Towards a Common Doctrine for African Standby Force-led Peace Operations

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Short Bio
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ABSTRACT

This article considers the military doctrine currently available to the African Standby Force (ASF) for peace operations (PO) on the African continent. In the absence of an updated and relevant doctrine for PO, risks are posed to the harmonization and coordination of multinational missions, as well as to the successful achievement of mission objectives. Despite laudable efforts by both the United Nations (UN) and bilateral donor nations to support the preparatory and continuation training of ASF troops, differences in the national and multinational experiences of this work and the differences in the legal basis of this doctrine do not provide an optimal ‘stop gap’ measure. The pressing new requirement for African peace missions to deter terrorist and insurgent anti-peace factions exposes the limitations of UN doctrine, which preserves traditional peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force. UN peace enforcement mandates, and guidance derived from NATO’s non-African experiences do not provide adequate guidance for ASF troops preparing to enter these operating environments. A cursory study of the impact of the absence of common doctrine supporting the multinational African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) indicates that different doctrinal approaches impact negatively on AMISOM’s ability to achieve its objectives.

Introduction

Since its development in 2003, the military elements of the African Standby Force (ASF) have operated in the absence of a relevant doctrine which reflects the experience of African peace operations\(^1\) (PO) across the continent to date. Both the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) recognise jointly that there is a need to align policy with their operations. However, there is a lack of common doctrine for African PO applicable to both organisations. This adds to the risks faced by African countries contributing troops to PO and may also contribute to a failure to achieve mission objectives.

\(^1\) In line with the 2015 Report published by the High-Level Independent Panel on the Future of UN Peace Operations (HIPPO), this paper uses the term ‘peace operations’, which is now used to embrace a broad suite of tools managed by the UN Secretariat. These instruments range from special envoys and mediators, political missions (including peacebuilding missions), regional preventive diplomacy offices, observation missions to small, technical specialist missions, multidisciplinary operations both large and small drawing on civilian, military and police personnel to support peace process implementation, as well as advance missions for planning. All these missions draw upon expertise mobilized by the Secretariat, including mediation and electoral specialists, and human rights, rule of law, gender, police and military experts. (See UN Publications, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People*, Report of the HIPPO, 16 June 2015, p.4, accessed on 15 April 2017 at http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf.)
This paper examines Africa’s doctrinal experience supporting PO to date. The paper begins with a general overview of doctrine and the role doctrine plays in support of multinational military operations. It then looks at the doctrinal experience of the AU, its regional brigades and its Member States and examines the way in which UN and other western doctrine on PO has shaped the African approach. A cursory examination of the experience of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) evaluates the impact of some of the different doctrinal approaches on the ground.

Conclusions suggest that, while a capstone ASF peace support operations (PSO) doctrine exists, it remains little-known, unused and outdated. The paper argues for the development of a relevant common doctrine for African PO which supports better unity and coherency of effort. The revised doctrine should be in line with the ASF’s limited institutional capacity to sustain and evolve doctrine. The provision of a guiding ‘concept’ and ‘philosophy’, which reflect emerging conflict and crises trends in Africa and lessons learned from the AU’s operational experience to date, would provide useful and timely guidance for militaries at both the regional and national levels. With plans to pursue more cooperative approaches to future AU-UN PO, the proposed concept would also clarify distinguishing features of AU PO and the ASF’s legal framework.

The Concept of Military Doctrine

In its simplest form, ‘doctrine’ is understood as ‘that which is taught’. Military historian Colin S. Gray defines doctrine as ‘guidance, mandatory or discretionary, on what is believed officially to be contemporary best military practice’. The historian and strategist, General John Fuller, defined doctrine as ‘the central idea of an army’, whereas Trevor Dupuy describes it as the ‘basis for academic study and field exercises and, in some cases, the military’s forecast of events and activities’. The AU defines doctrine as ‘a codification of beliefs or a body of teachings or instructions, taught principles or positions, as the body of teachings in a branch of knowledge’. It too, draws on the concept of ‘that which is taught’ and also ‘the basis for institutional teaching its personnel internal ways of doing business’.

Whereas all definitions of doctrine emphasise that doctrine is not a set of rules, they underscore that doctrine has authority and should represent past, present and future understanding of the nature and character of conflict. This understanding has been captured in the most recent edition of the UK Ministry of Defence’s Developing Joint Doctrine Handbook which describes doctrine as a set of ‘fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives – it is authoritative, but requires judgement in application’. Other references throughout the Handbook refer to doctrine as both a ‘handrail’ and a ‘professional body of knowledge for the military’. In summary, doctrine should provide a common framework for understanding approaches to military operations and should serve as the basis for the training and education for troops earmarked to contribute to a particular

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4 Dupuy (ed.), *International Military and Defence Encyclopedia*, 773.
7 Ibid
organization’s military operations. Moreover, doctrine should inform the further development of more detailed and specific tactics, techniques and procedures for the conduct of a wide range of military tasks. These are known to the military as ‘Standard Operating Procedures’ (SOPs), which, in the interest of supporting commonality, set out specific ways in which routine military tasks and procedures will be dealt with.

The issue of resources can introduce a further tension in the application and use of doctrine as doctrine must reflect realistic abilities of an organization rather than what the organization (or other organizations supporting the organization) may aspire to do. This highlights the importance of the process supporting the development of doctrine and the relationship between doctrine development and the utility and relevance of the final outputs. As such, the availability of ‘doctrine’ will often depend on the strength of the institution in question.\(^8\)

Military doctrine is organized functionally (e.g. across ‘J1 to J9’ functions), environmentally (e.g. land, sea, air, cyber, special forces, etc.) and thematically (e.g. resilience, joint, general understanding of the military’s role). For the purposes of this paper, it is worth noting that the UK doctrine on the military support to PSO is positioned under ‘J-3’ (operations) doctrine. This doctrine sits amongst 42 other doctrines supporting a wider range of other J-3 activities including Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN), Military Support to Humanitarian Assistance, Military Police, Explosive Ordnance Control, Security Operations and Deception, and the Military Contribution to Stabilisation Operations.\(^9\)

**Doctrinal approaches supporting African PO**

The doctrinal architecture described above is emulated at the multinational level and, in the case of the UK and the US, within NATO, with all members endorsing and using most of the guidance it produces as ‘national doctrine’. In all cases, a lead member state, or ‘custodian’, takes responsibility for the development of a specific doctrine, iterating it with all member states through to a completed draft. Where some countries may not subscribe wholly and completely to a NATO doctrinal publication, and maintain ‘green’ versions of the doctrine which may be nuanced according to the national way of doing things, other publications will enjoy full subscription of member states.\(^10\) These different doctrinal publications filter into both the national training and educational establishments which typically include the command and staff colleges at all levels of officer training. In this context, and in addition to the multi-tiered doctrinal architecture, military doctrine becomes developed for many different users working at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of the organization.

