should. He got the necessary permissions from the German authorities to take an ambulance to pick up suspected casualties from around the coastal towns of Longues-sur-Mer and Port-en-Bessin, he organised refugee centres, he posted German invasion notices and he set up an office to distribute aid. When the Allies arrived in Bayeux on 7 June, he ensured that proficient French administrative control continued, as any patriot should. In so doing, he was able to satisfy most of the concerns of the local Civil Affairs detachment. He made sure that there was enough money in the banks and post offices (5,635,000 francs), he published an order outlawing looting by the law of 1 September 1939 (\textit{État de Siège}), he maintained control over the police (except in forward areas), he supplied the Allies with vegetables, butter, eggs and cheese, he sent circulars to mayors in war-damaged areas on the steps to be taken regarding accommodation for those who needed shelter, he organised financial assistance to those bombed out of their homes, he organised food supply, schemes to prevent looting, burial of the dead, milk collection and the distribution of German army horses, and he met an Allied request for hospital facilities, finding bed spaces, bedding, managers, doctors and nurses around Bayeux for 900 wounded within 24 hours.\textsuperscript{111}

Rochat had been sub-prefect in Bayeux for two years and previously had worked in ministries of public works and the interior. He was experienced and he was not an extremist. Rather he was a loyal supporter of the politically extremist, but patriotic Vichyite minister of the interior, Pierre Pucheu (the first to be tried and executed by the Gaullists for treason and as a warning to other alleged collaborators on 20 March 1944) and was related through marriage to Vichy official Gaston Bruneton (pro-Pétainist and pro-Nazi who was head of the mission to support French workers in Germany). It was suggested that he was more career minded and less an arch supporter of the regime. Indeed, it was
reported in *The Times* that Rochat’s loyalty to Pétain had been doubted by the “Vichy secret police.”

Above all, he seemed acceptable enough to the first wave of Civil Affairs officers reaching Bayeux. Even, some senior officers were impressed by him, as it was reported that Lewis, SCAO at British Second Army, personally thanked Rochat on 14 June. It would appear that through Rochat the “Vichy regime had imposed itself on the Allies thanks to its efficiency.”

By contrast, those Gaullists who did emerge were rather thin on the ground and of unproven competence. Rochat’s eventual replacement, Raymond Triboulet, had great difficulty convincing the Allies that he was the chosen replacement. Triboulet was the leader of the resistance committee in Caen area and despite being out of radio contact for two months, had already been briefed by French authorities in Algiers to play a role in the post-liberation administration. On 8 June, he attempted to make contact, as ordered, with a French liaison officer. A British intelligence officer he met at Courseulles-sur-Mer was unsurprisingly unaware of such officers, but was keen to know about the nature of both such groups and the personalities involved. Seemingly unimpressed with Triboulet’s resistance credentials, the officer was cautious and non-committal regarding the administrative role. As too was the uninterested Civil Affairs officer he met the following evening, even when knowledge of local supply capabilities was offered. However, the officer did give him a pass, thought to be the first issued.

Whilst an appointed leader, whose work included gathering much intelligence on behalf of the Allies, Triboulet could hardly be viewed as a prominent resistance fighter. Thus, it was hardly surprising that he was unknown. Equally, it was surprising that he managed to become a relatively important Gaullist official. In part, this was because he was one of the first to be appointed and in part, because of the role he was to play in initial developments in the relationship between the Allies and the Gaullists in Normandy. Whilst, matters improved as the campaign drew on and the names of prospective leaders were given to Civil Affairs, even in the liberation of Caen, there was a momentary pause when Daure arrived to take over as prefect dressed like a “farmer.”

The obvious qualities of men like Rochat were matched by the personal foibles of some Civil Affairs officers and in many ways, the Frenchman came as a blessed, but naïve solution to their needs. The first Civil Affairs unit into Bayeux was No. 202 Civil Affairs Detachment, arriving there at 1730hrs on 7 June. It was a basic detachment and not one improved by an increment that could deal with a larger administrative area like a department or arrondissement. It reflected both Civil Affairs thinking that detachments covering these large areas could follow spearhead detachments at a more leisurely pace and operational thinking that presumed Caen (the administrative centre of Calvados) would be liberated on D-Day. As a basic or spearhead version, No. 202 Detachment was only responsible for ensuring that basic Civil Affairs needs were met in the area, it was not capable of dealing with much else. Furthermore, the Officer Commanding, Major H.B. Goodings (sometimes erroneously described as the Town Major), had his own limitations.
Goodings was, of course, the first interface with the liberated population of Bayeux and consequently at a celebration of the liberation on 9 June, he was “tumultuously cheered.” In doing his basic checks in the days before, Goodings gained a favourable impression of the efficiency of administration in the Bayeux. The police were up to strength (the police chief reassuringly had held his job for more than six years), the fire services were operational and notices about blackout, curfew, cameras and field glasses were given to the mayor, who seemed “very co-operative.” Rochat was instructed on 11 June to find a contractor to supply vegetables, milk and eggs to a military hospital, a task that passes without further comment in the detachment War Diary and where the mayor of Bayeux features more often. In an interview with The Globe and Mail in mid-June, Goodings (described in the article as a Canadian postmaster from Port Colborne, Ontario) explained how he landed on D-Day along with three American officers and made their way to Bayeux on motorcycles. He explained that he had told the mayor to get Bayeux back to “normality” as soon as possible, who was surprised at the lack of law being laid down. Relations with Rochat were described by Goodings as “happy” and co-operative.

Yet, Goodings shortcomings also show through. It has been suggested that after his first meeting with Rochat on 8 June, Goodings and a field security Lieutenant were so impressed, that he was given the nickname “king of the liberated territories.” If true, this demonstrated little understanding of the domestic political complications caused by the occupation. Furthermore, Goodings decision to use the former German military governor’s headquarters on the Rue de Litry was equally short sighted. It ran contrary to the spirit of pre-invasion briefing that Civil Affairs was not to be seen as replacing one form occupation with another. Whilst, pre-invasion briefings within British 30 Corps indicated the utility of capturing military governor’s buildings for the supply and civilian intelligence they might contain, this was not the same as actually using the building for government purposes. In Goodings case, the view held by a senior Civil Affairs staff officer at British 30 Corps was that the decision to use the building was a mistake taken by a “backwards colonial civil servant” Civil Affairs officer who knew no better. To ensure Goodings example was not repeated, Civil Affairs staffs constantly stressed that such buildings were not used by detachments. Only when such buildings were offered by the French authorities were concessions to the policy allowed. The offer by the authorities in Caen of 5 Rue de Hastings, a former Luftwaffe headquarters, was only accepted by No. 208 Detachment because both the level of damage in the city presented no alternative options and it had not been used by German military authorities.

Goodings relationship with No. 202 Detachment lasted until 17 July when he was posted to No. 2 Civil Affairs Group headquarters. In the meantime (before 20 June), matters in Bayeux were improved by the early arrival from No. 210 Detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Douglas G. Pirie Coldstream Guards, who was an “expert French speaker” (and a former Military Advisor to Rennell). Goodings can hardly be blamed for what he did. He was amongst the first
ashore, he had little experience, his task was to focus on the basics not on the politics and who knows how he was influenced by the American ‘Charlottesville men’. Certainly, Daure had the impression that Americans were more open to Pétainist propaganda, compared to the seeming neutrality policy of the British. Other Gaullist officials were also of the view that the Americans had a stronger inclination to interfere in French affairs and that overall the Americans were the most distant, the Canadians the friendliest and the British somewhere in between.

Goodings also fell foul of the unintended importance that was foisted upon Bayeux caused by the delay in capturing Caen. If Caen had been captured then the Rochat’s removal would have occurred in a backwater. Instead, with many media and French eyes on it, how Civil Affairs acquitted itself was bound to come under greater scrutiny. From 9 June, Colonel Chandon, one of the first French liaison officers to arrive, had been working alongside Rochat whose efficiency and British support would have been noticed. Triboulet, knowing that Rochat had in effect been recognised by the British, suggested to Maurice Schumann (journalist and aide to de Gaulle) on 12 June that Rochat should be transferred into civilian life. It was later reported (and echoed by Daure after the war) in The Times after Rochat’s dismissal that attempts to remove him began shortly after the liberation.

Indeed, a reconnaissance of the beachhead area by a senior Civil Affairs staff officer from 21st Army Group, Lieutenant Colonel D.R. Ellias, noted in a report (covering the period 9-12 June) that Triboulet had questioned Rochat’s continued presence. Ellias also noted that given the unease over Rochat’s authority had produced a series of practical problems. Both the mayor and commissioner of police in Bayeux felt unable to proceed with aspects of the law (particularly the ability to arrest) as they were uncertain who represented the legitimate identity of France. Despite Rochat’s efficiency local administration was becoming rudderless. Although, the view of Ellias, who conducted dozens of interviews with liberated Normans, was that most wanted an authority to trust in and that “without doubt a lead by General de Gaulle would be loyally and universally followed,” he suggested that with the imminent fall of Caen they might wait for a ruling from the regional chief there. Nevertheless, the French must act as they thought best.

A British Second Army Civil Affairs report (covering period to 19 June) indicated that, whilst Rochat was co-operative with the British, he had been “bad mouthed” as a collaborator, whilst Triboulet by contrast was accepted locally. In recognising that Rochat was likely to be removed, Civil Affairs staff at British 30 Corps (with responsibility for Bayeux) sought advice from London (presumably via the chain of command). The view of the Foreign Office was to do what was thought best in the circumstances. Locally, the reply received on 15 June from the “Col, Exec.” on the Civil Affairs staff at British Second Army, instructed 30 Corps Civil Affairs staff that:

... the policy was not to interfere with the policies of the indigenous population and, provided that DE GAULLIST authorities co-operated and
met the necessary demands of the Army authorities as passed on to them by CA, no action would be taken. Thus, on balance it was hardly a surprise that despite his seeming efficiency, Rochat was, under the authority of one de Gaulle’s representatives, removed from post for political reasons on 15 June. His replacement, Triboulet, despite initial problems in demonstrating his credentials, would have been reassuring to the British. Daure speaking after the war, described his fellow Frenchman as the least radical type one could possibly meet and a “country gentleman.” Indeed, he owned land between Caen and Bayeux and before the war had studied law. It was hardly a surprise the combination of the verbal attacks against Rochat by the French, the determination to allow the French to rule themselves and the general acceptability of Triboulet (to rather more experienced Civil Affairs officers) that Civil Affairs sensibly stood aside. However, that was not to say that the nature of the new arrangements suited everyone in Civil Affairs.

“Flowers, Cheers and Tears”

The unexpected return of de Gaulle to France on 14 June 1944 was variously reported in the press, but typically with an emphasis on the “fervent welcome” from several thousand Normans amidst “flowers, cheers and tears” in Bayeux. De Gaulle’s return served several purposes. It allowed him a feel for events in liberated France, it enabled the development of popular support amongst a public that generally heard but not seen the exiled leader, it provided an opportunity to check any further drift in Allied policy towards accepting the status quo and it facilitated the establishment of his policies and men in positions of power. Amongst his new men was the new regional commissioner for Rouen (Commissaire Régional de la République) was François Coulet and Colonel Pierre de Chevigné, the senior French military commander in the region. Coulet quickly replaced Rochat with Triboulet. The general public reaction in both the British and American sectors to arrival of the new team in Bayeux ranged from enthusiastic to emphatic support that de Gaulle and his men (and many women) represented the best way forward.

De Chevigné, as the senior French military commander in the region, was responsible for ensuring that the provisional authorities discharged their security responsibilities. This was done under the provisions of the État de Siège and by using French police, gendarmerie and courts. More police could be recruited as required and Chevigné brought with him a growing contingent of North African regulars (200 by August) and tirailleurs sénégalais for law enforcement purposes. Coulet, as regional commissioner (a Gaullist modification of the innovative Vichy regional “super-prefects”), was a form of governor general who referred to Algiers on substantial matters, but used his “discretion” when unable to communicate or on mundane decisions. In combat areas, the regional commissioner came under the jurisdiction of a military delegate (Kenig for northern France). In non-combat areas, when two or more commissioners were active a civilian delegate assumed control (M. Le Troquer
in the case of northern France).\textsuperscript{145} As with other central government agents (prefects and sub-prefects), his position was both politically and practically influential in shaping local events and in maintaining such areas as law and order, highways, public assistance, public health and education.\textsuperscript{146} Overall, the aim was to ensure French sovereignty, French military control over security elements (resistance and gendarmerie) in forward areas and French civil control (not another form of Pétainist military control) in rear areas. As The Times pointed out, the depth of Gaullists’ administrative preparations demonstrated that they were not simply grabbing the spoils of war.\textsuperscript{147} Thus, even if Montgomery did not, Lewis at British Second Army recognised that what had transpired in a few short hours on 14 June was effectively a coup d’état.\textsuperscript{148} Montgomery having received de Gaulle and his party on 14 June had simply reported to London that the general had been given a lukewarm reception in Bayeux and that he had left behind some functionaries whose purpose he was uncertain.\textsuperscript{149} That there remain competing versions of how well received de Gaulle was by his own countrymen is hardly surprising and is further complicated by the issues of what was genuine, what was drummed up and what the typical reaction of Normans might be a point when the liberation had only just started.

Despite, his clearly identifying the nature of events, Lewis was disgruntled that he had been given no warning and no advice on how to respond to the visit, even though officials in London knew that it was likely. Furthermore, it appeared that he thought well of Rochat and took badly to having such changes foisted upon him. It has been ventured that, at first, Lewis took very badly to the new arrangements and marched into see the new regional commissioner to tell him that the Gaullists were only recognised on a provisional basis, that the British expected order to be maintained and that Lewis did not expect to deal with any unnecessary new complications caused by Coulet’s arrival.\textsuperscript{150} Coulet certainly does little to dim such impressions of events in his post-war memoir.\textsuperscript{151} Even if not made in the way described, Lewis was still bound to inform the commissioner that the military required certain administrative arrangements to be put in place and that as the new incumbent Civil Affairs would look to him in carrying them out. Other accounts indicate that Lewis’ policy towards the new authorities was to make a judgement based on the reaction within liberated France.\textsuperscript{152} Inevitably, a few days of caution followed as each sized up events in Bayeux; a process that was confused by the arrival of a currency crisis (see section below). Indeed, a SHAEF report of the week ending 30 June 1944, indicated that there was “some tendency,” encouraged by Coulet, to discredit Civil Affairs staffs and detachments.\textsuperscript{153}

Surprisingly well briefed, The Times reported that the new provisional authorities were “arranged in parallel” with Allied arrangements. Optimistically it was suggested that: “perhaps in practice the complication may not be so great as it appears on paper.” The report recognised that in wider terms civil administrative difficulties were likely to remain until Allies finally recognised the sovereignty of de Gaulle’s provisional government.\textsuperscript{154} Administrative simplicity would clearly be eased by such recognition, however for it to be
forthcoming required various elements to be in place. In particular and irrespective of any personal prejudice within France or Civil Affairs, the new Gaullist authorities needed to demonstrate both that they could (and were) deliver acceptable amounts of administration across liberated France and that they represented popular will.

In measuring the French reaction to events in Normandy, Civil Affairs officers, including Captain E.G. de Pury interviewed those judged to have either good knowledge of local views or were influential themselves. The Bishop of Bayeux, Monsignor François-Marie Picaud, was regarded by Civil Affairs as a great influence in the region. Picaud felt he reflected the cautious optimism at events of many, who like him, were not natural Gaullists, but nevertheless great patriots:

We hate the Germans and are anxious for the best possible relations with the Allies. We insist on complete independence as regards self-government. De Gaulle crystallises the Resistance Forces and has always been a symbol of hope for oppressed Frenchmen. However, we know less about those who surround him and we hope he will not be influenced by extremists in doing his duty. It is evident that there is no alternative to him. In this region we are a conservative people and the farmers are greatly attached to their property and have a horror of communism.155

This view was supported by the Mayor of Bayeux, his assistant, a local lawyer and headmaster.156 Support for the personality of de Gaulle was less easy to identify. In early July, The Times reported that support for de Gaulle was more spontaneous and enthusiastic around Cherbourg, even in badly damaged areas, than in the reserved villages of Calvados.157 Nevertheless, a SHAEF report covering events of the same period indicated that most of the populations were taking little interest in internal political affairs.158 There was almost no interest in challenging the new French authorities.159 Most Frenchmen simply focused on surviving the conflict and for a large part depended on existing administrative arrangements (now controlled by the Gaullists) to help them do so.

**The New Men**

Therefore, of great interest to Civil Affairs were the administrative capabilities of the new authorities, for if they were not up to the mark then trouble may loom. Speaking after the war, Grasett at SHAEF was of the opinion that up until the liberation of Paris the Gaullists were immensely co-operative, gave a good welcome and were good at their job.160 However, Grasett tended to work with the best officials the Gaullists could offer and on the ground, the picture was mixed.

If unknown to others, Triboulet had tremendous personal misgivings about his competence. Nevertheless, he was at least able to present a favourable impression. Indeed, one of his first policies was to get mayors to send in returns on the number of dead horses, not because these were needed, but because they were easy to collate and gave the impression of administrative competency.
More purposefully, he ensured that French, not Allied authorities appointed mayors in newly liberated villages. To achieve this he sent youths forward on motorcycles to newly liberated villages to appoint (if required) new mayors; typically the first reasonably suitable person encountered.\textsuperscript{161} Furthermore, Civil Affairs reports from early July indicated that Triboulet was both capable and cooperative in helping to organise the collection of the harvest and facilitating the dispersal of refugees away from battle areas.\textsuperscript{162} He was judged favourably in post-war comments by a British 30 Corps Civil Affairs staff officer.\textsuperscript{163} Triboulet it is believed was responsible for drumming up the welcoming crowds that received de Gaulle on his 14 June visit to Bayeux. Indeed, Triboulet became a lifelong Gaullist. In June 1944, it was hardly a surprise that he should be given a position within the new regime. Triboulet was to hold the post of sub-prefect for a year, during which time he gained a reputation for being “efficient” in organising the food supply and capable in dealing with the thorny issue of collaborators.\textsuperscript{164}

However, these favourable comments came after the events of mid-June had subsided. At first, the change of officials in Bayeux was treated at the very least as frustrating. As a typical gesture of the determination to show that sovereignty was firmly in the hands of the Gaullists, French liaison officers encouraged the over-stamping of postage stamps depicting Pétain (used on identity papers). A policy soon rectified by new stamps being sent from Britain, but one found irritating and time-consuming in the meantime.\textsuperscript{165} Furthermore, many of the local Gaullists were considered both inexperienced and “intensely suspicious” of Civil Affairs giving the organisation only “grudging recognition” and in the process “setting everything back.” Even, Triboulet was viewed as knowing nothing beyond his own arrondissement. Yet optimistically it was also felt that “deeds alone will remove that suspicion” and full co-operation was soon anticipated.\textsuperscript{166} Civil Affairs estimated that it took about a week before Coulet was finally convinced of the organisation only “good intentions.”\textsuperscript{167} Coulet was convinced that this process was aided by the personal qualities of such Civil Affairs officers as Brigadier Thomas Robbins and Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Pirie and Colonel Charles Usher.\textsuperscript{168} Grasett was of the view that the Gaullists had come to recognise that they needed Civil Affairs.\textsuperscript{169}

A SHAEF report of 8 July 1944, noted that there was a marked improvement in the efficiency of civil administration officials. It reported that in Cherbourg more attention was given to administrative problems than to questions of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{170} In this city, some Civil Affairs officers were of the opinion that such was the competence of the local officials that detachments were hardly needed after the first two days.\textsuperscript{171} In the British sector, a correspondent for The Times reporting separate conversations with Lewis and Coulet indicated that relations between the Allies and the French were “cordial.” The Civil Affairs approach according to the reporter (probably reflecting Lewis’ interview) was always one of “taking action through the civil authority if it exists,” with “utmost cooperation” being exhibited by both parties.\textsuperscript{172}

Unlike Triboulet who had, at least, an opportunity to think about his new role in advance of D-Day, Coulet had none. He was told of his appointment on 13 June
(the nominated official Henri Bourdeau de Fontenay was still behind enemy lines) and sailed with de Gaulle from Portsmouth to Normandy at ten o’clock on 14 June. Nevertheless, Coulet had relevant experience. As secretary general of Corsica following its liberation in September 1943, he experienced the administrative collapse on the island and it has been suggested, made him unyielding in the need for strong administrative direction. In the The Times during June and July 1944, he was described as a “young and vigorous diplomat” who was pragmatic (in recognising the “first essential” was to win the war), sincere, co-operative and helpful in his relations with the Allies.

Official British views were no less complimentary, a Foreign Office report sent in mid-July to the British ambassador in Algiers, was of the view that the pre-invasion caution as to whether conservative Normans would accept the “leftist tendencies” of de Gaulle and his provisional government was “largely countered” by the “tactful behaviour of M. Coulet.” It used as evidence his willingness to retain as much of the local administration as possible, with very few Vichy officials being removed in Bayeux or Cherbourg and even fewer in Caen. It also pointed to the lack of party politics and a general absence of “collaboration organisations” as further examples of Coulet’s success albeit in recognised co-operation Civil Affairs (whose work was described as being done “tactfully and sympathetically”). Another typical of Coulet’s tact was his decision to make a speech that was “understated” in Cherbourg following its liberation on 27 June 1944. Aware of the left wing leanings of the port’s population, he emphasised the temporary nature of the provisional government in advance of post-war national elections.

Coulet clearly looked out for French interests and Gaullist policies, and was no slouch in doing so. Yet, far from upsetting the Allies, these were seen as part of a normal relationship with Allied officials. Indeed, most of the suggestions were accepted without question. Typical examples included. In June 1944, in reference to stealing and looting on the Canadian and British 51st Division fronts he asked for preventative measures to be introduced and for help to be given in making claims. In reference to a British army leaflet, warning against using post-1940 francs, he asked that this misunderstanding be investigated. In one of the many discussions regarding rights over enemy property he suggested that half of 300 bottles of wine captured from the Germans be given to French hospitals that had run out. In a meeting with Civil Affairs staff from British 1 Corps, on the subject of entering Caen, Coulet made it clear that he wanted to get into the city as quickly as possible after liberation and “It was agree that he should be given every facility for doing so.” In July, he asked that many of the Allied notices be re-worded in order to be more compliant with aspect of French law. He asked that relief was supplied to him centrally, for onward distribution through civilian channels. He requested that instead of paying cash for relief supplies, as preferred by Civil Affairs, he should instead sign against their physical receipt (Form F6), thus making the transaction as one settled between governments (Grasset agreed, knowing that Anglo-French agreements on mutual aid and currency were both close). In August, with an ever present eye on detail he asked that the daily drilling of French police by
certain Civil Affairs units, whilst not serious, should be discouraged.\textsuperscript{183} In preparation for the re-opening of schools, he asked that Allied units hand them over to the French authorities. He expressed upset at the giving of oranges to German POWs in the Cherbourg area.\textsuperscript{184}

Furthermore, Coulet (as \textit{The Times} suggested) gave the Allies genuine cooperation and help. Typical examples included. In June, he furnished a list of collaborators that should not be employed by the Allies.\textsuperscript{185} He directed mayors of communes to assist the Allies wherever possible:

... the duty of the French to give the maximum assistance to the Allied Armies in their struggle against the common enemy and for the liberation of France. Therefore, without hesitation, you must submit to the demands made of you by the Commander.\textsuperscript{186}

In early July, this came to mean that all Allied requests regarding movement and other security matter were auctioned immediately even if there were problems (these could be referred to Coulet later).\textsuperscript{187} In July, he issued orders declaring it illegal to possess Allied property. He made adjustments to arrest procedures making it easier for the Allies to transfer those they had arrested to French authority.\textsuperscript{188} He addressed refugees to help maintain their morale and take such burdens off the Allies. At St. Lô, a city so badly devastated over many weeks that the authorities moved to Coutances, in very difficult circumstances he bravely addressed a huge crowd.\textsuperscript{189} By 20 July, an American Civil Affairs report noted that Coulet’s authorities had issued 162 orders, covering such topics as evacuation, burying animals and bodies, public health, suspension of Vichy laws, appointment of officials, price control, rationing, financial instructions, the administration of justice, requisition, public movement, enemy property, arrest procedures and conditions for the indigenous press. There were also French versions of Allied notices on curfews, firearms and so forth. Furthermore, any notices deemed controversial were first discussed with Civil Affairs.\textsuperscript{190} In August, he organised 12 platoons of local labour (330 people) to work permanently with mobile refugee reception centres and CAIDs.\textsuperscript{191} At the request of Field Security (using Civil Affairs), he ensured that ID cards were checked by mayors within five days of liberation.\textsuperscript{192} He agreed to send food stocks into areas around Vire and Falaise.\textsuperscript{193} He also agreed that local fishermen should not be conscripted into the French force, but instead to return to fishing.\textsuperscript{194}

Yet, Coulet was not popular with all Frenchmen. The French communist party, whose article lambasting Coulet in \textit{Liberté} was censored by the French (and replaced by an article regarding the censorship), indicated that Coulet had reassured the Vichyites that they would be treated as well by him as they had been by Civil Affairs. It was even suggested that he had shaken the hand of Rochat (although that de Gaulle did the same was overlooked) and had promised the official another job. Furthermore, it quoted Coulet as saying that he understood that mayors could not help a “certain degree of compliance with the Vichy or the Germans.” Could the same not be said of arch-traitor Prime Minister Pierre Laval it reasoned. However, to \textit{The Times} the spat was evidence of the political splits in Algiers, not any shortcoming of Coulet.\textsuperscript{195} The official
response in Algiers was that attempting to “bump off everybody who has been playing ball with Vichy,... C’est de la merde.”¹⁹⁶

Nevertheless, by the end of July, SHAEF’s confidence in and recognition of Coulet was signalled in their instruction to 21st Army Group Civil Affairs that all Civil Affairs instructions and orders were to be copied to Coulet for information.¹⁹⁷ Reflecting both his new status and success, Coulet would meet with deputy Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, in early August, who as chairman of the ACA Committee would be fully aware of the Civil Affairs implications.¹⁹⁸ At the time of his transfer to Paris in late August, his work in Normandy was summarised in The Times in glowing terms: “The energy and efficiency with which Coulet’s difficult duties have been carried out have won for him, and for the French civil authorities as a whole, the increasing confidence of the allied military staffs.”¹⁹⁹ Thus, Coulet and his men (some new arrivals, other incumbents) acquitted themselves well in the eyes of Civil Affairs. They were there to serve French and to a lesser degree Gaullist interests, but under Coulet’s leadership, they did so in a way that was both diplomatic and did their bit (with the assistance of Civil Affairs) to help the campaign. However, the cordial and professional relationship that eventually marked relations came after the currency crisis that followed de Gaulle’s coup in Bayeux on 14 June.

**Supplemental Currency Noted**

What level of latitude Coulet had in interpreting his role in Normandy whilst fulfilling competing administrative, political and military commitments was open to question. The ability to direct events from Algiers (via London) was technically possible shortly after liberation, when the authorities in Bayeux and French liaison officers were able to use Army communications, without restriction, to send and receive messages.²⁰⁰ However, speaking after the war, Triboulet indicated that Algiers never provided any policy detail. Instead, it was necessary for the authorities in Bayeux to make their own judgements when turning broad policy into local practise.²⁰¹ Nevertheless, the presumption has prevailed that the supplemental currency crisis of June 1944 was directly orchestrated by de Gaulle.

Supplemental francs were not national (or metropolitan) currency (as could only be printed by the sovereign authorities whether in the national seat of power or in exile) nor spearhead currency (such as the yellow seal dollars or British Military Authority notes) nor military currency (such as the Allied Military schilling) but a hybrid. They were designed to ensure civilian cash flow without the political and practical complications of an exchange rate (as had been found in Italy²⁰²) in the circumstances where the Allies believed there to be no clearly identified legitimate and conventionally configured sovereign authority with whom to co-operate.²⁰³ In the case of the Belgium exiled government, they were recognised by the Allies as a legitimate and conventionally configured sovereign authority and consequently were able to print more bank notes in advance of their country’s liberation.²⁰⁴ However, the Gaullist authorities were not recognised by all as the legitimate sovereign
authority and thus under American pressure (driven by Roosevelt) the supplemental option was adopted.

Ironically, despite their perceived lack of authority the Gaullists had access to the French national gold reserves that would allow them to print additional national currency if permitted to do so by the Allies. However, being allowed to use the gold reserves would both symbolise that the Allies accepted the Gaullists as the legitimate French sovereign authority in exile and allow them a say in Allied administrative arrangements for France. It was the clearest example of how Roosevelt and de Gaulle were at loggerheads over the future political control of France. Such was Roosevelt’s caution that the future political direction of France should not be anticipated prior to national elections that he rejected Morgenthaler’s suggestion that the American treasury print République Française on the notes because it presumed the French wanted a republic.

Thus, de Gaulle’s remonstration seemed entirely reasonable, if also an effective method of demonstrating his patriotism. Yet, it came without any real danger, as use of the supplemental currency meant that effectively the Allies paid to run civil administration. In any configuration, de Gaulle was a winner but only if he remained philosophical, not become caught up with the symbolism he apparently craved. What was less clear was de Gaulle’s plan in the circumstances when cash flow in liberated France became a genuine problem.

Interestingly the start of the currency crisis came at point when Civil Affairs’ (and thus French liaison officers’) reports indicated that, except in a few villages served directly by Caen, there was no shortage of money in liberated France. Indeed, for the period to the liberation of Caen, it was reported across liberated Normandy that there was no overall shortage of money with payments being made in cash not on credit. Whilst banks were closed by the enemy, they had reopened in Bayeux on 14 June, albeit with restrictions on how much could be withdrawn. Furthermore, as an indicator of confidence in many places, deposits into banks exceeded withdrawals. The only concern, which began to emerge within a few days of the liberation, was a temporary lack of small change (typically one, two and five franc notes). In the British sector this was a particularly problem as prices were being rounded up to what was available, creating the threat of inflation. However, presuming the Germans did not destroy currency during their withdrawal (and there was little evidence for it in Normandy), this was likely to be only a brief hiatus until major banks with “enormous” cash reserves in cities like Cherbourg, St. Lô, Caen, Rennes and Paris were liberated. Thus, the supplemental currency was a publicly recognised practical expedient until such reserves were found.

By the same logic, the Gaullists could afford to reject the supplemental francs with little danger of personal cost to native Frenchmen. This was made easier with the impending arrival in France of 25,000,000 metropolitan francs brought over by Coulet on 14 June. It was an opportunite moment to cause a stir, as Civil Affairs reports of the general acceptance of the supplemental francs would have matched observations by French liaison officers. According to Ellias’ first Civil Affairs reconnaissance report in the week after D-Day, he noted:
You see it worn on the lapel like a favour with the tricolor showing. In shops, bistros and restaurants it is accepted without question. The Currency Proclamation has since been posted, but no reaction was noted. SHAEF also reported that the supplemental franc proclamations (and Eisenhower’s message) had been taken well by liberated Frenchman. The same reports also noted that most Frenchmen demanded information on the credentials of the provisional French government as none was widely available and neither proclamation had mentioned them. A mid-June Civil Affairs report from the British Second Army sector noted that, although very little of it had been issued, the supplemental currency was well received.

The proclamation that the supplemental currency was legal tender and equivalent to other French lawful money of like value was posted on 9 June. It stated that the Supreme Commander, under his powers as a military commander and in the absence of a recognised French Government, was the issuing authority for this currency. Most of the supplemental currency was distributed via soldiers paying for goods. Each soldier was paid 200 francs. In the American sector, 6,800,000 supplemental francs were shipped to France to cope with expected demands. An exchange rate was set at 200 francs to the pound (or 50 to the dollar), which was extremely favourable to the French and unfavourable to troops who did not receive full value for items purchased. Nevertheless, the currency was still the preferred option. Spearhead currencies, with their constant requirement to adjust exchange rates, were considered potentially inflationary and under such pressures, it was not certain that French financial institutions were able to cope without enormous Allied injections of capital. Even so, spearhead currencies remained available in case supplementary currencies failed.

The French reaction to the introduction supplemental currency was at first piecemeal and it was unclear what de Gaulle intended during the process. The event that was considered by SHAEF to spark events was the broadcast from London of a “semi-official” statement that pointed out that French agreement on the introduction of supplemental currency had had not been secured. The broadcast was made shortly before de Gaulle’s departure for Normandy and apparently came was a surprise to the provisional authorities in London. It was seen by The Times on 14 June as “yet another example of the need for an agreed set of principles in approaching the task of civil administration.” Nevertheless, it sponsored in the name of French patriotism a series of gestures as the broad statement was given local interpretation.

Soon after the statement, French liaison officers took the view that they would not accept the currency, a view endorsed by Kœnig. In an attempt to stop problems spreading, SHAEF considered their removal, but it was quickly decided that no “precipitous action” would be taken. Triboulet’s gesture was rather more profound when shortly after being appointed sub-prefect he took the decision to segregate the currency into a separate account. Soon Triboulet gave orders to the banks in Bayeux to keep new notes and not re-issue them to public. This came as something of a surprise to Civil Affairs as Coulet had agreed
in meetings with 21st Army Group not to interfere with the new currency. Yet, it was not considered too problematic as Frenchmen were still accepting the currency and using it to pay their taxes. The important requirement of maintaining anti-inflationary cash flow was still in place.224 Nevertheless, appeals were made. Triboulet speaking after the war ventured the British reaction was one of friendly protest, whilst the American approach was stormy. The Americans accused Triboulet of using Vichy francs, he replied that he recognised only French francs not Allied ones.225 More significant however, was refusal on 27 June of taxmen to accept the supplemental notes on the understanding that they about be ordered to reject the currency. Acting fast Civil Affairs intervened and managed to postpone the new tax policy in exchange for meeting all requests for supplemental to metropolitan francs exchanges until 30 June. It was hoped that a meeting in London on this date might resolve the issue.226

On 29 June, Grasset met Kœnig in London to state that after 30 June there would be no further exchanges and that he must try to forestall the tax issue.227 As an incentive, it was pointed out that given the cash flow requirement for small denominations there was no option but to introduce spearhead currency and this would necessarily see the exchange rate switch in the Allies favour. In the American sector, rates were likely to move from 50 to 200 francs to the dollar.228 Unsurprisingly, Kœnig instructed Coulet at the beginning of July to accept the currency (albeit kept in separate accounts) until the three governments could reach an agreement.229 An agreement on mutual aid and currency was successfully reached a few days later.230 The Allies decided on 17 July 1944, that no further injections of supplemental notes were required and as a symbol of new found financial co-operation the provisional authorities soon took on responsibility for currency. Interestingly, whilst larger notes were quickly removed denominations up to and including the 10-franc note were kept in circulation for the rest of the year.231

The crisis subsided as quickly as it had started. A British Second Army report for 9 July indicated the supplemental francs circulated freely.232 Reports from August 1944 indicated that the currency was still accepted by shopkeepers, if quickly deposited in the bank.233 Nevertheless, sensitive to possible French reactions caution was exercised over all financial matters. This included dealing with the financial short cuts used by troops to pay for locally purchased items. Despite rules prohibiting their use, soldiers were using NAAFI tokens (one franc and fifty cent) and as a result, these entered general circulation. Further orders were given to troops to prevent the possibility of an “awkward” French reaction.234

Thus, whether the currency crisis in Normandy was deliberately planned or the unforeseen consequence of a broad statement will no doubt remain part of French historical conjecture. So too will the true purpose of the provisional government’s rejectionist policy (if it existed); protection of sovereignty, easy popularism or a path to the greater financial and sovereignty benefits of a mutual aid agreement. The personal dislike of the currency by de Gaulle was recognised by many in positions of authority in Normandy. Whilst, the direction
of Triboulet was enigmatic (Was he a stalking horse or naively over enthusiastic?), Coulet and despite communications problems, took his lead from senior Gaullists. Indeed, in mid-August, after noting that soldiers were attempting to exchange supplemental francs for metropolitan francs Coulet asked if this might stop, because he did not want an incident and he had to follow his government’s policy. However, in June it was also recognised by individuals like Coulet, that a ready supply of small denominational notes was needed to prevent inflation. Thus, in balancing political direction with pragmatic needs Coulet had to tread a careful path. Grasset, speaking after the war, took the view that throughout the campaign Coulet was in a very difficult position in balancing such agendas and did wonderfully.

