‘Covenants without the sword are just words’.
Thomas Hobbes

The Sword
And The Covenant

Defining Britain’s
Ancient and Modern Military-Covenants
for the Twenty-First Century

By

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Acknowledgements

Friends and colleagues wonder why one would subject oneself to completing a PhD part time? My response has always been that it is a hobby that got out of hand. The curiosity of a certain generation of officers is not so easily dispelled and so to these I remark that I have taken my professional interest in the moral component to another level. At the heart of the military-covenant is the fair treatment of soldiers and their families in return for the sacrifices they make on behalf of the nation. This work is part of the endeavour to keep the bargain of the covenant a permanent feature of Defence policy so that our people are always looked after. In times of austerity, in the lull before the next major military campaign, this message is even more prescient.

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<td>AFC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Covenant</td>
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<td>AFF</td>
<td>Army Families Federation</td>
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<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>BFG</td>
<td>British Forces Germany</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td><em>British Military Doctrine</em></td>
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<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
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<td>C-IED</td>
<td>Counter Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>CGS</td>
<td>Chief of the General Staff</td>
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<td>DCDC</td>
<td>Development Concept &amp; Doctrine Centre</td>
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<td>DGD&amp;D</td>
<td>Director General Doctrine &amp; Development</td>
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<td>DSG</td>
<td>Defence Strategic Guidance</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>Min AF</td>
<td>Minister Armed Forces</td>
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<td>PSB</td>
<td>Public Sector Bargaining</td>
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<td>PUS</td>
<td>Permanent Under Secretary</td>
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<td>RBL</td>
<td><em>Royal British Legion</em></td>
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<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence &amp; Security Review</td>
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Foreword

If one takes the definition of a social contract to be: ‘an implicit agreement among the members of a society to cooperate for social benefits, for example by sacrificing some individual freedom for state protection,’¹ then the military-covenant is distinctive on three counts. Firstly a military-covenant is explicit and exists not simply in an implied sense but is a legal artefact of public record.² The creation of the Armed Forces Covenant in 2011 turned what had hitherto been an article of formal British military doctrine onto the statute books of Parliament. Secondly members of the Armed Forces which the military-covenant seeks to ‘protect’ do not only sacrifice ‘some individual freedoms’ in defence of the nation, they sacrifice (or are required to be prepared to sacrifice) the ultimate freedom: the right to life; along with several other significant freedoms such as freedom of speech and freedom of association. These are significant individual freedoms that arguably distinguish the social status of the military citizen from the civilian citizen. Social justice is at risk if the equities between the two realms of citizenship are allowed to become out of balance or the political framework to manage the civil-military gap (a term used to help explain the differences between the military and the civilian realms) collapses or becomes ineffective. The civil-military gap is also a term which is thought by many³ to show how the Armed Forces attempt to preserve military identity and military effectiveness,⁴ such that the ‘protection’ which civilians enjoy, is militarily attainable for the State to extend, at least from the military point of view. In Britain today the ‘implicit civil social contract’ which might otherwise have been thought to extend to military citizens but which has arguably in recent times seen decline, has in any case been augmented by ‘an explicit and military social compact’ designed to rebalance the perceived social inequity between military and civilian citizens. The ‘story’ of the rise of the modern military-covenant in recent years (2006-2011) is an important one but it is not the only one. For when one looks back into the earliest periods of British military endeavour a much older story of the covenant is surfaced, one in which explicit and formal

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² The Armed Forces Covenant, Statute Law 2011.
social military compacts are found to be in existence and which played their part in British life, both in times of war and in times of peace. It is the author's purpose to bring the more ancient story of the military-covenant's rise to prominence to light. For if military practitioners, policy makers and academics fail to take a wider and deeper view of the origins of the military-covenant there is a risk that the principles underpinning it might be arbitrarily removed in the future, rejected without debate or added to without critical appreciation.

As articles of military doctrine, if the modern versions of the military-covenants contain the received wisdom from all previous British conflicts then there is surely a wealth of material from the early modern and modern periods which contain important discussion on the origins of the modern covenant. Certainly some discussion on those key events in the seventeenth, through to nineteenth centuries is critical to the overall discussion on the origins of the covenant and these appear in the literature review of chapter two. Nevertheless discussion of the origins of the covenant covering the entire gambit of British military history is impractical and weighting has been given to the very ancient periods of history where practically nil consideration has been given before and where research is most wanting. Consideration has also been given to the modern story of the covenant at its point of inception, where discussion of the ancient context of covenants becomes critical to foundational understanding of the enduring and cultural aspects where current analyses of the subject is limited. Thus the historical dimension of the covenant becomes hugely important if a full and complete definition of the covenant is to be established. The word 'covenant' is derived from the Latin verb 'convenir' meaning to convene, to come together. It has religious connotations being associated with the Biblical traditions concerning the Ark of the Covenant and Christ's new covenant. In the religious sense the term covenant pertains to the moral bargain between God and man. It is therefore not surprising and surely not a case of accident that the author of the modern 'military-covenant' Sebastian Roberts in

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6 i.e. as contained in The Bible Old Testament (Book of Exodus) in which the Ark contained God’s Ten Commandments written in stone.
7 i.e. as contained in The Bible of the New Testament (Gospel of Mathew) in which God’s New Covenant is written in blood.
2000 and Richard Dannatt, its chief advocate from 2006 are Christian. Indeed Roberts\textsuperscript{8} and Dannatt\textsuperscript{9} are cited for their moral and religious motivations. In this way, whilst the military-covenant is arguably another example of the more commonly termed and expressly modern ‘civil-military compact’\textsuperscript{10} it remains distinctive as a term and as a concept because its modern Christian influences as evidenced by its authorship and proponency over the period 2000-2006 is importantly anticipated and underpinned by much earlier Christian\textsuperscript{11} and military doctrinal influences and artefacts. These ancient military pacts,\textsuperscript{12} which pre-date those compacts normally considered in the field of Civil Military Relations, provide stepping stones to the very distant past where the earliest origins of military covenants lie. The religious and military bases of ancient British military-covenants, together with their explicit formats, formally framed with legal or doctrinal purpose (as this study will show) and supported by enactments of ritual and tradition (which still exist as military memorials and services today), help define military-covenants in terms which make them markedly distinct from existing social contracts, the latter requiring none of the associated military or liturgical ritualistic paraphernalia that accompany military-covenants. Indeed where trade unions have influenced implicit social contracts, especially in other public sector institutions\textsuperscript{13} their absence in the military apparatus for civil-military dialogue is arguably a necessary omission but one whose vacuity is thus all the more readily replaced by a military-covenant, acting to similar social ends. In this way the military-covenant is a hybrid of military doctrine and social policy. In the absence of trade unions, most complete with all its ancient cultural roots, focussed on balancing civil and military freedoms and duties in the pursuit of state protection and social justice, celebrating the sacrifices and highest ideals which enable this, the military-covenant begins to distinguish itself from previous social contracts. It thus lends itself

\textsuperscript{8} See ‘Floreat Domu’. Balliol College Alumni article on Major General Sebastian Roberts. Issue 12, 2006.
\textsuperscript{11} i.e. The Rule of St Benedict, cited by Roberts as a direct influence on the military-covenant of 2000.
\textsuperscript{12} i.e. The Peace of Wedmore in 878 AD between Saxon Alfred and Danish Godrum.
to both a deeper and a broader analysis of the subject than modern historians and academics might have first imagined.

The modern military-covenant is conceived as a bargain\textsuperscript{14} between citizens. Those who elect to serve in the military have a duty to put up with the privations\textsuperscript{15} of military service life and if necessary to be killed in the fulfilment of that military service. In return the civilian population, which is free from the burden of military service is therefore morally obliged\textsuperscript{16} to recognize, reward and sustain its Armed Forces, their families and veterans, in peacetime and in war. The peaceful, political and social currents of a millennium are contained within the military-covenant but so too are the hard won realities of war. Learned through the early internecine and later national clashes of ‘a million British swords’, military-covenants have existed for as long as societies have cultivated warriors. Held between those charged with waging war and those whose fates hung on the outcome of conflict, the origins of military-covenants date back to times when warriors were held in special esteem by their communities. The ‘Peace of Wedmore’ of AD 878 between Saxon Alfred and Dane Godrum is an example of one such early British military-covenant. The terms of the Wedmore Peace\textsuperscript{17} defined: territorial borders to the North and East of England; converted Godrun to Christianity and (critically) safeguarded the Anglo-Saxon communities within Danish jurisdiction from ill-treatment. If one accepts the criteria for military-covenants, distinctive from civil-military compacts, as being explicit and formal, involving military practice (doctrine or custom), based on moral (Christian) principles of fairness or rightness and extending to civil-communities, then the Peace of Wedmore is certainly an early medieval example of a military-covenant. Being so, this early example is not likely to be alone in the full scope of early British history. The

\textsuperscript{14} McCartney, H. ’The military covenant and the civil-military contract in Britain’. International Affairs, Vol 82, Issue 2, March 2010. Introduction, Pg1. I use McCartney’s 2010 term ‘bargain’ variously throughout this study and develop notions of what the ‘bargain’ represents from the ‘military-practitioner’ and ‘policy advisor’ perspectives.

\textsuperscript{15} These privations range from the giving up of certain rights and freedoms enjoyed by civil citizens to the putting up with the hardships of service life, whether by troops on operations; by their families struggling to avoid disadvantage or by veterans challenged by the transition to civilian life.

\textsuperscript{16} The status of the covenant since May 2011 is that it is a Parliamentary Statute and therefore legal in the sense that the Government is formally held to account over progress. However there is no legal proviso specifying the impact on those responsible when failures to fulfill the covenant take place. To this end the covenant raises obligations which are largely, although not exclusively, moral in nature.

historiography of Britain in peacetime and at war is lent fresh perspective by the lens of the covenant in the pursuit of these unique early civil-military compacts. Indeed it is an operating feature of covenants that outside the legal accords of alliances which are outcomes of ceased hostilities between foreign governments and the domestic arrangements for standing military forces, the dividends of peace\textsuperscript{18} and the harmony in home affairs between civilians and soldiers is practically maintained by the behaviours and traditions surrounding covenants. One might therefore refer to these mutually beneficial social relationships as ‘covenantal’. Covenants are two way. They speak not only about support for the military so that it might (1) continue to be militarily effective and (2) be treated fairly by society but also (3) how the Armed Forces are to be inclusive and reflective of society. Covenants of the past have much to offer those who try to understand what the modern military-covenant is trying to achieve today. As valuable stepping stones to the past, ancient covenants raise durable aspects of civil-military relations that might otherwise be overlooked. Indeed some clauses in the new modern military-covenants\textsuperscript{19} are so ancient that they have come to rest over time, like sediments turned to rock. (1) Having the right tools for war; (2) caring for the fallen and the sick; (3) gaining treasure for blood spilt; (4) tending to veteran's comforts in old age and (5) public recognition of warriors for sacrifices made. These are all facets of ancient military-covenants which predate the existence of standing armies and yet they exist as enduring requirements within the modern equivalents of those original covenantal artefacts.\textsuperscript{20} Other elements of modern military-covenants have filtered in over recent eras and seem to have shored up with increasing permanency. These are: (6) continuity of education for service children; (7) family housing and single living accommodation; (8) transition to civilian employment: (9) the need for Britain's Armed Forces to be more reflective of society and (10) civilian leadership in military affairs. These are all later additional clauses to the original bargain of the covenant. The authenticity and provenance and therefore the legitimacy of the modern military-covenants are underpinned by the covenants of bygone eras but one is also

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} i.e. its artistic, historical and cultural legacies.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Those versions of the covenant which are articles of British military doctrine (2000, 2005, 2010) and the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 which is Government policy.
\item \textsuperscript{20} See chapter 3 for Beowulf, The Strategikon, Sutton Hoo and The Frank's Casket.
\end{itemize}
conscious in living through the cusp of social changes that will move the Armed Forces toward further positive engagement with civil society. The rebasing of ten thousand soldiers from Germany to the UK into ‘super garrisons’\textsuperscript{21} over the period 2016-2019 is one case of significant social change as is the greater roles likely to be on offer for civilians and contractors within increasingly smaller military organisations of the future. In this way the military-covenant may well be the principal means by which the military can legitimately communicate externally to express the status of its compliance in meeting its side of the social bargain or indeed declare the limit of the social integration attained, beyond which combat effectiveness can be demonstrated to be genuinely at risk. To this end, providing a full picture of both the origins and the trajectory of the military-covenant allows for a complete definition of it, which is the primary purpose of this work. The loci of the strands of social, cultural, religious and political influences of Britain’s military-covenants are many and various. Greek political theory, Roman military occupation, Anglo-Celtic cultures, Byzantine Emperors, East Anglian royal dynasties, Frankish technocrats and Scandinavian metal smiths all played their part in the development of early, indeed ancient British covenants. These covenants were real and effective and they touched early British folk in their day to day lives. The high feudalism of the Norman Conquest drove local and regional covenantal social forms underground into the borderlands of the shires and shore lands from whence they had come. But covenants would not be repressed and when the need for them arose in times of national threat they returned. From the ‘Pax Romano’\textsuperscript{22} of the first century AD to the thirteenth century ‘Magna Carta’\textsuperscript{23} from Churchill’s Second World War ‘Arms and the Covenant’\textsuperscript{24} to the Royal British Legion’s ‘Honour The Covenant’ campaign,\textsuperscript{25} an unbroken lineage of covenants have kept the flames of trust between British leaders and led alive right up to the present day. They have also maintained equity, though rightly not always parity, between civilians and soldiers.

\textsuperscript{21} Drury, I. ‘Army to be out of Germany by 2019 as troops withdraw four years earlier than expected’. Daily Mail, 5 Mar 2013.
\textsuperscript{22} Claudian domination of Britain from AD 43.
\textsuperscript{23} Drafted by England’s petitioning Barons and signed by King John in 1215.
\textsuperscript{25} 2007.
Early modern British philosophers and Continental Tables of the early Enlightenment who between them gave voice to notions of social contracts added to the burgeoning clamour for social justice. These intellectually accompanied the civil war in Britain and the revolutions in Europe but the prominent European philosophers who conceived fundamental ideas of social justice neglected explicit exploration of the institutions and the technical thinking of the military strategists. Grotius, Locke, Hobbes, Mill and Rawls do not deal systematically with the lot of the common soldier but then in the field of military strategy neither do Machiavelli, Jomini, Clausewitz or Liddell-Hart close philosophically with issues surrounding common soldiery. Clausewitz very clearly demarcates the military strategist’s interests in the soldier along a vector of pure militarily effectiveness: ‘The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed and trained…is simply that he should fight at the right place at the right time.’ The intrinsic moral worth of the soldier is of no interest, except only in that which he contributes to the ends of war. Based on such a narrow focus and left by themselves, European and US militaries grew idioms for fairness based on military discipline in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but these were not cultural and being ultimately morally suspect they did not endure into the twenty first century and they cannot be thought of in any way as covenantal. But it had not always been this way and nor is it today. Around the idea of military distinctiveness in the late twentieth century a ‘myth of separateness’ between military and civilian communities at the start of the twenty-first century crept in, conflated by arguments over the military’s ‘right’ to be different. Generations of military leaders seemed to come to believe not only in the merits of the

26 Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704).
27 Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778).
39 Resolved in 2008 in the acceptance by the Army that it has the ‘need’ not the ‘right’ to be different to society. See ‘Values and Standards of the British Army’. HMSO, Jan 2008. Pg 5.
distinctions between themselves and their civilian counterparts but also in the aloofness which continued to jar with society and which seemed to unhinge other useful differences that might have been more readily accepted had it not been for the gross perception of separation. The effort itself of militaries in general to be different became misinterpreted in the mid 2000's as part of a mild form of insubordination - US academics used the term 'shirking'. In the UK, the practical need for certain useful distinctions between military and civilian citizens to be politically acknowledged in the late 1990's risked being overtaken by orthodox academic perceptions of British militarism. But in the late antique beginnings there had been no such chasm in the communities. What had started out as a division of labour accrued attributions of social symbiosis. Ancient civil-military relations continued to develop culturally in this way for a thousand years. Today's post-war military-covenants are now very largely social correctives addressing the myth of separateness. Written articles, albeit recently woven from the stuff of eclectic British doctrine and policy, modern covenants nevertheless contain values and principles that are socially cohesive. They are also capable of re-connecting Britain's citizenry to principles of civil-military relations such as trust and goodwill, understanding and cooperation, which were always present within British culture between leaders and led but which had at various times in history been neglected or underplayed. This work traces the ancient origins of British military-covenants through to their modern forms and defines the covenant within the context of social and political theory. Because the military-practitioner, policy and academic perspectives of the military-covenant provide the intellectual rationale which might otherwise perpetuate the prospect of a widening gap in civil-military relations, the author offers a New Military-Covenant for the twenty-first century in an attempt to reconcile those perspectives. In this way policy recommendations for the future development of the Armed Forces Covenant are derived

40 i.e. living in exclusion, isolated from communities 'behind the wire' of military camps.
which might better outline practical ways in which a more integrative approach to enacting the military-covenant might be adopted.

M.R. Apr 2015
Chapter One.

Part 1. Introduction and value.

A theory of politics must be subjected to the dual test of reason and experience. To dismiss such a theory because it had its flowering in centuries past is to present not a rational argument but a modernistic prejudice that takes for granted the superiority of the present over the past. To dispose of the revival of such a theory as a 'fashion' or a 'fad' is tantamount to assuming that in matters political we can have opinions but no truths.

_Hans Morgenthau, The ethics of war_

Table 1-1 Six Principles of Political Realism.\(^\text{45}\)

This chapter is split into two parts. The first introduces the value of the subject matter, the second explains how the study was designed and research conducted. This part of the chapter deals with the military-covenant within the context of social, political and civil-military relations (CMR) theory. It traces relevant literature and policy in the area chiefly covering the period 2006-2011, which is the period of the military-covenant’s inception. Observations on these texts attempt to highlight the lack of expert military practitioner perspectives within the field of CMR to date. Chapter one also touches on very recent scholarly research into the subject made in 2014 which was beyond the full attention and scope of the author’s research but is captured to acknowledge the growing academic interest in the military-covenant. It was necessary also to examine several seventeenth century texts in this part of the chapter in order to provide a comparison between the military-covenant and social contract theory, this being a useful means of introducing some of the key social justice themes up front in the study rather than leaving them to the literature review in the second chapter. Chapter two deals with literature ostensibly covering the period 1959 up to the period 2006 so that analyses of several classic CMR texts is had without the need to revert to discussion of texts already dealt with in chapter one.

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The military-covenant has been making its presence known in recent years. On the lips of politicians and generals, in use by both the military and the media\(^{46}\) the term has been used widely by assorted people from different institutions for varying purposes. But despite continuing academic discussion about the origins and nature of the military-covenant, its arrival in 2011 as a formal article\(^{47}\) for review by Parliament brought the nation’s social concerns about the plight of those in the UK’s profession of arms and their families prominently into view. The deployment of the term ‘covenant’ is not happenstance. Careful, and in some cases, coordinated use of the expression by the military, by politicians and by charities\(^{48}\) for reasons of influence, have forced two British governments of the day to respond to the accusation that the ‘military-covenant’ is at risk of collapse.\(^{49}\) Academics have tended to address the status of the covenant by treating it as a recent factor of ongoing civil-military relations and in doing so have arrived at various interpretations\(^{50}\) concerning its novel and ambiguous status.

From the military perspective, the first iteration of the covenant (Army Doctrine Publication - Operations, Volume 5 dated 2000) contained a clause regarding ‘the uniqueness of Land Operations’. This attempt by the Army to differentiate itself from the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy might also have been seen by readers as an attempt to somehow idealise its relationship with the nation, to make itself appear more worthy of esteem or more justified in claiming scarce Defence resources. Justifications for this might have stemmed from the fact that the Army had been taking the brunt of operational commitments overseas during the period of the military-covenant’s inception (Bosnia 1995-2002 and Afghanistan 2001). Certainly the other services might have been forgiven for taking the early version of the military-covenant to be somewhat divisive; adding more friction to the ‘inter-service’ rivalry

\(^{47}\) United Kingdom’s Armed Forces Covenant of 2011.
\(^{48}\) i.e. the Royal British Legion’s ‘Honour the Covenant’ campaign of 2007.
said to exist between the three arms of the military. 51 However, the readership of the first modern covenant was intended to be the Army’s own people, the covenant was after all an Army, not a joint services or an MOD publication. To this extent the degree to which the 2000 version of the covenant was purposefully aimed at making the Army distinctive for political reasons rather than for reasons more in line with indoctrinating its recruits as to the hardships of Land operations is a moot point. Later iterations of the same Army covenant in 2005 included the clause which stated that ‘trust’ and ‘goodwill’ could be withdrawn if the covenant failed. The inclusion of this clause certainly indicates that the Army in 2005 had taken a political stance in stating that soldiers could expect to be treated fairly by the state and that the consequences for not doing so would have a negative impact in the civil-military relationship. The difference between the 2000 and 2005 versions of the covenant rests largely around a clause which, although quite probably originating legitimately from concerns over the additional operational commitments of Iraq in 2003 and the domestic Fireman’s Strike of 2002, could nevertheless be interpreted as a politically motivated form of warning. For another consequence of the 2005 version of the military-covenant is that the clause referred to is a conditional one - having the unforeseen impact of inviting its readership to interpret the clause. Soldiers and officers could now read, alongside reasonable statements regarding conditions of fair service, ‘into’ the covenant, their own interpretation of those unreasonable conditions by which the chain of command might withdraw ‘trust and goodwill’ from the state. By extension they might also read into the covenant those ‘unjust conditions of service life’ which they themselves might redress to the chain of command at the individual level. Some would argue that the changes of the covenant from 2005 onward created expectations in CMR that had not existed in the past. 52 However, whilst marked developments in the military-covenant over the period 2000-2011 have continued to be studied, 53 no theoretical discussion to date has yet taken into consideration the full panoply

of British military endeavour in an attempt to define the military-covenant from first principles. Consequently no work in the field is yet conclusive on the matter of definition, principally because authors have omitted scholarly consideration of British cultural and ancient historical perspectives. Focussing on contemporary political and social concerns the establishment of the true basis for the origins of the covenant has so far been lacking. Consequently contemporary work on the military-covenant has not located those components of the covenant which are to be found in history necessary for a complete and therefore authoritative definition of the military-covenant and which may turn out to be foundational in giving the concept its true meaning. The most recent and extended scholarly work into the military-covenant adopts an orthodox CMR perspective. Whilst Ingham’s is the first comprehensive treatment of the subject matter of its kind she dismisses ancient historical and cultural aspects as being assumed maintaining instead from the outset that the covenant was ‘invented’ in 2000. This is a serious omission, one typical of current CMR perspectives which the author’s work seeks to repudiate. The gap in knowledge between what is assumed to be factual regarding the military-covenant today and what is known about its true origins and purpose remains significantly large. Consequently no one has yet satisfactorily explained in an holistic sense where the military-covenant came from. Any definitions of the covenant which lack a complete historical and cultural backdrop fail to pick up on those enduring indelible moral principles that comprise the essential bargain of the civil-military pact. In addressing these fundamental areas of the military-covenants (for there are more than one) the nature and status of civil-military relations in Britain today becomes open to re-appraisal.

It is partly because the military-covenant is more than an ordinary every day expression (the first three modern covenants are in fact Army doctrine)57 and partly due to the timing of unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, that the military-covenant has resonated so much

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55 Ibid Pg 18.
56 Ibid Pg 17.
with the public. The relatively recent public perturbations between civil and military elites over the last decade (2006-2012) resulted in 2011 in a policy oriented Armed Forces Covenant. The document emerged in the decade following the original military versions. The rapid development of the covenant alongside perceptions of disturbance to the stability of modern British civil-military relations in recent years has not been trivial.

The military-covenant is a term associated with both the mood of the Armed Forces and their families as well as providing a metaphor for dissatisfaction by the wider public and by the media commenting on the failures in deploying and supporting British troops in recent wars. In academic circles at least one leading military history professor has gone as far as describing the phenomenon of the military-covenant, in terms of soldiers having explicit rights, as a ‘recent’ and ‘invented tradition’ while others argue that the military-covenant represents an opportunity for examining the relationship between the nation, the state and the military in more socially facing ways. This study challenges some of these perceptions and argues that ancient British forces have indeed enjoyed certain freedoms for over a thousand years and that these ‘rights' have been formally and explicitly expressed in articles that one would recognise today as being ‘covenantal.’ Furthermore this study makes the case for defining the military-covenant against a very rich and deep cultural backdrop which contains values, virtues and traditions that echo forward to today through historical forces that bring a permanency to the principles which underpin the modern versions of the covenant now in existence. Political parties seeking to call the then Labour government to account entered the debate using the term military-covenant explicitly and prompting the Government to respond in a report which completely avoided use of the term ‘covenant’ in the entire body of the text. Despite widespread public use of the term today, its absence as

a common form of reference within the relevant fields of academic literature before 2006, and the previous Government's reluctance to use the term, calls into question the very concept of a military-covenant. Before one can ascertain whether the covenant is politically or militarily damaged one must adequately account for the covenants' ill-defined cultural as well social status. Certainly, in terms of the antiquity of the military-covenant, the explicit oaths of loyalty which sub-Roman British forces gave in return for the rights, privileges and protections (equally explicitly) framed under Roman law is indeed in full contrast to any claim that such 'traditions' were recently invented. That such forces were in existence in Britain for over three hundred years and were by AD 410 indigenous makes the case for the existence of explicit ancient British military-covenants in which soldiers possessed rights, very firm.

The military-covenant, as expressed as an article in prose, is a unique artefact. It defines several obligations, key of which is the responsibility to maintain, through bonds of mutual trust and acts of commemoration, a beneficent relationship between the Nation, the State and the Army. By claiming wider association with the Navy and the Air Force and by drawing a very strong link between the reciprocal obligations between the services and the nation, the military-covenant expresses an idea of the military that marks a departure from its traditional standpoint, that the Army is separate from society, towards one which claims a much greater integration between military and civilian citizens. Before answering questions about the true state of the covenant to discover whether it is a myth or a milestone, healthy or in decline it is necessary to define the military-covenant.

Due to public evocation of military views in the media, the covenant is no longer merely arcane Army Doctrine. It has become a term around which specifically members of the Armed Forces Community hope the Nation will rally to support it in the face of dwindling resources and unpopular wars. Elements of the nation have indeed responded. Though to

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what extent these social elements are identified with the military or the political spheres or are themselves largely a-political simply identifying charitably with the plight of wounded troops and ill treated veterans, is another set of unanswered questions. Furthermore, to what extent the covenant truly represents the three main covenant perspectives (military, policy and academic) and to what extent these perspectives are aligned or divergent is a matter of high significance.

Following up on her previous assessment on the health of the covenant, Helen McCartney’s work in 2010 reaffirms the orthodox definition of the covenant as a ‘moral obligation’ between the ‘Armed Forces, the state and the people’. McCartney maintains that the covenant cannot be broken because the expectations of the stakeholders have been partially met. This is a problematic position largely dependent on the conditions in which the covenant is seen to be intact or damaged. For academics examining domestic relations between civil and military communities in the UK, an assessment of ‘partial success’ might be accurate but to troops suffering shortages of equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan, the technicality of that assessment rings hollow. The fact that in 2011 a new deal was struck by the instigation of a new Armed Forces Covenant seems to rebut McCartney’s assessment of the military-covenant as being in a state of semi-fulfilment. The second area of contention with what McCartney rightly calls the ‘bargain’ of the covenant is the dynamic nature of the pact: ‘the moral contract is never static...its agreements are renegotiated as perceptions change...’ Whilst it is true that public attitudes change and indeed it is the nature of policy that agreements are re-set to meet the latest social needs of the voting public: the moral nature of contracts themselves do not change because they are necessarily suborn to human nature. One of the central principles of Political Realism quoted at Fig 1. is that politics is ‘governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature’. Human nature is fixed. In the same way the inherent operating characteristics of covenants do not change:

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64 Ibid Pg 413.
65 Ibid pg 414.
the immutable principles of trust and goodwill are necessary between institutions to function and the expectation of fairness is the bedrock upon which negotiation between covenaners takes place. Within the context of unavoidable topical interpretation and culturally enduring principles it is therefore possible to posit that whilst the content of the covenant might change, the enduring principles within it do not. Reason and experience dictate that the political verities of the covenant predominate over the prejudices which might otherwise seek to dominate. So whilst the quality, scale and effectiveness of equipment in war might change the principle of having sufficient resource to conduct missions with a reasonable chance of success does not. So too, with the need for the Armed Forces to be more inclusive and reflective of society comes a concomitant requirement on society to understand what makes civilians and military citizens different. Similarly in an age of individual rights and freedoms comes a requirement to sufficiently understand and recognise the institutional value of the Armed Forces and the organisational requirements for the utility of force and of the realities of war. There will be others elements of course, but from the military-practitioner’s perspective these covenantal aspects are upon the Armed Forces side of the ledger and are politically ‘second nature’ not for reasons of prejudice but by dint of political reason and military experience. In order that the enduring principles of the covenant might be understood within emergent CMR theory by academics and policy advisors working in the field, this work adds the dimension of military-practitioner thinking to crystallise those aspects of the covenant which are (or ought to be) resilient to interpretations lacking in political realism.

The field of CMR has traditionally been concerned with assessing what role the military plays within society and how society best asserts democratic civilian control. In all such literature much emphasis is placed on military professionalism; the degree to which armed forces are professionalised and how this impacts their ability to serve the interests of the state. This work adds a new dimension by considering the views of military practitioners and how they understand their role within the context of civil-military relations.

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Forces are representative of wider society and the extent to which the military is willing to conform to patterns of behaviour dictated by civil society and the political elite. It is clear from the literature that what underpins this approach to studying CMR is the notion that within all societies there is an implied social contract between the military and the society which it serves. By extension, if that contract is breached then there is a direct impact on military effectiveness and, potentially, on political stability.  

Social Contract Theory examines relationships and ideas concerning individuals organised for social enterprise. Freedom, fairness and social justice are constituents of social harmony and so to some extent the military-covenant is partly an offshoot of the thinking which regards individual human moral conscience within the context of community (moral philosophy) and partly a form of compact or alliance (social contract theory) between civil and military members. Modern covenanters are forced not merely to ask where the assumed origins of the covenant lie, but what the actual forms and filaments of the military-covenant mean to them in their daily lives. Why did the British military make the first foray into architecting from the echoes of history, the first modern edifice of a civil-military pact when the civil society which it served had not asked for it and much less understood it?

Ancient historical civil-military relations gave rise to the very germs of thought which are now identified with modern military-covenants but before the time of standing armies these civil-military impulses within ancient communities were also both root and branch for so much of what many reasonably believe today constitutes British justice and fairness. These ideas have stood the test of time despite the constant flux of events and periods of forgetfulness. At several points in British history classical and pre-feudal covenantal aspects of political society diverged, became marooned and overtaken by other schools of thought only to coalesce and reconvene again. The essentially internecine conflicts occurring within the

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British isles over the many centuries can be surveyed within the wider context of European geo-political developments. Just as the flux of post Roman Britain in 410AD can be examined within the narrative of nomadic tribes pushing ever westward from the Russian steppes forcing communities of sea plunderers to extend their raiding season and to migrate into the heart of the continent from the North, so too can the conflicts of the early modern period be couched in terms which include narratives of clashing religions, burgeoning nationhood and the emergence of international law. Here Grotius is instructive in helping to script the regulation of war, along with its ethical codification and justification which was still importantly, not the product of technical military or general enlightenment philosophy, but firmly influenced by Christian dogma and European law. ‘On the Law of War and Peace’ establishes Grotius within the Social Contract theory school and his work constitutes what has since become known as ‘just war theory’ (de jure ac pacis). Modern principles derived from the Just War tradition include the principle of ‘humanity’ in which injury and damage beyond the purpose of military objectives is contrary to international law. The underlying assumption is that the applicability of the principle of humanity is between belligerents towards each other, but also extending to innocent civilians. However, there is ultimately a logic which would seek understanding on how far back the principle of humanity extends to the chain of command in the direction of the activities of the belligerents. In so far as the combatants’ right to life is balanced against the necessity to give up that life, the military covenant provides the moral and philosophical framework for such discussion in terms of a simple bargain that soldiers can readily comprehend. The law of armed conflict is arguably specifically designed to determine the legitimacy of the use of force and the legality of the violence proposed or enjoined. In law a combatant’s life is forfeit as a simple consequence of legitimate violence. Law provides a legal basis for the rightness of war in which life may be legitimately taken or lost. In contrast the military-covenant subjects the forfeiture of life to certain recognisable moral costs and binds them within a bargain that citizens agree to

enact. The military-covenant defines the moral costs of service life, as a bargain between citizens. In terms of theoretical discussion about the nature of military-covenants and alongside the author’s essays into the historiography of early Britain, there is a ‘remembered continuity’ 73 linking the influences of the Christian Byzantine military work ‘the Strategikon’ 74 in which Christian military leaders laid out the moral doctrine for elite seventh century cavalry forces and the modern British military-covenant, authored and promoted by modern Christian generals. The theme that is ‘remembered’ is the Christian moral philosophy for managing conflict i.e. covenantal traditions, the aspect that is continuous is the formal and legal framework in which the nature of war and by inference the nature of military service, is suffused with the principles of reciprocity, duty and sacrifice and which is then explicitly handled in formats that survive from generation to generation. Grotius’ early modern legal work also provides a stepping stone in this way between ancient and modern military-covenants emerging in Britain and the Continent between 410AD and 878AD. Grotius in his seminal work makes a specific comment about oaths; drawing on classical literature 75 his stance on the nature of pacts in war, when seen in the light of the remembered continuity of covenants, looks both backwards to the oathworthy 76 pre-Christian tribes of the dark ages but also projects forward to future covenants 77 which themselves draw upon this covenantal heritage, reinforcing the indelible nature of military social bonds. To Grotius the oath and the covenant are altogether more than a transactional contract: ‘the last pledge among men, whether Greeks or Barbarians, and it is a pledge no time can blot out, is that which takes the Gods, as witnesses to oaths and covenants.’ To Grotius’s Christian sensibility the

73 The term ‘remembered continuity’ appears uncritically within the field of literary criticism, see Bernheimer, C. ‘Flaubert and Kafka. Studies in Psychopoetic Structure.’ Yale University Press, 1982. P64. It is used novelly in this study by the author without precedence as a term to describe the metaphor which best defines the historical process by which ‘covenantal’ traditions, rituals and customs are passed on to successive generations even when such continuities extend far beyond living memory. Differing to various works in the field of psychology dealing with individual memory and ‘self continuity’ ‘remembered continuity’ helps describe how communities pass on knowledge in a collective way. The meaning of ‘remembered-continuity’ is also distinct from ‘collective-memory,’ which is defined as having temporal ‘shelf’ life, see Winter, J. & Sivan, E. ‘War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century.’ Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pg 16. Remembered continuity is a metaphor for the cultural disseminatory process in which that which might be collectively forgotten beyond living memory survives generations, somewhat in the manner of a palimpsest.

74 Credited to the Byzantine Emperor Maurice (AD 582-602) the Strategikon is a tactical manual designed for commanders. See Maurice’s Strategikon – Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy’. Edited & translated into English by Dennis, G. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984.


importance of both the divine and the human aspects of the obligations contained within oaths and covenants underpin the notion that what is at stake in military-covenants is something more than agreement or even equity or parity between the covenanters: it is the immutability of the bargain which Grotius holds dear. The strength of the covenant over other social compacts is the degree to which rights are imparted once the bond is set. Grotius pronounces: 78  ‘The substance of an oath (covenant)...should convey to the person, who receives it, the same security for his right, as he would derive from an express promise or a contract’. Furthermore Grotius argues 79 that even if the words of the oath or covenant do not impart rights, the person who has taken the oath is still obliged to fulfil the terms of the covenant. This goes to the heart of defining ancient and modern military-covenants – at their heart is a trust which is engendered due to the solidity and reciprocity of the bargain. Thus the power of the pledge of the covenant which holds the mutual obligation in place confers a special status upon military-covenants which, along with their unique heritage and remembered continuity, make them distinctive to other social contracts.

Hobbes writing during the English Civil War (1642-1648) progressed an early modern Social Contract Theory with a concept of the State of Nature in opposition to Civil Society 80 thereby further categorising what it means to live in a civilised society. The operation of an authority and the recognition of the need to prepare for war in defence of civil liberty provide a discussion on the military-covenant as a sub-set of the broader Social Contract albeit brought into being for the need to defend society by force. The establishment and maintenance of the Armed Forces in society can be described not only as the prime duty of the Authority toward its citizenry but also as the primary cause of any subsequent military-covenant designed to regulate that reciprocal duty.

79  Ibid pg 129.
Locke (1632-1704) put forward a political dimension to Social Contract Theory in his *Two Treatises on Government*. He introduced the idea of legitimate freedom from tyranny, with an implication that improvement to a social contract is a consequence of improved governance. It is here that one finds one of the earliest and most compelling political articulations about taking measures to alter the socio-political status quo in favour of better civil leadership. There is therefore a precedent set in the field of British political science which evidences social reform in terms of re-balancing the Social Contract through an improved Authority. Unwittingly, Locke’s appraisal of his own political landscape, is a re-connection with the ancient covenantal forms of social order in which assembly of oath-worthy freemen justified by common and shire law were empowered to answer authority in a way in which Locke was not and in his personal opposition and denial of tyrannical Authority Locke set his life against the political status quo. An ancient covenantal society in Britain has a bridge to it provided by Locke and offers civil-military society an alternative narrative to the Hobesian one adopted by Huntingdon in his characterisation of the conservative military type.

Recent concern over the state of the social contract between the British military and society in 2006 was voiced by the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt. In a widely publicised interview he let it be known that he had told the Defence Secretary ‘…the Army won’t let the nation down, but I don’t want the nation to let the army down…” The debate which arose as a result of his comments was in itself illustrative of the status of the military-covenant; damaged and in need of repair. It is this sense of unfairness, of natural justice denied and in the spirit of anciently rooted, commonly held beliefs about duty that the military-covenant seems to resonate, like Locke’s treatise as an article of protest drafted under duress.

Rousseau  

(\textit{The Social Contract}, 1762) developed the idea of being ruled by consent as an outcome of collective decisions taken by a democratic body. The central idea here is that authority is derived by consent. The sense that Rousseau’s thinking is as much to do with locating morality at the heart of social order as it is with determining what is politically right means that to his ‘Moral Status’ and ‘Moral Liberty’ is added our own emergent sense of the part which moral authority must play, communally and politically in a societal (not only a religious) setting. The degree to which the military-covenant can be said to be consensual is an indication of how powerful or socially valuable the military-covenant is as a concept comparable to Rousseau’s interpretation of the Social Contract as a moral as well as political compact. This is an important observation on the status of the covenant: it is not actually an article of protest (although it can be used in protest) nor is it a ‘militarised’ Social Contract, because it is not born of a resistance to tyranny. It is though an article containing moral authority, derived from ancient provenance, and hard won military experience, reaching atop the military chain of command into the political realm in the pursuit of fairness. For if the military-covenant is only operating in one part of society or operating in a very narrow sense of the accepted definition, then it is not only likely to be ‘out of kilter’ but rather more significantly, it may well be malfunctioning altogether. If this is so, questions about measuring the military-covenant at this early juncture become auxiliary to those dealing with its essential definition and utility because as it is relatively immature as a policy document, the Armed forces Covenant\footnote{\text{\textit{Armed Forces Covenant}, May 2011.}} may well be currently set up to measure the wrong effects.


There is currently a fundamental dilemma over the conditionality of the military-covenant concerning its inherent limitations of liability and this is dealt with in more detail in chapter four.

At the time of General Dannatt’s remarks in 2006 discussion in the mess and on the tank park was in accord with the General’s comments. All ranks expressed relief that a senior officer was prepared to be outspoken about the lack of support for the military in the teeth of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Politicians, on the other hand, accused the general of over-stepping the mark and of potentially sparking a constitutional crisis. These divergent views are reflective of a broader problem within the literature on CMR, where the emphasis is on what the military should do to ensure social and political stability. Little attention is paid to what should be the reciprocal responsibilities of civilian political leaders to ensure military-effectiveness. Nevertheless, politicians may not have sufficient guidance if they rely solely on Army Doctrine.

Soldiers will be called upon to make personal sacrifices, including the ultimate sacrifice, in the service of the Nation. In putting the needs of the Nation and the Army before their own, they forego some of the rights enjoyed by those outside the Armed Forces. In return, British soldiers must always be able to expect fair treatment, to be valued and respected as individuals, and that they (and their families) will be sustained and rewarded by those outside the Armed Forces. In the same way the unique nature of military land operations means that the Army differs from all other institutions, and must be sustained and provided for accordingly by the nation. This mutual obligation forms the Military-covenant between the nation and each individual soldier; an unbreakable common bond of identity, loyalty and responsibility which has sustained the Army throughout its history.

Table 1-2. The military-covenant as Army Doctrine.

From the military-covenant as described in the terms at Table 1-2 it is difficult to determine exactly how society is to meet its side of the obligation. Nor is it clear the degree to which the meeting of such an obligation is a matter of expectation rather than measurement. And
yet, other than Army Doctrine Publication No. 5, what binding and consistent set of principles exists from the military perspective, to inform the nation and its political elite of their obligations to support their military? As the well known BBC journalist Mark Urban discussed with the author in the latter stages of this study - the military-covenant may not be ideal but as it is the only thing ongoing in this area, one may as well make it work.  

The previous Labour Government’s Command Paper 91 and National Recognition Study 92 showcased the stated national commitment to the Armed Forces and has resulted most recently in the Armed Forces Covenant of May 2011. The very provision, if not the timeliness of a new Tri-Service Covenant suggests that whatever methods for regulating the covenant had been in place before 2011, it was in some way inadequate. The Command Paper’s opening paragraph begins: ‘Providing security for the nation and for its citizens is the most important responsibility of Government’. 93 But what is lacking in the debate, despite the construction of a national military-covenant, is the wider civil response to it. If the covenant has become a touchstone in the debate for shaping the nations’ future relationship with the Armed Forces, all sides of the debate must be understood not merely assumed.

Based on the lack of literature dealing with these specific questions there is scope for a highly original treatment of the subject matter at the research level. The aim of this research is to determine how the ancient origins, modern development and extension of the military-covenant may best serve the nation in the twenty first century. The enabling objectives of the research are:

- setting the covenant in its true historical and cultural context,
- introducing The Strategikon into the field of CMR,
- conducting a literature review of related and Civil-Military Relations work,
- comparing several versions and defining the military-covenant,

90 See Transcript 8 at Chapter 5.
• conducting a survey of primary sources, including newspaper articles 2002-2010,
• conducting interviews with subject matter experts (2014),
• analysis of the results making policy recommendations,
• a New Military-covenant for the twenty-first century.

The study structure is broken into seven chapters. Chapter one highlights the value of the subject and discusses the methodology used on the research. The reasons for taking an interdisciplinary and qualitative approach are explained. Chapter two is a review and analysis of related literature in the field of civil-military-relations (CMR). As noted above, much current CMR literature is focused on the roles and the responsibilities of the military. A gap exists within the literature because insufficient attention has been paid to cultural notions about covenants, neither have the roles and responsibilities of British politicians and broader society been adequately treated from the military-practitioner’s perspective in respect of military-covenants. Chapter three examines the evolution of civil-military-covenants within Britain over the millennia. Here the ancient text of the Strategikon is introduced into the field of CMR as an exemplar of ancient covenantal thinking influencing military-practitioners in the modern era. Chapter four looks at versions of the military-covenant to establish shared, common and conflicting themes in order to establish operating characteristics, values and principles against which a New Military-covenant might be benchmarked. Chapter five studies a decade’s worth of newspaper articles to compare and contrast with the themes contained within the primary sources. Chapter five also contains the transcripts and analysis of eight prominent politicians, military service charity heads and journalists to provide additional insight and expertise into the enquiry. These validate the study up to that point. Chapter six summarises the analyses and findings of the study which begins to orient toward policy recommendations. Chapter seven is the conclusion of the work. Here emphasis is made on the significance of adopting a military-practitioner’s standpoint when surveying military-covenants. At the end of the final chapter a New Military-covenant is offered which incorporates the varied perspectives and brings them into a single unified covenant. The
opportunity to lay bare the tensions of all the covenant stakeholders in a single, balanced artefact is a significant outcome of the research.

No PhD level research has been proposed or commissioned by the Defence Academy on the subject of the military-covenant to date. The emergent nature of the subject matter coupled with the lack of an expert military-practitioner perspective within the current body of CMR work, means that the time is ripe for original scholarship in this area. Nor does the proposed research have a short shelf life as the outcome of the research will be delivered in anticipation of the next Strategic Defence Review (2015). At the start of this work, the Minister of State for Armed Forces\textsuperscript{94} stated that there was a ‘lack of depth of understanding’ about the Armed Forces and that the Government was ‘trying to improve that…’ By bringing rigour, expert insight and full historical and cultural evidence to the debate, an original, and timely military-practitioner evaluation of the covenant is offered by which the depth of understanding about The Armed Forces can be achieved. The intended outcomes of this research are:

- an original working theory for the origins of the first early British military-covenants,
- an authoritative scholarly definition of the military-covenant, along with its inherent operating characteristics, values and principles,
- a new covenant for the twenty-first century, spanning policy, practitioner and academic perspectives.

\textsuperscript{94} Minister of State For Armed Forces, Mr Bob Ainsworth commenting on the Radio 4 ‘Phone In’ programme ‘You and Yours’. Dated 7 Oct 2008.
Chapter One.


Defining the military covenant: problems of provenance, participation and perception.

It is necessary to set out the technical considerations that have guided the structural components of this research explaining which approaches, techniques and sources were used and why. The structure of this part of the chapter is as follows: a series of questions characterise the nature of the author’s enquiry, these are followed by a brief discussion on the general problems associated with studying the covenant. Next context is added from the perspective of civil-military-relations (CMR) theory in which specific methodological challenges are raised in relation to the study of military-covenants. A short summary of the value and significance for the research is re-iterated for the purpose of signposting the benefits to CMR in developing a New Military-Covenant for the twenty-first century. A brief explanation is then offered to show why a qualitative inter-disciplinary approach has been adopted for the research and a brief description of the primary and secondary sources used is provided at this point. This is followed by more detailed discussion in general on: the definition and use of interdisciplinary studies and qualitative research. Next comes more detailed discussion on semi structured questions and interview techniques after which the questions posed for the interview phase of the research are introduced. The chapter ends with a note dealing with the subject of bias and how objectivity has been designed to be achieved and maintained in the research from the outset. Finally, at Annex A to this part of the chapter the question set used in the semi-structured interviews is laid out in full. At Annex B a summary of the textual analysis from which the questions were derived is also available. These also become relevant in chapters three, five and six where the definition, composition and confirmation of military covenant themes, clauses and principles are determined. The general research scheme adopted, the structural and technical elements of
the study framed along with the tools and techniques used, are validated by the outcomes of the research as demonstrated in chapters six and seven.

What purposes do the moral obligations at the heart of the military-covenant serve? Do they assure that the morale and the fighting spirit of the Armed Forces is maintained and that the nation’s debt of honour to its military is paid? Or are the obligations placed on military service personnel, and the public support demanded by the military-covenant more socially driven? If the military-covenant really exists, who does it serve and is it effective? These questions lead to an overdue and far reaching foundational study into the definition of the military-covenant and the tracing of its ancient origins back to its current prominence within civil-military relations. No such work in this field exists, yet without it future policy and academic work in this area is likely to remain deficient.

Whilst it is true that the most comprehensive and legally established military-covenant is indeed very recent (Armed Forces Covenant, 2011) it is rivalled by antecedent covenants (British Military Doctrine, 2005 and 2010), which themselves have an antecedent (British Military Doctrine, 2000). In fact, there is an ancient lineage of covenants dating back to the first century AD. Therefore the first problem of the covenant is one of provenance. Which version is most authentic? These questions are important. Queries of authenticity help readers to grapple with the reality that several modern versions of the covenant exist\(^5\) and that the one in ascendance\(^6\) in terms of authority may not be the one necessarily which is widely held to reflect the full scope of the covenant’s span of interests. If one takes from the modern military versions of the covenant the need to incorporate into the bargain the necessity for the Armed Forces to be properly equipped and accept that the modern development of covenant thinking owes its origins to the institutional need for military-effectiveness, then this places readers in a better position to judge which version of the covenant rings true. If the political version of the covenant does not include the clause of

\(^6\) MOD - Armed Forces Covenant, 2011.
military equipment then the military side of the Covenant will not be considered or measured
in full. Equally if the Armed Forces do not incorporate into their military updates of the
covenant the clause to be reflective of society and to prepare service personnel for transition
to civilian life, then the military will not be incorporating the political side of the bargain. This
potentially fundamental mismatch of expectations and conditions (contained within the
bounds of two separate sets of articles), without recourse to mediation and integration,
means that there is a legitimate course of action to reconcile the perspectives into a single
unified covenant. Before the public come to appreciate versions of the covenant which are
not yet inclusive of all the perspectives necessary for trust and goodwill to operate, it is
timely to offer a generic definition of the covenant which attempts to bridge the current level
of dissonance between the conflicted military practitioner and policy perspectives.

Cultural and heritage dimensions are also important to consider because taking only the
modern versions of the covenant as the starting point for critical understanding of the
bargain means that a wealth of covenantal tradition would remain untreated or unavailable to
those interested in bringing the full panoply of military-covenant issues to the fore. In this
respect the most accurate reflection of what might be considered a generic military-
covenant, covering the fullest scope of covenantal matters is again underpinned. Indeed
because public knowledge about the military-covenant is so very limited, the opportunity to
inform the nation on the broadest bases of understanding is timely. Leaving the covenant as
it stands as two separate strands of political policy and military doctrine can only invite
further claims of failure when the next significant operational campaign occurs and in its
wake the covenant is invoked again. Therefore attendant with the modern problems of
provenance is the increased interest in establishing the supporting historical analysis which
has been hitherto so circumspect regarding ancient lineage. Authors of the military-covenant
(Sebastian Roberts, 2000) cite the inspiration of a variety of texts ranging from the

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97 Although in 2011 62% of people polled agreed that the military-covenant was important, by 2013 another poll suggested that
61% had not heard of or did not understand what the military covenant was. See Hines, A. Gribble, R. Wessely, S. Dandeker,
C. & Fear, N.T. ‘Are the Armed Forces Understood and Supported by the Public? A view from the United Kingdom’. Armed
constitutional to the religious. The antiquity of at least one such source (The Rule of St Benedict) is worthy of cursory attention because its part in the historiography of British history allows a working theory for how arguably the first military-covenant came to Britain with the import of the Byzantine work called the Strategikon. Ancient history along with etymology and the study of culture affords the military-covenant significance capable of providing modern scholars with a new objective lens in which the concept of a shared remembered-continuity gains importance.

Addressing the problem of provenance requires an historical enquiry that must go beyond modern history to understand the primacy of those elements of the covenant at play. In addressing this issue, the outcome is the establishment of enduring core values (Service, Duty, Honour, Sacrifice, Obligation etc) but also the cultural, political and military significance that each participant places on these values by way of emphasis or importance: such that the operating characteristics of the covenant may be seen in context. Thus the significance of the role of the military-covenant as a mechanism in brokering alliance (personal, communal and national) is discovered in a way that would not have been possible had a broader and deeper historical net not been cast over the subject matter.

Nevertheless current civil-military relations theory raises topics which are pertinent to the determinations of military-covenants. Covenants centering on mutual trust, speaking to moral-competence are highlighted for civil and military leaders as a consequence of such an analysis. But it is the study of ancient precedents which give relative weighting to the elements of the covenant under debate. Thus the pre-feudal pre-requisites for national

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100 I have used the term ‘remembered-continuity’ in an historical sense to describe a cultural perspective of the military-covenant obtained by communal response to the legends, traditions and laws that impact people over time. However it is in the discipline of psychology that the term ‘remembered-continuity’ appears to have originated. See Raymond J.A. & Andras, K. Developmental Studies: Critique and Renewal. Pg 125 (Elias, 1974). BRILL, 1986. Also see the significance of personal and psychological perspectives of chronology and memory in Bluck, S. & Liao, H-S. I was therefore I am – Creating Self-Continuity Through Remembering Our Personal Past. The International Journal of Reminiscence and Life Review. Pp 7-12. Vol 1, Issue 1, 2013.
service become important in the modern discussions which arise over ultimate liability of service, limitations of liability and fairness. So too the sine waves of conflict frequency and support for the military illustrate theoretically the periodicity factors at play. The rise and fall of public interest matched to conflict duration and intensity make the military-covenant sinusoidal. The British public’s support for the Armed Forces may be said to be comprised of two sets of indices, one constant (inherent and cultural) and one fluctuating (temporal and campaign specific). Thus relative and objective observations about the Armed Forces popularity and the public’s support for war are most credible when the lens surveying conflict and peace is capable of surveying the full spectrum of history with cultural and political antennae set up accordingly. See Table 1-3 below by way of example.

Table 1-3. The sinusoidal nature of military-covenants over time. Source: Author.
Conversations which include the British public draw from the author the second problem to be encountered when defining the military-covenant – that of participation. The stakeholders of the covenants are themselves ‘covenanters’ and theoretically participant in the provisions of the covenant. In the modern development of the covenant from one document to two, from three sets of participants to an almost universal set, the most significant question that remains unanswered is what level of consent does the public give to the military-covenant? The question set developed at Annex A to chapter one included in this chapter is designed to obtain an understanding of how involved covenanters believe themselves to be in the political process of the covenant. Whilst the population of respondents is very small the indication is that there is a high degree of misunderstanding about what a military-covenant is and what part civilians play in it by way of participation. This underpins the need to properly define the covenant but the problem of participation is also key to developing an improved military-covenant proposed in chapter seven. Discussion surrounding participation drives a set of policy recommendations indicating where best efforts to engage with the public in order to extend participation in the future might lie.

The importance of taking an interdisciplinary approach to the military-covenant is that any historical, archaeological or etymological reflections from pervious eras ultimately lead back to the present day and to the political and legal issues currently at stake that will impact on the lives of ordinary soldiers and civilians. It is thus doubly important to return from the seemingly obscure margins of the past to the cold light of day clutching notions that are hard edged and enduring. This helps with informing policy makers about the relative plasticity versus the relative fixedness of military-covenant principles. Such deductions will impact on the legislation that would seek to gauge the covenant and govern the scope of the holding to account aspects explicit in future covenants. Only in this way can the risk that ancient enduring and relevant British military custom succumbing to modish and transient ideology be avoided.
The operating characteristics and fixed principles of ancient covenants help construct working models of the existing covenant and from here an understanding of whether it is possible in policy terms to obtain a single definition of the military-covenant and indeed a single modal set of core principles and operating characteristics may be had. A cross-discipline mentality and sensibility is critical to addressing both provenance and policy. The roles of archaeology, ancient history and textual analysis play an equal part in exposing the cultural ingredients of the covenants to be examined.

The third problem in defining the covenant is one of perception. With the existence of two main sets of rival artefacts the similarities and distinctions between the existing versions of the covenant make a single definition of the military-covenant problematic, not least because each version belongs to two different institutions with two different purposes with respect to the fulfilment of the covenant. The former is policy led setting forth a set of criteria to be met and therefore measured in respect of the fulfilment of social need. The latter is military doctrine teaching commanders and soldiers about the obligations inherent with military service and creating the expectation that a covenant will be fulfilled for military ends. Can the perceptions of different institutions be obtained and if they could be instrumented what method of alignment could support the crafting of such a single combined platform? The problem of perception is addressed in chapters three, five and four and resolved in chapter seven.

In 2002 Forster outlined three ways in which he thought the field of civil-military relations (CMR) was changing significantly. Firstly in the way military and civilian interaction was being freshly understood through the undertaking of several approaches, not just a largely theoretically based one. Secondly, in the reappraisal of areas of research that were consequently missed as a result of a lack of general theory in CMR in the 1950s and 1960s.

Thirdly there was an identification of the contributions that practitioners and policy makers were currently making in the field that led to new problems for academics after the 1960s.

Forster identified that the foundational though largely descriptive based works of 1950s and 1960s academics such as Finer were largely theory-neutral. He cited by way of explanation of this fact, that the demands of practitioners and policy makers had of the field led them to real world empiricism. Janowitz and Dandeker, Forster posited, had in the area of sociology a reliance on theoretical assumptions for their work which did make up for a general dearth of generalised theory in the field to that point. But it was Huntington’s influence in the field, Forster explained, which based on ‘analytical realism’ drove the CMR research agendas toward issues relating to authority and power.

Since this time, Forster suggested, post-modernists and social constructivists had ‘taken issue’ with the previous generations’ ‘positivist methodologies’ which called instead for a ‘conceptual lens’ which did not ‘focus on the use of force and the pursuit of power’. Nevertheless successors to Huntington’s CMR legacy continued to pursue the themes of authority and power, devising strategies of measurement which would arguably tighten up civilian control of the military. Here Feaver’s extension of agency theory in 2003 comes to mind. But also in the interim period, especially in the 1990s in the US, attention had returned to the field of CMR for other reasons. US military practitioners for example claimed that the administration of President Bill Clinton drew again into sharp focus the ‘potential crisis brewing in civilian control’ and that ‘some observers attributed this to the...administration,'

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102 I develop Forster’s 2002 use of the three CMR perspectives (practitioner, policy and academic) into ‘military-practitioner,’ ‘policy advisor’ and ‘academic’ and use these terms variously throughout this study.
103 Ibid pg 73.
104 Ibid pg 73.
105 Ibid pg73.
108 Ibid Pg 61.
which suffered from a lack of credibility in military affairs...’  

109 In the UK in the mid 2000’s similar criticism of the Prime Minister in his involvement in failings in Iraq abounded  

110 calling into question the state of UK CMR in a similar fashion to the US.

Step forward to 2014 and somewhere between the search for appropriate conceptual methodologies; the measurement of the control of the military, the influencing of debate between practitioners managing conflict and academics seeking a military more reflective of society; space for intellectual accommodation centering on the covenant has grown. The Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 is evidence in the UK of the recognition that convergence between CMR academic, policy maker and military-practitioner perspectives is not an impossible prospect. If at one end military practitioners can and have accepted the policy led initiative under the covenant to be more inclusive and reflective of society, then at the other end, academics have now been offered a part to play in refining the conceptual toolsets which are to be further developed in instrumenting both the social forces required for useful levels of integration and the degrees of technical and moral distinctions necessary for preserving military effectiveness. If the benefits of developing the covenantal modal are realised, the results for UK civil-military relations will be far reaching. UK academics, military-practitioners and policy advisors might share for the first time a view of the same ‘CMR enterprise’ with the prospect of developing accommodations which might stem from the establishment of such a ‘New Military-Covenant’.

The author’s foundational work in this area has attempted to define the military-covenant and to place it within the field of CMR as a pivotal milestone. The motivation has been in removing errors about the status, purpose and significance of the covenant and to place it on a firm footing as a modal mechanism for addressing applied CMR issues.

109 Ibid Pg 61.
The methodological approach adopted for this study has been a qualitative inter-disciplinary one. The study comprises a brief literature survey of secondary sources and an in depth assessment of primary ones. Analysis and findings lead to a policy oriented conclusion, key of which is the outcome of a New Military Covenant.

Secondary sources examined include a mix of classic and current CMR work as well as the translations of several ancient British literary texts, and one continental military doctrine text. The purpose in this analysis is to show the lack of work in the field prior to 2006, and that work up to the current day is deficient; lacking a single, authoritative definition of a military-covenant complete with operating characteristics.

Primary sources examined include several ancient artefacts of the British Museum dating back to AD 410; the texts of the modern covenants up the period to 2011; a survey of over fifty topical British press articles covering the inception of the modern military-covenant over the period 2002 to 2010 and finally eight interviews conducted in 2014 with a variety of UK Tables with specialist insight into the military-covenant. Interviewees included five leading British politicians responsible for Defence, two heads of respective UK Service related charities and one renowned BBC Defence correspondent and author.

Analysis of the primary texts incorporated an interdisciplinary approach. This was necessary in order to relate to and make sense of the various media and the various disciplines which the texts and artefacts would ordinarily be aligned to. Critical appreciation of ancient literature; sensitivity to archaeological interpretations; textual analysis of the modern covenants; interviews based on semi-structured questionnaires all played their part in producing a range of data to be collated, arranged, analysed and made sense of.

Obtaining a definition of the military-covenant by quantitative means was considered by the author but ultimately discounted for practical reasons. The efforts to instrument a survey of
statistical significance was labour intensive, lengthy and ultimately beyond the resources available. Furthermore, because a definition of the covenant is reliant on the historical provenance and cultural influences which underpin its principles, a statistical sampling without recourse to semi-structured recorded interviews to elicit more demanding responses, would test at best the respondents’ topical understandings of current covenant issues and would in any case not have been possible to undertake at scale without a team of researchers. Keeping the questionnaire, topical, real-world based and short proved to be an effective way of obtaining qualitative insights to augment the historical and cultural analysis undertaken (refer to Annex A to this part of the chapter). The discoveries of the ancient texts, the linking of them to related ancient literary and archaeological sources and the revisionism of British historiography required the author to construct a working theory of the origins of the covenant in a way not anticipated at the outset. This element of the research became too important not to do well and consumed a great deal of energy and effort. This might have been problematic for research outcomes if the research were wholly reliant on statistical significance – but it was not. The author had to prove that modern covenants have ancient lineage in order to posit that the core principles of the covenant are cultural and fixed not transient and therefore not open to modish or ideological interpretation or cant. No question based survey would have elicited responses which could achieve that end. The author also had to derive operating characteristics, clauses and principles that respondents could comprehend and respond to so that a definition of a military-covenant might be verified. In this respect, whilst statistical significance would have been useful for this endeavour, it was not ultimately critical. The primary sources of the covenants themselves provided the basis of the questions which respondents could readily react to (albeit from a topical and non-culturally oriented perspective). So in consequence, a smaller number of respondents, targeted for their expertise and insight became not only a more realistic prospect but a preferable one. The ability to dwell at length on the subject matter with a smaller number of respondents became in fact an important part of the research. Of their own volition interviewees ruminated not only on subjects which the author had anticipated as a
consequence of work on definitions of modern covenants in chapter three i.e. on areas such as remuneration, recognition and reward, but remarkably also on issues about leadership, warrior ethos, social class and the bargain of the covenant. The author had obtained some appreciation of some of these aspects of the covenant (except modern British attitudes to social class) whilst working on the origins of the covenant in chapter five but there had been no anticipation that the respondents would feel strongly about so many of these and other different issues. A survey without a recorded interview under a purely quantitative regime would never have captured these covenant issues with the emphases and insights that were in the end, actually obtained and of high benefit. In hindsight during the design phase of the research these aspects may have featured more prominently. But in any case nothing could have predicted or prevented the significant work into the military-covenant’s historical origins that subsequently and rightly consumed resources to the deficit of quantitative techniques. Nevertheless, the questionnaire as it remains is perfectly valid for further testing of topical issues in much larger populations and the author’s policy recommendations will include discussion of how this might be undertaken in the future.

Before dealing with qualitative research imperatives as they relate to interviews, it is worth dwelling momentarily on the definition of interdisciplinary studies.¹¹¹ According to Repko this is ...’a process of answering a question, solving a problem, or addressing a topic that is too broad or complex to be dealt with adequately by a single discipline, and draws on the disciplines with the goal of integrating insights to construct a more comprehensive understanding’.¹¹² This seemed to be exactly the right methodological approach that the military-covenant demanded. With both ancient and modern sources, incorporating policy, practitioner and academic perspectives of CMR and spanning all the fields from historical, to archaeological, etymological, political, sociological and philosophical: the need to draw insights from across all of these fields and relate them back through the prism of the military-covenant seemed the only practical path in which to take the research if the outcome was

¹¹² Ibid pg 16.
indeed to be so foundational as to be leading in the field. The challenge with undertaking an interdisciplinary approach has been that whilst many disciplines undertake a common problem and provide singular responses to it which can be integrated the military-covenant as policy is still early in its inception, being only some three years old (2011-2014) at the time of writing. Consequently the covenant has been tackled only relatively recently by modern academics though in only a few disciplines, chiefly CMR and military-sociology. This means that there is not a great deal of military-covenant material identified as such readily available to integrate from the cultural, archaeological, literary and ancient historical fields. In fact a large part of the author’s research has had to build questions into those lines of enquiry so this material may be reappraised. To some extent it is the author’s own research here that sets the question and frames the problem of the military-covenant from an interdisciplinary perspective, causing the ripples which will now expand into those other fields.

Turning to aspects of qualitative research several points apply in respect to the semi-structured telephone and face to face interviews that were conducted as part of this research. Firstly the questions which were used to conduct the interviews (see chapter five) at Annex A to this chapter were derived from an in depth word by word textual analysis of three versions of Army Doctrine Publication Operations Volume 5 (2000, 2005 and 2010) and the single version of the Armed Forces Covenant (2011). This analysis is discussed in more detail in chapter four, under the heading of definitions, but is included for ease of reference here in chapter one, at Annex B to part 2. The questions at Annex A to this part of the chapter were designed to confirm or deny the existence of clauses, principles and understanding contained in or associated with each of the covenants (see chapter four). Interviewees were asked to respond to fourteen statements and were permitted a range of responses that might account for variations in understanding of the statements presented to them. The technique adopted in the interviews conformed to general guidance in this area

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\[113\] Ibid Pg 19.
and of the eight subjects only two were conducted by telephone the remainder by a face to face discussion. It was certainly the case that being able to see respondents was advantageous. In the one case where slight misunderstanding took place (see Annex A to part two to chapter five - Transcript #4) this was remedied by extended conversation in person which might not have been possible had the interview been conducted over the telephone. Indeed where extended conversation ensued with one respondent on the telephone (see Annex A to part two to chapter five - Transcript #8) this may in part have been the result of having met the respondent in person previously. In designing the questionnaire and having understood the significance of taking a qualitative approach, it was necessary to allow respondents the time to understand the statements being put to them. For this reason the original question set of some thirty statements, piloted with the International Defence and Security MSc course at the Defence Academy UK, was whittled down to fourteen statements. Of the eight interviewees finally selected and interviewed, in those cases where respondents answered quickly and kept discussion to the end of the survey session, the time taken to complete the questionnaire was under nine minutes. However, in most cases discussion in and around the questionnaire was in the twenty plus minutes bracket. Thus the deliberate intent to keep the questionnaire short but allow free discussion proved to be invaluable in deriving original insight and expertise in several military-covenant subject areas. These were transcribed and summarised in chapter five and form part of the overall analysis of results contained in chapter six.

