CREST Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats

A Systematic Review Of Post-2017 Research On Disengagement And Deradicalisation

FULL REPORT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An urgent need exists for an empirically grounded understanding of the processes that lead individuals to disengage and deradicalise from terrorism and violent extremism. It is only with such empirically driven knowledge that appropriate interventions and programmes to assist in the successful reintegration of former terrorists and violent extremists can be designed, validated, updated and implemented.

This report provides a systematic review of the post-2017 research on disengagement and deradicalisation (see *Appendix A* for methodology). After screening more than 83,000 documents, we found 95 reports which met the criteria for coding. This sample of reports was coded across eight core coding themes and a total of 123 individual variables (see *Appendix B*).

Through the process of a systematic quality review, 29 articles were identified as meeting the criteria for full thematic analysis. In addition to this, the 30 most heavily cited pre-2017 papers (see *Appendix C*) on disengagement and deradicalisation were identified to be used as a comparative sample for the post-2017 publications.

The analysis of that collection has allowed us to identify the major factors involved in these processes and to assess the extent to which knowledge and understanding is progressing in this critical field.

Overall, the review found clear evidence of progress in our understanding of disengagement and deradicalisation. Comparison with the pre-2017 literature illustrates that valuable research is being conducted and published in the recent period using more robust research methods and which is providing new data for analysis and insight.

The review found that research had identified a range of facilitative causes and barriers for disengagement and deradicalisation, though work is still needed to determine the weighting of these. Encouragingly, the review also found that the available evidence suggests that many interventions examined appear to have positive impacts. Relapse and recidivism occur but appears to be uncommon.

Eleven major themes across the post-2017 research were identified and analysed:

OPPORTUNITY

The literature emphasised that what consistently differentiates those who have psychologically disengaged from others who have physically disengaged is opportunity. These opportunities can be provided by a new life with family, a new career, or a new sense of self-worth, or even an individual's incarceration. The evidence demonstrates that it is not enough to disagree with the strategies, tactics, and ideologies of the movement/groups an individual is affiliated to. Alongside this must be the perceived opportunity to safely, and permanently, exit.

DISILLUSIONMENT

Those who leave terrorist and extremist groups are invariably disillusioned with some aspect of life in the terrorist or extremist organisation. This can relate to disillusionment with personnel, disillusionment with strategy, or disillusionment with the day-to-day reality of membership. While the role of disillusionment is oft-noted, without the combined opportunity of exit it will not necessarily result in disengagement.

(DIS)TRUST

For the previously mentioned opportunity to be successful it must be offered by a trusted individual or organisation, in the eyes of the individual(s) disengaging. Without that trust, their engagement in the extremist lifestyle may be further prolonged.

When designing any disengagement, deradicalisation, and/or reintegration initiatives trust must be central. If those individuals and/or organisations administering the programmes are trusted, then there is a greater opportunity for success.

With trust in place, there is more likely to be a positive attitude towards the programme. This positive attitude is shaped by social relations and relational trust. Knowing who is most trusted, and who is distrusted, and by who is essential knowledge in the design stage of any successful programme. This must be constantly reviewed and reassessed throughout the delivery of the programme.

FAMILY AND FRIENDS

The trusted individual(s) providing the opportunity/ opportunities for disengagement from extremist organisations need not be external organisations. The most successful facilitators of disengagement can at times be an individual's family members or social connections. Family members and friends are oftentimes uniquely positioned to challenge and support the extremist in parallel.

One familial relationship that does have a more significant relationship with disengagement and deradicalisation is if the extremist is a parent themselves. Parenthood may not move an individual away from the maintenance of an extremist ideology, however, it may lead them to refrain from engagement in violent activity.

PRISON

A major finding is that imprisonment is a recurring facilitator of the disengagement and deradicalisation process. This happens through three major pathways:

1. Prison provides an opportunity for reflection
2. Prison physically disengages the individual from the group and/or other extremist individuals
3. Prison provides an opportunity to engage with disengagement and deradicalisation interventions.

Prison is often portrayed as or assumed to be a hothouse of radicalisation, though the disengagement literature paints a different picture, where instead it is a dominant setting for disengagement.

IDENTITY

Identity issues have previously been flagged as a key factor in radicalisation processes, and the review found that identity is also a major theme in disengagement and deradicalisation processes. The role of identity across the studies varied with different issues flagged, including:

1. the rejection of an existing extremist identity
2. the search and elevation of an alternative identity
3. the transformation of a militant identity into a peaceful identity that still embraced many similar values.

Overall, the findings suggest a key role for identity dynamics in disengagement and deradicalisation processes, but that the nature of these dynamics and outcomes varies on an individual basis.

IMPACT OF DISENGAGEMENT AND DERADICALISATION PROGRAMMES

The review found that disengagement and deradicalisation programmes generally work. Most participants report or show some positive impacts for most programmes. There is, however, considerable variation in terms of how the impact of programmes is measured and not enough data is currently available to assess which programmes are the most effective.

USE OF FORMERS

The potential role of former terrorists was focused on in eight of the shortlisted articles. The studies highlighted that formers have been used in a variety of different contexts and across a range of terrorist ideologies and movements.

The review found a range of potential benefits for using formers in disengagement and deradicalisation work, including the enhancement of knowledge about exits, the credibility of formers, and the possibility of formers acting as role models. However, no study has yet provided a clear-cut impact evaluation of the effectiveness of formers.

Another factor that was highlighted is that involvement in disengagement and deradicalisation work assists the formers themselves with their own reintegration process.

The general theme across the different studies was that allowing formers to be involved in such work can be beneficial in terms of cementing and protecting their own disengagement process.

SECURITY

In thinking about facilitators for disengagement and deradicalisation, one barrier identified in five articles related to security. In general, individuals felt their physical safety and security could be threatened or at risk if they disengaged from the extremist movement. These concerns could act as a deterrent for change and also posed a risk for reengaging.

A significant conclusion was that disengagement and deradicalisation interventions need to have concrete elements focused on protective measures for disengaged former extremists. Individuals who remained or became vulnerable to threats or violence from former comrades could be deterred from disengaging or coerced later into returning to the movement.

MENTAL HEALTH

The potential role of mental health in radicalisation processes has attracted considerable attention, but its potential role in disengagement and deradicalisation has been much less explored.

The review found that stress and burnout were the mental health issues most closely connected to disengagement and deradicalisation processes from terrorism. Mental health issues were also considered in terms of the post-disengagement phase. Discussions in this regard focused on the potentially harmful consequences of having being involved in violence and conflict situations. Studies highlighted that individuals may be suffering from trauma-related mental health issues such as PTSD.

Overall, these findings illustrated that a requirement for psychological support could be an important factor in the successful reintegration of individuals from a range of extremist groups and conflicts.

REINTEGRATION

Former militants face a variety of challenges concerning reintegration. Among the main challenges identified in the articles were:

1. the stigma associated with past offending

2. building a new positive identity
3. accessing practical, economic, and psychological support.

Many are highly conscious that their previous terrorist/extremist history will be seen negatively by the community around them and qualitative studies highlight some evidence of stigma experienced by former extremists.

When one considers the quality of the research data, though improved, it still lags behind the standards common in many other areas. Though a large number of studies were initially identified as relevant, ultimately very few made the quality benchmark criteria we set. Even among these studies, with a few exceptions, we note that in general, the majority relied on qualitative methodological approaches such as semi-structured interviews, autobiographical analysis and case study analysis. With one notable exception, research rarely made use of comparison or control groups.

The review identified some important gaps in both our current understanding of important issues and also in terms of the quality of the evidence available to answer critical questions. We outlined where these gaps existed and provided recommendations for addressing them.

DEFINITIONS

An important starting element for this report is to have conceptual clarity on the meaning of the key terms in the review. The focus of the review is on disengagement and deradicalisation from violent extremism. Previous research has highlighted that there is often conceptual confusion between these terms and that some researchers and policymakers have used the terms interchangeably while others use them to refer to distinct and separate processes.

Variation in how the terms are defined is also seen in the articles which were shortlisted by the current systematic review, and studies highlighted, for example, how in some cases different elements of government could apply different meanings to the terms.[1]

From a research perspective, the studies generally expressed a perspective informed by conceptualisations outlined in the work of John Horgan, in particular.[2] That perspective argues against using the terms interchangeably and presents disengagement as a concept related to behavioural change in the first instance and deradicalisation as a term reflective of psychological and ideological change.

Drawing on that perspective, this review argues that the two terms should be seen as distinct from each other. We define the two terms in the following ways:

Disengagement occurs when an individual is no longer a member of, or active participant in, a terrorist movement or violent extremism. The motivations for such cessation of involvement can vary, but the term essentially reflects changes in behaviour and does not necessarily extend to fundamental changes in belief or ideology.

Deradicalisation implies more fundamental change than disengagement alone. It requires a qualitative change in the attitudes, belief systems, and identities of former terrorists and extremists and indicates a substantive change away from an ideological commitment to a terrorist movement or cause. Deradicalisation reflects change at a psychological and ideological level and not just at a behavioural level.

1 E.g. Grossman, M., & Barolsky, V. (2019). *Reintegrating children, women and families returning to Australia from foreign conflict zones: The role of community support*. Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University.

2 See for example Horgan, J. G. (2009). *Walking away from terrorism: Accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements*. Routledge; Horgan, J., & Braddock, K. (2010). Rehabilitating the terrorists?: Challenges in assessing the effectiveness of de-radicalisation programs. Terrorism and Political Violence, 22(2), 267–291.

PRE-2017 LITERATURE

One of the objectives of the study is to assess if research published since 2017 supports or contradicts current assumptions behind existing disengagement, desistance, and deradicalisation intervention programmes and policy. To do so, this study identified and assessed the pre-2017 research which has had the most influence and impact concerning disengagement and desistence interventions.

When one considers these 30 most-cited pre-2017 articles, eight focused on disengagement from Islamist extremism and terrorism and five focused on ethnonationalism. There was one article each on disengagement or deradicalisation from left-wing and right-wing extremism. The remainder of the articles described generic disengagement and deradicalisation, without focusing on any specific ideology.

The regional focus of the research was quite varied. Four articles focused at least partially on Saudi Arabia and also four assessed disengagement from Northern Ireland related terrorism. Only three articles analysed disengagement or deradicalisation in the rest of the UK.

The defining feature of the pre-2017 sample is that it is dominated by literature reviews and theoretical development. Of the sample of 30, only five sources carried out any form of data collection with disengaged individuals. Combining these five sources, a total of 185 former terrorists and extremists were interviewed. Such a theory-building stage is nevertheless vital in any area of study. It provides the foundations of knowledge which can then be tested within future empirical research.

One can see the development of new theories of disengagement[3] and the application of pre-existing theories to this new topic.[4] These theories are developed through engagement with a wide variety of disciplines to develop our knowledge in the area.[5] The origins of our understanding of the assessment of deradicalisation programmes are similarly present here.[6] The theories developed in the pre-2017 literature are frequently applied in the post-2017 empirical literature. For example, in the contemporary literature there is a consistent reference to the push-pull model of factors that draw people away from the life of the terrorist,[7] and a variety of scholars also apply Kruglanski's quest for significance theory to the testing of their empirical data.[8]

Upon assessing the findings and proposals of these articles, it is clear that disillusionment with personnel and strategy was proposed in the pre-2017 literature as playing a dominant role in the disengagement and deradicalisation processes. These were the dominant push factors driving people away from involvement in terrorism and extremism. In contrast to these internal negative experiences driving people away from terrorism, the most oft-repeated external factor pulling

3 See Horgan, J. and Taylor, M. (2011). 'Disengagement, de-radicalisation, and the arc of terrorism: Future directions for research.' In R. Coolsaet (ed.) *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences (2nd Edition),* (pp.173-186). Ashgate Publishing Limited.

4 See Moghaddam, F. (2009). 'De-radicalisation and the staircase from terrorism.' *The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives* (pp.277–292). John Wiley & Sons.

5 See Mullins, S. (2010). Rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists: Lessons from criminology. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 3, (3), 162–193; Altier, M. B., Thoroughgood, C. N., & Horgan, J. G. (2014). Turning away from terrorism: Lessons from psychology, sociology, and criminology. *Journal of Peace Research*, *51*(5), 647–661.

6 See, Horgan, J. and Braddock, K. (2010). 'Rehabilitating the terrorists?: Challenges in assessing the effectiveness of de-radicalisation programmes.' *Terrorism and Political Violence, 22(2),* 267–291

7 Horgan, J. (2009). Individual disengagement. In *T. Bjorgo, & J. Horgan (Eds.), Leaving Terrorism Behind: Disengagement from Political Violence (pp. 17–29). Routledge*.

8 Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Bélanger, J. J., Sheveland, A., Hetiarachchi, M., & Gunaratna, R. (2014). The psychology of radicalisation and deradicalisation: How significance quest impacts violent extremism. *Political Psychology*, *35*, 69–93.

people away from membership was the role of family. People were deemed to be leaving the terrorist groups because of the desire to start a new life for themselves and their families. This was determined to be an especially important factor if and when the individual disengaging was a parent. As will be seen later in this report, these themes are often revisited in the post-2017 literature.

POST-2017 LITERATURE

While the pre-2017 literature was dominated by theory building, the contemporary literature has built on this theoretical base with a new wave of empirical research. A total of 1,761 individuals were either interviewed or surveyed across the 29 articles that were shortlisted for systematic review. This was significantly increased as a result of one article which included a survey of 924 former extremists and community members.[9]

The rest of the research ranged from an in-depth case study of one former extremist[10] to a series of semi-structured interviews with 129 formers, religious leaders, teachers, and community members.[11] This research is dominated by qualitative approaches. A total of 24 articles were purely qualitative, two were mixed-method qualitative and quantitative, and only three articles were purely quantitative. Twenty-three of these 29 articles used semi-structured interviews as their research methodology. One of the areas that clearly requires improvement relates to analytical transparency, as 10 of the articles did not specify what way the data were analysed.

In this sample, only one of the articles focused on British-based disengagement and deradicalisation.[12] By contrast, four reports analysed Indonesian-based disengagement, one each focused on the United States, Australia, and the Netherlands, and two each focused on Northern Ireland and Somalia. When considering the ideological focus of the research, 12 articles looked at Islamist terrorism and 11 analysed right-wing extremism.



Figure 1: Frequency of themes

9 Webber, D., Chernikoa, M., Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Hettiarachchi, M., Gunaratna, R., Lafreniere, M.A., & Belanger, J.J. (2018). Deradicalizing detained terrorists. *Political Psychology, 39*(3), 539–556.

10 Horgan, J., Altier, M. B., Shortland, N., & Taylor, M. (2017). Walking away: the disengagement and de-radicalization of a violent right-wing extremist. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 9(2), 63–77.

11 Khalil, J., Brown, R., Chant, C., Olowo, P., & Wood, N. (2019). *Deradicalisation and disengagement in Somalia*. RUSI Whitehall Report, 4–18.

12 Weeks, D. (2018). Doing derad: an analysis of the UK system. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 41(7), 523–540.

In the analysis of the sample there were 11 core themes identified. These were:

1. Opportunity
2. Disillusionment
3. (Dis)trust
4. Family and friends
5. Prison
6. Identity
7. Impact of disengagement and deradicalisation programmes
8. Use of formers
9. Security
10. Mental health
11. Reintegration

Figure 1 outlines the frequency by which each of these themes were observed in the sample. These frequencies are illustrative of the number of papers with this specific analytical focus. They do not denote the heightened import of any individual theme.

