DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT:
A CASE STUDY OF THE PHILIPPINES

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ABSTRACT

In the security spectrum, there is a blurring line between defence and development. In both traditional and non-traditional security situations, such as counterinsurgency and natural disasters, the armed forces has been called to respond in ways other than their mandate of physical protection in order to attend to human development needs. How and when this transition of roles happens has been studied and debated. As the main security institution of a country, militaries around the world have performed duties outside of their defence functions. Their tasks have expanded from maintaining peace and order to including nation-building, economic development, the provision of disaster relief, and engaging in efforts to conserve natural resources. Looking at these extra functions, the Philippines armed forces are no different in performing non-traditional roles. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is one of the key institutions, which has been at the forefront of the campaign in tackling these domestic challenges.

To a certain extent, the mixture of economic activities with combat operations has characterised the military’s different campaigns such as counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. Involvement in economic functions has been justified on the grounds that it is critical to ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of those living on the front lines, supporting the military’s role in nation-building. The aim of this study is to employ pre-determined metrics to evaluate the contribution of the Philippine defence sector to national development, and, in turn, comprehensive security. Whilst the conventional view is that defence is a burden on development, the question this study poses is whether, by contrast, in the Philippine context, there is a positive relationship between defence and development; that is, that defence expenditure contributes to development outputs such as employment, skill-generation and even infrastructural investment. The study framework is anchored to the following policies: AFP Modernisation Act of 1995, and its subsequent revision, AFP Modernisation Act of 2010, the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP), and the National Security Plan 2011-2016. The framework highlights the important security goals of defence industrialisation, internal security, and non-traditional security. These data were further substantiated and consolidated via archival sources, such as government and company reports, as well as secondary data (e.g. books, journals, etc.).
The mission thrusts of the AFP demonstrate the organisation’s multiple objectives to carry out a mandate to protect the state and the people. The Philippines has a very modest defence industry with few companies manufacturing small arms and ammunitions. Its goal is to be self-reliable, however, issues within the Procurement Law prevent this. Meanwhile, the conduct of counter-insurgency efforts through the IPSP allows the AFP unified commands and field units to support government units and agencies in their peace and development programmes.

Furthermore, the geographic deployment of military personnel and equipment across the archipelago allows the armed forces to respond in times of disasters. Overall, the armed forces has contributes positively to the national development of the Philippines. To this end, and based on the research finding, a number of important policy recommendations are advanced to raise the effectiveness of the Philippines’ security policies.
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Chapter 1
Evaluating the Contribution of Defence to
Philippine Security and Development

1.1 Making the Case for the Study

Chapter one seeks to make the case for a high-level study of the contribution of defence to the national development of the Philippines. Subsequent sections will outline the purpose, value, study pattern, and data-access strategy. However, at this initial stage, there is a need to sketch out the study’s contextual backdrop. Issues that need to be addressed include, why study the Philippines? Why defence? Why security and development? Naturally, the starting point for such a discussion has to be the Philippines. Since the country’s independence in 1898, issues of defence and security have played a central role in the affairs of state. However, the subject has received scarce academic attention. This study attempts to address this shortcoming.

1.2 Creation of a Philippine Defence

In November 1935, the Philippine Commonwealth was established, albeit a semi-independent status, after three centuries of Spanish colonial rule and later, by the United States. That same year, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were created under the guidance of General Douglas MacArthur. When the Japanese invaded the Philippines in December 1941 after the bombing of Pearl Harbour, the AFP forces were incorporated in the U.S. Army to fight the occupying force. Given its military establishment and war experience under the American influence, the AFP borrowed heavily from the U.S. Army’s organisational character, ideology, and political attitudes. In terms of orientation, the AFP was the least politically oriented military in Asia and was placed under the control of civilian leaders, who were elected democratically. Furthermore, the 1935 Constitution did not allow active military personnel from engaging in partisan political activities. Since the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth up until
the declaration of Martial Law in September 1972, the Philippines remained one of the most
democratic countries in Asia.

Following the independence of the Philippines from the United States, two sets of military
agreements were signed to strengthen the relationship of both countries: the Military Bases
Agreement (MBA) of 1947 and the Mutual Defence Treaty in 1951. Through the MBA,
American air and naval bases were stationed in the country; meanwhile the defence treaty
provided the Philippine government with various kinds of military assistance from the United
States. As such, throughout the Cold War years, the United States essentially assumed
responsibility for Philippine security. But on 16 September 1991, the Philippine Senate decided
not to ratify a new base treaty, resulting to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines in
November 1992. This event was seen as Manila’s pursuit of a more independent force
capability rather than an alliance-based defence policy. Around this time, the plan to modernise
the armed forces was announced by the Philippine government through the purchase of modern
aircrafts, fast-attack crafts, reconnaissance aircrafts, and corvettes, which prompted the passage
of the AFP Modernisation Act of 1995. Initially, the Philippine government appeared determined
to undertake a series of decisions and actions aimed at developing an autonomous defence
posture; however, it later revealed a financially constrained military institution. The AFP could
barely support its basic manpower and logistics requirements and, while the modernisation
programme was at most modest, it had to be put on the back burner. Thus, a few years after the
withdrawal of American forces from the country, the Philippines began eyeing again the U.S. for
its external defence needs. In 1998, Manila formulated a visiting forces agreement with
Washington, authorising the resumption of large-scale cooperative military activities between the
two countries. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and the
consequent decision of former President George W. Bush to form a global coalition against
international terrorism have created further opportunities to revitalise the Republic of the
Philippines-United States (RP-U.S.) alliance. While this alliance brought intense debates
between and among policymakers and civil society groups, it is realised that politics and
economics are directly linked to defence.
In the Philippines, defence and development has as its core the question of the relationship between military and civil society in their efforts to define and pursue security. It is founded on the principle that the process of defence and development is, essentially, a partnership between and among stakeholders – government agencies, the military, the private sector, non-government organisations, and the public. The issue of security is found across all levels of social, economic, and political organisations and is directly related with the issues challenged by the forces experienced when managing development in the society. Governance, either directly or indirectly as the control, management and allocation of public resources, is at the heart of the overarching challenges linking defence and development.

The Peace and Security section of the Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016 published by the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) states that “a stable national security environment is crucial to achieving development, human security and general welfare.” However, many Filipinos still regard the state of economic and social progress as unfulfilled promises and disappointing for three reasons. First, the tempo of progress is slow compared to its immediate neighbours such as Singapore and Malaysia. Second, the benefits of any development have not been felt by the general public. Third, corruption issues are pervasive and run across the government system undermining the people’s sense of ownership of and control over public policy. Philippine growth has trailed behind neighbouring countries like Thailand and Malaysia, and any presence of development has failed to benefit the majority, who feel increasingly alienated because basic social services are not delivered. The Filipinos’ sense of security because of these concerns has continuously been challenged. In many rural areas, issues of poverty, injustice, and corruption are the rallying matters behind internal conflicts, noted as major security threats by the AFP. Hence, each Philippine President post-World War II has attempted to pursue an appropriate and adequate security programme to achieve national stability, so that the government may become a responsible partner in promoting peace and good relations in the region and beyond.

In December 2010, the AFP released its new military campaign plan dubbed OPLAN: Bayanihan or the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) anchored through a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach, which strives to bring about a concerted effort towards national peace and security.
This approach emphasises the creation of a consensus and understanding of security that is shared not just within government institutions, but also by civil society. Both the government and civil society believe in the concept of human security, where the welfare and wellbeing of the people are at the core of its operations.

This introduction poses the need to study and understand defence and development from the Philippine perspective. Using the comprehensive security framework encompassing political, economic, and socio-cultural factors, this thesis argues that defence is a force that facilitates development as opposed to the traditional view that defence is a burden to development. In the case of the Philippines, this study will highlight the development output generated by defence expenditures. The succeeding sections will discuss the linkage between defence and development.

1.3 From Defence to Development

In the security spectrum, there is a blurring line between defence and development. How and when can the defence sector shift from mere affording physical protection to the long-term benefits of human security and development needs? What are the advantages and disadvantages of defence and development? Perhaps people should stop assessing activities in the defence and development space as unconnected events, but rather as a continuum where issues of human security, poverty reduction, and economic growth are concurrently being tackled. It has only been in recent years that ‘security’ has been used in a political sense. For example, in the field of international relations the term means defence from external aggression, a definition carried over after the First World War, also known as ‘traditional’. Generally, the term can be expressed in various ways, such as safety from violence, peace of mind, or free from financial burden in order to live a certain lifestyle.

However, the political implication of the word is not solely limited to the “national” level, as shown by the use of the term at regional levels as Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe or the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. As such, military
measures and foreign policies are not exclusive components of the term “security.” In the field of international relations, the dominance of national security conversations (e.g. nationalism, democratisation) is a product of the realisation that the protection of the state (people and resources) is the main responsibility of the government.

During the Cold War, the attention of national security by some countries such as the United States, Britain, and France was centred on the threat of the Soviet Union. Security was regarded primarily by the world’s superpowers in terms of military security. The end of the Cold War has caused an evolution in the definition of security, where it transitioned from being coined in terms of military capability to something related to economic growth. The security concerns of governments have expanded and now comprise varying issues from safety, economic growth to environmental concerns. This expanded explanation of security highlights a focal question: what is the connection between defence and the broader non-traditional elements of security?

With the transformation of how ‘security’ was defined, the relationship of defence and economy has fostered new possibilities for cooperation between the two sectors. Furthermore, this transformation brought remarkable changes in both policy and attitudes – defence expenditures decreased globally and procurement of weaponry shrank. From the perspective of policy-makers of those major countries influencing international security, the world has experienced fundamental changes. Whilst security during the Cold War was expressed predominantly in terms of military security, in the post-Cold War security was described in economic terms.

Additionally, when the Soviet Union fell, there was an increased pressure on governments to make new decisions about preserving national security, along with the social, political and economic demands that have been building in order to reduce public spending. In relation to the post-Cold War years, competition for resources revealed an enigma because major players in the international scene are unable (or unwilling) to deliver the goods, especially when economic and financial capacity are most important for determining the stability of the future security order. Most of these countries, like United States and United Kingdom,
are suffering from economic reverses. Sustaining and maintaining defence capability, while increasing a nation’s self-reliance, is expensive. However, most states that find sustaining military capability expensive have reacted by cutting the cost of maintaining a domestic defence industry through privatisation, engaging in international arms trade, and building alliances and pooling resources with like-minded nations (see Figure 1.1). Furthermore, these exchanges in security strategies and policies can also make an impact towards defence and development.

**Figure 1.1: Trading Off National Security and Defence Spending Priorities**

![Diagram showing the relationship between national security, defence spending, offsets, trade in defence equipment, political & economic pressures, defence exports, and defence imports.](Source: Pricewaterhouse Coopers. *The defence industry in the 21st century* 2005, p. 5.)

What emerged after the Cold War was an international security structure illustrated as a series of circles that integrate a collection of various security as well as economic arrangements (see Figure 1.2). The structure offers a practical framework for evaluating how defence industry and governments can work together to maximize the economic potential. It does so in a coordinated manner and clearly sets the security and economic environment. The framework comprises three concentric circles with the innermost loop representing the home market of the defence contractor. Like the first one, the two other circles have evolved since the framework was released in 1996. The character of national security forces and their necessities have
been changed by joint force doctrine, as private companies became engaged in buying equipment, assuming jobs formerly are the responsibility of the military and supplying facilities that were earlier owned and maintained by the government.\textsuperscript{19}

Figure 1.2: The Post-Cold War International Security Framework

![Figure 1.2: The Post-Cold War International Security Framework](http://www.sipri.org/)

These shifts in the international security are a response to the structural and cultural changes evident in the global environment. However, security priorities differ from state to state. The United States, for example, has maintained a major presence in land, air and water environments with state of the art systems capabilities known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Security scholars conclude that meaningful technological advances in capabilities instigate revolutions in military affairs. Matthews, for example, argues that “when the political, economic industrial, global, strategic, and military pressures partner with technology, it results to an RMA.”\textsuperscript{20} Another factor in an effective revolution is for the government to acquire some institutional features that allow them to direct technological advances that radically enhance military efficiency and efficacy.\textsuperscript{21} According to RMA advocate Andrew Marshall, it is:
A major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organisational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.\textsuperscript{22}

Similarly, there are those who maintain that RMA is a revolutionary impact of technological change or geopolitical on the outcome of military conflicts. Three basic conceptions can be derived from these points. The first highlights the changes in the state affected by political and socio-economic factors.\textsuperscript{23} The second is the evolution of weapons, weapons technology, military organisations, and doctrine because of advancements in technology.\textsuperscript{24} The third idea underscores how evolution in weapons will endure and adapt to the rapidly changing security environment.\textsuperscript{25} In consideration of these facets, the efforts must be intensified to develop new methods for effective arms control and secure environment. The next section talks about military operations other than war.

\subsection*{1.4 Military Operations Other Than War and Peace Support Operations}

Taking from the cue above, what constitutes a secure environment in a world where threats could be as protracted and unyielding as an insurgency or as unpredictable and sudden as a natural calamity? To encompass the broad range of conditions threatening humanity’s survival, dignity and livelihoods, an expanded paradigm of security is needed. From tsunamis to entrenched poverty to disease outbreaks to domestic conflicts and revolutionary uprisings, the dramatic events of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century have accentuated the vulnerability of developed and developing countries alike. The profile of threat has evolved throughout the years and a number of solutions have been attempted to mitigate it.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, there is a rising realisation in the United States that confronting defence issues do not necessarily need to use war as a tactic. The Western Alliance has faced pressures to redirect limited resources from military expenditures to areas of social
welfare, such as education and health. Military doctrine and practice have often had to deal with the challenges of operations that do not necessarily include large scale use of offensive military force. Some examples include Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013, as well as the Somalia and Haiti operations. In the 21st century, the term Stability Operations has been changed to Low Intensity Conflict to characterise just some of the operational possibilities. According to the United States Department of Defence’s doctrine, the Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) emphasises on preventing war and promoting peace.

Around the world, MOOTW has instituted a mounting stake of military commitments. For example in Iraq and Afghanistan, MOOTW activities are more often joint and/or combined operations with some level of involvement by civilian governmental, non-governmental (NGO), or private volunteer (PVO) organizations. In Afghanistan, military forces are conducting offensive operations against Taliban sanctuaries in the Eastern Mountains while building schools and wells in nearby villages, and supporting humanitarian relief agencies. Security levels and development vary greatly throughout the country, and commanders must allocate their resources to best advantage.

Table 1.1, below, shows the types of MOOTW operations embarked on by the United States military in Iraq when the First Gulf War ended in 2003. In the beginning of the 1970s, the British soldiers were engaged in missions that are now called “Peace Support Operations” (PSO). Both MOOTW and PSO encompass peacekeeping, peace management, peace building, disaster relief, humanitarian aid, handling refugees, riot control, counterterrorism and conflict prevention, counter insurgency and amphibious warfare. The armed forces may also get into information campaigns intended to influence public opinion in areas where it operates. In a similar vein, post-colonial states, such as those in Southeast Asia, embarked on the process of nation building by adopting the concept of comprehensive security whose principal security concerns transcended military nature.
### Table 1.1: Types of MOOTW Operations in Iraq

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<td>Arms Control</td>
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<td>Operations</td>
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<td>Recovery Operations</td>
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<td>Combating Terrorism</td>
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<td>Enforcing Exclusion Zones</td>
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<td>Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)</td>
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<td>Peace Operations</td>
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<td>Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight</td>
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<td>Protection of Shipping</td>
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<td>Strikes and Raids</td>
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1.5 Comprehensive Security

The intellectual reasons for defence-development linkages were furthered by academic expediency. The end of the Cold War left many international relations academics looking for a new purpose. Not only was much of their expertise made redundant, but also the near total failure of international relations experts to foresee the fall of Berlin Wall threw the value of their previous endeavours into question. Many saw an expansion of the concept of military security to cover the spectrum of threats to human safety, and so the discourse evolved – “environmental security,” “water security,” “food security,” “economic security”. The new realisation of the limits of military endeavour to ensure human safety, and the nature of the new threats, was lucidly summed up in a statement from Gwyn Prins: “You can’t shoot an ozone hole” in his book, “Threats Without Enemies.”

The Indian army, for example, has formally become involved in environmental conservation. Not only does the army own vast areas of natural habitat, but it is the only entity with sufficient resources to repair major damage caused by land erosion and resultant landslides anywhere in the country. Satellites used during the Gulf conflict are now being used to make crop growing more environmentally friendly through better targeting of fertilisers and pesticides. In 2011, the head of the United Nations Environment Programme proposed the need for a force of United Nations (UN) “Green Helmets” to respond to environmental disasters. Furthermore, the UN
Secretary-General’s 2009 report identified sea-level rise as the “ultimate security threat for some small island states, leading to further disputes over maritime territories and access to exclusive economic zones.” Such an environment could have widespread effects such as forced migration, may create social and political tensions slowing down peacebuilding efforts and threatening international peace and security.

Yet, there have been two significant impediments to a broad acceptance of the global security concept. First, the word “security” has negative connotations related to the repressive and oppressive behaviour of governments, and the commercial exploitation of public fears about crime. Public perception needs to be developed to see the term in its original, straightforward sense as being synonymous with human safety - freedom from danger. Second, the integrated paradigm might appear to question the need for contributory disciplinary areas. But good interdisciplinary work requires strong disciplines. The purpose of the global security approach is not to subsume its formative disciplines, but to create more effective understandings through linkages between and within them. The concept of comprehensive security was introduced to incorporate development as a major component of security. In this manner, development was defined within a state-centric security agenda. The post-colonial states that emerged in Southeast Asia after the Second World War largely prioritized nation building and state-formation. The eventual establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 was predicated on this concern for the security of those structures.

Over the years, ASEAN has progressively adopted an agenda emphasising broader security recognising the interlinked relationships of political, economic, socio-cultural and environmental dimensions of development. When discussing ASEAN’s comprehensive approach to security, Lizée and Peou argue “that national security does not only reside in the absence of external military hostility but also in the presence of socio-economic development within national boundaries.”
1.6 Comprehensive Security: The ASEAN Perspective

Whilst the popularity of comprehensive security discourses worldwide grew after the Cold War, the concept already surfaced in many security platforms in Asia, particularly in Southeast Asian countries, even during the peak of the tension between the Eastern and Western Bloc powers. These security platforms include the Defence Ministers Meeting, where the defence secretaries of the ten ASEAN states convene annually to discuss regional security challenges of mutual interests. The countries involved accepted (in varying degrees of formality) the idea of comprehensive security that recognises the importance of ensuring the political, economic, and social well-being of society and the state within both a domestic and international context. At least three states in the region – Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore – have developed their own versions of comprehensive security.

Indonesia has expressed the idea of *Ketahanan national* (national resilience), which also became its security doctrine starting from the Suharto era in the mid-1960s. The *Ketahanan national* programme was portrayed as a comprehensive security that focused on political, economic, socio-cultural, and military aspects covering both the domestic and the international environment. At that time, communism and economic recession were being faced by the political regime, thus the *Ketahanan* concept was a resolute strategy for the survival of the administration. The centrality of domestic stability therefore – translated as national resilience led to the emphasis on non-military, multidimensional measures to achieve national and regional security, with particular attention given to economic development. Similarly, Malaysia developed an articulation of this notion of comprehensive security. In 1986, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad declared that one “cannot separate national security from political stability, economic success and social harmony. Without these, all the guns in the world cannot prevent a country from being overcome by its enemies, whose ambitions can be fulfilled sometimes without firing a single shot.” Similarly with Indonesia, Malaysia believes that regional stability can only be secured though national resilience. Moreover, Singapore pursues a comprehensive approach to security through the concept of “Total Defence,” which will be discussed in Chapter 2. In addition, the other ASEAN countries like Brunei, Thailand, and the Philippines have also looked at defence through the lens of comprehensive security. From the
viewpoint of ASEAN, comprehensive security is conceptualised by giving importance to regime stability and economic development as both are essential elements in domestic stability. Alagappa notes that irrespective of the labels and the different interpretations, comprehensive security encompasses the political, economic, socio-cultural, and military dimension.\textsuperscript{48} Hence, while ASEAN states may have had an expanded notion of security beyond military concerns, its idea of comprehensive security was no different from the dominant state-centric approach of conceptualising security.

Where ASEAN differs starkly from other political and economic organisations, however, is in its development of regional security strategies. Instead of pursuing the usual deterrence, power-balancing, and alliance building, ASEAN engaged a different course directed at norm-building, building trust and confidence, and developing cooperative approaches with like-minded and non-like-minded states to address traditional and non-traditional threats.\textsuperscript{49} Contrary to Japan’s perception of resilience, the approach ASEAN preferred to adopt was inward-looking.\textsuperscript{50} The American Psychological Association describes resilience as “the process of adapting well in the face of adversity, trauma, tragedy, threats, or even significant sources of stress.”\textsuperscript{51} In a society’s context, resilience is the capacity for communities to absorb stress and recover quickly from difficulties. The strategy, in fact, was made a key strategic pillar of Obama’s National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2010,\textsuperscript{52} subsequently, establishing a resilience directorate in the White House. In the same vein, resilience is at the core of Singapore's strategic response to national security threats\textsuperscript{53}, being a small state surrounded by its territorially bigger neighbours.

Not surprising, the ASEAN way of looking at security was often considered a deviation from the usual security discourse as it habitually emphasised non-interference of internal affairs, as well as building of informal institutions. Comprehensive security and cooperative security have been widely used, not only in ASEAN but even in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).\textsuperscript{54} Cooperative security in this regard has been interpreted around the concept of inclusiveness, which promotes dialogue and multilateral cooperation among state and non-state actors. Together with other ASEAN countries, political stability and national security have been considered to be intrinsically linked with economic development by the Philippine government.\textsuperscript{55} In August 1992, the National Security Council of the Philippines presented a definition of national security
which stressed the protection and enhancement of the well-being of people’s lives and welfare alongside the preservation of the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. In this sense, national security, economic development, and human rights were seen as mutually reinforcing concerns.

1.7 The Philippines Attempts to Define Comprehensive Security

For decades, the Philippines has been challenged with a number of internal and external security issues. Much of the country’s internal security problems are rooted in the long history of socio-economic inequalities in Philippine society, the inability of the state to govern effectively, and the continuing armed challenges from communist insurgents and Islamist secessionist groups. Notwithstanding the revitalised security alliance between Philippine and foreign governments since 9/11, the country is still vulnerable to internal and external security threats.

The under-performance of the Philippine economy stands in marked contrast to most of its neighbours and helps to explain the many underlying problems that contribute to social discontent and instability. Within this environment, the military has employed a rather conflicting position, instigating the high profile coup attempts that have punctuated the recent history of the country, but also, on occasion, supporting democratic forces. In November 2010, potentially explosive corruption charges within the ranks of the military and threats from terrorist groups filled the pages of Manila’s independent press. Although these events have been given particular momentum by a number of recent political scandals, the situation is not unprecedented. On the contrary, the Philippine military has not always been a force for stability, despite a familiar Southeast Asian preoccupation with internal rather than external security. On occasion it has been a major source of domestic violence and instability. Moreover, some of the most fundamental relationships between coercive and political power remain fluid and unresolved in the Philippines, contributing to an overall sense of uncertainty and dysfunction.
That the Philippines should have become a byword for ineffective governance, corruption, under-achievement and instability is rather surprising, given its historical trajectory. The Philippines, more than any of Southeast Asia’s newly independent nations, seemed to have the most promise in the aftermath of the Second World War when it finally achieved independence. After all, as an English-speaking, ex-American colony, it seemed that the Philippines was uniquely placed to take advantage of the economic transformation that was about to gather pace throughout East Asia. And yet, despite some initial promise, the economic performance of the Philippines has fallen far short of that of Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and even Indonesia; its government has been conspicuously ineffective, and its military has been associated with political opportunism rather than the security of the nation. All these factors are interconnected and their origins can be traced to the pre-Independence period and the malign influence of American colonialism in particular. Indeed, the Philippines’ experience gives strong support to two of the main themes and arguments of this thesis: defence ‘and’ development. The dynamics and evolution of defence and development within the sphere of comprehensive security need to be placed in a wider context that goes beyond the narrow confines of military culture or even civil-military relations, to embrace the overarching, historically determined social, political, and economic setting in which such relationships are embedded.

The definition of security which the Philippines adopted in the late 1960s was a matter of national security policy and required the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to perform tasks that required tackling the domestic security challenges (e.g. insurgency and secessionism). Primarily, the traditional view of Philippine security sector refers to the mandate that AFP must protect the state against internal and external security threats. It is noteworthy to mention that the AFP has participated in several international peacekeeping operations such as the Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTOK) in the 1950s, and the Philippine Air Force Contingent sent to Congo and the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) to South Vietnam in the 1960s.57 Also, the AFP sent humanitarian forces to East Timor in September 2000.58

The 2010-15 Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) issued by the Department of National Defence of the Philippines on 12 January 2009 starts with an assessment of the current external and
internal security situation of the country. Externally, according to the report, the environment of peace, stability, and security particularly in the Asia Pacific region depends much on how the complicated problems of terrorism, globalisation, U.S.-China rivalry, competition for economic resources (e.g. energy), transnational crimes, climate and other environmental changes, and infectious pandemic diseases are to be addressed. Also, there are potential flash points or critical areas which could spark a shooting war. Among these are the South China Sea dispute, the China-Taiwan problem, and the North-South Korea stand-off. In recent years, the education and training programmes and equipment acquisitions of the Philippine armed forces have shifted towards modernisation and strengthening of capabilities that will allow Filipino soldiers to respond to different traditional and non-traditional security concerns including terrorism, transnational crimes, humanitarian operations, and disaster response. One of the goals of the Philippine Modernisation Act is to make the AFP a relevant player in any regional or international security management. Thus, it is clear that over time, Philippine policy has moved from emphasising traditional security to one emphasising non-traditional security.

1.8 Study Aim

The aim of this study is to employ pre-determined metrics to evaluate the contribution of the Philippines defence sector to national development, and, in turn, comprehensive security. Whilst the conventional view is that defence is a burden on development, the question this study poses is whether, by contrast, in the Philippine context, there is a positive relationship between defence and development; that is, that defence expenditure contributes to development outputs such as employment, skill-generation, and even infrastructural investment.

1.8.1 Research Question

Based on the introduction above, the research question that this study wants to answer is: how effective are the contributions of defence to the development of the Philippines? Specifically, the study will look at the areas of defence industrialisation, internal security, and non-traditional
security. The experience of the Philippines in the field of defence paints a dreary picture despite it being the envy of its neighbours in the immediate years after World War II. Through the years, the country saw the deterioration of its military capabilities amidst the continuing threat of insurgency and terrorism. In recent times, the Philippine government has viewed defence as a way to boost the economy. It has followed the trend of MOOTW and the AFP Modernisation Act of 1995, incorporating the inclusion of socio-economic aspects in its defence utility mandate. However, there the Philippine Armed Forces remain under-resourced. The opportunity costs of defence are especially high for the poorer nations, and so a case study of the Philippines is particularly relevant, focusing on analysing the defence-development relation from the perspective of a developing country.

1.8.2 Enabling Objectives

The enabling objectives of the study are to:

i. Evaluate the various defence frameworks, processes, and mechanisms by cross referencing with defence strategies of selected developed and developing countries.

ii. Determine the factors that contribute towards an effective defence and development strategy by using pre-determined metrics.

iii. Discuss and critically analyse the development of the Philippine defence policies and industry performance, and its contribution to national development.

iv. Propose policy recommendations towards an effective development model enabling defence to play a more robust role in meeting Philippine security challenges.

1.9 Study Value: Contribution to Knowledge

One of the distinct facets of a PhD dissertation is its original contribution to knowledge. These components include the nature of the research question, the use of an effective research
methodology, and evidence of critical evaluation. To make a contribution to knowledge, the research is expected to work at the boundaries of knowledge, impacting on the conceptual or theoretical development of a research discipline. The selected research methodology should arise from the evaluation of different approaches so that one chooses with justification the approach that maximises the validity, reliability and appropriateness.

The study seeks to fill the gap of literature since not much has been written about Philippine defence and security. This case study on the Philippines will offer a fresh perspective in looking at how defence policies helped to accommodate the needs of the situation. The viewpoints to be shared will highlight the impact of non-traditional security as it moves from traditional security. One of the issues is the limited interest in studying Philippine defence outside, along with the broader relevance of security. This limited definition is deeply anchored in the realist school, where the concept of security is viewed in a purely military sense. Second, there is a difficulty in acquiring both qualitative and quantitative secondary data. To overcome this, the study will seek primary data, and use a triangulation approach combining both qualitative and quantitative methods. This will be further discussed in a later sub-section on research methodology.

Second, the study aims to make an important contribution to the ongoing comprehensive security transformation in the Philippines. As mentioned above, the Aquino administration has attempted, through the IPSP, to expand the role of the armed forces and have the public participate in the security discourse for a broader understanding of the combat and non-combat scopes of military operations. This is a big leap for security discourse in the Philippines that last saw a publicly published Defence Paper in 1998. A lot has happened in the 12 years in between. Although there were several efforts to publish one (from 1998 to 2003), they were never approved nor released for serious public scrutiny. Based on initial interviews with some military officers, it can be determined that the challenge in implementing a strong security plan is the differing priorities of the national government.

Third, the study hopes to deliver a contribution that is relevant to practitioners in developing an understanding of defence and development. In this case, practitioners refer to military officers and civilians who have a stake in implementing the security programme of the government.
Philippine democracy affords appropriate legal avenues that can urge the government to put forth a comprehensive security framework. However, the high graft and corruption rate of the Philippines slows down the process. A report released by Hong Kong-based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) showed the Philippines as the 4th most corrupt country in Southeast Asia in 2010. The AFP is not spared from the statistics, where strong corruption assertions have plagued its logistics and procurement system. The plunder case against former AFP comptroller retired Major General Carlos Garcia, who was accused of amassing at least Php300 million (approximately USD6.3 million) in ill-gotten wealth while still in active service, showed the kind of corruption happening in the armed forces. In addition, the appointment of retired military officers to key positions in government agencies, especially during the presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, undermines the supremacy of civilian authority. Accordingly, the military still affects the security agenda of the country, and such agenda continues to remain confidential and restricted from public scrutiny. As a consequence, the limited information about the various security issues the country faces fails to nurture the knowledge of the general public. The Philippines may possess a participative civil society, but it lacks the ability to communicate and make the people understand the essential contribution of defence to national development. If truth be told, most Filipinos have a cynical view of the military establishment due to the historical baggage experienced during the Martial Law, such as the human rights abuses committed by some men in uniform that has increased the gap between the public and the defence sector.

1.10 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework of the study is a key part of the research design. It contains a system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs and theories that supports and informs the research. For Miles and Huberman, a conceptual framework “explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be studied – the key factors, concepts or variables – and the presumed relationships among them.” In the present study, the literature evaluation posits how defence can play an important role within the realm of development. In this context, to define defence contained in the traditional security structure is limiting. Therefore the framework
below seeks to derive an improved understanding about two integrated concepts: defence ‘and’ development. In this case, the Philippines will be the major point of the present study.

In the 21st century, development and security concepts have transformed to meet new strategic realities. Within this broader understanding, the economic, social and political domains are entwined into a composite, providing the foundation for enhanced security. Security is no longer defined simply as defending national territory by armed forces against external threats. Today, security is about the community plus the individual, whereby those in authority are mandated to warrant the well-being and safety of everyone. Furthermore, it is also seen in a comprehensive, multidimensional, and holistic manner. For instance, believing that a nation’s security begins from within, Indonesia stressed the primacy of domestic security by solving internal sources of security threats, such as insurgency, ethnic tensions, economic malaise and social divisions within its far-flung archipelago, creating in the process a condition of national resilience. The Malaysian concept of comprehensive security, moreover, emphasises non-military sources of security threats seen as ‘inseparable from political stability, economic success and social harmony’. Likewise, from a broad-based perspective, Northeast Asian countries (South Korea, China and Japan) incorporate economic growth, development, technological capability, political stability, international diplomacy, and even foreign aid within the spectrum of defence and security.

The contemporary MOOTW era has shifted the role of the Armed Forces from a solely offensive military capability to a supplementary nuanced development partnership between and amongst stakeholders. Several Asian countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Japan have for long positioned their defence sector as the central element within a broad-based comprehensive security model. The Philippines is now also stirring in this direction. With defence and development at its core, the conceptual framework (Figure 1.3) illustrates the policy, process and performance exercised by the Philippine security system to protect its citizens from any harm to their well-being. Among the policies emphasising development in the security approach, three have been highlighted: (1) Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernisation Act of 1995 and 2010; (2) Internal Peace and Security Plan (2011-2016); and the (3) National Security Policy.
(2011-2016). These three were chosen as central to the framework because of their strong defence and development bias involving non-traditional strategies.

The AFP Modernisation Programme of 1995 and the revised version of 2010 in Figure 1.3 encompass doctrinal approaches to development, education and training, equipment and force structuring designed to bring the Philippine Armed Forces to the same level of development as neighbouring countries. Since its passage, the Armed Forces have made the modernisation act the core of their initiatives to improve capabilities. The objectives of the programmes are: (1) to uphold the sovereignty of and territorial integrity of the Republic; (2) to assist civilian agencies in the preservation of the national heritage within its territory and its Exclusive Economic zone; (3) to fulfil its mandate to protect the state and its people from armed threats, and natural and man-made disasters and calamities; (4) to assist other agencies in the enforcement of domestic and foreign policies; (5) to assist the Philippine National Police law enforcement and internal security operations; (6) to fulfil the country’s international commitments; and (7) to support national development.72

The second Defence-Development policy, implemented in January 2011, is the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) or “Bayanihan” which calls for a multi-stakeholder approach in the pursuit of security and the protection of civil liberties. The IPSP reflects Philippine President Benigno Aquino III’s security thrust, involving four elements: governance, delivery of basic services, economic reconstruction, and security sector reform. IPSP was crafted to provide strategic guidance for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) while performing its mandated functions. To assure its success, IPSP will be anchored on two strategic approaches: The ‘Whole of Nation Approach’ and the ‘People-Centred Security/Human Security Approach’. The former is the framework that will guide how the Armed Forces of the Philippines implement IPSP. Rather than simply defeating the enemy, ‘winning the peace’ provides the framework for the new IPSP approach. This is a shift from a predominantly militaristic solution to a people-centred strategy based on broad-based consultations and strong partnerships with key stakeholders.

The human security concept has several components: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security personal security, community security, and political security.
requiring the entire government bureaucracy, private and public sectors, to implement collectively. IPSP aims to concretise the idea of putting human security at the core of the AFP’s plan and this signifies the intent of placing the people at the centre of its activities. These goals can be accomplished through (1) contributing to the success of the peace process; (2) maintaining a professional armed forces serving under democratic civilian control; (3) defeating the terrorist groups and their allies; (4) contributing to the resolution of conflict with the National People’s Army (NPA), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and other armed threat groups; (5) assisting civil authorities in taking responsibility for the welfare and safety of their constituents; and (6) supporting developmental, environmental protection, disaster risk reduction and management, and law enforcement activities.

The third Defence-Development policy is the National Security Policy. This aims to identify strategic priorities to establish the right balance in the “guns or butter” debate for the allocation of scarce resources; and to establish the prioritization between defence and development. Like the IPSP, the National Security Policy (2011-2016) focuses on four key elements: governance; delivery of basic services; economic reconstruction and sustainable development; and security sector reform. Moreover, the policy is anchored in two security goals: (1) promote internal socio-political stability, and (2) equip the Philippines to exercise full sovereignty over its territory and to provide protection to its maritime and other strategic interests.

Figure 1.3 identifies these three Defence-Development policies and then seeks to extract the key practices common to all policies. Practices may be defined as actual policy implementation, rather than simply rhetorical statements. These are civil-military integration, piracy and human/drug trafficking, natural disasters, and terrorism/insurgency. Civil-military integration is a component characterized by activities/operations that forge cooperation and commitment from both civilian and military forces. Another serious transnational crime is piracy and such a problem is being experienced by southern Philippines and ASEAN neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the proliferation of human and drug trafficking due to porous borders has contributed to a growth in transnational organized crimes; and warrants a collaborative approach to address it.
Figure 1.3: The Philippines National Security through the Prism of Comprehensive Security

Defence - Development

Policy

- AFP Modernisation Act of 1995 and 2010
  - Territorial defence
  - Modernisation of the Armed Forces
  - Defence Industry
  - Non-traditional security

Practice

- Defence Industrialisation
  - Improve collaboration to achieve a minimum credible defence
  - Enhance Public-private partnership
  - Enhance technological innovation
  - Self-Reliant Defence Posture (SRDP)

- Internal Security
  - Integration of rebels into mainstream society
  - Strengthening intelligence capabilities
  - Securing vulnerable targets
  - Enhance preparedness in the event of a terrorist attack
  - Use of force against armed threat groups
  - Ensure effective delivery of basic services

- Non-Traditional Security
  - Enhance response to calamities, including typhoons, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions
  - Reduce the risks of slow and rapid onset disasters
  - Improve capability to address piracy, smuggling, drug and human trafficking, and the transport of toxic and other ecologically harmful substances
  - Enhance maritime security
  - Increase cooperative security agreements with allies and neighbours

Performance

- Metrics
  - Strengthening Domestic Defence Capability
  - Employment and Skill Generation
  - Supply Chain and Infrastructure Development

- Metrics
  - Number of terrorists/insurgents re-integrated into society
  - Community involvement case studies and development projects
  - Intelligence successes

- Metrics
  - Improve response time efficiency
  - Enhance coordination within command structure
  - Effectiveness of military response
  - Nature and extent of recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction
  - Reported cases, incidents and responses
  - Prosecution and punishment of drug traffickers and those involved in piracy

Source: Author
The Philippines is situated in the Ring of Fire, where volcanoes are located, and around 19 typhoons visit the country each year, exposing it to disasters and emergencies. To make matters worse, the country lies in the midst of intersecting geologic fault lines, subjecting it to destructive earthquakes and tsunamis. Confronting these natural disasters causes significant exhaustion of limited government financial and material resources, resulting in the interruption of delivery of critical basic services. Insurgency is also active nationwide although its presence is felt mainly in remote areas. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aims “to overthrow the Philippine government and install a different socio-political-economic order in accordance with its political beliefs and ideology.”77 The country is also threatened by terrorism and as a staunch ally of the United States in its campaign against terrorism, has been a target of foreign and local-based terrorist groups such as Daesch, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

Having identified these myriad of security issues, Figure 1.3 then aims to establish the progress that policies in practice have achieved in pursuing a defence and development approach. The performance part of the framework identifies the quantitative and qualitative metrics that will be employed to test whether policy implementation has been successful.

1.11 Choosing an Appropriate Research Method

Choosing the most appropriate research method is a critical element in doctoral study as it sets the tone in how the data will be gathered and analysed. Before proceeding, it is important to dissect what is research and what is methodology to provide a clear understanding. Commonly, research is the search for knowledge. Reidman and Mory describe research as a “systematised effort to gain new knowledge.”78 Usually, it attempts to answer the question ‘how’. Sleisenger and Stephenson explain research as the manoeuvring of ideas or concepts in order to confirm, extend, or correct existing information with the help of scientific guidelines.79 Moreover, research methodology is the science and philosophy behind all research, while methods are the
way of doing research such as techniques, and tools used to collect, store, analyse, and present information as part of the research process.\textsuperscript{80}

The two main spheres of research are quantitative and qualitative. The departure point of quantitative research is numerical measurement of specific aspects of phenomena,\textsuperscript{81} widely applied in the areas of natural sciences and mathematics, as well as sociological and business research.\textsuperscript{82} Meanwhile, qualitative research uses structured or non-structured techniques and utilises analysis that are non-quantitative in nature, to gain understanding of social relations, and uncover issues and trends in views and opinions.\textsuperscript{83}

For the purpose of this research, the ‘onion’ process adapted from Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill will be used (Figure 1.4).\textsuperscript{84} In the following section, certain aspects influencing the choice of research methodology and research methods are addressed resulting to an appropriate research design that will evaluate the relationship of defence and development in the Philippines.

\textbf{Figure 1.4: Research Process ‘Onion’}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{onion_process.png}
\end{center}

\textit{Source: Adapted from Saunders, Mark Lewis, Philip, Thornhill, Adrian (2003), Research methods for Business Students, Pearson Education, (2004), pp. 84-112.}
1.11.1 Research Philosophy

Developing a research philosophy requires the researcher to make assumptions about the way he/she views the world. These postulations will reinforce the research strategy and research methods selected as part of that strategy. The researcher, who is concerned with facts and figures, may have a different perspective with the researcher who is concerned with attitudes and perceptions. While there are various research philosophies, three major ways of thinking are examined here: philosophy-epistemology, ontology, and axiology. Epistemology deals with the sources and limitations of knowledge; ontology deals with the nature of reality; while axiology is concerned with judgments about value. There are three stands in epistemology research and these are positivism (looks at natural science or physical science based on scientific approach), realism (relates to scientific inquiry but also captures thoughts and beliefs), and interpretivism (relates to social science and advocates for the understanding of human behaviour using qualitative approaches).

1.11.2 Research Approaches

There are two approaches with different styles that emerge in any research – inductivism and deductivism. Found by many to be a scientific method, the inductive approach relies on the empirical verification of a general conclusion derived from specific observations. Informally, inductivism is called “bottom up” approach and is more open-ended and exploratory. A researcher looks at specific observations and measures, then identifies patterns and irregularities, comes up with some indefinite hypotheses to be investigated, then finally develops some general conclusions or theories. On the other hand, deductive reasoning works from the more general to the more specific. Sometimes this is informally called a “top-down” approach. It starts with a theory on a certain topic, and then the researcher focuses to more specific hypotheses that can be tested. These hypotheses are reduced further by collecting observations.
1.11.3 Research Strategies

In their research process ‘onion’, Saunders, et al identified six strategies to pursue the study.94

1) Experiment
The experiment strategy is usually associated with the natural sciences, but it is also used in social research since it demonstrates basic elements in the logic of explanatory research.95 In their seminal book, Campbell and Stanley discussed the steps of conducting ‘true experimental design’, which by definition is an “experiment where subjects are assigned to an experimental group that receives a treatment or manipulation and a comparison group that does not receive some treatment or manipulation.”96 These steps are: (1) obtaining a pool of participants; (2) pre-testing participants on the dependent variable; (3) randomly assigning each participating to a control group; (4) carefully controlling for differences in the application of experimental treatment between the two groups; and (5) re-measuring both groups on the dependent variable at some time.97 Most of the time experiments are conducted in the laboratory as it allows the researcher to carefully regulate the setting in which controlled subjects/groups/variations are implemented and their effects observed.98 However, this very methodological rigour of control puts limitations on experimental techniques especially when studying human behaviour.

2) Survey
Survey is a commonly used technique in social science research, usually involving a collection of data from a careful sampling of a probable population by face-to-face questioning, telephone surveys or via questionnaires sent through post or email.99 The two parts of the survey – the question and the answer – may or may not be standardised, which gives rise to three different data gathering tools: the questionnaire (question and answer are standardised); the structured interview (only question is standardised and the answer expressed freely); and the unstructured interview (neither questions nor answers are standardised).100 While this method is the most popular and most convenient, the approach is over-used and respondents are weary of responding to questionnaires resulting to a poor response rate.101
3) Case Study
According to Yin, the case study method is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon set in a real-world context.”102 As far as the researcher is concerned, a case study may emphasise on an extensive understanding of a group/organisation, a community, a family, or even an individual.103 While case studies are generally identified with qualitative research, the strategy can be employed by both quantitative and qualitative research.104 It asks the questions ‘how’ and ‘why’ and these research questions may evolve as the research progresses.105 In many instances, researchers use a mixed data collection approach in case studies, utilizing a combination of observation, surveys and interviews.106 The case study strategy has its share of critics, who argue that a small number of cases do not represent a population, therefore, cannot provide claims for establishing reliability of findings.107 Yet, researchers continue to use the case study method with success in carefully planned and crafted studies of real-life situations, issues, and problems.

4) Grounded Theory
One of the most widely used strategy for analysing qualitative data is grounded theory, which is in essence an attempt to generate theories from patterns, themes, and categories.108 As such, data collection, analysis, and the eventual formulation of a theory stand in close relationship to one another.109 Grounded theory advocates, Strauss and Corbin, have indicated that the research strategy allows the researcher to be both scientific and creative as long as the researcher stick to the guidelines of thinking comparatively, obtaining multiple viewpoints, periodically stepping back, maintaining an attitude of scepticism, and following the research procedures.110 Although not easy to apply, grounded theory is a powerful method that underlines the importance of research inquiry especially about the area under study.111

5) Ethnography
As a discipline, ethnography is the study of a culture or cultures that a group of people share.112 As a research method, ethnography refers to the process of immersion or participation, covertly or overtly, in people’s daily lives for a long period of time, observing how they live, asking questions, gradually establishing trust, and collecting data on the issues that are part of the study.113 Meanwhile, some scholars have criticised ethnography for failing to understand the
bigger picture by only documenting the surface of events. North argued that the value of ethnography is limited to an individual study, thus observations cannot be generalised. However, proponents of this method maintain that ethnography is a useful approach to study parts of society that quantitative methods have difficulty accessing to.

6) Action Research
According to Robson, action research is a special form of research that involves both action – refers to what one does in their personal, social, organisation and political contexts -, and research – refers to how one finds out what one does in their different contexts. As action research is rooted in practice, it is also referred to as ‘practice-based research’.