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8 For example, the United States Department of Defense is supported by an extensive doctrine function, as well as different organizations and ‘systems’ which feed into the doctrine development review cycle, including the Virginia-based Army Training and Doctrine Centre and the Kansas-based Center for Army Lessons Learned. Likewise, similar to many of its other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, the United Kingdom’s Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre houses 63 civilian and uniformed members of staff, all of whom are responsible for supporting the ongoing development of new and existing ‘joint’ defense doctrine with the doctrine centres for all separate services within the armed forces also augmenting this capacity.

9 Interview by the author with staff at the UK Ministry of Defence Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, October 17, 2015.

10 Ibid
Beyond developing a more systematic approach to analysing lessons learned, it is unlikely that the AU will be able to replicate the NATO approach to doctrine development. Unlike the AU, UN, European Union (EU) and other international and regional organizations, NATO’s integrated political-military structure enables the development of the organization’s military capacity to be on a par with the development of its political capacity.\(^{11}\) NATO, as a military alliance of long standing has a well-integrated political and military structure. In general, its military capacity is matched to its political objectives such as the national contribution of 2 per cent to defence and security expenditure. This matching of political objectives and military capacity gives purpose to NATO’s military doctrine. By contrast, the AU and the UN, by their nature not military alliances, have less distinct and direct links between political purpose and military objectives. The development of doctrine for PO in the UN and AU has therefore been much more cautious and has had less significance than it has had in NATO.

The UN approach to producing guidance for PO has developed to comparable levels of sophistication as organizations like NATO. However, without the same integrated military structure as NATO, there is also more variability in terms of how the UN guidance is incorporated into national doctrine and used by member states. In addition, despite the use of the NATO term ‘PSO’ by a significant number of its members and its regional partners, the UN now uses the term ‘peace operations’, albeit continues to base this concept on the 1947 founding principles of UN peacekeeping.\(^{12}\) The preservation of these original peacekeeping principles also relates to the UN’s role as leading international authority in global peace and security issues and issues concerning legality and legitimacy that flow from this.\(^{13}\) For many UN Member States, the term ‘PSO’ emerged in the 1990s based on the ‘operational’ aspect of more robust peacekeeping interventions as well as increased military support to humanitarian and development actors.\(^{14}\)

As the UN is a ‘non-military’ organization, another difference between the approaches taken by the UN and NATO is the UN’s preference for ‘guidance documents’ rather than doctrine. Within this broader ‘guidance’, policy and SOPs are all produced both as generic and mission-specific products. The approach taken by the knowledge management team within the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) Policy Evaluation and Training Unit is one which follows a circular cycle of learning which brings policy development, guidance and training together into one process.\(^{15}\) Supporting this process is a Standing Committee comprised of representatives from every team in the UN’s two peacekeeping-relevant departments, the Department of Field Missions and DPKO. The Standing Committee meets regularly and, in close consultation with the UN missions, shares all issues relating to both doctrine and

\(^{11}\) In this context, the organization not only has authority for political decision-making (led by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) with representatives at Ambassador level) but also authority for military decision-making (led by the Military Council (MC) with representatives comprising senior military leaders). Similarly, while the NAC is supported by political delegations, the MC is supported by a very large, and functionally diverse, International Military Staff.

\(^{12}\) Report of the HIPPO, op cit


This work supports the updating of all guidance documents every two years, the output of which is fed regularly into the regional training centres, including the UN-accredited Regional Centres of Excellence (RCE) in Africa. In line with recent recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) for a closer strategic partnership between the AU and UN, the UN Office of the AU (UNOAU) now works with the AU’s Peace and Security Operations Department (PSOD) to enable the sharing of all policy, guidance and SOPs produced by the UN. As encouraged under the 1995 UN General Assembly resolution 39/47, these shared documents can be passed down to both regional and national authorities to support the alignment between UN and national training material supporting peacekeeping operations.

In summary, the development of doctrine is both a time-consuming and resource intensive function of a defense institution. The process includes research and data analysis, drafting, reviewing, iterating, achieving final agreement and ratifying the agreed output. Doctrine is produced for many different users at many different levels. This includes doctrine which underpins the efforts of one agency (i.e. the military) to a wider multi-agency thematic area (i.e. PSO or stability operations). The latter is particularly important in supporting international multiagency PO which involve lead organizations such as the UN and AU, and which should benefit from a degree of commonality, cohesion and standardization.

The AU’s Doctrinal Experience

Pursuant with Article 5(2) of the AU’s Constitutive Act, the organization developed the Protocol for the Establishment of a Peace and Security Council (PSC) to establish the collective security arrangements and an early warning system to enable more efficient and effective responses to conflicts and crises on the African continent. The resulting African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) included the ASF - an international continental multidisciplinary African peacekeeping force comprising a military, police and civilian element – as one of its five components. The ASF acts under the direction of the AU and is deployed to respond to African crises and conflicts.

