Doctorate of Philosophy

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Abstract

In sub-Saharan African countries that have made democratic transition from military rule and military-backed authoritarian regimes, state elites have embarked upon strategies aimed at demilitarising the new democratic political process. Demilitarisation of the state and politics has become an imperative because it is decisive for consolidating democratic politics and for ensuring improvements in public safety and security. Yet the process of such demilitarisation in these countries has often generated a paradox, whereby the reduction of the political influence of state institutions of violence has been associated with rising civil militarism and the prevalence of organised violence in the wider society.

In these circumstances, taking cognisance of the dangers of civil militarism and other forms of private violence is a priority for designing and implementing demilitarisation strategies and other security reforms in post-authoritarian African states. Reform-minded political elites and external supporters need to be sensitive to these dangers or risk perpetuating the shell of electoral democracy that cannot deliver the goal of human security in the region. This dissertation explored how the current approach to demilitarisation is related to the problem of civil militarism by examining the case studies of Nigeria and South Africa. It explains that given the condition of the state in Africa, demilitarisation of politics after transition from military or military-backed authoritarianism contributes to the emergence of civil militarism. Based on this finding, it argues for a comprehensive approach to demilitarisation as a strategy that caters to both state and societal violence in order to mitigate the risks of civil militarism in the process.
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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to the blessed memory of my beloved father, John Eluma Isima. He gave me all of his best so I could realise my highest academic vision, though he entered into his rest just before the completion of this project.
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parents gave me indispensable spiritual, moral, psychological and material foundation
that has carried me this far, and I honour them for this.

Space would not allow me to acknowledge all those who provided vital support for the
successful completion of this dissertation. Nevertheless I offer my deepest appreciation
to the individuals, groups and institutions listed below.

**Individuals**

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**Groups**

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Support Staff of the DDM&SA, Shrivenham

Above all, I thank the Lord God Almighty for giving me life, health, favour and the intellectual ability to undertake this study and to complete it. I am eternally grateful to Him.
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<td>Armed Forces Ruling Council</td>
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<td>Africa Strategic and Peace Research Group</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWB</td>
<td>Afrikaanse Weerstandsbeweging</td>
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<td>CDCC</td>
<td>Constitutional Debate Coordinating Committee</td>
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<td>CLEEN</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counter-Insurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DMI</td>
<td>Directorate of Military Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>FEC</td>
<td>Federal Executive Council</td>
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<td>IFP</td>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>IG</td>
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<td>IYC</td>
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<td>JMCs</td>
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<td>JMCC</td>
<td>Joint Military Coordinating Committee</td>
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<td>MEND</td>
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<td>Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force</td>
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<td>Niger Delta Vigilante</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Transitional Executive Committee</td>
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<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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<td>UDM</td>
<td>United Democratic Movement</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Background to the Study

This dissertation is an exploratory investigation into the relationship between the demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism in post-authoritarian African states. The study seeks to determine the extent to which and how civil militarism is exacerbated by demilitarisation of politics in post-authoritarian regimes, using the cases of Nigeria and South Africa. It is hoped that the results of the study can be used to inform future approaches to demilitarisation as part of democratisation, conflict prevention and security reform strategies in the region.

This inquiry is driven by the central paradox associated with the renewed search for democracy and security in sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the Cold War. Following the macro-economic dislocations and the attendant social crisis experienced in most parts of the region during the 'lost decade' of the 1980s, mass-based domestic demands for political freedom and popular participation coincided with an awakened international pressure for political liberalisation as precondition for desperately needed neo-liberal economic reforms in Africa by the turn of the 1990s. Thus since the unprecedented Sovereign National Conference of 1991 in Benin, the global wave of
democratisation has finally begun to sweep through the region that has now seen the end of about three decades of authoritarian rule since the end of colonialism and the transition in nearly all the states to, at least, electoral democracy. This quest for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa has however been associated with greater insecurity. More specifically, the end of authoritarian repression and the transition to democratic politics has coincided with the unleashing of deadly internal conflicts and violence across the region, and this is where the paradox lies. This is a paradox because the international promotion of democracy has largely been driven by the search for global security. This is based on the assumption that the promotion of democracy from the West to the rest of the world would also promote peace globally, as underpinned by the democratic peace theory.¹ In Africa, this assumption has been a major driving force behind the strategic shift in the official foreign policy of Western powers since the early 1990s towards pressure and support for democratisation.²

Admittedly, this paradox is not limited to Africa, but was to be found in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere since after 1990.³ However, the sheer magnitude of violence in Africa’s post-Cold War conflicts as demonstrated in the extreme cases of the conflict in Somalia (which has consumed the state itself since 1991), the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the war crimes in the conflict in Sierra Leone, and the on-going humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan, means that the paradox of democratisation and insecurity is most intense in the region.⁴ A crucial area where this paradox is most noticeable is the process of demilitarisation of politics, particularly in situations where the military had been extensively entrenched in governance before the transition to democracy. While the reduction of many of the professional and political
prerogatives of the military is essential for consolidating Africa’s new democracies and for prevent them from political predation or even surveillance by the military and security forces, the implementation of such agendas have been accompanied with militarism in society or civil militarism indicated by the aggravation of privatised violence.

In such circumstances, promoting democratic consolidation without taking cognisance of the associated risks of violence would be too costly for human security. Yet holding back demilitarisation would be equally dangerous for human security because, as has been aptly noted, demilitarisation is decisive not only for democratic consolidation but also for conflict prevention and peace-building. Furthermore, there is no existing absolute international or regional strategy with a set of guidelines for demilitarisation that could provide guidance for such processes in Africa’s new democracies. Rather, elements of demilitarisation have been implemented as part of programmes of Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Defence Reviews, and more recently, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). This approach concentrates on the demilitarisation of politics and neglects the demilitarisation of the wider society, and given the non-existence of clear guidance on demilitarisation, such approach constitutes a hybrid effort at best and a lacking strategy at worst.

Given this dilemma, understanding the conditions that permit successful demilitarisation without generating or aggravating the risk of civil militarism is the first requirement for designing a robust and comprehensive strategy that supports the
consolidation of sustainable peace and democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. This study therefore deals with the phenomenon of civil militarism as a threat to public security in the context of the demilitarisation, and explores why demilitarisation of politics in post-authoritarian African states is often associated with civil militarism. This dissertation represents the complete report of the study, which is organised into seven chapters discussed below.

Organisation of the Research Report

Chapter 1 forms the introduction to the study. It establishes the background to the research and brings into focus the global security and development context within which the predicament of public security in sub-Saharan Africa is conceptualised. Most importantly, it elaborates on the central problem of the relationship between demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism.

Chapter 2 lays out the methodological framework of the study. It describes the various methods used in each phase of the research and offers the justification for the choice of those methods. This chapter also describes the limitations encountered over the course of the study, and the limits, which were deliberately imposed on the study by the researcher.

The review of literature, which sets out the theoretical focus of the research, is covered in Chapter 3. Two main bodies of literature were examined in this chapter and they
include those on civil military relations and internal armed conflict. Specific issues
considered are military-society relations, societal militarism, and demilitarisation.
Other issues discussed include the privatisation of violence, the new violence, and how
civil militias emerge under those conditions.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide the analysis of data from the fieldwork supporting the two
case studies. Both chapters address the main research questions in the case of Nigeria
and South Africa, respectively. Together they form the first stage of the main analysis,
which explores the relationship between demilitarisation and civil militarism within
each case. Chapter 6 is the second stage and represents analysis across the two cases.
This chapter compares the findings from each case analysis and relies on common
patterns and trends to generate higher order explanations.

Chapter 7 is the conclusion of this dissertation. The chapter begins with the summary
of the report, in which key findings of the research are presented. At the end of the
chapter a set of recommendations are offered to support policy development and further
research.

Public Security and the State in the Global Context

Physical security is one of the most crucial public goods in short supply in post-colonial
Africa. Until the wave of democratic transition in the dawn of the 1990s, the
militarisation of politics in most states of the region undermined the delivery of this
critical service to citizens by central governments. As the emerging national elites
assumed the political leadership of the post-colonial state, it became apparent that a major concern of state policy across the continent was the consolidation of national sovereignty and, by extension, national security. Within the domestic environment, however, the legitimacy of these new states began to decline as the quality of governance deteriorated and as the failure of development generated a deep crisis of authority. This contributed immensely to the rise of popular political demands that made the hold of the political elites on power increasingly tenuous. National security, modified through the urgency of regime survival, thus became the main driver of state domestic policy.

Yet, public security (the state’s responsibility to protect citizens from physical violence or the threat of it) was not only neglected but also continued to deteriorate. National security was narrowed to meeting the exigency of securing the sitting regime from internal political ‘enemies’ and democratic pressures from those who demanded political accountability from state elites for dashing the hopes of post-colonial development. The central aspect of this exigency was the use of the monopoly of coercion by state security agencies traditionally tasked with external security requirements against their own citizens. The unwieldy employment of the monopoly of military force internally also undermined state agencies tasked with the preservation of internal order, and consequently public security. Thus the centrality of regime security as the guiding principle of state policy in an increasingly restive polity not only relegated public security in the conception of national security, but more importantly worked against its objectives.
In the context of authoritarian rule, which became the trend in the region within the first few years of independence, state elites fell back on state security forces to bolster social control through the suppression and neutralisation of political pressure. Consequently, the role, influence and power of the military and security forces in state policy and the political process became a preponderant feature of governance in the majority of African states. In many countries the security forces, particularly the military, exercised this political dominance indirectly from behind the façade of civilian rule. In many other extreme cases, the military directly took over the reins of power and became the decisive political force. Apartheid South Africa until the transition to democracy in 1994 and Nigeria before the end of military rule in 1999, respectively represent these models of military intervention in domestic politics. In both cases, the authoritarian political order fed on the militarisation of politics, which produced a state that became the major source of insecurity to citizens until the dawn of democratic transition in the 1990s.

However, despite the enthusiasm generated by the wave of political transition in both countries, in terms of the enhancement of public security in the context of improvements in the wider quality of governance, popular expectations remained largely unmet. While the process of democratisation itself, particularly its consolidation, required the demilitarisation of politics in order to dismantle state violence, this strategy did not produce commensurate transition from insecurity to a state of greater security for citizens. Rather, as the cases of South Africa and Nigeria reveal, the post-transition strategies of demilitarisation themselves have been closely accompanied by prolonged public insecurity, and a precipitous worsening of the
conditions of insecurity, in some cases, from other sources within the wider society. One of the most important of those other sources is the privatisation of violence in the form of civil security forces, or *militias*, which appear to have only replaced the role of the authoritarian-era state security forces within the civil society. The emergence and proliferation of informal security forces after the demilitarisation of politics, reveals a militarisation of civil society or a condition of *civil militarism*.

To set the context within which public security in contemporary Africa is to be understood, it is necessary to examine the global changing role of the state with regards to its responsibilities in the social contract with citizens. It is perhaps too early to conclude with certainty that the full experience of the 'coming anarchy' prophesied less than a decade ago by Robert Kaplan may never materialise, but the post-Cold War era does provide convincingly sufficient evidence for societies all over the world to nurse an increasing sense of foreboding over personal security. This is in spite of the (unrealistic) optimism and dreams of a new peace and greater security in the new world order following from the cessation of superpower confrontation from the end of the 1980s. This optimism was quick to announce the end to the costly preoccupation of states with national security concerns as the spectre of the nuclear threat was replaced by the hope for greater international cooperation and the triumph of neo-liberalism.

This search for a more secure order has been one of the most crucial concerns of nation-states since Westphalia, which conferred on the state the obligation of securing and developing national territories and populations. The logic of external state sovereignty demands that states, with their divergent and often conflicting interests, take into their
own hands the responsibility of maintaining their respective survival in the absence of an external guarantor. The defence of national population and territory against external enemies by the state in turn narrowed the conception of security in terms of 'national defence'. This practice came to be fully endorsed during World War II, given the total nature of social and industrial mobilisation by the opposing coalitions of forces.  

Security, thus, came to be defined in hard military and state territorial terms, giving rise to the national security doctrine, by which states sought to enhance their national security over one another. National security became the dominant paradigm in orthodox or traditional security thinking within the academic field of International Relations, which saw the sovereign territorial state as the central referent and unit of security rooted in political and military understandings of the realist school, and underpinned by the sub-field of Strategic Studies throughout the Cold War period.

The preoccupation of Cold War security studies with the nation-state as its fundamental referent arose from the dominance of the realist school of International Relations which assumes that the international system is an anarchic collection of rational state actors, and saw its concern as solving what John Hertz (and others later) label as the 'national security dilemma'. However focusing on the national security dilemma, it has been argued, rendered Cold War security studies grossly inadequate. One of the reasons offered for this objection is that its basic assumptions of internal social cohesion, regime legitimacy, the state's capacity to provide security, and definition of threats as exclusively external, ran contrary to the real experiences of developing countries. Furthermore, national security focused rather narrowly on the theory of deterrence and
the politico-military relations among the US, Western Europe and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), while neglecting other non-military but relevant elements of security. This is notwithstanding the obvious fact that most of the post-1945 violent conflicts took place in the developing parts of the world.

The traditional notion of national security came under more fierce attacks as economic, social and environmental agendas and their bearing on security gained ascendancy in International Relations from the 1970s and 1980s. This challenge gave rise to sustained calls from both the policy and academic communities to broaden the scope of security studies. These calls later developed into the critical security discourse, which sought to accommodate, among other things, the security concerns of Third World countries frozen by the East-West power relations of the Cold War. One major strand of the critical tradition is the notion of human security expounded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) since 1994.

Human security places human beings rather than states at the centre of security, and defines the security of individuals and groups in terms of safety and well-being, that is protection from fear and want mostly threatened directly, not by an anarchic international system, but by armed elements within states, including the state itself. Rather than usher in an era of global peace and security, the end of the Cold War and aspects of globalisation, however, exposed the declining capacity of the state to fulfil the ends of human security. This loss of capacity has only been symptomatic of a more general and well-published syndrome – the retreat of the state – which can be seen
in the two key traditional roles of the state: the provision of development and the provision of security.

The state has historically assumed the role of the provider of social and economic welfare, as a crucial element of its raison d'etre. Started by Otto Von Bismarck of Germany through the ‘Revolution from above’ of the 1880s, and reinforced by the 1917 Communist Revolution in Russia as well as the Great Depression of the inter-war years, the endorsement of the welfare state in Europe and North America was finally sealed by the necessity to respond to the social and economic dislocations of World War II. More than social welfare, the end of World War II also marked the beginning of the developmental state by which the state became the major driver for improving the well-being of citizens and economic growth of society, including the less developed countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America where governments sought to catch up with the developed world through state-led modernisation and industrialisation.

Secondly, the role of the state as the main guardian of the security of citizens, especially from external threats, was assumed as inherent in the notion of territorial sovereignty. The universal acceptance of this role received the greatest inspiration from the works of modern political theorists who regarded security as a public good. The most influential proponent of this theory was Max Weber, who argued that the monopoly over the instruments of legitimate violence is one of the defining characteristics of statehood. Yet, the growing inability of the state to fulfil these dual functions had become evident even before the Cold War was declared over.
The global economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s made the cost of the welfare state unacceptable in the West and generated a macro-economic crisis in the Third World. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist economy in Central and Eastern Europe ended the last bastion of the state as the provider of development, giving way to the triumph of neo-liberalism in the post-Cold War economic order. In the field of security, the ability of the state to maintain its monopoly of legitimate violence began to face bold challenges. Actors other than the state have emerged on the scene to share in the use of organised violence forcing the state to falter in its responsibility to protect the lives and properties of its citizens.

In the West, the growing threat of global terrorism renders the nuclear and most conventional arsenals of the state useless in securing its citizens. In the former USSR and the rest of the developing world, the state has been faced with much worse security challenges of internal disorder. The collapse of the Soviet state and the sequence of civil wars, secessionist violence and identity conflicts, involving the use of private military forces, have become one of the salient marks of the post-Communist security reality. In Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East, the loss of the monopoly of legitimate violence is most evidenced in the unchecked proliferation of state failure, civil war, Islamic fundamentalism, ethnic conflicts, illegal drug trafficking, warlords, trans-border violent crime, gang violence, privatisation of security, and a range of other symptoms. Most of these forces, which had already been brewing, were unleashed with the sudden abdication of superpower strategic and ideological commitments to maintain regimes that lacked a broad base of domestic legitimacy.
This global strategic change also coincided with a drastic global reduction of the political influence of the military and security agencies of the state (demilitarisation of the state) as part of the adaptations of the new world (dis)order and the broader agenda of democratisation in post-authoritarian states. Demilitarisation in transition states was seen as a prerequisite for democratic consolidation, since it is the military and security forces of the state that had mostly, directly or indirectly, dominated the political space to keep undemocratic regimes in power. Demilitarisation in these regions has thus required the altering of civil-military relations to create a political context in which the military could become democratically accountable to society through elected representatives in government. This in itself can be seen as a global momentum that has generated an emerging global agenda for SSR, which focuses on the reform of the military and security agencies of the state as well as those institutions responsible for their governance. It also focuses on policies, normative values, the political and legal framework necessary for the governance and management of the state security structures and institutions responsible for governing them.

However, within this context of post-authoritarian transition demilitarisation needs to be taken beyond the realm of the state and to transcend democratic governance of the military, if the provision of security is the objective. This is because the process of democratisation itself has created the conditions for the introduction of new complexities in the civil-military equation in these regions. In Africa and Latin America in particular, the rise of new forms of conflict and violence in society, where informal armed formations have become critical security actors. This gradual informalisation of security has become a hallmark of the post-authoritarian era, and a
manifestation which have implications for demilitarisation. Informal armed groups in these contexts include ethnic or regional militias, vigilantes, warlords, street gangs and similar groups that are not publicly accountable, but perform parallel military and security functions in conflict-prone environments — environments that could be characterised as those of violent peace rather than reflecting 'normal' conflict.

Apart from eroding the state's hegemony of force, these informal forces are themselves a security problem due to their ungovernability, and contribute to militarism in the wider society. This is where the limits of formal demilitarisation of the state become obvious, and where the need to take demilitarisation beyond the state into the society becomes urgent. This is a process, which has been described as involving the erosion of the ideology of militarism which views violence as a legitimate solution to social conflict and as an effective means of obtaining and defending power. This imperative of demilitarising the society has become particularly urgent in the course of democratic transition in Africa, where physical security has become a pre-eminent concern of citizens as the state's capacity to provide the fundamental conditions for the protection of life has weakened considerably.

This research seeks to assess the impacts and explore the limits of existing patterns of demilitarisation processes carried out by democratic governments in Africa with respect to the physical security of citizens, using experiences in Nigeria and South Africa. The study is limited to situations of relative peace, where armed violence is more sporadic than conventional (civil) war, armed rebellion or insurgency. Within this context, the study specifically examines the relationship between state demilitarisation and the role
of non-state actors in the provision of violence and public security. It also explores the possibilities of extending the process of demilitarisation to armed groups within the wider society outside of the state. This study deals specifically with non-state armed groups that take the form of militias, and in this regard, terrorists, guerrillas and insurgents are excluded, as they are usually engaged in open ongoing conflict.

The Research Problem

What has been described as the *third wave democratisation*\(^\text{33}\) witnessed the process of decline in the power and influence of the military and security forces of many African countries in governance. From the late 1980s radical changes in both the international and domestic environments had begun to shake the foundations of authoritarian regimes, which had held sway for decades after decolonisation, and precipitated their collapse in the wake of the 1990s. From military rule in West Africa, through intolerant single-party politics in East and Southern Africa to racial oligarchy in South Africa\(^\text{34}\), the coercive force of the military was employed to underwrite and sustain authoritarianism while it lasted.\(^\text{35}\) During this period, African states and politics came to be highly militarised\(^\text{36}\) through direct intervention in politics by the armed forces, resulting in socio-political instabilities; partisan use of the military and security forces by civilian dictators rooted in one-party; ethnic or racist constituencies; or the systematic embeddedness of a militaristic culture in resolving conflicts in the wider society.
Post-independence civil-military relations in Africa were thus characterised by the preponderance of the armed forces in politics and society. This arrangement embodied a state, which unleashed terror and violence on political dissent, culminating in the eventual diffusion of intimidation and coercion amongst the wider population by the state security agencies. Thus authoritarian civil-military relations was characterised by state violence through the instrumentality of the military, either as tools of civilian dictators or as direct political leaders. However, the eventual disengagement of the military from active involvement in domestic politics and the decline of its political influence clearly indicated that the hold on authoritarianism was no longer tenable. This recession of authoritarianism and the consequent transition to democracy in sub-Saharan African countries, sparked off since the dawn of the 1990s, opened a window of opportunity for rapid improvement of human security by permitting the evolution of a supportive political and constitutional climate.

Within the wider project of democratic development, some of the new democratic (or post-election) governments in the region, most notably South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana, have made attempts to demilitarise the political process through the establishment of civil control over their armed forces and to balance civil-military relations in favour of civilian supremacy. The project of demilitarisation in these countries therefore has witnessed attempts to reduce or contain the political power and influence of the official military in governance and in the society. These efforts have taken the forms of depoliticisation of the military, strengthening of democratic parliamentary control of the armed forces, reprofessionalisation of the military, improvement in civil oversight of the security sector, integration of military factions...
into single national armed forces, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) after a conflict situation, and other similar forms of institutional reform within the broader agenda of SSR and parallel programmes. To various degrees, defence and security policies were reviewed, institutions restructured or constructed, and security practices changed. The assumption behind these initiatives is that stable, unified and effectively governed armed forces are necessary to put transitional countries (including those in Africa) back on the path of stability, security, economic growth and sustainable development. These initiatives are thus necessary to create the enabling environment for improved security following democratic transition from the era of state coercion and the consequent political crises.

However, these initiatives have proved to be necessary, but not sufficient in themselves to guarantee public safety and security. The measures have, to some extent, helped in curtailing the political excesses of the military through accountability and control mechanisms. It is however arguable to state that, with some exceptions, populations in many African countries no longer fear the spectre of military coups now considered anachronistic, thanks to the post-Cold War strategic environment. Rather, a more critical threat to the security of citizens in contemporary African countries comes from the phenomenal growth of armed violence precipitated by the activities of emerging non-state militant actors that challenge the position of the state as the sole security actor even in peacetime.
The radical surge of militias and their complicity in armed communal violence in post-military Nigeria; insurgent groups with free access to small arms in nearly the whole of West Africa; dubious and unaccountable vigilante groups as well as party militias in post-Apartheid South Africa; and similar scenarios in both post-conflict and conflict-prone new African democracies, outpacing the capacity of the police and security forces, are new dimensions that have come to replace the authoritarian-era forms of militarism in the region.\textsuperscript{43} Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily aptly captured this scenario when they argue that, the earlier problem of whether governments could maintain control over their military forces is being displaced by the question of whether the African state could maintain its monopoly over the instruments of violence.\textsuperscript{44} With the end of authoritarianism, state militarism is being reproduced in the emergence and growth of several actors outside the state whose agendas have seriously undermined not only the state’s monopoly of violence, but also the physical security of citizens in many Africa countries.

The timing of their emergence is also of critical importance. It is at this crucial juncture when the political process is being demilitarised within the broader project of democratisation, when state violence is being controlled and when the involvement of military and security forces in social control is being rolled back that civil militias have emerged. Their emergence therefore not only contests the state’s monopoly of violence, but also indicates the reproduction of state militarism in civil society through the years of militarised politics. Worse still, the timing indicates that demilitarisation does not only fail to take account of civil militarism but rather appears to be associated with it. As the strategies of demilitarisation were implemented, civil militias began to emerge as
prevalent features of the transition period. This association, in turn, suggests the existence of some form of relationship between demilitarisation and civil militarism.

**Conceptual Framework**

As shall be observed in the literature considered in the next chapter, at least 5 possible hypotheses can be generated that seek to explain the privatisation of violence and the emergence of civil militias in post-authoritarian African states, which are listed as follows:

1. Civil militias emerged because of socially embedded legacies of authoritarian violence, which remained even after the transition to democracy;
2. Democratisation opens up the space for uncivil society which mobilises and employs violence;
3. Civil militias represent a development of new and powerful incentive systems for violence linked to conflict or crime;
4. The privatisation of violence is an exit strategy for the poor; and
5. Demilitarisation increases the risk of public insecurity and creates the conditions for civil militarism

This array of hypotheses shows that there are multiple factors that can directly generate civil militarism or can indirectly act upon other factors to support the emergence or growth of civil militarism. The main conceptual factors of democratisation, the legacies of militarism, conflict, crime, poverty and demilitarisation, together with the presumed
relation they have with the rise of post-authoritarian civil militarism form the conceptual framework for this study. As with most studies, a graphic display is useful for making this conceptual framework clear and this is presented in Figure 1 below. Yet, this research is concerned with the effects of demilitarisation on civil militarism, and the working hypothesis at the beginning of the study is that; in the context of post-authoritarian transition, demilitarisation of politics can cause the generation of civil militarism.

In order to test this hypothesis, all the 5 hypotheses above were explored in the course of the research. This was done in order to explore rival explanations and to identify intervening factors that might influence the effects of demilitarisation on civil militarism. In Figure 1 below, the bold arrow shows that democratic transition certainly drove the need for the demilitarisation of the political process. But demilitarisation is undertaken in order to consolidate the democratisation process and the two processes are mutually reinforcing, hence the two-way arrow between them. This arrow is bold because the relationship between the two concepts is already known and does not form part of the research question. While democratisation and demilitarisation were identified as possible causes of civil militarism, the other factors could also have acted as independent factors or factors acting upon democratisation and demilitarisation, and these are represented by the broken arrows. These arrows therefore depict the hypotheses above, and form the main questions explored in the study. Due to the exploratory nature of the study, the research was conducted inductively while the findings are provided in the concluding chapter.
This research aims at understanding and explaining the extent and nature of the relationship between the demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism in sub-Saharan Africa. It adopts a comparative approach and examines post-authoritarian demilitarisation and the evolution of civil militarism in Nigeria and South Africa as case studies. Supporting the overall aim of the research, the following enabling objectives are outlined:

- To understand the conditions under which the two phenomena occur in both countries;
- To determine the extent and nature of change in civil militarism in relation to the demilitarisation of politics; and
- To discover the extent to which this relative change is mediated by other factors.
This study is both timely and relevant as it seeks to extend the existing understanding of governance in the security sector by embracing the phenomena of privatised and non-state violence. Very little is known about the place of informal security forces in SSR analysis and policy, even though the privatisation of violence has become a most intractable menace in contemporary Africa south of the Sahara. Apart from the governance of privatised violence, this study also looks at the way in which efforts to govern security often exacerbate insecurity. By attempting to explore the link between the implementation of policy reforms in the security sector and the privatisation of violence, this study attempts to investigate an area that is not yet well understood.

Equally important, the comparative approach adopted for this study makes it possible to understand the contextual conditions in sub-Saharan Africa which impact on policy reforms in the security sector, and which influence the outcomes of such policy reforms. The reasons for the comparative approach and the selection of the cases of Nigeria and South Africa in particular are specified in the next chapter, which deals with the overall methodology of the research.
Chapter 2

Research Methodology

This chapter sets out the overall methodological framework used for the study. It outlines the strategy, the design, the analytical tools, conceptual framework employed for the study, the schedule of specific activities, the boundaries of the study, and the limitations encountered in course of the research.

Research Strategy

The Comparative Case Study Approach

In the examination of civil militarism and demilitarisation in the course of post-authoritarian transition, this research employs the comparative case study approach, using the two country cases of Nigeria and South Africa. The social behaviours studied are contemporary and lie outside the immediate control of the study. These factors make the manipulation of the key variables and control of extraneous variables through experimentation or quasi-experimentation impossible. Under such circumstances, the case study is the most appropriate approach for this research. Furthermore, the use of comparison across the cases makes it possible to control for the effect of variables and thus enhances the validity of the research findings. This is because this approach is an empirical investigation of social realities in their real-life contexts, where contextual conditions are highly significant for the phenomena under study.\textsuperscript{46} For these reasons, other strategies such as survey, narrative history and archival analysis are not deemed appropriate for this research and therefore not employed.
However, in the course of the study, historical materials on the cases selected were examined in order to understand the historical context within which the key variables are studied. The examination of the historical context is also considered to be important because of its potential implications for the phenomena under study. The importance of context is highlighted here because this study assumes that demilitarisation and civil militarism are closely linked to their context, which is crucial to the overall analysis.

Most importantly, case studies have the advantage of providing a full range of sources of evidence, including direct observation, 'grey literature', documentary evidence and interviews. This enhances the scope of triangulation of evidence and control of the key variables, both of which are crucially necessary for enriching the validity of the findings of this research. Furthermore, the choice of two cases is based on the need to undertake comparison so as to enhance the validity of conclusions drawn from the study. The use of two cases allows for assessment of the effects of change in the independent variable (demilitarisation), upon the dependent variable (civil militarism). A multiple case approach could have been used for the same purpose. However, the research is constrained in terms of the time and resources available, as well as the number of researchers involved in the study. The two-case approach is thus a less ambitious and more realistic tool for achieving the goal of the study.
Framework of Strategy

Figure 2 below illustrates a concise framework for the comparative case study strategy used in this research. The arrows represent the progression of the study, while the broken lines represent the feedback chain. The feedback link is important because initial findings during the course of data gathering from the field made reappraisal and adjustment of the original research design and proposition inevitable.

Source: Adapted from Robert Yin\(^{47}\)
Research Design

Research Objectives

As stated in Chapter 1, this study is essentially an exploratory investigation of the relationship between the demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism in post-authoritarian Africa. The main objectives of the investigation are:

- To understand the extent and nature of the relationship between the two phenomena, and
- To explain this relationship, if any exists between the two phenomena

Enabling objectives of this research are:

- To understand the conditions under which the two phenomena occur in both countries;
- To determine the extent and nature of change in civil militarism in relation to the demilitarisation of politics; and
- To discover the extent to which this relative change is mediated by other factors.

Units of Analysis

The units of analysis for this research are the demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism. It is these variables and the presumed relationship between them that form the focus of the study. The research takes the demilitarisation of politics as the independent variable and civil militarism as the dependent variable and looks at the effect of the former on the latter. However, these units are conceptual constructs and
they are operationally defined and translated into empirical variables in the following section to allow for observation and measurement.

**Conceptual Definitions**

This section defines the major conceptual blocks of analysis for this study – militarisation, demilitarisation of politics, civil militias and civil militarism – in the way in which they are meant and used throughout the research project. This definition is aimed at translating the concepts into variables that are empirically measurable for analysis. What follows is a brief survey of the literature where these concepts have been mostly used and their various connotations therein.

**Militarisation**

Demilitarisation is the reversal of militarisation and clarifying the meaning of the latter is essential to understanding the former. Various definitions have emphasised different dimensions to militarisation, and this itself illustrates the fact that it is a contested concept. One definition considers the concept as a steady growth in the military potential of states, and an accompanying increase in the role of military institutions both in national and international affairs. This definition is useful in bringing out the domestic and international perspectives to the concept. Another definition sees militarisation as a social process of military build up. This process involves the mobilisation of resources for war at all levels, including the political, the economic and social. This definition is important because while it overlooks the domestic/international dichotomy, it emphasises the *forms* that militarisation takes, including the militarisation of politics, the economy or society.
Two types of militarisation have been identified as, first, a process that contributes to 
militarism. This process includes excessive use of violence and increased importance 
attached to militaristic ideologies, values and beliefs about human relationships. The 
second type involves increases in military spending, in the size of armed forces, in arms 
imports and production, and in the military's political role. This definition suggests 
the linkage between militarisation and the concept of militarism, which is discussed 
below. Moreover it suggests some important indicators for assessing militarisation, 
including ideological and material indicators. In addition to this list of indicators other 
elements have been identified as being an increased destructive capacity of weapons, 
and the number of people under arms in a given society. More indicators include 
aggressive foreign policy, the preponderance of the military in the state, the 
subservience of the whole society to the needs of the military, and an ideology that 
promotes military ideas. The concept of militarism is discussed in a separate 
subsection below, although it has been associated with militarisation.

For the purpose of this study, militarisation is used at the domestic level and in terms of 
its political and social dimensions. It is defined as a deliberate process that contributes 
to an increase in the role of military and security establishments in domestic politics and 
in society, including excessive use of violence and increased importance attached to 
militaristic ideologies, values and beliefs in the course of social interaction. Given this 
definition, a militarised society is one that exhibits a capacity for organised violence in 
combination with neglect of the detection, investigation and successful prosecution of 
crime. The key indicators of militarisation used in this study therefore include the 
military’s political role, the preponderance of the military in the state, the use of military
coercion to resolve conflict in society, paramilitary policing and armament of civil groups.

Demilitarisation

As the reversal of militarisation, the concept of demilitarisation has been used broadly to denote changes associated with reductions in military values in society at various levels. This involves sustained reduction in the size and influence of the military sector in state and society and the reallocation of military resources to civilian purposes. Thus like militarisation, the concept of demilitarisation is multidimensional and various conceptualisations of the term have been suggested in the literature. These include the political, the economic and the social, psychological or cultural dimensions. Political demilitarisation deals with issues of the interaction between the military and the civil authorities, particularly the question of civil control of the military. The economic dimension deals with the winding down of defence and related budgets. These two approaches correspond to what is termed the demilitarisation of the state, while the social/psychological/cultural approaches deal with the demilitarisation of society. In this second category, an ideological dimension has been identified as the deconstruction of violence as a legitimate means of solving problems. Thus the concept of demilitarisation is applicable to the sphere of the state and the political, as well as to the civil society.

This dual conception of demilitarisation has also been underscored in the report of a seminar on Post-Conflict Peace-Building held in London by the Committee for Conflict
Transformation Support (CCTS). The report examines different forms of demilitarisation needed to achieve security and stability in society. It argues that the societal conception of demilitarisation goes beyond changing public institutions to changing 'values, attitudes and mindsets of ordinary people', particularly attitudes towards violence and its causes. In a discussion paper on which the seminar was based, this distinction is further clarified. It identifies two levels of demilitarisation, namely *surface* demilitarisation and *deep* demilitarisation. While the former is concerned with disbanding forces, surrendering arms and implementing ceasefire agreements, the latter 'seeks to address the roots of militarisation and to undo the legacy of war and militarisation as part of an effort to reconstruct society on a different basis'. The former is a *top-down* approach and corresponds to the state/institutional model identified earlier, requiring the reform of state security agencies. On the other hand the latter requires a bottom-up process initiated at the community level to reduce the culture of organised violence.

These two conceptualisations have also been characterised as *quantitative* and *qualitative* demilitarisation. Quantitative demilitarisation deals with the process of withdrawing tangible military instruments such as defence expenditure, force level, arms procurement and military intervention in politics. The qualitative is the non-tangible side which seeks to reverse 'militaristic ideologies and values' and de-emphasises violence as a means of resolving conflict. A comprehensive alternative to demilitarisation would therefore attempt to deconstruct the ideological and institutional structures of militarism.
The indicators of demilitarisation suggested in the literature include civilian control, demobilisation, disarmament, a decrease of defence spending and armed forces, conversion, and an erosion of the ideologies, which support violence. In this study, the dimensions of demilitarisation considered are the demilitarisation of politics and the demilitarisation of society. Strategies that target the institutions of the state are referred to as the demilitarisation of politics and the indicators used are civil control of the armed and security forces, reductions in the role of the military in political decision making, reductions in internal deployment of security forces, and reductions in paramilitary policing. The demilitarisation of society refers to strategies that aim to reverse militaristic ideologies and values and de-emphasise violence as a means of resolving conflict among social groups. Indicators of this dimension are reduction in number and activities of armed groups, and reversal of their attitude towards violence.

**Civil Militarism**

Civil militarism refers to militarism in the civilian society and so it is helpful to first define the concept of militarism. Militarism and militarisation are close concepts and the distinction between them has been blurred in many cases in the literature. A helpful clarification is that while militarisation is a process, militarism is in the realm of behaviour and attitude, and a manifestation of militarisation. The definition of militarism is equally diverse. It has been defined as the pervasiveness in society of symbols, values and discourse validating military power and preparation for war; or the inclination to rely on military means of coercion for handling conflicts. A common agreement sees militarism as the expansion of the military beyond certain bounds and its encroachment over civilian institutions with a corresponding decline in freedom and
democracy. Although militarism, according to these definitions is mostly associated with the state, the concept of civil militarism has been used to denote the manifestation of the same traits in the wider society. There are therefore state militarism and societal or civil militarism, and this dual conception is adopted in this study. The main indicator in both conceptions is the pervasiveness in the use of organised violence as instrument of addressing conflict.

Civil Militias

This concept is used to address the problem of categorising the diverse array of militias. Militias have been classified into a variety of categories that offer little help in terms of their motivations, activities and modes of operation. These definitions see them either as ethnic militias, religious militias, armed vigilantes, separatist militias, party militias, or civil defence forces. The main problem with such classification is that it does not accommodate the flexibility of militias to take on a variety of functions at different times. The reality of militia activities, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa is that those who appear to be ethnic do also operate as militants for religious, ideological, political and traditional vigilante objectives.

A more useful distinction categorises militias into ‘first generation’ and ‘second generation’ conceptualisations. The first category includes groups of citizens who are mobilised by the state to provide military service as a reserve army or auxiliary force for war. Since they are put together and maintained by the state, these militias are regulated and accountable to central authority. The second type is autonomous of the
state and sometimes works against the authority of the state. The crucial element of these militias is that they operate outside state regulation and are accountable only to themselves. Once again, the state-society distinction associated with the concepts defined above is present in the definition of militias, and it is this second generation of militias that is studied in this research. This distinction and the multipurpose objectives of various militias have led to definition of militias operating independently of the state as civil militias. For the purpose of the research, civil militias are defined as structured and organised informal armed groups that use violence for various purposes and which operate outside state control and regulation.

Research Questions

This study is guided by three main questions:

The first question is: What is the relationship between civil militarism and demilitarisation of politics in Nigeria and South Africa? Investigating the answer to this question requires the research to address the following specific questions:

- In what ways and to what extent were security forces involved in political decision making before the transition from authoritarian rule in the two cases?
- To what extent has this political involvement reduced?
- What are the phases in the evolution of civil militias in both cases? And
- What is the change in the activities and size of civil militias before and after reduction in the involvement of security forces in political decision-making?
The second question is: *Why have the activities and size of civil militias changed immediately after the implementation of demilitarisation in Nigeria and South Africa?*

The enabling questions here are:

➤ Under what conditions is reduction of the involvement of security forces in political decision-making followed by change in the size and activities of civil militias in the cases?

➤ Have these conditions been present before or after the emergence of civil militias?

➤ Do these conditions determine the emergence of civil militias?

The third question is: *How is civil militarism minimised in the process of demilitarising politics in the context of post-authoritarian transition?* The enabling questions include:

➤ What are the policy responses of the state to civil militarism?

➤ Is there any instance of reduction in civil militarism in the cases studied?

➤ What is the extent of this reduction?

➤ What policy decisions were responsible for this reduction?

➤ Are there more effective alternative approaches to these policies in addressing post-authoritarian public security crisis?

➤ To what extent can these policy interventions be applied successfully in similar other cases within and outside Africa?
Justification for the Case Studies

The units of analysis used for this study are the two country cases of Nigeria and South Africa. The selection of these specific cases is a deliberate choice and based on the fact that they both have in common a number of salient characteristics that are relevant for comparison. They also have crucial dissimilarities that permit control of variables and comparison.

In term of similarities, a very crucial fact is that both countries share a recent history of authoritarianism, in which the military played a central role in governance, and which is significant to a study focused on post-authoritarian states. While Nigeria made its democratic transition from direct military rule in 1999, South Africa made this transition earlier in 1994 from the apartheid political system in which the military was equally dominant in policymaking and governance. The political process in both countries was therefore highly militarised as a result of the preponderance of the military and security forces in governance.

Secondly, the two countries represent cases where the new democratic governments attempted to demilitarise the political process. In both Nigeria and South Africa, various efforts were made to reverse or reduce the involvement of the military in politics. These efforts include the reform or reconstruction of security policies, institutions and practices towards effective democratic control of the security forces.
Furthermore, civil militias and non-state organised violence has been a prevalent phenomenon in the aftermath of democratic transition and demilitarisation in both countries. This is in spite of differences in the extent to which the political process has been democratised and demilitarised in both countries. Thus the two key variables of the study - civil militarism and the demilitarisation of politics - are present in both cases.

Nigeria and South Africa are not the only countries with experiences of civil militias in sub-Saharan Africa. However, in many of the other countries in the region civil militias operate in the context of internal armed conflict, such as the Janjaweed in the current crisis in Darfur, the Kamajor during the civil war in Sierra Leone, and a host of other examples of prolonged armed conflict or immediate post-conflict environments. The militias in such contexts are protagonists involved in or associated with clearly delineated armed conflicts. In the cases of Nigeria and South Africa, the civil militias are not essentially a war-fighting force, but are more concerned with preserving their own order in conditions of relative peace.

Admittedly, the two countries have experienced internal armed conflict in the past, but the militias in these countries emerged long after the end of the conflict and do not openly pursue agendas that are related to the issues in the historical conflict. The political climate under which civil militias in the two cases operate is characterised by civil disorder and low level conflict of which crime and spasmodic inter-group violence are key characteristics. The militias here appear to emerge as localised responses to this
general condition of disorder, as against the conditions of protracted and widespread armed conflict.