The report now outlines the core findings within the sample relating to each of these themes.

OPPORTUNITY

DEFINITION

This theme focuses on the analysis of the role which a legitimate opportunity for exit plays in the physical disengagement processes of individuals leaving terrorist groups. The theme also addresses the role which a *lack* of opportunity can also play

KEY FINDINGS

Even in situations when an individual no longer believes in the ideology, strategy, and/or tactics of the group without the opportunity of exit they will remain involved with the terrorist organisation. This can either be a negative opportunity for exit (e.g. prison) or a positive opportunity for exit (e.g. a new job).

IMPLICATIONS

If one is looking to facilitate an individual's exit from an extremist movement the opportunity of exit must be developed in a way to be perceived as safe, legitimate, and durable. When assisting in the development and promotion of this opportunity one must consider what value the individual(s) are gaining from their membership of the group and assess as to whether this can be replaced within the newly developed opportunity.

THEME OVERVIEW

Upon assessment of the overall causes of physical disengagement, it is clear that disengagement is an elongated process, not an event. The process often involves a slow build-up before the ultimate exit from the group. Repeatedly across the literature, there were examples of individuals and groups who no longer saw a moral justification for the utility of violence to achieve organisational aims, yet remained organisationally tied despite this. What consistently differentiates these individuals who have 'psychologically disengaged' from those who have also 'physically disengaged' is opportunity. This may be the positive opportunity of a new life with family, a new career, entering a new stage of education, or gaining a new sense of self-worth through positive interactions with peers or loved ones. It can similarly be an ostensibly negative opportunity brought on through the individual's incarceration.[13]

The evidence demonstrates that it is not enough to disagree with the strategies, tactics, and ideologies of the movement/groups an individual is affiliated to. Alongside this must be the perceived opportunity to safely, and permanently, exit. Taylor, Semmelrock, and McDermott,[14] in their study of defection from Al-Shabaab, found that on average their participants had considered leaving the group for over half a year before they ultimately left, with one member of their sample having considered defection for four years before their disengagement. In their own analysis of deradicalisation and disengagement from Al Shabaab, Khalil et al.[15] similarly observed that for many of those former members of the group participating in their research it took many months, and at times even years, to find this opportunity to safely leave. For them, a key deterrent for exiting the group was the knowledge that this was potentially punishable by death.[16] This finding is consistent irrespective of group, geography,

13 Sikkens, E., van San, M. R. P. J. R. S., Sieckelinck, S. M. A., & de Winter, M. (2017). Parental Influence on radicalization and de-radicalization according to the lived experiences of former extremists and their families. *Journal for Deradicalization*, *12*, 192–226.
14 Taylor, C., Semmelrock, T., & McDermott, A. (2019). The cost of defection: The consequences of quitting Al-Shabaab. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV)*, *13*, a657–a657.
15 Khalil, J., Brown, R., Chant, C., Olowo, P., & Wood, N. (2019). *Deradicalisation and disengagement in Somalia*. RUSI Whitehall Report, 4–18.
16 Ibid

or ideology. Bérubé et al., in their analysis of Canadian former right-wing extremists, found that for those wishing to exit, the criminal and violent nature of the groups created, at times, insurmountable barriers to departure.[17]

The sometimes-competing roles of opportunity and psychological disengagement are most clearly presented in the case study of 'Sarah', the American former right-wing extremist whose disengagement process was analysed by Horgan and colleagues.[18] Extensive interviews with her revealed that for a long time before her ultimate disengagement from the group she was developing a deepening disillusionment with the movement. Her growing disregard for the group, its strategy, tactics, and personnel had the opposite effect than one normally would expect. It provided her with the need to demonstrate a renewed commitment to her fellow members. This was to conceal her true feelings about the group, from fear of being found out and punished. 'Sarah', even with her desire to leave without the combination of an attractive alternative and self-confidence, remained a member for significantly longer than one would naturally expect, based on her stated feelings. Despite her negative feelings towards the group and its members and leaders, membership still provided her with the perception of protection, self-worth, and validation. Therefore, any longstanding voluntary exit would have needed to be able to replace these in her life. However, it was ultimately her incarceration that provided the opportunity that she had been seeking to finally leave the group behind. It was through her interactions in prison that she was ultimately able to gain the sense of self-worth and belonging needed to leave right-wing extremism behind.[19] Similar can be observed in the case of 'Carl' who, like 'Sarah', was having personal needs met through his membership of a far-right organisation. However, once these needs were being met externally from the neo-Nazi movement, he was provided with more opportunity to commit to his disengagement process.[20]

The findings from the case of Sarah are repeated when one considers the broader female white supremacist population. Latif et al[21] observed that perception played a key role in the precipitation of exit. In their research, they found that perceived necessity of exit, perceived life on the outside of the group, and perceived opportunity each played a significant role in female white supremacists' exits from the movement. Therefore, if one is looking to facilitate an individual's exit from an extremist movement, the opportunity of exit must be developed in a way that is perceived as safe, legitimate, and durable. There must be a consideration of what value the individual is gaining from their ongoing membership of the extremist organisation, and for the opportunity of exit to potentially provide a replacement of these values.

The pre-2017 work of Neil Ferguson and others demonstrates the necessity of a clear opportunity for disengagement to be initially possible and ultimately maintained. In the case of Northern Ireland, Ferguson outlines that violent extremists require social and economic opportunities which can assist in the establishment of a financial future, and a chance to reconnect with family and community.[22] Alongside Mark Burgess and Ian Hollywood, Ferguson argues elsewhere that to disengage from politically motivated violence, the opportunity given by a space to think can be fundamental to successful physical and psychological disengagement. Oftentimes prison is what gives individuals that opportunity.[23]

17 Bérubé, M., Scrivens, R., Venkatesh, V., & Gaudette, T. (2019). Converging Patterns in Pathways in and out of Violent Extremism. Perspectives on Terrorism, 13(6), 73–89.
18 Horgan, J., Altier, M. B., Shortland, N., & Taylor, M. (2017). Walking away: the disengagement and de-radicalization of a violent right-wing extremist. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, *9*(2), 63–77.
19 Ibid
20 Mattsson, C., & Johansson, T. (2019). Leaving hate behind – neo-Nazis, significant others and disengagement. *Journal for Deradicalization, 18,* 185–216.
21 Latif, M., Blee, K., DeMichele, M., Simi, P., & Alexander, S. (2019). Why white supremacist women become disillusioned, and why they leave. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 1–22.
22 Ferguson, N. (2016). Disengaging from terrorism: A Northern Irish experience. *Journal for Deradicalisation*, *6*(1), 1–28.
23 Ferguson, N., Burgess, M., & Hollywood, I. (2015). Leaving violence behind: Disengaging from politically motivated violence in Northern Ireland. *Political*

DISILLUSIONMENT

DEFINITION

This theme looks at a variety of forms of disillusionment that play a role in precipitating an individual's disengagement and/or deradicalisation from a terrorist group. This includes disillusionment with organisational strategy, individual members, and the day-to-day reality of being in a terrorist group.

KEY FINDINGS

It was found that disillusionment with organisational personnel and strategies are significant push factors facilitating disengagement from the terrorist group. The literature identifies that this disillusionment is a comparative process whereby the individual compares their current existence and interactions with their prior experiences and/or expectations.

When an individual is disillusioned with personnel this takes place after significant and persistent forms of negative interactions with fellow members. It can also be accentuated by positive interactions with acquaintances external from the extremist organisation. However, disillusionment without the opportunity for exit will not result in disengagement and should be considered part of the elongated process of disengagement and deradicalisation.

IMPLICATIONS

Disillusionment with personnel provides the opportunity to develop comparative positive interactions with external actors, thus emphasising, by comparison, the negative reality of continued membership of the group. Disillusionment with strategy provides the opportunity to promote non-violent alternative strategies.

THEME OVERVIEW

Throughout the selected literature, participants repeatedly talk about their disillusionment as playing a significant role in precipitating their exit from the extremist organisation. Latif and colleagues[24] outline disillusionment as being inherently comparative. Members of the extremist organisations are either comparing their memories of their pre-extremist, or early extremist, life to their present. Alternatively, they may be comparing it to the future they anticipated and their perception of the membership and strategy of the group. In essence, their idealised notion of terrorist involvement was inconsistent with everyday realities.[25]

Three forms of disillusionment are continuously referred to: disillusionment with personnel, disillusionment with the day-to-day reality of being an extremist, and disillusionment with strategy. As will be focused on later in the report, disillusionment can result in both personal and organisational distrust, which can ultimately facilitate exit.

The disillusionment with personnel can be the result of extremist, or non-extremist, interactions. Windisch, Ligon, and Simi[26] note that this may be as a result of a perceived lack of loyalty or integrity on the part of the fellow group members. They cite the case of 'Paul' who during his membership of an extremist organisation was the victim of a violent crime. When

Psychology, *36*(2), 199–214.
24 Ibid
25 Windisch, S., Scott Ligon, G., & Simi, P. (2019). Organizational [dis] trust: Comparing disengagement among former left-wing and right-wing violent extremists. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *42*(6), 559–580.
26 Ibid

he sought help from his fellow members they did not come to his assistance. Where he found help was from his 'apolitical' friends outside of the group. This event, and the resultant disillusionment, played a big role in his exit from the group.

> *So, this is like a huge turning point. I'm starting to realize this community isn't genuine ... they didn't care about you as people, as much as they cared about you as organizers. ... I was distrustful of the whole thing and their intentions. ... I'm starting to get burned out and feel less emotionally in common. ... I felt like the person that sits in church and is thinking about every- thing but being in church, who's mumbling the hymns but doesn't believe what they're saying. ... At this point, I start my gradual exit.*[27]

In their analysis of Tunisian Salafi youths, Muhanna-Matar[28] illustrates, through the case of 'Fatima', that this disillusionment with personnel can also take place post-incarceration. In her account of the process of disengagement, she notes that, despite the heavy-handed nature by which she was treated by the prison guards, that it was the lack of support from her fellow Salafis which pushed her towards disengagement. This lack of support made her question the trustworthiness of her fellow Jihadis and the messages they espoused. Their actions were in direct contrast with their teachings.

Within the same research, the case of Leila illustrates one distinct case of disillusionment with the extremist lifestyle. Leila grew up in a liberal Tunisian household. In joining the Jihadi cause, she gave all this up and married a Jihadi man from a poor background. After the first few months of marriage and her immersion into the Jihadi lifestyle, she faced significant problems with her husband and found it difficult to cope with the strict social rule and socio-economic consequences of embracing the Jihadi ideology. However, even though this disillusionment arose within months of her Jihadi involvement, it was not until five years into her involvement that she disengaged from Jihadi groups. In doing so she did not completely abandon Salafism but rather embraced 'the secular liberal and spiritual Salafi worlds.'[29] Her case further emphasises the gradual nature of disengagement.

In their analysis of 87 terrorist autobiographies, Altier et al.[30] report that the most prevalent push/pull factor explaining disengagement is the disillusionment with the strategy or actions of the group. In 59% of the cases of voluntary disengagement that they analysed, the individual in question was experiencing this kind of disillusionment at the time of their disengagement. This is compared to 24% of individuals in their control group. This is closely followed by disillusionment in the leadership of the movement. In 55% of their observed cases of voluntary disengagement, it was reported that the individual was disillusioned with the leadership. This is compared to 17% of their control group. Disillusionment with the membership and disillusionment with day-to-day tasks was cited in 49% of all cases of disengagement, compared to 17% and 6% in the control group, respectively.[31] This disillusionment can thus provide a mechanism by which the disillusioned individual can adjust their sense of who they are and move away from extremism.[32] This disillusionment can result in a disconnect between prior expectations of what membership in the extremist organisation entails and the reality of experienced involvement. While the role of disillusionment is oft-

27 Ibid, p.569
28 Muhanna-Matar, A. (2017). The limit-experience and self-deradicalisation: the example of radical Salafi youth in Tunisia. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, *10*(3), 453–475.
29 Ibid p.17
30 Altier, M. B., Leonard Boyle, E., Shortland, N. D., & Horgan, J. G. (2017). Why they leave: An analysis of terrorist disengagement events from eighty-seven autobiographical accounts. *Security Studies*, *26*(2), 305–332.
31 Ibid
32 Latif, M., Blee, K., DeMichele, M., Simi, P., & Alexander, S. (2019). Why white supremacist women become disillusioned, and why they leave. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 1–22.

noted, without the combined opportunity of exit it will not necessarily result in disengagement.

For the pre-2017 authors, disillusionment was similarly one of the most common themes. As has been detailed above, this disillusionment comes in a variety of forms. However, as a whole, it was identified by Barrelle as being the most common trigger for disengagement. Once the disillusionment had taken hold then family, career, etc. would provide an opportunity for exit.[33] The theoretical development of the role of disillusionment in disengagement and deradicalisation really comes from the pre-2017 work of Mary Beth Altier, John Horgan, and others. In their co-authored and separate works, they show that individual members can become disillusioned with personnel, strategies, or actions.[34] However, Horgan does emphasise that individuals may also become disillusioned with themselves and the persona or identity that comes with being a member of the extremist organisation.[35] In the situations discussed in this report, disillusionment results in organisational exit. However, it has been observed that it can also lead to an internal change in roles for the individual extremist.[36]

33 Barrelle, K. (2015). Pro-integration: disengagement from and life after extremism. *Behavioral sciences of terrorism and political aggression*, *7*(2), 129–142.

34 Altier, M. B., Thoroughgood, C. N., & Horgan, J. G. (2014). Turning away from terrorism: Lessons from psychology, sociology, and criminology. *Journal of peace research*, *51*(5), 647–661.

35 Horgan, J. (2009). Individual disengagement. *T. Bjorgo, & J. Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Disengagement from political violence. New York: Routledge*.

36 Horgan, J., & Braddock, K. (2010). Rehabilitating the terrorists?: Challenges in assessing the effectiveness of de-radicalisation programs. *Terrorism and political violence*, *22*(2), 267–291.

(DIS)TRUST

DEFINITION

This theme looks at the dichotomous variable of trust and distrust. Included in this is the role that personal and organisational (dis)trust can play in individuals' decision-making processes and belief systems, influencing their disengagement and deradicalisation processes.

KEY FINDINGS

It was found that the opportunities to leave a terrorist organisation are more likely to be successful when they are offered by an individual, organisation, or entity that is perceived by the would-be defector as being trustworthy. The same opportunity provided by a distrusted entity is significantly less likely to lead to an organisational exit. Trust is most important at the initial stages of disengagement. However, if one is to have a sustained exit these and other trusting relationships must be maintained. Connected to this is the role of distrust. When one becomes disillusioned with the membership and/or leadership of the terrorist organisation this can lead to heightened levels of distrust, which, in turn, can be a push factor driving an individual out of the group.

IMPLICATIONS

When a disengagement or deradicalisation programme is being designed there needs to be consideration of the organisation and/or individual(s) delivering the programmes. In her chapter, Christensen emphasises how NGOs can, at times, be better placed than state-run bodies to deliver these programmes than state-led or sponsored organisations. Consequently, there needs to be an understanding of who and what is trusted and distrusted by those individuals and communities for whom the programmes are designed. The trusted individuals and organisations will also potentially differ by location. Therefore, there needs to be the requisite local knowledge when designing and implementing the programmes, and time spent developing the trust which will enable the successful application of the programme(s).