Yet, for Civil Affairs despite some initial emotion, they could sit tight and let the politics be persuaded by the facts in the knowledge that the supplemental currency was likely to be a temporary expediency pending the liberation of larger banks and even if this proved wrong, there was always the option of spearhead currency. That they could do so reflected a fingertip feel for the basic (not political) needs of France that was derived from good detachment and staff work, as well as the good judgment and diplomatic credentials of their senior officers (like Grasset) in dealing with the French authorities.

**French Female Snipers**

The nature of the French reaction to their liberators varied both around Normandy and during the course of the battle. Such factors as the scale of Allied destruction, duration of suffering, duration of exposure to the Allies, fears of German return as the campaign slowed down, numbness following exposure to combat and comparisons with poor German behaviour all helped distort French reactions to the landings. One consistent theme throughout the campaign was concern at the scale of destruction, although this was often mitigated by acceptance of it being the price of liberty. In Bayeux shortly after D-Day, *The Times* reported “flowers, cheers and tears.” French officers who landed on D-Day (combat troops not French liaison officers) reported that they were amazed both to see so many flags and celebrations in the area of the landing beaches. In Bayeux, they saw “an immense crowd, the whole town, storming forward, applauding their liberators” and people even came into the town from the villages to celebrate. The spirit of humanity also showed through and there are accounts of French civilians assisting Allied wounded on the landing beaches. At Courseulles-sur-Mer on 2 July, the French happily played football against the Allies. The “liberated” beat the “Liberators” by 4-2 and ticket (five francs) money went to the *sinistres*. At a return match between the British and French on 14 July, the British won by 6-2. Elsewhere, opportunities were afforded to make money in providing Allied soldiers with services like washing in exchange for soap and cigarettes. Sometimes this extended into sharing meals and time together.

In other cases, the French were less demonstrative. Sydney Jary was unimpressed by the few French he encountered during Operation BLUECOAT in
early August 1944: “No one looked up, silence prevailed. I was totally ignored.” However, later during movement from Falaise to Vernon his impressions were rather different: “I was clasped and kissed by French villagers – both men and women. Their countryside, unlike the Normandy bocage, had not been fought over.” At the liberation of Cherbourg, the reception for the Allies was welcoming and it seemed that only contractors, who had grown wealthy on the occupation, were upset. There was some French annoyance at the number of citizens killed in road accidents or favourable treatment of enemy prisoners. However, the reaction was often that of merely upset and there was no tendency towards being destructive or willing to carry out violence against the Allies. Whilst, there were a few examples of espionage carried out on behalf of the Germans, for most Normans the caution mentioned previously tended to prevail and was reported by Civil Affairs. Thus, it was odd, even at the start of the battle that reports appeared in British newspapers of the menace of French female snipers.

On Sunday 18 June 1944, a report written by an accredited War Correspondent, Rex North, appeared in The Sunday Pictorial newspaper. The article alleged that six out of ten Frenchmen in Normandy distrusted and detested the British, preferring instead their peaceful and prosperous lives enjoyed under German occupation. It contended that there were cases of the French openly insulting British troops. Furthermore, that French civilian snipers were now a serious nuisance behind the Allied lines. The Foreign Office in reporting on the matter considered the article to have a “dangerous effect... among its readers.” They were also of the view that the report was at odds with other War Correspondent reports and military operational reports (based on those supplied by Civil Affairs) from Normandy.

The Sunday Pictorial was judged by the Foreign Office to be one that circulated “amongst those classes who are anti-French” and the article was likely to strengthen their views. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office was amazed at North writing an article with the deliberate intention of seeing dissension between the British people and their French ally. Attempts were made to prevent it from doing further harm. The Foreign Office’s news department was asked if they could do anything to get the article corrected, but they indicated that they had no influence over The Sunday Pictorial correspondent as he was accredited. It was in any case a matter for SHAEF. Consequently, Sir Charles Peake wrote to Major General Walter Bedell Smith (Chief of Staff to Eisenhower) at SHAEF asking him to complain to the Minister of Information about North and asking for a correction to be made. In the meantime, Sir Herbert Williams MP, who had expressed an interest in the matter, was asked not to raise the question in the House of Commons.

A meeting at SHAEF was convened on 21 June. It was presided over by Bedell Smith and attendance included several senior staff officers from SHAEF and representatives from both the Ministry of Information and American Office of War Information. To provide context an overview of the patterns of reporting since D-Day was given. It revealed that in the period from D-Day to 13 June all British press reported the French mood as being either enthusiastically pro-[254]
Allies or having a not unfriendly attitude. After 13 June, reports appeared that began to express either French antipathy or hostility towards the Allies. American press reports by contrast and reflecting the approach of the American media at the time to follow government direction had focused on the invasion rather than the reaction. Nevertheless, there were in reports from both sides of the Atlantic descriptions of the levels of prosperity and even luxury encountered in Normandy.250

The 13 June was assessed to be the critical juncture and coincided with Montgomery’s statement to the press. It was at this event that it was thought female snipers were first mentioned, certainly five articles about snipers followed shortly afterwards.251 It may have been that Montgomery was inspired to mention such matters after mentioning them to Churchill when he had paid a visit to the bridgehead the previous day. Churchill’s impression of Normandy had been somewhat skewed by his (and Brooke’s) observations that most Frenchmen appeared unhappy and resented the huge Allied presence. Churchill’s tour had somehow managed to avoid the worst devastation and thus he also had a view that the region was abundant with food and only lightly damaged. The reports of snipers thus fitted into with Churchill’s concerns that the undercurrent of French opinion was unhelpful to the Allied cause. A view he expressed to Eden on his return. However, stories of French snipers a constant theme and may have in reality been an unfortunate conclusion drawn from blend of German sniper activity and the number of French women found to be the girlfriends of the occupiers.252

Following Montgomery’s press statement, came a subsequent series of articles where the general tenor doubted popular French support of the Allies. Later, stories suggesting apathy or hostility were printed (first story on 14 June). In explaining the refocusing of articles onto civilian and Civil Affairs issues, it was suggested that the cause was a combination of both a lull in the fighting and the lack of political proficiency amongst many correspondents (most were not political or diplomatic correspondents) in writing about matters accurately. The articles were not numerous, rarely greater than two or three across 12 British newspapers and always outweighed by other positive stories. However, they were written to “excite British apprehension.” The Sunday Pictorial was merely the most daring.253

The fundamental question for the meeting was how to proceed. Concerns were raised at possible confusion caused by having both positive and negative stories reported, at the potential dangers of keeping the story in the public eye by issuing denials and at the use of French public opinion surveys that might crush stories of sniping but may reveal other areas of discontentment (although these could be addressed by the use of psychological warfare). Some were keen for countermeasures to be taken, as they would stop the further spread of cynicism amongst troops who had already observed much Norman prosperity. Others thought that when more of France was uncovered, the prosperity of Normandy would be put into context. In the end, the immediate actions taken were to encourage more stories of the resistance, to gain press restraint in the handling of civilian and political issues, to investigate the stories of snipers and make a
Investigation by Field Security with the assistance of Civil Affairs indicated that most of the reports of female snipers could not be confirmed. Only one or two cases at most were likely. By the end of July, in a report to the British ambassador in Algiers, it was confirmed that the reports of French female snipers and other reports of the hostility of the younger generation was proven, after Allied investigation, unfounded. Indeed, in overall terms there were but a few cases of friction. However, what was also clear to the Foreign Office was that SHAEF was ill equipped to deal with the press and in particular, the British press:

The press department of this Headquarters is badly in need of skilled assistance in their dealings with the press, particularly on political questions.

Thus, it was suggested that Brendan Bracken, Minister of Information, sent a suitable individual to the headquarters to give advice on handling the press.

**Monitoring French Opinion**

Whilst the sniper story was an exaggeration of events, there was nevertheless much caution and constant interest in French opinion of the Allies. Every Civil Affairs detachment when sending in a report about a village or an area was asked to describe local views of the Allies. Furthermore, these reports also had to indicate whether attitudes were likely to deteriorate or improve in the future (see Chapter 6 and for an example of a typical survey form used in the battle of Normandy see Illustration F1.1: Civil Affairs Field Report Form, CA1 at Appendix F).

Various other sources were monitored by other intelligence agencies for the local mood. One such source was analysis of civilian mail. Two intelligence reports provided analysis of 1,197 items for the period from just before the landings to mid-July, although most of the mail related to the period of German occupation, providing a picture of life in Normandy prior to the landings. Some of the mail was noted for its outspokenness indicating that censorship was not expected either during or after the German occupation. Consequently, there were frank portrayals of events. Prior to the landings, many letters made unfavourable comment about Allied air raids, some strongly so and nearly all letters referred to them. However, the Germans were also unpopular for damaging crops in fortifying the coast and by conscripting local labour for defence building work at a time when the farmers needed labour. Seemingly, most billeted Germans (there were an estimated 70,000 Axis troops in Calvados in June 1944) were poor company and were unable to make themselves popular. There was specific upset at the lack of compensation for destroyed crops, late payment of wages, conscription for labour in Germany and the requisition of livestock, butter, potatoes and alcohol. However, there were very few pre-invasion political comments. Yet, it was possible for all belligerents to
be criticised, “one side kills us, the other makes us die of hunger” and “France is always the buffer.”

Most post-invasion letters expressed satisfaction at being liberated and some were exuberant. There were comments about high prices and some specific shortages (bread, salt, grain for poultry), but this was balanced by confidence that Normandy had a decent food supply. There were various reports, all contradictory, of numbers of casualties and deaths across Normandy. Yet, very few letters were critical of the Allies. Indeed, sometimes the views were complimentary, even of the work of Civil Affairs, as was the case in Cherbourg:

We have had no water, gas or electricity for ten days, but we are going to have lighting again tomorrow and perhaps the American technicians can do something about the water and I can assure you that they are not like the others, they don’t expect us to clean their shoes for them.

Furthermore, when these views were contrasted with those of reported conditions in still German occupied areas it was clear that many liberated Frenchmen were able to put their difficulties into context.

In still occupied areas, there were reports of many misdeeds by the German troops (especially by the SS), including: looting, pillaging, confiscation, threats of violence, lack of compensation, arson, killing those who refuse to give the occupiers what they wanted, seizing goods (including collecting food and goods from damaged and uninhabited houses) and running over people too slow to get out of the way. There were reports of how violence in towns was driving civilians into the country and how they took refuge in rocks, limekilns, vast caves, granaries, stables, pigsties, wine presses and tents. Some had no shelter at all. German evacuation schemes were also reported, giving Civil Affairs an idea of patterns of movement. The letters revealed that evacuees from Caen were encouraged to go in the direction of Trun. The chaotic nature of evacuation order was noted. Evacuations often came at short notice (20 minutes warning) and with the strict instructions to leave all property behind. Typically, this was then looted by remaining Germans and Frenchmen. However, from the descriptions in the letters, evacuees when on the move were well organised and well treated (if subject to Allied air attacks), being often provided with reception centres that had all the necessities if not rather more.

Indeed, such the letters were extremely useful for Civil Affairs in giving detail of the problems there were likely to face in soon to be liberated areas. So it was known from the letters that there were no reports of epidemics, if a few cases of diphtheria, typhoid and cholera. That food in the occupied areas appeared to be good in rural areas, but was poor in towns. That there was little bread anywhere. That Paris was suffering from poor food supply, high prices, a black market, public disorder in food queues, erratic public transport, and water and power supply problems. That to get basic items of food many Parisians had to search outside of the city. There was only one report of resistance activity, where a doctor was ordered to return home to treat many cases of diphtheria.
Good Franco-Allied relations were also confirmed by Charles Luizet, a senior representative of the provisional government (and future prefect of police in Paris) during a visit to Normandy in early July. He was regarded by the Foreign Office as an “excellent type” and thus his report was seen as reflecting a realistic impression of feelings in liberated Normandy. Luizet visited Caen, Bayeux, Cherbourg and many villages in between. He had nothing but praise for the British, finding good relations between the local Normans and British troops everywhere he went. Relations between the Allies and the French provisional authorities in the British sector were good, even if there was a certain amount of friction in the American sector. Nevertheless, matters were improving and the senior Civil Affairs officer in Cherbourg was regarded as excellent. In overall terms, French morale was best in those areas that had suffered the most. In Caen and Valognes there was some regret at the unnecessary Allied bombardment that followed the German military evacuation. Whilst, there was no hostile feeling and the populations recognised that faulty intelligence was to blame, Luizet was of the view that resentment might grow if such bombing practices were allowed to continue.265 The French public disappointment both in Normandy and amongst exile populations at the scale of destruction continued to be monitored by Allied foreign and war departments.266

Nevertheless, despite many good reports the Allies did not sit back as they were aware how anecdotes like snipers could multiply to cause local political difficulties. They were aware that most soldiers had experienced a range of French attitudes. Typical was British Army nurse, Audrey Hayward, who both enjoyed French company, but who was also shocked in late June when spat at from a balcony in Bayeux by a French countrywoman (wearing a peasants’ black). Nearby troops, suggested that this was typical for country people who now resented the devastating destruction of the liberation having been treated well by the Germans. Whilst, after consideration Hayward understood and had great empathy for the woman, many others would continue to believe the French were ungrateful thereby creating a very muddy picture of the nature of Franco-Allied relations.267 Civil Affairs recognised that maintaining an independent sense of the direction of such relations was fundamental to heading off either any potential real problem or any ill-judged press report. Intelligence was thus a vital component of good Civil Affairs. So too were the maintenance of good relations with the local population, the local authorities and to an extent the press. Improving the reputation of the Allies amongst the French was also helpful in generating good and useful relations. Here the Civil Affairs would both work with Psychological Warfare and Propaganda to convey positive messages and point out areas where military behaviour or practice might be improved to facilitate respect (many of these are explored in Chapter 7).268

PREPARING FOR FRANCE

In producing materials that gave a reliable indication of expected conditions in France, many more sources were used than had been prior to the invasion of Sicily. Indeed, as early as autumn 1942, organisations like SOE (through the
Ministry of Economic Warfare) began to compile handbooks with information that was of use to Civil Affairs.\textsuperscript{269} Elsewhere, exile groups helped with estimates of relief provision, often using the Relief Department as an intermediary, even if the political and security problems in working with the “fighting French” were only partly overcome by using this method.\textsuperscript{270} There were also several geographical studies of the North West Europe area conducted by government organisations.\textsuperscript{271} These included the Naval Intelligence Division handbooks and the Inter-Service Topographical Department’s Inter-Service Information Service (ISIS) reports. The latter focused on technical details of infrastructure such as roads, beaches, railways, whilst the former provided an overview of the main aspects of a country’s economy, administration, population, history and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{272} Many of these were assembled by the Schools of Geography at Oxford and Cambridge Universities.\textsuperscript{273} Much of this information was subsequently distilled into operational documents such as the SHAEF Field Handbook of Civil Affairs, France and 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group Technical Instructions.\textsuperscript{274} As a complement, the Foreign Office produced similar Zone Handbooks, which if anything were more detailed; the one on France included the address of the brothel in Bayeux (3 Rue de la Cavee).\textsuperscript{275}

To facilitate better knowledge of operational areas, a Civil Affairs reference library was established in Kensington (38 Hyde Park and Hotel Victoria) in September 1943. On its shelves were copies of Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department Basic and Zone handbooks, CASC lecture précis, Foreign Office Research Department publications, Civil Affairs reports, previous and historical proclamations and decrees, various manuals for Allied nations and ISIS reports.\textsuperscript{276} From these sources, a picture of expected conditions and likely problems could be both forecast and planned. It also provided a context for conditions and developments following the landings.

**Population**

In the period covered, British involvement was most closely associated with Calvados and Orne, whose populations in 1936 were 404,901 (in 763 communes) and 269,331 (in 573 communes) respectively.\textsuperscript{277} The density of populations in the two departments was 71.1 and 43.8 persons per square kilometre respectively, which compared to the national average of 76.1.\textsuperscript{278} The population of western Normandy was the most dispersed, typically living in small hamlets or single farms rather than grouped into villages.\textsuperscript{279} Most French communes in 1936 had less than 1,500 inhabitants and two thirds of these had less than 500. Only 186 communes across France had a population of more than 20,000.\textsuperscript{280} In terms of the major towns of Normandy in 1936, Cherbourg had a population of 39,000, Caen 61,000, Lisieux 16,000, St-Lô 12,000 and Rouen 122,832.\textsuperscript{281} In Calvados, the greatest density of population was in a 20km radius to the north, west and south of the Caen. Here there was an average density of 60-200 persons per km, whilst within the city, it was over 200 (both areas would be subjected to heavy bombing and fierce fighting).\textsuperscript{282} Only twenty to thirty percent of the population in Normandy in 1931 lived in urban areas.\textsuperscript{284} In Calvados, twenty percent of people in 1926 were from outside their native
department.\textsuperscript{285} As always, figures varied and some wartime intelligence reports indicated that the pre-war population of the arrondissement of Caen was 177,000, which included an estimated 54,000 in the city itself. The pre-war population of the arrondissement of Bayeux was judged 54,000 strong, with 7,000 living in the town. Of the 231,000 people in the combined pre-war population of the two arrondissements, it was considered that roughly 200,000 remained.\textsuperscript{286}

**Transport**

French motor transport was at very low levels.\textsuperscript{287} It was estimated that by September 1941 there were only 300,000 motor vehicles in operation, of these 240,000 were goods vehicles and buses. By 1944, it was thought that the figure had fallen to 100,000 (about four percent of pre-war figures) and of these most were over five years old.\textsuperscript{288} Railway figures from 1939 showed that France had 43,946 km of line, 18,434 steam locomotives, 751 electric locomotives, 518,441 goods wagons and 30,781 carriages, but by 1944 were thought to be considerably reduced.\textsuperscript{289} Roads were one of France’s greatest assets, boasting one of the highest densities in Europe with two miles of roads for every square mile of territory.\textsuperscript{290} The German authorities had maintained 39,000 km of the most important roads, but much of the rest had been without repair since before the war. Bridges were, however, the weakest point of the French network with most, even on the major *Routes Nationales*, limited to 20-ton load-bearing capacity and on minor roads falling to as little as 4-ton.\textsuperscript{291}

**Agriculture**

The principle agricultures of the region were wheat, sugar beet (around Caen), apples, soft fruits (around Lisieux), horses, sheep (around Cherbourg) and cattle.\textsuperscript{292} As with the rest of France, there were a high percentage of women working in agriculture.\textsuperscript{293} Over fifty percent of farmers in the region owned their property in 1932, with an average holding in 1930 of 5-15 hectares.\textsuperscript{294} Seventy-two percent of farms across France had less than ten hectares.\textsuperscript{295} Traction across French farms still largely relied on horses.\textsuperscript{296} Less than ten percent of Normandy was covered in woodland in 1938.\textsuperscript{297} Wheat production in 1938 was 100-500 quintals per 100 hectares, but further up the coast in northern France, it was over 1000; sugar beet yields were similar.\textsuperscript{298} Cattle numbers were amongst the densest in France at over 50 animals per 100 hectares in 1938. Pigs were middle ranking at 25-50 per 100 hectares, as were horses at 50-100 per 1000 hectares.\textsuperscript{299} Yet, as the result of the upheavals of war, it was estimated that there had been a twenty percent fall in cultivation across France.\textsuperscript{300} The harvest of 1940 across the whole of France had been particularly poor with only 42,000,000 quintals yielded as opposed to a pre-war average of 75,000,000. Although some improvements had been made, there were still overall shortages. Similarly, cattle numbers were down twenty-five percent in April 1941. This was, in part, because of the fighting, but also the lack of feed.\textsuperscript{301}
Across France, meat was thought to be forty percent of what it had been prior to the War.\textsuperscript{302}

\textit{Industry}

The port of Caen had developed with iron ore extraction from 1900. It was 15km from the sea and the connecting canal needed suction dredgers to move 250,000 cubic metres of sand per annum. The port had 35 births of various sizes, 29 10-ton cranes and one 25-ton crane. Its total seaborne movement in 1937 was 2,176,800 tons, including 600,000 tons of coal imported from Britain and Germany. Some 12,000 passengers also moved through the port every year. Around Caen, two blast furnaces produced 360,000 tons of foundry iron per annum and 42 ovens produced in a similar period 500,000 tons of coke. A local steel plant was equipped with three 30-ton retorts together with associated furnaces and rolling mill. These employed 4,000 workers. Shipbuilding had been a local industry since 1919 and there were ten slips for the production of colliers and oil tankers up to 12,000 tons. However, submarine and motor torpedo boat construction had ceased in 1936.\textsuperscript{303} Labour conditions in France were difficult with wages fixed at 1940 prices. Wages in rural areas were estimated to be six to eight francs per hour compared to eight to eleven francs per hour in larger cities and up to twelve francs per hour in Paris. The working week for most was 60 hours.\textsuperscript{304}

\textit{Health and Utilities}

With fifty-five percent of the French population living in communes of less than 5,000 people in 1936, it was perhaps surprising that urban areas benefitted from more generous per capita provision of health care.\textsuperscript{305} However, the health of the French rural population was improved by a number of schemes including nutrition, electrification, sewerage and water infrastructure programmes. In 1919, only twenty percent of communes had electricity, but by 1937, this had risen to ninety-six percent. Sewerage was less advanced with only two percent of communes having a piped network and disposal farms. Control of utilities was largely centralised during the occupation.\textsuperscript{306} Power production, despite the input from a number of hydroelectric stations, had suffered from wartime coal rationing. Piped water systems had always been limited to towns of 10,000 or more in size of population.\textsuperscript{307} In terms of telecommunications, prior to the war, there was on average one telephone for every 29 persons and all communes were provided with a telephone service.\textsuperscript{308} It was anticipated that the Germans would destroy much of the communications infrastructure as they retreated.\textsuperscript{309}

Given differences in health care provision, it was hardly surprising that mortality rates in rural areas were generally higher than urban areas. Tuberculosis was a significant killer in Normandy, but others (with figures that were higher than national averages) in the Rouen area included diphtheria, influenza and pneumonia.\textsuperscript{310} Nevertheless, many of France’s 2,062 hospitals (with 260,969 beds) were still intact.\textsuperscript{311} The malaria risk was felt to be low. Malnutrition was thought only to be a widespread problem in the south of
France. However, the safety of water was put as low and always required testing prior to use. In rural areas, water was likely to be subject to contamination from human sewage and animal waste used as fertiliser. Furthermore, the number of doctors available was now very low, with 800 known to have been moved to Germany and, overall, shortages of medical staff were expected. The average weekly ration prior to the landings was: 2,100g of bread, 23g of meat, 27g of fat, 175g of sugar, 35g of coffee, 50g of cheese and one litre of wine.

**GERMAN ADMINISTRATION**

One of the direct effects of the occupation included the German administration. This was under the control of Military Governor (*Militar-Befehlshaber*) General von Stulpnagel. In the German-occupied North Zone operational and administrative central staffs were headquartered in Paris with subordinates at *Région (Feldkommandanturen)*, *Département (Kreiskommandanturen)* and *Arrondissement (Ortskommandanturen)* levels. The administration had introduced a number of laws and orders, including making civilian ownership of weapons illegal. Under French and German control, it was estimated that there were 300,000 prisoners in various detention camps and prisons around France. With the prison capacity being 90,000, this was thought to result in much overcrowding (the increase was explained by those arrested for political and black marketeering reasons).

**RESOURCES**

Despite the tenor of such forecasts, there may well be benefits to be had in Normandy such as food, possibly labour, even some industrial items and raw materials that might help both the campaign and war efforts. Yet, whilst there were some food benefits, in the way of fresh vegetables, cheese and bread, these had to be balanced against civilian needs and the desire to reduce imports of relief supplies (see Chapter 6). Even if many British depots (including those of Civil Affairs) did benefit from Norman labour (see Chapter 7), generally labour supply proved elusive. The (very) few thousand employed in the British sector of Normandy, in no way compared to the huge numbers employed across the rest of North West Europe by the end of the war. Indeed, the original estimate for civilian pioneer labour was 96,000 (25,000 of whom were to be skilled), but by June 1945, 177,292 civilians were employed.

By contrast, Belgium was to provide a huge number of benefits to the Allied cause. Speaking just after the end of the War in Europe the head of the SHAEF Mission to Belgium (the senior most representative of the Allies to the Belgium government) British Major General George W.E.J. Erskine stated that Belgium railways had in March 1945, transported 3,000,000 tons of goods of which sixty-five percent was for direct military purposes, that by the end of the war, 350,000 Belgians worked in some capacity for the Allies (including at the huge food and fuel depots around Liège) and that 675 ships had been repaired of which 178 were British. Moreover, the quality of items and speed of delivery in Belgium could often beat domestic supplies. In the winter of 1944, 350,000
“extended end connectors” were manufactured in order to improve the cross-country mobility of tanks in soft ground and snow. Not only were these supplied quicker than could be achieved by domestic sources, but unlike supply decisions made in London which had to be balanced against other operations in other theatres this local supply source responded to the needs of the local campaign.\textsuperscript{320} When it was decided at end of September 1944, that more white light was to be used by vehicles in rear areas (where the air threat was now minimal), vehicle lighting systems were modified to allow them to be brighter in rear areas and dimmer in forward areas. Consequently, 200,000 kits (made up of 16 items) were designed and supplied within four weeks; a project that in Britain would take the Ministry of Supply another eight.\textsuperscript{321}

Generally, Normandy could hardly compare to these figures, especially after the battle damaged caused to local industry and power supply.\textsuperscript{322} However, the amount of aggregate quarried in the British sector during the three months or so of the campaign does bear comparison. From the 49 quarries used, some 265,673 tons of crushed rock were extracted (generally by the Royal Engineers) for use by British forces.\textsuperscript{323} This formed an impressive component of the 2,000,000 quarried by 21st Army Group throughout the North West Europe area during the entire campaign.\textsuperscript{324} Crushed rock was useful for roads, approaches to river crossings, railway beds, depots and airfields. By the time of Operation VERITABLE (clearing the west bank of the River Rhine) in February 1945, Royal Engineer quarries were producing 230,000 tons per month with 21st Army Group using 10,000 tons per day.\textsuperscript{325} Civil Affairs role in this tended to be facilitation between the military units and local officials, identification of local specialists and helping to balance local and military needs.

**Refugee Estimates**

Being able to estimate refugee numbers was important in identifying what levels of stress were likely to be placed on local food stocks and in turn what likely amounts of relief were needed. Furthermore, given previous experiences in France and Italy, considerable effort was given over to estimating likely refugee numbers. To start the detailed planning process, a Refugee and Displaced Persons Section was established at COSSAC on 17 November 1943 under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence W. Cramer, with Captains Malcolm J. Proudfoot and D.H. Frost in support.\textsuperscript{326}

In January 1944, reports on refugee matters from the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements and the American Department of State were sent to Cramer by American Fred K. Hoehler, head of UNRRA refugee operations (previously at OFFRO) working out of the American Embassy in London. Hoehler, through a determined effort to make contact with other refugee organisations, did much both to help bridge the gaps between London and Washington and allow military staffs to plan more effectively. He soon introduced Allied planners to the assortment of refugee councils (including the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees), exile refugee and welfare groups (including some French groups that had been in Britain since 1940\textsuperscript{327}), and
British and international voluntary relief agencies whose knowledge was to be so useful. In return, it was inevitable that UNRRA became a key feature of Allied plans.328

It was quickly apparent from information supplied that refugees were going to be a significant problem upon the surrender of Germany, if not before and it was essential that senior officers were made aware of such realities. With estimates of 9-30,000,000 people on the move, together with the complications of the legal status of different groups and individuals, it was clear by January 1944 that a plan was required. This was eventually produced in the second half of May 1944. With further information supplied by the Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy in London (for France, the British Ministry of Economic Warfare did likewise for Germany) detailed plans followed, including, the development of an identity (Index Card) and registration (Registration Record) card system (20,000,000 cards ordered). To assist planning and add weight to the plans, further senior staff officers were added to branch, including American Major General Allen W. Gullion (with a long connection with American Civil Affairs329). Although, at first, the French preferred to opt for their own welfare network, a system of liaison officers (made up from the nations to be liberated) was also established. One liaison officer was to be responsible for 10,000 refugees. To keep Civil Affairs officers abreast of developments refugee branch staff at SHAEF spent much time briefing at the mobilisation centres on likely problems and practical solutions.330

Despite such work, there remained confusion between SHAEF and 21st Army Group on definitions of different categories of person. The SHAEF view of refugee and displaced persons were:

Refugee - civilians not outside of their national boundaries, who desire to return home, but require help to do so. They can be temporarily homeless as the result of military operations or at some distance from their homes for reasons related to the war.

Displaced Persons - civilians outside of their national boundaries by reason of the war, who wish, but are unable to return home or find homes without assistance.331

By contrast, refugees were regarded by 21st Army Group as those who were temporarily homeless and had not moved out of their locality, who could rely on local support and would not need prolonged care in camps. Displaced persons were at distances from their homes, but not necessarily outside their national boundaries and who desired, but were unable to return. They could not rely on local help, which might even be hostile and thus dependence on Allied assistance was likely to be prolonged. Also mentioned were evacuees, those removed from their homes by order of the occupying military authority. Furthermore, it was acknowledged by 21st Army Group the term refugee could be used as a general term for all three groups except in cases where distinction was necessary.332 By the end of June 1944, displaced persons in British 30 Corps referred to anyone outside their immediate neighbourhood and who would
require longer-term Civil Affairs support; refugees were anyone seeking temporary safety from the dangers of war.\textsuperscript{333}

SHAEP also recognised that there might be various sub-categories, who at any time might become refugees or displaced persons. These included evacuees by order of the enemy or of Allied commanders, war or political fugitives, political prisoners, forced or voluntary workers, Todt workers (uniformed regimented labour supporting the military) and similar para-military organisations not treated as forces under German command, deportees, intruded persons (those settled by the Germans in France for political reasons), extruded persons (those dispossessed by the enemy), civilian internees (not British or American) detained by enemy authority, ex-prisoners of war and stateless persons. The responsibility for most of these groups lay with Civil Affairs, although British and American internees and Allied POWs were to be handled by their national POW systems, enemy POWs were to be handled by the provost, and those foreign nationals demobilised from enemy military organisations handled by their Allied demobilising authority.\textsuperscript{334}

SHAEP estimates on 4 June 1944 were that there were at least 11,332,700 people in some way displaced (this included 2,397,300 refugees at large within states). The figures covered Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (but did not include refugees within Germany), Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway. For France it was estimated there were 650,000 displaced persons within France, 2,000,000 refugees and 2,400,000 Frenchmen displaced in other states.\textsuperscript{335} This was a significant rise over January 1944 SHAEP figures for internally displaced that put numbers at 2,000,000 refugees and 134,000 displaced within French borders.\textsuperscript{336} Here the displaced comprised of 70,000 Belgians, 5,000 Czechoslovakians, 37,000 Dutch, 17,000 Poles and 5,000 other foreign workers (including Todt workers).\textsuperscript{337}

Furthermore in demonstrating the difficulties in producing accurate estimates, Foreign Office figures from September 1943 put the numbers in France significantly higher suggesting that there were 10,000 Czechoslovakians and 70,000 Poles working for Todt alone, together with a further 45,000 Czechoslovakian and 155,000 Polish civilians of all types and of the order of 450,000 Spanish and 750,000 Italian labourers.\textsuperscript{338} Estimates by COSAC in November 1943, indicated there were 3,500,000 displaced persons in France, 450,000 in Belgium, 1,125,000 in Holland and 8,000,000 in Germany that included Todt workers, civil prisoners, evacuees, refugees, enemy armed forces, and POWs.\textsuperscript{339} How many of these had moved during the war was uncertain as figures for the pre-war foreign population of France (31 December 1936) indicated there were 876,823 Italians, 463,143 Poles (287,000 working population including 50,000 in agriculture and 96,000 in mining), 317,143 Spanish, 211,484 Belgians and 41,474 Czechoslovakians amongst an estimated 2,566,733 foreigners in the total population of 41,227,000 of France.\textsuperscript{340} Most estimates were recognised as guesswork. Information was meagre and that which was available from inside occupied Europe was exaggerated in order to fool the Germans into believing they had more labourers than in reality they did.

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Furthermore, there were rarely any details of age, sex, health or mortality rates.\textsuperscript{341} Todt worker numbers were typical of the large and vague figures being used. Pre-D-Day SHAEF figures put the numbers of Frenchmen working for Todt at 500,000 within France, along with 170,000 workers of other nationalities.\textsuperscript{342} However, even Allied sources during the Normandy campaign were often just as vague. At meeting between French and Allied officials in mid-August 1944, it was only “heard” that 100,000 Todt workers were in Brittany.\textsuperscript{343} Only after events could some clarity be achieved. A SHAEF report from August 1944 indicated that in March 1944 there were actually 15,000 Todt workers (2,168 Germans, 12,822 others) in the Cherbourg area (including Alderney and most areas of Normandy west of the River Orne). Projects included work on the Atlantic Wall, V-weapons positions, camouflaging, gravel extraction and railway and road repairs.\textsuperscript{344} If national figures were problematic, regional ones were not without their problems. Intelligence suggested that evacuations in occupied Normandy included the almost entire evacuation: of Arromanches-les-Bains in October 1943, of villages along the Canal de l’Orne in July 1941, of Ouistreham in the area of canal in June 1943 and of sea front houses and villas in Villers-sur-Mer during May 1944. In May 1944, it was known that the prefect of the department made an appeal for all children to be evacuated from seaward areas all along the Norman coast from Granville to Ouistreham. In Caen 1,600 non-essential persons were evacuated after raids in 1943 and it was estimated that by June 1944 some 11,600 to 16,600 had been displaced from the urban areas of Caen, Cabourg, Bayeux and Deauville. To where was uncertain, although the estimated 250,000 from Rouen, Dieppe and Fécamp were known to have gone to Chartres and Dreux.\textsuperscript{345} Prior to D-Day, it was estimated that 250,000 people would be rendered homeless in the period between the landings and D+90, with 35,000 of them being encountered up to the fall of Caen.\textsuperscript{346} Allied intelligence estimates, suggested that the pre-war combined population of Bayeux and Caen arrondissement was 231,000 (177,000 in Caen arrondissement including 54,000 in Caen city; 54,000 in Bayeux arrondissement including 7,000 in Bayeux town), but the war had reduced this to around 200,000.\textsuperscript{347} It was known that from May 1943 there had been “general” evacuation from the coastal areas of Calvados, but not from areas inland of these. It was felt that there would be a partial German evacuation of Caen and Bayeux, but how great this would be would depend on the surprise of the assault. It was judged that most in Caen would head towards Bayeux.\textsuperscript{348} An estimate was made of the likely flows of refugees up to D-Day based upon an accelerated (encouraged by Allied radio appeals) but voluntary evacuation. Various complications were contemplated including the Germans calling a “State of Siege” (known to be contemplated), which could reduce refugee flow and a compulsory evacuation that might increase it.\textsuperscript{349} It was estimated that by D+7 of the 74,250 people, within in British 1 and 30 Corps areas, 49,500 were likely to be sheltering near their homes, 18,000 were likely to be remaining in
towns and villages and 6,750 originally sheltering outside the bridgehead area were likely to have returned. These could be subdivided into four types of need: the sick and wounded, employable persons seeking relief, unemployable persons seeking relief, persons not seeking relief. The total number seeking relief by D+7 was estimated at 30,674 (equally divided in employment terms) and casualties at 22,499 (with 2,357 being added daily). It was recognised that this was the “blackest picture” and that in reality, demands for Allied relief supplies were likely to be reduced by employing local resources. Indeed, it was considered that many would be able to live off the charity of farmers. The more urgent problem was thought to be medical resources. Reports a few days later noted rumours that a partial evacuation of Caen and Bayeux was intended with evacuees from Calvados being sent to Orne. Estimates of the population likely to be uncovered on D-Day (for the two British Corps) were now estimated to be 40,000, with the population of Bayeux put at 5,000.