Another important similarity is that the two countries are the glaring hegemonic powers capable of providing increasing leadership roles in sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of development and security. Both of them have displayed leadership capability in peacekeeping intervention within their respective sub-regions – Nigeria, through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and South Africa through the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This means there is a high probability that these countries would transmit their experiences and lessons learned in the process of post-authoritarian reform in the security sector to other countries within their spheres of influence. This is even more significant with the instrument of the African Peer Review Mechanism of the New Partnership (APRM) established in 2003. The APRM is a key instrument of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), through which member states commit themselves to exerting positive influences and to collective self-monitoring on a number of vital governance indicators. In addition, both countries play a significant role in global politics and global institutions, marking them as regional champions for development, and peace-building in Africa.

Furthermore, both Nigeria and South Africa have vast economic resources that could catalyse economic growth and human development in Africa if those resources are properly harnessed. Even though they have faced obstacles to the full utilisation of these potentials, the two countries have been able to mobilise their economic wealth to
support development efforts in neighbouring countries. The two countries therefore represent potential nodes of sustainable human development in Africa.

With respect to contrast, a significant element is the fact that these countries have emerged from different types of authoritarianism. Given the fact that authoritarianism in Africa took diverse forms, it is important to control the probable influence of such differences in the analysis. While Nigeria is a post-military democracy, South Africa is a post-racist political system emerging from an exclusive or restricted form of democracy. In Nigeria, the militarisation of politics and society was total (direct military dictatorship), while in South Africa militarisation took a different form as it was mediated by a civilian government that was responsible for state policy and practice. It is important to acknowledge the difference in the extent of militarisation and to measure its effect in relation to civil militarism.

Another area of very important difference relevant to the selection of the cases is the differences in the nature and extent of democratic transition. While the transition in South Africa was mass-based and thoroughly negotiated, in Nigeria it was driven largely by the retreating military elites and lacked mass mobilisation. Again in South Africa the transition was more explicitly focused on redefining the role of the military, but in Nigeria it was rather more general in nature, and had no specific focus on the military beyond its political disengagement. While the democratic project in Nigeria is still fragile and yet to take firm roots, South Africa represents a case of consolidating democracy. The width and depth of demilitarisation has therefore been far greater in South Africa than in Nigeria. In the former, the strategy of demilitarisation has been
more inclusive, more thorough, broader and highly institutionalised through legislation, new policy frameworks and restructuring. In the latter it has tended to narrowly concentrate on breaking the political power of the military elites, and has hardly been institutionalised. In spite of this crucial difference, however, civil militarism after the transition and demilitarisation is pronounced in both cases. Informal armed groups and violence prevail in South Africa as much as in Nigeria. These differences are important in order to measure the effects of the extent and nature of the association between the demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism.

Finally, after the initial rise and assertiveness of civil militias in both countries, they have tended to decline in South Africa while they still remain high in Nigeria. This difference has important policy implications. It provides a strong justification for inquiring into the conditions responsible for the observed reduction and the possibility of replication of those conditions where the incidence of civil militarism is high. Given the similarities and differences considered above, it is of high analytical value to look at Nigeria and South Africa together in the study of demilitarisation and civil militarism. Comparison between these countries makes it possible to understand the influence of different contextual conditions on the association between demilitarisation and civil militarism.

**Level of Analysis**

This research uses the national state as the level of analysis. While the behaviour of non-state armed actors is central to the study, the analytical focus is on state policy
changes and the way in which the behaviour of the non-state armed groups responds to those changes.

**Theoretical Proposition**

The central argument of this study is that, within the context of post-authoritarian transition the demilitarisation of politics can promote the generation of civil militarism, at least in the short term. The study argues that military-backed authoritarianism contributes to the militarisation of the larger society and that this militarisation incites greater militia violence as repressive controls are relaxed.

**Data Collection and Analysis**

This research has been conducted in two phases. The first phase commenced with a review of the relevant literature in order to achieve a full understanding of what is already known about the key questions of the study, and to delineate clearly the gaps that need to be addressed. This phase commenced fully in the later part of 2003 and has proceeded throughout the duration of the study. The second phase consisted of empirical study conducted within a period of six weeks in Nigeria and six weeks in South Africa. The fieldwork in Nigeria was conducted between March and April 2005 and in South Africa between November and December 2005. This section specifies the types and forms of data collected from the field, the sources of the data, the techniques employed in gathering them and the method used for their analysis.
Data Types and Forms

The study relied on primary, secondary and tertiary types of data. The primary data used include audio tape recordings of semi-structured and focused interviews, which were transcribed for analysis. Primary data were also generated through notes taken during interviews as well as direct observation of relevant contextual conditions and events. Other primary data used included government documents, policy statements, statistics, indices, surveys and similar publications already compiled and maintained in their raw forms. Secondary data were obtained from the results of analysis already done and published, including books, journals and other materials in libraries located both within the United Kingdom and in the case countries. Most of these data are essentially qualitative, although some are quantitative in nature and contained in secondary documents in the form of tables and charts. Other vital secondary data used were grey literature obtained via the Internet and from institutions in the field. Produced by government agencies, universities, research centres, professional organisations, and special interest groups, this literature comprised fact sheets, working papers, government documents, scholarly journals, bulletins, newspapers and conference proceedings. This literature was used because it is extremely valuable in offering additional knowledge used in modifying and refining the earlier findings of research, and in providing quick and flexible access to current research summaries, statistics and facts, as well as the opportunity to go into considerable details in the conduct of research. The data obtained from the grey literature were also very helpful in placing this research in a wider perspective.
Data Sources

Most of the data collected in Nigeria came from interviews with key individuals and groups within the following organisations: the O'odua People's Congress (a militia group), in Lagos, and the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (a militia group), in Abuja; the Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (CLEEN), Lagos; Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Abuja; Africa Strategic and Research Group (AFSTRAG), Lagos; the Nigeria Defence Headquarters, Abuja; the National War College, Abuja; and the Police Headquarters, Abuja. In addition, a number of serving and retired military officers, who preferred to maintain anonymity, offered valuable information informally in their private capacities.

In South Africa, the data came from the following organisations and individuals: the Institute for Security Studies (ISS); the Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town; Institute for Contemporary Islam, University of Cape Town; Mapogo a Mathamaga (a former militia organisation); the South African Police Service (SAPS), Nyanga Station, Cape Town; and individuals who have worked closely with the disbanded militia, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), as well as current and former officials of SAPS who have worked closely on PAGAD violence.

The interviews were conducted around the following broad questions: what are the experiences and perception of militia violence? The indicators of this variable include organised criminal violence, vigilante violence, and ethnic armies. A second question dealt with observations or recorded changes in militia violence and the rate of this change since transition (democratisation and demilitarisation). The main indicators for
this variable were the changes in the number of militia groups and in the number of
violent acts committed by them. A third area addressed the policy responses of the state
to militia violence from the point of their emergence to the point of their climax, the
indicators for which include policy statements and actual interventions by state
agencies. Furthermore, the interview included questions that probed the motivation,
dynamics, and methods of non-state actors: what were the driving motives of non-state
actors, how have they changed over time and what are their methods of operation? The
full range of the guiding questions used in the interviews is presented in the interview
schedule in Appendix I of this report.

Techniques and Timing
As stated earlier in this chapter, the initial phase of the study consisted of a literature
survey. This involved the review of documents, including journal articles and textbooks
obtained through online and library research in the United Kingdom. This technique
was also used to generate data during the second phase of the study in the field. Books,
articles, government reports and official statistics obtained from Nigeria and South
Africa were reviewed for primary and secondary data.

In addition to literature review, observation was used as a technique for data gathering
during the fieldwork. This technique was found to be powerful especially by helping to
strengthen the validity of data points revealed by other techniques. It was equally useful
in generating data on some contextual aspects of the case studies. A very good example
of the utility of this technique was the institutional resistance demonstrated by the
defence establishment in Nigeria towards some aspects of the research observed during
fieldwork. This strongly suggested the perpetuation of the culture of secrecy characteristic of the era of military rule and exposed the limit to which demilitarisation has been implemented in the country.

The third technique employed was interviews, including in-depth and focus group interviews. Interview proved to be the most important tool used during the second phase of the study in the field. It was used mainly to generate primary data on the views, perceptions, experiences and interpretations of key individuals in and out of government who have been either involved in or were critical observers of the demilitarisation process and militia violence. Interviews were found to be most suitable for dealing with these variables, which were related to what the actors made of their experiences and social realities. Those interviewed were members of the armed forces and law enforcement agencies, former servicemen, leaders of militias, public policy oriented researchers in the security field, and end-users of security such as people in the business community.

The semi-structured type of interview was used to ask measured and guided questions. This allowed for free but guided responses from interviewees without imposing a predetermined direction. Questionnaires were not used for fear of delays and low response rates. Given the distance between the field (Nigeria and South Africa) and Cranfield University where the main analysis was carried out, it proved difficult (both in terms of costs and time) to re-administer questionnaires in case the initial exercise failed to elicit timely and adequate response. Furthermore, questionnaires were not employed because they were deemed to be inappropriate for qualitative study of this
nature, and would be much more difficult to employ under the environmental conditions in which the research was undertaken.

Data Analysis

Preliminary analysis was conducted during the initial review of literature, which helped shape and refine the key questions of this research. However the major part of the analysis took place during and after the collection of relevant data from the field. At this stage the data collected from the two cases were condensed, categorised, structured and interpreted within each case. Initial findings were then used for cross-case analysis in support of the overall research.

Both within-case and cross-case analyses were based on matching emerging patterns from the data with the initial theoretical proposition, including the elimination of rival explanations. This analytical technique has been referred to as pattern matching. This involved relating careful observations of the patterns, which emerged from the data (after they have been categorised and structured), to those patterns of civil militarism and demilitarisation so as to compare between the predicted and actual pattern. The conclusions are linked back to the differences in the type of transition between Nigeria and South Africa.

Limitations

Several difficulties were encountered in the collection of data during the fieldwork. In Nigeria it was not possible to gather data on defence regulation and state response to the
civil militia challenge. While data on defence legislation in South Africa is available through open sources, it is not the case with Nigeria. Several attempts to secure items of information failed for many reasons. All the informal contacts made within the Defence Headquarters lacked currency. These individuals had been posted to various locations, which the headquarters was not disposed to divulging. New contacts had to be made within the period of the fieldwork, and those who were willing to offer any help were former officers who had retired from service. Some of these ex-officers were very helpful in providing information based on their personal experiences while in service.

However, these former officers did not have access to official documents and so could not provide access to objectively verifiable data on policy outputs that could be interpreted as attempts to demilitarise the political process. Several rescheduled meetings with the Directorate of Defence Information to fill in this gap did not take place before the expiry of the duration of the fieldwork, as the relevant officers were not always available at the appointed time. The unavailability of these data through open sources and the inability to secure them from official sources both suggested that the extent to which the state implemented demilitarisation was highly limited. This suggestion was confirmed by several former and serving senior officers of the Nigeria Army interviewed during and after the fieldwork. In separate discussions, all underscored a recurrent trend: that the government had deliberately kept defence and security related information from public access because it did not have much information to offer as no systematic reforms have been carried out in the sector since the end of military rule in 1999.
A major limitation was also encountered in South Africa. It was impossible to meet directly with members of the main militia organisation studied in the country. The militia, PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs), itself had ceased to exist as an organisation since after 2000. Most of its core operatives, the militants, had been convicted and were still serving various jail terms at the time of the fieldwork. Several attempts were made to visit the prisons so as to hold interviews with the former militants, but the bureaucracy within the correctional services was very slow and the necessary official permission for the visit could not be obtained before the end of the fieldwork. It was therefore impossible to have access to the perspective of the militia itself, although an attempt was made to make up for this limitation by talking to the initial supporters of the organisation at the time that it was still a popular movement and had not become a militia.

**Significance of the Study**

To date, there is no theoretical framework linking demilitarisation and the phenomenon of civil militarism. As an exploratory study this research attempts to contribute to the development of such a framework. It is also significant for policy and practice in the security sector of post-authoritarian societies, with similar conditions to the ones studied here. It attempts to re-examine existing propositions and assumptions about demilitarisation and privatisation of violence in post-authoritarian states as well as linking the theory of civil-military relations with conflict analysis. In terms of policy, this study seeks to broaden the range of approaches used by national governments in designing programmes aimed at consolidating democratic development and improving security conditions. Related to this, it attempts to feed into the policy tools of bilateral
and multilateral donors engaged in the fields of security and development in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally it suggests more innovative ways, based on empirical analysis, by which actions from the national to the grassroots levels can be improved upon for more effective delivery of public security.

The need to situate this research within the existing body of knowledge and to sharpen the focus of its key questions required an examination of the literature and specifically the analyses that have been undertaken on the problems of militia violence and demilitarisation in post-authoritarian transition. Two main bodies of literature were reviewed, including analyses on civil-military relations and internal armed conflict, and this review is presented in the next chapter.
Chapter 3

Review of Literature

Introduction

The observed paradox between demilitarisation and the rise of civil militarism, as specified in the background to Chapter 1, necessitates a critical examination of the existing literature. This review covers two broad areas of extant analysis, including civil-military relations and internal armed conflict analyses. These bodies of literature have been selected to examine the extent to which societal militarism and demilitarisation of politics have been linked and analysed, and to understand what has already been known in the area of civil violence in post-authoritarian societies.

More specifically, the review seeks to understand what is known about the problem of military intervention in the domestic political process and its impacts on violence in society. It is also important to consider what is known about the relationship between the reversal of this intervention and changes in civil order. Furthermore, it is the aim of this review to discover the extent to which analysis has illuminated the location of informal security forces and militias in the civil-military equation. The very fact that these armed formations perform military and security functions, even if irregularly; enjoy some level of localised legitimacy, however narrow; usurp state authority; and impact on the security of citizens in the civil society through their activities; makes
them worthy of consideration within the field of civil–military relations. They are a crucial element in the interaction between the state, the security institutions and the society, and it is important to understand how these interactions translate into change in the level of public security.

This security reality also generates a need to review the existing analysis of conflict because it is the context within which militias operate and it most suitably characterises the nature of social interaction between militias and other groups in society. This is in spite of the fact that conflict analysis tends to assume a clear distinction between peace and war and focuses less on the 'grey area' in between these two extremes. This is because much of the violence perpetrated by militias does not fit perfectly into the context of open armed conflict, even if they are difficult to define. Even though militia violence portrays the society to be at war with itself, it is difficult to put it in any of the existing categories of internal armed conflict such as civil war, insurgency, small war, low-intensity conflict, and other similar categories. Nor is it correct to characterise those countries where militias operate, as those enjoying internal stability and order, and this tension seems to blur the academic distinction between war and peace in many sub-Saharan Africa countries. Issues specifically discussed under conflict are the nature of political crisis in which civil militias operate in Africa, the impact of democratisation and demilitarisation on violence in society, the role of structural factors and other extraneous causes of civil militarism.
Civil-Military Relations

The literature on politico-military relations as it affects militarism and demilitarisation is broad and complex. This complexity derives from the sheer amount and diversity of the issues considered within its scope. The concept of demilitarisation began to receive academic attention in the early twentieth century with emphasis on questions associated with imposed reduction in the military capabilities of defeated nations after hostilities. However, during the Cold War research on demilitarisation was subsumed under Peace Studies and broadly dealt with reduction in the role of the military in politics. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the concept has generated much interest from a multiplicity of academic efforts.

In relation to sub-Saharan Africa, attempts have been made to identify the various ways in which demilitarisation has been undertaken. Of these efforts, five major strategies have clearly been noted to include:

...downsizing military budgets; demobilisation and reintegration; redefining roles and missions of armed forces; restructuring governance structures in the security arena; and reforming paradigms and structures.

The common theme running through these processes is that they deal with the better governance of the security institutions and policies of the state to achieve a desired pattern of power relations between the civil authorities and the armed forces. Yet such analysis tends to ignore the broader scope of relations involving elements of the wider society in civil-military relations.
Civil-military relations can therefore be conceived of in two broad categories. The first is a narrower, more traditional conception, which deals with the set of political relations between the military and civilian governments over the control of military force. The second is a broader and more recent conception. This considers the social relations that exist between the military and the wider society and between the civil authorities and the society over defence and security matters. Since this study deals with societal militarism, the main focus of this review is the broader dimension, particularly as it relates to the militarisation of society and its implications for demilitarisation. The review therefore does not consider the details of the traditional literature of civil control. However, the debates in the literature of military-society relations emerged from the more traditional analyses, and its development over time is traced in the beginning of the review. Thus the traditional literature is touched upon, but only tangentially.

Traditional Civil-Military Analyses

Early studies on civil-military relations were centred on finding solutions to the problem of civil control of armed forces, especially in established democracies where periods of crises posed real threats to the norm of civil supremacy over the security establishment. For Samuel Huntington, the solution to this tension is in the establishment of objective civilian control and this could only be achieved through professionalism in the armed forces, especially among the officer corps. Morris Janowitz proposes the integration into the military the values of civil society. Samuel Finer has suggested the inculcation of the principle of civil supremacy in the military establishment as the
guarantee of its subordination to political authority. Michael Desch also argues that structural factors, especially threats, are the primary determinants of the ability of civilians to control the military. Thus these early thoughts tend to focus exclusively on what Peter Feaver calls 'the civil-military problematique': the dilemma of maintaining a military that is strong enough to implement the policy objectives of civilians and a military that is at the same time subordinate to the political superiority the civilian leadership. Although these arguments are very useful in grappling with the major traditional issues of civil-military relations, they do not have much to offer on the impact of the military or militarism on the wider society.

However, the focus on the issue of civil control of armed forces assumes that the primary problem of civil-military relations is the threat of praetorian military intervention in domestic politics, and the inadequacy of such focus has forced a shift towards a wider problem of democratic management and implementation of defence and security policy. This moves the argument from the 'first generation' problem of preventing military intervention to a 'second generation problem' of the processes and practices of establishing effective structures for democratic governance in defence and security sectors – building effective defence policymaking structures, establishing meaningful parliamentary oversight of the defence and security sectors, and developing wider civil society input into defence and security debates. While this shift has helped in broadening the scope of civil-military analysis, one crucial gap that has remained is the inadequate attention given to the social dimension. In summary, the traditional literature on the civil control of armed and security forces virtually ignores the place of society in civil-military analysis, and is therefore unhelpful for examining and
understanding the issues of societal militarism and demilitarisation in post-authoritarian societies.

Interestingly, however, beyond the question of civil control, the literature of civil-military relations in the developing world has generated enormous debate in other directions that touch upon the place of the society. Prominent among them are the causes of military intervention, the nature of military rule, military politics in socialist states, the role of the military in politics, ethnic segmentation of the military, economic performance in military dictatorships compared to democratic economies, as well as military disengagement from politics. These concerns began to receive the academic attention just as the armed forces took over power and began to dominate the political landscape in many Latin American, African and Asian countries. Much has also been written on the conditions that influence the disposition of the military to disengage from politics. These conditions include forces that are both external to and internal to the military as an institution. This analysis is very useful in that it is based on comparative examination of experiences drawn from across the developing world, and advances explanations for the differences in the type and nature of post-military democracies. Moreover such analysis of military disengagement from politics is crucial mainly because disengagement is an essential element of demilitarisation in post-authoritarian societies where the military had been deeply involved in politics, and this is examined in more detail under the literature on military-society relations.
Military-Society Relations

While the literature considered above has been concerned essentially with the arguments around the subject of civil control, more recent authors have taken cognisance of the inadequacy of such approaches to the study of civil-military relations, and have suggested a shift in analysis that accommodates the broader question of the relationship between the armed forces and the societies of which they are a part. A very useful element of this shift is the theory of concordance, which highlights the need for dialogue, accommodation and shared values or objectives among the military, the political elites and the wider society. This theory considers the citizenry as an important partner in civil-military relations, even though the ultimate goal of such an arrangement is to enhance civil control over security forces. Another strand of this shift suggests more emphasis on the problem of how to maintain a military that sustains and protects democratic values in consolidated democracies. These works are important in so far as they seek to involve the society in military matters. Yet it is obvious that this involvement of the society is considered in terms of its role in the democratic management and control of the armed forces and related policy matters.

Other studies have made much bolder contributions to the understanding of the relationship between armed forces and society, although in different directions. Martin Edmonds argues that the nature of the military's relationship to its society is largely dependent on the society's worldview, which is in turn influenced by the level of technology, culture, and the socio-economic structure of the society. Others have looked into the factors that shape particular military-society relations and how these relations determine the legitimacy of the military institution in such societies. It is this
The legitimacy of the military, as observed by some, which constitutes the main linkage between the military and the civilian society. This legitimacy derives from the military's functional and socio-political missions, and directly determines the support it enjoys from the society.\textsuperscript{93} It is also argued that the functional mission, or 'the functional imperative of war', makes the military unique and separate from the civilian society.\textsuperscript{94}

Charles Moskos and Frank Wood examine the societal forces that have pressurised Western militaries to change to a more organisational structure, which may have detrimental implications for the functional imperative of war.\textsuperscript{95} The concept of the 'post-modern' military, which represents a phase in military organisation that is shaped by geopolitical and societal changes in post-industrial societies, is a recent development towards military-society analysis.\textsuperscript{96} These changes are seen as having undermined the militarisation of society, particularly the tradition of mass armies, conscription and military service, leading to a 'post-military' society in industrial countries.\textsuperscript{97} These contributions are very insightful, not least because they mark a sharp departure from the traditional problem of civil-military relations and focus broadly on the place of the military within the society.

Nonetheless, these analyses are heavily weighted in favour of the impacts of society on the military, particularly on how changes within society (both at the national and international or global levels) have forced the military to change in its structure, mission and outlook, and do not provide as much insight into the opposite direction of this interaction. A significant area that has received serious attention is the way in which
changes in societal values are determined or influenced by the military or its values. Furthermore, they deal more strictly with Western societies and do not reflect societies in the developing world, particularly African societies.

One important attempt to study the connection of the military to society is Huntington’s comparative study of 16 countries of Southeast Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean, which points to the legacies of military intervention in politics that pose challenges for democratic consolidation after transition. Also drawing from cases in Latin America, Central America, the Caribbean, Africa and Europe, Constantine Danapoulos explores the links between long-term disengagement and the factors in society that prompted military intervention in the first place. His focus is on the trends in society that prompt intervention and which must be reversed for military withdrawal to be sustainable. 

Roger Hamburg links the success of any disengagement to societal pressure (as was the case in Sudan); military defeat (citing the example of Argentina in 1982), serious domestic policy failure; intra-military cleavages; international pressure; and the crisis of governance faced inherently by military regimes.

In furtherance of this thread of analysis, Samuel Finer links the success of any disengagement to the combination of three conditions: the breakdown of the original praetorian group; increasing conflict of interest between political and military leaders; and political difficulties faced by military regimes. These writers provide the leading direction on thinking about the process of depoliticising the military, especially in developing and transitional countries, where the military had dominated almost every
facet of society. Within this thinking, demilitarisation is concerned with reversing the militarisation of politics, where militarisation is seen as the preponderance of the armed forces in the political, economic and social life of a country. The emphasis of the literature on disengagement is crucial for providing insights on demilitarisation, not only as it relates to the withdrawal of military forces from active politics, but more importantly on the continued influence or indirect role of the security forces in politics, and the impact of other legacies of militarism on the new democratic space.

Yet, as noted by Bayo Adekson, military disengagement cannot be equated to demilitarisation as has tended to be, even though the former is crucial to the latter. Other commentators have further elaborated upon this distinction and provided useful insights worthy of mention here. Said Adejumobi has pointed out that military disengagement from politics does not necessarily undo the practices and norms associated with militarism. This is because militarism is not limited to military rule, but is present also in civilian regimes and post-military new democracies where the entrenched norms and practices of militarism are not readily eradicated with the formal transfer of political power to civilian elites. In fierce support of this position, Robin Luckham has recently argued for a rethinking of the notion of military disengagement, which tends to focus only on official armed forces as a single unit of analysis. For him, such rethinking needs to consider all forms of militarism, including those deployed under military rule, by civilian dictators or 'semi-democracies', and by non-state armed formations. Further questioning of the concept of military disengagement have also directed attention to the conflict between the professional elements of the military and those in government under military rule, and showed that the military did not always act.
politically in unified and consistent manner. These analyses are very relevant in the context of Africa where civilian dictators and non-state armed groups have served as critical agents of militarism as much as military regimes, and where disengagement has not ended the culture of militarism even in post-authoritarian regimes. Under such conditions demilitarisation needs to extend beyond formal termination of the military’s political role to a wider process of dismantling those ideological and institutional norms and practices of militarism in both the state and the society.

The continued political influence of the military beyond its political visibility in the new democracies of the developing world, which have a history of military dictatorship, including the legacies of such history in the national society is an important dimension of military-society relations that has begun to receive increasing academic attention. This new attention has included the role of other security apparatuses; the privatisation of violence and the emergence of non-state armed formations; the spread of low-level conflict and its impacts on human security; and the implications of all these for democratic governance. The continued political power and influence of the military and other state security forces after democratic transition is an important element of military-society relations because it deals with the legacies of militarism in new post-military democracies discussed above and is a central concern for strategies of demilitarisation. The role of other security apparatuses, including the police and intelligence services, falls somewhat within the consideration of civilian autocratic regimes that rely on paramilitaries to undermine the power of the institutional military, and so has implications for politico-military relations. It also has relevance for understanding the militarisation of law and order as a legacy of militarism in new
democracies, particularly where the militarisation of politics in the past involved a fusion of military and police functions. The notion of the privatised violence represents one of the most important breaks in the attempt to link the military to society. Admittedly the privatisation of violence is a broad term that could refer to a wide array of non-state armed movements including global terrorist groups, mercenaries, insurgents and rebels engaged in armed conflict, the concept does not necessarily occur in situations of armed conflict as it also applies to civil militias operating in crisis or crisis-prone political environments.

In relation to the privatisation of violence, the notion of *civil-militia relations* has been suggested as a conceptual guide for examining the interaction of militias and their host societies. Marrie-Joelle Zahar offers a typology of four patterns of civil-militia relations. These are militias, which have their independent sources of revenue; those that are predatory; those that are parasitic; and those that have symbiotic civil-militia relations with their hosts.¹⁰⁸ The concept of civil-militia relations reinforces the imperative of factoring militias and similar forces into the analysis of civil-military relations, as well as the spread of low-level conflict. It brings to the fore the relevance of militia groups as important players in the civil-military equation, as well as the spread of private violence, though this is not strongly linked to the relationship between the military and society as an aspect of civil-military relations. The implications of the spread of armed conflict are considered later in the section on conflict, while the linkages between non-state groups and civil-military relations are examined here.
Societal Militarism

A second important manifestation of this shift is an emerging perspective in thinking away from the direct political power and influence of the military to the indirect legacies of military politics in the society. This concern could aptly be referred to as the 'negative externalities'\textsuperscript{109} of the militarisation of politics on civil-military relations, since it looks not at what the military, either in or out of power, \textit{intentionally does} in relation to the state or society, but at the unintended fallouts of historical militarism that have relevance for reference to the militarisation of society. This should not be confused with the material impacts of militarisation on society, which are well-known issues (including the impacts of military governance on national economic performance, the quality of governance, etc). Rather it is the linking of past political activities of the military with the emergence of non-state armed groups mentioned earlier.\textsuperscript{110} This is a sharp departure from the tradition in the literature because it takes the interaction of the civil and the military from the physical and institutional to the social and psychological plane. It suggests the examination of this relationship in the physical absence of the military, particularly the consequences of military politics in producing the conditions under which non-state security forces that occupy the civil side of security calculations emerge as a legacy of militarism.

In addition, it has been noted that effective maintenance of the means of legitimate coercion and its deployment to secure public order, the rule of law, and citizenship rights on the basis of norms and procedures should be the ultimate goal of democratic consolidation rather than the attainment of civil control.\textsuperscript{111} All of these points about the monopoly of violence by the state, public order, the rule of law and rights of citizens,
are threatened by non-state actors, and must therefore be factored into the understanding of civil-military relations. This connection is very apparent in the context of Africa where it is observed that, because so much of policing is paramilitary, civil-military relations establishes the context in which nearly all policing systems, including those operated by non-state actors occur. This connection is very relevant for understanding how the militarisation of policing has created the conditions for parallel security and activities engaged in by civil militias as part of the legacies of militarised politics.

In a study of militarism and the prospects of democratic consolidation in Nigeria, Kayode Fayemi provides another interesting direction. His study reveals that years of military repression have conditioned many communities to adopt military strategies in responding to any form of domination. Thus 'the greatest challenge in combating the scourge of political militarism is addressing the psychology of militarism that has become reified in the context of exclusionary politics'. The notion of the psychological legacy of militarism is re-echoed by the same author more recently, using the phrase, 'societal militarism and violence', as a legacy of years of military rule in Nigeria. This is the erosion of the culture of compromise, dialogue and accommodation in the resolution and management of conflicts. This is supported by Pita Agbese's position that the legacies of military rule include a culture of violence which places a premium on force and violence; and de-emphasises dialogue, bargaining and compromise between and within social groups. These points are very crucial to this study because they open up new areas of inquiry into the psycho-social impacts of military politics on society and point towards the process by which structural violence
and social exclusion translate into physical and cultural violence. These are discussed in more detail under the section on armed conflict, as they are considered pertinent to the understanding of the kind of context within which militias emerge and operate. In a similar study of civil-military relations in Southern Africa, Jackie Cilliers emphasises the structural issues of political and social alienation as eroding social norms and producing gangs and warlords. This study brings into perspective the social dimension of civil-military relations, but also raises further questions. Though the term 'demilitarisation' is not used, the argument for reclaiming militarised minds requires looking in the direction of the values and attitudes which have become entrenched among civilian populations and which support the propensity to use violence in normal social conflict. This proposal for psychological demilitarisation prompts the question of how to do so and is an area that requires further research, as opposed to the demilitarisation of politics and how it affects the privatisation of violence by civil militias, which is a central concern of this study.

Yet, as the foregoing review shows, academic analysis on the relationship between the demilitarisation of politics and the phenomenon of civil militias is still far from being fully developed. One very important piece of work, which suggests emerging thinking in this area, raises the paradox of demilitarisation. Guy Lamb observes that the demilitarisation of the state (or politics) may work in the opposite direction to the demilitarisation of society. In other words efforts to dismantle the political role of the military in politics and law and order functions in emerging democracies have coincided with growing militarism in the wider society. Going by this study's definition of demilitarisation of the society, this observation lends credence to the proposition of this
study. Exploring the way in which this observed paradox works is therefore a most central concern of the study. In the following section, the review focuses on the literature of internal armed conflict and the purpose is to examine what has been understood already about militias, the conditions under which they emerge and operate, and how they relate to the process of demilitarisation.

**Internal Armed Conflict**

The literature on armed conflict, more than that of civil-military relations, is enormous and diverse, and because the study deals with public security within national borders, this review excludes international armed conflict and concentrates on internal conflict. Even within the scope of internal conflict, the debates are so many and deal with a very wide array of issues that this review does not cover. This research deals with informal groups engaged in low-level conflict situations, where the state is relatively strong (not challenged effectively by on-going armed rebellion), and where there are no long-running violent conflicts among groups with a prior definition of an enemy. It deals with the security context of crisis situations or situations of disorder in which violence is mobilised by relatively small groups intermittently over specific issues. For this same reason, insurgencies, civil wars, genocide and other acts of open violent internal strife involving structured forces (even if they are non-state) are not considered in the review. Admittedly, delineating such a context of crisis in a clear-cut manner has been analytically problematic, and this difficulty is discussed below.
The Problem of Taxonomy

Finding the appropriate nomenclature for the conflict context described above, critical as it is, immediately faces the problem of definition and classification of internal armed conflicts. This problem has generated its own debate since the end of the Cold War, creating over a decade of what has been referred to as conceptual turmoil or semantic confusion among writers on internal conflict.\(^{118}\) This debate rages among those who interchangeably use concepts such as civil wars, intrastate wars, internal wars, ethnic wars, resource conflicts, communal wars, low intensity conflicts, small wars, insurrections, complex emergencies, post-modern wars, among many others.

Several attempts have been made to overcome this confusion through the categorisation of internal conflicts. One of such efforts establishes four criteria for defining civil wars as distinct from other types of internal armed conflict, including the level of violence, the geographical scope, the actors involved and the relative distribution of force among the contenders.\(^{119}\) According to this categorisation, such a civil war must involve, at least, 1000 battle-related deaths annually, being fought within established state borders with the state as one of the main actors, and where fighting is equally intense from both government and rebel sides. If this categorisation is generally accepted, civil wars are clearly not the type of violence considered in this study and is therefore not pursued further.

The level of violence has also been used to distinguish between three types of internal conflict since the end of the Cold War: minor armed conflict, which must result in a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths annually and less than 1000 deaths over the course
of the entire conflict; intermediate armed conflict with an annual death range between
25 and 999, with a minimum of 1000 battle-related deaths in the course of the entire
conflict; and war with a minimum of 1000 battle-related deaths annually.¹²⁰ The
concept of 'minor armed conflict' is helpful in terms of categorisation, but it does not
reveal very much about the dynamics and nature of conflict. Moreover, minor armed
conflict as defined here hardly fits the context of the type of violence considered in this
study, which sometimes does not result in up to 25 battle-related deaths within a year.
There also has to be an indefinite wait for the conflict to be fully resolved and the figure
of overall death determined to understand the category of the conflict.

Other criteria for classification have been suggested, using an idea-individual spectrum,
and whether or not the state is contested. Jan Angstrom uses these two criteria to
distinguish between ideological conflicts fought by the armed forces of at least two
parties over the way the state is ruled; resource conflict over a contested state, with the
aim of not changing the rule of the state, but of personal economic enrichment;
leadership conflict over the leadership of the state; and ethnic conflict involving the
armed forces of at least two ethnic groups of which at least one is not representing the
state.¹²¹ Kumar Rupesinghe and Sanam Anderlini base their typologies on the most
prevalent causes, including resource-based conflicts, conflict over governance and
authority, conflict over ideology and conflict over identity.¹²² Yet, these taxonomies of
internal conflicts may be suitable in a setting of conventional armed conflict. Resource
conflict and ethnic conflict come close to describing the context of violence by militias
as important actors. However they do not neatly describe the kind of context of crisis
where militias play multiple roles as protection forces or as private armies for a diversity of political, ideological and economic interests.

A way out of this problem of taxonomy has been attempted by Charles Tilly in his more embracing concept of collective violence. Tilly argues that individuals and groups engage in collective violence as a consequence of shielding from routine state violence.\textsuperscript{123} The concept of collective violence is useful because it is sensitive to the multipurpose operations of civil militias in crisis-prone environments. Ted Gurr advances a psychological and social framework for understanding collective violence, using the theory of relative deprivation.\textsuperscript{124} In a more recent work, Gurr sees collective violence at the community level as arising from inequalities among social groups where such inequalities coincide with communal cleavages and where social barriers are consciously put in place by dominant groups. He also identifies the tradition of hostilities and clashes among ethnic groups as a second factor.\textsuperscript{125} Relative deprivation throws up the whole issue of structural violence (social inequality and alienation) previously identified in the literature of civil-military relations as a prevalent condition in places where militias are endemic. The tradition of hostilities among groups is equally important, most especially because it has implications for the background to the militarisation of whole societies. These issues form an important part of the analysis and are fully discussed in the empirical chapters of this study.

Considerable analysis has also been done on economic factors of civil violence, within which there are many strands and arguments over the role of natural resources, economic development and the global market. On natural resources, much of the study
has resulted in conflicting findings. Some findings show a negative relationship between natural resources and conflict. Others have suggested a positive relationship by arguing that violence is motivated by greed for profits from the illegal markets in natural resources, or that natural resources only provide the opportunity to sustain rather than motivate conflict, which is essentially driven by grievance. Others more show that the link between natural resources and conflict is conditioned by the state of macro-economic development. Michael Ross warns that dependence on natural resources by a state invokes the 'resource curse', which includes the curse of civil war, by producing the 'rentier effect', which weakens the state and creates the conditions for rebellion. This is corroborated by other studies which show that mineral exports dependence sharply heightens the risk of civil war. The most controversial of mineral resources is petroleum oil, which has been closely associated with political instability in producing countries. One of the most powerful arguments about the politics of oil has been advanced by Terry Karl, who observes that countries whose economy depends on revenues from oil exports, regardless of cultural differences, experience a 'paradox of plenty' in which the inflow of vast amount of petro-dollars produces deep social and political crisis (including riots, conflicts and civil wars) rather than an opportunity for surmounting the obstacles to development. In a more recent study by Matthias Basedau and Wolfram Lacher, these thoughts have been further developed to show that dependence tends to play a major role in political instability when income per capita from oil exports is relatively low. This study demonstrates that while countries with low revenues per capita from oil exports are more likely to suffer considerable political violence, high-income oil states are largely spared by violence. This is because oil rents in low-income petro-states are often distributed through
patronage networks, which increases rent-seeking and competition and, consequently, the probability of violence.\textsuperscript{133} The crucial issues of the rentier state and the weakness of the state have potential implications as they create the political climate conducive to generating collective violence by civil militias. The link to dependence on natural resources, particularly oil, is also worthy of note as many African states depend on resources, which has the capacity to determine the nature of the state in relation to politics and civil militarism.

More broadly, development issues have been linked to civil violence. A variant of this analysis suggests that the processes of modernisation in the third world are likely to produce anarchy and communal violence.\textsuperscript{134} Another variant argues that the root cause of conflict is the failure of economic development, including the conditions of poverty and social exclusion.\textsuperscript{135} With regards to the African context, Jackie Cilliers qualifies this situation as that of 'general disorder' conditioned by the structural factors of political and social alienation and inequality that have produced 'the erosion of norms, emergence of gangs and warlords, and undermined the normal restraints on violence'.\textsuperscript{136} To this Paul Rich adds an important observation that these private forces represent 'desperate and militarised segments of society'.\textsuperscript{137} This reinforces the importance of the linkages of the structural conditions of inequality and exclusion to the militarisation of society, which generates non-state armed actors, even though militias are not specifically mentioned. Security and development have always gone hand in hand, and it is important to examine the role of development as a context within which demilitarisation and militia violence are shaped. Interestingly, all the issues raised
concerning inequality, alienation, state weakness and the rentier effect are also integral to social and economic development.

**The State and the Privatisation of Violence**

Shifting attention from classification, causes and correlates of internal conflict, other analyses have generated relevant insights on the *privatisation of violence* by non-state actors. The literature on privatisation in the field of security include those that consider private companies providing security and military services on commercial basis on the one hand, and those that focus on informal security actors on the other, and a good attempt has been made to disaggregate this dual trend of privatisation.¹³⁸ Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are increasingly being seen as traditional mercenaries reinvented under new conditions as guarantors of post-Cold War stability in unstable countries, particularly those in Africa.¹³⁹ These companies have become relevant for filling the security vacuum as a response to demand for security. As conflicts persist, and the international community remains reluctant to intervene, these corporate actors will continue to fill the security gap.¹⁴⁰ The growing privatisation of security since the 1990s has also generated ethical concerns among scholars.¹⁴¹ However, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, mercenaries and the corporate security sector are not the concern of this study, even though they are an important element of non-state violence. The focus is rather on informal security actors, particularly civil militias.
On the analysis of informal actors in internal violence, a number of authors agree that the rise and growth of non-state self-protection groups are a characteristic of fragile states – the growing weakness of the state to provide the legal guarantees of physical security to citizens from abuses, crime and physical violence. This creates the *unrule of law* which is one of many manifestations of a wider problem of governance failure deriving from the crisis of authority. Private protection by subaltern groups has become endemic throughout Africa and Eastern Europe, where this is seen as a reflection of the growing needs of elites to protect themselves from internal rivalries where the state has failed to uphold the rule of law and provide adequate security for all. What makes a state a state, as has been argued, is the extent to which it is able to wield firm control over standing armies and police forces while eliminating non-state controlled armies, militias and gangs. In practice, the ability of real states to approximate this Weberian ideal notion has varied markedly, both in temporal and spatial dimensions. This empirical variation has been identified as the basis for classification between *strong* and *weak states*. Strong states have been able to 'extract, penetrate, regulate, and appropriate' within their territories and over their populations; and have been able to neutralise opposition against their drive towards the accumulation of power. On the contrary, weak state leaders have been unable to achieve predominance in large areas of their countries and face impenetrable barriers to accumulate power. Joe Migdal aptly uses the concept of *social control* to capture this distinction. Strong states, therefore, are those with a high level of social control, while weak states have a low level. It follows then that the privatisation of the means of violence in the hands of informal security forces is a critical indicator of state weakness.
The anatomy of this condition of state weakness has been the subject of a very illuminating academic analysis among scholars of security in the Third World. An aspect of this analysis attributes the weakness discussed above to the nature of the society – the *social structure*, of which the state is only a part. Joe Migdal argues that post-colonial states faced immediate challenges to their claims of predominance, even in the midst of and since independence. The strength of the state is thus conditioned by the society which is composed of what he calls a 'melange' of social forces – families, clans, Multinational Corporations (MNCs), domestic enterprises, tribes, patron-client dyads – and the fundamental conflicts between them works against the emergence of the archetypal Western nation-state.\(^{148}\) Mohammed Ayoob has joined forces with Migdal by arguing that these social forces in the post-colonial state are competing foci of authority, which, though usually weaker than the state in terms of coercive capacity, are equal to or stronger than the state in terms of legitimacy as far as the perceptions of the substantial portions of the state’s populations are concerned.\(^{149}\)

Caroline Thomas blames the state and associates the problem of state weakness with the state’s *institutional capacity*. This is made up of the state’s *despotic power* (the force to impose rule on the population), and the *infrastructural power* (the strength of the state’s bureaucracies and their reach within the territory). While effective infrastructural power gradually eliminates the need for excessive exercise of despotic power in strong states, weak states are unable to move beyond reliance on crude coercion to enforce unwilling compliance.\(^{150}\) Brian Job adds another dimension of *national cohesion*, or *socio-political cohesion* which is lacking in weak states and creates the *insecurity dilemma* by which efforts by individuals and groups to protect themselves against perceived threats
results in an environment of increased threat and reduced security' for all in society. Barry Buzan captures this more sharply in his position that weak states 'either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and social consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic life of the nation'. A conclusion that can be drawn from these observations is that the lack of institutional capacity to exercise sustainable social control and to build national cohesion in societies characterised by competing foci of authority define weak states, and create the conditions for privatised violence.