THEME OVERVIEW

For the voluntary opportunities mentioned above to be successful, they must be offered by a trusted individual or organisation in the eyes of the defector. Without that trust, their engagement in the extremist lifestyle may be further prolonged. This is a particular issue when designing state-sponsored Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) or reintegration initiatives. In their assessment of how best to reintegrate families into Australia upon their return from foreign conflict zones, Grossman and Barolsky[37] were consistently told by their participants that any community organisations partnering with government in such an initiative would be inherently distrusted. Much of this is mitigated by the perceived lack of transparency in relation to the partnership. When designing any disengagement, deradicalisation, and/or reintegration initiatives, the centrality of trust must be central. If those individuals and/or organisations administering the programmes are trusted, then there is a greater opportunity for success. With that trust in place, there is more likely to be a positive attitude towards the programme. This positive attitude, shaped by social relations and relational trust, has been found to be a key predictor in the ultimate

37 Grossman, M., & Barolsky, V. (2019). Reintegrating children, women and families returning to Australia from foreign conflict zones: The role of community support. Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University.

success of the programme,[38] and has been proposed as a prerequisite to any effective analysis of any individual going through a disengagement, deradicalisation, or reintegration programme.[39]

The centrality of trust is the thesis presented by Tina Wilchen Christensen[40] in her assessment of civil actors' roles in deradicalisation and disengagement initiatives. With the state viewed by terrorists as the enemy, a purely state-sponsored initiative will find significant difficulties in achieving the trust necessary to succeed. Therefore, Christensen outlines how NGOs are best placed to succeed in any disengagement or deradicalisation initiative. Their status is not inherently tied to the political establishment many of those disengaging will have been fighting against, potentially, for years. It is the trust which these organisations can garner, due to their ostensible independence, that provides the opportunity for former extremists to be open to the external actors assisting in their exit. Christensen notes that the role of trust is most crucial during the initial stages of physical disengagement. It is then that they take the crucial step of trusting an organisation to assist in their transition to a new life. However, if this trust was to be questioned at a later stage in this process, there is still the possibility of it negatively affecting the continuation of the disengagement process.

When considering the case of the UK, Douglas Weeks'[41] research emphasises that when one considers the role of mentoring, the mentors first must be considered credible by their mentee to have any chance of success. Weeks found that being a former extremist did not intrinsically bolster an individual's credibility or trustworthiness, with one former extremist noting that "anyone that says that they have credibility because they used to be an extremist or because they understand what it's like, I don't think that is true."[42] Within the UK, these mentors must retain the perception of independence from the state in the eyes of their mentees. However, this is in parallel to maintaining the trust of their state sponsors. This can be a difficult balancing act, as by accepting governmental funding, a mentor's credibility can be undermined. Both parties must therefore agree on how to best develop these duelling forms of trust.

The role of trust is not only important when one is considering disengagement and deradicalisation programmes. It similarly has a vital role to play when considering an individual's natural exit from an extremist organisation. Mattsson and Johansson[43] illustrate this in their case study of 'Carl', a Scandinavian former white supremacist. Alongside his relationship with his mother, 'Carl' developed two significant trusting relationships which, in turn, assisted in him ultimately leaving his far-right membership and activity behind. These relationships were with his prison teacher and with a boxing coach outside of prison. As a result of the trust that he had in them, they were able to, through their actions and words, bring 'Carl' to question his affiliations and viewpoints. This is illustrated best by the reluctant acceptance that 'Carl' had when the boxing coach had him train with an immigrant fellow boxer.

When considering trust, one must also consider distrust. Windisch, Ligon, and Simi[44] emphasise the role of organisational distrust in facilitating an individual's exit from the extremist organisation. They argue that disillusionment with organisational personnel and

38 Milla, M. N., Hudiyana, J., & Arifin, H. H. (2020). Attitude toward rehabilitation as a key predictor for adopting alternative identities in deradicalization programs: An investigation of terrorist detainees' profiles. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, *23*(1), 15–28.
39 Van der Heide, L., & Schuurman, B. (2018). Reintegrating terrorists in the Netherlands: Evaluating the Dutch approach. *Journal for Deradicalization*, *17*, 196–239.
40 Christensen, T. W. (2020). Civil actors' role in deradicalisation and disengagement initiatives: When trust is essential. In *Routledge Handbook of Deradicalisation and Disengagement* (pp. 143–155). Routledge.
41 Weeks, D. (2018). Doing derad: an analysis of the UK system. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *41*(7), 523–540.
42 Ibid, p.529
43 Mattsson, C., & Johansson, T. Leaving hate behind – Neo-Nazis, significant others and disengagement. *Journal for Deradicalization*, *18,* 185–216.
44 Windisch, S., Scott Ligon, G., & Simi, P. (2019). Organizational [dis] trust: Comparing disengagement among former left-wing and right-wing violent extremists. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *42*(6), 559–580.

leadership can lead to distrust in individuals. This distrust, in turn, results in a disruption in internal collaborations within the organisation and can ultimately lead to disengagement from the movement. If members do not trust their comrades enough to collaborate with them, this can play a significant part in pushing them outside the groups.

Considering this centrality of this dichotomous variable of trust and distrust, if one is establishing a disengagement or deradicalisation programme, the consideration of whom would deliver such a programme is as important as the content of the programme, potentially even more important. Therefore, the local context is key when deciding on who is best placed to lead and deliver the programme.[45] Knowing who is most trusted, and who is distrusted, and by whom, is essential knowledge in the design stage of any successful programme. This must be constantly reviewed and reassessed throughout the delivery of the programme.

The role of trust and distrust was assessed by four outputs in the pre-2017 literature. Among them, Bertram emphasised that in the Saudi Arabian deradicalisation programme family members were used to challenge Islamist ideology. However, it was essential that these family members were trusted by the extremist, for their intervention to be successful.[46] The role of distrust was highlighted by Assaf Moghadam in his assessment of disengagement from the Red Army Faction. In this analysis, he cites the case of Albrecht whose disengagement was accelerated when she realised that she had lost trust among her fellow members. This led to her initiating her thoughts of exit.[47] These examples further emphasise the key role of trust in both natural disengagement and in deradicalisation programmes.

45 Weeks, D. (2018). Doing derad: an analysis of the UK system. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *41*(7), 523–540.
46 Bertram, L. (2015). How Could a Terrorist be De-Radicalised?. *Journal for Deradicalisation*, (5), 120–149.
47 Moghadam, A. (2012). Failure and disengagement in the Red Army Faction. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *35*(2), 156–181.

FAMILY AND FRIENDS

DEFINITION

This theme analyses the role which family and friends can and do play during disengagement and deradicalisation processes. This assesses whether family and friends are uniquely positioned to influence a person's disengagement and deradicalisation processes. It also addresses the role that parenthood can play in these processes

KEY FINDINGS

Family members and friends are not always best positioned to convince someone to leave a terrorist or extremist organisation. However, they may be uniquely positioned to help in the maintenance of that disengagement through the re-establishment of a family-based identity in the individual. One family relationship that does have a significant impact on disengagement and deradicalisation is parenthood. It is demonstrated across the literature that when an individual becomes a parent it does not necessarily facilitate any ideology-based deradicalisation. But it can influence the violent decision-making processes. This has been shown at times to have a role in deterring members from engaging in further violent activity.

Friendships external from the terrorist/extremist organisation provide the opportunity to develop external interests and networks. This can, therefore, help develop the potential future opportunity for exit from the movement. When the friendships and relationships external from the extremist organisation become more prominent than the internal organisational relationships the desire to leave becomes more intense.

IMPLICATIONS

The integration of family and friends of exiting extremists in the long-term strategy of disengagement programmes can provide the opportunity to support the maintenance of life outside of the extremist organisation. Their continued engagement both within and outside of the process can assist in the preservation of the positive non-extremist identities.

THEME OVERVIEW

The trusted individual(s) providing the opportunity/opportunities for disengagement from extremist organisations need not be external organisations. The most successful facilitators of disengagement can at times be an individual's family members or social connections. Family members and friends are oftentimes uniquely positioned to both challenge and support the extremist in parallel. Khalil et al.[48] noted that a sense of familial obligation was the most important driver for individuals to leave Al-Shabaab. The authors note instances where individuals were threatened to be disowned by their families, while in contrast, others were promised to have wives identified for them if they were to exit the group.

Hakim and Mujahidah[49] note that interpersonal and material support provided by a family member in the aftermath of release from prison can help the maintenance of disengagement through the 'remooring' of a family-based identity in the individual. The importance of the role that family can play is illustrated in the fact that the Dutch government, along with others, have brought parents in to play a more prominent role in the deradicalisation process.

48 Khalil, J., Brown, R., Chant, C., Olowo, P., & Wood, N. (2019). *Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia*. RUSI Whitehall Report, 4–18.
49 Hakim, M. A., & Mujahidah, D. R. (2020). Social context, interpersonal network, and identity dynamics: A social psychological case study of terrorist recidivism. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, *23*(1), 3–14.

Support groups have been set up to support parents of radicalised individuals, and upbringing support has been developed to assist parents in raising 'resilient' citizens, and thus prevent them from radicalising.[50]

The support that parents and family members can provide is not necessarily always in the encouragement of disengagement but can be in providing the support to sustain disengagement. This point is illustrated by 'Laura':

> *I think after my release, I've known so many women who got out, and who stood at the gate with their carton box without knowing where to go, and without any guidance. My parents were there for me when I got out, and when I just got out I lived with them as well. If I hadn't had my parents, I wouldn't have known where to go with my carton box either.*[51]

While there are some illustrative examples within the literature of the role of parents influencing the disengagement and deradicalisation processes, the empirical evidence does not necessarily support any assertion that they are fundamentally uniquely positioned to facilitate exit from an extremist organisation. Altier et al.[52] observed that 67% of those individuals who disengage in their sample maintain ties to non-extremists outside of the group. However, family/friends were reported as playing a role in convincing the extremist to disengage in just 14% of cases. This was less prevalent than in the control group. As with all others, as addressed previously, family/friends must first be trusted by the extremist if they are to have a positive influence on their potential exit.

One familial relationship that does have a more significant relationship with disengagement and deradicalisation is if the extremist is a parent themselves. Milla, Hudiyana, and Arifin[53] assert that parenthood may not move an individual away from the maintenance of a jihadist ideology. However, it may lead them to refrain from being drawn into the battlefield. This is supported by the research of Simi, Windisch, Harris, and Ligon[54] who observed that offspring were observed to be the most common familial relationship related to disengagement. In the case of 'Ulf', Mattsson and Johansson[55] noted that he made several attempts to leave. These planned exits were not due to any loss in ideological belief but because of a desire to build a better life for himself, his partner, and his children. However, despite this desire, he did not have the opportunities described earlier, and thus remained involved.

In contrast, a successful exit is illustrated by the case of Susanne who details that it was not the ideology of her extremist organisation that pushed her away but her concern that this would lead to the stigmatisation of her whole family, including her children.

> *"Cos well the whole neighbourhood knew who we are and so on and when my eldest was not invited to a birthday party one time, because we're Nazis aren't we . . . then explain that to your child."*[56]

50 Sikkens, E., van San, M. R. P. J. R. S., Sieckelinck, S. M. A., & de Winter, M. (2017). Parental Influence on Radicalization and De-radicalization according to the Lived Experiences of Former Extremists and their Families. *Journal for Deradicalization*, *12*, 192–226.
51 Ibid, p.210
52 Altier, M. B., Leonard, B. E., Shortland, N. D., & Horgan, J. G. (2017). Why they leave: An analysis of terrorist disengagement events from eighty-seven autobiographical accounts. *Security Studies*, *26*(2), 305–332
53 Milla, M. N., Hudiyana, J., & Arifin, H. H. (2020). Attitude toward rehabilitation as a key predictor for adopting alternative identities in deradicalization programs: An investigation of terrorist detainees' profiles. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, *23*(1), 15–28.
54 Simi, P., Windisch, S., Harris, D., & Ligon, G. (2019). Anger from Within: The Role of Emotions in Disengagement from Violent Extremism. *Journal of Qualitative Criminal Justice & Criminology, 7*(2), 3–36.
55 Mattsson, C., & Johansson, T. (2019). Leaving hate behind – Neo-Nazis, significant others and disengagement. *Journal for Deradicalization*, *18,* 185–216.
56 van de Wetering, D., Zick, A., & Mietke, H. (2018, p.122). Extreme right women, (dis-) engagement and deradicalisation: findings from a qualitative study. *International journal of developmental science*, *12*(1-2), 115–127.

One can consider the role of friends and other social connections in similar ways to family members. If they are trusted individuals who can provide an opportunity for disengagement they can have a positive impact on the disengagement process. These can relate to new friendships developed outside of the group, old friendships preceding extremist involvement, or friendships developed within the movement. Christensen[57] points to the importance of relationships external from the group during the process of disengagement. These can be formal relationships with mentors, employees, state actors, or NGOs, or informal relationships with family or friends. These relationships provide the opportunity to develop interests and networks outside the extremist organisation, and, in turn, develop the individual's social skills. This can, in turn, help create the perceived opportunity for a safe and successful exit from the movement.

It was observed for those friendships external from the organisation that the desire to leave may become more intense if and when these friendships become more prominent than the extremist ones. In other instances, the desire to leave the group is accentuated if and when an individual's friend within the group leaves.[58] Therefore, when considering the role of either family or friends, it is imperative to consider not just the presence of the relationship but also the value in which the potentially disengaged member places on these relationships.

The role of family and friends was one of the most dominant themes in the pre-2017 literature. In his psychological analysis of disengagement, Horgan cites the words of Garfinkel when saying that 'change often hinges on a relationship with a mentor or friend.'[59] This phrase neatly summarises the theme of family and friends in the pre-2017 literature. Family relationships are some of the most successful pull factors drawing an individual away from terrorism.[60] However, as emphasised in the (dis)trust theme, trusted family members have also been seen to be used in pre-2017 programmes in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.[61] In the pre-2017 literature, due to the lack of empirical evidence, there was not as nuanced an understanding of the role of families in these processes.

57 Christensen, T. W. (2020). Civil actors' role in deradicalisation and disengagement initiatives: When trust is essential. In S. J. Hansen & S. Lid (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Deradicalisation and Disengagement* (pp. 143–155). Routledge.

58 Simi, P., Windisch, S., Harris, D., & Ligon, G. (2019). Anger from within: The role of emotions in disengagement from violent extremism. *Journal of Qualitative Criminal Justice & Criminology, 7*(2), 3–36.

59 Horgan, J. (2009). Individual disengagement. *T. Bjorgo, & J. Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Disengagement from political violence. New York: Routledge*. P.21

60 Barrelle, K. (2015). Pro-integration: disengagement from and life after extremism. *Behavioral sciences of terrorism and political aggression*, *7*(2), 129–142.

61 Bertram, L. (2015). How Could a Terrorist be De-Radicalised?. *Journal for Deradicalisation*, (5), 120–149.

PRISON

DEFINITION

This theme looks at the role of prison and detention can play in an individual's disengagement and/or deradicalisation from a terrorist group. This includes the impact of imprisonment as a catalyst for change as well as an environment for administering disengagement and deradicalisation interventions.

KEY FINDINGS

Imprisonment is a major facilitator of disengagement and deradicalisation processes. This happens through three major pathways: 1) providing an opportunity for reflection, 2) prison physically disengages the individual from the group and/or other extremist individuals, and 3) prison provides an opportunity for individuals to engage with disengagement and deradicalisation interventions.