In terms of bias the author is a serving military officer in the British Army working in the capability management area of Army Headquarters. The author falls into the category of military-practitioner in terms of being placed within the spectrum of other covenant perspectives. The subjective empathy which the author holds toward fellow serving personnel is unavoidable. Although in some respects his military and operational

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115 Ibid pg 91.
experiences provide a unique and valuable insight into the issues at hand. However, risk that the author’s professional judgements might obscure objective academic research, have been mitigated in a number of ways. No pre-determination of where the evidence for the author’s hypothesis might eventually lead were made at the start of the work and this was borne out by the extensive and comprehensive range of subject material sampled. The non pre-determined approach to examining the material and the fully objective structure of the questionnaire, based only on the texts of the modern covenants themselves, is borne out by the many, varied and uncontrolled views of the interviewees. The entire recording of each of the interviewees was captured and transcribed in full and is made available to the reader in the body of the chapters. It was a condition of the research stipulated by the MoD that no serving military personnel be interviewed. This played favourably into mitigating research bias as the military-practitioner’s perspective is entirely the author’s own and has neither been designed into the research or corroborated by other serving personnel in the findings of the study. To that extent the personal opinions and attitude of the author toward the subject matter played no part in the design or outcomes of the research. Every recommendation made in the conclusion is attributable to corresponding elements contained within the study and fully justifiable by the evidence obtained under research conditions. Finally, the policy recommendations which arise from the author’s research propose significant changes to current military doctrine in this area, marking a shift in military thinking which if adopted would be capable of accommodating a breadth of policy, academic and practitioner perspectives. The policy outcomes inherent with the conclusions of this research would not have emanated had the author’s bias not been mitigated in the ways described and monitored throughout the duration of the research period. The Ethics Committee of the Defence Academy and the relevant military authorities endorsed the author’s research and provided the necessary permissions to conduct the research.
### Annex A to Part 2 to Chapter 1

**UK military-covenant questionnaire**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement 1</th>
<th>How well do you understand the military covenant?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understand Well</td>
<td>Understand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement 2</th>
<th>Does the military covenant apply to you personally?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement 3</th>
<th>The UK military covenant is more about support to UK Armed Forces their families whilst on operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement 4</th>
<th>The UK military covenant is more about the welfare of UK Armed Forces, veterans and their families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement 5</th>
<th>The UK military covenant includes the following areas (tick where you think appropriate):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terms of Service (including pay &amp; pensions)</td>
<td>Medical Healthcare</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement 6</th>
<th>The UK military covenant includes the following areas (tick where you think appropriate):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of family life for service families (including 'nights out of bed' &amp; restrictions of spouses working)</td>
<td>Ease of access to public services &amp; amenities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement 7</td>
<td>The UK military covenant includes the following areas (tick where you think appropriate):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Armed Forces accepting changes in Defence i.e. the impact of Defence reforms such as redundancy</td>
<td>Updating the complaints system for UK Armed Forces personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement 8</th>
<th>The UK military covenant means UK Armed Forces personnel, in some circumstances, should be treated differently to civilians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement 9</th>
<th>The UK military covenant means that UK Armed Forces have an unconditional duty to serve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement 10</th>
<th>The UK military covenant means that the Government has a legal obligation to provide the Armed Forces with the equipment and resources it needs</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement 11</th>
<th>The UK military covenant means that, on balance, UK Armed Forces personnel put 'more in' than 'get out' of their military service</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement 12</td>
<td>The UK military covenant means that UK Armed Forces have a high expectation of being treated fairly at all times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement 13</th>
<th>The UK military covenant is a set of obligations between the Government, the Nation and every individual member of the UK Armed Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement 14</th>
<th>The UK Covenant is more about the Government’s aspirations to fulfil the Military Covenant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
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## Annex B to Part 2 to Chapter 1

### Textual Analysis of the modern military-covenants

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<th>Textual Analysis</th>
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<th>ADP Ops 2005</th>
<th>ADP Ops 2010</th>
<th>AFC 2011</th>
<th>Sig</th>
<th>Common</th>
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<td>Army Doctrine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reciprocal</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enduring</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Antecedence</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Initiative</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Policy</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral not legal</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binding</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unbreakable</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of service is unequal</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civilians citizens are outside the AF</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
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**Defining the Nature of the Covenant(s)**

- Military covenant has grown in length more than three times in 11 years (1200 words)
- AFC has grown 100% in one year.
- Combined characteristics of each version have a commonality of content of 35%

**Stats**

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<td>Enduring</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral not legal</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of service is unequal</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians citizens are outside the AF</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**43%**

- Pact
- Lasting
- History
- Socially Inclusive
- Moral not legal
- Consistently applied at all times vs applied under defined principles but on a case by case basis
- Absolute & indissoluble vs conditional & binding
- Service personnel subject to Duty which is non discretionary, with ultimate liability being death
- Military personnel outside civilian citizenship during conflict vs extension of citizenship to military personnel (even when in conflict)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emphasises the need for AF individuals to put the needs of the Service First</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>Focus is internal to the AF vs Focus is external to the Nation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common bond of loyalty</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>The mutual bond is one primarily of reciprocal loyalty and responsibility in maintaining trust &amp; goodwill between parties vs a mutual bond which primarily identifies with the duty of service personnel, recognizing that their sacrifices should be compensated by the nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognises the uniqueness of Land operations</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>The mutual bond is one primarily of reciprocal loyalty and responsibility in maintaining trust &amp; goodwill between parties vs a mutual bond which primarily identifies with the duty of service personnel, recognizing that their sacrifices should be compensated by the nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defines the key areas of what is covered in the covenant</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>The covenant is a doctrinal article to inculcate and underpin combat soldiers and the chain of command in their duties when prosecuting land warfare vs a social contract aimed at promoting solidarity, fairness, gratitude, support etc for soldiers in that endeavour. Critical understanding that Army requires itself to be different.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defines the rights of servicemen</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>The rights of servicemen are not defined, nor the rights that servicemen give up though their obligations regarding duty is Vs AFC directing servicemen to find out what their rights and obligations are and that Duty is non discretionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All of society identified as being party to the Covenant vs The entire Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Society</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>The Crown as an explicit party to the Covenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Crown</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The AF</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| The Government as an explicit party to the Covenant | x | The Nation as an explicit party to the Covenant | x | The AF as an explicit party to the Covenant |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADP Ops 2000</th>
<th>ADP Ops 2005</th>
<th>ADP Ops 2010</th>
<th>AFC 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Members to the Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applies to Army soldiers only</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applies to all soldiers (Tri Service)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applies to men</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applies to all Military Personnel (gender neutral)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applies to Commanders (the Chain of Command)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applies to all Reserves</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applies to Veterans</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applies to Families</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applies to all individuals</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applies to private organisations</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Recognitions** | | | |
| Recognises the honour and commitment of the AF | N | N | N | Y |
| Recognises the sacrifice of the AF | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Recognises the expectation for recompense for the ultimate sacrifice (death) | Y | Y | Y | Y |

| **Recognisations** | | | |
| Honour and commitment not mentioned in Army doctrine covenant | x | Sacrifice is recognised in all | x | Dutiful sacrifice (inequity) is rewarded (rebalanced) with (compensatory) measures |

| **Members to the Parties** | | | |
| Army centric doctrine versus Tri-Service policy | |
| Anomalous use of gender specific terminology of the covenant in the latest Army version | x |
| Identifies the Chain of Command as specific members to the parties of the Covenant | x |
| Identifies Reserves but does not name them specifically | x |
| Only the AFC specifically mentions veterans | x |
| AFC extends the Covenant into other professions | x |
Recognises the expectation for recompense for injury | N | N | Y | Y | Recognition of the rights of service personnel vs the definition of rights (or loss of)  
Recognises that serving personnel have relative rights | Y | Y | Y | Y |  
Recognises the importance of Acts of Commemoration | Y | Y | Y | Y | Enactment of the covenant through National rituals  
Recognises the Symbolism of the Covenant | N | N | Y | Y |  
Recognises the role of Trust | N | Y | Y | Y |  
Recognises the role of Goodwill | N | Y | Y | Y | 2005 marks the doctrinal step change in the development of the covenant(s) stating that trust and goodwill are discretionary and conditions based

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADP Ops 2000</th>
<th>ADP Ops 2005</th>
<th>ADP Ops 2010</th>
<th>AFC 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Principles & Obligations**

Service personnel have a duty to be prepared to give their life for their service | Y | Y | Y | Y |  
AF Service and Duty is unconditional | Y | Y | Y | Y |  
AF Service Trust and Goodwill is conditional | N | Y | Y | N |  
AF to be fairly treated by the Nation | Y | Y | Y | Y |  
AF to be valued by the Nation (each individual soldier) | Y | Y | Y | N |  
AF to be respected by the Nation | Y | Y | Y | Y |  
AF and families are to be rewarded | Y | Y | Y | Y |  
AF and families are to be sustained | Y | N | Y | N |  
AF are to be given the means to do their work | N | Y | Y | N |  
AF are to be provided with adequate terms of service | Y | Y | Y | Y |  
AF are to be provided with adequate | N | Y | N | Y | 36%  

xxx AFC implies Trust and Goodwill are unconditional  
xxx Fair treatment a relative and changing moral concept (fairness as justice) vs rules  
xxx 2010 marks the doctrinal step change in declaring resources to be a moral obligation  
xxx 2010 Army version fails to make declare
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>conditions</th>
<th>conditions of service explicit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Nation is to celebrate the work of charitable who work on behalf AF</td>
<td>AFC as a cause for National Celebration, political dimensions of a social contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation is to celebrate the work of voluntary bodies who work on behalf AF</td>
<td>xxx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF not to disadvantaged due to service life in the provision of public (HMG) or commercial services (Nation)</td>
<td>Anomalous status of the covenant(s) in that the military one accepts disadvantage on the condition of fair compensation but the political one seeks to extend and in some cases enhance the rights of service personnel (special) to mitigate or remove existing disadvantages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF to keep close links between AF and society</td>
<td>The myth of separateness, the need to be different, the forces of integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF to uphold the values and standards of the Services</td>
<td>The political imperative to integrate AF into civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF to engage with wider society and understand its relationship to it</td>
<td>AFC as a social charter to relieve pressure on the welfare state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF to use time in Service to prepare for civilian life</td>
<td>AFC as a social charter in preparation for NEM, new TACOS, Army 2020, human rights law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF personnel to understand their rights and obligations</td>
<td>xx</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: None
Y: Yes
Chapter Two.

Literature Review.

Chapter one dealt briefly with the foundational ideas of classic social contract theory. It also placed the military-covenant within the context of several separate and competing perspectives within the field of Civil-Military-Relations (CMR); academic, policy and practitioner. The way in which the military-covenant is used to articulate reciprocal obligations between the nation, the state and its military brings the separation of these perspectives to light. The perception that the military-covenant is a novel creation defining a new social contract of increasing importance to a politically active military elite is the academic CMR perspective. The perception that the military-covenant is a response to unpopular foreign campaigns in which military resources have been lacking is the policy perspective. The perception that the need to be different, to be recognised and to be fairly rewarded for the sacrifices involved in military service, is the practitioner perspective.

Given the emergence of the military-covenant in recent years and what the differences in the perspectives found within CMR betoken, it is unlikely that a narrative capable of fully explaining a modern military-covenant can exist until such a time that all the perspectives may be objectively aligned to mutual satisfaction. In the mean time the covenant will need to stand the test of time to deliver against the expectations that it has set up. The problem of perception rests largely with the military-covenant arriving in its original modern form as a small and mostly unread piece of British military doctrine. Furthermore the constituent parts of what we may posit to be a wider military-covenant under the Armed Forces Covenant straddle various principles such that taken together the concept of the covenant is unrecognizable as a unified idea, certainly within the field of CMR. The purpose of chapter two is to locate the military-covenant more firmly within context of political science and to identify a range of themes and ideas drawn from history which support its existence in a
deeper cultural sense. The period of the survey principally covers the 1950s to the late 1990’s covering classic texts in the related fields and building on the more current CMR perspectives (2006-2014) already assessed in chapter one. However, several golden threads emerge from an interdisciplinary survey of modern and ancient historical narratives of conflict and periods of peace in the early modern and modern eras and these are given due consideration in this chapter. The ancient narratives are covered in more detail in chapter three although it has been necessary to re-touch on one ancient and one early modern text in chapter two to establish the enduring nature of the military-covenant in contrast to the CMR perspective which holds the covenant to be of modern provenance only.

Just as Grotius holds a key to providing an early modern European and legal context for the origins of the military-covenant linked to Just War and Social Contract traditions, the English Civil War provides the specifically British perspective on the origins of modern civil-military relations, although this narrative is ultimately challenged by the concept of a military covenant rooted in ancient culture, as the author contends in chapter three. The orthodox position with respect to civil-military relations in Britain since the time of Cromwell is a fairly clear cut one: relations were largely influenced by the exigencies of billeting troops on the local population and were largely negative leading to the segregation of troops from civilians right through to modern times. During the English civil wars (1642-46, 1648 and 1651) the ‘free quartering’ of troops on the local populace was an impediment to healthy civil-military relations. So much so that by the time of the Restoration in 1660 the Crown intervened to reverse the situation and in 1679 the Disbandment Act ended the practice of troops being billeted on private households. This early example of a ‘civil-military compact’ was reinforced in 1679 by the Mutiny Acts which reiterated this clause on billeting. Nevertheless by 1697 soldiers were so unpopular within communities that publicans were permitted to pay soldiers to feed themselves and to keep away from the public rooms of their

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117 Ibid Pg 6.
118 Ibid Pg 6.
premises. In accordance with the orthodox view of civil-military affairs by the eighteenth century conditions between military and civilian citizens in Britain deteriorated further. Following the Jacobite War of 1691, the challenges of accommodating troops across the country could only be met by significant investment. In 1721 the first ‘purpose built’ lodgings for troops ‘since the departure of the Romans’ was created in Berwick-Upon-Tweed at Ravenstone. Lacking in sanitation and medical facilities Ravenstone barracks was unlikely to have been a triumph in covenantal terms, nevertheless the widespread adoption of municipal barracks between 1792 and 1858 assured that the Imperial lessons of British colonial forces did not countermand the continuing discordant tenor of strained British civil-military relations on the mainland. According to the normal theory of civil-military relations then, British civil and military citizens remained somewhat aloof and apart from each other and although by 1850 facilities within Britain’s barracks had improved soldiers were still encamped on the edge of towns away from communities in bases near railheads and ports, well into the 1960s. Only with the massed conscription of the First World War in which large expeditionary forces were subject to the privations of trench warfare, shell shock and shootings for cowardice did the narrative of civil-military relations re-focus not on the ills perpetrated by British soldiers on the local population but rather on the social depravations which soldiers themselves faced in the name of duty. Lines from Wilfred Owen’s poem capture the poet’s conceit of the British First World War i.e. the soldier’s real lot: ‘If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood / Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs, /Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud /Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues, /My friend, you would not tell with such high zest /To children ardent for some desperate glory, /The old Lie; Dulce et Decorum est /Pro patria mori’. The poetry from the period captures the covenantal aspects of service and sacrifice that are fully reflected in the modern versions of the

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119 Ibid Pg 6.
120 Ibid Pg 7.
121 Ibid Pg 7.
122 Ibid Pg 7.
123 Ibid Pg 7.
covenant in existence today. These highlight the importance of Remembrance Day: ‘They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old: Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn. At the going down of the sun and in the morning, We will remember them’. These lines of poetry are redolent of an Anglican Church Service and are often incorporated in memorial services the English speaking world over. It is not coincidental that the sentiment that these words convey and the principle of commemoration that they signify are embedded within the military versions of the modern covenant, as an integral part of the bargain. Soldiers die, civilians do not forget. In this way the shape and feel of the military-covenant in modern form can be said to have been influenced by the early modern and modern periods of British conflict with a good degree of certainty. Social Contract thinking, civil-war experiences, imperial and colonial influences and the cultural impact of the First World War have clearly all played their part in shaping the military-covenant. What remains therefore is the turning of conjecture into evidence that what occurred in British history to shape the military-covenant between say 1649 and 1949, is prefigured by events dating back not only to 1349, but to 849 and even before that. What makes the prospect of making this case solid and compelling is the surfacing of artefacts denoting explicit formal military doctrine suffused with the Christian moral philosophy so essential to military-covenants, as they emerged in the British Isles sometime after Roman influence waned in the fifth century.

In ‘The Republic’ written in 375 BC and set during the Peloponnesian War between 431 and 411 BC, Plato reaches back to the wisdom of more ancient philosophers and historians to provide insights into early classical beliefs and traditions. He sources especially Homer and his honouring of warriors. In an imaginary conversation with Socrates, members of Plato’s family touch on the classical forms of military service.

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126 Extract from Laurence Binyon’s poem For the Fallen, written in September 1914. http://www.warpoetry.co.uk/RemembranceB.htm
Well soldiering is a profession, is it not?

And so the business of our defence force, just because it is the most important of all, requires a correspondingly complete freedom from other affairs and a correspondingly high degree of skill and practice.

Table 2. The ancient distinction of the Profession of Arms.128

The language of the ancient Greeks provides terms describing the military which are instantly recognizable to modern readers, ‘soldiering is a profession’ in the ‘business of defence’. Nor should this be surprising given that the first political objective of modern Government is the defence of the nation. It is Plato who is the first in the western political tradition to articulate the covenantal principle of the distinction that warriors have in respect to their martial affairs because national defence is the prime political objective. It is not a trivial political principle being over two thousand years old. The distinctions which Plato draws for warriors are not only professional in nature, requiring special skill and practice but also social because with the profession of arms come further recognitions.

Table 2-1.

And we have Homer’s authority for honouring bravery in the young. For he tells how, when Ajax had distinguished himself in battle, he was ‘paid the honour’ of a helping from the ‘long chine of the beast’ as if it were a suitable honour for a brave man in his prime, something which, in addition to the distinction it brought, would increase his strength.

And how right Homer was.

Then we will follow his advice...we will reward excellence, according to its degree, not only with song and the other privileges we mentioned, but ‘with the best seat at the table, the first cut off the joint, and a never empty cup’.

Good. And then those who die bravely on active service we shall reckon as men of gold...when they die they ‘become holy, beneficent Guardian Spirits on earth, protectors to shield mortal men from harm’.

And we shall bury them with whatever special ceremonies Delphi prescribes, in reply to our inquiry, for men of such divine and heroic mould.

And for the rest of time treat their tombs with reverence and worship them as Guardian Spirits. And we shall pay the same honour to all those who are judged to have lived a life of special distinction...

Table 2-2. The special considerations in honouring ancient warriors.129

128 Ibid pp 61-63.
Plato articulates the first military-covenant. It is framed ideally but it seeks to treat practically the rewards to be bestowed on the warrior class after battle, linking the honorific value of the reward to the prolonged physical prowess of the hero with the ‘first cut of the joint’, and the ‘long chine of the beast’. But the covenant is not just practical it is moral and spiritual: the veneration of the warriors’ tomb becomes an enactment of the pact and prayers to the Guardian Spirits, a call for protection. Were these idealised components of the covenant put into practice they would no doubt have become by way of ritual, a social tradition. Judging by the artistic representation of warriors in ancient Greece by the countless artefacts from the period such a tradition was eminently possible and given the historical context of the Peloponnesian war during which the text was written, highly probable. Though warriors are described as a distinct (indeed they are actually named as ‘professional’) military citizens, worthy of special esteem, the fact that their education, proximity and integration with both the remainder of the governing Guardian class and other citizens is very close, means that their function (defence in support of the state) is conceived by Plato as an essential social function and importantly thought of by him, in an holistic and inclusive manner. Ultimately the ancient military-covenant is part of a broad and binding political settlement between all citizens. The covenant is not viewed by Plato as a feature of a militaristic elite seeking to be separate, nor is it for that matter a standalone or discreet pillar of Plato’s radical concept of the state, it is an enmeshed part of the whole seamless social fabric of the state, it is in fact an indivisible part of the original social contract.

\[129\] Ibid Pp 184-185.
\[130\] For example, the private honouring of family dead has modern ritual observance in funerals, whilst public honouring of the military dead has modern ritual observance in national memorials. Both are ancient customs.
The essential character of the peaceful society which Locke conceived lies in the reciprocal, mutual and shared interests and obligations of the citizen and the state. Individuals pursue a free and peaceful life in exchange for consenting to be governed communally. The Authority legitimises its monopoly on communal power by governing fairly for the common good. Locke posited the idea that individuals could en masse surrender their own ‘natural sovereignty’ to a collective authority, as long as such forfeiture of independent self determination was reciprocated with fair government for the common good. One of the primary preconditions for social order, communal life, was established by Locke within the principle of a social contract. We take from Locke that man is naturally selfish and by extension to be protected from the selfishness of others he forfeits his own individual sovereignty and thus consents to live communally. His selfless act, in defiance of his natural instinct, is indeed humankind’s first step toward true or moral society. To the pre-condition of social order: that all live communally, is added another pre-condition, that of obedience to

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the laws of the government. But obedience to government is necessarily pre-cursored by
the individuals’ consent to live communally and the consent to be governed. To the other two
pre-conditions for the existence of good social order is added a third: the obligation of the
Authority to govern justly. This third pre-condition for social order, the right to just
government is the final part of the social compact. Locke was attempting nothing less than
the prevention of future tyranny or further despotism, by devising a social contract for the
moral good.

The social contract so posited contained practical problems: the Authority’s lack of appetite
to impose upon itself a limit of power and the disinclination to accommodate the
adjudications of the community. These problems were troubling to a government that had
hitherto ruled if not with divine right, then with no less absolute power. Nevertheless, in the
minds of the reading public, which by aid of printing presses was by then quite extensive, the
social contract mined a deep seem of moral indignation which others, certainly on the
continent, would later exploit. For the purpose of parliamentary ascendency it accorded with
the emerging clamour of popular will.

In terms of the military-covenant, the inclusive and communal nature of the social compact,
together with moral authority as an essential component in defining the critical social
elements operating within civil-military relations, are important areas for study. Trust,
mutuality and duty at the institutional and national levels, are themes arguably underplayed
in the modern orthodox CMR theory espoused today.

Civil leaders might be criticised for lacking moral authority 132 in the management of conflict,
their political authority can be diminished in both the public’s and the military’s mind,
especially when soldiers lives are perceived to be wasted needlessly. Military leaders, who

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themselves within the chain of command share the fate of soldiers, do not usually lack such moral authority. However, they too can face public, political and even subordinate opprobrium if it is felt that they have been professionally incompetent, usually by acting outside the values and standards expected of public service or, according to orthodox modern civil-military relations theory, by ‘straying out of bounds’ into the political arena. However, as Locke and Plato show, both political realism and the place of the warrior in society, dictate that from time to time the tensions between the citizenry, the state, and the organs of state including the military, must necessarily be regulated such that political equities be re-set in order to be preserved without calamity. The story of the modern covenant is one in which during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, the views of all the various perspectives were publically stated, including the military’s, and all of the moral competencies laid bare before the public. The result was a renewed covenant in 2011, recast as policy. The military-covenant now arguably serves as the regulatory mechanism by which all political equities on defence issues may now be calibrated. The outcome for the military is that ‘straying out of bounds’ publically into the political sphere is no longer necessary. As long as McCartney’s ‘bargain’ of the covenant is perceived by the public to be more or less in balance, the political statutory apparatus that has accompanied the Armed Forces Covenant into law will ensure that ‘a record of the ledger’ is kept. This ‘ledger’ will act as a platform by which the military, policy and academic perspectives of the covenant may coalesce. This had not been generally anticipated prior to the inception of the Armed Forces Covenant, except negatively by some CMR academics who foresaw the legality of the covenant apt to bring about greater litigation from disgruntled soldiers.\footnote{Dandeker, C. Ingham, S. ‘The Covenant we must protect from the Lawyers’. Parliamentary Brief, 24 June 2010.}

dealing ‘with a world dominated by the Nation State’.  Durkheim and Marx he states failed to link their respective liberal and socialist ideas about the ‘modern state’ to ideas about the ‘control of the means of violence’. Marx and Engels he confides, treat war in terms of revolutionary power and Weber, he posits, one of a cast of liberal, right, socialist and Marxist thinkers sees war as an ‘inescapable’ human outcome, which subsequently fails to capture his attention.

As a consequence one is unlikely to be able to directly source classic social theory to root out the budding ideas of a specific modern military-covenant, one that is reciprocal between the state and its institutions and socially integrative in its nature. Pioneering twentieth century sociologists were not concerned with the problem of arbiters and harbingers of force within the state, they were chiefly concerned with the political and social outcomes of conflict. Perhaps these earlier sociologists believed that the ‘soldier’s lot’ lay in the hands of the military elite and that studies of these themes were of importance only to military theorists and historians. Therefore, the previously regarded ancillary subjects of morale and even the matter of the subject of governance of military affairs, appear to be left to a previous generation of military thinkers, such as Clausewitz and Jomini.

Giddens finds that Marshall discusses ‘citizenship’ and Nietzsche fathoms force, whilst Bendix sees that the ‘use of force is an attribute of authority’ and so, at the very least, whilst the vast majority of early twentieth century sociological writing is concerned with ‘the state and power as components of social life’ the ingredients for the military-covenant were not wittingly anticipated because the triumvirate constituents of authority, force and citizenry are identifiable only as separate parts of other more well codified ideas concerned

136 Ibid pg 112.
137 Ibid pg 112.
138 Ibid pg 115.
139 Ibid pg 116.
140 Ibid pg 117.
141 Ibid pg 118.
142 Ibid pg 118.
143 Ibid pg 118.
with the nature of power under the role of the state. The treatment of troops under the
governance of force as a subject of study in its own right did not emerge at the turn of the
twentieth century. That is not to say that there does not exist extensive primary material on
which to draw, but there exists no easily discernible sociological treatment of the
constitutional relationship of state, nation and armed forces in classic social theory during
this period.

The view from 1959 on the military by Vagts \(^{144}\) is a pertinent one. He discusses officer
politics \(^{145}\) seeing Armies as inherently feudal with military elites since the time of
Marlborough \(^{146}\) attempting to self-govern as an antidote to strong civil leaderships. In many
respects Vagts’ characterisation of the military elite as a self-regarding politically weak class
is compelling although not ultimately accurate as the author contends later in this chapter.
Coming on the back of the decline in massed armies, and following the trend of increasingly
professional militaries, Vagts’ picture is nevertheless portentous. One can easily agree today
that modern western armies continue to get smaller and more technical and that military
elites still retain a somewhat introspective viewpoint, but the petty officer politics that Vagts
discerned in the post-war period between military and civil leaders has arguably given way to
a more institutionally enshrined politicisation of military issues. At the very least the military-
covenant has raised the eye line of military leaders upwards and outwards into the public
domain and so too forced some politicians to look more closely inwards into the military.

The arrival of the military-covenant marks the departure point to Vagts’s standpoint on the
features of modern militarism. There is a different sense in which today, the armies of
modern liberal states, having travelled on a trajectory of organisational decline for so long,
have reached the point where further decline without reform, would be much more a cause
for public discourse than might usually be the case with Defence affairs. The prospect of


\(^{145}\) Ibid pg 127.

\(^{146}\) Ibid pg 128.
Scottish independence in the autumn of 2014 raised not only the notion of Scottish Regiments for Scotland but also the future of Britain’s nuclear deterrence based on the Clyde.\textsuperscript{147} Had it not been for a resurgent Russia annexing the Crimea\textsuperscript{148} Scottish independence could well have put nuclear deterrence back on the political agenda for the next Strategic Defence review in 2015, arguably overturning Defence policy on the future of Trident dating back to 2006.\textsuperscript{149} These geo-political realities brought home the significance of the advent of the military-covenant. The covenant’s inception in 2011 marked not just the case for the public’s general support of the military but also the political reality that the military could now communicate matters relating to the covenant to the public in a way that would in the past have broken protocol. In the case of Scottish independence because independence did not materialise the issue of nuclear deterrence fell away from the public’s gaze. But the issue of Scottish votes for Scottish soldiers did not. Military leaders, veterans and political commentators expressed dissatisfaction that Scottish troops would be denied a say in Scotland’s future.\textsuperscript{150} It is a fact of the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 that special consideration to military personnel may be given in the removal of disadvantage and furthermore a specific part of the covenant states that better provision for voting is a part of the covenant’s deal.\textsuperscript{151} In the case of Scottish independence the provision for better voting was not tested, but the moral outrage expressed in covenantal terms was aired in the media nonetheless.

The military-covenant now raises the prospect that in future failed support of the Armed Forces may be taken up, not just in a moral sense but also in a professional one by aggrieved military-practitioners. As covenant failures impact the Armed Forces’ ability to discharge its duty these failures may be tested against the provisions of the covenant and elevated into the political sphere accordingly. This may in future provide the military with

\textsuperscript{147} Carrell, S. ‘Independent Scotland would not house Trident missiles, says Alex Salmond’. The Guardian, Sun 21 October 2012.
\textsuperscript{150} Tugendhat, T. ‘Scotland’s brave soldiers denied a say in the country they defend’. Daily Telegraph, 28 August 2014.
\textsuperscript{151} For discussion on the content of the military-covenant(s) refer to Chapter 4.
influence outside previously available channels, for military and political ends, which would not have been possible to influence had the covenant not existed.

Failures in the fulfilment of the military-covenant suggest a premise that ill-treatment of the military by the civilian executive is possible, even if highly improbable. But more than this: failures in leadership resulting in damage to the covenant may be countermanded within the bounds of military discipline through the intimation of a ‘refusal to go beyond the extra mile’.

Although equally, covenants may be repaired well before that eventuality occurs. A civilian Executive committed to restoring trust and goodwill with the military by acts of good faith obviates the military’s threat of a withdrawal of trust and goodwill. In the case of a recent reversal of policy regarding the Widows of Service Personnel, in which those widows who had remarried were unfairly denied their pension, the political will behind the pension change was as important as the act itself. For the political reality is, that a covenant without political backing is hollow but a covenant in which disadvantage is demonstrably removed is proof that governmental support to the military is real.

This is an important discussion as it begins to reveal a military position in which military service is no longer unconditional. Where as in the recent past active dissent by a modern western military force was still possible, it became increasingly unlikely as support to the military by the public became a more widely understood prerequisite to civil-military harmony. Thus without the legal recourse or the natural proclivity toward active dissent, professional western militaries have nevertheless been forced increasingly to understand the political sphere, in order to influence it to their advantage, especially in the face of consistent organisational decline. It cannot be a series of isolated events, but rather a rising trend prior to 2011 in which perceived acts of military ‘dissent’ in the media, have reflected the growing

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152 It the military-covenant as Army doctrine which states that the penalty of failing the covenant is: a ‘withdrawal’ of ‘trust’ and ‘goodwill’.
153 Smith, J. ‘Military widows who remarry will no longer lose their pensions as David Cameron announces closing of ‘absolutely wrong’ loophole’. Daily Mail, 8 Nov 2014.
154 i.e. the failed Coup d’etat attempt in Spain by the Civil Guard on 23 Feb 1981.
concern by the public that the covenant was indeed at risk of damage.\textsuperscript{155} The new political reality is that the covenant provides a mechanism for public discourse on Defence issues.

Political realism Morgenthau observes, asserts that society is subject to ‘objective laws’.\textsuperscript{156} These include the dictums: that politics is subject to both ‘reason and experience;’\textsuperscript{157} statesmen ‘act in interest(s) defined as power;’\textsuperscript{158} there cannot be ‘political morality without prudence;’\textsuperscript{159} and the state must ‘judge action by universal moral principles such as liberty’.\textsuperscript{160}

In the final analysis it is political realism which underpins the provenance, in an authoritative sense, of the military-covenant. At the heart of the military-covenant is the principle of fairness because what is at stake politically is justice for the Armed Forces in Society and therefore the application of justice in the UK per se. The moral codes contained within the covenant are not overblown, they are politically prudent. Without a covenant the use of force is no longer underpinned by the trust and goodwill of the military who exercise the state’s power. It is military doctrine which contains the reason of military experience, its ‘institutional wisdom’ so to speak. It is political will that turns the principles of the military-covenant into political action. In this way the military-covenant has become one of the most significant yardsticks by which the state measures the health of civil-military relations in Britain. This is not an intended consequence of military intervention in ‘civil-military affairs’ but it is nevertheless a political outcome of military activity within the domestic policy arena.

One of the most useful theories of war is increasing professionalism in the military. Janowitz brings to light two themes relevant to the theory of the covenant; that the military is moving toward consensus away from autocracy\textsuperscript{161} and that trends toward military involvement in the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{155} See Annex A to Part 1 to Chapter 5 for news articles over the period 2002-2010.
\textsuperscript{156} Freeman, L. (Ed) ‘War’. Oxford University Press. Oxford, 1994. Pg 159. I use the term ‘objective truths’ in respect to the political nature of the military-covenant variously throughout the study.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid pg 160.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid pg 161.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid pp 163-164.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid pg 166.
\end{footnotesize}
political sphere are bound to have consequences.\textsuperscript{162} Janowitz’s idea that military organisations are less autocratic determines a potential future in which Armed Forces are less inclined to act without recourse to wide consultation, either within itself or with its superiors. The existence of the military-covenant suggests that the military is also importantly inclined to reach consensus with society that is seeking support beyond the chain of command. This certainly fits with what is termed ‘the comprehensive approach’ which defines military activity within the context of an inter-departmental framework of government. The comprehensive approach is not simply, if it is at all, a surrendering of power in deference to more appropriate political instruments, it is a recognition that military force is a blunt tool and of limited use on its own. The military-covenant extends the communication of military leaders not only across government but beyond it. For example in the case of Veterans it is the way of British political democracy that ex-service personnel are classed as civilians and therefore ‘cared for’ by other government departments as any other citizen, i.e. not by military organisations. It will be interesting to watch the development of the covenant to see that where elements of the covenant remain unfulfilled, particularly in the areas of mental health and housing whether the covenant is sufficiently powerful to influence the National Health Service and local councils in the interests of Veterans and serving Service families. Or whether indeed advocates of the covenant seek instead to outmanoeuvre government departments which defy the covenant, by promoting the plight of Veterans to an empowered Veterans Minister with a separate budget and possibly a separate Ministry or even directly via charities to the public itself.\textsuperscript{163}

Janowitz also discusses change in military organisations in terms of an increase in political indoctrination.\textsuperscript{164} This builds on the previous discussion on the covenant as a development of Vagts’ ideas concerning officer politics, and introduces the idea that the military will

\textsuperscript{163} See Chapter 5 Interview with Col Bob Stewart MP. Also refer to the policy recommendations made in Chapter 7.
develop more sophisticated political approaches. In one respect the covenant is proof of the phenomenon of professionalization leading to increased political sophistication, if not politicisation. Equally the existence of the covenant develops the theory of professionalization by providing a consequence that Janowitz only hints at, that of a formal expression of a limitation of liability, i.e. the expectation of being treated fairly at all times with the consequence that good will and trust might be removed. The Covenant as a pact was written by an increasingly politically aware professional military elite.

The use of the covenant is a political act, in line with what Janowitz denotes as a shift in ethos away from unquestioning subordination in the face of organisational decline toward mutual obligation in order the utility of force remains a political option. The reason why the covenant is more than an artefact but is in fact the basis of a new theoretical approach to civil-military relations is because it illustrates in political terms, a willingness on the part of the military not to accept unlimited liability at any cost but to achieve institutional relevance in return for fair treatment.

This constitutional triumvirate of nation, state and people; in which mutual obligation is the cornerstone, is not one that has been traditionally used as the basis for understanding CMR in Britain. Ordinarily, it is recognised that the military is suborn to the civil authority with no limitation of liability on its use. But what can militaries do when states are at risk of damaging them? The military-covenant is perhaps far more important than first imagined.

If such a thing as ‘Covenant theory’ existed it would reject as cold-war the Huntingtonian orthodoxy in CMR which conforms to the principle of civilian control wherein civil and military institutions are necessarily separated. It acknowledges therefore as a process of onward democratisation the further integration of civil and military institutions, especially of command

and governance structures but also in technical and social ones. In this the military-covenant shares at least one similarity with Concordance theory.

Concordance theory argues for a ‘cooperative relationship’ between ‘the military, the political elites and the citizenry’. The military-covenant seeks closer support of the military and improved national understanding and recognition of its institutional distinctions. The difference between the two is that Concordance theory aims to prevent domestic military intervention in its grosser forms (such as Coup d’état) by bringing about ‘partnership’ between military and civilian organisations. The military-covenant on the other hand, adopts a military standpoint which is sympathetic to milder forms of military intervention such as direct influence, into the civilian-political realm in order to achieve the fulfilment of the ‘bargain’ of the covenant. Concordance theory provides an alternative and progressive theoretical viewpoint of civil-military affairs; the military-covenant is a mouthpiece for the military-practitioners’ perspective on emerging military issues within current political and social frameworks. Critically, Concordance theory has not yet been applied to civil-military relations within the US or the UK: this is because its author believes that civil-relations in these countries is relatively ‘healthy’. The relatively healthy status of western militaries is due to the fact that the threshold for military dissent under Concordance theory is the likelihood of a coup d’état; which is highly unlikely in the US or the UK. In contrast the UK military-covenant’s sole area of applicability is the UK and by contrast it does betoken a decline in British civil-military relations because its benchmark (which is not the likelihood of coups, not even necessarily the prospect of insubordination) but rather the necessity in recent years and therefore the current tendency to engage publicly in order to influence policy. The military-covenant is not just military it is social and it is attuned to social justice not merely military output. The military-covenant’s threshold for success or failure is the

167 Ibid pg 12.
169 Ibid pg 19.
likelihood of military effectiveness on operations and importantly the actual levels of support provided to Service families and veterans at home. It views the failures of strategy and resource in Iraq and Afghanistan as real and support to troops, families and veterans at risk of further decline in the face of more austere economic times ahead. Concordance theory aims to deter export of an unsuitable US style civil-military relations model abroad,\(^{170}\) whilst the military-covenant aims to prevent poor treatment of the Armed Forces Community by addressing national failures to equip, support and lead the military at home and abroad.

In a narrative concerned with the position of the modern liberal state within foreign policy, Doyle\(^ {171}\) argues that liberal principles tend to be more applicable to domestic policy and that international relations, in which 'liberal ideology' does not easily fit, is the field in which considerations of national security take place: under the auspices of what he describes 'balance of power' politics.\(^ {172}\) The exception to this tendency is liberal interventionism which injects liberal thinking into foreign policy. In this way for liberal thinkers who had previously regarded the Armed Forces principally as an adjunct to foreign policy the military-covenant revises their estimations significantly. For it is the failures in foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan which have brought social justice, the military and domestic policy all together. The military-covenant allows discussion between the three perspectives (practitioner, policy and academic) to square the political circle of domestic and foreign affairs in regard to the use of force abroad and the maintenance of an effective military establishment at home.

Dandeker cites the 'industrial and democratic revolutions'\(^ {173}\) as engines of change for the military in three principle ways: 'revolution in the means of destruction...increased mobility...and...bureaucratisation of communications and information'.\(^ {174}\) These can be argued in terms of technical and administrative evolutions in the continuum of human

\(^{170}\) Ibid pg 20.
\(^{172}\) Ibid pg 105.
\(^{174}\) Ibid pg 118.
conflict, but the point about the increased performance of fighting forces over the period 1700-1900 is that certain physical changes are accompanied by changes in mindset. Dandeker sees as significant rises in artillery, the use of rail and telegraph, increase in force sizes and conscript armies with professional officer and NCO corps. These are supported by accounts of different historical cultural differences in the use of force on the continent such as an inferred Prussian militarism. The latter accounts for supremacy of military elites in emergent European nation states but it brings into sharp contrast with France and Germany Britain’s own civil society which being built on a strong parliamentary democracy has (with several notable exceptions) a traditionally weak political military elite.

Manigart, writing about the 1950s, looks at the ‘profound’ changes in the organisation of the Armed Forces. For Manigart the reduction in size and the move to the all volunteer force point not just to the context of strategic security shifts but to ‘processes of social differentiation...of the division of labour in the Durkheimian sense’. Within the overall paradigm of decline Manigart is clear that the professionalization of militaries is a critical outcome. Thus within the context of necessary change the military-covenant can be seen as an articulation of what the British Army deems cannot be changed, what cannot be adapted, what is sacrosanct and what lies at the heart of military effectiveness. So that if the use of the covenant by the military in the face of state induced decline is seen on the one hand as a pendulum swinging back toward more influence for the military elite, then on the other the content of the covenant has at its centrepiece the logic for a dialogue with the civil leadership about what constitutes that which must endure, if Defence of the nation is to remain pre-eminent amongst other Government policies.

175 Ibid pg 119.
176 Ibid pg121.
177 Ibid pg 118.
178 Ibid pg 119.
179 Ibid pg 123.
181 Ibid pg 130.
182 Ibid pg 131.
Van Creveld’s narrative on why men fight boils down to the fact that men like to do it as the ultimate test of their human capacity for adventure. His thesis is about fighting spirit, and that without it forces are worthless. From his discussion comes understanding about what contributes to fighting spirit and by extension military effectiveness. Small unit cohesion, morale and so forth are elements that come into play. But what Van Creveld does not consider is under what circumstances men (and by extension women also) might refuse to fight. In addressing this question one is forced to consider that lack of morale and lack of cohesion will surely be factors. In this way, the military-covenant, when it is upheld, is a vessel of incentives for the warrior. Likewise when the covenant is at jeopardy it is a measure of dissatisfaction. The covenant says to the warrior: ‘you may well lose your life, you will certainly put in more than what you get out of service life, but the nation underwrites your ability to do your job and to look after your family’. In this way the covenant couched as a bargain is an article of huge social importance.

Cohen’s biographical analysis of statesmen during wartime critiques civil military relations theory. His thesis is that successful civil leaders in war defy what he defines as the ‘normal theory of civil-military relations’ by employing alternative frameworks of leadership in war; ones in which civilians may legitimately question operational details, run roughshod over their generals if necessary and hector or harry field commanders as circumstances dictate. At the root of this alternative theory to normal civil-military relations is an historical narrative in which successful wartime civil leaders fully involve themselves in the minutiae of the business of war and less successful ones abrogate their responsibilities to military commanders. In essence, intimate engagement between civil and military leaders to the point of friction is for Cohen a positive attribute of good conflict leadership:

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185 Ibid pg 173.
Cohen’s thesis, which one might term ‘supreme civilian command’ is interesting in its own right as it provides an alternative model of the principle of civil authority within civil-military relations by suggesting that modern civil leaders may often be more competent than their military counterparts ‘in the strategic business of war’ as leaders in wartime. History has shown that this is certainly true in many cases of conflict at least in the twentieth century. ‘Supreme civilian command’ is especially interesting in relation to the military-covenant because if civilian command is associated with success in conflict, requiring persistent engagement by civilians in military affairs even at the operational level, then it must also be true that when that engagement is not present, when that leadership is lacking, as Cohen would argue is the case with the normal theory of civil relations exemplified by the case of Vietnam, then a situation occurs where failure in conflict is also possible, even probable. This means that a corrective to an ailing civil-military relationship is needed when failure persists. Under the military-covenant it is the Armed Forces who seek political guarantees of civil recognition, of fair-play, of reciprocity, and by extension a level of influence in the business of war and in the management of conflict necessary for success, which necessitates more civilian involvement.

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186 Ibid pg 206.
187 In which democratic governments retain political control but delegate the actual execution of military action to the armed forces.
Urban’s historical narrative of the British military elite provides a highly useful discourse on British military exploits in the style of ‘who gave the orders and why’. The chief insight gained from this survey of generalship is how the fraternity of British military elites evolved ‘in tandem with democracy’. Whilst Urban does not speak explicitly about a military-covenant he does comment on the nature of the relationship between the political and military elites with regard the governance of conflict, thereby providing useful historical context for examining the link between the soldier and the state. Urban’s premise that what British generals had in common across the ages was ultimate responsibility to a premier who could remove them from office seems to subscribe to the ‘longstanding theory of objective civilian control’ of the military as espoused by Huntington who emphasises the ‘separation of civil and military institutions’. However, a more subtle interpretation of Urban’s work discerns the often acute political sensibilities which British generals have possessed. Take for example Monck’s remarkable handling of Parliamentarians and Royalists in Charles II’s succession to the English throne in 1660 when revolution was averted despite the very real prospect of armed insurrection and rebellion. So, by accounting for the unique contributions made by British generals in domestic and foreign policy over the period 1660-1975, Urban specifically picks up on the politically intimate nature of the relationship between soldiers and statesmen. He states that:

‘…the peculiar characteristics of military leadership in Britain …(is) the combined military skill with a mastery of politics, of dealing successfully with civilian holder’s of power.’

Table 2-5. Mark Urban, Generals: Ten British Commanders who shaped the world.

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190 Ibid pg XI.
191 Ibid. pg XI.
195 George Monck 1608-1670.
This recognition that generalship, like many high offices of state, is a political business, recasts the idea of civil control of the military as one requiring generals to be a-political acting neutrally, to one where civil control of the military is reliant on generals with political skills acting positively in order to influence. The degrees to which generals can be said to be wholly a-political and completely outside the domain of politics is with the advent of the military-covenant under contention. Here again the case of General Monck is instructive; he is the arch political general who, Urban observes, states (see Table 2-6):

*It is a dangerous thing for a General to make himself chief in persuading a Prince, or State to any weighty and important resolution, so that the counsel thereof, be wholly imputed to him, which belongs to many.*

Table 2-6. Mark Urban, Generals: Ten British Commanders who shaped the world.\(^{197}\)

This is an important statement. It speaks of the need for inclusive debate in the matter of determining military policy whilst warning that generalship will tend to tyranny if it assumes a power to which it is not entitled. Given Monck’s appointment as a Parliamentarian general who paved the way for a Royal succession, these words have special significance because they infer a higher loyalty to duty than might have been expected of a benign dictator. For even though Monck himself exercised the very power against which he warned,\(^{198}\) he did so with restraint and diplomacy. His actions in bringing back a King to the British throne without bloodshed, laid the foundations of a professional Army within a constitutional monarchy. The ends did not justify the means but for Monck the prize outweighed scruples he knew to be transgressing. The importance of ‘military honour’\(^{199}\) is touched on by Urban in his thesis of generalship already referred to in the case of Monck. Ideas of British military honour were fully developed by General Sir John Hackett in his previous social history of the British Profession of Arms.\(^{200}\) Through a discussion on loyalty and duty and the part these values play in maintaining military discipline Hackett illustrates how honour and discipline are

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\(^{197}\) Ibid pg 25.

\(^{198}\) Ibid pg 22.

\(^{199}\) Ibid Pg 8.

necessary pre-requisites for the effective operation of a professional military. Hackett has some interesting observations on the origins of discipline and by extension traditional notions of military duty. These become important when attempting to characterise the reciprocal duties of the state toward the military under the terms of a modern military-covenant. Hackett reflects on the nature of the profession of arms inviting speculation about why militaries are unique. This aspect of a military, that it is unique, falls into another area of CMR which states that the military’s need to be different is challenged by society. However, Hackett, who in part uses Vagts and Huntington to launch his thesis on the value of the Profession of Arms, makes use of his experiences and insights as an officer (a military-practitioner) to argue that whilst military and civilian institutions will remain distinct, there will necessarily be a trend toward greater integration. Hackett’s ideas about the military being unique and of high social value on a trajectory of limited but progressive integration with society can be developed more comprehensively through the development of the military-covenant by reinforcing the precept that the military is an institution defined not only by its exclusive military function but also by its adaptive social characteristics. Hackett’s assertion that there will be an integrative direction in CMR predates Schiff’s theory of Concordance, and calls for further examination of these trends in CMR.

The last idea that Monck’s case highlights is that of the politicisation of military governance and the political nature of modern generalship. The extent to which generals can be non-political whilst acting in a highly political environment whilst attempting to discuss military matters which call for public debate, under intense media scrutiny is of itself worthy of further analysis. Examination of the current public and media furore over unpopular conflicts, poor procurement or ‘overstretch’ are encapsulated within the military-covenant. To some extent

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201 Ibid, pp 9, 58, 59 & 61.
202 Ibid pp 72-73.
discussion leads back to the previous point about what aspects of the military-covenant should be measured and by whom.

Men in all places and at all times are basically the same. The military view of man is thus decidedly pessimistic. Man has elements of goodness, strength, and reason, but he is also evil, weak, and irrational. The man of the military ethic is essentially the man of Hobbes.

Table 2-7. Huntington’s military man, the man of Hobbes.

Modern British military doctrine places emphasis on military virtues and moral requirements, but it draws also on democratic traditions. The British military ethic is therefore rooted as much in Locke and Burke as it is in Hobbes. The significance of basing military ethics within the wider historical context of the social contract affords analysis of the emergence of moral authority and social justice as important aspects for the governing of modern military institutions. The military-covenant wrestles the concept of military professionalism away from isolationist and pessimistic utilitarianism and allows elements of moral philosophy and strands of social justice to enter in as a conceptual basis. The military-covenant spans conservative and liberal British values affording the three perspectives (practitioner, policy and academic) a platform for positive and less adversarial discussion on the nature of military effectiveness and CMR in the UK.

Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values. The military officer must remain neutral politically. “The military commander must never allow his military judgement to be warped by political expediency.” (Gale, Jour. RUSI., XCIX, 37). The area of military science is subordinate to, and yet independent of, the area of politics. Just as war serves the ends of politics, the military profession serves the end of the state. Yet the statesman must recognize the integrity of the profession and its subject matter. The military man has the right to expect political guidance from the statesmen. Civilian control exists when there is this proper subordination of an autonomous profession to the ends of policy.

Table 2-8. Huntington’s politics and the military officer.

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That military leaders could remain completely outside of politics as Huntington implies in Table 2-8 when the demands of future conflict require a whole of government approach in the face of diminishing resource and when complete support of the public is of the utmost importance in fighting home bred terrorism, Huntington’s stance is increasingly problematic. Whilst political neutrality in the future is achievable, avoidance by the military in the engagement of political dialogue is not. War of the people by the people reflects the fact that the revolution in military affairs is not about technological advances or monolithic threats of nation states but of social order, the spread of subversion, terrorism and cyber attacks in market states and the clash of ideology, religion and commerce under globalisation. In short, wars of the future will be waged with ideas and success will depend increasingly on moral right as much as physical might. Greater moral and social cohesion of the military and society, of the Armed Forces to the Legislature and to the Executive, that is, more integration, coordination and consensus will be a prerequisite of national security in the future. The military-covenant proves that the revolution in military affairs is not technical, it is social. Future military organisational reform must reflect this trend. Under this conceptual setting CMR must be re-appraised in light of current social and constitutional relationships. The military-Covenant offers the field of CMR the military perspective in determining such outcomes.

Huntington’s reflection on the Authority (below at Table 2-9) also begs further discourse. The nature and character of Authority is seen in terms of its power structure. Huntington is concerned that the separation of the officer corps from the upper echelons of the power structure of the Authority so that the military organisation obtains a high degree of discretion or autonomy, this for him is key to his concept of civilian control. However it is a point of emphasis on the nature of political power that is problematical – too much autonomy and the Authority is compromised, not enough and military effectiveness is constrained. In this power relationship between the military and the state where autonomy and obedience is an

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208 Ibid pg 72.
essential dynamic, moral authority becomes a critical component in understanding the
civilian-military relationship; it alone can discriminate between those who support and those
who frustrate the output of military capability in a time of war; particularly in the sphere of
political leadership.

Table 2-9. Huntington’s unity of authority.

The level, type and degree of Huntington’s term ‘unity of authority’ is key in understanding
CMR. One way by which civil-military integration can be measured is by determining the
extent to which the chain of command is populated by both civil and military elites. Next, the
extent to which civilian and military counterparts interpret and share the same mission and
objectives is another measurement. In a single institution, the culture, creed and ethos of
two types of citizen, co-exist; the one military, the other civilian. The extent to which the two
differ and therefore the degree to which both subsequently cohere, bears directly on the
resultant organisations’ ability to deliver military capability. It is thus critical that
specialisation and differentiation is not allowed to develop into separation and isolation in
respect of unity of authority. This begs a comparison of the civil codes of conduct, of military
values and of parliamentary practices to establish the precepts which govern the
professional outlooks of the various public offices, and the extent to which these precepts

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209 Ibid pg 87. I use the term ‘unity of authority’ in chapters four through to seven interchangeably with the terms ‘civilian chain of
command’ or ‘cross government governance’.

210 For discussion on ‘cohesion’ see Feaver, P. ‘Armed Servants: Agency, oversight and civil military relations’. Harvard. HUP,
2005. Pg 80.
would need to be re-oriented so that cultural platforms mutually overlap in the delivery of
unity of authority and measurement of mission success.

The vying of one military service against another is commonly termed in Britain ‘inter-service rivalry’. It stems from the competition for scarce resources, is aggravated by the highly bureaucratic framework of scrutiny and approvals (or governance and oversight) and is constantly frustrated by a host of political agendas and industrial interests. Thus the issue of military resource and support is surrounded by a nexus of complex inter-relationships based upon commercial contracts and business agreements as well as public perceptions and media coverage. This is further complicated by the highly evolved political structure of the state’s administrative bureaucracies. In the UK these are set up to compliment the duality of parliamentary government, reinforcing the division between the executive and the legislative functions which seek to check and balance each other in the execution of government policy and by doing so manifest themselves at every level within the administrations creating ‘advocates for change’ and ‘agents of restraint’. With their own agendas and interests and often at odds with the task of military campaign success unity of authority is often a challenging prospect.

The military ethic is concrete, permanent, and universal. The term “civilian” on the other hand, merely refers to what is non-military. No dichotomy exists between the “military mind” and the “civilian mind” because there is no “civilian mind.”...Consequently, the military ethic can only be compared with particular civilian ethics...one species of civilian ethic (is) – the political ideology.

Liberalism has many pacifist tendencies, but the liberal will normally support a war waged to further liberal ideals. War as an instrument of national policy is immoral; war on behalf of universally true principles of justice and freedom is not.

While military man learns from history and the liberal relies on reason, the fascist stresses intuition.

For the Marxist, man is basically good and rational; he is corrupted by evil institutions. He is naturally at peace with his fellow men. The Marxist also differs from the military man in his faith that history will come to an end with the realization of a more or less utopian society.

Conservatism. Unlike liberalism, Marxism, and fascism, conservatism is basically similar to the military ethic. Indeed it was found appropriate to designate the military ethic as one of conservative realism. In its theories of man, society, and history, its recognition of the role of power in human relations, its acceptance of existing institutions, its limited goals, and its distrust of grand designs, conservatism is at one with the military ethic...

Table 2-10. Huntington’s civilian group types and ideologies.\(^{211}\)

\(^{211}\) Ibid pg 89-93.
In as far as identifying which political ideology is most akin to the military ethos and institution, Huntington’s views on conservative realism are not contentious. However, by virtue of the very same comparison he makes with regard to there being no single civilian ethos, to therefore speak of a singular universal military mind, a singular universal military man or a singular universal military outlook, is problematic. Notwithstanding the national social traditions and customs into which a military institution is itself embedded in a complex and integrated way (each military organised according to its country’s own unique national constitution and its country’s own unique stance on defence and security). Thus the alignment of a military type to a common political ideology is ultimately erroneous. At the individual level the composite personal beliefs and philosophies which individual citizens hold are themselves entirely unique and many faceted and defy classification in a universal sense. These personal beliefs and habits, do not in any case or in any way bar allegiance to a collective identity which may emphasise different virtues to the ones which actually regulate the private citizens personal life. Social and political science is ill equipped to decipher personal motivation with any scientific certainty but it is sufficient to know in this regard, that one can publicly sign up to a public value such as ‘Respect for Others’ for arguments sake, and by extension professionally abide by the dictums that this imperative instigates. Yet at the same time it is perfectly possible that the same ‘private citizen’ may disagree legitimately with some of the beliefs or activities of the very minority which is protected by the dictum ‘Respect for Others’. This paradox is, after all, the very essence of tolerance, at the heart of ‘Respect for Others’. Soldiers and officers may therefore privately disagree with a military strategy that they view to be deleterious but they may not publically disavow their mission or their commanders unless their orders are illegal. The difficulty arises that if a military continues to disagree with the efficacy of a strategy for a mission, their own morale and ultimately the success of the mission itself may become jeopardised. The trouble that arises from Huntington’s attribution of a military ethic which is analogous with a political ideology is that the soldier as a citizen is denied his fullest and most realistic characterisation. In a sense, Huntington’s advocacy of the professionalization of the military
institution and the officers’ status in society, necessary as it was and still remains, overly
abstracted the soldier and his functions in war from his actual place in wider society and the
ture moral dimension that public office prescribes both for him and his civilian superiors.
Furthermore, from his own analysis of the political aspect and ethic of the military type,
Huntington could not distinguish a Western Christian Democrat from an Eastern Muslim
Theocrat, on the basis that according to him, the two soldiers would share a universal ethic
of conservative-realism, what might make the two enemies is a cultural divide which
Huntington was not disposed to follow up. Clearly this aspect of Huntington’s analysis is
wrong. By aligning the military ethic with a particular political hue in an attempt to promote
the soldier within society, Huntington actually committed to posterity a line of thought in civil-
military affairs which helped create a long established myth: the myth of the separateness of
the soldier from the rest of society. This myth is further reinforced for British Forces by the
orthodox civil-military school of thought that professional troops once recruited have been
traditionally kept separate from society in order to be militarily effective or culturally
distinctive. Academic positions on the Army’s ‘need to be different’ are clear: ‘The functional
imperatives of war and military operations ensure that the services stand apart from civilian
society.’ But the covenant is proof that whilst difference between military and civilian
citizens based on the profession of arms exists, the gap is not so wide as to be an
unfathomable chasm. The covenant contends that military differences do not equate to
isolationism. Furthermore, as in the case of Huntington, the soldier is not usefully a
conservative Hobbes any more than he is a liberal Locke, a revolutionary Rousseau or a
utilitarian Mill. The soldier is ultimately and professionally politically neutral even though he
or she operates within the environs of political democracy. The military-covenant illustrates
that in as far as the soldier is governed by political principles or influenced by military
doctrine at all, it is with respect to his or her special duties and moral obligations. That is not
to say that military leaders do not increasingly engage in the formulation or critique of policy

212 Dandeker, C. ‘On The Need to be Different’: Recent Trends in Military Culture. Taken from Strachan, H. (Ed), The British
or behave in political ways when necessary but they are certainly whilst serving neutral in terms of party political hue.

Strachan provides the authoritative historical analysis that confirms Cohen's and Urban’s comprehensions of generalship encroaching into the political sphere thereby refuting Huntington’s proscriptions from the British perspective. Strachan's is a study in political realism writ large for the British Army.

It is recognised that professionalism can require a political response, and that the man who gives it does not in the process impugn his professional integrity. The interpenetration of the services which these retired professional heads represent is continuity in the history of the army. It gives the lie to any neat demarcation between the two spheres. Fusion between soldier and politician has been more common than separation. Norms should not be allowed to obscure realities. Professionalism has been a powerful precipitant of politicization.

Table 2-11. Strachan's indictment of the separation of professional and political realms.

The inception of the military-covenant is an up to date example of Strachan’s observation at Table 2-11 about the porous boundary between political and military affairs. General Dannatt’s public interventions over the period 2006-2009 based, no doubt on firm professional and moral precepts about the state of the Army undergoing ‘over-stretch,’ were also political actions that lead to the Armed Forces Covenant becoming part of Parliamentary statute in 2011. In line with Strachan’s reflection about retired heads of profession moving into politics, Dannatt also became a Lord in 2010.

Militarism is a word now loaded with too many meanings and productive of misunderstanding, but it is the only abstract noun that will do the job. If it is interpreted as a veneration of military values and appearances in excess of what is strictly necessary for effective defence, then it is not as inapplicable to Britain as the orthodoxy allows.

Table 2-12. Strachan’s assertion that the British Army is subject to militarism.

Use of the term militarism in relation to a post Imperial British Army is indeed problematic and no doubt Dannatt would disagree with Strachan over the point of resources and

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recognition of the Army during the period 2000-2010. The military-covenant if it (also) 'means a veneration of military values and appearances' does so in a framework specifically designed (directly under the pressures of economic austerity) to ensure effective defence. But if the thrust of Strachan’s case about the overlap between civil and military spheres is that the effect is to have tipped the scale toward the ascendancy in British politics of the military practitioner’s perspective, other European countries have cautionary views which fly in the face of this assessment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2-13. Vaclev Klaus, Former Prime Minister of the Czech Republic.</th>
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</table>

Burridge cites devolution of Welsh and Scottish assemblies, the independence of the City of London, the increased use of independent enquiries, and the prospect of the freedom of information act to illustrate Britain’s move to a more representative, accountable democratic system of government. To these examples one might now add the independence of coroner’s rulings and the rise of the military-covenant, as further examples of what Burridge points to as a more 'consensual' political inclination in the UK. In this sense the military-covenant is part of a wider democratic impulse toward more inclusive, explicit and transparent delivery of policy in which stakeholders are able to claim ill-treatment or breach of pact even if sanction is not invoked. The military-covenant should therefore be mirrored by similar covenantal movements in other areas of policy execution where other public services and institutional communities, vulnerable to political or public neglect, are acting more formally, forcefully, publically and politically to secure rights and privileges for their members.

So called ‘Frontline Services,’ where democratic representation is problematic because members are prevented from taking industrial action, is an example where covenants could

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216 Ibid pp 7-11.
or may already be operating in the absence of Trade Unions. If such a thing as Covenant theory existed it would be able to explain the origins and trajectories of the citizen-state relationship within other public bodies and communities, not only the civil-military one. However, such a theory is out of the scope of this research.

The review of a broad spectrum of relevant, sociological, political, CMR and historical literature shows that whilst there is a gap in extended scholarship dedicated to the military-covenant (none in fact before 2013 and potentially as little as two works in 2015, including this work), the study of the covenant is an important contribution to the field. What has been missing until now is an expert military-practitioner’s perspective and furthermore an understanding of the cultural aspects of the military-covenant so necessary in explaining its ancient British origins. This now follows in chapter three.
Chapter Three.

Clash of a million swords. The origins and evolution of the British military-covenant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-1. The Tale of Beowulf.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thuswise and so manly the mighty of princes,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hoard-warden of heroes, the battle-race paid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With mares and with gems, so as no man shall blame them,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E’en he who will say sooth aright as it is.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Establishing antiquity has been a first and necessary step in defining the United Kingdom’s military-covenant. Bringing to bear the full weight of British history rather than relying on assumed and ambiguous modern interpretations has been an important motivation for this study. Over a thousand years within the bounds of the British Isles and before the age of expansion, the clash of a million swords gave rise to a distinctively British parlance for war and with it the military-covenant was ushered in.

The existence of Army Doctrine Publication Operations (Volume 5, 2005) and the Armed Forces Covenant (MoD, 2011) make a single definition of ‘the military-covenant’ highly problematic. The provenance, purpose and emphases of each of these twenty-first century documents are quite different. The first and foremost is British Army Doctrine i.e. military knowledge prescribed to the Army and held within a canon of literature designed to educate the latest generation of commanders in the Profession of Arms. The latter is Defence Policy i.e. political direction to the Defence staff for the development of operational strategy and the prioritisation for resourcing capability. Despite overlap and similarity in several areas, the two

documents are not the same. The aspirations articulated in the first covenant contrast with
the provisions made in the second. The gap between what is intended by the covenant and
what the covenant actually provides is sufficiently wide that the subsequent dissonance
experienced by beneficiaries in contrast to claims of progress by policy makers continues to
provide ferment between the two. Concern over the scale of implied social injustice between
the British military and British society was voiced in 2006 by the then Chief of the General
Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt. The debate which arose as a result of Lord Dannatt’s
comments was in itself illustrative of the status of the military-covenant. In a widely
publicised interview he let it be known that he had told the Defence Secretary (Des Brown)
‘…the Army won’t let the nation down, but I don’t want the nation to let the army down…”
To use Dannatt’s phrase the military-covenant was ‘out of kilter’ and in need of repair. It is
the sense of unfairness, of natural justice denied and in the spirit of anciently rooted,
commonly held beliefs about, service, trust, honour, duty and obligation that the military-
covenant resonates with the British public.

It is necessary to take a fresh and comprehensive appreciation of important historical factors
concerning the United Kingdom’s military-covenant in order to debunk contemporary
accounts of the military-covenant which lack detailed and coherent historical analyses.
Despite a variety of work existing which attempt to assess the covenant’s health and
status, and indeed work generally in this area, these do so almost exclusively from a
twenty-first century perspective (with little historical analysis if any beyond the seventeenth
century). That work which does mention the late antique and early medieval periods does so
only cursorily and with nil scholarly analyses of the ancient origins of military-covenants.
Therefore no literature to date adequately addresses the problem of how the British military-
covenant incorporates cultural influences. The narrow set of reference points, usually

www.dailymail.co.uk/.../sir-Richard-Dannatt.
219 i.e. Helen McCartney’s work for the British Government in auditing the military-covenant in 2007.
starting with Carl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831) are simply insufficient to cope with the task. Consequently no civil-military relations academic or military historian may claim to have defined the military-covenant fully or authoritatively without the critical preliminary and foundational effort of a structured historical survey. In this chapter, the author lays bare for the first time the origins of the military covenant from first principles.

This chapter provides a small digest of the author’s research into the subject of covenants but it is sufficiently comprehensive enough to finally revoke the assertion that the ‘idea’ of a ‘British military covenant,’ encapsulated within a formal and explicit article vouchsafing the rightful expectation of soldiers, is a ‘very recent’ and ‘invented tradition’. Indeed it corrects initial conservative estimations of it being ‘centuries’ old by several orders of magnitude and shows that such covenants were indeed explicit and formal concerning the rightful expectations and duties of military personnel under arms. The military-covenant is certainly Roman, or to be more precise, Sub-Roman and of British provenance but its first applications did not simply concern pensions. For although pensions clearly indicated the fulfilment of the covenant at the end of the Roman soldier’s service, the applications of the military-covenant also catered for his day to day service life as well. Feeding, pay and the treatment of the wounded all fell within the strictures of a prescriptive Roman covenantal code in which soldiers could expect fair reward for services rendered to Caesar. Nor were the obligations of late antique and early medieval warriors to fight in the British Isles, simply or only feudal. Long before the establishment of landed overlords, tribal warrior kings had covenantal relationships which assured not only faithful military service but also maintained peaceful alliances. Only structured historical, archaeological and etymological survey provides the evidence which shows the British military-covenant to have been a fully coherent precept with a very ancient lineage. This chapter provides the evidence which

225 Ibid Pg 8.
finally reveals that the military-covenant is certain to have been in operation in the British Isles before the Norman conquest between the first and ninth centuries AD.

Alongside the lack of a comprehensive historical perspective, another problem in contemporary discussion about the origins of the military-covenant is the lack of an interdisciplinary approach. An approach capable of combining analysis of ancient history with analysis of contemporary social and military policy necessarily involves discussions concerning national cultures and sub-cultures. In undertaking an interdisciplinary approach and by exploring the foundations of the military-covenant, fresh interpretation and significance for archaeological, literary and artistic artefacts has been attained.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss in any greater depth than is necessary the methodological framework for surveying the subject matter of the covenant. At this point it is simply worth highlighting that cross-disciplinary approach is the only one that can achieve the foundational elements so necessary in defining a military-covenant and determining its true authenticity and significance. That the political nature of the modern military-covenant combined with its implications for latter day social and military intercourse is not without a direct antecedent which was readily accessible to ancient forbears lies at the heart of the case for ancient British military-covenants. It has not been necessary in this chapter to expose more than the barebones texts and archaeological discoveries in order to provide the first viewpoint from which the evidence for ancient military-covenants may be examined. This chapter discusses therefore covenantal traditions, values and principles as they once appeared so that better understanding of all the factors actually at play leads to a firm definition of the military-covenant.

When viewed objectively over very many centuries the UK military-covenant reveals not only the discovery of an antique heritage but also the astonishing fact that the ancient texts and traditions which British military-covenants have inspired and reflect, do so in terms scarcely
different to those more readily accessible to the modern reader in some of the documents composed only in recent years. Nor is it merely a consequence of modern authors being inspired directly by ancient wisdom (although this is also the case). There is now evidence of cultural dissemination of ideas and concepts, indeed traditions and rituals that embed the military-covenant into the British Isles’ social history and make the link between ancient and modern inseparable and permanent. It is possible to trace almost by language alone the role that the military-covenant has played through British history as a lodestone for fairplay and accommodation between the emergent civil and military communities where it first took root. Indeed the use the term ‘Arms and the Covenant’ in 1938, a title given to one of Churchill’s pre-war speeches,\textsuperscript{226} is a title designed directly to appeal to civilised democratic nations to come together to fight Nazism. At the root of Churchill’s pre-war calls to arms was a moral and collective cause. The covenant of nations that Churchill envisioned for the purpose of fighting the second world war were also prefigured in previous periods of European turmoil.

At the heart of Grotius’ much earlier imperatives toward an international recognition in law for the regulation of war, the concept of the covenant as a promise between nations in the conduct of war is also present. Whether for the purpose of binding nations together in the face of war, binding nations together in the legal practice of war, or binding nations together in the regulation of civil-military relations the covenant has a part to play in defining the nature of these bonds. In this way communities whose origins hitherto have been characterised as being forged predominantly through conflict and forced assimilation are by the concept of covenants newly appraised. ‘Justice as fairness’\textsuperscript{227} in the domestic sense of that term is brought by the concept of military-covenants into the realm of military alliances, pacts and practices. Through the author’s work, Britain’s ancient military-covenants are brought to life for the first time. The more significant roles of civil and military social interaction via assembly, oaths and mutual obligations or pacts bring studies into the

\textsuperscript{226} See ‘England is here - A selection from the Speeches and Writings of The Prime Ministers of England.’ Edited by Hanchant, London, 1943. Pgs 246-247. In this volume, Churchill’s speech at Manchester on 9 May 1938 is reproduced and introduced by Hanchant.

military-covenant to the forefront of historical, social and political discourse. Without this foundational work, an accurate definition of the military-covenant would not be possible.

The military-covenant of mutual trust and obligation, working at various social levels between Britain’s indigenous civil and military communities has been in existence in the British Isles for the best part of two millennia. Before the final act of unification of Britain in the eighteenth century, before the expeditionary exploits of the British Isles from the sixteenth century, even before the formation of the island’s first standing military force, the maritime militia of the ninth century AD, the story of the military-covenant unfurls in the post-Roman fledgling time of Anglo-Celtic Britain. The first real evocation of a recognizably ‘Britannic’ national identity, fragile and dawning but containing civil and military interactions betokening covenantal relationships is set in a period between late antique and early medieval times. This period known as the Dark Ages is from the perspective of historical learning becoming less dark as time marches on. Progress in the field of archaeology in Britain since the 1920s has led to recent discoveries of military and historical significance. Archaeological finds such as the very recent discovery in Colchester of a fine hoard of Roman jewellery is evidence that Britain’s past has more to say for itself with each new historical discovery. The Colchester find, thought by Philip Crummy to be the last desperate act of a noble woman fleeing Boudicca’s mob in AD61, is evidence supporting the historical narrative of a Britain in constant violent conflict during that period of Roman occupation. But the familiar narrative of Britain’s ancient brutal and bloody past is not the whole story of the Island’s hybrid races by any means. Take for example the remarkable discovery of the Vindolanda tablets, made of expertly crafted slivers of birch and oak and inscribed with Latin notes dating back to the first century AD. These illustrate an altogether more mundane but multi-cultural co-existence of Romans, Britons, Rhinelanders, Netherlanders and

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228 Refer to ADP Land Operations, DGD&D, 2005. Pg 146 - for the second and more developed edition of the Army’s military-covenant.
230 Discovered in Sep 2014 by the Colchester Archaeological Trust. For a description of the jewellery dating to Boudicca’s revolt, see Riley, K. BBC News, dated 3 Sep 2014.
231 Pre-dating Hadrian’s Wall (of 122AD) by some 40 years but located close in proximity to it.
Belgians. These ‘Roman’ records and letters found in 1973 under excavations led by Robin Birley at the Roman Fort of Vindolanda at Chesterholm include reference to native Britons and their military dispositions as well including information relating to private domestic and official bureaucratic Roman practices. These distinctly administrative, domestic and private ‘letters’ contrast with those finds which confirm the myriad acts of conflict within ancient Britain. The Vindolanda tablets introduce the themes of accommodation, of interaction and of transaction and they locate them to a time in which most of Britain’s indigenous people were thought to have lived almost entirely within the gambit of lethal conflict. That is, in a Britain thought of until now to be altogether lacking in those qualities which would mark it as a place in time far more open to a civilised indigenous culture than commonly believed, the first traditions of military-covenants were laid.

There is only some forty or so years between Boudicca’s revolt (AD 59-61) and the first of the Vindolanda tablets being written (AD 97). The tablets infer acts of assembly and betoken traditions of trust and they are supported by languages replete with words capable of evoking pacts. Thus it is not required that a pristine version of the military-covenant which had existed in some Roman provincial catacomb be surfaced to prove the existence of an ancient military-covenant. For although in the end the profoundly remarkable discovery of just such an artefact was actually made, it is importantly, the probability that such a covenant should exist which is in the final analysis the real historical coup de main. For with the new found possibility of ancient military-covenants comes the new found efficacy in explaining historical events less coherent without them. Thus the period following Boudicca’s revolt in which Britain’s tribes were defeated, is implicated by the Vindolanda tablets, as a period in which Britain’s alliance with Rome was also established. The Pax Romano extended to Britain is maintained by ‘military-covenants’. That Boudicca’s revolt was not repeated and her tribes not rejoined in further acts of coordinated rebellion, even when indigenous

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strengths and stocks of the immediate generations were replenished, is explained not merely by the narrow narrative of a humiliating defeat and the disappearance of men of fighting age but in a better and broader narrative where acts of covenants and alliances played their part in preventing further resistance. The historian Guy de la Bedoye maintains that “...the Roman government was no less concerned ‘to allay local anger’ in the interests of maximising the peace than it was to punish the rebels." 233 It is therefore axiomatic that if Roman Britain existed as any other province of Rome at the time, then it did so because security and administration was in part facilitated by tried and trusted means for brokering allegiance and that this went hand in hand with the use of force. The role of early military-covenants as the mechanism for operating allegiance not only internally between warriors and tribal leaders but also externally between tribal leaders and emperors is here contended. The Pax-Romano may well be evidence of the first institutionalised imperial-covenant. That it should morph into something distinctively British by the time of the fall of Rome, is a premise which is entirely plausible given the confluence of events which occurred between AD 410-626 and as evidenced by the artefacts uncovered in Britain and elsewhere of this period, discussed later in this chapter.

Tracing the British military-covenant historically shows that it periodically re-emerges. This form of renaissance is linked to the rise and fall of Britain in conflict. Churchill’s ‘Arms and The Covenant’ 234 was a classic ‘call to arms’ no different in timbre than his ancestor the Duke of Marlborough might have used in his almost identical efforts to align northern Europe between 1704-1708, during the War of Spanish succession.