In the planning for the American sector and using experience from Italy, it was estimated that Corps were likely to handle 500 refugees (or ten percent of any city over 5,000) per day. Together with the British, there was a belief that the coastal area had been evacuated, but in case civilians were forced into the beachhead area, a contingency was generated to evacuate by landing craft 2,000 refugees to Britain per day. However, it was specified in British 30 Corps orders that this was only to occur if the situation warranted it and only if there were landing craft available. Furthermore, only designated craft were to be used. The contingency involved the creation of camps like the one at Sompting, but aside from a single peasant was one never invoked for fit refugees although in the early stages some wounded civilians were evacuated to a hospital at Northwood.

In fact, in the first few weeks of operations, the number of refugees and displaced persons encountered were few. However, there were still significant problems for the Allies (see Chapter 7). By October 1944, there were 50,000 displaced persons in liberated France (mostly Poles and a “few thousand” Soviets). The numbers increased substantially during the winter and by January 1945, 247,000 were being fed and housed by Civil Affairs in around 100 assembly centres across liberated western Europe. This created increasingly more significant problems for Civil Affairs. The lessons learnt in Normandy would be of value in dealing with these problems.

CONCLUSION

Stories of French female snipers aside, political conditions in Normandy were acceptable. Most Normans were happy enough with the Gaullists. The Gaullists did not attempt to queer their pitch by seeking radical or inflammatory change. After the initial issues of Rochat and currency, the Gaullist were happy to work with the Allies (more so in the British sector it would seem) and proved very supportive in at least their intentions. The vast majority of the French welcomed the liberation, some demonstrably so, others rather more quietly. The Allies were welcomed, although some of their personal practices (and despite a useful
pocket book) were not always welcome (see Chapter 7). Virtually everyone wanted rid of the Germans. There were some espionage and collaboration problems, and there were always issues with the self-interests of individuals (crime, prostitution and war profiteering), however these were either individuals or small and unrepresentative groups. The French were happy to be liberated, even if they did not like aspects of it.

Preparing for and dealing with the French and France was the essential work of Civil Affairs. Lessons from Italy indicated that thorough preparation was the best policy. Luckily, there was much more information to hand for Normandy than there ever was for Italy. However, the process of turning information into practical policy was not an exact science as the process of estimating numbers of refugees testified. Given such gaps and no doubt encouraged by the memories of 1940, there was a tendency in some cases to paint “blackest” pictures. Yet, in others, such as security assessments, there was a preference to go simply on what was known in terms of “black” and “white” list types. Nevertheless, whatever approach was used the overall effect was to encourage Civil Affairs officers to engage with the task at hand and to gain an increasingly thorough grasp of detail. Although, in some cases inexperience and personal temperament were to cause modest problems, the general trend was rather more systematic. Thus, when it came to the challenges thrown the way of Civil Affairs, there was a better understanding of context, of fact, of detail that allowed the provision of what was actually needed, not what was politically desired to win through. Many Civil Affairs officers were now also far more astute in dealing with matters diplomatically and recognising that on most occasions they time to allow a sensible decision develop. However, for the battle of Normandy, what time would also tell was whether the French had the practical capacity to deal with the problems of France and whether Civil Affairs could handle the practical battlefield civilian problems.
Chapter 5

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CHAPTER 6

SUPPORTING MILITARY OPERATIONS IN NORMANDY

PART I

SERVING MILITARY NEEDS

The political excitement that marked the beginning of the battle of Normandy has distracted many historians from the work of Civil Affairs. If any comment has been ventured it has tended to be dismissive, indicating that the French authorities were able to assume the majority of civil administrative work within days of the landings.¹ That the region remained calm has been attributed to a mix of Norman reserve and the conciliatory practices of the Gaullist authorities.² Other historians have pointed to the common purpose of the Vichy and Gaullist authorities in preventing anarchy.³ Either way the picture has been one of the French running France, the Allies merely providing tokens of a few cigarettes and some food.⁴ Overall, as mentioned in the previous chapter, there was little civil upset in Normandy and the Gaullist administration was in large part responsible for the calm that pervaded. Furthermore, a France run by Frenchmen was positively desired by the Allies. Nevertheless, this does not negate the role of Civil Affairs or reduce it to one simply of porters of relief supplies. Civil Affairs still had military interests to serve either generally in rear areas in preventing “disorganisation, disease and unrest” or more specifically in forward areas in preventing “disorder or obstruction” that might directly interfere with military operations.⁵ Keeping a close watch on the details of event as well as having the wherewithal to deal with them efficiently, effectively and sympathetically was the mainstay of Civil Affairs work.

In choosing what to watch, 21st Army Group developed a slightly narrower list of functional areas from the broad range examined at DCA (see Chapter 4) and for which a range of technical instructions were issued in time for D-Day: legal, fiscal, public safety, refugees and displaced persons, relief, allocation and control of relief supplies, rationing, accounting for relief supplies (British Zone), requirements and stock returns, production and processing, public health, economics, road transport, communications, engineer services, labour and posts, telegraphs and telephones (PTT).⁶ An additional area of interest was that of monuments, fine arts and archives, whose separately recruited officers were placed into Civil Affairs as a matter of administrative convenience. Nevertheless, during operations, all areas were to be regularly monitored and reports compiled. If problems were identified then solutions would be developed. In the
more technical areas, like PTT or monuments then both the reports and solutions were compiled using the expertise available at either formation headquarters or pooled with the Civil Affairs Groups. Unsurprisingly, at 21st Army Group headquarters there was a specialist to cover each of the technical areas (executive, displaced persons, administrative, legal, financial, public safety, public health, supply/economics and technical sections), whilst at lower formations there were very many fewer (Army: executive, administrative, financial and technical; Corps: executive and administrative).7

REPORTING

Reporting was an important part of Civil Affairs work as it gave senior Civil Affairs officers at Army and Corps levels and the DCCAO at 21st Army Group the information they required to make decisions, to balance resources and to strengthen their arguments in the face of a quartermaster’s reluctance. Indeed, the Military Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field stated:

Information is the key to good Civil Affairs work. A Civil Affairs officer must maintain constant contact with the people of his district of all ranks and conditions. He must not be office-bound, but must travel constantly and see for himself what is going on. Information is useless if not acted upon. A Civil Affairs officer must not only himself use the information he gains but must ensure that it is transmitted to those above him, on his level and below him to whom it may be valuable. All Civil Affairs officers should render regular reports to their superiors.8

In Normandy, every detachment was to compile reports and was to do so often. A report was to be compiled on every town, village and hamlet visited. To simplify and regulate the process of reporting, a one page Civil Affairs Field Report Form, CA1, was produced in advance of D-Day (For a copy of the form see Illustration F1.1: Civil Affairs Field Report Form, CA1 at Appendix F). The form requested basic information on size of population, numbers of refugees and displaced persons and numbers on relief. It also had sections that sought assessment of both legal and black markets, authorised and actual ration scale, food stocks, surpluses that might be used elsewhere, numbers of medical personnel, public health problems (specifically epidemics), the state of local services (water, gas, electricity, etc.), local administration (officials, civil defence, fire, PTT, etc.), supplies (clothes, fuel, soap, medical, lumber, etc.) and political stability (both generally and attitudes towards the Allies). There was also space for overall comments. Returns were to be made on a daily basis (tactical situation permitting).9

Formation staffs had the task of producing weekly or fortnightly reports that comprised of both an overview and reports on technical areas. Together, these gave analysis of trends and identification of areas that would need addressing.10 Consequently, formation staffs often requested specialist reports on a specific area of interest, such as agriculture or refugees.11 Indeed, in order to serve better the regular requests for such information, the CA1 form was subject to amendment and improvement. British 30 Corps were reported to have
instituted such changes. In many cases, additional information and separate 'overview' reports were generated by detachments, seemingly at their own initiative. Furthermore, Public Safety Officers submitted separate reports assessing the local police and public safety. Reports and returns were also to be compiled for non-Civil Affairs organisations such as Field Security, which case “Int. Sum., Form No. 1” would be used. However, it was noted the *Military Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field* that it was not the “business” of Civil Affairs to become a military intelligence gathering organisation.

An example of the desire to see information fed up the chain of command was shown in the orders issued for British 1 Corps (cancelled) Operation ABERLOUR in late June 1944. Here initial reports were to be sent six hours after arrival at a location and full report within 48 hours. Detachments were also asked to send a liaison officer to report to the SCAO at Corps at 1100hrs and 1800hrs daily. He was to be prepared to give a verbal brief on the condition of population uncovered, the refugee situation (and possible developments), the availability of food, the effectiveness of local administration, the state of law and order, the state of morale and the attitude of the population towards the Allies.

Tasks given to No 208 Civil Affairs Detachment in orders of late June 1944 reflected a similar need to report: "To establish contact with Prefet... To Recce and report on Departmental Adm... To call up specialists as required.”

Fundamental to the processes of gathering of information and its dissemination to staffs was transport. This typically came in the form of a pair of detachment motorcycles. Theoretically, these allowed Civil Affairs officers to get about an area more easily than larger vehicles, but in practice, it was found that many Civil Affairs officers had either never ridden a motorcycle or because of their age found it difficult to do so. Indeed, the uncomfortable and tiring nature of frequent motorcycle journeys on crowded roads soon made it difficult to sustain work rates. Many units also considered it useful to have some relief supplies with them when visiting an area to meet any pressing demand. Jeeps with trailers were the obvious solution, but only a few were made available.

Information gathering also involved working with other units. Close liaison with Field Security (Counter-Intelligence in American areas), Military Police units and Town Majors (responsible for requisitioning and administering billets) helped to identify potential civilian problem areas. Close liaison would also help to identify possible solutions. Indeed the *Military Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field* regarded liaison with all staffs and units in his area as an essential component of a Civil Affairs officers' work.

In preparation for Normandy, further close liaison with Royal Signals, Army Postal Services, Royal Engineers, RAMC, REME, RAOC, Army Fire Service, “Q,” Q(Movements) and Director(Labour) was deemed essential. However, such relations did not always work out favourably at all levels. Army Group Civil Affairs staff had persistently trying relations with "Q." Nevertheless, for lower formations there were often 'ways and means' to get things done. The Civil Affairs supply officer at British 30 Corps headquarters indicated that he never had a problem getting transport or others services he needed from other branches. The key he found was a good supply of alcohol, after which they "could not do enough."
WATCHING BRIEF

There was never any scientific measure by Civil Affairs of French capacity to deal with their civil administrative problems. Rather it was a judgement based on the opinions of those serving within the organisation, albeit structured by the nature of report forms like CA1. That these opinions reflected the considered views of many (now uniform wearing) civilian specialists and Civil Affairs with experience of course helped in gaining an accurate overview of events and capabilities. Based on such judgements the DCCAO at 21st Army Group, Robbins, was by the end of September comfortable in taking the view that with nothing further “to be desired” the French regional administration had made sufficient progress towards establishing “more normal conditions of life... it has been possible to withdraw the majority of Dets in France for deployment elsewhere.” This left only a small handful of regional level detachments in Normandy to oversee Allied lines of communication. In the meantime, Civil Affairs had the task of monitoring and ensuring that the French capacity was “competent” enough to allow Allied operations to continue with the fight. Some aspects of this work were relatively straightforward, other less so.

COURTS AND WATER

Two examples that provided examples of the more straightforward Civil Affairs work were those involving French courts and local water supply. The establishment of French-run civil courts and military tribunals were of great interest to the Allies. Firstly, if the various courts were unable to function, then their role would necessarily be handled Civil Affairs-run military tribunals and this might easily present political difficulties with the Gaullists. With no courts to run, a labour intensive part of Civil Affairs work was removed. Secondly, the functioning of the courts and the quality and volume of their work would provide substantial evidence of both the competence and true agenda of the Gaullist authorities. Thirdly, as the courts dealt with cases such as espionage, theft, looting and black marketeering that were of a direct military interest there was much Civil Affairs interest in ensuring military needs were met. The Gaullists were keen to demonstrate that they had the competence to run such courts and brought over teams of exile legal officials from Britain to help kick-start the process in case local officials were in still occupied areas. Initially, Chevigné employing the facilities of the French État de Siège was put in charge of establishing military tribunals and the first tribunal was established at Bayeux on 16 June 1944, using a mix of local and exile officials. In July, for reasons of civil supremacy control of all courts was transferred to Coulet. Whilst, there in case of need the Bayeux tribunal was really to symbolise Gaullist capabilities and to ensure French sovereignty as it was not until 4 July in Cherbourg that the first cases were heard. Sentences were passed on 8 July, after two Frenchmen, M. Leroy and M. Tournu, confessed to espionage missions
for the Germans. Despite demands for the death sentence, they were given life under Art. 7 of the penal code.27

Despite, the ‘softer’ nature of these sentences, Civil Affairs had few concerns about the quality of French justice or legal procedure, leaving Civil Affairs to a very straightforward role as observer. In fact, the only and modest adjustments required from these first cases (and which could be facilitated by Civil Affairs) were to ensure that Allied press photographers were kept, as required under French law, out of the court until sentence was passed and that war correspondents observe a greater degree of decorum during the proceedings. Allied officials observed all cases and during the battle of Normandy, Allied interests were always served.28 Not only were appropriate sentences handed out (from five years to death), but they were also well publicised in the legal press (including Presse Cherbourgeoisie) and at Mairies. Few escaped justice, even a village mayor, caught pillaging an American military dump, was sentenced to 15 years. By 1 October 1944, there had been close to 200 executions for cases of treason across liberated France, some summary.29

As the campaign moved on the robust nature of sentencing inevitably declined. By the end of 1944, in many economic criminal cases the numbers of acquittals and mild sentences had increased much to the upset of Allied authorities. It was judged by Civil Affairs legal officials in the American sector that only a quarter of those charged received a sentence. Although, there were plenty of genuine case of theft (petrol in particular) that now went unpunished, it was also true that some of the cases brought before the courts by Civil Affairs officers were untenable. The zeal of some American Civil Affairs officers in tackling economic crime even extended to putting cases forward of local women who had laundered a few clothes in exchange for cognac.30 Despite these later problems, during the battle of Normandy the courts both served Allied interests and demonstrated that the Gaullist had the necessary competency.

In the case of water, the increased numbers of troops in Normandy had a significant impact in lowering local water tables. This matter had been anticipated in advance of the landings by Allied geologists.31 Nevertheless, in helping to ensure the local authorities in specific locations were able to provide water to their inhabitants Civil Affairs were able to argue for remedial action to be taken. In Bayeux, after local representations, mobile bathing units that recycled water were established.32 In Reviers, reducing the number of troops billeted in the village was found to be the easiest and best solution.33 Other problems were more difficult to solve and of these, it was possible to make a distinction between those that were merely inconvenient and those that had bearing that was more dramatic.

Although, the broad policy of the fighting forces was to avoided civilian assistance projects, such were the perceived public health benefits of ensuring clean water and effective sewage treatment that often help was given. The combined effects of the exhausted nature of much French infrastructure, the pitifully small stockpiles of spare components and the obvious results of battle damage that across France American Army engineers with Civil Affairs guidance
contributed by the end of the war 250,875 man-hours to simple recovery projects; compared to 17,530 in Belgium.\textsuperscript{34}

\textit{Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones}

A great inconvenience came in the form of restoring the services of posts, telegraphs and telephones (PTT). The lack of PTT was explained by war damage to lines and cables, short supply locally of specialist materials and Allied security restrictions on communication with enemy-held areas. In the case of telegraphs and telephones, what network that did exist was often requisitioned by the Allies for their own purposes.\textsuperscript{35} This remained the case until the end of active operations in the bridgehead.\textsuperscript{36} However, the lack of communication affected both administrative effectiveness and morale. The former because communication between Bayeux and local officials in the towns and villages of Normandy was impeded and the latter because many French citizens could not communicate with friends and family in the rest of occupied Europe. Thankfully, some leeway was given regarding postal and courier services. Two weeks after D-Day, an official correspondence courier delivery system from Bayeux to local mayors was established and a month after D-Day, postal services were in operation within Cherbourg. However, most other areas waited for Allied field security to give permission and the problems caused were noted by Civil Affairs.\textsuperscript{37} By August, the need for telephone links between towns, for use by the local administration, had become “apparent.”\textsuperscript{38}

However, field security demands were only part of the problem as war damage had exacted its price on the networks. In gradually repairing line services, much work was done by French engineers, who showed great initiative. They were assisted where possible by Civil Affairs PTT specialists, who had access to limited amounts of equipment from Royal Signals specialist depots.\textsuperscript{39} Indeed, assistance was occasionally given by the Royal Signals themselves to help “sort out the mess.”\textsuperscript{40} However, the problems facing the engineers were enormous. Sometimes German attempts at sabotaging the system had only been avoided by French engineers carefully blowing up telecommunication items that could easily be replaced but giving the appearance of complete destruction. However, in the case of the exchange at Caen, booby traps remained within the exchange for weeks after liberation and these prevented repairs. Here, they also faced the problem of a shortage of specialist tools that were not easily replaced from the different tools of British sources. Moreover, the Caen circuit plan was out of date as the result of German adaptations made during the occupation. At first, it was thought that it would take eight to ten days to restore most local services.\textsuperscript{41} In fact, it took until late August to restore only a limited telephone system for 40 users. Civil Affairs were in this case only able to facilitate so much and the size of the technical problem ran at its own speed. In the mean time, important communication with French officials in Rennes could only be conducted by courier service and this was not fast or easy.\textsuperscript{42}

However, in recognising the utility of communication to the local authorities and to the morale of the local population where technically possible Civil Affairs
were able to put pressure on field security to reconsider their policies. Indeed, by mid-August, there was general Allied recognition to relent on official telecommunication restrictions. In meeting popular demands to be able to communicate with French prisoners and labourers in occupied Europe a scheme was started on 17 July whereby notes written on specially treated paper to facilitate censorship could be sent via London and the Red Cross in Switzerland. The notes took and extra 30 days to arrive and thus there continued to be pressure for less irksome methods of communication to be considered. Such was the dominance of security concerns regarding postal services that there was little real relaxation until the end of the war. Even the public internal and international postal service that began on 19 August 1944 insisted on the use of postcards only and was heavily restricted to just a few cantons in Manche and Calvados. Undoubtedly, security restrictions were an inconvenience to both French official and individual alike and whilst in each case Civil Affairs was able to make progressively more successful arguments for fewer restrictions, the inconvenience of the French had to be balanced against the security needs of the Allies. The more dramatically difficult problems came in the form of transport and food.

**Transport**

Transport was of fundamental importance to much of French civilian life. It conveyed people to places of employment, to safety and to hospital and it conveyed food and relief from farms and depots to factories, shops and people. It was generally in short supply and in poor condition, and these problems afflicted both road and rail transport. Matters were not helped by problems with the road and railway network. Most roads were heavily used by the Allies (one crossroads enjoyed 19,000 military vehicle movements in one day) and most railways were badly damaged (and when repaired, also used by the Allies). Transport was potentially a critical French vulnerability and one that could not be solved within existing domestic resources. A vulnerability that needed to be identified, categorised and resourced. The importance of transport problem was fundamental to the work of Civil Affairs.

Civil Affairs reports indicated various and specific transport problems. Although prior to the landings, most roads had been in a good condition, they were now collapsing under military traffic and there was only limited local capacity to effect repairs. Indeed, three steamrollers in Bayeux were taken by the Allies to help construct airfields and there were only small numbers in local road gangs. Whilst, the Allies were involved in road repairs, they only focused on roads of military importance. Even here, it took until the end of September, for French capacity to be brought up to levels suitable enough to take over from Allied engineers. Civilian transport movement was disrupted by many roads being restricted to military use alone. Even when there were concessions, like on Route Nationale RN13 (Cherbourg to Paris via Bayeux and Caen), use was limited to those vehicles capable of more than 35kph. Furthermore, prior to the landings, many Normans had commuted considerable distances to work each day by public transport. It was not until mid-August that regular autobus
services were available in the British sector. Rail services (despite assisting in alleviating traffic on military roads) were barely available for civilian use in the British sector before the campaign moved on. An additional initial problem was the paucity of reliable information on which to plan solutions as much of it was kept in enemy-controlled Caen.

From D-Day onwards, motor transport was clearly affected by deficits of petrol, tyres, batteries and spark plugs. Many key workers like doctors were without transport. The dairy industry (on which so many relied for employment) was particularly badly affected by the lack of batteries and tyres for its vehicles. Only agricultural transport, much of which was horse-drawn, was considered sufficient to meet need. By 9 July, it was estimated that in the British Second Army area there were just 75 lorries of various sizes (of which 56 were gas powered and very slow). Most were in poor repair. There were 41 cars in running order, used mostly by doctors or as improvised ambulances. Specialist vehicles, particularly fire fighting vehicles, had either been taken or destroyed by retreating German troops. At the same time, there were just ten garages in various states of repair available, of which was being used by the REME. Out of these resources, the French authorities were able to form at the end of July a transport column to assist refugee movement that was located in Bayeux and comprised of 20 lorries and five ambulances.

Civil Affairs helped where they could. Fire equipment shortages were partly solved by re-employing captured German equipment. Later, trailer pumps and 26 15-cwt trucks with fire pumps were supplied through Civil Affairs by the War Office. Two months after D-Day and responding to 21st Army Group demands, attempts were made by G-5 at SHAEF to meet urgent spot demands of tyres and vehicle parts by rearranging shipping plans. However, none of these addressed the fundamental deficit in numbers of vehicles required. Although more would become available upon the liberation of Paris in late August 1944, in preparations for its relief the gap needed to be filled and vehicles and drivers found to carry the much needed food, sanitary and medical supplies and fuel into the desperate city. Using available military transport was out of the question, not least as the result of British manpower shortages. However, there were spare, if rather old and war torn, vehicles in Britain. With suitably organised and trained French drivers, these were to form French transport companies, which operated exclusively in the 21st Army Group controlled area and transport only civilian relief supplies. The companies were run by the French authorities, but co-ordinated by Civil Affairs.

In its first consignment, 21st Army Group supplied 250 3-ton lorries and like other items of mutual aid payment was subject to later settlement. They were to be maintained by the French, with some spares and tools being made available by 21st Army Group. They were to be available at all times to transport relief either directly to where it was needed or to intervening depots. The vehicles were specially marked “Authorised by AEF for movement of civilian supplies” to prevent undue interruption at security checkpoints. They were transported across from Britain at a rate of 50 per day from the 24 August. Some 60 vehicles were set aside for work exclusively in Calvados. Using this and
civilian transport it was judged that there was enough to cover all haulage needs for Paris from the end of the first week of its liberation.\textsuperscript{67}

To meet rising demands across France, additional vehicles were supplied by 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group in September 1944.\textsuperscript{68} However, the scale of the transport related distribution problems faced by France required long-term resources beyond those available to 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group.\textsuperscript{69} Yet, without the significance of Paris, whose humanitarian conditions lent themselves to disease and disorder and whose political significance was clear to all, it is unlikely the transport companies would have been formed so early in the campaign to meet the demands of emergency relief. Furthermore, that 60 vehicles were earmarked for Calvados was indicative of transport shortages in areas of military interest that Civil Affairs were able to identify and rectify. In so doing, not only did they prevent possible problems in Paris, but they also achieved the equally important task of enabling the French authorities. That the French model was later employed in Belgium and The Netherlands came as no surprise.\textsuperscript{70}

\textit{Food}

Related to transport was the issue of food. Normandy was (and is) well known for its cheeses, cider and calvados. However, it was also a nationally important source of soft fruit, vegetables, sugar beet, wheat and oats. The area was associated with horse breeding and some inshore fishing. Even during the occupation, it was common for Normans to send food parcels of meat, sausage, dairy produce, tinned foods, flour, groceries and vegetables to less fortunate parts of France.\textsuperscript{71} By comparison with Brittany, Normandy's output was small, but it was a net supplier of food to other regions and had healthy trade with Paris. For context, Brittany's annual surpluses were estimated at 100,000 tons of wheat, 2,000 tons of butter, 150,000 tons of vegetables and 350,000 tons of potatoes. In addition to which it had 110,000,000 eggs in storage and could supply 2,000 tons of fish per month.\textsuperscript{72} With its smaller, but still plentiful supply, Normandy was a good choice for the invasion, as logistically most local needs were met from within the region (notwithstanding wartime problems of distribution and communication), indeed it had a great deal to give the Allies.

However, in planning needs for a campaign, not just a battle, it was necessary to plan for all (and potentially more revolutionary) parts of France, not least of which was Paris. Thus in Normandy it was necessary to consider periods of both emergency relief and more demanding rationing. There were dangers in this, as the scale of new rationing could easily be unfavourably compared to that during German occupation. There was a need to ensure in the provision of relief and the imposition of rationing that the peculiarities of national tastes and conceptions of what constituted basic needs were met. The introduction of rationing needed to be achieved without encouraging hoarding, black marketeering and inflation, any of which may exacerbate local political problems. Furthermore, food needed to be seen not just in terms of a commodity, but also a source of employment and regional industrial pride. This required the provision of equipment, fuel, specialist supplies of seeds and items
for processing. It also needed certain military aspects of the campaign such as unexploded ordnance and crop destroying cross-country movement to be mitigated. Much could be handled by farmers themselves, some help could be given by the local administration, but in dealing with the imports of essential items and with relations with the military Civil Affairs was to play a key part.

**Relief**

Civil Affairs intelligence for France indicated that outside of battle areas the basic ration of 2,000 calories (Britain’s 1944 ration scale was 3,000 calories up from 2,800 in 1940 and 1941) was available without imports of relief. However, towns and cities of over 10,000 inhabitants were believed to be able to feed only an estimated seventy-nine percent of the population. Refugees and displaced persons moving home or in from other areas were also likely to be in need of relief, as were the populations in battle-scarred areas.\textsuperscript{73} Indeed, SHAEF planners had assumed that a ten-mile deep zone along the coast would be stripped of food as the result of military activity.\textsuperscript{74}

To allow more detailed planning of shipping schedules and procurement needs it was decided to divide the 90-day active military period into three 30-day blocks. In the first block, there was to be enough relief for half of the whole of the liberated population and was made up of hard rations. In the second block, there was to be no imports for rural areas, but towns over 10,000 inhabitants were to receive rations (an equal mixture of hard and bulk rations) to feed half of their populations. In the third block, the scale was to remain as for the second phase, but the balance of hard (now a quarter) to bulk rations was to fall.\textsuperscript{75}

Arriving on D+1, as a hedge against uncertainty it was planned for a twenty-five percent reserve of hard and later bulk rations to cover the needs of labourers, refugees and lost stocks.\textsuperscript{76} Within the overall allocation, all formations had maximum allocation levels placed upon them for reasons of stock control. However, it was acknowledged that these may need to be adjusted with circumstances.\textsuperscript{77}

Hard or basic rations were not luxurious, rather they were designed to be nutritionally balanced and easily transported, stored and distributed. Typical of the desire to maintain nutritional balance was the special chocolate with vitamins, as recommended by experts made for mothers and children.\textsuperscript{78} Hard rations allocated to the British sector for the 90 days consisted of 24 tons of milk (whether powdered or condensed was not specified), 3.7 tons of vitamin rich chocolate, 24 tons of pulses, 48 tons of meat and 97 tons of biscuits.\textsuperscript{79} Flour and other bulk rations took longer to arrive and only began to be shipped in large amounts from the end of July (there were a few much smaller shipments of flour from the beginning of July\textsuperscript{80}). Whilst impressive numbers, these rations were required for all liberated areas covered in the first 90-day period, not just Normandy.\textsuperscript{81}

For bulk rations, the figures allocated to the British sector for the 90 days were 16,047 tons of four, 534 tons of fats, 799 tons of soup, 1,856 tons of milk, 1,298 tons of vitamin rich chocolate, 957 tons of coffee, 2,400 tons of pulses, 1,137
tons of meat (all items were procured by Britain except for 744 tons worth of soup). Although allocated, milk had not been procured in time for Normandy, but this was of little consequence in a dairy region. Of only slightly greater interest was the difference between what had been requested and what was allocated. For the 90 days, hard rations were 75.3 tons short of that requested and bulk rations 2,633 tons short.82

In supply terms, the daily food tonnages for the British sector to meet this estimate were ten tons of food on D-Day, by D+10 20 tons, D+20 140 tons, by D+53 166 tons and by D+60 285 tons. In overall terms, when other relief items like medical stores (from D+4), soap (from D+7), clothing, blankets (from D+31) and fuel (but not coal) were added, this would result in 2,500 tons imported by D+30, a further 10,000 tons by D+60 and a further 20,000 tons by D+90 (For details of British Second Army issues of Civil Affairs bulk supplies for the month of July 1944 see Illustration G1.1 at Appendix G).83 At Corps level, this was translated into a daily individual hard ration package of 4oz of preserved meat, 8oz of biscuits, 2oz of tinned milk, 2oz of pulses and 1oz of vitamin rich chocolate during the first 30 days (at half rations). For the following 30 days and for those in large towns the individual package was joined by 26oz of bulk rations.84 In terms of clothing, a surprising amount was transported by weight. A shipment of 100 tons typically included 17,500 men and women’s overcoats, 10,400 jackets, 11,900 trousers, 16,000 dresses, 45,000 vests, 43,000 pairs of underpants (knickers), 26,600 pairs of shoes and 9,800 nappies, along with many other items like socks, wool and shirts.85

Getting items ashore was never easy in the busy waters off Normandy and not helped by the storms that destroyed one Mulberry harbour and severely damaged the other in late June 1944. By D+62 of the 10,755 tons of food that had been shipped across the Channel for use by British Civil Affairs, only 5,310 tons of it had been discharged, 1,850 tons was being discharged and 3,595 tons was awaiting discharge.86 Furthermore, there were problems in identifying Civil Affairs items. The plan had been for all Civil Affairs supplies to be marked with large red letters “CA” in the British sector or a row of green dots in the American sector. However, owing to British labour shortages, not all packages were marked. Nevertheless, regular military stores were marked and it was judged that distinguishing Civil Affairs items should be straightforward.87

Yet, by mid-June, only 25 of 140 tons of Civil Affairs stock had been identified.88 Even by 24 July there still problems identifying stock.89 Necessary supplies were instead drawn from No. 64 BSD, RASC. Since early in battle, it had also acted as a Civil Affairs central depot in lieu of problems experienced in establishing Civil Affairs depots (No. 1 BPD, Civil Affairs was established on 28 July).90 There were great efforts taken to locate the Civil Affairs stocks and on 6 August, Lewis at British Second Army sent his appreciation to Captain L.R. Shepherd RASC of No. 223 Civil Affairs Detachment for his work since D-Day in tracing and forwarding Civil Affairs stores to the right depots.91

Thankfully, the slow nature of the Allied advance kept Civil Affairs out of trouble and planning guidelines that had assumed 1,000,000 French inhabitants would be uncovered by D+23 and 4,000,000 by D+40 were only reached at D+56 and
D+70 respectively. Furthermore, most of the coastal strip had been far less badly damaged than Allied plans had forecast and local stocks of food were reasonable. The German evacuation of non-essential civilians from the coastal strip (5-15 miles deep) helped still further. There were also sufficient enemy stocks still available that could be made available for civilian use. Thus, by the end of the first fortnight, a total of only four tons of Civil Affairs biscuits, tinned meat and vitamin-rich chocolate had been used in the British Second Army area. In the American sector, by using German stocks, beyond a few emergency rations, no supplies were issued in the first month of liberation. The only shortages in the first few weeks came not in food but in the availability of medical equipment and supplies that were quickly exhausted as civilian casualties began to mount in the British Second Army area. An urgent request was put out for additional medical panniers (packages of drugs, bandages and medical equipment).

Even, further inland the levels of food seemed plentiful to many observers, including journalists. In a letter to his son, David, a few days after the landings, Montgomery pointed out how plentiful food supply was in the area. Indeed, inspection of mail captured on landing indicated that the French themselves recognised the abundance of food in Normandy. That there was plenty to go around was helped by the loss of both electricity for refrigeration and transport links to markets. Within days of the liberation of Bayeux, there was a need to distribute 28,000 cheeses and increase the butter ration in order to make use of large surpluses. Furthermore, as a sign of decent supply, there was no evidence of any substantial black market activity.

Many of the surpluses came the way of British forces. Even at a later stage, this was possible. A military hospital at Cresserons was from 12 July to 18 August supplied locally with 1,897 eggs, 295l of milk and 18kg of butter. Overall, in the first fortnight after the landings and with an estimated 50,000 French civilians uncovered, the outlook was favourable as there was much food available, local distribution was working well enough and the harvest looked good. Furthermore, as a sign of decent supply, there was no evidence of any substantial black market activity. Even the three hundred percent inflation experienced in some areas in the first few days after liberation had been controlled. However even at this stage it was clear that there were both short-term and longer-term food supply problems to overcome. Indeed, as reflection of the need to keep in check rations required for later in the campaign, it was stipulated in late June in the British sector that Corps could distribute only 2,000 rations per day.

The image of abundance portrayed by fighting men and journalists alike indicated a naivety on their part. Reports of plenty of cheese to go around also reflected that little commerce was been conducted in the area and thus the potential for poverty was not far away. Furthermore, with the growing intensity of the fighting and corresponding population movement, it was estimated that in the liberated area 110,000 civilians were receiving some form relief at the end of July.
DAILY BREAD

Bread was regarded as fundamentally important to the maintenance of French morale, but after the liberation, its supply was far from guaranteed. Whilst the daily average Norman bread ration had been 300 g during the occupation, by August 1944 it had dropped to 100 g of bread and 160 g of biscuit. By contrast, in the same period, rations of meat, butter, cheese, lard and pulses had doubled (For details of French ration scales during July 1944 see Illustration H1.1 at Appendix H). That bread was important to all northern Europeans was clear. That it was especially important in both symbolic and nutritional terms to the French was also clear and the health of flour supplies was the subject of many detachment reports. A SHAEF G-5 Supply Branch letter to 21st Army Group in late July 1944 even referred to Marie-Antoinette's “Qu'ils mangent de la brioche” as way of highlighting the importance of bread to the Frenchman. A view confirmed by French officials. Prefect of Calvados, Daure, at the liberation of Caen, ventured that bread, was “l'aliment sacré” of the Frenchman and failure to provide it would have “grave results.” In late July 1944, the prefect of Manche indicated that there was much upset at the reduction in the bread ration. Even in peacetime, Calvados was dependent on supplies of wheat and flour from other departments. The pre-war deficiency of wheat for Calvados was in the order of 14,000 tons. With the disruptive impact of the battle of Normandy, the scale of the problem only grew. Whilst, there were French surpluses available, for the time being these remained in German hands. That a French deficiency was likely was apparent from the end of the first fortnight. Civil Affairs reported French views that flour was only likely to last until the beginning of July and thereafter Civil Affairs stocks were required until the harvest was collected. These concerns were echoed by Coulet within a week of his appointment in Bayeux. French opinion felt it likely that there would be no local supply of flour between 1 July and 21 September when threshing began. However, British Second Army made it clear to Coulet on 1 July that the Allies would only import supplies sufficient to “protect military interests.” Moreover, in contrast to the French fears, Civil Affairs staff at 21st Army Group, rather more optimistically, estimated that only from 5 August was imported flour necessary. To put the process into context, on a British farm in Warwickshire during the Second World War the harvest normal began in mid-August (two weeks earlier if unseasonable dry and sunny) and lasted until mid-September (or at most the third week, if unseasonably wet earlier in the summer). Harvesting 100 acres of wheat took ten days with the assistance of tractors. This included cutting the crop, gathering and standing the cut sheaves in a stook for three to four days to dry the grain and then transporting the sheaves to the farm. At the farm, for best quality grain that kept over the year, the sheaves were built into a rick and allowed to rest. Threshing then commenced form October into November. If needs be grain could be threshed earlier, but with a commensurately shorter shelf life. Transporting the grain to the mill, milling and onward distribution to bakers and shops followed.
In meeting the French bread supply problem in the short term, it was important to help the local administration ensure that all stocks of grain were identified, that what repairs that could be were made mills and bakeries, that fuel was found and that unnecessary use of flour stopped. For the longer term, it was important that as much of the harvest was collected as possible, that the production of yeast was maintained and that fields were planted for the following season. What was less certain was the degree to which the supply of bulk rations would be changed to meet the French desire for bread.