The points raised above are particularly relevant for Africa, where state weakness is seen as a product of prolonged fiscal and economic crises. This condition erodes the state’s revenue base, its effectiveness and physical presence in outlying areas, and forces the state to cede its monopoly of coercive force to militias, and vigilantes with criminal connections. Under such conditions, individuals seek personal substitutes by attaching themselves to the so-called ‘big men’ who are capable of providing protection or even advancing their personal interests at the expense of others. Again, this is a crucial observation, and one that is explored further in the case studies. What is important here and considered further in the study is the role of elites in the exploitation of state ineffectiveness to pursue narrow agendas for which the instrumentality of militias is a rational calculation.

The role of political elites as rational actors in the weakening of the state, particularly in Africa, has been illuminated in the literature. It has been observed that while independence was achieved with euphoria and high expectations in sub-Saharan Africa,
the dualism of the colonial era — the coexistence of non-formal traditional institutions and formal state structures — was not addressed by the new national elites. Rather, they maintained the artificiality and remoteness of the colonial state. This failure undermined the ability of the post-colonial state to meet expectations and prompted the disengagement of sections of the population from the state. One important form of this disengagement is the parallel systems or what Alice Hills calls the parallel universe, which offers alternative outlets for needs that remain unfulfilled by official channels.

An important element of these parallel systems is privatised violence, which in turn deprives the state of revenue and consequently weakens its capacity to accumulate wealth and capacity.

Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz argue that the state and politics in Africa operate on the basis of elites using 'disorder as political instrument.' In other words political elites operate the state informally and deliberately choose not to institutionalise political practice as well as state bureaucracies so as to enhance their narrow interests. In such circumstances, the manipulation of violence becomes a profitable resource for elites. This observation is a further development of the neo-patrimonial model of the African state by which the formal institutions of the inherited colonial state is said to have been de-bureaucratised by post-colonial rulers, so that the state operates through informal processes. Invaded by the patrimonial sphere of personal relations, public services operate through the informal networks of clientelism and nepotism in the neopatrimonial model. Under such conditions rulers allocate political office to their clients on the basis of patronage rather than any criteria of bureaucratic professionalism.
In some cases, it has been observed that it is the criminalisation of the state by its elites that significantly cripples its bureaucratic effectiveness. This process involves the entrenchment of criminal practices at the heart of the institutions of government, including the private use of the public security forces, the privatisation of violence and participation of rulers in the semi-clandestine economy. Powerful elites are, in such cases, part of an informal network that includes militias and armed groups to constitute the vectors of criminalisation. The operation of politics in such clandestine networks has prompted some commentators to observe that Africa is characterised by what they qualify as the 'rhizome state' or the 'shadow state', where warlords are the dominant political actors. While warlords certainly do not control the majority of states in Africa, the analyses above provide a powerful tool for understanding the role of elites in the informal operation of politics and the weakening of the bureaucratic state. One aspect of these analyses that is crucial to this study is the way in which the interaction of politics and the clandestine world shape the legacies of militarism in Africa's new democracies and its implications for demilitarisation.

Other factors have been associated with the weakness of the state in creating the conditions for the privatisation of violence and the emergence of civil militias. Bruce Baker points to the combination of state weakness, the context of danger, state predation and poverty. This combination blurs the boundaries between state and non-state law enforcement, and between criminal and rebel lawlessness in Africa. In such a context where citizens would naturally care more about their protection rather than who the provider is, they are left to their own devices of private law enforcement and self-
defence with low stake in conforming to the rule of law. In addition, global forces of change have been held responsible for aggravating state weakness by undermining the capacity of the state to address social problems. The example is given of the rise in vigilante killings in Indonesia and in the rest of East Asia in association with the financial crisis that began in the late 1990s. Ulric Shanon points out that the ceding of the state’s monopoly over the use of violence to non-state actors is an emerging global phenomenon, by which irregular forces — terrorists, mercenaries, guerrillas, warlords, militias, etc — on a global scale are eroding the legitimacy of the state as the guarantor of security and economic development. Robert Mandel adopts a multi-level analysis of the privatisation of security to argue that the shrinking of defence assistance by the end of the Cold War gave rise to two directions of privatisation of security: a top-down outsourcing of security to private companies; and a bottom-up pressure from militias, self-defence forces, vigilantes, neighbourhood watches and gangs. The retreat of superpower influence from the Third World is said to have exposed the lack of ‘empirical’ legitimacy of these states (derived from the ability to secure authority at the local level) and permitted warlordism. This phenomenon emerged gradually before the end of the Cold War as local factional leaders adapted their role in longstanding conflict areas to meet the changing environment. A more eclectic approach holds that the combination of post-Cold War withdrawal of superpower security guarantees, neo-liberal economic restructuring, global demilitarisation (retrenchment of military resources), and the surge of democratic pressures from the civil society; undermine the hegemony of the state, and create a vacuum which warlords seek to manipulate. Yet, while the privatisation of violence is a global trend, nowhere has this been more pronounced and more sharply contrasted
to the strength of the state than in Africa. Moreover the proliferation of militias as a unique or specific form of the privatisation of violence in African states requires a deeper look at the nature of the state in the region.

The process of democratisation has also been identified as one of the principal causes of insecurity. Observing the internal armed conflicts of the 1990s in Eastern Europe and Africa, analysts have associated political violence with the initiation of political liberalisation and democratic transition. Also in Latin America it is observed that democratic transition has seen the 'democratisation of violence', which has increasingly become an option for a multiplicity of societal actors. One explanation for this linkage is that democratisation permits the expression of ancient hatreds among rival nationalist groups in divided societies. Another explanation offered by Kumar Rupesinghe holds that it is not just the process of democratisation but its occurrence in fragile states that generate new conflicts. However, Jack Snyder has observed that such conflicts typically arise in the earliest stages of democratisation and decline as democracy consolidates. This is because at the early stages, elites use nationalist doctrine to contain popular pressure for democratisation and exclude internal opponents, which in turn provokes violent conflict. This is most likely to happen when elites are threatened by rapid political change and when the expansion of participatory politics occurs before the emergence of strong civic institutions. This position has been supported by a comparative study, which shows that the risk of violent conflict is high where democratisation is incomplete as opposed to dictatorships or consolidated democracies. Thus it is the subversion of the transition process by state elites who are threatened by democracy and the legacies of authoritarianism that spark off violent
conflict in the course of democratisation rather than the process itself. While this research does not deal directly with the conventional internal armed conflict considered in the foregoing analyses, the link between democratisation and insecurity deserves closer attention in the analysis. This is so because the demilitarisation of politics is in itself a consequence of the transition to democratic politics, and it is important to understand the interaction of civil militias with these two processes.

The New Violence

A useful way of looking at militia violence is to consider the dynamics or changing nature of conflict in which actors similar to militias have become prominent. The conventional view (of Kaplan or van Creveld) that sees conflict as essentially irrational behaviour, chaos or disorder has been challenged by a new way of thinking about its functionality. Rather than reflecting a breakdown of an orderly system, militia violence is seen as the ‘emergence of an alternative system of profit and power’, representing a reconstituted system in which some of the functions of the state are being taken over by regional warlords. Warlord activities also bear on politics involving rulers who control markets to enhance their power against domestic contenders. Non-state armed groups, in general, have also been associated with the primary objective to force their way back onto the social system from which they have been excluded. Thus the growth of warlords and non-state violence are also seen as characteristics of what is called the ‘post-modern conflict’. This changing face of conflict suggests the gradual emergence of a post-Westphalian age, in which the state is no longer able to interfere
with local armed actors who operate by holding local territories and acting politically and financially in the global system.\textsuperscript{179} This introduces another dimension to the debate – the dynamics of conflict, particularly the changing face of conflict and, with it, changes in the character of collective violence. An important element of this change is the way in which local actors adapt to state weakness to create their own order, and this is linked to the opportunistic role of elites in the employment of militia violence in society considered earlier.

This changing face of conflict has been characterised by others as a 'new war'. The new war thesis attempts to qualify the type of conflict that enveloped large parts of Africa and Eastern Europe with the end of the Cold War. It is argued that the new wars are defined by identity rather than ideology, and blur the distinction between peace, war and organised crime. Furthermore, they occur in states where the monopoly of legitimate organised violence is weakened by the process of globalisation.\textsuperscript{180} The erosion of the authority of the state is accompanied by violent war economies where the globalised economy and violence are mutually reinforcing, and in which illegal commercial entrepreneurship, private armies, and warlords are dominant features.\textsuperscript{181} Here private armies and non-state forces are presented as features of the new face of conflict in changing global economic conditions, but what is important for this study is the merging of conflict, peace and organised crime, and the way this linkage relates to the emergence of civil militias in post-authoritarian regimes.

The 'new violence' has also been diagnosed as an affliction of societies in the post-authoritarian period. At the heart of this new violence are conditions of deeply
ingrained social inequality and exclusion, thwarting the expectations of improvement in security and the rule of law that had been heightened by the return to democracy. However, it is claimed that the new violence is unleashed when inequality and social exclusion combine with the legacy of multiple centres of justice.\(^{182}\) This combination leaves a wide array of criminal and social violent actors who fill up the security vacuum left by the failure of the rule of law. Yet the existence of multiple centres of justice itself is a manifestation of the crisis of the state. It reveals the inability of the state to exercise its hegemony as the sovereign authority within its territory. For this reason the strength of the state within the context of post-authoritarian transition forms a central aspect for analysis in this study.

The claim that the face of conflict is changing has however faced some intellectual challenges. Opponents contend that the 'new war' thesis is an exaggeration of the empirical realities of armed conflict, which have been present for a century. What is believed to have changed is not so much the nature of war as the growing academic, policy and political attention being given to the horrifying features of civil wars.\(^{183}\) More poignantly, it is contended that warlords have been present for centuries and have emerged historically when central political-military control breaks down.\(^{184}\) These build on the work of other analysts who advance the thesis of state collapse as the context which produces warlord politics.\(^{185}\) Yet much of these analyses rely on the concepts of warlords and state collapse, which do not correspond exactly to the main concerns of this study. The term, warlord, is used mainly to describe an individual who controls a particular group or area through the possession of significant military power to exploit fragmenting states in pursuit of private interests. Yet, apart from Somalia,
Liberia and Sierra Leone the majority of sub-Saharan African states cannot be qualified as collapsed states. Overall, as conventional civil wars began to decline from the late 1990s the phenomena of state collapse and warlords have gradually ceased to be the defining elements of the crisis in many states in the region.

Instead of state collapse and warlords, the concepts of state weakness and civil militias are used in this study. The concept of militia has been found to be analytically more useful than that of warlord, which focuses narrowly on individual actors, and fails to clarify the dynamics of conflict and security.\(^{186}\) Militias in Africa are also said to operate where the state is fragmenting and where official state forces have broken up.\(^{187}\) Fragmentation more accurately defines the context of militias in Africa than collapse, yet militias also operate in African countries, which are not fragmenting, and so a more general term is needed to capture the range of contexts. This informs the preference for the concept of state weakness, more so that state weakness most accurately defines the two cases selected for this study. Nigeria and South Africa represent post-authoritarian societies where civil disorder is increasingly aggravated by informal armed forces in the form of civil militias. The conclusion below draws together the salient insights derived from the review, which are relevant to demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism in the context of post-authoritarian transition.
Conclusions

This chapter examined the existing analysis of civil-military relations and that of internal armed conflict under four related bodies of literature that touch upon the central concern of this study, which is the relationship between demilitarisation and civil militarism in post-authoritarian regimes. The four bodies of literature considered include those of military-society relations, societal militarism, the privatisation of violence, and the new violence. A number of crucial insights were provided by these groups of literature, which are relevant to understanding the linkages between democratisation, demilitarisation, post-authoritarian insecurities, the legacies of militarism and civil militarism in post-authoritarian states.

A most important idea suggested, particularly by the more recent literature on civil-military relations, is the paradox of demilitarisation. It is observed in this body of literature that the demilitarisation of politics and the state may actually contradict the demilitarisation of the civilian society and lead to its militarisation. Although this observation is central to the problem of this study, the way in which this contradiction works is not clearly explained in the literature.

In relation to demilitarisation, the literature also point to the legacies of militarised politics, which are present in the wider society after the formal termination of the political prerogative of the military. Here, a more comprehensive strategy of demilitarisation that goes beyond military disengagement from politics and deals with the legacies of militarism in the wider society is suggested. This observation speaks to
the third research questions of this study, which seeks to explore policy options for minimising the risk of civil militarism in the course of demilitarisation of politics in post-authoritarian new democracies.

Equally important, the process of democratisation was linked to internal armed conflicts. Although democratic transition is said not to cause conflict in itself, the literature strongly suggests that the early stages of democratic transition can be very traumatic and generate collective violence within the country involved. At this stage, the role of political elites in restricting successful transition is identified as the cause of conflict. Even though democratisation is not linked directly to militias, armed conflicts provide one of the most conducive political contexts for civil militia activities.

The literature also points to civil militarism as part of the legacies of militarism in post-authoritarian societies. Here civil militarism is a continuation of resistance against prolonged state violence before the transition or against authoritarian residues in the new political climate of semi-democracy. Other legacies of authoritarianism pointed out in the literature are the issues of structural violence such as social exclusion, deprivation, poverty and the failure of development. While these conditions do not go away with authoritarian rule, they create the conditions that drive the prevalence of militarism in society. Specifically, it is suggested that entrenched social exclusion and alienation due to authoritarian rule erode social norms, dialogue, compromise, and accommodation, while producing a culture of violence in which non-state forces emerge.
Finally, civil militarism is considered as a particular form of the privatisation of violence, which is associated with weak states. The literature identifies this condition of state weakness as providing the political context of crisis in which militias emerge and operate. Such a context may not necessarily be a conflict situation, but may involve a situation of violence where conflict, peace and crime co-exist. Under such conditions the state is unable to resolve normal social tensions, while its weakness creates the space for opportunistic use of violence to serve various interests. Furthermore, militias both provide protection and challenge the authority of the regime under such conditions of state weakness and are therefore real actors to be reckoned with in civil-military calculations. This means that any meaningful strategy of demilitarisation has to account for civil militias in the contexts where the authority of the state is fragmented.

The examined literature provides initial support to the major factors identified in the conceptual framework in Chapter 1 in relation to the emergence of civil militarism in post-authoritarian regimes. These factors include demilitarisation, democratisation, the legacies militarism, structural violence, and the fragmentation of state authority in weak states. The contradictory linkage between demilitarisation at the political level and at the societal level suggested in the literature strengthens the working hypothesis of this research. The rival hypotheses of the study were also supported in the literature. The utility of the central hypothesis and the rival hypotheses is therefore explored in the next two chapters (4 and 5), which examine the case studies of Nigeria and South Africa respectively. Emerging findings from these case studies are compared in a cross-case analysis under Chapter 6. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 therefore constitute the main analysis of this study and aim to prove whether or not any relationship exists between
demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism, how this relationship works, and the implications for the search for a new approach to demilitarisation that minimises the risk of civil militarism.
Current Map of Nigeria Showing the Regional States
A Historical Map of Nigeria Showing the Three Federal Regions Created by the British Colonial Administration in 1954

Map 1: Nigeria 1954
Map of Nigeria Showing Major Ethnic Groups and Minority Areas

MINORITIES COMMISSION MAP 5

NIGER COLONY

NORTHERN REGION
- Fulani: Over 50%, 35-50%
- Hausa: Over 50%
- Kanuri: Over 50%
- Nupe: Over 50%
- Tiv: Over 50%
- Other Northern Tribes: Over 50%

EASTERN and WESTERN REGION
- Yoruba: Over 50%
- Edo: Over 50%
- Urhobo: Over 50%
- Ibo: Over 50%
- Ibibio: Over 50%
- Igbo: Over 50%
- Other Nigerian Tribes: Over 50%

NIGERIA
MAIN TRIBAL GROUPS
1952-53

0 150 Miles
0 240 Kilometres

AGH
OIL INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACKS, MAY 2007

Abuja

MEND attacks
Non-MEND attacks

Okan oil field
Oshi oil field
Delta
Yenagoa
Bayelsa
Port Harcourt

Oguta oil field
Pipeline

Funiwa oil field
Brass River Terminal
FSO Oloibiri
FPSO Mystras

Gulf of Guinea
Chapter 4

Civil Militarism and Demilitarisation of Politics in Nigeria

Introduction

This chapter contains the report of the field research conducted in Nigeria to explore the relationship between civil militarism and the demilitarisation of politics. It begins with a brief history of military rule and the emergence of civil militias in the post-authoritarian dispensation in the country. This is followed by a discussion of the nature of the Nigerian state which forms the contextual background for the militarisation. The discussion of the context centres on issues of national socio-political cohesion, the political economy of petroleum oil, and social control under military rule. The chapter proceeds to examine the specific ways in which the militarisation of the state and politics occurred, and how this process developed into the militarisation of the wider society. The main analysis in this chapter deals with the democratic transition in 1999 and the strategy of demilitarisation implemented by the civilian administration. The focus of this analysis is the effect of the transition and demilitarisation on the rise of civil militias in post-military Nigeria. Other extraneous and intervening variables are discussed in order to attend to rival explanations. The chapter concludes with the discussion of the O'odua People's Congress (OPC) as the main militia used for analysis, although examples of other militias in the country are used in the discussion of the OPC. The main argument of this chapter is that while the OPC first emerged as a pressure group, the demilitarisation strategy of the government in 1999 weakened social
control and therefore created the space for the group to be hijacked and transformed into a militia.

The militarisation of the political process in Nigeria commenced almost with the historical emergence of the country as a post-colonial state. While the country became independent in October 1960, it took just over five years for the military intervention in the political process to commence. This involvement took the extreme form of direct military seizure of governance in January 1966 through a violent coup d'etat and the consequent termination of the fledgling democratic order. This event was epochal in the political history of post-colonial Nigeria as it marked the beginning and entrenchment of a long era of military rule and violent state repression. Although there was an interregnum of civilian rule between 1979 and 1983, the militarisation of politics was so far-reaching that the attempted democratic transition could not last more than four years before it was replaced by the second and more ferocious phase of direct military rule. In all, military rule generated internal resistance, which was sometimes violent. Some of this resistance was also sometimes national and sometimes factional in its mobilisation, but was prevented from escalation through military repression. While it brutally prevented the collapse of the state, the violent response of the state to political pressures created the conditions under which the civil society became gradually militarised.

In spite of the political culture of incessant coups and counter-coups, the transition to democratic rule in 1999 has not been punctuated by direct military intervention of the past, but has since progressed through a democratic change of government in 2003 through elections. Interviews with observers and military officers in Nigeria indicate
that the military hierarchy has since been disposed to remain in the barracks rather than intervene in domestic politics. Although there is still discontent at the lower level of the officer corps, the cooptation of the military hierarchy by the political elites has made the transition more durable than earlier attempts, even if slow, and minimised the probability of reversal to military rule.

The transition itself represented a non-violent pact between the military and political elites, even though resistance from the organised civil society was a dominant source of pressure against military rule. From the standpoint of the outgoing military leadership, the transition was an attempt to depoliticise the military institution. But from the standpoint of the political elite, it marked the demilitarisation of the polity, an issue of great concern to the civil and political society. The weight of this concern was demonstrated by the new civilian government that came to power in 1999, as it promptly began to seek ways to neutralise the political disposition of the military hierarchy.

The transition has proceeded with a decreasing emphasis on the state violence of the past, carried out by state security forces. Ironically, the new democratic space has also revealed an increased dimension of the militarisation of civil society, generated by the repression of the era of military rule. The manifestation of this has been the emergence and proliferation of civil militias of various characters, starting from the last few years of military rule to the present. These militias include the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) operating in Yoruba-speaking states of the southwest, the Bakassi Boys in the
Ibo-speaking states of eastern Nigeria, and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force predominantly in the Ijaw-speaking parts of the Niger Delta, among other less popular groups. These militias are structured organised formations that determine and enforce their own order in a way that is not accountable to the state or complementary to the security and order that the state seeks to provide. On the contrary, lacking in constitutional mandate, they have been involved in many incidents of extreme violence that threaten public security and order, and generate fear in the communities where they operate.

The presence of the conditions described above motivated the selection of Nigeria as a case study for exploring the relationship between the demilitarisation of the political process and civil militarism in Africa. In pursuit of this exploratory study, an empirical research was conducted in Nigeria in order to generate the relevant data for analysis. The data were sought on the specific questions of the original research questions of the study, as specified in Chapter Two. The main techniques used for gathering the data were interview, documents and direct observation.

This chapter presents the report of the field study. The report begins by setting the historical background to political militarisation and discussing the contextual conditions which impact on the provisioning of public security and order in Nigeria. The report goes on to discuss the process and extent of the militarisation of the political process. The policies and actions of the state in order to demilitarise politics are examined as well as the metamorphosis of civil militias as alternative security providers. The
analysis centres on examining whether or not there is a link between the demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism.

**Historical and Contextual Background**

The militarisation of Nigeria took place in the context of a country that was ridden with internal crises and contradictions from the beginning. Inter-group tension over the allocation of power and wealth had already become an important feature of the country's political economy before the end of colonial rule, and these crises constitute part of the crucial challenges that confronted the new independent state and state builders from 1960 onwards. The failure of post-independence state elites to manage and resolve these crises drove the military to intervene and seize the control of political power from 1966. However, militarisation aggravated the national crises rather than control them. Within a few months of the first coup, the military as an institution itself was caught by the vortex of the national crises and became one of the most glaring theatres of social conflict. The disintegration of the military into factions and the resultant cycle of coups and counter coups not only mirrored but aggravated the contradictions embedded in the foundations of the state.

The decolonisation process and the hard political bargaining and ferment it generated among a highly diverse national population and elites lay at the roots of the immediate post-colonial crisis. With ethnicity, region and religion as crucial indicators, this diversity provided a veritable catalyst to the fundamental social conflict over the control and management of national power and wealth. This social conflict and the crisis of
governance generated thereby are symptomatic of a more structural condition of state weakness, that is, the inability of the state to accumulate sufficient power and wealth to meet the requirements of human development and security. This weakness provides the socio-political climate both for the historical militarisation of politics and the contemporary emergence of civil militias in social conflicts. It is therefore crucial to examine the nature of the state in Nigeria and the political economic conditions embedded in the state as determinants of state violence and militarism in society.

The State and the Politics of Division

Nigeria has always been a weak state. With regards to security, this weakness has been evident in two dimensions. One is the failure of state elites to create the conditions for national cohesion among the country's multifarious social groups. The second is the failure of the state to provide adequate public protection of citizens from physical violence. However, the failure to promote national social cohesion among the different identities within the country represents one of the most fundamental factors underlying the militarisation of politics and this factor is discussed further below.

Although Nigeria is composed of over 300 ethnic groups, the political history of the country has been dominated by a somewhat controversial discourse of geopolitical dichotomy between the North and the South. This dichotomy itself is a legacy of the regional system of colonial administration, which structured the vast country into a federation of three relatively strong regions – the Northern, the Western and the Eastern
Regions. This structure was maintained at independence and, by 1963, a fourth region was created known as the Mid-West. The four regional structures were maintained until 1967 when General Gowon's Government restructured the federation into twelve semi-autonomous states. In spite of the division into four regions, the Western, Mid-Western and Eastern Regions were geographically situated in what was regarded as the southern part of Nigeria and were thus seen as elements of a larger South. In consequence, beyond just administrative structuring, the concepts of the North and the South came to be socially accepted as the two most important regional identities that dominate the competition over national wealth and political power to date, long after the abandonment of the regional structure.

This division is controversial in the sense that it does not follow any naturally occurring geographic or demographic criteria or those that are socially determined. Rather the dichotomy represented a merging of geography and political calculations that embodied serious structural contradictions. In the first place, northern Nigeria as colonially constructed is much bigger than southern Nigeria, in terms of landmass. The second factor, which is related to the first, is that the North contains more population of people than the Southern region. A third contradiction is the nearly polar distribution of religion along this dichotomy. While majority of Moslems in the country live in the north, the south is home to the majority of Christians. This arrangement created an uneasy coincidence of religion and ethnicity. A fourth problem with the structure of the state was that the boundaries of the regions coincided with the boundaries of the major ethnic groups. The Hausa/Fulanis controlled the Northern Region, while the Yorubas and the Igbos controlled the Western and Eastern Regions, respectively. This meant
that the regions were in fact ethnic states. A fifth factor has been that the north and the south are respectively dominated by large ethnic groups in such a way that the dichotomy does not reflect the multiplicity of the subaltern minority groups. In the north, the Hausa/Fulani group is the largest and dominant among a vast array of minority groups. Also in the south, the Yoruba and the Igbo groups are the two largest and dominant groups among a large number of minority groups. Ironically, the minority groups put together are by far larger than the three groups mentioned above. These structural contradictions have had crucial implications for the history of social conflict and the crisis of governance in the country.

One major implication of these contradictions is that, given the geographical and numerical superiority of the north, the region has continued to control the central government and dominate national politics since independence. The north had a greater number of seats in the national parliament and so continued to enjoy a majority in the first two general elections of 1959 and 1964. Sir Abubakar Balewa who became the first Prime Minister in 1960 and who also won the second elections was of Hausa/Fulani extraction in the north. The third and fourth general elections of 1979 and 1983 mirrored a similar pattern to the two previous ones. The north controlled the majority in the national parliament, while the President Shehu Shagari emerged from the north.

This political unevenness and the inability of the central government to skilfully manage the mutual animosities generated between the north and the south resulted in bitter controversies over the second general elections and the national census of 1965.
In the West, regional elections were marred by violent protests as the central government was accused of manipulating the results to the advantage of the ruling party, which was predominantly a northern party. In addition, the results of the national census were rejected in the West, where the central government was suspected of manipulating in favour of the north to maintain its political dominance. In the face of disorder and dangerous ethnic competition as well as corruption among the political elites, the military seized power to restore democratic order and political stability. This was to be achieved through the elimination of the corrupt political class so as to halt ethnic politics.

Yet the ethnic composition of the leaders of the coup, its execution, its aftermath and the way it was interpreted in different parts of the country resulted in the exacerbation of the deepening mutual ethnic and regional hostilities among the peoples of the north and the south. Most officers who led the coup were Igbo-speaking from the south. Whether by design or accident of history, the majority of political leaders killed during the execution of the coup (the Prime Minister and other prominent leaders) were northerners, while most of their counterparts from the south escaped death. Although the coup failed the most senior military officer, Major General Aguyi Ironsi, who rightly assumed the leadership of the country was incidentally of Igbo extraction. This deepened the interpretation of the coup as an ethnic agenda by the Igbos against the Hausa/Fulans, and led to an organised massacre of Igbos living in the north by northern military officers. The counter-coup of July 1966, involving the murder of General Ironsi, was perceived as the furtherance of this agenda of ethnic vendetta. By this
time, the military, seen as the guarantor of national political stability, was beginning to succumb to the pressures of the politics of division.

Furthermore the second coup generated bitter political tension between the Eastern Region (which was home to the Igbos) and the north, which also controlled the central government. Apart from displacing the Igbos from leadership, another round of deliberate massacre of the Igbos in the north took place during the counter-coup and continued into 1967. The felt injustice in all of those tragic events led to the failed bid for a separate state of Biafra in 1967 by the Eastern Region and the violent civil war of 1967-1970.

A very complex coincidence of religion, ethnicity and regionalism has also had serious implications for political order in the contemporary history of the country. Communal conflicts since independence have featured the deliberate targeting of religious groups and institutions. Violent attacks on Christians and churches in numerous communal conflicts in the north and reprisals on Moslems in the south clearly point to the dominance of religion in the history of communal conflict in the country. However, the fact that many southern Moslems living in the north were also targeted during such conflict reveals the limitation of religion in the understanding of social conflict in the country. The trend appears to suggest a central importance of ethnic identity in the conflicts.
After all, conflicts have also occurred among the minority peoples of the north as well as those of the south. The Tiv Riots of the early 1960s, the Tiv-Jukun conflict, the Modakeke-Ife conflict, and the variegated current conflicts in the Niger Delta area are among the many examples. These conflicts are mostly engaged in by groups with different ethnic constituencies, which however share common religious beliefs such as the Warri crisis. This trend not only lends credence to ethnic identity in relation to religion, but also adds to the complexity of the nature and causes of communal conflict in the country. A very prominent strand these conflicts occurs between the so-called indigenes and settlers. Indigene-settler conflicts over the control of resources in a particular territory between indigenous and settler ethnic categories which may or may not share a common religion. Good examples of these complex communal conflicts include the Ife-Modakeke, Tiv-Jukun, Zango-Kataf, Warri, and Ijaw-Ijaje conflicts. This complexity is made more difficult when the role of regionalism is also considered. In most of the conflicts, some northern Moslems from the southern fringes of the north have been targeted while minority groups from the far north are not targeted in communal conflicts in the north. This introduces an element of regionalism in the understanding of the phenomenon and exposes the limitation of ethnicity as the central issue.

The social divisions in the Nigerian society are therefore multiple and complex. These divisions have been in existence before independence and have generated the history of frequent communal conflicts that expose such prominent factors as ethnicity, religion, resources, and the manipulation of these factors by political elites. This complex interaction of religion, ethnicity and regionalism, makes it difficult to grapple with the
nature of communal conflict in the country and the way in which this conflicts have been played out since independence. Nevertheless, the conflicts continue to reveal lingering tensions embedded in very complex north-south, Moslem-Christian, and indigenous-settler dichotomies across the country. The culmination of all these crises produced an environment of political instability and disorder, which in turn provided the conditions for the militarisation of the political process through military involvement in politics.

Nigeria as a Petro-State

Nigeria has vast deposits of petroleum oil and has generated enormous financial revenues from the exploitation and export of this natural endowment since the late 1950s. From the early 1970s, when the global energy crisis shot oil prices up four times, oil became the single most important foreign exchange earner for the country. The export components of other sectors, including agriculture and manufacturing, considerably dwindled and the country gradually progressed into a monolithic economy depending nearly solely on petroleum oil for national revenues. The primacy of oil has remained an endemic feature of the economy with recent figures showing oil as constituting nearly 50% of GDP, over 90% of export earnings, and over 80% of total government revenues.\textsuperscript{201} Oil has therefore generated considerable rents for the Nigerian economy since the early 1970s, and has provided the prospects for transforming the post-colonial state into a strong modern state capable of generating the conditions for human security and development for its population.
Ironically, however, much of the political instability, violence and conflict in Nigeria have been closely associated with petroleum oil and its exploitation. More poignantly, oil has been identified as the theatre of conflict within which politics in Nigeria is played out. A highly oil-dependent country, Nigeria has continued to manifest serious political crises that characterise countries suffering from the so-called ‘resource curse’. The contours of these oil-related political crises or the political dimensions of the resource curse, in the context of Nigeria have been defined by violent conflict, authoritarianism, social inequality and political corruption or prebendal politics. Although regional and national struggle for political power in Nigeria has been characterised by violent conflict since independence, the most significant incident of violent conflict are the Biafran Civil War of 1967-1970 and the current spasmodic but endemic low-level conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta, in terms of their duration and cost. Incidentally these conflicts have been fuelled by the country’s dependence on oil, even though the root causes of some of them are known to lie elsewhere, including ethnicity and the way it is politicised. The conflicts therefore present very useful points where oil and politics in Nigeria mix.

Yet it is not just dependence on oil, but its abundance (measured by the level of income per capita from exports earning) and the way in which earnings from its exports are distributed, that provides the most striking links with conflict and political instability. 2002 figures show that although Nigeria earned $13.7 billion as rents from oil exports, per capita income from such rents for the same year stood at miserable $140 as against $3071, $14790, $5640, $9777, and $7506 for the equally oil-dependent but more politically stable Arab states of Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Brunei, the United Arab Emirate,
respectively. In addition to higher abundance, these Arab states have tended to spend their huge oil rents through large-scale distributive policies.\textsuperscript{205} In contrast, oil rents in Nigeria are distributed through networks of political patronage. It is therefore the low per-capita income from oil rents (occasioned by a high population burden) and the neo-patrimonial distribution of oil revenues that have put Nigeria among the category of conflict-prone petro-states.\textsuperscript{206} However, patrimonial distribution is not limited to oil resources, but is rather a manifestation of the nature of politics and of the state into which oil rents are inserted.

As discussed in the preceding sub-section, Nigeria at independence inherited a weak federal system bedevilled by ethnic-based and regional political competition, which frequently assumed violent proportions. It is into this existing political landscape of contending sub-national forces that the curse of oil rents as centralised resource was inserted.\textsuperscript{207} As oil rents gained ascendancy in the Nigerian economy, the personal income tax system was abandoned and the derivation principle (discussed below) which government distributed revenue among the constituent units of the federation came to be replaced by the Federation Account in 1966.\textsuperscript{208} The Federation Account, made up of the Federal Government, State Governments, and Local Governments (since 1979), serves as the pool from which oil rents are distributed to the federating units by the central Federal Government.

At independence the revenue allocation formula was based on the principle of derivation, by which a certain proportion of revenue from natural resources was retained in the region of their origin while the rest was collected by the central government.
Fiscal centralism was made possible through the authoritarian logic of military rule rather than a result of negotiation and consensus between the regional states and the central government. This has made the states increasing more dependent on the centre for their economic survival, and reinforced post-colonial neo-patrimonial politics. As regional states became completely dependent on central patronage from the Federation Account, they also became the most important mechanisms for distributing oil revenues to regional political elites and clients of the ruling patrons. Thus the creation of more states and Local Governments became a major trigger for intense political competition and conflict over revenue allocation among ethnic groups and their elites. This explains the intense agitation for more states and local governments, and the rapid proliferation of states from 12 in 1967 to 36 in 1996. The centralisation of the vast oil rents therefore enabled ruling elites to enhance their relative power position through skilful maintenance of patron-client networks, while exacerbating poverty, social inequality and conflict, including in the Niger Delta where most of the country's oil is exploited.

The Niger Delta has the highest incidence of poverty in the country, according to 1996 statistics. It is also populated by minority ethnic groups, which have suffered disproportionately from the developmental costs of oil extraction. Combined with the fact that the oil industry tends to generate huge rents for the state and the oil companies, while employing relatively few local workers, these conditions create high social inequality and consequently the structural conditions underlying the current violence in the Niger Delta.
Centralisation of oil rents has also been closely associated with the political culture of corruption for which Nigeria is very much known. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International has consistently ranked Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, and politics have continued to be dominated by pervasive incidents of corruption.\(^\text{211}\) According to Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, the country lost US $380 billion between 1966 and 1999 to state corruption.\(^\text{212}\) Political corruption became a rampant institutional issue with the oil boom of the early 1970s, culminating in the personalisation of political power and well-known massive looting of centralised oil rents by the regimes of General Babangida (1985-1993) and General Abacha (1993-1998).\(^\text{213}\) Yet this political culture has persisted after military rule. Most federal and state institutions, including the Parliament, the Police and State Governors, have been indicted and sometimes convicted of looting state funds since after 1999. Even the Presidency has not been able to escape this pandemic. The President and Vice-President are currently subjects of an on-going bitter in-fighting in which each side has accused the other of monumental mismanagement of huge sums of money belonging to a Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF).\(^\text{214}\) Meanwhile the Senate has just concluded investigations of the PTDF affair and indicted both President and Vice-President in its report.\(^\text{215}\) The PTDF is a special fund established for the purpose of training and education in the petroleum and gas industry, and preliminary Senate investigation has revealed the complicity of the President and the Vice-President in misappropriation of the fund and its distribution to their respective political clients.
Corruption in successive federal governments has also resulted in official neglect of the Niger Delta, and consequently the failure of development in the region. Given the relative importance of national income generated from the region, the failure of development has left the region with appalling conditions of underdevelopment that aptly capture the 'paradox of plenty'. This pattern is no less visible at the state and local government levels, where credible recent findings have revealed the politics of corruption involved in the distribution of oil rents. These findings also show how the struggle for access to oil rents as a source for political power has become a source of conflict at community levels, particularly in the volatile Niger Delta. Furthermore, the failure of development in the midst of plenty has fuelled a cumulative and pervasive sense of injustice and deprivation, which underlie the history of resistance to oil exploitation by the federal government.

Furthermore, because oil rents discourage tax and lead to high patronage, it has made the state less accountable and more repressive. This mechanism fosters authoritarianism and works against democratisation and democratic development. The militarisation of the political process and the entrenchment of authoritarianism in Nigeria have important links with petroleum oil. As host communities mounted more pressure for local control of oil resources, the Nigerian state has responded with increasing repression in collaboration with the powerful multinational oil companies operating in the Niger Delta. This became more obvious in the turn of the 1990s, when the Military Government commenced a systematic crackdown and open violence against community restiveness in the Niger Delta. This trend culminated in the Ogoni crisis and the brutal killing of Ken SaroWiwa and his co-activists in 1995 by the Military Government.
of General Abacha. From this point, the state became increasingly brutal, particularly in the Niger Delta where it relies on the use of the military to secure oil extraction.

Federalism under Military Rule

Much of the crises afflicting Nigeria is associated with the way in which the structure of federalism has been distorted after independence. The main distortion of the structure and practice of the Nigerian federal system has been the over-centralisation of authority. Federalism was adopted by the British colonial administration in 1951 in response to fears by minority ethnic groups of domination and exclusion by the major competing ethnic groups in the imminent post-colonial order. In the context of ethnic and regional competition (or animosity), the establishment of federalism was an attempt to decentralise state authority and create local control and management of political power and economic wealth. The ultimate goal of this arrangement was to diffuse the existing political tension and conflict among the various ethnic groups in the country. Thus the early post-independence regions had autonomy in the control and management of wealth and power within their territories, and were the dominant political forces in relation to a weaker Federal Government at the centre.

The first major distortion of the federal system was the centralisation of political power with the intervention of the military in governance. Admittedly, the federal system had started showing signs of imperfections from independence. Minority agitations over marginalisation continued as indicated by the demand for the Mid-Western Region and the Tiv riots of 1960 and 1964. These agitations stemmed from the fact that the federating regions coincided with the boundaries of the major three ethnic groups, as
discussed earlier in this chapter. This meant that the minority groups in each of the regions had no space to realise their political aspirations, as they were eclipsed by the major groups. What was needed was a further devolution of powers to the grassroots in such a way that responded to the aspirations of the minorities. The incursion of the military into politics in 1966 did the exact opposite of that, and federalism became one of the first casualties of the militarisation of politics.

Through Decree No. 34 of 1966, the General Ironsi military government abolished the federal regions and reconstituted them into provinces within a unitary state.\textsuperscript{225} Even though the military regime of General Gowon returned the country back to a federal structure comprising states (rather than regions),\textsuperscript{226} the core principles of federalism were progressively eroded. Under military rule the states were governed by military administrators who were appointed by and accountable only to the Head of State. Further more the constituent states were created on the basis of patronage and contained the potentials for conflict.\textsuperscript{227} This meant that, as opposed to the principles of decentralisation and devolution in a federation, the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as it has been known even under military rule) embodied a structural contradiction in which political power was concentrated in the centre.

The centralisation of power in an ethnically diverse Nigeria with a history of inter-ethnic and regional rivalry was bound to aggravate social conflict rather than reduce them. This was demonstrated by the proliferation of communal conflicts throughout the duration of military rule in Nigeria. Most of these conflicts were underpinned by the intensification of the historical mistrust among the various ethnic groups. The
centralisation of power under military rule exacerbated ethnic animosity as the control of the central government by any group meant the control of the entire country and fear of political exclusion by others. For instance, because nearly all the military Heads of State were of northern origin, most of the national crises, including the civil war of 1967-1970, centred on the overbearing dominance of the north as perceived by the other ethnic-based regions. Below the level of the central government, many of the states mirrored the structure of majority-minority divide at the centre and were transposed into the indigene-settler distinction at the roots of the majority of the communal conflicts in the country.²²⁸

The second and perhaps a more fundamental distortion of the federal structure has been the concentration of wealth and economic resources at the centre. Again, this was created by the military in government as a deliberate state policy. The centralisation of power required a commensurate centralisation of wealth to bolster the economic base of a hegemonic centre, and this was done through the monopolisation of land and mineral resources, which were under the control of the regions and communities.

At independence, Nigeria practiced fiscal federalism as enshrined in the constitutions of 1960 and 1963. National wealth was distributed through the 'derivation principle', by which a certain proportion of federal revenue generated from natural resources (including petroleum oil) was given back to the regions and communities where it was derived. Within this period, 50% of the revenue from mineral resources was given to the region from where the minerals were extracted; 30% was put in a distributable pool, which was divided among all the regions including the producing region. Only 20%
percent went to the Federal Government. However, from 1969 onwards, just as petroleum oil began to assume strategic economic importance, the derivation principle was progressively replaced by fiscal centralism by successive military regimes. Through the Petroleum Decree 51 of 1969 and the Land Use Act of 1978, the ownership of all lands and the control of resources contained therein (including oilfields) were vested on the Federal (Military) Government. As shown in the table below, the progressive centralisation of wealth involved a decline of the proportion of the derivation from 50% to 3% and an increase to the current 13%.