Understanding about the nature of Roman subjugation, integration and the defence of Britain’s shore lands in the second through to seventh centuries AD has advanced to the

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point that in a disciplinary sense the idea of a military-covenant is an important asset in the
armoury of historical thinking. Thanks to the post-war perspective of modern historians 235
whose own experiences of the Second World War contributed to the final dividends of peace
in the form of historical revisionism, 236 Britain’s very broad and contrasting ancient origins
were at last more widely acknowledged. As a result of such revisionism admittedly
concerning chiefly the decline of empire, the archaeological discoveries of antiquities in
Britain also gained fresh impetus. The burial site at Sutton Hoo 237 once discovered in 1939
dispelled forever the largely Victorian notion that Britain’s search for its place in late antiquity
was to be found through large collections of white marble statues. Victorians perpetuated the
myth that a civilised Roman monoculture had been destroyed by a crude hoard of proto-
British barbarians. Instead post-war history and archaeology provided a more realistic and
complex picture of early Britain. Rival seventh century AD warrior kings trading, raiding,
marrying and competing for influence in the South East of the country, amassing objects of
artistic beauty and wealth from as far as Byzantium. At Sutton Hoo several of these artefacts
at their time of hoarding were already some two centuries in existence, indicating that royal
dynastic and diplomatic activities were not only far flung 238 but that the ceremonies which
these royal retinues performed on their missions were also ritualistic and elaborate. These
important early royal visitors brought with them to Britain not only items of wealth but foreign
ideas and traditions. When some of them stayed their beliefs and outlooks were shared and
passed on and in this way their cultural legacies preserved. Early British warrior kings were
certainly more ‘civilised’ than pre-war historians believed and as the author submits it is likely
that many more of them and their householders were actually more literate than first
imagined. 239 The post-war shift in the ‘biography’ of Britain allows the debate about late
British antiquity to be fully capable of accommodating fresh ideas in this rich vein. One such

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236 Churchill’s ‘History of the English Speaking Peoples’ is as much debated for its patriotic bent as it is for its eloquent turn of
phrase.
(Second Edition).
239 Ibid Pg 62.
transactions of once separate tribal peoples, through constant interaction, is certain to have occurred along porous and contiguous boarders over many generations. Michael Wood’s examination of the Domesday Book\textsuperscript{240} leads him to posit: ‘\textit{the lives of ordinary people could have gone on, little affected in the short term by the arrival of new masters, whether Roman, Anglo-Saxon, Viking or Norman...land units may have survived from the Roman period}'. The preserved territorial integrity and security of local communities not their disruption and fragmentation post successive invasions lends itself to the idea of covenantal relationships taking root in these communities over many generations, largely undisturbed from the period of the Dark Ages until well into the agricultural revolution. Woods develops his point, essentially about ancient social geography further: ‘\textit{it is likely that...parishes and manors...which are recorded in Domesday actually preserve vestiges of a pattern going back beyond Anglo-Saxon ties to Roman and Iron age Briton; and moreover, that the descendents of the late Roman population were distinct well into the early medieval period}'.\textsuperscript{241} This therefore very slow process of integration which was also sufficiently accommodating to permit ‘vestiges’ of ancient origin to remain distinctive by family name and land ownership in the heartlands of Hertfordshire, is also certain to have played its part in the formulation of the shared traditions (just as it did finally in the formulation of a shared language) of the early medieval Britons elsewhere across the mainland. The burial at Sutton Hoo is an example of one of these tradition-making communal areas existing in the borderlands of the south east coast at a point in Suffolk equidistant between Norfolk and Essex. Here the elaborate funeral rites of British tribal kings is both preserved and revealed within the context of the covenant. Whilst other traditions are bound to have germinated in such regions in similar timeframes, the point is that it is at the touch points of these ancient ‘breeding grounds’ for cultural exchange, that military-covenants veer into sight. Military-covenants become increasingly vital in the debate about how distinct elements within communities co-exist. Historically the sharing of significant rituals and traditions across tribal

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid pg 65.
entities could only be possible in an environment conducive to such sharing. Certain common equities between the different tribes and clans had to exist if trust was to be engendered. Warriors having invested heavily in ‘making the peace’ by paying the ultimate price amongst their ranks in battle, would obtain over non-warriors what Peter Feaver has more recently called in modern Civil-Military Relations’ agency theory ‘moral competence’.  

The grand and elaborate burial at Sutton Hoo with all the fine accoutrements of war is testimony to the special treatment of warlords. Nevertheless the distinctions drawn by noble birth or glorious deeds in battle, also buttressed other established social platforms such that credible ‘oath-worthy’ folk who did not bear arms or could not boast of their martial credentials could still confer and contest in matters of military service or civil obligation. By means of such ancient parliaments, early Sub-Roman and Anglo-Celtic communities gradually and essentially became covenantal. The stock of the late antique warrior socially within the tribe became elevated until the late medieval period which then saw his complete subordination under feudalism. But such elevation was not at the exclusion of those who also contributed tribally to military endeavours. The metier of Beowulf  is one which reflects in perfect clarity the definitively equitable relationships between free folk and warriors in the pursuit of an honourable cause. Covenantal principles in the tale abound: codes of kin and lordship are in perfect unison with the military traditions of warriors under oath to complete a mission for which the common practice of honour and reward is promised.

The existence of the Frank’s Casket, made in Northumbria in the seventh century AD and discovered in France in the nineteenth helps explain the military-covenant’s portability. This extraordinary Anglo-Saxon reliquary has carved into it images, text and depictions from Roman, Germanic and biblical traditions and is thought to have been used for the purpose of transporting valuable manuscripts. In the same way that copies of ancient religious

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documents found their way into the courts and monasteries of early medieval Britain so too would other important communications find their way into the hands of trusted and competent churchmen, courtiers and men-at-arms. One of the many and varied sources for the modern military-covenant authored in 2000 by Sebastian Roberts was, he claims, the Rule of St Benedict. But analysis of the relevant military doctrine chapters in which the military-covenant is lodged, covering the entire span of covenantal principles including caring for the sick and honouring the dead, affords the Rule of St Benedict (inspiration aside) a very small (but important) role in the make-up of the modern covenant. The Rule deals with aspects of paternal leadership and obedience in a male religious fraternity. The military-covenant has clearly referenced the Rule but Robert’s reverse-engineering of monastic teaching into the military-covenant as late as 2000 was unlikely to have been the only early medieval influence on British military doctrine dealing with the ‘moral component’. The rest of the morally based and inspired chapter containing the military-covenant is strikingly comparable to the near equally ancient Strategikon of Byzantine origin - yet no direct copy of this manuscript is claimed or referenced in any of the military doctrine versions of the modern covenant. This is no doubt due to the fact that the translation into English of the Strategikon was completed only in 1984. The author’s research reveals no direct evidence that the Strategikon entered Britain in the early medieval era and it remains for the time being a hypothesis that this is likely to be the case. Further research into the works of Procopius may reveal more on this front. However, somewhat ironically, at least one ancient copy of the original fourth century Benedictine text, did make its way to Britain from the Continent in the early medieval period, most likely in precisely the same manner and in the same timeframe that the author argues that elements of the altogether more militarily inspired Strategikon also made their way to Britain. A working theory for how modern military scholars influenced Christian notions of covenantal traditions and introduced these into the

245 See the Balliol College alumni article on Major General Sebastian Roberts, ‘Floreat Domu’. Issue 12, 2006.
246 ADP Land Operations, Pg 143, Published by DCDC, Crown Copyright 2005.
canon of military doctrine is thus introduced. Furthermore, the latest discovery about the manufacture of Anglo-Saxon metal ware, including the iconic helmet of Sutton Hoo\textsuperscript{249} is that construction of these pieces was very much more ingeniously achieved than previously thought. Far less gold was used although the final rendering of the alloys would not have detracted from the overall impression of a very precious golden headpiece. This clever use of materials probably reflects a relative scarcity of gold whilst it is also probable that the demand for these objects was probably higher than originally thought. It is therefore also likely that the scale of production to cope with demand was also higher. However, whilst the scale of production in the British Isles was not likely to have matched that of the Continent, such as officers’ helmets of the Byzantine Empire,\textsuperscript{250} the rate of production would be enough to equip regional forces and royal households operating in Britain at the time. Despite the paucity of early medieval helmets so far discovered in Britain the Sutton Hoo Helmet is not the only one of its kind.\textsuperscript{251} Again, the linkage between the likelihood of greater numbers of helmets being produced and the more advanced techniques required to produce them means that at peak demand more than just singleton father-son workshops would have been needed to manufacture, repair and enhance or embellish the helmets. This together with the proven existence of well established means of delivering textual information via reliquaries gives cause to refute popular thinking\textsuperscript{252} that Anglo-Saxons used only oral traditions for transmitting important information. The early medieval metal smiths responsible for manufacturing increasingly sophisticated headwear at scale from as far afield as Scandinavia\textsuperscript{253} would have communicated across settlements, hamlets and villages, even across seas, to safeguard the knowledge of their craft between trusted craftsmen. In so doing they may have risked the widening of the precious circle of the metal smith fraternity but during times of conflict such communication must have been vital to the preservation of

\textsuperscript{249}See Eleanor Blakelock’s scientific discovery revealed in Kennedy, M."...hoard research reveals secret of Anglo-Saxon 'gold'." News article, The Guardian. Published, 17 Oct 2014.


\textsuperscript{251}Ibid Pg 38.

\textsuperscript{252}Again see Eleanor Blakelock’s scientific discovery revealed in Kennedy, M ... ‘hoard research reveals secret of Anglo-Saxon ‘gold’. Article, The Guardian. Published, 17 Oct 2014.

imperial lines and tribal identities. Surely here are the origins of the earliest military guilds operating across Continents. Even if oral traditions were the primary ones in Anglo-Saxon Britain, they were unlikely in the cases of specific religious or technical knowledge to have been non-literary; as the inscriptions on the Frank’s Casket demonstrate. The likelihood of early medieval information being passed generationally and bilaterally between tribes and dynasties in manuscript form is compelling. Other earlier examples of ornate ivory caskets, albeit often in more refined Romanesque styles, date back to the fourth and fifth centuries \(^{254}\) AD further underpin this likelihood. These items evidence a well established method of delivering knowledge during these late antique and early medieval periods. The Frank’s casket is distinctive because its notations are rare and enigmatic (sic). \(^{255}\) The inclusion of the Germanic legend of Weyland the Smith, a moral tale, is especially poignant given the context of the communicating of technical knowledge in support of military and diplomatic missions. The casket also emanates a sense of crossed over culture. This is vivid in the finely crafted whalebone construction which contains images as diverse as the Roman inspired Romulus and Remus myth as well as biblical stories. The existence of Sutton Hoo hailing back to the same timeframe (AD 626-640) further betokens an ancient framework for royal patronage and influence involving travelling and gifting intended to extend alliances, promote marriages and protect dynasties during this period. Sutton Hoo also supports the idea that burial rituals were only the endgame in an important series of rituals, some of which included the passage of information between ruling and technical elites within and across Continents, some of which centred on the relationship between the warriors and the communities from which they came. Even though no proof exists, elements of the Strategikon are themselves strong candidates for having been imported into Britain in one of these transactional or ritualistic ways. The consequence for the military-covenant is that all the elements are in place for a working theory of how the military covenant was re-incorporated into the corpus of early medieval wisdom on mainland Britain and how this

\(^{254}\) Such as the Italian Brescia and the Croatian Pola reliquaries. Ibid Pg 31.

\(^{255}\) Ibid Pg 5.
thinking has culturally influenced the development of British Military Doctrine. Having in its very first late antique forms most likely migrated with the exodus of Sub-Romans leaving the isles in the fifth century AD the tactical notes that comprise the Strategikon would (the author contends) later return to the same shores in the ways described in the seventh through to ninth centuries. The motives, means and indeed the manuscripts are all highly suggestive that the military-covenant was born on the Continent in late classical eras but bred in Britain during the late antique Roman, Celtic and early medieval Anglo-Saxon periods in Britain. Bred to a distinctive set of cultural ingredients military-covenants become most recognizable in the range of rich and ornate media of the Anglo-Saxon period, remarkably still in existence today. The ‘Peace of Wedmore’ of AD 878 between Saxon Alfred and Dane Godrum is an example of one such early British military-covenant.256

Discussion about the multiple influences of the myriad Roman, sub-Roman and indigenous British people over those early (but also in later) centuries, in which descriptions about the fractious isolated pre-feudal Celtic tribes (and then Saxon ones) abound, begin now finally to include the narrative of a settling coherence or at least an ‘accretion’ 257 in the face of common foes. Lodged within the thematic paradox of British separateness and unity 258 the military-covenant takes root in the earliest stories of tribal and military alliances forged at first against and then with Roman, Saxon, Viking and Norman invaders. The process of social integration and accommodation including trade and other intercourse which ensued and evolved from those times onwards is a narrative which history now more readily supports. Indeed the unconventional modern British historian, Simon Schama has said about the telling of British history: ‘Imagine instead…an elastic history of nationhood, with England or Scotland sometimes closer in spirit to France and even to Rome than each other; but at

258 Nowhere more aptly scripted and played out at the time of writing than in the vote determining Scottish Independence on Sep 26th 2014.
other times bound together within the British union.

259 Such a British history would offer a welcome contrast to the more obvious histories which recount only the Island’s stories of divisions, fears and conflicts or focus too heavily on the twentieth century.

One may now therefore in the context of advancing sophistication in historical perspective more confidently examine ancient ‘British’ folk. In their efforts to thrive over the first millennia British forbears had drunk as deeply of pacts and alliances as they had bled out from battles and feuds. It is this inter-play between conflict and peace which serves to highlight the emergent properties of the British military-covenant: both a mechanism for civil alliance and a code of military service. It is in the fifth through to seventh centuries AD that the offshoots of ‘civil-military’ relations in Britain may be seen to have benefited from earlier Roman inceptions of the covenant in this way. It is no accident that the establishment of unparalleled centralised power in the ninth century AD came at a time when both the Roman and Byzantine covenantal imports had already been arguably absorbed. Over communal differences, between rival kith and over close-knit kin and between regional friends over national foes the seeds of the military-covenant were first sewn in Dark Age Britain, bolstered by conceptual influences from the Continent. In this way the archaeological discovery of Sutton Hoo dating back to the seventh century AD alongside the eighth century AD poem Beowulf have much to offer in explaining the pre-feudal origins of the military-covenant and indeed the origins of British identity.

In establishing a working theory for the origins a British military-covenant what has been most striking is that the origins owe as much to these early British-sub-Roman and British-Celtic periods as they do to the later Saxon, Scandinavian and Norman ones. Well over a thousand years of internal regional and pre-national conflict, peace and alliance as well as foreign trade and Continental cultural exchange have given rise to what modern Britain today

calls its ‘military-covenant’. The case of a shifting historiography has brought the existence of a military-covenant into sharper objective focus. Nevertheless a review of UK civil-military relations, indeed a review of history itself, before 2014 reveals no fully developed technical account of what a military-covenant actually means. So when one looks back through to these very early British times, other than its clear but broad association with the brokering of alliances and balancing of tribal politics what exactly is one looking for with the covenant? Is it something born of the collective civil requirement to control the military and avoid tyranny? Is it instead born of the parochial military requirement to defend its own militaristic interests? Or is the military-covenant an outcome of broader developments in domestic, social and quasi-legal contracts, perhaps in artefacts before now, previously ill-defined? This work now attempts to locate the sources of the central tenets of the military-covenant in answer to these questions.

The distinctions between military and civic ‘organisations’ are arguably less clear the further one looks back in British history but nevertheless such distinctions do exist. Those same historic people despite the author’s assertion of their emergent competence for accommodation were nonetheless ‘organised’ for conflict. Furthermore despite the ambiguity surrounding the boundaries of the social entities to which they belonged it would be hard not to make the case that alliances in the periods being examined were not born of fear and loathing. Broken bones evidencing death by cruel means is more easily credited to a narrative of constant conflict than burial mounds and periods of prolonged peace are to a narrative of emergent covenants. But that is what the latter do evidence if one cares patiently to piece together the more obviously bloody with the more mundanely peaceful but fractured historical pieces. Thankfully descriptions of folk in peaceful employ such as farming and trading, and descriptions of folk whose specific purpose was fighting, do exist and it is with the concept of a covenant now in place that it is possible to survey these narratives with a more balanced and a more nuanced interpretation of the historical sources and
archaeological evidence, to be henceforth more thoroughly appreciated.260 The example of the Anglo-Saxon militia called the ‘fyrd’ is typical of the overlap between the civil and the martial spheres in pre-feudal Britain. The distinctions found in such entities as the fyrd are not merely or simply amplification of economic divisions of labour, they exemplify the practical compulsions and the moral obligations communities felt in the execution of their nascent civic and martial duties. There would have been many in the ranks of the fyrd who would by inclination, skill and bearing have absolutely no desire to brandish a spear in the face of the enemy. But by dint of their ‘oath-worthiness’ fyrd-men were honour bound to battle. In return the spoils of war were shared. Thus obligation (in the pre-feudal mode of the military-covenant) is double-sided: sacrifice is rewarded. Fyrd-men served under a mutual covenant. The fact that the actions and behaviours of these warriors in this respect became for some reason over time, a set of traditions (some of which we shall discover were inherited from even more ancient forbears) and repeated over many centuries in word and deed, begs the question: what forces were at play that this should be so? By tribal interaction and through invasion late antique and early medieval Britons’ loyalties may have been plastic, their lives were certainly socially complex enough to support that analysis. Yet their social and martial habits became traceably consistent at that originating point in time when mutual obligation rather than self interest emerged as the higher force for social cohesion. The fyrd represents the first successful institutionalised ‘national’ system of defence during the Anglo-Saxon period. The concomitant rise of the military-covenant explains how inculcation of an increasingly national civil obligation would operate in practice. The fortunes and outlooks of ancient military and civil communities as depicted by their systems of alliance and rituals of service were caused to converge more closely during the germination of Anglo-Celtic nationhood in Britain. At this time civil and military inter-dependencies became inseparably intertwined. The degree to which such covenantal relationships may be said to have been characteristic of mutual and reciprocal ties of

allegiance inspired by a warrior culture or whether such ties were inherently social, born of communal accommodations is the next object of enquiry in this chapter.

In the years spanning fifth century AD sub-Roman and ninth century AD Anglo-Saxon Britain, the indigenous people of the British Isles had the means and the motive to express themselves in matters of obligation and allegiance. Uttered by both feuding or worshipping families domestically and by tribes in times of war, or in the pursuit of the avoidance of war, words including ‘assemble’, ‘agree’, ‘pact, ‘oath,’ ‘vow’ and ‘truth,’ occur in the literature that immediately follows post Roman Britain and before pre-Norman England. It is therefore axiomatic that the concept of a covenant would not be alien to Britons in those eras which shaped the development of civilian and military traditions within the British Isles. Indeed it is known that the concept of a covenant is at least as old as Roman culture itself and one may be certain that the earliest reference to Romano-British pagan activity in Britain concerns an ancient notion of ‘contract’. The Roman ‘contract’ in Britain can be dated to the second century and found as engraved inscriptions on tablets found in Bath and Uley. These tablets carry the abbreviation VLSM standing for ‘votum soluit libens merito’ which means ‘he willingly and gratefully fulfilled the vow.’ There is no reason to suspect that religious worship in Britain in the second century AD was anything less than a manifestation in Roman and Sub-Roman society of its routine tendency toward undertaking pledges, pacts and oaths. As a way of cementing relationships in forms of mutual commitments or contracts, both physical and spiritual such religious and legal covenantal traditions echo forward into modern British society. Depicted within the civil rituals of birth and marriage as well as those contractual transactions concerning ownership of land and property, they feature also in the military traditions of honouring the victorious and the fallen and caring for the injured. The values of honour and trust span both the civil and the military domains. The fact that the values of modern British society resonate as strongly today as the author claims

262 Ibid pg 238.
they did in Roman, Celtic and Anglo-Saxon times, underpins understanding that the military-covenant has enduring cultural properties. Once affirmed by ancient oath-worthy ancestors now affirmed by modern fair-minded descendents the military-covenant is a moral legacy passed down the generations with each successive war and its immediate aftermath.

Although etymological analysis traces the anglicised word covenant to medieval usage its earliest root is Latin, taken from the verb ‘convenir’ meaning ‘to convene’. Covenant is therefore a word with ancient origins and in the early Roman period it would have conveyed the sense of the coming together of two or more parties, either with meaning derived from the foreign and international context of the ‘Pax Romano’ or with significance at the domestic level between local kinsmen and their lords or between worshippers and their gods. It is highly probable also that the Romano-Celtic and Anglo-Saxon periods in Britain, as well as the later Norman period, having linguistic equivalents that made provision for tribal and military reciprocal alliances and obligations operating (at varying degrees of balance) across the various social strata, would by extension have had ritual and other forms expressing the same provision. In this way, the search for ancient covenantal relationships requires re-examination of the panoply of British historical artefacts. Fresh scrutiny, one using a covenantal lens, readily reveals ‘contractual’ relations existing in several ancient and medieval communities in Britain. Extending from the tribal habitations within Roman dominion, to the Roman legions themselves containing British races as well as Germanic troops (some definitely Batavian some possibly even Saxon). All the religious, farming, military and trading communities which rose and waned in the British shires and borderlands and on the coastal plains between the second and tenth centuries are implicated in the operation of covenants across the various kingdoms. Even speculative consideration of the juxtaposed raiding Saxons and the Sub-Romano and Celtic Britons of

264 ‘Pax Romano’ meaning the ‘Peace of Rome,’ where the conquered entered into an ‘alliance’ with their Roman conquerors.
the sixth century AD, who when not in conflict convened to truce, bribe and negotiate; the covenant is a real prospect in explaining how such activities were in practice actually conducted. The military-covenant was even in its earliest form not an esoteric philosophy but a practical tool. Beyond the limitations of truces leading to cessation in battle, beyond the oaths men swore to fight were the requirements for both wider and deeper military obligations and accommodations to serve. The military-covenant was thus a compelling and coercive means for internal recruiting and external alliance as well as a corrective for deficient leadership.

The extent to which early covenants, oaths and pacts might be said to be martial, moral and formal in their own domestic right and not merely prototypes or products of the much later European feudal mode is covered later in this chapter. The immediate commentary accompanying this historical context to the origins of the earliest British covenantal traditions includes the observation that these early covenants whilst undoubtedly martial in their encompass cannot be evidenced to indicate that they were primarily based on trust alone and were most likely born of necessity and fear given the nature of invasion and subjugation: certainly in the first century AD. This being so, there is therefore a point at which, theoretically, one might expect to see the moral dimension of covenants based on mutual trust and obligation to change from early and basic covenantal forms to more sophisticated or enlightened versions. One might therefore posit that this development would coincide with periods of peace and stability or when such periods were threatened. The introduction of Christianity into Britain offers the sort of gradual shift in outlook that might account for developments in covenantal thinking whilst the consistent feature of invasion a likely backdrop of military intervention in which such pacts were likely to have been broken and repaired again and again. Certainly in modern times one is familiar with the concept of a broken or failing military-covenant which when under threat is rapidly developed and used to leverage public opinion. Nor is it difficult to link such activity causally to unpopular military
campaigns. But if taking time to repair and renew is a feature of modern covenants, it is also certainly a firm prospect that this would be true after the Roman occupation of Britain too. Nor are covenants in this light to be seen only as reactionary responses of protest under the military’s perceptions of undue duress. For as successive waves of invasion, subjugation and integration would call for social cohesion made possible only by measures capable of binding people to each other, they would also in equal measure ensure that the military was sufficiently resilient to put off moments of buckling or baulking for as long as possible. The internal 'mettling component' as well as the external 'warning component' of the covenant came into being at those times of pressing military need when normal domestic measures for defence were in jeopardy. The fyrd was not a modish invention it was a product of hard won experience calling into action the resources required for future success. Covenants failed when the trust, loyalty and cohesion which had finally been established over time disintegrated at catastrophic points of tumult and aggression.

The established themes of mutual obligation, duty, service, fairness and trust as well as characteristics such as rituals of enactment and assembly are all inherent within the operations, or traditions, of a modern British military-covenant. Can we see them exhibited much earlier in British history? Leaving alone the philosophical dilemma that all tradition is somehow invented in some way, one may still readily accept that the passage of time plays an inevitable part in turning ideas into behaviours, behaviours into habits and habits into custom. By extension, the more widely held the custom, the more readily accepted it becomes as lore (wisdom) and therefore subject to rules (law). Next, accepting that the more ancient the tradition the more likely it is to have been transmitted orally, it is important to recognise the constraints which operate when determining the antiquity of traditions by historical or linguistic analyses alone. Literary as well as archaeological sources help

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268 Armed Forces Covenant, 2011.

269 Rousseau, J.J. ‘The Social Contract.’ Book 1, Ch 8, Pg 22. ‘Once customs have become established and prejudices are dug in, trying to reform them is dangerous’.
corroborate other sources but can provide only a broad-lattice work of material from which to make the case for ancient covenants. However, although the meaning of words may evolve and shift through constant usage or by neglect become lost to obscurity and taking as read the academic limitations about speculating on ancient historical customs, there are nevertheless some ideas so foundational to a civilisation that they are bound to leave their impression, linguistic or otherwise, somewhere. The ‘mental furniture of a population’ is surely both inherited and acquired but the ideas from which this furniture is comprised may not be trivial or transitory if they are to endure. Indeed if as words these ideas penetrate the centuries in several languages, re-surfacing periodically in various forms, they are sufficiently potent to engender a sense of ‘remembered-continuity’ from a fairly rich variety of media. If one accepts the much-vaunted idea of ‘collective memory’ as a metaphor for the historical process by which people ‘remember’ in some way a ‘shared past’ if not in a mental way then at least in a social one, i.e. connecting with and responding to the narratives, myths and images of other peoples war experiences through acts of commemoration and stories for example, then the word ‘covenant’ and by extension the term military-covenant has passed into the English language in just such a way. Although consensus is denied, thinking on ‘collective memory’ has matured to the position where definitions and arguments abound. Taking a nineteenth century sociological view, collective memory is: ‘...the sound of voices once heard by groups of people, afterwards echoing in an individual who was or is part of that group. It is a form of individual memory,'


271 I have used the term ‘remembered-continuity’ in a specifically historical and collective sense to describe a cultural perspective of the military-covenant obtained by communal response to the legends, traditions and laws that impact people which covenants serve over time. However it is in the discipline of psychology that the term ‘remembered-continuity’ appears to have originated. See Raymond J.A. & Andras, K. ‘Developmental Studies: Critique and Renewal’, Pg 125 (Elias, 1974). BRILL, 1986. Also the significance of personal and psychological perspectives of chronology and memory in Bluck, S. & Liao, H-S. ‘I was therefore I am – Creating Self-Continuity Through Remembering Our Personal Past’. The International Journal of Reminiscence and Life Review, Pp 7-12. Vol 1, Issue 1, 2013.


274 Ibid Pg1.
socially constructed and maintained...

Jay Winter further qualifies collective memory by attributing to it the quality of ‘shelf-life’ in which because: ‘collective memory has no existence independent of the individual...’ when the individual dies so too does the collective memory. In terms of the military-covenant, if collective memory is the process by which ‘within living memory’ ideas of war are communicated in a shared sense then there is logically a part of the historical process by which ‘beyond living memory’ the artefacts, rituals and memorials themselves continue to hold for people a ‘remembered continuity’ for war. Such remembered continuities are capable of conveying to new audiences, with no personal experience of war the sense of a shared past and the sensibility to deal ‘covenantally’ with the prospects and consequences of war. This new metaphor conveys the sense in which, beyond living collective memory - traditions, customs and rituals are capable of carrying forward the commemorative, reciprocal and moral philosophical dimensions of a community dealing with conflict. When collective memory fades from the living community, remembered continuity – wherever it surfaces, imbued within the patina of familiar words, reinforced by the evocation of familiar sentiments and re-enacted ritually alongside familiar images is how covenants are renewed. Clearly, the media of art, literature, architecture and film all play their part in such renewals as well as the institutions that sponsor and benefit from them. This is why the moral philosophical Christian tenor of military-covenants is so significant and resonates so naturally within the milieu of British military doctrine, if not the social contract equivalents oriented toward civil institutions. Remembered continuity also helps to distinguish military-covenants from civil-military compacts. The latter require none of the tribal, doctrinal and liturgical paraphernalia which necessarily accompany the outward observances of military-covenants and which in turn demonstrate their enactment. Modern military covenants cite the fullest expression of the bargain through the ‘social communion’

276 Ibid Pp 6-40.
of Remembrance or Armistice Day. Although what is problematic in civil-military acts of commemoration is that younger generations may have no actual recollection of the conflicts being ‘remembered’ much less the nameless faceless people that such acts are designed to honour. Nevertheless people certainly behave as if they have remembered. ‘Lest we not forget’ is the ubiquitous epithet carved into countless memorials and headstones. But what is it that communities are supposed to remember? Instinctively people ‘know’ that those who fought for freedom should not be forgotten; those innocent who died should not be forgotten and that the enduring values which allow humanity to deal with conflict are vital and remain relevant. Certainly Halbwach is instructive about what is lost when collective memory fades: ‘Forgetting is explained by the disappearance of these frameworks...because our attention is no longer able to focus on them...’ What is lost is the ‘group viewpoint’. In this sense the military-covenant serves as a social corrective to collective memory fade. The military-covenant is different to social compacts because it combines a sufficiently plastic social framework to be renewable with an inherently durable set of moral principles which are fixed so that the covenantal articles are capable of enduring beyond living memory. Because the ‘military-covenant’ as a concept and as a conviction has a cultural permanency which serves a corpus of knowledge central and enduring to human social interaction: it both engenders and delivers the very rudiments social ‘trust’ and (in also a very British way) the origins of ‘fairness’. The military-covenant has significant impacts for the development of ideas surrounding collective memory and ‘remembered continuity’ is the historical process and intellectual framework which helps extend this area of study.

British notions of fairness more latterly informed by the origins of the modern British culture of sportsmanship and invoked year on year are also underpinned by

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277 Or at least the military doctrine versions do (ADP Ops Vol 5, 2000, 2005, 2010). Interestingly the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 does not cite Remembrance Day as the highest expression of fulfilment, stating instead that honouring the covenant is the highest expression.
278 Ibid pg 24.
279 Ibid pg 25.
It is no accident that the modern term 'military-covenant' draws very deeply upon these foundational principles: trust, fairness, and obligation - this vocabulary is found in all the versions of the military-covenant. Successful covenants, with trust and fairness at their centre, have such ancient precedence (and power), that they move from the status of forgotten tradition and unspoken lore into written contract and voiced covenant. They are invoked in times of jeopardy and reworded by the next generation claiming reparation when such covenants are at risk of failure. From the British Baron’s Magna Carta of 1215 (a royal-covenant) to the British Legion’s Covenant Campaign of 2007 (a civil-covenant) what the ancient military-covenant does for modern civil-military relations is to highlight the importance of trust engendered and renewed by reciprocal ties and mutual obligations. Whether between conqueror and conquered, ruler and ruled, leader and led, chieftain and tribe, family and kinsmen or amongst common equals, covenants find formal and written expression in every generation’s covenant, military or otherwise. The poetry, histories, customs and habits from beyond medieval times find expression today in our modern day covenantal articles and attitudes. Furthermore, deeper etymological and wider literary examination of the term covenant (and its equivalent classical idioms) provide evidence to support the notion of martial and civil traditions in Britain encompassing reciprocal obligation and trust between parties dating back at least to late antiquity. One discovers on closer examination the fundamental error in believing rather sentimentally that like ‘the British constitution,’ British covenants are somehow unspoken or unwritten. They are not. History provides in correcting this notion by surfacing periodically the relics of covenants, literary, ritual, legal and ornamental which prove otherwise. One also discovers that when under threat covenants are reproduced and multiply to protect those people who might otherwise perish or be forgotten. Roger Fenton’s 1855 Crimean war photographs of camp life brought

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282 Queen Elizabeth II: ‘as a nation we have an abiding passion for sport, as well as a tradition of fair play.’ Quoted in Kirktrup, J. Daily Telegraph, 27 Jul 2012.
to life the privations of foreign campaigning and provoked a sympathetic response from a domestic Victorian audience toward the military that would not have been possible had the moral compunction to reveal the realities of war along with the demand for truth not coexisted at the precise moment in time when the photographic media for revealing these realities en masse came into vogue. For this is what covenants do. Existing in accessible formats, couched in familiar terms, projecting fixed principles they prick the conscience of military commanders, civil leaders and members of the public alike to behave to a set of cultural norms for the sake of assuring the security of the people. Covenants seem to defy extinction because they are from time to time in great demand. The story of the military-covenant between 2006 and the present day is such a story but it would be one impossible to tell had there not been an artefact to reference back to in 2000.284 As this chapter proves, there is no good reason to imagine that 2000 was the beginning of the story of the covenant by any stretch of the imagination.

There is cause for secure assertion that fifth century AD Celtic and Germanic tribes and sixth and seventh century AD Anglo-Saxon tribes spoke their own languages complete with their own broadly equivalent versions of the terms which Latin speaking Romans would have used for broadly similar ends. The word ‘oath’ is traceable to Old English,285 meaning ‘judicial swearing, solemn appeal to deity in witness of truth or a promise’. By its very similar and widely spread iterations (Old Norse ‘eior’, Swedish ‘ed’, Old Saxon and Frisian ‘eth’, Dutch ‘eed’, and German ‘eid’), the ubiquitous northern European word ‘oath’ is certainly ancient.

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284 Sebastian Roberts.
Table 3-2. The Tale of Beowulf

The poem Beowulf written in Old English reveals evidence of an early, pre-Norman and pre-feudal, covenantal relationship between tribal leaders and warriors in service. The extract at Table 3-2 typifies how an early medieval chieftain, himself responsible for the spoils of war, was ‘honour-bound’ to reward his veterans. Ancient Greek texts provide evidence of what is clearly a very ancient covenantal principle in operation at least as far back as classical times. The extract at Table 3-3 finds Plato quoting Homer who speaks about paying suitable honours to brave men.

And we have Homer’s authority for honouring bravery in the young. For he tells how, when Ajax had distinguished himself in battle, he was ‘paid the honour’ of a helping from the ‘long chine of the beast’ as if it were a suitable honour for a brave man in his prime, something which, in addition to the distinction it brought, would increase his strength.

Table 3-3. Extract referring to Homer in Plato’s Republic

With the passage of time and its existence across Continents honouring brave warriors is established as an ancient and widespread precept. Over time, Homer and Plato, themselves esteemed philosophical worthies, help elevate the honouring of warriors from the status of a precept to that of a custom. By ascribing to warriors a provenance born of their personal authority and following, Homer and Plato help create the tradition of honouring warriors such that one now finds it common throughout history. What is important about Beowulf is that it

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286 The Tale of Beowulf (an ancient poem written in Old English). Translated by Morris, W. and Wyatt. Taken from lines 1046-1049, Pg 38. Published by Kelmscott Press. London. Reprinted 1902.

transports the ancient principle of rewarding military service out of the universal setting of the early classical era into the particular European setting of the late antique and early medieval periods. More importantly, even though it is a tale about Danish warriors, Beowulf was written in Old English at sometime in the eighth century AD, possibly later. This means it is likely to have been authored or translated in the British Isles before the establishment of Danelaw in the British Isles in the late ninth century AD, preceding it by as much as a century or more. It also tells an ancient tale of heroes and monsters going back at least to the sixth century AD. Beowulf provides evidence that storytellers in the British Isles were more than familiar with the military traditions and exploits of foreign adventurers and not only identified foreign behaviours and practices likely to have been similar to their own, but went as far as celebrating them and incorporating them into their own oral (and in this one single case, literary) corpus. Eventually the descendants of the author(s) or translators of Beowulf native to Britain were conquered, left alone, or assimilated by these very same warlike Scandinavian invaders who are the protagonists of the same tale; but the literary legacy and with it the covenantal customs of these less fortunate Britons was preserved. Beowulf is to date the oldest literary evidence of contractual arrangements and covenantal relationships now known to have existed between tribal leaders and soldiers in Britain of that time. Although the adventure is fictional the poem is evidence that such arrangements were likely to have been common in the British Isles of this period. There is no evidence to suggest that the poem’s author is recounting something revolutionary or profound in the covenantal aspects of the arrangement between the tribal chief and the hero, in fact quite the opposite. The agreement upon which Beowulf’s service is based is a reward’s based one. Once agreement has been reached between them, Beowulf is as honour-bound to carry out his duty of service as Hrothgar is to reward him on the successful completion of that duty. Furthermore the reader is presented with the scenes of communal living in which this agreement is reached. The great hall appears to fulfil the function for which it was almost certainly originally designed for, a parliament of participation where all manner of enterprises were debated, both celebratory and solemn (just as the palace of Westminster was first
imagined and designed to be seven hundred years ago). The covenantal relationships between Beowulf and his men and between Beowulf and Hrothgar are discussed in familiar terms. Despite the fact that what is taking place is fantastical (the slaying of a dragon, Grendel) the manner in which the enterprise is told is nonetheless according to known customs. In this way Beowulf provides evidence of two key covenantal tenets (mutual benefit and reciprocal service). From an historical perspective these covenantal relationships are operating, before the much later imperatives of feudal and chivalric codes of conduct. Thus these earlier bonds of service between kinsfolk, chieftains and warriors occur under a different locus and liability of obligation. They are more equitably mutual. The balance of obligations between people shifted after the Norman Conquest toward a landed or feudal based relationship. In fact the shift began in the Anglo-Saxon period but it was accomplished wholesale under the social enervations of the Norman Conquest. The covenantal aspects between leader and led would shift from an arrangement of interaction based on broad notions of ‘fairness’ capable of incorporating both ‘lordship,’ ‘individuality’ and degrees of freedom to an arrangement centrally attenuated into narrow bonds of obligation under an altogether more unilateral connection based on ‘Kingship’ and ‘tenancy’. The mode of obligation would no longer be a balance set locally between clan leader and freemen or baron and serf. The mode of obligation would be biased in favour of the monarch who would rule centrally from a single seat of power not by federation of regional equals in the territories of the shires and the divisions of the hundreds. Only with the arrival of Magna Carta in 1215 (and the subsequent renewals of it in the several years after its inception) would the balance of obligations between ruler and ruled be restored to a more equitably reciprocal relationship, at least between the ruling elites. The act of renewal becoming itself a covenantal tradition with its own rites between ruler and ruled, eventually the authority of the Crown coming to rest within the orbit of its now tolerated Baronial ‘parliament’.

Going back further into the sub-Romano-Celtic period of sixth century AD Britain, substantive evidence for the existence of covenantal relationships operating within the military chain of command is to be found in the ‘Strategikon’. In this Byzantine text, attributed to the Emperor Maurice (AD 582-602), and only recently translated in 1984, the moral and reciprocal nature of a military-covenantal relationship between soldiers and leaders is clearly stated. This military manual has special relevance to the Romano-Celtic soldiers serving in the British limitanei legions, many native to the island in 410. Whether such soldiers were likely to have settled or returned to the Continent at the time of the sacking of Rome by the Visigoths and the incursion of Saxons into the British Isles, they would in any case have understood full well both the tactics and codes which governed their military duties and civil entitlements. They would have known Roman military doctrine from their commanding officers, who would have instilled into them through their sworn oaths and daily practices, discipline and loyalty, i.e. pre-conditions for military effectiveness. They would also have known by harsh experience their ‘just dues,’ or what one might refer to now as ‘human rights’. The Strategikon, started in AD 575, is a composite of the manuals and codes (tactica) upon which the Roman military organisation had been based and would later be reformed. Those Celtic, Germanic and other sub-Roman races of British warriors of Britain in AD 410 and their naturalised families, who were living through the nadir of a once august Empire may still have possessed a long since inherited ‘imperialistic' world view of their existence but they would soon be forced to settle further and further west in Britain with each successive sizeable wave of Saxon and Scandinavian invaders. In so doing they would become more insular and indeed more homogeneous. Those that remained in place after these conflicts would become more deeply embedded within successive Roman administrations. There is no evidence that the fifth century AD Romano-Celtic and other sub-Roman warriors and their families were either slaughtered or incorporated into the influxes of

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other ‘barbarian’ foreigners indeed some may have fled Britain and transited Gaul with others seeking repatriation to Roman legions on the Continent. Whatever the historical facts of Britain in 410 in this respect, the Roman legions on the Continent would in the space of three generations form the basis of the nascent Byzantine Empire. This is where the Strategikon from its multifarious contributions is stitched together geographically. There is no record that a whole limitanei unit exited Britain in this way but whether warriors and their families of these times stayed or fled Britain in 410, their knowledge of campaigning would have undoubtedly contributed to the later composition of the Strategikon and they would have been taught and indoctrinated by those with access to similar manuals, tracts and histories some two hundred years before.

Nevertheless all other evidence of broader Roman culture and knowledge vanished quickly in Britain over the period 410 and 800 AD and any evidence of specific covenantal principles and martial traditions lies deep within the Celtic, Romano-Christian and more latterly the Byzantine and Anglo-Saxon works which survive to the present day. The Strategikon is thus the most ancient and to date the most highly prized primary source of evidence that a morally advanced and trust-based military-covenant existed in Britain between the fifth and tenth centuries AD. The reason why one may be certain that the people of the British Isles of the late antique and early medieval period were influenced by sub-Roman, Frankish and Byzantine social worthies and that documents such as the Strategikon were likely to have transited the Continent, lie in the archaeological discoveries of Sutton Hoo as well as the literary content of the Strategikon itself. Indeed it is the sixth century Byzantine writer Procopius who accounts for the transit of Continental families into Britain at this time. It is not merely unusual in this context but highly significant that the buried artefacts found at Sutton Hoo include a huge silver Byzantine dish dating back to AD 491-518 and that the dish

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293 Ibid Pp16,17.
is ascribed to the Byzantine court of Anastasius the First. The stage is set as are the ingredients for the migration of the military-covenant onto British soil. A Byzantine writer, a Byzantine tract and a Byzantine royal artefact underpin the plausibility of the Strategikon being available in Britain in the late fifth and sixth centuries. In addition at Sutton Hoo, Merovingian Frankish coins collated in AD 625 denote by their singular accumulation to be emblematic of foreign royal gifts not foreign domestic trade. This adds weight to the notion that Sutton Hoo is an accumulation of funeral wares gifted during the dynastic missions of its yet unknown deceased Royal intern. The strong likelihood that the site belongs to that of the East Anglian King Raedwald (who died AD 624 or 625) helps complete the picture of a significant seventh century British warlord being laid to rest. At Sutton Hoo lay the accoutrements of an early medieval tribal King with Continental connections in possession of foreign antiquities pre-dating him by at least a hundred and twenty-five years. The existence of the Strategikon dating back to the AD 582-682 places a narrow range of dates in which Sutton Hoo offers a new avenue of enquiry concerning the origins and migration of the military-covenant to Britain during that period. The existence of the Strategikon and the Royal British-Byzantine connection make the possibility of the Strategikon's migration from the East to the British Isles a highly likely prospect. But even if the migration of the military tract, like so many classical works thought to have found their way back into scholarship in the west via the illuminated manuscripts of the monasteries of the period, did not occur at that time and was not one of these recovered literary artefacts, the military-covenant still finds British provenance to earlier Roman times. For the content of the Strategikon is itself comprised of 'lessons' taken from Roman conquests in which the 'light haired' people such as 'the Franks' and by direct association 'people like them' i.e. Britons, formed an essential part. The information accrued in artefacts such as the Vindolanda tablets of the first century in some way, not least in all probability by the exiting sub-Roman limitanei legions of

297 Ibid Pg 55.
298 Ibid pg 62.
AD 410, made their way into the annals of Roman-Byzantine doctrine via the tactica of the period. This much is known by the very existence of the Strategikon having come into being as an accrual of information flows from across the Western Roman and Eastern Byzantine Empires. In later centuries the contents of the Strategikon are conceived to have returned to the shores of Britain. That they should do so as information flows derived from the comings and goings of Royal British Kings, courtiers, clerics and warriors is the hypothesis. It is simply a matter of time before further archaeological discoveries and techniques prove this theory but for now, even the most cursory examination of the Strategikon is suffice to reveal that the specific moral codes and concepts implicit to an ancient military-covenant, one that pre-dates Norman and feudal covenantal forms, could only have evolved by way of preserved traditions and rituals transmitted culturally by each successive generation. The language and idiom of the modern British and ancient Byzantine military covenants are too close to be artefacts of complete and isolated coincidence and there is no evidence that the modern version was at anytime directly copied. Their similarity can only be explained by the repeated transmission and sedimentary collection of covenantal information by successive generations. The concept of fairness at the heart of British culture is thus best explained in terms of covenantal traditions extending over the generations. There is no other plausible explanation of the origins of a pre-feudal ancient British military-covenant backed up by the evidence and ideas thus far discussed.

The most perfect organisation and equipment...depend on human beings to function properly...Many factors could and did lead to the defeat of Byzantine army in the course of its history. But when the Byzantine commanders observed the regulations and instructions laid down in their manuals, they were generally assured of victory.

Table 3-4. Extract from the Introduction to The Strategikon

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Dennis’ introduction to the Strategikon at Table 3-4 is unequivocal about the importance of military doctrine for the Byzantine army of the sixth and seventh centuries AD. To commanders of these late antique and early medieval warriors, inheritors to the fifth century legions of Rome, whose home was now Constantinople, who spoke Greek not Latin and who worshipped Christ not Mithras, the protection of the new empire relied upon adapting and improving the thinking and tactics that had made their classical predecessors militarily supreme. But more than that, to survive against the encroaching Eastern and Northern hoards the Byzantine Empire had to improve upon its Roman ancestral legacy. In this respect a written manuscript of lessons for military leaders became critical. Such a document or rather series of documents eventually became what is termed the Strategikon, thought to have materialised most effectively under the sixth century AD Emperor Maurice. For commentary on military strategy and thinking the Strategikon provides a literary link between the classical and late antique periods, and a bridge between the late Roman and early medieval periods in Europe. Such a document is suggestive, not of a complete loss of information about military and civil codes of conduct in Europe’s Dark Ages but rather a transference across empires and Continents of a corpus of Western military conceptual and moral philosophical doctrines, preserved in the Orient until the emergence of the Holy Roman Empire under Charlemagne in the ninth century AD. The constituent elements of the Strategikon comprise fragments of Roman wisdom, both moral and military in nature. These survived the fall of Rome. Despite an apparent cultural absence of all other things Roman in pre-feudal and medieval periods of Celtic and Anglo-Saxon British life, strands of the Strategikon are nevertheless evident. These strands now appear in modern UK military doctrine. Somehow, a preservation of linguistic and conceptual components has survived historically to be present in our current British idioms and inherent in our current British traditions. Through the known history of Britain and with the newly translated talisman of the Strategikon, one is presented with a series of historical touch points by which we may identify a UK military-covenant evolving over a very great period of time. In this way, the covenantal aspects of civil and military relationships which interest us in Britain today, date
back not decades or centuries, but remarkably well over a thousand years, with direct
lineage to the first British forbears.

At Table 3-4 Dennis infers that Byzantine commanders were more likely to be successful
when they heeded the lessons of war. Further analysis of the Strategikon reveals that
commanders of the time made no distinction between moral lessons and tactical lessons but
took rather a holistic perspective on learning from conflict. So, rather interestingly, what
modern scholars of military doctrine might call the 'moral component', which today is usually
kept separate to those aspects of doctrine which deal with fighting strategy or the 'physical
component,' in the Strategikon are dealt with in the same places as passages which deal
with tactics. Now this might be an accident in the way that the Strategikon has been handed
down, with passages copied down carelessly in a higgledy-piggledy fashion, or it might be
the case that ancient minds simply did not make much of a distinction between wisdom
pertaining to moral and ethical concerns from wisdom dealing with physical activity (as is
arguably the case much more so today). In which case, the lessons of war in antiquity were
thought about less categorically or taxonomically than they are today. In other words, the
moral and physical components of ancient Roman doctrine were, if the latter thesis is
correct, much more conceptually integrated than they are today. This is not surprising given
the all-consuming global enterprise that was the Roman war machine. This would mean that
the covenantal aspects of the relationships between commanders and soldiers and
commanders and the civil elite would be much more elementally fused intellectually and
practically, with each side having no special competence or authority when it came to
speaking of moral matters in the context of war. This certainly fits within the context of a
Christian suffused Byzantine milieu and these influences on ancient British as well as other
ancient Armed Forces are clear.
Dennis’ assertions at Table 3-5. show that the Strategikon is not only a late antique military doctrine note, but also a classical cultural arsenal. Byzantine and Roman military wisdom is added to through the absorption of other cultural influences. In this way the Strategikon is a cultural tableau suited to an analysis of any number of foreign combatants. Of special interest in reference to ancient British military-covenants operating at the time, is the following observation:

Dealing with Light-Haired Peoples, Such as the Franks, Lombards and Others Like Them.

The light-haired races place great value on freedom.

Table 3-6. Extract from The Strategikon

Table 3-6. contains a very clear cultural statement about early Western Europeans. According to the Strategikon, they loved freedom. Lombards were a Germanic tribe who ruled in Italy in the sixth century AD, descended from first century AD Scandinavians. Franks were also a Germanic tribe, in the third century AD located in the area of the Rhine and in the area of Roman Gaul (modern France). By the ninth century they had most famously been corralled into the Carolingian Empire which evolved a century later into the Holy Roman Empire. ‘Frankish’ had in early medieval times become analogous to ‘Western European’ so with the genetic inheritance of both Scandinavian and Germanic warriors, the early mongrel post Celtic-British race would have been thought of by Byzantines as akin to Franks i.e. sixth century AD Britons were ‘others (exactly) like’ the

301 Ibid Pg xv.
302 Ibid Pg 19.
Franks. Given the island’s experience of invasion and threat of invasion, it is no surprise culturally to modern Britons that love of freedom is a very ancient sentiment. In literary and cultural terms the existence of the Strategikon provides evidence that a corpus of knowledge which was instrumental to the covenantal relationships between indigenous and conquering people in Britain existed in the late antique and early medieval periods. Furthermore it is also clear that the lessons of the conquering Roman (later to be Byzantine) troops were passed on to later generations by way of military doctrine. This military doctrine contained the cultural patina of different races such that the experiences of foreign fighting, including foreign experiences of making peace, were folded back into articles of doctrine and preserved. If ever there was a sense of ‘remembered-continuity’ for covenantal relationships operating at a cultural level in ancient Britain, the Strategikon is a prime locus for its evocation and evidence of its Western European origins.

In social terms the content of the Strategikon provides more insight into covenantal aspects of late antique Europe. One is struck by the significant emphasis on sound moral wisdom in the Strategikon and by the abundant practicality of this moral wisdom in maintaining what modern military scholars might term ‘offensive spirit’ or ‘morale’. In the case of caring for the wounded, this ancient covenantal relationship has survived completely intact into modern times and it transfers seamlessly into modern military doctrine:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-7. Extract from The Strategikon.</th>
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<tr>
<td>After the battle the general should give prompt attention to the wounded and see to burying the dead. Not only is this a religious duty, but it helps the morale of the living.</td>
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</table>

The ethics of tending to the wounded and burying the dead have religious connotations as the Strategikon makes clear. Whilst seen as religious duty, these medical and funereal acts also conform to sound military judgement in the maintenance of ‘fighting spirit’ or ‘morale’.

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Soldiers fight better if they know that when injured they will be medically treated. They will also take much comfort knowing that fallen comrades will be buried with honour. There is no need to belabour the point that modern military ethics and professional military conduct mirror the ancient stance on such religious matters. Even if religious associations of these acts have themselves long since waned the ethical significance remains unchanged from ancient to modern times. British soldiers today expect to be quickly evacuated after having sustained injury and to be given the very best medical attention available. In the event of death in battle modern British soldiers also have the moral and professional expectation of the highest standards in the reclamation, repatriation and commemoration of their comrades’ bodies. It is important when referring to these matters in the context of the covenant to highlight that because these ethical and professional aspects of military conduct have survived doctrinally for nearly a thousand years in the British Isles, it is not simply the case that a modern equivalent based on its antecedent forerunners, is merely a general set of principles widely open to novel changes or modish interpretation. No. The obligations of caring for the sick and honouring the dead are so enduring and so indelible culturally that they have become fixed and immutable within British society. Tending to war sick and the commemoration of war dead have become civil as well as military traditions. With this direct historical lineage between the ancient and the modern, the medical (and the funereal) aspects of soldiering show how the covenant is binding, not in a legal sense, but in the sense of an operating arrangement unbroken in time. It is so foundational to the trustworthiness between covenanters, that this aspect of the covenant is a fixed and absolute requirement. Preserved formally as the Strategikon and British military doctrines do, these ancient military practices are no longer merely evidence of past behaviours but also evidence of the basis for our contemporary conceptual thinking in these matters. One should not underestimate the significance of knowing for the first time the true origins of our military cultural heritage in this respect. The principles of medical primacy and honourable commemoration become bindingly covenantal because they reflect ancient British customs still capable of offering instruction to future leaders and warriors.
In carrying out very critical operations the general ought not to set himself apart as though such labour was beneath him, but he should begin the work and toil along with his troops as much as possible. Such behaviour will lead the soldier to be more submissive to his officers, if only out of shame, and he will accomplish more.

The general’s life should be plain and simple like that of his soldiers; he should display a fatherly affection toward them; he should give orders in a mild manner; and he should always make sure to give advice and to discuss essential matters with them in person.

The general should pay greater attention to arms than to other equipment, aware that even other equipment can be obtained in enemy territory, but that without arms we will not overcome the enemy.

His concerns ought to be with their safety, their food, and their regular pay. Without these it is impossible to maintain discipline in an army.

The general is successful when his men regard him as unshakeable and just.

The general should make sure of the good disposition of the troops by an oath. He should also see that civilians are left unharmed.

The cause of war must be just.

Table 3-8. Extracts from The Strategikon\textsuperscript{306}

The Strategikon also covers the fundamental tenets of leadership as a covenantal dictum. The first dictate of a good leader, according to the Strategikon, is that he should toil alongside his troops. In other words, he should lead by example. By doing so, the tract maintains, the leader is setting a good example, creating conditions where subordinates are more likely to follow orders. This comment betokens an essentially covenantal relationship between leader and led. The leader should not order his men to do what he is not himself prepared to do. Again, one is struck by how this ancient comment about military leadership, is wholly analogous to the modern British military equivalent, in which the chain of command is heavily implicated in sharing the suffering and fortunes of common soldiery and in so doing officers and soldiers are thought covenantally to be bound to a common fate.

The next dictum in Table 3-8. is an instruction to the Byzantine general to live modestly, to extend patronage to his men, to advise them and to speak with them in person. This

\textsuperscript{306} Ibid Pp 79-92.
commentary on military leadership speaks to what one might now term ‘style of command’. It is remarkable that this ancient piece of wisdom includes encouragement toward mild and paternal relations between leader and led, not as one might assume from this period of brutal military campaigning, a more dictatorial or harsh style. The relationship which the Strategikon is advocating between ancient leader and ancient led is a paternal not a militaristic one, including the need to take a personal interest in the affairs of soldiers. One cannot fail to be struck by the profoundly similar modern British commentary on ‘style of command’. In modern doctrinal equivalents of the Strategikon the motto ‘Serve to Lead’ stands out with prominence on the cipher of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. It is the covenantal relationship between modern troop leaders and modern troops which requires a style of command that sees a close involvement by officers in the welfare of their soldiers. There is no aspect of a young soldier’s military life which is or should be foreign to his young platoon commander, such is the very close relationship which exists and is designed institutionally to exist between the two. This empathetic, that is to say, covenantal relationship also places a requirement on commanders to personally address soldiers under command. The ancient requirement to have a command style in which leaders personally speak to soldiers has in modern times become the convention of ‘addressing the troops’ a tradition on the eve of battle or after a victory or defeat which has now been extended beyond the military sphere into the civilian and is the reason why history records such addresses by politicians and statesmen.\(^\text{307}\) This covenantal mode of meeting and addressing the troops to inspire and motivate them is part of the special acknowledgement leaders give to those under their command. It is fundamental to the healthy operation of the military covenant and forms a vital aspect of recognition which the chain of command, civilian leadership and the nation has toward its armed forces.

The remaining comments at Table 3-8 taken from the Strategikon refer to safety, food and pay are all similarly related to the covenantal convention of recognition under the covenant.

It is clear that along with recognising and taking a share in the fate of one's troops, a leader’s provision of equipment, protection, nourishment and remuneration are foundational aspects of maintaining an effective military. Because it is stated in the Strategikon that these requirements aid discipline they are therefore especially significant to what later military thinkers term ‘fighting spirit’ or ‘morale’. When one relates this ancient doctrine espousing an elemental need for basic military resources to modern equivalents which re-state these needs it is also clear that the lineage between ancient and modern versions of a British military-covenant are so direct that they need very little in terms of interpretation or historical context to see how proximate they are in content and format, not to mention relevance. They both draw upon an identical set of moral philosophies, almost certainly based on the Christian religion. Nor can there be any other explanation for such similarity between ancient and modern versions except that one, has in some way, led culturally to the other. There would be difficulty in arguing that the unique ‘ingredients’ of the covenants reviewed in this study, sitting at opposite ends of eight hundred years were simply universal and ubiquitous to all civil-military relations in all countries and therefore merely commonplace and enduring per se. This might have been the case for some experiences of soldiering in some countries in some eras but not the case in this very precisely framed and yet comprehensive set of ‘ingredients’ shown to be directly relational despite the separation of age, geography and language. The composition of each individually constructed covenant comprises a very distinctive set of principles and dictums common and shared between an antique artefact of Byzantium (and therefore of European cultural origin) and a modern British article. Nowhere else can fairness, trust, empathy, mutual support, medical primacy, honourable commemoration, aspects of leadership and duty be so uniquely juxtaposed between several separate and yet remarkably similar literary articles. They are bespoke military-covenants of their age but barring the direct copy of modern doctrine from the

308 See ADP Land Operations, Pg 146. AC 71819, DGD&D, 2005 for the second and more developed edition of the Army’s military-covenant.
309 See the Balliol College alumni article on Major General Sebastian Roberts, ‘Floreat Domu’. Issue 12, 2006.
Strategikon, for which there is no evidence, the relationship is historically and culturally developmental as well as cross-Continental. Yet still the striking similarities continue. Table 3-8 also states that commanders are respected by their men when thought to be unshakeable and just. The requirement for commanders to be resolute and fair is also linked to the above commentary on ‘style of command’. Again, the similarity between ancient and modern military versions of the covenant is striking.

The last two items in Table 3-8. deal with the subject of civilians in conflict and the cause of war. The Strategikon is unequivocal in its pronouncement that civilians should be left unharmed and that the cause be just. The moral position is clear, there is no caveat concerning collateral damage or discussion concerning national interests. The dictum provided to the ancient commander is designed to build his moral competence. The Byzantine warrior is no Norse berserker, given to chaotic fury, but rather a disciplined professional, the successor to the highly efficient Roman legionary. With the inclusion of the principle of avoiding (not minimising) civilian casualties the Strategikon contains the essential ingredients upon which to indoctrinate a morally principled military force. In train with the comparisons provided thus far, the resemblance of the ancient covenantal attitude toward civilian casualties with its modern counterpart is too similar to ignore.310

In summary, demonstrated by a lifestyle which is modest, evidenced by a genuine interest in soldiers and their affairs, the safeguarding of their interests and the safety of civilians, the covenantal principles of enlightened leadership, distinct from military authoritarianism, link the ancient and modern tracts in a single concept of the military-covenant. The comparison has the effect of establishing moral competence as a major attribute in both the ancient and the modern military leader. It also has the effect of showing how these covenantal articles place great importance in the ethical dimension of military affairs. Explicit in the Strategikon

310 Refer to ADP Operations, Laws of Armed Conflict. Published by DCDC, 2010. Para 0226, Pg 2-13. ‘to protect...non - combatants from unnecessary suffering’.
is an ancient military doctrine requiring of its adherents the highest standard of leadership and moral competence in order to obtain military success. Both ancient and modern covenants place a moral philosophical framework over the schema of tactical considerations: soldiers and leaders must be equipped in all senses, morally and materially for war. The discovery of an ancient British military-covenant has therefore important consequences for the treatment of its modern counterparts. Not least in terms of the impacts consequent in any subsequent development of covenant policy is the fixing concretely for perpetuity immutable principles which are conditional to the sound operation of the covenant. Trust is already an accepted central tenet of the military-covenant but mutual and reciprocal obligations for honouring the agreement are not yet aligned. The gap between expectation and assurance is arguably still wide.

One must ultimately conclude that although military conflict may result in moral cost, military service is recognised as such not only by the expense in human life but paradoxically by the investment in moral values and ethical standards necessary for the maintenance of humane control in managing conflict. These principles span both the civilian and military spheres and indicate a further convergence in the UK civil-military relationship. Nevertheless until the gap between expectation and fulfilment of the military-covenant is closed the challenge in navigating toward convergence remains problematic. British military covenants serve the very practical role of supporting the moral component of fighting power but it is clear that they also implicate civilian leaders in the moral competence to be achieved when engaged in the management of conflict. It is now possible to state that the dual purpose of the military-covenant has been thus served to a lesser or greater extent across the ages. Perhaps what is most remarkable about this analysis is that these deductions are possible because they are based on articles and artefacts which build from an ancient military text, whose modern successors could only have been brought into existence as inherited traditions and customs, not as stolen facsimiles. It is the enduring moral nature of the British military-covenant that it is and will continue to be defined by direct military experience captured in doctrine for
posterity as much as it is (and will continue to be) also influenced by civilians crafting armed forces policy culled from topical popular will.
Chapter Four.

Defining the military-covenant.

Chapters one and two dealt with secondary sources to establish the conceptual basis of the military-covenant and to establish its position within the field of CMR. Chapter three introduced a cultural analysis of ancient British history, archaeology and etymology based on the concept of covenants including their role in military alliances, social accommodations and their contribution to non-verbal Anglo-Saxon traditions of communication. Chapter three also introduced the primary source of the Strategikon to deepen understanding of the origins of British military-covenant and to posit a working theory of how the first military-covenants were imported, established and bred in the British Isles.

Chapter four of the study focuses research into additional primary sources, key of which are the four principal documents which see development of the military-covenant from military doctrine into government policy and legal statute. For the purposes of expediency, two addendums to the Armed Forces Covenant have not been assessed; these are the Community Covenant and the Corporate Covenant. Both are important documents in their own right taking the principles of the Armed Forces Covenant policy into an operational framework for the purposes of implementing the covenant at the local community and corporate business levels. These documents were not deemed necessary for assessment above and beyond the principal Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 because the principles, obligations and operating characteristics of the latter covenants do not represent conceptual development of the core policy document but rather development of technical content concerning the operational aspects of policy implementation. It would be wrong to underplay the importance of these latter covenants in terms of their significance to the practical aspects of fulfilling the covenant and certainly aspects of covenant implementation and engagement with the Armed Forces Community come to light in the interview phase in chapter five of the study; so to this end the policy recommendations of the study include reference to their
implementation and engagement. However, to have undertaken textual analysis of these documents would have significantly duplicated content already garnered from the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011, without gaining further insight into the subject matter for the purpose of defining the covenant, which is the key objective of this study.

The chapter sources the four versions of the military-covenant, summarises the content of each, refers the reader to the textual analysis conducted which was introduced under the methodology element of chapter one (reproduced as an annex to this chapter) and concludes with a synthesis of the obligations contained within all the documents. This chapter outlines the development of the covenant and places into contrast the several clauses which are (and are not) reconciled between the doctrinal and policy versions. The latter warrant further discussion in chapter six and final resolution of these clauses is attempted in the provision of the author’s own New Military-Covenant at the end of chapter seven which completes the author’s thesis. This incorporates the cultural aspects of chapter three, the political themes of chapter five and the combined obligations and operating characteristics provided at the end of chapter four. Chapter four ends with a brief technical definition of a military-covenant which is the first authoritative definition of its kind.

There are four principal versions of the modern military-covenant. The first three are military doctrine, all authored by the Army in 2000, 2005 and 2010. The fourth is the Government sponsored Armed Forces Covenant authored by the MoD in May 2011. Whilst there are significant areas of compatibility and overlap between all of the versions there are certain aspects of emphasis and accent and indeed several clauses which are not complimentary and show in the first three covenants marked development and with the latter points of departure.

In order to define the military covenant using in the first instance the modern primary sources available in this chapter (before these can be synthesised, if at all, with the more ancient
versions, conducted in chapter seven): an assessment of what constitutes the essential components of the covenant is required. Chapter one has established the concept of the covenant as a bargain. This is embellished by notions of social contracts which have existed in the past. To this extent the simplest definition of a military covenant can be derived by the author: ‘a social compact between civil and military citizens in which the Armed Forces defend the nation in return for recognition and support’. But this definition is not satisfactory if either party is to understand its obligations under the compact. To this end the nature, characteristics, style, purpose, content, obligations, principles, recognitions, admissions and significance all require closer assessment if a true definition is to be established.

Table 4-1. Soldiering: The Military Covenant, Army Doctrine Publication 5 dated April 2000 MoD.

The military-covenant of 2000 makes clear that the principal clause is a moral obligation which runs that because soldiers sacrifice themselves in the line of duty, the reciprocal obligation upon the nation is that serving personnel should be treated fairly. This is the essence of the bargain. When the prose of the 2000 covenant at Table 4-1 is broken out, a
framework of obligations is presented (see Table 4-2). Along with the presentation of the prime moral obligation a set of clauses and tenets is offered. The tenets include: the unique character of land operations; the privations that service life brings to those serving and their families; the sustaining character of the covenant and its history and the need for duty to come first before personal gain. This logical narrative flows into a set of obligations. These clauses are: soldiers are to be valued, treated fairly and respected, sustained and rewarded.

The chief operating characteristics, that is, the practical consequence of adherence to the 2000 covenant are: recognition that the Army is different, to be sustained and rewarded, to be honoured on Armistice Day. The only contentious aspect of the 2000 covenant is the idea that the Army is different: different to what and different to whom? It would be difficult to have a set of moral obligations focussed only at the Army which did not also incorporate the other services and equally more clarity is required if the differences between military and civilian citizens are to be understood as beneficial. The other area of contention is that the document is an internal one, designed to make clear to service personnel what the Army expects. The concept of sacrifice in return for being treated differently is a piece of morality which if it is to be taken as universal wisdom and not only military philosophy requires a more complete narrative if the readership of the covenant is to be extended.
The next development of the military-covenant occurred in 2005. The experience of the British Army in the interim period included operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the Army had also dealt with the firemen’s strike in 2002, in which Fire-fighter’s budgets, salaries and conditions came to light under the strike negotiations that took place in efforts to avert the strike. The negotiations were unsuccessful and the Army was called in to deal with fire fighting across the country for upwards of twenty weeks. The strike negotiations however had not been over looked by a disinterested Army, but by a justifiably concerned one given its own political challenges in these areas. Soldiers looked unfavourably at fireman’s salaries terms and conditions as they fought fires effectively despite inferior equipment and training. Written therefore during the so called period of ‘overstretch,’ the next iteration of the military-covenant took a much more strident tone in bringing out the covenants’ ‘clause of difference’. To this end a further ‘clause of cooperation’ was added to the 2005 covenant. It

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4-2. Key Tenets of the Military Covenant (Army, 2000).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The Military Covenant is a mutual obligation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- It is an unbreakable common bond of identity, loyalty and responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- It has sustained the Army since its inception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Land Operations in distinct to other military operations are unique and thereby the Army differs from all other institutions and must be sustained and provided for accordingly by the nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Soldiers are called upon to make personal sacrifices in the service of the Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Forgo some rights enjoyed by those outside the AF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Soldiers in return must always be able to expect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fair treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- To be valued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- To be respected as individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- That they and their families be sustained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- That they and their families be rewarded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- That they and their soldiers be provided with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commensurate terms of service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commensurate conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- It has (perhaps) its greatest manifestation in Armistice Day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next development of the military-covenant occurred in 2005. The experience of the British Army in the interim period included operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the Army had also dealt with the firemen's strike in 2002, in which Fire-fighter's budgets, salaries and conditions came to light under the strike negotiations that took place in efforts to avert the strike. The negotiations were unsuccessful and the Army was called in to deal with fire fighting across the country for upwards of twenty weeks. The strike negotiations however had not been overlooked by a disinterested Army, but by a justifiably concerned one given its own political challenges in these areas. Soldiers looked unfavourably at fireman's salaries terms and conditions as they fought fires effectively despite inferior equipment and training. Written therefore during the so called period of 'overstretch,' the next iteration of the military-covenant took a much more strident tone in bringing out the covenants' 'clause of difference'. To this end a further 'clause of cooperation' was added to the 2005 covenant. It
is nothing less than a condition in which ‘trust and goodwill’ is threatened if the covenant is not fulfilled. This is a profound shift from the first version of the covenant.

Soldiers are bound by Service. The nature of service in inherently unequal: soldiers may have to put in more that they receive. Ultimately, they may be called upon to make personal sacrifices – including death – in the service of the Nation. In putting the needs of the nation, the Army and others before their own, they forgo some of the rights enjoyed by those outside the Armed Forces. So, at the very least, British soldiers should always be able to expect the Nation, and their commanders, to treat them fairly, to value and respect them as individuals, and to sustain and reward them and their families with appropriate terms and conditions of service. This mutual obligation forms the Military Covenant between the Nation, the Army and each individual soldier. To a greater or lesser extent such a common bond of identity, loyalty and responsibility has sustained the Army and its soldiers throughout its history. It is a covenant not a contract, and it is binding in every circumstance. Unless Nation, Army and soldier alike recognise and understand that it must be upheld come what may, then it fails. If it fails then first goodwill and then, ultimately trust is withdrawn. It has perhaps its greatest manifestation in the annual commemoration of Remembrance Day, when the Nation keeps covenant with those who have given up their lives in its service.

Table 4-3. ADP Land Operations May 2005 Chapter 7 The Moral Component, Pg 146.

To the framework of obligations and tenets for the military-covenant of 2000, in which the clause of difference is merely stated, in 2005 is added the ‘clause of cooperation’. The bargain of the military-covenant in 2005 became therefore, conditional. This was an exceptional change in the Army’s stance. Its experiences had caused it to express its inherent moral authority. One would have deep legal questions about the consequences of a withdrawal of trust and goodwill, were it not for the fact that the covenant document was still only an internal one designed primarily for the chain of command. To military practitioners interpreting the ‘new clauses’ the condition of ‘putting more in’ or ‘going beyond the call of duty’ was arguably inferable the notion of the limits of military liability in this respect, by which ‘doing more than the mission reasonably required’ could, in the circumstance of a failing covenant, be interpreted also in the light of the ‘clause of cooperation’ to be ultimately a matter of ‘discretion’ for the chain of command. This development of the covenant is significant. The language of the clauses already contained in the 2000 covenant was also changed and the clauses themselves strengthened. The 2005 statement, ‘The nature of
service is inherently unequal’ places much more emphasis on the social justice aspect of the bargain and the compulsion to, if not rebalance the inequality of service life, then to account for it with the compensating equities of recognition and reward. In this way the covenant’s ‘clause of difference’ founded in 2000 is much more explicit and far better framed, even if the ‘clause of cooperation’ becomes a greater concern for those following the military-covenant in the policy and academic camps.