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16 Interview by author with the Head of the Lessons Learned and Knowledge Management Team in the UN DPKO’s Policy, Evaluation and Training Unit, 2 December, 2015.
17 The Regional Centres of Excellence are accredited by the African Peace Support Training Association, which is an independent Pan-African association with close working relations with the African Union (AU), notably with the AU Commission and RECs/RMs, as well as other regional and international partners and stakeholders, including the IAPTC of which it is its African Chapter. See http://www.apsta-africa.org/introduction.
18 Interview with Head of Lessons Learned and Knowledge Management Team, op cit.
19See A/RES/49/37, Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, 83rd Plenary Meeting, 9 December 1994. This Resolution states that all member states contributing to UN peacekeeping operations are expected to align their own national training material to that which is produced by the UN.
The ASF comprises five brigades encompassing all of the African sub-regions. Like much of the AU architecture itself, this concept was a product of time and based on the experience of the late 1990s. As such, it was based on five scenarios including conflict prevention, observer missions, humanitarian missions, both Chapter VI (non-use of force) and Chapter VII (use of force) peacekeeping interventions. As endorsed by Article 4(h) of the AU’s Constitutive Act, a sixth scenario was also added which describes a more robust type of mission in respect of specifically defined grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The concept also sees each of the five African regions hosting a brigade, a brigade headquarters and a planning element (PLANELM). The brigades have developed a Rapid Deployable Capability (RDC) which requires harmonization between the AU and the RECs hosting the RDCs. This arrangement is complicated given both the overlapping nature of the RECs and the fact that AU-REC relations are negotiated on a case-by-case basis. For all missions initiated by the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Department (PSD) is responsible for mobilising the standby capabilities as required. This overall planning is facilitated between the various regional PLANELMs and the PLANELM within the AU PSD in order to ensure that what is envisaged as a requirement is ready for deployment.

With instability increasing in 2013 in areas such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali and Central African Republic (CAR), and in anticipation that the ASF would not meet its timetable to achieve ‘readiness’ of its military elements by December 2013, a proposal to develop an African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) was passed by the AU in November 2013. The high readiness brigade was to be composed of three infantry battalions and support activities such as stabilization, peace enforcement and intervention missions (including the neutralization of terrorist groups, other cross-border criminal entities, armed rebellions) and emergency assistance to member states within the framework of the principle of non-indifference for protection of civilians. Although there are differing views with regard to the extent to which the ACIRC either duplicates or complements the ASF, the concept was meant to be temporary and eventually folded into the Rapid Deployable Concept (RDC) of the ASF. However, at the time of writing, there have been no further developments or resolution within the AU on this issue.

In parallel to these developments, the idea of developing a common doctrine for the ASF was first pursued in 2003 when a group of consultants supporting the AU PSD developed the first AU PSO Doctrine. This doctrine was approved by the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (African Ministers of Defence and Safety and Security) and,

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22 Ibid
23 ASF PSO doctrine, op cit, p. 58.
24 Interview by author with officials from AU PSOD, September 30, 2015.
26 Ibid, p.60.
27 Interview by author with Col (retd) Nick Seymour and Brigadier (retd) Dick Baly, strategic advisers to the AU in support of AMANI II ASF Exercise, 11 November 2015.
although it was never officially published and disseminated, has been accessible through its online version.\footnote{Interview by author with members of the AU PSOD team, 4 April 2017.} The document reflects efforts to develop something that was suitable and relevant to the African context and which offers some useful guidance including a PSO ‘Glossary of Terms’, a definition of ‘doctrine’, procedures supporting the strategic, operational and tactical levels of PSO activity and planning tools. However, based on the way in which the doctrine was informed by UN principles and practice, its utility has remained limited. When the same Specialised Technical Committee called for the Doctrine to be revised in 2007 to ensure that the ASF was properly constituted to respond to new and emerging threats, a further draft was written and submitted by a different group of consultants.\footnote{Ibid} Based on the Committee’s view that the revised version did not suitably reflect both the strategic policy challenges and the security challenges across the continent, the draft doctrine never gained formal approval.\footnote{Ibid} This left an ageing and outdated 2003 ASF PSO Doctrine which conformed to UN practice and which failed to capture the organisation’s more recent experience in PO.

The adoption in June 2016 of the Five-Year Strategic Workplan for the ASF (2016-2020) calls for the development of “harmonized policies, guidelines and standard operating procedures for AU PSOs”\footnote{African Union, ASF Draft Strategic Workplan 2016-2020, Version 1.5, accessed on 6 April 2017 at \url{http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/draft-asf-strategic-work-plan-2016-2020-.pdf}, p. 10.}. Interviews with AU officials indicate that this provision of the Workplan was driven by the Specialised Committee’s view that revised policies and guidelines should address the multidimensional elements of the current doctrine to reflect the police and civilian components and not just the military components of the ASF; to reconsider the five original scenarios underpinning the APSA and the AU’s legal framework for PO; and, thirdly, to articulate the extent to which the ASF may be employed to deal with contemporary security challenges the continent now faces including violent extremism, human trafficking, piracy, terrorism, and health epidemics.\footnote{Interview by author with members of the AU PSOD 4 April 2017, op cit.} This development reflects general agreement across Member States for the harmonisation of a relevant ASF doctrine for PO and therefore casts doubt on suggestions of Member State resistance to the development of collective security measures in Africa. However, whilst the Strategic Plan provides a policy framework for implementation, adequate resources must be made available to support this effort.

Regional and National Efforts Supporting the Development of African PO Doctrine

Despite the relative progress made by the AU and RECs to create and support the development of the ASF\footnote{For a comprehensive account on the ASF’s initial ten years of development, as well as the different policies and joint training initiatives, see Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, “Progress with the African Standby Force” in \textit{ISS Paper} 98, May 2005.}, a combination of political, conflict-related and capacity constraints have had varying impacts on the development of the regional brigades. Capacity constraints in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) region have prevented training centers from becoming fully equipped to support readiness and deployability\footnote{Ibid, p.15}; conflicts and
political divisions between north African states have left the northern region disengaged with the process\textsuperscript{35}, and political divisions within the South African Development Community (SADC) have also impacted on the development of the SADC Brigade.\textsuperscript{36}

Some progress on the development of PO doctrine has also been made by both the East African Standby Force (EASF) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Brigade. In the context of the former, the EASF is supported by a brigade and brigade headquarters, both based in Addis Ababa, and a PLANELM based in Nairobi. Training of the ten East African countries comprising the EASF is conducted in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania and is supported by both US and British-led PSO training programs. This training is augmented by UN-led training on all areas of UN peacekeeping guidance including the Protection of Civilians, International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and other thematic areas relating to UN peacekeeping. This UN training takes place at the RCEs which, in the case of the East African region, is the International Peacekeeping Training Centre based in Nairobi and co-located with the British Peace Support Training Centre.