### Table 1

**Distribution of Oil Revenues in Nigeria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Producing State (%)</th>
<th>Federal Government (%)</th>
<th>Distributable Pool (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-1967</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1969</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1971</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1975</td>
<td>45 minus off-shore proceeds</td>
<td>55 plus off-shore proceeds</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1979</td>
<td>20 minus off-shore proceeds</td>
<td>80 plus off-shore proceeds</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1992</td>
<td>1 and half</td>
<td>98 and half</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1999</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from Sagay, I. E., (2001)*
In the context of strong ethnic and regional animosities, the centralisation of national wealth and its distribution unsurprisingly became one of the most important sources of tension and conflict. Couched in terms of demand for fiscal federalism, the struggle for a fairer and more equitable distribution of revenue from mineral resources, particularly petroleum oil, has remained an enduring legacy of militarism. The demand for local control of oil resources has been forceful from the start of military rule as demonstrated by the Isaac Boro-led rebellion of February 1966 against the Federal Government. In this rebellion Boro’s Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) mounted a violent demand for local control of resources and a separate existence as an independent Niger Delta Republic in the Ijaw-speaking areas of Nigeria. The NDVS thus became the first militia to question the structure and practice of Nigeria’s federalism.

Yet the attempted rebellion was launched two months into the beginning of military rule and suggests that Isaac Boro and his communities were acting against what was perceived as external exploitation of their locally based resources through the instrument of central military control, especially at a time that oil was beginning to gain ascendancy in national wealth. The militarisation of politics therefore created immediate and well-placed fears in the operation of the federal principle. These fears were later confirmed by the monopolisation of land and oil resources from 1969 by the militarised Federal Government at the centre. In addition, the government at the centre was seen as being controlled by the north, and this strengthened suspicions that fiscal centralism was a tool for exploitation of oil revenues and relative deprivations by the north. Although successive military governments brutally suppressed these agitations the grievances have escalated over the decades, including the Ogoni uprising of the
early and mid-1990s, and the demand for genuine fiscal federalism has assumed more violent expressions since the end of military rule.

While Nigeria's federalism was intended to foster national cohesion in a pluralist society, its perversion through military centralisation defeated that goal and embodied one of the most serious though suppressed grievances during the military era, namely the National Question. Concerned with how to structure the Nigerian federation in order to accommodate the interests of and guarantee access to power and equitable distribution of resources among ethnic groups, the national question has generated strident calls from various parts of the Nigerian society since 1992 for a Sovereign National Conference to fashion out a fundamental restructuring of the state. The distortion of the federal structure of the state through military centralism represented one of the most crucial conditions under which militarisation and social conflict were mutually reinforced. The next section examines the specific processes by which the political process was militarised and how those processes relate to the conditions that supported the emergence of militarism in the civil society.

The Militarisation of State and Politics

Militarisation of the state began with the coup of 1966 and involved the imposition of military control over the political, economic and social aspects of Nigeria. However in this study this form of militarisation is considered as essentially political with social implications and is assessed in two major dimensions. The first is the extent to which the structures of political power and governance were controlled by armed and security
forces, and the second is the extent to which the civilian society had been penetrated by armed and security forces to maintain social control since 1966.

Throughout the period of military rule the process of governance, development and implementation of state policy, including security policy, was taken over by the military hierarchy. In order to maintain effective social control the state relied heavily on brutal and paramilitary policing. From 1966, a Supreme Military Council (SMC), under the leadership of the military Head of State, was established as the highest decision making organ of the state. All democratic structures were dismantled, including the Parliament and the Constitution. While the Constitution was replaced by decrees and edicts, the core democratic processes of elections and public debate were also outlawed. This arrangement was mirrored in the regions where Military Administrators oversaw the implementation of the SMC's decision.

This involvement in and penetration of governance is a crucial indicator of the militarisation of politics as it replaced governance by popular consent with governance by coercion to back up decrees. Furthermore it commenced a process that excluded the majority of the population from the decision making process, which generated its own social contradictions. Genuine agitations for re-democratisation combined with the ethnic and regional understandings or interpretations of successive coups became a source of tension and threat to the stability of incumbent military regimes.

The suspension of democratic structures and processes foreclosed dialogue and political bargaining among the diverse groups within the country in two major areas. They
prevented frank democratic debate over the resolution of existing tensions and over the control and use of resources and political power. This control was sustained with the threat of decisive military response to any form of challenge. The necessary enforcement of such threats to maintain militarised order fostered a tradition of state violence with military regimes, which became a most critical source of insecurity. However, the incidence of such tensions has increased since the end of military rule, as the new democratic atmosphere has permitted their expression through violent conflict.

The Policymaking Environment under Military Rule

Military rule itself represents the militarisation of the state and politics as it involves the direct control of all the structures of governance and management of the political process by the military. The control of policymaking and implementation by the military hierarchy through the SMC, later renamed the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), was the highest expression of militarisation. In addition to the proscription of the institutions of democracy, the constitutional judiciary was undermined and court decisions were frequently flouted by subsequent military regimes. The real institutions of the judiciary were not the courts but special military tribunals set up all over the country since the Special Military Tribunal Decree of 1976. These tribunals, backed by decrees, dealt not only with alleged offences within the military but also civil and criminal cases involving civilians, and so the legal and judicial systems were extensively militarised.

Apart from governance, the military also complicated and as well became entangled in the pressures of social conflict embedded in the state. As showed earlier in this chapter,
the first military coup heightened inter-ethnic suspicion which generated the counter-
coup and the subsequent Biafra War. Furthermore the military advantage of the north
meant that successive military rulers emerged from the region and this continued to fuel
grievances in other regions over perceptions of political exclusion and domination by
the north. As rightly observed, under those political conditions, conflict pressures
continued to build up and escalated through the decades.\textsuperscript{239} The restriction of the
democratic space through military rule reinforced existing inter-group tensions and the
incidence of identity-based communal violence increased with the era of military
rule.\textsuperscript{240} The exacerbation of previous communal conflicts and the rise of numerous new
ones throughout the duration of military rule indicate the mutually reinforcing
interaction of the militarisation of politics and public insecurity in the country.

By the time the counter-coup of July 1966 took place, it became obvious that the
politics of social division plaguing the nation had infected the military. The organised
massacre of Igbo settlers in the north and Igbo officers before and during that coup by
federal troops have been discussed earlier. Yet, apart from the partisanship that
developed rapidly, competition over personal interests among officers became a source
of the chain of coups led by northern officers against northern officers. Thus violence
became the only means for changing government as long as the military remained in
power.
The Militarisation of Law and Order

Day-to-day law and order was equally militarised. Admittedly the police in Nigeria had been militarised since colonial period. Under colonial rule, they were raised as military units, commanded by army officers, possessed artillery and designed as occupation forces against a restive populace. They were therefore very brutal and exploitative and this continued into the post-colonial period. However, the period of military rule further militarised the police and exacerbated the history of brutality. Protracted military rule relied on joint operation task forces comprising military and police personnel to combat violent crimes. From the late 1980s and through the 1990s, the military governments of the states established anti-crime squads comprising of military and police personnel which were very brutal in dealing with suspected armed robbers. These operations were ostensibly meant to deter and combat violent crimes such as armed robbery through stop-and-search operations as well as rapid response to distress calls from victims of crime, they increasingly became symbols of a militarised polity.

Crime fighting took very violent dimensions, one of which was the frequent gun battles between the joint patrol teams and criminal gangs in the streets and on the highways. Gun battles associated with serious casualties, including death, on both sides became a common experience of ordinary citizens in the last phase of military rule. With long experience of such vicious joint operations, the normal civilian police itself became increasingly militaristic and acquired the character of a cruel and imperious force. An enduring consequence of this is the eventual adoption of military and paramilitary methods in law and order policing, which in itself was an indication of the militarisation of politics.
Yet militarisation of law and order eroded the efficiency of the police in crime control. Joint operations with the military were in themselves a manifestation of institutional neglect suffered by the police at the hand of successive military regimes. Saddled with lack of resources and protracted embargos on recruitment, the police displayed increasing brutality but lacked the capacity to control crime on their own. In many cases, the police were out-gunned by armed robbers who wield far more sophisticated weapons. Thus the militarisation of law and order concealed a condition of inefficiency in the police to discharge their constitutional role of providing public security and order beneath the veneer of increasing brutality.

The Militarisation of Civil Society

In various parts of the country, the contradictions of protracted military rule generated increased social tensions. From the late 1980s, these tensions were manifest in increasing political demands from the civil society and escalation of violent conflicts and were threatening authoritarian social control. The need to maintain militarised social control against these threats informed a gradual militarisation of the civilian society.

Societal Restiveness and Militarisation

Resource control has since been a central issue in violent community agitation. This is particularly so in the Niger Delta which is home to the vast reserves of petroleum. Since the NDVS rebellion of 1966, agitation for greater local ownership and control of
oil resources in the Niger Delta became a perennial threat to the authority of military control. This pressure took on an increasing militant form, as military repression became more totalitarian, with communities becoming part of a total mobilisation for violent resistance against central exploitation of local resources. Although the NDVS rebellion was crushed immediately, a number of popular movements have emerged in the Niger Delta since the dawn of the 1990s, including the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), and the Ijaw National Congress (INC). In the case of MOSOP the pressure was much popular and well organised, leading to the successful eviction of Shell from Ogoniland in 1993, through peaceful resistance. The gradual expression of violence by these movements during the climax of military repression in the 1990s only goes to reveal the process of reproduction of violence in a civil society that was being militarised through military occupation and violent repression.

The demands for resource control by the Ogonis were frustrated by brutal state repression that involved the deployment of military troops in the Niger Delta on a permanent basis. Heavy military occupation of Ogoniland from 1992 by the Babangida regime led to a chain of violent tensions, which culminated in the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other leaders of MOSOP by the regime of General Sani Abacha in 1995. This was followed in 1998 by the military invasion of Kaiama, an Ijaw community in the Niger Delta, where youth civic organisations under the umbrella of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) had mounted concerted demands for resource control through the famous 'Kaiama Declaration'. The militarisation of the Niger Delta was also taking place at a time that the state was battling with the crisis of legitimacy, following the infamous annulment of the June 12 general elections 1993.
Nearly all the critical sectors of society had been mobilised for civil disobedience to protest the annulment by mid-1994. The banks, the universities, the political class, petroleum workers, trade unions and civil society groups all joined in the resistance to reverse the cancellation, mainly in the southwest. State response of rising popular pressures for democratisation and political liberalisation became ferocious with the national political crisis following the annulment of election results. State security agencies became more confrontational in dealing with this political pressure, while prominent political figures were assassination by the regime’s death squad known as the Strike Force. Military force was also applied to prevent political gatherings and paramilitary forces deployed to universities to crush restive student unionism, which had become an integral part of the struggle. Moreover, military personnel were deployed to man essential services that were being sabotaged by uncompromising industrial actions. Increasingly, from the mid-1990s, the militarisation of the civil society had escalated from the initial occupation of communities to near total control of civil affairs, especially in the cities.

The Militarisation of Social Conflict

In response to the growing occurrence of communal conflict, Nigeria’s military regimes relied on violent internal security operations and enforcement of order by the military in the affected communities. In the context of ineffective law and order policing, and the absence of democratic structures for conflict transformation or resolution, elements of the armed forces were constantly deployed to forcefully quell communal violence.
However, in many cases of such internal operations, the military maintained a protracted presence in the communities and committed brutal violations against the population. 253

While this strategy involved reactionary containment of the expression of violence in communities, it did not address the underlying causes and motivation of conflict. The implication has been that protagonists in these conflicts were forced to live under conditions of militarised or armed peace, in which the structural grievances remained and constantly found violent expression whenever military suppression was relaxed. 254 In a few cases where the state had interest, special military-styled tribunals were set up to try perpetrators in communal conflicts. However the trials themselves were held in secret and in dubious circumstances. 255 This made the verdict always controversial and fuelled tension in the communities, rather than seeking to comprehensively resolve them. The nature of these tribunals reflected the military justice system, which tried failed coup plotters, and reflected a further militarisation of civilian communities.

From the foregoing, it is not surprising that by the time military rule ended in 1999 the militarisation of the Nigerian state and its politics had produced a legacy of state violence and endemic violence in the wider society. In addition to the brutality of security forces, the post-military legacies of societal militarism were essentially the restiveness in civil society over structural grievances and the intensification of communal violence. The transition to democracy in May 1999 provided the momentum and political space for the newly elected government to reverse these legacies of
militarism and to demilitarise the state and society as a guarantee for a more secure and safe political order.

**Democratic Transition and Civil Militarism**

Political liberalisation commenced in mid-1998, following the sudden death of the Head of State, General Sani Abacha, and precipitating a sudden and brief process of transition to multi-party democracy in May 1999. As discussed earlier, the militarisation of the political and societal spaces unleashed state violence and pervasive fear that became the main sources of insecurity throughout the period of military rule. The provision of adequate public security therefore required a political climate that allowed for the conscious transformation of the state from being the source of violence to the protector of the citizenry from violence.

The principle of popular participation inherent in democratic governance, at least in theory, meant that the process of the transition itself would feature intense pressure from the political and civil societies to reform the state and deal with the legacies of militarism. This is important because the end-state of a safe and secure post-authoritarian social order depended critically on the degree to which the transition process addressed the major issues of violence and insecurity. This section examines the actual process of the post-Abacha transition and the extent to which it addressed the legacies of militarism in the polity. It is important to examine the impact of the transition on the legacies of authoritarian rule in order to understand the tentative
implications of the latter for the rise of civil militarism and the associated problems of public insecurity after the inauguration of democracy in 1999.

The Transition Process and the Legacies of Militarism

At time that the transition to democracy began in 1998, militarisation had left a legacy of violence in both the state and society. State security forces had become extremely brutal in their operations in relation to civilians and were deployed permanently in parts of the country where resistance to state authority was manifest, particularly the Niger Delta. This included the armed forces, intelligence forces such as the State Security Service (SSS), and the police. In the wider society, communal conflicts had escalated in frequency and spread, with ethnic, religious and resource dimensions. In addition, growing resistance to state authority had created an atmosphere of community mobilisation and radical protests, particularly in the Niger Delta and the Lagos area. In the former, the annulment of the 1993 elections was seen as an act of injustice against the Yoruba, and the struggle to reverse that annulment was slowly escalating from protest to violent uprising. In the latter, the execution of the leaders of MOSOP by the state in 1995 radicalised youth militancy in the resolve to break state control of oil resources of the Niger Delta by the junta. Although growing violence in the society did not produce standing militias before 1998, many communities in different parts of the country had been mobilised for violence expression of perceived grievances.

The transfer of power from the military to elected civilians on 29 May 1999 only marked the beginning and not the culmination of democratic transition in Nigeria. This
is so for some important reasons. One of these is the sudden way in which military rule ended. Until this time the military regime of the late General Abacha had succeeded in foreclosing genuine transition to multi-party majority rule. Although the presidential election of 12 June 1993 was unilaterally cancelled by the military government, it was allegedly won by the late Moshood Abiola, who was from the Yoruba ethnic group in the southwest. A significant political implication of that election therefore was the perceived shift of power from the north to the south.

Given this background, June 12 was seen as the first attempt to shift political power and the control of the centre from the north to the south since 1960. Although General Obasanjo from the same southwest had ruled the country between 1976 and 1979, he became the head of state because he was the second-in-command in the military government of General Mohammed who was killed in a failed coup. Obasanjo therefore stepped in to complete the transition programmes of his late master, and so the administration was not seen as his. The cancellation of results of the general elections of 1993 by General Babangida, a man of northern origin, was therefore easily seen in the south as yet another act of aborting the political aspiration of the southwest. Seen as a continuation of the politics of exclusion, the cancellation further reinforced existing ethnic and regional tensions embedded in the federal structure of the state.

The sudden death of General Abacha in June 1998 forced a hasty transition programme, which lacked thoroughness and broad inclusiveness. To start with, this event allowed the emergence of a pro-democracy military leadership represented by the new Head of
Accordingly, the transition was driven largely by the military high command, which loathed the 'misadventure' of the military into politics and suddenly wanted to rediscover the military's constitutional role under democracy. The overriding goal of the transition between 1998 and 1999 therefore was not to address the fundamental dysfunctions of the state, but rather to end the history of military politics. This meant that the structural issues of alienation, deprivation and domination, which underlie the history of violence and militarism in the national society, as well as the issues of violence and insecurity, were never addressed during the transition period.

Admittedly, the national political mood following the death of General Abacha and the liberalisation of the political space by General Abubakar centred on the need to redress the injustice inherent in the cancellation of June 12. Since the winner of that election, Abiola, had died in detention in July 1998, the only way to appease the southwest was to allow for the first post-military presidency to emerge from zone. Yet, although this helped to diffuse the mounting tensions at the time, it only proffered solution to an instance of and not to the fundamental structure of the contradictions in the society. Nor did the 1998-1999 transition seek to address the perceived or real problems of economic deprivation and exploitation. Put succinctly, the transition did not attempt in any way to deal with the distortions in the structure and practice of federalism, which had remained the most fundamental crisis of the Nigerian state. On the contrary the transition passed on this fundamental structural crisis to the democratic dispensation. This meant that militant communities involved in agitation against the state were not demobilised, nor were the incentives for such demobilisation created.
Furthermore, the transition was guided and managed almost entirely by the military government with minimal or no participation from the political and civil society. A key indicator of the lack of popular participation is the current 1999 Constitution, which was drafted and approved by the outgoing military government. On 11 November 1998, the Justice Niki Tobi led Constitutional Debate Co-ordinating Committee (CDCC) was set up by the General Abdulrasheed government to propose a constitution for the incoming civilian administration. Made up of 25 members, the CDCC was ordered to submit its report to the Head of State by 31 December 1998. Within this period of six weeks the Committee, rather than open a national broad-based debate, did some minor adjustments to the 1979 Constitution, which was then submitted as its report. The lack of popular participation excluded the possibility of a frank and comprehensive national debate over the structural causes of political crisis from the transition process. Consequently the vexed structural issues of ethnicity, resource control and the structure of the federal system, which were at the roots of crisis and violence, were clearly avoided in the course of the transition and were left to fester in the post-military era.

The sudden and hasty nature of the transition and the fact that it was dominated by the military also excluded the question of direct state violence. No doubt, the military government released virtually all political detainees and prisoners in an attempt to improve human rights. However, there were no policy changes or institutional rearrangements to deal with the militarisation of social control, nor were there any political debate on the issues. Over all, the thinking of the outgoing military government seemed to be to 'disengage' from politics as quick as possible and so to
leave all the problems of the country for the in-coming civilian administration to deal with. Key issues of police brutality, internal deployment of the military and the institutional capacity for public security did not feature either in policy pronouncements or public debates throughout the period of the transition from military rule in 1998/1999.

The implication of all these was that the legacies of militarism were not dealt with by the transition, nor were there any attempts to do so. The result has been the continuation and escalation of ethnic and regional conflict over the control and distribution of economic resources and political power since the end of military rule. The escalation of these crises since 1999 has created the context in which the democratic climate has also coincided with the new phenomenon of civil militarism, in which (un)civil militias have emerged as dominant security actors in the country’s historical conflicts. The failure of the transition process to address the problems of militarism created a gap in the quest for a secure democratic order, and the new government sought to fill this gap through strategies of demilitarisation. The next section examines the strategies of demilitarisation adopted by the new democratic government after 1999. It assesses the approach used by the post-military state in addressing the legacies of militarism inherited from the history of military authoritarianism.
Demilitarising the State and Politics

The approach to demilitarisation adopted by the Obasanjo government from 1999 has been that of coup prevention, and hence has focused essentially on the armed forces and how to secure their loyalty and commitment to civilian rule. This is expectedly so because of the history of rampant military coups since 1966, as well as the political influence of the military hierarchy and their entrenched economic interests. The process of reversing the militarisation of the state and the political process is examined here in terms of changes in government policy statements, new institutional design, and the actual practice of the civilian government. What is measured here is the extent of reduction in the role of armed and security forces in the control of governance structures and processes, and in the maintenance of social control.

Control of Defence and Security

The inauguration of the elected government in May 1999 was the critical first step to demilitarising the domestic politics of Nigeria, apart from constitutional provisions. In the 1999 constitution attempt is made to foreclose the incident of military coup. Section 1 (2) prohibits the seizure and control of the state by unconstitutional means, thus providing the legal safeguards against direct military rule and a fundamental basis for demilitarisation. The constitution also provides for executive control and Parliamentary oversight of defence and security forces and policy, including a clear definition of roles for the security sector. However, the new civilian government was aware of the need to move further with steps to neutralise the political power and influence of the military, owing to the antecedents of the latter’s political adventures which always violated the constitution.
A very important policy decision of the Obasanjo government on assumption of office in 1999 was to announce a compulsory retirement of all military officers who had held political appointments during the military era.\textsuperscript{267} This was part of a broad programme of military reform articulated by the president in a speech given in July 1999 at the graduation of the Course Seven students of the National War College, Abuja.\textsuperscript{268} Other important elements of the envisaged programme included retraining of members of the armed forces on civil supremacy over military power. Interviews with informed observers and military officers in Nigeria reveal that this strategy was informed by the necessity to prevent the possible occurrence of coups.\textsuperscript{269} This appears to be a strong position of the Presidency as a similar statement was issued by the Vice President in September of the same year, in which the proposal to subordinate the military to civil authority featured prominently.\textsuperscript{270} With the end of military rule some of these officers had returned to regular service to work together with their less privileged counterparts who had not enjoyed the same privilege of influence and wealth in the era of military rule.

With regards to social control and law and order, the civilian government took steps to reduce military penetration of civil society and state violence. The government ceased using lethal force to suppress non-violent political activities. Furthermore, military personnel detached to the paramilitary anti-crime units were returned to their barracks in 1999, and this lessened the presence of military forces in society.\textsuperscript{271} In response to communal violence, government decided to allow the police to deal with civil
disturbances in the first instance, sending in military reinforcements only when the police were unable to restore order.

**Assessment of the Demilitarisation Strategies**

A marked outcome of this strategy has been the complete physical disengagement of active military officers from direct governance. In terms of policymaking, including that of the security sector, the direct role of the military and security forces has completely been removed with the democratic transition. Of crucial importance, the Federal Executive Council (FEC), which is the highest state policymaking body, is made up of an elected President, the Vice President (who is jointly elected with the president) and ministers who are appointed by the president. This is a departure from the military order where all the members of the Ruling Council were senior officers of the armed and security forces. Furthermore, a civilian has been the Minister of Defence since 1999, and this is the same with the police where a civilian minister is in charge of Police Affairs. The operational headquarters of defence and police are directly accountable to these ministers, respectively.

The democratic government has taken many practical steps to effect civil control of the armed and security forces in line with its policy articulations. The retirement of political military officers announced by the government was implemented with immediate effect. To this effect, over one hundred senior officers, including generals, were retired by the President a few weeks after assuming power. In a further effort to assert civil authority and control over the armed forces, the Chief of Army Staff and the two other service chiefs (Navy and Air Force) were retired and immediately replaced in
May 2001 over policy disagreement with the President. The Chief of Army Staff, General Victor Malu, particularly led the opposition of the service chiefs to government’s decision to bring in the US Military Professionals Resources Incorporated (MPRI) to handle the restructuring of defence in a way that was deficient in legitimacy. The government has also instituted a series of military training, and seminars aimed at political education, particularly inculcating the doctrine of civil supremacy over military power. These programmes have been held for selected middle-level officers, with the hope that what is learned would be passed on to other officers and men.

However, in spite of these changes in institutional arrangements and policy orientation, the demilitarisation of the political process in practice has been half-hearted, narrow and shallow. In the first place, the democratic transition itself was initiated by the military as discussed earlier. The military hierarchy allowed the political transition in 1999 because it needed a democratic environment for the military to rediscover itself after decades of political misadventure, which eroded professionalism. Because of this narrow objective, the framework and momentum for demilitarisation set by the military was limited. In addition the current constitution was drafted by the out-going military government and lacked broad-based consultation and public debate. Rather, the constitution reflects a civil-military bargain in which the military secured the space for its continued political relevance in the new democratic order. The constitution is ambiguous on the exercise of parliamentary oversight of the security sector, especially in the areas of budgets and maintenance of law and order.
Apart from this deficient legal foundation, the demilitarisation strategies of the new civilian administration lacked legitimacy and popular support. Lacking in consultation and input from the public and security institutions, the strategies lacked the legitimacy to sustain the limited momentum created. This has led to the observation that what has been achieved is 'presidential control' of the armed forces, rather than civil control. The controversy and resentment generated by the intervention of the MPRI within the defence headquarters itself, and the civil-military tension that resulted from this are indicators of the narrow legitimacy base of the strategies.

Executive control of armed and security forces is still tenuous. Informed observers have pointed out that the military has stayed out of power in self-restraint and not as a result of any deliberate reform being undertaken by the civilian government. With low morale, evident in a surge in voluntary retirement; a lack of conviction about civil supremacy among the lower ranks; and an army that was still restive in late 2004, evident in the rumours of coup, the military has hardly been brought under effective and secure civil control.

The influence of the military constituency in the security policy making process is still high; the penetration of society through internal security operations has remained; and the military tendency towards unilateralism and non-consultation has attended government's decisions in relation to defence and security matters since the transition in 1999. The fact that the President is a retired army general who had ruled the country as military Head of State in the past has cast much doubt on the extent to which the policy
process has been demilitarised. Together with the appointment of retired senior military officers into key positions of oversight, this has underlined the endurance of the military approach to the policy process in the security sector. Until 2003, the Ministers of Defence and Police Affairs were retired army officers, General Danjuma and General Jemibewon. To date the Chief Security Adviser to the president is also a retired general, while a retired colonel heads the State Security Service. Policy making in the security sector has therefore largely remained exclusive to this group of retired military officers, reminiscent of the era of military rule. This has led some to observe that the President operates the military style of leadership in governance.  

Critical actors, which have continued to be excluded in the demilitarisation strategies, are the parliament and civil society groups. For instance, the deployment of troops for law and order maintenance has never been referred to the parliament for debate, approval and regulation. The parliamentary institutions and mechanisms of oversight of defence and security have been inactive since 1999. The relevant standing committees in the parliament have never debated on any related issue and have never scrutinised budget implementation in the sector. The only parliamentary discussions on security issues occur when ministers defend budget proposal for appropriation. The lack of transparency in defence budgets also contributes to the weakness of parliamentary oversight. For instance, while the parliament continues to pass the defence appropriation bill, in reality the actual money released to defence headquarters after the yearly appropriation act is overhead budget. The money for capital projects is never released from the executive to the headquarters, and the parliament has never questioned this trend.
Current internal security operations by the military reinforce the limitation of the depth of the demilitarisation strategies. The penetration of society by military and paramilitary forces, and their use of violence against citizens have persisted through 1999. Acting under instructions of the President, military troops massacred hundreds of unarmed civilians in Odi in 1999 and Zaki-Biam in 2001. In spite of the widespread condemnation of these acts, the military has enjoyed impunity and none of its personnel has been brought to justice. This trend suggests that political control has not translated into demilitarisation of politics. It shows rather that either control is being used by the democratic state in an undemocratic way; or that civil control may only have been achieved at the strategic and operational level, but not yet at the tactical level of day-to-day relations between security personnel and civilian members of society; or the combination of both. The US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, in its Country Report on Human Rights in Nigeria for the year 2000, argued that armed and security forces continued to commit extra-judicial killings and used excessive force to quell civil unrest and ethnic violence throughout 1999, although they did so less frequently than under previous military governments. The frequency has however increased since 1999 and law and order maintenance had become a source of citizens’ insecurity in itself.

Between 1999 and the present, military forces have been deployed for numerous internal security operations in many locations of conflict. By 2001, army troops were already maintaining order in Kaduna, Benue, Taraba, Bauchi, Plateau, Kano and Nassarawa States. The costs of these operations have been very high in terms of the security of citizens. Between then and now, troops have invaded and levelled many
communities across the country. The most publicised among these raids include the November 1999 levelling of Odi community in Bayelsa State by the army, resulting in the killing of several hundreds of people; the invasion in October 2001 of Zaki Biam in Benue State, which destroyed much of the town and killed about 200 civilians; the raiding in February 2005 of the town of Odioma in Brass Local Council of Bayelsa State by soldiers. Fifteen civilians were killed in this operation and many houses were burned. All these operations were authorised by the democratic state and portrayed a scenario of warfare between the state and the society, in which the military has continued to play a dominant role.

A much more serious case of militarisation of social conflict is the case of the Niger Delta. In response to growing violent agitation for resource control and communal conflict in the region the government commenced a military operation code-named "Operation Restore Hope," a joint task force consisting of approximately five thousand army, navy, air force, and mobile police personnel under the command of an Army General. The task force has remained in the region to date and has been accused of employing lethal force in the communities. In all of these violations no soldier has been held accountable by the state. This, combined with the above facts, shows that the political process, particularly the maintenance of law and order, remains militarised regardless of the transition to democracy.

Some have even argued that the militarisation of law and order has become more intense than in the era of military rule. A senior military intelligence officer pointed out that there have been more military deployments to quell civil disturbance and to
maintain law and order since 1999 to present date than there were under military rule.²⁸⁹
The power of the military to take autonomous political decisions or to challenge civil
authority may have been curtailed, coups may have been prevented, and the government
may possess political control of the security sector, but the military has continued to
maintain an enduring presence in civil society.

The enduring militarisation of law and order is also manifest in policing in the
democratic dispensation. Decades of joint operations by police and military personnel
have transformed the character of policing to paramilitary operations, which remained
the practice to date. The Nigeria Police Force has not been reformed from paramilitary
organisation into a modern civilian police governed by the rule of law. Policing is still
governed by the colonial Police Act of 1943, which assigns military functions to the
force.²⁹⁰ Until January 2005 the government maintained a national anti-crime taskforce
known as 'Operation Fire-for-Fire', which was responsible for numerous human rights
abuses in previous years. It involved the use of high firepower in crime prevention and
combating. On December 28 2004, the then Inspector-General of Police, Tafa Balogun,
announced that the police killed 1,694 "suspected armed robbers" during the year. The
police also announced in 2002 that they killed more than 1,200 criminals in the year,
while about 41 civilians were killed accidentally in the crossfire between police and
criminals.²⁹¹ Apart from anti-crime operations, other victims of police brutality include
protesters, detainees and convicted prisoners.²⁹² Even with the end of 'Operation Fire-
for-Fire' police brutality has persisted and this is acknowledged by the police
themselves.²⁹³ Paramilitary policing, as it is practiced, reveals a tremendous weakness
in the democratic control of the security forces and thus constitutes derogation from the strategy of demilitarising the political process.

Furthermore, intelligence forces were completely left out of the demilitarisation process. In spite of the central role of intelligence personnel in the history of coup-making and state violence, the sector has been left intact and the tradition of secrecy of the military era still shrouds their operations. Particularly, the structures of the two most notorious services, the State Security Service (SSS) and the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), have not undergone any known changes. All attempts to obtain information on the intelligence services in the process of research were unsuccessful, and this itself reflected the continued lack of openness on intelligence matters.

Militarism has therefore remained an important feature of the political process in Nigeria, despite the strategies of demilitarisation that have been implemented since the transition to democracy in 1999. Yet it is not only in the realm of the state that militarism is manifest in contemporary Nigeria. The wider society has also become increasingly militaristic, particularly since the end of military rule. Although conflict has been occurring in different parts of the country before and after independence, informal armed groups and security forces that are structured and autonomous of state control began to emerge within the last few years of military rule. This period has seen the emergence of violent vigilante groups, ethnic, religious, and party militias, all of which threaten the sovereign authority of the state and human security, as well as constitute parallel security forces outside state control. The most prominent ones, which are also the most violent, include the O'odua People's Congress (OPC), the
Bakassi Boys, the Egbesu Boys of Africa, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta.\textsuperscript{296} As discussed in Chapter 2, these groups are referred to in this study as civil militias for the purpose of analysis, even though they differ in some respects.

Furthermore, it is this pervasiveness of these non-state unregulated security formations in the society that is referred to as civil militarism in this throughout this study, and this has already been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. This study is concerned with the emergence of civil militarism at the time that the realm of the state is being demilitarised, and thus seeks to understand the association between the two. Due to the multiplicity of civil militias groups, only the OPC was chosen for the study. Although the militias in the Niger Delta have been the most dangerous groups, given their current campaign of kidnapping, hostage-taking and bold confrontations with government troops, it was both difficult and unsafe to hold discussions with them in the course of fieldwork. Other groups such as the Bakassi Boys had crumbled in terms of their structure. Only the OPC had visible standing structures that were willing to grant interviews openly and under safe circumstances.

Post-Military Civil Militarism

Although communal conflict has been endemic in Nigeria since independence, such conflicts were not characterised by militia organisations. The emergence and endurance of militias embedded in society became a feature of the post-authoritarian era. The most visible and durable of these militias were the OPC, Movement for the
Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Bakassi Boys, the Niger Delta Peoples’ Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and a host of other less known militant groups in the Niger Delta. These groups are distinct from other actors in communal violence in Nigeria in two important respects. One, they are organised into structured standing forces and are mobilised on a near permanent basis. The second factor is that these groups use violence for different purposes and appear as parallel security structures, adapting their functions to various security challenges as they emerge.

It is difficult to make clear-cut distinctions between the various militia groups in Nigeria, and attempts to do so have created more difficulties in the conceptual understanding of the phenomenon. Most keen observers have regarded them as *ethnic* militias, and this is understandable because many of the militias operate within ethnic boundaries and their membership is virtually ethnically homogeneous. Yet of these observers, some have attempted to distinguish the so-called *ethnic* militias from violent vigilantes, while others have lumped violent vigilantes and militias together under the name of *ethnic* militias. The problem of these conceptual ambiguities has mainly stemmed from the combined use of the terms *ethnic* and *militia*. Although, ethnicity represents a most readily available instrument for social mobilisation in Nigeria, the relationship between ethnicity and militias in Nigeria is not straightforward just as the distinction between militias and violent vigilantes is artificial.

There are indeed few *ethnic militias* in post-transition Nigeria and the only clearly visible of them is the MASSOB. Formed on 13 September 1999, MASSOB articulates
a plan to establish a separate state for the Igbo-speaking people of present Nigeria and has mounted series of violent operations in the pursuit of this goal. Although there are other socio-cultural groups such as the OPC, the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the Igbo People's Congress (IPC) and the Arewa People's Congress (APC), those that are violent did not articulate ethnic and militia agendas simultaneously. For example at the time that OPC was formed as an ethnic umbrella for Yoruba interests, it functioned only as a pressure group and had not become a militia organisation. The INC, IPC and the APC are pressure groups clearly mobilised to advance ethnic interests, but do not operate as militias.

The only ethnic group that eventually became a militia is the OPC and its militarisation involved a process that should be understood in detail. This is because at the time that the OPC became a militia, it lost its popular legitimacy among the Yoruba and therefore ceased to be an ethnic organisation, in the sense of representing the ideals of progress for the Yoruba. Furthermore, not all acts of OPC violence have been ethnically motivated. Many of the conflicts involving the OPC have been among the Yoruba and victims of its violence have included Yoruba. The other well-known militia groups such as the MEND, NDPVF and the Bakassi Boys, though mobilised along ethnic lines, do not articulate ethnic objectives and cannot be said to be ethnic militias. On the contrary, they canvass for the economic interests of the Niger Delta region, even though some of their activities relate to criminality in the process. Most importantly, the Niger Delta is not culturally homogeneous but is composed of vastly diverse ethnic identities, which have fought one another in protracted conflicts.
In the case of violent vigilantes, the distinction is equally not straightforward. Non-violent vigilantes, which carry out anti-crime activities in collaboration with the state police, have been a historical feature of policing in Nigeria. However, the anti-crime groups that emerged after the transition in 1999 differ markedly from the normal (traditional) vigilantes. The post-1999 anti-crime groups are highly structured, well armed and operate as parallel security forces. The most known violent anti-crime organisations are the Bakassi Boys and the OPC, and these groups have been engaged in many violent confrontations with the police. Apart from the police, they have also been involved in violence with other social groups, resulting in many instances of extreme violence and killing. Thus, the post-1999 violent anti-crime forces cannot be categorised as vigilantes. Rather, their structure and activities mark them out clearly as militias, even if crime control was an essential factor in their emergence.

The post-1999 militias therefore started as different forms of pressure groups driven by the structural crisis of the Nigerian state. The main indicators of state crisis, which provided the focal point for the mobilisation of these groups, have been the inability or the failure of the state to address the legacies of exclusion and exploitation that underlie the history of conflict, and the failure of the state to supply adequate public security from violent crime. Yet, even this distinction is sometimes artificial. As the pressure groups developed into militias, both the crime control motive and the political economic motive appeared to be present simultaneously. Again, the OPC is the most obvious example of a cultural pressure group, which later added anti-crime operations as a cardinal objective. Furthermore, all the militias, whether they emerged as anti-crime groups or socio-cultural groups, became political in nature and operated as instruments
of violence used by political elites in such a way that undermines the role of ethnicity and social alienation. They became involved in civil disputes and were used to settling scores among politicians of the same ethnic and regional origins.\textsuperscript{305} A more comprehensive factor is the crisis of state weakness, which became more obvious and generated more societal pressures on the state after the transition to democracy. This informs the use of civil militia as a more appropriate category, which accommodates the various shades of parallel security forces emanating from the civilian society with various motives.

In order to understand the process by which what began as social movements developed into civil militias in the context of post-authoritarian transition and demilitarisation, a detailed examination of particular cases of militia organisations is required. The OPC is selected for this purpose and the next section of this chapter deals with the militarisation of the organisation after the end of military rule 1999.

**The Case of the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC)**

The use of military force against society by previous military regimes did succeed in imposing social control on a restive population in the short term. However, that model of social control depended on the immediate fear it imposed on the population without resolving the structural causes of restiveness in society. The result has been the persistence of structural social contradictions, which found several opportunities for violent expressions. The most devastating of such violent expression in Nigeria so far was the three-year Biafra War. Notwithstanding the many violent expressions of social
conflicts and democratic pressures, such violence did not produce civil militias throughout the period of military dictatorship. Civil militias as political actors began to emerge with the weakening of military dictatorship, and began to increase in number and intensity with the advent of democracy. This trend represents a paradox whereby the demilitarisation of the state appears to open spaces for militarisation by civil actors.

OPC was founded in August 1994 as a pressure group to advance the interests of the Yoruba ethnic group through non-violent means. Central to this agenda is the objective of defending the Yoruba ethnic group from what was felt as injustice and marginalisation within the federation. This position was also corroborated by the local leadership of the organisation in Lagos, which declared the objective of the organisation as defending the socio-cultural heritage of Yoruba. Set in the background of the wider national political context of mutual ethnic mistrust, and the immediate cancellation of the results of presidential elections of the previous year, complaints of injustice and marginalisation were bound to evoke passionate sentiments in the southwest. The presumed winner of the elections of 1993 was the late Chief Abiola (a Yoruba person), and the struggle for the re-validation of that electoral mandate provided the impetus for addressing this felt injustice.

It has been noted elsewhere that the democratic struggle to realise the electoral mandate of June 12 was the clear-cut aim of the organisation at formation. However elements of OPC leadership have revealed that a crime-free society is part of the cultural heritage of the Yoruba, which the organisation seeks to defend. Although it was prominent in the pro-democracy protests and public demonstrations in the southwest that attended the
controversial cancellation of the election, OPC did not transform into a militia until after the death of General Abacha (which ended the most brutal era of military rule) and installation of the democratic government in 1999.\textsuperscript{310} It began to operate as a vigilante organisation committed to fighting crime in the context of a weak criminal justice system that had long failed to deal with the crime problem in the country, particularly armed robbery.

In the pursuit of this objective, OPC meted out extremely violent methods of justice to alleged criminals, including raiding, shooting, beheading, mutilation, crucifixion and burning of properties of armed robbery suspects, starting from 1999.\textsuperscript{311} At this stage, the organisation began to shift focus from its original agenda of defending the alleged Yoruba interests as well as fighting the alleged marginalisation of the group. It was increasingly assuming security functions in a way that did not compliment public policing but sought to replace it.

OPC leaders justified this new security role with the argument that the state's criminal justice system had failed to prevent armed robbery and that they were filling the security vacuum thus created.\textsuperscript{312} However, this rational became tenuous as OPC moved on beyond crime-fighting and began to assume the form of an army involved in violent operations against members of other ethnic nationalities living in Lagos and in the southwest, particularly members of Hausa and Ijaw ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{313} OPC has denied being an ethic militia, and argued that clashes with other ethnic communities in Lagos were triggered when such communities rose to the defence of their members who were arrested by OPC as crime suspects.\textsuperscript{314} Yet such violent conflicts between OPC and
other ethnic communities had increased in number and spread beyond the city of Lagos to other locations in South-western Nigeria. While the entire Yoruba people did not endorse OPC as an ethnic army to engage other ethnic nationalities in violent conflict, this trend equally defies the explanation given by OPC leaders.

Soon the state also became one of the targets of OPC violence. The expanding security and military remit of OPC brought it into confrontation with the police and the courts. Although police repression against OPC’s pro-democracy activities had been mounted since 1996 when its president was arrested and detained, violent reprisals against the police began in 1999 just before the inauguration of the civilian government. These operations included attacks on law courts, police stations, vehicles and personnel. In such operations, police personnel were killed, abducted, maimed, and bathed with acid. They also seized large amounts of arms and ammunition from the police and indiscriminately released many detainees from police cells, including OPC members and armed robbery suspects. The war against the state, the seizure of weapons and release of detained criminals appeared more like urban terrorism than anti-crime vigilantism that the OPC claimed. Although the organisation still enjoyed sympathy from segments of the Yoruba group, its urban terror tactics was already causing fear and insecurity within Lagos city and its environs and revealed its transformation into a militia.