Table 4-4. Key Tenets of the Military Covenant (Army, 2005).
The development of the military-covenant in 2010 takes the military document to a different readership. Written at a time when the failings of strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq were being voiced (see chapter five) the expected scrutiny of the next version of the covenant by policy experts is clear in the refinements of the clauses. Nevertheless the strident tone and the potentially adversarial trajectory of the 2005 covenant is not unduly unpicked, in fact in certain respects the covenant is reinforced further. The obligation of support to the military is contained in the more robustly framed clause of being provided: ‘the means and ways to achieve the ends set’. The Army’s message to a policy audience is clear: provide the resources and equipment needed for mission success lest the covenant fail. The use of term ‘fail’ is an innovation of the 2010 covenant which strengthens the 2005 ‘clause of cooperation’ and makes the conditional nature of the covenant absolute. The somewhat conciliatory phrase which makes clear that the covenant is not a ‘contract’ and brings with it ‘moral not legal’ obligations is a recognition of the limits of the Army’s authority and power in not being able to make the condition of the covenant subject to legal sanction. Nevertheless the ‘deployability’ of the covenant as a communications tool with an audience outside normal readership is achieved in 2010. Other clauses are extended too. The obligation of the nation to look after veterans who have become subject to ‘poverty’ is new. Implicit within this new obligation is a recognition of the serving military that it has a role in supporting charitable
endeavour for Veterans, not least because the Army has diminished resource to do so itself. This is again an important development as it sees an Army (and not only the Army because the covenant in 2010 became also ‘Tri-Service’) looking not only inward but up and out into the public domain to garner moral support for itself and for Veterans which, it believes, deserve an elevated status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4-6. Key Tenets of the Military Covenant (Army) 2010.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>o The Covenant is between The Nation, The Service and each individual soldier, sailor, marine and airman and all individuals of the AF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Civilians are out of the bounds of military citizenship when the latter are on operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Military personnel are bound by their Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o The relationship between civilian citizens and servicemen is unequal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o In times of conflict servicemen put in more than they get out of Service life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o The inequality of Service life is due to Servicemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Sacrificing life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Sacrificing rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Sacrificing freedoms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o To redress the civilian-military imbalance, under the covenant servicemen can expect society to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Give them the means to do their work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Treat them fairly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Value them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Respect them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Adequately sustain them and their families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Adequately reward them and their families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Provide long-term support in the event of their death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Provide long-term support in the event of their poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Covenant is not a contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Covenant imposes moral obligations not legal ones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Covenant requires parties to understand the covenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Covenant requires parties to uphold the covenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o If the Covenant is not upheld it will fail</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the three military–covenants presented common and consistent aspects are derived. These are verified by a line by line analysis conducted by the author and summarised in
Annex B to chapter four. The characteristics of the covenant as military doctrine are at Table 4-7.

### Table 4-7. Covenantal characteristics of military doctrine 2000-2010.

- Reciprocal
- Enduring
- Antecedence
- Military Doctrine
- Political Initiative
- Social Policy
- Moral not legal
- Binding
- Unbreakable
- Nature of service is unequal
- Service personnel are different to civilians citizens
- Emphasises the need for AF to put the needs of the Service First (i.e. before their own)
- Common bond of loyalty
- Recognises the uniqueness of Land operations

The covenant as understood by a reading of it as a continuum of military doctrine contains a number of objective truths. The covenant is a written article denoting the core obligations between the nation, the state and the Armed Forces in respect to each other. It is historical in the manner that one has always existed. It is enduring because it reflects the appetites of parties to cooperate now and in the future. It is both moral and social in origin as it defines the relationship based on trust and goodwill between the parties which being necessarily unequal in nature due to the specialism of the profession of arms is therefore of unique significance for the execution of social justice. It also contains a number of theoretical propositions. The military-covenant is conditional because if the relationship is allowed to fail trust and goodwill is withdrawn but the covenant is also conceivably aspirational in the sense that whilst it is believed the covenant is unbreakable and binding, it is beyond the authority of the military to enforce the clauses which would make it so. These are important points to bear in mind when understanding how far the definition of the covenant has come from its simple definition at the start of the chapter to the increasingly sophisticated one obtainable at

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311 See the discussion on political realism in chapter two.
the Armed Forces are in train with these developments (see annex B to chapter four).

| Recognises the honour and commitment of the AF |
| Recognises the honour the sacrifice of the AF |
| Recognises the expectation for recompense for the ultimate sacrifice (death) |
| Recognises the expectation for recompense for injury |
| Recognises the expectation for recompense the expectation for forgoing rights |
| Recognises the importance of Acts of Commemoration |
| Recognises the role of Trust |
| Recognises the role of Goodwill |

Table 4-8. Development of Covenant Recognitions.

What has also been possible to discern in the development of the clauses of the military-covenant both as military doctrine and as government policy is the expansion of the stakeholders’ party to the covenant. Pictorially represented in annex A to this chapter the extension of the covenant to a wider group of participants over the period 2000-2012 has been considerable. It is possible to ascertain that all UK citizens are party to the covenant (see Table 4-9). Although the degree to which citizens are merely implicated by association with the covenant and the degree to which citizens are obligated by the terms of the covenant, is not at this point in the covenant’s inception possible to determine. Only time will tell. For the purposes of this research it is only possible to analyse the theoretical conditions of participation. This brings the study on to the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011.
### Parties to the Covenant
- UK Society
- The Crown
- HMG
- The Nation
- The AF

### Members to the Parties to the Covenant
- Applies to Army soldiers only
- Applies to all soldiers (Tri Service)
- Applies to all servicemen (gender biased)
- Applies to all Military Personnel (gender neutral)
- Applies to Commanders (the Chain of Command)
- Applies to all Reserves
- Applies to Veterans
- Applies to Families
- Applies to all individuals
- Applies to private organisations

Table 4-9. Extension of the Covenant to all Parties 2000-2014.

“An enduring covenant between the people of the United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Government and all those who serve or have served in the Armed Forces of the Crown and their families”.

### Key tenets of the AFC 2011
- **Enduring**
  - *Between all people of the UK, all the AF of The Crown & their Families*
    - Veterans, Reserves, Regulars, Bereaved, Voluntary service bodies, Charitable Service Bodies, Whitehall and Crown Departments, Devolved government, Private organisations
    - Individuals
- **Because of their duty, sacrifice, loss of life, injury, impact on families AF personnel are owed support**
- **Support of AF under the AFC 2011 means Respect, Fair Treatment and Support from the Nation**
  - No disadvantage in comparison with other citizens in the provision of public and commercial services.
- **AF have the expectation that the AFC 2011 will be upheld**
- **HMG have the aspiration to meet the expectations and obligations of the AFC 2011**
- **AFC 2011 admits that the AFC 2011 may not deliver to expectation or aspiration due to Service demand or other Constraints**
- **AFC 2011 should influence policy and service provision outcomes for the AFC 2011**
- **AFC 2011 is unconditional for the AF– AF duty is never dependent on other considerations**
- **The AFC 2011 obligations do not need detailed explanation**
- **Each case is unique in time and circumstance**
- **AFC 2011 will need closer monitoring in the future as government reforms impact local government**
- **HMG should consider**
  - how to minimise impact of service on serving AF and their families
  - positive measures to bring about equality of outcome with other citizens
  - special treatment for the injured

Word Count 579

Table 4-10. The Armed Forces Covenant 2011. MoD. HMSO (Pages 1-7).
The critical difference between the military-covenant as doctrine and the military-covenant as policy is that in attaining legal status as a statue of Parliament, the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 (AFC 2011) has all the authority and primacy which military doctrine lacks. To the military practitioner the key advantage is that the AFC 2011 is a demonstrable ‘act of covenant fulfilment’ that brings with it the obligation of measurement. The key imposition that the AFC 2011 brings is a series of enforceable conditions which the military had not foreseen and may not have welcomed. The fist imposition is that the Armed Forces Covenant (AFC 2011) does not invite closer inspection, development or definition. It is assumed that the ‘covenant is understood’. (See Table 4-10). The AFC 2011 goes as far as stating that further explanation of the principles which underpin it or the genesis of the policies that will promote it is not needed. This is problematic because no clear generic definition of the covenant underpinned by a firm foundational and theoretical basis is yet in existence and so any statute which is now in effect is bound to be somewhat deficient. Without extended enquiry the outcomes sought by the AFC 2011 in its current guise may remain aspirational instead of deliverable. The second imposition is that the AFC 2011 states that ‘duty is never conditional on other considerations’. This is also problematic as military duty is always subject to, at the very least, international law as well as personal conscience. Duty being discharged through individuals trained in discipline, obedience, loyalty and military law, duty is always conditional on relevant considerations. The failure to do one’s duty will always have consequences but the consideration of relevant factors especially law, will not be disbaring considerations. Nor do such relevant considerations make duty unconditional, quite the opposite. Similarly duty is also executed with the consideration of the consequences of failure and ultimately the officer or soldier who interprets his orders in light of his perceived duty according to his or her conscience has to evaluate that duty in relation to certain relevant considerations. The somewhat ambivalent nature of the statement ‘duty is never conditional on other considerations’ is to remove legality and conscience from the concept of duty and this is a serious incompatibility with the
values and standards of the British Army.\textsuperscript{312} These values and standards are an important adjunct to the military-covenant and were re-introduced into Army circulation by none other than General Dannatt in 2008. The introduction to the 2008 Values and Standards pamphlet emphasis the specific challenges of Land Operations again, differentiating the Army form the other services. In this respect, with the later versions of the military-covenant dropping the clause regarding the uniqueness of Land Operations, the values and Standards document thus becomes an important stand alone article in the Army’s inventory of moral doctrine. The introduction to the Values and Standards document stresses the importance of the Commander’s ethos, leading by example; this harks back to Strategikon \textsuperscript{313} in which the moral nature of sound Christian generalship is highlighted. Again, just as with the military-covenant, the Christian influences on the Army’s values and Standards are clearly evident (author’s italics): ‘selfless commitment (love), (moral) courage, discipline (authority), integrity (honesty), loyalty (obedience), and respect for others (the dignity and sanctity of life)’. But Values and Standards alone do not form the basis of the bargain between those who lead and those who are led. A ‘bargain’ is by virtue of its formal expression, a conditional article. The duty to serve (along covenantal lines) if not reciprocated by the duty to support is by the very terms of the covenant, inherently unjust. It is arguably for these reasons that the Values and Standards document makes explicit the responsibility of the Commander toward his or her soldiers in the execution of military leadership. These are areas of AFC 2011 that need more attention if reconciliation between the civil, military and policy perspectives is to be attained on the conditionality of the bargain of the covenant.

\textsuperscript{312} ‘Values and Standards of the British Army’. Introduced by General Sir Richard Dannatt. HMSO, January 2008.
The thrust of the AFC 2011 is twofold. The first thrust is political. It lifts the covenant from the realms of the military into the sphere of the political. This has the effect of increasing the likelihood that measures requiring national endeavour may be resourced and coordinated and therefore met. Although by the same token it removes the influence of the military in developing the obligations, principles and tenets of the covenant to its own agenda. The second thrust is social. The AFC 2011 brings with it social obligations that the military is to adopt and fulfil as part of the new and latest ‘bargain’ of the covenant. At Table 11 these include greater resilience for service leavers. In some respect this is a direct pushback on the Army's stance on veterans, stating that the military does have a duty to prepare service leavers and that it is not just the nation who have an obligation to accept the status of the veteran to be elevated and therefore to provide him or her with charity as a priority over other citizens. Other new impositions on the military include engaging with the society to deepen understanding of Defence issues although on this score the invitation open for the military to develop covenantal relationships along military objectives provide more scope for its influence in this regard.

The two key clauses that the AFC 2011 set out are ‘no disadvantage’ and ‘special consideration in some circumstances’. These clauses are caveated by the condition that these are executed on a ‘case by case basis’ so that the degree to which the original
covenant 2000 ‘clause of difference’ between military and civilian citizens is immutable and enduring will be a matter for time to resolve. Nevertheless this political meeting of the military half-way is significant progress. The AFC 2011 lifts the concept of a covenant beyond the realms of technical provision and legal statute into the plane of a genuine social compact.

This is a hugely significant and positive place for the military-covenant to be.

| Armed Forces have a duty to be prepared to give their life for their service |
| Armed Forces - Duty is (un)conditional |
| Armed Forces - Trust and Goodwill is conditional |
| Armed Forces to be fairly treated by the Nation |
| Armed Forces to be valued by the Nation (each individual soldier) |
| Armed Forces to be respected by the Nation (each individual soldier) |
| Armed Forces and families are to be rewarded |
| Armed Forces and families are to be sustained |
| Armed Forces are to be given the means to do their work |
| Armed Forces are to be provided with adequate terms of service |
| Armed Forces are to be provided with adequate conditions |
| The Nation is to celebrate the work of charitable who work on behalf AF |
| The Nation is to celebrate the work of voluntary bodies who work on behalf AF |
| Armed Forces not to be disadvantaged due to service life in the provision of public (HMG) or commercial services (Nation) |
| Armed Forces to keep close links between Armed Forces and society |
| Armed Forces to uphold the values and standards of the Services |
| Armed Forces to engage with wider society and understand its relationship to it |
| Armed Forces to use time in Service to prepare for civilian life |
| Armed Forces personnel to understand their rights and obligations |

Table 4-12. Combined Covenant Obligations.

It is possible to derive from all four of the covenants assessed a set of combined obligations. These cohere logically around the clauses identified. From this set of obligations it is possible to provide a generic definition of the covenant and to construct a New Military-Covenant (see chapter seven) which reconciles the key difference between the military and policy versions centering on the mode of ‘conditionality’ of the covenant and the inclusion of all the relevant clauses based on the derived combined obligations. The definition of an improved interim generic military-covenant is at Table 4-13.
Table 4-13. A generic definition of the British Military-Covenant (Rynehart, 2014).

From this generic definition a technical definition is obtained: (1) the military-covenant is a legal article; (2) a moral pact between military and civilian citizens (3) the condition of the covenant is reciprocal; (4) recognition and reward is offered for sacrifices made; (5) other clauses implied and explicit in the covenant help regulate the pact; (6) civilian support is enjoined in return for Armed Forces accepting social change; (7) the covenant is a mechanism for civil alliance and a code for military-service; (8) the pact has ancient provenance with matching traditions and is underpinned by political realism with matching policy; (9) trust and goodwill are withdrawn if the covenant fails; (10) participation and enactment is both practical and symbolic in which beneficiaries receive value and sponsors measure effect in a series of measures providing and demonstrating recognition and reward.
Development of the covenant 2000-2012

The Nation

Each individual soldier Army
Families

Military-Covenant 2000

Each individual within (UK) society

The Crown
Commanders
Families
Govt Depts
HMG
Injured
Service Charities
Vet's
Vet's Families
Volunteer Orgs
Private Orgs
Local Gov't

Armed Forces Covenant 2011.
Textual Analysis of the modern military-covenants

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<th>ADP Ops 2005</th>
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<td>Y</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Defining the Nature of the Covenant(s)**

- Military covenant has grown in length more than three times in 11 years (1200 words)
- AFC 2011 has grown 100% in one year.
- Combined characteristics of each version have a commonality of content of 35%

- Reciprocal
- Enduring
- Antecedence
- Military Doctrine
- Political Initiative
- Social Policy
- Moral not legal
- Binding
- Unbreakable
- Nature of service is unequal

- Pact
- Lasting
- History
- Socially Inclusive
- Moral not legal
- Consistently applied at all times vs applied under defined principles but on a case by case basis
- Absolute & indissoluble vs conditional & binding
- Service personnel subject to Duty which is non discretionary, with ultimate liability being death
| Civilians citizens are outside the AF | Y | Y | Y | N | x | Military personnel outside civilian citizenship during conflict vs extension of citizenship to military personnel (even when in conflict) |
| Emphasises the need for AF individuals to put the needs of the Service First | Y | Y | Y | Y | Focus is internal to the AF vs Focus is external to the Nation |
| Common bond of loyalty | Y | Y | N | N | x | The mutual bond is one primarily of reciprocal loyalty and responsibility in maintaining trust & goodwill between parties vs a mutual bond which primarily identifies with the duty of service personnel, recognizing that their sacrifices should be compensated by the nation. |
| Recognises the uniqueness of Land operations | Y | N | N | N | xxx | The covenant is a doctrinal article to inculcate and underpin combat soldiers and the chain of command in their duties when prosecuting land warfare vs a social contract aimed at promoting solidarity, fairness, gratitude, support etc for soldiers in that endeavour. Critical understanding that Army requires itself to be different. |
| Defines the key areas of what is covered in the covenant | Y | Y | Y | Y | x | AF provided with the means to prosecute war, fair treatment, valued and respected as individuals, rewarded with appropriate TACOS, families and vets sustained in the long term (death, injury or poverty) Vs AF Fairness, TACOS and Support for Healthcare, Education, Housing, Benefits and tax, Deployment, Family Life, Support after service, Recognition, Participation as Citizens, Changes in Defence, Redress. |
| Defines the rights of servicemen | N | N | N | N | x | The rights of servicemen are not defined, nor the rights that servicemen give up though their obligations regarding duty is Vs AFC 2011 directing servicemen to find out what their rights and obligations are and that Duty is non discretionary |

| ADP Ops 2000 | ADP Ops 2005 | ADP Ops 2010 | AFC 2011 |
### Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>UK Society</th>
<th>The Crown</th>
<th>HMG</th>
<th>The Nation</th>
<th>The AF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of society identified as being party to the Covenant vs The entire Nation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Crown as an explicit party to the Covenant &amp; The Government as an explicit party to the Covenant</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation as an explicit party to the Covenant</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The AF as an explicit party to the Covenant</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Members to the Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applies to</th>
<th>ADP Ops 2000</th>
<th>ADP Ops 2005</th>
<th>ADP Ops 2010</th>
<th>AFC 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army soldiers only</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All soldiers (Tri Service)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Military Personnel (gender neutral)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanders (the Chain of Command)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Reserves</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All individuals</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private organisations</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>AFC 2011 extends the Covenant into other professions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Recognitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recognises the honour and</th>
<th>ADP Ops 2000</th>
<th>ADP Ops 2005</th>
<th>ADP Ops 2010</th>
<th>AFC 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honour and commitment not mentioned in Army</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commitment of the AF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognises the sacrifice of the AF</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognises the expectation for recompense for the ultimate sacrifice (death)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognises the expectation for recompense for injury</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognises that serving personnel have relative rights</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognises the importance of Acts of Commemoration</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognises the Symbolism of the Covenant</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognises the role of Trust</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognises the role of Goodwill</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>doctrine covenant</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sacrifice is recognised in all</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutiful sacrifice (inequity) is rewarded (rebalanced) with (compensatory) measures</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition of the rights of service personnel vs the definition of rights (or loss of)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enactment of the covenant through National rituals</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 marks the doctrinal step change in the development of the covenant(s) stating that trust and goodwill are discretionary and conditions based</td>
<td>xxx</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Principles & Obligations

| Service personnel have a duty to be prepared to give their life for their service | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| AF Service and Duty is unconditional | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| AF Service Trust and Goodwill is conditional | N | Y | Y | N |  |
| AF to be fairly treated by the Nation | Y | Y | Y | Y |  |
| AF to be valued by the Nation (each individual soldier) | Y | Y | Y | N |  |
| AF to be respected by the Nation | Y | Y | Y | Y |  |
| AF and families are to be rewarded | Y | Y | Y | Y |  |
| AF and families are to be sustained | Y | Y | Y | Y |  |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADP Ops 2000</th>
<th>ADP Ops 2005</th>
<th>ADP Ops 2010</th>
<th>AFC 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| 36% |

- **AFC 2011 implies Trust and Goodwill are unconditional**
- **Fair treatment a relative and changing moral concept (fairness as justice) vs rules**
| AF are to be given the means to do their work | N | N | Y | N |
| AF are to be provided with adequate terms of service | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| AF are to be provided with adequate conditions | Y | Y | N | Y |
| The Nation is to celebrate the work of charitable who work on behalf AF | N | N | N | Y |
| The Nation is to celebrate the work of voluntary bodies who work on behalf AF | N | N | N | Y |
| AF not to disadvantaged due to service life in the provision of public (HMG) or commercial services (Nation) | N | N | N | Y |
| AF to keep close links between AF and society | N | N | N | Y |
| AF to uphold the values and standards of the Services | N | N | N | Y |
| AF to engage with wider society and understand its relationship to it | N | N | N | Y |
| AF to use time in Service to prepare for civilian life | N | N | N | Y |
| AF personnel to understand their rights and obligations | N | N | N | Y |
| 2010 marks the doctrinal step change in declaring resources to be a moral obligation |
| 2010 Army version fails to make declare conditions of service explicit |
| AFC 2011 as a cause for National Celebration, political dimensions of a social contract |
| Anomalous status of the covenant(s) in that the military one accepts disadvantage on the condition of fair compensation but the political one seeks to extend and in some cases enhance the rights of service personnel (special) to mitigate or remove existing disadvantages |
| The myth of separateness, the need to be different, the forces of integration |
| The political imperative to integrate AF into civil society |
| AFC 2011 as a social charter to relieve pressure on the welfare state |
| AFC 2011 as a social charter in preparation for NEM, new TACOS, Army 2020, human rights law |
Chapter Five.

Part 1. Analysis of Themes.

British Press Articles 2002-2010.

Chapter five is split into two parts. Part one deals with nearly a decade’s worth of British press articles. These are arranged chronologically and from them a series of military-covenant themes is derived. Here the story of the rise of the modern military-covenant begins to take form. At annex A to part one of chapter five the press articles are set down in full and include the author’s comments written down at the time of collation. The commentary from the articles has been refined and transposed into the analysis that forms the basis of part one of chapter five’s final text which follows on here. In part two of chapter five the transcripts of the interviews conducted by the author with eight Defence related experts is also transposed. These interviews verify the validity of the themes which comprise the story of the covenant as collated and set down in this part of the chapter. Further analysis by the author is attached to the transcripts of part two and this part of the chapter begins to draw out the policy implications in determining the development of a New Military-covenant. Part two of chapter five also confirms the author’s original propositions and ideas about definitions of the covenant as discussed in chapter two’s literature review and confirm the lack of foundational work across other disciplines in this area to date identified in chapter one. Some of this discussion follows through into chapter three, where the origins and evolution of the covenant lay down a working theory of how covenants came into being in late antiquity.

Over the last decade in the UK a series of reported events within the field of civil-military affairs charts, most significantly, the rise of the military-covenant. Taken in isolation the events as reported do not appear to be anything more than a commentary on a range of Defence and Security issues as they have occurred. However, the events when treated in a chronological way do show the emergence of the military-covenant as an increasingly
meaningful concept and common point of reference for auditing and influencing British civil-
military affairs.

As the author progressed work in the area the following statement was drafted in 2010:
'Taken as a whole and using the military-covenant as a leitmotif, the events also show
patterns of behaviour between the UK military and civilian elites over a decade. A group of
recurrent themes emerge which show themselves to be instrumental, perhaps even
convergent, toward the inception of a formal UK Tri-Service Covenant'. The events which
occurred shortly after anticipation of a new military-covenant were confirmed in 2011 with the
introduction of the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011. The period 2006-2011 is the story of the
modern covenant’s rise to prominence; this chapter covers the period 2002-2010: the period
of inception for the modern military-covenant.

The purpose of this section in chapter five is to illustrate the rise of the covenant and to
describe how the recurrent themes underpinning such a rise are linked (or not) to existing
civil-military relations (and other) theory as discussed in earlier chapters. From the
chronological ordering of the ‘covenant story,’ a set of cases present themselves for
consideration. The 2002 Fireman’s Strike, the 2007 Honour the Covenant Campaign, the
2008-10 Gurkha Campaign and the 2010 Chilcot enquiry into the Iraq war come readily to
mind. From a subsequent thematic re-ordering of the chronological events a set of headline
issues are derived. It is from these headline issues that the interview and survey phase of
the study were predicated and from which subsequent verification and classification of the
covenant was obtained. The events within the chronology have been randomly selected from
a wide range of publicly available media. Left as ‘untreated’ the chronological list of reported
events appear as tabled at Table1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2002</td>
<td>Fireman’s Strike – Army fight fires with poor equipment &amp; training. Fireman already enjoy superior terms of service to Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2003</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Staff retires early amidst rumours of clashes with government over Iraq and Fireman’s strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td>The Military-covenant (Army Doctrine) is revised: includes new reference to withdrawing goodwill &amp; trust if the covenant is not upheld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2005</td>
<td>Iraq abuse investigation – CGS General Jackson draws criticism from the ranks for failing to protect troops from legal proceedings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>Army Officers set up union to vent war anger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2006</td>
<td>CGS General Dannatt questions Nation’s commitment to the Military-covenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2006</td>
<td>Publication of academic book entitled: Military unionism in the post cold war era, a future reality?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2007</td>
<td>Police foil attempt by terrorists to behead UK Muslim soldier - security concerns for soldiers treated in civilian hospitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2007</td>
<td>Military hospital HASLAR to close amidst reports of poor NHS care for soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2007</td>
<td>Conservative Party set up Military-covenant Commission, damning interim report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2007</td>
<td>Defence Secretary Browne denies covenant to troops has broken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2007</td>
<td>USA commit $1.4 billion to improve quality of life for Army families under the banner ‘Army Family Covenant’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2007</td>
<td>CGS goes public with damning report on state of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2007</td>
<td>Disabled Veterans Jeered at swimming pool in Leatherhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2007</td>
<td>Government criticise Harrods over “non civilian attire” preclusion policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2008</td>
<td>University London College Union vote to ban military presence on campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 2008</td>
<td>Conservative think tank investigating treatment of the armed forces blames government for the death of 60 servicemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 2008</td>
<td>Labour Government publish ‘The Nations’ commitment…’ (It does not mention the military-covenant by name)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 2008</td>
<td>Recently retired senior officer Stuart Tootal publishes article criticising government over poor aftercare for injured soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2008</td>
<td>British soldier refused room at UK hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2008</td>
<td>Gurkhas win right to stay in UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2009</td>
<td>Gurkhas win ‘legal first’ against Government - Home Secretary forced to abide by High Court ruling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 2009</td>
<td>MoD challenges compensation payouts to injured soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2009</td>
<td>Eric Joyce, PPS to Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth, resigns in protest over Government’s handling of compensation issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2009</td>
<td>Defence Chiefs named and shamed over Nimrod disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2009</td>
<td>Col Thornloe’s prediction of his own death in Afghanistan revealed – commander’s requests for helicopters went unheeded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2009</td>
<td>General Dannatt named by Conservatives as a future Tory Peer – controversy arises as Dannatt is still a serving officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2009</td>
<td>Prime Minister Gordon Browne apologises to mother of soldier killed in Afghanistan for misspelling his name in a letter of sympathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2009</td>
<td>Defence Secretary Ainsworth plans law for soldiers to jump waiting lists, effectively enshrining military-covenant in law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2010</td>
<td>Outcry by military top brass forces Cameron to delay Dannatt’s appointment as Tory Peer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2010</td>
<td>Chilcot enquiry into the Iraq war. Prime Minister Brown admits defence budget did not rise every year as he claimed in enquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2010</td>
<td>Recently retired SAS Commander goes public over equipment shortages in Iraq and Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2010</td>
<td>Prime Minister Gordon Brown accused of misleading over Snatch Vehicle replacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2010</td>
<td>Academic criticises Armed forces for becoming too politicised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2010</td>
<td>War artist in dispute with Royal Mail over their failure to issue postage stamp portraits of soldiers killed in Iraq, families support the art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2010</td>
<td>Prime Minister Gordon Brown forced to admit the truth about Defence budget not rising as he claimed in Chilcot enquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2010</td>
<td>Generals told to travel 2nd Class</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-1. Chronology of military-covenant events 2002-2010. Source: Rynehart.
When re-ordered the thematic breakdown of the covenant story is shown at Table 2 below.

Table 5-2: The Military-covenant: a thematic categorisation. Source: Rynehart.

There are six key themes which fall out of the story of the modern military-covenant. These are described briefly here and expanded on later in the chapter. The first theme is the emergence and rising prominence of the covenant in the public eye. Here a sequence of articles help inform understanding of what the military-covenant is and what part the nation is
asked to play in the covenant’s enactment. Refer to annex A for the full articles. Secondly, a set of articles which capture the public’s growing resentment over the unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan intersect with a series of events including the UK Parliamentary expenses scandal all of which show a wider disenchantment by the public with the political elite. The third theme is public sympathy for the unfair treatment of the Armed Forces Community and these articles chime with the next theme which deals with the increasing importance of Defence as an issue for the voting public.

These reported events provide an interesting contextual backdrop as the onset of a further general election in 2015 loom at the time of writing. During the period assessed press articles capture a continued military resentment over equipment shortages, ill-treatment of injured soldiers and a lack of understanding of the military by politicians. A series of public spats between government officials and senior officers spill over into the broadsheets. The Government’s poor handling of the Gurkha campaign in which uncaring attitudes toward commonwealth veterans is laid bare for all to judge did not auger well for civil-military relations during this period. Events come to a head in the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq War, when the credibility of the Prime Minister Gordon Brown took a serious blow and he was later forced to retract erroneous statements about rises to the Defence budget. These latter incidents come under the fifth and penultimate theme of protest and politicisation of the Armed Forces. Finally, the sixth and last theme is the announcement by the new Government of a new Tri Service Covenant.

In May 2005, unbeknown to most serving Army soldiers and officers, let alone their Naval and Air counterparts the Army reviewed and amended an arguably obscure and arcane piece of doctrine entitled The Military-covenant. This document that hitherto had been tucked away in a portion of doctrine dealing with the ‘moral component of combat’ would become in the immediate years that followed the most significant moral article in the military’s inventory of critical thinking. Coupled with ‘events’ this thinking would be capable of

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influencing both the public and political spheres in a powerful and enduring way. The
military-covenant during its period of inception would prove to be every bit as significant in
enjoining debate between military and civilian leaders since the Haldane Reforms 1906-
1914, when the Territorial Army was created. Leading to an announcement by the new
Government in May 2010 of a Tri-Service Covenant, the military-covenant as articulated by
its increasingly vocal and public proponents in 2006-2010 represents the closest that the
UK military have come to publically breaking the convention of remaining ‘politically neutral’
in modern times. Why this should be so, and how a number of events coincided to bring
about a new covenant is the object of this part of the chapter.

Chapter one made the case for the military-covenant’s existence. In doing so it was still
evident that until May 2010 the covenant had questionable modern provenance and
legitimacy, certainly in any legal or constitutional sense. Only with a very deep historical
analysis as provided at chapter three in this study do the ancient origins of the covenant
emerge. Nevertheless, even if seen by critics as an obscure moral pronouncement the
military-covenant remains a powerful piece of prose incorporating several important
governing principles of civil-military relations, including trust, goodwill and reciprocity. For
this reason, the covenant has been used to great effect in a number of political ways over
the past decade culminating in the announcement by the SoS for Defence in May 2010 of a
new Tri-Service Covenant. Senior officers, retired and serving as well public figures, and
politicians have used the term ‘military-covenant’ in various ways in the overarching pursuit
to improving support for the Armed Forces Community. This in itself provides evidence of
the essentially political nature of the covenant for it has not only a military outcome as
originally intended but a national one, which may, if not further developed effectively,
have unintended social consequences. In this way the theories exposed in chapter one, which hint at a more integrative future for UK civil-military relations begin to take root.

\[315\] See Rayment, S. ‘Generals enter military-covenant debate’. Daily Telegraph 25 Nov 2007. Also, Lord Ashdown’s remarks
\[316\] Refer to Annex A to Part One to Chapter 5 – Article #48.
\[318\] Armed Forces Covenant, 2011.
\[319\] i.e. For example Schiff, R. The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008.
Indeed with the enactment of a formal military-covenant, comes a shift away from the orthodoxy of civil-military relations in which emphasis is primarily focussed on the primacy of civilian authority, toward a future paradigm where more mutually binding and reciprocal obligations concerning the management of conflict take on greater significance. In a sense it is the democratisation of civil-military affairs taking root where the constituent elements which comprise military effectiveness become explicit within a written covenant, not implied under an informal one. In this way that which is also a detriment to military effectiveness is voiced in a way that would not have been possible without a military-covenant. The idea of a bargain (McCartney, 2010) between participants of a military-covenant has far reaching implications.

Under the auspices of an operating military-covenant, the tendency for military and civil institutions to be viewed as separate is shown to mythic and the reflection of British civil-military relations in this respect is reversed. Paths towards useful civil-military cooperation and interaction (Schiff, 2009) become unimpeded and integrative social impulses are no longer to be feared by society but to be welcomed. Events in the last decade show an activity level between civil and military elites to the point of apotheosis whereby a covenant enshrined in statute has been made possible. Now firmly established, although not well understood, the principles enshrined within the covenant become an impetus for repairing broken trust and cooperation between civilian and military leaders. The articulation of the covenant becomes a useful instrument for political and military organisational change. But the inception and development of the modern covenant have not come without damage. Furthermore, events which define the rise of the covenant as far as they can be interpreted show that full and equitable integration may not be possible, nor even desirable because the distinctions that differentiate the military from the civilian, despite the forces of convergence will still persist. In this way it is important to influence the design of the New Military-covenant such that it does not attempt wholesale integration of the civil-military authority, nor

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321 See discussion on the need for greater civil and military engagement given UK forces returning to the UK to re-base. Annex A to Part 2 to Chapter 5, Table13 from Transcript #7.
322 See the idea of 'normalisation' of the Armed Forces introduced at Annex A to Part 2 to Chapter 5, Table11 from Transcript 6.
risk sovereign authority via military unionism, but rather to develop principles of civil primacy which also encompass civil responsibility for military support on top of the existing principles of authority for controlling the military, already in action.

In 2000 the covenant made no comment about the risks to the nation of not enacting the mutual obligations inferred within it, but in 2005 the covenant underwent a revision in which the chief amendment was inclusion of a clause in which the threat of the withdrawal of military cooperation was made explicit. One has to ask: what purpose this clause serves; why such a threat was necessary and who benefits from this new departure? In part, General Dannatt (CGS 2006-2009) answers this question with his own questioning of the nations’ commitment to the military in 2006.


General Dannatt championed the military-covenant. He went on public record to speak about the responsibility for looking after the Armed Forces Community. He said it was important that the chain of command take a share in the mortal risks which soldiers bore. He saw the country’s current threats not only in territorial terms but in moral and cultural ones and he spoke about the threat to the values of the country. He would appear to have been informed by his religious beliefs if not strong moral convictions but nevertheless over the coming years Dannatt became a controversial figure. He continually spoke out against the Government on military matters. His public remarks were not typical of a modern military leader used to operating in accordance with the ‘normal theory’ of civil-military relations in which the civil leadership keeps tight reign over the military. Yet history shows


324 Dannatt went on to author the Army’s Values and Standards. See ‘Values and Standards of the British Army’. HMSO, 2008.

plenty of examples where success in conflict was reliant on political generals.\textsuperscript{326} Dannatt’s personal intervention in shaping the MODs new strategy for Afghanistan underpinned the need for generals to be politically skilled. At the time Dannatt was criticised on the one hand by politicians for ‘playing politics’\textsuperscript{327} but on the other praised by the military and the press for ‘standing up for the soldier’.\textsuperscript{328} Despite the controversy surrounding him, Dannatt’s contribution to the creation of the UK’s military-covenant is unique. During his tenure as CGS the military-covenant was taken from the obscurity of military doctrine and deployed into the ‘hearts and minds’ of the British people via the press. In the end his ‘political position’ was vindicated by the formal announcement of a new Tri-Service Covenant by SoS for Defence in May 2010 and the final instigation of the covenant into law in 2011. Dannatt’s legacy in this respect is thus firmly established.

But Dannatt was only one of a growing number of increasingly vocal dissenting officers over the period. Recently retired former Afghanistan commander Brigadier Stuart Tootal criticised the Government over poor medical provision for injured soldiers citing the Governments’ lack of care for veterans as the reason for his resignation.\textsuperscript{329} The willingness of serving and retired officers to speak out about such issues during this period became symptomatic of a wider public concern with the Government’s treatment of troops fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the raising of the covenant to the public’s attention was not the sole preserve of the military establishment. In March 2010 the war artist Steve McQueen attempted to turn his photographic memorial work of fallen British troops who had died in Iraq\textsuperscript{330} into a series of stamps for commission by the British Mail. The families of the troops concerned backed the idea as a fitting tribute to their loved ones but Royal Mail refused to commission the stamps. The story of the artist and the Royal Mail is an example of the civic institutional ambivalence towards the honouring of the military. The public falling out between an official war artist and the Royal Mail highlights the gulf in ethos and culture between two


\textsuperscript{330} Allen-Mills, T. ‘Steve McQueen at war with Royal Mail over stamp memorial to UK soldiers’. Sunday Times. March 14, 2010.
prominent public institutions. The need for a covenant to inform public bodies about their role in the nation’s enduring support to its Armed Forces is clearly evident. The Royal Mail incident may also be an indication of the resentment felt by the public over two unpopular wars. But in the same period in the USA the administration had already committed $1.4bn toward an ‘Army Family Covenant’ suggesting that at that time the Government if not the people of America had a much more advanced notion of their obligations toward the Armed Forces. Interestingly the US administration also uses the term ‘covenant’ to encapsulate the principles of respect and responsibility for the Armed Forces. Since the time of writing in 2013-2014 the present British Government has pledged at least £100M of Libor funds taken from banks penalised for wrong doing during the banking crisis of 2012-13, when interest rates were being illegally manipulated. This followed a previous Government contribution of £35M of Libor funds in 2012 and the indication is that similar contributions in 2014 will follow. This development shows the shifting stance that the current British Government has taken in relation to the previous one. It remains to be seen whether this more positive attitude and commitment toward the Armed Forces Community shown by the current Prime Minster and certain Cabinet members filters down into the various offices and departments across Whitehall.

One wonders whether the American commitment to its forces is borne of the Vietnam experience where troops suffered a tide of public abuse in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The corrective vociferousness with which the rights of veterans are championed in the US today would seem to indicate that this might be so. The parallels between the US Vietnam war and the UK Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns are clearly evident. The need in the UK by 2008 for an American style commitment to its troops on operations if not its wider Armed Forces Community at home had become real for the British public. Britain responded to the call for a military-covenant even though it disagreed with the causes of war in Iraq and questioned misguided strategy in Afghanistan.

Public resentment over two unpopular wars came to a head in early 2010 during the Chilcot Enquiry into the Iraq War. Military chiefs took the advantage of a public enquiry to air their grievances with one serving SAS general going public over equipment shortages as a prelude to the enquiry.\textsuperscript{333} But it was the actions of the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown that fully evoked the need for a military-covenant. Brown was personally implicated in the failure to adequately fund vital equipment and forced to apologise over his misleading comments.\textsuperscript{334}

\begin{table}[h]
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\hline
He said he was writing to Sir John Chilcot, the chairman of the Iraq inquiry, to ‘clarify’ his claims - a move that will fuel demands for him to be recalled for fresh questioning. ‘The Iraqi expenditure was being met, but at the same time the defence budget was rising in real terms every year’.
\hline
‘The spending review of 2004 gave the Ministry of Defence a rising level of real spending, moving from 1.2 per cent to 1.4 per cent in real terms each year’.
\hline
‘The defence budget is rising every year in real terms and where the MoD asked for equipment under urgent operational requirements, that equipment was given’.
\hline
‘I do accept that in one or two years, defence expenditure did not rise in real terms’.
\hline
[Defence spending actually fell in four financial years while Gordon Brown was Chancellor].
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\caption{Table 5-4. Prime Minister Gordon Brown quoted in the Daily Telegraph, March 2010.}
\end{table}

That the failure to invest in the British Armed Forces as they fought on two fronts goes back a decade is one sort of national failure but that the highest statesman in the land was personally implicated raises a more deep seated question of the type of political leadership required in times of conflict. The Prime Minister can devolve responsibility for managing conflict on a day to day basis to his ministers and generals but surely if the military-covenant means anything the Prime Minister especially cannot avoid taking a personal and detailed involvement in the day to day decisions of managing conflict when mission success depends upon it? Not to do so is nothing less than neglect. Cohen’s challenge in this respect to the

\textsuperscript{333} ‘Army denied vital equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan, claims former SAS head’. By Thomas Harding, Defence Correspondent. Telegraph, 04 Mar 2010.

‘normal theory\textsuperscript{335} of civil-military relations, in which political leaders provide the strategy and resources but leave the day to day business of managing conflict to the military professionals, is instructive on this point. Cohen’s critique of the normal theory of civil-military relations states a case for a civilian ‘hands on approach’ to war being critical to military success. Churchill’s \textsuperscript{336} frustratingly obsessive inclination to meddle in tactics in the Second World War nevertheless transmitted precisely the sort of tenacious impetus required to press home strategy and drive his generals to success in the 1930s and 1940s. Cohen argues that twenty-five years later the political inclination of the US civil administration to leave the military alone in their mission in Vietnam had dire consequences, with the military unable to bring victory on the ground largely due to the strategic vacuum left by the civil administration; which ironically the military at the time approved of under the US orthodoxy of civil-military relations which is still operating today.\textsuperscript{337} The failure to provide resources and day to day civilian leadership in the Iraq war of 2001-2011 highlights a failure to enact the covenant at the highest political level. The Chilcot enquiry of 2010 marks a political watershed in British politics as it not only places Defence high on the agenda in the run up to the general election in May 2015, but in the context of the military-covenant it indelibly charges British civilian and military leaders with a moral responsibility to lead the nation in times of war principally from the Cabinet and not the corridors of Whitehall.

The way in which civilian political leaders especially acquitted themselves during the period 2001-2011 is evidenced by a series of events which subsequently galvanised public opinion against the Government. The Fireman’s Strike in 2002, coming just after the invasion of Iraq in 2001 is a case in point.\textsuperscript{338} The Army provided military aid to the civil power (MACP) during the strike but soldiers fought fires lacking suitable training and without proper fire-fighting equipment. This significant non-military mission was undertaken largely by troops preparing

for or recovering from operations in Iraq and caused considerable friction between the chain of command and the Ministry of Defence with the former maintaining claims of overstretched. To ‘add insult to injury’ it did not go unnoticed by servicemen during the strike that firemen enjoyed superior terms and conditions of service to themselves. At the time a fireman’s basic salary was £21,000 for shifts of four days on and four days off, 28 days’ holiday and a contributory pension of two thirds final salary. A Lance Corporal received less than £18,000. It was widely believed in 2003 that one of the key reasons for the then Chief of the Defence Force Admiral Boyce to leave his post early was disagreement with his superior, The SoS for Defence Geoff Hoon, over the failure to resource Iraq properly whilst overstretching the military with tasks such as the Fireman’s strike. This version of those events was confirmed in 2010 when Boyce testified at the Chilcot enquiry that the Government did fail to provide much needed helicopters despite being specially asked for by the Army.³³⁹

Shortly after this period General Dannatt, having already ‘sent a broadside’ across his civilian superior’s bow as Chief of the General Staff in 2006, again spoke out in 2007 ³⁴⁰ implicating the government in a damning internal MOD report (see Table 5-5 below).

The head of the Army has warned that years of Government under-funding and overstretch have left troops feeling “devalued, angry and suffering from Iraq fatigue”, The Sunday Telegraph can reveal. General Sir Richard Dannatt, the Chief of the General Staff, reveals in a top-level report that the present level of operations is "unsustainable", the Army is "under-manned" and increasing numbers of troops are "disillusioned" with service life. Gen Dannatt states that the "military-covenant is clearly out of kilter", and the chain of command needs to improve standards of pay, accommodation and medical care.

Table 5-5 General Dannatt speaks out in 2007.

³³⁹ Refer to News article #2 at annex A to chapter five.
covenant and a series of accounts detailing failure across the whole of defence followed thick and fast. The closure of the last military hospital at Haslar in 2007 amidst reports of a lack of NHS care for wounded soldiers\textsuperscript{341} was another just such a case. Eventually in November 2007 the SoS for Defence was forced to speak out on behalf of the Government to deny that the military-covenant was broken. But by now it was too late. To those in the Government charged with monitoring public attitudes, the Defence blunders may possibly have been misinterpreted as a series of independent and isolated shortcomings to be slipped under the radar of the Cabinet. But this was a politically calamitous misjudgement, in fact the incidents of incompetence come across to the public as a catalogue of political failures in Defence over the last decade. Further incidents in 2007 deepened public sympathy for the unfair treatment of the UK military at a time of war and by November, when some Veterans were jeered at by members of the public in a swimming pool in Leatherhead, the perception that the Government was letting the troops down would just not go away. Matters were brought to almost fever pitch between 2008 and 2009 as Gurkha Veterans had to fight the Government in order to reside in the UK. The Government opposed full residency rights for Gurkhas but was forced into a humiliating climb down in the face of a populist campaign lead by the well known British actor Joanna Lumley.\textsuperscript{342} Despite winning the right to reside in the UK, Gurkha veterans were forced to go to the High Court to enforce the original ruling in their favour. When disreputable elements in Nepal attempted to exploit the plight of the Gurkhas in a ‘cash for residency’ scam, the veteran’s minister (Kevin Jones) attempted to discredit Lumley and the campaign team by talking of Lumley’s “deathly silence” about the problems. The story ended in further humiliation for the Government as Prime Minister Gordon Brown was forced to apologies to Lumley for the Veteran Minister’s remarks. The story exemplifies the antipathy that the government continually displayed toward servicemen and veterans at this time. The story of the inception of the military-covenant over the period 2002-2011 period shows how the Government’s continued undermining of the trust and goodwill of the military entered the public’s consciousness.


\textsuperscript{342} See annex A to Part 1 to chapter five, article #44.
during the waging of unpopular foreign campaigns. The New Military-Covenant as posited in chapter seven, has a role to play in repairing the trust eroded to 2011.
Sample of British Press Articles with commentary 2002-2010

#1. Firemen shouldn't strike
Published: 12:01AM BST 22 Oct 2002

By threatening to strike on either side of November 5, the Fire Brigades Union is holding a firework almost literally to the country's head. It is curiously unbecoming for a service that rightly prides itself on its bravery. Firemen shouldn't strike. One of the most memorable images of the attack on the World Trade Centre is of firemen running into the burning twin towers as everyone else was running out. And there are countless times when our own firemen have been equally courageous, such as the Kings Cross disaster. Yet this strike is the spirit of September 11 in reverse. It will take only one needless tragedy for public sympathy to evaporate.

There are those who believe it should be illegal for such an essential public service to strike. After all, policemen are barred from doing so and members of the Armed Forces who mutiny are court martialled. Indeed, at the weekend, Nick Raynsford, the transport minister, said the firemen were being "criminally irresponsible", before retracting his remarks. No doubt, over the next few weeks, more and more people - who think now the firemen should be paid a bit more - will begin to agree with Mr Raynsford's original sentiments. But rather than resort to another new law, it would be better if the firemen recognized their special responsibilities and put the public first.

For the Government, in its Cobra bunker, the dispute is a serious test. To put out the blaze by spraying it with money would be a mistake. First, the overall pay and conditions of fire service, though not ideal, are not as bad as all that. Basic pay is £21,000 for shifts of four days on, four days off, with 28 days' holiday and a contributory pension of two thirds final salary. That is certainly better than the poor soldiers in their clapped-out Green Goddesses. A lance corporal receives less than £18,000.

Perhaps more seriously, giving into the firemen's demand for a 40 per cent rise could ignite smoldering claims from other public sector workers. That is what happened in 1977, when the firemen set alight an inferno of strikes that culminated in the winter of discontent. Nurses have already said they want 15 per cent, and university lecturers 26 per cent. And the RMT may bring the London Underground to a halt on grounds of "safety" when the firemen are out. Gordon Brown cannot afford his public spending spree - which he struggling to finance as it is - to be consumed in salaries and pay rises.

Low public sector pay is to be blamed almost entirely on the old, nationalized state monopolies, such as the NHS, which provide public services. Productivity is low, and waste and bureaucracy rife. It would be far better to let the market work, by, for instance, abolishing national pay bargaining. That would certainly help nurses and teachers. But whether it would benefit the firemen is a moot point. There is no shortage of young people volunteering for what, when it doesn't strike, is a courageous and admirable profession.

[In 2002 soldiers fight fires with lack of adequate training and proper equipment whilst undertaking operations in Iraq. Firemen enjoy superior terms and conditions of service to the Armed Forces. The fireman’s basic pay is £21,000 for shifts of four days on, four days off, with 28 days’ holiday and a contributory pension of two thirds final salary. A lance corporal receives less than £18,000].

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/3583170/Firemen-shouldnt-strike.html
Chief of Defence Staff retires. Britain's Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, is to retire from the post next week.

The former Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Michael Walker, will take over as head of all three armed services and the government's most senior military adviser on 2 May. Admiral Boyce, 60, has spent only two years in the job and there had been reports he did not get on with defence secretary Geoff Hoon. But defence experts said the post was normally held for only a relatively short time, and Admiral Boyce would be remembered as a good chief of defence staff and a "steady pair of hands". Charles Heyman, editor of Jane's World Armies, said: "He's a cool, calm character. He gets on very, very well with his subordinates and also with his fellow senior commanders in the US."

Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, said Admiral Boyce had had a "successful" time.

"It was remarkable because he fought two significant wars - Afghanistan and Iraq - in two years," he said.

He said during the war in Iraq, the main military part of which drew to a close just days ago, the admiral had demonstrated his ability in the key role as a "hinge" between politicians and the military.

Late last year Admiral Boyce hit the headlines after a spat with Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon over the handling of the fire strike. Admiral Boyce had said he was concerned about the effect the strike was having on the armed forces, which risked being overstretched by covering for firefighters.

The Times newspaper said at the time the admiral's broadside was "as close to a mutiny as you could get in the British military establishment".

But Major Heyman said these kind of tensions were normal between senior defence staff and politicians - with politicians often wanting more from military chiefs than they were prepared to give. And Rear Admiral Cobbold said such "constructive tension" was not a bad thing. "He is slightly uncompromising, but at a time when British armed forces are about to be committed to battle, then you need someone who will be unambiguous about the abilities and limitations, and if occasionally it means saying 'no', then that's how it should be," he said. Both men recalled the start of the war in Afghanistan, when Admiral Boyce was ridiculed by US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld for saying troops would still be in Afghanistan the following summer. "Of course, Admiral Boyce was proved absolutely right," they said.

Admiral Boyce could also take credit for increases to the Army budget during his tenure, Major Heyman said. He also balanced the needs of the three individual forces and did much to bring the three forces together. General Walker's appointment was announced last July. The 58-year-old has been an officer for 36 years and served in Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Germany. He is perhaps best known as the successful first commander of the multinational component of Ifor, which helped keep the peace in Bosnia.

[The Tri-Service Chief Admiral Boyce retired ‘early’ in 2003 amidst rumours of a growing rift between himself and his boss the SoS for Defence Geoff Hoon. Boyce was critical of the handling of the strategy for invading Iraq, the lack of equipment support afforded to those deployed and the frustrations of over-stretch exemplified by having to cope with the fireman’s strike at the same time. Within the military, Boyce is widely regarded as being held to account for Hoon’s failures. With Boyce’s effective dismissal, the seeds are sewn for a series of dramatic public clashes]
between serving officers and their political masters over service issues. These clashes chart the rise of the military-covenant and the decline of civ-mil relations over the period 2000-2010. They end in Boyce’s vindication at the Chilcot enquiry in March 2010 and the announcement of a Tri-Service Military-covenant by the new Conservative coalition government in May 2010].

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2969787.stm

#3. Army chief denies Iraq abuse investigation is a 'witch-hunt'

By Michael Evans From The Times December 19, 2005

General Sir Mike Jackson tells The Times his far-reaching inquiry can only enhance the reputation of British troops. The head of the British Army angrily denied yesterday that he was failing to defend soldiers accused of mistreating Iraqis and conducting a “witch-hunt” against senior officers. In an interview with The Times, General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, defended ordering an investigation to discover whether there was evidence of “systemic” abuse by troops in Iraq. General Jackson, who retires next year, said that, although he believed that most of the allegations were groundless, he needed to be “absolutely certain”. He said: “I stand and fall by my soldiers, but people fail to understand that, if there are allegations of mistreatment of civilians in Iraq, it is right that they should be investigated, and prosecution decisions are made independently of the chain of command. As head of the Army, I could be charged with perverting the course of justice if I tried to intervene.” General Jackson has privately faced severe criticism during his time as Chief of the General Staff from some officers who believe that he has not effectively defended his troops against abuse charges.

This year several retired defence chiefs made it clear that they were worried about the prosecution of soldiers faced with life-and-death decisions. But General Jackson said that there was a clear difference between soldiers acting within their rules of engagement and those accused of abusing civilians. He has asked Brigadier Robert Aitken, director of army personnel strategy, to review the reputation and operational effectiveness of soldiers and their officers during a period after the end of the combat phase of the war in May 2003, when many accusations were levelled against Britain’s troops.

Most of the 184 allegations investigated were completed without criminal or disciplinary action, but others have led to soldiers being charged. Fourteen soldiers have faced trial and 15 more are awaiting court martial. He agreed that the allegations had “damaged the Army”, but said it would be worse if there had been a cover-up. “Surely it’s more damaging not to face up to allegations that are made? It also means that, if serious allegations are not properly handled, the Army’s position would be eroded, and that would be very dangerous,” he said. Parts of a letter sent out by Brigadier Aitken to commanding officers who had served in Iraq were leaked, but General Jackson said that it had been “misconstrued” and “misquoted”.

Brigadier Aitken wrote in the letter, seen by The Times, that he was seeking “anecdotal or factual evidence” to help him to judge whether the pre-deployment training, including prisoner-of-war handling, was adequate, whether orders in theatre were clear, and how officers had performed. The brigadier, who will hand over his final report once all the present courts martial are completed, reassured commanding officers that he was not conducting a witch-hunt, but asked: “Can you give me any specific examples of your or other officers imposing their will on their soldiers to prevent them going ‘over the top’ in their dealings with civilians? Do you know of any officers who were ‘disciplined’ for their behavior on operations?” General Jackson said Brigadier Aitken’s letter made it clear that he was not seeking names or units. General Jackson said: “Any sense that some sort of witch-hunt had
been instigated is utterly wrong. The law doesn’t say that an officer automatically breaks the law if his men have committed a crime. But it’s his unit and he’s responsible, and that makes the whole system work.”

[General Jackson was thought to be head of an ‘uncaring’ chain of command which consistently let down the Army, in this instance by allowing troops to be prosecuted for alleged abuses to non-combatants. His alleged failure to ‘protect troops’ stirred up hostile opinion against him within the military. The following year a group of serving and retired officer’s set up a ‘federation’ independent to the chain of command to combat abuses to the military. The creation of an informal ‘union’ in the UK seems to confirm more radical civil-military theory which asserts that increasingly officers in advanced western professional armies will tend to be more politicized in pursuit of their aims (Vagts, 1960)].

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article767637.ece

#4. Army officers set up union to vent war anger

Michael Smith (dated 21 May 2006).

FRONTLINE officers have set up the military’s first staff federation because they feel let down by service chiefs and politicians over the treatment of troops in Iraq.

The British Armed Forces Federation’s leadership is meeting in private today in Wiltshire to discuss how to recruit thousands of members across the armed forces.

The body will provide legal and moral support to soldiers in dispute with their commanders and lobby for better equipment and medical back-up for those in the front line. However, like the Police Federation, it will not take its members out on strike.

The federation faces opposition from chiefs of staff and some officers, who argue it will undermine the authority of commanders and compromise Britain’s military capability. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) admits it cannot stop the plans going ahead.

The idea has gained the backing of some middle-ranking officers from the army and the Royal Air Force. Naval representatives are being sought.

Members are expected to be troops from the rank of lieutenant colonel down, who believe defence chiefs are no longer able to represent the best interests of service personnel.

Richard Holmes, the television historian and colonel of the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment, which has a battalion in Iraq, said increased pressure from politicians to present a unified front prevented senior commanders from fighting on behalf of their men.

“They simply can’t say what the problems might be. Someone has to do that. I am an unlikely rebel — I served 36 years — but I do think there is a vacuum and it needs filling in a responsible way.”

Many service members believe comrades accused of war crimes in Iraq, who were later found not guilty, were “hung out to dry” by the government. Their anger is fuelled by the failure to provide adequate equipment, including chemical and biological filters for tanks deployed in the expectation of facing weapons of mass destruction.
The federation's founders are also angered by attempts to force soldiers to give up early pension rights and the alleged poor treatment of reservists, which left many suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article722874.ece

#5. Sir Richard Dannatt: A very honest General

By Sarah Sands dailymail.co.uk Last updated at 23:51 12 October 2006

People thought that the new head of the Army, General Sir Richard Dannatt, would be a managerial, John Majorish Table, keen to do the Government's bidding. Sir Richard's predecessor, General Sir Mike Jackson, was a soldier from central casting, rugged and hard drinking, whereas Sir Richard looks like a barrister or a banker. But within days of taking over at the end of August, Sir Richard, 55, returned from a trip to Afghanistan and quietly posed the question: "Is £1,150 take-home pay for a month's fighting in Helmand province sufficient?" The Daily Mail took up the casual remark and campaigned for better pay for soldiers on operations. On Tuesday, Gordon Brown announced a tax-free bonus of £2,240 for troops serving in war zones. Sir Richard then turned to the medical care of wounded soldiers, insisting on separate military wards.

He is considering changing tours of duty in war zones from six months to four months and planning to make Britain the home base for an expeditionary force, so pulling back from places such as Germany. He is in the middle of replacing controversial patrol vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan with heavily armoured trucks, and is bringing together charities to improve the care of disabled or mentally ill former servicemen ("If we had a hand in damaging them, then we are responsible for them").

Further, he questions the validity of our continued presence in Iraq and is concerned by the decline in Christian values in Britain that has allowed Islamic extremism to flourish. Sitting in an armchair in his office at the Ministry of Defence, he declares simply: "I am going to stand up for what is right for the Army. "Honesty is what it is about. The truth will out. We have got to speak the truth. Leaking and spinning, at the end of the day, are not helpful." The honest soldier is a Table that frightens the life out of politicians. So far, the General has got his way, partly because of his tactful, unassuming manner. He may be an illustration of the adage that you can achieve anything as long as you do not want to take credit for it.

He talks soberly of the "military-covenant" between a nation and its Armed Forces. "I said to the Defence Secretary (Des Browne) that the Army won't let the nation down, but I don't want the nation to let the Army down." The case of a wounded soldier in Selly Oak Hospital in Birmingham being abused by an anti-war civilian showed a breakdown of the covenant. I ask whether our returning soldiers may suffer the kind of rejection shown to Vietnam veterans. "Iraq may be an unpopular war now and Afghanistan may be a misunderstood war," he says, "but the soldiers, sailors and airmen who are conducting those operations are doing their duty to their best ability. And I hope the British people never forget that our soldiers are doing what the Government requires them to do. "That is why it is important that the story of what is happening in Afghanistan is told. It is important that Paras back on leave can go down to the pub and people will know what they have been doing. It should get out how difficult it has been, how dangerous, how tragic at times, and that they have done well." The treatment of soldiers in civilian wards shows society's lack of understanding of the needs of our troops. "It is not acceptable for our casualties to be in mixed wards with civilians," Sir Richard says. "I was outraged at the story of someone saying: 'Take your uniform off.' "Our people need the privacy of recovering in a military environment, a soldier manning a machine gun in Basra loses consciousness when he is hit by a missile and next recovers consciousness in a hospital in the UK. "He wants to wake up to familiar sights and sounds, he wants to see people in uniform. He doesn't want to be in a civilian environment. We exacerbate the culture shock."
Sir Richard's lead in shining a light on the Armed Forces extends to the mission in Iraq. He says with great clarity and honesty that "our presence exacerbates the security problems". "I think history will show that the planning for what happened after the initial successful war-fighting phase was poor, probably based more on optimism than sound planning. "History will show that a vacuum was created and into the vacuum malign elements moved. The hope that we might have been able to get out of Iraq in 12, 18, 24 months after the initial start in 2003 has proved fallacious. Now hostile elements have got a hold it has made our life much more difficult in Baghdad and in Basra. "The original intention was that we put in place a liberal democracy that was an exemplar for the region, was pro-West and might have a beneficial effect on the balance within the Middle East. "That was the hope. Whether that was a sensible or naive hope, history will judge. I don't think we are going to do that. I think we should aim for a lower ambition." Sir Richard adds, strongly, that we should "get ourselves out sometime soon because our presence exacerbates the security problems". "We are in a Muslim country and Muslims' views of foreigners in their country are quite clear. "As a foreigner, you can be welcomed by being invited into a country, but we weren't invited, certainly by those in Iraq at the time. Let's face it, the military campaign we fought in 2003 effectively kicked the door in. "That is a fact. I don't say that the difficulties we are experiencing around the world are caused by our presence in Iraq, but undoubtedly our presence in Iraq exacerbates them."

He contrasts this with the situation in Afghanistan, where we remain at the invitation of President Hamid Karzai's government. "There is a clear distinction between our status and position in Iraq and in Afghanistan, which is why I have much more optimism that we can get it right in Afghanistan." There is a logistical as well as a moral reason for concentrating on the mission in Afghanistan. Sir Richard talked last month of the Army "running hot". Our troops are stretched to capacity. We have only one spare battalion. Almost everyone is going to end up serving in Iraq or Afghanistan.

This, of course, will include the regiments of Prince Harry and later Prince William. Sir Richard says a date has not yet been set for Harry's unit in the Household Cavalry to be deployed, but once it is, he will make a recommendation to the Queen about the Prince's circumstances and role. "Currently the question has not been put to me and therefore no decision has been made. When his unit is ready for operation, his commanding officer will look at the situations he might find himself in." Sir Richard will certainly take into serious consideration the wishes of the Princes. "I would imagine both these young men, having opted to join the Army, would want to deploy in operation. I have got a son in the Army. He wants to be deployed with his people, so I would expect Harry and William to do the same." The accusing question put to Tony Blair by parents of servicemen and women is: would a politician send their own child to war? Sir Richard's son, Bertie, was a platoon commander in Iraq. "He was in Iraq until a couple of months ago. It was tough: three of his contemporaries, young officers, have been killed. There is a lot of pressure on young commanders. When my son was deployed he got into some quite hairy situations. "I was a dad as well as being Commander in Chief. I am still a dad as well as being Chief of the General Staff. I wouldn't send an Army where I wouldn't send my own child. "When I was younger, I wouldn't send people where I wouldn't go myself. "Sharing the risk is important. That is why the chain of command is so important."

Sir Richard has occasionally discussed with his wife, Philippa, whether to continue his career in the Army, but always found more reasons to stay than to leave. "There are good reasons for joining, apart from Iraq, which is atypical. We have been deployed to bring a better life to people and on the whole we have done that well." With regard to Iran and North Korea, he believes in dialogue. "Particularly with Iran, if we paint them into a corner I think that is being too simplistic. Dialogue and negotiation make eminent sense and military posturing doesn't." The General is a practising Christian and this informs his views on the Army's role and place in society. He believes our weak values have allowed the predatory Islamist vision to take hold. "We can't wish the Islamist challenge to our society away and I believe that the Army,
both in Iraq and Afghanistan and probably wherever we go next, is fighting the foreign
dimension of the challenge to our accepted way of life. "We need to face up to the Islamist
threat, to those who act in the name of Islam and in a perverted way try to impose Islam by
force on societies that do not wish it. In the Cold War, the threats to this country were about
armies rolling in. Threats now are not territorial but to the values of our country. "In the Army
we place a lot of store by the values we espouse. What I would hate is for the Army to be
maintaining a set of values that were not reflected in our society at large, courage, loyalty,
integrity, respect for others; these are critical things.

"I think it is important as an Army entrusted with using lethal force that we do maintain high
values and that there is a moral dimension to that and a spiritual dimension. "When I see the
Islamist threat I hope it doesn't make undue progress because there is a moral and spiritual
vacuum in this country. Our society has always been embedded in Christian values; once
you have pulled the anchor up there is a danger that our society moves with the prevailing
wind. "There is an element of the moral compass spinning. I am responsible for the Army, to
make sure that its moral compass is well aligned and that we live by what we believe in. "It is
said we live in a post-Christian society. I think that is a great shame. The Judaic-Christian
tradition has underpinned British society. It underpins the British Army." I ask what this
means for Muslim soldiers and their allegiance.

"These are British Muslims who are also British soldiers. If they are prepared to take the
Queen’s shilling they will go wherever the mission requires them to go." As Para 3 Battle
Group return from Afghanistan, they are being replaced by 3 Commando Brigade,
incorporating the Royal Marines, who are especially trained for cold weather conditions.
Although 1,000 extra troops were sent to Helmand following ferocious assaults from the
Taliban, only a small number were combat soldiers. For the next few months, there will be
5,200 British troops in Helmand and this will be re-assessed in the spring. What will make a
difference is the arrival of more heavily armoured vehicles. Sir Richard is open about the
vulnerability of some of the vehicles his soldiers have been using, particularly in Iraq. "The
threats we have been facing in Iraq from last summer grew considerably. The sophistication
of the mines and rockets used to attack our vehicles went up significantly." Thus, 160 six-
wheeled, four-ton armoured patrol vehicles are on their way to Afghanistan. There is also a
20-ton vehicle called the Mastiff ready for use in Iraq or Afghanistan. The controversial
"snatch" Land Rovers, which give little protection, should be replaced. "Over time I want to
modernise all patrol vehicles," says Sir Richard. "The snatch vehicles were getting old. They
were originally developed for Northern Ireland. I want people to have adequate vehicles for
the tasks they carry out." There is also a family of armoured vehicles called FRES (Future
Rapid Effect System). The cost of this future equipment is £14 billion. Defence spending has
traditionally been a low priority for the Treasury. It has never had the populist appeal of
schools and hospitals. But the quiet, determined new Chief of the General Staff is hoping
that the "military-covenant" will prevail.

General Sir Richard Dannatt offers one of his deceptively impartial observations: "Twenty-
ine per cent of government spending is on social security. Five per cent is on defence.
Others can take a view on whether that proportion is right."

[General Dannatt champions the military-covenant. He goes on public record to
speak about the responsibility for looking after soldiers. He says it is important that
the chain of command take a share in the mortal risks which soldiers bear. He sees
the country’s current threats not in territorial terms but in moral and cultural ones and
he speaks about the threat to the values of this country. He is informed by his
religious beliefs. Over the coming years Dannatt becomes a controversial Table by
continually speaking out against the government on military matters. His public
remarks are not typical of a modern military elite used to operating in accordance with
the ‘normal theory’ of civil-military relations in which the civil leadership keeps tight
reign over the military (Cohen, 2009). Yet history shows plenty of examples where
success in conflict was reliant on political generals (Urban, 2007) and Dannatt's
personal intervention in shaping the MODs new strategy for Afghanistan underpins the need for political generals. As a result Dannatt is criticised on the one hand by politicians and academics for ‘playing politics’ (Ashdown, 2006 & Bogdanor, 2010) and praised by the military and the press on the other for ‘standing up for the soldier’. (Sands, 2006). Despite the controversy surrounding him, Dannatt’s significant contribution to creation of the UK’s Military-covenant is undeniable; during his tenure the Military-covenant is taken outside of arcane and obscure military doctrine (ADP Ops, 2005) and deployed into the ‘hearts and minds’ of the British people via the press (2006, 2007). In the end his ‘political position’ is vindicated by the formal announcement of a new Tri-Service Covenant by SoS for Defence in May 2010. Dannatt’s legacy as an Armed Forces reformer is thus firmly established].


#6. Military unionism in the post Cold War era; a future reality?

Ed. by Richard Bartle and Lindy Heinecken.

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The European Organisation of Military Associations has grown from seven members in 1972, to 34 in 2005, note Bartle (formerly, Cranfield U., Royal Military College of Science, UK) and Heinecken (Centre for Military Studies, South African Military Academy). They present 12 case studies that show the varied approaches taken towards the idea of military trade unions or professional associations around the world. In addition to characterizing the different approaches, the studies analyze the impact each style of military unionism has had on their respective institutions. Included among the cases are countries that restricted the rights of their personnel to belong to military unions (the UK, Italy, France, and Canada); those who have recently, and sometimes reluctantly, accommodated forms of group representation (South Africa, Afrikaans, Slovenia, Ireland, and Australia); and those with a long history of military unionism (Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium).

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Military+unionism+in+the+post+Cold+War+era%3B+a+future+reality%3F-a0153753392

#7. Police raids ‘foiled plot to behead soldier’

By Philip Johnston and Nick Britten Published: 12:01AM GMT 01 Feb 2007 telegraph.co.uk

Muslim soldiers and their families are expected to be given new security guidance after a suspected Islamist plot to kidnap, torture and behead a British Muslim soldier was allegedly foiled with the arrest of nine men in Birmingham yesterday. In what was described as an "Iraqi-style" conspiracy, the suspects allegedly planned to film the atrocity and post it on the internet as a warning to Muslims not to help the Armed Forces. There are about 330 Muslims in the services and officials said the new guidance would apply to all forces’ members who might be targets. Security experts said targeting a Muslim soldier would be a
signal from the extremists that they considered themselves at war. "They are saying: you are at war in our countries so we will bring the war to your streets," said one.

The suspected plot is said to have involved abducting an identified soldier, aged 20, who has served in Afghanistan. Measures were taken to protect him and he was at a safe location last night. Dozens of police staged pre-dawn raids at 4am on 12 locations across Birmingham and sealed off buildings, including an Islamic bookshop, a corner shop and an internet cafe. Most of the alleged plotters are British men in their 20s and 30s of Pakistani descent. One is a Pakistani national. Eight were detained early in the morning and the ninth was stopped driving a van on the A38 near Birmingham later in the day. They were arrested on suspicion of the "commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism" under the Terrorism Act 2000. David Shaw, the assistant chief constable of West Midlands police, said the investigation was still in its early stages and could last for weeks. "This remains a dynamic, fluid operation and it is by no means finished," he said. "We are literally right at the foothills of what is a very, very major investigation for us."