Until early 2014, there was no regional doctrine or any tendency to use the ASF PSO doctrine and embed this into the EASF training programs. Thereafter, British-led efforts were made to facilitate the development of a ‘tri-service’ tactical level doctrine entitled ‘Planning Doctrine for PSO’.\textsuperscript{37} Developed at the tactical level, this Doctrine was approved, and formally adopted within the PLANELM as acceptable tactical doctrine to support African PSO. The doctrine is used for PSO training purposes within the dedicated EASF training programs run in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. The development of this tactical doctrine was also used to support the EASF Exercise in Adama, Ethiopia in 2014, which was politically important in terms of demonstrating the ‘readiness’ of the EASF.\textsuperscript{38} Based on the EASF’s progress on the development of operational doctrine and doctrine for integrated mission planning, doctrine development in the region appears to be progressing according to a bilaterally-supported, ‘bottom-up’ approach.\textsuperscript{39}

In contrast to the bottom-up model pursued by the EASF, the ECOWAS Brigade developed a strategic level PSO doctrine that was based largely on the extant ASF PSO doctrine but amended to reflect the peculiarities of the region.\textsuperscript{40} While the doctrine has been described as out-dated and in need of revision, meetings held in November 2015 between ECOWAS and

\textsuperscript{35} Alex Ramsbotham, \textit{The Implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan}, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{36} SADC already once witnessed a divergence of opinion between pacifist and militarist camps in the deployments to both Lesotho and DRC in 1998; de Coning, \textit{op cit}, p. 109. Although SADC has, to a certain extent, proven itself as a rapidly deployable brigade under the ‘Force Intervention Brigade’ (FIB) concept that supported the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in March 2013, In March 2013 (See UNSC 2098 which authorised a SADC ‘intervention brigade’ to carry out ‘targeted offensive operations to neutralize armed groups with the intent of preventing violence against civilians and protecting civilians under imminent threat’). For more information on the FIB concept, see Peter Nadin, “Peace Support: A New Concept for UN Peacekeeping”, United Nations University, 29 May 2013, accessed on 6 April at \url{https://unu.edu/publications/articles/peace-support-a-new-concept-for-un-peacekeeping.html}.

\textsuperscript{37} Interview by author with Lt Col (Retd) Eric Tyson, October 21, 2015.

\textsuperscript{38} Interview by author with Lt Col (Retd) Henry Sugden, October 22, 2015.

\textsuperscript{39} Interview by author with the head of the British Peace Support Training Centre, November 23, 2015.

\textsuperscript{40} Interview by author with staff within the Rostering and Training Unit in the ECOWAS Commission, November 3, 2015.
doctrinal experts were intended to support a revised version of the doctrine.\textsuperscript{41} However, based on the skeletal staff of only 5 military officers within the ECOWAS Planning and Management Cell responsible for the development of ECOWAS PSO doctrine and SOPs,\textsuperscript{42} the development of relevant doctrine to support the ECOWAS Brigade remains unfinished business. Similar to the experience of the EASF in Nairobi, the Accra-based Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre continues to serve as a UN-accredited RCE and therefore the principle venue for training in support of wider UN guidelines and requirements. In contrast to the EASF, the experience of the ECOWAS Brigade could therefore be characterised as a ‘top-down’ approach to regional doctrine development.

While the RECs have the legitimate authority to progress with the development of regional doctrine for PO, and enhance their regional capabilities, the subsidiarity principle\textsuperscript{43} supporting the implementation of continental doctrine remains relevant. Both the Protocol for the establishment of an AU PSC and the Common African Defence and Security Policy act as a reminder that the RECs do not stand on their own but remain linked organically, and serve as ‘building blocks’, to the AU. Therefore, whatever capability is being developed for the regions will be based on the political decision-making of the relevant regional and AU resources. In this context, and according to AU doctrine, if a regionally deployed PO force was dependent on AU resources, the AU would have ultimate command and control authority over the regional troops.\textsuperscript{44} For this reason, and based on the likelihood that ‘coalition of the willing’ arrangements will support future African PO, regional doctrine should be informed by a common continental capstone doctrine.

An analysis of structures and processes which support the development of national military doctrine across the ASF’s regional brigades confirms that existing doctrine for PO remains largely borrowed and, in some cases, amended in a limited way to reflect realities of regional operating environments. Exceptions to this general observation include the case of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, whose national military doctrine is based on the counter-guerrilla warfare used to defeat the Derg regime in 1991. In keeping with the Ethiopian Government’s Soviet-inspired approach to doctrine development, this doctrine is revised regularly and updated to reflect lessons from national and regional experiences. The doctrine also serves as the basis for defence education and training at all levels of officer development. Whereas Ethiopia’s pre-deployment training curriculum for UN Missions draws heavily on UN policy and guidance, these documents are amended to take account of national doctrine.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} Ramsbotham, op cit, p.37.
\textsuperscript{43} There are three main elements in the application of subsidiarity: decision-making mechanisms, burden-sharing and the division of labour (See AU, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence, No. PSC/PR/2.(CCCVII), 2012.
\textsuperscript{44} Interview by author with AU PSOD staff, September 30, 2015.
\textsuperscript{45} Interview by author with the former Director of Training, Ethiopian Ministry of National Defence, October 23, 2015. Interviews also indicated that this practice also reflected the experiences of countries which hosted RCEs, such as Kenya and Ghana, where UN peacekeeping guidance had been used as the basis for PSO doctrine.
The experience of Rwanda also emerged as slightly different in that, while the Rwandan Defence Forces have adopted a largely British-based PSO doctrine, work has been undertaken by research and lessons-learned teams to nuance the doctrine to ensure that it captures the Rwandan experience. For example, the Rwandan case emphasises the country’s understandable concern with genocide. This concern colours much of what emerges in Rwandan doctrine and how it is taught at the Rwandan Armed Forces Command and Staff College. The negative effect is that the threat of genocide is, arguably, over emphasised and used to justify some types of military action which runs counter to what would be accepted in Western doctrinal circles.