The combination of violent vigilantism, ethnic violence and urban terror tactics of OPC undermined its initial moral authority to defend the interests of the Yoruba ethnic group and as a democratic pressure group. By the middle of 1999 it was abundantly clear that
OPC had become a noble idea that had gone out of control, and that needed to be tamed. A study of the trajectory of OPC’s development is important for understanding the factors for its loss of initial focus and metamorphosis into a civil militia.

Two years after formation, OPC was embroiled in a bitter leadership struggle within its own ranks. Led initially by a medical professional and a moderate, Dr Fredrick Fasheun, OPC began to witness the infiltration of more radical and militant but hardly educated elements between 1996 and 1998. The arrest and detention of its president within that period by the Abacha government created the opportunity for this infiltration. By the time the president was released after the death of General Abacha in 1998, the militant elements had hijacked OPC leadership and steered it in the direction of violent confrontation. The new leader, Ganiyu Adams, a carpenter and commercial motorcyclist, with the support of prominent Yoruba leaders managed to supplant Fasheun.\textsuperscript{316} It is at this stage that OPC became militant and began to shift focus from its original noble ideal of democratic struggle to defend Yoruba interests. However Fasheun promptly denounced this violent posture as ‘hooliganism’ and rejected the new leadership after his release.\textsuperscript{317} From 1999 onwards this ideological difference between the two rival leaders and their respective followers had split OPC into two factions, resulting in the breakdown of command and control as well as accountability of members’ activities. The transformation of OPC into a militia therefore did not occur in a vacuum. Rather it occurred in the context of this internal leadership crisis and the consequent emergence and prominence of the more radical elements within the organisation.
While the failure of the criminal justice system to deal with violent crime added a significant dimension to OPC violence, it certainly does not explain the transformation of the organisation into a militia. OPC had existed with a different agenda before it went into crime fighting and violence. Admittedly, the crime rate was high in Nigeria at the time that OPC vigilantism and other similar organisations emerged. The crime rate had started to increase since the early 1980s as a result of urbanisation and declining socio-economic fortunes of the population and the state criminal justice system had been too weak to deal with this challenge. Yet, this did not result in the emergence of militias or violent anti-crime organisations. There were, of course, traditional vigilantes and neighbourhood watches that operated since colonial times, particularly in rural Nigeria, as community anti-crime initiatives. However these initiatives served their communities in collaboration with the police, and did not engage in the kind of extreme violence associated with the OPC and similar militias. Third, the fact that its founding national leader denounced violent methods indicates that security functions were not part of its original mandate.

In addition, OPC operatives were also involved in acts of criminality themselves, and lack the moral authority to fight crime. Furthermore it is difficult to see any evidence to suggest reduction in the level of violent crime as a result of OPC crime-fighting activities. OPC claimed that it has seriously reduced the violent crime rate in its areas of operation. However informed observers have maintained that violent crime has been on the rise, particularly in the Lagos area. Finally, OPC did not have to become militant and adopt terror tactic to fight crime. Rather its military operations, methods and tactics defy the principles of crime fighting.
The understanding of OPC's militancy lies in the process of its development from formation to the present. It had a noble objective at the time it was formed — defending the Yoruba against marginalisation within the federation. However between 1996 and 1998 the organisation was hijacked by some political elites, who restructured and transformed it for purposes other than the original interests of the entire Yoruba people. This is a position strongly held in the national headquarters of the Nigeria Police. Political opportunism has also become a trend in the emergence of civil militias in the country. In a comparative study of other civil militia groups, including the NDPVF, the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and the Bakassi Boys, this trend was identified as prominent.

Leaders of the NDPVF revealed that they had existed as part of community youth structures of popular pressure for resource control, which political elites began to exploit for their narrow interests as the country moved from military to democratic rule. They held that national political elites from their constituencies hijacked these structures during elections and used them to secure electoral victory through violence and intimidation of the opposition and voters. The politicians would arm them with deadly weapons and promise to reward them with jobs, houses, cars, and other material rewards after elections. These politicians not only always failed to keep their promises, but also failed to disarm the youth after the elections. A consequence of this is the loss of control of armed groups and the gradual transformation of a youth structure for collective action into a violent militia. In the Niger Delta, the Rivers State Governor has been linked to the instigation of the series of violent conflict between the NDPVF
and the NDV since 2003. Similarly, the Governors of Anambra and Imo States took over control of the Bakassi Boys and employed them as their private armies against political opponents. Incidentally such militias become a readily available instrument for use to a variety of interests.

The fact that at the time that OPC leadership was taken over by the radical faction, the central grievance of injustice and marginalisation was being addressed meant that the new OPC leadership had an ulterior agenda. The most crucial indicator of marginalisation cited by the OPC leaders when it was formed was that the Yoruba was perpetually being denied the political leadership of the country since independence. The only Yoruba person who had led the country by this time was General Olusegun Obasanjo who ruled as a military head of state between 1976 and 1979. However he only ruled for three years and it was rather fortuitous that as second-in-command he had to step into the office of the Head of State, who was assassinated in the abortive coup of February 1976. The facts that General Obasanjo stepped in only to complete the democratisation programme of his late master, and that the period of his tenure was relatively very short, were sufficient reasons to feel a sense of political marginalisation in a multi-ethnic state.

The 1993 presidential election, which was presumably won by Chief Moshood Abiola, would have installed the first Yoruba president with executive powers and would have served to redress this felt marginalisation. However, the cancellation of the results of that election by the military government truncated that opportunity and heightened the feeling of injustice. Yet at the time OPC started its militant campaigns, the national
political mood was already sympathetic to the Yoruba cause. The marginalisation was being redressed and the OPC would have become less combative and reciprocated the national political rapprochement if it was not representing another agenda. After all the era of the worst military dictatorship had just ended with the death of the Head of State, General Abacha in 1998; the more benign interim military government of General Abdulsalami had committed itself to democratic transition to be completed in less than a year, and had released most political detainees (including Yoruba politicians); and all the political parties had agreed to allow only Yoruba candidates to contest the presidential election.

OPC violence even intensified after the inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo, a man of Yoruba ethnic origin, in May 1999 and has persisted to date. This persistence after seven years of uninterrupted Yoruba presidency shows that OPC became a militia organisation when political opportunists and conflict entrepreneurs hijacked its structures and reoriented its mission to achieve some personal, rather than community or Yoruba ethnic agenda. This opportunistic takeover was achieved through the propping up of radical youths who lacked the professional and moral authority to provide leadership for the Yoruba people. By training and profession, the militants who usurped the leadership of OPC were unskilled labourers. They therefore could never have qualified as leaders of the highly educated Yoruba people, but rather represented street boys who were willing and capable of doing the dubious bidding of political opportunists.
Conclusions

State Weakness, Demilitarisation, Opportunism and Civil Militarism

Political opportunism and the militarisation of OPC did not occur in a political vacuum. Political opportunism may have occurred in different forms under different political conditions, but did not necessarily generate structured and organised civil militias in Nigeria until after the end of military rule. The emergence and proliferation of civil militias, including OPC and the many others, began to occur at a time when the political process was being democratised and demilitarised. What then is the connection between the democratic transition, demilitarisation of politics and the emergence of civil militarism?

It has been shown earlier that the process of democratic transition itself marked the first step in the process of reversing the militarisation of the state and the political process. It has also been demonstrated that militarisation and the logic of violence by which decades of military rule survived had created much structural contradictions in the Nigerian state, including the centralisation of power and resources. Given the history of deep divisions among the various social groups in the country, these contradictions had aggravated the social tensions and grievances within the society and between the state and the society. However, these grievances were violently suppressed through authoritarian social control measures, although the grievances remained unresolved and found expression through a number of violent conflicts. The liberalisation of the political system in 1998 and the transition to electoral democracy in 1999 therefore created a new political climate, which allowed for free expression of these grievances in various parts of the country.
The transition had required political liberalisation and guarantees of people's fundamental freedoms. The last military government therefore repealed the most repressive decrees, which impinged on human rights on the eve of transfer of power to the new civilian government, as well as released all political prisoners and detainees. In furtherance of this liberalisation, the demilitarisation strategy of the new civilian administration, which reduced the employment of military force in the civil society, helped to relax the existing repressive social control. However the relaxation of social control exposed the suppressed structural contradictions in society and emboldened a flurry of intense political pressures on the democratic state to address such contradictions. Examples of such pressures include the explosion of communal conflicts and the widespread call for sovereign national conference to renegotiate the terms of the Nigerian federal system, for decentralisation of policing and for local control of natural resources since the end of military rule.

The new political pressures themselves generated a situation of serious political complexity, which the state proved too weak to grapple with. The sheer number of these demands was an important indicator of this complexity. During the sittings of the Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission (also known as the Oputa Panel) set up by the new government in 1999 to investigate human rights abuses of the past, many of the petitions submitted came from various ethnic groups, which complained of various injustices that needed to be redressed comprehensively. Most of the memoranda received by the panel from ethnic nationalities centred on the national question and the future of Nigeria's federalism. The gravity of such demands was
also a source of this complexity. Many of the demands threatened the very existence of the state, and would require a very skilful political management. For instance the demands to allow all the ethnic and religious groups to renegotiate the basis and terms of coexistence as a single Nigerian state and to allow decentralised policing could go badly for a country that was deeply divided if granted, unless such demands were well managed with extreme political skill.

Worse still, the new democratic state lacked the capacity to respond appropriately to these demands. Its democratic experience to handle complex political emergencies was poor. Its first democratic experience was between 1960 and 1966. The next time it made attempt at democratic governance was between 1979 and that was terminated in 1983 by military intervention, which lasted until 1999. The president himself did not have a very rich democratic credential. As a retired general, he had served as a military head of state and had been more used to military solutions to social problems.333 This is demonstrated in the failure of the government to create the conditions for broad-based national debate on these sensitive political issues since the end of military rule.334 This complexity did not help in building the necessary confidence in a political system where mutual mistrust had been endemic. Rather the depletion of such confidence provided various opportunities to various political actors.

The relaxation of social control in 1999 has also been accompanied by escalation in the rate of violent crime, particularly armed robbery in the major cities and on highways. Statistics on crime rates are difficult to obtain, as they are almost non-existent. Yet
there is widespread perception that armed robbery is increasing frequency. Official crime statistics remain highly inaccurate due to inadequate crime reporting, lack of proper recording even where crime is reported and official manipulation of records to satisfy political and institutional interests. However, a criminal victimisation survey conducted in Lagos in 2005 revealed that robbery is perceived as one of the most prevalent crimes. Most of the keen observers interviewed in the course of research indicated that the rate of armed robbery has been increasing before and after the democratic transition. The escalation of the crime, most importantly in terms of its perception, also helped to intensify the pressure from the society on the state to deliver more effective security, and thus exacerbated the complexity with which the new democracy was confronted.

Demilitarisation not only permitted the expression of accumulated social pressures on the state, but also exposed the weakness of the state in a very significant way. As the pressures for greater security and state restructuring intensified, it became obvious that the state lacked the capacity to exert an acceptable level of social control that was required to maintain order in a democracy. It became obvious that without the use of military force, the institutions of the criminal justice system, particularly the police, could not control social pressures such as mass actions, demonstrations and violent crimes. Due to the cumulative neglect of the police, associated with the militarisation of law and order, the demilitarisation of policing in 1999 revealed the weakness and inadequacy of the police in coping with its statutory responsibilities of maintaining law and order. The cumulative neglect of this vital security organ had eroded every aspect of the force, including their physical condition, morale, knowledge, and
materials. The judiciary did not fare better, as years of neglect and intimidation by military regimes had compromised the judicial process through corruption and led to the a situation where the courts themselves subverted and slowed down the course of criminal justice. The new democratic space required the courts and the police to respond efficiently and adequately to the demands of social disorder in 1999, but the demilitarisation strategy exposed the lack of capacity in these institutions to meet those expectations. In a way, this failure helped not only to radicalise the frustration in society, but also created opportunities for elites to pursue agendas that impact on the state of public safety and security.

The reduction in the penetration of society by military forces and the failure to quickly replace it with sustainable social control measures exacerbated the complexity of societal pressures and security challenges faced by the state from 1999. Although the police have continued to rely on paramilitary tactics in law enforcement, the use of the military in direct policing through joint task forces with the police was drastically reduced in 1999. While the soaring crime rate and the inability of the police to deal with it has forced the return of joint military operations, the suspension in 1999 of the ubiquitous military patrol teams, roadblocks, and the fear they created in society helped to relax social control. The, the infiltration, hijacking and politicisation of community-based mass movements and pressure groups occurred from the time when military social controls were relaxed. It was from this point that the pressure groups gradually transformed into militias, or began to operate as militia organisations. This political opportunism was employed in the hijacking of OPC structures and it radicalisation from a pressure group into a civil militia as an organised and structured force in 1999.
Map of South Africa
Map of South Africa Black Homelands under Apartheid
Chapter 5

Civil Militarism and Demilitarisation of Politics in South Africa

Introduction

The transition from apartheid rule to multi-party democracy in South Africa by the end of April 1994 has probably been the most significant political event in Africa in recent history. This is because the historic elections and the ascendancy of the African National Congress (ANC) under President Mandela not only ended decades of authoritarianism and political violence in the South Africa. Most importantly, these events aborted the spectre of war in the country as well as accounted mostly for the decline of conflict, militarism and political instability in Southern Africa. All of these issues were of major concern to the United Nations and the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU), particularly given the fact that decades of violence, militarism and instability had become a formidable obstacle in the quest for human development and security in the region.

Particularly for South Africa, the end of apartheid marked the end of history in a highly militarised political system and created the enabling environment for peace building and development. Through the militarisation of politics, apartheid rule had created the conditions of public insecurity for the vast majority of the population through the brutal use of the armed and security apparatuses of the state against the anti-apartheid pressure. Like the case of Nigeria examined in Chapter 4, this militarisation was
characterised by political repression and state violence, which generated its own violence in the wider society. Thus the end of apartheid and the transition to multiparty democracy was accompanied by a deliberate reversal of the militarisation of politics by state elites. Yet the demilitarisation of the political process did not reduce the condition of insecurity in the wider society. Rather the period of the demilitarisation process witnessed the emergence of a number of non-state security forces, which posed considerable human security predicaments for the new democracy.

The militarisation of the political process was itself intimately associated with the contradictions of the ideology of apartheid, which, as a state policy, began to take its roots from 1948. The roots of these contradictions lie in the history of political and social exclusion of the black majority of the population by the white minority since the formation of South Africa in 1910. The crisis of identity resulting from this exclusion therefore became a defining feature of politics in the new state right from the start. Although the security forces had always been an exclusive political asset of the white minority, it was not until 1948 when racial exclusion was institutionalised through the policy of apartheid that the militarisation of South Africa became a clear state objective. From this point on the military was constantly deployed jointly with the police in internal security operations mainly to impose the apartheid order in the face of growing resistance.

However, the 30 years between 1948 and 1978 can be seen as the first phase of militarisation, characterised by ad-hoc use of state violence to put down the black struggle against apartheid. This was mainly because the struggle itself was more or less
non-violent within this period, involving fragmented and episodic protests, rallies, marches, sit-ins and labour strikes. As the struggle shifted from protest to more coordinated and enduring violent resistance, the militarisation of politics was taken into the second phase from 1978 up to the dismantling of apartheid in 1990. This second phase exposed the dominant power and influence of the security establishment in steering the state's policy direction. This period coincided with an intensification of the national political crisis generated by apartheid rule to which the state sought to respond through a comprehensive reform encapsulated in the Total Strategy. As security concerns increasingly became the central issues of national politics, the Botha government relied on Total Strategy to counter what was perceived as an emerging revolution and systematically incorporated the military as the dominant constituency in the policymaking environment. This was achieved through the establishment in 1979 of the National Security Management System (NSMS) initially as the mechanism for management and co-ordination of national security, and later as an instrument solely responsible for implementing the objectives of the counter-revolutionary strategy from the turn of the 1980s. Dominated by the security forces, particularly the military, NSMS became the ultimate symbol of the militarisation of the apartheid state.

Through the instrument of the NSMS, troops from the armed forces and police were deployed to black townships and maintained bases there as occupation forces. In many cases the menacing presence and activities of the security forces during this occupation of the civil space provoked the mobilisation of communities for collective opposition to the state, and this increasingly assumed a violent nature as the military siege on society continued. It therefore became obvious from the mid-1980s that the violent penetration
and occupation of society by military had reproduced violence and militarised the civil space, as the armed resistance from the oppressed communities became more structured and insecurity became widespread.

Consequently, the political liberalisation opened up by the new government of de Klerk in 1990 necessitated the reversal of the involvement of the security forces in the political process as an essential condition. Thus the demilitarisation of the political space was one of the high points in the political negotiations between 1990 and 1994, when the first multi-party elections were held, and became a central concern for the new democratic government of Nelson Mandela. The dark history of the military establishment during the decades of authoritarian rule generated the need for the transformation of the defence sector and a series of other measures aimed at demilitarising the political process as an integral part of the post-apartheid democratic transition.

The demilitarisation strategy started with a swift termination of the direct involvement of the military in policymaking and proceeded with gradual reduction of internal security operations by the military and paramilitary forces, as well as the democratisation of governance of the security sector through and beyond the transition period. The process of demilitarisation has thus produced the establishment of relatively strong democratic control over the security forces and their operations in relation to the society. However, while the strategy has helped in controlling state violence, the militarisation of the civil society continued into the democratic dispensation and became a dominant threat to public security in the new democracy.
Non-state armed and security forces in the form of party militias and extremely violent vigilante groups emerged in the immediate post-transition years as indicators of increasing civil militarism. Examples of these groups are party-affiliated self-defence units (SDUs) and self-protection units (SPUs), extreme right-wing groups and vigilantes such as the People Against Drugs and Gangsterism (PAGAD) and Mapogo a Mathamaga, each of which became a source of terror to citizens in the communities where they operated.

Although South Africa has managed to bring these forces under relative control years after the transition, the paradoxical occurrence of demilitarisation and civil militarism makes the country a very important case for this study. This chapter is the report of the case study of South Africa. It examines the context of the case, the militarisation of the political process, the demilitarisation of politics as well as the metamorphosis of civil militias.

**Historical and Contextual Background**

The most striking feature, and thus the defining element, of South Africa’s violent political history has been the crisis of identity and the intense competition generated among social groups in a multi-racial society. This conflict had already emerged before the state attained independence from British colonialism, and was not immediately resolved by state elites. Rather this crisis was later to determine the violent nature of politics in South Africa and the pre-eminent position of the military in the conflict.
British colonial rule was finally established after many wars with the Boers (Dutch settlers) and with the indigenous African populations, who also fought many ferocious wars against Boer domination. The victory of the British in the last war of 1899-1902 witnessed the commencement of full colonial rule, though not without continuous violent resistance. The post-colonial state that came into being in 1910 was a compromise solution to this crisis as political power was shared between the Boers and the English settlers. Yet this compromise produced its crisis as the black (African) majority population was excluded and the independence constitution kept all political powers in the hands of the whites. A most crucial element of this exclusion was the disenfranchisement of the black population. Moreover, the white population was not monolithic as the Boers (also known as Afrikaners) saw the compromise as a threat to the Afrikaner culture and political identity.\textsuperscript{342} Thus the prerequisite national socio-political cohesion that makes stable and well-governed states was already lacking at the formation of the South African state, laying the basis for the history of social conflict and the militarisation of the political space.

Apart from political violence, the contradictions of apartheid politics also developed a complex relationship with criminal violence, which is relevant to the understanding of civil militias in post-apartheid South Africa. The complex relationship between politics and crime in South Africa were located in the politicisation of crime and the criminalisation of politics. During the conflict, the state employed violent gangs against anti-apartheid groups in the townships. Conversely, the anti-apartheid movement saw the apartheid system as crime, and treated acts of collaboration with the state as such. In addition, crime began to grow rapidly in the early 1980s and peaked during the years
of the transition to democracy. It is instructive that this period coincides with the most violent period phase of the political conflict over apartheid rule. The ways in which criminal violence interacts with the militarisation, the process of demilitarisation and the emergence of militia and violence are important for this study and are examined in a separate sub-section below.

The State and the Politics of Exclusion

Although the exclusion of Africans from the political process had commenced with colonial rule and had progressed through the decades since independence, racial exclusion became an official state policy from 1948 when the National Party (NP) came to power. Formed to advance the political interests of the minority Boer population, NP began to pursue the Afrikaner nationalism as soon as it took over power through a series of laws and policies aimed at excluding blacks socially and politically.

The state policy of racial exclusion, or apartheid, commenced with a systematic legal segregation of the races within the country. Through the Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act of 1949 and the Immorality Act of 1950, sex relations between whites and blacks were outlawed. In 1950, the Government enacted the Population Registration Act, which helped institutionalise racial separation by entrenching the categorisation of the national population in accordance with criteria established by the Government. Following this racial categorisation, the Government enacted the Group Areas Act in 1950, which permitted the establishment and enforcement of separate residential areas for the different racial categories. Within two years of assuming state power, the NP
completed the legal framework for the social and spatial segregation of the national population, as a prelude to the full implementation of apartheid rule.

The next stage in the imposition of apartheid rule involved the translation of the legal segregation into unequal access to state facilities and services among the racial categories through another set of legal frameworks. The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act was enacted in 1953 to establish the legal foundation for the maintenance and promotion of a range of segregated and unequal state facilities. In addition, the Bantu Education Act was enacted in the same year to allow the Government to promote what has been qualified as ‘inferior training among Africans’, in line with what the government perceived to be the future occupational status of the blacks. Thus the necessary legal basis for unequal access to basic public facilities and services were consciously established and institutionalised through legislation within the first five years of the Nationalist government.

With racial segregation and inequality secured, the implementation of the apartheid policy progressed to the stage of separate or parallel development, starting from 1958 when Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd assumed office. This stage involved the development of separate political institutions in separate territories ostensibly to ‘cater for the political aspirations of the excluded black Africans or Bantus’. By 1959, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act was passed to safeguard the evolution of separate development. Through this policy Africans were to find political expression and rights of citizenship within these geopolitical entities designated as their native homelands, with each homeland representing each of the ‘nations’ into which the
African population had been categorised. The policy embodied considerable structural distortion of the society, as it was a unilateral decision of the government and a derogation from the political and economic aspirations of blacks to participate as equal citizens in a unitary South African state. As a critical instrument for stemming the tide of African migration into the cities to take advantage of economic opportunities, the homeland system weakened the economic base of the black population in order to bolster the tenuous social control by the minority Government.

This structural distortion became more obvious in the implementation of separate development from the early 1960s. Starting from 1963, ten homelands were created and granted some degree of internal self-government, with a view to gradually nurture them towards final independence. However, the homelands created were predominantly rural and consisted of less than 13% of the total area of the national territory, despite the fact that blacks constituted 70% of the national population. Furthermore, the implementation of this policy led to the infamous forced removals of Africans from the urban areas to segregated black townships and the homelands. The implication of all the above was a dire condition of poverty, overcrowding and general lack of resources in the homelands. With a form of internal self-government, the homelands were essentially no more than dumping grounds of a disempowered African population to emasculate black political aspiration and to strengthen the dominance and control of the white minorities.

Separate development was monitored through a system of 'influx control'. This system involved the application of restrictions and pass regulations, which were enforced by the
security forces. Passes were issued to establish criteria for employment and housing in the cities with the goal of removing majority of blacks who could not meet the criteria to the homelands and to reverse black urbanisation. The legal framework of separate development was completed with the passing of the Black Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970. This law forcibly made blacks citizens of the homelands and cancelled their South African citizenship. Consequently the forced removal of Africans from white South Africa, which began since the early 1960s, intensified through the 1970s and proceeded into the early 1980s. The denial of citizenship to blacks, combined with the overcrowding in the townships and the condition of poverty there, in juxtaposition with the concentration of wealth in white South Africa, exposed the extent of the contradiction in the structure of the state and the precariousness of its foundations.

Separate development embodied the necessary conditions for the intended final stage of apartheid rule, which was the establishment of a pure white South African state where blacks would be foreigners. This policy objective was clearly articulated in a speech addressed to Parliament by the Minister of Plural Relations and Development, Connie Mulder, on 7 February 1978:

*If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as the black people are concerned, there will be not one black man with South African citizenship.... Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state in this honourable way and there will no longer be an obligation on this Parliament to accommodate these people politically.*

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The homelands were designed to develop into independent states apart from the white South Africa for Africans to exercise their citizenship and realise their political aspirations. The goal of apartheid therefore was to resolve the historical crisis of cultural and political identity, which the Afrikaner people had faced since settling in southern Africa in the mid-seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{353} As a minority race in an alien environment of predominantly black native population, the Afrikaner people had always struggled to retain this identity. This struggle found historical expression through the many wars with the traditional African political institutions and with the British colonial authority, the formation of the two Afrikaner republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, and the creation of the exclusive Afrikaner National Party after independence to capture political power.

The state that came into being in 1910 therefore embodied unresolved historic structural contradictions in the form of identity crisis among racial groups as the actors. Apartheid rule helped to formalise and institutionalise these contradictions by generating a security dilemma where the security of Afrikaner identity threatened the very existence and identity of the African population. The political aspiration of Africans to majority rule within a single republic also threatened the ideology of Afrikaner supremacy. The violent struggles resulting from this dilemma produced a low-intensity conflict and created the conditions for the militarisation of the internal political process of South Africa. This conflict featured a central role by the military and produced a pattern of civil-military relations in which the military and security establishments remained dominant factors in politics until the end of apartheid.
Security Forces in Historical Social Conflict

It has been pointed out that in every struggle between white dominance and black resistance, the security establishment was a constant decisive factor. The precarious position of the minority government in the balance of power among social and political forces necessitated a constant fusion of military, intelligence and police forces on one hand and political authority on the other as guarantee for the survival of minority rule. Thus the militarisation of politics in South Africa, short of direct military rule, involved a fusion of the military and political elites and a strong influence of the military on the policymaking process to respond more coercively to the growing black resistance against apartheid.

The implementation of apartheid from the late 1940s generated immediate resistance from the African population, as it formalised the history of deprivation and structural violence they have since suffered. Although African resistance to official discrimination and exclusion had been mounting since the beginning of post-colonial white minority rule, this resistance became more intensive and organised from the 1950s as the implementation of official apartheid took its toll on the black population. The first of such coordinated resistance was the Defiance Campaign of 1952-1953 in which non-violent protests, burning of passes, boycotts and civil disobedience were the main tactics. Organised by the African National Congress (ANC), this campaign involved a nationwide mobilisation aimed at defying the new apartheid laws. By 1958, a broad coalition of anti-apartheid democratic movements called the Congress Movement successfully organised a general strike to protest parliamentary elections, which excluded blacks. By the end of the decade, black resistance had mobilised
enough moral force to threaten the stability of the apartheid state, and necessitated the use of state violence to impose social control.

However as the resistance hardened the state began to rely on the use of armed and security forces for internal law and order functions and suppression. The 1960 bold protest against the most hated Pass Laws in Sharpville, during which the police massacred 69 blacks and the consequent mass demonstrations that spread throughout the country, immediately signalled the inadequacy of the police alone. Starting with the banning of black political organisations such as the ANC and the Pan-African Congress (PAC), and the arrest of their leaders after the Sharpville massacre, the state began to impose emergency regulations and increasing deployment of the South African Defence Force (SADF) troops in the cities and the homelands. From 1960, SADF began to embark on joint internal security operations with the South African Police (SAP). However throughout much of the 1960s, suppression of black resistance was handled mainly by the SAP's Security Branch, with limited involvement of military intelligence, particularly the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI).

The combination of sustained black resistance with a constellation of other factors in the wider Southern Africa region at the turn of the 1970s heightened the threat to the survival of Afrikaner supremacy. The military, being the last bastion of defence, became an integral part of the next level of state response to this threat. The second stage of militarisation began in the late 1970s, by which time SADF had transformed into an active participant in policymaking in wider security matters. By the mid-1980s the militarisation of politics reached its climax through not just the control of
security policy by SADF, but also its complete penetration and occupation of the wider society. This penetration in turn militarised the wider South African society as black resistance escalated from non-violent political pressures to violent sabotaging of the authority of the state. Large segments of the African society were therefore militarised as daily confrontation with heavily armed SADF troops and militarised police units intensified.

With increasing number of youths joining the ANC’s underground military wing, the militarisation of the wider society further manifested in the use of state-sponsored black vigilantes. These establishment vigilante forces unleashed brutal violence on anti-apartheid forces and became a major source of fear and insecurity until the end of the decade when the political liberalisation started by de Klerk in 1989 brought about a gradual dismantling of the state violence. The de-linking of the security establishment from vigilante militias became necessary as it had become a core issue in the conflict and in the negotiations, which paved the way for the transition to democracy.

The Crisis of Criminality

Apart from state and state-sponsored violence, crime has been a critical source of insecurity in South Africa. The coexistence of criminal violence with the history of political violence and its endurance to date further illustrate the weakness of the state, mostly highlighted in the period of the transition to democracy and its immediate aftermath. Also the complex interaction between criminal and political violence noted
in earlier sections was an important factor in the context within which demilitarisation and militia violence interact. Criminal violence has always been an endemic part of the history of South Africa, particularly gang related violence. However the development of violent crimes assumed a crisis proportion from the early 1980s when the anti-apartheid struggle escalated into violent uprisings.

Throughout the decades of apartheid rule, the criminal justice system was not efficient in dealing with crime as a public security issue, particularly in black and coloured townships. The overriding dominance of political violence drove a narrow concern of the apartheid police with counter-revolutionary policing and repression. State protection from crime only occurred in white settlements, while crime was left to fester in the vast non-white segments of the population. The narrow concern with political control and the suppression of the anti-apartheid resistance across the country led to the neglect of normal anti-crime policing. The police and the courts were therefore enforcing apartheid laws instead of apprehending, trying and punishing criminals. The result of this was that the criminal justice system was not designed or prepared to respond effectively to crime. The police particularly lacked the necessary training and resources to implement the new (changed) procedures of democratic civilian policing. The operational weakness of the SAP in relation to crime has been captured succinctly as follows:

*Apartheid police were primarily concerned with liquor or pass raids and the suppression of dissident political activity; they were chronically ineffective in controlling everyday crime*.
The problems of operational incompetence and lack of capacity in relation to anti-crime policing were also compounded by corruption in the police. In particular the police were known for colluding with known criminals in the townships to perpetrate unlawful killings. By the time the transition had commenced it was obvious that the state, hiding beneath the veneer of a tough and restrictive entity, was too weak to provide the basic conditions of public security for all of its citizens.

In addition, the institutions of the apartheid criminal justice system were physically distant from black communities, in terms of crime control. Thus beneath the more visible atmosphere of politics, crime had always been a source of insecurity to the majority of South Africans during apartheid and an outcome of the politics of exclusion. Furthermore, the failure of the criminal justice system to deal with this insecurity again illustrates the structural weakness of the state, which became more manifest in the transition period.

The exacerbation of criminal violence from the early 1980s exposed this linkage to politics. As the challenge to apartheid rule became more violent at this time, political offences were classified as crime. Also from this time, as the struggle intensified, both the state and the opposition employed and armed known criminal gangs against each other. The political direction of the formal criminal justice system and the neglect of conventional crime policing was another indicator of this linkage. The criminalisation of the political struggle and the political instrumentalisation of crime therefore were two ways in which crime and conflict were linked in the politics of apartheid rule, and these linkages provide useful insights into the militarisation of
politics and the emergence of civil militarism. The next section explores the key dimensions, which characterise the militarisation of South Africa’s politics from the early 1980s to the end of apartheid.

The Militarisation of State and Politics

As stated the background section, the military and security forces had always been involved in the politics of apartheid and the struggle against it. They had always been an instrument employed by apartheid elites for suppression and a source of fear in non-white South Africa. However, the systematic militarisation of the state became obvious from the late 1970s, with the formal dominance of the security establishment in both the formulation and implementation of national policy.

Although SADF and domestic politics had been intertwined since 1910, the systematic and total penetration of state and politics by the security and military establishments commenced from the mid-1970s. Until this time, the armed and security forces had always existed as instruments of white rule. As observed by Grundy, these forces had tended to be identified closely with the policies of the dominant wing of the ruling party. As political forces they were redesigned to provide the critical coercion needed to secure the unpopular dominance of Afrikaner political identity. This design was achieved gradually from 1948 when the predominant English-speaking officer corps of the armed forces was systematically replaced with Afrikaner officers in preparation for a more proactive political role. However, until the dawn of the 1970s such political interventions were infrequent and ad-hoc.
The combination of growing international isolation and the abrupt collapse of sympathetic white minority rule in the immediate Southern Africa sub-region coincided with escalating domestic resistance to apartheid policies in the early 1970s. The combinations of these developments threatened to undermine the authority of the state and brought its survival to a crisis point. With apartheid social control increasingly waning into the middle of that decade, the state became desperate and elevated the security establishment, dominated by the military, into positions of developing and coordinating state policy. The imposition of coercive forces onto the political space in preference to political dialogue as a means of maintaining effective social control further signalled the growing weakness of the state. Two key dimensions of militarisation embodied in this political ascendancy of the military and security forces were the control state policymaking, and the militarisation of law and order functions.

Political Ascendancy of the Security Forces

The new role for the military in policymaking is better understood in the context of the erosion of apartheid social control. The massacres, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and imprisonments of black activists, as well as numerous discriminatory state social and economic policies, had increasingly brought the era of black protest campaigns to its climax in the early 1970s. In 1973, the first major black labour strikes for more than a decade broke out in protest of the general dehumanising conditions under which black workers were forced to work. This was followed in 1976 when a wave of student and worker demonstrations was triggered by the infamous massacre of students in the Soweto township of Johannesburg. By the end of that decade, ANC had renewed its
campaign of guerrilla insurgency against the state. As the state failed to resolve the escalating crisis through dialogue and became more repressive, the anti-apartheid pressure became more national in spread, more enduring and more organised towards the end of the decade and into the early 1980s, overwhelming the capacity of the police for social control.

Overall, the victory of the Soviet-backed insurgency campaigns of the liberation movements in the Southern Africa, the international isolation of apartheid, and the escalating domestic crisis of apartheid social control not only heightened the real threat to Afrikaner supremacy, but was also perceived by the state as the beginning of communist Total Onslaught by the Soviet Union. The violent reaction of the state to these threats provided the political space for the ascendancy of the military establishment in the policy process. The development of the concept of Total Onslaught by the SADF and its adoption by the state marked the first major step in prioritising military objectives in national security. Embodied in the 1977 White Paper on Defence, and amplified by the revolutionary changes in the immediate sub-region, Total Onslaught was accepted by the government as the basis for the state's counter-threat strategy. Instructively, the facts that the most critical security threats to the apartheid state were internal and that the state's threat analyses were carried out only by SADF meant that internal security had essentially become a purely defence issue.

Embodied in the same 1977 White Paper on Defence a comprehensive strategic doctrine was developed by SADF to guide the state's response to Total Onslaught. Known as Total National Strategy, this response called for the 'marshalling of all state resources to
combat revolutionary warfare while simultaneously engaging in substantive domestic reforms'. Again the adoption by government of SADF's official doctrine of Total Strategy for counter-insurgency clearly indicated the military's gradual takeover of the state's policy environment.

It is also important to note that the most senior civilian state official advocating the concept of Total Onslaught from the late 1960s to the early 1970s was Pieta Botha who, incidentally, was the Minister of Defence at the time. This suggests that the development of Total Onslaught and the resultant Total Strategy in the 1970s involved a gradual fusion of the military and political elites in response to the deepening crisis of apartheid control. This suggestion is strengthened by the fact that Total Strategy was not implemented until Botha became the Prime Minister in 1978.

As a response to the growing national crisis, Botha undertook a comprehensive national reform strategy, the essential part of which was the establishment of the National Security Management Strategy (NSMS). At the apex of the NSMS was the State Security Council (SSC), which replaced the Cabinet in 1972. Although the SSC had the Prime Minister as its head, it was dominated by senior military experts, particularly from the DMI, and it was the SSC that ran the state from 1978 to the collapse of apartheid in 1990. Through the NSMS, the military had direct control of decision-making down to the local level. At the regional level, the Joint Management Centres (JMCs) of the NSMS which coordinated local COIN strategies was composed nearly completely of SADF officers. The Twelve-Point Programme of the reform announced by Botha in August 1979 clearly indicated the intention to integrate the
armed forces in the process of administration. The eleventh point of that programme called for 'the maintenance of effective decision-making by the state, which rest on a strong defence force and police force to guarantee orderly government....' The NSMS thus became the most important policy instrument for the implementation of Total Strategy and took over the policy formulation and execution as well as centralised decision-making under the military and security establishment. As it later became obvious, the NSMS provided the policy framework for the military penetration of society through internal security operations from the middle of the 1980s.

The Militarisation of Law and Order

The second dimension of the militarisation of politics was the assumption of internal law and order functions. The intensification of state structural and physical violence from the late 1970s and early 1980s forced an immediate shift in the anti-apartheid resistance. The economic deprivation of the majority of black township residents, the escalation of rents and of the costs of services in those areas, the de-legitimisation of the Black Local Authorities, and the continued educational segregation and denationalisation of blacks culminated in the gradual escalation of the protests into violent confrontations in the second half of 1984. This phase of the struggle involved the total mobilisation of entire communities against deepening socio-political marginalisation.

ANC campaigns of sabotage on security, economic and infrastructural targets increased in frequency and sophistication. Local civic associations which first emerged in 1979 in
some black communities to take up issues of a local nature soon spread throughout the townships and became linked up formally in 1983 to provide the initial broad-based coalition for the national resistance. By September 1984, violence finally broke out in the townships and spread throughout the country. Led by the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the National Forum (the new anti-apartheid coalitions), which had strong links with the ANC, the violence became increasingly coordinated and developed into a formidable uprising in the townships between 1984 and 1986. The uprising itself was spontaneous response to rising rents and, subsequently, to the call by ANC to 'render the townships ungovernable' and to set up alternative structures of 'people's power'. The uprisings combined with the intensification of ANC guerrilla insurgency to mount an unprecedented physical challenge to the apartheid state.

With the SAP lacking the capacity to maintain social control in the face of escalating uprising, and the SADF deployed into the townships to help the police, an era of military penetration and occupation of society commenced. The state's counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy placed the SADF and security forces at the centre of managing the conflict. The COIN strategy involved the imposition of states of emergency and emergency laws. As the uprisings broke out, the NSMS was transformed into an instrument of the COIN strategy and given the responsibility for implementing the daily tasks of the emergency laws. As argued somewhere else, the ability of the NSMS to respond to the uprisings enabled its officials and structures to play a pre-eminent role within the state and in the management of conflict at all levels. This pre-eminence provided the policy platform for the penetration and occupation of black townships by military and police troops.
Through Operation Palmiet, launched in October 1984, and the states of emergency of 1985 and 1986-1988, the military troops launched operations to regain control of the townships. The military deployed jointly with the police in heavily armed violent raids, house-to-house searches, and joint-patrols in armoured vehicles. In 1985 alone, SADF had deployed 35,372 soldiers in 96 African townships, while many were conscripts put on standby. Empowered by emergency legislations, many permanent army bases were established near large townships, SADF and SAP troops mounted roadblocks, conducted arbitrary arrests and detentions, shot and abducted activists with impunity, prohibited and dispersed gatherings that were deemed 'unlawful', patrolled and sealed off black urban areas, and maintained a presence in and around black school premises. In schools, students were forced to study with SADF officers sitting in their classrooms and sometimes serving as teachers. A crucial result of this strategy was the politicisation of military and intelligence forces, and consolidation of a culture of violations.

Equally serious was the militarisation of the police. The internal deployment of the SADF on a permanent basis and their joint operations with the police was bound to militarise policing in many ways. An important process worthy of mention was the involvement of the SAP in fighting conventional military warfare. Through its COIN unit, SAP personnel fought along SADF officers in the Angolan Civil War in 1976, among other internal military operations against ANC guerrillas. It was therefore not surprising that the SAP adopted what has been termed as 'fire-force' policing, directed against political opponents of the state. Thus the military penetration of society was
total as armed personnel controlled and regulated nearly every facet of social interaction.

**The Militarisation of Society**

Although the direct occupation and penetration of the society by the armed and security forces resulted in crushing the uprising, the control of the township was not fully regained. Individual activists and organisations within black communities continued to oppose apartheid in addition to continued insurgency mounted by the ANC underground. This informed a shift to new forms of social control involving a two-pronged strategy: the withdrawal of the security forces into the background and sponsoring of black conservative groups in brutal attacks against anti-apartheid activists and organisations in black communities towards the end of the 1980s. This strategy was accompanied by immediate reproduction of violent armed groups in the wider society, and signalled the militarisation of civil society as a function of the militarisation of the state.

**Establishment Vigilantism**

The use of black vigilante groups against the resistance marked the third dimension by which the security forces maintained their dominance of the political space. However, this strategy involved the use of forces within society, and so marked the beginning of militarisation of the civil space. Black vigilantes and black police forces were formed,
trained and armed by the SADF and police to unleash a spate of bloody assaults on structures of township rebellion to regain control of the vast black areas of the republic. The use of establishment vigilantes from late 1985 produced a spiral of what is frequently referred to as black-on-black violence in the township and proved to be a more efficient counter-revolutionary strategy. Enjoying impunity and state support, these armed groups openly carried firearms, perpetrated indiscriminate assaults, searches, abductions, arsons and killings, all directed against UDF and ANC-affiliated youths. The most notorious of these were those affiliated to the Inkatha Movement in Natal, whose vigilante activities precipitated a cycle of violence involving the killing of 528 people in the Pietermaritzburg township of Edendale Valley between September 1987 and March 1988. This figure represented almost two-thirds of unrest-related killings nationwide within the same period. State-sponsored vigilante violence and the counter violence it reproduced represented the most crucial site in the last stage of the militarisation of state and society.