IMPLICATIONS

Prison is the dominant environment in which disengagement and deradicalisation occur. Rather than see prison as a hothouse for radicalisation, it is more accurate to see it as presenting an effective environment and opportunity to facilitate change.

THEME OVERVIEW

The impact of prison on disengagement and deradicalisation was the dominant theme to occur across the shortlisted articles, appearing as a significant factor in 12 of the 29. The major finding was that imprisonment was a recurring facilitator of the disengagement and deradicalisation process. This positive role for prison applied across a range of different terrorist groups and ideological spectrums, including nationalist separatists, left- and right-wing extremists, and religiously motivated terrorists.

Three major ways in which prison had an impact are identified over the articles. The first way was in relation to prison providing an opportunity for reflection for the individual to think back on past behaviour and past decisions and to consider a change in lifestyle and orientation.[62] The second factor was in relation to physical disengagement from the group and other extreme individuals.[63] This physical separation was linked to the first element of prison of providing an opportunity for reflection and reassessment of life choices and life goals. The third element, but one which was least common across the articles, was in relation to the opportunity for individuals to engage in specific disengagement and deradicalisation interventions in a prison setting.[64]

Typical of the reflective experience account of prison is the account provided in the case study of "Sarah" given by Horgan, Altier, Shortland, and Taylor (2017):

> *… federal prison 'changed her life' and that there were several contributing*

factors related to her stay in prison that greatly influenced her decision to eventually walk away from the movement. She stressed that if she had not experienced these other contributing factors, she is unsure if she would have been able 'to seal the deal' and 'really truly make that break.' Incarceration provided physical separation from the movement and,

62 E.g. Chalmers, I. (2017). Countering violent extremism in Indonesia: Bringing back the Jihadists. *Asian Studies Review, 41*(3), 331–351.
63 E.g. Latif, M., Blee, K., DeMichele, M., Simi, P., & Alexander, S. (2019). Why white supremacist women become disillusioned, and why they leave. *The Sociological Quarterly,* 1–22.
64 E.g. Webber, D., Chernikova, M., Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Hettiarachchi, M., Gunaratna, R., ... & Belanger, J. J. (2018). Deradicalizing detained terrorists. *Political Psychology, 39*(3), 539–556.

according to Sarah, afforded her the opportunity to confront the doubts she struggled to conceal as part of the movement[65]

The finding that prison provides an important opportunity to rethink involvement in extremism also applied in the context of prisoners who were housed with fellow terrorist or extremist prisoners. Prison is often portrayed as or assumed to be a hothouse of radicalisation, though the disengagement literature paints a different picture, where instead it is a dominant setting for disengagement. An example of settings where terrorists experience prison with other terrorist prisoners comes from the Northern Ireland-focused studies. Ferguson and McAuley (2017), for example, provided accounts of interviews with former Northern Irish paramilitary prisoners from both republican and Loyalist factions. As one interviewee noted:

> *Prison just gives you an opportunity to be detached from the conflict. It's a dubious way to be detached, but you're detached from it and it gives you time to think. You come out with pretty clear ideas in your head. It's pretty difficult after that period of time when you're away and you go back and see your friends and colleagues from before and some of them are thinking in exactly the same way as they did in the early seventies. How's this happening like? And then they think because you've been in prison it's softened you or broken you or whatever, but that's not the case. It's just common sense, pragmatism. You can't go on killing each other forever. Some time you're going to have to talk, so why not do it now rather than go through another ten, twenty (or whatever) years of conflict?*[66]

The prison experience did not always represent a permanent disengagement from extremism. In the life-course interview-based studies, cases were highlighted of individuals who expressed apparently genuine desires to move away from the extremism during their time in jail but who regressed on release, such as when they returned to old relationships connected to the movement and felt they had no choice but to remain. It was noted that in many of these cases, the individual did eventually disengage, and in their reflection on the prison disengagement process was highlighted as a significant stage in the process.

Overall, the very strong connection between imprisonment and disengagement identified in the review studies is supported by the growing evidence that recidivism rates for released terrorist prisoners appear to be remarkably low.[67] The evidence suggests that prison tends to 'work' in terms of disengaging terrorists. The review's overall findings suggest this positive benefit, in most cases, is not the result of focused interventions (though these seem to help, as will be discussed in the next section) but rather to more general impacts of imprisonment.

For the pre-2017 researchers, the key role that prison played was in the creation of a context and an opportunity to make a new start external from the group, and potentially to move away from the ideological viewpoint perpetuated by the extremist organisation.[68] In forcing individuals 'off the battlefield', it gave them the opportunity to reconsider their options.[69]

65 Horgan, J., Altier, M. B., Shortland, N., & Taylor, M. (2017, p.71). Walking away: the disengagement and de-radicalisation of a violent right-wing extremist. Behavioral sciences of terrorism and political aggression, 9(2), 63–77.
66 Ferguson, N., & McAuley, J. W. (2017, p.118). Ulster loyalist accounts of armed mobilization, demobilization and decommissioning. In L. Borsi & G. De Fazio (Eds.), *The Troubles in Northern Ireland and Theories of Social Movements* (pp. 111–128). Amsterdam University Press.
67 E.g. Renard, T. (2020). 'Overblown: Exploring the gap between the fear of terrorist recidivism and the evidence.' *CTC Sentinel, 13*(4), 1–11.
68 Doosje, B., Moghaddam, F. M., Kruglanski, A. W., De Wolf, A., Mann, L., & Feddes, A. R. (2016). Terrorism, radicalisation and de-radicalisation. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, *11*, 79–84.
69 Ferguson, N. (2016). Disengaging from terrorism: A Northern Irish experience. *Journal for Deradicalisation*, *6*(1), 1–28.

IDENTITY

DEFINITION

This theme looks at the role that an individual's sense of identity can play in disengagement and/or deradicalisation. Identity refers to the individual's concept of themselves. Identity can be fluid and have numerous elements.

KEY FINDINGS

Identity change is a major theme in disengagement and deradicalisation processes. This can involve 1) the rejection of an existing extremist identity, 2) the search and elevation of an alternative identity, and/or 3) the transformation of a militant identity into a peaceful identity that still embraces many similar values.

IMPLICATIONS

Identity transformation appears to be one key element of successful disengagement from violent extremism and terrorism. In designing interventions it is worth considering how the intervention will impact on identity and facilitates the emergence of a more positive sense of identity. The positive elements are often pre-existing elements of identity which have been submerged by the extremist identity. Assessing change in identity can also be a useful metric for evaluating the impact of interventions.

THEME OVERVIEW

Identity issues previously have been flagged as a key factor in radicalisation processes, and the review found that identity is also a major theme in disengagement and deradicalisation processes. The role of identity across the studies varied, with different issues flagged, including 1) the rejection of an existing extremist identity, 2) the search and elevation of an alternative identity, or 3) the transformation of a militant identity into a peaceful identity which still embraced many similar values.

The disengagement process can understandably represent a threat to an individual's current sense of identity and this issue was particularly flagged in studies based on qualitative analysis of interviews with terrorists and extremists. Syafiq's 2019 study, for example, was based on semi-structured interviews with seven Indonesian terrorists. Syafiq concluded that for all seven prisoners, the disengagement and deradicalisation process had resulted in the prisoners experiencing threats to their identity. These threats came from a variety of directions, including from former comrades that they were no longer true Muslims, and from the wider community that they remained dangerous terrorists. In both cases, the individual's new sense of identity was under serious challenge.[70]

How individuals processed identity transformation was identified as a potentially important factor in preventing relapse following disengagement. Milla, Hudiyana, and Arifin found that for 89 detainees in Indonesia, more positive attitudes to disengagement and deradicalisation interventions were associated with the adoption of alternative identities.[71]

70 Syafiq, M. (2019). Deradicalisation and disengagement from terrorism and threat to identity: An Analysis of former jihadist prisoners' accounts. *Psychology and Developing Societies, 31*(2), 227–251

71 Milla, M. N., Hudiyana, J., & Arifin, H. H. (2020). Attitude toward rehabilitation as a key predictor for adopting alternative identities in deradicalisation programs: An investigation of terrorist detainees' profiles. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 23*(1), 15–28.

A number of the studies based on detailed interviews with extremists highlighted that identity transformation from the individual's perspective was built around positive elements of an older or existing identity rather than primarily about the abandonment of the current extremist identity. For example, van de Wetering, Zick, and Mietke's study on right-wing extremist women found that:

The narratives created by the female exiters are all characterised by a principal motive of a good self that enters into – or has always been in – contradiction with the extreme right environment. In this sense disengagement from the extreme right group or organisation does not mean a break with established forms of self-interpretation and identity creation.[72]

In the context of that study, the positive identity might centre around the concept of being a good mother and caring for her children, and for the elevation of this perceived as an already pre-existing identity element to be a key element in the disengagement and deradicalisation process. This finding was strongly echoed by others studies looking at women extremists. For example, consider this quote from an interviewee in the Da Silva et al. study:

> *"It was at the pre-prison stage and then prison itself (…) it was the time to digest the concept in the affective sense—how could we recover from a certain sloppiness towards the kids, sloppiness in the sense of oversight of our role as parents? … when I leave prison, I will dedicate the nextten years to my children, and that's what I did."*[73]

This trend also was identified in interviews with jihadi prisoners where the elevation of an identity based around family in some cases correlated with the rejection of the militant identity.[74]

Not all identity transformation was found to be based on the complete rejection of a militant identity. Some research found that identity transformation can focus on remaining committed to some principles but changing the methods of achieving these. For example, Joyce and Lynch's research on former paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland found that many viewed their current core identities still in terms of acting on behalf of their communities. As one interviewee observed:

> *I have been involved in my community from day one. This is what I've been doing all my life. Trying to make my community better. I am still fighting for my community. It's a different fight but it's the same in many ways.* (Republican ex-prisoner)[75]

This finding helps explain the popularity of community-based found among the ex-prisoners. As Joyce and Lynch noted, the former prisoners'

> *…role in preventive work allows ex-prisoners to create a sense of identity continuity which, in turn, can serve a variety of functions. …. Ex-prisoners' role in preventative work provides them with an opportunity to emphasize the continuity of their identity, post conflict.*[76]

Overall, the findings suggest a key role for identity dynamics in disengagement and deradicalisation processes, but that the nature of these dynamics and

72 van de Wetering, D., Zick, A., & Mietke, H. (2018, p.124). Extreme right women, (dis-) engagement and deradicalisation: findings from a qualitative study. International journal of developmental science, 12(1-2), 115–127.
73 Da Silva, R., Fernández-Navarro, P., Gonçalves, M. M., Rosa, C., & Silva, J. (2020, p.461). Disengagement from political violence and deradicalisation: A narrative-dialogical perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 43(6), 444–467.
74 Hakim, M. A., & Mujahidah, D. R. (2020). Social context, interpersonal network, and identity dynamics: A social psychological case study of terrorist recidivism. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 23(*1), 3–14.
75 Joyce, C., & Lynch, O. (2017, p.1077). "Doing Peace": The role of ex-political prisoners in violence prevention initiatives in Northern Ireland. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40*(12), 1072–1090
76 Ibid

outcomes varies on an individual basis. The research suggests, though, that it is important to consider identity – and what happens to it – when considering the design and evaluation of interventions in this field.

Consistent with the contemporary literature, identity was widely addressed in the pre-2017 research. Altier and colleagues highlighted that in the aftermath of leaving the terrorist group that individuals need to construct a new identity bringing together their new and previous lives and roles.[77] This is a key challenge for them as they look to develop their new identity while engaging with those who continue to associate them with their prior extremist identity. Barrelle places significant emphasis on the role of identity change. In her 2015 piece, she emphasises that during the disengagement process the individual needs to realign their personal and social identity away from the organisational identity which may have once played such a dominant part for them in defining who they were.[78]

77 Altier, M. B., Thoroughgood, C. N., & Horgan, J. G. (2014). Turning away from terrorism: Lessons from psychology, sociology, and criminology. *Journal of peace research*, *51*(5), 647–661.
78 Barrelle, K. (2015). Pro-integration: disengagement from and life after extremism. *Behavioral sciences of terrorism and political aggression*, *7*(2), 129–142.

IMPACT OF DISENGAGEMENT AND DERADICALISATION PROGRAMMES

DEFINITION

This theme looks at the impact of programmes and interventions which are designed to facilitate disengagement and/or deradicalisation from terrorism or violent extremism. This applies both to custodial and community-based programmes.

KEY FINDINGS

Generally, disengagement and deradicalisation programmes seem to work, with most participants reporting or showing some positive impacts for most programmes.

IMPLICATIONS

The evidence supports the development and use of disengagement and deradicalisation programmes with terrorist and extremist offenders. Taken as a whole, these interventions show positive impacts in a majority of cases. However, they do not work in 100% of cases and evidence is currently lacking on what elements of such programmes are the most effective.

THEME OVERVIEW

Following from the frequent finding around the generally positive impact of imprisonment, a related notable finding from the review is that by and large disengagement and deradicalisation programme interventions also appear to work.

One immediate question raised by many studies is how to measure the effectiveness of interventions. Traditionally, prison-based interventions are often assessed in terms of recidivism statistics. Most of the interventions here, however, are not assessed in those terms. One reason for this is potentially related to the fact that terrorist prisoners appear to have surprisingly low recidivism statistics, in general. For example, in a study examining the Dutch Terrorists, Extremists, and Radicals' (TER) approach for intervening with terrorist and extremist prisoners, Van der Heide and Schuurman noted the "striking low" recidivism rate for the sample of 189 clients supervised by the TER team: just eight showed terrorism-related recidivism (4.2%), with another three cases of non-terrorism-related recidivism reported (5.8% overall). Interestingly, these rates are comparable to the low levels seen in most other countries.[79]

The Van der Heide and Schuurman assessment tended instead to focus on a process evaluation of the TER approach and noted that it suffered from increasing financial pressure as time progressed, as it was viewed as an expensive programme to run and some elements were cut from the intervention as time progressed.[80]

Other studies have tried to use other indications of impact apart from recidivism rates. In many cases, this has focused on attitude change among the individuals who undertake the programmes. For example, Webber et al. reported on the impact of rehabilitation programmes on former LTTE prisoners in Sri Lanka. The study found that a more intensive programme administered to 490 prisoners resulted in a significant

79 Van der Heide, L., & Schuurman, B. (2018). Reintegrating terrorists in the Netherlands: Evaluating the Dutch approach. *Journal for Deradicalisation, 17,* 196–239.
80 Ibid

reduction in extremist attitudes compared to the reduction seen for 111 prisoners who experienced a less intense programme. Interestingly, both groups overall showed a reduction in extremist attitudes and were also found to hold less- extreme attitudes following the programme compared to a matched community sample living in areas formerly controlled by LTTE.[81] The combination of relatively large numbers, comparisons between two different types of intervention, and comparison with a control group make this one of the most rigorous studies currently available on disengagement and deradicalisation.

The Webber et al. finding that interventions can have a significant positive impact is largely supported by other studies though none have quite such a robust methodology. The Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM) intervention used in Australia, for example, has been the focus of some evaluative work.[82] PRISM is a voluntary, needs-based intervention that varies in terms of its content on a case-by-case basis. The intervention is delivered by a team of psychologists working in partnership with a religious support officer (RSO), and services and programs officers (SAPOs).