Estimating local stocks was easier said than done. Most were in private hands where there was, at least, an understanding that hoarding both guaranteed enough grain for personal use and was likely to return a profit once prices had risen, as surely they must. Elsewhere, local officials (as they had with the Germans) were happy to hedge against future supply problems by overestimating the amount they required and underestimating the amount they knew to be available.\(^{119}\) As No. 202 Detachment found in tours during June around Bayeux, asking local officials was rather fruitless.\(^ {120}\) By early July, Civil Affairs units started to make independent assessments of the flour stocks.\(^ {121}\)

Such visits also helped to stamp out rumours that Allied interest (as German interest before) was only because they wanted the food.\(^ {122}\)

The independent surveys also indicated that French administrative control, both of local food supply and of rationing, worked well (except in the most forward areas). Indeed, the only assistance required was in late June for Civil Affairs to import 5,000,000 ration cards and 2,000,000 coupons as usual stocks remained in Paris.\(^ {123}\) This replaced earlier views of rationing being poorly organised, although this in part resulted from key individuals being caught behind enemy lines.\(^ {124}\) The new found Allied confidence in the French system of food control soon translated into the Gaullists being found a role in the Civil Affairs process of estimating bulk import requirements.\(^ {125}\)

With the estimates in, it was confirmed that there was a gap and that imports were required. Some special requests for express coaster deliveries had been made in late June by British 1 Corps whose area included badly damaged sections of the Norman coastal strip.\(^ {126}\) Whilst these demands were agreed in the early part of July, with the increased demands in mid-July SHAEF planners viewed such unscheduled demands as unreasonable, especially as shipping was at such a premium following the disruption caused by storm damage of late June. They were also judged unfair to other parts of France who may as a result lose out. Furthermore, the alternative in the form of biscuits, whether or not they were desirable, were at least nutritionally balanced.\(^ {127}\) With no alternative supply of flour available, unpopular biscuits must suffice as part of the ration. However, to ensure that the ration included some bread when local stocks eventually ran out in late August, British Second Army were granted in mid-August an additional 20 tons of bulk flour per day for six days.\(^ {128}\) On 19 August, SHAEF issued a policy that Allied relief was only to be distributed where genuinely needed. In the view of the headquarters, food conditions in France were too good to allow automatic handouts, especially as they compared favourably to conditions in Britain.\(^ {129}\)
As far as possible, other elements of the bread production process had also been investigated and solved. Some, such as the mechanics of making bread had presented few problems. Most bakeries and mills were in good repair and only needed fuel (which could be arranged through Civil Affairs) to restart operations. Indeed, it was estimated by the end of the first week of July that local bakeries were able to produce 25,750kg of bread per day for British Second Army if ingredients and materials were supplied. The ingredients sent as a result, included six tons of yeast that was sufficient to cover all military and most civilian needs in the British sector. Local yeast production was soon possible with 20 tons of potatoes being put aside for the purpose in each Allied sector. Thankfully, there was also enough seed available for the following year.

Measures were also taken to reduce Allied and unnecessary consumption of bread and flour. Within a week of taking over as regional commissioner, Coulet banned bread with all café meals. To ensure that supply to the local population was not effectively reduced (and to control inflation) by shopkeepers seeking to make a profit out of soldiers by raising their prices, a list of official prices was published by the commissioner. It also helped to prevent any Allied resentment at being swindled. The list covered all produce consider essential not just bread and typical maximum prices in the second week of July were 36 francs for a dozen eggs, four francs for a litre of milk and ten francs for a kilogram of vegetables. Coulet’s policies were shadowed by British policies and soldiers were ordered to stop buying bread, flour, meat and potatoes, as these items were in short supply. However, purchase of milk, butter and cheese was acceptable as these were perishable. To make the process transparent and fair, bilingual notices on what food soldiers may or may not buy were posted in many forward areas at the end of June. Nor were such restrictions new, some had been imposed within days of D-Day as the result of Civil Affairs foresight. Many bakeries close to troop concentrations, like those in Courseulles-sur-Mer were put out of bounds as early as 9 June.

To enforce such policies, patrols by Military Police units ensured both that soldiers complied and that crops were not taken from or destroyed in fields. The reputation of the Army was judged to be at risk, if French hardship resulted. Nevertheless, the prospect of fresh bread had soldiers seeking it out, often without understanding the consequences. Long queues of Canadian troops were seen by Civil Affairs officers outside bakers in Thaon on 21 June. By early July, British Second Army Civil Affairs made it clear to Coulet that they were happy to ban troops from buying or trading any item of food if the French requested it. This gesture opened the way to arrangements were Allied tinned rations (that could be stored by the French) were exchanged for surplus fresh items. What was in surplus or not changed with the seasons, the campaign and with local and wider French demands. Building stocks for the liberation of Paris became increasingly important. Consequently, the policy frequently changed during July as at first items were banned by the French authorities and then allowed. By the beginning of August, Allied troops were banned from buying anything that
was on the French ration scale, including meat, bread, milk, butter, cheese, eggs, clothing, footwear and meals.\textsuperscript{143}

Nevertheless, throughout the period of the Normandy battle, a certain amount of local and military confusion remained as to what could or could not be sold to troops. Many troops were similarly confused that at a time of heavy rationing local restaurants continued to open their doors to French custom.\textsuperscript{144} Furthermore, the controls did not suit everyone. In mid-August, farmers complained that they were unable to sell their cheese to a profitable Allied market as the result of the restrictions.\textsuperscript{145} Many were particularly concerned about price and supply controls, fearing they might herald the uneconomic low prices that farmers had barely survived pre-war. Farmers wanted financial security, other Normans wanted reasonable prices, the Gaullists wanted to stockpile for Paris and most soldiers wanted to buy French farm produce; protests were soon made.\textsuperscript{146} The change in outlook by many farmers stood in contrast to the enormous generosity they had shown to Allies and refugees earlier in the campaign.\textsuperscript{147} Yet, by the end of August, there was evidence of farmers hoarding and profiteering in Brittany and Normandy, but with the battle moving on and with their increasing competence, this was left to the French authorities.\textsuperscript{148}

\textit{Grain Harvest}

Despite measures to control unnecessary use of bread, the real answer to supply problems lay with ensuring that as much of the harvest as possible was gathered. Most of the department’s wheat was grown in the area between Courseulles-sur-Mer and Falaise with roughly 5,000 ha north of Caen and 5,000 ha south of the city. Both parts were subjected to much fighting and military activity.\textsuperscript{149} There were several associated problems. Much of the prime arable land was still either under enemy control or was covered in the activity of war. This included considerable amounts of unexploded ordnance (mostly \textit{described} as mines) and this was regarded as by far the biggest problem facing the harvest.\textsuperscript{150} However, there were also maintenance issues associated with the equipment used to harvest and thresh the crop. There was a shortage of transport. Many areas, especially those close to the frontline, were short of labour. Movement between farm, field and home was not helped by Allied security controls on all public movement. There were even a few natural problems, including some diseased crops around Bénouville.\textsuperscript{151} Ascertaining the capacity of the region to gather the harvest was of great interest to Civil Affairs in identifying potential vulnerabilities (For an example of a Civil Affairs agricultural survey see \textit{Illustration I1.1: Agricultural Survey in Cresserons Area, 24 July 1944} at Appendix I).

Loss of crops incurred not just as the result of battle damage. Also included were general vehicle movements, the construction of airfields, minefields and additional roadways for tracked vehicles crops, and the cutting of crops to avoid fire hazard to ammunition dumps.\textsuperscript{152} Whilst at first all military related damage to all crops (not just wheat) was rather less than anticipated, as military activity increased so did levels of destruction. Late July figures for crops lost as the
result of Allied activities in the British sector was put at between twelve and twenty percent.\textsuperscript{153} This included 20 airstrips constructed in the British sector of Calvados (airfield B1 opened as Asnelles on 7 June, there were a total of 12 by 16 June) and the huge Rear Maintenance Area of 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group that by the end of Normandy used most of the space in a six-mile radius around Bayeux and smaller areas around Bény-sur-Mer, Plumetot and Carpiquet airfield at Caen.\textsuperscript{154} Whilst some of the area used by British forces exploited German facilities it is uncertain as to how much of the estimated seven percent (30,000 hectares) of farmland used by German forces in Calvados for defences was used by the Allies.\textsuperscript{155}

Unsurprisingly, clearing unexploded ordnance was problematic. In part, this was because the Royal Engineers were too busy with military priorities and in part, because a complete reconnaissance of every field was likely to ruin crops in the process. However, as a gesture of support the Allies did supply intelligence to local officials and farmers on known minefields.\textsuperscript{156} Furthermore, from an early stage, attempts were made to employ methods for both marking minefields and informing civilians of their whereabouts.\textsuperscript{157} On a few rare occasions Royal Engineer spare capacity to search and clear was made available especially when the location of minefields were known or there was a need to restore local confidence following a civilian casualty in the fields.\textsuperscript{158} Despite the potential risks many French were very keen to be trained in mine clearance, such was the need to gather the harvest (and later to plough and plant for the next year). The matter was referred by Civil Affairs to the French authorities in London to take forward.\textsuperscript{159}

As the campaign moved forward in mid-August, it was found that the number of mines encountered in forward areas was so great that in a few areas the harvest was simply abandoned. The threat of mines also prevented Allied pioneers, POWs and Polish displaced persons (who had good knowledge of agriculture\textsuperscript{160}) being offered as labour.\textsuperscript{161} The mines did cause casualties. At Périers-sur-le-Dan two tractors were destroyed and three casualties resulted when a series of mines were detonated. A further seven were later found in the same field.\textsuperscript{162} Deaths of farmers were not common, but were not unknown.\textsuperscript{163} The tenacity of the Norman farmer to see the job through regardless was acknowledged by both Civil Affairs and the French authorities.\textsuperscript{164} Across Calvados, some 1,000 inhabitants were killed or injured by mines in the period to the end of August.\textsuperscript{165} Even after the campaign moved on casualties from such ordnance continued and at Troarn it was reported that more died from such means after its liberation than during the battles for it.\textsuperscript{166}

Although, the problem of mines and unexploded ordnance was difficult to resolve within the resources and time available, Civil Affairs was able to provide rather better help elsewhere. In the case of shortages of spares and consumables, it was possible to request an urgent delivery by express coaster of spot items. In such a way, demands were made for 100 tons of binder twine, greaseproof paper, sacks for grain and horseshoe metal.\textsuperscript{167} Mostly the demands were met, although often they arrived at the last minute, reflecting a desire not to use precious shipping until it was clear that there was no alternative local
Indeed, although most motorised agricultural equipment was in reasonable repair, the few spares needed were behind enemy lines in Caen and for a time it was uncertain when the city would be liberated and what spares remained. Some of the spot items needed were rather unexpected. Many canvas rollers for reapers and binders had been taken by soldiers during inclement weather of late July to roof shelters and cover weapons slits. Civil Affairs was able to ensure that replacement rollers were delivered within a week. Whilst, there was little success in getting Allied assistance with machinery repairs, use was made of both Civil Affairs and other military transport in moving the harvest from field to farm.

Although, responsibility for the collection of the harvest remained with the French, Civil Affairs was able to provide advice, information and links to Allied organisations, like Field Security. From the beginning of the harvest at the start of August, matters were judged to be well in hand. Triboulet's indicated that Civil Affairs assistance was only required in forward areas. Mayors provided possibly the most important function in gathering labour (including French refugees) to complete the task, whilst other officials were able to facilitate, with Civil Affairs assistance, the use of surplus German army horses. Many mayors formed cantonal committees to form labour into mobile gangs that went from farm to farm both within their cantons and beyond where labour shortages were acute. In this way, at least some of the land in the evacuated areas to the east of the Canal de l'Orne was harvested. The committees also helped to find spare parts, often by cannibalising redundant machinery. The French also decided priorities. Civil Affairs reports in some areas indicated that in the desire to gather in the wheat, other crops like barley and oats were left to become overripe. It was possible that such crops were judged already beyond use (they were normally harvested before wheat), but given the number of working horses in Normandy (each consuming in the region of 16lbs of mixed oats and barley per day) it was a decision that could not have been taken lightly.

In the forward areas, it was judged by Civil Affairs in Canadian First Army (south and east of Caen) that, of the wheat in their area, half of the harvest could be saved with properly organised labour. However, on the eastern edge of the Canadian area, during the same period in the second week of August, British 1 Corps was less optimistic. Here there were problems with the reliability of farm equipment and there were no mobile gangs available. What population remained was either too scarce or too poorly motivated after recent fighting to do the work. A complete loss of the harvested was only averted by the early return of the refugee population. It was not fully satisfactory. On the other side of Canadian First Army's western boundary, British 12 Corps found at the beginning of August that the lack of machinery and draught horses, together with the ubiquitous mines, saw less than ten percent of oats and just five percent of wheat harvested in forward areas. This compared to ninety percent of oats and between fifty and seventy percent of wheat in rear areas. A week later, it was judged that of the 2,000 acres of crops in the depopulated area south of the Caen to Villers-Bocage road none had been harvested and the
prospects for being so were grim. In this case, there were no refugees to call on as they were being kept deliberately clear of the area to facilitate military mobility.\textsuperscript{182}

In rear areas and from the point of view of Civil Affairs at Lines of Communication, whilst some fields were uncut, the results were nevertheless deemed satisfactory.\textsuperscript{183} Initial estimates had feared that yields were likely to be reduced by fifty-five percent.\textsuperscript{184} Fortunately, although the deficiency increased, yields through the work of the French and Civil Affairs turned out to be far better than predicted. By the end of August 1944, it was estimated that yields were only twenty-five percent down north of Caen and fifty percent down to its south. In overall terms, this amounted to a deficiency of an estimated 31,000 tons for the department, double the usual amount.\textsuperscript{185}

\textit{Galloping Majors, Potatoes and Cowmen}

Civil Affairs did not restrict itself to just the needs of the harvest. Its work in other areas of farming and associated industries, helped to facilitate both the restoration of output and the good name of the Allies. In late June, the mayor of Banville complained that German army horses needed on farms were being used by high-ranking British officers for riding around on jollies. Civil Affairs made recommendations up the chain of command that this should cease. The mayor was also concerned that storage barns were being used by troops. On inspection, the problem was found to be less serious. However, that time was spent investigating and if needs be addressing such matters was indicative of the political and practical benefits that only Civil Affairs had the time or people to develop.\textsuperscript{186}

Reports in July 1944, from the area of Luc-sur-Mer and Lion-sur-Mer, that military damage, looting by troops and minefields had resulted in the loss of fifty percent of seed potatoes (the basis of the following years’ crop) needed investigation. Whilst the damage was not as extensive as claimed (being closer to twenty percent in coastal areas and under three percent overall) the generally poor state of the potato plants did raise concerns that there were insufficient amounts of seed for the following year.\textsuperscript{187} Civil Affairs, thus, busied itself with investigating possible imports of seed potato from Scotland (traditionally the home of the best seed in Britain), rather than the usual Dutch supply and in case alternatives were not available in Brittany. Details were important and it was considered vital that any potato chosen by the Ministry of Food must closely resemble the typical Norman potato \textit{L’Abondance de Metz}.\textsuperscript{188} Some 8,000 tons of seed potato were normally required and 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group recommended to SHAEF that 3,000 tons were imported by the end of January for planting in March.\textsuperscript{189} In the meantime, Civil Affairs detachments marked the potato fields with notices stating that theft was forbidden.\textsuperscript{190} A seemingly small affair, the potato event saw Civil Affairs achieving many of its basic goals, ensuring good relations with the local population, preventing food shortages, keeping morale high by ensuring familiar products remained available and salvaging the reputation of the Allies.
Normandy was synonymous with dairy production. Milk, cream, butter, cheese and meat were all products of the industry. Some 50 tons of butter was produced per week in the British sector, with half produced in commercial dairies and half in farms.\textsuperscript{191} In addition, 20,000 cheeses were made per day in farms and factories in the same area.\textsuperscript{192} Factories produced nutritionally important lactose and condensed milk.\textsuperscript{193} However, there were problems. Many of the products were perishable. Some items could be preserved through salting, such as butter, but others like cheese and milk presented greater problems. Whilst, American First Army Civil Affairs arranged for a salvaged German gunboat engine to power 300 tons of cold butter storage at Isigny-sur-Mer, there was no refrigeration capacity in the British Second Army area.\textsuperscript{194} Nevertheless, the \textit{Paillaud} condensed milk and tinning factory at Creully seemed an ideal Civil Affairs opportunity to restore a plant that could be of benefit to the French and Allies alike. Not only might it be able to supply a nutritious product that was easily stored, transported and distributed, but also there were employment benefits.

In peacetime, the factory coped with 12,000 litres of milk per day in producing 5,760 425g cans of sweetened condensed milk (in an aluminium can) and 9,600 485g cans of unsweetened condensed milk (in a tinplate can). From the twenty to forty percent of milk that was unsuitable cheese was made. In many ways, there was great optimism for the factory. It had a good stock of tins (90,000 tinplate and 50,000 aluminium) and it was thought that army cigarette tins and bulk steel drums could be improvised to fit the need (advice was even sought from the \textit{Metal Box Company} in Britain on possible improvisations).\textsuperscript{195} The boilers were in good order, there was ten days’ supply of coal available locally, there was enough sugar for three months production and problems with transport could easily be solved with the assistance of Civil Affairs. However, a fundamental problem lay with getting sufficiently strong electricity supply; hitherto supplied from Caen.\textsuperscript{197} A water turbine nearby, but was inoperative during the dry season. A temporary loan of an Allied generator was contemplated, but milk production was not deemed a priority. Instead, it was decided to wait for power to be restored from Caen.\textsuperscript{198} If the factory was a disappointment, rather more could be done elsewhere and keeping dairy herds productive was one. Through farmers or mayors complaints to Civil Affairs, it was found that newly arrived Allied units often set up camp in meadows or on grazing land. This damaged prime pasture. Furthermore, troops often left field gates open and even knocked fences down as they occupied these camps allowing beasts to escape. Reports in late July indicated that this was a particular problem around Mathieu. Consequently, Civil Affairs posted notices in an attempt to stop the problem:

\textbf{CATTLE ENCLOSURE.}

Fences will not be damaged.

Gates will be kept shut.

Milk needed for Military Hospitals.\textsuperscript{199}
Mathieu was, at this stage, close to the battle line and some Civil Affairs officers were concerned that casualties amongst the beasts might result. Nevertheless, farmers assured Civil Affairs officers that their animals were becoming wise to shellfire and would instinctively wander off to find safe ground. To an extent, the willingness of farmers to let their beasts stray was in contrast to the earlier tendency to herd them into barns for protection. At Grucy as elsewhere it was found that often as not such buildings were inevitable targeted during combat killing all animals, whereas some may survive if allowed to wander. Even so, resultant stray cattle blocked roads, took Civil Affairs time and effort to find and in the meantime their milk was lost to the farmer. Where they could, Civil Affairs provided fencing to enclose fields cut in two by new allied roads.

By early August, in addition to their use for troop encampments, the productive qualities of many pastures were also being reduced by the dusting they received from regular nearby vehicle movements. This compounded, the drying of the grass by the by now fine weather. Seemingly, the notorious storms of 19 to 21 June and the heavy rain of 20 to 22 July in parts of Normandy had done little to improve the pasture. Indeed, throughout June and July the weather in Normandy varied considerably, before settling into a hot August. (For an overview of weather during the period see Table J1.1 at Appendix J). Furthermore, it was known from prior to the campaign that certain areas were particularly susceptible to drought, including the Odon valley and around Flers (See Map E1.4: Prominent Rivers in the British Sector of Normandy at Appendix E).

Reports from the area in mid-August confirmed that many local watermills around Roulleurs had ceased to function as streams dried up. Indeed, the lack of rain was regarded by the French as problem even in early June. Civil Affairs assisted by carrying water for troops to use in watering animals in locations where the farmers had been evacuated and asked that in rear areas military vehicles used arable fields in preference to pastures when traversing an area.

A number of schemes were employed by Civil Affairs to control and to protect dairy herds in forward areas. During the static period of the campaign, arrangements were made to allow farmers back into forward areas to milk their beasts if animal evacuation proved difficult. As the campaign became more mobile, Civil Affairs troops were employed to herd cattle into pounds, from where they could be claimed by the soon to return famers. In mid-July, British 12 Corps had as part of its orders for Operation GREENLINE details of both civilians and likely cattle numbers in the area of operations between Tilly-sur-Seulles, Villers-Bocage and south to the River Orne. In the 75 square miles of the northern part of the area, it was estimated that there were 230 head of cattle, whilst in the 170 square miles to the south there in the region of 630 beasts. Animal pounds were established at Saint-Manvieu-Norrey, Mouen and Cheux.

Marking of cattle by Civil Affairs to help the process of identification was regarded by the French as unnecessary as most farmers knew their beasts, but continued as a means of monitoring cattle movement in forward areas. In the fortnight to 4 August 126 cattle and 25 sheep were collected. It was not unusual for soldiers to be asked to milk animals in areas where farmers had
been evacuated.\textsuperscript{214} There were clear benefits to this, but many soldiers, especially those from county regiments like those of the 4\textsuperscript{th} Battalion, The Somerset Light Infantry, also did it on their initiative for compassionate reasons recognising that the cows needed to be milked.\textsuperscript{215} Rounding up animals could be dangerous work. Near Fierville (For an overview of the area see Illustration K1.1: Report on State of Accommodation, Population and Livestock Around Caumont L’Éventé, 31 July 1944 at Appendix K), it was discovered that bulls were aware the cows were in season and it was thought “doubtful if they will remain passive.” Rather more dangerously, German booby traps were found on gates into some pastures.\textsuperscript{216}

As the campaign moved into the southern area at the beginning of August, less livestock was encountered below gridline 065, as together with the population the area had been systematically evacuated by the Germans. What animals there were, benefitted from the generally underused pasture and were unlikely to starve.\textsuperscript{217} If a reduction in cattle numbers marked early August, it was replaced by increasing numbers towards the end of the month, necessitating the creation of further pounds.\textsuperscript{218} Getting refugee farmers back to their farms, along with their livestock, was a priority to Civil Affairs. Indeed, even in plans for D-Day formations were to provide for the earliest return of livestock farmers, subject to field security checks.\textsuperscript{219} In mid-August, around Chanu, the provision of troop carriers by formations expedited the return of many farmers to their animals.\textsuperscript{220}

Dead animals were an altogether different Civil Affairs problem. Whilst maimed and recently killed animals were butchered and used by both the Allies and French, many more others were beyond use.\textsuperscript{221} The sight of dead animals (most believed to be killed by mortar bomb and shell splinters), was said to sicken many soldiers, particularly the farmers amongst them.\textsuperscript{222} Many Americans from rural parts reportedly covered the eyes of dead livestock with straw.\textsuperscript{223} Although dead animals were found across Normandy, Civil Affairs reports from mid-August, indicate that there were especially high numbers in the areas around Bernières-le-Patry and Tinchebray. Indeed, Civil Affairs provided much intelligence on the location of dead animals for later disposal by either civilian (at Civil Affairs arrangement) or military sources of labour.\textsuperscript{224}

The concern over possible fly-borne diseases was taken very seriously, especially by medical units, who were warned on 19 August to prepare for cases of dysentery and enteritis.\textsuperscript{225} The need to dispose of the dead animals was widely recognised and arrangements were made in consultation with the Royal Engineers to find solutions.\textsuperscript{226} The problem was not helped by the hot sun of August and was soon regarded as “acute.” Disposal was not helped by the lack of local labour (either through evacuation or involved in the harvest), by the widely scattered nature of the dead beasts (making the use of bulldozers uneconomic) or by the large numbers killed within buildings. Progress was slow.\textsuperscript{227} Although bulldozers were used near La Ferrière as at the request of No. 217 Civil Affairs Detachment, often other methods were employed.\textsuperscript{228} Royal Engineers blew holes in the ground for the burial of animals and it was common for troops to form burial pits by using grenades.\textsuperscript{229} Burning carcasses was also an option, but most were covered in a mixture of creosol and diesel or sump oil
and buried. As elsewhere, the role of Civil Affairs was clear, to prevent disease from directly infecting and degrading the military efficiency of troops and to prevent its indirect path via the local population.

CONCLUSION

The harvest was a French concern and largely organised and carried out by them. However, Civil Affairs involvement was not a token effort, as they provide a variety of forms of support, particularly in forward areas and in supplying important spot needs. In some cases, Civil Affairs through their own investigations and reporting processes identified areas of vulnerable French capacity. At other times, the French were more than happy to point to what they needed. Harvesting of crops and husbandry of livestock in forward areas was one such, but so too were a variety of spot items that the French could not furnish themselves (at least for the time being). There were examples, like the milk factory where on deeper investigation the balance of interests between restoring the factory and concentrating on more immediate Civil Affairs tasks went the way of the latter. There were also examples, like the use of barns and pastures, where Civil Affairs faced a never-ending task of constantly reminding formations of the consequences of their actions. By identifying weak points and providing support to address critical gaps in French capacity, several benefits were forthcoming. The French did not starve. They were able to eat more bread than biscuits and be happy doing so. They were able to see how the Allies helped them gather in the harvest or impound valuable cattle. Things were done, most needs were met and reputations were enhanced (or at least salvaged). In the process, Civil Affairs was provided with decent evidence of the growing capacity of the new Gaullist authorities to administer the needs of France. Furthermore, by working on practical matters for similar ends, mutual respect between the French, the Gaullist authorities and Civil Affairs was fostered. The likelihood of disorganisation, disease and unrest was further away than ever, but as long as the battle continued potential problems remained.
Chapter 6 Endnotes


5 TNA, WO 171/365, *War Diary*, 30 Corps Civil Affairs staff, *Civil Affairs Operational Instruction No. 1 to No. 202 Civil Affairs Detachment*, 17 May 1944.

6 TNA, WO 171/105, *War Diary*, G(Ops) 21 Army Group, *Operation Instruction, Civil Affairs*, No. 6, 7 June 1944.


9 TNA, 219/3729, 21 Army Group, CA/Mil Gov Branch, *Historical Survey; 21 Army Group Civil Affairs Technical Instruction No. 2, Administration of Civil Affairs units in the field (British Zone)*, March 1944.

10 TNA, 219/3729, 21 Army Group, CA/Mil Gov Branch, *Historical Survey; 21 Army Group Civil Affairs Technical Instruction No. 2, Administration of Civil Affairs units in the field (British Zone)*, March 1944.


12 TNA, WO 171/365, *War Diary*, British 30 Corps Civil Affairs staff, Civil Affairs Conference, 6 July 1944.

13 TNA, WO 219/3939, 21 Army Group, *Civil Affairs Technical Instruction No. 7 (British Sector)*, undated but thought to be May 1944.

14 TNA, WO 171/365, *War Diary*, 30 Corps Civil Affairs staff, *Civil Affairs Operational Instruction No. 1 to No. 202 Civil Affairs Detachment*, 17 May 1944.


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Chapter 7
Supporting Military Operations in Normandy

Part II

Supporting Battlefield Needs

Whilst food, transport and PTT were important to the French, they were only of indirect interest to the Allies. Disease and disorder were the direct interests. But so were other civilian elements. These included field security, population movement, crime, legal obligations and the supply of labour. In either isolation or combination, they might affect operational security, military movement on and around the battlefield, targeting and logistical support. Civil Affairs role was, of course, to assist in mitigating the problems such elements might cause or in the case of labour mitigate the problems that prevented its use. Many of the negative impacts, such as disease, reduced military mobility, espionage, crime, panic and even disorder and sabotage were related to the population movement. This in turn was associated with civilians seeking safety during periods of danger and it had passed returning to what was left of their homes and possessions. With echoes of 1940, considerable emphasis was placed on ensuring proper control of population movement around the battlefield.

Population Movement

In preparation for Normandy, various different elements were identified in explaining the nature of civilian movement around the battle area. These included groups fleeing from battle or bombing, those attempting to return home despite Civil Affairs orders to not move, bands of forced labourers, deportees and other displaced persons seeking salvation and the very serious risk of refugees being forced through the frontline by the enemy to hinder Allied operations. It was anticipated that all refugees would be tired, “half-starved” and unable to travel or do hard work (which they should not be expected to do). Many might be tempted to loot from houses and steal crops from fields and barns in order to survive. At registration, many may scarcely be able to remember their names having been forced to use many aliases in avoiding the Gestapo. Children were expected in number and were likely to be separated from their parents or relatives.¹
**PLANNING**

Each of the different types and conditions of person moving about forward areas required different levels of assistance and lengths of stay in accommodation. Displaced persons were thought to need the longest stay and at a later stage the assistance of UNRRA. Population control was likely to involve various combinations of battlefield control, evacuation, registration, security checks, provision of emergency relief (including food, medical care and accommodation) and eventual dispersal to indigenous control. Whilst the greatest share of the work was done by Civil Affairs other military organisations such as Field Security, the transport organisation, Town Majors and Military Police were also likely to be closely involved.²

To expedite the process of controlling movement, Civil Affairs staffs at formation headquarters were to play a key role in co-ordinating information from detachments and other military units as to the size, nature (ages, physical conditions, health problems and so forth) and direction of civilian movement. Refugees (and other categories) were to be directed by troops, Field Security, Military Police and indigenous police to (Divisional) Refugee Collection Points. These were checkpoints sited on rear divisional boundary (ideally in the Divisional Administration Area) and to where, civilians seeking refuge were directed in order to remove them from the danger area. In some circumstances, subordinate collection points might be established forward of the divisional boundary and refugees collected here were to be sent to the divisional collection points in packets of up to 50 persons, led by an appointed local leader. The identification of suitable civilian travel routes around the area was the responsibility of “Q” and Q(Movements). Their knowledge of military supply routes allowed them to decide which civilian routes were likely to have the least impact on military interests. In this forward area, in keeping refugees clear of military traffic, Military Police were to assist Civil Affairs in refugee control. In consultation with Military Police and Civil Affairs, Field Security was to establish Security Control Posts on likely refugee routes in order to expedite the screening of refugees (in Normandy the security posts and collections points were often co-located). From the divisional collection points, refugees were sent, in most circumstances, to temporary refugee transit points (Corps Refugee Transit Camps, CRTCs) set up by the host Corps (For a flow chart of typical arrangements at a CRTC during July 1944 see Illustration L1.1 at Appendix L).³

At the CRTC, the refugees were to be given food (even fed if unable to cook themselves), first aid and information (conveyed by loudspeaker van or megaphone). The badly wounded were to be evacuated to civilian hospitals. The ideal located for the CRTC was considered to be in the Forward Maintenance Area (FMA) were maximum use could be made of passing military transport and communications networks. Indeed, it was stipulated that any military vehicles returning from the frontline empty was available to carry refugees from divisional collecting points onwards. Mobile feeding was, at least, contemplated before the landings, with the possibility of pre-cooked food and liquids being transported in insulators and containers to suitable points on refugee routes. It
was not intended for more than a handful of refugees to stay overnight at a CRT. Instead, they were either to be dispersed locally with the help of local authorities or sent up the chain to an Army Refugee Assembly Centre (ARAC). 

The job of the ARAC was to hold refugees prior to their dispersal amongst the local community or, in the case of displaced persons, await a decision on their fate. It was anticipated, that as ARACs moved on, its accommodation was to form the basis of a displaced persons camp. Consequently, the location of ARACs needed to take into account long-term accommodation. Barns, schools or halls were considered the most suitable, tented accommodation was not a consideration. Proximity to a railhead, a CAID, good food storage and enough safe water for up to 3,000 persons was important for ease of work. There needed to be the capacity both to expand at short notice and to incorporate civil defence measures. The provision of an information bureau, a communal kitchen, mess hall, medical facilities, hospital accommodation and a disinfection centre were also required. Specific arrangements were to be made for the location of latrines, ablutions and medical facilities, and the issue of soap and blankets. Use of any buildings for refugee purposes was to be arranged through the local authorities in order to facilitate a smoother hand over, than with requisitioned property, when the time came.

In Civil Affairs camps, treatment of refugees was to be kind, but firm. Self-help, under the supervision of suitable leaders, was to be encouraged. Refugees could be employed in assisting Civil Affairs, especially those who were members of local Red Cross and other voluntary agencies. However, the early transfer of refugees to local civilian authorities was emphasised. The organisation of refugees was to be in family, village and district groups (a practice generally adhered to during operations). Displaced persons were to be arranged by nationality. All groups were to establish a representative leader and, if there was time, a committee. To keep track of refugees, basic information was to be recorded, including name and destinations, along with dates of arrival and departure. Such information was to be used by the Information Bureau (in tracing relatives and missing persons), by Civil Affairs (for their records) and by Field Security units. Registration cards were to be issued in military camps to ensure that all had been recorded. Emphasis was placed on the prompt tackling of rumours, in order to prevent any possible despondency. Any key rumour-makers were to be reported to Field Security and if necessary sent to a Field Security, Civilian Interrogation Camp. Here, if found to be a risk individuals were either be sent to the civilian internee section of (certain) POW camps for detention or handed over to French authorities.

Specialist Civil Affairs detachments were to run the CRTCs and ARACs, with additional detachments and specialists posted in as necessary. Within No. 2 Group, Civil Affairs, there were at various times up to five detachments (some with increments) dedicated to CRTC and ARAC work within the 21st Army Group and Lines of Communication areas of Normandy (For details of the changing command arrangements, tasks and locations of No. 2 Group, Civil Affairs detachments see Table C1.1 at Appendix C). In the American sector, in
the period to D+45, two refugee camps were established at Cherbourg (Barfleur) and Sainte-Mère-Église.\textsuperscript{10}

Beyond these instructions advanced by 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group and the Military Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field, the SHAEF Field Handbook of Civil Affairs, France stated that rations for refugee camps were to be issued on the same scale as the general population, except in circumstances of special need. The health of vulnerable refugees and displaced person groups was of equal concern as that of the general public. It was considered that, following the punishing period of German occupation, tuberculosis, infant mortality, typhoid fever and venereal disease were all likely public health threats. This was in addition to reported cases of typhus in prisons and internment camps that together with the dangers inherent when Frenchmen returned from Germany and other typhus infected parts of occupied Europe could see the disease spread to the public at large. If typhus was found, it was specified that the Civil Affairs Public Health Officer informed both local RAMC units and put a request through to SHAEF G-5 for the services of American Typhus Commission (a lesson from Naples, see Chapter 3). Furthermore, steps were to be taken to immunise those sent to care for the typhus victims. DDT dusting of all those connected with the outbreak and an exhaustive search for victims and those who had encountered them was to be made.\textsuperscript{11}

In dealing with refugees during an opposed advance, the SHAEF Handbook presented a rather different image of what was required to that of 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group. At 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group, the emphasis was on clearing refugees (and anyone considered to be in the way) away from the battle and for which the cascading process of collection points, CRTCs and ARACs was developed. There was, in other words, a form of evacuation that was encouraged by both technical instruction and the structural practises of detachments and groups. An arrangement that extended to the contingency of refugee camps in Britain. By contrast, SHAEF put emphasis on the need for refugees to “standfast,” where movement was halted until it could be properly organised by the military or French authorities. Here, formation commanders had the responsibility for giving the standfast order. It was an order that could be issued by way of leaflets, broadcasts, resistance groups and other means as permitted by the military situation. In order to ensure compliance, French liaison officers together with Civil Affairs officers were to make it clear that food, shelter, transport and other assistance could not be provided “unless they comply with standfast orders and official movement instructions.” Only in exceptional circumstances were commanders initiate evacuation and then only in certain areas.\textsuperscript{12}

The policy on refugees as drawn up at 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group and SHAEF was subject to discussion at Army and Corps level. British Second Army held a conference on 31 March 1944 that officers from British 30 Corps attended.\textsuperscript{13} The discussions were framed within the assumption that refugees needed to be removed from the battlefield. Civil Affairs staff at British 8 Corps held a conference on the matter at Worth Hall, West Sussex on 5 May 1944. Here it was stipulated that Military Police were responsible for keeping refugees off essential military
roads and directing refugees to CRTCs. Each Military Police section was to have a French speaker (recruited by the police not via Civil Affairs) to expedite the process. It was hoped that French police co-operation would be forthcoming.

Divisions were to site forward collecting points (in brigade areas) and divisional collecting points (near the Divisional Administration Area). All refugees were to be directed to the CRTCs, no matter what type or category. It was expected that some might stray, but provided they did not interfere with operations this was considered acceptable. As per instructions, the CRTCs were to be located near the Forward Maintenance Area, but not too close to food dumps for reasons of security and public order. It was expected that medical provision was to be a mixture of military and civilian personnel. Reflecting the view that control was the most important aspect of the process, the conference discussed who might build or supply a wire fence to put around any CRTC.  