1.11.4 Time Horizons

There are two basic types of study that researchers may undertake depending on the scale of time available and the desired output of the study.

1) Cross-sectional studies
Cross-sectional design involves the collection of data of more than one case at a single point in time, which are then analysed to reveal patterns of association. A researcher undertaking a cross-sectional study is concerned with choosing several cases on the basis of carefully thought variables. As the data is collected at one time point, there is no pre-test/post-test measure to compare in cross-sectional studies, therefore, the researcher has to conduct extensive literature review and use the knowledge acquired through experience in order to define the independent and dependent variables needed in the study.

2) Longitudinal studies
In contrast, longitudinal design involves the collection of data from the same sample at two or more points in time. Since longitudinal studies tend to be more time consuming and expensive, it is not usually conducted by a single researcher. As a method of data collection, longitudinal studies normally use self-completion surveys or structured interviews.
1.11.5 Data Collection Methods

Data collection is an important aspect of any type of research study. The ability to achieve the research aims and answer the research question depends on the effectiveness of data collection; therefore the selection of method/s is an important and crucial process.\textsuperscript{124}

1) Sampling
Sampling is the process of selecting a set of individuals or other entities for the purpose of determining parameters or characteristics of the larger set.\textsuperscript{125} It is critical to pay attention to the sample size to be chosen, and whether it can statistically justify the parameters of the study to be conducted and that the selected sample is not biased meaning different sections are represented.\textsuperscript{126} Equally important, is the method of sampling to generate the set.\textsuperscript{127} Different sampling techniques can be categorised into two, probability samples and non-probability samples. In probability sampling, each case in the population has a fair chance of being selected, while in non-probability sampling are used when it is problematic to pinpoint all potential cases in the population.\textsuperscript{128}

2) Secondary Data
This pertains to the collection of data publicly available, including books, articles, government reports and organizational documents. As is the case in primary research, secondary data can be obtained through quantitative and qualitative research. A clear benefit of using secondary data is that much of the background work needed has already been carried out, published texts and statistic could have already been used elsewhere. However, the researcher needs to assess the quality of the data and the approach used in initial gathering of the data.\textsuperscript{129} Usually the analysis and measurement does not translate to reliability and validity.

3) Observation
Collecting data through observation is done by either covertly or overtly watching behaviour, events, or noting physical characteristics in their natural setting. One benefit of conducting covert observation is the likelihood for individuals to behave normally and naturally if they do
not know they are being studied. However, ethical problems may arise when doing this kind of study, thus overt observations are preferred.

4) Interviews
Used in both quantitative and qualitative researches, interview method offers a framework in which respondents can freely express their thoughts and opinions. In quantitative study, interviews entail the use of structured survey instrument, where questions are asked in the same order and the responses are amenable to a statistical analysis.\(^{130}\) On the other hand, in a qualitative study, interviews are more flexible and questions are open-ended.\(^{131}\) Oftentimes, interviews are combined or ‘triangulated’ with other methods ensuring the validity of the questionnaire used.\(^{132}\) Interviews may also be used as a follow-up to a questionnaire as this permits the respondent to express responses in a flexible way, thereby providing additional information relevant to the research.\(^{133}\)

5) Questionnaire
The questionnaire is an important research instrument that involves a series of questions for the purpose of gathering information from a sample of respondents. A researcher must be mindful especially when designing the questionnaire as it is used to obtain relevant, specific and original information, as well as aimed at answering the research question.\(^{134}\) The questionnaire may be administered through various means of communication such as postal, telephone, email, on-line, delivery and collection as well as through structured interviews which require the presence of the interviewer and the interviewee.

1.11.6 Research Design

A quality research design involves a careful planning process motivated by attention to detail\(^{135}\) as it serves as the blueprint for realising the research objectives and answering the research questions.\(^{136}\) There are many types of research design and the choice of design usually reflects a particular researcher’s standpoint and the question desired to be answered. It is imperative that the researcher has a clear understanding about the sources of information, the design techniques, the sampling methods, the schedule, and the availability of resources.\(^{137}\) Research design of the
study is illustrated in Figure 1.6. Information for this study will be obtained from both primary and secondary sources.

1.11.7 Selected Research Methodology

In view of the above points, mixed research methods were selected for this study and were illustrated by adapting Figure 1.4, as shown in Figure 1.5. The selected research methodology was framed through a realism-interpretivist philosophical approach; an inductive approach; case study as the research strategy; time horizon that is longitudinal; and data collection methods that include secondary data, questionnaires and interviews. The pastel-shaded boxes indicate the research methodology chosen and the red lines indicate the direction and development thinking process this research has undergone.

Figure 1.5: Selected Research Methodology

The interpretivism philosophy is adopted, where both the leadership and forces on the ground of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are interviewed, as well as other sectors in the field of defence and development. As an empirical research, inductive approach is used to gather data since the study wants to evaluate if defence contributes positively to national development. For this reason, case study is chosen as the research strategy that explored the areas of defence industrialisation, internal security, and non-traditional security. A mixed data collection approach was used utilising secondary data, questionnaire and interviews to exercise reliability and validity of the findings. Given the time element this research was carried out evaluating the policies of the administration of President Aquino as well as the other Philippine presidents post World War II, this study was longitudinal in nature.

Research design is critical in this study because the ‘contribution to knowledge’ originated from the nine fieldwork trips to the Philippines. The scant data on Philippine defence and security indicate that empirical investigation was essential giving emphasis to both the adequacy and quality of information. With this intention in mind, the appropriate research strategy used was ‘triangulation’ method (See Figure 1.6). Advocates of triangulation method assert that the result of combining three approaches is a net gain to address bias and practice objectivity. In particular, survey/questionnaires and secondary data interviews were used in this study.

Archival. The initial research design in this study was archival based. Figure 1.6 illustrates in detail the subgroups and the components within each group in detail. Documentary written material concerned with organisational records, including the recipient firm’s personal production, notes, emails and letters and websites (See Appendix A for sample letter of request). Documents and statistics were obtained from government offices, government websites, national archive, and university libraries. Archival researches were done at the libraries of the Department of National Defence, National Defence College of the Philippines, University of the Philippines, De La Salle University, and Ateneo de Manila University. Non-governmental reports, including publications by the United Nations, World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank were used. Finally, information was also sourced from conferences such as the conference papers of
Shangri-La Dialogue, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), and other relevant internet sources.

**Figure 1.6: Triangulation Research Methodology Model**

Source: Author

**Secondary Data.** Using this method, a thorough literature search was undertaken. This included books, journals, specialist publications, quality magazines, newspapers as well as verified web-based materials.

**Fieldwork, Interview and Questionnaire.** This approach involved sampling and the sampling technique employed was a combination of snowball (network or chain) and quota. The sampling frame contained the population of government staff and officers who are linked to formulating defence strategies and modernisation policies of the Philippines as well as security think tanks. These were the Department of National Defence, Armed Forces of the Philippines, National Defence College of the Philippines, Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, and, defence firms. As the proponent works fulltime in Singapore, field work to the Philippines was done in three stages. The first stage of fieldwork was done between August 2012...
to January 2013, where defence agencies, security personnel, research institutions, and university libraries were the primary sources of information. The second stage of the field research was scheduled between August 2013 to February 2014 to make a follow-up on issues that need clarification from institutions and individuals mentioned above. The third stage of the field research was done between July to October 2014 for further information gathering. However, prior to these visits, initial communication and approval were already obtained from the sources.

The trips were done in the Philippines – specifically in Manila, Negros Occidental, Tacloban City, Leyte, Davao City, Davao Oriental, and Compostela Valley – to interview relevant individuals for the study. At the meetings, every opportunity was taken to verify the information shared in the completed questionnaire, through directed, but nonetheless, open-ended conversation. This allows the respondents to feel relaxed and more flexible to explain their points, as well as develop more detailed responses to the questions posed. Furthermore, respondents often brought with them hard copy of reports to support the interviewer’s data collection efforts. Generally, respondents showed keenness to participate in the fieldwork as they deem the research topic to be very significant and beneficial in their line of work. *(Appendices F to I provide the list of participants interviewed in the Philippines.)*

### 1.11.8 Data Analysis

Both qualitative and quantitative analyses were used in the study. For qualitative analysis, NVivo 10 was chosen to organise data because the software is available at the National Institute of Education, where the researcher is working. The kinds of nodes generated in the software reflected the information to address the research question, as well as facilitated in the sorting and categorising process. These nodes were categorised based on the three areas identified in the conceptual framework: defence industrialisation, counterterrorism/counter-insurgency, and non-traditional security. Relevant information from the interviews and government documents were categorised into the nodes identified. Most of the interviews were recorded but some were not due to the sensitive nature of the subject. Instead, these interviews were hand-written to make the interviewees more comfortable. Interview notes were immediately transcribed and keyed into the
computer. Research materials were imported in the Sources section of the software categorised into folders. Contents of the materials were coded in the nodes identified. Analysis was generated based on the data entered.

Quantitative data were analysed employing the univariate analysis, where frequency tables were employed to compute percentages in each category of data. Responses were calculated based on the numbers of respondents against the sample. Microsoft Excel was employed to generate the charts used to explain the results of the completed questionnaires. In view of the semi-structured interview questionnaire answers from the defence firms, personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, government and non-government officials, the answers were grouped based on the questions and analysed independently to classify common themes and issues.

1.11.9 Reliability and Validity

The use of triangulation method increased data reliability and addressed any biases as different sources were utilised to verify research results and maintain objectivity. To avoid participant error, the proponent made appointments and interviewed the respondents during their less busy hours. Such a situation provides a more relaxed atmosphere for the interviewee, free from any interruption. In terms of subject or participant bias, organisation documents were obtained to counter-check the accuracy and reliability of the data or information provided. Observer bias was minimised as the author was not attached to any of the organisations that were part of the study and she was the only person engaged in the conduct of the whole fieldwork study, which included distribution of questionnaires and interviews.

The application of the triangulation method ascertained the validity of the data gathered. Information was cross-checked by asking experts in the field, particularly the practitioners both in the armed forces and other government agencies. In addition, staff members of non-government agencies such as the private defence firms and universities were also interviewed to further validate the data.
1.11.10 Ethical Considerations

In every study, research ethics must be followed at all times. In this study, the author ensured that the privacy of respondents was protected; that the time frame for the research was determined; and that interviews were conducted according to pre-arranged appointments. The author also avoided questions that would make the respondents uncomfortable, although in certain occasions information could not be shared due to the sensitivity of the topic, these were classified, or the interviewee was not authorised to speak about it. The researcher also agreed that anonymity and confidentiality were strictly observed. During the access to data, the author maintained the position that no pressure would be directed towards the respondents enabling data access, and all information was to be provided voluntarily. Moreover, the author strictly focused on the research project’s aims. In addition, interview and survey documents are stored in a safe place of which only the author has access. These documents are solely used by the author and are not disseminated without approval from the respondent.

1.11.11 Study Limitations

Although the study has successfully answered its aims and objectives, there were some unavoidable limitations throughout the research process. First, scheduling the fieldwork in the Philippines was a challenge since the researcher was based and works full-time in Singapore. Interview appointments had to be pre-scheduled before the trip to maximise time and finding a common time can be challenging. Second, some respondents prefer to communicate via text message or short message service (SMS), rather than email correspondence, which is preferred by the author because it is cost-effective. To handle this, the author subscribed to free online instant messaging services such as Viber and Whatsapp, in order to set an appointment with prospective respondents. Third, some interviewees refuse to answer certain questions due to the sensitivity of the subject. Fourth, there is shortage in related literature and reading sources since not much research has been done about the contribution of defence to development in the context of the Philippines.
1.12 Study Structure

Chapter One sets the scene in respect to the research focus of the present study. Chapter Two will scrutinize the literature on defence economics and development as well as its theoretical and empirical aspects. It will also provide a critique on differing arguments pertaining to defence as a ‘drag’ on growth and development, as well as being a ‘force for good’ facilitating development. The chapter will also provide insights to the comprehensive security policies of countries such as Japan, Malaysia, China, South Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia. Chapter Three will provide an evaluation of the broad Philippine security environment, including the diverse military and non-military threats the country faces. Chapter Four will then discuss the principal components of the country’s defence economy focusing especially on the nature and extent of the defence ‘and’ development networks. Chapter five focuses on the empirical impact of the defence contribution to the development of the Philippines. In closing, Chapter Six will identify conclusions and provide policy recommendations that will draw together the different strands of the discussion and analysis presented in Chapter Five. The fundamental objective of this research is to contribute to knowledge and suggest ways to improve policy, inviting interested observers, scholars, and practitioners to share their own perspective to this important and relevant issue.
References and Notes


6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.


10. Ibid.


13. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) is a “non-governmental (second track) process for dialogue on security issues in Asia Pacific. There are currently twenty member committees of CSCAP (from Australia, Cambodia, Canada, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United States of America, and Vietnam) and one observer (from the Pacific Islands Forum). More information at Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Available from http://www.cscap.org/.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.


22. Ibid.


25. Ibid.


Ibid.
29 Negrete, B. Op Cit., p. 3.
33 Ibid.
42 ASEAN was formed in 1967 and originally included Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei was accepted in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, and Lao and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia.
49 ASEAN as a regional grouping has, however, allowed member states like the Philippines and Thailand to continue with their own bilateral defence arrangements with the United States that existed even before ASEASN was established in 1967.
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128 David M, Sutton CD. 2011. Op Cit. 227
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
Chapter 2
Conceptual Roots of Defence ‘and’ Development

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical review of the literature analysing the key theories concerning defence and development as well as outlining the interrelations between these two concepts, as illustrated in the conceptual model in Figure 1.3 (Chapter 1, p.23). This review of the literature is also an avenue to further improve the research question and objectives and evaluate the relevant literature about the subject matter being studied. To objectively review the literature, the first part of this chapter will critically evaluate how security evolved since the Cold War era. Throughout the years, analysts have debated whether defence has made a significant contribution to economic growth. Interestingly, there has been no settled consensus regarding this issue but it is important to look and evaluate the nature of the debate and how comprehensive security is playing a role within 21st century national security planning. Comprehensive security, as defined in the conceptual model, incorporates factors of both defence and development such as civil military integration, response to natural disasters, and ways of de-escalating terrorism and insurgency.

The second part of this chapter will evaluate the various developmental approaches crafted and debated over the last 50 years. Whilst development has been equated with economic growth, prior to 1970 at least, it includes more than just a quantitative methodology. In its 1991 World Development Report, the World Bank stated that “the challenge of development is to improve the life of the people especially those living in poor countries with better education, higher standards of health and nutrition, a cleaner environment, greater freedom, and a richer cultural life.” The third part of the chapter will look at the comprehensive security framework of three countries, namely, Singapore, China and Japan. These countries were chosen as an example of states which have adapted both defence and development in their model. Later in the chapter, an understanding of how countries deal with the dynamics of the defence and security environment
will be provided. It will try to answer the question; does defence make a contribution to
development?

2.2 Scope and Evolution of Security

Up until the conclusion of the Cold War, security was traditionally defined as primarily focusing on military defence of the state – its population and resources – as well as the employment and control of military force. Hence the postulate, that if the state is able to maintain peace and order, the security of its citizen is also protected. As tension brought by the Cold War declined, it became obvious that the security of a nation was threatened by domestic challenges and external actors. Increasingly common were civil wars in Africa, poverty in Southeast, disease, hunger, violence, calamities, and human rights abuses. This revealed that when focus was on traditional security policies, basic human needs were neglected, failing to exercise the primary security objective of protecting and uplifting the lives of its citizens.

More recently, traditional security has been confronted by comprehensive approaches in the study of security. In distinguishing between traditional, and recent broad conceptions, Stephen Walt, Mohammed Ayoob, and Barry Buzan, among others, have articulated very different views about how to define defence to adapt to the changing environment. Stephen Walt’s (1991) traditionalist perspective has initiated the greatest debate within the security studies community. As a realist, Walt associates security with peace and the prevention of conflict through military means (deterrence, non-offensive defence and the like). For Ayoob national security is a function of nation building that requires both “security hardware” (control of coercive force) and “security software” (integration and legitimacy). Meanwhile, Buzan framed comprehensive security through the interconnection of five concepts, namely, political, military, economic, societal, and environmental has specifically widened the definition of threat away from a purely military to a more general one. Professor David Baldwin also identified four recurrent themes of security: (1) viewed as one of the many goals of the state and not just the main objective; (2) used as both military and non-military technique; (3) stressed on judgment in line with defence policy; and (4) academic understanding of the relationship of defence and development issues.
Broadly speaking, what is articulated here about security suggests the deepening definition of what is security as time goes by. Among the proponents addressing a more holistic approach to security are paradigms that include comprehensive, collective and cooperative measures that aim to warrant that for each person to be protected. In the international scene, cooperation between and among states are on the rise to help curb potential threats caused by terrorism and organised crime. In sum, all these dimensions can be incorporated under comprehensive security.

Comprehensive security emerged from the post-Cold War discourse over the connotations of security as a field of inquiry. One of the first who advocated the concept was the late Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme, who headed the Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues created in 1981. Former Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira defined comprehensive security by listing the following requirements: (a) a vibrant industrial base, (2) a robust economy, (3) beneficial economic relationships, and (4) an active assistance programme. Hsiung noted that comprehensive security produced two diverse but interrelated changes that shifted the focus away from the state as the central unit of analysis. The first change focused on the external community at large, where forces of the environment and the effects of globalisation have constrained the ability of governments to control them using own resources. Epidemics like SARS and H1N1 Bird Flu, Ebola, and AIDS are but a potent reminder that this reality exists and is happening around the world. Another reality is the series of financial crises that struck Europe in the early 1990s and 2000s, Latin America from 1990 to 1995, Asia Pacific from 1997 to 1999, and North America in 2009. The other trend is the transition to a human-centric security of which the United Nations defined in its 1994 Human Development Report as “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression, as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.”

The importance of comprehensive security to both developed and developing countries has led to a wealth of literature on defence and development. More than just a trendy catchphrase, comprehensive security has entered the consciousness of policymakers in Washington, D.C. and other national capitals in recent times. As a matter of fact, the Pentagon in its 1998 “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region Report” has a section on “The Search for Comprehensive Security: Transnational Security Challenges for the 21st Century,” which
discussed how both traditional and non-traditional elements of security can still equally influence the political, economic and social structures of the society.\textsuperscript{16}

From the discussion above, it is shown that comprehensive security is a rising topic within the academic sphere. In the subsequent sections, the issue of security is further linked with development to include: suppression of piracy, human and drug trafficking, other crimes at sea, smuggling of illegal immigrants, disaster, insurgency, terrorism, and defence economy. The shift from traditional to comprehensive security is reflected in the changing global security landscape as evident in the physical and economic issues surrounding the state, economy and the individual. This study aims to peel off the comprehensive security layers revealing the essential role of defence and development, in this case, the Philippines.

\section*{2.3 Development}

\subsection*{2.3.1 The Development of ‘Development’}

The study of development is multidisciplinary and multidimensional, covering the spectrum of socio-economic, political and cultural. This field remains an interesting component for researchers due to the various political and social issues surrounding developed and developing countries.\textsuperscript{17} In addition, development normally contains institutional, social, and administrative fundamental changes in structures, attitudes and, customs, and beliefs.

Before the Second World War, the economic and social development of third world countries was clearly not a policy objective of the colonizers, who emphasised division of labour and trade within and among colonial blocks.\textsuperscript{18} Todaro and Smith noted that development has traditionally been measured using the per capita gross national product (GNP) taking into consideration the ability of a nation to expand its output faster than the growth rate of its population.\textsuperscript{19} During this time also, economic gains would either “trickle down” to the general public through jobs and other opportunities or generate the needed circumstances for a broader distribution of economic and social welfare.\textsuperscript{20} As long as the economy is growing, other problems such as poverty and
unemployment come in second in terms of importance.\textsuperscript{21} This view shifted by end of World War II as less developed countries saw the evolution from being dependent to becoming independent. It also became a turning point for scholars and policymakers in taking a closer look to better understanding the development process as a foundation for designing appropriate development policies and strategies.

### 2.3.2 Development Schools of Thought

Four major schools of thought dominated the post-World War II economic development discourse: (1) the linear-stages-of-growth model, (2) theories and patterns of structural change, (3) the international-dependence revolution, and (4) neoclassical, free-market counterrevolution. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the development process was regarded as a series of successive stages of economic growth through which all countries must pass.\textsuperscript{22} All that was necessary for developing countries to shift towards the path of economic growth was the right mixture of investment, savings, and foreign aid. This process is more popular with the developed countries, which distinguishes development with that of rapid growth.

When the linear-stages growth model became popular in the 1970s, theories and patterns of structural change and international dependence revolution became the norm. Using modern economic theory and statistical analysis, a developing country must undertake structural changes in order to experience rapid economic growth.\textsuperscript{23} Meanwhile, the international-dependence revolution regarded underdevelopment in terms of international and domestic power relationships, institutional and structural economic rigidities, and the resulting proliferation of dual economies and dual societies both within and among the nations of the world.\textsuperscript{24} There was weight put on the necessity for new policies to address the problems of poverty, unemployment, and inequalities. The 1980s and early 1990s marked the spread of neoliberalism, which emphasised the beneficial role of free markets, open economies, and the privatisation of inefficient public enterprises.\textsuperscript{25} This theory notes that failure to develop cannot be blamed on manipulative internal and external elements, but on the high government interference and control of the economy. In the following sections, theories by Adam Smith, Walt Rostow and other
development proponents will be discussed to give an in depth look at the defence and development relationship.

2.3.3 Adam Smith: Champion of the Free Market

In 1776, Adam Smith published “The Wealth of Nations” with the concept of economic growth as its main agenda. It posits that the natural tendency of man towards self-interest results in prosperity with minimal contribution from the government through giving every person the freedom to produce, manufacture and barter goods as they liked and opening all markets to competition. Smith called this free-market force became known as the ‘invisible hand.’ Alongside a free-market economy, Smith believed that enlightened self-interest, limited government, and a solid currency can produce universal prosperity. Smith saw the importance of thrift and savings, especially when the latter was used as capital for investment. Through investment, more labour-saving machinery would be bought to encourage innovation, anticipating that advancement in technology would boost revenue on investments and build-up the standard of living. For Smith the values of hard work and inherent were inherent in people, thus when things do not work as they should, government should step in to enforce the laws.

For Smith, government’s responsibilities are restricted to the country’s defence, provide universal education, building of infrastructures, the enactment of the law, and the punishment of crime. In this second element, Smith warned against government bureaucracy, where he said that “there is no art which one government sooner learns of another, than that of draining money from the pockets of the people,” emphasising universal education to offset the dulling and negative consequences of the division of labour that was part and parcel of industrialisation. The third aspect advised by Smith was a strong currency, where the ability by the government to depreciate currency will be curtailed by using it as payment for wars or other wasteful expenditures by backing currency with hard metals. His free-market principles involved eliminating tariffs with hard currency acting as a check to spending to keep taxes low and allow free trade across
borders. For Smith, taxes and tariffs are repressing industry and trade overseas as well as making people’s lives more expensive.

However, Smith’s seminal book, “The Wealth of Nations,” is not lacking in theoretical slips. According to a critic, Smith failed to see the significance of the entrepreneur in stopping inefficiencies and establishing new markets. Furthermore, both advocates and detractors of Adam Smith’s free market capitalism have contributed to the framework set-up in “The Wealth of Nations.” Nevertheless, even with the criticisms, the free-market theory and its concepts have contributed to the discourse on economy and markets.

2.3.4 Modernisation Theory

Modernisation theory, which emerged in the early 1950s, notes that economic progress and industrialisation signifies a positive political and social change. Its primary concept describes the transition from traditional to modern societies. Fuelled by Cold War politics appeared the stages-of-growth model of development advocated by Walt W. Rostow, who described the evolution from underdevelopment to development in a series of steps or stages through which, he argued, all countries must undergo. As a proponent of economic progress, Rostow is a key figure in the study of modernisation theory. In the opening chapter of his book, The Stages of Economic Growth, Rostow presented the five categories which he identifies all societies: the traditional society, the pre-conditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the edge of high mass consumption.

The traditional society is characterised by subsistence agriculture with limited technology and is feudalistic in nature with the political power concentrated amongst the elites. The pre-condition stage is depicted by improved transport investment to expand market and production specialisation, the reform in agriculture, and the growth of imports. The take off stage is illustrated by a pivotal development transpiring over 20-30 years that fundamentally changes a nation’s economy because obstacles to stable advancement are surmounted, forces for making widespread economic progress dominate the society, and growth becomes a normal condition.
In the *drive to maturity stage*, industrial base is diversified and modern technology is increasingly being utilised to cover sectors of the economy in order to achieve a self-sustaining growth.\(^{42}\) The age mass consumption stage is characterised by a high employment rate and high output levels.\(^{43}\)

Despite being widely acclaimed, Rostow’s pre-condition to take-off stage was also criticised for lack of supporting historical facts. Nonetheless, it became useful to describe the necessary conditions for initiating self-sustained growth. Rostow’s prerequisite for upward mobility in the development stage resonates with the Harrod Domar equation, which gives emphasis to capital accumulation and investment. The system of development illustrated in the stages of growth theory did not always work because certain conditions are lacking or different. In the context of developing countries, investments are translated into massive doses of foreign aid and capital, sometimes with a low rate of return. The Marshall Plan worked for Europe because it possessed the necessary institutional conditions and infrastructures, unlike developing countries suffering from poverty and conflict.

Another proponent of the modernisation theory is Seymour Martin Lipset, whose classic article in 1959 argued that democracy is a direct result of economic growth.\(^{44}\) Lipset contended that the level of education and development in rich societies is higher, their means of communication is more sophisticated, have larger middle class, and their social equality is better.\(^{45}\) He claimed that these features are essential in order for democracy to flourish and function well.\(^{46}\)

By the late 1960s, following the theory’s rapid recognition, a backlash erupted within the circle of social scientists. One major opposition came from Samuel Huntington through his book ‘Political Order in Changing Societies’. Huntington contended that proponents of modernisation theory were correct in considering economic development as releasing profound social change but should not assume changes will lead to progress.\(^{47}\) However, others refute such criticisms saying living standards, education and economic opportunities, and infrastructures have improved. Furthermore, he noted that societies on the verge of dramatic social transformation have the tendency to be volatile and even violent.\(^{48}\) Only when there are healthy political
institutions adept to directing and reacting to such changes, can affirmative results likely materialise.

Oftentimes, modernisation theorists see traditions as impediments to economic growth. Critics maintain that traditional societies are usually wrecked without having experienced the advantages of modernisation. The theory is criticised for failing to consider the poor. In fact, the economic gap between progressive and poorer societies has increased. According to a December 2014 OECD report on inequality and growth, rich countries today earn 9.5 times more than the poorest 10%, compared to the 7:1 ratio in the 1980s. Whilst modernisation theorists see traditions as obstacles to the growth of the economy, its critics insist that some societies have shifted from a traditional poverty to a more modern misery. Statistics from the World Bank reveal that over 3 billion people (almost half of the world’s population) live on less than $2.50 a day, almost a billion cannot read or sign their names by the start of the 21st century, a billion children live in poverty, 640 million live without adequate shelter, 400 million have no access to safe water, 270 million have no access to health services, and in 2003, 10.5 million died before reaching the age of 5 (or roughly 29,900 children per day). Also, dependency theorist André Gunder Frank criticised the trouble-free image that the modernisation theory adopts. Frank argued that developing countries were essentially fated to disaster because of their place in the international scene, which ensues to underdevelopment and dependence.

2.3.5 Dependency Theory

In the 1950s, dependency theory emerged as a critical response to the economic development approaches that transpired after World War II. Whilst the theory of modernisation understood that all societies go through similar stages of development, dependency theory argues that underdeveloped countries are not reflections of what developed countries were; rather they have characteristics of their own that are less imposed by external demands. The main proponents of this theory are André Gunder Frank, Raúl Prebisch, Hans Singer, Paul Baran Paul Sweezy, Samir Amin and Bill Warren. Many of these scholars focused their studies on Latin America, except for Amin being the leading dependency theorist in the Islamic world. The advocates of this
theory believe that the theories of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and other classical economists are not suitable for an analysis of the dualistic dependent structure of many nations such as Brazil, India, and Mexico. Among other things, the theory assumes the absence of monopoly power and the spread of the benefits of technological progress across the whole trading process.52

For dependency theorists, less developed countries are to be understood as a chunk of the global process. The roles of these less developed nations are to provide inputs for advanced nations and provide low wage manufacturing under adverse terms of trade. According to Prebisch, the world is divided in two: the centre and the periphery. The centre consists of the industrial regions of the world, whilst the periphery comprises of mostly underdeveloped countries which specialise in agricultural and other primary production.53 Such division benefits both the centre and periphery areas that allow for maximising production, income, and consumption, and spreading the benefits of such maximisation to both areas.54 In particular, Prebisch counters the idea of free market, and examines how rewards from competition tend to shift toward the centre.55 Prebisch specifically attacked the theory of comparative advantage, and noted that its precepts were repeatedly violated by the industrialised nations, whose economists nonetheless used classical trade theory as an ideological weapon.56 He also implied that industrial countries acted as monopolists against agricultural countries in the trading process.57

The popularity of the dependency theory declined in the 1980s when rising economies like Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan, also known as the Four Asian Tigers, have proven their strength in global production, finance, and services.58 At this point, the weakness of the theory was found and scholars were not pleased with the failures of classic dependency theory to address the economic performance of the newly industrialised countries (NICs). Moreover, one critic questions whether dependency theory’s message is still applicable at the present time, taking into account that it reflects the conditions and understanding of the 1960s.59
2.3.6 World-Systems Theory

World-systems theory provides a holistic viewpoint in understanding human interaction within a global political economic framework. The theory argues that the world is contained in one system called capitalist world-economy as a ‘total social system’ rather than single societies. The main argument lies on the premise that significant interaction networks such as alliances, trade, and information, have long contributed to the interconnection of societies and cultures. In other words all human interaction, whether big or small, from the household to global market, comprise the world-system. More than just the involvement of international institutions, world system is all about the people in the planet, their culture and traditions, the socio-economic and political institutions, and the relationships happening among them.

The theory is largely associated with Immanuel Wallerstein whose influential work, “The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the origins on the European World-Economy in the Sixteen Century” published in 1974, views a ‘world economy’ that centres on the economy rather than a political one with two or more entities dependent on each other as regards to basic essentials like food, and safety. Furthermore, Wallerstein proposed a framework of system and relations, similar with that of the dependency theory, which indicated four different categories: core, semi-periphery, periphery, and external. The core countries benefit largely from having strong economies and powerful militaries owning and controlling the major and periphery are geographically and culturally different where one focuses on labour-intensive, whilst the other on capital-intensive production. Periphery societies are labour-intensive, do not have strong governments, and suffer unequal distribution of resources. Halfway between core and periphery, semi-peripheral states have moderately developed and diversified economies but are not influential in global trade. External nations are those that sustain socially required divisions of labour independent of the core. Critics of this theory note how world-systems put its emphasis largely on the economy and not much on culture.
2.3.7 Globalisation Paradigm

According to Appelbaum and Robinson, globalisation studies evolved from five sets of phenomena that intrigued researchers. These are the emergence of a globalised economy, the development of global cultural patterns and practices, the appearance of new multinational institutions, the multidirectional movement of people around the world, and the rise of new social hierarchies like inequality. By the end of the 20th century, the rate of social change and transformation accelerated. There are a number of theoretical discourses that are identified with globalisation studies. One set of globalisation theories looks at the global school of capitalism. Leslie Sklair has put forward a theory with ‘transnational practices’ (TNPs) at the core that involves economics (transnational capital), political (transnational capitalist class), and the culture-ideological (cultural elites). Similar to Sklair, Robinson also analyses the emergence of transnational capitalist class as the group that manages these globalised circuits. However, unlike Sklair, Robinson theorises an emergent transnational state (TNS), which is a group consisting of political and economic institutions as well as government mechanism that have been affected by forces in the international scene. Globalisation also brought about the ‘age of information and the use of the network society through the rise of information and technology (IT) such as the Internet, and the emergence of information capitalism referred to as ‘new economy’. This new economy is illustrated as informational, global and networked.

It is not surprising that this theory has its share of critics, who argue that globalisation allows for the power and influence of capitalists and conglomerates to increase at the cost of human rights and civil liberties. Furthermore, they contend that understanding the place of globalisation in the sphere of defence needs more depth. However, Christopher Hughes argues that there is an interconnection between globalisation and security involving both traditional and non-traditional security issues. According to Matthews, globalisation enhances civil-military integration, which reduces the burden of defence expenditure by promoting technological sharing, supply chains, spin-on and spin-off technologies, and dual-use technologies. As discussed below, these theories emphasise the strategic significance in studying comprehensive security in the context of Philippine security.
2.4 Armed Forces and Society: The Process of Civil-Military Relations

Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz have led the research on civil-military relations for more than five decades. In 1957, Huntington published his book, which examined civil-military relations as a system of interconnected parts that included (1) formal structural position of military institution in government; (2) informal role and influence of military groups in politics and society; and (3) nature of military ethics and dominant ideologies of non-military groups, and neither of these alters without causing changes in other elements of the system. Based on these components, Huntington put forth the concept of ‘professionalism’ of which the spotlight lies on the soldier and the state. The soldier’s behaviour within the structure of the military as an institution is guided by a series of regulations, norms, customs, and traditions. The basic understanding it seems is that the professional behaviour of a soldier outside the walls of the military has been approved by the state. Cottey et al also note that civilian authorities should take charge in developing a defence policy and the military should confine itself to executing their decision. In support, Janowitz perceives that as a civil servant, the professional soldier must remain neutral when dealing with public affairs. Meanwhile, Janowitz has also observed that study of civil-military relations in developing countries is scarce.

The global security environment in early 1990s welcomed the idea of a reduced international arms competition as well as a review of the role of defence post-Cold War. During this time, the use of the military in non-combat role has been increasingly affecting government policies. The challenges of civil-military relations include paramilitaries, who often operate as auxiliary members of the military institution. In other parts of the globe, members of the army that once participated in conflict are reintegrated into mainstream. Additionally, part of the new civil-military relations structure is the increasing number of peacekeepers, civilian police, and international monitors. However, Bland sees this as a flawed argument, instead suggests that civilian control must be grasped through the concept of ‘shared responsibility’ between the civilian leaders and military officers. Adding to the debate, Cottey et al reason that civil-military relations has to be understood as part of the state’s governance and legitimate democracy. They explored five enhancements of this theory. First, civil-military relations should not dwell just on the threat, but also on the expanding role of the military. Second, civil-
military relations should broaden the concept of democratic control to include foreign policies.\textsuperscript{92} Third, civil-military relations need to find ways to balance the control of civilian authority over the military. Fourth, is to sensibly study the terms ‘military’ and ‘armed forces’.\textsuperscript{93} Fifth, is for civil-military relations to be comprehended holistically.\textsuperscript{94}

Over the years, the role of the military has broadened to include engagement in peacekeeping and humanitarian functions. However, these extended functions confound the issue of civil-military relations and might complicate during the execution because of the tough stance the military is known for. Hence, obedience of the military to democratic control is crucial in civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{95} In democratisation, it is important to carefully investigate the nuances of civil-military relations, and not plainly assume that the military is willing to step back and let the civilian authorities take the rein.\textsuperscript{96} The challenge then is how to develop interim actions to have the military transition, in a peaceful manner, from these broad roles and resume their role in external defence? In the same way, deploying the military to confront internal threats must not be the long-term solution, since that is the responsibility of the national police and they can be trained to become a formidable force to protect domestic affairs.\textsuperscript{97} These two views will be further examined in the next two sections looking at the broader context of defence whether it hinders or facilitates development.

\section*{2.5 Defence as a Drag on Growth and Development?}

In the last few decades, literature exploring defence spending in developing countries has been on the rise. Most of these researches have focused on whether or not defence spending has had a positive, a negative, or no impact whatsoever on the economy of these countries. Some studies have also looked at other dimensions of military spending in developing countries such as the economic and non-economic causes of defence expenditures, the effect of changes in, and the reasons behind developing countries’ desire to produce weapons.\textsuperscript{98} According to Dabelko and McCormick, the “guns vs butter” debate is the classic image of opportunity costs for government spending over military and social welfare areas.\textsuperscript{99} They mention that as military expenditures of
a country increases, the social benefits are affected. Russett, Gottheil, and Pryor, amongst others, have empirically studied this process of trade-off in many developed nations.

One of the first scholars to suggest that defence spending might have a positive effect on economic growth was Emile Benoit. In his major study of 44 countries, which included Mexico, Argentina, South Korea, Egypt, and the Philippines, Benoit suggested that defence spending could help economic growth by:

(1) Feeding, clothing, and housing a number of people who would otherwise have to be fed, housed and clothes by the civilian economy…; (2) providing education and medical care as well as vocational and technical training…; (3) engaging in a variety of public works – roads, dams, river improvements, airports, communications networks, etc. – that may in part serve civilian uses; and (4) engaging in scientific and technical specialties… which would otherwise have to be performed by civilian personnel.

Benoit also recognised the possible negative effects of defence spending since, in a developing country, military spending represents an important opportunity cost, and, in addition, the government usually exhibits “negligible rates of measurable productivity increases.” Benoit discussed the causality issues between defence and growth by noting that “countries with rapid growth might feel better able to indulge themselves in the luxury of elaborate defence programmes”. However, Benoit has been criticised on two levels. First, a number of scholars have issues with how Benoit described the variables used, as well as the way he interpreted the data derived from the statistical analyses, which neglected to acknowledge the likelihood of synchronicity between defence spending and economic growth. Second, Benoit’s belief that military expenditure has a positive effect on economic growth, did not rely on the results of the regression analyses, but on his evaluation of non-quantifiable contributions performed by military programmes to the civilian economy. Ball argues that most of the time, rapid increase in economic progress do not affect the allocation of resources, social equality, or contribute to sustainable growth. Meanwhile, employing a marginally dissimilar methodology, Lim repeated the study of Benoit, this time on a larger group of developing
countries for the period 1965-1973, and discovered that high military burdens is unfavourable to economic growth. More recently, the study of Faini, Arnez and Taylor, using regression estimates for 69 countries for the period 1952-1970, showed that an increase of 10 percentage points in military expenditure leads to a decline of annual growth by 0.13 per cent. Both Lim and Faini et al showed that a higher military burden has a direct negative impact on economic growth.

The defence burden has been denounced as a huge shift of the country’s resources from a social welfare function to something socially draining that does not contribute to uplift the lives of the poor. Growth suffers due to increasing levels of defence expenditures controlling resources that could otherwise have been spent on infrastructural investment benefitting the people, and hence contributed to growth. In addition, if military expenditures are financed by reductions in social welfare budget, visibly defence burden is heavier on basic services than on collective growth. Kaldor has summarised this distribution pattern saying that “money for defence comes from the excess products produced in the province, but spent in the cities.” Furthermore, Frederiksen and Looney also stipulate why defence expenditures are a drag on development. First, the “income shift” by Benoit, increased defence spending decreases civilian Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and thus reduces economic progress unfairly. Second, they contended that military expenditure unfavourably affects progress because the government generally, demonstrates small rise in noticeable efficiency.

Whilst the arguments stipulated make sense, a vital element in the defence and development debate is the financial resource limitation of the country. A state with limited resources has a higher probability to experience budget reductions, more often than not; at the expense of development projects in order for defence plans can be upheld. There are two reasons why governments tend to shift priority away from development projects to sustain defence programmes. One, policymakers find it more convenient to trim development investments such as infrastructure. Two, special interest groups that include high ranking officials, politicians, defence contractors, may realise that maintaining the status quo is economically and politically advantageous. Thus, a negative relationship between defence and development would be expected in a resource constrained state. On the other hand, nations that enjoy financial
resources can easily afford the responsibility and expense that comes with maintaining a strong military capability. By viewing the analysis through a resource constraints lens, it is not difficult to comprehend why two developing states with matching levels of defence spending may undergo strikingly different levels of development.

2.6 Defence: A Force to Facilitate Development?

In most defence economic studies, military expenditure is a critical topic because of its connection with supply and demand; output and input. Many studies reveal an affirmative stand on defence spending vis-a-vis economic growth. Economists have it that growth slackens because resources that should have been for investment has been shifted to support defence. However, evidence on developed countries does not reveal the same conclusion. Wolf notes that defence spending establishes economic stability as well as accelerates technological progress and transfers, resulting to an inclusive growth. Some scholars claim that military spending help accelerate the growth of resource-rich less developed countries. Looney observes defence as a semi-luxury good and claims that defence is a semi-luxury good and increases the output by multiplier effect. Goel added that the impact of research development makes on defence sector surges the growth of the economy. Generally, nations with a heavy defence burden develop more, and those with the smallest defence burdens tend to display the least growth rates. Compared with other regions of the world, African arms imports had an upsurge in the 1970s, but fell back when they reached their height in 1982. In the same decade, heads turned towards the developing countries because of their expanding armed forces. This was during post World War II, when the U.S. supported and financed the defence posture of some states. Economists took an interest in how this growth would impact on the economy. The study of Benoit indicated that higher growth rates were supplementary to higher defence burdens, suggesting to a point that bilateral economic aid does have some effect. Countries like Indonesia and South Korea, which have had recent economic growth and have had wars or defence crises during a period, are starting to grow their defence expenditure again. Money may be available and accessible, but always present are competing needs, and the defence sector, like others who wants a piece of the pie, must justify its claims. Money cannot be spent on defence
unless it is justified, and in this sense, the rise of the country’s GDP sets a perimeter on how much defence burden it can afford.

The direct contact between defence and development appears to flow mainly from defence to development rather than the other way around. Defence programmes of most countries make tangible contributions to the civilian economies by ways suggested by Benoit in the previous section (Section 2.5). Other engagements of the defence sector with the general economy include research and development and financing of projects for joint civilian and military use. David Schmidtz articulates a common assumption when he maintains that “a nation that defends itself from invasion will be defending those citizens who do nothing to help as well as those citizens who do help,” and that defence is thus a public good. William Mitchel and Randy Simmons characterise “defence” as “the classic public good.” Similarly, David Gauthier suggests that “if national defence… is supplied to one person, then…it is supplied to all.”

As a part of the government, the military institution has constantly been viewed as a positive force in fostering economic growth. This prospect lies on the revolutionising effect that defence brings to the state both at the national and international levels. At the individual level, transition occurs through military training, which gives emphasis to discipline, efficiency, respect, and integrity. Benoit supports by adding that soldiers must equip themselves with skills such as “following and transmitting precise instructions; living and working by the clock; noticing and reading signs; and spending and saving money”. According to Weede, soldiers share the economic burden because the practice of discipline and obedience are instilled in both the working and management spheres. Taking these points into consideration, it can be expected that military training is essentially an investment in human capital that is projected to produce profits through the efficient utilisation of resources.

At a broader level, the military fosters nation-building by promoting social mobility, mobilising economic resources, and breaking down regional, ethnic, and religious divisions. More importantly, certain aspects of these processes would seem to carry implications for inequality and service delivery to the poorest elements of society. Many times the military has been called to construct public infrastructures like school buildings health centres. Taking into account these
viewpoints, it can be expected that the scope of military participation in society would encourage the provision of basic human needs, even relative to the level of economic development.\textsuperscript{143} Work by Leontif and Duchin, using an input-output model of the world economy, indicates that global disarmament and increased development aid would have had positive effects on growth in all regions of the world.\textsuperscript{144}

Generally, underdeveloped countries are described as having high unemployment with low consumption, and some analysts have rationalised the increases in defence spending in these countries as a way to stimulate economic growth and development.\textsuperscript{145} The notion that military is an engine of growth also illustrates the transformation of the military, where defence expenditure in social infrastructures such as roads, schools, and bridges more often, than not, benefits the civilian sector directly, arguably performing a non-traditional role in nation building.\textsuperscript{146} Furthermore, it may benefit the civilians if military professionalism and organisational management expertise flow into the public sector. In addition, Lebovic also argues that preserving military balance neighbouring countries places the fear of being invaded in check, eludes reductions in investments, and prevents brain-drain.\textsuperscript{147} Others consider the military to be the defender of the middle class, where they oppose the traditional political players by upholding social and economic reforms and people’s participation.\textsuperscript{148} Such is the case in some countries in Asia Pacific, where the increase in defence spending is reflected in positive economic growth at the same time adopting a comprehensive security framework.

2.7 Comprehensive Security in Asia Pacific

In the late 1980s, the Asia Pacific started to pick up as an economic powerhouse, when its growth rate rocketed from 6 to 9 per cent stretching over the next 20 years without a sign of slowing down.\textsuperscript{149} This caught the attention of the wider world. A World Bank study showed that between 1960 and 1990, Asia Pacific’s eight high performing economies (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) flourished more than twice as fast as the rest of East Asia surpassing even the oil-rich region of the Middle East.\textsuperscript{150} With an annual growth rate of 7 per cent, twice that of the older industrial economies, like the United
States, Asia Pacific region’s remarkable growth record, extended from the original eight to other nations, dubbing the 21st century as the “Pacific Century.”

Along with these economic changes, the outlook of developing countries towards security also shifted. Gone was the sole reliance on hard strategies when dealing with security threats, rather there was compromise that to face 21st century threats, a 21st century solution was needed. Thus, comprehensive security became an essential element in the policies and approaches of nations. The following sections will underscore how some Asian countries, like Singapore, Japan and China, were able to incorporate comprehensive security into their agenda.