This phase climaxed from 1987 when two newly formed black police forces, the municipal police and the police auxiliaries (known as kits-konstabels) gradually began to absorb the vigilantes. The goal was to complement the recovery of full control of the townships. These forces were more brutal in policing the townships than the security forces and succeeded in creating pervasive fear in the townships through series of criminal activities and violations with impunity. In these conflicts, the indirect role of the military involved the use of the local JMC to guide Inkatha militants and SAP in joining forces to wipe out ANC/UDF supporters in 1988. The political leaning of these conservative black forces was so obvious that they were observed to have less to
do with crime prevention and more with political pacification.\textsuperscript{397} The withdrawal of troops from the townships and their replacement by conservative forces of establishment vigilantes and black auxiliary police formations was, therefore, in line with the increasing militarisation of the society through the infiltration and splitting of the resistance. It is known that Chief Buthelezi, the leader of the Inkatha movement, formed in 1975 as a liberation movement, was initially a member of the ANC Youth League before being made the Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Homeland that was created in 1977.\textsuperscript{398} Yet the same Inkatha was used as a counter-revolutionary force to challenge the activists of ANC/UDF activists in order to break their control on black communities in the late 1980s through extreme violence.\textsuperscript{399} The creation of proxy forces in the communities laid the foundation for the party militias that featured prominently during the difficult years of the transition.

Apart from state-sponsored vigilantes and the black conservative forces there were right-wing white armed groups committed to preserving Afrikaner supremacy. The most prominent of these was the Afrikaner Werstandsbeweging (AWB), which emerged at the time of the collapse of apartheid by the end of the 1980s. Compared to the black conservative forces, the less violent AWB were not involved in serious acts of actual violence, but were more concerned with maintaining their economic interests.\textsuperscript{400} The violence associated with white conservative forces was related to the fear of social exclusion of the white minority by the imminent black majority government in post-apartheid South Africa.

\textbf{Political Violence in the Transition Period}
The most intense manifestation of the militarisation of the wider South African society occurred in the transition period between the end of apartheid in 1990 and the installation of democracy in 1994. Within this period, violence between the ANC and the new Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) erupted and escalated to civil war proportions. As a reaction to the brutal violence of state armed vigilantes, the townships had formed their own militias at the behest of the ANC and the UDF to defend their communities. Known as Self-Defence Units (SDUs), these militias operated as 'organs of people's power' in the townships from late 1984 and targeted the state-sponsored black conservative forces until 1990. However, following ANC suspension of armed struggle in 1990, the SDUs shifted their targets to IFP-controlled armed hostel dwellers that had been receiving training and support from SADF Special Forces and the right-wing AWB since the mid-1980s. IFP-affiliated Self-Protection Units (SPUs) emerged from 1993 as an organised militia in response to the SDU challenge, particularly in the KwaZulu Natal area.

Although both the state and ANC had agreed to end violence, the SDUs and SPUs precipitated such a level of violence from 1990 that marked the transition period out as the most violent of the country's history. Backed by the so-called third force (elements in the security forces which used Inkatha as a counter-revolutionary force against ANC/UDF), SPUs launched a string of violent attacks against ANC and its supporters in the townships. From this point, rivalry between the IFP and ANC supporters assumed the level of civil war in the Natal Midlands.
Political violence and the transition process were therefore intimately related, but in a two-way direction. Most of the violence that occurred during the negotiations period was aimed at shaping the political outcomes of the transition itself rather than aborting it. Yet it was this violence that played a crucial role in fuelling ANC’s persistent demands for government to restrain the security forces, which culminated in the pressure from the ANC and the civil society to demilitarise the political process and rein in the security forces.

A Militant Civil Society

Beyond the immediate conflict, but in relation to it, organised militarism had also been present in the wider civil society before 1990. This was reflected in the militarisation of the informal justice mechanisms and civic structures of people’s power established in black townships during the uprisings of the early and mid-1980s. The police and the entire formal criminal justice system lacked legitimacy and served as tools of repression against political expression. In response, communities developed their own justice structures, including the makgothla (traditional practice of restorative justice), neighbourhood watches, and street committees, culminating in the People’s Courts.

The People’s Courts, which emerged in the mid-1980s, emerged as alternative structures of governance in response to the absence of the formal criminal justice services and the ANC call for ungovernability.

The People’s Courts were essentially new forms of social ordering in black communities, where they served to control ‘normal’ crime and addressed civil
matters. However, from the mid-1980s when the uprisings started, the Courts began to adopt extremely violent and arbitrary methods of justice, particularly against ‘political’ crimes. Blacks suspected of collaboration, informing, sell-out or those who served in local administration as police and councillors were targeted by the Courts. In total, about 900 people were burnt to death between 1985 and 1994 through the popular justice of the People’s Courts. Although the Courts virtually collapsed under state persecution in the late 1980s due to their affiliation with the radical opposition, they re-emerged in 1990 as civic organisations for social ordering in the absence of capable state institutions to provide public safety.

Criminal violence peaked in these critical years of political transition, having started to build up from the mid-1980s when the township uprisings began. Between 1990 and 1994 recorded assault increased by 18%, rape by 42%, robbery by 40%, and burglary by 20%. For the same period, the rate of reported murder was 30 citizens per 100,000 of the population, while the daily number of victims of stabbings, beatings, and shootings was 2,500. Thus, as the thorny political issues associated with the apartheid history were being resolved in the negotiations, crime was increasingly becoming an issue that was to assume a crucial place in the quest for public security under democracy. However the overriding importance of political violence in the negotiations precluded the appreciation of criminal violence as a major security issue, even though the timing of the rise in the level of reported crime underscores the association between crime and politics mentioned earlier.
The deep divisions generated by apartheid and the consequent militarisation of various factions in the last years of the conflict meant that violence became a valuable tool for the various stakeholders in shaping the outcomes of the transition process, especially in the pre-election phase of negotiations. Furthermore, even outside the context of the political conflict, violent vigilante activities undertaken by informal armed and security forces also became a critical feature of the security environment at the climax of political militarisation. Thus at the time of political liberalisation in 1989, the militarisation of politics by the apartheid state had created a highly militarised society. The combination of the penetration and occupation of civil society by security forces, the armed resistance against apartheid, the arming and use of establishment vigilantes and conservative forces had left a mishmash of armed actors with violent dispositions.

Democratic Transition and the Legacies of Militarism

Although the militarisation of politics through apartheid had created conditions of violence and public insecurity decades before the transition, the period between 1990 and 1994, during which the transition took place, has been observed as the most politically violent period of the country’s history. Political violence became not only a driver for the transition, but the main obstacle to the transition as it exacerbated the condition of pervasive insecurity. Violence therefore became a serious concern of the main parties in the transition (the government and the ANC), and the control of such violence became a central issue in the process of the negotiations.
This was the case because while political liberalisation became inevitable by the end of the 1980s, violence became a vital tool for shaping the outcome of the ensuing democratic transition by the various social actors (principally the NP government, ANC and IFP). Conversely, the transition was about the control of violence, both the structural violence of political exclusion and racial inequality, and the direct violence of the state security forces, which underpinned political exclusion.

The exclusion of the majority black population from political participation, with its various socio-economic implications, was at the roots of the social conflict and militarism until the installation of democracy in 1994. This was reflected by the core ANC objective of majority rule within a unitary state right from the start. It was the incompatibility of this aim with that of minority rule that created the crisis in which the use of direct violence became politically expedient. Forced by the crisis and unsustainability of minority rule, the transition was essentially about transforming the state into a multi-racial system that was governed by the majority and that served the entire national population without discrimination. This meant that the issues of violence and public insecurities, which underpinned and were produced by the structure of exclusionary politics, needed to be addressed in the transition process. This section examines the transition process between 1990 and 1994, and the way in which the problems of violence and public insecurity were dealt with.

**State Armed and Security Forces**

The legacy of state security forces and the control of the violence associated with them were given prominent attention in the negotiations. This was driven mainly by the
history of brutal security forces, exacerbated by the complicity of the security forces in the IFP-initiated political violence from 1990.\textsuperscript{414} The concern over state security forces was focused mainly on the SADF, the Homeland armed forces and the SAP, as they constituted the major instruments of state violence. The two main concerns of the major negotiating parties, particularly the ANC, were the integration of the various security forces and their political control. These two challenges were to be addressed by the multi-party Transitional Executive Committee (TEC) that was set up in 1993 to manage the transition in the course of the negotiations.

In relation to the armed forces, the TEC established a Joint Military Coordinating Committee (JMCC), which managed the integration of the various armed forces – the SADF, the liberation forces, and the armies of the homelands – into the new SANDF that emerged on the eve of the elections in 1994.\textsuperscript{415} While integration of forces was being achieved, civil political control of the armed forces remained the most difficult objective, particularly for the ANC (the main negotiating party in the transition).\textsuperscript{416} In pursuit of this the ANC, under the Pretoria Minute signed on 6 August 1990, agreed to promptly suspend all armed actions unilaterally.\textsuperscript{417} ANC had mounted pressure for demilitarisation by calling for a dismantling of the NSMS, strengthening of legislative oversight and civil control of the armed and security forces.\textsuperscript{418} In fact the question of civilian political control of the armed forces became a subject of heated argument during the JMCC’s Sub Council on Defence deliberations.\textsuperscript{419} However this was not sufficient to achieve political control in the early years of the transition, as the various armed forces had not been integrated, more so that the government still retained firm control of the most brutal armed forces in the context of a high level of mistrust.
between the negotiating parties. The ANC was therefore limited to exerting intense political pressure on the government to control the violence of the various security and armed forces and their covert links with conservative forces. This pressure involved threats to boycott the negotiations and revert to non-violent mass action, some of which were actually carried out.\textsuperscript{420} By threatening to pull out of the negotiations and revert to mass action against the state, the ANC managed to extract commitments from the government to rein in the security forces and wielded some indirect control over SADF until the integration process was completed on the eve of elections in 1994. Despite this relative progress, the changes that were made were not institutionalised and had not resulted in structural changes in the security architecture. Institutionalisation and restructuring were later to form the core of the demilitarisation strategy of the Mandela Administration.

The control of the police received the earliest attention in the transition process. This was because by the early 1990s, the SAP had acquired a reputation for brutality, and had been linked to covert sponsorship of black on black violence. However the main focus on policing in the early transition period was on human rights violations, and so the imperatives were to build legitimacy for the police, introduce a culture of human rights, demilitarise the SAP, establish effective political control over them, and improve relations with communities.\textsuperscript{421} The National Peace Accord of 1991 (established to address high levels of political violence in the early transition period) set up systems for monitoring and investigating police misconduct and violence. It also set up a code of conduct for the police and gave local communities a role in monitoring of the police.\textsuperscript{422} The emphasis on human rights and police-community relations led to the establishment
of the first community policing structures in the early 1990s, which were also provided for in the Interim Constitution of 1994. Despite the genuine concern with human rights issues in relation to the SAP, the transformation of the police from a paramilitary force did not occur throughout the transition period.

A significant obstacle to changes commensurate to the integration of the armed forces was the fragmentation of the police. Integration of the various police forces was far less significant in the negotiations compared to that of the armed forces, even though there were 11 police forces, including the SAP and the police forces of the Homelands. The homeland police were subject to significant control by the SAP, which controlled their access to finance and technical resources despite nominal independence. Furthermore there was far less interest in police service by the opposition groups. On one hand the SAP was a dumping ground for whites who could not secure jobs in other sectors and was unattractive for employment. On the other hand, the liberation movements did not have police services and so did not generate the pressure for integration. Under such conditions, the parties settled for an arrangement in which political control over the police was exercised by the government, while the communities were involved in monitoring until the inauguration of democracy in 1994.

The Conservative Forces

As discussed in the preceding section, the conservative forces of state sponsored black vigilantes and white right-wing armed groups emerged to defend the precarious political position of the minority white, just as the apartheid system was collapsing. The fears of
political revenge and black domination in the imminent event of political victory for the ANC fuelled the violence that was intended to prevent such an outcome. These fears were sufficiently dealt with early in the negotiations and as the transition proceeded, these forces became increasingly insignificant and disappeared. The Record of Understanding (ROU) signed between De Klerk and Mandela on 26 September 1992 played a crucial role in addressing white minority fears. A major agreement, among others, between the NP and the ANC under the ROU was a broad parameter of a new constitution, including the creation of an interim Government of National Unity.\textsuperscript{427} Once this commitment was secured from the ANC, the fundamental fear of black retaliation after the transition was so seriously weakened that conservative militias lost their political relevance.

ANC/IFP Militias

The violent conflict between the ANC and IFP was driven largely by the latter's campaign of violence against ANC supporters. However, IFP strategy of violence against ANC supporters in collaboration with the security forces during the transition was not to frustrate the process, but rather to prevent their exclusion from the negotiations.\textsuperscript{428} This was because in the course of the negotiations a close relationship developed between ANC and National Party politicians, and it was becoming clear that the new rapprochement was working to the political advantage of ANC as the party dictated the direction of the negotiations.
The above categories of militias were functions of apartheid politics and the violence associated with it. They were closely associated with the conflict over political exclusion, and they gradually disappeared as the fundamental question of exclusionary politics was being resolved. Although the ANC renounced violence in 1990, it had no effective control over the SDUs, which were driven more by grassroots mobilisation against Inkatha violence during the negotiations.\footnote{429} Inkatha, on the other hand, continued to employ the SPU in violent attacks on ANC/UDF well into and beyond the elections of 1994. However as IFP fears of political exclusion were accommodated through the inclusive Government of National Unity established in 1994 by the ANC and the concept of a ‘rainbow nation’ (multiracial society), the violent conflict between the two parties de-escalated rapidly to its end. While the total number of fatalities from this violence jumped from 1403 in 1989 to 3699 in 1990 and reached a climax of 3794 in 1993, it declined rapidly from 1994, after the elections, to less than 500 in 1997.\footnote{430} The chart below gives a graphic presentation of the rise and decline of ANC-IFP violence before and after the transition.
Anti-Crime Civic Movements

Crime and the insecurities associated with it were not an issue at all in the transition process and negotiations. The overriding concerns were issues of political violence associated with state security forces and party militias; majority rule; and the conduct of multi-party general elections. This meant that the growing problem of crime was ignored in favour of the obviously more important issues of politics in the pre-election period. Given the changed political climate after 1994, the new civics that absorbed the People's Courts focused on rising normal crime and civil disputes to provide some form of order in the townships. This was because, although the political climate had changed and there was far less political repression, the state still lacked the capacity to
provide effective policing and democratic order, which had never been prevalent in non-white communities.

However in the early period of the transition, the resurgence of locally based extra-state ordering stimulated political debates aimed at formalising them and integrating them into the formal justice system. Yet, apart from the community policing initiatives of the early 1990s, which focused on human rights issues, there were no attempts to address crime throughout the transition period. As the crime rate soared, popular vigilante justice under the auspices of the civic movements became rampant across the country and consolidated through the transition period. Thus the tradition of militarism in the civil society, which took roots in the 1980s in relation to crime control were not addressed in the process of negotiations, but were rather thrown into bolder relief after the transition due to the failure of the state to create the conditions of safety and security against high crime rates. It is from this tradition of popular justice that the civil militias of the post-1994 era emerged.

The Demilitarisation of Politics: An Assessment

The discredited role of the security forces, particularly the SADF, the intelligence services and SAP in the political history of the country, forced the issues of transformation and effective civil control of the security forces onto the top of the policy agenda of the new democratic government. With the integration of the security forces completed by the end of the transition period, the new government became particularly
concerned with securing the democratic order by insulating the political process from undue interference from the military and security establishments through a demilitarisation strategy.\textsuperscript{434} During the negotiations, a broad set of principles relating to defence and security, democratic political control in particular, had been agreed by the various parties, and some of these principles were written into the Interim Constitution of 1993.\textsuperscript{435} However, the new government urgently sought to operationalise these principles through a strategy of demilitarisation that involved institutional designs and restructuring within the security sector. The focus of this strategy included mainly the establishment of effective civil control and ending the history of human rights violations. The demilitarisation process that accompanied the post-apartheid transition to democracy and its assessment are examined in this section. The assessment is based on changes in state security policy, new institutional design and changes in actual state practice in the security domain, since the inauguration of democracy.

The demilitarisation focused mainly on SANDF, although changes have also taken place in other areas of the security sector. The first element of the strategy was the establishment of the civilian Defence Secretariat in 1994. The Secretariat was placed on the same level with SANDF headquarters, and both to be accountable to a civilian cabinet minister. This removed the military from control of the policymaking process, and restricted the SANDF headquarters to policy implementation and advice, while reserving policymaking for the Secretariat.\textsuperscript{436} Apart from this division of labour, the accountability of the SANDF to a civilian cabinet minister appointed by an elected president helped to regulate the activities of the armed forces. Similar institutional reforms were carried out in the police and intelligence services, though far more slowly.
A new Secretariat for Safety and Security came into being in 1995 to advise the Minister for Safety and Security, ensure police accountability, and monitor policy implementation by the SAPS. On the policy arena, the strategy has sought to construct a new framework. The most important policy directions are provided by the 1996 Constitution, the White Paper on Defence, the Defence Review, the White Paper on Safety and Security and the White Paper on Intelligence. These documents clearly specify the supremacy of the civil authority over the security forces and their oversight by the Parliament. They also clarify the different roles of the military and the police, as well as specify the conditions under which the security services are employed.

The efforts demilitarise the political process has proceeded extensively since the end of apartheid, as far as the original objectives are concerned. The installation of the new democratic government in 1994 came with an abrupt and complete removal of the defence headquarters from national policy formulation and the assertion of civil authority over defence and security. Executive control of the security forces was demonstrated in 1998 when the Chief of SANDF, General George Meiring, was dismissed by President Mandela following a political fall-out over the General’s misuse of intelligence information. Attempts to assert executive control of the SANDF faced initial difficulties. The real problem of executive control lied with the relationship between the civilian Defence Secretariat and SANDF headquarters, where the transfer of functions from military headquarters to the Secretariat was slow. This was compounded by the fact that the Secretariat was staffed largely by military officers.
In addition the division of labour between the Secretary of Defence and the Chief of SANDF has not been as clear in practice as it is in theory. The lack of civilian expertise as a legacy of the past, and institutional resistance from former SADF officers, have been identified as the main problems.  

Legislative oversight of the defence force has been fairly strong, as the JSCD and the Portfolio Committee on Defence in the National Assembly have been effective in their oversight responsibilities. They were instrumental to the development of the White Paper on Defence and have been effective in legislation and holding SANDF officers to account for implementation of policy. However, internal deployment of SANDF troops did not terminate with the end apartheid. The relative shortage of police personnel prompted the deployment of large numbers of SANDF troops on a daily basis in long term policing tasks from the beginning of the democratic era. Such deployments continued, although with decreasing number until 1999 when it was ended. Yet this cannot be regarded as re-enactment of apartheid militarisation. These were operations in support of the police in conflict situations where the state is not a protagonist as was the case apartheid deployment. Again, operations were regulated by democratic and constitutional safeguards, and were largely accepted by society.

Paramilitary policing, as a major concern of demilitarisation, has drastically declined since 1994. Although incidence of police brutality is still high in South Africa, it is far less compared to the apartheid era and it is related to crime-fighting rather than political repression. Between April 1997 and March 1998, the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) received complaints of 518 deaths from police action, 157 criminal
assaults by the police and 67 acts of misconduct. For 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 the respective figures were 558,311 and 69; and 472,500 and 143. Between 2003 and 2004, complaints processed by the ICD against members of the SAPS, included 383 deaths in police custody, 384 deaths from police action and 1,473 cases of serious criminal offences allegedly committed by members of the SAPS. The problem of police brutality has remained, in spite of the implementation of elaborate programmes of human rights training and new codes of conduct for the service.

Nevertheless, there has been a dramatic decline in the number of people killed in public demonstrations and gatherings. The problem of police brutality has rather been associated with growing public pressure for tougher policing as crime levels soared with the end of apartheid. This pressure resulted in the Government's adoption in 1999 of Operation Crackdown, which placed emphasis on effective crime combating using lethal force in place of soft policing. Even then, there has been no reported case of politically motivated killings by the government or its agents, and security officials accused of violations have been put on trial.

The end of politically motivated police operations against the populace by the state, the drastic reduction in and more regulated military deployment for internal operations, and the prosecution of security officials accused of human rights violation prove that the civil authorities have achieved a high degree of democratic control of the security forces. This also proves that the state has undertaken a drastic demilitarisation of the political process. However, the militarisation of the wider society produced by the extreme violence of the state in the height of apartheid social control remained very
high. Paradoxically, the militarisation of politics and the weakening of repressive social control were accompanied by the radicalisation of a militant society and the emergence of more structured and enduring forms of civil armed formations and civil militarism. The phenomenon of civil militarism in post-apartheid South Africa and the conditions under which it emerged are discussed in the sections below.

**Civil Militarism After 1994**

Armed groups associated with the political violence of the transition period gradually disappeared after 1994, yet the failure of the new democratic state to provide public safety and security under conditions of rising crime levels created the climate for the emergence of a new form of militarism in the civilian society in the first few years of democracy. Out of the tradition of civil militancy against criminals in the last years of apartheid, violent vigilante groups hardened through 1995 and quickly developed into full militias within the civilian society. The most prominent of these groups which later transformed into civil militias, albeit in various degrees, were the People Against Drugs and Gangsterism (PAGAD), which operated in the Western Cape; Mapogo a Mathamaga in Limpopo province; and the Mfelandawonye Wamapondomise Burial Society in the Eastern Cape. Under the conditions of growing physical threat of violent crime and a criminal justice system that was too weak to address the problem, local communities gave initial popular support to these anti-crime movements for protection. However, shortly after their emergence, these groups developed out of control into militias and perpetrated organised violence within the communities they set out to protect in the first place.
The most important factor uniting these armed groups is that they emerged as militias immediately after the new Mandela Government began to implement the strategy of demilitarising the state and politics. The timing of the rise of these latter day militias and the demilitarisation programmes of the new government suggests a link between the two phenomena and the next section attempts to explore this link in detail. Although Mapogo has so far been the largest of these groups, in terms of coverage and membership, PAGAD remained the most violent and efficient of all post-1994 civil militias in South Africa. For this reason PAGAD is selected as the focus of analysis in examining the relationship between the demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism.

**The Case of People Against Drugs and Gangsterism**

Apartheid's brutal repression succeeded in imposing militarised social control and in putting down the nationwide uprisings of the mid-1980s. However such control was tenuous as the underlying structural contradictions of apartheid rule persisted and deepened towards the end of the 1980s. The replacement of military troops with establishment vigilantes and black conservative forces was intended to bolster the precarious social control of direct state violence with other militarised civilian formations was an extension of state violence by other means.

This re-adjustment of state violence slowly set in motion the reproduction of violence in the wider society, and culminated in the emergence of civil militarism at this point in the history of apartheid. In addition, the response to the call by the ANC and its supporters to render the country ungovernable radicalised and slowly transformed the
civic structures into informal armed groups. However, more structured and organised militias and informal armed groups did not begin to emerge until the end of apartheid and at the time that demilitarisation was being implemented. The remaining part of this section is an attempt to explore the association between the civil militarism and the demilitarisation process, by exploring the case of PAGAD. The origins, transformation and operations of this organisation are particularly focused upon to explore this tentative relationship.

PAGAD was formed in 1995 as a popular pressure group in response to the soaring crime level of the immediate post-apartheid period. This group emerged in the context of a criminal justice system that had long been abandoned in preference for paramilitary policing and which had become too weak to respond adequately to the rising wave of organised and violent crime. It emerged and operated in the Cape Flats, a group of Moslem dominated, middle-class, coloured communities around Cape Town. With initial base in Athlone, PAGAD coverage area quickly spread to Bo-Kaap, Heideveld, Retreat, Mitchell’s Plain, Lansdowne, Salt River, Kensington, Pelican Park and Manenberg. These townships were hotbeds of the anti-apartheid struggle, where the de-legitimisation of the state produced neighbourhood watches that were as well-armed as community protection structures. It is out of these neighbourhood structures that PAGAD emerged initially as a popular movement. However, within a short period of time, the organisation transformed into an ultra-violent vigilante group, which adopted urban terrorist tactics in its operations, and targeted people suspected of drugs and gang offences as well as the institutions of the state’s criminal justice system in many instances of frightening violence.
Led by the middle class and supported by the middle and upper class, PAGAD enjoyed initial popular support and managed to mobilise entire communities around the struggle against drugs and gangsterism, which had become endemic in the Cape Flats since the early apartheid years. Initial methods included peaceful protests and marches on the houses of drug lords and gang leaders. These marches were also taken to the Minster of Justice as a way of mounting pressure on the state to take tougher measures against crime, which had become the most important security threat from the mid-1990s. In addition, PAGAD initially collaborated with the police who provided escort for the early marches. By the end of 1995, PAGAD had started using extreme violence by openly burning the cars of drug dealers, and bombing their houses.

The turning point in cooperation with the police came when PAGAD launched its campaign of terror, ostensibly against criminals. This started with the case of the notorious gang leader, Rashad Staggie, who was shot and openly burnt to death by PAGAD mobs under full police deployment in August 1996. By early 1996 PAGAD had evolved a sophisticated paramilitary wing called the G-Force, which anchored its operation on an intelligence component. Between 1996 and 1997, G-Force mounted a series of violent operations involving the tailing, ambushing and pipe-bombing of gangs and drug dealers. At the same time it mounted several attacks on courts and raided police stations, seizing firearms and ammunition for further operations. At this stage it became obvious that the organisation had shifted focus from its original agenda and had taken on a security and military mission. This new mission and the targeting of state institutions like police stations and the courts as well as public places
revealed a totally different agenda to the initial popular response to crime. It revealed a rapid transformation of the organisation into a civil militia that had become a central part of the problem, which it set out to deal with originally. An examination of the stages of PAGAD development is essential to understanding the factors responsible for this change in mission and radicalisation.

At the beginning of PAGAD, it had no formal organisational structure. However, a year after its formation, the organisation experienced a leadership crisis and change, followed by a quick process of structuring and radicalisation by the new leadership. Before this time an extreme Islamic organisation called Qibla had infiltrated and become a strong lobby within PAGAD. Influenced by the Iranian Revolution, Qibla lobbied for Islamic solution to the crime problem. Through this lobby, Qibla succeeded in infiltrating PAGAD and displacing its pioneer leadership following the leadership crisis of 1996. From this stage, Qibla established the G-Force whose members were trained in the use of firearms and military-type operations. As a highly sophisticated formation, the G-Force was divided into cells with areas of specialisation. Three senior officials of the SAPS, in separate interviews, agreed that PAGAD was hijacked by strong forces that were not a part of its original agenda. It was after this take-over of PAGAD control from the original leadership that the organisation transformed from a popular anti-crime pressure group to a civil militia, as the G-Force became its central driving force. Thus the transformation of the organisation into a militia using urban terrorist tactics mirrored the emergence of the radical element from the internal leadership crisis.
The weakness of the criminal justice system and its inability to deal with rising crime waves effectively fuelled the popular demand on the state for greater security. However the adoption of extreme violence by PAGAD cannot be explained by this weakness alone. As indicated by one of the interviewees in the course of fieldwork, service delivery in the criminal justice system was totally absent in the black townships during apartheid rule, and yet these townships did not produce paramilitary organisations after the end of apartheid. In support of this argument, a serving senior official of the SAPS pointed out that even with the post-apartheid infrastructural upgrading of the townships, coloured communities are still being served better than the black communities, in terms of policing and justice. Direct observation of the various townships in the course of fieldwork also confirmed this difference between the coloured and black townships.

The recourse to violence against the state contradicts the initial vigilante objective of community protection. The goal of crime fighting would be served more if community initiatives collaborate with the police and the courts to bolster the formal criminal justice system. On the contrary, PAGAD attacked courts and raided police stations carting away weapons that were never to be accounted for. The intimidation of court judges and the harassment of the police certainly serve to weaken the operational effectiveness of the criminal justice system in the communities. These activities indicate that the new PAGAD that emerged from the internal leadership crisis had a different agenda from the mere mobilisation of the communities against drug dealers and gang members.
Furthermore, if drug dealers and gangs were a security menace in the communities where PAGAD emerged, the organisation’s militia activities exacerbated that menace. The use of petrol and pipe bombs on the cars and houses of gangs and drug dealers, surveillance, shooting and burning of suspects, the harassment of court judges and invasion of police stations, and involvement of some of its members in crime and revenge violence, all worked to generate an atmosphere of fear and feeling of insecurity in the communities of PAGAD operation. PAGAD military operations provoked violent retaliations from the gangs who came together to fight a common enemy, and this precipitated a cycle of conflict between the two camps in the Cape Flats during the late 1990s.

PAGAD was not a response of the poor to an ineffective criminal justice system in the face of rising crime. Its composition, particularly at the leadership level, defied the theory that popular vigilantism is the typical response of the poor to a weak criminal justice system, because they could not have the means to engage the services of private security companies, which rich people do. The coloured communities where PAGAD operated were certainly not poor in relative terms. Unlike the black shanty townships located on the socio-economic margins of the apartheid state, the coloured communities were middle-class people who had houses, businesses and infrastructure and where the neighbourhood watches were well-armed with licensed firearms. In addition PAGAD received moral and financial support from middle and upper class residents, who, together with the organisation’s leadership, could easily have afforded the services of private security companies. The fact that they did not suggests that they had another mission than individual and community protection. This was unlike poor people’s
initiatives such as the Peninsula Anti-Crime Agency (PEACA) and many other spontaneous mob actions against crime as well as taxi drivers who fought down violent crimes. PEACA, for instance, operates in the poor black township of Khayelitsha near Cape Town. It is made up of former combatants of the liberation struggle who could not afford an office building but operates from two shipping containers. Although it was established in 1998, PEACA has not metamorphosed into a militia. Rather it has continued to operate in cooperation with the police as an effective community self-help initiative by poor people.

Finally, it has been observed that there was a disconnection between the publicity PAGAD had and the scope of actual support that they were able to muster nationally. According to one interviewee, the campaign against crime, particularly drugs, was very popular because it was seen as a national problem at the time. However, the support for PAGAD never spread beyond the Cape Town area. This interviewee pointed out that most PAGAD members were ex-drug lords, whose criminal activities discredited the whole enterprise of crime fighting. This has been corroborated by another former police officer who observed that some in the communities saw PAGAD as a response to the business challenge posed by the semi-legal and illegal businesses run by the gangs. These perceptions not only undermined the credibility of PAGAD at the time, but also fundamentally weakened the thinking that PAGAD as a militia was a response to the weakness of the criminal justice system in the face of rising crime levels.
To understand PAGAD militarism, there is a need to examine the trajectory of PAGAD's metamorphosis in the context of the security transformation which followed the democratic transition in South Africa. Qibla, which infiltrated and took over control of PAGAD in 1996, is a Shi‘ite Moslem sect in the Cape Flats, led by radical Shi‘ite scholars of international recognition. It had struggled without success to gain influence a hold in the Cape Flats where the majority are Sunni Moslems.\textsuperscript{468} The emerging popular structure of collective action, which PAGAD represented, provided an opportunity for Qibla to popularise its ideology. While Qibla could not mobilise as much as 3,000 to 4,000 people in a gathering, PAGAD was able to mobilise 20,000 to 30,000 people in single meetings. Moreover, PAGAD was able to get such crowds to speak with one voice.\textsuperscript{469} Qibla members first joined PAGAD and then began to change the agenda by propagating Islamic solutions to crime. The culmination of this infiltration and take-over was the supplanting of PAGAD leadership by Qibla elements and the consequent radicalisation of the organisation.

This infiltration and hijacking of PAGAD was not just an isolated case, but conforms to a general pattern in the history of self-protection vigilantism in the Cape Flats. Historical observations show that the perception of insecurity always led to various forms of self-protection, which in turn were hijacked by various interests; be they ideological, political or other interests. In the mid-1950s a group of neighbourhood watches emerged to offer protection against gangs and drugs, but this group ended up as a violent organisation known as the Globe Gangs. However the Globe Gangs were absorbed by the police as reservists. Similarly, another group called the Peacemakers emerged in the mid-1970s to fight gangs and drugs. Again this group later became a
violent vigilante and was consequently absorbed into the police as reservists. Mapogo a Mathamaga experienced a similar trajectory. Rising crime was a genuinely felt public concern in Limpopo, while the criminal justice system was inefficient and discredited at the time Mapogo emerged in 1996. However, shortly after its emergence, Mapogo’s founder and leader, John Magolego, was captured by the United Democratic Movement (UDM) and almost won a seat in the Provincial Parliament. UDM is an opposition political party and its links with Magolego were perceived as an attempt to benefit from the mass mobilisation of Mapogo to upstage the ANC control of the province. Mapogo also experienced internal leadership conflict, although the original leadership survived the crisis. The organisation split twice, leading to an exodus of many of its executive members who disagreed with Magolego over his lack of financial accountability, violent activities through the use of hit squads, the predominance of white right-wing members, and the organisation’s involvement in politics. All these factors generated considerable controversy about Mapogo’s intention and led to a suspicion of a hidden political agenda. The transformation of PAGAD followed the same pattern, except that the security services did not manage to control the movement until it had been turned into a militia.

At the time that PAGAD was transforming into a militant organisation, the security services in South Africa were undergoing a complex and painful process of transformation. The complexity and difficulty of this process helped to facilitate the hijacking and radicalisation of PAGAD. The security transformation, which accompanied the democratic transition, was part of the demilitarisation process discussed earlier. This process involved the termination of militarised social control
and the security footprint in the civil society. It also involved the integration of the various security forces of the state with those of the liberation movements and the defunct homelands. The end of the Security Branch’s footprint created a security vacuum, which coincided with the time PAGAD started to mobilise. The Security Branch was one of the most notorious units of SAP, especially in the implementation of the apartheid emergency regulations. The end of its repressive activities therefore meant the relaxation of repressive controls and the permission of popular collective actions, which PAGAD represented at its early stage. The new democratic freedom also witnessed an escalation in crime rates, which the transforming security services could not grapple with.

The process of integration of the security forces faced daunting challenges. The sheer number of the forces to be integrated, the variety of actors involved in the process, and the fact that many of them were formerly opposed to one another during the anti-apartheid struggle posed a complexity to security policymakers from the end of apartheid to the second half of the 1990s. At the same time a large part of the former police personnel left the service, as they did not want to work under the ANC Government. Apart from integration, a most crucial concern then was to depoliticise the police to and change its focus to crime. All these challenges and complexities made it difficult for the new government to quickly put in place a benign democratic, but effective form of social ordering and control to fill the gap created by the dismantling of the apartheid security control. The fact that PAGAD violence escalated quickly at this time suggests that its new leadership took an opportunist advantage of the hiatus of the security transformation of the mid-1990s to pursue its mission.
Furthermore, while the demilitarisation process focused on regulating the security forces, the capacity of the state to provide security was not rebuilt. The demilitarisation strategy informed police reforms that focused on human rights and civil control, but neglected issues of operational effectiveness of the police service, including the areas of crime detection, prosecution of criminals, and punishment. Under the new political dispensation, the police were faced with huge public expectations and policy frameworks to deliver public safety, but did not receive the appropriate training to implement effective democratic policing. Issues of operational effectiveness only began to receive official attention in late 1997 when PAGAD violence was already at its peak. The police set up special PAGAD unit in August 1997, while the first Detective Academy in the country was established in October of the same year. The year 2000 marked the turning point of PAGAD militarism, as the police finally rose up to the task law enforcement. It was in 2000 after the police had jailed scores of PAGAD militants, prosecuted hundreds of them, raided the G-Force cell and seized their weapons that PAGAD campaign of bombings ended. This shows that building the capacity of the police to perform their statutory functions was a crucial in closing the opportunities for civil militarism created by the relaxation of social control in the course of demilitarisation.

Conclusions

State Weakness Opportunism, Demilitarisation and Civil Militarism

PAGAD operated in predominantly coloured communities and most of its operators were coloured. Although black communities suffered most from apartheid repression,
the coloured population also suffered social exclusion, marginality and neglect, and were never fully integrated as first-class citizens in the white South Africa state since they were never considered white enough.\textsuperscript{479} This informed their support for the ANC in the struggle against apartheid. Safety and security in the communities were neglected as the focus of policing then was on political repression rather than crime. Worse still, police and court officials colluded with and assisted notorious gangs in their criminal activities, creating low confidence and negative evaluation of the public criminal justice system in the Cape Flats.\textsuperscript{480} As a result the challenge of crime control was left to the communities and the street committees, and neighbourhood watches performed this role. There had thus been a desperate need in the Cape Flats for service delivery in public safety and security given the notoriety of gang and related violence.

Civil militarism in post-apartheid South Africa began to occur at the time that the demilitarisation of the political process got underway. The end of military occupation, the withdrawal of the security forces from the communities and the termination of establishment vigilantism produced new waves of political liberties from the strict control of the state. However, this new climate also precipitated new pressures on the state from the society. The problem of crime and the structural conditions of the decades of social exclusion and marginalisation that underlie the problem became issues of urgent importance and formed a new focus for public pressure on the state. As noted by one interviewee, this new political climate conduced to the unleashing of social and political pressures which had always existed, but which had been suppressed for decades from the society. One of these pressures is the public demand for more effective delivery of security from crime.\textsuperscript{481} In effect, the demilitarisation process took
the focus away from apartheid repressive forces to crime and criminals as the new most important threats to physical security.

The new political climate of relaxed social control fuelled popular expectations of enhanced public security. The historical lack of competence in crime control was a major weakness that hindered the state from meeting these expectations. Furthermore, the complexities and difficulties encountered in the transformation of the security services exposed the weakness of the state to respond adequately to these expectations. The centralisation of police resources and the dwindling of police capacity due to the shift from merit towards equity exposed the inability of the state to meet the popular expectations. In the townships and the rural areas, the absence of crime policing as a legacy of apartheid rule exacerbated this weakness. The problems associated with the integration of the various security forces, including the mass resignation of former SAP members mentioned earlier also adds to this weakness. In the face of rising crime waves, the popular pressures arising from the new democratic liberties and the failure of the state to respond adequately to these pressures fed the complexities faced by policymakers, particularly as it related to the security of citizens.

Under such conditions, the civic structures in the townships, including street committees and neighbourhood watches continued to mobilise against crime while new ones emerged, including PAGAD, PEACA and other less known structures. However, just as these structures were infiltrated and taken over by political activists during the township uprisings of the mid-1980s, these structures constituted viable platforms that
could be exploited for political opportunism. PAGAD represented the most attractive of
these platforms for the fact that it was able to mobilise tens of thousands of people for
marches within a short period of time after its formation. Besides most of its leaders (at
the time of formation) were ANC supporters, which meant that they were likely to enjoy
the sympathy of the state. Furthermore, the predominance of Moslems in PAGAD's
membership and support base made it easier for ideological penetration. However the
hijacking of PAGAD changed this relationship and took the organisation beyond a mere
civic structure of social ordering to an agent of urban terrorism against the state.
The radicalisation and militarisation of PAGAD by Qibla took place in the context of
demilitarisation of the state and politics. The demilitarisation process emphasised the
reduction of the influence and role of the security forces in politics. This necessarily
weakened social control and permitted the explosion of political pressures hitherto
contained by apartheid’s brutal security forces. The initial mass mobilisation against
crime was a democratic expression of these pressures, as long as the public peace was
not breached. However, as authoritarian social control was weakened, democratic
social control was not quickly put in place, nor were the real problems of a weak
criminal justice system in the face of rising crime addressed urgently. The inability or
failure of the new state to penetrate society and establish its empirical predominance in
the townships through democratic bargains and effective law and order policing allowed
for the emergence of the popular anti-crime movements, and also left them at the mercy
of political and ideological opportunists. This failure created an opportunity, which was
seized upon by Qibla elements when they took over PAGAD and used it for their
political or ideological ends.
Chapter Six

Demilitarisation and Civil Militarism:
Nigeria and South Africa Compared

Introduction

So far this study has examined the demilitarisation strategies introduced in the context of post-authoritarian transition and how these strategies have been associated with the exacerbation of public insecurity in Nigeria and South Africa. The main indicator of this increase in public insecurity is the privatisation of violence by civil militias outside the control of the state, a phenomenon that has become one of the most critical predicaments in the quest for human security and development in contemporary Africa.

Nigeria and South Africa illustrate the fractious wave of political transition from authoritarian rule to sustainable democracy, which has become a common experience of the vast majority of African states since the dawn of the 1990s.\textsuperscript{484} Until this wave, decades of authoritarianism (the hallmark of post-independence politics in Africa) generated structural contradictions in the society and were generated by these contradictions in a mutually reinforcing relationship. Despotic rulers needed to manipulate the political process in order to impose their rule and repress popular political dissent. The exclusion and repression of political dissent themselves produced crises and political instabilities which threatened social order and which were thus met with repressive state strategies. Thus political crises and instabilities have been the
offspring of the interaction between authoritarian rule and structural contradictions in the domestic politics of post-independence Africa.

Under the conditions of various forms of authoritarian rule, these crises and instabilities forced the militarisation of politics as the needed tool for maintaining and enhancing social control and order. Thus in spite of these crises and the many conflicts that resulted from them, the period of authoritarian rule revealed some degree of social control in many states. Until 1991 when the authority of the state collapsed in Somalia and 1993, when Eritrea successfully broke away from Ethiopia, African despots managed to exercise control over their national territories and populations, even if such social controls were characterised by repression and violence. Violent intimidation of the opposition and military solutions to internal conflicts put the authoritarian state at an advantage (however precarious) over its domestic power contenders in the wider society, particularly as far as the challenge to social order was political in nature. Although the state could not eliminate all its internal political enemies, it managed to provide some form of social control in response to incessant social disorder.