In later 8 Corps clarification, it was noted that divisional vehicles returning to the Forward Maintenance Area were available be filled with refugees if required. Furthermore, it was now expected that most refugee movement away from the battle was likely to take place at night. During the day, refugees were to be asked to stay put, but there was no suggestion that this was a permanent solution. Refugee movement was expected to be random with the possibility that groups might “drift” towards the enemy from heavily bomb towns, before coming back towards Allied lines when the battle moved on. Bridges over rivers were considered ideal collecting points as they funnelled movement, although there were possible bottleneck problems if not carefully controlled. Finally, for security and military mobility reasons, CRTCs were to be located more than five miles away from the Forward Maintenance Area. Nevertheless, despite the emphasis on the need to evacuate away from battlefield dangers, there was also recognition of the need to reduce the burdens of Civil Affairs by dispersing refugees as soon as possible. In this respect, British 30 Corps took the view that CRTCs should only be used in the last resort.

The emphasis on what to do with refugees therefore varied between British formations. However, the emphasis of 21st Army Group instructions encouraged evacuation through CRTCs and this can be considered the norm of what was expected. In practice, British sector policy evolved and whilst, at first, during the static period of the campaign, the emphasis erred towards evacuation, later, during the breakout, it moved to one of standfast. This evolving approach reflected the rather different requirements that both the battlefield and civilian desires dictated. For, if the static period was characterised by the desire for civilians to get away from danger, the breakout was characterised by their desire to return home.

**Refugees**

**Before Caen**

Plans in Normandy were often undone by events and the deployment of the 21st Army Group refugee camps was no exception. The plan had been for two CRTCs
to be located somewhat north of the Bayeux-Caen road. British 30 Corps was to be responsible for CRTC “A” established on D-Day (and closer to Bayeux at Fresnay-le-Crotteur in the commune of Saint-Gabriel-Brécy) and British 1 Corps for CRTC “B” established on D+1 (and closer to Caen in the area of Le Fresne-Camilly). In addition, an ARAC under British Second Army (run by 1 Corps until D+5) was to be established on D+2 close to Mathieu on the Douvres-la-Délivrande-Caen. Four specialist refugee detachments (Nos. 204, 205, 206 and 219, later joined by a fifth) were to be responsible for running the facilities working closely with prisoner of war detachments. The plan made a great deal of sense it covered both of the major urban areas and in particular the significant northern escape route out of Caen (See Map E1.5: Care of Refugees in the British Sector of Normandy at Appendix E).

Typical of the planning involved was No. 205 (Refugee) Detachment (running CRTC “A”) which was to land on D-Day with four of its officers and four of its other ranks, together with two officers (it was not specified if these were doctors) and four other ranks of the RAMC and one officer and 30 other ranks from No. 218 PW (Prisoner of War) Camp. They were accompanied by a 3-ton lorry loaded with surgical supplies, petrol cookers, camp kettles, picks and shovels for the camp, together with water, rations and officers’ kits for the camp staff. With such frugal amounts, if large-scale refugee problems were encountered, then it was deemed that the fullest possible use was to be made of local resources and personnel. To screen refugees for reasons of field security, a second lieutenant intelligence officer, arriving independently from Corps headquarters, was to be attached. The other vehicles, personnel (one Civil Affairs officer, one medical officer and five other ranks) and equipment of the detachment were to arrive from D+2 onwards.

However, the combination of very few refugees and the inability to seize Caen on D-Day resulted in much turmoil as these plans were amended. The sites of the ARAC and CRTC of British 1 Corps were either still behind enemy lines or regarded as being too close to the fighting, whilst for the CRTC of British 30 Corps there was simply not enough work to justify the facility. As a result, a delay ensued as new sites or enough refugees were found. It was not until 9 June that the first camps were established by British 1 Corps with the ARAC located at Amblie (as one of the few suitable locations) and CRTC “B” at Cresserons (to process refugees from northern Caen and east of the Canal de l’Orne). Later, on 15 June, British 30 Corps established CRTC “A” at Ellon (a suitable location to process refugees from the battle areas south of Bayeux). Others were created as the campaign developed and at the start of July a third CRTC was created.

At first, the refugee detachments had little difficulty in carrying out their tasks. What few refugees they processed were quickly absorbed locally. Most of those encountered had fled from the coastal towns and villages during the opening bombardment of the landings. The anticipated German evacuation of Caen towards the Allies had not taken place, but many of the coastal towns and villages had been partly evacuated in the preceding weeks. Indeed, reflecting the slow pace of life, No. 205 (Refugee) Detachment was re-employed on 9 June
as piquets to prevent disruption caused by French “sightseeing.” The few refugees that did appear were typical of those found throughout the campaign, hiding during the fighting and only appearing afterwards. Despite fears of refugees being used to hinder Allied movement deliberately there were no reported incidents during the campaign and only very rarely did refugees cause battlefield nuisance. One of the few reported incidents was at Le Reculey (north of Vire) in early August, where 60 refugees had hidden themselves in a hedge that was about to be stormed by British tanks. Civil Affairs officers of No. 221 Detachment were able to organise their removal to a safer location. However, population movement clogging military supply routes was a more regular occurrence that required frequent Civil Affairs and Military Police intervention.

Every effort was made to reduce the chances of refugees clogging roads. Whilst, there were occasions when refugee (often horse-drawn) transport was permitted to be used in leaving the divisional area (indeed, it might help alleviate pressure on the RASC), such means were only allowed on roads cleared for civilian use by formations. Often, at divisional collection points, a local French “caretaker was appointed to safeguard carts and other vehicles that might otherwise cause problems if left to wander the highways at will. Divisional transport then took the refugees to the CRTC (if required), Corps transport from there to the ARAC and then onwards to civilian accommodation by a mixture of indigenous means, Civil Affairs transport or whatever could be garnered from Q(Movements) at 21st Army Group. The emphasis was on controlled movement and to expedite the process, refugees were only allowed to carry a “reasonable” amount of luggage. In broad terms, the use of regular military transport was deemed to work well. In support of Operation EPSOM at the end of June, Civil Affairs evacuated 1,800 refugees using divisional transport. Experience also indicated that divisional collecting points worked best when located near a building or barn in which refugees could shelter and rest whilst awaiting security clearance and transport.

The intensely destructive nature of the battles to get into Caen, during the first month of the campaign, left British Second Army with few options, but for the general evacuation of forward areas. These included Saint-Manvieu-Norrey and Bretteville-L’Orgueil to the west of Caen and from villages in the British 6th Airborne Division area (east of the Canal de l’Orne) to the north of the city. Most of the 1,500 refugees were taken directly to the ARAC at Amblie. Some 215 were badly wounded and they were sent to civilian medical stations in Bayeux. Others who were lightly wounded were helped at Amblie by RAMC and local Secours National staff. Despite, the upheaval, normal life carried on for many refugees, with three babies being delivered in the few days the civilians were at the camp. By mid-June, all of the refugees at the ARAC had been dispersed. Some shortfalls in equipment, such as bedding, had been discovered, but this was often addressed using captured German equipment.

By the end of June, Allied refugee camps were running at full throttle as new Allied offensives took place and the liberation of Caen was anticipated. Across the British sector, the three CRTCs handled 5,522 refugees and the ARAC 1,995 by 9 July. Just over half of refugees coming through British camps were
children. Other refugees of all ages were handled by the French themselves. The *Secours National* at Rue Royale in Bayeux had by 19 June dispersed 4,000 refugees since D-Day and was presently caring for a further 2,000.\(^{35}\) The increase in numbers was starting to present problems. Some of these were specific. Increased numbers of refugees were being encountered in the narrow British 8 Corps area to the west of Caen, where they had no spare room for a CRTC. British 30 Corps offered a site in their area.\(^{36}\) An offer that was accepted and the third CRTC established. On the eve of the liberation of Caen, there were now three CRTCs (at Cresserons, Conde-sur-Seulles/Château Ducy and Fontaine-Henri) and one ARAC (at Amble) in the British sector. However, despite the third CRTC, there was not enough accommodation to meet any surges. Surges could be caused in two ways, by an influx of refugees and by the backlog caused by not being able to find local dispersal accommodation fast enough. CRTCs even with the use of barns could only cope with 200 refugees staying overnight and ARACs by using barns and PW detachment tents could accommodate no more than 1,000 for slightly longer periods.\(^{37}\)

Previous work in mid-June estimated that there was dispersal accommodation for up to 4,000 available in Bayeux, together with facilities for up to 1,000 casualties.\(^{38}\) By the beginning of July, many of these places had been taken. Consequently, detachments were asked provide reports on the amount and location of spare dispersal accommodation in their area. To get a sense of scale, detachments were also asked to supply estimates of how many refugees were already dispersed in their areas. Many refugees had, of course, been accommodated directly and without the help of Civil Affairs, through local French administration.\(^{39}\) Additionally, detachments were asked to seek out more localised solutions for refugee dispersal, thus avoiding the use of CRTCs.\(^{40}\) Along with more accommodation went the need for more resources. It was estimated that an additional 5,000 blankets were needed for refugee camps and civilian hospitals. There were similar requirements for eating and cooking utensils and for water boilers.\(^{41}\) The pressure on staff was also starting to tell and only partly relieved by the arrival of American medics, further RAMC orderlies and local French staff.\(^{42}\) However, with such pressure also came experience. It was noted in the war diary of No. 205 (Refugee) Detachment both that “all personnel showing an improvement in the handling of their duties as a result of the practical experience gained” and that new ideas for handling the throughput were being developed.\(^{43}\)

**Caen**

The liberation of Caen in the second week of July was a turning point for the handling of refugees by Civil Affairs. It was the first occasion that significant numbers were handled. It came at a time when the French authorities wanted to do more, had been doing more, were trusted to more and provided an opportunity for the Allies to do less. It also came at a time when the capacity of the CRTCs, the ARAC and French arrangements to accommodate refugees were close to saturation point. Furthermore, following the liberation of Caen there were significant pressures to get the population away from this still embattled...
city and many arranged their own flight. That something of a drama developed was hardly surprising, but a drama does not always make a crisis. The failure of certain Civil Affairs components did not spell the failure of the organisation. Lessons, however, were learnt.

As early as 20 June, at a meeting between Lewis and Coulet, a mutual desire emerged for the French to take on greater responsibility regarding refugees. They were to be responsible for registration, dispersal and the eventual homeward return of refugees. By the end of the month, certain aspects of refugee work were automatically regarded as a French concern, such running the missing persons’ bureau. In planning for the liberation of Caen, Gaullist authorities’ arrangements included the employment of 30 local vehicles to carry fresh meat, milk and butter into the city. Civil Affairs happily assisted this by providing passes to speed passage through military checkpoints. French plans also included the establishment in Bayeux of two French surgical teams comprising of ten doctors and 40 nurses ready to receive casualties from the city or if considered a better option to be called forward by British Second Army.

However, it was the first real test for the French in dealing with an incident both remotely and in a battlefield. Indeed, in Civil Affairs post-operational assessments, whilst the French plans for Caen were viewed as decent, their execution was complicated by the needs of military operations. Such was the determination of the Gaullists to be responsible for their public that initial Allied involvement in co-ordination was stymied as the French eagerly got on with what they thought was best. Some clumsy decisions were made that could have been avoided if Civil Affairs had been consulted, including the decision to merely move refugees from Caen to nearby but already overcrowded towns and villages. Compounding problems was the lack of any coherent structure to the methods of communication in either Bayeux or Caen.

In addition, to the reports compiled by Civil Affairs detachments on the availability of local accommodation, other preparations were made by the organisation for the liberation of Caen. One such was the establishment of an independent Civil Affairs transport pool. This was to take relief forward into Caen. Other forward moving military motor transport was, of course, required to support combat needs. The pool was established by taking a single 3-ton lorry from five detachments for a period of 48 hours. Three vehicles were to carry rations, a fourth cooking equipment and coal, and the fifth refugee camp equipment. A further five 3-ton lorries were available at twelve hours notice to lift more rations. When Caen was liberated on 9 July and acting on Civil Affairs advice from within the city, three lorries carrying 14,000 rations went forward at 1830hrs. Feeding equipment arrived on 10 July along with a further 20,000 rations. The value of the pool was immediately recognised.

However, establishing a more permanent arrangement after Caen proved difficult. There were simply not enough drivers and modern vehicles available within 21st Army Group. Nevertheless, such was the value of it that the improvised pool was regenerated with nine vehicles on 24 July and by mid-August was at between 19 and 24 vehicles. In the period between 24 July and 31
August, the column travelled 56,575 miles and carried 1,009 tons and 1,040 persons.\textsuperscript{54} However, by the end of August, the creation of the French transport companies provided much of the forward bulk lift capacity required by Civil Affairs.

Using the pool to take refugee equipment and relief forward into Caen in early July was in many ways a step change for Civil Affairs. Of course, it reflected the need to deal with desperate humanitarian conditions expected within the city, but if it was clear of enemy, as many hoped it would be, then it was an excellent means of preventing refugee problems leaving the city. By getting the population of Caen to standfast then military use of roads into Caen that were already blocked by the huge amount of debris caused by pre-liberation bombing raids was facilitated. Pressure on saturated refugee camps would also be averted. However, it would only work if Caen was safe enough for the refugees to stay.

By the time of the liberation, it was known that the majority of the city’s estimated 62,500 inhabitants had been encouraged by both German orders and Allied bombing to leave the city, most departing in the direction of Trun.\textsuperscript{55} What was not known was the exact number of those who had stayed. Although, it was known that, through pre-arrangement with the Allies, a safe area around the Lycée Malherbe had been established, no one was certain how many or in what condition they were.\textsuperscript{56}

The first substantial report, made at 2300 hrs on 9 July by No. 201 Civil Affairs Detachment, indicated that there were between 20,000 and 25,000 civilians still in Caen, 2,500 were dead, 1,000 wounded.\textsuperscript{57} Most of these figures proved to be slightly exaggerated. Numbers of dead caused during immediate period of the liberation (as opposed to those killed during raids on and around D-Day) were later revised downwards to an estimated 700 people.\textsuperscript{58} Some contemporary estimates put total deaths for the population of Caen (including the raids on and after D-Day, the liberation and those from Caen killed elsewhere) at 1,967 people and close to the accepted 1944 calculation of 2,000.\textsuperscript{59} Other recent estimates put the figure at 600 killed during the raids at lunchtime on 6 June (despite leaflets encouraging citizens to move out of the city, with the cancellation of school many stayed at home at home with their children during this uncertain period), 200 killed by raids on 7 June, 350 killed during the liberation and a further 233 who died of wounds sustained after the liberation, putting the total closer to 1,400.\textsuperscript{60} These can be compared to an estimated figure of 3,000 French killed on D-Day and D+1 (approximately the same number as American servicemen killed on D-Day) and a total of 19,890 during the liberation of the French region. The latter figure has been equated to equal twenty-nine percent of the 70,000 (some put the figure closer to 60,000)\textsuperscript{61} French killed by Allied air raids during the Second World War. Most French killed in Normandy died as the result of air raids.\textsuperscript{62}

However, other studies put the number of French deaths during the liberation of Normandy at 13,632, including 7,557 in Calvados.\textsuperscript{63} One study using French sources, has calculated that 15,000 Normans were killed during the battle along with a further 19,000 killed during the air raids in the months of 1944 prior to
the landings. The 19,000 pre-D-Day figure is disputed by others who put it closer to 11,000, but even this above the 10,000 limit desired by a Churchill mindful of avoiding potential problems with the French population and authorities. That such difference emerge is not surprising as firstly, numbers vary depending on which start date used and secondly which departments are included (or excluded) in the definition of the region of Normandy. Wartime Normandy included the heavily bombed cities of Rouen, Lisieux and Le Havre that since the war sit within Upper Normandy.

The number remaining in the Caen was equally difficult to estimate. Some Allied figures suggested that 12 to 16,000 had remained until liberation, of which 10,000 were on relief, 3,000 were refugees and 500 were displaced persons. French figures suggested the number was 18,000, a figure used by some Allied reports. Counting was not helped by the dispersal of inhabitants to stone mines around the city immediately prior to the liberation (some 10-12,000, with some figures of 15,000 moved into mines at Fleury-sur-Orne and La Maladrerie) and the continued movement out of city following it. One rather poignant note associated with those liberated was discovery of the only surviving member of Caen’s 210-strong Jewish population. The woman was sent to stay with another survivor from Bayeux for comfort and given support from the Rabbi at British Second Army headquarters.

Assessments of Caen indicated that there was only accommodation standing for 8,000 people. By the end of the battle of Normandy, 125,000 inhabitants of Calvados were listed as war victims, including 76,000 who had lost everything including their homes.

The picture that met Civil Affairs was indeed one of devastation (most utilities were not restored until September), but the welcome was described as enthusiastic (See Map E1.7: Extent of War Damage to Caen at Appendix E). Furthermore, hospitals and relief systems worked well, if in need of supplies. Bread supplies had been under pressure from 6 June when as preparation for events to come both French and Germans besieged bakers. Mains water supplies had virtually cease and old wells like those at Église Saint-Etienne were re-established. Prior to the landings, planning by the local Défense Passive (principally made up of the youth of the city) had established a system of surgical teams (six were activated on 6 June), casualty reception centres (such as Hospice des Petites Soeurs des Pauvres) and a main operating centre (Bon-Sauveur). The development of these plans was only encouraged by events in Caen following the landings. Medical supplies were seized by police from pharmacies and surgeries, although most German medical facilities had moved to Falaise by the time of the city’s liberation. Vichy authorities from Paris were also able to assist sending some 250 tons of relief and many millions of francs in the month prior to the city’s liberation.

The medical work at the Bon-Sauveur was noted as particularly praiseworthy. There were no epidemics. There were just a few cases of scarlet fever. The impressive standards of relief, accommodation and welfare provided to several thousand at the Lycée Malherbe and Église Saint-Etienne were also noted (looking after in excess of 3,000 refugees and caring for a further 1,700 after liberation). There was a rudimentary fire service, and soon supported by the
extra capacity of the Army Fire Service. Water was available, but pumps were required. Banks were still able to function. A basic supply of food was available from destroyed houses, wholesale grocers and the near environs (meat from cattle killed during bombardment, milk, cheese and butter were brought in under gunfire until just prior to the liberation). It was fortunate that the grocers located in Caen were not badly damaged by the raids. However, for the long term the prognosis was poor. French sources suggested that food stocks were likely to last only a few days. Exacerbating, the supply problems were badly blocked roads and little serviceable transport.\textsuperscript{75}

Some of these problems were addressed locally with Civil Affairs assistance. On 10 July, No. 219 (Refugee) Detachment was sent forward to assist. On arrival, it was clear, that there was a need for soap (30 cases), de-lousing powder and 100 gallons of creosote (for latrines). In exceeding usual relief limits with these quantities, special permission was granted to the detachment by British Second Army.\textsuperscript{76} From 12 July, various measures were put into place to restore some basic water and sewerage services in the city, clear rubble from streets, remove bodies and dispose of unexploded ordnance. Civil Affairs closely co-operated with the two Royal Engineer companies, two pioneer companies, No. 1 Group, Canadian Royal Engineers and two bomb disposal squads sent to Caen in best using what limited spare capacity they had available to help with these civilian needs.\textsuperscript{77}

However, it was apparent within hours of arrival that the city was still vulnerable to enemy mortar bomb and shellfire. Matters got worse over the next few days. In the first seven days after liberation, Civil Affairs calculated that 26 inhabitants were killed and a further 221 injured.\textsuperscript{78} Many citizens were extremely keen to leave and many did so by their own means. In general, their willingness to leave related very closely to the level of enemy activity. When the city was not being shelled most wanted to stay and when the bombardment recommenced many grabbed at any chance to leave the city. This resulted in periods of near chaos and panic.\textsuperscript{79} Indeed, an outbreak of general panic was judged at times to be very close, most notably at night. To an extent panic was calmed by reassuring messages and information broadcast from speaker vans, by Civil Affairs presence in the main refugee area around the Lycée Malherbe (there were few Allied armoured vehicles in this area that might do so otherwise), by the steadfastly reassuring nature of the senior most Civil Affairs officer in the city, Colonel Charles Usher, and by the bringing of French medical teams forward.\textsuperscript{80}

Such measures could only go so far and the numbers leaving increased. Some, 1,500 were thought to have left by their own means by 14 July and the uncontrolled nature of this exit had “created some embarrassment by blocking essential roads.”\textsuperscript{81} The establishment of 22 checkpoints helped to stem, but not solve, this problem.\textsuperscript{82} Official evacuation seemed both sensible and necessary.\textsuperscript{83} The evacuation was thus a spontaneous reaction to events, it was driven by reasons of humanity and military need and it was further encouraged by increased shelling of the city on 14 July.\textsuperscript{84} Initial plans to remove 3,000 from the city were now increased to 5,000. An overwhelming sense of urgency took over
leading to previous Corps refugee control measures being ignored. By 15 July, some 3,000 refugees had been officially evacuated since the liberation. If self-evacuation was added, it was estimated that 9,700 (including 800 wounded, sick and infirm) had now left Caen. An estimated 7,000 to 10,000 remained, 2,000 of these residing south of the River Orne in the stone mines at Fleury-sur-Orne.

Getting refugees out of Caen by official means had proved difficult even before the decision was made to increase numbers. It got worse. Few refugees were given security checks. There were no safe locations for assembly. There was insufficient stationary for registration. The French authorities in Caen whilst co-operative were prone to making “enthusiastic,” but unauthorised and ill co-ordinated decisions as to who was to leave and when. Civilian transport (used by many) was unreliable making it difficult to predict pace of movement. Attempts to send refugees to where there were spaces were thwarted by refugees insisting their drivers took them to (typically) Bayeux where many had friends or relations (or thought it was safe). Preparation, even establishment of many reception centres had not been completed in time for the movement. Numbers had been underestimated of elderly, sick and infirm that required some form of ambulance or specialist care. Few checks for disease were made before departure. Communications from the French authorities in Bayeux were slow and imprecise in identifying locations for refugee dispersal. Unsurprisingly, disproportionate numbers were sent to destinations like Douvres-la-Délivrande for dispersal (an easy route out of the city and close to many refugee camps), who were unable to cope and consequently attempted to prevent new arrivals. By 15 July, all available dispersal accommodation was saturated. Amongst the CRTCs and ARAC, there was no co-ordinating officer at Army level to manage the distribution of refugees. Lines of Communication headquarters continued to insist that the coastal strip was kept free of refugees for reasons of security and logistical mobility. Capable as they were, CRTCs and the ARAC were finding it difficult to cope with the combined effects of influx and backlog. The surge was too great for the resources available.

The backlog was the key problem. The French were simply not finding enough dispersal accommodation fast enough. To an extent, measures were found within the British sector. Amblie was increased to cope with 2,000 (1,200 more than normal) refugees and a fourth CRTC was established at Bussy, near Bayeux that could accommodate 1,500 more (in both cases Lines of Communication provided the additional resources). However, this was not enough. A short-term fix was needed to cope with the expected numbers and this came in the form of transporting new refugees to the American sector. In fact, many refugees had already quietly moved there of their own accord, but this official request was not welcomed by the Americans.

Yet, on the insistence of 21st Army Group, under whose command they came, a limit of 4,000 refugees was agreed. From 17 July, refugees were evacuated from Amblie and Bussy to Barfleur on the northern coast of Manche (107km from Amblie) at a rate of 30-40 lorry-loads per night (See Map E1.5 at Appendix E). On 19 July, evacuation to the American sector was suspended as numbers at Amblie and Bussy had become manageable (400 more elderly and children
were taken to Barfleur from the mines at Fleury-sur-Orne at the end of July). By now, matters in the British sector had been improved by spare accommodation being made available from Allied sources, by the French authorities enforcing compulsory billeting in Bayeux, by the establishment of a joint Anglo-French refugee co-ordinating committee in Bayeux, and by the easing of conditions in Caen.90

The use of Barfleur provided the time to find better answers to problems in the British sector, but it also revealed further shortfalls in the British evacuation system. The movement by convoy was slapdash. One refugee arrived dead, there was no list of who was sent and there were American doubts as to the quality or even existence of medical and security checks. Consequently, American medical and security specialists were sent into the British sector to screen refugees.91 Many obvious lessons were learnt from the evacuation, including the need for better information, better communication, better preparation, better control measures, better registration, better screening and better co-ordination. The key lesson from the point of view of Canadian First Army was to decide on a policy, let everyone know what it was and stick to it.92

Many of these lessons were heeded. Co-ordination was improved with the creation of a French “commissioner for refugees” (who was to nominate in advance of liberation a local point of contact and co-ordinator through whom other agencies worked thus avoiding the chaos of Caen), the joint committee in Bayeux, a 21st Army Group refugee committee (meeting weekly) and an Army level committee (meeting daily).93 Having observed events in Caen, Canadian First Army Civil Affairs decided to create a refugee section on their staff.94 At a more basic level, the need to provide hot cocoa and coffee to refugees, rather than unfamiliar British Army tea, during transit was viewed as a good way of maintaining morale in trying circumstances.95 Despite the pressures on refugees there appear to have been very few incidents of squabbling between them.96

Once the fighting around the city had subsided, the short-term problem was managing the return home of post-liberation refugees. The medium-term problem was managing the return of the tens of thousands that had been evacuated by the Germans to the south and south east of the city. The short-term problem had to contend with both the need to get labour into Caen to support the Allied campaign and the likely turmoil caused as inhabitants flooded the rather obvious, but militarily important routes back into the city. By 25 July, the stream of workers from both the British and American sectors going back into Caen was in full flow. The messy and uncontrolled nature of the return was described by No. 208 Detachment as “completely balled up.”97 Many inhabitants did not wait to be co-ordinated by either the Allies or the joint refugee committee in Bayeux. Whilst Civil Affairs attempted to arrange a more co-ordinated return, substantial efforts by Military Police and French police were made in keeping the routes clear.98 Messy and inconvenient as it was, the return was not as worrying as the prospect of the return of greater numbers still under German control. Their potential impact on Caen, whose accommodation and roads were needed by the military, and most importantly their likely impact on Allied mobility south of the city were of great concern.

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The Germans had evacuated not just Caen, but also many of the communes running south west and east of the city. Captured documents revealed that the Germans had ordered the evacuation from 7 July of 35 communes in the area between Bretteville-sur-Odon to Le-Bény-Bocage and encompassing areas as far north as Tilly-sur-Seulles. The inhabitants were moved first to south of the line Saint-Sever-Calvados to Vire to Falaise and then 15 km further south to below the line Sourdeval to Flers to Argentan (See Map E1.6: Civilian Evacuation and Stop Lines in Normandy at Appendix E). Later intelligence indicated that from here there was a further movement to south of the line Rennes to Domfront to Alençon. Although orders were given by German that anyone found remaining in the area to be shot, other aspects of the evacuation were surprisingly generous as there were no restrictions on baggage, the Germans even purchased both food and any cattle that could not be moved, and rear parties (of farmers and administrators) were left as late as 25 July. Reports of such convoys were confirmed in British 12 Corps Civil Affairs intelligence summaries, with columns that appeared to comply with the above procedures, moving south between the Rivers Laize and Odon on 30 and 31 July (See Map E1.4 at Appendix E). The reports were confirmed by “reliable” French sources from Mayenne on 11 August, which also indicated that there were refugee reception centres at locations including Tincebray and Trun. It was reported that 72,000 civilians under German guidance had passed south through Tincebray. Although certain aspects of the German evacuation plan were interrupted by American military thrusts southwards, as the British sector expanded, the scale of the evacuation was confirmed. Later, the area between Caen, Falaise, Vire and Caumont-l’Éventé was described as having been to subject much devastation and population displacement. Modern estimates suggest that from 6 June onwards over 100,000 inhabitants fled their homes in Calvados, at least one quarter of the pre-war population. The vast majority of these inevitably fled south.

Whilst, evacuation was thought likely by pre-D-Day intelligence, much of the detail only started to become known towards the end of July and more completely at the beginning of August. In the American sector, the first indications of the German evacuation had come when no officials were found at the liberation of La Haye-du-Puits on 12 July, but the details of where they had gone emerged only later. From captured mail and speaking to the authorities in Caen, it was clear that many of the city’s inhabitants had been evacuated in the direction of Trun. Furthermore, the few inhabitants encountered as the campaign developed and air intelligence helped to provide further detail. It was clear that detachments and refugee camps would need to be flexible in responding to the developing picture.

As the two armies of 21st Army Group moved gradually south and west of Caen from mid-July, the scale of the evacuation and as well as that of destruction was increasingly noticeable. In Tourville-sur-Odon, only 50 inhabitants remained a
third of the pre-war population. Aunay-sur-Odon was totally destroyed and Villers Bocage was not far behind. In Épinaÿ-sur-Odon, 24 remained out of 446. At Baron-sur-Odon, ten remained out of 216. At Évrecy none remained of the 759 (For a survey of population changes and habitability in British sector of Normandy, 22 July to 31 August 1944 see Table M1.1 at Appendix M). However, by contrast other locations were under considerable refugee pressure. Caumont-l’Éventé had to cope with both its own refugees (unusually for a town in the Odon valley area it had not been evacuated by the Germans) and those from neighbouring areas (See Illustration K1.1: Report on State of Accommodation, Population and Livestock Around Caumont L’Éventé, 31 July 1944 at Appendix K). Le-Bény-Bocage was found to be in a similar position.105 Yet, in the area of advance, south to the line Flers to Falaise, very few inhabitants were encountered by 21st Army Group.106 To the west of Caen and during the same period, Canadian First Army had similar experiences in finding the area largely depopulated.107 Given the low numbers encountered, the work of Civil Affairs in refugee terms was largely uncomplicated and this provided an opportunity for the manpower of CRTCs and ARAC to be reassessed. Many of the RAMC and all of the PW detachment staff now departed, their places being filled by French medical, pioneer and administration staff (Britain provided these French “Territorial” units with most of their equipment), together with Civil Affairs staff from unused detachments.108 Rather greater refugee numbers began to be expected and were encountered from the second week of August. This was a key time in the battle of Normandy as the German Seventh Army began to be squeezed by the advancing Allies into the Falaise Pocket (a diminishing area between Flers, Falaise, Argentan and Trun, see Map E1.6 at Appendix E). The opportunity to inflict a serious blow against the enemy could not be missed and any aspect that might deteriorate this blow, such as the inhibiting factor of refugee movement, needed to be avoided. Once the battle of the Falaise Pocket was over (16 to 20 August), the pursuit of what remaining elements of the German forces there were to the River Seine was equally important. Here the need to ensure that military logistical support to the rapidly advancing Allies was maintained became of key importance. Supply routes and maintenance areas required as much effort in being kept clear of refugees as the battlefield before and arguably, more so with the greater likelihood of return now the area was apparently safe.

By the second week of August, a series of Civil Affairs contingency plans had been established to deal with the expected mass return of refugees. These included the establishment, with French advice, of food dumps from 15 August on the line from Flers to Falaise (at the end of August, the French also established stockpiles of food in the area109). Refugees were to be directed to these if as expected they made their way back north from south of the line Rennes to Domfront to Alençon. These dumps were to be supported by multiple refugee reception points, notices of their existence and information points where directions and advice was to be given by French officials and Civil Affairs staff. As a supporting measure, the ARAC of British Second Army was to move to near Flers and be ready from 19 August.110 As a means of detachments keeping
both refugees at collecting points and healthy during the related Operation TOTALIZE (in the first part of August in the area of the Caen to Falaise road) the SCAO of Canadian 2 Corps made it clear that, they were to carry extra stocks of “anti-louse powder, biscuits and tinned milk and cocoa.” Refugee movement was not simply expected from those who had be evacuated or fled south, it was also likely to come from those who had moved, or been moved, north into the liberated area and wished to move back south. Detachments in these areas, including No. 208 Detachment, were to help ensure that French police patrols and if necessary their own interventions prevented refugees moving south of the line Estry (north of Vire) to Caen (see Map E1.6 at Appendix E).

West of Flers, the first significant numbers of refugees (7,000) was encountered when at German refugee camp in Chanu was liberated on 17 August. Furthermore, the town’s mayor suggested that a further 30,000 refugees had recently passed through the town. Some 2,000 were found in farms at La CARNEILLE having been evacuated from Condé-sur-Noireau. In both cases, standfast orders were given whilst local dispersal was contemplated. Nevertheless, at Chanu essential workers were soon allowed to return to Tinchebray and 400 farmers were quickly returned to their farms. With Condé-sur-Noireau badly damaged, it was decided to keep 1,000 at La Carneille. Elsewhere, around 500 refugees were found in an iron mine at L’Aunay. The speed of work now possible in refugee handling was impressive, two-thirds of those at Chanu had been interviewed by a Field Security Section in a single day. However, the usual Civil Affairs demands for de-lousing powder, sprayers, ambulances and French nurses remained.

Some of the refugee pockets presented Civil Affairs officers with dramatic challenges. On 13 August, at Saint-Pierre-la-Vieille, north of Condé-sur-Noireau, Captain Owner and French liaison officer Captain Mollet extracted 17 refugees (including some extremely elderly French ladies) under fire near the frontline. They later captured six Germans and located an enemy tank, complete with working radio. On 15 August, American Captain (sometimes recorded as Second Lieutenant and even Major) Colin H. MacDiarmid located and dealt with 1,600 refugees in a railway tunnel near Condé-sur-Noireau (see section below).

Refugees were not simply found in fixed locations, many were starting to return to their homes further north. Reports started to come in of refugees moving into Chanu from the American sector to the south and west. On 18 August, there were reports of military movement being hindered along local roads near Flers by refugees returning home. The particular problem was refugees using slow and unpredictable horse-drawn carts. French authorities were told by Civil Affairs to move the carts off the roads and only move off again when given permission to do so later that evening. Following their standfast, these mobile refugee groups were to be sent to nearby villages for the duration of the current operation (French authorities did issue standstill orders to refugees, but they only tended to work if the authorities had good communications with local representatives in the areas concerned). However, soon, with the arrival of these refugees, many villages reached saturation point.

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To prevent further movement back onto military roads, village mayors were asked to find accommodation in nearby villages. However, as these too became saturated the French authorities were asked to establish three holding centres, with Civil Affairs assistance, on north bound routes near Condé-sur-Noireau. The centres were joined by a French-run refugee camp at Épinay-sur-Odon (south of Villers-Bocage) at the end of August. To allow some movement for people (especially farmers) keen to return home, refugee routes were established that avoided routes used by the military. These were largely enforced by French police. Now with better numbers and greater reliability (together with armbands for new recruits supplied by Civil Affairs) their general success rates provided further evidence of the growing capacity of the French authorities.

The intensity of the Civil Affairs task in controlling the movement of refugees in both Canadian First Army and British Second Army areas was recorded in many Civil Affairs detachment war diaries. No. 207 Detachment working with British 51st Highland Division in the Canadian First Army area at Bretteville-sur-Dives to the south-west of Caen recorded both the intensity of work on 19 August and how well it was appreciated:

Extremely busy all day preventing refugees from clogging traffic on roads vital to troop movement. In spite of all difficulties such a problem presents all roads were kept clear... 2100 Major Filardi as Det. Commander was thanked by General Rennie... Commander 51st H. Div. personally for the good work performed in this connection.

Similarly hard work was recorded on the same day in the British 49th Division area, where one Military Police sergeant and three lance corporals worked with Civil Affairs and Field Security to control the movement of refugees from north of the Mézidon-Canon to Vimont road. Elsewhere, reports came of 2,000 refugees discovered near Falaise, 3,000 around Saint-Pierre-sur-Dives and 2,000 close to Mézidon-Canon in the period to 16 August. At Trun on 21 August, a Civil Affairs detachment of Canadian 2 Corps found a camp run by a mayor at which he had prepositioned food ready for the turbulent times of the Allied advance. The camp of 100 refugees was entirely self-run, the food was described as excellent, it had medical staff, cooks, a barber and the mayor merely needed help in organisation as too many of refugees wanted to "run the show." Overall, by 23 August, the refugee problems across Canadian First Army front were less pronounced.