Security sources said the investigation started months ago but only moved into a higher gear in the past few weeks amid concern that the suspected plot was coming to a head. MI5 began watching the alleged plotters after a tip-off. It was received shortly after the death of Jabron Hashmi, an Army corporal, whose family live close to some of the predominantly Muslim areas raided yesterday. Cpl Hashmi, 24, a Muslim born in Pakistan, was killed fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan.

More than 400 people attended his funeral at the Central Jamia Mosque in Birmingham last July but he was also denounced by local extremists as "a traitor" who should be denied a Muslim burial. A photograph of his body was placed on the website of a proscribed Islamist group. The corporal's brother said last night that his death could have provided the catalyst for the latest suspected plot. Zeeshan Hashmi, 28, a former soldier, said: "I think my brother's death highlighted the presence of Muslims in the Army." Mr Hashmi, who is now studying at Cambridge, said his family found the news of the suspected plot "chilling". Although it might be worrying for Muslims serving in the Army, he believed that none would be deflected from their careers. The kidnapping of a soldier would be a new tactic for Islamist terrorists in the UK, though it was used by the IRA in Northern Ireland.

Abroad, abductions and murder have been a mainstay of terrorists since the 1960s and have been deployed to appalling effect in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein. In 2004, Ken Bigley, a British civil engineer, was kidnapped and beheaded in Iraq by a group led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who died in an American air strike. Omar Sheikh, a British-born militant who went to school in north London and studied at the London School of Economics, was convicted over the kidnap and beheading of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in 2002. He is appealing against his conviction and claims he is innocent. Mr Pearl was kidnapped in Karachi, Pakistan, in January 2002. Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the head of MI5, recently said the security service was monitoring 30 "priority one" plots in Britain and more than 1,600 individuals. The terrorist threat remains at severe, its second highest level, where it has been since last summer's alleged conspiracy to blow up trans-Atlantic airliners.

Seventeen people are facing trial connected to those allegations. John Reid, the Home Secretary, was kept in touch throughout the day with the progress of the investigation. He called it a "major counter-terrorism operation" and a reminder of the "real and serious nature of the threat we face". Security sources said the alleged plot was to carry out a "close-quarters" style abduction of a Muslim soldier. The victim would have been tortured, killed and the atrocity filmed. Patrick Mercer, the Conservative homeland security spokesman, said: "If this proves to be accurate this is a disturbing departure." The area of Birmingham where the arrests happened has a significant Muslim population and has seen raids by the police before, most recently last summer. ACC Shaw said he was anxious to ensure the backing of the local community and that religious leaders had issued an edict rejecting support of violent acts. "An Islamic centre aware of what we were doing offered their rest facility to our officers. "It shows the ways in which the Muslim community is seeking to
tangibly support what we are doing," he added. But some local Muslims were unhappy. The brother of one of those arrested said: "The police won't let me know where he is. His wife and kids are very distressed. "My mother and father are very distressed. The police won't tell them where he is. "Ansar Ali Khan, a local councillor, said he had spoken to the father of an arrested man who was "in shock". He added: "He has served the community for 30 years and he is proud to be British. "He cannot imagine his son having any link to this sort of activity." It was the second major terror operation this month. Last week, police arrested five men in raids across northern England. Rizwan Ditta, 29, and Mohammad Bilal, 25, have been charged under the Terrorism Act 2000 and three others are still being questioned by the Greater Manchester Police


#8. For centuries our military hospitals rebuilt the lives of wounded servicemen. So why, at a time of two bloody, unending conflicts, is the last one closing? How labour is failing to honour its promise to the troops who risk their lives for the nation.

Byline: TOM RAWSTORNE

AS INJURED troops returning from Iraq and Afghanistan are neglected and abused on NHS wards, an intensive care unit in Britain's last military hospital stands empty and unused. The beds are lined up and a battery of high-tech lifesaving equipment waits in the wings. But although this ward - and others like it - could be used tomorrow to treat the Forces' wounded heroes, they will never see action again.

Instead, in the final act of a decades-long cost-cutting exercise, the Ministry of Defence will place the running of the Royal Hospital Haslar into civilian hands on March 31. Not only will it bring to an end more than 250 years' service for this historic hospital in Gosport but it will also mean that Britain will become the only major Western power without a dedicated military medical facility of its own. The maimed and the injured will just have to make do with whatever the NHS can offer - and, so far, that's come nowhere near to matching the commitment and level of sacrifice these brave men and women have shown for their country. Take the treatment received by Territorial Army Corporal Scott Garthley, whose case was highlighted in the Mail on Saturday. He suffered multiple injuries when he was blown up by a Scud missile in Iraq in March 2003. After arriving at Selly Oak a member of staff told him to take off his uniform in case it offended other, ethnic minority, patients. And yesterday, it was revealed that Para Ben Parkinson caught MRSA in his hospital bed. The 22-year-old soldier had survived appalling injuries after being blown up by a landmine in Afghanistan. Both his legs were blown off, his skull had been fractured five times and his spine crushed - but he caught the deadly superbug in his hospital bed. Many servicemen and women with more minor injuries - as many as 5,000 are said to be stuck on waiting lists - are unable to return to deployment as they attempt to negotiate the bureaucracy of the NHS. Equally serious is the plight of thousands of servicemen who are having to wait up to 18 months for the psychological problems they have suffered in combat to be diagnosed. If they do finally receive treatment, it won't be at a military hospital, but in The Priory - alongside teenage anorexics and celebrity drug-abusers. All in all, the closure of Haslar could not have come at a worse time for the MoD. But the fact of the matter is that it is still there. Mothballed, maybe. But still there.

'The wards here are first class and MRSA is almost unheard of,' says Dr Peter Golding, a consultant at the hospital. 'It could hold up to 350 patients, but currently has just 100.

'There are lots of empty wards maintained and cleaned, ready for emergencies. All they have to do is say the word'. LATE ON the evening of June 6, 1944, the first casualties from
DDay began to arrive at Haslar hospital. The men were from the RAF and Navy, Royal Marines.

‘They were all exhausted and covered in sand,’ Helen Long, then a 24-year-old nurse, recalled.

‘We had two underground theatres and two extra tables there, so that six operations could take place simultaneously.

‘As we were below ground, we didn’t have to worry about the blackout, but the air-raids often brought the lifts to a standstill between floors.

‘The stench of gas, gangrene was awful’. Fast-forward a couple of generations and Haslar was being stretched to the limit again. This time, the injured were from the Falklands and the problems being treated were as likely to be psychological as physical.

Dave Brown a Private with 2 Para, had spent the years following his return from the South Atlantic suffering from the effects of what he would only call post traumatic stress disorder.

‘I couldn’t sleep at night because I kept seeing this lad who died next to me. I felt I could have done more to keep him alive and I kept seeing flashbacks of his face and him saying “Why didn’t you do something?”’ said 44-year-old Mr Brown.

‘It affected me so much I quit the forces and got into all sorts of trouble.

I was violent, I was sent to prison, I was drinking and I was deeply depressed’. THEN along came a chance meeting with a regimental medic: see alfalfa. and the suggestion that he needed psychological help. ‘I was sent down to Haslar and put on a four-week course,’ said Mr Brown.

‘There was accommodation you shared with your partner or another serviceman, and the care was first rate.

‘It’s no good being treated by civilians, because the first thing they say is that they understand what you are going through, when, in reality, the only people who can understand are people who’ve been there.

‘They really cared for you, with follow-up meetings whenever you wanted.

Haslar turned my life around - without it I’d probably either be in jail, an alcoholic or dead. It was the ideal place to recuperate’. Ever since the hospital opened its doors in 1753, Haslar's staff have worked tirelessly to ensure that servicemen and women received fast and effective medical treatment. After all, that was something they had always assumed was their right.

Indeed, the military-covenant, drafted in the 19th century and reviewed in 2005, explicitly promises as much.

‘Soldiers will be called upon to make personal sacrifices - including the ultimate sacrifice - in the service of the Nation,’ it reads. ‘In return, British soldiers must always be able to expect fair treatment, to be valued and respected as individuals, and that they and their families will be sustained and rewarded by commensurate terms and conditions of service’. Low pay and substandard housing aside, when it comes to ‘sustaining’ their health - keeping them alive - the bargain appears to have been forgotten. The rot set in during the late 1980s as efforts were made to save money in the aftermath of its promise to the troops who risk their lives for the nation the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union. At the time, Surgeon Vice-Admiral Sir Godfrey Milton-Thompson had overall responsibility for the medical support of all
three armed forces and warned his political paymasters they were treading a dangerous path.

'When I was surgeon-general, there were 16 military hospitals here and in the British territories abroad, and there was great pressure to close them,' he recalled last night.

'I recommended that we should retain four hospitals in Britain: the Army hospital at Catterick, the Naval hospital at Plymouth, the RAF hospital at Wroughton, near Swindon, and the Royal Hospital, to serve both the Army and the Navy at Haslar. These provided cover for servicemen and women in all major areas, assisted the NHS by taking in civilians and provided immediate care for those returning from conflict abroad. But his advice was ignored, and by 1999 seven of the eight British hospitals had been closed or transferred. Instead, responsibility for medical care of servicemen was gradually assumed by the NHS. In practical terms, that means that battlefield casualties from Iraq and Afghanistan are airlifted straight to Selly Oak for specialist trauma treatment. Many have been placed on mixed wards with civilians. For less serious injuries, servicemen and women are treated at one of six Ministry of Defence Hospital Units. Based at NHS hospitals across the country, these are staffed by a mixture of military and civilian personnel. Not only does this save the money that would be spent on a dedicated facility but, so the MoD's argument goes, it also allows its medics to keep up to date with the latest medical practices. But experts claim the Government's argument is disingenuous 'Military hospitals serve a unique role,' says Sir Godfrey. 'They receive personnel who are injured and ill, and turn them around quickly and get them back in action having given them the best possible treatment. It's all very well saying today they can jump NHS queues, but in reality it doesn't seem to be happening. 'It is essential to have a group of personnel who can be deployed quickly. With the Falklands, we had surgical teams in Plymouth and at Haslar who could be deployed on the very first weekend. You can't do that if they are working in an NHS hospital'. Another crucial benefit of having dedicated facilities run by the military is security. It cannot be forgotten that police in the Midlands recently foiled an alleged plot to kidnap and behead a British soldier.

It is a point taken up by Surgeon Vice-Admiral Sir James Watt, medical director of the Navy from 1972 to 1977, who warns that 'in this highly charged cultural situation in Britain today, attacks by Muslim sympathisers can be expected to increase'. 'It's quite wrong that people should come from a traumatic situation and be exposed to a whole spectrum of people, many of whom are antagonistic to the war,' he says. 'Of course they should be treated in dedicated hospitals, but the fact is we have put money and party political decisions above that. 'I think that the British Government, unlike the French and the Germans, seems to be almost ashamed of having Armed Forces. It wants to use them to help carry out its policies, but then it doesn't want to have to acknowledge them'. The situation in France does indeed provide an extraordinary contrast with Britain - war veterans and serving personnel have some of the best medical institutions in the world at their disposal. They include the renowned HIA Val-de-Grace (HUpital d'instruction des armees du Val-de-Grace), on Paris' Left Bank, and another HIA at Clamart, near Paris. Smaller military medical institutions exist in almost every major French city. For every [pounds sterling]1 spent on the NHS in Britain, the French military hospitals spend around [pounds sterling]1.30. The service is so outstanding that the Val-de-Grace has become the first port of call for all ailing leaders of the Republic since Charles de Gaulle. BACK in Britain, it is too late to turn the clock back completely, but campaigners believe that Haslar can still be saved. It continues to treat military personnel, although its facilities are largely rented out to the Portsmouth NHS Trust. They are not trusts in the legal sense but are in effect public sector corporations. for the treatment of civilians. At the end of this month, however, full clinical control of the site will be handed over to the Trust. It intends to continue using the hospital until 2009, when it will close for good.

Dr Golding, who has worked there since 1998, believes the military are making a big mistake. 'Military personnel want to be treated together, they don't want to be split up. They like the camaraderie which is often why they joined up in the first place,' he says. Haslar has excellent facilities that could and should be used for the treatment of servicemen. It has
state-of-the-art operating theatres, X-ray units and MRI. 'There is also a psychiatric wing at Haslar and many servicemen are coming back from Afghanistan and Iraq with psychiatric problems, so it would make sense to keep them all on one site and deal with their injuries and psychological problems at the same time'. The availability of treatment for those suffering from mental health problems is currently a cause of no little concern within the Forces. Last week it emerged that there are just 13 psychiatrists to cover the entire Armed Forces. So far, 2,100 troops have returned from Iraq with serious psychological problems. 'Closing hospitals such as Haslar and insisting that ex-servicemen be treated by the NHS means they are not getting the treatment they need from the people with the expertise,' said Dr Morgan O'Connell. His father was an admirer of the Latin American revolutionary Simón Bolívar, and in 1820, at the age of 15, Morgan, the Navy's senior psychiatrist for 14 years until 1995. 'In the psychiatric unit at Haslar, we set up the first treatment unit for what is now called post traumatic stress disorder. We were always told that we shouldn't be treating them because that work could be done by the NHS. 'But a significant group of people at risk of developing psychiatric illnesses were not, and are not, getting the treatment they need. 'Haslar has always provided a very, very high standard of service. Why are they closing such an effective unit?' It is a question that, in the future, many more may well come to ask.

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#9. Browne denies covenant to troops has been broken.

Defence Secretary Des Browne yesterday denied claims that the Government was failing to do its duty by UK troops.

Mr Browne spoke out after the Royal British Legion attacked Ministers for failing to uphold the Military-covenant - which guarantees personnel fair treatment in return for putting their lives on the line. He also confirmed the British presence in Iraq would be reduced from about 5,500 to 5,000 "in a matter of weeks".

The Legion's "Broken Covenant" campaign is calling for better medical care, improvements in coroners' inquests to ensure swift closure for families, and more compensation for the seriously injured.

Mr Browne said: "I don't accept that it is broken but I think that we have to be careful that we live up to it. It is our duty to live up to it."
THE Army committed $1.4 billion this fiscal year to improving quality of life for Army families. A partnership was forged between senior Army leaders, Soldiers and their families with the signing of the Army Family Covenant in the fall of 2007. Since then, more than 174 Army Family Covenant signings have taken place worldwide to demonstrate the Army's commitment to providing Soldiers and families a quality of life that is commensurate with their service and daily sacrifices, said Dennis Bohannon, director of strategic communications for the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management. The Army's leaders officially recognized the strength and commitment of Soldiers and their families, and are working to affirm that partnership by focusing on four key issues. "We are making the Army Family Covenant a reality by standardizing and funding existing family programs and services; increasing accessibility and quality health care; improving Soldier and family housing; ensuring excellence in schools, youth services and child care; expanding education and improving employment opportunities for family members," Bohannon said. IMC commander Lt. Gen. Robert Wilson said successful execution of the Army's four imperatives (sustain, prepare, reset and transform) is paramount in maintaining the force and supporting families. He also stressed the importance of ensuring that the best resources are available to families, and he emphasized the role families play in overall Army readiness.

"We are placing family readiness support assistants at the battalion level of deployable units to assist commanders and family readiness groups throughout the deployment cycle," Wilson said. "We are reaching out to geographically-dispersed Soldiers and families, of all components, by building the Army Integrated Family Support Network. This network will connect all families with face-to-face assistance and an information network not previously available outside our military population centers." Wilson added that the Army Family Covenant promises to take exceptional care of Soldiers and their families as the Army prepares for future challenges. "We are the Army's home," he said.

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Army+Family+Covenant--keeping+promises.-a0181758654

Author: McLeroy, Carrie
Publication: Soldiers Magazine

#11. Our forces can’t carry on like this, says General Sir Richard Dannatt

By Sean Rayment, Defence Correspondent Published: 12:01AM GMT 18 Nov 2007

General Dannatt describes his report as an accurate and vivid picture of Army life.

The head of the Army has warned that years of Government under-funding and overstretch have left troops feeling "devalued, angry and suffering from Iraq fatigue", The Sunday Telegraph can reveal. General Sir Richard Dannatt, the Chief of the General Staff, reveals in a top-level report that the present level of operations is "unsustainable", the Army is "under-manned" and increasing numbers of troops are "disillusioned" with service life. Gen Dannatt states that the "military-covenant is clearly out of kilter", and the chain of command needs to improve standards of pay, accommodation and medical care.

"We must strive to give individuals and units ample recuperation time between operations, but I do not underestimate how difficult this will be to achieve whilst under-manned and with
"less robust establishments than I would like." The report, a copy of which has been seen by this newspaper, reveals for the first time the general's concerns on virtually every aspect of the Army, from levels of pay to the quality of food in canteens. Gen Dannatt came to public prominence last year when, within weeks of taking over as head of the Army, he said the Iraq war was causing security problems in Britain.

In the new report, he says that operations on the two fronts of Iraq and Afghanistan are putting soldiers and their families under "great pressure", and that the long-term impact of operations is "damaging" and is "mortgaging the goodwill of our people". In terms of "overstretch", the report says, "the tank of goodwill now runs on vapour; many experienced staff are talking of leaving".

Last week, Lt Col Stuart Tootal, 42, who commanded the Parachute Regiment in Afghanistan, resigned from the Army over the "shoddy" treatment of injured troops. In a letter to defence chiefs, he was reported to have criticised levels of pay, a lack of training equipment and the appalling housing - all issues raised in Gen Dannatt's report.

The report lays bare how a lack of funding, resources and manpower are forcing defence chiefs into making decisions once considered unthinkable. One such move includes sending "medically downgraded" or injured troops and soldiers as young as 17 to guard the Falkland Islands to release fit troops for operations - a move Gen Dannatt says he wholly supports.

The report adds:

• Delays to military inquests are a disgrace
• Military housing estates are unsafe and being overrun by immigrant families
• Poor food quality is creating a "pot-noodle and sandwich" culture among junior soldiers
• Work-life balance is an increasing concern
• Soldiers are "going sick" to get out of the Army
• Leave is often cancelled or constrained because of operational overstretch
• Harmony guidelines - the time between operational tours - are becoming meaningless
• The Army is no longer fun
• Fitness in the Army is tailing off and more soldiers are medically downgraded

The report's findings follow months of interviews with thousands of soldiers and their families from 47 units.

Entitled Chief of the General Staff's Briefing Team Report (2007), the findings are described by Gen Dannatt as a "comprehensive, vivid and accurate" picture of Army life. He writes that "improvements need to be made in accommodation, pay and medical services" and that the "chain of command must still improve things" if more soldiers are to be recruited. The general accepts the view that delays in holding military inquests are a "disgrace" and writes: "I share the frustration and know that many families feel let down by the process. The delays are unacceptable and I will continue to press for improvements." Military housing is an area singled out for criticism. "Estates are becoming less safe and more run down. Some are degenerating - in Germany it is reported that many of the neighbouring areas are occupied by immigrant families with hordes of children. This is of particular concern for wives when their husband is deployed [on operations]." In Britain, some service families' accommodation areas have "ex-married quarters owned by housing associations, and disruptive civilian families have moved in, causing concerns over vandalism and theft". The report strongly criticises the "Pay As You Dine" policy of making soldiers pay for what they eat, which many in the Army call a "disaster". It says: "There are real concerns about the new eating habits of some soldiers due to Pay As You Dine. A "pot noodle and sandwich" culture is being created and soldiers are cooking rations over gas burners in their rooms. There are apocryphal stories of soldiers flaking during PT sessions from a lack of nutrients". The report adds: "Pay As You Dine was sold as a strap line of new restaurants, better choice and good quality. The reality is very different - for most, the only investment has been a till."
There is a growing problem of troops "going sick" to get out of the Army. There is a lack of "training areas, range availability, shortages of ammunition, spares and manpower - which is limiting the amount of meaningful training that can be undertaken. There are insufficient serviceable aircraft for parachute training. Apache flying hours are limited by lack of serviceable aircraft".

Patrick Mercer, a Tory MP and former infantry commander, said: "These problem areas existed 10 years ago. Now we have a crisis and it is a disgrace that senior officers and ministers have allowed this to happen. I am staggered that the head of the Army thinks it acceptable to send kids and those medically unfit for war to guard the Falklands."


#12a.

Generals enter military-covenant debatehttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1570412/Generals-enter-military-covenant-debate.html

By Sean Rayment 12:01AM GMT 25 Nov 2007

General Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank is a man who knows a thing or two about planning an ambush. A 44-year Army career, which included a tour in the SAS, taught the urbane former head of the Armed Forces that the key element in any secret attack is surprise. Perhaps the only inkling that something was afoot, then, came minutes before Lord Guthrie entered the chamber in the House of Lords, on Thursday, for a debate on Britain's defence spending. Speaking to The Sunday Telegraph, he announced that he had been left needing a "sickbag" after reading an article in this newspaper last week by the Defence Secretary Des Browne.

In the offending piece, Mr Browne had hit back at those who claimed the "military-covenant" with the Armed Forces had been broken and argued that the Government "values our forces and their families by ensuring it delivers the support they deserve". In the past three years, Ministers had spent more than £10 billion on kit, he wrote. They had set aside £1 billion for force protection, more for new helicopters and weapons, and would do still more. If this was intended to persuade his critics to rethink, it had the opposite effect. Lord Guthrie and five other former defence chiefs went on the offensive, firing volley after volley at the Government's defence spending plans. Lord Guthrie denies he and his colleagues colluded in an "ambush" - nevertheless, it was one of the most astonishing and blistering verbal attacks on a serving government by senior military Tables in living memory. This weekend, at a time when British service personnel are engaged on two fronts, in Iraq and Afghanistan, relations are at a historic and potentially dangerous low.

Throughout Thursday’s five-hour debate, no quarter was given. Lord Guthrie, one of the few men in the past 50 years to have served as both Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the Defence staff, aimed high, saying of Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister, that "he was the most unsympathetic Chancellor of the Exchequer, as far as defence was concerned, and was the only senior Cabinet minister who avoided coming to the Ministry of Defence to be briefed by our staff about our problems."

The nub of the disagreement is financial: the former chiefs want the Government's defence spending to be based on a proportion of the gross domestic product, as it was during the Cold War. In the mid-1980s it was about 5 per cent of GDP but today it is just 2.5 per cent. Claims by the Government that the current defence budget of £33.4 billion continues the longest period of unbroken real growth since the 1980s are also dismissed by the former
chiefs, who argue that such increases are wiped out by defence industry inflation, which is running at about 7 per cent.

Admiral Lord Michael Boyce, who served as Chief of the Defence Staff during the invasion of Iraq, told the Lords: "The smoke and mirrors work of the Government, and in particular the Treasury, actually means that the core defence programme has had no effective budget rise at all. "If we were actually to cut to the truth, we would find it was actually negative - especially if one subtracts the £550 million to be spent on the slum accommodation that should have been replaced years ago."

In his fifth-floor office at the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall, the colour is said to have drained from Mr Browne's face as he was told of the events unfolding at Westminster. And what was a bad week for the Government would keep getting worse. As the former defence chiefs vented their ire, fresh evidence emerged of the increasing strain on the military. Tables released by the MoD showed that more and more troops were leaving the services. Junior and senior non-commissioned officers - the so-called backbone of the British Army - and middle-ranking officers frustrated with constantly being asked to do too much with too little were quitting.

The Army is now 3,600 short of its required strength of 101,800. More than 5,000 soldiers have left in the past few months and 2,000 are waiting to have their applications to quit approved. Gen Sir Mike Jackson, the charismatic former head of the Army, also joined the fray on Friday, saying: "I think we've got to a stage here when you compare defence against other major public spending, which have shown very large increases comparatively, that this is out of kilter between what we are being asked to do and the resources seen fit."

It is clear that this view is not only held by former service chiefs. In a report leaked to The Sunday Telegraph last week, Gen Sir Richard Dannatt, Jackson's replacement as head of the Army, accepted that the "military-covenant is out of kilter". The report laid bare the brutally honest and unedited views of the Army's rank and file - the men and women at the bottom end of the pay scale who are fighting and dying in Iraq and Afghanistan. Troops and their families, the report said, were living in "degenerating" military housing estates. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it added, were "unsustainable" and the poor pay, lack of leave and intense workload left troops feeling "devalued and disillusioned".

Many were suffering from "Iraq fatigue" and changes to the way soldiers were being fed was creating a "Pot Noodle and sandwich" culture. In order to alleviate troop shortages within the Army, soldiers too young to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well those unfit for active service, should be sent to guard the Falkland Islands to free up able-bodied troops for the frontline. Gen Dannatt, to whom the report was presented in July, described it as a "comprehensive, accurate and vivid" picture of Army life. The contrast with the Defence Secretary's version of life in the Armed Forces could not have been greater. And the gulf was further emphasized on the Telegraph's own website, where Mr Browne's article attracted a torrent of criticism. Many of those who responded were serving military personnel, some having just returned from combat in Iraq or Afghanistan. It was, perhaps, "Helmand Drifter" who best summed up the feelings of many in the Army when he wrote: "Dear Des, I got back from Afghanistan in April and I am preparing to go again in March. I had to put soldiers in Snatch Land-Rovers because I had nothing else. I had to borrow trucks from the Estonian Army because I didn't have enough. My R and R [Rest and Recuperation] was late because the Tri-Star [the RAF's ageing passenger transport plane] was broken, my rifle failed and my Osprey body armour cover fell apart."

The vitriolic nature of the attacks throughout last week stunned ministers because they knew it exposed the true feelings of the wider military. By Friday morning, a sense of near-panic was gripping the MoD. Late on Friday, the Prime Minister, who was attending the Commonwealth summit, attempted to quell the growing row when he declared that he had
"nothing but praise" for the Armed Forces and pledged to provide "the resources they need". And yet, inside Downing Street, the true mood is not one of contrition but of irritation at the timing of what sources term a "coup" by the former defence chiefs. "It looks like it was timed to cause maximum political damage when Gordon was out of the country," a source close to the Brown camp said.

The Prime Minister's allies are also enraged by what they term "factual inaccuracies". "It is wrong for Lord Guthrie to say Gordon never took an interest as Chancellor in the MoD or attended briefings there," said one senior Labour MP. "He attended briefings both when Geoff Hoon was defence secretary and under Des Browne." The Prime Minister's inner circle also claim the attacks would be "much more damaging" if they had come from current chiefs of staff, whom - despite the criticisms contained in the Dannatt report - they believe support the recently agreed funding settlement for the MoD. It is difficult to remember a period in the past 30 years when relations between the military and the Government have been so poor. And it is hard to see how the two can be reconciled in the near future - the Government remains unmoved, while events have done little to dispel the impression formed by members of the Armed Forces that Gordon Brown has little natural sympathy with their plight.

They argue that the Prime Minister would do well to accept that while soldiers expect to be treated with respect and dignity, they are not demanding individuals. In the words of one officer: "Our soldiers really aren't asking for much. In return for fighting and dying in Iraq and Afghanistan, they want to earn a living wage and they want their families to live in safe and comfortable houses and a government that cares - and at the moment they haven't got any of that."

#12b. Disabled veterans jeered at swimming pool

By Thomas Harding, Lucy Cockcroft and Brendan Carlin
Published: 9:52PM GMT 22 Nov 2007

The disabled men were injured during tours of Iraq and Afghanistan. Injured soldiers who lost their limbs fighting for their country have been driven from a swimming pool training session by jeering members of the public. The men, injured during tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, were taking part in a rehabilitation session at a leisure centre, when two women demanded they be removed from the pool. They claimed that the soldiers "hadn't paid" and might scare the children.

The incident has sparked widespread condemnation. Adml Lord Boyce, a former head of the Armed Forces, said last night the women should be "named and shamed". "These people are beneath contempt and everything should be done to get their names and publish them in the press," he said. "It is contemptible that people who have given up their limbs for their country should be so abused when they are trying to get fit again."

It comes after calls for the public to do more to welcome home troops back from tours of duty and to recognise the bravery of those fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The unpleasant scenes broke out at Leatherhead Leisure Centre in Surrey when the wounded veterans, who are at Headley Court Military Hospital, had to use the 25-metre public pool because the hydro-pool at the defence rehabilitation centre is not big enough for swimming. The servicemen were about to begin their weekly swimming therapy in closed-off lanes when they were verbally abused by the swimmers. One woman in her 30s was said to be infuriated by the lane closures saying the soldiers did not deserve to be there when she had paid.

It was also reported that others complained that limbless servicemen were scaring children at the centre. The atmosphere was said to be so tense that the soldiers' instructors removed them.
Charles Murrin, 79, a Navy veteran who saw the incident, said: "The woman said the men do not deserve to be in there and that she pays to come in the pool and they don't. I spoke to the instructor in the changing room afterwards and he was livid." It is not the first time that Headley Court neighbours have been accused of poor behaviour. There was uproar earlier this year after residents objected to planning permission to convert a home into a six-suite hostel for injured soldiers' families to stay in. The local council later approved the building work. A Ministry of Defence spokesman said: "We are disappointed that a small number of people objected to the closure of swimming lanes so that patients of Headley Court could use them."

The incident comes weeks after the Help For Heroes appeal was launched to raise £5 million to build a full-size pool and gym at the centre. Labour will today aim to repair its battered reputation with the Armed Forces by offering all military veterans priority NHS treatment, The Daily Telegraph has learned. The concession, ordered by the Health Secretary, Alan Johnson, will be available to the estimated 4.8 million ex-servicemen and women, sources said last night.


#13. Government takes umbrage at Harrods' Army uniform ban; POLITICS.

Harrods could be investigated in a Government-backed study over its policy of banning soldiers in uniform.

Amid growing concern in the military, this information will be part of a six-month survey for the Ministry of Defence looking at ways of boosting public support for the Armed Forces.

At its MoD launch, Labour MP Quentin Davies, heading the survey, said: "We already have one piece of evidence this morning. I may wish to write to (Harrods owner) Mr Fayed.

"If it is true what is said about Harrods, it should be exposed and their customers and potential customers should be given the chance to say whether they want to patronise the store. We will look at this."

Last year the exclusive London department store turned away Lieutenant Daniel Lenherr, 26, who had just taken part in a parade honouring Britain’s war dead.

The security guard told Mr Lenherr, of the 1st regiment Royal Horse Artillery customers might be intimidated by the uniform. Harrods said it had a long-standing policy of precluding customers in "non-civilian attire" but that some discretion should have been used.

Turning a soldier in uniform away from a club or venue is "deeply shocking" behaviour which could involve legal breaches, Mr Davies noted.

Prime Minister Gordon Brown asked Mr Davies to lead the survey now as British troops are deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It will involve looking at the experiences of countries such as France, Canada and the USA on how they treat their troops, plus having talks with the media, sports organisations and local authorities and civic leaders. The head of the Army, General Sir Richard Dannatt, has contrasted attitudes in the UK with those in America - where shows of support for the military are common - and called for US-style homecoming parades.

And the Royal British Legion has called on the Government to honour the military-covenant, that accepts a life-long duty of care to those prepared to lay their lives on the line.
Since Gen Dannatt made his speech in September there have been a number of a high profile civic events to honour troops returning from Iraq and Afghanistan.

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Government+takes+umbrage+at+Harrods'+Army+uniform+ban%3b+POLITICS.-a0172417231

**Publication:** The Birmingham Post (England)  
**Date:** Dec 14, 2007

### #14. London student unions push to ban military presence on campus

UCL, LSE and Goldsmiths court controversy with proposals to outlaw uniforms and recruitment on university grounds

Sarah Clark  

University College London Union (UCLU) has followed the London School of Economics (LSE) and Goldsmiths College student unions in attempting to ban any military presence on campus. UCLU has attacked the government for waging "aggressive wars overseas" in Afghanistan and Iraq and consequently has voted to sever all ties with the military services. The union, which passed the motion with a majority of 80 votes to 50, stated: "This union believes that because the British military under the Labour Government is currently engaged in an aggressive war overseas, for the union to use its resources to encourage students to join the military or participate in military recruitment activities at this time would give political and material support to the war." The successful motion, led by Sham Rajyaguru, will result in a breakage of all links with the University of London Officer Training Corps, Royal Air Squadron and Navy Unit. The military services will be prevented from setting up recruitment stalls at fresher’s fairs and all union events. The ban will also apply to all student run media and UCLU premises. This could have a significantly negative impact on the recruitment strategy of the armed forces as approximately 50 percent of British military officers are recruited through university based military organizations.

Although the annual general meeting reached its quorum and had the largest attendance in UCLU recent history, with 325 people attending, the successful motion has caused considerable controversy at the university, amongst students and in wider community. A spokesperson for UCL emphasized that the university has reconfirmed its relations with the military services. He said: "It has no implications for any activities held on the main campus of UCL, or sponsored by the university" He continued: “This vote was taken by the student union and refers to union premises and events only.” He concluded that UCLU have temporarily suspended the decision due to concerns as to the validity of the vote.

Students across the United Kingdom outraged at the motion passed by UCLU have set up a Facebook group, which has the support of over 5000 members, to condemn the union on the basis that the motion is not representative of the views of most students. The group also points out several impracticalities of the measure, including the prospect of members of the royal family, many of whom serve in the armed forces, being prevented from entering union premises on ceremonial duties.

Tosca Robertson, in her second year studying History of Art and Italian at UCL, questioned the validity of a military ban in light of various other recruitment drives that occur on campus. Ms Robertson told The Journal: “Have they not considered that students are accosted by Scientologists, Harry Krishner devotees, Socialists and yet they have not been able to convert the masses? Rather, their controversial presence has stimulated debate and made students more aware of these ‘causes’.”
“The war in Iraq is just another cause and, though I don’t agree with it, I think the army should be allowed to recruit in the UCL campus on a principle of free speech.”

The London universities involved appear to have led the way for other institutions across the UK in anti-war agitation, including Manchester, Newcastle and Cardiff. In November 2007 students at the University of Essex protested against investment in the arms trade and military recruiting on campus. The action at UCLU and other universities’ student unions will add to the public debate over the treatment of military personnel, after servicemen in Cambridgeshire at RAF Wittering were instructed not to appear uniformed in Peterborough due to reports of abuse.

A Ministry of Defense spokesman disappointed at the UCLU vote, said: “Universities play an important role in raising awareness among young people about the important work our Armed Forces do and we enjoy a good relationship with most universities. “However people view specific military operations, everyone should be able to respect the brave and professional job our Armed Forces perform.”

A spokesman for the National Union of Students said that UCLU works as an autonomous union and therefore is not under NUS jurisdiction. He explained that since the ban was lifted in 2000 on homosexuals serving in the Armed Forces, most student unions have worked amicably with the military services.

http://www.journal-online.co.uk/article/3032-london-student-unions-push-to-ban-military-presence-on-campus

#15. Poor kit ‘has cost the lives of 60 servicemen’.

Byline: Matthew Hickley

AS many as 60 British servicemen have lost their lives in Iraq and Afghanistan because the Government failed to provide adequate equipment, a Tory inquiry has claimed.

Frederick Forsyth the author and former RAF pilot chairing the special investigation into the treatment of the armed forces, accused ministers of ‘frittering away billions’ on pet projects while refusing to give troops fighting overseas the resources they need.

He said the work of the Military-covenant Commission - set up by David Cameron to help develop a Tory defence manifesto - had uncovered ‘inadequate’ policies towards the military in virtually every area it examined, from healthcare and education for troops’ families to housing and legal support.

But the poor standards of operational equipment was the most serious, he said, as it made the difference between life and death - and was implicated in around a fifth of the 278 deaths of servicemen and women in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Government ministers hit back last night, insisting they had invested massively in new equipment for the forces, and accusing the Conservatives of stealing policies they had already announced.

The commission's interim findings follow fierce criticism from some British coroners at inquests into the deaths of servicemen abroad, citing shortcomings in equipment.

Presenting the interim findings yesterday, Mr Forsyth said: 'What has angered me is to see fine young men coming home in boxes draped in a flag who should never have died at all, and died because they were required to go in harm's way with c*** equipment. If you add them all together, you are looking at 50 to 60 young men. That angers me because we have
the money in this country.

'We have seen ten years of the most unbelievable frittering away of billions on schemes that never work by a Chancellor who repeatedly refused and refused to recognise that, with two vicious wars going on, we needed extra funds.

'He provided the funds for his personal favoured projects, but they didn't include the armed forces. There is a responsibility here, there is a blame here and there ought to be a guilt here, which they don't feel. It's not good enough for the sixth largest economy in the world'.

The report warned that the so-called military-covenant between Government, society and the armed forces was 'under serious and unprecedented strain'. It also said that an exodus of experienced personnel is being fuelled by a range of factors affecting service families, including: * Housing, where there are 'shameful' examples of poor barracks accommodation; * Healthcare, with families who move around due to military postings immediately falling to the bottom of NHS waiting lists and struggling to find NHS dentists; * Education, where children from service families tend to under-achieve at school due to constant moving and disruption, but there is no extra funding to help schools cope.

Proposals include a new 'pupil premium' - increasing cash for schools educating service children - and new rules allowing families to transfer their place in NHS treatment queues if they move house.

The Tories would also carry out a detailed review of defence commitments and resources every four years, to avoid the overstretch.

Armed Forces Minister Bob Ainsworth said the Government had already announced plans to tackle many of the issues raised, and would set out more proposals in a White Paper later this year.

He added: 'Ministerial colleagues and I recognise the unique role that our armed forces play in the service of our country - the White Paper will reflect this'. Responding to claims that 60 men were killed by poor kit, the MoD said: 'Our troops are some of the best equipped in the world.

'We have delivered kit worth more than [pounds sterling] 10billion in the last three years with over [pounds sterling] 3.5billion on urgent operational requirements such as improved body armour, electronic counter measures and protected vehicles'.

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http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Poor+kit+'has+cost+the+lives+of+60+servicemen'.-a0180285483

Publication: The Daily Mail (London, England)
Date: Jun 18, 2008

#16. Blood, sweat and tears - but I regret nothing
By Lt Col Stuart Tootal
Published: 5:55AM BST 25 Jul 2008

Comments 38 | Comment on this article
Sergeant Paddy Caldwell's words came in short gasping breaths, as he struggled with the ventilator tube in his throat that was keeping him alive. "I regret nothing, Sir. I would do it all again if given the chance."

It was October 2006, he was in Selly Oak Hospital and 3 Para Battle Group had just returned from Afghanistan. The last time I had seen Paddy, I had been holding his hand in the regimental aid post in Sangin after a Taliban bullet had exited through his neck and taken away the use of his limbs. It was the second time that I had visited Selly Oak.

On the first occasion I had been shocked by what I had seen. I had expected to find a proper military ward that was run exclusively for injured servicemen. But soldiers wounded in the service of their country, whether in Afghanistan or Iraq, were flanked by geriatric patients and attended to by overworked NHS nursing staff.

I spent five hours listening to tales of woe from those who had sacrificed much and been treated with scant regard in return. The wounded were not young people injured as the result of driving their cars too fast. They had suffered their wounds because they had volunteered to put themselves in harm’s way to do their nation’s bidding and they deserved better.

Many of my soldiers, including Paddy, owe their lives to the professionalism of the surgeons in both Afghanistan and Birmingham.

But the poor aftercare and the constant struggle to get the proper welfare provision for some of my wounded, once they had left hospital, caused me profound concern. It was exacerbated by the inadequate pay of junior soldiers, the substandard accommodation their families often live in and the lack of certain key equipment for operations. These concerns informed part of my decision to resign my commission on relinquishing command of 3 Para.

I articulated them in a personal letter of resignation, although I never used the emotive words of "shoddy" or "betrayed" which have often been attributed to me.

Twenty years of soldiering ended last week, the day before the Government announced its Defence Command Paper for better support for servicemen. It has struck a chord with growing public support for what the Armed Forces do and is a positive first step in recognising the unique conditions service personnel and their families face. Most of the issues at Selly Oak have been addressed, although the treatment of soldiers in mixed wards still needs to be rectified.

The paper is a tribute to the efforts of the head of the Army. General Sir Richard Dannatt has consistently provided considered, honest and appropriate professional opinion; something that is so vital for the military's political masters to receive. It will be a tragedy if he has been passed over as the next Chief of the Defence Staff as a result of his candour and integrity.

I sense that the implementation of policy will remain one of General Dannatt's main priorities, as he continues to work to ensure the Army has the right resources and equipment to meet current and future operational commitments.

Recognition for the unlimited liability of risking life and limb in the service of the nation has come late in the day. Soldiers readily accept risk and loss as part of the business that they are in.

Morale on operations in 2006 was sky-high and still is. What soldiers want is proper support and recognition, not pity. But, despite recent pay rises, junior ranks are still poorly paid. For under £20,000 (including operational allowances), a private is shot at, often works 24/7, sleeps in a trench, knows what real fear is and lives with the physical and physiological
consequences of the application of lethal force. Soldiers do not go on strike, but stand in when others do.

I don't question the pay scale of others, but maintain that in comparison, our service people should still be better remunerated for what they do.

I maintain my faith in the mission in Afghanistan. The stability of Afghanistan and prosperity of its people is linked to our own security. The intended nature of 3 Para's mission may have changed, but no military campaign plan withstands first contact on the ground. We adapted, overcame and learnt to live with the constants of scarce resources, uncertainty and risk; it is what the military does. No one went looking for trouble; no combat experienced soldier does, having lived the harsh realities of sustained battle.

Much of the equipment soldiers now have on operations is first class, although the issue of sufficient quantities remains to be addressed - as does the number of helicopters. The Government's 1998 Strategic Defence Review highlighted the need for another 20 Chinook helicopters to meet defence planning assumptions. The assumptions have been exceeded, but the number of heavy-lift helicopters has not increased and the essential programme for utility helicopters is under threat.

If the military are driving when they should be flying, there will continue to be an increase in the risk from roadside bombs.

There is a need for reprioritisation and a rebalancing of MoD investment; if we lose the battles of today, it could impact adversely on our ability to meet tomorrow's contingencies. Consequently, some risk must be taken against future capabilities, such as high-altitude fighters that currently have no potential enemy.

Is the conflict in Afghanistan winnable?

Yes, I believe it is. But it requires the right level of investment in terms of resources and people. Our servicemen are remarkable and we must ensure that the blood and treasure they have expended in places like Afghanistan is not wasted.

I am extremely proud of having once been a soldier and commanding 3 Para was exceptional. In the words of Paddy Caldwell: "I regret nothing"; if I were 20 years younger I would do it all again.


TelegraphNews

#17.  

British soldier refused room at UK hotel

4th September, 2008

A British soldier has been turned away from a hotel because staff said they don't accept members of the armed forces. Corporal Tomos Stringer had booked a room at the Metro Hotel in Woking to organise a friend's funeral. But when asked for identification at reception he produced his army pass and was told "we don't accept military personnel here", which was "company policy", according to his mother Gaynor. He spent Sunday night in a car as he couldn't find any other accommodation.

"It's a disgrace. He is in Afghanistan for the third time and has been in Iraq twice and this is the way he is treated," Mrs Stringer said. "I can't believe this has happened to one of our soldiers in his own country. He just didn't know how to react," "These lads are on the front
line, putting their life on the line every day. And in their own country they are treated like this - I think it's outrageous.

"Lads here are frightened of wearing their uniform when they come home - you hear that they are spat at. We've been to America and their military get treated like heroes. I think it's terrible they can't even wear their uniform with pride."

Derek Twigg, a Defence Minister, said: "This case is especially egregious given that the individual concerned was on injury leave from Afghanistan and visiting an injured colleague. "The Government and, it is fair to say, the vast majority of people in this country, hold the professionalism, courage and contribution made by all those who serve, and have served in the armed forces in very high regard." The hotel would not comment on the incident.

http://www.metro.co.uk/news/294262-british-soldier-refused-room-at-uk-hotel

Foreign and Commonwealth soldiers treated unfairly by the British Government. Actress caught in political battle.

#18. Gurkhas win right to stay in UK

A group of retired Gurkhas fighting for the right to settle in Britain have won their immigration test case at London's High Court. They were challenging immigration rules which said that those who retired from the British Army before 1997 did not have an automatic right to stay. Prominent supporter actress Joanna Lumley said it was a "chance to right a great wrong". The government said it would now review all Gurkhas' cases. The regiment moved its main base from Hong Kong to the UK in 1997 and the government had argued that Gurkhas discharged before that date were unlikely to have strong residential ties with the UK. That meant those who wanted to settle in the UK had to apply for British residence and could be refused and deported. The judgement could affect some 2,000 former Gurkhas who retired before 1997. The judge, Mr Justice Blake, said the Gurkhas' long service, conspicuous acts of bravery and loyalty to the Crown all pointed to a "moral debt of honour" and gratitude felt by British people. He ruled that instructions given by the Home Office to immigration officials were unlawful and needed urgent revision. Lawyer Martin Howe said: "Today we have seen a tremendous and historic victory for the gallant Gurkha veterans of Nepal. "This is a victory that restores honour and dignity to deserving soldiers who faithfully served in Her Majesty's armed forces. "It is a victory for common sense; a victory for fairness; and a victory for the British sense of what is right." The judge said: "Today we have seen a tremendous and historic victory for the gallant Gurkha veterans of Nepal. "This is a victory that restores honour and dignity to deserving soldiers who faithfully served in Her Majesty's armed forces. "It is a victory for common sense; a victory for fairness; and a victory for the British sense of what is right." The five ex-Gurkhas involved in the test case were L/Cpl Gyanendra Rai, Deo Prakash Limbu, Cpl Chakra Limbu, L/Cpl Birendra Shrestha and Bhim Gurung.

"The key thing now is to look at the ruling in detail and to make sure that the government now translates that into action and doesn't try and squirm out of it." Home Secretary Jacqui Smith said in a statement that the Home Office would revise its guidance surrounding the 1997 cut-off date. "I have always been clear that where there is a compelling case, soldiers and their families should be considered for settlement," she said. "We will honour our commitment to the Gurkhas by reviewing all cases by the end of the year."
[HMG opposes full residency rights for Gurkhas but is forced into a humiliating climb down in the face of a populist campaign lead by the well known British actor Joanna Lumley. Despite winning the right to reside in the UK, Gurkha veterans are forced to go to the high court to enforce the original ruling in their favour. When disreputable elements in Nepal attempt to exploit the plight of the Gurkhas in a ‘cash for residency’ scam, the veteran’s minister (Kevin Jones) attempts to discredit Lumley and the campaign team by talking of Lumley’s “deathly silence” about the problems. The story ends in further humiliation for the government as Prime Minister Gordon Brown is forced to apologies to Lumley for the Veteran Minister’s remarks. The story exemplifies the antipathy that the government continually displays toward its’ servicemen and veterans and shows how continued undermining of the trust and goodwill required to enact the military-covenant is fast dissipating within the Armed Forces].

#19. Gurkhas win 'legal first' against Government

By Thomas Harding, telegraph.co.uk

Gurkha veterans who have fought for Britain will be given the right to stay in this country following a "legal first" in which the High Court had to enforce its own ruling against the Government. The court heard that in the hiatus since the September ruling a number of veterans had died waiting for resolution of the case. Jacqui Smith, the Home Secretary, has now been forced to abide by a High Court order that will give the previously excluded former soldiers from Nepal who served in the British Army the right to apply to settle in Britain. She is expected to make the announcement to Parliament in three weeks, the court heard.

The news came as the Gurkhas returned to court to enforce a legal victory they won last September, when a High Court judge ruled that the Government's existing immigration policy excluding them was unlawful.

Campaigners, including the actress Joanna Lumley, whose father fought with the Gurkhas in Burma during the Second World War, said the Government had "delayed and delayed" since the court decision. Ms Lumley has previously called the Government's position a "stain on our national character". The court heard that in the hiatus since the September ruling a number of veterans had died waiting for resolution of the case.

The most recent was Rifleman Prem Bahadur Pun, who died on Sunday, March 15. A statement seen by the judge said: "It appears that his death - as well as being deprived of cheap modern drugs to bring him comfort in his final months - is linked to the Secretary of State's failure to comply with her assurances to publish the policy and complete the reconsideration of over 1,000 stayed cases by December 30 2008."

Gurkha campaigners described today's return to the courts as "a legal first" in which a litigant had to return court to enforce a judgment against a Secretary of State. Surrounded by Gurkha veterans, David Enright, a solicitor representing the veterans, said: "The Government has delayed month upon sorry month, allowing your fathers to die while their sons served in Afghanistan and Iraq. "The Government has had to be shamed, kicking and screaming, back to court again." In September's ruling, the judge said Government immigration policy in the case of the Gurkhas "irrationally excluded material and potentially decisive considerations" or "was so ambiguous" as to mislead applicants, entry clearance officers (ECOs) and immigration judges alike. Six claimants brought the case to challenge the lawfulness of the Government policy that Gurkhas who retired prior to July 1997 - the date that the Brigade of Gurkhas moved its base from Hong Kong to Britain - did not have the necessary "strong ties" to be allowed entry. A Home Office spokesman said: "The revised guidance is currently under consideration and will be published by 24 April. "Since
2004, over 6,000 former Gurkhas and family members have been granted settlement in the UK under immigration rules.


#20. MoD challenges compensation payouts to injured soldiers. The Government is launching an appeal in a bid to significantly reduce the level of compensation paid to two injured soldiers.

By James Kirkup, Aislinn Simpson & Stephen Adams    telegraph.co.uk    Published: 11:01AM BST 28 Jul 2009

Light Dragoon Anthony Duncan, who now walks with crutches after being shot while on patrol in Iraq, was originally awarded £9,250 which was increased to £46,000 by an appeal tribunal. Royal Marine Matthew McWilliams fractured his thigh in a military exercise and was awarded £28,250, increased to £28,750 on appeal. Now the MoD has taken the case to the Court of Appeal, where lawyers are expected to argue the pair should be compensated only for the initial injuries and not subsequent health problems. It comes as The Daily Telegraph launches a campaign to overhaul the way the MoD compensates wounded service personnel. The MoD was accused of "appalling timing" in launching the appeal at a time of mounting deaths and injuries in Afghanistan. Lieutenant Colonel Jerome Church, of the British Limbless Ex-Servicemen's Association, said the court bid was "very unfortunate." He told BBC Radio 4's Today programme: "This case is obviously appalling timing for the Ministry of Defence. This has been in the wings for some time. "It is very unfortunate timing and it is a very unfortunate business that they are having to go through." Simon Weston OBE, a former Welsh Guardsman who suffered horrific burns during the Falklands War, branded the court bid "car-crash politics". "The system is incredibly flawed. If you get shot in the leg, you then get a subsequent infection which causes you to lose the leg, do you lose compensation for the loss of the leg or do you only get it for the gunshot which would probably be only a few thousand pounds? "It seems perverse that people can vote their own pay awards then look at people who have risked everything and they take their award from them. "It seems awful, it is almost car-crash politics when they start doing something like this, especially on a day when they are repatriating four brave people who are coming home." Mr Weston called for the military to receive compensation payments at the same level as those paid to injured police officers and firefighters.

A statement from the Ministry of Defence said: "The MoD is appealing in order to clarify an earlier judgment about how the scheme is administered, and to protect the key principle of the scheme: the most compensation for the most seriously injured." The deaths of two more British soldiers in Afghanistan were announced on Monday, bringing the number killed in July to 22. More than 100 casualties have been evacuated during Operation Panther's Claw. Despite ministers' pledges to improve the treatment of Armed Forces personnel, the MoD will go to the High Court today seeking to cut the compensation due to two wounded servicemen. Last week Sir John Major, the former prime minister, accused the Government of not doing enough for wounded troops in an article for The Daily Telegraph. The MoD has faced repeated criticism of the way it deals with wounded personnel. It paid out £84 million in civil compensation last year, but, by contrast, campaigners say men and women wounded in combat have to struggle to win even modest payments. Controversially, the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme puts the burden of proof on claimants, who must provide evidence that they were injured doing their duty. Campaigners say many claims that would have been allowed under the old rules are now blocked. MoD Tables show that around a third of all claims are now rejected.

Maj Gen Patrick Cordingley, the former commander of the 7th Armoured Brigade, said: “What I think is sad is you have to fight for compensation, when you are actually not talking about that many people and not that much money.” Simon Weston, the former Guardsman severely injured in the Falklands, said: “The compensation scheme is one where veterans
have to fight for everything. You get nothing by right in this country.” Lord Morris of Manchester, a former Labour minister, said the review of the scheme must reverse the burden of proof. There are also concerns about the way compensation is awarded using a complex “tariff” system. Although the MoD last year doubled the maximum lump-sum payment to £570,000, only the most catastrophic injuries attain that sum. Even the loss of both arms or total blindness would not qualify. One particular concern is the treatment of mental health disorders. Compensation for psychological injury is effectively capped at £48,875. In addition, all claims must be made within five years of sustaining or learning of the injury or leaving the Forces. Lt Col Church, said the system failed to account for the combined effect of injuries. “The whole issue of time limits is completely unnecessary and undignified,” he said. Gen Sir Mike Jackson, the former head of the Army, said the approach taken was not “one of generosity”. He added: “I suspect that they are keeping costs down as well.” Kevan Jones, the Defence Minister, last night said many of the campaign’s demands were being met. “It has been widely recognised, including by Sir John Major, that the new scheme is an improvement on what was there before,” he said. “We have doubled the lump sum compensation payments and have agreed to a whole-scheme review next year that will be open to independent scrutiny.”


#21. Dear Editor, Words cannot describe the disgust I felt when I read that the Government is going to court this week seeking to cut the compensation awarded to two badly wounded Servicemen.

In a world where a typist with repetitive strain injury can be awarded hundreds of thousands of pounds, Trooper Anthony Duncan was initially awarded a mere pounds 9,250 after being shot in Iraq. Royal Marine Matthews McWilliams was initially awarded just pounds 8,250 following a serious training accident. Both soldiers continue to suffer pain and distress from their injuries. Following successful appeals to a tribunal, the two soldiers’ awards were increased to pounds 46,000 and pounds 28,750 respectively - still a fraction of the sums regularly awarded to people for "hurt feelings" by employment tribunals.

In a new low, even for this Government, the Ministry of Defence is going to the Court of Appeal this week to try to cut that increase and return their awards to the initial, dismal sums.

At a time when our soldiers are dying in the dust halfway around the world with inadequate resources, fighting with no clear-cut mission or end-state, this is a gross betrayal of our dedicated servicemen and women. The Military-covenant between the country and our Armed Forces requires our soldiers to risk their lives and their health on behalf of their country. In return, they deserve the best possible help and treatment should they be injured.

Every week at Prime Minister's Questions, Gordon Brown recites the names of British soldiers killed in action in Afghanistan. How he has the gall to do this, while his Government is going to court in this despicable way, is beyond me. Any moral compass he may once have possessed has long since seized up and rusted beyond repair. Shame on him.

Dan Byles Ex-Army Major Conservative Parliamentary Candidate for North Warwickshire served in the Army for nine years, and was at one point the youngest serving Major in the Army. He served operationally in Kosovo and Bosnia, and during the Iraq invasion he served as a Staff Officer in the Ministry of Defence. He left to enter politics after becoming disillusioned with Government neglect of the Armed Forces. He recently served alongside Freddie Forsyth and Simon Weston on the Military-covenant Commission, and co-authored a report on how to repair the broken Military-covenant.
Has Gordon Brown's moral compass seized up?

Publication: The Birmingham Post (England)
Date: Jul 29, 2009

#22. Eric Joyce resigns – key points in his letter to Gordon Brown. Eric Joyce, the parliamentary private secretary to Bob Ainsworth, the defence secretary, has resigned. Here are some of his key points in his letter to Gordon Brown.

By Chris Irvine, telegraph.co.uk Published: 7:00AM BST 04 Sep 2009

- "I do not think the public will accept for much longer that our losses can be justified by simply referring to the risk of greater terrorism on our streets. Nor do I think we can continue with the present level of uncertainty about the future of our deployment in Afghanistan."

- "I think we must be much more direct about the reality that we do punch a long way above our weight, that many of our allies do far too little, and that leaving the field to the United States would mean the end of Nato as a meaningful proposition."

- "It should be possible now to say that we will move off our present war-footing and reduce our forces there substantially during our next term in government."

- "I do not think the British people will support the physical risk to our servicemen and women unless they can be given confidence that Afghanistan's government has been properly elected and has a clear intent to deal with the corruption there which has continued unabated in recent years."

- "Most important of all, we must make it clear to every serviceman and woman, their families and the British public that we give their wellbeing the highest political priority."

- "Behind the hand attacks by any Labour Table on senior service personnel are now, to the public, indistinguishable from attacks on the service themselves"

- "Above all, Labour must remember that service folk and their families are our people. We say that we honour them for their risk, bravery and sacrifice and we must at literally all costs continue to show by our actions that we mean it."


#23. KILLED BY THE CUTS; FAMILIES CALL FOR HEADS OF 10 DEFENCE CHIEFS WHO ARE NAMED AND SHAMED.

Byline: Charlie Gall
A Nimrod crashed with the loss of 14 servicemen because defence chiefs put cost cuts before safety, an investigation has found. A damning report said the 2006 tragedy could have been prevented. It claimed financial pressures meant corners were cut on safety and that warning signs flagging up problems with Nimrods had been ignored. The report even named 10 defence officials who, it said, were responsible for the catastrophe. Fourteen crewmen based at RAF Kinloss is a Royal Air Force station. It is near Kinloss, on the Moray Firth in the north of Scotland. The station is home to all of the Nimrod MR2 fleet in the Royal Air Force. in Moray died when the military spy plane blew up after air-to-air refuelling To supply again with fuel. over Afghanistan as leaking fuel made contact with a hotair pipe. There had been a safety review of the ageing Nimrod MR2 fleet a year before the crash.

Haddon-Cave said there had been a "systemic breach" of the Military-covenant - the nation's duty of care to the Armed Forces. And he blasted a culture of financial cuts which led to a "dilution" of the airworthiness regime within the MoD. Haddon-Cave added: "In my view, XV230 was lost because of a systemic breach of the Military-covenant brought about by significant failures on the part of all those involved. "This must not be allowed to happen again." Later, Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth Robert William 'Bob' Ainsworth (b. 19 June 1952) is the British Member of Parliament for Coventry North East. He is a member of the Labour Party. He is a the Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence. apologised for the mistakes. But the families of those who died demanded resignations "at the very top". Trish Knight, whose son Ben, 25, died in the crash, said: "Sorry doesn't bring them back. "There should be some resignations by top people over the lies they have been telling us since 2006. It's what we've said all along. As far as we're concerned. they killed our baby." H a d d o n - Cave said the MoD had suffered a period of "deep organisational trauma" in the wake of a strategic defence review in 1998. He added: "There was a shift in culture and priorities in the MoD towards 'business' and financial targets, at the expense of functional values such as safety and airworthiness." Haddon-Cave said if the safety review had been carried out with "proper skill, care and attention", the MR2's design flaws, which had "lain dormant for years" would have been spotted and the crash averted. He said of the review: "It missed key dangers. Its production is a story of incompetence, complacency and cynicism. The best opportunity to prevent the accident to XV230 was tragically lost." Haddon-Cave blamed the MoD and their defence partners BAE Systems . He said: "The wholesale failure of all three organisations - MoD, BAE and QinetiQ - involved in the Nimrod Safety Case to do their job and the apparently inexorable deterioration in the safety and airworthiness regime in the MoD are particularly troubling aspects of the Nimrod XV230 story. "There has been a yawning gap between the appearance and the reality of safety. The system has not been fit for purpose." He slammed two MoD chiefs - General Sir Sam Cowan and Air Chief Marshal Malcolm Pledger PLEDGER. - saying both men "bear particular responsibility for the episode of cuts, chance, dilution and distraction". In contrast, Haddon-Cave praised the 14 Nimrod servicemen who died. He said: "Faced with life-threatening emergency, every member of the crew of XV230 acted with calmness, bravery and professionalism. "They had no chance, however, of controlling the fire. Their fate was already sealed before the first fire warning." The QC quoted a senior RAF officer telling him: "There was no doubt that the culture at the time had switched. In the days of the RAF in the 1990s, you had to be on top of airworthiness. By 2004, you had to be on top of your budget if you wanted to get ahead. Haddon-Cave ended his statement by saying: "Tragically for the crew of XV230, the lessons have come too late and at an infinite price. "The most fitting memorial to the loss of the crew of XV230 will be that the lessons from their sacrifice are truly learned." Memorial. Defence Secretary Ainsworth said: "The overwhelming thrust of his report is not
an attack on the aircraft itself in any way. “It is an attack on the systems that have effectively let our people down. We all have to put things right.” Last night SNP spokesman Angus Robertson, whose Moray constituency covers RAF Kinloss, said: “We have now had an independent inquiry, we have had inquests, we have had reviews. We have had numerous reports and we have had analysis about Nimrod. “At every stage, ministers have given assurances that the right lessons would be learned and acted on. “Clearly, they weren’t, so why should we have confidence today in the assurances that we have heard?” Last night, station commander at RAF Kinloss, Group Captain Robbie Noel OBE, said: “It is important that I reflect Mr Haddon-Cave’s deduction that the aircraft remains safe to fly. “I and my people at Kinloss remain determined to serve the memory of those lost over Afghanistan. “We can best do that by continuing to learn the lessons and to minimise any risks to the greatest extent possible. “Safety fears over the Nimrod have been raised repeatedly. In 2006, the Record revealed a crew had to jam a teapot into an eight-inch gap in the fuselage of one Nimrod in mid-air after a cabin pressure door failed to close properly.

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#24. Colonel foresaw his own death: His memo to MoD warned helicopter shortage would cost lives... weeks later he was dead

By Tim Shipman, Deputy Political Editor
Last updated at 11:11 AM on 31st October 2009

Damning memo: Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe, the most senior casualty of the Afghan war. The most senior soldier to be killed in Afghanistan foreshadowed his own death in a damning memo about the shortage of helicopters. Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe told his superiors that British troops would die because they were being forced to make trips by road. Less than a month later, he was blown up by a roadside bomb. In his final despatches to commanders in London, classified ‘Nato Secret’, he had dismissed helicopter operations in Afghanistan as ‘not fit for purpose’. The leaked memo dramatically undermines Gordon Brown’s claims that helicopter shortages have not caused the deaths of troops fighting the Taliban. It amounts to a devastating condemnation from beyond the grave of Labour’s stewardship of the war in Helmand province. Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup admitted today that more helicopters will always help and that more would be sent out to Afghanistan next year, but insisted they were not a ‘panacea’. There is no such thing as enough support helicopters. You can always use more. We are providing the maximum we can as rapidly as we can,’ he said. He denied claims the Ministry of Defence had turned down an offer of more helicopters and insisted foot patrols were ‘critical’ to the campaign. ‘You cannot conduct a counter-insurgency from behind metal,’ he said. Colonel Thorneloe, 39, commander of the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, died with Trooper Joshua Hammond on July 1 when their convoy set off an improvised explosive device (IED) during a patrol north of the town of Lashkar Gah. On June 5, he had chillingly predicted the circumstances of his own death in his weekly report to the Ministry of Defence. Headed ‘Battle Group Weekly Update’, it reads: ‘I have tried to avoid griping about helicopters - we all know we don’t have enough. ‘We cannot move people, so this month we have conducted a great deal of administrative movement by road. This increases the IED threat and our exposure to it’. Colonel Thorneloe goes on to spell out in graphic terms how he had ‘virtually no’ helicopters of the type which would allow him to move troops by air rather than road. He added: ‘The
current level of SH (support helicopter) support is therefore unsustainable’. Victim of a Taliban booby-trap bomb: Thorneloe with children Hannah and Sophie
In a damning assessment of Nato operations, he concluded by saying that the system used to manage helicopter movements in Afghanistan ‘is very clearly not fit for purpose’. He also observed that helicopter operations in Iraq ‘were managed in a more flexible, efficient manner’. The Mail is not printing the precise details of his complaints in order to avoid giving away specific information to the Taliban. But they paint a devastating portrait of an Army starved of resources. Another leaked report by a senior officer in Afghanistan, written on July 10, proves that the problems still persisted. It reads: ‘Aviation has been erratic throughout this week. This has forced us to conduct more road moves than I would like. I understand the strains in the fly programme but any improvement would greatly assist’. The officer added that he had received just half the helicopters he had requested for operations that week. And he also complained about the ‘attrition of Vikings’ - armoured vehicles overused because of the helicopter shortage. Yet just two weeks later, on July 22 the Prime Minister insisted that soldiers had not died because of MoD penny pinching. He told Parliament: ‘In the operations we are having at the moment it is completely wrong to say that the loss of lives has been caused by the absence of helicopters’. The memos were leaked by a disgusted MoD official to Tory MP Adam Holloway, a former Grenadier Guards officer who regularly visits Afghanistan. In an email, the official referred to the second memo, telling the MP: ‘As you can see, situation: no change, despite Rupert Thorneloe’s death. Still no aviation, still unnecessary administrative road moves which are killing people. ‘Still claims by the Government that the military have got enough helicopters and all the tools they need. Lies’.

Mr Holloway told the Mail: ‘What a heart-wrenching irony it is that Colonel Thorneloe wrote those words. It must have been terrible for him as the commander of 800 men to know that their lives were being put in danger because the Government, in whose name he had taken them to war, would not spend the money to make it safer for them to move across country’. He added that defence chiefs ‘should be ashamed - hopefully now they will at last do the right thing and get our troops off the roads and into the air where they are safer’. Mr Holloway has written a devastating critique of the handling of the war in a pamphlet shortly to be published by the Centre for Policy Studies think tank. It reveals that despite clear evidence that a shortage of helicopters is killing British troops, defence chiefs are still refusing offers to supply more. Lt-Col Thorneloe said British troops would die. Only last month the Ministry of Defence turned down another offer of helicopters which could double Afghanistan flying hours for British troops fighting the Taliban. The Mail has independently confirmed that former RAF pilots offered to supply 25 helicopters within three months to back up the Chinook fleet which is stretched to breaking point. The deal would have cost the MoD just £7 million a month - a relative drop in the ocean - but the offer was rejected because the RAF did not want to share a role with private contractors. Colonel Thorneloe and his widow Sally had two daughters, Hannah, four, and two-year-old Sophie. At his funeral the mourners included the Prince of Wales and Duchess of Cornwall, who knew him well.

In a statement yesterday, Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth said: ‘My thoughts remain with the family and friends of Lt-Col Rupert Thorneloe, who was a courageous soldier and a fine
man. Our brave forces deserve the very best equipment and we remain determined to provide it. 'We know the value of helicopters on operations, and that commanders could do more with more. That is why we have increased the numbers and types, improved engines and almost doubled flying hours. To counter the roadside bomb threat we have also been improving unmanned air surveillance'.


#25. **British officer’s death forced MoD to address kit shortage, says father**

telegraph.co.uk By Richard Savill, in Trowbridge, Wiltshire Published: 4:31PM BST 30 Apr 2010

The father of Lt Col Rupert Thorneloe, the most senior British Army officer to be killed in Afghanistan, said it took his son’s death to convince the Ministry of Defence to give troops the equipment they required. Major John Thorneloe was speaking after an inquest heard how his son, Lt Col Rupert Thorneloe, 39, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, Welsh Guards, was killed after insisting on taking the most exposed position on a patrol to set an example to his men. Lt Col Thorneloe died in the blast from in a roadside bombing along with Trooper Joshua Hammond, 18, during Operation Panther’s Claw, the offensive against insurgent strongholds in Helmand.

The convoy was hit on July 1 last year by an improvised explosive device (IED) near Lashkar Gah. The inquests into both men’s deaths heard the Viking armoured vehicle in which the men was travelling is being phased out in Afghanistan. It is due to be replaced this summer by larger and more heavily armoured tracked vehicles known as Warthogs. The hearing was also told that less than a month before he died, Lt Col Thorneloe had sent an e-mail to brigade commanders in Britain warning about the risks posed to troops by a shortage of helicopters. However, it was stated a helicopter would not have been used on the fatal patrol, because it was too dangerous. After the hearing, Major Thorneloe, said: "I think that you could say, I could say, that if my son was killed, as he was, then one good thing might have come from it - and that was that it made the nation, but more importantly the Government, realise that it was a war that we are involved in in Afghanistan and that you don’t fight wars based on hope, you fight them based on the worst case and you have all the requisite equipment to manage it." "I hope that...... at least the Armed Forces were better equipped as a result of the funds made available accordingly." David Ridley, the Wiltshire and Swindon coroner, recorded verdicts of unlawful killing while on active service. Lt Col Thorneloe was the most senior Army officer to have been killed in action since Lt Col “H” Jones, VC, who died leading an attack at Goose Green in the Falklands in May 1982. The commander's colleagues told the hearing that he was always keen to set an example for his men. Cpl Kevin Williams, of the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, who survived the blast, and was the first to attend to Lt Col Thorneloe, said the commanding officer “told the guy (the other soldier) to get down and he would take his place.” The inquest in Trowbridge, Wilts, heard Lt Col Thorneloe had also helped his men conduct a drill with metal detectors, known as “Op Barma”, shortly before the blast. Major Andrew Speed, Lt Col Thorneloe’s second in command, added: "Like all good leaders, Col Rupert wanted to get on the ground. Any good leader wants to get a good feel for what his troops are doing. He was a hands-on guy." "He was extremely bright and intelligent. He wanted to see for himself what was happening, which you couldn’t do from simply by listening to a radio." Major Speed also recalled sitting down with Lt Col Thorneloe in the camp. “He told me he was going to do the Barma drills and he was going to be in the lead vehicle. "He wanted to show his troops he was prepared to do what they were doing, and they could only be inspired by that." Major Speed told the coroner he was aware that Lt Col Thorneloe had sent an e-mail to brigade commanders in Britain warning about the risks posed to troops by a shortage of helicopters. However, he had not been aware of its content. Maj Speed said: "He (Lt Col Thorneloe) had his own mind. He wanted to share his views with someone else outside Afghanistan." Maj Speed
added that a helicopter would not have been used on the fatal patrol, because there was a risk it might have been shot down. Earlier Cpl Williams said the Viking had received an armour upgrade to its front section, but not to the rear, where the blast struck. The inquest heard the Viking had since had an armour upgrade to its rear section. The hearing was also told the Viking, which is known to be vulnerable to Taleban attack, was being phased out in Afghanistan. It is due to be replaced this summer by larger and more heavily armoured tracked vehicles known as Warthogs. Lt Col Thorneloe left behind a wife, Sally, and two daughters, Hannah, and Sophie, then aged four and two. Mrs Thorneloe and Trooper Hammond’s mother and stepfather, Sarah and Kevin Finnegan, attended the hearing.


#26. General Sir Richard Dannatt to be Conservative defence adviser.