2.7.1 Singapore’s Total Defence

Given its limited natural resources and growing economic interdependence with other countries, Singapore recognises the importance of diplomacy and deterrence as the twin pillars of its defence policy. From the viewpoint of diplomacy, Singapore sees itself as non-partisan and an active participant in international organisations like ASEAN, the World Trade Organisation, and the United Nations (UN). As part of its responsibility in UN peacekeeping, Singapore has sent personnel, aircraft, and naval vessels to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf of Aden though on a limited scale. In the event that diplomacy does not work, deterrence is applied. Articulated in 1984, deterrence strategy is harnessed through ‘Total Defence’, which is intended ‘to unite all sectors of society in defence of Singapore. The framework is made up of five pillars identified as:

- **Military Defence.** The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is a strong defence force that aims to deter anyone from thinking of attacking the country. Its military strength is built up through National Service. SAF also ensures that all equipment is in good working condition all the time and keeps up with the latest advancements in technology to meet 21st century threats including non-conventional dangers such as terrorism.

- **Civil Defence.** The Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) trains civilian volunteers in first aid, rescue and evacuation procedures, and shelter management. To further orient the public about likely emergencies, the SCDF regularly conducts talks and emergency
workshops. Civil defence is aimed at instilling confidence and resilience in times of national crisis.  

- **Economic Defence.** A strong economic foundation, built upon sound policies and practices encourages the country to be more competitive as well as enable it to withstand financial shocks. It also recognises that military power depends on economic strength, and possible vice versa. Consequently, Singapore gives high priority to national defence, keeping its budget to no more than 6 per cent of its national gross domestic product. 

- **Social Defence.** The Singapore government has often stressed that maintaining racial and religious harmony and treating other ethnic groups fairly is not just the morally correct thing to do; it is also a political, economic and foreign policy imperative for the city-state's continued prosperity and survival. 

- **Psychological Defence.** This is aimed to create a collective will and commitment among Singaporeans to protect its independence as a nation. 

Considered as a ‘small state,’ Singapore’s success in overcoming economic and security challenges can be deemed a major achievement in the contemporary era. Several factors can be attributed to this. First, under the strong and stable leadership of former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (1959 to 1990), long-term planning, especially in the fields of education, economic fields and technological advancement, was highly encouraged. From the onset, Singapore faced enormous challenges: lack of natural resources, inter-ethnic conflict, a small land mass, and a relatively small population. Virtually, these challenges pushed Singapore to invest into human capital, reinforcing the continuous pursuit for sustainable competitive advantage. Singapore also has the geographical advantage to be located at an international economic crossroads where trading, shipping, banking, and tourism flourish. The development model of Singapore acknowledges that the synthesis of political stability, social cohesion, and economic development lead to mutual reinforcement. 

Second, the way Singapore government has managed the economy has demonstrated both progressive and farsighted adopting an interventionist strategy. The country’s strategic policies are successful because they were planned and implemented to support the attainment of sustainable growth. Although it experienced a decline during the 1998 financial crisis, the
interventionist strategy it exercised was used to manage its economy. Meanwhile, the growing economic success of two of its largest neighbours – China and India – has created opportunities as well as challenges for Singapore. In response, higher valued-added initiatives such as the development of local capabilities, for example in the areas of biotechnology and nanotechnology, are encouraged and supported by policies. In 2003, Singapore opened of an international research and development centre for biomedical sciences called Biopolis that costs almost US$300M. Whilst Singapore is far from being like China in terms of scale and cost, the island-state can measure up on technological innovation. Ranked as one of the world’s top 10 start-up ecosystem, Singapore’s persistent drive as an innovation and technology centre is constant with its development success and probably a major aspect for its success.

Similar with the Philippines Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Singapore’s national security architecture comprises a “whole of government” approach encompassing a strong system that rallies other agencies to participate in its three key security pillars of policy, operational coordination, and capability development. Whilst other Southeast Asian countries view their militaries as the likely chief providers of comprehensive security, Singapore leaders consider the Armed Forces strictly as a hard-security deterrent that balanced other security deterrents. Apart from the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), the Total Defence strategy also underscored the streamlining of police and emergency services, civil management and oversight agencies, judicial and law enforcement institutions, and other public services.

Known to have a modern military on one hand, Singapore also recognises the need to invest in soft power. Singapore is able to capitalise and influence other countries through the different political, economic and socio-cultural strengths it possesses and although small in size, can ‘punch above its weight’ globally. Seeing that Southeast Asia is known for its instability considering the various security challenges such as terrorism, transnational crime, and territorial disputes, there is no doubt Singapore will keep on investing in hard power, complemented with soft power. As a small state, hard power will persist to be Singapore’s backbone and core resource in defending its territory with soft power being employed when and where vital. To promote its Total Defence posture abroad, Singapore declared it will intensify dialogues, confidence-building and cooperation with other militaries of nations within and outside the
region. Confronted with the need to appropriately and flexibly respond to security challenges including humanitarian affairs and disaster response, Singapore is acting on how to transform its 3rd Generation Forces, placing emphasis on integration/networking, holistic advancements, and technological advancement to implement effective responses and enhance operational capabilities.

2.7.2 China’s Security Posture

In recent years, the rise of China has been exceptional with an average annual economic growth of around 7.8 per cent. Such development has led to a tremendous increase in the standard of living among many Chinese people and also fuelled a comprehensive military modernisation and expansion. China has declared a “peaceful rise” and claims to pursue a defence policy that is defensive in nature, attempting to calm fears about its growing global strategic influence. Backed by the high and constant increase in defence budget, China has been modernising its military forces. In keeping with the concerns on the security situation, China’s military expenditure for 2015 amounted to $215 billion, 7.4 per cent higher than 2014. With a vision to transform itself into an industrial capital and technological hub, technically-advanced weapons, aircrafts, warships and other sophisticated hardware are continuously coming out of China’s production lines.

According to Tai Ming Cheung, China is pursuing a two-pronged approach in the modernisation of its defence industry: internal re-engineering and realigning of civilian economy with defence industry. The purpose of internal re-engineering is to disrupt bureaucratic barriers in order to nurture a more competitive and entrepreneurial institution. Integrating the defence industry with the civilian market aims to form a dual-use technological and industrial base to highlight civilian military integration (CMI) so that common technologies, manufacturing processes and equipment, personnel, and facilities can be utilised by both private and public sectors. It was in the mid-1990s when China’s approach to CMI shifted to an active strategy of dual-use technology development and commercial-to-military spin-on especially in the areas of information technologies. In its defence industry plan (2001-2005), China emphasised the
dual importance of both the transfer of military technologies to commercial use and the transfer of commercial technology to military use, actively promoting joint civil-military technology cooperation.\textsuperscript{183} China actively promotes the Revolution in Military Affairs emphasising Chinese characteristics that comprise chiefly of the ‘mechanisation’ and ‘informatization’ of its military power, based on its military strategy.\textsuperscript{184} With the implementation of the Five Year Plan, defence enterprises established collaborations with Chinese education institutions and private research firms to embark on research and development on dual-use technologies.

One of the industries that benefitted considerably from CMI efforts is the shipbuilding. In the late 1990s, Chinese shipbuilders entered into several technical cooperation agreements and joint ventures with overseas shipbuilding firms in Germany, Japan, and South Korea.\textsuperscript{185} It opened opportunities to gain access to advanced ship designs and manufacturing technologies like modular construction techniques, advance ship propulsion systems, computer-assisted design, and manufacturing and testing equipment.\textsuperscript{186} Through CMI, Chinese military was able to leverage in these infrastructure and software developments that permitted a significant expansion in its naval capability. On 10 August 2011, the first Chinese aircraft carrier commenced its sea trials, putting China as the latest UN Security Council permanent member to possess such capability.\textsuperscript{187} Apart from shipbuilding, the satellite business was also affected by the success of CMI, where telecommunication satellites are used by the civilian sector and the military.\textsuperscript{188}

On 31 March 2011, China published its seventh White Paper since 1998 highlighting military confidence building, forging better relations, and lessening tensions with its neighbours through joint trust systems and participation in regional security mechanisms like the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting.\textsuperscript{189} Also outline in the White Paper is use of the military in peace time including disaster relief and UN peacekeeping and joint military training.\textsuperscript{190} Over the last two decades, Chinese outlook on security has widened taking into account economic and other non-traditional security concerns. Where China’s comprehensive security is concerned, it has stepped up to a new stage underscoring both hard power (defence economics) and soft power (political and cultural).\textsuperscript{191}
2.7.3 Japan’s Integrated Security Framework

In March 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake with over 15-meter high tsunami caused the largest natural disaster in Japan’s recent history. To make matters worse, four nuclear reactors in the Fukushima Daiichi plant stopped functioning and released radiation with hydrogen explosion and cooling water leakages. The whole tragedy raises several important questions related to national security. First, natural calamities, especially large-scale earthquakes and tsunamis are indeed a national security issue for Japan. Second, the role of the armed forces is indispensable to cope with natural disasters. Third is the dependence of Japan on nuclear energy. Based on a premise that changes in a nation’s threat perception define the need for new defence policy guidelines, Japan has decided to adopt a new defence policy that aims to bolster more proactive, flexible and quick responses in the sea, land and air. Officially called the National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG), the policy, announced in December 2010, outlines Japan’s security and defence strategies for the next ten years.

The NDPG has ushered a number of significant changes in Japanese defence policy, force structure, and decision-making processes, as policymakers in Tokyo grew increasingly wary of Chinese maritime expansion in the disputed waters of East China Sea. Whilst the NDPG addresses a wide range of security challenges facing Japan, including the continuing destabilising influence of North Korea and new concerns about cyber-attacks, the core of the document focuses upon increasing Japan’s ability to cope with what are described as “grey zones” conflicts that arise from disputes over “territory, sovereignty and economic interests.” The 2010 defence guidelines continue a trend begun in the previous NDPG, shifting the focus of Japan’s Self Defence Forces (JSDF) from northern defence in Hokkaido toward the island chains that extend far to the south and closer to Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. The new policy includes the creation of a “Dynamic Defence Force”, replacing the “Basic Defence Force Concept.” The new concept behind the Dynamic Defence Force allows the Japanese forces to operate actively and seamlessly in the middle ground between the extremes of peace and military contingency, and response to emergencies. Whilst the previous defence policy seeks to develop a multifunctional flexible defence response element to encompass emerging twenty-first century threats, it was criticised as being distinctive dividing up the roles between peacetime or
emergency situations. On the other hand, the new NDPG calls for an ‘integrated security strategy’ that can be called to respond whether there is conflict or not. Furthermore, the new guidelines also recognise the existence of ‘gray-zone’ disputes, which are tensions over territory, sovereignty, and economic interests that are not to spiral into wars.” On this basis, Japan pledges to strengthen its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities along with developing a more mobile and flexible force structure that is better coordinated to respond to any contingency that might arise.

Another development seen in the new defence policy is the formulation of Japan’s security policy objectives. In the 2004 security guideline Japan focused on two points, to thwart direct threats and to help improve the security of the international environment. In the 2010 NDPG, three security objectives are specified: “to prevent any threat from directly reaching Japan and to eliminate threats that have reached it so as to minimise the ensuing damage, and thereby secure the peace and security of Japan and its people; to prevent threats from emerging by further stabilising the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and by improving the global security environment, so as to maintain and strengthen a free and open international order and ensure Japan’s security and prosperity; and to contribute to creating global peace and stability and to secure human security.” The Japanese government has positioned the concept of human security as one of the key perspective of its foreign policy with a perspective on making the 21st century a human-centred one. It is associated with the basic human needs model and emphasises the freedom from want aspect popularised by the United Nations. Japan has been implementing human security through the Trust Fund for Human Security, Official Development Assistance (ODA), and the Commission on Human Security (CHS). Since it was introduced by former Japanese Prime Minister Keizō in 1998, human security has been implemented through the country’s development policies and activities in the area of post-conflict peace building and peace-consolidation in Southeast Asia, especially Cambodia and Aceh.

Figure 2.1, below, shows Japan’s integrated security strategy that has included emerging 21st century threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, cyber warfare, the health concerns, and natural disasters, such as earthquakes and tsunamis along with China’s growing naval presence in the region and North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. The defence
policy also pursues to confront emerging non-traditional security challenges that threaten the country. The shift in Japan’s security framework shows a significant step in its long-term strategy to confront a changing security environment.\textsuperscript{202}

**Figure 2.1: Japan’s Integrated Security Strategy**

![Diagram of Japan's security framework]


This is not the first time Japan has formulated a security framework. In 1980, the Japanese government already embraced ‘comprehensive national security’ (‘*sogo anzen hosho*’) as its security framework.\textsuperscript{203} However, this is the first time a comprehensive security went beyond the spectrum of a military thinking what with the prioritisation of non-traditional security issues. The framework is an articulation of three concepts that focused on self-defence, non-military diplomacy, and disaster response.\textsuperscript{204} Incorporating natural disasters in the security strategy has been the most interesting piece in recent years. Earlier, many observers are sceptic about the inclusion of earthquakes or tsunamis in a national security doctrine, but today, natural disasters, climate change and pandemics form part of the make-up of non-traditional security threats.
2.8. **Blurring the Lines: Philippine Defence ‘and’ Development**

Separately, the thrusts of defence and development have been used to achieve the objectives of foreign policy. Lately, the line dividing the two has been hazy. Although their primary role is to defend the state from external aggression, Armed Forces across the world have performed duties beyond their defence responsibility. Militaries have taken on tasks related to economic development, nation-building, the preservation of political stability, managing public enterprises, providing disaster relief, enforcing public order, as well as engaging efforts to conserve natural resources.205

The defence posture practiced by Singapore, China and Japan suggests the need to re-examine the validity of Benoit’s argument that defence contributes positively to development. Singapore, China and Japan have taken advantage of new ideas about security espoused by contemporary scholars, policymakers, and international institutions. Apart from state sovereignty and territorial integrity, these three Asian countries have embarked on ways to address threats such as climate change, piracy, human/drug trafficking, pandemics, natural disasters, and transnational crime. Most of these threats require a coordinated response as well as transnational cooperation among all stakeholders (such as the government, non-government organisations, local communities, and other non-state actors).206 How these security strategies compare with that of the comprehensive security goal of the Philippines is illustrated in Table 2.1. Clearly, the four countries have embarked on responding to both traditional and non-traditional security challenges.
Table 2.1: Comprehensive Security: Commonality of Policy Objectives between the Philippines, and Singapore, China, and Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philippine Comprehensive Security Strategy</th>
<th>Singapore’s Total Defence</th>
<th>China’s Comprehensive Security</th>
<th>Japan’s Integrated Security Strategy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Defence industry</td>
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<td>• Response to natural disasters</td>
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<td>• Transnational crime</td>
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<td>• Terrorism, communism and insurgency de-</td>
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<td>escalation</td>
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*Gleaned from the information in Section 2.7: Comprehensive Security in Asia Pacific

Source: Author

Whilst the Philippines may not enjoy the concept of ‘rich nation, strong army’ like Singapore, China and Japan, to some extent, the country has sought to link defence and development in its pursuit to create an integrated security strategy through especially the following three policies of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (2010), the Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernisation (1995 and 2010), and the National Security Plan (2011-2016). A country with both insurgency and terrorism threats, the Armed Forces of the Philippines have been at the forefront of a campaign to tackle some of these domestic challenges, and as part of its pursuit for political and economic stability, have embarked on ‘non-traditional’ missions. As part of the comprehensive security action plan, these non-traditional missions involve carrying out long-term projects aimed at contributing to the economic development of the country.
2.9 Summary

In this chapter, development theories, such as modernisation theory, dependency theory, world-systems theory and globalisation theory, have been identified and examined. This was followed by a discussion on civil-military relations highlighting the works of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. A key section of this chapter weighed on whether defence is a drag on growth or a force that facilitates development. Spending for defence has been denounced by critics as a huge shift of the country’s resources from a social welfare function to something socially draining. One of the first scholars to suggest that defence spending might have a positive effect on economic growth was Emile Benoit through his study of 44 countries. To further understand the comprehensive security, this chapter also contextualised how defence and development work in certain Asian countries. The experience of Singapore, China, and Japan were highlighted citing data about the implementation of each country’s defence policy. At the end of the chapter, the three security policies of the Philippines of which this study focuses on were slowly peeled to see how they compare with the more successful Asian economies. Whilst the policies are not novel, they have not been evaluated in the specific context of Philippine development planning. Thus, the research gap that this thesis seeks to address has regard to an empirical analysis of the success of these policies to integrate defence into the Philippine national development framework, as encapsulated in the conceptual framework (Chapter 1, page 23).
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3.1 Scene Setting

The last chapter was concerned with critically evaluating the literature on defence and development. These included development approaches, such as Smith’s free market, Rostow’s ‘take-off’ model, modernisation theory, including globalisation paradigm and here civil-military integration in the Asia Pacific was argued. The message was clear, however, that some countries in the Asia Pacific, such as China, Singapore, and Japan, embrace security in broader terms. Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 offers a framework of analysis that reflects these development priorities. Against this backdrop, the primary objective of this chapter is to critically discuss the themes and practice posed by this study: defence industry, internal security, and non-traditional security encompassing both responses to natural disasters and transnational crime.

Section 3.2 discusses the components of defence industry. Section 3.3 discusses counterterrorism and counter-insurgency perspectives. This section provides examples of how certain countries undertake these efforts. Section 3.4 examines the role of the armed forces during national disasters. This section provides an understanding of civil-military engagement during a disaster. Section 3.5 of this chapter examines the response against transnational crime. Section 3.6 critically examines policies of China, Japan, and Singapore in relation to defence industry, counterterrorism/counter-insurgency, response to natural disasters, and transnational crime. Section 3.7 closes the chapter. This sets the tone for the subsequent country case study of the Philippines in Chapter 4, in terms of its defence and development process, and evaluation of the implementation of policies in relation to the defence industry, internal security, and non-traditional security (Chapter 5).

3.2 Defence Industry

Whilst there was no global arms industry to speak of prior to World War II, well rather not on the same scale as it does today, arsenals producing rifles and cannon, shipyards constructing
warships already existed in the 1920s and 1930s. However, this received slim attention from scholars, except for a few studies done on companies, such as Krupp, Maxim, and Vickers after World War I ended.¹ By end of the Second World War and the ensuing Cold War, interest escalated due to the dramatic impact on scale, scope, and character of the global arms industry the two conflicts brought.² As the arms industry expanded in terms of national security significance, economic importance, and technological complexity, its profile also increased. Today, the defence industry is as closely and as intently scrutinised as the electronics, aviation, or financial sectors. A dynamic phenomenon, global defence industry has the capacity to constantly move and go through periods of prospers and decline.³ With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, defence industries worldwide confronted a new military, political and economic reality.⁴ Defence industries around the world were prompted to restructure when this happened. The number of major defence firms shrunk noticeably as they merged or procured the military assets of other companies leaving the industry. The result then was an armaments production controlled by a few large defence companies such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing in the United States, for example, and BAE Systems, Thales, and DASA in Europe.⁵

National security is the commonly implicit main driver of defence industrialisation as many countries consider it a very important issue. It is not coincidental that shifting interest in defence industrialisation often parallels episodes of international conflict or tension, such as that leading up to World War II and during the Cold War.⁶ The recent crisis in Ukraine also confirms this point, where an increase in military build-up is seen in countries bordering Russia.⁷ It is noteworthy that the more ambitious defence-industrial programmes in the developing world tend to be found in states with strong national security issues, such as India, Iran, Pakistan, and South Africa.⁸ Bitzinger suggested five main factors that seem to be affecting the global defence industry today, which in turn may drive future changes and transformation when it comes to the structure, organisation, activities, and processes of defence industry.⁹ These are (1) the hierarchical nature of the global process of armaments production; (2) the impact of military spending upon the defence industry; (3) the effect of the international arms trade; (4) the process of defence-industrial globalisation; and (5) the emerging information technologies-based revolution in military affairs.¹⁰
3.2.1 Hierarchy in Armaments Production

The hierarchy in the global arms industry can significantly affect the nature of armaments production in a given nation, likewise, its role and relationship in the global defence commerce. There is no consensus on how to classify arms-producing nations, but it is typical to define global defence industry into three or four tiers. Keith Krause, for example, ranks the United States and the former Soviet Union at the top of the chain and describes both countries as *critical innovators*. In the second tier, described as *adapters and modifiers*, most Western Europeans are categorised for their developed military technologies, while the rest of the arms-producing countries are grouped into a third-tier called *copiers and reproducers*. Andrew Ross may agree with Krause’s description of tier one; his second tier includes China, Japan, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy and the United Kingdom; and in the third-tier are the developing, newly industrialised countries like Israel, India, Taiwan, and South Korea. Ross added a fourth-tier characterised by states with very limited arms production capabilities such as Mexico and Nigeria.

Bitzinger, *et al* define the first tier as countries with the capacity for across-the-board development and manufacture of advanced conventional weaponry, such as the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. The four European nations have achieved tier 1 status primarily through the unification of their defence industrial capabilities, via collaborative programmes and joint ventures. If the basis lies on the inheritance of the Soviet military-industrial complex, Russia may or may not fit into this grouping, as its defence industrial capacities have deteriorated in the last 20 years because of scarcity of funds to maintain its defence R&D base. Given the U.S. dominance in defence capabilities especially on its research and development fuelled by a huge military R&D budget (approximately $72 billion in FY2012, more than the rest of the world’s defence R&D budgets combined), it seems suitable to label the United States as *Tier 1a* and the rest as *Tier 1b*. The second tier is divided into three groups: (Tier 2a) industrialised countries possessing the capabilities for advanced but quantitatively limited defence production, such as Australia, Canada, Israel, Norway, Japan, and Sweden; (Tier 2b) developing or newly industrialised nation with modest military-industrial complexes, such as Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Iran, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey; and (Tier 2c) developing industrial states with large, broad-based defence industries but still inadequate in R&D and industrial capacities to develop and produce highly sophisticated conventional arms, such as China and India. The bottom Tier
3 are countries that possess very limited and generally low-tech arms production capabilities, such as the manufacture of small arms or the licensed assembly of foreign-designed systems, such as Egypt, Mexico, and Nigeria.\textsuperscript{18}

\subsection*{3.2.2 Impact of Defence Spending}

The past twenty five years have witnessed a wave of ups and downs in global defence expenditures. When communism collapsed and the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, major cuts in defence spending have been observed around the world. From 1989 to 1999, global defence budgets fell by nearly 35 per cent, whilst defence spending fell by almost half, from 4.7 per cent to 2.4 per cent.\textsuperscript{19} Among the leading European arms-producing states, total defence spending fell by 12 per cent between 1991 and 2004, from $194 billion to $170 billion, as measured in constant 2003 U.S. dollars, according to data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).\textsuperscript{20} French military expenditures fell by 8 per cent over this period, Britain’s defence budget declined by 12 per cent, and German military spending dropped by 30 per cent.\textsuperscript{21} Since the Cold War ended, an even bleaker data was seen. Using constant 2000 U.S. dollars, combined defence spending by Europe’s big three (Britain, France, and Germany) fell nearly 20 per cent between 1989 and 2003.\textsuperscript{22} Over that same period, total military expenditures for the then 15 members of the European Union (EU) declined 14 per cent overall.\textsuperscript{23} After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian spending dropped sharply by more than 90 per cent from an estimated $200 billion in 1989 to $14 billion in 1999.\textsuperscript{24}

Along with the decline was ‘peace dividend’ that allowed the countries to develop and produce arms that it neither needed nor afford.\textsuperscript{25} According to Intriligator (1996), \textit{peace dividend} refers to the benefits resulting from lower defence spending and the conversion of military production into civilian production.\textsuperscript{26} This state of affairs, in turn, compelled leading arms producers to engage in major rationalisation and consolidation efforts. Among the large advance arms-producing countries hundreds of thousands of defence workers became jobless and countless of communities were badly affected as defence manufacturers cut back production or decided to close down.\textsuperscript{27}
Since the turn of the millennium, global defence expenditures made a huge rebound. Based on SIPRI statistics, world military spending has grown by nearly 50 per cent between 2000 and 2011 (See Figure 3.1). But as the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis began to have an impact on government budgets and as the United States began to wind down its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the world total levelled off after 2009 and has now begun to fall. But in 2012, global defence expenditure fell 0.5 per cent for the first time since 1998 due to deep cuts in the spending of the United States and Europe that were only partly offset by increases in countries such as China and Russia. In 2014, defence spending in Asia and Oceania increased by 5 per cent reaching $439 billion mostly caused by China’s 9.7 per cent increase in military expenditure. Other top spenders include Australia with 6.7 per cent increase, South Korea and India of 2.3 and 1.8 per cent, respectively, whilst Japan’s spending remained the same. Meanwhile, tensions in South China Sea have prompted Vietnam to boost its spending by 9.6 per cent, whilst nearby Indonesia, decided to break its spending by 10 per cent.

Figure 3.1: World Military Expenditure, 1988-2014

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database. The totals are based on the data on 172 states. The absence of data for the Soviet Union in 1991 means that no total can be calculated for that year.
3.2.3 International Arms Trade

A growing dependence on international sales to increase business revenues was observed post-Cold War era. Arms markets may have domestically declined, but the significance of defence sector overseas has grown. In 2007, BAE Systems’ focused almost 80 per cent of its business overseas and just 22 per cent in the United Kingdom. The same goes with other European companies like France’s Thales and Dassault, and Sweden’s Saab, which in 1998 generated more than 60 per cent of its revenue from outside markets. Countries elsewhere have similar experience, like Israel which exports more than 75 per cent of its output. For many defence companies, international sales do not just serve as additional revenue, considerably, they have become critical to the survival of the defence industry. Competition in the global market is high, whilst production facilities and jobs are threatened. Besides, territorial and maritime disputes, and counterterrorism and counter-insurgency efforts have opened up the global defence market, especially in the Southeast Asia region. Arms manufacturers are increasingly ready to transact business, and offer potential buyers incentives, such as offsets, technology transfers, and foreign direct investments.

3.2.4 Globalisation of Armaments Production

From a traditional, single-country set-up, the globalisation of the arms industry has shifted to a more transnational scale. In a time of limited defence budgets, increasing R&D costs, and progressively competitive arms markets, arms-producing states looks at this internationalisation of armaments development and production as possibly the only affordable way to continue having an economically and technologically competitive defence-industrial base.

The content and shape of the global arms market is essentially affected by the expanding defence technology and industrial base. This process will likely have acute effects for different national security issues that include defence policy and military guidelines, arms control, regional security, and the future of national defence industries. Globalisation elicits palpable national security concerns and the future of self-sufficiency in arms production, the military and commercial outcomes of global technology diffusion and proliferation of conventional armaments. Globalisation serves as a challenge to the future of self-sufficiency.
in many arms-producing countries, as foreign ownership and participation in joint ventures and international collaborative programmes weaken the national nature of the domestic defence-industrial base. International competition through increasing the efficiency of defence contracting might be healthy, but some arms producing countries are apprehensive about the consequence of losing grip over key industrial assets and core technologies. In addition globalisation raises substantial misgivings about the inadvertent diffusion of advanced military technologies and other know-how relating to arms production. Furthermore, globalisation has implications to national security, to the point that reliance on foreign sources for critical defence systems could raise unwanted vulnerabilities, especially in times of conflict or war. Ultimately, the process of globalisation will affect the patterns of arms production, economic growth and development in the domestic scene, and international relations.

3.2.5 Technology and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

The RMA is deduced as shift in character and conduct of warfare, and is perceived as a process of discontinuous and disruptive change. The current RMA model has been inevitably associated to the developing views of network-centric warfare (NCW), also known as network-enabled capabilities or network-based defence. According to the NCW perspectives, it is the revolution in information technologies – the growth in computing power, advances in communications and microelectronics, miniaturization, and so on – that makes possible the comparable RMA and allows innovation and improvement in the areas of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). In 2003, the United States Defence Department has said that “NCW causes combat power to surge by networking sensors, decision-makers, and shooters, in order to attain the desired outcomes of increased speed and survivability, greater lethality, and a degree of self-synchronisation.”

Developments in technology have corresponded with significant innovations in the way militaries are engaged around the world. From the use of cavalry units in World War I to the deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, known as drones, the ways in which military operations are planned and conducted have evolved considerably. Furthermore, the NCW doctrine gives a military the ability to “to achieve a high level of shared battlespace
awareness that is developed to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in accordance with the commander’s intent.” This includes not just joint warfare in a specific theatre of operations, but also the coordination of dispersed forces on a global level. This being examined, the next section will discuss how the military counters terrorism and insurgency.

3.3 Internal Security: Counterterrorism and Counter-insurgency

The Cold War years observed terrorism and political violence through the bipolar lenses of east versus west, communism versus capitalism, and evil versus good. This was followed by some diverse trends in the terrorism literature, particularly during the 1970s and early 1980s, when there was a complete emphasis on international and transnational terrorism whilst ignoring domestic terrorism; and also the tendency to put a heavy spotlight on left-wing terrorism and ignore right-wing terrorism.

By the end of the Cold War, there was a shift on how conflicts were analysed through the realisation that each has its own unique variables. In the post-Cold War era, Americans focused on terrorism in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, whilst the Soviet tackled Chechen’s ongoing insurgency against Russian rule. Suddenly, the world became more complicated and accordingly, the enemy became more spread out. Drug trafficking, organised crime, and illegal immigration were identified as traditional concerns when confronting terrorism. Furthermore, new kinds of threats were formulated, ranging from infectious diseases to information warfare. The recognition of old/new threats was, in turn, transformed into a wider operational mandate for government agencies in charge for counterterrorism. The mandates of the different agencies that formerly were quite separate, such as customs, border control, security intelligence, defence, and policing, began to cloud into one another. The inclination to put distinct events into the same category was also manifested in various analyses of terrorism of that period. One analyst, for instance, consolidated drug trafficking, international crime, ethnic cleansing, religious fanaticism, rural guerrilla, and urban terrorism all together as legitimate concerns for counterterrorism policymaking in the post-Cold War world. In the mid to late 1990s, the “new terrorism” phenomenon began to emerge as analysts recognise the threat of Islamists extremists and, in particular, discharged Afghan fighters returning home after the
defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan. Islamist extremism increasingly began to draw the attention away from other post-Cold War threats. This trend only became more serious after the attacks on 11 September 2001.

It has been more than a decade since the 9/11 attacks, still enduring policy debates whether to adopt a counterterrorism or counter-insurgency strategy in countries like Afghanistan, exist. But these discussions do not offer clear explanations on how to strategically counter the threats of these security challenges. Debates on how to counter insurgency and terrorism in conflicts such as in Afghanistan, have been described as somewhat short-sighted because of too much concentration on the strengths and weaknesses of short- and long-term commitments whilst sidestepping critical discourses on sustainable security strategies.

According to Michael Boyle, “a counter-insurgency strategy should not be seen as a counterterrorism strategy and vice-versa.” The main tenet of counter-insurgency recognises that a sole military solution is not practical making it necessary for a combination of military and political solution that adopts a population-centric approach. Counter-insurgency doctrine rests on a few crucial scaffolds of protecting the local population, promoting good governance, eliminating enemy safe-havens, and training the locals to take the fight to the insurgency. Bruce Hoffman classifies counter-insurgency into two: classical and modern. The former pursues an insurgency that is confined within the borders of a country, whilst the latter takes principles of the classical counter-insurgency and uses them to combat insurgency at the international level that while countering insurgency, also addresses the underlying socio-economic conditions that allow terrorism to thrive. Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ are the famous lyrics behind a more softer counter-insurgency approach inclined by countries that want to promote good governance and gain legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Such a perspective shows how development can be a key in addressing some of the issues and concerns causing terrorism and insurgency.

Equally complex is counterterrorism, which over the last fifty years, has developed into a more dangerous form of unconventional warfare, mirroring, and responding to the evolving trends in global terrorism. Before the 1990s, tactics used by terrorists include hijacking of planes, kidnapping, and raiding embassies to promote their causes. In recent years, terrorism tactics have become more indiscriminate making it more dangerous if governments fail to elevate its responses. Terrorism today is indeed a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. In
terms of countering terrorism and its complexities, hard and soft power approaches are applied as all-encompassing strategy.

3.3.1 What is Terrorism?

Although terrorism is thought to be as old as history, there is no one definition of the term. As Charles Tilly has appropriately said, the definition “sprawls across a wide range of human cruelties”. The term terrorism first entered the Western consciousness in relation to state-organised violence and repression and, in particular, to describe the actions of French revolutionaries against their domestic enemies in 1793 and 1794. During what became known as the Reign of Terror, France’s new government legally executed as many as 17,000 people, and it is estimated that another that another 23,000 were illegally executed. In subsequent years, terrorism was a tactic used by dictators such as Adolf Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot, and expanded to include attacks by non-government, such as the Irish Republican Army, Basque separatists, and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) on governments and public at large. Today, multiple definitions of terrorism exist. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman have counted as many as 109 different definitions. In their words, “authors have spilled almost as much ink (trying to define the concept) as the actors of terrorism have spilled blood”. Terrorism expert Walter Lacquer has also encountered over 100 definitions and has come to the conclusion that the “only general characteristic generally agreed on is that terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence”.

3.3.2 Inventory of Counterterrorism Approaches

Steven and Gunaratna define counterterrorism as measures to decrease susceptibility to terrorist acts, to thwart and respond to terrorism, and having the capacity to respond to any attack. In the response against terrorism, two types have emerged. The hard approach indicates the use of the military in combatting the terrorists, and the soft approach, which can range from legal jurisdiction to rehabilitation. Statistics indicate that in the U.S., from 1983 to 1998, counter-terrorism response leaned more toward the use of the legal system, where only three of the 2,400 terrorist incidents during the period of investigation were responded with military means. This confirms the claim by some counterterrorism analysts that in the
1970s, the more dominant model of response was the use of the justice system and eventually transformed into a military response by the 1980s. No clear explanations have been provided why this is so, but one angle being looked at is at that time, the U.S. does not have much experience yet in dealing with issues of counterterrorism. A state can use a range of counterterrorism policies, strategies, and instruments to fight groups resorting to terror.

**Political measures**

A number of political measures can be used to counterterrorism and to try to resolve its causes or grievances, which can be political, economic, or social in nature. These measures include negotiations, socioeconomic, and political reforms, and international cooperation to cut off terrorist financing, extradite terrorists, regulate borders, and sharing of intelligence.

**Legislative and judicial measures**

These measures include emergency and other special legislation to expand the government’s power to arrest, detain, and incarcerate suspects and to gain intelligence about the group’s operations; use of the courts to undertake investigations; legislation to disrupt terrorist financing; and amnesty and repentance measures to lure active members and to reintegrate them into the mainstream.

**Security measures**

These measures include military deployments to protect the population; intelligence operation; organisational machinery to coordinate security units and operations; and preventive actions for defence, such as the hardening of facilities and control of access.

In the context of Southeast Asia, the realities of insurgency and terrorism often overlap. Terrorist organisations work hard to exploit local grievances and use these grievances to spread their ideas of hate and violence; taking advantage of insurgent sanctuaries as base of operations to plan and launch terrorist attacks. The strength of terrorist groups in the region stems from their robust and interconnections between groups. The governments of Southeast Asia face a number of challenges in establishing a common front against terrorism, specifically in the areas of overcoming sovereignty and non-interference issues. Whilst such mind-sets are understandable, there are the same areas that terrorist and insurgent groups exploit in their operations. Terrorists take advantage of the porous borders and cross relatively unhindered from one country to the next.
3.3.3 What is insurgency?

Insurgency has long existed ever since people have used violence to resist states and empires, but its strategic significance has receded and flowed throughout history, increasing when conventional war between great powers was unlikely and states were ineffective at defeating it. When governments fail to meet the expectations of its citizens, tensions arise and negotiations fail, creating the basic elements why people would likely support a rebellion.\(^70\)

Following the Second World War, insurgency emerged from the combination of nationalism and anti-colonialism, peasant unrest, leftist, or communist ideologies, which exploited and organised this discontent, and, in some cultures, a tradition of banditry and raiding.\(^71\) There were two main trends: conflicts based on opposition to outside rulers, particularly the European colonial powers, and class based conflicts (some with ethnicity elements) against local elites. In both Latin America and the Philippines, the latter trend was the most common. Policing was central; local issues and grievances were paramount. Where the British saw counter-insurgency as akin to colonial policing, and thus stress the synthesis of police and military efforts, the French and later the Americans considered it to be more like war than policing. Eventually the latter perspective dominated. As articulated by Clausewitz, insurgency conceptualised as war is viewed as purposeful behaviour with a rational, policy-focused dimension intermixed with passion and chance.\(^72\) The idea that insurgency was a variant of war dominated American thinking, where former President John F Kennedy called it another type of war because of its used of infiltration, ambush, guerrillas, instead of directly confronting the enemy.\(^73\)

Whilst most Western nations have adhered to the idea that insurgency is war of a peculiar variant, this notion has not been universal. Some strategic theorists such as Ralph Peters, Edward Luttwak, Martin van Creveld, and Michael Scheurer argue that it is more like war than not, and hence the objective is the use of force to defeat the enemy.\(^74\) Many practitioners of counter-insurgency, from Rome to the Soviet Union and contemporary Sri Lanka, took this track, treating insurgency as an enemy-centric conflict where decisive military victory was attainable. From this perspective, the appropriate response is force directed at insurgents and their supporters. It also suggests that it is primarily a military activity, and that decisive defeat
of the insurgents should be the goal. Despite the logic of this idea, the norm has been to attempt an uneasy blend of war and political economic re-engineering.\textsuperscript{75} This may tackle the symptoms of pathological systems but does not address the root of the conflict.

### 3.3.4 Counter-insurgency not Conventional Warfare

The difference between conventional war and counter-insurgency arose from the triangular nature of the conflict. Conventional war sought to destroy the rebels or at least render them ineffective. At times, this was done indirectly by eroding the rebel’s armed forces’ support, or physically, by destroying the enemy’s industry and agriculture depriving them of a supply base and hide-outs.\textsuperscript{76} General Sir Fran Kitson differentiates counter-insurgency from conventional warfare by noting that the former makes use of campaign propaganda to lure the citizens into participating in their cause.\textsuperscript{77} On the other hand, propaganda plays second fiddle to armed struggle.\textsuperscript{78}

As Galula observes the experience of conventional warfare maybe similar to most characters in counter-insurgency warfare where there are obvious disparities between the concerns of the two opposing sides.\textsuperscript{79} The first links to the physical situations suffered by the ones concerned that directly affect the ways they struggle, and the other implies to the rubrics by which the two sides must act.\textsuperscript{80} Guerrillas do not act or speak for a ‘state’, but are, rather, in direct clash with the political institution of their state and generally seek to replace the existing political order.\textsuperscript{81} Generally the state has at its disposal a variety of tough methods to engage in conventional warfare, from diplomatic and trade sanctions to the use of military force. But because insurgents have a shortage of the traditional equipment to counter the government they are fighting against, they possess some unique advantages and can stay hidden, thus targeting can be a challenge compared when in a conventional war situation. Given that rebels can mix and mingle with the general public, the risk of collateral casualties from inaccurate attacks on them by the state is high. These unfortunate events have, in many instances, been exploited by the guerrillas in their campaign propaganda.\textsuperscript{82} All of this requires strategic thinking when pursuing a counter-insurgency approach. Having discussed the traditional role of the military, the next section will examine the role of the armed forces in non-traditional security issues.
3.4 Role of the Military during Natural Disasters

Natural disasters such as earthquake, flood, volcanic eruption, drought, tornado and hurricane have affected lives, livelihood, and properties, and have caused peaks in mortality and morbidity. Since 1990, natural disasters have affected more than 200 million people every year.\(^8\) For example, the 2004 tsunami that affected 14 countries including Indonesia and Sri Lanka killed 230,000,\(^8\) and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti killed 225,000 people, destroyed health care facilities; and left many homeless.\(^8\) In the last thirty years, the scale of disasters has magnified, due to the rapid rate of environmental degradation such as deforestation and waste disposal, and to increasing climate variables such as higher temperatures, and more violent wind and water storms.\(^8\) From 2000 through 2014, there were three times as many natural disasters recorded as there were from 1980 through 1989 (See Figure 3.2).

**Figure 3.2: Total Number of Reported Natural Disasters between 1980 and 2014**

![Figure 3.2: Total Number of Reported Natural Disasters between 1980 and 2014](http://www.emdat.be/)

The effect of a disaster on the local economy usually consists of direct consequences, such as damage to crops and infrastructures; and indirect consequences, such as unemployment. According to a United Nations Report published in March 2015, global economic losses from natural disasters have continued rising to an average of $250 billion to $300 billion
annually.\textsuperscript{87} This shows that disasters disrupt long term growth paths and pose challenges to governments and communities.

Nonetheless, societies have been able to reconstruct damage properties and building and people have been able to rebuild through recovery and relief efforts. In recent years, the humanitarian focus that has characterised disaster response is changing, along with the way nations, especially the military, have responded to large-scale disasters. The military has also been accepted as a disaster response agency that provides assistance and resources to civil communities in natural disasters.\textsuperscript{88} In the United States, the role of the military has grown more notable and substantial, almost to the point that the armed forces is increasingly seen as the first responders, since the inception of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979.\textsuperscript{89} The task of FEMA is to coordinate disaster responses around the United States, which has overwhelmed the resources of the local and state authorities.\textsuperscript{90} Following the October 2005 devastating earthquake in Pakistan, domestic and international military actors mounted the largest and longest humanitarian airlift operation ever undertaken.\textsuperscript{91} Also paying attention to the role of the military during natural disasters are regional alliances such as NATO, which played a key role in the Hurricane Katrina response in 2005.

Increasing curiosity over the military’s role in disaster response is driven by different dynamics. According to Hofmann and Hudson (2009), assisting in relief efforts can improve the image of the military at the same time provide training opportunities.\textsuperscript{92} This is also one way for the armed forces to expand its role, especially at a time when defence worldwide are undergoing budget cuts.\textsuperscript{93} With an increasing incidence scale of natural disasters, national and foreign militaries can be expected to play a bigger role, where the capacity of humanitarian organisations may be expectedly stretched.\textsuperscript{94} A lot of countries usually send their military to assist in disaster relief and response. Most of the time, the armed forces is called to response to emergency relief activities such as search and rescue, evacuation and provision of relief goods and services because of lack of personnel and logistical incapacity by the local government.\textsuperscript{95} However, such actions need to be contained within the bounds of defined structures, like the Oslo Guidelines,\textsuperscript{96} wherein the military is a member of the inter-government agency coordinative framework.\textsuperscript{97} Whilst deployment directives firmly stay within the chain of command, part of the concerned armed forces unit’s (its personnel and assets) mission is to engage civilian government units and authorities on a horizontal
fashion. Moreover, depending on the severity and extent of the disaster, the figure armed forces personnel and assets deployed is also usually scaled.

Unlike other domestic missions, the involvement of the armed forces in disaster relief is deemed relatively uncontroversial. For Desch, having the military engaged in disaster response does not necessarily mean unhealthy relations between civilians and the armed forces not like counterterrorism, law enforcement, or social welfare. By nature, the deployment of the armed forces is usually transitional and sticks to a certain time-table, this non-traditional role does not go against the balance of civil-military relations in a democracy. Meanwhile, three conditions have been noted in assessing if the function provided by the armed forces heads to a more healthy practice of civil-military relations: (1) it does not crowd out civilian actors who can do the same job better; (2) it does not enable the military to gain additional institutional privilege; and (3) it does not veer the military away from its core mission. The role played by the military in civil-military relations, especially in disaster response, is important; without undermining the role of the civilians.

A key factor in looking at the role of the armed forces in responding to disasters is through the humanitarian response framework that is normally led by a civilian authority or agency of the country involved. The collective response stated in this framework highlights the fundamental tenet of democratic civil-military relations, where it takes into account how the civilian actors can employ the help of the local and foreign military assets and, likewise, how these defence entities can deal with civilian authority especially during disaster response operations. Moreover, the framework has features that can be further studied such as the identification and stipulation of the military’s task in disaster response; the clarification of how to the civilians deliver authoritative decisions for the military to follow; and the integration of foreign military assistance into the disaster response operation.

One source of potential tension in civil-military relations is the engagement of the armed forces with non-government organisations (NGOs) during disaster response, given their different organisational, cultural, and historical backgrounds. It was stressed by Mandel (2002) that there is a danger of ‘militarisation’ in disaster response, especially since military responders are better-equipped compared to humanitarian organisations. Furthermore, concern over the military’s ‘armed’ credentials as state agents adds a layer of politics to their presence, which contradicts to the role of relief organisations as neutral actors. For
example the conduct of relief activities and information sharing during the 2004 tsunami disaster between the military and the NGOs were described as parallel and irregular.\textsuperscript{107} The thin interaction between groups both was because of the existing biases about the military as human rights violators\textsuperscript{108} and the opinion by the NGOs to limit its engagement with the military.\textsuperscript{109}

The framers of the Oslo Guidelines recognise that that disaster response is not the military’s domain and thus maintain it be the ‘last resort’ and a temporary measure. Principally, military personnel are state forces; hence any deployment and presence in foreign soil have sensitive implications and must be threaded carefully. Consequently, foreign contingents have the responsibility to avoid interaction with the local population and where possible to dissociate the tasks they perform from their military nature. Furthermore, even though the presence of foreign military is only for a limited timeframe, it is paramount that any engagement must adhere to institutionalised bounds of engagement.\textsuperscript{110} It also recognises civilian authority over military assets and host government-led framework for disaster response.\textsuperscript{111} In developing countries affected by large-scale disasters, more often than not, the local government is affected and unable to respond. When such a situation happens, the military is requested to step in and becomes the focal point of coordinating rescue and relief operations, until when civilian authority is restored. If not properly handled, civil-military relations can be a challenge.