In an evaluation of the PRISM prison intervention used in Australia with terrorist prisoners, Cherney found that the longer prisoners engaged with PRISM, the more likely they were to show indications of disengagement and that most prisoners reported positive benefits from having completed the programme. The three main benefits identified by a sample of 12 prisoners who undertook PRISM were 1) having an opportunity to engage with PRISM staff and talk issues through in a non-judgemental manner, 2) developing skills to help deal with stress, anxiety, and frustration that can result from being incarcerated, and 3) helping prisoners to self-reflect and gain insight into their offending.[83]

Support for a positive impact of interventions was also found by Muluk, Umam, and Milla in a study examining 66 prisoners who participated in the Indonesian Terrorist Rehabilitation Program. The research identified two psychological interventions – emotional expression training and cognitive flexibility training – that were associated with increasing prisoners' acceptance of democratic life and more positive attitudes towards the state.[84] Research also suggests that prisoners' attitudes to a rehabilitation intervention prior to its start can be a significant predictor of the impact of the intervention. In another study focused on Indonesian prisoners, Milla, Hudiyana, and Arifin found that a positive attitude toward the rehabilitation program correlates with a decrease in support for radicalism, particularly for support to jihad as war. This study was based on interview profiles for 89 terrorist prisoners held in Indonesian prisons.[85]

Differing from the contemporary literature, the pre-2017 research provides a more descriptive assessment of deradicalisation and disengagement programmes. The authors did not have the same levels of access to data that we witness today and were, therefore, unable to carry out the empirical reviews which are possible today. What was being emphasised in the analysis of programmes in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere was that the programmes showed potential[86] and could serve as a source for inspiration for programmes

81 Webber, D., Chernikova, M., Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Hettiarachchi, M., Gunaratna, R., ... & Belanger, J. J. (2018). Deradicalizing detained terrorists. *Political Psychology, 39*(3), 539–556.

82 Cherney, A. (2018). Supporting disengagement and reintegration: qualitative outcomes from a custody-based counter radicalisation intervention. *Journal for Deradicalisation, 17,* 1-27; Cherney, A., & Belton, E. (2019). Assessing intervention outcomes targeting radicalised offenders: Testing the pro integration model of extremist disengagement as an evaluation tool. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 1-19.*

83 Cherney, A. (2018). Supporting disengagement and reintegration: qualitative outcomes from a custody-based counter radicalisation intervention. *Journal for Deradicalisation, 17,* 1-27; Cherney, A., & Belton, E. (2019). Evaluating case-managed approaches to counter radicalization and violent extremism: An example of the Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM) intervention. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 1-21.*

84 Muluk, H., Umam, A. N., & Milla, M. N. (2020). Insights from a deradicalisation program in Indonesian prisons: The potential benefits of psychological intervention prior to ideological discussion. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 23*(1), 42–53.

85 Milla, M. N., Hudiyana, J., & Arifin, H. H. (2020). Attitude toward rehabilitation as a key predictor for adopting alternative identities in deradicalisation programs: An investigation of terrorist detainees' profiles. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 23*(1), 15–28.

86 Horgan, J., & Altier, M. B. (2012). The future of terrorist de-radicalisation programs. *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 83-90.

elsewhere.[87] However, further empirical analysis (as seen in the post-2017 literature) was deemed necessary.

87 Stern, J. (2010). Mind over martyr: How to deradicalize Islamist extremists. *Foreign Affairs*, 95–108.

USE OF FORMERS

DEFINITION

This theme looks at the role that former extremists and terrorists can play in disengagement and/or deradicalisation.

KEY FINDINGS

There is a range of potential benefits for using formers in disengagement and deradicalisation work, including 1) enhanced knowledge about the exit process, 2) the credibility the involvement of formers can give to interventions, 3) the potential for formers to act as role models for change, and 4) involvement reinforces the formers' own disengagement process. However, no study has yet provided a clear-cut impact evaluation of the effectiveness of formers.

IMPLICATIONS

The review finds general theoretical support for the use of formers in disengagement and deradicalisation work, with a range of potential benefits highlighted. However, evaluations are still needed to provide clearer evidence on the impact of formers in such roles.

THEME OVERVIEW

The potential role of former terrorists in facilitating disengagement or deradicalisation is a topic that has attracted increasing attention. Government support for such practice has fluctuated over the years. Eight of the shortlisted studies considered in some capacity the role that formers could play. None of the articles, however, provided a clear-cut evaluation of the effectiveness of formers in this capacity. The studies did highlight that formers have been used in a variety of different contexts and across a range of terrorist ideologies and movements.

The use of former members in a range of disengagement and deradicalisation interventions targeting current members or at-risk individuals, or to support other former members, appears to be a relatively common approach and is a preferred strategy in some countries. Though not an official policy in a UK context, formers have still played substantial roles across a range of interventions. For example, Weeks (2018) interviewed 23 mentors in the UK who worked on disengagement and deradicalisation interventions and found that roughly half were former extremists.[88]

This strategy is used across the full spectrum of terrorist movements and ideologies. Several studies noted that in Northern Ireland, former paramilitary prisoners often played significant roles in groups and initiatives aimed at preventing future conflict and tackling sectarianism, and projects focused on (often self-defined) restorative justice.[89]

Collectively, the studies suggested a range of potential benefits for the use of formers in interventions including:

- enhancing knowledge about exit and disengagement processes from such groups
- formers are seen as credible, familiar, relatable, and less judgemental

88 Weeks, D. (2018). Doing derad: an analysis of the UK system. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 41*(7), 523–540.
89 Ferguson, N., & McAuley, J. W. (2017). Ulster loyalist accounts of armed mobilization, demobilization and decommissioning. In L. Borsi & G. De Fazio (Eds.), *The Troubles in Northern Ireland and Theories of Social Movements* (pp. 111–128). Amsterdam University Press.

- formers provide role models for others that successful exit is possible.90

Another factor that was highlighted in the studies is that involvement in disengagement and deradicalisation interventions assists the formers themselves with their own reintegration process. This can happen both in terms of reinforcing identity transformation and in providing a fresh sense of purpose.[91] For example, in the context of Northern Ireland, Joyce and Lynch drew attention to the potential sensitivity involved with ex-prisoners working with at-risk youth, but they nevertheless concluded that:

> *it is clear that in the process of doing peace work, or doing counterterrorism is at the same time the very process that allows ex-prisoners to continually reinforce their identity as peace makers while protecting their violent past as a legitimate part of this process.*[92]

In a case study analysis of right-wing extremism based on extensive interviews, Horgan et al. concluded that an important element that facilitated this individual's progression was that she felt "a responsibility to go out and try to undo damage, try to put a stop to it [violence, racism] and, and, you know, its infantile stages if [I] can help someone." In this case, she was able to fulfil this sense of responsibility by, for example, speaking to at-risk youth.[93]

Beyond such potential benefits at a psychological and emotional level, allowing formers to be involved with interventions and similar projects can also assist at a practical level in terms of providing them with employment and concrete socially acceptable roles. Chalmers noted how some of the former terrorists interviewed in his study in Indonesia were:

> *now cooperating closely with the police to convince other former jihadists to disengage, and are likely to continue to receive official sponsorship. These former militants have thus now established a secure source of income – or at least its likelihood when released.*[94]

The general theme, then, across the different studies was that allowing formers to be involved in such work can be beneficial in terms of cementing and protecting their own disengagement process.[95] The role of formers as considered in this theme was not assessed in-depth in the selected pre-2017 literature.

90 Christensen, T. W. (2020). Civil actors' role in deradicalisation and disengagement initiatives: When trust is essential. In S. J. Hansen & S. Lid (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Deradicalisation and Disengagement* (pp. 143–155). Routledge.
91 Bérubé, M., Scrivens, R., Venkatesh, V., & Gaudette, T. (2019). Converging Patterns in Pathways in and out of Violent Extremism. *Perspectives on Terrorism, 13*(6), 73–89.
92 Joyce, C., & Lynch, O. (2017). "Doing Peace": The role of ex-political prisoners in violence prevention initiatives in Northern Ireland. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40(12), 1072–1090.
93 Horgan, J., Altier, M. B., Shortland, N., & Taylor, M. (2017, p.72). Walking away: the disengagement and de-radicalization of a violent right-wing extremist. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 9*(2), 63–77.
94 Chalmers, I. (2017, p.345). Countering violent extremism in Indonesia: Bringing back the Jihadists. Asian Studies Review, 41(3), 331–351.
95 For example see Mattsson, C., & Johansson, T. Leaving Hate Behind–Neo-Nazis, Significant Others and Disengagement. Journal for Deradicalisation, (18), 185–216.

SECURITY

DEFINITION

This theme looks at the role security can play in an individual's disengagement and/or deradicalisation. Security in this context refers to the individual's perception of physical safety and risk.

KEY FINDINGS

Concerns about physical security and safety act as a deterrent for individuals contemplating disengagement from an extremist group. The review found it is common for individuals to perceive they would be at physical risk of violence and threat if they disengaged. Such fears can also act as a motivation to reengage with a movement after leaving.

IMPLICATIONS

Interventions should include a focus on protective measures to help safeguard the physical security of individuals both during the disengagement process and afterwards.

THEME OVERVIEW

In thinking about facilitators for disengagement and deradicalisation, one barrier identified in five articles related to security. In general, individuals felt their physical safety and security could be threatened or at risk if they disengaged from the movement. These concerns could act as a deterrent for change and also posed a risk for re-engaging.

The threat posed by former comrades varied in severity across contexts. Taylor, Semmelrock, and McDermott conducted detailed interviews with 32 former members of Al-Shabaab. They found that 70 per cent of the disengaged combatants have received death threats from Al-Shabaab, and many described themselves as "hunted". Fears about their security were a major concern – if not *the* major concern – for the former members.[96]

Concerns about their physical safety if they disengage are also a recurring theme in the accounts given by former members of far-right groups. For example, Latif et al.'s study explored why women left White Supremacist movements. This research involved in-depth, face-to-face interviews with 21 women who participated in violent racist groups in the United States. The research identified coercive pressure as a significant factor in keeping women in the movement even after they had become disillusioned with the ideology. This is well illustrated in one case study from the research:

Mary felt fearful about the consequences to her and her children that would follow if she left the movement, especially the threat of reprisals from her group and the lack of support she would have on the outside since she had been in the movement for so long. Her husband used these as "scare tactics" to keep her in the movement for a year after she was no longer an avid member: *He would always say that you would never make it on your own, how could you support yourself? And that I would fight you for the kids and all of that.*[97]

96 Taylor, C., Semmelrock, T., & McDermott, A. (2019). The Cost of defection: The Consequences of quitting Al-Shabaab. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV), 13,* a657-a657.

97 Latif, M., Blee, K., DeMichele, M., Simi, P., & Alexander, S. (2019, p.379). Why white supremacist women become disillusioned, and why they leave. *The Sociological Quarterly, 61(3),* 367–388.

This theme is echoed in the research findings of Bérubé et al., in their study based on life-course interviews with 10 former Canadian members of violent right-wing extremist groups. The research found that the extremist groups involved were typically very hostile to former members who had left or disengaged. As one interviewee reported:

> *After I left I was … I really had no option but to return to my parents' house. And all the Nazis knew that address. There was another Skinhead living in full view of my parents' house who could track my comings and goings as well as theirs. And there were certainly some instances of intimidation that occurred that, you know, I was worried. And in fact, I've been more worried in recent years where I've been harassed by somebody who was a [group] member and they doxed my parents. My elderly, frail, sick parents got fucking doxed. And I was really scared that something was going to happen to them. And I'm really grateful that nothing did, and they don't live at that address anymore but…* (Participant 3)[98]

It is not surprising, then, that Corner and Gill, in their study analysing the autobiographies of 91 terrorists, found that psychological distress could be common among disengaged terrorists and that this was significantly linked to fear of harm from group members.[99]

For the studies which considered this issue, a significant conclusion was always that disengagement and deradicalisation interventions needed to have concrete elements focused on protective measures for disengaged former extremists. Individuals who remained or became vulnerable to threats or violence from former comrades could be deterred from disengaging or coerced later into returning to the movement.[100] The role of security as considered in this theme was not assessed in-depth in the selected pre-2017 literature.

98 Bérubé, M., Scrivens, R., Venkatesh, V., & Gaudette, T. (2019, p.82). Converging patterns in pathways in and out of violent extremism. *Perspectives on Terrorism, 13*(6), 73–89.

99 Corner, E., & Gill, P. (2019). Psychological distress, terrorist involvement and disengagement from terrorism: A sequence analysis approach. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 1-28.

100 E.g., van de Wetering, D., Zick, A., & Mietke, H. (2018). Extreme right women, (dis-) engagement and deradicalisation: findings from a qualitative study. *International Journal of Developmental Science, 12*(1-2), 115-127.

MENTAL HEALTH

DEFINITION

This theme looks at the role that mental health issues can play in disengagement and/or deradicalisation. Mental health is often considered in terms of radicalisation but is comparatively ignored in terms of disengagement or deradicalisation processes.

KEY FINDINGS

The review found that stress and burnout are the mental health issues most closely connected to disengagement and deradicalisation processes from terrorism. Post-disengagement, individuals can also be suffering from trauma related mental health issues such as PTSD and other anxiety disorders.

IMPLICATIONS

Professional psychological support could be an important factor in the successful reintegration of individuals from a range of extremist groups and conflicts.

THEME OVERVIEW

The potential role of mental health in radicalisation processes has attracted considerable attention, but its potential role in disengagement and deradicalisation has been much less explored. The review however identified five articles which did examine this issue to some extent. The general finding was that stress and burnout were the mental health issues most closely connected to disengagement and deradicalisation processes from terrorism.

Altier et al., for example, in a study analysing autobiographical accounts for 87 individuals, found that burnout was the most commonly cited factor connected to disengagement after disillusionment.[101] Burnout was also flagged as a significant factor in Corner and Gill's study which also analysed the autobiographies of 91 terrorists. The results here highlighted that burnout was a factor significantly associated with terrorists who were experiencing psychological distress. Corner and Gill concluded that:

Principles of trauma-informed care (Gillespie-Smith et al., 2020)	**Principles of procedural justice** (Mazerolle et al., 2013)
1. Safety 2. Trustworthiness and transparency 3. Peer support 4. Collaboration and mutuality 5. Empowerment, voice, and choice 6. Sensitivity to cultural, historical, gender issues	1. Citizen *participation* in the proceedings prior to an authority reaching a decision. 2. Perceived *neutrality* in decision-making. 3. Whether or not the authority showed *dignity and respect* throughout the interaction. 4. Whether the authority appeared *trustworthy*.

101 Altier, M. B., Leonard Boyle, E., Shortland, N. D., & Horgan, J. G. (2017). Why they leave: An analysis of terrorist disengagement events from eighty-seven autobiographical accounts. *Security Studies, 26*(2), 305-332.

> *burnout was a result of multiple negative experiences and distress … The evidence also highlights the role of burnout in disengagement, and emphasizes the role of multiple factors impacting on an individual, and how these factors compound to increase a desire to disengage.*[102]

These findings tie into an existing literature which has highlighted that active involvement in terrorism and extremism can be highly stressful. Burnout and a desire to escape from this stress can become significant push factors for disengagement and deradicalisation.

Mental health issues were also considered in terms of the post-disengagement phase. Discussions in this regard focused on the potential harmful consequences of having been involved in violence and in conflict situations. Studies highlighted that individuals may be suffering from trauma-related mental health issues such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.[103] Other case studies described former members suffering from panic attacks and depression.[104] Overall, these findings illustrated that a requirement for psychological support could be an important factor in the successful reintegration of individuals from a range of extremist groups and conflicts.