Behind the advancing troops came the Maintenance Areas and associated Roadheads. Keeping these clear of refugees was deemed particularly important for reasons of security and logistical mobility. Preventative action was taken to ensure that these areas were especially well protected from refugees. To protect the Rear Maintenance Area around Bayeux, in the second half of August it was ordered that there was to be no further dispersal of refugees north of the line Balleroy to Tilly-sur-Seulles to Caen. In establishing the No. 1 Cushion (a form of roadhead) of the Canadian First Army on 21 August to the west of Falaise, efforts were made to keep the area clear of refugees. British 12 Corps Civil Affairs orders given on 22 August, which emphasised the cushion area between
Condé-sur-Noireau, Thury-Harcourt and Falaise was to be kept clear of civilian movement. Anyone found trying to enter was to be ordered to standfast and had to accept hard living, until military operations had moved on.\textsuperscript{130}

Several refugee collection points were established along to the southern edge of the Corps area to help achieve the aim (they were joined by a series of French administered control posts using resistance fighters along the line Vassy to Potigny preventing movement from the west and north\textsuperscript{131}). The establishment of checkpoints involved close co-operation between Civil Affairs and Military Police of British 53\textsuperscript{rd} Division. Checkpoints were situated on all main roads from the south. In addition, Civil Affairs reconnoitred suitable good locations for collection points and erected signs accordingly. Whilst, divisional transport continued to be used in transporting refugees, they were increasingly assisted in doing so by French police. To make life as tolerable as possible for the refugees at the collection points, each was issued with 2,000 rations, de-lousing powder, soap and creosote. Medical facilities and related transport were also available courtesy of the 12 Corps Civil Affairs refugee detachment.\textsuperscript{132} Later similar procedures were used to protect British Second Army’s No. 4 Roadhead that opened on 26 August north-west of Laigle. As the Allied breakout matured, the decision of where to locate collection points was made easier by sending spare Civil Affairs detachments to Flers and Argentan to pick up intelligence on likely refugee movements.\textsuperscript{133}

The return home for many refugees was in most cases physically exhausting. Civil Affairs detachments noted that the lack of French transport did not help. Nevertheless, Civil Affairs did attempt to help by suggesting the best routes to take that avoided military areas.\textsuperscript{134} Even when refugees had made it back home, they found that if their homes had survived other threats such as mines and booby traps remained.\textsuperscript{135}

Inevitably, mixed views appeared on the efficacy of the control of refugees south of Caen. At least one report indicated that the problem encountered was not as bad as had been contemplated.\textsuperscript{136} An estimated 70,000 French inhabitants were evacuated by the withdrawing German forces.\textsuperscript{137} Yet, most of these were to return after the Allied crossing of the River Seine. By the second week of September, the population in Caen was estimated to be at 30,000 and a further 25,000 were waiting to return.\textsuperscript{138} However, it was also true that the still large movement of several thousands, particularly into the rural areas south-west of the city, was effectively controlled. Overall, it was deemed by Civil Affairs at British Second Army that refugee movement had caused little embarrassment to the military as the result of the measures put in place.\textsuperscript{139} General Rennie was one who would agree. Furthermore, that such measures had been considered and planned and, moreover, were by now benefitted by experience meant that the ghost of 1940 had been put to rest. In any case, this was just the beginning of such mass movement of people. Later, 50,355 refugees were encountered in Nord, 18,000 in Pas de Calais and 18,845 in Somme.\textsuperscript{140} By 11 November, across liberated North West Europe, 461,060 refugees and 51,490 displaced persons had been uncovered.\textsuperscript{141} Greater numbers still were encountered in 1945. Such
large numbers of refugees clearly needed to be managed and experience in France indicated what could be done.

The relative benefits of the stay put compared to the evacuate policies re-emerged during the Ardennes offensive later in 1944. Here the Allied Civil Affairs needed to consider what to do with the civilian population when withdrawing from a previously liberated area. Whilst, evacuation had its merits the speed of the German offensive together with shortages of Allied transport (not to mention command and control failures) made stay put the only option. In retrospect, it was considered by Lewis at British Second Army that if the River Meuse had been crossed the likely panic would have required drastic action by Civil Affairs to keep military roads clear.142

SUPPORTING FORMATIONS

How best to serve military and their own needs was a constant debate for Civil Affairs. Working with senior formations made sense because the overview provided enabled detachments to be used efficiently and there were benefits of being the senior commander’s toy. However, if timely responses were needed then working a lower formation level made sense as a detachment was closer to the event and in touch with tactical intelligence. It was also helpful that Civil Affairs was seen to serve the needs of the frontline commanders. Then there were the needs of the organisation. It needed to consider civilian as well as military boundaries.143 Civilian problems could easily occur away from battlefield events. The obvious compromise seemed to be the Corps level, which had a sufficiently large area for Civil Affairs to get their teeth into, but was also close enough to the action to respond to problems quickly. Of course, certain detachments worked at Army and Lines of Communication level in providing refugee support or support to a French department, but in forward areas and for the spearhead detachments, the focus was on the Corps. This contrasted with the Americans who had both staff and detachment associations down to the divisional level.

With the focus of so much of spearhead work on managing refugee problems, good intelligence was invaluable. In early July, it was identified that close liaison by detachments with formations was essential to keeping detachments in the picture as to refugee movements.144 This heralded an era when it became fashionable for detachments to be assigned to a division either for a single operation or on a semi-permanent basis. The link was broken when either the division or Corps moved to another part of the frontline, but the detachment remained. Furthermore, the relationship was not a straightforward one, as a number of Civil Affairs officers were unfamiliar the aim and purpose of different types of formation. In the case of British 8 Corps, this required briefing notes to be sent out to help clarify the differences between armoured, tank and infantry divisions.145

In the case of British 1 Corps, such policy was evident from the end of June. Indeed, orders from (the cancelled) Operation ABERLOUR in late June 1944 specified that Civil Affairs spearhead detachments were to move with divisions
to establish “immediate control in inhabited places as they are secured.” Individual detachments were then detailed off to be attached to each of the infantry divisions. They were to maintain the “closest touch with divisional staffs in order to give maximum assistance in accordance with the operational situation.”146 In British 30 Corps, also in late June, Civil Affairs liaison officers from spearhead detachments worked directly with divisions, with Major R.J.E. Trefusis of No. 213 Detachment supporting 7th Armoured and 50th Divisions and American Captain Colin H. MacDiarmid with 49th Division.147 Such close contact with formations in the attack was seen as part of the fundamental work of Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs spearhead detachments in the British 30 Corps area were instructed to be prepared to:

- Carry out normal routine duties of visiting and getting to know all about each commune in their area (i.e., food, refugee potential, transport, etc.);
- and also to move forward automatically with the battle, so as to carry out CA duties immediately towns and villages are liberated, including contacting mayor or his representative, getting local administration going again, posting proclamations, etc..148

The battlefield relationship between the responsibilities of a spearhead detachment and the formation it served were outlined by Civil Affairs staff at British 30 Corps area in early August. Here detachments were told to keep in contact with formation commanders to find out both where civilians were and the routes they could and could not use. Detachment staff was to be divided between liaison officers moving forward with the brigades (if this was desired by the division), the staff of the collecting point and the officer commanding (and some support) at either divisional MAIN or REAR headquarters. No part of the spearhead detachment was to be further back than the REAR divisional headquarters. When the liberated area became stable, the detachment headquarters was to set up in the town or village that made the most suitable centre. If the formation was able to exploit further forward, a rear party could be left behind as the main part of the detachment moved forward. In large areas, it was possible for two centres to be established to oversee local civilian needs. On the consolidation of an area, detachments were to ensure that differences between divisional and communal boundaries were properly co-ordinated with neighbouring detachments.149

Closer working relations with divisions were not always easy in practical terms. In late July, detachments in British 8 Corps area found that there were practical problems in working with the MAIN headquarters of an armoured division. It was not always possible for a detachment to remain alongside such a headquarters as it moved about the battlefield. Instead, it was viewed as a better to remain with either the REAR headquarters or, the even more “sensible” option, the associated infantry brigade. Nevertheless, a liaison officer on his motorcycle was to remain in contact with MAIN headquarters. However, in broader terms too close a contact with a division was viewed as potentially distorting the purpose of a Civil Affairs detachment. By working for a Corps, the detachment was free to go to where the problems were, not to where the divisional headquarters needed to locate itself.150 Furthermore, if a detachment
found itself fixed by local demands, then it would not be torn by the need to stick with the division. Instead, the Corps was large enough to be able to send another detachment either to leapfrog forward or to take on the localised burden. In both cases, the focus remained on solving the civilian problems on the battlefield.

As the campaign pushed south towards Flers and Falaise, the utility of close links with divisions was questioned still further. Links were required for reasons of intelligence, as Civil Affairs instructions for Operation BLUECOAT indicated, however, being tied to a division, but having Corps responsibilities often provided unnecessary complication (For an idea of the complexities of Civil Affairs detachment relations see Illustration N1.1: Re-Arrangement of Civil Affairs Detachments During Period of Corps and Divisional Exchange of Battlefronts, 21 July to 4 August 1944 at Appendix N). Furthermore, with the larger areas now being encountered, there was much more for detachments to do in the way reconnaissance and reporting. As a result, leapfrogging became increasingly the norm.

Elsewhere, some confusion was becoming evident on the rear boundaries of Army areas as Lines of Communication detachments came forward to take over responsibility. An adjustment was needed to the pattern of detachments in order to ease the workload, to provide a clearer division of labour and to reflect better the more normal civilian conditions in the coastal area. As a result it was agreed on 12 August by British Second Army, Canadian First Army and Lines of Communication that four types of detachment were now required. As before there were five detachments available for refugee work (four CRTC and one ARAC, British 8 Corps did not have a CRTC and Canadian First Army did not have an ARAC). Three detachments were to work with prefects and six detachments would work with sub-prefects. These would leapfrog forward as new French administrative areas were liberated and handed over from the spearhead detachments. Three spearhead detachments were to be attached to each Corps and an additional one attached to Lines of Communication to safeguard their interests in the area of the coastal belt. The three spearhead detachments were to work with divisions (as General Rennie’s comments indicated) where necessary, but the emphasis was now rather more on serving the Corps area. A further adjustment was made in August when as a means of responding quickly to events, a Civil Affairs detachment was placed directly under the command of British Second Army (reinforcing the lessons of the evacuation of Caen).

By now, many aspects of Civil Affairs detachment work had matured. The evacuation of Caen and the push south had given virtually every detachment some form of practical experience. This came on top of the unexpected training opportunity that was allowed by the small bridgehead at the start of the campaign. Here the numbers of detachments ashore were too many for the work required and consequently individual Civil Affairs officers visited other detachments to compare notes (For a graph showing the build-up of detachments in Normandy see Illustration D1.1 at Appendix D). This was actively encouraged by senior Civil Affairs staff. Handover of information
between detachments was also getting better as experienced was gained. Leapfrogging, constant movement and transfers of areas between British and American sectors needed a systematic system for ensuring that the relationship with the French authorities and in serving military needs remained consistently effective. Good passage of information was the key feature to success. Outgoing detachments were requested to leave, if not a link officer, then reports and short fact sheets outlining key data for the incoming unit at the detachment’s main office (For an example of handover material see Illustration O1.1: British 8 Corps Civil Affairs Survey as Part of Handover Report, 24 August 1944 at Appendix O).

Thus, with experience Civil Affairs detachments made significant improvements as they learnt from both success and failure. The links with formations were invaluable and all spearhead detachments recognised the need to nurture a relationship with Corps, divisions and even brigades. The larger an area encountered typically corresponded to working with a higher level of formation. However, keeping a link with a division was never a mistake.

How well divisions responded to Civil Affairs units is difficult to ascertain, even if General Rennie was happy enough. At the soldier and officer level of a battalion, the relationship was more random. Martin Lindsay, Commanding Officer of a Gordon Highlanders’ battalion, was aware of Civil Affairs by virtue of a brother officer who was commanding a detachment in Caen (Colonel Usher). However, his interest in Civil Affairs only went as far as whether they could get hold of some cider for the battalion. Sydney Jary, a platoon commander, was only “slightly” aware of the organisation. Yet there were examples of Civil Affairs providing noticeable military benefits in terms of local intelligence being passed on and reputations being assisted.

In early August in the area between Caumont-l’Éventé and Le-Bény-Bocage, No. 217 Detachment was able to supply details of an enemy underground cable that was still in use and a warning that a local railway viaduct was heavily mined. In the case of the latter, one of the operations officers at British 11th Armoured Division was “glad to get it” as he was about to use the bridge. The unit also investigated a rarely reported claim of Allied tanks machine-gunning civilians at Le Fouc. On investigation, one of the casualties, Madame Moulin, indicated that she and her sister (who was the only death) had taken shelter in a ditch when they were engaged from range of 500 yards by Allied tanks, which she believed to be an unintentional action by the tank crews. Nevertheless, the incident was reported by Civil Affairs in order to help rebuff distorted reports. Proving the value of Civil Affairs to formations could be demonstrated in a variety of other ways too.

**SAVING FRENCH HERITAGE**

In conflict, heritage is often one of the victims and the battle of Normandy was no exception. Nevertheless, the taking of reasonable measures to provide an element of protection for such heritage was judged to provide diplomatic and propaganda benefits as both contrast to Nazi practices and being morally the right thing. Furthermore, there might be localised political benefits in the
countries and regions of a campaign. In providing an element of protection for the heritage in European battlefields, both guidelines were identified and a small staff formed from a group of like-minded art historians, archaeologists and curators first in American and then joined by a number from Britain and smaller numbers from states like Poland.\textsuperscript{161}

The guidelines became the basis of SHAEF policy (and later the basis of the 1954 Hague Convention and its Protocol I) and staff to support elements of the policy were incorporated into Civil Affairs for North West Europe, if only for reasons of administrative convenience.\textsuperscript{162} Within Civil Affairs for North West Europe, the specialist officers were known officially as Monument, Fine Art and Archives officers. In American circles, they were commonly known as the “Venus Fixers” or “Monuments Men.”\textsuperscript{163} There were “about twenty” monuments officers who covered North West Europe working at SHAEF and with lower formations.\textsuperscript{164} There were others, like Lieutenant Colonel Sir Leonard Woolley, who was appointed within national chains of command. He was appointed as Archaeological Advisor to DCA, but also did much work with and for SHAEF. It was Woolley's suggestion to Eisenhower that a separate order be issued emphasising the need and obligations to protect monuments and works of art (which became the basis of the 1954 Hague Convention).\textsuperscript{165}

Relations between the monuments men and the rest of Civil Affairs varied, with good reports in the British sector and less good ones in the American sector.\textsuperscript{166} At a formation level, the relationship appears to be more obscure. Relations with the American First Army headquarters relations were supportive.\textsuperscript{167} Lewis at British Second Army thought their work worthwhile, but that they “needed to be kept under control.”\textsuperscript{168} A senior Civil Affairs staff officer at 21 Army Group was of the view that they did “job of work of more or less value.”\textsuperscript{169} In 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group, there was one fatality, Major Ronald E. Balfour KRRC, monuments officer with Canadian First Army. He was killed by shellfire when returning to his billet near Cleves in March 1945.\textsuperscript{170}

Monuments were defined by SHAEF as any “structures or object of historic, artistic, scientific, or literary value, or any part or fragment thereof,” with the most important categories being churches, historical remains, archaeological sites, châteaux, scientific collections and other cultural institutions.\textsuperscript{171} Of central importance to the monuments policy that was underwritten by Eisenhower was:

\begin{quote}
... to take all measures consistent with military necessity, to avoid damage to all structures, objects or document of cultural, artistic, archaeological or historical value; and to assist, wherever practicable, in securing them from deterioration consequent upon the process of war.\textsuperscript{172}
\end{quote}

The policy emphasised the need to avoid unnecessary or wanton damage, including looting and sacrilege, and that full respect should be paid by troops to historic objects belonging to the French people. Specifically, buildings on the “Official Civil Affairs Lists of Monuments” were not to be used for military purposes without explicit orders from an Army or subordinate delegated commander. Such buildings were to be closed and put “out-of-bounds” to all
troops. All churches, Great War Cemeteries and buildings designated by Civil Affairs Monuments Specialist Officers were also designated: “not for military use.” Woolley recalled after the war that after the extensive list was published (by Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey F. Webb, monuments officer to SHAEF) he was:

... contacted by a distinctly worried Major-General who told me that this portentous volume was quite impossible; it was so long that there could be scarcely a building left in which troops could be billeted or offices set up; it disregarded all the requirements of military operations and must be withdrawn immediately.174

In the five departments of Normandy half of those on the list were churches (which were protected by existing Hague laws), many were public buildings (typically Hôtel de Ville) and which would be used by the French authorities, other were fountains, statues, crosses, menhirs and stone circles. This left around 40 that the military might or could possibly want to use. Woolley considered the list, but the answer was that the SHAEF list was moderate.175 Nevertheless, if such buildings were used for reasons of military necessity, the SCAO was to receive reports of how the buildings were to be used and what happened to their contents. Civil Affairs detachments were to report on all buildings listed in their area of responsibility and through civil authorities were to ensure that such premises were guarded by local police. If buildings were damaged or debris blocking traffic routes, then measures were to be taken to prevent demolition or items being removed (except under supervision of French authorities or monuments officers). Similar precautions were to be taken with moveable works of art with the general principle being to leave rather than move.176

The policy provided some broad political benefits (but not full salvation for the items concerned) in July 1944. Through the Portuguese ambassador, the Abbess at Lisieux contacted the Allies to ask that the city might be declared open given its “sacred character.” Similar appeals had also been made by her to the German authorities. The matter was handled by the Foreign Office, who, given the city’s proximity to the frontline and function as an important communications centre, thought that such a request would be turned down. The assumption on consultation with SHAEF proved correct. SHAEF considered that by agreeing to such a request a “flood” of similar requests was likely to be made and this might provide the defending German forces with an advantage. Nevertheless, it was pointed out that it was policy to afford as much protection as possible to ancient monuments and the Basilique Sainte-Thérèse at Lisieux was on the list.177 This complimented Eisenhower’s policy of 2 June that stressed all bombing in support of the campaign needed to minimise civilian casualties.178 Eisenhower might well have also been thankful (in retrospect) for a monuments officer who was able to persuade his staff officers that taking historical objects at Versailles for the General’s office there was likely to cause much upset with the French.179

It was clear that the protection of monuments was taken seriously prior to D-Day as it formed part of many Civil Affairs pre-invasion briefings. At British 30 Corps, Civil Affairs staff noted both that the French took more pride than most
in their history and that Normandy was rich in gothic and medieval items.\textsuperscript{180} In particular, the immediate area of operations in Calvados had 19 such sites, including churches, châteaux, museums, abbey ruins and prehistoric stones.\textsuperscript{181} British Second Army first weekly report on 19 June specified that there was no evident damage to monuments in their area.\textsuperscript{182} Furthermore, by mid-July the Bayeux tapestry had been located at the Château de Souches, the medieval town of Bayeux was intact and across Normandy, 12 monuments were intact, 16 slightly damaged, seven seriously damaged and three destroyed. Overall, in Normandy, there was less destruction of French monuments, on the official list, than expected by this stage.\textsuperscript{183} By early August, the monuments officer for British Second Army, American Captain L. Bancel LaFarge, had conducted a survey of 69 of the 85 key monuments in 50 locations in his area. He found that seven were destroyed, 12 badly damaged, nine damaged, six slightly damaged and 34 intact. A further survey of a wider list of monuments in 63 locations revealed similar proportions of destruction.\textsuperscript{184} With monuments officers only being able to get into an area several days, if not weeks after the fighting had passed, these reports also reflected the damage inflicted on Caen. By 20 August, starting to reflect the scale of the fighting south of Caen, the reports of the monuments officer with British Second Army indicated that there was mounting levels of destruction evident in the newly liberated areas.\textsuperscript{185} A survey compiled after the end of the campaign of, principally, the British sector in Normandy, by monuments officer, Major The Lord Methuen (part of the Lines of Communication Civil Affairs staff), revealed the extent of damage. Of the 18 churches listed as monuments (either Monuments Classés or Monuments Inscrits) in Caen, five were destroyed and four seriously damaged. Some 66 other monuments destroyed in the city. Across Calvados, there was destruction of monuments in 18 communes and damage in many other others.\textsuperscript{186} The destruction of such monuments was widely reported in the press. The destruction of Caen was a particular feature.\textsuperscript{187} This included the work of a shell from HMS Rodney that destroyed the church tower of Saint-Pierre on 9 June.\textsuperscript{188} Shortly after the liberation of the city, the Foreign Office noted that the questioning of the need for raids on Caen (that fused together the themes of damage to property, the numbers of civilian casualties and the destruction of heritage of the city) was a reoccurring theme and ventured that SHAEF should seek to justify the necessity of the bombing.\textsuperscript{189} Locally there was upset that the destruction was unnecessary as the Germans withdrew from the western side of the city on 9 July without a shot being fired. Indeed local resistance fighters had guided the Allies in to the city. Many inhabitants were also mystified as to why the city had been bombed on 6 June when there were fewer than 300 Germans in the city.\textsuperscript{190} The destruction on 12 August of parts of Château d'Harcourt, together with its family records that went back to William the Conqueror was a particular sadness to the monuments officer who inspected the site. The shelling of the château by the British was but one element in a story that involved many parts and seemingly much conspiracy. It appeared that a collaborator brought deliberately misleading information to the British about German positions
there. He appeared to be motivated by a grudge against the guardian of the château, who in turn made allegations about the part played by the collaborator. The Germans it also appeared caused most of the damage by deliberately setting light to the château. 191

The surveying of sites, the security of the contents and the effecting of sufficient repairs to preserve the integrity of many monuments was largely the responsibility of the French authorities. 192 However, for the French, lack of vehicles and petrol made surveying difficult and lack of materials presented problems in making repairs. Consequently, monuments officers tended to survey and assist, where possible, with repairs. 193 An example was the archive at Saint-Sépulcre in Caen, whose roof required repairs to prevent rain destroying important historical and government records. The French authorities had little spare labour and few materials to effect such extensive repairs. Although Civil Affairs were not able to assist with labour (which the French eventually found) they were able to assist with roofing felt and tarpaulins supplied with the assistance of the local Deputy Commander Royal Engineers, Major J.W. Setchell. 194

That the French were concerned to protect their heritage was demonstrated when it was reported by anxious French authorities that the Château de Creully (a SHAEF listed building) was being used by the RAF as the location of a “Malcom Club” for rest and relaxation. The Eleventh Century building had been subjected to “repairs” by the RAF who had filled its medieval floor with concrete and pointed its stonework with Portland cement. In their defence, the RAF officer in charge, who was unaware of the monuments officers or their lists, said that if he had been aware he would have welcomed the advice. It was suggested that 21st Army Group inform the RAF and RN of such policy. 195

The Malcom Club was not the only example of the unintended consequences of military activity. Many church towers were destroyed or damaged by Allied shellfire because of threats (real or imagined) from snipers. This over-cautious approach saw the destruction of many church towers. Yet, Civil Affairs were able to save at least one tower from destruction, when a French liaison officer decided to climb an [unidentified] tower under question and prove that it was free of snipers. 196 Church towers were also used for artillery observation posts by the Allies. This was of great concern to Lewis who informed Civil Affairs at British 1 Corps that such use should be stopped for fear that the enemy will systematically target towers. 197 Rubble from monuments was often used by military engineers as the most convenient material with which to repair roads or use in construction. Consequently, notices in English and French were posted to help prevent the removal of debris. Monuments officers often sorted through the debris themselves to save the most important items. 198 Further notices had to be posted around collapsed monuments to prevent their further destruction or clearance of their debris. 199 Schemes were also established with the French in towns like Caen to encourage local children to search for and collect smaller artefacts. 200

However, officially listed buildings aside, not all destruction by engineer bulldozers was unwelcome. The mayor of Courseulles-sur-Mer was delighted...
with Royal Engineer plans in early June to demolish three unoccupied buildings that impeded military traffic flow. In consultation with No. 203 Detachment on the matter, he said that the plans would help him with his scheme for “post war traffic planning.” On 13 July 1944, No. 204 Detachment arranged a scheme between the French authorities and the Royal Engineers whereby any houses the French wished to be demolished should be marked with an 18-inch “black blob.”

One general problem for Civil Affairs was the ability of those liberated to make comparisons with monuments policy in the American sector, with German policy during the occupation and with pre-war French policy. In the American sector, monuments officers were entitled to publish their own lists of what they considered important, with the additions having the same weight as the original SHAEF items. The French had their pre-war lists, which were very extensive. Later it was discovered that the Germans list was different again and covered policies towards the protection of historic buildings used by them. On closer inspection the Germany list, whilst impressively long, focused mainly on ensuring that the occupiers kept their billets in good order and “would not have served to preserve many monuments during an operation.” Nevertheless, in order to ensure that policy in the British sector was not unfavourably compared to other policies it was recommended that an amended version of the French list be used. Overall, despite individual problem, the political sensitivity of issues of heritage was at least mitigated by the actions of monuments officers in Civil Affairs. Elsewhere, there were greater problems in saving the reputation of the Allies.

LOOTING BY ALL

There were plenty of examples of Allied troops looting monuments in Normandy, including British troops stealing from the Musée des Antiquaires in Caen, from Château d’Andrieu and from the church at Andrieu. Furthermore, the need to protect the “good name” of the Allies in the prevention of looting was seen as highly important task of Civil Affairs by monuments officers. However, looting was a widespread problem and not just associated with the theft of high art and artefacts. It was a problem right from the start of operations. Indeed, Lewis was of the opinion that looting of all objects, whether monuments or not across North West Europe was “bad at all times,” a view supported both by regular entries in the Civil Affairs detachment war diaries. In early August 1944, French regional commissioner, Coulet, indicated that looting was prevalent amongst Allied troops, who were taking items from private property, government offices and commercial premises. Some, like Sydney Jary, have taken the view that looting by Allied troops was a particular problem once the fighting forces had passed and “less disciplined” Lines of Communication troops took over an area. Most infantry were unable to take items because they did not have the means of transport. However, looting was conducted not just by Allied soldiers, but also French civilians and retreating Germans. Indeed, even before the landings, many Normans had
amassed plenty of evidence of looting by SS and Ostruppen (often called “Booty Germans”) units arriving in the spring of 1944.214

Addressing the problem of looting by soldiers was largely a matter for the Military Police. Nevertheless, Civil Affairs was able to assist both with certain practical elements and with mitigating political consequences of such activity. In putting items out of temptations way, the protection and removal to safety of moveable artefacts was a French responsibility. However, there was not always the manpower or transport to do it.215 Civil Affairs was able to assist in moving objects to safety themselves, as members of No. 216 Detachment did at a church in Putot-en-Bessin on 30 June or No. 230 Detachment did at church in Ifs on 8 August. More typically, they arranged with the local authorities for additional indigenous security patrols. They also helped to facilitate co-ordination between French and Military Police.216 The Gaullists were keen to stamp out looting amongst their countrymen and to show that they were doing something about it. Indeed, with the establishment of French military tribunals at Cherbourg in early July, some of the first general cases were Frenchmen accused of looting (see Chapter 6).217 Furthermore, the French authorities issued orders and notices banning looting. These were both encouraged and facilitated by Civil Affairs.218 Further Civil Affairs facilitation established joint anti-looting patrols between Military Police and French police in towns and villages.219

The problem of looting was inevitably linked to the evacuation of civilians from the battle areas. Whilst, many Normans attempted to solve the problem by returning home, restrictions on movement and military needs often prevented such instinctive behaviour. Various measures were introduced, including putting pressure on the French to increase police presence in forward areas, but a general shortage of manpower at first presented problems. An alternative was to appoint “caretakers” in charge of property as soon after liberation as practical.220 Given that German looting had been attributed to the British, another remedy was to attempt to collect evidence as soon as possible following an incident in an attempt to identify the nationality of the looters.221

The problem became greater during August when villages evacuated by the Germans were uncovered.222 In mid-August, the French were asked to put gendarmes in each empty village to prevent damage and looting.223 Cases were to be investigated by both Military Police and the gendarmerie, as a method of proving that, as much of the looting was civilian as military.224 However, as the breakout took place towards the end of August, the rapid advances provided fewer problems as local populations were away from their homes for shorter periods. Nevertheless, German looting did continue during their withdrawal and Civil Affairs Public Safety Officers were instructed to investigate cases in order to obviate claims against the Allies.225 However, the scale of the problem was such that these methods were unlikely to be truly effective and in most cases, Civil Affairs focused on pressurising the authorities to do more following thefts of Allied property.
FIELD SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE AND PERMITS

Field security was important to the military campaign in preventing the occurrences and opportunities for both espionage and sabotage. Generally, this was achieved by screening all civilians (those that crossed the frontline were of greatest interest), controlling their movement, prohibiting certain activities (use of cameras and binoculars, etc.) and generally monitoring their activities. It was work primarily conducted by the Field Security Sections of the Intelligence Corps (Counter-Intelligence Corps in the American sector), but often with assistance from Civil Affairs and Military Police. 226 By the end of the battle of Normandy, there were 13 sections and four detachments of Field Security in the British Second Army area and elements of these were permanently embedded in CRTCs and the ARAC. 227

Civil Affairs assistance included, collecting and controlling refugees at the frontline, making certain that Allied interests were served with the re-establishment of French courts, assisting the passage of information regarding unusual activities and collaboration, and ensuring that local authorities registered all civilians in their areas, issued and regularly checked identity documents, and enforced restrictions on movement and prohibited activities. Civil Affairs also helped to facilitate field security work by bringing together interested parties. By the end of July weekly meeting were being held between the French authorities, local police, Civil Affairs, Military Police and Field Security. 228 However, as mentioned previously it was made clear in the Military Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field that Civil Affairs primary work was not as a field security intelligence-gathering organisation. Furthermore, in Civil Affairs work to facilitate the restoration of local capacity the organisation also recognised that field security restrictions often worked at cross-purposes in creating disproportionately time-consuming work for the organisation, obstructing civilian productivity and causing local frustration.

Thankfully, not all security work was onerous. Ahead of D-Day, the Todt labour organisation, with its multinational mix of workers was thought to be a particularly likely location for possible stay behind enemy agents. 229 In practice, virtually all of its workers were easily rounded up and few provided any noticeable security risks to Allied interests. The most significant problems were those of hygiene, morals and criminal tendencies (including looting at Douvres-la-Délivrande). Most Todt workers did not cut a good image and at times, there were discussions as to whether it was better to use them as labour or simply ship them away to prisoner of war camps in Britain. Many of the French amongst them were regarded as Frenchmen or French colonials of the worst types from the unseemly districts Paris and Marseilles. Consequently, at first, most were detained only as a precaution to protect sites like the Beach Maintenance Area at Courseulles-sur-Mer. Later in deciding who was to be responsible for their administration, most German workers became prisoners of war, whilst non-Germans were categorised as displaced persons and used (if willing) as labour (those of Allied west European nations were encouraged to join either national military units or civilian pioneer units). 230

[356]
For Normandy in general, the numbers of individuals actually found to be engaged in espionage and sabotage was low, however, the numbers accused of collaboration was often high and produced much (and largely pointless) field security work. Most denunciations received were made on the grounds of either the “amorous or commercial.” Nevertheless, several agents were discovered, including seven found by Field Security in Bayeux shortly after its liberation. Typical French enemy agents were usually considered “low grade” youths, who had been given a course in tank and badge spotting. There were also Germans agents to contend with, including men from 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, who came across the battle line on the night of 13 June dressed as civilians and when captured claimed to be deserters.

The total number of cases (from all nationalities) that came through No. 31 Army Civil Interrogation Camp, between 22 June and 11 August was 112. Of these 21 were released, seven enlisted into the French army, eight placed with displaced persons, 23 were kept for further questioning (some were sent back to Britain, before being later returned) and the balance imprisoned by either the British army or French authorities. They comprised a mix of Germans, French men and women, a few French girls with “low mental age” and double agents working for Germans. Other agents had been identified, but were still at large at the time of the report. That many were released was unsurprising as security checkpoints often brought in those who were without a pass or had out of date documents. Spot checks on the road between Bayeux and St.-Loup-Hors found that 25 out of 1,160 inspected had no passes and at Douvres-la-Délivrande on 31 July, 134 out of 1,037 had out of date documents (most movement permits lasted only 24 hours). Thus, the 30 “suspects” sent to Field Security when 150 refugees were evacuated from Ranville on 10 June in all likelihood were only guilty of possessing incomplete documentation.

A further factor was the simple problem of differentiating between those unfavourable and those well intentioned towards the Allies. The view of 1 Corps Civil Affairs staff at Courseulles-sur-Mer on 8 June was that whilst the reaction to landing appeared favourable and co-operation with the Allies was good, there was no sign of the resistance movement and it was impossible to differentiate between pro-Nazi, Vichy or patriotic Frenchmen.

That many Frenchmen happily continued to use out of date documentation reflected a constant friction between civilian and field security needs. Indeed, free movement of French civilians had quickly become a thorny problem for the organisation and it became more so as the battlefront moved further away. The typical maximum distance permitted for travel was 6 km (2 km in forward areas). However, this did not take account the unexpected mobility of the French workforce, which even in rural areas travelled considerable distances from home to work. Dairy farmers needed to move between their village centre farm and distant land (often in different communes) year round and arable farmers had additional problems during the harvest period when many of them necessarily helped each other out. Elsewhere, key workers, like doctors, needed to move over some distance to see their patients, workers like hauliers needed to deliver essential supplies across Normandy from central depots and others.
like industrial workers simply needed to commute to work.\textsuperscript{238} On top of which many refugees were extremely keen to either get to a refuge with friends or family or, later, return to their homes before they were ransacked.\textsuperscript{239} Whilst, in June, Civil Affairs were able to issue permits to key workers like bakers, hauliers and doctors, this hardly sufficed for the longer term and as the battle of Normandy dragged on problems became more evident.\textsuperscript{240} The problems fell into two categories, a practical one of Civil Affairs officers issuing the passes and a political one of harmonising military with civilian needs. The practical problems were various. Officially, the only acceptable permits were those issued by Civil Affairs under the guidance of Field Security, yet by mid-June, it was found that contrary to such regulations many military units were simply inventing their own passes.\textsuperscript{241} There was also much time-wasting bureaucracy and whilst vehicle permits were issued by mayors they nevertheless (and even at the end of July) had to be counter-signed by both Civil Affairs and the sub-prefect’s staff.\textsuperscript{242} There was often a shortage of forms.\textsuperscript{243} There were variations in procedure, especially between Corps in forward areas that put operational needs first and Lines of Communication in the area behind that were more easily swayed by local needs. Whether naively or deliberately, most civilians were unaware of either the differences or the boundaries and happily crossed into forward areas with passes issued in rear areas.\textsuperscript{244} Many French simply did not understand the need for the restrictions.\textsuperscript{245} Consequently, many workers who were given permits instinctively did not take the direct route requested and instead strayed off course to see their property, land, family or friends.\textsuperscript{246} In the American sector during the period to D+45, it was estimated that typically close to thirty percent of a population returned home within ten days of it being liberated.\textsuperscript{247} Furthermore, many military drivers that gave lifts to Frenchmen unthinkingly took them outside the 6km area.\textsuperscript{248} Indeed, as experienced later with Military Government in Germany, with so many soldiers simply unaware of the organisation or its role in authorising civilian movement a mockery was made of the efforts taken to ensure correct procedure.\textsuperscript{249} Thus, it was hardly a surprise when so many were arrested during Field Security spot checks.

As the Normandy bridgehead got larger, the reduced density of detachments quickly resulted in Civil Affairs workloads escalating substantially as the numbers of permits processed increased exponentially.\textsuperscript{250} There were simply not enough officers at Civil Affairs detachments to sign the increasing number of permits demanded.\textsuperscript{251} Matters were not helped by too few French police to enforce the restrictions and the multiplicity of forms and passes being used (not all of which needed to be counter-signed by Civil Affairs).\textsuperscript{252} Naturally, from within a few days of liberation there was civilian pressure for greater leniency in granting permits and exemptions for both people and vehicles. Within a few weeks, there were similar demands for the distance of travel without a permit to be increased. However, 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group policy remained that although permits were issued for key workers, there was to be no let up in the checking of passes and general restriction on movement.\textsuperscript{253} Indeed
Field Security, forward formations and formations along the coastal belt frequently asked for even greater restrictions. Nevertheless, regardless of the logic of explanation, as the campaign started to move beyond Caen, the matter increasingly frustrated the French. In a meeting with Civil Affairs staff at 21st Army Group on 12 August, Coulet, reflecting both his view and those of both the regional commissioner for Brittany and Daure in Caen, stated that the restrictions were too stringent. Given that advances were being made by the Allies, he asked that restrictions be dropped completely for the Bayeux commune and widened to 14 km elsewhere. However, for Robbins as DCCAO, and his American equivalent, there were still too many detentions on security grounds for such a broad brush lifting of limits. Nevertheless, they were looking into exemptions for certain communes and this might include Bayeux.