### 3.5 Transnational Crime

The maritime domain covers more than 70 per cent of the earth’s surface made up of seas, oceans, rivers, lakes and inland waterways. As a very important global resource, it provides food, livelihood, energy resources, jobs, ecological services, and tourism opportunities. The maritime domain also plays a key role in sustaining domestic and international transportation and trade, the movement of the people, as well as the preservation of peace and security. If there is good order at sea, peaceful trading, the security of shipping and transportation, the development of marine resources in accordance of international law, and the freedom of navigation are upheld.\textsuperscript{112} There are also challenges at sea that threaten to unsettle the good order and these include piracy, trafficking in persons, arms and people smuggling, trafficking of illegal drugs, and other transnational crimes.
Asia, where the Philippines is a part of, is a distinctively maritime region. The relative lack of land-based transport infrastructure, both within and between nations, as well as its geographical natures, that the role of the sea is very crucial. Asia strategically lies on two important waters – the Indian and Pacific Oceans – that economically and strategically benefit countries such the United States, China and India. Many countries consider themselves stakeholders of a peaceful maritime domain with extensive interests; therefore, transboundary cooperation must be facilitated.

3.5.1 Maritime Security

The concept of maritime security started to draw attention after the 9/11 attacks and the related apprehensions on maritime terrorism. The escalation of piracy off the Somalia coast between 2008 and 2011 brought the issue of maritime security to the fore and elevated it high on policy agendas. Since 2010, maritime security strategies has increasingly been recognised as a vital part of the security framework of states, regional institutions, maritime organisations such as the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United States, African Union, NATO with its Alliance Maritime Strategy 2011, and the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the International Maritime Organisation included maritime security in their list of tasks. Meanwhile, territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea have seen claimants make considerable investments toward their blue water navies recognising the importance of the maritime domain as a security space.

Discussions of maritime security frequently draw attention to challenges or ‘threats’ (e.g. transnational crimes, maritime terrorism, illegal fishing, environmental crimes, or maritime accidents) that prevail in the maritime domain. In recent years, arguments on whether to include climate change and disasters at sea as maritime issues have also been increasing. There are those who propose that maritime security can be described as “good” or “stable order at sea”. As a consensus though, there has not been a satisfactory definition of what is maritime security.

Apart from being a contested concept, maritime security also involves very different activities. According to Bueger (see Figure 3.3), at least six domains of practice constitute
maritime security: The first domain includes traditional tasks of ensuring security at sea, that is, activities related to national defence and power projection. The second is comprised of diplomacy and geared at ensuring freedom of navigation and access to ports, but also preventing maritime inter-state disputes and establishing common security. Third, maritime security includes law enforcement operations at sea, that is interdictions, inspections, or patrols. The fourth dimension refers to legal regulations and the setting of rules and standards across various legal domains, such as, trade, environment, shipping or criminal law. The fifth domain involves the field of capacity building. They are directed at strengthening the level to which agencies can respond to maritime security issues by developing human resources and equipment. Finally, the sixth domain includes activities related to the sharing and fusion of information and maritime situation and domain awareness.

Figure 3.3: Domains of Maritime Security Practice

Source: Bueger C. From dusk to dawn? Maritime domain awareness in Southeast Asia. 2015.

Various agencies and professions work in each of these domains, including, but not limited to, navies, coast guards, maritime police, port authorities, regulatory agencies, or ministries of fisheries, trade, transport and foreign affairs. The domains together constitute maritime security practice, and none of them could be successful without the other. The relations between the practices are multifaceted and one should not assume a linear relationship, e.g. in the sense that legal regulation or information sharing precede law enforcement. Appropriate responses to maritime security challenges require that each domain is continuously informed.
about the needs of the other, not the least to adapt to changing circumstances. The domain of information sharing has become central to coordinate maritime security practice and develop cooperative regional maritime security regimes. As the National Research Council’s Committee of the 1,000 Ship Navy noted, information sharing can be a “key enabler” in maritime security, because it is an anchoring practice, and has potential benefit for all of the six other domains of maritime security practice.

### 3.5.2 Domain Awareness

A critical element to protecting maritime security is warranting that countries have the essential data at their disposal manage crisis or take responsive action if needed. As Colby notes:

> There are no limits to the types and sources of information which may be useful. The processing of intelligence refers to the treatment accorded to the raw data collected. It generally includes appraisal of the relevance of the information, as well as editing and cataloguing in forms useful to decision-makers. These tasks vary enormously in complexity, depending in large measure on the amount and quality of data requested and actually collected.

The vastness and nature of the oceans present particular challenges for states seeking to improve their knowledge of the range of activities undertaken at sea. Intelligence gathering involves a range of operational and policy perspectives as well as legal considerations. The legal dimension provides a framework or advises the states’ operational exercises in seeking intelligence for the purpose of promoting or ensuring their maritime security. The policy of maritime domain awareness (MDA) and similar policies have been critical drivers and goals for intelligence gathering at sea, as well as information sharing. MDA is one of the main U.S. policy initiatives since the 9/11 attacks. It seeks to generate and use information concerning vessels, crews, and cargoes. According to the United States maritime strategy plan published in 2013, MDA is the “effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment.” Accordingly, the purpose of the MDA is to provide appropriate, timely, precise decision-
making, to facilitate actions that will stop threats to the national security interests of the U.S.\textsuperscript{139}

The primary elements of a global MDA include: a global network of regionally based maritime information exchange partnerships, the institution of worldwide standards for broadcast of vessel position and identification; automated tools to discern patterns, changes, and potential threats, and alerting maritime partners of suspicious behaviour and potential threats.\textsuperscript{140} The need for international cooperation to achieve MDA and a shared interest among states for situational awareness and threat awareness to improve maritime security cannot be denied. Aside from cooperation across different government agencies, MDA also entails collaboration with the private sector.\textsuperscript{141} Collaboration with the private industry is vital considering that most international shipping is managed by the commercial sector. It has been suggested that the system would greatly benefit if commercial information from manufacturers and shippers could be made available.\textsuperscript{142} However, difficulties here are that valuable and detailed information is not likely to be made available to the U.S. government in the absence of domestic legislation requiring this, and even then the information may not be reliable or prove insufficient for the purposes for which it was sought.\textsuperscript{143}

Other states and regional groups have developed their own coordinated approaches to handling information relevant to maritime security. As one example, the European Commission proposed in 2008 a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), to prevent unauthorised crossings by immigrants, reduce loss of life at sea, and enhance Europe’s security.\textsuperscript{144} Australia and New Zealand have adopted similar MDA policies in light of the large expanse of their EEZs and search and rescue regions.\textsuperscript{145} The Western Pacific Naval /symposium created a Regional Maritime Information Exchange (ReMIX) to share non-sensitive information on maritime security threats.\textsuperscript{146} The adherence of different states to this approach underlines that MDA is ‘the key to maritime security’.\textsuperscript{147} The need to collect, process, and share information is fundamental to the range of law enforcement and military activities that are likely to be needed to ensure maritime security.
3.6 Strategies in Practice: Selected Countries

In Chapter 2, security policies of China, Singapore, and Japan were highlighted to explain comprehensive security in the Asia-Pacific context. The sections that follow look at specific practices on how these three countries tackle the issues of defence industrialisation, traditional security, and non-traditional security issues, discussed in preceding sections, thus strengthening the relationship between defence and development.

3.6.1 China’s Defence Industry

In almost every year for over two decades, China has increased its military expenditure by double-digit percentages. In March 2015, China announced that it would raise its defence budget by 10.1 per cent (approximately $145 billion). Whilst down from the previous year’s 12.2% increase, the pronouncement will continue to raise concern from Washington and neighbouring capitals with which China has an ongoing maritime territorial conflict. China’s new budget is more than three times those of other big spenders such as France, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and nearly four times that of its rising Asian rival, India.

It is also the only country besides the United States to have a triple-digit defence budget (in billions of U.S. dollars). Funding priorities of the Chinese military in 2015 included the strengthening of modern logistics, step up national defence, research and development, and develop defence-related science and technology industries.

With its broad-based defence industries but insufficient R&D capability, China has traditionally been categorised as a Tier 2c arms producer. China owns one of the oldest, largest, and most diversified military-industrial facilities in the world with around 1,000 establishments, involved in research and trading, by end of the 1990s. In particular, China is one of the few nations, who has actually produced an almost full range of military equipment, from small arms to warships to aircraft carriers to ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. However, the uphill climb has not all been a bed of roses. Its defence industry also suffered from a number of failings that have impeded the translation of advanced technologies and design into reliable weapons systems. As of the late 1990s, China’s military expenditures totalled only about $10 billion, significantly less than that of Japan and South Korea, and possessed one of the world’s most technologically backward defence
China’s defence R&D was deemed deficient in several key areas, such as aeronautics, microelectronics, sensors, electronic warfare, and sophisticated materials. Not surprising at all, since the defence industry of China had traditionally been immature in the area of systems integration.

This pattern could be changing given the increasing progress in Chinese defence transformation in terms of quality and new weapons capabilities over the past decade or so. China has ambitions to be a regional superpower and is steadfast to modernise concentration on the RMA transformation process. One issue here is how China’s defence industry is performing compared with other arms-producing nations in relation to the constantly changing technological goalposts of weapons development. If in the next few years China can close the gap with other advance military systems and rise in the hierarchy, another issue is the growing disparity between economic performance and defence spending, which in the last ten years has grown to an average of 15.9 per cent annually.

3.6.2 Singapore’s Fight against Terrorism

Singapore’s concern for its safety and security has been well documented long before 9/11. It has its fair share of terrorist attacks and ethnic tensions in the course of its history. In fact, several of its security agencies had been developing capabilities to deal with specific threats such as those in the chemical and biological domain. In 1999, the National Security Secretariat (NSS) together with the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) was formed with the objectives of enhancing the coordination of Singapore’s security agencies and to forge and strengthen interagency linkage through the strategic convergence of these organisations and other government agencies, directing efforts against the emerging threats of non-conventional warfare and transnational terrorism.

The 2001 arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members for plotting bombings in Singapore has increased its government’s efforts to enhance the protection of critical infrastructures such as border checkpoints and water installations, preserving property, and avoiding possible interference in the social order. The law enforcers and the Internal Security Department (ISD) continue to map out standard operating procedures to fine tune emergency responses through special trainings for security agencies and personnel on a regular basis. Stricter
border controls have also been put in place by the government to prevent the entry of any elements to transnational terrorism. Examples of such measure include the purchase of surveillance equipment to enhance the monitoring of goods and people against Singapore’s borders and the imposition to stricter visa requirements on foreign nationals. As a proactive measure, the Parliament signed into law the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act criminalising activities related to terrorist-funding. In addition, the government has drawn up new frameworks for managing information technology in the face of cyberterrorism as well as regulating the use of materials that could be used to make weapons of mass destruction.

In 2003, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) published a white paper entitled “The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism,” where officials proposed the importance of underpinning social cohesion and religious harmony recognising the critical role in countering terrorism by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. One of the measures put in place in relation to this is a community effort called Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) composed of local Muslim religious clerics to rehabilitate those who have been detained for participating in terrorist activities. The aim of the RRG is “to correct” the misinterpretation of the principles of Islam and dispel extreme and violent ideologies by counselling JI detainees and their families. Depending on the politics, culture, and priority, affected states have responded to terrorism from different viewpoints. Singapore has opted for an ideological response to counter extremism and it has worked very well for them, where in 2015, already 57 detainees have been rehabilitated and released from detention since the programme started in 2002.

### 3.6.3 Japan’s Civil-Military Engagement during the March 2011 Tsunami

On 11 March 2011, a magnitude-9 earthquake struck northeastern Japan that resulted to a major tsunami submerging approximately a 500km-wide area, leaving the local government paralysed. If this was not enough, the earthquake also caused the radioactive water to leak from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. At most 107,000 personnel of Japan’s Self-Defence Force (SFD) force were deployed from 11 March to 31 August 2011 (until 26 December 2011) for the nuclear disaster, combining the strength of the three branches of
the armed forces – land, sea, and air – making the operation the biggest response it had to face.\textsuperscript{171}

Enacted into law in 1987 and subsequently amended in 1992, the Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) has enabled the SDF to participate in international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations.\textsuperscript{172} To fulfil immediate requests for overseas HADR support, the JSDF maintains designated units through the Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF), and depending on need, can provide medical units, transportation vessels and aviation capabilities.\textsuperscript{173} Between 1998 to April 2016, a total of 140 JDR Teams (19 search and rescue teams, 57 medical teams, 46 expert teams, and 18 SDF units) have been deployed to 43 countries including Haiti in 2010 and the Philippines in 2013.\textsuperscript{174} Through its Ministry of Defence, Japan has been sharing its HADR expertise with the other armed forces in the Southeast Asia, through the ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Field Exercise (ARF-DiREx), which was first initiated in 2009, leading to a more strengthened bilateral relationship with the countries in the region.\textsuperscript{175}

\subsection*{3.6.4 Transnational Crime in the Context of Japan}

Japan is a major maritime power and an island nation, whose economy (the world’s third largest) and trade are reliant upon the safe passage of shipping. In particular, Japan transports 80 per cent of its oil through the Malacca Straits,\textsuperscript{176} and a blockage of this sea lane caused by an intentional terrorist incident or an accident resulting from a piratical incident would significantly harm Japan’s economic interests.\textsuperscript{177} The cost of would-be deterring pirates or terrorists alone is substantial for the Japanese shipping industry. Since the late 1990s, successive Japanese governments have actively responded to a number of maritime security threats. A rise in maritime piracy in Southeast Asia encourage the Obuchi Keizō administration (1998-2000) to begin implementing a broad anti-piracy strategy that focused on building maritime policing capabilities, establishing institutions to monitor and analyse maritime security issues, and amending domestic and international law.\textsuperscript{178} Subsequent Japanese prime ministers developed this anti-piracy approach into a model which the Asō Tarō administration (2008-2009) reproduced to confront the growing number of piratical incidents off the Somali coast, including the passage of an Anti-Piracy Law in March 2009.
Japan’s entrepreneurship in responding to piracy has had significant repercussions in the domain of maritime security.

In order to confront maritime security challenges, Japanese governments have repeatedly turned to the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), not least because of the legacy of Japan’s imperialist expansionism and the anti-militarist norm that evolved in the wake of defeat in the Second World War. The reliance upon the JCG stems in part from the responses of both the Obuchi and Koizumi Junichirō (2001-2006) administrations to incursions into Japanese waters by North Korean ‘suspicious ships’ in March 1999 and December 2001, respectively. Whereas in the 1999 case, the Obuchi administration ordered the Maritime Self-Defence Forces (MSDF) to take maritime security action and chase the suspicious ships out of Japanese maritime territory, and in the latter case, the JCG pursued a North Korean ‘suspicious ship’ into China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) where the ‘suspicious ship’ sank under mysterious circumstances. The 2001 case established a dual strategy in Japan’s foreign maritime security policy whereby the JCG would confront non-traditional security threats, whereas the MSDF would defend Japanese territorial challenges, as well as support US-led missions in the ‘war on terror’ in an auxiliary. Even in the defence of Japan’s sovereign territory, the deployment of the JCG to police disputed territories, such as the Daioyu/Senkaku Islands, and to defend against incursions by North Korean suspicious ships are examples of the Japanese government’s preference to rely on a law enforcement organisation rather than a military one at sea.

3.7 Summary

The analysis in Chapter 3 has sought to provide a clearer backdrop to the Philippine case study analysis of defence and development to be undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. The focal concepts of this study – defence industry, internal security (counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency), and non-traditional security – were defined and examined in this chapter. In bite size pieces, Chapter 3 also looked into what characterises defence industry, and how and where manufacturing countries fit in this characterisation. This chapter also discussed the importance of RMA and how developments in defence technology correspond with how militaries around the world engage. Furthermore, counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency initiatives have also been identified. Likewise, how the
increasing role of the military in non-traditional issues, such as disaster response and transnational crime, affects its image has also been examined. To make the concepts more palatable, China’s defence industry was described, Singapore’s fight against terrorism was discussed, and how Japan engages its defence sector to confront non-traditional challenges was also examined. For this, the domains defence industry, internal security, and non-traditional security remain strong areas for which the defence sector of the Philippines can learn from and enhance its strategic and operation capabilities. To begin, the next chapter will provide an in-depth analysis of Philippine security policies and zoom in on the three areas that this study wants to evaluate.
References and Notes

7 See US military spending falls, increases in eastern Europe, Middle East, Africa and Asia [press release]. SIPRI, 13 April 2015.
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Chapter 4
Traditional and Non-Traditional Security in the
Context of the Philippines

4.1 Defining Security

The purpose of Chapter 4 will be to examine how the role of the military has evolved by focusing on traditional security whilst incorporating non-traditional issues into the system of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the policies of different Philippine presidents starting from Ramon Magsaysay. Magsaysay’s administration is crucial to the discussion because apart from being in the highest position during the Cold War, he was once the Secretary of National Defence few years after World War II ended, during which time the security landscape was slowly shifting. This sets the context for the subsequent country case study of the Philippines in Chapter 4, in terms of its defence and development process, and evaluation of the implementation of policies in relation to the defence industry, counterterrorism/counter-insurgency, natural disasters, and combating transnational crime (Chapter 5).

The national security environment of the Philippines has undergone dramatic changes especially post World War II that made a huge impact on the country’s local and foreign policies. Since 1946, the external security of the Philippines has been the responsibility of the United States through the Philippine-American treaty. On the other hand, the Philippine government concentrated on settling internal concerns. However in 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposal to extend the stay of the U.S. military bases in the country. This left the nation-state with the huge task of securing its territorial integrity consisting of 7,107 islands. Exacerbating this challenge is the South China Sea dispute involving neighbouring countries – Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei and China.

Along with the United States, the Philippines has also reinforced its security relations with Japan and Australia, and increased its participation in regional and global institutions like ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the UN. However, whilst issues of sovereignty and maritime security are pressing concerns, it is interesting to note that the security policies
of the country downplay these challenges. In particular, the inability of the AFP to defend
the country against external threats has always been raised. This weakness is mostly
attributed to the insurgency and Moro secessionism that has been ongoing for almost fifty
years, as well as in the high military support dependence on the U.S.\textsuperscript{1} Notably, the old
security policy of the Philippines saw the AFP focusing on internal defence, while reliant on
the western ally for external defence. The inability of the Philippines to protect its territorial
waters also limits the country’s ability to diplomatically manoeuvre because of insufficient
influence in negotiations.\textsuperscript{2} Aside from the weight acted upon by military capability in
diplomacy, Pangilinan (2008) also values military defence as a deterrent against threats, and
as ‘insurance’ should diplomacy and deterrence disappoint.\textsuperscript{3}

The influence of the U.S. in the Philippines security policy is further observed in the issue of
counterterrorism, when the latter joined the Global War on Terror campaign. However, the
terrorism issue in the Philippines, although showing remnants of foreign influence is largely
an internal security situation, associated, to some extent, with the government’s inability to
provide quality basic services. Furthermore, the recognition of additional security challenges
has balanced the outlook to pay close attention to other equally pressing concerns such as
climate change and other environmental issues, maritime security, and transnational crimes.
The presence of these issues signal the rise of developing countries with their sets of
concerns, and new actors such as civil society and non-government organisations; and how
both have affected the norm-setting agenda of international affairs. This brings to the fore
some questions this chapter will address: What is ‘security’ to the Philippines as well as to
the Filipino people? Who is supposed to provide security? What are the policies that must
be undertaken to address these security concerns? These are some of the questions this
chapter will address.

4.2 Birth of the Philippine Armed Forces

Historically, the responsibility of ensuring the safety of Philippine sovereignty and its people
has been delegated constitutionally to a fairly small regular military force known as the AFP.
Up until 1990, AFP was comprised of four service branches namely the army, air force, navy
and constabulary. The Philippine Army (PA), Philippine Air Force (PAF), and the Philippine
Navy (PN) are entrusted the duty to protect national land, air and sea, respectively. The
responsibility of implementing law and order for rear-area defence during emergencies fell on the hands of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). In 1901, the United States established the PC, followed by the formation of the Philippine Army in 1935. In 1991, the PC was abolished and replaced by the Philippine National Police (PNP). As support to the AFP, the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical units (CAFGU), an irregular auxiliary force whose members are from the local communities, are activated to support area defence.

Granting that a likeness of a citizen’s armed force existed during the country’s struggle for independence from Spain, the military of the Philippines can map out its beginning to the pre-colonial period. Scholars of military studies observe that armed and organised Filipino fighters played an active role in combating against Japanese and American occupation forces. Interestingly, the present-day Philippine armed force was modelled after the military of the United States and was officially established by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 1 of 1935. Consequently, the Philippine Army was formally created as the first component of the Armed Forces under the National Defence Act. The 1935 Constitution named the President as the armed forces’ Commander-in-Chief, laying the foundation for the military’s development into a key element of presidential politics in the Philippines. Whilst a civilian defence secretary was tasked with day-to-day oversight of the army, the president was given wide-ranging powers over appointments and policies within the armed forces. To balance the president’s authority over the AFP, the legislature was granted overseeing roles through its mandate to confirm the appointments and promotions of military personnel, as well as its control over the defence budget and legal investigations in cases of wrongdoing in the AFP.

However, the United States did not just refrain itself from influencing the structure of the AFP. American colonialism also shaped the civilian political institutions responsible for the management and supervision of the Philippine military by also determining its roles and functions. Unlike neighbouring Indonesia and Myanmar, the Philippine military did not struggle independence violently from its American colonizers. In 1946, the U.S. handed over authority to a civilian Philippine government in an orderly and largely amicable manner. This meant that the AFP lacked the narrative of a heroic independence strain upon which it could base demands for political hegemony. In its place, influential and land-owning civilians became the dominant political class, whilst the AFP continued to display the characteristics of a colonial army. Since the protection of Philippine external defence fell on the U.S.’ shoulders, the AFP was entrusted to focused on internal defence, which
contributed, largely, to its size, training, equipment and supplies. The term ‘internal security’ became an encompassing expression of all threats targeted to the government and its citizens. Originating from a postcolonial standpoint, Hedman (2001) backed this by concluding that, “neither national interests of security nor the political dynamics of reconstruction” dictated the organisation of the Philippine forces.

4.3 The Evolving Role of the Military

A persistent question surrounding countries in Asia involves the role of the armed forces in civil governance. In some countries, the military plays a stabilising role allowing for peaceful transitions between political leaderships, whilst others observe a very thin line dividing civilian and military affairs. In the Philippines, the ‘interventionist’ tendency of the AFP developed as a consequence of many factors as discussed above. Prolonged exposure to social ills and the realisation that much leaves to be desired in governance politicised the young AFP officers. Moreover, the military played a key role in combating the twin armed conflicts that grew following regime change in 1972, namely the communist insurgency of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), its armed wing – the New People’s Army (NPA) – and the National Democratic Front (NDF) on the one hand, and the separatist movement led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) on the other. The use of coercion in governance was palpable in these conflicts and would sustain the military’s political role beyond 1986. Longstanding exposure to domestic conflict where national development is a component of the overall antidote would contribute to the military’s politicisation and the development of an ‘interventionist’ tendency among its officers. The next sections will show how the role of role of the military evolved from President Ramon Magsaysay to the administration of President Benigno Aquino; and how these affected the Philippine security policies.

4.3.1 The Huk Rebellion and Ramon Magsaysay

The internal direction of the AFP was first established with the rise of the Hukbalahap (or the Huks) insurgency, which launched serious campaigns against the government from 1946 to 1954. The Huk guerrilla fighters and the government forces were once allies against the
Japanese, but rebelled because they were kept out of the post-war political order. Utilising a two-pronged approach to fight the insurgency, then Defence Secretary Ramon Magsaysay directed the AFP to “engage the Hucks militarily in a more organised and efficient way, and to show them that the government had their interests in mind and that the military could be trusted to protect and take care of them”. The second strategy was materialised in the form of socio-economic activities where the AFP went on medical missions, distributed relief goods to those affected by the crossfire, built temporary roads and bridges, constructed makeshift schoolhouses, and drilled water wells in villages declared Huks-free.

Magsaysay’s successes in overcoming the Huk rebellion made him so popular that he won the presidency in 1953. Under his leadership, the Philippines was domestically stable and internationally seen as a model for young democracy and developing economy. In the 1960s rose a political maverick Ferdinand Marcos, who ran the country from 1965 to 1986. Democratically elected at first, Marcos turned into a classic third-world dictator by the 1970s and used the military as a strategic partner to stabilize his regime.

4.3.2 Marcos and Martial Law (1965 – 1986)

During the administration of President Marcos, the rise of developmental roles associated with counter-insurgency was established. The relentless internal conflicts from two fronts – communist insurgency and Moro secessionism – contributed to the civilian government becoming heavily on the security afforded by the military. When Marcos declared Martial Law in 21 September 1972, he called the AFP his ‘partner in national development’. Martial law cemented the breakdown of the government institutions, namely the executive, legislature, and judiciary. As ‘partners of development,’ military roles were expanded to include non-military functions, the integration of the police and military into one government organisation, and clampdown on civil liberties, such as elections and freedom of expression. Consequently, this resulted to an intensified sense of political awareness within the AFP as the chief implementers of power over a highly personalised dictatorial regime.

Given that the military was now Marcos’ most important piece of state machinery, it was crucial for him to keep the armed forces under his control. From 1973 to 1975, the AFP saw a 700 per cent increase in its budget where Php3.5 billion (approximately US$75.6 million)
was added. This was the highest defence budget for any state within the Southeast Asian region at that time. Accordingly, several thousands were recruited into the AFP ranks, boosting the number of soldiers from 70,000 in 1973 to 275,000 in 1975. Marcos’ employment of Huntington’s ‘subjective civilian control’ repeatedly violated the chain of command by keeping loyal generals beyond the retirement age and favouring his military associates for promotion over more deserving officers. Likewise, military officers loyal to the dictator were appointed to key civilian posts in some government agencies.

Clearly such actions had growing implications on the professionalism of the military, leading to the formation of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) by some disgruntled junior officers of the AFP. Soon enough, a plot to oust Marcos was laid using as backdrop the public demonstrations against the purported electoral fraud following the February 1986 snap presidential elections. With the blessing of then Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, who also aspired for reform, RAM disobeyed the AFP chain of command and rallied with other anti-Marcos groups. Beleaguered by mass protests and deserted by key generals, Marcos had no choice but to escape in 1986 and relinquish power to his archenemy, Ninoy’s wife, Corazon Aquino. Whilst Marcos retired in Hawaii, he left the Philippines with weakened democratic institutions, politicised military and unresolved insurgencies.

4.3.3 Corazon Aquino (1986-1992): Return of Democracy

The reinstatement of democracy after the 1986 People Power Revolt had a huge impression on the Philippine armed forces. Given its critical role in preserving the Marcos regime and in the political transition, it was vital that democratic civilian control be established and the role of the military be defined clearly. It took the whole of the Aquino administration to rebuild Philippine civil-military relations to their pre-martial law state. Given the tremendous entanglement of the AFP with the Marcos dictatorship, it was imperative to clarify the roles of the military and to impose democratically legitimated civilian control. The adoption of the 1987 Constitution restated civilian authority over the military, including legislative power over defence budget and military appointments and promotions. The Philippine Constabulary was also abolished and saw the separation of the police and military, where after some time, the PNP has to assume from the AFP the primary role of preserving internal security affairs, so the latter can concentrate on external defence. But the seriousness of the
insurgency and secessionist problem demanded the continuing counter-insurgency role of the AFP\textsuperscript{32} and prevented the immediate transfer of key functions from the military to the police.\textsuperscript{33}

In the presence of political forces with diverse backgrounds, democratic institutions could be both unstable and accommodating even if interests were potentially unsound.\textsuperscript{34} In this context, the military became an important stakeholder in Cory Aquino’s administration, where the government agreed to the demands of higher pay, removal of cabinet officials who are deemed left-leaning or hostile to the armed forces, holding back on the trial of military officers and personnel suspected of violating human rights, and the employment of a more military method of suppressing internal conflicts.\textsuperscript{35}

However, as the restoration of democracy was accelerated by a military coup, the Philippines also became susceptible to military adventurism. The Aquino administration was challenged by seven coup attempts from politicised and discontented officers, some of whom had led coup attempt against Marcos that resulted to the 1986 People Power Revolution.\textsuperscript{36} However, these coup plots were unsuccessful due to the lack of popular support from senior military officials, who remain loyal to the civilian government, and the latent U.S. support to the regime.\textsuperscript{37} Although survey polls bared widespread dissatisfaction with economic and political conditions under the Aquino government, this did not translate into public support for political intervention by the military.\textsuperscript{38} Hence, the coup attempts were unsuccessfully due to the strong opposition by civil society. Moreover, the senior command remained loyal to the incumbent government and the US continued to support Aquino.\textsuperscript{39} But the seriousness of the last coup attempt in December 1989, where the soldier rebels were able to seize several military facilities, prompted the government to create a fact-finding body to investigate its causes and provide recommendations to avoid a repeat of the incidents.\textsuperscript{40}

The Davide Commission, named after its chairman Hilario Davide, conducted a rigorous probe of the issues surrounding the coup plot and also studied the armed forces as a political institution. Containing crucial findings and recommendations, the final report of the Commission exposed the persistent problems within the military institutions, which include inadequate pay and benefits for its soldiers, lack of logistical support and services to deployed personnel, favouritism in promotions, and the rampant corruption in the military and government.\textsuperscript{41} The investigation did not only stressed the value of security reform, it also
highlighted the need for the civilian government to get its act together, fulfil the promises of democratisation and people empowerment, and to work for genuine national development.  

Other reforms include the establishment of the Office of Ethical Standards and Public Accountability (OESPA), which was given exclusive jurisdiction over active AFP members implicated in graft and corruption cases. In addition, a Code of Ethics was adopted to provide clearer guidelines for AFP personnel on matters concerning civil-military relations. Yet, the effectiveness of the code concerned not so much on the reluctance of the armed forces to be subjected to civilian power as it was the lack of credibility and effectivity of the authorities to implement its function. The appointment of retired military officers to strategic government post was rampant, even after martial law, and this displayed the weakness in the bureaucracy and governance. In her book, Gloria (2003) concluded that the appointment of retired generals to strategic government positions could be accredited to the soldier’s socialisation and the nature of regime. The expansion of the role of the military to include community and outreach as a counter-insurgency approach permitted soldiers to take on civilian functions, which prepared them for subsequent bureaucratic appointment, a sign that the country’s civilian government failed to deliver the basic services in conflict and post-conflict areas. Gloria also discussed that the regimes following the 1986 People Power Revolt also acknowledged, and/or perhaps “encouraged the influence and involvement of the armed forces in managing the affairs of the country.”

4.3.4 Fidel V. Ramos (1992-1998)

Subsequent administrations sustained the process of reforming the AFP that started during the presidency of Aquino. The general policy of the Ramos administration, however, was centred on reconciling with the adversarial groups – communist party, Moro secessionists, and even military rebels – through peace negotiations. In 1996, a peace agreement was forged between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) that established autonomy in provinces and cities that voted to be part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Being an ex-military himself, Ramos had the advantage of dealing with a military, granting rebel soldiers an unconditional amnesty, which halted military adventurism temporarily. Many of those who joined the coups against the Aquino government returned to the AFP and were awarded with loyal and distinguished service to the
state under Ramos.\textsuperscript{50} This might have put coup attempts at a standstill, thus creating an environment favourable to economic growth, but some maintain that the rendering of unconditional amnesty weakened military discipline and undermined democratic civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{51}

During this period, for example, “the rise in criminal activities particularly kidnapping and drug-related crimes, were attributed to the involvement of military and police personnel with various criminal syndicates in the country.”\textsuperscript{52} At the same time, this administration saw the appointment of dozens of retired military officers in a wide variety of civilian positions, including “many strategic and therefore powerful positions in such agencies as the Department of Defence, National Security Council, Department of Interior and Local Government, Department of Transportation and Communication, Department of Public Works and Highways, and many ambassadorial posts.”\textsuperscript{53} A major power broker under Ramos, for example, retired brigadier general Jose Almonte, served as head of both the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Intelligence Coordinating Authority (NICA).\textsuperscript{54} Moreover, even renegade RAM officers, like Gringo Honasan, ran for public office with some notable successes. In a similar vein, the government’s accord with the MNLF in 1996 has seen its long-time leader Nur Misuari elected (without opposition and with backing from the Lakas-NUCD Party) as governor of the Autonomous Region Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Rather than signalling a new militarist trend in Philippine politics, however, this pronounced development ended with Ramos, who significantly, refrained from extending to his own defence secretary and former chief of staff, General Renato de Villa, the much-coveted presidential endorsement – and associated release of executive resources – which, under Aquino, had helped launch his own bid for Malacañang in 1992.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{4.3.5  Joseph Ejercito Estrada (1998-2001)}

Ramos’ successor to the presidency, Joseph “Erap” Estrada, worked to establish his own network of supporters in the PNP and the AFP, favouring officers marginalised in the previous post-martial law administrations with plum posts. In this regard, Estrada had forged a close alliance with Senators Enrile and Honasan, whose network of “mistahs” (cavaliers/classmates) from the Philippine Military Academy’s class of 1971, had been sidelined under both Aquino and Ramos. Notably, Estrada appointed Chief of Police Panfilo
Lacson as the director of the PNP, thus confirming a pattern of control by civilian politicians over coercive apparatuses of the state. Lacson, after all, had served as Estrada’s right-hand man in the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) in the early 1990s and is known to be a trusted lieutenant of the president. Under Lacson, “parallel promotion of three classmates – Ruben Cabagnot, Tiburcio Fusilero, and Reynaldo Acop – to key PNP regional commands made them the most powerful cohort in the police”.  

However, Estrada’s civilian political enemies proved equally astute in their cultivation of clients within the Philippine military and police. Thus, when Estrada found himself increasingly besieged by popular protests in Manila and by the televised impeachment hearings in the House of Representatives in December 2000, the possibility of a military clampdown against these challenges to his presidency remained beyond reach. Instead, with the prosecution walking out in protest from the Senate trial, the defection of civilian political allies from Estrada culminated with most of his cabinet resigning and joining street parliamentarians for a “People Power” showdown. In the event, Estrada’s close allies in the military eventually abandoned their president and commander-in-chief in the face of persistent pressures from influential businessman, politicians, and retired officers, and amidst signs of rapidly eroding support from the president among active AFP and PNP officers.  

Thus, the ouster of Estrada from the presidential palace on 20 January 2001, and the simultaneous swearing in of his vice president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, to the highest political office of the land, saw an immediate changing of the guard in the military and police establishments. First of all, AFP chief of staff Angelo Reyes, whose tenure had been extended by Estrada into the year 2002, had confirmed his timely resignation from the armed forces upon reaching official retirement age in March 2001. Moreover, PNP director Panfilo Lacson promptly turned in his “courtesy” resignation and has been replaced by Leandro Mendoza as acting national police chief. Finally, with all eyes focused on the May 2001 legislative and local elections, the most important political battles ahead involve candidates associated with the new Macapagal Arroyo and old Estrada administrations, rather than the “word wars” and “coup talks” within military ranks.  

As suggested by the following retrospective of the aborted Estrada administration, civilian political considerations have clearly continued to shape the broad contours of national security and law enforcement policies from the 1990s up to the early years of the new
century. The much-touted modernisation programme to upgrade the armed forces’ operational capabilities after the closure of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines in 1992, for example, remained in virtual limbo under the tenure of Defence Secretary Orly Mercado. Despite legislation passed under the Ramos administration to implement such modernisation over a fifteen-year period, Estrada declared a one-year moratorium on government funding of this programme during his first month in office in 1998, citing more pressing problems because of the Asian financial crisis and the Philippine budget deficit. Not until the following April 1999 did Manila earmark an initial $150 million toward this modernisation programme – “to supplement the 1999 defence budget, which had effectively been frozen at 1998 levels in US-dollar terms”.59 Estrada waited until July 1999 before he “pledged to allot Php10 billion (approximately US$216 million) for the acquisition of military hardware and weaponry to speed up the modernisation of the poorly equipped Armed Forces,” with specific reference to the Philippine Air Force as the “initial beneficiary of the military upgrade.”60 Although incidents in the South China Sea have provided an important backdrop to such pledges,61 the modest gains promised to the prioritised air force (still the smallest of the three services) pale against the political manoeuvring of Estrada and his supporters to introduce a new chapter in Philippine-U.S. “special relations” by way of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), ratified by the Senate in Manila on 27 May 1999.62 The possibilities for politically and otherwise useful VFA spinoffs are presumably many – ranging from the investment in heavy infrastructure associated with developing harbour and airport facilities to the boost to local economies due to the influx of dollar-salaried servicemen and women on rest and recreation.63

Meanwhile, the AFP had been relegated to a comparatively circumscribed domestic role, to fight the insurgents and secessionist armed groups in the hinterlands. Whereas the National Democratic Front (NDF) declared an end to the peace talks with the Philippine government in 1999 and added that “it expected fighting in the country to pick,”64 only pockets of NPA guerrillas remained in the mountains of Bicol, the Cordilleras, and in the rural hinterlands of “the Visayas island of Samar and the three southwestern provinces of Mindanao”.65 As the integration of former MNLF guerrillas in the armed forces proceeded apace, moreover, other armed Muslim groups have been confined to local pockets of influence, whether the small Abu Sayyaf, associated with terrorist tactics in Sulu and Basilan, or the much larger Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), anchored in the backwater Mindanao provinces of Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat. In March 2000, Estrada launched an
“all-out” war against the Abu Sayyaf and the MILF, capturing about 40 of the latter’s camps, including its main base, Camp Abubakar. Within a month of resuming the presidency in January 2001, however his successor, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, ordered the suspension of military operations against the MILF so as to pave way for a new round of peace talks.66

Finally, in the wake of the end of the Cold War and after the Senate vote blocking renewal of the Military Bases Agreement with the U.S. in 1991, the AFP had, for the first time, assumed responsibility for external defence. Although the Mutual Defence Treaty of 1951 survived these far-reaching changes in Philippine-U.S. security relations, this agreement remains concerned with threats to either party stemming from “external armed attack in the Pacific” – thus precluding overt U.S. assistance in the Mindanao conflict and the Spratly Islands dispute.

4.3.6 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010)

In 2001, a non-violent revolt inducted Arroyo as President after the aborted impeachment proceedings against Estrada. Like in the 1986 People Power Revolt or EDSA I, the role played by the military was arguably crucial and resulted in some serious consequences for civil-military relations in the Philippines. In July 2003, a group of junior officers led a mutiny against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo protesting against widespread corruption in the AFP. Calling themselves the Magdalo group, the plotters took over the Oakwood Hotel in Makati City and declared their withdrawal of support from the president and commander-in-chief claiming that they have exhausted all possible channels within the military institution to air their grievances and the mutiny was their last resort to be listened to.67 The mutiny failed but it revealed that some within the military system continue to harbour discontentment with civilian authorities.

Largely due to the unwavering loyalty of military generals and the rest of the members of the armed forces, the Arroyo administration survived several more coup attempts.68 After the Oakwood Mutiny, the Feliciano Fact-Finding Commission was created to investigate the root causes and the issues behind it. Apart from the prevalent corruption within the AFP, the Commission reported the poor situation of soldiers in combat and widespread favouritism and politicisation of the military.69 The coup plot also highlighted the failure of the past
administrations to implement the recommendations proposed in the Davide Fact-Finding Commission report (see Section 4.3.3). The Feliciano Commission report endorsed to the government that legitimate grievances of the military must be given utmost attention, such as the improvement of the welfare of combat and non-combat personnel and to professionalise the military, in order to prevent future military adventurism. Soon after, President Arroyo embarked on some changes within the military system. Nevertheless, Hernandez argued that the failed mutiny showed that civil-military relations in the Philippines remained basically the same as that existing prior to 1986, which has an expanded military role including national development functions along with a weak civilian oversight institutions and poor socio-economic conditions.

The involvement in internal conflicts is considered by the Philippine military force as a deviation from its main duty of developing its conventional military capabilities. From the standpoint of the AFP leadership, giving more importance to internal security problems diverts AFP’s endeavours toward the realisation of a self-reliant defence through pursuing modernisation projects.” Dissenters within the AFP warned that the military’s long-drawn-out involvement in internal security prevents it from acquiring the air and maritime capabilities for a credible deterrent posture in the South China Sea. They added that the AFP might forget its training for territorial defence whilst its hardware (depreciated because of its constant use in counter-insurgency operations) might not perform optimally in conventional warfare. One defence analyst notes succinctly: “Whilst the AFP have made headway in reducing the communist and secessionist forces… these (successes) were achieved at the expense of an exponentially deteriorating capability to carry out even the most basic of territorial defence operations.” In addition, utilizing material continuously under “adverse combat conditions” causes excessive wear and tear on them, which effectively reduces their effectiveness and reliability. For instance, the Philippine Navy’s (PN) deployment of its patrol crafts in the counter-insurgency/counterterrorism operations in the southern Philippines reduces patrol visibility in other critical areas of the country. Hence, the incidence of intrusion of foreign vessels into the country’s territorial waters has increased.

Concerning the weak military capabilities of the AFP, the 2007 assessment report notes that the “PN lacks the assets for conduct of maritime patrols over territorial waters, since it does not have any anti-air capability and is incapable of conducting antisubmarine and mine
warfare operations.” It also outlines the Philippine Air Forces’ (PAF) inadequate air defence, surveillance, and air-lift and ground-attack capabilities. Clearly, it concludes that: “basic capabilities that enable the AFP to move, shoot and communicate are still wanting.” In 2010, a group of ranking AFP officers admitted that the Philippine military’s aging equipment, limitations in combat readiness, logistic support, and inter-service operability hindered its potential for joint operations to combat external or traditional threats. Summing up, the report pessimistically and candidly states that the overall capability of the AFP to defend its territory remains inadequate.

In 2007, the AFP initiated a reform programme that aims to fundamentally transform the armed services so it can effectively respond to internal and external security challenges. It received a further boost from the DND memorandum on acquisition of defence material under the Capability Upgrade Programme (CUP) and the realignment of the purchasing process with that of the AFP’s mission. The urgent goal of the programme is to restore at least 70 per cent of the Philippine military’s capabilities for internal security affairs; and its long-term goal is to develop the Philippines’ territorial defence.

4.3.7 Benigno Simeon Aquino III (2010 - 2016): From Internal Security to Territorial Defence

Upon assuming office in 2010, President Benigno Aquino III announced his intention to modernise the AFP, to buttress the country’s territorial defence, and to check China’s aggressive assertion of its sovereignty over the South China Sea. During the welcoming ceremony for the incoming AFP Chief of Staff, General Ricardo David, President Aquino called on the military to defend democracy and be at the frontline of government reform. Aquino asked his administration to revive and support the modernisation of the AFP, as well as ordered Defence Secretary Voltaire Gazmin to ensure that the modernisation programme becomes a means to intensify the military capabilities of the country. Furthermore, at his first state-of-the-nation address, Aquino proposed to rent out the Navy’s unused military reservations to private firms in order to raise US$100 million for the procurement of four new patrol vessels as part of the modernisation programme.
Soon after, a joint DND-AFP task force formulated the AFP “Long-Term Capability Development Plan,” which appeals for the immediate shift of the policy from internal defence to external defence. The Long-Term Capability Development Programme of the Aquino administration provides a modest deterrent capability for territorial/maritime defence. It allots Php421 billion (an estimated US$8.5 billion) for a long-term capability upgrade with the bigger share of the defence budget allocated to the PAF and PN instead of the Philippine Army as per usual practice. The Air Force is expecting to acquire multi-role and lead-in fighter planes, surface attack aircraft, and long-range reconnaissance planes, while the Navy intends to procure multi-role attack vessels, offshore patrol craft, and surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, as well as upgrade its materiel for joint maritime surveillance, defence and operations in the South China Sea. In tangible terms, the long-term capability plan has a blueprint of a three-year transition period “from full mission-capable ISO (internal security operation) to territorial defence capabilities.”

In the same vein, the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP), released in January 2011, also stressed the importance of shifting the AFP direction from internal defence to external defence. While the IPSP recognises AFP’s capability to adequately perform its constitutionally mandated duty, the plan adheres to the long-term capability upgrade of developing the necessary capabilities within the three-year period. In the long run, the Philippine government wants to establish a modest but “comprehensive border protection programme” (including the country’s exclusive economic zone) that is anchored on the surveillance, deterrence, and border patrol capabilities of the PAF, the PN, and the Philippine Coast Guard.

However, the lack of financial support from the House of Representatives prevented the immediate implementation of the plan. Nevertheless, the 2 March 2011 incident between a Philippine survey ship and two Chinese patrol boats at Reed Bank prompted the Aquino administration to redirect the country’s security focus. The incident highlights the sensitivity of the territorial dispute in Philippine-China bilateral relations, and how it obscures the delicate balance of power in the areas contested, claimed in whole or part by the Philippines, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. The incident also triggered a strong clamour from the military and other government institutions for the allocation of resources to the development of AFP’s territorial defence capabilities. When all diplomatic efforts to resolve the territorial row with China reached an impasse, the Philippines announced it would
upgrade the AFP’s outposts on the Spratly Islands; boost its military presence on the western island of Palawan near the disputed South China Sea; and allocate Php8 billion (approximately US$186 million) to acquire patrol boats and aircraft to safeguard its maritime boundaries.95 China’s heavy-handed behaviour in the South China Sea, as well as its uncompromising diplomatic posturing, further convinced the new administration of shifting AFP’s focus from internal security to territorial/maritime defence.