The role of mental health was only looked at in a cursory manner in the pre-2017 literature. Researchers like Mullins emphasised how programmes such as the Saudi Arabia one had mental health professionals present to evaluate the participants, and to be able to address their needs.[105] The importance of a consideration of mental health comes not just with the personnel working on the programmes. Bertram emphasises that it must also be taken into consideration in the design of any intervention. In his discussion of the role of prison he outlines that isolation could be detrimental to the psychiatric health of the terrorist. This in turn can reduce the likelihood of disengagement and deradicalisation.[106] These points need to be considered in the implementation and design of any intervention.

102 Corner, E., & Gill, P. (2019, p.19). Psychological distress, terrorist involvement and disengagement from terrorism: A sequence analysis approach. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 1-28.
103 E.g., Grossman, M., & Barolsky, V. (2019). *Reintegrating children, women and families returning to Australia from foreign conflict zones: The role of community support*. Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University; Khalil, J., Brown, R., Chant, C., Olowo, P., & Wood, N. (2019). *Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia*. RUSI Whitehall Report, 4–18.
104 van de Wetering, D., Zick, A., & Mietke, H. (2018). Extreme right women, (dis-) engagement and deradicalisation: findings from a qualitative study. *International Journal of Developmental Science, 12*(1-2), 115–127.
105 Mullins, S. (2010). Rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists: Lessons from criminology. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, *3*(3), 162–193.
106 Bertram, L. (2015). How Could a Terrorist be De-Radicalised?. *Journal for Deradicalisation*, (5), 120–149.

REINTEGRATION

DEFINITION

This theme looks at the issue of the reintegration of former terrorists and extremists. Reintegration back into society is a critical phase in the disengagement and deradicalisation processes and poses a particular set of challenges.

KEY FINDINGS

Three main barriers to integration were identified: 1) stigma associated with past offending, 2) building a new positive identify, and 3) accessing practical, economic, and psychological support.

IMPLICATIONS

Interventions that incorporate or facilitate identity transformation can build resilience to cope with some of the challenges of reintegration. Practical and psychological support resources can be built into post-release management and risk monitoring interventions and frameworks.

THEME OVERVIEW

Reintegration into society following disengagement from extremism is receiving increasing research attention. Eight of the short-listed articles focused on reintegration issues to some extent. Former militants face a variety of challenges concerning reintegration. Among the main challenges identified in the articles were:

- stigma associated with their past offending
- building a new positive identity
- practical, economic, and psychological support.[107]

Many are highly conscious that their previous terrorist/extremist history will be seen negatively by the community around them and qualitative studies highlight some evidence of stigma experienced by former extremists. For example, Syafiq's study on Indonesian terrorists recorded some experiencing social exclusion following their release. One interviewee, a former Imam, was banned from preaching or leading prayers in his neighbourhood:

> *They were a bit worried. Now I have been banned from preaching. I should not preach in my neighbourhood [...]. I was the second imam before being imprisoned. Now I am deactivated to lead prayer. So, I no longer have a schedule [to lead prayers]. (SH, 45 years)*[108]

One interviewee in Hakim and Mujahidah's study highlighted the impact of community suspicion on himself and his family:

> *My parents told me when I was in the prison that, after a week [of my arrest], every time my parents left our house, people looked at them as if they were seeing the devil. No no, they didn't greet them at all. So [the neighbours] were shocked as if my family had committed the greatest sin on earth. They were so alienated. Aisha (Reza's sister,*

107 Grossman, M., & Barolsky, V. (2019). *Reintegrating children, women and families returning to Australia from foreign conflict zones: The role of community support*. Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University.

108 Syafiq, M. (2019, p.243). Deradicalisation and disengagement from terrorism and threat to identity: An Analysis of former jihadist prisoners' accounts. *Psychology and Developing Societies, 31*(2), 227–251

> *pseudonym) cried when she saw me in prison for the first time. She said, "Brother, I was called up at school and asked by my Counselling teacher. How could your big brother do that?" Even now, people in my neighbourhood are divided between those who support me and my family, and those who don't like us.*[109]

Eventually, the tension proved too much in this case and the interviewee moved away from the area to avoid the stigma.[110] Former extremists use a variety of strategies to deal with the challenges of exclusion and stigma relating to their history. Many cases, for example, reported keeping a low profile, being discrete, and avoiding revealing to others their history of terrorist or extremist involvement.[111] As one interviewee in Syafiq's study described it:

> *I am currently working at a brokerage firm. My partners and even my boss initially did not know that I was a prisoner jailed for terrorism offences. They finally found out about me when there was news in a newspaper which reported an interview between a journalist and me. Yet, after they discovered my background, they were fine. (HSR, 41 years)*[112]

However, most participants realised that they would only be able to hide their background temporarily.

The extent of stigma experienced or perceived appears to vary between individuals and contexts. Not all interviewees reported feeling stigmatised. Twelve per cent of the interviewees in Taylor, Semmelrock, and McDermott's study on former members of Al-Shabaab expressed regret around the stigmatisation now attached to them by wider Somali society. That suggests, though, that 88 per cent were not as affected by stigma. Khalil et al.'s study also found a mixed picture concerning stigma in the Somali context, it being an issue for some interviewees but not others.[113]

Linked to this, many individuals focused on developing a new identity based on personal characteristics or more positive social activity, which could eventually dominate the consequences of the previous extremist identity. As one of Syafiq's Islamist terrorist interviewees reported:

> *I learn farming and socialising with my neighbours and society. I have applied the knowledge of how to socialise with others. I often visit people from door to door, and make conversation with them It is a part of learning how to get close with my society. (SA, 38 years)*[114]

In the context of Northern Ireland, building a new identity was also a theme to emerge from interviews. As a former paramilitary prisoner interviewed by Ferguson and McAuley put it:

> *I've got to a position, which you know it is a position within the community, doing a lot of work the schools recognize, the police recognize, loads of things. I've dropped the tag of ex-prisoner and all that stuff, dropped that a long time ago. You know, some people feel that they still need to use that and we were saying, people like [David] Ervine*

109 Hakim, M. A., & Mujahidah, D. R. (2020). Social context, interpersonal network, and identity dynamics: A social psychological case study of terrorist recidivism. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 23*(1), 3–14.
110 Ibid
111 Khalil, J., Brown, R., Chant, C., Olowo, P., & Wood, N. (2019). *Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia*. RUSI Whitehall Report, 4–18.
112 Syafiq, M. (2019, p.242). Deradicalisation and disengagement from terrorism and threat to identity: An Analysis of former jihadist prisoners' accounts. *Psychology and Developing Societies, 31*(2), 227–251
113 Khalil, J., Brown, R., Chant, C., Olowo, P., & Wood, N. (2019). *Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia*. RUSI Whitehall Report, 4–18.
114 Syafiq, M. (2019, p.243). Deradicalisation and disengagement from terrorism and threat to identity: An Analysis of former jihadist prisoners' accounts. *Psychology and Developing Societies, 31*(2), 227–251.

> *were saying, like there has to come a stage where you leave that behind […] you have to move beyond that and move forward.*[115]

Practical and psychological support networks were also flagged as a key issue. Interviewees reported that having such support made an enormous difference in their efforts to reintegrate into society.[116] Such support frequently came from family and pre-radicalisation friend networks. For example, Sikkens et al. conducted 21 in-depth interviews with Dutch former radicals and their family members. They flagged the role that family could play in supporting reintegration. As one interviewee recorded:

I think after my release, I've known so many women who got out, and who stood at the gate with their carton box without knowing where to go, and without any guidance. My parents were there for me when I got out, and when I just got out I lived with them as well. If I hadn't had my parents, I wouldn't have known where to go with my carton box either.[117]

It is noteworthy that several disengagement and deradicalisation programmes emphasise maintaining or reinvigorating the individual's relationships with family members and their previous community. The stated rationale is so that these relationships can provide psycho-social support for the individual when they are released or otherwise complete the programme.[118]

Grossman & Barolsky, in an Australian study based on community and stakeholder interviewees, also identified that community perceptions were an important factor regarding the issue of reintegration and that these perceptions were complex and mixed. Added to this were issues around the resources available to assist reintegration and community perceptions of the availability of such resources.[119] The Grossman and Barolsky study found that:

Across government and professional stakeholders, there was overwhelming support for an integrated community-government support model that combined:

- Informal community-based social support
- Localised agency-led social services and educational support
- Government-based risk monitoring and management.[120]

The role of reintegration as considered in this theme was not assessed in-depth in the selected pre-2017 literature.

115 Ferguson, N., & McAuley, J. W. (2017, p.123). Ulster loyalist accounts of armed mobilization, demobilization and decommissioning. In L. Borsi & G. De Fazio (Eds.), *The Troubles in Northern Ireland and Theories of Social Movements* (pp. 111–128). Amsterdam University Press.
116 Da Silva, R., Fernández-Navarro, P., Gonçalves, M. M., Rosa, C., & Silva, J. (2020). Disengagement from political violence and deradicalisation: A narrative-dialogical perspective. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 43*(6), 444-467.
117 Sikkens, E., van San, M. R. P. J. R. S., Sieckelinck, S. M. A., & de Winter, M. (2017, p.210). Parental Influence on radicalization and de-radicalization according to the lived experiences of former extremists and their families. *Journal for Deradicalisation, 12,* 192–226.
118 E.g., see Khalil, J., Brown, R., Chant, C., Olowo, P., & Wood, N. (2019*). Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia*. RUSI Whitehall Report, 4–18.
119 Grossman, M., & Barolsky, V. (2019). *Reintegrating children, women and families returning to Australia from foreign conflict zones: The role of community support*. Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University.
120 Ibid.

CONCLUSIONS

The need for an empirically grounded understanding of the processes that lead individuals to disengage and deradicalise from terrorism and violent extremism is clear. It is only with such empirically driven knowledge that appropriate interventions and programmes can be designed, validated, updated, and implemented, to assist in the successful reintegration of former terrorists and violent extremists.

This project has systematically examined the recent disengagement and deradicalisation literature to build a robust collection comprising the higher-quality studies focused on this subject in recent years. The analysis of that collection has allowed us to identify the major factors involved in these processes and to assess the extent to which knowledge and understanding are progressing in this critical field.

The major themes and issues have been described earlier. There is evidence of progress in our understanding of disengagement and deradicalisation. Comparison with pre-2017 literature illustrates that valuable research is being conducted and published in the recent period using more robust research methods, which is providing genuinely new data for analysis and insight. A range of facilitative causes and barriers have been identified, though work is still needed to determine the weighting of each. Encouragingly, the evidence also suggests that many, if indeed not most, interventions examined appear to have positive impacts. Relapse and recidivism occur but appear to be uncommon.

There is much to be positive about, but concerns remain. The quality of the research data, though improved, still lags behind the standards common in many other areas (such as, for example, our understanding of desistance processes with non-terrorist offenders). Though a large number of studies were initially identified as relevant, ultimately very few made the quality benchmark criteria we set. Even among these studies, with a few exceptions, we note that, in general, the majority relied on qualitative methodological approaches such as semi-structured interviews, autobiographical analysis, and case study analysis. With one notable exception – research rarely made use of comparison or control groups.

Looking ahead, the review also identified some important gaps in both our current understanding of important issues and also in terms of the quality of the evidence available to answer critical questions. We outline now where these gaps are most obvious and our recommendations for addressing them.

RESEARCH GAPS

What has been presented up to now in the report has been a focus on the key themes identified through the process of a systematic review. The purpose of this final section of the report is to outline where we believe there are still significant gaps in our knowledge of disengagement, deradicalisation, and desistance from terrorism. Below we present gaps in our knowledge and methodological approaches. We propose that by filling the gaps in the methodological approaches there will be a greater opportunity to fill the gaps in our knowledge.

GAPS IN KNOWLEDGE

TIMING

It has been identified that disengagement is often a drawn-out process. Some research presents the length of time which this process can take (see, for example, Taylor, Semmelrock, and McDermott[121]) However, we need more in-depth knowledge about this timing. It would greatly benefit those designing disengagement and deradicalisation programmes to have an understanding as to whether there are, for example, significant transition periods for influencing individual exit.

BACKSLIDING

Current research does not provide a great deal of insight into the processes and risks around apparently disengaged or deradicalised individuals later re-engaging with terrorism. The studies reviewed included cases where this happened, such as Hakim and Mujahidah's detailed case study of Reza, an Indonesian jihadi.[122] The initial stages of the article present Reza's intent to disengage from terrorist activity, influenced by his social contexts and connections. This, however, concludes with Reza re-engaging with his terrorist lifestyle. A more systematic understanding of the factors involved is clearly needed. An empirically led understanding of why and how individuals like Reza re-engage with terrorism would allow practitioners to develop more resistant support structures to assist in the development of a more sustainable disengagement process.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Tied into concerns about backsliding; more knowledge is needed to develop our ability to assess to what extent individuals are disengaged and deradicalised. Many of the studies discussed indicators in the process but this was primarily based on qualitative data. More quantitative research is needed to operationalise such indicators and to enhance the ability to reliably assess the degree to which disengagement, deradicalisation, or rehabilitation have occurred.

MENTAL HEALTH

The evidence reviewed suggests that the dynamic in how mental health relates to disengagement and deradicalisation is not the same as the dynamic often portrayed in relation to radicalisation. Here, the major issues appear to relate to stress and burnout, rather than personality or clinical disorders. More research is needed to unpick these factors and the role that this potential plays in disengagement and deradicalisation processes.

ASSESSMENTS OF PROGRAMMES

Ongoing assessments of disengagement and deradicalisation programmes are essential for their

121 Taylor, C., Semmelrock, T., & McDermott, A. (2019). The Cost of defection: The Consequences of quitting Al-Shabaab. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV)*, *13*, a657-a657.
122 Hakim, M. A., & Mujahidah, D. R. (2020). Social context, interpersonal network, and identity dynamics: A social psychological case study of terrorist recidivism. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, *23*(1), 3–14.

continued utility. The available evidence so far suggests that programmes, in general, do have positive benefits. That evidence, though, is still of patchy quality and efforts are needed to improve the data in this area. In particular, the current state of knowledge is poor at identifying what elements of the different programmes have the most impact. As most interventions comprise multiple elements, this creates uncertainty over what works best.

For evaluations of programmes to be credible, they must be independently administered with comprehensive access to the programmes being assessed. The assessments require clearly set criteria for success that go beyond self-administered metrics of recidivism.

DISTINCT PATHWAYS OF DISENGAGEMENT AND DERADICALISATION

There is good recognition in the literature that a range of push and pull factors are involved in disengagement and deradicalisation processes. This review has highlighted the presence of major common themes, and linked to this is the question of whether distinct pathways can be identified. The potential to do so appears to exist and some initial steps in this direction can be seen in the literature. More attention should be focused on developing models in this regard.

UK-FOCUSED RESEARCH

The context in which disengagement and deradicalisation takes place is central to our understanding of this process. The analysis by Weeks[123] was the only piece that focused on the UK. In contrast, since 2017, there has been noticeably more empirically rigorous research carried out in countries such as Indonesia. Future research needs to gain a better understanding of disengagement within the UK. This must be facilitated with greater academic access to prison and disengaged populations, with an emphasis on methodological and analytical transparency.

ROLE OF SPORT AND RECREATION

Four of the articles selected for systematic review briefly outlined the positive impact that sport played during the disengagement process (Grossman & Barolsky[124]; Mattsson & Johansson[125]; da Silva et al.[126]; Weeks[127]). None of these went into enough detail, providing sufficient empirical evidence to justify this as a stand-alone theme. Future research on these positive, non-political engagements and activities would create a more holistic understanding of the disengagement process.