A way found around the problem was to issue permits of greater duration. This also reduced Civil Affairs detachment work. At first permits had been issued for only 24 hours, later they were issued for five days and by the mid-August there was discussion of extending this to a month. Even with such relaxations, it was found in late August in the Lines of Communication area, that there were still large huge numbers of applications. However, by September, there were signs of improvement as gradually certain restrictions were lifted. The frustrating balance between military needs and civilian needs was rarely better shown than with the issue of permits. Ultimately, however, Civil Affairs policy was one of supporting military endeavour, if arguing for and having sympathy for the French case.

**Disease**

Compared to Naples the threat of an outbreak of a highly contagious and deadly disease in Normandy was only ever slight. That this did not happen may well have been related to such background factors as a low prevalence prior to the landings. Nevertheless, the threat continued to be taken seriously. Indeed, the need to be aware of health problems and to take action where dangers were found had by the time of D-Day become a matter of routine. All reports of disease were investigated and preventative measures were taken in such forms as issuing detachments with soap, creosote and de-lousing powder. Civil Affairs also helped to build French medical capacity and as mentioned in the previous chapter by facilitating the burial of dead animals. Nevertheless, despite the genuinely favourable conditions, two diseases made it to prominence during the campaign, scabies and venereal disease.

Lice, scabies and other skin diseases were particularly evident problems in Normandy, especially amongst children. By 9 July, British 30 Corps CRTC had handled 2,562 refugees since D-Day (just over half of these were children). One tenth of refugees had lice and one-third scabies. Some 150 scabies sufferers were disinfected in one French camp near Bayeux on a single day in early July, the lack of both disinfestation equipment, sanitation supplies and spare clothes presented the likelihood of failure if the number of cases increased. With
assistance from British Second Army assistance, a disinfestor was loaned to the French clinic at Bayeux and clean clothes were obtained from the Returned Stores Depot. Soon the clinic with its eight showers and disinfestor was delousing up to 600 per day and helping to both control disease and prevent re-infection. The almost complete local absence of soap and other forms sanitation was a related problem and was only solved by spot demands being requested. A further related problem was that the nature of medical panniers developed for Civil Affairs. Although, generally these worked well, they had not taken into account the general problems of getting hot water in battle zone. Consequently, the sulphur ointment supplied to treat scabies was not as convenient to use as directly applied benzyl benzoate.263

By late June, in an attempt to control scabies (and the associated lice) every refugee in the British 30 Corps area was given a medical inspection prior to dispersal. If evidence were found then an individual (or if a family, the entire household) was sent to the ARAC for treatment. Furthermore, if field detachments were unable to make an inspection then all its refugees were sent to the CRTC and any transport used decontaminated.264 Despite the lessons learnt in Naples, there was initially a reluctance to spray de-lousing powder as matter of course, but by mid-July, all refugees were sprayed.265 However, whilst the problems while manageable in terms of contagion, in overall terms, it was realised by August, that the scale of scabies and nature of treatment, which required time, plenty of soap and benzyl benzoate, many baths and much supervision, was “so vast as to be outside the scope of anything CA can do, and that it is a problem which can only be attacked by the French authorities.”266 The continued building French of capacity was clearly the most efficient and effective option.

The much-feared impact of such non-life threatening, communicable skin diseases, like scabies, on the health and efficiency of troops was difficult to determine. Of the 814 British army cases of scabies, it was possible that the living conditions of the troops might be solely accountable for such occurrences rather than any contamination spreading from the civilian population. In total there were some 10,341 cases of infectious disease notified amongst British Second Army troops in the thirteen weeks to 30 September. Scabies was the third most prevalent disease, with the most substantial being enteritis (5,618 cases) followed by malaria relapse (1,572).267 Unsurprisingly, in attempts to prevent scabies and other communicable diseases infecting the troops various measures were taken by the military including spraying, inoculation and eradication of potential sources.268

Venereal disease was a greater problem for troops.269 Here, Civil Affairs involvement tended to be one of assisting prevention through facilitation and enforcement. Facilitation came in such forms as making it easier for French treatment clinics to work effectively by releasing to French doctors copies of German records on brothels and prostitutes that had been taken by military intelligence. Help was also given in establishing and provisioning dispensaries and similar elements needed in the control of the disease.270 Civil Affairs also helped to disseminate Allied policies banning prostitution. However, not
everyone agreed with the prohibition approach. Canadian First Army queried the efficacy of such policy in preventing the spread of the disease. They were of the view that it was better to follow French practice of medical regulation rather than trying to stamp it out with dubious police methods. Their advice was to consider it as a medical not a moral problem.\textsuperscript{271}

Enforcement tended to be associated with ensuring that any civilian found with the disease was both cautioned and properly treated by the French authorities. One such example took place in early July at Ver-sur-Mer. Here, No. 225 Detachment identified a prostitute, Mme. Lissot, “who had infected troops with VD.” In putting the responsibility on the local authorities, the mayor of the coastal town was asked to ensure that she went for treatment in Bayeux. However, either the mayor was not interested or Lissot was elusive, as three days later the mayor had to be asked again. In reflecting the need to maintain a careful balance between protecting Allied military interests and ensuring that the French took administrative responsibility, a contingency was established whereby taken it was agreed in talks with the police in Bayeux, that if nothing further was done after another three days then Lissot was to be arrested. A day later, she returned untreated from Bayeux claiming to mayor that the hospital did not have the facilities. After an interview with a Civil Affairs officer, she was admitted to a military hospital for treatment by the RAMC.\textsuperscript{272}

If the prevention of troop debilitating epidemics was the sole measure, disease control was a success story for Civil Affairs. The combined policy of precaution, supervision and action, which had been learnt in Italy, served military needs well and despite the shortage of medical staff amongst Civil Affairs. However when faced with substantial problems like those at Belsen the shortcomings were rather more obvious.\textsuperscript{273}

**Local Labour and Civil Affairs Manpower**

Some aspects of Civil Affairs work were largely beyond their control, one such being the ready supply of indigenous labour to support the Allied campaign effort. Prior to the landings, the Allies believing that there were 100,000 men in Normandy had planned to use French labour for a whole host of tasks. These included road gangs, quarrying, port work, ordnance depot workers, store men, security, skilled workers in workshops and various work in the NAAFI.\textsuperscript{274} Depot work in the British 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group Rear Maintenance Area relied very heavily on large numbers of available local labourers. However, the expectations of the supply of local manpower were rather greater than what was found. The many fewer men discovered in Normandy were often too old or too young or already engaged in vital work like farming, guarding, policing or public administration and many of these were soon recruited by the French authorities into the nascent French army.

Whilst at the beginning of August some 15,000 French workers were employed across the liberated areas, this did not meet the numbers required.\textsuperscript{275} By this time, the Director of Labour for 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group, despite Civil Affairs endeavour, had only managed to engage 2,000 labourers for work in the depots.
between Caen and Bayeux. This was a tiny fraction of what was required and it was unlikely to improve. Indeed, it was forecast to get worse, as jobs in Caen were better paid than for those at depots in rural areas. Recruiting at depots was also not helped by domestic labour laws that restricted the employment of women. This came at a time when 3,000 vacancies for jobs that were suited to women were available at the Returned Stores Depot of No. 17 Army Ordnance Depot. Other sources of labour, such as the Todt workers were gradually reducing as the organisation’s French and Polish labourers were taken for service in exile armies. And nor was it a case of simply numbers. As an agricultural area, there were comparatively few skilled workers in Normandy and these were needed for specialist work in depots. Even in the American sector, there were problems with a shortfall of 2,000 labourers. Whilst the Americans were able to cover their needs by importing labour from Black American military units, other problems were introduced as the number of French allegations of rape, theft and poor behaviour increased against these men.

Although, Civil Affairs was able to get the labourers it required for its first depot, No. 3 CAID that arrived at Sommervieu on 14 June, there were problems in store as other Civil Affairs depots arrived. One method around the labour shortage problem in the British sector was to restructure the various depots and use alternative sources of British labour. In the case of Civil Affairs, its depots were boosted with manpower stripped from No. 1 Civil Affairs Group when it arrived in late July 1944 (the balance of the Group began training for Germany). Whilst, this meant that No. 1 Group was no longer able to function, it was both regarded as a “price worth paying” and justified by the increasing capacity of French administration. Thankfully, in general terms the shortage also sorted itself out as the bridgehead expanded and greater numbers of civilians were found in the south and west of the region. However, even here, recruiting the necessary labour for mobile gangs to support the CAIDs proved difficult because it was unglamorous work compared to working for a more obviously military depot or becoming a guard. Most of these problems were only solved as the campaign moved into the populous industrial areas of France and Belgium.

The cannibalisation of No. 1 Group helped to address other shortages faced in Civil Affairs manpower. The problem was most acute amongst the non-commissioned administration staff. By late July, it was apparent that many Civil Affairs NCOs, now that they had been elevated to Senior NCO (a benefit of Civil Affairs’ early promotion policy), wanted to get back to their regiments and large gaps were created. Furthermore, some drivers and cooks had become casualties and there were a number of discipline problems, which had resulted in early transfer.

**CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS**

Civil Affairs work involved working with people and it was here that much value was added in terms of simply making things work. Whether working with a formation staff, the French authorities or the public at large personal qualities
made much difference, something that was already recognised by the *Military Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field.* There were many characters in the organisation and many others simply got on with the job. Several bridged the gap between the military and civilian requirements of the campaign. How they bridged the gap ranged from diplomatic leadership to sheer bravery, to using professional expertise, to employing courtesy to full effect. All helped to stand Civil Affairs and the Allies, not least the two Armies in the British sector in good stead. Their abilities were in some cases recognised by those in uniform about them, but not always.

**Charles Usher**

Colonel Charles M. Usher was an exemplary example of a Civil Affairs officer. His life was one closely associated with both sport and the army. He played rugby for both Scotland (capped 16 times between 1912 and 1922 and in 1912 was the first soldier to captain a national team) and the Army.\(^\text{284}\) During the First World War, he was captured after the battle of Mons, spending over four years as a prisoner of war with the Germans.\(^\text{285}\) He had two pieces of regimental bagpipe music written for him and the pipes were an instrument he was able to play to a high standard under the tuition of the McLennans.\(^\text{286}\) He took command of the 1st Battalion the Gordon Highlanders in January 1938 and on the outbreak of war took it to northern France.\(^\text{287}\) In December 1939, he had the difficult job of informing the regiment that battledress was to be worn in the field not the kilt.\(^\text{288}\) During the winter of 1939-40, with the battalion still in France, much time was spent patrolling the border with Belgium to prevent unauthorised persons coming across and something that required much cooperation with the French authorities.\(^\text{289}\) Discussions with the French were helped by Usher’s fluency in the language. He left as commanding officer in late February 1940 after 29 years service (putting him in, at least, his late 40s).\(^\text{290}\) He went on to serve as commander of No. 10 Lines of Communication Sub-area, during the 1940 campaign, where he was responsible on several occasions for organising rear defences.\(^\text{291}\) After the war, he went on to be Director of Physical Education at Edinburgh University in 1946.\(^\text{292}\) However, in wartime when after 1940 he was considered too old for active service, Usher joined Civil Affairs.\(^\text{293}\)

Usher’s bravery, quick thinking and leadership were unmistakable. On reconnoitring Caen on the evening of 10 July, a shell exploded in front of him that was quickly followed by a Canadian soldier twenty yards away being shot by a sniper.\(^\text{294}\) Nevertheless, Usher still had the presence of mind to notice that the shell crater had filled with salty water. Seawater had contaminated the city’s water supply because of the locks on the *Canal de l’Orne* were damaged. Nevertheless, this provided an opportunity and within hours, he launched a plan to store sewage in these craters as preventative public health measure.\(^\text{295}\) His energy was unmistakable and a British Second Army Civil Affairs report on Caen described him as “here, there and everywhere in his kilt.”\(^\text{296}\) The French echoed this image, writing at the end of the war the civil defence chief for Caen, Joseph Poirier, described Usher’s entry into the city:
Unsurprisingly, when a battalion of the Gordons arrived in Caen, he would, when free of Civil Affairs, go off to join them in battle.298

An excellent example of his bravery and leadership came during on the many artillery bombardments of the city following its liberation. Food for the refugees at Lycée Malherbe and Église Saint-Etienne was cooked by French civilians in the open yard at the Lycée. At one point of the battle, a shell fell into the yard, killing (according to Usher) half of the cooks. Usher, described his actions after the war, where he rallied the remainder and told them in forthright terms that “there was no question of their running away.” Consequently, the meal was only 15 minutes late and none of the refugees knew what had happened.299 Lewis at British Second Army when considering Civil Affairs after the war saw Caen as the most difficult problem faced prior to the breakout and that it was “well handled” by Usher.300

He was highly thought of by the Prefect of Calvados, Pierre Daure.301 This may in part be explained by Daure’s anglophile nature that stemmed from before the liberation.302 Nevertheless, Daure’s comments to the press in putting the destruction of Caen into the context were most welcome for Allied commanders. Daure stated that the people of Caen were thankful for the liberation and the city’s “was as warm for [England] as ever.”303 There were also good personal reasons for Daure’s continued support for Usher. Usher put into motion a plan to rescue Daure’s wife (Marianne was the sister of regional commissioner, François Coulet), two children, mother and father-in-law. They, in early August 1944, were on the German side of the frontline. No. 207 Detachment was instructed on 9 August to actively search for them once the frontline moved forward.304 After several days, intelligence was received that they were in sheltering in a farmhouse. When this was overrun by the Allies, Usher ensured a party with cars transported them to safety before a German counter-attack.305

They were found by members of Nos. 201 and 209 Detachments a few miles south-west of Trun on 22 August. Their discovery was regarded at the time as having “again cemented the good relations with the French Authorities.”306

Usher ensured a good balance between safeguarding Allied interests and encouraging the French to take responsibility for themselves. Usher’s approach following Daure’s appointment, was to continue in charge for a few days with Daure shadowing, then to hand over and then after a few more days to deliberately “fade out,” whilst continuing to support Daure from afar. From afar, Usher helped to facilitate much of Daure’s work. When Falaise fell, Usher ensured that medical equipment and supplies found in a German military hospital were sent to the hospital in Caen that desperately needed such items. There were also his innate diplomatic skills. He made sure Foreign Secretary Eden was aware of both Daure’s anglophile nature and his wonderful work and this probably helped to ensure Daure received the CBE. In return, Usher was made a Chevalier de la Légion d’honneur, presented the Croix de Guerre with
palm and became a *Citoyen d'honneur* of Caen. A road was named after him in Caen, *Rue du Colonel Usher*, close to the new University. Donnison, the official historian, was clearly taken with Usher, noting that he “must have been a wonderful leader of men” and describing his involvement in the liberation of Caen in detail in the Official History. A view supported by Lord Methuen, a monuments officer who met Usher in Caen for the first time on 30 August 1944 and worked alongside him for some days. He viewed Usher as a “gallant and inspiring leader.”

**Gentlemen Under Fire**

At other levels, there were examples of bravery and injury in the line of Civil Affairs duty. Captain T.E. Dale from No. 201 Detachment was wounded on leaving the beach at Hermanville on D-Day. Despite a cut on the cheek, he "lost no time from duty." No. 207 Detachment, on landing at Ouistreham on 8 June captured a number of Germans and weapons at 1600 hrs, before being “bombed to hell” and sleeping in a “wet trench.” The next day the war diary entry simply said, “Raining, Bombing and strafing – Nobody loves us.” Shortly after, 65 Germans, two machine guns, one sub-machine gun, many small arms, grenades and ammunition were captured after members of the detachment attacked a farmhouse. Two American officers Major Basil Filardi Jr. and Captain Gerald C. Sola lead four of the detachment’s soldiers in the attack. Reports of other prisoners being taken were not unusual and several Germans were later captured in the battle of Normandy.

The most daring example of Civil Affairs work under fire in the British sector came from another American army officer, Captain Colin H. MacDiarmid, with No. 205 Detachment and Civil Affairs liaison officer to 43rd Division. MacDiarmid's campaign got off to a difficult start when he found himself stranded on a drowned tank near Ver-sur-Mer whilst coming ashore on 7 June. However, the danger of this was to pale into insignificance when compared to later events. On 15 August 1944, MacDiarmid was asked to investigate reports of a number of refugees in a railway tunnel near Condé-sur-Noireau (Grid 936354). In the tunnel, close to the frontline he found 1,600 refugees. The refugees had been in the tunnel ten days with most located at the southern end of it. Conditions were reasonable satisfactory with cattle located in nearby woods to provide milk, a stock of supplies within the tunnel and a generally decent level of organisation. Whilst, bread was in short supply and hygiene was poor, there were no problems with disease. A chapel had even been rigged up in a railway wagon complete with a confessional box fashioned from a bicycle wheel. Despite, heavy enemy fire and both entrances being heavily mined, many of the refugees still wished to exploit lulls in the fighting to return to their homes and this provided the key danger to both their safety and Allied operations. In the words of his recommendation (signed by Montgomery) for the Military Cross, MacDiarmid’s actions in calming and controlling the refugees prevented "hordes of panic stricken refugees becoming a serious hindrance to the military operations."
Other examples show much compassion and understanding in gaining the support and trust of local French citizens and officials. It is difficult not to be impressed by the officer commanding No. 204 (Refugee) Detachment, Major Norman Taylor who wrote heartfelt letters both to the mayor of Cresserons, M R. Coltee, following the death of his wife as the result of Allied action and to the mayor of Plumentot on the death of some of his citizens because of the fighting. In return, the Coltee’s reply on the detachment’s departure in August was equally moving in describing how appreciative the French were for the help provided by Civil Affairs in the previous weeks.  

**CONCLUSION**

Much of Civil Affairs work was indirect, helping to facilitate the circumstances that should in all likelihood prevent disorganisation, disease and unrest. However, there was also a direct role in not just preventing problems like disease and disorder, but also ensuring that the reputation of the armies fighting in Normandy remained untarnished. In most of the areas examined, the organisation acquitted itself well. There were problems finding enough and the right type of labour, but these were temporary and not insurmountable problems. There were some areas, like medical work, where the generally healthy nature of Normandy in all probability covered some large gaps in operational capability. Nevertheless even here, the procedures for considering matters of health were robust and well co-ordinated. It was unlikely there would be a repeat of the problems in Naples. Most other areas performed rather well. There were complications with the evacuation of Caen, but if part of the remit of Civil Affairs was to ensure the indigenous authorities developed the capacity to assume responsibility for themselves, then such messy events were necessary.

There were Civil Affairs lessons to learn too. Some of these were rather trifling like ensuring a decent supply of cocoa. Others required more resources, such as a transport pool. Some were more philosophical as with the relative benefits of evacuation and standfast policies. The glue that made Civil Affairs work was it its people. Although some were older than many fighting men, the idea of ancient military gentlemen on tour no longer stood; unless, of course, they compensated by wearing a kilt and carrying a rifle. The glue of the organisation’s people helped to cement relations between Civil Affairs and other military units, between Civil Affairs and fellow staff at the formations and between Civil Affairs and the French. The perpetual dialogues of how to balance civil and military needs and where to place Civil Affairs within the military structure were never likely to be fully resolved to everyone’s satisfaction, but at least there was an opportunity in many (not all) cases to consider matters with resolving a practical problem in mind.
Chapter 7 Endnotes

1 TNA, WO 219/3939, 21 Army Group, Civil Affairs Technical Instruction No. 3 (British Sector), 2 June 1944.
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CONCLUSION

The aim of this research was to assess the utility of British Civil Affairs in supporting military operations during the Second World War using the Normandy campaign as the principle case study. It has sought to reach a finding by contemplating a series of implicit, but rather basic questions and setting these against primary sources and published literature.

Was there a job of civil administration to be done during a military campaign? All the states in which military operations were contemplated required some form of administration. It was true those in Africa did not need as much or as wide a range of administrative elements as highly centralised states like France and Italy, but nevertheless they needed something. The degree of state modernity merely determined the scope and depth of administrative elements that needed to be covered. These elements were provided in peacetime and there was no reason to believe that they were not needed in wartime. Indeed, with the greater propensity for disease, injury, malnutrition and population movement they were needed even more. Populations had grown accustomed to and were largely dependent on centrally provided goods and services. Although, the level of dependency determined how long a community was able to cope without central assistance, war was likely to and often did make people more dependent. It was also dependency that had immediacy to it, starving people needed to be fed and injured citizens needed medical treatment.

Yet, the degree to which administration needed to be provided by central, as opposed to regional, government depended on the state in question. All states needed some form of regional co-ordination, whereas central government assistance could largely wait (whether it wanted to wait, as in the case of de Gaulle’s provisional government was rather a different question). There was, however, the issue of which was the most useful level of regional government in meeting basic needs. As the Allies found in Italy, the process of forecasting the level (regional or provincial) at which administration was most likely to work was not always accurate. In France, the Allied focus tended to be at the department level, whilst ironically the Gaullists invested in the regional commissioner for Normandy, François Coulet. An additional complication was that whatever worked best in peacetime was likely to be in some way distorted during wartime when parts of a region or area remained under enemy control. There was therefore the issues of who provided what resources and for how long until such time that the local administration was able to stand for itself.

Was it acknowledged that such a job needed to be done? Military experience both during and before the Second World War concluded that some form of civil administrative arrangements were necessary during a campaign. The collective memory of the 1940 campaign in France and Belgium recognised that there was a need to take suitable measures to prevent large numbers of refugees
interfering with military operations. The Rhineland occupation indicated that for Military Government some form of organisation was required for both practical and legal terms in discharging the responsibilities of an occupation force. And, to discharge them in such a way that did not encourage disease and disorder. Whether such memories were helpful or not can be questioned. They could be seen to encourage a tendency to either focus on one or two specific administrative problems (rather than the broad range required during a long campaign) or on creating an organisation that was perfect for ‘fighting the last war,’ but not suited to present needs. However, there was, at least, a kernel of an idea, which with the further experiences of war in Africa and Italy went on to produce something that was appropriate for North West Europe. Additionally there was the need to scope the size of the job in terms of what elements and resources were required to allow civil administration to function properly. Acknowledging the diversity of such elements and size of resources necessary took many by surprise, especially, when the preference for a simple provision of relief during wartime proved insufficient to fit the bill.

Was it a military job? Here opinion was divided and depended on underpinning presumptions. For many in the military the view was instinctively one of control. Commanders wanted the confidence that total military control over all events on the battlefield would bring. Thus, controlling battlefield refugees made a great deal of sense. However, what happened behind the battlefield and after the battle was subject to rather more shades of opinion. In the ‘hiatus’ areas there was a greater tendency towards relinquishing any interest or involvement. The issue of what happened when the battle was over was made the more complicated by the months it took to wage most campaigns of the Second World War. The longer a campaign lasted the greater likelihood of greater resources being required to service increasing civilian needs and demands. In terms of legal obligations, for enemy states the creation of a Military Government was obliged, but even here the preference was that, sooner rather than later, the task was to be handed over to a civilian-run Control Commission. Thus, the common view that pervaded early military thinking was that certain battlefield functions, like refugee control, were a military task, but other aspects of administrative were either not or where but only on a very light basis commensurate with a commander’s operational requirements.

These views were supported by many of the civilian government ministries and by national leaders like Roosevelt who wanted to go civilian early. In different ways, they were each obliged to consider post-conflict needs. The sooner a civilian relief organisation could start operating the smaller the chances of an unfortunate regressive interruption. However, both TORCH and Italy demonstrated the practical shortcomings of this theory. Civilian organisations, either national or international, were not up to the task of either working in support of military needs or in operating so close to the frontline. Civilian organisations served their own needs, not those of the military. There was a conflict of interest. Inevitably, civilian organisations would eventually take over, but this needed to be at a time of the commanders choosing and this necessarily grew in duration as campaigns extended in duration. The task was a military
one and could not, for the time being, be shared for reasons of practicality and military need. However, the military were required to consider both the longer-term and the ‘hiatus’ area civilian requirements. Furthermore, by making the job a responsibility of the military for the first six months, military planning was forced to consider not just kinetic but also civil needs. This comprehensive approach within one organisation had a certain integrity to it.

Within the military, did the job need to be done by Civil Affairs? Other parts of the military establishment had experience of handling civilian issues. Military Police cleared refugees off roads, RAMC administered medical aid and Field Security searched for dangerous civilians. Some of those advising Churchill thought that Civil Affairs could be better achieved elsewhere by some other arrangements. However, none of the organisations was equipped with the ability to consider the entirety of civilian administration. By taking such a piecemeal approach, import considerations or events may fall through the gaps, especially, if the longer-term had to be considered. An organisation like Civil Affairs was therefore justified. Yet, by being justified on its ability to see the big picture, a danger presented itself in the form of developing a greater institutional concern for civilian rather than campaign requirements.

Thus, began a debate as to how best to integrate Civil Affairs with the rest of the army. Several ideas of integration were developed; a separate staff branch (G-5), a separate service supporting the staff and a separate chain of command. All had their strengths and weaknesses, but out of them could be identified three cardinal features: the need to ensure that a commander of a campaign maintained and understood his obligation to the civilian population, the need to generate a common view that both Civil Affairs and the fighting forces were pulling together, and the need to structure an organisation that could do the job. AMGOT achieved the latter, but arguably failed in the first two respects, especially the sense of pulling together. In Normandy, all three were achieved. This was in part, because commanders were aware of the failures of AMGOT’s separate chain of command, in part, because commanders were now better educated about civilian problems, and in part, because Civil Affairs itself had made significant improvements in terms of quality.

Were Civil Affairs up to the job and were Civil Affairs seen to be up to the job? Prior to North West Europe, the organisation suffered from both patchy quality and a perception of such. During the North West Europe, campaign whilst elements of weakness remained these had largely been mitigated by structural, educational and developmental changes. There were without a doubt some fine men in the ranks of Civil Affairs in Africa and Italy. Many had relevant civilian experience of work as public and colonial officials. However, they were faced with a number of problems. They were seen as having colonial tendencies, they were only interested in civilian needs (and not military needs), they were too old, there were insufficient numbers of experts to cover an ever-increasing range of tasks, there was inexperience of working in a military environment, they were ill prepared, and they were led by some controversial characters (Rennell). Both experience and perception amongst the wider military were not
useful in supporting either the organisation or its people. A perception shared by military and politicians alike.

However, with the reforms made in advance of North West Europe, many of these issues were to an extent addressed. Although problems remained in recruiting the right quality, age and specialisms the overall effect was an improvement. Better training at CASC helped to provide a more uniform quality and gave the few directly recruited civilians a better understanding of the military organisation (even if further training was later required). Commanders were now better educated in the needs and ways of the organisation. Quirky specialists on a formation staff were often balanced by regular staff officers of reasonable, if not excellent, quality. The organisation was now large enough to be able to replace or hide some of its more obviously weaker officers. Its structure of staffs and detachments was now decently configured to better deal with a broad range of civilian problems and many layers of indigenous administrative arrangements. Indeed, many of these were further refined as the North West Europe campaign progressed. However, it was not large or permanent enough to attract many career officers. It continued to be subjected to the prejudiced views of influential senior officers.

Did Civil Affairs deliver what was needed in Normandy and was it seen to deliver what was needed? At a superficial level, the campaign was not embarrassed by much in the way of disorganisation, disease or unrest. There were a few problems with a few roads being blocked by refugees, there was a little disease in the way of scabies and there was much looting, but none of these significantly threatened the campaign. In exploitation of local resources, the audit was even less comfortable. Yet, even here, that there was not enough labour available had rather more to do with the slow breakout and German labour policies during the occupation than any failure by Civil Affairs. Rather more helpfully, Civil Affairs was able to assist formations with control of refugees during the battles around the Falaise pocket. They were able to supply formations with some intelligence. They were able to assist Field Security. They oversaw the re-establishment of the French authorities and helped them to redevelop the indigenous capacity to administer their own affairs; thereby allowing the campaign commanders quickly to loosen their ties with Normandy as attention was turned to new battles in other parts of North West Europe.

Significantly, Civil Affairs were able to assist in mitigating some of the thornier political and diplomatic issues facing the campaign. With the bombing of Caen, although the question of the justification of the city’s widespread destruction would inevitably return, during the campaign itself, individuals like Usher and groups like the monuments officers did much to ensure that immediate resentment did not grow. Most significantly, in diplomatic terms the organisation oversaw the establishment of de Gaulle’s provisional government. That consideration of the matter had taken place prior to D-Day helped set the policy of ‘waiting and seeing’ but in ‘seeing’ Civil Affairs was able to both supply evidence of the Gaullists general competence and ensure that military needs were served by the new authorities. They helped to mentor the new authorities
in civil administrative areas of military interest (a perspective that is at odds with some French history).

There were lessons for Civil Affairs, not least of which came with the drama over the evacuation of Caen. Yet even here, lessons were learnt that would be helpful later, during the breakout and on entering Germany. Furthermore, by assisting the Gaullist administration to take responsibility for refugees, although an inefficient process, it did at least help to build independent local capacity. Other matters were more complicated. Whether it was better to evacuate or hold (standfast) a refugee population depended on so many factors that creating a ‘one-size fits all’ policy was never likely to happen. Moreover, what was more important than an indoctrinated approach was the combination of being able to be flexible in the responses given and understanding the overall military requirement (in this case keeping the operational area free for military manoeuvre). There were perpetual problems of insufficient transport, too few key specialists (medical officers in particular) and a general shortage of support staff. Although, none of these were easy to resolve without some form of reciprocal cost, in most cases alternative solutions were found that fitted within available resources.

Was Civil Affairs fundamentally tested in Normandy? Compared to the scale of problems faced later at Belsen or in feeding parts of The Netherlands or the political problems that afflicted Belgium, Normandy provided no fundamental test. However, the scale of problems anticipated and encountered, such the evacuation of Caen, keeping the tide of refugees back from areas south of the city or ensuring the harvest was brought in were still considerable. That they did not become substantial was because of the effectiveness of the organisation’s monitoring and response system. With an organisational bent towards a watching brief, which was reinforced by a constant system of reporting there was little let slip. If problems were identified then every attempt was made to resolve them before they became a danger. Investigations were made, spot resources procured, and contingency plans made. Traditional hurdles to success such as the nature of the military logistical system were now restructured to serve all of the responsibilities of the commander (including for the civilian population) and this was reinforced by the corporate influence at SHAEF. With such robust systems, perhaps that is why famine relief in The Netherlands is regarded as an Allied success and why very few are aware of the problems in Belgium; Belsen was perhaps too big a human task for any organisation to tackle without some form of recrimination.

What are lessons for the future? Parallels between wartime and modern Civil Affairs produce a number of resonances. Some of these are positive, some negative and others different. The key difference is of course the type of war being fought. Despite connections with the idea of a ‘global war on terror’ for most members of the voting public the conflicts in Iraq (this is written on 30 April 2009, the day that British troops formally withdrew from providing security in southern Iraq) and Afghanistan are not of the same scale, intensity or internationally threatening status as the Second World War. Then the threat was direct, was global, was capable of invasion, existed across several
continents, threatened national economic and political interests around the World and required the mobilisation of all economic, financial, human, intellectual, political, military and diplomatic resources to defeat it. Only in American can it be said that the sense of threat from the global war on terror is anywhere close to the nature of the wartime Axis threat. Thus, the resources dedicated to modern conflicts are for most part not fully mobilised. The type of conflict is also different. The Second World War was heavy on combat power, whilst recent conflicts have a stronger bent towards state building and political processes. Thus, the role played by Civil Affairs is necessarily different. Nevertheless, there are parallels.

The negative parallels are very familiar. The generally dismissive attitude of the war fighters to Civil Affairs remains broadly the same. The view that nothing that is non-kinetic should be in the military is perhaps stronger today after years of institutionalisation around a combat heavy Cold War threat. The quality of some Civil Affairs personnel can continue to let the organisation down and contribute to the idea of it as a dumping ground for deadwood. The issue of where to put Civil Affairs within the military organisation and what to do with them (even if their role is understood) is another consistent theme. Departmental differences of opinion continue of the best course of action to take, even if mitigated in Britain by the Stabilisation Unit and cabinet committees. There continue to be differences of approach between the military and humanitarian communities. Differences of approach, of levels of commitment and of interest continue to distort the decision making of international alliances and coalitions. Indeed, compared to the Second World War where the relationship between America, Britain and the exiled Allies was able to focus on the global threat, arguably today the distortions of alliance politics are a greater problem. The solutions of many of these negative aspects remain the same, better training within the organisation, educating those around the organisation and better government and international co-ordination. They are all in evidence and some are successful.

Perhaps the most important component of successful Civil Affairs remains the realisation by others that there is a job to be done and that Civil Affairs is an important element in achieving the desired goal. Whether, such realisation of need comes with education or bloody experience varies between conflicts. There is a much wider question of whether the armed forces, with their institutionalised focus on war fighting and kinetic threats ever have the option but to find out the hard way. That war is a complex environment is well recognised, but the historical tendency amongst most armies has been to endeavour to find simple and formulaic solutions. The recognition of Civil Affairs as part of the solution often comes after all the other options has been exhausted. Their role in a military framework works better when Civil Affairs are properly integrated into to the planning, command and control process, when they are able to deliver the quality of expertise required, when their role as enablers is understood and when there are seen delivering military benefits. Civil Affairs is successful when it is able to help, when it is seen to help, when it is easily available and when it is not regarded as institutionally threatening.
Indeed, certain elements go deeper into the culture of a military organisation and the job it performs. The first of these is whether modern states have the theory and practise of warfare right. Whether it be countering terrorism or an armoured shock army, it is inconceivable to consider any form of conflict that is not amongst the civilian masses. Even the exceptions are exceptional. This raises the question of whether in any use of armed military force it is possible to avoid the civilian dimension. Yet, the nature of the training, culture, equipment, doctrine and development of modern armed forces remains focused on the fighting component. This is after all the purpose of the organisation. Yet, in the circumstances where history informs us that civilian agencies tend to avoid warzones for reasons of paucity of numbers, inexperience or a desire to avoid its inherent dangers, that the military is often the only option but does little to prepare itself for this likely role makes little sense. True the real element of change may be some form of international law that further obliges states and armies to consider their obligations, but there is also a need for a culture shift within the military. This is not to deny importance of fighting, but rather to recognise that success requires more factors to be considered. That such a model was found acceptable in dealing with events in Malaya and is being used in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is one that is quickly replaced by a narrowly focused kinetic model makes little sense.

There is a requirement, if Civil Affairs is not to follow similar paths as before to remove the simplifying tendencies at large within armed forces and better reflect true complexities. This may well be difficult to do when many soldiers come from humble educational backgrounds and the turnover of personnel is great. Yet, to an extent, the beginnings of developing more complex conceptual frameworks are already evident. The problem now is one of shifting embedded cultures. Here a readjustment of the sense of loyalty and professionalism within the armed forces may make a difference. That a good career path can include Civil Affairs, that working for Civil Affairs can take one perilously close to but not over to the needs of other organisations and that training for such eventualities is a key component in ensuring military success on the battlefield are all elements that need to be considered. However, this is not simply a matter for the military, the unresolved issue of how to co-ordinate disparate organisations requires better leadership and consideration of whether sequential organisational phases (as employed during the Second World War when the military handed over to UNRRA) might make more sense than simultaneous approaches. Both offer a comprehensive methodology, but if all the eggs are put in one (military) basket with Civil Affairs as custodians of the civil elements, there is also the added benefit of accountability. A similar question needs to be asked as whether it is better to have a stabiliser or war fighter in control. Interestingly the official American view remains for the State Department to lead, but reality paints a rather different picture.