4.4 The Armed Forces of the Philippines as Development Providers

When Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the presidency in 2001, the military launched a ‘new’ counter-insurgency programme called Bantay Laya (Freedom Watch). This whole-of-government approach increased the involvement of civilian agencies and other security institutions such as the police.96 The military was put in-charge of clearing and holding a community that was infiltrated by insurgents whilst national and local civilian agencies were tasked with proving the means to develop the area. However, in reality, the military have often found themselves performing task related to the development phase of the campaign. Two factors have influenced this outcome: First, the aim of the projects was to foster goodwill with the populace in order to expedite combat and intelligence operations.97 This led to the military taking initiative, directly implementing the projects themselves – even though they were supposed to only assist and provide support. Second, efficient service delivery (health, education, etc.) has always been a challenge in the far-flung areas of the country where governance failures are common.98 In such areas, the military usually come to represent the face of the government; the slow response and apathy of the civilian government often compel the military to fulfil the socioeconomic responsibilities of other government agencies.

It is also worthwhile to examine the ramifications of civil-military relations at the local level. The relationship between local chief executive and military commanders, and their perceptions of each other on a wide range of issues (extent of communist threat, the loyalty of local leaders, the performance of the local government, etc.) affect the success of local counter-insurgency operations.99 These factors influence whether they would implement such projects with the assistance of civilian stakeholders. A critical coordinating institution is the local peace and order council, mandated by law as the venue where local security issues
are to be discussed and plan to address threats drawn up. However, there has been a lack of due diligence when it comes to activating this mechanism. The military has, in most instances, entered a community suspected of being under the influence of the insurgents without consultation with local authorities, causing enmity between civilian and military authorities. The lack of cooperation by local actors has also led to the unilateral assessment of a community’s needs by the military. This has often resulted in projects that do not meet the needs of the people.

Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this trend. Effective civil-military coordination for local peace and development has occurred in certain parts of the country. In one province, for example, local officials took ownership of the counter-insurgency programme and the division of labour was well-respected. Leadership that engendered cordial relations between stakeholders delivered positive results, with human development dramatically improving within a short period of time.


Even with the emphasis of civil-military relations, the Philippine government has tasked more development tasks to the military in recognition of their efficient implementation of civic action projects. Since 2001, highly decorated retired military officials, who were actively involved in military projects and known for their field combats, have been assigned to key cabinet posts that are usually connected with defence and security. In response to the government’s appreciation of the military’s capacity to undertake development missions whilst remaining engaged in internal security operations, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the AFP have made major institutional adjustments. They have updated AFP doctrines to include civil-military principles as well as allotted resources and training toward the employment of non-traditional tactics such as building of infrastructures and socio-economic activities.

The establishment of the National Development Support Command (NADESCOM) within the AFP in 2007 was part of this. Created as a functional command with a domain of operations spanning the entire archipelago, NADESCOM had been tasked to provide for the ‘development of the capability to participate in the infrastructure projects of the
government.” A large of the NADESCOM was the Army’s Engineering Brigades. The NADESCOM’s objective was to support and assist the efforts of the military as well as the civilian government to improve conditions related to security and development. This would imply that it would not merely play a part in the internal security operations of the military but also the anti-poverty programmes of the civilian government.

It can be noted that the scale of NADESCOM operation was wider compared to previous development support commands: it could conduct development projects in conflict, underdeveloped, and depressed areas. From a legal point of view, this could be interpreted as going above and beyond the support-and-assist responsibility vested to the AFP by existing administrative regulations. This could, however, also be seen as a proactive step, since reducing poverty could help perception of its potential contribution to economic welfare that was not found in any of the national government’s development plans.

The presence of NADESCOM characterised a shift in the military’s thinking, as it highlights the role of the AFP in development. Its officials believed that they are not simply building infrastructure but also improving the people’s well-being. From their operation experiences, soldiers realised that structures built were often not utilised by the people, making counter-insurgency efforts unsustainable as localities ‘cleared’ from insurgency could potentially face security threats again. To confront this challenge, the NADESCOM had engaged on a comprehensive development programme with a package of infrastructure projects and socio-economic activities. Socio-economic initiatives included outreach programmes, skills development, nutrition, sanitation, livelihood training, values education, disaster relief, environmental conservation, development of cooperatives, etc.

NADESCOM development programmes were presented in two forms. First was through the Kalayaan Barangays (Free Communities) Programme that focused on conflict zones. The beneficiaries of this programme were determined by the civilian government based on the assessment of the AFP’s Corps of Engineers. Whilst the DND and the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) oversaw the whole implementation, the information they gathered came from the military commanders assigned to conflict areas. OPAPP is the agency under the executive branch of the government, which takes charge of pursuing peace negotiations with rebel groups. They are also mandated to implement government programmes aimed at reducing conflict and promoting peace around the country.
The second programme was the *Bayanihan sa Barangay* (Cooperation in the Community), which permits the military to embark on development projects in communities anywhere in the country.\textsuperscript{112} National and local governments could enter contracts with NADESCOM for the delivery of services or the implementation of the government’s poverty reduction programmes.\textsuperscript{113} Private companies, foundations, non-government organisations, and even foreign donors could commission the NADESCOM to implement projects related to infrastructure, community outreach, livelihood, para-education, etc.\textsuperscript{114}

NADESCOM programmes were a break from the traditional role of defence. The critical difference is in the balance of interaction between the military’s and the civilian institutions. Previously, the AFP had been engaged in development work with minimal civilian input or contribution. Then, there was a shift to a clear demarcation of responsibilities between the two, with the military concentrating on combat operations. The NADESCOM programmes rested between those two thrusts. Although it engaged in development functions, there was a recognition that other government agencies have to be involved and a certain degree of civilian oversight provided. The military saw itself as simply providing assistance to these efforts and not leading them. Despite its positive feedback, the NADESCOM was short-lived. In 2012, the programme was deactivated citing the need to restructure the FP under the Defence Planning Guidance 2013 to 2018.\textsuperscript{115} Upon its conclusion, NADESCOM was able to finish 1,800 projects including health centres, schools and farm to market roads.\textsuperscript{116} OPAPP is expected then to handle the community development functions.

4.5 Summary

In the Philippine history, two momentous events are marked by noteworthy involvement of the military. The 1986 People Power Revolt or EDSA I, which eventually put an end to Martial Law, and the EDSA II Revolution that ousted President Estrada from power. In EDSA I, military leaders Defence Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile and Philippine Constabulary Chief General Fidel Ramos openly defied Marcos to join the mass protests, while in EDSA II, Defence Secretary Orlando Mercado and AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes withdrew their support from Estrada. Alagappa argues that in most development nations, the role of the
military includes non-traditional functions because it is assigned with issues related to politics, social, and economics, rather than just concentrating on traditional roles.\textsuperscript{117}

This chapter has examined the different defence and development policies initiated by the different post-World War II Philippine presidents starting from Ramon Magsaysay. It highlighted the tradition and non-traditional functions of the AFP through its mandate to protect the Philippine state, its people and territories, and participate in nation-building through development initiatives.\textsuperscript{118} From this mandate, it is clear that the AFP is both an implementer and participant of defence and development policies. Whilst the National Defence Act of 1935 provides the external defence orientation of the AFP, it has also been directed to provide assistance in the maintenance of law and order and has consequently been involved in development and nation-building.\textsuperscript{119}

Does the Armed Forces of the Philippines perform new roles? The discussion in this chapter says no. The AFP has undertaken non-traditional military roles such as law enforcement activities and search and rescue operations along with its traditional duty of protecting the state’s territories since it was established. The AFP has been assisting the local government and other government agencies in disaster response, environmental awareness and protection, and anti-transnational crime activities. Furthermore, the AFP also participates in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in countries such as East Timor and Haiti. This chapter also cited the example of NADESCOM, a development command of the AFP, tasked to support civic action projects.

In recent years, the education and training programmes and equipment acquisitions of AFP have been reviewed and upgraded to be more oriented toward the building of capabilities so its personnel can respond to both traditional and non-traditional security concerns. The AFP Modernisation Programme of 1995 and 2010 is crafted to bring the AFP to the same level of development as its neighbouring countries. This programme along with the National Defence Security Plan 2011-2016 and the Internal Peace and Security Plan of 2010 will be the subject in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
From Policy to Practice: Delivering the Philippines’ Defence-Development Paradigm

5.1 Introduction

As the main security institution of a country, militaries around the world have performed duties outside of their defence functions. Their tasks have expanded from maintaining peace and order to including nation-building, economic development, the provision of disaster relief, and engaging in efforts to conserve natural resources. Looking at these extra functions, the Philippines armed forces are no different in performing non-traditional roles. For years, the country has borne the effects of lingering internal conflicts (e.g. insurgency, political instability and underdevelopment), and as a result, has sought to reinforce the linkage between development and security, a connection evident long before scholars and policymakers paid attention to the existence of a ‘security-development nexus’. Situated in the western part of the Pacific Ocean, the Philippines is no stranger to natural disasters. The country lies in what is called “the ring of fire” and is visited on average by 19 to 20 typhoons every year. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is one of the key institutions, which has been at the forefront of the campaign in tackling these domestic challenges. As part of their pursuit to act on this, the AFP has embarked on ‘non-traditional’ missions, often called ‘civic action’, which involves carrying out projects aimed at contributing to the economic development of communities within conflict zones and those affected by disasters.

To a certain extent, the mixture of economic activities with combat operations has, characterised the military’s different campaigns such as counterterrorism and counter-insurgency. Involvement in economic functions has been justified on the grounds that it is critical to ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of those living on the front lines, supporting the military’s role in nation-building. Whilst the primary responsibility of the AFP is the “protection of the people and State” as stipulated in Section 4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the implementation of development projects, such as environmental protection, disaster response and community engagement, is consistent with this mandate. Similarly, in zones of insecurity and violence, the armed forces are semi-equipped with apparatus needed
for logistical capability to build roads, schools, health facilities and other basic infrastructures.

The consequence of relying on the military to carry out development projects has however been a matter of some debate. The scholarly literature on defence and development cautions that the divergence from the external-defence role could strain the military’s professionalism, and weaken its competency in the core role of war fighting. Another concern is that the military’s involvement in these unconventional tasks could increase its political autonomy which could potentially undermine democratic civilian control. Equally important, such engagement might lead to citizens being unable to differentiate between military and civilian-government roles with respect to security and development. In fact, as described in the previous chapter, the AFP has been involved in civil society, most evidently during Martial Law. Although this changed when a democratic system was restored after the 1986 People Power Revolution and the 1987 Constitution eventually put in place, remnants of military involvement in civilian matters still exist until today. A case in point is that out of the 13 individuals appointed as Secretary of the Department of National Defence (DND) post-Marcos era, eight were former generals of the AFP or Philippine National Police (PNP) chiefs. Nevertheless, the role of the armed forces cannot be undermined in the many responsibilities of the national government provided it is within the bounds of the Constitution and policy framework.

Whilst Chapter 3 looks at the security policies promoted by the different Philippine presidents starting from Ramon Magsaysay to the administration of Benigno Aquino, Chapter 4 highlights the three policies endorsed by President Aquino and discusses how these policies are implemented to emphasise the role of the armed forces in nation-building. Chapter 5 argues that the military’s participation in Philippine development programmes can be described by two factors. First, the resolution of domestic political crises through military intervention has provided the armed forces with leverage to (re)engage in non-traditional tasks and security policymaking vis-à-vis civilian institutions without sacrificing their traditional roles. Second, the increasing significance of the comprehensive security concept has provided the military with a framework to validate its continued engagement with development activities. Non-traditional missions can have a positive impact on national security if good governance and effective civilian oversight of security institutions exist. Security sector reforms aimed at promoting military professionalism and norms related to
transparency, accountability, respect for human rights and the rule of law, etc., could address the challenging consequences stemming from the expansion of the military’s functions along the security-development frontier.

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the contribution of the Philippine defence sector to national development, and, in turn, comprehensive security. The succeeding sections discuss how three Philippine policies, identified in Chapter 1 and further explained in Chapter 3, are being implemented to enhance both defence and development. These policies were chosen to represent the conceptual framework because it involves the four comprehensive security concepts of defence industry, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, civil-military relations during natural disasters and anti-trafficking, which this dissertation is analysing. The policies are namely, the AFP Modernisation Act of 1995 and the revised Act of 2010, Internal Peace and Security Plan of 2010, and the National Security Policy 2011-2016.

5.2 From Policy to Practice

With defence and development at its core, the conceptual framework (Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1) illustrates the policy, process and performance exercised by the Philippine security system to protect its citizens from any harm to their well-being, and, indeed, to promote that well-being. Thus, to be explicit, a major overarching aim of the three policies within the conceptual framework is to improve development levels through enhanced civil-military integration. The first such policy is the AFP Modernisation Programme of 1995 or Republic Act 9878 (RA 9878) and its subsequent revision, Republic Act 10349 of 2010, encompass doctrinal approaches to development, education and training, equipment and force structuring designed to bring the Philippine Armed Forces to the same level of development as its neighbouring countries. Since passage of the policy, the Armed Forces have put the modernisation programme at the centre of their initiatives to improve capabilities.

The push to modernise the AFP came in the early 1990s after the United States had withdrawn its military bases in the Philippines when the Senate voted against it. The AFP Modernisation Programme (AFPMP), which was to be implemented through the DND, was approved on 23 February 1995 as a legal and policy framework to “modernise the AFP to a level where it can fully and effectively perform its constitutional mandate of upholding the
southernity and preserving the patrimony of the Republic.” To fulfill this mandate, five principal thrusts were identified, which focused on the development of structure, personnel, and doctrines. The modernisation programme comprised five components namely: (1) capability, material and technology; (2) bases and support system development; (3) human resource development; (4) doctrinal development, and; (5) force restructuring and organisational development. The programme was given a PhP331.62 billion (approximately US$7.51 billion) budget broken down into two sub-programmes: Sub-program 1 has a budget of Php164.55 billion (approximately US$ 3.73 billion) whilst Sub-programme 2 has a budget of Php167 billion (approximately US$ 3.80 billion). This was also distributed in tranches. Php50 billion (approximately US$ 1.13 billion) to implement the first five years of the AFPMP, Php74.2 billion (approximately US$ 1.68 billion) for the second year, and Php37.6 billion (approximately US$ 852 million) on the third year, whilst the remaining five years is Php2.8 billion (approximately US$ 63.5 million). R.A.7898 stipulated parameters to limit the effect of hefty military spending in the country. The first set of parameters is that AFPMP allocation will not hamper the basic economic and social services provided by the government. As such, the DND was required to make the programme sustainable by creating its own trust fund. The AFP Modernisation Act Trust fund was to be sourced from the defence budget; proceeds from the sale, lease or joint development of military bases and reservations; shares from the proceeds of the sale of military camps; proceeds from the Government Arsenal (GA); proceeds from the disposal of excess AFP assets; funds from the budgetary surplus; proceeds from the Malampaya Natural Gas field; and all interest of the trust fund.

The second set of parameters guarantee the economic and technological benefits to the country from AFP acquisitions. The programme intends to be able to decrease foreign exchange outflow, contribute to local job generation, and increase technology transfer to the Philippines. With this, the DND has to ensure that the programme offers Filipino contractors and suppliers an advantage, or foreign contractors and suppliers willing and able to locate a substantial portion of production in the Philippines; incorporates in each contract/agreement provisions for countertrade, in-country manufacture, co-production schemes or other innovative arrangements; and includes in the contract the transfer to the AFP of principal technology involved for the operation and maintenance of the equipment.
The main components of the modernisation programme are the capability, materiel and technology development (CMTD) that covers the purchase of appropriate weapons systems and technology and its upgrade and maintenance. At 89%, CMTD gets the biggest portion of the total AFPMP budget, whilst the rest of the amount is distributed among the following: bases support system development (BSSD), human resource development, doctrine development, and force restructuring and organisational development. In 2007, from the total Php33.5 billion funds (approximately US$ 728.27 million), Php25.96 billion (approximately US$ 545.57 million) went to CMTD.

Unfortunately, the Asian 1997 financial crisis negatively impacted the programme, whereby financial investments in the country were greatly reduced. Funding for modernisation was austerely challenged. In 1998, with the advent of increased Moro separatist activity in Mindanao, the AFP shifted priorities from external defence to internal security, which also shifted the priorities of the modernisation programme to enhance Internal Security Operations (ISO) capabilities. The Revised Re-prioritised Project List (RRPL) was approved in 2004 based on the project lists identified in the years 2001 and 2002 (see Appendix J).

The implementation period of R.A. 7898 expired on December 2010 without any significant progress in terms of modernising AFP capabilities. What was pursued instead was the upgrading of basic capabilities to bring these back to acceptable levels of readiness. However, of the total amount of Php331 billion approved for the fund requirements of the programme, only Php35 billion was used for the capability upgrade programme of the AFP for internal operations. In the July 2011 report released by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5, only 317 projects or 59.36 per cent were completed from the 534 planned projects. Appendix J shows on-going projects under R.A. 7898.

When the term of the R.A. 7898 ended in 2010, President Aquino supervised the passage of the Revised AFP Modernisation Act, known as R.A. 10349, amending the 1995 AFP Modernisation Act and extending the AFP’s modernisation for another 15 years. The aim is to develop the Philippines’ minimum deterrence capability as well as its domain awareness across contested waters within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The AFP Modernisation Act has served as the primary source of funds for procurements to augment the AFP’s capabilities, whilst the annual defence budget has largely been dedicated to
compensation of personnel and maintenance of existing defence hardware. In his first three years in office, President Aquino allocated US$648.44 million to modernising the AFP. In 2013, there was a 17% increase in defence spending, wherein US$1.73 billion was allocated for defence procurement in the period 2013-2017. Not surprising though that the significant increase in defence spending and procurement funds came on the heels of a Philippine-China standoff over the Scarborough Shoal and the Philippines’ subsequent decision to initiate compulsory arbitration vis-à-vis territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

The Philippine economy has shown high GDP growth rates since 2012, averaging over 6 per cent growth, and if there is ever a time for Manila to invest in boosting its military capability, it is now. From $1.24 billion in 2004 to $3.29 billion in 2014, the Philippines made a 180 per cent increase in its defence expenditures (See Figure 5.2). The percentage of growth may appear high, but decades of habitual non-investment mean that the increase hardly scratches the surface. In the late 1980s, the Philippines realized that its armed forces were inferior to its ASEAN neighbours in military equipment; worse, it found itself ill-equipped to contain the threats plaguing internal and external security. Likewise, several domestic political (e.g. corruption) and economic (e.g. Asian financial crisis) challenges have made it challenging to modernise the AFP on a large-scale.

**Figure 5.1: Philippine Military Expenditure in US$ million (1998-2014)**

![Graph showing Philippine military expenditure from 1998 to 2014](source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, 2014.)
In his 2013 State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Aquino restated his desire to upgrade the capabilities of the AFP, but, cautioned it will not be easy due to budgetary constraints. Aquino said, “Building a minimum credible defence posture is not something we can take lightly. Do we follow others who prioritize the possession of a nuclear option at the expense of everything else? I do not think anyone would agree. We will balance our needs. We are committed to meeting the needs of our society, whilst remaining a good and upstanding member of the community of nations.”

With AFP’s very limited annual budget, most of the money goes to the salaries and allowances of its personnel rather than to capability upgrades. When democracy was restored in 1987, the newly adapted Constitution prohibits the Congress and Senate from allocating more funds to defence than for education. Since then, the minimum credible defence is a concept that has become popular in the public debate, but not clearly defined even by military officials. Some in the DND simply associate minimum credible defence with the acquisition of new military equipment and the improvement of military infrastructure as deterrence from external threats. Defence Secretary Voltaire Gazmin sees it as “an effective force presence inside the Philippines and its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with exhibited competence to defend the country and protect its national interests if and when the need arises.” Similarly, DND Chief of Staff Dr Peter Paul Galvez defines it as “a relative level of capability that would make someone think twice.”

Others, such as Brigadier General Aying, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programmes of the AFP, believe strategic direction is a crucial component of this effort.

The second Defence-Development policy observed in this study is the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) or “Bayanihan”, implemented in January 2011, and calls for a multi-stakeholder approach in the pursuit of security and the protection of civil liberties. The IPSP reflects the security thrusts espoused by Aquino, which involves four elements: governance, delivery of basic services, economic reconstruction, and security sector reform. IPSP was crafted to provide strategic guidance for the AFP whilst performing its mandated functions. To assure its success, IPSP was anchored on two strategic approaches: The ‘Whole of Nation Approach’ and the ‘People-Centred Security/Human Security Approach’. The former is the framework that will guide how the AFP implements IPSP. Rather than simply defeating the enemy, ‘winning the peace’ provides the framework for the new IPSP approach. This is a shift from a predominantly militaristic solution to a people-centred strategy based on broad-based consultations and strong partnerships with key stakeholders. The human security concept has several components: economic security, food security, health security,
environmental security personal security, community security, and political security requiring the entire government bureaucracy, private and public sectors, to implement collectively. State security complements human security. IPSP aims to concretise the idea of putting human security at the core of the AFP’s plan and this signifies the intent of placing the people at the centre of its activities.

Contained in the IPSP are four strategic concepts that contribute to the three areas focused in this study. The first concept is for the AFP to Contribute to the Permanent and Peaceful Closure of all Armed Conflict by observing the primacy of the peace process and supporting peace-building initiatives such as reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in conflict-affected areas. The second concept is the Conduct of Focused Military Operations against armed threat groups by employing distinct methodologies to engage the New People’s Army (NPA), the Moro International Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and other threat groups. The third concept is to Support Community-based Peace and Development Efforts, which focuses on securing and bringing peace and development to conflict-affected communities. The AFP shall also contribute in supporting community development activities through the building of basic social infrastructure. The fourth concept is to Carry Out Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the AFP with the objectives to develop capability, professionalise the military ranks, and engage the stakeholders in AFP-initiated activities. These strategic concepts significantly relate to the areas of practice identified in the conceptual framework. The first three concepts tackle the counter-insurgency/counterterrorism efforts and non-traditional security, whilst, the fourth concept engages defence industrialisation. The very domestic nature of this plan underscores the army-centric character of the Philippine armed forces.

The third Defence-Development policy is the National Security Policy. The policy aims to identify strategic priorities to establish the right balance in the “guns or butter” debate for the allocation of scarce resources, and to establish the prioritization between defence and development. Like the IPSP, the National Security Policy (2011-2016) looks at four key elements: governance; delivery of basic services; economic reconstruction and sustainable development; and security sector reform. Moreover, the policy is anchored in two security goals: (1) Promote internal socio-political stability and (2) Equip the Philippines to exercise full sovereignty over its territory and to provide protection to its maritime and other strategic interests. In his 2011 State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Aquino announced
that the acquisition of state-of-the-art vessels, aircrafts, and weapons for the military, police and other uniformed personnel were in motion. Likewise, he stated that the enhanced capacity of law enforcement agencies had resulted in increased efficiency and effectiveness of arrests, convictions, and prevention of crimes, transnational included. In addition, he reported of the improved morale and welfare of soldiers and law enforcers due to programmes implemented by the government, as well as an increase in the defence budget to include military modernisation.

Having described how the national policies were fit to realise a Philippine comprehensive security framework, the subsequent sections will analyse how these policies are implemented both at the national and local levels.

5.3 Development Implications of the Philippine Armed Forces Modernisation

Figure 5.2: Evaluating policies through the Defence Industrialisation Framework

5.3.1 Indigenous Defence Industry

When World War II ended, the newly independent Philippine state signed three military agreements with the United States to enhance its weak military capability and to provide a coordinated deterrent against any external threat: the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947, the Military Assistance Programme (MAP) of 1947, and the Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) of 1951. The Philippines tried to establish an autonomous defence capability by
forming a tri-service armed forces on 4 October 1947 composed of the Army, Navy and Air Force. However, the threat posed by communist insurgents forced the AFP to deploy 26 combat battalion teams for counter-insurgency operations.\textsuperscript{49} As a consequence, the AFP became largely army-centred focused on combatting internal concerns and through the MDT, the AFP's conventional military function was limited to occasional participation in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO)\textsuperscript{50} military exercises and joint exercises with American forces in Philippine territory.\textsuperscript{51} This understanding steered to a post-independence state where the U.S. forces took charge of territorial defence, whilst the AFP was responsible for internal security operations.

The early 1970s, however, saw the Philippine government make an attempt to develop some capabilities for an autonomous defence posture. However with the Moro secessionism in Mindanao, and the general reluctance of the U.S. to provide the AFP with counter insurgency weapons made the Philippine government realise that it would have to supply its own armed forces with the necessary hardware for internal defence.\textsuperscript{52} As eloquently rallied by President Ferdinand Marcos in 1974:

\begin{quote}
\textit{``We taught and we have learned our lessons well that we should never build our defences on the shifting sands of mutual defence agreements, and it is time we build it on firmer foundations. For whilst we have faith in our allies, we should not be completely dependent upon them. For whilst we believe in their courage and their capability, they also have their own national interest that may sometime conflict with ours. For in matters of defence the guarantee of friends can be modified to suit their needs and interest, as the history of nations vividly show.''}\textsuperscript{53}
\end{quote}

As such began the pursuit of developing an independent defence system depending entirely on the Philippines’ capabilities and resources. The AFP, specifically the army, began acquiring various non-American-made weapon systems and equipment in line with its organizational expansion.\textsuperscript{54} This was the Philippine government's first major step towards achieving an autonomous defence capability, as the programme was aimed at enabling the AFP to conduct defensive operations in any low- to medium-level conflict without relying on its western ally.\textsuperscript{55}
The Self-Reliant Defence Posture (SRDP), through the enactment of Presidential Decree 415, took the development of a domestic defence industry as its objective. The programme envisioned the attainment of local production capability for war materiel whilst conserving foreign exchange and, in the process, spurs industrial and economic growth. The fundamental concept was to produce locally, when feasible, materiel for the Philippines armed forces through partnership between the military and civilian establishments, whilst those materials that cannot be sourced domestically will be imported with the eventual goal of acquiring the technology for the production of these materiel. Utmost to this purpose is the significant role of the military and government agencies of providing technical and financial assistance to civilian defence manufacturers. Achieving this objective and effective implementation involved the establishment of the Joint Staff for Materiel Development and its implementing arm, the Research and Development Centre. Project managers were also designated to manage the various projects. Considered as the first major step in the AFP capability upgrade, the government allocated US $ 25M to support research and development of the Philippine Army capabilities. Collaboration between the DND and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) provide the network for the support of the programme, which also included the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Finance and the University of the Philippines (UP). To pump prime the defence industry, an annual appropriation of at least Php100 Million (approximately US$5.9 million) was legislated, which afforded the necessary monetary backing to support defence-related research and development projects. Having the proper support structure is important to attract defence companies to invest. Officials of the Defence department commissioned SRDP projects with the arsenal facility of the government and local manufacturers, encouraging the use of indigenous resources and production capability to equip the AFP so that it could perform its “basic functions to move, shoot, communicate, and survive, free from external intervention and influence.”

Initially, the SRDP programme was successful in affording a medium for the development of the industry whilst meeting its basic requirements for materiel. One programme of note involved the production of Simba Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV), which was a joint venture between GKN Defence, a unit of British automotive and industry group and Philippine-based Asian Armoured Technologies Corporation. The AFP ordered 150 Simbas of which eight were delivered fully built, whilst the remaining 142 AFVs were assembled in
the Philippines under a countertrade arrangement. Other projects included domestic production of small arms, radios, and assorted ammunition. In 1974, the Elisco Tool Manufacturing Company was given the task of producing 150,000 M16s (Models 613 and 653P) under licence from Colt, which provided a turnkey plant and actual production began in 1982 with an additional contract for 60,000 rifles subsequently included. Other SRDP projects included mortar production (the manufacture of 81mm mortar tubes began in 1974 and 60mm tubes in 1977); a MKII hand grenade was produced by 1978; and 5.56mm ammunition began to be produced by Government Arsenal (GA) in 1983. M16 rifle production was also accompanied by the manufacturing of various accessories, for example, a company called El Oro made M16 bayons.

In an interview with GA Director Jonathan Martir, he stated “the SRDP not only increased Philippine self-reliance, but also cut costs, provided jobs, and saved much-needed foreign-exchange funds.”

In the early years of SRDP, some 15 defence companies participated in supplying military hardware to the AFP. However, more than forty years later, the programme has failed to achieve any of its objectives. Most of the defence companies, which were part of the SRDP, had difficulty sustaining its business operation, therefore had to close down, because of insufficient defence acquisition budgets, graft, corruption, inflation and a lack of support from the national leadership. These conditions were exposed in the 2003 Philippine-U.S. Joint Defence Assessment Report, which reviewed, among others, the counter-insurgency strategy used by the Philippine Armed Forces. In a presentation attended by the author, Major General Guillermo Molina, former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programmes of the AFP, shared the result of a Defence Capability Assessment and Planning System (DCAPS) of the DND which revealed the AFP’s limited capabilities for territorial defence because it can only provide limited coverage making Philippine air space vulnerable to air intrusions.

5.3.2 Development of Defence Production

The Philippines has a very modest domestic arms industry, although interest in the production of small arms, ammunitions, and munitions has been around since at least 1917. A series of measures was proposed for the creation of a local arms industry prior to independence, but all failed to pass until the enactment of Republic Act 1884 (R.A. 1884) – an Act establishing a
Government Arsenal – signed in 1957. This declared that it was government policy “to achieve within reasonable time self-sufficiency in small arms, mortars, and other weapons, ammunitions for these weapons, and other munitions for the use of the military establishment.” It also mandated the creation of a government arsenal for the purpose.

~ Micro-industrial Analysis

The result of R.A. 1884 was the establishment of state-run arsenal located 120km north of Manila, within 370 hectares of land, in the province of Bataan. The Government Arsenal (GA) designs and manufactures small arms, mortars, other weapons and ammunition for these weapons, and other munitions for use by the AFP and the PNP. It produced its first small arms cartridge in August 1971. However, it was not during the onset of Martial Law in 1974 when GA began to manufacture integrated small arms ammunition.

Today, GA retains its role as the major supplier to the AFP and the PNP. Under government regulations enacted in April 2000, GA is charged with developing “capabilities to enhance self-sufficiency in the country’s defence requirements. Towards this end, the GA shall be effectively used in the production of basic weapons, ammunitions and other munitions for the use by the AFP and PNP.” GA’s mandate further allows it to use its production facilities to arrange joint ventures, co-production or similar arrangements with ‘local and foreign entities’. The GA was originally envisioned to be a centre for defence industries to meet domestic requirements and supply the world market but due to the constraints of existing laws in the early 1980s, such possibility did not conceive. However, under R.A. 7898 and the regulations described above, GA is permitted to export arms produced “in excess of AFP and PNP requirements.”

The GA has four major production plants, namely, the case and bullet plant (cases and bullets); the primer plant (boxer primers); the propellant plant (propellant powders); and the cartridge assembly plant (loads and assembles the different components into finished cartridges). Supporting its production lines, the GA is stocked with the machine shop (for fabrication of punches, dies, gages and machine parts); metallic link belt shop (metal links for cartridge linkage); carpentry shop (fabrication of tooling, gages, and other measuring devices; proof house (ballistics-test of in-process and finished products); and physical and chemical lab (inspection-test of metallic raw materials, chemicals, components and finished
products). These are in addition to the power and water utilities, a three-level communications system, an industrial safety/security network and several welfare service facilities that include a 25-bed secondary hospital.

In April 1998, the PNP’s Firearms and Explosives Division (FED) recorded 45 legal manufacturers of small arms, 533 authorised dealers and 133 gun repair shops in the country. Among the private players, one of the biggest is the Arms Corporation of the Philippine (Armscor), which claims to be the “largest arms and ammunition manufacturer in Southeast Asia and is present in over 60 countries.” Whilst selling to the PNP and to some extent the AFP, the principal market of Armscor is the civilian gun market, in the Philippines and abroad. In ASEAN, Armscor is the biggest supplier of ammunition for the Royal Thai Army, Royal Thai Navy, and Royal Thai Police. In 1905, two British gentlemen Roy Squires and William Bingham opened a printing company in Manila called Squires Bingham, Co, which was later bought by an American named Arthur Hileman, who then converted the place to a general merchandise store. In 1941, Filipino businessman Don Celso Tuason bought the company, then turned it into firearms and ammunition manufacturing company when the Second World War broke out and import and foreign exchange were restricted. License to manufacture firearms and ammunition was then granted by President Elpidio Quirino in 1952. The company was eventually re-organised into Arms Corporation of the Philippines, during which time, Don Celso had turned over the management of the corporation to his three sons: Demetrio, Butch, and Severo. In 2012, Don Demetrio retired as Chair and passed the baton to his son Martin. When the younger Tuason took over the reins from his father, Armscor has already established two offices in the United States – one in Nevada called the Armscor Precision International and the Armscor Cartridge (importer f of ammunition cases and bullets from Armscor Philippines).

Two of the newer players include United Defence Manufacturing Corporation (UDMC) and FERFRANS Specialities. UDMC, owned and led by Mr Gene Carino, provides assault rifles, special-purpose rifles and precision rifles to the PNP, AFP, Philippine Coast Guard, among others. Situated in the vicinity of Parañaque City, one of the cities that make up Metro Manila, the manufacturing plant of UDMC houses their research, development, prototyping, and production units. FERFRANS is a firearms and ammunition manufacturer based in Cebu City in the Philippines, which was established in 1997. The company owned by brothers Ferdinand and Francis Sy provides weapons for the PNP and the AFP. It was the
operational requirements of the PNP Special Action Force and specialised military units in the US that motivated FERFRANS to design and develop its products.\textsuperscript{90}

As shown in Table 5.1, Armscor, among the respondents, employs the largest number of employees at 1,200 employees, who work in its Philippines factory alone to satisfy the 80% export demand of its products. The smallest company of the respondents is FERFRANS with only 10 employees, who give service support to their clients in the Philippines and Asia.\textsuperscript{91}

### Table 5.1: Company Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Year Established</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Arsenal</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Philippine - Public</td>
<td>500-1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDMC</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Philippine - Private</td>
<td>Less than 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FERFRANS</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Philippine - Private</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armscor</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Philippine - Private</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013.

Of the four respondents, only the GA revealed their annual turnover for 2008-2013, although the rest did mention during the interview that they did well in the years stipulated. Table 5.2 reveals that there has been a rise in the GA’s revenue since 2008. In 2013, GA reported an annual turnover of 23 million rounds, which is a 17% increase from the 19 million rounds recorded in 2012. This can be attributed to the Philippine government’s sense of urgency to modernize its military capability largely involving the South China Sea issue.

### Table 5.2: Annual Turnover (Production output in million rounds), 2008-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>18.36</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>23.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interview with Roger Gamban, Chief Strategic Management Office and Chief Liaison Officer, Government Arsenal in August 2013.\textsuperscript{92}

As mentioned earlier, trajectory of the Armscor Company is gearing towards an overseas market where 80 per cent of its products are exported. The older Tuason said that it took around 40 years for Armscor to break into the American market.\textsuperscript{93} When the younger Tuason took over the U.S. sales in the early 2000s, Armscor sales broke $800,000 and within two years, sales were up by $2.5 million.\textsuperscript{94} Correspondingly, this foreign market view is also shared by the two other private companies mainly to keep the business afloat. Although the three private companies participate in government biddings and do get orders, the AFP and
PNP largely buy their supplies from the GA, which primarily was established to support the small arms needs of the military and law enforcers. Aside from the Philippine government, Figure 5.3 shows the types of customers the four companies cater to.

**Figure 5.3: Types of Customers**

![Types of Customers](source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013.)

All the respondent companies reported having the Philippine armed forces and national police as their buyers. Except for the GA, three of the respondent companies revealed having mixed customers, who are largely foreign governments. 100% of GA’s goods go to the AFP and PNP. FERFRANS provides weapons for the PNP and AFP, as well as several police units in the United States, and several countries including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Peru.

Although both Armscor and FERFRANS have offices in the United States to support their clients based there, only Armscor sells its products to private individuals, whilst FERFRANS wants to concentrate in supporting law enforcement and military personnel. In April 2013 UDMC sent a letter inviting President Aquino to visit and see what the company could do for the armed forces in line with the modernisation efforts. A month later, General Chito Dizon, head of the President Security Group (PSG) inspected the units to see if the UDMC rifles meet the requirements of the PSG’s Special Reaction Unit. The General said that if the rifles pass further testing, the PSG will place an order for the elite unit. This is a welcome respite for Mr Cariño, who could only look as the country’s military and police forces buy rifles and other weapons from abroad. A provision in the Procurement Law (Republic Act 9184) disqualifies companies such as UDMC from submitting a bid for government contracts.
for assault rifles. At the July 2015 Congress review of the AFP Modernisation, it was revealed by Assistant Secretary Patrick Velez of the DND’s Finance, Acquisitions, Installations, Logistics Office that there is a need to amend the law because it is not conducive for defence procurement and does not support small players. Not all defence materiel are completely off-the-shelf, that is why, it is difficult to provide and establish baseline for procurement. Items such as life-cycle cost and enhance capability are not given a premium as far as R.A. 9184 is concerned. Meanwhile, to increase publicity for the company, Armscor and UDMC are frequent exhibitors in defence trade fairs in the Philippines. Furthermore, the latter is an active user of the social media such as Facebook and Twitter.

~ Human Resource Development

Human resource is an important facet of the defence industry. With the help of education institutions - higher learning and vocational institutes – skills and capabilities in specific areas in defence and security industries are developed and upgraded. Figure 5.4 shows the educational background of the employees of the companies surveyed.

Figure 5.4: Educational Background of Employees

![Employee Educational Background](source.png)

Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013.

More than 45% of the employees of the companies surveyed are graduates of vocational schools, followed by university graduates who comprise almost 27.75%. This is a reflection of the employees’ roles in the company as shown in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5: Roles of Employees in the Company

![Percentage of Employees Involvement](image)

Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013.

Figure 5.5 shows that 57.6% of the employees of the companies surveyed are involved in the operation of plants. As these companies are manufacturing in nature, the technical nature of the job indicates that companies prefer workers who have practical and mechanical knowledge of the machines they would need to operate. In 2013, the Philippines gross domestic product (GDP) was at 7.2%, making it one of the fastest growing economies in Asia. Growth was attributed to the impressive performance of the construction and manufacturing sectors, as well as the surge in government and consumer spending. This contributed to the increase in the creation of jobs within the defence sector see Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Creation of Jobs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increase in the creation of jobs over the past five years</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013.

FERFRANS owner, Mr Sy, revealed during the interview that the company has increased its creation of local jobs over the past five years, however, minimal. Although there has been an increase in production as deemed by the rise in FERFRANS’ annual turnover, most of the work remains at its office in the United States, where the owners spend most of their time.
However, Mr Sy would not disclose the figures pertaining to these details. On the other hand, the GA shared that for the period 2010 – 2013, 300 new staff were hired as engineers, medical staff, security and firefighters, munitions operators, machinists, labourers, and carpenters. Since Martin Tuason took over the helm of the company, Armscor’s operation in the United States has expanded with the opening of its newest brand, Rock Island Armory, and the building of a new facility in Nevada with 50 people. With this new development, all firearms emanating from their company will now go with the Rock Island Armory brand, whilst the Armscor brand will now only be limited to the ammunition. Still, Armscor’s 15-acre property in the Philippines remains the main manufacturing based of the company.

With regards to management training and skills development, Table 5.4 shows that 75% of the companies surveyed only spend less than 10% of their budget to training and skills development of their employees.

**Table 5.4: Annual Expenditure on Management Training and Skills Development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual expenditure on management training and skills development</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 10%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater than 50%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013.*

As one of the oldest defence companies in the Philippines, many of Armscor’s machines, whilst in good condition, are at least 20 years old and manually operated. However, Armscor allots between 11%-20% of its budget to enhancing the skills of its employees, a little higher compared to the other three companies. UDMC justified that most of its machines are computer-operated and can be programmed to produce as many rifles as necessary. In the case of FERFRANS with only 10 employees, the company hires qualified employees but does not need to spend much on skills training, rather focus its energy on R&D, which they do most of the time in the U.S. This change in the condition of the environment has affected in the maintenance and creation of defence industry related jobs.
~R&D Strategy

Investment in R&D is very important in ensuring a successful defence industry, especially as it involves the innovation of new ideas and technologies. The commitment of Philippine defence companies towards R&D activities has been satisfactory. Of the Philippine companies interviewed (see Table 5.5), three spend more than 50% of their annual expenditure to research and developing new technologies. Clearly, majority of the companies interviewed value the importance of investing in R&D in order to be competitive. The three private companies have foreign governments as clients; therefore, their innovations must remain relevant to the needs as well as to the changing security environment.

Table 5.5: R&D Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual R&amp;D expenditure as a percentage of revenue</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 10%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater than 50%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013.

Government Arsenal, being a government entity, only spends less than 10% of its annual revenue to R&D. This reality does not reflect the strategic goal of the GA to improve ammunition technology and expanding the capability for weapons production as called for in its charter. According to Gamban, the desire to invest in R&D is there but more important for the GA is to prioritise where the money should be spent first. Such is a different case with the three private companies. The UDMC, FERFRANS, and Armscor have allotted at least 50% of their budget to research and development. With more diverse clients, the private companies must constantly improve their products to attract more customers. The three private companies are all family-owned enterprises, thus the bulk of marketing ideas and research falls on the shoulder of the owners and family members.
Table 5.6: Presence of R&D Facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company R&amp;D Facilities</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013.

All companies interviewed for this research have R&D facilities as illustrated in Table 5.6. The Government Arsenal has its main laboratory in Bataan, where it conducts development testing. The location of both UDMC and Armscor facilities is in Manila. Meanwhile, FERFRANS laboratory is located in Cebu City, with an office in the United States, the same with Armscor. In an interview with Department of National Defence Chief-of-Staff Dr Peter Paul Galvez, he confirmed the approval of a defence economic zone proposal that will house a defence complex involving local and international defence companies.105 This will be further discussed in Section 5.3.4.

Of the companies surveyed, only one receives R&D funding from the government. Although very limited, the R&D funding of the GA is included in the yearly appropriations of the government. The rest of the local firms surveyed rely on their own revenue to support research and development. This is shown in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7: Government R&D Funding Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R&amp;D funding assistance from the government</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013.

Mr Cariño realises that R&D is expensive and, more often than not, is at the expense of the company without government subsidy. He argued that private companies need support by way of orders.106 Even with the presence of local defence companies that are prepared to cater to the needs of the clients, the Philippine armed force still imports its medium and large calibre ammunitions. The Philippines currently produces munitions only for small calibre firearms. Again, the problem lies with the procurement policy, which states that “the prospective bidder must have experience of having completed at least one contract that is
similar to the contract to be bid. “With the Philippine defence industry at its infancy and defence material can be sourced from very limited suppliers, there is concern that this will support the oligopolistic designs of some defence contractors. Clearly, it is a challenge for smaller players to break in. Without the support of the government, local private companies acknowledge that they have no match for foreign brands. In May 2013, the Philippine Defence Department awarded a contract for 50,000 M4s to U.S. Company Remington. The other bidders included big American firms such as Colt, Manroy and Sig Sauer. This frustration is shared by Armscor, who lost a bid for a PNP contract for 60,000 9mm pistols to an importer of the Australian-made Glock. Armscor was the only Philippine company that made a bid. Nevertheless, all executives interviewed remain confident that collaboration with other institutions is the way to go as reflected in Table 5.8.

Table 5.8: Collaboration with Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaboration with other institutions</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013.

All the companies surveyed have collaborations with different academic and private institutions. As expected, the GA has a constant cooperation with the Department of National Defence – AFP involving the enhancement and repair of basic weapons, improvement of quality of ammunition, and conduct of familiarization firing. Likewise, the government defence company also has collaboration with the DOST through its Metals Industry Research and Development Centre in the testing of raw materials. UDMC Chair and CEO Gene Cariño shared in the interview that the Philippine Navy’s Naval Special Operations Group (NAVSOG) continues to field test the Pneumatic Valve and Rod (PVAR) rifle, manufactured by UDMC, as it suits the PN’s fighting environment.

For companies to stay ahead of the pack, it is important for them to produce new creations, inventions and relevant designs to participate in rapid production development and growing competition in the market. Moreover, ensuring that products are patented is similarly significant for the growth of the company, which is characterised by constant change,
competition, and challenges.\textsuperscript{111} Table 5.9 shows which among the defence companies have registered their patents.

### Table 5.9: Patent Registrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does the company have any patent registrations?</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013.*

The three private companies have made sure that with every introduction of new product in the market, they have an exclusive right. For instance, UDMC holds several patents for its Pneumatic Valve and Rod Gas-Piston System (PVAR System) used in M16s, M4s, and other similar weapons.\textsuperscript{112} However, GA does not have any patent registrations of its manufactured small arms ammunition, despite that fact that it has introduced a new product in the last five years as reflected in Table 5.10. With the realisation of the Defence Economic Zone (Section 5.3.3) in the near future, it is crucial for the GA to patent its products for it to remain competitive if it has the intention to expand its market. Currently, 100% of its products are bought by the AFP.