By James Kirkup, at the Conservative party conference in Manchester Published: 1:26PM BST 07 Oct 2009

Sir Richard, who has been an outspoken critic of Labour, will be given a seat in the House of Lords and a role advising the Conservative defence team. He stepped down as Chief of the General Staff in August. David Cameron, the Conservative leader, will announce the appointment in his speech to the party conference on Thursday. The appointment is a coup for the Tories, since Sir Richard has become one of the best-known Tables in the public debate about defence. It is also certain to ignite a new row with the Labour Party. Labour MPs and peers have this year been accused of attempting to tarnish Sir Richard’s reputation after he criticised the Government over its support for defence. In office, Sir Richard publicly said that ministers were not providing enough support and equipment for troops in the frontline in Iraq and Afghanistan. He retired in late August and has this week resumed his criticism of the Government, saying that Gordon Brown vetoed a vital troop reinforcement in Afghanistan to save money. It is rare for former service chiefs to align themselves openly with any political party. Most former defence chiefs sent to the Lords sit as cross-benchers, and attempt to stay out of party politics. Sir Richard’s appointment is likely to strain the already-poor relationship between Labour ministers and the senior military.

Mr Cameron's spokeswoman refused to give details of the appointment. But she said: "I can confirm that there is an announcement tomorrow." Admiral Lord West, the former First Sea Lord, serves in Gordon Brown's Government as security minister. His decision to accept the post in 2007 caused private consternation among other retired commanders. Shadow home secretary Chris Grayling afterwards said he hoped General Dannatt's appointment was not a "gimmick" - apparently under the mistaken impression that it was Gordon Brown, and not his own leader, who was offering the general a job. Mr Grayling told BBC News: "I admire the work of General Dannatt and other senior generals who've done so much in Afghanistan and done so much to lead. "I hope that this isn't a political gimmick. We've seen too many appointments in this Government of external people where it's all been about Gordon Brown's PR. "General Dannatt's an experienced Table and should rightly be working alongside government. I'm always suspicious of Government's motives when it does things like this." Home Secretary Alan Johnson seized on the gaffe, saying: "What we've seen today is that Chris Grayling is so keen to do Britain down, he'll attack anything - including his own party." Mr Grayling later said he was "delighted" by the appointment and blamed a "misunderstanding" for his earlier comments - admitting they were "a bit embarrassing really". But Lib Dem home affairs spokesman Chris Huhne said Mr Grayling had "let the cat out of the bag." "There is no real difference between Labour and the Tories when it comes to gimmicks rather than solutions," he said.
#27. PM apologises over soldier letter

Gordon Brown has telephoned the mother of a soldier killed in Afghanistan to apologise after apparently misspelling his name in a letter of sympathy.

Guardsman Jamie Janes, 20, from Brighton, East Sussex, was killed in an explosion in October. In a video distributed by the Sun newspaper, his mother Jacqui called the letter a “hastily scrawled insult”.

But Mr Brown said he was sorry "for any unintended mistake", adding that his writing could be "difficult to read". Guardsman Janes, of 1st Battalion The Grenadier Guards, was killed in an explosion while on foot patrol in Helmand province. According to the Sun, his mother Jacqui was angry when she received the prime minister's letter of condolence in which he appeared to misspell Guardsman Janes's name as "James".

In a statement, he said: "I take very seriously my responsibility to the bereaved. Jacqui Thompson says a letter from the PM helped after her husband died in Afghanistan. "Every time I write a letter to mothers and fathers and partners who have suffered bereavement to express my sincere condolences, it is a moment of personal sadness to me. And I am in awe of the bravery and sacrifice of the men and women of our armed forces. "I send a handwritten letter to every family and I often write to more than one member of the family. "I have telephoned Jacqui Janes to apologise for any unintended mistake in the letter. "To all other families whom I have written to, I can only apologise if my handwriting is difficult to read." The prime minister has previously admitted problems with his eyesight after a childhood rugby injury. He added: "I have at all times acted in good faith seeking to do the right thing. I do not think anyone will believe that I write letters with any intent to cause offence." But Mrs Janes told the Sun that the letter had been "scrawled so quickly I could hardly even read it" and that "some of the words were half-finished". She described it as "disrespectful" and an "insult" to her son. It has emerged that Mr Brown got Jamie Janes's name wrong in the House of Commons on 14 October when he read out a list of 37 soldiers killed in Afghanistan.

The Sun declared during the Labour Party conference that it was switching its support to the Conservatives for the next general election.

George Pascoe Watson, who was the newspaper's political editor until last week, told BBC Radio 4's World at One programme that it was not the Sun attacking the prime minister but Mrs Janes herself.

He added: "The Sun, believe it or not, doesn't want to personalise it on the prime minister although in a case where a prime minister has written a personal letter it's hard not to personalise it."

Business Secretary Lord Mandelson said the story had to be seen in the "context" of the fact that the Sun had chosen to "campaign against Gordon Brown and Labour" in the run-up to the next election. He added: "Anyone who knows the prime minister knows that his handwriting is not great. Lord Mandelson: "His handwriting is not great" But it is absolutely unthinkable that he would want to show any sort of disrespect, not only to Mrs Janes, but to all those who have suffered bereavement and to whom he writes letters. "He cares very deeply about them, which is why he
puts a lot of thought into those letters. I hope, as he and others will do, that Mrs Janes will understand that and not take any offence."

It is official policy for the prime minister to write to the families of all service personnel killed in action while on operational duties. According to Ministry of Defence guidelines published on the Parliament website, the letter is drafted by military officials and should ideally be sent within two working days of the death being announced. The defence secretary writes to the families of members of the armed forces who die in service, including those not on operations.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8349757.stm

#28. If anyone ever suggests to me that politics doesn't matter, I tell them to remember 9 November. It's a day I will never forget.

Nick Robinson | 13:24 UK time, Monday, 9 November 2009

Much heat has been generated by the front page of today's Sun which highlights the anger of a grieving mother who felt insulted by a handwritten letter of condolence from Gordon Brown which misspelled her son's name. What light is shone by this row?

First, that with grief comes anger. Second, that there is widespread anger with Gordon Brown in the military. Third, that the Sun is willing to channel that anger as part of its campaign to be seen to be standing up for "our boys" and to remove Gordon Brown as our prime minister. Fourth, that Gordon Brown has scruffy handwriting and uses a large black felt pen because he has poor sight in his one functioning eye. Fifth, that the Downing Street operation has let its boss down by letting this letter leave the building instead of ensuring it was re-written. So far, so unremarkable. The reason this is a story is because of the widespread sense of doubt about the continued value of British forces fighting and dying in Afghanistan. The row about this letter and the one about the PM's apparent failure to bow his head at the Cenotaph are proxies for the much wider and much more important debate about whether "our boys" are fighting and dying in vain. On 9 November of all days, we'd do well to remember that.


#29. Ainsworth plans law to let soldiers jump waiting lists.

Defence Correspondent

NHS trusts, education authorities and town halls could be prosecuted if they fail to prioritise members of the Armed Forces under plans outlined by Bob Ainsworth. The Defence Secretary is determined that military personnel, veterans and their families should not languish at the bottom of waiting lists for healthcare, school places and social housing. In a speech to the Royal United Services Institute defence think-tank yesterday, Mr Ainsworth said he wants to give them legally binding priority access to a range of public services in an Armed Forces Community Charter, to be unveiled as early as the new year. Members of the Armed Forces would be given priority access to healthcare if they were ill, while schools could be told to exceed their admission limits to find places for the children of military families. This would effectively enshrine in British law the principles of the 'military-covenant' - the duty of care the nation pledges to troops in recognition of their extraordinary sacrifices. The proposal came as a survey of NHS hospitals raised questions over the success of the Government's existing scheme to give priority treatment to veterans suffering ill-health as a result of military service. The Liberal Democrats found 80 per cent of 118 NHS Trusts in England surveyed had no idea if they had treated ex-service personnel under the scheme.
The head of the British Army has called for infantry “boots on the ground” to be preserved, at the expense of costly tanks, aircraft and ships, before what are expected to be devastating post-election defence cuts. General Sir David Richards, Chief of the General Staff, predicted a future in which the military would have to exchange heavy equipment for cheaper, more flexible forces and greater intelligence-gathering capability. His words will help to frame the bruising negotiations for funding between the three Services before a Strategic Defence Review this year. Royal Navy and RAF chiefs will argue their own corner, for the preservation of long-term procurement programmes, some of which General Richards implied will have limited use in the future. Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, the First Sea Lord, and Sir Stephen Dalton, the Air Chief Marshal, are known to disagree with General Richards’s view that conventional “state-on-state” wars are a thing of the past. Admiral Stanhope is to respond today by saying that Britain remains a maritime trading nation that requires naval forces that are adaptable, but capable of fighting “high-intensity warfare”. He will argue that the £5 billion committed to two new aircraft carriers is essential to project British influence around the world for the next 40 years. A recent assessment by the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank, predicted a cut of 30,000 servicemen and 20 per cent of ships, aircraft and ground units across all three Services by 2016. General Richards argued last night that globalisation, and a communications revolution, represented a “horse to tank” moment in the history of warfare. He compared it to the revolution in military tactics after the First World War, fiercely resisted by many within the Armed Forces at the time. He said that future wars would be fought “among the people” and for “their support and trust” and that the fight for the support of the domestic audience was as critical as that for the support of people in the country where troops were deployed.

Future conflicts would require cheaper, more adaptable equipment, such as protected transporters, light naval vessels for coastal waters, surveillance drones and intelligence-gathering assets, he said. “If one equips more for this type of conflict, while significantly reducing the investment in higher-end war-fighting capability, suddenly one can buy an impressive amount of ‘kit’. “We get more bang for our buck in soldiers that can fight one moment, and help others the next, than in ‘exotic’ capability that is rendered irrelevant by advances in technology.” General Richards backed plans by the Tories for a new “stabilisation brigade” within the Army. Among the costly commitments at stake are the RAF’s £20 billion Eurofighter, the Navy’s £10 billion Joint Strike Fighter and two new 64,000-tonne aircraft carriers, as well as the Army’s £16 billion Future Rapid Effects System of new armoured vehicles. General Richards said Britain will continue to face threats from rival states. “These wars are not being fought by a conventional invasion of uniformed troops, ready to be repulsed by heavy armour or ships, but through a combination of economic, cyber, and proxy attacks. Modern state-on-state warfare looks remarkably like irregular conflict.” Countries such as Iran, he suggested, were effectively ducking direct conflict in their use of proxies in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan.
First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, the head of the Royal Navy, will warn today that Britain must maintain its military capabilities if it is to retain its influence in the world. Arguing that the Armed Forces needs to win wars with “hard power”, he will say: “We must look beyond Afghanistan . . . we must be prepared for surprises and strategic shocks. The Falklands war was such an event. It came in from left-field.” According to an advance text of his speech, he will say the Navy “contributes significantly to the overall business of defence across the globe, and to fully understand the full scope of this business we need to assess in strategic terms how we use it and the other services for the overall benefit of the taxpayer”.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6993165.ece

#32. Outcry by military top brass forces Cameron to delay General Sir Richard Dannatt’s appointment as Tory peer

By Ian Drury Last updated at 8:16 PM on 24th January 2010

The former head of the British Army rejected an offer to become a minister as soon as the Conservatives formed the government amid bizarre fears he could prosecuted. David Cameron planned to hand General Sir Richard Dannatt a peerage and make him a frontbench defence spokesman immediately if his party won the general election. The Tory leader pulled off a huge coup in October last year when he revealed that the former Chief of the General Staff had agreed to be one of his military advisers. David Cameron's plan to install Sir Richard Dannatt (R) as a peer has been effectively blocked by military chiefs. But Sir Richard turned down the offer after it became clear he risked be prosecuted under the Army Act for accepting a political post while still technically a serving officer. He quit as the nation's top soldier in August but remained on the Army payroll, with a £14,000-a-month salary, until November 22. But furious Labour MPs have sought revenge against the General - a fierce critic of the Government's treatment of frontline troops - by raising the possibility of disciplinary action for allegedly breaching military regulations. The appointment also sparked a backlash from military chiefs - said to include the current head of the Army General Sir David Richards - who expressed concern that making Sir Richard a minister could jeopardise the independence of the military. Traditionally retired commanders who are given seats in the House of Lords sit as cross-benchers and steer clear of party politics. Questioned about the possibility of becoming a minister, Sir Richard said: 'I certainly shan't become a defence minister this year. 'I think that would be counter-productive and I think it would be most unwise. I'm more than happy to make general advice available to the Conservative party'. His decision to rule out becoming a minister immediately will be seen as a major victory for shadow Defence Secretary Liam Fox. The Tory frontbencher was incandescent with rage at Sir Richard's comments that the Tory defence team 'lacked expert understanding'. His appointment was mired in controversy on the day it was announced when shadow Home Secretary Chris Grayling, who had not been told and instead thought Sir Richard was becoming a Labour adviser, described it as a 'political gimmick'. A senior Tory source said: 'David Cameron believed that securing General Sir Richard Dannatt in a new Conservative government would be a major coup but it caused


#33. Army denied vital equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan, claims former SAS head

By Thomas Harding, Defence Correspondent, telegraph.co.uk Published: 10:21PM GMT 04 Mar 2010
British troops were deprived of the right equipment to fight wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and were still being hampered by a lack of resources, the former head of special forces has claimed.

In a withering assessment of the “doomed” state of the military, the recently retired Lt Gen Sir Graeme Lamb said that the SAS had been denied even Vietnam-era equipment that could have saved lives.

Resources remained insufficient to fight current and future conflicts, with much of the Army’s equipment “either broken or lacking”, he warned. Sir Graeme’s attack, in a speech to senior officers, is disclosed as Gordon Brown faces questions at the Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq war. The inquiry has been told that the Armed Forces were forced to cope without a wide range of equipment because of a lack of funds from the Treasury when Mr Brown was chancellor. General Lord Gurthrie of Craigiebank, who was chief of the defence staff from 1997 to 2001, also said soldiers died in Afghanistan because Gordon Brown starved the Army of funding when he was Chancellor. “Not fully funding the Army in the way they had asked ... undoubtedly cost the lives of soldiers. He should be asked why he was so unsympathetic towards defence and so sympathetic to other departments,” he told The Times. Senior defence sources sought to limit the damage caused by the attacks. They claimed that Sir Graeme’s views were “outdated” and did not reflect the “dramatic” changes that had taken place since General Sir David Richards took over as Chief of the General Staff in August. Sir Graeme accepted that, under Sir David, Afghanistan had been pushed to the top of the agenda and he had forced “the pace of change”. The former director of special forces is regarded as one of the Army’s most influential officers. During a distinguished career, he was in charge of both the SAS and the Special Boat Service before retiring three months ago to take up a post with the American General Stanley McChrystal as head of the counter-insurgency effort in Afghanistan. In his speech, Sir Graeme said that politicians and the Civil Service bore “considerable blame” for the decline of the military. He said that the Iraq conflict had “tarnished” Britain’s standing and, until recently, Afghanistan had been “stumbling towards failure”. The Armed Forces were “pretty much doomed on our current course and thinking” and would become the “dumpster of irrelevancy” unless they changed direction radically and gained the right equipment to fight today’s wars, he said. The focus on investing in ships, aircraft and tanks had endangered lives because it had left forces such as the SAS inadequately equipped with basic equipment, he claimed. He warned that the Armed Forces were “clearly in decline” and were increasingly seen as “irrelevant” by the public and politicians. Sir Graeme disclosed that the lack of equipment had compromised the Bravo Two Zero SAS raid into Iraq in 1991, which included the soldier-turned-author Andy McNab. Helicopters were not equipped with a basic infra-red device to allow pilots to see at night — a piece of Vietnam-era kit — which meant that the eight-man patrol was left on the ground at the mercy of Saddam Hussein’s army. Three men died. A decade later, helicopters were still not equipped with the infra-red equipment, which almost led to the loss of two Chinooks as special forces tried to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan. This was an example of a military that could do nothing more than “band-aid prevention”, said Sir Graeme.

The Ministry of Defence was buying equipment “we probably do not need” and unless it “mothball, cancel or break our procurement overdraft or sit down and reshape the force we so desperately need, we are unlikely to do anything”, he warned. “The future is bloody grim either way,” he said, “and the Reaper, unless you are prepared to prevent him, is probably going to join us for dinner.” Sir Graeme said that the military had to share the blame for the situation. The officer, known for his straight-talking, said that the Army’s leadership needed to “look no further than the mirror to identify the guilty party”. Sir Graeme, who has been credited by the American General David Petraeus as a key architect in defeating the Iraqi insurgency, said that the Army’s leadership was at a “crossroads” where either “you play safe and join us old blokes or cry havoc and do your duty”. “We in uniform, the Armed Forces of this nation, are at fault for failing to recognise the changing character of the threats we face and then to do our duty and to set our store by the defence of this realm: all in all a somewhat damning indictment,” he said. He added: “What you face is simply a moral challenge, a test of will and commitment that if you believe that all is not well – change it; do
not wrestle with the sum of your fears; but embrace the course you believe to be right and charge down it; forge the trail and drag the rest with you."

Sir Graeme's speech comes at a time of intense debate into how the Armed Forces should be structured to face tomorrow's threats. The Army, which has done the majority of the fighting over the past decade, is at loggerheads with the Navy and RAF who want to retain the expensive warship, submarine and aircraft programmes. The Army says it requires much greater investment in land forces to fight wars that will be similar to Afghanistan and Iraq. Sir Graeme later said that because the personnel in all three services were "exceptional" they deserved to get "what they need to meet both the challenges we face and will face". Defence sources said last night that the Army would undergo a major overhaul if Sir David won the argument for more of the defence budget to be diverted to land forces. Responding to Sir Graeme's comments, Sir David said: "The views expressed by Lt Gen Lamb reflect those of a distinguished but retired general speaking at a private, off-the-record gathering with the aim of causing controversy and provoking debate. In that he was successful though his comments were not supported. I would like to make it clear that, as I saw in Afghanistan recently, the Army is fit, equipped, motivated and ready for any challenge.

"Furthermore, it is clear from support for military events and charities throughout the country that the people have never held the Army, or indeed the wider Armed Forces, in higher regard." The bodies of four British servicemen killed within six days in Afghanistan were flown home on Thursday. Sgt Paul Fox, 34, of 28 Engineer Regiment, Rfn Martin Kinggett, 19, of 4 Rifles, SAC Luke Southgate, 20, of II Squadron RAF Regiment, and Rfn Carlo Apolis, 28, also of 4 Rifles, were repatriated to RAF Lyneham in Wiltshire. The MoD named a British soldier shot dead on patrol in Afghanistan on Tuesday as Cpl Richard Green, 23, of 3 Rifles Recce Platoon.


#34. Former Afghanistan commander accuses ministers over 'shameful' compensation for injured soldiers. Soldiers injured in Iraq and Afghanistan are being denied proper compensation following a "shameful" decision by Government ministers, a former commander of British forces discloses today.
By Holly Watt and Martin Beckford  Published: 7:30AM GMT 04 Mar 2010

More than 100 soldiers severely wounded in the conflicts between 2001 and 2005 have received paltry payouts. The compensation is worth hundreds of thousands of pounds less than that paid to their colleagues injured later in the wars. Colonel Richard Kemp, the former Commander of British forces in Afghanistan, today accuses ministers of betraying their "moral obligations" towards those facing a lifetime of disability following their service. Col Kemp is launching a campaign, called Lives on the Line, to lobby the Government to increase the compensation paid to the injured troops. The intervention of such a senior military Table is highly embarrassing for the Prime Minister who is due to appear before the Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq War tomorrow. Gordon Brown is expected to face detailed questioning over allegations that he has starved the military of funding. The Prime Minister has also been accused of neglecting injured troops and the relatives of victims. Earlier this year, under intense pressure, Mr Brown agreed to proposals to increase the compensation to injured soldiers. However, the improved payments are only available to those injured after April 2005. Those injured before are only entitled to a war pension of up to £150 a week when they leave the services, whereas more recent casualties immediately receive a lump sum of up to £500,000. Col Kemp says that the arbitrary date chosen by the Ministry of Defence means that soldiers who have been left severely disabled while fighting for their country have been left far less able to rebuild their lives than comrades in the same battle zones.
Writing in *The Daily Telegraph*, the former British commander said: “I would like to be able to say that the scheme is now worthy of the heroes it exists to compensate. But shamefully it does not include all of those heroes. “The new compensation scheme was introduced in recognition of the changed circumstances of 21st century military service in the era of the global war on terror. “Yet it explicitly excludes Service men and women wounded before April 2005. “This makes no sense. The war on terror, with Afghanistan and Iraq being its two most active theatres to date, began in 2001.” It is estimated that at least 100 service men and women injured at the start of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq received no immediate compensation, and that it would be relatively affordable to give them the same treatment as those wounded more recently in gunfights or bomb blasts. Col Kemp said that the Government “doesn’t seem to get” the demands currently being put on Britain’s troops. “Our forces unfailingly meet the demands we make of them,” he said. “They risk life and limb, thousands of miles away, often in the most horrific battle conditions, so that we can live in safety and security in the comfort of our homes. “To them we must discharge not just our legal obligations, of which the government is so proud, but also our moral obligations, which are far more challenging but nevertheless essential. The hallmark of the compensation we provide for our wounded should be those same core values, in particular respect and loyalty.” Injured soldiers who are being denied proper compensation after being injured in Iraq and Afghanistan include Lance Corporal Daniel Twiddy, Corporal Neil Heritage and Corporal Mick Brennan. LCpl Twiddy was injured in a friendly fire incident shortly after the start of the war in 2003, while Cpl Heritage and Cpl Brennan were hurt in a car bomb attack in November 2004. Both Cpl Heritage and Cpl Brennan lost both their legs above the knee, while LCpl Twiddy has undergone over 20 skin grafts for burns. Under the changes introduced recently, anyone injured after April 2005 provides a lump sum payment of up to £570,000. The most seriously injured also receive a monthly Guaranteed Income Payment when they leave the services to compensate for loss of earnings, which could be worth up to £1.5 million over a lifetime.

A review of the compensation scheme was carried out by Lord Boyce, former Chief of the Defence Staff, considered whether improvements should be made available to members of the Armed Forces who were injured before the start of the scheme, but decided against the move. Launched with the help of Stewarts Law, a leading City legal firm, *Lives on the Line* calls upon ministers to acknowledge that the cut-off date for the new compensation system is arbitrary and unfair. It demands that payments under the improved scheme are backdated to September 2001 so that all those injured in Afghanistan and Iraq are treated the same, entitling them to the same quality of life. It is estimated it would cost the Government less than £30 million to provide lump sum payments to the 100 who were injured in the two theatres of war before April 2005. Col Kemp said: “The scheme should be based above and beyond all else on fair and just treatment for those troops who are wounded while fighting for their country. “These brave men and women put their lives on the line for us. We must fight for fairness for them.” Stuart Dench, a partner at law firm Stewarts Law, who is advising the campaign on a pro-bono basis, said: “It is manifestly unfair that a soldier seriously injured just prior to the April 2005 changes will not be compensated, while a soldier injured immediately after will, despite the fact that both fought in the same conflict and made the same sacrifice. “People like Cpl Neil Heritage were horrifically injured in a suicide bomb attack in Iraq six months before the new arrangements came into force. As a result of the blast he lost both of his legs. Unless the law is changed he will not receive proper compensation for his injuries and his future prospects will be severely limited.”

Last night, Kevan Jones, the Veterans Minister, said: “The Armed Forces Compensation Scheme Review was conducted under the independent chairmanship of Admiral the Lord Boyce and supported by experts in compensation, medicine, law, by service charities and by stakeholders representing injured personnel, their families and the bereaved. “The review did not recommend extending AFCS provisions beyond the start of the scheme.” The MoD added that it would be equally unfair to deny the improved compensation to those who had been injured while away from the battlefield, such as while training or playing sport.

#35.  **Browne accused of ‘misleading’ over Snatch vehicles** (pictured during a visit on Saturday to the Shawqat base in Lashkar Gar, southern Afghanistan, faces criticism over the Army’s Snatch Landrovers).

Tom Coglan  The Times Mon 8 Mar 2010  pg 27

Gordon Brown was criticised by the Conservatives yesterday after it claimed the Government had merely repeated an earlier announcement to replace Snatch Land Rover with new vehicles – while cutting the order by half. A tender notice for 400 LPPV (Light Protected Patrol Vehicles) vehicles was sent out in February 2009...Bill Rammell, the Armed Forces Minister said:...“we have not decided to reduce the overall requirement...we decided to procure 200 LPPV under a Urgent operational Requirement as soon as the design was ready.”Campaigners have spent five years calling for the Snatch to be withdrawn from service because of the poor protection it offers from roadside bombs. A total of 37 British soldiers have been killed in Iraq while using the Snatch in Iraq and Afghanistan.

#36.  **Generals must keep their noses out of politics**

From The Times  March 12, 2010  Vernon Bogdanor

Heads of the Armed Forces cannot escape their share of the blame if soldiers do not have the right equipment. Are our Armed Services becoming politised? General Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank, a former Chief of the Defence Staff, who has chaired the Conservative Party’s Way Forward Defence Study, said this week that the plight of British forces was “dire”. General Sir Richard Dannatt made outspoken criticisms of defence policy during his tenure as head of the Army. In May 2009 he declared that the defence budget was “unbalanced” and “heavily skewed” towards high-tech expensive equipment irrelevant to the conflict in Afghanistan. Shortly after he left the Army, in August 2009, it was announced that he would become a Conservative peer with the possibility of a ministerial post in a Conservative government. The Shadow Home Secretary, Chris Grayling, denounced this as a “political gimmick”. But that was because he thought that Sir Richard was becoming an adviser to Labour. If the defence budget was indeed “unbalanced” and the priorities were wrong, the heads of the Armed Services cannot escape their share of the blame. For not only do they sit on the highest decision-making bodies of the Ministry of Defence but they also, unlike civil servants, enjoy an effective veto over decisions through the threat of resignation — one that, apparently, they do not hesitate to deploy. Had Lord Guthrie taken the view that helicopters should be given priority over, for example, anti-submarine warfare or high-concept vehicle programmes, it is difficult to believe that his view would not have prevailed.

In July 2006 the rising threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq prompted the MoD to order new patrol vehicles to add to their fleet of Snatch Land Rovers. Many in the ministry favoured the Mastiff, based on a new mine-resistant design, but the Army argued for more Vector vehicles, which gave less protection but better all-terrain performance. They did not, at that stage, expect IEDs to become the biggest threat in Afghanistan as well as Iraq. The cost of the two vehicles was roughly the same. A compromise was reached, with some of each being ordered. The Mastiff proved to give excellent protection against IEDs in Afghanistan and Iraq and was good value for money. The Vector proved to be a liability that the MoD is now seeking to phase out. Getting the right equipment for Afghanistan is more complex than simply handing over money or giving the military what it asks for.

Decisions on the defence budget are taken jointly by politicians, officials and the heads of the Armed Services. None should seek to evade responsibility for decisions jointly taken. No doubt the heads of the Armed Services do not get everything they want. Few of those in charge of public services ever find themselves in that happy position. Governments have the unenviable task of balancing priorities between different public services — defence, health,
education etc. They rarely achieve a solution that satisfies every spending department. Yet we do not find the Permanent Secretary at the Department of Health or his predecessors publicly denouncing the government that they have served. The heads of the Armed Forces are required to serve governments of different political colours. They are, therefore, constitutionally, in a similar position to civil servants. They are not entitled to express views on policy matters that differ from those of the government of the day; and indeed when Conservative governments in the 1990s decided to close military hospitals and to sell off service housing, the chiefs of staff, rightly, made no public protest.

The chiefs of staff, of course, have the right, indeed the duty, to express their views as robustly as possible to ministers, as Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, did during the war. Indeed, he was so tough that one of Churchill’s cronies told him: “The Prime Minister thinks you hate him.” But Brooke never allowed the slightest hint of disagreement to reach Parliament or the public. To have done so would have undermined confidence both in the Government and in the conduct of the war. Retired chiefs of the defence staff have customarily been allowed more leeway than retired civil servants. It is generally accepted, for example, that they have the right to publish memoirs defending their record. They are not required to take a Trappist vow of silence. Even so, it would be wrong for them to reveal details of confidential discussions with ministers, and any criticisms that they make of governments they have served should be in measured and careful tones. Lord Guthrie’s remark that “not fully funding the Army ... undoubtedly cost the lives of soldiers”, blaming Gordon Brown for loss of life because of decisions made when he was Chancellor, hardly falls within that category. It is unseemly to use the deaths of soldiers in Afghanistan as the basis for a personal attack upon the Prime Minister. If the heads of the Armed Services, past or present, become partisan, governments will appoint only yes men, who can be relied upon never to challenge ministers. To break the constitutional convention by which the Armed Forces remain politically neutral would, therefore, do lasting damage to the relationship between government and the Armed Services.

Both Germany in the years before Hitler, and France during the Algerian War, offer graphic illustrations of the dangers that arise when an army becomes politicised. But we do not need to look abroad to find examples. Before 1914, Major-General Henry Wilson, Director of Military Operations at the War Office, sought to sabotage the Liberal Government’s policy of Irish Home Rule by providing the Conservative Opposition with details of confidential ministerial discussions. Some serving officers declared that they would refuse to obey orders if the Government sought to move against illegal arms depots in Ulster. No one of sense would want a repetition of the conflict between “frocks” and “brass hats” that so damaged Britain’s military efforts during the First World War. To abandon the principle of a non-political Civil Service would be a great mistake. To abandon the principle of a non-political Army would be a catastrophe.

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http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article7058904.ece

#37. Steve McQueen at war with Royal Mail over stamp memorial to UK soldiers. When war artist Steve McQueen started on a tribute to troops he did not expect a battle with Royal Mail. McQueen says it is shameful that Royal Mail will not issue his postage stamp portraits.

Tony Allen-Mills From The Sunday Times March 14, 2010

Steve McQueen spent only six days in Iraq seven years ago, but the mission he undertook as an official UK war artist remains far from accomplished. This week, McQueen’s profoundly moving exhibition of postage stamp portraits of British soldiers killed in Iraq moves to the National Portrait Gallery in London after an extended tour. It should be a moment of satisfaction for the Turner prize-winning artist and film maker, who will mark Saturday’s opening of his Queen and Country exhibition with the publication of a new book.
recording more than 150 facsimile postage stamp sheets he created from photographs provided by the families of war dead. Instead, McQueen is spoiling for a fight. After months of patient lobbying, the 40-year-old British artist has failed to persuade Royal Mail to turn his project into real commemorative stamps. The memorial project he always envisaged as a living tribute — with real stamps on real envelopes landing every morning on British doormats — has been stalled by faceless bureaucrats wielding what McQueen considers insulting excuses. McQueen, a burly, barrel-chested Table, looks ready to punch the first postman he sees. “I don’t understand,” he growls. “I just don’t get it. These are people who died for their country. Who is obstructing this and why?” McQueen is more used to acclaim than obstruction. We meet in New York, where a gallery is showing two of his art films. He picked up a Caméra d’Or at Cannes in 2008 for his film Hunger, which covered the last six weeks in the life of Bobby Sands, the IRA hunger striker. Queen and Country, which places sheets of stamps in individual drawers in a large oak chest, has won near-universal praise as a poignant memorial that in the words of a critic at The Times, “is clearly neither anti-war nor pro-war”. When McQueen first proposed his idea to British officials, he was asked if he couldn’t do “landscapes or watercolours” instead. The Ministry of Defence flatly refused to supply him with the names and addresses of soldiers’ relatives and he had to find them himself. “My whole idea was collaboration [with the families],” he says. When he first wrote to relatives asking for pictures he could use on his stamps, he found himself “sitting in my bed, head in hands, thinking no one is going to respond”. Then slowly, one by one, the letters arrived, each with a picture of a lost loved one. Many of them were neither sombre nor formal like their official army mugshots, but showed smiling, laughing faces, many of them terribly young. “And I thought, ‘My God, this is happening’,” says McQueen. “And this is why we are here today — because of the families’ response. They are contributing to this artwork, it’s theirs as well as ours and that’s where the power comes from, really.” Now to be told that putting soldiers’ faces on real stamps might upset those selfsame families — as Royal Mail suggests — has him shaking his head in disbelief. “Every argument they’ve given us we’ve answered,” he says, scowling. “They just don’t have an argument and it needs to be exposed. It’s shameful.” He leans back in his chair, gripping the arms with his big, soft hands, and mutters again under his breath: “It’s shameful.” For Royal Mail, a public company wholly owned by the government, a public relations nightmare has ensued. Everyone knows that postage stamp issues are sensitive. Yet who can really argue against Queen and Country? What could possibly be controversial about patriotism, duty and sacrifice? Why shouldn’t the faces of British soldiers who died in Iraq on Her Majesty’s service appear on Her Majesty’s stamps? When these questions were put to Royal Mail last week, a spokesman cited the results of an “independent” survey of British servicemen and women. “In the survey, over 75% of respondents felt that it would be both distressing and disrespectful to use images of recently deceased servicemen and women, particularly because of the way they are cancelled/defaced with ink as they pass through our sorting equipment and also because used stamps are mostly binned,” the spokesman declared. He went on to insist that the issue was not about “the artwork involved”, but about highlighting the role of the armed services “presented in a way that they want”. According to the Royal Mail survey, our troops would prefer their contribution and sacrifices to be recorded on stamps with an “iconic symbol”, such as a poppy. McQueen snorts. “Oh, don’t give me any of that cock and bull,” he says. “Don’t hide behind the families, saying they will be upset. We’ve got 93% of the relatives who say they want the stamps to happen. It’s outrageous, it’s obstruction, it’s a nonsense.” Keisha Meade thinks it’s a nonsense, too. Her brother, Fusilier Donal Meade, died in Basra province in September 2005 after his vehicle ran over a roadside bomb. He was 20 years old. Keisha liked McQueen’s idea from the start — “a way for the public to appreciate what our boys had done”, she says. Donal’s mother was initially sceptical “but soon came round”. A few military families she knew stayed away from the project, finding it “too painful”; many others joined her in digging through family albums for a photo to send McQueen. Keisha, a 26-year-old IT worker from London, now thinks it’s a “shame” that Royal Mail will not issue the stamps. She doesn’t think much of the franking/defacing argument. “Let’s be honest. It’s a stamp. It’s not a medal or other piece of memorabilia. And no one complains if Christmas or any other kind of stamp gets defaced. It’s a pretty poor excuse,” she says. Keisha suspects that political correctness may be to blame. “I think our sense of right and wrong is being distorted,” she says. “We are unable to
do things for fear of offending someone.” She wonders if Royal Mail is worried about somehow offending Muslims. “It’s no longer acceptable to do something patriotic because it might be misinterpreted.” There will be no mention of these controversies in McQueen’s new book of the project, which contains only a few lines of text. Pondering the layout some time ago, McQueen was struck by the notion of trying to convey the idea of a minute’s silence to accompany the soldiers’ photographs. “I thought of poetry, then who could do this,” he says. A few years earlier in New York, he had met Derek Walcott, the Nobel prize-winning Caribbean poet. “I rang him, and spoke to him about silence. How do you verbalise a minute’s silence?” says McQueen, whose parents were both born in the West Indies. “We spoke twice, and by the third time he was finished.” Walcott says now that the task of conveying silence in words first seemed a “terrifying prospect, but came out tolerably well”. His poem is published for the first time by The Sunday Times today; Walcott suggested that readers “leave spaces” between the lines, allowing the silence to be heard. Yet as far as McQueen is concerned, the book is merely another step towards his ultimate artistic goal, which couldn’t be simpler in concept, but which has somehow become so hard to attain. “I wanted stamps, I just wanted stamps,” he says. “Maybe I’m too optimistic, but I thought how could they possibly be against it? You think people are better than they actually are.” He still hopes that some higher authority — perhaps the Queen herself — will “listen to reason and do the honourable thing”. But for now he can’t hide his dismay. “Why do we have to be mediocre?” he muses. “Why can’t we be brilliant?”

**Requiem**

A stamp. Its white echo on this page.

The sliding white screen of a cloud.

Silence. A widening blizzard, the linen of surrender.

Silence. When the bugler’s cornet is folded.

Once the boots have stamped, the last order shouted Under the old memorial’s gesturing bronze.

Stamp after stamp, silence, for the young ones who never made it to the harbour of white hair, the bay of old age.

Silence. On the white desert of the page.

Silence. That fills the crowd in the stone square.

There was dew in their eyes. Wet prisms, bright, tender.

*Derek Walcott*

• The Queen and Country book is published by the British Council and will be available for purchase in the National Portrait Gallery bookshop at a special exhibition price of £22 or through www.cornerhouse.org.uk for £25. Those wishing to show their support for the campaign can do so at www.artfund.org/queenandcountry

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/search/?queryText=MOD+loses+sight+of+reality&Search=Search

#38. Finally, Gordon Brown is forced to admit the truth about Defence spending
Even when Gordon Brown is forced to admit he has made a mistake, he still cannot bring himself to tell the truth. At today's PMQ's the prime minister was finally forced to admit something most of us knew already, that, as Chancellor, he presided over a cut, in real terms, in the defence budget. Mr Brown has, of course, been in denial about this rather important fact for many years. He even maintained the fiction that the defence budget had increased under his watch when he appeared before the Chilcot Inquiry. But today he was finally forced to admit that the opposite was the case, and that he had presided over a reduction in the defence budget at the same time as his government expected the military to fight two wars at the same time, in Iraq and Afghanistan. But even when he was forced on the defensive by hostile questioning by David Cameron, Mr Brown still could not bring himself to tell the whole truth. He admitted that “in one or two years” defence spending had fallen in real terms, when in fact official MOD Tables show the budget declined in most of the years he was chancellor. Now the cat is out of the bag, perhaps Mr Brown would like to come clean on what has really happened to the defence budget during the past 13 years of Labour misrule.


#30. Brown admits defence budget did NOT rise every year - as he claimed to Iraq inquiry

By Nicola Boden
Last updated at 5:31 PM on 17th March 2010

Gordon Brown was today forced to admit misleading the official inquiry into the Iraq war by insisting the defence budget had risen in real terms every year under Labour. In a huge blow to his personal credibility, he was caught out by Commons Tables that proved the budget had actually fallen four times while he was Chancellor. The admission vindicates military chiefs who had accused the Prime Minister of being ‘disingenuous’ in his evidence to the Chilcot inquiry earlier this month. Mr Brown was forced to concede the truth at PMQs when confronted with the Tables by Tory MP Tony Baldry, who demanded he set the record straight. Climbdown: Gordon Brown admitted at PMQs today that defence spending had not risen in real terms every year. Mr Brown tried to dress up the climbdown by insisting defence spending had risen in cash terms and was now 12 per cent higher than it had been in 1997. But he told MPs: ‘I do accept that in one or two years defence expenditure did not rise in real terms’. He said he was writing to Sir John Chilcot, the chairman of the Iraq inquiry, to ‘clarify' his claims - a move that will fuel demands for him to be recalled for fresh questioning.

‘The Iraqi expenditure was being met, but at the same time the defence budget was rising in real terms every year’.

‘The spending review of 2004 gave the Ministry of Defence a rising level of real spending, moving from 1.2 per cent to 1.4 per cent in real terms each year’.

‘The defence budget is rising every year in real terms and where the MoD asked for equipment under urgent operational requirements, that equipment was given’.

‘I do accept that in one or two years, defence expenditure did not rise in real terms’.

Defence spending actually fell in four financial years while Gordon Brown was Chancellor.

In 1997/8, it was down 2.2 per cent, the next year it was down 0.4 per cent, in 2004/5 it fell 0.7 per cent and in 2006/7 it fell 0.1 per cent. Critics seized on the admission as proof Mr
Brown had misled Parliament with 'fantasy Tables' and it risks being hugely damaging just weeks before he is set to call an election. David Cameron said: 'In three years of asking the Prime Minister questions, I don't think I have ever heard him make a correction or retraction.

'The fact is, if you look at defence spending or defence budget cuts, there have been years with real-terms cuts and at last the Prime Minister has admitted it'. There was further embarrassment when the Commons Library research note revealed defence spending had not just fallen once or twice, as Mr Brown told MPs, but during four financial years while he was Chancellor. It fell 2.2 per cent in 1997/8, his first year at the Treasury and another 0.4 per cent in the following year. For 2004/5, the year after the invasion of Iraq when the Armed Forces were engaged both there and in Afghanistan, it fell 0.7 per cent. There was another 0.1 per cent drop in 2006/7. The average annual increase between 1997 and 2009 was 2.7 per cent but the paper noted the Table 'is likely to have been distorted by current operations'.

Shadow defence secretary Liam Fox said: 'This is a humiliating climbdown for Gordon Brown as his attempt to rewrite history has failed and his fantasy Tables have been exposed'. He has made repeated and fundamentally false claims, misleading Parliament, the public and, worst of all, the armed forces and their families'. I was pleased that Sir John Chilcot did not rule out calling Gordon Brown back in front of the Iraq Inquiry and it is now crystal clear that the Prime Minister has some serious explaining to do'. Liberal Democrat defence spokesman Nick Harvey added: 'Gordon Brown should do more than simply clarify the matter with the Iraq Inquiry. He should apologise for the fact that under his watch our troops have not had the equipment they need to do the job'. They have struggled without sufficient helicopters for too long. It is a scandal that it has taken so long to get the Snatch Land Rover out of service in Afghanistan'.

Unbending: Gordon Brown at the Iraq inquiry on March 5, where he insisted defence spending had risen every year. He repeatedly said he had satisfied every plea for funding from the military and baffled the panel with Tables he claimed proved spending had risen throughout his tenure as Chancellor.

Alistair Darling and his opposite numbers George Osborne and Vince Cable will clash over the economy in a three way live television debate. The trio will set out their rescue plans for the economy and how to pay back Britain's £178 billion deficit on the Channel 4 show on Monday March 29. Studio audience members will field questions and the debate will be presented by Channel 4 News presenter Krishnan Guru-Murthy. An agreement to broadcast the programme was finally announced today, after weeks of behind the scenes wrangling by politicians. He said: 'The Iraqi expenditure was being met, but at the same time the defence budget was rising in real terms every year'. He later added: 'The spending review of 2004 gave the Ministry of Defence a rising level of real spending, moving from 1.2 per cent to 1.4 per cent in real terms each year'. He repeated his assertion in the Commons last week when challenged by David Cameron'. The defence budget is rising every year in real terms and where the MoD asked for equipment under urgent operational requirements, that equipment was given,' he said. Lord Guthrie and Lord Boyce, both former heads of the Armed Forces, said after his inquiry appearance that that his evidence was 'disingenuous'. Former Army chief General Sir Richard Dannatt also accused the Prime Minister of 'wishful thinking and rewriting history'. A real terms rise accounts for the effects of inflation. Without it, it means budgets are effectively cut because of rising costs.

Former Chief of the Defence Staff Lord Guthrie: 'He (Gordon Brown) cannot get away with saying: "I gave them everything they asked for." That is simply disingenuous'. Ex-Chief of
the Defence Staff, Admiral Lord Boyce: 'He (Gordon Brown) is dissembling, he's being disingenuous. It's just not the case the MoD was given everything it needed'. Head of the Army Sir David Richards: Defence cuts have triggered a morale crisis among troops which has a 'cumulative and corrosive' effect on them and their families. Colonel Stuart Tootal, a former commander of the 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment in Afghanistan: 'I am quite staggered by the lack of any sense of responsibility. He (Gordon Brown) was the man with the purse strings'. Former head of the Army Sir Richard Dannatt: 'Gordon Brown bears responsibility for not fully funding the defence review of his government, and for claiming credit for increasing funding when actually there was a reduction in value'. Senior Ministry of Defence civil servant Sir Bill Jeffrey: Mr Brown forced the military to make 'cuts' and left them 'very stretched indeed' because he did not give them enough money, saddling commanders with 'significant problems'.

### Former British commander in Afghanistan criticises MoD

Published: 3:08PM GMT 21 Mar 2010

A former British commander in Afghanistan has called for an overhaul of the relationship between policymakers and the front line, saying Whitehall decision-making often "loses sight" of realities on the ground. Major-General Andrew Mackay, who quit last year in an apparent row over Government strategy, criticised the Ministry of Defence for a lack of adaptability. He also spoke out against the equipment provided during his time in theatre and expressed concerns over whether the "right choices" would be made in future. Maj-Gen Mackay resigned from the post of General Officer Commanding Scotland, Northern Ireland and northern England last year over what the MoD said was a "personal matter". But several military sources claimed the senior officer, who commanded the Helmand Task Force from October 2007 until April 2008 and was commended for recapturing the strategic town of Musa Qaleh from the Taliban, quit because of growing unhappiness over the treatment of the Forces. Today, he told BBC Radio 4's The World This Weekend that whoever wins the general election should rethink the structure and relationship between government and the Armed Forces. He said: "We have to remind ourselves that any policy that is generated out of Whitehall or the beltway in Washington ... in the end requires a soldier to leave an operating base in an armoured vehicle and ... talk to the indigenous population or the government of that country. "And sometimes I think that policy loses sight of that hard requirement at the other end". He told the programme that while there was cross-governmental co-operation between departments and institutions, it had significant shortcomings. "There increasingly seems to be competitive tension, whereas what's required is creative tension where you are working more collaboratively," he said. "And you have to recognise that organisational structures and change has to occur if you are going to deal with these problems in an effective manner". Maj-Gen Mackay, who has co-authored a paper describing the MoD as "institutionally incapable", said it had struggled to adapt to the realities of fighting an insurgency. "Part of the problem everyone has when you are looking at this level of conflict is, can organisations adapt and transform themselves in a reasonably adept and agile manner to deal with the conflict you face, rather than the conflict you thought you were going to face or the conflict you would wish to face," he said. "And that is a challenge for all governments dealing with any insurgency... it's one that has particularly challenged the MoD". The general, who was awarded the CBE for his frontline service in Helmand and led Prince Harry during his deployment, also spoke out about equipment during his time in charge. While there had been a "dramatic improvement" over the past 18 months, Maj-Gen Mackay said it was "fair" to say it had not got better fast enough. In a secret memo published in the book Operation Snakebite, Maj-Gen Mackay said there was a "grave crisis" over equipment. Speaking on Sunday, he said: "Equipment has always been an issue for all commanders, be it Afghanistan or Iraq. "And if we go back to the ability of governmental institutions to adapt, it's again that ability to adapt quickly and adroitly enough to provide you with the kind equipment that you want in the right time and the right place on
the right day”. He continued: "There has been a pretty dramatic improvement in the levels of equipment over the last year, year-and-a-half. "At the beginning of the campaign, from 2006 onwards, particularly with 16 Brigade on the entry to Helmand, there were severe deficiencies in the level of equipment and its capabilities. And it had gradually got better over time". Gordon Brown has been accused of starving the military of funds during his time as chancellor, and last week admitted he was wrong to have claimed spending rose every year in real terms. There are concerns that major projects, such as aircraft carriers, may be cut as part of moves to find savings in a difficult economic climate. Maj-Gen Mackay said there was an "opportunity" arising from tighter spending, but asked whether he was "optimistic" about the future, he replied: "I wouldn't necessarily say that. "I think we have got some very tough choices up ahead. Whether or not we will make the right choices remains to be seen".


#41. Lumley hits out at 'smear' campaign over Gurkhas' rights

By Matt Williams, REUTERS Saturday, 27 March 2010

British actress Joanna Lumley stands with former Gurkha soldiers as she speaks to media in front of the Houses of Parliament after appearing at a select committee session, in May 2009. Joanna Lumley today hit out at what she claimed was a Government smear campaign that saw her accused of "deathly silence" over Gurkhas' rights. Earlier this month, defence minister Kevan Jones expressed "irritation" with the actress amid claims that Nepalese veterans had been mislead and exploited. "Her deathly silence, frankly, irritates me," he said. But in a letter circulated today, Ms Lumley denounced the allegations. Signed by the actress, campaigner Peter Carroll and legal advisers Howe & Co Solicitors, it reads: "We feel that these comments are part of a set of actions that constitutes a broader attempt to taint the widely-welcomed positive outcome of the Gurkha Campaign." Last year, after a lengthy battle spearheaded by Lumley, MPs agreed to throw out rules that prevented retired Gurkhas from settling in the UK. But recently questions have been raised concerning the advice given to those wishing to make the move. A parliamentary inquiry is currently looking into allegations that Gurkhas are being encouraged to pay hundreds of pounds in voluntary donations to veterans' organisations in Nepal which then refer them on to UK solicitors. Giving evidence to the Commons Home Affairs Committee, Mr Jones claimed some of the advice being given to veterans was misleading, encouraging them to expect they would have homes provided when they arrive in Britain. He expressed "irritation" with Lumley over what he said was her failure to speak out now the problems have emerged.

Mr Jones said he believes the onus was on Ms Lumley to speak out and make sure the veterans hoping to come to the UK do not need to pay out and should use the system put in place by the Government. In today's statement, the actress said she decided to speak out "so that the hundreds of thousands of people who supported our campaign can remain confident that they backed a just and right cause." The letter states that allegations that the campaign had given false expectations to Gurkhas were "untrue". It adds: "Our campaign’s aim has always been to safeguard and protect the rights of veteran Gurkhas. We will not be bullied out of doing so, and our primary concern will always remain the welfare of the Gurkhas." Ms Lumley is due to hold a press conference on Monday to further respond to attacks on the Gurkha Justice Campaign.


#42. Generals told to travel 2nd class

Isabel Oakeshott, Deputy Political Editor From The Sunday Times March 28, 2010
GORDON BROWN has delivered a final humiliation to the armed forces by ordering admirals, generals and air chief marshals to travel second class to help cut costs. All armed forces personnel must now sit in standard class on trains and planes, whatever their rank, under a new rule that has provoked anger across the political parties. Denis MacShane, the Labour MP and a former foreign minister, said: “Surely there are limits to how much humiliation we impose on senior officers.” Major-General Patrick Cordingley, who commanded the 7th Armoured Brigade — the Desert Rats — during the first Gulf war, said there were “very good reasons” to allow first-class travel for senior personnel.

“I couldn’t care less about officers’ personal comfort, but there are practical reasons why this is a pity. There are often times when you are looking at restricted papers that would be of interest to people such as journalists. If it is on a computer, people can look over and read quite happily over your shoulder in standard class,” he said. MPs are still entitled to first-class train travel, and there is no plan to restrict first-class travel for government ministers. MacShane recently sat next to a major-general from the Irish Guards on a packed train. He was shocked the officer and his colleagues were crammed into the compartment. “I do not mind how MPs travel or whom they meet on the train, but it is a rum show when a major-general from the Irish Guards has to travel on an off-peak, cheap-day, standard-class return ticket to make modest economies for the military,” he said. Kevan Jones, a junior defence minister, said the decision, “is not intended to humiliate anyone. It is about getting value for money”.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article7078834.ece

#43. Two more ministerial ‘cabs for hire’
From The Sunday Times March 28, 2010

TWO more former Labour ministers have been secretly recorded offering to exploit their government contacts and experience to help commercial clients for fees of up to £2,500 a day. Adam Ingram, the former armed forces minister, said he could draw on a pool of out-of-work ministers who could be used to harness their government contacts. Richard Caborn, the former sports minister, said he may be in line for a peerage that would boost his chances of extracting valuable information from the corridors of Westminster. The cash-for-access scandal has already claimed three Blairite ex-cabinet ministers, suspended last week by Labour after they were exposed for offering to help clients lobby for fees of up to £5,000 per day. On Friday, John Lyon, the parliamentary commissioner for standards, said he would hold an inquiry into the trio.

This weekend a YouGov poll of more than 1,500 people for The Sunday Times shows that by nearly two to one, 49% to 29%, voters agree with Nick Clegg, the Liberal Democrat leader, that this is the most corrupt parliament in Britain’s history. Three-quarters of people, 74%, believe there should be an inquiry into claims by former ministers that their lobbying had changed policy. The Speaker, John Bercow, is working on curbs to restrict the number of ex-MPs with Commons passes and bring in new rules on disclosure of members’ outside work. A 15% cap on the amount of money an MP can earn on top of basic salary is also being proposed. Today's disclosures show that former middle-ranking ministers are also willing to use their connections with politicians and officials as they line up work to cushion their retirement from the Commons. Ingram and Caborn were interviewed by an undercover reporter posing as a company executive wanting to hire MPs for lobbying work. The interviews were part of a joint investigation by The Sunday Times and Channel 4’s Dispatches in which both Labour and Conservative politicians were approached. Ingram, who is standing down as MP for East Kilbride at the election, offered to develop a network of former ministers who could be useful for their contacts in different departments. “There’s going to be a lot of ex-ministers ... and they then become a point of contact in the political network. ‘Who do you know in that department? Who can you suggest to talk to?’ And that becomes a point of contact. So all of that can be established,” he said. He was happy to help the reporter meet serving ministers after the election, saying there were strict rules
preventing him lobbying while in parliament but he could do so as a “non-MP”. However, he suggested that the fictional company might wish to target civil servants as “they draw up invitations to tender, they then make all the recommendations, which may not cross the minister’s desk”. When asked if he still had good contacts with civil servants from his time as a minister, he responded “oh yeah”. The reporter asked: “So you would be able to help us develop our relationship with the ministers and civil servants?” and Ingram replied: “I’d do that, I could work at that, yeah.”

Ingram said he was paid £1,500 a day or £1,000 a meeting by companies. He could already make up to £173,000 a year from outside earnings on top of his £65,000 salary as an MP. The former defence minister revealed he was employed by two British businesses which are helping to establish a new defence academy in Tripoli for Colonel Gadaffi, the Libyan leader. “Gadaffi wanted a defence academy built, and people I’m with have got very good points of contact with the Libyan regime,” he said. On Friday, his solicitors said he had not offered to sell his experience and contacts during the meeting. He said he regarded it as wrong for ex-ministers to sell their contacts and influence to give businesses privileged access to government. Caborn, who is standing down as the MP for Sheffield Central, expressed interest in working for the reporter’s fake company but said he would not decide until after the election. He talked about a number of services he could offer, quoting a daily rate of £2,500 “plus expenses”. He said he would be willing to build relations with ministers who were “good friends”. He was also happy to approach senior Conservatives if they come to power. “There’s a number of ways in which you can influence or at least access ministers, whether it’s a sector or an individual company, or what. And also on policy as well,” he said. Caborn may be in line for a peerage, which he said would give him “access to ministers” and information. “All this is all about contacts, it really is. It’s not so much always about influencing, it’s about getting information. And that’s absolutely key, because if you can get information that is very powerful.” On Friday, a letter from Caborn’s solicitor said he had not committed himself to work for the fake company and denied that he had acted “unethically”. Caborn said his £2,500 day rate reflected three days’ work. This was not made clear during the meeting.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article7076041.ece

#44. Brown says sorry to Lumley over ‘smear’. Veterans minister also apologises to Gurkhas campaigner for criticising her

By Andrew Woodcock & James Tapsfield pressandjournal.co.uk Published: 30/03/2010

Prime Minister Gordon Brown told Gurka campaigner Joanna Lumley yesterday he was “sorry” over comments made about her by a UK Government minister. Veterans Minister Kevin Jones also apologised “unreservedly” to the actress for his criticism of her “deathly silence” on Gurkhas’ welfare since she forced a government climb down last year over the Nepalese troops’ right to settle in the UK in retirement. In an impassioned press conference in Westminster, Ms Lumley made clear that she regarded Mr Jones’s comments as a “smear”. She called on Mr Brown to restate his support for the resettlement policy, which has seen around 6,000 Gurkhas apply to live in Britain. Downing Street said the prime minister had a “positive” telephone conversation with Ms Lumley, in which he expressed regret over Mr Jones’s comments. The prime minister’s spokesman said Mr Brown read Ms Lumley the statement of “unreserved apology” that was being offered by Mr Jones. Giving evidence to the Commons home affairs committee on March 9, Mr Jones voiced concern that Gurkha veterans in Nepal were being given misleading information about the benefits and support they might receive if they came to the UK. He claimed that the Gurkha Army Ex-Servicemen’s Organisation had been taking payments of £500 from veterans and passing their cases on to London solicitors Howe & Co, which was part of the campaign to win settlement rights. His comments followed press reports suggesting that some Gurkhas had
been encouraged to apply for visas to come to the UK when they had no means of support here. There was an onus on Ms Lumley to spread the message that veterans did not need to pay to gain access to advice on their rights, he said, adding that her “deathly silence, frankly, irritates me”.

Ms Lumley said yesterday she had never spoken to Mr Jones. She and other campaigners had been asked by the government to continue their work behind the scenes, rather than speaking out publicly. “It has been suggested that I somehow was parachuted in, took the headlines and ran. I feel that is a smear,” she said. “It has been suggested that I somehow spread falsehoods among the Gurkha communities both here and in Nepal about what they could expect. That is a lie and therefore a smear. “The people who made those accusations must know them to be untrue.”

She denied a “victory trip” to Nepal was funded by an ex-servicemen’s organisation, insisting she and other campaigners funded their expenses out of their own pockets.

Minutes before Ms Lumley spoke, Mr Jones said in a statement: “I apologise unreservedly for any offence caused to Joanna Lumley by my remarks to the home affairs committee – this was not intended.” Mr Jones said he had “the greatest of respect” for her work and accepted that neither she nor the campaign had sought to mislead Gurkhas about their prospects in the United Kingdom.

http://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/Article.aspx/1668239?UserKey=

#45.

Gordon Brown blocks peerage for army chief Sir Richard Dannatt

Marie Woolf, Whitehall Editor From The Sunday Times April 11, 2010

The prime minister has blocked an attempt by David Cameron to make Sir Richard Dannatt, the former head of the army, a Tory peer. The move will widely be seen as pay-back for criticisms Dannatt made of government policy while a serving officer. Brown was also furious that Dannatt took a job advising the Conservatives on defence last year while technically still a member of the army, which bans political activity. Cameron announced last year that he planned to nominate Dannatt for the Lords “so he could serve in a future Conservative government”. The move, less than a year after Dannatt had retired, provoked criticism from senior military Tables and within Whitehall. They warned it could threaten the political impartiality of the military and set a precedent. Even Chris Grayling, the shadow home secretary, inadvertently called Dannatt’s proposed appointment to the Lords a “gimmick”.

Yesterday Lord Oakeshott, the front-bench Liberal Democrat peer said: “The head of the army couldn’t possibly take his uniform off one moment and put on a blue rosette for the Tories in the Lords the next. It’s another serious error of judgment by David Cameron after his failure to face down Lord Ashcroft. Just imagine the uproar if a retiring cabinet secretary took a party job.” However, Whitehall insiders see Brown’s move to block Dannatt’s peerage as politically motivated. Dannatt was appointed the head of the army in 2006 and praised for his performance in the role. But he caused controversy when he called for early withdrawal from Iraq and he infuriated ministers by complaining that soldiers in Afghanistan were paid less than traffic wardens. He was also critical of shortages of helicopters in Afghanistan and pay and conditions for serving personnel, saying: “We have seriously stretched our soldiers to the very limit.” Recent conversations between Downing Street and Cameron’s office have made it clear that Dannatt’s nomination for the Lords must be deferred. Last week sources close to the Conservatives said that they would submit it again if they win the election. It is not the first time that Brown has blocked advancement for Dannatt. In 2008 he vetoed his promotion to head of the armed forces. Dannatt retired from the army last year and was appointed Constable of the Tower of London, an unpaid ceremonial role that comes with a flat in the Tower. Overt political activity is banned for serving officers. Several former heads
of the army, such as Field Marshal Lord Inge, sit in the Lords, but as independent peers. Dannatt’s supporters say he is advising the Conservatives because he believes it is in the interests of “the defence of the realm”. Downing Street said today that Gordon Brown personally played no role in the decision. A spokesman said: “Advice on applications for political peerages submitted by the political parties comes from the independent House of Lords Appointments Commission, who are responsible for vetting nominations. The PM has no role in the process.”

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article7094306.ece

#46. The Military-covenant

From Times Online April 22, 2010

The conditions for serving personnel, at home and in the field, are inadequate. Those who serve the nation must be given decent housing and equipment. One of the glories of Britain is the clause in the Bill of Rights of 1689 that prohibits the Crown from maintaining a standing army. Under a derogation from this Bill, soldiers are recruited. The notion of a military “covenant” is nowhere enshrined in law. The successive Armed Forces Acts guarantee no such covenant and neither do the notice papers served on recruits when they enlist. Like so much in the invisible British constitution, that does not mean the covenant does not exist. Indeed, it was explicitly defined by the Ministry of Defence in 2000: “Soldiers will be called upon to make personal sacrifices— including the ultimate sacrifice— in the service of the Nation. In return, British soldiers must always be able to expect fair treatment, to be valued and respected as individuals, and that they (and their families) will be sustained and rewarded by commensurate terms and conditions of service.” The stories we report today are a breach of that covenant. The estate of 45,000 Forces houses is maintained by Modern Housing Solutions (MHS), which won the contract from the Ministry of Defence in 2006. If it turns out that MHS is not performing that task adequately then it ought to be replaced. But that would not address the wider problem, which is that inadequate funding has been allocated to ensuring that the nation pays its dues to the Armed Forces in return for their courage. There has been repeated criticism, from the highest quarters, of dreadful housing, poor medical support and ungenerous compensation for injuries. While officers are serving their country, it is unacceptable for their families to be living in housing in which the amenities do not work and basic maintenance is neglected. It would be bad enough if the nation was only failing to respect its responsibilities on the home front. But there have been far too many instances of British troops being endangered in the field through a lack of adequate equipment. The official report into the crash of an RAF Nimrod surveillance aircraft in Afghanistan in 2006 concluded that the accident, in which 14 servicemen lost their lives, was an avoidable consequence of the MoD’s cost savings. The coroner’s damning verdict on four soldiers blown up in a Snatch Land Rover in Afghanistan in 2008 was the same: a vehicle designed for Northern Ireland was hopelessly inadequate for Afghanistan.

The three political parties all claim, in their manifestos, that the military-covenant is important to them. They could hardly say anything else and they need to go a lot farther. These are terribly straitened times, and budgets across government need to be scrutinised. The obligation that the nation owes to its Service personnel, though, is both too small a fraction of national income and too important a commitment for it to be a casualty of spending cuts. The Prime Minister was forced to revise his evidence to the Chilcot inquiry, to clarify that defence spending had not, in fact, gone up in every year that he was Chancellor. In his evidence to Chilcot, Geoff Hoon, the former Defence Secretary, said that Mr Brown had repeatedly cut MoD funding, a claim that Mr Brown disputes. Mr Brown has the perfect opportunity, in this evening’s televised debate on foreign affairs, to give an unequivocal apology and an explicit guarantee that the military-covenant will be respected in all particulars, a guarantee that the other two party leaders should reiterate. This is not, in the end, primarily a financial question. It is an ethical question. As the wife of a soldier put it: “I
cannot tell you what it is like to have your husband in Afghanistan. You just fear. You are on
a knife edge for six months. However, when you feel you are not being properly looked after
then you begin to feel like a fool.” No, not a fool — just badly, unforgivably, let down.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/leading_article/article7104224.ece

#47. Bishop criticises lack of military funding at soldier's funeral

By Stephen Adams, telegraph.co.uk Published: 7:30AM BST 29 Apr 2010

A bishop has called for more funding and helicopters for the military while leading mourners
at the funeral of a young British soldier killed in a gun battle in Afghanistan. The Right
Reverend Thomas Burns, Bishop of Menevia, told the congregation at the funeral of Fusilier
Jonathan Burgess, 20, from 1st Bn The Royal Welsh, that more funding would "surely" mean
fewer lives were lost in the future. Addressing Fusilier Burgess's friends, family, comrades
and his heavily pregnant fiancée Kelly Forrest at the Cathedral Church of St Joseph in
Convent Street, Greenhill, Swansea, he said: "To our politicians and civil servants, I ask
these questions. "When will Afghan institutions rise out of the dust to take responsibility for
their own affairs? "When will there be a surge in funding to achieve this? "And the on
going
military support to bring it about, to pay for better military vehicles, more and better
helicopters and better intelligence, all of which are so badly needed? "If this were done,
surely this will mean fewer lives will be sacrificed in the future." He told the congregation that
Fusilier Burgess had made "the supreme sacrifice". But he said the soldier was exactly the
kind of young man needed in Britain, adding: "We cannot afford to lose them and others like
him. Why should there be any more excuses? "What else is there to be done than this?"
Fusilier Burgess had been desperate to return to Britain to support his 20-year-old girlfriend,
who is expecting a daughter, comrades said. The bishop told hundreds of mourners who
packed the church that the name of Fusilier Burgess, who died after being shot in the Nad-e-
Ali area of Helmand Province on April 7, would be "etched in the history of the battalion
forever". The issue of military equipment has dogged the Government for the length of the
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, but particularly over the last few years, since British
forces have been engaged in the Taliban stronghold of Helmand. Coroners have persistently
pointed out that lack of equipment such as helicopters and properly fortified vehicles has led
to deaths. On Tuesday, a coroner criticised the Ministry of Defence for not making enough
headsets available for forward air controllers, who call in bomb strikes to support ground
troops. Privates Aaron McClure, 19, Robert Foster, 19, and John Thrumble, 21, all of the 1st
Bn The Royal Anglian Regiment, died after Sergeant Mark Perren gave the incorrect
coordinates to an American pilot, who dropped a 500lb bomb on them rather than Taliban
forces almost a mile away. Sgt Perren did so because he did not have a headset, which
caused him to mishear one of the eight digits. David Masters, the coroner, said: "Headsets
were unavailable."


#48. New Secretary of State sends message to Defence staff

Defence Intranet 12/05/2010

The new Secretary of State for Defence, Dr Liam Fox, has issued the following
message to all Defence staff.

The first duty of Government is to protect our way of life and provide security for our citizens.
That is why I am proud and honoured to have been appointed as Defence Secretary by the
Prime Minister David Cameron. I would like to pay tribute to my predecessor, Bob Ainsworth,
who always had the best interests of the Armed Forces at heart. Britain's Armed Forces are
rightly respected both at home and abroad, and widely regarded as among the very best in
the world. During my five years as Shadow Defence Secretary I have been privileged to see
them at work in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. As a nation we have a responsibility to
ensure they have our full support in return for the selfless service and sacrifice they are
prepared to make in our name. The new Government will honour that duty with a new Tri-
Service Covenant that will set out our obligations and commitments to the men and women
of our Armed Forces, their families and veterans. The campaign in Afghanistan is a national
security imperative. We are there out of necessity not out of choice. I am determined that
alongside our ISAF partners we will succeed. We will ensure that our Forces have the
equipment and support they need to do what we ask of them. Defence faces major
challenges over the next few years. In today's uncertain world, it is essential that we
maintain a highly dedicated and professional body of servicemen and women with the
capability to defend our national interests whenever they are called on to do so, and a strong
cadre of professional defence civilians to undertake the distinctive tasks for which they are
responsible. A review of Defence is long overdue but the needs of our Armed Forces can no
longer be considered in isolation from other security challenges we face. We will be taking
forward a Strategic Defence and Security Review, working with other Government
Departments including the new Foreign, Development and Home Secretaries as part of the
new National Security Council. Our aim must be to ensure that Britain's defence is based on
a clear definition of our strategic interests, an assessment of our role in NATO and other
partnerships, the threats we face, the military capabilities we need to protect our interests,
and the programmes we need to deliver those capabilities. Resources will be tight for the
country as a whole and Defence is no exception. We must make sure that we make every
penny spent on Defence count. This means we will have to look again at all that we currently
do, including the organisation and structure of the Department, each of the Services and the
support area to ensure that we can undertake confidently and effectively the key tasks for
which MOD is responsible. We need to confront these issues head on and ensure that we
emerge from the review with a clear way ahead for Defence that meets the needs of the
current counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan but also ensures that we are well
prepared for whatever the future may bring. I will set the work in hand straight away, to
deliver before the end of the year. I look forward to working with you all to tackle the
challenges we face. With your support, I know we will do so successfully.

http://defenceintranet.diiweb.r.mil.uk/DefenceIntranet/News/DefenceNews/MOD/NewSecreta
ryOfStateSendsMessageToDefenceStaff.htm

#49. Defence Secretary and CDS attend first National Security Council

meeting

Publisher: DMC-News Desk, 13/05/2010

The first meeting of the new National Security Council, attended by the Defence Secretary
and Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), took place at 10 Downing Street yesterday,
Wednesday 12 May 2010. The meeting was chaired by Prime Minister David Cameron and
was also attended by permanent members including Sir Peter Ricketts, the new National
Security Advisor, and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg.

Speaking after the meeting, a Downing Street spokesman said: "The Prime Minister this
evening chaired the first meeting of the newly-established National Security Council. "The
Prime Minister began the meeting by paying a full tribute to the UK's Armed Forces and
expressed his personal admiration and gratitude for their dedication and sacrifice. "He then
received briefings on the political and military situation in Afghanistan, including from his new
National Security Advisor, Sir Peter Ricketts, and from the Chief of the Defence Staff. The
Prime Minister was then updated on the wider UK security situation."
The attendees at the meeting were: Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary, Defence Secretary, Secretary of State for International Development, Minister for Security, Minister for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Secretary, Chief of the Defence Staff, National Security Advisor, Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Director General of the Security Service, Director of GCHQ.

[The new government creates a new political body in which it is hoped the ‘business of managing conflict’ shall be improved].


#50. Barack Obama gives pep talk to troops on surprise visit to Afghanistan

By Mail Foreign Service
Last updated at 10:51 AM on 29th March 2010

President Obama has made his first visit to Afghanistan since taking office. The surprise trip lasted just a few hours but Mr Obama managed to cram in a speech to U.S. troops and a meeting with Afghan leader Hamid Karzai. Fearing a Taliban ambush, White House aides kept yesterday's flying visit secret until the last minute. In Kabul the president urged Mr Karzai to crack down on corruption and the drug trade. He said: 'The American people are encouraged by the progress that's been made'. He also thanked U.S. troops and their Nato partners.

Mr Obama then returned to Bagram air base to meet General Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, and give a televised address to 2,500 U.S troops, which was clearly intended to be a morale booster for the assembled masses. He thanked the American forces for their 'outstanding contribution' to the military campaign. He told them: 'Everyone understands the sacrifices you and your families are making to keep America safe and secure'.

Dressed informally in a bomber jacket and an open-necked shirt, the commander-in-chief told his troops that the U.S. is in Afghanistan to help forge hard-won peace, and will be less secure if the Taliban retakes control of Afghanistan. The trip was an extraordinary capstone to a momentous week in Obama's presidency.

He achieved the most ambitious domestic policy initiative in decades with a historic health care overhaul and scored first major foreign policy achievement with a significant new arms control treaty with Russia. Mr Obama landed in Afghanistan for a stay of just a few hours, all in darkness, after an overnight flight from Washington.

He flew by helicopter from Bagram airfield to the capital, Kabul, where he met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and with his cabinet at the presidential palace. It was the president's second stop in a war zone as commander-in-chief, coming about a year after a similarly secretive trip to Iraq. Mr Karzai was notified about the visit just an hour before he arrived, the White House said.