However, the wave of democratic transition, which began with the 1990s, has progressed with an increasing weakening of this authoritarian social control. The democratic change necessarily required the demilitarisation of the political space and the abdication of repressive social control measures. This has had profound implications for the balance of power between the state and society in post-authoritarian Africa. The most crucial implication has been the strengthening of the relative power of societal forces in the political process. The corollary of this is a weakening of the
ability of the new democratic state to exercise legitimate social control in relation to societal forces and to establish its predomination across the national territory. Post-authoritarian politics have continued to experience social disorder in which armed groups emerging from society operate with greater ease as crucial actors in the utilisation of organised violence in everyday politics.

As the last two chapters of this study show, authoritarianism in Nigeria and South Africa involved a high degree of militarisation of politics in order to maintain social control against the menace of political crises and instability. The two countries also witnessed a drastic weakening of this authoritarian social control as an integral and deliberate element of the transition to democratic politics. This is accomplished through the demilitarisation of politics, resulting in the reduction or elimination of state violence vis-à-vis the civilian population.

The two case studies also reveal that, within the context of this democratic transition, the demilitarisation process created the freedom and enabling space for popular movements and civic structures to engage in collective action which seek to address the structural contradictions created by decades of authoritarianism. Also evident from the examination of the two cases is the emergence within these popular movements of radical elements with political and ideological motivations, interests and pursuits. With time these elements with extreme views and methods have tended to take over the leadership of the popular movements and transform them into militant organisations engaging in violent and illegitimate activities.
The abandonment of the popular cause and the assumption of armed violence by these groups were bound to fuel the proliferation of organised civilian violence and the deterioration of public insecurity in both countries. They also pose further challenges to governance in the new democratic atmosphere, in terms of designing and implementing the appropriate democratic response from the state. Furthermore, given the general condition of state weakness, these movements managed to benefit from local legitimacy by providing protection services that the state failed to provide. By attempting to usurp the state in the delivery of physical security, the activities of these movements have the capacity to undermine or fragment the legitimacy base of the state, thus aggravating the fragility of democracy in Africa.

In the last two chapters, the paradox of demilitarisation and civil militarism are examined within the separate cases of Nigeria and South Africa under different contextual conditions. Findings from the case studies confirmed the central hypothesis of the study that the demilitarisation of the state contributes to the development of civil militias. This chapter brings the two cases together for cross-analysis in order to test the validity of this the hypothesis under the different conditions. The analysis is based on comparing across the two cases the key variables of history and context, strategies of demilitarisation, civil militia violence, criminality, and transition violence.
History and Context

The wider democratic transition within which the demilitarisation of politics has taken place in Nigeria and South Africa is characterised by two common conditions of violence and structural weakness. State weakness is admittedly a broad phenomenon that embraces a whole gamut of political, economic, military and social dimensions. However, for the purpose of this study this weakness is assessed in terms of the ability of the state to provide adequate security for citizens. As the previous two chapters demonstrated, violence and state weakness had already been present in Nigeria and South Africa from the beginning of statehood and have persisted through the era of authoritarianism. These two conditions are important because they define the context of public insecurity and civil disorder and are examined below.

Violence and Conflict

The authoritarian state faced two main threats to internal security and order. The most obvious is the challenge from opposition groups and the pro-democracy segments of the national population, which mounted strong pressure on the state to redress the inherent structural distortions of authoritarian rule. These political pressures were most times violent as were the cases of the Biafra Civil War (1967-1970) and the various theatres of the anti-apartheid struggle in Nigeria and South Africa, respectively. Although ordinary citizens suffered as victims, the primary target of this pressure was the state and the resulting violence was centred on social conflicts among various groups in close relation to the control of state power.
The militarisation of politics and the use of state violence for repression had generated incipient civic formations for political engagement with the state, at the climax of the authoritarian dispensation. This is so because the repression of political dissent over contested national issues and the constant violence of armed and security forces forced the gradual evolution of organised civic structures for collective political action.

In the South West and the Niger Delta of Nigeria, where state repression was most fierce and where the democratic pressure had mostly emanated from, a legacy of collective actions gradually emerged. There were constant incidences of mass protests, rallies, strikes and violent confrontations with security agencies deployed to break up such actions. In South Africa, the daily confrontations between the troops and communities in the townships also gradually produced a legacy of collective action in the communities. From the early 1980s, street and area committees as well as large civic organisations were beginning to emerge in such townships as Soweto and Port Elizabeth. By the middle of that decade, they had nearly spread across the entire country in an effort to render the townships ungovernable for the apartheid state.

The civic structures also assumed the role of policing against violent crimes. Given the political focus of policing, communities were left to their own devices for protection against this type of physical violence. In the absence of the state with regards to crime, these civic organisations became the unofficial but de facto organs of social ordering. Relying on support from the local community, they were responsible for arrest, detention, trial and punishment of criminals.
The civic organisations thus performed the dual functions of crime control and political resistance. With time a tradition of community mobilisation for collective action against shared threats, including structural and physical violence both from the state and criminals, particularly in marginal communities, was entrenched in the areas where state repression and social control were most intense. By extension, the militarisation of politics not only maintained a coercive social control, but also laid the basis for community organisation for collective action. By ignoring the protection of citizens from violent crime, the militarisation of politics generated a security vacuum, which was being filled by the community-based organisations, including both civil and non-civil ones. The emergence of the civic organisations for social ordering therefore served to expose the absence of the state's bureaucratic power, and the precariousness of militarised social control.

The second, but less obvious challenge to domestic security came from crime. This challenge was less obvious because national security in the authoritarian era was defined narrowly in terms of regime security and so the state downplayed any threat that did not target the state or the regime directly. However, beneath the surface of political violence, crime has always been a serious threat to human security, which is a vital element of public security. Violent crimes had always threatened the physical security of citizens even if it was ignored by the authoritarian state.
The implication of this fragmentation of security is that the authoritarian state failed to protect the majority of the population from violent crime. In South Africa, the state provided protection for the white segment of the population and left the coloured and black population to their own devices against crime.\textsuperscript{487} Policing was political in direction as its emphasis was placed on breaking the resistance to apartheid rule.\textsuperscript{488} In Nigeria policing was paramilitary and was directed against the opposition to military rule rather than crime. Given the low ranking of crime as a public security issue, the authoritarian state demonstrated a failure to develop the capacity to deal with it effectively, and this leads to the problem of weakness embedded in the structure of the state.

\textbf{Institutional Weakness and Service Delivery}

In the face of political challenges to national security, the authoritarian state demonstrated considerable weakness in terms of infrastructural power. Although the authoritarian state managed to exercise its despotic power through the employment of state violence, it could not create a domestic political and social consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic life of the nation. As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, the authoritarian state in Nigeria and South Africa was unable to move beyond the raw exercise of coercion to compliance through more peaceful means.\textsuperscript{489} Thus the institutional capacity of the state depended precariously on the use of coercion to impose social control on the population.
The failure of crime policing itself reflected a wider failure of the criminal justice system. While the security landscape was dominated by political violence, crime and related violence were neglected by the authoritarian state. A crucial indicator of this is the absolute lack of records of crime in both countries before the transition to democracy.\textsuperscript{490} Apart from the lack of crime records, state justice against crime was inaccessible to the vast majority of the population due to the near absence of the state. In the case of South Africa, the institutions of the criminal justice system, mainly the police and the courts, were remote in terms of physical distance from the vast majority of the population. The justice system itself was also too expensive for the socially excluded majority, and the process of justice administration was too winding and time consuming.\textsuperscript{491} In Nigeria, the police and institutions of criminal justice were very corrupt and deeply politicised, so that they could not deliver justice efficiently. In both cases, the relative absence of the police was in spite of the militarisation of society, which saw heavy deployment of joint police and army troops in the streets. The main focus of the police deployed in such operations was to deal with political activities such as protests, demonstrations, rallies, etc, and this political militarisation took the focus of policing away from crime.

The most important threats to the physical security of people therefore have been both political and social. The political threat came from an overbearing and violent state and violent conflict, while the social threat came from violent crime. In Nigeria, the most serious type of violent crime has been and remains armed robbery, in which bands of armed men openly attacked and killed their victims to rob them of money and valuable items, especially in the cities.\textsuperscript{492} In South Africa, it has been gang violence and robbery.
In the Western Cape particularly, inter-gang warfare and violent clashes between gangs and communities were a constant phenomenon since the 1950s. However, as long as the emphasis of policing was political, the state never managed to address the social dimension (crime) of threat to physical security. Thus the state was both an active and passive source of insecurity for the vast majority of its citizens in both countries.

The neglect of crime by the authoritarian state and the inability of the criminal justice system to deliver justice services across the national territory was a core element of structural weakness, which limited the scope for public security. Furthermore, the repressive strategies of the state made it a natural enemy of the masses. Given this antagonistic relationship, it was natural that the state did not consider the provision of public security as a national priority. Finally, if the welfare and security of citizens is the major rationale for the existence of the state, then the failure of the state to provide public security showed that the authoritarian state in both countries was grossly dysfunctional and weak. This weakness characterised the context in which the political space was militarised as well as the context within which the democratic transition of the 1990s and the resultant process of demilitarisation took place.

The militarisation of politics supplied the coercive power for social control against political pressures that were generated by the structural contradictions of authoritarianism. However, the authoritarian state lacked the essential infrastructural power required to supply the long-term, sustainable and more peaceful means of social control. At the time of the democratic transition in both countries, a number of
politically active civic associations and pressure groups had established themselves in
the political and social environment, with many of them having used violent methods in
confrontations with the state and other rival actors, including uncivil organisations and
criminal gangs.

The Crisis of Public Insecurity

Although conflict and violence constituted the national security problem of the
authoritarian era, the transition to democracy has been accompanied by a crisis of public
insecurity. This was highlighted as a more general problem across post-authoritarian
Africa in Chapter 1, and more specifically as endemic in Nigeria and South Africa in
Chapters 4 and 5. The exacerbation of crime and the emergence of violent militias in
the new democracies marked this crisis. Their emergence at the time that these states
were implementing strategies of demilitarisation also has important implications for
examining the hypothesis of this study.

The Crisis of Criminality

Although crime had been a social reality in both Nigeria and South Africa, there has
been a sharp increase in the level of public insecurity from crime and related violence.
The issue of crime level during and after the transition in both countries has been
controversial. While official police statistics sources insist on a decline in crime level,
independent sources agree that there has been a rising crime wave since transition.
Independent surveys of criminal victimisation also indicate high level of crime in public
perception.
Although official statistics of crime in Nigeria is difficult to obtain, the police there strongly hold that the overall level of crime, including robbery, has declined since the end of military rule in 1999. However, the findings of criminal victimisation survey conducted in Lagos show that crime, particularly armed robbery, has been on the rise since the end of military rule. Interviews conducted in the course of fieldwork also show that the public perception of crime is high. It is difficult to measure the real changes in crime level since the end of military rule. The main reason for this is the lack of official records of crime before the transition to democracy, a fact that underscores the neglect of crime as a national security issue by the military elites. In spite of this controversy, there is a general perception in Nigeria that violent crime is increasing. Whether this is so in reality is not so much important because it is the perception of crime (the fear of insecurity from crime) that shapes people's behaviour in response.

This controversy has been less important in the case of South Africa. There is a general agreement the level of crime rose sharply through the transition years. However there is lack of agreement on whether the level has stabilised since the years after transition, or whether it has continued to rise. In spite of this, there is a pervasive perception that crime has been rising consistently in South Africa. The public perception of crime in both countries has also, especially immediately after the transition, coincided with the weakness of the criminal justice system in both countries to control crime. The coincidence of these two factors has been the justification for the emergence of popular anti-crime organisations.
Civil Militarism

Both countries experienced civil militarism as a second element of the crisis of public insecurity in the course of the transition. In both countries the organisations which transformed into militias did not all mobilise around criminal issues. In South Africa, the main militia group, PAGAD, certainly started as an anti-crime movement. However in Nigeria, while some of the militias began with an anti-crime agenda, particularly the OPC and the Bakassi Boys, others started with a clear political agenda, such as those in the Niger Delta. It is therefore problematic to use crime as a common factor in the emergence of civil militias.

Furthermore, while crime levels have continued to be perceived as high in both Nigeria and South Africa, the dynamics of civil militarism has varied in both countries. In South Africa, the end of violent PAGAD activities from 2000 has meant the end of civil militarism in the country even with the perception of a rising crime wave. On the contrary, Nigeria has continued to witness an increase in the number and intensity of militias and their violent activities. It is also of significant importance to appreciate the timing of these militias as developing at the time that the processes of democratisation and demilitarisation were being initiated. This is because the capacity of the state to deliver security has always been an important public concern in the process of various kinds of political transition; and what happens to the security agencies in that process has always had crucial consequences for transitional public security. The next section examines the interaction of the relevance of these outcomes and the processes of democratisation and the demilitarisation of politics in both countries.
Democratisation, Demilitarisation and Civil Militarism

As observed in Chapters 4 and 5, the democratic transition and demilitarisation strategies differ in scope, depth and the context within which they occurred across the two cases. The immediate post-authoritarian period of democratic transition generated the political pressure for demilitarisation and the extent to which the demilitarisation process was implemented and therefore its scope was determined by the momentum of political pressure from the wider society. This momentum as well as the extent and scope of demilitarisation were found to be different in the two cases. In spite of this difference, the democratisation and demilitarisation were followed by civil militarism. This section will explore the linkages between these two concepts.

Violence and Democratisation

In Nigeria, the transition was guided by the outgoing military elite, who ensured the protection of entrenched interests in the management of the transition. Furthermore, and related to the above, the transition was driven partly by the military elite and partly by the pro-democracy groups in the society. In addition, the pressure for political change was relatively peaceful and sometimes compromising, with many of the pro-democracy groups conceding vital ground to the military elites. The result of all this was that societal momentum for democratic transition was relatively weak and relatively non-violent.

Although there were a few episodes of violence during mass protests that were quelled by security forces, such as the protest against the structural economic reforms of 1996
and the protest against the annulment of presidential elections in 1993, such acts of violence have been episodic rather than sustained. The short period of the transition, including the voting period, was peaceful, unlike the case of South Africa. Furthermore, the history of communal conflict was not revisited at this period. Rather inter-ethnic and communal violence were endemic features of the era of military rule and have continued through the transition to democracy as a constant feature of politics.

In South Africa, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, the period of the transition was the most violent period in the history of the country. It was characterised by violent conflict between ANC supporters and government forces on one hand and ANC and IFP forces on the other. As explained in the preceding chapter, the transition in South Africa is intertwined with political violence, both as an instrument and as a core issue in the negotiations. However, these were acts of political violence and were concerned with the struggle for the control of state power. On the contrary the popular anti-crime movements were not political, at least at the initial stage. The mission and agenda of the movements were clearly articulated in terms of crime fighting, and their activities targeted alleged crime suspects at the time they began to operate.

Demilitarisation and Civil Militarism

One striking difference in the demilitarisation process between the two cases is its extent and scope. The public pressure for demilitarisation in Nigeria was relatively weak and thus drove a process that was not extensive and far-reaching. Although the new civilian leadership of the country has managed to achieve a relatively high degree
of executive control of the armed and security forces, parliamentary oversight of the forces remain weak and the political misuse of the forces is still occurring. In terms of the scope, only the armed forces were affected, while the police and intelligence services have been virtually left intact. In the case of South Africa, this momentum was relatively high. Although the democratic change was driven by a high degree of political negotiations and compromises between the ANC and the NP-led government, the ANC had a bargaining advantage, which enabled it to impose its terms on the transition.\textsuperscript{499} The painful history of protracted and costly political violence, the international and African sympathy for the ANC, the moral authority of its leadership (Nelson Mandela), and the near total mobilisation of the national population for change, all combined to fuel a forceful pressure for change.

The sheer diversity and number of local actors involved in the democratic pressure reflect this near total mobilisation of the South African nation. Apart from the ANC and its underground, large coalitions of democratic forces, including women groups, youth movements, labour unions, academic institutions and local civil society organisations all took part in forcing the process and direction of the transition to secure fundamental changes in governance with the aim of redressing the structural contradictions of apartheid rule. A most crucial element of these contradictions was the militarisation of politics and the notoriety such militarisation had acquired through decades of egregious violations by the state security forces. Thus the momentum for demilitarisation was relatively high, and the process was broad and far-reaching\textsuperscript{500}
In spite of the above-mentioned differences in the two case studies, the demilitarisation process in both countries progressed faster than the structural crises of authoritarian rule were resolved. The power imbalances between ethnic and racial groups, relative economic deprivations, and intractable violent crime were parts of the structural distortions caused by authoritarianism, and which also formed the new foci of political pressure from the society. With the transition to democratic governance, the momentum for change, rather than abate, shifted to these deep-seated crises and engaged the political activism of the civic organisations that emerged at the peak of authoritarian rule.

Incidentally, the demilitarisation of politics also served to embolden the civic community in the new shift. Demilitarisation of politics brought the stringent control of the state over the political and socio-economic life of the nation and its intimidating presence to an end. The end to the physical harassment and occupation of whole communities by military and security forces reflected the liberalisation of the political space, which gave way to a new wave of democratic freedom. This new climate of democratic freedom in turn emboldened the political activism of the civic community in its pressure on the state to implement further drastic structural changes. This development has had two inter-related significant consequences for national security.

First, demilitarisation shifted the focus of political pressure from the physical violence of the state to structural issues. Although state violence has reduced faster in South Africa than it has in Nigeria, the reduction in both cases has produced the same effect in
the shift of political pressure on the state from the society. The structural contradictions, which began to receive the new political attention, differ across the two countries and depended on the history and nature of the two societies. However, one common structural issue that generated new political pressures in both countries is crime. As state violence reduced, the capacity of the new democratic state to deal effectively with violent crime as the most crucial post-authoritarian challenge for public security came under public scrutiny. The democratic freedom not only put the state under increasing pressure to do more to protect citizens from the violence of crime, but also exposed the state's lack of capacity to meet this expectation.

The weakness of the criminal justice system in both countries did not just occur with the transition to democracy, but had always been an element of authoritarian rule. As discussed earlier, the authoritarian state in both countries had neglected the importance of crime as a national security threat and had left communities to their devices to protect themselves. The demilitarisation process thus helped to expose this neglect and the consequent inability of the state to deal with the problem by permitting the shift in the political pressure to crime. The exposure of the inability of the state to respond adequately to this demand provided the reference point for civic organisations to mobilise for popular movements around crime issues. In areas where crime remained endemic, popular movements began to emerge and mount symbolic and direct pressure on the state to address crime.
In Nigeria groups like the Bakassi Boys in the eastern cities of Aba and Onitsha, and the OPC in Lagos emerged initially as popular anti-crime initiatives. Their early activities of crime fighting and popular justice were a symbolic pointer to a crucial security vacuum. In South Africa, PAGAD emerged as the most popular anti-crime initiative of the people in the Cape Flats area. PAGAD's initial campaigns involved mobilisation through the mosques, rallies and marches to the houses of state officials. It was a more direct call on the state to respond firmly to pressing security needs. However, about the same time, crime detection and popular justice was increasingly becoming an important strategy for PAGAD. The transition from civic pressure on the state to popular justice against crime suspects was not only subtle but also became a threat to the rule of law and social order.

The second and related consequence of demilitarisation for national security is the weakening of social control. If social control in the authoritarian era was precarious because it depended only on state repression and the intimidating presence of the security forces in the communities, the end of that repression and intimidation took away what was left of social control. As observed above, the expression of political demands within the new democratic freedom gradually proceeded towards issue-oriented popular movements, whose activities became increasingly lawless and played out in a fashion that threatened public order. The failure of the state to democratically control or effectively regulate this incipient social disorder revealed a further weakening of social control. Whether it is because the state was unable or unwilling to contain the emerging breakdown of law and order, that it did not take immediate and effective action to halt the trend meant that social control was low at the point in time. This
weakening of social control is in itself an outcome of the demilitarisation process. This is so for a number of reasons. First, the wave of anti-crime violence began with the implementation of the demilitarisation strategies, particularly the withdrawal of the armed and security forces from their posts in the communities. Admittedly violent conflict had been endemic in both societies even while they were militarised, but those violence were different in nature from the post-demilitarisation violence.

Furthermore, traditional community self-protection had always been a feature of the authoritarian period, particularly in forms of neighbourhood watches and local vigilantes. Yet such initiatives were not violent; they were not mass-based; and they operated within the bounds of law and cooperated with the formal law enforcement agencies. Rather than a substitute to public security, these groups operated as a supplement for the state and filled the gap where the state was deficient in the capacity to protect communities. Thus the mass anti-crime movements of the democratic era were a distinct phenomena rather than historical continuities.

It has also been posited that the popular movements emerged in response to the failure of the criminal justice system to deal with the problem of crime effectively in the new democracy. This view has been strongly suggested in the literature as discussed in Chapter 2, and corroborated by some observers in the course of fieldwork. Yet it is clear that the weakening of the criminal justice system did not just happen with or after the democratic transition. In Nigeria and South Africa, the criminal justice system had always been too weak to deal with crime long before the transition to democracy. As
discussed earlier in this chapter, the police, the courts and correctional services in both
countries had either been almost absent from the vast majority of the population or had
systematically neglected their function in relation to crime fighting in the era of
authoritarian rule. This was a reflection of the narrow security focus of the state on
political challenges to regime security, while crime as a threat to public security was
downplayed. Thus the weakness of the criminal justice system in relation to crime had
always been a feature of the state in both cases.

However, this enduring weakness that had always been, was exposed by the democratic
transition and the demilitarisation process. The new democratic climate only made it
possible to hold the state to account in terms of service delivery, including that of the
criminal justice system. The existence of vigilantes and neighbourhood watches
alongside the formal courts and police before the democratic transition was an
indication of the inadequacy of the criminal justice system. As the demilitarisation of
politics took public attention from state violence to criminal violence as the new most
crucial security problem, the new political climate of democratic freedom generated
popular demand for the state to solve the problem. Because the state never had
sufficient capacity to solve the problem, it could not meet this popular expectation and
was increasingly de-legitimised even under the condition of democracy. This de-
legitimisation in turn generated the mobilisation of communities into popular anti-crime
movements as a way of disengaging from the state to provide community self-
protection.
Another explanation for the popular anti-crime movements is that they are the typical response of the poor to the security vacuum created by the weakness of the criminal justice system. According to this view, in societies where the state fails to provide adequate physical security, the rich would buy protection from private security companies while the poor would engage in vigilante activities since they could not afford the private security services. It is true that in both Nigeria and South Africa the private security industry has increasingly become a dominant actor within the security sector as an indicator of the failure of public security. It is also true that only those who are well to do and corporate organisations employ the services of private security companies. Furthermore, ordinary or non-violent vigilante activities are engaged in by the poor, usually in rural communities or in the poor areas of cities. A very good example of such activities is the Peninsula Anti-Crime Association (PEACA), as discussed in Chapter 5. PEACA is an example of normal and less organised vigilantism, which operates on the margins of many African societies.

However, the popular anti-crime movements are certainly not the initiatives of the poor. Rather, they are initiated, organised and led by middle-class people, who also could afford the services of private security companies. The cases of the OPC in Nigeria and PAGAD in South Africa, as examined in Chapters 4 and 5, reveal that popular anti-crime movements are distinct from the traditional response of the poor to the public security vacuum. OPC was organised and initially led by Frederick Fasehun, a successful medical doctor, with the support of many middle-class people in the South-West of Nigeria. Similarly, PAGAD was formed and initially led by middle-class people who owned businesses and houses. In both cases, these leaders were people who
commanded respect in their communities and were able to utilise that respect to mobilise popular support.

In addition, other similar movements in both countries were observed also to have been organised by people who are well to do. The Bakassi Boys in Nigeria and Mapogo a Mathamaga in South Africa serve as two examples. The Bakassi Boys, which operated in the eastern part of Nigeria, was put together by leading businessmen who later secured the support of the Governors of Abia State and Anambra State. In the case of Mapogo a Mathamaga, which began its operation in the Limpopo Province, the founder, Mr John Magolego was already a successful businessman and was able to mobilise popular support through his standing in the community. He was also able to transform this movement into a legitimate private security company after the state proscribed its vigilante activities. In all these instances, the amount of money required to mobilise and equip as well as to meet the logistic requirements of these movements is far beyond the reach of the poor. Popular collective actions usually require large amount of financial resources as well as people with huge social capital for mobilisation of popular support.

In summary, given the context of democratic transition, the demilitarisation of the political process created the enabling space for the emergence of the popular movements around structural issues, a phenomenon which was accomplished in two ways. First, by taking away the authoritarian social control systems, the demilitarisation process shifted public attention from state violence to criminal violence as the new most important source of physical insecurity. Thus, demilitarisation helped to highlight the
security implication of crime. Crime became an important issue not because it never existed before, nor because its levels rose necessarily, but because it became the most important threat to physical security left and thus became a rallying point for public action.

Second, the demilitarisation process also exposed the weakness of state capacity to provide physical security for its citizens. The weakening of authoritarian social control helped to bolster the new political freedoms under democratic conditions and emboldened the mobilisation of the popular movements. Although civic organisations did mobilise for collective political action at the peak of authoritarian rule, they were constantly repressed with the menacing presence of the security forces in the communities. The withdrawal of these forces was required to grant the full freedoms of democracy and to end any such official constraints on the expression of such democratic freedoms. The demilitarisation process involved the withdrawal of the armed forces from the communities, and the communities subsequently began to mobilise for popular action as an expression of democratic freedoms.

Elite Capture of Popular Movements

The ability of communities to mobilise themselves for popular action in relation to shared needs and legitimate pressing concerns is in itself a dividend of democracy, and a part of the fundamental freedoms that the struggle for democracy aspired to achieve. However, in the two cases considered in this study, the context of state weakness and the demilitarisation process both played important roles in creating opportunities for the
popular anti-crime movements to be radicalised and hijacked for different purposes through violent means by elites. In this section the phenomenon of elite capture of popular movements is examined in relation to the demilitarisation process and the emergence of civil militias in both Nigeria and South Africa.

It has been argued earlier that the demilitarisation process exposed the institutional weakness of the state in both Nigeria and South Africa. This is because in propelling the shift from a tough and repressive state to a more tolerant and less violent state, the demilitarisation of politics also permitted the public shift of attention to crime as a crucial security problem. This in turn made crime a new rallying point for popular mobilisation of pressure on the state for effective response. However, the pressure helped to expose the existing weakness of the state to respond effectively to crime. Yet the demilitarisation process further exacerbated this condition of state weakness, which created the opportunity for the radicalisation and transformation of the popular movements into civil militias.

Apart from failing to respond to the challenge from crime, the post-authoritarian state also displayed a lack of capacity to regulate the activities of the popular movements and to ensure their compliance with public order in a democracy. As the anti-crime movements became more locally popular in terms of their demand on the state, and as the state continues to display the inability to act against crime, the movements increasingly became radical and began to carry out popular justice on alleged criminals out of frustration with the state. It is at this point in the development of the popular movements where they become openly violent that the increased weakness of the
institutional capacity of the state becomes very evident. While the demilitarisation process weakened the coercive power of the state, the bureaucratic power of ensuring peaceful compliance to the rule of the state was not put in place to accompany the process. The net result is an overall weakening of the state’s institutional capacity to wield effective social control.

In Nigeria, the radicalisation of OPC and the Bakassi Boys as well as their engagement in violent justice caught the state unprepared. The initial violent acts carried out by these groups in the pursuit of justice against crime took place publicly and, sometimes, with police deployment in the scene. Apart from the failure or inability of the security forces to prevent such acts of violence, the state failed to show any immediate policy response to the new challenge to public order. This trend is replicated in the case of South Africa. At the time that PAGAD began to apply violence to their activities, the new police service did not take any immediate steps to control them. PAGAD marched to the homes of alleged gangs and drug dealers, issued threats of summary punishment, culminating in the shooting and burning of gang leader, Rashaad Staggie in 1995, under full police deployment and glare. Although the state later reacted to this growing public disorder faster in South Africa than in Nigeria, its initial inaction or do-nothing policy was common to both countries.

This policy stance of immediate inaction needs to be examined in relation to the complexity of reforms that had to be carried out within the security sector in line with the new political climate. This is because the immediate, short-term reaction of the state would be the restoration of public order, which is a serious security issue. In South
Africa, this complexity was daunting. The integration of the various security forces, including former ANC fighters, the old South Africa Police and the police services of the former homelands, into a single national police service proved to be very complex. Mutual animosity resulting from the injustices of the past and the need to be sensitive to those animosities added to the complexity of the integration process.

Moreover the differences in command and control structures and in institutional culture, and the fact that many of the experienced former officers of the old apartheid police opted out of service as a protest against serving with former enemies, increased the number of challenges to be grappled with in the reform process. The rising public demand for effective state response to crime thus coincided with the time in which a difficult and complex process of security reforms was underway. In Nigeria, as considered in Chapter 4, the process was much more shallow and slower, and thus the institutional and policy reforms required to meet the growing public expectation in relation to crime was inadequate.

However, of these reforms, it is the demilitarisation process that informed the inaction of the state in relation to the radicalisation of the popular movements. The post-authoritarian emphasis on human rights and democratic stability were new standards, which drove the demilitarisation of the political process, particularly the way in which security forces respond to social disorder. The demilitarisation process de-emphasised the use of state violence to control political challenge, but at the same time the state lacked the capacity to replace the repressive social control with a peaceful and democratic one. This difference created an immediate social control vacuum and
consequently left the state handicapped in terms of the appropriate policy response in line with the change in the political environment.

Thus at the time the popular movements were becoming radical the state did not act because it could not do so appropriately, and this exposed a weakening of the state in relation to social forces. Although the deployment of armed force to aid the police in managing internal crisis continued, they were situations where the state only intervened as a third-party between different social groups, and not as a protagonist in conflict. The popular anti-crime movements were expressions of the new democratic freedom and expectation, which were only increasingly going out of control by becoming violent in their methods. An armed response, therefore, would put the state in direct confrontation with the democratic movements, making the state a party to internal crisis.

State inaction in the face of radical popular movement accentuated the weakness of the new democratic state and thus created the political opportunity for elite capture of the popular movements. State inaction in the face of violent mob justice against crime was proof of a total loss of social control or the institutional capacity to ensure compliance with the rule of law through non-violent means. This condition undermined the authority of the state and transformed the democratic freedom to democratic licence, in which certain social activities embarked upon as democratic expression went unregulated and uncontrolled by the state. It was this licence that powerful local elites exploited by capturing the popular movements and using them to pursue ulterior interests other than crime fighting.
Conclusions

Popular anti-crime movements are captured by local elites through infiltration and takeover of their leadership. In both cases of OPC and PAGAD, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the popular movements experienced leadership crisis at the point where they became radical. This crisis involved a struggle for control between the original founders who were more moderate and a group of new but more radical members. In both cases, the latter group emerged out of the crisis as the new leaders and took over control of the movements. The emergence of this group is accompanied with a transformation of the character and objectives of the movements. Whereas they were essentially concerned with curbing the menace of violent crimes at the beginning, they began to assume the character of militia formations after the leadership crisis and change.

The struggle over control and the consequent change of leadership indicate the process by which the movements were hijacked by powerful local elites; and the gradual shift in character from being a radical anti-crime movement to a violent armed organisation engaging in acts of urban terrorism represent the phase in which the popular movements were being transformed into militia organisations. Thus, the civil militias considered in the two cases are products of opportunism, a process by which state weakness is exploited by powerful elites to brazenly capture popular movements and to use them as violent instruments for parochial goals. While this opportunism takes a political form in the case of OPC in Nigeria, that is the goals are political in nature; the case of PAGAD is more of an ideological opportunism. Opportunism, therefore, whether political or
ideological, provides a crucial insight into the transformation of popular movements into civil militias in the cases examined in this study.

The foregoing shows that in the course of implementing demilitarisation of politics, state elites are unprepared for managing and even anticipating such popular uprisings. Indeed, in both cases, democratisation was supported by security reforms that sought to dismantle the political prerogatives of the armed forces, yet there appeared to be no clear thinking on how parallel efforts could address the requisite demilitarisation of the wider society (as well as politics), which in many respects undermined the gains of the reforms.

However, opportunism does not occur in a political vacuum. It occurs in the context of state weakness, indicated by the collapse of social control as shown in Figure 4 below. In the two cases examined, this crisis of social control is generated and exacerbated by the process of demilitarisation of the political process in the course of democratic transition. The weakness or inability of the criminal justice system to respond effectively to the problem of crime had been a feature of the state since the era of authoritarian rule. However, it is the demilitarisation process that highlighted this weakness as a result of the exposure of crime as the new security menace. Under the conditions of democratic freedom, the new focus on this weakness provided the basis for the emergence of popular anti-crime movements.
These dynamics expose the inherent dangers of conventional strategies of demilitarisation in post-authoritarian environments, where the structures for public security are weak and where structural legacies of authoritarian rule have not been resolved. The gradual decline of civil militarism in South Africa as the institutional capacity of the police and the criminal justice system was being improved is instructive. Even though the structural problem of inequality has not been resolved, the improvement of the infrastructural power of the state since the end of apartheid has helped close the space for opportunistic mobilisation of uncivil groups.

The two case studies show that where the institutional capacity of the state is weak and where there are many unresolved contradictions, such as high crime rates, political exclusion or economic deprivation, civil militias could develop quickly to create
conditions of public disorder and insecurity. The case studies have also demonstrated that two reasonably different approaches to democratisation, which relied solely on demilitarisation of politics, can be undermined in very similar ways due to failure to address the institutional structures which could accommodate the grassroots malaise leading to the violent uprisings of informal groups. The last chapter will provide a summary of the chapters of this dissertation and provide recommendations for further research and policy development.
Chapter 7

Conclusions and Recommendations

The global political transformations of the post-Cold War era and, specifically, the triumph of political liberalism have produced a complexity of outcomes in different parts of the world. Defined as the 'dismantling of authoritarian institutions by means of reforms entailing the progressive relaxation of state controls over political expression and organisation, and the granting of civil and political liberties . . .', political liberalisation at the global level created the crucial political impetus for democratic transition and profound security transformations worldwide. In Africa, one crucial consequence of these changes has been the renewed quest for the twin goals of democracy and security.

The struggle for democracy in Africa has already been well underway before the end of the Cold War. Masse-based domestic resistance to authoritarian rule as well as the opposition of excluded political elites were already piling strong pressures on military or military-backed dictators for more inclusive politics after the first decade of independence. The macro-economic dislocations, which hit the continent from the early 1970s and persisted through the 1980s, as well as the consequential dire social difficulties brought upon people also served to energise these domestic democratic pressures. Thus the post-colonial twin conditions of political exclusion and persistent underdevelopment generated an indigenous democratic movement.
Yet the strong international support enjoyed by African dictators throughout the Cold War years tilted the balance of power in their favour against domestic opposition groups and democracy movements, thus blocking the chances for early democratisation in the region. Furthermore, the near simultaneous dissolution of authoritarian regimes in Africa and in other regions from the early 1990s lends credence to the crucial role of global forces in the democratic transitions of the post-Cold War era.

Disillusioned with development assistance to African dictatorships, and motivated by the view that democracy would improve the economic performance of African states and peace in the region, Western powers and multilateral financial institutions suddenly replaced their support for authoritarian regimes with a new international (essentially Western) pressure for political liberalisation and democracy from 1990 as the new global political orthodoxy. This strategic shift became the decisive factor for the experience of the so-called third wave of the process of democratisation in Africa. Thus the liberal world order is witnessing an era in which the quest for and desirability of democracy in Africa has become a shared goal for both local and international actors.

The same can be said with regards to the quest for security in the region since the dawn of the 1990s, even though the real experience of security has not proceeded at the same pace with this new quest. The end of the Cold war coincided with a deterioration of security in the continent, with the emergence of many new internal armed conflicts and the exacerbation of old ones as the superpower abdication of Cold War commitments to African dictators permitted the full manifestation of suppressed crisis into armed violence. In spite of this gloomy picture, however, there has been an unprecedented
collaboration between African and international actors in a renewed quest for peace in the region beginning with African initiatives in 1990 and, later, international support from the end of that decade.

At the national level, African governments have become part of a global post-Cold War trend in which ethnic conflicts are contained through state strategies of accommodation. These strategies involve power sharing, devolution of state power and granting of minority rights, as against the failed policy of repression of ethnic claims on the state.\textsuperscript{517} The redefinition of the mission of regional economic cooperation mechanisms (RECs) to deal with armed conflicts in the region, such as the ECOWAS response to the Liberian civil war in 1990, was another decisive factor. This new response was significant in demonstrating that the post-Cold War decline in the strategic importance of Africa would be met by regional solutions to regional security challenges. The dissolution of the moribund Organisation of African Unity (OAU) a decade later and its transformation into the African Union (AU), equipped with far more decisive security mandate and stronger instruments, further underscore the new momentum within Africa to make the region more secure.

International involvement in the search for security in Africa, hesitant through much of the 1990s, slowly gathered momentum by the end of the decade as the linkages between security and development started to receive international policy recognition.\textsuperscript{518} The UN, EU and bilateral as well as multilateral donors have since then embarked on large and expensive operations to resolve some of the most intractable and violent armed conflicts in the region. On-going support for conflict prevention, peacekeeping and
peace-building initiatives in many conflict and post-conflict countries represent, even if the degree of such commitment still fall below actual expectations, growing international commitment to the quest for security in Africa.

This new global commitment to security in Africa has been identified by recent studies as the most important factor for observed drastic reduction in the incidence and intensity of intra-state armed conflict since the dawn of the new millennium. Yet, although there are now less numbers of civil war in Africa, low-level violence and political disorder still characterise and bedevil on-going projects of democratisation in many of the post-authoritarian states. Of this new violence, the phenomenon of civil militarism has stood out as a most crucial paradox of democratisation and the search for security in Africa.

Civil militarism and low-level conflict are not sensational enough to attract international response, and they are often ignored by state elites as negligible threats. However, they constitute a challenge to the authority of the state and make the security dividends of democracy elusive. The availability of alternative and unregulated violence employed in pursuit of a variety of goals constricts the very ends of democratisation—civil liberties and freedoms, national security, and public order. Endemic low-level violence limits the scope for the development of democratic governance in other ways. The use of violence to resolve social conflicts encourages the bypassing and informalisation of the rule of law and the application of democratic processes and institutions to seek solutions to social conflict.
This study focused on civil militarism as an endemic form of such new insecurity associated with demilitarisation. The study was based on the working hypothesis that the demilitarisation of politics in post-authoritarian African states generates the emergence of civil militarism. It is the exploration of this hypothesis that this study has been concerned with. The exploration has proceeded inductively through the last 6 chapters of this dissertation, which are summarised below.

In Chapter 1 of this study, this problem was examined in detail within the particular context of post-authoritarian transition. It was observed that the current democratic transition in Africa has coincided with the transition from state violence to civil militarism as a major threat to the physical security of citizens, though in some cases authoritarian legacies have remained but with reduced level of repression. It was also observed that the point where militia violence begins to emerge in post-authoritarian states is that crucial stage of the transition process where new state elites adopt strategies to demilitarise the political process as guarantee against democratic reversal. It was therefore proposed that the conventional approach to demilitarisation in post-authoritarian African states generates civil militarism.

This proposition formed the central hypothesis of the empirical study. Two case studies of Nigeria and South Africa were selected to explore this relationship between demilitarisation and civil militarism, and the nature of such relationship. The cases were also used to explore the dynamics of such relationship, particularly in terms of differences in the impact of contextual conditions. Although both cases involved the strategies of political demilitarisation adopted in post-authoritarian contexts, they
represent unique cases in terms of the nature of the state, the history of authoritarian rule, the momentum of the democratic transition, and the extent and depth of the demilitarisation process. These indicators were used to measure the similarities and differences between the demilitarisation process in Nigeria and South Africa, and how these variations and similarities impact on civil militarism in both cases.

Chapter 2 set out the methodological framework of the study and the justifications for the approach adopted. Chapter 3 dealt with the review of existing literature that touch upon the issues of demilitarisation and public insecurity, organised violence and its governance by the state, and the privatisation of violence. The review examined two main bodies of relevant literature: civil-military relations and internal armed conflict. The literature suggested some important linkages between demilitarisation and civil militarism to support the main hypothesis of the study. The privatisation of violence as an indicator of civil militarism is suggested as a manifestation of the structural conditions of exclusion and inequality in physical violence. This transition from structural to physical violence occurs where the state suffers from the fragmentation of authority. The literature also suggests that this fragmentation of state authority and institutions create a security vacuum which is being occupied by civil militias. In sub-Saharan Africa, this fragmentation is identified in the literature as a product of neo-liberal pressures, and the process of democratisation was identified as a central element of these pressures. Finally, it was also suggested that civil militarism in African countries is a legacy of authoritarian rule, by which state violence was reproduced in the wider society, and which is now manifesting in the post-authoritarian political order. Although demilitarisation of politics is an essential component of democratic transition
in Africa, the way in which it is linked with civil militarism in conditions of fragile states, fraught with structural crisis and legacies of authoritarian rule required further clarification. This tentative linkage was then explored in the two case studies.