Like the Rwandans, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) also have dedicated resources and systems supporting the development of defense doctrine which informs training delivered by its national peacekeeping training centre. These systems and processes have been developed to a fairly sophisticated level and could be instructive for countries wishing to develop the capacity of their national ministries of defence in this area.

The experience of the Ethiopians, South Africans and the Rwandans appears to be the exception rather than the norm. In addition to the tendency to ‘borrow doctrine’, economic limitations and resource constraints, particularly for African countries recently emerging from conflict, make this observation not surprising. Feedback from countries such as Burundi (which uses both French and American doctrine) and Sierra Leone indicated that ambitious post-conflict defense transformation plans have not prioritised capacity for doctrine development. However, based on the absence of doctrine and systems supporting doctrine development in countries like Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya (where British and American doctrine is used), this phenomenon cannot be fully explained by a lack of economic resources.

Another factor which contributes to both the development and teaching of doctrine is the experience of military officers who attend foreign staff colleges. All respondents interviewed for this research confirmed that it is often the case that national authorities use these foreign experiences to build their own capacity to support training and education. Representatives from both Uganda and Rwanda suggested that these experiences also made an important contribution to the review of ‘borrowed’ PSO doctrine and ensured that documents could be updated according to the developments of close allies and partners. One interesting development was the recent agreement by the African countries in the Great Lakes region for their Staff College Commandants to meet regularly with the objective of harmonising their training and education curriculum which has included the recently drafted EASF tactical doctrine.\(^46\)

There are still varied and sometimes hard-to-reconcile sources of doctrine in African countries today. An element of these sources is the doctrine and practices inherited from the colonial era. Another element of these sources is acquired by officers at various stages of their careers attending courses in the West or, formerly, in the Eastern Bloc. Further influences are felt by current and largely western-run training centres such as the BPST concept. There are yet more and different influences introduced by the softer approaches offered to military, law-enforcement and civil society delegates under the banner of UN human rights training, gender awareness and similar topics. Above all, as African officers gain higher command experience on PO in Africa and elsewhere, they bring their own often hard-won lessons learned. Making sense, in an African context, of all these different and sometimes contradictory influences is extremely difficult.

\(^46\) Interviews by author with members of the Ugandan, Kenyan and Rwandan defence forces, November 2016.
The Impact of UN Doctrine on the ASF

Although the UN has been deploying peacekeeping forces since 1947, the organization did not produce an overall framework for guidance for peacekeeping operations until 2005. A ‘Capstone Doctrine’ entitled “UN Peacekeeping Principles and Guidelines” was then produced in early 2008 which sought to capture the past sixty years of UN peacekeeping experience and provide a doctrine which sits on top of the large number of directives, guidelines, manuals, SOPs and training materials which have been issued by both the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) over the years.\footnote{Cedric de Coning, Julian Detzel and Petter Hojem, “UN Peacekeeping Operations Capstone Document”, \textit{Report of the TFP Oslo Doctrine Seminar}, 14-15 May 2008, Oslo, Norway, p. 1.} Irrespective of this ‘stock-taking’ exercise, both the 2000 Brahimi Report and the 2015 HIPPO Report called for the UN not to depart from its original 1947 principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force, as well as initiating interventions only following the signing of a peace agreement and where there was a ‘peace to keep’.

This notwithstanding, the UN’s recent experience in PO such as the DRC, CAR and Mali all indicate that, in practice, the UN is wandering ‘off course’ and intervening not only in areas where there is no peace to keep, but only where more conventional warfare approaches such as intelligence operations, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism are followed. The nature of this military activity is more akin to the respective types of stabilisation operations that NATO and coalition forces lead in Afghanistan and Iraq. Whilst this has led scholars like Cedric de Coning to propose the need for a new AU concept for stabilisation operations on the African continent\footnote{See Cedric de Coning, “Peace Enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal Distinctions between the AU and UN” \textit{Contemporary Security Policy}, 38:1, February 2017, pp. 145-160.}, it also further widens the conceptual divide between AU and UN concepts of PO.

Despite its involvement in stabilisation-type operations in DRC (under MONUSCO), CAR (under MINUSCA) and Mali (under MINUSMA), the UN’s peacekeeping doctrine lacks any means and ways for supporting stabilisation operations. This limits the organisation’s ability to provide strategic or operational support to the AU in this area. John Karlsrud suggests that even the UN’s inconsistent use of the term demonstrates a lack of conceptual clarity in this area. Whereas Karlsrud argues that the UN’s first use of the term ‘stabilisation’ came in 1995 in Bosnia (‘Stabilisation Force’), he notes that no correlation exists between the use of stabilisation in the titles of various UN missions and the ability of those missions to use force.\footnote{John Karlsrud, “The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali”, \textit{Third World Quarterly}, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2015, p. 42.}

The use of Chapter 7 peace enforcement mandates became more of the norm, rather than the exception, following the largescale loss of civilian lives in both Srebrenica and Rwanda in 1994 and based on the failure of UN forces to protect civilian populations. The UN commitment to the ‘Protection of Civilians’ agenda that followed, and the subsequent featuring of this commitment in the mandates of most UN PO, led to peacekeeping forces being increasingly
equipped with a Chapter 7 provision to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilian lives. While UN Chapter 7 ‘peace enforcement’ operations do not require consent, and may involve the use of offensive action, Kalsrud argues that such offensive action has normally been only short-term in duration and does not identify and name specific enemies.\textsuperscript{50} This is not the case in either AU or UN-led African PO such as MINUSMA, where Al-Qaeda in the Mahgreb has been named as an identified enemy and in Somalia, where AMISOM’s Concept of Operations requires troops to target and pursue members of al-Shabaab.