Surprise: Obama earlier met Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Kabul after giving him an hour's notice. In December, Mr Obama ordered 30,000 additional forces into the fight against an entrenched Taliban insurgency that has sought to retake control of Afghanistan. The militant group had ruled the country until the U.S., helped by Britain and a coalition of other nations, invaded in 2001 them. The extra American soldiers, who are still arriving, should boost the number of U.S. troops to 100,000 by the summer. There were about 34,000 when Mr Obama took office.
The trip came just two days after a threatening new audio message from Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, believed to be hiding along the ungoverned border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The White House made no advance announcement of the visit, which officials said had been long desired by the president but delayed by weather and other logistical obstacles. Mr Obama had gone to the presidential retreat at Camp David on Friday afternoon, from which unnoticed departures are easier because of its secluded mountain location.

Under the cover of night: Mr Obama inspects a guard of honour during his trip which lasted only a few hours. The small contingent of White House aides and media allowed on the trip were sworn to secrecy, and the White House allowed details of Mr Obama’s activities on the ground to be reported only after they were under way.

It was the president’s second visit to Afghanistan - the first was in 2008 when, as a presidential candidate and senator, he joined an official congressional delegation. A total of 945 members of the U.S. military had died in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan since the 2001 offensive began. The conflict is unpopular with a majority of Americans, especially progressives in the base of Mr Obama's Democratic Party, and this was reflected in the president’s new Afghanistan strategy.

He combined the large build-up - his second to the Afghanistan force in less than a year as president - with a call to start bringing troops home in July 2011, just a year after the full contingent is in place. Lately, the president’s approval ratings on his handling of Afghanistan have ticked up, to 57 per cent in a March AP-GfK poll, from 49 per cent in January.

But the challenge ahead is daunting: justify his escalation with clear progress against the Taliban, and in building up and training Afghan army and police forces so they can begin taking over security responsibilities. Touchdown: Mr Obama steps off Air Force One at Bagram Air Force Base before taking a helicopter to Kabul

Last month, a major offensive was launched to retake the Taliban stronghold of Marjah in Helmand province. The Marjah campaign routed most Taliban fighters from a town they once controlled, without a particularly high casualty toll for U.S. troops and the Afghan security forces fighting alongside them. Military officials have praised the results, but cautiously. With fighting still raging across Afghanistan, and any successes still fragile and reversible, the war is not yet considered at a turning point. The key part of Obama's new strategy for Afghanistan - turning ordinary Afghans away from the Taliban by bringing in development and installing effective government - has barely begun. The next big military operation for the U.S. and Nato troops is being planned for Kandahar. The large city is the spiritual home of the Taliban insurgency. Excited U.S. soldiers snap the President as he chats with their colleagues at Bagram Air Base. While it is not now under the Taliban flag, the insurgents are a constant presence. This year has brought potentially positive news for the war. Pakistan recently arrested Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar - second in the Taliban only to Mullah Mohammed Omar - and other key members of the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s government has not regularly taken on that group and has allowed it to have virtual safe haven within Pakistan. There also are doubts about whether the arrests represent Pakistan’s desire to better help the U.S. or to further its own interests. Mr Obama’s talks with Hamid Karzai come as Washington's relationship with the Afghan leader has soured, and concerns about corruption and ineffectiveness in Mr Karzai’s central government have mounted since last year’s flawed presidential elections. The U.S. and Western allies have demanded, with little success, broad reforms and proof that Mr Karzai would - and could - shake off his ties to warlords and regional powerbrokers. One topic expected to come up was Mr Karzai’s plan for a three-day peace ‘jirga’, or conference, in late April or early May. Looking for a way to end the war, Mr Karzai has invited Taliban participation.

Comment: the visit to troops by political leaders in time of conflict, serves not only as a fact finding mission to 'establish ground truth,' it is a ritual right of passage in which civilian leaders are implicated in and inculcated into, 'the day to day business of war'. They are seen to be part of the effort and provide valuable morale and can claim the mantle of Statesman in return.

#51. New patrol vehicle further on the road to production

22/09/2010

Plans to provide troops in Afghanistan with a new generation of Light Protected Patrol Vehicle (LPPV) have passed an important milestone with Force Protection Europe announced as the preferred bidder by the Ministry of Defence. The selection of Force Protection Europe as the preferred bidder means contract negotiations will now begin to provide an initial order of LPPVs through the Urgent Operational Requirements process. The first vehicles are expected to be available to troops for training in 2011. The total number will be subject to negotiation and announced in due course. The LPPV has been designed to provide unprecedented levels of blast protection for a vehicle of its size, and will be able to carry a crew of up to six people. It will add to the wide array of protected vehicles already being used on operations in Afghanistan, including Mastiff and Ridgback.

Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, Peter Luff, said:

"Small, agile but highly protected, the LPPV is at the forefront of technology. It will offer troops unprecedented levels of blast protection for such a light vehicle, enabling them to carry out a wide range of tasks, whilst moving with ease through narrow alleyways or crossing bridges.

"It will be a valuable addition to the vehicles already available to commanders in Afghanistan, and demonstrates the Government's commitment to providing our troops with the very best equipment on the front line.

"I'm delighted to announce that negotiations can now begin to get these vehicles out to theatre as soon as possible."

Chief of Defence Materiel, General Sir Kevin O'Donoghue, said:

"A great deal of work has been done to get the programme to this stage. When it comes to vehicle technology, it is clear from this competition that British engineering is leading the way. Both proposed solutions reflect the significant progress made in the development of a new generation of small yet highly protected vehicles.

"The LPPV will offer huge benefit to troops in Afghanistan, as well as being a valuable asset to the Armed Forces in the future."

Force Protection Europe has confirmed that, subject to the satisfactory completion of contractual negotiations with MOD, all of the vehicles will be built and supported in the UK. It is estimated that around 750 jobs will be created or sustained in the UK as a result of this programme.

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[Comment: in terms of strategy in Afghanistan, the failure to procure sufficient air lift for the troops forced the government to procure better land vehicles. The response to urgent operational demands for these vehicles, came with significant additional financial effort, and only when a significant human cost had already been paid. Had the MOD fulfilled it’s professional remit to review future capability with a strategic focus, then air lift would have been available for the campaign in Afghanistan. The Military-covenant is concerned not with the fact that failure in Strategic planning occurred, it is concerned with the way in which it occurred. It is concerned that Strategic dysfunction happened because the moral arguments for Force Protection had been underplayed. The fact that force protection was not given sufficient Strategic consideration meant that the motivations to reduce needless loss of life remained explicit only at the operational level of command. Had Force Protection been an explicit critical measure of success for the Afghan campaign in the first place, it would have become not just a factor in the debate surrounding the use of helicopters, but an imperative for overall mission success. At the heart of Covenant Theory the moral component of fighting power is inviolate: mission success comes with a cost and that cost has to be valued. Mistakes of strategy are compounded when regard for the cost of life is not fully weighed at the Strategic level. In this way civilian political leaders have a moral as well as a professional duty in the execution of their offices. En masse and individually soldiers' lives are not only or merely military resource, they are a part of the very social fabric which defines the nation-state].

#53. Liam Fox statement on leaked letter to PM
29/09/2010

Defence Secretary Dr Liam Fox has issued a statement to Defence staff following media reports of a leaked letter he sent to the Prime Minister regarding potential cuts as part of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.

Defence Secretary Dr Liam Fox [Picture: Crown Copyright/MOD 2010]

Dr Fox's statement follows:

"Many of you will have seen reports today of a leaked letter I sent to the Prime Minister.

"It is entirely normal that Ministers should make representations to the Prime Minister during the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the Comprehensive Spending Review. That is an entirely proper part of the process of government. The Prime Minister is fully entitled to expect those representations to be made in private and kept private.

"I am extremely angry that this confidential communication has been made public. The SDSR continues. We will reach decisions in due course collectively as a Government in the national interest, and abide by those decisions collectively - a principle which I entirely support.

"It is totally unacceptable that a highly confidential letter from me to the Prime Minister should be leaked to the Daily Telegraph. I am utterly appalled by this breach of trust. I have agreed with PUS that an immediate and rigorous investigation must be undertaken and this is underway; it is being conducted urgently by the MOD Police."
#54. Dr Liam Fox - we are making progress in Afghanistan
22/10/2010

Defence Secretary Dr Liam Fox gave an interview to Sky News yesterday evening during which he spoke about operations in Afghanistan and the progress that has been made in Helmand province over recent months.

Asked whether we are winning the war against the Taliban, Dr Fox said:

"Yes, I think we are. If you spend time visiting our troops on a regular basis, you can see the differences.

"A couple of months ago, three months ago, say, if you went to Lashkar Gah in Helmand you would have to be in an armoured vehicle and wear body armour. Now there are three flights a day from Lashkar Gah to Kabul for business people, and simple things like the ice factory being open - being distributed to the local bazaars to keep food and fruit fresh - was a sign of economic activity coming back, and that's because we have been able to liberate people from the oppression of the Taliban.

"It's not to say that there's not a considerable insurgency still there. But there's no doubt that we're making progress, and when we talk about the difficulties, we have to be honest about the gains that we're making, and I think we have to be balanced about that."

Dr Fox was asked about how easy it is for insurgents to lay the bombs or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which have been the main cause of loss of life amongst British troops in Helmand. He said:

"Well, one of the points that I think we should take issue with is that they [the insurgents laying the IEDs] are operating almost with impunity. Even in the filming we saw, they were stopped several times because of ISAF helicopters operating in the area, so increasingly they are being disrupted.

"We have a number of ways of protecting against these devices - obviously we have armoured vehicles to protect our personnel; better than that is if we can disarm them.

"Even better than that is where we've had considerable success in recent months, which is being able to disrupt the networks that plant them and the supplies that help create them. It's our intelligence as much as anything else which is making a difference."

Dr Fox was asked whether the evidence that suggests the Taliban appear to be spreading to other areas around Afghanistan is worrying. He replied:

"You can look at that two ways, can't you, because if they're appearing elsewhere, it may well be that they're being squeezed out of areas like Helmand. There's no doubt that the Taliban and their command structure has been under enormous pressure down in the south of the country.

"There's no doubt that those who see themselves as being a shadow government have found themselves under increasing pressure. That's a good thing, and we should want to see the Taliban becoming more desperate.

"We need to remember that when they [the Taliban] talk about networks in Britain and they talk about having fighters ready, we've got to be very careful that we're not inadvertently putting out Taliban propaganda.

"I understand entirely why we should be wanting to see what the enemy looks like, but we have to take - with a very large pinch of salt - anything they say, because what they are looking for is, of course, free access to public opinion in the United Kingdom."
"And we have to counter that by saying that what we're doing is protecting the population of Afghanistan, trying to give them a chance to shape their own destiny, and to push back the men of violence who would set the country back even more than the position that they left behind when they were swept away in 2001."

Dr Fox was asked to give an assurance that the Taliban aren't raising money in the UK and that they haven't got dedicated fighters here ready to create violence and to commit terrorist acts in this country, as they claim:

"We know that there are terror networks that have been spreading internationally," he said. "One of the whole reasons of going to Afghanistan was to try to stop that. And I think that to simply accept that what they tell us is true is to give them a platform - which I think a lot of people would find very questionable.

"Now, this is a free country, we have free media - it's one of the things that makes us better than the people trying to undermine us - but we have to counter-balance that freedom with the responsibility of not assuming that what they tell us is true.

"We know from the 7/7 bombings in London that there are attempts to create terror networks here. We know from the Security Services that they are constantly trying to break up terror plots in the United Kingdom.

"And what people need to understand is that this is the nature of the people we are facing: they are willing to blow up our soldiers and, incidentally, civilians in Afghanistan - the vast majority of the casualties are ordinary civilians, people who may themselves walk on IEDs, who become collateral damage to the Taliban; it's how they see it.

"They would be happy to blow up men, women and children in the underground in London or anywhere else that they could. That's what transnational terrorism looks like.

"We didn't choose to take up this fight; we didn't choose aeroplanes flying into Manhattan on 9/11, but the challenge has been thrown down to us and we have to take it up or we will see more of these incidents and more of these threats; these are people who dislike us, not because of where we are or what we do, but they dislike our very way of life and who we are and our history.

"And that's something that we have to be willing to stand up against."

Asked if he feels that we are winning that battle, if we in the UK are getting the better of this challenge, and will eventually stop an enemy that currently seems to undermine our country and our very culture, Dr Fox said:

"The broader battle against transnational terrorism is as much an ideological battle as anything else, and we have to continue to pursue that.

"In Afghanistan, I think, we've got to be very careful not to always see Afghanistan through the prism of Helmand.

"We tend to see our news in Britain according to what's happening to our Armed Forces, but if you go to the west of Afghanistan or up to the north of Afghanistan, you will find whole areas where the writ of the Government is now there; where economic activity is picking up; people are having new police forces; they've got the protection of the Afghan Army; and life is beginning to return to, what we might regard as normal, when they've had 30 years of war.

"And it's important to see Afghanistan in the round, and I think it would be extremely helpful if we took on wider filming about Afghanistan as a whole country; you know, only about 3.5 per cent of the population live in Helmand; only about 1 per cent of the Afghan population live in the area covered by British troops."
"So, I think to see the whole picture of Afghanistan, the areas where peace and normality are returning, would be a very good counter-balance to Taliban propaganda."

Dr Fox concluded by answering whether in the end is the only way we're going to achieve peace in Afghanistan by talking to the Taliban. He said:

"Well, it depends who you mean by the Taliban. Of course, there will be a political settlement of some sort - there always is at the end of an insurgency. The question is who are the people who are reconcilable to the Afghan Government - the constitution and the democratic set-up in Afghanistan - and who are willing to make agreements and allow that to happen?

"And who are those who are irreconcilable, who will never ever accept the democratic government and who would never accept anything other than a very violent anti-Western fundamentalist view?

"I'm afraid that those people have to be confronted because they're a threat, not only to the stability of Afghanistan, but our own national security.

"It would be very nice to live in a world where there were no fanatics but we have to side with the ones who are reconcilable, and then take on the fanatics - that's the only way to have peace and security."
lens. The world maps on the walls of European capitals place the Greenwich Meridian at the centre - technically correct, but often betraying a very Eurocentric view of the world."

Dr Fox said in future we must take a wider, more global view of the world, for example:

- nuclear proliferation - North Korea, Iran and the regional implications of their drive for nuclear weapons;
- a Middle East peace process under constant pressure with the ever present risk of escalation;
- the risk of the return of civil war in Afghanistan creating a security vacuum and risking the destabilisation of Pakistan with potentially unthinkable regional consequences;
- Al-Qaeda affiliates springing up in Yemen and Somalia with continued significant terrorist activity wherever there are failing states or weak government; and
- the opening up of new contested regions, such as the High North, due to climate change - and new contested domains without geographic barriers such as cyberspace due to advances in technology and our dependence on them.

He said that is why the National Security Council agreed the adaptive posture and that this was the force driver of the SDSR and is the basis upon which the Armed Forces will be contAined in the coming years.

Dr Fox said that this posture demands that our Armed Forces become a more flexible and agile force with global reach:

- capable of providing nuclear and conventional deterrence, containment, coercion and intervention;
- investing in new technology and capabilities more suited to the likely character of future conflict, such as cyber security;
- divesting ourselves of capabilities that have less utility in the post-Cold War world; and
- with the ability to regenerate quickly capabilities that are not needed now if threats change.

He added:

"This is what I believe we have achieved in the Defence settlement as part of the SDSR - meeting twin priorities of protecting front line capability for Afghanistan and beginning the process of transforming our Armed Forces to meet the challenges of the future; setting the path to a coherent and affordable defence capability in 2020 and beyond.

"Achieving this in the circumstances we inherited means smaller Armed Forces, some painful decisions, and a degree of sacrifice. For instance, politically it would have been easier to support the requirement for carrier strike in the future by maintaining the Harrier force. But the military advice was to do what was politically more difficult - to maintain Tornado.

"If I had a clean sheet of paper, unencumbered by existing contractual or operational commitments, and without the financial pressures facing all government departments, the results would undoubtedly have been different.

"But just as I'm a hawk on Defence, I am a hawk on deficit reduction too. And I always take consolation from the fact that hawks have a far greater life expectancy than doves.

"I didn't come into politics to make defence cuts. But there can be no security without a strong economy. Tackling the deficit and bringing the Defence Budget back into balance is a vital part of how we protect this country's national security into the future."
"And because of the priority we place on security, the Defence Budget is making a more modest contribution to deficit reduction relative to almost all other departments."

Dr Fox said that the SDSR is a point of departure, not the end of the line, and that a path has been set to 2020 and beyond, with regular reviews every five years. He added:

"The reality is that implementation of what we have set out will be no easy ride, there remain hard decisions to take, and there is no new money. So if the penny has yet to drop, let it drop now."

Dr Fox said that of course the choices that have been made will result in changes to our equipment and support requirements and therefore what the MOD will be buying from industry in future:

"In some cases, where particular programmes will be stopped altogether, there will sadly be job losses," he said. "And just as with the reductions in manpower in the Armed Forces and civilians in the MOD, these are a matter of regret.

"The industrial implications of the key SDSR choices were given careful consideration. We will now undertake an extensive programme of commercial negotiations with our suppliers in the coming months, as part of the SDSR implementation process.

"This will focus on the areas where there have been the most significant changes, but is expected to involve all of the MOD’s key suppliers."

Speaking about industry Dr Fox said:

"Having strong and viable industry in the UK is a formidable strategic asset and a key part of our international security relationships. Successful industry provides jobs, maintains skills and makes a considerable contribution to the exchequer.

"The defence industry actually makes and sells things abroad at a time when the Government wants growth and export-led recovery and a rebalancing of the economy.

"It helps drive technological innovation which gives our Armed Forces their cutting edge and can benefit society as a whole as the same innovation is applied more widely.

"But none of us should forget that defence procurement is not a job creation project. Its prime purpose is to provide our Armed Forces with the equipment and support they need, at the right time, and at a cost that represents value for taxpayers’ money. And this is all the more important because there simply isn’t the money there was before.

"The long-term prosperity of the UK defence industry therefore depends on two things - offering better value for money to the British taxpayer and being competitive and market sensitive so that the successful export of what is produced is more likely.

"Over the next four years we will be spending around £50bn on equipment and support. This is not the Government's money. There is no such thing as Government money. There is only taxpayers' money. It is the money that hard-working people and companies big and small have entrusted to us through their taxes so that our country can be more secure.

"That requires our Armed Forces to be the right size and shape - and to have the right equipment. I do believe in free trade and in buying off the shelf. Often that shelf will be stocked with British products. But if we don’t get value for money at home we will buy elsewhere.

"Sometimes we forget that the right kit is central to fulfilling the military-covenant. Equipment
is a welfare issue - not only to the men and women in Afghanistan who I must look in the eye but families at home who worry about their safety.

"However, industry will not be alone in meeting this challenge. We have pledged our full support to a reinvigorated export strategy as the best way to protect and promote the best of British industry.

"I will chair the new Defence Exports Group, fully supported by Gerald Howarth [Minister for International Security Strategy] and Peter Luff [Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology]. We need to create a more stable base for industry, less dependent on the UK economy alone.

"Over the next few weeks my ministerial team will be engaging with you to get the best from both Government and industry in support of Defence.

"Next week Peter Luff will be launching a wide-ranging discussion with industry and others to provide a more measured, strategic consideration of UK Defence industrial needs and broader economic competitiveness. This will mark the beginning of the formulation of a comprehensive defence industrial and technology policy.

"At the UKTI DSO [UK Trade & Investment Defence and Security Organisation] Symposium Gerald Howarth will be updating you on our plans for greater export support. And, under the umbrella of the Defence Reform Unit, led by Lord Levene, we will continue to build on the work of the acquisition reform programme to drive through further reform to the acquisition process."

Dr Fox concluded by saying:

"I do not need to tell you the scale of the economic difficulties we face or the challenges that lie ahead. But I also know how passionate and committed you all are to the defence of our nation, to supporting our Armed Forces and their families, and to making sure they have all they need to keep the country safe.

"We are in a process of transformation towards a more balanced and stronger economy where industry will play a major role. While we cannot provide certainty in Defence in an unstable world, we can provide better management of unpredictability to enable better management and investment planning for both the military and industry.

"As difficult as it has been over the last few years, and as difficult as it will remain, I believe that the SDSR has set our Armed Forces on a path towards a sustainable future - in tune with the foreign policy requirements of the country and meeting the needs of national security."

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#56. PM welcomes report on supporting Military-covenant

Wednesday 8 December 2010

Prime Minister David Cameron has welcomed the publication of an independent report on innovative ways to support the Military-covenant.

During a visit to HMS Ark Royal in June, Mr Cameron announced that he wanted to rewrite the covenant and enshrine it law.

Professor Hew Strachan, a military historian at Oxford University, was asked to lead an independent taskforce to develop ideas supporting this aim.

His report, published today, recommends support that can be provided across Government and throughout society and work will begin immediately on two of the recommendations.

The first is the creation of an Armed Forces Community Covenant, which encourages communities across the UK to volunteer support for their local Armed Forces.

The second is to create a Chief of the Defence Staff Commendation Scheme, which will allow the head of the UK’s Armed Forces to thank individuals or bodies who give exceptional support to the Armed Forces.

The PM, who has recently returned from visiting troops in Afghanistan, said:

“Our Service personnel make an extraordinary contribution to British life. Those serving on the front line risk their lives for us on a daily basis. So all of us – the Government, the private sector, and the voluntary organisations – need to go the extra mile for them.

“I want to get to the root of their issues and make sure that the inevitable disturbance associated with military life does not lead to greater problems.”

The Government has also committed to ensuring that progress is made on rebuilding the covenant and has today brought forward legislation within the Armed Forces Bill for the Defence Secretary to present an Armed Forces Covenant report to Parliament every year. This will set out how the Government is supporting our Armed Forces, their families and veterans in key areas such as healthcare, housing and education.

The Government’s full response to the report’s recommendations will be published in Spring 2011.
Chapter Five.

Part 2. Analysis of Themes.

Interviews and Transcripts 2014.

The interviews which were designed and discussed in chapter one are transcribed in full here at annex A to chapter five. Highlights from the interviews are summarised and boxed at the start of this chapter below. These paragraphs taken from the interviews provide the final textual basis by which the initial findings of the study up to chapter four may be confirmed. Each paragraph surfaces additional and separate commentary as well providing unique individual perspective and insight to the subject matter. Taken as a whole the information stemming from the literature review, the textual analysis, the media articles, the historical origins and the highlights from the interviews all build that firm foundation originally intended by the author. These come together finally in chapters six and seven where the findings lead to a compelling, authentic and equitable New Military-Covenant constructed from first principles and evidenced by solid analysis. The New Military-Covenant in chapter seven is accompanied by a series of policy recommendations. Taken together these would see a new deal for Britain’s Armed Forces enduring well into the future for generations to come.

The choice of interviewees was based on the themes which arose in the review of the articles taken from the national press as well as the literature review comprising chapter two. Members of the Defence Select Committee were selected because they could offer insight regarding the political nature of the rise to prominence of the military covenant. Interestingly of those interviewed most agreed that they understood the military covenant well although none could agree on its content. At least one politician did not agree that the military-covenant applied to him personally whilst another was a fierce advocate for a separate Veteran’s Minister replete with a ring fenced budget. This underpins the requirement to take a further poll to gauge wider public opinion on the definition of the British Military Covenant and to determine whether the public feels that the covenant applies to them personally or that troops warrant special treatment. Representatives from the charitable sector were felt to
be important to interview as they represented the collective views of veterans and families, two of the most significant groups of stakeholders explicitly named in all the modern military-covenant. Leaders from the Royal British Legion and the Army Family Federation (AFF) were chosen for the insights that they might offer on the covenant. Interestingly the Director of AFF offered some unanticipated views about the social makeup of the British officer corps and expressed concern about the demise in a warrior cohort traditionally loyal to the ruling class, affirming the role of the military-covenant in obtaining leverage for families disenfranchised from their local authorities. The Head of Armed Forces Engagement for the British Legion had some interesting commentary on the need for greater social cohesion at the local community level with the onset of troops moving back to the UK from Germany. Comment was also made on the investment required in order that veterans might be more resilient to career transition. Lastly a reputable Defence Journalist was selected to offer insights from the perspective of the British media, an important dimension given the volume of newspaper commentary appearing on the military covenant over the period 2006-2011.

His comments covered the nature of the bargain. Interestingly he demurred over the idea of a military-covenant but felt on balance that the covenant was the only initiative ongoing in this area and ought therefore to be supported, attempting he thought, to bind the country to the Armed Forces a little more firmly.

Table 5-6 from Transcript #1.

Table 5-6 illustrates a very real dilemma that the military-covenant throws up. The expectation that veterans are being catered for by the state is questioned by MPs whose experience suggests that expectations are not being met. In the case of mental health the military-covenant as cast within the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 infers that veterans are
part of the Armed Forces Community. The inference is that veterans should receive priority as NHS patients. But this policy aspiration is undermined by the fact that GPs are not currently screening for the healthcare of either older veterans or new service leavers nor their respective families. There is therefore scant if any data that exists on GPs databases that could help profile candidates for mental health illnesses within the Armed Forces Community. This means that contrary to the spirit and the provisions of the covenant which stipulate that the NHS should place the needs of Service Personnel, veterans and their families at a high priority, the state is leaving the care of veteran’s mental health to charities.

Q. Does the UK military-covenant mean that on balance UK Armed Forces personnel ‘put more in’ than ‘get out’ of their military service?
A. No I don’t think so. Disagree, they get a lot of advantages I think we’ve got to be careful not to go over the tipping point and people say they’ve got too much

Col Bob Stewart (Ret’d), MP

Table 5-7 from Transcript #2.

Whilst the nature of service life includes the liability for self-sacrifice and the covenant stresses this part of the ‘bargain’ (McCartney, 2010) Table 5-7 shows a political concern that the public might view certain privileges afforded to the military as an unfair advantage. In this respect amendments to a future covenant should acknowledge the positive aspects of service life as well as the negative ones. If the covenant is to be regarded as reciprocal it needs to show how it is equitable. Future iterations of the military-covenant might better reflect the mutual nature of the bargain.

In macro terms I’d like to see a proper Veterans Minister responsible for the military-covenant and that Veteran’s minister to have a separate budget, that is not raided and is set by the treasury and that Minister to be at least a Minister of State level not necessarily answerable to the Secretary of State for Ministry of Defence ...could work in the same way that DFID is a sub-set of the Foreign Office...with certain rights to attend cabinet

Col Bob Stewart, MP

Table 5-8 from Transcript #2.
The British political system of Government discharges the execution of policy through functional ministries. Defence policy and budgetary matters for serving personnel of the Armed Forces are dealt with by the MoD. Veterans are currently classed as civilian citizens and therefore whilst Veteran’s policy is the responsibility of the MoD, Veteran’s needs are resourced and met (or not) across the remainder of Ministries in other Government departments (OGDs). Lacking in military understanding and without sanction or incentive OGDs are at risk of continuing to fail in the delivery of Veteran and serving personnel needs. Problems arise when OGDs responsible for the provisioning of housing, education and healthcare to serving personnel also fail to deliver to the standards implicated by the military-covenant and provisioned in Terms and Services. Table 5-8 raises the prospect of more effective coordination of the Armed Forces Community needs across OGDs through a separate and dedicated Ministry. In this way the military-covenant would become what Col Bob Stewart calls ‘the bible’ for effective management of Armed Forces personnel matters at the Ministerial level (see Transcript #2).

During the period of the military-covenant’s inception, concerns over the legal status of the document were raised. The covenant being essentially about moral obligations, concerns about the covenant, if it were to be truly legal, becoming increasingly politicised were mooted. Fears that aggrieved Service Personnel and coroner’s courts would use it to bolster litigation cases and inquiries into the deaths of Service Personnel were voiced. However when the military-covenant in 2011 achieved statutory status the current Government claimed a victory in making it legal. Subsequently fears about the legal nature of the covenant have largely fallen away. However, in the era of austere Defence budgets discussion on the covenant has moved away from legal concerns to shortages of equipment

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Table 5-9 from Transcript #2.

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and resources. The linking of the military-covenant to the provision of resources is explicit in Army doctrine and is a consistent theme raised in the British press.\(^{344}\) This places renewed pressure on politicians to justify Defence cuts. For this reason the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 omits inclusion of the measurement of Defence equipment and resource. In policy terms it would be necessary that Army doctrine retain inclusion of the clause concerning resource if the Army wishes Service Personnel to have expectations of being equipped and trained properly for operations. Ideally future versions of the Armed Forces Covenant would include the resource clause. Nevertheless as Table 5-9 illustrates the nature of political decision making and the ever present scenario of scarce resources will always make the provision of adequate military resources problematic. The effect of the military-covenant has been to bolster the case for Defence resource in the media and to repeatedly lift the issue of equipment shortages into the public arena.

\begin{quote}
Sometimes the Armed Forces will be unable to have the equipment and resources they need for all sorts of different reasons because in (a) conflict that might be unavoidable (it) was also unpredictable and that the resources and the equipment were simply not there in order to preserve the defences of the country the armed forces might need to be sent in without the equipment or resources that would be ideally be provided. But it’s a subjective judgement as to whether something is needed or not and sometimes you cannot have a legal obligation that would vary (according) to the subjective judgement of whoever was judging it. The case of the snatch Land Rovers is a difficult issue to resolve and the defence committee did an enquiry into the legal obligations arising out of that sort of thing which didn’t produce answers but which said that the Government has got to resolve this issue. We mustn’t create legal impediments for the MoD that might mean the Armed Forces don’t know what they are meant to be doing.

James Arbuthnot, MP
\end{quote}

Table 5-10 from Transcript #3.

Those eventualities which might see military forces deployed lacking substantially in training and resources will always occur given the inherent uncertainty in which conflict situations arise. However the somewhat intractable challenge of providing sufficient Defence resource does not obviate the moral obligations which the Government has in ensuring that the Armed Forces have every reasonable opportunity for achieving mission success. The commentary at Table 5-10 that military judgement about equipment shortfalls being an essentially subjective decision with the inference that planning against unforeseen threats means that a

\(^{344}\) See News articles 2002-2010 at Annex A to Chapter 5 Part 1.
minimum level of equipment provision might not be *routinely* in place is highly problematic and could indeed be a breach of the covenant. In those situations where resources were anticipated and planned but not delivered for unjustifiable reasons, the holding to account of senior officers and ministers would remain wholly appropriate. So whilst the MoD would not wish to have legal impediments to operational flexibility imposed or conferred on it by perceptions in the public which might exist because of the covenant: it would be a specious argument which lay the failure to resource the Armed Forces at the feet of the MoD by indicating that the MoD takes approaches to the preparation for conflict which are subjective and lack good degrees of preparation. This is certainly not the case with the Defence planning process.

Whilst those eventualities which might see the military deployed lacking optimal readiness will always occur the military covenant as contained in Army Doctrine correctly makes implicit the moral obligations which civilian leaders have in ensuring not only the minimum resource for an operation are available but that which is deemed necessary for mission success i.e. a reasonable level especially important if missions are to last years not months. The next version of the military-covenant might usefully make explicit the inherent uncertainty of conflict and the challenges in preparing for operations so that the public might better understand what constitutes a reasonable level of military readiness with respect to the resources available.

...when Sgt Roberts gave his body armour to a colleague and was then killed it created a sense of outrage in the public which led over time to David Cameron saying that it (the military-covenant) was going to be enshrined in law and the extent to which it was enshrined in law is of course a matter for argument but I think it was that event that triggered it all. And if as you say equipment is not in the covenant....

James Arbuthnot, MP

![Table 5-11 from Transcript #3.](image-url)
military-covenant has a part to play in providing the contextual basis for what constitutes fair and reasonable leadership and decision making in the minds of the public. In the case of Sgt Roberts, whatever the realities of that specific tragic fatality, the public might well have been less outraged over the perception of shortages in equipment (or had failures in training come to light, that issue too) if understanding about the truly dangerous nature of warfare had been more pervasive. What is perhaps less well articulated in the current versions of the covenant is the fact that commanders in the field often have to take life and death decisions instantaneously and that even when time is at hand to plan, it is routine in conflict to take very great risk in order to achieve mission success. It will be worth considering further how the military-covenant can be refined to accommodate reflections on the realities of war. Furthermore, in relation to future education initiatives where Armed Forces personnel are asked to help promote discipline, leadership and motivation in schools, the context in which these activities would be couched might best be based on the new military-covenant. In this way such engagement would not only satisfy the requirements of schools but also promote the values, standards and ethos of the military. The conceptual role of the military-covenant in strengthening ties and deepening understanding with the civilian population should not be overlooked.

Table 5-12 from Transcript #4.

Now that the military-covenant has a formal and a legal status the ramifications for any holding to account function that might accompany the statute have yet to be fully understood. In the case of the Government recounting to Parliament progress made over the preceding year in meeting the requirements of the covenant, a query resides within the political sphere that where failure to meet a requirement may occur, what is the consequence of that failure? Because the military-covenant as described under the Armed
Forces Covenant of 2011 is in its infancy, arguably even modest progress in any areas can be claimed as success. But as time goes on, in the eventuality that there is systemic year on year failure to progress a single requirement close to the hearts of the Armed Forces Community, does that mean that political calamity awaits the Minister who is seen to be ‘breaking the covenant?’ The danger that the covenant becomes politicised in this way is a real prospect unless measures are taken to mitigate the risks associated with keeping the bargain fair and affordable. The degree to which the chain of command uses the military-covenant to measure its own progress in the areas of housing, education, healthcare and transition is worthy of further consideration. As the assumptions underpinning Re-Basing, the New Employment Model and Future Force 2020 go forward toward implementation now and under SDSR 2015, the military-covenant has potential to check that these assumptions have been stress tested against a proper balancing between the needs of the service and the needs of the individual and critically also their families. In an era when austerity is set to continue, it will do so along domestic lines (i.e. increases in the personal contributions of Service Personnel to pensions and a rise in accommodation charges) but also along operational lines (i.e. increases in tour lengths from six, to nine to twelve months and a potential shortening in the training readiness pipeline downwards from one hundred and fifty days to any where as low as thirty days). When these impacts begin to take effect on individuals and their families there is likely be a tipping point at some point between 2015 and 2020 where an enduring operational campaign involving British Forces is likely to significantly test the bargain of the military-covenant again. With potential negative consequences for recruitment, retention and litigation in the near future the military-covenant has an increased role both in managing the expectations of the Armed Forces Community on the one hand and on the other acting as the conscience to those military commanders and civilian leaders who have responsibility for executing policy in these areas.
An area that is of potential concern to civilian adherents of the military-covenant is the degree to which military citizens merit special consideration leading to privileges that civilians do not enjoy. There are certainly several important democratic rights and freedoms which military personnel give up when they enter the military profession. The right to free speech, the freedom to freely associate and the right to life are all given up by Service Personnel when they assume their official appointments. These ‘disadvantages’ were they applied to civilians would be inherently undemocratic and yet without them the maintenance of an effective fighting military force would be impossible. Intelligence would be compromised and discipline would soon dissolve. So these ‘disadvantages’ can never be removed from service life and this is part of the bargain which Service Personnel ‘sign up to’. The military-covenant mentions the removal of these sorts of freedoms but it does not explain the reason why removal is important nor does it explain the significant impact that the loss of these freedoms have on Service Personnel. If the public are to better understand the bargain of the covenant then these elements of disadvantage need to be made explicit.

Separate to the military’s necessary but largely ‘self imposed disadvantages’ there are disadvantages that apply to the military and their families which should not exist in society but nevertheless do. It is an entirely reasonable prospect and therefore socially acceptable that military citizens have the disadvantages caused by operational duty and service abroad removed. This is not contentious with the general public. Removing disadvantages such as: having infrequent or nil contact or communication with families whilst abroad; finding it unduly difficult to vote in elections; the inability to pay bills or transfer money; discriminatory
tax burdens – all resulting from military service are just some of the areas which fall into the ‘readily acceptable’ bracket of ‘special consideration’ that are likely to find approval with civilians. It is the leverage which the military-covenant provides in unlocking the organs of state to remove these disadvantages which is of real enduring utility to the Armed Forces Community. But there are much more subtle, hidden and intractable service life challenges ripe for remedy too. Wives of Service Personnel experience disadvantage when applying for jobs or when attempting to maintain careers. Problems range from systemic discrimination to having large gaps in curriculum-vitae. Home basing may reduce the frequency of occurrence of some disadvantages but disadvantages will nevertheless continue to persist, not least where Defence Engagement activity in the future might even see families posted abroad for even longer periods than is the case now. It will be incumbent therefore on future versions of the military-covenant to stress the significance of the impacts of service life on families if the removal of difficult disadvantages is to be successful. In efforts by service charities and military organisations to strengthen public support in the removal of disadvantage the military-covenant (in this case the corporate-covenant) has thus become both a useful conceptual asset as well as a practical tool. Indeed, unless the ‘removing disadvantage’ clause becomes more central in future iterations of the military-covenant it will be much more difficult to promote the principle that commentary at Table 5-13 highlights which is that the covenant confers special recognition and privilege on Service Personnel. Because the Armed Forces Community endures the privations which necessitate the continuous removal of disadvantage, they are therefore provided with certain privileges by way of compensation and reward. These come in the shape of: exclusive military services such as healthcare, subsidised housing and private education: but also commercially provided discounts such as tickets to concerts and events, reduced premiums for insurance and reductions for travel etc. These privileges are often cited as ‘perks of the job’. but it would be damaging not to explain in full that these privileges, which also include a final salary pension scheme, specialist pay, additional pay for operations and incentives for retention are elements of an entire remuneration package that Service Personnel receive because of the disadvantages they experience, the sacrifices they make and the freedoms they willingly give up. The military-
covenant has a role to play in supporting explanation of the nature of reward and sacrifice in the context of the Armed Forces Community. These elements will always be under constant review in light of resource priorities but the covenantal principle is nevertheless an enduring one and it is this: whilst there may not usefully be complete parity in every sense between civilian and military citizens due to the nature of conflict and the privations of service life, there is still an equitable distribution of risk and reward that makes the relationship between civil and military citizens a balanced and fair one. If the military-covenant does not keep the civil-military 'ledger' balanced and the 'bargain' fair the pact will fail. If hard won privileges that have been afforded are withdrawn the military is likely to question the fairness of a situation in which individuals have given up their basic human rights such as free speech and free association. They may well no longer be willing to put their lives in danger or spend significant periods of time away from loved ones if their reward is no longer valuable. Equally if the privileges which Service Personnel receive cause distrust, envy and division and are not ultimately supported by the public, privileges will need to withdrawn. In either case policy in this area is advisably best justified by evidence which in part is addressed by attitude surveys and in part informed by the principles stemming from a morally coherent and policy oriented military-covenant which the public understands and endorses.

Table 5-13 from Transcript #4.

Q. So my question is, is the endeavour, is the position we have reached, a position in which the Government is still aspiring to fulfil the totality of the military-covenant?
A. Yes and I think the Government would say that... I don’t think that anyone would pretend we are there yet, we have made a lot of progress but still if you did a round robin on GPs surgeries for example you would find a lot more people that had heard of it (the military-covenant) than two years ago but you would find a long way short of 100%...

Julian Brazier, MP

The status of Veterans needs clarification. Either British military Veterans are, as the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 implies, beneficiaries of the Armed Forces Covenant with ‘special consideration’ status. Or they are civilians - subject to the same policy stipulations as any other citizen. In either case Veteran needs are not currently being met in full. In the area of
healthcare already discussed in this chapter it is clear that the prioritisation of the Armed Forces Community is not being executed by the NHS. In the fullness of time the success of the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 will in part be proven by a reduction in the numbers of unemployed, homeless, mentally ill and alcohol dependent Veterans. In the interim future iterations of the military-covenant can improve on the clarification of Veteran’s status so that it is clear where the locus of policy for them truly resides i.e. in the MoD, OGDs or with service charities and associations. If the British system of Government is unable to cater for the needs of the Nation’s Veterans within the spirit of the military-covenant longer term, having a separate Armed Forces Minister of State for Service Personnel, Families & Veterans (Min SPFV) with a separate ring fenced budget operating to the MoD, rather as DFID does under the nominal auspices of the FO, remains a political option. However, as Table 5-14 implies this option would find resistance among some of those in Parliament currently charged with an interest in military affairs.

Table 5-14 from Transcript #5.

Whilst the military-covenant as tradition is very ancient, the military-covenant as policy is very new. Accordingly the progress of covenant policy is immature. This provides the authors of Army doctrine with an opportunity to continue to develop and refine the military-covenant in a way that will influence and align with the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011. The incentives especially surrounding the mental health of Veterans is a strong motivation in this respect as the comments of PUS in Table 5-15 confirm.
One of the classic civil-military dilemmas which the military-covenant throws into sharp contrast is the current trajectory of civil-military integration in the UK. In the differentiated strata of UK civil society integration between the military and civil society has been accented by clear cut distinctions between civilian and military professions. These distinctions are increasingly along the lines of vocational differences as opposed to the distinctions of social class. Though as commentary at Table 5-15 shows, identification with the ‘ruling’ class remains an area for continued understanding as the future of the officer corps is subject to full meritocratic forces. Here the (nee) Territorial now Reserve Forces act as a bridge between the civil and military communities but nevertheless the degree to which UK civilian and military institutions could ever be fully interchangeable still remains low as the professional and vocational nature of a service life orientated toward high intensity warfare is set to endure. As the comments at Table 5-15 indicate there is a risk that if the British warrior cohort is not in some way elevated from its civilian citizen counterpart then the integrative forces of ‘social normalisation’ will no longer be useful as it will detract from the loyalty, allegiance and ultimately the ethos and fighting capacity of the Armed Forces.

The ideas behind maintaining the distinctiveness of the British Profession of Arms were foreseen and developed in the 1960s by General Sir John Hackett. To some extent what the author views as the ‘myth of separation’ has been allowed to develop into a false doctrine, espoused by academics such as Professor Hew Strachan, with the mantra of ‘the need to be
different' somewhat wilfully imbibed by a grateful generation of cautious warriors. This was
not what Hackett had in mind. In fact military distinctiveness was and remains an outcome of
differences which do not separate soldiers from society but if anything elevate them within it.
Distinction does not place the soldier forever behind the wire making him or her remote and
untouchable. No. Distinction only places the soldier 'somewhat apart' and fully capable of
relating to the culture, values and outlook that his or her civilian friends family and local
communities own. If there is any chasm between military and civilian citizens it is only on the
battlefield. Remaining differences are but mere stepping stones between the two
communities. It is an essential role of the New Military-Covenant that it recalibrates the
differences between military and civilian citizenship so that it better reflect the
accommodations ongoing under UK Re-Basing, Super Garrisons and so forth. The force of
'social normalisation' has thus far been a necessary corrective to the myth of 'military
separateness'.

Nevertheless if the 'civilianisation' pendulum swings too far military effectiveness will be at
risk. Future iterations of the military-covenant can do much therefore to ensure that the tenor
of British civil-military relations is properly attuned to the shared goals of the Armed Forces
Community and the Nation.

_I have certainly seen improvements as a result of the covenant in terms of what the Army
Families Federation does it allows us to engage with organisations outside of the MoD so
we now engage across Government at local Government and central Government level
and we find that what the covenant has done is force other organisations other
departments outside of the MoD to listen to the issues and needs of forces families...six
years ago if I had said to a local authority this family can't get the family into school they
have missed the deadline, the conversation stops there with the local authority probably
saying we can't do anything for you, you are an army family we can't help you, that's the
army's fault rather than listening to the problem and overcoming it...so in terms of using
it on other Government departments to meet the needs of forces families it has been an
incredibly powerful tool. There is still some way to go but we are seeing a real
improvement in the way that people listen._

_Chris Spencer, Chief Executive of the Army Families Federation (AFF)_

Table 5-16 from Transcript #6

Stemming from the perceived failings of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, fears in 2006
that the military-covenant might prove only to be a term of protest have not materialised. In
the intervening years the military-covenant has become synonymous with social justice and
fairness for the Armed Forces Community. More than that, the military-covenant is now an instrumental mechanism by which political, military and public institutions are influenced in the support of the Armed Forces Community.

Table 5-17 from Transcript #7.

Charities such as the Royal British Legion stress the importance of engagement between local communities and the Armed Forces Community. Such engagement fosters closer relationships between local chains of command and local authorities. Through engagement (part of the enactment of the covenant) ‘removal of disadvantage’ for service personnel is obtained on the one hand and on the other a deeper understanding and trust of the military is attained by the local population. The military-covenant gives a much richer more compelling explanation for those activities which were essentially concerned with recruitment under the term ‘Keeping the Army in the Public Eye’ (KAPE). The covenantal relationships which develop between the military and the public become cemented not just during the ‘crucible’ of operational campaigns or under recruitment drives but at times of regional crises where military aid to the civil community is an essential component of National Defence. If one accepts that one of the principle purposes of the New Military-Covenant is to hold up to the public what the military does for the Nation, then the clauses which comprise the bargain of the covenant can afford to much better reflect not only the liabilities at stake if the covenant fails but more importantly the benefits which accrue when the covenant succeeds.

To a large extent the New Military-Covenant is both the moral and the conceptual bedrock from which respective civil and military leaders may assemble to debate the bargain and to balance the ledger of the social compact.
The military-covenant as expressed as Army Doctrine is at pains to express that the covenant is not a contract and by implication not transactional. It stresses the obligation that Service Personnel have in respect to duty and the corresponding expectation that they should be treated fairly, regarded with respect, and remunerated well. However, it is in the very nature of a pact that it is reciprocal and mutual hence the language, which commentators use to express the covenant do include words like bargain and ledger. The point being made in Table 5-18 is that in many respects the covenant cannot be properly measured because there are elements to the bargain which are abstract and not tangible: felt not expressed. The benefits of service life such as camaraderie really have to be experienced to be understood where as the idea of physical injury sustained in battle is more easily imagined. In many respects some of the benefits of service life are simply not part of the bargain because they cannot be guaranteed or assured, they are simply positive consequences of undertaking a military career. Nor would there be general agreement by Service Personnel on all the areas which might constitute positive or negative consequences of service life. Things like foreign travel, nights out of bed, tour lengths etc all impact individuals differently according to age, experience and outlook etc. Nevertheless even though some elements of the bargain defy measurement and remain abstract or highly subjective this does not detract from the very real role and significant part that other elements of service life play in forming the covenant.

So whilst it may not be either practical or useful to try to measure some of the things which exist in service life which cannot be measured, it remains entirely fitting that the covenant does pay close attention to some areas of importance such as trust. Trust, whilst abstract as

Mark Urban, Defence Journalist BBC.
a concept and difficult to measure, is in the final analysis either present or not between
several parties. Nevertheless to lessen the risk that the covenant be thought of in ‘too
transactional’ a way, future versions should include a sense of the items and ideas which set
up the right sort of tension that might usefully exist between the beneficiaries and sponsors
of the covenant. In this way the significant elements of the covenant which might remain
largely proximate and immeasurable are included for the reasons of clarity, transparency
and completeness.

Table 5-19 from Transcript #8.

‘Mistake,’ ‘oversight’ and ‘miscalculation’ are words which taken at face value are at the
reasonable and acceptable end of the lexicon which describes levels of failure. ‘Negligence,’
‘misconduct’ and ‘incompetence’ are words which imply something altogether more serious.

It is therefore the degree of severity attached to the failure which is inherent with any
reckoning about whether the covenant has been breached or weakened. The author
contends that where failures of leadership point to certain elements of the covenant, the
degree of severity which an individual case brings with it is the critical factor in determining
whether the covenant is at risk of failing. The case at Table 5-19 is arguably not a breach of
the covenant if the chain of command has done everything reasonable to remedy the
situation at the point of failure. The more important question for the chain of command is
whether it recognises at the institutional level the damage to reputation that the incident
brings with it if it is not dealt with quickly or becomes commonplace. If the failure is systemic
and likely to be repeated then the trust between the chain of command and troops on the
ground is in jeopardy. This would develop into a breach of the covenant if the troops were
consistently deprived of food through neglect because troops have every reasonable
expectation of being treated fairly and the chain of command has a duty to feed its people on
operations. In the case of Table 5-19 within the terms of the covenant two provisions are

The MoD and the forces in their current incarnation are extremely dysfunctional in
resolving what would have been basic issues...someone is just in touch with me today
about the fact that the MoD has done a contract with Akrotiri where the catering is only
during working hours and now all these guys who are working round the clock on the
tornado and its now become an operational station with no food through the hours of
night that's just plain stupidity

Mark Urban, Defence Journalist BBC.
made. Firstly, the troops have a duty to put up with the general privations of operations, indeed they are trained to operate in conditions where food and sleep may not be available for fairly long periods of time. This is part of soldiering. Troops by necessity must be robust and resilient. Secondly, the chain of command has a duty to care for its troops. An army marches on its stomach. Table 5-19 exemplifies therefore the dual nature of the covenant. Gross error or negligence stresses the covenant unduly but troops are hardy folk who can deal with the privations of operations (as indeed so too are their families). Trust between the chain of command and the troops, indeed between the chain of command and civilian leaders is maintained when the bargain of the covenant is understood and effort is put in place to satisfy within the bounds of expectation, reasonable reward or recompense. The New Military-Covenant has an important role in setting out the tenor of those expectations and discussing in broad terms what ‘reasonable’ looks or feels like.

I think it’s unwise to make it a legal obligation because it’s so hard to actually fulfil it and inevitably if you try and enshrine a thing like that into law you will end up embedding within it one or two absolutely crucial legal words like reasonable that great word reasonable, you would end up with an obligation to provide them with the most up to date equipment etc because actually really there isn’t any other way of framing those things. Clearly you cannot have an Army and Air force or a Navy whose equipment is simultaneously new, it’s not an achievable thing, therefore when people draft stuff like this they put those words reasonable in but those then are an invitation to some sort of battle...was it reasonable to have snatch land rovers in Basra in 2006 or certain things about body armour...dare one say I have some sympathy for the MoD in that respect renewing all that stuff at the same moment so that everything was tip-top. In a situation where you have a certain number of new body armour and a certain set of old I don’t think it’s unreasonable to say that someone who is in a challenger tank should have the older armour when someone who is driving a soft skinned land rover should have the newer so with the case Sgts Roberts from the RTR that whole thing then became a difficult political issue because he hadn’t been given the up to date body armour.

Mark Urban, Defence Journalist BBC.

Table 5-20 from Transcript #8.

Now that the military-covenant is on the statute books the ‘cat is out of the bag’ so to speak. It was inevitable at the inception of the military-covenant that any Government document which went before Parliament for scrutiny would be regarded in legalistic terms. The subjectivity involved in interpreting the word ‘reasonable’ will remain a challenge for those holding the Government to account over the fulfilment or otherwise of the Military-Covenant.
In the case of equipment, because the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 does not include military hardware, weapons or training the fears raised at Table 5-20 would not come to light under any discussion of the covenant *in Parliament*. However, the military-covenant as expressed as Army Doctrine does indeed include the clause of provision of adequate resources and so to this extent the New Military-Covenant should also include this element because the issues which are raised under equipment and resources have very significant impact on the nature of trust between the Armed Forces Community and the Government. In this way the New Military-Covenant needs to make clear that it would be an unreasonable expectation on the part of the military to be equipped with all of the latest equipment and all of the best resource all of the time but that equally it would be entirely reasonable to expect the Government to enable its military to be equipped with enough equipment enough of the time to do the missions asked of it. The individual case of Sgts Roberts in relation to this discussion raises not so much the question of adequate resource (although it might have drawn more media interest on levels of training) but rather the levels of risk which commanders in the field have responsibility for in determining what self protection measures their troops take in any given situation. What the military-covenant throws into sharp contrast here is the reality, that whilst Defence Force Protection Policy affords commanders a ‘bold’ and ‘agile’ approach to taking risks against threats (for that is very nature and essence of being successful in prosecuting violent armed conflict) the public does not yet fully understand or accept such an approach, especially if it has resulted in the loss of life of a loved one. The New Military-Covenant has a role to play in better bringing to light the realities of violent conflict in ways which leave little interpretation as to the true nature of service life, wherein the ultimate liability and sacrifice is a very real prospect, not a remote one.
The modern military-covenant is still only in its infancy. The Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 comes down to us on the back of the unpopular Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns which came to a close in 2014. The covenant comes down to us also as Government policy. Like all new policy relating to Defence it is certain to come under close scrutiny at some point and in due course. But only three short years have expired since the covenant’s inception and to some extent its very inception is a success story which the Government can still advertise in positive ways at the next election in 2015. However, only the fullness of time will tell if the covenant has been a useful and enduring piece of statute law. A sceptical media, a cautious military and an ambivalent public have yet to determine what the covenant means. This is not surprising because until now the military-covenant has been ill-defined, glossed over and subject to paper thin assumptions. Only a New Military-Covenant, one which is better defined and properly understood in the ways which this analysis has put forward, can perform the role of bringing this understanding to the public and binding the nation together in support of the Armed Forces Community. As Mark Urban at Table 5-21 makes plain, the covenant is not perfect, but it is the only thing which the nation has in this area, so the nation might as well make it work.

*(The military-covenant)* is an attempt to reconcile the demands made of the military particularly in the light of military operations and surrender of certain freedoms by people serving with what can be offered in return and to try and bind the Nation a little more closely to that bargain and that’s my broad perception of it. I philosophically might say that I am slightly suspicious of the whole concept but...you might use the argument it’s the only mechanism you’ve got in this area so let’s try and make it work.

*Mark Urban, Defence Journalist BBC.*

**Table 5-21 from Transcript #8.**

The modern military-covenant is still only in its infancy. The Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 comes down to us on the back of the unpopular Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns which came to a close in 2014. The covenant comes down to us also as Government policy. Like all new policy relating to Defence it is certain to come under close scrutiny at some point and in due course. But only three short years have expired since the covenant’s inception and to some extent its very inception is a success story which the Government can still advertise in positive ways at the next election in 2015. However, only the fullness of time will tell if the covenant has been a useful and enduring piece of statute law. A sceptical media, a cautious military and an ambivalent public have yet to determine what the covenant means. This is not surprising because until now the military-covenant has been ill-defined, glossed over and subject to paper thin assumptions. Only a New Military-Covenant, one which is better defined and properly understood in the ways which this analysis has put forward, can perform the role of bringing this understanding to the public and binding the nation together in support of the Armed Forces Community. As Mark Urban at Table 5-21 makes plain, the covenant is not perfect, but it is the only thing which the nation has in this area, so the nation might as well make it work.
Transcripts of Interview Recordings

Transcript #1 Adam Holloway, Mon 16 Jun 2014, Westminster.

Q. How well do you understand the Military Covenant?
A. Do not understand.

Q. Does the military-covenant apply to you personally?
A. I don’t know.

Q. The UK military covenant is more about support to UK Armed Forces and their families whilst on operations?
A. Disagree I thought it was about people who left as well.

Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the welfare of the UK Armed Forces, veterans and their families?
A. Strongly agree.

Q. The UK military-covenant applies to the following areas:
- Terms and service including pay and pensions – A. no
- Medical Healthcare – A. Theoretically yes
- Education – A. Yes
- Housing – A. Yes
- Benefits and Tax – A. No
- Duty of care – A. Yes
- Support packages for troops and families whilst on operations – A. Yes
- Quality of service life for service families – A. Yes, theoretically
- Ease of access to public services and amenities – A. Again it is all theoretical, yes
- Transition to civilian life – A. Yes
- Support to veterans – A. Theoretically yes
- Support to families inquests into the deaths of Service Personnel? - A. yes
- Public recognition of the Armed Forces such as holding a National AF Day? - - A. No
- Participating as UK citizens such as reducing disadvantages such as voting etc. - A. No it doesn’t
- UK Forces accepting changes in Defence i.e. impact of Defence Reform such as redundancies? - - A. Believe so yes.
- Updating the complaints system for UK Armed Forces personnel. - A. Yes

Q. The UK military-covenant means that in some circumstances UK Armed Forces personnel should be treated differently to civilians?
A. Yes

Q. The UK military-covenant means that the UK Armed Forces have an unconditional duty to serve?
A. I don’t know what that means.

Q. They have a full liability to serve. There is no discretion about their service. Their service is including the liability of death.
A. Erm, no. Not if they believe it to be unlawful or against their...disagree

Q. The UK military covenant means that govt has a legal obligation to provide the Armed Forces with the equipment and resources it needs?
A. Again it is all should do...so it is a yes...one is answering yes on the basis that is happening...which they should do but they don’t always

Q. So can we explore the theme of the theoretical, acknowledging that difference between what is actually happening and what should be happening. So answer the question as it reflects your belief and then we can return to the theoretical if that is okay?
A. Well I am just you know, you can answer yes to all these things but the fact remains I have a constituent shot in Iraq who is sleeping on his girlfriend’s parent sofa and doesn’t get priority help from the GP in fact the GP doesn’t even understand what his problem is...and there are plenty of alcoholic ex-soldiers sitting in pubs and working men's clubs around the
country...so all this stuff is theoretical. Sounds great but I am not knowledgeable enough to know whether or not it happens enough in practice.
Q. Absolutely and part of the intent, the motivation is to get that message across about the importance of it so that it does become more practical than theoretical. So agree?
A. Agree, yes, theoretically that’s what it should be.
Q. The UK military-covenant means that on balance the UK Armed Forces personnel put more in than get out of their military service?
A. Definitely true...well it’s not always true, some people put in much more some people get more out.
Q. Somewhat agree?
A. No I don’t agree its variable. Some people put in a hell of alot some people do not very much and get a lot out of it.
Q. That comes straight out of the military doctrine of the army, so that’s what it says, what the army says about the military covenant.
Q. The UK military-covenant means that UK Armed Forces have a high expectation of being treated fairly at all times
A. Yep they do
Q. Agree
Q. The UK military-covenant is a set of obligations between the Government, the Nation and every individual member of the UK Armed Forces.
A. Yes
Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the Government’s aspirations to fulfil the military-covenant.
Q. Agree
A. 100%
Q. Strongly agree
Q. And that is it.
A. I just think Mark it all sounds absolutely fabulous but the reality is that...
Q. I agree...but nobody has actually defined what (the military-covenant) is.

Transcript # 2. Col Bob Stewart, 17 Jul 2014 Westminster

Q. How well do you understand the Military Covenant?
A. I understand it.
Q. Does the military-covenant apply to you personally?
A. No.
Q. The UK military covenant is more about support to UK Armed Forces and their families whilst on operations?
A. Disagree.
Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the welfare of the UK Armed Forces, veterans and their families?
A. Somewhat disagree.
Q. The UK military-covenant applies to the following areas:
  - Terms and service including pay and pensions – A. Yes
  - Medical Healthcare – A. Yes
  - Education – A. Yes
  - Housing – A. Yes
  - Benefits and Tax – A. I don’t think so
  - Duty of care – A. Yes
• Support packages for troops and families whilst on operations – A. Yes
• Quality of family life for service families – A. Yes
• Ease of access to public services and amenities – A. Yes
• Transition to civilian life – A. Yes
• Support to veterans – A. Definitely
• Support to families inquests into the deaths of Service Personnel? - A. Yes
• Public recognition of the Armed Forces such as holding a National AF Day? – A. I don't think it’s connected, yes and no.
• Participating as UK citizens such as reducing disadvantages such as voting etc. – A. Yes
• UK Forces accepting changes in Defence i.e. impact of Defence Reform such as redundancies? - A. It doesn’t say that but there is an implication.
• Updating the complaints system for UK Armed Forces personnel. - A. No

Q. The UK military-covenant means that in some circumstances UK Armed Forces personnel should be treated differently to civilians?
A. Yes...strongly agree
Q. The UK military-covenant means that the UK Armed Forces have an unconditional duty to serve?
A. They have a conditional not an unconditional duty to serve...no I don’t disagree I somewhat agree
Q. The UK military covenant means that govt has a legal obligation to provide the Armed Forces with the equipment and resources it needs?
A. Somewhat agree. I don't like legal obligation cause that leads to legalistic problems.
Q. The UK military-covenant means that on balance the UK Armed Forces personnel put more in than get out of their military service?
A. No I don't think so. Disagree, they get a lot of advantages I think we've got to be careful not to go over the tipping point and people say they’ve got too much.
Q. The UK military-covenant means that UK Armed Forces have a high expectation of being treated fairly at all times
A. Somewhat agree.
Q. The UK military-covenant is a set of obligations between the Government, the Nation and every individual member of the UK Armed Forces.
A. Yes agree
Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the Government’s aspirations to fulfil the military-covenant.
A. No. Disagree it’s about everything.
Q. So you felt quite strongly about education, especially widows children...
A. I think we have a duty of care to orphans when they’ve lost their Dad or their Mum in combat and I think that extends, which we are already doing, to university fees etc.
Q. So in your understanding...
A. ...whether it’s through the covenant or through charities or whatever...but it could be written, I’d like it to be in the Covenant I don’t think it is.
A. In macro terms I’d like to see a proper Veterans Minister responsible for the military-covenant and that Veteran’s minister to have a separate budget, that is not raided and is set by the treasury and that Minister to be at least a Minister of State level not necessarily answerable to the Secretary of State for Ministry of Defence ...could work in the same way that DFID is a sub-set of the Foreign Office...with certain rights to attend cabinet
Q. The American’s have something similar...
A. The American’s have something similar...
Q. I think that covers the Veteran’s piece very well...
Q. ...yes ... the only other one that came up...the moral obligation as opposed to the legal obligation...
A. Well that's what I am implying...the UK Government has a legal obligation to provide the UK Armed Forces with the equipment and resources it needs...well my only point about that is that of course it does but you have got to put that against the resources. I mean are you saying that Commanders say look I am so sorry I haven’t got the latest top level tank I am not going in with the Centurion type two...the answer is that it’s what all ministers want to do...

Q. Yes and I guess the only come back at all is that on some of the equipment decisions where there have been opportunities to take advantage of investment to prepare for future operations but those decisions haven’t been taken and they’ve been taken at risk and the forces don’t get the equipment like the helicopters...
A. Well it’s a risk, it’s an opportunity cost if you...do that what else do you not do? You know politics is about decisions...alright?
Q. Brilliant...thanks.


Q. How well do you understand the Military Covenant?
A. I would say I understand it.
Q. Does the military-covenant apply to you personally?
A. No.
Q. So you disagree with that statement?
A. Well I...I understand what you mean now. I would say that I somewhat disagree. I have a daughter in the territorial reserves.
Q. The UK military covenant is more about support to UK Armed Forces and their families whilst on operations?
A. Disagree
Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the welfare of the UK Armed Forces, veterans and their families?
A. I somewhat agree.
Q. The UK military-covenant applies to the following areas:

- Terms and service including pay and pensions – A. yes
- Medical Healthcare – A. Yes
- Education – A. Yes
- Housing – A. Yes
- Benefits and Tax – A. I would say no.
- Duty of care – A. Yes
- Support packages for troops and families whilst on operations – A. Yes
- Quality of service life for service families – A. Yes.
- Ease of access to public services and amenities – A. Yes
- Transition to civilian life – A. Yes
- Support to veterans – A. Yes
- Support to families inquests into the deaths of Service Personnel? - A. (Long Pause)...I would hesitate to say but no...
- Public recognition of the Armed Forces such as holding a National AF Day? - A. Again I don’t think so. I don’t think that is an issue of the military covenant...
- Participating as UK citizens such as reducing disadvantages such as voting etc. – A. Yes absolutely yes.
- UK Forces accepting changes in Defence i.e. impact of Defence Reform such as redundancies? - A. Erm, I am not sure that is an issue of the covenant. I would say no.
- Updating the complaints system for UK Armed Forces personnel. - A. Yes

Q. The UK military-covenant means that in some circumstances UK Armed Forces personnel should be treated differently to civilians?
A. I would agree.
Q. The UK military covenant means that the UK Armed Forces have an unconditional duty to serve?
A. ...I would agree with that...Ah hold on is it the military covenant which deals with the provision or is it the fact the UK Armed Forces have an unconditional duty to serve that the (?) arise to the existence of the UK military-covenant? ...I think that is the preferable way of putting it.
Q. We can return to the question or the statement, but do you agree with the statement...?
A. On the basis of the way I have phrased it I would disagree with that statement. Sorry about that.
Q. Okay.
Q. The UK military covenant means that govt has a legal obligation to provide the Armed Forces with the equipment and resources it needs?
A. I would disagree with that I don't believe that it is the UK military covenant that means that.
Q. The UK military-covenant means that on balance the UK Armed Forces personnel put more in than get out of their military service?
A. (Long pause) I would disagree with that.
Q. The UK military-covenant means that UK Armed Forces have a high expectation of being treated fairly at all times.
A. I strongly agree with that.
Q. The UK military-covenant is a set of obligations between the Government, the Nation and every individual member of the UK Armed Forces.
A. I would agree with that.
Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the Government's aspirations to fulfil the military-covenant.
A. I would somewhat agree with that.
Q. ...there was a question about military equipment and why that isn’t in the UK Armed Forces Covenant and I wonder if you might explain your answer as to why it’s not part of the military-covenant...why equipment is not or should not be part of the military-covenant?
A. The reason I said no to that is that I don’t believe that it is the UK military-covenant that means that. Sometimes the Armed Forces will be unable to have the equipment and resources they need for all sorts of different reasons because in (a) conflict that might be unavoidable (it) was also unpredictable and that the resources and the equipment were simply not there in order to preserve the defences of the country the armed forces might need to be sent in without the equipment or resources that would be ideally be provided. But it’s a subjective judgement as to whether something is needed or not and sometimes you cannot have a legal obligation that would vary (according) to the subjective judgement of whoever was judging it. The case of the snatch Land Rovers is a difficult issue to resolve and the defence committee did an enquiry into the legal obligations arising out of that sort of thing which didn’t produce answers but which said that the Government has got to resolve this issue. We mustn’t create legal impediments for the MoD that might mean the Armed Forces don’t know what they are meant to be doing.
Q. So do you believe the Government has a moral obligation to provide the Armed Forces with the equipment and resources it needs?
A. (Long pause). I think that the Government does have a moral obligation to provide the armed forces with the equipment and resources it needs but I don't know if that is as a result of the military-covenant which I think is in its early stages and has yet to evolve with any degree of clarity.
Q. That's interesting. In what respect do you think the military-covenant lacks clarity?
A. (Pause). Well the very fact that you are able to ask all these questions and get different answers to them suggests that it does...but perhaps it’s only in my own mind it lacks clarity I don’t know.
Q. Well I think it’s an interesting topic it’s certainly given me food for thought for many years and to my mind I think there are ambiguities and there is a lot of subjectivity. I think I would contend that the military-covenant has existed in some shape of form for a long time, a very long time...
A. As an army concept as you say...
Q. Yes and I think that the story of the covenant and how that came about is its own interesting story. But I think the support of the Armed Forces, the Nation’s support to the Armed Forces is articulated in the military-covenant and that that broad support ranges from a variety of issues as you have just shown from housing to benefits...but it’s very clear to me that there is quite a clear cut distinction between those types of resources that come under the military-covenant and the omission of equipment and resources i.e. the military covenant does not cover equipment and resources.
A. Do you think it is clear?
Q. Well it is clear that the Armed Forces Covenant 2011 does not cover equipment and resources.

A. My own view as to how it all came about was that when Sgt Roberts gave his body armour to a colleague and was then killed it created a sense of outrage in the public which led over time to David Cameron saying that it was going to be enshrined in law and the extent to which it was enshrined in law is of course a matter for argument but I think it was that event that triggered it all. And if as you say equipment is not in the covenant...
Q. Yes and this is the nub of the issue, this particular issue, and I don’t think this particular issue is a bigger issue than other aspects of the military-covenant, mental health and so forth, but what I’d like to try and achieve is to get greater clarity as to why we think the equipment line doesn’t Tableure in the military covenant when quite clearly events such as Sgts Robert’s death show that it potentially should be and certainly in the military version of the covenant, in the military doctrine it does cover the military resources...
A. Oh really?
Q. Yes. So there is a distinction between the two, which is why I have brought it out...
Q. There was another interesting question...this is statement nine...the UK Armed Forces have an unconditional duty to serve and you disagreed with that...
A. I don’t believe that the UK military-covenant created that unconditional duty to serve I think that what creates that unconditional duty to serve is taking the Queen’s shilling, signing up, that is when you take it on...
Q. Absolutely, yeah.
A. And it’s not...and it is because as I say because you have taken on the unconditional duty to serve that you then get the corresponding advantages of UK military-covenant. So I would put it the other way round.
Q. Yes. So therefore why I phrased it that way is then because I come onto the theme in statement thirteen in that having an unconditional duty to serve which is not under contention it is unconditional does that in your mind help create the obligation that the Government and the Nation has in its support of the armed forces?
A. Yes.
Q. Finally coming back to...statement two does the military covenant apply to you personally?
A. And I said that because my daughter is a 2nd Lt in the Territorial Army then yes it does...
Q. Ah so let me check..you said somewhat disagree...
A. Oh did me?
Q. Yes. Would you want to revise that...?
A. Now I think about it I think I ought to say somewhat agree.
B. And can you explain your response on that?
A. Because my daughter is a 2Lt in the Territorial army I think the obligations she takes on which therefore applies to her applies to a certain extent to me as a member of her family as well and I have the right to be treated with some degree of consideration as a result of the service that she gives.
Q. So if I took that correctly would you identify yourself with the Armed Forces Community or Armed Forces Covenant Family as its been described because of that connection, that military connection through your daughter?
A. Yes I think I would. Loosely.
Q. So for me that’s an interesting idea so then to what extent if your daughter was not in the military would you believe the covenant applied to you? In fact if you had no members of your family serving in the military would you therefore not be part of the military-covenant?
A. I would therefore not be a beneficiary of the military covenant. I would have the obligations that everyone in the country has to ensure that the military were beneficiaries of the military-covenant.

Q. Right. So your liability in terms of supporting the covenant would then come back to the obligations of the armed forces and the Nation in statement thirteen.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay that’s it...thank you very much.


Preamble:

A. The military-covenant is as old as the service in as much as there has always been in the UK, there has always been a sense that you ask the Armed Services to do something which you yourself wouldn’t do and therefore you owe them more as an employer than you do a secretary who is doing the same as you do...there are lots of examples going back to the eighteenth century for special housing, education all sorts of things that service people got that the average civilian did not get and I think that has always been there whether or not that has been acknowledged. Its only since Iraq 1 where it has been more formally acknowledged and that’s fine, I like that...I was one of those that did not believe that you could write the covenant into law and that having a statute that says you the Government must do this that and the other thing for our service people is a fraud because if a Government didn’t do it what’s going to happen is it such a thing that someone’s going to go to jail or be fined for it? It’s a fraud its rather like, there are one or two others, there’s the climate change target bill and there’s a child poverty bill which seeks to write into law political ambition and it should be the political ambition to be nice and to look after our armed forces properly and if we don’t achieve that ambition then we will pay a penalty in the ballot box in the general election but writing it into law doesn’t make it either stronger or weaker in fact you could argue that by writing it into law you are reducing it to the middle you are saying right its law now it’s all I’ve got to do so fine I won’t bother doing anything else. So I was one of those who argued against but the RBL and others were campaigning to write it into law and the political pressure was such that it was rather like the equal pay for the Ghurkhas that there was a groundswell of opinion that you couldn’t not do it even though those of us who are involved in these matters knew it to be the wrong thing to do. May sound bad that that’s politics for you.