### Table 5.10: Introduction of New Product and Production Servicing Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did your company introduce a new product, service or production method in the last five years?</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013.*

The Teflon coated cal. 45 training ammunition has been introduced by the GA to the AFP and PNP. Likewise, UDMC, FERFRANS, and Armscor have each came up with a new product in the last five years. In 2012, FERFRANS launched their own weapon after four rigorous years of research and development both in the Philippines and in the U.S. The
FERFRANS Special Operations Assault Rifle or the FERFRANS SOAR provides unique features, such as the rate reduction system that controls the heat, and wear and tear of the weapon, which achieved the needs of the AFP and PNP.\textsuperscript{113}

5.3.3 Defence Economic Zones

Plans to expand the operation of GA into a Government Arsenal Defence Industrial Estate (GADIE) is gaining momentum with the approval of the Master Development Plan (MDP) by the Secretary of the DND and the issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) in 2015.\textsuperscript{114} The creation of the GADIE is allowed under the revised AFP modernisation programme. The MDP is required to build the right zoning of structures to be situated in the GA’s 340-hectare estate. The ECC is part of the GADIE application for issuance of presidential proclamation as Special Economic one. The GADIE aims to be the centre for the manufacture of various products to support the country’s defence and security requirements.\textsuperscript{115} Similar with the objective of the SRDP, any excess material in the local scene will be sold in the global market. The project will include appropriate locations, rod network and various infrastructures that would be constructed, relative to the manufacture of defence materials to include company housing area and attendant facilities.\textsuperscript{116} In consideration of the existing GA facilities, the strategy involves the outlining of the expansion into stages, having distinct areas for new developments and future plans to prevent confusion of projects and management.\textsuperscript{117} New developments or Phase 1 will be a prospect for a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) undertaking.\textsuperscript{118} Joint deal revenues in the GA may be added to the trust fund of the modernisation programme. On the other hand, the improvement and expansion areas or Phase 2 will be dependent on the programmes and budget approved by the government.\textsuperscript{119} Both phases will be classified into two major zones: the Non-explosive zone (location for defence related industries that are not in the manufacture of hazardous products) and the Explosive zone (for defence products that are hazardous in nature). (see Table 5.11).\textsuperscript{120}
### Table 5.11: The Proposed Defence Industrial Estate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
<th>Zones</th>
<th>Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 (Development of Defence Industrial Estate)</td>
<td>Administration Zone</td>
<td>New GA administration building, Engineering Office, Commission on Audit Office, Multi-purpose Hall, entry processing and security area, hotel and service apartment, convenience store, commercial spaces, new emergency hospital and sports complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housing Zone</td>
<td>Executive housing, staff housing of 30 hectares total area as per Presidential Proclamation 371 (latter is excluded from the MDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Explosive Zone</td>
<td>Rifle manufacturing plant, brass rolling mill, KIA Motor plant, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explosive Zone</td>
<td>Manufacture of medium and high calibre ammunition, melt loading facility of PAF, and other projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2 (Improvement and Expansion of Existing GA Facilities)</td>
<td>Non-Explosive Zone</td>
<td>Lead wire manufacturing plant, case and bullet division, raw material warehouse, and planning and logistics division warehouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explosive Zone</td>
<td>Primer loading plant, TNR manufacturing plant, additional cartridge magazines, 40mm and other medium calibre ammunition manufacturing plant, ball powder manufacturing plant, NC and NG manufacturing plants, melt loading facility of PAF, and others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The present GA will be kept as a facility principally operated and managed by the government, where its development and expansion is dependent on the needs and priorities of the AFP and the PNP. As the first defence economic zone in Southeast Asia, several foreign companies have expressed interest. This will materialize through the approval of tax
incentives by the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) allowing for the participation of not just local companies, but also foreign manufacturers to operate in the defence zone. Already weapons and munitions manufacturers from Canada, the United States, South Africa, and South Korea have pronounced their plans to set-up shop.\textsuperscript{122} Topping the list are South Africa’s Rheinmetall Denel Munition and a unit of South Korea’s S&T Holdings Company, which has firmed up a proposal for a Php2 billion ($44 million) firearms manufacturing plant.\textsuperscript{123} Also considering are U.S. based Colt’s Manufacturing Co. and Canada’s Waterbury Farrel.\textsuperscript{124} However, interested companies are not only confined to the manufacture of weapons and ammunition manufacturers, but as well as backpacks, boots, food packs, and logistics. By getting local and foreign firms to invest and produce munitions in the country, more jobs will be created, and provided that the Congress amends the R.A. 9184, the government will cut short its procurement process and support streamline procedure.

5.4 Internal Peace and Security Plan, and Socio-Economic Recovery

Figure 5.6: Evaluating policies through the Counter-Terrorism/Counterinsurgency Framework

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure56.png}
\caption{Evaluating policies through the Counter-Terrorism/Counterinsurgency Framework}
\label{fig:5.6}
\end{figure}

Source: Adapted from the conceptual framework in Figure 1.3.
5.4.1 Philippine Internal Security Context

The 2005 Philippine Human Development Report says that the security environment of the country is being challenged by two of the world’s longest running armed conflicts - the Moro secessionist movement in Mindanao in the south, and the communist insurgency occurring in several provinces around the country. From 1986 to 2004, insurgency in the country had affected 91 per cent of its provinces that caused mortalities, social disruption, economic degeneration and chronic poverty. The insurgency has been attributed to social injustice, political marginalisation, lack of education, limited livelihood opportunities, as well as the non-implementation of land reforms. As argued by Banlaoi (2010), the “long-drawn insurgency is a complicated symptom of a political malady that was ingrained in Philippine society.” His study pointed to social exclusion and economic marginalisation as root causes of armed uprisings in the country. Ranked 117 out of 187 on the Human Development Index (HDI), the Philippines has a population of 100 million, of which 41.7% lives on less than $2 a day. Poverty incidence in the Philippines remained high at 25.8% in the first half of 2014, suggesting that the “jobless economic growth” in the country did not trickle down to the poor. This suggests that in insurgency-affected areas with high poverty rates and insufficient delivery of basic services, such as health and education, there is a strong campaign to recruit into rebel groups.

However, certain areas have successfully managed to confront the challenges of insurgency and terrorism using non-traditional measures. The two case studies presented below illustrate how development initiatives overcame the destabilising impact of internal security. First, is the insurgency concern in Negros Occidental province and how the military was able to engage the locals to participate in their development efforts, and second, the secessionist problem in three municipalities of Maguindanao.

5.4.2 Peace and Development Plan: Case Study 1 - Negros Occidental

Located in the heart of the Philippine archipelago, Negros Occidental is a lush sugarcane region inhabited by 2.9 million people. Its economy is mainly agricultural, with 98 per cent of its alienable and disposable land being used for agriculture and 2 per cent for inland fishery.
Despite the high economic state of the province, Negros Occidental has one of the lowest average family incomes in the country. Some students in the rural areas are forced to leave school to work in sugar plantations. This situation has resulted to low levels of literacy among children. Furthermore, this situation has caused inter-generational poverty and illiteracy, where some families, in order to survive, decide to join the armed struggle.\textsuperscript{132} Whilst on the run with his family to avoid military detection, one rebel returnee interviewed said they survived on monthly rations of rice and coffee.\textsuperscript{133} Four years of their life were spent on gun fights with the military, educating the masses on anti-government propaganda, and collecting revolutionary taxes from private businesses.\textsuperscript{134} In the mid-1980s, the New People’s Army (NPA) cadres had gained widespread support in sugarcane haciendas, villages, and towns, successfully wrested concessions from elites on behalf of the working poor and the movement itself, and posed a powerful challenge to planters and authorities. They lost this position by the early 1990s under the combined influence of counter-insurgency, regime change, and internal conflicts within the movement.

Before being declared by the Philippine Army as “insurgency-free” in June 2015,\textsuperscript{135} the province was under a guerrilla regional front called the \textit{Kilusang Rehiyonal} – Negros (KR-N) with an Executive Committee and Regional Operational Command, a Regional White Area Committee and three guerrilla fronts, namely: Northern Negros Front (NNF), Central Negros Front (CNF), and Southwest Front (SWF).\textsuperscript{136} The KR-N has a total of 259 politico-military personnel and 191 high-powered firearms. The three guerrilla fronts are strengthened by a total of eight guerrilla platoons operating in the hinterlands to arouse, organize-expand and mobilize vulnerable people and communities with their ideological-political-organizational mass works, affecting/influencing at least 100 \textit{barangays} with 27 highly affected/influenced, from a total of 662 \textit{barangays} province-wide.\textsuperscript{137} The guerrilla movement is capable of disrupting and damaging economic activities and facilities, threatening non-supporters, and extorting money from landowners and businessmen to finance their operations.

Since 1987, several government programmes have been launched as well as counter-insurgency operations conducted. Based on government data from 1986 to 2010, at least 66,000 identified former communist insurgents from all over the country have benefited from financial and relief assistance from numerous types of government programs.\textsuperscript{138} The number of beneficiaries continues to grow every year yet an increasing trend in the recruitment and personnel strength of the NPA for the period from 2000 to 2010 was noticeable particularly
in Negros Island. Contributory to this alarming trend is the very wide mountainous areas in
Negros Island, where only two Army battalions were operating there from 2002 to 2008.\textsuperscript{139} However, without the military and law enforcement agencies the situation could have been
worse. In an interview with Lt. Col. Ariel Reyes, former Commander of the 47th Infantry
Battalion based in Cauayan, Negros Occidental, he foresees an increase of residents joining
the NPA since the government has given mining companies the permit to conduct mining
explorations in the area.\textsuperscript{140} It is construed that this adverse trend is a manifestation that
Negros Island remains to be a fertile ground for communist insurgency, and that the peace
and developmental approaches employed by the government will fall short if its goals and
objectives are taken for granted.

In 2012, the provincial government of Negros Occidental launched the 5-year Peace and
Development Plan for communities affected by armed conflict. Former 303\textsuperscript{rd} Infantry
Brigade Commander Brigadier General Jon Aying hatched the idea and proposed it to Negros
Occidental Governor Alfredo Marañon, whose council decided to adopt it.\textsuperscript{141} The advocacy
plan has short-term and long-term objectives that include: (1) to promote poverty reduction,
food security and sustainable economic development; (2) to develop a healthy, educated and
active community with high moral values; (3) to promote balanced ecology, biodiversity and
disaster risk reduction and management; (4) to promote effective and efficient
implementation of development programs and delivery of basic services in the countryside;
(5) to secure communities from armed conflict, criminality and disasters; (6) to advance
community empowerment, ownership and people’s shared responsibilities in governance,
peace and security; (7) to resolve conflicts and grievances existing and arising within
communities and among community groups.\textsuperscript{142} These objectives have been matched to the
needs of the province, likewise, they reflect the aims of governance and sustainable
development advocated by the NSP policy. As BGen Aying emphasised, “national security
can be defined as governance determining the kind of security and development for the nation
wherein practically security and development cannot be dichotomized.”\textsuperscript{143} Consequently, the
plan formed the basis for the creation of the Provincial Peace Integration and Development
Unit (Pro-PIDU) by virtue of Governor Alfredo Marañon Jr’s Executive Order 12-016 signed
on 17 July 2012.\textsuperscript{144} The Pro-PIDU undertakes plans, programmes and activities to help
address issues facing the marginalized communities in the province. Its five interdependent
components are socio-economic, psychosocial and cultural, environmental and natural
resource management, good governance, and justice and security. Table 5.12 shows the specific activities enveloped in the components.

Table 5.12: Components of the Pro-PIDU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic</th>
<th>Psychosocial and cultural</th>
<th>Environmental</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
<th>Justice and security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| A. Crisis Intervention Projects | • Balik Sibilyan Debriefing  
   • Trauma Healing  
   • Wellness Information & Education Programme (WIEP)  
   • Educational Assistance and Scholarship Programme (NOSP)  
   • Health Assistance and Programme (NOCHP) | • Awareness Programme  
   • Support to NGP  
   • Support to Anti-illegal Logging Programme  
   • Support to Anti-illegal Mining | • Peace Process  
   • AFP-Guns for Peace  
   • Peacebuilding Initiatives  
   • Stakeholder Engagement and Meetings  
   • City-Municipality PIDU Creation  
   • Grassroots Governance Organizations  
   • Good Governance Awareness Programme | • Awareness Programme  
   • Grassroots Community Resiliency Programme  
   • Community Mediation and Reconciliation Programme  
   • Military Operations  
   • Integrated Community Defence and Public Safety  
   • Legal Cooperation |
| B. Sustainable Livelihood Projects | • Wellness Farm  
   • Household Backyard Farm  
   • Vocational Technology | | | |

Source: Fieldwork at the 303rd Infantry Brigade Camp in Negros Occidental from February to March 2014.

Col. Aying said “the programme is not a one-shot deal.” The AFP IPSP emphasises that the primary focus in the conduct of military operations is not just defeating the enemy but more significantly, Winning the Peace, if possible without the use of arms. As a long-term strategy, Pro-PIDU aims to transform the capacity of the government, AFP included, to deliver services especially to the underprivileged or the marginalised members of the society. But with the lingering reputation of the military as human rights abusers during the Martial Law years, the AFP is careful to label each action as their own. Hence, it is paramount that the local government unit takes ownership of the activities. Besides it is also their responsibility. The socio-economic component is headed by DWSD; the psychosocial and cultural by the Department of Education; the environment by the Department of Environment and National Resources; good governance by the provincial office; and the justice and security by the AFP. Through the humanitarian caravan, for example, some government staff travelled to remote areas with the military to deliver basic services. They bring with them
doctors, lawyers, agriculturists, and dentists. Politicians, who sometimes tag along, were curiosity amongst the residents. “Oh, that’s how Governor looks like!”

One of the projects of Pro-PIDU is the organic wellness farm, for which the provincial government has allotted Php1.5 million (approximately US$ 32,500) for the preparation of land and development of facilities. So far, the farm has generated an income of Php300,000 (approximately US$ 6,500) in gross sales and has catered to the socio-economic needs of around 34 family members of former rebels. Additional plans for satellite organic farms are being drawn up to establish sites in other parts of the province, particularly the first, fifth and sixth districts. It is the goal of the Pro-PIDU advocates to see the institutionalization of the programme within the provincial government to ensure the annual appropriation of budget regardless of who stays in the elected position. Other project components of the Pro-PIDU include the emergency relief and assistance, and the Guns for Peace program. Since 2012, at least 150 rebel returnees (see Table 5.13) have received cash in exchange for firearms and livelihood assistance from the government. According to BGen Aying, it is “not the goal of the military to bring its enemies to their knees but to their senses.” Commenting on the implementation of the IPSP in the province, Lt. Col. Reyes said that there is still much to do because of many factors to consider. He cited that in order for IPSP to be successful, stakeholders (government, public, business, academe, NGOs, armed forces, etc.) must be directly involved and committed to contribute their share in solving primary issues. As a document espousing Whole-of-Nation Approach and the Human Security Approach, IPSP was crafted with the involvement of local government agencies, NGOs, civil society, and academe, giving equal emphasis to combat and non-combat dimensions of military operations.

Table 5.13: Livelihood and Financial Assistance to Rebel Returnees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Amount Assisted</th>
<th>Number of Rebel Returnees</th>
<th>Amount (Php)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPAPP (CLIP)</td>
<td>Admin Cost – 500.00 Immediate – 5,000.00 Livelihood – 50,000.00</td>
<td>33 rebel returnees</td>
<td>1,831,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Admin Cost – 500.00 Immediate – 5,000.00</td>
<td>34 rebel returnees (being processed by PSWDO)</td>
<td>187,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPAPP (SIP)</td>
<td>Immediate – 5,000.00</td>
<td>7 former rebels</td>
<td>350,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>Immediate – 5,000.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>820,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 1993, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) was created “to provide technical and administrative support to the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process in the discharge of his/her functions for the coordination and implementation of all components of the comprehensive process.” In 2007, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo launched the social integration programme (SIP), housed within the peace process office, for rebels seeking to return to normal life before a peace agreement. Under Aquino, the SIP became the comprehensive local integration programme (CLIP); it now relies on mayors and provincial governors to deliver assistance in attempts to skirt inter-agency coordination problems in Manila. The amount covers the administration cost (investigation on the authenticity of the returnee), immediate assistance, and livelihood assistance. The Provincial Social and Welfare Development Office (PSWDO) does the profiling to find out the needs of the person. According to Jennie Macalipsay of PSWDO, a questionnaire is used to determine the needs of the rebel returnees and he/she will be referred to the proper government agency for support. Prior to the profiling though, the identity of rebel returnees will have to be validated and authenticated first by the AFP to ensure that they are not sent by the NPA leadership to infiltrate. Since money is involved, the military is cautious that the person did not just resurface to avail of the financial support that will eventually help the rebel group. Whilst most of the returnees return to mainstream, the rebel interviewed remains in the custody of the 303rd IB because of his former leadership position within the NPA. He and his family face constant threat from former comrades because of their knowledge of operations and unit structure of the movement. His children attend the neighbourhood secondary school, whilst he helps out in the organic wellness farm of the Army and earns Php200/day. Intending to start his own organic farm when he can eventually go back to his old home, the former rebel strives to learn as much as he can about livestock and organic farming as he is keen to apply that knowledge and new skills on his own soil.
5.4.3 Social Work and Development: Case Study 2 – Maguindanao

Maguindanao is a province located in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) composed of 36 municipalities, which are further subdivided into 508 barangays (small independent communities of persons). It is a province rich in history, culture and resources. But despite its agricultural abundance, Maguindanao remains one of the poorest provinces in the Philippines with a 57.8% poverty incidence according to national statistics. For decades it has witnessed several conflicts and its residents are continuously displaced whenever military troops and Moro rebels clash. Most often than not, these hostilities occur in the farms of the residents.

From 2011 to 2014, there was a total of 280 incidents recorded in the province, of which the highest number of incidents was in 2014 with 88 incidents double from the 43 incidents of 2013 (see Figure 5.7).

**Figure 5.7: Incidents in Maguindanao, 2011-2014**

Incidents are characterised as ambush, encounters, arson, assault, bombing, hostage taking, shooting, theft and abduction, which threat groups based in Maguindanao, perpetrated against the military, law enforcers, government personnel and/or civilians. Figure 5.8 shows that in 2014, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) have conducted the most...
number of attacks, whilst the least is the Jemaah Islamiyah with only one encounter during the last four years.

Figure 5.8: Incidents Perpetrated by Threat Groups, 2011-2014

Of the 36 municipalities, the study has focused on three – Barira, Buldon, and Matanog. These three combined has a territory that stretches up to 32,000 hectares and served as host to Camp Abubakar, once the main stronghold of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) since the 1980s. Until the late 1990s, the camp was also the MILF’s largest settlement and centre of its Shariah-based government. Forest and bodies of water acted as natural barriers around the camp, enhanced by trenches and tunnels dug by the MILF members. Its founder and chair Salamat Hashim, and his military chief Al Haj Murad Ibrahim used to live and held office there. Camp Abubakar had a school, a training academy, a hospital, businesses, farms and markets, providing for the needs of its fighters and civilian residents. For many Muslims in Central Mindanao, Camp Abubakar served as their “Malacañang Palace” (official residence and principal workplace of the President of the Philippines), where leaders were summoned for important consultations and where wayward members of the MILF and even Muslim civilians were brought for discipline and punishment. For most non-Muslims, Camp Abubakar was the seat of power of an organisation they perceived to be a threat to their lives, properties, and peace in their communities. In the book Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao, Vitug and Gloria note that it was the policy of the government under President Fidel Ramos to keep off Camp Abubakar and the other main
The authors quoted former Defence Secretary, Renato de Villas, as saying:

“These [Camp Abubakar and Camp Busrah] have become political symbols. If we raid Abubakar and Busrah, it would mean an all-out war against the MILF. We hit them elsewhere but never in these two camps.”

A certain kind of respect was accorded to the camp.

For the armed forces, the area was a “no man’s” land where those who ventured risked losing their lives. Ironically, this is also one of the favoured areas of deployment by new graduates of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), especially for faster career progression. The more dangerous, the better. The expansion of MILF armed activities from the central portions of Mindanao to the Lanao provinces in the north increased MILF logistical requirements, especially military hardware and daily subsistence. In search for resources, the MILF intensified its extortion activities, in areas such as the 64-kilometre Narciso Ramos Highway, which borders the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao. By March 2000, the number of MILF checkpoints and roadblocks along the Highway had increased. These were meant for extorting fees from commercial and private vehicles passing through the area, claiming that the first-class, two-lane highway was part of Camp Abubakar. Whilst the road was built to cut travel distance by more than three-fourths, travellers were advised to drive through it only during day-time due to the risk it poses.

The MILF had constructed well-entrenched defensive positions along the Highway, evidently in recognition of its strategic importance. Before President Joseph Estrada’s “all-out-war” campaign against the MILF in 2000 after the peace talks broke down, Camp Abubakar was a fortified rebel base with concrete bunkersroofed with layers of coconut trunks, man-made ditches, and could virtually resist close hits from 105mm artillery shells. Construction materials to be used in the completion of the Narciso Ramos Highway in 1994 were diverted by MILF sympathizers for its bunkers. It was obvious that such reinforced defensive positions along the Highway were dangerous as they could prevent the movement of AFP troops and logistical flow between the 4th Infantry Division (northern Mindanao) and the 6th Infantry Division (Central Mindanao).
Eventually, the Camp fell into the hands of the Philippine military at the end of a two-month offensive. However, the campaign came with a price – those paid for by the affected communities. The conflict harmed families in 14 provinces, four cities, 89 municipalities, and around 489 barangays. The campaign resulted in a mass exodus of 800,000 to one million civilians in Mindanao, making it perhaps the single biggest episode of internal displacement in the country since World War II. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines was recorded to have the fourth largest number of internally displaced families after Burma, East Timor, and Indonesia in 2001 based on the World Refugee Survey of U.S. Committee on Refugees.

After the fall of Camp Abubakar, the 603rd Infantry Brigade (IB) of the Philippine Army’s 6th Infantry Division was deployed in the MILF’s former base located in the tri-boundaries of Barira, Buldon, and Matanog municipalities. Under the 603rd IB are the Army Special Forces Battalion, 37th, and 39th Infantry Battalions. All three places are 4th class municipalities with a combined population of 76,684 people in 14,391 households. In 2005, Camp Abubakar was renamed Camp Iranun by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The place, subsequently, became a “peace zone” and residents have since been witnessing the tremendous pouring in of local and foreign funded projects meant to complement the efforts of accelerating the socio-economic growth of local communities.

The AFP assisted the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in relief and rehabilitation. The soldiers constructed temporary shelters for the displaced communities and conducted numerous medical and dental missions. Priority was given to reconstruction and rehabilitation of school buildings. In coordination with the Department of Education (DepEd), military engineers repaired a building in Buldon and nine school facilities in Matanog. Beyond building schools, a number of AFP personnel served as teachers to displaced children through the Army Literacy Patrol System (ALPS). The AFP also assisted the Department of Agriculture (DA) in the construction of farm-to-market roads; supported the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in repairing mosques, municipal halls, and roads. The AFP Corps of Engineers became the de facto implementing arm of the National Irrigation Authority (NIA), given the latter’s request to have the Langkong-Sarmiento-Abubakar Road paved.

Although there was an increase in attacks by the BIFF in 2014, none of these happened in the Barira, Buldon, and Matango areas. According to the 603rd Commander, “there has not been
any single rebel-Army encounter in the area since 2003.”\textsuperscript{177} This he owed to the compliance by both sides of the government-MILF Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities,\textsuperscript{178} which is being enforced with the help of a multinational peacekeeping group, the Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team. Seeing the progress gained, the 603\textsuperscript{rd} IB was pulled out of Camp Iranun and replaced with a smaller contingent of about 600 combatants in 2015.\textsuperscript{179} The brigade has since been relocated to Pigkalagan District in Sultan Kudarat in Maguindanao, 170 kilometres away.

In terms of economic progress, foreign investors from South America, the Middle East and other parts of Asia have shown interest to engage in high value crop production in the town of Matanog, which boasts of fertile soil.\textsuperscript{180} La Frutera Corporation, a banana company, is exploring the possibility of allotting at least 1,000 hectares for banana plantation.\textsuperscript{181} Fruit producer Dole Philippines has also proposed setting up a 5,000 hectares pineapple plantation, whilst a Guatemala-based investor is eyeing coffee plantations.\textsuperscript{182} These investors have pledged to provide technical requirements and capital, as long as the town can assure peace and order as well as the people’s cooperation. The mayor of Matanog, Mohammad “Kits” Guro has attributed the relative peace to the efforts of the 603\textsuperscript{rd} IB.\textsuperscript{183}

However, this relative peace may be short-lived. At the national level, the government and the MILF leadership have been conducting peace talks since 1998, which resulted in several attempts of signing a peace agreement. The latest document was the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), although has been in the pipeline since 2012, was not approved by the 16\textsuperscript{th} Congress of the House of Representatives before it adjourned in February 2016. The BBL, which was supposed to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to create a Bangsamoro political entity, was expected to be one of the highlights of President Aquino’s administration before he stepped down in June 2016. In the absence of a bill, there is a fear among civilians of hostilities brewing in the near term.
5.5 National Security Policy (2011-2016): Focus on Non-Traditional Security

Figure 5.9: Evaluating policies through the Non-Traditional Security Framework

| Source: Adapted from the conceptual framework in Figure 1.3. |

5.5.1 Frontline to Disaster

The Philippines geographical location makes it susceptible to natural disasters. The country experiences around 900 earthquakes and 20 typhoons of which six to nine make landfall each year, making it the third-highest disaster risk country in the world. One indicator that shows the big role AFP plays in disaster response is the budget it allows for humanitarian affairs and disaster response (HADR). Since 2010, the AFP sets aside Php1 billion for disaster response and management annually. Another factor contributing to this is the fact that a number of conflict-affected areas are susceptible to calamities and many times the military finds itself functioning two roles at one time – internal security and disaster response.

In November 2013, the Philippines was severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan which turned out to be one of the deadliest natural disasters to ever strike earth in recorded history. A storm surge followed that smashed through coastal neighbourhoods and farmlands across central Philippines. The typhoon killed thousands and left millions homeless, whilst hitting an
already poor region and pushing them deeper into poverty and increasing their vulnerability to the next disaster. A year before that, on 4 December 2012, Typhoon Bopha struck the Philippines, with the island of Mindanao worst affected. While Typhoon Bopha was not as strong as Typhoon Haiyan, it hit a region ill-prepared for this kind of calamity. Using these two disasters as case studies, the contributions of the Armed Forces to disaster response are explained in the following sections.

5.5.2 Typhoon Haiyan: Case Study 1 – Coordination and Support

Tropical Depression 31W or Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines on 8 November and was recorded the most powerful storm in recent history. Days before the storm moved toward the mainland, the Philippines National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) public advisories were issued alerting local authorities to monitor the situation and disseminate early warning information to communities. With a force equivalent to a Category 5 hurricane, Typhoon Haiyan (locally named Yolanda) struck the central region of the Philippines. For the next 16 hours, the super typhoon directly swept through six Philippine provinces and affected over 10% of the nation’s population of 105 million people. According to the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Haiyan had powerful winds up to 200 mph (300 km/h) with gusts up to 225 mph (360 km/hr). The speed of the storm as well as advance warning prevented greater flooding and may have saved many lives. Almost 90 per cent of infrastructures were heavily damaged or destroyed, including airports, roads, schools and medical facilities. Furthermore, decentralised government authority, a shortage of available government workers, looting, and heavy rains delayed some relief efforts.

Within a few days after the typhoon made a landfall, the Philippine government reported that an estimated 11.5 million people had been affected by the storm, with more than 540,000 displaced (of which roughly 380,000 were staying in 1,215 evacuation centres and 162,000 outside the centres). The government also reported that 792,000 people were evacuated in advance of the disaster. The city of Tacloban (population 220,000) capital of Leyte province was one of the hardest hit places and the scene of the most concentrated destruction and death (see more data in Table 5.14). Thousands of Tacloban residents reportedly drowned in a “two-story high” storm surge, including people seeking safety in a sports
stadium that served as a shelter.\textsuperscript{195} With a steady growing population combined with poor infrastructure in disaster-prone areas, the Philippine archipelago is highly vulnerable to natural calamities and humanitarian crises.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.14: Effects of Typhoon Haiyan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>damaged (totally/partially) houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of damages (agriculture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of damages (infrastructure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of damages (social)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of damages (cross-sectoral)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost of damages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NDRRMC Updates on the Effects of Typhoon Haiyan.\textsuperscript{196} Data gathered during fieldwork in Tacloban City and Ormoc City in September 2014  

Of the 17 regions of the Philippines, nine were affected – Western, Central and Eastern Visayas, regions VI, VII, and VIII, respectively.\textsuperscript{197} Region VI includes the following provinces: Aklan, Antique, Capiz with the capital of Roxas City, Guimaras, Iloilo, and Negros Occidentals.\textsuperscript{198} Region VII includes Bohol, Cebu with Cebu city as its capital, Negros Oriental, and Siquijor. Lastly, Region VIII is composed of Biliran, Eastern Samar, Leyte with the capital of Tacloban City, Northern Samar, Southern Leyte, and Western Samar (See Figure 5.10).\textsuperscript{199} The huge infrastructure damage brought by the typhoon to these areas slowed rescue and response, and also hampered the delivery of goods and services to those affected.
Local and international organisations and foreign governments activated their response to aid those who were affected by the typhoon. The AFP in support of foreign militaries such that of Australia, South Korea, the United States, played a critical role in clearing airports and roads to quickly allow much needed humanitarian assistance to be delivered. United Nation agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID OFDA) and the United Nations Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC), were also quick to respond by sending teams into the affected areas to conduct initial rapid assessments. These initial rapid assessments are crucial for the timely and accurate determination of the potential damage and the much needed aid. During Typhoon Haiyan, the Philippine military responded with 25,526 personnel. Military efforts involved the use of 47 sea vessels, 46 aircrafts, and 570 mobility vehicles. Appendix L shows the timeline of AFP deployment to areas affected by the typhoon.
With the magnitude of devastation caused by Typhoon Haiyan and the overwhelming response by the international community, the AFP created the Joint Task Force Yolanda.\textsuperscript{204} The mission of the Task Force was to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations in coordination with the local government units (LGUs) and foreign military forces to track the distribution and delivery of relief of goods, deployment of responders, assets and resources in order to mitigate the effects of the super typhoon.\textsuperscript{205} Its concept of operation was to establish the AFP-OCD-HADR command coordinating centre that set up logistical hubs where goods and supplies were positioned and ferried using all available land, sea, and air assets. In addition, the command centre also facilitated coordination of all efforts with the international military forces through the multi-national coordinating centre (MNCC). MGen Velarmino said that the MNCC was established to facilitate coordination and cooperation of foreign military forces with the affected nation to support the HADR in affected regions in Central Philippines.\textsuperscript{206} The host nation determines the priorities for support and articulates those priorities to the MNCC for support. Upon the transition from relief to early recovery to rehabilitation phase, engineering units would assist in the reconstruction of damaged infrastructures and provide engineering support to other agencies as requested by the Regional Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council (RDRRMC).\textsuperscript{207}

The other mechanism the AFP used to facilitate the response operations during Typhoon Haiyan included the Office of Civil Defence (OCD) being the executive arm of the NDRMMC and maintains the operations of the centre 24/7. The main office of the OCD is in Camp Aguinaldo, where the DND office is located, showing the close coordination of the two offices. It is supported by all 16 regional centres nationwide to constantly monitor any disaster-related incidents and disseminates appropriate advisories and guidelines to all concerned. In an interview with OCD Region VIII Director Dr Blanche Gobenchiong, she said that the NDRRMC operating centre given its limitations in some areas achieved its mission by continuously improving its core functions on alert and monitoring, multi-agency operational coordination, response resource mobilization, information management, operations capability upgrade to effective programme coordination.\textsuperscript{208} On alert and monitoring, the operations centre provides warning in close coordination with warning agencies. It disseminates warning to areas threatened by disasters to provide the public with advisories on the extent, potential or ongoing emergency situation including necessary precautionary measures to be undertaken. The operational centre monitors the probable
consequence of potential ongoing and past disasters on emergency situations, alerts available response units, and monitors the transition from emergency response and relief to early recovery phase.

Another coordinative mechanism used in the influx of humanitarian response and aid were the one-stop shop facilities, which were activated on 12 November 2013, four days after the typhoon hit. Open 24 hours/7 days, the facilities served as the information hub for all transactions between and among donors, consignee, and recipients of foreign donations. The identified government agency expedited the documentation and processing of imported donations including the issuance of customs, immigration, quarantine clearances and the flight clearances. During initial operations, two one-stop shop facilities were established – at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and in Mactan airport in Cebu. With the concept of one-stop shop, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) also established the Typhoon Haiyan Action Centre to facilitate the entry of relief goods and personnel by air or by sea. The Action Centre was led by the Bureau of Customs with representatives from the Department of Finance, Bureau of Immigration, DSWD, Department of Health (DOH) and OCD. In the operationalization of the one-stop shop of the DFA, the following coordinative policy procedures were adopted:

- The PH government should be informed first of the offers of assistance through the embassies
- Medical assistance coordination with the DOH;
- Search and rescue with the NDRRMC or OCD;
- Goods must be consigned accordingly or to the embassy
- Military assistance with the DND Operational Coordination with the MNCC;
- Cash assistance to social welfare account, NDRRMC or PRC

During the height of the Typhoon Haiyan operation, civil-military coordination at the tactical level was established through co-location concept in Cebu, Roxas; and Tacloban, liaison visits in Manila, Ormoc, and Guian; and direct assignment of foreign military contingents to government departments and ministries. Co-location as a form of network governance is a way of organizing response teams when responding to an emergency situation. This temporary set-up enables effective communication, as well as, enhances efficiency due to collaboration and task allocation. According to Major General Velarmino, Commander of Task Force Yolanda (Haiyan), one of the best experiences of civil-military coordination
mechanism was the establishment of the civil-military coordinating centre in Roxas City on 14 November 2013, wherein co-location strategy among local agencies and foreign countries was adopted. Functions performed included (i) liaison and coordination between civil-military and other organisations, (ii) receive, validate, and coordinate requests, and (iii) provide as a venue of sharing information (e.g. 3rd Infantry Division of the AFP provides situation updates). As a need-based set up, any organisation that wants to extend will have to drop by first in one of these centres to register their name and members. Depending on the kind of support (e.g. food, shelter, medicine, etc.) the organisation is providing, those in-charge in the monitoring centre will check their records on who needs such assistance before the helping organisation can proceed. Members of the Task Force meet daily to update each other about the condition in their respective responsibility.

Allied countries provided overwhelming international support during the disaster relief operations. 57 countries responded to the appeal of the government among which 29 have military capabilities that were engaged in search, rescue, and retrieval operations and other humanitarian assistance activities such as providing medical services. Overall, there were 15,400 multinational military personnel involved in the operations, 145 military aircrafts, and 29 navy ships were utilized providing support for the AFP and other government agencies and NGOs. Transportation assets of other multinational forces were integrated to further fast track the delivery of the needed resources to the typhoon affected areas. The Joint Task Force Yolanda coordinated and monitored the flight schedule, naval schedule, and initiated force protection for 29 multinational foreign military performing HADR operations in the different typhoon affected areas. These actions were commended by the UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Baroness Valerie Amos, who said that, “This is the most effective civil-military coordination we have ever seen at the field level and should be used as a model for future disaster response operations.”

Issues and challenges faced and identified by the military were revealed during interviews with military personnel involved in the Haiyan operations. Table 5.15 identifies these issues and challenges categorised as processes, capabilities, information, and resources.
Table 5.15: Issues and Challenges Experienced During Typhoon Haiyan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues and Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Processes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Command and Control not immediately established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Need for additional strategic lift capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Need for Incident Command System and other related training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of situational awareness with limited rapid damage and needs assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Need to enhance public information dissemination on disaster events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resources</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of HADR resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Need to maximise reservists involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of a facility for the Multinational Coordination Centre (MNCC) at the strategic and operational level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of an emergency communications system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of long range public address systems and portable address devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of disaster response equipment down to battalion-level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews and Survey results. Fieldwork in Tacloban City and Ormoc City in September 2014.

A few days before the arrival of the typhoon, government agencies, including the AFP, were mobilised. On 7 November, President Aquino conducted a national live television broadcast and dispatched the secretaries of the Department of National Defence and the Department of the Interior and Local Government to Tacloban City to coordinate preparations for disaster response. Concurrently, DSWD prepositioned food, medicine, and other relief support, and emergency funds were apportioned and put on standby. However, despite these preparations, military personnel interviewed attributed the issues and challenges to the massive destruction of the typhoon. Processes initially put in place by local government units were not immediately established since local personnel trained in disaster response were the victims themselves. Even with the AFP’s extensive experience in responding to frequent typhoons and earthquakes, its lack of capacity for airlift and sea transport limits its humanitarian capabilities in the archipelagic environment. With just three C-130 transporters, a limited number of utility helicopters and a few landing and logistic vessels, the massive storm exposed the government’s inability to deliver essential quantities of materials and other aid, such as food, water, and medicine, to a wide coverage area. This brings to the lessons identified by the AFP as shown in Table 5.16, which captured overarching points to address in preparation for future disaster events.
Table 5.16: Lessons Identified by the AFP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preparedness for typhoon at Haiyan magnitude</th>
<th>Lessons Identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Need to elevate preparedness for a worst case scenario such as super Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ground preparations were insufficient for the magnitude of Typhoon Haiyan with strong storm surges which swept away evacuation centres</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multilevel response should be seamless</th>
<th>Lessons Identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Local to national level responsibility handover</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Responder assistance should be sent from outside of the region</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Leadership dealt with overwhelming circumstances</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Expectations from military support</th>
<th>Lessons Identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• There was an over dependence on the military’s strained assets and resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Responsibility should be equally shared with other civilian organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There was a limited mechanism between the AFP and the regional disaster risk reduction and management council (RDRRMC) for the logistics operation for immediate supply replenishment during the response</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overwhelming International Support</th>
<th>Lessons Identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Early response from the international community occurred after the expedient disaster declaration by the government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 57 countries and 29 multinational military organizations participated in HA/DR operations</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectiveness of the MNCC</th>
<th>Lessons Identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The MNCC facilitated coordination with foreign military forces to support HA/DR missions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• For Typhoon Yolanda, it was the first time the AFP had an operational MNCC</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Readiness</th>
<th>Lessons Identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• AFP has limited training on inter-agency HA/DR operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There is limited unit training on HA/DR operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• HA/DR operations are dependent on using appropriate equipment</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculties and Logistics</th>
<th>Lessons Identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The AFP has available facilities for coordination and HA/DR to include command and control and storage of equipment and goods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• AFP lacks the Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) facility that could utilized for HA/DR operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Command and control, and interagency/ multinational coordination were drastically impacted by the disaster event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There was minimal logistics preparation and no pre-positioning of additional supplies/equipment in anticipation of the typhoon which led to shortfalls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews and survey results.219 Fieldwork in Tacloban City and Ormoc City in September 2014.

Two days after the typhoon made its first landfall, the Philippine government issued a request for humanitarian assistance to other countries.220 The timely response of the AFP and by militaries of other countries addressed the immediate needs of survivors, and was key in the success of the succeeding rescue and relief operations. The humanitarian professionals and local government personnel interviewed for this study provided three reasons why the contribution of the military was significant to the overall success of relief efforts. First, the storm destroyed key infrastructure (e.g. airports, roads, communication systems) that was
essential to support relief operations; and its strong winds toppled down trees and utility poles, and left debris scattered all over making it difficult to pass.\textsuperscript{221} Facilitated by the initial efforts of the AFP, the heavy lift capability of Australia, South Korea, U.S., and other foreign militaries were vital to speedily reinstate transportation routes for the relief goods to be moved, as well as re-establish communication lines. Second, the storm damaged hundreds of acres of crops and properties across a number of provinces and municipalities. Military capabilities made it possible for government agencies and humanitarian organisations to access hard to reach areas.\textsuperscript{222} Third, the prompt response of the armed forces afforded life-saving relief to survivors in the initial crucial days, whilst the government agencies and humanitarian organisations prepared capabilities to deploy.\textsuperscript{223} The devastation of Typhoon Haiyan highlighted critical capability shortcomings in airlift and sealift within the AFP that limited their ability to respond rapidly to the humanitarian crisis.\textsuperscript{224} Within days of the disaster, numerous foreign military contingents were supporting humanitarian operations, providing equipment, logistics and relief supplies. For example, the U.S. Department of Defence deployed 13,400 military personnel, 66 aircraft and 12 naval vessels including an aircraft carrier battle group.\textsuperscript{225} Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and 16 other countries deployed military ships, aircraft and personnel, providing the Philippine government with significant quantities of relief supplies and logistical capacity to reach affected areas.\textsuperscript{226} Dozens of countries also donated to relief efforts in the form of cash assistance and supplies. The slight response from fellow ASEAN countries was noticeable as this disaster resulted in a limited collective effort despite the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response whose mechanism was established in 2005.\textsuperscript{227} This could be attributed to the small “light” fleets owned by most ASEAN countries that are deemed more useful for defence and surveillance, and not for large-scale disaster response such as Typhoon Haiyan operations.

5.5.3 Typhoon Bopha: Case Study 2 – Effectiveness and Efficiency

The second case involves another typhoon that happened in southern Philippines, which is rarely visited by a typhoon. Typhoon Haiyan may be the strongest typhoon recorded in modern history, but the challenge of Typhoon Bopha is also concerning precisely because the areas affected have not experienced typhoon, much more, have an idea how to respond to one. Typhoon Bopha (locally named Pablo) made landfall three times in the Philippines,
spreading destruction across 30 provinces, in December 2012.\textsuperscript{228} The islands are no stranger to typhoons and other severe weather events, but Bopha was different; Mindanao, the area of initial impact, typically does not experience typhoons of this magnitude. It destroyed properties and agricultural crops, cut power and telecommunication lines, and forced the cancellation of flights and ferry services. Strong winds and heavy rain left thousands homeless, as well as flooded roads and bridges needed by rescue personnel trying to reach stricken regions.\textsuperscript{229} The death toll reached 1,067 people, with most on the southern island of Mindanao, where floods and landslides caused major damage on December 4 (see Table 5.17). A total of 834 people remain missing, about half of them are fishermen.\textsuperscript{230}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Effects of Typhoon Bopha}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Super Typhoon Bopha Impacts} & \textbf{Metric} \\
\hline
People dead & 1,067 \\
\hline
Damage to: agriculture & $566,985149.36 \text{ USD}$ \\
Infrastructure & $161,613,943.54 \text{ USD}$ \\
Total cost of damages (private properties) & $61,045971.89 \text{ USD}$ \\
Total cost of damage & $789,645,064.78 \text{ USD}$ \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\label{table:typhoon_impacts}
\end{table}

Relief food and medicines had been on standby whilst thousands of people along the country's eastern border were being prepared for evacuation to safer ground in preparation for the typhoon.\textsuperscript{231} With Bopha expected to strike the southern parts of the Philippines, as well as cities and provinces in Southern Tagalog and Metro Manila, the possibility of landslides was advised in Surigao, Davao, Compostela Valley, Misamis Bukidnon, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Zamboanga, Leyte, Cebu, Bohol, Negros, Panay and Mindoro.\textsuperscript{232} The national police, coast guard (PCG) and navy had pre-positioned their personnel on key areas and their units for disaster response in preparation for Bopha's impact. Appendix M cites the AFP’s role during the Typhoon Bopha response.

One of the most badly hit areas in the province of Compostela Valley was the municipality of New Bataan. Within New Bataan is a village called Barangay Andap, where the flash flood originated bringing with it rocks from the mountains and destroying everything along its path – houses made of straw, people, animals, and farms. Along its trail was also the camp of the 66th Infantry Brigade’s (IB) Charlie Company, which was not spared and seven soldiers lost their lives that day. The area is known for insurgency activities, hence the presence of the
Army. According to the Civil Military Operations (CMO) Commander of the 10th Infantry Division, Lt Col Llewellyn Binasoy, the main role of military personnel in far flung areas is counter-insurgency, so most equipment available are intended for fighting the rebels, not for disaster response. However, the Philippine Army acknowledges the added responsibility of HADR and receives disaster response trainings from the NDRRMC in partnership with the AFP such as the Combat Life-Saver, Search and Rescue. It has been found out that some of the typhoon victims were members of the rebel group. Asked how the military deals with it, Lt Col Binasoy of the 10th Infantry Division said that:

“First and foremost, this is a humanitarian situation. We do not distinguish. This is what is good about IPSP, when we are taught about human rights, which is universal. And during the times of disasters, we need to adhere to the International Humanitarian Law. This is what we instil to the soldiers.”