**Challenges to harmonising future approaches to African PO**

Although the sixth scenario outlined in the AU Protocol distinguishes the AU from the UN in the context of being able to authorize more offensive intervention operations where there may be no agreement by all parties to intervene, the other five scenarios in the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF do not accommodate the realities of most African PO. The second issue which challenges the existing ASF PSO doctrine is the emergence of a ‘two-tracked’ PO doctrine with the AU (and some TCCs) on one track (according to NATO-informed PSO doctrine) and the UN-informed TCCs on another track (according to UN peacekeeping principles). This ‘two-tracked’ approach is driven in part by the pressure for many TCCs to become more conversant and proficient in UN doctrine in order to enhance their eligibility for deployment on UN missions. In this context, the UN-endorsed RCEs responsible for UN training inadvertently compete with those regional training programs which seek throughput from the regional brigades to support readiness levels. In addition to the competing UN training, the ease of access to embedded bilateral support for ASF regional training programs encourages the sharing of PSO and stabilization doctrine of national authorities leading the training. In Africa, the more dominant western defence engagement efforts include the US-led African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, the BPSTs, and the French-led training programs francophone African countries. Beyond these bilaterally-funded centers and training programs, a number of foreign military advisers embedded in the regional and national peacekeeping training centers, as well as ASF Brigade Headquarters, also promotes the sharing of non-ASF PSO doctrine.

Irrespective of the updates required by the ASF PSO doctrine, the AU PSOD has developed a repository of doctrine which amounts to approximately 80 different guidance notes, all of which are available to the standby brigades.\textsuperscript{51} The ASF PSO doctrine sits within this broader doctrinal architecture, albeit an architecture which lacks a conceptual foundation and which, to a large extent, has been ‘borrowed’ from others. This ‘borrowed’ doctrine has as its basis the experience of multinational troops in specific types of geographical environments. For example, NATO PSO doctrine rests on the experiences of NATO operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq – environments that bear significant difference to the nomadic cultures, geography, ecological patterns, governance structures, and military resources in Africa. It is

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid
\textsuperscript{51} Interview by author with the UN DPKO UNPET Team’s Team Leader for Knowledge Management and Lessons Learned, December 4, 2015.
worth noting here that, with the EU wholly reliant on NATO doctrine, non-African doctrine is also followed by EU Forces operating in Africa.\textsuperscript{52}

The tendency to borrow and outsource doctrine and guidance in Africa is driven mainly by capacity shortfalls, as well as the lack of systems and resources required to support national doctrinal processes. UN DPKO currently hosts over one thousand officials responsible for the planning and administration of military operations. With the AU PSOD only supported by fifty officials (with only 4 individuals supporting the area of doctrine and guidance\textsuperscript{53}), it is perhaps understandable as to why the organization lacks a doctrinal process and ‘culture’ to support the ongoing analysis, drafting and review processes that characterize most Western organizations.

To some extent, an emerging culture of learning and doctrine development has been supported by the knowledge sharing project between UNDPKO and AU PSOD which will enable sharing of all available UN guidance and doctrine on peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{54} These efforts will go some way towards promoting the ‘currency’ and ‘multinational’ nature of the doctrine which informs training and education for all AU TCCs. However, conceptual gaps will remain as a result of the different acceptable operating environments in which each organization undertakes PO. As a result of operating according to three principles that no other multinational organization uses – i.e. consent, impartiality and the limited use of force - the UN is already starting from a different founding basis for doctrine which limits ‘enforcement’ operations of UN peacekeeping missions to mainly defensive actions only. As such, there is a difference between a ‘UN-authorised/AU-led’ peace mission with a Chapter VII mandate which results in AU forces undertaking offensive stability-type operations, and a ‘UN-authorised/UN-led’ peacekeeping mission with a Chapter VII mandate which allows UN troops to undertake military operations in accordance with UN guidance. Although the HIPPO Report makes it clear that the UN is not ready to engage in counter-terrorism or counter-insurgencies operations, the organization continues to authorise Chapter VII AU-led missions that do undertake these activities.

On the other hand, the AU is constitutionally able to mandate troops to intervene in more robust military operations, either according to ‘Scenario 6’-type interventions or in response to terrorist and insurgency threats. This vests the AU with legal authority that goes beyond what the UN Charter grants to regional authorities under its Chapter VIII provisions.\textsuperscript{55} As a result, both the AU’s Constitutive Act and Protocol have been described as having broken new legal ground in international law, and as having codified the right to intervene to prevent serious international crimes in a way that goes beyond the instruments provided by Article 33 of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{52} Interview by author with the Military Adviser to the European Union’s Mission in Addis Ababa, November 20, 2015.

\textsuperscript{53} Author interview with AU PSOD, September 30, 2015.

\textsuperscript{54} Interview by author with UN DPKO UNPET Team’s Team Leader for Knowledge Management and Lessons Learned, op cit.


\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
The AU PSC’s December 2015 proposal to send 5,000 troops to Burundi in order to avert a humanitarian crisis, demonstrated the organisation’s ability to be innovative in this area. As a result of the differences in the legal frameworks of both organizations, there is a need for common ASF doctrine which is not only informed by the different type of PO experienced to date, but which also reflects the more offensive-related enforcement operations which are supported by the AU’s legal framework. Emphasis is now being placed on the effective management of ‘transitions’ from smaller AU-led front-end operations to larger UN-led operations in the future, and the need for AU troops to ‘build up’ capacity to operate in the context of a UN environment in the force generation phase of an AU-operation. Although these efforts will support African TCCs’ ‘readiness’ for UN-led operations, they still leave guidance for the AU’s more robust military operations incomplete, incoherent and uncommon.

The Doctrinal Experience of AMISOM

The final element of this research examined the impact of the absence of common and relevant doctrine for African PO in an operational environment. The case study of AMISOM was selected as virtually all TCCs were members of the EASF, which offered a view on the performance of an ASF regional brigade. In this context, the author interviewed a number of AMISOM force headquarters (HQ) staff, sector commanders and mid-level officers from all TCCs who were posted to the Mission between 2015 and 2017. Focus group discussions with representatives from the TCCs were also held in Addis Ababa in November 2015 and February 2016. Respondents were asked about the doctrine that was used by their troops in Somalia, the impact that different doctrinal approaches had on the mission and, in the absence of relevant common doctrine, ways in which better harmonisation and interoperability could be achieved by the Mission in the short to medium term.