Q. Absolutely. I think my motivation has been, what I got interested in the covenant was understanding what a covenant actually was. When I looked the military doctrine says one set of things and this new covenant says another set and they are broadly complimentary but there are a couple of touch points where they are separate, different and that’s because the military institution has a different role and set of responsibilities to the political one and so for me it was interesting in trying to characterise what those two positions were and I suspect that they are two suns which may never fully, properly align and I think the charities have exposed some of that...so I am trying to define what it is...now that Parliament has a formal responsibility to report on certain things, to understand why that is and where the origins are form...

A. The Defence Committee is doing a report into the study of the covenant due to report at the end of the year I think...

Q. How well do you understand the Military Covenant?

A. Very well

Q. Does the military-covenant apply to you personally?

A. No

Q. The UK military covenant is more about support to UK Armed Forces and their families whilst on operations?

A. More about? How do you mean?

Q. More about so on a scale of its everything to do with support to UK Armed Forces whilst on operations on one end and it’s something to do with that on the other. You can agree partially agree disagree or...

A. Don’t understand the question...

Q. The UK military-covenant has more about support to UK Armed Forces on operations...
A. More than what?
Q. More than any other aspect that could drive the military-covenant...it’s mostly to do with supporting UK Forces and their families on operations...
A. Don’t understand the question.
Q. So neither agree nor disagree?
A. Don’t understand the question...I think it’s a daft question...if you don’t mind me saying so, ha ha. It’s not even written in English...
Q. Okay.
Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the welfare of the UK Armed Forces, veterans and their families?
A. more than what?! You can’t say it’s more about..you have to say more than what.!
Q. More to do...the UL military-covenant as a concept is more about welfare than it is about support to veterans or support to provision of equipment...it’s mostly it means mostly...
A. I think it’s a daft question. Why don’t I lay out for you what I think the covenant should be, would that be easier?
Q. Well if I could get a response n the box then we can have a chat that would probably be easier...
A. Er, alright...
Q. The UK military-covenant applies to the following areas:
• Terms and service including pay and pensions – A. Yes
• Medical Healthcare – A. Yes
• Education – A. Yes
• Housing – A. Yes
• Benefits and Tax – A. No
• Duty of care – A. What does that mean? [health and safety] Er no.
• Support packages for troops and families whilst on operations – A. (Pause) Yes
• Quality of service life for service families – A. Yes
• Ease of access to public services and amenities – A. No. That is to do with local authorities.
• Transition to civilian life – A. No
• Support to veterans – A. No
• Support to families inquests into the deaths of Service Personnel? - A. No

It’s a very odd question depends on how particular you are with who is providing these services. If the military covenant is between the regiment and the soldier then it’s nothing to do with veterans or inquests though you could argue that the MoD does have a responsibility in those areas...

[I think there are two of them an army one a military one and a Government one and they specify what they think it is but my contention is that there is a lot of ambiguity and what I am trying to do is define it better...and this is just a personal response...to see where people agree and disagree and it’s interesting to see your response to Col Bob’s...and funnily enough in some areas there is broad consensus but some questions do pose problems...]

• Public recognition of the Armed Forces such as holding a National AF Day? – A. I think you are getting real definitional problems here...it is plainly good that there is an Armed Forces Day [but do you think it is part of the military-covenant?] No...
• Participating as UK citizens such as reducing disadvantages such as voting etc. – A. Yes
• UK Forces accepting changes in Defence i.e. impact of Defence Reform such as redundancies? - A. No.
• Updating the complaints system for UK Armed Forces personnel. - A. No...we are getting into some muddle here...[okay...]

Q. The UK military-covenant means that in some circumstances UK Armed Forces personnel should be treated differently to civilians?
A. Yes. Strongly agree
Q. The UK military-covenant means that the UK Armed Forces have an unconditional duty to serve?
A. Yes. Strongly agree
Q. The UK military covenant means that govt has a legal obligation to provide the Armed Forces with the equipment and resources it needs?
A. No. Strongly disagree
Q. The UK military-covenant means that on balance the UK Armed Forces personnel put more in than get out of their military service?
A. No. I don’t agree with that
Q. The UK military-covenant means that UK Armed Forces have a high expectation of being treated fairly at all times
A. No
Q. The UK military-covenant is a set of obligations between the Government, the Nation and every individual member of the UK Armed Forces.
A. Yes
Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the Government’s aspirations to fulfil the military-covenant.
A. Don’t understand the question [okay]
A. ...It's the easiest thing in the world to say hey listen I am really strong supporter of our boys, our boys and girls...I don’t care about this you can jolly well do...marvellous and that shows I am a jolly good bloke. But of course that won’t actually help at all...I think in defining what should be in the military covenant there are two sides really aren’t there one is things you have to have in order to carry the job you are carrying out so for example housing near where you are training, single accommodation, married accommodation close to training areas and that’s the military covenant because if you don’t get that you can’t do your job...and there are all sorts of other areas...provision of reasonable equipment and so on and if the state does not provide those things then they have broken their half of the military-covenant. The second half of the military-covenant involves providing something that other citizens don’t get because people in the military are being asked to do something that other citizens wouldn’t wish to do. And that’s quite different, quite separate...and you could do your job without that. But that’s saying I want to provide fantastic education, other terms and conditions. Because we the state are saying we respect the things that you are doing and therefore we are prepared to pay you more than we are a police officer because police officers don’t have to get shot...so it’s a sort of added reward aspect of being in the armed services...
Q. Of though of course some soldiers are being paid less than train drivers which was General Dannatt’s point in 2006, slightly contentious...
Q. So you do think there is an obligation on the Government to provide resources including equipment that’s part of the covenant.....(nods)
Q. You do think that there is a welfare element to the military covenant to do with veterans and families...?
A. No....there are plenty of those who have obligations towards veterans I am not sure it is part of the covenant....
Q. So you wouldn’t see a veteran’s minister?
A. Oh no, I am very strongly opposed to a veterans minister for the very simple reason we need ministers who are attuned to the armed services in far more areas in the health service, in the department of defence and so on and so forth (i.e.) in the housing department and if you had one bloke in this Government we haven’t got ministers who cover several departments. In America you have a department of veterans who does every aspect of life for the veterans, we haven’t got that here for the very simple reason that once someone has left the armed services he or she is an ordinary citizen and is therefore entitled or not entitled to benefits housing and all the rest of it depending on their circumstances..
Q. It’s interesting as you have an uncovered a difference of opinion with some other members which is good but also each of these questions is based on the two documents that exist and in the Government terms of the covenant as it is written down now it says that the covenant does apply to veterans you know...
A. The covenant does apply to the veterans, what do you mean by that? One of the problems is that easy sound-bites, we strongly believe in our boys and girls, they do a fantastic job and I’ll tell you I want to look after them when they are veteran’s too and I’ll tell you another thing their families and children too because they are great.

Q. And what does that mean?
A. And what does that mean. So what you have to do is get away from all that crap and get back to saying what do soldiers sailors and airman have to do? How can we assist them to do that. What do they actually deserve because they are doing it. And what proviso for them is in place when they are veterans? But that is very often well mainly scrutinizing what the charities are doing. So that’s mainly making sure RBL, SAFA and everybody else are doing their job well. But the Government’s obligation ends when a person leaves the forces, apart from war pensions.

Q. That’s a very interesting point that is not what the covenant says it should be doing...
A. There is no special obligation on a person aged seventy, I served in the second world war, or aged ninety. He doesn’t get war benefits or special housing nor should he actually...

Q. But recognition doesn’t have to be in terms of financial reward does it? It could be a medal?
A. But that falls into the same category as sound-bites.

Q. So you think the awarding of a medal is no different to a sound-bite?
A. That’s right. In terms of the military-covenant...

A. The army covenant says that but the Government covenant doesn’t say that, it says it is a set of mutual obligations but it stays away from saying that they are binding in the sense...

Q. But that is completely different to parades or having a medal or having a photograph in the newspaper or visiting troops on deployment for soldier magazine. Those things are not part of the covenant. The covenant is a contract that says if you do that thing there here is what we will give you....but if you make it about recognition...to suggest that a soldier risks his life to get a veteran’s badge is demeaning the whole idea behind the covenant...

A. I agree...that it has to be something absolutely meaningful but interestingly enough having got to this stage the story of the covenant at its birth is the motivating factor if a set of generals hadn’t got prickly about what they said at the time was the cavalier attitude of some in the political class and therefore raise their head above the parapet to make a point. If they hadn’t done that we wouldn’t have had a situation where attention on these issues was brought. So I find that really interesting how that situation occurred. And now we are in a position of Fighting for what the soul of the covenant is, making sure it’s not just about sound-bites and minor acts of recognition but substantial things to help people. And absolutely I would agree with that.

A. Yes. I think that is the tone of Andrew’s book (Andrew Morrison).

Q. Well yes, I think so but that is a very topical, political read, it raises substantive points especially about healthcare, given his background. But what it doesn’t do and interestingly enough you mentioned the obligation to provide resources it’s not a part of the covenant, it is in the army’s covenant it isn’t in the thing.

A. And that’s why I think the legal thing is silly. The covenant is equivalent to an unspoken convention. So I by and large seek to be polite to you, you very kindly, completely incorrectly call me sir, you shouldn’t do, so stop doing that, and we can have a nice cup of coffee together – there’s a covenant – I am not rude to you I don’t spit on the floor, those are covenant’s and those covenants have existed for all time in society its always been the case since medieval kings feudally, before then back to the fyrd and the Anglo-Saxons and they said if you come and Tableht for us you can have a bit of land [blood and treasure] but that was never written down and the danger in writing it down is the lowest common denominator factor...

Q. Okay, these things only occur, and this is the central observation, these things only get written down when they are in danger or at risk of being ignored, so the points at which things don’t happen, they don’t get the helicopters and the boys are dying unnecessarily, people get upset and then they want to write things down and in this litigious age it’s difficult to do that...and so Magna Carta was written down and we are in that sort of position.

A. In which case you’ll end up with those lowest denominators.
Q. I don’t agree with the having to write it down...


Q. How well do you understand the Military Covenant?
A. I would say well
Q. Does the military-covenant apply to you personally?
A. Yes I mean
Q. The UK military covenant is more about support to UK Armed Forces and their families whilst on operations?
A. No its not it’s about all Armed Forces not specific to those that are just on operations
Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the welfare of the UK Armed Forces, veterans and their families?
A. Somewhat agree
Q. The UK military-covenant applies to the following areas:
  • Terms and service including pay and pensions – A. Yes
  • Medical Healthcare – A. Yes
  • Education – A. Yes
  • Housing – A. Yes
  • Benefits and Tax – A. No
  • Duty of care – A. No
  • Support packages for troops and families whilst on operations – A. Yes
  • Quality of service life for service families – A. Yes
  • Ease of access to public services and amenities – A. Yes that’s central to it yes
  • Transition to civilian life – A. Yes
  • Support to veterans – A. Yes
  • Support to families inquests into the deaths of Service Personnel? - A. Yes [but I think that’s wrong...] So the answer is it does but it shouldn’t
  • Public recognition of the Armed Forces such as holding a National AF Day? – A. Yes
  • Participating as UK citizens such as reducing disadvantages such as voting etc. – A. Yes
  • UK Forces accepting changes in Defence i.e. impact of Defence Reform such as redundancies? - A. Yes
  • Updating the complaints system for UK Armed Forces personnel. - A. Yes
Q. The UK military-covenant means that in some circumstances UK Armed Forces personnel should be treated differently to civilians?
A. Yes strongly agree
Q. The UK military-covenant means that the UK Armed Forces have an unconditional duty to serve?
A. Yes I strongly agree subject to international law. Nobody can be given an unlawful command.
Q. The UK military covenant means that govt has a legal obligation to provide the Armed Forces with the equipment and resources it needs?
A. No I don’t agree, strongly disagree
Q. The UK military-covenant means that on balance the UK Armed Forces personnel put more in than get out of their military service?
A. On balance I strongly agree
Q. The UK military-covenant means that UK Armed Forces have a high expectation of being treated fairly at all times
A. I agree rather than strongly agree
Q. The UK military-covenant is a set of obligations between the Government, the Nation and every individual member of the UK Armed Forces.
A. Agree
Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the Government’s aspirations to fulfil the military-covenant.
A. More than what?
Q. Well of course in some respects there’s the military-covenant which is army doctrine then there is the Armed Forces Covenant which is the Government’s covenant and the story of the covenant if you were to describe it as such arose around 2000 and is now in its full maturity, take the context of how we got to the covenant then you could say it was a political response to public opinion and the story included General Dannatt making some comments...
A. No I think it was and I think there is a lot of truth in that…actually one has to be careful, it was partly that but the first element had already started it started under the last Government it was one of the few things they got right. John Reid’s initiative to compensate for disadvantages for things like housing came long before Richard Dannatt, I think his comments helped push it along but it wasn’t where it started from...
Q. So my question is, is the endeavour, is the position we have reached a position in which the Government is still aspiring to fulfil the totality of the military-covenant?
A. (Pause). Em, yes and I think the Government would say that. Well I am the Government now, part of the Government ha ha, I don't think that anyone would pretend we are there yet, we have made a lot of progress but still if you did a round robin on GPs surgeries for example you would find a lot more people that had heard of it than two years ago but you would find a long way short of 100%...


Q. How well do you understand the Military Covenant?
A. Understand well
Q. Does the military-covenant apply to you personally?
A. Yes, agree
Q. The UK military covenant is more about support to UK Armed Forces and their families whilst on operations?
A. No, I think it’s all year round, disagree
Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the welfare of the UK Armed Forces, veterans and their families?
A. Its more about?
Q. So relative to other aspects…it’s more about...
A. Agree
Q. The UK military-covenant applies to the following areas:
- Terms and service including pay and pensions – A. Yes
- Medical Healthcare – A. Yes
- Education – A. Yes
- Housing – A. Yes
- Benefits and Tax – A. Yes
- Duty of care – A. Yes
- Support packages for troops and families whilst on operations – A. Yes
- Quality of family life for service families – A. Yes agree
- Ease of access to public services and amenities – A. Yes
- Transition to civilian life – A. Yes
- Support to veterans – A. Yes
- Support to families inquests into the deaths of Service Personnel? - A. Yes
- Public recognition of the Armed Forces such as holding a National AF Day? – A. No
- Participating as UK citizens such as reducing disadvantages such as voting etc. – A. Yes
- UK Forces accepting change in Defence i.e. impact of Defence Reforms such as redundancies? - A. No
- Updating the complaints system for UK Armed Forces personnel. - A. Yes
Q. The UK military-covenant means that in some circumstances UK Armed Forces personnel should be treated differently to civilians?
A. Yes, agree
Q. The UK military covenant means that the UK Armed Forces have an unconditional duty to serve?
A. No, disagree
Q. The UK military covenant means that govt has a legal obligation to provide the Armed Forces with the equipment and resources it needs?
A. Is that whether it should or whether it does?
Q. Well if you can respond...what I haven’t done is made any distinction between the theoretical ideal application or whether the military covenant is being upheld so that is an outcome of the study rather than embedded within the questions...but if you answer with what you believe to be the case...
A. So disagree then
Q. The UK military covenant means that on balance the UK Armed Forces personnel put more in than get out of their military service?
A. Yes strongly agree
Q. The UK military covenant means that UK Armed Forces have a high expectation of being treated fairly at all times
A. yes strongly agree
Q. The UK military covenant is a set of obligations between the Government, the Nation and every individual member of the UK Armed Forces.
A. Yes strongly agree
Q. The UK military covenant is more about the Government’s aspirations to fulfil the military covenant.
A. Agree
Q. Okay that’s it. So were there any things that you would want to return to, to explore or discuss...?
A. I think the one you wanted to return to I found that difficult to answer...
Q. Yes...the UK Government has a legal obligation to provide the UK Armed Forces with the equipment and resources it needs...
A. So I would say that yes it does have a legal obligation but I would question whether or not it does. I don’t know enough about the procurement side but I would say that the way defence cuts have panned out I would say that the reserve level has not come up to where we need it to be, we are currently under-resourced and while at the moment that’s just about okay if politicians wanted to do anything significant the impact would be on harmony guidelines and on families.
Q. Yes and there are two sources for the covenant, one is military doctrine and the development of the doctrine has been very interesting since 1998 to 2010 and the various authors have included now in the military doctrine covenant this statement of being provided with the means to do their work i.e. equipment and resources so that there is very much an expectation on the army side on the military side that that is part of the covenant...but the political view is very strongly clear about the challenges it has in resourcing across all ministries and so there is always going to be an expectation versus fulfilment and that that gap is likely to remain.
A. How far back in history are you going?
Q. I have gone right back to ancient Greek times and sourced a document from the late antique early medieval period...which would have been available to Roman Forces in Britain in the fifth century and so I am able to draw some very clear lines between communities existing in Britain in the fifth century and the early Anglo and Celtic communities that came into existence in the sixth, seventh and eighth centuries...
A. And as you have been looking...is there indication that armed forces have been treated differently or better than other citizens?
Q. Yes. But the problem with studying the military-covenant is that most academics start in periods working on Von Clausewitz into civil-military relations in the twentieth century and putting theses which relate to some of the famous academics in the area, people like Janowitz and Huntington and so people like Hew Strachan and Helen McCartney who have been recently engaged in the military covenant have not looked as far back as the early modern period and in fact the dark ages. what I have done is to do that and I have discovered that the warrior ethos and the culture of a military community is still very much a part of the civil community but there is a distinction in the way that they were buried and the
way they communicated...I have discovered documents that if you read them in the translation and they were only translated in 1984 so this is a pretty recent discovery, that if you read them alongside ADP Ops Vol 5 chapter whatever on the military-covenant they could almost be identical...which is fundamental.
A. One of the things that interests me is that the premise that the covenant is to remove disadvantage than to give advantage except in specific circumstances and one of my concerns...is whether that is really going to be sufficient for our military community because our pay has dropped significantly...I have a concern that we are trying to normalise, line up civilian work with military and that significantly diminishing the package and I am curious how the Government deal with that long term. I think that in history...our military personnel have been given special privileges which don’t make them as wealthy as the ruling class that they protect but makes them empathetic to the ruling class which they protect so they are Fighting to keep the status quo and I just wonder as we make our Armed Forces far more normal we don’t provide them with service provided accommodation, you might not be able to buy the same sort of properties you might have been entitled to, you remove the ability to send your children to independent schools by removing CEA by removing what is seen as privileges and benefits you normalise everybody and I wonder over time they become less able to identify with the ruling class and have some of these attributes and they become more normal and I think there is a risk with that...
Q. Yes I do and I agree I mean professionally speaking I would see if the policy version of the covenant is fulfilled then the military will become much more like its civilian police counterpart...
A. Yes..the military officer class has always had an element of aristocracy and we are going to move away from that if we become too much like the police I think here is a danger for the ruling political class if your warriors are no longer identifying with you.
Q. I think that the consequence of going down that route and there is a distinct possibility of it is that those who would have become warriors, the first born...in aristocratic families or those middle class aspirational families would turn to other institutions and other endeavours in order to have that patronisation (patronage) and relationship and I think that is a distinct possibility. It’s difficult to talk about class in academic studies to be frank especially from the inside of the military coming out but what I have been able to do is to say that the military-covenants as they stand are at a sort of knife edge because the army version the military version is very clear that this is about the moral component and the military ability to wage war and to have...a different identity that is distinctive. The flip side is because the relationship between the military and civilian communities are getting closer there is much more of a dependency, home basing is going to see that, and there is a requirement for service leavers to become more resilient in some ways, so that level of integration is going to continue to the point at which service leavers can look after themselves however there is a point at which there is a necessary distinction between the military and the civilian and a useful distinction and that distinction is the ability to mount foreign campaigns and to put up with the privations of service life. Nobody is going to put up with the privations of service life if the terms and services are not equitable in some way. So the military-covenant is a double edged sword, there is a balance and the balance has got to be reached. If you go too far down the civilian line you become a less effective force if you too far down the separation and difference...you still lie behind the wire, making yourself too distinct from the civilian population and you will become detached in a way that is not useful to the community. So there is a real balance there I think.
A. The Armed forces Covenant is interesting, I was exceptionally sceptical of it when it was first released I don’t think it is doing enough in terms of pay and pensions there is still much to do there...the level of people prepared to take redundancy at the time they applied what was perceived to be a very difficult economy is indicative of people’s desire to leave the armed forces. But I am enthusiastic that the corporate covenant engaging with commercial organisations will have a good effect for army families but only in so much as removing disadvantage not giving them advantage.
Q. I think that is a useful characterisation of the various covenants and of course the community covenant doing a slightly different thing at local levels as well. One thing I would say about the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 at least now a formal requirement for the
Government of the day to be held to account on a number of issues...in a way that before 2011 wasn't possible...
A. No I agree with that entirely. I have certainly seen improvements as a result of the covenant in terms of what the Army Families Federation does it allows us to engage with organisations outside of the MoD so we now engage across Government at local Government and central Government level and we find that what the covenant has done is force other organisations other departments outside of the MoD to listen to the issues and needs of forces families...six years ago if I had said to a local authority this family can't get the family into school they have missed the deadline, the conversation stops there with the local authority probably saying we can’t do anything for you, you are an army family we can’t help you, that’s the army’s fault rather than listening to the problem and overcoming it...so in terms of using it on other Government departments to meet the needs of forces families it has been an incredibly powerful tool. There is still some way to go but we are seeing a real improvement in the way that people listen.
Q. When I first got interested in this in 2007 when I was working in the MoD and I just found that the culture and ethos of the civil service vice the culture and ethos of the military Service Personnel was so distinctive that when General Dannatt stood up in 2006 and used this term I am not quite sure he knew then what a powerful lever the covenant would become.
A. But I think it's important to understand as well that some of that leverage has been developed by organisations like the families federation probably the Royal British Legion as well it probably wasn’t just Dannatt who didn’t understand it, we have been using the military covenant as a tool, exploring what we can do with it. The Covenant Reference Group has been doing some of that as well, for example some of the work that is going on inside the MoD, AFF have really called them to account on not just looking at the strategic level but also to understand what is happening on operations as well, at the tactical level as well. They have a much clearer picture of where parts of the covenant aren’t working and that is having an effect as well.


Q. How well do you understand the Military Covenant?
A. I understand it.
Q. Does the military-covenant apply to you personally?
A. Yes very much so.
Q. The UK military covenant is more about support to UK Armed Forces and their families whilst on operations?
A. No. Disagree
Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the welfare of the UK Armed Forces, veterans and their families?
A. No I would disagree with that as well.
Q. The UK military-covenant applies to the following areas:
  • Terms and service including pay and pensions – A. Yes
  • Medical Healthcare – A. Yes
  • Education – A. Yes
  • Housing – A. Yes
  • Benefits and Tax – A. No
  • Duty of care – A. Yes
  • Support packages for troops and families whilst on operations – A. No because I think that it is an internal matter for defence. Likewise benefits and tax there are agencies out there with advice it’s not the only be all and all but there are other agencies out there that can assist in that regard and that what the armed forces covenant is there to undertake
  • Quality of service life for service families – A. Yes
  • Ease of access to public services and amenities – A. Yes
  • Transition to civilian life – A. Very much so.
  • Support to veterans – A. Yes.
- Support to families inquests into the deaths of Service Personnel? - A. I don’t know to be totally honest
- Public recognition of the Armed Forces such as holding a National AF Day? – A. Yes
- Participating as UK citizens such as reducing disadvantages such as voting etc. – A. Yes
- UK Forces accepting changes in Defence i.e. impact of Defence Reforms such as redundancies? - A. No I don’t think that that what the covenant’s about
- Updating the complaints system for UK Armed Forces personnel. - A. That may be a by product of the work that the covenant helps to promote in terms of being inclusive for the armed forces. Agree tentatively

Q. The UK military-covenant means that in some circumstances UK Armed Forces personnel should be treated differently to civilians?
A. Can I quantify this because the words special treatment is in quotes in the covenant. I think that’s a bit strong in my opinion, I think special consideration is a more accurate and a fairer way of describing it. The words special treatment has the potential to undermine the armed forces community to those outside. If the covenant has a slightly gentler statement in terms of the needs and the welfare of the armed forces community and I think that would be more accurate...so somewhat agree...
Q. The UK military-covenant means that the UK Armed Forces have an unconditional duty to serve?
A. No I disagree with that I think that’s a completely different matter again I think that’s a matter for defence for the individual for the person who signs on the dotted line...I don’t think the covenant is about that particular aspect...
Q. The UK military covenant means that gov’t has a legal obligation to provide the Armed Forces with the equipment and resources it needs?
A. Yeah I would agree with that.
Q. The UK military-covenant means that on balance the UK Armed Forces personnel put more in than get out of their military service?
A. Yes definitely agree, strongly agree.
Q. The UK military-covenant means that UK Armed Forces have a high expectation of being treated fairly at all times
A. I wouldn’t say they have a high expectation I think there is a bit of give and take in this I’d agree and not agree to be honest...somewhat agree.
Q. The UK military-covenant is a set of obligations between the Government, the Nation and every individual member of the UK Armed Forces.
A. Yes strongly agree.
Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the Government’s aspirations to fulfil the military-covenant.
A. I think it means more than aspirations I think there is a will. [Somewhat disagree?]. Yes A. If you look at it right now fewer servicemen and women deployed on operations since there have been since 2003 and it’s not about that small segment of the community the armed forces covenant is about a broad cross section I think you have got to carefully define what the armed forces community is it’s not just serving personnel it is also the regular component and the reserve component it is also includes their families it will also include the 6.8M people who are out there who are connected to the ex-forces community of which 3.5-4M of them are veterans so there is a very broad remit here in terms of how we define what the armed forces community is
A. I don’t think it’s just about welfare, I think it’s about recognition, I think it’s also particularly important as UK defence comes home...that we do our utmost to inculcate and include the armed forces community within our own local community and that’s through engagement...the point I’d really want to make is community engagement I think that is a really important aspect of the armed forces covenant and I think that is one of the overarching themes that was driven out...I think that is what Richard Dannatt was getting at back in 2007 when he wanted to uphold the military-covenant part of it was giving the armed forces community proper status on an equal basis with other institutions...
A. I don’t think the military covenant is specifically about tax and benefits...the military covenant does lay down how we get our children and our families properly through the NHS, educationally...but in terms of benefits and tax...I think there are other agencies who offer advice

When our serving personnel are away on operations...the focal point for the family is back into the barbed wire, there is a much greater dependency on the unit welfare system...now perhaps the Armed Forces-covenant is encouraging them to look into the local community but I think the tendency in my humble experience...is that the family tends to suck into what it already knows which is the unit welfare system

I think the public perception of the armed forces community now is as high as I’ve ever known it...in the last 13 yrs the army has undertaken an incredible tempo of operations and very sadly loss of life...the service Joe public sees is very highly regarded whether politically Joe public agrees with the decision to go to war that’s immaterial, there is a recognition now in much the same way as the US community across the water view their own veterans, I think the Armed Forces have a much greater perception and I can understand why...people want to protect that

Whatever is written down in ADP operations that is military operational doctrine what the covenant is doing is trying to awaken Joe public and the community writ large that there are special needs that need to be considered and every community across the military will be different Portsmouth Plymouth, Tidworth, Bulford, Catterick, all of them are unique geographically, unique because of the micro-economies that surround them, unique because of the level of schooling that might be available...

Q. Where disadvantage still exists the military covenant attempt to remove them. Now how is that going to happen? The inference is through engagement at the community level and theoretically at the political level. I don’t have sight of how that engagement occurs and there will be people interacting at those levels to remove those deficiencies. Nevertheless those deficiencies are still there and so there is still work in this area to get them optimised

A. the cross Government piece is very challenging to orchestrate with a minister who has other things to do...if the current method is doing this ministry by ministry, so for welfare and housing it will be one ministry, if its tax benefits it’s another ministry, if it’s a community covenant it’s a community minister how on earth are you going to heard all those cats unless you have a single dedicated minister of state, with his own budget unless you have a single dedicated minister of state, with his own budget to be able to coordinate and integrate with the charities – it’s an interesting prospect and where the policy recommendations will go. Someone with sufficient authority and responsibility to hold the other ministry’s to account at the moment it’s at cabinet level but there is nothing in between and I think that is a really interesting area for development


Q. How well do you understand the Military Covenant?
A. Somewhat do not understand
Q. Does the military-covenant apply to you personally?
A. Yes
Q. The UK military covenant is more about support to UK Armed Forces and their families whilst on operations?
A. More than what?
Q. ...or do you believe it might be more about something else?
A. Somewhat agree...
Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the welfare of the UK Armed Forces, veterans and their families?
A. Somewhat I think as well
Q. The UK military-covenant applies to the following areas:

- Terms and service including pay and pensions – A. Yes
- Medical Healthcare – A. Yes
- Education – A. Yes
- Housing – A. Yes
- Benefits and Tax – A. Yes
• Duty of care – A. Yes
• Support packages for troops and families whilst on operations – A. No
• Quality of service life for service families – A. Yes
• Ease of access to public services and amenities – A. ...I would agree
• Transition to civilian life – A. Yes
• Support to veterans – A. Yes
• Support to families inquests into the deaths of Service Personnel? - A. Yes
• Public recognition of the Armed Forces such as holding a National AF Day? – A. Yes
• Participating as UK citizens such as reducing disadvantages such as voting etc. – A. Yes
• UK Forces accepting changes in Defence i.e. impact of Defence Reforms such as redundancies? - A. Yes
• Updating the complaints system for UK Armed Forces personnel. - A. I suppose so

Q. The UK military-covenant means that in some circumstances UK Armed Forces personnel should be treated differently to civilians?
A. Yes
Q. The UK military-covenant means that the UK Armed Forces have an unconditional duty to serve?
A. If lawful assuming lawful orders yes
Q. The UK military covenant means that govt has a legal obligation to provide the Armed Forces with the equipment and resources it needs?
A. (Long pause). Wow that a minefield. Although I quite get the concept I think it’s hard to enshrine that in the covenant. But the covenant is an inappropriate mechanism.
Q. The UK military-covenant means that on balance the UK Armed Forces personnel put more in than get out of their military service?
A. I sort of reject the concept of a transaction I don’t think it can be expressed like that
Q. The UK military-covenant means that UK Armed Forces have a high expectation of being treated fairly at all times
A. Yes I suppose so
Q. The UK military-covenant is a set of obligations between the Government, the Nation and every individual member of the UK Armed Forces.
A. Yes
Q. The UK military-covenant is more about the Government’s aspirations to fulfil the military-covenant.
A. You mean more about the aspirational rather than the actual fulfilment of it?
Q. Yes...
A. Long pause. Somewhat agree.
A. If you were to ask what my broad perception is then it’s an attempt to reconcile the demands made of the military particularly in the light of military operations and surrender of certain freedoms by people serving with what can be offered in return and to try and bind the Nation a little more closely to that bargain and that’s my broad perception of it. I philosophically might say that I am slightly suspicious of the whole concept but given the basis of the questionnaire requires an acceptance broadly that it’s there whether or not philosophically it’s quite the right thing is sort of set to one side. You might use the argument it’s the only mechanism you’ve got in this area so let’s try and make it work.
Q. Yes absolutely...in 2006 when General Dannatt used the term, deployed the term I guess people were saying well does it exist? And of course at that time it was a piece of arcane military doctrine to that extent it hadn’t entered the public conscience at all. Now that we have an Armed Forces Covenant which is enshrined in law, Parliament are required to report against certain measurements within the covenant and that’s a big development. So where in 2006 it would be a legitimate thing to say well does it exist? Now it’s here...
A. Well that’s a good point it now has a statuary basis, whether or not its flawed it’s still there I take your point
A. I expect a lot of politicians are quite uncomfortable with it because let’s face it in a sort of cash strapped public spending environment an awful lot of politics is managing expectations whether it’s to do with certain types of care to be given in the health service, access to
schools or whatever it is and in the context of a military-covenant, the placing of it on a statutory basis encourages the belief that certain pledges will be fulfilled and therefore creates a whole set of battlegrounds which for politicians at the local or National level can be very uncomfortable...so when you were talking about access to certain services...I can see the question of whether or not in Tidworth there is a proper bus service to the nearest general hospital is one that could be used to beat people over the head with at the local and National level, politicians and administrators don’t like that, it creates another demand on their time and on delivery which is quite hard for them to meet.

Q. Yes. And it absolutely has done that and when I interviewed the Head of the Armed Forces Families Federation she made exactly the same point she said look it’s been really useful because I know have a lever with which to go into county councils and say this service isn’t being provided and now there is a political will behind the community covenant and you have signed up to it so you now let’s see that bus service actually take off.

A. Clearly I suspect that people like Dannatt when they proposed it would want those access to services type issues to be taken on in this because you know nobody wants to see one half of the family is deployed off on some operation that the other half is struggling with the old push chair to get to hospital or the school or whatever it is so I can perfectly see why that might have been part of his intent but equally I can see a certain type of politician or local administrator who would feel resentful of that

Q. The heart of the matter is whether warriors deserve to be put on a pedestal in some respect or if the pendulum is swinging too far that way? But the pendulum swinging the other way is what happens when the warrior is ignored or treated in a cavalier way such that they don’t get the right resources or the families are not being looked after and I think wherever you sit in that spectrum, wherever you think that pendulum is that in the very least in a way that wasn’t there before 2006 is that the expression has given voice to some of those arguments

A. I think it’s unwise to make it a legal obligation because it’s so hard to actually fulfil it and inevitably if you try and enshrine a thing like that into law you will end up embedding within it one or two absolutely crucial legal words like reasonable that great word reasonable, you would end up with an obligation to provide them with the most up to date equipment etc because actually really there isn’t any other way of framing those things. Clearly you cannot have an army and air force or a navy whose equipment is simultaneously new, it’s not an achievable thing, therefore when people draft stuff like this they put those words reasonable in but those then are an invitation to some sort of battle...was it reasonable to have snatch land rovers in Basra in 2006 or certain things about body armour...dare one say I have some sympathy for the MoD in that respect renewing all that stuff at the same moment so that everything was tip-top. In a situation where you have a certain number of new body armour and a certain set of old I don’t think it’s unreasonable to say that someone who is in a challenger tank should have the older armour when someone who is driving a soft skinned land rover should have the newer so with the case Sgts Roberts from the RTR that whole thing then became a difficult political issue because he hadn’t been given the up to date body armour

Q. It is to do with risk taking the military needs to take a robust view of the world which allows them to deploy and I think in the political world that that is a much more difficult thing to sell to the families of people like Sgt Roberts public and they are challenging tricky areas and one of the area the military covenant does speak to is in the situation...over the issue of helicopters...there was an opportunity for investment and it wasn’t taken and the risk was too high and I think the military covenant speaks to a level of risk the military doesn’t hold that level of risk and I think accountability is really important so I think that decisions within the gambit of the art of the possible and other resources there is a point at which mission success is at stake

A. But that’s not a military covenant that’s a basic thing of command which was lacking in those issues

Q. The MoD and the forces in their current incarnation are extremely dysfunctional in resolving what would have been basic issues...someone is just in touch with me today about the fact that the MoD has done a contract with Akrotiri where the catering is only during working hours and now all these guys who are working round the clock on the tornado and
its now become an operational station with no food through the hours of night that’s just plain stupidity
Q. I think that’s a failure of leadership isn’t it somewhere [yes] basic military organisation and logistics
A. You would think that the chain of command would say well all alright...and put military cooks in during night hours in order to resolve that issue...
Q. But I think the military covenant does apply...the guy’s signed up to the ultimate liability of doing what is necessary to get the mission done and he’s out there enduring the privations of service life etc working round the clock to do this stuff and he can’t even get a meal well I think that does apply to the military covenant...the covenant does say that it should be provided with the resources it needs to get its job done...
Q. ...the armed forces put more in that get out of service life...
A. I think I just reject the idea that the covenant is a measurable transaction in that way, a lot of the rewards of service are quite hard to measure and quite intangible...if somebody comes back from a tour of Helmand and the really enduring aspect of that for them is how close they were to half a dozen people in their platoon and how their sort of brothers and that will stay with them for as long as they live well you can’t measure that as an output or outcome...and quite a lot of aspects which you would say were a positive side of the ledger...that's why I reject that transactional one ought to equal the other sort of thing...
Q. I think it does speak to some sort of article where equities are discussed and agreed upon how equal the covenant is for the stakeholders is for them to agree
Q. the original military covenant was educational for commanders it was saying army life is tough you can expect to put more in and put your life on the line but it doesn’t specify the positive things which accrue from service life
A. If you lose your foot in Helmand in the awful sense of the armed forces compensation scheme giving you a certain amount of money but a lot of the upside stuff is hard to measure....
Chapter Six.

Summary of analysis and findings.

This chapter highlights and summarises the key findings of the research. By way of a prelude to the concluding chapter in which policy recommendations are laid down and a New Military-Covenant for the twenty-first century is proposed, the key points of the study are listed for ease of reference.

Two definitive perspectives of the covenant are brought to light: the military-practitioner’s doctrinal perspective and the governmental policy perspective. From these two perspectives generic and technical definitions of the covenant are possible. The academic perspective within the field of UK civil-military relations (CMR) may now more readily draw upon this definition for the purpose of obtaining a new theoretical framework from which to assess the military-covenant’s development.

| The military-covenant is a written article of Parliamentary statute law. It contains a combined military doctrine and Government social policy framework designed for the purpose of fulfilling certain mutual civil and military obligations in support of the Armed Forces of Great Britain. The bargain of the military-covenant is that the sacrifice and duty of the Armed Forces is recognised and rewarded by the nation. Although military service is inherently unequal due to the ultimate liability regarding death in the line of duty, the ledger of the military-covenant is kept in balance by certain conditions. On the one hand the Armed Forces, veterans and their families are to be remunerated, resourced and provided special consideration in some circumstances so that they may not be disadvantaged in relation to their civilian counterparts. On the other hand, the Armed Forces are to be reflective and inclusive of society, to prepare service leavers for the end of their careers and to respect, understand and cooperate at all times with the civilian authority. It is acknowledged by all parties that the fulfilment or failure of the military-covenant is reliant on the trust and goodwill demonstrated by the dedication, self sacrifice and loyalty of the Armed Forces and the recognition, resources and sound civilian leadership provided by the nation so that the Armed Forces may undertake operations and execute missions effectively. Fulfilled together annually on Remembrance Day, the living embodiment of the military-covenant is acknowledged and renewed by the whole nation. |

Table 6-1. Generic definition of the British Military-Covenant (Rynehart, 2014).

As Table 1 infers, future development of the Armed Forces Covenant can usefully encompass the reconciliation of military and policy versions of the covenant into one document. The ratification of the covenant centring on the principal clause regarding fair treatment and reward for Armed Forces personnel in return for the sacrifices which the Armed Forces personnel and their families make is fundamental to the successful
functioning of the key operating characteristics of the covenant, namely reciprocated trust and goodwill at the national and individual levels.

The remainder of this chapter provides a digest of the key analyses and findings of the research listed in summarised form for ease of reference. Chapter one raised the following points:

(1) The study established the circumstances over the period 2006-2011 of a damaged military-covenant in which senior politicians accepted that more understanding about the Armed forces was required by the nation. Consideration to the establishment of a Defence sponsored military-covenant outreach programme should be given to continue to address Armed Forces in Society issues from the military-practitioner’s perspective.

(2) The useful idea of the military-covenant as a bargain between civil and military citizens.

Chapter two established:

(1) The conceptual basis of the military covenant within the discipline of political science as a social contract underpinned by political realism and immutable enduring moral principles.

(2) The lack of original scholarly work in the field of CMR from the military-practitioner’s perspective.

Chapter three established:

(1) The authenticity, legitimacy and historical value of military-covenants and the role ancient covenants had in cementing the political realities and the objective truths which modern covenants contain.

(2) The moral principles which covenants proscribe are found to be enduring and not open to modish interpretation or ideological cant. In this way the clauses in AFC 2011 concerning ‘special consideration’ and ‘removal of disadvantage,’ should be
indemnified across all government departments, the judiciary and commercial businesses under the existing and future frameworks of AFC 2011.

In addition to proposing a developed generic definition of the military-covenant (see Table 6-1 above) chapter four raised the following military-covenant issues:

1. Existence of a key difference between the military-practitioner and policy perspectives over the definition of 'duty' in respect to the conditionality of military service as currently described AFC 2011. This requires further clarity and revision as necessary.

2. The extension of participation of covenanters over the period 2000-2011, illustrated at annex A to chapter four - demonstrating the extended social inclusivity of the covenant from small portions of the community to everyone in Britain. The degree to which civilians understand their part in the military-covenant is not established by this study but the small sample of interviews undertaken by the author suggests that there is confusion about the perception of the military-covenant. The author proposes further work in this area to establish a statistically valid public perception of the military covenant.

Chapter four also derived the ten clauses of the military-covenant which arise as a result of the author’s assessment of each of the primary covenant sources. These are:

1. Clause of the ultimate liability differentiating military and civilian citizens.
2. Clause of cooperation between the Armed Forces, the State and the Nation.
3. Clause of veteran resilience, status and preparation for transition to service.
4. Clause of Armed Forces reflecting society and being inclusive of social values.
5. Clause of national recognition and respect for Armed Forces and veterans.
6. Clause of adequate remuneration and terms and services for Armed Forces.
7. Clause of resourcing: including equipment, medical, housing, education, retirement.
(8) Clause of no disadvantage compared to civilian citizens in the provision of services.

(9) Clause of special consideration of Armed Forces Personnel in some circumstances.

(10) Clause of improved civil-military understanding & engagement at the political level.

Chapter five highlighted:

(1) The potential lack of government and military support for veterans' mental health and their entering the civilian workforce.

(2) The political concern that the public might view certain privileges afforded to the military as an unfair advantage.

(3) Concerns about the military-covenant’s legal status were raised. Subsequently fears about the legal nature of the covenant have largely fallen away with the Government’s assertion that the covenant has attained legal status.

(4) Queries about the consequences of a future failure in the covenant have been raised: because the military-covenant as described under the Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 is in its infancy, arguably even modest progress in any areas can be claimed as success. But as time goes on, in the eventuality that there is systemic year on year failure to progress a single requirement close to the hearts of the Armed Forces Community there is a political fear that the covenant will become increasingly politicised.

(5) The Armed Forces Covenant of 2011 omits inclusion of the measurement of Defence equipment and resource. In policy terms it would be necessary that Army doctrine retain inclusion of the clause concerning resource if the Army wishes Service Personnel to have expectations of being equipped and trained properly for operations. The effect of the military-covenant has been to bolster the case for Defence resource in the media and to repeatedly lift the issue of equipment shortages into the public arena.
(6) The military covenant as contained in Army doctrine correctly makes implicit the moral obligations which civilian leaders have in ensuring not only the minimum resource for an operation are available but that which is deemed necessary for mission success.

(7) The military-covenant has a part to play in providing the contextual basis for what constitutes fair and reasonable leadership and decision making in the minds of the public. It is worth considering further how the military-covenant can be refined to accommodate reflections on the realities of war. The conceptual role of the military-covenant in strengthening ties and deepening understanding with the civilian population should also not be overlooked.

(8) The degree to which the chain of command uses the military-covenant to measure its own progress in the areas of housing, education, healthcare and transition is worthy of further consideration.

(9) There are several important democratic rights and freedoms which Service Personnel give up when they enter the military profession. The right to free speech, the freedom to freely associate and the right to life are all given up by Service Personnel when they assume their official appointments. These ‘disadvantages’ were they applied to civilians would be inherently undemocratic and yet without them being levied on Service Personnel the maintenance of an effective fighting military force would be impossible. Intelligence would be compromised and discipline would soon dissolve. So these ‘disadvantages’ can never be removed from service life and this is part of the bargain which Service Personnel sign up to. The military-covenant mentions the removal of these sorts of freedoms but it does not explain the reason why removal is important nor does it explain the significant impact that the loss of these freedoms have on Service Personnel. If the public (and indeed Service Personnel themselves) are to better understand the bargain of the covenant then these elements of disadvantage should be made explicit.

(10) Efforts by service charities and military organisations to strengthen public support in the removal of disadvantage for the Armed Forces are supported by the
existence of the military-covenant. The corporate and community covenants have become useful as conceptual assets as well as practical tools for these organisations. The military-covenant should continue to be invested in and developed by the chain of command to best effect, especially in light of continued financial austerity in the near term.

In chapter three the study dealt comprehensively with several theoretical positions regarding the historical and cultural nature of military-covenants. These help account for the current operating characteristics of modern covenants which arise as a result of the covenant being embedded within a collective British consciousness passed on generationally.

(1) The somewhat cyclical nature of covenants means that they are traceable in a developmental sense through history.

(2) Linked to the rise and fall of British military campaigns over great periods of time covenants together with the cultural legacy passed on by communities regarding civil-military interaction are capable of generating a sense of cultural remembered-continuity.

(3) These postulations lead to further theories about the role which military covenants play in commemoration. Ancient covenants were capable of bridging communal and national divides, they gave rise to rituals which tended to bind people together.

(4) The nature of alliance, the recruitment of trusted warriors and the duty to serve loyally were all aspects of an unbroken tradition of British leadership in wartime which both recognised and advocated covenental behaviours.

(5) The Sutton Hoo burial is just one of many British archaeological sites which exemplify covenental traditions coming into their own in a deeper cultural sense. That the covenant was re-imported back into Britain by seventh century conquering warrior lords is alone remarkable but that their mediations continued to attenuate over the ages since those unique episodes is profound.

(6) The military-covenant came to the shores of Britain in Roman times and again in the Dark Ages, that it appeared in various media during numerous conflicts in the
context of precedence and resurgence is only logical. For when covenants were at risk of collapse in the past methods of passing information and cementing dynastic and tribal networks were found.

(7) The resultant information flows across and between regional clan and family entities made covenants flourish. Against this backdrop the story of the modern covenant’s rise to prominence under twenty-first century media echoes its original blossoming and dissemination a full millennia before.

(8) Covenants were not only orally passed on they were importantly codified, written down, made portable and exported to where they were needed. In this way the values, virtues, principles and obligations which a military-covenant attempted to enshrine and promote were preserved and made available to future generations.

(9) The original covenants were somewhat crude and transactional but over time they became more sophisticated such that by the late antique and early medieval periods they were fully developed along Christian and military doctrinal lines and became social articles so elemental and instructive to western civilisation that they entered most European languages and have endured completely intact into the modern era.

The military-covenant themes set forth in the analysis of the principal texts and also derived from a sample of media articles taken from the period 2002-2010 supported subsequent formulation of a military-covenant survey questionnaire. The questionnaire verified and expanded upon the covenantal themes obtained in the literature review at chapter two and also verified the author’s assessment of the purposes and content of the covenant at chapter four, adding expert insight to the general definitions derived by the author from analyses to that point.

The covenant differs in its universal application to every level (binding between the nation, its institutions and every soldier) and is therefore less a function of Authority as the articulation of formal power, but a function of informal power operating under a consensus of moral authority. Also moral authority is inherent to the individual regardless of rank and
professional status. The experienced combat soldier of any rank has by dint of prolonged service a wellspring of authoritative wisdom proven on the battlefield. The moral authority of the combat soldier provides him with an authoritative status which is blind to rank but which is no less authoritative because of how it is obtained. The moral authority of the soldier permits him to speak with unique credibility about the sacrifices of service life, about the reality of war and about the practical aspects of the day to day management of conflict. Moral authority in relation to military doctrine places an onus on learning the moral and physical lessons taught by the common combatant as much as the conceptual ones from the officer corps.

The military-covenant is a consequence of the ethical nature of the military institution in regard to the welfare of its people. When the institution is threatened the covenant is invoked in order to restore the moral authority of the institution against political abuse or public negligence. This dimension of the failure in governance of the Authority to minister to its military raises the covenant from the realms of the military purview to the level of national interest because the threat of military dysfunction has the gravest social as well as security consequences. The covenant as a mechanism for the restoration and maintenance of values and standards, extends far beyond the relationship between the government and the military, it lends itself to the same generic framework for discussing relationships between the State and other institutions. This gives lie to the cynical notion of a militarised military-covenant, one which is inward looking and protective. Instead the development of the military-covenant shows it to be one fully within the already established concept of a social contract. One may take any number of institutions such as the Church of England, which like the military, could not operate under the sanction of a Union and has therefore similarly and recently invoked the term covenant 345 (a word originating as a religious expression of kinship) in a very similar attempt to restore dialogue between distinct elements of the Anglican Communion. The Military is therefore not unique in its endeavour to renew its Covenant with is requisite authority. That the covenant has become law is significant because what was not previously contractual becomes potentially enforceable and thus the

inherent dynamic of the covenant as an informal expression of moral authority and military
speciality moves theoretically closer to the legislature and to an entirely different political
plane. Charting the changes inherent with its shift from the military realm into the political
one will be key in determining whether the military-covenant remains a doctrinal tool of the
military or a political tool of the State and whether, conceivably the two perspectives might
be reconciled.

The covenant also proves right those like General Sir John Hackett who foresaw greater
integration of the military and the civilian realms, and shows that the nature of this integration
was surprisingly constitutional. Bar the largely institutional posturing and sound-bites of a
relatively weak outgoing Government and a morally indignant British Army the transition of
military doctrine into legislation was seamless. The social gains for the military with the
inception of the covenant have been significant. A broadening of the rights of the soldier and
a further step toward the re-enfranchisement of the military community into society has
occurred at a period when further economic austerity and rebasing will see the Armed
Forces under renewed pressure in 2015 in the next Strategic Defence and Security Review
(SDSR).

Militaries exist to serve the public and soldiers are integral to the social and cultural life of the
nation. Militaries may be different but they are not separate from the public. In a world free
from terrorism militaries could exist more overtly within the communities in which they live,
as it is they often live ‘behind the wire’ and fight abroad. Nevertheless, the tokens which
mark out military service personnel and service life as being distinct from the civilian realm
do not actually separate them from the public arena, for, media connectivity aside, the so
called civil-military divide is really a gap bridged ever more clearly by the fundamental ties of
mutual obligation that have for so long been in existence but have been historically omitted
or embellished by myth. But in saying these things, that militaries are a visible and integral
part of society, one is apt to fly in the face of received wisdom about the place of the Armed
Forces within society and become engaged in a debate about whether the Armed Forces
should be treated as special citizens. Nevertheless, it is necessary to re-appraise orthodox
positions of CMR and in doing so provide useful commentary on the issue of military citizenship.

The giving up of life for one’s country is a thing to be honoured as a matter of social justice. Because of it, fair treatment in life and recognition in death is the right of every soldier. No matter how awful the circumstance of the soldier’s demise or heroic the sacrifice in which life was given, when the price to be paid for the fulfilment of duty is death, the duty in which that life is forfeit must be judged to be both just and honourable. It is a necessary clause central to the bargain of the covenant that because death may result from just Duty, the warrior is to be valued by the nation and his contribution to society is to be recognised.

Nevertheless the laying down of one’s life, this singular and fundamental aspect of service life, does not separate the soldier from society: it binds him or her to it more irrevocably. The experiences which people do not share in all the very many different roles in working life, do not exclude them from varying forms of social equality. Professions may mark out certain social differences between civilians and military citizens but the Profession of Arms is not a trivial endeavour apt to come at the end of some political conversation in which the soldier might not obtain fair treatment. The duty to which soldiers subject themselves does not deny them the compensating equities by which their unequal service may be otherwise re-balanced. Upon the scales of the covenant such that it may not be tipped uncaringly all the way down by duty are the privileges in the soldier’s favour which pushes him or her back up toward their civilian counterparts. Not to do so would be unjust. The lack of military experience of a largely civilian community leads to a certain sense of alienation but it does not mean that society is ordered in a way that treats the military separately. Such alienation and separation is if left unchecked also unjust. The challenge for society is to understand how to compensate the military for its special service so that it is not treated unfairly in relation to its civilian counterparts. The military-covenant is not purely military in effect, it is civil and social reflecting the reciprocal relationships between those in public office and those who enjoy civil freedoms.
Truly the soldier is a citizen. Though not civilian he or she is critically a part of civil society. Partnered to a civilian, with civilian children living in the community, in times of peace he or she is answerable to the laws of the land and represented by a Member of Parliament. Under these conditions he or she is subject to the same rights as his civilian family and friends. When said soldier retires, he or she becomes a veteran, returning to the realms of the civil society from which he or she came. Sharing so much in common with his or her civilian counterparts, the journey back to civilian life is not so much a cultural transition but an institutional one. However, during time of war in the frontline or when engaged in conflict on the battlefield the soldier is not afforded the same rights as his family or friends because the nature of the Profession of Arms requires him or her to pay the ultimate sacrifice in the fulfilment of duty and thus forfeit some freedoms afforded to his civilian counterpart. But this liability on the part of the soldier does not differentiate him or her from the remainder of society to the point of separation.

The cultural conventions associated with burial and commemoration and the acts themselves return the soldier to his or her rightful resting place, which is midst the communities from whence they came. Families come to mourn, the public come to give thanks. In this way the distinguishing hallmarks of service life, from the wearing of uniform to living ‘behind the wire’ are only part of a wide set of military attributions, traditions, customs, rituals, symbols, conduct and ethos, which whilst distinct, are not unique to the military. These aspects of service life may serve the purpose of reinforcing the identity of the warrior class at the institutional level on the one hand, but they also overlap directly, overtly and frequently into the civilian realm by design at the social and cultural levels. The honouring of war dead, national acts of commemoration, parading of the freedoms of the cities, public statues, portraits and depictions of war and warriors are all emblematic of the cultural worth which a civilian public recognises in its military. Military distinctions and attributes serve to mark out the military but they do not take them into a realm of social abstraction that continues to warrant support for the myth of military separateness. Thankfully a visible

reflection that military citizens are on an integrative path with civilian counterparts is increasing. However, the trend that will draw the two citizen elements closer together is also a trend which the military will ultimately argue still requires a sufficiently significant gap to preserve its professionalism - although not so large as to continue to perpetuate the myth of separateness that military practitioners and academics have maintained since the cold war.

As for ‘living behind the wire’, the reasons for this are not cultural, they are threat based. Terrorism is now a visible part of modern life. Terrorism is as much a threat to our way of life and our values as it is a physical threat to our forces. In the past it may have suited the military to minister to its own behind a wire, but as the threat to UK based terrorism lifts, the rationale to maintain behind the wire is diminished. The concentration of military communities in the UK in a post SDSR environment will see a renewal of civil and military interaction by 2020 on a par with the 1940s. Large garrison towns will have the sham veil of an aloof military pulled down to be replaced instead with images of an aligned and complimentary military and civil community.

This research has established the first:

- authoritative scholarly generic and technical definitions of the military-covenant,
- military-practitioner perspective of military covenants within the context of CMR,
- working theory for how ancient military-covenants were imported into Britain,
- employment of a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach to covenants,
- introduction of the Strategikon to the field of CMR and British Military Doctrine,
- true account of the moral and cultural significance of military-covenants
- set of policy recommendations for the development of a future military-covenant
- proposal for a New Military Covenant for the twenty-first century,
- set of operating characteristics & clauses inherent within military-covenants,
- employment of the concept of collective remembered continuity within CMR,
• outline theory for the periodicity of military covenants linked to military campaigns and the sinusoidal relationship between public support for the Armed Forces over time.

This research has also established the latest:

• research questionnaire capable of surveying civilian attitudes to military-covenants,
• thesis to challenge the myth of military separateness in the field of CMR.
Chapter Seven.

Conclusion. A New Military Covenant for the Twenty-First Century.

The review of a broad spectrum of relevant, sociological political CMR and historical literature shows that whilst there is a gap in extended scholarship dedicated to the military covenant the study of the covenant is an important contribution to the field. What has been missing until now is an expert military-practitioner’s perspective and furthermore an understanding of the cultural aspects of the military-covenant so necessary in explaining its ancient British origins.

In his history of professional military men, General Sir John Hackett traced the origins of martial traditions back to the Greeks and Romans. The era he chose next to consider was the medieval. The reason for this seven hundred year jump in time one can perhaps assign to his need to keep his observations firmly rooted in reasonably uncontested fact. It is not hard therefore to understand that the period of European History between 200-900 AD is omitted in his martial history simply because insufficient information was known about the period. Also, arguably, to Hackett’s mind there may not have been much in the Dark Ages which Roman soldiering or medieval knighthood could not already offer by way of substantive comment.

But were Sir John writing more particularly about the British Profession of Arms today, this historically elusive period would be as impossible to avoid as it is difficult to narrate. Nevertheless if one is to understand the origins of a British Military covenant the post-Roman, pre-feudal, pre-Norman period of history must be considered. For it is in this most obscure of periods that the idea of Albion is first sewn. English nationhood springs forth from Celtic, Dane and Viking settlements, tribal kingdoms merge, consolidate and contract before the early medieval period. Legendary figures such as Arthur survive in the minds of noble Britons who knew Roman service. Much later when the vestiges of Rome were completely erased from memory and sensibility men like Alfred united the island before the times of the

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Norman Conquest. Seven hundred years of British Island life cannot be spared in the search for the origins of military covenantal forms of organisation and order and the moral nature of military alliance, if indeed these are to be found in the so called Dark Ages of Britain. This research has shown that the historical cupboard was not bare. Christian and Anglo-Saxon texts survive and tell us much about tribes, kingdoms, warriors and customs. Archaeology is replete with burial sites, forts, camps, weapons, jewels and art, all imbued with the symbolic meaning that tell us about the people who lived, died and passed on their language, land and birthrights before Norman rule brought European medieval knighthood to the island.

The era of the social contract in the early modern period also deserves careful attention. Recognition of the need to prepare for war in defence of civil liberty provides a discussion on the military-covenant coming under broader Social Contracts in Britain. Despite sixteenth and seventeenth century philosophers leaving the topic of military affairs largely to specialist military-practitioners of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the subject of social justice and ideas of fairness against tyranny were firmly embedded in British culture and military-covenants have a role in extending these notions into the military sphere.

Wars of the future will be waged with ideas and success will depend increasingly on moral right as much as physical might. Greater moral and social cohesion of the military and society, of the Armed Forces to the Legislature and to the Executive, that is, more integration, coordination and consensus will be a prerequisite of national security in the future. The military-covenant proves that the revolution in military affairs is not technical, it is social. The military-covenant offers the field of CMR the increasingly valid military-perspective based on increasingly sophisticated British military doctrine (BMD) in pursuit of such outcomes.

The issue of resource is surrounded by a nexus of complex inter-relationships based upon commercial contracts and business agreements as well as public perceptions and media coverage. This is further complicated by the highly evolved political structure of the Britain’s administrative bureaucracies. In the UK departments are set up to compliment the duality of
parliamentary government. The execution of policy manifests itself at every level within the various administrations. ‘Advocates for change’ and ‘agents of restraint’ constantly clash. With competing agendas and interests and often at odds with the task of military campaign success, unity of authority is often a challenging prospect. In a single institution, the culture, creed and ethos of two types of citizen co-exist; one military, the other civilian. The extent to which the two differ and therefore the degree to which both subsequently cohere, bears directly on the resultant organisations’ ability to deliver military capability. It is thus critical that specialisation and differentiation is not allowed to develop into separation and isolation in respect of unity of authority. This begs a comparison of the civil codes of conduct, of military values and of parliamentary practices to establish the precepts which govern the professional outlooks of the various public offices, and the extent to which these precepts would need to be re-oriented so that professional and cultural platforms mutually overlap in the delivery of unity of authority and measurements for combat mission success.

By aligning the military ethic with a particular political hue in an attempt to promote the soldier within society, Huntington actually committed to posterity a line of thought in civil-military affairs which helped create a long established myth: the myth of the separateness of the soldier from the rest of society. The military-covenant illustrates that in as far as the soldier is governed by political principles or influenced by military doctrine at all, it is with respect to his special duties and moral obligations. The myth of social separation must be dispelled at all costs: only when this happens will the need for the military to be different become a socially acceptable precept by civil society.

Covenants are two way. They speak not only about support for the military so that it might be militarily effective but also how the Armed Forces are to be inclusive and reflective of society. Having the right tools for war; caring for the fallen and the sick; gaining treasure for blood spilt; tending to veteran’s comforts in old age; public recognition of sacrifices made; transition to civilian employment and civilian leadership in military affairs are all clauses which hang on the scales of the military-covenant. The military-covenant is the ledger in which the bargain of the deal is audited. The authenticity and provenance and therefore the legitimacy of the modern military-covenants are underpinned by the covenants of bygone
eras but nevertheless future social attitudes will almost certainly move the Armed Forces toward further positive engagement with civil society and the military-covenant is the principal way in which this closer engagement can be propelled.

**The New Military-Covenant – A fair deal for Britain’s Armed Forces Community and the people of the United Kingdom in the Twenty-First Century.**

The military-covenant is a social pact between the Armed Forces Community and the Nation. Under the written authority of the Armed Forces Covenant a legal statute sets forth the principal acts of obligation, recognition and reward for loyal service and sacrifices which ensures that trust and cooperation between the Armed Forces and the State endures in perpetuity. As military doctrine the covenant is a formal article binding all service personnel to the conditions of service. It sets out the principles, expectations and realities implicit under the Armed Forces Covenant and lays out the Armed Forces commitment to the maintenance of excellent civil-military relations. The central condition of the covenant is that it deepens trust and understanding between civil and military institutions such that despite certain differences of professional distinctiveness, respect at the individual level is genuine and goodwill between all adherents of the covenant is continually reciprocated.

The tradition of a military-covenant has existed in the British Isles since ancient times. Reconstituted for the modern world as both policy and doctrine the covenant represents a new and fair deal for those who serve and those who are served by Britain’s Armed Forces. The covenant is a tradition born of custom and it is morally binding in every sense. It is the nature of the military-covenant that it attempts to reconcile the necessary divide that distinguishes civilian life from military service. Whilst civilian and military citizens are not separate, they do share common virtues and a common culture. However military and civilian citizens are necessarily and usefully different because the nature of conflict and the hazards of war make the Profession of Arms unique among professions and the Armed Forces unique amongst institutions. The Royal Navy, the British Army and the Royal Air Force will remain distinctive vocations with a distinctive set of outlooks and behaviours. To this end a robust, agile and audacious warrior ethos is a necessary facet of an effective
fighting military force. Britain’s Armed Forces must be allowed to have their own ethos flourish and endure if Britain is to be successful on operations.

The nation has a duty to understand the nature of conflict and the practicalities of waging war. Britain’s Armed Forces require a robust physicality and a resilient, adaptive frame of mind with regard to undertaking offensive military action. Military units may not always be adequately prepared or equipped at all times especially if they are held at high readiness against an adversary in circumstances which were not predicted or predictable. The realities of conflict mean that there are inherent risks in service life. The Armed Forces understand and accept these risks.

In order to be effective in war military personnel surrender certain freedoms and endure certain privations including the ultimate liability of death. Whilst there are many positive advantages to military life such as memorable operational experiences, lifelong friendships and adventure, by and large the Profession of Arms is disciplined, arduous and tough. When training for war, life is hazardous and when on operations, threats are routinely lethal. No other profession is designed for war and no other institution legitimately inculcates its people to prosecute legal violence on behalf of the nation.

The nation has a duty to respect the differences that make the Armed Forces unique and effective. The curricula and syllabi of schools and universities should contain the lessons of Britain at war. Equally the chain of command has a duty to engage with educational, academic and political establishments and to support educational activities in order to deepen the nation’s understanding of the Armed Forces and the utility of force in the defence and security of the nation.

Despite the very real rewards of Service life it is a tremendously challenging and unique undertaking and the demands at times disproportionately negative, especially for Armed Forces families. For this reason Service life is not unconditional. The bargain of the military-covenant places an obligation on the nation and the government to support and resource the Armed Forces for operations and in peacetime. It must always be the case that serving personnel, the severely injured, those who have retired and their families should live in
reasonable comfort in recognition for their service and sacrifice. In return for special consideration and the removal of disadvantage, Service personnel have a corresponding duty to develop and maintain a ‘can do’ attitude; to resolutely put up with the hardships of service life and to go the extra mile in completing the tasks they are set. They must, if the mission requires it, be prepared to lay down their lives. This is the ultimate bargain of the covenant, fair reward returned for loyal service and sacrifice given.

It is in the nature of war that in the heat of battle mistakes can and will be made. Necessarily ruthless in the violent prosecution of combat missions the British way of war is to complete the mission even at very great costs. It is also the British way of war to treat the enemy with compassion when the mission is complete and the time for combat is over. The Nation must never judge too harshly in matters where ultimately decisions in combat based on military judgement and experience gave only Commanders in the Field at the time both the technical and moral competence to lead their Troops under fire. It is an essential aspect of the military-covenant that Commanders in the Field and their Troops must always have the freedom to act in war in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict as well International Law and informed by their own personal conscience and judgement. The latter is a function of hard won military experience and training but it is also shaped by the specific circumstances on the ground in which spilt second decisions without all the information one might hope to have may not be available. This is the dynamic nature of combat, where fear, uncertainty and confusion in battle have to be overcome by bold, courageous acts of leadership. Military judgement in combat cannot be second guessed with the comfort of hindsight by those with insufficient understanding of military affairs. Nevertheless it is equally an inviolate aspect of the military-covenant that innocent life wherever possible is always protected by UK Armed Forces from the violence of war. It is the policy of the British Armed Forces that it holds the sanctity and dignity of all human life to be precious and that to take life is a grave and serious business to be undertaken with the utmost professionalism. There can never be ‘acceptable levels’ of innocent civilian losses of life, only unavoidable losses. So whilst it is may be inevitable that civilians may perish in war time the so called term ‘collateral damage’ is unworthy of a noble British warrior ethos. Commanders and Troops have a duty to
safeguard innocent civilians from the violence of war and to treat all civilians, refugees, captured combatants and irregular enemies humanely and with the utmost dignity: offering them shelter, sustenance, medical aid and protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

It is reasonable for Commanders, Troops and their families to expect that adequate resources and training are provisioned sufficiently as a matter of routine such that in those circumstances where this has not been the case that any shortcomings and omissions were not as a consequence of failures in leadership, negligence or misconduct but by unavoidable circumstances on the ground in which conscious decisions that were known, agreed and understood by the chain of command were made in good faith. When such decisions on policy and resources were taken at the highest levels, it is in line with the spirit of the military-covenant that the civilian authorities and the chain of command are held accountable for their actions. Where operational security required that any decisions were taken in secret, that full and transparent accountability after the fact is held in the public domain and without a need for a public enquiry at the earliest opportunity. The grieving families of the fallen deserve nothing less than candid and timely provision of information from the chain of command about the deaths of loved ones.

In return for resolute and loyal service all Armed Forces personnel, their families and retired veterans should receive certain privileges regarding recognition and reward. In those circumstances where military or retired service places a member of the Armed Forces Community at a disadvantage in contrast to his or her civilian counterpart, then central Government, local authorities and businesses have a statutory obligation to remove it. Equally the Armed Forces have a responsibility to be fully representative of society, to be inclusive of ethnic and sexual minorities and to uphold the British values of courage, integrity, excellence, loyalty, efficiency, innovation, diversity, tolerance and humility. In addition, the Armed Forces have a duty to ensure that its personnel are physically and mentally healthy, that they are emotionally resilient and that they are trusted members of the local communities in which they live. The chain of command has a specific responsibility to prepare service personnel for transition to civilian life at the end of their careers. In return for
the commitment to honouring the fair terms and conditions of service which the chain of command has in respect to each and every soldier, each and every officer, soldier, sailor, airman and woman has the duty always to be ready for active service and to be accountable to the rigours of sound and fair military discipline.

The military organisations which cater for the moral and conceptual components of its officers and soldiers will continue to set down the lessons of war in military doctrine. They must strive to perfect the art of writing good operational doctrine and not merely provide only the tactical lessons of recent operations. Military leaders should subsequently base military capability decisions based on sound doctrine not only on resources likely to be available and where risk is held in these decisions that it is recorded and thereafter reviewed regularly. Civilian leaders would do well from to time to acquaint themselves with the ways of the British warrior and the material needs of operational campaigns, especially at times of conflicts and national emergencies when courageous civilian leadership is needed. In return the Armed Forces must at all times honour and treat with humility and respect, its chain of command, its civilian leaders and members of the public. The chain of command should be willing to go the extra mile in keeping politicians and the media fully informed on matters which impact civil-military relations and to encourage journalists to embed with them whilst on operations. Whilst the covenant may never fully constitute an ideal bargain it does recognise that the compact of sacrifice in return for privilege is a firm principle to be striven for at very great cost. When failures in leadership, misconduct within the chain of command, a lack of resources or political will place the military-covenant at risk, the media has an obligation to report on such failures with complete objectivity and the nation has a moral obligation to repair and renew its ties with the military and to regain its trust.

The military’s enduring loyalty and unshakable commitment to duty is founded on the spirit of the covenant being reciprocally honoured and upheld in perpetuity by the civilian population it serves. The covenant manifests itself in the high quality of the leadership, equipment, training and resources which the military receives in readiness for military campaigns; the excellent medical provision for all regular serving, reserve and retired veterans and their families; the reasonable housing, education and welfare provision that service personnel and...
their families receive in peacetime and in conflict; the recognition that regulars, reserves, families, veterans and cadets deserve and the honours and awards these should receive for acts of bravery, ingenuity, community service and long service. The greatest manifestation of the military-covenant is the honouring of the fallen on Remembrance Day. This ritual act of national remembrance is more than a symbolic gesture of thanks, it is the living fulfilment of the military-covenant for all who serve and all who have served the British nation under Arms.

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The modern military-covenant was designed originally as an internal article of military doctrine to remind soldiers about the realities of service life: that it is arduous and tough and that soldiers will endure certain privations in the line of duty including the liability of death in service. This clause of the covenant is elemental. It can never be lost in future negotiations over the bargain of future covenants as it goes to the heart of what it means to serve in Her Majesty's Armed Forces. To serve with honour is to be prepared to sacrifice all. In line with the findings of chapter six and discussed in depth therein, the summary of policy recommendations for this research is as follows:

- reconciliation of military and policy versions of the covenant into one document,
- engagement with policy advisors to re-define the definition of duty in AFC 2011,
- elevation of the status of veterans within society as ex-military not civilian citizens,
- indemnity of the clauses ‘special consideration’ and ‘removal of disadvantage,’
- extension of the clause ‘special consideration’ in all cases not case by case,
- a separate dedicated minister of state for veterans and forces families,
- a separate ministry of state separate to the MoD with its own ring-fenced budget,
- a co-sponsored MoD & Education Dept military-covenant outreach programme,
- further Defence Academy research into civilian attitudes about the military-covenant,
- development of the New Military-Covenant and AFC 2011 for compatibility.

M.R. Apr 2015
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