What are benefits to other fields of study? For too long there have unfortunate gaps in the histories of France and warfare. The sense that the French did everything for themselves in Normandy during 1944 will now have to be revisited. A fresh examination of French sources is required to provide a better
understanding of how the French really saw Civil Affairs and how they really worked with the organisation. Too much emphasis has been placed on Gaullist and diplomatic views of a few crazy days in mid-June when few were able to think straight (even if they could). The relationship between Civil Affairs and local Gaullists was far more complicated and was one where mutual-dependency mixed with mistrust, genuine friendship and operational need. The Allies did more than just remove the Germans from France.

In terms of military history, this research argues that war is more than just about numbers of tanks. This is not new, many have pointed to the importance of logistics, of leadership, of wartime economics as factors that must be considered when contemplating warfare. However, this research develops on a recent trend to examine the human and in particular civilian dimension of warfare. Whilst some French historians, have produced some worthy work in French on the civilian cost of the battle of Normandy too little of it has made its way into the English language. Moreover, by studying the role of Civil Affairs new dimensions are given to the nature of the wartime effort. The workings of the War Office, another dimension to the transatlantic relationship, the role of key individuals, the huge efforts made to institutionalise success and develop professionalism all add to the understanding of how the war was fought and who fought it. The nature of Civil Affairs work indicates that men of all ages were actively involved and the skill sets involved went beyond basic field craft. For Civil Affairs officers a different type of leadership was required, less bags of smoke and left flanking, and rather more bags of flour and enabling.

The lessons of history and experience are for us all to learn and inevitably, one sees an entirely different scene when all of the dimensions are put in place. This research helps to better account for some of the hitherto neglected elements of this picture. When participants in a staff ride or a battlefield tour now survey the terrain where their fathers may have fought and fell, they can have a clearer image of the scene their forebears saw. There is the scale of the civilian involvement in the battle, no longer just the image of pretty girls and cider, but rather huge amounts of both upheaval and endeavour. There is too a great sense of the dimensions of warfare, of the easily forgotten elements to be considered, of the range of military expertise required and of the necessary organisational and training developments. It is difficult to contemplate the battles of the Odon valley without considering the requirement to bring in the harvest, the need to look after dairy herds or the need to mitigate the effect of the mass evacuation and then later return of thousands of French citizens. It has always been difficult to walk around Caen without imagining the damage, the civilian casualties and the upset, but this is now balanced by the diplomacy and efficiency of Usher and his special relationship with Daure. Whilst, in Bayeux, the part played by Goodings helps to explain the need for good training, it is also true the role played by Pirie whose Italian experience stood him in much stead helped to calm matters.

In sum, it is easy to be dismissive of Civil Affairs and simply see the organisation as a strange gathering of ancient men or Old Etonians. However, after much experimentation, a considerable amount of heartache, the determination of
individuals like Bovenschen, the be-kilted diplomacy of Usher and the rather mundane, but fundamentally important procedural and professional improvements, Civil Affairs was both useful and necessary to the military in Normandy. It is likely to remain so too.
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### Illustration A1.1: Sources of British Civil Affairs Officer Recruitment for the North West Europe Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Emergency Commissions</td>
<td>36.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Army</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Army</td>
<td>7.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Army Reserves</td>
<td>5.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned Civilians</td>
<td>4.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Army Reserves</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Regular Army</td>
<td>0.94%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Reserve</td>
<td>0.55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:

Figures based on the 3,591 successful candidates that completed their training.
APPENDIX B  ILLUSTRATION B1.1: BRITISH 30 CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS STAFF  

ARRANGEMENTS JULY 1944  

Civil Affairs  
H.Q. 30 Corps  
S.C.A.O. Col. R.S. Lambert M.C.  
Policy  

Executive Section  
S.O. I Lt. Col. J.F. Millard  
S.O. II Maj. W. Tweddle  

Fr. Mil. Liaison  
Maj. J. Rheims  
Liaison with Fr. Authorities  

Administrative Section  
S.O. I Lt. Col. A.N.M. Villiers  
S.O. II Maj. H.D. Martyn  

1. Moves of Detachments. Orders (with Adm.),  
2. Refugees (Policy), Refugee Evacuation to Corps  
   Transit Centre B.P. “Todd” etc. (Policy). Cattle  
   Evacuation  
3. Public Safety, Passes, Control of Civilian Circulation.  
5. Legal, Police, Fire, F.A.D.  
6. Information, Maps, War Diary.  

S.O. II Maj. H.J.R. Trefusis  
S.O. III Capt. G.L. Robson  
Special Tasks for Exe and Adm  
Liaison  

1. Administration of CA. Dets and Refugee Centres.  
2. M.S. Matters  
5. Labour Wage Rates, Food Prices, Cost of Living.  
7. Public Health, Hospitals, Med. Supps. V.D.  

31.7.44
APPENDIX C  TABLE C1.1: COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS, TASKS AND LOCATIONS
OF UNITS OF NO. 2 GROUP, CIVIL AFFAIRS, 18 JUNE TO 5 AUGUST
1944.

The following table is made up of data assembled from a number of original
sources:
Locations of British Second Army Civil Affairs Detachments, 18 June 1944.³
Locations of British Second Army Civil Affairs Detachments, 8 July 1944.⁴
Locations of British Second Army Civil Affairs Detachments, 23 July 1944.⁵
Locations of British Second Army Civil Affairs Detachments, 5 August 1944.⁶

Notes:
Under Cmd = Under command of
Loc = Location (using original War Office spelling and grid reference)

By sticking to the descriptions used originally some (easy to follow)
inconsistencies appear in the tasks of many detachments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detachment</th>
<th>18 June</th>
<th>8 July</th>
<th>23 July</th>
<th>5 August</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>Under Cmd</td>
<td>1 Corps</td>
<td>1 Corps</td>
<td>1 Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task</td>
<td>3 Div and Douvres La Délivrande; Res for Caen</td>
<td>3 Div area less Gazelle and Le Landel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loc</td>
<td>Colleville-sur-Orne</td>
<td>Colleville-sur-Orne, 0878</td>
<td>Caen</td>
<td>Caen</td>
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<td>202</td>
<td>Under Cmd</td>
<td>30 Corps</td>
<td>30 Corps</td>
<td>12 Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Area Det. for Corps area</td>
<td>Res Spearhead</td>
<td>Res Spearhead</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loc</td>
<td>Bayeux</td>
<td>[Monceaux-en-Bessin], 803768</td>
<td>Putot-en-Bessin, 9072</td>
<td>Putot-en-Bessin, 9072</td>
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<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>Under Cmd</td>
<td>11 L of C</td>
<td>11 L of C</td>
<td>L of C</td>
</tr>
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APPENDIX D  ILLUSTRATION D1.1: NUMBERS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENTS
IN BRITISH AND AMERICAN SECTORS, D-DAY TO D+60.7

![Graph showing the number of Civil Affairs Detachments in British and American sectors over a period of 60 days after D-Day. The graph indicates an increase in the number of detachments over time, with higher numbers in the British sector compared to the American sector. The x-axis represents the number of days after D-Day, while the y-axis shows the number of Civil Affairs Detachments. TheBritish Sector is represented by a solid line, and the American Sector is represented by a dotted line. The graph highlights a steady increase in the number of detachments for both sectors, with the British sector maintaining a higher number throughout the period.]
APPENDIX E  MAPS RELATED TO RESEARCH.

Map E1.1: Normandy (also known as the Rouen Région). (EF)

Map E1.2: The five Département of Normandy (focused on area of interest). (EF)
Map E1.4: Prominent Rivers in the British Sector of Normandy. (EF)

Map E1.3: The Arrondissement of Normandy (focused on area of interest). (EF)
**Map E1.5: Care of Refugees in the British Sector of Normandy. (EF)**

- **Blue**: Principal areas of evacuation in the British Sector
- **Red**: Cluster of military-run refugee camps in the British Sector
- **Green**: Barfleur camp used by the Caen evacuees (arrow indicative)

**Map E1.6: Civilian Evacuation and Stop Lines in Normandy. (EF)**

- **Red (solid)**: German evacuation lines (refugee movement southwards)
- **Blue (solid)**: British refugee stop line - no refugee move north of line
- **Blue (dotter)**: British refugee stop line - no refugee move south of line
- **Green (solid)**: British food dump line to stop refugees moving north
- **Orange (dotted)**: French administered control line to stop refugees moving north
- **Yellow (area)**: The 'Falaise pocket'
Map E1.7: Extent of War Damage to Caen.

Red   90-100% destruction

Pink  60-90% destruction

(Source: Author’s collection)
# Appendix F Illustration F1.1: Civil Affairs Field Report Form, CA1.8

**Field Report – CA**

**Detachment**

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## 1. Statistics (Estimate numbers)

- **Population**
  - Normal
  - Present
- **Displaced Persons**
  - Male
  - Female
- **On relief**
- **Employed by military**
- **Otherwise unemployed**

## 2. Food Situation

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<th>Black Market</th>
<th>Importance as to major foods</th>
<th>Estimate of local efforts to eliminate</th>
<th>Flour milling capacity (quintals per day)</th>
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<td>Flour/bread grains (quintals)</td>
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<td>Butter (kilo)</td>
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<td>Edible oil (litre)</td>
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<td>Potatoes (kilo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milk (litre)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meat (kilo)</td>
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<td>Fish (kilo)</td>
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## 3. Estimate availability as below

### (a) Services

- Water
- Gas
- Electricity
- Sewage disposals
- Trams or buses
- Railways services
- Road transport.
- I.W.T.
- Housing
- Hospitals
- Medical services
- Food processing
- Industrial potential

### (b) Administration

- Civil administration
- Civil defence
- Fire service
- Police
- Prisons
- Courts
- Banking facilities
- Post Office
- Pensions
- Telephone and Telegraph
- Functioning of rationing system
- Food distribution
- Food collection

### (c) Supplies

- Clothing
- Shoes
- Soap
- Fuel (Coal)
- Fuel (P.O.I.)
- Seeds
- Livestock
- Agricultural equipment
- Technical equipment
- Lumber
- Cement
- Medical supplies
- Warehouse facilities

## 4. Public Health (Estimate Situation)

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<th>Bad</th>
<th>Epidemic (State type)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nurses</td>
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<td>Required</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Midwives</td>
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## 5. Political Stability (Estimate local political situation as follows)

- **General situation**
- **Noting**
- **Active unrest**
- **Passive unrest**
- **Normal**

- **Attitude towards Allies**
- **Hostile**
- **Satisfactory**
- **Friendly**

### Rank

- C.O.

### Signature

(Cover Sheet Form)
General Remarks

Comments by Forwarding Echelon

(Back of Single Sheet Form)
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<td>Vitaminised Chocolate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>15 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT 80</td>
<td>13,658 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DERV</td>
<td>10,385 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HD 30</td>
<td>405 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HD 50</td>
<td>715 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 600</td>
<td>180 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene</td>
<td>1,200 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M 800</td>
<td>35 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grease No. 2</td>
<td>1,554 pounds</td>
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## APPENDIX H  ILLUSTRATION H1.1: FRENCH RATION SCALE FOR DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUAL, JULY 1944.10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provisional</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>J1</th>
<th>J2</th>
<th>J3</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>T / T1 / T2</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>V</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bread per day</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biscuits per day</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salt per month</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee per month*</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sugar per month</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jam per month</td>
<td>g</td>
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<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wine per month</td>
<td>l</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>½</td>
<td>½</td>
<td>½</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes per month</td>
<td>kg</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour per month</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
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<td>Beans per month</td>
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<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>Chocolate per month</td>
<td>g</td>
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<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
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<td>g</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
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### Notes:
- *= by end of month
- # = each category of individual was to have 8 tickets per month
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commune</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Oats</th>
<th>Barley</th>
<th>Harvesting Machinery</th>
<th>Horses</th>
<th>Tractors</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Surplus</th>
<th>Deficiency</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cressonns</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>57</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Massey-Harris (Spares) Mac Cormick (Adequate)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plumetot</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feriers</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 to 5 Hectares</td>
<td>Adequate Spares Req'd for (Massey-Harris and Dering)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Béchoville</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blairville</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hercoville Beau Lieu</td>
<td>M. Pitrois, D/Maire – Full Report to Gen. De Marni (FR) 211 Detachment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villeneuve</td>
<td>YES various, French, German &amp; British</td>
<td>4 Sets needs 1 Set</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Béchoville</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62.5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX J  TABLE J1.1: OUTLINE WEATHER CONDITIONS IN NORMANDY, 6
JUNE TO 31 AUGUST 1944.

In order to cover both the entire period and to give a sense of how conditions could vary across the region the following table is made up of data assembled from a number of original sources:

British 49 (West Riding) Infantry Division Provost Company.\textsuperscript{12}
No. 224 Civil Affairs Detachment.\textsuperscript{13}
No. 218 Civil Affairs Detachment.\textsuperscript{14}
No. 209 Civil Affairs Detachment.\textsuperscript{15}

Notes:
- = no data in original document
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Weather</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 6</td>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>Courseulles-sur-Mer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 7</td>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>Coyp., CMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 8</td>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>De Provost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 9</td>
<td>Fine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 10</td>
<td>Fine</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 12</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 13</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-----</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>218</td>
<td>Det., Civil Affairs</td>
<td>Fine, dry, good visibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224</td>
<td>Det., Civil Affairs</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>225</td>
<td>Carcany</td>
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<tr>
<td>226</td>
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<tr>
<td>227</td>
<td>Courseulles-sur-Mer</td>
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<tr>
<td>228</td>
<td>Carcany</td>
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<td>230</td>
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<td>231</td>
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<td>232</td>
<td>Carcany</td>
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<td>233</td>
<td>Courseulles-sur-Mer</td>
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<td>234</td>
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<td>235</td>
<td>Courseulles-sur-Mer</td>
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<td>236</td>
<td>Carcany</td>
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<tr>
<td>237</td>
<td>Courseulles-sur-Mer</td>
<td>Fine, dry, good visibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238</td>
<td>Carcany</td>
<td>Fine, dry, good visibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Cloudy, slight drizzle
- Warm, dry
- Visibility good
- Wind NE
- Strong wind
- Bright sunshine
- Rain, fresh NE wind, sea moderate to rough
- Clearing by 1200 hrs
- Very wet during day
- Strong wind NE
- Strong wind
- Cloudy, slight drizzle
- Warm, dry
- Visibility good
- Wind NE
- Strong wind
- Bushed
- Strong wind
- Wind NE
- Strong wind
- Bushed
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<th>Date</th>
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<th>Details</th>
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<td>June 22</td>
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<td>Fair</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 23</td>
<td>Courseulles-sur-Mer</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>sunshine, rain in intervals, fine</td>
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<td>June 24</td>
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<td>Good</td>
<td>rain in evening, fine</td>
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<td>June 25</td>
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<td>Fair</td>
<td>sea calm, strong sea, fine</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 26</td>
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<td>Showery</td>
<td>rain, low cloud</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Very fine</td>
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<td>Location</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>August 9</td>
<td>Le Reculey</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>August 27</td>
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<td>Les Andelys</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 30</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 31</td>
<td>Les Andelys</td>
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### Report on Recce carried out by Major H.F. Gorman, on 31 July 44.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name of Village</th>
<th>Map Ref.</th>
<th>Percentage of HABITABLE Houses</th>
<th>Remaining Visible Population</th>
<th>Livestock Alive</th>
<th>Livestock Dead</th>
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<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept Vents</td>
<td>695578</td>
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<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
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<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
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<td>St Jean des Essartiers</td>
<td>678543</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>NIL throughout</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>La Fouquerie</td>
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<tr>
<td>St Ouen des Besaces</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>La Morichesse les Mares</td>
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<td>Nil</td>
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**Notes:**
- Medical posts at 665540 and 680515 were questioned and reported that no civilians had been seen or treated by them.
- There were signs that refugees had been overtaken by the battle at 675520 (overturned carts, dead horses and personal belongings littered the lane), but no civilians were to be seen in the vicinity.
- No recce of villages WEST of road CAUMONT/St MARTIN des BESACES was made as infantry was deployed and appeared to be moving across to the EAST front.
- ALL evidence pointed to a SOUTHWARD evacuation of livestock by GERMANS.
APPENDIX L
ILLUSTRATION L.1.1: REFUGEE PROCESSING ARRANGEMENTS AT
BRITISH 30 CORPS REFUGEE TRANSIT CENTRE, JULY 1944.
APPENDIX M  TABLE M1.1: SURVEY OF POPULATION CHANGES AND
HABITABILITY IN BRITISH SECTOR OF NORMANDY, 22 JULY TO 31
AUGUST 1944.

The following table is made up of data assembled from a number of original
sources:
British 8 Corps Civil Affairs Fortnightly Report No 2, 4 August 1944.18
British 12 Corps Civil Affairs Fortnightly Report No 2, Period 22 July to 4 August
1944.19
British 12 Corps Weekly Civil Affairs Summary No 1, Period 6 to 12 August
1944.20
British 12 Corps Weekly Civil Affairs Summary No 2, Period 13 to 19 August
1944.21
British 12 Corps Weekly Civil Affairs Summary No 3 and 4, Period 20 to 31
August 1944.22
21st Army Group Civil Affairs Report on Percentage of Habitable or Easily
Repairable Houses in Liberated Communes, 10 August 1944.23

Notes:
- = location mentioned in original document, but no data given
(xx) = data from the modern wider commune

To give the data context, recently compiled statistics of wartime French civilian
casualties have been added (Blue shading).24 These include both those killed in
each commune as well as those from the commune who were killed either there
or elsewhere. Pre-war population figures (Orange shading) are also included for
reasons of context and these are drawn from the wartime documents.

It should be noted that recent figures refer to a complete commune whereas the
wartime figures can refer to merely a hamlet within it. Where possible the
figures for either or both elements are included.

Similarly, the names of some places of habitation on War Office maps are
sometimes misspelt or truncated. To ease the process of their location today
modern names based on IGN (Institut Géographique National) maps are also
detailed where necessary.25 The grid references are taken from the wartime
documents.

[491]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pre-War Pop</th>
<th>Died IN Commune</th>
<th>Died FROM Commune</th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>Map Ref</th>
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<tr>
<td>21 Jul to 4 Aug</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9657</td>
<td>10244</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Aug to 19 Aug</td>
<td>1,655</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9657</td>
<td>10244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Aug to 12 Aug</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9657</td>
<td>10244</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Aug to 31 Aug</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>10244</td>
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<td>1,050</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9657</td>
<td>10244</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Pref.</td>
<td>War Pop.</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Pop.</td>
<td>Death in Commune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>20 Jul 44</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>135</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
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**Map Key**
- Pre-War Pop: 7171
- 1935: 8651
- 1945: 9836
- 1955: 1059
- 1965: 1132
- 1975: 1205
- 1985: 1278
- 1995: 1351
- 2005: 1424
- 2015: 1507
- 2025: 1590

Communes: Viers, Chanteau, Château de Villers, Champeyr, Chambois, Caumont-l'Éventé, Castillon, Chouain, Chambois, Cheux, Charny, Castillon.
<table>
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<th>Place</th>
<th>Pre-War Pop</th>
<th>21 Jul to 4 Aug Pop</th>
<th>Died IN Commune</th>
<th>Died FROM Commune</th>
<th>Pop. 6 Aug to 12 Aug</th>
<th>% Hab. 6 Aug to 12 Aug</th>
<th>% Hab. 20 Aug to 31 Aug</th>
<th>% Hab. 13 Aug to 19 Aug</th>
<th>% Hab. 5 Aug to 11 Aug</th>
<th>% Hab. 1 Aug to 7 Aug</th>
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<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</table>

- Data for various dates and places, showing population changes and deaths in and from the commune.
Map Ref.
Pre­War Pop.
21 Jul to 4 Aug Pop.
6 Aug to12 Aug Pop.

8767

6965

0931

9261

9452

9064

7664

9653

2828

Nil

1
95

95

100
1
9

‐

3
2

Nil
5
‐

‐

3

80

80

Nil

‐

10‐11

10

Nil

Nil

10

28

20

‐

50

99

3

2

146

142

9664

Nil
‐

14
11
10

10

75

196

6756

‐

200

9
9
Nil

4
Nil

Nil

15
Nil

177

9861

240
17
7

‐
5

25

103

‐

20 Aug to 31 Aug Pop.

2

66

87

Guêprei
138

Grimbosq
‐

Granville (War Office)
Crauville (IGN)
Commune: Torteval‐
Quesnay

286

Grainville‐sur‐Odon

147

Goupillières

248

Gavrus

‐

Fourneaux‐le‐Val

‐

Foulognes

1

13 Aug to 19 Aug Pop.

Fontenay‐le‐Pesnel

31

Fontaine‐Étoupefour

2

Fierville
Commune: Sept‐Vents
7

Feuguerolles‐sur‐
Orne
Commune:
Feuguerolles‐Bully

Died FROM Commune
Died IN Commune
21 Jul to4 Aug % Hab.
6 Aug to 12 Aug % Hab.
10 Aug % Hab.
13 Aug to 19 Aug % Hab.
20 Aug to 31 Aug % Hab.

[496]

Fel


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<th>Map Ref.</th>
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<td>88</td>
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<td>13 Aug to 19 Aug</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
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<td>10 Aug</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>75</td>
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<td>Death</td>
<td>Population</td>
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<td>------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Aug to 12 Aug</td>
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</tr>
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<td>13 Aug to 19 Aug</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug to 31 Aug</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Map**:
- La Fouquerie
- La Graveire
- La Hoguette
- La Morichese
- La Redantiere
- La Rue de Parfouru
- La Senaudiere
- La Vacquerie
- Landes (War Office)
- Landes-sur-Ajon (IGN)
- La Rive de Parfouru
- Commune St-Jean-des-Esartiers
- Commune St-Jean-Laye
- Commune Gravette
- Commune Gravette
- Commune Damperre
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<th>Commune: St-Georges-d'Aunay</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>% Hab.</th>
<th>Died FROM Commune</th>
<th>Died IN Commune</th>
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<td>(8)</td>
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<td>Le Manoir</td>
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<td>9851</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Le Mesnil-au-Grain</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>8553</td>
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<tr>
<td>Le Neubourg</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3693</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Thuit</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9163</td>
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<td>Le Valtru</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Le Vey</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>4191</td>
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<td>Les Loges</td>
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<td>Died IN Commune</td>
<td>Died FROM Commune</td>
<td>Pre-War Pop</td>
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**Ref.**

- Lingèvres: 75, 5, 8
- Livry: 80, 2
- Longraye: 100, 100, 4
- Loucelles: 98
- Louviers: 5
- Louvigny: 90
- Maisoncelles-sur-Ajon: 40
- Maltot: 30
- Martainville: 95
- Mènil-Hermay (War Office): 30
- Ménil-Hermay (IGN): Nil
- Mènil-Vin: 100

**Map Ref.**

- Martinville: 100
- Mènil-Hermay (War Office): 100
- Ménil-Hermay (IGN): 100
- Mènil-Vin: 100
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**Deaths from Commune**
- Died in Commune: Livry
- Died in Commune: Ommoy

**Pre-War Pop.**
- Quesnay-Guesnon: 7565
- Planques: 222
- Rabodanges: 232
- Planques: 218
- Quesnay-Guesnon: 7565
- Quesnay-Guesnon: 7565
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**Map Ref.**

- Tilly-sur-Seulles
- Tournay-sur-Odon
- Tournay (War Office)
- Tilly-sur-Seulles
- Villers-Bocage
- Vieux
- Verson
- Ventes
- Vauthain
- Vaucouleurs
- Vendranges
- Vaucelles
- Vezin-le-Coquet
- Vieux, Touffreville
- Vieux, Tourville
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<td>21 July</td>
<td>Refugee transit centre CONDE, serving 12 and 30 Corps.</td>
<td>50 Div.</td>
<td>59 Div.</td>
<td>In res for future ops. C.A. adm of small part of BAYEUX canton within Corps area.</td>
<td>50 Div on RIGHT, 59 Div on LEFT of Corps sectors.</td>
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<td>24 July</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
<td>50 Div.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15 Div.</td>
<td>59 Div passed to comd 12 Corps; CAUMONT sector taken over from V.U.S. Corps by 15 Div, which came under comd 30 Corps</td>
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<td>25 July</td>
<td>Passed to comd 12 Corps in situ.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>CAUMONT sector passed to comd 8 Corps. C.A. adm of part of BAYEUX canton within corps area passed to 210 C.A. Det. 43 and 7 Armd Divs came under comd 30 Corps. 30 Corps attack with 43 Div on RIGHT, 50 Div on LEFT and 7 Armd Div in res.</td>
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<td>30 July</td>
<td>Reverted to comd 30 Corps and est new refugee transit centre 774686, serving 8 and 30 Corps</td>
<td>50 Div.</td>
<td>7 Armd Div. (In res till div adv).</td>
<td>43 Div.</td>
<td>50 Div took over rear of Corps area between Corps flank bdys and remained in res. 30 Corps attack continued with 43 Div on RIGHT and 7 Armd Div on Left.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2 August</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
<td>50 Div.</td>
<td>7 Armd Div.</td>
<td>43 Div.</td>
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APPENDIX O ILLUSTRATION O1.1: BRITISH 8 CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS SURVEY AS
PART OF HANDOVER REPORT, 24 AUGUST 1944. 27

[509]


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**Columns:**
- IRIN-No.: Identification number
- Geography: Location
- Main Sector: Main sector of the settlement
- Main Condition: Main condition of the settlement
- Main Activity: Main activity of the settlement
- Remarks: Additional remarks

**Rows:**
- Serial No.: Sequential number for each entry
- IRIN-No.: Identification number
- Geography: Location
- Main Sector: Main sector of the settlement
- Main Condition: Main condition of the settlement
- Main Activity: Main activity of the settlement
- Remarks: Additional remarks

**Table Notes:**
- The table provides a comprehensive overview of various settlements, their identification numbers, geographical locations, main sectors, conditions, activities, and additional remarks.
APPENDIX P  IMAGES OF PEOPLE, PLACES AND EVENTS RELATED TO RESEARCH.

Note:
The copyright of many of these images is not held by the author, they have been made available for use in this document under the auspices being used solely for educational purposes and not for financial gain.

Image P1.1: The Right Honourable Sir James Grigg, Secretary of State for War. (Artist: Eric Kennington, [undated]) (Source: © UK Ministry of Defence Art Collection, London)
Image P1.2: Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke (CIGS), Grigg, General Sir Bernard Paget (Commander, Home Forces). (Photographer: David Scherman, 1942) (Source: © TIME Inc.)

Images P1.4a-b: Major General Stanley Kirby, Director of Civil Affairs, War Office. *(Source: © IWM Collection, London – TR 1235 and TR 1237)*

Images P1.5a-b: Major General Francis, The Lord Rennell of Rodd, CCAO, AMGOT. *(Source: © IWM Collection, London - TR 14225 and TR 1424)*

Image P1.6: Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Grasett, ACOS G-5, SHAEF. *(Source: © IWM Collection, London - TR 2629)*
Images P1.7a-c: General Sir Bernard Montgomery, Commander of 21st Army Group, meeting, seeing and being seen by the civilian population of Normandy, 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London)

Image P1.8: Montgomery giving a press conference, June 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London)
Image P1.9: Montgomery and leader of the Free French General Charles de Gaulle together in Normandy, 14 June 1944. *(Source: © IWM Collection, London)*

Image P1.10: Generals Montgomery and Eisenhower (Commander of SHAEF), 1944. *(Source: Author’s collection)*
Image P1.11: Pierre Daure, Prefect for Calvados Département (speaking), 1944. (Source: Author’s collection)

Image P1.12: Daure and French General Marie-Pierre Kœnig in Caen, 1944. (Source: Author’s collection)

Image P1.13: Raymond Triboulet, Sub-Prefect for Bayeux Arrondissement. (Source: Author’s collection)
Image P1.14: François Coulet, Commissioner for Rouen Région (far left) and Grasset at church service in Bayeux, 14 July 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London)

Image P1.15: Lieutenant Colonel Charles M. Usher, Civil Affairs officer. (Source: Author’s collection)
Image P1.16: de Gaulle addressing the crowd in Bayeux, 14 June 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London)

Image P1.17: de Gaulle (addressing the crowd), Kœnig (centre, hands behind back), Coulet (hat in hand), Bayeux 14 June 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London)
Image P1.18: de Gaulle with Ambassador Pierre Viénnot around Bayeux, 14 June 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London)

Image P1.19: de Gaulle around Bayeux, 14 June 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London)
Image P1.20: Bombing of central Caen, 6 June 1944. (Source: Author’s collection)

Image P1.21: Central Caen after liberation (intersection of Canal de l’Orne and River Orne). (Source: Author’s collection)
Image P1.22: Destruction in area of Le Château de Caen, 1944. (Source: Author’s collection)

Image P1.23: Pulling bodies of the rubble in Caen, 1944. (Source: Author’s collection)
Image P1.24: Clearing up Caen, 1944. (Source: Author’s collection)

Image P1.25: Vire, 1944. (Source: Author’s collection)
Image P1.26: Villers Bocage, 1944. *(Source: Author's collection)*

Image P1.27: Caumont L'Éventé, 1944. *(Source: Author's collection)*
Image P1.28: Falaise, 1944. *(Source: Author’s collection)*

Image P1.29: Destruction to village and fields at Cagny, 1944. *(Source: © IWM Collection, London - CL 477)*
Image P1.30: The destruction of Aunay-sur-Odon, 1944. (Source: Author’s collection)

Image P1.31: Rots, 1944. (Source: Author’s collection)
Image P1.32: Refugees in caves at Fleury-sur-Orne, 1944. (Source: Author's collection)

Image P1.33: Relief arrives at Lycée Malherbe in Caen, 10 July 1944. (Source: Author's collection)
Image P1.34: Refugees being evacuated from outside Lycée Malherbe in Caen, July 1944. (Source: Author’s collection)

Image P1.35: Evacuation from outside Lycée Malherbe in Caen, July 1944. (Source: Author’s collection)
Image P1.36: Villagers return to Buron, 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London - B 7688)


Image P1.38: Newly arrived French medical staff, June 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London)
Image P1.39: Unexploded ordnance being cleared from field near Caen, 1944.
(Source: Author’s collection)

Image P1.40: Measures taken to preserve the supply of flour, Normandy 1944.
(Source: © IWM Collection, London)
Image P1.41: Making use of meat from livestock killed in battle, Normandy 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London)

Image P1.42: Cattle killed in battle, Normandy 1944. (Source: Neil Powell’s “Battlefield Historian” collection)
Image P1.43: Norman cattle being evacuated by troops, 8 July 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London - B 6606)

Image P1.44: Paillaud condensed milk and camembert factory, Creully, [undated]. (Source: Author's collection)
Image P1.45: Military vehicles moving through a wheat field near Aunay-sur-Odon, 1 August 1944. (*Source: © IWM Collection, London - B 8376*)

Image P1.46: Soldiers help with the Norman harvest, 2 August 1944. (*Source: © IWM Collection, London - B 8528*)

Image P1.47: Airmen help with the Norman harvest, 1944. (*Source: © IWM Collection, London - CL 600*)
Image P1.48: Harvesting near a temporary airstrip, Normandy 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London - CL 614)

Image P1.49: Armoured vehicle positioned at the edge of a Norman potato field. (Source: © IWM Collection, London - B 5766)

Image P1.50: Use of Norman crops for camouflage, July 1944. (Source: Author’s collection)
Image P1.51: Military vehicle tracks cut across Norman farmland, 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London - CL 912)

Image P1.52: Armoured vehicles driving through a meadow, Normandy 1944. (Source: Author’s collection)

Image P1.53: Vehicles crossing farmland near Falaise, August 1944. (Source: Author’s collection)
Image P1.54: Dust from passing vehicles, Normandy 1944. *(Source: Author’s collection)*

Image P1.55: Military depot located on farmland near Bayeux, 1944. *(Source: © IWM Collection, London)*

Image P1.56: Bayeux by-pass cutting through farmland, 1944. *(Source: © IWM Collection, London)*
Image P1.57: Digging-in close to an apple tree, Normandy 1944. *(Source: Author’s collection)*

Image P1.58: British mortar position located in a Norman orchard, 1944. *(Source: Neil Powell’s "Battlefield Historian" collection)*
Image P1.59: Air photograph giving a good indication of the mix of orchards, arable fields and meadows found during 1944 in the British sector of Normandy. (Source: Neil Powell’s "Battlefield Historian" collection)
Image P1.60: Apparent normality in Bayeux, July 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London)

Image P1.61: Tempting, but out of bounds to the military, Café in Bayeux, July 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London)
Image P1.62: Police of all ages at 14 July Parade in Bayeux, 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London)

Image P1.64: Speaker van helping to keep the civilian population informed, Normandy 1944. *(Source: © IWM Collection, London)*

Image P1.65: Civilian water supply (military water plant can be seen in background), Normandy 1944. *(Source: © IWM Collection, London)*
Image P1.66: Two enemy prisoners and their female associate under guard, Normandy 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London - B 7748)

Image P1.67: Pay being issued to British Airborne troops, including the smaller sized French supplemental franc notes. (Source: Neil Powell's "Battlefield Historian" collection)
Images P1.68a-l: People of Calvados, 14 July 1944. (Source: © IWM Collection, London)
Appendices Endnotes


2 TNA, WO 171/365, War Diary, 30 Corps Civil Affairs Staff, entries July 1944.

3 TNA, WO 171/252, War Diary, British Second Army Civil Affairs, Weekly Civil Affairs Report No. 1, 19 June 1944.


5 TNA, WO 219/3952, Second British Army, Reports, Arms and Corps, Civil Affairs Fortnightly Report No. 3, 23 July 1944.

6 TNA, WO 219/3952, Second British Army, Reports, Arms and Corps, Civil Affairs Fortnightly Report No. 4, 6 August 1944.

7 TNA, FO 371/42019, SHAEF, ACOS G-5, Weekly Civil Affairs Summary No. 10, week ending 18 August 1944.

8 TNA, WO 171/3575, War Diary, No. 211 Civil Affairs Detachment, No. 2 Civil Affairs Group, entries for June 1944.

9 TNA, WO 171/252, War Diary, Second Army Civil Affairs Staff, Fortnightly Report No. 4, 23 July to 6 August 1944.


11 TNA, WO 171/3568, War Diary, No. 204 Civil Affairs Detachment, No. 2 Civil Affairs Group, entries for July 1944.

12 WO 171/510, War Diary, 49 (West Riding) Infantry Division Provost Company, Corps of Military Police, entries for June to August 1944.

13 WO 171/3588, War Diary, No. 224 Civil Affairs Detachment, entries for June to August 1944.

14 WO 171/3582, War Diary, No. 218 Civil Affairs Detachment, entries for June to August 1944.

15 WO 171/3573, War Diary, No. 209 Civil Affairs Detachment, entries for June to August 1944.

16 TNA, WO 171/3581, War Diary, No. 217 Civil Affairs Detachment, entries for July 1944.

17 TNA, WO 219/3952, Second British Army, Reports, Arms and Corps, Civil Affairs 30 Corps Overall Summary No. 2, 7 July 1944.

18 TNA, WO 219/3952, Second British Army, Reports, Arms and Corps, 8 Corps Civil Affairs Fortnightly Report No. 2, 4 August 44.
19 TNA, WO 219/3952, Second British Army, Reports, Arms and Corps, Civil Affairs, 12 Corps Fortnightly Civil Affairs Report No 2, Period 22 July to 4 August 1944.

20 TNA, WO 219/3952, Second British Army, Reports, Arms and Corps, Civil Affairs, 12 Corps Weekly Civil Affairs Summary No. 1, Period 6 to 12 August 1944.

21 TNA, WO 219/3952, Second British Army, Reports, Arms and Corps, Civil Affairs, 12 Corps Weekly Civil Affairs Summary No. 2, Period 13 to 19 August 1944.

22 TNA, WO 219/3952, Second British Army, Reports, Arms and Corps, Civil Affairs, 12 Corps Weekly Civil Affairs Summary Nos. 3 and 4, Period 20 to 31 August 1944.

23 TNA, WO 171/165, War Diary, Civil Affairs Staff 21 Army Group, entries for August 1944.


26 TNA, WO 219/3952, Second British Army, Reports, Arms and Corps, Civil Affairs 30 Corps Overall Summary No. 4, 4 August 1944.

27 TNA, WO 171/3581, War Diary, No. 217 Civil Affairs Detachment, entries for August 1944.
Phew!