In an interview with Mr McAdrian Cobero, Operations Staff of the OCD, he shared that Compostela Valley is one of the most progressive provinces in terms of implementing HADR training. This is largely due to the leadership and political will of Governor Arturo Uy, who made sure that mechanisms needed to establish an Incident Command Post (ICP) are in place as per implementing guidelines of the NDRRMC. The first ICP post located at the provincial capitol was installed two days after the typhoon made landfall. Considering the devastation caused by its strong winds and heavy rains – no power, down communication lines, and unpassable roads – this is already considered a fast response. ICPs were also established in the five municipalities that were affected. ICP is the field location where the primary functions of overall management of the incident are performed. In 2012, the Philippine government through the NDRRMC adopted the Incident Command System (ICS) as an on-scene incident management mechanism that regularly conducts training for disaster managers and managers of all local government units, non-government organisations and private sector agencies. Whilst government employees were the focal persons in the disaster response operation at the provincial ICP and the military take instructions from them, in the municipal ICPs, meanwhile, it was the other way around. The Armed Forces temporarily took the reins since the municipal employees and local police force were the victims themselves. According to Ms Arceli TimogTimog, Head of the Provincial General Services Office (PGSO), the municipal ICPs were relinquished back to the civilians after three days.
The physical presence of the military helped a lot in the disaster operation but it was not enough. They had guns and ammunitions but what they needed at that time included “rope, lifejackets and chainsaw” as commented by Lt Col Mike Aquino, Ex-O of the 1001st Infantry Brigade in Maco, Compostela Valley.\textsuperscript{238} Disaster response as one of the responsibilities of the AFP is explicitly stated in AFP Modernisation, IPSP and NSP policies, but the reality is the money needed to augment this obligation is not programmed within the defence budget. As a consequence, army units must rely on their smarts and initiative to support this need.

5.5.4 Analyzing Military Response during Natural Disasters

The involvement of the AFP in disaster response operations is a function of legal and normative principles as documented in Presidential Decrees, Republic Acts, and Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs). Formerly known as the National Disaster Coordinating Council, the NDRRMC has been chaired by the Secretary of National Defence since 1978. NDRRMC provides the armed forces a legitimate role in disaster response as well as stipulates a framework for civil-military engagement. The regular presence of natural disasters in the Philippines has afforded a historical basis for this kind of engagement: (a) that the armed forces takes directives from the civilian authority (whether the NDRRMC chief, the governor or the mayor) on deployment, activities, tasking, reporting procedures and timetables (including pull-out of troops from the site); and (b) although disaster response is secondary military mission, its significance is equally important in attaining the strategic goals of the military especially in areas affected by insurgency.\textsuperscript{239} As argued by Desch\textsuperscript{240} and Goodman,\textsuperscript{241} the participation of the AFP in humanitarian affairs and disaster response creates minimal disagreement, mainly because of these crucial purposes. Based on the two case studies discussed, there was no tension between the military and civilian authority in making crucial decisions concerning search and rescue operations.

The NDRRMC is composed of 44 members that include the Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Finance, Labour, Justice, Public Works, Transportation and Communication, Social Welfare and Development, Trade and Industry, Local Government, Health, Environment and Natural Resources. The Chief-of-Staff and Executive Secretary supported as council members as well.\textsuperscript{242} On the local/community level, the highest-ranking officer of
the AFP is a member of the local disaster risk reduction and management council (LDRRMC).

The LDRRMC performs the important functions of integrating disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation into the local development plans and programmes. The MOU on the International Humanitarian Assistance Network of 2007 had assigned the DND major responsibilities to facilitate international assistance. The MOU signed with the Departments of Health, Transportation and Communication, Justice, and Finance designed specific roles for each department. The DND performs rapid needs and damage assessments which form the basis of requesting international assistance, facilitate entry of international teams through Immigration and Customs, accredit the disaster relief teams and provide logistical support to allow for operations and air transport to disaster areas.

Table 5.19 indicates the major roles of the military services.

With the approval of the National Disaster Response Plan by the NDRRMC Council in June 2014, the DND through the AFP has been appointed as the lead cluster for search, rescue, and retrieval (SSR) cluster with the support of DSWD, DILG, PNP, Bureau of Fire Department (BFP), OCD, PCG, DFA, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), PAGASA, DPWH, DOH, Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), telecommunication corporations, and other organisations acknowledged by the NDRRMC (see Table 5.18 for AFP roles). Clustering is an approach promoted by the United Nations (UN) as a response to the international humanitarian coordination system set by General Assembly Resolution 46/182 in December 1991. Clusters are groups of humanitarian organisations (UN and non-UN) working in the main sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. shelter, food security, health, and emergency telecommunication. Clusters are formed when clear humanitarian needs exist within a sector, when there are a number of organisations that volunteer to help within sectors, and when national authorities require coordination support from local and foreign actors. Good coordination is critical in emergencies because it lessens the gaps and overlaps in humanitarian organizations’ work, making it viable for a more coherent and complementary response. More importantly, clusters provide a venue for stakeholders and partners such as international humanitarian actors, national and local authorities, and civil society to work together.
Table 5.18: Roles of the AFP During Natural Disasters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Roles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>Engineering Brigades of the Philippine Army coordinate with the Department of Public Works and Highways to support the restoration of destroyed public works infrastructure such as flood control, waterworks, roads, bridges, power facilities and other public structures and utilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Philippine Air Force| The Philippine Air Force coordinates with the Department of Transportation and Communications Air Transport Office and carries out the following responsibilities:  
1. Aerial search and rescue operations  
2. Directs immediate repair of damaged airports, runways, and facilities  
3. Attends to inter-agency contingency planning and execution of plans for air crashes outside of airport facilities  
4. Prepares daily outlooks with the Philippine Atmospheric. |
| Philippine Navy    | The Philippine Navy collaborates with the Philippine Coast Guard (under Department of Transportation and Communication) to conduct rescue and emergency operations. The Navy assists in transporting relief goods and personnel via sea lanes. |

Source: Data gathered during field work at the Department of National Defence in July 2015. Information provided by the Centre for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance.

The AFP, as a structured agency, is the most robust first responder during natural disasters. Aside from the lead agency in the search, rescue, and retrieval operations, the AFP also assisted the NDRRMC and its various levels in the regional, provincial, and municipal in the conduct of disaster response operations in order to save lives, protect properties and minimise damages caused by natural and man-made calamities. The AFP typically serves as the ‘boots on the ground’ in major catastrophes, providing manpower, logistics support, and relief in coordination with civil actors. The military additionally supports reconstruction and recovery through its engineering corps.

According to MGen Jet Velarmino, the AFP adopts doctrinally the force provider and force employer concept in the conduct of disaster response operations. The major force providers are the Philippine Army, Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. MGen Velarmino said that these major military services each organises, trains, and equips their respective disaster response unit, which will be deployed in humanitarian affairs and disaster response (HADR) operations through the unified command. On the other hand, the unified command provides command, control and direction of all disaster response operations at the operational and tactical levels, where they deploy assets from different infantry divisions to disaster.
response units nationwide. Furthermore, MGen Velarmino shared that the role of the military in HADR includes but are not limited to: (i) during prevention and mitigation, engineering units could be tasked to construct dikes and other flood control structures; (ii) as part of preparedness, prepositioning of food and non-food items in disaster prone areas; and (iii) to disseminate early warnings and advisories in isolated areas. He emphasised that in the aftermath of any disasters, AFP troops are ready to conduct search, rescue, and relief operations. During rehabilitation and recovery, AFP engineering units may be tasked to rebuild communities and infrastructures such as houses, roads, and bridges. As mandated in the Constitution as the protector of the people, the Filipino public expects the presence of the military when disaster strikes. MGen Velarmino, the military sees this as an opportunity to help and exercise civil-military cooperation and coordination. Both cases reveal the efficiency of the military despite being poorly equipped for these types of operations (not surprising, given the institution’s counter-insurgency thrust).

5.5.5 Combating Transnational Crime

The incidences of various transnational crimes within the Philippines have created a significant impact on its political, economic, and sociocultural stability and security. The country addresses a number of illegal activities at sea such as smuggling of goods, trafficking of people, trade of illicit drugs, illegal trafficking of arms, piracy and armed robbery, and maritime terrorism.\footnote{251} The activities may occur within Philippine national jurisdiction or conducted by Filipino nationals but nevertheless have an impact on the region.\footnote{252}

\textit{Trafficking in People:} Smuggling and trafficking of people, mostly women and children, is a component of illegal migration of Filipinos overseas. The Philippines is a major source of people trafficked to other countries, particularly to the United States, Singapore, Canada, Japan, Italy, United Kingdom, Jordan, Malaysia, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia.\footnote{253} Philippine authorities report that the number of victims of trafficking in people increased from 220 in 2004 to 359 in 2007.\footnote{254} The foremost arrangements of trafficking in people to these countries are through illegal immigration, mail-order bride scheme, family tours, cultural exchange, and adoption.\footnote{255} As the Philippines witnesses an increasing number of Filipino women migrating to other countries, the trafficking of these women in the hands of
illegal recruiters, slavers, and prostitution rings has also increased.\textsuperscript{256} Some of these Filipinos become subject to domestic violence, as well as to labour and human rights abuses.

The degree of illegal human trafficking by sea involving Filipinos to neighbouring states is not known. However, incidents have been cited by the Philippine government of women trafficked in cargo vessels, and in freezer vans and drums, and some of these women do not survive the journey.\textsuperscript{257} A more common problem associated with the illegal transport of people is the illegal migration of refugees to the Philippines. Under the human rights code of the Philippines, the movement of asylum seekers and refugees is not illegal.\textsuperscript{258} However, according to the research of Feliciano and de la Cerna, there are boats transporting people through western and southern seas that are not spotted by border patrols.\textsuperscript{259} This indicates that maritime borders are porous and they do not have proper monitoring and surveillance system, and thus susceptible to illegal activities such as the trafficking of people, and perhaps illegal arms and drugs.\textsuperscript{260} Table 5.19 shows the number of convictions from 2005 to 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Convictions</th>
<th>Number of Persons Convicted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total | 223 | 246 |


Reflected in Table 5.19 are an increasing number of convictions since 2005. The Philippine government increased its funding for the Inter-Agency Council against Trafficking (IACAT) to $2.4 million in 2013 and continued efforts to implement anti-trafficking laws at the national, regional, and provincial levels.\textsuperscript{261} IACAT was established to enforce the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (Republic Act 9208). The Council undertook notable efforts to prevent the trafficking of overseas through training and awareness campaigns for government officials, prospective overseas workers, and members of the public and to proactively identify and rescue victims exploited within the country. The government obtained 27 trafficking convictions in 2013, which doubled to 55 in 2014.

Illegal Drug Trafficking: The Philippines is geographically at the crossroads of drug trafficking in the Asia-Pacific region. Known as a producer, exporter, importer, and consumer of synthetic drugs, the country is in a strategic location for the transit and market of these drugs. Drug syndicates consider the Philippines as an investment haven for drugs and money laundering, and a recreation place. In a global review on drug consumption and production, the Philippines has been cited to have reported an increasing trend in cannabis consumption and methamphetamine production, and is identified as source of synthetic drug precursors to various destinations in the world. The same with the issue on trafficking in persons, it has not been determined as to how much illegal drugs that originate in certain areas of Asia, such as China, have successfully entered the Philippines undetected through the country’s small ports. Table 5.20 shows the accomplishments of the Philippine government against illicit drug trafficking from 2011 to 2014.

Table 5.20: Anti-Drug Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accomplishments</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-drug operations</td>
<td>12,269</td>
<td>9,885</td>
<td>11,474</td>
<td>16,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests</td>
<td>10,636</td>
<td>10,159</td>
<td>9,162</td>
<td>13,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutralization of drug groups</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug cases filed</td>
<td>12,627</td>
<td>12,534</td>
<td>10,502</td>
<td>17,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismantling of drug labs and dens</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It was in the mid-1990s when the illicit manufacture of crystalline methamphetamine and the first industrial-scale clandestine manufacturing facility was discovered. Since 2004, the Philippines has the highest estimated methamphetamine prevalence rate globally, and since then the number has been stable or slightly declining. Still, the manufacture of crystalline
methamphetamine continues in the Philippines, with 118 manufacturing laboratories detected and dismantled in 2014, an increase from 92 in 2013. (see Table 5.20). Physical sizes of these clandestine drug laboratories can range from small ‘kitchen-type’ to large and medium-sized facilities; and can be located in both rural and urban areas. It is estimated that about 14 per cent of the total number of local municipalities is drug infested. About 5 per cent of the total population are dependent on illicit drug, including 7 per cent of the total youth population. The illegal drug trade in the Philippines is a multibillion dollar industry involving prominent individuals (e.g. politicians, law enforcers) and foreign nationals (e.g. Chinese), who not only focus their activities in major cities like Metro Manila and Cebu, but has expanded to provinces and municipalities.

A number of factors contribute to the increase in drug trafficking in the Philippines. Economic difficulties and poverty may be identified as the main reasons for people resorting to drug trade as an alternative source of income. There has been an influx of members of transnational criminal organisations masquerading as legitimate investors and tourists in the country. Liberalization and deregulation have also been cited as reasons for the movement of illegal goods, including illicit drugs. For these reasons, law enforcement agencies regard drug trafficking as a national security threat.

Apart from contributing to the increasing level of crime in the Philippines, it is surmised that drugs can finance activities of insurgent and secessionist groups. Local authorities have discovered marijuana plantations in some areas in the Philippines with high incidence of insurgency activities. Likewise, the amount of illegal drugs transported by sea, land, or air remains unclear; however, some areas have been identified as coastal trafficking points around the archipelago. Seizures of illegal drugs can enable them to be traced from their origin in certain parts of Asia to their point of entry into the country through small ports along the extensive coastline. In 2012, for example, illicit drugs perceived to have originated in South America have been seized in the Philippines, possibly intended for onward trafficking to mainland China and Hong Kong.

Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Piracy in the Philippines sees a decreasing trend based on Table 5.21. The table shows that there have only been 52 incidents of piracy in the Philippine waters from 2006 to 2015, compared to a total of 1,046 incidents in the region. However, the
problem is far from over, especially with the porous borders surrounding southern Philippines. Mindanao has had a long history of peaceful trade with Malaysia and Indonesia. But what is concerning is the presence of pirates that attack coastal communities and vessels\textsuperscript{278} and make the Sulu archipelago a base for them to resupply, rest, and plan their next raiding expeditions.\textsuperscript{279} Compared with the Strait of Malacca, which recorded 55 attacks in 2015, the problem of piracy and armed robbery in southern Philippines is more rampant.\textsuperscript{280} The insurgency and terrorism problem in the Philippines have added to the security challenges confronted by the security forces in Mindanao. Secessionist groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) have ethnic affinity with seafaring families and contribute to the prevalence of piracy in Southern Philippines.\textsuperscript{281}

\textit{Illegal Trafficking of Arms:} There are about 630,000 licensed firearms in the Philippines, with an average increase of 65,802 registered firearms each year.\textsuperscript{282} Most of these firearms are sourced locally through licensed defence firms such as Armscor and UDMC; or imported legally from the U.S., China, Israel and Europe.\textsuperscript{283} However, based on the information gathered by the intelligence agencies it was revealed that there are more than 300,000 loose firearms in the country, which are owned by gun enthusiasts, hobbyists, political warlords, or criminal groups.\textsuperscript{284} Smuggling of firearms is conducted through air and seaports through the delivery of packages, big equipment, appliances, and international aid. But it is through the seaports where these smuggling of loose firearms most commonly occur. According to the interview with an official of Philippine Centre on Transnational Crime (PCTC), the ports of Manila, Cebu, Leyte, Negros provinces, and Mindanao have been used to smuggle guns to be sold to armed threat groups and criminal gangs.\textsuperscript{285} Local guns, usually of less firearm power, are manufactured in the Philippines and shipped to both local and foreign markets on board passenger vessels and fishing boats. More sophisticated and high-powered firearms are smuggled into the country.\textsuperscript{286}
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<td>40</td>
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<td>Straits of Malacca &amp; Singapore</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* AC-Actual; AT-Attempted

A number of factors have contributed to the proliferation of illegal trafficking of arms in the Philippines. The high marketability of firearms and the involvement of unscrupulous officials in arms smuggling for use in private arms are the two main reasons that this problem remains unabated in the Philippines. The lack of control of gun dealership and manufacturing in the Philippines, as well as the pilferage of arms from the military and police, also lead to arms smuggling.

5.5.6 Military and Law Enforcement Coordination

Similar to global trends, the Philippines has associated some of the maritime security threats with a wider context of transnational crime. Illegal trafficking in drugs, goods and persons, piracy and terrorism all have land and sea components and are linked to transnational criminal groups. The Philippines estimates that the profit from drug trafficking is almost half the country’s national budget, whilst terrorist groups have used laundered money to support their activities and expand their facilities. Some activities of terrorist groups also include kidnapping or hostage for profit, such as the kidnapping by the ASG of 21 people at the Sipadan Beach Resort, Malaysia in 2000 and 20 people at Dos Palmas Beach, Palawan, in 2001, the victims of whom were brought to Southern Mindanao. Although the economic benefits from conducting these illegal activities at sea have yet to be accurately determined, a holistic approach in addressing these concerns not just from a maritime security perspective but also from a national security perspective is warranted.

There are more than 40 individual and inter-agency institutions governing the marine and maritime sectors in the Philippines, which involve some functions related to maintaining good order at sea. Each of these government institutions has a number of priorities set out in their mandates, annual plans and programmes. For example, the Maritime Industry Authority has adopted a ten-point programme that institutionalises an advocacy campaign for the safety travel and protection of the environment. Law enforcement agencies have mandates to protect the territorial integrity of the Philippines, promote maritime safety and security, protect the marine environment and provide services such as search and rescue, and vessel traffic management. Enforcement agencies cooperate in order to carry out more effective mechanisms against illegal activities at sea, such as the joint manning of vessel traffic
monitoring centres by the Philippine Ports Authority and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG),
and port state control by these agencies along with the Bureau of Customs, the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, the Bureau of Quarantine and Inspection Services and the
Philippine National Police. A number of other initiatives have been established by the
Philippines, such as the deployment of sea marshals or counter-terrorist teams on board
vessels in the aftermath of the SuperFerry 14 incident. Each sea marshal team is composed of
officers from the PCG, the AFP, the Philippine National Police (PNP) and private ship
security agencies. In support of the sea marshal operations, coast guard K-9 units are also
used to search for bombs, firearms and illegal drugs in cargo containers as a pre-departure
port security measure.

The issues addressed through inter-agency cooperation also demonstrate the maritime
priorities of the Philippines. Some of the existing collaborative mechanisms established by
various government institutions include the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC), the Inter-Agency
Counter-Narcotics Operations Network – Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (ICON-
PDEA), the Inter-Agency Philippine Border Management Network (IPBMN), the National
Committee on Illegal Entrants (NCIE), the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
(NICA), the National Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee (NALECC), and the
Presidential Anti-Smuggling Group (PASG). Law enforcement agencies, particularly the
PCG, are also cooperating with the Land Transportation Office to inspect documents of
vehicles being transported by ferry and to monitor the illegal transport of smuggled and
stolen vehicles. Similarly, a Joint Coastal Coordination Desk was formed by the PCG and the
Bureau of Customs to identify coastal ports where no customs official or employee is
regularly stationed. The Joint Coastal Coordination Desk is also tasked to receive confidential
information related to smuggling operations; take testimony, receive evidence, administer
oaths, summon witnesses and require the submission of documents by subpoena; and assist in
the prosecution of smuggling cases.

Furthermore, President Aquino signed Executive Order 57 in September 2011 to establish a
National Coast Watch System (NCWS), harmonising diverse policies and programmes that
cut across multiple agencies including the Philippine Navy, the Philippine Coast Guard and
the Philippine National Police-Maritime Group. Under this initiative, which establishes a
National Coast Watch Council charged to develop strategic direction and policies, the
agencies are mandated to work together to enhance maritime domain awareness across the country. Whilst there are overlaps in terms of duties and functions, minimal cooperation had been observed between agencies prior to the creation of the NCWC. In the context of a changing security landscape, it is essential that a common operating picture be shared across this group of diverse stakeholders. The NCWS is an initiative of the Philippines with critical support coming from its international partners. The U.S government, through the Defence Threat Reduction Agency, has provided US$20 million to cover the costs of data integration from various agencies to the facility, as well as installation, training, and radio communications. Discussions with other international partners are on-going as the Philippines looks for new opportunities to cooperate on capacity-building programmes.

5.6 Summary of Findings

This chapter has analysed the policy formulation, strategy, and implementation of defence and development policies in the Philippines. The Philippine government has been instrumental in enacting policies that give credence to the role of the AFP not only in defence, but also in development. Considering the internal and external factors that have influenced Philippine security policies, the AFP has managed to engage the public and private sectors through partnerships and collaborations, in such activities as defence industrialisation, counterterrorism/counter-insurgency, and non-traditional security. These engagements have managed to create innovation, skills and jobs, promote development projects, as well as enhance coordination and response. However, the extent of the impact on these performances has been limited. Table 5.22 provides a snapshot of how the policies were implemented based on the case studies specified.

The study has focused on three areas as main themes to evaluate the four policies, namely, the AFP Modernisation Act of 1995 and 2010, the IPSP 2011-2016, and the NSP 2011-2016. The three main focal points of the study are the defence industry, internal security, and non-traditional security. Four defence companies were surveyed and 17 experts were interviewed to talk about the Philippine defence industry. On the internal security situation in the Negros Occidental and Maguindanao, 16 individuals coming from the armed forces, other government agencies, non-government organisations, academe, church, and a former rebel were interviewed. Meanwhile, 38 individuals were interviewed about non-traditional security,
which focused on transnational crime and the AFP’s response during Typhoon Bopha in 2012 and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013.

Table 5.22: Snapshot of the Implementation and Evaluation of Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metrics</th>
<th>Defence Industry</th>
<th>Internal Security</th>
<th>Non-Traditional Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthened defence capability</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased privatisation and efficiency</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Weak procurement law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased employment and skill generation</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>More foreign contracts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased supply chain and infrastructure development</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Will take another 10-15 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased intelligence successes</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Increased number of rebel returnees, decreased support of the mass base, and reduced number of clashes</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater civil-military relations</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Church, NGOs, academe are involved</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased development projects</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Defence economic zone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced coordination</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Collaboration between AFP, government and public</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced maritime security</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Procurement of multi-use equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved response time</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Early warning system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of response</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>ISO capabilities for HADR</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecution and punishment of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Notes:  
a. Low capability  
b. Reprioritization from external to internal security  
c. Collaboration between Coast Guard and AFP  
d. Weak procurement law  
e. More foreign contracts  
f. Will take another 10-15 years  
g. Reduced number of clashes  
h. Collaboration between Coast Guard andAFP  
i. Church, NGOs, academe are involved  
j. Clearing of roads and rebuilding houses  
k. Infrastructures and livelihood  
l. Defence economic zone  
m. Collaboration between AFP, government and public  

Notes:  
* DND-AFP-OCD-LGU coordination  
** High in personnel capability but low in equipment  
*** DND-AFP-OCD-LGU coordination
*P – positive; N – negative

Sources of primary data:

- Attended the presentation by Brigadier General Guillermo Molina, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5 at the House of Representatives in July 2015, Quezon City, Philippines;
- Interview with Brigadier General Jon Aying, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; Interview with Dr Rommel Banlaoi, Executive Director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research.

- Attended the presentation by Brigadier General Guillermo Molina, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5 at the House of Representatives in July 2015, Quezon City, Philippines
- Interview with Brigadier General Jon Aying, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; Interview with Dr Rommel Banlaoi, Executive Director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research.

- Attended the presentation of Admiral Rodolfo Isorena, former Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard in July 2015.
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- Interview with Brigadier General Jon Aying, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; Interview with Dr Rommel Banlaoi, Executive Director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research.

- Interview with Dr Peter Paul Galvez, Chief of Staff of the Secretary of the Department of National Defence; Attended presentation of Assistant Secretary Patrick Velez of the Finance, Acquisitions, Installations, Logistics Office of the Department of National Defence.
- Interview with Dr Peter Paul Galvez, Chief of Staff of the Secretary of the Department of National Defence; Attended presentation of Assistant Secretary Patrick Velez of the Finance, Acquisitions, Installations, Logistics Office of the Department of National Defence.

- Interview with Brigadier General Jon Aying, former Brigade Commander of the 302nd Infantry Brigade in Negros Occidental; Interview with Jennie Macalipsay, Social Worker, Provincial Social Welfare and Development Office in February 2014; Interview with Brigadier General Arnel dela Vega, former Commander of the 603rd Infantry Brigade based in Maguindanao.

- Interview with Harry Pineda and Edwin Lopez, Executive Director and Advocacy Officer of Alter Trade Foundation based in Bacolod City in February 2014; Interview with Brigadier General Arnel dela Vega, former Commander of the 603rd Infantry Brigade based in Maguindanao; Interview with Captain Gregorio Jose of the 603rd Infantry Brigade based in Maguindanao.

- Interview with Arceli Timogtimog, Head of the Provincial General Services Office in Compostela Valley in October 2014; Interview with Colonel Neddy Espulgar, Commander of the 19th Infantry Battalion based in Tanauan in Leyte province in September 2014.

- Interview with Dr Peter Paul Galvez, Chief of Staff of the Secretary of the Department of National Defence.

- Interview with Dr Peter Paul Galvez, Chief of Staff of the Secretary of the Department of National Defence.

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Table 5.22 notes that the implementation of policies has a low impact on the industrialisation of the defence sector. Despite the strong emphasis of the policies toward improving the arsenal of the Philippine armed forces, little has been done to materialise this goal. Mainly, the complaint of the private defence companies is the lack of support for local manufacturers. The willingness to participate in public bidding is visible, but the weak procurement law prevents smaller players to do so. Most of the time, it is the bigger foreign companies who acquire these government contracts. The private companies have invested in computer-operated machines to increase their production but they need cooperation in terms of sales in order for their business to grow as well as generate employment. The potential of the defence economic zone, however, is a promising venture to realise this participation.

Comparatively, the evaluation of AFP’s response to internal security and non-traditional security showed a more positive outlook. The AFP, especially the Army, has a lot of experience in internal security. The AFP has manpower strength of 125,000 of which 68 per cent or 85,000 soldiers are with the Philippine Army (PA) distributed in 11 major units throughout the country. During Martial Law, the PA had the reputation of being human rights abusers, but through security sector reforms, the outlook towards men in uniform is changing. In both Negros Occidental and Maguindanao provinces, the presence of the military still connotes the existence of insurgency and terrorism, but engagement with the local communities and NGOs has proven to be an effective intelligence strategy. The engineering unit of the AFP has also been called to build roads and bridges in hard to reach areas.

The role of the AFP during natural disasters has also been positively evaluated by the interviewees. In the two typhoon tragedies, the armed forces based in the areas were the first responder, where their role in search and rescue has been crucial. Prior to the onslaught Typhoon Bopha and Typhoon Haiyan, military units have already been deployed to assist the residents in evacuation. However, the tragedies, especially during Typhoon Haiyan, also
revealed the deficiency of the AFP in response capability. Furthermore, the collaboration between the AFP and the PSG can be attributed to the response against transnational crime. The PSG’s capability to investigate and capture traffickers is limited due to the lack of boats, so they join forces with the Philippine Navy (PN) to strengthen their capacity. The overall picture showed that implementation in some areas worked, and in other areas need more work.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

6.1 Summary

The purpose of this research project has been to evaluate the contribution of the Philippine defence sector to national development through the lenses of three areas: defence industrialisation, internal security, and non-traditional security. Whilst the conventional view is that defence is a burden on development, the question this study poses is whether, by contrast, in the Philippine context, there is a positive relationship between defence and development; that is, that defence expenditure contributes to development outputs such as employment, skill-generation and even infrastructural investment.

The experience of the Philippines in the field of defence paints a dreary picture despite it being the envy of its neighbours in the immediate years after World War II. Through the years, the country saw the deterioration of its military capabilities amidst the continuing threat of insurgency and terrorism. In recent times, the Philippine government has viewed defence as a way to boost the economy. It has followed the trend of incorporating the inclusion of socio-economic aspects in its defence utility mandate. However, there the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) remain under-resourced. The opportunity costs of defence are especially high for the poorer nations, and so a case study of the Philippines is particularly relevant, focusing on analysing the defence-development nexus from the perspective of a developing country.

The enabling objectives of the study are as follows: (i) to evaluate the different defence frameworks, tools, processes and mechanisms by cross reference to defence strategies in selected developed and developing countries; (ii) to determine the factors that contribute towards an ‘effective’ defence and development strategy by using pre-determined metrics; (iii) to discuss and critically analyse the development of the Philippine defence policies and industry performance, and its contribution to national development; and (iv) to propose policy recommendations towards an effective development model enabling defence to play a more robust role in meeting Philippine security challenges.
The literature is abound with scholars addressing a more holistic approach to security that includes comprehensive, collective and cooperative measures that aim to ensure security for each person. In particular, international cooperation has increased resulting in transnational policing to enhance global security against potential threats caused by terrorism and organised crime, and lately non-traditional challenges. The importance of comprehensive security to both developed and developing countries has led to a wealth of literature on defence and development. More than just a trendy catchphrase, comprehensive security has expanded to include economic, health, and environmental concerns, as well as the physical security of the individual, of which all are intertwined. The shift from traditional to comprehensive security is reflected in the changing global security landscape as evident in the physical and economic issues surrounding the state, economy and the individual. This study aims to peel off the comprehensive security layers revealing the essential role of defence and development, in this case, the Philippines.

The different schools of thought and theories highlighted in Chapter 2 also showed two differing perspectives on the role of defence to development. On one hand, some scholars view that defence is a burden to growth and development as it massively shifts welfare-enhancing resources to military expenditures. They argue that with these cutbacks development projects are sacrificed in order for defence programmes can be maintained. On the other hand, other scholars claim that the military plays a progressive role in nation building. Chapter 2 explores studies that have identified defence as a force that facilitates development.

In attaining foreign policy objectives, defence and development strategies have long been utilized, eventually blurring the lines between them. Although their primary role is to defend the state from external aggression, Armed Forces across the world have performed duties beyond their defence responsibility. Militaries have taken on tasks related to economic development, nation-building, the preservation of political stability, managing public enterprises, providing disaster relief, enforcing public order and engaging efforts to conserve natural resources. The defence posture practiced by Singapore, China and Japan suggests the need to re-examine the validity of Benoit’s argument that defence contributes positively to development. Countries like Singapore, China and Japan have taken advantage of new ideas about security espoused by contemporary scholars, policymakers and international
institutions. Apart from state sovereignty and territorial integrity, these three Asian states have embarked on ways to address threats such as climate change, piracy, human/drug trafficking, pandemics, natural disasters, and transnational crime. Most of these threats require a coordinated response as well as transnational cooperation among all stakeholders (such as the government, non-government organisations, local communities, and other non-state actors).

Whilst the Philippines may not enjoy the concept of ‘rich nation, strong army’ like Singapore, China and Japan, to some extent, the country has sought to link defence and development in its pursuit to create an integrated security strategy through especially the following three policies of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (2010), the Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernisation (1995 and 2010), and the Philippine Development Plan (2011-2016). A country with both insurgency and terrorism threats, the Armed Forces of the Philippines have been at the forefront of a campaign to tackle some of these domestic challenges, and as part of its pursuit for political and economic stability, have embarked on ‘non-traditional’ missions. As part of the comprehensive security action plan, these non-traditional missions involve carrying out long-term projects aimed at contributing to the economic development of the country.

Against this backdrop, Chapter 3 has sought to provide a clearer context of how defence industrialisation, internal security, and non-traditional security are defined in this study. The domains defence industry, internal security and non-traditional security remain strong areas for which the armed forces can enhance its strategic and operations capabilities. As defence industries around the world are expanding in terms of national security significance, its relevance in terms of economic importance and technological evolution is also increasing. Since the 9/11 attacks, interest in the study of terrorism has heightened especially today when terrorist tactics are becoming more lethal. In the Philippines, insurgency emerged from the combination of nationalism and anti-colonialism sentiment against the ruling elites. Employing counterterrorism and counter-insurgency responses require strategic thinking that involves the use of hard and soft approaches.

The 1987 Constitution has made this mandate clear that whilst the AFP is tasked with both internal and external defence, the military must also be at the forefront of nation building. One of the questions asked in Chapter 4 was, ‘Does the Armed Forces of the Philippines
perform new roles?’ Based on the study, the AFP has participated in non-traditional activities since it was established, as part of its role as the ‘protector of the state and its people.’ In recent years, the AFP has been involved in humanitarian affairs and disaster response, as well as coordinating with the Coast Guard and police in tackling transnational crime. Furthermore, the AFP also participates in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in countries such as East Timor and Haiti. The various functions performed by the AFP result from legal and historical factors, as well as international cooperation. Today, the AFP’s education and training programmes offered by the Department of National Defence, as well as the acquisition of equipment are likewise leaning more toward the building of capabilities that will allow the soldiers to respond to an array of non-traditional security concerns.

6.2 Conclusions

The mission thrusts of the AFP demonstrate the organisation’s multiple objectives that equip it as a whole to carry out a mandate to protect the state and the people. In the process of evaluation, a number of questions have been addressed. Has defence contributed significantly to development? Has there been a genuine development of a Philippine defence industry? Has there been an effective internal security effort? Is the role of the armed forces in non-traditional security relevant? Finally, this study has sought to analyse defence and development in the Philippines by reference to certain metrics held to reflect the breadth and depth of local security endeavour. Accordingly, based on the findings of the analysis in Chapter 5, this study offers the following conclusions:

1. Philippines defence capability is insufficient.

Minimum credible defence is a concept that has become popular in the public debate over the modernisation of the AFP. Unfortunately, the Philippine government has not articulated this concept very clearly. Based on interviews, some government officials simply associate minimum credible defence with the acquisition of new military equipment and the improvement of military infrastructure. Others believe strategic military training is a crucial component of this effort. Where the modernisation programmes are concerned, the assessment is gloomy. When President Benigno Aquino stepped down as president in June 2016, the projects under the AFP Modernisation Act of 1995 (R.A. 7898) remain incomplete,
with several more projects still ongoing, while others have not even started. On the other hand, the revised AFP Modernisation Programme under Republic Act 10349 has only 2 of 33 projects awarded, although President Benigno Aquino announced in his 2015 State of the Nation Address that it has signed 30 projects for implementation and funding by the Department of Budget Management (see Appendix for list).

Notwithstanding, the AFP has benefited considerably under President Aquino’s administration, where multiple modernisation projects have either reached significant acquisition stages or have been completed entirely during his tenure. These included the acquisition of 12 FA-50 fighter jets for the Air Defence Wing of the Philippine Air Force, and two frigates and two anti-submarine helicopters for the Navy.

2. **Defence industrialisation in the Philippines is immature.**

The local defence industrial base plays a vital role in the quality, availability, and sustainability of the defence material solution. Section 5.3.2 in Chapter 5 indicates that the Philippines has a weak defence industrial base. In particular, there are no major players for capital equipment and primary defence assets. Defence acquisition relies on foreign military hardware to fill the shortfall in capability. In essence, the AFP and DND acquires capital assets from foreign vendors to answer current requirements. By way of contrast, with the presence of a strong industrial base, government and private players may enter into collaboration to produce cutting-edge technology to address not only the present needs, but also future technological requirements (Defence Economic Zone).

It was examined in Chapter 3 what defines a defence industry. If these measures are applied to the Philippines, it can be concluded that defence industry is neglected despite the presence of local arms manufacturers. The Self-Reliant Defence Posture (SRDP) has been one of the government programmes that helped pushed competition among private defence firms. The promise of a robust defence industry in the Philippines was seen during the initial stage of the SRDP, however, due to factors such as corruption and too much dependence on the government as the buyer, the programme did not progress. More than a decade later, the AFP Modernisation Act of 1995 and 2010, as policies, attempt to push for the modernisation of the military armaments, and along with it the defence industry, but challenges in the procurement law discourages local players to bid.
At the national level, the symbiotic relationship between SRDP and the wider national development policy should be fully emphasised. Specific time-bound project goals should be conceptualised in consultation with stakeholders. Initiating an industry-wide knowledge base involves sustaining research and monitoring process should be considered to periodically determine gaps between the policies. No doubt the country can produce small arms equipment and supplies, as ascertained in Chapter 5 however; the Philippines needs to concentrate on upgrading its arms production status in order for the economy to benefit from its external defence initiatives as well as any long range modernisation efforts. With the Defence Economic Zone now in the works (Section 5.3.3), it would be practical for the Philippines to embark on a long term plan involving R&D efforts to implement the programmes.

3. **Internal security related problems have decreased.**

Going by the number of rebel returnees in Negros Occidental (Table 5.13), decreasing insurgency and terrorism activities in the three Maguindanao municipalities (Section 5.4.3), internal security challenges in the Philippines have reduced. A big part of this outcome is derived from the local stakeholders taking ownership of the programmes of the government through the armed forces. Additionally, a strong support from the local government units gave the programme more leverage to reach the intended beneficiaries. Domestic conflicts in the Philippines, more often than not, occur in the poorest provinces of the country, where poverty incidence and unemployment rate are high, making its residents more vulnerable to recruitment by the communist rebels. With the support of the local populace, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts in Negros Occidental and Maguindanao have been successful.

The Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) of the Aquino administration is a counter-insurgency strategy that aimed at winning hearts and minds of the people rather than directly confronting the enemy. Since its inception in 2011, IPSP has been successful in so far as putting emphasis on the combat and non-combat dimension of the campaign. Whilst combat operations are deemed necessary, it is considered the ‘last resort,’ giving more importance in engaging the local community, such as what they have done in Negros Occidental (Section 5.4.2) and in Maguindanao (Section 5.4.3). The IPSP promotes a “People-Centred Approach”
that is why one of the main activities of the 303rd Infantry Brigade is the Peace Caravan, where the armed forces accompany members of government agencies to far flung areas to deliver basic services. However, such a move sometimes poses a challenge because the soldiers wear their uniform and carry weapons, and people in those areas, having experienced the harshness of the Martial Law era, are suspicious of men in uniform. Nonetheless, the IPSP policy is working due to the emphasis of a ‘people engagement’ narrative.

4. **Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism enabled a robust relationship between the AFP and stakeholders.**

What is unique about IPSP is that the policy was crafted not without the participation of non-military entity such as civilian government agencies, the academe, and civil society groups, which allowed for the framing and broadening the definition of security that puts the welfare of the people at the core of its strategies and operations. Having been under a Martial Law regime for 13 years, this interaction between the military and civil society is a commendable feat.

The two case studies on internal security – Negros Occidental and Maguindanao – gave insight that the opinion of the local communities about the military is changing as demonstrated by an easier acceptance of government projects. Another healthy advantage established by this relationship is the sharing of intelligence between the local residents and the military deployed in the area (See Table 5.22 for sources of interviews).

5. **AFP’s response during natural disasters is valuable and strengthens civil-military relations.**

In the Philippines, the National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council (NDRRMC) confers in the armed forces a legitimate role in disaster response and provides a framework for civil-military engagement. The two disaster case studies – Typhoon Bopha and Typhoon Haiyan – afforded a platform for civil-military engagement to function and provided a more defined structure, where the armed forces take clear directives from civilian authority in terms of duties, procedures, and timetables without leadership confusion. The case studies also showed that, whilst the primary role of the military is physical protection, their role in responding to non-traditional security challenges is equally significant. Furthermore, the case studies point to how self-sufficient combat units are despite being poorly equipped for these
types of operations (not surprising given the institution’s counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism thrust). These are highlighted in Table 5.17.

6. **With the Philippine Coast Guard at the forefront against transnational crime, the AFP’s supporting role has been significant.**

Transnational crimes have existed and a consensus has emerged that these will be a growing challenge, especially with globalisation and radical advancement of technology. The Philippines, being an archipelagic country characterised by scattered islands and islets and a long and virtually unguarded coastline, posed a challenge to law enforcers, but an advantage to traffickers. Hence, collaboration between the Philippine Coast Guard and the AFP is crucial.

Based on these conclusions, it can be recognised that defence has a positive role in the national development of the Philippines.

6.3 **Policy Recommendations**

This study has been concerned about the contribution of defence to development by looking at how the policies affected certain case studies. Policy recommendations will thus be at the strategic level, reflecting on how security and development can work well together. This suggests policy relevance to both AFP and the general public. The policy recommendations, as derived from the principal conclusions (section 6.2), of this study, are as follows:

- It is recommended the Philippine Congress amend the existing Government Procurement Reform Act (R.A. 9184). Government agencies such as the DND and AFP have realised that the current Procurement Law does not support defence-related acquisitions. Focusing on the least price among bidders, the present Procurement Law has allowed the Defence department to deviate from the necessary requirement of establishing capability as a reason for procurement. There is a competition between Best Value (affordability) vs Customer-Satisfaction (needs). Furthermore, the procurement process has been observed to be lengthy and does not support streamline procedure. R.A. 7898 and R.A. 10349 state that only offers coming from the suppliers themselves will have to be entertained by the AFP. This has not been the case,
however, because the Procurement Law allows agents and distributors to participate. The provision in the Procurement Law that requires the bidder’s largest single contract be at least 50% of the Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) has to be revisited because it has resulted to the lack of participation by indigenous companies and single-bidder contracts because only the players can participate in the larger contract.

- It is recommended that the government support a local defence industry. Policymakers, who pull the budget strings, have always viewed defence spending as a cost centre, making it a challenge for the defence department to obtain needed funds for capability. The goal is to link defence spending as a percentage of the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country, as most developed countries do. One way to achieve this is to pursue the plans to build a Defence Economic Zone, which can be pursued under the Private-Public Partnership (PPP) mechanism to help improve the national economy. As it promotes local manufacturing, resulting to job generation, the Defence Economic Zone shows in concrete terms the linkage between development and security in a manner. Not only is this sustainable, it can also help achieve the self-reliance in defence posture the Philippines is aiming for.

- It is recommended that the Philippine President appoints a civilian Defence Secretary with a strategic depth on security rather than a newly retired General. As a ‘partner’ in development during the Martial Law era, President Marcos appointed retired military generals to key civilian posts. This gave the military a free reign over civilian matters, resulting to human rights abuses. The idea of democratic control has the civilian leaders develop the defence policy with the military implementing the decisions of civilian authorities. This has been highlighted in the 2003 Joint Defence Assessment conducted by Philippine and U.S. defence and military officials, which include among others the implementation of a strategy-driven multi-year defence planning system and improvement of personnel management systems. However, this is not the case in the current economic and political condition of the Philippines, where the military is encouraged to intervene in the affairs of civil society. Democratic control of the armed forces must always be observed as emphasised in the 1987 Constitution. Such action empowers civilian institutions and promotes security sector reform nationwide,
and this involves installing a civilian defence secretary. This reform upholds the principle of accountable and transparent management of national security institutions.

- It is recommended that the appointment of the Chief-of-Staff of the AFP be rotated among the main branches of the armed forces. The Philippines is an archipelagic country, however, since the AFP was established most chiefs came from the Philippine Army. There were five from the Air Force and one from the Philippine Marines, but none from the Navy. Of the 125,000 AFP membership, 85,000 of the personnel are with the Army, and with it goes the bulk of the military budget. The rotation of AFP chiefs-of-staff among the branches of the armed forces enhances the jointness in the military and could contribute significantly to supplementing the defence-development process. Each main branch could offer new ideas and perspectives for strategic security capability, and avoid the AFP to be construed as too army-centric.

- It is recommended that a new National Defence Act (NDA) be drafted and passed into law. In 2006, the DND and AFP submitted to Congress a draft of a proposed NDA. A product of several consultations across the country, the draft intended to update the Commonwealth Act No. 1, otherwise known as the National Defence Act of 1935. So much has happened in the last eight decades and the original defence charter has become outdated and does not suit the needs and conditions of the 21st century security environment. However, the 2006 proposal was never enacted into law.

Some of the suggestions in the 2006 NDA draft proposal include the redefining of security principles and concepts, restructuring of the promotion and advancement schemes of the armed forces, as well as the enforcement of discipline and professionalism in the military. These issues remain relevant until today. With the current emphasis on security and development, it is vital for the government to revisit the 2006 draft and craft a new or an updated one that will include the role of the AFP in non-traditional security such as in disaster response and transnational crime. This can help ensure the continued implementation of the reform agenda and bring about a stronger defence institution.
6.4 Suggestions for Further Research

From the conclusions and policy recommendations stated above, here are four research ideas that can be further explored.

1. There is limited literature pertaining to Philippine security despite its broad experience in terms of internal security and non-traditional security. This study is an attempt to contribute to fill that gap in the literature. For future research, an in-depth study on the Philippine defence industrialisation shall be conducted to further discuss its political, economic, and socio-economic implications.

2. As this research has only focused on the Philippines, further research on defence and development should be employed, this time, comparatively looking at other Southeast Asian countries with its unique culture, composition, and varied military priorities.

3. The existence of a ‘source country’ and a ‘receiving country’ allows transnational crime to prosper if not properly addressed. For future research, a study on the security collaboration in the tri-border area between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia is suggested.

4. As this study has only concentrated on the role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in disaster response, for future research, it is also important to look at the cooperation angle between the Philippine military and the foreign troops during humanitarian affairs engagement. It is suggested that interviews with foreign military participants should be explored.
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Appendix A

To Whom It May Concern

PhD Research to Evaluate the Contribution of Defence to National Development in the Philippines

I am a researcher at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. I presently work as a researcher for the National Institute of Education, but previously spent almost four years at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) as a researcher in defence and counterterrorism studies.

During my time at RSIS, I applied and was accepted as a student to enter a PhD Programme at Cranfield University, UK Defence Academy. The focus of my research is the contribution that defence makes to development, broadly defined. For my case study, I wish to research the experience of the Philippines in forging a cross-over relation between defence ‘and’ development. My study framework is anchored to the following policies: the AFP Modernisation Act of 1995 and its subsequent revision in 2110, the Internal Peace and Security Plan of 2010, and the National Security Policy (2011-2016) to highlight the important security goals of economic development, disaster management/prevention, piracy suppression, internal security, and international commitments.