The two cases selected for this study represented countries in which the main variables in the hypothesis of the study were present, as is obvious from the discussions in Chapters 4 and 5. Nigeria and South Africa both made transition to democratic governance at a time when many structural issues of exclusion and inequality had not been resolved. The democratic transition in both cases involved the implementation of demilitarisation as a deliberate strategy of consolidating the new democracy. Also in both cases the process of demilitarisation was characterised by the phenomenon of civil militarism. In the case of Nigeria it was discovered that the context of unresolved divisions within society and growing crime rates generated popular demands on the state. It was also found that the Nigerian state has since failed to meet these demands and has been unable to provide effective social control against disorder. This has created more opportunities for politicians and criminals to hijack popular movements, which are being turned into militias. As the conditions of weakness on the side of the state pervades, the militias have continued to grown in number and intensity.

The case of South Africa shows similar trends. Demilitarisation occurred when the state was weak institutionally, while rising crime levels generated popular demands on the state. The inability of the state to meet the demands and to regulate the popular movements effectively also created the space for opportunistic capture of the movements. In this case, opportunists were mainly Islamic ideologues, although there
were some business and political elements. A most important finding from this case is that, as the institutional capacity of the state was strengthened from the end of the 1990s through effective policing, social control drastically improved and the civil militias gradually disappeared.

Chapter 6 constituted the synthesis of findings from the cases of Nigeria and South Africa. The cross-case analysis aggregated the specific findings from the cases into broad but consistent categories. First it shows that demilitarisation of the state and politics alone in a post-authoritarian context can generate civil militarism, where the state is structurally weak and fails to resolve collective grievances within society. The chapter shows that in weak states, the approach to demilitarisation weakens repressive social control but does not replace it with effective democratic social control, and this creates the space for opportunistic development of militias. The findings from the case studies therefore confirm the main hypothesis of this study that the demilitarisation of the state and politics after political transition from authoritarianism can generate civil militarism. Although the cases differ in terms of the extent of democratisation and demilitarisation, the failure to address institutional structure to accommodate grassroots uncivil mobilisation can produce violent militias in the wider society.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The initial objectives of this study have been met in the course of the research. The study set out to explore the relationship between demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism in post authoritarian African states, as its main objective. It also sought to
explore for intervening and extraneous variables that play a role the linkage between the two phenomena. As the study has showed, the two case studies and the activities of OPC and PAGAD is one of many examples of where a more militant or vigilant element of a non-state group can generate public insecurity during a period characterised by efforts to promote a more democratic approach to security governance and civil-military relations. More specifically, as states embark on democratic security reforms including the de-politicisation of the military, more enabling space opens for non-state actors to exert a voice in a state’s security affairs. Due to the inadequacy of conventional demilitarisation strategies – indicated by the failure of the state to deal with the culture and mindset of violence in society, the failure to improve the capacity of state structures responsible for public security, and the failure to enter into productive bargain with social movements with legitimate demands – the ability of the state to wield effective social control seriously weakened. This creates opportunities, which allow popular groups to be captured by the more radical and violent elements of the community. Under such conditions, public insecurity is aggravated and concentrated violence against state forces continues. Both the OPC and PAGAD case illuminate this phenomenon in their activities against criminals, innocent victims and the state, creating fear and insecurity in the communities.

This phenomenon of civil militarism is certainly not limited to South Africa and Nigeria, but has been observed in a number of other African countries, including the majority of countries in West Africa. In Nigeria various types of civil militias have emerged since the end of military rule in 1999 as dominant sources of widespread insecurity, including the Bakassi Boys, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, the
O'odua People's Congress and the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta, among others.

Furthermore, the study also sought to inquire into ways for developing an alternative approach to demilitarisation, which is comprehensive enough to inform a coherent strategy that addresses the linkage between demilitarisation and civil militarism. Uniting the observations taken from the political demilitarisation process in Nigeria and South Africa shows that that future strategies and policy developments in this area must embrace ways of demilitarising the wider society and not just the state and the political system. Future approaches tackling demilitarisation must address this growing problem and extend their analyses and practical efforts beyond traditional state structures and reach out to a greater society, which has been acclimatised for years to a state of societal militarisation. Indeed, change management efforts underpinning demilitarisation strategies must embrace the agendas of non-state groups which have the capacity to exert influence under the reformed and democratised structures, and which also have the potential to provide shields for groups keen to use these channels for the pursuit of more violent ends. It is also high time that the debate on civil-military relations addresses this phenomenon.

The way demilitarisation is being managed currently is grossly insufficient and counter-productive in terms of strengthening democracy, promoting human security, good governance, and conflict prevention. Demilitarisation therefore needs to be improved upon to involve a comprehensive approach that deals with militarism in both the state
and society. The lack of any existing practical guidance and adequate literacy on
demilitarisation makes the quest for such a comprehensive approach very difficult.
Given the serious negative implications of existing approaches for democratisation,
peacebuilding and conflict prevention, there is an urgent need to promote robust
knowledge on demilitarisation. This requires serious debates on how to approach
demilitarisation and further academic research to deepen understanding of how such a
comprehensive strategy needs to be approached. Equally important is the need for
practical guidance for state policymakers in new democracies. The importance of tools
and guidelines cannot be over-emphasised as this study has showed that their absence
leave state elites with no sense of direction and so forces them to introduce changes that
are dangerous for human security. In line with this recommendation, the linkages
between demilitarisation of politics and civil militarism needs to be absorbed by SSR
policy, defence reform tools, defence reviews, PRSPs, and other similar international
policy instruments.
Appendix 1

Guiding Interview Questions Used During Fieldwork

1. Under what circumstances did the civil militias emerge?

2. What were their main motivations?

3. How did the militias metamorphose over time?

4. How did your militia organisation impact upon safety and security in the community?

5. What are your personal observations and interpretations of civil militia violence in relation to public security as has been provided by the state?

6. How do you see the phenomenon of militia violence in relation to the democratisation process and reforms with the security sector?

7. What was the response of the state to the emergence and growth of civil militias?

8. To what extent are those policy responses effective and why?

9. What policies were responsible for reduction in militia violence and how did those policies work?

10. In what ways can state responses to militia violence be improved upon or implemented differently?
Notes

1 For the democratic peace theory, see Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', 1986, pp. 1151-1169
2 See, for instance, President Bill Clinton's 1994 'State of the Union Address' in which the new foreign policy direction of promoting democracy was enunciated. See also Laurence Whitehead, 'Concerning International Support for Democracy in the South', 1996, p. 247
3 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratisation and Nationalist Conflict, 2000, p. 28
6 Robert Kaplan systematically sets out a grim portrayal of how a complex multiplicity of new threats, including social, economic, political, environmental and cultural factors, will combine to 'shatter' the illusory dreams of the post-Cold War peace dividend and turn the era into that of unmanageable global insecurity and anarchy. See Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, 1994 and 2000
7 Optimists of the post-Cold War peace dividend include Stephen Van Evera, Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War, 1990; Carl Kaysen, Is War Obsolete? 1990; and Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, 1994
8 Many writers have considered this euphoria of a post-Cold War global peace as premature, in the face of growing internal and regional conflicts, existence of military threats even to US, and a number of non-military threats to global security. See Richard Schultz, Roy Godson and George Quester, Introduction, 1997
9 The peace treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, which ended the 30-year war in Europe sealed the demise of the Holy Roman Empire and replaced it with modern nation states as the highest unit of political organisation, laying down the basic premises of statehood, chiefly state sovereignty. There are however alternative views that the Westphalian state has since failed to be what it claims to be. For more of this debate see Wikipedia, 'Peace of Westphalia' at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Westphalia; Jan Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic Practice: Studies in Diplomacy, 1999; Makinda Samuel, 'Sovereignty and Global Security', 1998; Prem Jha, 'In Defense of the Westphalian State', 2000
10 Ronnie Lipschutz, After Authority: War, Peace and Global Politics in the 21st Century, 2000: 40
12 The national security dilemma is created when the military steps taken by a state to secure its territory and interests become a source of instability and military threat to other states. Works on the national security dilemma include John Hertz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', 1950, Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', 1978; and Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear... op. cit
13 In place of the 'national security dilemma', Brian Job proposes the 'insecurity dilemma', which takes into consideration the internal fragmentation of society and the weak capacity of the central state to provide adequate security against both internal and external threats for citizens in the Third World. See Brian Job, The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World, 1992, p. 18.
14 Schultz, Godson and Quester, op. cit, pp. 5-6


UNDP, Human Development Report 1994


Martin Van Creveld details four aspects in which the state all over the world is declining in the capacity to deliver on its Westphalian mandate: defence capability; provision of state welfare; control of citizens; and maintenance of public order. See Martin Van Creveld, 'The Fate of the State', 1996. See also James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, 1990; Mark Zacher, 'The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance', 1992; and Kenichi Ohmae, 'End of the Nation State', 2000

The world's first programmes for social welfare (unemployment, accident, sickness, and old age insurance) were mounted by Bismarck as the leader of Germany. See Van Creveld, Op. cit, p. 8.

While the communist revolution imposed state control and central planning in resultant USSR, the Great Depression saw a devastating macroeconomic slump in Europe and North America that necessitated state intervention on behalf of domestic populations, and devastations of World War II left the state as the only capable institution for economic development. See Maurice Bruce, The Coming of the Welfare State, 1974; Van Creveld, op. cit, pp. 7-14; and Ohmae, op. cit, p. 214


Public goods are those provided by the state due to the collective nature of their consumption and their critical relevance to basic survival.

This argument is based on the assumption that the state is an impartial bureaucratic entity that exercises this monopoly to protect the entire population without discrimination and that it is accountable to those it claims to protect. See Georg Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, 1821, pp. 188f; and Max Weber, Economy and Society, 1914, pp. 48ff. However this assumption has come under severe attack, particularly from those clamouring for the privatisation of security functions. See Christopher Clapham, 'Africa Security Systems: Privatisation and the Scope for Mercenary Activity', 1999, pp. 24-25

Van Creveld op. cit, p. 10

This threat was brought to the fore by the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Although the current war against terror has witnessed formidable deployment of US conventional forces, it is doubtful if this has been able to liquidate the threat of global terror to the only super power and its allies as well as interests.


For an elaborate presentation of this argument, see Robin Luckham, Taming the Monster: Democratisation and Demilitarisation, 1998, p589

Security sector reform (SSR) became the popular agenda for promoting good governance within the security sector since 1998 when Nicole Ball developed a proposal for the UK government on the subject. See Nicole Ball, Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British Government, 1998. However it is the UK Department for International Development (DFID) that placed SSR on the international agenda as argued by Dylan Hendrickson in, A review of security sector reform, 1999, p 9


The Third Wave has been described as the transition that swept away many non-democratic regimes across the globe since the 1974 coup d'etat in Portugal, which ushered in the military government that facilitated the rapid and sweeping democratic transition in that country. This wave was experienced later in Latin America in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the collapse of direct military rule, and in Africa
from the late 1980s when both civilian and military dictatorships began to give way to popularly elected governments. See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 1991. Yet whether this process can be called a ‘wave’ at all has been seriously questioned, owing to its contradictory pattern of simultaneous progress and reversal of democratisation. The most explicit of this criticism can be found in Robin Luckham and Gordon White (eds), Democratization in the South: The Jagged Wave, 1996

34 The concept of racial oligarchy is borrowed from Samuel Huntington, ‘Reforming Civil-Military Relations’, 1996

35 This is not limited to Africa alone. The military and security forces played the central role of underwriting the emergence and survival of civilian authoritarian regimes in the Baltics, Asia and elsewhere. See Algirdas Gricius and Kestutis Paulauskas, ‘Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Lithuania’, 2002, p. 29; and Eul-Soo Pang, op. cit, p. 586. See also Miles Wolpin, Militarization, Internal Repression and Social Welfare in the Third World, 1986


38 Authoritarian civil-military relations is used to mean the pattern of relationship between the military institution and the civil society in which the former is controlled and used as instrument of internal repression to maintain regime stability.

39 Various authors have defined the concept of demilitarisation differently. However, the common thread is that it is concerned with the reduction of military power, influence, resources and activities in the policy of a given government. Here I use it to mean the reduction of the power and influence of the armed forces in domestic politics. For an elaborate definition of the concept of demilitarisation, Darryl Thomas and Ali Mazrui, ‘Africa’s Post-Cold War Demilitarisation: Domestic and Global Causes’, 1992, pp. 157-174; Guy Lamb, ‘Reflections on Demilitarisation: A Southern African Perspective’, 2000; and Alex de Waal (ed), Demilitarising the Mind: African Agenda for Peace and Security, 2002


42 The triumph of liberalism and the end of super power ideological competition in Africa since the end of the 1990s, combined with the simultaneous influence of globalisation, made the post-Cold War era an unfavourable climate for the survival of military regimes or intervention in politics, both in the domestic and international environments. However, it is arguable to state that in order to adapt to an unavoidable wind of democratic change, military rulers in many African countries have managed to stage a come-back to power through guided demilitarisation (a process through which retreating military rulers negotiate the democratic transition to secure the continued political power of the military) or transmutation (a process where a military ruler contests elections and manipulate the outcomes to become a civilian president succeeding himself). Democracy or democratisation under former military rulers such as Jerry Rawlings in Ghana, Robert Guei in Cote d’Ivoire, Yahaya Jammeh in The Gambia, Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Pierre Buyoya in Burundi as well as Sani Abacha and Olusegun Obasanjo (currently the president) in Nigeria, exemplify the continued influence of the military and casts doubt on the genuineness of the transition. In transitional civilian dictatorships like Cameroun, Kenya, Zimbabwe, democratisation did not go farther than allowing multi-party elections, even if this has helped to weaken the power of such rulers.


44 Hutchful & Bathily, ibid
45 For arguments in favour of graphic display of conceptual frameworks, see Matthew Miles and Michael
Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook, 1994
46 Robert Yin demonstrates the appropriateness of the comparative case study approach where contextual
conditions are relevant to the phenomena studied. See Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods,
2003, p. 3
47 Yin introduces this model from the case study method used by the COSMOS Corporation. See Yin,
Ibid, p. 50
48 Guy Lamb, Demilitarisation: A Review of the Concept and Observations from the South African
Experience, 1999, p. 5
49 SIPRI, ‘Militaryisation and Arms Control in Latin America’, 1982
50 Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, (eds), War and Society: The Militarisation of Southern Africa, 1989
Experience’ op. cit, p. 1
54 Ibid, p. 6
55 Jacklyn Cock, The Sociology of Demilitarisation and Peace-Building in Southern Africa
56 This seminar, on Demilitarising Minds and Societies, was held on 7 December 2000 at the John Adams
Hall, 21 Endsleigh Street, London. CCTS is a network of civil society organisations that work in the area
of post-conflict peace-building and conflict transformation. It holds seminars and conferences as well as
publishes newsletter series.
57 Ibid, pp. 1-2
58 Howard Clark, Demilitarising Minds, Demilitarising Societies, 2001, pp. 1, 5 & 6
59 Martinho Chachiuia, Demilitarisation of Post-Conflict Societies... 2000, p. 2
60 Susan Willett, ‘Demilitarisation, Disarmament and Development in Southern Africa’, 1998; Jacklyn
Cock, The Cultural and Social Challenge of Demilitarisation, 1997, p. 117
61 Jacklyn Cock, Ibid; Nathan The 1996 Defence White Paper: An Agenda for State Demilitarisation,
1998
62 A. Ross, op. cit, pp. 563-564
63 Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee, ‘introduction’, p. 9
64 Robin Luckham, 1998, op. cit, p. 2; Eide and Thee, ibid
65 Kjell Skjelsbaek, 1980, pp. 82-82; M. Klare, Militarism: The Issues Today, 1980, p. 36; Alfred Vagts,
A History of Militarism: Romance and Realities off a Profession, 1938, p. 12
67 See, for example, Nnamdi Obasi, Ethnic Militias, Vigilantes and Separatist Groups in Nigeria, 2002;
Osita Agbu, ‘Ethnic Militias and the Threat to Democracy in Post-Transition Nigeria’ 2004; Ahmadu
Johns, ‘Gangs, Pagad & the State: Vigilantism and Revenge Violence in the Western Cape’, 2001
69 Ibid
70 Ibid
71 Nigeria led the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) first to intervene in the Liberian
civil war in 1991, which paved way for the end of the war and elections in 1997. In February-March 1998
Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops intervened in Sierra-Leone and reversed the military coup that replaced
the democratic government with a rebel-allied military junta. Nigerian troops, again under the auspices of
ECOMOG have been in Liberia since late 2003 where they have been able to halt the civil war and put a
peace process in place. South Africa has not been so aggressive towards peace support operations in its
sub-region. However it first intervened in Lesotho where it led SADC troops to quell an incipient military
coup in 1998. Again it participated significantly in UN Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of
48.
72 Details of the African Peer Review Mechanism of the NEPAD and all the Country Review Reports are
available on the web site of the organisation: http://www.nepad.org/aprm/


Charles Auger, Information Sources in Grey Literature, 1989

See Robert Yin, op. cit

Separate interviews with Colonel (Retired) Dikio Dixion and several other currently serving officers who pleaded anonymity.

Lamb, 1999, op. cit, p. 3


Samuel Huntington defines objective control as enhancing the strength of the military and making it a tool of a neutral state for missions based on verifiable facts on behalf of the society. This is contrasted against subjective control, which is sought by competing civilian groups to acquire or maintain power over their rivals in a divided society. See Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 1957, p. 81-85


Michael Desch, Threat Environments and Military Missions, 1996, p. 13 & Civilian Control of the Military...1999, p. 11

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James Burk, Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations, 2002, p. 8

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173 Patrick Regan and Errol Henderson, 'Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent?', 2002
174 Robin Luckham, 2003, op. cit, p. 19
las David Keen, 1996, op. cit, p. 15; Paul Jackson, Warlords as Alternative Forms of Governance Systems, 2003, p. 131

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188 Interview with Dr Nnamdi Obasi, a researcher at the National War College, Abuja reveals that the senior level of the military hierarchy has accepted the principle of civil supremacy. There is, however, a doubt that this has been accepted at the lower level, and this is where an unlikely possibility of coup attempt is foreseeable. Also during another interview, Colonel (rtd) Dikio revealed that it was the frustration of the military institution with the contradictions of military rule that paved the way for democratic transition. The military had lost its credibility as a result of military rule and wanted a democratic environment in which it could rediscover itself.
189 See Abiodun Alao, Security Reform in Democratic Nigeria CSDG Working Papers 2000
191 The number of states within the federation has expanded with the creation of new states by various military regimes.
193 Luckham, ibid, p. 208
194 Representation in the Federal legislature was based on population. See International Crisis Groups, 2006, op. cit p. 5
195 Luckham, 1971, op. cit, pp. 39 & 177
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222 Osita Agbu, 'Ethnic Militias and the Threat to Democracy in Post-Transition Nigeria', 2004, p. 8
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224 See Harold Dappa-Biriye, Minority Politics in Pre-and-Post Independence Nigeria, 1995
225 General Aguiyi Ironsi's broadcast to the nation on May 24, 1966
226 General Yakubu Gowon's broadcast to the nation on 27 May 1967
227 International Crisis Group, op. cit., p. 21
228 Isaac Albert, op. cit., pp. 1-5
229 See Akanmu Adebayo, Embattled Federalism, 1993
230 See Ike Okonta, Niger Delta: Behind the Mask
231 Ibid
232 See Itse Sagay, 'True Federalism, Resource Control and the North', 2005; and Dominic Aboro, 2005, op. cit
235 The name of this organ was changed by various military administrations, though its functions and power remained basically the same. Under the regime of Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) it was called the Armed Forces Ruling Council, while it was called the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council under General Abacha (1993-1998).
236 See Decree No. 1 of 1966 as contained in the Federal Ministry of Information Release and Government Notice No. 148/1966
237 The threat of decisive military repression of reactionary resistance to changes brought about by a coup that was always contained in the initial announcement stage.
240 See Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, op. cit., p. 15
243 Alemika, & Chukwuma, I., ibid, p. 25
244 Innocent Chukwuma, 'Vigilante and Policing in Nigeria', 2000, p. 17
245 Etannibi Alemika and Innocent Chukwuma, Police-Community Violence in Nigeria, op. cit, p. 21
247 International Crisis Group, ‘Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty’, op. cit. p. 16; for synopsis of these collective actions and their brutal ending, see Watts, 'Resource Curse..., op. cit. pp. 66-72
250 Ongoing court trial of the former Chief Security Officer to General Abacha has revealed the central role of the Strike Force in the assassinated of many political activists, including the sporadic bombings and failed assassination attempts. See Joseph Adeyeye, 'Al-Mustapha and the Coup Story', 2004
251 Alemika and Chukwuma, Police-Community Violence in Nigeria, op. cit, p. 25
252 Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), op. cit., pp. 51, 118 & 211
256 Isaac Albert, op. cit, pp. 1-5
257 For example, the Kaima Declaration issued by Ijaw youths demanded complete local control of land and resources
258 General Abacha’s transition programme was to maintain himself in power perpetually. See Alex Ekweume, ‘What Nigeria Lost By Abacha's Untimely Death: Well-thought Out Provisions of the 1995 Constitution’, 2005
259 see Mobolaji Aluko, ‘Demands for Presidential Power Rotation in Nigeria and Present Dangers’, 2005
260 In the course of military rule, internal disagreements over the military’s involvement in politics had divided the organisation into two ideological factions, comprising a pro-democracy bloc and those who wanted to perpetuate military dictatorship. For more of this, see Pita Agbese, ‘New Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Africa’, 1999, p. 238
261 Interview with Colonel (rtd) Dikio Dixon
262 Otive Igbuzor, ‘Constitutional Reform in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Challenges to Civil Society Organisations’, 2005
263 As a citizen living in Nigeria at the time, I personally observed the transition process. See also Ekweume, op. cit; and Aluko, Demands for Presidential Rotation...op. cit.
264 Otive Igbuzor, ‘Constitution Making and the Struggle for Resource Control in Nigeria’ 2005; Ekweume, op cit
266 See Sections 130, 153, 154, 215, 216, 217 & 218 of the 1999 Constitution
267 Interview with Dr Nnamdi Obasi, Research Fellow, Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution, National War College, Abuja, Nigeria
268 According to Dr Obasi, the reform programme announced by the President in the speech embraced the retirement of officers who had held political office, downsizing, retraining on civil supremacy over military power, and modernisation.
People who share this view include Dr Kayode Fayemi of the Centre for Democracy and Development, and serving military officers who pleaded anonymity during interview. Some of the officers were from Defence Intelligence and revealed that the retirement was a result of intelligence advice given to the President to the effect that the return of former political office holders to service would cause disaffection in the barracks among the more professional officers who had never had the privilege of political office. The former political officers had acquired much wealth and political influence and so had a lifestyle that was above the average in the barracks. More so, due to this social disparity, it was thought that some of these officers were most likely to be insubordinate to their superiors in the services. Finally it was thought that the possible combination of disaffection and indiscipline could cause restiveness among the rank and file and further threaten the democratic order.

Originally cited in Fayemi, 2003, op. cit, the Vice President's speech was the inaugural address to Course Eight students of the National War College, Abuja.


See Thisday (Lagos, Nigeria), 13 June 1999

Dr Obasi, ibid. See also Emmanuel Ojo 'Taming the Monster: Demilitarization and Democratization in Nigeria', 2006, p. 263.

Dr Obasi, ibid. This argument is reaffirmed by Dr Sylvester Odion in an interview held in Lagos during fieldwork. See also Kayode Fayemi, 2003, op. cit, p. 74.


Interview with Colonel Dikio Dixon in Cotonou, Republic of Benin, April 2005.

Separate interviews with General (retired) Ishola Williams and Dr. Sylvester Odion, April 2005

Interview with Kayode Fayemi, April 2005

Separate interviews with Col. (retired) Dixon, Dr. Obasi and Dr. Odion

Focused interview with members of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, one of the civil militias operating in the Niger Delta

Dr Obasi (ibid) revealed in an interview that the parliament has never made meaningful contribution to the public policymaking process in the security sector since the return of democracy in 1999. This is a result of an aversion to military matters as well as the lack of technical knowledge of defence and security issues.

Interviews held with Colonel Suleiman Abdulkadir at the Defence College of Management Technology, Shrivenham, UK. Colonel Abdulkadir is a senior officer in the Nigerian military. This officer was very helpful in providing tremendous insights from his various postings within defence and extensive experience of the internal security operations of the armed forces.

Separate interviews with Dr Obasi and Colonel Abdulkadir, op. cit. In another interview, Colonel (retired) Dikio Dixon pointed out that in spite of budget approval by the parliament, defence policies have not been matched with resources as defence funds are controlled by a mafia.


Ibid.


See all the Bureau's human rights reports on Nigeria from 1999 to 2005.

Ibid

Interview with Colonel Suleiman Abdulkadir, op. cit.

Human Rights Watch, "Rest in Pieces": Police Torture and Deaths in Custody in Nigeria, 2005, pp. 65-70; Interview with Innocent Chukwuma, Director of the Centre for Law Enforcement Education of Nigeria (CLEEN), Lagos

For the yearly figure of these killings since the end of military rule, see the 2000-2005 editions of the Human Rights Country Reports on Nigeria by the US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour.

Interview with Innocent Chukwuma, op. cit. See also the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, 2000, op cit

Interview with Mr Emmanuel Ighodalo, Public Relations Officer, The Nigeria Police Force, at the force Headquarters in Abuja, April 2005

The SSS in particular, in conjunction with the paramilitary Mobile Police Force, were used as hit squads against political opponents during the military era. See Said Adejumobi, Demilitarisation and the Quest for Democratic Stability, 1999, p. 5

For an exhaustive list, see Eric Berman and Nicholas Florquin, ‘Armed Groups and Small Arms in ECOWAS Member States (1998-2004)’, 2005


See, for example, Nnamdi Obasi, op. cit

Ahmadu Sesay, et al op cit

Nnamdi Obasi, op. cit,

Osita Agbu, 2004, op. cit

Sesay, et al. op. cit, pp. 16-17; Nnamdi Obasi, op. cit, p. 5; and Human Rights Watch, The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and Torture, 2002, pp. 7-8


While those in the Niger Delta have been concerned with issues of the control of petroleum resources, the militias outside the region, such as the OPC and the Bakassi Boys emerged as anti-crime outfits.


The founding President of OPC, Dr Frederick Fasehun, articulated this objective in an interview published in Africa Today, February 2000. p.24-25.

Focus interview with the leadership of the OPC command in the Ajegoro Local Government Area of Lagos State

Nnamdi Obasi, ibid, p. 27; Human Rights Watch, ‘The O’odua Peoples’ Congress: Fighting Violence with Violence’, 2003, p. 4

Obasi, op. cit., pp. 35-36


OPC local command leaders in the Ajegoro Local Government Area of Lagos affirmed this justification for vigilantism, in a focus group interview in April 2005. See also Fasheun, F., ‘The Police is Polluted’, 2000, a published interview in which the founding President of OPC gave the same reason.

See Obasi, op. cit. p. 36-37

Focused interview with OPC local command leaders, op cit

For a list of OPC attacks on police personnel and facilities in 1999 alone, see Obasi, op. cit. p. 39-41

See Obasi, op. cit. pp. 30-33 for the full details of this leadership crisis and eventual fractionalisation of the organisation.

Newswatch, Lagos, 6 November 2000. p. 19

Obasi, op. cit. pp. 5-6; Sesay, et al. op. cit., pp. 18-19

Obasi, ibid; Human Rights Watch, The Bakassi Boys..., op. cit., p. 7

Human Rights Watch, ‘The O’odua Peoples...op cit, pp. 8-9

Innocent Chukwuma, in an interview held in CLEEN headquarters, Lagos, during fieldwork in Nigeria

OPC local leaders in Ajegoro local government area of Lagos made this claim during a group interview. They claimed OPC had substantially stemmed the level of armed robbery and won the confidence and support of their communities. However, a police reform expert, Miss Kemi Asiwaju of the CLEEN Foundation, argued that the overall perception of Lagos residents is that violent crime has been increasing in recent years.

In an interview held at the police headquarters in Abuja in April 2005, the Public Relations Officer of the police, Mr Immanuel Igodalo, stated that one of the reasons OPC emerged was to fight military rule. OPC was originally used by some politician who eventually lost control of it.

It should be recalled that the intensification of state violence and repression of political pressure in the Niger Delta, especially in the second phase of military rule, had generated community mobilisation for non-violent collective action in the region. Various youth structures had become an integral part of this mobilisation and collective action in the communities.
Focus group interview with the leadership of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force in Abuja in April 2005, during fieldwork.


Human Rights Watch, The Bakassi Boys..., op. cit., p. 13

See the text of an interview granted by Fasheun (OPC’s founding president) in Africa Today, February 2000, p. 24-25.


See General Abubakar, Time to Break Cycle of Instability and Mistrust, being his last address to the nation, on Friday, 28 May 1999. See also Oputa Panel, Volume II, op. cit., p. 13

Agbu, ‘Ethnic Militias and the Threat to Democracy in Post-Transition Nigeria’, op. cit., p. 5; In separate interviews, both the OPC and the NDPVF argued that Military-era brutality repression suppressed youth political demand and expression of grievances of inequality, which were exploding now due to the disappearance of the military

See the report of the Oputa Panel, op. cit.

Apart from being a one-time military Head of State (1976-1979), Olusegun Obasanjo was a commander during the Civil War and secured military victory for the Federal troops against the Biafra forces

For instance, many years after the conclusion of the Oputa Panel, government has not yet implemented its recommendations. Neither has the National Assembly nor the civil society had the opportunity to debate the recommendations contained in the report.


Ibid, p. 7

Only the Police spokesperson, Mr Ighodalo, expressed contrary view. According to him, the police have fought down the crime rate, especially since the assumption of office of the current Inspector-General of Police, Mr Sunday Eheindero, in 2005.

The police establishment itself has affirmed this observation. See Federal Ministry of Police Affairs, ‘Activities of the Ministry of Police Affairs’, 2002

Johannes Harnischfeger, op. cit. pp. 26-29

See Chris Alden, Apartheid’s Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State, 1996

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Ibid, pp. 12-14


For all the laws passed to underpin apartheid, see

http://africanhistory.about.com/library/bl/bitsalaws.htm

Chris Alden, op. cit, p. 15

Ibid, p. 15

Ibid, p. 17

Butler, Rotberg and Adams, op. cit, pp. 1-2

Ibid, 7

Ibid

http://www.answers.com/topic/bantustan

See Butler, Rotberg and Adams, op. cit, pp. 5-11


In 1921, a large number of activists from the religious community refused to be moved from their land in the Eastern Cape. See Cawthra, ibid., p 11

Ibid, pp. 12-13; Chris Alden, op. cit., pp. 17-18

First introduced in 1923 and amended severally, Pass laws were designed to regulate the movement of black Africans into urban areas. Outside of designated “homelands”, black South Africans had to carry passbooks at all times.

Gavin Cawthra, op. cit, p. 16; Philip Frankel, Pretoria’s Praetorians: Civil Military Relations in South Africa, 1984, p. 103


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360 See Jonny Steinberg, Nongoloza's Children: Western Cape Prison Gangs during and after Apartheid, 2004
361 See Gavin Cawthra, Policing South Africa...1993, p. 32-33; Mark Shaw, 1997, op. cit, p. 157
362 Interview with Professor Wilfried Sharf, at the University of Cape Town in November 2005; interview with Boyane Tshehla, Programme Head, Crime and Justice, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, December 2005
364 Wilfried Sharfe, 'Community Justice and Community Policing in Post-Apartheid South Africa... ' op. cit., p. 157
365 Jeremy Seekings, Social Ordering and Control in the African Townships of South Africa: An Historical Overview of Extra-State Initiatives from the 1940s to the 1990s, 2001, p. 71
367 Interview with Charles Carelessen, a senior official of SAPS Crime Intelligence in the Eastern Metropol of Cape Town
368 Mark Shaw, 1997, op. cit. p. 157
370 Kenneth Grundy, op. cit, p. 63
371 For the strategic changes in Southern Africa’s regional relation from 1974, see Gavin Cawthra, Securing South Africa’s Democracy: Defence, Development and Security in Transition, 1997, p. 28. See Alden, op. cit for the international isolation of the apartheid state, including some of the most constraining resolutions of the UN.
372 Alden, Ibid, pp. 21-23
373 Developed within the South African defence establishment, the concept of Total Onslaught became a dominant source of military and security doctrine in the mid-1970s following the victory of the soviet- and Cuban-backed liberation movements over sympathetic white minority governments in Southern Africa. According to this concept, there was a communist/Soviet onslaught in all spheres against the state in pursuit of the internationalisation of communism through revolution.
374 See Alden, op. cit., pp. 41-42; Cawthra, Brutal Force, op. cit., p. 26
375 See Alden, op. cit., p. 30
376 Ibid, p. 49
379 Cawthra, Brutal Force, op. cit., p. 33
380 Ibid, p. 32
381 The new Constitution, which came into force on September 1984, did not recognise blacks as citizens of South Africa, but consisted of three chambers – the House of Assembly for whites, the House of Representatives for the coloured, and the House of Delegates for Indians. See Alden, pp. 138-141; and Cawthra, Brutal Force, p. 243
382 During its second National Consultative held in Kabwe, Zambia from 16 to 22 June 1985, the ANC called on supporters to launch a people’s war that would render the townships ungovernable and set up structures of alternative people’s power. This was to be achieved through mass action and violent opposition to cripple the organs of government. See Monique Marks and Penny McKenzie, 'Militarised Youth: Political Pawns or Social Agents?', 1998, p. 223; and Timothy Sisk, Democratisation in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract, 1995, p. 72
383 See Alden, op. cit., pp. 169-171
386 Cawthra, Brutal Force, pp 223 & 245-247; Nathan, ibid, p. 68; Alden, pp. 244-246
387 Nathan, Troops in the Townships... p. 70; Cawthra, Securing South Africa’s Democracy, op. cit, p. 50
388 Nathan, ibid, p. 70; Boraine, op. cit., pp. 160-162
389 Philip Frankel, Pretoria’s Praetorians... op. cit., p. 103
390 Mark Shaw, 'South Africa: Crime In Transition...', op. cit., p. 157

439 Gavin Cawthra, 2005, op. cit


441 Ibid, p. 56

442 Cawthra, 2003, op. cit., p. 40

443 South Africa Department of Defence (1996), op. cit., Chapters 4(33) & 5(12); Jacklyn Cock, Introduction, 1998, op. cit., p. 3; interview with Colonel Ishmael Moketse, a serving officer of the SANDF

444 Janine Rauch, 2000

445 South Africa Yearbook 2004/05, pp. 451-452

446 Rauch, 2000, p. 13; and 2004, p. 55, op. cit


448 See, Anthony Minnaar, op. cit., p. 2; and Makubetse Sekhonyane & Antoinette Louw, 'Violent Justice, Vigilantism and the State’s Response', 2002


450 Interview with Mr Jeremy Vearey, Director of the Nyanga Station of the South African Police Service, held on 16 November, 2005

451 For details of PAGAD’s violent operations, see Bill Dixon & Lisa-Marie. Johns, 'Gangs, Pagad & the State: Vigilantism and Revenge Violence in the Western Cape', 2001

452 One of the initial supporters of PAGAD, Reverend Father Christopher Clohesi, affirmed this initial popular support, in an interview conducted in November 2005

453 Interview with Jeremy Vearey, op. cit

454 Ibid

455 Ibid; Botha, A., 2001, op. cit

456 Ibid; interview with Gordon Brookbanks, former Police Intelligence Co-ordinator, in November 2005

457 Ibid

458 These officers include Jeremy Vearey, Gordon Brookbanks and Charles Carrelessen. At the time of interview, Brookbanks had retired from the police service, although his memory of the experiences as was still very fresh

459 Interview with Shaid Mathee of the Centre for Contemporary Islam, University of Cape Town, South Africa, on 20 November 2005

460 This point was made by Charles Carrelessen, during interview conducted in November 2005 in Cape Town

461 Charles Carrelessen observed that PAGAD produced more violence and fear, thus becoming a threat to security in their communities. Shaid Mattee also observed that PAGAD members committed crimes and atrocities, and were involved in illegal business, for which they are currently in jail

462 Interview with Brookbanks, op. cit

463 Jeremy Vearey and Charles Carrelesen, op. cit


465 Moses Kanyile made this observation in an interview held on 2 December 2005 in Pretoria. Kanyile was in Mkhonto WeSizwe (the ANC military wing during the anti-apartheid struggle), and later joined the SANDF after the integration in 1994. At the time of the interview, however, Moses had retired from military service

466 Interview with Brookbanks, op. cit

467 Interview with Vearey, op. cit

468 Interview with Carrelesen, op. cit

469 Ibid


472 Interview with Brookbanks, op. cit
It should be noted that the White Paper on Defence was not developed until 1996, while that of Safety and Security (police) was only published in 1998. Also, the main post-apartheid legislations on security matters were made about this time.


See Dixon & Johns, op. cit.


Interview with Shaid Mathee

Brookbanks pointed out that until the leadership crisis within PAGAD, the ANC leadership was made up of pro-ANC people

The term, jagged wave, has been used to qualify the trend in developing countries, where democratic transition has been observed to proceed back and forth, with gains and reversals. See Robin Luckham, Democratisation in the South: The Jagged Wave, op cit

The two most important sources of threat to internal social order are political pressures and criminal violence

Interview with Professor Wilfried Scharf of the Department of Criminal Justice, University of Cape Town, South Africa, 20 November 2005

Interview with Jeremy Veary, op. cit

The history of social conflict between different ethnic, religious and racial groups over the control of the state in both countries, and the fact that the state became a protagonist in these social conflicts illustrates this lack of institutional capacity in the authoritarian state to deliver public security

Interview with Professor Wilfried Scharf of the Institute of Criminology, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Cape Town, South Africa, 20 November 2005. The same observation was made by Innocent Chukwuma, the Executive Director of the Centre for Law Enforcement Education of Nigeria (CLEEN), Lagos, in an interview held in March 2005

Interviews with Charles Carrelesen, op. cit; Boyane Tshehla, Programme Head, Crime and Justice, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2 December 2005; Ooduwa People's Congress (OPC) representatives in Lagos, March 2005; Interviews with Wilfried Scharf and Innocent Chukwuma, op. cit.

Direct observation of daily life in Nigeria, having been born and raised in that country; interview with Innocent Chukwuma, op. cit

Separate interviews with Gordon Brookbanks and Charles Carrelesen

Interview with Emmanuel Ighodalo, op. cit.

See Etannibi Alemika and Innocent Chukwuma, Criminal Victimisation and Fear of Crime in Lagos Metropolis, Nigeria, 2005

See Mark Shaw, 1997

Duxita Mistry, Falling Crime, Rising Fear, 2004, pp. 18-20

The current escalation of violence in Iraq illustrates this, as other examples such as Afghanistan and Haiti. In Iraqi the disbandment of the security forces immediately after the invasion in 2003 of the country by the Coalition Forces has been associated with the current level of violence and the state's capacity to manage of public security

Adrian Guelke, op. cit

Many academic observers of the process have confirmed its broad and extensive nature. See, for example, Gavin Cawthra, Security Transformation in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 2003, op. cit

See the constitutions of the two countries for a list of these freedoms.

Jeremy Veary, op. cit

Interview with Kayode Fayemi, op. cit

Interview with Shaid Mathee, op. cit

The crucial importance of the private security sector and the fact that it is patronised only by the rich was noted during fieldwork. Private security companies were observed to be present in nearly all the houses in the wealthy residential areas and shopping malls across the country
Although it was not possible to meet members of PEACA during fieldwork, mainly because doing so was not judged to be a priority for the study, separate interviews with Professor Wilfred Scharf and Bouyane Tshehla revealed that the association is made up of former ANC fighters, who had retired from active service. These people are so poor that they operate as squatters from abandoned empty shipping containers. They have remained few in number and have not been able to mobilise popular support for their cause.

See Human Rights Watch, The Bakassi Boys... op. cit

Interview with John Magolego at the National Head Office of his private security company, Mapogo a Mathamaga, in Pretoria, on 8 December 2005.

Interviews with OPC operatives in Lagos, Nigeria, and with an initial PAGAD supporter, Father Christopher Clohesen, in Cape Town, reveal that the popular movements were in deed frustrated with the inadequate response of the state to genuine public demand for effective anti-crime measures and had to take the law into their own hands as the only way of securing their lives and properties

Interview with Jeremy Veary, op. cit

Ibid

Interview with Gordon Brookbanks, op. cit

An essential element of this new capacity is experienced in democratic policing. It should be remembered that due to decades of authoritarian rule and militarised politics, policing has been paramilitary in both countries. Until the end of military rule in 1999, the only experience of democratic policing was the first five years of independence (October 1960-January 1966) and between 1979 and 1983. Yet policing in the first few years of independence was still repressive as bequeathed by the immediate past era of colonial repression. South Africa never had any experience of democratic policing until the end of apartheid in the 1990s and, until then, paramilitary was an essential element of the history of racial repression

The definition of political liberalisation is quoted from Mark Robinson, Economic Reform and the Transition to Democracy, in Robin Luckham and Gordon White (eds), 1996, p. 70

For elite and mass demand for political and economic incorporation in Africa, see Claude Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, 2000, pp. 37-51; Robin Luckham, 2003, op. cit, p. 4

Ake, Claude Ibid, p. 128; Larry Diamond, 1993, p. 5; Jack Snyder, op. cit, p. 13

Ted Gurr, 'Ethnic Warfare on the Wane', 2000

Nicole Ball has clearly pointed how new concerns with conflict transformation and governance as preconditions for poverty reduction redirected donors' attention to security issues. See Nicole Ball, Transforming Security Sectors: The IMF and World Bank Approaches, 2001, pp. 46-47

See the Human Security Report, War and Peace in the 21st 2005, p. 4. See also Gurr, 2000, op. cit

See Eric Berman and Nicolas Florquin, Armed Groups and Small Arms in ECOWAS Member States, op. cit
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