LEGITIMATE OPPORTUNITIES

This report has identified that opportunities for safe and sustainable exit are key to precipitating an individual's disengagement from a terrorist organisation. However, to benefit from this understanding there needs to be further research done to ascertain what opportunities of exit are considered to be legitimate by the terrorism actors. This research must consider the effect that the regional and organisational contexts may play within this as well as the variable of time.

ROLE OF FORMERS

Many of the studies in the review highlighted potential benefits for using former extremists in counter radicalisation, disengagement, and deradicalisation work. The evidence around this, however, needs more development, and in particular, some important questions need addressing. The selection of the 'right' formers, in particular, needs attention. How can 'right' be assessed? What are the appropriate factors to

123 Weeks, D. (2018). Doing derad: an analysis of the UK system. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *41*(7), 523–540.
124 Grossman, M., & Barolsky, V. (2019). *Reintegrating children, women and families returning to Australia from foreign conflict zones: The role of community support*. Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University.
125 Mattsson, C., & Johansson, T. Leaving hate behind – Neo-Nazis, significant others and disengagement. *Journal for Deradicalization*, *18,* 185–216.
126 Da Silva, R., Fernández-Navarro, P., Gonçalves, M. M., Rosa, C., & Silva, J. (2020). Disengagement from political violence and deradicalization: A narrative-dialogical perspective. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *43*(6), 444–467
127 Weeks, D. (2018). Doing derad: an analysis of the UK system. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *41*(7), 523–540.

consider? Research has not yet explored these issues. Comparative research is also needed to assess the impact of formers compared to other approaches and to assess where and when in interventions formers can be of most impact.

GAPS IN METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

DIVERSITY OF METHODOLOGICAL AND ANALYTICAL APPROACHES

This systematic review of disengagement and deradicalisation emphasises that there is a considerable lack of diversity in the methodological and analytical approaches employed by researchers. The report is dominated by research utilising qualitative, semi-structured interviews analysed through thematic analysis. These methodological and analytical approaches are clearly legitimate. However, a greater diversity of methodological and analytical approaches would provide a more holistic understanding of disengagement and deradicalisation processes.

LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH

To gain an in-depth understanding of the role of timing and the propensity for backsliding proposed above, a longitudinal approach may need to be applied. Approaching research in a longitudinal manner can positively influence the validity of findings. To date, longitudinal research is noted by its absence in disengagement- and deradicalisation-related research.

CONTROL GROUPS

In the sample of research analysed here, only three studies used any form of control group in their studies (Webber et al.[128]; Van De Wetering, Zick & Mietke[129]; Altier, Leonard-Boyle, Shortland, and Horgan[130]). The future application of well-designed control groups will provide more confidence in the results of the research. It will allow us to identify what is unique to the disengagement processes for terrorist actors.

128 Webber, David, Marina Chernikova, Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Malkanthi Hettiarachchi, Rohan Gunaratna, Marc-Andre Lafreniere, & Jocelyn J. Belanger (2018). "Deradicalizing detained terrorists." *Political Psychology*, 39(3), 539–556.

129 van de Wetering, D., Zick, A., & Mietke, H. (2018). Extreme right women, (dis-) engagement and deradicalisation: findings from a qualitative study. *International Journal of Developmental Science*, *12*(1-2), 115–127.

130 Altier, M. B., Leonard Boyle, E., Shortland, N. D., & Horgan, J. G. (2017). Why they leave: An analysis of terrorist disengagement events from eighty-seven autobiographical accounts. *Security Studies*, *26*(2), 305–332.

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS

The primary objective of this project is to evaluate the recent research on disengagement and deradicalisation from terrorism and violent extremism published between January 1 2017 and February 1 2020. To achieve this, a systematic review methodology was applied. Presented here is the stage-based methodology utilised in carrying out the review. Figure 1 (below) provides an initial overview of the identification, screening, and selection processes that were followed.

STAGE 1: SYSTEMATIC SEARCH

To optimise the systematic literature search, the following cross-disciplinary selection of databases was used:

- ISI Web of Science
- Scopus
- Lexis Nexus
- PubMed (Medline)
- Google Scholar
- JSTOR
- Wiley Online Library
- International Political Science Abstracts
- Researchgate
- Mendeley
- PsychInfo
- Academia.edu

The above-listed databases each were searched to identify the relevant literature published between January 1 2017 and February 1 2020. The search strategy consisted of a combination of the following Boolean keywords:

(disengag*, OR derad*, OR desist*) AND (islam*)

(disengag*, OR derad*, OR desist*) AND (radicali*)

(disengag*, OR derad*, OR desist*) AND (extrem*)

(disengag*, OR derad*, OR desist*) AND (terror*)

(disengag*, OR derad*, OR desist*) AND ("right-wing", OR "far-right")

(disengag*, OR derad*, OR desist*) AND ("Irish Republican", OR "dissident republican")

(radicali*, OR terroris*) AND (rehabilit*, OR "exit", OR "leaving")

(islam*) AND (rehabilit*, "exit", OR "leaving")

("right-wing", OR "far-right") AND (rehabilit*, OR "exit", OR "leaving")

("Irish Republican", OR "dissident republican"), AND (rehabilit*, OR "exit", OR "leaving")



Figure 1: Flow diagram of the search procedure for the systematic review

(extrem* OR radicali* OR terroris* OR insurg*) AND (disengag* OR derad* OR desist* OR rehabilit*)

(extrem*, OR radicali*, OR terroris*) AND (reform*, OR rehabilit*, OR interven*)

(insurg*, OR rebel*, OR paramilit*) AND (reform*, OR rehabilit*, OR interven*)

(islam*, OR jihad*, OR ideolog*, OR "political violence") AND (reform*, OR rehabilit*, OR interven*)

("right-wing", OR "far-right", OR "Irish Republican", OR "dissident republican") AND (reform*, OR rehabilit*, OR interven*)

(extrem*, OR radicali*, OR terroris*) AND (prevent*, OR defect*)

(insurg*, OR rebel*, OR paramilit*) AND (prevent*, OR defect*)

(islam*, OR jihad*, OR ideolog*, OR "political violence") AND (prevent*, OR defect*)

("right-wing", OR "far-right", OR "Irish Republican", OR "dissident republican") AND (prevent*, OR defect*)

These combinations were designed to identify the most comprehensive list of literature relating to disengagement and deradicalisation of all forms of terrorism and extremism.

Alongside the above systematic search of databases, the research team hand-searched core journals in the area of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies. In this search, each edition of the selected journals was checked for relevant articles within the specified timeline. The selected journals were:

- Terrorism and Political Violence
- Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
- Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression
- Perspectives on Terrorism
- Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) papers collection
- Journal of Deradicalisation

The final stage of the search strategy included a search of the Radicalisation Research repository to ascertain if any key literature was inadvertently missed through the two previous search stages. From this three-stage search, a total of 83,536 sources were identified. Of these, 370 items were deemed to be eligible for potential inclusion, after the removal of duplicates and irrelevant sources.

STAGE 2: SHORTLISTING FOR ANALYSIS

The next stage of the process involved the shortlisting of identified sources for further analysis. This involved two members of the research team reading each of the abstracts and executive summaries of the 370 articles and reports. They assessed each for relevance and ascertained if they met the eligibility criteria (see Table 1). Of the 370 articles and reports, 95 met the eligibility criteria. Due to the time constraints on the completion of the review the decision was made not to include monographs in the analysis.

STAGE 3: DEVELOPMENT OF CODEBOOK AND DATABASE

As the systematic search and shortlisting was ongoing, the principal and co-investigators developed a codebook. The development of this codebook was based on knowledge of the contemporary and pre-2017 literature on disengagement and deradicalisation. To finalise the codebook, its design was reviewed for utility after the coding of the first 10, 20, and 30 articles. The finalised codebook included eight core

Focus of the Study	Desistance Disengagement Deradicalisation Terrorism Extremism
Type of Violent Extremism	Islamist and other Religiously-Motivated Nationalist-separatist Right-Wing Left-Wing Lone Actor Single-Issue
Type of Research	Quantitative Qualitative Mixed Methods Case Studies Literature Reviews Programme Reviews
Publication	English Language Published Open Source Literature All Types of Reports All Types of Scientific Disciplines All Countries Publication Date Since 2017

Table 1: Overview of the eligibility criteria

coding themes and a total of 123 individual variables (see Appendix B). The coding themes are:

1. Publication
2. Paper Focus
3. Research Type
4. Methodology and Analysis
5. Sample
6. Key Variables (Programmes)
7. Key Variables (Natural)
8. Ethics and Bias

STAGE 4: CODING

Each of the 95 longlisted articles was coded by at least two coders to ensure inter-rater reliability. The finalised coding for each entry was decided upon during coding meetings of the coding pair. For the early coding meetings, the PI and Co-I carried out their coding meetings in the presence of the research assistants; to train them in the process. For the duration of the coding, the entire research team was allocated sources to code. The coding pairs were rotated to ensure a variety of coding teams, thus improving the reliability of coding. The PI also regularly carried out a quality check on coding outputs.

STAGE 5: ASSESSMENT OF RELEVANCE AND QUALITY

After the completion of the coding, the PI and Co-I completed an assessment of quality and relevance. This was to ensure that the final review of the literature was solely based on the most relevant and highest-quality research. A scoring system was developed to shortlist outputs for final review. The first stage of the scoring was to assess if the research was empirical or not. Those sources that were not empirical were given a score of 0 and those that were empirical were scored 1. Each of the non-empirical sources was excluded from the remainder of the assessment and review process. After this initial stage, a total of 56 sources remained. Each of these 56 was scored across five further criteria:

- Replicability of Method and Transparency of Sample (1–4 points)
- Ethics (0–2 points)
- Relevance (1–3 points)
- Primary Data (1–3 points)
- Analytical Approach (0–2 points)

The scoring of each article was carried out utilising the database compiled in Stage 4 and revisiting the original sources. At the end of the scoring, each article that scored 11+ points was shortlisted for review. A total of 29 articles reached this threshold (see *Appendix C)*. Each of these articles was then thematically analysed by the PI and Co-I to ascertain the main areas of focus across the research.

STAGE 6: PRE-2017 SOURCE IDENTIFICATION

Citation analysis was used as a framework for assessing the impact of past research studies. The citation analysis used Google Scholar to identify the most-cited articles focusing on disengagement and deradicalisation.

The search strategy for this stage of the research was not as comprehensive as for the post-2017 literature. To identify the most-cited articles, a series of Google Scholar searches were completed using the keywords: *deradicalisation terrorism, deradicalisation extremism, disengagement terrorism, disengagement extremism, desistance terrorism, desistance extremism.* The 30 most-cited sources (see *Appendix D*) were then each coded using the same codebook that was developed during *Stage 3* of the research.

APPENDIX B: CODEBOOK VARIABLES

This appendix outlines what each of the variables within the codebook is measuring. These variables are split across eight categories. These categories are:

1. Publication
2. Paper Focus
3. Research Type
4. Methodology and Analysis
5. Sample
6. Key variables (programmes)
7. Key variables (natural)
8. Ethics and Bias

1. PUBLICATION

This page of the codebook outlines the key publication details for the selected source.

Output code: Each analysed source is given a unique numerical identifier code that is consistent across each of the pages of the codebook.

Year of publication: This is the year that the source was published, and **not** the year of submission.

Journal title: The name of the journal (if any) that published the article.

Publication type: This variable identifies if the source was a book chapter, peer-reviewed journal articles, and non-academic reports.

Publication title: The full title of the publication.

Keywords: If any keywords were specified at the point of publication these are contained here.

Citations: The number of times the source had been cited at the time of the last coding, according to Google Scholar.

Coding date: On each coding page it is specified when the most recent update on that page was made.

2. PAPER FOCUS

This page of the codebook outlines what the topic focus(es) of the individual publications is/are.

Ideological focus: The ideologies of the terrorists/extremists analysed in the research.

Regional focus: The geographic region within which the research focus was.

Country focus: The country/countries which were the focus of the research.

Advanced market: The insurance density (premium volumes) and penetration as a per cent of GDP as uses the model developed by Swiss Re. The 29 countries identified as comprising the "advanced markets" are Japan, Belgium, Greece, Australia, Hong Kong, Italy, Finland, France, Portugal, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Malta, Switzerland, United States, New Zealand, Austria, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Sweden, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Germany, United Kingdom (excl. Northern Ireland), and Cyprus.

For the purpose of this research Northern Ireland was included.

Disengagement: This indicates whether the source focused on disengagement, defined as "when an individual is no longer a member of, or active participant in, a terrorist movement or violent extremism. The motivations for such cessation of involvement can vary, but the term essentially reflects changes in behaviour, and does not necessarily extend to fundamental changes in belief or ideology."

Desistance: This indicates whether the source focused on desistance, defined as "the process of abstaining from crime among those who previously had engaged in a sustained pattern of offending".

Deradicalisation: This indicates whether the source focused on disengagement, defined as "a more fundamental change than disengagement alone. It requires a qualitative change in the attitudes, belief systems and identities of former terrorists and extremists and indicates a substantive change away from an ideological commitment to a terrorist movement or cause. Deradicalisation reflects change at a psychological and ideological level and not just at a behavioural level."

Reintegration: This indicates whether the source focused on reintegration, defined as "the action or process of a terrorist or extremist actor integrating back into society after being released from incarceration, or is a returning foreign fighter".

Recidivism: This indicates whether the source focused on recidivism, defined as "the reoffending of previously convicted terrorists for crimes covered under terrorism legislation".

Theories: This indicates what, if any theories, are presented in the source.

Theories/Models supported: This indicates what, if any, theories or models are supported in the source.

Theories/Models unsupported: This indicates what, if any, theories or models are not supported in the source. This requires the theories and models to be tested and supported not to be found.

3. RESEARCH TYPE

This page of the codebook details the research design of the publications.

Secondary research: This specifies whether the research is analysing pre-existing data.

Primary research: This specifies whether the research is generating and analysing new data.

Theoretical research: This specifies whether the research is focused on the outlining and/or development of a theory.

Programme review: This specifies whether the research is a full or partial review of a disengagement or deradicalisation programme.

Research design: This specifies what type of research design was employed by the researchers.

4. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS

This section of the codebook details the methodological and analytical approaches of the individual sources.

Qualitative/Quantitative: This specifies whether quantitative or qualitative research methods were employed.

Mixed methods: This specifies if a mixed methodology approach was utilised by the researchers.

Research methodology: Within this, it is specified what specific type/types of research method(s) were employed.

Replicable: Based on the level of information given to the reader, it is adjudicated as to whether the research is fully or partially replicable.

Location of research: This specifies in what category of location the research took place (e.g. prison/detention facility, family home, via electronic communications, etc.).

Timing of research: This specifies the year(s) in which data collection and analysis was carried out. It is thus different from the year of publication.

Differential statistics: This specifies whether differential statistics were used.

Significance testing: This specifies whether any form of significance testing was employed.

Standardised tools: This indicates whether any forms of standardised tool were used in the research process.

Type of standardised tools: This variable indicates the type of standardised tool (e.g. PCLR, VERA, etc.), if any, which was used in the research.

Qualitative data analysis: This variable specifies what qualitative data analysis approach, if any, was employed by the researcher(s).

5. SAMPLE

This section of the codebook gives information relating to key aspects of the population and sample of the individual studies.

Population: The complete set of individuals, programmes, etc. from which the sample is drawn.