This is an interesting and policy-relevant research endeavour. Although it is clearly a field ripe for research, none to my knowledge has been undertaken in the Philippines. Accordingly, my doctoral research programme aims to fill this gap, but I do need your help to pursue my planned empirical research.

I wish to seek your participation in the research programme. Specifically, I would like to interview you, and where feasible and convenient to follow-up by interviewing colleagues in the field. The questions will not be sensitive or intrusive and the answers will in any case be treated as confidential. The purpose of the research is to push the boundaries of knowledge, taking as the departure point, the under-reported positive spin-offs the Philippine defence economy makes to broader economic, industrial and technological development.

Thanking you in anticipation.

Yours sincerely

Ava Patricia C. Avila
PhD Student
Cranfield University, UK
Questionnaire – Defence Industry

DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE PHILIPPINES

Aim of the Questionnaire

This questionnaire is designed to gather evidence to evaluate the contribution of the Philippine defence sector to national development. The questionnaire is part of a PhD research programme. The outcomes of this research will be utilized to further assist the Philippine government in enhancing its defence policy and strategy in developing a comprehensive security framework.

This questionnaire is directed to Philippine-owned defence industries, whose businesses are involved in manufacturing defence materials for the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National Police and other related government agencies. Your participation and expert opinion is essential in assessing the contribution of the defence sector in promoting Philippine national development.

Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Your cooperation is appreciated. Rest assured that we will keep your responses confidential and only my supervisor and I will have access to it.

Instruction

Many of the responses in this questionnaire sample require a tick in a box. However, some questions will ask for your written comments, detailing your insights into a particular topic.

Sections covered in this questionnaire

PART A : Company Profile
PART B : Company Operation, Strategy and Human Resource Development
PART C : Company Technology Development Capability
PART D : Impact of Defence ‘and’ Development
PART E : Final Suggestions

Please complete all questions according to the guidelines provided.

A. COMPANY PROFILE

1.01 Company Name:

1.02 Address:

1.03 Contact Person:

1.04 Position/Designation:

1.05 Year Started:
1.06 Type of Business (please tick one): ☒
   a. Individual proprietorship ☐
   b. Public limited company ☐
   c. Private company ☐
   d. Co-operative ☐

1.07 Paid-Up Capital:

1.08 Annual Turnover (for the last five years):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.09 Ownership of the Business in terms of paid-up capital (should add up to 100%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage 100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Privately-owned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government-owned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. COMPANY OPERATION, STRATEGY AND HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

Please note that all questions in this section are about your firm (including your branch or subsidiary)

2.01 Which of the following best describes your company? (Tick all that apply) ☒
   a. Plant production ☐
   b. Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) ☐
   c. Upgrade/Retrofit ☐
   d. Manufacturing ☐
   e. Accounting ☐
   f. Sales Office ☐
   g. Others, please specify ________________________ ☐

2.02 Number of Employees in your company: (Please tick the appropriate box) ☒

   Under 250 ☐
   250-500 ☐
   500-1000 ☐
   More than 1000 ☐
2.03 Please estimate the proportions of your company’s workforce according to level of education attained. Please include all levels of workers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education Attained</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than elementary school</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Graduate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school Graduate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational School Graduate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Studies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.04 Approximate percentage of employees in your company involved in:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.05 Your company’s annual expenditure on management training and skill development as percentage of revenues (please tick the appropriate box).

- Less than 10% ☐
- 21-30% ☐
- 41-50% ☐
- 11-20% ☐
- 31-40% ☐
- Above 51% ☐

2.06 For each of the following categories, please identify the defence industrial factors that exist in your company.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports and Destination</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Products/Nature of Process</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing Process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRO process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services offered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export potential</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R &amp; D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.07 What is the competitive strategy of your company’s principal business (choose the most applicable answer)

- Based on natural resources availability
- Based on favourable costs of skilled workers
- Based on product or process technology
- Based on marketing strategy
- Based on the infrastructure support

2.08 Your company’s broad industry category:

- Aerospace
- Maritime
- Weapon
- ICT
- Automotive
- Others, please specify

2.09 Does the company manufacture civil/commercial products?

- Yes
- No

If yes, please specify.

_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________

2.10 Who are the company’s clients and the percentage of the total revenue? (Please tick all that is applicable)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client/s</th>
<th>Percentage %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government (please specify agency)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Company (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C: COMPANY TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITY

3.01 Your company’s annual expenditure on developing new technology as a percentage of revenue

Less than 10% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 41-50% ☐
11-20% ☐ 31-40% ☐ Above 51% ☐

3.02 Your company’s annual R&D expenditure as a percentage of revenue

Less than 10% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 41-50% ☐
11-20% ☐ 31-40% ☐ Above 51% ☐

3.03 Does your company have R&D facilities?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, please indicate the reasons
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

3.04 Does your company collaborate with other institutions (such as Department of Defence, universities/colleges, and others)?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, please specify which organization and details of collaboration:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Details of the project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.05 Does your company receive R&D assistance from the government?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, please provide details of the assistance:
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
3.06 Does your company source the following? (tick the appropriate box):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
<th>Subcontract</th>
<th>Specify</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components and Parts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialised Research and Training Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultancy services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Raw materials for maintenance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.07 Does your company have any patent registrations?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, please give details and indicate when required, where the registration is lodged and the nature of the technology patented.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of patent</th>
<th>When acquired</th>
<th>Where registration was lodged</th>
<th>Nature of technology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tbody>
</table>

3.08 In the last five years, did your company introduce a new product, service or production method?

Yes ☐ No ☐

3.09 If yes, this innovation originated from:

- Within the firm ☐
- Another source in your country ☐
- Another country ☐
3.10 If a technology has come from another country, how was it transferred? (Please tick all applicable boxes)

- Bilateral agreement
- Technical Cooperation
- Offsets
- Joint Venture
- Turnkey contracts
- Foreign Direct Investment
- Others, please specify _____________________

3.11 Please specify the country engaged with (please tick):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Joint Venture</th>
<th>Co-production</th>
<th>Sub-contract</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, please specify</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

D. IMPACT OF DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT

4.01 Have the changes/developments in policies (e.g. AFP Modernization, National Security Policy and Internal Peace and Security Plan) been good for the business?

- Yes ☐
- No ☐

If yes, in what ways have they been beneficial?

__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

4.02 Have your products/services helped in the development of the country in any way?

- Yes ☐
- No ☐

If yes, in what way?

__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
4.03 Has there been an increase in the creation of jobs over the past five years?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, what type of jobs and numbers over the past five years?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Work</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. FINAL SUGGESTIONS

Please suggest possible improvements to the effectiveness of the defence industry as it contributes to the development of the Philippines.

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

Thank you for your cooperation.
Appendix C

Questionnaire – Counterterrorism and Counter-insurgency

DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE PHILIPPINES

Aim of the Questionnaire

This questionnaire is designed to gather evidence to evaluate the contribution of defence to national development. The questionnaire is part of a PhD research programme. The outcomes of this research will be utilized to further assist the Philippine government in enhancing its defence policy and strategy in developing a comprehensive security framework.

This questionnaire is directed to counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency agencies and sectors in the Philippines. Your participation and expert opinion is essential in assessing the contribution of the defence sector in promoting Philippine national development.

Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Your cooperation is appreciated. Rest assured that we will keep your responses confidential and only my supervisor and I will have access to it.

Instruction

Many of the responses in this questionnaire sample require a tick in a box. However, some questions will ask for your written comments, detailing your insights into a particular topic.

Sections covered in this questionnaire

PART A : Personal Profile
PART B : Organization Profile
PART C : Terrorism and Insurgency
PART D : Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency
PART E : Impact of Defence ‘and’ Development
PART F : Final Suggestions

Please complete all questions according to the guidelines provided.

C. PERSONAL PROFILE

1.10 Name:
1.11 Position/Designation:
1.12 Organization:
1.13 Years in the Organization:
1.14 Job/Research Scope

____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
D. ORGANIZATION PROFILE

2.01 Type of Organization (please tick one): ☒

e. Government ☐
f. Non-Government Organization ☐
g. Academe/Think Tank ☐
h. Others, please specify ☐

2.02 Objectives of the Organization:
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

2.03 Focus of the Organization. Please tick all that applies

a. Counter-terrorism ☐
b. Counter-insurgency ☐
c. Civil Military Integration ☐
d. Disaster Management ☐
e. Piracy research ☐
f. Anti-piracy operation ☐
g. Human Trafficking research ☐
h. Anti-human trafficking operation ☐
i. Drug trafficking research ☐
j. Anti-drug trafficking operation ☐
k. Economic development ☐
l. Governance ☐
m. Others ☐
Please specify _________________

2.04 Does your organization collaborate with another organization to counter terrorism/insurgency?
Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, please specify way/s of collaboration.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

E. TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY

3.01 Number of terrorist attacks in the last 15 years

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<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

269
3.02 Number of insurgencies in the last 15 years

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

3.03 Perpetrators

Abu Sayyaf

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

MILF

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

MNLF

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

NPA

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

F. COUNTER TERRORISM AND COUNTER INSURGENCY

4.01 What are the counter-terrorism measures that have been put in place?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hard approach</th>
<th>Soft approach</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4.02 What are the counter-insurgency measures that have been put in place?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hard approach</th>
<th>Soft approach</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.03  Number of terrorists/rebels apprehended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captured</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Indicted</th>
<th>Integrated back into the society</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.04  Do you think there is a need to improve the counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency efforts?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, how (cite some ways)
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

4.05  Do you collaborate with the local community?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, please specify how.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

How is your relationship with the local community?
________________________________________________________________________

4.06  Do you engage in development projects?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Already put in place</th>
<th>In the process of implementation</th>
<th>Proposed</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.07  Are the projects in consultation with the local community?

Yes ☐ No ☐
E. IMPACT OF DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT

5.01 Have the changes/developments in policies (e.g. AFP Modernization, National Security Policy and Internal Peace and Security Plan) benefitted the organization?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, in what ways have they been beneficial?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

5.02 Have the changes/developments in policies (e.g. AFP Modernization, National Security Policy and Internal Peace and Security Plan) benefitted the local community?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, in what way?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

5.03. Do you think what the government is doing is enough to mitigate the threats?

Yes ☐ No ☐

Why?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

F. FINAL SUGGESTIONS

Please suggest possible improvements to the effectiveness of the security sector as it contributes to the development of the Philippines.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

Thank you for your cooperation.
Appendix D

Questionnaire – Non-Traditional Security (Disaster Response)

DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE PHILIPPINES

Aim of the Questionnaire

This questionnaire is designed to gather evidence to evaluate the contribution of the Philippine defence sector to national development. The questionnaire is part of a PhD research programme. The outcome of this research will be utilised to further assist the Philippine government in enhancing its defence policy and strategy in developing a comprehensive security.

The questionnaire is directed to personnel and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Department of National Defence and other related government agencies, policymakers, defence industries, scholars, and non-government organizations who have been involved in either defence or development. Your expert opinion is essential in assessing the contribution of the defence sector in promoting Philippine national development.

Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Your cooperation is appreciated. This survey questionnaire is confidential and only I and my supervisor will have access.

Instruction

Many of the responses in this questionnaire sample require a tick in a box

However, some questions will ask for your written comments, detailing your insight into a particular topic.

Please complete all questions according to the guideline provided.

A. PERSONAL PROFILE

1.01 Name:
1.02 Position/Designation:
1.03 Company/Organization:
1.04 Years of Employment in the Company/Organization:
1.05 Job Scope:

B. ORGANISATION

Please note that all questions in this section are about your organization.

2.01 Type of Organization

a. Government
b. Non-Government
c. Academic/Think Tank
d. Private company
e. Others

Please specify __________________

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2.02 Objectives of the Company/Organization:

2.03 Focus of the Company/Organization:

Please tick all that applies

n. Counter terrorism studies
   □
o. Civil Military Integration
   □
p. Disaster Management
   □
q. Piracy research
   □
r. Anti-piracy operation
   □
s. Human Trafficking research
   □
t. Anti-human trafficking operation
   □
u. Drug trafficking research
   □
v. Anti-drug trafficking operation
   □
w. Economic development
   □
x. Governance
   □
y. Others
   □
   Please specify ____________________

2.04 When were you deployed to the area?

2.05 Did you play a civil-military coordination role for your organization?

   Yes   □       No   □

2.06 Which geographical areas did you work in?

C. DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

This section includes questions that focus on pre-disaster training including institutional policy and guidelines for engaging with non-military actors.

3.01 Have you personally participated in civil-military training?

   Yes   □       No   □       Uncertain   □

3.02 What training course/s have you participated in?

3.03 What documents or reference materials does your organisation use for civil-military engagement?
3.04 Does your organisation have staff specifically assigned to coordinate civilian and military actors?

Yes ☐   No ☐   Uncertain ☐

D: EXPERINCES DURING DISASTER RESPONSE

4.01 What were the organisation’s channels of communication with the military and non-military actors?

4.02 Did your organisation able to request information from military actors in a timely manner?

Yes ☐   No ☐   Uncertain ☐

4.03 What do you believe is the most critical information needed to effectively coordinate with military or non-military actors?

4.04 Which cluster did your organisation participate in?

a. Emergency Telecommunications ☐  
b. Logistics ☐  
c. Health ☐  
d. Protection ☐  
e. Shelter ☐  
f. Food Security/Nutrition ☐  
g. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene ☐  
h. Camp Coordination and Camp Management ☐  
i. Other: ☐

4.04 Coordination between military and humanitarian actors was effective.

Strongly Agree ☐  
Somewhat Agree ☐  
Uncertain ☐  
Somewhat Disagree ☐  
Strongly Disagree ☐  
Not Applicable ☐

4.05 Were population needs assessed?

Yes ☐   No ☐   Uncertain ☐
4.06 Were the local community members included in the development of the assessment?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Uncertain ☐

4.07 Were local community members included in the data collection phase of the assessment?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Uncertain ☐

4.08 Needs assessment findings were shared.

- On a daily basis ☐
- On a weekly basis ☐
- As data were required ☐
- When requested only ☐
- Not applicable ☐
- Other ☐

4.09 Did your organisation utilise military assets or support to assist in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Uncertain ☐

4.10 What kinds of assets/support?

- Use of military convoys ☐
- Logistics ☐
- Communications ☐
- Transport of supplies ☐
- Transport of people ☐
- Engineering ☐
- Other: ☐

4.11 Requested military assets were made available in a timely manner.

Yes ☐ No ☐ Uncertain ☐

4.12 Were these military assets used effectively?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Uncertain ☐

4.12 Why was the use of military assets requested?
4.13 Civil-military coordination during the response to the typhoon functioned well.

Yes ☐ No ☐ Uncertain ☐

4.14 The involvement of the AFP in humanitarian assistance and disaster response had a positive outcome for disaster affected communities.

Yes ☐ No ☐ Uncertain ☐

4.15 Regardless of training, military knowledge of the humanitarian mission is limited.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</table>

4.16 Which of the following areas of engagement between military and civilian actors in disaster response works most?

Conducting needs assessment ☐
Communications between actors ☐
Overall coordination ☐
Joint training ☐
Provision of military assets to your organisation ☐
Other ☐

E. FINAL SUGGESTIONS

Please suggest possible improvements to the effectiveness of the AFP as it contributes to disaster response.

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

Thank you for your cooperation.
Appendix E

Questionnaire – Non-Traditional Security (Transnational Crime)

DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE PHILIPPINES

Aim of the Questionnaire

This questionnaire is designed to gather evidence to evaluate the contribution of defence to national development. The questionnaire is part of a PhD research programme. The outcomes of this research will be utilized to further assist the Philippine government in enhancing its defence policy and strategy in developing a comprehensive security framework.

This questionnaire is directed to sectors focusing on issues related to piracy and criminal trafficking in the tri-border area between Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Your participation and expert opinion is essential in assessing the contribution of the defence sector in promoting Philippine national development.

Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Your cooperation is appreciated. Rest assured that we will keep your responses confidential and only my supervisor and I will have access to it.

Instruction

Many of the responses in this questionnaire sample require a tick in a box. However, some questions will ask for your written comments, detailing your insights into a particular topic.

Sections covered in this questionnaire

PART A : Personal Profile
PART B : Organization Profile
PART C : Piracy and Criminal Trafficking
PART D : Counter Measures
PART E : Impact of Defence ‘and’ Development
PART F : Final Suggestions

Please complete all questions according to the guidelines provided.

G. PERSONAL PROFILE

1.15 Name:
1.16 Position/Designation:
1.17 Organization:
1.18 Years in the Organization:
1.19 Job/Research Scope

H. ORGANIZATION PROFILE

2.02 Type of Organization (please tick one): ☑

   i. Government
   j. Non-Government Organization
   k. Academe/Think Tank
   l. Others, please specify __________________________  ☐
2.02 Objectives of the Organization:

__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

2.03 Focus of the Organization. Please tick all that applies

a. Counterterrorism ☐
b. Counter-insurgency ☐
c. Civil Military Integration ☐
d. Disaster Management ☐
e. Piracy research ☐
f. Anti-piracy operation ☐
g. Human Trafficking research ☐
h. Anti-human trafficking operation ☐
i. Drug trafficking research ☐
j. Anti-drug trafficking operation ☐
k. Economic development ☐
l. Governance ☐
m. Others ☐

Please specify ___________________

2.04 Does your organization collaborate with another organization to counter the issues of piracy and criminal drug trafficking in the tri-border area?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, please specify the local organization/s.

_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________

If yes, please specify the international organization/s.

_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________

Please specify way/s of collaboration.

_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________

I. PIRACY AND CRIMINAL TRAFFICKING ACTIVITIES

3.01 Number of piracy incidents in the last 15 years

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

3.02 Number of drug trafficking in the tri-border area in the last 15 years

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
3.03 Number of trafficking of firearms in the tri-border area in the last 15 years

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

3.04 Number of trafficking of persons in the tri-border area in the last 15 years

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

3.05 Who are the perpetrators of these piracy and criminal trafficking activities in the tri-border area?

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

3.06 What geographic areas in the Philippines are vulnerable to threats of piracy and criminal trafficking?

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

3.07 What are the reasons people engage in these activities?

_____________________________________________________________________

J. COUNTER MEASURES

4.01 What are the counter measures that have been put in place against piracy and criminal trafficking activities in the tri-border area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hard approach</th>
<th>Soft approach</th>
<th>Others</th>
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4.02 Number of individuals apprehended. Include the name of groups they belong to.

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<th>Captured</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Indicted</th>
<th>Integrated back into the society</th>
<th>Others</th>
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</table>
4.03 Do you think there is a need to improve the counter measures against piracy and criminal trafficking in the tri-border area?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, suggest some ways to improve the situation.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

4.05 What are the some of the government policies that have been put in place to combat these threats?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

4.06 Are there collaborations between the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia regarding these issues?

Yes ☐ No ☐

4.06 Are these enough?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, what more should be done?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

4.07 Are there collaborations between the military, intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the Philippines?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, please specify these collaborations
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

E. IMPACT OF DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT

5.01 Have the changes/developments in policies (e.g. AFP Modernization, National Security Policy and Internal Peace and Security Plan) benefitted the organization?

Yes ☐ No ☐
If yes, in what ways have they been beneficial?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

5.02 Have the changes/developments in policies (e.g. AFP Modernisation, National Security Policy and Internal Peace and Security Plan) benefitted the actions towards combating piracy and criminal trafficking in the tri-border area?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, in what way?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

5.03. Do you think what the government is doing is enough to mitigate the threats?

Yes ☐ No ☐

Why?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

F. FINAL SUGGESTIONS

Please suggest possible improvements to the effectiveness of the security sector as it contributes to the development of the Philippines.

__________________________________________________________________
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Thank you for your cooperation.
### List Defence Industry Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms Corporation (Armscor)</td>
<td>Mr Demetrio R Tuason</td>
<td>Chair Emeritus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Brigade General Jon Aying</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service Relations, Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Maj Edgardo Vilchez Jr</td>
<td>Chief, Strategic Alignment Office, AFP Transformation Roadmap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
<td>Mr Danulo Augusti B Francia</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary for Plans and Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
<td>Mr Raymund Quilop</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary for Strategic Assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
<td>Mr Peter Paul Reuben Galvez</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De La Salle University</td>
<td>Prof Renato de Castro</td>
<td>International Studies Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferfrans Specialities</td>
<td>Mr Francis Sy</td>
<td>Co-owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Arsenal</td>
<td>Maj Gen Jonathan Martir (Ret)</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Arsenal</td>
<td>CDR Roger Gamban PN (Ret)</td>
<td>Chief Strategic Management Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defence College of the Philippines</td>
<td>Ms Charithie B Joaquin</td>
<td>Chief, Academic Affairs Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process</td>
<td>Dr Jennifer Santiago Oreta</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Air Force</td>
<td>Ret Gen Benjamin Defensor</td>
<td>Former Commanding General, Philippine Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research</td>
<td>Mr Rommel C. Banlaoi</td>
<td>Executive Director &amp; Chair of the Board of Trustees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rappler</td>
<td>Ms Maria A Ressa</td>
<td>CEO &amp; Executive Editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rappler</td>
<td>Ms Carmela Fonbuena</td>
<td>Reporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Australian Navy</td>
<td>Mr Max Montero</td>
<td>Defence consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Reform Initiative</td>
<td>Ms Kathline Tolosa</td>
<td>Convenor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Defence Manufacturing Corporation</td>
<td>Mr Gene Cariño</td>
<td>Chair &amp; CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of the Philippines</td>
<td>Prof Aileen SP Baviera</td>
<td>Asian Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of the Philippines</td>
<td>Dr Rosalie Arcala Hall</td>
<td>Faculty, Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ms Criselda Yabes</td>
<td>Author (Boys from the Barracks: The Philippine Military After Edsa</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## List of Internal Security Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alter Trade Foundation, Inc.</td>
<td>Negros Occidental</td>
<td>Mr Harry Pineda</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alter Trade Foundation, Inc.</td>
<td>Negros Occidental</td>
<td>Mr Edwin Lopez</td>
<td>Advocacy Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Negros Occidental</td>
<td>Brigade General Jon Aying</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Former 303rd Brigade Commander, Philippine Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Negros Occidental</td>
<td>Captain Jimrhic Obias</td>
<td>303rd Civil Military Officer, Philippine Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Negros Occidental</td>
<td>Col Ariel Reyes</td>
<td>47th Battalion Commander, Philippine Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Maguindanao</td>
<td>Col Arnel dela Vega</td>
<td>603rd Brigade Commander, Philippine Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Maguindanao</td>
<td>Captain Gregorio Jose</td>
<td>303rd Civil Military Officer, Philippine Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Maguindanao</td>
<td>Lt Col Diosdado Carreon</td>
<td>Defence Attaché</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanews</td>
<td>Maguindanao</td>
<td>Mr Ferdhinand Cabrera</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao Coalition of Development Networks</td>
<td>Maguindanao</td>
<td>Patricia Sarenas</td>
<td>Former Chair of the Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negros Occidental Provincial Government</td>
<td>Negros Occidental</td>
<td>Ms Nellen Marie Gomonit</td>
<td>Technical Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process and Paghillusa sa Paghidaet-Negros</td>
<td>Negros Occidental</td>
<td>Ms Maria Lourdes Tison</td>
<td>Peace Panel Member and Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PaxChristi Philippines</td>
<td>Negros Occidental</td>
<td>Mr Jack Panime</td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Social Welfare and Development Office</td>
<td>Negros Occidental</td>
<td>Ms Jenie Macalipsay</td>
<td>Social worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology &amp; Livelihood Development Centre</td>
<td>Negros Occidental</td>
<td>Ms Sharon Juance</td>
<td>Project Development Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negros Occidental</td>
<td>Tatay Eduardo</td>
<td>Former communist rebel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix H

#### List of Natural Disaster Case Studies Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>Maj Rey Leonardo Guerrero</td>
<td>Commander, 3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division, Philippine Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>Lt Col Nedy Espulgar</td>
<td>Commander, 19&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>Lt Col Rodrigo Ilustrisimo</td>
<td>Civil Military Officer, 8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division, Philippine Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>1Lt Alex Orina</td>
<td>Civil Military Officer, 14&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>2Lt Prolen Bobacua</td>
<td>Ex-O Alpha Company, 19&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Typhoon Bopha</td>
<td>Lt Col Llewellyn Binasoy</td>
<td>Civil Military Officer, 10&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Division, Philippine Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Typhoon Bopha</td>
<td>Lt Col Michael Logico</td>
<td>Commander, 66&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Typhoon Bopha</td>
<td>1Lt Mike Aquino</td>
<td>Officer, 1001&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compostela Valley Province Government</td>
<td>Typhoon Bopha</td>
<td>Ms Arceli Timog-Timog,</td>
<td>Head, General Services Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Development Corporation</td>
<td>Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>Mr Arthur Veloso Jr</td>
<td>Security Supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
<td>Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>Ms Connie Tangara</td>
<td>Camp Coordination and Camp Management Operations Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao Coalition of Development NGO Networks</td>
<td>Typhoon Bopha</td>
<td>Ms Patricia Sarenas</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Bataan Municipal Social Welfare &amp; Development Office</td>
<td>Typhoon Bopha</td>
<td>Ms Beverly Jane dela Pena</td>
<td>Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Typhoon</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Bataan Municipal Social Welfare &amp; Development Office</td>
<td>Bopha</td>
<td>Ms Liana Erika Salinas</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council</td>
<td>Bopha</td>
<td>Maj Gen Eduardo del Rosario (Ret)</td>
<td>Former Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council</td>
<td>Haiyan</td>
<td>Usec Alexander Pama</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
<td>Haiyan</td>
<td>Mr Kumudu Sanjeewa</td>
<td>Information Management Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
<td>Haiyan</td>
<td>Mr Dan Carlo Samoza</td>
<td>Civil Military Coordination Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Civil Defence</td>
<td>Haiyan</td>
<td>Dr Blanche Gobenchiong</td>
<td>Regional Director, Region VIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Civil Defence</td>
<td>Bopha</td>
<td>Mr Mc Adrian Nouve Cobero,</td>
<td>Operations Staff, Region XI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Civil Defence</td>
<td>Bopha</td>
<td>Ms Riezel Chatto</td>
<td>Operations Staff, Region XI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacloban City Government</td>
<td>Haiyan</td>
<td>Hon Raissa Villasin</td>
<td>City Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
<td>Haiyan</td>
<td>Mr Errol Merquita</td>
<td>Project Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haiyan</td>
<td>Ms Zhandra Dy</td>
<td>Typhoon Survivor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haiyan</td>
<td>Ms Venus Anido</td>
<td>Typhoon Survivor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bopha</td>
<td>Ms Weng Casagda</td>
<td>Typhoon Survivor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix I

### List of Transnational Crime Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Lt Col Harold Cabunoc</td>
<td>Public Affairs Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
<td>Mr Peter Paul Reuben Galvez</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Justice Mission</td>
<td>Mr Ralph Morales</td>
<td>Manager for Community Mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Coast Watch Council Secretariat</td>
<td>Usec Jose Luis Alano</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council</td>
<td>Usec Alexander Pama</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Centre on Transnational Crime</td>
<td>P Dir Felizardo M Serapio Jr (Ret)</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Centre on Transnational Crime</td>
<td>P Supt Raul C Siriban</td>
<td>Director for Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Centre on Transnational Crime</td>
<td>P Supt Joel D Casupanan</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Coast Guard</td>
<td>Admiral Rodolfo Diwata Isorena</td>
<td>Commandant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Coast Guard</td>
<td>CDR Allen J Dalangin</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Coast Guard Staff for Intelligence, Security, and Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Coast Guard</td>
<td>Capt Teotimo R Borja</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Coast Guard Staff for Plans &amp; Programmes and International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Coast Guard</td>
<td>Ms Vivien Cay</td>
<td>Coast Guard Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix J

In Progress Projects under RA7898

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service/Units</th>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Contract</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>AW-109E Power helicopters</td>
<td>Delivered and accepted</td>
<td>AgustaWestland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upgrades for the Gregorio del Pilar-class frigates</td>
<td>Being done but at a piecemeal-basis. There were already proposals provided to the PN for the upgrades of its sensors and combat suite and weapons systems, but it seems that the PN has not yet fully decided on the final system composition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Sealift</td>
<td>PT PAL (Indonesia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>8 AW-109E power armed helicopters</td>
<td>P3.44 billion</td>
<td>AgustaWestland (Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 C-295 medium tactical transport aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 CN-212i light tactical transport aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Falcon RF-7800V Combat Net Radio integrated into the RF-7800I Intercom systems</td>
<td>$18 million</td>
<td>Harris Corp (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upgrade of 28 M-113 armoured personnel carriers</td>
<td>Php882 million</td>
<td>Elbit Systems Ltd (Israel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>400 light rocket launcher –Airtronic RPG-7 40mm</td>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 14mm towed Howitzer systems</td>
<td>Php438,620,000</td>
<td>Awaiting for the NOA, after Elbit systems Land and C4I passed the post-qualification requirements of the DND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44,080 pieces of Force Protection Equipment</td>
<td>Php1.7 billion</td>
<td>Joint venture between Israel’s Achidatex Nazareth Elite and Philippine shipbuilder Colorado Shipyard Corp. Deadline was 15 March 2015, but they have yet to deliver</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Interview with MGen Fernando Manalo (Ret), Undersecretary, Finance, Munitions, Installations & Materiel, Department of National Defence on 30 July 2015.*
### Projects under the Revised AFP Modernization (RA10349)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service/Units</th>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Contract</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Frigate (AW159 wildcat)</td>
<td>Projects have already completed Stage 1 of its 2-Stage bidding</td>
<td>It is still to be determined if the final offer from AgustaWestland will be responsive to the final specifications and budget provided for the bidding’s 2nd stage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Helicopter (ASH)</td>
<td>Projects have already completed Stage 1 of its 2-Stage bidding</td>
<td>Acquisition project has stalled since it would be dependent on the winning frigate’s design and components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-Purpose Attack Craft (MPAC) Mk. 3</td>
<td>Divided into 2 parts: Bidding for the 1st part which covers the actual boat and standard subsystems has already been announced. The 2nd lot will involve the acquisition and installation of remote weapons systems (RWS) and short-range surface-to-surface missile systems that will be awarded via Government-to-Government (G2G) deal with Israel.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jacinto-class Patrol Vessel (JCPV) Combat Systems Upgrade</td>
<td>Bidding failed as none of the 9 potential bidders submitted a bid.</td>
<td>Several of the bidders requested to increase the Approved budget of the Contract (ABC) as the amount was not enough to do what the PN specified. The PN and DND is now reviewing the details and is yet to decide if they would increase the budget, or reduce the amount of work to be made to fit in the budget allocated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) (Korea)</td>
<td>Post-bid qualification has been completed and awaiting for a</td>
<td>Samsung Techwin (South Korea) will only start the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amphibious Assault</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>System/Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Force Imagery</td>
<td>Targeting Support System (MITSS)</td>
<td>NOA to be provided to the winning bidder</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Combat Utility Helicopter (CUH) – 8Bell 412EP</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surface Attack Aircraft/lean-in Fighter Trainer (SAA/LIFT) – 12FA-50 fighting Eagle</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defence &amp; Surveillance Radar</td>
<td>Delayed due to the late approval by the president. Originally the plan involves the donation of a feeder radar system to the PAF in time for the APEC conference in November 2015 while the 3 new radars are being made. With the delays, it is uncertain if the Israeli government can provide the said radar before the conference. The NOA for this project is also pending, and further delays would mean the new radars would only arrive in 2017 following the delivery time frame. While the radars are still pending award, the construction of facilities to house these radars are also awaiting awarding.</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Air Support (CAS)</td>
<td>Bidding has been pending for almost 2 years now, with several changes made on the submission of bids. No time frame has been made yet on when the bid submission will take place, although this was said to be</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
among the most urgent requirement as the PAF’s OV-10s are rapidly deteriorating due to age and airframe stress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Requirement/Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Range Patrol Aircraft (LRPA)</td>
<td>In 2014, bidding failed in its first attempt, and no new announcement has been made by the DND on when they intend to restart the tendering process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Motion flight Simulator</td>
<td>Underwent tender in 2014 but failed to move forward until now.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130T – 2 ex-US Marine Corps C-130T Hercules aircraft</td>
<td>$20 million – US Php1.6 billion (Philippines) USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition for the FA-50</td>
<td>Still undetermined if a bidding will be the acquisition mode to use</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Army**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Acquirer/Supplier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle-mounted and handheld radios</td>
<td>Government-to-government Harris Corp (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket Launcher Light</td>
<td>Airtronic (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7USA</td>
<td>Airtronic (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 filed ambulances (Humvee-based M1152 combat ambulance)</td>
<td>Government-to-government AM General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbishing and repair of 114 ex-US Army M113A2 armoured personnel carriers</td>
<td>Has not yet gained traction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shore-Based Missile System</td>
<td>Not in the original projects that was approved by the president</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AFP’s General HQ and Service Support Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Acquirer/Supplier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>680 Kia KM-450 trucks</td>
<td>Government-to-government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Engineering Equipment</td>
<td>Tendering has not yet started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C41STAR System</td>
<td>Tendering has not yet started</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Table based on interviews and secondary sources searches done by author.*
## Appendix L

### Timeline of AFP Deployment to Haiyan Affected Areas from 8-16 November 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 8 November (Friday) | • Power, communications, and transportation were paralyzed because of the 300KPH winds.  
• 3 Enlisted Personnel were killed, 12 are missing, and 31 were wounded including three officers.  
• Philippine Army’s 8th Infantry Division Commander Brg. Gen. Jet Belarmino, with the headquarters beside the Tacloban Airport had to bore a hole in the ceiling of his headquarters to survive the rising waters.  
• Lt. Col. Fermin Carangan an Air Force officer assigned in Tacloban who was supposed to lead a rescue mission in the area along with his men was swept out of the sea for six hours. He managed to survive, and save a 7-year-old boy in the process.  
• The AFP’s first priority was to establish communication so that assets and manpower can be transported and redirected. |
| 9 November (Saturday) | • Tacloban City Airport was opened for military-grade aircraft. The first flight/sortie of C-130 transported Secretary of Social Welfare and Development Dinky Soliman, NDRRMC Director Eduardo Del Rosario; an AFP medical team and members of GHQ Crisis Action Team; Medical Team & members of GHQ Crisis Action Team; 2 generator sets; 7,000lbs relief goods from DSWD; other food packs. An incident command post and radio contact centre was established immediately upon arrival of equipment to monitor movement of relief operations.  
• Another C-130 from Zamboanga also transported 50 drums of jet fuel to Tacloban City needed for on-going aerial survey, rescue, and transport with SOKOL and Huey helicopters of the Philippine Air Force.  
• Two major supply/logistics hubs were identified and established by the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division in Iloilo City and Roxas City to serve as staging area of relief efforts going to accessible barangays, while clearing operations are also on-going in isolated areas. In Panay Island, 845 personnel from said unit were deployed to conduct relief. Additionally, 250 reservists from the Army, Air Force, and Navy volunteered their time to assist in the ongoing operations in Panay.  
• AFP helicopters were also brought to transport relief goods into Roxas City from Iloilo City; when the roads were cleared the Army used their trucks to keep the flow of goods and relief to barangays with open roads.  
• Two Navy ships delivered aid and relief goods to the islands of Carles and Estancia in Northern Iloilo to address requirements in the area. |
| 10 November (Sunday) | • To improve existing make-shift communications centre, communications van from the AFP, personnel from Office of Civil |
Defence, cadaver bags, and one generator set (Smart Communications) were transported to Tacloban City.

- Two vessels of the Philippine Navy departed for Palawan and Tacloban containing more than 300,000 lbs of relief goods and other relief items. The AFP transported the PNP Special Action Force to conduct law enforcement because there was already lawlessness and looting incidents particularly in Tacloban.
- We also transported the Mammoth Medical Mission Team capable of orthopaedic, surgical, and anaesthetic medicine via another flight of C-130.
- In Panay, communication centres were quickly established at Estancia in northern Iloilo, Roxas City in Capiz, Kalibo airport in Aklan, and San Jose in Antique utilizing military radio to widen the scope of monitoring.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 11 November  | - To assist in ongoing relief and road clearing efforts and address shortages in communication facilities, the AFP transported via C-130 aircraft Department of Energy personnel, additional PNP SAF, Smart Communications personnel and equipment, and cadaver bags.  
- Transport of relief goods via Navy Vessels continue from Masbate City to Burias Island and Tacloban City.  
- To further assess the damages caused by Typhoon Yolanda, the AFP conducted aerial surveillance in Calicaaoan and Manicani Islands, and Guian Eastern Samar, Northern Panay, Northern Palawan including Coron, Negros Island, Masbate Province, and Cebu City.  
- Aside from Tacloban, the AFP deployed troops, land, and aerial assets to other severely damaged areas in Panay Island to deliver relief goods. |
| (Monday)     |                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 12 November  | - To augment existing military and police forces conducting road clearing and humanitarian assistance and disaster response in Tacloban, the AFP deployed two battalions of Military Engineers and a battalion from the Army’s Special Forces.                                                |
| (Tuesday)    |                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 13 November  | - Military Engineers along with the Army’s 1st Special Forces Battalion begun road clearing to open up major supply routes and allow for the faster delivery of goods and aid in Tacloban.  
- We also sent 11 trucks from the Army to assist in the transport requirements from the two current major supply drop-off points in Tacloban and Guiuan.                                           |
| (Wednesday)  |                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 14 November  | - Relief operations of the Philippine Navy are on-going in Tacloban, Ormoc, Isabel, Leyte, Bantayan Island, and Panay Island.  
- Three C-130 aircraft delivered relief goods from Cebu to Tacloban and Guiuan.  
- As part of the Bayanihan Express project of the AFP, various relief centres were established in different headquarters in Metro Manila. They will be loaded on military trucks from the Army to be sent to Tacloban from Manila. These self-sustaining troops composed of security elements, maintenance personnel, and communication personnel with equipment will mass in Tacloban and will be redeployed from there to continue ground relief operations in Iloilo, Antique, and Capiz. |
<p>| (Thursday)   |                                                                                                                                                                                                         |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 15 November (Friday) | - Four Huey helicopters were also deployed to deliver relief goods to Carles and Estancia in Iloilo.  
- As of November 15, the AFP has about 12,000 troops on the ground under the command of Central Command conducting Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR) operations in typhoon-affected areas in Visayas. It also has about 3,400 external troops including follow on forces augmenting said troops.  
- The AFP also deployed troops to assist the DSWD in repacking relief goods. Aside from troops deployed in DSWD Repacking Centres, the AFP has also established its own Repacking Centres in various headquarters in Metro Manila in coordination with said department: four in the Navy headquarters, one in Villamor Airbase, two in the Army headquarters, and one in the General Headquarters in Camp Aguinaldo.  
- Since day one, the AFP facilitated the transport of displaced civilians and their processing and turnover to DSWD officials from Tacloban to Manila and Cebu on board different air and naval assets.  
- Also since day one, four out of 8 SOKOL choppers while 10 out of the 22 huey helicopters are currently conducting HADR operations in Visayas.  
- For our land assets, 81 trucks are continuing transport of relief goods in affected areas.  
- Fifteen Navy vessels were also deployed to conduct HADR in all three incident areas.  
- The AFP’s strategic deployment of its land, air, and naval assets to assist in ongoing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response operations shows that we prioritize on-going relief efforts while maintaining sufficient equipment and support to Internal Security Operations. |
| 16 November (Saturday) | - As of this morning, the 2nd Serial Bayanihan Express which comprises 140 Army soldiers and 24 military trucks are preparing to depart after re-fuelling from Legaspi City towards Tacloban City.  
- The 3rd Serial Bayanihan Express consisting 53 combined Army, Air Force and Navy soldiers with 28 military and civilian trucks/vehicles on the other hand is set to depart Batangas Port to Tacloban City via RORO vessel along with personnel from 1st Special Forces Battalion en route to Tacloban.  
- The Philippine Navy vessel AT296 departed Cavite City today en route to Matnog, Sorsogon. The logistics ship which has a bow ramp will prioritize the transport of military vehicles carrying equipment and personnel who will conduct HADR operations in Tacloban City. The vessel which has a capacity to carry 8 military vehicles is expected to arrive in Sorsogon tomorrow night.  
- Also today, five C-130 flights by the Australian and New Zealand government will be conducted from Mactan Air Port in Cebu to Tacloban, Guian, and Ormoc to transport teams and equipment to augment in ongoing HADR operations in the area.  
- Meanwhile, troops from the 3rd Infantry Division, Philippine Army together with a group of Canadian Army soldiers arrived at Roxas |
City, Capiz on board a Ceres bus and five M35 trucks loaded with logistics supplies for relief and rehabilitation operations yesterday. A command post was established thereat to monitor movement of relief operations.

Source: Data gathered during field work in Tacloban City and Ormoc City in September 2014.
Appendix M

Timeline of AFP Deployment to Bopha Affected Areas from 2 – 25 December 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>AFP Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2 Dec    | • NDRRMC Operations Centre was raised to Red Alert Status  
          • NDRRMC conducted an Emergency Preparedness Meeting re Typhoon “PABLO” on December 2, 2012 at 2:00 PM at the NDRRMC Operations Centre to discuss the preparedness measures of concerned agencies and regional offices. It was attended by representatives from PAGASA, DILG, DOH, DSWD, AFP, PNP, PIA, BFP, PCG, PRC and MMDA  
          • The AFP Alerted its operational units to assist local DRRMCs and LGUs and prepositioned SAR equipment |
| 3 Dec    | • Alerted its operational units to assist local DRRMCs and LGUs and prepositioned search and rescue (SAR) equipment |
| 4 Dec    | • AFP prepositioned a PAF Aircraft for the use of OCD5 for disaster response and assessment operation in Bicol, particularly in Masbate province and Ticao Island. |
| 5 Dec    | • The 65IB and 51IB of the Phil Army were dispatched to assist the population affected by flooding in Kapai, Tagoloan and Bubong in Lanao Del Sur. |
| 6 Dec    | • DRG/WASAR Teams on standby and ready for dispatch upon signal:  
          • Two teams aboard Headquarters Coast Guard District Southeastern Mindanao (HCGDSEM) with rubber boat and out-bound motor – Sasa Wharf, Davao City  
          • One team aboard Coast Guard Station Davao with rubber boat and out-bound motor – Sta. Ana, Davao City  
          • One Special Operations Group (SOG) Team aboard Coast Guard Station Davao equipped with diving gears  
          • One team aboard Coast Guard Station Mati with motor banca – Mati City, Davao Oriental  
          • Coastal barangays under Mati City were alerted by PCG as well as with their respective PDRRMCs, MDRRMCs, and LGUs  
          • CGS Davao has cancelled all voyages from Sta. Ana Pier Davao City bound to Kaputian and Talicud Island, Island Garden City of Samal |
| 7 – 9 Dec| • Alerted its operational units to assist local DRRMCs and LGUs and prepositioned SAR equipment.  
          • 8th Infantry Division, TOG8-PAF, PCG, PNP, and PN response teams are on standby for possible deployment.  
          • AFP prepositioned a PAF Aircraft for the use of OCD5 for disaster response and assessment operation in Bicol, particularly in Masbate province and Ticao Island.  
          • The 65IB and 51IB of the Phil Army were dispatched to assist the population affect.  
          • 671B and 701Bde conducted search and rescue and retrieval operations at Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental. |
| 10 – 12 Dec | • DRG/WASAR teams on standby and ready for dispatch upon signal: |
• Two teams aboard HCGDSEM with RB and OBM – Sasa Wharf, Davao City
• One team aboard CG station Davao with RB and OBM – Sta. Ana, Davao City
• One SOG team aboard CSG Davao equipped with diving gears
• One team aboard CG station Mati with MBCA – Mati City, Davao Oriental
• Coastal barangays under Mati City alerted by PCG as well as advised to form their own response team

13 Dec
• EastMinCom provided trucks and assisted the transportation of Non-Food Items to Municipality of New Bataan, ComVal Province.
• 6718 and 701st BOE conducted search and rescue and retrieval operations at Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental.

20 Dec
• Troops from 66IB DRU, 72IB DRU and TG 1002nd conducted their search and retrieval operations and 525ECBn conducted clearing operation at New Bataan, Compostela Valley.

25 Dec
• SAR operations were concerted efforts of PCG, AFP (NOLCOM, WESTCOM, CENTCOM, WESTMINCOM, EASTMINCOM, PAF and NAVFORSOL), BFP and PNP with a total of 164,331 families/702,746 persons evacuated to the designated evacuation centres established in various affected areas and outside evacuation areas (relatives and friends) and with 134 persons rescued
• Task Force Maritime Search and Rescue SarGen is continuously conducting search and rescue operations for the remaining missing fishermen • PCG-manned BFAR Patrol Boat MCS-3005 rescued four (4) survivors and recovered one (1) dead body; BFAR Patrol Boat (MCS-3009) scoured the waters of Surigao and Mati City, Davao Oriental. • PCG K-9 Search and Rescue dogs with handlers were deployed for SAR and retrieval operations in New Bataan, Compostela Valley, under the operational control of 10th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army
• AFP (67IB and 701st BDE) conducted SAR and retrieval operations at Boston, Davao Oriental. • Phil. Navy stationed in Surigao del Norte retrieved three (3) fishermen from General Santos City in the custody of foreign vessel Reefer Calya Portese on the way to Tokyo, Japan. The said fishermen were confined in CARAGA Regional Hospital.

Source: Situation reports by the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) taken during fieldwork at the Office of Civil Defence Region XI in Davao City in September to October 2014.