AMISOM was first authorized to deploy to Somalia in January 2007. This mission followed a legacy of interventions in Somalia since 1991 and was mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to protect national authorities (rather than civilians), and support humanitarian

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58 Interview by author with the Chief, Integrated Training Service, Department of Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Field Missions and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, November 27, 2015.

59 It should be noted that Sierra Leone also contributed troops to AMISOM in 2013, but were brought back in 2014 due to the Ebola crisis (interview by author with Colonel Simeon Shireffa, Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, October 21, 2015.)


61 These Interventions included the 1991 mediation efforts led by the Organisation of African Unity, the League of Arab States (LAS) and Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1991-92 and UN in 1992; a UN Military Observer mission in 1992 (UNOSOM I); a military operation (UNITAF, US-led) in 1992-93; wider peacekeeping under Chapter VII (UNOSOM II) in 1993-95; ‘political peacebuilding’ (UNPOS) between 1995 and 2013; and the present day coexistence of peacebuilding (UNSOM) and a more robust UN-authorized AU-led intervention (AMISOM) since 2007.
assistance and political dialogue.\textsuperscript{62} Since the issuing of these initial objectives, AMISOM’s mandate has evolved to support a stabilisation force and capacity-building of Somalia national security forces under a revised ‘concept of operations’ which authorises the Force’s participation in military operations against al-Shabaab.\textsuperscript{63}

The way in which AMISOM is structured is such that most sectors are led and supported by different national contingents. Kenya, Burundi, Ethiopia and Uganda all have their own sectors with two remaining sectors jointly led (Ethiopia-Djibouti and Kenya-Uganda). The view from a number of African and non-African officers working in the force headquarters is that there is no common doctrine supporting the Mission and that, as a result, guidance issued by the force HQ is generally not followed. They added that the lack of common guidance was further disabled by the lack of common equipment used by the TCCs, as well as significant disparities in skillsets such as English language ability and computer skills. HQ staff also confirmed that no common doctrine supporting the Mission had been shared or disseminated. Officers from all TCCs working across the six sectors stated universally that the only doctrine followed was national doctrine. Irrespective of these views, HQ staff felt that the central structure still played an important ‘symbolic’ role in binding together the multinational effort and providing a UN-recognised military construct which served to legitimise the national interests which different TCCs are pursuing in Somalia. However, its intended role in providing any central command and control is much less pronounced and, although all of the military branches (J1-J7) are included in the HQ, many branches were described as ‘serving as empty vessels’.

Across the TCCs, respondents confirmed that the only national armed forces with its own national doctrine was Ethiopia. There was a general feeling that, as the mission is characterised by counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, neither bilaterally-taught PSO doctrine nor UN peacekeeping doctrine had optimized preparation for the Mission. As a result, in dealing with these environmental challenges, troop contributors other than members of the Ethiopian armed forces tended to use a national approach to conventional military operations. In the case of Burundi, its national approach to conventional operations was shaped by its internal bush operations executed during its 1993-2005 civil war. The requirement for these troops to engage in mobile operations in Somalia required the use of American Armed Personnel Carriers, which the Burundians had neither owned nor operated prior to their arrival in AMISOM. Both Ugandan and Kenyan troops acknowledged that, unlike their training in the area of counter-terrorist operations, their exposure to the concept of counter-insurgency had been ‘introductory only’, and based on British history and doctrine. Other senior officers argued that British and American concepts and doctrine on counter-terrorist operations differed somewhat from responses required to counter terrorist threats in Somalia. Based on the variable understanding of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, a number of TCCs were described as taking a more ‘static defensive posture’ in fielding these operations rather than a more ‘mobile defence posture’. The approaches of other TCC were described as ‘untouchable postures’ (suggesting that troops did not leave the sector HQ or barracks). To many mid to senior officers, this enabled al-Shabaab to ‘gain time’ for reinforcing itself and taking back areas that had been liberated by AMISOM. A number of respondents underscored that al-Shabaab’s success was not based in its strength but based on AMISOM’s lack of knowledge and doctrine supporting counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations against an enemy who is highly mobile and

\textsuperscript{62} See UNSC resolution 1744, dated 20\textsuperscript{th} February 2007.

\textsuperscript{63} For more details on the specific objectives of the most recent AMISOM mandate which was adopted at the UN Security Council’s 7731\textsuperscript{st} Meeting on 7 July 2016, access http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/.
who engages in asymmetric warfare. This, it was felt, required mobile defence systems which could dominate all areas of responsibility in all weather conditions, twenty-four hours a day.

Feedback from the sectors also emphasised a number of definitional differences. For example, whereas reasonably common definitions of brigade, battlegroup/taskforce, battalion, and regiment exist in most national and multinational doctrine, feedback suggested that different TCCs brought different interpretations to these terms which, on occasion, caused confusion. The nature of the Mission was also described differently by different respondents, with some respondents labelling the Mission as ‘peace enforcement’, some using the term ‘stabilisation’ and others using the terms ‘warfare’ and ‘counter guerilla-warfare’. One sector commander explained that, before a PO could be supported, communities needed to be liberated and then stabilized, and that this type of situation was characterised as counter-guerrilla warfare rather than stabilization or enforcement. Another commander made a similar observation but added that, for this reason, it was not possible to speak about conflict and post-conflict situations which, he felt, reflected the language of UN peacekeeping training manuals and PSO doctrine. One former Force Commander also observed that the regular changes in operational requirements for the Mission often required a revised concept of operations (CONOPS) for which, he felt, little or no capacity existed in the AU.

Different approaches to decision-making were also noted. In this context, the Ethiopian national doctrine embeds the historical practice applied in Ethiopia of ‘committee/consensus-based’ decision-making which means in practice that command and control is established by three entities: a commissar (the political lead), an intelligence lead and a Force Commander. With other TCCs operating under a system of command and control exercised by a single individual, these differences also caused confusion and decision-making according to different timeframes. Feedback from the AMISOM HQ suggested that, generally speaking, power and decision-making across the TCCs is not devolved to lower levels and remains in control of a small number of senior leadership.