Sample size: The number of participants in the research.

Representativeness: Based on the overall population it is evaluated whether the sample is fully or partially representative.

Age range: This specifies the age range of the sample from the youngest to the oldest.

Mean age: The average age of the sample.

Prison sentence length: The range of prison sentences for individuals in the sample(s).

Control groups: This specifies whether a control group was used in the research.

Voluntary/Mandatory engagement: For those individuals who were part of a deradicalisation or disengagement programme, this variable measures whether their involvement was voluntary or mandatory.

Length of programme: This specifies the length of time needed to complete the programme.

6. KEY VARIABLES (PROGRAMMES)

In this section of the codebook, details are given relating to the key findings of those publications that focused on formalised deradicalisation and/or disengagement programmes.

Mental health: Is mental health focused on in the research? (yes/no)

Mental illness: If mental illness is a key variable, which mental illnesses are focused on in the research?

Counselling: Is counselling used within the programme? (yes/no)

Counselling effect: Does the counselling have a positive, negative, or neutral effect on participants? Is this effect supported or unsupported?

Stage of counselling: At what stage of the disengagement process does this counselling take place?

Type of counselling: What type of counselling (e.g. family, occupational, educational, psychological) is taking place in the programme?

Individual or group counselling: Was this individual or group counselling?

Mandatory or voluntary counselling: Was engagement with counselling voluntary or mandatory?

Mentoring/coaching: Was mentoring or coaching of the individual terrorist/extremist involved within the programme?

Stage of mentoring/coaching: At what stage of the disengagement process did the mentoring/coaching take place?

Type of mentoring/coaching: What type of mentoring/coaching (e.g. with formers, religious leaders, educators, vocational trainers, etc.) was involved?

External support organisation: Do the individuals partaking in the programme receive any support from organisations external from the programme e.g. from employers, sporting organisations, religious organisations, etc.?

External support individual: Do the individuals partaking in the programme receive any support from individuals external from the programme e.g. family members, religious leaders, etc.?

Familial relationships: Which significant familial relationships impact on the individual's disengagement and/or deradicalisation?

Familial relationships value: Do these familial relationships have a positive or negative impact on the individuals' disengagement and/or deradicalisation? Is this supported or unsupported by evidence?

Social connections: Which significant social relationships impact on the individual's disengagement and/or deradicalisation?

Social connections value: Do these social connections have a positive or negative impact on the individuals' disengagement and/or deradicalisation? Is this supported or unsupported by evidence?

Employment before: What type of employment were the individuals involved in before their engagement in the disengagement programme?

Employment during: What type of employment were the individuals involved in during their engagement in the disengagement programme?

Employment after: What type of employment were the individuals involved in after their engagement in the disengagement programme?

Type of terrorist activity: What type of terrorist activity were the individuals on the programme involved in?

Type of non-political criminal engagement: What type of 'ordinary' criminality were the participants involved in?

Role: What role did the individuals have within the terrorist or extremist organisations?

Most recent group name: What terrorist/extremist organisation were the participants most recently involved with?

Previous group names: What other terrorist/extremist group(s) had participants previously been involved with?

Violent/Non-violent: Were participants involved in violent or non-violent terrorist/extremist activity?

Formers: Were former extremists/terrorists used as a key part of the programme?

Time since conviction: How long since the conviction did the disengagement/deradicalisation programmes take place?

Naturalistic disengagement: Did the participants leave the terrorist/extremist groups of their own accorded or was their exit enforced?

Mechanisms: What mechanisms (e.g. identity change, vocational, attitude change, education, etc.) for disengagement/deradicalisation were used in the programmes?

Religious support: Was religious support provided as part of the programme?

Ideological support: Was ideological support provided as part of the programme?

Youth worker: Were youth workers involved with the delivery of the programme?

Social worker: Were social workers involved with the delivery of the programme?

Coerced membership: Is there evidence that participants were coerced to join the extremist/terrorist group?

Stigma: Was there evidence of the stigma of terrorist/extremist membership as being a barrier to disengagement/deradicalisation?

Funder/Supporting organisation: What is the nature of the funding agency/supporting organisation of the programme?

Education: Did education play a key role in the programme? If so, what type of education?

Recreational activities: Did recreational activities play a key role in the programme? If so, what type of recreational activity?

Recommendations (Research): What recommendations did the paper have for future research?

Recommendations (Policy): What recommendations did the paper have for policy and practice?

Trust: Was trust identified as a significant variable in the paper, if so, trust in who/what?

7. KEY VARIABLES (NATURAL)

In this section of the codebook, details are given relating to the key findings of those publications that focused on individuals who disengage or are deradicalised without any stated programme related intervention.

Push factors: What internal factors (e.g. loss of faith in ideology, disillusionment with strategy, disillusionment with personnel, effects of violence (physical), effects of violence (psychological)) from within the terrorist/extremist group pushed the individual into disengagement?

Pull factors: What external factors (e.g. prison, family, employment demands, amnesty, positive interactions with moderates) from outside of the terrorist/extremist group pulled the individual into disengagement?

Mental health: Is mental health focused on in the research? (yes/no)

Mental illness: If mental illness is a key variable, which mental illnesses are focused on in the research?

Counselling: Is counselling used within by the individual(s)disengaging/deradicalising? (yes/no)

Counselling effect: Does the counselling have a positive, negative, or neutral effect on participants? Is this effect supported or unsupported?

Stage of counselling: At what stage of the disengagement process does this counselling take place?

Type of counselling: What type of counselling (e.g. family, occupational, educational, psychological) is taking place in the programme?

Individual or group counselling: Was this individual or group counselling?

Mandatory or voluntary counselling: Was engagement with counselling voluntary or mandatory?

External support organisational: Do the individuals receive any support from any organisations e.g.

from employers, sporting organisations, religious organisations, etc.?

External support individual: Do the individuals receive any support from any individuals e.g. family members, religious leaders, etc.?

Familial relationships: Which significant familial relationships impact on the individual's disengagement and/or deradicalisation?

Familial relationships value: Do these familial relationships have a positive or negative impact on the individuals' disengagement and/or deradicalisation? Is this supported or unsupported by evidence?

Social connections: Which significant social relationships impact on the individual's disengagement and/or deradicalisation?

Social connections value: Do these social connections have a positive or negative impact on the individuals' disengagement and/or deradicalisation? Is this supported or unsupported by evidence?

Employment before: What type of employment were the individuals involved in before their engagement in the disengagement process?

Employment during: What type of employment were the individuals involved in during their engagement in the disengagement process?

Employment after: What type of employment were the individuals involved in after their engagement in the disengagement process?

Type of terrorist activity: What type of terrorist activity were the individuals involved in?

Type of non-political criminal engagement: What type of 'ordinary' criminality were the participants involved in?

Role: What role did the individuals have within the terrorist or extremist organisations?

Most recent group name: What terrorist/extremist organisation were the participants most recently involved with?

Previous group names: What other terrorist/extremist group(s) had participants previously been involved with?

Violent/Non-violent: Were participants involved in violent or non-violent terrorist/extremist activity?

Formers: Were former extremists/terrorists influential in the disengagement/deradicalisation processes?

Time since conviction: How long since the conviction did the disengagement/deradicalisation process take place?

Mechanisms: What mechanisms (e.g. identity change, vocational, attitude change, education, etc.) for disengagement/deradicalisation were used by the individuals?

Religious support: Was religious support provided?

Ideological support: Was ideological support provided?

Stigma: Was there evidence of the stigma of terrorist/extremist membership as being a barrier to disengagement/deradicalisation?

Education: Did education play a key role in the process? If so, what type of education?

Recreational activities: Did recreational activities play a key role in the process? If so, what type of recreational activity?

Recommendations (Research): What recommendations did the paper have for future research?

Recommendations (Policy): What recommendations did the paper have for policy and practice?

Trust: Was trust identified as a significant variable in the paper? If so, trust in who/what?

8. ETHICS AND BIAS

This section of the codebook outlines whether there is any evidence of unethical practice or bias evident in the research. It also denotes what ethical practices and approaches were taken by the researchers.

Ethical concerns: This specifies what ethical concerns, if any, were present with a particular piece of research.

Ethical approval process: This specifies whether the completion of an ethical approval process was indicated by the researchers.

Ethical measures taken: This outlines what ethical measures, if any, were taken by the researchers.

Potential bias: This indicates what form of bias the author(s) may have had, potentially influencing their analysis.

Named ethical code: This specifies what ethical code, if any, the authors indicated that they were adhering to during the research.

APPENDIX C: POST-2017 SHORTLIST AND ASSESSMENT OF RELEVANCE AND QUALITY SCORING

Empirical	Replicability	Ethical	Relevance	Primary Data	Analytical approach	Total	Article Title
1	3	2	1	2	2	11	Deradicalisation and Disengagement from Terrorism and Threat to Identity: An Analysis of Former Jihadist prisoners' Accounts
1	4	2	2	2	2	13	Parental Influence on Radicalisation and De-radicalisation according to the Lived Experiences of Former Extremists and their Families
1	1	2	3	2	2	11	Ulster Loyalist Accounts of Armed Mobilization, Demobilization, and Decommissioning
1	4	2	3	1	0	11	Reintegrating children, women and families returning to Australia from foreign conflict zones: The role of community support
1	2	2	1	3	2	11	Civil Actors' Role in Deradicalisation and Disengagement Initiatives: When Trust is Essential
1	3	2	1	3	2	12	Attitude toward rehabilitation as a key predictor for adopting alternative identities in deradicalisation programs: An investigation of terrorist detainees' profiles
1	4	2	3	3	2	15	Deradicalizing Detained Terrorists
1	2	1	3	3	1	11	Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia: Evidence from a Rehabilitation Programme for Former Members of Al-Shabaab
1	2	2	3	1	2	11	Leaving Hate Behind- Neo-Nazis, Significant Others and Disengagement
1	2	2	3	3	1	12	Reintegrating Terrorists in the Netherlands: Evaluating the Dutch approach
1	2	2	2	2	2	11	Transitional Journeys Into and Out of Extremism. A Biographical Approach
1	3	2	2	1	2	11	Assessing intervention outcomes targeting radicalised offenders: Testing the pro integration model of extremist disengagement as an evaluation tool
1	2	2	2	2	2	11	Extreme Right Women, (Dis-)Engagement and Deradicalisation: Findings from a Qualitative Study
1	3	1	2	3	2	12	Insights from a deradicalisation program in Indonesian prisons: The potential benefits of psychological intervention prior to ideological discussion

1	3	2	2	3	2	13	"Doing Peace": The Role of Ex-Political Prisoners in Violence Prevention Initiatives in Northern Ireland
1	2	2	2	3	1	11	The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al-Shabaab
1	2	2	3	3	2	13	Why White Supremacist Women Become Disillusioned, and Why They Leave
1	2	1	3	3	1	11	Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Bringing Back the Jihadists
1	3	2	3	3	2	14	Anger from Within: The Role of Emotions in Disengagement from Violent Extremism
1	3	2	3	1	2	12	Social context, interpersonal network, and identity dynamics: A social psychological case study of terrorist recidivism
1	4	2	2	1	1	11	Why They Leave: An Analysis of Terrorist Disengagement Events from Eighty-seven Autobiographical Accounts
1	4	2	2	1	2	12	Disengagement from Political Violence and Deradicalisation: A Narrative-Dialogical Perspective
1	2	2	3	2	2	12	Doing Derad
1	3	2	2	2	2	12	Organizational (Dis)trust: Comparing Disengagement Among Former Left-Wing and Right-Wing Violent Extremists
1	4	2	3	2	2	14	Supporting deradicalisation and reintegration: qualitative outcomes from a custody-based counter radicalisation intervention
1	3	2	3	2	2	13	The limit-experience and self-deradicalisation: the example of radical Salafi youth in Tunisia
1	4	2	2	1	1	11	Psychological Distress, Terrorist Involvement and Disengagement from Terrorism: A Sequence Analysis Approach
1	3	1	2	2	2	11	Converging Patterns in Pathways in and out of Violent Extremism: Insights from Former Canadian Right-Wing Extremists
1	2	2	3	3	0	11	Walking away: the disengagement and de-radicalisation of a violent right-wing extremist

APPENDIX D: PRE-2017 SOURCES

Author(s)	Year	Article Title
Altier, Thoroughgood & Horgan	2014	Turning away from terrorism: Lessons from psychology, sociology, and criminology
Horgan, Altier	2012	The Future of Terrorist De-radicalisation programs
Boucek	2008	Counter-Terrorism from Within: Assessing Saudi Arabia's Religious Rehabilitation and Disengagement Programme
Stern	2010	Mind Over Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists
F. Moghaddam	2009	De - radicalisation and the Staircase from Terrorism
A. Moghadam	2012	Failure and Disengagement in the Red Army Faction
White	2010	Structural Identity Theory and the Post-Recruitment Activism of Irish Republicans: Persistence, Disengagement, Splits, and Dissidents in Social Movement Organizations
Alonso	2011	Why Do Terrorists Stop? Analyzing Why ETA Members Abandon or Continue with Terrorism
Della Porta & LaFree	2012	Guest Editorial: Processes of Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation
Horgan	2008	Deradicalisation or Disengagement?: A Process in Need of Clarity and a Counterterrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation
Gunaratna & bin Ali	2009	De-Radicalisation Initiatives in Egypt: A Preliminary Insight
Ferguson	2016	Disengaging from Terrorism: A Northern Irish Experience
Barelle	2015	Pro-integration: disengagement from and life after extremism
Horgan & Braddock	2010	Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalisation Programs
Bertram	2015	How could a terrorist be de-radicalised?
Ferguson, Burgess & Hollywood	2015	Leaving Violence Behind: Disengaging from Politically Motivated Violence in Northern Ireland
Kruglanski, Gelfand, Belanger, Sheveland, Hetiarachchi & Gunaratna	2014	The Psychology of Radicalisation and Deradicalisation: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism
Horgan	2008	Individual Disengagement: A Psychological Analysis
Sukarieh, Tannock	2015	The deradicalisation of education: terror, youth and the assault on learning

Doosje, Moghaddam, Kruglanski, de Wolf, Mann, Feddes	2016	Terrorism, Radicalisation and Deradicalisation
Sukabdi	2015	Terrorism in Indonesia: A review on rehabilitation and deradicalisation
Ashour	2010	Online De-Radicalisation? Countering Violent Extremist Narratives: Message, Messenger and Media Strategy
Dechesne	2011	Deradicalisation: Not soft, but strategic
Morris, Eberhard, Rivera, Watsula	2010	Deradicalisation: A Review of the Literature with Comparison to Findings in the Literatures on Deganging and Deprogramming
Reinares	2011	Exit From Terrorism: A Qualitative Empirical Study on Disengagement and Deradicalisation Among Members of ETA
Horgan & Taylor	2011	Disengagement, De-radicalisation and the Arc of Terrorism: Future Directions for Research
Demant, de Graaf	2010	How to Counter Radical Narratives: Dutch Deradicalisation Policy in the Case of Moluccan and Islamic Radicals
Mullins	2010	Rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists: Lessons from criminology
Schmid & Price	2011	Selected literature on radicalisation and de-radicalisation of terrorists: Monographs, Edited Volumes, Grey Literature and Prime Articles published since the 1960s
Kruglanski, Bélanger, Gelfand, Gunaratna, Reinares, Orehek, Sharvit	2013	Terrorism—A (Self) Love Story Redirecting the Significance Quest Can End Violence

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