The most comments on differences in national approaches related to the extent to which troops engaged with the local population. In keeping with its national doctrine, and for the purposes of intelligence gathering and force protection, Ethiopian troops prioritised relationships with local groups whom, they suggested, would then become ‘the eyes and the ears’ of the Mission. While both Djiboutian and Ethiopian troops shared cultural affinities with many of the Somali tribes, each pursued a different approach to community engagement. The approach used by the Ethiopian forces is central to its doctrine and considered critical to its national approach to counter-insurgency. Feedback from both Ugandan and Ethiopian forces suggested that aspects of doctrine used by Djiboutian troops were sometimes in direct conflict with the doctrine followed by their forces. A number of officers deployed to AMISOM’s Sector 4 (shared by both Ethiopian and Djiboutian forces) stated that joint operations proved challenging because of the different doctrines. One example shared was the way in which both troops pursued a ground-based target. Whereas Djiboutian troops were required to use static positions, Ethiopian troops used helicopter transportation to move closer to the target before moving closer on the ground. The impact of these different approaches to pursuing the same target was that the Ethiopian troops often arrived in the target’s location in one day, whereas the Djiboutians could take three days to reach the same location. The approaches of other TCCs toward mobility operations exposed a preference for the use of tanks and heavier equipment to achieve the same degree of mobility.
Differences were also observed in the way in which patrols were carried out. Whereas some troops carried out patrols using tanks and armoured vehicles, others would initially patrol on foot to enable engineers to check for mines, with vehicles following thereafter. Other officers deployed to Sector 6 commented on the different approaches to keeping the sector safe. In this context, only some nations used watchkeepers, which exposed the groups who did not use watchkeepers to attack. HQ staff also noted a range of different approaches to holding weapons whilst troops patrolled which impacted on levels of engagement with the local populations.

Whilst the feedback on the impact of common doctrine summarised above suggests that the absence of a common multinational doctrine for AMISOM is having a negative impact on the ground, other comments indicated that this issue is not, on its own, responsible for the lack of coherency and harmony of the mission. Whereas some respondents noted a connection between the lack of common doctrine and the mistrust between TCCs, others associated the mistrust with the lack of common agreed ‘regional interest’ that the mission was supporting. There was a view that this lack of declared ‘regional interest’, and agreed common goal, opened space for suspicion to develop regarding the pursuit of different national interests amongst TCCs.

Different cultural and historical backgrounds of the TCCs also differed, with some approaches more aligned with the doctrine of different historical partners and the approach of the Ethiopian forces aligned to their own experience of military campaigns.

Other respondents underscored the fact that AMISOM’s mandate continues not to support any ‘exit strategy’ which, in their view, continues to undermine its chances of success. It was felt that the mandate and mission objectives should include support to government institutions and administrations, as well as to strengthening host nation security forces. Liberating areas from al-Shabaab without leaving strong administrations and institutions to take governance forward opened space for the newly liberated areas to fall back into the hands of the enemy. The view of one sectoral commander was that this type of ‘conflict prevention’ was different to the way in which UN guidance on conflict prevention was defined and interpreted. Commanders at all levels felt that AMISOM’s mandates did not ‘close the loop’ between the security requirements on the ground and the national capacity required to counter threats and sustain security.

**Conclusions**

Based on the AU’s doctrinal experience to date, emerging conflict and crises trends on the African continent and the agreed strategic direction with regards to cooperative approaches to African PO, there is a need for a common doctrine supporting the ASF’s contribution to future African PO. A straightforward adoption of UN peacekeeping, UN peace enforcement and NATO stabilisation principles and doctrine is not appropriate to prepare ASF components adequately for the continental threats they face. The current ‘dual-track’ training informed by both ‘borrowed doctrine’ and UN RCE curriculum cannot, on its own, support this effort.

A cursory look at the impact that this issue has on the AMISOM mission suggests that the lack of a common multinational doctrine results in different use of language and interpretation of terminology, different approaches to decision-making according to different timeframes, different procedures being followed for ground-based operations, and different defensive postures taken towards deterring the same enemy. The culmination of these issues results in enemy mobility being enabled, enemy relations with local populations being sustained, and an
increased incidence of attacks on AMISOM forces. Combined with ongoing mistrust across TCCs and a mandate which does not lend to the development of governance capacity for AMISOM-liberated areas, the Mission’s overall efforts continue to be challenged at best, and undermined at worst.

While RECs/REMs are beginning to take forward efforts to both revise and develop PSO doctrine, these regional efforts must support an overall ASF ‘strategic concept’ for PO, particularly as most future ASF deployments are more likely to be in the form of ‘coalitions of the willing’. This proposed ‘strategic concept’ – and general philosophy - should articulate the emerging trends and nature of conflict on the continent, and use this analysis to revise the current scenarios which serve as the basis for ASF intervention. The concept should also inform the development of a common ASF doctrine for PO, serve as a basis for amendments and updates to national doctrine and be reflected in regular regional and continental training programmes and joint exercises. Research on the impact of the lack of common doctrine on other types of UN and AU-led missions on the continent would provide further data in this area and inform the nature of different regional conflicts and crises facing the different ASF brigades.

The resources required to develop these doctrinal processes at the national, regional and continental levels should not be underestimated. As most African countries lack the dedicated resources, processes and culture to support doctrine development, donor countries and embedded advisers facilitating these processes should ensure that national and regional doctrine is grounded in the realities of the continent’s resource, geographical and political limitations.

Even with these efforts, it is unlikely that TCCs will, in the short to medium term, depart from their national ways. However, through the support of Western defense engagement programmes and the encouragement of the AU’s PSC to its Member States, initial institutional capacity-building to produce doctrine at both the regional and national levels could be supported. The development of a strategic concept for the AU’s contribution to African PO is essential to this. Such a concept could provide the basis for AU collective and regional security interests and more clearly articulated PO mission objectives that flow from these common interests. In addition to regular regional and continental exercises and training programmes, these efforts could support ongoing relationship-building, the breakdown of mistrust across African TCCs, and shared knowledge and experience.
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